ESSAY

ON

THE THEORY OF NATIONALITY:
Its Origin and Influence
on the
History of the Nineteenth Century.

'Yn spyte of alle temptacions
To belong to other nacioons
Ile remaine an Englyssheman'.
(Old Ballad).

James Munro
(M.A. Enrolled A.D. 1605)
69 Manchester Avenue
The Theory of Nationality in the XIX Century.

Scheme:

I. THE MEANING OF NATIONALITY.
   The Old State System.

II. ORIGIN OF THE THEORY.
   (France).
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III. INFLUENCE OF THE THEORY.
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THE THEORY OF NATIONALITY.

Despite a long and brilliant history such as fate had in store for but few of the many shibboleths radical and conservative of the Revolutionary era, from the Declaration of the Rights of Man by the National Assembly to the invention by Talleyrand of the principle of 'Legitimism', the principle of Nationality is today so far from being regarded as an ultimate ideal, that in many quarters it is subjected, in respect of many of its tendencies, to the most hostile and unsparring criticism. The survival and successes of the theory have not been unopposed; and nation-patriotism has only emerged triumphant from its arduous conflict with state-patriotism at the cost of increasing narrowness and exclusiveness in the sentiment of loyalty. Nationality, we shall find, has been based as much on hate as on love.

Though a century of active life can be conceded to the principle of nationality as a conscious factor in the making of history, yet nations and national sentiment existed in Europe long before the French Revolution. As the memories of centuries of vigorous national life within our own island (Ireland being comfortably forgotten) may cause us to be surprised that the continental states did not at an earlier date follow our example and assert the principle, so obvious in our own case, that the limits reached by the 'folk' should be accepted as the boundary of the state, we must emphasise in the history of nationality on the continent the existence of two successive stages, the triumph over two distinct forces—one external and one internal. The people have in the first place to attain to national self-consciousness, and the consolidated nation has then to measure forces with the consolidated state, whose bounds have meantime been arbitrarily determined by the wars and by the caprices of its feudal lords. The process in both its stages is closely connected with the progress of democracy and enlightenment. In its earlier stages, social and economic; in its later, more purely political,—the struggle of the people to be a nation, and of the nation to be free from all external control,—the history of nationality is the history of modern European civilisation.
Nationality, as appears from the origin of the word itself, is based on community of race, or rather on the recognition of common descent, which, in general, will involve a community of language, and in later times a common literature.

This literature itself may become an important source of national feeling by fostering the sentiment of national unity. The common traditions of the race, whether of glory or of suffering, form a tie not only between past and present but between all the present sharers of the ancient memories. Religious beliefs, when held in common by the race, should also be included under this head as impelling to unity. It may be recalled that the oldest of Greek historians, Herodotus, made it the criterion of the limits of Greek nationality, that Hellas was wherever men shared the blood, language, religion, and manners of the Hellenes.

When a people has a community of sentiment, it seems to deserve the name of a 'nation'; but to awaken an enthusiastic nationalism, the impulse of a community of interest is invariably required. Nationality remains dormant till summoned to assist 'the cause'. Drum and trumpet, the 'trusty blade' and the 'grey goose-quill' are in earlier times the instruments of nationality; and the military connection still dominates its development in some continental countries. It has been left to the nineteenth century, however, to find in economic considerations another element of common interest — another method of adding the appeal of selfishness to that of sentiment; but indeed modern international commerce is conducted on principles that have many analogies to those formerly appropriate to a state of war. This element of interest it is which supplies the dark side of the picture of nationality; and once the interests of rival nations have clashed, the sentiment of hate or fear comes to lend its inspiration to the unbeautiful nationality thus developed.

In an essay entitled 'What is a nation?', M. Ernest Renan has attempted to discover in one of these elements the whole foundation of the principle of nationality. Taking a wider than merely national view, he finds in the racial principle, not union but disunion: races are everywhere mingled, and "we have no right to go about the world feeling the heads of people, then taking them by the throat and saying 'you are of our blood, you belong to us'"; — especially since the development of ethnological science might prove that there was a
mistake after all. This however is merely extravagant. M. Renan was preaching against the incorporation of Alsace and Lorraine by Germany. When he says 'racial considerations, then, have been for nothing in the constitution of modern nations', he may safely be ignored: when he really reaches sound principles, we may listen to his disapproval of the doctrine that 'the Teutonic family... has the right of reclaiming such of its members as are beyond the pale of Teutonism, even when these members do not seek reunion. The right of Teutonism over such a province is greater than the right of the inhabitants of the province over themselves'. This is obviously a good point; but what it proves is, not that nationality is to be disregarded, but that national sentiment should be consulted. Race alone does not make a nation.

'Language invites reunion, it does not enforce it... in man there is something superior to language—will'. This admits all that is necessary for our point, and draws attention to one of the strangest phenomena of nationality—the community of sentiment binding together the cantons of Switzerland, in which there is no homogeneity of race, of language, or of religion.

Religion 'retains all its importance in the spiritual jurisdiction of each man; but it has almost completely disappeared from the considerations that trace the limits of peoples'.

Community of interest makes not a nation but commercial treaties. 'A zollverein is not a fatherland'.

'A nation is a living soul, a spiritual principle. Two things... constitute... this. One is in the past, the other in the present. One is a common possession of a rich heritage of memories; the other is the actual consent, the desire to live together, the will to preserve worthily the undivided inheritance that has been handed down... To have common glories in the past, a common glory in the present: to have done great things together, to will to do the like again—such are the essential conditions for the making of a people'.

If the co-operation of the people be without a conscious sentiment of solidarity, nationality is certainly wanting. But how is the national self-consciousness to arise? Historically we find that on the groundwork of racial unity the full consciousness of a common interest has to be constructed ere the nation can achieve the cohesion and enthusiasm which alone can give success to its efforts. All these
elements are found at work not only in the creation of the nations, but also in effecting the triumph of nationality in the nineteenth century over the old state-system of Europe so stoutly championed by Metternich and all who dreaded the return of 'revolution'.

National sentiment is not always a spontaneous popular growth; and in several cases the desire for national independence has required to be sedulously fostered not only by the inspiration of the poet and the man of letters, but by the more material devices and cunning of the statesman. The Romantic movement sent poets and dramatists back to the old heroic days, and every struggling nation in Europe derived a stimulating impulse from the new literature and the old legends. National interests, too, have at times been manufactured by the statesman as a means to unity and strength. Thus the zollverein or Customs Union served the cause of nationality in helping both to exclude Austria from Germany and to attach the lesser states to Prussia. When with the decline of Austria the national movement ceased to be the concern of secret societies and secret presses, when it passed from the hands of students and writers to the practical control of statesmen and diplomats, then men like Cavour and Bismarck did not hesitate, in the pursuit of the ultimate good of the nation, to risk a transient unpopularity by ceding national territory or by involving the people in an aggressive war.

The old state-system of Europe, which arose from the ruins of the Mediaeval Empire, was based on force. But in few cases was the state in any sense the governmental organisation of a 'nation'. Its true representative was the monarch, to whose power Roman law contributed the principle of autocracy; feudal custom, the doctrine of suzerainty; and Christianity itself, the theory of divine right. The interests of the state meant those of the Prince, not those of the people; those of authority, not those of liberty. Under the plea of the Miltonic Satan, 'public reason just, Honour and empire', perhaps in some cases 'with revenge enlarged', Governments added to the extent of their dominions by wars and family alliances, by perfidies and brutalities of every description, recking nothing of the heterogeneous nature of the territories thus acquired. The 'enlightened despotism' of the eighteenth century was essentially anti-national, and it was those very monarchs who sought to confer benefits on their own subjects who were responsible for the thrice-repeated spoliation of Poland.
The economic policy of the Mercantile system dominant in Europe in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries has been termed by List the National System: a much better name would be the State System, for it was not the national and popular interests of opulence and comfort, but the political and governmental interest of defence and power that was the real object. The central idea of the system was that one state's gain was another state's loss; and the object of such devices as the Navigation Laws of 1651 was not merely to add to the commerce and power of Britain, but also to damage those of the Dutch. In politics, likewise, the state system sought for territorial aggrandizement at the expense of its neighbours—a policy closely connected with the concentration of power in the hands of the central authority, the Prince.

Similarly, it is only by interpreting 'nation' in the sense of 'state'—that is, by considering the tie of a common government to be sufficient to constitute a 'nation'—that we can reconcile the arbitrary treatment, in 1615, of Belgium, of Norway, of the Rhenish Provinces, and of Venice, with such a declaration of the allied sovereigns as the following, 'Nations will henceforth respect their mutual independence; no political edifice shall henceforth be erected on the ruins of formerly independent states; the object of the war and of the peace is to secure the rights, the freedom, and the independence of all nations'. If we remember that 'nation' here means 'state', and that it had not yet become ridiculous for a ruler to say 'L'Etat c'est moi', then it appears that 'nationality' is but a paraphrase of 'legitimism'.

