THE DOCTRINE OF THE TRINITY IN CERTAIN EARLY ARABIC CHRISTIAN WRITERS, WITH SPECIAL REFERENCE TO THE INFLUENCE OF THE ISLAMIC ENVIRONMENT.

by.

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Selection of material

Four writers have been selected for full consideration of their Trinitarian teaching within this thesis. Three of these were bishops - Sa‘id ibn Bi‘rīq (877–940) Melkite, Patriarch of Alexandria, better known as Eutychius by which latter name he will be called throughout the remainder of the work; Ḫiyā ibn Shīna (975–1049) Nestorian bishop of Nisibis, henceforward to be referred to by his usual title of Elias of Nisibis; Būlus (Paulus) ar-Rāhib al-Anjāfī, whose dates of birth and death are not known but who is known to have been engaged in theological writing during the 13th century and who was a Melkite bishop of Sa‘ida. Abu Zakanīt Yāḥyā ibn ʿAdī ibn ʿAmīd ibn Zakanīt-Takritī al-Manṭiqī (893–974), the well-known Jacobite philosopher and theologian, is the fourth.

While the Melkites, Nestorians and Monophysites continued to exist as separate churches throughout the period under review in this thesis, it was felt that since these churches all accepted the Nicaean definition of the Trinity it was not necessary to lay too great stress on the particular ecclesiastical adherence of the individual writer. The extent to which his different approach to Christology influenced him in his development of Trinitarian doctrine is one of the questions to be considered during the examination of each individual writer.

The principle used in the selection of material was
that of choosing writers who were comparable in intellectual ability and in the extent of their influence. A secondary consideration was that they should be representative; of the four writers one is from Egypt, one from Syria and one each from the north and south of Iraq; two of the writers belong to the early period of intellectual ferment in Islam, one to the time when kalām was reaching its zenith and the last to the close of the period of the Crusades.

**Scheme of work**

In the first chapter the historical setting of the Christian churches in the Middle East during the period under review will be outlined. The points of unity and divergence between the Christian churches will be discussed in so far as they are relevant to the historical setting and to the subject of the thesis. Finally there will be a brief section giving the main difficulties involved in making an exposition of the doctrine of the Trinity during the period of the Islamic Empire.

The second chapter will contain studies of the Trinitarian doctrines of each of the four writers. In the biographical sketches of each will be included a perspective of the particular ecclesiastical and literary tradition to which he belonged. In addition, each writer will be set in relief against a specific background. Thus, the work of Eutychius will be shown in relation to that of St John of Damascus, that of Yahyâ ibn 'Adî against the background of early Islamic Aristotelian speculation, while that of Elias of Mésîbîs, the contemporary of al-‘Âqillâni, will be studied largely in the context of kalâm. The last in point of time, Paulus ar-Râhib, sums up in his teaching at least some of the speculations
The last chapter will be devoted to an examination of the major technical terms employed by the four authors under discussion. An attempt will be made to trace the evolution of the meanings inhering in the principal terms, throughout the fertile period of inter-relations between Nestorians and Jacobites and between Christians and Muslims. This period ended with the final Turkish victories over both Mongols and the Latin powers; the victories which were to lead to the Ottoman hegemony in the Middle East. In an atmosphere such as that of the Ottoman tyranny in which the ultimate principle was neither God nor man but mechanical efficiency, no importance could any longer be attached to free metaphysical speculation. With the eclipse of metaphysics in the Arabic-speaking lands went a vital bond between Christians and Muslims; with a common cultural heritage lost the confrontation could henceforward take place only on either the political or religious level; from then onwards, for good or ill, Christians and Muslim would meet without a "common language", until events would either force one upon them or, less probably, an awareness of underlying religious unity would enable a new theological language to develop.

CHAPTER ONE
The Religious Situation of Christians in the Islamic Empire

Section One
Observations on the situation of Christians in the Islamic Empire

It is not necessary to repeat here the findings of scholars regarding the political or social status of Christians in the Um-
What is of interest is to establish their position in the religious and philosophical aspects of Islamic culture. The quality of the contribution of Christians to the formation of Islamic culture throughout the period under discussion (650-1350) has not yet been determined fully. Although there have been studies of Christian work in certain fields such as medicine, there are still large areas of philosophy and theology which have not yet been fully explored.

The numbers of Christians engaged in intellectual activity throughout the period showed a marked proportional decline. It is impossible to determine whether the numbers of Christian scholars declined absolutely, although it is more probable that their numbers decreased rather than increased. What is certain is that in proportion to the numbers of Muslims engaged in philosophy and theology the Christians appeared to be in decline. In other words, the important fact is not that the Christian contribution may have become less but that the Muslim contribution undeniably increased.

For the early period, that is 650-950, the evidence is clear that Christians were eager and ready to take part in the formation of the new Arabic-speaking civilisation. The volume of translation from Greek and Syriac into Arabic cannot be explained satisfactorily except on this assumption. The great names in this work of translation, such as the Bakhtīšu and Ḫunayn ibn Ishāq were scholars capable of original work and not mere transmitters contributing nothing but translation. Side by side with this key role played by Christians in the laying of the foundations of kalām and falsafā went their important role in administration and counselling of rulers, not to speak of their pre-eminence in medicine.
The fact that in the space of four or five generations their influence had proportionately dwindled is partly due to the immense success of their own contribution and partly to the renaissance of Persian culture.

For the later period, 950-1350, positive evidence is lacking. Islamic civilisation had reached its zenith in the Middle East by the 12th century. A true historical perspective of its achievements was hardly possible at the time but some indication of how the Christian contribution was actually evaluated in the 11th century is given if we consider that in his Kitāb al-nilal wa-k-nīḥal ash-Shahrastānī, out of 250 pages devoted to the religious sects of his time gives only 8 to the Christian churches and 10 to the Jewish sects. In the second part of this book in which ash-Shahrastānī discusses the development of philosophical sects of both the pre-Islamic and Islamic periods he gives brief mention to Ḫunayn ibn Isḥāq and Yaḥyā an-Naḥwī (John Philoponus or Yaḥyā ibn ‘Adī) in his list of those concerned in the formation of Islamic philosophy prior to Ibn Sīnā. He does not mention that they were Christians.

While it would be desirable to give some account at this stage of how Christians viewed their own position in Islamic culture throughout the period this is not possible as so far little or nothing with direct bearing on the question is available in the Christian Arabic texts so far edited, and the modern scholars, who have studied different aspects of Christianity in the Middle East do not appear to have concerned themselves with this question. The texts to be studied in the next chapter will give rise to some general observations and the historical perspective shown in the work of Paulus ar-Rāhib in particular will give many valuable clues tending towards a final verdict. (1)
Section Two

Unity and Divergence among Christians in the Islamic Empire

As was stated in the introduction, it is not proposed here to give a full survey of the historical and doctrinal development of the Christian churches of the Islamic Empire. Rather the viewpoints of two authors living within the Islamic Empire will be given. The first to be considered will be that of a Muslim, ash-Shahrastānī, while the second will be that of the Melkite, Paulus ar-Rāhib, who lived towards the close of the period under discussion.

In his Kitāb al-milal wa-k-nípal the first part of which is a consideration of the beliefs of the various religious sects, Muslim, Jewish, Christian and pagan, ash-Shahrastānī gives a short account of the teaching of Christ and of the doctrinal preoccupations of his followers. He says that he has seen the "Epistle of Paul to the Greeks" and he would seem to have had some direct knowledge of the Gospels. His selection of certain points of Christian doctrine and his neglect of others indicate that he is writing as a Muslim to fellow-Muslims. It is precisely the latter fact which makes his account valuable here. Because he is writing as a Muslim to Muslims we can accept that he is giving a dispassionate account of how Christian beliefs appeared to medieval Islam.

In his general statement on Christian beliefs, ash-Shahrastānī says that Christians differ among themselves on two main issues. The first of these is the mode of Jesus' descent, of His union with His mother, and of the incarnation of the Word (kalima). The second issue is the mode of His ascension, of His union with the
angels and of the withdrawal of the Word. Ash-Shahrastānī says that Christians affirm that God has three ḍānim, that the supreme Creator is one jawhar, by which they mean that He is al-ḏānim bi-ḥa-nafs (self-subsistent). He is one in jawhariya and three in ḍānimiya. By the ḍānim they mean the ḥayāt, such as wujūd (existence), ḥayāt (life), 'ilm (knowledge), the Father, the Son and the Holy Spirit. They say that only the knowledge clothed itself (tadarra') and became incarnate, not the other two ḍānim.

It is of interest for this thesis that a little further on ash-Shahrastānī uses the word shakhṣ to denote individual. Thus "kamāl ash-shakhṣ al-insān fī thalāthāt ashya al-mubāwa wa-imānā wa-mulkā wa-ghairihā (al-maṣīḥ) min al-anbiyā' kānnawṣāfina bīhāshāha al-thāliḥqaw ba'diha wa-l-maṣīḥ 'alāḥi as-sallām darajatuhul fawqa dhalika li-annahu al-ibn al-wahīd falsī nafsī lahu wa lā qiyās lahu ilā ghairihī min al-anbiyā'ī". It would seem that jawhar and ḥayāt are used to describe the perfection of God and shakhṣ and ḥayāt to describe that of man. A discussion of this will be best left to the chapter on terminology.

In his discussion of the distinctive tenets of the Christian churches ash-Shahrastānī begins with the Melkites. Without any preamble beyond stating that the Melkites are the followers of one Malka who appeared in Rūm and made himself master of it, ash-Shahrastānī says that the Melkites say that the Word was united with the body of Christ and put on his humanity. By the Word they mean the ḍānim of 'ilm (Knowledge) and by the Holy Spirit they mean the ḍānim of ḥayāt (life). They do not call the knowledge "Son" before His clothing himself (with humanity); rather Christ along with what he is clothed with is "Son". Some of them say that the Word is mixed with (maṣajat) the body of Christ in the same way.
as wine is mixed with milk or with water. Melkites explain that the jawhar is other than the agānim; they stand to each other in the relation of al-mawṣūf to as-sifā. It is thus that they explain their certainty about the Trinity.

Melkites say that Christ is universal humanity and not particular humanity and that he is eternal (qādīm azalī) from eternal (qādīm azalī); that Mary gave birth to an eternal god; that the slaying and the crucifixion befell the humanity and the divinity together. They apply the terms "fatherhood" and "sonship" to God and to Christ because of what they found in the Gospel where it says "thou art the only son" and where Ṣimāʿūnas-ṣafā (Simon Cephas) says "Truly thou art the Son of God."

Ash-Shahrastānī comments on these quotations from the Gospel to the effect that they may indicate a wish rather than affirm a state; but he continues with quoting several consecutive verses from St Matthew's Gospel in which Christ instructs his disciples to love their enemies so that they may be perfect as their heavenly Father is perfect. Also when he was being crucified Christ said "I go to my Father and to your Father."

Arius is then mentioned as having said that God is the eternal (qādīm) and that Christ is created. As a consequence of his teaching the Patriarchs and bishops of the Constantinople region met and drew up a creed. Here ash-Shahrastānī quotes most of the Nicene creed. He ends his discussion of the Melkites with a brief account of their eschatological beliefs.

Ash-Shahrastānī compares the Nestorians to the Muʿtazila for they apply wisdom to the interpretation of the Gospels just as
the Mu'tazila applied wisdom to the interpretation of the Sharif's. Nestorius said that God is one and possesses three qānin, existence, not knowledge and life. These qānin are additional to the dhat nor are they the dhat itself. The Word was united with the body of Jesus in the same way as the sun's radiance enters a crystal or as an engraving appears on a seal. This doctrine of qānin resembles the doctrine of the school of the Mu'tazili Abū Ḥāshim in regard to awāl because this teaching affirms that one thing may have different properties (khabaš). Nestorius means that God is one by jawhar, that is, not composite of genus, but that He is simple, one. By life and knowledge he means two uqnūmin jawhariyyān, that is, two roots or two principles (mabda') belonging to the knower. Nestorius then went on to interpret ilm as an-nuṣq and also as al-kalima. The final statement of his kalām is then that God is existent, living and rational. This is in fact how the philosophers define man. The difference is that man is composite and God is simple and this implies that there is a change in the meanings attached to the terms according to whether they are applied to God or to man.

Some Nestorians assert that God has other qifāt such as power and will and so on but they do not posit these as qānim. Some say that each of the three qānim is living, rational and God but the rest consider that the name "God" is not to be applied to each of the qānim. They say that the Son is eternally begotten of the Father and that He became incarnate and was united to the body of Christ when He was born. Origination (ḥudāth) refers to the body and to the humanity. He is God and man made one. (He is) two in jawhar, two in uqnūn and two in ḥabī'a; an eternal jawhar and an originated jawhar, perfect God and perfect man.
The union does not do away with the eternity of that which is eternal, nor with the originated character of that which originated, rather the two have become one Christ, one will. Often they have changed the mode of expression so that tabī‘a is postulated instead of jawhar and shakhs instead of uqna.

The rest of what ash-Shahrastānī has to say about the Nestorians does not concern us here. It remains to consider his remarks on the teachings of the Jacobites. These, he says, assert the three aqānim but say that the Word was changed into flesh and blood so that God became (ṣūra) Christ, who is thus God manifest (ṣūr-ṣāhir) in his body, so that they are one and the same. Some Jacobites say that Christ is God, while one of them has said that the divinity was manifested in the humanity so that the humanity of Christ has become the place of the appearance of God (al-ṭaqq), not by the inherence (ṭulūl) of a part into him, nor by a union with the Word, but that He became he (God became man). Most Jacobites have asserted that Christ is one jawhar and one uqna, except that they say that He is from two jawharān. They often say "one tabī‘a from two tabī‘atānī." They mean that the jawhar of God which is eternal and the jawhar of man which is originated (mahdūth) have become one composite in the same way as the soul and the body are composed into one jawhar and one uqna; thus Christ is wholly God and wholly man. So it is said rather that man became God than that God became man in the same way as when a coal is cast into a fire men say that the coal became fire and not that the fire became coal. In reality the coal now is neither absolute coal nor absolute fire; rather it has become a burning coal. The Jacobites
say that the Word is united to the particular man and not to the universal man. Sometimes they explain the union by saying it is a mixture (intizāj), and investiture (iḍrā') and that it is an inheritance (ḥulūl) like the inheritance of the image (gūra) of the man in the mirror.

Ash-Shahrastāni ends his discussion with some general remarks on the doctrinal differences between the Christian churches and with references to some minor sects but these are not of interest here. Rather the treatise of Paulus ar-Rāhib (13th century) on the Christian sects "al-firāq al-nagrāniya" will now be considered. (Cheikho - Vingt Traités pp 27-34).

Paulus begins by stating firmly that in his time there are four Christian sects, Melkites, Nestorians, Jacobites and Maronites. (Ash-Shahrastāni made no mention of Maronites, nor did he use the word firāq; the Christians were the ummat al-Masīh, the Melkites ašbāb Malka, the Nestorians ašbāb Naṣīr, the Jacobites ašbāb Yaʿqūb.) Paulus makes clear that his treatise has a positive import by stressing the points on which these sects are in full agreement, namely that there is one God who is a Trinity, and that God sent His Word to become incarnate. Also all these accept the creed of Nicaea, which he quotes in full. This done, he proceeds to summarise the Christological doctrine of each sect so as to bring out the precise points of difference. These are as follows:

**MELKITES** Christ is one divine uqnum eternally generated from the Father

two ūshīlātānī, divine and human

two types of action- fiʿlānī-divine and human

two wills-mashīlātānī- divine and human

Mary is mother of God since she is mother of the second uqnum.
NESTORIANS Christ is two uqnumān;
two ṭabī'atān;
one human will
one divine act
Mary is mother of Christ, not mother of God

JACOBITES Christ is one divine uqnum
one divine ṭabī'a
one divine will
one divine act

MARONITES Christ is one divine uqnum
two ṭabī'atān;
one divine act
one divine will

From this point Paulus takes on the role of defender of the Melkite point of view which leads him to an attack on the points in which this differs from those of the other sects. He first sets out to demonstrate the existence of both the divine and human ṭabī'a in Christ through the use of texts from the Gospels and he then asserts that to say that Christ is not God or to say that he is not man are both contrary to the Creed. Then Paulus goes on to describe how this union of divine and human occurred. He states that there are three kinds of union known to us:

**ittiḥād guhārī** - union of appearance e.g. the appearance of fire in red-hot iron

**ittiḥād mujāwara** - union of contiguity e.g. the presence of both water and oil in one vessel

**ittiḥād humāsāja** - union of mixture e.g. the mixing together of honey and vinegar

It is clear that it is the first kind of union which is applicable here. The divine nature of Christ permeates the human as fire permeates red-hot iron.
Having thus demonstrated by reason and by reference to
the Gospel and to the Creed the presence of two ābī'atānī and two
fi'ālānī in Christ, Paulus goes on to prove the presence of one
uqnum from St. Matthew 19:27, where baptism is commanded to be
given in the name of the Father, the Son and the Holy Spirit. If
Christ is two uqnumānī, then men are baptised in the name of four
uqnumān. If men are baptised only in the divine uqnum of Christ,
then they are baptised and profess their belief in only half of
Christ, not in the whole Christ. This is apostasy.

Nestorians, who assert two uqnumānī in Christ, say that
if Christ is one uqnum, then the living human being could not have
been a shakhsī. Paulus answers that Christ derives His nature from
Mary, not His uqnumānī. The same uqnumānūn serves both ābī'atānī.
Had He taken a human uqnum also there would have been no union at
the Annunciation (waqt al-bisāhā) and there would have been two
Christ and two shakhsīnī. Thus Nestorians believe in the union
of contiguity. Against them Paulus quotes Galatians 4:4 "He sent
His Son born of a woman and under the law and also the Creed" and
in Jesus Christ His only Son..."

Paulus moves on to discuss the Jacobite position. The
Jacobites, he says, although they are correct in asserting one divine
uqnumānī, err when they assert one divine ābī'ā, act and will because
this implies that the conception, birth, and circumcision took place
in the divine nature. This is manifestly objectionable view for
it means that Jacobites must admit that their God died, was buried
for three days and that pain entered the divine ābī'ā. If to this
the Jacobites would reply that accidents and suffering belong to
the body alone, then he would say that if you distinguish a body in
Christ why not admit two full ḥabībatāni.

He then goes on to state that Christ did not forsake the divine ḥabī'ā at any time after the union took place at the Annunciation, neither in Mary's womb, nor on the Cross nor in the tomb, nor in hell, nor at the right hand of the Father, since the divine ḥabī'ā is indivisible, infinite and impassible.

Paulus continues his discussion of the Jacobite position with an exegesis of John 20:17. "I ascend to my Father and to your Father, to my God and to your God" He says that "my Father and your Father" implies two kinds of paternity, that which is by ḥabī'ā and that which is by adoption. Likewise "my God and your God" implies his divine ḥabī'ā and His creaturehood. This latter point was made clear on the Cross when he cried out "My God, why hast thou forsaken me".

If the Jacobites should argue from the text "and the Word became flesh" Melkites would say that He became flesh in the divine uqrūm not in the divine ḥabī'ā otherwise the indivisible nature of God, Father, Son and Holy Spirit, would have become man. An uqrūm can unite with something and still retain its independence, not so a ḥabī'ā.

Paulus seems to think that the Jacobite and Maronite prayer ʿquds Allāh ʿquds al-qāwī ʿquds alladhi lā yamūt alladhi ʿuluiba min ajlīmā implies an assertion that the whole Trinity was crucified.

Finally, Jacobites, Nestorians and Maronites share a common error in speaking of one divine act and of one divine will in Christ. Paulus considers that he has already said enough to refute the idea of one divine act and goes on to deny the one divine will by arguing from Luke 22:42 "...not my will but thine be done".
This is evidence for there being two wills in Christ. It is an
impossibility that there should be two divine wills and therefore
two wills in two ḥabībatānī are implied.

Paulus ends this treatise with a short prayer for unity.

While neither Paulus ar-Rāhib nor ash-Shahrastānī uses
the expression "church" (al-jamāʿa) except when quoting from the Creed,
it is explicit in the latter and implicit in the former that the
Christians are one umma, the ummat al-Masīh. Both make clear
that the differences between the sects are primarily theological
and only secondarily ecclesiastical. Both stipulate that these
theological differences are not concerned with what are the proper
objects of belief for Christians but are concerned with the rela-
tionships between these objects. All Christians believe in the
independent reality of God and of man, all believe that it is the
will of God that these two realities should become one. They
differ in their estimates of how this will of God has been accom-
plished in Christ.

It is clear to-day that the Christian’s objective know-
ledge of God is that which has been revealed to them in and through
the Gospels. It is also clear that what has been revealed to them
is sufficient for them to live the Christian life. Thus it is
difficult to appreciate why the attempts to define the unique
existence of Jesus Christ could have led to such enduring ecclesi-
astical divisions. The answer would seem to involve the consid-
eration of three facts. The first of these is that in the 5th
and 6th centuries men did not know nearly as much as they thought
they did about the nature and innate purposes of man. To-day it
is realised that men are only at the beginning of their self-dis-
covory as a species and it is obvious to that it would be rash to
make any further statements on the humanity of Jesus Christ. Secondly, the theology and Christology of Nestorius, brilliant and consistent though it was, failed to gain acceptance in the end precisely because it tried to solve once and for all the twin mysteries of man in himself and man in his relation to God. His work now stands largely as a melancholy memorial to the debilitating effect of rationalism on human thought and progress. It was the relatively inconsistent and violent Cyril who led the way out of the impasse, for it was the formula of two natures which was to leave the way open for further independent understanding of the mystery of man. It was unfortunate that not all the followers of Cyril of Alexandria were able to share his final magnanimity in accepting the moderate Oriental understanding of physis (nature) as abstract rather than strictly concrete. The Monophysite reaction to the interim settlement was mainly due to the Egyptian, Palestinian, Syrian and Mesopotamian monks, whose tendency to extremes of asceticism doubtless predisposed them emotionally to prefer a view of Christ in which the human element largely disappeared.

