A STYLISTICS OF DRAMA:
STOPPARD'S TRAVESTIES,
WITH PARTICULAR REFERENCE TO PARODY

by

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DECLARATION

This thesis is the work of the undersigned, and has been composed by himself.
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To all who have helped me through all my years in the bonnie capital of Scotland, through thick and thin, in weal and woe, amidst rain, sleet, snow or (occasionally) sunshine, to all who have had to put up with my antic bursts of elation or sombre clouds of dejection, who have lifted my eyes to glories aloft or given me the metaphorical kick up my derrière, I would like to register my heartfelt gratitude: to mum and dad for their faith in me and for their regular weekly letters; to my late brother Stephen for insights from Australia; to Mrs Elizabeth Black, my principal supervisor, for her guidance; to Mr W. Keith Mitchell, my second supervisor and Dr Alan Davies, head of department, together with the other members of staff and students in the department for their cheery smiles; to Edinburgh University for granting me the Postgraduate Studentship for two years; to friends at Pollock Halls who had cups and cups of tea (Typhoo, Darjeeling, Assam, English Breakfast, Earl Grey, Ceylon, &c. - the list is endless) with me; to friends at Bellevue Chapel, in particular the Fairfields, to whose home I am no stranger now, and of whose Sunday dinners can I not say to have been deprived the delectation; and to God for continued grace.
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This thesis seeks to investigate how stylistic methods may be applied to drama texts, and focuses its attention on Stoppard’s Travesties, which, by its parodic nature, compels an investigation of literary parody as an intertextual mode. The author first seeks to place stylistics within a historical and procedural framework and considers ideological and procedural impasses that have bedevilled stylistic analyses, such as the preoccupation with objectivity or ‘scientificity’, and concludes that an eclectic approach is the best safeguard against this.

Drama texts, like all literary texts, are pulled in two directions - one that seeks to identify them with ‘ordinary’ discourse, and one that seeks to emphasise their ‘literariness’ or dramaticality. Comparison is therefore made between everyday conversation and drama dialogue (whether that tends towards naturalism or stylisation), before the notion of the layeredness or embeddedness of dramatic discourse is focused on as its hallmark. This would imply several senders and receivers in the discourse situation of drama.

That drama texts can be linked to ordinary discourse is borne out by the fact that pragmatic principles can also be applied to them (hence, Roger Sell’s ‘pragmatic stylistics’). Grice’s Cooperative Principle and Leech’s Politeness Principle (together with the concept of face) have been applied to drama texts, so that implicatures can be generated. Pragmatic principles, though primarily considered in relation to intradiegetic (inter-character) discourse is also applicable to extradiegetic (author-audience) discourse.

Another way in which drama texts tend towards ‘literariness’ is their situatedness within a historical tradition, and parody makes this to be the case very ostensibly. Parody is considered in relation to the notion of intertextuality, and compared with other intertextual modes. Several features closely associated with parody have also been isolated: defamiliarisation, metafiction, the open text and humour. The author thence proceeds to detailed analyses of passages from Travesties in the light of what has been discussed in the earlier chapters of the thesis.
Whither Stylistics?
The use of the word 'stylistics' has evolved in the short period of its history, and its concerns are still the subject of much debate. It would thus seem appropriate to state from the outset what one means when one talks about stylistics. From this point of view, it is the purpose of this chapter to clear the ground for later chapters.

An early instance of its use was in Charles Bally's *Traité de Stylistique Française* (1909). Interestingly enough, Bally deliberately avoids talking about literary language but sets stylistics the task of analysing what is termed non-conceptual thought. For him, thought is either conceptual or non-conceptual, the former being determined by 'objective, conventionally determined concepts' (and would thus include clichés or fixed collocations) and the latter by 'subjective but private feelings, attitudes, motives, perspectives, etc.' Thus conventional thought is set against original conception, social acceptance against personal expression, and the objective against the subjective. The challenge of stylistics, for Bally, was to examine the 'affective' values of language which reflects conceptual, personal and subjective thought. There is constantly a tension between individual thought and what language allows of that thought to be encoded. (And indeed,
this idea is central to structuralism, whose proponents would declare that there is nothing new under the sun; one is free only to play around with the structures that are already in existence.)

An important impetus to stylistics was the rise of Formalism in Russia and New Criticism in America. There was increased scepticism at talk about the 'influences' on a writer or detailed references to biographical details. There was felt to be a need for more methodological rigour - more objectivity, perhaps even 'scientificity'. With Wimsatt and Beardsley's essays, 'The Intentional Fallacy' and 'The Affective Fallacy' (1946), the ground for 'close readings' or explication de texte or practical criticism (after I. A. Richards's Practical Criticism, 1929) had been established. With the rise of the discipline of linguistics, one did not have to look too far for a sufficiently rigorous methodology and a set of terminology that could be used in analysing passages of literary texts. In this way, the desire for precision, rigour and objectivity could be satisfied.

By virtue of its interdisciplinary status, (literary) stylistics has to keep abreast of developments in both linguistics and literary criticism, specifically literary theory. There has unfortunately been the tendency on the part of stylisticians to leave aside literary theory altogether, so that whilst Formalist theories have been challenged by Structuralist, Post-structuralist, Affective (or Reader-Response) and Feminist theories, much of the work
done in stylistics is still based on Formalist premisses. This has undoubtedly created problems, and there have been strictures on stylistics as a blinkered enterprise, notably those by Stanley Fish, an avowed proponent of 'affective' stylistics - though 'affective' is used in a slightly different sense from that used by Bally: 'affective' on the part of the receiver for Fish, and 'affective' on the part of the sender of the message for Bally. The main problem, for Fish, of a formalist stylistics is not only that it is often dehumanising (in the sense that the human element in a text is deleted) but also that the link between description (which a formalist stylistics can perform with top marks) and signification is arbitrary, and one should come to terms with this problem of objectivity, rigour and interpretation before proceeding further.

E. D. Hirsch in The Aim of Interpretation deals with this problem in a chapter entitled 'Style and Synonymity'. He takes as a basic assumption of stylistics the postulate that 'given an identical context, a difference in linguistic form compels a difference in meaning'. In other words, the basic premiss for stylistics is a monistic view of language - where a different expression points to a different meaning or content. The task of stylistics then would be to point out features of linguistic form and then to proceed from the descriptive stage to the interpretive stage. However, Hirsch urges the case for the possibility of synonymy, the implication of which would be that it would be fallacious to argue for a one-to-one mapping from stylistic features to
meaning. A case in point would be the apparently interchangeable words synonymy and synonymity. He leaves the reader puzzling over the difference between the two words (presuming, of course, that the reader has noticed it), before revealing with the deftness of a conjurer that there was indeed no semantic significance in the choice of either word. Synonymity was used in the main title and the titles of the sub-sections in the chapter because 'the word synonymy ... would convey [his] meaning more clearly because of its more obvious association with the familiar word synonym'. This smacks of trickery unworthy of a critic and the reader cannot be blamed for a certain amount of irritation at a critic trying to score points for himself. This example would perhaps be best discounted. The other example that Hirsch uses is bachelors v. unmarried men. Taken in isolation, the former would sound informal whilst the latter impersonal and legalistic. The keynote for Hirsch is isolation. If it were possible to present the meanings of both phrases (together with all their connotations) in the form of a Venn diagram, there would be an area of overlap, thus:

![Venn diagram](image-url)

His counter example is a charter for a Bachelors' Club (or Club for Unmarried Men), where there would be absolutely no difference if either phrase was used instead of the other.
With this, he comes to the conclusion that perfect synonymy (or synonymity) is possible. And if synonymity is a real possibility then analysis of style (i.e., style as choice between several alternatives) is gratuitous because it cannot point to meaning in any definite way for it is immaterial which 'surface structure' is chosen: meaning is not affected at all. One objection that could be put forward by literary stylisticians is that the example was from what could be construed as a semi-legal document, and that in the language of the law several rules are operative which would not be in more non-specialised usages. (But again, some stylisticians, e.g., Roger Fowler - who would much rather be called a linguistic critic anyway - would object to a dichotomy between literary and non-literary language.)

The conclusion that Hirsch finally comes to is that stylistics 'cannot be a reliable method of confirming an interpretation, but neither can any other method perform those feats'. Any attempt at a systematic methodology towards interpretation is doomed from the start! Underlying Hirsch's statement is the assumption that stylistics can only describe 'objective' facts in a literary text and that this is unproblematic.

Objection also comes from Talbot Taylor who is dissatisfied with 'the inability of stylistics to acquire academic respectability (or funding) [which] stems directly from the criterial dilemma posed by the dominant bi-planar model'. The problem again is the connexion between what he calls stylistic content (by which he means the observable
linguistic features of a text) and the 'message' (or, if one likes, the 'meaning') of a text. A jump is required from the first plane to the next, and the jump may be by means of the trampoline of intuition (as has been called for by Bally and others) - which would require the language-user to practise introspection - or by means of 'discoveries' made in related disciplines such as psychology or even computer systems. Thus it can be said that the theorising ('introspective', 'subjective') tendency is set against the empirical ('objective') tradition prevalent in the physical sciences. This is not the place to expatiate on the merits of either method, but suffice it to say that both are used in linguistics - for instance, the tradition of discourse analysis draws heavily upon intuition whilst that of conversational analysis upon empirical methods.

Pearce's thesis 'Chains choice: the linguistic analysis of novels and A Portrait of the Artist as a Young Man' finds the procedure adopted by Anne Cluysenaar unacceptable. There is once again the rehearsal of the monist and dualist views with regard to the form-content dichotomy. But it is mainly Cluysenaar whom he has found as his scapegoat. For instance, in talking about the following short poem,

Swiftly the years beyond recall.
Solemn the stillness of this morning spring.

Cluysenaar comments that
what we have is a skilful use of syntax to mime the meaning. Line 1 is 'incomplete' in a sense not applicable to line 2. The adverb swiftly leads us to expect a verb, a verb which could still appear after beyond recall (read aloud, the intonation should preserve this possibility). The second line therefore breaks upon line 1 as if line 1 were short of time, and in its completeness it represents time stilled instead of time snatched away. Moreover, the elliptical form, syntactical equivalent of an initial 'how', provides intensity and immediacy of effect, supporting the contrast of the years to this ... morning (with its demonstrative).

Pearce sees four kinds of statements made by Cluysenaar. Firstly, there are manifest judgements ('skilful use of syntax'). Secondly, there are assertions which equate formal features to some aspect of meaning in a broad sense ('the incompleteness of the first line represents time snatched away'). Thirdly, there are propositions of the effect of the poem on the reader (e.g., 'the elliptical form provides intensity and immediacy'). And finally, there are more general statements about the syntax ('line 1 is "incomplete"', 'the verb could appear in an elliptical position', &c.).

For Pearce, statements of the first kind are unsatisfactory because these constitute evaluations by Cluysenaar, whose verity or falsehood are largely unprovable. For instance, it is not possible to give a clear-cut list of skilful uses of syntax and another one of unskilful ones. One could reasonably extrapolate from this that when Cluysenaar states later of a D. H. Lawrence poem that deviation and appropriateness interact in 'a particularly charming way' (p. 69), Pearce would not find that statement acceptable either. He thus evinces the stylistic desire for
objectivity or 'scientificity' mentioned above. It is not without grounds that there has been a great deal of dissatisfaction with the methods of some of the traditional literary critics - notably F. R. Leavis, and stylistics is, in part, a reaction against this. Indeed, Trevor Eaton objects to some of the statements made by Leavis because he does not indicate the modality of his own assertions (p. 10), where 'modality' is used in the sense employed by Halliday and other systemic grammarians. He thus uses words like 'us' and 'we' (as, for instance, in 'Conrad is incomparably closer to us to-day than Hardy and Meredith are') and Eaton understandably finds this practice professionally repugnant and comments that

By this apparently innocent pronoun he places his student in a dilemma: he either agrees with the assertion, in which case the master wins his point, or he disagrees and is placed on the defensive, for Leavis's tone suggests that non-acceptance entails insensitivity. (p. 10)

It is obviously the case that anyone involved with stylistics would want to distance himself from the methods of Leavis. What is interesting, however, is the fact that for Eaton, Leavis's transgression was not so much that he made modalised statements but that he made them whilst purporting to be making objective (or 'scientific') statements - which, in Eaton's definition, means 'falsifiable'. However objectionable the Leavisite position may be (and this position may
be traced back to Arnold), to over-react and immediately champion the cause of objectivity and text-immanence is not the best solution.

Going back to Pearce, one could without much difficulty equate Eaton’s modality with his evaluative or judgemental statements. The question that is worth asking is whether Cluysenaar has ever claimed that her stylistic analyses were free from modality or evaluative statements. In fact, in her preface she talks about the use of evaluation in no uncertain terms.

I have avoided the tedium, and jettisoned the rigour, of pointing out every junction at which critical statements switch from (various levels of) description to evidence, nor have I always overtly 'retrieved' my critical remarks by showing how they can be related to linguistic evidence. (p. 10)

Stylistics is presented here as an extension of practical criticism, enabling the critic to sensitise his grasp of detail together with his grasp of structured wholes. (p. 10)

It is obvious then that Cluysenaar makes no apologies for her use of evaluative statements. Eaton in the same article talks of Leavis confusing the role of the critic with that of the academic, the former having the warrant to make impressionistic and general comments and the latter being expected to be concerned with a more rigorous, and an altogether more sinewy and intellectual pursuit. Whilst such a division might appear theoretically unimpeachable, and even desirable, it is not always that clear-cut in practice. It has to be granted that the concern of an academic must in the main be rigorous and substantiable, but one cannot put
him in a straitjacket and insist that only objective, scientific (and falsifiable) statements are worthy of the mouth or the hand of an academic. Thus, rather than insist on the dichotomy of the critic and the academic, one could think of both having a certain amount, or perhaps even a substantial amount of, common ground (and, if one can think of a Venn diagram again, having an intersecting area of common interest). Since the literary critic and the academic in the field of literature are, in the main, writing about the same thing, though each from a slightly different perspective, it would be helpful if each was cognisant of the other’s concerns. Furthermore, one has to be wary of the pursuit of objectivity for its own sake, remembering that it might not be appropriate for all spheres of knowledge. One could also take the common-sense view put forward by Chapman:

... being ... concerned with a subject deeply rooted in human life, it [literary criticism as an academic pursuit] cannot move too far away from the common concerns of the people.\textsuperscript{13}

It would thus seem that at least some of Pearce’s indignation is misplaced. The desire for rigour is not necessarily consonant with the desire for objectivity.

Pearce also talks of Cluysenaar making statements which assume a parallel between ‘the syntactic form and the meaning of the poem’ (p. 20). The dissatisfaction with the so-called mimetic fallacy has also been seen earlier in Hirsch and Taylor. The problem is that if one is not allowed to make the jump from descriptive statements to more
critical ones, much of what would remain in stylistics would be of a taxonomic nature (and it is perhaps the fear of this that has made many of those involved in literature view linguistics and stylistics in an antipathetic light). Indeed, whilst reviewing a recent book on stylistics, Alan Durant posits two questions, with regard to the study of inferential interpretation, which are in need of further attention.

How are inferences triggered by particular linguistic forms (an established issue in pragmatics)? How are socially originated assumptions stored and ranked in memory, and then selected in acts of interpretation (the cognitive issue for a theory of ideology)?

The second question assumes that the use of pure linguistics (as opposed to, say, sociolinguistics) in coming to terms with literary texts does not provide the most interesting results. The first question, of course, highlights the precarious nature of the 'jump' from form to meaning. There have been some rather crude attempts at defining the link between linguistic form and interpretation. Herrnstein-Smith has, for instance, the 'formula: \( S(R)X \rightarrow X \)', which she interprets as follows.

something in a literary work that is ... manifest or 'surface', \( S \), bears some relation, \( R \), to something else that is ... obscure ... or 'deep', \( X \); therefore, by analyzing \( S \), one may discover \( X \).
One notices at once the Chomskyan model of language to which she alludes. The complexities that bear on interpretation of literary works are seemingly swept conveniently away with the wave of a hand. Timothy Austin\textsuperscript{16} envisages a bipartite stylistics, which he sets forth diagrammatically as follows.

\begin{center}
\begin{tikzcd}
\text{hypothesised} \\
\text{linguistic analysis} & \text{aesthetic form} \\
\text{relation}
\end{tikzcd}
\end{center}

Austin’s use of the phrase ‘aesthetic form’ is not always clear; at one point, he talks of such notions as ‘pattern’ and ‘symmetry’, and at another, he talks about ‘readings’ of a particular work. The model, however, does seem to be a workable one if one can think of ‘aesthetic form’ as encompassing features of the text which are stylistically or critically significant. More importantly perhaps is the sense that ‘pure’ linguistics is insufficient for describing and interpreting a literary text.

Austin’s bipartite stylistics is not of course the only way of looking at stylistics, but many who claim to be working in stylistic criticism work under this rather rough and ready model. Pearce’s criticism of Cluysenaar is that some of the ‘modalised’ or impressionistic statements made by her are unwarranted; in other words, there are not sufficient grounds given for the leap from the first box to the second. A pragmaticist, however, might want to challenge this view and claim that linguistic analysis embraces, among other things, aesthetic sense,\textsuperscript{17} whereby one would take a broader view of linguistics which encompasses all questions
of context. It does seem, however, that the model shown in the diagram can be a workable one although the distinction between them is, admittedly, arbitrary, and so for practical purposes should be retained. This has been done in this particular study where a consideration of the pragmatics of communication and pragmatic principles (ostensibly, a more 'linguistic' consideration) is put adjacent to a consideration of intertextuality and parody (ostensibly, a more 'literary' consideration). The fact of the matter is that both, in the final analysis, are a matter of convention. The only distinction between them is that the former convention is more accessible to the masses, as it were, and therefore rests on less tenuous ground.

In the early days of stylistics, when emphasis was very much on objectivity, a great deal of emphasis was given to linguistic analysis (where linguistics is taken in the narrower sense of phonology, syntax and semantics). This of course survives as 'linguistic stylistics', as opposed to 'literary stylistics', where the focus is avowedly narrow and non-linguistic matters are religiously shunned. When Widdowson’s analysis of Frost’s ‘Stopping by Woods on a Snowy Evening’ first appeared\textsuperscript{18} there were objections to it on account of his purported failure to deal with what was thought to be central to the poem:

When the reader thinks twice about what the last line means ['And miles to go before I sleep'], he realises there must be a latent meaning beneath the manifest one. This reveals itself as a metaphor - 'a long way to go before I die'. On re-reading, one
now registers the attractive woods as the Forest of Death, and additional meaning attaches to every line.  

To this, Widdowson responds by saying that there is not sufficient linguistic justification for interpreting the poem as a death wish, but nevertheless concedes that that is a possible interpretation of it. 'My own feeling is that this', that is, sleep meaning death, and the woods being the Forest of Death, 'is altogether too weighty a construction to place on this single repetition, and I see no warrant in the actual text for [this] interpretation'.

But a word in passing first. It can be noticed that in the last stanza particularly there is the feeling of unspecificity.

The woods are lovely, dark, and deep,
But I have promises to keep,
And miles to go before I sleep,
And miles to go before I sleep.

One may account for this by the fact that, in semantic parlance, promise is a three-place predicate, i.e., (1) someone promises (2) someone (else) (3) to do something. Here, there is the persona announcing that he has made promises, but one is justified in asking 'Promises to do what?', and 'Promises to whom?' One can also take note of the unspecificity of miles. It is not 47.3 miles or ten thousand miles or even many miles, but merely miles. It can be said that, generally, vague referentiality encourages a symbolic or metaphor-
ical reading, so that this lends a certain amount of credence to the Death Wish reading of the poem. (This provides a rather neat example of the kind of codes available for the leap from linguistic description to meaning.)

Going back to the issue of a bipartite stylistics, one can see then that Widdowson was unwilling to move very much beyond linguistic form to aesthetic sense. One can accuse Widdowson of not taking 'Stopping by Woods' qua poem in its fullest sense because, as has been suggested by James P. Thorne,²⁰ (and pace Roger Fowler) suggestiveness and ambiguity are features which are valued in poetry and in most literary works in general.

Perhaps yet another example can be taken, this time Deirdre Burton's stylistic analysis of Pinter's The Dumb Waiter,²¹ a study very much in the tradition of linguistic stylistics. Once again, the study is undertaken with much verve. As the analysis is that of a play, a rather different approach from that of Widdowson had to be taken. As this at present almost untouched area of the stylistic analysis of drama is at its inchoative stage, new findings in the area of conversational analysis had to be used. Thus, in as much as Widdowson made use of concepts of grammar and semantics in his analysis of Frost, Burton had to fall back on pragmatics for her study of Pinter. For example, there is a great reliance on studies based on differing social (and other) relations between participants. So the conversations between Gus and Ben in The Dumb Waiter are said to be unbalanced when one examines who it is who makes
the initiations, or asks the questions, or makes requests for speaker’s rights and permission to speak, or volunteers information. The talk in The Dumb Waiter has been said to be like children-adult talk and has been compared to M. C. Ward’s findings in Them Children: A Study in Language Learning. Also, the conversations in the play are said to betray features of teacher-pupil talk as outlined, for instance, by Sinclair and Coulthard. To change the metaphor slightly, one can say that in the play, there is certainly an imbalance of power in the sense that Ben seems to have the upper hand most of the time (though the times when he seems to lose control are significant, and, to use a word that has been bandied about for a while in stylistics, are foregrounded). Whilst the move towards an analysis which takes into account recent developments in pragmatics is, to say the least, commendable, the stricture on Widdowson can also be levelled against Burton. The unequal relationship between Ben and Gus is undisputedly there, but Burton seems to have left aside what would be felt as being ‘central’ (i.e., the ‘theme’ in traditional parlance) of The Dumb Waiter. Whilst recourse could be made to semantics for the vagueness or unspecificity of ‘On Stopping by Woods on a Snowy Evening’, one would have to rely on studies in narratology for the sense of incompleteness about The Dumb Waiter. There are a number of unanswered questions in the play which will remain unanswered until the end of time—for instance, who slipped the envelope containing the matchsticks under the door?, or who is working the dumb
waiter? On the other hand, one must come to terms with the fact that it is the unspecificity in the play which makes it possible to make further generalisations about it in the same way that one can generalise from 'On Stopping by Woods'. After all, it must be said that most readers would be better able to relate to, and therefore appreciate, a poem on the Death Wish than one merely on someone stopping by woods on a snowy evening. (And furthermore, there is a tradition of poetry on this theme, as in, for instance, Keats's 'Ode to a Nightingale'.) Consequently, it would also be more helpful to think of The Dumb Waiter not merely as being about two hitmen, but rather as expressive of human beings trapped in an enclosed space and any inroads made by the outside world strikes terror in their hearts. One could possibly even extend this and give the play a political or spiritual interpretation if one desires. Rigour in analysis is a fine thing, but rigour which disregards messier data simply because they are messier - as one suspects to be the case here - leaves very much to be desired.

Practitioners of stylistics and users of linguistic techniques in analysing literary texts should not distance themselves from, say, those who teach English literature in secondary schools. There have been charges that what has been done is either 'a reduction of literature to a clumsy expression of its mechanics (a headcount of oddities, in Carter's experiment on collocation)' or 'the dressing-up of a glaringly obvious in the kind of glum gobbledygook which only the most humourlessly insensitive could take serious-
In their enthusiasm to transfer linguistic methods to literary criticism, many have succeeded only in isolating stylistics from mainstream literary studies. The question is whether the effort put into acquiring a new set of terminology is really worth it.

The feeling of being out of one's depth is also not helped by much of the work done in poetics or the science of literature because the assumption of the autonomy of a text only dehumanises a text. Poetics takes on board many of the assumptions of the Jakobsonian school of linguistics. There is much more to a literary text than its 'literariness' and Jakobsonian linguistics is very often not cognisant of a literary text's social and historical situatedness. And so it is that very often when a linguistic analysis of a literary text stubbornly ignores what would seem to be staring one in the face, one feels frustrated and cheated. The point being made here is that 'scientific' rigour can too often be seen as an end in itself, so that the human element in literature is played down; given the choice of either methodological rigour or a fuller-orbed perspective on the text in question, the present author would opt for the latter. Indeed, Deirdre Burton's second section of her Dialogue and Discourse has already been criticised. Michael Toolan declares the rigour in the second section should be spurned as 'deathly' because categorising moves oversimplifies the situation, and therefore can even misrepresent the text. The legitimacy of linguistic stylistics seems to have been questioned.
The desire for rigour and objectivity is based on the assumption that literature and ultimately language itself (on which literature is dependent as the channel) can be analysed in the same way as a natural phenomenon—such as light or sound or gravity—can, so that one can discover its ‘rules’ or ‘laws’. This is avowedly not the case, so that the distinction between objectivity and subjectivity is really out of place here, as has been pointed out by Dan Shen:

The distinction ['objectivity' and 'subjectivity'] ... does not work very pertinently to a phenomenon such as language. By language, one does not mean a sequence of sounds (or letters) in their own right but a conventionalised system of sounds or sound symbols used for communication.26

The point then is that rigour and objectivity if pursued as a goal in stylistics is bound to lead to infelicities, because the phenomenon of language is itself not based on rules (in the strict sense) but on convention, and is, therefore, socially determined. There are ‘rules’ only in so far as the term is used analogously with the ‘rules’ in physical or natural phenomena, and in so far as the ‘rules’ are fairly stable within specified social and historical (and perhaps even psychological) contexts. Therefore, Halliday’s description of language as a ‘social semiotic’ is apt because semiotics highlights the arbitrariness of the sign system. (And if one calls semiotics a science, one has to make the proviso that science is not used in the same sense as the physical sciences.) Stylistics then has to be based on convention—both linguistic and literary, and where stylistics differs from conventional literary
criticism is that these conventions (arbitrary though they might be) are made explicit, as is the case in the semantic feature of vagueness or incompleteness pointed out in Frost’s ‘Stopping by Woods’. The rule that semantic incompleteness encourages a symbolic reading is not a natural one but a conventional one.

Meanwhile, the link between Austin’s linguistic analysis and aesthetic form remains vague. Can the hypothesised relation have something to do, for instance, with Jonathan Culler’s ‘literary competence’? It can be said that the generalising principle briefly touched on above is part of a literary convention that has to be acquired. And if one is more in sympathy with the school of affective stylistics à la Stanley Fish, one could say that this is a convention brought to bear upon the text by readers (or, for Fish, the ‘interpretive community’) trained to see literature as being about ‘the human condition’. A stylistics which emphasises reader response is not without its problems either. The question of who the reader is is still very much a matter of dispute. Is he the ‘ideal’ reader, or the ‘super’ reader or the ‘informed’ reader or the ‘competent’ reader? The problem of the link between form and content is again evident because there are clearly ‘informed’ readers within the same interpretive community who respond differently to the same text, so that Fish’s ‘interpretive community’ is fine as a theoretical construct but is however highly impracticable and difficult to pin down.
it is apparent that there may be no simple relation between the linguistic stimulus and our response to it, and ... it is thus futile to attempt to account for response merely by isolating certain linguistic configurations ... no such simple relation exists.27

That is Kintgen's conclusion after pointing out, among other things, some of the inadequacies of Fish’s readings.

Perhaps it would not be out of place to quote Durant again. He talks of the need for incorporating both ‘social’ and ‘cognitive’ aspects in a model of reading. Ultimately, what counts as an acceptable interpretation is its tacit approval by (a sufficient number in) the interpretive community, if one can borrow Fish’s phrase; the aesthetic sense is thus conventional, and social in origin. Fowler himself was at pains to suggest that educational and cultural milieus were at work to produce varying responses amongst different readers.

A dramatic example, for me, was when I served as a GCE A-level examiner in English both for students [pupils] educated in British schools and for candidates from Malaysia and the Caribbean. Systematically different kinds of answers were furnished by different groups of candidates, varying no doubt in accordance with differences in their educational and cultural milieus.28

He also quarrels with Chomsky's 'linguistic competence' and Culler's 'literary competence' and stresses the need for non-linguistic knowledge - 'pragmatic' or 'encyclopaedic' knowledge (p. 169). It would seem then that for Fowler, pragmatics is to be distinguished from linguistics, and thus if this was to be included in Austin’s model, the diagrammatic representation would take the following form.
Aesthetic form therefore interacts not only with linguistic form but also with a socially situated pragmatic context from which it ultimately derives its sanction. The fact that literary criticism takes place in an academic context further underlines its institutional domain. Whilst Fowler has repeatedly stressed the need to play down the dichotomy between a literary text and a non-literary text, it is still felt helpful to retain the box 'aesthetic form' above. There is perhaps the case for thinking of aesthetic form as being another aspect of pragmatics (because it is part of the encyclopaedic knowledge brought to bear on literary works), but talk of aesthetic form is still meaningful at this stage especially when referring to genres and reading conventions specific to literature. (Once again, a case in point is the generalising principle which was alluded to in the discussion above on *The Dumb Waiter* and 'Stopping by Woods'.)

Coming back to the question raised earlier about the link between linguistic form and meaning (via pragmatic knowledge and/or aesthetic form), one can say that the link can be provided by social semiotics (and also - dare one add - literary semiotics). And because it is by way of social semiotics that one reaches a particular reading of a work, this meaning is also historical.
Perhaps there could be a digression here on the question of the validity of a particular reading. Critics in the deconstructionist and reader-response school of thought have been quick to stress the fluidity of meaning. Hirsch brings in the distinction between interpretation and significance\textsuperscript{29} (though it must be said that he has since reneged on this position slightly). The former is based on the author's intention and it is his contention that it is the author's intention that starts one off along the road of interpretation, though one might want to proceed to expatiate upon the significance of a particular work. Ultimately, one would not like to say that anything goes as far as interpretation is concerned, especially if one is dealing with a pedagogical situation. Most would wince if they were told that the irregular lines of Matthew Arnold's 'Dover Beach' represented the fluctuating force of the waves upon the beach.\textsuperscript{30} Hirsch's objection to such an interpretation would be that this was not part of Arnold's intention, and if pressed he would probably say that there was no such convention or semiotic principle in operation at that time. One could then perhaps cite George Herbert's butterfly-shaped poem 'Easter Wings' and other seventeenth-century metaphysical poets working in the tradition of 'concrete poetry', or give some examples from e. e. cummings, to which an objector would reply that there is a greater probability for lines of poetry to be irregular in length than for poems to be in the shape of butterflies, and it is thus highly likely that the lines of 'Dover Beach' were of irregular
lengths by coincidence, and this would be a triumph for Pearce for the case for 'mimetic fallacy'.

The point made by Fowler about the role of cultural and educational milieux in helping determining a particular slant in a person's reading of a text raises important questions. Shen has been anxious to point out the conventionality of linguistic and literary 'rules'; such 'rules' are even more problematic when it comes to literature: 'there are in the institution of literature, no definite, specific conventional ways of converting linguistic sequences into literary structures and meaning'. If everything was as vague and nebulous as that, it would seem that talk about the 'rightness' or 'wrongness' of a particular reading is beside the point, but this has proved not to be the case, because the above reading of 'Dover Beach' can be generally said to be unacceptable and should remain unacceptable. But if one can imagine a reader coming from a particular culture where such a convention is very well established, can one still say that such a reading is unacceptable? It is the opinion of the present writer that it must still be thought of as an inappropriate reading (thereby laying himself open to the charge of being an imperialist!), because 'Dover Beach' is historically and culturally situated so that this would not have been part of the author's intention. This would come under Hirsch's 'interpretation' rather than his 'significance'.

Indeed, even Fish, for all the linguistic games that he plays with his students, emerges as a strong supporter of the importance of the author's intentions in his later writings. It is only when texts are presented ahistorically and acontextually that one can get multitudinous readings. He surmises the case of discovering of 'new evidence (a letter, a lost manuscript, a contemporary response)' pointing to the possibility that Jane Austen's 'intentions have been misconstrued by generations of critics' and that she intended an unironic Mr Collins against whom there were no jokes. This is very much in keeping with the tradition in pragmatics which focuses on 'a goal-oriented situation' in other words, a situation in which the producer of the message is not only trying to do something (illocution) but is also trying to achieve something, having a particular goal in mind (perlocution).

The position taken here then is that there is a common core of meaning which is fairly stable (as opposed to the indeterminacy of some schools of thought in literary theory), and it is with this that one must work in coming to a reading of a text. This is not to say that there are no dissenting voices amongst stylisticians about the aims of stylistics. Notably, Culler looks at things from the other end and envisions a semiotics which does not offer new readings but explains the conditions of (acceptable!) old readings, for
The historical perspective enables one to recognise the transience of any interpretation, which will always be succeeded by other interpretations, and to take as object of reflection the series of interpretive acts by which traditions are constituted and meaning produced.35

So far then, some of the problems in stylistics have been outlined: the charge of arbitrariness between description and interpretation or between form and meaning; the status of impressionistic or 'unfalsifiable' statements in stylistics; the problem of relevance - linguistically significant features are not always stylistically significant ones as well; the problem of the lack of an attempt at a symbiosis between linguistics and literary theory; and the need (particularly if a pedagogical situation is envisaged) to know what would count as an acceptable reading and what would not. There are not likely to be definitive solutions to all the problems in stylistics, but recent developments have cleared the way towards approaches with more finely honed tools. In a sense, the tension between description and interpretation has eased as descriptive methods in linguistics have taken on board features of context so that one cannot have 'pure' description as such because descriptive acts are already interpretive in nature. The desire for objectivity and 'scientificity' has waned somewhat, but rigour is still seen as the colours nailed to the mast of stylistics. This is not a bad thing in itself provided it is not taken to extremes. Given the limited tonnage of the vessel, some rigour might have to be jettisoned in
stylistics in favour of 'messier' social semiotics, where this can be taken to include language, pragmatics and even aesthetics.

Looking at the legion of approaches in and perspectives on stylistics, one might just find the task too daunting on methodological and theoretical grounds. One might perhaps want to wait for the rather disorderly state of many linguistic and pragmatic theories (some of which are only in a seminal state) to put their own houses in order before one ventures to employ them on literary texts. After all a finer tool makes for finer workmanship. The fact of the matter is that linguistics is not a science in the same way that physics or chemistry are sciences. Much can be said for an empirical approach to linguistics that can be paralleled to that in the pure or physical sciences. Nevertheless a more rationalist or cognitive approach should not be entirely ruled out either. In so far as linguistics is a science, it is a human science. As such, a blanket approach which would merely view things in a monochromatic light should be regarded with some suspicion. The fact of the matter is that insightful inroads into literary texts have been made by means of stylistics, even given the present state of the art.

In the introduction to an anthology on stylistics, Ching et al. enlarge upon the rationalistic and behaviouristic predisposition of schools within the transformational linguistics tradition. Their conclusion is that
these alternatives do not have to be considered as mutually exclusive. The reason they do not ... is that they have differing emphases, if not altogether differing goals. The student who wishes to investigate the use of linguistics in literature is therefore best advised to consider these competing models as 'choices' which may be made on the basis of what he wants his own emphasis to be.\textsuperscript{36}

The word which is perhaps at the tip of the tongue of many reading this would be 'eclecticism', and it is certainly an eclectic approach that Ching \textit{et al.} argue for. One can borrow the philosophical concept of \textit{antinomy} much used in theology where there is 'the mutual contradiction of two principles or correctly drawn inferences, each supported by reason'.\textsuperscript{37} It is not implied that different approaches will yield different readings, but rather that different approaches will predispose one to particular lines of thought and argument, and therefore, like an antinomian concept, one's reading of a text is affected by the approach taken. It would be reasonable then to infer that an eclectic approach is more likely to give a more balanced reading. Where tools have developed in different ways, it is up to the stylistician to choose the ones which are best suited to his task.

It would seem appropriate to try to fit the present study within the wider framework outlined here. As has been mentioned, the stylistic analysis of drama is really in its fledgling stage at the moment, and part of the reason why stylisticians have shied away from drama is not only its more complicated discourse situation (in the sense that it would involve both micro-analysis - inter-character
discourse - and macro-analysis - author-audience discourse) but also its size; even a short ten-minute play would be at least several pages long. Because of the propensity in stylistics for micro-analysis, normally short texts (typically poems) have been singled out for analysis. And it could be because of this that the charge of microscopism has been levelled against stylistics. In a sense, drama broadens out the analysis to a more general level, and thus it is in this light that it is felt that there should be questions asked about the wider area of parody. This would presumably incur the wrath of the pro-scientificity faction in the sense that many of the claims would be 'unfalsifiable', and the author of this study would be in danger of venturing beyond the pale of stylistics. Neither should stylistics be seen as the only legitimate approach to literature. Whilst the possibility of this danger is not being denied at all, the position taken here is that 'scientificity' is not viewed as the highest good. An analogous situation would be the Death Wish interpretation of 'Stopping by Woods' where the deliberate avoidance of such a reading would be, in a sense, misrepresenting the poem, particularly as the Death Wish theme has been well established in the English literary tradition. It is all too easy to use a text only to illustrate linguistic or sociolinguistic points, and this would not be doing justice to the text in question. It is not denied, however, that 'the English literary tradition' is hard to pin down - and one might even want to ask whether there is indeed such a thing as a unified 'English literary
tradition’ - but be that as it may, the near-consensus Death Wish reading (making it probable that such was the author’s intention) makes it necessary that this is accounted for, for otherwise, the reader of such a stylistic analysis might feel short-changed.

One might wonder at this point why it is that Stoppard’s Travesties was chosen for analysis, as in many ways it is an untypical play. The fact of the matter is that this remarkable creature the typical play is hard to come by, and most plays are foregrounded in some way or other, to use the Formalist term. Apart from that all literary works have to be situated in some kind of literary context, and parody and other intertextual features force the reader (or audience) to come to terms with context, not only socio-linguistically but also within a literary tradition. In a sense the parodic nature of Travesties emphasises its ‘literariness’, and parody can be said to take one to the end of the spectrum because the text is more self-consciously ‘literary’. There is a need to isolate the distinguishing features of a literary work, and to illustrate that the communicational channel is very often more complex than thought. Analysing Travesties, then, would be a conscious move away from the work of Deirdre Burton, who is only concerned with micro-analysis and the inner discourse situation of the play. Furthermore, intertextuality (within which parody is a technique) works on both the local (micro) and global (macro) level, and as has been emphasised earlier, both are required to keep the text in perspective, so
that the text is read not as mere character-to-character interaction, but as a literary text, with a literary sender. Intertextual references can be made by characters in the inter-character discourse level. At the same time intertextuality and parody alters the complexion of the argument in a text as a whole. Ultimately then, parody and intertextuality dramatise some of the relevant issues in stylistic analysis. Drama which is discoursally and perspectivally unproblematic and straightforward would not merit much examination and analysis, being devoid of artistic sophistication. Travesties, in being parodic and exhibiting features of a montage, complicates both the discourse structure and the perspective of the play. It would seem then that the objection that Travesties is an untypical play can be turned inside out because a play without so-called literary features can hardly be said to exist. It is only that in Travesties, the literariness has been distilled, as it were, and can thus be considered, rather paradoxically, the typical play par excellence (in the same sense that one might want to consider Tristram Shandy the typical novel par excellence). Therefore even as it is necessary to consider the language of plays in terms of phonology, syntax, semantics and discourse, it is imperative that the play’s literary context is not suppressed. Studies in discourse have often had context as their keyword, but in literary works, literary context merit special attention over and above the sociolinguistic and cognitive context emphasised by discourse studies and ‘pragmatic stylistics’.
Discourse studies and 'pragmatic stylistics' provides an accessible entry to what might be considered rather abstruse texts because they are based on sociolinguistic knowledge and concepts which are often retrievable from one's general social interaction, from the point of view of the learner, whereas the next stage of proceeding to the literary context is more obviously textual and intertextual. Stylistics has been on the defensive too long, and taking the bull of discoursal complexity by the horns is a gesture towards a more aggressive breed of stylistics.

Therefore it is in no way being denied that using Travesties as the text for analysis problematises stylistics, and indeed this should be seen in a positive light. On the one hand drama can be aligned to ordinary discourse, as has been done in 'pragmatic stylistics', whether applied to intradiegetic or extradiegetic dramatic discourse. On the other hand, drama can, and must, be aligned to literariness and dramaticality (pace Fowler). The suspicion with which some literary critics have viewed stylistics is understandable because there is the danger of imposing linguistic (and pragmatic) categories to something which is far more complex than envisaged by these categories. The problematisation of stylistics suggests that there are far more things in heaven and earth than area dreamt of by the proponents of linguistic and pragmatic categories. For instance, considerations of dramatic works as macro-speech acts have a tendency to be reductive, belying the complexity of literary and dramatic communication. (Doubtless, one can argue that certain 'pol-
itical' or 'protest' plays are merely denunciatory pieces of the status quo, but Travesties would obviously not fit the bill: hence the choice of it.)

Before proceeding further, it might be useful to contextualise the present study within the framework of discourse studies, and it might be helpful here to reproduce Edmondson's componential characterisation of the various traditions within discourse studies, as compared with grammar.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Field of Study</th>
<th>Delimiting Linguistic Unit</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>grammar [- s][- u]</td>
<td>sentence</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>text linguistics [+ s][- u]</td>
<td>text</td>
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<tr>
<td>pragmatics [- s][+ u]</td>
<td>utterance</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>discourse analysis [+ s][+ u]</td>
<td>discourse</td>
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</tbody>
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[NOTE: s = suprasentential; u = use]

Needless to say, this characterisation oversimplifies the domain of interest within each tradition, and partly serves to justify the discourse analysis tradition. Without proceeding to expatiate on the merits of the individual traditions, one can say that not one has been strictly adhered to in this study, and as far as the present study is concerned, text linguistics, pragmatics and discourse analysis represent different shaped tools in the tool kit labelled discourse studies.
Firstly, A; secondly, minus A:

A Word On Stoppardian Aesthetics

What I was trying [in Travesties] was this. What I'm always trying to say is 'First, A. Secondly, minus A.' What was supposed to be happening was that we have this rather frivolous nonsense going on, and then the Lenin section comes in and says, 'Life is too important. We can't afford the luxury of this artificial frivolity, this nonsense going on in the arts.' Then he says, 'Right. That's what I've got to say,' and he sits down. Then the play stands up and says, 'You thought that was frivolous? You ain't seen nothin' yet.' And you go into the Gallagher and Shean routine. That was the architectural thing I was after.40

One would recognise Formalist overtones in Stoppard's talk of 'architecture' and contrast. The approach taken here in this study is therefore in line with Stoppardian aesthetics which emphasises foregrounding and contrast. The debate on Cecily's lecture in Travesties brings to a head what would be significant in an analysis of a Stoppard play. As noted in Chapter IV, the parodic element in Travesties results in the play acquiring a metafictional or metadramatic quality, and this metafictional quality is brought about by means of the defamiliarisation and foregrounding of the theatrical norm; the canonical communicational discourse structure is broken down by the addition of further 'authors', as it were (which is what occurs in parody). Indeed, it would seem that both comedy (and jokes) and parody are very apt forms or techniques to use in view of the aim of Stoppard. Whereas parody is based on the contrast of the voices of various authors (each thereby foregrounding the other), jokes are based on incongruity on the semantic and pragmatic
level, and one finds an abundance of these in *Travesties*. Studies on jokes have been fairly sporadic, but one study concludes that 'the incongruity just appears to be resolved, because the "resolution" conflicts with valid reasoning made previously. In other words, it is seemingly appropriate but virtually inappropriate.' The mention of appropriateness highlights again the importance of a backgrounded norm against which one has to compare a piece of discourse. Jokes then, like parody, are two-pronged: on the one hand, contrast is seen in the non-fulfilment of expectations (derived from a set of norms), and, on the other hand, it has a logic of its own (so that things are seemingly appropriate). Or, to use another metaphor, Stoppard establishes a different, and almost manic, world of the stage, such as the world of Rosencrantz and Guildenstern when they are 'off-stage' in *Hamlet*, where coins, when tossed, can come up heads a hundred times. Part of the humour of jokes is in the double, incongruous nature, and part of the interest of parody is its dual source. In both, two worlds are forcibly held together in a vice.

It might seem here then that the approach is excessively formalistic and as such a-humanistic. However, the fact that the study will go beyond the text in the analysis will make it much more broad-based. The premiss is that meaning cannot stand on its own or exist in vacuo, but is produced in a system of contrasts, which is indeed a structuralist view.
No book . . . has any meaning of its own, in a vacuum. The meaning of a book is in a larger part a product of its differences from and similarities to other books. If a novel did not bear some resemblance to other novels we should not know how to read it, and if it wasn’t different from all other novels we shouldn’t want to read it.42

Lodge’s words above again emphasise that a text cannot be considered an autonomous artefact because it is actually part of a signifying system. Emphasising defamiliarisation and setting up systems of contrasts and similarities then can be seen as a way into the text. Roger Sales,43 for instance, whilst commenting on Cecily’s lecture at the beginning of Act II, talks of ambushes for the audience; in other words, audience expectation is defeated, and the discourse stands out from the norm that has been established for the play before the interval. Thus, the notion of contrast and foregrounding can be applied for more general, literary questions, as in theatrical style - a ‘frivolous’ Act I and a ‘serious’ Act II - and characterisation - the debunking of the stereotypical idea of a pretty girl not being particularly bright, the ‘dumb blonde’ stereotype, by letting her deliver a boring, intellectual lecture, and thus as far as the east is from the west, so far hath Stoppard removed his Cecily from Wilde’s.

Foregrounding can also be seen in more micro level of course, on the phonological, syntactical, semantic level, and more importantly for dramatic texts, on the level of pragmatic principles.44 This is not without its problems, because it has to be decided what will form the ‘background’ of the text - the norms - and can be seen as ideologically
dangerous because the 'unmarked' is often seen to be the desirable, thereby introducing value judgements, whether good or bad, into a concept where such connotations should be alien. Let it be said once and for all, to forestall any later criticism, that the unmarked is not to be confused with the good and the marked with the bad. But more than that, the norm very often has to be spelt out with recourse only to an intuitive sense of appropriateness. Despite the long tradition of research in English grammar, probably no grammarian would admit that his treatment is complete and exhaustive - not even the 1,779-page *A Comprehensive Grammar of the English Language*! It would seem to be utter futility then to attempt to come up with an exhaustive 'grammar' of discourse and 'rules' of literary criticism. Dan Shen has been at pains to point out the conventionality of language 'rules' and also 'rules' of literature so that talk of objectivity would be out of place, and it is this conventionality which would account for the sometimes protean quality of language, especially across the temporal and social spectra. Therefore, no apologies are made for the intuitive comments made about what stands out in the text.

**The Present Study on the Map of Critical Theory**

Taking the cue from Roman Jakobson's features of linguistic communication and their functions, Raman Selden makes a survey of different schools of (literary) criticism based on their broad, general tendencies. Jakobson's linguistic functions take the following form:
which results in the following set of linguistic functions, each of which emphasises the corresponding feature of linguistic communication:

Referential  
Emotive  Poetic  Conative  
Phatic  Metalingual

Omitting the communication feature of CONTACT, which (for Selden) is not of special interest to literary theory, Selden provides five tendencies or orientations in literary criticism, each one having a predilection for a particular feature of linguistic communication, thus:

CONTEXT (history)  
ADDRESSER ---> MESSAGE (writing) ---> ADDRESSEE 
(writer)  CODE (structure)  (reader)

Emphasis on the reader is given by proponents of reader-response or reception theorists; and those working in structuralism and post-structuralism (deconstructionism) would be underlining the structure of a text; formalist and rhetorical criticism would give prominence to the message and code, and romanticism to the addressee. In terms of the present study, the feature of the code, the addressee, the context, and to a certain extent the addressee are relevant. In the case of linguistics and stylistics, the emphasis has been
traditionally been on the code. In other words, texts have been seen as being fairly autonomous, and that there are sufficient cohesive features within the text itself to make the text coherent; but with the onset of pragmatics and especially the rise of speech-act theory (and the notion of locution, illocution, and perlocution), this framework has been seen to be inadequate, and pragmaticists have emphasised ostensive behaviour and brought the intention of the writer or the producer of the discourse to the fore; the focus is on 'a goal-oriented speech situation, in which s [the speaker or writer] uses language in order to produce a particular effect in the mind of h [the hearer or reader]'. This would seem to bring stylistics closer to the kind of biographical criticism predominant before the advent of New Criticism, but talk of a writer's 'genius' would be avoided. This is not to say that aspects of form, system, or structure will have to be marginalised. Certainly, mention of grammatical, discoursal and other categories give the lie to this, and much of the analysis betrays some underlying Formalist thinking, especially the concept of defamiliarisation or estrangement. However, the difference lies in the fact that the code is seen to be under the control, or manipulation, of the addressee, so that perceived structures (or aberrations in the structure) are attributable to the addressee. The mention of perceived structures is significant because it brings to the fore the question of subjectivity and reader-response theories because, after all, structures have to be perceived before
they can be attributed to the addressee. The framework under which pragmatics operates demands that the addressee has a quasi-proprietorial right over the meaning of his utterances, and while there is much talk about the fulfilment or the defeating of readers' or audiences' expectations, many critics who give emphasis to the subjectivity of the reader - especially those working on reception theories or even Freudian theories - would be dissatisfied with the pragmatic framework which seems to give excessive power to the producer. This is in no way being denied here, and as the arguments have already been rehearsed elsewhere, it will be said that texts, seen in a pragmatic framework, have fairly stable meanings, and that the pragmatic framework can be said to be positivist in nature in as much as it steers clear of Derridean deconstructionist instabilities. The present study therefore treats literary communication as an element within the over-arching system of communication where the addressee's intentions are seen as being central. However, intended instability is a different matter altogether, such as the ambiguity in certain kinds of poetry, or the author not providing sufficient information to resolve a particular problem (as in Henry James's *The Turn of the Screw*), or providing multiple endings (as in John Fowles's *The French Lieutenant's Woman*), or, as is the case here, the work is given a complex parodic structure, so that there is an 'oblique' author. In such a situation, the polyvalency can be said to be built into the structure, which, in turn, is attributable to the author. Thus it is that in Traves-
ties, the tradition of historical criticism is relevant, though it is not intended that Marxist and deterministic theories of historical criticism will be made use of, because the author is seen to have sufficient control of the context when he makes recourse to intertextual references and historical allusions.

It will be obvious then that the approach here is an eclectic one, and which of Jakobson’s linguistic functions (and as a corollary, which aspects of literary criticism) are to be emphasised depends to a large extent on the text itself.

NOTES
3. ibid., p. 65.
4. ibid., p. 72.
5. Taylor, p. 106.
8. Translated from the Chinese by Arthur Waley.
9. Cluysenaar, p. 82
12. The use of the masculine is for convenience’ sake. Apologies to all feminists.


Hirsch’s approach [‘meaning’ v. ‘significance’] is legalistic in spirit: the author has a proprietary right to the text’s meaning, and anyone who infringes that right by treating the text’s significance as having as much validity as the author’s meaning is doing something improper. (The Theory of Criticism [London: Longman, 1988]; p. 290.)

30. Anecdote supplied by postgraduate student from Indiana University.


33. In Jane Austen’s Pride and Prejudice.

34. Leech, p. 15.


43. Roger Sales, Tom Stoppard: 'Rosencrantz and Guildenstern Are Dead' (Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1988), pp. 14ff. This of course echoes Stoppard's own comments in 'Ambushes for the Audience: Towards a High Comedy of Ideas' (Theatre Quarterly Vol. 4 (May-July 1974), 3-17), and the metaphor has been quickly appropriated by other critics, for instance, Susan Ruskino (Tom Stoppard; Boston: Twayne Publications, 1986).

44. Cf. Geoffrey Leech, 'Pragmatic Foregrounding? Conversational Styles in Shaw's You Never Can Tell', Paper presented at the PALA Conference, Lancaster, April 1987. Here, Leech takes politeness as the norm, the unmarked case and is thereby able to comment on breaches of the rules of politeness.

45. Dan Shen, 'Stylistics, Objectivity and Convention', Poetics Vol. 17, No. 3 (June 1988), 221-238.


49. This is the criticism of Selden (The Theory of Criticism, p. 290) levelled against Hirsch's distinction between 'meaning' and 'significance'. Hirsch considers that it is only the author's intention that determines the meaning and gives validity to a particular reading.
CHAPTER II

POLYPHONY: DRAMATIC DISCOURSE

Transaction v. interaction: stylisation and naturalism

In so far as any stylistic methodology has been developed specifically for the analysis of drama texts, these have emphasised the interactional function of language. A bipartite function of language has been put forward by Brown and Yule (in their Discourse Analysis). Where interactional language expresses solidarity or animosity or any other social relationship between interlocutors for that matter, transactional language gives emphasis to the content-bearing role of language. As such, everyday conversation is more interactional, whilst a lecture is more transactional. Indeed for a long time, the interactional function of language was not deemed important or even not recognised, so that the interest shown in interactional language amongst researchers in conversational analysis, pragmatics and other related fields is something to be welcomed, to say the least.

It is therefore understandable that linguists have been keen to analyse drama based on the interactional function of language. After all, much of drama is plain dialogue and thus closely allied to everyday conversation. The problem is that whilst in some plays the relationship between characters in a play are of great significance, there are others where interpersonal relationships between characters
are marginalised. (This is not to say that they are altogether unimportant, but that such an analysis would not give a holistic picture, or would give a biased or skewed view of the text in question.)

This would seem to have very much to do with the sub-genre of the dramatic work, or to the period in which it was written, as the mode has swung from 'stylisation' to 'naturalism', back and forth, over the centuries of dramatic history. It would be foolish to pretend that these labels are anything more than convenient tags; they are used only to comment on the general propensity of the work towards 'stylisation' or 'naturalism'. Nevertheless, it would be a grave error (indicative of literary incompetence as some might say?) to have a blanket approach towards these two general, broad modes in dramatic writing. What would seem to be a fruitful approach in Miller's Death of a Salesman would have a rather more dubious position in Eliot's Murder in the Cathedral. One of the differences, as has been hinted at above is that these two different modes in dramatic writing correspond roughly to the two different functions of language outlined above. It is not surprising that 'stylised' drama has been thought of as being didactic, as it is allied to the transactional function of language (cf. Halliday's ideational function of language).

In many ways this is not a problem peculiar to stylistic analyses of drama texts as many analyses of prose texts have been faulted for not being able to see the wood for the trees in the same way that too close an attention to charac-
terisation in a 'stylised' play, in some way, distorts it. There is a tendency for stylistic analysis (whose progenitor, one could say in some ways, was 'close reading' à la I. A. Richards) to concentrate on local features or selected passages to the neglect of more general features. In other words, there needs to be a balance between micro- and macro-analysis. As micro-analysis seems more amenable to analyses based on the interactional function of language, stylistic analyses of drama texts have this as their forte, often giving insights into the relationship between characters. What has been left out of consideration is the relationship between the author (playwright) and the reader/audience. In other words, the fact that there is always more than one level of discourse in dramatic works must be taken into account.

