Literary Theory and Literary Aesthetics

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This work is concerned with discovering what kind of assertions can be meaningfully made about a literary work. That is, specifically, in what ways and to what extent the tradition of literary theory is or is not consistent with the aesthetic nature of literature, and where the limits of such a 'consistent' interpretation are to be drawn. This has involved both a consideration of certain traditional hermeneutical problems within criticism, and also an outline of what I believe to be the nature of the aesthetic per se. I have paid particular attention to metaphor, as a model of the 'literary', and to rhetoric.
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Introduction

A critic may with advantage seize an occasion for trying his own conscience, and for asking himself of what real service, at any given moment, the practice of criticism either is, or may be made, to his own mind and spirit, and to the minds and spirits of others.

Matthew Arnold

This work is concerned with certain problems in the description and treatment of literature, principally within literary theory and criticism, but also in a more general context, that is, wherever a definition of literature is called, explicitly or implicitly, into play. All of the problems which I shall deal with are perennial ones, the reader will no doubt have read the contents with a feeling of familiarity, but what I intend to show is that they are all interconnected, that they are, in fact, all aspects of a single problem - the application of a consistent notion of the aesthetic to the literary work. That a 'consistent notion of the aesthetic' exists is one premiss of this thesis, that it is continually on the point of realization within the tradition of writing on literature, and continually, for a variety of reasons, left unrealized, by that tradition, is another. To this extent my work has been simply a matter of connecting previously remote areas of this tradition, of discovering what it has left out, or what it leaves over, of drawing implications. (Hence the apparently excessive use of quotation here, producing what seems, at times, almost a parody of the thesis 'style'.) In one sense, then, this work is concerned with the compatibility of beliefs. I have begun with metaphor because, as will emerge, metaphor provides us with the best model of literature from an aesthetic point of view.
CHAPTER I

Metaphor

But it is just this technical formulation, which reveals the truth to our understanding, that conceals it once again from our feelings; for unfortunately the understanding must first destroy the objects of the inner sense before it can appropriate them. Like the chemist, the philosopher finds combination only through dissolution, and the work of spontaneous Nature only through the torture of Art. In order to seize the fleeting appearance he must bind it in the fetters of rule, dissect its fair body into abstract notions, and preserve its living spirit in a sorry skeleton of words. Is it any wonder if natural feeling does not recognize itself in such a likeness, and if truth appears in the analyst's report as paradox.

Schiller
'There is', writes Montaigne, 'more ado to interpret interpretations than to interpret things; and more books upon books than upon any other subject; we do nothing but comment upon one another.' 1 Three hundred years later we find even in the field of literary studies not only works of criticism, that is, books upon books, and works of literary theory, or books about books about books, but also works on literary theory, or books about books about books about books. It begins to sound like the refrain from a nursery rhyme. I would defend the present essay, however, by stating that it is, firstly, about a part of language - metaphor - and, secondly, an act - interpretation. But why should I feel in need of a defence? Disparaging though Montaigne's comment seems, a few sentences later he is speaking of how our opinions 'are grafted upon one another; the first serves as a stock to the second, the second to the third, and so forth; thus step by step we climb the ladder', presumably to comprehension.2 This may be so, nevertheless this essay is cast in a form which I feel I need to defend, even if only to myself.

The source of my misgivings is this, that the present study is, to my mind, full, one might say 'stuffed', with quotations and references. In the essay quoted above, Montaigne goes on to discuss the use of 'foreign and scholastic examples' and asks if they are so much used because 'we seek more honour from the quotation, than from the truth of the matter in hand?'.3 His own essay is replete with quotations from Plutarch, Tacitus, Plato, Seneca, Quintilian, Aristotle, Propertius, Cicero, Virgil, Martial, Horace, Juvenal, Ovid, and others, quotations that often simply repeat what he has previously said in his own words. (The title of the essay is 'Of Experience') Yet there may be many reasons for using quotations. They can lead the reader gently to a subject through something of subsidiary and intrinsic interest, as, hopefully, my use of Montaigne has done here. They may be summarizing, as many of Montaigne's are; a function to which the brevity of Latin is well suited. They may be essential to the integrity of the argument, as in scientific papers. It may be that they express something which you yourself wish to say but cannot say as well, or summarize a position more succinctly than a paraphrase could. But they can also be used as mere ostentation, the seeking after 'honour'.4 I have used them for all these reasons, including the last; for as a piece of
research it must appear as a piece of research. (Quotations can also be used as an *argumentum ad verecundiam*, but this is an argument beneath contempt.) This leads us, however, to another conundrum; if you are familiar with the literature to which I refer then it is unnecessary for me to refer to it, if you are not then you must trust me not to misrepresent it, and if you will trust me thus far why not simply trust me to talk sense on my own account? (Reason wants not Johnson to support it.) But let us separate this into two questions, so that there will be no confusion; firstly the necessity of research, secondly, its display. Apropos the first question, one might ask how one can know, in advance of doing research, whether anything one wants to say has not already been said, that is, whether one's own work is not going to be redundant? One discovers whether or not this is the case primarily from the tone of contemporary discussions of the subject, but also from the advice of those who are familiar with the subject; it is not so great an obstacle as it appears. One can write a synthesis, but a synthesis which is not underpinned with the writer's own convictions quickly becomes little more than a colourless résumé. I inadvertently overcame this problem by writing the whole essay originally without benefit of research, so that the subsequent research became organized around the undermining, modifying, or expanding of conclusions which I had already come to. If I could have found those conclusions, or the answers to the questions which those conclusions raised, in any of the works on metaphor which I have used, then I would not have bothered to write this essay. Bacon, in his essay 'Of Studies', writes that one should read 'not to contradict and confute, nor to believe and take for granted, nor to find talk and discourse; but to weigh and consider.' and this, I believe, is very sound advice, except I would add that if one's aim is to write on the same subject then one should read also 'to improve upon'. As to the display of one's researches, here there are three considerations to be made; firstly, it is good manners to acknowledge a debt, and justice to fairly represent what one indicts, secondly, by comparing and contrasting my own views with existing writings I place the reader in a position to judge to what extent what I have to say is novel, and, thirdly, and perhaps most importantly, since my own reading in the subject largely progressed by way of the footnotes and bibliographies of existing works it would seem churlish not to extend the same benefit to future students of the subject.
Yet;

Men do not know the natural disease of the mind; it does nothing but ferret and inquire, and it is eternally wheeling, juggling, and perplexing itself like silkworms, and then suffocates itself in its work...It thinks it discovers at a great distance, I know not what glimpse of light and imaginary truth; but whilst running to it, so many difficulties, hindrances and new inquisitions cross it, that it loses its way, and is made drunk with the motion: not much unlike Aesop's dogs, that seeing something like a dead body floating in the sea, and not being able to approach it, set to work to drink the water and lay the passage dry, and so choked themselves.

Now that I have satisfied myself as to the form of this essay, why does this passage from Montaigne make me pause? Could the research and its inclusion be represented by the sea, a sea that will choke me before I reach my quarry? Even apart from this resemblance the application of the simile contains all sorts of unflattering comparisons; the goal of the intellectual endeavour is represented by a corpse, the inquirer by a pack of dogs. Even the word 'quarry', meaning an object of pursuit, is, after all, etymologically derived from the Latin for 'skin', and its use might therefore presume the destruction of the object of pursuit. We could remember here how Schiller, in the epigraph to this essay, speaks of the understanding destroying 'the objects of the inner sense before it can appropriate them'. Is the analogy, however, a fair one? For though I have at times during the writing of this essay felt quite overwhelmed by the literature on the subject, given that we are discussing language and the description of language, the literature on metaphor is not something separate from the metaphor in the way that our figurative body is separate from our figurative sea; that is, the water is a route rather than an obstacle. But still the image is troubling, for how we see a thing depends very much on what we see it through. This is the subject of the present essay.
The Problem of Metaphor

Perhaps the oddest thing about the problem of metaphor is that outside of its discussion in poetics, or philosophy, or linguistics, that is, outside the discussion of it as a problem, it is not a problem at all. Montaigne wrote that when one heard 'talk of metonomies, metaphors, and allegories, and other grammar words' one was apt to think of 'some rare and exotic form of speaking' though they in fact describe 'phrases that are no better than the chatter of my chambermaid.' While researching this essay I decided to turn my recreational reading to good use by looking out for metaphors which I might use as examples or test cases in this chapter. After a short time, however, I had to give up, for my 'recreational' reading had ceased to be that and had become a difficult task, demanding more than usual concentration! The difficulty lay not in trying to analyze such metaphors as I discovered, but rather in finding them at all, for simply remembering to register metaphors turned the most fluid and easy text into something quite different. This experience impressed on me from the beginning of my study two related facts about metaphor; firstly that metaphor is so far a part of 'ordinary' language that it is not something we are generally used to contrasting with non-metaphorical language, that is, it does not 'stand out', and secondly, as a corollary to this, in the vast majority of examples our comprehension of what the metaphor means is spontaneous, we are not aware of being presented with a problem. There is no 'problem of metaphor', then, in this sense; the problem of metaphor is the problem of its formal description — nothing more. For to describe our comprehension of the meaning of metaphor as 'spontaneous' is to describe the speed of that comprehension not its nature, just as when scientists claimed that mice could be 'spontaneously generated' from heaps of corn or drawers full of old shirts they demonstrated only their own ignorance. Yet description and, indeed, interpretation is an unrewarding task unless undertaken for one's own pleasure; the layman, who is aware of no problem to begin with, is apt to respond to a solution to that problem with "Yes. Of course. So?". But it is not always obvious why the obvious is such, and to make it so, to express what was oft, but confusedly, thought, is the raison d'être of a study such as this. The purpose of this essay, then, is neither to recount a discovery, except in so far as interpretation is discovery, nor
to invent the gratuitous, but rather to make explicit in abstract terms what is implicit in the very use of metaphor in concrete instances.

Metaphor ranges from the familiar and prosaic, 'Man is a wolf', which produces little more than a mental shrug, to the outrageous, 'Light is but the shadow of God', against which the rational processes disperse like spray from a rock. For this reason those studies of metaphor which proceed with the analysis of a single example often end with a characterization of their subject which, while applying to the case in hand, can seem inadequate to cover the whole range of metaphorical usage. On the other hand comments on metaphor which are abstract and aphoristic, while initially satisfying in their brevity and suggestiveness, often reveal chronic ambiguities if one tries to use them to distinguish metaphorical language from any other type of language. Sometimes, to paraphrase J.L.Austin, it is easy to believe that oversimplification is the occupational disease of literary theorists, were it not for the sneaking suspicion that this is their occupation. I have chosen to take a more abstract pathway and to approach the goal not through the rigorous analysis of a single example but through a series of topics; firstly, how the actual meaning is generated/understood, secondly, what is specifically metaphorical about metaphor, thirdly, what type or types of meaning can metaphor generate, and, lastly, the role of metaphor in pleasure and persuasion. As will soon become apparent, these divisions are artificial if not entirely arbitrary; each topic is almost inextricably bound up with all the others, and often it has been necessary, since only part of the subject can be in focus at a time, to use as premisses what will only later become conclusions. Indeed, already here, in the introduction, I have found myself talking in the context of assumptions some of which, we will later find, cannot be made. For this reason I will be leaving many loose ends as I go along, as will be nowhere so obvious as in the discussion of Aristotle, but they will all, I hope, be picked up before the end — with one or two intractable exceptions. This is primarily a problem of vocabulary; to begin at all it will be necessary to use terms the precise sense of which it is yet our task to determine. But let us begin at a beginning.
Meaning

Aristotle, in his *Poetics* defines metaphor as 'the application to one thing of a name belonging to another thing', adding later that mastery of its use is the most important thing for the aspiring poet. This definition is a masterpiece of concision but the examples which Aristotle proceeds to give seem to confuse rather than clarify it. He divides metaphor into transference from genus to species, as exemplified in 'Here lies my ship', in which 'lying at anchor' is a species of 'lying'; from species to genus, as in 'Odysseus has indeed performed ten thousand noble deeds', in which 'ten thousand' is a species of the genus 'many'; from species to species, as in 'Drawing off the life with the bronze' in which 'drawing off' is used for 'severing', both being species of 'taking away'.

These may have been excellent metaphors in ancient Greek but, for historical reasons that we shall discuss when describing dead metaphors, they do not immediately strike the modern English-speaking reader as particularly illuminating examples of transference. 'Ten thousand' does not appear to fall naturally into the genus of 'many', not for instance in describing populations or astronomical data; even as a species of the genus 'number of performable noble deeds' it would still seem to be hyperbole rather than metaphor. There is, however, according to Aristotle, a fourth category of metaphorical transference - by analogy.

I explain analogy as what may happen when of four things the second stands in the same relationship to the first as the fourth to the third; for then we may speak of the fourth instead of the second, and the second instead of the fourth.

He gives as an example 'old age is to life as evening is to day', from which one can derive the metaphors 'the evening of life' or 'the sunset of life' to stand for 'old age', and 'the old age of the day' to stand for 'evening'. In some cases, he continues, there can be no name for some of the terms in the analogy but the metaphor can be used to supply them.

For example, to scatter corn is called sowing, but there is no word for the sun's scattering of its flame; however, this stands in the same relationship to sunlight as sowing does to corn, and hence the expression, 'sowing his god-created flame'.

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Metaphor by analogy, then, relies upon the correspondence between two ratios; A:B as C:D, in which one of the terms may be something which does not already have a name. In the Rhetoric Aristotle states that of the four kinds of metaphor 'the most taking is the proportional [analogical] kind', such as Pericles' description of the vanishing from their country of the young men who died in a war "as if the spring were taken out of the year." which relies on the ratio 'young men':'country' as 'spring':'year'.

It has been suggested that Aristotle's fourth type of metaphor, that by analogy, is not a separate type but rather the explanation of the others. However, although he mainly concentrates on the proportional metaphor in the Rhetoric he does not drop the classification there and we would do well not to dismiss it either, for, as our discussion will later show, there are great difficulties involved in drawing a dividing line between metaphor and other figurative uses. Aristotle may indeed be talking about the way metaphors are signalled, that is, if we can make the distinction, the way they appear rather than the way they are produced. In the Rhetoric he insists that proportional or analogical metaphor 'must always apply reciprocally to either of its co-ordinate terms', that is, 'if a drinking-bowl is the shield of Dionysus, a shield may be fittingly called the drinking-bowl of Ares.' This may be the distinction which Aristotle wished to draw between analogical and other types of metaphor but a problem obviously arises when there is no name for one of the terms of the analogy, if, for instance, the poet wanted to liken a sower to the sun. The idea of metaphor as the transfer between genus and species, and from one species to another, will become more important in discussing dead metaphors and the vexed question of the division between metaphorical and literal.

When, in the Poetics, Aristotle states that 'the ability to use metaphor well implies a perception of resemblances' I take this to be an acknowledgement that analogy is implicit in every metaphor. In the Rhetoric he likewise says that 'in every metaphor to give names to nameless things, we must draw them...from kindred and similar things'. All similarity depends upon analogy, the distinction we draw between our use of the two words depends upon how readily we comprehend the analogous relationships between parts or relations of parts in two different objects or situations, or on how formally we wish to speak. We do not, for instance, talk of faces being analogous to one another but of
metaphor resembling one another even though we arrive at a perception of this resemblance by comparing the ratios between the proportions of eyes, nose, mouth, and so on, of face A and the ratio between the proportions of eyes, nose, mouth, and so on, of face B. Thus we customarily speak of a baby resembling one of its parents even though its features are of quite a different size and complexion. What we call resemblance depends very much on the readiness with which we discover analogous relationships. 'Analogy' implies a certain distance; one 'compares', for instance, Edinburgh University with some other university but one 'draws an analogy' between a ship and the state. Where one decides to fix the line between the use of these two terms, 'analogy' and 'resemblance', may be either a personal or a cultural matter. On a personal level, for example, I have never seen a baby which resembled one adult any more than it resembled any other adult. At a cultural level, a Chinese was once extraordinarily taken with my resemblance to Fred Astaire; but, though within the rather gross paradigms which he probably used to distinguish between occidentals, the likeness was highly striking, for an occidental it would hardly exist. That is, if the whole world, but for Fred Astaire and I, was Chinese we would pass for twins, though at the present moment our features are only analogous in comparison to oriental ones. Because of this element of relativity in the perception of resemblances, and because in dealing with metaphor we will find ourselves dealing with similarities between even abstract and concrete situations, in which our normal use of 'resemblances' would be stretched beyond its natural limits, we will use the term 'analogy' which, though in some instances it will seem too formal, we can justify by demonstrating that ultimately analogy is the cause of resemblances or similarities.18

As we have said analogy relies upon the correspondence between two ratios, A:B as C:D (for example, 1:3 as 2:6), but it should be understood that this is simply the most formal expression we can give to the relationship without actually reproducing the metaphor itself, that is, 'A is C', and that providing the equation 'sunset:day' as 'old age:life' is only the first, most elementary step in the explanation of how such a metaphor works. In a detailed working out of the metaphor the identification of 'day' and 'life' would also need to be established, but again this would be by means of demonstrating the analogous relationship between the two, or between features of one and the other. The stage at
which we are prepared to say that A is 'like' C is, therefore, a pragmatic question, the metaphor itself supposes that 'the sunset of life' is sufficient to represent the correspondence that is being established, but this likeness depends on a series of more detailed correspondences since sunset and old age are not so alike that we would confuse an example of one with an example of the other.

Our 'sunset' metaphor hardly seems a controversial one, indeed it appears obvious but, as I have said, I am here concerned with explaining why the obvious is obvious. For, as I.A.Richards writes, while our skill in using metaphor is prodigious 'our reflective awareness of that skill is quite another thing - very incomplete, distorted, fallacious, oversimplifying.'

Let us look first of all at what we might call 'everyday' metaphors, in particular those in which terms which appear to most properly belong to the description of objects and processes in the external, physical world, the world of the senses, are used to denote affective qualities or abstract features. Such dual functions terms can be adjectives, verbs or nouns; so people are 'warm', 'cold', 'hard', 'crooked', 'shallow', or 'deep', classes are 'high' or 'low', we 'hunger' for knowledge and 'weigh' evidence, hopes are 'kindled' or 'shattered', wit comes in 'flashes', 'pressure' is exerted on governments, and opinion exists as a 'climate'. Not only does it seem that there are very few terms that describe the workings of our emotions and ideas, and our conception of human personality and society that are sui generis, but even such terms as have become so, for example 'jealous' and 'discreet', are often found to be etymologically related to observable physical phenomena ('boiling' and 'sifting' respectively). The etymologies of words are indeed often tributes to the progressive making abstract of the physical image. What is important to note here is that such descriptions as 'deep sadness' and 'high hopes' are the most dead of dead metaphors, so long felt to be appropriate that we are rarely aware of their figurative status. (Whether or not a dead metaphor is still a metaphor is a question we must postpone.) Indeed, when we attempt to rescue the original force of a dead figure of speech we try to conjure up the original image by prefixing the phrase with 'actually' or 'literally'; 'I literally lost my head', 'Lily, the caretaker's daughter, was literally run off her feet.'
Some research into whether this dual use of terms to describe physical and psychological properties is to be found in historically unrelated languages, and the degree of agreement in their usage between such languages, has been carried out by the psychologist Solomon Asch.\textsuperscript{21} What he found was that dual terms are to be found in historically unrelated languages and that their usages do correspond to a significant degree. For example 'sweet'; in Hebrew pleasant words are said to be "sweet to the soul" (Prov. 16:24); in Greek it is used to describe the voice and is etymologically linked with the verb 'to please'; in Hausa the phrase 'I don't feel sweetness' means to feel unwell; in Burmese it is synonymous with 'pleasant' when used in connection with the face, voice, or speech; and in Chinese 'sweet' or 'honeyed' are synonymous with 'specious' when used in connection with words. The same uniformity is found in the use of 'bitter'; "bitterness of the soul" in Hebrew (Job 7:11); 'bitter' pain or tears in Greek; 'bitter fate' meaning 'a hard lot in life' in Chinese; 'bitterness of character' meaning an unpleasant disposition in Hausa; and to 'speak bitterly' meaning to speak in an unfriendly manner, in Burmese. Likewise the use of 'sour'; applied to the heart in Hebrew (Psalms 73:21); a 'sour man' meaning a misanthrope in Chinese; and 'I am very sour toward that person' meaning 'I detest that person' in Burmese.\textsuperscript{22} In all of these examples 'sweet' does not stand merely for any positive psychological quality, for example courage or honesty, nor 'bitter' or 'sour' for just any negative quality, for example fear. In certain languages words may denote only a physical quality (what we might call an 'immediate' sensory quality), possibly because the language does not possess an extended psychological vocabulary and does not differentiate between different qualities of basic psychological attributes. Furthermore a given term may develop a somewhat different range of connotations in what we will, provisionally, call its non-literal attribution, such as the Chinese use of 'sweet' to mean 'specious' - though the idea of pleasing is still retained. Such usage, if all other variables could be accounted for, might serve as a good index of a culture's attitude towards some particular quality; when, for instance, a writer talks of 'the cold cash of literal fact' his choice of metaphor is expressing a particular attitude towards 'literal fact'.

One explanation of this duality in the use of certain terms could be an associative connection on the basis of immediate sensory stimulus
properties common to both instances of use. However, despite the obviously metonymic aspect of some instances of substitution, as 'reddened' for 'embarrassed', this will not account for most uses of dual function terms, as, for example 'colourful' to describe character. A more promising explanation is that what the usages have in common is the description of a mode of interaction. When we call an object 'hard' we mean that it resists change when pushed or pressed and supports other things placed upon it without changing its own form. Hardness is, therefore, resistance to change imposed by external forces. When 'hard' is used to refer to a person, what it describes is a formally similar interaction. The way in which we experience the interaction between a 'hard' person and another, or ourselves, or his environment, follows the same schema of interaction as we might find in an abstract definition of 'hard'. The terms contained within this definition may themselves seem metaphorical when applied to our person, but as we move progressively deeper in working out the correspondences our terms, for example 'resistance' and 'change', become increasingly abstract and less obviously attached to any particular domain, physical or psychological. The content and complexity of the hardness of a table and the hardness of a person may be radically different but they share the same dynamic of the application of a force and unyielding opposition to that force. The same schema of interaction makes intelligible the attribution of 'hardness' to questions, facts, times, bargains, and winters. Asch does not use the word but the relationship between sets of terms that can be joined by such correspondences is one of analogy, as previously described. The difficulty of describing, in less abstract words, the hardness of a 'hard' person is demonstrated by the synonyms with which we might replace it, as for example 'harsh' or 'unfeeling', both of which also have their roots in sensory vocabulary, and neither of which has precisely the same connotations as 'hard'. The common properties of a colourful person and a colourful object could likewise be characterised in this way, as sensory stimulation arising from variety. All terms such as 'hard', 'soft', 'bitter', 'sweet', 'large', 'small', 'warm', 'cold', refer to properties of things as perceived by a human being, and it is only from this viewpoint that the metaphorical attribution of such terms can be meaningful. When we say 'small mercy' we mean 'insufficient to what was required', as we would more literally refer to a small amount of food (though even this latter
is to some extent relative), that is, what is normally syncategorematic, without independant meaning, becomes categorematic, able to stand on its own, within the context of the metaphor; the metaphor presumes it. This is perhaps what Aristotle has in mind when he states that 'many' is a genus of which particular numbers — between x and y — can be a species. To call a person 'warm' or hopes 'high' is to invoke a norm that is not one established by use of these terms in their immediate sensory contexts.23

The terms, that can be used both literally and metaphorically, so far discussed, cannot be said to properly refer to the raw material of sensory experience alone. Rather they describe modes of interaction between terms that may vary from belonging to either the exclusively concrete domain or the exclusively psychological. (One might think here of the various uses of 'see'.) When we employ the description of forces or relations as observed in the external, physical world to events, processes, and relations in the psychological, human world we are referring to functional properties that they share. Thus in his Critique of Aesthetic Judgement Kant says that in analogy the sensory properties of the analogon do not resemble or, as we might say, 'immediately resemble' the original but share a similar formal principle of functioning; the enlightened state can therefore be represented by an organic body, the parts of which relate to one another in a harmonious way, while tyranny can be represented by a machine such as a treadmill.24

The emphasis is, therefore, on the mode of functioning, the correspondences that can be drawn between the dynamic interaction of parts in one instance, the enlightened monarchy, and another, the body.

Although in discussing those terms that can be either literal in the physical domain or metaphorical in the psychological domain, we have referred to them as 'dual function' terms this may be misleading, since they can stand in a wide variety of different sentences in which they signal that the ratio between the parts or the interplay of forces in one situation is analogous to the ratio between the parts or the interplay of forces in another; for instance 'dead' in the following conjunctions — person, to the world, language, letter, matter, gold (unburnished), colour (in painting), nettle (non-stinging variety), sound, Sea, centre, weight, freight (sum paid for cargo space not occupied), arch (not functional), hand, hours, stock (unsaleable goods or unemployed capital), ball (out of
play), of winter, stop, loss, 'lock, 'light (shutter), reckoning, asleep, level, against, men (empty bottles), metaphor, and so on. But we must now move on to less conventionalized metaphors.

It was I.A.Richards who started perhaps the most fruitful modern line of enquiry concerning metaphor with his definition of it as 'two thoughts of different things active together and supported by a single word, or phrase, whose meaning is a resultant of their interaction.' Starting from the idea that all definitions are 'essentially ad hoc', that is, relevant only to some purpose or situation, some restricted "universe of discourse" he goes on to state that an essential feature of metaphor is the use of a term outside the universe of discourse for which it has been defined, in a context in which it requires a new definition. It is, therefore, according to Richards 'fundamentally...a borrowing between and intercourse of thoughts, a transaction between contexts.' Moreover he was prepared, on the basis of this definition, to include as metaphorical all 'those processes in which we perceive or think or feel about one thing in terms of another'. This is a very broad definition and, though elsewhere Richards insists that metaphor is not a 'verbal matter', at this stage of our enquiry we will continue to concern ourselves with verbal expression.

One of the immediate advantages of Richards' definition of metaphor, over Aristotle's one of 'improper naming', is that it does not appear to require the difficult task of deciding what is 'proper' to a word, but, as we shall see later, this advantage exists only in appearance. However the 'interaction' view of metaphor does provide a useful emphasis and is taken up by the philosopher Max Black who talks of the principal and subsidiary subjects of the metaphor (Richards' 'tenor' and 'vehicle') being 'active together', or interacting, to produce a meaning that is a resultant of that interaction. The given context, what Black terms the 'frame' of the metaphor, imposes an extension of meaning on the focal word by which it obtains a new meaning which is 'not quite its meaning in literal uses, nor quite the meaning which any literal substitute would have.'. He rejects the idea that this happens through a selection of the connotations of the focal word used, in favour of the idea that the reader is 'forced to "connect" the two ideas' suggested by the two
Me? respective words or phrases. This is an overstatement; certainly the principal subject ('Man' in 'Man is a wolf') controls the relevant connotations of the subsidiary subject ('wolf'), and vice versa, but 'forced to "connect"' appears to be a phrase designed to circumnavigate the use of 'resemblance' as being a word too prosaic for what he wishes to convey. However, as we have earlier noted, resemblance or analogy cover a vast range of relationships and situations, arguably all those in which, as Richards says, 'we perceive or think or feel about one thing in terms of another'. In The Meaning of Meaning Richards explicitly states that he considers metaphor to be 'the use of one reference to a group of things between which a given relation holds, for the purpose of facilitating the discrimination of an analogous relation in another group.' We will now consider the nature of these 'groups' and how the exchange takes place between them.

One of the major points which this essay will try to communicate is that the examination and elucidation of the analogous properties or qualities a literal usage may share with its metaphorical employment keeps us within the limits of the ordinary use of language and, as dead metaphors demonstrate, our common way of perceiving the world. This saves us from having to make recourse to dubiously extra-linguistic or quasi-psychological explanations of the significance of poetic images. For John Press images such as the Sea, the City, and the Desert are 'primordial' and their significance is 'discovered by poets rather than invented by their idiosyncratic use of language'. He then goes on to quote a number of erotically orientated poems which all employ images of cherries, apples, or spices, commenting that 'the theories of both Freud and Jung about the nature and origin of images enables us to detect a logic in the poetic employment of imagery which might otherwise have escaped us'. However, the Freudian analytical procedure, insofar as it is almost exclusively sexually orientated, cannot be said to be a subtle hermeneutical tool outside the field of psychopathology for which it was developed. We need neither Freud nor Jung to help us discover why images of cherries, apples, or spices are apt images for an erotic context. The size, shape and colour of cherries, the trajectory of the curves of an apple, the aromatic and pungent properties of spices and
their exotic origin, the sensuous pleasure derived from these products, the status of fruits as emblematic of nature and, figuratively, its 'generosity', as well as a variety of other properties and qualities of fruit and its place in the life of man make these images particularly apt metaphors, both on the immediate basis of resemblance and the more 'postponed' basis of analogy, for the female body and, therefore, for erotic poetry. (It may seem strange to appeal to some properties that are themselves primarily figurative, that is, the emblematic status of a domain, but this status can itself be justified by the drawing of analogies which do not rely on such conventions.) The basic dynamic or function which connects the two domains is 'sensuous pleasure derived from the organic' but it is the number of possible attributions which they both share, the degree of correspondence between terms in the two domains, whether metaphorical or literal in either case, that is directly proportional to the appropriateness of the image.

The literal, denotational, and connotational associations of 'desert' will make sense of Marvell's 'And yonder all before us lie/ Deserts of vast eternity' without recourse to talk of primordial images. The denotational sense, that is, that found in the dictionary definition, of 'desolate' and 'barren', provides us with two terms that are not only appropriate to the sense of the whole poem but which are also commonly attributed, literally or metaphorically, to human physical or psychological states. Given the problem of conceiving of eternity, or time without end, the image of the desert, a vast and uniformly empty expanse, invoked by the literal sense of the word, is as close as one can get to comprehending or conveying the concept. We can say, therefore, that the sensory and associated emotional properties of 'desert' are to man as the emotional import of the idea of eternity. Eternity is a rather metaphysical notion and therefore a special case when it comes to the making of metaphor, but even this brief elucidation of the literal, or linguistically non-controversial, terms used to describe the attributes of deserts should demonstrate its aptness to describe certain psychological states. Some metaphorical images are taken direct from the human domain, for example those of birth, love, and death, and therefore need no such gloss to explain their affective connotations. Other common themes in poetry, such as the changing seasons, are so familiar as to be taken as affectively charged of their nature. To take this last example, we might
elucidate several layers of correspondence between the seasons as perceived and affective aspects of human life; firstly, they are naturally emblematic of the passage of time which brings things, good and bad, to us and takes things, good and bad, away; secondly, the changes are manifested on a landscape which demonstrates a high degree of continuity in its form, just as for all changes in personality and fortune there is sufficient continuity in the basic aspects of the individual, felt self for us to be able to speak of another person or ourselves as 'the same person' at widely separated points in time; thirdly, in connection with these correspondences, there is a contrast in that the landscape on which the change of seasons is manifest is, despite its changes, more permanent than any individual life. The simple process of decay is not so apt an emblem of time as affectively perceived because it cannot sustain this range of corresponding attributes, though it could be used metaphorically for more short term affects, such as 'the decay of affection'. The seasons can also serve as a memento mori, for while their course is circular ours is linear.\(^3\)

The same basic term or image, for example 'sea', 'city', or 'desert', may serve to construct a different image in different contexts; it is the systematic employment of a certain body of terms in a coherent body of imagery that marks off one poetic 'school' or epoch from another. Nineteenth-century Romantic writers used connotations of 'sea' and 'city' that eighteenth-century writers did not, the medieval European and the ancient Hebrew writer would have used different connotations again. However the literal attributes of these things and their relation to man, the role they play or could potentially play in his life, allows us to grasp the way in which they could function in a variety of different metaphors. We could represent this as follows:
In this diagram each circle represents the domain of a concept and the shaded area the metaphorical attribution. The range of what can be included in this domain is very great, ranging from the strictly denotational (logic), that is, all the particular existing examples of x; the connotational, that is, the overtones or associations customarily evoked by x; to the realm of contrast, which Hume classes as one of the forms of association between ideas.\textsuperscript{40} This is, however, a subject we will return to later. It is important to note here that it is not the entire domain of either concept that is operant in the metaphor; though the degree of correspondence may be high the concepts must remain to some extent discrete. Absurdities in interpretation are usually caused by mistaking the nature or extent of the correspondence between the two domains. To present the further, more direct, connections between p, q, r, s, themselves would require a more complicated three-dimensional model, for it seems likely that almost any two things can be 'combined' to form a metaphor. Even when an object or relation has a conventional or traditional symbolic meaning, for example within a religious context, those properties or qualities of it which were originally felt to make it an apt metaphor for a concept or feeling will often allow us to reconstruct those concepts or feelings even when it is encountered in a form comparatively isolated from its supporting body of doctrine. Systematically organized religious belief is, necessarily, an expression of universal tendencies in human thought rather than vice versa. Even in the case of the use of theory-laden terms from abstruse 'sciences', as in the Metaphysical poets, the technical term will often retain an etymological connection, or stand in a metaphorical relation, to more familiar concepts.

It could however be argued that Donne's line 'O my America, my new found land,' loses its significance unless we apprehend what 'America' stood for in the late sixteenth century.\textsuperscript{41} This is a highly contentious proposition for, insofar as none of us will ever have the opportunity of being born in the sixteenth century we must content ourselves with what historical research and imagination will provide. Furthermore, it is going to be the latter of these two resources which will prove most fruitful once we have gone past the simple fact that the continent of America had recently been discovered at this time. The sense of mystery and possibility suggested by 'my new found land' does not need a specific
historical dimension in order to make it applicable to the experience, physical and psychological, that is the context of the poem. What it does require is a sympathy towards, an ability to entertain or imagine what it would be like to entertain, the idea of the erotic (in the widest sense) that is conveyed by the metaphor. D.H. Lawrence uses the same metaphor in a more extended form when he talks of a man's desire 'for the embrace, for the advancing into the unknown, for the landing on the shore of the undiscovered half of the world, where the wealth of the female lies before us.' Referring back to our diagram we may note that some of the attributes or connotations which fall under the domain of 'new land', for example 'hostile', are partly excluded in Donne by the modifier 'found' suggesting 'sought', but mainly by the overall sense of the poem. We may decide that the metaphor also connotes an 'exploitative' attitude on the part of the speaker, but whether we consider this a negative or a positive quality depends more upon our knowledge of, or attitude towards, the erotic than upon our knowledge of the discovery of America. While many things could be derived from the metaphorical connection, some will be irrelevant because too prosaic for the context, or will be contradicted by the sense of other parts of the text, that is, those metaphorical attributions so far derived, as they form a consonant series, or will involve anachronistic denotations or connotations of words or concepts that can be proven to have a sense at variance with modern ones.

Just on what basis the two domains, or words, interact is a question which Black addresses in his discussion of the metaphor 'Man is a wolf'. In order to arrive at a meaning what is needed, according to Black, is 'not so much that the reader shall know the standard dictionary meaning of "wolf" - or be able to use that word in literal senses - as that we shall know...the system of associated commonplaces.', and, furthermore, the metaphor's effectiveness relies not so much on the truth of these commonplaces as their ready availability to the reader. Literal use of a word commits the speaker to 'acceptance of a set of standard beliefs about wolves (current platitudes) that are a common possession of the members of some speech community' and it is this 'wolf-system of related commonplaces' which is evoked when the metaphor is used. It is from these 'associated commonplaces' that the properties are found which apply
Meat-aphor to 'Man', that is, which make sense of the metaphor, or make what would otherwise appear to be a piece of nonsense into a metaphor. The reader uses the 'system of implications', belonging to the subsidiary subject ('wolf') 'as a means for selecting, emphasizing, and organizing relations in a different field.', that is, the principal subject ('Man'). Although Black has earlier rejected the idea of metaphor involving 'comparison' his account of the way in which metaphor leads the reader 'by way of the wolf-system of implications to construct a corresponding system of implications about the principal subject.' obviously involves some sort of comparison. The ideas associated with 'wolf' are, in Black's words, 'not sharply delineated, and yet sufficiently definite to admit of detailed enumeration.' The same position is taken by Goodman in his Languages of Art in which he writes of metaphor occurring when a term 'with an extension established by habit is applied elsewhere under the influence of that habit' so that in its metaphorical use there is both 'a departure from and a deference to precedent.' Certainly the 'associated commonplaces' pass over, there is, as Goodman says, 'a migration of concepts', but without the use of such terms as 'resemblance' or 'similarity' or 'analogy' to say that metaphor involves transference is only to produce, in Greek at least, a tautology.

What I called 'the problem of metaphor' appears here also, in Goodman's description of it, as both 'a departure from and deference to precedent', for the problem is principally one of vocabulary. Metaphor is language used unconventionally, yet metaphor is a convention; it is 'improper naming' yet it is not simply misnaming, since it can be apt or inapt. As in manners and in morals so in language, what is improper today is the convention tomorrow and what was the convention yesterday is, due to our forgetfulness, the novel of today. What is 'proper' to a word depends on the general state of the language, but we shall discuss this in greater detail later on. This historical shift in the denotations and connotations of words has its counterpart in the overlapping, but rarely coextensive, areas of meaning represented by similar words in contemporary languages. As I have said, though the metaphor's immediate appearance must be one of impropriety, it is possible to follow the metaphor down, through the terms of its implicit analogies, to a level at which it is no longer clear to which domain the terms of correspondence 'properly' belong. I take this to be what Richards means when he says
that in metaphorical language 'one reference borrows part of the context of another in an abstract form.'\textsuperscript{51} Certain properties, or supposed properties, of wolves are made to serve as a model for certain properties of men. The success of this procedure depends on the possibility of translating some predicates applying to wolves into some predicates applicable to men, those predicates which can, as Eberle writes, be 'expressed in partial vocabularies of the two subject-matters.'\textsuperscript{52}

In his \textit{Semiology and the Philosophy of Languages} Umberto Eco talks of 'the only possible representation of the content of a given lexical item' being provided 'in terms of an encyclopedia.' and it this concept which we will now examine in order to see how, apart from associated commonplaces, the domain of a term or concept might be filled in, just what it might contain.\textsuperscript{53} Eco writes that the sememe (the unit of meaning) is 'a virtual or potential text', 'the source of energy of chains of connotation', and suggests that a case-like representation of the encyclopedic content, along metonymic lines, will account for metaphorical usage.\textsuperscript{54} Thus a representation of noun x implies the aspect of perception, the form of x (F), an agent of production (A), a material from which x is made (M), and a purpose which x is supposed to fulfil (P).\textsuperscript{55} For example:

\begin{verbatim}
/house/ $\Rightarrow$ F A M P
With roof Culture Bricks Shelter
\end{verbatim}

Considered from the point of view of being a shelter, a house can therefore be referred to as a shelter, or a shelter as a house - in some instances of which the use will be metaphoric. The organization of these cases is described as metonymic because, for example, to call a house a 'roof' is an instance of metonymy.\textsuperscript{57} (One might also think here of Hume's three 'principles of connexion among ideas...Resemblance, Contiguity in time or place, and Cause or Effect' by which one idea introduces another 'with a certain degree of method and regularity.'\textsuperscript{58}) Such an encyclopedic representation is 'potentially infinite' since each of the cases - F, A, M, P - has an almost indefinite range, even for one culture.\textsuperscript{59} For this reason Eco conceives of the 'universe of semiosis' as a 'labyrinth' in the form of a net, since 'every point can be connected with every other point, and, where the connections are not yet designed, they are, however, conceivable and designable.'\textsuperscript{60} Earlier I spoke of the dictionary entries
of the terms involved in any metaphor as being sufficient for its explanation; my discussion here of Eco is meant to extend rather than supplant that model; he himself speaks of the dictionary as a 'disguised encyclopedia' but we might also call it a summary of, or, in certain circumstances, an abstraction from, the use that characterizes the meaning of a word, a use which ultimately involves the whole of the labyrinth of language.61 This encyclopedic content of the term corresponds to what Black called the 'associated commonplaces' but the advantage in Eco's model is that it illustrates one aspect of metaphor obscured by Black's account; the fact that though metaphor requires that we know enough of the encyclopedia to understand it, it also 'permits us to understand the encyclopedia better.' in that metaphorical usage brings into focus parts of the labyrinth - connections - that have not previously been considered; 'the terms in question are enriched with properties that the encyclopedia did not yet grant them.'62

Aristotle, in the Rhetoric, observes that 'metaphors imply riddles' and that riddles, therefore, provide good examples of metaphor.63 In illustrating his general model of metaphor and in drawing a distinction between 'closed' or trivial, and 'open' metaphors Eco uses two Kenningar, Icelandic riddles; 'The tree for sitting' and 'The house of the birds'. In unravelling the first of these he begins by constructing the following table for 'tree':

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>/Tree/</th>
<th>D</th>
<th>F</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Trunk</td>
<td>A</td>
<td>M</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nature</td>
<td>Natural wood</td>
<td>Fruits</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Branches</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
| Vertical | ...

As a potential reserve of information about trees, their purposes and uses, the encyclopedia would allow the almost infinite extension of such a table. Our context however has indicated 'sitting', so that a 'series of hypotheses leads us to single out in the tree trunk the element "verticality", so as to look for something that is also wooden but "horizontal".64 Keeping the idea of sitting in mind we might try a representation of 'bench':

- 25 -
Although 'bench' is obviously the best answer, the metaphor is not very striking; 'Cognitively speaking,' as Eco writes, 'not much is learned, except for the fact that benches are made of crafted timber.' This then is a trivial metaphor because the correspondences, though inescapable, are few. Eco's second example 'The house of the birds' is what he considers to be 'good', 'open', or 'poetic' metaphor. He constructs the following tables for its interpretation:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>/House/</th>
<th>⃰F</th>
<th>A</th>
<th>M</th>
<th>P</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Rectangular</td>
<td>Culture</td>
<td>Earth</td>
<td>Shelter</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Closed</td>
<td>(Inorganic)</td>
<td>Resting on ground</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Covered</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>/Birds/</th>
<th>⃰F</th>
<th>A</th>
<th>M</th>
<th>P</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Winged etc.</td>
<td>Nature</td>
<td>Earth</td>
<td>Flying in the sky</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(Organic)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

This metaphor is more difficult than the 'Tree for sitting' example because 'it requires more daring abductions.' We might try 'sky':

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>/Sky/</th>
<th>⃰F</th>
<th>A</th>
<th>M</th>
<th>P</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Formless</td>
<td>Nature</td>
<td>Air</td>
<td>Nonshelter</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Open</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

In this example the 'process of semiosis' can be continued much longer than in our first example, it 'permits inspections that are diverse, complementary, and contradictory.' and it is this property which Eco defines as 'poetic'. Although most commentators eschew definitions of what makes a 'good' metaphor most agree that the metaphor's effectiveness depends on the number and complexity of correspondences involved, its resistance to simple interpretation. For example Eberle, who is discussing metaphor in scientific theory, talks of one metaphor being 'cognitively better' than another if from it one can construct a better model, a better representation of the facts involved in the principal subject;
"Models...are extended metaphors if by "extending the metaphor" we mean "constructing the model whose existence is suggested by the metaphor"."58 However the relationship between metaphor and scientific theory is something we will discuss elsewhere.

Eco's account of the interpretative rules for metaphor demonstrates an aspect of the discussion which is common to most accounts, that is, they are almost invariably biased in the direction of the sort of metaphor which is used as illustration. Eco thus emphasizes 'contrast' and a certain closure in interpretation, for suggestive as 'The house of birds' is it does have a specific goal - 'sky' - and this specificity is not something we can expect from other metaphors. Indeed, along with other *kennings* such as 'the gannet's bath' or 'the whale road' for 'sea', or 'the snake's sorrow' for 'winter', such riddles do focus on one aspect of the principal subject, in each case absent, and do employ terms in a non-literal or extended fashion - 'house', 'bath', 'road', ('tree' is more controversial) - but from this account we might be left with the idea that the disguising of the principal subject was the distinguishing feature of metaphor, which plainly, in the majority of cases, it is not.69

There is, however, a more important point to make here and it is that the 'associated commonplaces' or 'encyclopedic content' of any term can be manipulated by the context in which the metaphor occurs so as to emphasize those properties, or that portion, which we finally select to serve as the basis for correspondences.70 Indeed, it may be the context itself which establishes the associations, or content, of any term which we meet within it and which thereby allows the metaphor to convey what it never could outside of that context. This is an aspect of metaphor which Nowotny discusses at some length in her *Language Poets Use*, where she writes that 'the real peculiarity of poetic structure is that in it one constituent is used to develop the potential of another...one constituent acts upon another almost like an x-ray.'71 The same could be said, of course, of the mutual dependency of terms in everyday, or 'ordinary', language but in even the isolated metaphor this exploration of the 'contents', the potential meanings, of a term is, as we have seen, far more important to the particular meaning that the term is intended to convey. Words are used in such contexts in a heuristic fashion; most
obviously in the case of catachresis, when an old word is used in a new sense in order to name the previously unnamed, but also in a more general way. This same idea is evident in Paul Valéry's description of the writer as a 'maker of deviations';

This does not mean that all deviations are permitted to him; but it is precisely his business and his ambition to find the deviations that enrich, that give the illusion of the power or the purity or the depth of language. In order to work through language he works on language.72

This exploratory, refining process is what Nowottny considers the characteristic of poetry, in which 'the structure of a passage is... a means of making it possible for forms of language used in it to have more meaning than they would otherwise have; the structure is a solution of the problems involved in getting a particular thing said.'73 Through retrospective redefinition, by metaphor, of abstractions produced by some initial metaphor the poem, as a 'network of figures', consists of 'multiple relationships undergoing multiple transformations', and thereby conveys by each subsequent metaphor what that metaphor could not convey in isolation.74

This account, however, raises the question for me: Where does the metaphorical, in any context, begin? Langer suggests that;

Since the context of an expression tells us what is its sense - whether we shall take it literally or figuratively, and how, in the latter case, it is to be interpreted - it follows that the context itself must always be expressed literally, because it has not, in turn, a context to supplement and define its sense.75

As we have seen from Nowottny's account, the literal context which we might evoke for the interpretation of metaphor will depend upon the context in which we find that metaphor - if it occurs at the end of a series we may well consider its principal subject, the ostensibly 'literal' part, to be itself metaphorical in intention. Poetry, and literature in general, is distinguished by containing metaphors of metaphors and the point at which we decide that we are now concerned with the literal is of the utmost importance to interpretation. Indeed, different forms of criticism are characterized by the degree to which they postpone
discussion of the 'literal', but this is a point we shall return to in later chapters. Augustine, talking of biblical interpretation, comments that 'we must not suppose that all the events in the narrative are symbolic; but those which have no symbolism are interwoven in the story for the sake of those which have this further significance.' Just as it is 'only the share of the plough that cuts through the earth' and 'the strings of the lyre...that are designed to produce the music' though the whole of the plough and the lyre are necessary to achieve the respective effects. Augustine's similes are interesting, if slightly confused, but more important to us here is that he is discussing biblical interpretation; for, as an historical fact, just what part of the text constitutes the share of the plough, or even if the share is to be distinguished from the plough, is a question which has received innumerable different answers.

The immediate context of any element may thus be itself a figurative element in a previously established context and so we may pursue literal reference from figurative description to the act described, and from this act to the character's possible figurative status, and from here to the action as a whole, and from here to the status of the representation as a 'fiction', and so on until we reach the larger context of shared cultural knowledge and belief which will still be, however remotely, operant on our criteria for choosing what similarities are to be transferred, what correspondences drawn, between principal and subsidiary subjects, even in our most explicit metaphor, the first in the series. This is the importance of context; that if any element or elements, in this chain were disengaged from the rest, so that we had to draw our criteria for its interpretation more or less directly from the cultural context, we would interpret it in a different way to the way we would were we taking it as part of something else. The various approaches that criticism may take will also lead to a focus on different correspondences, as for example were one to read The Tempest 'in the context of', as the saying goes, Shakespeare's comedies, or his tragedies, or his later plays, or romantic tragicomedy in general, or the Nature-Art debate of the period, or any of a host of other contexts, though ultimately, whether we make it explicit or not, we criticize in the context of the relationship between ourselves and the world, of which the work is a fragment. If we discuss any of these contexts, aside from the last, as self-contained then we are
probably drawing correspondences between a figurative representation and what is itself metaphorical rather than literal, that is, we are working within the context of an unexamined metaphor.79

The most obvious way in which metaphor is signalled, or announces its presence, is through an absurdity in its literal sense - a man is plainly not a wolf - but there are other properties which guide us into reading metaphorically. The juxtaposition between two domains of meaning can, as Tourangeau writes, render a literal reading 'impossible, silly, irrelevant or simply incomplete.'79 But a literal reading could also be ruled out, even in the absence of any overt semantic anomaly, simply because it would describe a 'bizarre state of affairs'.80 Tautology, for example, by its apparent banality, and contradiction, by its patent rejection of literalness, also encourages us to read it metaphorically. The text which uses metaphors, as Eco writes, 'apparently lies, speaks obscurely, above all speaks of something other, all the while furnishing only vague information.'81 By these means, by violating all of the most general rules of good sense in communication, metaphor attracts the attention of the reader, providing that they have not previously decided upon the ineptness of the author, to the fact that something other than the literal meaning is meant. (According to Aristotle the 'liveliness of epigrammatic remarks' and the attractiveness of riddles is due to 'the meaning not being just what the words say'.82) Yet I would not want to give the impression that it is merely unconventionality, or the breaking of rules that guides our perception of metaphor; metaphor is a rule in itself and one which is so familiar, so integral a part of our use of language, that more often than not we are unaware of that process of rejecting the literal meaning of terms which is described above. 'Diction,' wrote Samuel Johnson, 'being the vehicle of thoughts, first presents itself to the intellectual eye; and if the first appearance offends, a further knowledge is not often sought.' for Whatever professes to benefit by pleasing must please at once. The pleasures of the mind imply something sudden and unexpected; that which elevates must always surprise. Whatever is perceived by slow degrees may gratify us with the consciousness of
improvement, but will never strike us with the sense of pleasure.\textsuperscript{23}

Thus, as Ricoeur writes, the metaphor must be "semantic impertinence", a "violating of the code of pertinence or relevance which rules the ascription of predicates in ordinary use." but also a "semantic innovation, thanks to which a new pertinence, a new congruence, is established in such a way that the utterance "makes sense" as a whole.'; the metaphor, according to Ricoeur, is 'not the enigma but the solution of the enigma.'\textsuperscript{34}

At this stage there is a general point I wish to make about fiction, which is closely related to our foregoing description of the signalling of the metaphor. Hymes describes metaphorical sentences as challenges to the reader 'to try and figure out some context in which he can use them.' and I would suggest that this challenge, or offer, is what is extended by fiction in general.\textsuperscript{25} For fiction too is irrelevant, often impossible or incomplete, it appears to say the thing that is not; as apparently incongruous to our daily commerce with the real world as the individual metaphor, considered from a strictly 'literal' point of view, is incongruous to its surrounding text. Literal falsity is both the touchstone of metaphor and one of the defining characteristics of literature, for even if we can discover a story to be true that truthfulness is irrelevant to the uses to which we put it as a story. Later, particularly in dealing with pleasure and persuasion, I shall return to and expand upon this correspondence.

Before going on to discuss how the division may be drawn between the metaphorical and the literal, I will just pause to take a brief look at a type of what we might call 'metaphorical representation' that is an intermediate stage between the individual, isolated metaphor we have been so far looking at and those forms of fiction which we will later be concerned with. In the \textit{Rhetoric} Aristotle characterizes proverbs as metaphors;

Suppose, for one instance, a man to start some undertaking in hope of gain and then lose by it later on, "Here we have once
more the man of Capathus and his hare" says he. For both alike went through the same experience.®

Is this actually the 'same' experience? Aristotle feels that the correspondence between the man of Capathus and his hare and the unnamed man and his unspecified situation, is close enough for the identification to be complete. Though the two situations are only analogous to one another, the proverb, like the metaphor converts 'is like' to 'is'. Both 'parable' and 'proverb' in the Old Testament are translated from the Hebrew mashal meaning 'to be like'.® In the New Testament both the Hebrew and the Greek words rendered as 'parable' imply resemblance or, more particularly, the placing of two things side by side, the bringing together of two different things in order for one to explain or emphasize the other.® Aside from proverbs and parables much of the language of the Bible is, as both its Oriental origin and its abstract subject matter would lead us to expect, figurative. Scripture, Aquinas writes, 'expresses truth in two ways, first, through its literal sense, when things are signalled by words : secondly through the spiritual sense, when things are signalled by other things.' This 'spiritual sense', he continues, is found by 'looking past the thing signified by the literal sense to other realities behind them'.®

The metaphorical sense is contained in the literal sense, for words bear imaginative suggestion as well as their plain and proximate sense. The literal sense of a figurative phrase is not the figure of speech itself, but what it symbolizes; for instance, when speaking of God's arm the Bible literally means that he wields power, not that he has a bodily member.®

Even what was considered as true historical narrative could be given a spiritual interpretation; Augustine, for example, declares that it is 'arbitrary to suppose that there could not have been a material paradise, just because it can be understood also in a spiritual significance...or that there was no rock from which water flowed when Moses struck it, just because it can be interpreted in a symbolic sense, as prefiguring Christ'.® There is here, strange as it would seem in Augustine, a refreshing permissiveness about the variety of interpretations a text can yield, though he adds that we must also believe in the truth of the story 'as a faithful record of historical fact.'® For, though for him the
scriptures were 'always to be interpreted with reference to Christ and his Church', there was at this time no set formula for how this was to be done, nor any prohibition on multiple interpretations.\textsuperscript{33} If we look at one of Augustine's own interpretations we find it at once ingenious and, to modern eyes, highly contentious. For example, though he considers the Flood and the building of Noah's ark as historical facts, he also considers the ark as a symbol of the Church 'on pilgrimage in this world' saved by the wood of the ship which prefigures the wood of the Cross, furthermore he finds a correspondence between the proportions of the ark and those of the human body, prefiguring the incarnation of Christ, between the door and the wound made in Christ's side, since the latter is 'the way of entrance for those who come to him, because from that wound flowed the sacraments with which believers are initiated', and between the 'squared beams' used in the ark's construction and the 'life of the saints which is stable on every side; for in whatever direction you turn a squared object, it will remain stable.' Augustine concludes, therefore, that all the other details mentioned in the account of the ark are also 'symbols of realities found in the Church'.\textsuperscript{34} His account appears fanciful though its analogical basis is clear; 'Church : world' as 'ark : Flood', 'door : rescue' as 'crucifixion : salvation' and so on. But it is important to note that within each of these analogies there are further ones. Thus, for instance, the straightforward proportional analogy between the dimensions of the ark and those of the human body yields not only the Incarnation but could also, in conjunction with the first analogy between the Church and the ark, yield the familiar image of the Church as the Body of Christ, an image which itself contains further analogies. This sort of typology, in contrast to straightforward allegory, views previous events as literally true though also an anticipation of what it holds to be the decisive event, thus the Exodus is a 'type' of the more decisive deliverance accomplished by Christ. (The parallels with the psychoanalyst's 'reading' of the patient's early experience are striking.) Such a procedure was not an invention of the Church fathers, Philo of Alexandria had used allegorical interpretation to establish a congruency between Platonic philosophy and Jewish theology, and the Gnostics also interpreted the Old Testament in this way (though, in keeping with their tenets, they treated the God of the Old Testament as an evil demiurge and the serpent as a type of Christ.\textsuperscript{35}) Nevertheless the exegetical findings,
or inventions of the Church fathers, and their subsequent history of biblical exegesis, forms a whole which, in its detail and the unity of that detail, demonstrates an investigation of the metaphorical potential of narrative that has probably never been surpassed in its thoroughness. Much of this early writing on interpretation, as for instance that of the Gnostics in their blatant and self-conscious disregard for authorial intention, is still interesting and suggestive today, but we must move on to less exotic pastures.