The third fact to be considered in this discussion of the continuance of disunity among Christians of the Islamic Empire is that these Christological divergencies had already crystallised as independent ecclesiastical organisations before the advent of Islam. The rise of national feeling in Syria and Egypt and the continual rivalry between the Byzantine and Sassanian Empires had made some measure of religious autonomy inevitable in these areas, but the divisions between themselves and the separation from the main ecclesiastical body of Christians was made bitter by the
doctrinal differences. Though there is evidence of contact in Baghdad between Nestorians and Jacobites on at least the level of philosophy during this period there does not seem to have been any major attempt or indeed desire for re-union among the Christian churches of the Islamic Empire. Each church seems to have made its own terms with the Muslim conquerors and to have had a measure of autonomy granted to it. (4) Mutual polemic among Christians continued throughout the period although these seem to become more stereotyped with the course of time. (5) A note of hope is suggested by the evidence of the treatise to be considered in full in the next chapter. This points towards the view that the most important factor in the doctrinal developments of the different churches was the Islamic religious and cultural development. So strong was this influence that it would seem that in spite of themselves the theology of the churches developed on similar lines. The Trinitarian doctrine of Paulus ar-Rahib would seem to include the advances in knowledge and experience gained both by the Jacobite Yahya ibn ‘Adi and the Nestorian Elias of Nisibis.
Section Three

Difficulties in the presentation of the Christian Doctrine of the Trinity in the Islamic Empire.

It is of course well-known that the Qur'an contains strictures on what was conceived to be the Christian doctrine of the Trinity. The majority of Muslims took these strictures at their face value and tended to regard the doctrine as being manifestly absurd if not downright polytheistic. But while this was undoubtedly an embarrassment for Christians desirous of expounding their doctrine there was another more profound difficulty. The Christian enters into the mystery of the life of the Trinity in and through Jesus Christ and an understanding of the inner life of love of God has always implied a prior understanding of the revelation of God's love for man as expressed in the Incarnation. The Islamic context made this approach difficult for two reasons. First, the person of Jesus Christ was a matter of dispute among Christians who therefore found it difficult to portray Him adequately to non-Christians especially when these non-Christians had had a religious leader of outstanding personality who was still clearly in their minds. Secondly the Muslim experience of the overwhelming transcendence of God and of the insignificance of man were the two poles of his religion. It would require several generations of thought and prayer for him to bring these two poles of experience into some kind of relationship congenial to the human mind. Only when this had been accomplished could the possibility of the immanence of God be entertained.

In the exposition and defence of their beliefs Christians
had therefore to attempt a different approach. Providentially they already had to hand the work of St. John of Damascus, De Fide Orthodoxa in particular, in which Christian doctrine was given in the framework of metaphysical thought. Here the Christian doctrine of the nature of God and the doctrine of the Trinity were given before the Incarnation was discussed. Thus it was only in metaphysical terms that the Trinity could be seriously debated with Muslims. The great exponent of the earliest encounter was Yaḥyā ibn ‘Adī, who developed a presentation of the Trinity in harmony with the principle of causality. Later there combines with the preoccupation with metaphysics a research into the religious significance for man of the Trinity, provoked doubtless by the Islamic religious context. This axiomatic aspect is seen in the work of Elias of Nisibis. These strands are finally brought together into harmony with each other and with the traditional Greek formulations in the work of Paulus ar-Rāhib at the close of the period.

The purpose of this thesis is then to show that the living and thinking of their religion by Christians in the Islamic Empire brought new depths and fresh insights to the understanding of the doctrine of the Trinity.
CHAPTER TWO

Studies of Trinitarian doctrine in the Islamic Empire

Section One

Eutychius of Alexandria (877-940)

Eutychius (Sa‘id ibn Bīriq) was born in Fustat in 877. He studied medicine and indeed wrote several medical treatises before he became Melkite Patriarch of Alexandria in 933. He is best known for his chronicle (naga al-jawhar), a universal history which gives an account of the Caliphate up to the year 938.

Eutychius also wrote polemical works against major heresies and he engaged in controversy with Nestorians and Jacobites. In all this he was very much part of the Melkite literary tradition, for although Theodore Abū Qurra, with Antonius of the monastery of St. Simeon, to mention but two of the Melkite Arabic writers of the 8th, 9th and 10th centuries, who seemed to have proceeded the Nestorians and Jacobites in appreciating the need for an Arabic Christian literature, the Melkites do not seem to have produced thinkers of originality, whether in religion or in philosophy. Rather the Melkite Arabic writers would seem to have concentrated their energies on translation into Arabic of patristic literature and of canonical works. Even their homiletic literature is largely translation from patristic sources as also are the commentaries and other exegetical works. Their original work is largely polemical and devoted to expositions of the orthodox faith with refutations of the Nestorians, Jacobites and more guardedly, of the Muslims. (7)
It is against this general background that Eutychius' positive doctrinal work must be first seen. Later it will be possible to compare his Trinitarian doctrine with that of St. John of Damascus in the latter's De Fide Orthodoxa, a work of similar scope to that of the Kitāb al Burhān (Book of the Demonstration) which will now be considered. (8)

The Kitāb al-Burhān is usually ascribed in the manuscripts to St. Athanasius, an earlier Alexandrian champion of orthodoxy. Professor Montgomery Watt and Georg Graf are in agreement that the internal evidence shows that the work was composed in Arabic and that the writer was of the Melkite tradition. There is also evidence for the latest possible date of composition, for the miraculous portrait of Christ which is said in section 383 of the work to be in Edessa was transferred from there to Constantinople in 944. Also sections of the Kitāb al-Burhān dealing with specifically Nestorian and Jacobite tenets are reproduced in the chronicle nāṣr al-jawhar of which Eutychius is the undisputed author. In the light of this positive evidence, coupled with the absence of any other likely author, it seems reasonable to suppose that the Kitāb al-Burhān is an exposition of the theological tenets of Eutychius, the Melkite Patriarch of Alexandria.

The Kitāb al-Burhān is in four parts of which the first is an exposition of the whole of Christian doctrine, that is, of the nature of the Godhead, the Incarnation and the economy of grace. The second part is a collection of prophecies and types which testify to the truth of Christian doctrine. The third part contains scriptural evidence for Christian beliefs and the fourth is made up of propositions directed against the Jews. It is with the
first part that this thesis is concerned here and specifically with those sections which deal with the nature of the Godhead and the Trinity and, to a lesser extent, with the Incarnation.

Eutychius' starting-point is his assertion of the creation of the universe. He says that things in their totality are either created or they are not created. If they were not created, they would not be subject to change; but this is manifestly not so. The fact of change is obvious to all and it follows therefore that things in their totality are created. Therefore there must be one who created them. He who creates must not himself be created, otherwise we would be faced with the possibility of an endless series of creating beings. This is a concept without meaning. Also he who is not created and who is not subject to change must be a god. The inference is that the Creator is the supreme God who establishes, preserves and orders creation.

Then Eutychius proceeds to outline the cosmology derived from Neo-Platonism which was still prevailing in his time. Creation can be classified as being of two kinds, ṭāfif or ruḥānī (immaterial) and ṣhaqīf or ẓhalīf (material). Creation as a whole has three limits, muḥtada' (beginning), maʿla'ī (place) and ẓifḥ al-ḥilya (characterisation by external qualities). Immaterial creation has the first two of these limits and material creation has all three. The Creator alone has no limits. He is azalī (pre-eternal), He is present in every place and He has no external characteristics, for He is more subtle than any immaterial thing.

The treatise now considers the question of man's knowledge
of God. Since God has no external characteristics by which He can be known by the senses, it follows that He can only be known by the reason. In order to be able to withstand the light of the knowledge of God the human reason must be purified from unbelief and sin. But it is emphasised that this kind of knowledge is a gift from God without man's having been able to effect it. It is analogous to the sun's rays which reach men without their having any power over the sun's radiance. "Knowledge does not reach God, because the distance between the Creator and creation is too great for the creature to reach a knowledge of the Creator. Consequently there is no attaining the knowledge of God and of His tabi'a (nature) which is His jawhar (essence), and a creature does not reach the gifa (description) of it." (9) "God is not known in Himself or in His essence, but by his nature (as shown) in His works." (10) "God is known only by His works and activity and transcendence." (12)

But just as the positive knowledge of God through creation reaches men for their benefit and guidance, so also does the negative knowledge of God. For God has implanted in them a hope for knowledge of Him. "God has taught men knowledge ....to the extent that would benefit them, so that by that knowledge He might draw them to Himself; and He has veiled from them that which, had it come to them, would have harmed them because they were too weak for it." (13) This veiled knowledge is God's revelation of Himself in the Scriptures through the prophets, "Whose reasons were sound through faith and pure through good works." "Thereby He calls (men) to wonder at what He has veiled from them; and to purity of reason through good works."
Eutychius then goes on to describe the Creator with a number of Qur'anic epithets: 

- Mushif and munif (Giver of life and death), rahman (Merciful), hannan (compassionate), 'aziz (Mighty), gadir (Omnipotent), maliq (Ruler), 'uluma (loftiness), rabb (master), sayyid as-sada (Lord of lords), hakim (Wise) and 'allam al-ghuyub (Knower of Secrets).

It is emphasised that all these names describe God's activity, not His essence.

Eutychius then goes on to treat of the anthropomorphic manifestations of God described in the Scriptures and he explains these first as further instances of God's revealing Himself to men in a veiled and negative way, for none of these descriptions of God in human terms reveals anything of His essence; and secondly, as positive expressions of God's will to inform men that there was to be an tajassud (Incarnation) of his Creator Word in a human jawhar, so that two natures were to be united in one Christ, one of them Divine, creative, veiled, united with a created human nature; the two are joined together by the qawam (hypostasis) of the one kalimat Allah (Word of God).

Next is a brief reiteration of the uniqueness and unity of God. It is now that Eutychius brings in the question of the origin of evil, with a specific reference to az-zandiga, that is, to the Manichaeans or to persons who hold views similar to theirs.

Contrary to these Eutychius' view is that a created thing which continues in the way of nature, that is, which continues in obedience to the Creator, is good. If it goes voluntarily from the path of obedience it has entered into a condition of evil. Evil is defined as the non-existence of good. Evil is 'araq (an accident) and is not natural.
Having thus forestalled at least the immediate accusations of polytheism and of dualism, Eutycheus now begins his exposition of the doctrine of the Trinity with a positive assertion. "It is necessary then for him who seeks to know God and believe in Him and to worship Him that he should know that God is complete, not without a kalima (Word), and His Word is established, subsisting, everlasting, never ceasing, not beginning and not ending, for God was never animal-like without a Word, but He always had a Word begotten from Him - not like our word which has no qawām (permanence), and which is dissipated into the air, but a Word with a qawām (hypostasis), living, complete, not separated from Him but established in Him forever, for outside of Him there is no place for it to be in where He is not. No place is empty of Him, and He and His Word fill all things, but nothing holds Him." (15)

After this bold beginning, Eutycheus now proceeds to develop his Trinitarian doctrine by analogy. Man has reason which has the property of begetting a word. Thus reason and word are distinct and yet they are one shajā (thing) in nature because of the conjunction in a single nafs (soul). They differ in their hypostases which are respectively to beget and to be begotten. The case is similar with God and His Word.

The question of rūḥ (spirit) now arises. The human word has a spirit but this spirit is foreign to it and does not belong to its nature because it is a part of the air. This it is which becomes a sound for the word when the word is uttered and through it the qūwa (power or meaning) of the word becomes clear. But God's Nature is simple and there is no composition in it. It is impossible for the Word of God to be inferior to
man’s word and so they must know by correct faith that the Word of God has a spirit. This spirit must be a qawāṣ jamiḥiyya (essential power) of God with an hypostasis peculiar to it. It proceeds from the Father and abides in the Word, because it manifests it (the Word), not being separated from God in whom it is forever, nor from the Word to Whom it is attached forever.

This section is concluded with a passage with a Qur’anic ring. "When God Wills a thing He only says to it, "Be", and it is, because He has power for all that He wants, and affects all that He Wills. He wills by His mind, and speaks by His Word, and fashions by His Spirit." (16)

Eutychius then sums up his positive statements on the Trinity as follows. They are the Father, the Son and the Holy Spirit, three names for three jihāt (possibly personae) in the essence of one God. (17) The Father is characterised by begetting, the Son by begottenness and the Holy Spirit by procession. (18)

The arguments now taken a slightly different turn with the assertion that man’s spirit is created in God’s image. This spirit is a rational, logical nafs (soul) which possesses reason, word, and spirit. To reinforce this argument the writer mentions the sun with its disc, beams and radiance as another, through more remote, image of God created by Him. It is the reason of God which is the creator of reasons, the Word of God which is the creator of words, and Spirit which is the creator of spirits. "He" (The Creator God) is a pre-eternal reason, begetting the Word and causing the Spirit to proceed. He is thus one pre-eternal Father from Whom all Fatherhood is derived and named in heaven and
earth, the bad (beginning) of everything and the sabab (cause) of everything, yet without beginning and without cause; everything is from Him but He is from nothing; He is begetter but not begotten. He is the creator of everything, and alone the Father of the Word by the nature of the essence." (19)

"His Word, too, is pre-eternal. He is the unique Son of God begotten from the Father before all times, light from light, very God from very God, begotten not created, from the jawhar of the Father; by Him all things were made (or given existence). There was no time before His begetting, and He has no beginning; for that reason we say before all times. It has ever been the case that the Son is not made (given existence), and He did not exist after not existing, but He is the radiance of the light of the Father and the ḫilya (externalisation) of His gawḍūm, and His living wisdom and His power and His enduring word. . . . . He is not called Father apart from a Son, and if He existed when He had no son, He would not be a Father. If it was the case that He only had a Son afterwards, then He would be a Father afterwards, but not before that. This view, however, implies change, from not being a Father to becoming a Father, and that is the worst unbelief . . . ." (20)

"As for all the creatures they are given existence afterwards by the will of the Father and His Word and His Spirit; they are something from nothing, and not from the jawhar of the Father." (21)

Eutychius continues his dissertation with warnings about misconceptions of the Trinity. He stresses the difference between begetting in the divine sense and begetting in the human sense and he warns against the use of the imagination in forming concepts of God and more especially in forming concepts of the Trinity.
People are not to imagine that there are three Gods. They are not to let enter their minds the idea that there are many Gods or that there are three separate wujūh differing in likeness and figure and outward appearance, such as Abraham, Isaac and Jacob, or that there are three kings sitting separately on three thrones, or yet that there are three stars or lamps, or three angels such as Michael, Gabriel and Raphael. For all that is unbelief and error which is followed by idolaters.

Fatherhood and sonhood in God are not the same as fatherhood and sonhood among men and likewise the Word of God is not the same as man’s spoken word which passes out of himself into the air. Likewise the Spirit of God is not the same as the spirit of man, nor like that of angels, nor like the spirit of beasts or of the winds. The production of the word and of its spirit in man is two-fold. It is first immaterial, being without speech, hidden in the reason and it is only secondly material, an utterance composed of the breath (spirit) of the air and the co-operation of many members of the body, such as the windpipe, mouth etc. - this utterance is then borne by the air to its hearers, so that the word with its sound reaches their hearing. (22)

There is now a return to the consideration of the Creator and the creation. Eutychius reiterates that God created by His Word along with the volition of His Reason and the will of the Spirit. God gave Adam the logical, rational spirit of life by a breath of His Spirit who gives life to everything with the approbation of Reason and the concurrence of the Word. (23) At this point the first three verses of the Prologue to St. John’s Gospel are quoted and further on "Christ the Word of God" is quoted, from the same Gospel as saying: "I and the Father are one; I am in the
Father and the Father in me; he that hath seen me hath seen the Father; no one is able to come to the Father save by me." These four quotations are all used to stress the unity of God in His gawāmāt rather than as arguments for the divinity of Christ.

Eutychius now completes his specifically Trinitarian teaching as follows; "The exposition of the unity of God's jawhar has now been completed. It (His jawhar) is His ṭabī'a (nature) and His kiyān and the trinity of His qawāmāt; these being His qawānim and the jihāt of Reason, Word and Spirit. Qawānim may be explained as something which remains fixed and permanent in its condition, never changing or moving." (25)

Following this there is a description of the order of creation, first of the immaterial spirits and then of the material world. The creation of man is seen as coming last in order that man might provide the link between the two kinds of creation. With the pride and fall of Iblis and of his companions, who together formed the tenth and lowest host of angels, God willed to raise man from his first state to that of the fallen angels. Iblis in his envy deceived man into thinking that he might become god-like through eating the fruit of the tree of knowledge, that is, that he might become god-like through his own powers. With the fall of Adam and Eve, mankind entered upon a decline in their religious activities, which were to tend more and more towards the practice of idolatry and of polytheism, and they also declined in their moral activities. At the moment of time in which man reached the fullness of corruption God gave the fullness of mercy to them. The Holy Spirit who had never ceased to guide men away from evil by speaking to them through His prophets and messengers and also
through the Law sent down to Moses, now purified Mary the Virgin in order that she might be made worthy of the indwelling of the consubstantial Word of God within her. "The creative Word of God (then) (itahada) became one with) a created man whom He created for Himself with the concurrence of God the Father and of the Holy Spirit as a new creation, without human seed over which sinfulness had taken its course" (26)."Accordingly the creative Word of God mingled with the jawhariya of the man, complete with its body and blood (by blood is signified the animal soul of man) and with its rational, logical spirit (rūḥ 'āquila kāłmānīya). The Word of God with His qawām became the qawām of that humanity whose jawhar became complete by the qawām of the Word of God which constituted it. The humanity was neither created nor was anything except by the qawām of the Word of God Who created it and constituted it out of no previously existing thing in the womb of Mary, and not out of a cause (sabab) through which it had a beginning from seed of anything else, except the qawām of the creative Word which is one of the divine Trinity." (27)

The analogy of the sun which sends forth beams which nevertheless do not become separated from its disc is here applied to the continuing union of the Word Incarnate with the Father. There is no question of any change or transformation in the Godhead, for the mixture of human and divine is analagous to a mixture such as that of iron and fire in which a material element is mixed with an immaterial element. In such a mixture the essential nature of each constituent element remains unchanged. It is here that Jacob Baradacus and Nestorius both went astray. The first conceived of a mingling of the divine and human natures in Christ, such as that which occurs when gold and copper are melted together into one ingot. But this is a
transformation and transformation implies corruption. The second thought the mixture of divine and human in Christ to be one in which both natures remained separate, as happens when a single necklace is formed out of two inter-twined yet separate strands of gold and copper. Rather, says Eutychius, "He is one Christ, the Son of God, unique, begotten of His Father before all ages, light of light, very God of very God, begotten not made, (being) of the sūs and jawhar and ṭabi'a of the Father." (28)

Eutychius' exposition of the Incarnation continues with an assertion that the Son of the Father and the Son of Mary are one and the same. The reason is that one does not give birth to ṭabi'i but to aqānīnā. Christ's nāsūt (humanity) has the uqrān of the Son of God. "The word which caused that flesh to be in Mary resembled the seed from which is the origin of the flesh." (29)

The question of Christ's maslī'ā (will) is now raised. Christ has two wills, for will, by which is meant the will for good, belongs to the jīns (genus) and not to the khāṣṣīya (particular). Hence in Christ's two kiyānāni(natures) there are two wills. It is to be noted that a distinction is made here in the treatise between will and desire. Desire is defined as a particular inclination belonging to an individual. These ahwā'khāṣṣīya (particular desires or inclinations) are opposed to the natural will, for they are directed to what is not good. "Hence (men) differ about those accidentally occurring inclinations generated by the ash-shahwāt (appetites). Each one wills what he fancies of them for the sake of his pleasure in them; but despite that, no one has strayed outside the common will which summons creation to will and to love good in this world and the next." (30)
The last part of Eutychius' discussion of the Incarnation which concerns this thesis is that which begins with the statement that Christ confirmed for believers that He is perfect God by His performing the acts characteristic of divinity (al-f'il-al-illahit). The examples which he gives in his treatise are those which illustrate the Quranic epithets of God; indeed the Quranic expressions are in fact used. Thus Christ is Creator of what He wills (khallaq lima yashu'u), for example He created from clay two eyes for a blind man (John 9:1-7) and He made wine out of water. He is 'allam al-ghuyub (Knower of things hidden) and ghaffar li-dhunub (Forgiver of sins). These two attributes are both seen in Christ in the episode of the repentance of Mary Magdalene. Christ will raise to life through His own power all those in the tomb on the Day of Resurrection. The example given is that of the raising to life of Lazarus. Furthermore Christ is malk yawm ad-din (Lord of the Day of Judgement), and this is confirmed by His bringing together in the Transfiguration on Mt. Thabor of the living and the dead.