Analyses based on the interactional function of language yield different results depending on the kind of play it is that is being analysed. This would be true on the level of inter-character discourse. There is often too a manifestation of the interactional function of language between the author and the reader/audience, and this interactional relationship is often very crucial. (The transactionality or interactionality of the author-reader/audience discourse level is often a question of degree. For instance, some leftist or marxist plays are more concerned to present a monolithic point of view, so that the playwright is more interested in carrying out a transaction than to interact, as it were. On the other hand, drama with a lot
of humour in it seems to suggest an engaging activity between the writer and the audience/reader, and would seem to point towards interactionality.) Generally, comedy, humour and parody are situations which bear heavily on the 'outer' or 'higher' level of discourse, where the writer-reader/audience level of discourse is problematised. This is also true of many self-conscious (narcissistic?) works so that the interactional function of language must come to the fore, both on the inter-character level and also in the writer-reader/audience level.

There is perhaps another level of discourse which can be touched on - the intra-character level, which is epitomised in, say, the soliloquies of Macbeth and Hamlet. This would be the kind of discourse one would get when one was thinking aloud. This is not, however, to suggest that all monologic discourses in drama are discourses on the intra-character level. For instance, in Henry Carr's monologues in Travesties, he clearly envisages an audience, even if it is an imaginary one.

**Drama and naturalistic dialogue**

It would seem profitable at this point to consider how far drama dialogue resembles everyday dialogue. (The term 'everyday dialogue' is admittedly vague and covers a multitude of sins, but seems acceptable in a common-sense sort of way.) Many of the analyses of dramatic texts from a pragmatic point of view (analysing, to repeat oneself, the inter-character level of discourse) work under the assump-
tion that drama dialogue is close enough to real-life dialogue so that inferences drawn from everyday situations would in the main be equally applicable to those found in drama as well. It is of course no news to say that there is a variety of plays. As mentioned in the previous section, there are forms of drama which are highly stylised or even ritualised and there are those which seem to resemble a transcription of people talking in an un-self-conscious manner. In either case, the reader or audience will be asked to draw upon his (perhaps intuitive) knowledge of sociolinguistics - or rather, ethnography - to come to a conclusion with regard to the intentions of a character, and ultimately of the author. The amount of sociolinguistic (or even mere cultural) knowledge required to be brought to bear of course varies from play to play, and from playwright to playwright, but generally, it can be said that plays which appear to be most naturalistic would be the ones too which would be most amenable to an ethnographic analysis.

Given this problem, it would seem that the natural choice of a play for stylistic analysis would be a naturalistic one, and it would perhaps be with raised eyebrows that one hear of an attempt at a stylistic analysis of parodic plays such as Rosencrantz and Guildenstern are Dead, and Travesties. Part of the reason for choosing these 'problem' plays for analysis is that naturalism is a relativistic label and no matter how near to real-life dialogue a scene from a play may be, the dialogue in the play would have been idealised in some way, and 'pure' naturalism, if that were
possible, would neither be bearable nor desirable. The use of obviously non-naturalistic texts (yet not taking the other extreme of, say, verse drama like Murder in the Cathedral) would in many ways help elucidate problems associated when coming to terms with drama dialogue. Moreover, whether the play be stylised or naturalistic, there is one factor which makes it discoursally more complex than everyday language, because inherent in drama dialogue is:

... the audience. This means that to all the direct participants of the dialogue is added another participant, silent but important, for everything which is said in a dialogue is oriented towards him, toward his consciousness.²

This perception is from one end; from the other end, drama language is peculiar or distinctive because of the author. Whereas in everyday dialogue, there is interaction between different centres of consciousness, in drama dialogue, this originates from one single consciousness, no matter how schizoid the author might force himself to be. Thus the assumption that drama dialogue can be equated to real-life dialogue is fallacious, and an analysis based on that assumption will distort the play in question. No doubt, the degree of audience-consciousness varies from play to play, but each play envisages some audience, be it the contemporary theatre-goer, or some clandestine reader or the theatre-goer a decade hence (in the case of a banned text), so that at the very least the discourse situation must needs be different.
The differences between real-life dialogue and drama dialogue have already been listed in, for instance, Keir Elam's *The Semiotics of Theatre and Drama*, and it may be of help to summarise what these differences are here below. Generally, it can be said that drama dialogue is characterised by:

* Syntactic orderliness. The need for comprehensibility or followability rules out non sequiturs, false starts, personal allusions, digressions, sentence fragments, &c. If these are present then they are seen as being motivated (q.v. example below);

* Informational intensity. The information-bearing role of language is normally constant in drama, so that every utterance counts, and everything that is said is significant and carries the action and the 'world-creating' functions forward in some way;

* Illocutionary purity. The illocutionary progress of the dialogue is essential to the development of the action. This is true especially at the level of macro-speech acts, which in drama form far better-structured and more coherent global units than any conceivable extra-dramatic version. Each individual illocution generates the next in a dynamic chain;

* More systematic floor-apportionment control. Turn-taking and the control of the 'floor' has interested those working in conversational analysis and pragmatics for a while. Whilst general rules of turn-taking and floor-
apportionment control can be formulated from everyday conversation, drama dialogue manifests these rules in a neater manner.

Also, one can think of the differences (as listed by Brown and Yule) between written language and spoken language. The mechanics of the genesis of a play does therefore in part account for some (or perhaps many) of these differences as plays are in most cases written out before they are performed. This would in some way account for the syntactic differences between drama dialogue and real-life exchange.

Finally, apart from syntactic differences and discoursal differences very often the discourse relations or the discourse situation in a play is much more complex than what is encountered normally. This should be further explored and indeed merits further elaboration.

It would therefore be necessary to consider drama language not only in relation to everyday language, but also as its own semiotic system of generating meaning. There have been studies, for instance, which seek to stress the naturalistic aspects of drama dialogue. Stylisticians in particular have to be cognisant of the literary and dramatic nature of drama language together with its linguistic aspects and should guard against across-the-board value judgements with regard to naturalistic and stylised dialogue in drama as has sometimes been done.

The points made about drama language would seem to point to a perfect compliance to Grice's Cooperative Principle (see Chapter III) with its maxims of quantity,
quality, relation and manner. Syntactic orderliness relates
to the maxims of relation and manner; constant informational
intensity to the maxim of quality; illocutionary purity to
the maxim of manner; and systematic floor-apportionment
control to the maxim of manner. Indeed, it would seem that
literary language including drama language complies with the
Cooperative Principle more than ordinary, everyday language.
It would, however, be a mistake to consider this to be the
whole truth when it comes to drama language because perfect
cooperation would make the text uninteresting and lack-
lustre. Whilst these observations about dramatic language
are generally accurate - as, indeed, it is useful to have
this backdrop against which to compare individual instances
of dramatic language - there will be times when it will be
deemed necessary to give prior place to some other aspects
of language, so that the Cooperative Principle might have to
take second place. Travesties, for instance, can be said to
have broken the maxims of manner and relation because it
does not provide a connected narrative for the audience.
Carr's monologue is redolent with non sequiturs,
false starts, digressions and sentence fragments: the very
things that Elam points out should in some respect
distinguish drama language from everyday conversation,
although he notes that these might be found if they are
motivated.
Discourse levels

From the discussion of interaction v. transaction in drama, it is clear that in so far as any metalanguage has been developed to deal with interaction, this has been developed on the inter-character level of interaction. It would not be far-fetched to suggest that this is the most unmarked level of interaction. In other words, the task involved in coming to terms with inter-character interaction is the one which is most basic because this is the one brought to bear on everyday conversation. Anyone living in society is called upon and expected to draw on his knowledge of the 'rules' of inter-character interaction. Therefore, in approaching a play, an examination of this level of interaction is one which is most obvious and most available.

(Even in non-naturalistic plays, this basic level of interaction must be there or it ceases to resemble a play.)

It is when one has to come to terms with the author-reader/audience level of interaction that problems seem to crop up. One could take the view that this calls for specialised interpretive skills and that this is one aspect of 'literariness' and that this calls for literary competence (cf. Jonathan Culler, Structuralist Poetics). This would require the knowledge of generic and other codes so as to be able to decode the dramatic text. One could, on the other hand, take the other view, propounded by Sperber and Wilson (Relevance, &c.), that what is needed is not a code (semiotic) model but an inferential model based on the so-called relevance principle. In some ways, this accords well with
Roger Fowler's approach (in *Linguistic Criticism* and elsewhere) which sees ordinary language and literary language as social semiotics. In other words, it is not that one must have a thorough facility in codes but that one should be able to extend the inferential process (on which one is called to use in everyday language) to the admittedly more complicated situation of author-audience interaction. This is also the stance taken by Roger Sell in his efforts to promote 'pragmatic stylistics':

> All texts address real-life meanings from their creators to their recipients, and a creator's estimate of the text's reception by its likely recipient can affect its formation.

It has been argued elsewhere that an eclectic approach often works well in a discipline which has not developed a distinctive methodology of its own. The two points of view alluded to above represent two not incompatible perspectives. The rules of language (syntactic, discoursal, pragmatic and, to a certain extent, phonological) allow for a certain amount of originality, which one might call inventiveness. In other words, there is always the possibility of new syntagmatic combinations, so that a first instance of any kind of combination would most probably require the reader/listener/audience to draw on his inferential skills. This has already set a precedent for this particular combination so that the reader/listener/audience, the next time he encounters a similar combination, can draw on not only his inferential skills, but also his memory. Where there are instances of a particular combination set up, it can be said that a code has been set. In fine then, a full-blown
argument of code v. inference is not likely to prove particularly fruitful because they represent two dynamic processes which a reader or member of the audience has to rely on to come to an interpretation of a text. The code and inference conflict can also be seen as a manifestation of the two poles of language - towards conservatism, and towards inventiveness. (One might also extend this to literature in general, in particular to parody, where one builds on the old, which provides the trampoline from which to leap towards the new.)

It might, at this stage, be helpful if the discourse levels could be presented diagrammatically. This has already been outlined by Michael Short, who represents 'the canonical form of a communicative event where one person addresses and gives information to another' as follows.

![Diagram of Communicative context](attachment:diagram.png)

This could be said to represent the inter-character level of interaction. But this level of discourse is embedded or subordinated, as it were, in the playwright-to-audience/reader level of discourse because the playwright addresses his audience/reader through the play, that is, obliquely by means of the characters in the play. In this respect the discourse situation in a play is different from that of mere eavesdropping, or of a voyeur surreptitiously observing
others, because the playwright has arranged it such that it is 'overheard' (and 'overseen'!). Diagrammatically, this could be represented thus.

```
Addresser 1 ---> Message ---> Addressee 1
(Playwright)                       (Audience/Reader)

                                 Addresser 2 ---> Message ---> Addressee 2
                                 (Character A)                       (Character B)
```

In the case of intra-character discourses such as Shakespearean soliloquies, or Guildenstern thinking aloud in Rosencrantz and Guildenstern are Dead, where the message is meant for no-one's ears but the speaker's on the 'lower' level of discourse, Character B would be the same person as Character A.

**Layered Discourse**

As is obvious from above, part of the problem of discourse in drama is that it is some kind of layered discourse and the author can only address the reader/audience obliquely, which in part explains why some plays have attracted some quite conflicting interpretations. It has been suggested above that because the relationship between the author and the reader/audience is sometimes interactional rather than transactional, a rather more 'protean' message is put forward. (It is perhaps in reaction to the proliferation of interpretations that some critics like Culler have declared that the critic should not be looking for new inter-
pretations but rather features of literariness. The question of acceptability of a particular reading or interpretation thus arises as well (see Chapter I.)

The complexity is compounded in the case of memory plays or in hallucinatory and dream sequences and this would, as it were, add another layer to the discourse. In the case of Travesties, most of the play is supposed to take place in the memory of Old Carr - the exceptions being where Old Carr appears, and the rather enigmatic section at the beginning of Act II with Cecily delivering a lecture, and the scenes where the Lenins appear. (This has given critics some consternation and stands out uncomfortably in the play.) Therefore in most of Travesties at least, there is a three-layer discourse situation which can be represented thus.

```
Addresser 1 --> Message --> Addressee 1
(Playwright) (Audience/reader)

Addresser 2 --> Message --> Addressee 2
(Old Carr) (?Old Carr)

Addresser 3 --> Message --> Addressee 3
(Character A) (Character B)
```

This is further complicated by the parodic nature of the dialogue, in that Oscar Wilde becomes some kind of an oblique addresser. In fact, it is possible to think of parody, irony and literary allusion as adding another layer
to the discourse. Wayne Booth\(^{10}\) refers to various 'levels' of meaning when discussing irony, and Sperber and Wilson see irony as a case where echoic interpretation is called for. In other words, when a person makes an ironic statement, he distances himself from it, because that statement is attributable to a certain person or a certain kind of person. In the case of parody the effect is not so isolated but is present more generally. In any case, the use of parody, irony or literary allusion can be said to add another layer to the discourse situation, and further problematises the reader's/audience's perception of the author's illocution or force. (The question of parody, irony and allusion will, however, be dealt with in Chapter IV in greater detail.)

By virtue of this presentation of the discourse structure, it would be easier to see which level the Wildean elements (for instance) should be attributed to. Naturalistically, it can be attributed to the second level because Old Carr has just got things rather mixed up and has confused fact with fiction. But in so far as the Wildean elements become the object of parody (which implies deliberate superimposition of texts), then this has to be attributed to the first level of discourse.

This multi-layered discourse situation is by no means unusual in literature and much has been written about this with regard to Emily Brontë's *Wuthering Heights* or Henry James’s *The Turn of the Screw*. Indeed, Scholes,\(^{11}\) for instance, has seen literariness in terms of duplicity on the part of the author, who puts on a persona. Changing the
metaphor, one can say that the essence of literariness is layered discourse, so that in Tom Jones, for instance, there is the popular distinction between Fielding the actual writer and 'Fielding' the jovial and garrulous narrator given to having flights of discussion with his readers. Hatfield,12 in discussing Fielding, refers to 'dramatised authorship' and 'the surrogate author', and 'the character he [Fielding] has "personated"', so that the narrator in Tom Jones is Fielding's 'positive spokesman'. This idea of layeredness or embeddedness would thus seem to be central in literature. Embedded discourse in drama is rarer if one discounts play-within-play situations, such as those found in The Taming of the Shrew or even Hamlet, which playwrights have exploited for a long time. There are memory plays with frequent flashbacks, however, such as Tennessee Williams’s The Glass Menagerie or Peter Shaffer’s Equus, and of course Travesties, although the persons through whose eyes the audience perceive the action have different degrees of reliability. It will be noted that the identity of the addressee on the second level is problematic as Old Carr is supposed to be reminiscing on his past in Zurich, presumably rehearsing his memoirs; he is alone on stage and it is not until much later that old Cecily (Mrs Carr) comes into the scene, so for most of the play it cannot be assumed that he is addressing her. One could assume that he is talking to himself, or perhaps to an imaginary interlocutor who would stand for a potential reader of Carr’s memoirs. In The Glass Menagerie, Tom is a playwright, so when he moves
outside of the action and comments on it to the audience, this audience must also be imaginary (just as Old Carr's possible reader of his memoirs is imaginary) even if he looks straight into the eye of one of the members of the audience, simply because Tom is not Tennessee Williams. In the same way, the psychiatrist, Dysart, in Equus narrates the story of his experience with Alan Strang, the boy who blinded six horses, to an imaginary listener. In another Shaffer play, Amadeus (1980), Salieri is made to invoke the Ombri del Futuro or the Ghosts of the Future and then narrate the story of himself and Mozart to them. The Ombri del Futuro can be taken as either real in the context of the play or as imaginary, thereby pointing to Salieri's deranged state of mind, in which case the 'inner context' of the play will be taken with a pinch of salt, and would parallel, though in a less extreme form, the inner situation in Travesties. Clearly, the 'Ghosts of the Future' and the 'Shades of time to come' are meant to parallel the real audience, and indeed, the stage direction has it that Salieri addresses the audience (see, for instance, the end of Act I, Scene ii - For a second, munching [cakes and pastries], he [Salieri] regards the audience with malicious amusement), this can be taken as a form of shorthand for 'the audience whom Salieri regards as the Ghosts of the Future'.

One could also consider the situations found in Miller's Death of a Salesman and Stoppard's Night and Day. In Death of a Salesman, Willy Loman is given to impulsive
reminiscences of the past and in Night and Day, Ruth Carson imagines herself seducing Jacob Milne at the beginning of Act Two. In either case, the reader/audience is given access to the character's thoughts, and what takes place in the mind is made flesh, as it were. The point is that in these cases it cannot be said that there has been ostensive behaviour or intentional communication,\textsuperscript{13} so that talking of what Willy Loman or Ruth Carson meant is beside the point, unless one takes the word 'meaning' in the Freudian sense. A communicative model of discourse takes as its assumption the addressee's desire to communicate meaning at each level. Indeed it would be to misunderstand the discourse situation to talk of Willy Loman's or Ruth Carson's communicative intentions in the memory or fantasy sequences. If one were to set out in diagram form the beginning of Act Two in Night and Day, it would probably take the following form.

\[\text{Addresser 1} \rightarrow \text{Message} \rightarrow \text{Addressee 1} \]
\[(\text{Stoppard}) \rightarrow \text{(Reader/Audience)} \]
\[\text{'Experiencer'} \]
\[\text{(Ruth Carson')} \]
\[\text{Addresser 2} \rightarrow \text{Message} \rightarrow \text{Addressee 2} \]
\[(\text{Ruth/Milne}) \rightarrow \text{(Milne/Ruth)} \]

It is of course possible that a dream or a fantasy takes the form of images or scenes where there are no characters interacting. Indeed at the very beginning of
Night and Day, there is the dream of Guthrie the press photographer, and the dream is dramatised for the audience; apart from some isolated shouts, there is very little use of any verbal language.

Here, where the discourse situation is in a sense still layered, the deletion of the second and third levels of centres of consciousness from which ostensive communication takes place renders the 'message' of the first addresser less complicated. It can be said that all that is happening in the scene is Stoppard telling the audience that Guthrie is terrified of the ebullient situation in Kambawe. The complexity of most multi-layered discourse situations in drama can be attributed to the fact that one cannot be certain which addresser a particular 'message' should be attributed to. The problem then seems to be an attributional one, and is crucial in instances of misunderstandings.

GEORGE: ... Yes, I'm something of a logician myself.
BONES: Really? Sawing ladies in half, that sort of thing?
GEORGE: Logician.  (Jumpers, p. 44)
One could take the view that Bones really did not catch what George said, and so the mistake is motivated on the part of Stoppard, thereby suggesting that George’s logic has some of the frivolity of a magician’s trick about it. One could, on the other hand, take the view that Bones was pretending to make a mistake and therefore making light of George’s hobby-horse. It could also be the case the both Stoppard and Bones are making an ironic comment on George. In any case, it would be unthinkable that it was just a mistake, pure and simple.

Therefore, the attribution of a particular linguistic or discoursal feature is by no means always straightforward. Pfister, for instance, has highlighted the critical controversy regarding the interpretation (supported by Mark Van Doren) that the elevation of Jakobson’s ‘poetic function’ in Richard II is what led to his eventual downfall, because it meant capitulating his political responsibilities. In other words, the poet in Richard II has overtaken the soldier and the politician in him. This interpretation attributes the ‘poeticality’ of his speeches to the inner discourse situation. It is, however, possible to attribute it to the outer discourse situation, in the same way that one would attribute the blank verse in Shakespeare’s plays to the dramatist rather than to the characters in the play. It is thus important that one has to come to terms with drama qua drama, with a discourse structure much more complex than
that of everyday conversation. Consciousness of the layered-ness of dramatic discourse would help in the attribution of particular features in a play.

Looking at the 'experiencer' level of discourse in the diagrams above, one might wonder in what way this differs from a soliloquy or a thinking-aloud situation (which has been characterised as intra-character discourse above). It must be admitted that there is probably a very fuzzy separating line between them, but the fact that one's thoughts are spoken out aloud makes it possible that there is an addressee even if it is only the addressee himself or an imaginary person. The fact that the words are enunciated implies some kind of effort made by the speaker, which accords well with the idea of ostensive behaviour or intentional communication. Indeed, this is intuitively acceptable because it makes sense to talk of Old Carr in Travesties perhaps trying to mislead himself or his imaginary addressee by his ramblings whereas it does not to talk of Ruth trying to deceive someone else or even herself by her fantasy simply because a fantasy cannot be intentional communication.

In the rise of self-conscious literature, many modern plays have sought to break down the discourse levels so that Addresser 2 might seem to be speaking to Addressee 1 and has the effect of giving the audience a jolt in the midst of their complacency (an effect perhaps comparable to that in the slow movement of Haydn's Surprise Symphony). But direct address cannot be considered as a recent phenomenon because it is common in Shakespeare as well. One can think of the
choruses in *Henry V* and *Romeo and Juliet*, or Prospero’s epilogue in *The Tempest*, or the Clown’s (Feste’s) song at the end of *Twelfth Night* or Puck’s address at the end of *A Midsummer Night’s Dream*. One can discount the choruses because they are not part of the action of the play and can be considered as representing the voice of the playwright, or the theatre company as a whole. Prospero, Feste and Puck can be thought of as having stepped out of their dramatic rôles and have become the mouthpieces or spokesmen of the theatre company or the playwright, and the audience is not left in a state of bewilderment because none of the other characters are left on stage and hence it is obvious that the audience is being addressed.

The situation, however, is slightly different in, say, Stoppard’s *The Real Inspector Hound*, or even *Rosencrantz and Guildenstern are Dead*, where the audience is not allowed to luxuriate in the ‘suspension of disbelief’ because these plays are narcissistic or metadramatic or self-conscious. There is an apparent breaking down of the confining walls within each discourse level.

(A good pause. ROS leaps up and bellows at the audience.)

ROS: Fire!

(GUIL jumps up.)

GUIL: Where?

ROS: It’s all right - I’m demonstrating the misuse of free speech. To prove that it exists. (He regards the audience, that is the direction, with contempt - and other directions, then front again.) Not a move. They should burn to death in their shoes.

[Rosencrantz and Guildenstern, p. 44]
The audience is given a jolt because here, apparently Ros (Rosencrantz) is conscious of the presence of the audience. To use the common metaphor, the fourth wall has apparently been removed. It would seem then that the situation here parallels the situations in the Shakespearian plays mentioned above because Ros seems to have been invested with another rôle (in the same way that Prospero the Duke of Milan becomes Prospero the spokesman for the theatre company and the playwright in the Epilogue of The Tempest). Yet Ros is still interacting with Guil (Guildenstern) - 'It's all right - I'm demonstrating the misuse of free speech' is said to Guil - and also, for instance, no member of the audience would be tempted to remonstrate when Ros declares contemptuously that no one is moving. Furthermore, he not only regards the audience but looks in other directions as well as if there were audience all around. What this amounts to is that in, say, the original London production, John Stride was not only playing Rosencrantz, but also playing an actor playing Rosencrantz. In other words, another layer of discourse seems to have been added into the play. The layering could presumably be extended ad infinitum. The unease of the audience at this juncture is probably due to the fact that their situation is analogous to that of Ros's imaginary audience. Stoppard capitalises on the reaction (or lack of reaction) of Ros's imaginary audience being the same as that of the real audience - i.e., no movement at Ros's shout of 'Fire!' Apart from shocking the audience, incongruities like these generate humour, and humour is an essential part
of Stoppardian drama.

The discourse situation would take the following form.

- Addresser 1 ---> Message ---> Addressee 1
  (Stoppard/John Stride playing actor playing Ros) ---> (Reader/Real Audience)

- Addresser 2 ---> Message ---> Addressee 2
  (Actor playing Ros) ---> (Imaginary audience and actor playing Guil)

- Addresser 3 ---> Message ---> Addressee 3
  (Ros) ---> (Guil)

The difficulty is that the second and third levels of discourse are not always distinguishable, compounded with the fact that both 'Ros' and 'actor playing Ros' are not conventionally distinguished in the printed text, in the sense that both their parts are labelled the same way (but cf. Old Carr being distinguished from Carr in Zurich in 1917 in the text and on stage), and are both played by John Stride on stage.

There is also of course the possibility of conflating the first and second levels of discourse, which, as has been mentioned above, accounts for the audience’s discomfort in that the audience identify themselves with the imaginary audience in the second level of discourse.

One of the effects of having several layers of discourse is that different levels of fictionality and reliability are created; typically, characters in the inner
levels of fictionality have decreasing levels of validity; this is particularly relevant when considering perspective in drama.16 There is generally a hierarchical arrangement of figure-perspectives in drama, and characters which are not integrated into the action (such as choruses, philosophising figures) or sections of the play which do not give the play narrative propulsion (such as songs) as seen as being perspectivally closer to the audience, thereby having greater validity. In the same way, the audience is in some way surprised as 'Rosencrantz' becomes 'the actor playing Rosencrantz' because the latter is perspectivally closer to the audience, and therefore, logically, more reliable. This is generally true of Travesties; for instance, Carr's statement at the end of the play that Bennett was actually the British Consul in Zurich is more reliable than what was represented in the distorted, inner level of discourse, namely that Carr was the Consul and Bennett the manservant.

A comparable situation can be said to obtain in The Real Inspector Hound (Faber, 1968) in that two critics - Birdboot and Moon - are apparently part of the audience watching an Agatha Christie 'whodunnit' thriller when all of a sudden, they are written into the whodunnit itself. It would seem to be the intention of Stoppard to problematise the discourse situation in the sense that the second level of discourse is drawn towards the first level at the beginning (since Birdboot and Moon seem to be part of the
audience) and towards the third level later on (since Birdboot and Moon seem to have been drawn into the dramatis personae of the whodunnit).

It would be reasonable to ask what would be the rationale behind such a complicated superstructure, or to use the term employed at the beginning of this section, macrostructure. Undoubtedly it must be admitted that a complicated discourse structure opens the way to apparent cross-overs in discourse levels, which by their very incongruity and unexpectedness generate humour and readjustment of the audience’s perspective. Unfortunately humour has been given little attention in linguistic analyses; there has been a brief discussion of this on pp. 33-34, and there will be further treatment of the subject in Chapter IV.

The second important reason why such a complex discourse structure has been used has already been hinted at above, when it was mentioned that it could have been part of Stoppard’s purpose to problematise the text. Indeed the
Russian formalist school of criticism has had, from the start, for its motto defamiliarisation or ostranenie; and Stoppard’s own motto ‘First A, then minus A’ has already been alluded to in Chapter I. Art should distort ‘practical’ language and should set out to defeat readers’ or audience’s expectations. Defamiliarisation alias deautonomisation alias foregrounding has had the sanction of stylisticians from the early days of stylistics although the notion has mostly been applied to the areas of syntax and phonology, particularly in poetry, or to the semantics of various lexical items. As the interest is widened to embrace the discourse structure, it is noteworthy that the concept of defamiliarisation still proves useful. There is the proviso here that foregrounding in texts is not seen as something merely text-internal, but as being motivated and encoded by the author. In other words, the approach of foregrounding can be useful even if one does not take on board the assumption of the autonomy of the text from its author.

Thirdly, this complex structural edifice can be seen as part and parcel of the narcissistic tendencies of much of modern (specifically, post-modernist) literature. David Lee Bratt prefers to attribute this to Stoppard’s ironic muse. Irony in Stoppard, for Bratt, encompasses a Weltanschauung, and is ‘a habit of thought or anything approaching a philosophic view’ and the ‘source was philosophical rather than rhetorical’. This is an approach markedly different from that of the ‘Angry Young Men’ who preceded Stoppard, and it
militates against a monolithic structure of drama. A multiplicity of voices or perspectives are heard and it is not often clear which voice or perspective has the ascendancy.

Going back to the distinction between interactive and transactional language, one could say that whereas in drama whose language is mainly transactional a study of the play’s macro-structure would be more helpful; in drama whose language is mainly interactive, a study of its micro-structure would be more profitable. In Stoppardian plays this has much to do with the contrast between more naturalistic plays (e.g., Night and Day) and more stylised ones (e.g., Travesties or Rosencrantz and Guildenstern are Dead). Both naturalism and stylisation are tendencies and it would be foolish to pretend that there is an impenetrable barrier between them. Night and Day, for instance, has been labelled as a naturalistic play (a lapse or a coming to the light on Stoppard’s part, depending on one’s point of view); but then again there are features in it which would reside more comfortably in a more stylised dwelling place. For instance, Stoppard has the tendency ‘to create characters whose primary rôle is as the spokesman or woman for a particular point of view’ and this is in some ways seen in Night and Day which goes against the propensity to more fully rounded characters in naturalistic plays. The point here is that absolute stylisation and naturalism do not exist as such, and even if either were possible, it would not be desirable. There is then a place for both micro- and macro-analysis in most drama texts.
Obviously, a naturalistic play would more closely resemble real-life dialogue and conversation, and therefore the micro-analytic models used in conversational analysis could without great difficulty be transferred to examine drama dialogue (as has been done for Pinter, for instance — q.v., Deirdre Burton’s *Drama and Dialogue* or Michael Short’s ‘Discourse Analysis and the Analysis of Drama’). In other words, an examination of the character-to-character level of discourse is likely to prove fruitful. A more stylised play would generally be more amenable to the study of its macrostructure. In the case of Stoppard’s plays, however, even the stylised plays would profit from a study of their microstructure because most of his dialogue is laden with jokes, and indeed it can be said that one cannot be said to have understood Stoppard at all if one has not come to terms with the texture of his plays.

The question of referentiality

The problems encountered when examining self-conscious texts in a way highlights the problem of referentiality which has dogged analysts for a while. The question of whether one can in fact refer to fictional objects and persons has been the subject of much debate (q.v., for instance, Adams, *Pragmatics and Fiction*, sect. 1.2). There have been claims that in literature, the writer pretends to perform speech acts (as has been suggested, for instance, by Searle), and this has already been criticised strongly by Pratt and Fish. Adams has been able to come up with an alternative
model based on the several discourse levels found in literature. For him, 'every fictional text is embedded in a fictional context that includes a fictional speaker and hearer' (op. cit., p. 10) so that in that fictional context (or, to adapt the terminology to that used here, in that discourse level) the speech acts hold and have their normal illocutionary force.

For example, Searle (op. cit., p. 65) states that in relation to the opening lines of Iris Murdoch's *The Red and the Green*, Iris Murdoch is only 'pretending ... to make an assertion, or acting as if she were making an assertion, or going through the motions of making an assertion, or imitating making an assertion'. The problem is that Searle has failed to distinguish between the writer and the narrator. Adams gives the pragmatic structure of fiction as follows.

\[
W(S (text) H)R
\]

\[
W = \text{writer, } S = \text{speaker, } \text{text} = \text{text, } H = \text{hearer, } R = \text{reader}
\]

The underlining marks the communicative context, which is fictional.

Indeed, this is similar to the discourse levels presented above only that the metaphor has been changed from layering to embedding. When Adams talks of fiction he in fact has in mind drama as well. With regard to a Hamlet soliloquy, he mentions that

what we normally call stage directions function in a manner similar to the narrator in the novel, for they indicate what fictional characters do .... so the communicative context is not located at the level of Hamlet’s soliloquy but at a higher level [note the
change in metaphor!] in which a speaker talks about Hamlet within the world of the drama, and as a fictional speaker, he addresses a fictional hearer (p. 24).

He seems to suggest that there is a fictional speaker who is responsible for, say, the stage directions and the like (the equivalent in novels would be titles and chapter headings), and this fictional speaker addresses a fictional hearer; this level of discourse would be 'embedded' (or be at a lower level) than the writer-audience level of discourse. This seems to concur with the characterisation of literariness referred to above: that the essence of it is layeredness or embeddedness (or duplicity, in Scholes's words).

To map out the problem of referentiality, it would seem, is to rehearse the problems arising from confusion and apparent cross-overs of discourse levels. The point seems to be that this is especially relevant when considering drama because the popular reference to a 'dramatic' quality in a text rests on the amount of layeredness in the discourse. In some ways the problem of referentiality is theoretical, and has to do with the referential status of persons and objects in literary texts. On the other hand, the legitimisation of referentiality in literature would lend support to various approaches to literature which make explicit extra-textual connexions between the literary text and the real world.

The question of referentiality is still important especially with reference to self-conscious drama, as in the passage from Rosencrantz and Guildenstern dealt with above. In reading novels or watching drama, the reader/audience is encouraged to identify with certain characters or situations.
or to equate situations in the world of the text with a situation or situations he is familiar with. This convention of empathy makes intuitive sense because there has been the assumption that literature has to do with 'the human condition' or 'the way of the world'. In view of this convention, any similarity with the world as the audience/reader knows it is important as he will want to identify it with the world as he knows it. This situation becomes acute when the world referred to is a stage world - as is the case in the passage from Rosencrantz and Guildenstern - because it is the world that the audience would very much be conscious of, and it is this identification which gives the reader/audience a feeling of unease. In spite of this feeling of discomfort, the reader/audience will stop short of complete identification and will not begin to remonstrate with Rosencrantz, but the reader or audience will be very conscious of his position as an eavesdropper.

Thus the fictionality of the situation has to be admitted but literature must retain some level of referentiality or else it loses its status of being able to comment on the real world.

Another question which is relevant is the status of apparently half-fictional situations - for instance, Sherlock Holmes's address, 221B Baker Street, London. Whereas Baker Street and London exist in the 'real world', there is no 221B on Baker Street (although there was a No. 221 for the first time in 1930 when Upper Baker Street merged with Baker Street). One could also think of the status of
historical figures in plays - for instance, Carr, Tzara, Joyce and Lenin in Travesties, or Salieri, Mozart, Constanza and Joseph II in Peter Shaffer’s Amadeus (though, interestingly, in both the plays, the ‘inner context’ is mediated by an ostensible narrator). The entire inner context must be assumed to be fictional though the reader/audience must be allowed to link it to the ‘real world’. And this can be confirmed by the fact that unless there are indications to the contrary, things function in much the same way in the inner context as they do in the real world. In other words, unless the writer indicates otherwise, the reader/audience will assume that characters in a play will not be fifteen feet or two feet tall; or weigh thirty stone or ten pounds.

The degree to which the situation in the inner discourse situation is allowed to point towards the ‘real world’ varies from play to play, but is nevertheless there, so that one can say that Stoppard’s Every Good Boy Deserves Favour is not only about a person wrongly confined to a psychiatric ward but also about the repression of the people’s voice in eastern bloc countries. The ability to do this presupposes an acquaintance with the ‘background’ knowledge or ‘pragmatic’ knowledge vis-à-vis the text in question.

The ‘referential function’ of language has also been appealed to in studies generally going under the name of the sociology of literature. This can be seen in, for instance, Joan Rockwell’s Fact in Fiction where there is a good coverage of work in that area. The assumption of referen-
tiality is seen by the fact that data from fictional texts are used to point towards social conventions and values. (It will be noted, of course, that Rockwell includes drama under the general term fiction, as can be seen from references to, for instance, Shakespeare and restoration drama.) By its very plot, a work of fiction - be it a novel or a play - encodes norms and values. There is, of course, Ian Watt’s celebrated essay on Robinson Crusoe 25 who saw in the novel a celebration of the so-called Protestant work ethic and its emphasis on the prudent management of money matters. For Rockwell, norms and values can be transmitted by participation (and here, she has in mind the Lord’s Supper or communion or eucharist and other religious rites), by the personification of values in heroes or heroines (whether these be ideas of ‘nobility’ or ‘honour’ or the figure of the gentleman-spy), and also by identification. In this sense then it can be said that all works of fiction encode a Weltanschauung, and this element of meaning may be conscious or unconscious. The traditional formulaic ending of ‘living happily ever after’ - that is, success in romantic and economic terms - is said to encode bourgeois values. In other words, willy nilly, the author is forced into the position of God, so that traditionally at least, goodness is rewarded and evil punished. Stoppard betrays a great deal of self-consciousness when he allows the play in Rosencrantz and Guildenstern to make some remarks on this.

PLAYER: Between ‘just deserts’ and ‘tragic irony’ we are given a lot of scope for our talent. Generally speaking, things have gone about as far as they can possibly go when things have got about as bad as the
reasonably get. (He switches on a smile.)
GUIL: Who decides?
PLAYER: (Switching off his smile) Decides? It is
written. Rosencrantz and Guildenstern, pp. 58-59

The last sentence, interestingly enough, echoes the way in which Jesus introduces quotations from Old Testament scriptures in response to temptations from Satan in the wilderness (see, for instance, Matthew 4.4, 7 and 10). Indeed, a parallel can be put forward: in the same way that the divine nature can be grasped in his dealings with man as recorded in scriptures, so also can the author’s general outlook on life be inferred in the organisation of the plot. (One can, in this respect, think of the novels of Muriel Spark with much benefit.)

The point being made then is that it is necessary to move to the ‘outer’ discourse layer in discussing literary works, and that a literary work is not merely an artefact devoid of any contact with the ‘real world’, but rather there is an ongoing conversation between the fictional text and the ‘real world’.

It must be said, however, that much of this is beyond the scope of this study, but this area has been touched on because the text which is being studied, Travesties, does excite some of these questions. This question has been dealt with by Issacharoff,26 who, considered, among other texts, Stoppard’s Travesties in relation to reference. It is interesting to note that the conclusions reached here on a hierarchical and layered discourse structure in drama is affirmed there as well:

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(1) there must be a distinction between author’s and characters’ speech acts; and ...(2) there is a hierarchy (ibid., p. 88)

The point that the distinction between ‘ordinary’ and fictional discourse based on the presence or the lack of (extratextual) reference is untenable is again emphasised. Scholes’s characterisation of literariness (and, thus, also dramaticality) as being located in the nature of literary communication is therefore very apt in this light. There is ‘duplicity’ in literary communication which creates ‘a literary tension between the utterance as communicative and externally referential, on the one hand, and as incommunicative and self-referential, on the other’.27 The point is not that literature cannot make extra-textual references, but that its layered nature complicates extra-textual reference, resulting in what Scholes calls a literary tension. And because subtlety rather than brashness is seen as something prized in literature, the layeredness which brings about this tension is thus to be prized as well.

In summary then, the distinctiveness of drama language and discourse lies not only in the syntactic and lexical markers but rather in the idea of layeredness and embeddedness developed in this chapter. So useful is this metaphor that other ‘literary’ questions such as irony (see Chapter IV) and referentiality and considerations of the author’s ’persona’ have also come to be encapsulated in this metaphor. This is indeed useful because they can be seen as being inter-related, and might lead the way towards a more holistic approach to drama. Layeredness is not only a
function of dramaticality, but also of literariness: indeed, there is not a great deal of difference between a novel and a play except in the nature of their performance - the former (typically) by silent reading and the latter (typically) by actors, &c., on a stage - but the fact that plays can be read silently as well further lessens the distinction. Descriptive passages, admittedly, are generally minimised in plays and are transformed to stage directions or given to a chorus figure on stage (the surrogate author, as it were). It would seem too that a lot of muddled thinking and misunderstanding could be cleared up if there was a clearer grasp of this idea of layeredness. Theoretically, there are an infinite number of possible levels of complexity in discourse structure, so a comprehensive taxonomy would be an impossibility. However, various noteworthy plays have been considered in this light. And to balance the kind of text-intrinsic studies made under the aegis of stylistics, reference has been made to text-extrinsic studies where a dramatic text has to mean something not only within its own terms of reference but also beyond that; it might be surprising to find such approaches legitimised within a framework of stylistics, but the denial of this only serves to isolate the literary text from other academic or non-academic pursuits, or, worse still, by the sin of omission, allows or causes the misreading a particular text. This is crucial because Travesties, the text under consideration, makes overt historical references.
NOTES


Stating it as simply as I can, we sense literariness in an utterance when any one of the six features of communication [postulated by Jakobson] loses its simplicity and becomes multiple or duplicitous .... Whenever a communicative act encourages us to sense a difference between maker and speaker, our literary competence has been activated.... [If] the words of an utterance seems to be aimed not directly at us but at someone else, this duplicitous situation is essentially literary. (pp. 21f.)

12. Glenn W. Hatfield, Henry Fielding and the Language

13. Sperber and Wilson, Relevance, p. 49.


16. See, for instance, Pfister, Drama, especially section 3.5.2.


18. op. cit., p. 18.


27. Robert Scholes, Semiotics and Interpretation, p. 23.
CHAPTER III

PAS DE DEUX: DIALOGUE AND PRAGMATICS

Dialogue in drama: the inner discourse situation

Much has been said in the previous section about the fact that drama dialogue cannot be exactly the same as real-life dialogue no matter how naturalistic it may sound. Because of the layered nature of some kinds of dramatic discourse, an examination of inter-character interaction may not be the most fruitful enterprise in some cases and may even be misleading in others. But it is this level of discourse which is often the most accessible and there is a case for attempting to analyse this level of discourse even in the case of drama texts where the communicational channel has been made problematic (as is the case with Stoppard, and also Pinter and Shaffer).¹

As has been mentioned elsewhere there has not been much work done within the Anglo-Saxon tradition examining inter-character discourse in drama apart from that of Deirdre Burton. Hess-Luettich² however outlines some of the work done within the German tradition, where drama dialogue has been used to formulate and develop hypotheses concerning the overall structure of ordinary conversation. In some ways, fictional dialogue out-interacts everyday interactional dialogue. Fictional dialogue can point towards conversational principles
because they reach in the communicative mechanism a
degree of condensation which can hardly be found in the
everyday practice of interacting individuals ..., be-
cause they represent in particular critical situations
of interaction in a well marked way ..., because they
are regarded as analytically pure in comparison with
everyday discourse ..., or because they more strictly
define a number of typical situations within a theoreti-
cally definite set of possible situations of
discourse. (p. 203)

Thence comes the paradoxical situation - that fictional dia-
logue differs from real-life dialogue, but at times differs
in such a way as to crystallise conversational principles
because they are illocutionarily purer. It has, for inst-
ance, been pointed out that Grice's Cooperative Principle
works better for drama dialogue than for real-life dialogue
because in the case of the latter a whole gamut of interact-
ional variables have to be brought to bear upon the situ-
uation.

The fact that drama dialogue differs from real-life
dialogue should not then deter stylisticians from applying,
in a selective manner, the methodology developed in conver-
sational analysis or the ethnographic observations related
to discourse analysis or sociolinguistic studies. This
would include studies based on various terms of address or
the use of the pronoun system, the exchange structure,
speech acts and the co-operative principle, and also
presupposition. All this would be part of what has been
termed the micro-structure of the dramatic text. Pronominal
reference and terms of address represent well-covered ground
in the subject. Brown and Gilman,\textsuperscript{3} for instance, discuss
the T and V forms of the second-person pronoun (e.g., \textit{tu} v.
vous in French; du v. Sie in German; and thou v. you in Shakespearian English). Particularly interesting would be the lack of symmetry between not only pronominal forms (although the distinction, for better or worse, is not available in contemporary English, but would be helpful in considering Shakespearian English), but also terms of address (the available options include title + first name + surname; title + initial(s) + surname; title + surname; surname; first name + surname; first name (full form or familiar form) - e.g., Mr Joseph Bloggs, Mr J. Bloggs, Mr Bloggs, Bloggs, Joseph Bloggs, Joseph, Joe, Joey) - and other forms of address more related to one's position or social standing vis-à-vis the other person, e.g., Sir, Madam, squire, nurse, O favoured one, idiot). Asymmetrical pronominal forms and terms of address imply a difference in social standing, or, if one prefers, power. The most obvious example of this in Travesties is when Carr addresses Bennett as 'Bennett' and Bennett addresses Carr as 'Sir', implying a servant-master relationship, which, in fact, is made ironic when it is revealed in the end that such was not the case at all. When pronominal reference is marked, inferences can be made regarding the character concerned; when Othello constantly refers to himself in the third person, one can infer that he is in the habit of not perceiving himself as he really is and is therefore holding on to an idealised image of himself.4
Studies in conversational style

The word *stylistics* itself leads one to infer that the concept of style is one of its central concerns. In the same way that different inferences can be made due to differing styles in prose and poetry, an analysis of different styles of conversation and dialogue might be able to throw some light on various aspects of characterisation in a dramatic text.

Deborah Tannen in *Conversational Style: Analyzing Talk Among Friends* (1984) distinguishes between what she terms 'high involvement' and 'high consideration' styles in her analysis. This distinction is based on Robin Lakoff's rules of Politeness or rules of Rapport, viz.,

1. Don’t impose (Distance);
2. Give options (Deference); and
3. Be friendly (Camaraderie).

Different circumstances demand different emphases on each of the above rules, so that rules 1 and 2 apply in, say, a more formal situation. (It must be noted that there are personal and cultural differences.) When a guest is asked 'Would you like a drink?' and the reply is 'Thank you very much, that would be lovely', the guest is applying rule 1; if the reply is 'Oh, just whatever you’re having', or 'Please don’t bother', he is applying rule 2. On the other hand, someone who enters a house or a flat and says, 'I’m dying of thirst. Get me a cup of tea, will you?' is applying rule 3.
It might be surprising that the third example should be an instance of the application of the rules of Politeness at all. Perhaps Rapport would be a better word. In any case, in the third example, for it to be friendly, it must be assumed that the speaker is a close friend of whoever is in the house or flat, or else the attempt at friendliness may backfire. (This can be said to be true of most 'impolite' or rude remarks, but this will be covered in another section below.) This might be a good place to emphasise that rapport is not the only relevant parameter in the analysis of conversation. There would be several other alternatives to

1. I'm dying of thirst. Get me a cup of tea, will you?

For instance, the person could have said either of the following.

2. I'm very thirsty. Get me a cup of tea, will you?

3. I'm feeling quite parched. Get me a cup of tea, will you?

4. I'm positively dehydrating. All that running about has drained the last drop of liquid from my emaciated body. I think a cup of tea might prove to be my saviour.

Which of the above evinces the greatest politeness or rapport? This is debatable. Given the right context, all can be said to perform the same speech act (or have the same illocutionary force), but are at the same time different. For example, (3) is a more interesting way of saying (2), and (1) is a more interesting way of saying (2). (4) is a more humorous (and therefore also more interesting) way of saying any of the above. This can be said to have to do with the use of hyperbole ('dying of thirst', 'positively
dehydration') and lexical clashes (i.e., the opposite of lexical collocation in, for instance, a cup of tea and saviour), so that (4) can be thought of as being ironic. What is evident then is that there are other parameters involved in conversation such as the parameters of humour and interest. In any case, it is always useful isolating various strands and examining conversation in the light of these parameters.

In a later article, Lakoff rearranges her rules, changing the hierarchical order to an order or a continuum of stylistic preferences, with Grice's maxims on one end of the continuum, where what she calls Rules of Clarity apply, and the rules of rapport and camaraderie on the other. The latter would feature 'direct expression of orders and desires, colloquialisms and slang, first names and nicknames' (ibid., p. 65). The language on the 'clarity' end of the continuum would be more message oriented, and thus it is that Brown and Yule's notion of transactional v. interactional discourse could be evoked. The lesser the degree of clarity, the greater the amount of shared knowledge, and the more that which is presupposed. The focus on content,

which is also associated with spoken language in formal or nondialogic genres, also conspires to ignore interpersonal involvement, a way of honouring participants' need to avoid the negative effects of involvement [ibid., p. 18].

Deborah Tannen's 'high involvement' style would then be identified with interactional language and her 'high consideration' style with transactional language. However, it must be noted that what Deborah Tannen is concerned with is
casual conversation (indeed, talk among friends). (In Conversational Style, her analysis is based almost solely on dinner-table talk in a house in California on the American Thanksgiving Day.) What she is suggesting then is that even within the 'genre' of casual conversation, there are the sub-genres of these two styles. What seems to be emphasised is the polarity potential of language.

It would seem then that the Rules of Clarity are sometimes pitted against the Rules of Rapport, and an emphasis on the former produces a 'high consideration' style whilst an emphasis on the latter produces a 'high involvement' style.

It might be useful at this juncture to have a look at Leech's concepts of rhetoric in everyday conversation. By the use of the term rhetoric, Leech wishes to focus on conversation as 'a goal-oriented situation, in which s [the speaker/writer] uses language in order to produce a particular effect in the mind of h [the hearer/reader]' . He also distinguishes between the interpersonal and textual rhetorics (based on Halliday's functions of language), because, for Leech, whilst the ideational function of language falls within the pale of grammar, the interpersonal and textual functions of language fall within the domain of pragmatics. It has been pointed out above that there are several parameters involved in conversation, each involving its own 'rules'; following the tradition of Grice, Leech calls these parameters principles. (It should be pointed out that Leech distinguishes 'rules' from 'principles' - see
It would be interesting then to be able to compare Leech's principles with Tannen's conversational styles and Lakoff's rules.

It might be clearer if the diagram from Leech's Pragmatics was reproduced here.

(From Fig. 1.4, p. 16)
What Lakoff and Tannen have been concerned with would seem to be encompassed in Leech's interpersonal rhetoric, and the Rules of Rapport can be associated with the Politeness Principle, Irony Principle, &c. It has been mentioned earlier that other parameters (principles) are also involved, such as interest and humour, so presumably one could posit the Interest Principle, of which humour can be an element. Most of the data analysed consists of conversation which, generally speaking, evince some kind of cooperation and feeling of goodwill, and there has not been any example of 'slanding matches' or instances of taunts and insults and other provocative behaviour. (This would be relevant in the consideration of Travesties, or in Night and Day, where there are instances of biting sarcasm.) Presumably, then, one could have not only a style of conversation which is characterised as 'high involvement' or 'high consideration' but also 'high animosity' or 'high hostility'.

The multiplicity of the principles involved suggest that conversation is indeed a complex social phenomenon (and indeed, the social nature of it needs to be emphasised, for, after all, ideas of politeness, cooperation and humour are social in origin). It might be helpful now to examine some of these principles in greater detail.
The Cooperative Principle

Grice’s maxims of conversation have been pretty well plotted out in books on discourse analysis and pragmatics, and is indeed the mainspring of Mary Louise Pratt’s Toward a Speech Act Theory of Literary Discourse, but it would be good, for the sake of completeness, for these to be considered here as well. The Cooperative Principle consists of the four maxims of conversation. The principle is expressed as follows.

The co-operative principle

make your contribution such as is required, at the stage at which it occurs, by the accepted purpose or direction of the talk exchange in which you are engaged.

The maxim of Quality

try to make your contribution one that is true, specifically:

(i) do not say what you believe to be false,

(ii) do not say that for which you lack adequate evidence.

The maxim of Quantity

(i) make your contribution as informative as is required for the current purposes of the exchange,

(ii) do not make your contribution more informative than is required.

The maxim of Relevance

make your contributions relevant.

The maxim of Manner

be perspicuous, and specifically:

(i) avoid obscurity,

(ii) avoid ambiguity,
(iii) be brief, and
(iv) be orderly.9

Grice's principles have been challenged by, for instance, Sperber and Wilson, for whom the maxim of relevance should be elevated to a principle, so that all the other maxims should be coalesced into that principle. They claim that the principle of relevance can be justified cognitively. That indeed might be so, but for the purposes of analysis, such a principle does not provide a workable tool. Hence, in spite of the danger of positing new principles ad infinitum (indeed, this is the charge that Sperber and Wilson have levelled against Leech's Pragmatics), having several intertwining principles might prove to be more methodologically sound for the purpose of analysis.

One of the ways in which inferences can be generated is if one or other of the maxims is flouted, that is, when one or other of the maxims is not followed, but for a definite purpose, most evident in the so-called comedy of manners.

Apart from being flouted (or exploited), the maxims can be violated - that is, when the speaker deliberately sets out to mislead the hearer; there can also be a clash when two or more maxims are at loggerheads with each other, so that one or more of the maxims have to be broken in order to fulfil another; or the speaker can opt out altogether by saying that he is unwilling to cooperate. But obviously, what is most interesting is when maxims are flouted because
it can be shown that the maxims can help generate implicatures. One can take note of the following example from Travesties.

TZARA: Eating and drinking, as usual, I see, Henry? I have often observed that Stoical principles are more easily borne by those of Epicurean habits.
CARR (stiffly): I believe it is done to drink a glass of hock and seltzer before luncheon, and it is well done to drink it well before luncheon.

(Travesties, p. 36)

Tzara’s and Carr’s speeches can be said to constitute an accusation followed by an excuse (that would be the pragmatic or illocutionary force of the utterances) in a way that must be considered circumlocutionary (thereby breaking the maxim of manner) to say the least, in a way that could be considered to be foregrounded. For instance, the same pragmatic force would be evinced by the following ‘adjacency pair’.

TZARA: You are eating and drinking again, Henry. You, who claim to observe Stoical principles, are showing signs of Epicureanism!
CARR: You cannot blame me. It is the done thing to have hock and seltzer before lunch, and if I have it well before lunch, so much the better!

A lot lost in the translation, it must be admitted! By the circumlocutionary use of language, Tzara and Carr (or is it Wilde, or perhaps Stoppard?) have broken the maxim of manner. The satisfaction derived from the syntactic neatness of the passage and its humour is lost in the paraphrased version. Its effect is patently different from the following example (from Levinson):

Miss Singer produced a series of sounds corresponding closely to the score of an aria from Rigoletto.
where the circumlocution can be justified because it yields the implicature that Miss Singer sang very badly. Even in such clear-cut cases of the exploitation or flouting of a maxim, there is still the question why a more direct style has not been used. Once again, the following sentence potentially has the same pragmatic force:

Miss Singer’s performance of the aria from Rigoletto was very lacking (in accuracy, style, &c.).

Thus, it is not only in instances when the maxims are broken, it would seem, gratuitously, but also in instances when they are actually exploited or flouted that Grice’s maxims do not provide the full and final interpretation to an utterance. Perhaps what can be said is that the original utterances are more humorous and interesting, simply because they are more unusual and novel, which provides a case for the evocation of the Interest Principle. Much can be said for producing a novel and original expression, and this would appear to be the motivation for flouting certain of Grice’s maxims.

What the ‘translation’ of the passage from Travesties has done is not only to rob it of humour, but also of the almost Augustan neatness in and balance between Stoical principles and Epicurean habits (adjective + noun pattern, each adjective being derived from the name of a philosophical school), and done/before and well done/well before (which is a fallacious argument, being derived from word play and punning). This could be said to conform to the pattern of rejoinders and repartees. Again, this is not accounted for in Grice’s maxims. The humour derived from
the fallacious argument must be interpreted as part of the extradiegetic 'message' and intention. The incongruity is not to be attributed to young Carr (or Jack in The Importance) because the characters are psychologically naïve. The distinction between naturalistic drama (with the implication of psychologically sophisticated characters, for instance Ruth in Night and Day) and stylised drama (with the implication of more naïve, 'straight' characters, for instance young Carr and Tzara above, and Dolly in You Never Can Tell below) is therefore important. Of course, the situation is not as straightforward as all this because young Carr and Tzara do make extensive use of indirect speech acts as noted above.