As in matters of commerce and industry, so in all departments of politics the nation saw its liberties circumscribed and its interests disregarded on the pretext of 'reasons of state', which in many cases amounted to no more than the caprice of the personal ruler; and as the middle class grew stronger in numbers, in wealth, in education, and in political capacity, the time drew nigh when the old system of repression must be overthrown. The struggle for political liberty, for constitutional rule, involved also a movement towards the assertion of the principle of nationality. The initiative, as in the case of so many European movements, was taken by France, which was perhaps the only continental Power which could be said at the end of the eighteenth century to have attained national unity and independence. For the
other peoples of Europe national sovereignty was impossible until the
foundation of national unity had been well and truly laid.

Of the five great Powers which formed the Concert of Europe in the
early nineteenth century, France and Britain had completed the process
of national growth, while the nationality of Spain, though of equal
antiquity, was somewhat disturbed by provincial jealousies. The
three Eastern Powers were not only illiberal but also unnational or
incompletely national. In every respect, of course, Russia was in a
more backward condition than the rest of Europe; but why Austria
should, in the main, represent Italy, and why Russia should not
represent Germany, are questions less easy to solve. The explanation
of the delay till the nineteenth century of the consummation
of national unity in Germany and Italy is to be found in the pretensions
of the would-be cosmopolitan Holy Roman Empire to rule both these
countries. Instead of forming large nation-states, Italy and Germany
were divided under the Empire into a 'bewildering profusion of
principalities', the rulers of which, though the real weakness of
the central power, gradually attained to a state of independence more
or less perfect, so that disunion was prolonged till the nineteenth
century by the interests of the princes in maintaining the system of
particularism. It is easy to see how Austria as the heir of the
Empire should have become the champion of the existing status, the
overthrow of which would involve for her the loss of influence and
prestige, and the creation of powerful rivals.

The liberalism of the later eighteenth century was still connected
with the system of state supremacy. For Louis XVI, Joseph II, and
Catharine II, reform meant uniformity of paternal rule by an omni-
potent government. What was sought was the extension, not the
diminution, of the sphere of the state. Nor did revolutionary France
reject the principle, for, together with the privileges and exemptions
of the nobility and clergy, the old provincial barriers were swept
away in order that the now impartial authority of the single centralized
government of France might be yet more absolute. The state, however,
was now in theory to coincide with the nation, and herein lay the
justification of the enlarged powers of the former. It was only when
the European Powers undertook to invade France in order to destroy
the work of the Revolution that the result of the identification of
state and nation became apparent.

In origin a mere vindication of the right of the French nation to
sovereignty within France, the war was converted by the enthusiasm of
the nation for its new-found liberties into a crusade on behalf of
oppressed nationalities — a species of knight-errantry among states,
which was utterly foreign to the European system of the time. On
such a theory of her duties, France would find that to the making of
war there would be no end; but the very continuance of the war led to
a new spirit in the nation.

At first came, in 1795, the doctrine of the 'natural boundaries',
that France must extend to the Alps and the Rhine — a doctrine perhaps
— conflicting with nationality in some districts, yet, not without
justification if deemed necessary for the security of Greater France.
The relation of this theory, a national aspiration founded not on
racial but on territorial connections, to the sentiment of nationality
properly so-called is thus put in Sidgwick's Development of European
Polity, - 'In any appeal to, in any effusion of, patriotic sentiment,
the characteristics of the particular part of the earth's surface
inhabited by a community occupy a prominent place; to constitute
the object of patriotic devotion the imagination seems to require
this embodiment. When we think of the 'sea-girt isle' of England,
la belle France', or the German 'fatherland', we often do not
separate the community from the land, but fuse the two into one notion;
and in more than one case this fusion has had the politically
important effect of making it seem natural and right that a portion
of the earth's surface separated from the rest by marked natural
boundaries should be the territory of a single state'. The craving
of France for the Rhine and Alps frontier has been throughout her
history a disturbing factor in European affairs. Two difficulties
stand in the way of the application of the liberal doctrine that the
people should themselves choose to whom their allegiance should be
given — the result might be to give one of the neighbouring states an
indefensible frontier which in the interest of security it could not
rightly accept; and again the rights of minorities cannot possibly be
preserved where the mixture of races is at all complicated. Unless
the will of the people is vigorously manifested in opposition to the
government, it is well to leave the settlement of border territories
to the natural cause of historical development—that is, on grounds of expediency, to admit the old illiberal principle of 'Beati possidentes'.

Soon, however, the tide of war flowed beyond the 'natural' boundaries of the state: from the worship of liberty the national spirit passed to the cult of glory. Yet Napoleon himself, despite his aggressive policy and his system of centralisation, did much for nationality in Europe, not only by promises but by his actual performances. He revived the hopes of one nation in Poland, where he created the Grand Duchy of Warsaw, and of another in Italy which approached more nearly to unity in the kingdom of 'Italy' and 'Naples' than it had done for a century. Again, in the Confederation of the Rhine he took a step towards the unity of Germany, for the old Empire had been powerless to express national unity in the face of the sovereignty of the several component states. His entire system of 'satrapies', in fact, was in accordance with, rather than in opposition to, national feeling. Yet he but flattered the Poles and Italians in the interest of his own ambitious plans, and however far he may have meant to go in assigning national limits to the states he should found, these states could never have been anything but dependencies of Napoleon. Still, his influence was stimulating one for the oppressed nationalities of Europe, whether they saw in him, as in Poland, a deliverer, or, as in Spain, an oppressor.

It was in opposition to France, however, that the Napoleonic wars were destined to revive in its pure defensive form the national principle whose inspiration had made the armies of the Republic in its early days so irresistible. National feelings were aroused throughout Europe by the high-handed acts of territorial spoliation—everywhere committed by the now autocratic power of Napoleon, and by nothing more than by his 'Continental system'. France no longer gave peace and liberty to other 'nations': to all in turn she brought war and humiliation: on all she imposed foreign intervention and dictation. By the tyranny of Napoleon it came about that 'after 1807 the roles began to be reversed, the law of nations began to supplant the law of kings, and the states of Europe, such as Russia, Prussia, Sweden, and Spain, began to recognise either by word or deed the principles of national integrity and national honour. Even Austria, foremost of the opponents of nationality in the nineteenth century, appealed
before the war of 1809 to the sentiment of German patriotism, and proclaimed the object of the struggle to be the attainment of the unity of Germany under Austrian leadership. But deeper than the change of tone in these governments was the actual feeling of national union in hatred to Napoleon's system created among the peoples themselves.

From this time Napoleon had to face not only the resources of the state, but the whole force of embittered nations. Spain, never 'blessed' with a strong central government, and scandalously misruled by Godoy, lost little in the overthrow of the Bourbon dynasty; but the nation resented much more strongly the imposition of a foreign ruler by Napoleon, and risings occurred in all parts of the country. The provincial feeling prevented the national action from becoming united, and perhaps disunion for once was strength, by producing a harassing guerilla warfare over a wide area when a united Spanish army could not have hoped for success in a pitched battle. With British aid the Spanish nation was thus enabled to give to Napoleon the first check in his triumphal career, the first warning of his approaching downfall.

In Spain Napoleon met a new kind of opponent. Spain was Spain; but his previous opponents had 'not been Italy and Germany; they were in Italy and Germany'. In these countries the overthrow of the state was easy and decisive: in Spain the nation was able to prolong the struggle after the downfall of the state; and in Prussia Napoleon was to find that where state and nation are united, the combination has a vigour and might unattainable where the state is no more than a state. The Spaniards were undisciplined, unorganised, unenlightened; but they gave the world the lesson it needed. Henceforth the wars are national, and Napoleon's career ceases to be one of unchecked triumph. His 'commission was against states that were not also nations'.

The formation of the theory of nationality was left to Germany. In the War of Liberation the champion of the principle of nationality was the Prussian statesman, Stein, whose leadership of the German unionists dates from the time when, almost simultaneously, Fichte expounded in his Addresses the theory of nationality, and Spain illustrated it in practice at Baylen. Fichte's position may be summarised with the aid of a few quotations,—in times of danger the spirit of quiet civic loyalty to the constitution and the laws
will not avail; there is need further of 'the consuming flame of the higher patriotism'. 'A nation that is capable, if it were only in its highest representatives and leaders, of fixing its eyes firmly on the vision of the spiritual world, Independence, and being possessed with the love of it... will assuredly prevail over a nation that is only used as the tool of foreign aggressiveness and for the subjugation of independent nations'... 'The first original and truly natural frontiers of a state are unquestionably their spiritual frontiers. What speaks the same language, that is from the first and apart from all human contrivance united by mere nature with a multitude of invisible ties. It understands itself and may go on understanding itself better; it belongs to itself, and is by nature one and an indivisible whole. Nor can it at pleasure take up and mix into itself a nation of foreign origin and language without (at least at first) confusing itself and violently disturbing the even course of its development. Only from this internal frontier described by the human being's intellectual nature comes the limitation of the territory as a consequence; and in a natural view of things it is not the people who live within certain mountains and rivers who form an that account a nation, but contrariwise people live together and are shielded, if fortune arranges it so, by rivers and mountains, because already by a higher law of nature they are a nation'.