Before going on to a consideration of the extent of the influence on the composition of this treatise of the Islamic environment it would seem to be useful to set the Kitāb al-Burhān in relief against the De Fide Orthodoxa of St. John of Damascus. There are several reasons and advantages in doing this; both St. John and Eutychius were Melkites; they were separated in time by less than 200 years; it is very unlikely that Eutychius was not thoroughly acquainted with the work of St. John; the De Fide Orthodoxa and the Kitāb al-Burhān are alike in scope and object in that both aim at providing a clear exposition of dogma as it was to be seen in the definitions of the ecumenical Councils and in the writings of the
Greek Fathers; both works are pastoral in intention in that they are implicitly addressed to contemporary Christian audiences, and more specifically to Melkite audiences.

Both works are divided into four parts but whereas the four parts of the Kitāb al-Burhān are concerned respectively with (1) the Godhead, the Incarnation and the economy of grace, (2) prophecies and types testifying to the truth of Christian doctrine, (3) scriptural evidence for Christian beliefs and (4) propositions directed against the Jews, the De Fide Orthodoxa is divided differently and shows different emphasis in its basic construction. Thus the first part contains the doctrines concerning the nature of the Godhead and concerning the Trinity, the second deals with cosmology and the nature and psychology of man, the third discusses the divine economy of grace, the Incarnation, the psychology of Christ and the main events of His earthly life and the fourth outlines matters of current theological controversy such as the two natures of Christ, the mystery of the Eucharist as it was affected by the Christological disputes and the veneration of images, and gives the Orthodox position on these questions. Much more space is given by the Kitāb al-Burhān to the use of arguments from Scripture and prophecy and while the Jews are mentioned in one section of Book IV of the De Fide Orthodoxa in connection with a dispute over the observance of the Sabbath as a day of rest, in the Kitāb al-Burhān a whole part is devoted to using their scriptures against the latter in their denial of the divinity of Christ and allied Christian doctrines. This emphasis would no doubt be due to the fact that the Christians and Jews had in common much of the Scriptures. Thus the fact that
Christians and Jews tended to draw contrary conclusions regarding the Messiahship of Jesus from the Old Testament and its prophecies would tend to weaken considerably the Christian case in the eyes of Muslims.

It is now possible to compare and contrast the Trinitarian and, to some extent, the Christological doctrines contained in the two works. It is proposed to take the relevant themes in Eutychius' exposition already given in detail in the preceding pages of this chapter and to compare these with similar themes expounded by St. John of Damascus.

The opening themes of the Kitāb al-Burhān, the existence of a Creator who is God, God's transcendence and man's knowledge of God, the refutation of polytheism, although not that of Manichaen dualism, mirror much of the first five chapters of the De Fid. Orth. Then a difference between the two works appears, in that Eutychius gives here an account of cosmology leading up to the creation of man, such as appears in De Fid. Orth. only in Book II immediately after the demonstration of the necessity of there being a Creator God. Although the nature of evil is defined by St. John similarly to Eutychius in Book I chap. 12, the discussion of its origin is left to Book II chap 12. As for Eutychius' discussion of the Trinity, the argument of God, His Word and His Spirit together with the analogy of the man's word and its spirit, though, not, it is to be remarked, with the psychological analogy between the tripartite nature of man's soul and the tripartite nature of God, are to be found fully expounded in De Fid. Orth., at times in the same wording. It is of interest that the expression "substantial power" applied to the spirit by Eutychius is found in St. John's work. The sun image, with its disc, beams and radiance seen as an analogy of the Trinity, is found in both works.
Again, when Eutychius discusses the application of the terms fatherhood and sonhood to God, the points which he emphasises, though in an abridged fashion, are the same as those stressed in De. Fid. Orth., Book I, chap. 8. The Father alone is without cause and beginning, He is the cause of all that is other than He, including the Son and the Holy Spirit. The Son is known also as Word in order to make clear that generation within the Godhead is not to be compared to human physical generation but rather to the production by the human mind of words (Book I chap. 6). He is called Son to emphasise that "He is the impress of the Father's substance and has subsistence, being perfect and in all respects similar to the Father, save that He is begotten." (De Fid. Orth) The Holy Spirit is not generated but proceeds from the Father through the Son simultaneously with the Son’s generation. He also is perfect God.

It is of interest that whereas St. John in chap 9 discusses two names of God, "He that is" being His first name and the more important, while the second is "o theos", for which he gives similar Greek derivations to those of the Cappadocian Fathers, Eutychius does not do the same for Allah, except to supplement this name with other Quranic names of the Deity.

In section 170 Eutychius answers the question as to how it was that Christ did not tell people in the Gospel that He was God and thus dispel all doubt, as follows: "If Christ had said He was God, He would have led those people who believed in Him into great error, because whoever says the word "God" has named the whole of the divine jawhar and the one kiyān, and by saying the word "God" has conjoined the three agānim, the Father, the Son and the Holy Spirit. If Christ had said, "I am God", he would have asserted Himself to be the Father, the Son and the Holy Spirit, to possess the three agānim, and to be the
Begetting, the Begotten and the Proceeding. That is falsehood and error ...." Thus it would seem that Allah was seen to be the personal name of the Deity in a sense in which o theos was not. (32)

Conversely, St. John does not find it necessary to give space to warning against misconceptions about God arising from the use of the imagination in connection with the doctrine of the Trinity whereas Eutychius finds himself obliged to make explicit the dangers of polytheism and modalism.

Like Eutychius, St. John uses the texts from St. John’s Gospel, "I and the Father are one" etc. to stress the unity of God in His hypostases. In De Fid. Orth. they do not appear, however, in the context of a discussion of the Trinity but rather in Book IV, chap. 18, where St. John is largely concerned with matters of current theological discussion.

Eutychius then takes up again the theme of Creator and creation and develops it on similar lines to those in De Fid. Orth. Book II, chaps. 1 - 12. A full discussion of the cosmology lies outside the scope of this thesis but it is noticeable that whereas in his account of the creation St. John of Damascus refers throughout to "man" and only mentions Adam and Eve by name once in passing reference, Eutychius gives in some detail the story of the creation of Adam and Eve and their encounter with Iblis. His account is closer to Scripture than that of St. John. Eutychius also stresses the degradation of men which followed the eating of the forbidden fruit. This led them into moral turpitude and into idolatry and polytheism.

In his discussion of the Incarnation Eutychius follows the same lines as those of St. John. There is the same emphasis on
the aspects of the "new creation" and on the two natures of Christ. In his exposition of the latter aspect, however, Eutychius relies much less than St. John on detailed philosophical arguments and gives more weight to the Scriptural evidence for the integrity of Jesus Christ together with the use of simple analogies drawn from material things.

Again, where St. John gives an account of human psychology (developed previously in Book II) and applies this to Jesus Christ in Book III, Eutychius replaces this with a somewhat detailed account of Christ's miracles and other acts. The only reference to psychology which he makes is to the question of the will of Christ. There does not appear to be the same distinction made between will and desire in De Fid. Orth. as in the Kitāb al-Burhān.

Finally, in the discussions of the general Resurrection, Eutychius gives more emphasis to the aspect of Christ as Judge than does St. John.

In sum one could say that in De Fid. Orth. Jesus Christ is God because He is the Incarnate Son and Word of the Father, while in the Kitāb al-Burhān Jesus Christ is God because He performs the acts of God. Certainly this statement is an over-simplification as it stands, but there would seem to have been sufficient evidence brought forward to show that Eutychius is concerned more with the actions of God rather than with His being. Thus, in his Trinitarian and Christological teachings Eutychius is concerned first and foremost to stress the life of God as made manifest in His actions to men, in other words, the integrity which he stresses is moral. God is a personal being who wills and acts. The emphasis is on the Father who generates and on the Spirit who proceeds rather than on the Son who is generated. It is true that the Word is seen
as active and activating but only with and through the Spirit.

Christ is a man who performs the acts characteristic of God and who therefore is seen in a mysterious way to be affiliated to the Word of God, Who being Himself subsistent and perfect, though derived from the Father, is true God of true God. The humanity of Christ is affirmed, there is no question of an appearance of God in human form.

There would seem to be no doubt that Eutychius was at home in the Islamic religio-cultural environment in which he lived and worked. In the Kitāb al-Burhān there are the obvious references to Quranic names of God and the use of the Quranic name for Satan but above all there is the reiteration of the theme of the Creator and His creation and the deep concern to defend the moral integrity and uniqueness of God. The Quranic references are not used as substitutes for argument; they form an integral part of an exposition of the whole of positive Christian doctrine. It is the simple matter-of-fact quality of his work which is its most impressive feature. There is no trace of polemic against Muslims and even in his refutation of the teachings of Nestorius and of Jacob Baradaeus there is no attack on their persons, whereas St. John of Damascus had found it necessary to declare the latter two men accursed.

The full discussion of the Trinitarian terminology of the Kitāb al-Burhān will be left over to Chapter Three. It will have been noted, however that two words are used to denote "Member of the Trinity" namely gawām and uqnum. Dr Cachia in his notes prefacing his edition of the work says that in some cases the S text has had gawām emended to uqnum but this has not been indicated
in the printed edition in any of the key passages cited, (33) Qawum would seem to be a straight-forward translation of "hypostasis" while uqnuum has a complicated derivation and evolution which will be explored in the chapter devoted to terminology. Uqnuum did in fact become the regular term in Arabic for member of the Trinity while qawum disappeared from use.

Before ending this survey of the Trinitarian teaching of Eutychius there is one question to be considered. As was stated in chap. One, Sect. 3 of this thesis, the fundamental difficulty to be faced by a Christian wishing to expound the doctrine of the Trinity in an Islamic environment was not so much the Muslim insistence on the oneness of God, nor even the Quranic strictures on the Trinity arising from Muhammad’s misunderstanding of the orthodox Christian doctrine, rather it was the fact that the Christian approached this mystery through Jesus Christ. The difficulty is that it was first necessary to show to Muslims or rather to Christians living in an Islamic environment the vital importance of Christ. (Even to-day the personality of Muhammad is a powerful and immediate influence on the Islamic world and how much greater must have been its impact at the time in which Eutychius was writing.)

Eutychius deals with the difficulty in two ways. He emphasises the divine character of Christ’s miraculous acts while never denying his full manhood and although he takes Scriptural terms as his starting-point he expounds the Trinity on a rational basis of analogy, that is to say, his basic argument is that if man is a rational, logical spirit how much more true must this be of his Creator. Because he stays close to the traditional patriarchic justification of the hypostasis of each of the members of the Trinity
he manages to avoid the risk of modalism. Eutychius combined with the Greek sense that all causality was finally reserved to the Father, that He was the monoarche of being and action, the contribution of the Arabic language and of Muhammad in particular that Allah was the personal name of the Deity. Thus, his tendency was to reserve at least the greater part of "personality" in the modern sense of the term to the Father. There is a sense of a return to something like the theology of St. Irenaeus with his image of God with two hands.

There are difficulties in reconciling this position fully with the Scriptural evidence, yet certainly it is not unorthodox. Later Arabic writers were to see further into the problems and to develop the doctrine from very similar starting-points as Eutychius.

Was his attempt at expounding the Trinity too rationalistic? Considering his difficulties he could hardly be said to have over-rationalised; and certainly his aim was not to rationalise the mystery or to water-down the traditional teaching; from the beginning of the work Eutychius insists on the incomprehensibility of God, by man.

Above all it must be remembered that the Kitāb al-Burḥān is essentially a pastoral work directed to Christians. It is not addressed to Muslims, rather it is concerned with the positive exposition of doctrine. The contribution to the future development of doctrine concerning the Trinity was perhaps simply the unwitting outcome of the complete involvement of Saʿīd ibn Bitrij in his Islamic environment and his willingness, implied over and over again in the Kitāb al-Burḥān, to be one with the historical evolution of his people. It is this commitment which gives life to his "clear exposition" of the Trinity to those fellow Christians who
shared with him an Islamic environment.

Section Two

Yahya ibn 'Adî (893-974)

Born in Takrit in 893, Yahya ibn 'Adî went in early youth to Baghdad which was still the capital of the Islamic Empire and its then greatest centre of learning. He pursued his philosophical studies under the Nestorian Abî Bishr Matta and under the Muslim al-Farabi. This early experience made him a convinced adherent of those who held that Aristotle was by far the greatest philosopher. After al-Farabi had moved to Damascus, Yahya apparently took over as leader of the former's Baghdad school and he continued as the teacher of both Christian and Muslim students. His life does not seem to have been disturbed by outside events and he remained at work in Baghdad until his death in 974.

His great labours in the collection and copying of ancient works of philosophy were only surpassed by his own contributions to philosophy. These works have entirely disappeared and are only known to us through medieval indexes and bibliographies. Some idea of the enormous respect in which he was held by his contemporaries and by later generations in the Islamic Empire is given by the epithets of "the Philosopher" and of "the Logician" which were applied to him in the Middle Ages. (35)

At the present day it is possible to examine and assess the value of his theological writings of which over thirty still exist in manuscript form. Of these ten have been edited, notably by Augustin Périer, who also made French translations, and by Paul Sabat. (36) These edited texts deal with Yahya's teachings concerning
the unity and trinity of God and with the Incarnation.

Before turning to a consideration of Ya'qūb's theological work, in particular of his Trinitarian teaching, it is enlightening to devote some attention to the literary tradition from which he stemmed. He belonged to the Monophysites who were divided into various churches, of which only those of Syria and Egypt are our concern here. Largely owing to the influence of the monasteries, which tended to be Monophysite, the Christians of Egypt were almost all Monophysites as also were the majority of the Christians of Syria. In the 5th century at the request of the Arab tribe of Banu Ghassān, two Monophysite bishops were consecrated specifically for the Christian Arabs. One of these, Jacob Baradaeus, reorganised and extended the Monophysite Church of Syria, which had in fact been dwindling in numbers due to strong opposition from the Byzantine Emperors. It was because of his efforts that the Syrian Monophysites became known as Jacobites.

In the 6th century, despite the strong position of the Nestorians, the Syrian Monophysites began to extend their numbers in Iraq and Persia. Fur'Abdin to the north of Nisibis, Mar Mattai to the north of Mosul and Takrit to the north of Samarra were their main centres in the east. It is probable that the monks of Mar Mattai and the people of Takrit had always remained Monophysite despite the preponderance of Nestorians in that area. Certainly the Monophysites were well represented throughout the central provinces of the Islamic Empire. There is literary evidence that there was interchange of ideas and of the results of scholarship throughout the Middle Ages between the Egyptian Monophysites and those of Syria and the East. There is also the important fact of the eastward migration of the School of Alexandria after 718.
In their attitude to the use of Arabic as their literary language there is a clear division between the Monophysites of Egypt and the Monophysites in Syria and Iraq. While the Copts developed an extensive literature in Arabic covering all aspects of ecclesiastical life, that is to say not only doctrine and polemic but also chronography, commentary, homiletics, canon law and works of edification, the Jacobite Arabic literature was almost entirely restricted to dogmatic works written in an apologetic or polemic vein. The number of Jacobite Arabic authors is far less than those of the Copts. The cause of this difference in output seems to be related to the fact that while the Coptic language early died out as a literary language so that all literary composition was made in Arabic, the Jacobites continued to use Syriac as their main literary language. In fact there are few Jacobite Arabic compositions on ecclesiastical matters after the 11th century. The work of translation into Arabic of patristics and commentaries which had formed an important part of the intellectual contribution of the Jacobites in the Middle Ages continued somewhat longer. (40)

Yaḥyā ibn ‘Adī was the first important Arabic writer to appear among the Monophysites. In his role of defender and expositor of Christian doctrine in the Islamic Empire he left a decisive mark on both the Jacobites and the Copts. No other Christian Arabic writer seems to have tackled the basic doctrines of the Trinity and the Incarnation nor the exposition of these two Muslims, with such boldness. Possibly it was his well-known outstanding grasp of philosophy which led to his works in these fields being considered insurpassable. His understanding of the principles of dialectic and of speculative thought coupled with his firm reliance on the teaching of Scripture concerning the Trinity and the
Incarnation made of Yaḥyā ibn ‘Adi one of the freshest and most original minds ever to be devoted to Christian theology. Though references in at least one of his treatises to Dionysius, St. Basil and St. John Chrysostom show that he was not ignorant of at least the major Greek Fathers, he does not rely on their work to prove his points. (41) Since he was not a bishop nor even a monk he probably felt freer to develop his speculations on dogma than if he had formed part of the ecclesiastical hierarchy. Yet there is no trace of irresponsibility in his attitude to his work. His intellect is entirely given over to the task of expounding Christian beliefs to the Muslim intellectuals of his day.

Yaḥyā wrote at least six treatises on the Trinity or rather, to use his terminology, on the Christian belief that God is one jawhar and three ṣifāt. There are also four treatises dealing with the Incarnation. His major ideas on these two subjects are contained in his best-known treatise, which is the one to be considered fully in this thesis; the other treatises are elaborations of aspects of his thought contained in this major treatise, which is entitled: maqāla li-il-shaykh Yaḥyā ibn ‘Adī fi ṣiḥḥat ‘tiqād an-naṣāra fi-l-bāri’ jalla wa ta‘āla annahu jawhar wāḥid dhu thalāthiṣifāt (Treatise concerning the rightness of the Christian belief that the Creator is one jawhar and three ṣifāt). (42)

Yaḥyā ibn ‘Adī begins his treatise by stating his intention. This is "to show forth the soundness of the Christians' belief that the Creator is one jawhar and three ṣifāt, each one of which is other than the other two in ma‘nā." He then shows that he will develop his argument by the use of analogy.

The illustration he uses is that of two mirrors facing one another. In each of the two mirrors is found an image (ṣūra)
of all that is in the other. The two facing mirrors are equal, so that the images are also similar. Not only that, but each of the two mirrors will have received from the other an image of its essence (dhātuhā). Moreover, in the very image of the essence (dhāt) will be found reversed an image of the other also.

In the image of either of the two mirrors will be found one of three states (ahwāl) each of which is other than the other two states. One of these is the existence which it has in its particular existence (wujūdahā 'ain). This will be found in the image in the mirror opposite to it. It is clear then that this image in this state is the reason for the existence of the image in the other two states.

The truth of the last statement can be demonstrated by the removal of this image (that is, of the mirror containing it). The image in the mirror opposite to it would then simply not exist; and if this latter did not exist, the (original) image would not be reflected to the mirror from which it took its origin and in which it existed. Moreover, it is not impossible that the image which is in the mirror should exist without there being any other mirror opposite to it. In that case there would be no other image except that which is in this mirror. Also, because it would not exist in anything opposite to it, this image could not be said to be reflected. Thus there exists in it by reflection another existence differing from its existence in the mirror. It is clear that it is this reflected existence which is the cause (sabab) of the other two existences, for in the removal of the image it was presumed that both images would disappear. Whenever the two images exist, the reflected existence is absolutely necessary. This reflected
existence is analogous to the existence of the Father. It is clear that it is a cause (illa). The Son and the Spirit are therefore the two effects (ma‘lulūnā) of the cause which is the Father.

If the first state is the image itself (bi‘aynihā) in the opposite mirror of the image in the first mirror, then the second state is the image itself in the opposite mirror. This second state is an analogy of the Spirit sent out (muna‘ith) by the Father. The third state takes its origin (al-ḥāsila) from the reflection in the mirror from which it came forth (gadarat). This is analogous to the šifā of the Son, for the Son has exact equivalence (musāthāla) to the Father in two aspects, one of these being the image itself and the other being His existence in the dhāt of the Father without being outside Him (that is, without being outside the Father).

It is necessary that this image be understood as constituting one single image and not thought of as one multiplied by three. In that case the three šifāt will be understood as being three mawdā‘āt. The meaning of each mawdā‘āt will differ from the meaning of each of the other two. (It is now necessary to clarify what is intended here by "meaning" (ma‘nā). If for example intelligence (aql) were taken as coming within the scope of "meaning" then if it were said that one of the three mawdā‘āt did not have intelligence then this would contradict what was previously stated, that is, that there is no difference between this image (without intelligence) and the image in the mirror opposite to it, for it and the image reflected in the opposite mirror is in fact one image by virtue of its particular existence (bi‘aynihā). Since it is thus indisputable that the meaning of each one of the three states must be other than the meaning of the other two, therefore the "meaning" in this context must imply a difference in modes of being, that is, that the meaning of
its (state's) existence in the mirror is different from the meaning of the (state) when it is reflected to its dhāt from its existence in the opposite mirror. The (inner) meaning of its being is transmitted to the opposite mirror, thus there is (something which) takes its origin from it and a meaning occurs therein which is other than the meanings proper to the other two. What has now become clear is that the one image exists in itself in three states and this by multiplication (takthīr). The three gīfāt are united to it (the mirror); the image in the mirror will be other than the image which occurred in the opposite mirror for this latter will be the image of the first image which in its turn is the image of the second image. These images do not differ in virtue of their being images, rather they differ by the modes of their existences in the mirrors, that is, the image existing in the first mirror, the image existing in the second mirror and the image which is reflected to the (second) mirror.

To sum up - in so far as it is an image the object is one. In so far as this image exists in three ūmbūr or, if it is preferred, three gīfāt, it is three. Thus the image has become multiple by reason of its gīfāt.

Yaḥyā now completes this part of his work by stating that this mirror illustration is only intended for those whose minds are only capable of grasping sensible objects (maḥāṣāt). In his opinion the mirror illustration is easier to understand than the mind, thinker and thought analogy of the Trinity. This latter analogy he now proposes to expound.