One can consider another example, this time from Night and Day which is considered a more naturalistic play than Travesties.

WAGNER: Do you know London, Ruth?
RUTH: Oh, rather. Good old London eh? ... the red buses scattering pigeons in Trafalgar Square ....
CARSON: Yes, indeed.
RUTH: Covent Garden porters with baskets of fruit and veg piled on their heads, threading their way among the flower girls and professors of linguistics.
CARSON: All gone now.
RUTH: Flexing their native wit against the inimitable banter of the pearly kings .... The good old London bobby keeping a fatherly eye on the children feeding the beefeaters outside Buckingham Palace ...
CARSON: Oh, all right.
RUTH: ... giving himself a glancing blow with his riot shield every time a tourist asks him the time.

(Night and Day, 2nd edn., p. 43)

This can be seen as violating the maxim of Quantity because Ruth has already answered the question by just saying 'Oh, rather'. Instead, she chooses to describe London
from the clichés of travel brochures and *My Fair Lady/Pygmalion*. One the one hand, one can consider that Ruth has flouted the maxim of quantity, implying that Wagner has asked a stupid question. Indeed her husband (Carson) takes it on the surface level, as can be seen in his first naïve response, 'All gone now'. But as has been mentioned above, dwelling on another's faux pas is potentially rude, so that the interpretation of Ruth's statements would depend very much on the relationship between Ruth and Wagner. Once again, as in the passage from *Travesties*, there is patterning in Ruth's speech, typically \(<\text{NP} + \text{V-ing their NP} + \text{preposition} + \text{NP}>\), evoking, presumably the Interest Principle (though the effect is presumed to be ironic, being imitative of the language of travel brochures, &c.). Thus, there needs to be more than Grice's maxims to come to terms with the inter-character interaction in texts.

Indeed, one could think of Ruth not so much as merely imitating the clichés of travel brochures, but also parodying them, and this is interesting in this present context, as it is an ostensible case of 'intertextuality' (to borrow a term that has admittedly been overused) because it conjures up the attitudes, and not just the words, associated with travel-brochure language. In this situation, there seems to be a side comment on the inadequacy of the attitudes concomitant with the travel industry which insists on giving just a superficial view of the tourist spot in question.
Whilst conversation is more complex than merely following or breaking Grice's maxims, they can be used powerfully to characterise a character’s speech. This has been done in relation to Pinter’s The Caretaker, for instance.10

Therefore, the Cooperative Principle can be seen as a strand that can be used in the analysis of conversation, and could provided a systematic manner of looking at texts, although very often one has to make use of other principles as well. Cooperation has be be seen not only on the level of character-interaction in plays, but also on the level of author-reader (or audience) level of interaction. In this context, it is relevant to ask whether a technique such as parody can be considered as violating the Cooperative Principle because it calls for a higher level of 'knowledge' (at least a nodding acquaintance with the source text) and generally complicates the communicational channel by the inclusion of an 'oblique' addresser. The end result of parody might prove to be baffling to the reader and thus violate the Maxim of Manner. Pratt8 has, for instance, applied the Cooperative Principle to author-reader interaction, and has proposed the concept of tellability in relation to narrative. But much like the Cooperative Principle in inter-character discourse, complete observance would result in tedious and unoriginal texts; complete cooperation ultimately implies, among other things, a strict compliance with generic norms, and hence to readers’ expectations. In the case of literature, strict adherence to generic norms seems to result in popular 'pulp' fiction (Mills-and-Boon-type
novellettes for romance fiction, or Agatha Christie-type whodunnits for detective fiction, or Alastair Maclean-type stories for spy-detective fiction). Thus, Travesties is 'uncooperative' not only because of its parodic nature, but also because of its lack of fit into a particular generic mould (and among the generic types suggested include Shavian dialectic drama, Brechtian epic theatre and Nabokovian autobiographical fiction).

The Politeness Principle

It can be noted that Lakoff talks of the Clarity and Rapport rules. But for Leech, the distinction between rules and principles is crucial, mainly to emphasise that principles are social in origin (q.v., his second postulate: 'Semantics is rule-governed (grammatical); general pragmatics is principle-controlled (rhetorical)', p. 21). And indeed the Politeness Principle can be seen as the epitome of that which is social.

The maxims of the Politeness Principle have been summarised as follows.

(I) TACT MAXIM (in impositives and commissives)
   (a) Minimise cost to other [(b) Maximise benefit to other]

(II) GENEROSITY MAXIM (in impositives and commisives)
   (a) Minimise benefit to self [(b) Maximise cost to self]

(III) APPROBATION MAXIM (in expressives and assertives)
   (a) Minimise dispraise of other [(b) Maximise praise of other]
(IV) MODESTY MAXIM (in expressives and assertives)
   (a) Minimise praise of self [(b) Maximise dispraise of self]

(V) AGREEMENT MAXIM (in assertives)
   (a) Minimise disagreement between self and other [(b) Maximise agreement between self and other]

(VI) SYMPATHY MAXIM (in assertives)
   (a) Minimise antipathy between self and other [(b) Maximise sympathy between self and other]

Once again, one can look at Tzara’s accusation dealt with in the previous section and see the alternatives available for him.

(1) Eating and drinking as usual, I see, Henry?
(2) You are eating and drinking again, Henry.
(3) You haven’t given up your bad habit of eating and drinking excessively, I see.
(4) Why haven’t you given up your bad habit of eating and drinking excessively, Henry?
(5) This is just downright disgraceful and absolutely disgusting! Every time I see you, you are gorging down food by the hundredweight and imbibing alcohol by the gallon. If you keep going on like this, you will be six feet underground by tomorrow.

Once again, there is a gradation from (1) through to (5) of increasing directness in the accusation, and depending on the context, (1) could either be more polite, or more menacing than (5). So there seems to be a case for
introducing the Politeness Principle in the analysis of drama texts. What is evident here is that politeness works on two levels - on the level of form, and of content. With the same speech act, in this case accusation, one could choose a politer or a less polite way of doing it. There is the choice of a politer speech act as well, and in this case Tzara could have chosen to ignore Carr’s eating and drinking habits. The approbation maxim (‘minimise dispraise of other’) would seem to have been violated. On the question of form, Leech has postulated that one can ‘increase the degree of politeness by using a more and more indirect kind of illocution’,\textsuperscript{12} although this has been disputed;\textsuperscript{13} however, Leech’s point can be said to hold true generally.

As has been mentioned above, (5) could possibly be a very rude statement, or be a sign of camaraderie (Tannen’s ‘high involvement’ style)\textsuperscript{14} - and possibly, the exaggerated statements would point to the latter, used to give more colour to the statement.

Lakoff\textsuperscript{15} (q.v. supra) sets the variable of politeness against the variable of rapport, so that the level of politeness can be a clue to the level of rapport. Lakoff uses the term camaraderie to refer not only to a positive rapport but also a negative one (i.e., friendship and enmity), and at the other end of the continuum, distance refers to a lack of relationship (as in the relationship between strangers). This attempt at matching the two variables is interesting, and allows one to make statements not only about the phenomenon of politeness in drama dialogue,
which manifests itself on the surface structure most obviously, but also allows an interpolation to the interpersonal relationship between characters.

However, the issue (like most human issues) is a fairly complicated one. Furthermore, the polarity (whether positive or negative) of the relationship between characters seems sufficiently crucial in plays to want to separate them to either end of the scale, with neutral relationship (Lakoff’s distance) right at the centre. As will be seen later, the curve showing the variable of politeness plotted against the variable of rapport (interactivity/interpersonal relationship) is not a symmetrical one, which necessitates the separation of positive rapport from negative rapport. The phenomenon of politeness itself, moreover, is not straightforward either because it is culture specific and is in a constant state of flux in time, in the sense that the desirable ‘norms’ differ from period to period. (The notion of ‘norms’ in pragmatics has been attacked on ideological grounds, but this will be discussed below.) Politeness can be distinguished on the level of form and content as well, so that there can not only be formal politeness, but also illocutionary politeness, as has been mentioned above.

Roger Sell distinguishes between selectional politeness (which would include questions of fashion and taboos, direct and indirect speech acts, and levels of lexicalisation - which would seem to include illocutionary and formal
politeness covered above) and **presentational politeness** (which would determine the extent of verbalisation, and thus be analogous to Grice’s maxim of quantity).

I would suggest a division of politeness into *selectional politeness* and *presentational politeness*. A writer who maintained absolute politeness of selection would scrupulously observe all the taboos and conventions of social and moral decorum. He would never choose anything to say, or any words to say it in, that would be in the least bit offensive to his likely readers. A writer maintaining absolute politeness of presentation would observe the Cooperative Principle at all costs, so that his readers would never be in the slightest doubt as to what was happening, what he meant, or why something was tellable. If he did flout this principle, the point of what he was saying would be easily ascertainable through obvious implicature.17

Obviously, Sell’s ‘selectional politeness’ would come under the Cooperative Principle in the present analysis; and his ‘presentational politeness’ under the Politeness Principle, which is here subdivided into the Principles of Formal Politeness and Illocutionary Politeness. Sell’s work on the so-called area of Pragmatic Stylistics is interesting as the Cooperative and Politeness Principles are applied to the extradiegetic18 level of discourse, which does much to demythologise literary texts; authors and writers are seen to have to observe some level of politeness with their readers and audiences. In a work such as *Travesties* where the author’s relationship with the reader is crucial (one can think of the protests at Cecily’s lecture being boring or problematic as charges that Stoppard has been superciliously uncooperative with or impolite to his audience); in fact, parody and irony and other techniques have been pointed out by Sell not to be consonant with the requirements of selectional politeness (i.e. the Cooperative Principle).
Some level of balance has to be struck between the trade-off of cooperation or politeness for interest, novelty, and so on, and a balance has got to be struck if a literary work is to be viable at all.

The phenomenon of politeness is also complicated by the question of how much of politeness is merely convention and how much of it genuinely expresses the desires and feelings of the speaker. Excessive politeness would smack of servility, and inadequate politeness would lead to charges to insensitivity. The other problematising factor is the fact that the Politeness Principle is pitted not only against Grice’s maxims of conversation (with its emphasis on Clarity and the transactional or ideational function of language) but also the desire of the speaker to ‘save face’, or at least not to ‘lose face’. In a sense, some examples of the Politeness Principle can be said to be a result of a face-saving desire on the part of the speaker in the sense that the speaker would wish to show himself socially competent. (In this case then politeness would be merely conventional, and does not necessarily imply heartfelt feeling on the part of the speaker. For instance, a ‘Thank you’, especially with a low-high intonation pattern does not necessarily imply genuine gratitude on the part of the speaker.) The balance between politeness (especially illocutionary politeness) and face-saving is necessary to avoid any impression of either obsequiousness or rudeness and arrogance should the balance be tipped to either end of the scale. In some ways, face-saving has been built into some
aspects of polite behaviour. It is normal to expect an excuse after an apology, so that if there were no real excuse, one would have to say so (‘I’m sorry; there was no real excuse for it’, &c.). On the other hand, an excuse is polite as it makes use of the approbation maxim, because the one who makes the excuse, by making it at all, implies that the one to whom the excuse is made is in a position to have the right to know why an act of transgression has been made against him and the right to expect that the act of transgression was not committed gratuitously. (Generally, any act that confers rights to others is a polite act, and this concept needs to be incorporated into Leech’s Politeness Principle.) On the other hand, an excuse is a face-saving device and carries the implication, ‘I am not the wretch you make me out to be!’ and thus goes against the Modesty Maxim. This can be seen as another example of Grice’s clash of maxims.

Indeed, Brown and Levinson have analysed politeness in terms of the concept of ‘face’. They distinguish between ‘negative face’ - ‘the desire of every speaker that his actions should be unimpeded by others’ - and ‘positive face’ - ‘the desire of every speaker that his wants should be desirable to at least some others’. In other words, a person concerned with negative face would try to impose less on another person, whilst a person concerned with positive face would try to give the other person a positive, attractive image. Impolite acts are therefore face-threatening acts (FTA’s), whether the face be positive or negative.
FTA's can be either off-record or on-record. The former would be what would normally be called a hint, where an utterance might take the form of a declarative (for instance, 'It's a bit draughty in here' instead of 'Shut the window!'). Furthermore, an on-record FTA can be either redressive or bald and non-redressive; the former would manifest some level of politeness (for instance, 'Could you shut the window?' or 'I wonder if you can shut the window', as opposed to 'Shut the window!'). This can, of course, be set out diagrammatically, in the tradition of systemic grammar, as a series of choices:

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- Don't perform FTA
  Perform FTA - off record
    on record - bald
      redressive - positive pol.
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Also in the tradition of systemic grammar, there would have to be the proviso that there is a cline relationship between the most impolite act and the most polite act. When compared with the classification here, performing an FTA can be equated with illocutionary impoliteness; and off-record FTA's and redressive on-record FTA's and bald on-record FTA's represent a cline within formal politeness. It would be apparent then that a concept of politeness based on Leech's maxims is not dissonant with one based on 'face', although the notion of face complicates matters because, as
has been suggested above, the hearer’s ‘face’ has got to be balanced with the speaker’s ‘face’; Brown and Levinson seem to be concerned with the hearer’s ‘face’ only.

There, is, however, another aspect of politeness that seems to have been left out of consideration in the various studies on politeness, and that is the question of politeness in relation to the third person - politeness vis-à-vis a non-participant in the discourse situation. It is not clear whether in such a situation a speaker would feel constrained to mitigate an impolite comment on a third person, or perhaps even to avoid it altogether. One can say intuitively that there must be constraints in the representation of a third person: one might surmise that such a strategy makes the speaker appear altruistic or charitable, and thereby maintain the speaker’s positive ‘face’. Such a consideration would not be irrelevant to Travesties because Old Carr is seen to be desirous of putting down and disparaging Joyce in his memoirs, clearly in Joyce’s absence (‘him dead in the cemetery up the hill’), and in this situation impoliteness towards a third person can make it appear that the speaker has an axe to grind.

If it were possible to plot the level of politeness against the level of interactivity (or interpersonal relationship), it would probably take the following form.
The fact that the graphs are not symmetrical justifies the bipolar separation of Lakoff's 'camaraderie' ('Camaraderie explicitly acknowledges that a relationship exists and is important, whether one of friendliness or hostility', ibid., p. 65). Fig. 1 implies that speech acts can be arranged according to the level of politeness and that the higher the level of interactivity between the persons concerned, the more likely is the illocutionary politeness to be greater. The shaded area implies that in cases of high interactivity, a person might feel confident enough to put it at risk by performing 'impolite' speech acts such as criticising (although one could justify that by saying that the impolite
speech act was performed - in a meta-speech act manner - for the ultimate good of the person concerned or of the relationship).

Fig. 2 implies the possibility of rendering a particular speech act in different ways ('surface structures', if one can borrow Chomsky's term), and this is what will be designated as 'formal politeness'. Formal politeness decreases generally with increased friendliness and also with increased hostility. The shaded area shows that it is possible to imply increasing hostility by increasing formal politeness, in which situation formal politeness could be thought of as being ironic.

It must be emphasised that the graphs represent general tendencies only, and a playwright could reasonably assume his audience or readers to have some grasp of this phenomenon, and certainly plays towards the naturalistic end of the spectrum would capitalise on this phenomenon.

To return to literature and the Politeness Principle, Leech has, for instance, attempted a study of G. Bernard Shaw's *You Never Can Tell* (1898) with the help of these principles. This comedy involves Mrs Clandon and her three children Gloria, Dolly and Philip, and Mrs Clandon's estranged husband Mr Crampton (Mrs Clandon has retained her maiden name after the estrangement), whom she has not seen for eighteen years. The children have been brought up in Madeira, and they are now in the coast of Torbay in Devon, and the action takes place in August 1896. It is because
the children have not been brought up in an English-speaking environment that there are some bizarre effects in some of their exchanges.

DENTIST: ... Why didn't you let me give you gas?
YOUNG LADY [DOLLY]: Because you said it would be five shillings extra.
DENTIST (shocked): Oh, don't say that. It makes me feel as if I had hurt you for the sake of five shillings.
YOUNG LADY (with cool insolence): Well, so you have.21

It must be obvious that this dialogue, naturalistically speaking, is slightly odd to say the least - and is thus 'foregrounded' - not syntactically or semantically, but pragmatically. On the one hand, the young lady seems to be observing the maxim of Quality by giving an honest and straightforward answer to the dentist's question. However, what the young lady seems to have broken is the Politeness Principle. The dentist (Valentine) obeys the Tact Maxim by referring to a situation where the cost (in terms of pain) to other would be minimised (Dolly's pain would have been relieved had she been given gas). Dolly interprets Valentine's sentence as a straight question, not considering the other interpretation of the sentence as an assertive ('You should have let me give you gas'). She breaks the Generosity Maxim by trying to minimise the cost to herself (in monetary terms) rather than maximising it. So not surprisingly, Valentine is shocked because, by saying that she refused gas because it would have cost her five shillings more, she has brazenly pronounced herself a niggard.

Apart from that (as Valentine himself exclaims), Dolly's statement suggests that Valentine is excessively calculating when it comes to money matters (thereby breaking
the Approbation Maxim). Using terms from semantics, one could say that this is a possible implicature from Dolly’s first utterance. And indeed, Valentine expresses this implicature in unreal terms (‘as if I had ...’) hoping that this implicature would be annulled or cancelled, hesitantly bringing out the olive branch for Dolly to accept. Dolly’s unabashed affirmation of the implicature makes it doubly impolite because Valentine has given her the opportunity to retrieve herself, as it were.

This exchange takes place near the very beginning of the play, and it would not be surprising that one of the main themes of the play is the way to live out one’s principles in society (principle now used in its non-pragmatic sense, for Mrs Clandon could be seen as a proto-suffragette!). Here, Dolly has put the maxim of Quantity far above the maxims of the Politeness Principle and shows up her awkwardness in being unable to strike some kind of an equilibrium, and makes one suspect that her mother’s method of upbringing is in some way lacking. Apart from this the scene is extremely funny simply because of this incongruity between Dolly’s lack of sophistication and her complacent self-satisfaction.

Perhaps one can have a look at Night and Day again.

RUTH: I’m sorry I wasn’t here to greet you Mr ... Guthrie. I had to go into Jeddu to pick up some things.
GUTHRIE: The boy said it was okay to wait in the garden. Is that all right?
RUTH: Of course.

... .................................................................

RUTH: ... (Pause) By the way, we don’t call them boy
any more. The idea is, if we don't call them boy they won’t chop us with their machetes. (Brief smile.) Small point.

(GUTHRIE holds his arm out, palm to the ground.)

GUTHRIE: Boy about this high, fair hair, your mouth, knows about cameras, has a Kodak himself; said I could wait in the garden.

(RUTH acknowledges her mistake, but GUTHRIE pushes it.)

His name’s Alastair.

(He has pushed it too far and she snaps at him.)

RUTH: I know his bloody name.

GUTHRIE: (Olive branch) The one I use mainly is a motorized F2 Nikon. [Ruth has previously asked, ‘What kind of camera do you use?’] (Sips tea.) Lovely.

(Second edition, pp. 17-19)

The speech acts in this extract could be characterised as follows:

1. Ruth apologises (for not being around when Guthrie arrived, and gives an excuse).

2. Guthrie requests confirmation of permission (to wait in the garden).

3. Ruth agrees.

4. Ruth comments on the inappropriateness of the word (‘boy’) used by Guthrie (and gives a reason for the inappropriateness).

5. Guthrie invalidates Ruth’s criticism by pointing out that he used ‘boy’ to refer to Alastair, not Francis, the African servant, as Ruth had thought.

6. Ruth criticises Guthrie for dwelling on her mistake.

7. Guthrie steers the conversation to ‘safer ground’, answering Ruth’s earlier question, and commenting on the tea.
As has been mentioned above, the phenomenon of politeness can be applied not only to the 'surface structure' of the speech act itself, but also to the speech act or illocution made by a character. Therefore, Nos. 1, 2, 3 and 7 can be seen as essentially polite speech acts, and one can appeal to some of Leech's maxims of politeness, although it is here that one realises that the maxims are in some ways deficient. No. 1 can be said to obey the modesty maxim ('maximise dispraise of self'); No. 4 follows the agreement maxim ('maximise agreement between self and other'); and No. 7 again takes the lead from the agreement maxim ('minimise disagreement between self and other' - by changing the subject). No. 2 is slightly more problematic, however. By requesting permission to remain in the garden, given him by Alastair, Guthrie confers on Ruth the right or the authority over her house and garden, and thereby does not become over-presumptuous, and therefore gives Ruth a positive 'face'. Being cognisant of the other's authority does not seem to have been characterised in Leech's politeness maxims (unless one thinks of this as an oblique way of 'praising' Ruth), because requests do not seem to have been included in the scheme outlined above. (It has been noted above that any act which confers rights to another or recognises the authority of another is a polite act, and certainly, a request would qualify as a polite speech act under these terms.)

Nos. 4, 5 and 6 are in essence impolite because they constitute criticisms of the other, thereby violating the so-called agreement maxim. What is interesting is the
varied 'surface structure' these impolite speech acts take. In No. 5, Ruth uses the more indirect declarative mood ('...we don’t call...') rather than the imperative ('don’t call...'); she further downplays the criticism by the meta-statement 'Small point'. There is also the reason behind her criticism, which is developed in an almost picturesque manner ('... chop us with their machetes'), which makes it not only more interesting, but also gives it a local African flavour (i.e., the mention of 'machetes').

No. 5 is again more than just a straight criticism of Ruth’s jumping to the wrong conclusion, and Guthrie could just have said, ‘Actually, I was referring to Alastair’, and actually apologised for the ambiguous use of ‘the boy’. Instead of this, however, he refers to Alastair in a circumlocutory manner, and by dwelling on Ruth’s mistake he is breaking the approbation maxim ('minimise dispraise of other'). The strategy of expansion has also been used by Ruth in No. 4, but she appends her comment with a brief smile, and the comment 'Small point'. In the case of No. 5, instead of trying to appease Ruth, Guthrie presses his point further, indicative of his irritation at Ruth’s smugness when pointing out his 'mistake', or perhaps his desire to tease and embarrass her, so that No. 6 comes out in a more direct manner without any appeal to the Interest Principle, emphasised with the expletive bloody.

What can be seen here is that the character of the conversation changes after No. 3 because of the introduction of an impolite speech act which causes a crease in the fabric
of the conversation. One can take note of the strategies used by Ruth and Guthrie in Nos. 3 and 4, and talk of Ruth’s caustic sense of humour and Guthrie’s matter-of-fact attitude; they cannot be said to be conversationally naïve then. The difference between this passage and the other one from *You Never Can Tell* is clear enough, but in spite of the complexity of some of the speech turns in the passage from *Night and Day*, appeal to the Politeness Principle proved to be helpful.

The analysis seems to throw light on the character of Ruth and Guthrie, so that from this passage, the reader/audience can surmise that Ruth has the tendency to stir things up, because, after all, it was she who initiated the impolite speech act. One can also see that Guthrie will not take things lying down, but would certainly try to get his own back. These readings would be tentative and would have to be confirmed by the rest of the play, but they still vindicate the usefulness of an appeal to the Principle of Politeness.

Thus far, only the inner discourse situation has been analysed in terms of Politeness, but, as has been mentioned earlier, there is a case for applying these pragmatic concepts to the outer discourse situation. However, it is more difficult to consider the politeness of the author, rather than his cooperation, which has been discussed earlier.
The ideological trap of pragmatic stylistics

Roger Sell states in no uncertain terms that pragmatic stylistics is not radical in the way that many post-structuralist approaches are.

Literary Pragmatics is not in the least revolutionary. Many literary scholars have acknowledged the essential point of reader-writer interaction all along, and many scholars have already reacted against formalism.22

Perhaps the danger of tagging on the pragmatics of non-literary discourse to literary discourse is that the norms of 'ordinary' discourse are simplistically transferred to literary discourse. More than that, it is all too easy to see Cooperation and Politeness as norms (in quantitative terms) but also as that which should be aimed at. The notion of the norm has also been seen as being ideologically charged.

The point that one should be sceptical of a universal Cooperative Principle applicable to all texts has already be brought to the fore by Mary L. Pratt in her article, 'Ideology and Speech-Act Theory'23 where she criticises Searle and Grice for privileging 'personal' discourse (as opposed to 'institutional' discourse where one would speak for, or as a representative of, the institution one is concerned with) because 'speaking "for myself", "from the heart" names only one position among the many from which a person might speak in the course of everyday life. At other points, that person will be speaking, for instance, as a member of some collective, or as a rank in a hierarchy, and so forth' (p. 63). The question of intentionality needs to be examined more closely, because what one says is affected by which hat one has got on at the moment. For instance, if a doctor
says, 'You can confide in me not only as your G.P. but also as your friend', he implies that his reaction and response does in some way depend on the role he perceives himself to be in. It would not be difficult to imagine a situation when there could be potential conflict between what a person would say as a doctor and what he would say as a friend. Intentionality therefore needs to be perceived as a function of social rôle, whether one is speaking from a personal point of view or whether one is acting as a spokesman for someone else or for a group of people. This is crucial when considering drama because, as has been mentioned, dramatic communication is not straightforward due to its layered nature. The issue is complicated by the fact that there are at least two levels of intentionality - not only are dramatists speaking, but the characters in the drama are speaking as well, and dramatists can (in most cases, anyway) speak through their characters only. Speech Act theory must therefore be cognisant of such situations as well because speech acts and intentionality may be refracted through other people.

Apart from this, Pratt also faults the Gricean maxims for favouring the norms of 'emotive distancing, and commitment to efficiency and factualness that hold for predominantly male, professional, especially intellectual, discourse (such as this essay, for example)' (pp. 67-68), so that questions of affective relations or power relations or the question of shared goals is left out of consideration and modes of discourse which do not emphasise relevance,
efficiency and truthfulness are marginalised. The same can probably be said of Leech's Politeness Principle: politeness implies other-orientation as opposed to self-orientation, so that altruism and magnanimity are prized. It has been suggested above that there are 'face' requirements not only for the hearer, but also for the speaker, and again, it would appear that there are modes of discourse which do not emphasise other-orientation. Much of literary discourse would not easily accept the qualities of efficiency and truth as being those sought for, and so it occupies a rather uneasy position in relation to Speech Act Theory. The notion of politeness also sits dubiously vis-à-vis literary discourse. Sperber and Wilson,24 for instance, in their study of Pragmatic Principles, bring to the foreground Grice's maxim of relation and elevate it to a Principle of Relevance which would take into account the other maxims by emphasising the question of efficiency. Once again, the concern with efficient language is obvious, to the detriment of other forms of language use.

As has been mentioned by Pratt, language is used for a gamut of purposes, and when one is quarrelling or gossiping or flattering or mimicking or teasing or doing a whole host of other things, one does not necessarily have efficiency or strict truthfulness as an ideal to be aimed at. There has been a lot of insight from Speech Act Theory enabling language to be seen as not merely ideational (to use Halliday's terms) or transactional but also interpersonal or interactional; in other words, language is not only used to carry
out the business of the world, so that it can be said that when one makes an utterance, the language used not only accomplishes something (in terms of speech acts) but it also maintains relationships, among other things. Not all language fits into the 'utilitarian' mould and to re-cast all data to fit the mould only does injury to the data. What is needed is a theory that is more wide-encompassing and would take into account various facets of language use. However, Leech’s notion of ‘interpersonal rhetoric’ as opposed to 'textual rhetoric' (see above) goes some way towards redressing the balance; one might want to think of the Cooperative Principle as having more to do with textual rhetoric than intertextual rhetoric as Leech has considered it.

One could of course go back to Jakobson,25 in his six functions of language including the renowned ‘Poetic Function’ which is said to be important in literary texts and other para-literary texts (such as advertisements and jokes based on word-play). What he has got right is to emphasise that not just one function is in operation at any one time, but that several might be operative simultaneously. Indeed, Pratt brings out the same point when she says that ‘One must be able to talk about reader/text/author relations that are coercive, subversive, conflictive, submissive, as well as cooperative, and about relations that are some or all of these simultaneously or at different points of a text. Such developments would considerably enrich the speech-act account of avant garde texts, and of "resisting readings" ... of the sort discussed by many feminist critics’ (p. 70).
Perhaps a word of warning would not be out of place here, because it is felt that there is the danger of going overboard in constantly trying to undermine the author and to try to psychoanalyse him and thereby convincing oneself that there is a demon behind every bush. In many political or feminist or deconstructionist readings of texts, critics have sometimes been over-concerned about 'showing up' the author and thereby give a skewed picture of the text in question. It is therefore felt here that there is the danger of giving an unbalanced reading by making use of some of these 'resisting reading' methods because there is the possibility of doing violence and injury to the text. This is not to deny that power relations, for instance, can be gleaned from texts, and that not only between characters in the text but also between the author and the reader. Such an analysis would obviously be fruitful in respect of political discourse such as campaign speeches. What is denied here is that it is always helpful to examine power relations in every text, and from that label it radical or bourgeois or imperialist. (One could consider the rather shrill rhetoric and blanket approach in Ngugi's criticism of some texts, for instance.) This would seem to savour of a McCarthy witch-hunt and it would not be the business of a literary critic, much less that of a stylistician, to do that. The notion of politeness as opposed to that of power has been used here because it seems to be more generalisable; the notion of power is politically laden, and can potentially distort one's view of a text.
The question is where one would proceed from here. Leech has already proposed additional principles such as the Politeness and Irony and Banter Principles to go together with Grice’s Cooperative Principle. Making use of the Hallidayan model of language functions, Leech describes a transaction between addressee and addressee occurring in three different planes. Communication on the interpersonal plane (i.e., discourse) is achieved by means of an ideational transaction (i.e., representation), which in turn is achieved by means of a textual transaction (i.e., text). Each level of linguistic function has its own principles of effective communication. Grice’s Cooperative Principle, for instance, could be located on the level of representation; in Leech’s parlance, the Cooperative Principle is an example of ideational rhetoric (this seems to run counter to his chart in Pragmatics). However, there may be occasions when, for instance, the interpersonal (or in Jakobson’s terms, the emotive and conative) function of language overrides some of the constraints of the ideals of the ideational function. Other principles such as the Politeness Principle or even others like the Animosity Principle could be located on the interpersonal level of communication. Jakobson’s poetic function could then be fitted into the scheme by seeing it as being controlled by the Interest Principle, which could be seen as an example of interpersonal rhetoric. How far should one proceed with these additional principles then? Should one go on to talk of a Coercive Principle, a Conflictive Principle, a Subversive
Principle, a Submissive Principle? (Pratt, p. 70) Would maxims like 'exaggerate the other person's fault' or 'try to get the last word in' which are operative in quarrels fit into a Quarrelling Principle or perhaps into a more generalised Animosity Principle? At present with the inchoative and seminal state of things in Pragmatics, it would seem well nigh impossible to come up with a neat classificatory list of the available principles and sub-principles with their accompanying maxims, such is the complexity of human linguistic behaviour. On the other hand, it would oversimplify and falsify things to analyse texts on the basis of a supra-principle, and probably the best solution at the moment would be to consider each text on its own merit. This is, of course, not without precedent, as, for instance, in Hess-Lüttich's 'Maxims of Maliciousness: Sheridan's School for Conversation'. In such a situation then uncooperativeness can be seen not so much as aberrations in behaviour but as conforming to an alternative set of Principles. It might be helpful to note that some of the new 'Principles' put forward by Pratt and others relate to discourse types or genres such as quarrelling, which are not as generalisable as Politeness or Cooperation. Some of the other Principles suggested relate to the lack of Politeness or Cooperation. Therefore, it would seem helpful to distinguish between notions that can be generalisable through a broad spectrum of texts such as Politeness or Cooperation or Interest, and particular features said to be held in common by particular discourse types, or perhaps within certain
schemata. Obviously, an advertisement differs from a sports commentary; a joke differs from a sermon; a letter differs from a lecture. The 'rules' relating to discourse types or scenarios are more akin to the felicity or appropriateness conditions governing speech acts than to pragmatic principles, because discourse types can be linked to generic speech acts. One can consider Pratt's earlier notion of an author's generic speech act being that of an assertion, and from there proceed to expatiate on the felicity conditions of assertions. It might therefore be confusing the issue to talk of the Cooperative Principle in the same breath as the Quarrelling Principle. What is needed might be a Principle marked by its lack of Politeness or Cooperation (perhaps an Animosity Principle).

It has been suggested that readers have to be alerted to the discourse type or schema they are encountering, and one notable example of such a study is Labov's 'rules for ritual insults' (otherwise known as sounding, signifying, woofing, &c.), where such rules obviously run counter to the maxims of the Politeness Principle. Other non-efficient, non-intellectual discourse types might also have 'rules' that run counter to the maxims of Politeness and Cooperation.

It must be remembered that Grice of course allows for the possibility of flouting/exploiting, violating, clashing and opting out of his maxims, so that in a sense unprincipled - or rather, one should say uncooperative - linguistic behaviour has been taken into account. The complaint
of Pratt against Grice and Co. is then not so much on methodological grounds but on ideological grounds (as is obvious from the title of her article), for in making cooperative behaviour unmarked, Grice has effectively labelled quarrelling, punning and other linguistic behaviour marked, and therefore untypical, marginal and perhaps even undesirable. On methodological grounds, however, it is possible to see the Cooperative Principle as being unmarked without in any way implying that cooperative behaviour is always superior and the most desirable or appropriate, and taking the cue from the formalists’ notion of ostonenien or defamiliarisation, one can talk of deautomatisation or foregrounding when there is in fact uncooperative behaviour. Whilst the Cooperative Principle does in fact take into account uncooperative behaviour when it talks of violation and opting out, it does not proceed to inquire why it is that a maxim has been flouted, violated, and so on. In other words, there needs to be a recognition that not only can there be a clash of maxims, but also a clash of Principles.

One can take an obvious example.

REGISTRAR: And how are we today?
PATIENT: I’m really feeling a bit poorly.

And the patient could be said to be completely cooperative in that he has been truthful, relevant, perspicuous and not saying too much or too little. On the other hand, the following exchange could have taken place.

REGISTRAR: And how are we today?
PATIENT: I’m not too bad, really.
Assuming that it is the same patient, he has in this case violated the maxim of quality in that he has uttered that which is not strictly true. One must, however, account for the violation of the maxim because one is not normally uncooperative gratuitously. In this example, one can bring in Leech’s Politeness Principle and say that the patient has said what he did in deference to the Generosity Maxim (‘minimise cost to other’) in that he does not want to create a stir or alarm the registrar, and perhaps even to the Agreement Maxim (‘maximise agreement with other’) in that he supposes that the registrar hopes that he is all right and he is willing to go along with that. One could also have the following exchange taking place.

REGISTRAR: Good afternoon, Mr Marlow. How are we today?
MARLOW: I’m not very happy. I don’t know about him.
REGISTRAR: Sorry?
MARLOW: Or perhaps you mean you?
REGISTRAR: I don’t follow -
MARLOW: (Sigh) You said ‘How are we today?’ We. I wondered who the other or others -
REGISTRAR: Come, come. A manner of speaking.32

Here, of course, the patient (Marlow) deliberately chooses to misunderstand the registrar; he is uncooperative in that he gives an irrelevant answer (‘I don’t know about him’), and is also obscure, prompting the registrar to ask him for his meaning (‘Sorry?’, ‘I don’t follow -’). In this situation, one can say that another Principle is in operation, so that Marlow subverts the registrar’s original question. This could perhaps be the Animosity Principle, and the use of this Principle would be indicative of the user’s attitude towards the other and also his own outlook. He is not
disposed to please anyone else; neither is he feeling too cheerful at the moment, as is borne out by the lines that follow a little later in the same scene.

REGISTRAR: Not feeling too great? Well. That's not very surprising, is it? You're going through a tough time at the moment.
MARLOW: Look. I'm impressed with your astonishing powers of deduction, which surpass even those of the great Holmes himself - (ibid., p. 38)

Now, Marlow is not only being uncooperative but also being positively impolite by implying that anyone could have seen that he was 'not feeling too great' (specifically, he has broken Leech's Approbation Maxim by dispraising the registrar). The interesting thing, however, is that on the face of it, Marlow seems to be obeying the Politeness Principle because his utterance is, superficially, a compliment to the registrar. The utterance is of course ironic (signalled by the exaggeration - the registrar's 'astonishing powers' of deduction, surpassing those of the great Holmes), and Leech might want to say that the Irony Principle is in operation here as well, indicative of Marlow's outlook - an ironic one which implies a certain amount of detachment from and cynicism at things.

Whilst Marlow is obviously having recourse to some kind of Animosity Principle in the above example, it is noteworthy that a Humour Principle is in operation as well because the exchange must be admitted to being amusing, if not humorous. It is not Marlow who is trying to be funny (funny in the ha-ha sense, anyway) but rather the author; in other words, the Humour Principle is located in the outer discourse situation, that is, that between the author and the
audience/reader, because it would be part of the intention of Dennis Potter to entertain. The problem of multiple-layered discourse in drama has already been alluded to earlier. The Principle would be in operation in a joke as well:

A: What do you call a deer with no eye?
B: I don’t know. What do you call a deer with no eye?
A: No-eye deer/No idea.

Again, the utterances would be pointless from the Gricean perspective. If one could posit an Interest Principle which would take into account witty repartees and word plays (such as the homophonic pun in the example above), then it could be seen that this has displaced the Cooperative Principle. This would of course operate on a larger scale in the case of a literary text as a whole.

Perhaps another example would serve to illustrate the various principles at work in conversation. The following is from Stoppard’s The Real Thing; Henry and Charlotte are husband and wife, and Max and Annie are another couple who have paid them a call.

CHARLOTTE: (Taking the bag from [Annie] and investigating it) Darling, there was absolutely no need to bring ... mushrooms?
ANNIE: Yes.
CHARLOTTE: (Not quite behaving well) And a turnip ...
ANNIE: (Getting unhappy) And carrots ... Oh, dear, it must look as if -
HENRY: Where’s the meat?
CHARLOTTE: Shut up.
ANNIE: I wish I’d brought flowers now.
CHARLOTTE: This is much nicer.
HENRY: So original. I’ll get a vase.
ANNIE: It’s supposed to be crudités.
HENRY: Crudités! Perfect title for a pornographic revue.
CHARLOTTE: I’ll make a dip.33
Annie has apparently committed some kind of a faux pas by bringing vegetables for crudités. Charlotte is obviously surprised by the offering but refrains from making negative comments in deference to the Politeness Principle. Henry, on the other hand, has no compunction about making comments. He says, 'Where's the meat?' implying that one normally has meat with vegetables, and further implying that Annie's offering was unusual; there is further implication that Henry has a close relationship with Annie that will bear some teasing (a decrease in the level of politeness might indicate not only an increasing level of hostility but also an increasing level of familiarity). The same thing can be said of Henry's later contributions. This of course contrasts with Charlotte's strategy and she immediately shushes him up, and this is done by the impolite speech act of an order. The fact that Henry is her husband makes it appropriate for her to cast aside the Politeness Principle when speaking to her husband, but she resumes its use when speaking to Annie ('This is much nicer'). Whilst Henry's apparently rude comment establishes his relationship with Annie (later on, the audience see that they are having an affair), his lack of deference to the Politeness Principle is also due to his prizing the Interest Principle. Henry is a playwright, and does all he can to make witty and unexpected remarks, even to the extent of letting himself be potentially misunderstood.
The Cooperative and Politeness Principles should not therefore be taken as the ideal for which all forms of discourse should have a propensity. In fact, it is when the maxims are broken that the text becomes interesting because it is then that it is obvious that another Principle has superseded the Cooperative Principle. And from here, one can make inferences from observing which Principle is given the ascendancy. The question which logically follows is why a particular Principle has been judged to be more important than another. Observing which principle is privileged is a step towards coming to grasp the speaker’s outlook and intentions.

Pragmatic stylistics and sub-texting
It should be stated here that the method of analysing drama, particularly drama dialogue, in terms of pragmatic principles is not a particularly radical one (as mentioned earlier), and has already been done in perhaps more ad hoc ways heretofore. This is true in the sense that it is not part of the aim of pragmatic stylistics to dissect the author or psychoanalyse him; neither is it to destabilise a particular text and open it up to indefinite signification. The assumption is that non-literary discourse - say, a conversation - is intentional and stable, and this assumption is carried over to literary texts as well, although this in no way denies specific literary conventions that problematise literary texts. One can, in particular, consider the method of sub-texting dramatic texts, frequently used with
more laconic playwrights like Pinter. For instance, this is Roslyn Arnold’s\textsuperscript{34} sub-texting of Pinter’s \textit{The Black and the White}.

\textbf{TEXT}

(The first OLD WOMAN is sitting at a milk bar table. A SECOND WOMAN approaches. Tall. She is carrying two bowls of soup, which are covered by two plates, on each of which is a slice of bread. She puts the bowls down on the table carefully.)

SECOND: You see that one come up to me at the counter? (She takes the bread plates off the bowls, takes two spoons from her pocket, and places the bowls, plates and spoons.)

FIRST: You got the bread, then?

SECOND: I didn’t know how I was going to carry it. In the end I put the plates on the top of the soup.

FIRST: I like a bit of bread with my soup. (They begin the soup. Pause.)

SECOND: Did you see that one come up and speak to me at the counter?

FIRST: Who?

SECOND: Comes up to me, he says, hullo, he says, what’s the time by your clock? Bloody liberty. I was just standing there getting your soup.

FIRST: It’s tomato soup.

SECOND: What’s the time by your clock? he says.

\textbf{SUB-TEXT}

Did you notice how men are still attracted to me?

I’m not interested in your flirtations... I’m threatened by them .... I’ll ignore that question ... keep to the basics.

O.K. I’ll go along with you. We’ll talk about safe topics.

We get on well, when we keep the talk about food.

No, I’m not going to let the matter drop ... I want you to talk about my experience. I didn’t notice anyone.

Good ... I can retell the story now ... re-enact it. I was that annoyed ... flattened really... and I wasn’t even inviting attention ... just standing there playing maid for you.

I’m going to put you down ... ignore your story ... you’re having yourself on.

I’m still going on about it. Instant replay ... here’s how he tried to pick me up.
FIRST: I bet you answered him back.  
SECOND: I told him all right. Go on, I said, why don’t you get back into your scrabhole, I said, clear off out of it before I call a copper. (Pause.)  
FIRST: I not long got here.  
SECOND: Did you get the all-night bus?

Listen again to what he said. Knowing you, you wouldn’t miss a chance. Too right, I told him to piss off or I’d call the cops ... won’t find me being an easy mark.

Let’s keep to safe topics ... our relationship’s too fragile for these threatening exchanges ... You could just be fantasising anyway ... let’s play safe.

Sure ... we’ll keep to the routine ... I don’t want any confrontations either.

It will be evident that sub-texting is a form of paraphrase (see, for instance, Nash’s paraphrase of the opening scene of Hamlet.) There is the danger, of course, in sub-texting, that one will overread things and see a devil behind every bush because it allows one’s imagination free rein. The danger is always attempting to make the sub-text as contrastive to the text as possible: in this case, there is the assumption that the surface text is being motivated by attempts at being polite (other-oriented) on the part the characters, made manifest in indirect utterances, and making the sub-text as self-oriented as possible. The other problem is that the characters are made to comment on their underlying intentions, which in ordinary circumstances may be unconscious or not verbalised, so that their utterances seem rehearsed and premeditated. On the other hand, one can see how much of it is pragmatically generated, and that because of the constraints of Cooperation or Politeness,
there has to be a more innocuous surface form. It must be admitted that part of the usefulness of the method of sub-texting is the minimal use of metalingual terms, which one might not want to introduce completely to secondary school pupils. However, the use of the metalanguage can often hone up the interpretation. Indeed, sub-texts are also generated by violation of the maxims of Cooperation and Politeness. For instance, when First does not respond to Second’s invitation to take note of the man coming up to her at the counter, but instead talks of the bread for the soup, she has violated the maxim of Relation of the Cooperative Principle, and it is this that has generated the implicature that she is not interested in Second’s encounters with men. One can also compare the sub-text to First’s remark: ‘I bet you answered him back’, which is ‘Knowing you, you wouldn’t miss a chance’. Obviously, the text appears much more innocuous than Roslyn Arnold’s sub-text, and if that is correct, it would appear that the Politeness Principle has been at work so that the sub-text which violates the Maxim of Approbation, because it proclaims Second as a flirt, and it is the Politeness Principle that has deflected the impolite remark to something more innocuous.
NOTES

1. Indeed, Burton in her work on drama declares her almost exclusive concern with the inter-character level of discourse; one has to '[distinguish] the macro-conversational aspect of a work of literature and the micro-conversations therein ... I shall here be concentrating on the latter micro-talk' (Deirdre Burton, 'Making Conversation: On Conversational Analysis, Stylistics, and Pinter', Language and Style, Vol. XII, No. 3 (Spring 1979), 188-200.


4. Henry G. Widdowson, 'Othello in Person', in Carter, ibid., pp. 40-52. A word of warning: the article is very badly proof-read, especially the quotations ('Good God, the souls of all my tribe define [sic.] / From jealousy!', p. 47).

5. 'The logic of politeness, or minding your p’s and q’s', in Papers from the Ninth Regional Meeting of the Chicago Linguistics Society (1973), 292-305.


11. One could consider John le Carré’s The Spy Who Came in From the Cold in the light of this. It has all the ingredients of a spy-thriller novel but ends unexpectedly with the spy getting killed, thereby giving a different complexion to the novel as a whole.


18. The terms extradiegesis and intradiegesis to refer to discourse levels in literary texts are from Gérard Genette, Narrative Discourse (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1980).


27. Geoffrey N. Leech, Pragmatics (London: Longman, 1983); see also his article, 'Stylistics and functionalism', in Nigel Fabb et al. (ed.), The Linguistics of Writing (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1987), pp. 76-88, where he dwells on several models of language functions.

28. Figure 1.4, p. 16.


CHAPTER IV

PAROIDIA: INTERTEXTUALITY AND PARODY

'A côté de toute grande chose il y a une parodie'

- Hugo

There has been over the years an undeniable movement from the view of language as an artefact which can be interpreted synchronically (to borrow Saussure's term) to a view of language which is situated, not only in historical but also in social and economic terms. The reaction against more formalist methods has been in the direction of emphasis on the pragmatics of production and reception of a text, among other things. Developments in linguistics have also brought to the fore aspects of contextualisation. And unlike ordinary linguistic communication, which can be dealt with synchronically, literary communication very often has to be considered diachronically; this is perhaps more true of some literary texts than others. Pragmatic stylistics tends to see literary texts synchronically, and the added historical dimension can be included in the analysis by reference to precursor texts. Nowhere more than in Stoppard has one to be aware of the situatedness of his work within a literary tradition, and to turn a blind eye on this would be to lose much of the richness of his work. Whilst not entirely espousing Harold Bloom's notion of the anxiety of influence, the view taken here is that earlier texts go on to
shape the text in question. Parody demonstrably brings this element of precursor or parent texts to attention ostensibly, and it would therefore be imperative to consider the question of intertextuality and parody in any consideration of Tom Stoppard. If literariness can be seen in terms of duplicitous communication, the fact that literary texts are often riddled with precursor texts would add strength to that postulate in view of the fact that precursor texts contribute to the indirection in the communicational channel.

Harold Bloom’s ‘anxiety of influence’
The use of intertextuality here differs slightly from Bloom’s influence. For him, every poem is bedevilled by its precursors – one could almost say, its progenitors – so that each new poem is necessarily a re-writing of its ‘parent’ poem(s). To use Bloom’s own words, ‘Every poem is a misinterpretation of a parent poem. A poem is not an overcoming of anxiety, but is that anxiety’ (p. 94). ‘True poetic history is the story of how poets as poets have suffered other poets ...’ (ibid.). Bloom’s notion of influence is useful in that it shows up the shortsightedness of studying a work of literature wrenched from its historical context. To look at it from another angle, one can say that each literary work is located within a certain genre and that what is apparently a new genre must necessarily be a modification of one or more previously existing genres. The conservative force exists hand in hand with the more radical force, and this accords well with Bloom’s influence. It
will be obvious that Bloom’s influence is at once a more general term and a more diffuse quality than intertextuality, and that influence is more a comment on the author, whilst intertextuality is more a quality of the text. Nevertheless, suffice it to say that influence and intertextuality work in parallel ways. A word of caution would probably be not out of place. Intertextuality, as a term, has been variously used by various writers and theorists. As used by Jonathan Culler, it probably approximates to Bloom’s influence.

A major point on which there would be agreement, however, is that literary works are to be considered not as autonomous entities, ‘organic wholes’, but as intertextual constructs: sequences which have meaning in relation to other texts which they take up, cite, parody, refute, or generally transform.²

Intertextuality

As a term, ‘intertextuality’ has already been variously appropriated (or misappropriated, as one is tempted to say) and banded about by linguists. The term has been borrowed from Julia Kristeva’s La Révolution du Langage Poétique,³ where intertextuality is defined as the ‘transposition of one (or several) sign system(s) into another’ (pp. 59-60). She goes on to say, ‘since this term [intertextuality] has often been understood in the banal sense of “study of sources”, we prefer the term transposition because it specifies that the passage from one signifying system to another demands a new articulation of the thetic – of enunciative and denotative positionality’ (p. 60). Kristeva seems to want to distance herself then from the idea of influence.
The premiss is that each text generates or appropriates its own sign system or semiotic system, so that intertextuality involves at least a two-pronged sign system. She says further on that ‘polysemy can also be seen as the result of a semiotic polyvalence – an adherence to different sign systems’ (ibid.), and hits on one of the problems of texts where there is much intertextuality involved. It is obvious at once that intertextuality is used here in a more restricted sense than Bloom’s influence or the commonsense idea of inspiration. On the other hand, it is more than mere quotation and allusion, although, admittedly, these pave the way towards the activation of another sign system. As mentioned before, the term itself has been appropriated by various theorists in different ways. David Birch uses ‘intertextuality’ to refer to a process of reading texts which denies the assumption that any literary text can or should be autonomous, the assumption that ‘the text is sufficient unto itself’, so that the reader has to bring to the fore his own ‘intertextual experiences’. Whilst not denying Birch’s theoretical position, namely that it is inadequate seeing literary texts as autonomous wholes, his use of the term ‘intertextuality’ is idiosyncratic as he has stretched the term to include the reader’s experience of texts. What one is looking out for here in this context is a more textual basis of intertextuality.

Given that intertextuality is taken to refer not to a reading strategy, but to a quality inherent in the text (but activated by the perception of the wary reader) which
complicates the communicational channel, one could consider whether or not, of itself, intertextuality - and parody in particular - can be considered as deviance from the norms of the Cooperative Principle and the Politeness Principle. As has been mentioned earlier, the ascendancy given to a certain pragmatic principle against another is very often a calculated trade-off, perhaps involving a certain amount of risk. There is the possibility, of course, that the intertextuality might not be recognised, leading ultimately to erroneous readings of the text, in which case the Maxim of Manner can be said to have been violated; intertextuality can also be seen as impolite and face-threatening because the author has presumed upon a certain audience who would be sensitive to his intertextual references. The danger of allusion appealing to an initiated élite only has already been mentioned by Nash:

These citations often have a function that goes beyond the mere decoration of a conversational exchange. They are a kind of test, proving the credentials of the initiated, baffling the outsider.5

Travesties, for instance, has been said to make its 'appeal to a self-conscious, elitist audience'.6 The fact that the outsider might find himself baffled points towards the violation of the Maxim of Manner. As will be mentioned further down, intertextuality, and parody in particular, can open the way to multivalent readings and metafictional comments, which ultimately complicate the channel of communication, all of which go against the ideal of clarity as envisaged by the Cooperative Principle. In this way then it can be said that intertextuality as a textual feature is a marked one,
and presuming that intertextuality is not gratuitous, the additional effort called on by the author of his readers must be taken to represent a trade-off for other effects desired by the author. Arguably, one can say that intertextuality is an economical way of communicating in that intertextuality evokes one or more additional texts without quoting them in whole, so that they can be considered super-relevant (bearing in mind that Sperber and Wilson’s Principle of Relevance has economy as one of its maxims)! It all comes full circle then, if one has to consider the pragmatics of intertextuality.

A relevant question is how intertextuality is activated; in other words, what would count as a directive signal towards using intertextual strategies in interpretation. Parody would certainly be an important class of intertextual work, and Walter Nash in his discussion about recognising a parody gives great emphasis to the notion of discrepancy or disjunction - 'discrepancies of "fit" between expression and content, and discrepancies of style on the plane of expression itself'. There are, of course, very often more overt clues such as the title of the text (in Nash’s example, ‘Bert Lawrence gets the bug’) or other editorial features (for instance, a poem found in an anthology of parodies). The division of a text into the planes of expression and content is useful because one of the most important signals of a parodic work is the perception of a less than perfect ‘fit’ between them, but at times what is required is a
certain amount of familiarity with the source text. It is, after all, possible to read a text with intertextual features as a straight text.

To use a rather banal example, it would seem possible to read the following as a straight text, presuming for the moment that the reader has never in his life ever encountered, directly or indirectly, Hamlet’s to-be-or-not-to-be soliloquy. How much sense would be made of the following?

To wed, or not to wed? That is the question.  
Whether 'tis nobler in the mind to suffer  
The pangs and arrows of outrageous love  
Or to take arms against the powerful flame  
And by opposing quench it.

But then again, the context of the passage (one of a series of texts entitled 'SHAKESPEAREAN SOLILOQUY IN PROGRESS', found in a parody anthology) militates against an innocent — as it were, prelapsarian — reading of it. Added to that is the traditional 'genre' of getting married jokes (the cliché of the nuptial cords being chains of iron), and also the implication that 'the powerful flame' of love can be opposed (and thereby quenched) by marriage, which would in most cases be perceived as being illogical. If one takes this to have been intended by the author, then one can assume that the situation here is a tongue-in-cheek one, analogous to the famous opening statement of Pride and Prejudice ('It is a truth universally acknowledged that a single man in possession of a fortune must be in want of a wife'). On the other hand, this could be seen as a hard-headed attempt to fit a new subject matter to a framework not originally intended for it (and so, once again, the
notion of the less-than-perfect fit is evoked). Thus, although recognition of the source text is an important clue, this is very often not the only one.