Such examples as the scriptural tradition provide are further illustrations of the conviction that Aristotle seems to hold in the *Rhetoric*, that the proverb/parable has what Bacon, talking of Aesop’s fables and other ‘parabolic poetry’, called an ‘inwardness’ of meaning, which allows it to apply metaphorically in a variety of different contexts. This ‘inwardness’ of the meaning of the anecdote or story corresponds, then, to what Aquinas calls the ‘imaginative suggestion’ of the word, both being, properly speaking, species of metaphor. In his *Aesthetics* Hegel talks of the relation between the fable and its general application relying on the ‘more general characteristics’ of the two situations, those elements which, as I have already argued, do not appear to exclusively belong, in their ‘proper sense’, to either the principal or subsidiary subject alone. For example, beginning some undertaking in the hope of gain and then losing by it later on is not a pattern, or dynamic, which properly belongs only to the man of Capathus and his hare, though he may be a striking example of it. But we must now take a closer look at this question of what is ‘proper’ to a word or concept.
Dead Metaphors

Dead metaphors seem most obviously to derive from Aristotle's metaphor by proportion or analogy, in which a name is provided for the previously unnamed on the basis of the position it holds in the analogy; A:B as x:D. Examples of such dead metaphors would be 'leg of the table', 'mouth of the river', 'neck of the bottle', and so on. The deadness of our examples consists in the fact that they do not immediately strike us as figurative (though placing them in a list as I have done here may slightly revive them); we only call them metaphors at all because they appear, though the case is not always so obvious, to have derived from what were originally examples of improper naming - an old word has been used in a new sense, without losing its old use. Shelley when he wrote his famous passage about every author of language being, in the 'infancy of society', necessarily a poet, 'because language itself is poetry', probably did not have such prosaic examples as 'the leg of the table' in mind but the idea is clearly applicable to our discussion. The language of poets', he continues, 'is vitally metaphorical; that is, it marks the before unapprehended relations of things and perpetuates their apprehension, until words, which represent them, become, through time, signs for portions or classes of thought...and then, if no new poets should arise to create afresh the associations which have been thus disorganized, language will be dead to all the nobler purposes of human intercourse.' Against this view I would argue that the creation of such metaphors is invariably a collective rather than an individual act, for though they must start with some individual it is only general understanding which makes them metaphors, and, furthermore, many metaphors created by poets will never become current, that is, will never die, because they depend upon a very specific context for their existence and so cannot, as metaphors, become commonplace. However, Shelley's association of the creation of language with the poetic act (if not strictly with 'poets') is illuminating and has since been echoed by other writers on culture. Cassirer, for example, writes of "radical metaphor" as 'a condition of the very foundation of...verbal conception'. Likewise Langer speaks of metaphor as 'the law of growth of every semantic,'; 'the power whereby a language, even with a small vocabulary, manages to embrace a multimillion things; whereby new words are born and merely
analogical meanings become stereotyped into literal definitions...the force that makes language essentially relational, intellectual, forever showing up new, abstractable forms in reality, forever laying down a deposit of old, abstracted concepts in an increasing treasure of general words.\textsuperscript{102}

The psychologist Vygotsky envisages this growth of language through analogy, as expressed in metaphor, in a way that, as we shall see, accounts for both the continuity and discontinuity we find between the present senses of a word and its etymology. The historical development of language, like the formation of concepts by the child, often relies, according to Vygotsky, on a \textit{chain complex} of associations in which links established at, historically, short-range will demonstrate an obvious resemblance in meaning, though it may not be possible to show a common concept that unites all the multiple meanings with the original one from which they have developed.\textsuperscript{103} In illustration of this idea he cites the semantic evolution of the Russian word \textit{sutki} from its original meaning of 'seam' (the junction of two pieces of cloth), to its use as denoting any sort of junction, such as the corner of a room, to its metaphorical use for 'twilight' (the junction of day and night), to its use to denote the twenty-four hour day (the time between one twilight and another).\textsuperscript{104}

While we can find a common attribute in 'seam', 'corner', 'twilight', the concept of 'twenty-four hour day' does not share in this attribute and we might be surprised to discover what its etymology was.\textsuperscript{105} Though 'day' still contains the idea of division, implicit in the idea of junction, that is, non-continuity, in that the other concepts denoted by sutki could not, in English, serve as metaphors for the period between one twilight and another, nor it for any of them, we could not claim that the etymology of this particular use was especially pertinent to its sense. We might note a similar divergence in meaning from the etymological root between the words 'ignore' and 'ignorance' since, while both are derived from \textit{in} meaning 'not' and \textit{gno} meaning 'know', to be able to ignore a thing one must have knowledge of it.

When is it, then, that a metaphor dies? Demetrius says that when a metaphor is applied with 'good taste' it can seem 'literally true', and I would argue that it is this appearance of literal truth which marks the end of a figure's figurative status.\textsuperscript{106} A similar point is made by Langer who writes that 'if a metaphor is used very often, we learn to accept the word in its metaphorical context as thought it had a literal meaning.
there.\textsuperscript{107} and Goodman who writes that 'with repetition, a transferred application of a schema becomes routine, and no longer requires or makes any allusion to its base application...its past is forgotten and metaphor fades into mere truth.'\textsuperscript{108} That is, if the improper, metaphorical use of a word proves useful then the new sense given to the old word will become part of the literal sense of that word when it appears in a new context. (We will come to the division between 'literal' and 'metaphorical', which I have rather arbitrarily introduced here, in a moment.) Wimsatt and Brooks define the dead metaphor as a 'collapsed metaphor, one in which A [principal subject] and B [subsidiary subject] have come together so completely that only one is left holding the field', though while this may hold when A is a concept without a name it will not do for every example of what we may wish to call a dead metaphor.\textsuperscript{109} While some words which we can trace back to a metaphorical beginning, such as 'arrive' from ad ripare meaning 'to come to shore', are so completely literal that the original, literal meaning is truly buried others tend to rise zombie-like under the influence of a context which recalls their origin - 'I put my foot down with a firm hand', 'A virgin land, pregnant with possibilities'. In these cases the subsidiary subject attracts more attention than the principal subject. Likewise transposing a metaphor from one medium to another can resuscitate its literal status; Eco, for example, cites Modigliani's female portraits which 'visually reinvent (but also oblige us to rethink even conceptually and, through various mediations, verbally) an expression such as neck of a swan.' and even 'worn-out expressions such as flexible (used to indicate openness of mind, lack of prejudice in decision making, sticking-to-the-facts) can reclaim a certain freshness when...translated visually through the representation of a flexible object.'\textsuperscript{110} Interestingly, when we try to rescue the original force of a dead figure of speech we attempt to conjure up the original physical image by prefixing the phrase with 'actually' or 'literally'; 'I literally lost my head', 'Lily, the caretaker's daughter, was literally run off her feet.' in which the prefix to the figure is used in the same sense as the archaic 'very'.\textsuperscript{111} Paradoxically such expressions will probably occur when the speaker is most aware of the aptness of the metaphor, though they seem to be least aware of its metaphorical nature.

The deadness, or liveliness, of metaphor is historically and culturally conditioned, thus Aristotle's example of 'the arrow flew' does
Metaphor

not strike me as live enough to be an obvious example of metaphor, while Turbayne's example of dead metaphor, 'smelling of indolence', does not strike me as dead enough to be almost literal. In contrast 'The cat insinuated himself into the kitchen' does sound to me like a metaphor because of the conventional use of the words 'insinuate', 'insinuation', and so on, in the human domain, but, in that 'insinuate' is derived from the Latin sinus meaning 'curve', the word might be said to apply more literally to the movements of a cat than in its normal senses. However, if we accept that the sense of a word is its standardized usage then our example is a metaphor, transferring the usual sense of 'insinuate' to the cat, anthropomorphizing it. Even if one is aware of the root the expression is more 'metaphorical' than, for instance, 'the leg of the table' (if this is metaphorical at all) because those usages which immediately recall its root, while possible, are uncommon.

Whether a term is literal or metaphorical, then, depends not on its etymology but on those contexts in which it is habitually used; the distinction between literal and metaphorical is, at this stage, an historical question. This is even more pronounced in the case of homonyms, such as 'bank'. While what the lexicographer classifies as multiple meanings will be given under one dictionary entry - as in mine 'bank', is split into two parts, the first defined as 'raised shelf of ground, or slope' or 'flat-topped mass of clouds, snow, etc.', and the second as 'sloping margin of river, ground near river' or 'edge of hollow place' - words that are classified as homonyms are given separate entries. In the case of 'bank' this means there are five entries; 'bank' meaning 'to confine with banks' or '(of car or aeroplane) to travel with one side higher'; 'bank's meaning 'establishment for custody of money'; 'bank'a meaning 'to trade in money', 'to keep money at bank', or, in 'bank on', meaning 'to base one's hopes on'; 'bank's meaning 'galley-rowers bench', 'tier of oars', 'row of organ keys', or 'working table'. 'Bank', and 'bank' are obviously related, and likewise 'bank's and 'bank'a, while 'bank's seems to have a metaphorical connection to 'bank'. However these three all share a common root in the Old Teutonic bankon meaning 'bank', from which came, by analogy, the later Teutonic bank meaning 'bench' giving, directly, 'bank's and more indirectly, through Italian and French, and along metonymic lines concerning the physical setting of early banking practices, 'bank'. It is clear, however, in this case, that we
would never be able, without the aid of the respective words' etymologies, to make a direct connection between 'bank' and 'bank', their meanings are so divergent that homonymy might just as well be accidental for all that the use of one will tell us about the use of the other. While knowledge of the root of 'insinuate' does liven our perception of its normal uses, the connection between the various uses of 'bank' is little more than an historical curiosity. However as we can see in the distinction made by the dictionary between 'bank' and 'bank', the distinction between homonymy and multiple meaning is, as Lyons writes, 'indeterminate and arbitrary.' Resting ultimately upon either the lexicographer's judgement about the plausibility of the assumed "extensions" of meaning or upon some historical evidence that the particular "extension" has in fact taken place." The distinction Lyons speaks of is artificial rather than "arbitrary", since the lexicographer will be guided by distinctions drawn in actual use, but such distinctions can change, though not perhaps so easily between the homonyms of 'bank', from one generation to the next.

There may, however, be instances when the effect of etymology on present sense will appear more important. There are instances when, as some writers have claimed, we use words believing that we are referring literally to something when in fact we are only referring to it by way of a metaphor. In such cases as 'the leg of the table' this is obviously an irrelevance, since we are unlikely to confuse the attributes of table legs with those of other sorts of legs, and our knowledge of table legs is direct, not dependent on our knowledge of other sorts of legs, even though the dictionary defines the two uses as close enough to merit a single entry, that is, as instances of multiple meaning rather than homonymy. However there are instances when we cannot point directly at any object in order to determine the meaning of the words we use, the most obvious example, and one which we will discuss in more detail later, being theological language, and, specifically, terms predicated of God. Hick writes that 'in all those cases in which a word occurs both in secular and in theological contexts, its secular meaning is primary in the sense that it is developed first and has accordingly determined the definition of the word.' The meaning of a term when it is applied to God is, then, an adaption or extension of its secular use; for example, the ancient Egyptian symbol for God (neter) was an axe-head, from which
we might deduce that the term started out as an abstract conception of 'strength' or 'power', developing by an extension of the idea of the ordinary role which such a weapon would fulfil. Whether neter, then, properly refers to something other than this abstraction is really the same question as whether neter is a literal term or a dead metaphor, the metaphorical nature of which has been forgotten. What effect the answer to this might have on the sense we can properly claim to convey by theological language is a question we shall leave to later.

We shall now turn to more mundane examples, first of all to show how consideration of the etymologies of words can make them seem more like dead metaphors than is at first apparent, and secondly to see how significant this may be for their sense. As I noted earlier Aristotle’s metaphor ‘the arrow flew’ appears to me as a literal use of the word ‘fly’. If we understand flying as moving through the air with wings then it will appear metaphorical, but there are so many other objects which ‘fly’ and which are not birds, and which, indeed, have no other single term to describe their movement through the air, that ‘fly’ seems to properly belong to all of them. Given that an arrow does not have wings we might try to discover what were the correspondences between an arrow and a bird which led Aristotle to call his application of ‘fly’ to an arrow metaphorical. First of all we can distinguish the movement of an arrow or of something thrown, from the movement of other objects through the air in that it is horizontal; something simply falling does not appear to be flying. The fact that, as a bird, the arrow appears to be defying gravity, which inanimate objects ordinarily do not, gives it a certain appearance of animation, that is, of intention, purpose or design, and it is this quality, real in the bird but only apparent in the arrow, which makes ‘the arrow flew’ metaphorical. So we might distinguish between the literal and metaphorical uses ‘fly’ by saying that in one instance there is intention and in the other there is not. However the etymological root of ‘intention’ tells us that it came from ‘stretching’ or ‘putting under strain’ which would make ‘intention’ a literal reference to the origin of the arrow’s motion and a metaphorical reference to the origin of the bird’s. ‘Purpose’ and ‘design’ likewise discover etymological roots in physical actions. However, like ‘insinuate’ the word ‘intention’ is now used in contexts in which it would not be confused with its
etymological origin, we know what is intended when we hear the word, it has its intendment fixed by the laws governing its use.

The extension of the meanings of one term in order to name a new concept is not exclusively an historical phenomenon. As Addison writes;

Polite masters of morality, criticism, and other speculations abstracted from matter, who, though they do not directly treat of the visible parts of nature, often draw from them their similitudes, metaphors and allegories. By these allusions a truth in the understanding is as it were reflected by the imagination; we are able to see something like colour and shape in a notion and to discover a scheme of thoughts traced out upon the matter... Allegories, when well chosen are like so many tracks of light in a discourse, that make everything about them clear and beautiful.  

The transfer from the concrete, 'the visible parts of nature', to the abstract can be seen both in 'insinuate' and 'intention', and in Addison's image of understanding being 'reflected' by the imagination, and notions having 'colour and shape'. There can also be a transfer from the abstract to the concrete, as in Eliot's 'Streets that follow like a tedious argument/ Of insidious intent', though we might imagine that, as an historical shift, this would account for fewer extensions of meaning.  

Such metaphors as Addison's, that is, those used illustratively, differ from historical extensions of meaning, whether into polysemy of homonyms, in that the sense of their new use is not divorced from the sense of their old one to the same extent.

This divorce of the sense of the etymological root from the sense of the contemporary term is the subject of C.S.Lewis' discussion in his essay 'Bluspels and Flalansferes', aptly subtitled 'A Sematic Nightmare', in which he distinguishes between two types of metaphor, 'Master's' and 'Pupil's', on the basis of their respective original uses. The question really hinges on whether we think independently of buried (though not necessarily 'dead') metaphor or not. The 'Master's' metaphor is, according to Lewis, one invented to help another grasp a concept we already fully understand ourselves, that is 'clear in our own minds'. In this case the way in which we understand the concept is relatively independent of the
metaphor we have invented; we are not dominated by our new 'tool' because we have 'other tools in our box.' Such a metaphor becomes dead if I continue to use the terms of the metaphor but forget that they were originally metaphorical; I may even concatenate them into a single neologism, the original elements of which I can no longer identify. However this forgetting does not necessarily alter my thinking on the subject, provided that it was originally a magistral metaphor and my conception of the subject it described was not limited by it;

To anyone who attempts to refute my later views on the subject by telling me that I don't know the meaning of my metaphor I may confidently retort "Derivations aren't meanings"...What is important for us is to grasp that just in so far as any metaphor began by being magistral, so far can I continue to use it long after I have forgotten its metaphorical nature, and my thinking will be neither helped nor hindered by the fact that it was originally a metaphor, nor yet by my forgetfulness of that fact. It is a mere accident.

Such 'dead' metaphors as 'arrival', 'insinuate', and 'intention' seem adequately covered by this account (though 'intention' is not as precise a concept as, for instance, 'arrival'). Lewis' second type of metaphor, the 'Pupil's' is that type which, in contrast to the magistral, we encounter when it is we ourselves who are being instructed. Such a metaphor, according to Lewis, makes what has previously been meaningless acquire 'at least a faint hint of meaning.' In this instance we are 'entirely at the mercy of the metaphor.' and if it has been badly chosen or if we are not aware that it is a metaphor, 'we shall be thinking nonsense.' This type of metaphor is 'the unique expression of a meaning that we cannot have on any other terms; it dominates completely the thought of the recipient; his truth cannot rise above the truth of the original metaphor.', his thought is 'entirely conditioned' by the imagery which the metaphor contains. Such a metaphor can die, or, as Lewis terms it, 'fossilize', in two ways; we may either grasp the subject more directly by study of the subject itself, or we may continue to use the metaphorical term and forget the analogy it represented though without gaining any more direct apprehension of the subject. In the first instance it makes no difference to our understanding to forget that the term has ever been metaphorical but in the second instance, if I continue to use the term,
then it is now meaningless and my conception of the subject 'which could never get beyond the imagery, at once its boundary and its support, has now lost that support....I am only talking, not thinking, when I use the word.'

Our thought is independent of the metaphors we employ, in so far as these metaphors are optional; that is, in so far as we are able to have the same idea without them....The relationship of meaning to derivation will thus vary from word to word, and from speaker to speaker.

Lewis' account is a lucid one but I have reservations about the example he gives of a pupillary metaphor and, therefore, about his account of this type of metaphor. The example that he gives is of his own conception of what a fourth dimension would be like. He has arrived at this by analogy, that is, by being told to imagine how a third dimension would appear to the inhabitants of a two-dimensional world. The problem that arises for me is that I cannot imagine a two-dimensional world, for though I can imagine a very flat one I realize that even being 'very flat' involves the notion of a third dimension. For this reason it does not at all help me to imagine a fourth spatial dimension and I frankly admit that I cannot. Furthermore I am not sure that Lewis does not simply imagine that he imagines it, that is, that there is not some gap, some empty space in the image which he has when he thinks of a fourth dimension. We could consider an alternative example of what may have been a magistral metaphor - the word 'hedgehog' ('hedge' due to the animal's habitat, and 'hog' due to its snout). If we look at the dictionary definition - spiny insectivorous quadruped, rolling itself into a ball for defence - then its name does not seem particularly pertinent to its nature. Direct acquaintance with the animal is important to the metaphorical deadness of the term 'hedgehog' and, indeed, I had heard it for years before realizing that it was made up of two words with self-contained meanings. Were one's conception of the animal limited to the metaphor, that is, a hog that lives in a hedge, then one would have a very poor idea of the animal, and it is difficult to imagine this as a very effective pupillary metaphor. However it is equally difficult to imagine a situation in which the passing on of the name, even assuming that the 'pupil' has never seen anything as common as a hedgehog, would
not be accompanied by some further explanation of the way it differed from a hog both in size and appearance. The name could then, despite its descriptive properties, equally well be something else, a group of syllables with no previous sense, and the metaphorical nature of the name would be, as it has been for me until recently, accidental. This account relies on the ability of the person who is instructing us on hedgehogs being able to represent the animal in other ways aside from its name and, at this level of language, not only is this probable but it is even more likely that our acquaintance with the representation will precede our learning of the name. But we may now turn to a more esoteric concept - 'elephant'. In the choir stalls of Chester cathedral there is a wooden carving of an elephant which has, among other unelephantine qualities, hooves. It is, I would argue, an example of an unintentional visual metaphor. One can see how the carver might have arrived at the hooves by analogy with animals with which he was familiar; the larger a European quadruped becomes, along the scale of quadrupeds, the less likely it is to have paws and the more likely it is to have hooves, similarly, though a bear is large and has paws it is also shaggy, therefore a large smooth-skinned animal will have hooves. The carving is a representation in a much stronger sense than we can use in calling the word 'hog' in 'hedgehog' a representation, though we might be justified in so doing. Again the metaphor might be unimportant on acquaintance - one can now recognize the carving as an elephant because it is more like that animal than any other - but it is quite plausible that a contemporary of the carving on seeing a real elephant might believe that they had discovered a previously unrecorded animal that was 'something like an elephant'.

It is the conversion from 'it is something like' to 'it is' which is the fundamental process in the demise of metaphor. But there are two types of 'it is', the first is when we point to the object itself or a faithful representation of it and say 'it is that', the second is when we remain in ignorance of the true nature of the object but still say 'it is that', as for instance when, pointing to our carving, we implicitly declare that an elephant is a 'long-nosed, large-eared horse'. The first relies on a more direct acquaintance with the object, or a more detailed knowledge of it than is contained in the metaphor and dies because it is so easily accompanied by a representation, the second relies on a knowledge of the metaphor alone, but, since it is not so
easily pointed to directly, it dies because it is no longer taken to be a metaphor. Naming a hedgehog a 'hedgehog' is likely to be a gradual, communal act which will leave nobody confused as to what it refers to, but the carved elephant is an esoteric piece of vocabulary analogous to an abstract term or a specialized use, perhaps the invention of an individual. With most academic disciplines concerned with the humanities there are a host of terms analogous to 'long-nosed, large-eared horse' which point to something either quite unlike their apparent meaning, the way in which they are used, or else to nothing at all in existence; the centaurs, griffons, and chimeras of the intellectually orientated mind. The popularity of the multiplication of entities, of classes, and classes of classes, can be seen, for example, in contemporary literary theory; one system of classification after another is thrown out, replete with evocative terms that will not, however, resolve into separate senses, that is, one can define the terms but the definition remains chronically ambiguous in the practical situations to which they supposedly refer. There are certain words, such as 'subjective' and 'objective', which, when any writer uses them as absolutes, become mere husks of sense. This is the power of the Greek, the polysyllabic, or even simply the technical word over the imagination; there is, after all, an etymological link, via the concept of magic, between 'grammar' and 'glamour'. Classifiers are always in the ascendant over analysts in popular intellectual life, since it is easier to learn a jargon than to equal an insight. (The 'fundamental dichotomy', an animal practically unknown in the wild, is best of all.)

As a second example of an alternative pupillary metaphor to that of Lewis I would suggest the likening of words and their meanings to tools and their functions. I would argue that once one has grasped the aptness of this metaphor, even if one has never considered the concept of meaning before, then one has grasped all that is contained in the likeness, that is, one has as complete a knowledge of what the master means by it as they have themself. In certain cases the metaphor contains the whole of the idea, and thus understanding it at all presupposes that one could construct another different metaphor to express the same idea. It would still be possible, of course, to learn the words contained in the simile and repeat them, parrot-fashion, in response to the stimulus 'meaning' without reflecting on them and, therefore, without being able to offer an alternative metaphor, or even perhaps to be able to do so at
first but subsequently forget and still carry on using the expression. In both these instances we might say that, even though the likeness is obviously being drawn in the expression, as a metaphor it would be dead to the user.

As we saw with 'bank' (the establishment) the original name given to something may be to a large degree accidental to its defining characteristics. With an example such as 'insinuate', despite its original metaphorical status, its image of curving, we are not dominated by that original meaning, that is, we can use the word correctly and meaningfully without even being aware of its origin.\(^{130}\) We think, therefore, independently of buried metaphor in so far as we could, in Lewis' words, supply in its place a 'new and independent apprehension' of our own, for 'to have a choice of metaphors (as we have in most cases) is to know more than we know when we are the slaves of a unique metaphor.'\(^{131}\) This holds for individual sensible objects, continues Lewis, but 'when we begin to think of causes, relations, of mental states or acts, we become incurably metaphorical.'\(^{132}\) This is something we have already touched upon when talking of expressions such as 'deep sadness'. In this sphere Lewis considers that 'freedom' from a given metaphor is, in some cases, 'only a freedom to choose between that metaphor and others.'\(^{133}\) Whether we can legitimately call something which has a definite sense 'incurably metaphorical' is a question we will return to, for it concerns not only the division between metaphorical and literal, but also the type, or types of meaning a metaphor can have, and the possibilities of paraphrase. Lewis holds that in certain instances a thing has never been apprehended literally and we must therefore have metaphor understood to be such, or nonsense, and that, therefore, 'we are never less the slaves of metaphor than when we are making metaphor, or hearing it new made.'\(^{134}\)
Metaphorical and Literal

How are we divide the metaphorical from the literal? We began with Aristotle's definition of metaphor as the application to one thing of the name belonging to another, an alien name, or the use of a word transferred from its proper sense. Is metaphor, then, simply improper use of language, that is, catachresis? The two terms 'metaphor' and 'catachresis' are obviously not synonyms in so far as catachresis could be, by this definition, mere nonsense as well as metaphor. But the introduction of our new term, even if we decide it is the genus of which metaphor is a species, does not actually advance us very far in the direction of the distinction we are looking for. In hitting on the idea of metaphor as deviance from 'proper' or 'ordinary' language we have, so to speak, got the snake by the tail; but where does the tail end and the body begin?

We have seen some of the ways in which a metaphorical (or metonymic, in the case of 'bank') term can become literal in the preceding analysis of dead metaphor and we could summarize these as follows: A word is the proper word for a thing when it becomes the one that a speaker of the language would expect to hear applied to that thing, that is, when any ambiguity that might arise in understanding its use is due to homonymity and not to the novelty of the application. It may be best, then, to contrast metaphorical language not with ordinary or literal language, but with established language. This is certainly not the last word on the distinction and neither is it very informative about the particular qualities of the metaphorical and the literal/established, but this historical aspect is, nevertheless, a good place to begin.

In the Poetics Aristotle defines a 'poetic coinage' as a 'word which has not been in use among people' and we might adapt this to say that a poetic metaphor is, in contrast to those metaphors in their declining years, the use of a word that has not been in use among people. In contrast to nonsense there is, in the new application, a discoverable appropriateness, by way of analogy, as has been discussed in the first part of this essay. As long as the impropriety of the application or use, the resistance between the old and new senses of the word, remains for so long is the application metaphorical. Demetrius holds that 'custom...is especially a teacher of metaphors.' and applies them almost
Demetrius conception of the growth of language appears to be an odd one, for he speaks of 'custom' describing some ideas 'so well by metaphor, that we no longer need literal words; the metaphor remains, usurping he place of the original word - as, for example, "the eye of the vine"; but we would obviously not want to presume that there was always a literal term for a thing, that came into being, as it were, with the thing itself.140 However, the idea of custom establishing the proper, apparently literal name for a thing is, I believe, correct, for what is apparently literal is literal. The metaphor points out an analogy, between situations or things, which has not been previously accepted or 'seen'. As Eco writes, 'the latent proportion...does not exist before the metaphor; it must be found, whether by the person who invents the catachresis or by the person interpreting it...after which discovery language absorbs the trope, lexicalizes it, and registers it as an overcoded expression.141 A term which has thus 'settled', the sense of which is sufficiently common for it to be amenable to a reasonably adequate definition, can then be described as literal or, excluding homonyms, univocal. Indeed without this settled aspect metaphor could not exist, for it only exists in contrast.142 However, I believe that the idea of all contemporary language having its roots in metaphor is mistaken; though the number of things that can be named, the referential power of language, evidently increases by metaphor, we must allow that there is, at however remote a stage, a time when a word is simply a collection of sounds either arbitrarily or metonymically (as in onomatopeia) associated with some object in the world, for we cannot have a metaphorical application without a literal meaning.

Something of this process can be seen in our acquisition of language as children, or, more rarely, in learning a foreign language. Our first steps in learning to understand or reproduce language consist in associating a word or phrase with some specific situation. We reproduce it on what appears to be a similar occasion and are rewarded either by approval or, more directly, by our efforts being the cause of the repetition of some pleasure. We repeat our word or phrase in subsequent similar situations and gradually discover, from the reactions of others, whether we have mistaken the analogy between one situation and another which defines them as the same situation. As a personal example, the
first time I saw a concrete-mixer I pointed it out as a 'coffee machine', naming it by analogy with a coffee grinding machine I had recently seen working in a shop. A new word or phrase invites the child, or adult, to find a governing semantic rule from its context; we abstract the recurring attribute from particular instances and generalize to new instances. The concept that we thus form is also a semantic rule, a rule of reference for the new word. Not only nouns but also verbs, propositions, and subject-object constructions are learnt in this way. When they are taught systematically it is by the comparison of sentences that are alike in every element except that to be learnt, matched with situations that are identical but for the relevant linguistic feature. This can also be a procedure for the definition of concepts even at an esoteric level, as, for instance, in such questions as 'Is Ulysses a novel?' or 'Can you separate "modern" and "medieval" elements in Luther's weltanschaung?', and so on. Quine writes that it is, therefore, 'a mistake...to think of linguistic usage as literalistic in its main body and metaphorical in its trimmings.' and Richards describes metaphor as 'the omnipresent principle of language'. But before taking what may seem to be naturally the next step, and declaring that all language is governed by metaphor, we might ask what is to be gained or lost by saying so. Even if we allow that situations which are the same are rarely identical situations, this does not make our use of a term or phrase to cover all of them, metaphorical. This is, however, related to an idea of language which is bound to occur to one if one thinks about the subject of language in these terms, an idea for which I will let Nietzsche be the spokesman;

Every word instantly becomes a concept precisely insofar as it is not supposed to serve as a reminder of the unique and entirely individual original experience to which it owes its origin; but rather, a word becomes a concept insofar as it simultaneously has to fit countless more or less similar cases - which means, purely and simply, cases which are never equal and thus altogether unequal. Every concept arises from the equation of unequal things. Just as it is certain that one leaf is never totally the same as another, so it is certain that the concept "leaf" is formed by arbitrarily discarding these individual differences and by forgetting the distinguishing aspects.
In this passage we slip along, almost insensibly, from similarity to difference, to inequality, to arbitrary association, as if unaware that, apart from the names of individuals and places, there are few words which are not intended to refer to classes of things and that language can usually be made as specific as the instances which we want to refer to require it to be. Metaphorical use is distinguished from simply general use by the fact that, as we have observed, it is the use of a word which is somehow contra-indicated by the context in which it occurs. Thus one can refer to 'leaf 1, 2, 3, 4...' as 'leaves' without transporting into one context any term belonging more properly to another, while in referring to a leaf as a 'tongue of fire' one does. Likewise 'leaves of a book' is not metaphorical because one does not have to think of leaves (botanical) in understanding or using it (though my placing it here, among other 'leaves', has probably made you do so). More strictly analogical uses of 'leaf' occur when a botanist refers to specialized leaves, such as those of a carnivorous plant or climber; in these cases the analogy is drawn on the basis of a specialized definition of leaves as organs, a definition that may not coincide with the more obvious characteristics by which the non-botanist identifies them.

If all language is metaphorical then no language is metaphorical, for to transfer a word or phrase from its proper context implies a proper context, a literal use for that word or phrase. Nevertheless metaphor is no respecter of settled categorical habits and, as such, is often instrumental in forming new ones; even a dictionary only half a century old can surprise one with how many uses which now seem literal are cited as figurative extensions. While there is a dividing line between metaphorical and literal use it is one which, due to the freedom with which ordinary language exploits the possibilities of allusion or similitude, is constantly moving. Jakobson writes of an 'ascending scale of freedom' in the possible combination of linguistic units which a language user can make, going from phonemes to the combination of phonemes into words, to the formation of sentences, to the combination of sentences.140 (This varies from language to language; the possibilities of combining parts of words into new yet immediately meaningful ones are, for example, much greater in modern Greek than in modern English.) We could look upon the formulation of sentences and the combination of sentences as the creation of contexts within which a word can take on a
new meaning, in which a use that would perhaps elsewhere be simply nonsense can become metaphorical. Indeed it is uncommon to find a single paragraph of any sort of discourse which does not contain a metaphor, or at least a construction that once would have been one. Even in speech, the context of which is more often a practical one, this freedom to invest, by analogy, an old expression with new meaning is possible, though we might expect it to be rarer. For in discourse there are always two elements; the familiar, that is, known words and the syntactical rules for their combination, and the particular, that is, what on any particular occasion the speaker or writer is trying to refer to, which will often be something quite novel.\textsuperscript{149} I have refrained from saying that it will always be novel because though two situations, say two separate occasions of addressing a letter to the same place, are not identical, just because we are only doing 'the same thing' does not justify our saying that we are doing something 'different'. When a discourse is made up almost exclusively of metaphors then we have a riddle, though its very status as a riddle, its form, tells us that it points towards a literal object or situation.\textsuperscript{150} Metaphor, then, is a way of increasing the possibilities of conveying new information, comparable to the combination of old senses that make up a new sentence but, at the same time, involving a deviance from an established use, so that its metaphorical use is not simply new but also unorthodox.\textsuperscript{151}

It is because of metaphor's ability to express the novel that it is often found at what Quine calls 'the growing edge of science'.\textsuperscript{152} But we must justify our use of the word 'metaphor' here, for it would seem that 'analogy' would better describe the theoretical models of science. However metaphor and analogy are two types of representation that are intimately connected. When we consider metaphor as involving only a single point of comparison or likeness we can then contrast it with analogy which, by definition, sets out numerous comparisons point by point. But metaphor, as our earlier discussion has shown, involves not just a single point of comparison, though it often appears to, for an analogy is always implicit. Likewise in simile the 'like' hides a multitude of 'likes'. If we wish to divide these three terms from one another then we would do so along a continuum of increasing explicitness as to just what features of
the principal and subsidiary subjects are being compared, with metaphor at the least explicit end of the spectrum and analogy at the most explicit. It is, finally, a matter of appearance.

Turbayne, who, in *The Myth of Metaphor*, is mainly concerned with metaphors in science, writes that 'to present items belonging to one sort in the idiom appropriate to another' is not necessarily to create confusion but, on the contrary, often has 'great illustrative and explanatory value.' This definition of metaphor is almost identical with Ryle's description of the 'category-mistake' and this parallel is of great significance for the use and abuse of scientific description. For it is in science, and, as we shall shortly see, in philosophy too, that the division between metaphorical and literal can become most problematic. Turbayne cites Freud's *Interpretation of Dreams* and Berkeley's *Essay Towards a New Theory of Vision*, among other works, as examples of 'the deliberate and sustained application of an extended metaphor - that is, a model - to a concrete problem.' At a more prosaic level I might offer the example of those models consisting of balls and springs that are used in teaching chemistry to demonstrate molecular structure, for, while the atoms themselves are represented in a similar idiom, that is, as matter (the balls), the forces which bind them together are represented by a different idiom, again matter (the springs). In this instance we could say that the spring is an instance of visual metaphor. Used with awareness metaphors can illuminate obscure or previously hidden facts, however, when they are used without awareness the result is confusion; as if, for example, we were to expect the breakdown of some molecule into its constituents to give us certain elements and whatever type of matter the springs represent. However, the model, whether a visual or a verbal matter, is a form of explanation, it makes intelligible to us what otherwise might not be. If an analogy or metaphor is a good one then it can be used as the basis for experimentation and to make the results of experimentation intelligible. There may come a point at which the established metaphor becomes more misleading than helpful, and it is then dropped in favour of one which is, as we might say, more apt.

However, with certain very effective metaphors our instinct is to 'deny the metaphor and affirm the literal truth', as Turbayne writes;
The history of science may be treated from the point of view that it records attempts to place metaphysical disguises upon the faces of process and procedure. After the disguise or mask has been worn for a considerable time it tends to blend with the face and it becomes extremely difficult to "see through" it.157 (In such instances the metaphor does not die by becoming literal, it dies by becoming hidden, by taking on the appearance of literalness.) In the mind of the observer it moves along a continuum from simile to metaphor to literal truth, but unlike our earlier examples of the metaphorical becoming literal, in the scientific context, in which the metaphor is a form of explanation, this process involves a loss of sense. Turbayne describes how a special set of implications is taken from one idiom, for example that belonging to machinery, and used to explain facts about something not so directly observable, for example the human body. What are conclusions in the first idiom are thus used as premisses in the second.158 However, no metaphor, he continues, can 'validly claim to provide the correct allocation of the facts.',' though it may serve as a more useful guide than its predecessors, and if it does cease to be understood as metaphor, or if it is not understood as such to begin with, then the result is confusion.159 I do not, however, agree with Turbayne's conclusion that 'we cannot say what really is, only what it seems like to us' since while all theories about processes or forces are provisional there are certain basic objects in scientific inquiry, the flesh and blood of things, which science does refer to without involving itself in metaphor at all.160 Similarly, while we may not be able to point to an observable literal half of the analogy we have drawn, individual observations and experimental results are things which we can actually point to; it is in the synthesizing, theoretical aspect of science that metaphor holds sway. Somebody, possibly Bertrand Russell, wrote that reality was the current state of scientific knowledge, and, in that reality is, once we have allowed for the provisional nature of theory, what seems, to contrast reality with appearance in this context seems futile.

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In Demonstration, in Councell, and in all vigorous search of Truth, Judgement does all; except sometimes the understanding have need to be opened by some apt similitude; and then there is so much use of Fancy. But for Metaphors, they are in this case utterly excluded. For seeing they openly profess deceit; to admit them in Councell or Reasoning, were manifest folly.  

Hobbes appears here to completely reject the use of metaphor in philosophy. Yet this may be a question of style rather than of subject matter, for he is ready to allow simile, or undisguised metaphor, and in praising it he himself employs what seems to be metaphor — 'understanding...opened by some apt similitude'. Having, in the last section, identified metaphor and simile as figures with the same cognitive potential, differing only in appearance and immediacy, we might read this passage as a warning against the confusion that can arise from using metaphors when it is possible they will not be understood as such. In an earlier chapter Hobbes writes that metaphors and tropes are 'less dangerous' than such words 'as are the names of Vertues and Vices' — 'wisdom', 'fear', 'cruelty', 'justice' — because, while these ethical terms hide the fact that they signify 'the nature, disposition, and interest of the speaker', figurative words at least 'profess their inconstancy'. Is there a sense, then, in which ethical and evaluative terms are dead, or, rather, hidden metaphors like those hidden scientific metaphors discussed above, that is, involving a loss of sense? I do not wish to get into a full-scale discussion of the evaluative use of language here but will say, in passing, that, since evaluative statements are obviously statements about the disposition of the speaker, unless the speaker is actually lying they cannot be said to be deceitful, and to insist that the speaker make the subjective nature of his statement explicit is purely gratuitous, for what they "really" mean is to be understood by what they say. We will now turn to Demonstration and Councell in general.

Nietzsche, in the essay earlier referred to, begins by attacking the supposed objectivity of evaluative, moral language, but soon extends his argument to all language. He writes of how a 'uniformly valid and binding designation is invented for things', and how, with this 'invention', the 'legislation of language', the difference between truth and lies first comes into existence. Aside from the use of 'invent' this proposition
seems uncontroversial, since without such a 'legislation', an established body of correct usage, there can be neither representation nor misrepresentation. However, Nietzsche then goes on to question the basis of these linguistic conventions;

Are designations congruent with things? Is language the adequate expression of all realities? It is only by means of forgetfulness that man can ever reach the point of fancying himself to possess a "truth" of the grade first indicated. If he will not be satisfied with truth in the form of tautology, that is to say, if he will not be content with empty husks, then he will always exchange truths for illusions.¹⁶⁴

The arbitrary designation of things, according to Nietzsche, arises through processes involving metaphor - a nerve stimulus is 'transferred' into an image, the image 'imitated' in a sound - 'each time there is a complete overlapping of one sphere, right into the middle of an entirely new and different one.'¹⁶⁵ The result is, he concludes, that though we believe we know something about such things as 'trees, clouds, snow, and flowers', in fact 'we possess nothing but metaphors for things - metaphors which correspond in no way to the original entities'; we 'dissolve' our sudden impressions, images, and intuitions into concepts and abstractions.¹⁶⁶

What then is truth. A moveable host of metaphors, metonymies and anthropomorphisms: in short, a sum of human relationships which have been poetically and rhetorically intensified, transferred, and embellished, and which, after long usage, seem to people to be fixed, canonical, and binding. Truths are illusions which we have forgotten are illusions; they are metaphors that have become worn out and have been drained of sensuous force, coins which have lost their embossing and are now considered as metal and no longer as coins...to be truthful means to employ the usual metaphors. Thus, to express it morally, this is to lie according to fixed convention, to lie with the herd and in a manner binding upon everyone.¹⁶⁷

Nietzsche claims that it is only by forgetting that the original perceptual metaphors are only metaphors and not 'the things themselves', that one can live 'with any repose, security, and consistency', for our concepts are piled up on a foundation of, as it were, 'running water.'¹⁶⁸

If all this is 'true' what then of Nietzsche's own discourse? Is it made
up lies? A paradox is an attractive thing, but it can be profound or meaningless, and a discourse that undermines itself can only leave irony - but at whose expense?

Nietzsche defines the liar as 'a person who uses the valid designations, the words, in order to make something which is unreal appear to be real,' but this is not, of course, possible unless there is a valid designation; there must be truth for there to be illusion and truth is a property which only language can possess. To illustrate how we may differentiate between what is true and what is not, or at least between degrees of truthfulness, we might look at the opening of the essay under discussion. Here Nietzsche invents a fable in order to convey 'how miserable, how shadowy and transient, how aimless and arbitrary the human intellect looks within nature.' I am no more than a human being with a human intellect so I cannot verify Nietzsche's picture, but when he speaks of this intellect 'detaining' us for 'a minute within existence', then it becomes clear that words are being used to make the unreal appear real, for a lifetime may not be an appreciable span in the history of the universe, but to a human being, as Nietzsche was and as any of his potential readers are, it is a lifetime. This assertion of Nietzsche's, then, appears to have been a metaphor - 'a man's lifetime : universe' as 'a minute : a man's lifetime' - but as we see, when its terms are formally set out, it is neither true nor a metaphor. Philosophically, then, some metaphors are better than others.

In another essay, written during the same period, Nietzsche suggests that the 'spiritual activity of millenia is deposited in language.', and it is to this idea, which is especially relevant to the examination of the role of metaphor in philosophy, that we shall now turn. Jonathan Culler states that, since a literal expression is 'a metaphor whose figurality has been forgotten.', then philosophy 'is condemned to be literary in its dependence on figures'. As we have seen, however, in our discussion of Lewis' essay, there are many ways in which a figure can lose its figurative status and each of these ways will have a different effect on its subsequent meaningfulness. In his Essay Concerning Human Understanding Locke condemns 'atomists' for defining 'motion' as 'passage from one place to another' on the grounds that this is merely to replace one synonymous word with another. Paul de Man comments on this passage;
Locke's own "passage" is bound to continue this perpetual motion that never moves beyond tautology: motion is a passage and passage is a translation: translation, once again, means motion, piles motion upon motion. It is no mere play on words that "translate" is translated in German as "übersetzen" which itself translates the Greek "meta phorein" or metaphor. Metaphor gives itself the totality which it then claims to define, but it is in fact the tautology of its own position. The discourse of simple ideas is figural discourse or translation and, as such, creates the fallacious illusion of a definition.\textsuperscript{176}

I have already described many of the objections that can be made to the idea of the ubiquity of metaphor, here I will just reiterate that choice of metaphor entails a freedom from metaphor, and the fact that if a contemporary term were truly synonymous with its metaphorical origin then they would be interchangeable, which, patently, in the majority of cases, they are not. De Man goes on to discuss how the metaphors which Locke himself employs to describe language shape his cognition of the subject, so that he must be read 'to some extent, against or regardless of his own explicit statements...he has to be read in terms of the rhetorical motion of his own text, which cannot be simply reduced to...identifiable facts.'\textsuperscript{176} The idea that metaphors play a crucial role in theoretical description is no more than has already been discussed, but it does not follow from this that meaning or verification must be indefinitely postponed. Indeed, were this the case then meaningful discussion of the figurative status of Locke's passage would be impossible. De Man holds that, at times, 'it seems as if Locke would have liked nothing better than to be allowed to forget about language altogether', but this is a comment that only a fellow-writer could seriously make.\textsuperscript{177} All writing, philosophy included, demonstrates an extraordinary concern with language - this is the paradox of Nietzsche and all writers on the inadequacy or distorting influence of language. Those who take language for granted only write out of necessity. Philosophy is a concern with the referential power of language par excellence, and, in this respect, we could characterize the project of philosophy, from Socrates onwards, as an attempt to liberate thought from the disruptive power of metaphor and the unreflective use of language.\textsuperscript{176}

When de Man states that philosophy 'is condemned, to the extent that it
is dependent upon figuration, to be literary' and that, consequently, it cannot claim a separate 'identity or specificity' from literary discourse, he says no more than that metaphor can be found in both.179 Though we must make this distinction, that the metaphors in philosophy are made to be questioned.180

This is a view that Derrida seems to hold when he asks 'Has not philosophy always recalled the arbitrariness of the sign in order to point the contingent and superficial exteriority of language to thought, the secondariness of the sign in relation to the idea, etc.?', but it soon transpires that the question is more than rhetorical.181 In 'White Mythology' Derrida states that 'metaphor seems to involve the usage of philosophic language in its entirety, nothing less than the usage of so-called natural language in philosophical discourse, that is the usage of natural language as philosophical language.'182 The argument by which he arrives at this conclusion is already familiar to us; the abstract concept comes into being through the 'wearing away' usage of what was originally physical metaphor. The difference is that Derrida takes this idea to its final conclusion, short of resigned silence. He quotes a dialogue from Anatole France in which one character, to demonstrate how 'metaphysical metaphor' has 'erased piles of physical discourses', reactivates 'the primitive inscription' in "The spirit possesses God in proportion as it participates in the absolute".183 By tracing the genealogy of each term this is finally rendered as "He whose breath is a sign of life, man, that is, will find a place...in the divine fire, source and home of life, and this place will be meted out to him according to the virtue that has been given him...of sending abroad this warm breath, this little invisible soul, across the free expanse."184 This is the meaning, or one of them, of the title 'White Mythology', for metaphysics has 'erased within itself the fabulous scene that has produced it, the scene that nevertheless remains active and stirring, inscribed in white ink, an invisible design covered over in the palimpsest.'185 Though Derrida states that 'the issue is not to take the function of the concept back to the etymology of the noun along a straight line', he nevertheless sees the historical tie between origin and use as 'not a reducible contingency.'186 We have already noted that theological language can only be analogical, and this is a fact not hidden from most theologians, but Derrida appears to extend the rule of
metaphor to cover all abstract language and this presents a special problem for its philosophical description;

Metaphor cannot dominate itself, cannot be dominated by what it itself has engendered, has made to grow on its own soil, supported on its own base. Therefore it gets "carried away" each time that one of its products - here the concept of metaphor - attempts in vain to include under its own law the totality of the field to which the product belongs. If one wished to conceive and to class all the metaphorical possibilities of philosophy, one metaphor, at least, always would remain excluded, outside the system : the metaphor, at the very least, without which the concept of metaphor could not be constructed...167

Without a non-metaphorical vocabulary or standpoint one cannot stand outside of the subject of metaphor, or even define it - for some defining term will be itself metaphorical. Drawing an analogy with the concept of scientific theory as metaphor, he asks 'Is rectification henceforth the rectification of a metaphor by a concept? Are not all metaphors, strictly speaking, concepts, and is there any sense in setting metaphor against concept?'.168 That 'proper meaning' is not synonymous with 'original meaning' is something we have already established, but Derrida is suggesting something more radical - an absence of 'proper meaning' in the philosophical use of language.169 There are two questions to be answered here : Is Derrida right? Does it make any difference if he is?170 With Nietzsche's paradoxical argument these two questions amounted to a single question, but Derrida's position is more sophisticated.171

To ask whether a term in philosophy can be separated from its physical roots is to ask whether it can be made to meaningfully refer to something other than those roots. ("The spirit possesses God in proportion as it participates in the absolute" is not, of course, philosophically meaningful to begin with!) In Derrida's account the philosophical term, despite his emphasis on genealogy, appears suddenly, devoid of defining properties that will separate it from its metaphorical origins by allowing it to refer to a state-of-affairs separate from those origins.172 However, as Austin reminds us, 'it is advisable to bear in mind...that the distinctions embodied in our vast and, for the most part, relatively ancient stock of ordinary words are neither few nor always very obvious, and almost never just arbitrary'.173 Just as it is the
context of the use of a word which makes it either metaphorical or literal, so it is the context of any word which qualifies its precise sense. We can look upon a word such as 'intention' as an attempt to hide an image of stretching, or as an attempt, or the result, of a differentiation between concepts. Those sentences which 'stretch' can meaningfully belong to are not the same sentences as those which 'intention' can meaningfully belong to, though there may be some overlap and, as with 'insinuate' we can imagine 'intention' being used metaphorically in this overlapping. Even if the rest of the components of those sentences are themselves rooted in metaphor - though, given their new independence, 'originated in metaphor' is more apt - then at least we know that they all belong to the same area of language, that is, when they appear together we are not immediately aware of metaphor.

If we mix the domains of 'stretch' and 'intention' then we no longer have the contemporarily literal, for the domains can be differentiated; the two words refer to different states-of-affairs, and to substitute one in the normal context of another is to create metaphor, to say something novel by the use of analogy. 'Intention' and 'stretch' are more closely related to their respective areas of language than to one another, indeed the very fact that one began in another but began on the basis of an analogical relationship denies the possibility of identity. Let us look for a moment at the individual metaphor: Without some state-of-affairs to provide a resting point, or points, in the interpretative process begun by metaphor, that is, without some resemblances that exist and therefore can be pointed to even if their description has not previously existed in language, then metaphor is not possible. To argue, then, that some abstract or philosophical term is metaphor is to point to resemblances between its normal use and its genealogy, that is, to understand how they are separate. If we, provisionally, adopt as a criterion of significance the possibility of providing a definition that is ultimately ostensive for each term in any sentence, then we must allow that, despite any metaphorical relationship between a term and its ancestors, the states-of-affairs that would be finally pointed to by such definitions would be different from one another.
Metaphor

The problem, if problem it is, of the relation between literal meanings and any other sorts of meanings confronts us nowhere more strikingly than in the central topic of this essay - literature. It was Dryden's opinion that 'the boldest strokes of poetry, when they are managed artfully, are those which most delight the reader.' and he cites Virgil and Horace, in their 'frequent use of the hardest metaphors, and of the strongest hyperboles', as both the best authority and the best argument for this opinion. Aristotle, who in the *Poetics* writes that "there are not the same standards of correctness in poetry as in political theory or any other art.", gives examples, in the *Rhetoric*, of metaphors which are 'bad taste' in certain forms of discourse because they are 'too much like poetry.' There may indeed be reason for identifying the poetical with metaphor per se, for though, as we have seen, almost all discourse uses metaphors, there may be a point at which the difference in degree to which one form uses them becomes the difference between that kind and others. With respect to the use of words Bacon defined poetry as 'but a character of style' which 'belongeth to the arts of speech' and held that its 'license' derived from its being a product of the imagination 'which, being not tied to the laws of matter, may at pleasure join that which nature hath severed, and sever that which nature hath joined: and so make unlawful matches and divorces of things'. It seems unlikely that any single feature can be defined the presence of which will justify our calling one form of discourse literary or poetical, for the way in which we use such terms differs not only with time but also between individuals, that is, it seems fruitless to try and lay down a priori rules about where difference in degree turns into difference in kind (it is for this reason perhaps that the perennial problems in aesthetics are not ones of detail but rather of general principle). Jakobson writes that 'poeticalness is not a supplementation of discourse with rhetorical adornment but a total re-evaluation of the discourse and of all its components whatsoever'. But this seems to me misleading, for not only can poetry be a very localized effect, perhaps only a single sentence in a whole book, but also it suggests, as many bold statements do, more than it can deliver - the existence of a type of discourse which owes nothing to the rules governing all other types.

Metaphor is not, in itself, the criterion for dividing literature from other types of discourse, but the division, wherever we decide to draw it,
is made on the basis of metaphor or metaphorical effects. Some contemporary linguists have approached literature in this way; Leech, for example, distinguishes literature from other "varieties of linguistic activity above all by the number and the importance of the deviant features it contains." The deviations that occur in literature, in contrast to simply uncommon words or usages, can belong, due to the context-specificity of certain metaphors, to only a single text. Mukarovsky's concept of the aesthetic as being the product of foregrounding is of some relevance here:

The function of poetical language consists in the maximum of foregrounding of the utterance. Foregrounding is the opposite of automatization, that is, the deautomatization of an act; the more an act is automatized, the less it is consciously executed; the more it is foregrounded the more completely conscious does it become.

An expression that is automatized is that expression which we would expect in a situation, foregrounding is the presentation of what is not expected and what is, therefore, capable of "provoking special attention." I am not here concerned with defining 'the poetic', but much of what is said by Mukarovsky, whether it is right or wrong with regard to this larger question, is illuminating about poetic license and suggestive about the relation between poetic license and metaphor. He holds, for example, that the 'poetic utilization of language' is made possible by a background of 'standard language', 'the norm' which is distorted or violated by poetry. Indeed Mukarovsky identifies the metaphorical and the aesthetic use of language to the extent of stating that when 'a metaphoric designation loses its esthetic effect completely, it becomes a literal designation.' However, in discussing metaphor as linguistic deviation it is easy to forget that metaphor is itself a norm, that is, it is a meaningful use of language, not something extra-linguistic; it is a type of language called 'metaphoric'. We are, I believe, now in a position to resolve the paradox of metaphor as a meaningful deviation from the use that characterizes meaning, as conventional unconventionality.

We have already seen how the use of a word is metaphorical if the context in which it appears somehow contra-indicates that use, and how,
from an historical perspective, metaphor exists in contrast with established language. On the basis of these conclusions we can now characterize the metaphorical, in contrast to the literal, in this way: The metaphorical is language using language, the use of usage. If we cannot split 'ordinary language' and metaphor into a straightforward dichotomy then we can at least distinguish between different degrees of figurativeness. All language is heuristic in the sense that it points beyond itself to states-of-affairs but, within language itself, we can distinguish between heuristic and non-heuristic expressions on the basis of whether what is pointed to already has an established connection with the expression that is used to point, the immediacy with which we grasp what is pointed to, and the novelty of the expression, that is, how familiar we are with that state-of-affairs embodied in that verbal formula, or, indeed, in any. Within the body of existing words or expressions, excluding neologisms in so far as their form is arbitrary, metaphor is the use of language at its most heuristic. Metaphor refers us not directly to a state-of-affairs but to another area of language and it is through what that area refers to that we view the state-of-affairs to which the metaphor finally points. It is this indirection, the filtering or magnifying function of the usage used out of its ordinary context, which allows the metaphor to be more specific than established language. Hence the role of metaphor in naming the previously unnamed. From this heuristic pole language fades through the figurative and the dead metaphor towards the literal use of language, which is non-heuristic in the sense that here usages are established; expressions can be related immediately to their corresponding objects or states-of-affairs without an intermediary use of language. If, for a moment, we consider language as a means of dividing up the world (like a yardstick laid against reality, as Wittgenstein has it) then metaphor uses these existing divisions to create previously unexisting ones.
Type of Meaning

Metaphor, then, is new language built upon literal, established usage but saying something more than can be said by that established usage as it is usually combined.213 Hegel places the source of metaphor in 'the need and power of spirit and heart which are not content with the simple, customary and plain, but place themselves above it in order to move on to something else, to linger over various things, and to join two things together into one.'214 But at this point we should note that writers on metaphor, while broadly agreeing on the innovative nature of metaphor, differ widely in the semantic status, or degree of meaningfulness, they accord these innovations. Coleridge, most famously, talks of the poet diffusing a tone and spirit of unity into his subject 'that blends and (as it were) fuses, each into each, by that synthetic and magical power...Imagination.

This power...reveals itself in the balance or reconcilement of opposite or discordant qualities: of sameness with difference; of the general with the concrete; the idea with the image; the individual with the representative; the sense of novelty and freshness with old and familiar objects...215

Poetry and prose, according to Coleridge, consist of the same elements, but it is the combination of these elements by the imagination which distinguishes the poetic.216 The same idea can be found in Hobbes, who had earlier written that a poem required both 'Judgement' (the power of discerning between things) and 'Fancy' (the power of finding similitudes), but that 'Fancy must be more eminent' because it is extravagance of invention which produces the pleasure which is the end of poetry.217 Similarly Alexander Gerard, an earlier and, to my mind, greater literary theorist than Coleridge, had suggested that the imagination 'draws out from the whole compass of nature such ideas as we have occasion for, without attending to any others; and yet presents them with great propriety, as if all possible conceptions had been explicitly exposed to view, and subjected to our choice.'218 Thus, for Gerard, the imagination is the spirit that gives shape to the 'confused heap of materials, collected by fancy'.219 Shelley too, for whom poetry is "the expression of the imagination", writes of imagination as 'mind acting upon...thoughts
so as to colour them with its own light, and composing from them, as from elements, other thoughts, each containing within itself the principle of its own integrity. But simply the recurring insistence of writers on the connection between imagination and what are obviously metaphorical combinations, will not take us very far. Gerard, Coleridge, and Shelley are all approaching this connection from the point of view of the production of metaphors but here I am concerned with the understanding of metaphors, and their effect on the imagination, for, however we finally define imagination, I believe we will find that it is a concept intimately bound up with the possible meanings metaphor can convey.