This section begins as follows. If everyone who thinks (ya'qūl) does so because he has a mind, and if the mind is reckoned among those things which may be understood, then if these two be
granted then it is clear that the mind is only understood by the mind. It is then clear that the mind is a ḍhāt and that the meaning of its existence does not include the meanings of its existence as thinker ('āqīl) nor as thought (ma'qūl). The concept of the mind’s existence as thought is other than the concept of the mind’s existence as mind. Anyone sound of intellect will understand that he who knows his mind, when 'āqīl is understood as a ḍhāt, will himself have the meaning of thinker. Furthermore, he who knows his own ḍhāt will be known to his ḍhāt, since he is himself ḍhāt. Thus he who is one ḍhāt will contain three sifāt, for he is 'āqīl and 'āqīl and ma'qūl. He who is 'āqīl is bi'tāfībī both 'āqīl and ma'qūl. We may give the name of 'āqīl to the ḍhāt of God but first we must purify the word 'āqīl from additional connotations. 'Āqīl is the cause of the other two ma'qūl and it is only 'āqīl stripped of the meaning of the other two ma'qūl when the ḍhāt is considered as making an image of itself it is said to be ma'qūl. It is now clear that the concept of the 'āqīl is mujarrad and that the 'āqīl is a cause (ṭilla) of the other two ma'qūl, that is, that it is the cause of the 'āqīl and of the ma'qūl.

Yākyā now combines the analogy of mind, thinker and thought with his mirror illustration. He says that if the removal of one of the two concepts be imagined then the removal of the other two would follow automatically. The converse is also true, for if we postulate one of the three then the other two must necessarily exist also. In this way the Father is a cause of the Son and of the Spirit. Just as the 'āqīl exists in the 'āqīl and not in anything exterior to it and just as the ḍhāt of the 'āqīl does not contradict it nor does it exist outside it, so does the Son exist. The
jabila of the Son and the jabila of the Spirit are one. Again
ma'qul is an analogy of the Spirit, for the Spirit is outside the
Father, being sent out from Him in the same way as the ma'qul in its
state-of being ma'qul is outside the 'aql yet returning to it (wārid
illehi).

In sum, the relationship between Father and Son and Holy
Spirit is analogeous to the relationship between 'aql and 'aql and
ma'qul in that the jawhar of the 'aql is that it is the dhāt of the
ma'qul. This single dhāt is not multiple in itself, but it is
described by three gifāt each of which is other than the other two.
The Christians believe of the Creator (here Yahyā interpolates jalla
wa ta'ālā) that He is one jawhar in no way multiplied by His being
jawhar, but rather that His jawhar has three gifāt, or if it is pre¬
ferred, three khawāqq. When that jawhar is seen as joined to them
then it can be observed that there is a mujtama'. The opposition
between the three gifāt or khawāqq is only in virtue of their modes
of being, not in virtue of the jawhar.

Yahyā now deals with the following hypothetical question.
Suppose that it were permissible to say that the Father is the cause
of the Son and of the Spirit on the grounds that the Father's
indwelling (manzil al-dhālā) with Them both is (as) the indwelling of the
essence of the mind (dhāt al-'aql), and that this mind has had
abstracted from it the meanings of thinker and thought, and further
more that this abstracted dhāt was the cause of that whose hypostasis
(qawṣa) was (derived) both from it and (also) from another meaning
which had been added to (that is, to the adh-dhāt al-mujzārieda);
suppose all the foregoing, yet how does one justify the assertion
that the Son is the thinker without the thought and that the Spirit
is the thought without the thinker and how can this assertion be
reconciled with the belief (i'tirāf) that the Son and the Spirit are
one and equal in jawhar, ḥabī'a, power and glory?

In his justification of the assertions Yaḥyā starts with another analogy. The thinker abstracted from both mind and thought is analogous to the Son who became man without either the Father or the Spirit becoming man. (At this point Yaḥyā refers to the Gospel as his grounds for this belief concerning the role of the Trinity in the Incarnation). But why should the incarnate Son be more accurately represented by thinker than by thought? The reason is that man can become the thinker of the abstract essence but he cannot become the thought because he cannot become the abstract essence, nor can he become united with it. Therefore it is more appropriate to term the Son as the thinker without the thought and the Spirit as the thought without the thinker.

In his treatises on the Incarnation Yaḥyā reiterates this point and it is in fact the central point of his Christology. For the purposes of this thesis it is sufficient to observe that Yaḥyā had manifestly grasped an axiom of theology, namely that there must be a congruence between the terms employed in the expressions of Trinitarian doctrine and those used in corresponding expressions of Christological teaching.

In dealing with a writer as subtle and complex as Yaḥyā it is very difficult to make an evaluation of motives. Is he a theologian trying to expound the Trinity by means of sensible and intellectual analogies and illustrations; is he a philosopher pre-eminenty concerned with developing the principle of causality or is he rather one who believed that though theology and philosophy must be studied separately and as distinct disciplines yet in the last analysis they are perfectly reconciliable, even in their technical terms?
(It is to be noted that the consideration of the terminology will be left to a later chapter.)

The last section of the treatise in which Yahyā makes an implicit analogy between Father, Son and Spirit on the one hand and God, God-Incarnate and man on the other would seem to give some weight to the theory that Yahyā held that theology and philosophy were ultimately reconcilable. This point of view is also compatible with the Monophysite position in Christology in which stress is laid on the active role of the Son in the effecting of the Incarnation. Certainly there would seem to be implied in this analogy a view of man somewhat as follows: the essence of man is that he can think, therefore only a thinking-God could become united with man. Yet, in comparison with God the Creator seen as bearing the same relation to His creation as that of Thinker to thought, man is passive. It is only in virtue of his union with God-Incarnate that man becomes an effective thinker, in other words, it is only through Jesus Christ that man can realise himself. It is of interest also that while Yahyā does not use the active term "Word" of the second member of the Trinity, but restricts himself to the more passive term "Son" nevertheless it is clear that he is considering both the active and the passive aspects of the second member for he uses both ma‘īdal, a passive term, and ‘aqlil, an active term, in reference to Him.

Yahyā ibn ‘Adi was concerned to achieve two things: first to expound the Trinity, or rather the traditional definition of the Trinity, in terms familiar to the learned of his day, and secondly, to express the relationships within the Trinity as accurately as
possible and that for him who was an Aristotelian philosopher would inevitably mean in terms of causality. Yet Yaḥyā was a religious man who lived in an Islamic environment and Muslim theologians were early to grasp the dangers for theology of arguing that Creator and Cause could be equivalent terms; for they saw perhaps more clearly than any other body of thinkers before the physicists of the twentieth century that cause and effect were mutually dependent terms. Thus to describe the Creator as cause of the universe, whether He were considered primarily as final cause or as first mover, was to imply a necessary relationship between Creator and creation. This at best was a denial of monotheism and at worst was a denial of the possibility of religion.

Yet precisely because Yaḥyā was a religious man who believed in the Incarnation, he saw that the findings of philosophy must be shown to have real existence if they were to have any validity at all, whether in the disciplines of the physical sciences or in the discipline of pure logic. To show that the principle of causality was a principle inherent in the Godhead would be to prove that real knowledge was possible to man, because the principle upon which all knowledge must be based, that is, that the universe is a system of interconnecting facts, would be seen to be the principle of the life of God Himself. For Yaḥyā then, the philosophical axiom that the universe could be studied in itself without reference to outside influences was also a theological axiom. Creator and created were really separated by a gulf which was only bridged by the Word of God "leaping down from heaven" and thereby giving to a dead, determined and at best cyclic universe the possibility of real, conscious, responsible life by the agency of the men who accepted the immense challenge now offered to them.
There remains an important question. How far was Yahyā justified from the Christian point of view in describing the relationships between the three members of the Trinity in terms of causality? In general terms the battle over whether the Trinity could properly be described in philosophical terms, had long been over. Hypostasis and ousia had become orthodox terminology in referring to the three members and the Godhead itself. Therefore the question should really be posed in the following form: how far is Yahyā's thought in conformity with the Scriptural evidence? The clearest expression of the relationships between the three members is to be found in St. John's Gospel in such passages as 10:15, 14:20 and 17:21-22 where the relationship between Father and Son is described in terms of indwelling and of mutual knowledge. Knowledge is of course used here in the sense of the experience of a presence, necessarily opening out into love (cf. Hosea 6:6). There are two points to be noted here, first the use of analogy in St. John's Gospel, that is, the application to the relationship between Father and Son of the Biblical word for the right relationship between God and man, and secondly, the implied necessity of the existence of love in the Godhead, for it is not possible to postulate the inherence in God of an accident. Thus love in the Trinity is raised to the status of a principle and Christian tradition from St. Paul onwards has been unanimous in seeing in the Holy Spirit the substantiation of this principle. Once love is seen as the expression of the necessary relationships between the members of the Trinity its approximation to the view of causality implied in Yahyā's treatise is clear. An indication that Yahyā held such a view is his interesting use of the word mutassā' as designate the Triune nature of God. (43)
Still we have yet to determine how far Yahya ibn 'Adi's treatise can be said to be a truly religious expression of the Trinity. Do not its careful logic and extremely complicated illustrations tend to remove the possibility of a human response to the mystery? In order to form a fair assessment it is necessary to bear in mind that the time in which he lived was one of intense philosophical effort on the part of Muslim thinkers to formulate their religion and to justify it by appeal to philosophy. The intellectual challenge to Christians was one which they could hardly ignore and still remain accepted by Muslim intellectual circles. It would seem then that one of Yahya's motives would have been to secure for Christian philosophical thought a position of respect among Muslims. The establishment of God as the Cause of causes would have been an immense tour de force. It is hardly the fault of Yahya that subsequent events in the Islamic world slowly eroded the intellectual climate in which such an original contribution, for such it would seem to be, could have been developed to the full. Its influence certainly continued in Oriental Christian circles, for a bare statement of his doctrine is to be found in the 14th century Melkite bishop, Paulus ar-Rahib. With the super-imposition of the Western humanist theologies on the remains of the Oriental churches this treatise seems to have fallen into oblivion at least so far as its theology was concerned. Cheikho who prepared the edited text of the treatise found it necessary to add a footnote in which, without giving any reason, he stated that 'illa meant mabda' throughout the work. It is true that the distinction between principle and cause is a subtle one, nevertheless it exists in modern speech. If one were to read the treatise in this light one would find it difficult to elucidate at all and the genuine interest for theology and philosophy would cease to exist. (44)
In so far as this treatise can be seen to be in harmony with the doctrine of the Trinity as expressed by St. John and by St. Paul, it would seem to have a basis in religious experience and thus to be a valid Christian statement of the Trinity. Of course it is by no means a complete statement for it does not take into account other aspects of the religio-cultural climate of the Islamic world, namely the deep interest in linguistics, in prophecy and in sacred scripture. In order to achieve a complete statement of the Trinity in the context of the Islamic Empire it would be necessary to synthesise the Trinitarian teaching of Yahya ibn 'Adi with that of Elias of Masi;is. Indeed such a synthesis seems to be adumbrated in the work of Paulus ar-Ra'ib.

It is now desirable to set the theological work of Yahya in relief against a background of metaphysics. Ideally this metaphysics should be that of Yahya himself but all his philosophical treatises have disappeared. The next best choice would obviously be his master in philosophy, al-Farabi, but again the precise nature of al-Farabi's views on several of the subjects under discussion is still a matter for research. Thus it is only possible to make general remarks. There are a number of ways in which these ideas could be arranged but the simplest method would seem to be to discuss them in the order in which they occur in the treatise which was examined in the preceding pages. This simple method is adequate for the purposes of this thesis which is concerned with the history of ideas rather than with fixing the correct positions of these ideas in the framework of a metaphysics.

The first important philosophical notion to appear in the treatise is that of causality. "The Son and the Spirit are therefore the two effects of the cause which is the Father". Here we
have a statement of causality in which is implied firstly a causality which is eternal and therefore outside time. If this causality is outside time then it is not directly related to change and movement. Secondly, since it is axiomatic that the three members of the Trinity are all eternal and all equal in their Godhood, therefore there is a mutually dependent relation between cause and effect within the Godhead. (We have noted above that this view of causality fits in well enough with the Christian view of the essence of God as love considered as a communication of life.) It is necessary to point out also that St. John of Damascus, following certain of the Greek Fathers, referred to the Father as the Cause and as the Source or Principle. Nevertheless these latter do not seem to have developed this idea so as to emphasise the Son and the Spirit as the eternal effects of an eternal cause. One is left with the impression that Yaḥya is endeavouring to give expression to a conviction that there is a real basis in God not only of the universe but also of the human experience of the universe. If men experience the universe as essentially growth and change, which is another way of saying that the essence of the universe taken as a whole is the continuous communication of life, then this communication of life must exist in the eternal Being. Further light on this aspect of Yaḥya’s view of causality will be seen when the question of his view of the active intellect is considered.

What of Yaḥya’s views on the relationship between God and the universe? He certainly held that God was the Creator and that the universe was created out of nothing.
The Neo-platonic philosophers, with al-Fārābī, had sought to solve the problem of the gulf between spirit and matter, between Infinite and finite by the theory of emanation. In this theory from the First Being (the One) comes forth the first intellect called the First Caused. From the first intellect thinking of the First Being flows forth a second intellect and a sphere. From the second intellect proceeds a third intellect and a sphere. The process goes on in necessary succession down to the lowest sphere, that of the moon. From the moon flows forth a pure intellect, called active intellect. Here end the separate intellects, which are, by essence, intellects and intelligibles. Here is reached the lower end of the supersensible world (the world of ideas of Plato). (46)

Leaving aside for the moment the question of the active intellect, it is easy to notice the resemblance between Yahyā’s exposition of the Trinity and the first steps in the emanation theory. From then on the two metaphysical cosmologies would necessarily diverge. In the absence of direct knowledge of Yahyā’s metaphysics it is not possible to draw absolute conclusions, but since he was the pupil of al-Fārābī it seems reasonable to draw the inference that Yahyā saw in the Christian doctrine of the Trinity a metaphysical hypothesis which would reconcile the neo-Platonic metaphysics of al-Fārābī and the orthodox Christian and Muslim doctrines of the creation of the universe of the world out of nothing; for Yahyā places firmly within the First Being the two initial stages in the origin of the universe.

It would seem that al-Fārābī held that the active intell-
ect was a principle of being. The function of the active intellect in man was seen somewhat as follows by the philosophers who accepted the notion: The active intellect, of which Aristotle speaks in the *Anima III*, is considered to be immaterial. It causes the passive intellect to pass from potentiality to act, and made the intelligible in potentiality intelligible in act.

The active intellect is related to the passive as the sun is to the eye. The eye is in potentiality to see while it is dark, but it sees actually as soon as light shines. The same is to be said of both the passive and active intellect.

The active intellect shines a kind of light upon the passive, by which the passive becomes actual, and the intelligible in potentiality becomes intelligible in act. Furthermore, the active intellect is a separate substance, which by lighting up the phantasms, makes them to be actually intelligible.

Again, without a direct knowledge of Yahya’s own metaphysics it is impossible to draw firm conclusions, yet when his view of the Incarnation is taken in conjunction with his doctrine of the position of the Son within the Godhead, it would seem within the bounds of possibility that Yahya saw in the role of the second member of the Trinity a resemblance to this view of the role of the active intellect in man. The term *‘Aqil* itself suggests this also. Thus it would appear in this hypothesis that it is only through an acceptance of the Incarnation that men can see the universe as it is, can grasp their own positions relative to the universe and to the Creator and so begin to work out their own destiny. In this view the Incarnation would appear to contain a metaphysical hypothesis which could reconcile the orthodox Christian and Muslim doctrines of the gulf between the Creator and His creation with the neo-Platonic emanational theories
of al-Fārābī.

Certainly it seems that while there have been many Christian thinkers who have attempted reconciliations between Christian doctrine and secular metaphysical systems there have been few who have been bold enough to take the facts of Revelation as material for metaphysical thought. If this metaphysics were available for study, it might even appear that Yaḥyā ibn ʿAdī in the twin boldness of his faith and of his intellect was unequalled among Christian thinkers.

In passing it is of course obvious that the concept of God as mind knowing itself derives from a combination of Platonic and Aristotelian notions. Yaḥyā would seem to have shared this view of the First Being as mind with al-Fārābī.
Section Three

Elias of Nisibis (975-1049)

Ilyā ibn Shinā was born in Nisibis in 975. In early youth he joined the monastery of St. Michael at Mosul and he was made priest there in 994. Later he transferred to the Simeon Monastery at as-Sinn. In 1002 he was made bishop of Bēth Nuhādhūrū and finally he became Metropolitan of his native town of Nisibis in 1008. His death took place in 1049. Thus Elias of Nisibis lived at a time when the Nestorian Arabic literature reached its greatest achievements and when the Muslim science of kalām was coming to its zenith. (47)

Before going on to the consideration of Elias' own work it is necessary to give a brief sketch of Nestorian literary activities in Arabic. Of the three main groups of Christians in the Islamic Empire the Nestorians were the most assiduous in their composition in Arabic of all forms of ecclesiastical writing. Not only that, but their Arabic composition continued to the close of the Islamic Empire; nor did it prevent a continuation of their studies in Syriac.

In the seventh century the Nestorian Church was the most important Christian community in Mesopotamia and Iraq. Its provinces there were as follows: Babylonia, with the see of the Catholicus or Patriarch at Seleucia-Ctesiphon or Madā'in; Susiana (Khūzistān), with the metropolitan see of Jundaisābūr (Syriac, Bēth Lāpāt); Bēth 'Arbāyē, with the Metropolitan see of Naqibīn (Misibis); Maishān, near the Persian Gulf, with the metropolitan see of Bāṣra; Adiabene, with the metropolitan see of Arbīl; and Garamaea (Bēth Garmāwā or Bēth Jarnāwāi) with the metropolitan see of Karkūk (Syr. Karkhā dho Bēth Selūkh). In addition there were bishops at the following places; Fīra, Bahrain Islands, Bēth Mādhūyē including the towns of Mālēnān, Dinavar and
Hamadān, Bēš Rāzikāyē including the city of Rai (near the modern Teheran), the district of Abrashar (Nishāpur) in Khurāsān. Merv and Herāt also appear to have been sees. There were Christian converts among the Rēphthalite Huns and Turks near the river Oxus who received their own bishop. Samargand also probably became a see and the Nestorian missions to China are famous.

Of the Nestorian sees enumerated above three were the outstanding centres of their culture. These were Jundisābūr where the medical school was situated, Merv, and Nisibis which was famous for its theological school. This school had been founded towards the end of the fifth century by Barsauma when the Nestorian pupils were driven from Edessa by the Emperor Zeno. (48)

Thus when the Abbasid dynasty came to power in Iraq with Baghdad as the centre the Nestorians found in the Islamic Empire ideal conditions in which their culture might flower. They provided the majority of the teachers, physicians, translators and administrators of which the new State was in need. Their culture was broad as well as deep for it was not unusual for one man to be both physician, philosopher and cleric, besides being engaged in the composing of original treatises in these subjects.

The cultural climate which was engendered by the confluence of the Nestorian teachers with the rising class of Muslim intellectuals was one of intense intellectual activity with great emphasis on speculation. Muslims, Jacobites and Nestorians shared each others' teachers of philosophy while at the same time adhering to and ardently defending their differing points of view in theology. According to Dr. Walzer the Nestorians, in contrast to the Jacobites who received their Aristotelian philosophy from the classical if neo-Platonic school of Alexandria, had received their philosophy from centres close to the school of Athens. This school laid emphasis on faith and on
"revealed books". The day when the different strands in Greek philosophy which entered the Islamic Empire through the Jacobite and Nestorians can be distinguished in their cross-fertilisation and development in the Islamic philosophers, whether Christian or Muslim, is still far distant. No attempt to disentangle the origins of the philosophical elements in the theology of Elias of Nisibis will therefore be made in this thesis. (49)

The literary output of Elias of Nisibis was indeed many-sided. Linguistics, history, canon law, theology and religious poetry all were enriched by his pen. This productivity was carried out in two languages, Syriac and Arabic, which was in itself a remarkable feat. Elias was at home in classical Arabic and it seems that the impetus to his literary work in Arabic was given by his friendly relations with a Muslim, the Wazir Abu‘l Qāsim al-‘Uṣain ibn ‘Alī al-Maghribī. The latter originated in Egypt, from which he came as a political exile to Iraq. There the Emir Nasr ad-Daula ‘Abd al-Malik ibn Marwān al-Kurdi became his patron and Abu‘l Qāsim took up residence in his domain in Diyarbakr and Maiyāfāriqīn. He died in the latter place in 1027. While residing in Maiyāfāriqīn Abu‘l Qāsim entered into a correspondence with Elias who was then Metropolitan of Nisibis and on two occasions came to Nisibis to discuss with him. This correspondence has been preserved in part and its theological and chronological interest throws light on the writings of both.

Elias was well-versed in the Aristotelian metaphysics and logic of his time. In his Christology he consistently defended the Nestorian point of view, and he reserved his ability in polemic for those who did not share it. With Muslims, however, his tone was conciliatory to the extreme of endeavouring to reduce the theological
differences between Christians and Muslims to that of the prophethood of Muhammad. (50)

The known works in Arabic by Elias of Nisibis number about sixteen. Of these seven are concerned with theology and polemic. The one to be studied in detail in this thesis is the risala fiwa'daniyat al-khâliq wa tathlith aqâ'ima'ni. According to Georg Graf, Elias had promised to provide a Florilegium or collection of texts from the Scriptures, as a supplement to one of his major theological treatises: "The Meetings". This has disappeared while a similarly announced treatise, the one to be studied in this thesis, has survived. Before going on to consider this, it is advisable to give a brief description of the major treatise to which it forms a supplement.