In summary, Seeley says that Fichte made the virtue of nationality lie precisely in that union of past and present generations which secures to the actions of men an earthly immortality, a view which recalls the famous passage from Burke, in which not the kinship of the members of the nation, but the less close relations of the citizens of the state are celebrated, the state is a partner in all sciences, a partnership in all art; a partnership in every virtue and in all perfection. And as the end of such partnership cannot be attained in many generations, it becomes a partnership not only between those who are living, but those who are dead and those who are to be born'.

Driven to desperation by the exactions of Napoleon, the Prussian people gladly welcomed such doctrines, and the party of independence and unity urged them on by praise of the German national character, by appeals to a glorious past and encouragement for the present, and by education and instruction designed to inculcate love of God, king and fatherland. Stein's plans however were thwarted by Napoleon's
demand for his dismissal; and though the abolition of serfdom may have promoted the union of classes, his scheme for military reform and national representation had not been executed. Prussia again fell into the background, and whilst the stout resistance of the Austrian people was rendered unavailing by the lack of resolution in the government, and whilst Russia was opposing to Napoleon that union of strong people and strong government which is well nigh invincible, Prussia contributed nothing to the cause of nationality but the futile conspirings of secret societies and the more permanent and influential inspirations of a few great writers. But the greatest writers of Germany at this time were cosmopolitan: Lessing, Herder, Wieland, and Goethe all deemed patriotism a morbid weakness incompatible with our duties to other nations. Lofty as was the theory of the unity of Europe, yet the practical measure of unity attained was that based on the nation, and, unfortunately, on the nation supported by arms. In any case, even in a 'federation of the world', local patriotism would still have a place, and within the limits of the state there is room for local or district feeling. The Napoleonic system offered to Europe unity in subjection: the anti-Napoleonic forces contended for national liberty, which could not be attained without divisions and jealousies. Had liberty been compatible with the despotic rule of Napoleon over Europe, that would have been the more desirable alternative: as this was not so, liberty had to be preferred to unity.

But if Europe was not to be united under Napoleon, its nations must unite against him, and in the effort each might attain to solidarity and cohesion. In August 1808 Stein had written, 'The war must be waged for the liberation of Germany by Germans', and this is what happened (with Russian aid) in 1813. States and peoples once more co-operated in a fierce national outburst, and the eager enthusiasm of national feeling at this epoch seemed irresistible. Yet was its consummation in a united Germany to be delayed for half a century, since, after conquering Napoleon at Leipzig, the 'nation' had still to overcome the opposition of the statesmen and diplomats who caballed at Paris and Vienna.

When the Napoleonic era had ended, and the representatives of the European states met at Vienna to settle the affairs of the continent, they saw no means of guarding against a recurrence of revolutionary
violence save by the repression of constitutionalism and its new ally, nationality; and by frequent conferences to consider the desirability of suppressing any incipient disturbances of the peace of European states. The fruit of the War of Liberation was not the comity of nations, but the Concert of Europe, an illiberal and anti-national league of states.

When the nations of Europe, after the hopes and efforts of the Napoleonic era had vanished, were given up once more to their reactionary rulers without distinction of race or sentiment, it remained for them to make the history of the nineteenth century a history of conspiracy and revolution, of brutal militarism and fraudulent diplomacy, ere the forces of repression should yield, as yield they must, to the wishes of the nations for unity and for constitutional rule.

The complete revision of the map of Europe during the last ninety years is in the main the achievement of the principle of nationality. The work of reconstruction has taken two forms, one aggregative, the other disruptive; and the newly-formed states may also be divided into two classes, unitary and federal. Each of the three generations into which the century divides has a character of its own.

From 1815 to 1848 governments are dominated by a fear of a revival of the revolutionary spirit, and the people by a general desire of tranquility after twenty years of war. Yet this is a period of preparation for coming changes, a period not distinguished by 'graceful concessions' from above, but by a vigorous maintenance of existing conditions under the plea that any disturbance might be fatal to the European system. Metternich's desire of 'stability', indeed, was so unbounded that one might imagine that he expected, in accordance with Hobbes's theory, that the dissolution of the state might mean a return to the state of nature and the war of every man against every man.

While Austria and Europe adopted a policy of severe repression towards all liberal movements, reformers were forced to take action under disguises; and besides secret societies avowedly political, we have literary and antiquarian societies also really political in aim. The work of nationality in this period is the achievement of two worlds of dissolution,—the creation of the Belgian state by its severance from Holland, and of the Greek Kingdom by the recovery of its inde-
Holland and Belgium, united under the House of Orange by the Congress of Vienna to form a strong barrier against French aggression, naturally divided in race, in language, in religion, and in economic interests, remained a single kingdom only till 1830, when Belgium revolted and was established with the help of Britain and France as an independent kingdom. This was the first indication given to Europe of the folly of trying to bind together diverse nationalities within a single state. The monarchy had dynastic connections with Holland, and the Belgians, naturally suspicious, found only too much cause to justify their belief that the common rule was really exercised for the benefit of the 'predominant partner'. As in the time of Joseph II, Catholics and Liberals found it easier to reconcile for a moment their century-long feud and unite to achieve their independence than to endure any longer the arbitrary rule of a foreign king. Fortunately for Belgium, Britain and France were sympathetic, while the Eastern Powers were occupied with risings in Italy and Poland; and the doctrine of intervention in the interests of 'legitimism' could not be enforced against the 'revolutionists'.

The cause of the re-establishment of the independent nationality of Greece has special features of interest, as in this case the end was only achieved by the aid of the European Powers, though each of these sought primarily its own interest in settling the affairs of the East, and allowed national considerations their full weight only when insurrection gave place to a war of extermination demanding the interference of one or more of the Powers and threatening the stability of the European settlement. Hardy and adventurous, but cruel and crafty, neither crushed nor conciliated by the Turks, the Greeks responded widely to the call when the time for action arrived, and they made so stubborn a resistance as to win the sympathy of even the governments of Europe. To the success of the Greeks a great contribution was made by the folly and carelessness of the Turkish government, which allowed the growth of a strong national secret society, the Hetairia Philike, and (even more dangerous) the development of Greek sea-power in the case of merchantmen armed against the Algerian pirates.
The Greeks were really a half-savage people, not directly connected with the ancient inhabitants of Hellas, and having affinities rather with Byzantium than with ancient Athens and Sparta; yet the mere name of Greece was sufficient to stimulate a European sympathy with the movement of national independence which would not, at least at that period, have been excited by the insurrections of Servia or Moldavia. The Greeks took full advantage of the national traditions of their country in appealing to European aid, and they met with great success. The Greek movement for national freedom began quietly under the disguise of a revival of the Greek language and literature; and this plan of disguising political societies as antiquarian, literary, or philological was later followed in other parts of Europe. The revolt of the Greeks had also other claims to the sympathy of Europe as a rising of Christians against Mussulman oppressors of atrocious barbarity; and thus on both sides sentiment was the strongest force leading to the recognition of Greece as an independent nation. But the interests of Austria and Britain in leaving Greece strong to oppose Russia excluded from the new kingdom its natural adjuncts of Crete, Thessaly, and Epirus, and prepared the way for further national agitation. These lands have been to Greece what Alsace and Lorraine have been to France since 1870.

In 1823 an application of the principle of nationality was made in the New World by President Monroe of the United States, in his famous message to Congress, which enunciated the doctrine of 'America for the Americans', and whose provisions—that European Powers shall neither interfere in the political affairs of the United States nor found new colonies on American soil—have since been upheld in Mexico and Central America.

It might also be maintained that the rising in Portugal in 1820 was a vindication of national as well as constitutional liberty, being as it was a protest against a Brazilian court and a British regency. The risings of 1830 in Rome and Paris were directed to the acquisition of political rights within the state rather than to the construction of a new national state; but even within the first period we come upon the name of one of the greatest and most advanced leaders of the national movement, Giuseppe Mazzini, whose activity in promoting the liberty, independence, and unity of Italy dates
from about 1830.

In the second period, that of general awakening and effort, there are two stages. The first attack on 'absolutism' and 'legitimism' fails because of the excesses of the reforming party—a result paralleled in British history by the necessity of a second revolution—against the Stuarts, and in France by the similar fate of Louis XVI and Charles X. As a result of the incompatibility of the desires of all the reforming parties, the reward of victory was snatched from them while they were already quarrelling over the spoil they had not secured. But while 1848 served as a lesson to constitutionalists and nationalists, the forces of absolutism were too elated at their victory to estimate aright the strength of the opposition they had excited. The great events of 1859, 1866, and 1870, which gave to Europe two strong nation-states, at the same time freed Europe from the folly of a statecraft based on terror of international change only to deliver her to the uneasiness of a policy founded on dread of war. The last date of this era of national reconstruction is 1878, when the Treaty of Berlin added to the states of Europe two Christian principalities wrested from the Turks. The great names of this mid-century period are doubtless those of Cavour and Bismarck, but it must not be forgotten that the dominant principle of nationality was also championed by (against Russian aggression) by Louis Napoleon. The period is remarkable for the extent to which journalism and the press were made to contribute to the cause of nationality; and scarcely less so for the unscrupulousness of the methods employed by the leaders of the national movement.