The writer of a contemporary 'handbook of rhetoric' describes the virtues of metaphor as 'economy of meaning', that is, the compression of a wide spectrum of ideas and feelings into a few words, the power to 'put us more deeply in touch with the world in a more complex way', and the power to 'enlarge and harmonize experience'. This emphasis on the emotive potential of metaphor is common; Brooks, for example, holds that all 'the subtler states of emotion...necessarily demand metaphor for their expression.', and this is the standpoint of most rhetorical writings, whose emphasis is on the potential for pleasure and persuasion to be found in figurative language. Longinus, in On the Sublime, writes that the 'timely expression of violent emotions together with true sublimity is the appropriate antidote for the number and boldness of metaphors...the onward rush of passion has the property of sweeping everything before it, or rather of requiring bold imagery as something altogether indispensable; it does not allow the hearer leisure to consider the number of metaphors, since he is carried away by the enthusiasm of the speaker.' To adapt the subject matter so as to accommodate the figure seems a strange suggestion, but the whole of Longinus' attitude to metaphor is ambiguous. While he describes how sublimity, or literary excellence, and 'the expression of strong feelings' can guard against 'the suspicion that attends the use of figures.' and even conceal the fact that they are figurative, he also counsels the use of figurative language 'in the handling of commonplaces and of descriptions' for, here, 'nothing so much confers distinction as a continuous series of metaphors.' Indeed, as it transpires, the excess which Longinus fears, though his argument is
slightly confused, is not in the number of metaphors employed but in the emotion conveyed by them. For, though 'emotional and descriptive passages...most gladly find room for them', metaphors can be too emotionally potent for more sober passages.\textsuperscript{225} As we have seen, there is no particular reason for equating emotional expressiveness with metaphor per se, but as we go on it is this aspect of metaphor, what we might call its rhetorical role, which will become increasingly important to us.

As we have seen in the preceding sections one of the most important distinguishing characteristics of metaphor is novelty. Aristotle writes that, while strange words simply puzzle us and ordinary words 'convey only what we already know', metaphor is the means by which we 'can best get hold of something fresh.', of new ideas.\textsuperscript{226} When he says a new idea he does not necessarily mean only an intellectual construct, the example he gives is of the poet calling old age "a withered stalk" and thus conveying 'a new idea, a new fact, to us by means of the general notion of "lost bloom", which is common to both things.'.\textsuperscript{227} Eco likewise writes of how 'infinite pieces of encyclopedic information can be inserted' into the 'schema' provided by the analogy - A:B as C:D - to produce new predicates, making metaphor 'above all, a tool of cognition.'.\textsuperscript{228} We have already seen how metaphor expresses the previously unexpressed, indeed may be, at any given time, the only possible way of pointing to the unnamed. According to Langer it is when 'new, unexploited possibilities of thought crowd in upon the human mind' and 'the poverty of everyday language becomes acute' that conditions are 'favourable to the development of metaphorical speech.'\textsuperscript{229} Likewise Lewis' account of how 'a new metaphor starts forth, under the pressure of composition or argument', and how our 'new understanding is bound up with the new metaphor.', would seem to apply as much to poetic conception and the understanding of poetry as to any of the more theoretical discourses with which he is concerned.\textsuperscript{230} But how new is this 'new understanding', particularly from the reader's point of view?

True wit is Nature to advantage dress'd;  
What oft was thought, but ne'er so well express'd;  
Something, whose truth convinced at sight we find,  
That gives us back the image of our mind.\textsuperscript{231}
That this passage from Pope is so well known is perhaps the best argument in favour of its sense. But it also exemplifies all the ambiguities involved in the study of metaphor. For is 'what oft was thought' the subject of poetry, and metaphor only the way of verbalizing it? How can we be convinced of the 'truth' of a poetic statement? Is this the result of its giving back only the image of our own mind? The quotation itself could provide a focus for all these questions, yet it seems to bring them prematurely to a close, for even in applying them to it we find that its immediacy, the conviction that it produces 'at sight' seems to undermine them, to introduce an artificial note into any analysis we might perform. Pope's account of wit, as Johnson says, 'depresses it below its natural dignity, and reduces it from strength of thought to happiness of language.'232 But in the case of metaphor happiness of language may be strength of thought, for the figure may be the only way of expressing or making manifest some thought or some state-of-affairs. Literature, and poetry most obviously, is a form of discourse in which form and content are inseparable and it would seem unwise to look for its essence either in the novelty or the philosophical perspicacity of what is conveyed. I would side with Pope insofar as I believe that the aesthetic lies less in what is said as in the fact that it is said. Dryden's definition of wit, as 'propriety of thoughts and words', is perfectly gratuitous from the reader's point of view since, as I shall argue in a later chapter, tone of voice cannot be separated from the subject matter, but when Dryden states that it is 'in other terms, thoughts and words elegantly adapted to the subject.', then this is, from the writer's point of view, no more than finding a means of expression, and applies particularly well to the conception of metaphor.233 This is not to describe metaphor as an ornament, as Demetrius appears to do, but to make it part of the matter that is conveyed; Dryden, indeed, describes how catachresis and hyperbole should be 'used judiciously, and placed in poetry as heightenings and shadows are in painting, to make the figure bolder, and cause it to stand off to sight.'234

There is no final way of characterizing the potential sense of every instance of metaphor. In my first section, on meaning, I examined how metaphor generated meaning but such an account as was given cannot finally decide on what semantic status is to be accorded the metaphor per se. Were it the case that established language and metaphorical
language were fixed and separate entities then this might be possible, but, given the creative role which metaphor often, perhaps always, plays within language, it is not. Thomas Browne, in the preface to his Religio Medici, cautions that such of his expressions as are 'meerly Tropical' are to be taken 'in a soft and flexible sense, and not to be called unto the rigid test of Reason.' We can look upon metaphor as a way of rendering a concrete subsidiary subject into an abstract one; thus the connotations of 'wolf' in 'Man is a wolf' do not refer primarily to the physical properties of a wolf, but rather to the lupine, though the image of the wolf is integral to the figure, as a form of hyperbole, in evoking and giving force to the attribution of those lupine qualities to man. The final semantic potential of abstract language is a question of pragmatics, that is, of how much, if anything, they communicate in any particular instance. The degree of meaningfulness a metaphor can have is decided by its efficiency as an instrument, by the ratio of the results achieved in sense, to the complexity of expression. As Dryden writes, 'A city's being buried [in sleep and wine] is just as proper on occasion as an angel's being dissolved in ease and songs of triumph.' for poetic license is 'the liberty, which poets have assumed to themselves in all ages, of speaking things in verse which are beyond the severity of prose.'

Bacon characterizes 'allusive' poetry, in contrast to 'narrative' or 'representative', as follows;

Allusive or parabolic is a narration applied only to express some special purpose or conceit. Which latter kind of parabolic wisdom was much more in use in the ancient times, as by the fables of Aesop...And the cause was, for that it was then of necessity to express any point of reason which was more sharp or subtile than the vulgar in that manner, because men in those times wanted both variety of examples and subtility of conceit. And as hieroglyphics were before letters, so parables were before arguments: and nevertheless now and at all times they do retain much life and vigour, because reason cannot be so sensible, nor examples so fit.

This is an interesting passage, both for the parallel it draws between allusion and primitive argument, and also for the idea of the metaphorical being necessary 'to express any point of reason...more sharp
or subtle than the vulgar', a role which we might presume, from the close of the passage, Bacon would suggest that it can still play. At the end of the last section I stated that metaphor is, potentially, a way of creating new divisions in language, that is, of combining elements to create a reference that is more specific than that normally contained in any of the individual elements or their non-metaphorical combinations. It is this filtering, or magnifying function of usage used out of its normal context, the specificity of metaphor, to which we shall now turn.

What is closest to us is more differentiated than what is at a distance; most famously there are the Eskimo's multiple distinctions between different sorts of snow, and the Philippino Hanunóo's names for ninety-two varieties of rice. This is not exclusively a cultural matter, each of us will have a specialized vocabulary for what is close to our central concerns, and will be able to draw and name distinctions which are unknown, because unnecessary, to another English speaker. The metaphor aims towards this discriminating function, towards establishing an increased intimacy with the facts that lie in the conjunction of the principal and subsidiary subjects of the metaphor, the reference that is brought into being, as we might say, between them. Demetrius writes that some ideas 'are described in metaphors with greater clearness and exactness than if exact language had been used - as the phrase "the battle shivered",' so that no paraphrase 'could give a truer or clearer impression.' By 'exact language' I presume Demetrius means literal language, for, as he says, the description could not be more exact. But it is in the emotional sphere that metaphor seems to come into its own, just as it is in this area that we find perhaps the greatest and least obvious differences between modern languages.

Cleanth Brooks identifies metaphor with paradox for 'all metaphor... involves some element of paradox, for metaphor by its very nature cannot give a strictly point by point analogy with no element of discrepancy and contradiction between items compared.' It is these 'overlapping, discrepancies, contradictions' which, in Brooks' opinion, allow the paradoxical aspect of metaphor to convey subtle or complex emotional states and processes.

I submit that the only way by which the poet could say what "The Canonization" says is by paradox. More direct methods may be tempting, but all of them enfeeble what is to be said. This
statement may seem less surprising when we reflect on how many of the important things which the poet has to say have to be said by means of paradox: - most of the language of lovers is such...242

This is an opinion which I broadly agree with, though it seems unnecessary, and possibly confusing, to introduce the concept of paradox, since it is not so much the overlapping of concepts which generates the meaning in paradox, as it is in metaphor, but rather what is excluded from whatever is synonymous in terms involved. Brooks argues that it is the 'precision' of Donne's statement in "The Canonization" which distinguishes it from a paraphrase of its contents, such as "Love in a cottage is enough". Such a cliché is not, of course, a paraphrase of Donne's poem, it is only a related sentiment; the precision lies in the conciseness with which the paradoxical or metaphorical form of the poem draws in whole complexes of emotions which, though recognizable, are not reducible to familiar proverbs. In Principles of Literary Criticism Richards describes metaphor as 'a semi-surreptitious method by which a greater variety of elements can be wrought into the fabric of the experience.' for 'what is needed for the wholeness of an experience is not always naturally present, and metaphor supplies an excuse by which what is needed may be smuggled in.'242 (How, and to what ends, we shall examine both in the final section of this chapter and elsewhere in this thesis.) This is expressed rather from the creator's point of view, but the basic idea of metaphor as an addition to language, an addition that narrows down the referential function to something unusually specific, is clear. Bacon makes a similar point when he declares that poesy, in contrast to reason which 'doth buckle and bow the mind unto the nature of things', submits 'the shows of things to the desires of the mind'.244 There is, in this statement, a suggestion of the ambivalence with which rhetoric and rhetorical figures (once exposed as such) has been considered historically. Today 'rhetorical' most readily connotes, or, in some cases, denotes, 'over-elaborate' or 'insincere'. The allusiveness of metaphor, the inevitable introduction of matter strictly foreign to the subject which it entails, can be either clarifying or confusing, revelatory or deceptive. Herbert Read, like Brooks, considers that the poet 'seeks absolute precision of language and thought, and the exigencies of this precision demand that he should exceed the limits of customary
expression, and therefore invent - invent sometimes words, more frequently new uses of words, most frequently phrases and figures of speech which reanimate words, and among these, above all, metaphor.246 Read goes on to say that our normal, non-poetic language, is 'clear and logical' only 'at the cost of being superficial or inexact' and that the things the poet 'approaches' are 'eternal things'.246 Now, while metaphor does more closely define the sense in which the principal subject is to be taken, that is, modifies that sense, this modification can be "mere rhetoric" and is just as capable, if not more capable, than non-metaphorical language of being 'superficial and inexact'.

I must now distinguish between the idea, to which I subscribe, of the potentially heuristic function of metaphor, and another popular idea - that metaphor in some way transcends language. In the First Surrealist Manifesto André Breton announces that surrealism is in revolt against the 'reign of logic', under which 'boundaries have been assigned even to experience', and is based on 'the belief in the superior reality of certain forms of association heretofore neglected, in the omnipotence of the dream, and in the disinterested play of thought.'247 I do not believe that there is such a thing as 'disinterested thought' in any absolute sense, but the surrealists' use of accidental association, especially in the Exquisite corpse, was aimed at achieving the expression of, if not disinterested thinking, then at least oblique or unconscious thinking, freed from the 'restrictions of logic' and the everyday.248 These 'written games' were 'contrived so that the elements of language attacked each other in the most paradoxical manner possible, and so that human communication, misled from the start, was thrown into the mood most amenable to adventure.'249 In the unplanned associations produced by the Exquisite corpse, continues Breton, 'we had at our command an infallible way of holding the critical intellect in abeyance, and of fully liberating the mind's metaphorical activity.'250 Metaphorical because not only was the interaction between principal and subsidiary subject (whichever was which) not everyday, but it was not even intentional; only that it should be metaphorical was intended. This use illustrates the twofold nature of metaphor, for as a method of synthesizing scientific results it is critical intellect at, potentially, its most critical, but it can also be
just the opposite for in it the copula 'is' appears, from a logical point of view, to indicate contradiction, nonsense, or paradox, an aspect that became more obvious as surrealism became more visual and eventually degenerated, in some instances, into the simply "odd". (A visual representation less readily suggests the domain that belongs to it than the word by which it is usually referred to does; it becomes a puzzle more readily than a metaphor.251) Breton writes that with the advent of surrealism 'imagination is on the verge of recovering its rights', and certainly such methods as outlined above depend heavily on the products of what Hobbes, Gerard, and Coleridge would have called 'Fancy' though whether this term can be made synonymous with 'imagination' is another question.252 Here we might bring to mind a distinction made by Joseph Addison between two types of 'wit'; true wit which is 'a Resemblance and Congruity of Ideas....that gives Delight and Surprize' such as to be found in 'Metaphors, Similitudes, Allegories, Aenigmas, Kottos, Parables, Fables, Dreams, dramatick Writings, Burlesque and all the Methods of Allusion'; false wit which is the 'Resemblance and Congruity' of letters, syllables, words, or visual elements, such as to be found in 'Anagrams, Chronograms, Lipograms, and Acrostics...Ecchos and Doggerel Rhymes...Puns and Quibbles...Mimickry'.253 Both classes are, strictly speaking, methods of allusion, the difference lying in whether it is the sense or the ingenuity of the result which is the more striking. Metaphor can demonstrate either true or false wit, which belong to imagination and fancy respectively, and it is as well to keep this in mind in the following discussion, for there we shall meet several writers who, like Breton, consider metaphor per se as the salvation of the human spirit. Before moving on, however, we might consider Addison's third type of wit - mixt wit. This is 'a Composition of Punn and true Wit...Reason puts in her Claim for one Half of it, and Extravagance for the other.'254 One might cite Donne and, preeminently, James Joyce, as exemplifying this combination though, with Donne especially, the false wit, as 'tone of voice', often contributes to the true wit of the whole.

But we shall now return to the idea of metaphor as transcendental. J.Middleton Murray, for example, describes the 'highest function' of metaphor as being 'to define indefinable spiritual qualities.', while Ricoeur describes it as 'that strategy of discourse by which language divests itself of its function of direct description in order to reach the
Myth is one of the great myths, in the popular sense, of much writing in aesthetics and literary theory; as a word it is surrounded by an aura of profundity, but what, if anything aside from an 'I know not what' accompanied by intimations of profundity, exists in the midst of this aura when the word is used in a context such as that above, is a mystery. Such a vagueness is recurrent and perhaps inevitable in discussing the effect of poetry, but we must see if it is inevitable in describing metaphor.

What lies beyond the strictly observable, measurable and verifiable aspects of things?...What are things, natural and human alike, in their inner, inpalpable, unseen beings?...Brought thus sharply to the boundaries of the demonstrable, i.e. scientific, knowledge of the world, we are confronted by the illimitable, unplumbed world lying beyond the narrow scope of the discourse of science and the understanding, and in the face of this metasensual world, the world as it is in itself, the unknown being of things, we are left to wonder and surmise...it is at this point that metaphor and symbol come into operation.

This passage, from an essay by D.G. James, is typical of the approach we are looking at, in moving from a description of the inadequacy of language when called upon to deal with things-in-themselves, that is, the fundamental anaemia of language, to a declaration that the poetic metaphor is the remedy to this. In that metaphor is involved in naming, this is obviously true, but something more than this is meant here. Nowotny similarly begins by stating that 'the relation we assume to exist between our own consciousness and what is "out there", is only illusorily clear; the conventions of language foster the illusion that objects "out there" can be reliably identified and referred to by the proper use of their accurate names.', and goes on to declare that metaphor 'breaks the hold of convention and enables us to become aware of the subjectivity of objects and the objectivity of subjective processes.'

Likewise Harries, who writes that there are moments when 'the inadequacy of our language seizes us, when language seems to fall apart and falling apart opens us to what transcends it.', moments when 'contact with being is reestablished.' Such words as could be found, she continues, to 'close the gap between language and reality' would have to be 'the creative words of God.', but the poetic metaphor, by rendering language
'questionable', 'succeeds in gesturing towards a language that shall never be ours in which...things speak to us'. There are echoes of the Nietzschean approach to language here, and, though one has an inkling of what state of language is being described, the vocabulary of the descriptions themselves founders on the fact that the limits of language are the limits of language. (Nowottny, for example, according to her own account cannot be talking about that metaphor which she refers to by the 'proper use of its accurate name', that is 'metaphor'.) Metaphor is, therefore, the triumph of language over such obstacles to reference as may occur rather than a bypassing of them, a tribute to the potency of language rather than its inadequacy.

Literature is often talked of as 'showing' or 'teaching' us something and the parallel, made by Harries, with the Divine is a recurring feature of literary discussion from Plato onwards. Booth writes that it is the 'inherent aspiration of all literature to metaphoric truth that accounts for our tendency in modern times, as the old religious metaphors have weakened their hold on us, to turn literature to overt religious uses.' How overt these uses are is questionable, but certainly much of the vocabulary that would once have most naturally belonged to practical theology is now the possession of literary criticism. The theologian Paul Tillich, discussing the symbol's religious function of opening up 'levels of reality which otherwise are dead to us', cites the arts as a type of discourse which creates 'symbols for a level of reality which cannot be reached in any other way'. Precisely in what sense we are to understand theological terms, especially those terms predicated of God, is a question which Aquinas addresses, and his conclusions are of interest here. Certain terms which are used of God, as when he is called 'a rock' or described as having an 'arm' are used metaphorically, since nothing which is not finite and material can be a rock or have an arm. However, certain other terms, such as 'wise' or 'good' or 'just' are predicated of God neither univocally, that is, with precisely the same sense in which we use them of a person (which would introduce anthropomorphism), nor equivocally, that is, with an entirely different meaning from that which they have in the human context, for in that case they would have no significance for us; rather they are predicated in an analogical sense. We can see how such an analogical predication works 'downwards' when, for example, a dog is described as 'faithful' to indicate that 'at a level of a
dog's consciousness there is a quality that corresponds to what at a human level we call faithfulness.1262 It could be argued, however, that this is anthropomorphism. Aquinas, nevertheless, held that "pure perfections", like goodness, which are not inextricably bound up...with a particular level of being, can be predicated of God; and it is these terms which are predicated in an analogical sense.1263 We have already discussed such terms, mainly abstract or relational, which cannot be said to properly belong to a single domain, but the case of God is a more particular and problematic sort, though it applies to all speculation on the realm of what D.G.James above called the 'inner, inpalpable, unseen' being of things. Although the human possession of goodness, wisdom, justice, and so on, is supposed to stand in the same relationship to these qualities in God as, for example, the faithfulness of a dog stands to the faithfulness of a human being, from a linguistic point of view our terms primarily refer to the world and their use when predicated of God is only an approximation; we do not know what perfect goodness or wisdom would be like. This is, indeed, Aquinas' conclusion also - that 'the meaning which the term has for me in my own mind' is not 'adequate to the objective reality connoted by the term when predicated of God.'1264 As Copleston concludes, there is, therefore, in Aquinas' account of 'our natural knowledge of the divine nature...a certain agnosticism.'1265 Aquinas is not concerned with showing that theological language is as meaningful as any any other sort of language, but rather with explaining how the believer is to understand theological language. The degree of meaningfulness we ascribe to the vocabulary used to describe the ultimately unknowable is finally a matter of faith, we cannot derive any knowledge from that vocabulary itself, for it neither shows nor teaches us anything unless we are prepared to make a non-rational act of faith in the reality to which it points. For our purposes we can consider such terms as 'wise' and 'just' as metaphorical once taken out of the human sphere ('good' is more problematic), for Aquinas does not provide an argument for showing how such terms can be made to properly belong to any other sphere. To give metaphor a transcending function, then, entails far-reaching consequences that have little to do with the technical questions raised by figural language, and which are, ultimately, amenable to neither ratiocination nor discussion, but only to statements of belief.
There is a form, or, one might say, use of metaphor which seems especially to signal an attempt to describe the undescrivable - systrophe. It is defined by Henry Peacham, in his *Garden of Eloquence*, as 'when the Orator bringeth in many definitions of one thing, yet not such definitions as do declare the substance of a thing by the general kind, and the difference, which the art of reason doth prescribe, but others of another kind all heaped together'. Hegnauer, a modern rhetorician, defines it as 'an elliptical periphrasis of one tenor by three or more asyndetic and isocolical analogies.', so perhaps some examples would be more helpful than trying to further define it.

Sleep that knits up the ravel'd sleave of care,
The death of each day's life, sore labour's bath,
Balm of hurt minds, great nature's second course,
Chief nourisher in life's feast, —

'O comfort-killing Night, image of hell!
Dim register and notary of shame!
Black stage for tragedies and murders fell!
Vast sin-concealing chaos! nurse of blame!
Blind muffled bawd! dark harbour for defame!
Grim cave of death! whispering conspirator
With close-tongu'd treason and the ravisher!'

Stella, the only planet of my light,
Light of my life, and life of my desire,
Chief good whereto my hope doth only aspire,
World of my wealth, and heaven of my delight...

'Systrophe' comes from the Greek *systrepein* meaning 'to turn back to, to revolve around' and this aptly describes the figure, for the metaphors involved revolve around the principal subject in a series of approximations. As can be seen from the examples above, it is a figure that belongs most naturally to the expression of powerful feelings, and to *demonstrative oratory*, that is, persuasion, eulogy, and invective. In his essay on systrophe, Hegnauer discusses George Herbert's use of its 'argumentive force' in the 'cognitive process of interpretation and definition'. The example he uses is Herbert's sonnet 'Prayer':

Prayer the Churches banquet, Angels age,
Gods breath in man returning to his birth,
The soul in paraphrase, heart in pilgrimage,
The Christian plummet sounding heav'n and earth;

Engine against th'Almighty, sinners towre,
   Reversed thunder, Christ-side-piercing spear,
   The six-daies world-transposing in an houre,
   A kinde of tune, which all things heare and fear;

Softnesse, and peace, and joy, and love, and blisse,
   Exalted Manna, gladnesse of the best,
   Heaven in ordinarie, man well drest,
   The milkie way, the bird of Paradise,

   Church-bells beyond the starres heard, the souls bloud,
   The land of spices; something understood.

Of such deliberative use of systrophe Hegnauer writes that the single metaphor is admitted to be inadequate and instead becomes 'just one of many attempts at fencing in the absolute' so that the figure moves on from one to another, each 'subsequent translation makes the preceding one appear relative, and at the same time adds a new angle to the total picture.'\(^{274}\) When the figure comes to an end 'it is not because it has attained to the truth, but because it despairs of the possibiblity of ever attaining it.'\(^{274}\) Thus, though Hegnauer places systrophe outside of what we may call emotive discourse, he does so by giving it what appears to be a semi-transcendental role, as a way of using analogy to point out 'the inadequacy of the analogical method in pursuit of the unnameable.', the 'something understood' of Herbert's poem.\(^{275}\) (This arguably places the figure once again within emotive discourse.) He likens the 'continuous translation' of systrophe to 'the approximation of the circle by way of superimposed polygons,' in that, by using the technique, 'one can go on forever, one can get infinitely close to the infinite without ever reaching it.'\(^{275}\) The analogy is an interesting one, for a figure is either a circle or a collection of polygons, it is not both simultaneously, that is, one can imagine one sees a circle in series of imposed polygons, but no circle is there. However there are two important ways in which systrophe can be differentiated from the sort of 'transcendental' use of metaphor already discussed. Firstly, from the reader's point of view, what is conveyed by the figures may be quite precise enough to form a clear picture, indeed precision seems to be one of the main strengths of systrophe. Secondly, and more importantly from a cognitive point of view,
it is an error to liken a concept to a circle or anything so definite; the image of imposed polygons with their interconnections and relationships is more appropriate to something which may be either too specific for non-metaphorical description or, as in the case of prayer, a multi-faceted complex of elements. It is, of course, the desire to describe such things as these that gives rise to the individual metaphor as well.

Against all this emphasis on meaning one could object, with Archibald Macleish, that 'A poem should not mean / but be.' but in quoting these lines I have, in a way, contradicted them - for I have appealed to their meaning. Yet such an attitude is a common one even, paradoxically, in literary criticism itself; Herbert Read, for example, writes that the 'emotional unity which is the raison d’être of every poem cannot be measured by the instruments of reason.' Likewise D.G.James, whose account of metaphor was discussed above, distinguishes poetic statement from theological statement on the grounds that the former 'does not advance to statements about the nature of the world'.

(Metaphor) is the imagination of one thing in the form of another; it is the mode in which the nature, the being, the imagined extra-sensual essence of a thing, is represented by the identification with the apparently different; and it is a procedure for which science can give no warrant; the scientific use of language must abhor metaphor....metaphor is the only way in which the imagination works; it never adds up to a statement and doctrine.

The piece of fiction is, according to James, the world as 'dissolved and recreated' in the imagination of the author, it contains 'no generalizations, no philosophy....Something is held up for us to behold; but nothing is said.' A more modern and technical formulation of this venerable doctrine comes from Mukarovsky who writes of poetic language achieving 'maximum intensity to the extent of pushing communication into the background as the objective expression' so that language 'is not used in the services of communication, but in order to place in the foreground the act of expression', that is, it is expression 'for its own sake'.

Describing a human product as existing 'for its own sake' is rather like calling a process 'spontaneous' - it is a signal that an explanation
cannot be produced. To return to the quotation from Archibald Macleish - 'A poem should not mean / but be.' - one of the ways in which I could have demonstrated its meaningfulness, or its intention to possess meaning, is by asking what it meant and thus eliciting a paraphrase. It is to the issue of paraphrase that we shall now turn, for this is perhaps the last word on metaphor's potential meaningfulness.

The most obvious paraphrase of metaphor is another, separate figure, - simile. Henle goes so far as to say that the difference between metaphor and simile lies in simile containing 'no terms with figurative senses.' This is true insofar as, while the copula 'is' identifies the principal and subsidiary subjects, the use of 'like' presumes that the two things are not the same, however, when the principal and subsidiary subjects are very unlike, as, for instance, when one is concrete and the other abstract, then 'like' is being used in a sense so loose as to be figural. In certain instances the 'like' of simile may be drawing things only analogous together with no less licence than the 'is' of metaphor draws together things only 'alike'. (Without there existing a distance between the two things, over which they must be drawn, there would be simply an instance of comparison rather than simile.) The simile, then, as Aristotle says, 'is metaphor, differing from it only in the way it is put'. Addison, as we have already seen, defines 'allusions', such as simile, metaphor, and allegory, as 'but so many different manners of similitude'. But we should not emphasize the similarities at the expense of the differences between the two figures. Aristotle holds that simile is less attractive because it is longer, and this idea of the metaphor as a more daring and forceful figure than simile has been common throughout the history of writings on the two. Demetrios, for example, writes:

A simile is an extended metaphor. For example, you may take the metaphor, "The poet Python, pouring down on you in a flood", and amplify it by saying "pouring down on you like a flood". So the figure has been converted into a simile, and it is safer. The former version is a metaphor and more dangerous.
The greater 'liveliness, attractiveness, and verve' of the metaphor, when compared to the simile, has perhaps been overplayed. Certainly, at a formal level, the semantic perturbation involved in the identification made by metaphor is greater than that in the comparison made by simile, but it would be unwise to decide, on this basis, which is the more 'dangerous' per se. The extravagance of the figure depends more upon the distance between the two subjects involved; the simile claims that the distance is shorter than it is, and the metaphor that it does not exist at all, but in reality we remain aware of the separateness and the degree of that separateness, involved in the relationship between principal and subsidiary subjects.

But if simile still involves the figurative use of language then it cannot be said to be the sort of paraphrase which takes us very far towards establishing paraphrasability as a test of the meaning of figurative language. Let us first hear the case against paraphrase. This takes several forms, the most common being the simple statement that metaphor cannot be paraphrased! Owen Barfield, for example, writes that the kind of usage one finds in 'good poetry is always the kind that could not be paraphrased.' but goes on to add that the 'poetic element in any statement...is essentially something which can be expressed in no other way.' This last clause is, I believe, correct but I am not sure that to say this is to deny the possibility of paraphrase. In his essay 'What Metaphor Means', Donald Davidson confuses the situation even further by insisting that metaphors 'mean what the words, in their most literal interpretation, mean, and nothing more.', so that metaphor 'says only what it shows on its face - usually a patent falsehood or an absurd truth'. This whole essay of his is a dire warning against interfering with the basic vocabulary surrounding a subject, for his position leads him to declare firstly that 'metaphors cannot be paraphrased...because there is nothing there to paraphrase.' but secondly that this is not 'to deny that a metaphor has a point, nor that the point can be brought out by using further words.' In some instances to paraphrase may be to replace an utterance with its equivalent - as, say, a definition for each word, or, if possible, synonyms for some of the terms involved - but it can also be, and this is usually its end, to provide the sense of the original. Providing the sense of the original is a very different matter in
literary discourse and in other types of discourse. For in literary discourse the 'form' is never contingent; it is essential.

Aristotle claims, perhaps rather gratuitously, that metaphors must be drawn 'from things that are related to the original thing - just as in philosophy also an acute mind will perceive resemblances even in things far apart.'\(^{290}\) What is interesting here is likening the process of creating metaphor with the process of philosophical enquiry, for metaphor, particularly when discussed in a literary context, often appears to be the very antithesis of the rational. Harries, for example, writes that measured by 'established and accepted language, the collisions of poetic metaphor have no proper sense.' and 'cannot be drawn from what has already been established.'\(^{291}\) The sense of metaphor cannot, of course, be drawn from anywhere other than established language - the material from which it is created. Looked at from the point of view of Eco's 'encyclopedic content' the potential of established language is much greater than it appears when looked at only under the categories of denotation and connotation (in its more restricted sense). Metaphor may very often convey a very great emotional charge but this does not, in itself, place it beyond questions of truth or falsity, or sense. When someone is described as a 'wolf' they either have the characteristics metaphorically imputed to them by this description or they do not. As Goodman writes, 'The question why predicates apply as they do metaphorically is much the same as the question why they apply as they do literally.', though, particularly with the novel metaphor, the meaning may be somewhat vaguer, 'less sharp and stable', than an established predication.\(^{292}\) This in itself could serve as a proof of the meaningfulness of metaphor, but I do not yet want to abandon the possibility of paraphrase.

What might we wish to call a 'paraphrase'? If everything literal in \(T_1\) (the individual metaphor, line, poem, and so on) is stated in \(T_2\) and everything referred to metaphorically by words in \(T_1\) is literally designated by words in \(T_2\) then we might call \(T_2\) a paraphrase of \(T_1\). But the ties between the principal and subsidiary subjects, despite the fact that they create the metaphor for us, are not always easily identified. In dealing with the isolated metaphor, the sort of metaphor one deals with when "dealing with metaphor", the case is simpler; one could, for instance, paraphrase 'Man is a wolf' as 'Man is fierce, cruel, and so on',

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'Man has wolfish ferocity, wolfish cruelty, and so on', or 'Man is cruel and fierce and the cruelty and ferocity of man is like the cruelty and ferocity of a wolf'. On the basis of these examples, particularly the last, in which 'wolf' is apparently used literally, Beardsley considers literal paraphrase is indeed possible. There is enough in such paraphrases to give the metaphor a meaning, but not necessarily enough to give the meaning of the metaphor in question - the paraphrase trails off into 'and so on'. That metaphor is open to rational explanation is something that was established at the beginning of this essay, but here we must admit that to paraphrase the metaphor is not to replace it with something that has an equal sense. To say, for instance, that the cruelty and ferocity of a man is as the cruelty and ferocity of a wolf, could seem almost an apology for these traits in man, since a wolf is not to be judged morally, but in the original this sense was not present. The original, as we saw with some of Eco's examples, may have an ambiguity or a specificity which is difficult to reproduce in the paraphrase simply on logistic grounds. This is not to say that paraphrase is impossible but only to explain why even the most thoughtful examples given of it can seem jejune; for what is dismissed with 'and so on' or 'etc.' is almost inevitably, like the countryman's "Mile and a bit", several times more than what has been given.

When the metaphor is considered in situ the difficulties of paraphrase are even more pronounced. It has been suggested that a poem is a long idiom, that is, a sequence of words the meaning of which cannot be predicted from the meaning of the individual parts, but, since a poem does not recur in various contexts that would give its meaning, as an idiom does, such a viewpoint would place poetry forever beyond comprehension. However, there is, I believe, a strong case for considering local instances of usage in literature as idiomatic, insofar as their full meaning can only be brought out by the context of the whole to which they belong. A piece of literature, preeminently poetry, consists of numerous interrelated elements, 'multiple relationships undergoing multiple transformations' as Nowottny writes, and this infuses into any particular instance of metaphor a meaning which not even a full paraphrase of that metaphor in isolation would adequately cover.

Nowottny's account of the kind of meaning generated by a poem, impressionistic though that account is, is persuasive;
Both in the means of organization and in the particulars organized there is much unverbalized, not tied down in a sign....The particulars, however definite in themselves and however definite in the analogy they build up, bring into play an aura of their suggestions, the 'feeling-tone' of their adhesions in the world of non-linguistic reality; this feeling-tone, though it may be as individual as a taste or a scent, is also, like these, too idiosyncratic and rich to pin down in verbalization.295

Perhaps, then, the best way to bring out the meaning of metaphor, particularly extended and complex metaphor is not paraphrase at all. Something of the relationship between metaphor and paraphrase exists between the epigraphs to the chapters in this work and the chapters themselves - the epigraphs as metaphors. If the content of the chapters could be thus summarized, is there any need for the chapters themselves? The epigraphs are helpful, but they have only the appearance of summaries or explanations; they suggest truths open to more literal expression but also things that are impossible, or simply nonsensical. The chapters, I might say, 'refine' the epigraph, for though the epigraphs are shorter they are not distillations but rather more general and more vague than the chapters. That is, they act better as epigraphs than they would were they placed, as such quotations often are, at the end of the chapter as summaries, where they would suggest that those confusions which they contain are somehow a 'conclusion'.

Black writes that 'the set of literal statements' produced by paraphrasing a metaphor 'will not have the same power to enlighten and inform as the original', for 'implications previously left for a suitable reader to educe for himself, with a nice feeling for their relative priorities and degrees of importance, are now presented explicitly as though having equal weight....literal paraphrase inevitably says too much - and with the wrong emphasis.'296 This seems to be an appeal to intuitionism; for why should literal paraphrase inevitably misrepresent the original metaphor? This depends on what we consider to be the ends of paraphrase; to reproduce the effect of the original, or to make its meaning more explicit, that is, perhaps to describe the effect. To reproduce the effect is impossible, since it depends, even in mundane examples, not only on the brevity but also on the semantic aspects of
using figurative language, that is, the sense is contained not only within the figure but also in the use of the figure per se. Metaphors extend an invitation to the hearer or reader to follow the creator through those novel connections in the 'encyclopedia' which it involves. However, this does not preclude description, or the making of the implicit explicit – which may itself have an explanatory role, particularly in the case of a figure the sense of which can be definite even when the source of that sense may be obscure. Nowottny, again, holds that it is doubtful whether critical language 'can deal fully with the complexities of the various poetic modes of meaning at that level where..."one string, sweet husband to another, Strikes each in each by mutual ordering"'. Even if this difficulty could be overcome, she continues, 'it would be advisable to calculate, beforehand, what we might hope to achieve by pushing theoretical criticism to this level, since the poem (incalculably more complex than any one sentence in it, and each sentence probably more complex than comparable sentences in ordinary discourse) would seem, by definition, to preclude the making of useful generalizations about the ordering of the whole.' It is true that exhaustive description can produce a text which seems more in need of interpretation than what it describes. However, the relationship between text and critique is the main subject of this thesis as a whole, and so we shall not go into it here. Obviously something has gone wrong in a paraphrase or description that is intended to bring out the sense of a metaphor if what it says is no more than what the metaphor says better by itself, but, in practice, interpretations that illuminate do exist. Our next section may indicate some of the reasons why this is so.
Metaphor as Rhetoric

'Had we but an Act of Parliament to abridge Preachers the use of fulsom and luscious Metaphors,' wrote Samuel Parker in 1670, 'it might perhaps be an effectual Cure of all our present Distempers.'

The great temptation in writing on metaphor is to describe its effects as all of one sort or all of another, to describe it either as the ultimate confuser of sense, or as per se the vehicle of a higher wisdom. Metaphor is a kind of allusion, it introduces, in the subsidiary subject, something which is, strictly speaking, foreign to the immediate subject of discourse. Without this foreignness there is no metaphor. (Paradoxically, the more obviously metaphorical the figure is the less obvious is it that the subsidiary subject acts as an allusion, for one simply registers the whole figure, subsidiary and principal subjects together, as metaphor.) Metaphor, then, involves not only speaking of a thing as what it is not but also speaking of it as something else, that is, we see the principal subject 'in the light of' the subsidiary one. This is the rhetorical aspect of metaphor - the way that it influences how we see the principal subject. In, for example, 'Man is a wolf' it is those human traits which can be most easily rendered into the vocabulary associated with wolves that will be most emphasized, brought most forcibly to our attention. It is important, however, to emphasize here that the subsidiary subject is also modified by its relationship with the principal subject; we might compare 'The ship's prow ploughed the waves' with Bolivar's description of trying to govern Latin America as 'like trying to plough the sea'. In some instances it may indeed be that the intention is to attract our attention to the subsidiary subject, as in Shelley's lines;

Hell is a city much like London -
    A populous and a smoky city;
    There are all sorts of people undone,
    And there is little or no fun done;
    Small justice and still less pity.

Likewise Langland's Lady Mede seems as much an attack on lasciviousness as on bribery and corruption.
The subsidiary subject, then, both changes its significance under the influence of the principal subject and 'filters and transforms' the usual associations of that principal subject, selecting and emphasizing what might be ignored or even suppressed by a different metaphor. Even if we wish to deny the validity, the aptness of the metaphor, in order to understand it we must at least momentarily concur in the viewpoint that it offers. Black gives as an example of this influence, the description of a battle in the vocabulary of chess - a vocabulary that would suppress the emotive, human aspect of the principal subject - but we might also think of Pope's 'Rape of the Lock', Swift's *Battle of the Books*, or any of the great set pieces of description in Dickens. As I argued in the opening section of this chapter, the type of allusions made by the subsidiary subject is often a distinguishing characteristic of the individual writer, the school or movement, the period, or even nationality.\textsuperscript{304} The type of allusions made by the metaphors Lawrence uses in his description of sexuality are perhaps the most distinctive aspect of his style; censorship, if censorship it was, created rather than stifled what we know as Lawrentian. But the rhetorical aspect of the relationship between subsidiary and principal subject is not confined simply to such obvious examples as these, it exists wherever metaphor exists, indeed, as we have seen, it is its presence or absence which distinguishes metaphor from established language.

There is in the very use of metaphor the implication, whether justified or not, that established language is inadequate to the reality involved, that something must be 'brought in' to the account. (What we might call the 'opposite' of metaphor, that is, tautology, significantly appears to assert just the opposite - the total adequacy of language.) When this is not justified then the use of metaphor appears only as a poor style, for recourse to the figural, when redundant, gives out the promise of a certain type of inquiry, and a certain novelty or complexity in the object sought, which cannot be fulfilled. I am thinking now not primarily of that 'poetic diction' exemplified by Dryden's 'woolly care', and rejected by Wordsworth, but rather of less literary contexts. In scientific, and perhaps philosophical, metaphors the allusion is made purely for cognitive purposes and thus, while they may have a rhetorical aspect, with all that implies, the obscurity of the principal subject militates against the sort of effects we are here concerned with.
In his *Poetics* Aristotle states that he will not discuss thought in tragedy because he has already dealt with the subject in his treatise on rhetoric, to which discipline it 'more properly belongs' - 'Thought includes all the effects that have to be produced by means of language; among these are proof and refutation, the awakening of emotions such as pity, fear, anger, and the like, and also exaggeration and depreciation.' George Campbell in 1776 described poetry as 'no other than a particular mode or form of certain branches of oratory,' an opinion which is presumed not only in Aristotle but also in Longinus and many Renaissance works on poetry. Aristotle illustrates the rhetorical aspect of metaphor by comparing its effects with the use of epithets; just as to call Orestes either 'mother-slayer' or 'father's avenger' is to bring forward either the ugly or the 'good' aspects of his action, so a metaphor to be complimentary must draw its subsidiary subject 'from something better in the same line' as the thing to be complimented, and to disparage 'from something worse'. This is the result of the filtering action of the subsidiary subject and it is this selection of a certain group of properties out of all those which characterize the principal subject which puts that principal subject into a certain perspective. This selective description implies a judgement, that is, it is, in a broad sense, the expression of an ideology.

The rhetoric involved in metaphorical description is brought out by nothing so much as the non-reciprocity of the analogy upon which it relies. Demetrius points out that not all metaphors are as interchangeable as 'the city's pilot' and 'the ship's ruler', though so many false analogies have been urged on the basis of this particular metaphor that not even it would seem exempt from our argument. He states that the poet is 'justified in calling the mountain slope "Ida's foot", but would not be allowed to describe a man's foot as his "mountain slope".' Why? To refer to a mountain's 'foot' is to emphasize its grandeur - how massive it must be if this is only its foot! imagine a person so great that their foot would be comparable to a mountain slope! - but a mountain is massive and awe-inspiring and so the metaphor passes as justified, the diction involved in describing it must be elevated in order to reach the real effect the mountain has. But it is for these same reasons that the terms of the analogy cannot be reversed - a foot is not grand and awe-inspiring, we do not have to strain the imagination to realize its size or
to imagine giants in order to feel that we have done it justice. Longinus cautions against using 'grand diction' at all times, 'for to apply great and stately terms to trifling matters would be like putting a big tragic mask on a tiny child.' But if a foot is simply a foot, no less is a mountain slope simply a mountain slope. There is obviously something unsatisfactory about this last clause, yet many have seen figural language as an obstacle to truth, as a mist that obscures the plain, unadorned fact. Thus, for example, Hobbes;

The sixth [cause of Absurd conclusions, I ascribe] to the use of Metaphors, Tropes, and other Rhetoricall figures, in stead of words proper. For though it be lawfull to say, (for example) in common speech, the way goeth, or leadeth hither, or thither, The Proverb sayes this or that (whereas wayes cannot go, nor Proverbs speak;) yet in reckoning, and seeking of truth, such speeches are not to be admitted.

The seeking after objective truth and the refinement of the standards of that objectivity are certainly the objects of the sciences and of philosophy; a metre is a metre and 'Not both p and not-p' are true, no matter what our emotional attitude towards them. There are, however, times when a metre may seem considerably longer or when we are strongly inclined to deny that a contradiction is a contradiction; but the first can be empirically verified and that the second is a contradiction is what, of its nature, it must be. In this sense the measurements of science, though created by human beings are independent of human beings; despite the undeniable role of relativism it is the existence of verifiable physical constants as the basis of science which makes it possible even to recognize that relativism. Philosophy likewise deals with the application of givens to human thought, that is, what must a priori be the case in any specific instance. If we look once again at metaphor we find that we are discussing what might also be loosely called constants, that is, a uniformity across culture and, as a brief look at the literature syllabus of any school or university would quickly tell us, across time, in the way we perceive and describe, through metaphor, the affective aspects of our existence. The role of time and culture is by no means negligible, they may, through changes in the habitual associations of the subsidiary subject, render the metaphor impenetrable or, more importantly, deceptively clear. But is a mountain simply a mountain?
Obviously yes but, equally obviously, no. A tautology of this kind is as rhetorical as the most highflown metaphor, for if the speaker thought a mountain was simply a mountain they would hardly need to say so; the only context in which such a tautology would be made is one in which this fact had already been admitted. 'A mountain is simply a mountain' like 'Man is simply an animal', presupposes something more, the statement would be redundant otherwise. The context of every metaphor or simile, the unspoken and naturally transparent premise upon which it rests is 'as perceived by myself' or, more often, and invariably in poetic metaphor, 'as affectively perceived'. In this sense we may say that in the humanities, in contrast to the sciences, the measure is never independent of humanity. This general point is, however, one which will run throughout this work and it is enough merely to register it here.

It is very difficult to imagine some metaphors as reversed; for example 'Man is a wolf' as 'The wolf is the man of the animal kingdom'. When one thinks of comparing an animal to man the effect is quite different from comparing man to an animal. In, let us say, a documentary about wolves one would probably find some degree of anthropomorphism, and its evolution would invariably be talked of, presumably for the sake of convenience, in terms of conscious design, that is, metaphorically. When this is done, as when one calls a dog 'almost human', the light in which the animal appears is very different from that which falls on mankind when it is described as wolfish or dog-like. There is, then, at least an element of exaggeration in such metaphors as 'Man is a wolf'. However novel the metaphor, it implies a human standard; to describe a man as a wolf is to distinguish him, morally, from the wolf, at least in his aspirations or professions, since when the metaphor is reversed the animal appears in a more sympathetic light that it otherwise might. 'She eats like a bird' is a particularly obvious example of this since, while it could possibly mean that she eats the same sort of diet, or that she eats half her own bodyweight in food every twenty-four hours, or even that she picks up her food with her mouth and flies off with it; what it is taken to mean is that she eats little, yet a bird does not usually eat little, for a bird. Such animal metaphors, then, rely on those traits which actually distinguish the two things that are being compared. The same is true of many metaphors.
The import of certain metaphors can be far from inevitable, yet that import becomes fixed by being habitually used in a context in which only certain of the metaphors potential meanings can be generated. Eco cites the metaphor 'She was a rose' as one the interpretation of which can never be completely ingenuous; for of the possible correspondences which can be drawn from it there are some which are already familiar, some which come 'ready-made'. He lays out the content of 'rose' and 'woman' as follows:

/Rose/ ➔ F A M P
   Colour Nature Vegetal Gratia sui
   Freshness

/Woman/ ➔ F A M P
   Colour Nature Animal Gratia sui
   Freshness

The meaning that we arrive at for this metaphor is conditioned, according to Eco, by the knowledge that 'when a woman is compared to a flower, it is in terms of woman-object, which, like the flowers, lives for its own sake, purely as an ornament to the world.', and this conditioning, he concludes, renders the metaphor 'scarcely cognitive'. This fixity is not, however, an intrinsic property of the metaphor 'She was a rose'; in the absence of overt physical resemblances, aside from the abstract 'beauty', between the principal and subsidiary subjects, the element of common, purpose, or lack of it, seems the most dominant likeness, but it is by no means this which gives the metaphor its peculiar quality - one need only think of a subsidiary subject which was beautiful and existed for its own sake, but which was inorganic. If the 'she' was a young woman then it would connote a beauty that was short-lived, if an older then it would connote a fullness, a stateliness, a beauty completed (the element of time is controlled by the principal subject acting on the subsidiary subject), but in both cases the comparison made between the type of beauty of the rose and of the woman is perhaps more important. By viewing the human through something which, though living, lives in a very different way, the type of beauty is posited as something alien, something 'uncanny', that is, not the familiar, domesticated beauty of an
art object or a landscape. From a masculine point of view, though not necessarily exclusively so, the tendency to contrast the human with the natural is collapsed by the metaphor; an identification often made in metaphors describing women. To a man a woman can be a manifestation of nature in a way that his fellow man almost never is (a wolf is at least an animal, it is even a mammal). Thus it is not simply a likeness in the element of purpose that is operative in the final effect of the metaphor, indeed, depending on the context, it need not even be the most dominant cognitive feature. As with the animal metaphors, it is the element of difference - between the human and the natural - which creates the force, if we can rescue that force from familiarity, of the metaphor.

Aristotle's metaphor 'The sunset of life' is one that I have already discussed; it suggests not an approaching end of the sort that death is, but rather something cyclical, it also suggests that the change is external, that it is happening around the object rather than in it. 'The old age of the day', on the other hand, suggests almost the reverse of this - this day in particular is going to be over forever, the day itself has grown old. Yet there is more to the metaphor than this parallel, there are also the associations of sunset - mellowness, withdrawal, tranquility - and for this reason the metaphor 'sunset of life' could not be used, for example, in retrospect to apply to the last years of someone who died young. The metaphor, then, involves more than an analogy relying on cessation, it describes a particular type of old age, and when it is used as a generalization it casts old age in a light which it may or may not deserve in the particular. In this connection we might consider the often hidden metaphors in advertizing, a great contemporary repository of rhetoric. For example, one motoring organization has the slogan 'It's great to know you belong'. While it is true that one does 'belong' to an organization the whole sentence is usually associated with a very different context, that of 'belonging' to a family or comparable close-knit group, in which the ties are personal, it suggests unconditional acceptance, a natural right to regard, or an affinity - everything except the type of commercial transaction to which the slogan is used to refer. In a similar vein is the bank which advertizes itself as 'A friend for life'. We may 'bank on' a friend but the analogy posited by the advertizement, once reversed, presents a very derogatory view of friendship. These are rather trivial examples but we might also consider
the abuse of analogy in the following saying of the Institut für Geopolitik in defence of the idea of Lebensraum, dating from just before the Second World War; 'A nation can no more manage to get along without the mouths of its rivers than the owner of a house can get along without the key to his door'.\textsuperscript{316} It is to effects such as these that 'rhetorical', in its now popular sense, refers. Montaigne writes that it is the business of the rhetorician 'to deceive not our sight only but our judgements, and to adulterate and corrupt the very essence of things.'\textsuperscript{316} In the same passage he compares rhetoric unfavourably to a woman's use of cosmetics, but he has either no great understanding of this subject or sixteenth century cosmetics were a much cruder affair than they are today, for the main point of his comparison is that both are a sort of 'plastering over' of the truth. However make-up is, at its most subtle, an art which conceals art, an art of emphasis, of drawing the observer's attention to certain features and distracting it from others - in this sense the comparison with rhetoric is just. However, not all artifice is considered to be deception.

The eighteenth century critic Joseph Trapp, in his lecture 'Of the Beauty of Thought in Poetry or of Elegance and Sublimity', insists that the poet must abide by the rules of reason and truth, from which rules he does not exempt even such rhetorical devices as equivocation;

Neither metaphors, hyperboles, ironies, nor even equivocal expressions, when properly used, nor fiction or fable, are any deviation from this rule of right thinking, for there is a wide difference between falseness and fiction, between that which is truly false (if I may so speak), and that which is only so in appearance. Tropes and fictions are raised, as it were, upon the foundation of right reason. Truth is the basis of them and receives new luster from such airy disguises.\textsuperscript{317}

We have now seen how metaphor can be improperly used and examined briefly how it can be truthful in the affective sphere; it is a matter of right use rather than the intrinsic properties of metaphor itself. Ricoeur writes that the fiction of metaphor has 'the power of suspending what we call "reality" in ordinary language', of addressing itself 'to deeply rooted potentialities of reality to the extent that they are absent from the actualities with which we deal in everyday life under the mode of empirical control and manipulation.'\textsuperscript{316} This may be the case, but
metaphor can also conceal and manipulate; all argument from analogy is prone to this. There is no reason why the imagination should not be just as much an extension of the 'empirical' manipulative mode, as a revelation of its opposite. Hegel, in contrast, says of similes and their authors; 'In general a melancholy and weak feeling readily overflows into comparisons. What such a soul desires, what constitutes its interest is far off and past, and so, in general, instead of regaining courage it is induced to immerse itself in something else.' These lines, perhaps unintentionally, suggest the 'escapist' view of literature which might be contrasted with Ricoeur's 'revelatory' one.

As an example of the rhetoric of a literary metaphor we might look at the opening of L.P. Hartley's *The Go-Between* - 'The past is a foreign country. They do things differently there.' The metaphor, as it is first stated, is a striking and highly emotive one, but the present tense in the second sentence, while enforcing the original metaphor, also suggests that the past is not what is over. (In this sense it is like an analysis of the metaphor; by focussing on certain correspondences it reveals what it was that was striking about the metaphor.) It is true that the book will 'inhabit' the past, and in this the use of the present tense is apt, but there is also an equivocation, a suggestion of the impossible, that is, it makes the past as 'real', as important as the present. There is a deadness in the metaphor; time is arrested, and the final impression is too cerebral, too introverted, too pessimistic. But what of 'O my America, my new found land,'? Here, I would argue, the metaphor is simply trying to catch up with the experience; 'something else' is appealed to not as an escape from the import of the facts but rather to convey that import, to establish an intimacy with the facts. It may be the case that certain areas of experience, like having 'deep sadness' or 'high hopes', cannot be communicated without the help of some degree of figurativeness. There are times, too, when to speak as 'objectively' as possible about affectively-charged areas of experience, especially to those who have no direct experience of them, is to misinform. No doubt a psychologist could offer a paraphrase to Lawrence's description of the effect upon Tom Brangwen of his meeting with the foreigners - 'they had set fire to the homestead of his nature, and he would be burned out of cover' - but it would be unlikely to be itself free of metaphor, or to be as appropriate to the specific case. To object that such metaphors go beyond the facts is to
presume that the facts of any particular situation are only what an observer could verify. Metaphor receives some justification from our normal uses of the word 'like'; "Situation x is like...", "No, it is just like situation x.", "Yes, but what is situation x like?". Demetrius, writing on rhetoric, states that "Everything normal is unimpressive, and therefore fails to attract admiration.", but though rhetoric can obscure or simply adorn, it also serves to render language capable of referring to those states-of-affairs which are not everyday, which are out of the run of things, which are imbued with special significance.321

Conclusion

"How we see a thing depends on what we see it through." We have come some way since then, but the idea remains intact; metaphor is a way of seeing things. But this 'seeing' is perhaps itself metaphorical, for metaphor is rather a way of thinking or believing about things, a way of feeling about things. This is the usefulness of beginning our study of literature through an examination of metaphor; for the paradox of literature is that it is an effective "untruth", it both is (by effect) and is not (by definition) about reality. Let us look at Hughes' definition of allegory:

An Allegory is a Fable or Story, in which under imaginary Persons or Things, is shadow'd some real Action or instructive Moral; or, as I think it is somewhere very shortly defin'd by Plutarch, it is that in which one thing is related, and another thing is understood. It is a kind of Poetic Picture, or Hieroglyphick, which by its apt Resemblance conveys Instruction to the Mind by an Analogy to the Senses; and so amuses the Fancy, whilst it informs the Understanding. Every Allegory has therefore two Senses, the Literal and the Mystical; the literal sense is like a Dream or Vision, of which the mystical Sense is the true Meaning or Interpretation.322

What is interesting about John Hughes' Essay on Allegorical Poetry, from which this passage is taken, is the range of forms which its author is prepared to allow under the title 'allegorical'. Writing of the Circe episode in the Odyssey, he states that when characters are fictitious and events 'without the Bounds of Probability of Nature', then it is
'impossible for the Reader to rest in the literal sense, but he is of necessity driven to seek for another Meaning under these wild Types and Shadows.' Allegory, even allegory as involuted as Langland’s, appears as a crude form of representation in comparison with most others, that is, it is a form which rarely allows us to forget the author’s controlling hand and one which easily lends itself to didacticism. But the very vagueness of Hughes’ description of it reveals its kinship with those other forms; the definition he takes from Plutarch, for example, also covers the most essential point of irony, and the comparison with the hieroglyphic reminds us of Bacon’s description of the fable. However, this speaking of a thing as it is not in order to show it as it is, finds its most compact expression, one might say its ‘model’, in metaphor. One might hesitate to agree with Hughes that it is ‘Instruction’ that is conveyed by the analogy, at least within literature, but the idea of two senses is presumed by metaphor – we take the subsidiary subject in a ‘metaphorical sense’ because it cannot be taken literally, that is, because it is a fiction. In allegory the principal subject is likely to be signalled by the names of the characters, places, or events, and in the fable by either the anthropomorphic element or the usual character associated with the animal, that is, the role it would play in a metaphor describing a person, and by the sheer triviality of the action. But all literature is about what is not; its fiction is as incongruous with our daily commerce with the real world as the individual metaphor, if we considered it literally, would be to its surrounding text. Yet the idea of a work having ‘two senses’, as presumed by literary criticism, seems to many an affectation, an unnecessary complication of the simple truth that everyone enjoys a good story.