"The Meetings" is composed in the form of a letter by Elias to his brother, the teacher and secretary and physician Abu'l 'Alâ qâ'id (or qâ'd) ibn Sahl. In this letter Elias sets out a record of the conversations which he had with Abu'l Qâsim between the 5th and 29th of July in the year 1026. These conversations seem to have been the result of the initiative of Abu'l Qâsim who had expressed a wish to gain an understanding of the Christian religion and of the logical bases of its tenets. The discussion is divided into seven "meetings" of which the subjects were as follows: firstly, the Christian understanding of the oneness and threeness of God (the latter is understood as înîfîlî a self-existent being with His immanent Word (mutq) and with His Life; secondly, the indwelling of the Son of God in the manhood of Christ; thirdly, the witness of the Qur'ân to the Christian teaching of the oneness of God (citations are made from commentaries on the Qur'ân, especially from Abû Ja'far at-Tabari, sometimes with refutations by Elias); fourthly, proof of the truth of
the Christian religion both from reason and from miracles; fifthly, Elias presented on request a detailed exposition of Christian dogma for the qādī Abū Ya'qūb al-Mutakallim who had questioned Elias’ veracity. At the wish of Abu'l-Asim he also promised a separate treatise on the Christian understanding of the oneness (of God). This is the treatise to be studied in detail in this thesis. The sixth subject was "A disputation concerning Grammar, Speech and Discourse" in which Elias attempted to show the superiority of Syriac over Arabic especially in the greater clarity in the distinction of subject and object in the former. He also contrasted the easier legibility of Syriac with the necessity of Arabic to have recourse to diacritical points. The seventh "meeting" treated of the disavowal by Christians of astrology; their view of Muslims; and their teaching concerning the soul. The dialogue form is maintained throughout the whole work but it has a strongly literary character and bears the marks of having been composed after the event. (51)

It is now possible to proceed with the study of the above-mentioned treatise "Concerning the oneness of God and the three-ness of His agānim." (52) This treatise is addressed to a Muslim qādī and is concerned with the exposition and justification of the doctrine of the Trinity. Elias’ aim is to show what is meant by the statement that God is "One Jawhar and three agānim" and by the statement that "the Creator is one and that there is no God besides Him."

His argument runs as follows: both Christians and Muslims agree that God is one and that this One must either exist in another, which would imply that He is an accident (‘āraq) or else He is self-existent (gā'im bi-nafsīhi). It is obvious that the supreme God must be self-existent. Now He who is self-existent is
either living or not-living. But he who is the maker of life must Himself be living. He who is living and self-existent must be wise or not-wise. It is clear that the maker of wisdom cannot be unwise.

Having thus established that God is self-existent, living and wise, Elias mentions that the Syrians call a self-existent Being kiyān. (Ma'īn Ma'īn notes here that kiyān is the equivalent of jawhar and of ḥabīb). Thus God is a kiyān by His self-existence, living by His Life and wise by His Wisdom.

Now God's wisdom and life cannot be accidents. That which is not accident is either kiyān or uqūnā. Since the dhāt, life and Wisdom of God cannot be either three jawāhir or three accidents they must be three aqānim. Therefore Christians say that God is one kiyān and three aqānim.

Kiyān refers to God's self-existent Being and aqānim refer to the dhāt, the ḥayāt and the ḥikma. Thus according to Elias there is no difference in meaning between kiyān wāhid thalāthat aqānim and qā'im bi-nafsīhil dhī ḥayāt/ḥikma.

If some Muslims, may God protect them" should allege that by affirming that God has life and wisdom Christians are positing two eternal beings other than God and are thus destroying His uniqueness, the answer would be as follows: Christians and Muslims agree that God is both living and wise. Now the rules of logic and of language demand that derived names participate in the meanings of the words from which they are derived. Wise is derived from wisdom and living is derived from life. Thus someone is not wise except by wisdom and is not living except by life. In the same way a man does not become a grammarian except by possessing grammar, nor an architect except by acquiring the science of architecture. If Muslims should say that such a rule may apply to names, but that it
does not apply to God, Christians would say that this is exactly the point of contention and as such cannot be adduced as an argument. In fact if one were to follow the Muslims' line of argument one would have to say that they are more open even than Christians to the charge of shirk, for Muslims assert that God has knowledge, life, power, will, speech, hearing and sight.

If one the other hand Muslims were to ask why God should be restricted to three āqānīm, then Christians would answer as follows: the names of God belong to two categories, those which refer to His being and essence (yakabba kiyānahā wa dhātahā) and those which refer to His actions. Thus to say that God is living and wise is the equivalent of saying that He is self-existent (qā'im bi-nafsānî) or of saying that He is a dhat. The point is that life and wisdom in the Godhead are not additive composite powers as they are in men. Rather life and wisdom are part of God's self and very nature.

The other names are ṣifāt fi'liyya and are related to the actions of God; for example ṭalīma mushtaq wa tāghima yarīmu. These ṣifāt fi'liyya are all derived from verbs and specifically from verbs of action. Thus the epithet "creator" is concerned with God's relation to creatures and the epithet "merciful" is a description of God's relationship to those to whom He shows mercy.

Next comes a passage in which Elias sums up what he has so far established concerning the threeness of God. It runs as follows:

wa ala hadhā-l-mithāl tajrī-l-umār fī jamī'ī-l-ismā'-l-Khārija 'an-Ldh dhāt wa-l-hikma wa-l-ḥayāt fa lamma kānat Ldh-dhāt wa-l-hikma wa-l-ḥayāt khāwāṣ dhatiyya wa kānat-il-irāda wa-l-jād wa-r-rahima wa ma shākalaḥā ṣifāt fi'liyya summiyāt adh-dhāt wa-l-hikma wa-l-ḥayāt khawāṣ wa āqānīm wa summiyāt al-irāda wa-l-jād wa-r-rahima wa ma shākalaḥā ṣifāt.
Elias now turns to another problem of terminology concerning the Godhead. This problem is the use and interpretation of the work *jawhar*. Muslims say that *jawhar* signifies that which carries accidents, therefore the use of this word by Christians implies that they believe that accidents exist in God. Elias shows that this difficulty is essentially a matter of confusion in translation from Syriac. He says that the Syriac word for self-existent being, *kiyân*, was translated into Arabic as *jawhar*. Now this word *jawhar* carried in Arabic the meaning of "that which carried an accident." If that is to be the interpretation of *jawhar* then certainly God is not *jawhar*. If on the other hand *jawhar* is used in the sense of "self-existent being" then no difficulty exists.

At this point Elias gives corroboration for his view by quoting from the works of three of the 'ulama': "may God have mercy on them and may He protect the Muslims". The first to be cited is Abî Ja'far Aḥmad ibn al-Ash'ab. In his work "fi-l-ilm-l-ilbāhi" there is the following passage: "The Prime Mover is however absolutely first and is thus the cause of all things (*'illatu-l-mawjūdah*). He is either substance (*jawhar*) or accident (*'arad*). It is impossible for Him to be accident, since the cause of accident is the *jawhar* and God is the cause of everything. The accident is not to be found existing in itself but in the underlying substance. Thus God is a substance, or He is something even better than a substance, or He is a *kiyân*. (The point is) use any expression whatever provided only that the meaning is preserved."

The second extract is from the Kitāb al-ṭams 'il-ṣūl al-khams by Abû Bakr Muḥammad ibn al-Ṭayyib al-Bāqillānī. "If we scrutinise the saying of the Christians that God is a single substance in three *aqānim*, we find no divergence (between us) except in nomen-
clature, because Christians assert that God is a substance which is unlike created substances in that it is self-existent, being. Thus the meaning is correct while the expression is wrong. Names are related to what one actually intends when one uses them. Christians have never claimed that God is a substance like created substances. Our quarrel with them and with the Jews is concerned with the prophecy of Muhammad."

Elias then stresses that al-†aqlānī has made it clear that Christians cannot be criticised for their use of jawhar in reference to God so long as they mean by this that He is self-existent. The disagreement of Christians and Muslims is "only concerned with the prophecy of Muhammed ibn ‘Abd Allah may God have mercy on him."

Then Elias quotes from the Qādī Ābd ʿAbd Allah al-Husayn ibn ‘Abd Allah ibn Shibli. The gist of this quotation is that men know of God’s attributes such as power and knowledge through the existence of these in creatures. When these terms are applied to God there is both a similarity and a difference. Thus Christians speak of God as a jawhar which is a notion derived from observation of created things but which in God is different in that there it is used in the sense of self-existent. Christians and Muslims use the same process of deduction from created to Creator.

Finally, Elias, observes that if jawhar is to continue to be used in the sense in which Muslims are currently employing this term then there will be no Arabic term for "self-existent". In that case it would be best to use the Syriac term for "self-existent", namely kiyān. Likewise, since there is no Arabic term to designate that which is neither kiyān ‘amm, nor ‘arad, the use of the Syriac term uqān is should be continued to signify that which is neither accident nor general substance.
In his notes on his edition of this text père Ma'louf describes this very important text as "a pearl of Christian literature." Certainly the language and the reasoning possess a distinctive clarity and there is a complete lack of polemical emphasis. Elias' acquaintance with Muslim texts is striking. Even more striking is the underlying assumption that the God of the Christians and the God of the Muslims are one and the same. Elias is at pains to demonstrate that any differences on this point are no more than semantic.

There is also a general sense of pastoral concern in this treatise. It would seem that Elias of Nisibis tended to regard both Christians and Muslims as members of his flock.

The philosophical basis of Elias' presentation of the oneness and threeness of God is well constructed. Analogical reasoning is reduced to a minimum. The linguistic approach seems plausible, though to establish its substance would require detailed study in Arabic and Syriac. The outstanding merit of this treatise is that it leaves an impression that the Trinity is a living reality which has to be experienced, not a formula to be learned. In Elias' thought on the nature of God there is a happy blend of the Greek sense of the Father as the source of all good, with the Hebrew insistence on the living God and the Egyptian emphasis on the wise, beneficent ruler. Also the use of a word connected with the root kūn to define the essential being of God denotes the dynamic nature of God better than does jawhar. In Elias' insistence on the word kīyān there is more than an echo of the God who defined Himself as "I am I Who am". The starting-point of Elias' reflections on the meaning of the Trinity is the living God of the Scriptures, not a philosophical definition. Closely connected with this is the other presupposition, namely that the God of the Christian Scriptures is one
and the same as the God of the Qur'ān. Possibly he regarded whatever he judged to be true statements about God in the Qur'ān as having been derived from Christian or Jewish sources; such statements would then seem to be translations into another language and idiom.

After these general considerations of Elias' approach to the Trinity it is necessary to examine his method more closely. Thus he uses the word dhīh to apply both to one of the arzīm (the Father) and to the kiyyān of God. However, if one considers that it is perfectly orthodox to apply the word "Father" to God as a whole as well as to the first member of the Trinity there would not seem to be a difficulty here. What Elias is stressing is that the essential nature of God is to be three arzīm, two of which derive from the first. He could perhaps have completed his statement by referring to God who is Wisdom and to God who is Life, but such a terminology would have sounded strange to Christians and Muslims alike. In fact in this treatise he avoids the use of the traditional Christian names for the second and third members, that is, Son of Word and Spirit. In another treatise Elias did in fact work out the connection between the scriptural and philosophical terms for the three members on the same lines as Eutychius had used, but like him Elias had then to have recourse to analogical reasoning employing as a starting-point an analysis of human psychology and physiology. The argument was that whatever is true of man must be infinitely applicable to the Creator.

If kiyyān could be shown to have had a scriptural meaning similar in intent to "I am Who I am" as well its metaphysical meaning, then Wisdom and Life, although not popularly regarded as "names" of the second and third members in the same way as Son of Word and Spirit, are yet certainly valid terms derived from Scriptures for these two
members; since furthermore Elias has asserted the equivalent of kii*n and dhāt, we would be left with a Trinity of Being, Wisdom and Life. In this Trinity there would be a perfect harmony of scriptural and of metaphysical thought and terminology, a oneness of being, of actuality and of form.

At least one can say that we have in this treatise a master-piece of Christian thought and meditation. Elias shows himself a great Christian teacher both in his presentation of the subject and in his restraint, for he leaves veiled the key to the whole mystery of the oneness and three-ness, which is that God's self is love. Until Muslims had experienced the revelation of God's love in Jesus Christ they would not be able to see further. To have spoken of love at this stage could have led only to confusion or even to profanation.

As in the preceding studies, consideration of terminology as such will be left to the last chapter.

Much of the influence of kalām on the defence made by Elias of Nisibis of the Christian doctrine of the oneness and threeness of God is clearly apparent in his treatise and in his quotations from Muslim authors. It remains to underline this influence by quoting from the al-Inzād of Abū-l-Mu'āwli 'Abd-al-Malik ibn 'Abd-Allāh Yūsuf ibn al-Juwaynī, otherwise known as the Imām al-Juwaynī. In his chapter on the necessary attributes of God, al-Juwaynī has a section in which he attacks the Christian teaching of substance in God. His argument is as follows: substance in the language of theologians means that which has extension. Now it is clear that it is impossible that God should have extension. Alternatively, substance is defined as that which receives accidents, but it has been explained beforehand that God cannot receive contingent traits.
To those who assert that God is a substance, al-Jâdiyyî replies by a distinction. He says that if in calling God a substance is understood the attribution to Him of characteristics proper to substances, proofs have been given that this is impossible; if what is understood is the giving to Him of the name of substance without attributing to Him either the nature or the characteristics, then in this case the names of God must be taken out of the discussion because these cannot be determined by the intelligence of men. Now there is no other meaning known for substance (except those mentioned above). In no religion is it permitted to give assign an appellation to God arbitrarily.

Christians believe that God is a substance; that He is the Third of three. In saying that He is a substance, they mean that He is the principle of the aqâlim. According to them there are three aqâlim; being, life and knowledge (‘ilm). They call being the Father, knowledge the Word, whom they also call the Son, and they call life the Holy Spirit. That which they mean by Word (kalima) is not what (Muslims) mean by kalâm; for them kalâm is something created. In their teaching these aqâlim form the substance, without the addition of anything else. The substance is one and the aqâlim are three. Furthermore, according to the Christians, these aqâlim do not have existence by themselves; they are in relation to the substance what the Muslims, or those Muslims who accept the term, call aqwâl. For these latter the aqwâl is, for example, the extension of a substance; that is, it is something added to the existence of the substances and has for its attribute neither non-existence nor existence. Nevertheless it is a positive attribute. Thus aqâlim are for Christians what aqwâl are for those Muslims.
Further on al-Jā'wānjī asks why Christians restrict the number of the aqānim to three. Why, for instance, should power be left out in favour of knowledge? Why are hearing and sight omitted?

After a discussion of the Christian's belief in the divinity of Christ, which does not concern us here, al-Jā'wānjī continues by stating that Christians believe that the aqānim are gods. He says that despite the diversity of their sects all are unanimous in affirming the threeness of God. To this Muslims reply that according to the Christians' own statement none of the aqānim has a separate existence. So how can that which does not have existence possess divinity? al-Jā'wānjī says that later on he will establish clearly that God is necessarily living, knowing and powerful. If the uqānim of knowledge was God it would necessarily also be living and powerful. Thus Muslims may fairly ask Christians why they do not recognise four gods, substance, existence, life and knowledge. Otherwise they (the Christians) should admit that they are holding to a purely arbitrary religious opinion.

These extracts from the work of al-Jā'wānjī show that on the religious level the kind of arguments used by Elias were taken seriously by the orthodox who felt obliged to refute them following the traditional methods of the mutakallimīn. Against this circular reasoning it was unlikely that the attempts of Elias and others like him could make a real impression. Nevertheless it is part of the contention of this thesis that in making this effort despite the adverse circumstances Nestorians succeeded in making a contribution of lasting value to the Christian understanding of the mystery of the Trinity. This will be shown more clearly in the chapter on terminology and in the Conclusion.
Paulus ar-Rāhib al-Antūki (13th century)

It is only from the headings of his extant works that we know anything of the life and chronology of the Melkite writer known as Paulus ar-Rāhib. From these we understand that Paulus originated from Antioch, became a monk and finally was made Bishop of Saida. In one of his works, a letter to a Muslim friend, it is stated that he had visited the "lands of the Greeks and Franks", that he had travelled to Constantinople, to Moldavia and to Rome.

Two facts indicate that Paulus lived and wrote not later than the 13th century. The first is that between 1321 and 1328 two Muslim theologians made written attacks on him; but the work which they attacked was not an original work by Paulus ar-Rāhib but rather a third-hand polemical treatise derived from his work. Secondly, Paulus attacks the Maronites as unorthodox Monothelites, which means that he must have lived before the Maronites entered into union with the See of Rome. (According to William of Tyre, the decisive step towards this union took place in 1182, although it was not until the 16th century that all Maronites abandoned Monothelitism.)

There is no indication in Paulus' own writings as to whether he lived during the time of the Latin principality of Antioch. All that one can say is that his literary approach to Muslims is conciliatory and hopeful.

It is the opinion of Georg Graf that most probably Paulus flourished during the 13th century. There would seem to be a possibility that he could have lived and worked somewhat earlier, possible during the 12th century.

Paulus was first and foremost an apologist, who tried to correct the Muslim misunderstanding of Christian teachings. Secondly, he was a polemicist who turned his efforts towards estab-
lishing the soundness of orthodox belief over and against the tenets of those he considered to be dissident Christians. In his writings he is concerned with those problems of natural theology which were still in the foreground of controversy in his time, namely the creation of the world, the being and attributes of God and His relation to the world. Paulus' awareness of the need to oppose those philosophies and theologies which were contrary to his own, together with his knowledge of Aristotelian philosophy and his mastery of the technique of dialectic gave him the ability to approach these problems from a commanding position. However, he does not seem to have in any way gone beyond those main lines of Christian apologetics which had already been laid down in the existing Christian Arabic literature. In other words one could say that Paulus lacked originality and the power of free speculation.

Georg Graf considered that the great merits of the writings of Paulus ar-Râhib were his clarity in the exposition of his subjects, the simplicity of his language, the concrete way in which he presented abstract problems, the variety of literary forms which he employed, and his moderation in dealing with his adversaries.

The extant works attributed to Paulus ar-Râhib number no more than eight. All of these have been edited and with one exception are contained in the collected editions of texts made by Cheikho and his collaborators. These works are all of an apologetical nature and are addressed to dissident Christians, to Muslims and to Jews. Two of these which have bearing on this thesis will now be studied. (A third treatise was studied earlier in Chapter One, Section Two).

The first of these to be considered is entitled "al-'aqida

áníya yâbtawâ sharâ al-ma'îbid lil 'umam 'alâ khîlîfî al-sinâtiha
In the first part of this treatise Paulus ar-Râhib uses the literary device of a dialogue between two groups of people. On one hand there are the "Apostles" (al-fawâriq) and on the other there are the rest of mankind. It is of interest that Paulus makes himself the spokesman of the second category in that throughout "mankind" is referred to by the pronoun "we" and "they" is used for the Apostles.

Although this treatise is in the form of a dialogue between Christians and pagans, it would seem evident from the text that what Paulus ar-Râhib had in mind were Muslims, not pagans. It hardly seems likely, also, that a bishop in Syria in the 12th century would find it necessary to write a pastoral treatise concerned with paganism. It is more likely that this is a convenient device for showing Muslims as being unbelievers from the Christian point of view, without the disagreeable necessity of addressing them directly in such terms.

There is no difference between the approach of Paulus to Trinitarian doctrine in this treatise and in another treatise entitled "risâla 'aqîqa fi wujûd il-bâri' ta'âlâ wa kamâlâtihî wa aqânîmihî." (58) In the latter treatise the presentation of Trinitarian doctrine is explicitly designed to refute Muslim imputation of polytheism to Christians.

There is a preamble in which mankind is depicted as without religion and displeasing to God until God in his mercy desired to save them from the hands of Iblîs, their enemy, and bring them into the kingdom of heaven. Therefore God sent his disciples to all parts of the world and to all men, explaining the Torah and Gospel to them in their own languages. Their message was that God had sent them to deliver men from unbelief and from the worship of stars and of the elements and to save them from hell-fire. They invited men to
worship the true God, besides whom there was no God, who had no partner in lordship, whom none resembled in divinity, who had no equal in eternity, who was without body or parts and whom no space contained. The true God was without beginning or end, He was hidden in His essence but apparent in His deeds, maker of all things out of nothing, knower of secrets before their genesis. He creates and destroys at will, raises the dead to life and grants eternal rewards and punishments. All this is a description of God’s attributes, He Himself is one jawhar in three aqānim, Father, Son and Holy Spirit.

It is at this point that the argument begins. The opposition expresses horror at these names given to God and says that they are unknown to their philosophers and theologians. How can one be three, or three one? How can there be a father and son together since a father must precede a son? How can there be a son without begetting? These assertions are inconsistent with the clear statements of the unity of God made at the beginning. The Christian reply argues that there are two kinds of fatherhood and sonship, one coarse and material and represented by human generation and one light, delicate such as the birth of light from the sun. Both are created forms of birth but the latter form shows that there is at least a possibility of "refined" forms of birth.