Nowhere is the struggle for the recognition of the nation as the political unit of more interest than in Italy. The progress of national unity, checked by Austrian aggression, is gradually completed in the course of half a century, during the first thirty years of which no apparent progress is made. The Congress of Vienna left Italy divided between a number of small independent states, nominally sovereign, but all, save perhaps Sardinia, under the reactionary and repressive influence of Austria. Oppressive and unconstitutional rule provoked revolts in Naples and Piedmont in 1820 and 1821 respectively, in Rome in 1831, and in Sicily in 1848. But though, till the latter year, no serious attempt to secure Italian unity was
made, theorists, conspirators, and statesmen were already at work elaborating schemes by which the claims of nationality should be asserted, and Italy, from being a 'geographical expression', became a Power in Europe. The scheme of Gioberti for the federal unity of Italy under a liberal reforming Pope had for a moment seemed possible in the first days of Pius IX, the opening of whose reign was marked by a few measures of moderate reform and by an anti-Austrian policy. But in two years these hopes passed away; and the republican party also found it necessary to postpone their wild extremist plans in favour of the statesman-like schemes of the king and ministers of Sardinia, the only Italian state ruled by a dynasty which could be called Italian. The conspirators of the Carbonari had effected little or nothing; the Young Italy party of Mazzini—a party which, while repudiating the idea of appealing for foreign assistance, attempted to harmonise the ideals of nationalism and cosmopolitanism—had served only to give inspiration and enthusiasm to the masses; and when at last unity came to Italy, it came as the result of the skilful manoeuvres of the minister of the only national state in Italy, the state of Sardinia, which won the right of leadership by the devotion of the ill-starred Charles Albert in 1848-9. From the date of the second overthrow of the Sardinian troops at Novara, if not from that of Custozza, the crown of a united Italy was assured to the House of Carignan. Fortunately for Italy, Victor Emmanuel found in Cavour a statesman whose conscience in no way hindered his genius from surmounting all obstacles. The first step was taken when Sardinia posed in the Crimean war as the ally, on equal terms, of Britain and France, while Austria by her temporising policy was earning the hatred of Russia and the distrust of the allies. Meanwhile under Austrian rule all Italy save Sardinia was subjected to the worst excesses of reactionary government, and on the conclusion of the war Cavour, at the Congress of Vienna, had the great satisfaction of laying before the representatives of the Powers a statement of the position of affairs throughout Italy. No action was taken upon this discussion, but it was nevertheless a diplomatic triumph for Cavour, who persisted in his policy of sound, liberal administration at home, and the cultivation of useful allies abroad. He himself declared the necessity of the union of constitutionalism and nationalism; 'It is impossible for the government to have an Italian or national policy outwardly, without being inwardly reforming and
liberal; just as it would be impossible to be inwardly liberal without being national and Italian in all external relations'. Commercial treaties, railways and public works, the suppression of clericalism on the one hand and of revolutionary movements on the other; the reform of the army and the creation of a navy, - these are the features of Sardinian policy in preparation for the inevitable war with Austria. As Cavour gained confidence his schemes became bolder; and a national Italian society was formed to spread through the whole peninsula the desire for national unity. The next step was to secure the alliance of France, and this Cavour did not hesitate to purchase at the cost of the cession of Savoy and Nice, whose people are not Italian in race or perhaps in sentiment. The war which Cavour so much desired was almost averted in 1859 by means of European intervention, and when it did come it was prematurely closed after the victory of Solferino by Napoleon's withdrawal in dread of German aid of Austria. Yet Sardinia gained much more than the mere cession of Lombardy by Austria, for the people of Parma, Tuscany, Modena, and the Romagna had seized the opportunity to expel their opponents, and now threw themselves on the protection of Sardinia, with which they are incorporated in an already semi-national union. The will of the people was in each case tested by plebiscite, and the European Powers did not see fit, or were not enabled, to interfere. This accession of strength however had to be paid for at the cost of the cession of Savoy and Nice to the disloyal accomplice, France, which thus cancelled all possible feeling of obligation on the part of the new kingdom.

The later stages of the growth of Italian unity make an exceedingly ugly picture. In 1860 Garibaldi was let loose on Sicily and Naples, and in the same year Umbria and the Marches were violently attacked and torn from the Papal government. 'Such a violation of European tradition was possible only because good government and the rights of peoples were becoming of greater moment than the legitimacy of kings or the integrity of states'. That the people willed the union was deemed sufficient justification for these proceedings, more brutal but scarcely more immoral than the earlier intrigues with secret societies and revolutionaries. For Cavour himself, and doubtless for his colleagues, the end justified the means; and it was Cavour who said 'If we did for ourselves what we are doing for Italy, we should be sad blackguards', — a verdict in which Azeglio heartily
concurred, adducing the obvious parallel of the diplomatic preliminaries to the partition of Poland.

In 1861 the first Italian parliament conferred on Victor Emmanuel the title King of Italy, but Papal Rome and Austrian Venetia still remained 'unredeemed'—emblems of the historic plagues of Italy—the rule of the unprogressive Mediaeval Church and of the unprogressive Mediaeval Empire. Schemes for the actual purchase of Venice and for the compensation of Austria in the Balkan peninsula proved fruitless; and it was only as the result of alliance with Prussia in the war of 1866 that Austria was finally expelled from Italian soil. Though another Garibaldian raid in 1867 was repulsed by the French and Papal forces, the Franco-Prussian war of 1870 afforded an opportunity for the final seizure of Rome; and in the next year the capital of the now completed kingdom was transferred in accordance with the 'natural fitness of things' to that august and ancient seat of empire. The state was free, but the Papal obstinacy and preference for the role of martyr prevented the realisation in its entirety of Cavour's ideal of a free church in a free state.

From 1859 to 1870 the process of 'swallowing' Italy 'leaf by leaf like an artichoke' went rapidly forward, the rate of progress being in marked contrast to the repeated failures of the revolutionary movements in the earlier part of the century. At the same time there went on the process of obliterating 'particularism' and of fostering the loyalty of the Italians to the new kingdom by the creation of an administrative organisation based on the French system of 'departments', by the unification of the commercial and educational systems of the country, and by the facilitation of intercourse between its various districts. At times there has been a movement rather popular and revolutionary than statesmanlike for the liberation of the Tyrol from Austrian rule. But Italy has already reached her 'natural limits', and it is not probable that the Irredentist movement will meet with success unless there should be a complete dissolution of the Austrian empire.

The constitution by which Victor Emmanuel gained such popularity in Piedmont remains the constitution of the united kingdom, and the whole story of Italian unity is a notable example of the triumph of national rights under the auspices of a constitutional monarchy over the principles of the inviolability of treaties and monarchical
legitimacy—a triumph won by means of a diplomacy unscrupulous at times in method, but ever loyal to the ideal of the formation of a strong nation-state.

While the Italian movement ended in the creation of a unitary state, and that of Germany in a federal empire, some obvious parallels may yet be drawn between the work of Bismarck and that of Cavour. Each was the trusted and powerful minister of the strongest native king, whose dominions they were destined so largely to increase; each had to expel Austria from the new state, and enjoyed at first the friendship of France though this in both cases changed later into jealousy. In both cases the constitution of the dominant state has been applied in some measure to the union, so that Italy and Germany are both constitutional monarchies,—the former in the English sense in which the constitution is everything and the monarch almost a negligible quantity politically; the latter in a German sense in which the monarch is everything and the constitution often "more honoured in the breach than in the observance".

The contrasts, however, are still more striking. Germany had had a feeble bond of national union for centuries in the Empire and the Federal Diet, and the feeling of German unity had never become extinct. The Diet itself, however, had become an instrument in Austria's hands for preventing any closer connection between the German states. Powerless itself, save to repeat to Germany the order of Metternich 'Stagnate, lest a worse thing befall thee', the Diet sought to prevent the creation of any stronger central authority, and became the representative not of union but of disunion. Italy, on the other hand, had no traditions of union weak or strong in modern times, but the work of nationalists and revolutionaries had so far prepared the way that Cavour through his whole course carried with him an enthusiastic people, whereas the German nation had almost become consolidated ere it realised whither Bismarck was driving it. Prussia was also enabled by the peculiarly military character of her predominance to incorporate in the German empire her non-national territory, whereas Sardinia lost her trans-Alpine possessions in becoming wholly Italian. Finally, whereas Sardinia paved the way for the growth of nationalism by constitutional and administrative
NOTE:—Austrian government under Metternich was founded on a belief, like that of Macchiavelli, in the natural tendency of the state to decay, and, with a disregard of sentiment equal to his own, proceeded to impose on Italy from abroad, that strongly centralised government and secret system of espionage which Macchiavelli had approved for her salvation and unity of Italy.
reforms, Prussia, in defiance of liberal sentiment and public opinion, began by the reformation of her army and the silencing of protest both in parliament and the press. While Sardinia prepared an ally for herself by opposing Russia in the Crimea, Bismarck connected the cause of Germany with that of autocracy by a league with Russia against the Poles in 1863.