I would suggest that just as the involved process we go through in order to apprehend the import of a metaphor is swallowed up in our apprehension of that metaphor, so the process of inference by analogy, from the work to the world, that takes place when we read is likewise normally obscured by the fact that we are so used to doing it, by the very naturalness of the process. Fiction, by being non-literal, extends, like its compressed counterpart the metaphor, an invitation for us to discover a non-literal way of understanding it. Allegory and fable do this most obviously but I am not suggesting that every piece of literature should be understood as allegory, though criticism, especially
when it concentrates on character, has often done so in a variety of more or less sophisticated ways. Neither am I suggesting the generalizing from one fictional instance to a rule in the world, though again this is a common strategy. Rather I am here introducing an idea which I shall later expand upon, that is, that, for the purposes of criticism, literature can be considered as the subsidiary subject of a metaphor, the principal subject of which supplied by the reader. To make plain this principal subject and to examine the import of the rhetoric involved are, therefore, the two 'aims' of any criticism that can be said to be consistent with the nature of literature - from the most naive to the most esoteric. What I do not intend, in calling literature 'metaphorical', is to champion that use of the word 'metaphor' in such constructions as 'The Crucible is a metaphor for the McCarthyist era': this simply tells me that the speaker wishes to regard the play as an historical document, that is, that their primary interest in the work is not a literary one. (We might also note that it implies the substitution theory of metaphor!) Poetry, and literature in general, is distinguished by containing metaphors of metaphors and the point at which we decide that we are now concerned with the literal, that is, at what level of abstraction we choose to locate the principal subject, is of the utmost importance to the style of critical interpretation. We might, indeed, characterize different forms of interpretation by the degree to which they postpone discussion of the principal subject.

I am not suggesting, in beginning this study that metaphor can be used as a metaphor for literature, but rather that literature is essentially metaphorical. I do not wish to impose metaphor on literature, to create an aesthetic gimmick, though the necessity of clearly defining what I meant by metaphor to begin with may make it seem this way, since it reverses the actual process that led to this study; that is, the gradual emergence of the metaphorical as a unifying model in the topics that follow. Literature, as we shall see, is metaphorical after the model of rhetorical or metaphysical metaphor, that is, that type the significance of which is destroyed by paraphrase because its significance lies in what it can effect only in its original integrity. Hence the idea of form and content in literature being inseparable and the idea of
literature as a style of description (as 'wolf' is a style of vocabulary for the description of 'Man'). Hence also the notion that the discussion of literature is inevitably a discussion of values. The following chapters are, however, written almost as if self-contained for the very reason that I did not want to give the (false) impression that in approaching each subject my primary interest was in working them around towards the metaphorical. The proof, and, perhaps, usefulness, of the hypothesis that literature is essentially metaphorical lies not so much in the fact that beginning with certain conclusions about metaphor one can use them as premises in discussing literature, but rather in that we will find the same problems which have come up in connection with metaphor will reappear in almost exactly the same terms in the chapters that follow, and that, starting with what are traditional questions in literary theory or poetics, we are constantly brought around to propositions about the use of language already met with in the discussion of metaphor. Thus, for example, you might consider the chapter that follows either as a self-contained discussion of the relationship between literature and reality or an examination of the proposition that the literary work, like the individual metaphor, is, a description of what is (the world) in terms of what is not (the fiction).

But let us finish this chapter with a problem, a problem which may demonstrate why there should be a question of the relationship between literature and reality at all. In this chapter I have broadly distinguished two types of metaphor - the 'scientific' or empirical, which is contingent and hypothetical, and the 'metaphysical' or rhetorical, which is essential and final. Only the scientific metaphor, I have said, can actually 'die' - either by being replaced, or by being so amenable to ostensive definition that it becomes part of established language ('leg of the table'). The fundamental process in the death of metaphor, then, is the conversion from 'it is something like' - the metaphor's 'is' - to 'it is' - the immediate referentiality of established language. A dead metaphor is no metaphor. The scientific metaphor is simply a prelude to its own extinction. But what can be said of mortal metaphors, that is empirical ones, cannot be said of rhetorical ones. A rhetorical metaphor takes upon itself the function of a scientific metaphor, it asserts
something about the world either by a false analogy, in the sense that it asserts what cannot be asserted, or by an analogy made within the realm of the affective. A rhetorical or metaphysical metaphor cannot, therefore, die in the same way as a scientific one, it can only become hidden. Moreover I have said that the rhetoric of metaphor lies in the fact that it speaks of something in terms of what it is not. As an argument from analogy the only guarantee of sense that it can give is its contingency in the role of describing. If it is empirical then it is always aimed at its own extinction, either through ostensive definition, or through its replacability. (An argument from analogy is never proof.) But there is a problem here, for what does it mean to say that we can distinguish between two types of metaphor on the grounds that one is contingent and hypothetical while the other is essential and final, one empirical and one rhetorical? The problem is this: To say that there are two types of metaphor is to say that they are two uses of language analogous to one another, that is, metaphorically related. But what sort of metaphor is involved, what sort of metaphor is it that we use in calling both 'metaphorical', - a 'scientific' or a 'metaphysical' one? If it is a scientific one then we must allow that to be truly such either 'metaphysical' metaphor is not metaphor, for an empirical metaphor must be capable of being replaced with something else, or, if this is not the case, then 'metaphysical' metaphor is identical with 'scientific', and no analogy is involved. But if this is so then we cannot distinguish between them. If, on the other hand, the analogy between the two types of metaphor is a 'metaphysical' one, then we must say that one or the other is not truly metaphor, which again involves us in contradiction. The paradox exists, however, only for so long as we ignore what the word 'rhetorical' implies. We can identify 'rhetorical' metaphor and 'empirical' metaphor because each is, in fact, a moment in the other's history, a potential of the other. We can if we like ignore the hypothetical status of a scientific analogy and thus believe what is impossible, as a child might inadvertently do in understanding an analogy as literal truth, likewise we may choose that rhetorical metaphor should appear scientific, as when we believe that metaphor can show us 'the inner, inpalpable, unseen being of things'. Metaphysical metaphors "exist", are not contingent because we choose that they should be so. They contain, or import, in what they emphasize and suppress, in their ethos, something
which we wish to believe. When we choose that they should not, they unravel into false analogies or nonsense (or become paraphrasable!). In order to understand the metaphor as such, and not as absurdity, we must momentarily concur with the viewpoint it offers; our feelings are implied. The rhetorical metaphor, then, is simply a compressed analogy the form of which is necessary because our principle interest in it depends not, as in empirical metaphors, on the orderings of verifiable fact to which it can point, but upon what it can convey only in its original integrity.

This last point - the indivisibility of form and content - though it will inevitably arise again in the following chapter, is something I shall deal with more fully in Chapter 3. For the moment let us see how this relationship between rhetorical and scientific metaphor is reflected in the question of literature and reality.
CHAPTER II

Literature and Reality

We all know that art is not the truth. Art is a deception made in order to approach the truth, at least such truth as can be expressed. The artist has to find a way to convince others of the truth through his deception. Too many painters believe instead that the result of their work, that is their canvasses, is the "truth" in itself. "Truth" is found beyond the canvas, never in it. It is realized in the relationship of the canvas with reality.

Picasso

But since it will frequently happen that some delusion must be admitted, I know not where the limits of imagination can be fixed.

Johnson
Introduction

In this and succeeding chapters I wish to consider how the principal subject is to be expressed or described in interpretation, that is, to consider the kind of vocabulary that can be meaningfully used, and the kind of assertions that can be meaningfully made, within literary criticism. Thus the following chapters will be concerned with the relationship between literature and reality, the distinction between form and content, the 'thesis' or 'metaphysic' of the work, and evaluation. It is important to emphasize here that I am not primarily concerned with the question of interpretation versus misinterpretation but rather with the relevance or irrelevance of interpretations to the work as literature, that is, one might say, with the 'So what?' of interpretation.

Strange as it would seem there is a whole debate on the truth-value of fictional statements. For though fictional characters and situations do not, by definition, exist, they can be the subjects of sentences. What, then, is the ontological status of Pegasus or Julien Sorel? The answer seems and, indeed, is obvious - they are fictional characters, hypothetical instantiations. Is is and isn't isn't. Inquiry into what particular non-empirical mode of 'real being' fictional characters possess, in lieu of the mode of being of things such as the page you are reading, is futile; for once we have called them 'fictional' we have the answer. (Though this is an answer that those who send baby clothes to pregnant characters in The Archers, or abuse television villains in the street, choose, for whatever reason, to forget.) Every fictional narrative or poem arrives with the prefix 'Imagine...', and there is no difficulty, from a pragmatic viewpoint, about what status is to be accorded such a designation. The domain of the imagination is that area between belief and disbelief we inhabit whenever we think in terms of 'it is as if...', and thereby employ our existing knowledge to infer something that is not, or not yet, the case, whether for amusement, as in children's games or literature, or as guide to future action, as in expectation. Nevertheless, there is still a good deal more to say about the relationship between fiction and reality.
Reference

A statement may be used for the sake of the reference, true or false, which it causes. This is the scientific use of language. But it may also be used for the sake of the effects in emotion and attitude produced by the reference it occasions. This is the emotive use of language. But usually references are involved as conditions for, or stages in, the ensuing development attitudes, yet it is still the attitudes not the references which are important. It matters not at all in such cases whether the references are true or false. Their sole function is to bring about and support the attitudes which are the further response....The emotions and attitudes resulting from a statement used emotively need not be directed towards anything to which the statement refers.2

This passage, from I.A.Richards, demonstrates the difficulties of the subject of the referential aspect of literary language. For is Richards' statement the equivalent of saying that in metaphor it does not matter what is chosen for the subsidiary subject? Yet, as was demonstrated in Chapter 1, it is the light cast by the subsidiary subject on the principal subject that is the assertion made by the metaphor.

Language in literature, then, both does and does not refer, in the same way that the subsidiary subject of metaphor both does and does not refer to its dictionary definition. But this paradox exists only as long as we fail to separate established language from metaphorical language. Wellek, for example, draws attention to the rhetorical nature of literary language but then withdraws from such a direct emphasis on referentiality by saying that 'Art imposes some kind of framework which takes the statement of the work out of the world of reality.'3 Frye, too, is led to talk of literature as 'autonomous language', but it is the representatives of more formalistic approaches to literature who most emphasize this side of the equation, as, for example, Linda Waugh who writes that 'poetry is not made with ideas but with signs...[it] is not about the real world of life, but about itself.'4 Insistence on the non-referentiality of the language of literature must, however, lead to contradiction, as in the following passage from Tzvetan Todorov, in an essay on Henry James;

Art therefore is not the reproduction of a given 'reality', nor is it created through the imitation of such a reality. It demands
quite different qualities; to be 'real' can even, as in the present case, be harmful. In the realm of art there is nothing preliminary to the work, nothing which constitutes its origin. It is the work of art itself that is original; the secondary becomes primary, hence the frequent comparisons in James's work that explain 'nature' through 'art', for instance:

'That was the way many things struck me at that time, in England - as reproductions of something that existed primarily in art or literature. It was not the picture, the poem, the fictive page, that seemed to me a copy; these things were the originals and the life of happy and distinguished people was fashioned in their image.'

Here Todorov appeals to some common conceptual ground between his thesis and the work he quotes, that is, if he is claiming that his thesis has some basis in fact then he is making the story refer to some basis in fact, he is claiming that the work can be made to refer to the same given reality which his thesis expresses. This side of the paradox, then, - that literary language does not refer - produces as great a self-contradiction, when taken too literally, as the other side - that literary language does refer - which ends with us talking of fiction as fact.

The examples of insistence on the non-referentiality of literary language given above are, with the possible exceptions of Richards and Todorov, in the nature of asides, throwaway generalizations that suffer from the urge to define too soon, but before leaving the subject I will consider an essay by Michael Riffaterre in which he actually sets out to define what he calls the 'referential fallacy'. His intention is to show that the 'referentiality of literary meaning...is a fallacy, and that the representation of reality is a verbal construction in which meaning is achieved by reference from words to words, not to things.' As we might guess from his use of the word 'representation', the reading of Wordsworth's 'Yew-Trees', which is his test case, does not abandon the connection between words and things. What he is really arguing for is the recognition that the most important factor in the meaning of the poem is the way that its words act upon and modify one another, rather than the existence of any actual yew-trees.

First we have a wood code, or living-matter code, represented by 'intertwisted fibres'. 'Intertwisted' not so much adds to 'fibre' as it activates and singles out the most important feature in the semantic complex of 'fibre'. That is to say 'fibre' as a part of
an organic, living fabric, 'fibre' as a component incapable of independent existence...tied to other fibres by something that is not mere contiguity or mere mechanical function, for that would be mineral or metallic or artificial. 'Fibre' as bound to other fibres by links complex enough, and labyrinthine enough, to become a kind of image within an image of the complexity of life. Hence 'intertwisted'....Now, all these details are but a grammatical expansion of the meaning of the word 'growth', which is in itself only a generalisation of 'trunk'....So that lines 16-18 mean not in relation to the particular experience of a yew-tree and do not depend upon our verifying them against such an actual tree. They mean as a formal variation on one semantic feature.

It is a happy accident for my purposes that the sort of interpretation of language he employs has close affinities with that practised by Eco, and discussed in Chapter 1. In basing his interpretation on semantic relations between words and the associations of concepts (the 'code'), he cannot also be arguing that language is non-referential in the sense of unconnected with a reality which is the basis of such connections. As soon as we move from one word to an associated one, say 'fibre' to 'organic', then, unless their relationship is one of homonymy, we have moved through a portion of the real world. What Riffaterre is really objecting to, in coining 'referential fallacy', is the critical practice of making proper names, when they occur in a literary context, refer to the historical reality of those proper names. He uses two examples from Wordsworth's poem - 'Azincour' and 'Yew-tree'.

Names are such a marker not because they are famous per se, but because a name sounds more specific than a noun....Suggestiveness is circular: the descriptive sentence finds its reference in a name whose referent need only be the preceding part of the sentence leading up to it.

'Azincour', then, for Riffaterre, signals only the distant past, and this is given by its context, not its reference; its historical details are not important. However, he is led astray by his own lack of ignorance here, for, according to the letter of the poem, the tense could refer to the day before the poem was written, indeed, it is only his knowing that Azincour happened in 1415 that makes him read the first eight lines of the poem in the way that he does, and thereby conclude that 'Azincour' adds to the evocation of the tree's antiquity. His point is better made with 'Yew-
tree', for here he shows that critics can tend to explain away difficult aspects of the poem by referring the reader to the physical appearance of yew-trees, and thereby introduce a rather bogus evaluative standard of 'minimal factual recording'. The problem is that if we are to accept, as seems reasonable, that there is a 'wood code' or a 'living-matter code', then why not an 'Azincour' or 'Yew' code, indeed, the idea of an encyclopaedia more readily suggests such items than those Riffaterre and Eco advance; 'Azincour' - battle, fifteenth-century, age of chivalry, English victory over France, victory against odds, won by disregarding humanitarian conventions (war-crime), won by technical innovation, and so on. Riffaterre seems correct in deciding that little of this content of 'Azincour' is germane to the poem, though, as I have said, he himself uses the time reference contained in it. What part of the connotations that belong to 'Azincour' are relevant to the poem is, then, decided by the rest of the poem; this is most probably what Riffaterre means when he says that literary meaning 'is achieved by reference from words to words'.

The connotation of war-crime, potential in 'Azincour', is not picked up, not made active in the interpretation, because it would make too much of the rest of the poem redundant. This is what I mean by the critic making the 'best' reading. To make 'Yew-Trees' an ironical comment on British patriotism would take a great deal of ingenuity. (Ingenuity is usually a virtue, hence the current state of criticism.) But, and this is something the non-critic instinctively feels and resents; such criticism is an almost autonomous enterprise; it starts with what it wants to say and rationalizes the work into an unnatural shape in order to have occasion to say it. Nevertheless, how can I say that the overall meaning of the work is the arbiter of what connotations are relevant in each of its elements, when it is only the connotations selected for its elements that give us the overall meaning? This argument has only the appearance of circularity, for what the reader is looking for, as I have said before, is a consonance in the meaning of the elements, they are looking for the best, that is, most interesting possible reading.

Hough writes that 'When Stendhal sets Lucien Leuwen first in Nancy, then in Paris during the July monarchy, he is committing himself to representing a verifiable external reality - the provincial nobility, then the political and official class of the capital, at a particular moment in
their destiny', that by choosing this background he is 'committing himself to history.' Does this mean that only an expert in this period of French history would be qualified to judge Lucien Leuwen? that historical inaccuracies are necessarily aesthetic faults? that we should defer aesthetic judgements on works which treat of historical events of which we had no historical knowledge? The actual existence of anything that might correspond to the 'setting' of Lucien Leuwen is not an aesthetic consideration. The setting exists as a contribution to motive and an opportunity for choice, as scenery, as atmosphere, as action itself, but as such its 'historical accuracy' is irrelevant; to assert otherwise is to assert that the work is a poor relation of an empirical study, a very poor relation indeed. However, we might imagine that in certain instances - for example if on the last page the hero is on his way to a battle which, as an historical fact, was a massacre - our knowledge of historical fact will influence the imaginative suggestion of the work. This is not a question, it seems, which can be answered in any absolute sense in a purely theoretical context, though I feel that the critical abuses arising from making literary references literally refer are both more common and more misleading than those that can arise from a more restricted reading.

In what sense, then, can we say that fiction does refer or assert? Sidney answers the charge that the poet is a liar by saying that of all writers the poet is the 'least liar' since 'he never affirms and therefore never lieth'.

For as I take it, to lie is to affirm that to be true which is false. So as the other artists, and especially the historian, affirming many things, can in the cloudy knowledge of mankind hardly escape from many lies. But the poet, as I said before, never affirmeth. The poet's 'persons and doings are but pictures what should be and not stories what have been' and are to be taken 'not affirmatively but allegorically and figuratively written'. A crude critical approach will treat literature as though bound to truth in this way, but in this case it is, as Sidney says, not 'that poetryabuseth man's wit, but that man's wit
abuseth poetry.' Yet what are we to make of what is 'allegorically and figuratively written'?

In dedicating the Paradiso to his patron, Con Grande della Scala, Dante insists that the meaning of his work is not simple but polysemous:

The first meaning is the one obtained through the letter; the second is the one obtained through the things signified by the letter. The first is called literal, the second allegorical or moral or anagogical. In order that this manner of treatment may appear more clearly, it may be applied to the following verses: "When Israel went out of Egypt, the house of Jacob from a people of strange language, Judah was his sanctuary and Israel his dominion." For if we look at the letter alone, the departure of the children of Israel from Egypt in the time of Moses is indicated; if to the allegory, our redemption accomplished by Christ is indicated to us; if to the moral sense, the conversion of the soul from the woe and misery of sin to a state of grace is indicated to us; if to the anagogical sense, the departure of the consecrated soul from the slavery of this corruption to the liberty of eternal glory is indicated.15

The Renaissance philosopher Jacopo Mazzoni also appeals to the tradition of biblical interpretation, in his Defence of the Comedy of Dante, and cites the 'Song of Solomon' as a poem which is not 'purely phantastic' but rather 'one of those which under the husk of the literal sense conceals pure and complete truth.', so that 'it can be called phantastic with respect to the literal sense, but icastic with respect to the allegorical sense.'16 But the influence of the biblical model was, perhaps, pernicious, for what was to be found affirmed in the analogical sense was held to be always conformable with a truth, or rather, the truth. Unless poets are also to be taken as writing under the direction of the Holy Spirit, this claim to truth is not one that can be made for their work; yet it is one which, in other forms, is often made. As, for example, Nietzsche;

Thus art treats illusion as illusion: therefore it does not wish to deceive; it is true...Artistic pleasure is the greatest kind of pleasure, because it speaks the truth quite generally in the form of lies.17

This idea of the poet as, necessarily, a truth-teller inherits also the classical tradition of the furor poeticus that goes back at least as far
as the Homeric 'Hymn to Dionysus', in which Dionysus is invoked as the god without whose help the poet will write nothing of value. Plato, too, insists, in several places, that it is not art but divine inspiration which enables the poet to write beautiful poems. A similar sentiment can be found in many writers; in a pure form in Emerson's 'The Poet' (1844), Whitman's 'Preface' to Leaves of Grass (1882), and Lowell's 'The Function of the Poet' (1894), and implicit in any treatment of the artist as somehow necessarily oracular. Many critics do not seem able to stop with the bald fact that the poet is a person who writes what some section of humanity calls 'poetry'. Richards, for example, declares that, in comparison with the poet, 'the ordinary man suppresses nine-tenths of his impulses, because he is incapable of managing them without confusion. He goes about in blinkers because what he would otherwise see would upset him. But the poet through his superior power of ordering experience is freed from this necessity.' The opposite thesis is equally supportable, and my own experience makes me lean more towards it, but this is not a question to be decided by aesthetics or literary theory. In that this, essentially Romantic, conception of the poet can lead us to a prejudging of everything that comes to us as 'literature', it is, at the very least, a fundamentally un-critical notion.

If literature does make assertions through what it means 'allegorically' or analogically, then it must be capable of being false if it is to be capable of being true, thus Edward Phillips makes the distinction that it is 'whatever is pertinently said by the way of allegory [that] is morally though not historically true'. I have already touched on how an assertion is made by a fiction in considering the rhetorical effect of the subsidiary subject on the principal subject in metaphor. The descriptions or representations of fiction stand, as I have said, in an analogical relationship to reality, and it is their metaphorical appropriateness rather than the truth of their letter that we are invited to believe in, that constitutes their 'truth to life'. For once a fiction takes on the function of describing, is created, outside the empirical, solely to bring reality to mind (as opposed to lying), we are involved in rhetoric. Literature asserts things about the world, or can assert (for us) things about the world, only within this rhetorical realm, the realm of 'moral truth'. Whether such assertions are assertions is a question I shall postpone to Chapter 4.
Literature as Information

The nineteenth-century critic and historian Hippolyte Taine, holding that a literary work 'is not a mere individual play of the imagination, the isolated caprice of an excited brain, but a transcript of contemporary manners, a manifestation of a certain kind of mind.' concluded that from literature 'we might recover...a knowledge of the manner in which men thought and felt centuries ago.' He begins by considering the work as a 'fossil shell', which is studied to bring before us the animal which inhabited it; the work or, as he calls it, 'document' is a 'lifeless wreck...valuable only as a clue to the entire and living existence.',

If [the historian's] education suffice, he can lay bare, under every detail of architecture, every stroke in a picture, every phrase in a writing, the special sensation whence detail, stroke, or phrase had issue; he is present at the drama which was enacted in the soul of artist or writer; the choice of a word, the brevity or length of a sentence, the nature of a metaphor, the accent of a verse, the development of an argument - everything is a symbol to him; while his eyes read the text, his soul and mind pursue the continuous development and everchanging succession of the emotions and conceptions out of which the text has sprung: in short, he unveils a psychology.

By this means the historian/critic discovers the 'system in human sentiments and ideas' which characterizes the 'elementary moral state' of the race, surroundings and epoch (la race, le milieu et le moment) from which the work arose. He realizes, however, that such a construction will always be incomplete and produce only an incomplete judgement. Indeed Taine is a strange historian - he would exchange 'fifty volumes of charters and a hundred volumes of state-papers for the memoirs of Cellini, the epistles of Saint Paul, the Table-talk of Luther, or the comedies of Aristophanes.' His 'historical' project being dubious, he is perhaps best considered as advancing a form of psychological criticism; it is, as he says, a 'moral history' he aims at, one that will discover the 'psychological laws, from which events spring'. The description of his method, if we were to replace writer with reader, might describe the discovery of the imaginative suggestion of the work as I shall describe
it. Whether or not such a project could be undertaken on an historical scale, and what purpose such provisional results would serve, is doubtful.

Even leaving aside Taine's systematic approach, the idea of literature as information is a pervasive one; there is a suggestion of it in Johnson's claim that the reader of Thomson's *Seasons* 'wonders that he never saw before what Thomson shows him, and that he never yet has felt what Thomson impresses.', and more than a suggestion of it in the contemporary insistence that contemporary novels are information about the political facts of the countries in which they are set or from which they come. But Johnson is vague as the sort of knowledge poetry provides, Zola, on the other hand, is quite explicit about le roman expérimental; 'We are looking for the causes of social evil; we study the anatomy of classes and individuals to explain the derangements which are produced in society and in man...We [obtain] the necessary data so that by knowing them we may be able to master the good and the evil....No work can be more moralizing than ours, then, because it is upon it that the law should be based.' Zola's model is a scientific one - Claude Bernard's *Introduction à l'étude de la médecine expérimentale* - and it is the spirit of scientific research he feels the novel should emulate:

The novelist starts out in search of a truth....The problem is to know what such a passion, acting in such surroundings and under such circumstances, would produce from the point of view of an individual and of society; and an experimental novel, *Cousine Bette*, for example, is simply the report of an experiment that the novelist conducts before the eyes of the public. In fact, the whole operation consists in taking facts in nature, then in studying them the mechanism of these facts, acting upon them by the modification of circumstances and surroundings without deviating from the laws of nature. Finally you possess knowledge of the man, scientific knowledge of him, in both his individual and social relations.

Except, of course, that no experiment has taken place and all one has done is to imagine what might be! The praise of Balzac is interesting, for Sainte-Beuve, too, talks of him as a 'physiologist and anatomist' but declares that he 'imagined as much as he observed.' While Zola's manifestoes may seem dated, much contemporary discussion of the arts, as I noted above, demonstrates a similar demand; whenever, for example, 'social comment' is taken as an evaluative term. The sort of information
Zola means is information about type, but a similar concern for the strictly factual can be found in James' report that he was left 'gasping' by Zola's admission that his next book was to be set in Rome - a city Zola had not visited. This concern with the factual seems to be directed mainly towards the novel: thus John Stuart Mill;

Poetry, when it is really such, is truth; and fiction also, if it is good for anything, is truth: but they are different truths. The truth of poetry is to paint the human soul truly: the truth of fiction is to give a true picture of life.

As one might imagine, it is the opinion of Henry James that the 'only reason for the existence of a novel is that it does attempt to represent life.', and it must speak 'with the tone of the historian', it must, indeed, be 'history'. Criticism, then, only just beginning to recover from the rhapsodic absolutism of the nineteenth-century, in James begins to take on a new, and now familiar, prosaic absolutism - literal truth to the literal fact;

The air of reality (solidity of specification) seems to me the supreme virtue of a novel - the merit on which all of its other merits (including...conscious moral purpose...) helplessly and submissively depend. If it be not there they are all as nothing, and if these be there, they owe their effect to the success with which the author has produced the illusion of life.

'The Illusion of Life'

In what terms, historically, has the question of literature as a representation been discussed? This is the question I will address here. But why such a concern with terms? In a discipline, like criticism, that comprises almost entirely of words, terms are practice.

Aristotle writes, in the Poetics, that characters in tragedy should be 'good', 'appropriate' (that is, female characters should not be manly or clever), 'lifelike', and 'consistent'. For the moment I will concern myself only with the criterion of 'lifelike', or 'resemblance' as it is
sometimes translated, though appropriateness and consistency of characterization are obviously related to this. This concern with 'resemblance' is one that has hardly ever been out of favour, and today 'convincing', 'unconvincing', 'realistic' and 'unrealistic' are perhaps the most common evaluative terms used of art, particularly outside its academic study. Because the word 'realistic' is popularly used and popularly understood as meaning "lifelike", I will use it here in preference to 'naturalistic', though I will have something to say about its more technical use - as denoting subject matter - towards the end of this chapter.

Mazzoni, deferring to the authority of Plato, holds that since 'the truth of imitation...consists in representing things exactly as they are, it therefore follows that it is an essential mistake in poetry to represent them differently and with dissimilitude.', and his contemporary, Castelvetro, insists that the matter of poetry should be like the matter of history and not 'less like the truth than is the history produced by the course of mundane events'. Indeed, Castelvetro seems to say that the only reason it should be 'like' history rather than history itself is that if it were merely history then the poet would get no credit for his imaginative powers! ("Based on a true story."!) Though Aristotle was speaking of tragedy when he laid down the principles quoted above, Lope de Vega holds that it is also the true goal of comedy to 'imitate the actions of men and to paint the customs of their age.', a view that looks forward to the Naturalist's concern with the contemporary. This concern that the imagination should not be stretched too far is also evinced in the Renaissance's concern with the 'unities' of time and place; thus Sidney finds fault with the English drama for making the stage now Asia, now Africa, now a garden, the scene of a shipwreck, or a battlefield, while in the space of two hours a character is conceived, born, grows up, and is married. Corneille, too, insisting that dramatic poems, as imitations or portraits of human actions, are, like all portraits, 'more excellent as they better resemble the original', believed that if the play lasted two hours 'it would be a perfect resemblance if the action which it represented did not require more time in reality.' Already, though Corneille considered such perfect resemblance too difficult to try, we are moving towards credibilit or realism as the absolute aesthetic standard. Thus Tasso;
Poetry is nothing else than imitation; this cannot be called in question; imitation cannot be separated from versimilitude, for imitation is nothing else than giving a resemblance; no part, then, of poetry can be other than true to fact. In short, truth is not one of the conditions demanded from poetry for its greater beauty and ornament, but is intrinsic to its very essence and in every part is necessary above anything else.42

Addison, for example, writes that it is only 'nature' which can 'please those Tastes which are the most unprejudiced or the most refined.', a sentiment more famously expressed in Johnson's 'Preface' to The Plays of William Shakespeare, where he writes that 'Nothing can please many, and please long, but just representations of general nature.'43 The idea that 'Good art is nothing but a representation of life' is one that is especially applied to the novel, a form that is taken to have emerged when narrative turned from the romance to the 'history of', that is, to realism.44 But even two hundred years before James declared that 'the air of reality' was the 'supreme virtue' of fiction, Georges de Scudéry had written that he could not be touched by the misfortunes of the Queen of Guindaye and the King of Astrobacia since he knew that their realms were not to be found on any map.45

It is with the end of the nineteenth-century, however, that we find Horace's judgement, Incredulus odi ('unable to believe it, I dislike it'), is a reigning principle of critical judgement.46 Henry James, for example, in an attack on Our Mutual Friend, asks, apropos two of Dickens' characters, 'was anyone ever mischievous in that singular fashion? Did a couple of elegant swindles ever take such pains to be aggressively inhuman - for we can find no other word for the gratuitous distortions to which they are subjected.'47 Though he accepts that half of Dickens' characters can be 'intentionally grotesque' he demands that in the story there must also be 'exemplars of sound humanity who should afford us the proper measure of their companions' variations'.48 Zola, in a more sweeping gesture, objects to the Romantic movement in the theatre, with its 'persistent and monstrous exaggeration of reality' and its 'characters in doublets who perform great feats and flit about like insects drunk with the sun', on the grounds that such people as it portrays 'have never existed.'49
The old formulas, classical and romantic, were based on the rearrangement and systematic amputation of the truth....Up to the present the different literary schools disputed only over the question of the best way to disguise the truth so that it might not look too brazen to the public. The classicists adopted the toga; the romantics fought a revolution to impose the coat of mail and the doublet. Essentially the change of dress made little difference; the counterfeiting of nature went on. But today the naturalistic thinkers are telling us that the truth does not need clothing; it can walk naked.50

Zola can claim the unusual honour of being a prophet in the realm of poetics, for, when he declared that naturalism would survive and become the 'durable formula' for art, he was actually right.51

('Truth', it seems, has always been proposed as a characteristic of fiction, perhaps most commonly through the idea that literature presents 'types', that is, that while literature may be false when it speaks of particularities it is true when making generalizations. Aristotle, for example, writes that 'it is not the poet's function to describe what has actually happened, but the kinds of thing that might happen, that is, that could happen because they are, in the circumstances, either probable or necessary.'52 Sidney describes poetry as moderating between moral philosophy, which 'giveth the precept', and history, which describes the example.53 This poetry can do because, while the historian is tied to 'the particular truth of things and not to the general reason of things', and the philosopher to 'a wordish description, which doth neither strike, pierce, nor possess the sight of the soul', the poet can give 'a perfect picture of it in one by whom he presupposeth it was done; so as he coupleth the general notion with the particular example.'54 Victor Hugo, in similar vein, wrote that, in creating a dramatic work, the poet should choose 'not the beautiful, but the characteristic'.55 Schopenhauer, too, writes that, in art 'one single case stands for thousands in that what art has in view with that careful and particular delineation of the individual is the revelation of the Idea of the genus to which it belongs; so that, e.g., an occurrence, a scene from human life depicted correctly and completely, that is to say with an exact delineation of the individuals involved in it, leads to a clear and profound knowledge of the Idea of humanity itself perceived from this or that aspect.'56 But perhaps the most famous expression of this attitude, in English literature,
is to be found in Fielding's 'true history' of *Joseph Andrews*, in which he declares that he describes 'not men, but manners; not an individual but a species.' Historians, according to Fielding, may agree as to the place in which an event took place but hardly anything else;

Now with us biographers the case is different; the facts we deliver may be relied on, though we often mistake the age and country wherein they happened: for, though it may be worth the examination of critics, whether the shepherd Chrysostom, who, as Cervantes informs us, died for love of the fair Marcella, who hated him, was ever in Spain, will anyone doubt that such a silly fellow hath really existed?...is not such a book as that which records the achievements of the renowned Don Quixote more worthy the name of a history than even Mariana's: for, whereas the latter is confined to a particular period in time, and to a particular nation, the former is the history of the world in general..."58

From this Fielding concludes that the lawyer he describes 'is not only alive, but has been so these four thousand years : and I hope G-- will indulge his life as many yet to come.'59)

Let us look at this claim that literature, to be good, must be 'realistic', and that, in fixing 'its attention on reality and contemporary existence', in showing us 'the world as it is', realism can claim the monopoly on Truth.60 To say that a great deal of what has been traditionally taken as 'great' literature would become 'bad' literature by these lights is to prejudge the issue, for, if the principle is valid then both tradition and instinct must defer to it. Johnson's work has something of a struggle with the question of realism despite, or perhaps because of, the definite air of his pronouncements on it. He praises Shakespeare for having no heroes but only 'men, who act and speak as the reader thinks he should himself have spoken or acted on the same occasion.'

This therefore is the praise of Shakespeare, that his drama is the mirror of life; that he who has mazed his imagination, in following the phantoms which other writers raise up before him, may here be cured of his delirious ecstasies, by reading human sentiments in human language; by scenes from which a hermit may estimate the transactions of the world, and a confessor predict the progress of the passions.61
This is praise indeed - or would be for a book of social psychology, or anthropology, or sociology. (Aristotle held that we enjoy accurate representations of what we know because we feel pleasure in discovering what is depicted, but when it is an unknown object it must be the execution of the likeness which pleases, since we cannot judge the accuracy of the representation.) Johnson himself provided a criticism of this view, fifteen years earlier, in an essay on the novel; 'If the world be promiscuously described, I cannot see of what use it can be to read the account or why it may not be as safe to turn the eye immediately upon mankind, as upon a mirror which shows all that presents itself without discrimination.' Not only as 'safe', but as much to the purpose. However it is not promiscuous description but selection, system and experimentation that Zola claims as the principle virtue of naturalism. The naturalist writer, insists Zola, is not simply a photographer, his method is to experiment;

With the application of the experimental method to the novel that quarrel dies out. The idea of experiment carried with it the idea of modification. We start, indeed, from the true facts, which are our indestructible basis; but to show the mechanism of these facts it is necessary for us to produce and direct the phenomena; this is our share of invention, here is the genius of the book....The writer's office, far from being lessened, grows singularly from this point of view. An experiment, even the most simple, is always based on an idea, itself born of an observation...He sets out from doubt to reach positive knowledge; and he will not cease to doubt until the mechanism of the passion, taken to pieces and set up again by him, acts according to the fixed laws of nature.

Realism is, then, as William Dean Howells wrote, 'nothing more and nothing less than the truthful treatment of material', and nothing must interfere with 'the illusion in which alone the truth of art resides.'. Yet there are many different forms which can lay claim to being 'realistic'; Eliot, for example, explains the complexity of James' sentence structure as arising from 'a determination not to simplify, and in that simplification lose any of the real intricacies and by-paths of mental movement'. Yet, and here begin the doubts as to whether language is representative at all in this sense, why is it that while even our most complex thoughts can be sure-footed, we stumble through James' sentences? The 'modernist'
approach was also seen as a breakthrough in realism. Virginia Woolf, for example, discussing the 'conventional' plot structure and characterization of novels by such writers as Wells, Bennett, or Galsworthy, reports a 'doubt, a spasm of rebellion, as the pages fill themselves up in the customary way.', and expresses this doubt in the question 'Is life like this?'.67 When one looks 'within', she continues, life is not like this; the mind 'receives a myriad impressions - trivial, fantastic, evanescent, or engraved with the sharpness of steel...so that, if the writer were a free man and not a slave, if he could write what he chose, not what he must, if he could base his work upon his own feeling and not upon convention, there would be no plot, no comedy, no tragedy, no love interest or catastrophe in the accepted style.'68 She insists that any method is right 'that expresses what we wish to express', but of Joyce she writes that, 'If we want life itself, here surely we have it.'69 Ortega y Gasset, on the other hand, condemns what he calls the 'infrarealism' of Joyce and Proust on the grounds that, in making what normally exists only on the periphery of attention occupy its centre, their method is unrealistic.70

One last form of 'realism' I wish to mention, most often found in strictly aesthetic theories and in accounts of the imagination though also in the conclusions to specific critical essays, is the identification of the experience of the characters or narrator of the fiction and the experience of the reader. Richards, for example, defines the 'essence of Tragedy' as an experience in which the mind of the reader is forced for a moment to live without 'any of the innumerable subterfuges by which it ordinarily dodges the full development of experience.'

It is essential to recognize that in the full tragic experience there is no suppression. The mind does not shy away from anything, it does not protect itself with any illusion, it stands uncomforted, unintimidated, alone and self-reliant.71

The experience of tragedy is, then, according to Richards, like a tragic experience in its immediacy and the demands it makes on us.72 Leaving aside the fact that it is fictions, of all types, by which we dodge the 'full development of experience', it has to be said that Richards must have been a very fortunate man, for I take it from this that he never discovered what a tragic experience was.73 But I shall have more to say
about this view of literature as a sort of correspondence course at the 'University of Life', elsewhere.

Let us return to Johnson and his comment on the unities of time and place; 'The objection arising from the impossibility of passing the first hour at Alexandria, and the next at Rome, supposes that when the play opens the spectator really imagines himself at Alexandria, and believes that his walk to the theatre has been a voyage to Egypt, and that he lives in the days of Antony and Cleopatra. Surely he that imagines this may imagine more.' He further observes that it is rare for 'minds not possessed by mechanical criticism' to 'feel any offence from the extension of the intervals between the acts, nor can I conceive it impossible or absurd that he who can multiply three hours into twelve or twenty-four might imagine with equal ease a greater number.' This obviously applies to drama, but does not, at first sight, appear to touch on 'realism' in other forms of literature, but the premiss upon which he bases these views does - 'It is false that any representation is mistaken for reality; that any dramatic fable in its materiality was ever credible, or, for a single moment, was ever credited.' Exceptions, such as statues which could be mistaken for people or the trompe effect in painting, at least at the moment before they are taken for representations, have no analogue in literature. 'Imitations', writes Johnson, 'produce pain or pleasure, not because they are mistaken for realities, but because they bring realities to mind.' But in how many different ways can reality be brought to mind? The language of literature, writes Hazlitt, 'is not the less true to nature, because it is false in point of fact; but so much more true and natural, if it conveys the impression which the object under the influence of passion makes on the mind.' And once we have admitted this degree of licence in bringing reality to mind, we have admitted every degree. What, then, of Zola and his experimental method? His contemporary, Guy de Maupassant, points out that the process of selection which Zola advocates is itself 'the first blow to the theory of the whole truth,' and that the aim of creating 'a total illusion of truth', which naturalists espoused, should better earn them the title of 'Illusionists'.

The illusion of reality does, indeed, appear to be one of James' aims, for he states that he is shocked at the novelist conceding 'in a
digression, a parenthesis or an aside' that his fiction is 'only make belief';

Such a betrayal of sacred office seems to me, I confess, a terrible crime; it is what I mean by the attitude of apology, and it shocks me every whit as much in Trollope as it would have shocked me in Gibbon or Macaulay. It implies that the novelist is less occupied in looking for the truth (the truth, of course I mean, that he assumes, the premises that we must grant him, whatever they may be) than the historian, and in doing so it deprives him at a stroke of all his standing room.®1

What is the novelist’s 'standing-room'? If it is to maintain the reader's historical faith, then truthfulness is certainly not one of the qualities of the novel. Sartre goes further than this, calling for (manifestoes are le vice francais) an 'absolute subjective realism', that will leave the characters 'genuinely' free of their creator.®2 If there is one thing that is categorically unreal, however, it is illusion. If we must make the verisimilitude of a narrative a moral question on such grounds, then we might characterize the 'fourth-wall' concept of art as a sort of philosophical error, for if we cease to be able to measure the representative against the represented, the real, then we cease to be able to measure its truth at all.®3

But if the arrangement of details is imposed, cannot the details themselves be 'as they are'? But at what level is this to be, since we have seen Dryden insist that hippocentaurs and chimeras are 'founded on the conjunction of two natures which have a real separate being.'?®4 Once we grant the novelist 'discriminative choice', as Hardy writes, 'we grant all.'®5 Reality is what really happened, and to be like reality is to be different from it. Thus if a station master tells me that a train for Leeds leaves platform twelve at six o'clock, and there is no train for Leeds from that station and no platform twelve either, then the fact that Leeds, trains, platforms, and six o'clocks exist does not make what the station master said any less a fiction than had he told me I could catch a gryphon to Narnia every blue moon. (One is, however, a better illusion of information than the other, that is, more convincing misinformation.) It might be objected that while trains can be met with in everyday life, gryphons cannot. Yet this is a strange basis for an evaluative standard; that the representation of what we meet with in everyday life is 'good',

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and the representation of anything else is not. Has anybody ever judged from this position without first making the, false, assumption that the former type of representation is more 'true' than the latter? If we did demand the 'true representation' of everyday facts then narrative and poetry would be the lowest of art forms, since words do not represent half so well as speech, objects, lines, and colours. If we want history then there are history books which do the job better, if we want social anthropology then there are works of social anthropology, if we want things 'as they are' then there is the world as it is. Thus Alexander Gerard, addressing the question of 'whether poetry be properly an imitative art?';

Poetry makes use of language, or artificial signs. These bear no resemblance to the things signified by them; and therefore the poem can have no proper resemblance to the subject described in it. It cannot be called an imitation of that subject, with any more propriety than an historical narration can be called an imitation of the transaction of which it gives an account.

With the exception of drama there is no form of literature which cannot be more properly called descriptive, and hence heir to all that descriptions are heir to. While imitation, as Tasso said, cannot be separated from verisimilitude, description bears a different relationship to reality, and particularly so if it is by definition untrue - fictional. If the description brings to mind realities then it is in its proper relationship with reality, but any piece of language that makes sense - and some that do not - will do this. 'This question of realism,' writes Robert Louis Stevenson apropos Zola, 'regards not in the least degree the fundamental truth, but only the technical method, of a work of art.' Yet this is the last thing Zola, as the champion of an 'ism', will see; 'Our condemnation of the romantic formula is summed up in one severe remark: To destroy one rhetoric it was not necessary to invent another.' Rhetoric begins with the selection of materials, its structuring, with description itself - from the choice of subject to the choice of word order. Once a fiction is created to bring reality to mind ('Man is a wolf') we are involved in rhetoric.

Nothing is more a matter of convention than the 'realistic'. Classical and Renaissance theorists were concerned that the representation of
action in drama should not exceed the time-limit such an action would occupy in life, and yet did not balk at masks, speaking in verse, or musical accompaniment. Johnson, as we saw, claimed that Shakespeare presented characters speaking as anyone would on a similar occasion, and in another essay he describes the works of Fielding and Richardson as exhibiting 'life in its true state, diversified only by accidents that daily happen in the world, and influenced by passions and qualities which are to be found in conversing with mankind.' - two propositions that would be particularly difficult to sell to a contemporary fifth-former.

(Even each individual work tends to generate its own conventions, so that, for example, the reader, under the impression that they have been reading an almost day by day account, is startled when, in Flaubert's *Sentimental Education*, sixteen years are made to pass in four sentences.)

To praise a work for its realism, as to carp at its lack of realism, is, necessarily, a non sequitur in that such a bald judgement cannot be made to follow from any consistent principle. Indeed, the same person who might make such a statement will, on another occasion, enjoy any amount of fantasy. It is not that we dislike a thing because it is unrealistic, rather we say that it is unrealistic because we dislike it. I have suggested above that each work generates its own convention of description: Does this mean that it is perceived as a fault when the work suddenly breaks its own convention? But if the work establishes the convention then any deviations from what has so far been established are also part of its convention, because its full relationship to reality is not finally established until the last word of the work. Yet there seems to be some truth in this idea of self-consistency, since too great a deviation, for example some *deus ex machina* in a story of everyday London folk, can be said to work the imagination too hard. Yet we do not mind having our imagination worked hard so long as we consider the work was worth the trouble.

Literal credibility is probably so often appealed to as a virtue because it is so easy to appeal to, we are all experts at what things are like at an everyday level, and, though it may not really be the verisimilitude or otherwise which effects our enjoyment of a work, 'realism' has at least the appearance of an objective criterion for judgement. To say that somebody means something other than what they
say is, of course, only marginally more polite than saying that they do not know what they are talking about, but as with many other formulas that are used in criticism, formal or informal, there is here simply a gap between response and expression that has been filled in a makeshift way. For the principles implied in judgements based on verisimilitude, would, if seriously held, place all fiction beneath the consideration of the person who makes them.

At the beginning of this section I promised to say something about the distinction between 'realism' and 'naturalism', for, though I have used 'realism' in a loose popular sense here, it has a more technical use. 'Naturalism', then, is used to refer to a method of representation but a method which has limited subject matter - the unexceptional - while 'realism' refers to subject matter and attitude to subject matter - impartial, 'objective' presentation of low-life - though in this attitude we might say there is a limitation put on method. This is one way of drawing the distinction, but in a field in which terms are manipulated primarily with an eye to impact and fashion rather than theoretical clarity, the distinction is often drawn in different ways. Let us look, however, at the sense of 'realistic' I have outlined here, for it is often used evaluatively, as in the "gritty realism" claimed as the principle virtue of such books as John Hubert Selby's Last Exit to Brooklyn. Such unremitting focus on the revolting, often prescribed as edification for the 'bourgeois mind', is more properly a form of decadence; the constricting of the compass of experience to the narrow, and, therefore, distorting area of the extreme. There is something in the temperament of this century to which this view appeals, but Schopenhauer could readily explain the reason for this more restricted meaning of 'realism';

For whencs did Dante take the materials for his hell but from this our actual world? And yet he made a very proper hell of it. And when, on the other hand, he came to the task of describing heaven and its delights, he had an insurmountable difficulty before him, for our world affords no materials at all for this...
Yet, as Saintsbury observes, 'killing is not in the least more real than kissing, nor are descriptions of outrage and torture more so than descriptions of dances and Watteau-like picnics.' If you want to 'face reality', or even some specific sort of reality, that you desire knowledge of for the good of your soul, then to go in search of it in a book is to travel in the wrong direction.

More Real Than Reality

'Art is more real then reality' : this is a perhaps crude, though revelatory, formula which I use to express an attitude which can be found in several writers on aesthetics. It takes a variety of forms, but in each case is found to rest, not surprisingly, on a general theory as to the nature of reality and can only be understood in the light of that theory. I will quote at length, therefore, from one example - Hegel's "Introduction" to his Aesthetics;

If...the pure appearance in which art brings its conceptions into existence is to be described as 'deception', this reproof first acquires its meaning in comparison with the phenomena of the external world and its immediate materiality, as well as in relation to our own world of feeling, i.e. the inner world of sense....But it is precisely this whole sphere of the empirical inner and outer world which is not the world of genuine actuality; on the contrary, we must call it, in a stricter sense than we call art, a pure appearance and a harsher deception. Only beyond the immediacy of feeling and external objects is genuine actuality to be found. For the truly actual is only that which has being in and for itself, the substance of nature and spirit, which indeed gives itself presence and existence, but in this existence remains in and for itself and only so is truly actual. It is precisely the dominion of these universal powers which art emphasizes and reveals. In the ordinary external and internal worlds essentially does indeed appear too, but in the form of a chaos of accidents, afflicted by the immediacy of the sensuous and by the capriciousness of situations, events, characters, etc. Art liberates the true content of phenomena from the pure appearance and deception of this bad, transitory world, and gives them a higher actuality, born of the spirit. Thus, far from being mere pure appearance, a higher reality and truer existence is to
be ascribed to the phenomena of art in comparison with [those of] ordinary reality.  

Hegel further adds that history, 'burdened with the entire contingency of ordinary life and its events, complications, and individualities', is more deceptive than the work of art which 'brings before us the external powers that govern history without this appendage of the immediate sensuous present and its unstable appearance'. Art, then, 'has the advantage that it points through and beyond itself, and itself hints at something spiritual of which it is to give us an idea, whereas immediate appearance does not present itself as deceptive but rather as real and true, although the truth is in fact contaminated and concealed by the immediacy of sense'. Schopenhauer, too, plays a variation on this theme, though his formulation is more strictly tied to an implicit theory of the imagination. What Schopenhauer is concerned with are what he calls 'Ideas', 'the direct and adequate objectivity of the thing-in-itself', which though expressed 'in innumerable individuals and particulars are related to these as archetypes to their copies'. Such Ideas can only become 'objects of knowledge' when the subject 'relinquishes the common way of looking at things, gives up tracing...their relations to each other, the final goal of which is always a relation to his own will; if he thus ceases to consider the where, the when, the why and the whither of things, and looks simply at the what; if, further he does not allow abstract thoughts, the concepts of reason, to take possession of his consciousness, but, instead of all this, gives the whole power of his mind to perception, sinks himself entirely in this, and lets his consciousness be filled with the quiet contemplation of the...object actually present' and 'forgets even his individuality, his will, and continues to exist as pure subject' then the object passes 'out of all relation to something outside it, and the subject out of all relation to the will, then that which is known is no longer the particular thing as such; but it is the Idea'. It is art, according to Schopenhauer, which best exemplifies this kind of 'knowledge' because in it the object is isolated, taken out of time, and perceived without its relations.

If the whole world as idea is only the visibility of the will, the work of art is able to render this visibility more distinct. It is the camera obscura which shows the objects more purely,
and enables us to survey them and comprehend them better. It is the play within the play, the stage upon the stage in 'Hamlet'.

A position very similar is (apparently) advanced in Heidegger's 'Origin of the Work of Art'. He discusses Van Gogh's painting of a pair of peasant's shoes, and asserts that, in 'discovering' the 'equipmental quality of equipment', the work lets us 'know what the shoes are in truth', since 'the equipmentality of equipment first genuinely arrives at its appearance through the work and only in the work.' It is not, then, according to Heidegger, that Van Gogh depicts, or draws a likeness of a pair of actually existing shoes, for to see the painting in this way is to treat the painting itself as 'equipment', rather it has 'set up a world' in which material, instead of disappearing into usefulness, as it does in the manafacture of equipment, is caused 'to come forth for the very first time and to come into the Open of the work's world.'

Truth happens in Van Gough's painting. This does not mean that something is correctly portrayed, but rather that in the revelation of the equipmental being of the shoes, that which is as a whole - world and earth in their counterplay - attains to unconcealedness.

What can we make of this idea of 'genuine actuality', 'being in and for itself', 'the unconcealedness of Being'? It is interesting to note that Plato, starting from a similar point of view about the relationship between things and their Ideas, arrives at an opposite conclusion about art - that it is a copy of a copy. Rather than asking if art can do what these philosophers say, if such a question can be asked, it would seem both quicker and more decisive to ask if anything is more real than what we call reality, that is, what can be meant by the phrase 'thing-in-itself'. But we cannot talk about the thing-in-itself; the phrase only has meaning when it is placed in contrast to the individual's perception of the thing, their version. Each writer - Hegel, Schopenhauer, Heidegger - is an individual, so that in talking of the thing-in-itself he admits that he is not talking of the thing-in-itself. He can mention it, as I am doing, but the application of the phrase to anything immediately undermines that phrase, cancels out its own use. It is much more honest, then, simply to talk about things and distinguish other people's
misconceptions by characterizing them as 'misconceptions', as distortions introduced by the action of the will. Everyone will know that one is not deliberately lying. Likewise, when somebody obligingly adds the suffix "In your opinion!" to anything I say, I feel the addition as quite redundant, for my saying it has made it my opinion. (The suffix is really the equivalent of a contradiction or an appeal to my lack of direct knowledge of the subject.) 'Real', in 'Art is more real than reality', is, then, being used as an evaluative word, as a term of praise, and 'reality' as a term of derogation. To speak of the 'thing-in-itself', like talking of a 'real' book, party, man, and so on, is to say that these things correspond to one's idea of what they should be at their 'best', and it is perhaps the most deceptive way of thinking just because it is so absolute, because it denies any possibility that one's conception is contingent. The truth of any concept, far from being 'contaminated and concealed by the immediacy of sense', must be rooted in that immediacy to be verifiable. What these philosophers have actually claimed about art appears, then, to be that, as rhetoric, the work can be so persuasive as to seem to embody the very essence of a thing.

A related approach, which I will touch upon before leaving the subject, is to be found in the Marxist Georg Lukács, who defines the 'goal of all great art' as the provision of 'a picture of reality in which the contradictions between appearance and reality, the particular and the general, the immediate and the conceptual, etc., is so resolved that the two converge in to a spontaneous integrity' in which 'reality becomes manifest and can be experienced within appearance' and 'the general principle is exposed as the specific impelling cause for the individual case being specially depicted.' According to Lukács the representation of life which the work contains, because it is 'structured and ordered more richly and strictly than ordinary life experience' is 'in intimate relation to the active social function, the propaganda effect of the genuine work of art' and, therefore, 'cannot possibly exhibit the lifeless and false objectivity of an "impartial" imitation which takes no stand or provides no call to action.' The 'genuine' work, then, according to Lukács contains not a false 'impartial' objectivity, but a true 'partisan objectivity' which sees the thing not as it is, but as it really is.

From Lenin, however, we know that this partisanship is not introduced into the external world arbitrarily by the individual
but is a motive force inherent in reality which is made conscious through the correct dialectical reflected of reality and introduced into practice.106

If objectivity, as it is ordinarily defined, is seeing a thing as it really exists, external to the mind and without distortions introduced by the perceiving subject, how can there be two forms of it? and how can impartiality, which is, to all present concerns, synonymous, be a false form of it? The key lies in the oxymoron 'partisan objectivity', for what Lukács relies on is the view that though the objects of our desires, beliefs, or hopes, do not actually exist, the fact that they can be thus objects gives them an objectivity. But how can we say that what is imaginary, and, therefore, by one definition of 'real', unreal, is more real than reality? What Lukács is probably aiming at is that what is usually called 'reality' is not reality as that word is defined but a bourgeois construction; if so then some of the difficulties of his argument could be overcome by placing 'reality' within quotation marks when it is meant in this sense. Once more language has run away with itself and we are back at the idea of a reality more real than reality, and the admission of prejudice raised to absolute principle which it entails.

I have given so much space to these four thinkers here because the claim that art reveals a superior reality is one which often steals upon both literary theory and criticism without us being aware. By rejoining the formula to its underlying assumptions I have, hopefully, shown how far reaching are the intellectual consequences we commit ourselves to by its use.

Before leaving the subject of literature and reality there is one last 'reality' which I must turn to - the reality of the author as an historical person. Though 'intention' is now widely considered to be a closed subject, I wish to show the ways in which intentionalism may persist as a buried premiss in specific critical arguments or descriptions, and the consequences or implications of its presence.
Intention

To give an accurate description of what has never occurred is not merely the proper occupation of the historian, but the inalienable privilege of any man of parts and culture.