Thus far, it would seem that recognising intertextuality has much to do with expectation; it implies the knowledge of what is appropriate on the part of the reader. Whenever a sense of incongruity is felt, it is because these 'laws' of appropriateness have been transgressed. The notion of competence would then seem to be relevant in view of this. But in considering parody as a subset of intertextual options, one has to be cognisant of the fact that parody stresses difference, whilst there are other intertextual methods which borrow silently from another source, so that similarity rather than difference is stressed. Irony could also be considered as another intertextual method which stresses difference. (Various metaphors have been used in describing irony - one is using another voice, or another mask (persona), one is putting the ironic statement within inverted commas, or on a lower level than the other statements.) One could, for instance compare these clues with Booth's clues to irony in The Rhetoric of Irony, viz., (1) straightforward warnings in the author's own voice (e.g., titles, epigraphs, &c.), (2) known error proclaimed (when what is presented does not accord with the reader's knowledge of the world), (3) conflicts of facts within the work, (4) clashes of style, and (5) conflicts of belief between the beliefs expressed and the author's supposed beliefs. Once again, the keyword here is conflict, which
expresses the same idea as discrepancy in the case of parody. Apart from the first clue, all the rest - (2) to (5) - expresses the idea of conflict, discrepancy or incongruity, which seems to suggest that irony is closely allied to parody. What is obvious is the presence of at least two ethos or sign systems in irony and parody. Carter in his Vocabulary,\(^{10}\) sees the breaking of Grice’s maxims as a clue towards an ironic reading. But he goes on to discuss violations of genre conventions as well. Both these ‘clues’ go on to show again the centrality of the notion of conflict. The semiotic polyvalence mentioned by Kristeva can be seen in the case of parody in that it is not immediately obvious which sign system is the privileged one, and in this respect parody differs from irony, for the ironic passage is immediately made the butt or the victim of a range of possible attitudes ranging from lighthearted jest to heartfelt scorn and derision.

However, there would seem to be other intertextual methods such as literary allusion or even plagiarism which would seem to draw out common features rather than differences (the notion of disguise would seem more pertinent than that of juxtaposition in the case of plagiarism), which can effectively be compared to the metaphor where assimilation is emphasised. This would seem to suggest that there is a whole range of possible pragmatic attitudes towards source or background texts, so that it would be helpful to think of intertextuality as a neutral label as regards the attitude towards the source or background texts.
Defining Parody

It will be obvious by now, with the barrage of related terms, that the term *parody* itself needs to be defined. It might be good at the start to say that this study will not attempt an historical survey of the use of the word itself, but in the best of classical tradition, it might be useful to consider the etymology of the word as given in *The Oxford Dictionary of English Etymology*. The English word *parody* comes from the Greek *παρωδία* or *paroidia* which is derived from *par(a)*, meaning 'beside, subsidiary, mock-', and *oide*, meaning 'song, poem', from which comes 'ode' as well. In other words, *parody* etymologically has the notion of an accompanying song. As Linda Hutcheon points out, most theorists conceive of the etymology of *parody* as meaning 'counter-song' rather than a beside-song. This is of course not surprising, in view of the popular notion of parody as something which encompasses the notion of ridicule, as can be seen in most dictionary definitions of *parody*. Johnson gives it as an 'imitation of a work so turned as to produce a ridiculous effect', whilst *The Oxford English Dictionary* has the following:

A composition in prose or verse in which the characteristic terms of thought and phrase in an author or a class of authors is imitated in such a way as to make them appear ridiculous, especially by applying them to ludicrously inappropriate subjects; an imitation of a work more or less closely modelled on the original, but so turned as to produced a ridiculous effect. (Vol. VII, 1931, repr. 1961, p. 489)

This can be compared with definitions in more recently published dictionaries.
A. A **parody** is a piece of writing, drama or music which copies the style of someone well-known or perhaps represents a familiar situation or person in a humorous and exaggerated way. (Collins Cobuild English Language Dictionary, 1987, p. 1043)

B. 1. A literary or musical work in which the style of an author or work is closely imitated for comic or satirical effect – compare CARICATURE. 2. A feeble or ridiculous imitation. (Longman Dictionary of the English Language, 1984, p. 1068)

What seems obvious here is that parody is popularly thought of as having a negative attitude (‘humorous and exaggerated’, ‘comic or satirical’) towards the source text, so that parody is popularly thought of as making light of the source text and the sentiments expressed therein. Indeed, this has been the stance taken by some theorists, for example Margaret Rose. One finds this also in Todorov’s *The Poetics of Prose*;¹² Todorov distinguishes stylisation from parody by saying that in the former, there is no discord between the two ‘levels’ of the styliser and the stylised, whereas in the case of the latter, the ‘levels’ of the parodist and the parodied must necessarily be discordant (p. 245).

This concern for the difference in attitude towards the source text has also been echoed by Linda Hutcheon. She compares parody with irony and satire in terms of their ‘pragmatic ethos’, by which she means the intended effect of the technique on the reader/audience. Whereas satire throws scorn and irony mocks, parody can do either or neither. This is to say that the characteristic pragmatic ethos of parody is neutral.¹³ Nash takes the same view.
[N]ot all parody is hostile; many acts of literary caricature and burlesque show affectionate familiarity with the things they imitate, and are a form of positive criticism, of stylistic analysis, and ultimately of tribute.14

In view of the range of possible attitudes inherent in a parodic work, it would seem unhelpful to define parody based on its presumed pragmatic ethos, as Todorov has done. Indeed, parody is thought of as enjoying the multivalency of Kristeva’s intertextuality, so that parody as a technique offers multiple perspectives on a text. Chambers puts forward the point that it is the parodist’s task to present cues [analogous to ‘clues’ used above] that are both convincing and ambiguous, to present information that is qualified by contrasting alternatives.15

so that parody becomes the favoured mode of the ‘open’ text which denies definite closure.

In view of this, it would be helpful to look at some definitions given to parody by theorists cognisant of the multiple perspective that parody can offer. Linda Hutcheon, in search of a more neutral definition of parody has this to say about it: ‘Parody ... in its ironic "trans-contextualization" and inversion, is repetition with difference’ (p. 32), and further on,

[Parody is repetition, but repetition that includes difference ...; it is imitation with critical ironic distance, whose irony can cut both ways. (p. 37)

Probably, the problematic word about the definition is ‘ironic’, because the term has sometimes been used interchangeably with ‘parody’, in which case the definition would be tautological. To be fair to her, she goes on to say that ‘the range of pragmatic ethos [of irony] is from scornful
ridicule to reverential homage’ (ibid.). But then again, parody too would have the same potential pragmatic range, so that the difference between irony and parody is not very clear.

The above can be compared with Chambers’ definition:

The original Greek meaning of the word accurately implies that parodic fictions contain a skein of contrasts. These are created by three major groups of techniques that juxtapose (or clash), transform (or conflate) and disguise (or camouflage) literary conventions. These techniques are parody, and parody should be understood as a technical concept, not a genre ... the techniques are not chained to any specific content or motive. Thus, some parodists write satire (Swift), but others may avoid it (Nabokov). Similarly, some adapt other writer’s conventions (Beerbohm), but some go on their own way (Barth). (p. 146)

Like Hutcheon, who stresses difference, Chambers emphasises contrast in his definition. Also, whilst Hutcheon is interested in parody across the board in all art forms, including not only literature but also music and art, it would be obvious that Chambers focuses his attention on literary parody. The latter interest is probably closer to the concerns of this discussion.

At this juncture, the several points made about parody can be conflated. Parody is an intertextual device whereby incongruity is perceived, so that this is seen as a comment, whether frivolous or serious, on the background text or its sentiments, or even on the foreground text. Parody thus makes it doubly important that texts should not be taken as being merely autonomous and self-referential because parody interacts with the background text, and more than that, it interacts with what the background text represents metonymically. This is admittedly a problematic question as there
is no foolproof way of determining the extent of the metonymic evocation arising out of the background text. For instance, would Travesties, being (among other things) a parody of *The Importance of Being Earnest*, be a comment on *The Importance* itself, or on the literary convention or tradition of the Comedy of Manners (which *The Importance* can be said to represent), or perhaps on nineteenth-century English drama, or on hypocrisy and upside-down values? This point will be raised again further down. Thus far, it will suffice to say that parody is a trans-contextualisation of a text (and of the tradition it represents), with neither the foreground text nor the background text being automatically the privileged one. There could, of course, be more than one text in the background, but the point that the background texts will not necessarily be the denigrated ones still holds true.

**Parody and Irony**

A valid question would be in what way parody differs from intertextuality since a 'broad', wide-embracing definition of parody has been given. Allied terms like irony, plagiarism, imitation and pastiche have yet to be considered. Furthermore, parody can, in many ways, be compared with allusion and free indirect discourse. One can start with the assumption that intertextuality is the superordinate term, so that parody, irony and the rest represent techniques within intertextuality.
As has been suggested above, there does not always seem to be a clear-cut difference between irony and parody. If one examines the clues (or 'cues') given to parody and irony above, it will be obvious that a great many of the clues are similar. Chambers takes a rather cavalier attitude towards this.

I do not intend to argue with those who would maintain that parody is merely an aspect of irony. For the most part, parody and irony are interchangeable, and it is up to one's individual conscience to decide which concept contains the other. For instance, from one angle of vision "A Modest Proposal" is a parody, and from another it is an ironic attack upon the morals of man. To borrow from Lewis Carroll's Humpty Dumpty, one must decide 'which [of the two concepts, irony or parody] is to be master - that's all' (p. 29).

The implication here is that parody comments on the text ('literary conventions') whereas irony comments on the world outside the text. That there is such a tendency must be admitted, but it must be acknowledged as well that such a classification is not always very helpful because the distinction is not always as neat as the one in 'A Modest Proposal'. There has been, for instance, talk of Stoppard's 'ironic muse' in relation to his 'parodic' plays. The difference has more to do with scope than with the distinction between whether the comment is on a text or on the world outside the text.

Sperber and Wilson, for instance, have seen irony as instances of quotation and therefore irony has an echoic quality so that irony, no less than parody, has a textual basis. There are also others who have seen irony as being an intertextual technique. (However, as has been noted above, other metaphors have been used.) It should be noted
again that parody has also been described as being ironic. Robyn Carston, in an article receiving much inspiration from Sperber and Wilson, states that

Parody is truly echoic, the echo keeps on coming, and identifying its real world source is basic to understanding it while with irony this is not necessarily so.19

Here, the distinction seems to hinge not on the question of textuality but on the necessity of identifying the source in order to come to an understanding of the text. Once again, whilst this general tendency is in no way being denied, it must be said that this distinction is too nebulous to be usable for distinguishing between irony and parody. To start off with a banal example, one could say, 'What a lovely day it is!' when there is an absolute torrential downpour at the moment, and the utterance would be construed as being ironic. In other words, the person who made that utterance is echoing another utterance made by another person, or another utterance which could have been made by a certain kind of person. In this way, there is an oblique comment that the 'quoted' utterance is ridiculous and is to be sneered at. Considering Booth's clues given above, one can say that the most obvious one is the conflict between the semantics of the sentence and the actual state of affairs at the moment. There is also some conflict in style because the exclamative sentence structure gives it a quasi-literary flavour, especially if given with an exaggerated intonation pattern, thereby again signalling irony.
The echoic quality is also obvious when (in a contemporary living room setting), a person cries, 'Hark! do I hear a car outside?' The utterance would undoubtedly be labelled as ironic. Yet the utterer does not imply the opposite of what he has said, which would be the definition to irony in dictionaries (albeit the popular definition of irony signalling the opposite of what is being said; there might be a case for distinguishing 'irony' from 'ironic statements', but whenever the term irony is used here, the sense is as in 'ironic statements'). The utterance echoes Victorian stage language, yet cannot possibly be an actual quotation - there were no cars in those days! This provides the hearer with clashes of style: not only is the utterance a piece of anachronism, but it is not internally consistent in terms of form and content either. In this case, given the context, the utterer would probably not be mocking the traditional stage language - for that would be flogging a dead horse - but has appropriated a style alien to the situation for comic interest, so that no denigration is intended to either the characteristic style or content (or 'tone' to use a traditional term) of the traditional language of the stage apart from a lighthearted jest. In fact, this might be akin to Nash's 'affectionate' parody. The question which arises is whether this might not be thought of as parody, after all. One could postulate distinction between parody and irony based on the 'literary' nature of the echoed text; this would, however, give rise to problems of classification of what is literary and what is not. If this distinction
were upheld it would not be far-fetched to surmise on the potential literary forebear of 'Hark! do I hear a car outside?' (perhaps, 'Hark, hark, the lark') and think of it as being not only ironic but parodic as well.

One could also surmise a grammatical criterion for distinguishing between parody and irony. There would thus be intertextuality on the level of the morpheme, the word, the group, the clause, the sentence, and even the paragraph and the text, in the manner of systemic grammar. One can postulate then that the distinction has to do with the level at which intertextuality occurs, with irony tending towards lower level units and parody towards higher level units. If one takes as an example a modern-day sitting room situation, with one person exclaiming of another person, 'He is waxing eloquent', or even 'He waxeth eloquent', it can be seen that a distinction between parody and irony based on the 'literariness' of the background text is untenable because The Concise Oxford Dictionary labels wax in this sense as both 'archaic' and 'poetical' (apart from the phrase 'to wax and wane'), and both utterances can be said to be ironic. Once again, irony is signalled by a contrast in style (presumably, the utterance would be sandwiched between other utterances in ordinary colloquial style). In this case then, intertextuality seems to be narrowed down to the level of the word or lexis. Once can also point to the morpheme -eth, the archaic third-person suffix for verbs, and suggest, without much ingenuity, that the utterance therefore echoes, say, the Authorised Version of the Bible.
However, the phrase (or group) 'wax eloquent' has become a fixed collocation or an idiomatic expression, so that a lot of the 'surprise' element is lost (and it has been noted that the notion of expectation is central to any consideration of irony and parody because incongruity implies unexpectedness). The fixed collocation then is an analogue to the dead metaphor which has lost its novelty value, and as there are different levels of deadness, there are also different levels of ironicness in irony. Be that as it may, the phrase is still used facetiously, which is a step towards irony, and in this case, the level of the group is seen to operate in irony. In the case of parody, however, it is far more normal to talk of a text being parodic, and perhaps also a paragraph or a sentence, so that the general tendency of irony operating on lower level units and parody on higher level units holds true.

However, the fact that one often refers to an ironic tone rather than to an ironic clause or sentence suggests that the feature is normally a more diffuse one, and that the generalisations made above are rather crude ones. Where intertextual features are highly localised, these have often been viewed as examples of foregrounding. Studies in this area have also overlapped with studies concerned with reregistration, or, investigations into residual register features. Where the unit is the word or the group, it is often impossible to identify a specific 'source', but, nevertheless it might be possible to identify a specific group of texts or a certain domain of language use
('register') with which the word or the group might be associated. (See, for instance, Carter's Vocabulary (1987), Chapters 5 and 8.) It would seem then that at this level, intertextual studies could well be carried out alongside studies which are based on the notion of foregrounding or register. But it may be said that the greater the extent of the intertextuality, the more likely it is to identify a more specific intertextual source. And herein lies the distinction between irony or allusion on the one hand, and parody on the other (although it must be conceded that there is no clear line of separation between them). Parody is based on a level of intertextuality which is often much greater in extent than that of irony or allusion. It would of course not be impossible to say that a character's speech in a play is ironic throughout the play, or that an author's voice, say Jane Austen's, was ironic, and thereby imply that intertextuality is associated with a larger extent of the text. In such a situation, it might be pointed out that there is no consistent intertextual source as there would be in parody. Where an author is said to be ironic in a novel, it can be taken to mean that he borrows the voices and texts of others, without particular engagement in particular voices and texts. In parody, there is normally a continued engagement with a source text. This would also explain why it is that in the case of parody, the source or echo seems more often to be, if not literary, then textual, whilst in the case of irony this is less often the case. Carston's point is that the identification of the 'real world' source
of parody is basic to understanding the text whilst this is not necessarily the case with irony; it is suggested here that it is not so much the necessity of identifying the source that is crucial, but rather that it is often more possible to identify the source of a parody rather than that of irony, simply because of the extent of intertextuality in parody, and in many cases one would have to be content with saying that the source text of an ironic passage could have been made by a certain kind of person, or under certain circumstances. (It will be obvious from this that 'source text' has been used very broadly to cover potential texts.) The point made here is that this difference is a result of the difference in scope of the intertextuality of parody and irony. A minimal source text is not easily identified, simply because it is highly likely that such a text has been used several or even many times. Parody and irony are not then intrinsically different in kind but in the scope of their intertextuality. Therefore distinctions based on the level of textuality, on the necessity of identifying the background text for understanding, on the 'literariness' of precursor texts, and on 'higher' or 'lower' level language features seem to point towards a distinction based on the extent of the intertextuality, and so all the other distinctions are a result of this, and this is the general view taken here.

At this point, it might be appropriate to put in a caveat with regard to irony. Thus far, the discussion has centred on texts as it has only concerned itself with
intertextuality. Irony, of course, has been applied to extra-textual contexts, as in 'situational irony' or 'cosmic irony' (normally associated with Hardy - q.v., Muecke),20 or even 'dramatic irony'. The last item, however, occupies an uncomfortable middle ground between textuality and intertextuality. The typical situation would be when the audience (or reader) has access to information not available to the character, thereby having a different perspective to what is being said. If one can take the speech-act notion of the intentionality of a speech act (without in any way suggesting that being ironic is a speech act), one can take it that the author has committed an act of 'ostension' by making it possible for the audience (reader) to perceive the incongruity between what is said on stage and what the audience (reader) knows, so that the character is seen in a different (ironic?) light. Hence such irony may be located in the author-audience (reader) level of discourse. But it has been said to be in an uncomfortable middle ground because in some ways it approaches so-called cosmic irony where what happens in the world is seen as being attributable to an intentional force (Fate, Destiny, Satan, &c.) which/who would derive malicious pleasure from the goings-on on earth. This is obviously beyond the scope of this study, unless it is in some way encoded in the text (as in Rosen- crantz and Guildenstern, in which case, the external force to which the irony is attributable to is the written-ness of the source text, Hamlet:
PLAYER: Between 'just deserts' and 'tragic irony' we are given quite a lot of scope for our particular talent ...
GUIL: Who decides?
PLAYER: (Switching off his smile) Decides? It is written. (pp. 58-59)

This, together with 'dramatic irony' occupies a middle ground between the textual and the extra-textual. Suffice it to say that in such uses of the word, the concentration is on the pragmatic force of irony rather than its textual duality.)

Parody and (Literary) Allusion
It would be helpful to consider literary allusion as well at this juncture because of its comparative similarity to parody. One could consider a short passage from Rosencrantz and Guildenstern.

ROS: You made me look ridiculous in there.
GUIL: I looked just as ridiculous as you did.
ROS: (An anguished cry) Consistency is all I ask!
GUIL: (Low, wry rhetoric) Give us this day our daily mask. (Act I, p. 30)

The scene takes place after Ros's and Guil's interview with Claudius and Gertrude where they were asked to discover 'Whether aught to us [Claudius and Gertrude] unknown afflicts him [Hamlet] thus'; at the same time everyone gets Ros's and Guil's names confused so that each does not know when exactly to bow. In this situation then, Ros gives a cry which is faintly flavoured with rhetoric, asking for consistency in their naming: 'Consistency is all I ask'. (One can take note of the Complement-Verb-Subject structure.) This makes it potentially ironic, but given Ros's
characterisation in the play as a rather naïve and unquestioning person, this interpretation is rejected; a reader of the playscript is helped in this by the stage direction describing Ros’s cry. And it is Guil, always the sharper of the two, who recognises this potential and capitalises on it, and thus gives the rhymed rejoinder, ‘Give us this day our daily mask’ which of course alludes to the Lord’s Prayer (‘Give us this day our daily bread’, Matthew Ch. 6, Authorised Version). Guil recognises that Ros’s utterance has the form of a prayer, and thus quips it with an altered line from the Lord’s Prayer. The question that is relevant here is the relation between Guil’s statement and the source text. There is, notably, as in all cases of intertextuality, transcontextualisation of the original utterance. There is an activation of a pattern of similarity and contrast. As mentioned above, it points towards Ros’s utterance having the structure of a prayer; at the same time, there is a suggestion that they have a need beyond the basic necessities (which is what ‘bread’ can stand for), and that there is a problem of identity (as suggested by ‘mask’). But the Lord’s Prayer is not necessarily mocked here because allusion provides a neat turn of phrase. This illustration also serves to confirm the point made that the difference between between parody and allusion is in the scope of the intertextuality. Here it is limited to just a line and would justifiably be called an allusion.
Ziva Ben-Porat has provided an interesting account of the poetics of literary allusion. For him, there are four steps in a discerning reading of a text which contains literary allusions, viz., (1) recognition of a Marker (+ mr) in a Given Sign (S), (2) identification of the evoked text, (3) modification of the Initial Local Interpretation (LI) of the Signal (S + mr), and (4) activation of the Evoked Text (RT) as a Whole, in an attempt to form maximum intertextual patterns. One of his examples is an extract from T. S. Eliot’s ‘The Love Song of J. Alfred Prufrock’:

And I have known the arms already, known them all -
Arms that are braceleted and white and bare
(But in the lamplight, downed with light brown
hair!)
Is it perfume from a dress
That makes me so digress?
Arms that lie along a table, or wrap about a shawl,
And should I then presume?
And how should I begin?  (lines 62-69)

There are allusions, in these lines, to John Donne’s ‘The Relic’, which contains, among others, the line, ‘A bracelet of bright hair about the bone’. So in this case, the marker would be ‘braceleted’, ‘white’, ‘bare’, ‘light’ and ‘hair’, and the marked would be the line quoted from Donne. The local interpretation (LI) is Prufrock’s boredom and sense of meaninglessness and also his simultaneous feelings of attraction and revulsion. The local interpretation of the alluded text RT - i.e., LI₁ - is very far from Prufrock’s reaction in that it symbolically comments on the victory of love over death. Both LI and LI₁ together yield LI₂ intertextually: ‘the idea that the only real measure of life is death, the waiting end from which there can be no real
escape in tea and small talk, that the only counter-measure for death is love' (p. 119). Because the marker 'maintains the metonymic structure of the relationship sign-referent which characterizes all allusions' (p. 108), LI₂ is able to bring together both these worlds. In other words it is not only the alluded words, phrase, &c. (S + md, i.e., sign containing marker) which are activated, but that the sign containing the marked elements activates, metonymically, the whole referent text, so that the religious imagery in 'The Relic' becomes relevant in 'The Love Song', suggesting that Prufrock can be seen not only as some kind of a prophet figure but also a saviour figure. In LI, there is the element of the woman as an object of attraction and revulsion; in LI₁, a woman is seen as both angel and whore, so that there is the motivation for LI₂, concretising the attraction-revulsion element. In LI, there is the element of the stifling culture and society v. lost instinctive life force, and in LI₁ the element natural laws v. civilisation with regard to love and sex is evoked, so that together, in LI₂, there can be seen the deadening effect of civilisation on the libido.

Comparing Ben-Porat's example of allusion and the earlier example from Rosencrantz and Guildenstern, one would be conscious of the fact that the interpenetration of the foregrounded text ('local interpretation') and the backgrounded text ('evoked text') differs from text to text. Basically, there is no definite separating line between allusions and so-called idiomatic expressions, which are
essentially overused allusions, covering a wide range of expressions with classical references ('Achilles' heel', 'Scylla and Charybdis') or biblical references ('the eleventh hour', 'thorn in one's flesh'), Shakespearian references ('the milk of human kindness', 'the mind's eye') and so on. In such instances, there is very little inter-penetration between the foregrounded and backgrounded text, and the backgrounded text might even be forgotten (as is evidenced by the fact that one could well make use of some of the expressions referred to above without knowing their source). There will be then a range of expressions which cover the 'middle ground', as for instance in the following example. Carr comments on The Importance of Being Earnest saying, 'It is a play written by an Irish - (glances at GWENDOLEN) Gomorrahist' (Travesties, p. 51). Carr evinces ingenuity in the coinage 'Gomorrahist' (and thereby avoids the terms 'homosexual' or, more offensively, 'bugger' or 'poof') in compliance with the dictates of society that the alternatives cannot be used in front of a lady. On the one hand, 'Gomorrahist' becomes a synonym for 'homosexual'; on the other there is the allusion to the men of Sodom and Gomorrah who lusted after their own kind in Genesis. Again the reference is potentially ironic, but the reader's/audience's knowledge of Carr would rule this out and attribute to Carr the disapproval of homosexuality inherent in the Genesis account of Sodom and Gomorrah. Carr's (or perhaps Stoppard's) inventiveness would earn him at least a smile from the audience or reader, and very often there is an
element of humour involved here, evidenced by the fact that allusive phrases are often used in puns.

Both allusion and parody are intertextual techniques. Allusion is like irony in that the extent of the quotation is not as great as in parody, the difference being that in irony, there is likely to be a more negative attitude (or pragmatic ethos) towards what is being quoted. Allusion, like parody, involves evoking the background text, and activating it metonymically. In the case of 'The Relic', the Christian element, together with the holiness-depravity paradox, has been picked out to fuse with the local elements in 'The Love Song'. As mentioned earlier, the problem is how much should the background text evoke metonymically. In the discussion on 'The Love Song', metonymic evocation operated on the thematic level. In the case of Travesties, which is self-consciously 'literary', metonymic evocation can be said to operate generically as well, in the sense that a whole class or genre of literary works are evoked. In other words, the 'genre' of the Comedy of Manners is said to comment on and be commented on by the encounters between Carr, Tzara and Joyce. Therefore, each sets the other off, and certainly, both might end up unfavourably. The extent of metonymic evocation can thus be said to depend on the foreground text, so that in the final analysis, there is interpenetration between the foreground and background texts. In Travesties, one finds, on the one hand, the highly serious argumentative mode, each character having unmitigable views, and this is, on the other hand, set off and
even undermined by the frivolity or unearnestness of the conversation of the characters in *The Importance*, so that the end result is a paradoxical serio-frivolous mix. Wilde's 'art for art's sake' aesthetics is also evoked to counter Tzara's iconoclastic aesthetics and particularly Lenin's Marxist aesthetics, and on the face of it appears to vindicate Joyce's position.

It is the superimposition of texts - literary allusion on a smaller scale and parody on a larger scale - that leads to multiple signification in allusion and parody.

**Free Indirect Discourse and Parody**

Mention has been made of the point that parody is in many ways similar to quotation (in the use-mention distinction), and that parody, like irony, thrives on incongruity, or, to change the metaphor, doubleness. It might be suggested here then that the analogue to parody is not 'mention', in other words, quoted or reported discourse normally set off in inverted commas, but rather free indirect discourse, which partakes both the features of direct speech (thought) and indirect speech (thought), and its presence would be signalled by this doubleness of not being set off by inverted commas yet containing elements of reported speech (thought).

Like parody, free indirect discourse involves superimposition so that what is available is not quoted wholesale, but is set down in a semi-quoted state. Free indirect discourse has already been covered in a fair amount of detail by Pascal\(^2\) and by Leech and Short\(^3\) and has also
been discussed by continental theorists under the names le style indirect libre or erlebte Rede. The technique is invaluable in enabling the author to distance himself from the perspective given in the text, although his condoning or disapproving a particular point of view can often be surmised. The fact that free indirect style is closely linked to irony and parody can be seen by examining, for instance, Lawrence’s The Virgin and the Gipsy.\(^{24}\) Much of the short story is from the point of view of Yvette, daughter of a village vicar, Arthur Saywell, whose wife Cynthia had deserted him. Naturally, there is much of the text which contains Yvette’s thoughts and speeches in free indirect style. The following passage is near the beginning of a section, and has not been anchored on anybody’s point of view.

It is very much easier to shatter prison bars than to open undiscovered doors to life. As the younger generation finds out somewhat to its chagrin. True, there was Granny. But poor old Granny, you couldn’t actually say to her: ‘Lie down and die, you old woman!’ She might be an old nuisance, but she never really did anything. It wasn’t fair to hate her. (p. 13)

Here, the speaking voice is signalled by the italicisation of did (normally indicative of stress in transcriptions) and also the abbreviated forms couldn’t and wasn’t. The second sentence is also an incomplete sentence. The speaking voice in itself is an insufficient indicator of free indirect style as the narrator might choose to adopt a speaking voice himself (and the second sentence might be considered a case in point). The fact that the sentences at the end of the paragraph are mediated is evident from the past tense form
of the verb in the last sentence. The first sentence is apparently the narrator's, but as the style becomes more colloquial it becomes more obvious that the latter sentences are in free indirect style. The problem is that ... is not entirely obvious in whom the discourse should be anchored, though Yvette would be the most likely candidate as it is her grandmother that is being talked about (so that the term of address Granny is appropriate to her). But more than the colloquial tone, one can have recourse to one's knowledge of Yvette and say that much of the passage represents Yvette's point of view because the sentiments expressed are characteristic of Yvette and uncharacteristic of the narrator, so that free indirect style is more than a grammatical category.

This can be compared with an earlier passage, before Yvette is introduced by name:

He [Arthur] had married an imperishable white snow-flower [i.e. Cynthia]. Lucky man! He had been injured. Unhappy man! He had suffered. Ah, what a heart of love! And he had - forgiven! Yes, the white snow-flower was forgiven ....

At the same time, out of the squalid world sometimes would come a rank, evil smell of selfishness and degraded lust, the smell of that awful nettle, She-who-was-Cynthia. This nettle actually contrived at intervals, to get a little note through to the girls, her children. (pp. 2-3)

The exclamatory sentences together with the dash to indicate a dramatic pause ('And he had - forgiven') point towards a speaking voice suggesting free style, and the past tense form ('had - forgiven') indirect style. Much of the first paragraph (with the exception of the more sedate declaratives) can be taken to be a representation of the talk of
the people of the village. In this instance, the grammar could be deemed sufficient to indicate free indirect style, though this is confirmed by the reader’s knowledge of the narrator. At the same time, there are local inconsistencies - diametrically opposite points of view are comically juxtaposed, not only between the declaratives and exlamatives, but also between subsequent exclamatives. ‘World knowledge’ about Lawrence also confirms free indirect discourse - he is not inclined to be predisposed to the clergy, and whatever he perceives to stultify the ‘natural instincts’. This gives rise to incongruities, so that Lawrence can be said to parodise or ironise the language of the people of the village.

The latter paragraph, however, has fewer grammatical markers to point to free indirect style, other than the fact that there is a high concentration of descriptive adjectives, oftentimes highly metaphorical ones, so that there are embedded in the utterance propositions such as ‘The world is squalid’, ‘Cynthia is a rank, evil smell of selfishness’, ‘Cynthia is an awful nettle’. The high concentration of this makes it sound greatly exaggerated (perhaps this can be consigned to another register), and furthermore the sentiments would not be consonant with those of Lawrence, or uncharacteristic of him, so that one is disposed to think of the latter paragraph, too, as being in free indirect style, attributable to the point of view of Granny or the Mater. Again, the passage can be considered ironic or parodic because of its ‘quoted’ quality, so that free indirect style
can be identified even without overt grammatical signals. The point then would be that free indirect style cannot be considered a clear-cut grammatical category.

Turning back to parody, one can say that its similarity to free indirect style would indicate that it can share the 'pragmatic force' of free indirect style. On the one hand, there is detachment and even abnegation, and on the other hand there is the ambivalence and multiple signification as a result of this detachment.

An Intertextuality Typology

At this point then, one can illustrate the various intertextual techniques or modes in a chart, with scope (i.e., extent of intertextuality) and attitude towards source text (i.e., whether positive or negative) being the two variables.

\[
\begin{array}{c}
\text{ATTITUDE TOWARDS SOURCE TEXT} \\
\text{Positive/Neutral} \\
\text{Negative}
\end{array}
\begin{array}{c}
\{\text{(comparison) parody}\} \\
\{\text{stylisation}\} \\
\{\text{plagiarism?}\}
\end{array}
\begin{array}{c}
\{\text{(comic) parody}\} \\
\{\text{travesty}\} \\
\{\text{burlesque}\}
\end{array}
\\\n\text{SCOPE} \quad \text{less} \quad \text{greater}
\]
Parody, stylisation, travesty and burlesque have a greater intertextual scope than irony, allusion or quotation; in other words, the former are more extensive modes of intertextuality than the latter. Intertextual techniques or modes can also be distinguished by their relation to the source or backgrounded text. The view taken here is that for parody and quotation, there is no pre-determined ‘pragmatic ethos’, so that they might be mocking or adulative or even absolutely neutral in relation to the source text, in which case the source text is there to provide only a framework or model. But allusion and stylisation (and certainly plagiarism in a more covert manner) have a positive, or at least a non-antagonistic, relation with the source text, whereas in most cases, irony, travesty or burlesque have a negative relation with the source text. It will be obvious then that where the pragmatic ethos is not pre-determined, the intertextual technique becomes a formal label.

There is also another problem in that the closely-related terms travesty, hudibrastic, burlesque and parody have sometimes been used interchangeably. The term parody in this context has been used as the more general or superordinate term, but this is by no means the universal practice. John Jump (in Burlesque) for instance takes burlesque as the most general term. He distinguishes four kinds of burlesque based on whether a subject has been elevated or debased; and on whether the source (the ‘original’) is specific (for instance Pamela in the case of Fielding’s Shamela) or general (for instance the epic in Pope’s
The Rape of the Lock). Travesty would then involve debasement, based on a specific source; hudibrastic debasement, based on less confined material; parody elevation, based on a specific work; and the mock-poem elevation, based on a class of literature. Jump’s distinctions have not been adopted here because they have not been felt to be particularly helpful, and the distinction based on the specificity of the source appears to be quite arbitrary. The question of elevation or debasement is not always as clear as it seems and it is possible for both to co-exist.

Therefore, in contrast to Jump, parody is used as the general term, being the most common one, leaving travesty and burlesque undefined, except for the fact that they involve a ‘negative’ pragmatic ethos.

The point to be made here is that very often terms in use are quite arbitrary and the distinctions are not always clear-cut, and there is therefore a huge area of overlap, not only between intertextual modes, but also between parody and also between what have been taken to be more grammatical categories such as register and free indirect discourse. The example of Ruth’s description of London in the previous chapter can also be well considered again. The passage has been described as being not only ironic but parodic. Sammells, for instance, comments on it thus.

Ruth ... launches into a parody of travel-brochure clichés about the tourists’ London ... The parody tricks out Ruth’s resentment and frustrated anger, the disillusionment which Milne — the embodiment of positive values — is able to make good.26
The description of Ruth’s language has not only been that it is highly intertextual, i.e., it is parodic; it can also be said to contain residual register features, this time of travel-brochure language. What is clear-cut here, however, is that the source text has been evoked that it might be brought down; there is the implication that travel brochures present a white-washed or superficial image of the places concerned and thus the foreground text exists in an antagonistic relationship with the background text. This, however, is intradiegetic discourse, and as has been mentioned is often more cut and dried than extradiegetic discourse.

Characterising Parody

As would be obvious from the previous section, the term ‘parody’ used here is a formal one as an intertextual technique and must be assumed to have a wide range of ‘pragmatic ethos’, and thereby have a wide range of possible relationships with the source or backgrounded texts. Traditionally at least, a parodic text has been described as being a text where there is a disjunction between the content and the expression. Each can potentially be borrowed and displaced. As has been pointed out, the disjunction need not be between the content and expression, but this bipartite division has its uses especially in relation to classification. Priestman,\textsuperscript{27} for instance, comments that
The literary parody may be said to involve the distortion of the style and spirit of a text so that 'form' and 'content' are no longer experienced as a unique fusion, but an incongruous copy supervenes (the parody) which is similar but not identical to the original. (p. 28)

Indeed, Nash²⁸ has provided various models of parody based on this bipartite division of content and expression. If parody is to have a target to be mocked at, then potentially this can be the source content or the source expression, or the displacing content or the displacing expression. But often, there is no specific target, and the motivation of the author is very often just to produce a humorous piece of writing. Mention has been made of Jumpy’s four kinds of burlesques in the previous section, but one of the reasons for not adopting his distinctions here is that he does not take into account the 'targetless' and 'open' parodies which modernist texts seem to revel in. Nash’s models bear a certain resemblance to Ben-Porat’s characterisation of literary allusion, though Ben-Porat’s notion of the evoked text giving rise to intertextual patterns is more helpful because he does not limit what is being evoked to just the content, and, as has been mentioned above, the extent of metonymic evocation differs from text to text. Nash’s notion of the derived expression can be said to be equivalent to Ben-Porat’s ‘marker’.

The following example from The Times (29 September 1987) could be examined from the point of view of possible targets.
When that Septembre with his showres and dewye
Hath given everyonne the Winter ’fluye,
And made themme takye leave of all their senses,
Than longen folk to goon to Conferences.
And specially from every shire’s ende
Of Englande, to Blackyepool they wende.29

This is of course a parody of Chaucer.

Whan that Aprill with his shoures soote
The droghte of March hath perced to the roote,
And bathed every veyne in swich licour
Of which vertue engendred is the flour;

Thanne longen folk to goon on pilgrimages,
And palmers for to seken straunge strondes,
To ferne hawles, kowthe in sondry londes;
And specially from every shires ende
Of Engelond to Canterbury they wende ....30

The context of the first passage must be available to appre¬
ciate it; it is, of course, the time of the Conservative
Party conference in Blackpool (‘Blackyepool’). The author
has borrowed Chaucer’s form and style (the rhymed couplet,
‘olde worlde’ spelling, representative archaic words) but at
the same time brings in modern turns of phrases (the modern
notion of Conferences, rather than the abstract noun, and
the colloquial ‘to take leave of one’s senses’ disguised in
olde worlde spelling) which already creates tension. Of
course, the subject matter has been displaced, so that
instead of pilgrims, there are now conference goers. These
few lines are quite representative of the rest of the
parody, and the tension between the Chaucerian world
(recalled metonymically by the source text) and the modern
one is always there. Further down, there is a description
of Mrs Thatcher: ‘Well wimpled up and on her perm a hat. / Her hosen were of fynest nylon mesh / And gartered tyte.’
‘Wimpled’ sits uncomfortably with ‘perm’, ‘hosen’ with
'fynest nylon mesh'. What is it that is the target of the parody? Or is there a target at all? Parody involves superimposition (cf. Ben-Porat’s poetics of allusion in the previous section), so there is not only a superimposition of The Canterbury Tales on the world of party conferences but also metonymically the whole mediaeval world view. The point made here is that going to conferences is not only set off against going on a pilgrimage but the reader is invited to step back from the present world and view things from a distance (this, incidentally, would go along very well with the formalist notion of estrangement); the reader is made to see conferences in another light, but it would be the parodist’s aim to entertain his readers with humour as well. Thus, the notion of the 'target' in parody is not often the most helpful one, and Ben-Porat’s notion of 'intertextual patterns' can be well made use of. In this case, parody evokes not only the Chaucer text itself but the Chaucerian zeitgeist as well.

There are also parodies which are merely academic exercises, intending to demonstrate the parodist’s skill in observing the techniques or the idiosyncratic style of the source text or author. In this case, more so than that in the previous example, there will be no specific 'target' at all. Seymour Chatman, in his study of the later style of Henry James, appends to his book two parodies of James, one by Beerbohm and another by Rouse.31 Using the various grammatical features that he has isolated as belonging to the style of James, Chatman goes on to point out how each parody
measures up to his categories and is able to demonstrate the intuitive feeling that Beerbohm has been able to give a more accurate parody of James. (This is perhaps an oversimplification because he talks of, for instance, the Jamesian feature of 'immediate access to the protagonist’s mind’, which would not be a grammatical category at all. This would perhaps go to show that there can never be a pure parody of style as opposed to content.)

Priestman distinguishes between ‘public parody’ and ‘comic parody’:

By public parody I mean parodies whose new content is satirical, political, or a comment on current affairs (newsworthy items of all shades): ... Comic parody is that kind where the parodist endeavours to make the new content amusing, partly in its own right, and partly in relation to the old model which would normally be associated with a seriously-meant ‘content’. (pp. 36–37)

This is not to suggest that ‘public parodies’ are not humorous because incongruity of any sort (on which parody depends for its effect) has the potential to set off humour. The Jamesian parodies mentioned above, having no extra-mural target would seem to fit more into the ‘comic’ category of parodies. Of course it is not always a case of either public or comic; indeed it could be said that in most cases the comic element is there simply because of the consciousness of some form of disjunction, whatever form that disjunction might take. Thus Priestman’s label public parody might be equated to satirical parody, which need not be lacking in humour, and would be parody where there is an
extrinsic target of mockery added to the comic element inherent in parody. Priestman provides an example from *Punch* (27 September 1883) commenting on Paddington Station.

> I know a bank whereon foul road-slush flows,  
> Where passing one has need to hold one’s nose;  
> Where familiar slop-carts do combine  
> To store malodorous muck in foetid line.

Parody involves superimposition and in this case, it latches on to Oberon’s lines to Puck in *A Midsummer Night’s Dream*:

> I know a bank where the wild thyme blows,  
> Where oxslips and the nodding violet grows,  
> Quite overcanopied with luscious woodbine,  
> With sweet muskroses and with eglantine. (II.i.249-52)

Here, the pastoral scene evoked by the source text is deliberately contrasted to the state of Paddington Station. The iambic pentameter and the initial lines of the original have been appropriated together with its rhyme scheme. The initial consonants of some of the lexical words have also been reproduced *(sweet muskroses/store maladorous)*. Thus here, the target is not so much Shakespeare as Paddington Station in the late nineteenth century.

Priestman’s public parody would then fit into the category of parody where the target is the displacing subject.

However, parody can also attack the original subject or content and have a hostile pragmatic ethos, as is evident in Walter Nash’s parody of D. H. Lawrence. Here is the first stanza.

BERT LAWRENCE GETS THE BUG
I saw a bug today,  
in the quadrangle, as a matter of fact;  
and that’s how he looked, all matter-of-fact  
and bug-like, in the way of bugs.
The poem has its source from the various poems about animals by Lawrence, only that Lawrence's perceived idiosyncracies are exaggerated, implying a hostile stance towards him. As as been hinted above, there is not always a clear-cut distinction between form and content and in this case his stylistic predilections have also been appropriated and exaggerated.

Parody can also potentially displace the style and attack the displacing style. Of course, these are not the only possibilities. Nash has also gone into more complex parodic schemes where there might be more than one parodic source. *Travesties*, for instance, has its parodic source in Wilde, but also travesties (as is announced by the title) the historical figures in the play. (Travesty has been classified as a form of parody above. Yet it is problematic, because the travesties of the historical characters here are extra-textual.) There is also a great deal from Cecily's lecture and from the second act in general which are quotations from Lenin himself, damning himself with his own words, as it were, and they are turned against him because of the transcontextualisation. All this of course goes towards making complex text intertwined with various parodic modes. However, a generalisation may perhaps be made here: that the more extended a piece of parody is, the more likely it is that something more than a simple denigration is sought, and that the higher the possibility that there is a more complex relationship with the source text. This can be said to be so merely because of the fact
that much more effort is likely to have been put into a longer piece of work, and therefore the author can be thought to be seeking greater returns from his effort. And this can be said to be true of Travesties, and that Wilde’s The Importance of Being Earnest and Joyce’s Ulysses are not there merely to be applauded or denigrated, but rather to work together with the dialectic of the play. Thus serious parody implies engagement with the evoked text(s) rather than mere denigration or even adulation, giving rise to intertextual patterns. It is therefore more difficult to classify a more extended literary work which is parodic as ‘public parody’ or ‘comic parody’, or talk in an unproblematic manner about the target of the parody, whilst not denying that this is often possible in shorter works.

Parody as defamiliarisation
As has been pointed out above with reference to the parody on Chaucer’s Canterbury Tales, one of the effects to parody is to allow the reader to step back from the text and take a more distanced look at the material, and this accords well with the aims of a liberal education, one of which is to be able to disentangle oneself from one’s immediate situation and predicament and survey the object of investigation dispassionately.

The formalist notion of defamiliarisation or ostranenie has been much used by stylisticians and is used synonymously with foregrounding and de-automatisation. Halliday\textsuperscript{32} expatiates upon de-automatisation with reference to J. B.
Priestley's *An Inspector Calls*. 'Automatised' texts would be characterised as being the 'most neutral' or 'unmarked' (p. 130), and so de-automatisation as a critical and philosophical concept would seek to disrupt this, and it could be expected to filter down to the pragmatics and indeed to the grammatical structures of the text. Indeed, in drama, the problem is more critical because most plays are temporally limited to three or four hours, and within this space of time, the dramatist has to conjure up a world before the audience, and it is with reference to this 'world' that the dramatist has to convey meaning. De-automatisation then, it would seem, is particularly relevant to plays as it would be the means by which the dramatist calls attention to the way the 'inner' world of the stage differs from the world as the audience (or reader) knows it. (The question of foregrounding is indeed a perspectival one; it is interesting to note that a perspectival readjustment is thought necessary in the traditionally grammatical domain of reported speech\(^3^3\) so that parody can be seen as an extension of the perspectival problem to the textual domain.)

To create a partially differing reality by conversational means within the space-time of a dramatic performance is almost bound to demand some de-automatization of the language, whereby the patterning of words and structures enables them to make their own distinct contribution to the meaning. (p.135)

He then goes on to say that 'the wording becomes a quasi-independent semiotic mode through which the meanings of the work can be projected' (p. 136).
If anything, a literary work involves some amount of appropriation of the tradition (which encompasses not only the assumptions of the age but also the language) and yet at the same time strives to achieve some level of meaning which involves bringing into focus the elements that he is interested in. This can be seen to parallel the task of a dramatist who cannot create another Eden without in some ways mirroring the first Eden. Halliday suggests that the mode through which this is achieved is de-automatisation, and with reference to J. B. Priestley, his entry point into the play is the modal system. He seems to imply that the process of de-automatisation always filters down to the grammatical level, but this would seem to be over-optimistic to the writer of this paper. De-automatisation could profitably been seen from the point of view of pragmatics (as in the ‘Politeness Principle’ above), and if pragmatic knowledge or encyclopaedic knowledge can be allowed to include knowledge of the literary tradition, parody would seem to fall naturally as one of the choices of modes or techniques by means of which de-automatisation can be made manifest.

Sammells (op. cit.) also sees parody as a means towards defamiliarisation in his discussion of Stoppard. In Rosen- crantz and Guildenstern, the Shakespearian Hamlet is made to be seen in a different light (Ch. 2, Sect. II). The modern idiom in which Ros and Guil speak ‘off stage’, as it were, serve to further distance Shakespeare’s Hamlet, so that one is tempted to question tragedy as an adequate metaphor for life. In a sense, the ‘off stage’ scenes are made to seem
more real than the 'on stage' ones. This is not always to be taken for granted either, and this can be a red herring as in The Real Inspector Hound. This also can be seen as a parody of the conventional whodunnit thriller, and again, Sammells comments on the defamiliarising effect: 'The confusions of The Real Inspector Hound are carefully engineered to a demonstrable end: to defamiliarise not just the hackneyed mechanism of the whodunnit but also those habitual categories by means of which we, as critics, might be tempted to recognise it' (p. 60). By defamiliarising what has often been unquestioningly accepted, parody exposes some of the pitfalls of some elements of the literary tradition (and here, 'literary' is used in a very broad sense to encompass works beyond the canon).

However, on the other hand, and paradoxically, the use of parody can also provide the audience with advance information about the outcome of a situation, thereby opening up the possibility of dramatic irony. Rosencrantz and Guildenstern are Dead owes its provenance ostensibly to Hamlet, so that the dénouement (if there can be said to be one) is already known to the audience (and is, in fact, already announced in the title of the play), thereby intensifying the sense of futility in Rosencrantz's and Guildenstern's constant ontologically- and even teleologically-charged questionings. Superior audience awareness can be said to open the way up for discrepancies and ironies. This has
been pointed out by Pfister who goes on to add that this intertextual knowledge can again be subverted, thus making the text doubly defamiliarised.

Parody as Metafiction
As noted above, parody not only points to the subject but also the expression. Very often there is a disjunction between the form and the content, so that form can come under the focus of examination. And it is partly through this new focus on form that de-automatisation is made possible. At the same time, parody takes its place amongst all the modes through which self-consciousness or narcissism is realised.

Priestman enlarges on this:

... [C]ontemporary English criticism has been most stimulating ... in its suggestion that parody is a paradigm of the whole fiction-making process where the parodist is seen as one who draws attention to the way in which fictions are made. (p. 5)

Parody refuses to delude readers or audiences to view art as merely mirroring the outer reality. Instead, parody harks back to other texts which seems to stress that very often, one’s knowledge of the world is through texts. It refuses to allow the reader to ‘lose oneself’, as it were, in the text.

Stoppard’s Moon and Birdboot (in The Real Inspector Hound) and Rosencrantz and Guildenstern (in the play bearing their names) have been described as metafictional characters, although it would probably be more accurate to describe them as characters in metafictional plays (both of
which rely on parody for their metafictionality). Parody provides more than a single view of the text, and as has been pointed out by Schlueter 'Any clear sense we may have had of what is "real" and what it "fictive" is almost irrecoverably disturbed'.36 This is, of course, with reference to The Real Inspector Hound. The multi-layered nature of the discourse situation in that play has already been commented on earlier. In this case, the bottom-most discourse layer (the whodunnit) is already a parody of the traditional whodunnit, and its staginess (by which is meant its artifice or acted-out quality) is emphasised. The housekeeper, for instance, dusts a chest of drawers in expectation of a telephone call; the possible motives of the main characters for wanting to kill Simon Gascoyne are established; there are, in addition to that, the traditional stage histrionics. This would inevitably distance the audience from the discourse situation, which would be established as 'fictive'. This is doubly re-inforced by the presence of another layer of intervening discourse - that of the critics, Moon and Birdboot - which would seem to confirm the fictive nature of the whodunnit. The world of Moon's and Birdboot's discourse would be deemed more 'real' than the world of the whodunnit. The audience's and reader's confidence is immediately shattered in the second half of the play when these two worlds seem to merge, seemingly indistinguishable from each other. (One could perhaps even think of this as some kind of a 'parody' of the traditional play-within-a-play situation.)
Parody would then seem to be a mode where the fiction-making process is dwelt on. The parodist is necessarily self-conscious, and the defamiliarising process lends itself to such self-consciousness. Abasto characterises parody thus: 'La parodie ... porte sur des systèmes signifiants; c'est une langage au second degré' ('Parody ... bears on signifying systems; it is a metalanguage').

Kennedy talks of Rosencrantz and Guildenstern exploiting 'some of the built-in theatrical overtones of Hamlet (the play’s concern with acting and the play-life metaphor)’ and that scenes taken directly from Shakespeare are cast in a new frame, and indeed he calls Rosencrantz and Guildenstern the meta-text of Hamlet. Presumably, what is meant by 'quoting in a new frame' and 'meta-text' is that because of the transcontextualisation of the original Shakespeare passages, the reader or audience would bring on board different assumptions and this would be a result of the backgrounded text being located within the foregrounded text. For Kennedy, this results in the 'demythologizing [of the] tragic sense of life' (p. 50) encapsulated in the Shakespearian tragedy.

Parody and the open text
Another mode that parody lends itself to is 'openness', a term fairly popular with reception theorists. Roman Ingarden, precursor to the German reception theorists, talks of indeterminacies - 'spots' or 'points' or 'places' where the reader is called upon to cooperate with the author to
'concretise' them, so that the reader is actively involved in the process of reconstruction. Wolfgang Iser himself makes use of the concept of blanks or gaps. Using the analogy of normal social interaction, he states that 'we have no experience of how others experience us',\(^{39}\) so that we have to 'fill the gap with projected phantasies'. For him, the very fact that literature calls for interpretation at all is evidence of the presence of the gap. The blanks can be seen as potential connexion points, when in a novel, &c., there are changes of perspectives or points of view. He also talks of the 'wandering viewpoint' and the idea of norms, so that one's initial grasp of a character is that of a norm, and as one continues reading, the original conception is altered away from the norm, so that in the end, the original ideas are recast or remoulded. The idea of the norm, however, presupposes the presence of a set of expectations on the part of the reader. When the reader is made to experience the non-fulfilment of an expected function, a 'blank' is left, which the traditional novel has always filled (p. 207).

This notion is relevant with reference to parody because in the case of superimposition of texts, it is not always immediately obvious that one has the dominant position. There is always the contesting alter-ego or Doppelgänger, analogous to the Jekyll-and-Hyde disjunction. In a literary tradition where ambiguity is often prized (cf. Empson), the potential doubleness of parody has been similarly prized. However, Iser's 'blanks' are related to the
sequential progress of a text, or, as he calls it, 'the syntagmatic axis of reading' (p. 216), whereas parodic indeterminacy would seem to be perceived more in the paradigmatic axis. This Iser refers to as negation. He also suggests that negation itself might become thematically relevant (secondary negation), taking for his example the unresolved nature of *The Sound and the Fury*, which, for him, presents the modernist ethos of life being 'full of sound and fury, signifying nothing'. This can also be seen in Fowles's *The French Lieutenant’s Woman* where several endings are provided. Whilst *The Sound and the Fury* is an open text (in the sense that there is no definite resolution) because of the multiple point of view, and *The French Lieutenant’s Woman* because of its multiple endings, parody is potentially open as well because of its intertextual nature, adhering to various sign systems. By no means is it here implied that all parodic texts are open texts as will have been obvious from some of the earlier illustrations where there are textual and contextual clues.

A short parodic text can be used to illustrate its potential openness. The following is a Wendy Cope sonnet, and the source text is obviously Shakespeare’s Sonnet cxxix.

The expense of spirits is a crying shame
So is the cost of wine. What bard today
Can live like old Khayyám? It’s not the same —
A loaf and Thou and Tesco’s Beaujolais.
I had this bird called Sharon, fond of gin —
Could knock back six or seven. At the price
I paid a high wage for each hour of sin
And that was why I only had her twice.
Then there was Tracy, who drank rum and Coke,
So beautiful I didn’t mind at first
But love grows colder. Now some other bloke
Is subsidizing Tracy and her thirst.
I need a woman, honest and sincere,  
Who’ll come across on half a pint of beer.

This sonnet’s polyphonic parodic nature is obvious from the various sign systems evoked. There is of course the evocation of Shakespeare and the romantic norm of the sonnet. Superimposed on this is the norm of a libidinous man in search of a woman. There is also allusion to Khayyám and the sensual man. On the face of things, it is not absolutely clear what the pragmatic force of this parody is. Whilst several norms have been evoked no one of them is automatically privileged. The parody and the source text stand at odds against each other. The source (‘The expense of spirit in a waste of shame / Is lust in action’) brings to relief the persona’s casual attitude towards sex. Therefore, a parodic text need not bring to a resolution the several sign systems that it evokes. Added to that, Wendy Cope wrote these parodies of Shakespeare under the persona of Strugnell, so that what one has here is layered discourse.

This contrasts to, for instance, the persona’s ironic use of ‘sin’ (l. 7), where the context makes a straight reading of ‘sin’ (in its biblical sense, and can be linked to Shakespeare’s waste of shame) untenable, so that it has to be read as facetiousness on the part of the persona. In this case there is no indeterminacy attached to the ironic reading of ‘sin’. This of course contrasts with the potential openness of parodic texts. Redfern, for instance, has described punning as adding to polyphony and fugality. These metaphors from music can indeed be applied to parody
very aptly as well. In a fugue, each voice has the potential of carrying the subject of the fugue; yet there are times (during the episodes) when the subject is not present in any of the voices at all. The musical metaphor emphasises the complex reading process required by many parodic texts because in a fugue each voice must be attended to, so that there needs to be more attention paid than in a simple melody-plus-accompaniment.