The dominions of the 'house of Austria', which had for centuries enjoyed the leadership of Germany, had never been of a nature sufficiently compact and homogeneous to furnish the elements of nationality, and thus the attempts of Joseph II to find unity in uniformity of administration were doomed to absolute failure. Yet the hope of consolidating even the most heterogeneous elements was not abandoned; and on the fall of Napoleon, Austria sought territorial compensation in Italy, and thus increased the unnatural nature of her political system. Austria could not lead in Germany by virtue of power based on Italian, Slav, and Magyar lands beyond the German pale; and the Germanisation of these territories was impossible, more particularly by such unsympathetic and Macchiavellian methods as were employed in Italy. In the Austrian empire the Germans were actually in a minority, and the system of heedless acquisition had its reward when Austria was forced into a vain resistance to the tendencies of the age. With all her traditions of imperial greatness Austria had nothing but disintegration to expect from an age of national reconstruction. While it was the interest of Austria to keep Germany and Italy weak, divided, and devoid alike of personal and political liberty, the policy of Prussia dictated a close and permanent union of Germany under her own leadership. The days when Western Europe required a champion against the Turks were long since past, and, facing Russia on the Niemen, and France on the Rhine, Prussia had become the obvious protector and leader of the smaller German states. As early as 1850 Prussia was looked upon as the natural military leader of Germany and the defender of the Rhine, and three years later she had established herself as the head of a wide economic union. The result of these tendencies has been the gradual movement of the centre of the Austrian system south-eastwards in the direction of Pesth, and the rise of Prussia, not sudden or unexpected but inevitable to dominion over a Germany extending from
Kiel to Munich and from Metz to Königsberg, and including not only the German provinces of Schleswig-Holstein regained from Denmark, but also those of Alsace and Lorraine recovered from the French after the war of 1870-71.

The failure of Germany to attain a substantial centralised government in 1848 was due to the glamour of the Imperial tradition of Austria and to the victories of Radetzky in Italy. The Hohenzollern House still hesitated to take a step which should exclude the Hapsburgs from Germany; and when the Austrian army retrieved her position her statesmen acted fully in the spirit of the remark of Schwartzenberg when reference was made to Austria's obligation to Russia for assistance in quelling the revolution—'We shall astonish Europe by our ingratitude'. The death of Count Schwartzenberg ends for Austria and for Europe the era of successful repression. Metternichism is still the policy of the state, but the ability to support so retrograde a system is now absent. In the Crimean war Austria attempts, as in 1813, to play a 'waiting game', and so to impose her own terms on the combatants. But the result is the opposite of that expected. Instead of the goodwill and respect of all parties, she wins their hatred and distrust. She loses her prestige as the first of European Powers, while her un-German interests become clearly evident. Her subsequent diplomacy, outwitted by Cavour and Bismark, does nothing to improve her position, while Prussia advances rapidly towards the leadership of Germany.

The diplomatic genius of Bismark is evidenced by the manner in which Austria was induced to share the odium of the Prussian policy with reference to the Danish Duchies, while Prussia reaped all the advantages. Russia had already been won over at the time of the Polish insurrection in 1863. Italy was induced in April 1860 to enter into an alliance with Prussia against Austria in the event of war breaking out within three months, the reward of the court of Florence to be the cession of Venetia; and, finally, Napoleon III was allowed to believe that compensation would be given to him in Belgium or on the Rhine for the accession to Prussia's strength which would result from the war. German opinion was hostile to Prussia at this time, but Bismark possessed the strongest army and, in Moltke, the genius who should direct its efforts to the right place at the right time. Very judiciously Bismark endeavoured to place the war
not on the ground of the Schleswig-Holstein dispute—a matter of merely Prussian interest, but on that of the reform of the German Confederation, which was calculated to win sympathy for Prussia, not only within but also beyond Germany. War broke out in the end of June, and was concluded in seven weeks with the exclusion of Austria from Italy and Germany, and the recognition of Prussia as the head of a North German Confederation. The question of compensation to France had now to be discussed, and project after project was thwarted by Bismark. The unity of Germany was meanwhile promoted by treaties with the Southern States, assimilating (in 1866) their military and (in 1868) their commercial systems to those of Prussia. Yet unity did not seem likely to be attained in the immediate future by such means, and Bismark resolved to force on a war with France. His opportunity he manufactured for himself by the famous publication of the garbled 'Ems telegram', by which he brought war out of an incident that seemed to be satisfactorily closed. Of success in the war there was never any doubt; and the South German states, after sharing in the national glory, formally entered the Confederation, and tendered to the king of Prussia the new title of Emperor of Germany. After the successful establishment of German unity, Bismark reverted to a policy of peaceful and not illiberal reform. Even Austria was conciliated, and entered into an alliance with Germany as early as 1872, though no formal treaty was signed till 1879.

The methods of the champions of German nationality are scarcely less scrupulous than those of Cavour in Italy, and its foundation of 'blood and iron' may not prove the most secure that could have been employed. The contrast is especially striking with the plan proposed by the first German statesman, Stein, in his 'Political Testament'. His scheme would certainly have taken longer to effect its object, but it might have proved more secure. Stein would have educated the people, Bismark awake their enthusiasm. Stein's plan would have produced a people better fitted to govern themselves, Bismark has produced a people loyal to the principle of a strong military monarchy.

The German empire, though it has won the favour of the nation by its appeal to their pride in military glory, is yet not based on liberty; and it is perhaps now less true that 'Prussia is merged in Germany', as Frederick William asserted on the occasion of his famous
ride through Berlin in 1848, than that Germany is merged in Prussia. But the Prussian system must be liberalised if it is to be permanent. The mighty masses of the German people cannot remain for ever 'under the iron heel'. Nationality has been achieved, but not in alliance with true constitutionalism. A 'paper constitution' does exist, but German liberties are not protected as they should be; and when a weak Hohenzollern succeeds to sovereign power, the German people will have an opportunity of deciding the question whether permanence is possible for a national system that does not rest upon true constitutional liberty.

The position of Austria today is a commentary on the fate of any state which opposes the natural development and independence of nations. Not content with opposing the dangers of 'revolution' and 'Jacobinism' at home, Austria interfered in Italy and Germany and throughout Europe in the interests of a policy at once antiquated and illiberal. 'The administration in Austria was not a system; it was based on neither plan nor principle but on tradition and habit'. But Europe at last could endure no longer the application of mediaeval methods of rule in the enlightened nineteenth century; and when the mantle of Metternich and Schwarzenberg fell to Count Buol-Schauenstein the hour had struck for Austria to be driven from Germany and Italy, and to withdraw from the ranks of the Great Powers to settle accounts with the many subject races acquired by war and royal marriages in the days of her prosperity when she was the bulwark of Western Europe against the Turk. Not only has Austria been forced to abandon Italy and Germany; she has had to concede independence to Hungary, though both remain under one monarch for the present.

Filled with indignation at the long period of inertia and depression to which they had been condemned by the reactionary policy of Metternich, the subject races of Austria-Hungary, - Magyar, Czech, and Slav-stimulated by literary and sentimental movements led by journalists such as Kossuth, Havlicek, and Gaj, rose in 1848 to assert their rights, national as well as constitutional; and the difficulties of reconciling national claims in the mixed population at once became apparent. The language question alone was sufficient to create almost insoluble difficulties, and when the conflicting interests of
Czech and German, of Magyar and Slav, of Croat and Serb—none of them in a mood for compromise or concession—had to be considered throughout the whole political system, Austria found it an easy task to play off one race against the other, and end by conceding neither constitutional liberty nor national independence.

Austria's victories in 1849, however, left her nominally united and still subject to absolute centralised government, but bankrupt in resources and, ere long, in reputation; her rule the object of detestation not only in Italy but in Hungary and the Slav provinces as well. From the death of Schwarzenberg she lacked statesmanlike guidance even on reactionary lines, and drifted into a position in which she was no longer formidable to her foes. In every diplomatic encounter from the opening of the German war, Austria constantly lost ground, for from this time she was unable to rely on support from Germany, while her eastern and Italian dominions were to her but a source of weakness. Unable, from financial and military weakness as well as from lack of friends abroad, to take a firm tone in dealing with European problems, Austria still attempted to dominate by interposing as arbiter when opportunity should offer. But this shifty and indecisive policy led to such vacillations that Austria became the object of distrust and contempt rather than of respect and fear. Degeneracy and decay within the Empire prepared the way for the liberation of Italy and the union of Germany.

The loss of Lombardy in 1859 led to the first spontaneous movement of the Austrian monarchy in the direction of reform which had been known since the Napoleonic era. After a transient movement in 1850 towards the establishment of a federal state, a constitution was adopted for the whole monarchy in February 1861, but the subject races were dissatisfied with this concession, and as a protest their members seceded from the Reichsrath. The constitution was suspended in 1865, and negotiations entered into with Hungary on the subject of the relations between the various parts of the dominions of Francis Joseph. The question resolved itself into an alternative between Federalism and Dualism. Hungary, it was clear, must have an independent parliament and ministry; but should the Slav populations be similarly favoured? Austria in the end declared for dualism, and Austrian and Hungarian governments alike postponed the settlement of
the claims of the minor races.