The opposition then asks how three can be one and one three? The answer is that God is both one and three, just as we speak of the sun’s disc, light and warmth and yet there is only one sun. The argument then shifts to the names of the three aqānim and asks how Father, Son and Holy Spirit can each be God and yet there is only one God. Again the answer is in the form of an analogy. From a single ingot are formed a ring, a bracelet and a bangle. There are three items (aʿyān) but only one jawhar.
Although the opposition liked this explanation they hastened to question the Christians about the meaning of "jawhar", which they understood as having dimensions and occupying space. The argument again followed the line that there were two kinds of jawhar, coarse and refined. The refined jawhar as breath, intelligence and light do not occupy space. He who created them must be even more "refined". When asked why God was called "jawhar" the Christians replied that existent objects are either jawhar or accident. Jawhar is self-subsistent and accident is not; accident only exists in something other than itself. God is called jawhar to signify that He is self-subsistent. He is unlike created jawhar because the fact of their being created implies that they did not produce themselves. That which produces something else must be other than it.

The argument continues in the same vein, that is that men must of necessity apply to God the higher of any two possible epithets. Example, God is called living rather than non-living for two reasons, first, because living is higher than non-living and second because calling Him living excludes the possibility of "dying" from Him. Likewise He is rational, able to speak and thereby ignorance is excluded from Him. Now it is possible to demonstrate that the three qadim are the Father, who is the dhat, the nujj who is the Son and the life ghayb which is the Holy Spirit.

The Christian argument now uses the Muslim argument that cause and effect are mutually necessary one to the other. The second two qadim it is argued, are the effects of the first uqdim which is considered as being the first cause. The world, however, is not an effect of the first cause because the fact of its being other (than God) means that it must have come into existence and
that which has come into existence is not an effect of the first cause but rather the first cause is the efficient cause of (contingent Being).

The opposition then asked whether this living, speaking God was also all-hearing, all-seeing, all-powerful, generous, noble, merciful. When the Christian reply was yes they went on to suggest that living, and speaking were mere ṣifāt like the other epithets. The Christians replied by making a distinction between ṣifāt which belong to the jawhar of God and those which belong to other jawāhir and are applied to God in an analogical sense. The opposition then stated that ṣifāt are accidents but the Christians have now made them individual substances (aʿyān). The Christians went back to the distinction between coarse and light (refined) jawāhir and said that only ṣifāt of coarse jawāhir are called ʿarāq because their disappearance from the jawhar does not affect the nature of the jawhar, the ṣifāt of refined jawāhir are called ʿunwāt and are inseparable from these jawāhir. Thus the disappearance of the sun's light from the sun would mean the disappearance of the sun itself. In the Creator these ṣifāt are aʿyān, they are the aqānim of the all-Highest.

The gist of the Christian argument would seem to be that since the ṣifāt of the more refined jawāhir can not be separated from these jawāhir, even less can the ṣifāt of the Creator be separated from his jawhar; This was seen to be the touchstone of truth, it was because of this that Christians insisted on the one God unified in the jawhar, threefold in the aqānim of Father, Son and Holy Spirit. "Allāh al-wāḥid al-muwāḥhad bi-l-jawhar al-muthallath bi-l-aqānim al-ʿīb wa-l-ibn wa-r-rūḥ al-quḍūs." (60)

The argument now moves on to the subject of Christ. The opposition sees two opposing sets of actions described in the Gospel
as being performed by Christ; human and divine, regarded here as logically contradictory terms. The reply reiterates the three *sifāt* of God, that the Son is God’s Word and the Holy Spirit His Life. God at the end of time was generous to His creation and sent His Word without its being separated from Him, just as one sends a letter to a distant town. The words are sent without their ever being separated from the intelligence which is parent to the word. In the same way the sun’s light reaches men without there ever being any real distinction between the sun’s disc and its light. The Word took flesh of Mary the pure virgin in order to purify the nature of Adam which had been soiled by sin and to raise it up after its fall and to take it up to the highest grades. Thus He is eternal because He is the Word and temporal because He is the son of Mary. He worked miracles by the human nature and suffered pain in the human nature.

There follows a repetition of the "union of appearance" argument given in the first treatise (see Chap. I Sect. 2), using again the simile of the piece of red-hot iron. Thus the Son of God took a human nature (ṭabī‘a) in order to let His power shine through it. The 'letter' analogy of the preceding paragraph is again stressed, together with another analogy of the impossibility of separating the thought from the thinker.

When asked why God became man and suffered when He could have conquered Iblīs without this the Christians replied that this arose from God’s great generosity; also it was in order that Iblīs might not be able to boast that while God had vanquished him, yet he (Iblīs) had conquered man. The third reason for God’s becoming man was that He might teach us humility, lowliness and patience through deeds and not only through words.
The opposition then observed that in no way then did (He) bear the suffering and cross in His own nature. The Christian reply now stresses faith in an interesting way by quoting "he who believes in me will do greater than my works" (by works is here intended miracles, that is divine acts). Since it is belief in the Resurrection that makes men capable of "divine acts", the purpose of the Cross is to make possible in the hearts of believers deep faith in the Resurrection. The cross is emphasised in order to draw attention to the Resurrection.

At this point the opposition brings out its final objection. "Your worship a human being in association with God." The Christians emphasise the fact of two natures in Christ and that worship goes to the divine nature through the human. In the same way fire-worshippers worship the fire burning in wood, not the wood itself. It is in the same spirit that men honour a king by kissing his robe or his written word.

The opposition now capitulates, convinced by the intelligent arguments and logical exposition of Christian doctrine. They accept baptism in the Father, Son and Holy Spirit and obey the commands of the apostles to destroy the temples of the idols, building churches in their place.

In commenting on the treatise studied above one can say that there is no compromising on the basic Christian beliefs in the Trinity, Incarnation, redemption, salvation and Resurrection, which are put forward in the most positive way. What is suggested is that faith in the Resurrection of Christ and thus in the divine origin of Christ will enable the believer to perform divine acts, to become like the Creator. Creator and created, this had been the dominant Islamic religious theme. It was within that framework that human beings and human institutions must find their true shapes and
forms. This treatise of Paulus is a presentation of Christian doctrine set in the religio-cultural atmosphere of Islam. Creator and created are treated as mutually exclusive terms. There is only one way in which the problem can be solved. One term will have to be absorbed in the other, man will have to become God. If the Word took on a human nature, it was only as the first step towards man partaking of the divine nature, it was because in all things the initiative must come from the Creator.

It is now possible to consider within the context of Paulus' thought on basic Christian doctrine and his exposition of this in a Muslim environment his teaching on the Trinity. In his preliminary statements, which appear as an answer to an implicit question: Who is God? Paulus describes God in language characteristic of the Qur'an. God is a personal being, that is, He is described as knowing, making, creating, destroying, rewarding and punishing. It is taken for granted, therefore, that the relation between God and man is a personal one.

It would seem that the crucial point in this dialogue, if one may so term it, concerning the Trinity, was the Muslim awareness of this personal relationship between God and man, between Creator and created. Theirs was not the Judaistic concept of a covenant between God and a people chosen by Him, it was something more universal than that and yet still insistent on the relationship of the individual human being to God. To a Muslim then the idea of three "personalities" in the Godhead seemed at best an exaggeration and distortion of the moral unity of the Godhead. Likewise the Nicean definition of the Trinity as three hypostases and one ousia was not useful as a basis from which to discuss with Muslims. Nor could one start with the person of Jesus Christ because the person of Muhammad was more real and immediate to Muslims than that of Christ.
These difficulties were still as formidable in the time of Paulus ar-Rāhib as they had been in that of the earlier Christian Arabic apologists whom have been studied in the preceding pages and the evident inadequacies in his presentation of the Trinity, in the two treatises studied here must be judged in this light. (62)

The second part of the treatise under discussion is concerned with the Jews and with their relationship to Christianity. Again it is Paulus who takes it upon himself to present the non-Christian case. This part of the treatise has no bearing on the subject of this thesis and will therefore not be studied here.

The second of the treatises of Paulus ar-Rāhib to be considered was written by him in his capacity as Bishop of Ṣaidā to the Muslims resident in the town. The literary form is similar to that of the first treatise in that it is also in the form of a dialogue. Here the dialogue is openly between Muslims and Christians with Paulus taking the part of the Muslims and his fellow-bishops and theologians taking that of the Christians. The question and answer style of the first treatise is not adhered to so rigidly here and much more prominence is given in this treatise to the non-Christian point of view. The title of the treatise is “risāla Bilḥus usquf Ṣaidā ar-rāhib al-anṭāki qad arsalaha li-baʾdq maʿṣrifihī alladhīna bi-Ṣaidā min al-muslimīn.” (63)

After a preamble in which Paulus endeavours to establish from the Qurʾān itself the validity of the Christian religion, he tackles the main Muslim contention against the validity of the Christian religion, namely the doctrine of the Trinity which they saw as contrary to the oneness and unity of God. The reply he gives is positive; if only Muslims could realise that the endeavour of Christians in speaking of the Trinity is to render more precise the
statement that Almighty God is a living, intelligent being, then they would not object to it. "When we Christians observe things coming into being we know that something other than them brought them into being, for it would be illogical to suppose that they came to be by themselves. Thus we proclaim His existence and say that He is a being, yet unlike other beings since He is their creator. Beings can be divided into those that are living and those that are not, so to God we assign the higher of these two attributes and assert that He is living, thus denying that He is capable of corruption. Living being can be divided between rational and non-rational being, so again to God we assign the higher attribute and speak of Him as intelligent. These three names are the one God Who is and always has been a living, intelligent Being. For us Being is the Father, and the Son is Intelligence and Life is the Holy Spirit."

Paulus thus presents the doctrine of the Trinity as adding nothing but light and clarity to the traditional belief in the Uniqueness and Oneness of God.

Since Paulus in his first section had established the validity of the Christian Scriptures he is now able to draw on the Old Testament for instance of the words Father, Word and Spirit being applied to God. He then makes mention of four occasions in the Qur'ān where the words Word and Spirit occur in similar contexts.

Paulus then summarises by saying that the meaning of the Trinitarian doctrine is the under-lining of the fact that God has many gifāt and yet is the One God.

He then goes on to discuss the Incarnation. This he expounds as follows: the Son was begotten of the Father before all ages. This Son who is likewise the Word of God was sent (into the world) without any separation from the Father, just as the sun's rays reach us without any separation from the sun. Paulus then
deals with the objection raised in surat-ta-an'am where it is asked how God could have a son without having a female companion. Paulus stresses that the fatherhood of God is of a different kind from human fatherhood.

Paulus then takes surat-an-nisa'â (v. 153) "wa lâ galabîhu wa lâkin shubbiha labuhâ" and gives it a Christian interpretation to the effect that this verse means that Christ was crucified in His human nature and not in His divine nature. As in the first treatise he again compares the Union of the divine and human natures in Christ with the union of fire and iron in a heated piece of iron. He then sums up Trinitarian and Incarnation doctrine by comparing the Father, Word and Holy Spirit with the mind, speech and spirit of man and with the disc, light and heat of the sun and by reiterating the testimony given by the Christians' book, transmitted to them by the apostles.

The Muslims now object to the Trinitarian doctrine on the grounds that the terminology merely confuses the real issue about God, which is the question of His oneness. Why do Christians lay themselves open to misinterpretation by speaking of a Son? The Christian reply is that Muslims themselves use anthropomorphic language about God. If the Muslims' answer, that one must make an effort to understand the meaning rather than dwell on the external image is valid for them, then it is valid for Christians also.

Paulus concludes the discussion of the Trinity with a long list of negations concerning what the Trinity is not, of which the most important are; ishtirâk, tab'I'd, tashbîh since they figure in the Qur'an.

The discussion then turns to another subject concerning the nature of God. Christians describe God as jawhar on the grounds that whatever exists is either jawhar or accident'alâq. When Muslims
object that jawāhir occupy space, the same answer is given as in the
first treatise, namely that a distinction must be made between "coarse"
and "light" jawāhir. To the latter group belong soul, mind and light.
Since these "light" jawāhir do not have accidents in the strict sense,
even less would one find it possible to predicate them of God.

Now the discussion takes another turn. This time it is
a purely Christian intervention on the subject of Law. This they
regard as divided into "shar-i"at 'adl wa shar'i"at faqi." The law
of Moses came into the first category and was to be practiced until
it was firmly established in men. Then God Who is absolute per-
fec tion and generosity gave of His best in giving His Word a human
nature in order to show through it (the human nature) His power and
generosity. Since that which preceded this, that is, the law of
Moses, was meant to prefigure it and since it (the Incarnation) is of
the highest generosity, therefore anything further in the way of law
is unnecessary.

One last difficulty is raised and settled. Since the
Qur'ān and the Prophet praise Christians, their works and their
religion how is it possible for Christians to abandon something so
excellent, and, finally how can they follow him who has not come to
them but only to others? (the reference here is obviously to
Muhammad).

The end of the letter is a prayer for peace and good-will
between Christians and Muslims and a request that the dialogue be
carried on by any further queries which would be transmitted by him
(Paulus) to the bishops.

These two treatises of Paulus ar-Rāhib when read in con-
junction with those of Eutychius, Yaḥyā ibn 'Adī and Elias of Nisibis
are self-explanatory. There is in the work of this Melkite bishop
little more than a repetition of those original contributions of
Christian Arabic literature to the presentation of the Trinity, namely,
the metaphysical description by the Jacobite Yahya ibn 'Adi of the
Trinity in terms of causality and the definition by the Nestorian
Elia of Misis of the Godhead as a unity of Being, Wisdom and Life.
There is a slight difference in Paulus' use of the second description
in that instead of *zikma he uses *mutq.(64)

In his discussion of substances, in his use of material
imagery of the Trinity, for example, the sun, its rays and radiance
and in his approach to Christology Paulus shows little change from the
path laid down by Eutychius and St. John of Damascus.(65) Indeed what
is striking is that despite the Crusades, and Latin Christianity and
despite the troubled history of Christians in the Islamic Empire
during the intervening centuries, there is expressed in the work of
Paulus ar-Rahib an even stronger sense of affinity with his Muslim
neighbours and an even stronger will to engage in theological dialogue
with them. It is also of interest that despite his polemics against
the Christology of the Jacobites and Nestorians Paulus found no
difficulty in using in one and the same treatise quotations from both
Yahya ibn 'Adi and Elias of Misis together with arguments derived
from the traditional Melkite position. Lest it be thought that this
was a mere choice of weapons convenient for use in a polemical treatise
but not suited to a more weighty work it should be noted that the argu-
ments of Yahya and Elias appear also as an integral part of Paulus'
Trinitarian doctrine in his treatise "risala 'aqliya fi wujud il-bari'
ta'ala wa kamalatih wa aqanimihi".(66)
CHAPTER THREE

Discussion of the technical terms used by the writers studied in Chapter Two in their presentation of Trinitarian doctrine

In the previous chapter the expressions of Trinitarian doctrine by the four writers, Eutychius, Yaḥya ibn ‘Adī, Elias of Nisibis and Paulus ar-Rāhib were studied individually although an attempt was made to situate each writer against an intellectual background which would bring out those characteristics which had most bearing on the subject of the present thesis. The Kitāb al-Burhān of Eutychius was compared and contrasted with the De Fide Orthodoxa of St. John of Damascus; Yaḥya ibn ‘Adī’s theology was set in relief against certain metaphysical theses attributed to his master in philosophy, al-Fārābī; the Christian apologetics of Elias of Nisibis were immediately followed by the subtle misinterpretation of his presentation of the Trinity by al-Juwaini; finally, the work of Paulus ar-Rāhib was seen as an attempt to synthesise the presentations of Trinitarian doctrine studied in the three previous writers, namely, the final distillation of patristic teaching on the Trinity re-styled to suit the Islamic environment, the statement of the Trinity in terms of Aristotelian causality and the Christian Arabic scholastic treatment of the doctrine. Each of these writers used technical terms to define his teaching; some of these were held in common while others were not. It is therefore an essential part of this thesis to determine as far as possible what meaning each term held for each writer. Only in this way will it be possible to determine whether there was a development in Trinitarian doctrine during the Islamic Empire or whether the tasks of apologetics and polemics were too urgent for any lasting concepts of positive importance to be formed. Therefore the key words and phrases used by each of
the four writers will be studied individually although where possible reference will be made to contemporary external evidence which supports the interpretations suggested in this thesis.

Section One

Butychius of Alexandria

It would seem best to start with a brief reiteration of the passages in which Patriarch Butychius refers to the Trinity. His first reference is to Allah and His (kalimat Allah) who is the (kalimat Allah) which joins together the jawhar of Allah with the jawhar of a man to form Jesus Christ. Furthermore this (kalima) is "established, subsisting, everlasting, . . . . . not like our word which has no (jawam) and which is dissipated into the air, but a Word with a (jawam) living, complete, not separated from Him but established in Him forever . . . ." Like man's reason and word, God and His Word are one (shay') in nature because of their conjunctions in a single (nafs); they differ likewise in that the function of one is to beget and the function of the other is to be begotten.

Again like man's word God's Word has a (qawam), again they differ in that God's Spirit has a (jawam) while man's has not. This Spirit must be an (jawar) of God with its own (jawam). These (jawam) are the Father, the Son and the Holy Spirit, three names for three (prosopoi) in the jawhar of the one God. The Father is characterised by begetting, the Son by begottenness and the Holy Spirit by procession.

Having given an "internal" description of the Trinity Butychius then proceeds to give an "external" picture. Allah is the supreme exemplar in that it is His reason which is the creator of
reasons, His Word which is the creator of words and His Spirit which is the creator of spirits. "He (the Creator God) is a pre-eternal reason, begetting the Word and causing the Spirit to proceed. He is thus one pre-eternal Father . . . . the beginning of everything and the (posab) of everything . . . . He is the creator of everything, and alone the Father of the Word by the nature of the jawhar."

"His Word, too, is pre-eternal. He is the unique Son of God begotten from the Father before all times . . . ."

It was noted above that (jihāt) was used of the members of the Trinity; further on Eutychius gives (muḥān) as a misleading term for members of the Trinity and therefore one which should not be used.

Eutychius summed up his Trinitarian teaching as follows:

"The exposition of the unity of God's jawhar has now been completed. It (His jawhar) is His (tabī'a) and His (kiyān) and the threefoldness of His (qawāmāt), these being His (aqīnām) and the (jihāt) of knowledge ('ilm), Word and Spirit. Qawām may be explained as something which remains fixed and permanent in its condition, never changing or moving."

It is obvious that for Eutychius God's essence, nature and being are three different ways of looking at the one thing. It is also clear that for him the (qawāmāt) are three distinct objects, each equally God. It was shown in the earlier discussion of the Kitāb-al-Burhān that Eutychius' doctrine is substantially the same as the patristic summaries compared in the De Fide Orthodoxa of St. John of Damascus. There would seem to be no room for doubt that (kiyān) represents being as jawhar represents OUSIA and qawāmāt represents hypostases. (69)

The technical meaning of jihāt is less clear. On a simple linguistic basis it would seem to refer to prosopon; yet it is important to note that Eutychius must have intended by its use an
abstract sense of this term, for he uses the concrete wujūh as an example of misleading terminology which would incur the accusation of polytheism.

The word uqūnūm appears in two key passages only of the Kitāb al-Burāh. One is that cited above and the other, referred to the discussion in the previous chapter, is used in Eutychius' discussion of the Incarnation in which he states that one does not give birth to ḥalālū but to an uqūnūm. Christ's hu'mūn has the uqūnūm of the Son of God. The question now arises; if gawām is the equivalent of hypostasis and ḥu'mūn implies an abstract sense of prosopon, what is the technical sense in which Eutychius uses the term uqūnūm? (65) This term, which is the modern Arabic translation of persons, only appears in Classical Arabic as in connection with the Christian doctrine of the Trinity. Certain lexicons tend to regard uqūnūm as a textual corruption of guyyām, in turn a corruption of gawām. (66) It is not disputed that this corruption could have occurred in certain texts but it does not seem adequate as an account of the origin of the word uqūnūm since, as was remarked above, the word gawām would seem to have been an adequate translation of hypostasis.

It is necessary therefore to look elsewhere for the origin of the Arabic term uqūnūm. In chapter Two, Section Three, Elias of Misisibis was quoted as referring to uqūnūm as being originally a Syriac word. Since Elias was well-known as a scholar in both Syriac and Arabic there would not seem to be any reason to doubt this statement. It remains then to discover as far as possible what this term conveyed in Syriac at the time of its acceptance as the Arabic term for member of the Trinity. From the evidence of the usages of Elias of Misisibis and of Eutychius it would seem to have become established in Arabic sometime in the 10th century. In an appendix to Part One
Vol. II of his "Islam and Christian Theology" Dr. Sweetman says that, the Syro-Arabic lexicons give the following Arabic meanings for the Syriac word qnāmā transliterated into Arabic as aqmām, namely "shakhs hidden person," also "nafsā" pertaining to self. It is outside the scope of this thesis to enter into a discussion of the long and complicated history of the usage of the term in Syriac. Although many aspects of its usage have yet to be fully explored two points seem to be clear: qnāmā is extensively used in the Syriac Old and New Testaments with a reflexive meaning akin to "self" or "ipse," and it was used by the Nestorians as a translation of the Cappadocian understanding and usage of the word hypostasis. It has also been suggested that in addition to these fairly well established meanings qnāmā may have received some of the force of the Greek gnome.