Many critics have found Travesties an unstable text in the sense that there are several viewpoints to it, none of which is ostensibly or undeniably privileged. It would probably be true to say that this is partly due to the pastiche quality of the play (with songs and lectures and limericks), but this is also partly a result of the Wildean background of the play. 'T]he play refuses to admit that any single style of writing enjoys a uniquely privileged relationship with what it purports to describe: the play is an argument between styles to match its argument between documents', so writes Sammells (op. cit., pp. 80-81).

Parody and Humour

Priestman distinguishes between 'public parody' and 'comic parody' but the former, no less than the latter, has the potential for humour simply because parody implies incongruity. Parody as a mode of text-play (in much the same way that punning is a mode of word-play or paranomasia) works towards laughter and humour. Juggling of texts and words involve superimposition which implies a certain amount of
unexpectedness which impels the reader or audience to contemplate (forced perhaps) juxtapositions. This element of 'wit' or 'cleverness' where a more convoluted mode of communication is preferred to the more straightforward monotextual monophonic one causes parody to allow marvellous leaps of excitement in the mind of the reader or audience. Therefore, it seems essential to point out, even though in passing, that the notion of wit and humour must not be left out in any consideration of parody. Indeed, Walter Nash's consideration of parody is under the auspices of The Language of Humour, where parody is seen as one of the modes through which laughter is excited. Not to take account of the playful nature of parody is like dissecting a joke and carefully labelling each part but doing so without a twitch of a face muscle even in the direction of the proverbial Mona Lisa smile. Whilst such an activity is by no means illegitimate, a person carrying out such an activity can be said to have missed the point of the joke. Certainly, parody implies a certain amount of playfulness; added to that there is also calculated skill. The calculated harking back to another text can also be calculated to diffuse the cast-iron preachy quality of a pedagogue (cf. the D. H. Lawrence parody above). Auden, for instance, comments on the practice of flyting where each person is ritually insulted and takes this as being essentially comic:

the calculated skill of verbal invention ... indicates that the protagonists are not thinking about each other but about language and their pleasure in employing it inventively. A man who is really passionately angry is speechless and can only express his anger by
physical violence. Playful anger is intrinsically comic because, of all emotions, anger is less compatible with play. Admittedly, parody is not flyting and they are different in many ways, but both imply a certain amount of narcissistic interest in their production, so that propagandistic literature and highly politicised tracts are incompatible with an extended parodic framework.

Thus, it is understandable that when Rosencrantz and Guildenstern was first put on as a 'fringe' event at the Edinburgh festival in August 1966, it was felt that there was a new mood in drama that was distinct from '[John] Arden's social concern, John Osborne's anger, and even Harold Pinter's comedy of menace'. Admittedly, the playful element in the play was a result not only of its parodic nature but also of the wordplay in the inner situation of the play, but the element of parody can be taken to be an important contributary factor to the general feeling that there is something less preachy, less angry and less menacing about to take on the British stage.

However, there is presumably a paradox here. Parody defamiliarises, thus establishing distance and contemplation; parody amuses as well, thereby encouraging laughter and participation. The strength of parody seems then to be the ability to embrace these two apparently opposing poles in gleeful simultaneity. A parodic play then is able to achieve the at-the-moment glitter of jokes and laughter together with the cerebration and intellectualising ('the
comedy of ideas'? that is presumed to inhabit any serious play. On Rosencrantz and Guildenstern again, Whitaker comments,

They ask us to accept as a finality neither Wilde’s delightfully brittle world of masks nor Beckett’s exhilaratingly austere world of fragmentation and deprivation. Alert to the possibility of dwelling in those worlds among others, they invite us to rediscover the humane balance and freedom that constitute the open secret of the play (ibid., p. 8).

NOTES


9. (Chicago: University of Illinois Press, 1974), Ch. 3.


18. Q.v. David J. Amante, 'Ironic language: as structuralist approach', Language and Style, Vol. XIII, No. 1 (Winter 1980), 15-26; where he says that 'Ironic discourse is intertextual, intentional and transparently counterfactual in nature'. He seems to want to have it both ways - that irony 'echoes' another text and also is verified by nature in its counterfactuality. Another common metaphor used is that of 'voices' (as in Walter J. Ong's 'From Mimesis to Irony: The Distancing of Voice', Bulletin of the Midwest Modern Language Association (Spring/Autumn 1976), p. 3).


28. Walter Nash, The Language of Humour, Ch. 5. For him, parody basically separates into two planes: that of expression and that of content; the most obvious indicator of a parodic frame of mind is the derived expression, derived from the original or source expression in the background text.


30. A modern rendition of the same lines might be helpful:

When the sweet showers of April fall and shoot
Down through the drought of March to pierce the root,
Bathing every vein in liquid power
From which there springs the engendering of the flower

.........

Then people long to go on pilgrimages
And palmers long to seek the stranger strands
Of far-off saints, hallowed in sundry lands,
And specially, from every shire's end
In England, down to Canterbury they wend ... (tr. Nevill Coghill, Penguin Classics, 1951)


33. Q.v. Meir Steinberg, 'Point of view and the indirectness of direct speech', Language and Style, Vol. XV, No. 2 (Spring 1982), 67-117.

34. Manfred Pfister, The Theory and Analysis of Drama (tr. John Halliday) (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1988). He states that 'Advance information ... is also conveyed in the frequent intertextual references in dramatic texts to mythical or historical events that the dramatist can safely assume are familiar with his or her intended audience' (p. 43) and perhaps the same can be said of audiences going to see a production of a classic text; some familiarity with the written text on the part of the audience can be assumed.


40. Once can, incidentally, take note of the allusion (quotation) in the title; making use of Ben-Porat's poetics of allusion, one can say that the themes of *Macbeth* have been recalled metonymically.


CHAPTER V

PARNASSIAN PARSING? ANALYSIS OF THE TEXT

Burtonian Analysis

Thus far, there has not been very much done in the way of analysing dramatic discourse, with the exception of the work done by Deirdre Burton and a few others. The model used by Burton herself is a modification of the model used by Sinclair and Coulthard which was based on teacher-pupil interaction in classrooms. The model is analogous to the Systemic Grammar model, where there are different levels of delicacy, so that a transaction comprises one or more exchanges, an exchange one or more moves, and a move one or more acts. However, emphasis will be given to transactions on the levels of move and act because higher units are not very likely to yield much when dealing with drama texts. (The same point has been made by Michael Toolan in his analysis of a novel.) The other problem with these higher levels is that they tend to be rather difficult to pin down and could give rise to contentious analyses. Indeed, Burton herself says that ‘The really interesting interactive ranks are those of Exchange and Move’.

The Burtonian analytical method is not without its problems, however. It is used ideally with two-person informal dialogues, or duologues, as one might say. Speech turns, in her analysis, are often coterminous with moves and in this way, this facilitates analytical neatness. It would
not be difficult to see that in the case of monologic discourse (say, a lecture) or an extended speech turn (say, a story-telling sequence), it would be more difficult to envisage an analysis based on the Burtonian model. This could be seen to be due to the fact that the Burtonian model privileges interactional discourse where the interpersonal function of language is made prominent. This is made obvious from the labels given to moves - opening, challenging, supporting - and indeed from the label move itself; the metaphor used is that of a game, and the labels challenging and supporting suggest a disposition or an attitude taken towards the previous move. This presupposes the notion that conversation or dialogue can very often become a battle of intentions, so that at the end of the conversation, a person can be seen to be either pliable or belligerent, easy going or driving a hard bargain. The problem with each model is that it is very often ideologically motivated (and here, ideology is used in a wide, all embracing and not in a merely political sense). What this means, of course, is that the model cannot be seen as the answer to all analyses of spoken discourse (or written-to-be-spoken discourse). In many ways, it is not surprising that the interactional aspect of conversation has been brought to the fore, for this is one way it can be distinguished from written discourse which often has as its basis the transactional or ideational function of language. Burtonian analysis would be in line with dialogue based on (un)cooperation and (im)politeness. A lecture, on the other hand, is
based in the main on logical sequence and a story on temporal and causal sequence, with different levels of self-effacing and subjectivity. This is not to suggest that a person delivering a lecture or narrating a story is not cognisant of a hearer or an audience. Indeed, very often, the hearer’s (suppressed) reaction is anticipated and the lecturer or story-teller proceeds accordingly. In Travesties, there are obviously many passages of monologic discourse, especially Carr’s reminiscences and Cecily’s lecture in Act Two, and there an alternative to the Burtonian method must be used.

Apart from monologic discourse, there are also problems when there are more than two persons engaged in conversation. In such a situation, a person has the choice of not only supporting or challenging a previous move but also to remain silent and allow the other people get on with the conversation. In the case of four-person groups, there is the possibility of splitting up into groups of two, with occasional incursions into the other group. It would be obvious that analysis can become very unwieldy in the case of larger groups. A person, from what he says, might be Supporting a person and Challenging another person at one and the same time; likewise, in relation to one Discourse Topic, he might be making a Re-Opening Move, but in relation to another, he might be making a Bound-Opening Move, and so complications in labelling may arise.
But it must be allowed that Burton's Speech Act classification of dialogue is not without its uses and is often a useful preliminary step in analysis. It would therefore be helpful to outline some of the key points in her analysis. Analysis on the level of acts is based on speech act theory, and parts of the dialogue are broken up into individual acts and she has provided a list of nineteen possible acts (op. cit., pp. 156-59) but one need not necessarily limit oneself to those (for instance, the category 'reject' which is not in Burton's list has been used in this analysis). On the level of Moves, a level less 'delicate' than that of acts, Burton provides seven possible categories, viz., Framing, Focusing, Opening, Supporting, Challenging, Bound-Opening and Re-Opening, though it is obvious that she regards the Opening, Supporting and Challenging Moves to be the crucial ones.

Burton characterises Frames and Focuses as 'explicit markers of Transaction boundaries, and involve Acts that are essentially attention-getting, pre-topic items' (p. 148); Opening Moves, on the other hand 'have no anaphoric reference to the immediately preceding utterance' (ibid.) and are typically Informatives, Elicitations or Directives. A Supporting Move can occur after any of the other moves, and is one that 'maintains the framework set up by a preceding Initiatory Move' (p. 150). A Challenging Move has been made if the appropriate act expected after the preceding Initiatory Move has been withheld. (For instance, in response to an Informative, the listener may refuse to give his atten-
tion; ask for a repetition of the utterance; ask for clarification of information about the identification of objects, persons, ideas in the discourse topic; or ask for more attention concerning the semantic relations that obtain between the referents in the discourse topic (p. 151).)

A Bound-Opening Moves occurs after a preceding Opening, Bound-Opening or Re-Opening Move has been Supported and serves to enlarge the Discourse Framework by providing further information regarding the topic in discussion. Finally, a Re-Opening Move occurs after a preceding Opening, Bound-Opening or Re-Opening Move has been Challenged and it reinstates the topic that has been deflected by the Challenging Move.

The following is a summary of Act I of Travesties.

pp. 17-21 The Zurich Public Library
pp. 21-26 Old Carr reminiscing: rehearsing his memoirs
pp. 26-32 Young Carr and Bennett: racing through history
pp. 32-36 The meeting, limerick style: Carr, Tzara, Gwendolen and Joyce
pp. 36-47 Introduction, Carr and Tzara from The Importance
pp. 47-56 Carr and Tzara, and Gwendolen and Joyce
pp. 56-63 Joyce and Tzara: the cross examination à la Lady Bracknell and Jack Worthing
pp. 63-65 Carr’s monologue again

**Burtonian Analysis: pp. 32-36**

The analysis of the passage (see Appendix A) is not without its problems, as can be seen from the number of instances of
multiple labelling and part of this is due to the fact that ostensibly the passage is about Joyce trying to borrow money from Carr, so the main interaction is between Joyce and Carr. Because of this Tzara appears to be speaking out of turn most of the time and making uncalled for comments, commenting, for instance, on Joyce’s motives for the visit (21) and Joyce’s pronunciation of dada (26), and essentially declaring his dadaist position (33, 42, &c.). (The numbers refer to the numbering of moves in Appendix A.) One can take note of his Challenging Moves and consider his monomaniacal interest in dadaism in his Re-opening Moves near the end of the passage. This gives him the overall impression of being an unsociable and egoistical man.

Gwendolen, on the other hand, emerges as a complete idiot. Many of her moves are Supporting Moves, though she makes sporadic opening moves. No. 19 is ambiguous as she would could be referring to either Joyce or Tzara; it probably be the former as this would be in line with Joyce’s admitted purpose to borrow ‘a couple of pounds till [he is] paid’. However, if this were the case, then No. 24 would be completely out of the blue, and indeed Joyce’s Challenging Move (No. 25) points towards the inappropriateness of Gwendolen’s remarks. In No. 29, Gwendolen makes a Re-opening Move, but unlike Tzara, she re-opens Joyce’s Moves rather than her own. Further down, she makes mostly Supporting Moves in response to Tzara’s declarations on his attitude towards
Art. Thus, Gwendolen is seen to make inappropriate remarks, or to support Joyce’s suit, or to acquiesce to Tzara’s position on Art.

Joyce, however, is seen to be persistent in his intention of borrowing money from Carr, if not almost unashamedly so. His moves are typically Opening ones, or re-opening his previous moves. This, of course, makes him appear very sure of himself as he proceeds with what he has come to do, taking it in his stride.

On Carr, however, what is interesting is his response to Joyce’s request. In the beginning he seems to reject it but later appears to accept it (in Nos. 28 and 32, for instance), but both have been labelled as Supporting Moves because the acts of either accepting or rejecting were appropriate ones after an act of requesting. The request act (labelled directive) has as its adjacency pair the act react in Burton’s analysis. (Therefore, the appropriate Supporting Move was to hand over the pound or whatever amount was asked for by Joyce.) The act accept, then, is incomplete without a react, and the absence of the latter is significant.

Prompted by Gwendolen’s suggestion (No. 29), Carr goes on to muse on ‘British culture’ and with one exception (No. 59) ceases from responding to Joyce’s Re-opening Moves. Again, the absence of a response is significant and can possibly be construed as inostensible Challenging Moves (and one would have to interpret the lack of response as wilful silence, where, applying the Cooperative Principle, one could take it to indicate a
negative response to the previous request, but this counters the previous accept); on the other hand, this could be seen as the result of Carr’s withdrawal from interacting with the other characters and participating in the conversation. It can be seen that No. 40 (‘Now ... British culture ...’) and No. 57 (‘By Jove, I’ve got it! Iolanthe!’) are not addressed to anybody in particular (that is, if one considers only the character-to-character level of discourse). Again, this withdrawal from participation in the conversation points towards a monomaniacal obsession with the glories of British culture.

This analysis would seem to indicate that each character has an obsessive interest which he clings on to – each character, that is, with the exception of Gwendolen. This is done to the extent that it proves detrimental to the ongoing conversation in that the rules of conversation are constantly being broken. Joyce persists in his request for money (there is an abundance of restatements); Tzara speaks out of turn and insists on giving dadaist pronouncements on Art and culture; whilst Carr withdraws from the conversation and ponders on the merits of British culture. Tzara in particular seems to have taken as the basis of his conversation the Impoliteness Principle. In No. 21, he maximises dispraise of Joyce (in deference to a Disapprobation Maxim) by suggesting that there is an ulterior motive in his coming to call on Carr (which, incidentally, proves to be true); in No. 33, he maximises disagreement with Carr (in deference to a Disagreement Maxim) by contradicting him to his face.
This also applies to what he says after that because his position manifestly differs from that of Carr, and he in no way seeks to tone down his position but rather reinforces it with scatological references, though it is Gwendolen who says the word. (This is perhaps interesting with reference to No. 24 where she engages in some kind of a euphemistic circumlocution, so that No. 56 has to be interpreted as unintended coarseness, as confirmed by the stage directions.)

In the whole passage, Bennett only makes one contribution, No. 63, but this is not surprising, considering that he is supposedly the butler. The reference to Tzara’s auntie is of course an allusion to Nos. 33 and 34, and this is based on the (supposedly) misunderstanding of Tzara’s French-Rumanian accent of ‘anti’; the point is whether this is deliberate misunderstanding or not, because if this is, then No. 63 would have to be interpreted as being ironic. In other words, Bennett would be ‘quoting’ what someone stupid enough to have misunderstood Tzara had said. However, Bennett’s position as a butler would not have allowed him to make ironic remarks at the expense of a guest, because the ironist adopts a higher or superior position (making use of Booth’s metaphor).

This of course leads to the question of discourse layers. If Bennett is seen as having made those remarks innocently, then one would have to attribute the irony to the addressee in a higher discourse layer. This could be either the Old Carr-to-imaginary audience level of
discourse, or the Stoppard-to-audience/reader level of discourse. What the Burtonian analysis cannot take account of is of course the higher discourse layers. What it does do is to classify the utterances of the characters according to their speech acts, though one might have to go into more qualitative analysis based on pragmatic principles to sharpen the analysis. This of course means that the analysis assumes that the dialogue is straightforward conversation, and cannot take into account the fact that what actually happened took place in the mind of Old Carr. Another obvious point is the limerick style which can be said to be another obvious feature staring one in the face (or perhaps, screaming one in the ears) which the Burtonian analysis cannot take account of.

On the one hand, this makes it obvious that what is happening is not realistic and is all part of Old Carr’s manic reminiscences of Zurich in the war years. The presentation of Joyce as a money-grabbing opportunist and Tzara as a homophobic exhibitionist dadaist would then be part of the intention of Old Carr. If one locates this element in the author-audience/reader discourse level, then it could be said that Stoppard is experimenting with various styles in Act I (together with the Wildean style and Shakespearean style), and in a sense colluding with Tzara in this pastiche; on the other hand, Stoppard’s limerick scheme and further borrowings later on in the scene go against Tzara’s dadaist tenet (‘The classics - tradition - vomit on it!’ (p. 35)) and undermine the apparent collusion.
Burtonian Analysis: pp. 36-40

The analysis in Burtonian terms (see Appendix B) is again problematic simply because the method is not designed to cover problematic discourse such as the full-blooded argument found here. The passage starts off in Wildean style, and indeed, as a lot is 'being done' in the Austin sense, the analysis maps out the speech acts there. But as the passage progresses, one find an increasing amount of informatives as both Carr and Tzara enunciate their point of view with regard to war and art and ideals; interactional interest is replaced by philosophical and ideological interest. The Burtonian analysis in itself does not reveal very much about the nature of the dialogue, in contrast to the previous limerick-style section. What can be said, however, is that both Carr and Tzara here seem to be in approximately equal standing in terms of power; neither is inhibited from making Opening Moves or Challenging Moves. It is interesting to note too that some of the Opening Moves can be construed as Challenging Moves by default (for instance No. 10); instead of responding appropriately to the previous move, the speaker instead opts to start another topic. In one aspect, this passage is less problematic than the previous one: it is more of a dialogue than the other one as there are only two interlocutors (apart from Bennett's initial utterance introducing Tzara to Carr) and so this passage is less plagued with the difficulties relating to the addressee, or speakers deliberately foregoing a speech turn. Where a speaker refuses to respond appropriately to a
move in this passage, he would have to make an Opening Move (which is also, by default, a Challenging Move because it is a move inappropriate to the previous initiatory one). One can take as an example No. 10, where instead of responding to Carr’s statement about society apeing the fashions of philosophy (which can be interpreted as a criticism of Tzara’s adopting Benthamistic ideas), Tzara elects to ignore the statement, and respond by criticising Carr’s habits (and this has indeed be labelled as an accusation because it is more difficult to construe it as an innocent comment) in a tit-for-tat manner. This can be taken as a pointer to the cat-and-dog relationship between Carr and Tzara, each trying to break down the other’s defences.

Roughly speaking, one can say that the passage finds itself pulled in two separate directions. The start of the passage seems to be tugged along what shall be called, for convenience’ sake, the Wildean path; the latter half of the passage, however, seems to be drawn towards a more belligerent invective style. Labelling the two propensities thus is not entirely inappropriate, both having their foundation in historical fact: The Importance of Being Earnest was mounted in Zurich, and the Great War, as it was called then, was being fought in the rest of Europe. Of course, as Stoppard informs his readers in the stage direction, ‘TZARA, no less than CARR, is straight out of The Importance of Being Earnest’ (p. 36). Before going on to elaborate on both these styles, one can say from the outset that the Politeness Principle cannot be said to apply at all.
Neither Carr nor Tzara is seen to have any concern for saving the face of his interlocutor, but instead, each is out to establish himself and his own point of view. Indeed, it can be said that a Self-aggrandisement or Self-establishment Principle (one can include this as one of the Principles in Leech’s interpersonal rhetorics) is at work here which overrides whatever constraints the Politeness Principle might have imposed upon the speeches of both speakers (for instance, neither Carr nor Tzara has any compunction about contradicting each other, thereby breaking the Agreement Maxim). This can be said to be sufficiently untypical of ordinary speech so that the passage would strike the reader or audience as being theatrical, and most certainly unnaturalistic. To talk in formalistic terms, one can say that a speech style which gives pre-eminence to the Self-aggrandisement Principle to the utter disregard of other Principles is foregrounded, so that, in a sense, the reader or audience can be said to have been prepared before hand for an intellectual and philosophical tussle.

It may be recalled that in a previous section, Politeness has been seen in terms of illocutionary politeness and formal politeness. The distinction between the Wildean style and the belligerent invective style can be seen from the fact that although both are illocutionarily impolite, the Wildean style has some level of formal politeness in it, achieved by means of indirectness (there is a caveat though) as can be seen in No. 5, 'I don’t know that I approve of these Benthamite ideas, Tristan', rather than 'I
disapprove of these Benthamite ideas of yours', or even 'What nonsense!'. This, of course, contrasts sharply with the abusive name-calling by Carr in No. 73, for instance. Formal politeness is also evident in the terms of address in the vocatives in the beginning of the passage: 'my dear Tristan' (No. 2), 'Tristan' (No. 6), 'Henry' (No. 10) and, to balance it all up, 'my dear Henry' (No. 7). The use of first names (cf. Bennett's 'Mr Tzara', No. 1) with the optional term of endearment would, on the face of it, seem to imply some level of intimacy and feeling of goodwill. The obvious intertextual Wildean mode, however, forces the reader or audience to distance himself from the text, so that the text is open to ironisation. Of course, excessive formal politeness can be interpreted as either hostility or camaraderie but not indifference. One can take the lead from The Importance and see this as joyous banter, but this is difficult to square with the latter end of the passage.

The pragmatic notion of presupposition is also useful in coming to terms with the Wildean style, though one might have to take the notion of presupposition beyond the normal confines of linguistics. It is presuppositions which are absolutely outrageous in nature which add to the Wildean flavour of the beginning of the passage. For instance, No. 8 has the implicature 'To remark that one was brought to a salon by a sense of duty leads to terrible scenes', and the use of even (a focusing additive subjunct) points to how flabbergasted Carr is when the same thing occurs in 'the most respectable salon'. All this presupposes that one
would normally go to a salon not to enjoy oneself but to
fulfil one’s responsibility. This can hardly be said to
concur with how things are in the real world. More outrage¬
ous is the implicature that people are so much enslaved to
fashion so that there would be an outburst against any
expression of Stoical beliefs merely because they are un¬
fashionable, to which Carr seems to have aligned himself by
his remarks. These outrageous implicatures seem to recall
the ‘conflict’ or ‘discrepancy’ which is a clue to the iron¬
ic nature of an utterance discussed above. Indeed, giving
the utterances an ironic interpretation would seem to be a
way out of the manic nature of the Wildean discourse, but in
this case, a sane world is not seen as a desideratum, and
irony if it is there at all would be better attributed to a
higher discourse level, i.e., the author-to-reader/audience
discourse level rather than the character-to-character
discourse level.

The Wildean quality is also evidenced by flawed logic
(another ‘discrepancy’!), so that No. 11 is a contradiction
of terms. An Epicurean can be expected to practise Epicure¬
anism, and a Stoic Stoicism. However, the fact that No. 11
can be construed not only as a comment but as an accusation
- and indeed, is taken as one by Carr because No. 12 con¬
stitutes an excuse - makes it likely that Tzara would have
it that his utterance were taken ironically, the sense of it
being: ‘You talk about duty and think yourself a Stoic; why
don’t you practise what you preach instead of eating and
drinking all the time, indulging yourself in the pleasures
of the flesh? But once again, the speech act is an indirect one, and is thus typical of the Wildean sequence in this passage. However, Carr’s excuse (No. 12) exhibits even greater logical infelicities. It is based on the parallelism done/before and well done/well before, and the pun on done (= customary in fashionable circles) and well done (= commendable). Again, its illogicality makes it open to ironic interpretation (i.e., taking No. 12 as a witty repartee to top Tzara’s neat parallel structure Stoical principles/Epicurean habits), but Stoppard’s stage direction (stiffly) makes this unlikely and the wittiness has to be attributed to Stoppard, not to Carr. Carr’s following moves (Nos. 13 and 14) are similarly manic because they contain the presupposition that ailments are subject to fashion (and therefore not subject to the laws of cause-and-effect, about which an argument will develop to reach magnificent proportions). No. 16 is another instance of a pun, based on the Latin post hoc, ergo propter hoc (‘after this, therefore because of it’), and No. 24 has the outrageous presupposition that ‘succinct alliteration’ is a precondition to a call to arms.

Thus far, it can be said then that another Principle is in force which has pushed the Cooperative Principle or the Politeness Principle (at least the Illocutionary Politeness Principle) to the background. This Principle, which can be called the Wittiness Principle, would seem to take on board the maxims of formal politeness, and maxims emphasising punning and linguistic parallelism, and these maxims are
emphasised to the expense of logic and a sane perception of the world. What is interesting as well is that the essence of this so-called Wittiness Principle is debated in the text as well (the lack of logic, and the favouring of cleverness), so that the 'cleverness' in the text would seem to make Stoppard be in collusion with Carr in his argument with Tzara about cleverness, and with Tzara in his argument with Carr about causality. In the Wildean passage then what Stoppard has evoked is the Wildean frame of mind which emphasises the Self-Aggrandisement and Wittiness Principles (it is not denied that these are any more than convenient labels), rendering the whole discourse nothing like what the audience will be used to in everyday circumstances. Certainly the incongruity contributes to the humour in the passage. At the same time, as mentioned above, the Wildeanism colours the subsequent argument, undermining both Carr and Tzara.

In No. 25 ('Oh, what nonsense you talk!') the deference to formal politeness seems to be breaking down in that an impolite illocution is rendered in an impolite form (instead of, say, 'I'm afraid you aren't making much sense to me at all'), which points towards the concomitant breaking down of the Wildean8 style in the passage. The response that Carr gives, however, seems to maintain the Wildean epigrammatic style, with two clauses balancing each other:

\[
\begin{align*}
  & \text{IT } [\text{verb}] \quad \text{NONSENSE, BUT AT LEAST} \\
  & \text{IT } [\text{verb}] \quad \text{CLEVER NONSENSE.}
\end{align*}
\]
It would appear then that the Wittiness Principle is given precedence so that Carr is, uncharacteristically, allowed to admit (albeit in a qualified way) that he has been talking nonsense. In his response (Nos. 27-29), Tzara employs the direct style again, and appropriately, his words match his style, at least in Nos. 27 and 28, as he declaims (perhaps an unfortunate word as it implies 'cleverness') against cleverness. Unfortunately, in his final comment, No. 29, the balance between style and content is lost, and indeed, Carr is quick to point this out. Tzara equates semantically incompatible items, Chance and design. This would fit into the rhetorical device of paradox or oxymoron. 9

Carr’s response to that is rendered problematic because of the protean state of the world inhabited by the characters: both the Wittiness Principle and the Self-aggrandisement Principle seem to be in operation. Is Carr’s comment (No. 30) an innocuous one or does it hark back to the debate on cleverness? Is the side comment No. 32 meant to be taken ironically or straight? The Wildean world where style is the essence, and meaning an inconvenience to be borne, would allow for a straight reading of No. 32, whereas a world where meaning and signification is attributed to all speech would only allow for an ironic reading of the utterance.

When Tzara responds to that, he does so in a Wildean mode. He uses the term of address my dear Henry; No. 33 consists of a main clause followed by successive subordinate clauses (including ‘rank-shifted’ clauses, in Hallidayan parlance), and the qualifiers to causes are in a diminishing
scale:

causes we know little about
causes we know very little about
causes we know absolutely nothing about

so that whilst denouncing design, his speech affirms design. Carr's reply is a straight informative (No. 35), and Tzara's subsequent response a chant (No. 36), both seemingly in defiance of the Wittiness Principle.

This, however, is not the end of the story, because a curious pattern of parallelism is set up again (another instance of 'cleverness') because No. 37 corresponds to No. 25 and No. 38 to No. 26, though with a slight modification. This is possibly an instance of internal parody (by which is meant parody attributable to the character-to-character level of discourse). No. 38 is unfortunate then, because it succeeds in being 'clever' by its internal parallel structure, and by its being a parody of No. 26, though ostensibly Tzara is denouncing cleverness. Another possibility is to interpret this as external parody, by which is meant parody attributable to a higher level of discourse, such as the parody of The Importance of Being Earnest is, in which case Tzara is unaware of his cleverness and the reader or audience can pounce on the discovery of dramatic irony. (The other instance of internal parody is Nos. 57-63.) No. 39 again gives good evidence of cleverness because of the pun on exploded, drawing on its literal sense because of the mention of the war. Again Tzara seems damned by his own speech.
From here on, both characters seem to be given to making rather lengthy speeches, which is uncharacteristic of the Wildean style, but rather each seeks to put forward his own idea of Art and why the war was fought. Here, more than the beginning of the passage, Challenging Moves are made quite often, and there is less evidence of cleverness, except for the internal parody in Nos. 57-63, which Carr uses to turn against what Tzara has said. Another feature which would need to be commented on is Carr’s dwelling on sartorial details, which can be said to be foregrounded because in Gricean terms, the maxim of quantity has been broken: he is giving far more information than is required in No. 40. The same can be seen in No. 47, where Carr describes his enlisting in the army in terms of sending round to Hamish and Rudge for their military pattern book. The kind of good-natured yet super-critical cat-and-dog relationship seems to have been transformed in the latter half of the passage where there is less of an attempt at being ‘clever’ or subtle, and each character is only concerned about putting forward his views in a cruder manner. In fact, many of the statements take the form of definitions (‘... to be an artist at all is like living in Switzerland during a world war’ [Carr, No. 46] or ‘Doing the things by which is meant Art is no longer considered the proper concern of the artist’ [Tzara, No. 48]). Grammatically, they are in the ‘timeless’ present tense; rank-shifted clauses are combined with the equative verb be.
This passage as a whole then evinces different styles having various sources (Wilde being an obvious one). In other words, there is a glorious mixture - the outrageous and the manic go hand in hand with the earnest and the passionate. The use of internal and external parody opens up the passage to greater indeterminacy and sometimes there is doubt as to which level of discourse one is to attribute a particular feature. Wildean inconsequentiality and non-chalance is made to cohabit with the passion and fervour of the end of the passage, and it would seem that Stoppard is there to set up conflicts and incongruities and does not attempt to resolve them. Tzara especially is made to give opinions only to have them denounced by the way he expresses them.

This has, of course, made it extremely difficult to pin Stoppard down, and indeed, he himself comments, referring to *Jumpers* and *Travesties*,

> It’s a matter of taste whether one says they’re wonderfully frivolous saddened by occasional seriousness, or whether there’s a serious play irredeemably ruined by the frivolous side of this man’s nature.10

As has been pointed out in a previous section, the use of parody implies both defamiliarisation and also a transformation of the power structure of the text; the multiplicity of sources destabilises the text in terms of communication. The place given to the so-called Wittiness principle implies also a different kind of author-reader/audience relationship - certainly more playful and less coercive. Indeed, Peter Hutchinson has used the metaphor of a game in describing the
activity of authors. The metaphor of game or play is certainly not inappropriate in relation to Travesties, where so very often, the audience or reader is caught unprepared. (Perhaps one can even say that the essence of humour is its very nature of being unexpected.) Furthermore, play or game implies a certain kind of relationship between the author and the reader or audience where there is a two-way involvement, in contradistinction from the situation in a lecture room, say.

Indeed, it is in this respect that the distinction between 'sense' and 'force' put forward by Leech is significant, because much more is being conveyed than the mere meanings of the sentences on the page, so that in this instance, the 'interpersonal' function of language between the author and the reader or audience is significant. The pre-eminence given to a certain principle does give a clue as to what form the interpersonal relationship takes, and in this instance what concerns the reader or the audience is not only the relationship between the characters in the play (though that is not unimportant either) but also how he is to respond to Stoppard’s overtures of congenial playfulness, as implied by the position given to the Wittiness Principle. The Burtonian analysis will henceforth be abandoned due to its obviously limited use in plays such as Travesties where the extradiegetic discourse is as important as the intradiegetic one. But, importantly, is has been able to point to the adversarial nature of the interaction of the characters in Travesties.
Monologues: Carr's opening monologue, pp. 21-26

Probably one of the distinctive features of Travesties is the presence of lengthy passages of monologic discourse, most notable of which would be the reminiscences of Carr in Act I (pp. 21-26, and also pp. 63-65), and Cecily's lecture on Marx and Marxism in Act II. What linguistic inroads there are that have been made upon drama have considered its dialogic structure, which, perhaps, is understandable because it is the predominance of dialogue which makes drama distinct from the other literary genres. (There is, it must be admitted, the case of the one-man or one-woman play which would pose problems to such a definition of drama.) Obviously, a conversational analysis type of analysis is not going to prove very helpful in such circumstances, although it is sometimes useful to think of monologues as essentially dialogues where one end of the conversation only is heard, a situation not unlike that of one overhearing one end of a telephone conversation: in other words, interactional monologue can be distinguished from transactional monologue. (The fact that television programmes and films can give the audience one end of the telephone conversation without making the conversation totally incoherent proves the point.)

There have been many attempts at defining the term 'monologue'. However, as Pfister points out, 'Anglo-American criticism has established a terminological distinction between ... a soliloquy and a monologue'. The former would refer to a speech where, situationally, there is no addressee on stage; the latter would, on the other hand,
refer to a speech where, structurally, it is autonomous and of a considerable length. The situational v. structural distinction is not particularly helpful in this study and will thus not be pursued further. Suffice it to say that monologism and dialogism represent tendencies in both situational and structural terms, in as much as there can be dialogic monologues and monologic dialogues, as indeed has been observed by Pfister. Structurally, it could be said that monologues tend towards transactionality and dialogues towards interactionality, so that interactional features or overt audience consciousness in monologues or soliloquies can be said to be marked. In this respect then Carr’s monologue stands out, and thereby attention is being focused on Carr’s speech at the beginning of the play.

It could be said in passing then that the method of interspersing a (literary) monologue with an interlocutor is not without its precedent, as is evident in the work of Michael Hoey and Eugene Winter and one can take as an example Hoey’s analysis of Herbert’s ‘Vertue’. He interpolates the words of the poem with the words of a questioner:

Poem. Thy root is ever in its grave
Questioner. What is the consequence of this?
Poem. [And] thou must die. (p. 148)

He thus puts his finger on the dialogic structure even of monologues, and so it could be said that dialogue and monologue represent two ends of a cline. (This is again the question of transactional v. interactional language metamorphosed; dialogues would be associated with interactional
language and monologues with transactional language.) In point of fact, the 'questions' need not be (in terms of speech acts) elicitives and as will be seen later can be really comments or even accusations. There are, however, basically two kinds of 'questions' that can be inserted in monologues, namely, on the one hand, the 'questions' serving to bring out the logical connexion between clauses (as is done by Hoey in the above example); on the other, the 'questions' representing genuinely anticipated questions, and this is encoded in the utterance of the speakers by various grammatical or discoursal features. It is the latter which would be indicative of an interactional use of language. (This raises the question of reader-response theories and theories about reader expectations, and no doubt some cross-fertilisation might prove insightful.) Thus, whether to a greater or lesser extent, monologues would reflect some 'dialogic' qualities. Indeed, Hoey comments that

If dialogue has primacy over monologue [by which he means that one can go through life without ever having to produce a monologue, but it would be much harder to survive without ever engaging in a dialogue], it is but a small step to seeing monologue as a specialised form of dialogue between the writer or speaker and the reader or listener.¹⁶

In other words, he takes dialogue as the unmarked form and monologue as the marked form. Obviously, the situation would be more complex in a literary text because of the different levels of consciousness of the reader. To make use of a non-literary example, one can say that the popular disc-jockey talk (of BBC Radio 1, as opposed to Radio 3,
where one would talk of a 'presenter', and not a disc-jockey, anyway), though essentially monologic betrays a lot of the features of dialogic discourse (i.e., interactionality) by foregrounding the interpersonal dimension of the talk. Montgomery has commented on the pronominal references, the modes of address, the deictic features, and the use of expressives, interrogatives and directives in D.J. talk,17 so that an ongoing conversation is simulated, apparently, in such monologues. This can be seen as the non-literary equivalent of novels with self-conscious narrators such as Sterne’s *Tristram Shandy* and Fowles’ *The French Lieutenant’s Woman*.

Another point made by Hoey which is relevant to the present analysis is that frequently, for a full-orbed description of a text, more than one mode of description is necessary.

The future of stylistics lies not in the meticulous application of a single descriptive apparatus, insightful though that can be on occasion, but in the eclectic marshalling of observations from all branches of language study and beyond [which, in his case, included literary criticism and theology].18

Implicit in the statement is that different stretches of a text require different treatment and that the purist, in denying all but strict linguistic observation, will end up very much the loser.

It is thus proposed that Carr’s monologue in Act I of *Travesties* be analysed in terms of, among other things, its dialogic structure, where the interpersonal dimension is stressed and is therefore to be contrasted to Cecily’s lecture at the beginning of Act II. Another feature which is
prominent here is the many 'voices' that Carr puts on, each strongly contrasted with the other (each 'voice' always signalled some way or other), so that sometimes he appears to be having a conversation with himself. Therefore, a pragmatic analysis of this monologue must take into account not only the interpersonability of the passage but also the intertextuality, both of which are clues to the 'voice' put on by Carr.19

It might be worthwhile to point out some of the rather peculiar features of the passage from the outset. Not only is monologic discourse distinguished from dialogic discourse, but also written from spoken discourse. This makes the language of plays an altogether strange manner of discourse because it is written to be spoken. Within the inner discourse situation (the Carr-to-audience level of discourse), Carr seems to be rehearsing his memoirs, which, typically, are in written mode. Yet because he says everything out aloud he is, as it were, pulled in two different directions, so that, on the one hand, there is some evidence of linguistic patterning typical of written language, and on the other hand, there are also colloquialisms and other features of spoken discourse.

One could interpolate Carr's statements with the presumed questions of an interlocutor in the manner of Hoey:

CARR: He was Irish, of course.
QUESTIONER: Was he from Limerick then, since he's so fond of limericks?
CARR: ... not actually from Limerick - he was a Dublin man, Joyce, everybody knows that.
QUESTIONER: That's why his Ulysses is set in Dublin then?
CARR: ... couldn't have written the book without [hav-
ing come from Dublin].

QUESTIONER: There's a limerick about Dublin, isn't there?

CARR: There was a young man from Dublin, tum-ti-ti-tum-ti-ti-troublin'...

QUESTIONER: Why can't you remember so much of it now?

CARR: ... there's little encouragement for that sort of thing in the Consular Service. Not a great patron of poetry, the service, didn't push it, never made a feature of it.

QUESTIONER: Do you mean that they discouraged poetry and the arts in general?

CARR: Didn't discourage it, I'm not saying that, on the contrary, a most enlightened and cultivated body of men, fully sympathetic to all the arts.

QUESTIONER: Can you give an instance of their support for the arts?

CARR: Look no further than the occasion that brought us together, me and Joyce, brought him to this room, full support, a theatrical event of the first water, great success, personal triumph in the demanding role of Ernest, not Ernest, the other one, in at the top, have we got the cucumber sandwiches for Lady Bracknell, notwithstanding the unfortunate consequences.

QUESTIONER: What do you think of Joyce?

CARR: Irish lout. Not one to bear a grudge, however, not after all these years, and him dead in the cemetery up the hill, no hard feelings either side, unpleasant as it is to be dragged though the courts for a few francs...

QUESTIONER: Is that why you dislike him?

CARR: ... it wasn't the money, or the trousers for that matter...

QUESTIONER: To go back to the British Consulate in Zurich, they generally didn't support the arts, then?

CARR: ... all in all, truth be told, the encouragement of poetry writing, was not the primary concern of the British Consulate in Zurich in 1917, and now I've lost my knack for it. Too late to go back for it. Alas and alack for it.

QUESTIONER: All that is irrelevant, is it not?

CARR: ... I digress.

QUESTIONER: What about apologising then?

CARR: No apologies required, constant digression being the saving grace of senile reminiscence.

It will be seen immediately that the places where questions and also the kinds of questions asked are different from those of Hoey's. It can be said as well that the possibility of inserting questions at all here stresses the dialogic
nature of this monologue, and at the very least the speaker is conscious of an intended audience. According to Hoey and Winter, there is potentially a question in between every clause, and this, on the whole, has not been what has been done here. Their aim for inserting questions is to demonstrate clausal relations (some of which would include condition-consequence, evaluation-assessment, and general-particular), whereas here, it is to show the interpersonal nature of the monologue. Consequently, the questions are not always in the WH-type form.

Perhaps the most notable grammatical feature of the passage is the abundant presence of negatives:

1. Not actually from Limerick
2. couldn’t have written the book without
3. there’s little encouragement
4. Not a great patron of poetry
5. didn’t push it
6. Didn’t discourage it
7. I’m not saying that
8. look no further
9. it wasn’t the money, or the trousers
10. the encouragement of poetry writing was not the primary concern of the British Consulate ...
11. No apologies required

Apart from cases where the negative is used for stylistic neatness (for instance, No. 2 could have been rephrased as ‘must’ve come from Dublin if he wrote the book [probably Ulysses, or possibly Dubliners]’, but which would rob the utterance of the sentence-final stress), negation can be seen pragmatically as a politeness device (notably in the classic understatement) or as a pointer towards the speaker’s consciousness of having possibly let the hearer make certain erroneous assumptions,20 which the speaker is anxious to nip in the bud. It could also, of course, be an
indicator of Politeness and of this consciousness. Both Politeness and cognisance of the hearer’s possible assumptions point towards the centrality of the interpersonal function of language. However, at places where negation is a result of the latter, it would seem most natural to insert a question, as this would be what the speaker would have in mind.

No. 1 is of course a case in point, where indeed a question has been inserted. Interestingly enough, these questions are often an indication of the way the speaker’s mind works. The question itself seems belaboured, if not logically infelicitous as it links a hobby, or perhaps a habit, with a place of origin. Nos. 3, 4, 5, and 10, however make use of negation as a device in understatement, though again there might be some projected hearer’s assumption involved as well. The principle of Formal Politeness, as it has been called earlier, seems to be at work here.

One could also take note of the metastatement, ‘I digress’, which points not only to a certain amount of self-consciousness, but also implies the inserted question ‘All that is irrelevant, is it not?’, underlining the fact that the relation maxim of the Cooperative Principle has been broken. (The topic of the discourse, presumably, should be James Joyce.) The inserted question again attests to an inherent dialogic quality in the monologue. If by saying ‘I digress’, Carr implies that he has broken one of the maxims of the Cooperative Principle, by saying ‘No apologies required’, he implies that there has been some breach in the
Politeness Principle. The original inserted question ('All that is irrelevant, is it not?') can be reinterpreted not merely as a question or a comment, but also as an accusation which would, with an excuse, form an adjacent pair.\textsuperscript{21}

He recognises the normative force of the Cooperative Principle and the Politeness Principle, but at the same time refuses to give full sway to their constraints. Therefore, far from being seen as vague reminiscing, Carr's monologue would seem to be very conscious – one might even say over-anxious – of the presence of hearers. There could also be some element of the entertainer in Carr as well. Indeed, audience-consciousness is so prominent that one might take it as being foregrounded and say that Carr is concerned about giving a good impression of himself to the audience. Given Carr's foreign office training, being in the business of diplomacy, this should perhaps not strike one as something extraordinary.

The next paragraph differs markedly from this one.

(1) My memoirs, it is, then? (2) Life and times, friend of the famous. (3) Memories of James Joyce. (4) James Joyce As I Knew Him. (5) The James Joyce I Knew. (6) Through the Courts with James Joyce ... (7) What was he like, James Joyce, I am often asked. (8) It is true that I knew him well at the height of his powers, his genius in full flood in the making of Ulysses, (9) before publication and fame turned him into a public monument for pilgrim cameras more often than not in a velvet jacket of an unknown colour, photography being in those days a black and white affair, but probably real blue if not empirical purple and sniffing a bunch of sultry violets that positively defy development, (10) don't go on, (11) do it on my head, (12) caviar for the general public, (13) now then - Memories of James Joyce ... (14) It's coming. [Travesties, page 22]
Unlike the previous paragraph, it is much more difficult to insert (non-logical type) questions which would indicate what Carr anticipated from his audience. But this is not to say that Carr forgets about his audience. One can find several acts not consonant with language which is mainly ideational. In other words, apart from mere informatives, Carr provides the audience with No. 1 (which appears to be an elicit) and No. 7 (which has an embedded question making it a possible indirect elicit), and Nos. 11 and 12 (which, grammatically at least, appear to be directives). There are others of questionable status - clauses without main verbs (Nos. 2-6, 12 and 18). It is only Nos. 8 and 9 which provide the informatives regarding James Joyce (which would now be the topic, from which Carr had digressed in the previous paragraph).

It would be true then to say that instead of signalling the anticipated questions by the use of negatives as has been done in the previous paragraph, Carr signals them by making quasi-elicits himself in Nos. 1 and 7, so that here, audience-consciousness is signalled discoursally rather than grammatically. One can take note of the grammatical imperatives in Nos. 10 and 11, which would be anomalies in memoirs. One alternative is to take them, like the earlier questions, as projected responses from his audience, but this would leave No. 12 rather inexplicable. The other alternative is to take it that Carr is now talking to himself, that he is now suffering from a so-called split personality, or has several personas that he can call up at will.
Hoey and Winter have it that there are two kinds of clause relation. The relation can be either logical, or matching. In a lot of poetic discourse (but not necessarily exclusive to it), the relation between clauses is matching. Matching relations can again emphasise similarity or contrast. Taking 'do it on my head' as an abbreviated form of 'I can do it standing on my head', one can surmise a logical relationship between the three clauses, which would help make No. 12 less obscure. This can be seen as an attempt to project another image of Carr different from the one projected earlier, so that, setting the utterances out in question-and-answer form, one gets:

   CARR I:  Don't go on [talking like this].
   CARR II: Why not?
   CARR I:  [We don't want to hear all this; you (i.e., anyone) can] do it [standing] on your head.
   CARR II: Why else?
   CARR I:  [Because this is] caviar to the general public [i.e., they won't understand what is going on; or ironically, you're producing such a magnificent piece of discourse].

And this can be said to elucidate the verbless clause. (The allusion is, of course, to Hamlet.) This therefore complicates the relationship between Carr and his (supposed) audience. It was established that he was generally conciliatory in the previous paragraph, anticipating the audience's likely questions. In this paragraph, he even asks the questions himself. However, since then, he has become more inward looking, and carries on the conversation with himself alone (issuing directives to himself), dramatising the situation.
Indeed, Carr’s retreat into himself is already signalled earlier on in his violation of the maxim of quantity by providing four possible titles to his memoirs (Nos. 2-5), and by the excessive modification in the informatives in Nos. 8 and 9. The Cooperative and Politeness Principles can be seen as Other-oriented principles. The lack of deference given to the maxims of the Cooperative Principle then can be seen as a withdrawal from the solicitude for the Other. No. 8 starts off by embedding the informatives in subordinate clauses, as if they had been assumed (‘presupposed’) by his audience. But Carr quickly sidetracks into details about the possible colour of Joyce’s jacket, and comes up with very unusual collocations: real blue, empirical purple, and sultry violets. The first two can be taken as ‘mistakes’ for the fixed collocations royal blue or true blue, and imperial purple, where the ‘mistake’ is a result of semantic similarity in the former, and phonological similarity in the latter. This can, on the one hand, be interpreted as Stoppard having a bit of a joke at Carr’s expense, so that the ‘mistakes’ have to be attributed to the outer level of discourse. If the audience (the real audience, not Carr’s supposed audience) or reader in the outer level of discourse can be taken to be summing up Carr’s character through of his monologue, Stoppard gives the audience a helping hand by allowing Carr to blunder on in this manner, thereby destroying the conciliatory and solicitous overtures implicit in the previous paragraph. On the other hand, these ‘mistakes’ by Carr could also be seen
as a bit of Joycean indulgence on the part of Stoppard. He sets out to disorientate the reader or audience as Joyce does in *Finnegans Wake* (for instance, in the Anna Livia Plurabelle chapter, Joyce has the following: 'Temp untamed will hist for no man. As you spring so shall you neap. O, the roughty old rappe! Minxing marrage and making loof’ (p. 196) and they obviously allude to proverbs ‘time and tide will wait for no man’, ‘as you sow, so shall you reap’, and the fixed collocation ‘making love’). Because these ‘mistakes’ do not add anything to the meaning of what is said, Stoppard may be said to be parodying Joyce, and making light of his method.

The rest of the monologue confirms the impression given of Carr in these first two paragraphs. He races through various topics that he wants covered in his memoirs: James Joyce, Zurich itself, Lenin and Dadaism and Tzara.

The rest of the passage will be dealt with in less detail, but it may be helpful to point out sections where there would be marked departures from what would be expected in a person’s memoirs; in other words, it would be helpful to see the aspects of Carr’s monologue which would be foregrounded or deautomatised when considered *qua* memoirs. Mention has already been made of the tendency in *Travesties* to have word plays and other kinds of linguistic patterning. Carr seems to have taken advantage of the ‘floor’ given him to provide his audience with as much linguistic patterning
as possible, in so far that the bulk of the monologue are purple passages. In his description of Joyce, he provides the audience with a string of verbless groups or phrases.

A prudish, prudent man, Joyce, in no way profligate or vulgar, and yet convivial, without being spendthrift, and yet still without prinness towards hard currency in all its transmutable and transferable forms and denominations, of which, however, he demanded only a sufficiency from the world at large, exhibiting a monkish unconcern for worldly and bodily comforts, without at the same time shutting himself off from the richness of human society, whose temptations, on the other hand, he met with ascetic disregarded tempered only by sudden and catastrophic aberrations ... [pp. 22f.]

One can take note of the alliterative adjectives used in Carr’s description of Joyce: prudish, prudent, profligate; vulgar, convivial;27 transmutable, transferable. Yet it must be said that the alliterations are gratuitous and it must be suspected that many of the adjectives were used merely for alliterative effect. It has been mentioned above that the use of the negative is often to cancel an assumption. A prudish and prudent man will in no wise be expected to be profligate or vulgar, so that informing the audience that Joyce is neither profligate nor vulgar after describing him as being prudish and prudent does not add anything new to the description of Joyce in the sense that not being profligate and vulgar are included in the semantics of ‘prudish’ and ‘prudent’; the adjectives are therefore redundant; in which case the maxim of quantity of the Cooperative Principle has been broken. One inference is that Carr has a propensity for verbosity, or perhaps the Wittiness Principle has overridden the constraints of the maxims of the Cooperative Principle. This would be in line with the initial
reading of this monologue, where Carr's overanxiety to ingratiate himself with his audience would go together well with his fancying himself as a wit and a raconteur. At best, Carr succeeds in saying absolutely nothing about Joyce (what is one to infer from the statement that Joyce exhibited a monkish unconcern for world and bodily comforts, and yet did not shut himself from the richness of human society, but that he can be an ascetic at times and an epicurean at other times); at worst, it is all gobbledygook or contradictory statements even (the minimiser only sits uneasily with the intensifier catastrophic). The semantic clash is obvious in the rest of the paragraph.

- in short, a complex personality, an enigma, a contradictory spokesman for the truth, an obsessive litigant and yet an essentially private man who wished his total indifference to public notice to be universally recognised - in short a liar and a hypocrite, a tight-fisted, sponging, fornicating drunk not worth the paper, that's that bit done. [p. 23]

Contradictory clashes with truth; indifference to public notice does not square with a desire to be universally recognised. In addition, in short signals a restatement of the previous utterance in summary form, yet this does not quite happen in this instance. The utterances after both times in short was used bear little relation to the previous utterances, so that it would not be surprising for the audience or the reader to become like Alice after listening to the Jabberwocky poem: 'Somehow it seems to fill my head with ideas - only I don't know what they are!'
The reader or audience is just left to infer from the invective quality of the last section (which would indeed be a blatant breaking of the maxims of the Politeness Principle) that he bears a grudge against Joyce, a grudge so great the he allows the fabric of his discourse to be creased and puts to risk the urbane image of himself that he has tried to project earlier on. The public persona that he has been trying to project breaks down, and in so far as there can be a personal, private voice of Carr, this would be it.

Also interesting is the final metastatement, 'that's that bit done' - where, presumably, this being an aside, he is addressing himself - confirming that he has withdrawn from audience-consciousness to self-consciousness. What this demonstrates is the number of voices that Carr can call up: the invective last passage contrasts sharply with the more wordy, meandering and even turgid passage preceding it (one can take note of the number of subordinate clauses tagged onto the initial verbless clause, 'A prudish, prudent man, Joyce'). The final metastatement, though presumably an aside to himself, is yet another persona of Carr's.

In the next paragraph one sees the calling up of another voice in Carr's repertoire. There, he begins with a cliché-ridden style. With an unspectacular sleight of hand, he transforms 'darkest Africa' to 'Whitest Switzerland', and talks about his 'Ups and Downs' (that is his proclaimed purpose, in any case). The obsession with word patterning continues. \textit{Mutatis mutandis} becomes \textit{mucus mutandis} when
describing the Limmat River in Zurich. He tries patterning the adjectives (this time with rhyme) in his description of Lenin:

enigmatic, magnetic, but not, I think, astigmatic ... dynamic, gnomic and yet not, I think, anaemic ...