Wilde107

'Intentionalism' I will here loosely define as the tendency to seek the key to the import or value of a work in the intentions of its author that is, to criticize by reference to the author's thought processes and motives. Pope expresses it thus 'In every work regard the writer's end, / Since none can compass more than they intend'.108 Indeed good intentions have become, with varying degrees of explicitness, a common normative standard in evaluation and thus, through the persuasive definitions of Romanticism, - 'poetry is the spontaneous overflow of powerful feelings...emotion recollected in tranquility' - part of the definition of literature itself.109 But, such is the 'naturalness' of this approach that it is not a tendency restricted to the overtly Romantic; Hulme, for example writes that 'excellence in verse' is rooted not in the emotion it produces but that 'Wherever you get...sincerity, you get the fundamental quality of good art'.110 Richards too appeals to authorial intention when he writes that 'the deliberate conscious attempt directed to communication' is never so successful as 'the unconscious indirect method.'111 One example of intentionalism that seems to me particularly representative of the style, as I inherited it, is Coombes' comparison of a stanza from Gray's 'Elegy' with part of Hopkins' 'The Leaden Echo and the Golden Echo'; the latter, Coombes writes, is better because instead of Gray's 'neat or solemnly impressive versified propositions' Hopkins conveys his thought in an almost physically felt effort'; Coombes concludes from the comparison that 'Poetic thought occurs when the idea is felt, not merely utilized, by the poet, who makes his words unfold the thought as it develops; usually, the thought is felt through concrete words and images, the abstract being too vague and general.'112 This could be understood as a description of the sort of poetry he prefers and as a description of that poetry's effects, but if so it is, for the reader, a very tortuous way of doing so; its advantage for the critic is, that the
hypothetical genesis is easier to describe than the actual properties that lead to its inference.

**Evaluation**: It is such an approach as this which produces those evaluative judgements which are apparently based on exclusively historical criteria such as 'radical', 'experimental', 'important in the history of', 'original', 'derivative', 'conventional', and so on. These, as we shall discover in later chapters, are not aesthetic judgements and so do not belong to criticism. 'A writer who produces a pastiche skillful enough to contain pages Stendhal might have signed at the time', writes Robbe-Grillet, 'would in no way have the value he would still possess today had he written those same pages under Charles X....[No one] would dream of praising a musician for having composed some Beethoven, a painter for having made a Delacroix, or an architect for having conceived a Gothic cathedral.'

But what if a previously unknown Stendhal or Beethoven manuscript or painting by Delacroix was to be discovered, would they then have no aesthetic value? A forger who produces 'a new masterpiece by Cézanne' is, from a critical point of view, as great an artist as Cézanne, for a great artist is a person who produces great art, that anybody should think otherwise is the grossest superstition. (This does not mean, of course, that a work cannot be the best of its period, but this is an aesthetic judgement only in a sense relative to the aesthetic value of that period as a whole, not in any absolute sense. Consider the fate of Ossian.)

It could, however, be said that, with regard to evaluation, the work itself is evidence of what the author intended. Thus Hough:

In judging a poem we can say 'These lines were presumably intended to produce an effect of grandeur; but they are platitudinous and inflated, and fail to do so.' Or 'this poem aims at elegance but achieves only triviality.'...Part of the process of judging an unsuccessful or incompletely successful poem is a matter of summarising the intention and seeing that it is unfulfilled. With a completely successful poem all is achievement, and the question of a separately conceivable intention need not arise.
But if the intention that we summarise is inferred from the poem then the only intention for which we have evidence is the intention to write the poem as it exists. Even if the poem is bad, to infer an intention that is excess to the facts is only to say 'I can see how this could be improved or changed to something I would like better' or 'If I were a poet I would be disappointed with this poem', that is, to rewrite the poem to exclude its faults and then measure the poem against this rewriting. We do not know that these lines were intended to produce an effect of grandeur, only that they are platitudinous and inflated. If we suppose that they were then we imagine every work to have been written by a failed great poet. Thus Collingwood;

What the artist is trying to do is to express a given emotion. To express it, and to express it well, are the same thing. To express it badly is not one way of expressing it...it is failing to express it. A bad work of art is an activity in which the agent tries to express a given emotion but fails.116.

There may indeed be something in this, but it is a type of shorthand that tortuously expresses what is really at issue, that is, the expectations we have of art, and which can be misleading, for the emotion is not 'given' at all except as it is given in the work. Once the inquiry moves outside such 'intention' as the work provides, that is, once this discussion of intention becomes more than pleonastic, it becomes no more than extravagant speculation on 'what has never occurred'. The poem expresses not failed grandeur but absurdity. But if we can characterize a bad poem by saying that it has certain negative characteristics, that is, qualities which we could define as the failure of certain positive qualities, does this not require us to invoke intention? But then if a poem were perfectly absurd, we would have to praise it for perfectly expressing absurdity, for every work perfectly expresses exactly what it expresses. The difficulty only arises, however, if we have already decide to judge by intentions. Every work does perfectly express exactly what it expresses, but this is itself one of the arguments against judging from intention, for this only makes every poem a good poem if we are already committed to judging by intention. The only meaningful criterion is, as we shall see, whether or not what the poem expresses was worth expressing.
The question of intention can, nevertheless, be more problematic than this. Consider Hurd's defence of the *Faerie Queene*:

When an architect examines a Gothic structure by Grecian rules, he finds nothing but deformity. But the Gothic architecture has its own rules, by which when it comes to be examined, it is seen to have its merit, as well as the Grecian. The question is not, which of the two is conducted in the simplest or truest taste: but whether there be not sense and design in both, when scrutinized by the laws on which each is projected. The same observation holds of the two sorts of poetry. Judge of the *Faerie Queene* by the classic models, you are shocked within its disorder: consider it with an eye to its Gothic original, and you find it regular. The unity and simplicity of the former are more complete: but the latter has that sort of unity and simplicity which results from its nature.117

What Hurd is doing here is very useful from a critical point of view; he is seeking to remove from the reader's mind a false and inapplicable standard of value, to make the reader appreciate the *Faerie Queene* for what it is. But is this what he does? For the question for evaluation is whether or not the poem is 'conducted in the...truest taste'. What he has done is to set up another standard that is, arguably, just as irrelevant, for whether or not a work conforms to some model - other than the critic's model of a 'good work' - is not an aesthetic judgement of that work. Each new work is a variation on a genre (x) but that variation is itself a species (xy), a new genre to be conformed to or deviated from. Thus if we are only to judge each work according to its type then judgement must always be favourable; alternately we can decide on a fixed number of genres - but this is the very thing that Hurd is arguing against, for, as he rightly observes, to judge only according to accepted genres can lead to misunderstanding. Consider, for example, William Carlos William's 'Red Wheelbarrow';

so much depends
upon
a red wheel
barrow

glazed with rain
water
beside the white chickens

This is, or rather, would be a poor haiku. I have heard it described as a haiku so let us for a moment pretend that is what it is. It is a poor haiku, then, because it does not conform to the form of haikus. This is not, however an aesthetic judgement, for the Prelude is also a poor haiku, as are all of Shakespeare's sonnets, but this fact does not usually effect our sense of their value. If it were intended as a judgement then it could only be a judgement of William Carlos Williams' grasp of Japanese poetical forms and only then if he had declared that he set out to write a haiku; it cannot, in any sense, be an aesthetic, critical judgement. If the judgement was not intended as one of Williams then it is irrelevant, for if a sonnet can be a good poem and a poor example of a haiku then being a poor example of some form cannot be part of an aesthetic judgement. To say it is a bad poem is an aesthetic judgement but to introduce 'haiku' into the critical account is to introduce an irrelevance that serves only to demonstrate the critic's knowledge. Why, then, did I ever hear it described as a such? Perhaps because this poem, as several others by Williams, reminds the reader of a haiku. (It may be that Williams has himself said such was his intention - I do not know.) This demonstrates the distortion, or abnegation, of the evaluative process which intentionalism can introduce, for if we make conformity to the nearest related type or genre of which the poem seems an example, or the fulfilment of the author's expressed intention, the standard by which we evaluate the work then we are not judging that work as a work, that is, not making an aesthetic judgement.

Hough writes that 'All literature is read within a context - a historical context in the first place. The author's intention, where he has made it known, is part of this historical context.' so that 'Samson Agonistes could not be judged rightly if we did not know that Milton intended to write a tragedy modelled on classical Greek tragedy.' and 'Lycidas...would be almost unintelligible to a reader who did not know...that it was intended to be a poem in the long and elaborate tradition of the pastoral elegy.' Such things are interesting to know, and can certainly help prevent our preconceptions getting in the way of judgement, for it would be foolish to pretend that a reader can appreciate
all the forms of poetry without some sort of introduction to the possibilities of poetry. But this does not ultimately bear on aesthetic evaluation or criticism, that is, it is a process for overcoming preconceptions, if it becomes simply a means for arguing away strengths or weaknesses on the grounds of 'convention', then it is a positive hindrance to criticism. The knowledge of genre, and its use as a normative standard, cannot be defended on the grounds that it helps prevent us from mistaking the intention of the work, for this, as we saw with Hurd, supposes that intention is already being used as a standard and itself points out the dangers of doing.

Significance: I will now turn to intention as a criteria for the elucidation of the import of the work; 'A perfect judge', writes Pope, 'will read each work of wit / With the same spirit that its author writ'. As we shall see in the next chapter, our 'natural' tendency is to see and talk about the work as a medium of communication, and this includes the idea of an author with something to say and the work as the way it is said, that is, to look for a personality behind the letter. This is unproblematic so long as we restrict our search to what the work itself will yield, but this approach can also lead, as I will show, both to the rationalizing of the work to a pattern it does not have and to the actual ignoring of what the work, in itself, expresses.

Treating a work as the communication of someone separate from that work is, then, a common practice, but we can draw a distinction between seeking to reconstruct the author's intentions from the work and seeking to restore them from other sources or on the basis of certain presuppositions about the nature of the work. The former need be no more than one way of talking about what is really on the page, for, as I wrote above, to talk about the author's intentions in this way is to talk of what was done in terms of what the 'author' did. It is the latter that can lead to distortions in the perception of the work itself. John Harrington in his 'Briefe Apologie of Poetrie', for example, cautions the reader of Ariosto's Orlando Furioso to read the bawdy passages 'as my author meant them, to breed detestation and not delectation.' This, as I have written elsewhere, was one of the drawbacks of New Criticism; it appeared to assume that a work of a certain complexity must always "mean t
well", and it encouraged the reader to adjust the meaning of the work until it did demonstrate this type of meaning. What is bawdy is bawdy.122

The phenomena of historical intentionalism, discussed above with regard to value, can also be said to encompass certain approaches that rely on historical criteria for deciding on meaning. Knights, for example, though he asserts that we need only read Shakespeare's plays 'with attention' to discover "how they should be read.", also writes that a 'consideration of Shakespeare's use of language demands a consideration of the reading and listening habits of his audience.'123 Thus he considers that "the contemporary factors that conditioned the making of an Elizabethan play...the construction of the playhouse and the conventions depending, in part, upon that construction, and the tastes and expectations of the audience.' are all 'evidence' as to how Shakespeare should be read.124 Why not, indeed, make full use of the evidence? The answer is contained in the very word 'evidence' - for a work is not a murder mystery, it is not so much a collection of clues as the 'deed' itself. Historical background can be very useful in enhancing the enjoyment of a work, and certainly some knowledge, or even fanciful speculation, about a work's milieu is a useful way of maintaining the attention when dealing with a long work of an unfamiliar style. This is, however, a more complicated subject, for historical criteria are demonstrably essential in deciding on meaning at a local level - a dictionary is itself, in one sense, an historical document.

Nevertheless certain historical, as biographical, approaches can be both irrelevant and positively detrimental to aesthetic judgement, and therefore to criticism. Before demonstrating why this should be so I must make it clear that I am not in any way denigrating either the methods of historical scholarship as they pertain to literature, nor the role such scholarship must play in the 'teaching' of literature. Indeed, with regard to this 'teaching of literature', history is all. The principles of literary criticism, we may presume, can also be taught but, though history and criticism can scarcely avoid one another if the former is to have a general appeal, criticism, despite that it requires a wide acquaintance with literature, cannot be properly described as part of an historical activity, and certainly cannot be taught in a similar manner. That Spenser's diction in *The Faerie Queene* and elsewhere and Sidney's in *Arcadia* were archaic for their times is of great interest to the literary
historian but irrelevant to the critic. Knowing what a word means to a people, whether that people is separated by nationality or by time, is knowing what that word means in a context that derives from thence. This is part of literary history and also part of literary criticism, in so far as we need to know what all the words in a work mean, at an everyday level, before we can begin to consider the significance that the context of that work gives them. What I mean by 'significance' is the role those words play in the imaginative suggestion, the metaphysic of the work. Much of the obfuscation that exists within criticism and much of the hostility that exists towards it is the result of confusing 'significance', as it is here defined, with meaning; meaning is what can be preserved in paraphrase, significance is what cannot. We are as capable of finding the meaning of Spenser's archaisms as his contemporary audience would have been, and if we are not then only time and philology will tell, but it does not follow that we can say the same of their significance, or that it is at all relevant to criticism that we should be able to do so. Sidney, for example, wrote that he 'dare not allow' Spenser's 'old rustic language...since neither Theocritus in Greek, Virgil in Latin, nor Sannozaro in Italian did affect it.', Ben Jonson wrote that Spenser 'in affecting the Ancients, writ no Language', and D'Avenant attributes Spenser's use of 'exploded words' to the necessity of finding rhymes, while, in contrast, Digby praises him for 'renewing some obsolete words and using some ancient forms of speech' on the grounds that as well as expressing 'more lively and more concisely what he would say' they also 'retain the majesty of antiquity'. Indeed D'Avenant records that the archaic nature of Spenser's language 'be grown the most vulgar accusation that is laid to his charge.' Today all of Spenser's language has 'the majesty of antiquity', and it is only a specialist reader who can identify as 'more archaic' or even mock-archaic those parts which caused such consternation to his contemporaries, that was part of their 'significance' for them. Should the reader, as critic, then, look for the significance of using archaisms? No, because although as a critic I must 'read as an Elizabethan' with regard to meaning, I can only read as a critic with regard to significance. The significance which these aspects of Spenser's work had for his contemporaries or the significance of Spenser's intention are an issue for literary history, for literary history is concerned with Spenser's work in the context of a
certain period. The significance of the work as an object of criticism, that is, the significance of the work per se, is, in this sense, timeless because as a critic this is always the significance it has for me. The question of my limitations as a late twentieth-century man is of no interest to me, I have never been anybody else and I never will be anybody else, such limitations as I know I have I can strive to overcome, such limitations as I cannot know I have I cannot take into consideration. As a critic I wish to know the effect of the work and that is something I can only verify with reference to myself.

But where are we to draw the line between meaning and significance? According to Preston when Pope wishes to denigrate William III in *Windsor Forest* he associates him with William I who in turn is referred to as 'Nimrod', a figure generally understood in eighteenth-century biblical commentaries as the type of the tyrant. Could this not be said to be an historically determined significance that is germane to the criticism of the poem? The passage in which 'Nimrod' occurs is, in fact, self-explanatory with regard to the traits that are being attributed, so that it is only the meaning of the word 'Nimrod' itself that is now problematic. If the work bears out the meaning that the typology lends it, that is, for example, if tyranny is obviously predicated of a 'Nimrod', then the significance of 'Nimrod' as it occurs in the work needs no more support than the eighteenth-century meaning of the word will supply. If the work does not bear out this meaning then, unless we wish to understand the use as an instance of irony, the eighteenth-century significance of 'Nimrod' is irrelevant to criticism of the work, and only an appeal to authorial intention can make it otherwise. But as we have seen with Donne's 'O my America' and Wordsworth's 'Azincour' there are occasions, particularly with regard to proper names, when the case is more difficult to decide. Meaning, in the sense of word use, and significance shade imperceptibly into one another and it would be futile to try to decide, before the fact, where a proper respect towards the one turns into an uncritical deference towards the other.

A great deal of specialized knowledge is only of 'use' to criticism from an intentionalistic point of view. (It may be that it is not the natural tendency to appeal to intention that is responsible for the emphasis on specialized knowledge within criticism, but conversely that a desire to have specialized knowledge, "hard evidence", within criticism is
responsible for the persistence of the more indirect forms of intentionalism.) The nature of Roger Ascham's prose style can be explained by his mentally translating from the sixteenth-century idea of good Latin, but such an explanation does not account for that nature in the sense that a critic must account for an effect, in the sense of showing why it strikes one as it does. As we shall see, looking to an author or their times for 'proof' of import can cause us to distort the work by rationalizing into or out of existence what does or does not accord with what we know of these things, but it can also be used as an excuse to avoid the actual import of the work. There is a difference between explaining and explaining away. With the aid of such phrases as 'inherited from' and 'reacted against', and the psychoanalytical concept of sublimation it becomes possible to derive the system of values which a work expresses from any background which its author might have had; a futile, if harmless procedure, since in giving a 'how' rather than the 'what' of the work's values it passes over analysis in favour of a fancifully "scientific" appearance of it.

There are of course examples of critical pronouncements that run counter to intentionalism; Dryden asserts that the author is certainly competent to judge the 'fabric and contrivance' of their own work but, with regard to the 'ornament of writing' and its effects, since it is 'the child of fancy', it can no more be judged by the 'fancy' of the author 'than two crooked lines can be the adequate measure of each other.' Johnson, in the same vein, writes that though 'equivocations' which 'at least approach to impiety' are to be found in Milton's Lycidas he does not believe that Milton was conscious of them. Goethe likewise writes, apropos some works that were attributed both to him and to Schiller, that only a 'thorough Philistine' would be at all interested in deciding on their authorship, 'as if the existence of such things were not enough.' In modern times the desirability of separating author from work has been stated more systematically. (Though whether this separation has been as systematically made is another question, and one that I will come to shortly.) Schleiermacher, for example, wrote in 1818 that the critical task is to be formulated as follows
"To understand the text at first as well as and then even better than its author." Since we have no direct knowledge of what was in the author's mind, we must try to become aware of many things of which he himself may have been unconscious, except insofar as he reflects on his own work and becomes his own reader. Moreover, with respect to the objective aspects, the author had no data other than we have.132

Dilthey writes that criticism is concerned not 'with the processes of the poet's mind but with a structure created by these processes yet separable from them.'; Wimsatt and Beardsley, in 'The Intentional Fallacy', that 'the design or intention of the author is neither available nor desirable as a standard for judging the success of a work of literary art', and Wellek that 'The meaning of a work of art is not exhausted by, nor even equivalent to, its intention. As a system of values it leads an independent life. The total meaning of a work of art cannot be defined merely in terms of its meaning for the author and his contemporaries.'133 Nor, it must be said is the critical practice of critics either exhausted by, or, indeed, equivalent to, their stated principles.

Poe, for example, writes that we should 'forebear praising the epic on the effort's account' and looks forward to a day when the value of a work is decided 'by the impression it makes, by the effect it produces' rather than 'by the time it took to impress the effect or by the amount of "sustained effort" which had been found necessary in effecting the impression.'134 A few pages later, however, he is praising a poem for '(breathing) an earnestness - an evident sincerity of sentiment'.135 Eliot does something rather similar in 'Tradition and the Individual Talent', where he writes that 'Honest criticism and sensitive appreciation are directed not upon the poet but upon poetry.', but then discusses Canto XV of the Inferno almost exclusively in terms of Dante's mental processes, concluding the discussion with a definition of poetry which is decidedly Romantic in taking the poet as the starting point; 'Poetry is not a turning loose of emotion, but an escape from emotion; it is not the expression of personality, but an escape from personality.'136 It could be, of course, that all that Eliot says of Dante could be translated into statements about the effect of the Canto, indeed if the criticism is about this Canto then it must be capable of such translation. The problem is
that even if the invention is at this stage harmless, it appeals to
criteria that cannot be sustained unless we are prepared to start judging
the author rather than the work; a principle that only works when it does
not matter whether it does or not is not very useful principle. More
revealing about the hold that intentionalism has on criticism is, however,
Wimsatt and Beardsley's 'Intentional Fallacy' itself. Aside from making an
obvious appeal to intentional criteria when they write that the
'characteristic fault' of contemporary poets lies in 'planning too much.',
they also write that 'Poetry succeeds because all or most of what is said
or implied is relevant'.137 Relevant to what? This concept of relevance
supposes something other, more or less, than the work as it exists, that
is it presumes a model, an intention, that can be differentiated from the
result, the work. Everything is relevant to the work as it exists, as it
is given. Similarly Crane, in an essay on *Gulliver's Travels*, sets out to
show that attempts to interpret the 'Voyage to the Country of the
Houyhnhnms' by appeal to the 'climate of opinion', 'dominant tendency' or
'ruled opposition of attitude or belief' of the historical period in which
Swift wrote betray a 'fundamental confusion in method.'138 This sounds
promising, for I was never happy with the way that the disturbing nature
of this part of the work was avoided by the simple assertion that Swift
was a Christian minister.

Indeed Crane attacks critics' attempts to defend Swift against the
charge of all-out misanthropy by appeal to the intellectual and religious
concerns of Swift's age, on the grounds that general postulates about an
historical period cannot be made to encompass every instance of thought
or expression in that period. Crane does himself believe that the voyage
is misanthropic but is still concerned with the question as to whether or
not Swift can be distinguished from Gulliver in this chapter, that is,
whether or not Gulliver is himself an object of satire at the end of the
work. This, according to Crane, cannot simply be the result of an
exegesis of the voyage itself. Despite that Crane gives much space to
attacking the idea that the degree of misanthropy can be judged from the
'spirit of the age' he himself appeals to Swift's acquaintance with
certain contemporary textbooks of logic, and the definitions of humanity
which they contained, and to the evidence of certain of Swift's letters.
The evidence that he produces is interesting enough in itself and perhaps
indicative of Swift's state of mind when he wrote the letters under
consideration, but, in so far as Crane considers the voyage to be misanthropic to a greater degree than Swift can be said to be misanthropic, his essay is not primarily concerned with Gulliver's Travels, that is, it is not an essay in criticism. (It may be that the work is intrinsically ambiguous, that is, there may be no answer to the question as it is posed. It is such works that most encourage us to go outside of them to answer what are essentially questions for criticism.) Crane's is an essay about Swift's mental state as it is manifested in his letters. The mental state of Gulliver's Travels is not touched on, except where he writes that he considers the last voyage to be misanthropic.

But how can a book be said to have a mental state? This question introduces the question of just what the word 'Swift' means when it is used in connection with Gulliver's Travels or A Tale of a Tub or The Battle of the Books, and so on. It should be understood that if we are to avoid intentionalism yet also do justice to the many critical works which appear intentionalistic but, in fact, are not, then we must appreciate that an author's name when it is used to refer to works can mean quite different things on different occasions. The author, in connection with a particular work is an hypothesis, that is, if we wish to use the author's name - and it is often convenient to do so - it should be understood that this author is a part of the fiction under consideration, a part which exists only by virtue of the work, or, to speak paradoxically, a part which comes into being after the work and is inferred from it.

Gardner writes that 'each work has an historical relation to its author's other works.' and this is certainly true, but it has no more aesthetic relation to those works than to any others that were ever written. If I say that work A is darkly pessimistic and work B, written by the same person, is tentatively optimistic I can say that A and B, that is, this writer's oeuvre, is darkly pessimistic but tinged with optimism. This does not mean, however that A's effect is tinged with that of B, the cumulative import is a property of the oeuvre and not of either A or B as unique literary works. The import of any particular work can only be decided upon by an examination of the meaning of that work. Thus a criticism of work A can be part of a criticism of a writer's oeuvre, but the criticism of a writer's oeuvre cannot be part of the criticism of work A. I have no objection to the discussion of what import
arises from the diaries, correspondence, essays, sermons, philosophical works, and so on, of any writer, that is, I can see no reason why these individually, or as an œuvre, or even in connection with the same writers fictional works, cannot be in themselves objects of criticism.\textsuperscript{142} The question that must arise is, however; When we refer to the 'author' are we referring to the hypothesis that we have inferred from work A, or works A and B, or works A, B and C, and so on? This is something we must be clear about for the author is not, for critical purposes, some person who ever lived and went by the name we find on the cover of the work, rather the author is an inference from a work or body of works; the author of \textit{Gulliver's Travels} may be quite a different entity from the author of \textit{Gulliver's Travels} and \textit{A Tale of a Tub} who may be quite a different entity again from the author of \textit{The Correspondence of Jonathan Swift}.

I have involved myself in this admittedly tortuous argument as to the nature of the 'author' in relation to the work because there are circumstances in which what appears to be intentionalist criticism is not necessarily so.\textsuperscript{143} Take, for example, Longinus' description of the \textit{Odyssey};

\begin{quote}
As though the ocean were withdrawing into itself and remaining quietly within its own bounds, from now on we see the ebbing of Homer's greatness as he wanders in the realms of the fabulous and the incredible...I am speaking indeed of old age, but after all it is the old age of a Homer.\textsuperscript{144}
\end{quote}

This passage describes the \textit{Iliad} and the \textit{Odyssey}, 'Homer' is the way in which Longinus refers to the import of these. Similarly when Eliot writes that Donne felt thought 'as immediately as the odour of a rose.', that it was for him 'an experience' that 'modified his sensibility', he is patently not writing about any historical person but about the effect of certain writings.\textsuperscript{145} Likewise Lawrence who declared that one should 'Never trust the artist.' but rather 'Trust the tale.' and that 'The proper function of a critic is to save the tale from the artist who created it.', nevertheless almost invariably talks about works in terms of their 'authors'.\textsuperscript{146} However, by talking about the unconscious motivation of the author, that author is, for Lawrence, rarely more or less than an hypothesis inferred from the work.
There is a sense in which criticism is always trying to 'reconstruct the author', that is, in the sense that to grasp with immediacy the unity of the imaginative suggestion of the work, to feel the work as an all-encompassing world, one requires first and foremost the ability to empathize. 'We are all poets when we read a poem well,' writes Carlyle, 'The "imagination that shudders at the Hell of Dante," is not that the same faculty, weaker in degree, as Dante's own?.'\textsuperscript{147} But this is only one way of talking about how the work makes an impression on oneself, it describes the faithful reconstruction of the imaginative suggestion of the work as it exists, not of Dante as an historical figure independent of the work. Emilio Betti makes a similar point to Carlyle's when he writes that because, with literature, we are dealing with 'objectivations of mind', interpretation must take the form of 'an inversion of the creative process' so that 'the interpreter retraces the steps from the opposite direction by re-thinking them in his inner self.'\textsuperscript{148} The danger however of seeing the process of reading as Betti does, that is, as 'the recognition' of meaning by 'the cognizing subject', is that it almost inevitably leads us to think of the work as the expression of, if not the historical character that went by the author's name, at least the expression of some historical character.\textsuperscript{149} Thus elsewhere he states that 'One proceeds...to the pre-supposition that the totality of speech, just as that of any manifestation of thought, issues from a unitary mind and gravitates towards a unitary mind and meaning. '; but the 'mind' of a work, its imaginative suggestion, may turn out to be a quite different type of entity from the 'mind' of a person.\textsuperscript{150} Hence, though, as we have seen, to talk in terms of 'the author' may be just one way of talking about the import of the work, to identify the import of the work with the expression of even some hypothetical inferred mind, like our own, cannot be justified before the fact, and to presume it is to delimit, before the fact, the kind of import which a work may have. This is a subject I shall return to in the next chapter.
Conclusion

To attempt to...define art as nothing more than a recollection or reproduction of the highest beauties of nature, strikes at the very root of its free and independent existence. Had not art a power distinct from that of nature, were it not governed by its own peculiar laws, we should be compelled to regard it as a feeble device of the ancients, a subtle contrivance by which to protract in faint reflection the declining vigour of its own natural life. Those who were not all-absorbed in the consciousness of youth and vigour would hasten eagerly in pursuit of truth, and leave the grey-headed to seek warmth from the mummy of life, and the feeble-minded to revel in insubstantial shadows.

Schlegel153

To praise literature for the presentation of facts is, then, to commit it to a standard of evaluation in which it must compete with historical, sociological, anthropological, or psychological texts - on their own ground. Moreover, a concern for realism is a demand that literature be a scientific metaphor, that is, amenable to paraphrase without loss, contingent to explanation. To treat the text as the expression of some historical reality (including that of the author) is to treat it as compound, as the expression of something that could be expressed otherwise, that is, something other than what, as a whole, it expresses. (This notion, as we shall see, cannot be commensurate with any description of literature as a discrete form of discourse, for it deprives literature of its identity.) Literature, I would argue, is, on the contrary, metaphorical after the model of rhetorical or metaphysical metaphor, that is, its significance is of that type which is destroyed by paraphrase because it lies in the pleasure and persuasion it can effect only in its original integrity. This leads us on to the subject of the next chapter - 'Form and Content'. For if the work, to remain a work, cannot be considered as primarily denotational, that is, if the terms within the work cannot be replaced salva veritate with others (there being no verity to save), but are absolutely necessary to its identity, then we cannot separate expression from what is expressed within literature: What then of the traditional distinction between form and content, or style and matter?
CHAPTER III

Form and Content

We act as though we had tried to find the real artichoke by stripping off its leaves.

Wittgenstein

Whatever you want to say, there is only one word to express it, one verb to set it in motion and only one adjective to describe it.

Maupassant

Whatever we want to convey, there is only one word to express it, one verb to animate it, one adjective to qualify it.

Maupassant
These two terms - 'form' and 'content' - do not have a universally agreed usage in literary criticism, though the distinction they represent pervades that subject. At a simple level we might use 'form' to designate such categories as the sonnet, short story, or novel, and 'content' to designate whatever is written within any of these forms. On this basis it is possible to say that two different pieces can have the same form, but they cannot, even if they have similar 'themes' or 'plots', have the same content. However, there is another definition of 'form' used within literary studies which appears synonymous with 'style' (a term I will deal with later), and this is the 'mode of expression' of a work. In this sense 'form' is commonly distinguished from 'content' on the basis that while the latter is 'what is said', the former is 'the manner in which it is said'. In the discussion of a literary work this 'form' often appears only as a transparent medium, the means by which we know about the work - "War and Peace" is a novel about Russian family life during and after the Napoleonic war/a group of characters called Bezuhov, Count Rostov, Sonya, Bolkonsky, and so on.". Charles Lamb's 'Shakespeare' or Roger Lancelyn Green's 'Homer' obviously do not reproduce the effect of the original, do not convey the same import, yet they appear to bear some sort of relationship to their originals, a relationship that is almost universally sanctioned by our customary way of talking about works. What that way of talking seems to suggest is that there is a kernel of information, the reported action, the 'thought', or simply a 'ripping good yarn', that lies within the work, behind the expression.

This distinction between 'content' and 'form' appears, for example, in Aristotle, in his definition of tragedy as 'a representation of an action that is worth serious attention, complete in itself, and of some amplitude'. The mode of representation is not, however, transparent to him for in his introduction he promises to talk about 'the types of plot-structure that are required if the poem is to succeed'; nevertheless the overall impression one gains from both the Poetics and the Rhetoric is that drama is a matter of pieces fitted together, an impression that is even stronger with Demetrius and Longinus. (The classical emphasis on rhetoric, touched upon in Chapter 1, would tend to suggest that the affective aspect of 'form' was assumed in the writings of these authors,
for it is a greater consciousness of the rhetoric of literary language, coupled with a realization that the only semantic a work has is contained in its affect, which might serve to collapse the distinction under discussion.) The idea that poetry can be defined by its subject matter reappears in the Renaissance; Cinthio, for example, insists that the poet is so called because he is a 'maker' and 'not because of his verses but chiefly through his subjects he is called a poet, in so far as these subjects are made and feigned by him in such a way that they are suitable for poetry.' - a rather circular definition! Castelvetro, too, implies the distinction while further restricting what is 'poetical', when he declares that it is the action which is 'poetical' in poetry, while the moral habits of the characters are only accessory, for, since these are dealt with in Aristotle's Ethics and Theophrastus' Characters, they are principally philosophical and not poietical material! Castelvetro's is an unusual distinction but the defining of 'poetry' in terms of subject matter is a tenacious habit; Arnold, for example, writes that the first thing a poet must do is 'select an excellent action', that is, an action that will 'most powerfully appeal to the great primary human affections: to those elementary feelings which subsist permanently in the race, and which are independent of time.' However, in the same essay, Arnold also writes that feeble conception and loose construction can render the effect of even an excellent action 'absolutely null', and invites the reader to compare the 'same story' in Keats' Isabella and Boccaccio's Decameron. More explicitly on the side of treatment as the definition of 'poetry' are Newman, who writes that 'Opinions, feelings, manners, and customs, are made poetical by the delicacy or splendour with which they are expressed.', Hulme who, in his 'Romanticism and Classicism', simply asserts that 'subject doesn't matter', and Ortega y Gasset, who writes that 'A work of art lives on its form, not on its material; the essential grace it emanates springs from its structure, from its organism. The structure forms the properly artistic part of the work, and on it aesthetic and literary criticism should concentrate.'7

In the first part of this essay I will be primarily concerned with the concept of subject versus form that has emerged from the preceding brief survey. The more complex, and perhaps more contentious, question of style as expression I will leave to the second part of this chapter. There is, of course, hardly any definition of 'style' which cannot be
interpreted to include what will here be referred to as 'structure', but to identify the two from the start would be, to a certain extent, to beg the question.

The most straightforward concept of 'form', then, is 'form' as the structure - 'logical', 'narrative', or 'dramatic' - of the work, what is more informally called the 'story' or 'plot'. 'Narrative structure' is a common term, but there seems no firm agreement as to what this is. If we use it to designate the order in which events are related, as distinct from their " chronological" order, then 'form', in this sense, consists of sequences of action which are distinguished and described in a number of ways; formally by such terms as 'linear', 'conical', and so on, or informally, in terms of 'trials', 'successes', 'failures', 'resolutions'. Such terms may be useful in characterizing a genre, but it is hard to see how analysis of this type, if it could be distinguished from analysis of meaning, can contribute to the elucidation of the individual work. The discovery of the form common to a genre seems only useful in telling us, as critics, how the sense conveyed by that genre is achieved. Moreover, and the point is most obvious with the second set of terms, though it applies no less to the first, whatever divisions are drawn between one sequence and another they are made on the basis of meaning, that is, formal analysis is only a disguised from of semantic analysis. Likewise the terms in which we might describe 'dramatic structure' are hard to distinguish, in practice, from the 'informal' description of narrative structure and, as the building and relaxation of tension, such structure is inseparable from any consistent concept of 'content'. To treat the 'drama' as distinct from characters and events, as they are presented, is to make the erroneous supposition that it exists in the same manner as that presentation, but independently of it.

We might, for a moment, adopt a division between 'form' and 'content' in which 'content' refers to the chronological sequence of events and the characters involved, in some separate existence as they might be hypothetically inferred from the work, and in which 'form' refers to the manner in which this existence is reported, the narrative sequence and verbal design, in short, the work. 'Form' in this sense could be defined as recurring features of rhetoric. In interpreting a work we could certainly discuss 'content' independently of 'form', according to this definition, but we could hardly discuss 'form' without bringing in
'content', unless we were to reduce the work to a kind of algebraic formula. I cannot discuss how a book is about what it is about without bringing in what it is about. For the critic, as I said before, structure only bears on the individual work in the way it contributes to sense. Even given a system of classifying rhetorical devices, their deployment in analysis would depend upon knowing what the import of any arrangement of words signified in rhetorical terms. 'Form' as structure, that is, the relationship between elements of 'content', is also 'content', for such relations may generate parallels or antitheses, or a third meaning not explicit in either part alone, from crude moralistic irony to the subtle relations of main action to subsidiary action - the arrangement of words is the sense of a sentence. Any element is, then, token-reflexive; its complete meaning in the work can be found only in its relations to other parts of the work. To put the matter bluntly: Lamb's tales from Shakespeare are not the essence of Shakespeare.

A rather interesting collapse of 'form' and 'content' occurs almost inadvertently in Friedrich von Schlegel's *Lectures on the History of Literature*, though Schlegel himself allows the moment to pass without becoming conscious of what it implies:

In the works of Shakespeare a whole world is unfolded. Whosoever has comprehended this, and been penetrated with the spirit of his poetry will hardly allow the seeming want of form, or, rather the form peculiar to his mighty genius, nor even the criticism of those who have misconceived the poet's meaning, to disturb his admiration; as he progresses he will, rather, approve the form as both sufficient and excellent in itself, and in harmonious conformity with the spirit and essence of his art.®

What Schlegel does not seem to realize is that to change the form would be to change the 'essence' of Shakespeare's art. The fallacy of considering form and content as separable, of believing affect to reside in one independently of the other, remains in this passage; it is, indeed, compounded, for Schlegel has made their unity into an evaluative standard.® The rule, often repeated through the history of criticism, that form must be wedded to content, is a guideline for the writer (for whom it is tantamount to saying 'say what you intended') not for the reader; for the reader the form always is wedded to the content. (This, however, is something I shall return to in discussing style.) Schlegel's
reappraisal of Shakespeare brings to mind the distinction that is often made between 'imposed' or 'conventional' form, and 'organic' form, the former being exemplified by poets of the 'Augustan' period and the latter by the poets of the 'Romantic' era. In 'imposed' form, it is said, the ideas are fitted into a pre-existing structure, while in 'organic' form the structure follows the idea. But such a distinction only signals a reluctance to read a certain type of poetry as poetry, for, the precise tenor of the idea being a function of how it is written, all literature, to be read as literature, must be considered as having 'organic' form; the definition of 'organic' is a definition of literary language per se. Likewise, it is often said that the student must be aware of literary conventions in order to know when a writer departs from them - as if the conventions themselves were, with regard to the imaginative suggestion of the individual work, semantically neutral, transparent.

This interdependence between elements of a work which I have outlined here is also insisted upon by James:

A novel is a living thing, all one and continuous, like any other organism, and in proportion as it lives will it be found, that in each of the parts there is something of each of the other parts. The critic who over the close texture of a finished work shall pretend to trace a geography of items will mark some frontiers as artificial, I fear, as any that have been known to history...What is character but the determination of incident? What is incident but the illustration of character?...When a young man makes up his mind that he has not faith enough after all to enter the church as he intended, that is an incident...''

A similar identification of what might be separated into 'form' and 'content', is made for poetry by Empson, who writes that 'A metrical scheme imposes a sort of intensity of interpretation upon grammar'. Empson's observation might, of course, serve as the basis of a definition of 'poetry', and this fact serves to illustrate, as does James' 'in proportion', the curious nature of the present subject: It appears almost impossible to talk about 'form' and 'content' as one thing, yet what seems to be the easiest, most natural way of talking constantly appears to treat as accidental what is, in fact, essential. Even when I assert that form and content are inseparable I appear to assert the existence of two separate entities - 'form' and 'content'. What elements in the work these
two words refer to is not an issue here, for writers use them in various ways, and I might say in my defence (a strange defence!) that I do not have any strict notion of what I have been using them to refer to myself. It is not, however, the principle of separation itself which I am objecting to, it is, rather, the independent consideration within criticism of the elements which are separated, that is, the making accidental of what is essential. The separation of 'form' from 'content', as, indeed, the point where we might distinguish between the two, depends upon the type of context in which we are using the text. For literary criticism it is the imaginative suggestion of the text, that is, the text as work, which is the object of enquiry, and this imaginative suggestion is not simply an aggregation of certain elements, it is the sum of everything that is in the work. To treat the text as compound, as the expression of something other than what, as a whole, it expresses, is, then, to ignore its literariness, to use it as some other form of discourse.

Yet the formula remains problematically unproblematic; "Discuss the imagery/diction/structure/plot/form of x", "How does the imagery/diction/plot/form of x contribute to..."; all of which serves to make us think that these are things a work has, ancillary to its essence, rather than aspects of what it is. The alternative question, the one implied by what this thesis has so far argued, would be simply "What is said?", but there seems, as yet, something strange and bare about such a question. To say that 'form' and 'content' are inseparable seems to imply that to paraphrase any element or collection of elements chosen for some similarity of function, independently of the rest of the work is to talk of something other than the text as a work, as literature. Consider even the following paraphrase which Hunt makes of a speech from Shadwell's Psyche:

With kindness I your prayers receive,  
And to your hopes success will give.  
I have, with anger, seen mankind adore  
Your sister's beauty and her scorn deplore;  
Which they shall do no more.  
For their idolatory I'll so resent,  
And shall your wishes to the full content!!

I receive your prayers with kindness, and will give success to your hopes. I have seen, with anger, mankind adore your sister's beauty and deplore her scorn: which they shall do no more. For
I'll so resent their idolatry, as shall content your wishes to the full.14

Hunt's prose rendering has merely inverted Shadwell's inversions, but the effect of the two excerpts is not the same; Shadwell's syntax is 'interpretative', in the sense that it is inseparable from the effect of the lines. Would it, then, be reasonable to answer "What is said?" with a repetition of the work in question? The identification of 'form' and 'content' appears to undermine the very concept of literary criticism until we realize that even my amended question contains a subterfuge, that is, assumes what literary criticism does not want to say. For criticism can be distinguished from reading for pleasure on the grounds that while in reading it is the imaginative suggestion which is the object, in criticism it is my response to this suggestion which is the object. (I avoid the conventional 'our' in this last clause because its use is part of the very subterfuge I am discussing.) In criticism, then, one is talking about, not reproducing, one's response, and it is primarily the misrepresentation of this response which is the issue in this discussion of 'form' and 'content'.

The question of structure is, however, the least interesting aspect of this subject, for, perhaps because of its very lack of universal definition, it is a notion, in contrast to that of 'style', which has to be taught. This is not, of course, true of the idea of literary forms such as the sonnet, play, novel, short story, and so on, but, despite those contemporary movements which have taken 'structure' as their object, the average educated reader is still not likely to feel a sense of recognition or of propriety when a work is described either geometrically or even in such abstract terms as 'trials', 'successes', and 'failures'. What the average educated reader feels is arguably irrelevant to the discipline of literary criticism, but the fact is an indication that this concept of the division between 'form' and 'content' is not so ingrained as that one to which I now wish to turn.
Style

Others for language all their care express,
And value books, as women men, for dress:
Their praise is still - the style is excellent;
The sense they humbly take upon content....
In the bright Muse, though thousand charms conspire,
Her voice is all these tuneful fools admire;
Who haunt Parnassus but to please their ear,
Not mend their minds; as some to church repair,
Not for the doctrine, but the music there.14

Here is 'something, whose truth convinced at sight we find,' or is it, perhaps, merely at first sight convincing? For Pope's analogy between the man and his attire, and sense and style, is a false one: What is left of an expression once its expression is taken away? This point makes the concept of rhetoric problematic, for these quotable lines were at first sight convincing, and that conviction was created by means of false analogies and the persuasive force of the closed heroic couplet. 'The poet,' writes Nietzsche, 'presents his thoughts festively, on the carriage of rhythm; usually because they could not walk.'16 But Pope's "thought" has not ridden either, though it appeared to for a time. I have asked, rhetorically, what is left of an expression when its expression is taken away: Does, then, my distinction between Pope's "thought" on the matter of 'style' and 'content' or 'matter', and the carriage or the dress of that thought, that is, the nine lines from 'Essay on Criticism' quoted above, indicate that my question should not have been rhetorical, that Pope's distinction is valid? For we must note that with this quotation it is not that, while the content of the argument is valid, the style is invalid - such designations hardly make sense - but rather that the whole is a superficially convincing expression of a false distinction. More importantly, for my present concerns, however, is the way in which I have used the quotation; for I have used it as the statement of an argument and not as poetry, not, indeed, as literature in the sense in which I have used and will use 'literature' throughout this thesis. When this quotation is considered as an argument the definite air of the lines is an irrelevance to remove. As nine lines of poetry, however, the air is an inseparable part of the expression we refer to when referring to those
nine lines in a critical context. It is for this reason that I have to cast my question in an almost paradoxical way - 'What is left of an expression once its expression is taken away?' - for an expression does not have an expression, it is what it is.

Of all critical fallacies the distinction between 'style' and 'content' or 'matter' is the most persistent, the most widely practiced, the most alien to the concept of literature, and the most difficult to discuss without committing. "What is the author writing about, and how does his way of writing relate to what he is saying?", runs the usual question for the student, and immediately, in seeking to collapse the distinction the question reinforces it. It may be the presence of the author which lies at the heart of this problem - "What do you think the poet is trying to say here?" - for the idea of an author suggests somebody with something to tell or say, and the work then becomes the way that thing is told or said.' A style, like its rural homonym, is difficult to think of except as a means - a means of getting from the word to the content, to the meaning, to the author's intentions. Part of the confusion arises from approaching the subject from the writer's point of view, for what Pope says may be true for the poet as they correct the manuscript, and certainly seems to be readily confirmed every time we take up a pen. A style is, for the writer, a means of expression, but for the critic it is the expression; for the work does not so much express a personality lying behind the letter, as manifest one in the letter.

Let us consider the term 'style' as used to denote the manner of writing as opposed to the matter to be written about, and approach the distinction between 'form' and 'content' at this more familiar level. Style is often spoken of, and perhaps thought of, as detachable from meaning, but the analysis and evaluation of style seems to lead inevitably back to meaning. When there is no difference in meaning, for instance between 'She sells cakes and pies' and 'She sells pies and cakes', or else a great difference, as between 'Guns not butter' and 'Buns not gutter', then this does not constitute a difference in style. When there is a difference in meaning at a connotational level between two sentences, but also some apparent similarity at another level, as between 'Canst thou not minister unto a mind diseased?' and 'Can't you help a lunatic?', the difference is called one of 'style'.

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Philip Sydney speaks for a tradition that sprang from classical
treatises on rhetoric when he declares that the 'manner' of the poet
surpasses table-talk by its 'peizing each syllable of each word by just
proportion according to the dignity of the subject.', but it is an attitude
towards the relationship between 'style' and 'content' which receives its
most famous expression in Dryden's definition of 'wit' as 'a propriety of
thoughts and words; or, in other terms, thoughts and words elegantly
adapted to the subject.' As Addison very properly pointed out, however,
if this is the true definition of 'wit' then 'Euclid was the greatest Wit
that ever set Pen to Paper'. Though Addison's reply was made little
more than thirty years after Dryden's original remark, it is now a
critical assumption that such rigorous separation of 'form' and 'content'
is a pre-Romantic aberration; a proposition for which, since such a
separation, even if only implicitly made, is still the common sense today,
there seems little proof. Here we come once again upon the problem that
while it is easy to say that 'form' and 'content' are inseparable, it is
difficult to retain that inseparability in one's saying. Matthew Arnold,
though on other occasions more circumspect, describes a 'great artist' as
one 'who subordinates expression to that which it is designed to
express.', and Ezra Pound, decidedly post-Romantic, lists among
the principles of 'Imagism' the resolve to 'use absolutely no word that
does not contribute to the presentation....no superfluous word, no adjective
which does not reveal something.' If there was ever a cautionary tale
against confining a certain temperament or opinion to a certain period
then it is the eternal return of such dogmatic statements long after
"their time" has passed. Take, for example, Mark Schorer's 'Technique as
Discovery', in which he addresses the idea that we cannot talk of the
content, that is, the experience that has gone to make the work, but only
of 'achieved content', that is, the form, the work as work. When we
speak of 'technique', he continues, 'we speak of nearly everything.' - but
in this 'nearly' lies his link with the traditional distinction discussed
above, for by 'technique' he means 'any selection, structure, or distortion,
any form or rhythm imposed upon the world of action'. The writer, then,
he concludes, cannot eschew technique; yet he can still talk of the
'content' of a work almost exclusively in terms of characters, and
describe one novel as a 'technical failure' because it contains 'a
psychological tension which disrupts the form of the novel and obscures

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its meaning, because neither the contradiction in style nor the confusion of point of view is made to right itself.\(^{23}\) One recalls Arnold's definition of the 'great artist' as the one 'who subordinates expression to that which it is designed to express.' Having said that 'technique' or style is something a work cannot fail to have, by virtue of being a work, it is a contradiction to talk of a work as a 'technical failure'. Moreover if, as Schorer says, 'style is subject' then there cannot be a 'contradiction in style', for the meaning of the work far from being obscured by the relationship between elements in the style is composed of them. There is, indeed, no excess, no irrelevance, in the work as work - these two notions only appear with regard to particular interpretations (or even, perhaps, understandings) of the text. It is an habitual fault in predatory critics to accuse the work of inconsistency because it will not bear out the meaning they wish it to have, or which they expect it to have by virtue of the author's pronouncements or their experience of other works. But if the style contains the meaning, then the meaning must be contained in the style; from the critic's point of view there is no such thing as a technical failure.

In most forms of discourse we are primarily concerned with the denotational value of words; for instance, in two different contemporary descriptions of the same chemical reaction differences in connotational meaning, while they may effect how interesting we find the description, are negligible in contributing to the meaning conveyed, to the sense we take away from them. There are other areas of discourse, such as philosophy, in which the case is more problematic:

A...for I do not altogether admit that he who considers things in their reasons considers them in their images more than he who views them in their effects. (Plato *Phaedo*, 100.)
B...because I do not at all admit than an enquiry by means of theory employs "images" any more than one which confines itself to facts. (Plato *Phaedo*, 100)
C...a theoretical enquiry no more employs images than does a factual investigation. (Plato *Phaedo*, 100)

With writers such as Heidegger or Derrida, that is, those writers, introductions to, or translations of, whose work is usually prefaced with an assertion that the task in hand is almost hopeless, the question of denotational sense is even more confused, and in this confusion often
lies the problem of whether they are philosophy or literature. Literature per se, as we saw in the last chapter, does not denote; we do not paraphrase as we read, as we might when taking notes from a lecture on chemistry or the philosophy of Plato. Words identical and co-extensive in sense and usage are extremely rare, such synonyms as 'donation' and 'gift', 'leap' and 'jump', 'slay' and 'kill', or even more so 'German' and 'Kraut', will have different connotations and, therefore, potential meanings in a literary context. Mentally running down a list of synonyms for a word in a literary context is, indeed, a good exercise for discovering why any line or passage has the precise effect it does, especially when "all it appears to say is...".

Every way of saying has a different connotational import. The passive voice, for example, can emphasize a character in a situation or weaken the responsibility of another, especially in a first-person narrative. Some element we might expect, or the implications of an action, may be 'deleted' and thus emphasized by its absence. In connection with this, the reticence or ambiguity of a work will also have a semantic component, perhaps serving ironical or dramatic purposes. Processes or emotions that are nominalized may be emphasized at the expense of the action or actor. The omission of a specific reference may effect a generalization, or the making metaphorical of an action or thought. Archaisms or foreign words, that would not alter a paraphrase, may summon up historical contrast and comparison, or reflect on the narrator. Many such effects only appear as part of a history of literature, that is, as a result of contrary expectation. One can easily become enmeshed in intentionalism, however, if this historical dimension is not to a certain extent deliberately overlooked – that Spenser's diction in the *Faerie Queene* or Sidney's in *Arcadia* were archaic for their times is of great interest to the literary historian but, as we have seen, irrelevant to the critic. There is an overwhelming reason for not extending this little catalogue of literary effects, or rhetoric, and it is this – to include every different effect would mean including the whole of literature, for even those effects that can be subsumed under the same rhetorical title are on each occasion different. There is no standard, apart from grammatical sense and arbitrary historical expectation, that can serve a measure of such effects in the way that that natural colour or perspective does for painting.
This non-synonymity is, indeed, the definition of the text as a literary object, and it is those philosophical or even historical works, the main interest of which we feel is lost by paraphrase, which become a part of 'literature' in its broad sense, a part of what was once revealingly called belles lettres. This is not, of course, to say that the literary work is a text that cannot be paraphrased—any text may be paraphrased—but rather that when considered as a literary work it is the original integrity of the text which is the main object of our interest. Any text may be used for any purpose, as, for example, my use of Pope at the beginning of this section—a use that was primarily philosophical rather than literary-critical. These are not, however, the terms in which this question of paraphrase or synonymity has usually been discussed. One side claims that literature is unparaphrasable, while the other claims that if a thing makes sense then it must be amenable to paraphrase. Furthermore, because the question has a distinctly philosophical flavour to it, it is often discussed on what might be called philosophy's "ground", where certain important distinctions can easily become forgotten in the excitement of generalities. Hirsch, for example, in an essay concerned with 'style' argues that while, for example, 'bachelors' and 'unmarried men' taken in isolation appear non-synonymous because we intuit different semantic probabilities for them from our past linguistic experience (informal, and impersonal and legalistic respectively); in any context only certain of their 'semantic potentialities' are utilized, and there may be, therefore, occasions when they are interchangeable without this substitution effecting a change in sense. He demonstrates this with a hypothetical charter for a bachelors' club, by which it emerges that the two terms, 'bachelors' and 'unmarried men', can replace one another with no change in the sense conveyed. The fact appears too obvious to be worth demonstrating, but it is also irrelevant to the question he is addressing, that is, the value of a stylistic approach to literature. With regard to the text as literature no difference is negligible, even the slight differences which separate 'bachelors' (positive, active, way of life, slightly farcical) from 'unmarried men' (negative, in potentia, collective), for to treat the terms as interchangeable or the form of the expression itself as redundant, is to treat the text as primarily denotational, as something other than a literary work. (Since the truth value of any sentence containing
'Aristotle' is not effected by its being replaced with 'The Stagirite' they are, from a philosophical point of view, identical; the roles I am placed in by reading either one or the other, that is, the respective effects of the two are, nevertheless, entirely different.) It is the decision not to consider any nuance as negligible, any connotation as surplus, which constitutes the making literary of a text. It is a question of choice, then, a choice that must to a certain extent, succeed some form of evaluation, that must take into account whether the integrity of the work is worth preserving. This solution to the question of synonymity in literature is sufficiently inimical to the objectifying trends in both literary theory and aesthetics that constitute these disciplines' very attempt to define themselves, to account for the fact that the problem is considered a perennial one. However, to say that "Literature is what we choose not to paraphrase, that is, literature is what we call 'literature'", no more addresses the question of what criteria we employ in this choice than does the definition "Literature is what cannot be paraphrased", though it does have an advantage over this second definition in that it allows the question to be asked. The question, then, of the definition of literature is really one about the basis upon which this choice is made, and it is to this that I shall turn in the next chapter.

Yet the inseparability of style and content is a difficult concept to express, as blunt and challenging as a metaphysical proposition; it is perhaps fitting, then, to begin a short catalogue of attempts to express the concept with a writer who has a high tolerance for blunt metaphysical propositions, and who thus appears almost everywhere else in this thesis as the villain. 'Style', writes Schopenhauer, 'is the physiognomy of the mind.'

To arrive at a provisional assessment of a writer's worth it is not necessary to know what or upon what he has thought, because that would mean having to read everything he has written; it is sufficient in the first instance to know how he has thought. Now an exact impression of this how of his thinking, of its essential nature and prevailing quality, is provided by his style.26

Puttenham too, who defines 'style' as 'a certain contrived form and quality...of words, speeches, and sentences', holds that it reflects the quality of the author's mind;
And because this continual course and manner of writing or speech sheweth the matter and disposition of the writer's mind more than one or few words or sentences can shew, therefore there be that have called style the image of man (mentis character). For man is but his mind, and as his mind is tempered and qualified, so are his speeches and language at large; and his inward conceits be the metal of his mind, and his manner of utterance the very warp and woof of his conceits, more plain or busy and intricate or otherwise affected after the rate.27

Either of these two short passages could serve as a statement of the basic premiss behind the essays in Auerbach's Mimesis or, indeed, any stylistic approach to literature, including those forms of formalism which have a sociological or historical goal. One need only think of those authors, often a source of confusion in attempts to define 'literature', that endure by virtue of their 'style', such as Thomas Browne, Edmund Burke, or Gibbon, to see that the how is often taken as a source of value. 'Stylish' is, especially today, a common term of praise, though, since no work can lack a style, such a judgement is also a non-sequitur. I will shortly come to definitions of 'good style', but for the moment I wish to examine whether even the distinction between the how and the what of thought is justified, that is, whether what Browne, Burke, or Gibbon say really is irrelevant to the value we place on them, for there is a great difference between thinking of style as the dress of thought and as its physiognomy. This difference is well brought out in De Quincey's praise of Burke as the writer of the 'largest and finest understanding' of his time. De Quincey lays stress upon the word 'understanding' for he is defending Burke against those critics who had both praised and damned the author of Reflections on the Revolution in France for his 'fancy', that is, for the figurativeness of his 'style'.

His great and peculiar distinction was that he viewed all objects of the understanding under more relations than other men and under more complex relations....Now, to apprehend and detect more relations, or to pursue them steadily, is a process absolutely impossible without the intervention of physical analogies. To say, therefore, that a man is a great thinker, or a fine thinker, is but another expression for saying that he has a schematizing (or, to use a plainer but less accurate expression, a figurative) understanding. In that sense, and for that purpose, Burke is figurative: but, understood, as he has been understood by the long-eared race of his critics, not as thinking in and by his
figures, but as deliberately laying them on by way of enamel or after-ornament, - not as incarnating, but simply as dressing his thoughts in imagery, - so understood, he is not the Burke of reality, but a poor fictitious Burke, modelled after the poverty of conception which belongs to his critics.²⁹

Likewise, on reflection, we discover that, unless we wish to resort to a synopse that will bring them down to some common ground with other attitudes, it is not that Pater often has a precious style or Nietzsche often an aggressive one, but that the two writers often demonstrate, respectively, precious and aggressive attitudes to life. To speak, however, of style as the 'incarnation' of thought, or even to use any of the relatively few synonyms, such as 'manifestation', 'materiality', 'realization', 'disclosure', 'unconcealedness', which might replace the term is, aside from evoking inappropriate metaphysical associations, to suggest some separate mode of existence of the thought, which, even if such an existence is possible, is of no interest to the critic.