The Austrian and Cisleithian Diet was left under German control by the withdrawal of Slavs, Poles, Slovenes and Italians about 1868 and 1870, and it seemed that Federalism was about to be established when Count Beust was dismissed and the Austrian ministry restored the system of German supremacy. The annexation of Bosnia and Herzegovina in 1878, however, alienated the German liberals, and the government now began to seek support in the Czechs and Poles. The next few years saw the Emperor and the nationalities gain at the expense of the Diet. Again, however, the policy of conciliation was checked by the violence of the Young Czech party in Bohemia from 1890 onwards, and the movement towards federalism ceased from that time.

In Hungary the tendency has been for the Magyarisation of the whole of the eastern kingdom. Croatia was given a liberal measure of self-government in 1875, but Transylvania was incorporated in Hungary; and in more recent times the Croats have suffered from the exclusive policy of the dominant race.

The union of Austria-Hungary is not a product of the post-Napoleonic treaties, but though the countries have a longer connection yet their separate interests appear to be greater than those they share. The establishment of the Dual Monarchy in 1867 greatly attenuated the connecting link, and, though it has outlasted the nineteenth century, it is still doubtful whether this form of relationship will have so long a life in the East as it had in the North of Europe, despite the fact that both Austria and Hungary have now liberal constitutions.

Yet neither Austria nor Hungary would be freed altogether from racial troubles by a complete separation. Hungary would still have the Croats, Roumanians, and Serbs to conciliate or repress. Austria would doubtless still be distracted by the grand rivalry of German and Slav and the petty rivalries of the weaker races—Illyrians in Istria and Dalmatia, Poles in Galicia, and Czechs in Bohemia. These subject races are at present fairly well treated by the German government of Austria and the Magyar government of Hungary; but in the event of a political upheaval they would probably seek a greater measure of political independence. The Pan-Slavic movement may result at last in the creation of another strong state in south-eastern Europe, though the western states are not likely to allow the great Slav Power, Russia, to find her profit in any disturbance of the
elements of the Austro-Hungarian system. The Federalist policy, which opposed the establishment of Dualism as a compromise with the principle of nationality, has become stronger, and the repeated difficulties between the two parts of the dominions make it probable that the ultimate solution of the problem will partake of the nature of a Federation.

The case of Norway and Sweden is closely analogous to that of Austria-Hungary in some respects, and may, at the sacrifice of chronological order, be introduced here. As an arbitrary union of two countries long disjoined, it scarcely parallels the long common history and tradition of Austria-Hungary; but in the adoption of the system of a single kingship with separate administrations, the comparison is obvious. Norway only submitted after a struggle in which a British fleet assisted Sweden; and, after ninety years, the Norwegian parliament has recently declared the tie of common kingship severed, and the union dissolved.

Dualism is a peculiarly unstable variant of federalism, as conflicting interests can meet with no impartial mediation in a central assembly. The position in a dual state resembles that of the Roman republic when the death of Crassus reduced the triumvirate to a partnership of two, Caesar and Pompey. When any infringement of sovereign rights must benefit a single rival, the drawbacks of a system of co-operation become more apparent than its advantages. Pleasant and unusual circumstances in the case of Norway are the peaceful nature of the separation and the good relations maintained between the kingdoms since the removal of all formal connections.

The goodwill of the Powers enabled several other nations to follow the example of Greece at a later period in the century, and to break away from the misgovernmment and confusion of Turkish rule, though this emancipation was delayed for twenty years by the Crimean war.

Boumania, which had been formed in 1862 by the union of Moldavia and Wallachia, in spite of British and Austrian opposition, received recognition as a sovereign state from the Powers in 1867 and Servia, after the Russo-Turkish war of 1877-8, while Bulgaria became an autonomous subject to Turkish suzerainty; and eight years later extended its boundaries by the annexation of Eastern Roumelia, which
the Powers had separated from it in 1878. In these cases, however, the desire to weaken Turkey or to save the revolted provinces from misrule was a stronger motive than the desire to uphold the theory of nationality. Still, the result was a triumph for that principle, and shows that in every quarter of Europe the general trend of modern history has been towards its vindication. The annexation of Bulgaria in 1881 by Eastern Roumelia in the face of Russian and Servian opposition is a better, because more spontaneous, example of the true work of the theory of nationality, while the establishment of Roumania and Servia as kingdoms in the same year was a confirmation for Eastern Europe of the alliance already established in the new western states between nationality and constitutional monarchy.

France was already in 1789 in possession of a compact and homogeneous nationality, yet in that period of the nineteenth century in which the process of nation-building was most actively in progress, no state is more immediately interested in the success or failure of the schemes than France. Basing his claim to sovereign power, like the earlier Emperor, on the theory that he represented the 'nation', Louis Napoleon was also the champion in Europe of that principle of nationality which had been so utterly disregarded by his uncle's conquerors in the European settlement of 1815. Yet so half-hearted and ineffectual was his action, and so fatal the results to himself and to France that Napoleon III has been described as 'the sport of national forces which he had helped to create but which he was powerless to control'. His achievements were by no means trifling, but their effect was scarcely in any respect beneficial to France. Louis Napoleon was chiefly responsible for the recognition of the national unity of the Christian provinces of the Danube, Moldavia and Wallachia under the new title of Roumania, which suggested the Italic origin of the people. He also assisted Italy in her progress to national solidarity; but proving himself a mercenary and wavering ally, he lost all claim to the gratitude and respect of the friends of freedom as well as to the favour of the upholders of absolutism. The price of his assistance, Savoy and Nice, brought the frontiers of France to the Alps; and it was his great desire to complete the expansion of France to her natural boundaries by abetting Prussia in her advance to the headship of a united Germany. But as he had
abandoned Sardinia when her revolutionary progress in the centre and south of Italy had become too rapid, so also he preferred that Prussia's new dominions should cover only the north of Germany. Napoleon failed to secure the Rhine boundary by a peaceful revision of 'the treaties' at a European Congress; and even after Prussia's leadership in Germany had been achieved without French influence, Bismarck refused the concession which Napoleon believed he had been promised. It was to his desire for compensation for the increase of German power that the war of 1870 was due, to the inconsistency of his previous policy that he lacked allies, to the illiberal and incapable character of his government that the débâcle was so speedy.

In the branches of his national policy which less immediately concerned the actual strength of France, his policy was no less futile, no less damaging to the prestige of the government. In Poland alone the Treaty of Vienna had given some sanction to the principle of nationality, and in 1863 Napoleon for once appeared in the role of upholder of 'the treaties' against the arbitrary measures of Russia. Yet his intervention went no further than protest, for Prussia was in complete sympathy with Russia, and France could not rely on British or Austrian assistance.

The Mexican adventure of Napoleon was even more disastrous to his reputation. For the formation of a united Germany and a united Italy on the frontiers of France, Napoleon sought compensation not only in the expansion of France to the Rhine and the Alps but also in the headship of the Latin races, which would leave France dominant in Europe. Neither to Sardinia nor to Prussia did he at first wish to grant supremacy over the whole of their national territory; in each case he had wished to establish over the smaller states of the south a French protectorate. That scheme had failed in Italy, and was still to fail in Germany, when Napoleon embarked on the wider scheme of extending the power of the Latin race to America. So rapid had been the progress of the United States that a spirit of emulation was excited, while the civil strife of Federal and Confederate afforded an excellent opportunity of vigorous action in Mexico. But adequate support was not given to the expedition, and when, on the conclusion of the civil war, the United States applied the Monroe doctrine and demanded the withdrawal of the French troops, Napoleon had to acquiesce in an ignominious desertion of the cause he had espoused.
His Mexican policy illustrates the devotion of Napoleon to a principle of racial agglomeration wider even than that usually understood by the term nationality, and more nearly approaching the idea of Imperial Federation.

The second period, which ended in 1878, left the European system almost entirely reconstructed according to the principle of nationality. Some details were left for a later period to supply, and while Norway and Sweden have since agreed to separate, problems of nationality still confront the statesman in Poland, Austria-Hungary, and Ireland. The theory still dominates as theory, but its recent history is one of development in thought rather than in action. The device of federal government and the 'annihilation of space' by inventions increasing the celerity of communications have rendered it possible to extend the principle of national unity to colonies or kindred races no matter how far removed; and if we have as yet no instance of such harmonising of the spirits of nationality and empire, the question has at least been brought within the scope of practical politics. How far such wider union may tend to widen views and extend sympathies must be determined ere one can pronounce judgment on this extension of the principle of nationality.

The tendency of modern times to democracy, to the recognition of the nation as a factor in political calculations, is also connected, both as cause and effect, with the achievement of national unity and the development of national sentiment. The transfer of sovereign power from the absolute ruler to the popular will is closely related to the substitution of loyalty to the nation for loyalty to the personal ruler.

The novelty of the French Revolution theory lies in the doctrine that the state must truly represent the nation: in the eighteenth century the state had come to represent no more than the governing class. Henceforth nation and state were to be one, and their identity was to be a source of strength in encountering both internal difficulties and perils abroad. From this time, then, the feeling of the nation could not be ignored, and future historians at least will have to take account of that public opinion which in the period of paternal governments was so inconspicuous as rarely to attract the
notice of the chronicler of a history purely political.