The negative, as has been mentioned above, normally signals an understatement or the inappropriateness of a given assumption. In this case, there is no semantic strand in enigmatic or magnetic to suggest astigmatic at all; the same is true of dynamic, gnomic and anaemic. In fact, it would seem as if these adjectives were specifically chosen because of their semantic dissimilarity whilst still being phonologically similar in the final syllable. Once again, Carr is so enamoured of phonological neatness that sense ceases to matter for him. There are further attempts at cleverness as he modifies the title of Edmund Wilson’s book to suit his purposes, ‘Halfway to Finland station’, and as he puns on ‘escapements’, being either a mechanism in a clock or a watch (where ‘jewelled’ would be used as in ‘a 17-jewel watch’), or acts of escaping (perhaps an archaic sense of the word but not unavailable for such a punster as Carr - in which case, ‘jewelled’ would imply that the refugees in Switzerland escaped with all their heirlooms and treasures). Mention has been made of the possibility of there being a parody of Joyce. Indeed, the phrase ‘snot-green’ has made its appearance in Ulysses, so that as Carr evokes another public persona after the invective he has levelled against Joyce, this is probably an imitation of the Joycean technique, possibly inviting some smiles at Joyce’s expense.
However, as he proceeds in his description of Lenin, he quickly leaves behind the Joycean mode, and one quickly detects another voice coming to the fore: ' [Lenin] with his fine head of blond hair falling over his forehead had the clean-shaven look of a Scandinavian seafaring - ' (p. 23). His preoccupation with style has led him to fall foul of Grice's maxim of quality. Carr has moved on into the mode of a popular romance (à la Mills and Boon). It is not long before he realises that he has gone overboard in his description of Lenin:

(1) hello, hello, (2) got the wrong chap, has he? - (3) take no notice, (4) all come out in the wash, (5) that's the art of it. [p. 23]

This stretch would be quite unusual in a monologue, more so in a person's memoirs. No. 1 would be an attention-getter, No. 2 an informative which seeks confirmation (signalled by the tag has he?), No. 3 is a directive, No. 4 an informative being the reason for No. 3, and No. 5 another informative being a comment on No. 3 (that, of course, refers anaphorically to No. 3). Therefore, Nos. 1 to 3 are discoursally unusual in a monologue in that they imply some kind of interaction with an interlocutor. The ellipsis of the auxiliary verb in No. 4 runs counter to the 'literary', patterned language that Carr has tried to adopt earlier on. 'All come out in the wash' is proverbial, and utterly non-literary! It must be inferred that No. 1 is an attempt to rouse himself (i.e., getting his own attention); in No. 2, 'he' refers to himself qua memoir writer; and No. 3 is addressed to Carr's audience. All this seems symptomatic of
a split personality or a desire to dramatise the situation, and Carr the private person distances himself from Carr the memoir writer now that the latter has made a blunder. (It might be a matter of debate whether the 'blunder' was deliberate, or whether it was yet another attempt at showing the number of 'voices' Carr has at his command.)

Then follows another discoursally odd utterance, within which there is a long parenthetic (and dramatised) comment.

Fact of the matter, who (without benefit of historical perspective and the photograph album, Red Square packed to the corner stickers with comrade-raderie, and now for our main speaker, balding bearded in the three-piece suit, good G-- if it isn't Ulyanov!, knew him well, always sat between the window and Economics A-K etceterarera) well, take away all that, and who was he to Radek or Radek to him, or Martov or Martinov, or he to Ulyanov for that matter? - in Zurich in 1917? [pp. 23f.]

This is discoursally odd because it constitutes an excuse, and signals a return to audience-consciousness on the part of Carr, and it must be surmised that Carr has anticipated an accusation (the other constituent of this 'adjacency pair') - 'If you knew that Lenin was in Zurich, you should have prevented him from returning to Russia.' The parenthetical interpolation is discoursally interesting as well. 'Historical perspective' triggers off the actor and dramatist in Carr, and he gives an instantiation of historical perspective by mentioning the photograph, providing the audience with yet another voice in his repertoire. As dramatist, he sets up the scene; then comes the part of the chairman or master of ceremonies, 'now for our main speaker'. One has to infer that 'balding, bearded, in the three-piece suit' is some kind of a stage direction. Then comes
the voice of another speaker, possibly a projection of Carr himself expressing his surprise at who the person he has met in the public library in Zurich has become. Carr thus sets up an inner level of discourse, which allows him to bring to the fore the Thespian in himself. And he reinforces this by the allusion to *Hamlet*: 'What's Hecuba to him, or he to Hecuba ...?' As a result, Carr presents himself not only as one who is given to verbosity (seen here in the gratuitous lengthening of words - *comraderaderie*, and *etceterarera*), feeling the need to justify his actions or the lack thereof (seen in the anticipated accusation), who can be extremely self-conscious and audience-conscious, but also as one who is adept at taking on various roles, one who can, like Hamlet, act a part if he needs to.

It is in the midst of this that his attempt at producing his memoirs breaks down, as he proceeds to justify his lack of action. Again, there is a question-answer (elicit-reply) sequence:

**QUESTION:** So why didn't you put a pound on him, you'd be a millionaire, like that chap who bet sixpence against the Titanic.

**ANSWER:** No [that's true, I didn't]. Truth of the matter, who'd have thought big oaks from a corner room at number 14 Spiegelgasse. [p. 24]

Once again, Carr verbalises the anticipated question from his audience, but as in the case above, it is dramatised. This can be seen from the fact that he addresses himself in the second person ('why didn’t you', &c.). But once again, he attempts to go on with his memoirs, and yet again, the mad (Joycean and Wildean) illogicalities noted above invade his memoirs - 'the sadly-sliding chaqrinned Limmat River',


'the banking bouncing metropolis of trampolines and chronometry of all kinds'. Presumably, the proximity of 'banking' has generated 'bouncing', which in turn generates 'trampolines' (being one of its collocates) together with the phonological similarity with 'trams' and 'tramlines' (Zurich being noted for its banks, watches and trams). Further on, 'narrow, cobbled, high old houses' generates 'the house of the narrow cobbler', so that there is an abundance of phonological and lexical patterning, but to the detriment of semantic flow, unfortunately. There are, however, more subtle puns in store for the really alert reader or audience, and these must be admired for their ingenuity: 'who'd have thought big oaks from a corner room at number 14 Spiegelgasse' (p. 24, the pun being on oaks and acorn), and further on, 'What did it do in the Great War, Dada, I am often asked' (p. 25), the latter being an echo (parody) of the Second World War slogan, 'What did you do in the Great War, Daddy?' This leads, as above, to self-dramatisation. He steps out of the role of the memoir-writer and issues the directive 'get a grip on yourself', and as in the earlier paragraph, moves out of the 'literary'/Joycean mode to a more banal one. Then he dramatises the subject Dada:

THE MORE-OR-LESS SEDATE MEMOIR WRITER: Number One [Spiegelgasse], the Meierei Bar, crucible of anti-art, cradle of Dada!!!
QUESTIONER: Who? What? Whatsisay Dada??
THE MORE EASY-GOING CARR: You remember Dada! – [QUOTE FROM ENCYCLOPAEDIA, &c.] historical halfway between Futurism and Surrealism, twixt Marinetti and André Breton, 'tween the before-the-war-to-end-all-wars years and the between-the-wars years [UNQUOTE] – Dada! – [QUOTE FROM A MILITANT DADAIST] down with reason, logic, causality, coherence, tradition,
The combination of grammar, lexis and discourse (all register markers) make the various 'voices' of Carr quite distinct from each other; on stage, the changing voice quality, pace, &c. would heavily demarcate each voice from the other. The intertextuality in the passage emphasises this as well. It is this putting on of various voices that lends Carr’s monologue an air of a one-man show, emphasising its interpersonal, and even chameleon or protean, and hence, dramatic quality. As has been mentioned elsewhere in this study, there is not always a firm separating line between a quotation, an allusion and a parody, but each involves some amount of trans-contextualisation of the intertextual element, thereby distancing the various source texts.31 In this case, there is the quasi-encyclopaedic entry on Dada, the Dadaist creed in the form of a chant, and the near-iambic lines of a Dadaist popular song.32 The parody serves to distance each text from the audience, and to display each to view. At the same time, the juxtaposition of various registers lends humour to a monologue, which, inherently, could be quite dry. The fact that there can be such a varied and dense level of intertextuality emphasises the facility of Carr to come up with a montage of different styles and voices, essentially bringing out the various personae, whether public or private, Carr has at his disposal.
As Carr struggles on with his memoirs on Dada, his audience is treated to further instances of interactive language as he begins them with more anticipated questions, but even as he proceeds to answer those questions, one finds further echoes of other texts:

1. I well remember [Dada] as though it were yesteryear (oh where are they now?) ... Oh the yes-no’s of yesteryear.
2. Whose age done gone.
3. Over the hills and far away ...
4. entente to the left, detente to the right, into the valley of the invalided blundered and wandered ...
5. myself when young --

No. 1 harks back to François Villon, ‘But where are the snows of yesteryear?’ the clause in parenthesis has the same grammatical structure as the Villon. The ‘yes-no’s of yesteryear’ is of course a pun on Villon’s ‘snows of yesteryear’, ‘snows’ being phonetically equivalent to the last syllable of ‘yes-no’s’. Done used as an auxiliary in the perfective aspect is also unusual, but it is sometimes thus used in Negro spirituals. No. 3, ‘Over the hills and far away’ is another song which can be found in Gay’s Beggar’s Opera. Overall then, Nos. 1, 2 and 3 evoke a romantic (romantic with a small ‘r’, that is) attitude. Strangely enough, this is contrasted with the attitude associated with the source text of No. 4, Tennyson’s ‘The Charge of the Light Brigade’, and No. 5, from Omar Khayyám’s Rubaiyat. The former berates the human loss due to someone’s
'blunder', although he pays tribute to the 'six hundred'. It might be worth one's while to remember that the topic of Carr's memoirs has changed from Dada, to Carr himself in Switzerland, so that he is anxious to present a positive image of himself, hence the romantic allusions, but the Tennyson and Omar Khayyám represent a more sceptical and cynical attitude. Doubtless, he succeeds in being very clever in his use of Tennyson, making oblique allusions to the political situation in 1917 - the Triple Entente (between Britain, France and Russia), the Entente Cordiale, and also to ententes and detentes in general during the period of the Great War. Carr therefore juxtaposes various attitudes by means of various intertextual references (literary allusions, in this instance), so that on the one hand, he seems to be evoking a romantic attitude, associated with Villon, the air, and the spiritual (?); and on the other, a more cynical and sceptical one associated with Tennyson and Omar Khayyám.

And amidst all this, Carr's obsession with patterning has not slackened. There is phonological patterning again in the form of alliteration - 'to be picked out - plucked out - blessed by the blood of a negligible wound' (p. 25) - together with syntactic patterning:

- the miraculous neutrality of it,
- the non-combatant impartiality of it,
- the non-aggression pacts of it,
- the international red cross of it [p. 25]
And once again the pattern is strained although it is kept uniform: **THE + [MODIFIER] + [NOUN] + OF IT.** However, the pattern can normally only take abstract nouns, so that using **pacts** and **red cross** in the noun slot is unusual.

And finally, in referring to Switzerland as the 'still centre of the wheel of war', Carr makes further intertextual reference to T. S. Eliot, and this, interestingly enough is a device T. S. Eliot himself was very fond of, though known to him as literary allusion. One finds in Burnt Norton (of the **Four Quartets**) the phrase 'At the still point of the turning wheel' (section 4; the metaphor is of an axle tree), and also in **Murder in the Cathedral** (1935) the clause '... that the wheel may turn and still / Be forever still' (pp. 21 and 40).

The overall effect is that the whole monologue is redolent with patterning. When this patterning does not give way to illogicality and semantic clashes, it plays with words and ideas cleverly. This would seem to give the passage the sparkling flavour of theatrical high-jinks. This passage also provides the reader or audience with the first impression of Carr - conciliatory, solicitous, self-conscious, and full of confidence in his dramatisation of the situation. More importantly, the several attempts at dramatisation here prepare the way for the rest of the Act, where presumably, these rather weak attempts at role-play turn into full-fledged dramatisation (though not without some tricks played by Carr's memory and his estimation of himself). The theatrical sparkle resulting from self-
consciousness, audience-consciousness, role-play and general register mixing, punning and other forms of word-play, and intertextuality lifts the typically dull monologue to give it its comic and humorous quality.

The analysis of the phonology, syntax, lexis and discourse of the passage then should proceed together to give a full-orbed interpretation of the passage. Qua discourse, this monologue is noteworthy because of its interactional or interpersonal markers and its attempts at dramatisation which Carr has to resort to as his 'audience' cannot really respond to him. The phonological and syntactic (and even semantic) patterning is a result of a speaker or writer overanxious for patterning and perhaps a display of wit. It is important that the reader or audience has a right estimation of Carr before proceeding on to the 'inner situation' in the rest of the Act where some of the features noted here are continued, notably the intertextuality (limericks and spectres of Wilde and Shakespeare) and attempts at cleverness. More than this (and perhaps forestalling Act II), this contrasts sharply with Cecily's lecture, with which this will be compared. After all, apart from the fact that both are monologues, they both attempt to provide, among other things, an historical account of what happened in Zurich during the War years; moreover (perhaps surprisingly) parts of Cecily's lecture are also dramatised. However, its very lack of wit and sparkle is evident (because of its lack of interactionality, and the intertextuality in Act II is
from the Lenins' writings (as has been noted by Stoppard on his acknowledgements page; their status is debatable, but this will be discussed later on).

Apart from helping to characterise Carr, the puns and word-play and the other attempts at wittiness might just engender sheer admiration from the audience, and this helps to position the audience emotionally closer to Joyce's views on art. This has been commented on by Zeifman:

the dazzling, exhilarating play with words, betrays his [Carr's] intentions, having precisely the opposite effect of vindicating Joyce in our eyes .... Indeed, in terms of the actual substance of its argument, the outcome of debate is left, typically for Stoppard, deliberately unresolved. But because we are so bowled over, so elated by Carr's dizzying sleight of words, we find ourselves, almost subliminally, identifying with Joyce, the quintessential punster and wordsmith.36

More than that, one has to pierce beyond Carr to Stoppard, and move on to a 'higher' level of discourse, and see the discourse originating from Stoppard. He is thus an entertainer, sometimes poking fun at Carr by making him make absurd, contradictory statements, and allowing him to commit mistakes, so that whilst enjoying the high-jinks and Carr's attempts at giving the audience a history lesson, one should remember to take all things with a pinch of salt, Stoppard seems to be suggesting. There is perhaps a comment on history (and by extension, on journalism).37 All history is perceptually situated; in other words, it is always a person's point of view, and in a sense, this is a necessary evil, as seen from both Carr's and Cecily's monologues. Carr's monologue, redolent with allusions, literary and non-literary, reinforce this view. Intertextuality is often a
dangerous tool to use as it can work both ways. Zeifman is probably right in considering the monologue as a parody of Joycean methods, with its pastiche and untrammelled borrowings, but Joyce is not only vindicated before the audience’s eyes, but also made the target of humour, albeit good-natured humour. Intertextuality evokes several stances as has been mentioned above, and by means of this and register mixing, Carr displays a many-faceted view. The various voices put on by Carr help to provide this. Intertextuality, register mixing (lexis, grammatical structures or speech acts associated with different registers exultingly cohabit), and the privileging of various pragmatic principles help point towards this. Parody as a method has long been a favourite of Stoppard’s, and is particularly helpful in establishing an ambivalent attitude towards the source text. In his so-called Theatre of Ideas, parody is a useful technique in presenting or dramatising a position or a stance. Ideas that are just mouthed would not find easy acceptance from the audience, but parody invigorates and lends life to the position or stance by evoking a text which is representative of this stance. Even as the process of transcontextualisation, which, by definition, parody employs, makes the new text deautomatised, the audience or the reader is compelled to grapple with the stance associated with the parodied text. In this instance, the Joycean stance has been put on stage by means of Joycean techniques, and the audience is left to react to that. In a sense, the subject of the play is Zurich in 1917, and the
various intertextual references and other possible sources imply several possible stances and viewpoints, and this is reinforced later on in the play when it becomes evident that each character is closely associated with a particular viewpoint.

Analysis, pp. 26-32: Carr and Bennett

This passage forms an interesting transition from the monologic passage preceding it and the more dialogic one following it. Whilst being on the surface a dialogue between Carr, the presumed British Consular official in Zurich and Bennett, his manservant, the passage still betrays a lot of the features of a monologue; this would be evident, if nothing else, from the long speeches sometimes given to the characters. Rather than addressing an audience with his memoirs, Carr is supposedly speaking to Bennett. Carr’s speeches, if analysed as conversation, will undoubtedly be seen as being discoursally odd. The cleft sentence (‘It is ... that ...’) of the first sentence immediately links this with Carr’s monologue. Quirk et al. note that, discoursally, this cleft structure is indicative of either a divided focus (though it is only the context which can indicate which of the two focused items is new and which is given), or a rather mannered form of writing (as in ‘It was a very troubled wife that greeted Harry on his return that night’). In this case, it can be said that both of the
above uses are relevant to Carr's initial statement. The initial focused item (this complete absence of bellicosity) recalls the last sentence of the monologue before the entry of Bennett ('... there is no war in Switzerland'), and the deictic this indicates its proximity. At the same time, as has been noted in the analysis of the monologue, Carr is entirely at home with a gargantuan range of voices, so that the adoption of a 'mannered' style is in keeping with the image of Carr that has been projected earlier. However, with the entry of Bennett, the use of the cleft structure, so that the initial focused item is a given item, referring back to the end of his monologue, must be considered to be unusual, in view of the fact that Bennett has just made his entry and therefore might not have heard the last part of Carr's monologue. The inference, then, is that Carr has broken both the Cooperative Principle and the Politeness Principle in relation to Bennett, because by making his utterance potentially unintelligible he has broken the maxims of quantity and relation, and because by not being linguistically helpful to Bennett, he has broken the tact maxim\(^4\) ('minimise cost to other'). One has to infer then that Carr does not feel restrained by either the Cooperative or Politeness Principle in relation to Bennett. Carr can also be supposed to continue to address his 'audience', as he did in the monologue above. The fact the Carr has let Bennett bring in the tea things without any offer of assistance already breaks the maxim of generosity (minimising cost in terms of labour) of the Politeness Principle. But all
this would have been accepted without a murmur on the part of the audience because the gentleman-butler relation would have been made obvious, partly by the fact that the Cooperative and Politeness Principles are not even given lip-service by Carr, and partly by more extrinsic, non-linguistic clues such as the butler's uniform and the butler's gait. The metaphor of cost and benefit, of £.s.d., in the Politeness Principle is particularly apt because the gentleman-butler relationship implies an agreement, a social contract, whereby the employer agrees to part with his money expressly to ignore certain maxims of the Cooperative and Politeness Principle. This gives the lie to the postulate that the Cooperative Principle should be seen as a universal principle and that uncooperativeness should be marginalised. Seen in this light then, the lack of cooperation and politeness would not have been foregrounded; even if one moves to the outer level of discourse and consider that the passage comes from a play first performed in 1974 when butlers or menservants are a fast disappearing breed amongst the English gentry (but ironically in vogue in certain parts of America), the situation where the Cooperative and Politeness Principles do not hold sway has its modern equivalents (customer-waiter or executive-tea lady relationships) where rights and responsibilities are negotiated. Carr, then, as Bennett's employer, would typically initiate acts, as seen in the informative:
You have no doubt heard allusions to the beneficial quality of the Swiss air, Bennett. The quality referred to is permanence.

though Bennett would be expected to initiate announcements and other similar things. Therefore, thus far, the features noted seem to be in keeping with discourse features expected in such a relationship. One could also take note of the terms of address; Bennett is always just ‘Bennett’ to Carr, whilst Carr is always ‘sir’ to Bennett, so again the asymmetrical relationship is emphasised.

Illocutionary politeness has been distinguished from formal politeness earlier. With regard to the gentleman-butler relationship, it may be said that whilst it is not unusual, and indeed it is expected, for the employer to manifest illocutionary impoliteness (in giving orders to, and criticising the butler, and making other similar speech acts), in most cases, formal politeness would be strictly observed, if nothing else, to preserve the outer surface of magnanimity, and it would be unthinkable that anyone from higher social circles should raise his voice! Even the kind of illocutionary impoliteness with which the employer is able to address the butler is limited to the sphere (tacitly perhaps) agreed upon. Hence, some of the ‘impolite’ speech acts that Carr commits later on would still strike one as unusual and would be foregrounded. For instance, the act of criticising - devaluing the other’s worth, and thus a face-threatening act - is one which occurs frequently. In criticising the ‘lower classes’ (the upper class ‘goaded beyond endurance by the insolent rapacity of its servants’,
p. 29), he would be criticising the servant class to which (presumably) Bennett belongs. Carr seems to be going beyond the bounds of the extent to which he can be 'impolite' because in this instance, he criticises not Bennett as his butler, but the 'class' of which Bennett is a member.

The act of criticising goes on in the parenthetical passage:

... Bennett, I see from your book that when Mr Tzara was dining with me, eight bottles of champagne are entered as having been consumed. I have had previous occasion to speak to you of the virtues of moderation, Bennett: this time I will only say, remember Russia. (p. 29)

The criticism here constitutes an accusation as well: 'You have been drinking some of my champagne', only Carr succeeds in being much cleverer than that by the obliqueness of the accusation, disguised as a reminder ('I have had previous occasion ...', 'remember Russia'). However, the absence of an excuse or an apology which forms an adjacent pair with an accusation is unusual, so that one is left to wonder whether in the strange world of Carr's memory, one is just to take it as a straight reminder.

Further down is another criticism by Carr, this time of his manner of speaking, and once again Carr's sheer volubility and cleverness make it stand out.

I'm not sure that I approve of your taking up this modish novelty of 'free association', Bennett. I realise that it is all the rage in Zurich - even in the most respectable salons to try to follow a conversation nowadays is like reading every other line of a sonnet - but if the servant classes are going to ape the fashions of society, the end can only be ruin and decay. (pp. 30-31)
As above, the criticism of Bennett is generalised to a criticism of the 'servant classes'. But this time, Bennett is allowed to proceed with an apology and excuse: 'I'm sorry, sir. It is only that Mr Tzara being an artist --', but perversely, Carr prefers to take the excuse as an accusation, and proceeds to make another accusation against Bennett: 'I will not have you passing moral judgements on my friends. If Mr Tzara is an artist that is his misfortune.' This fluidity of speech acts must in part be attributed to the author-reader level of discourse, because the sheer unexpectedness of it must be humorous. As will be seen later, this can also be accounted for differently. Before Bennett leaves the stage, Carr succeeds yet again in criticising Bennett: 'I'm not sure that I'm much interested in your views, Bennett', once again putting him down.

It will be seen then that in many ways, the discourse between Carr and Bennett is unusual, so that the audience or the reader would notice this. At one level, many of the 'impolite' speech acts can be accounted for by the employer-b Butler relationship holding between them, so that these are actually sanctioned by the (tacit) agreement implicit in such a relationship. At another level, Carr frequently oversteps the bounds of such a relationship when he criticises Bennett not only qua butler, but also qua a member of the 'servant classes' or even a person in his own right. It can be said then that all this would point to Carr's attitude towards the 'servant classes'. The inference from the monologue that Carr fancies himself as a wit and racon-
teur is reinforced here as well, even as he tries to put on aristocratic airs. At the same time, Stoppard has Carr as the butt of his irony as well because Carr’s ‘clever’ comments to Bennett on remembering Russia is based on a misunderstanding of what Bennett means by a ‘social revolution’.

It will be obvious to many as well that many of Carr’s speeches parallel those of Algernon in The Importance of Being Earnest:

ALGERNON [...] : Oh! ... by the way, Lane, I see from your book that on Thursday night, when Lord Shoreman and Mr Worthing were dining with me, eight bottles of champagne are entered as having been consumed. LANE: Yes, sir; eight bottles and a pint. (p. 253)

ALGERNON [languidly]: I don’t know that I am much interested in your family life, Lane. (p. 254)

ALGERNON: Lane’s views on marriage seem somewhat lax. Really, if the lower orders don’t set us a good example, what on earth is the use of them? They seem, as a class, to have absolutely no sense of moral responsibility. (p. 254)

The fact that there are so many echoes of The Importance makes the audience constantly aware of the parallel situation there, so that the intertextuality invites a comparison between the attitudes of Carr and the attitudes of Algernon. The manic element resulting from the volatility of the speech acts referred to above and from unreal presuppositions (‘The lower orders are there to set the upper orders a good example’, &c.) can, at one level, be seen as the Wildean influence on Carr. Utterances are given different speech acts or different scopes than would be expected. In the example above, Bennett’s excuse is re-
interpreted as an accusation by Carr. This can also be seen in Carr’s misunderstanding of ‘social revolution’ and ‘revolution of classes’ (Travesties, p. 29), and also in Carr’s argument that conspiring to be a spy is by far more wicked than being a spy. The fact that the line of argument can be compared with that in an Irish joke⁴⁴ makes it not implausible that part of the effect sought by Stoppard was that resulting from an ‘Irish’ joke, so that the response to Carr from the audience would not be to sneer at Carr or be contemptuous of him but for all to regard it all in good humour. Carr’s reasons for considering masquerading as a spy more wicked than being a spy itself are given as follows:

To masquerade as a conspirator, or at any rate to speak French with a Rumanian accent and wear a monocle, is at least as wicked as to be one; in fact, rather more wicked since it gives a dishonest impression of perfidy, and moreover, makes the overcrowding in the café gratuitous, being the result neither of genuine intrigue nor bona fide treachery. (p. 28)

The reasons are that it is dishonest and that it causes gratuitous overcrowding at the Odeon and the Terrasse. What makes his argument stand out is the assumption that being a spy for the enemy is less culpable or a matter of less concern than being dishonest or causing gratuitous overcrowding. This is all the more surprising considering his (assumed) position as the British consular official who might certainly take a serious view of anything that should jeopardise the national security. The result is that his argument becomes preposterous because of the inconceivable assumptions behind the argument. Added to this, as a result
of these assumptions, Carr comes up with very unusual lexical collocations (as these assumptions filter up to the semantic level): genuine intrigue and bona fide treachery; if these lexical items were analysed componentially, both intrigue and treachery would have the feature [- desirability] - in other words, these lexical items are taken negatively; on the other hand, genuine and bona fide would have the feature [+ desirability] - in other words, these lexical items are taken positively. This obviously causes a semantic clash, resulting in intrigue and treachery acquiring the feature [+ desirability], thereby raising the possibility that Carr inhabits a world where conventional values or conventional semantic features cannot be taken for granted. One can also take note of the word wicked used here because of its being limited to certain specific registers only. Firstly, there is the field of the fairy tale with its wicked fairies, wicked stepmothers, and wicked queens; secondly, there is the biblical use of it, associated not only with evil or satanic, but also with man's sinfulness or depravity (cf. Calvinism) and extended generally to cover the moral sphere; thirdly, there is the facetious use of it (as in 'There is no rest for the wicked', when referring to one's busyness). The asymmetric relationship noted already between Carr and Bennett makes the third interpretation very unlikely indeed. Even if Carr's speech were to be considered as being addressed to the imaginary audience (in other words, it is still Carr the memoir writer speaking here), facetious statements are not
characteristic of him as seen in the initial monologue. The biblical use of *wickedness* on the other hand sits awkwardly with talk of overcrowding at the Odeon and Terrasse; it could be, then, that Carr has evoked a curious fairy-tale world where characters act and react in a manner which is highly abnormal. Of course, overarching it all, is the unlikely scenario conjured up of people masquerading as spies - for indeed, why should anyone want to masquerade as a spy. So it is then that in the passage, there seems to be some kind of conflict or discrepancy evoked not only in relation to pragmatic principles and assumptions but also on the semantic level and in relation to register.

Added to that, there is a punning joke as well, this time embedded in Carr's narrative discourse:

> Old Drewitt, or Madge, came in and told me. Never trusted the Hun [William II?], I remarked. Boche, he replied, and I, at that time unfamiliar with the appellation, turned on my heel and walked into Trimmett and Punch ... (p. 28)

The play is on the words 'Boche' (= German) and 'bosh' (= nonsense) which are similarly realised phonetically. The punning here takes on the quality of a joke because it involves the yoking together to two semantically incongruous words. Presumably, the humour here is on the Stoppard-to-audience or reader level of discourse. Just a little further down, Carr comes up with a one-liner: "Tristan Tzara. Dada Dada Dada" [reading Tzara's card]. Did he have a stutter?" (p. 28). There is again the yoking together of two disparate elements: the written text and a person's speech habits or defects, as the case might be. As with the
speech on the wickedness of spy-masquerading, and the misunderstanding of 'class war', it must be inferred that the humour is from the author Stoppard and not the character Young Carr because it would otherwise be out of character for him, and this would reinforce the impression that the inner discourse situation is manic in quality, and that the characters inhabit a world where nothing may be taken for granted.

The derivative or intertextual quality of the monologue preceding this passage has already been commented on, and the echoes of The Importance of Being Earnest are fairly obvious. In as much as some of the features of the monologue still persist here, where Carr is apparently addressing his manservant, many of the features are also carried over, and intertextuality is not an exception. Intertextuality, and parody in particular, involves evoking the text in question and also whatever goes together with it - the accompanying attitudes and positions. This can be seen in Carr's description of the situation in the trenches: 'Bliss it was to see the dawn! To be alive was very heaven.' This is picked up from Wordsworth's The Prelude:

Bliss it was in that dawn to be alive,
But to be young was very Heaven!46

Immediately following that he cries, 'Never in the whole history of human conflict was there anything to match the carnage', which in fact echoes Winston Churchill's famous words uttered in relation to the R.A.F. pilots in the Battle
of Battle of Britain: 'Never in the field of human conflict was so much owed by so many to so few.'

Further on, he alludes to the title of a novel by the German-American writer Erich M. Remarque, *All Quiet on the Western Front* (1929), and makes use of a phrase in vogue in the War, 'tickety boo'. Added to that, there are parts of Carr's speech which stand out because the clauses have non-finite verbs or even no verbs at all:

the shot and shell! - graveyard stench! (p. 27)

Great days! Dawn breaking over no-man's-land. Dewdrops glistening over the poppies in the early morning sun - All quiet on the Western Front ... Tickety boo, tickety boo, tickety boo, tickety boo (p. 28)

Alex. Rodger and Jean Ure have, in their analysis of a poem, commented that this feature is prevalent in the titles of paintings, so that this register might have been 'borrowed' (e.g., 'Niccolo Rinieri, "St Sebastian and the Holy Women", 67½" x 68½", or 'Lucien Freud, "The Painter's Mother Resting I", 36 by 36 ins.'). However, this feature can also be said to have been appropriated by poets - particularly the Romantic poets (so that, in terms of register, this can be linked back to the quotation from Wordsworth). It can be said then that Carr is deliberately evoking a (traditional) 'literary' register, so that his approach to the war can be said to be a Romantic one, charged with the optimism of Wordsworth and the fervour of Churchill. The fact that the intertextuality has been incorporated into Carr's speech makes it a brilliant tour de force, but tempered, no doubt, with Wildean lapses - Carr
partakes of the Wildean 'nonsense' (after all, The Importance could be said to be, generically, a nonsense play, à la Edward Lear's nonsense verse) in his interaction with Bennett. Not only are there pragmatic infelicities, as have been pointed out earlier, but there are also semantic ones. Even in the initial utterance, Carr seems to give his audience a piece of tautological inanity:

Switzerland, one instinctively feels, will not go away. Nor will it turn into somewhere else. (p. 26)

The laws of physics dictate that a place will neither 'go away' or 'turn into somewhere else'. When Carr mentioned 'permanence' earlier, he, it is presumed, was referring to the atmosphere or the quality of life in Switzerland, so that these two sentences do no add anything to the meaning at all. One could, of course, use the literary strategy of giving them a metaphorical reading. Winter's and Hoey's50 notion of matching and logical relationships have already been alluded to earlier, and Hoey has it that the matching relationship is more frequently resorted to in poetic language. Having noticed already Carr's desire to cultivate a 'literary' style, one should not be surprised to find the matching relationship evident here (on the semantic level):

\[ \text{Switzerland has a] reassuring air of permanence} \\
= \text{Switzerland, one instinctively feels, will not go away} \\
= \text{Nor will it turn into somewhere else} \\

However, Carr's attempt at producing a style lofty and grand is given the metaphorical smack in the cheek by the inane utterances, making the whole thing bathetic. Its very inan-
ity at once links it to the 'nonsense' tradition in literature and The Importance. It also confirms somewhat the manic air mentioned as being evident in Carr’s monologue.

The 'matching' relationship between propositions and patterning is evident elsewhere in Carr’s speech.

How I wish I could get back to the trenches -
  to my comrades in arms -
  the wonderful spirit out there in the mud and wire -
  the brave days and fearful nights.

or, perhaps,

How I wish I could get back
  to the trenches -
  to my comrades in arms -
  the wonderful spirit out there in the mud and wire -
  the brave days and fearful nights. (p. 27)

But further ingenious patterning, this time on the phonological level is also present for the perspicacious.

(1) God’s blood! the shot and shell! - graveyard stench
(2) oxblood shot-silk cravat, starched

(1) Christ Jesu! - deserted by simpletons
(2) creased just so, asserted by a simple pin,

(1) they damn us to hell - ora pro nobis -
(2) the damask lapels - or a brown, no, biscuit - no -

(1) get me out [of here]
(2) get me out the straight cut trouser ... (p. 27)

What is happening here seems to be some kind of intratextuality, where one part of the text parodies another. Patternning (similarity) on the phonological level, however, leads to infelicities on other levels, and disparate elements seem to have been clamped together against their will. It leads to new coinages on the lexical level: 'oxblood shot-silk cravat'; there is also, on the semantic level,
some contradiction of his earlier statements. Talk about 'the graveyard stench' and desertion contradicts Carr's talk about the 'wonderful spirit' in the trenches, and 'the brave days and fearful nights' just immediately before this. The contradiction can, in some ways, be said to be consistent with the manic quality of Carr's speeches. Furthermore, the patterning also provides a useful way into the other topic that occupies Carr's mind a lot - sartorial details. The excessive sartorial details obviously break the maxim of quantity or even the maxim of relation, and to stress Carr's manic, one might say almost monomaniacal, preoccupation with clothes, Carr being the perfect dandy,\textsuperscript{51} Stoppard allows him to continue in this vein further down as well.

The distinction between transactional language and interactional language has already been touched on; whilst Carr is ostensibly interacting with Bennett, he produces discourse which does not take account of Bennett's presence. In terms of speech act theory, however, there is frequent and abrupt vacillation between passages of interactional and transactional language. Searle, for instance, classifies speech acts into five categories, viz., representatives, directives, commissives, expressives and declaratives. Of these it is only the representatives which would, by virtue of the kinds of speech acts which would come under that umbrella, emphasise the transactional function of language; the other categories of speech acts would be considered as being under the aegis of interactional language. The nature of the relationship between Carr and Bennett would lead one to
expect a stress on interactional language, with the exception of minimal informatives, which can often be seen as indirect directives or commissives because they imply a direct reaction on the part of the hearer (e.g., ‘Dinner is ready’ = ‘Please come and dine now’; ‘We have run out of champagne’ = ‘Please order more champagne’; ‘A gentleman called, sir’ = [a prelude to] ‘Please get in touch with this gentleman’; ‘He left his card’ = ‘Please read this card’). In view of this, there are a lot of utterances in the passage which are anomalous qua speech acts. Representatives (or informatives) can generally be divided into description and narration. Having realised this (or even without), one would be struck by the extraordinary amount of representatives in the passage, generously littered with smatterings of directives, commissives or expressives. What is even more noteworthy is the sharp line of division between the representatives and the rest of the passage, i.e., the parts that are more obviously interactional by virtue of the speech acts contained in them. This is already obvious at the beginning of the passage in Carr’s speech. He begins by describing the situation in Switzerland, but he abruptly switches over to a directive: ‘Tonight I incline to the theatre; get me out the straight cut trouser with the blue satin stripe and the silk cutaway. I’ll wear the opal studs’ (p. 26). (The first clause gives the reason for the directive, and the last clause is an indirect directive.) Bennett has also been given long passages of representatives: one can take note especially of the long
speeches on pp. 29-30 and 31-32; the latter is punctuated with two parenthetical comments by Carr - one is the Wildean comment on his lack of interest in Bennett’s views, and the other a comment on the obviousness of Bennett’s views, both negative comments, these two being the only obvious clues to interaction. The very abrupt switches between interactional and transactional language and that transactional language is sociolinguistically dispreferred in this social context make the representatives marked and therefore foregrounded. So, unusually, Bennett gives Carr (and the audience) a lesson in history of Russia around the War years in his narration and also a résumé of ‘Marxist dogma’ in his description. The fact that Carr is allowed to have his ‘time slips’ enables Bennett to race through historical events very quickly as he moves on from the Russian revolution (p. 28) to the Tsar’s abdication and the setting up of the provisional government (pp. 29ff). It must be realised that the whole of this section takes place in Carr’s memory, so that the comments made in relation to Carr’s monologue still hold, as this whole section can be considered to be embedded, as it were, in Carr’s monologue. The Bennett that is here spouting Marxist tenets and rehearsing events in Russian history has been conjured up by Carr, so that, in a sense, ‘Bennett’ can be considered another voice in Carr’s repertoire, and therefore is another facet of history. Bennett’s speech is highly contrasted to Carr’s, redolent with manic logic, puns and word-play, intertextuality and parody, laden with pragmatic infel-
cities, and therefore intoxicatingly entertaining. The very lack of these qualities makes Bennett’s contributions stand out, and his would be a more sedate (and perhaps less entertaining) account. The very clear-cut separation of representatives from the rest of the passage enables Bennett to adopt the ‘objective’ tone of, say, an encyclopaedic entry. But what is suggested may be that the ‘objective’ voice is just one amongst many and not necessarily the most important one either.

In view of this, it is surprising that Carr thinks that ‘Bennett seems to be showing alarming signs of irony’ (p. 32), as his contributions seem to be noteworthy by its very lack of it. In fact, it is when intertextuality rears its head that the audience or reader becomes suspicious. And near the end of the passage, Bennett quotes La Rochefoucauld:

Yes, sir – if I may quote La Rochefoucauld, ‘Quel pays sanguinaire, même le fromage est plein des trous.’ Lenin is desperately trying to return to Russia ... (p. 32)

In addition to that, the fact that the quotation is actually a non sequitur, bearing virtually no relation to Bennett’s account of Lenin, except his having lived in Zurich, makes it stand out. And added to this, the quotation has actually been used by Carr himself earlier on: ‘what a bloody country even the cheese has got holes in it!!’ (p. 28) so that it would seem that the manic quality is creeping in again, and one can infer that Old Carr is losing control of Bennett’s
'objective' voice. A little further down, Bennett comes up with an advice to Young Carr, which again is quite uncharacteristic of Bennett.

A betting man would lay odds of about a million to one against Lenin's view prevailing. However, it is suggested that you take all steps to ascertain his plans. (p. 32)

The clear-cut distinction between interactional and transactional language seems to have been lost; there is a certain amount of ambiguity in the first sentence, whether it is to be interpreted as hypothetical (and is therefore a representative speech act) or as an indirect advice to Carr (and is therefore a directive speech act), and the fact that Bennett restates it ('I'd put a pound on him, sir'), personalising it by using the first person, suggests the latter interpretation. The fact that this is uncharacteristic of Bennett makes it necessary to account for it. In the analysis of the monologue, it was seen that at one point Carr seemed to be making excuses for an anticipated accusation. Here, Carr harks back to the same subject: his not observing Lenin while he was in Zurich. It would seem then that his desire to absolve himself from blame has produced a highly unlikely and uncharacteristic discourse for Bennett, so that any blame would be shifted from himself to Bennett as it was he who advised him thus, asking him to concentrate his attention on Kerensky instead.
So even in this passage there is a conglomeration of styles; disparate elements are yoked together, and together with the Wildean account of Zurich is the 'unaligned' or dispassionate view represented by Bennett, and this sedate face offsets the more Joycean and perhaps Dadaistic effervescent face. The character of Carr seen in the monologue is confirmed in this passage. The Wildean infiltration prepares the way for the Wildean domination in what is to follow. At the same time the voice of the memoir writer is still present in the rapid historical account given by Bennett.

Analysis, pp. 41-47:

Another encounter between Carr and Tzara

Once again, there is an encounter between Carr and Tzara beginning in Wildean fashion and finishing off in each character declaiming his position on art and politics and denouncing the other personally and the stance that he has taken. It would thus be interesting to trace the transition from the more manic discourse to the more polemical one, and consider how this colours the play as a whole. But within the micro-analysis of the passage, the switch from the parodic Wildean mode to a non-parodic one is significant, and there are linguistic clues to a change of mode, so that as soon as one mode becomes automatised (the norm, as it were), the other one is resurrected. (The two modes have already been alluded to in the analysis of the encounter of pp. 36-40 above.)
The distinction between interactional language (with typically non-representative speech acts) and transactional language (with typically representative speech acts) has already been commented on. And one of the features of Wild¬eanism is speech act fluidity, in the sense that a parti¬cular (conventional) realisation of a speech act⁵³ is per¬versely interpreted in a more literal fashion, or is given a different scope than what is conventionally expected. In this instance, it can become so long drawn out so that it becomes a tour-de-force of a joke. The passage begins with the refrain from The Importance:

CARR: And what brings you here, my dear Tristan?
TZARA: Oh, pleasure, pleasure ... what else should bring anyone anywhere? (p. 41)

This is not the first occurrence of this exchange, and its re-occurrence is an indication of Old Carr’s attempt to clear the slate of his mind and starting all over again. Speech act fluidity is obvious from the philosophical sig¬nificance given to Carr’s elicitation by Tzara (‘Pleasure is the prime motivator or driving force of man’), which would typically be given a more immediate scope (e.g., ‘I have come to propose to Gwendolen’). The parodic nature of the dialogue immediately discounts an ironic or facetious reading of Tzara’s reply (i.e., that Tzara was merely teasing Carr) because the play of which it is parodic, The Importance, is marked by stereotypical, cardboard-like characters who have very little inner life beyond surface pleasantries. Subsequently, the characters in the passage similarly partake of the naïveté and innocence of the
characters in The Importance. Added to that, the fact that the discourse here is supposed to occur within Carr’s mind, which is admittedly given to flights of fancy, leads the audience or reader to expect a manic discourse.

Stoppard then develops this feature into a marvellous joke, capitalising on the Wildean speech act fluidity.

CARR: ... Where have you been since last Thursday?
TZARA: In the Public Library.
CARR: What on earth were you doing there?
TZARA: That’s just what I kept asking myself.
CARR: And what was the reply?
TZARA: ‘Ssssh!’ Cecily does not approve of garrulity in the Reference Section. (p. 41)

Here there is a sequence of elicitation-reply exchanges which begin conventionally enough. Carr’s intensifier (‘What on earth ...’) forces attention on Tzara’s being in the Public Library, which is out of the ordinary because typically being in a Public Library would not merit the surprise which one can infer from the use of the intensifier. The reply, ‘That’s just what I kept asking myself’ would normally (conventionally) be given the interpretation, ‘I don’t know either’. However, Carr prefers to conjure up the scenario of Tzara in the Public Library literally asking himself, ‘What on earth am I doing here?’ and then waiting for a reply. The fact that Tzara answers Carr’s question (containing the assumption of the above scenario) without so much as a raised eyebrow implies that this is indeed the sense in which his earlier utterance should be taken, thereby forcing the audience or reader to reorientate himself. And his answer forces the audience to infer not only that he asked himself ‘What on earth am I doing here?’,
but also that he did so aloud, so much so that he provoked a 'reply' from Cecily. The result is that the carpet is pulled from under the feet of the audience or reader each time, and thus the manic establishes itself early on in this passage, and the 'cleverness' (the systematic non-fulfilment of expectation) here gives way to Wildean humour.

As before, some of the redundancies in the passage - instances of Grice's relevance maxim being broken - point towards a character's hobby-horse, a character's hallmark, as it were, similar to the way Dickens gave distinctive traits to his characters by which they can be identified. (The comparison with Dickens's frequently grotesque characters is not altogether out of place because his grotesque characters are similarly one-dimensional characters.) In this passage, Carr makes reference to names that are fashionable or not fashionable as the case might be, and by so doing gives excess and irrelevant information:

CARR: Who is Cecily? And is she as pretty and well-bred as she sounds? Cecily is a name well thought of at fashionable christenings.
TZARA: Cecily is a librarianness. I say, do you know someone called Joyce?
CARR: Joyce is a name which could only expose a child to comment around the font. (p. 41)

'Cecily is a librarianness' is the reply to the elicit 'Who is Cecily'; thus, Carr's comments after the elicit are redundant, as it were. It has already been made obvious in previous passages that Carr is preoccupied by fashion in clothing; this passage confirms his interest in fashion, but this time in names; what is made apparent here also is his assumption (inimical to Juliet's 'that which we call a rose
by any other name would smell as sweet’) that a person’s character can always be judged by the fashionability of his name, and this would help characterise Carr as one preoccupied with surface glitter.

Some level of formal politeness is also preserved in the Wildean section (as would be becoming in polite social circles), so that negative statements (i.e., face-threatening acts) are couched in euphemism and circumlocution. Consequently, Tzara says ‘Cecily does not approve of garrulity in the Reference Section’ (rather than ‘Cecily forbids talking ...’), and Carr goes on to talk about ‘comment around the font’ on the name Joyce (rather than ‘Joyce is a particularly unfashionable name’). Further down, Carr responds to Tzara’s statement about Cecily’s suspicion of hat-drawn poems (of which Tzara approves), Carr produces an illocutionary impolite statement whereby he applauds Cecily’s suspicion, and by so doing, threatens Tzara’s ‘face’; again this is couched in indirection (this would be the ‘formal politeness’ discussed earlier) because it is a quasi-informative. Therefore, paradoxically, whilst the characters are cardboard-like, they are also sophisticated and well-schooled in clever, polite indirection and coinages (Tzara’s ‘librarianness’ or Carr’s ‘belle-litter’ are examples). One also finds that the characters also come up with a number of ‘clever’ utterances, as in Carr’s utterance, ‘I had no idea that poets nowadays were interested in literature’ (p. 42) which succeeds in producing a paradoxical statement because poets, by definition,
write poetry and therefore produce 'literature'; but Dadaism renounces the traditional literary corpus, so that whilst apparently contradictory on the surface, the utterance contains a measure of truth in it. Carr’s 'cleverness' is also evident in his coinage 'belle-litter' as the antonym of 'belle-lettre', both being phonologically similar. Given the cardboard-like characterisation one wonders whether these evidences of 'cleverness' are really chance hits on the part of the characters, and are perhaps to be attributed to a higher level of discourse, perhaps to Old Carr, but certainly to Stoppard. As mentioned above, the realisation of the reader or audience that he can place himself above the innocently produced utterances produced by the characters (cf. dramatic irony) certainly gives him a greater sense of delight, and perhaps of superiority.

One also finds that Tzara comes up with utterances that are discoursally marked, so much so that Carr comments that he finds the conversation hard to follow. In Tzara’s speech on page 42, he comes up with a series of representatives on the subject of James Joyce, and it is discoursally marked because it moves out of the predominantly interactional Wildean mode. The transactional mode (which would typically be represented by representative speech acts, whether they be narration or description), however, is the one which one would expect to find in a person’s memoirs, so that this can be interpreted as Old Carr’s desire to get on with his memoirs taking over the dramatisation of the events in Zurich in 1917. In a sense, this would explain the
excessive detail on Joyce’s mismatched apparel, and the clever alliteration in ‘sundry sundered Sunday suits’, because these would have been more typical of Carr than of Tzara. Furthermore, it is when the passage seems to get out of the Wildean mode, inching its way towards a higher level of discourse (i.e., Old Carr speaking), that stances on Art and Politics are established, and this is a theme that will be developed in the play. Thus, in Tzara’s transactional discourse, Joyce is established as being anti-Dada, and therefore, not someone Tzara would approve of.

The conversation quickly reverts to the Wildean mode when a passage from The Importance is specifically recalled:

JACK: ... Hallo! Why all these cups? Why cucumber sandwiches? Why such reckless extravagance in one so young? Who is coming to tea?
ALGERNON: Oh! merely Aunt Augusta and Gwendolen.
JACK: How perfectly delightful.55

Not surprisingly, interactional language is in the forefront again, with elicits, replies and comments. And of course, before long, Carr manages to come up with another manic and outrageous statement.

... Gwendolen is a scrupulously truthful girl. In fact, as her elder brother I have had to speak to her about it. Unrelieved truthfulness can give a young girl a reputation for insincerity. I have known plain girls with nothing to hide captivate the London season purely by indiscriminate mendacity. (p. 43)

There is again a play on (attitudinal) polarity of the semantics of some of the lexical items. Unrelieved would typically modify a noun with the feature [+ undesirability], as in unrelieved boredom. Because of this, the reader or audience would have to entertain a world where truthfulness
would be seen as something negative. The fact that truthfulness and mendacity are modified leads one to infer that these are not seen to be absolutes.\textsuperscript{56} Mention has already been made of the assumptions lying behind the use of negation. The situation becomes a little more complicated if the negative element is lexicalised, as is the case here, in the modifiers - namely, 'unrelieved' and 'indiscriminate' - because it has to be decided whether the modifiers are restrictive or not. If the modifiers are taken as being restrictive, the above sentences would yield the following:

1. Truthfulness can give a girl a reputation for sincerity; but unrelieved truthfulness can give a girl a reputation for insincerity.
2. Plain girls with nothing to hide cannot captivate the London season by mendacity; but plain girls with nothing to hide can captivate the London season by indiscriminate mendacity.

Probably, the restrictive interpretation would be the favoured one because the unrestricted interpretation would yield the proposition: 'Truthfulness can give a girl a reputation for insincerity' which is contradictory (or paradoxical, but if paradoxical the paradox would need to be explained and in this case it is not). The parallelism of 'unrelieved truthfulness' and 'indiscriminate mendacity' (both with negative modifiers, and truthfulness and mendacity being antonyms) would suggest that the restrictive interpretation should be attached to the second proposition as well. In either case, the stances would be ones that the reader or audience would distance himself from, and would thus be seen as a Wildean tour de force. The same can be said of Carr's statement further on: 'I am not sure I
approve [of Gwendolen’s knowing foreign languages]. It’s the sort of thing that can only broaden a girl’s mind’; and this is more obviously manic because broadening a girl’s mind is met with disapproval, again, a stance to distance oneself from. (The Wildeanism is obvious if one compares this with Lady Bracknell’s pronouncement: ‘I do not approve of anything that tampers with natural ignorance. Ignorance is like a delicate exotic fruit; touch it and the bloom is gone.’) It could be said that the Wildean mode has, by now, firmly established itself, so that Wildean echoes or Wildean logic would now come to be expected. The play on Joyce’s name is continued, and Carr’s description of him as being ‘middle-aged, plainly dressed, bespectacled and answering to the name of Joyce’ does not stray too far from the truth; only the assumption that Joyce is the person’s christian name and not the surname leads Carr astray. Together with this goes Carr’s suspicion of all things foreign (this can be seen in his statement: ‘you don’t imagine I’d let my sister go unchaperoned in a city largely frequented by foreigners’; and his surprise at English Literature being included in Foreign Literature in Zurich, and his refusing his consent to Tzara’s marrying Gwendolen because ‘girls never marry Rumanians’). There are further echoes of The Importance in the exchanges about Tzara’s christian name.
The discourse becomes marked again when the characters begin to give long speeches, which would be unusual in the Wildean mode because, as mentioned before, the speech there would be characterised by interaction and non-representative speech acts. The transition is made fairly obvious:

CARR: That [Zimmerwaldianism] sounds like the last word in revolutionary politics. What does it mean?
TZARA: It describes those Socialists who at the Zimmerwald Conference in 1915 called on the workers of the world to oppose the war. Well, at the Zum Adler Lenin was raging away ... (p. 45)

Carr, in the Wildean mode, gives the audience a pun on the last word: i.e., 'Zimmerwaldianism' would be the last entry in a dictionary of revolutionary politics since it begins with the letter Z, and also the more modern meaning 'latest, most up-to-date' (this might be anachronistic, but Stoppard would not be too concerned about the incongruity - in fact, Travesties revels in incongruity). Carr's elicit obviously paves the way for Tzara's reply. All this, of course, can be considered a side sequence within another exchange in which Carr issues the directive ('I cannot believe that that is the whole explanation' = 'Give me the whole explanation [of why you are known as Jack in the Library]'). Tzara's explanation (as a response to Carr's directive) and reply (as a response to Carr's elicit) stand out in that they are devoid of the manic illogicalities and the 'clever' word plays of the Wildean mode (though there is a possible pun in 'he [Lenin] dried his eyes and lashed into the Dadaists'/'eyelashes'), and there is the incongruity in Tzara describing himself as a case which was 'Most unfortunate. Terrible blow to the family'. But, in any case, as a result of
Carr’s directive, Tzara’s utterances can be easily divided to narration and description. But the point of the matter is that Tzara does not take the most direct route of responding to Carr’s directive, so that if one can make one’s appeal to Grice’s ‘quantity’ maxim or Sperber and Wilson’s relevance maxim, it would be obvious that Tzara does not answer directly and can be said to be not very economical in his utterances. Some of the items, for instance, are heavily modified - ‘One day last year, not long after the triumph at the Meierei Bar of our noise concert for siren, rattle and fire-extinguisher’ - so that excess information is given. Mention of the Zimmerwaldists is also incidental to the explanation about why Tzara is Jack in the library. And in the midst of the narration, Tzara moves into the descriptive mode with ‘existential’ statements, and here the verbs are all in the timeless present (or the ‘state present’).57

Well, as a Dadaist myself I am the natural enemy of bourgeois art and the natural ally of the political left but the odd thing about revolution is that the further left you go politically the more bourgeois they like their art. (p. 45)

All this seems to suggest that Tzara is doing much more than giving the explanation asked for by Carr. There can be said to be excessive detail and excessive description, so that it would seem that the face of Old Carr presenting his memoirs, keen on describing what things were like then, is discernible yet again. The use of the ‘state (simple) present’ seems to be becoming more widespread at this juncture, a
form which is closely associated with definitions, so that a character’s stance on art and politics is being clearly mapped out.

TZARA: It is odd, isn’t it? I mean it is the contradiction of the radical movement.
CARR: There is nothing contradictory about it ...

This is clearly moving away from the Wildean and interactional mode, and most of the utterances would be, in terms of speech acts, declaratives. It would seem part of Stoppard’s stratagem to lull his audience into Wildeanism, and quickly disorienting them by switching to another mode (the other obvious example would be the contrast between the end of Act I with Old Carr still reminiscing, and the beginning of Act II with Cecily delivering a lecture). In fact, it can be said that generically speaking, Travesties is moving away from the Nonsense Drama to the Drama of Ideas, as the passage moves on to a debate about the position of the artist in society. Interestingly enough, the fact that The Importance forms the framework of this play is not irrelevant to the debate in question, in spite of the fact that there are dichotomies – multichotomies:! in the play, and the debate section would seem to be a section where the parodic influence of The Importance would least impinge upon, on the discoursal or pragmatic level. The Importance, however, is a play of one-dimensional characters, as has been mentioned earlier, so that stereotypes are established, and characters are not seen to develop, psychologically speaking and attitudes are radically polarised. In the same way, because Travesties harks back to The Importance, the characters
there are also established to be similarly undeveloping, and associated with a particular stance in terms of art and politics, and thus attitudes are similarly polarised.