'Art', writes Victor Hugo, 'has a terrestrial, material side.' so that 'do what it will, it is shut in between grammar and prosody': It is just this negative, almost grudging way that the identity of style and sense is made.²⁹ Arnold, for example, talks of 'style' as 'the expression of the nobility of the poet's character', and Lawrence, firmly attributing significance to style, talks of how a novel can have sympathies which are not those assumed by the author.³⁰ An ethical sympathy is, as Wilde says, a mannerism of style, and vice versa, but it is a work's mannerisms of language which constitute its style, we cannot have a work without them.³¹ As Robbe-Grillet observes, it is only necessary to change the tense of the verbs or replace the first person perfect by the third person past in L'Etranger, or to rearrange the words in Madame Bovary for there to be nothing left of Camus or Flaubert, for their respective 'universes' to 'disappear'.³² Those writers, then, who, like Maupassant, have been aware that there is only one way to say a thing or, rather, that each saying says only one thing, are apt to equate a concern with style with a concern for truthfulness: Arnold, for example, writes that 'truth and seriousness' are inseparable from 'superiority of diction', Stendhal describes pondering a quarter of an hour over whether to place an adjective before or after its noun in his pursuit of 'clarity' and 'truthfulness', and Conrad writes that 'the whole of the truth lies in the
presentation'. It is Flaubert, however, who is most famously aware of style, which he calls 'the life-blood of thought', as the defining property of the individual work, even to the extent of holding that aesthetic criticism lagged behind history and science because of a neglect of its analysis.

You say that I pay too much attention to form. Alas! it is like body and soul: form and content to me are one; I don't know what either is without the other. The finer the idea, be sure, the finer-sounding the sentence. The exactness of the thought makes for (and is itself) that of the word.

Although this conscious concern with style is an un-British one (Conrad tends to prove rather than disprove the rule), Coleridge, in his lecture 'On Style', writes that he 'cannot conclude...without insisting on the importance of accuracy of style as being near akin to veracity and truthful habits of mind; he who thinks loosely will write loosely', a sentiment that is picked up again in Orwell's 'Politics and the English Language', where he asserts that our language 'becomes ugly and inaccurate because our thoughts are foolish, but the slovenliness of our language makes it easier for us to have foolish thoughts.' But these are only tentative formulations of the plain truth that the word, once written, is the thought.

What might it mean, then, to say that a work has a 'style'? Perhaps it is this: that the significance of every element, in relation to the total meaning, is immediately apparent. This would also account for the idea of a "style" as something recognizable, predictable, and amenable to parody. Conversely a style can also appear as an historical phenomenon, that is, as a deviation from a norm that has become stylistically neutral (that is, appears not to be a "style") through familiarity. Sidney complains that certain writers 'cast sugar and spice upon every dish that is served to the table, like those Indians not content to wear earrings at the fit and natural place of the ears, but they will thrust jewels through their nose and lips'; an interesting comment, in the light of the vagaries of fashion in men's jewellery, on how style becomes conspicuous through changes in taste with regard to import. 'All the recognized flowers, the removable ornaments of literature', as Pater writes, 'are part
of the actual value of what one says. To take Sidney's analogy; the 'flavour' of a literary work is part of its meaning.

The goodness or badness of style is not something that can be judged independently of the import of the work, neither, as a corollary of this, can the appropriateness or inappropriateness of the "subject" be judged independently of the style. Can we lay down a priori rules, then, by which to recognize poor style, as Orwell does? This is not possible with literature except in terms of effect; those often repeated rules of clarity and economy which Orwell lays down are rules only for producing a certain type of effect. Interestingly enough, Pater, in his essay 'Style', also champions the plain, unadorned style, free of 'surplusage'!

(Moreover, one might ask how seriously such rules as Orwell's are to be taken, when the final one advises the reader to 'Break any of these rules sooner than say anything outright barbarous'.) We might still try to say that an appropriate style is one in which diction and syntax do not produce incoherence between a hypothetical denotational meaning and its connotational level...except, as with irony, where appropriate. This is, obviously, something that cannot be said. We might also, believing we have grasped the general import of the work, feel able to judge to what extent diction and syntax are appropriate in local effects, but this presupposes a final import that the work may not have. This was the case with Schorer describing a work as a technical failure; what it signifies is the wish for a different, hypothetical work made to one's own specifications. This last, unkind thought brings us to the three standards by which we can be said to measure 'style'; whether or not we think what is said is worth saying, whether or not we agree with the import of the marriage between between hypothetical fact and connotation, and whether or not, in the case of obscurity, the effort expended in unravelling the sense seems worthwhile. An offender against the first and last of these could be the following, 'Lessons with me, indeed, that charming summer, we all had a theory he was to have'; an admirer of Henry James might be prepared to defend this sentence, but in doing so they could only appeal to the overall meaning that is conveyed by 'The Turn of the Screw'. The three standards I have outlined here are, of course, only three ways of trying to get at the same idea; all of them can be reduced to the first. The last is not merely to repeat the modern dogma that clarity and economy are best; we may find that the most discursive style
can satisfy it, while the most "journalistic" cannot. With regard to style and evaluation, then, we cannot argue about whether *Ulysses* could have been "better put", because the way it was put is *Ulysses*, but we can argue about whether or not it was worth putting.
Then I asked: 'does a firm persuasian that a thing is so, make it so?'
He replied: 'All poets believe that it does...

William Blake

To confuse intelligence and dislocate sentiment by gratuitous fiction is a short-sighted way of pursuing happiness. Nature is soon avenged....Why does religion, so near to rationality in its purpose, fall so short of it in its texture and its results? The answer is easy: Religion pursues rationality through the imagination.

Santayana

When one places life's center of gravity not in life but in the "beyond" - in nothingness - one deprives life of its center of gravity altogether.

Nietzsche
Style 'Degree Zero'

In the last chapter I appeared to edge the concept of 'style' almost out of the critical vocabulary - for without the concept of 'subject' or 'content', 'style' has no boundaries and, therefore, no identity. It may be that the term can be retained to denote the text as a literary work, as opposed to an historical, sociological, psychological one; so that 'Discuss the style of x' becomes equivalent to 'Discuss x as a literary work'. However, the model I have originally established for literature, that is, the metaphor, does presuppose a division that, at first sight, seems to correspond to a division between form and content, that is, the division between subsidiary and principal subject. Indeed, in the last chapter I resorted to the phrase 'hypothetical or imaginary fact' to designate the events or characters or narrator, the existence of which might be hypothetically inferred from the work, and this phrase appears to once more invoke the concept of 'content'. This was partly due to the fact that I was talking about the division between 'form' and 'content', but there is another and more important reason.

Robbe-Grillet writes that it is the writer's 'manner of speaking' which constitutes their whole enterprise, for the writer has 'nothing to say', but 'only a way of speaking.' But the notion of 'a way of speaking' suggests alternatives, that is, alternative ways of speaking about the same thing: And this, it must be said, is inescapably the manner in which we perceive style. Each way of expressing, each manifestation of an imaginary fact, or imaginary performative, indicates a different attitude towards that imaginary fact, and it is the angle at which the text views this 'content' which is the connotational import, the style or rhetoric, of that text. There is, of course, no fact but simply the manifestation, but 'style' can only be identified as such by the way in which it 'acts upon' something else. This idea of 'variations on', or 'deviations from' presupposes a norm, a style degree zero. The term degree zero I have borrowed from Group μ's General Rhetoric for, as we shall see, the question of what rhetoric 'acts upon' is a very similar question to the one that I am asking here. Their tentative answer to this question is that a discourse degree zero is one reduced to its essential semantic components; but if we apply this solution to literature then we are simply talking not about the essence of a work but, rather, a different
text. This emerges in the way in which Group μ illustrate the concept; 'If at degree zero a character in a story is to be assassinated, we are forced to choose a weapon even if the particular weapon has no influence on the development of the plot.' If we define the work in terms of plot then such an element is degree zero, but such a definition does not retain the integrity of the work, that is, the text as literature. The only way in which the type of the weapon could be surplus to the imaginative suggestion of the work is if it was not specified, in which case its type would not exist as an element in the work. (Indeed if the weapon is unspecified, the supposition that it was any particular type of weapon would be an alteration of the work, because being unspecified would be one of its properties.) The critic can consider nothing in the work as surplus or contingent without reducing that work to a different one, without treating it as something other than literature.

What, then, does style 'act upon'? In painting we might say that perspective and the natural colour of objects is a kind of visual degree zero, allowing for the vagaries of light, but there is no similar standard, aside perhaps from grammatical sense, which could serve as a standard of literary style. Preceding or prevailing 'styles' may render a 'style' conspicuous, make the work "stylish", but there is, in truth, no work without a style. The situation is similar with regard to architecture or clothing: What would constitute an architectural style degree zero? A pillar that is not Corinthian, Doric, or Aeolian can be in a 'plain style'; the possibility of differentiation presupposes that of identity and, therefore, even if only one example of a thing exists, a stylistic identity, an identifiable style. We may think of Baroque as the triumph of the excrecent, but to remove everything identifiably Baroque from a structure would not be to reveal an architecture degree zero. Likewise there are no variations on literature, but only different ways of being literature.

Style degree zero within literature is, then, inconceivable, it is a concept which makes no sense. However, if we work out the implications of conflating those elements customarily divided into 'style' and 'content' or 'form' and 'subject' then the intuitive notion of style (or rhetoric) as something that 'acts upon' something else can still be rescued from meaninglessness. Having established that style generates import, that a 'way of saying', within literature, is what is said, I must now assert
that what I have referred to as the 'hypothetical fact', that is, the 'subject', is also an aspect of style. The assertion only remains alarming so long as we are looking for a degree zero, a basic common denominator between manifestations, within literature itself. If the literary work is, as I have argued, an expression of 'life is like...' then what the work describes is also part of the style of its description: That which has hitherto been seen as the 'what' of the work - what is described - is, in fact, an aspect of style, a 'how' - how the world is described. This is how, from a literary point of view, Lamb's tales are related to Shakespeare. The counterpart to style, what style works upon, is not, then, something within the work, that is, the 'content', rather the counterpart to style is the world.

I now wish to propose that the relationship between the work, as a style, and the world is the same as that between the subsidiary subject ('wolf') and the principal subject ('Man') in metaphor. The effect of the subsidiary subject in metaphor is, as I have already described, a filtering one, that is, it selects and emphasizes aspects of the principal subject and thereby puts this subject in a certain 'light', in a certain perspective. Moreover the metaphor is an affective or ideological perception of the principal subject and, therefore, essentially rhetorical, for this attaching of the affect or value to the fact is the defining characteristic of rhetoric. What I now wish to turn to is the rhetoric that constitutes the relationship between the work and the world. To do so I must enquire into the manner in which style 'acts upon' the world, and this will involve me to a certain extent with the question of what is, unfortunately, known as the 'function' of literature. Strange as it may seem to identify the literary with the rhetorical, once we have ruled out those approaches to literature that consider it in some way directly referential, as I did in Chapter 2, those pronouncements on the nature of the relationship between literature and the world, or life, that remain, that is, those pronouncements that are concerned with literature's revelatory or instructive power on a less mundane level, all implicitly but inevitably tend towards the demanding of literature the sort of assertions that can only be made in rhetorical terms.
The "Function" of Literature

What is the function of literature? This question has always had a false ring to it for me; the use of poetry, one might well argue, is a class that must contain all the uses that poetry is put to. There is, moreover, something inappropriately technological in the words 'function' or 'use', as if the idea of a 'poetical end' signalled the end of poetry. 'All art', declared Wilde, 'is quite useless.' Nevertheless, in the history of writing on literature there are three 'ends', first proposed together, to the best of my knowledge, by Minturno in his De Poeta libri sex (1559), which encompass all of the various answers to this question: 'to teach, delight, and move'. Moreover, historically, each of these hardly ever appears without at least one of the other two; poetry teaches by moving, teaches by delight, moves by teaching, delights by moving, and so on. The 'function' assigned to literature is, then, almost invariably accounted for in terms of the production of one or more of this group of closely related effects.

The picture is somewhat complicated by those theories that give literature an overtly political role. Mazzoni, for example, holds that comedy was 'invented' to show that humble life is 'happy and fortunate and capable of infinite consolations.' and by thus keeping humble citizens content with their state, prevent them from being 'moved to disobedience and rebellion'. Mazzoni likewise attributed the invention of tragedy to the need to prevent those in power from becoming over-confident and, consequently, 'insupportable and insolent in their dominions'. Similarly Heywood defends the drama on the grounds that plays are written 'to teach subjects obedience to their king, to show the people the untimely ends of such as have moved tumults, commotions and insurrections; to present them with the flourishing estate of such as live in obedience, exhorting them to allegiance, dehorting them from all traitorous and felonious stratagems.' Rousseau makes the same point in a condemnation of literature and the arts in general, writing that they 'strew garlands of flowers on the iron chains that bind [men], make them forget the original freedom for which they seem to have been born, cause them to love their slavery, and turn them into what is known as a civilized people.' This is not an idea that is likely to be found very endearing by many literary theorists today. Lukács, for example, writes that the work of all the
great figures of literature from Homer onwards 'reveals an understanding', and therefore contributes to the realization of the Marxist evolutionary process." Brecht, too, dreams of an 'instructive and entertaining' theatre that can help the 'unfree, ignorant man of our century...master the world and himself'. It may be that all art is intrinsically suited to the preservation of the status quo, or to its rearrangement, I do not know and I do not believe anyone else does either. For myself I would tend to think that the Goth who advised against the burning of a library on the grounds that while the populace was "busy about those toys, we shall with more leisure conquer their countries", was fundamentally right. However, in all these examples, though literature is given a political, or 'civil' function, this is incidental to those effects which are, we might say, the more immediate use of literature, that is, the reader or playgoer's use. What these theorists propose is the use of literature's power to instruct, delight, and move; they are not, therefore, in conflict with the notion of these three as the function of literature.

Here I wish to record the attitude towards the function of literature that I grew up with. It is important to emphasize that this attitude was rarely stated so explicitly as I wish to state it here, at least not in this present century, for, though its roots go back at least as far as Plato, we have inherited it, irrespective of the theoretical positions we espouse, almost as a reflex. The attitude is vaguely and, therefore, well expressed by Arnold when he writes that 'the best poetry will be found to have a power of forming, sustaining and delighting us, as nothing else can.' This is what I was 'taught' and what I see everywhere in literary criticism even today; for I am proceeding on the assumption that Samuel Beckett is considered no less 'forming' and 'sustaining' by his champions than Wordsworth is by his. Literature, then, according to this attitude is the expression of a common, buried life of humanity, a life that appears to be passed over by an everyday which, as Hazlitt says of society, 'is constructed into a machine that carries us safely and insipidly from one end of life to the other, in a very comfortable prose style.' Such a common life may be a fiercely individualistic, 'existentialist' one; the idea is common enough, despite the contradiction involved. Literature was supposed to form and sustain through its power to enlarge and enrich one's experience of the world and thereby enhance and refine one's reactions to life. The function of literature was, then, in short,
emotional growth. This does not mean that I was trained up as a little aesthete; being a schoolboy in the 1970's meant rather that my literary response was more often than not channelled into the development of what might be loosely termed a 'social conscience'; a sterile one, however, for it chiefly manifested itself in collective self-righteousness. Auden's opinion that poetry's purpose is not the creation of 'magic' but 'by telling the truth, to disenchant and disintoxicate.' would have seemed perfectly in keeping with this.16 (The even more portentous and often repeated use of 'safe' as a pejorative term, still more so.) However, the precise tenor of my literary education derived, as I now realize, from certain aspects of New Criticism. Richards, for example, is quite explicit about the value of literature lying in its providing us with the means to compare and evaluate experiences, in supplying the 'best data available for deciding what experiences are more valuable than others.'17 Despite its insistence on the 'affective fallacy', New Criticism encouraged one to look for both a complexity and a coherence in the view of life offered by any work, that is, it was chiefly through irony and paradox that the work both explored and effected feelings. (An 'optional corollary' to this was that the poet was an expert in 'feeling'.) This, then, was the function of literature, and, though New Criticism often seemed to be characterized by a search for objective criteria, in its assumption about the work it demonstrated at least as great an emphasis on the 'teaching' power of literature as any Renaissance or even Romantic school. In deference to my critical roots I will designate this attitude the 'fallacy of literature meaning well', for the fundamental problem with this attitude, the problem that betrays its basic smugness, lies in the paradox of praising a thing for showing us what is to be valued.

Of Minturno's three 'ends', 'delight' is the one most likely to be emphasized in an informal context and passed over in a formal one, but, as will emerge, the three - teaching, delighting, and moving - become almost inseparable in most discussions of the 'function' of literature. Castelvetro is unusual in holding that 'poetry has been discovered solely to delight and to recreate the minds of the crude multitude and of the common people, who do not understand the reasons and the divisions and the arguments, subtle and far from the practice of ordinary men, which the philosophers use in investigating the truth of things, and professional men in their labours.'18 This is an opinion in no way
typical of Renaissance writings on the subject, in which it is more usually held that poetry teaches by delight or delights by teaching. In contrast Richards asserts that it is as absurd to imagine 'that a competent reader sits down to read for the sake of pleasure' as to imagine that a mathematician sets out to solve an equation for pleasure, or that the noise made by a motorcycle is the reason for its having been started. Even if Richards' analogies were sound his is an opinion which simply offends against experience, for, though he is trying to get at the source of the pleasure literature provides, a question passed over by Castelvetro, even the inventor of 'practical criticism' must allow that without the element of pleasure such an enquiry would hardly be taking place. But in order to show why literature can legitimately be talked about in terms of rhetoric, I must move on to Minturno's other two ends of poetry - teaching and moving - and examine the relationship between the two.

As I indicated above, in talking of Arnold's opinion that literature 'forms' and 'sustains', literature is commonly held to 'teach' through its effect on the reader's feelings, the reader's sensibility. The instructional aspect of literature, then, inevitably appears, either explicitly or implicitly, as a matter of morality or ideology, as a matter of 'sense of value'. The era that appears to be most specific about the moral end of literature is, perhaps naturally, that era with the most specific morality; so much, indeed, a matter of concensus that its naming is considered superfluous. Dante, writing of his Commedia, states that the purpose of his poem is 'to remove those living in this life from a state of misery and lead them to a state of happiness.' Trissino argues that since 'the greatest benefit that can be rendered to human beings is to teach them to live well' and since 'the poets are those who mingle with delight precepts designed to make the lives of men perfect, poetry should of right be thought by everyone a most excellent thing.' Elyot describes comedy as 'a mirror of man's life, wherein evil is not taught but discovered, to the intent that men beholding the promptness of youth unto vice, the snares of harlots and bawds laid for young minds, the deceit of servants, the chances of fortune contrary to man's expectation, they being warned may prepare themselves to resist or prevent occasion.' Sidney too, drawing on a geometric analogy, credits comedy with teaching the 'right', 'the beauty of virtue', by presenting the 'oblique', 'the filthiness
of evil'. Sidney's figure demonstrates the moral certainty of the age, for there must be an absolute, a fixed point, for there to be an oblique, a deviation; he can even assert that the bad may repent on seeing their actions 'contemptibly set forth', through 'the force truth hath in nature.' This is, indeed, a universe in which nature means. With regard to tragedy Castelvetro, interpreting Aristotle's catharsis as a matter of moral improvement, writes that it has the power to purge 'fear and compassion', to change its 'spectators from vile to magnanimous, from fearful to firm, and from over-pitying to strict'. He further speculates on the possibility of 'other kinds of tragedy, as, for example, those that contain the changes of good men from misery into happiness, or the change of the wicked from felicity into misery, in order that the people may be assured by the examples that are presented, and confirm themselves in the holy belief that God takes care of the world and exercises special providence over his own, defending them and confounding their enemies and his'. In this matter of cutting the tale to suit the purpose the poet has an obvious advantage over the historian, an advantage often pointed out, in deference to Aristotle, by Renaissance writers. Thus Cinthio writes that the 'poet presents things not as they are but as they should be, that they may serve to instruct his readers about life.' However, though Cinthio writes that the poet's moral function is 'to praise virtuous actions and to blame vices and by means of the terrible and the piteous to make them odious to the reader.', and Sidney that poetry 'ever sets virtue out in her best colours, making Fortune her well-waiting handmaid, that one must needs be enamoured of her.', this should not be taken to mean that such theorists considered morality as something 'added' to the events portrayed, or poetry as a form of propaganda. As Sidney's geometrical metaphor demonstrates, they considered that to show virtue in its best colours and vice in its worst, was only to show the two of them in their true colours, to show them as they are. Tasso writes that the presentation of virtuous deeds alone can 'win over the souls of readers' but that there is nothing that cannot be accomplished, 'in the soul', by a great poet - what Dante, Trissino, Cinthio, Castelvetro, and Sidney propose is that poetry can accomplish a knowledge of the true nature of good and evil. More importantly, with regard to the question of propaganda, these writers, however they may differ as to the method of inculcating this knowledge, all believe that
the knowledge of good and evil, vice and virtue, is a knowledge. That a work should do the reader 'some good' and preferably not be harmful to society as a whole is, however vaguely conceived, not so strange an idea today as is the idea that virtues and vices can be so identifiable, so geometrically 'solid', as to permit us to talk about literature in this straightforward way. It is the presence of a pervasive and uniform moral standard which enables Spenser to define the 'general end' of his Faerie Queene, as being 'to fashion a gentleman or noble person in virtuous and gentle discipline.', and which can assume the existence of a conscience for the play to catch.31

Morality is not, however, a factor which belongs solely to religious equations. Though 'morality' almost inevitably suggests religious prohibitions and prescriptions, and 'ideology' political convictions, what they have in common is the reference to a system of values, and I will use both of them, and interpret quotations containing them, quite promiscuously in this single, common sense. When Johnson writes that the 'end of writing is to instruct, the end of poetry to instruct by pleasing.', the didactic overtones of 'instruct' evoke a notion of morality, in all its geometric surety, that has a distinctly period flavour to it, when, however, he writes that 'it is always a writer's duty to make the world better', he expresses a thought now so cliché as to pass unnoticed in the latest interview with an author.32 Shelley, in a more explicitly 'modern' vein, identifies a moral purpose in art with dogmatism, and asserts that 'There must also be nothing attempted to make the exhibition subservient to what is vulgarly termed a moral purpose.', though his next sentence declares that 'the highest species of the drama' teaches 'the human heart, through its sympathies and antipathies, the knowledge of itself; in proportion to the possession of which knowledge every human being is wise, just, sincere, tolerant and kind.'33 Goethe likewise voices a common feeling when he writes that there is no 'poetry' in political subjects and that the poet who 'gives himself up to a party...is lost as a poet', but if one's politics happen to be on a 'cosmic', one might say 'metaphysical' scale, the charge of partisanship looses its force, for one is 'revealing nature' no less than the Renaissance writers above; thus, for Lukács, those writers that 'understand' the Marxist evolutionary process reveal 'insights and illuminations more profound than the superficial image mankind has of
itself at a particular time.', and, in so doing, fulfil an ideological/moral purpose.34

The connection between morality and literature is made in widely different ways; Ruskin declares that it is the function of art to enforce 'religious sentiments' and perfect the 'ethical state' of mankind, and that, consequently, 'the art of a nation...is an exponent of its ethical state.', that 'you must be good men before you can either paint and sing', and that 'the fineness of the possible art is an index of the moral purity and majesty of the emotion it expresses.'; George Eliot, on the other hand, is content to state that the writer 'can no more escape influencing the moral taste, and with it the action of the intelligence, than a setter of fashions in furniture and dress can fill the shops with his designs and leave the garniture of persons and homes unaffected by his industry.', and that the writer should therefore endeavour to provide something more than 'spiritual gin.'35 George Eliot is close to a modern ideal here, that literature should have a good effect without being too deliberate, too overt, in doing so, that is, that literature is 'concerned with', 'addresses', 'reveals' questions of value rather than sets out to answer them; 'A great work of literature', writes Leavis 'explores and evokes the grounds and sanctions of our most important choices, valuations and decisions'.36 It is an ideal even more pronounced in the wish expressed by T.S.Eliot for a literature that is 'unconsciously, rather than deliberately and defiantly, Christian'.37 Wayne C.Booth, assuming that the novel 'means well', declares that 'an author has an obligation to be as clear about his moral purpose as he possibly can be.', noting that while 'it was the peculiar temptation of Victorian novelists to give a false air of sentimental comradeship through their commentary, impersonal novelists are strongly tempted to give the reader less help than they should, in order to make sure that they are seen to be "serious."'.38 When Lowell wrote that 'Whoever reads the great poets cannot but be made better by it', his statement was at least open to the interpretation that he was defining 'great poetry' as that sort which inevitably makes a person better, but Booth is simply assuming that even when a work gives little or no indication of it, as literature it must have some improving or at least enlightening moral purpose.39 In this respect he is caught between the wish that literature should not be too obvious about its
improving qualities, and the belief that all "serious" or "difficult" literature does improve.

When thinking of those who have argued against any intrinsic connection between art and morality, it is such as Wilde - 'There is no such thing as a moral or an immoral book. Books are well or badly written. That is all.' - that spring most readily to mind. However, what emerges from the writings of Wilde or Pater is simply a different sort of morality, that is, they argue against one system of values in terms of another. We come almost full circle with Flaubert, for whom 'truthfulness' is the only morality;

If the reader can't find in a book the moral that is to be found there, then either the reader is a fool or else the book is false in its exactness. For once anything is true, then it is good. Even obscene books are only immoral in that they are deficient in truth. Things don't happen 'like that' in real life.

I say we come full circle because, despite their differences, what Flaubert has in common with the Renaissance writers mentioned above is the identification of the true with the desirable. This, as I have noted, is the real objection to the idea of a "moral" import in literature, that whatever is imported into a representation in the way of an ethical or ideological sympathy is somehow an adulteration or a distorting of the truth that should characterize representation. Thus, while Sidney drew on a geometric analogy in discussing 'truth in nature', Hawthorne compares the pursuit of a moral purpose in a work to 'sticking a pin through a butterfly, - thus at once depriving it of life, and causing it to stiffen in an ungainly and unnatural attitude.' Lawrence employs a strikingly similar image when he describes how the novelist, in trying to 'nail down' the novel with a morality, must either 'kill' the novel, or fail, through the work's natural autonomy. For Sidney poetry 'doth grow in effect into another nature, in making things either better than nature bringeth forth, or, quite anew, forms such as never were in nature' and in so doing creates ideals for mankind. When Sidney describes the world of nature as 'brazen' and that of poetry as 'golden', he is praising poetry for showing an ideal that is "more true", for Hawthorne and Lawrence this gilded nature is at fault precisely because, in following an ideal, it is unnatural and "false". Arnold, however, who uses 'moral', as I have used it
here, to refer to whatever 'bears upon the question "how to live"', provides a common ground between the two camps when he asserts that 'moral ideas' cannot be considered an interpolation in art because they are 'so main a part of human life.' 

This is not to say, as Newman does, that 'poetry is ultimately founded on correct moral perception', or to argue, with Patmore, that 'bad morality is necessarily bad art, for art is human, but immorality inhuman.', for to hold that literature is inescapably moral, in the sense of concerned with "how to live", is not to make any assertions about the morality it demonstrates, or even to hold that it 'serves a moral purpose', in the way that some of the above theorists have suggested.

Literature is a redescription, an ordering of language, language which in its very organization is a reflection on the world, and such a redescription, as we saw with metaphor, cannot but, by its very existence, make assertions about what is described. That is, though many subsequent theorists have deprecated Castelvetro's idea that the poet can 'cut' the tale to suit a moral purpose, it is the very 'cutting' of the tale, the fact that a tale must be 'cut' from the world, that generates the moral or ideological charge of the work. Poetry, writes Coleridge, is 'the power of humanizing nature, of infusing the thoughts and passions of man into everything which is the object of his contemplation... and it stamps them into unity in the mould of a moral idea.'

This is, indeed, what giving the world ad hominem implies; giving the world in terms of value, the systematization of which lies in the 'cut' of the work. In short, literature consists in making reality mean. This investment of meaning is implicit in two views on literature that I now wish to consider, firstly that literature in some way mediates between us and our 'essence', and, secondly that literature is in some way involved with the resolution of 'the enigma of life'.

It is the province of the poet, writes Schlegel, 'to shed a refulgence over the ordinary events of daily life, and to invest them with a higher importance, a deeper meaning.' The very presence of a boundary to a narrative, that is, its identity as a work, invites us to consider it in a different way to any other form of discourse; for to report what is not as what is, as with metaphor, immediately signals a figurative, a "deeper" meaning. This is most obvious with poetry, the presence of which is announced by just this interpretative pressure being exerted on the word.
The question here, however, will centre around the notion of investment, of literature investing the ordinary with 'a higher importance, a deeper meaning.' Although 'investment' suggests something put into, it is a traditional wisdom, and one that Schlegel subscribes to, that literature reveals the higher importance and deeper meaning of the everyday. Coleridge, who noted the coincidence of the views expressed in his lectures on Shakespeare with those of Schlegel, writes in those lectures that poetry gives 'a more vivid reflection of the truths of nature and of the human heart.'

Lowell voices a similar opinion when he describes the 'great poet' as not only 'an interpreter between man and nature' but also between 'man and his own nature'; 'It is he who gives us those key words, the possession of which makes us masters of all the unsuspected treasure-caverns of thought, and feeling, and beauty which open under the dusty path of our daily life.'

Everyman is conscious that he leads two lives, the one trivial and ordinary, the other sacred and recluse; the one which he carries to the dinner table and to his daily work, which grows old with his body and dies with it, the other that which is made up of the few inspiring moments of his higher aspiration and attainment, and in which his youth survives for him, his dreams, his unquenchable longings for something nobler than success. It is this life which the poets nourish for him, and sustain with their immortalizing nectar.

Poetry is, then, the key to 'the poetical' in life. Hazlitt describes this ordinary life as "mere oblivion", a dead letter: for all that is worth remembering in life, is the poetry of it. Literature, by these lights, is revelatory; its 'grand power', as Arnold termed it, is its 'interpretative power', by which he meant 'the power of so dealing with things as to awaken in us a wonderfully full, new, and intimate sense of them, and of our relations with them.' Such a view implies that we can hardly be said to be in touch with the world outside of our poetical dealings with it, an implication made explicit in Bergson's aesthetic;

Between nature and ourselves, nay, between ourselves and our own consciousness a veil is interposed: a veil that is dense and opaque for the common herd—thin, almost transparent, for the artist and poet...We had to live, and life demands that we grasp things in their relations to our own needs. Life is action. Life implies the acceptance only of the utilitarian side of things in
order to respond to them by appropriate reactions: all other impressions must be dimmed or else reach us vague and blurred....The individuality of things or of beings escapes us, unless it is materially to our advantage to perceive it....This tendency, the result of need, has become even more pronounced under the influence of speech; for words - with the exception of proper nouns - all denote genera. The word, which only takes note of the most ordinary function and commonplace aspect of the thing, intervenes between it and ourselves, and would conceal it from our eyes, were that form not already masked beneath the necessities that brought the word into existence....Art is certainly only a more direct vision of reality.  

Conrad echoes something of this aesthetic when he writes that what the reader demands of the writer is, in effect, "Take me out of myself!" meaning really, out of my perishable activity into the light of imperishable consciousness. It is hardly surprising that Hulme, in some obvious irritation, describes how, for those reared on Romanticism, verse 'always means a bringing in of some of the emotions that are grouped around the word infinite.', and that the 'essence of poetry' is, for them, a 'vagueness' a suggestion of being led to the 'beyond'. In contrast, he continues, the 'classic' is suffused with 'the light of ordinary day', it is 'always perfectly human and never exaggerated: man is always man and never a god.'. But a tautology is rarely the sign of an end of rhetoric, only of a shift in rhetoric; Hulme still claims that unconventional language can give the 'exact curve' of a thing, that it is, indeed, 'dry, hard, classical' poetry which will best do so. To what end? My question is rhetorical, for we are still within the realm of the investment of meaning. Eliot's view of the topic is complicated, or, one might say, simplified, by a leap of faith.

For it is ultimately the function of art, in imposing a credible order upon reality, and thereby eliciting some perception of an order in reality, to bring us to a condition or serenity, stillness and reconciliation; and then leave us, as Virgil left Dante, to proceed toward a region where that guide can avail us no farther.

The imposition of a credible order is very far from a revelation of true order. Sartre too, writing as an author, describes how the work is created 'by condensing relationships, by introducing order where there was none,
by imposing the unity of mind on the diversity of things.' and that, for this reason, he feels 'essential' in relation to what he has created.\(^6\)

When a reader sets this order or unity in motion they too find themselves essential in relation to it, they 'act it out'. This is, however, a change of emphasis, for while we might still agree with Coleridge that the 'object of art is to give the whole *ad hominem*, this now says nothing about the validity of what is given.\(^6\)

Carlyle writes that great poetry 'discloses the inner harmony of things; what Nature meant', but does nature mean, in this sense?\(^6\)

Of course those writers I have journeyed through would insist that it is only 'great' literature that can disclose our essential nature, that can give us the whole *ad hominem*, with *hominem* being used in an absolute sense. But for this we must have a *hominem* with an absolute sense, and an affective, ethical sense at that, for these rhapsodies have not been all for biochemistry or anatomy or psychology.

Forster talks of how characters from works belong to 'a reality of a kind we can never get in daily life.', but the reality of this 'reality' is another matter.\(^6\)

His concern is primarily a mundane one, but its implications are profound:

> For human intercourse, as soon as we look at it for its own sake and not as a social adjunct, is seen to be haunted by a spectre. We cannot understand each other, except in a rough and ready way; we cannot reveal ourselves, even when we want to; what we call intimacy is only a makeshift; perfect knowledge is an illusion. But in the novel we can know people perfectly, and, apart from the general pleasure of reading, we can find here a compensation for their dimness in life. In this direction fiction is truer than history, because it goes beyond the evidence, and each of us knows from his own experience that there is something beyond the evidence, and even if the novelist has not got it correctly, well - he has tried...And that is why novels, even when they are about wicked people, can solace us; they suggest a more comprehensible and thus more manageable human race, they give us the illusion of perspicacity and of power.\(^6\)

In life we infer, by means of an analogy from ourselves, the motives of another's act, and from these hypothetical motives we likewise infer a hypothetical personality, but the act is the only fact we have, everything else is speculation, a speculation we can, to a greater or lesser extent, justify on pragmatic grounds. It would seem that if we do not know what perfect knowledge of a person is like, then we are not even in a position
to judge our perfect knowledge of the characters of a fiction. There are
two possible objections to this; firstly that we may claim to know
ourselves perfectly and use ourselves as a standard, secondly that the
above assumes that a character in a fiction is the same sort of entity as
a person in life. The first of these objections is hardly serious, for
even the most overreaching of us knows that being familiar, even perfectly
familiar, with oneself, is a very different matter from being able to give
the kind of objective description of oneself that a novel does.

Furthermore, even if we ignore what introspection seems to confirm, that
is, that we judge characters not according to ourselves but according to
a generalized notion drawn from our experience of others, the 'illusion of
perspicacity and power' remains, for it is a hypothetical other that is
made the object of this perfect knowledge. The second objection, that the
notion of our knowledge of characters giving an illusion of knowledge
falsely rests on the assumption that a 'character' in fiction is not the
same sort of entity as a person in life, involves much wider questions
about the nature of fiction. However, even if we do not want to divide up
the work according to those divisions which its language, were it
denotational, would imply, those assertions that it makes about characters
are still part of the 'whole ad hominem' implicit in the work as a style
of description. And if the assumption of perfect knowledge of character
is part of that style, then we are back with the redescription of
humanity as comprehensible and the illusion of perspicacity. The question
of the nature or extent of the illusion finally rests on how we read.

The second manifestation of the idea of literature 'investing with
value', which I wish to consider here, is that expressed in the notion of
art being tied up with the "enigma of life". The idea that art is a
solution to this "enigma" appears a typically Romantic one - Shelley's
*Defense* is a good and well known example - but all assertions that some
work has 'shown' or 'told' us something of universal importance contain
some taint of it. Nevertheless it is in the nineteenth century, the age of
truly effusive writing on the nature of literature, that this attitude
finds its most forceful expression. Schlegel, as we saw, describes the
'proper business of poetry' as the representation of the eternal, the ever-
important, and the universally beautiful' by shedding 'A refulgence over
the ordinary events of daily life' and investing them 'with a higher
importance, a deeper meaning.'6 (How one 'reveals' by 'investing' is the
whole question of the nature of rhetoric, but I shall not deal with that yet.) On this basis Schlegel divides drama into three classes; the least valuable which merely presents us with 'the visible surface of life', the more valuable, that is, those 'effective representations of human passion where the deeper shades and springs of action are portrayed - a delineation of characteristics, not individual but general, of the world and of life, in manifold variety, their inconsistencies and their perplexing intricacies - in a word, a picture of man and his existence, recognized as an enigma', and the most valuable in which the drama will not only describe 'the enigma of existence' but also 'solve it - extricate life from the tangled confusion of the present, and conduct it through the crisis of development to its final issue.' Carlyle places the Poet alongside the Divinity and the Prophet, in his Heroes and Hero-worship, and asserts that the Poet and the Prophet are essentially the same, in that they 'have penetrated both of them into the sacred mystery of the Universe....That divine mystery which lies everywhere in all beings, "the Divine Idea of the World, that which lies at the bottom of Appearance," as Fichte styles it; of which all Appearance, from the stormy sky to the grass of the field, but especially the Appearance of Man and his work, is but the vesture, the embodiment that renders it visible.' A 'delineation' is poetical, according to Carlyle, if it expresses a 'musical thought', that is 'one spoken by a mind that has penetrated into the inmost heart of the thing; detected the inmost mystery of it, namely the melody that lies hidden in it; the inward harmony of coherence which is its soul, whereby it exists'; poetry is, then, an 'inarticulate unfathomable speech, which leads us to the edge of the Infinite, and lets us for a moment gaze into that!'. Heidegger uses a strikingly similar image in answering the question asked by his essay 'What Are Poets For?';

In the age of the world's night, the abyss of the world must be experienced and endured. But for this it is necessary that there be those who reach into the abyss....He among mortals who must, sooner than other mortals an otherwise than they, reach into the abyss, comes to know the marks that the abyss remarks. For the poet, these are the traces of the fugitive gods. Only the poet, according to Heidegger, can trace these marks of the 'fugitive gods', that is, of the 'holy', for the rest of humanity. This the
poet achieves because language is the 'precinct' (*templum*) of Being, and it is by constantly 'going through' this precinct, that is, by the conversion within poetry of the language dominated reason, that we reach Being. One should remember here the assigning of a transcendental function to metaphor which I discussed in Chapter 1. For Emerson poets are not, as for Heidegger, only priests, they are themselves 'liberating gods' by whom he is 'invited into the science of the real'.

With what joy I begin to read a poem, which I confide in as an inspiration! And now my chains are to be broken; I shall mount above these clouds and opaque airs in which I live — opaque, though they seem transparent — and from the heaven of truth I shall see and comprehend my relations. That will reconcile me to life and renovate nature, to see trifles animated by a tendency, and to know what I am doing.

The presence of so much enigma, sacred mystery, and inward harmony, the presence of so many gods, however figurative, is a good index of the general tendency of this line of argument, this complex of emotions: it is a religious tendency. Auguste Comte held that poetry could help in the realization of his 'Religion of Humanity', by establishing a 'really human point of view' after the demise of the theism which hampered it. Indeed, Comte intended that poetry should give an aesthetic form to his philosophy and thereby make it intelligible to all, being used as the basis of ceremonies to accompany birth, marriage, and death, when it would serve to remind people of the Great Being — Humanity — of which they are a part. A less systematic and better known expression of the same sanctifying impulse, and of the connection between the uses of literature and religion, is Matthew Arnold's assertion that we should conceive of poetry as 'capable of higher uses, and called to higher destinies, than those which in general men have assigned to it hitherto.

More and more mankind will discover that we have to turn to poetry to interpret life for us, to console us, to sustain us. Without poetry, our science will appear incomplete; and most of what now passes with us for religion and philosophy will be replaced by poetry.

Boccaccio had called theology 'the poetry of God', an idea which Arnold echoes when he declares that the 'strongest part of our religion to-day
is its unconscious poetry; but also one which he proposes will be reversed — literature will become a secularized theology. And so it has, even among those who appear to reject all 'codes', for, whatever the vagaries in the fortunes of organized religion, the need to be consoled and sustained is, demonstrably, an historical constant.

What are we saying when we praise a work for its insight, for the glimpse of the abyss it affords us, for its wisdom? One can praise a text or a person for cleverness, for to do so only implies that one is clever enough to follow the argument it or they present, though not necessarily to have constructed it for oneself; but how does one verify wisdom? Wisdom is what that person has who has assigned to each thing just the measure of meaning and value which will enable them to form a satisfyingly complete picture of the world, a picture which facilitates a certain degree of systematization in the making of choices and the assignment of priorities. (It is hardly an accident that 'wise' or 'philosophical' are often used to refer to a person whose attitude is, more strictly speaking, stoical, for stoicism is the systematic avoidance of all those feelings that wisdom is universally supposed to remedy.) To praise a work for wisdom, then, is to say only that it is, at most, as wise as oneself, for, as I have said, value is created rather than discovered, and that this degree of wisdom is praiseworthy. Nothing gives so convincing an illusion of depth as a mirror. Likewise, how will I know when I am gazing into the Infinite, when I have penetrated to the inmost heart of things, as Carlyle says, or when I have, in Heidegger’s vocabulary, experienced the abyss of the world? By spontaneous inner conviction? This solution removes the question from the realm of argument, and out of this realm I will not follow it. As we saw with the notion of the transcendental function of figural language, in Chapter 1, to subscribe to this view of literature is a matter of faith. To have faith, in this sense, is to hold by some unverifiable ascription of meaning and value, some wisdom which has either come to one ready-made, or, having been invented by the individual, has become absolute to them. 'Faith' most readily suggests religious sentiment but I do not mean it to have so narrow a designation: To be a Marxist or an Existentialist or a Rationalist or a Humanist, to be in complete accord with the imaginative suggestion of the works of George Herbert, or Kafka, or Joyce or Beckett,
that is, to see life in terms of the metaphysic any of these demonstrate, is to have a 'faith', a 'wisdom'.

For many writers, particularly those associated with Romanticism, it is the 'imagination' which is the channel through, or ground upon, which literature improves or enlightens the reader. Coleridge, for example, argues that 'works of imagination...carry the mind out of self, and show the possible of the good and the great in human character.', concluding that in 'the imagination of man exist the seeds of all moral and scientific improvement'. Shelley, the whole of whose *Defence of Poetry* is a paean to 'the imagination', there calls it the 'great instrument of moral good', and elsewhere refers to it as 'the immortal God which should assume flesh for the redemption of mortal passion.' Schopenhauer, too, describes how 'the imagination' extends the horizon of the genius 'far beyond the limits of his actual personal experience', and is thus 'a means to the knowledge of the idea, the communication of which is the work of art', though he adds that 'the imaginary object' can also be 'used to build castles in the air congenial to egotism and the individual humour, and which for the moment delude and gratify'. Writers who are primarily interested in the relationship between art and society at large have also given imagination an ameliorative role; Duvignaud, for example, writes that imagination 'embraces the entire existence of man', and that 'through the symbols offered by a work of the imagination' we 'participate...in a potential society which lies beyond our grasp.' While all this may be true, there is also very good reason for considering imagination as the borderland between knowledge and delusion - as much in 'aesthetic contemplation' as anywhere else.

Imagination is often held to be a "free ordering" of the contents of the mind; Hume writes that 'Nothing is more free than the imagination of man and though it cannot exceed the original stock of ideas furnished by the internal and external senses, it has unlimited power of mixing, compounding, separating, and dividing those ideas, in all the varieties of fiction and vision.' In this sense it is held to be that form of mental activity which comes into play at the point where thought becomes divorced from reality. Imagination is also, less commonly, held to be the synthesizing power of the mind and to have privileged access to truth. Coleridge, for example, would confine the first of these two definitions to 'Fancy', which he describes as 'no other than a mode of memory.
emancipated from the order of time and space', while the second definition would apply to his description of 'the imagination' as 'the living power and prime agent of all perception'.

I have identified Coleridge's description of imagination with the idea of access to truth because, while we may perceive wrongly, only perception can give this access. However, 'imagination', as we may define it from the use of the word and its derivations, is characterized by just this lack of certainty. As the mind's proposing 'It is as if...', imagination is restricted in its epistemological claims by all that the subjunctive suggests; 'He behaves as if he owned the place' can indicate that he does not, that he probably does not, or that the speaker does not know whether he does or not. Imagination enters into the search for truth through the conditional form - 'If... then... then...' - that is, as suggesting ways by which the truth might be found, but it cannot itself directly furnish proof. But if imagination cannot be identified with perception per se, must we than speak of it as 'thought divorced from reality'? It seems this way, yet there is something of the truth lost in the word 'divorce', for we might rather say that the imaginary is obliquely related to the real.

Imagination is, of course, traditionally associated with literature, Hazlitt calls poetry 'the language of the imagination', but here I wish to approach this association not from the usual point of view, that is, of creation, but from the point of view of reading. Schiller's description of aesthetic contemplation is a good place to begin, since he defines it in opposition to perception.

So long as Man in his first physical condition accepts the world of sense merely passively, merely perceives, he is still completely identified with it, and just because he himself is simply world, there is no world yet for him. Not until he sets it outside himself or contemplates it, in his aesthetic status, does his personality become distinct from it, and a world appears to him because he has ceased to identify himself with it. Contemplation (reflection) is Man's first free relation to the universe which surrounds him.

To identify this type of contemplation with imagination is to make very large claims for that form of thinking; but there are many forms of conceptual thinking that can be subsumed under some legitimate use of the
word 'imagine' - conceiving ('Imagine what it will be like complete'),
guessing ('I cannot imagine what he is doing'), forming an opinion ('I
imagine it means'). However, though I believe Schiller's to be a good
description of imagination it is another question as to whether it
adequately describes 'aesthetic contemplation'. Schopenhauer, for example,
writes that the aesthetic 'lifts us suddenly out of the endless stream, of
willing, delivers knowledge from the slavery of the will, the attention is
no longer directed to the motives of willing, and thus observes then
without personal interest'. This picks up the idea of the imagination as
divorced from reality, though Schopenhauer's attitude to reality, as was
discovered in the last chapter, makes this a praise of the aesthetic.
Imagination is, however, anything but disinterested for it is the element
of self-direction, or self-dependency, which gives rise to the distinction
between imagination and perception or memory, that is, which gives rise
to the concept of imagination. For 'imagination' has a semantic identity
only through the use of 'imaginary' as an antonym of 'real', and 'imagine'
as an antonym of 'know'. Thus, though the imagination is undoubtedly
powerful and profound in its effects, though it can 'so exquisitely ravish
or torture the soul', as Addison writes, 'as might suffice to make up the
whole Heaven or hell of any finite being.', it can afford no access to
truth; if it is the great moral improver then it works these effects not
by means of reason but by emotional appeal, by skill in riding the ebb
and flow of feeling, in short, by rhetoric. 'Man', says Hazlitt, 'is the
only animal that laughs and weeps; for he is the only animal that is
struck by the difference between what things are, and what they ought to
be.' We might say that 'he' laughs and weeps because he can imagine
what is not, but, though the imagination may enforce our feeling of what
ought to be, with regard to what is the imaginary is surplus.

Why is the belief that literature can mediate between ourselves and
our essential nature or solve the 'enigma' of life so common? Because
literature answers our need for significance, its 'cut', by giving the
world ad hominem, must perforce manifest a sense of this significance, a
sense of value. Schlegel described poetry as 'investing' life with a
'higher importance and a deeper meaning', but what can it mean to 'invest'
with 'meaning' or 'importance'? It means to expect a return, to place some
value on a thing and to expect, by that act, to either ensure the value
one has placed or to get back more. It is interesting in this connection
to consider another meaning of 'invest', that is, 'to lay seige to';
through literature, it might be said, we 'lay seige' to reality, make it
yield up some meaning to us. To 'invest' can also be to clothe, or to
endue with, but it is not some separable level of the work that is
invested with a meaning, rather the work is itself the investment, the
investiture of language with the affective or ideological. The power
of the literary to move should be, then, far from a simply peripheral
concern in any study of literature; though, again, this is an 'aspect' of
literature which objectifying trends in criticism and literary theory have
found inimical to their aims.

Longinus, in his On the Sublime, defines sublimity in poetry as that
which 'touches the spirit' of an intelligent and well read man, and leaves
'more food for reflection in his mind than the mere words convey'. The
power to move, to impress, has nearly always been taken as an index of
literary excellence. Young, for example, in his Conjectures on Original
Composition (1759), writes that 'Applause is not to be given, but
extorted; and the silent lapse of a single tear does the writer more
honour than the rattling thunder of a thousand hands'. (In less
demonstrative periods fiction may indeed be valued for the pleasure of
being moved without being invited to show it - on the basis of the
possibly quite sound principle that an emotion suppressed is more
profound than one released.) Likewise literary criticism and theory are
more or less explicit, at different times, about this 'aspect' of literary
response. Hazlitt, for example, describes poetry as 'the highest eloquence
of passion, the most vivid form of expression that can be given to our
conception of any thing, whether pleasurable or painful, mean or
dignified, delightful or distressing'. Poe feels he 'need scarcely
observe that a poem deserves its title only inasmuch as it excites, by
elevating the soul', and that 'The value of the poem is in the ratio of
this elevating excitement'. Lawrence likewise attributes the novel's
value to its power to address and affect 'the whole man alive', to 'set
the whole tree trembling with a new access of life'. René Wellek very
sensibly points out that the question of how literature affects its
audience is an empirical one, very sensibly but also very shortsightedly
for, as the ebb and tide of critical vocabulary shows, such a project
would involve a prohibitive range of variables, uncomputable because not amenable to definition. Yet affect, as we shall see, must inevitably be part of the basis of any comprehensive description of literature.

Young, who, as we saw, holds that 'Applauding hands and dry eyes...are a satire on the Writer's talent and the Spectator's taste.', compares such judges and the writers they praise to 'an intoxicated host, and his tasteless guest, over some sparkling adulteration, commending their Champagne.' The analogy is interesting, for something very like it reappears in the epigraph to Wimsatt and Beardsley's essay on the 'affective fallacy' - 'We might as well study the properties of wine by getting drunk.' The 'affective fallacy' is, according to Wimsatt and Beardsley 'a confusion between the poem and its results' which 'begins by trying to derive the standard of criticism from the psychological effects of the poem and ends in impressionism and relativism.' Poetry, they argue, is a discourse about emotions and objects, and the emotive quality of objects as a 'pattern of knowledge', and not the 'infliction' or 'administration' of emotion to the reader. They feel that this point is worth emphasizing because the ignoring of it leads to the disappearance of the poem 'as an object of specifically critical judgement.' But against what school of thought is this admonition directed? Primarily against such authors, deriving from Longinus, as I have just considered. Tolstoy is explicitly unregenerate in this respect for he defines 'art' as 'a human activity consisting in this: that one man consciously by means of certain external signs, hands on to others feelings he has lived through, and that others are infected by these feelings and also experience them.' For Wimsatt and Beardsley this emphasis is mistaken for, they assert, there is no evidence to show 'that what a word does to a person is to be ascribed to anything except what it means, or if this connection is not apparent, at the most by what it suggests.' This assertion, however, cuts both ways, for if meaning can be identified with affect then discussion of affect will be quite compatible with discussion of the work as 'an object of specifically critical judgement'. If we return to the epigraph - 'We might as well study the properties of wine by getting drunk.' - it emerges that the problem with Wimsatt and Beardsley's position is that it admits of no ground between being unsympathetic towards a particular 'pattern of knowledge' and actually vomiting. If one wants to know what wine is like one must drink it.
There is, moreover, a sense in which meaning can only be talked about in terms of affect, or potential affect. If we take irony, for example, then the meaning, in any comprehensive sense, of a passage or work that can be called ironical can only be discussed in terms of a feeling of superiority which one audience has over another actual or potential audience. A similar point can be made about satire, which relies for its semantics upon the self-satisfaction of the audience. But all literary semantics depend upon effect, not necessarily upon the the effect we might suppose the work seeks, but certainly upon that which it produces. To demonstrate why this is so I must now turn to a more direct consideration of rhetoric itself.

**Literature as Rhetoric**

The study of rhetoric, or perhaps it would be better to say the teaching of rhetoric, supposedly arose from from a purely pragmatic origin - the fighting of legal battles. The notion of a professional arguer gave rise to the corresponding idea of a 'science' of convincing argument. Rhetoric, seen in this light, is a collection of abstract formulas which can accommodate any sort of semantic content and which, like a mathematical formula, will yield a certain result. It is just this idea of an evaluatively-neutral manipulation of questions of value, of persuasiveness, irrespective of the merits of the case, which Plato attacks in his *Gorgias* and *Phaedrus*. He is concerned that the rhetorician should not be accorded a higher status than the philosopher, for, he argues, those techniques which are truly instrumental in discovering the truth, that is, definition, division, and understanding, belong to the dialectic method and therefore to philosophy. Aristotle, apparently in contrast, begins his *Rhetoric* by declaring that rhetoric is the counterpart of dialectic. Indeed he holds that the rhetorical enthymeme, example, and maxim are equivalent to the syllogisms of logic. (The enthymeme is an argument, based on premises that are probable or generally held to be true, that is used to lead to a conclusion about a particular instance.) Following Aristotle, Cicero in his *De Oratore* asserts that wise thinking and 'elegant speaking' are inseparable, and Quintilian, in his *Institutio Oratoria*, declares the corollary - that no
man can be a good orator unless he is also a good man. If we are to make wise thought a necessary criterion for 'elegant speaking' then Aristotle, Cicero, and Quintilian cannot be argued with, but merely redefining rhetoric as 'rhetoric directed to a good end' does not answer Plato's original charge. Moreover Cicero's idea that the two are inseparable cannot be squared with the notion of decorum, a notion that is central to the concept of rhetoric, for without alternative ways of expressing the same facts, there can be no 'better' way and, consequently, no rhetoric.

Rhetoric, in contrast to dialectic or philosophy, is just this 'dress of thought' and, therefore, it is those subjects which are open to differing opinion that are most amenable to it. For rhetoric, by its emphasis on a particular interpretation is preeminently a means for ending dialogue, though equally it could be said that it is only rhetoric which keeps certain questions alive. A subject is manipulated by the enthymeme, the example, or the maxim, in order to produce an evaluation, that is, not to prove but to persuade. This foreclosure can be seen in metaphor, which, by talking about a thing in terms of something it is not, suppresses or emphasizes affective aspects of that thing; Aristotle's 'sunset of life', as we saw, can, as a generalization, cast a light on old age that might not be appropriate in a particular instance. Such a selective description, the essential aspect of rhetoric, implies a judgement and, therefore, an ethic or ideology. The enthymeme, with its suppressed premiss, requires a broad base of common opinion in favour of that premiss, a context of accepted values, in order to function as an argument. Indeed all moral or evaluative arguments must take the form of the enthymeme, for without some non-logical moral or evaluative assumption I cannot get from an 'is' premiss to an 'ought' conclusion, that is, the suppressed premiss must itself be a statement that can only be the conclusion of another enthymeme. Rhetoric, then, is the stamp of the affective, the ethical, or the ideological, on discourse. Aristotle, for example, recommends the use of the maxim on the grounds that it displays the speaker's ethos, that is, his moral preferences or character, advice that only makes sense within a context of accepted values. This, it would appear, is the very reason for Plato objecting to rhetoric being linked with philosophy;
Whenever then an orator, who is ignorant of good and evil, finds a people in a state of similar ignorance, and takes upon himself to persuade them by passing an eulogium, not upon a poor ass as though it were a horse, but upon evil as though it were good; and when, by having studied and learned the popular opinions, he has succeeded in persuading them to do that which is evil instead of that which is good, what kind of fruit do you imagine his oratory will hereafter reap as the harvest of the seed he has sown?  