In addition to these meanings put forward by Dr. Sweetman and by the Nestorians, it seems in the light of the studies made during the course of this thesis that yet another Greek word may have influenced the development of meaning of qnāmā, namely oeconomia, which was used in a presentation of the Trinity made by St. Hippolytus and also to a lesser extent by Tertullian, whose contribution to this particular line of development of doctrine has been overshadowed by his more familiar Trinitarian doctrine based on persona. Oeconomia was of course the regular Greek term used to designate the Incarnation and the place of the Incarnation in human history. Its use by St. Hippolytus may have been motivated by a desire to assimilate the terminology of Trinitarian doctrine to that of the Incarnation and of grace. (70)

It would seem then that at the time of its entry into Arabic terminology qnūmā, when used in connection with the Godhead, would have retained both its reflexive and its objective senses.
It would seem likely also that the emphasis of the term was on the inner meaning of the thing specified and not on the outward appearance.

Thus the Trinitarian terminology of Eutychius does not present any major problems. He was chiefly concerned to translate into Arabic the teaching contained in De Fide Orthodoxa but his two uses of an uqmim would seem to imply that he was making an attempt to add elements of Trinitarian doctrine developed from sources other than those used by St. John of Damascus.

Section Two

Yaḥyā ibn ‘Adī

It is not necessary to traverse again the complicated arguments of the thesis of Yaḥyā ibn ‘Adī studied in Chapter two. Rather his terminology will be reviewed in the light of what is currently understood to have been the usage of those terms in early Islamic theological and philosophical speculation. In passing it should be noted that although in this treatise Yaḥyā does not use uqmim there exists one treatise of his "jawāb ash-shaikh Yaḥyā ibn ‘Adī ‘an masā’il sa’ala’annah sā’il fil-aqānīm ath-thalātha al-illāh ‘āl-mithal‘il-wahid" in which this term is used. (7) The discussion in this latter treatise is more general but it does not differ substantially from the main lines of his thought put forward in the treatise studied in this thesis. It suffices to note that the term uqmim was known to him although it did not suit his purpose to use it extensively.

In the beginning of the treatise it was noted that Yaḥyā ibn ‘Adī began by stating that his intention was "to show forth the soundness of the Christians' belief that the Creator is one jawhar
and three gifāt, each one of which is other than the other two in maʿna. In the concluding passage of the section in which he sets out the mirror analogy Yahyā made as a summary the statement that in so far as it was an image the object was one. In so far as the image existed in three aḥwāl or, if it was preferred, three gifāt, it was three. Thus the image had become multiple by reason of its gifāt.

In the section in which Yahyā employed the mind, thinker and thought analogy he stated that the mind was a dhāt and that the meaning of its existence did not include the meanings of its existence as thinker (ʿaqil) or as thought (maʿqūl). Also that he who was one dhāt would contain three gifāt, for he is ʿaqīl and ʿaqīl and maʿqūl. A little further on naʿt is employed in the meaning of gifā.

In both the first and second sections Yahyā uses the words sabab and ʿilla interchangeably.

Two other meanings are given for the word gifā, namely maʿqūl, and khāṣṣa. Thus in this treatise Yahyā uses either as synonyms or as explanations of his term gifā the following words naʿt, hāl, maʿqūl and khāṣṣa. In addition to these it should be noted that Yahyā uses the term qawām once and that in the sense of hypostasis or "subsistent."

Finally it should be noted that Yahyā uses ʿilla and sabab interchangeably in both the first and second sections.

It is clear from the title of the treatise... one jawhar and three gifāt" and also from the twin facts (a) that the term jawhar does not appear again until the conclusion and (b) that gifā is throughout explained by associating with it several other words that Yahyā ibnʿAdī intends his definition of jawhar and gifā to emerge
during the course of the treatise. In other words he is not arguing from two given premises, jawhar and gifa, rather he is using these words as convenient instruments for conveying the Christian doctrine of the Trinity. The meaning which he will give to them will be derived from the doctrine and not vice versa.

Thus it would seem best to start the discussion of Yahya's terminology with the word ḍhāt. This word is used throughout with the consistent meaning of essence. Contrasted with it is the notion of existence (wujūd). (72)

In this light it is possible to begin the discussion of gifa which is now seen to be connected with the notion of essence from which existence has been abstracted. (73) It was stated above that gifa is throughout the treatise associated with other terms. The first of these to be considered is ḥāl. (Naʾūr need not be considered for it does not appear to have any other significance other than epithet) ḥāl a term used in metaphysics, logic and Muslim theology. In the first two of these disciplines it implies the mode of something which is subject to change while in Muslim theology it implies a quality belonging to an existent thing but which is itself neither existent nor non-existent. (74) In this view ḥāl is a kind of universal. In relation to Allah these ḥāl were seen as being His qualities e.g. "being a knower" ('ālimya). However this doctrine was soon regarded as heterodox and was discarded by official kalām. It remains to decide which of these three uses of the term ḥāl was the one which Yahya ibn ʿAdī had in mind in this treatise. Now since in logic and in metaphysics ḥāl contains the notion of change it is difficult to see that Yahya could have used the term as it was used in either of these two disciplines because the notion of change in the eternal Godhead is impossible to entertain. Thus the Muslim theological
usage would seem to be the most likely, namely that ḫāl was seen as a quality belonging to an existent thing but which was itself neither existent nor non-existent. Al-Jūwainī who was opposed to the use of this concept in relation to God was to define ḫāl as the extension of a substance, that is, something added to the existence which has for its own attribute neither non-existence nor existence. (75) Still it is necessary to bear in mind that in this treatise Yahyā uses ḫāl as one of several epithets describing his term sīfa and a final decision on the sense in which he employed each term must wait until the discussion of each has been undertaken.

The next term to be considered is mawjūd. Mawjūd in metaphysics has the wide sense of maqīl or else it has a narrower sense of the subject in which an accident (‘araq) is said to inhere. In logic mawjūd is synonymous with maqīl and is thus opposed to maqīl (attribute). It is probably unwise to try and fix on any one of these usages as being exactly that which Yahyā had in mind especially as all these terms were probably not as precisely defined in his time as they were later, but the general trend is clear enough. It would seem that in describing sīfa as a mawjūd he was implying that in his usage in this treatise sīfa had the sense of a subject.

Finally there is the term khāṣṣa. This term implies that which is the property of a being or that which can be predicated of a being. Either usage would fit in with the previous epithets applied to Yahyā’s use of the word sīfa.

To sum up - it would seem that in this treatise Yahyā ibn ‘Adī was using sīfa in the sense of an essential quality which could be predicated of a being and yet which was itself a subject of which something could be predicated. This tentative meaning of sīfa has the merit of harmonising with the Christian term hypostasis.
Then in this treatise Ya'qūb would imply by jawhar and ḥifā an abstract essence which had essential qualities. These essential qualities would also be subjects of which particular existence (wujūdha 'ain) could be predicted. Also Ya'qūb would seem to identify the abstract essence (dhat) with the Father who is one of the ḥifāt and also the cause of the other two ḥifāṭinā. Then since the Father as ḥifā is a mawqūf with a particular existence essence and existence would seem to be finally one in Him.

In his use of ma'na in the title of the treatise Ya'qūb would seem to be stressing that in the last resort any terms used for the Trinity are but attempts to put the mystery before the human mind in an intelligible fashion. The aim set out in this treatise and in others is clearly that of defending the orthodox Christian doctrine of the Trinity in a religious and cultural climate different from that in which the doctrine had originally been formulated.

The remaining terms used by Ya'qūb ibn 'Adi can now be briefly reviewed. Ḥabī'a (nature) is used in the second section of his treatise in the statement that the Ḥabī'a of the Father, the Son and the Holy Spirit is one and the same. This is reiterated further on in the statement that the Son and the Spirit are one and equal in jawhar and Ḥabī'a etc. 'Aql, 'aqil and ma'qul although used here by Ya'qūb as a convenient analogy to describe the Trinity do probably also reflect the Aristotelian concept of God.

In conclusion it can be said that with Ya'qūb ibn 'Adi there begins the attempt by Christian Arabic writers to re-formulate the orthodox Christian doctrine of the Trinity in terms accessible to the Islamic religious and cultural climate. His contribution was twofold therefore, first the attempt to provide a terminology for the
existing doctrine and secondly by the due application of the principle of causality Yahya opened a line of development of the doctrine for the future.

Section Three

Elias of Nisibis

In his treatise "risāla fī waḥdanyat il-khāliq wa tahlith agānimīhī" which was studied in Chapter Two, Elias of Nisibis uses a distinctive terminology. He expands his short title by stating that he intends to show what is meant by the statement that Allah is "one jawhar and three agānim". He takes as a preliminary assumption that Christians and Muslims are in agreement as to what is meant by the oneness of God. Having described Allah as "jawhar", Elias further defines Him as "qa'īm bi-nafsīhī". He then gives the Syriac term for "qa'īm bi-nafsīhī". This is "kiyān". Elias then says that the (Syriac) term for that which is neither accident nor general substance (kiyān 'āmm) is "uqānim"

Further on Elias makes a reference to the kiyān of Allah and also to His dhāt. He follows this by making a distinction between (qifāt dhātiyya) and (qifāt fi'ilīya) and says that the names of attributes pertaining to the essence of God belong to one of these two categories. Later Elias makes a further clarification in his terminology when he says in effect that qifāt should be reserved as a term for the qifāt fi'ilīya such as al-irāda wa-l-jūd wa-r-rāhma and that agānim in the sense of khāwāq dhātiyya should be used for adh-dhāt wa-l-ḥikma wa-l-ḥayāt.

It would seem then that Elias uses jawhar with the sense of qa'īm bi-nafsīhī. He then gives kiyān as the Syriac for qa'īm bi-nafsīhī and follows this later by referring to the dhāt and to the kiyān of Allah together. Thus kiyān could either have the connotation...
of \( dh\text{"} \) which itself does not seem to bear any other interpretation than essence, or it could have been used there to imply existence, as a distinct concept from essence. Further on Elias states that \( k\text{\dh\text{"}} \) in Syriac means a self-existent being and this would bring it more into line with "substance". Probably the point of the whole discussion is that Elias is determined to show as clearly as possible that when the Christians apply the term jawhar to God they do not use it in the sense in which the mutakallim\(\text{\text{"}} \)s used this term.

\( Q\text{\' \text{"} im bi-nafsihi \) does not seem to differ radically in meaning or intent from \( Q\text{\' \text{"} im bi-dh\text{"} t\text{"} hi. \) If there should be implied by the use of \( naf\text{"} \) a suggestion of \( naf\text{"} \) in the sense of the form of a living thing then it might appear that Elias, by using \( Q\text{\' \text{"} im bi-nafsihi \) rather than \( Q\text{\' \text{"} im bi-dh\text{"} t\text{"} hi, \) was intending his terminology to be taken in a less abstract sense than would have been implied by the use of the latter term. Neither of these two terms would seem to have been finally approved for application to Allah by orthodox kal\(\text{\text{"}} \). Al-T\(\text{\text{"}} \)ft\(\text{\text{"}} \)s\(\text{\text{"}} \)n\(\text{\text{"}} \) describes Allah as \( d\text{"}h-dh\text{"} t\text{"} al-wajib al wuj\(\text{\text{"}} \) (the necessarily existent essence). (77)

By \( g\text{\text{"} if\text{"} } \) Elias evidently intends to imply the Muslim theological use of the term, that is that they are attributes derived from the Quranic names of God. (78) It is not necessary here to compare Elias' division of these attributes with those made by the mutakallim\(\text{\text{"}} \)s. It is his intention to show that the a\(\text{\text{"} gn\text{"} \) are not epithets but that they are real entities. This is reinforced by his use of \( kh\text{\text{"} w\text{"} } \) to explain \( g\text{\text{"} if\text{"} } \). Thus Elias is perhaps adding to the theological term \( g\text{\text{"} if\text{"} } \) the implications of the metaphysical term \( k\text{\text{"} h\text{"} s\text{"} } \), that is the notion of the property of a being or of that which can be predicated of a being. \( Kh\text{\text{"} w\text{"} } \) is further qualified by \( d\text{"} h\text{"} t\text{"} l\text{"} y\text{"} \) and thus Elias makes it clear that he is stressing that the a\(\text{\text{"} gn\text{"} \) belong
It now remains to compare the terminology of Elias of Mähdis with that of Yahya ibn 'Adi. Firstly, while both use jawhar, when applied to Allah, as implying dhāt, there is it would seem to be a slight difference in that for Yahya dhāt is completely abstracted from existence while in Elias' treatise it is employed in a less abstract sense. Secondly, by gisāt both Elias and Yahya intend to imply "essential qualities" although for Elias the theological import of the term is more important than the metaphysical while in Yahya's treatise the usage, with the possible proviso of the slight theological tincture of hāl, is purely metaphysical.

Thirdly, Elias does not use qawān in his treatise while Yahya used it once in his.

The fourth and most important term to be considered is uqnum. As was seen in Section Two, this term was known to Yahya ibn 'Adi as the Arabic term for member of the Trinity. He certainly understood this term as implying hypostasis. It is not clear from his other treatises whether he understood uqnum as having other shades of meaning than hypostasis although the reflexive and objective senses of the Syriac word would seem perhaps to be brought out in his distinctive analogical treatment of the doctrine of the Trinity. At any rate it is clear from his apologetic work as a whole that his intention was to defend and expound the orthodox Christian formulation of the doctrine in the Islamic climate. Any other considerations were purely secondary to this main purpose.

For Elias on the other hand it is the Syriac word which is uppermost in his mind. From his treatise is gained more light on the Syriac connotations of uqnum since he states that in Syriac uqnum means that which is neither accident nor general substance.

to the dhāt.
This statement perhaps implies that *quilm* was a metaphysical term as well as a theological term. It is not possible in this thesis to unravel all the possible meaning of the Syriac word *quilm*. It seems reasonable to suppose however that by the time of Elias of Nisibis the Arabic world *quilm* had the connotations of hypostasis together with those of its Syriac theological and metaphysical background. To these two groups of connotations, it can be argued, should be added a third. This is the causal connotation contributed by Yahyā ibn 'Adī; for although Elias makes no mention of Yahyā and his work it is clear from his argument that in his view *likma* and *hayāt* stem necessarily from the *dhīt*. It is an essential part of any formulation of the doctrine of the Trinity that some attention be paid to the relationships between the members and the only relationship immediately discernible from Elias' treatment is that of necessary causality.

It would seem that in Elias' treatise there is another colouring given to the notion of causality. This is revealed in the choice and arrangement of the names chosen by Elias for the three members of the Trinity. Certainly the choice was chiefly determined by the need to use names which corresponded to the "attributes" of the Muslim theologians as well as to those of names of God revealed in the Christian Scriptures. Yet there is a connection between these three names or rather there is a connection in the analogy behind these. While being is the source, yet wisdom and life are essential to the full reality. God is a living, rational being. Since created living beings are composed of organs, God can be visualised as super-organic, a Being in Whom can be seen mirrored the human consciousness of essential individuality and yet of equally essential collectivity. Yahyā had referred to the
nujtam' of the Godhead. Elias is not so explicit and yet there would seem to be implied in his treatment of the Trinity a similar social anthropomorphic preconception. Thus causality and organic development when seen in the light of the Scriptural and other definitions of the Christian Trinity would cease to be abstract and remote notions and would regain a primal living force which could be rationally applied to the rejuvenation of individual men and of human society. While this interpretation of Elias' thought may seem tenuous it is lent substance by the possibility of the influence on the Syriac word qmâh of the Greek ecstatica. This was discussed in the first section of this chapter.

In sum then one can say that the treatise of Elias of Moisibis studied in this chapter and in chapter two show that the Christian Arabic terminology to express the doctrine of the Trinity had developed from the time of Eutychius and that the influence of the Islamic environment was instrumental in causing Christian theological divisions to be overridden in this particular field of doctrine at least.

Section Four

Paulus ar-Râhîb

In the early part of the first treatise of Paulus ar-Râhîb he made a distinction between the attributes of God and God Himself Who is "one Jawhar in three aqânîm, Father, Son, and Holy Spirit." When discussing an analogy of the Trinity Paulus refers to three a'yân in one jawhar. Next he explains what he intends to convey by describing God as jawhar. Jawhar is to be understood as [(gâ'îm bi-dhatihi)]

The three aqânîm are said by Paulus to be adh-dhât, an-nuq, and al-ḥayât. When asked why "living" and "speaking" were not mere...
epithets like "all-hearing" etc. Paulus replied with a distinction between ǧīfṭat ḏhāṭiyya and ǧīfṭat used of God in an analogical sense only. The opposition retorted that all ǧīfṭat were accidents but that Christians had made them ʾāyān. To this Paulus replied that the term ʾarād was only used for the ǧīfṭat of coarse essences; the ǧīfṭat of light essences were ǧūwāṭ and were inseparable from their essences. "In the Creator these ǧīfṭat are ʾāyān; they are the aqānim of the all-Highest."

The vocabulary of the second treatise does not contain any variations on the terminology of the first treatise considered.

In Paulus ar-Rāhib's usage the Christian theological term jawhar has now developed further in that it signifies not only ḏhāṭ but also ǧāʾīn bi-ḏhāṭiyya. The Syriac term kīyān would seem to have been assimilated into jawhar. The names of the three aqānim are given by Paulus as adh-ḏhāṭ, an-ṇutq and al-ḥayāt. The change from the usage of Elías of Misibis is in the use of an-ṇutq in place of al-ḥikma. Possibly this change was made to facilitate the combining of Elías' statement of the doctrine of the Trinity with the demonstration of Trinitarian doctrine given by Eutychius, on which Paulus would seem to have drawn heavily for his basic exposition; that is, Paulus has adh-ḏhāṭ and an-ṇutq and al-ḥayāt corresponding to al-ḥikma and al-ḥikma and ar-ʾarād. An-ṇutq is nearer to al-ḥikma than is al-ḥikma while it still conveys the notion of rational Being.

It is to be noted with regard to Paulus' use of the term ǧīfṭat that he distinguishes among the ǧīfṭat of God in a different way from Elías. Again this would seem to be in order to combine the essential point of Elías' argument with the doctrine contained in the Kitāb al-Furban. In referring to the ǧīfṭat of light substances ǧūwāṭ rather than as ʾarād Paulus would seem to be
echoing a statement of Eutychius. A similar statement is also to be found in the De Fid. Orth., where the essential powers of God are discussed.

Finally Paulus ar-Raḥib says that in the Creator these ḫifāt (or qūwāt) are a‘yānī. By this he would seem to imply that the ḫifāt or aqānim or qūwāt are hypostases. It is to be noted that qawāmāt is no longer used for hypostases.

In the terminology of Paulus ar-Raḥib there does not appear to be any new contribution to the development of the doctrine. Rather there is an attempt to synthesise the traditional Melkite presentation with the doctrine of Elias of Nisibis. It was noted in Chapter Two that Paulus explicitly states the causal conception of Yahyā ibn 'Aṭī without comment.

Section Five

Before closing this chapter concerned with terminology it seems useful to refer to a statement of ash-Shahrastānī mentioned in Chapter One, Section Two, in which he writes of the perfection of God (according to the Christian view) as consisting in the jawhar and the ḥifāt, while the perfection of man consisted in the shakhṣ and the ḥifāt. The comparison is presumably between the unique God and the individual human.

Since ash-Shahrastānī does not attempt any comparison between ḥifāt and aqānim it would seem possible that for him aqānim did not bear an anthropomorphic connotation, that is, they were not visualised as individual persons.
CONCLUSION

It is the conclusion of this thesis that in each of the texts studied in Chapter Two there is internal evidence for the view that the exposition of the doctrine of the Trinity by the early Christian Arabic writers was influenced by the Islamic religious and cultural environment; that this influence was not only general and diffuse but that it also affected the choice of terms and their precise definitions; that though the Islamic influence produced apologetics of a negative kind, it also provoked an attempt to study afresh the traditional presentation of the Trinity and to formulate the relationships within the Trinity in a positive manner; that furthermore the approach of the Christian Arabic writers to the question of the relationships within the Trinity was different from that of Latin Scholastics and of sufficient originality to deserve its own place in the history of the development of Christian doctrine.
NOTES

1. The works of L.E. Browne, J.W. Sweetman and R. Walser have been referred to during the preparation of this section. References will be found in the bibliography. These works, together with those of L. Gardet and M.M- Anawati, were found to be invaluable in the provision of general information. The stand-point adopted in this thesis differs, however, from those of the scholars enumerated above in that here Arabic Christian theology is viewed as a phenomenon worthy of study in its own right. It is suggested that when full studies of the development of Christian doctrine within the Islamic Empire have been undertaken, it will be necessary to take the contributions of the Arabic Christian writers into account when future assessments are made of the whole Christian inheritance of mediaeval theology and philosophy.


4. L.E. Browne chaps. 4-5 Eclipse of Christianity in Asia.

5. L.E. Browne, J.W. Sweetman, also the evidence in the treatise studied in this thesis.

6. This remark is a reiteration of that made in the Introduction where it was suggested that metaphysics provided the main cultural bond between Christians and Muslims in the early Islamic period.


9. Kitāb al Burhān. Section 7

10. " " " " 8
11. " " " " 13
12. " " " " 12
13. " " " " 10
14. " " " " 20
15. " " " " 31
16. " " " " 34

17. The suggestion that jihat may be a translation of personae comes from the writer of this thesis. Further on it is pointed out that Eutychius mentions wujūh as an unacceptable term for members of the Trinity.