Perhaps the most obvious thing in the debate is the jettisoning of the Politeness Principle (both the formal and the illocutionary), because by definition an argument involves contradiction of another person’s ideas or point of view. And as the argument develops, taboo words (‘smartarse’, ‘prick’, ‘shit’) and swear words (‘by Chr---’, ‘my G--’) begin to be employed.

This, however, is not to say that patterning is not present, so that the ‘wittiness’ principle can be said to be in operation in a debate or quarrelling situation; thus there is phonological patterning in Tzara’s ‘bogus bourgeois Anglo-Saxon prick’, or his pun on flair/flare in ‘a rather unusual flair in your poncey trousers’, together with syntactical patterning as in

Without art man was a coffee-mill: but
\textbf{with} art, man - is a coffee-mill! (p. 47)

or even

\textbf{Art} is absurdly overrated by artists, which is understandable, // but what is strange is that \textbf{it is} absurdly overrated by everyone else. (p. 46)

The ascendancy given to the wittiness principle is also evidenced by intertextuality, and in this case, Tzara quotes Christ’s words in the Temptation, which are, themselves, from the book of Deuteronomy: ‘man shall not live by bread alone’, which is used to emphasise the point that there is something beyond the physical side of life.
It has been mentioned that the main verbs are typically in the 'state (simple) present', and it would be interest to note the points of deviation, as in:

What possible connection could there be between that [Lenin and the revolution] and the shrill self-enclosed squabbles of rival ego-maniacs ... (p. 46)

The modal is in the past tense form, signalling attitudinal distancing from the proposition; in terms of speech act, the utterance is indirect, because this would be what is traditionally known as a rhetorical question. Thus, this would be an indirect declarative, emphasised by the doubling of the semantic component [+ possibility] in the grammar (could) and also in the lexis (possible). Of course, Carr’s utterance also includes the proposition: 'You Dadaists engage in "shrill self-enclosed squabbles" and are made up of "rival ego-maniacs"', but these propositions are made indirectly. Immediately after this, Carr launches into the descriptive mode, signalled by the change to the past tense.

When I was at school, on certain afternoons we all had to do what was called Labour - weeding, sweeping, sawing logs for the boiler-room, that kind of thing; but if you had a chit from Matron you were let off to spend the afternoon messing about in the Art Room. Labour or Art. And you've got a chit for life?

The passage is marked because it deviates from the quarrelling norm established earlier, where each character merely presents his view on art. Of course, it would have to be said that the lexical items let off, and messing about would contain the embedded proposition that art is a soft option and a self-indulgent one, but the switch to the descriptive mode leaves Tzara waiting for the point of the description, so that this could be said to be the descriptive counterpart
of a parable, a narrative with a point. And of course, the point is made undeniably clear in the last sentence with the switch back to the present tense, continuing the established mode. The need to wait for the last sentence for the point of the description helps build up the tension to a climactic point (cf. the so-called periodic sentence). Clearly, talk about the point makes the Gricean concept of relevance not out of place here, and this thus distinguishes it from the more Wildean passages above, where talk about the point of an utterance would be beside the point, as it were, so that the language here would be a more utilitarian one, where the ideational mode is ascendant.

And Tzara rebuts in kind when he comes up with another description, again signalled by the past tense form of the verb so that it is clear that what Carr and Tzara are doing are giving examples to prove their point.

...when you see the drawings he [the artist] made on the walls of the cave, and the fingernail patterns he one day pressed into the clay of the cooking pot, then you say, My G--, I am of these people! It's not the hunters and the warriors that put you on the first rung of the ladder to consecutive thought and a rather unusual flair in your poncey trousers. (p. 46)

This is rendered more interesting by the embedded discourse situation and hence embedded discourse within Tzara's utterance, so that the reaction to the drawings and patterns can be dramatised ('you' can either be a hypothetical person, or Carr himself). And once Tzara gets out of the descriptive mode, he switches back to the present tense, and the last sentence is a declarative. In fact, the example of tribal man is continued when Carr appeals to it before coming up
with another declarative, 'The idea of the artist as a special kind of human being is art's greatest achievement, and it's a fake'; Tzara then makes use of the example again, extending the description to include the 'priest-guardian of the magic that conjured the intelligence out of the appetites'.

Thus, what starts off as a Wildean interlude develops into a full-fledged argument, with supporting examples, of the place of art in society, and these two can be said to be the two important strands in Travesties. Perhaps it can be said that Carr seems to have got up on top in the argument because Tzara has had to defend not only the position of the artist but also the position of the Dadaist in society, so that for him, the function of art in society is encapsulated by the statement: 'The difference between being a man and being a coffee-mill is art', and the function of Dadaism is encapsulated in the statement 'Without art man was a coffee-mill: but with art, man - is a coffee mill', which seems to negate his argument about the function of the artist. And in the midst of the argument, a change in the light reminds the audience that the passage takes place in Carr's memory, and that he is going off the rails again. The passage therefore contains not just humour and highjinks but also a heated debate.
Analysis, pp. 47-63: More Encounters

Once again, as with previous passages, any attempt to see the passage in terms of interpersonality poses problems, problems that the Burtonian analysis is not equipped to cope with. There are four characters interacting, namely, Carr, Tzara, Gwendolen and Joyce (Bennett can be discounted as he retires almost immediately), which yields a total of six possible interpersonal interactions if one excludes the possibility of a person talking to himself.\(^5^8\) However it is also obvious that the characters quickly group themselves into pairs, and it would be surmised that it is these relationships between the persons in each pair which would prove to be significant. Joyce is paired off with Carr as he comes to borrow money ('a couple of pounds') from Carr; Tzara is paired off with Gwendolen as he tries to woo her; Joyce further down the scene is paired off with Tzara as he cross-examines his protegée's 'suitor', Lady Bracknell-fasion. It is interesting to note that in the paired interaction the individual illocutions add up to a particular speech event or some kind of a more global speech act.\(^5^9\) As has been pointed out earlier the Wildean framework leads to cardboard-like characters who are made to represent particular stances in art and society. The relationship between characters are therefore not to be viewed merely as interpersonal interaction but also a collision of various philosophical viewpoints.
1. Joyce and Carr

Once again the interaction is marked because from the outset discourse 'rules' are being broken. And appeal to discourse rules do not seem to be out of place here because at this stage the scene seems to have become more naturalistic as the 'speech event' represented here is that of Joyce attempting to borrow money from Carr; therefore, discourse rules from everyday conversation should be applicable here. Thus, it is quite evident that from the outset, Carr chooses the 'dispreferred' when interacting with Joyce:

JOYCE: Good morning, my name is James Joyce --
CARR: James Augusta? (p. 47)

Carr’s utterance would be, in Burton’s classification, undeniably a Challenging Move in that he interrupts Joyce (the dash in the punctuation points towards this) and does not wait for his speech turn. Furthermore, Joyce’s initial utterance constitutes a greeting with an introduction (and he would probably have proceeded on to his purpose for coming, as is the norm when a person introduces himself to a stranger), and the appropriate response, if one responds at all, would be another greeting, the counterpart in the adjacency pair. Carr’s comment on Joyce’s name is thus inappropriate on this count as well. Carr’s utterance also breaks the Politeness Principle in that it has the potential perlocutionary effect of embarrassing, or even insulting, Joyce, and the effect can be seen as a face-threatening; the relevance of the utterance is also questionable as the speech event is that of Joyce trying to borrow money from Carr, so that the utterance is infelicitous in Gricean
terms. (‘Relevance’ here would be from the point of view of the author-reader level of discourse; the fact that Joyce was actually christened ‘James Augusta’ is only relevant if considered an interesting piece of trivia.) From the perspective of Carr, who as yet is ignorant of Joyce’s purpose for coming, the bringing up of the subject of Joyce’s christian names is irrelevant because it is a digression. The motivation for Carr’s utterance is thus questionable and it can either be taken that Carr is simply discoursally naïve, or that he does not consider it worth his while to ‘save’ Joyce’s ‘face’; otherwise it can be said that the situation in plays, and in this play in particular, is such that some of these discourse rules can be overridden in favour of other pragmatic principles. The earlier discussion suggests that all three of these possibilities may hold here. The characters, like those in Wilde which they parallel, are stereotypes and they are cardboard-like, and being the offspring of Old Carr’s defective memory, it is not surprising that they are thus; therefore, in some measure, the characters should be seen as being discoursally (because psychologically) underdeveloped. Secondly, after the monumental tirades in previous passages, it should not be surprising that Carr and the other characters, having such opposed views on art, should not feel called upon to maintain surface equanimity and goodwill towards men. Thirdly, seen from a higher level of discourse, the purpose of a play cannot be seen as being merely utilitarian, having the role of ‘informing’ the audience, more so a Stoppardian
Defamiliarising techniques call upon the author to surprise and amuse the audience and the confusion that follows is funny. The multivalency is also evident in what follows:

**JOYCE:** Was that a shot in the dark?
**CARR:** Not at all - I am a student of footnotes to expatriate Irish literature.

Once again, one wonders whether what Carr says is to be taken literally; that is, whether he is indeed a student of footnotes to expatriate Irish literature (which is highly improbable), or whether he is being flippant and ironic (and this interpretation is generated by the incongruity between the situation represented and the way things are in the real world). The problem is never really resolved. Joyce’s response seems to indicate the latter response, but Carr’s subsequent reply is just as equally enigmatic:

**JOYCE:** You know my work?
**CARR:** No - only your name.

Joyce’s utterance is a rephrasing of Carr’s earlier utterance (given the latter interpretation), and he seeks to confirm its accuracy - which, however, Carr quashes immediately. In doing so, Carr violates the Politeness Principle, specifically the Agreement Maxim, by giving an unmitigated negative; and Carr’s response is also face-threatening for both himself and for Joyce by indicating his lack of knowledge of Joyce’s work (face-threatening to Carr) and his lack of interest in it (face-threatening to Joyce because this suggests a lack of merit in his work). The upshot of it is that Carr appears mercilessly rude to Joyce, unwilling to move an inch to keep up appearances. This is
confirmed when Carr constantly harks back to the gender
dubiety in Joyce’s name, and later on addresses him as
‘Doris’ (p. 49) (and further down as ‘Janice’ (p. 51) and
‘Phyllis’ (p. 53)), which again is face-threatening because
a person’s name is closely associated with his (positive)
‘face’. Again, it is not clear whether this is done
deliberately or whether Carr’s memory is so defective that
this is done unconsciously (and if one takes up the former
interpretation, Old Carr could be said to be getting his own
back for Joyce’s litigation and defamation of him in
Ulysses) - and this is not unlikely given the fact that
Joyce has been assigned the role of Lady Bracknell in the
Wildean scheme; but what is clear is that these bizarre
discoursal lapses are highly humorous, so that in the outer
level of discourse at least, the Humour Principle has over¬
ridden the constraints of the other principles. In a sense,
however, this part of the exchange can be considered a comic
interlude before the speech event takes its course, and it
is here that Joyce’s position on art and politics is esta¬
lished. 62

In essence, the rest of the interaction between Carr
and Joyce constitutes Joyce’s trying to flatter and
 ingratiating himself with Carr by means of his blarney. (One
is aware, of course, that in talking about flattering
someone or appealing to someone’s dandiacal tastes, one is
referring to a person’s perlocutionary act, rather than to
his illocutionary act, and there is the danger of over¬
psychologising a character by doing so. In this case
however, Joyce’s perlocution is made crystal clear by the odd description of *The Importance* in terms of Algernon’s change of costumes, and by the fact that Carr indeed falls victim to Joyce’s blarney.) As mentioned before, Stoppardian aesthetics is based on conflict and the contrast between a character who has come to manipulate and a character who falls victim to his manipulation sets off humour in the play by its very incongruity.

Given the framework or ‘scenario’ of ‘borrowing money from someone’, there are elements or features in the exchange that are decidedly marked or foregrounded, most notably Joyce’s extended quotation of his poem ‘Mr Dooley’ in full, where each stanza is introduced by an appropriate clause, so that the whole poem is embedded within a very long sentence. Thus, on the syntactic level, because of the sentence length and because of its structural neatness, this passage is marked.

(One can take note of the alliteration in ‘cantaloupe contorts’, ‘blatant bulletins’, ‘furious fellow’, ‘pope and priest and parson left the poor man in the lurch’; there is syntactic parallelism in stanzas 1 to 4, each being an interrogative sentence, beginning with ‘Who is the ...?’ One can also take note of the various biblical allusions in ‘Mr Dooley’: ‘Nebuchadnezzar’ (book of Daniel, passim.), ‘water from life’s fount’ (John 4.14: ‘... the water that I shall give him shall be in him a well of water springing up into everlasting life’ (A.V.)), ‘the Gospel of the German on the Mount’ (Matthew 5-7: the Sermon on the Mount), all of
which seem to be associated with the so-called Imperialist position. Marxist vocabulary ('proletariat') is associated with the Marxist position. On the whole then, there is a great deal of patterning involved.

In terms of Grice's maxims or the Politeness Principle, the passage is unusual, and its relevance questionable, because Joyce has not taken the most economical way of stating his point (and what exactly is his point, one asks at the end of it all). On the level of Politeness, the poem puts forward a point of view which would undoubtedly be inimical to His Majesty's representative in Zurich as it puts forward a neutralist stance with regard to the War; thus, the Maxim of Agreement would seem to have been broken. This public declamation of Joyce's cannot be thought as being calculated to win his way into Carr's favour. The point of the quotation is also left unclear:

JOYCE: ... the impression remains that I regard both sides with equal indifference.
CARR: And you don't?
JOYCE: Only as an artist. As an artist, naturally I attach no importance to the swings and roundabout of political history. But I come here not as an artist but as James A. Joyce. (p. 50)

Carr verbalises the implicature of Joyce's utterance. (The fact that he prefaces the reported clause with 'the impression remains' would otherwise be gratuitous.) But implicatures are defeasible and in a qualified manner Joyce negates the implicature when he confirms that he does regard both sides with equal indifference but only as an artist. The point is whether such a separation of a person into his various personas is possible, and if, as he says, he has come
'not as an artist' (p. 50) or 'as a poet .. but as the business manager of the English Players' (p. 49), then the point of the quotation of the poem is doubly mysterious. On the outer level of discourse, however, it can be said that this helps characterise Joyce as one who was indifferent to which side won the war, and therefore to be distinguished from Carr on the one hand, and from Tzara and Lenin (who advocated class war rather than war based on nationalism or patriotism), on the other. It also establishes Joyce as a flamboyant and enigmatic character, certainly in terms of his speech. Again, seen in terms of the author-reader/audience (extradiegetic) discourse, the quotation is less of a purple passage, because it exemplifies the art-for-art’s-sake position on the war.

But there are yet more digressions and 'ambushes' for the audience before one is able to get on to the proper business of borrowing and lending. There is the joke on who the British Prime Minister is at that time.

JOYCE: ... I received £100 from the civil list at the discretion of the Prime Minister.
CARR: The Prime Minister ---?
JOYCE: Mr Asquith.
CARR: I am perfectly well aware who the Prime Minister is - I am the representative of His Majesty's Government in Zurich.
JOYCE: The Prime Minister is Mr Lloyd George, but at that time it was Mr Asquith.
CARR: Oh yes. (pp. 50f.)
For the record, Asquith was the Prime Minister from 1908 to 1916, and Lloyd George from 1916 to 1922. Carr seeks to confirm Joyce's statement by repeating the last part of Joyce's utterance, and Joyce interprets that as a question as to who the Prime Minister was, and thus names Mr Asquith as the Prime Minister at that time. However, this is met with Carr's response which violates the Politeness Principle, by criticising Joyce's utterance for not observing the Maxim of Quantity, and therefore containing the implicature that he, being 'the representative of His Majesty's Government in Zurich' would be unaware of who the Prime Minister is. However, this time, the joke is on Carr because it is he who has got it wrong. This is not inconsistent with Stoppard's earlier characterisation of Carr, who gets the carpet pulled from under his feet very often, again emphasising his unreliability as a character and also as a narrator. There is also the incongruity of a character (supposedly) exemplifying Englishness par excellence not knowing who the British Prime Minister is, which incongruity is the hallmark of Stoppardian aesthetics. Immediately after this, this quintessential English gentleman is allowed to disrupt the conversational discourse by enthusing about Gilbert and Sullivan operettas, mentioning their titles, and quite ignoring turntaking rules and rules of Cooperation and Politeness. (His (aristocratic?) Englishness is emphasised further down when he is shown not to understand Joyce's colloquial use of the noun 'swell' (p. 52).) This again gives Stoppard the opportunity to have a joke based on the
double entendre:

CARR: Patience!
JOYCE: Exactly. First things first.
CARR: Trial by Jury! Pirates of Penzance! (p. 51)

When Carr says 'Patience!', he withdraws from interactional language, and indulges in Jakobson's 'emotive' function. Joyce however interprets his utterance as an elliptical form of 'We must have patience', that is, as interactional language, being an advice to him, and this is reinforced by his response.

Even when Joyce finally gets down to the business of borrowing money from Carr and getting him to take the part of Algernon in The Importance by pandering to Carr's pride in his Englishness and his sartorial impeccability. This of course produces the manic description of The Importance in terms of Algernon's costumes, which, in ordinary circumstances, would be manic, because this violates Grice's maxims of quantity (talking too much about costumes at the expense of all else) and relevance. In this interaction, then, Joyce is seen to gain the upper hand, because ultimately he succeeded in borrowing the two pounds from Carr, and pragmatic incongruities show up Carr's foibles and his unreliability, just as Joyce's 'Mr Dooley' show up his position 'as an artist'.

2. Tzara and Gwendolen

Just as the Carr-Joyce interaction fits into a 'scenario' of money-borrowing, the Tzara-Gwendolen interaction fits into the scenario of lady-wooing from the point of view of Tzara,
and of encouraging Tzara from the point of view of Gwendolen. The interaction starts off as a threesome with mutual introductions, leading to the quotation of poems. It is when Tzara quotes his poem that the Stoppardian multivalency rears its head:

TZARA (to JOYCE): For your masterpieces
I have great expectorations
(GWEN’s squeak, 'Oh!')
For you I would eructate a monument.
(Oh!)
Art for art’s sake - I defecate!
GWEN: Delectate ... 
TZARA: I’m a foreigner. (p. 48)

This is in part a result of the three-person interaction; on the one hand, there is the need to assert his opposition to artistry and all that Joyce stands for, and on the other, there is the need to impress Gwendolen to whom he has come expressly to propose. Although the stage direction has it that the poem is addressed to Joyce, Gwendolen’s responses in the midst of the recitation indicates that she is more than a mere third person in the interaction. (This highlights the kind of doubleness that Burton’s method is inadequate to cope with.) Thus, Tzara’s ‘mistakes’ are problematic: are they genuine mistakes (bearing in mind that the characters are frequently one-dimensional and therefore such an interpretation would not be as implausible as it would initially appear), or deliberate mistakes to be interpreted as such by Joyce and Gwendolen, or deliberate mistakes to be interpreted as such by Joyce but not by Gwendolen? The ‘mistakes’, if not attributable to Tzara, would certainly be
attributable to the author. The intricate patterning seen in Carr’s monologue is evident here again: ‘expectorations’ v. ‘expectations’; ‘eructate’ v. ‘erect’; and ‘defecate’ v. ‘delectate’. There is of course the phonological similarity of the pairs of words, and semantically, the first word of each pair refers to a traditionally ‘taboo’ bodily function couched in long words (hence Gwendolen’s squeaks). And it is this doubleness which generates the humour in the passage and which is also the trademark of Stoppardian aesthetics. The doubleness is also evident extradiegetically as each character has to be shown to take up a specifically identifiable stance: for Tzara, everything is chance, whereas for the art-for-art’s-sake aesthete, everything is artistry. But the fact of the matter is that the systematic ‘mistakes’ in Tzara’s poem is evidence of artistry, so that Tzara condemns Dadaism with his own words!

The fact that immediately after this, Wildeanism sets in again underlines the fact that the joke is on Dadaism because the Wildean framework aligns itself to artistry rather than to chance. The use of parody specifically evokes a text and, metonymically, the stance associated with the text. Once again, the scene becomes manic with violations of the Politeness Principle.

GWEN: But it is the most beautiful thing I’ve ever heard I have a good ear, would you not agree, Mr. Tzara?
TZARA: It is the most perfect thing about you, Miss Carr.
GWEN: Oh, I hope not. That would leave me no room for development. (Stoppard, p. 48; Wilde, p. 261)
On the one hand, Gwendolen follows the Maxim of Approbation by complimenting Tzara (which perhaps violates the Maxim of Quality in view of the 'mistakes'), but immediately after that violates the Maxim of Modesty by boasting about her 'good ear', so than in one speech-turn, Gwendolen obeys and breaks the maxims of the Politeness Principle. Then there follows what appears to be lexicographical fastidiousness on the part of Gwendolen when she insists on a literal interpretation of 'perfect'. An ironic interpretation would normally be available but because the characters are meant to be Wildean and one-dimensional, one has to infer that one has entered the world of manic discourse again.

From here, the Tzara-Gwendolen interaction proceeds on to the recitation of a poem made out of the cut-out pieces of Shakespeare's eighteenth sonnet. But again, this is not without more ambushes and the dialogue becomes a collage or pastiche of Shakespearian quotations:

GWEN:... You tear him for his bad verses? [Julius Caesar 3.3.30] ... These are but wild and whirling words, my lord. [Hamlet 1.5.133]
TZARA: Ay, Madam.
GWEN: Truly I wish the gods had made thee poetical. [As You Like It 3.3.16]
TZARA: I do not know what poetical is. Is it honest in word and deed? Is it a true thing? [As You Like It 3.3.17]
GWEN: Sure he that made us with such large discourse, looking before and after, gave us not that capability, and god-like reason to fust in us unused. [Hamlet 4.4.39]
TZARA: I was not born under a rhyming planet. [Much Ado About Nothing 5.2.40] Those fellows of infinite tongue that can rhyme themselves into ladies' favours, they do reason themselves out again. [Henry V 5.2.156] And that would set my teeth nothing on edge - nothing so much as mincing poetry. [Henry IV, Part I 3.1.131]
GWEN: Thy honesty and love doth mince this matter [Othello 2.3.247] - Put your bonnet for his right use, 'tis for the head! [Hamlet 5.2.92] ... I had rather than forty shilling my book of songs and sonnets here [Merry Wives of Windsor 1.1.198] ...
TZARA: But since he died, and poet better prove, his for his style you'll read, mine for my - love. [Sonnet 32.13] (p. 54)

Gwendolen, of course, has the quotations that argue for artistry whilst Tzara has those that argue for 'honesty' and 'truth'. In terms of discourse interaction, this would have to be seen as two characters giving forth two different points of view, but the fact that it is a pastiche of Shakespeare quotations problematises the text as one would have to move out to the author-reader level of discourse, for it must be presumed that the characters in the inner level of discourse are unaware of their Shakespearian language so that the pastiche is attributable to Stoppard. On the one hand, the pastiche vindicates Tzara because pastiche is a favourite Dadaist technique; on the other hand (Stoppard's 'Minus A'), the Shakespeare pastiche is demonstrably an artistic artefact (because the quotations are not chosen at random, but, on the contrary, 'artistically' chosen to fit into the discourse, so that, ultimately, one has to admire it), resulting in the appearance that Stoppard is, in the pastiche, in collusion with the 'artistry' side of the argument, resulting in Tzara's ultimate deflation.

Indeed, the same can be said of the second pastiche, that is, the pastiche of Shakespeare's sonnet, because the final poem turns out to be an explicit description of the
male member in sexual terms (again taboo, hence Gwendolen’s shriek), so that Joycean ‘artistry’ gains the upper hand over Dadaist ‘chance’.

From thence, Stoppard re-launches into the Wildean world where such improbabilities as a girl falling in love with a man just because he ‘edited a magazine of all that is newest and best in literature’ can happen. Once again, as was the case in the Carr-Joyce interaction, when one considers the more global ‘speech act’, the scenario as it were, of Tzara wooing Gwendolen, one finds the episode of the pastiche-poem infelitious or inappropriate, because Tzara would have known that Gwendolen was an ardent admirer of Joyce, and the use of dadaist methods (in producing the ‘poem’) and the proclamation of the dadaist credo (‘All poetry is a reshuffling of a pack of picture cards, and all poets are cheats’, &c., p. 53) are hardly likely to be calculated to win the lady’s favour. One can see these as violations of the ‘felicity conditions’ of the macro-speech act of ‘wooing’, or as violations of the maxims of the Politeness Principle, in particular the agreement maxim. One is to assume either that his dadaist tendencies have got the better of him, or that the extradiegetic discourse has overridden the constraints of the intradiegetic discourse, or perhaps both. This accords well with Pratt’s notion of a ‘display text’.64 Stoppard, it can be inferred, is anxious to present his readers or audience with a variety of styles (which was also Joyce’s proclaimed aim in Ulysses, which again gives a clue as to whom Stoppard’s sympathies are
with) so that *Travesties* fulfils Pratt's assertability condition. At the same time dadaism is demonstrated, as it were, in front of the audience, and the 'doubleness' noted above ('Firstly, A; secondly, minus A') affords great humour to the episode.

One can consider Leech's pragmatic notion of discourse as a goal-oriented activity. He expatiates on the various kinds of goals of discourse, viz., (a) dynamic and regulative goals, (b) coexisting goals, (c) subordinate goals and superordinate goals, (d) long-term goals and short-term goals, and (e) major and minor goals. Therefore, a goal of a particular utterance need not be monolithic, as the goals can be complementary or even conflicting. This is particularly true of interactional language as opposed to transactional language; and here, it is ostensibly interactional as there are two characters conversing with each other. This complexity is already possible when the goal is attributed to one source of consciousness; thus with the existence of the extradiegetic discourse, the complexity is likely to increase. Therefore, in the Carr-Joyce and Tzara-Gwendolen interaction, the conflicting signals sent as to the goals of the utterances can be seen to be the result of conflicting coexisting goals not only within each character but also between the characters and the author. In view of the fact that most of the characters in *Travesties* are from Wilde, and therefore frequently one-dimensional, the clash
of goals between the characters conjured up (ostensibly) in the mind of Old Carr, and Old Carr himself, and the author is all the more significant.

In this interaction then there are probably co-existing goals; Tzara has purportedly fallen in love with Gwendolen; therefore one of his goals (his major goal, perhaps) is to declare his love for her and propose marriage to her. However, this implies his admiration for Gwendolen, and all that appertains to her, which, unfortunately for Tzara, includes the espousal of Joycean aesthetics as she has made herself Joyce’s disciple. Tzara’s minor goal would seem to be to assert his dadaist credo. Old Carr’s unreliability has already been stressed by Stoppard especially in the earlier monologue, so that one has to take it that the portrayal here is subject to his whims and fancies, and could just very well be a figment of his own imagination. Already, this presents problems, and as a memoir-writer, his goal would seem to be to present his readers with historical truth, ‘tell it as it is’, give an honest and decent portrayal of the characters and of the zeitgeist (ignoring all the theoretical and ideological reservations one might have of the possibility of doing this). He is, however, not detached from the description and portrayal given here, and Stoppard is keen to show Old Carr as one having a definite point of view with regard to art and the War, and also with an axe to grind, especially with regard to Joyce. Once again, there are conflicting goals because the former involves giving an objective account of Tzara whilst the
latter involves subverting dadaism and undermining all that Tzara has to say. Finally, there is the rather more elusive question of the goal of the playwright; one can take it that one of the goals would be to entertain and amuse the audience or reader; and that the other would be to inform and perhaps even to enlighten. And indeed, these two need not be conflicting goals at all, but can be thought of as coexisting goals. On the other hand, the goal of amusing or entertaining (which would be encapsulated in the Interest Principle) might gain the upper hand, so that the author would have no qualms about taking liberties with other aspects of the text. One might want to ask whether one of the goals of the author might not be to be fair to all the points of view represented in the text, and despite all that Stoppard himself has had to say on this subject, it must be said that a literary text is under no obligation to be so, at least not in the same way that a history text book is. Thus it is that the passage evinces a high degree of complexity, and it is this that must account for the fact that the passage is not straightforward at all. It must be taken for granted that the text is under Stoppard’s control, so that to have allowed the ‘artistry’ is the Shakespearian pastiche to undermine Tzara would seem to point to Stoppard’s not giving credence to dadaism.
3. Joyce and Tzara

The Joyce-Tzara interaction begins with their mutual introduction in the presence of Carr and Gwendolen and continues in the question-and-answer sequence further down. The interaction can hardly be said to have begun well. The discourse is marked from the start.

GWEN: Do you know Mr. Tzara, the poet?
JOYCE: By sight, and reputation; but I am a martyr to glaucoma and inflation. Recently as I was walking down the Bahnhofstrasse my eye was caught by a gallery showcase and I was made almost insensible with pain.

GWEN: Mr. Joyce has written a poem about it. It is something you two have in common.
JOYCE: Hardly. Mr. Tzara’s disability is monocular, and by rumour, affected, whereas I have certificates for conjunctivitis, iritis and synechia, and am something of an international eyesore.

GWEN: I mean poetry. (p. 48)

Joyce decides to interpret Gwendolen’s remark as an elicitation or question rather than an introduction. Shortly afterwards, Joyce misunderstands (or chooses to misunderstand) Gwendolen’s remark about him and Tzara having something in common, so that it would appear that Joyce is being very uncooperative by producing inappropriate responses to Gwendolen’s remarks, almost subverting them. Moreover, he makes unmitigated, unflattering and disparaging remarks about Dadaism and Tzara in the presence of Tzara, so that he flagrantly violates the Agreement and Approbation Maxims of the Politeness Principle. He talks of the dadaist exhibition in Bahnhofstrasse making him ‘almost insensible with pain’; and he refers to Tzara’s wearing a monocle as an affectation (which, seemingly, is justified because on pp. 56-57, Joyce points out that Tzara’s monocle is in the wrong
eye and Tzara promptly obliges by placing the monocle in the other eye). Finally, he disparages himself when he describes himself as an 'international eyesore'. In the doubleness evident in Joyce's so-called mistakes, because they open up Gwendolen's utterances to two interpretations, is again manifest Stoppard's keynote. The clash between Joyce and Tzara and their representative positions and ideologies is also foreshadowed here by Joyce's uncooperative and impolite remarks. The next time the two characters meet is in the question-and-answer episode.

Qua inter-character discourse, the question-and-answer episode is immediately marked. Joyce has the monopoly of questions (elicitations) or verbal directives (e.g. 'Give further examples of Dada' = 'What are further examples of Dada?') and Tzara invariably provides the 'supporting' reply (though the nature of the reply is sometimes highly irregular). Thus, Joyce is aligned to the position of power as he has conferred upon him the right to ask, a right withheld from Tzara: Joyce is the equivalent of the teacher in teacher-pupil discourse, or even the inquisitor, to stress the point, in inquisition discourse! However, the questions and answers themselves are sometimes problematical. One of the felicity conditions of asking a question is that the speaker should not know the answer to the question and believe that the hearer does. In view of this, questions such as the following are aberrant: 'Grasping any opportunity for paradox as might occur, in what way is the first name of your friend Arp singular?' (p. 57) He is able to say that
the answer to the question might contain a paradox ('His name is singular in that it is duplicate'), and that Arp’s first name is ‘singular’ (= unusual), so that it would seem that he is aware of the answer to his question, and that what he is doing is providing clues to the answer. Joyce’s verbosity is also unusual (one might say ‘singular’), as in the following: ‘Is he your sworn enemy, pet aversion, bête noir, or otherwise persona non grata?’ (p. 56) where each of the terms used is a near-synonym of the others: it would seem that Grice’s maxims of quantity and manner are being ignored. What is achieved by these so-called aberrations is a certain measure of punning and word play. There is the patterning of lexis in the latter example, where each term includes the component [+ not liked]; and this is subsequently balanced with lexical items with the component [+ liked]: ‘friend, comrade-in-arm, trusted confidant, or otherwise pal, mate or crony’. The latter are actually two pairs of three, the latter three being more colloquial. There is also punning: ‘Arp’s first name is singular in that it is duplicate’, ‘Hugo Ball is unspherical’. These features have been noted in Carr’s monologue, and so their re-appearance should not be surprising, and can be said to point towards Joyceanism.

It is, however, the outer level of discourse which proves interesting, because this episode is in fact a parody of the question-and-answer episode between Lady Bracknell
and Jack Worthing in *The Importance*, and also the 'Ithaca' episode in Joyce's *Ulysses* (Episode 17), and the latter can be said to be derivative as well:

Of the many historical precedents for Ithaca, including Socratic dialogue, legal inquiry, pedagogical examination, scientific method, and even modern advertising ('What is home without Plumtree's Potted Meat?'), two at least exerted special influence - religious catechism and scholastic dialectic: Jesuit-trained Joyce.68

Thus, qua author-reader/audience discourse, this passage not only furnishes the reader or audience with further information on the rise of dadaism and dadaist activities, it succeeds in incorporating Wildeanism and Joyceanism as well, and it is this which generates the manic quality which lends the passage its humour. Thus it is that Stoppard succeeds in more incongruity: presenting dadaism by means of Joyceanism (very much like the way in which the dadaist technique of pastiche is presented with immaculate artistry in the previous section), and it is the Joycean technique which ultimately deflates the dadaist argument. Thus, by means of parody, Stoppard is able to evoke metonymically Wildean and Joycean aesthetics to suit his own ends.

The passage ends with the match of invectives, adumbrated by the impolite and uncooperative inter-character discourse noted above. But more than that, this piece of invective echoes the others (one by Carr directed towards Tzara, p. 40; and the other by Tzara directed towards Carr, p. 47), and this points towards the structured nature of *Travesties*, where these passages of invective function as refrains. And as in the earlier passages, the language loses its interactive quality and takes on the quality of a
declamatory speech, so that it can be surmised that Stoppard is not so much interested in **dramatising** his characters, but making them his own mouthpieces, denigrating their companion’s ideological and philosophical position, and countering that with their own position. Thus, in the language of Winter, there is a ‘matching’ relation between these passages, as they all begin with the same formula of swearing (‘By G—’) and thence to offensive name-calling. But in this case, there is also another matching relation - with Joyce’s speech immediately following this. But with a difference: the swearing formula is omitted, and so is the offensive and taboo name-calling. The lexical differentiation is marked (cf. ‘you little Rumanian wog – you bloody dago’, etc. (p. 40); ‘you bloody English philistine – you ignorant smart-arse bogus bourgeois Anglo-Saxon prick’, etc. (p. 47); ‘you supercilious streak of Irish puke!’ etc. (p. 62)). In all the above there is the formula of making highly racist remarks, underlined by highly emotive lexical items as well. Joyce’s lexical items seem tame in contrast:

You are an over-excited little man, with a need for self-expression far beyond the scope of your natural gifts. This is not discreditable. Neither does it make you an artist. (p. 62)

But this still matches the other passages because this starts off by identifying the other person’s position, and there is grammatical similarity in the use of the equative verb **be** (although this is often elided in the verbless clauses in the earlier passages). The alliteration evident in the other passages is also present here (as in ‘continuously and contiguously’ though in this there is much more
than alliteration because only a consonant has been changed). And, as in the other passages, Joyce proceeds to expatiate on his own position, but unlike them, the syntax is not broken up (cf. 'Eat - grind - shit. Hunt - eat - fight - grind - saw the logs - shit' (p. 47), 'Dada! Dada! Dada!!', p. 62); and where there are verbless clauses, these involve the copula verb to be, and are idiomatically acceptable. ('What [would there be] now of the Trojan War if it had been passed over by the artist's touch? [It would be] Dust. [It would be] A forgotten expedition prompted by Greek merchants looking for new markets'. In each of the above the elision involves a pronoun and a verb phrase with be as the main verb.) And the difference in tone can also be understood, simply by the lack of exclamation marks! Thus, the note of calm marks it out from the other passages, and one can even talk of elegance in the rhetorical structure ('If there is ..., it is ...') and in the intertextual references ('a golden apple' in Jason and the Golden Fleece; 'a wooden horse' in the Trojan siege; 'a face that launched a thousand ships', Helen of Troy - and a quotation from Christopher Marlowe's Dr Faustus, l. 1328). Once again, the intertextuality conjures up metonymically the source text and its associated tone, viz. heroism. The fact that Joyce's speech is made to stand out from those of the others, or is made to be foregrounded, seems to imply that Joyce has been singled out for different treatment, and seems to underline the importance of this passage in the play. Unlike Tzara's, Joyce's speech does not seem to have
been undermined, so that one might conclude that Stoppard can be taken to be more sympathetic to Joyce’s position.

The joke is of course not yet over as Stoppard concretises Joyceanism and Dadaism by making Joyce a conjurer ('An artist is the magician put amongst men to gratify – capriciously – their urge for immortality'), and Tzara smash all the crockery (dadaist iconoclasm, implicit in Tzara’s statement ‘all art is anti-art’).

It is difficult to categorise the passage as a whole because, true to Stoppardian aesthetics, pragmatic norms established are being constantly undermined. On the one hand what goes on is that Joyce has come to borrow money from Carr, and Tzara to propose to Gwendolen, but this summary of the passage would belie the situation, because, on the other hand, there is a lot going on in the passage which is not consonant with these ostensible aims, as the language moves away from being interactional to become more emotive and transactional. Characters are made to lose control and thus show their true colours, as it were, so that philosophical and ideological positions are battled out on stage. And yet again, this level of earnestness in theoretical positions is undermined by the manic and parodic nature that the passage develops into, with conjuring tricks and elements from music-hall thrown in, so that the serious and the light-hearted become hopelessly entangled, a duality that has come to be seen as Stoppard’s trademark.
Carr's final monologue in Act I, pp. 63-65

After a few lines from The Importance, Old Carr is back again with his so-called memoirs. Once again, the features noted in the initial monologue are present here, chief among which is the tendency towards dramatisation and a penchant for intertextual references, evident in the use of the free indirect style and the occurrence of residual register features. The audience/reader has to be cognisant of the constant vacillation from one 'voice' to another in Carr; and sometimes there is no clear-cut distinction between when one 'voice' retreats and another 'voice' succeeds.

Ostensibly, Carr is writing his memoirs, and is therefore involved in a documentation of the zeitgeist in Zurich in 1917, and this, among other things, involves reference to other textual sources of the time, and it is when he appears to quote or, in fact, does quote from other sources that his predilection for dramatisation becomes evident. The beginning of the monologue is characterised by verbless clauses, some of the words and phrases heavily modified, which may be said to be characteristic of newspaper headlines and announcements. And it is this which points towards the intertextual quality of the passage.
Personal triumph in the demanding role of Algernon Montcrieff [sic]. The Theater zur Kaufleuten on Pelikanstrasse, an evening in Spring, the English Players in that quintessential English jewel 'The Imprudence of Being —' Now I've forgotten the first one. By Oscar Wilde. Henry Carr as Algy. Other parts played by Tristan Rawson, Cecil Palmer, Ethel Turner, Evelyn Cotton ... forget the rest. Tickets five francs, four bob a nob and every seat filled. (p. 63)

The heavy modification characteristic of journalesque is evident when analysed in the manner of systemic grammar:

\[ m \ h \ q \ m \ m \ h \ q \]

Personal triumph [in [the demanding role [of [A. M.]]]]

\( m = \text{modifier}, \ h = \text{head}, \ q = \text{qualifier}; \) square brackets indicate rankshifted groups

The distinction between the 'public' voice of the newspaper and the more 'personal' voice of Henry Carr is also evident on the level of lexis; in the latter, Carr makes frequent use of personal pronouns and lexical items which would be very low on the scale of formality, together with cliché items ('four bob a nob', 'the Irish lout and his cronies', 'bear a grudge'). His not being able to remember the name of the play forces him to abandon his 'public' voice for a while before taking it up again, but the 'personal' voice gets the better of him, when he feels called upon to translate 'five francs' into English money,\(^69\) and given Carr's xenophobic tendencies (alluded to earlier), this is not surprising. And thus, for the rest of what follows, in the main, Carr abandons his attempt at using his 'public' voice, as Joyce's alleged insult to him lurks in his mind. The use of this 'personal' voice implies a different
relationship between Carr and his audience as it indicates a certain amount of complicity, even as the speech act is transformed from that of an informative (a representative speech act in Searle’s categorisation) as it should be in the documentation of memoirs, to that of a complaint (a non-representative speech act). This makes clear the transformation from transactional- to interactional-dominated language use. This results in his reading aloud the legal document pertaining to Carr’s litigation against Joyce and vice versa. However, Carr is unable to endure this straitjacketing and the need to ‘translate’ the document, just as he felt called upon to ‘translate’ five francs, takes over, first by the interpolations identifying the referents in the legal document (‘that’s me’, ‘that’s him’), then by putting the documents aside and restating the contents. If the legal document can be seen as Carr adopting another ‘public’ voice, it can be concluded that the ‘personal’ voice must out. And interestingly enough, he introduces a digression, launching into metastatements, which, surprisingly betray a lot of self-knowledge, when he is made to comment on his ‘time slips’ and his getting his own speeches confused with those of Algernon’s in The Importance. The tendency towards self-dramatisation noted in the initial monologue is manifested by his attributing an utterance to ‘you’: ‘No, steady on, old chap, that was Algernon - Algernon!’ Here, the second person is used generically which in this case refers primarily to the speaker, i.e., himself (for instance ‘you’ve jumped the points’ - that is what Carr himself, not
his audience, has done). He moves on the comment on what his audience can expect (from him, or perhaps, from the play) from now on:

anybody hanging on just for the cheap comedy of senile confusion might as well go because now I’m on to how I met Lenin and could have changed the course of history etcetera ... (p. 64)

This, surprisingly, betrays a lot of self-knowledge; he implies that was has gone on before might by perceived as ‘cheap comedy’, and that he himself might be suffering from ‘senile confusion’, which nearly breaks down the discourse structure, for these statements are self-conscious (typical of post-modernist literary texts, and Carr here is analogous to the self-conscious narrator of The French Lieutenant’s Woman) and are in fact metastatements (with the implication that the senile, unreliable figure of Old Carr might, after all, be a put-on part, with liberties taken with history to add colour to it). This is all potentially disorienting to the audience (and can perhaps be seen as a defamiliarisation technique), so that the whole of Act I can be interpreted as having been enacted by Carr deliberately for the benefit of his audience, especially the section of the audience keen on ‘the cheap comedy of senile confusion’. His penchant for self-dramatisation reinforces this possibility, and the audience has to consider the possibility of setting up an additional level of discourse where Carr is, qua dramatist or playwright, in fact interacting with an audience attending to a dramatisation, rather than an audience of potential readers of his memoirs.
This is the only metadramatic incursion of Carr, and the senile figure appears then to take over the rest of the play (parts of the second act are problematic, but more of that further on), but this, in fact, problematises the play, because this can also be seen as Stoppard having a bit of a joke with his audience-reader, deliberately letting Old Carr speak uncharacteristically, so that, in fact, Carr has been made a mouthpiece of Stoppard — in other words, the voice of Stoppard is thinly disguised as that of Carr. In this case, an additional layer of discourse need not be set up. This ambiguity is never resolved, and both possibilities are to be held side by side. Richard Corballis seems to suggest that the former might be the case, although he fails to take this possibility seriously:

Old Carr is not just embroidering past events; he is significantly distorting them, as Nabokov’s senile or deranged narrators are wont to do (e.g. in Despair) and as Peter Shaffer’s Salieri fails to do in Amadeus (which is one reason why that play is less satisfying than Travesties).71

Carr goes on to read the document again, and as before stops to comment on it and proceeds in his own vein, possibly taking up his memoirs again as he deals summarily with the life of Joyce, though the language points towards Carr’s ‘personal’ voice rather than his ‘public’ one. This is because the requirements of Gricean principles and other discourse rules are not met, as would be expected of a piece of discourse such as one’s memoirs. Carr refers to ‘the other case’ even though it has not been mentioned earlier, so that the use of the definite article can be said to be aberrant.
Carr thus presumes on the familiarity of his audience/readers with the story of the counter-claim. Referential vagueness (hence a violation of Grice’s Maxims of Manner) is evident in ‘But it was the money with Joyce’. The audience has to assume that this is an elliptical version of, say, ‘But it was the money with Joyce (extracted from me) that has riled me up’, or ‘It was the victory of Joyce’s suit for slander that went to me, though it was the money that went to Joyce in the first suit’. Slightly further down, Carr makes use of telegraph language with the ellipsis of some grammatical words in: ‘But he was a sick man then, [with a] perforated ulcer’ (p. 64). Therefore, although thematically Carr has moved back to Joyce, his speech presupposes a lot, indicative of a high degree of familiarity with the audience, and can be equated to Deborah Tannen’s ‘high involvement’ style of speech. This works ironically against Carr because his unreliability and his foibles have been made manifest in what has gone on before, which ultimately goes some way in discrediting his point of view vis-à-vis the debate about art and politics. His description of the dream about Joyce, in the same manner, works against him in that he loses the game of one-upmanship, and Joyce, in this ‘posthumous’ court case, ends up one up on Carr. The court case provides a useful metaphor for the concerns of the play because the adversarial positions taken up by the main characters parallel the two parties in a lawsuit. The dream scene thus provides a microcosm of Act I of the play. This can be set out in playscript form:
CARR: And what did you do in the Great War?
JOYCE: I wrote Ulysses. What did you do?
(CARR left speechless)

The game of one-upmanship and taunting, or the phenomenon of a slanging match has seldom been characterised discoursally, although this phenomenon is not entirely rare in dramatic texts: one has only to think of the tiff between Cecily and Gwendolen in The Importance, and it is also evident in the earlier exchanges between Carr and Tzara. The adversarial condition is presupposed, and the object or goal would be to leave the interlocutor at a loss for a reply, unable to justify himself, perhaps even turning his own utterances against himself (as would be the case here). In such a situation, the adjacency-pair requirement can be said not to hold because a reply to an elicit would not be desirable, at least from the point of view of the speaker, and in this case, the grammatical questions are not elicits but comments (in other words, they are rhetorical questions). Politeness and Co-operation are not issues at all. The ‘questions’ are then indirect speech acts. The strength of Joyce’s riposte lies in the fact that he has transformed the referential scope of ‘what’ in Carr’s so-called question, and also deliberately misinterpreting the ‘question’ as an elicit rather than a comment, thereby being infuriatingly literal-minded. Whereas Carr has in mind a more patriotic scope to his pronoun ‘what’ (the utterance having the force of ‘You did nothing of worth to your country to whom you owe your allegiance in the Great War’, cf. ‘Ask not what your
country can do for you; ask, what you can do for your country’), Joyce gives the pronoun a more artistic scope and therefore leaves Carr open-mouthed in his dream!

The monologue thus reinforces the impressions established earlier on in the play, and ultimately undermines Carr’s position in the play and shows up his flaws. He is made to condemn himself by his own words, although his propensity for pastiche and self-dramatisation makes him seem to have espoused Joyceanism, at least emotionally. However, all this is unstable because of Stoppard’s frame-breaking device in which Carr is allowed to make metadramatic statements so that there is a possibility that the whole superstructure is constructed and enacted by Carr, and the audience and reader must be conscious of this duality in Travesties.
Act II

That the second act of *Travesties* is quite different from the first is obvious. This act is predominated by a 'documentary' style, and can be summarised as follows.

1. Cecily's lecture pp. 66-71
2. Cecily and Carr (as Algernon/Tzara)
   Take 1 pp. 71-75
   Take 2 pp. 75-78
   Take 3 pp. 78-79
3. Nadya's address and Lenin's letter pp. 79-80
   (embedded in Nadya's discourse)
4. Wildean episode (Cecily, Carr, Tzara) p. 80
5. Nadya's address (continued) p. 81
6. Old Carr's version of the story p. 81
7. Nadya's address (continued), with pp. 81-84
   Lenin embedded and Carr interposing
8. Lenin's oration (embedded?) pp. 85-86
9. Nadya's address (continued), with pp. 86-89
   Lenin embedded
10. The 'Gallagher and Shean' routine pp. 90-93
11. Quick Wildean dénouement pp. 93-97
12. The present: Old Cecily and Old Carr pp. 97-99

What will be obvious from the above is that Act II in the main consists addresses by Cecily and Nadya interrupted by sequences from the characters in Act I (Nos. 2, 4, 6), before the play is towed back to the theatrical highjinks as a tailpiece in Nos. 10-12. It is not proposed that the 'Wildean' (perhaps 'Joycean' as well) sequences be analysed
because they have already been analysed in Act I. Stripped of the 'Wildean' sequences, Act II would seem to consist of addresses which contain various embedded pieces of discourse (mainly quotations from diaries and letters) as illustrative examples of the point being made in the addresses. It is obvious then that the language on the intradiegetic level is not going to be very interesting as there is very little interaction between the characters, and the speeches are to be addressed to an audience. Indeed Cecily's speech is meant to be very disturbing to the audience because it would appear that her lecture is addressed to the theatre audience (the stage direction indicates that she should be 'waiting for the last members of the audience to come in and sit down'). The language therefore becomes more 'utilitarian' and message oriented (transactional or ideational), and this, in fact, can be said to fit into the grand scheme of things in the play because 'utilitarian' language can be said to be aligned to Lenin's 'utilitarian' conception of art (stated both by Cecily and Lenin here), whilst the 'Wildean' language of Act I can be said to be aligned to Joycean conception of art. Stoppard has been criticised for his incorporation of long monologues in Act II, unrelieved by humour as in Carr's monologues, but the paradox of the situation is that Stoppard's 'failure' is in a measure his 'success' in view of the fact that the disjunction between the two acts illustrates Stoppard's 'Firstly, A; secondly, minus A'.
However, the structural flaw in Act II is likely to make it confusing to many readers and members of the audience. Act I has established *Travesties* as a memory play; and Cecily’s and Nadya’s speeches cannot be incorporated into this scheme. In fact, Stoppard himself confesses as much:

I think that the unadorned Lenin bit is a bit of an anomaly, since, as you say, the play takes place in Carr’s memory. I did think it was a good idea to keep the Lenins in documentary style but I don’t know that I would do the same now.76

It would seem quite pointless then to try and force the addresses into the discourse scheme from the start. Assuming that the documentary sections are separate from the others which occur in Carr’s memory, one still encounters problems because although the documentary sections have in the main been kept quite distinct from the others, there is still some degree of interpenetration between the two main sections, mainly though Cecily who is apparently Lenin’s protégée here. Whilst Carr is seducing Cecily behind her desk, Nadya delivers her address (pp. 79-80), and Tzara, Carr and Cecily, one after another, overhear her address. The only way that there can be resolution of this problem is to take up the possibility raised in the discussion of Carr’s monologue at the end of Act I that Old Carr is not letting on more than he can help, playing his cards close to his chest, but is actually the dramatist and stage-manager of the whole set-up, and is in fact providing the audience with a history of Marxism and of the Lenins in Zurich by
means of a documentary style deliberately, but finds that he cannot help having a joke or two by invading the documentary section with characters from the Wildean section of the play. In a sense, there can never be a completely satisfactory solution to the problem, but what is obvious is that Stoppard makes use of multi-layered discourse in the Wildean sections, but completely dislodges the norm in order to make a point about Lenin and what they stand for, especially in relation to the arts. Considering Lenin's oration (and the stage direction seems to indicate that this is to be the centre-piece of Act II), one can set out the several alternative discourse situations diagrammatically as follows:

(I) Lenin's oration as an indication of Leninist/Marxist idea of the role of the arts, particularly literature

```
Stoppard --> Message --> Audience/Reader of Play
          |                          |
Lenin    --> Message --> Audience of his oration
```

(II) Lenin's oration as an illustrative example in Cecily's lecture

```
Stoppard --> Message --> Audience/Reader of Play
          |                          |
Cecily   --> Message --> Audience of her lecture
          |                          |
Lenin    --> Message --> Audience of his oration
```
(III) Lenin's oration as an illustrative example in Nadya's address on the development of Lenin

\[
\text{Stoppard} \rightarrow \text{Message} \rightarrow \text{Audience/Reader of Play} \rightarrow \\
\text{Nadya} \rightarrow \text{Message} \rightarrow \text{Audience of her address} \rightarrow \\
\text{Lenin} \rightarrow \text{Message} \rightarrow \text{Audience of his oration}
\]

(IV) A conflation of (II) and (III) above: Nadya's address as an attempt at dramatisation in Cecily's lecture

\[
\text{Stoppard} \rightarrow \text{Message} \rightarrow \text{Audience/Reader of Play} \rightarrow \\
\text{Cecily} \rightarrow \text{Message} \rightarrow \text{Audience of her lecture} \rightarrow \\
\text{Nadya} \rightarrow \text{Message} \rightarrow \text{Audience of her address} \rightarrow \\
\text{Lenin} \rightarrow \text{Message} \rightarrow \text{Audience of his oration}
\]

(V) If Old Carr is envisaged as stage-managing the whole set-up, there would have to be an additional level of discourse included in all of the above, directly below the Stoppard-to-audience level of discourse. Thus, to give Lenin's oration the most complex discourse structure would produce the following diagrammatic representation:
One could, justifiably, ask why it has been necessary to opt for such a complex discourse structure. The point of the matter is that there are indications in the text that such would have been the intention. The clues to Old Carr’s manipulative role in the representation of the situation have already been outlined in the previous section. Cecily, at the end of her lecture (on page 70) is made to translate pedantically the Lenins’ speech in the library, thus indicative of her lecture being on a higher level of discourse. And finally, Nadya is made to preface Lenin’s speeches and thereby contextualising them (for instance, she gives the introduction ‘Letter to V. A. Karpinsky in Geneva, the same day, March 19th, 1917’ (p. 79); or after Lenin’s oration, she appends to it the statement that ‘Ilyich wrote those remarks in 1905 during the first revolution’ (p. 86)). What is significant, however, is that the addressees on each level of discourse is actually an audience of some sort, and it can be said that this is the reason for the disconcerting effect of Act II. On each level, the addressee (that is,
intended addressee, and therefore does not include eavesdroppers) is not on stage, and bears a great deal of resemblance to the 'real' audience, so that the 'fourth wall' of theatre would seem to have been broken down. And unlike Carr’s monologues in Act I, where it is he who, chameleon-like, changes his 'voice' or persona, in Act II, it is the audience who has to adjust to the slight change of addressees. The audience’s disquiet can thus be attributed to the fact that it is made to be more than an eavesdropper, addressed only indirectly on the highest level of discourse, on the extradiegetic level, and more than that, this is systematically being done again and again. The complex discourse structure would also account for the feeling that much of Act II seems discoursally closer than Act I. If, as Scholes suggests,77 that literariness is not located in the text or the reader or the system but on the complex communication channel (which Scholes christens as duplicity), the Lenin oration, if conceived in its most complicated form, would exemplify literariness par excellence! Seen in these terms, literature (because by definition literary works exemplify 'literariness') is an uncooperative enterprise, which gives the lie to cooperation and politeness as norms in the extradiegetic level of discourse.