Plato's concern is obviously not a logical positivist one, he does not object to the concept of 'good' itself, but rather to the idea that anyone but a philosopher should know what 'good' is.

In an essentially religious age, in an age in which the 'good' is a given, the enthymeme will of course assume the nature of an argument, an expression of reason. Bacon distinguished rhetoric, as a form of argument, from logic on the grounds that 'logic handleth reason exact and in truth, and rhetoric handleth it as it is planted in popular opinions and manners.' In Bacon's terminology 'all persuasions that are wrought by eloquence' are chiefly 'recommended unto reason' by the 'imagination', that is, through 'insinuative reason', the rhetorical. However, despite the fact that this description occurs in his *Advancement of Learning*, a work devoted to reason in the logical sense, Bacon's account of rhetoric is not an entirely negative one. He describes how reason can be 'disturbed' by means of logic, through sophistry, by means of rhetoric, through 'imagination' overpowering reason, and by 'morality', through the action of the passions or affections; the last of which we might also include under the heading of 'rhetoric'. Nevertheless he can claim that the true 'end of rhetoric is to fill the imagination to second reason, and not to oppress it' and that rhetoric per se should no more be held responsible for misleading that logic per se should be held responsible for sophistry. This defence of the imagination can be accounted for by Bacon's description of the source of moral 'knowledge': 'For we see that, in matters of faith and religion, we raise our imagination above our reason; which is the cause why religion sought ever access to the mind by similitudes, types, parables, visions, dreams.' The advantage that rhetoric possesses is not described by Bacon in terms of cunning or misleading, but in terms of physics: 'For many forms are equal in
signification which are differing in impression; as the difference is great in the piercing of that which is sharp and that which is flat, though the strength of the percussion be the same.' Rhetoric is justified, then, according to Bacon, because, through its power of penetrating to the imagination, it can better persuade the listener of those 'truths' that pertain to morality and the affections.

What, then, can be called 'rhetoric'? I shall reproduce De Quincey's answer to this question here, partly because his definition is so elegantly put, but primarily because its emphasis leads to questions which, I here wish to address, about the description of literature.

The province of Rhetoric, whether meant for an influence upon the actions, or simply upon the belief, lies amongst that vast field of cases where there is a pro and a con, with the chance of right and wrong, true and false, distributed in varying proportions between them. There is also an immense range of truths where there are no chances at all concerned, but the affirmative and the negative are both true: as, for example, the goodness of human nature and its wickedness; the happiness of human life and its misery; the charms of knowledge and its hollowness; the frailty of human prosperity in the eyes of religious meditation, and its security as estimated by worldly confidence and youthful hope. In all such cases the rhetorician exhibits his art by giving an impulse to one side, and by withdrawing the mind so steadily from all thoughts or images which support the other as to leave it practically under the possession of a one-sided estimate.

This is in keeping with Bacon's definition of rhetoric as 'insinuative reason', as that form of argument that deals with reason 'as it is planted in popular opinions and manners.' The enthymeme and the maxim can be characterized as 'arguments' from popular opinion or custom. As well as the historical aspect of rhetoric, it is important to note that rhetoric is a temporal effect, indeed it is this characteristic alone which allows rhetoric to appear as such within an historical period. The 'impulse toward' and 'withdrawal from' that characterizes rhetoric is only explicable in terms of a shift in attention, that is, rhetoric necessarily implies a beginning and a duration. This is brought out by Bacon's distinction between 'reason' and 'affection' on the grounds that 'reason
beholdeth the future and sum of time' while 'affection beholdeth merely the present'. Bacon accounts for the power of rhetoric to make affections 'behold' only the present, by asserting that 'the affections themselves carry ever an appetite to good', that is, what he calls the 'truths' of morality. It would be better, however, to describe this as an 'appetite' for value, for as Bacon's explanation stands it will not explain what he acknowledges elsewhere, that is, that rhetoric can make valuable to the affections that which he would not classify as 'good'. This brings me to Bacon's account of 'poesy', which he also holds can 'raise and erect the mind' to 'magnanimity' and 'morality'. Although he does not explicitly connect rhetoric with poetry, he describes both in terms of 'insinuation' and the action of the 'imagination'; this parallel is further emphasized by the distinction he makes between poetry, which submits 'the show of things to the desires of the mind', and reason, which 'doth buckle and bow the mind unto the nature of things'.

The connection between rhetoric and poetry has often been made; Puttenham, for example, who described poetry as 'the first Rhetoric of the world', describes the poet as 'of all others the most ancient Orator, as he that by good and pleasant persuasions first reduced the wild and beastly people into public societies and civilities of life, insinuating unto them, under fictions with sweet and coloured speeches, many wholesome lessons and doctrines.' Similarly explicit is George Campbell, two centuries later, who asserts that 'Poetry indeed is properly no other than a particular mode or form of certain branches of oratory.' However, what is more interesting, and more revealing, is the consistency with which different writers have, like Bacon, written of literature in terms that are compatible with the description of rhetoric.

Sidney believes that he deserves to be 'pounded' for 'straying from poetry to oratory' in his Defense, but finds that in 'wordish consideration' their affinity justifies the 'digression'. This can be accounted for in terms of the great influence exerted by such writers as Cicero and Quintilian during the period in which Sidney was writing, but it can also be accounted for in terms of an awareness on Sidney's part of what comprises the province of rhetoric, that is, by his possession of a term, now 'lost', to cover the range of poetical effects and the means by which they are produced. Longinus describes how it is the essence of rhetoric to make us 'seize upon the stronger element, so that we are
attracted away from the demonstration of fact to the startling image, and the argument lies below the surface of the accompanying brilliance.

But by what means has the orator here concealed his figure? Obviously by its very brilliance. For in much the same way as dim lights vanish in the radiance of the sun, so does the all-pervading effluence of grandeur utterly obscure the artifices of rhetoric. Something of the same kind occurs also in painting. For although light and shade as represented by colours may lie side by side on the same surface, it is the light that first catches the eye and seems not only to stand out, but also to be much nearer. So also is it with literature: by some natural affinity and by their brilliance, things which appeal to our feelings and sublime conceptions lie nearer to our hearts, and always catch our attention before the figures, overshadowing their artistry, and keeping it out of sight, so to speak.123

If there is an objection that one can make to this account then it is that in describing how brilliance 'obscures the artifices of rhetoric' Longinus is setting the horse after the cart, for the obscuring of artifice is itself a property of rhetoric. When Tasso advizes the poet that he 'should not show feigned things in the light of the sun, but rather in the darkness, like goods that in that way are more easily sold.', that he should 'elevate' what is low, 'give the effect of being generally known and illustrious' to what is obscure, 'supply art to the simple, ornament to the true, authority to the false.', he is speaking, unmistakably, in terms of rhetoric.124 Likewise Mazzoni echoes Aristotle's advice to the orator (and, incidentally, Booth's to the novelist), when he advizes the epic poet to resort to overt moral judgements in order to demonstrate his ethos to the audience.125

Even as the term 'rhetoric' was falling out of favour and, therefore, out of any use but a derogatory one, theorists were becoming more 'explicit' about the rhetoric of literature; thus Wordsworth writes that 'The appropriate business of poetry...her appropriate employment, her privilege and her duty, is to treat of things not as they are, but as they seem to exist to the senses, and to the passions.'126 Despite this declaration Wordsworth goes on to describe how certain kinds of 'vicious' poetry can 'dazzle' and 'beguile' by 'absurdities, extravagances, and misplaced ornaments', such rhetoric is not, however, according to Wordsworth, 'genuine', for 'genuine' poetry is 'as permanent as pure
Hunt, echoing Bacon's more defensible position, holds that poetry "begins where matter of fact or science ceases to be merely such, and to exhibit a further truth; that is to say, the connexion it has with the world of emotion, and its power to produce imaginative pleasure." A gardener, Hunt continues, will tell you that this flower is a 'lily', this is a 'matter of fact'; the botanist will tell you it is of the order of 'Hexandria Managynia', this is a 'matter of science'; but Spenser tells us that it is the 'lady' of the garden, and Ben Jonson that it is 'The plant and flower of light', this is the 'poetical sense' of the flower, 'the beauty of the flower in all its mystery and splendour.' We could examine this idea from the opposite direction by imagining an account, in the first person, of childhood religious belief. It might begin thus;

As a child I believed in heaven and hell.

There is no poetry in this, it is simply the description of a certain state of affairs, it conveys no feeling, it does not give the 'inwardness', the affective aspect of what is described. Let us introduce the element of 'childhoodness' in a more direct way;

Once upon a time I believed in heaven and hell.

The alteration introduces childhood both by association - 'Once upon a time...' is a traditional opening of children's stories - but it also conveys the fabulous world of childhood, a world that is continuous with the fairy tale, and governed by its laws. The belief in heaven and hell, however, is still not immediately present, it is simply mentioned. Let us try again;

Once upon a time there was a heaven and a hell.

Now we have a poetical rendering - a rendering that includes a great deal more than the first rendering and which could only be made synonymous with it by the ignoring of almost all that it conveys - but also a sentence, like any that would contain 'flower of light', that describes a literally impossible state of affairs. Also, like 'flower of light', it is ambiguous outside of its context in a way that 'lily' or 'As a child I
believed in heaven and hell' are not. Even the 'slightest touch of genuine humanity', writes Patmore, 'is of more actual and poetic value than all that is not human', for 'Nature has no beauty or pathos...but that which the mind invests it.', and thus it is 'the state of mind' which reflects and is given expression by nature which is the 'true subject' of poetry.130 Pater, likewise writes that 'just in proportion as the writer's aim, consciously or unconsciously, comes to be the transcribing, not of the world, not of mere fact, but of his sense of it, he becomes an artist, his work fine art', for literature is representation 'as connected with soul, of a specific personality in its preferences, its volition and power.'131 In more sophisticated mood there is Richards' description of metaphor as 'a semi-surreptitious method by which a greater variety of elements can be wrought into the fabric of the experience.', since 'what is needed for the wholeness of an experience is not always naturally present, and metaphor supplies an excuse by which what is needed may be smuggled in'.132 The concept of the enthymeme, the heart of rhetoric, implies just this 'smuggling in', this giving of the world ad hominem. 'Life', writes Henry James, 'has no direct sense whatever for the subject and is capable...of nothing but splendid waste.'

Life being all inclusion and confusion, and art being all discrimination and selection, the latter, in search of the hard latent value with which alone it is concerned, sniffs round the mass as instinctively and unerringly as a dog suspicious of some buried bone.133

How latent is the value art discovers? That is, would it not be better here to say 'invents' or 'invests'? Hugo wrote that drama must be a 'concentrating mirror, which...concentrates and condenses the coloured rays, which makes of a mere gleam a light, and of a light a flame.'134 A gleam is a comparative thing, as Longinus said, a gleam is a spark in darkness, a light is an illumination, a banishment of that darkness, a flame is a centre of attention; one may only be magnifying but this process necessarily entails the gradual eradication of the context and it is thus an altering, a changing.135 Aristotle, it should be remembered, distinguished between comedy and tragedy on the grounds that comedy aims to present men as worse than they are, tragedy as better.136 The seventeenth century writer Pierre Nicole saw this alterative effect of art
as leaving the way open for a more sure poisoning of the mind; 'What makes the danger greater is that comedy removes all the remedies which might prevent the evil impression it makes; the heart is softened by the pleasure of seeing it; and the mind is wholly occupied with externals and drunk with the follies it sees represented, and consequently beyond the state of Christian vigilance.' Johnson, in the following passage on the novel, likewise implicitly recognizes the rhetorical potential of fiction though, unlike Nicole, he believes that this can be as much a matter of moral instruction as corruption:

These books are written chiefly to the young, the ignorant, and the idle, to whom they serve as lectures of conduct and introduction into life. They are the entertainment of minds unfurnished with ideas and therefore easily susceptible of impressions, not fixed by principles and therefore easily following the current of fancy, not informed by experience and consequently open to every false suggestion and partial account... For this reason these familiar histories may perhaps be made greater use of than the solemnities of professed morality, and convey the knowledge of vice and virtue with more efficacy than axioms and definitions. But if the power of example is so great as to take possession of the memory by a kind of violence, and produce effects almost without the intervention of the will, care ought to be taken that, when the choice is unrestrained, the best examples only should be exhibited, and that which is likely to operate so strongly should not be mischievous or uncertain in its effects.

This is, however, only one aspect of giving the world ad hominem, and its tone encourages the modern mind to slip over it with "this is what was once thought", forgetting that today we are no less assured of certain certainties very like these, though we see them only vaguely and the conventionality of their expression hardly registers as such. 'Because the Mind of Man requires something more perfect in Matter, than what he finds there,' writes Addison, in terms sufficiently abstract to rise, through metaphor, above the status of historical curios, 'and can never meet with any Sight in Nature which sufficiently answers its highest Ideas of Pleasantness...it is the part of the Poet to humour the Imagination in its own Notions, by perfecting Nature where he describes a Reality, and by adding greater Beauties than are put together in Nature, where he describes a Fiction.' Camus notes that style, which he
describes as the unity and boundary of the 'recreated universe' of the work, is the 'correction which the artist imposes by his language and by a redistribution of elements derived from reality...It attempts in the work of every rebel, and succeeds in the case of a few geniuses to impose its laws on the world.'

In a footnote Camus approvingly cites Delacroix's opinion that 'it is necessary to correct the inflexible perspective which (in reality) falsifies the appearance of objects "by virtue of precision".' There are overtones of Lukács' 'partisan objectivity' in this assertion, for every mannerism of style, that is, style per se, is the expression of an ethical sympathy. Lawrence recognizes this when he writes that because 'a novel is a microcosm, and because man in viewing the universe must view it in the light of a theory, therefore every novel must have the background or the structural skeleton of some theory of being, some metaphysic.'

Most explicit about this metaphysical temper inherent in the poetic or literary is Matthew Arnold, who defines the 'end and aim of all literature, if one considers it attentively' as nothing but 'a criticism of life.' This 'criticism of life' must, however, be made 'in conformity with the laws of poetic truth and poetic beauty', that is, it must be made through 'truth and seriousness of substance and matter, felicity and perfection of diction and manner'. It makes this 'criticism', exhibits this metaphysic, according to Arnold, through its 'powerful and beautiful application of ideas to life, - to the question: How to live.'

He gives the following three examples of 'moral ideas':

Nor love thy life, nor hate; but what thou liv'st, Live well; how long or short, permit, to heaven.

For ever wilt thou love, and she be fair

We are such stuff As dreams are made on, and our little life Is rounded with a sleep.

As ideas these fit easily into De Quincey's description of topics that allow of opinion, and which cannot be definitely settled, that is, concepts about which definite assertions can only be made within the realm of rhetoric; Arnold implicitly declares as much when he writes that poetry 'attaches its emotion to the idea'. But are these answers to the
question 'How to live'? Tchekhov wrote that in observing, selecting, and combining, the artist, we might say 'the work', presupposes a question, but that it is only the 'correct setting' of the question, not its solution, that is 'obligatory for the artist.' Robbe-Grillet voices a similar thought when he writes that 'the function of art is never to illustrate a truth - or even an interrogation - known in advance, but to bring into the world certain interrogations (and also, perhaps, in time, certain answers) not as yet known as such to themselves.' However, a question, particularly a question that admits of no answer, is itself an assertion, it asserts that something is problematic and presupposes a choice of answers, of meanings - "When did you stop beating your wife?".

Many theorists, then, have talked about literature in terms of rhetorical effects, not only when praising it but also, on occasion, when villifying parts of it. Robbe-Grillet, for example, describes how in the 'bourgeois' novel 'the word functioned as a trap in which the writer captured the universe in order to hand it over to society.' Significantly it is metaphor that he singles out as the primary means by which this is done, for he holds that far from simply expressing a comparison, it 'actually introduces a subterranean communication, a movement of sympathy (or of antipathy) which is its true raison d'être.'

What would the village lose by being merely "situated" in the valley? The word "huddled" gives us no complementary information. On the other hand it transports the reader (in the author's wake) into the imagined soul of the village; if I accept the word "huddled", I am no longer entirely a spectator; I myself become the village, for the duration of a sentence, and the valley functions as a cavity into which I aspire to disappear.

Such analogies, he declares, are too insistent not to reveal an 'entire metaphysical system' in the work, for the sentiment is, by means of metaphor, made to appear to derive from and find fulfilment in the world. Thus metaphor, as I wrote in Chapter 1, appears to be the most rhetorical of rhetorical figures. But why should I care that the village is even "situated" in the valley? Robbe-Grillet seems to believe that literature can 'just say' without saying anything, without trying to establish a contract with the reader, as if to bring a hypothetical village to my attention were to assert nothing. My contention is that this is not so; however it will be well to consider some of the ways in
which various writers have sought to distinguish, either explicitly or implicitly, the literary from the rhetorical.

De Quincey, whose definition I began with, distinguishes 'eloquence' from 'rhetoric' on the grounds that 'eloquence' is 'the overflow of powerful feelings upon occasions fitted to excite them.', while 'rhetoric' is, in contrast, 'the art of aggrandizing and bringing out into strong relief, by means of various and striking thoughts, some aspect of truth which of itself is supported by no spontaneous feelings, and therefore rests upon artificial aids.' This distinction, however, like many made in that period when writers seemed to write primarily for writers, produces no difference with regard to the effect upon the audience - the distinction from this point of view is only between intentional rhetoric and unintentional rhetoric. I have let De Quincey's 'eloquence' stand for the poetical here because of its obvious affinities with Wordsworth's conception of poetry, however, Hazlitt had earlier used 'eloquence' in a sense that appears synonymous with 'rhetoric';

The difference between poetry and eloquence is, that the one is the eloquence of the imagination, the other of the understanding. Eloquence tries to persuade the will, and convince the reason: poetry produces its effect by instantaneous sympathy. Nothing is a subject for poetry that admits of dispute.

The most conclusive criticism of this passage is contained within the passage itself; poetry and eloquence are both types of eloquence! That we are such stuff as dreams are made of is only indisputable to the extent that we feel it is a statement without sense. Despite the difference in vocabulary the basis of Hazlitt's distinction is much the same as De Quincey's, the difference between 'persuasion' and 'instantaneous sympathy' lying in the reader's temperament rather than in any intrinsic properties of different works. Newman, in the same tradition, describes how 'Poetical eloquence consists, first in the power of illustration - which the poet uses, not as the orator, voluntarily, for the sake of clearness or ornament; but almost by constraint, as the sole outlet and expression of intense inward feeling.' Perhaps the most famous, and clear, expression of this idea is to be found in Mill's description of poetry as 'overheard';
Poetry and eloquence are both alike the expression or uttering forth of feeling. But if we may be excused the seeming affectation of the antithesis, we should say that eloquence is heard, poetry is overheard. Eloquence supposes an audience; the peculiarity of poetry appears to us to lie in the poet's utter unconscioness of a listener. Poetry is feeling confessing itself to itself, in moments of solitude, and bodying itself forth in symbols which are the nearest possible representations of the feeling in the exact shape in which it exists in the poet's mind. Eloquence is feeling pouring itself forth to other minds, courting their sympathy, or endeavouring to influence their belief, or move them to passion or to action.\textsuperscript{158}

For the reader, of course, poetry is eloquence. The passage remains, however, a good description of what seems to be the difference, but this very seeming to be signals the presence of rhetoric; indeed, in that the 'poet's utter unconscioness' is more apparent than real, poetry is another degree of artifice again. James, who provided me with the title 'The Illusion of Life', writes that we 'feel that we are touching the truth' in proportion to the degree to which art offers us 'life without rearrangement' and 'in proportion as we see it with arrangement do we feel that we are being put off with a substitute, a compromise and convention.'\textsuperscript{159} This is the naivety of James' position; that the appearance of truthfulness should be more truthful than the appearance of falsity, of artificiality. For James, the novelist must have the 'power to guess the unseen from the seen, to trace the implication of things, to judge the whole piece by the pattern, the condition of feeling life in general so completely that you are well on your way to knowing any particular corner of it'.\textsuperscript{160} This "gift" of being able to take a mile from an inch, from which springs the fallacy of praising the artist for insight, is no more than speculating in a convincing manner, the conviction that it produces in the reader can only exist, in contrast to what James says, by virtue of a shared convention - "Yes, this is the way things are.". (One might here remember again the enthymeme.) On a more esoteric level Heidegger holds that poetry 'measures' the language that is the 'master of man', and thereby creates a 'dwelling for man in the world.'\textsuperscript{161} The act of measuring does not, of course, presume either an amount to be measured or even a standard unit of measurement, nevertheless it is an act of appropriation, of taking the world \textit{ad hominem}. The 'literary', writes Robbe-Grillet, is that which 'functions
like a grid or screen set with bits of different coloured glass that fracture our field of vision into tiny assimilable facets.' The novel, he believes, is particularly dedicated to this enterprise of controlling the world by 'assigning it a meaning', and thus 'because of it, the world has only, little by little, lost all its life.' However, this sentiment occurs in an essay entitled 'A Future for the Novel', for Robbe-Grillet's project is the construction of a world, within the novel, that is 'more solid and more immediate' than the 'universe of "signification"' which the novel has previously offered;

In this future universe of the novel, gestures and objects will be there before being something; and they will still be there afterwards, hard, unalterable, eternally present, mocking their own "meaning," that meaning which vainly tries to reduce them to the role of precarious tools, of a temporary and shameful fabric woven exclusively - and deliberately - by the superior human truth expressed in it, only to cast out this awkward auxiliary into immediate oblivion and darkness.

To be there, to be in literature at all is to be something, to assume a meaning, to be part of a fabric. The logical conclusion to Robbe-Grillet's argument is the rejection of literature, for to write is to bring something to the attention, to give it a meaning, to present it as an object worthy of attention because of the part it plays in a larger whole. A more defensible position is that adopted by Mazzoni who, while classifying poetry with sophistry, in that it 'propounds feigned things to our intellect in order to regulate the appetite', holds that it is justified in doing so when its end is to improve. Thus there can be, according to Mazzoni, a poetry which is sophistic in a bad sense, and a poetry which can be sophistic in a good sense, depending on whether it tends to 'disorder' the will or make the will 'conformable with the just'. (Interestingly, from the point of view of the role of criticism, he later writes that since the 'judgement' given by the author can be a matter of controversy, there is 'perhaps...no less utility derived from raising the question whether the writer has judged well and whether the precept that can be obtained from his judgement is the best one.'. Mill makes a point similar to Mazzoni's in answering Bentham's charge that all poetry is misrepresentation' in that, as Mill summarizes him, it consists 'essentially in exaggeration for effect: in proclaiming some one
view of a thing very emphatically, and suppressing all the limitations and qualifications.' Mill allows that the charge is just and even asserts that 'all writing which undertakes to make men feel truths as well as see them, does take up one point at a time, does seek to impress that, to drive that home, to make it sink into and colour the whole mind of the reader or hearer.' However, he continues, poetry is 'justified in doing so, if the portion of truth which it thus enforces be that which is called for by the occasion.', so that while all writing 'addressed to the feelings has a natural tendency to exaggeration...we must aim at too much, to be assured of doing enough.' For Mill there are truths of the sort that can be expressed rhetorically, so that his defence of literature runs parallel to a justification of rhetoric - this, we shall find, is always the case.

The Metaphysic

Literature is not representation but description, and description of what is (the world) in terms of what is not. It is for this reason that it is, inevitably rhetorical; for the description stands in an analogical relationship to reality and we cannot have such an analogy or metaphor, for its own sake, without a rhetorical aspect. In Chapter 1 I stated that figurative language is, paradoxically, a meaningful deviation from the use that characterizes meaning, that it is the use of usage. I now wish turn to what was only touched upon in that chapter - in discussing fables - that is, the imaginative suggestion not of the isolated phrase, but rather of the narrative as a whole. This cumulative significance we derive from a work corresponds to what has been, misleadingly, called the author’s 'outlook', 'vision', or 'philosophy'.

Aristotle considered that poetry is more worthy of serious attention than history, because it is concerned with 'universal truths, and is, therefore, more 'philosophical'. Elyot describes poetry as 'the first philosophy that ever was known, whereby men from their childhood were brought up to the reason how to live well'. Sidney, who makes a similar point when he describes poetry as 'the first light-giver to ignorance', elsewhere calls the poet 'the right popular philosopher.'. Likewise Arnold gives poetry the same function as philosophy and
simultaneously sets it above "philosophy" when he describes it as 'nothing less than the most perfect speech of man, that in which he comes nearest to being able to utter the truth.' Though the term 'philosophy' has almost completely gone out of use in a literary context, along with 'message', for reasons I shall come to, the belief expressed by these authors is not simply an historical curiosity. The terms may have been replaced by 'vision', 'outlook', or 'attitude towards' but each of these expresses the same feeling that the work, as a whole, or even the writer, as an ouevre, is making some one, unified assertion about reality, is demonstrating some definable attitude towards life.

This 'philosophy', 'outlook', 'vision', or 'attitude' I will here refer to as the 'imaginative suggestion' or 'metaphysic' of the work. By 'metaphysical' I mean those assertions that are made, within or without literature, about the tenor of existence, its 'feel'; such assertions as are answers to questions like 'Why am I living? What purpose has my existence? Which of these things is of absolute importance? What should I do?'. What an enquirer after such questions seeks is not knowledge but direction and/or consolation, for they are questions the answers to which must inevitably belong to the realm of rhetoric. A great deal of apparently disparate thought can be gathered under this heading of 'metaphysical', for though the Lord Mayor's "philosophy of life" and Sartre's Being and Nothingness may differ greatly with regard to their degree of systematization, the consistency of the argument they advance, or even their 'poetry', they are both concerned with "man's place in the universe", with how one ought to live, with, in short, "the meaning of life". This, then, is the sense in which I will apply the term 'metaphysical' to literature. A work can be said to demonstrate a single, definable metaphysic for the same reason as it can be said to be metaphysical at all, that is, by virtue of the fact that it is bounded, a discrete piece of language framed between two covers and, as such, cannot help but have a unity, the unity which it has. In literature, as I wrote in Chapter 3, the reflection on the universe is manifest in the selection and presentation of material for the attention of the reader, by the relationships of proximity, similarity, symmetry, closure, and continuation which exist within the constellation created by this boundary, that is, by the style. A disconnected urinal in an art gallery invites a different mental set to one lying in a dump, but literature is
another degree of artifice again, for language itself is a framing, a creation of boundaries. This is why I have insisted that all literature has 'organic form'; for if the metaphysic or imaginative suggestion is the cumulative significance then all that is in the work contributes to this; it is the decision not to consider any nuance as negligible, any connotation as surplus which constitutes the making literary of a text.

Literature does not, of course, appear as a matter of conclusions, of answers that can be verified or falsified - not until it falls into the hands of a critic, at least. Nevertheless we can speak of the work as an argument, an argument that resides in the nature of the agreement between the world and its description within the work. When we speak of the 'world' of the novelist or poet we can mean nothing more than our own world at a different, figurative, level of language, and this is a tacit acceptance of the metaphysical nature of that 'world', for it presupposes a significance to be abstracted.17 What lies behind our voluntary subjection to this 'world', this abstraction and crystallization, this pattern of significance? The answer probably lies in two aspects of imaginativeness - amusement and discovery - but also in the desire for an affirmation of our sense of human significance, in the desire to experience the world ad hominem. Fictions, then, move us not because we have been lulled into believing that the events they describe really happened, nor because we already believe that the events they describe did happen, are happening, and will very probably always happen, rather we are moved, our attention is caught by the text because it manifests an atmosphere which we wish to prevail. This, we might say, is the motive of the will in the 'willing suspension of disbelief'.

Is there some way that we can separate literary metaphysics from 'philosophical' metaphysics? This separation was something quite often attempted by those philosophers who, having renounced metaphysics and yet recognizing the affinity between the statements made by metaphysics and those to be found in poetry, sought to exempt poetry from their renunciation. Ayer, for example, in *Language, Truth and Logic*, distinguishes between metaphysics and literature on the grounds that the metaphysician writes 'nonsense' while believing he is 'primarily concerned with the expression of true propositions', while the poet writes nonsense 'because he considers it most suitable for bringing about the effects for which his writing is designed', that is 'the creation of a
work of art'. By 'nonsensical' Ayer means 'meaningless', a term he applies to any sentence which expresses a proposition which is neither analytic (necessarily true) or empirically verifiable. However, though he seems to consider poetry as a legitimate activity and metaphysics as not, he does not go on to explain why the creation of a work of art should legitimize meaningless propositions, and so we must leave his aesthetic speculations as they stand.

Such criteria as Ayer sets out for 'meaningfulness' will obviously not satisfy its common, almost universal 'metaphysical' sense of 'significance'. This is the kind of meaning which is sought in order to serve as the basis for choosing between possible courses of action. Moreover it could be argued that if a proposition was truly 'meaningless', that is, without a meaning, it could not be understood let alone understood to be 'meaningless' in the sense of unverifiable. There are other ways of considering metaphysical systems, aside from the point of view of logicality or verification. Thus, for example, Bertrand Russell writing on the 'melancholy optimism' of Plotinus;

A philosophical system may be judged important for various different kinds of reasons. The first and most obvious is that we think it is true...But truth is not the only merit that a metaphysic can possess. It may have beauty, and this is certainly to be found in Plotinus; there are passages that remind one of the later cantos of Dante's Paradiso, and of almost nothing else in literature...Again a philosophy may be important because it expresses well what men are prone to believe in certain moods or in certain circumstances. Uncomplicated joy and sorrow is not a matter for philosophy...Only joy and sorrow accompanied by reflection on the universe generate metaphysical theories.

Russell is using 'philosophy' in a popular sense here, that is, not in the sense of an activity concerned with the structure of truth and valid argument, but rather in the metaphysical sense of a blend of narrative and direct rhetorical appeal. Indeed, he explicitly makes the comparison with poetry. Why, however, do I describe 'philosophical' metaphysics as a blend of narrative and direct rhetorical appeal? If we consider even that apparently anti-metaphysical metaphysic 'Existentialism' we find that it is just this, the description of certain psychological states together with some emotive generalizations about the nature of existence, which are taken as the grounds for making recommendations as to conduct.
Consider, for example, the drama of the universe crushing the thinking-reed in that passage from Pascal with which the study of Existentialism usually begins, for here the universe, far from being indifferent, as the passage seems to want to say, is capable of 'arming itself', can 'kill' rather than let die, have an advantage, and even be capable of ignorance: it is an animated universe. This animation is contained in the series of metaphors that runs through the passage;

Man is but a reed, the most feeble thing in nature; but he is a thinking reed. The entire universe need not arm itself to crush him. A vapour, a drop of water suffices to kill him. But, if the universe were to crush him, a man would still be more noble than that which killed him, because he knows that he dies and the advantage which the universe has over him; the universe knows nothing of this. All our dignity consists, then, in thought.162

It is only by passing over the metaphoricalness of the passage that it can be made to sustain an assertion of the dignity of man but without the metaphors the assertion would not exist in the first place.163

I have singled out Existentialism because it is a metaphysic, or collection of metaphysics, which supposedly denies inherent significance; that other forms of significance-giving, the religious, could also be described, even in its theological aspect, as a collection of stories and injunctions.164 However, for a closer look at 'philosophical' metaphysics I wish to examine a passage from Schopenhauer, at one time a poet's philosopher and still valued for the 'poetry' of his writing;

Thus his [Man's] existence, even when we consider only its formal side, is a constant hurrying of the present into the dead past, a constant dying. But if we look at it from the physical side; it is clear that, as our walking is admittedly a constant prevented falling, the life of our body is only a constant prevented dying, an ever-postponed death: finally, in the same way, the activity of our mind is a constantly deferred ennui...The life of every individual, if we survey it as a whole and in general, and only lay stress on its significant features, is really always a tragedy.165

It would be equally valid to deduce from the passage of time that we are constantly being born, to describe our walking as a triumph over gravity, a constant remaining upright, and to draw an analogy between this last
"fact" and the energetic and fecund nature of our mental activity. What are significant features to Schopenhauer may not be so to you and me, and, despite his claim to objectivity, or formality, what he presents us with is an emotive interpretation of facts - the passage of time, the mechanics of walking - which are, in themselves, perfectly neutral. (Tragedy is, of course, a literary form.) This, then, is rhetoric as I have defined it above, and one might see from its presence here why George Campbell, in his Philosophy of Rhetoric (1776), considered that the study of rhetoric 'properly conducted, leads directly to an acquaintance with ourselves; it not only traces the operation of the intellect and imagination but discloses the lurking springs of action in the heart.' However, what I wished to find was some way of distinguishing between literary and philosophical metaphysics, for no-one would confuse a page of Sartre with a page of Shakespeare (though other cases are more problematic). The difference might be said to lie in the fact that while literature is descriptive and immediate, metaphysical philosophy is prescriptive and tends to abstraction. Both express an attitude, through style, but in literature this expression is a more pervasive quality that it is in metaphysical philosophy. This difference is very much a matter of degree, the "philosophical" text expresses a metaphysic while the literary work manifests one, we might say, but the two obviously tend towards one another to a greater or lesser extent on different occasions.

When one thinks of 'poetic thought' it is of such explicit statements as Gray's 'Elegy', Wordsworth's 'Prelude', or perhaps Proust's A la recherche du temps perdu, contain - of the wistful, the stoic, the pessimistic, or the mystical - but though such statements are not necessarily identifiable with the metaphysics manifested in any of these works, neither can one claim that they are irrelevant to them. Arnold wrote that Wordsworth's 'poetry is the reality' while his 'philosophy...is the illusion', and that one could not do him justice until one had dismissed 'his formal philosophy.' This 'formal philosophy', we may presume, is that metaphysic which can be constructed from certain details of Wordsworth's works, but as an abstraction it cannot claim to be the metaphysic manifest in those works; this we saw with Pascal. To argue that the poetry and 'philosophy' run counter to one another is to argue that the poetry too says something, but to dismiss Wordsworth's overt
metaphysical statements is to do as much violence to the metaphysic manifest in his work as does identifying that metaphysic solely with those overt assertions. As I said earlier, from a critical point of view nothing is surplus to the work.

The question of overt metaphysical statements or abstract reflections on the world is one that is especially important to the method of criticism and so I will deal with it at some length here. As I said, when one thinks of 'poetic thought' it is to such propositions that one's mind turns; a reviewer of the Oxford Dictionary of Quotations described it, approvingly, as 'the iron rations of literature', as if were one to boil down literature the precipitate, the quintessence, would be a collection of quotables. But it is quotables, that is, overt metaphysical assertions that I now wish to consider, and by this I mean such things as the following;

We are such stuff
As dreams are made on, and our little life
Is rounded with a sleep.189

The still, sad music of humanity.190

Les vrais paradis sont les paradis qu'on a perdus.191

I will refer to such epigrams, aphorisms, or apercus, as sententiae, to distinguish their degree of explicitness from that to be found in the event or situation described, the choice of adjective, or the generalizing metaphor (which are equally metaphysical in character.) As we saw in Chapter 2, one must walk a narrow path between insisting that language in fiction is referential and that it is non-referential if one is not to become involved in paradox, for the relationship of fiction to reality is one of metaphorical appropriateness rather than literal correspondence. However, there is a sense in which 'Tintern Abbey' asserts that humanity has 'still, sad music' and the Tempest asserts that 'We are such stuff as dreams are made on'. That such generalizations are made 'in character' is an irrelevance; the assertions are made, even if only momentarily, by the work - they are there on the page. This is not to make the mistake of suggesting that Shakespeare advizes one to, above all else, put money in one's purse; indeed, once one overcomes the idea of looking for a personality behind the work rather than in it, a certain amount of
resistance to treating such sentential as reflections on the world also disappears. There is a unity in what the work says, inevitably, but this may be the sum of even contradictory reflections.

In an essay by Morris Weitz, concerned with such sententia and called e. 'Truth in Literature', he claims that though such statements are in the nature of empirical statements the 'well-wrought reader' does not allow a rejection of them 'to enter into his response to the work of art.' He describes how a 'philosophy' can emerge from a work as follows:

Given the presence of symbolism plus the general claims about experience, we soon pick out a larger pattern of claim about the world, and perhaps, in some cases, a whole theory of behaviour in regard to some phenomenon. Never printed as such, the theory is yet suggested or implied by the total combination of invented characters, places, things, events, their symbolic associations, and the reflections of the author.

(As an example of such a 'basic truth claim' in a novel he attributes to Proust the idea that 'love is an illusion and cannot bring us happiness'.) Despite the comprehensiveness of this description he holds to two points that render his position questionable: firstly, he attributes the reflections on the world to the author, which makes him reject as negligible all those assertions that are made 'in character', and, secondly, he believes that only 'most' literary works contain such a point of view. It is not surprising, then, that he believes the reader can, and should, prevent their response to the sententia from entering into their response to the work, for he makes such sententia into something accidental to the work. This is crude reading, as crude as making the opposite assumption and ignoring everything but the overt metaphysical assertions. This latter is what I will call 'taking the book at its word', as one does when ascribing to Pascal the description of an indifferent universe, which means, of course, not taking the book at its 'word'.

But what of an author's 'philosophy' in the sense of a consistent type of statement about the world running through the work's sententia? René Wellek, in a review of Leavis' Revaluations, takes Leavis to task for not making explicit, in his discussion of Blake, Wordsworth, and Shelley, "the romantic view of the world" which the three poets have in common. Leavis replies that 'For the critic, for the reader whose primary interest is poetry, those three poets are so radically different, immediately and
finally, from one another that to offer to assimilate them in a common philosophy can only suggest the irrelevance of the philosophic approach.\textsuperscript{195} The kind of approach Wellek is urging, Leavis suggests, assumes that 'poets put loosely what philosophers formulate with precision.'\textsuperscript{196} Furthermore this kind of extrapolation can only be achieved by ignoring what is unique to each work, by specializing the kind of sense that one is looking for, and often ironing out inconsistencies in that sense, as they appear in the stylistic qualities.

If, in reply to my charge that Shelley's poetry is repetitive, vapourous, monotonously self-regarding and often emotionally cheap, and so, in no very long run, boring, Dr Wellek tells me that Shelley was an idealist, I can only wonder whether some unfavourable presumption has not been set up about idealism.\textsuperscript{197}

Moreover if one's object in reading was to inform oneself about idealism then a study of Berkeley, Hegel, or F.H.Brandley would be more to the purpose than a study of Shelley.

"The good thing about doing English Literature", someone once remarked to me, "is that it's a little bit of everything." It is a little bit of history, sociology, psychology, philosophy, and so on, in the sense that as soon as one begins to talk about culture, character, or ideas, in an analytical setting, shades of these disciplines are evoked. This is true and it is also a 'good' thing about literary studies, but literary criticism, to deserve the name, should be above all the study of the individual work with reference to its individuality. The danger of introducing any of these disciplines, and their intrinsic reference points, wholesale into criticism is that the work itself gradually gets pushed further and further out of the picture until one is left with an historical, or a sociological, or a psychological, or a philosophical essay on text T, instead of an essay on work T. This is not merely a distinction in terminology; there will be a genuine difference between an essay on the cognitve and emotional import of Shelley's work, and an essay on idealism illustrated by quotations from Shelley, just as there is a difference between discussing Pope's lines as a comment on the relation between form and content, and discussing them as poetry. (As a general rule we might say that generalization introduces a certain insensitivity to the particular.) However, the bald statement that literary criticism
should be primarily concerned with the imaginative suggestion of the individual text explains very little. I must justify such an assertion, for the mere wish to keep literary criticism as a separate discipline does not achieve this. I will return to this question in Chapter 6.

Rhetoric and Belief

'All great poetry', writes Eliot, 'gives the illusion of a view of life.', for 'every precise emotion tends towards intellectual formulation.'191 However, though he attributes a 'philosophy' to Dante he warns against generalizing from this example, for 'great poetry' need not have a 'great philosophy' behind it;

As flies to wanton boys, are we to the gods;
They kill us for their sport.

What makes such lines 'great poetry', though they are 'poor philosophy', according to Eliot, is that they express 'in perfect language, some permanent human impulse.'199 Eliot concludes from this that poetry is not a 'substitute' for philosophy or theology or religion, that its 'function is not intellectual but emotional', and 'cannot be defined adequately in intellectual terms.'200 But Shakespeare's lines do not express even a poor philosophy according to my earlier definition; they express a view of life, certainly, but such views are a matter of metaphysics, of rhetoric. (Russell, too, spoke of the value of a metaphysic lying in its expression of 'what men are prone to believe in certain moods or in certain circumstances.').) Likewise what he does describe as 'great philosophy' is a system of thought that falls within the metaphysical category; 'E la sua volontade e nostra pace' may be great poetry but the existence of that God to which 'sua' refers is an emotional rather than philosophical matter.201

To express a thing rhetorically, that is, to make 'poetry' out of a view of life, is, as De Quincey says, to give the 'impulse' to one side of a two-sided question, while withdrawing it from the other, so as to leave the mind 'practically under the possession of a one-sided estimate.' We cannot talk about this swaying of the emotions toward an at least
partially exclusive estimate without considering the nature of belief, for rhetoric, so defined, and the definition seems adequate, is precisely a matter of producing conviction where no proof is possible. And yet, to talk about literature in terms of belief...? This is one reason why De Quincey's description seemed so apt to my purposes, for 'impulse towards' suggests something both playful and momentary, something, above all, non-intellectual. In contrast 'belief in' suggests something static, something with a far clearer outline, the product of an intellectual process. But a belief is no less a belief for being hazy or transient. But belief arising from emotion...? It is customary to think of emotion in almost exclusively physiological terms, and there may be something to this - some, after all, have considered thought itself to be the product of a reflex inhibited in its motor aspect - but if we are to deal with even the cruder nuances of poetical metaphysics, even from the pragmatic point of view I intend to adopt, we cannot start down among the nerve cells for there is too far to go from there before we even get to hunger, let alone angst or piety. Suffice it to say, for the moment, that the very existence of metaphysics presupposes a causal connection between emotion and belief.

The frame of reference we employ, the terms we use in criticism depend upon what type of meaning we ascribe to, what tenor of belief we invest in, the terms we encounter in the literary work. 'Pragmatism', as a theory of meaning, has been seen as a mediator between metaphysics and logic, and, as such, an examination of it may prove useful in mediating between 'poetry' and and "common sense", since it is the quality of this mediation which establishes the type of discourse of the critical piece. As Peirce formulated the pragmatic approach, meaning is arrived at by translating an ordinary categorical singular statement in which a predicate is applied to an object ('This is hard') into one, or several, conditional or hypothetical statements - 'If operation O were to be performed on this, then E would be experienced' - thus 'This is hard' becomes 'If one were to try and scratch this, one would not succeed'.

The last sentence derived is the pragmatic meaning of 'hard'; if a term resists such a translation then it is scientifically meaningless, though it may evoke images or stimulate emotion. To develop the meaning of a term we have therefore, according to Peirce, 'simply to determine what
habits it produces, for what a thing means is simply what habits it involves,' for it is what is 'tangible and practical' which is 'the root of every real distinction of thought, no matter how subtle it may be'.202 Understanding a declarative sentence consists, then, in being disposed to accept or reject it in certain concrete situations; our idea of what a sentence describes is our idea of the sensible effects we would experience or observe from it. As we might expect, this emphasis on the concrete situation and on experimentation makes this approach unsympathetic towards any sort of metaphysics, which, by definition, treats of what is impervious to the senses, and therefore a subject which Peirce describes as 'much more curious than useful, the knowledge of which, like that of a sunken reef, serves chiefly to enable us to keep clear of it'.204 In all this there is no mention of truth, though obviously a statement which contains a term which cannot be so translated - for example, 'God is One' - cannot be true or false. However this pragmatic method was extended by William James in a way that is particularly pertinent to the subject of belief. In a sense we have reached our journey's end with Peirce's notion of habit and sensible effect, but it is necessary to clarify how we might apply this to the literary metaphysic, and, to that end, we must take a detour to see where we cannot go with it.

James, though he allied himself with Peirce's approach, did not reject metaphysics; in fact he saw in the pragmatic method a means of deciding between competing metaphysical statements. He held that, since there can be no difference anywhere that does not make a difference somewhere else, 'no difference in abstract truth that doesn't express itself in a difference in concrete fact and in conduct consequent upon that fact, imposed on somebody, somehow, somewhere and somewhen.', then the pragmatic method could be used to 'interpret' every idea by tracing its practical consequences, 'to find out what definite difference it would make to you or me, at definite instants in our life, if this world-formula or that world-formula be the true one.'205 So far I would consider this uncontroversial, it is little more than a restatement of Peirce's position and it outlines considerations that were very much in my mind when I spoke of the 'imaginative suggestion' of the work. But James' pragmatism is more than a matter of interpretation, it is a theory of 'truth'. For James ideas become true 'in so far as they help us to get into
satisfactory relation with other parts of our experience, to summarise them and get about among them by conceptual short-cuts instead of following the interminable succession of particular phenomena.206

A new opinion counts as 'true' just in proportion as it gratifies the individual's desire to assimilate the novel in his experience to his beliefs in stock. It must both lean on old truth and grasp new fact; and its success...in doing this, is a matter for the individual's appreciation....The reasons why we call things true is the reason why they are true, for 'to be true' means only to perform this marriage function....The true is the name of whatever proves itself to be good in the way of belief, and good, too, for definite assignable reasons....If there be any life that it is really better we should lead, and if there be any idea which, if believed in, would help us to lead that life, then it would be really better for us to believe in that idea, unless, indeed, belief in it incidentally clashed with other greater vital benefits.207

James goes on to say that the 'vital benefits yielded' by beliefs are potentially incompatible, and that 'the greatest enemy of any one of our truths may be the rest of our truths'.208 The concept of truth is extended to cover even metaphysical assertions - if we will lead a better life by believing in the existence of God, or moral absolutes, or an obligation, in recognizing our own freedom, to recognize the freedom of others, then it is 'true' that such things exist - for 'true' here is what will 'carry us prosperously from any one part of our experience to any other part, linking things satisfactorily, working securely, simplifying, saving labor'.209 It is the notion of individual satisfaction as the touchstone of belief, and therefore, truth, which is the problematic aspect of this theory, and the point at which it touches on literary metaphysics. Many reports may be coherent but they do not make a state-of-affairs actual; they are only made so, made true, by their correspondence to an actual state-of-affairs. As with the 'representational' power of language, we must at some point be able to point to what is actually in the world, outside of any proposition or body of propositions, if we are to justify the truth of a belief. James does not define what 'good' means in 'good in the way of belief', but once a person has built a coherent edifice of belief to their own satisfaction, it is often the case that it answers so many needs, becomes so
comfortable, that even when its initial premisses are proved false or meaningless, the person persists in their belief, not because it retains any truly explanatory power, but because it satisfies the desire for coherence - it allows them to remain emotionally at ease.

According to James pragmatism can harmonize empiricism with religious thought, for it "converts the absolutely empty notion of a static relation of "correspondence"...between our minds and reality, into that of a rich and active commerce...between particular thoughts of ours, and the great universe of other experiences in which they play their parts and have their uses.'210 This is to suggest that reality is prepared to meet us half way, which is the one thing which reality, as that which exists independently of anybody's opinion about it, will not do. (The promiscuous attitude towards truth contained within this theory finds one popular expression in the idea that truth is relative to the individual - that what is true for me is not so for you. But it is clearer to speak of something being true of one person and not another.)

We can pragmatically justify the adoption of a principle, since this adoption is an act, and an act can be justified by showing what ends or goals are served by performing it. For example, the principle of the Uniformity of Nature, as the basis of the principle of induction (A₁ is X, A₂ is X, A₃ is X, and so on, therefore all A's are X), can only be rendered probable by induction, a process which presupposes what, in this case it sets out to prove. Though neither true nor false, our adoption of it can be justified by the end results of scientific investigation. If we were to ask whether it is 'true' that every effect has a cause, the only answer could be, likewise, 'So far.', and so if we are bothered by the sound of a tap dripping, it is wisest to adopt the approach of examining our taps. One cannot believe 'p' without behaving as if 'p' were true, but one can behave as if 'p' were true without believing that it is. We are in a similar position with theories, which will always contain some term that denotes something not directly observable, such as protons and electrons, the existence of which is inferred from many things which we do observe and which we presume to be effects of them. A theory is an 'as if' which has explanatory power, and, to this end, it cannot simply be a summary but must explain even such facts as were not known when it was devised. To talk of their being 'fashions' in fundamental particles is perhaps justified, but we confuse the issue if we consider the word is
being used in the same sense in which we would use it when talking about skirt lengths.

But what of a theory which offers us no rules according to which we could deduce perceptive propositions, or from which there was no observable effect, for which, in other words, there was no possibility of verification? One attitude would be to consider that the assertions which such a theory makes are not assertions at all. (This is Carnap's position - that such a theory is without sense, 'it does not speak about anything; it is nothing but a series of empty words'.211) I have already defined as 'metaphysical' those beliefs which, though perhaps abstracted from experience, claim to give knowledge that cannot be readily verified by experience. Such is their nature that they may summarize but they do not explain; in that they do not allow us to predict future experiences they add nothing to our knowledge of the world other than an emotional colouring and a knowledge of the possibilities of their own kind. While they may have no empirical content such theses, or pseudo-theses, do evoke thoughts, and feelings, so that while they may be logically irrelevant, to call them meaningless would be to overstate the case - 'Quadruplicity drinks procrastination' may evoke or express nothing, but the same could not be said of 'God is One' or 'Man is condemned to be free'.

If we take a rather familiar metaphysical assertion we can see both how it is 'meaningless' and how it can have significance, that is, pragmatic consequences. According to the idealist thesis since all our knowledge of the external world is ultimately based on sense-perception, we have no guarantee that the world continues to exist, or to exist in the same form, when it is not present to our senses, that is, no guarantee that it exists independently of our idea of it. If, however, this is so then no experiment could be devised to verify it, since the experiment itself would have to be, however indirectly, perceived. Thus the naive realist who believes that what they see and feel is really there, and the idealist who believes that what they see and feel are their idea, are in exactly the same position with regard to the world. If we chose to talk about the world as if what was unperceived did not exist it would not necessarily be false to the way we experience the world, but it would be unnecessarily complex, since it would involve no practical difference in the way we use the world. In short, it does not matter
whether the idealist thesis is correct or not, but accepting it would introduce completely useless complications into the way in which we describe the world. But if the theory itself entails no pragmatic consequences, the holding of it certainly can. In the way I have explained it there is little poetry, little emotional charge, in the assertion, but the opening of Schopenhauer's *The World as Will and Idea* is a different matter;

"The world is my idea": this is a truth which holds good for everything that lives and knows, though man alone can bring it into reflective and abstract consciousness. If he really does this, he has attained to philosophical wisdom.\(^{212}\)

Given that this is only a pseudo-assertion, what can it signify? In the absence of an informative content, in a text that is not in a position to refine itself through argument, that is, in a work read as literature, whatever is on the page is part of the final sense. What construction, then, can be put on "The world is my idea"? What does it suggest? One type of thought for which it could almost be the motto is the autistic; that type characterized by mental activity being controlled and shaped primarily by the wishes of the individual, rather than the conditions imposed on it by the real nature of objects and events. Idealism is, of course, a theory of reality, so that invoking the 'real' as a contrast would be, to a certain extent, an unfair manoeuvre. But is not this denial of reality as what exists independently of anybody's opinion about it, the whole emotive charge of the phrase? If we convert it into sense then it means nothing, our only answer could be 'So what?', but its imaginative suggestion is little connected with any sense that it could legitimately bear; it appears to center the world around the individual reader, to exalt wishful thinking, to reduce the concrete to the abstract, the intractable and external to the personal and internal. (In the same way the religion that tells us that the world is an illusion - compared to what? - will not actually make the ground any less hard or the stomach more full, but it can change one's attitudes to these realities.) Schopenhauer's lines cannot be substituted, *salva veritate*, for any others because there is no truth to save; a characteristic which often appears in the definition of the literary. (Indeed if it were a meaningful assertion then it could not bear the imaginative suggestion that it does,
for it is the impossibility which generates the emotion and the emotion
the belief, the significance that it has.) Thus other sentiments may be
related to it, but their suggestion will never be identical. When, for
example, The Tempest declares that we are such stuff as dreams are made
on, an assertion about the unreality of reality similar to Schopenhauer's
is being made, though the emphasis lies quite differently. But, insofar as
we can say that two such statements are related, indeed, simply in saying
that there is a type of statement of which these are examples, it becomes
obvious that there is no small amount of rhetoric in calling them
'meaningless', for it is through a type of meaning, that is, significance,
that they are related.213

What is happening when such an 'irrelevant' assertion actually
acquires relevance? It begins with a small disturbance in language which
is transmitted gradually further and further from its starting point. An
analogy based on another language will help: Pragmatically speaking 'A
sharp' is 'B flat', in that coming across either one would play precisely
the same note; the facts they represent, in terms of pitch, are identical.
But let us imagine that one is transcribing a tune and this pitch is the
first one that one comes across; in that either method of representation
will faithfully represent the fact, either manner of notation will do
quite as well. If, however, an 'A' subsequently occurs we will have to
decide either change the first note to 'B flat' if it has been written 'A
sharp', or indicate with our new 'A' that it is no longer 'A sharp'. If we
do not observe this musical syntax then our transcription will not
faithfully represent the original tune. So when it is announced that "The
world is my idea" it would not matter if all that followed were adjusted
to what this phrase could sensibly mean, if the 'intervals' between words,
as they correspond to facts, was maintained. But when we are told that
the realization that the world which surrounds us 'is there only as an
idea' is the goal of 'philosophical wisdom', we have changed from what is,
potentially, a different way of talking about the same facts, to a claim
that what is being presented is a new, and startlingly suggestive,
emotionally-charged fact. This is equivocation. If one does not observe
the syntax one's representation, one's semantics, go astray. The
difference between this instance and our musical analogy is that here the
'music', the world, is directly available to confirm or deny any
individual transcription. If some writer want to rewrite my life as a
novelette, or a scherzo, as a caprice, or a lament, I do not have to take their word for it that this is the way life is, though there may be various reasons (in the sense of 'motives' rather than 'grounds') why you are, at one time or another, inclined to do so.

All striking language, all language that tends towards the 'literary' or 'poetical', contains something of this disturbance. Take, for example the following statement of the pragmatic principle I have described - 'A difference that makes no difference is no difference'. There is a sense in which the meaning of this is obvious, especially when it occurs within the context in which I have placed it; all that is necessary is that one replace the first 'difference' with 'distinction'. But the statement is striking because the original 'difference' that turns out not to be one is evoked, that is, it is not simply mentioned as a hypothetical one, it is part of the argument of the whole. Thus there is the suggestion of a paradox underlying the statement, a momentary implication that we can have a difference which is not a difference. Likewise it is almost impossible to take Wittgenstein's 'Whereof one cannot speak, thereon we must keep silent.' as the tautology it is, for the 'whereof' must refer to something mystical, must it not? Neither of my examples may be great poetry but they are quotable, they are striking and it is this element of rhetoric which makes them so, for the only way to make language striking, to make it ring, to create the quotable, is to lie a little; as I am doing here.

It might appear that the metaphorical use of language would quickly run foul of such a pragmatically orientated definition of meaningfulness. Poe puts it most poetically;

The demands of truth are severe. She has no sympathy with the myrtles. All that which is so indispensable in song, is precisely that with which she has nothing whatever to do....In enforcing a truth we need severity rather than efflorescence of language. We must be simple, precise, terse....He must be theory-mad who, in spite of these differences, shall still persist in attempting to reconcile the obstinate oils and waters of poetry and truth.214

However, it is precisely the hypothetical translation which Peirce outlines upon which metaphor depends for its semantic import.215 In the case of metaphor the operational aspect is carried out in the imagination, by means of emotional sympathy, it is a matter of
recognition rather than experiment, and the translation is looser, more idiomatic, more likely to provide a compound of meanings than a single one. There is then a further process involved - the working out of consequences, to find if we agree with, or 'like', the metaphor. Though recognition can be seen as a form of agreement, in that our understanding presupposes the aptness of the metaphor, we can distinguish between knowing what is meant by a word, for example 'Kraut', and subscribing to its connotational import, between what we recognize as part of our culture and what we ourselves believe. This second process also takes the form of 'if then', but its object is different. Both processes constitute making the implicit explicit and are thus the basic form of criticism, but the degree to which one or the other is emphasized marks a rough division between two styles of literary criticism. When the first process, by which we discover what the metaphor means, that is, by which we make explicit the connection between the work and the world at its most basic level, predominates then the criticism appears primarily 'analytical'. When this process is extended by the second, the working out of what follows from what the metaphor implies, then we may say that the criticism appears primarily 'critical' in the sense that it begins to involve judgements that go beyond meaning in a restricted, denotational sense, and into pragmatics, that is, significance. There is a difficulty here in expressing the difference involved in that both processes involve making the implicit explicit; the making explicit of connotational meaning. What primarily distinguishes them is that the second process extends its discussion of the work further into the world, it is to a greater degree involved with the world independently of the work, and consequently finds itself 'answering back' to the work much more so than it would if it were primarily concerned only with translating, or explaining it. Meaning or significance in the second sense, in the sense in which it is pursued further into the world, is 'meaning' in the sense of effect - 'A means B' being translated as 'A has B as its consequence', or 'B is the effect of A', rather than 'B could be substituted for A'. (Any other conception of criticism is committed to nothing more than disguised pleonasm, to reading over again, to reading for the reader.) In that the poetical or literary is, notoriously what defies paraphrase, or rather, what we wish to save from paraphrase, and our experience with Schopenhauer may indicate why this is so, it may be that what I have
called the 'critical' approach will turn out to be the approach which literary criticism, as an autonomous subject, can most properly consist of.