'It is impossible to express and confine a nation's history merely in terms of the state', and there already has arisen a school of historians to do justice to the history of the people. J. A. Green's *History of the English People* is written in the belief that it was the great impulse of national feeling, and not the policy of statesmen, that formed the groundwork and basis of the history of nations, may be taken as the foremost example of the new attempt to write the history not so much of court and camp as of the home and the marketplace. *A state*, he says, 'is accidental; it can be made or unmade, and is no real thing to me. But a nation is very real to me. That you can neither make nor destroy'. History written on such principles is likely to be of particular value to the average citizen; and in this age of specialisation, an idea so peculiarly modern and democratic as a 'History of the People' is by no means likely to yield to the demand that history must become a mere magazine of facts for the political scientist.

The force still retained by the sentiment of nationality at least in this country, is evidenced by the expression of the general feeling in various departments of literature, and notably in the hatred of Russia cherished by such poets as Swinburne and William Watson. The spirit of liberty is with these writers conjoined with that of patriotism; in others the imperial spirit has been predominant, but throughout the works of almost all our recent writers is to be found a pride in the national destiny, and in most a recognition of national responsibilities.

In its whole mission the principle of nationality has had no bitterer enemy than Russia. Austria was indeed the protagonist of Reaction at a time when the Czar Alexander favoured a liberalising policy, but Russia under that monarch and his successors has surpassed her instructor in the policy of repression. Austria and Russia, having accepted the doctrine that mere extent of territory is a source of strength, awoke too late to the fact that to be strong the state must also possess solidarity. To attempt to attain this by liberal methods has seemed to them absurd, as history teaches that nationalities which have become self-conscious are not easily conciliated by compromises or half measures. The policy adopted, therefore, both by Austria and by Russia has been that of attempting to
create a new unity in uniform subjection to a strong central government. Had the territories possessed by either of these countries possessed in common the elements from which a nationality could be constructed, there would have been no necessity for the rulers to have recourse to illiberal methods of rule, but nationalisation is impossible where it means the unification of existing and mutually jealous nationalities.

Russia's attitude towards the lesser nationalities within the borders of her empire has been one of uncompromising hostility, and in external politics she has only favoured the principle when her interest obviously dictated such a course, as in the case of the Danubian Principalities, whose independence was expected to weaken Turkey, and to render themselves amenable to Russian influence. The territory gained by Russia from Sweden, Turkey, and Poland between 1700 and 1815 she had endeavoured to Russify by methods which have revolted the mind of the liberal Powers of Western Europe and of America; and have done much to win for Russia the cordial dislike not only of advanced thinkers but of all believers in the rights of man. In addition to the case of Poland, which may be taken as typical, we have the introduction of the system of creating a Russian province by the suppression of a nation, in Courland, Livonia, and Esthonia (the Baltic Provinces) in 1865, and the extension of the system to Finland in 1895, while in the south the treatment of the Armenians has excited no less bitter antagonism.

The suppression of the national language and of liberal culture in these provinces continues today, as does the plan of administration by Russian officials, so that in the east of Europe at least, nationality has gained less than constitutionalism. The creation in these provinces of a sentiment of Russian nationality would seem to be a hopeless task; and the defence that the wider sentiment must be made to prevail is inadmissible where that larger patriotism cannot exist. Of constitutionalism Russia has seen some fitful gleams in the creation of the Zemstvos or district parliaments, and in the emancipation and encouragement of the rural population.

For Europe the case of Poland, thanks to its great traditions and its cruel sufferings at the hands of Russia, Austria, and Prussia in
the eighteenth century, must always be of the highest interest; but in dealing with it, it must be remembered that the treatment is not unique, but part of the regular Russian system.

The triumph of nationality in the nineteenth century finds two notable exceptions—the case of Poland and Ireland. In both cases it would not be too much to say that the 'nation' itself is largely to blame for this. An inability to compromise and an exceptional facility in conspiring have characterised both of these peoples, and led them to refuse large measures of political freedom. Both have enjoyed and abused liberties, and 'reasons of state' are strong against their restoration. Yet in accordance with the liberal doctrine of nationality it must be admitted that Ireland, no less than Poland, has a right to demand self-government; but where logical consistency and political expediency conflict, there is, unfortunately, no doubt as to the issue.

In 1815 Poland was made a separate kingdom, though subject to the Czar; and in 1818 the Diet, elected under a liberal constitution, was opened by Alexander. The Poles however set about the old work of plotting and obstruction, and in 1823 the constitution was suspended, to be regranted only with restrictions in 1825. Nicholas on his accession violated the constitution by the appointment of Russian officials, and in 1830 the Polish 'nation'—the aristocracy of the greater and lesser landowners, that is to say,—broke out in open rebellion on the news of the July revolution in Paris. By attempting to negotiate and delaying warlike operations, the Poles played into the hands of Nicholas, who was by no means inclined to parley with the forces of 'Jacobinism'. The want of a middle class, a political danger emphasised by Aristotle, once again proved fatal to the Polish rising. The peasants had no enthusiasm for the cause; Austria, Britain, and France did not intervene, though in all these countries sympathy was generally on the side of the Poles. The war at an end, Poland ceased to be a kingdom, and became a province of the Russian empire, retaining however a separate jurisdiction and administrative machinery.

Still the movement for complete independence persisted, and the feeble concessions of native administration in local affairs made in 1862, when Constantine was sent to Warsaw, only stimulated the desire for further concessions. The movement was fostered under the auspices
of the Agricultural Society, a body rather political than economic, and a bid was made for the support of the serfs by a petition to the Poles for the restoration of the constitution and a recruiting law establishing conscription in Poland for the Russian army. The levy to be made exclusively on the revolutionary town population. This measure led immediately to the insurrection; and the indifference of the peasantry, the alliance of Prussia, and the neutrality of the rest of Europe, gave Russia an easy victory, which was followed up by severe measures of repression. In 1864 Russia in turn made a bid for the favour of the peasants by a measure of emancipation much more liberal than that which had just been applied to Russia. By continued blows at Polish independence and nationality, however, and by the repression of all liberal culture, Russia has more recently exhausted any gratitude that could have been called into existence by her agrarian legislation; and when Poland at last finds a leader, he will not lack followers from all the elements of a people now for the first time deserving the name of 'nation'.

The feudal states of the Middle Ages — the United Provinces, the Swiss cantons, and the Hanse towns — arose from combinations of weak states to secure their independence of some strong and acquisitive neighbour. In union each group found a vast increase of strength and influence as regards foreign affairs, while in no case was the central tie of a nature to restrict local liberties.

In Switzerland we encounter one of the most difficult questions in connection with nationality — the reconciliation of the local and with the central demand for patriotic devotion in the case of a federation. The Congress of Vienna left Switzerland a loosely compacted 'bundle of states', but the force of circumstances led in 1833 to a severance of the tie by seven Catholic states whose ultramontane and reaction policy could not be reconciled with that of the majority. As was to be expected, the central government, weak as it was, resented this; and, thanks to the diplomatic delays of Palmerston, the other cantons had time to snatch the victory ere Europe could be induced to interfere. The result of the Sonderbund war, in 1847, was the establishment of a new liberal constitution creating a strong confederation in place of the weak federal union. National patriotism was, as in
the American Civil War, decided to be above local patriotism: the interest of the majority dominates — by force, if need be. The rights of the minority in such a case are not as yet admitted to exist; and here the principle of nationality may seem adverse to liberty, though there is a possibility that if confederations become larger and larger, the tendency to be loyal to the largest union might be stimulated into a movement for cosmopolitanism.

The case of Switzerland as a nationality is unique. It has a free republican constitution, yet no community of race, language, or religion. There is doubtless community of common interest between the various cantons German, French, and Italian; but it is doubtful whether even this and the sentiment of national unity due to historical connections could long preserve the 'nation' from being engulfed by its monarchical neighbours, were not the republic guaranteed by treaties. The Swiss have no 'nationality' of their own properly speaking; yet they have developed a national sentiment; and the convenience of having a national state between France, Italy, and Germany, has led to this exceptional case of a 'national' union between diverse elements — a union based not on race, but on sentiment and interest alone. The case of Switzerland thus illustrates the gradual growth, where local liberties are duly respected, of a federal patriotism which overshadows but does not supplant the old exclusive local feeling; so that it has been claimed by Sidgwick that the distinction between a 'confederation of states' and a 'federal state' is one of time only, these being successive stages in the growth of federalism. Could this process be expected to repeat itself in the case of larger unions, we might have hopes of nationality leading upwards to cosmopolitanism; but as has been noted, ardent patriotism is rarely consistent with a due appreciation of other nations — far less with love for them.

The modern development of federalism, again, is in most cases the result of the demand of distinct races within existing unitary states for a greater measure of independence. Wherever the racial components of the state are more than usually complex, federality becomes the only method of satisfying their claims to self-government without destroying altogether the coherence of the state. Federalism thus 'realises the maximum of liberty compatible with order'. Where exactly the line should be drawn which gives a minority a claim to liberties as a 'nation', it would be difficult to determine precisely.
If we are to concede self-government to Celtic and Catholic Ireland, must we not free Saxon and Protestant Ulster from the 'tyranny of the majority' within Ireland? If Hungary is to be independent of Austria, why not also Bohemia? If Croatia has a parliament separate from that of Hungary, will not the same reasoning establish the right of Transylvania to a similar institution? The tendency of modern times to 'integration' is now being accompanied by a tendency to Federality; and as more liberal views prevail, it is probable that the principle will be extended in favour even of the smaller nations.