The 'dialogic' feature of Carr’s monologues has also been noted, as most of the speech acts constitute are, in Searle’s taxonomy, non-representative speech acts;78 the addresses by Cecily and Nadya, in contrast, are in the main representative speech acts (i.e., description and narrat-
ion), and could be analysed in the manner of Winifred Crombie's or E. O. Winter's text linguistics. In Crombie's classification, there are three possible semantic relations between propositions, namely logico-deductive semantic relations, or associative ones, or tempero-contigual ones. Logico-deductive semantic relations include the following relations: reason-result, grounds-conclusion and condition-consequence; whilst associative semantic relations consist of those of contrast, comparative similarity, statement-affirmation, statement-denial, and concession-counterexpectation. Tempero-contigual semantic relations are those of chronological sequence and temporal overlap. An emphasis on logico-deductive semantic relations produces 'metaphysical' prose, whilst an emphasis on associative semantic relations produces 'baroque' prose (and it can be said here as well that associative relations predominate in poetry); finally, an emphasis on tempero-contigual semantic relations produces a narrative. An analysis of part of Cecily's lecture and part of Lenin's oration in these terms might thus be interesting.

(1) The leader of the assassins had it that history sometimes needed a push. (2) Marx held that terrorism was unscientific and useless. (3) Events after 1881 supported Marx. (4) Alexander II had freed the serfs and allowed modest reforms, (5) but with his death repression came down more tightly than ever. (6) The reforms had evidently been a mistake. (7) Alexander III set out to re-Russianise Russia. (8) Six years later there was a last flicker from the party of the People's Will. (9) A group of students were arrested (10) while plotting to kill the Tsar. (p. 67)
(How far a proposition coincides with a clause is debatable. Obviously both units are based on different criteria, the former on semantics and the latter on syntax. The problem if a proposition was not defined in syntactic terms is that there is a lack of a consensus on what constitutes a proposition. The following analysis, therefore, takes the easy way out by not treating 'proposition' as a problematic unit; in essence, the following is an analysis of the semantic relations between clauses, although a number of clauses may be grouped together occasionally.)

(2) is related to (1) by means of a simple contrast as two conflicting views are presented; and (3) constitutes an affirmation of the statement in (2) although the affirmation is made by 'events' rather than any subjective consciousness. (4) to (10) can then be said to have a general-particular semantic relation because mention of 'events after 1881' leads Cecily to narrate these events. (In fact the narration extends beyond this passage. (4) to (10) particularise not only the events but also their supporting Marx's theory; the latter would be clearer if the narration was extended, so that the point that terrorism was unnecessary to topple the Tsarist government could be made evident.) However, (4) on its own is also related to (3) in terms of chronological sequence, where the perfective aspect in (4) indicates temporal precedence. (4) and (5) have a concession-counterexpectation (and, secondarily, chronological sequence) semantic relation. (6) is the result of the reason in (5); another result of (6) is (7), so that the
'mistake' of Alexander II led to Alexander III's repression and attempts at re-russianising Russia. (7) and (8) are related in chronological sequence. (10) is the particularisation of (8), giving specific reference to the metaphor 'last flicker', and therefore (9) and (10) are related not only by way of temporal overlap (signalled by the subordinating conjunction 'while'), but also reason-result ((9) being the result of (10)).

This perhaps rather tedious textual semantic exegesis of a paragraph of Cecily's lecture goes to exemplify the nature of her monologue. The semantic relations in the paragraph are from all three of Crombie's categories. There is narrative (tempero-contiguous semantic relations: chronological sequence, temporal overlap); there is also expository 'metaphysical' prose (logico-deductive semantic relations: reason-result); and there is 'baroque' prose as well (associative semantic relations: contrast, statement-affirmation, general-particular, concession-counterexpectation). Therefore, Cecily, not only expounds Marxism and communism, by commenting on the various ideological offspring within Marxist theory (typically by using associative semantic relations) and by giving a reasoned account of Marxism and of the events surrounding Lenin's rise to prominence (typically by using logico-deductive semantic relations), but also narrates the events happening in Russia and in Lenin's life. The fact that Cecily's lecture lends itself to text linguistic methods is also significant; the neat semantic categories extracted without
much difficulty or debate suggests that what one has in Cecily’s lecture is discourse which completely obeys Grice’s Cooperative Principle. As has been mentioned earlier, Cecily’s lecture has been the subject of much debate; it has been suggested as well that perfect cooperation should not be seen as being entirely desirable in a literary work. The fact that on the intradiegetic level the passage demonstrates a high degree of cooperation might have something to do with critics’ reservations about Cecily’s lecture, especially when compared with Carr’s monologues in Act I.

Quick reference could also be made to Longacre’s typology of (monologic) discourse. The parameters in his typology are contingent temporal succession, agent orientation and projection (into the future).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>+ Ag. Orient.</th>
<th>- Ag. Orient.</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>+ Contin. Succession</td>
<td>NARRATIVE</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Prophecy (+ Proj)</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Story (- Proj)</td>
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<tr>
<td>- Contin. Succession</td>
<td>BEHAVIOURAL</td>
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<td>Hortatory</td>
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<td>Promissory (+ Proj)</td>
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<td>Eulogy (- Proj.)</td>
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The only overlap between Longacre’s parameters and Crombie’s semantic relations is that between Longacre’s contingent temporal succession and Crombie’s tempro-contiguous semantic relations. The analysis in Crombie’s terms has indicated (though not always) some degree of contingent temporal succession; there is also a high degree of agent orientation (e.g., certain acts have been performed by Alexander II and
Alexander III); and there is no projection into the future. Based on these parameters then, Cecily’s lecture can be considered as a narrative, having in it elements of expository prose as well. Cecily’s lecture can be put on the same footing with Nadya’s address, so that whole sections of Act II consist of mainly narrative discourse. Most of the Lenin passages are extracts from articles, diaries and letters, and can generically be considered transactional, accounting for the lack of dramatic quality in Act II. Notable exceptions would be Lenin’s oration and some of his speeches after that, and this is made obvious by the inappropriacy of text linguistic methods. In fact, Cecily’s lecture is distinctive in its very lack of variety in terms of speech acts, and the whole lecture is composed of individual informatics or representative speech acts, and the only instance of intertextuality is quotation (bearing in mind that in Chapter IV, intertextuality has been taken to include parody, allusion and irony, amongst other things), and quotation is the least subtle form of intertextuality, and in this case, introduced by some kind of a tag. This is in contradistinction to Carr’s initial monologue which borrows liberally from other texts (whether actual texts or possible texts), making his monologue a plethora of intertextual references, so that Carr’s voice is lost in a multitude of other voices. Also distinctive is the fact that Cecily’s quotations represent in the main transactional and ‘utilitarian’ language, whereas Carr’s allusions are frequently literary. This can be generalised: much of the
pastiche of Act I is that of non-'utilitarian' texts, whereas the pastiche of the Cecily-Nadya-Lenin sections in Act II is that of 'utilitarian' texts. Lenin's oration, however, is noteworthy in its attempt to be interactional, in contrast to the other sections of the 'documentary' part of Act II.

(1) Today, literature must become party literature. (2) Down with non-partisan literature! (3) Down with literary supermen! (4) Literature must become a part of the common cause of the proletariat, a cog in the Social Democratic mechanism ... (5) I dare say there will be hysterical intellectuals to raise a howl at this ... (6) Such outcries would be nothing more than an expression of bourgeois-intellectual individualism. ... (7) Calm yourselves, ladies and gentlemen! (8) Everyone is free to write and say whatever he likes, without any restrictions. (9) But every voluntary association, including the party, is also free to expel members who use the name of the party to advocate non-party views. (10) Secondly, we must say to you bourgeois individuals that your talk about absolute freedom is sheer hypocrisy. (11) There can be no real and effective freedom in a society based on the power of money. (12) Are you free in relation to your bourgeois publisher, Mr Writer? (13) And in relation to your bourgeois public which demands that you provide it with pornography? (14) The freedom of the bourgeois writer, artist or actor is simply disguised dependence on the money-bag, on corruption, on prostitution. (p. 85)

The oration, generically speaking, is meant to persuade and convert the throng, and the use of rhetorical ploys presupposed, and probably Mark Antony's oration at Caesar's funeral is the classic example of this. Seen in these terms then, an oration differs from a lecture, the former having the possible perlocutionary force of persuading whilst the latter merely informs. In other words, an oration is interactional whilst a lecture is transactional (or in Halliday's terms, interpersonal and ideational). In terms of Long-
acre's typology, an oration would probably fit best into the category of behavioural discourse because of its lack of contingent temporal succession and its implied agent orientation towards the hearer. Because of its interactional nature, questions of politeness and the like come into play. Lenin clearly envisages a contradictory point of view than his, and singles out the writer and addresses him directly in a rhetorical question (Nos. 11 and 12), so that Leech's Maxim of Agreement is broken. The constraints of politeness are therefore overridden in favour of getting Lenin's point of view across. The contrast is also evident in terms of individual speech acts within the oration. The status of Nos. 1 to 4 is not clear; in any case, they have to be seen as being more than mere representatives because their truth or falsehood is not in question. They can be considered expressives because they express Lenin's psychological state; and they can be thought of as directives, because ultimately, they have the force of 'Bring down non-partisan literature!' for instance, and the use of the modal must seems to point towards this. There is also a clear directive in No. 7.

Not surprisingly, Stoppard asks for the speech to be 'delivered from the strongest possible position with the most dramatic change of effect'; this would suggest that Lenin's oration is a central passage in the play. The other keynote is change; the analysis of Lenin's discourse in his oration makes it clear that it is marked and differs discoursally from the expository and narrative prose of the
other Cecily-Nadya-Lenin passages. Lenin's oration as a whole constitutes a different macro-speech act as well, pointing to his proselytising fervour. More than that, his monologue contrasts with Carr's: another feather in Stoppard's 'Firstly A; secondly, minus A' cap. The discourse type used becomes a kind of litmus-test for a person's aesthetics, and the contrasting variety available is testimony to the contrasting variety of possible positions taken on art and politics. The polarity of discourse types and characters is therefore significant: on the one hand, there are Carr, Joyce, Tzara and Gwendolen; on the other, Cecily, Lenin and Nadya. Stoppard allows the Interest Principle full sway in the discourse of the former group (and this goes towards explaining why the discourse is redolent with instances of violations of the maxims of the Cooperative and Politeness Principles), lacing it with humour and wit and manic elements and all manner of incongruity - parody, irony and intertextuality, semantic clash, logical clash - so that the carrot is held before the audience, tempting them each step of the way to be accomplices with Carr, Joyce, Tzara and Gwendolen. In this way, Travesties is a celebration of artistic exhilaration over the cold cerebration of Marxism.
NOTES


5. This is of course comparable to motif or refrain in Samuel Beckett's Waiting for Godot (London: Faber & Faber, 1965), for instance, at the end of the play, p. 94:

   VLADIMIR: Well, shall we go?
   ESTRAGON: Yes, let's go.
   They do not move.

Here there is the indirect directive issued by Vladimir, which is given the assent by Estragon (the accept), but the whole exchange is rendered absurd when there is no react; that is to say, there is not the appropriate action accompanying the exchange.

6. See, for instance, Blum-Kulka, 'Indirectness and Politeness in Requests: Same or Different?', JLP 11 (1987), 131-46. Her conclusion is that although the level of politeness is often proportional to the level of indirectness, this is not always the case.


8. It will be realised that 'Wildeanism' is another convenient label, signifying a particular pragmatic mode. The fact that 'Oh, what nonsense you talk!' and the talk about cleverness have echoes in The Importance does not detract from the value of the label. (Cf. 'Oh, that is nonsense!' (p. 269, Penguin Plays) 'I am sick to death of cleverness. Everybody is clever nowadays.' (p. 270))

9. '[A] rhetorical figure by which two incongruous or contradictory terms are united in an expression so as to give it point', in Paul Harvey (ed. & comp.), The Oxford Companion to English Literature (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 4th edn., 1967), p. 607.

11. Games Authors Play (London: Methuen, 1983). 'An author can draw [the] reader into a closer, essentially enquiring, or speculative relationship with a text' by means of the games on which literature depends' (ibid., p. 1).


14. See, for instance, Michael Hoey, On the Surface of Discourse (London: George Allen & Unwin, 1983) and Eugene O. Winter, Towards a Contextual Grammar of English: The Clause and its Place in the Definition of Sentence (London: George Allen & Unwin, 1982). This has also been developed by Winifred Crombie (in Process and Relation in Discourse and Language Learning (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1985)), who talks not about clauses but about propositions, and for whom inter-propositional relations can either be general semantic ones (as in cause and effect), or interactive semantic ones (as in elicitation and response).


19. 'Dramaticality' is characterised by interactional intradiegetic discourse. Carr’s monologue is therefore more dramatic than Cecily’s.

20. This has been given considerable footage and yardage in Pragmatics, though normally christened as the defeasibility of implicatures. 'Presupposition' has come to mean all things to all men, so it was thought that a neutral term such as 'assumption' would be used.

21. This has been commented on by Michael Toolan ('Analysing Fictional Dialogue', Language and Communication Vol. 5, No. 3 (1985), 193-206) as an instance where it is not clear whether an excuse or even silence is to be seen as a Supporting or Challenging Move in Burton’s terms.

22. See, for instance, Michael P. Hoey and Eugene O. Winter, 'Believe me for mine honour', Language and Style Vol. XIV, No. 4 (Autumn 1981), 315-39 where they talk about clause
relations before going on to analyse Brutus's and Antony's speeches in *Julius Caesar*.

23. 'The play, I remember, pleased not the million; 'twas cavaire [or caviary] to the general.' (Hamlet, II.ii.465)

24. This point has been made by Michael Toolan, op. cit.

25. It would seem that 'mistakes' are inherently funny especially if they conjure up incongruous images; this can be compared with malapropisms, for example.


27. Alliteration is a matter of the initial consonant of the stressed syllable, and not the initial syllable of the word.


Then, gazing over the handkerchief, he [Buck Mulligan] said
- the bard's noserag! A new art colour for our Irish poets: snotgreen. You can almost taste it, can't you?


31. The problem with intertextuality is that there is no prescribed attitude to the 'source' text. Sperber and Wilson, in their discussion of 'echoic utterances' (which, to all intents and purposes, can be equated to intertextuality; see Dan Sperber and Deirdre Wilson, *Relevance: Communication and Cognition* (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1986), Ch. 4, § 9), who comment that they can convey a whole range of attitudes and emotions, ranging from outright acceptance and approval to outright rejection and disapproval' (p. 240), implying as well, one can take it, that an echoic utterance can also convey a more or less indifferent attitude towards the source text.

32. Interestingly enough, the various 'voices' put on by Carr here is analogous to the Dadaist fascination with pastiche - pulling out different texts of different 'registers' out of a hat, as it were.
33. D. G. Rossetti’s translation of François Villon’s Le Grand Testament, Ballade des Dames du Temps Jadis: ‘But where are the snows of yesteryear?’ (‘Mais où sont les neiges d’antan?’)

34. Air XVI, in Act I, scene xiii:
   If with me you’d fondly stray
   Over the hills and far away.

35. Tennyson’s ‘Charge of the Light Brigade’:
   Into the valley of Death
   Rode the six hundred.
   Cannon to right of them,
   Cannon to left of them,
   Cannon in front of them
   Volleyed and thundered.
   Stormed at with shot and shell,
   Boldly they rode and well,
   Into the jaws of Death,
   Into the mouth of Hell.
   Rode the six hundred.  (Lines 16-26)

Edward Fitzgerald’s translation of the Rubaiyat:
   XXVI
   Myself when young did eagerly frequent
   Doctor and Saint, and heard great argument
   About it and about: but evermore
   Came out by the same door where I went.

   XXVII
   With them the seed of Wisdom did I sow,
   And with mine own handwriting to make it grow
   And this was all the harvest that I reap’d –
   ‘I came like Water, and like Wind I go’.


37. After all, Stoppard was a journalist before he became a playwright. His later play Night and Day is about journalism and puts forward the point that very often no one has monopoly of the truth.

38. See, for instance, Ziva Ben-Porat’s comments on allusion; parody can be said to work in a similar way (‘The Poetics of Literary Allusion’, PTL 1 (1976), 105-28).


40. ‘Cost’ would have to be taken metaphorically: by not being linguistically cooperative, Carr forces Bennett to put in a greater deal of effort in interpreting his utterances. Leech’s documentation of linguistic politeness, as has been suggested elsewhere, is incomplete (but, see, for instance,
Penelope Brown and Stephen C. Levinson, *Politeness: Some Universals in Language Usage* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1987) where politeness is seen in terms of face-threatening and face-saving, and this level of generality seems to be able to cope with a greater range of potential speech acts by commission or by default); also, illocutionary politeness can be distinguished from formal politeness. As exemplified in this example, there can not only be sins of commission but also sins of omission. This problem has already been highlighted in the analysis of conversation between more than two people, where by responding to one person’s advances, one might concomitantly be ignoring another person deliberately; this is not always taken into account by conversation analysts.

41. The similarity to the Sinclair and Coulthard model in analysing teacher-pupil talk in classrooms should be obvious.

42. The pagination is that of the Penguin Plays edition: Oscar Wilde, *Plays* (Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1948; last reprint 1985). The final quotation is of course echoed in Carr’s statement, ‘Bennett seems to be showing alarming signs of irony. I have always found that irony among the lower orders is the first sign of an awakening social awareness’ (p. 32).

43. The characters in *The Importance* would seem to be lacking in their knowledge of speech acts and pragmatics. In the following, which has been picked up by Stoppard in *Travesties*, Jack fails to understand the scope of ‘what’.

ALGERNON: How are you, my dear Ernest? What brings you up to town?
JACK: Oh, pleasure, pleasure! What else should bring one anywhere? (p. 254)

Typically, the scope of ‘what’ would be more local, but Jack chooses to widen the scope of it, so that the question turns into a philosophical one for him. (Perhaps here is the dreaded question of referentiality in literature in disguised form!) The term volatility or fluidity in speech acts is used here not only for utterances given different speech acts than would typically (given the context) be given them, but also for utterances given different scopes (as in the example) than would typically be given them.

44. As in, for instance, the following: ‘Have you heard about the Irishman who got a black-and-white dog because he thought the licence was cheaper?’ This is, of course, based on the false analogy between a television licence and a dog licence. Generically, the ‘Irish’ joke can be said to be based on false association, and it is this manic yoking of disparate elements that lends humour to Stoppard’s Wildeanisms.
45. The wicked are also to be contrasted to the righteous; cf. Psalm 1.


49. As in, for instance, Keats's 'Ode on a Grecian Urn':

O Attic shape! Fair attitude! with brede
Of marble men and maidens overwrought,
With forest branches and the trodden weed ...

or in Wordsworth's 'November, 1806':

Another year! - another deadly blow!
Another mighty Empire overthrown!

One might object to the first example because the verbless clauses are actually apostrophes (in other words, they are the counterpart of the epic invocation); the latter example, however, has verbless clauses and clauses with non-finite verbs which are not vocatives.


51. It would be more than a mere coincidence that the author of The Importance himself was reported to be quite punctilious in his toilet.

52. It has been mentioned in a previous chapter that irony can be considered a kind of intertextuality if the term can be generalised.

53. This could be compared to the situation of a misunderstood speech act, as in the following example.

SERGEANT: Reveille sounded five minutes ago, Jenkins.
PTE. JENKINS (at his ease): Oh did it?
SERGEANT: Get out of that bloody bed! When I give you an order I expect you to jump to it.

54. This rather perverse interpretation is not without precedent. See, for instance, A. A. Milne’s Winnie-the-Pooh:

'[I’m] Tracking something,’ said Winnie-the-Pooh very mysteriously.
'Tracking what?’ said Piglet, coming closer.
'That’s just what I ask myself. I ask myself, What?’
'What do you think you’ll answer?’
'I shall have to wait until I catch up with it,’ said Winnie-the-Pooh.

(London: Methuen, first published 1926), p. 34

The fact that the passage recalls Winnie-the-Pooh makes it not inappropriate to compare both texts; in both the reader takes a rather more enlightened view of things than the naïve characters in the text; in both, humour and delight is engendered as a result.


56. Perhaps in this age where relativistic ideas are gaining acceptance, the fact that truth and falsehood are not seen as absolutes but as socially motivated value judgements unrelieved truthfulness and indiscriminate mendacity might not seem that much of a semantic clash.


58. That is to say, the Carr-Tzara, Carr-Gwendolen, Carr-Joyce, Tzara-Gwendolen, Tzara-Joyce, and Gwendolen-Joyce interactions. Those that are deemed significant have been underlined.

59. Q.v. Stephen Levinson, Pragmatics (Cambridge: Cambridge Univ. Press, 1983), pp. 279 and 281; appeal has also been made to such notions as frames, scripts, scenarios, and schemata in Gillian Brown and George Yule, Discourse Analysis (Cambridge: Cambridge Univ. Press, 1983), ch. 7.

60. Once again, there is the caveat that ‘rules’ in language are to be regarded as conventional norms rather than ‘ever-fixed marks ... to the edge of doom’!

61. There has, of course, been a considerable amount written on turntaking; for an account of it, see Levinson, op. cit., pp. 296ff.
62. It has been pointed out that Stoppard deliberately omits the fact that Joyce had socialist and republican sympathies, but Stoppard is not concerned so much with real characters as with caricatures and polarised opinions clashing with each other.

63. Stoppard has been criticised for not being to adopt a woman's point of view, and in Travesties, this is probably true, as the male characters in the Wildean scheme are in some sense historical but not the women characters, so that attention tends to be focused on the men. Therefore, there is the tendency to see the interaction as lady-wooing rather than man-hitching. But this can be compared with Stoppard's response to this charge:

... of Derek Marlowe's charge that he didn't understand women, Stoppard said that he would have understood it if Marlowe had said people rather than women. (Susan Rusinko, Tom Stoppard (Boston: Twayne Publishers, 1986), preface)

64. Mary Louise Pratt, Toward a Speech Act Theory of Literary Discourse (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1977), pp. 132-151. There she talks about the appropriateness condition of 'assertability' or 'non-obviousness', where an author has to present something that is likely to be interesting, so that a book has to be something of a 'display text':

In making an assertion whose relevance is tellability, a speaker is not only reporting but also verbally displaying a state of affairs, inviting his addressee(s) to join him in contemplating it, evaluating it, and responding to it. (op. cit., p. 136)


67. Cf. Stoppard's own remarks in his interview by Robert Cushman in Talking Theatre, broadcast over BBC Radio 4, 6 January 1988:

Quite a lot of stuff which people have shouted at each other in that play [Travesties] is stuff which I quite like to shout at certain people myself. When Joyce and Tzara have an argument about the validity of their respective points of view of art, the arguments are not supposed to be travesties at all. They represent something actually of my own shizoid attitude towards that particular subject, and they try to be coherent versions of argument which I would produce ... I mean,
I'm an absolute Joyce man ... I began to write stuff that I began to think was quite persuasive on his [Tzara's] behalf.

Whilst Stoppard claims to have given coherent arguments for both points of view, these arguments are couched in different terms, syntactically and pragmatically, as will be noted in the discussion about the Joyce-Tzara interaction. The author has at his disposal more than the mere semantics of both perspectives.


Did he fall?

By the body's known weight of eleven stone and four pounds in avoirdupois measure, as certified by the graduated machine for periodical selfweighing in the premises of Francis Froedman, pharmaceutical chemist of 19 Frederick street, north, on the last feast of the Ascension, to wit, the twelfth day of May in the bissextile year one thousand nine hundred and four of the christian era ... [four more lines] (p. 1461)

What second departure was contemporaneously perceived by him similarly, if differently?

A temporary departure of his cat....

In other respects were their differences similar?

In passivity, in economy, in the instinct of tradition, in unexpectedness. (p. 1527)

(James Joyce, Ulysses (New York: Garland Publishing, 1984)) Joyce’s verbosity and love of excessive detail, and his partiality for word play are evident here.

69. The Wednesday, April 18, 1917 issue of The Times (p. 13) gives the rate of exchange on April 17 as 24f.18c.- 24f.25c. to the pound; five francs is therefore slightly over four shillings.

70. See Randolph Quirk et al., A Comprehensive Grammar of the English Language (London: Longman, 1985), section 6.21; the generic 'you' can take the meaning of 'one', or refer primarily to the hearer(s) or speaker.

72. Conversational Style: Analyzing Talk Among Friends (Norwood, New Jersey: Ablex, 1984). This style of speech is supposed to establish camaraderie, and the constraints of Co-operation and Politeness are not the ones that are foremost.

73. Labov’s rules for ‘grounding’ (ritual insult) and Auden’s rules for ‘flyting’ have already been alluded to; these would be examples when impoliteness becomes the norm.

74. John F. Kennedy, Inaugural Address (20 January 1961); the quotation itself echoes other quotations.

75. The ‘messiness’ of Act II can be explained by its provenance; see Tom Stoppard’s statements to Hayman (12 June 1974) in Ronald Hayman, Tom Stoppard (London: Heninemann, 1977): ‘I actually stopped the play and had actors coming down to read that passage [i.e., the whole Lenin section] from clipboards or lecterns’ (p. 10). This would have produced the discourse relation as illustrated in (I) below.


77. See Robert Scholes, Semiotics and Interpretation (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1982).


81. One could consider Act I of The Tempest where a large part of the act is devoted to Prospero’s narrating the story leading up to his and Miranda’s exile; this has excited comments on the wisdom of long narrative monologues in drama. The problem is not with long monologues or narrative passages as such (witness the success of some one-man or one-woman plays), but with their lack of dramatic quality. If literariness should be inherent in literary works, then dramaticality should be inherent in drama. It has been pointed out that literariness has been characterised as ‘duplicitous’ communication (Scholes, op. cit.).
could be said that dramaticality is characterised by interactional intradiegetic discourse. Therefore, although Act II is complex in terms of multiple discourse levels and thereby exhibiting literariness, it is often lacking in dramaticality because what there is is mainly embedded transactional discourse (extracts from Lenin’s diary and letters, &c.). This, however, is not the case in Carr’s monologues; their dialogic or interactional quality has already been pointed out.
An overview of 'Travesties'

The detailed analysis of Travesties in Chapter V, no doubt often tedious as is typical of much of stylistics, draws together a few threads that are significant in the play. The play is a complex one from the point of view of discourse, as there are instances of interactional and transactional language, containing various discourse types, ranging from lecture, oration and catechism-like discourse to monologic reminiscences, limericks and one-liners, with different levels of dramaticality. The play is also highly derivative, and there are not only echoes of Wilde and Joyce, but also Brecht and Shaw. In view of this, one might despair of ever being able to come to a coherent conclusion about the play.

As mentioned before, the keynote to Travesties is Stoppard's 'Firstly A; secondly, minus A' because this establishes the notion of contrast and also of multiple signification. Over and over again, the unresolved state of various possible interpretations bear witness to this. Contrast is obvious in the two sets of characters who hardly ever come together: on the one hand, there are Carr, Tzara, Joyce and Gwendolen; and on the other there are Cecily and the Lenins. The discourse situation is such that the first group of characters are under the control of Carr because
the discourse is contained within the discourse of Old Carr's memoirs; and the second group is under the control of Cecily because the discourse is within the discourse of Cecily's lecture. (But, as typical of Stoppard, this is still arguable and the various alternative interpretations have been set out in Chapter V.) This also leads to two broad discourse types: what have been described as 'utilitarian' and 'non-utilitarian'. On the one hand, there are lectures and orations and letters, discourse types which are of the 'utilitarian' mode, and generally favouring the Cooperative Principle, and at most times the Politeness Principle as well. (The question of Politeness, however, might not come into the question at all because these discourse types are generally more transactional than interactional; in other words, they are more message orient-ed.) Leech's attribution of the Cooperative Principle to interpersonal rhetorics,¹ as opposed to textual rhetorics has earlier been disputed. It is the contention here that the discourse types represented in the Cecily-Nadya-Lenin discourse gives the ascendancy to textual rhetorics, and it is thus appropriate that 'text grammar' methods have been employed rather than pragmatics.

The discourse types represented by the section under Carr's control, however, consist of limericks, pastiche, objets trouvés (and indeed poèmes trouvés) and what has been described variously (in Chapter V) as manic, Wildean or Joycean discourse. These gloriously violate Grice's maxims of manner, relation quantity and quality. The Wildean
passages have been said to give lip service to the Principle of Formal Politeness and completely disregard Illocutionary Politeness. Characters willingly, without any compunctious visitings of nature, contradict other characters, shame them in their faces, and Levinson’s notion of positive and negative face are completely jettisoned. The manic passages have also been characterised by what has been called speech act fluidity or volatility. The passages are not only marked on the level of pragmatics. There is no shortage of semantic infelicities and logical flaws. The fact that this discourse under Carr’s control differs so markedly from ordinary everyday discourse makes it stand out, and one has to decide whether the characters are meant to be seen as being naïve (supported by the notion of speech act fluidity, but contradicted by the presence of indirect speech acts) or whether other pragmatic principles have taken precedence over cooperation and politeness (and perhaps even common sense). The discourse is redolent with allusions, up to saturation point in Carr’s monologue, so that at the very least it is to be faulted with regard to Grice’s maxim of manner. There are puns and jokes galore, some of which do not only embellish the discourse but actually hinder the progress of the macro-speech act.

There is also internal contrast within the discourse under Carr’s control between the Wildean discourse and the passages of invective where punning and word-play are abandoned for swearing and insulting, where even Formal Politeness is completely cast out. The implicit contrast with
ordinary discourse is present here as well. Each represent-
ative position on art and politics is seen to take the
offensive line, to the utter disregard of pragmatic prin-
ciples that seek to keep the channels of communication open.
Not surprisingly, the passages of invective end up being
interactional cul-de-sacs, and the only way out is to have a
'time lapse' at each of those points.

Added to this, there is also the situational incongruity
(irony, perhaps) of Carr, the rather stolid John Bull
figure given Joycean language, and Cecily the young attrac-
tive girl spouting tedious Marxist tenets; this incongruity
is also present when labels on Tzara and Joyce are taken
literally, so that Tzara becomes an 'iconoclast' by smashing
dishes, and Joyce becomes a 'magician' by performing
conjuring tricks. (Or perhaps this is an extreme instance
of Eliot's 'objective correlative'!) In view of this, one
has to come to the conclusion that implicit in Stoppard's
'Firstly A; secondly, minus A' is the notion that contrast
is not there only as a means towards something else, but can
be present for its own sake. In Rosencrantz and Guilden-
stern Are Dead, the orthodox, essentially monolithic view of
Hamlet is challenged: the first shall be last, and the last
shall be first. The Real Inspector Hound undermines the
enclosed world of the whodunnit. Wagner, the union man in
Night and Day, comes under attack because of his attempt to
silence non-union voices. The Lenin section of Travesties,
as suggested in Chapter V, is put down because the Marxist
view demands that every person, and by extension every work
of art, toes the party line (and this accords well with the inimical view generally taken by Stoppard of leftist politics and the Eastern bloc in general – as in *Every Good Boy Deserves Favour* and *Professional Foul*).

With this element of contrast or incongruity on the level of discourse, coupled with the desire to undermine monolithic views, it is not surprising that Stoppard should take advantage of the vehicle of parody, which thrives on the notion of incongruity. As has been suggested in Chapter IV, parody, and intertextuality as a whole, can be considered an essentially uncooperative mode; it undermines the background text in the sense that elements associated with it are not appropriated wholesale, and what very often happens in extended literary parody goes beyond what happens in Priestman's public parody and comic parody. There is very often an active engagement with the background text so that intertextual patterns are formed. Apart from resulting in a richer reading, parody can also open the way to multiple readings, or to the so-called open text. In *Travesties*, there is engagement with *The Importance* and *Ulysses* and *Finnegans Wake* (an perhaps also limericks, Winnie-the-Pooh, Irish jokes, Gallagher-and-Shean routines) not only as texts but also in the stances they represent, because these are essentially non-utilitarian discourse and in some measure are subversive or militate against earnestness, and ultimately, against marxism. More than that, they undermine the dialectical tirades on art and politics in Act I between Carr, Tzara and Joyce (although, as has been
suggested, Joyce is seen to gain the upper hand in all of it). The layered nature of the discourse heightens dramaticality and encourages multiple perspectives by its very complexity: Leech has pointed out that there might be conflictive goals (among other things) in each level of a particular discourse situation; added to that, different discourse layers imply different pragmatic goals attributable to the addressee at each level.

Finally, an element which is often left out in the cold when discussing literature is laughter and humour, and again this is tied in to the notion of contrast and incongruity, and therefore also of parody and of violated pragmatic principles. It has been suggested that in puns and word-play, for instance, incongruity (whilst apparently congruous on the surface) is sought for its own sake; incongruous situations, language and discourse may be said to be potentially funny, and certainly Stoppard is not there to stop any member of the audience from having rollicking good fun. As suggested in Chapter V, it probably goes deeper than that: laughter and humour draws the audience to complicity, so that they have to react against the Lenin passages in Act II. And ultimately, the patterned nature of Travesties with a sleight of hand, the notion of ‘contrast’ can be transformed to that of ‘balance’ - sets itself against Tzara’s anti-art position. Act II balances Act I; the comic ‘balanced’ dénouement of The Importance with the couples being neatly paired off after the slight ruffle due to the exchange of files is evidence of patterning; Wildean
discourse balances dialectical discourse; and so on. The constructed nature of literature must not be ignored, and in this case, implicates Stoppard and his audience in the Joycean position on art rather than Tzara’s.

**Justifying the Ways of Stylistics to Man**

To round up the discussion, it might be useful to come back to the use of the stylistic method in analysing literature as opposed to other methods. One charge has been that stylistics describes what is perfectly obvious in unnecessarily abstruse and obfuscating terms. Another charge is that of microscopism, and therefore of missing the wood for the tree. The link between stylistics and pedagogy is understandable because, after all, much of stylistics as it is known now has its roots if not in pedagogical situations (whether the language of the literature concerned is in the learner’s first, second or foreign language), at least in the institutional domain. This is not to deny that stylistics can stand on its own right. Carter and Simpson⁶ distinguish between literary and linguistic stylistics; where the former sees stylistics as an instrumental activity in the interests of literary interpretation, the latter tends to see stylistics as an activity in its own right. The charge of substituting ‘metalingual waffle’ for ‘belletristic or aesthetic waffle’⁷ in literary criticism, or the charge of microscopism would be irrelevant in a self-justifying discipline. However, the fact that stylistics is
often used as an instrument within a general language-based or literature-based education régime makes stylistics accountable or answerable to language or literary studies.

It should be said from the outset that it is by no means suggested that stylistics is the only legitimate approach to literature. Stylistics, and primarily pragmatic stylistics (or literary pragmatics) would be a useful way of countering the charge of over-generalisation and airy-fairy pronouncements in literary criticism. The fact that pragmatics is anchored in the learners' experience of language and language use makes pragmatic stylistics a useful starting point in coming to terms with a literary work. It is axiomatic that one should start from the known before taking the plunge into the unknown. The historical situatedness of a literary work makes it more than the sum of pragmatic observations made of the language of a literary work, as would be obvious from the discussion of *Travesties*. Therefore, in these terms, students and pupils of literature should be 'taught' literary competence. The approach taken here would be helpful then in coming to terms with literature and literary language and discourse, which, on the one hand, shares many of the features and pragmatics of ordinary language and discourse; but on the other hand, has certain distinctive features (though this by no means implies that these features might not be borrowed from time to time in ordinary discourse); hence discussions on 'literariness' and 'dramaticality' are not entirely out of place. It is this two-pronged approach which would prevent the two extremes of
tedious microscopism and unsubstantiated (or unsubstantiable) generalisations. There is perhaps also the danger of making pragmatic stylistics another 'content' subject because of the amount of time that must be invested in acquiring the metalanguage; the attraction of pragmatics is that there already exists a non-specialised vocabulary to describe speech acts and pragmatic principles (as in the sub-text method mentioned in Chapter III), so that the level of refinement in the metalanguage can be left to the teacher, depending on the level of the students or pupils.

The question of using literature within a general language education system is more complicated and depends on the aims of such an education. If nothing else, literature provides a useful content-based syllabus, as opposed to a structural syllabus or a skills-based syllabus. A structural syllabus is deemed anathema for many now, and a skills-based syllabus is often difficult to monitor especially for examination purposes, and the use of literature, and of stylistics, is therefore not to be sneered at within a general language education framework.

As has been emphasised in previous chapters, the stylistics of drama is still in its embryonic stage, but one can be encouraged at the inroads that have been made in pragmatics and speech-act theory and other critical theories that would make the stylistics of drama a fruitful area of research.
NOTES


5. That literature is based on patterns has been observed by E. M. Forster in *Aspects of the Novel* in relation to plot, which in turn has been re-emphasised by G. W. Turner (*Stylistics* (Harmondsworth: Pelican, 1973), pp. 263-4).


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Rosencrantz and Guildenstern are Dead (London: Faber, 1967)
Enter a Free Man (London: Faber, 1968)
Tango (adaptation of Skawomir Mrozek’s play, trans. Nicholas Bethell) (London: Jonathan Cape, 1968)
Albert’s Bridge/If You’re Glad I’ll be Frank (London: Faber, 1969; 2nd edn. 1976)
After Margritte (London: Faber, 1971)
Jumpers (London: Faber, 1972)
Artist Descending a Staircase/Where are they now? (London: Faber, 1973)
Travesties (London: Faber, 1975)
A Separate Peace (London: Samuel French, 1977)
Every Good Boy Deserves Favour/Professional Foul (London: Faber, 1978)
Dogg’s Hamlet, Cahoot’s Macbeth (London: Inter-Action Imprint, 1979)
Dogg’s Our Pet, Cahoot’s Macbeth (London: Faber, 1980)
The Real Thing (London: Faber, 1983)
The Dog It was That Died, and Other Plays (London: Faber, 1983)
Squaring the Circle (London: Faber, 1984)
Hapgood (London: Faber, 1988)
Summary of the acts
Marker (m), Summons (sum), Silent Stress (^), Starter (s), Metastatement (ms), Conclusion (con), Informative (i), Elicitation (el), Directive (d), Accusation (acdn), Comment (com), Accept (acct), Reply (rep), React (rea), Acknowledge (ack), Excuse (ex), Preface (pr), Prompt (p), Evaluate (ev).

COHESIVE LINKS: Additive, Adversative and Causal items (add, adv, cau); Repeat, Restate and Qualifying items (rept, rest, qual).

JOYCE: (1) Top o’ the morning! – James Joyce

(2) I hope you’ll allow me to voice my regrets in advance for coming on the off chance – b’jasus I hadn’t much choice!

CARR: (3) I ... sorry ... would you say that again?

JOYCE: (4) Begob – I’d better explain I’m told that you are a –

TZARA: (5) Miss Carr!

GWEN: (6) Mr Tzara!

JOYCE: (7) B’jasus! Joyce is the name.
**GWEN:** (8) [to CARR] I'm sorry - how terribly rude!  
Henry - Mr Joyce!

**CARR:** (9) How d'you do?  
**SUPPORT** (s + el)

**JOYCE:** (10) Delighted!  
**SUPPORT** (s + rep)

**TZARA:** (11) Good day!  
[to whom?]  
**SUPPORT/OPENING?** (s)

**JOYCE:** (12) I just wanted to say how sorry I am to intrude.  
**RE-OPENING** (No. 2) (ex + i)? rest 2

**CARR:** (13) Tell me ... are you some kind of a poet?  
**OPENING** (el)

**JOYCE:** (14) You know my work?  
**SUPPORT/OPENING** (rep + el)

**CARR:** (15) No - it's something about your deliv'ry - can't quite -  
**SUPPORT/BOUND-OPENING** (rep & i & el)

**JOYCE:** (16) Irish.  
**SUPPORT** (rep & i)

**CARR:** (17) From Lim'rick?  
**BOUND-OPENING** (el)

**JOYCE:** (18) No - Dublin, don't tell me you know it.  
**SUPPORT** (rep & com)

**GWEN:** (19) [to CARR] He's a poor writer - **OPENING** (i)

**JOYCE:** (20) [to CARR] Aha! **SUPPORT** (com)  
A fine writer who writes caviar  
for the general, hence poor -
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>TZARA: (21) [to CARR] Wants to touch you forRE-OPENING (com sure.</th>
<th><strong>JOYCE:</strong> (22) [to TZARA] I’m addressing my friend, Mr ...</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>CARR:</strong> (23) (gulp) Carr</td>
<td>SUPPORT (i)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>GWEN:</strong> (24) Mr Tzara writes poetry and sculpts with quite unexpected results. I’m told he recites and on Saturday nights does all kinds of things for adults.</td>
<td>OPENING (i)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>JOYCE:</strong> (25) [to GWEN] I really don’t think Mr Carr is interested much in da-dah ---</td>
<td>CHALLENGE (ev)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>TZARA:</strong> (26) We say it like Dah-da.</td>
<td>CHALLENGE (ev)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>JOYCE:</strong> (27) [to CARR] The fact is I’m rather hard up.</td>
<td>(RE-)OPENING (i &amp; dir/el)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>CARR:</strong> (28) Yes, I’m told that you are. If it’s money you want, I’m afraid ...</td>
<td>SUPPORT (com &amp; ex/rep) (reject?)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>GWEN:</strong> (29) Oh, Henry! - he’s mounting a play, and Mr Joyce thought your official support ...</td>
<td>BOUND-OPENING (i &amp; dir)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>CARR:</strong> (30) Ah ...!</td>
<td>SUPPORT (ack &amp; acct)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
JOYCE: (31) And a couple of pounds till I’m paid.

BOUND-OPENING (dir) rest 28

CARR: (32) I don’t see why not. For my part, H.M.G. is considered pro-Art.

SUPPORT (i & acct) rest 30

TZARA: (33) Consider me anti.

OPENING? (i)

GWEN: (34) Consider your auntie?

CHALLENGE (ev & el)

JOYCE: (35) A pound would do for a start.

RE-OPENING (No. 31) (dir) add 30

CARR: (36) The Boche put on culture a plenty for Swiss, what’s the word?

CHALLENGE?/OPENING (i & el)

JOYCE: (37) Cognoscenti.

SUPPORT (rep)

CARR: (38) It’s worth fifty tanks.

[= Getting the Swiss on the side of the Germans through German culture is equivalent to fifty tanks.]

BOUND-OPENING (com)

JOYCE: (39) Or twenty-five francs.

SUPPORT/RE-OPENING (i & dir) add 35

CARR: (40) Now ... British culture ...

CHALLENGE/OPENING (com)

JOYCE: (41) I’ll take twenty.

RE-OPENING (i & dir) add 39

TZARA: (42) (scornful) Culture and

CHALLENGE (to Nos.
Reason!

JOYCE: (43) Fifteen. RE-OPENING (i & dir) add 41

TZARA: (44) They give us the mincing machine! RE-OPENING (com)

GWEN: (45) That's awf'ly profound. SUPPORT (com)

JOYCE: (46) Could you lend me a pound? RE-OPENING (No. 43) (el & dir)

TZARA: (47) All literature is obscene! The classics - tradition - vomit on it! RE-OPENING (i)

GWEN: (48) (Oh!) SUPPORT (ack/com)

TZARA: (49) Beethoven! Mozart! I spit on it! RE-OPENING (i)

GWEN: (50) (Oh!) SUPPORT (ack/com)

TZARA: (51) Everything's chance! BOUND-OPENING (i)

GWEN: (52) Consider your aunts. CHALLENGE (dir)

TZARA: (53) Causality - logic - I ssssssh- RE-OPENING (i)

GWEN: (54) -- awf'ly profound SUPPORT (com)

JOYCE: (55) (to BENNETT) Could you lend me a pound? OPENING (el & dir)

GWEN: (56) I thought he was going to say 'Shit on it'.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Character</th>
<th>Scene</th>
<th>Dialogue</th>
<th>Action</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>CARR</td>
<td>57</td>
<td>By jove, I've got it!</td>
<td>(RE-)OPENING (No. 40) (i)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TZARA</td>
<td>58</td>
<td>Obscene! [= Disgusting!]</td>
<td>CHALLENGE (to No. 57)/RE-OPENING (No. 53) (com)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CARR</td>
<td>59</td>
<td>Is it? [= Are there really naughty bits in it?]</td>
<td>BOUND-OPENING (el)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TZARA</td>
<td>60</td>
<td>Gut'n tag! Adios!</td>
<td>OPENING (con)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GWEN</td>
<td>61</td>
<td>Au revoir.</td>
<td>SUPPORT (con)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TZARA</td>
<td>62</td>
<td>Vamanos!</td>
<td>OPENING (dir?)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BENNETT</td>
<td>63</td>
<td>Give my regards to your auntie.</td>
<td>SUPPORT (No. 60) (con)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
**APPENDIX B**

**BURTONIAN ANALYSIS: PP. 36-40**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>BENNETT (entering) (1) Mr Tzara.</th>
<th>OPENING (i)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>CARR: (2) How are you, my dear Tristan?</td>
<td>OPENING/FRAME (el)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(3) What brings you here?</td>
<td>OPENING/FRAME (el)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TZARA: (4) Oh, pleasure, pleasure!</td>
<td>SUPPORT (i)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(5) What else should bring anyone anywhere?</td>
<td>BOUND-OPENING (i/com)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CARR: (6) I don't know that I approve of these Benthamite ideas, Tristan.</td>
<td>SUPPORT (com)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(7) I realise they are all the rage in Zurich - (8) even in the most respectable salon, to remark that one was brought there by a sense of duty leads to terrible scenes (9) but if society is going to ape the fashions of philosophy, the end can only be ruin and decay.</td>
<td>BOUND-OPENING (i) add 6, adv 5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TZARA: (10) Eating and drinking, as usual, I see, Henry?</td>
<td>OPENING (acc) (also CHALLENGE by default)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(11) I have often observed that Stoical principles are more easily borne by those of Epicurean habits.</td>
<td>OPENING (com/accn) add 10</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
CARR: (12) (stiffly) I believe it is done to drink a glass of hock and seltzer before luncheon, and it is well done to drink it well before luncheon.

(13) I took to drinking hock and seltzer for my nerves at a time when nerves were fashionable in good society.

(14) This season it is trenchfoot, but I drink it regardless because I feel much better after it.

TZARA: (15) You might have felt much better anyway.

CARR: (16) No, no – post hock, propter hock.

TZARA: (17) But, my dear Henry, causality, is no longer fashionable owing to the war.

CARR: (18) How illogical, since the war itself had causes.

(19) I forget what they were, but it was all in the papers at the time.

(20) Something about brave little Belgium, wasn’t it?

TZARA: (21) Was it? I thought it was Serbia ...

CARR: (22) Brave little Serbia ...?
(23) No, I don’t think so. SUPPORT 21 (i) adv 21

(24) The newspapers would never have risked calling the British public to arms without proper regard for succinct alliteration. SUPPORT 21 (i) cau 23, adv 21

TZARA: (25) Oh, what nonsense you talk! CHALLENGE (com)

CARR: (26) It may be nonsense, but at least it is clever nonsense. SUPPORT (com) add 25

TZARA: (27) I am sick of cleverness. BOUND-OPENING (i)

(28) The clever people try to impose a design on the world and when it goes calamitously wrong they call it fate. OPENING (i) add 27, cau 27

(29) In point of fact, everything is Chance, including design. OPENING (i) add 28

CARR: (30) That sounds awfully clever. SUPPORT (com)

(31) What does it mean? OPENING (el)

(32) Not that it has to mean anything, of course. OPENING (com) qual 31

TZARA: (33) It means, my dear Henry, that the causes we know everything about depend on causes we know little about, which depend on causes we know very little about, which depend on causes we know absolutely nothing about. SUPPORT 31 (rep) rest 29
(34) And it is the duty of the artist to jeer and howl and belch at the delusion that infinite generations of real effects can be inferred from the gross expression of apparent cause.

BOUND-OPENING (i) rest 29

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>CARR: (35) It is the duty of the artist to beautify existence.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>SUPPORT (i) adv 34</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

TZARA: (36) Dada dada dada dada ... [34 times in all]

CHALLENGE (?i) adv 35

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>CARR: (37) Oh, what nonsense you talk!</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>CHALLENGE (i/ms)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

TZARA: (38) It may be nonsense, but at least it’s not clever nonsense.

SUPPORT (com) add 37/parody 26

(39) Cleverness has been exploded, along with so much else, by the war.

(Re-)OPENING (i/com)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>CARR: (40) You forget that I was there, in the mud and blood of a foreign field, unmatched by anything in the whole history of human carnage. Ruined several pairs of trousers. Nobody who has not been in the trenches can have the faintest conception of the horror of it. I had hardly set foot in France before I sank in up to the knees in a pair of twill jodhpurs with pigskin straps handstitched by Ramidge and Hawkes. And so it went on - the sixteen ounce serge, the heavy worsteds, the silk flannel mixture - until I was invalided out with a bullet through the calf of an irreplaceable lambs-wool dyed khaki in the yarn to my own</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>
specification.

(41) I tell you, there is nothing in Switzerland to compare with it.

TZARA: (42) Oh, come now, Henry, your trousers always look ---

CARR: (43) I mean with trench warfare.

TZARA: (44) Well, I daresay, Henry, ...

(45) ... but you could have spent the time in Switzerland as an artist.

CARR: (46) My dear Tristan, to be an artist at all is like living in Switzerland during a world war. To be an artist in Zurich, in 1917, implies a degree of self-absorption that would have glazed over the eyes of Narcissus.

(47) When I sent round to Hamish and Rudge for their military pattern book, I was responding to feelings of patriotism, duty, to my love of freedom, my hatred of tyranny and my sense of oneness with the underdog - I mean in general, I never particularly cared for the Belgians as such.

(48) And besides I couldn't be an artist anywhere - I can do none of the things by which is meant Art.
TZARA: (49) Doing the things by which is meant Art is no longer considered the proper concern of the artist. In fact it is frowned upon. Nowadays, an artist is someone who makes art mean what he does. A man may be an artist by exhibiting his hindquarters. He may be a poet by drawing words out of a hat. In fact some of my best poems have been drawn out of my hat which I afterwards exhibited to general acclaim at the Dada Gallery in Bahnhofstrasse.

CARR: (50) But that is simply to change the meaning of the word Art.

TZARA: (51) I see I have made myself clear.

CARR: (52) Then you are not actually an artist at all?

TZARA: (53) On the contrary. I have just told you I am.

CARR: (54) But that does not make you an artist.

TZARA: (55) An artist is someone who is gifted in some way that enables him to do something more or less well which can only be done badly or not at all by someone who is not thus gifted. (56) If there is any point in using language at all it is that a word is taken to stand for a particular fact or idea and not for other facts or ideas.
(57) I might claim to be able to fly ...
Lo, I say, I am flying. (58) But you are not propelling yourself about while suspended in the air, someone may point out. (59) Ah no, I reply, that is no longer considered the proper concern of people who can fly. In fact, it is frowned upon. Nowadays, a flyer never leaves the ground and wouldn’t know how. (60) I see, says my somewhat baffled interlocutor, so when you say you can fly you are using the word in a purely private sense. (61) I see I have made myself clear, I say. (62) Then, says the chap in some relief, you cannot actually fly after all? (63) On the contrary, I say, I have just told you I can.

(64) Don’t you see my dear Tristan you are simply asking me to accept that the word Art means whatever you wish it to mean; but I do not accept it.

TZARA: (65) Why not? You do exactly the same thing with words like patriotism, duty, love, freedom, king and country, brave little Belgium, saucy little Serbia--

CARR: (66) You are insulting my comrades-in-arms, many of whom died in the field of honour--

TZARA: (67) --and honour--all the traditional sophistries for waging wars of expansion and self-interest, presented to the people in the guise of rational argu-
ment set to patriotic hymns. Music is corrupted, language conscripted. Words are taken to stand for opposite facts, opposite ideas. That is why anti-art is the art of our time.

CARR: (68) The nerve of it. (69) Wars are fought to make the world safe for artists. It is never quite put in those terms but it is a useful way of grasping what civilised ideals are all about. The easiest way of knowing whether good has triumphed over evil is to examine the freedom of the artist. (70) The ingratitude of artists, indeed their hostility, not to mention the loss of nerve and failure of talent which accounts for 'modern art', merely demonstrate the freedom of the artist to be ungrateful, hostile, self-centred and talentless, for which freedom I went to war, and a more selfless ideal for a man of my taste it would be difficult to imagine.

TZARA: (71) Wars are fought for oil wells and coaling stations; for control of the Dardanelles or the Suez Canal; for colonial pickings to buy cheap in and conquered markets to sell dear in. War is capitalism with the gloves off and many who go to war know it but they go to war because they don’t want to be a hero. (72) It takes courage to sit down and be counted. But how much better to live bravely in Switzerland than to die cravenly in France, quite apart from what it does to one’s trousers.
CARR: (73) My G--— you little Rumanian wog — you bloody dago — you jumped-up phrase-making smart-aleckyarty-intellectual Balkan turd!!!
(74) Think you know it all! — while we poor dupes think we’re fighting for ideals, you’ve got a profound understanding of what is really going on, underneath! — you’ve got a phrase for it! You pedant! Do you think your phrases are the true sum of each man’s living each day? — capitalism with the gloves off? — do you think that’s the true experience of a wire-cutting party caught in a crossfire in no-man’s land? — Why not infantile sexuality in khaki trews? Or the collective unconscious in a tin hat? It’s all the rage in Zurich! — You slug!
(75) I’ll tell you what’s really going on: I went to war because it was my duty, because my country needed me, and that’s patriotism. I went to war because I believed that those boring little Belgians and incompetent Frogs had the right to be defended from German militarism, and that’s love of freedom. That’s how things are underneath, and I won’t be told by some yellow-bellied Bolshevik that I ended up in the trenches because there’s a profit in ball-bearings!

TZARA: (76) Quite right! You ended up in the trenches because on the 28th of June 1900 the heir to the throne of Aустro-Hungary married beneath him and found that the wife he loved was never allowed to sit
next to him on royal occasions, except!
when he was acting in his military capacity as Inspector General of the Austo-
Hungarian army - in which capacity he therefore decided to inspect the army of Bosnia, so that at least on their wedding anniversary, the 28th of June 1914, they might ride side by side in an open carriage through the streets of Sarajevo! Aaaah!
Or, to put it another way ---

CARR: We're here because we're here ... OPENING (?chant)
because we're here because we're here ...
we're here because we're here because we're here because we're here because we're here ...

TZARA: [simultaneously] Dada dada dada ... OPENING (?chant)
(etc.)