18. Kitāb al Burhān. Section 36

19. " " " " 53
20. " " " " 54
21. " " " " 55
22. " " " " 64
23. " " " " 66
24. " " " " 69
25. " " " " 71
26. " " " " 109
27. " " " " 110
28. " " " " 123
29. " " " " 139
30. " " " " 147 and 148

There would seem to be in Eutychius and in the later written studies in this thesis a tendency to reserve the fullness of "personal" qualities to the Father alone.

 unicode has not been translated at all in this thesis and least of all would it be translated as persona since the word developed in a context where the proper name of the Deity, Allah, was undeniably endowed with "personal" qualities. There is a noticeable reluctance to endow the Son and the Spirit with "personal" qualities which seem to be reserved for God the Father. It will be seen later in the work of Elias of Mishibis and in that of Paulus ar-Rahib that this led to the same term being applied (a) to the nature of God and (b) to the Father.


Introd. p. 1.

34. The following notes are drawn from the art. "Trinité" in the Dict. Theol. Cath. and also from G. L. Prestige, God in Patristic Thought.

It is not necessary to cite the many references by the Apostle Paul to the Father, the Son and the Spirit as a joint, interconnected reality, nor yet the references to the "God and Father of our Lord Jesus Christ." Of more interest here are the pointers to the means by which Christians may attain a deeper understanding of the mystery of God which St. Paul offers. This means is the tool of analogy and specifically the analogy between the nature of man and the nature of God. Thus in I Cor. 2: 10-12 a parallel is drawn between the spirit of man and the spirit of God. Throughout Ephesians St. Paul teaches that there is an organic connection between the unity of God and the unity of Christians. In Romans 8: 9-11 St. Paul makes clearer how this organic connection is brought about; through the indwelling of Jesus Christ Christians become partakers of the
vivifying Spirit of Jesus Christ.

St. John's Gospel again makes use of the principle of analogy and it is only here and in the Book of Revelations that is found the first use of "Word" as the equivalent of "Son".

Developing a theme of St. John's Gospel St. Irenaeus says that it is the Spirit Who leads them to the Father. He also stresses that the Father, Son and Spirit are known to men by reason of the specific relationship of men to each of the three.

With the Apologists of the second century there begins the first attempt to arrange the Father, Son and Spirit into some sort of rational order. For St. Justin, the Father is the Creator, Jesus Christ is the Son Who is the Word and Who is in a second rank after the Father, and the prophetic Spirit Who is in the third rank. God is seen as the cause of being in all others than Him. It is at this point that difficulties arose over the use of "Word" as the equivalent of "Son". "Word" carried two distinct meanings at this time; the first of these was the Greek logos which referred either to spoken expression or to implicit rationality and the second was derived from its use in Scriptures where it implied theophany.

Perhaps in an attempt to combine the two meanings St. Justin and his pupil Tatian referred to the double state of the Word, that is, the Word considered as immanent and the Word considered as expressed. St. Irenaeus did not follow St. Justin in this device of the double state of the Word. (It is of interest, however, that with St. Theophilus of Antioch he concurred in referring to the Holy Spirit as Wisdom. (It may be that this terminology implied another attempt to bring together the philosophical and Scriptural meanings of "Word", that is, that the prophetic Spirit may in a sense be the expression of the immanent Word of God.) At any rate, it is to St. Irenaeus
that we are indebted for the great image of the Trinity which sums up the positive development of Trinitarian doctrine in the first two centuries. It is that of the two hands of God; the first hand is the Son Who is to reveal the Father to men and the second hand is the Spirit Who is to sanctify souls. The use of the metaphor of hand is doubly significant, firstly because it is the graphic Scriptural term to denote the power of God, thus for men the Son and the Spirit are both equal manifestations of God’s might, and secondly because its use by St. Irenaeus seems to imply that personality in the modern sense would seem to have been reserved by him to the Father.

35. Graf - vol II pp. 233-9
36. Petits Traité s apologisti ques de Yahyà Ben 'Adî - Augustin Périer
37. Paul Sbath - Vingt Traité s phil. et apol. d'auteurs arabe s chrétiens du IXe au XIe siècle.
38. I.E. Browne - p.10
39. W. Montgomery Watt - Islamic Philosophy and Theology p.43
40. Graf II pp. 220-2
41. Périer p. 53
42. Cheikho - Vingt Traité s de théologie et philosophie chrétiens. pp. 70 - 75.
43. The following notes, with the exception of the part in parenthesis, were drawn from the article "Trinité" in the Dict. Theol. Cath. and from "God in Patristic Thought" by G.L. Prestige.

It had been the combined efforts of the Cappadocian Fathers which had brought about the slow abatement of the strong theological and personal rivalries which had been engendered in the East by the whole Trinitarian controversy of the 4th century. At any rate it was their combined efforts supplemented by the work of St. John of Damascus which was to provide the Christians of the
Islamic Empire with the philosophic justifications of their belief in the Trinity. This is not to say that the Cappadocians solved all the theological problems occupying the minds of the Eastern bishops during the period before the Christological controversies of the fifth and sixth centuries. (On the contrary it is a part of this thesis to assert that certain positive tendencies in the theology of those who had disliked the use of homoousia as were to make a reappearance in a more propitious time during the Islamic Empire. These were the pre-occupation with the unity of God which were found already in St. Lucian of Antioch and the pre-occupation with the integrity of Jesus Christ. (It is tempting to see in this the existence of a Syrian approach to theology as distinct from those of Hellenism and of the Latin West but the establishment of the existence of such a school still requires a great deal of research and an even greater amount of historical re-orientation.)

It has been said that the role of the Cappadocians was to provide answers to the following questions; what is "person", why are there three of these in one God and what are the differences between these three "persons". For St. Basil ousia meant that which is common to individuals of the same species while hypostasis is the individual existent which possessés and is comprised of ousia. Thus he opposes hypostasis to ousia in the same way as particular is opposed to general and proper to common. Against the criticism that if the hypostases are numerically distinct then why are they not three gods St. Basil is firm that the divine nature is one in number. He illustrates his meaning by giving similes of God in the shape of the one rainbow which contains many colours, and of a king and his image, that is, there are two objects and yet these two are numerically one. St. Basil affirms orthodox doctrine by saying that it
is proper to the Father to be agennetos, to the Son to be gennetos and to the Holy Spirit to be known by men after the Son and for Him to take His substance from the Father. In sum, St. Basil insists on one God and three "persons" but he cannot be said to have clarified how the three persons are related to one another and to the Godhead.

St. Gregory of Nyssa carried speculation concerning the nature of the Trinity into another direction. He posed the problem as being essentially a question of what significance one gave to the word "God". If "God" is first and foremost a word describing a certain nature, then it is certainly possible to speak of one God with three hypostases. St. Gregory also saw the corollary which would follow this thesis, that there is a sense in which we can speak of their being only one man and in fact he developed this theme in a magnificent way. In sum, it depends on whether "God" is regarded as an abstract term or as a concrete being: if the former, then we shall inevitably arrive at three gods from our three hypostases, if the latter, we shall recognize one God in three hypostases.

Besides this interpretation of the word "God" St. Gregory of Nyssa offered another. He suggested that theos is really a noun derived from the verb theoreo "to oversee". Thus the name of God is essentially the name of an activity or operation. The operation or activity of God moves from the Father by the Son towards the Holy Spirit. Still this does not really solve the problem of how there is only one operator in the Godhead. Behind these speculations there lay his historical hypothesis that Christianity was the golden mean between Judaism and polytheism on the one hand and polytheism
on the other.

In St. Gregory Nazianeus we have an affirmation of the oneness of God. There is only one God because there is only one eternity. In God there is but one principle which is the Father; the Son and the Holy Spirit we know by faith as respectively generated by and proceeding from the first principle. Thus if we think of God as chiefly the first cause we shall see him as the monarchy (the single source); but if we consider rather those in whom the first principle resides we shall adore the three. Following the speculations of St. Gregory of Nyssa, he also sees the unity of God mirrored in the essential unity of man. The historical disunity of men is seen as the result of the fluxes of time.

In the writings of Didymus the Blind there is a summary of the contributions of the Cappadocian Fathers to Trinitarian doctrine. He tells us that St. Gregory of Nyssa spoke of the Son as being immediately caused by the Father while the Holy Spirit is only caused by the Father through the intermediacy of the Son. In terminology the Cappadocians accepted that persona and hypostasis should be accepted as equivalent terms but they never themselves gave a satisfactory definition of hypostasis.

St. Cyril of Alexandria in his writings on the Trinity continued on the lines laid down by the Cappadocians. Like them he wrote of the Holy Spirit proceeding from the Father through the Son. His contribution was to emphasize the divinity of the Holy Spirit.

In the sixth century the name of Leontius of Byzantium was associated with the application to doctrine of abstract logic. In his attempt to provide a common terminology to apply both to the Trinity and the Incarnation he tended to identify ousia with physis.
but since physis has no existence except in hypostases or individuals
his work led to God being regarded as an abstraction from the three
hypostases, tritheism in other words. In this tendency to abstraction he was followed by other theologians of the sixth and seventh
century. G.D. Prestige lays the blame for the unhappy situation
of Trinitarian doctrine in this period on the influence of the negative and abstract character of Christological speculation, "Chal-
ccedon negatived Nestorianism, (which was an attempt to make physis
concrete) and negatived the Monophysite conclusions wrongly drawn from
Cyril's premises."p280. It was the work of the writer known as pseudo-
Cyril whose contribution to Trinitarian doctrine, mainly the doctrine
of co-inherence "porichoresis" and the description of God as a single
ousia, godhead, power, will, energy, arche, etc, which was to draw
Trinitarian theology out of the morass into which/was sinking. The
greater part of this work was incorporated by St. John of Damascus
into his De Fide Orthodoxa.

44. Attention has been paid to the studies made by Augustin Périer
in his "Yaḥyā Ben ‘Adī - Un philosophe arabe chrétien du Xe siècle."
Périer laid emphasis on that aspect of Yaḥyā's Trinitarian teaching
in which he stresses the mind, thinking, thought analogy and indeed
seems to imply that God is mind thinking itself. While Périer,
unlike Cheikho, translated 'illa as "cause" and not as "principle"
he did not develop the point further. In this thesis, which is
concerned more with those lines of development of Trinitarian
doctrine which were seen as fruitful in the context of the Islamic
Empire, emphasis has been laid rather on the application by Yaḥyā
of his view of causality to the Godhead. It is to be noted also
that Périer, with Graf and Cheikho, tended to translate ʿumām as
"person". Possibly it was this pre-conception, coupled with their
presumed acceptance of the Thomist view of causality - where causality is specifically ruled out as a possible relationship between the members of the Trinity - which led them to pay little attention to this aspect of Ya'qûb's theological work.

45. see note (43)
46. see F. Copleston "History of Philosophy" vol I p. 330 and also R. Walser "Greek into Arabic" p. 21
47. Graf - vol II p. 177
48. L.E. Browne, pp. 8-10
49. R. Walser p. 11 Graf vol II p. 103 following
50. Graf vol II pp. 177-8
51. Graf vol II p. 179
52. Cheikho pp. 124 -129 (edited Ma'lior)
53. above p. 65 para 2
54. L. Cheikho - Trois Traités anciens de polémique et de théologie chrétiennes", quoted by L.E. Browne p. 123-4. This quotation and interpretation are another example of the misunderstanding of the Arabic Christian theology due to the assumption that "umma" can be translated as "person".
55. El-Irchād - ed. J.D. Luciani p. 27
56. Graf vol II pp. 72-3
57. Cheikho pp. 1-12
58. Cheikho pp. 47-63
59. al-Jawwaini pp. 16-17. It is of interest that part of the Muslim argument against the Creator being the cause of the universe is used by Paulus ar-Râhiib to demonstrate the existence of the members of the Trinity. It was presumably hoped to defend the Christian philosophical position that God is the
supreme cause and at the same time to use the Muslims' own theological argument to demonstrate the reality of the Trinity.

60. Cheikho - p.6 line 6

61. For the reason that this definition depended on prior recognition of the reality of the Father, of the Son and of the Holy Spirit as distinct entities.

62. The only finally convincing testimony of the Christian belief in the Triune God is of course the witness of the life, words and actions of Jesus Christ. The value of the insights into the Trinity of the Christian Arabic apologists could only be appreciated fully by those who accepted the Christian interpretation of the mission of Jesus Christ.

63. Cheikho pp. 15-26 incl.

64. Paulus ar-Rāhib occasionally used kalima also.

65. It is of course noticeable that there are certain differences in Paulus' discussion of substances in that he uses both jawhar and A'yn for substance, that is, both the Muslim philosophical and the Muslim theological terms were evidently known to him. Also of note is his use of qā'lim bi-shatihi for self-subsistant. Cf. al-Taftāzānī's commentary on the Creed of Najm al-Dīn al-Masaff translated by E.B. Elder p.29.

67. It does not seem possible to say with certainty whether Eutychius had in mind the Muslim concept of kalimat Allah or whether he was using kalima simply as a translation of logos.

68. pp. 47-63 - Cheikho

69. It will have been noted that jawhar has been left untranslated throughout this thesis. The reason is that jawhar seems to
bear a slightly different meaning in each of the first three writers studied.

70. The information on the basis of which the following notes were written is derived from the exhaustive article "Trinité" in the post-war edition of the Dictionnaire de Théologie Catholique and also from a careful study of the conclusions concerning the development of the doctrine of the Trinity reached by C.L. Prestige in his "God in Patristic Thought!" Incidentally this latter work is referred to in the bibliography attached to the above mentioned article.

In the third century there appeared the first two heresies which directly questioned the Trinity. On the one hand was Adoptionism, whose Eastern originator was Paul of Samosata, who probably through over-emphasis on the humanity of Christ, ended by denying His divinity and consequently by also denying the Triune nature of God. On the other hand were the Patripassians or Monarchianists who tended to deny the Trinity in the name of the affirmation of the Divine Unity. These explained the Incarnation by saying that the Father took flesh of Mary and thus became His own Son. The latter tendency, although one might say that it later penetrated the Hellenic East in the form of modalism, does not seem to have, in itself an important strand in the development of Trinitarian doctrine in that region. It is relevant to mention it here because it forms the background to the thought and work of Tertullian and St. Hippolytus. It is probable that some of the less well-developed aspects of Tertullian's Trinitarian teaching may have been due to the influence of St. Hippolytus. Works of the latter, who wrote in Greek, are known from the Catalogue of the Nestorian Med Jesu to have been translated into Syriac and Arabic and Origen is recorded as having
listened to a sermon by St. Hippolytus during his visit to Rome in 212. Although reference was made to the Geschichte der Syrischen Literatur by A. Baumstark and to Vol. I of the Geschichte der Christlichen arabischen Literatur by Georg Graf entitled Die Übersetzungen it was not found possible to determine whether the major theological works of St. Hippolytus as distinct from the canonical works attributed to him, had been translated into Syriac or Arabic.

St. Hippolytus is one of the few early writers to attempt a synthesis of theology. The main points of his teaching are as follows. God is the Creator. At the head of the visible creation is man. In order to become himself God, man has only to obey the orders of the Creator. God began creation by sending out of Himself the Word, the immanent reason. It is this logos who gives to each individual his nature and existence. Evil originates in man's will and it is thus that it enters the world. The Word of God endeavours to set men free from necessity by calling them to liberty and to this end the Father sent the Word to become man Himself.

In his Trinitarian teaching there are two points of interest for this discussion. The first is his use of the "double state" of the Word hypothesis. St. Hippolytus refers to the Son as light from light, water springing from a source, as a ray from the sun. In fact he develops the idea a step further, for in his teaching the Word is seen as first immanent and eternal, then temporal, external and co-ordinated to the creation of the world and finally as the Son. This latter title is apparently applied to the Word when He becomes incarnate and not before. The dangers of ditheism and subordinationism inherent in this theory were later to come to a head in Arianism, and perhaps Monophysitism may in one sense be seen as the last vestige of this theory which in St. Hippolytus
has already become far removed from the question of the possibility of a fruitful dialogue between the philosophical Greek and the Scriptural usages of the term "Word".

St. Hippolytus was to leave a better legacy to future theologians than his hypothesis concerning the Word. When writing about the essential unity of God in his treatise *Adversus Noetus*, he expressed himself as follows on the Trinity: "I shall not say two gods, but one only; two prosopa, and in economy as third, the grace of the Holy Spirit." Here the word "economy" used by St. Irenaeus to express grace and its dispensation, is analogously used by St. Hippolytus to refer to the mysterious economy contained in the mystery of the divine unity.

Like St. Hippolytus, Tertullian referred to the second prosopon as Word, reason and power of God and he likewise saw God as having become "Father" only at the creation. He also said: "If God is unique, there is in Him a certain economy, a dispensation, a communication of unity from which flows a trinity." *Adv*. Præx. 2 col. 157. Thus by the presence of this economy are constituted the prosopa. That "economy" is used here analogously to its use in reference to grace and the Incarnation is indicated by its use in the same treatise with precise reference to the latter subjects.

On the question of the meaning for Tertullian of persona, G.L. Prestige says that "for Tertullian the person is rather the concrete presentation of the individual than the support to a legal title; of course the word persona is susceptible of a juridic sense and it can also designate the moral person; but here it is employed in a less technical sense; it serves to put in relief what there is characteristic in the divine persons." (*God in Patristic Thought* chap. 5 entitled "Organic Monotheism").
In sum one may say that Tertullian insisted on the numerical distinction between the persons but he also insisted that the unity of substance was a numerical and absolute unity.

It is to be noted also that in his Verzeichnis arabischer kirchlicher Termini, Georg Graf gave qanûn as having been derived from ἀκόνωμος. His reason for this was apparently that the term qanûn or perhaps qanûm was used by Abu Qurra with the meaning of "diocesan treasurer." On the other hand he gave the meaning of qanûm when applied to the Trinity as being person or hypostasis.

For the whole question of the meanings inherent in ἀκόνωμος see C.L. Prestige chap. "Divine Providence" pp. 57-67 incl.

71. Périer - "Petits Traités etc." pp. 28-43

72. On the use made by Yahyâ ibn 'Adî of dhîf and of the other terms referred to in this section reference was made to the relevant articles in the Encyclopaedia of Islam (new edition where possible) and also to the Lexique de la Langue philosophique d'Ibn Sinâ by A.M. Goichon.

73. While attention was given to the Muslim theological position that the ṣifât Allah were the abstract qualities lying behind the asma' Allah, it would seem that while Yahyâ ibn 'Adî may have had in mind an attempt to show a correspondence between the Muslim doctrine of qualities and the Christian doctrine of the Trinity, in this treatise he is clearly intent upon devising his own philosophical term to describe the relationship between the members of the Trinity and the Godhead itself.

74. D.B. MacDonald "Muslim Theology" pp. 159-160 also creed of al-Fudali in the appendix p. 319, also works referred to in note 72. Doubtless it was the metaphysical aspect of the Mu'tazili controversy which was of concern to Yahyâ in this treatise rather than the
future implications for Muslim theology.

75. The Ash'ari school in general was opposed to this use of *hal*

76. Jawhar is of course to be understood here as substance. What seems to be implied by the use of jawhar is an emphasis on the reality of God's essence (dhāt). Yet this dhāt can be considered as abstract since it only actually exists in the three *gift* and not outside them.

77. al-Juwaini p. 19 however does use *qā'im bīnafsīhi* as applicable to Allah.

78. See note (73)

79. By this statement is meant that jawhar in Christian usage in Trinitarian doctrine would seem to have become a term distinct in meaning from its (jawhar) use in Kalām and in Islamic philosophy.

80. That is, not only a self-subsistent being but also an essence which is self-subsistent is implied.

81. that is, 'ilm

82. 'ain is given in Lexique de la Langue philosophique d'Ibn Sinā p.257 as an essence existing concretely in a given individual.

83. In the article "Trinité" of the Dict. Theol. Cath. there is given a summary of the views of the great scholastics - that is a summary of the major developments in Trinitarian doctrine by the end of the 14th century in the Latin West.

On the question of relationships there were two main schools of thought. The Thomists, who held to the principle that the divine persons are constituted in the oppositions which bring about their distinctions, declared that the Holy Spirit is only distinct from the Father and the Son by reason of the procession; that is, the opposition of active spiration (from the Father) and passive spiration (from the Son) marked the distinction of the
Holy Spirit as a person. The Scotists held that even if the Holy Spirit did not proceed from the Son, He would yet be distinct by reason of the personal properties implied in His relation to the Father. Since the Holy Spirit comes from the Father and from the Son, those two are but one principle.

It would be presumptuous on the basis of a study of four Arabic Christian writers to attempt a full comparison of Arabic Christian Trinitarian doctrine with that of Latin Scholasticism. Yet there is one first impression which should be recorded. It is that not withstanding the intellectual merit of the Trinitarian doctrine of the Latin Scholastics, there seems in first comparison with the doctrine of the Arabic Christian writers studied, to be a lack of human context. In the first three Arabic writers especially, there was to be noted a sense of human commitment to a specific environment and its problems. Moreover, even the insights of Yahya ibn 'Adi were never divorced from his view of the nature of human society. The same was true of Elias of Masmis. The unity in diversity of the human race is but a reflection of the unity in diversity of the Trinity and Divine Providence is but an overflowing of the Divine economy of the three members of the one God.
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