At intervals during the nineteenth century Britain has been reminded of the claims of nationality by the ever recurring outbursts of disturbance in Ireland. The conciliatory labours of statesmen have not been rewarded by a transference of that enthusiastic loyalty which Ireland has so long cherished for her own traditions. Priestly influence has been exerted to distort the issue and prevent the Irish people from seeing the real issue save through the medium of prejudice and hatred. The want of religious unity, and the policy of meeting present benefits with reproaches for past injuries may long delay the coming of national homogeneity. Whether or not there is real cause for alarm at the prospect of a grant of self-government to Ireland is a question that admits of doubt even in those who are well qualified to judge; and in spite of the most liberal theories, no statesman would imperil the interests of the whole for the sake of performing an act of 'justice' to a fragment of that whole.

But Britain has experienced more recently another movement akin to, or identical with, the tendency to draw closer the bonds of nationality. The limits of the British race are not to be found without surveying Asia, Africa, and Australia, as well as Europe. Is it not, then, possible that a single state should arise whose boundaries should include all these territories? Such a state would obviously be of a federal nature, while each of the colonies would continue to possess local parliaments. Which colonies, which dependencies would be fitted to share in such a union it would indeed be difficult to determine; but the principle of nationality furnishes the clue most likely to lead to a satisfactory solution of the problem. The difference, at least, between the admission of the people of Canada and that of the Hindoos and Mohammedans of India is obvious.
While the French Canadians of Quebec have already been Anglicised in national feeling, such a consummation is not to be expected in the case of the 'coloured' races, and one certain limit is thus fixed to imperial federation on national lines. The principle seems to find general favour, but the difficulties are great; and the attempt to create a basis of common interest on economic principles has not yet been very successful.

The question of the beneficial action of the British Empire on the backward races whose interests it has undertaken to promote is one rather of state and governmental than of national action. But in spite of European jealousy and detraction at home, the nation justly approves and takes pride in an Empire based on the principles of justice, freedom and progress. Judgment cannot in the present age be passed upon state or nation without reference to its action and reaction upon other states and nations, but where imperialism involves on the one hand national expansion, and on the other the beneficent discharge of the responsibilities of a powerful and enlightened people, there at least empire may be said to be justified; and any endeavour to unite more closely the components of the empire may rightly claim our approbation.

Mazzini predicted that nationality would prove a stepping-stone to cosmopolitanism, but history scarcely bears out this idea. Either the process of national reconstruction has rather tended to foster hatreds by drawing the dividing-line more distinctly, while public opinion is apt to judge the actions of neighbouring states hastily and from a hostile standpoint. Throughout Europe armed nation still confronts armed nation; and with the expansion of colonial and commercial interests in all parts of the world, there is constant menace of an 'incident' which will embroil Europe in a great war through the operation of that public opinion which was so devoid of influence under the old governmental system. Partly the coming of democracy and of a cheap press and other 'improvements'—but partly too the separation of nationality from nationality, the cherishing by each of its separate traditions of glorious actions against its neighbours or oppressors, have brought about the unstable condition of the modern civilised world, and necessitated the enormous armaments
which are prepared for the eventuality of war at any moment. But it may be hoped that this phase will prove transitory. The character of militarism impressed on all the great states of Europe is due to Germany; and Germany's position depends on the position of a strong leader, for at present Germany is not free. With the subsidence of the military spirit, there is a bare possibility that the tendency towards national confederation might increase, and that the process of aggregation might proceed on ever wider lines—a British confederation being followed by an English-speaking confederation, and that by a Teutonic confederation, while Latin and Slav races might also coalesce. But even if this should be the case, there seems but little hope that such community of interest could be attained as to affect the combination of these large racial units in a 'parliament of man', a 'confederation of the world'. On the whole, nationality, though apparently a liberal idea when compared with the old state-system, does not appear to point in the direction of cosmopolitanism. It is at present narrow and separative in its tendencies. One of its foundations is not infrequently the common hate of a common foe; and, while this is so, it cannot tend towards cosmopolitanism, a doctrine of friendly feeling towards each and all.

'It was given to the war of 1870', says M. Sorel, 'to prove that quarrels between nations have a more implacable character than quarrels between sovereigns, and that the principle of nationality, so far from producing any progress in political morality, on the contrary, leads men to return to the most barbarous practices'.

The triumph of the principle of nationality was achieved at the expense of the old idea of the community of Europe based on the treaties of 1815 and their successive confirmations by congresses of the Powers. The recognition of Italy and Germany as political entities has involved the return of Europe to its old condition as a mere 'geographical expression'. But better far that this should be so than that Europe should be united under such a tyranny as that imposed by Metternich in the years following the overthrow of Napoleon. The ideal of cosmopolitanism is the higher ideal, but for the present the national system is what is practical; and the practical ideal for the men of today is that of a warm and healthy patriotism which does not engross all the virtues for one nation, and leave only despicable qualities to foreigners. 'Do not let us abandon', says
M. Renan, 'this fundamental principle that man is a reasonable and moral being long, before being allotted to such and such a language, before being a member of such and such a race, an adherent of such and such a culture. Before French culture, German culture, Italian culture, there is human culture'. This must be conceded, 'yet', says Carlyle, 'the better thinkers will see that loyalty is a principle perennial in human nature, the highest that unfolds itself there in a temporal, secular point of view; for there is no other kind of way by which human society can be safely constructed than that feeling of loyalty whereby those who are worthy are reverenced by those who are capable of reverence'.

Owing to the instability of the states and the permanence of nations, the theory of nationality has brought it about that loyalty has become a thing determinate and unalterable. That a man should be bound by sentiment, not to an abstraction or even to a territory, but to other men, is also an advance in conception, and tends to make the bond of nationality the true 'spiritual' tie described by Renan and Fichte.

The love of 'mankind in general' must in most cases be but a feeble sentiment, and the extension of the affection felt for kith and kin from the family to the nation is to be commended so long as it is not accompanied by a contrary feeling towards those outside the nation. Where national sentiment has been based on resistance to foreign foes, the approach to the cosmopolitan spirit must be slow and gradual, and must begin with a catholic tolerance of foreigners ere actual appreciation and affection can arise. The ideal of nationality would not expire even were that of cosmopolitanism achieved. The affection of each man for all that is his own, that has become part of his 'self', will make the famous lines of Scott read true for the native land and one's kindred until the end of time.

The 'rights' of a nation as against its government are closely connected with its 'rights' to independence from foreign control. As a nation rises to self-consciousness, it naturally demands that it should be permitted to share in the management of its own affairs. Hence we should say, and history confirms the idea, that nationality implies constitutional rule. Even Germany has a constitution, though it has also an 'over-mighty lord'.
The sovereignty in a national state will therefore rest with the nation, but there is no necessity that monarchy should be absolutely abolished. Even after the large country-state has so firmly established its unity on the basis of nationality that there is no longer any need of a single ruler as the embodiment of the unity of the state against the disruptive tendency of an unruly oligarchy and the theocratic pretensions of the Church under a foreign potentate, there are still occasions when the use of an extraordinary prerogative in the hands of a single ruler is of the utmost service to the state; the danger of resistance to such unusual measures is less where they are supported by the dignity of a monarch than where they rest upon the less august authority of the President of a Republic. The history of the nineteenth century shows us the development of the two principles together throughout Europe, the general form of rule evolved being that of a representative democracy under a constitutional monarchy.

Napoleon III held that the national sentiment was to be created not by the grant of constitutional liberties, but by sound orderly government. Later the ruler might confer liberty on the people at his discretion, and could in this way add to his popularity. But the nation was, at least at first, adequately represented by the person of its prince, and the national unity and strength were in reality unattainable save when the forces of the nation were thus at the disposal of a single will. This theory seems to coincide with that on which Bismarck conducted the advance of Prussia to the leadership of a united Germany; but very different from these were the doctrine and the practice of Cavour. For the Italian leader, liberty was the most valuable ally of the nation-building statesman; for the French emperor and the Prussian minister, liberty was not the right of the nation, but a gift by which the national sovereign might conciliate or gratify his people. The latter theory savours much of the old absolutism and 'divine right' of an age before the coming of the modern democracy: the opposite extreme in theory was reached by the Italian republican theorists and idealists, speculative and extreme, essentially unpractica...
The theory of Cavour is the via media between these views, and it will naturally commend itself to the view of British moderation as the statesmanlike plan. In early times when the disruptive forces have not yet been overcome, strong centralised and even unified government is necessary for the development of the nation; but nineteenth century France and Germany had no need to be thus kept in tutelage, and Napoleon at last learned by experience that the government may delay too long its politic grant of freedom to the nation. Germany's military power and prestige uphold unshake the honour of the national state, but the future has to decide between the respective durabilities of systems founded respectively on the people's will and on 'blood and iron'.