Metaphysics and Belief

I do not for a moment want to suggest that literature sets out to tell us how to see the world, and therefore, how to live - I do not think it is possible to talk about what literature "sets out to do" - what I do wish to suggest is that, by influencing the way we think and the quality of our feelings, qualities which do effect the way we perceive the world, literature does in fact do just these things.

We can define 'belief' as the acceptance of the existence of a certain state-of-affairs, the putting of one's trust in the truth of a statement, or the efficacy of a principle. But belief may be more or less explicit, and our use of the word 'believe' extends from the description of knowledge, direct acquaintance with a state-of-affairs, to opinion, or belief based on grounds short of proof, that is, provisional conviction. There is a justification for this range of usage, for, in practice, knowledge and opinion shade into one another imperceptibly, though at their two extremes they are easy to distinguish; in everyday life we behave as if certain things were facts though our grounds for doing so would probably make a scientist or logician pale, were it not for the fact that both these sets of people find that, outside their disciplines, they must do likewise or do nothing. Allowing every proposition a degree of belief corresponding to its degree of credibility may be 'perfect rationality', but for the moment I must lay aside considerations of rationality and, in order to see what belief is in practice, adopt a more psychological approach. Belief, then, as it is defined within the discipline of psychology, is any enduring feature of a person's cognitive life, an idea felt to be true and acted upon when appropriate situations arise, often accompanied by an emotional state. For the sake of clarity I should say that here I am concerned not so much with temporary feelings as with permanent or semi-permanent emotional or volitional dispositions. Beliefs are often systematically related to one another, as would appear natural, but the sort of stereotypic personality that the psychologist is
concerned with is of no interest here; the areas of feeling which metaphysics and literature are concerned with are more subtle and less tangible than those which the psychological questionnaire is often manifestly fishing for.

The essence of a belief, then, is a disposition to respond in a certain way to a certain situation. What then of metaphysics, which do not, by definition, present us with new facts, and, therefore, with any reason to change our disposition towards any situation? Most metaphysical systems in the philosophical sphere rely, as we have seen, on the exaggeration of some rhetorical paradox, or linguistic analogy; the infusion of reality with some difficulty of logic or the interpretation of the forms of language. Like my example of idealism, or the conviction that time or matter are unreal, such ideas begin with an isolated but emotionally-charged model of analysis, or form of expression, and seek to assimilate all modes of discourse to it. The model is based on a use of words which begins by merely disturbing the restrictions upon which their normal meaning depends, and then goes on by ignoring them. We might compare the original intuition of the metaphysician with that once alive and supple wood used by the proto-Venetians - just as time and tide turned it to the stone-hard foundations over which rose all the baroque intricacies of Venice, so the metaphysician's arguments turn the original poetical impression into a system in which the intuition becomes, or appears to become, something quite different. But the emotive foundation should not be overlooked, for the imaginative suggestion of the idea will be the greater part of its significance; for this reason it might be better to speak of a 'metaphysical temper' rather than a 'metaphysical philosophy'.

As we saw with Pascal, it is only by denying the figurativeness of the metaphysical assertion that it can be made to assert something about the world, but without this figurativeness the assertion could not exist at all. We might, therefore, speak of the significance of the metaphysical assertion as that 'nostalgia' that is left behind by the way in which it itself cancels out what it momentarily appears to assert, the vacuum created by its impossibility. That the figure should be 'concealed by its very brilliance', as Longinus terms it, is part of the paradox of metaphysics already touched on in the conclusion to Chapter 1; for though the only significance a metaphysical assertion can have is pragmatic,
that is, its emotional significance, it has, by definition, no pragmatic meaning. If it does not appear as meaningless, does not collapse on itself, it is because the impossibility it momentarily asserts is a desirable impossibility; this is why I have said that the very existence of metaphysics presupposes a causal connection between emotion and belief. The 'object' of poetry, writes Wordsworth, 'is truth, not individual and local, but general, and operative; not standing upon external testimony, but carried alive into the heart by passion; truth which is its own testimony, which gives competence and confidence to the tribunal to which it appeals, and receives them from the same tribunal.' - which is to say, not truth at all. The expression of a view of life that so moves us, that gives the 'impulse' to one side of a two-sided question, that we allow to comprehend the whole in the exclusive, even if only for its duration, is perceived by us as poetical. Without affect, then, there is no literariness, no poetry. The metaphysical temper that is manifested in any literary work is unlikely to be explicitly revisionary, in the manner of any of the great world religions, or of Schopenhauer, Heidegger, or Sartre, since the description of the world as a style is usually highly specific; though a distinction could be drawn here between the lyric poem and the novel, on the basis of the novel's (usually) greater intensity, its relative comprehensiveness and the greater investment of time necessary to read it. My discussion of metaphysics has mainly been an unsympathetic one; what we are left with is the idea that they are no more than a form of spiritual colonization - that metaphysics is not so much a matter of what words can legitimately mean as who is to be 'master' of our perception of the world. But we still have some way to go.

We saw with idealism that it could be squared with fact if only we rearranged the rest of our way of talking about the world in accordance with it, but, since the idea makes no practical difference, it would mean only an increase in complexity, and it seems vain to employ a greater number of concepts than is necessary in order to describe the same facts. If we leave aside, for the moment, the fact that literature is fiction, and, therefore, immediately suspect, we can say that, as I argued earlier, the very ordering and placing of emphasis that constitutes style predicates something about what is ordered that is more than the things themselves. It could perhaps be argued that being entertained by a work is an act rather than an intellectual process, but it would seem closer to
the truth to say that it is the two things inextricably woven together. We have already met with the distinction between the 'representative' and the 'expressive' functions of language, but we may here take a closer look at it, for it can lead to a misleading simplification.

Now, many linguistic utterances are analogous to laughing in that they have only an expressive function, no representative function. Examples of these are cries like "Oh, Oh" or, on a higher level, lyrical verses. The aim of a lyric poem in which occur the words "sunshine" and "clouds," is not to inform us of certain meteorological facts, but to express certain feelings of the poet and to excite similar feelings in us. A lyric poem has no assertional sense, it does not contain knowledge.219

The problem is that literature is more analogous to telling a joke than to laughter, and, for this reason, responding to it cannot but involve cognitive processes. Carnap, from whom the above quotation comes, contrasts poetry with philosophical metaphysics on the grounds that while the former expresses 'temporary feelings' the latter expresses 'permanent emotional or volitional dispositions.'219 It would seem, however, that all forms of literature can express both these things, and that a distinction between literary and philosophical metaphysics cannot be drawn on these grounds. However, Carnap further distinguishes between the 'non-theoretical' character of the arts and of philosophical metaphysics by saying that while the arts do not lose any of their high value for personal and social life in possessing this characteristic, philosophical metaphysics does, because it 'gives the illusion of knowledge without actually giving any knowledge.'220 This is a point to which I shall return, but, in itself, it does not explain wherein the value of which it speaks may lie.

Reading a work is more than simply examining an orientation towards the world, for this reading requires a sympathy towards that orientation in so far as it involves the investment of time in making the work's centre of attention my centre of attention. To say that this sympathy is unconnected with the world, with life 'outside' the work, is, then, shortsighted primarily because of this investment; in reading this work I am not only not reading that work but I am not doing anything else either. Even if one's object is just, in that chilling phrase, to 'kill
time', there are many different ways of doing so, the element of choice remains.

The picture of philosophical metaphysics I have given is almost wholly negative, but is, there some way in which literature can be exempted from what has been said? We might remember Mill's answer to Bentham's charge that all poetry is 'misrepresentation' and consists 'essentially in exaggeration for effect: in producing some one view of a thing very emphatically, and suppressing all the limitations and qualifications.', that is, that such rhetoric is justified when it undertakes to 'make men feel truths', and that one 'must aim at too much to be assured of doing enough.' The order in the world which the work manifests, it might be said, may be as much a revelation as an invention, and the pleasure we derive from it may come as much from being undeceived as deceived. Let us imagine that my own personal bias is that the world is, at least potentially, very pleasant, and that life itself is beautiful; while I could not prove either by logic or empiricism, I am often aware that both logic and empiricism are being abused when the grounds for believing the opposite are put forward. The attitude, or principle, is a vague one but I can justify its adoption, for my private use, pragmatically, in that it has so far involved me in none of the abuses of the intellect or imagination which other possible orientations towards the world entail, that is, I do not have to deny or invent facts in order to sustain it - it requires only possibilities. (However, if I need to be reminded, to have my personal bias confirmed, is it not for the very reason that it is my construct rather than something simply there?) When a work presents a more pessimistic orientation I consider it poor not merely because it is 'not to my taste' but also because in pessimism I find the response of a mind which having failed either to identify or obtain what it wants, has settled for the lesser happiness of being systematically miserable, even at the expense of denying what can exist. The different collections of facts which the two general feelings - optimism and pessimism - are inferences from may appear to the mind as a conflict, but they must both have a real existence in order to do so. As Chesterton wrote, apropos the 'pessimism' of Byron, 'The popularity of pure and unadulterated pessimism is an oddity; it is almost a contradiction in terms. Men would no more receive the news of the failure of existence or of the harmonious hostility of the stars with ardour or
popular rejoicing than they would light bonfires for the arrival of cholera or dance a breakdown when they were condemned to be hanged.' In the universal darkness which the pessimist pronounces their own light, whether it be integrity or superior knowledge of the darkness, or, as with the Existentialists, 'rebellion', 'authenticity', or 'good faith', shines twice as bright, and is, indeed, a cause for rejoicing. But does this mean that the rhetoric of pessimism is more rhetorical, less honest, than some other form? As we have seen, there is a difference between the degree of rhetoric involved in, for example, 'A difference that makes no difference.', and "The world is my idea": realization of this is the goal of philosophical wisdom.' and so it may, indeed, be possible to speak of one rhetoric being more rhetorical than another, and even to hold that one rhetoric may be necessary to counterbalance another, to bring the subject to a mid point where no, or at least very little, rhetoric exists. It could be argued, for example, that compared to the seriousness with which we consider life, that is, compared to the concrete nature of the significance we posit in our life, we are such stuff as dreams are made of.

In this sense the most profound pleasure that we derive from literature is the pleasure of recognition, the pleasure of recognizing our own experience in essentia (in that the metaphysical unity of the work only exists by virtue of this essence), in recognizing our feelings 'objectified'. The relationship between the reader and the work is, then, an interaction rather than a matter of static contemplation; in reminding us of that emotional tenor which certain configurations of events have inspired in us, and in placing what we recognize, however subliminally, as its essence, the metaphysic that generalizing from that emotional tenor creates, once more into the world, at a different point, the work suggests to us that this emotional tenor could belong to more than a single isolated configuration, but could be the pattern of a life, or of life - it 'verifies' that tenor. (The distinction between 'the pattern of a life' and 'the pattern of life' is an important one that I will take up again elsewhere.) One might then speak of one of the effects of literature being the affirmation of the affective aspect of our sense of human community; literature can sustain and vindicate this sense, whatever we have chosen that it should be. To this extent literary taste, as I will argue in the next chapter, is not divorced from more comprehensive orientations
towards the world. We may perceive the attitude expressed by a metaphysic, whether literary or otherwise, as simplistic or profound, mean or magnificent, banal or powerful, bland or dramatic, but we cannot prove it to be either absolutely true or false in its descriptive aspect. Pessimism is only more rhetorical than any other metaphysic in that it appears to remain unaware, and to propagate a lack of awareness, as to what it pragmatically means, that is, it is another degree of hiding what is really said, of ensuring that affect is subliminal. One may believe in God and know what one's motives for doing so are, but the pessimist must go on hiding their true celebration or their pessimism would become a contradiction - 'He's only happy when he's miserable'. The 'world' which we begin to inhabit as we read is always our own world from a new angle, it is a metaphor of our world, our world 'seen through' the style. The degree to which we can pass into this world, take it as truly descriptive of the possibilities of our own, that is, the degree to which we judge the metaphor to be apt, is the measure of our evaluation of the work and our sympathy with its metaphysical temper.

The metaphysic is that apparently irreducible imperative, the basis upon which significance is itself ascribed, and the reader or critic's conception of it is that "human nature", that "life" or "world" which they assume themselves to have in common with the author, and, in the critic's case, with the reader. Such is the nature of this ascription that we can only distinguish between the importance of a thing and the importance we attach to it, once that attachment is broken. The relative breadth or narrowness, subtlety or crudity of this conception will thus, as I have said, be the major determining factor in the reader or critic's approach to the work and their evaluation of it. There is no objectivity here, except in a negative sense, only degrees of willingness in the critic and reader to subject their own conceptions of, and assumptions about, value to investigation; for though it is impossible to prove what, with regard to value, is essential to humanity, it can be proved what is only contingent to it. 'Perfect rationality', writes Russell, 'consists, not in believing what is true, but in attaching to every proposition a degree of belief corresponding to its degree of credibility.' But the degree of credibility which a metaphysic possesses is, by definition, an illusion induced by rhetoric, an hallucination of significance.
Thought in action has for its only possible motive the attainment of thought at rest; and whatever does not refer to belief is no part of the thought itself. The action of thinking may incidentally have other results; it may serve to amuse us, for example, and among dilettanti it is not rare to find those who have so perverted thought to the purpose of pleasure that it seems to vex them to think that the questions upon which they delight to exercise it may ever get finally settled. This is the very debauchery of thought.

Peirce

Nothing which we know of exists 'in-itself', in the sense of not being relative to the mind, though, obviously, if our knowledge consists of facts, then those things exist independently of that relation. There are, however, states-of-affairs which belong almost solely to the individual mind, the orderings which are the result of private, possibly idiosyncratic, determination. Most fallacious arguments, unless the point is very complex or obscure, issue from such idiosyncracies. A politician may use a fallacy consciously, relying on the collective idiosyncracy of his audience, but the sort of non-logical 'argument' I wish to discuss here is the sort that begins in sensation rather than cogitation, and which is more likely to be an unconscious disposition. Fashion too may play a part here; we have probably all at one time or another adopted some way of looking at the world which came to us from an external source and which, though for a little time it seemed to express what we were, in retrospect appeared to be half a matter of being true to ourselves and half a matter of lying to ourselves. While I would not go as far as Peirce does, when he says that every creed was 'as an historical fact invented to harm somebody', it seems that placing oneself inside any systematically ordered metaphysic (and even the most rigorously anti-metaphysical philosopher embodies a metaphysic, in our literary sense, in tone of voice) almost invariably requires the rationalizing of some of our sensations out of existence, and the rationalizing into existence of others. While the analysis of sensation may lead to its refinement, to a change in what action arises from it, or what beliefs we hold in conjunction with it, and, therefore, ultimately its
actual strength, the sensation itself, as an immediate link with the world, and, perhaps more indirectly, with ourselves cannot be bullied or cajoled into or out of existence, be it in the interests of coherence or poetry, without some part of that world or ourselves disappearing from view.

Since this work is exclusively concerned with literature you might still expect at this point some sort of distinction to appear that will redeem literature from its association with metaphysics. I might say that, while the respective qualities of philosophical and literary metaphysics are distinguished primarily by degrees of emphasis, and while they are both frequently used for the same purposes - novels as textbooks and metaphysical essays as entertainment - this difference in degree represents a difference in kind. So it does; one is literary metaphysics and the other is philosophical metaphysics! I might say that, with regard to effect, in literary metaphysics sensation is not 'rationalized' into or out of existence, but rather gently persuaded - though, obviously, Voltaire and George Eliot demonstrate different degrees of gentleness. But then I could also argue just the opposite - that, in conflating idea and description, literature is more aggressively metaphysical than "philosophy". I could write that our consciousness that fiction is fiction undermines the very metaphysic it creates, or that by objectifying that metaphysic, by making it an object, it allows us to separate the significance attached by it to the world, even as that attachment takes place. But it is only by being a fiction that it manifests a metaphysic. Perhaps I could write, most convincingly of all, that the imaginative suggestion of the work only becomes a metaphysic once it comeq into contact with literary criticism, for there is some truth in this. Perhaps I could join a circus - if I was a contortionist.

In whatever manner I consider that our sympathy, involved in the very understanding of a description as literature, is set in motion by the work I must come back, however reluctantly, to the idea that the motive and function of thought is the production of belief. It is important, however, to remember here that I am not talking about what is presented at a literal level, that is, not about in what manner we believe in Macbeth, or Lilliput, or the Cheshire Cat, psychologically fascinating as this question is, but rather the sympathetic participation of the
imagination in the metaphysics manifested by these things. Belief, whether provisional or firm, is the orientation of the mind towards a particular state-of-affairs. Peirce who, in uncharacteristically poetic fashion, describes belief as 'the demi-cadence which closes a musical phrase in the symphony of our intellectual life', distinguishes its three properties as being, firstly, that it involves the cessation of doubt, secondly, that it establishes a rule of action, and, thirdly, that it is something that we are aware of.\textsuperscript{330} But if we are to hold good to the connection we have made between belief and its pragmatic consequences then we must reject the hypothesis that belief, as a cessation of doubt and the wellspring of action, is always present to the individual's awareness. While the significance of a belief may be determined by the mode of action which it gives rise to, the habits which it involves, often the motivating belief of an action is only implicit in the action itself, or in other beliefs which rely upon it. It may be better for us to refer to this orientation of mind revealed in an action as an 'attitude' rather than a 'belief', since it is more in keeping with normal usage, 'beliefs' usually being only those attitudes which their possessor can articulate. Furthermore we should recognize that an attitude is not simply a resting place for thought; as a rule, conscious or unconscious, for action it is also an influence upon further processes of thought as the individual is faced with new situations and ideas. This last is important, for it is only by keeping it in mind that we can form a clear picture of just what sort of process imaginative suggestion is, and just what function the critic might usefully fulfil in making explicit what is implicit in the work.

I have already examined the sort of beliefs or attitudes that the significance-giving aspect of literary description generates through its rhetoric. 'The commonest novel,' writes De Quincey, 'by moving in alliance with human fears and hopes, with human instincts of wrong and right, sustains and quickens [the] affections. Calling them into action, it rescues them from torpor.'\textsuperscript{331} Sartre too writes that by 'fixing' an aspect of reality in writing, the work makes that aspect 'intentional', the reader has the 'guarantee' that the connections established by the work 'have been expressly willed.'.\textsuperscript{332} Moreover, part of the enjoyment of the reader, continues Sartre, lies in a feeling of being 'essential' in
relation to the world, in a 'feeling of security...which stamps the strongest aesthetic emotions with a sovereign calm.'

It has its origin in the authentication of a strict harmony between subjectivity and objectivity. As, on the other hand, the aesthetic object is properly the world in so far as it is aimed at through the imaginary, aesthetic joy accompanies the positional consciousness that the world is a value, that it, a task proposed to human freedom.233

Chesterton makes a similar point, though in a different idiom, when he writes that even as the blackest of pessimistic artists writes 'some shameless and terrible indictment of creation, his one pang of joy in the achievement joins the universal chorus of gratitude, with the scent of the wildflower and the song of the bird.'234 And for the reader, too, the thing has been said, the significance given, the universe has been made metaphysical and infused with value, and the reader, irrespective of the nature of their own values, has been made thereby essential in relation to the metaphysical universe. But Sartre is wrong, for nothing can make us essential to the world. That the work is 'intended' is of the utmost importance, but insofar as it is intended by another it becomes a second nature; the reader feels essential because within literature the world is given ad hominem, it is tamed by being made significant. One instance of rhetoric may sway one to this evaluation and another instance to that, but rhetoric per se is the purveying of a sense of value.

This is perhaps especially evident with the novel.235 Lawrence wrote that though the novelist may try, by 'helpless, unconscious predilection', to 'nail down' the novel with a morality or ideology, the novel will either 'die' or get up and walk away with the nail.235 This may be so, but I am tired of the hammering as the nail goes in and the tugging and the rending as it comes out again; the novel may exchange one ideology for another, but it never frees itself from ideology per se, even its own undermining is a matter of appearance, a superficial phenomenon, for this too is the expression of an ideology. The separate identity of the nail and the novel is, then, an illusion, for their are no works, even for such, let us say, heavy-handed novelists as Balzac, Mauriac, or Lawrence himself, apart from those works that bear their names.
Literature, by giving significance, tames the world. For the literary is characterized by, indeed exists by virtue of, a host of concepts which do not exist in the world; destiny, fate, finalities (other than death), the real existence of the past, meaning in accident, absolute meaning. Of all terrible things, the most terrible is time and yet literature turns to it again and again, because time cannot appear in literature or even in writing; to write is to fix the moment and make it significant, and it is just the negation of significance which makes the experience of time what it is. Death, too, that most uncompromising of events, cannot appear without a significance in literature, because nothing appears without significance in literature. Newman saw in the fate of characters so 'good' as Romeo and Juliet, and Ophelia 'something inconsistent with correct beauty, and therefore unpoetical'; today a happy ending might seem contrary to 'poetic justice', though so revealing a phrase would be unlikely to appear in the explanation as to why it should appear so. Poetic justice' is what we call the ultimate significance we desire from a work and the phrase is no less appropriate in connection with admirers of Kafka or Beckett than it is in connection with admirers of Dickens.

Is all literature, then, by its very nature, 'spiritual gin'? It is. But such an assertion must be placed in some sort of context in order to be properly understood. I wrote earlier that the opposite of style is the world, but this does not mean that style ceases at the limit of the work, nor that style, and all that it implies, is solely a property of "art objects". For in life it would appear that the degree of rhetoric appropriate to the case is always in inverse proportion to the degree that the case generates. It is about those things concerning which literariness is least appropriate that you are most 'literary', in the sense of tending towards those concepts that I have described as characterizing literature, for in these instances you appeal to fate and absolute meaning almost as a reflex - sometimes, it is true, too much is not enough but sometimes anything is too much. You desire poetic justice in life too; not simply the religious but every metaphysic is an expression of this desire, for every metaphysic is the adaption of reality to a more emotionally satisfying form, and every sense of fate or absolute meaning, every feeling that x deserves y, is the expression of a metaphysic. The common life is not 'prose': Life imitates Art. All these stories are a means of taming the world (a 'wild' landscape is an
uncultivated one); literature is the systematization of these stories we tell ourselves, it is those stories as we find them in books.\textsuperscript{240} (The word 'author' derives from the Latin \textit{auctor}, meaning one who augments, a title given to conquering generals who brought new territory.) If we were to say that one lives by stories or in stories, or one simply lives, what would be overly sententious about such a statement would be the claim that one can 'simply live', especially when such a claim is written down, or even spoken. 'I also had my illusions.', Wilde writes in his \textit{De Profundis}, 'I thought life was going to be a brilliant comedy, and that you were to be one of the graceful figures in it. I found it to be a revolting and repellent tragedy....But while there were times when I rejoiced in the idea that my sufferings were to be endless, I could not bear them to be without meaning.'\textsuperscript{241} It is something much more basic than simply charm that flies 'At the mere touch of cold philosophy.'

To apply logic to the poetical is to break a butterfly upon a wheel, but to apply the appearance of it is to do worse. I am enamoured of literature and would have the reader of this work enamoured of literature also, but only for what it is. Whether literature is the debauchery of thought or simply thought at play is finally a matter of how we read and how we criticize. For, as we have seen, all poetical language, indeed perhaps all memorable phrases, slips towards a certain 'anarchy' of thought, the disturbance of syntax in order to introduce a semantic import which runs counter to either the logical possibilities of language or the empirical fact. (There are, of course, works in which the metaphysic is so pathologically divorced from reality that no pleasure can be derived from them by the reflective mind, though no doubt they give pleasure to those whose metaphysical temper is in sympathy with them.) But though individuals, perhaps the majority of people, will find a resting place, a niche, for their metaphysical sympathies, in romances, or 'existentialist' novels, or thrillers, in this school or that school, or whatever was last published in 'serious fiction', (habitual poetry readers are rare), the most fruitful use we can make of literature is to range widely and freely across time and genre, to try and test, through the imagination, those metaphors for our life which works both ancient and alien embody, to have no sooner sampled, sympathized with, and weighed up the metaphor than to move on. For while anarchy, as self-rule, of the spirit is the essence of entertainment, if we stay in one literary niche,
constrict our imagination to a narrow compass, we are, in effect, 'elevating' one literary metaphysic to the status of a "philosophy", and our entertainment then becomes something other than self-rule. Moreover, the boundary between style and world is a matter of constant personal discovery. Here we come back to the two ways of criticizing, or types of critical emphasis - the thematic and the metaphysical. A theme, even if its elements are in conflict with every other part of the work, can be found in any work, but to pursue it, to talk as if the passing on of that which, when defined, is no more than a banal platitude or a philosophical pseudo-assertion, were the heart and soul of our experience of the work, or as if the passing on of truths about psychology, or sociology, or politics, or time, or free will, were the main point about literature, is indeed the very debauchery of thought.

There is an important corollary to this view of the literary work as the expression of a metaphysic, and criticism as the examination of this metaphysic by relating it to the world through one's own response - it changes the traditional question 'Should criticism be evaluative?' into 'In what manner should criticism be evaluative?'. For, except in the technical aspect, that is, in the discovering of how this collection of words has generated this imaginative suggestion, literary criticism, in that it is criticism of a rhetorical mode of language, cannot be anything else but a form of evaluation.
CHAPTER V

Evaluation

But it will be asked, whether this method of analyzing metaphysically matters of feeling and sentiment, will not be attended with many inconveniences? Whether it will not often engage us to enquire into the reasons of things which have no reason at all, damp our pleasure by leading us into the custom of discussing coldly what was designed by nature to touch and to inflame, and put such shackles upon true genius, as to render it servilely timorous, and check it's enterprising ardour?

D'Alembert

Incorrectness of taste may arise, either from the dulness of our internal senses, or from the debility of judgement. The former renders our sentiments obscure and ill-defined, and therefore difficult to be compared. The latter incapacitates us for perceiving the relations even of the clearest perceptions, or the most distinguishable qualities. In either case, the mind is distracted with suspense and doubt. This is an uneasy state, from which we are desirous to extricate ourselves by any means. If we have not vigour of taste enough, to determine the merit of the object, by its intrinsic characters, we take up with any standard, however foreign or improper, that can end our wavering. Authority in all its forms usurps the place of truth and reason.

Gerard
Taste : Beauty

Although 'beauty' is not a word that readily springs to mind in connection with the evaluation of literature I will use it here for two reasons; firstly because it is perhaps the only specifically aesthetic evaluative word that there is and so its sense, though far from fixed, is less likely to slip and slide through the variety of contexts that the more general 'good' can; secondly, as a word used for a long time in connection with literature and still used in works on general aesthetics, by using it from the outset these other standpoints, that is, the historical and the aesthetic in general, may be brought in without constant recourse to translating one set of terms for another. Moreover 'beautiful' is quite a common form of positive appraisal in more spontaneous, informal contexts. That this should be so is, indeed, strange and demonstrates a contradiction within the common sense attitude towards the concept, for, while the person who subscribes to this attitude will talk as if 'beauty' were an objective category they will also insist, in argument, that it is a purely subjective one. This would seem to suggest that there is a certain metaphysicality in this common-sense attitude, perhaps the result, as with many such contradictions, of intuitive feeling seeking to make some sort of compromise with an irrefutable but inimical piece of popular philosophy. Consider Nietzsche;

Nothing is more conditional - or, let us say - narrower - than our feeling for beauty. Whoever would think of it apart from man's joy in man would immediately lose any foothold. "Beautiful in itself" is a mere phrase, not even a concept. In the beautiful man posits himself as the measure of perfection; in special cases he worships himself in it...Man believes the world itself overloaded with beauty - and he forgets himself as the cause of this. He alone has presented the world with beauty - alas! only with a very, all-too-human beauty... He has humanized it, that is all. But nothing, absolutely nothing, guarantees that man should be the model of beauty. Who knows what he looks like in the eyes of a higher judge of beauty?'

Nietzsche's attitude to the concept of beauty is an example of what might be described as the common-sense attitude; that "beauty is in the eye of the beholder" is a truth readily verified by observation of the differences between the tastes of individuals. The afflatus of the passage
consists in the dismissive attitude towards the humanization of the world, as the 'vanity of the species', and in the implication that there is a 'higher judge'. However, since we cannot, logically, ever transcend what we are, everything, absolutely everything guarantees that 'man' is the model of beauty. The real problem, philosophical or otherwise, is to discover what it is in the eye of the beholder that gives rise to the concept of beauty. For this 'eye' has been perhaps a misleading metonym. Spinoza, who also held that beauty 'is not so much a quality of the object which is perceived as an effect in him who perceives it.', writes that if our eyes 'were more long-sighted or more short-sighted, or if our temperament were other that it is, things which now appear to us beautiful would appear to be ugly and things which now appear to be ugly would appear to us beautiful.' What this demonstrates, he elsewhere asserts, is that 'each one judges concerning things according to the disposition of his own mind, or rather takes for things that which is really modifications of his imagination.', for 'things cannot, except with respect to our imagination, be called beautiful or ugly, ordered or confused.' Likewise Hume writes that 'there is nothing, in itself, valuable or despicable, desirable or hateful, beautiful or deformed; but that these attributions arise from the particular constitution of human sentiment and affection.', and Montesquieu, in his 'Essay on Taste', declares that beauty does not have a 'positive nature' but is 'merely relative to the nature and operations of the soul.', that is, that the sources of 'beauty, goodness, &c. lie within us, and, of consequence, when we enquire into their causes, we do no more than investigate the springs of our mental pleasures.' This insistence that aesthetic response is connected with 'temperament', 'the disposition of the mind', 'sentiment or affection', or 'the nature and operations of the soul', as these three philosophers variously have it, would seem to suggest that this response, this sense of beauty, is far from arbitrary. Indeed it is a commonplace, generally obscured by the first burgeoning of theoretical reflection, that a statement about a person's tastes in literature or even the other arts, is usually taken as a statement about the person's temperament or disposition in general. As Schiller writes.

Beauty is therefore an object for us, since reflection is the condition under which we have a sensation of it; but it is at the same time a state of our personality, since feeling is the
condition under which we have a conception of it. It is then certainly form, because we contemplate it; but it is at the same time life, because we feel it. In a word, it is at once our state and our act.

Yet why is it, if taste is so generally acknowledged to be an integral part of a person's mental life, should it be almost inevitably talked about, theoretically at least, as if it were something autonomous and inscrutable? Moreover, as something irrelevant to criticism.

To say that beauty is in the eye of the beholder is not, analogous to saying that blue is in the eye of the beholder, and it is not analogous because, excepting physiological defects, the perception of colour does not vary from person to person. As Pope writes 'Tis with our judgements as p our watches, none / Go just alike yet each believes his own'. What it means to 'believe' one's own taste, or how this piece of wit might teach us not to believe what we believe, are difficult questions, but the general implication is a common one. Although Pope would have taken the real existence of good and bad taste for granted the very word 'taste' itself has come to have a hollow and conventional ring about it. Thus Herbert Read; 'Much as I dislike the idea of "taste" (for the good taste of one generation is the bad taste of the next, and in time even the bad taste of a period becomes the "chic" of a later age) there is nevertheless a certain exchange of appreciative gestures which is part of the civilized behaviour of a society.'

Read's reasons for disliking the idea of 'taste'; and, by implication, the idea of the evaluation of literature are commonplace. Nelson Goodman, for example, writes that evaluation 'distorts and even inverts the whole task of the philosophy of art';

[The] primary task of aesthetics is to discriminate and interrelate the aspects under which works of art are to be perceived and comprehended...Judging the excellence of works of art or the goodness of people is not the best way of understanding them.

This sounds reasonable but the analogy between the moral appraisal of a person and the evaluation of a work is one that begs the question, for before we can examine a 'work of art' we must decide that this is what it is, rather than simply a representation (if it is visual) or a fiction (if it is written). (Moreover, is there really something to 'understand' about
a work of art other than why we like, or dislike, its company?) The 'term work of art' presupposes this distinction. Unless we are to allow that everything that comes to us labelled 'art' is actually distinguished from other representations or fictions by virtue of this label (as, in common parlance, a person who writes verse is a 'poet') then we must allow that if 'art' is not an 'evaluative' word then it is at least a discriminatory one. But to say that this representation or fiction is 'art' need not be to say more than that it is worthy of a certain kind of attention.\textsuperscript{10}

Northrop Frye, for example, in pursuit of a 'systematic structure of knowledge' concerning literature would banish 'all casual, sentimental, and prejudiced value judgements, and all the literary chit-chat which makes the reputations of poems boom and crash in an imaginary stock exchange.', for 'whatever dithers or vacillates or reacts is merely leisure-class gossip.' and can 'no more be a part of the structure of criticism than the Huxley-Wilberforce debate is a part of the structure of biological science.'\textsuperscript{11} His list of poets on the 'stock exchange', Milton, Donne, Tennyson, and Shelley, is unremarkable enough - the presence of these names in a scholarly work of criticism will raise no eyebrows - but is this because they are God-given as poets? Are these works poetry because, as children, we found them on the poetry shelves in the library? A little later in the same 'Polemical Introduction' Frye writes;

Comparative estimates of value are really inferences, most valid when silent ones, from critical practice, not expressed principles guiding its practice. The critic will find soon, and continually, that Milton is a more rewarding and suggestive poet to work with than Blackmore.\textsuperscript{12}

Not only does Frye think Milton a more rewarding poet than Blackmore but he asserts that you will too, that is, not only does he make evaluative judgements but he also claims universal validity for them. However, if value does exist, he believes that it is best to keep 'silent' about it! That Frye's two views are incompatible does not, however, make either of them necessarily false. What must be remembered is that somewhere somebody chose Milton, Donne, Tennyson and Shelley, over a host of their minor contemporaries, and that this choice was repeated - over and over again, one would hope. 'Milton is a more rewarding and suggestive poet to work with than Blackmore'; it is time then to sell Blackmore and buy into
Frye's analogy of the stock exchange is as dishonest a one as could be imagined, for it suggests, by mixing up two forms of value, that aesthetic evaluation is a mercenary and opportunistic thing rather than a reflection of just this consciousness that one poet is more 'rewarding and suggestive to work with' than another. This 'stock exchange' is a sign that we do not simply inherit the value judgements that are handed down from some mythical time in the past when critics were "right", whatever that can mean. Moreover changes in the evaluation of a work are always intimately bound up either with changes in the understanding of the nature of the work, or in the more general perception of values, or both together. But these very changes in the perception of the work and in the more general context of values are cited by Frye as a reason against making value judgements; 'Every age, left to itself, is incredibly narrow in its cultural range, and the critic, unless he is a greater genius than the world has yet seen, shares that narrowness in proportion to his confidence in his taste.' He imagines how a critic of the early nineteenth-century might praise Bowdler's edition of Shakespeare for rescuing "what is immortal in our great poet from what the taste of his time compelled him to acquiesce in.", and how a critic today, passing over Dickens' melodrama and sentimentality as an embarrassment, would settle on everything in Dickens 'darkly and ambiguously ironic, or hostile to Victorian standards', thus producing a Bowdlerized version of Dickens. Then how does Frye know that Milton is more rewarding than Blackmore? Or does he know it and know that he does not know it? If Frye knows that his age is a narrow one then he must know how it is so and be able to see beyond its confines, if he does not know then he cannot suppose it is, merely by analogy with former ages, for his supposition, confined as it is, cannot take form. We have the same problem with the 'test of time'; if everybody waits for it then it is never made. If 'excellence' emerges gradually then it is only as a result of local but persistent evaluative judgements, throughout time, by people who are not concerned with awaiting the 'test of time'. Every age may be, as a whole, narrow but the narrowness of every age is similar in quality, that is, the basic axioms of stupidity are universal and timeless, but that person who lives the life only of their own times, that is, who has nothing they have not inherited from the inevitably bowdlerizing mainstream of thought, will always be a bad critic. Moreover value judgements are not
prophesies, though it is a popular misconception that they should be, to say that a critic who derogates something that is later popular was 'wrong', and one who praises what is later popular was 'right'. Frye appears to be worried about being 'proved wrong' by a subsequent generation, as if the fact that the Elizabethans thought Seneca a greater dramatist than any of his Greek predecessors should mean that we should forever suspend judgement on the relative merits of Shakespeare and McGonagal. There is nothing inherently wrong with a permanently suspended judgement or even a total rejection of the concept of judgement - but criticism cannot proceed without it. The study of literature does not presuppose any value in literature itself, since the value of the study may lie in the mental exercise of studying per se, but, as I have argued in the last two chapters, literature is a concept which exists only by virtue of a sense of 'literary value'.

The fact that evaluative judgements appear not to be a matter of proof or falsification must bring us back, however, to the primary objection to them; that is, that taste, not being accountable to the intellect, cannot be discussed. Thus Schiller;

Experience can give us answer whether there is a Beauty...But how there can be a Beauty...neither reason nor experience can teach us.'

Kant considers that we discern beauty with the imagination rather than the intellect; that is, we refer the representation not to its object, with a view to knowledge, but to our feelings of pleasure or displeasure in the representation itself. He concludes, therefore, that 'The judgement of taste is not a cognitive judgement, and so not logical, but is aesthetic - which means that it is one whose determining ground cannot be other than subjective.' An aesthetic judgement, then, according to Kant, 'does not deal with any concept', since there can be no transition from concepts to feelings of pleasure or displeasure.

The delight which we connect with the representation of the real existence of an object is called interest. Such a delight, therefore, always involves a reference to the faculty of desire...Now, where the question is whether something is beautiful, we do not want to know, whether we, or anyone else, are, or even could be, concerned in the real existence of the thing...All one wants to know is whether the mere representation of the object is to

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my liking, no matter how indifferent I may be to the real existence of the object of this representation...everything turns on the meaning which I can give to this representation, and not on any factor which makes me dependent on the real existence of the object. Everyone must allow that a judgement on the beautiful which is tinged with the slightest interest, is very partial and not a pure judgement of taste....For, since the delight is not based on any inclination of the subject (or on any other deliberate interests), but the subject feels himself completely free in respect to the liking which he accords to the object,...he must believe that he has reason for demanding a similar delight from everyone. Accordingly he will speak of the beautiful as if beauty were a quality of the object and the judgement logical...although it is only aesthetic, and contains merely a reference of the representation of the object to the subject...21

This idea of disinterest as the defining property of the aesthetic is a widespread one; Montesquieu writes that an object is termed 'beautiful' when it 'appears merely agreeable without being advantageous', and Coleridge that 'beauty itself is all that inspires pleasure without, and aloof from, and even contrarily to, interest.'22 Schopenhauer uses the same idea to account for the pleasure that is connected with the perception of beauty;

[It] is quite obvious that the beautiful as such excites pleasure in us without having any kind of connexion with our personal aims, that is to say with our will....[When] an aesthetic perception occurs the will completely vanishes from consciousness. This is the origin of the feeling of pleasure which accompanies the perception of the beautiful. It therefore rests on the abolition of all possible suffering.23

This last argument, with its premiss that pleasure is a purely negative state, is so framed that it is impervious to qualification and so I must leave it as it stands. What Schopenhauer's position has in common with that of Kant and Coleridge, however, is the attempt to distinguish aesthetic pleasure, as it appears in the reaction 'This is beautiful', from more earthly pleasures, that is, pleasure which arises from the perception of what Kant terms the utility or perfection of an object.24 Schopenhauer attempts to achieve this by making the sense of beauty the highest type of pleasure, Kant and Coleridge by making it a different sort of pleasure, both however depend upon the independence of aesthetic judgement from the
intellect and the will. Poe, too, writes that the 'sole arbiter' of poetry is 'taste', and that poetry, as 'the rhythmical creation of beauty', has only incidentally anything to do with 'the intellect or with the conscience', with 'truth, which is the satisfaction of reason, or...passion, which is the excitement of the heart'.

If aesthetic judgement is independent of the intellect/will then 'taste' can only be a matter of visceral reaction, belonging not even to psychology but rather to biochemistry. 'Taste', writes Leibniz, 'is something like an instinct.' and can be distinguished from understanding by the fact that it 'consists of confused perceptions for which we cannot give an adequate reason.'

'Natural taste', writes Montesquieu, 'does not consist in a theoretic knowledge, but in the quick and exquisite application of rules which, in speculation, may be really unknown to the mind.' Likewise Santayana writes that aesthetic values and preferences 'spring from the immediate and inexplicable reaction of vital impulse, and from the irrational part of our nature.' The sense of beauty, declares Coleridge, 'is intuitive', the necessary corollary of which, according to a strict definition of 'intuition', is the position taken by Frye - that the sense of aesthetic value is 'individual, unpredictable, variable, incommunicable, indemonstrable'. But what can it mean to say that taste is 'unpredictable'? Does it mean that the tastes that people have are constantly surprising us? Yet if taste is autonomous and arbitrary, independent of the intellect or personality, why should we expect any particular type of preference of anyone, why should it ever be necessary to say that taste is 'unpredictable'? This will not do, however, for being able to predict someone's taste is not the same as being able to account for it.

It may strike us at first as strange that almost all of those writers that I have marshalled here to speak against the possibility of accounting for taste, have also argued that taste can be improved. Leibniz, for example, who wrote that taste 'consists of confused perceptions for which we cannot give an adequate reason.', states, in the next breath, that to 'have good taste, one must practice enjoying the good things which reason and experience have already authorized.' This is rather like Frye's implied belief that great art is God-given, that it is enough for good critics to do nothing in order for excellence to triumph; for who will authorize the authority? Voltaire, too, writes that the 'intellectual taste
is much more formed by education and culture, than the sensual one', and requires 'time, instruction, and experience.'\(^3\) Gerard holds that while 'judgement' is 'implanted in very different degrees in different men.', nevertheless 'the principles of taste may be improved very much beyond their original perfection.'\(^3\) The idea that 'tastes are not to be disputed', he continues, 'would imply that our natural principles of taste, unlike all the rest of our mental faculties, and our bodily powers, are incapable of being either improved or perverted; it would infer that it is absurd to censure any relish, however singularly gross.'\(^3\)

The idea that taste is formed by education and culture, and can be improved, relies upon a connection between taste and cognition. It is often argued that since many people who once thought A was good now, having been exposed to B, think B is better, while the movement never takes place in the the opposite direction, from B to A, with the same effect, then this movement constitutes an improvement in taste. (I have deliberately avoided being specific about A and B since to give examples might, for some readers, bring the argument to a premature close.) This is not, however, always the case; many people who have been exposed to what the literary establishment would call 'good' literature, prefer to relax with what that establishment and they themselves would call 'trash' literature. This, they would say, proves nothing, since they know it is 'trash'; but a preference is a preference and what the habit proves is that their avowed taste, implicit in the use of 'good' and 'trash', is simply snobbery. But let us go back to this movement from A to B and the idea of taste being improved. All the preceding shows is that taste changes, or can be changed in a certain direction. There is always a 'good taste'; thus an Elizabethan might be weaned off Sophocles and onto Seneca, a Restoration reader might be taught to appreciate Otway more than Shakespeare. That taste commonly changes in certain predictable ways does not necessarily entail that taste can be 'improved', for this concept presupposes that which it was intended to prove, that is, the existence of a standard of 'good taste'. 'Human nature', writes Addison, 'is the same in all reasonable creatures; and whatever falls in with it, will meet with Admirers amongst Readers of all Qualities and Conditions.\[For\] it is impossible that anything should be universally tasted and approved by a Multitude, tho' they are only the Rabble of a Nation, which hath not in it some peculiar Aptness to please and gratify the Mind of Man.'\(^3\) There is
even a word, though not a very attractive one, to cover this universality of taste - *intersubjectivity*. But the idea of taste as intersubjective, like the scholastic 'occult causes' and the eighteenth-century *lusus naturae*, explains little and proves less, for that a judgement is widespread does not make it, necessarily, the outcome of a ratiocinative process. That tastes change, or can be changed, and that a certain concensus always exists as to what is 'good' and 'bad', then, tells us nothing about whether the process of evaluation is intellectual or otherwise.

The Beautiful and the Good

In the eighteenth-century, the heyday of discussion on 'taste' at an international level, it was generally held, if not always very clearly stated, that literary 'taste' was something more than a sensual matter. Voltaire, for example, while admitting that literary taste, like the 'sensation of the palate', is a 'quick discernment, a sudden perception', a relishing of what is good and a rejection of what is bad which, moreover, 'requires the influence of habit to give it a fixed and uniform determination.', is at pains to insist that the word 'taste', in connection with art, is to be taken metaphorically.35 It is the mind, according to Voltaire, that is 'touched and affected' by the perception of beauty and thus, while the common saying that there is no disputing about taste may be true of the palate, 'the maxim is false and pernicious, when applied to that *intellectual taste*'.36 Addison, too, insists that 'taste' is to be understood as a metaphor, adding however that it 'would not have been so general in all Tongues had there not been a very great Conformity between' what he calls 'Mental Taste', which pertains to the arts, and 'Sensitive Taste' which pertains to the palate.37 'The Pleasures of the Imagination,', he writes elsewhere, 'taken in their full Extent, are not so gross as those of Sense, nor so refined as those of Understanding.'38 Likewise Alison asserts that 'The emotions of taste may therefore be considered as distinguished from the emotions of simple pleasure by their being dependent upon the exercise of our imagination, and though founded in all cases upon some simple emotion, as yet further requiring the employment of this faculty for their existence.'39 Such writers had no
doubt, then, that taste was a matter of emotion and intellect; Gerard, for example, writes that it is 'no difficult matter to trace a...connexion between taste and character in individuals.', and in contrast to the apparently tentative, non-committal approach of Frye, we find Gibbon declaring that 'The poetical fame of Ausonius condemns the taste of his age.' However, the pleasures to be derived from the apprehension of beauty are, as Addison wrote, 'not so refined as those of the Understanding', and the spontaneity of aesthetic judgement, that is, the fact that it is a 'sudden perception', prevented those writers from identifying aesthetic pleasure with 'interest', as we saw with Kant's Critique of Aesthetic Judgement. Hume, for example, held that there is 'something approaching to principles in mental tastes; and critics can reason and dispute more plausibly than cooks or perfumers.', but that there is also 'a considerable diversity in the sentiments of beauty and worth, and...education, custom, prejudice, caprice, and humour, frequently vary our taste of this kind.'

Now, it is evident, that this sentiment must depend upon the particular fabric or structure of the mind, which enables such particular forms to operate in such a particular manner, and produces a sympathy or conformity between the mind and its objects. Vary the structure of the mind or inward organs, the sentiment no longer follows, though the form remains the same. The sentiment being different from the object, and arising from its operations upon the organs of the mind, an alteration upon the latter must vary the effect, nor can the same object, presented to a mind totally different, produce the same sentiment.

Taste, then, according to Hume as to those writers I have so far mentioned, is a matter of the psychology of the reader. Thus D'Alembert describes how the philosopher as critic 'begins by giving himself up to the high and lively sensations of pleasure' that arise from the first impression of a work, then 'recollects himself; extends his researches to the causes of his satisfaction; singles them out one after another; distinguishes carefully between illusory sensations, and deep and lasting impressions; and by this analytical procedure is rendered capable of pronouncing with judgement concerning the merit of a work in general'. Thus the 'philosophical connoisseur', according to D'Alembert, will not allow 'the poets's attention to please the external sense' to 'justify his
dispensing with the more important obligation of satisfying the reason and imagination of his readers, by the justness of his ideas, and the sublimity of his views.' But even if literary taste is more than a sensual matter there remains the problem of value itself, for while we may account for taste, how are we to account for the sense of value in itself?

First of all we should note that there are no self-guaranteeing criteria of value; value is never inherent in facts but is ascribed to them by human agency. For this reason Ayer concludes that aesthetically evaluative words, like ethical ones, are employed 'not to make statements of fact, but simply to express certain feelings and evoke a certain response.' Accordingly, no criteria can be found for determining the validity of such judgements, 'not because they have an "absolute" validity which is mysteriously independent of ordinary sense experience, but because they have no objective validity whatsoever.'

[The] purpose of aesthetic criticism is not so much to give knowledge as to communicate emotion. The critic, by calling attention to certain features of the work under review, and expressing his own feelings about them, endeavours to make us share his attitude towards the work as a whole.

The only verifiable facts, therefore, that the critic communicates are the descriptive propositions he formulates about the work. If we accept this argument then it seems we must also accept that it is impossible for one person to contradict another on a question of value. Yet, if we do not immediately succumb to the vertigo which the rigorous logic of linguistic philosophy so often inspires, we will see that there is more to be said on the subject than this. Writing ten years later Ayer adds that it does not follow from his argument that two people cannot 'significantly disagree about a question of value, or that it is idle for them to attempt to convince one another.' In practice most disputes are about questions of fact; it is only when our antagonist maintains their contrary attitude without disputing any of what we consider to be the relevant facts that we reach a point at which discussion is fruitless. I shall return to the question of the context of values later in this section, but, for the moment, I wish to look more closely at this question of relativism. Why Ayer's original position seems so discouraging to my
enterprise is that such phrases as 'simply to express certain feelings',
and 'no objective validity whatsoever' have themselves strong evaluative
overtones. (Yet how little of what we feel to be fundamentally important
to us could we, indeed, express in terms other than emotive, in terms
that would be objectively valid in the sense Ayer appears to mean?)
According to the relativistic position, to say that "x is good" is to say
no more than "I like x", and the only way to contradict such a statement
would be not "No, it isn't", but rather "No, you don't". Given the wide
differences in literary taste, and since 'good' always implies comparison,
this position can seem to bring us to an impasse. Thus Beardsley;

It is easy enough to be discouraged by it, and to conclude that
the only thing we can do in talking normatively about aesthetic
objects is to say how they appeal to us and others like us...We
cannot argue people out of a liking for raw onions, it might be
said; how can we expect to argue them out of a liking for Mickey
Spillane, or Rock and Roll?49

Beardsley here seems to believe that 'taste' in connection with literature
is not a metaphor at all. But what if we replace 'taste' with, for example,
'preference'? In the last two chapters I have tried to show that
literature does express an attitude towards the world, that every work
has a rhetoric which can be approached through the exploration of what
sort of person one would have to be to enjoy the work in question.
Perhaps this modern aversion to the connection between taste and the
personality arises precisely because, it being impossible not to make
value judgements on literature, one does not want those value judgements
to spill over into the judgement of any individual, just as in liberal
parlance one cannot make a generalization about a national character
unless it is favourable, so that 'The French have such a feeling for x'
demonstrates culture connoisseurship and 'The French are a bunch of x so
and so's' demonstrates, for the same reason, that you are a prejudiced
ignoramus. Moreover, in an age, in contrast to the eighteenth-century, in
which literature is discussed predominantly in cognitive terms, how is it
possible to carry on disclaiming a connection between taste and
cognition?

Before continuing I must distinguish between that beauty which the
dictionary defines as a combination of qualities that 'delights the
sight', and that beauty which it defines as a combination of qualities delighting 'the moral sense, or the intellect'. It is only the second, and vaguer of these which is of interest to me here. 'Beauty', it is true, is a word that suggests a non-cognitive response; even such formalistic attempts at objectifying the criteria for visual beauty, as, for example, the Golden Section, do not explain why such a geometric proportion should evoke this response. The two terms 'good' and 'beautiful', behave in many similar ways and have often been identified with one another.\textsuperscript{50} They are most commonly distinguished, however, on the grounds that a 'good' thing is pleasing because it serves a purpose while a 'beautiful' thing is pleasing in itself. Kant expresses it thus:

Objective finality can only be cognized by means of a reference of the manifold to a definite end, and hence only through a concept. This alone makes it clear that the beautiful, which is estimated on the ground of a mere formal finality, i.e. a finality apart from an end, is wholly independent of the representation of the good. For the latter presupposes an objective finality, i.e. the reference of the object to a definite end.\textsuperscript{51}

It is true that the idea of beauty relying upon a thing embodying certain conceptual or cognitive qualities runs into the difficulty that considering a thing beautiful seems more likely to be a spontaneous reaction than the end of a cognitive process. However, it may be that, if we want to keep to this notion, then literature must be exempted from subjectivity. 'Beauty', writes Tasso, oblivious to the idea of subjectivity, 'is a work of nature, and since it consists in a certain proportion of limb with a fitting size and beautiful and pleasing colouring, these conditions that once were beautiful in themselves ever will be beautiful, nor can custom bring about that they will appear otherwise,' but 'In respect to...words it may be conceded (since they have nothing to do with our contention) they are best that are most approved by practice, for in themselves they are neither beautiful nor ugly but they appear such as custom makes them'.\textsuperscript{52} Once the various elements of a work have been distinguished and the mode of their combination discovered, that is, once the semantics of the whole are grasped, it seems unlikely that there is some other objective quality left over, namely the 'beauty' of the work. It is meaningless to ask whether a thing is beautiful because we think it is, or do we think it is beautiful because
it is. Beauty is a positive response to some quality that the sum of the elements possesses in our 'eyes'; to say that beauty has intrinsic value is, therefore, a pleonasm; the considering of a thing beautiful is an evaluation of that thing — albeit spontaneous. This evaluation, then, is an evaluation of the work's semantics, of its metaphysic or imaginative suggestion. We can have 'beauty' as a spontaneous aesthetic evaluation of literature, but not so long as we continue to believe that the aesthetic response is a disinterested one, an end in itself. It is because literature is a matter of words that it is, critically, a much more approachable art form than, for instance, music. For, though a certain type of music can become associated with a certain social milieu and, thereby, come to signify it, music is a language unto itself, working its effects in an immediate, visceral manner. In contrast, the language of literature, even when ordinary usage is stretched to its figurative extreme, is at the most only a modification of our everyday language and, consequently, the world it describes.

In the quotation from Russell in the last chapter he states that one of the merits a metaphysical system can possess, irrespective of its truth value, is beauty, and in that chapter I tried to show what this beauty might consist of. For, while to the intellect such a metaphysical system may appear to be no more than futile speculation, there is something in its significance-giving which is emotionally satisfying — it manifests an atmosphere we wish to prevail, it 'glamourizes' existence. Findlay, adopting an approach reminiscent of both Kant and Schopenhauer, describes the 'aesthetic field' as 'one of suspended conception, of pure having something before one for contemplation: it is a field essentially divorced from the Yes-No of belief and conviction, as it is divorced from the other Yes-No of practical concern with its necessary involvement in reality.' What I wish to propose, however, is that the perception of beauty or aesthetic value is rather a 'Yes, yes, yes' and that, with regard to literature, beauty can be defined as that property which an idea possesses when it embodies or represents for us the end of a desire. With this proviso, that it should be a desire that cannot possibly be fulfilled. For the significance of the metaphysical assertion, as I wrote in the last chapter, is that 'nostalgia' that is left behind by the way in which it itself cancels out what it momentarily appears to say, the vacuum created by its impossibility. (Perhaps this is why the beautiful
in general and the poetical in particular are so often attended by a certain wistfulness, even pain.) If the aesthetic appears independent of the will and intellect, that is, disinterested, then it is so insofar as the appeal of metaphysics must always run counter to reason - the pleasure of the beautiful is always a pleasure derived from the momentary abnegation of reason. If beauty appears as the suspension of interest it is because metaphysics must evade the intellect in order to exist and be significant. The response of 'beauty' does not rely, then, on a belief in the reality of what is pointed to by, or embodied in, a work. The pleasure arises not from the belief that this 'poetic justice' can ever really exists, but from the idea of it, which does exist in the mind of the reader as they read. When in a work we spontaneously perceive a metaphysic which answers our wish for the world to be thus, for our being in the world to be thus, then that work is perceived as beautiful or "valuable in itself". (To what extent this is true of other art forms I cannot say, though there may be every reason for supposing that literature is a radically different case from music or the visual arts in this respect.) Beauty is often described as a harmony of some sort between elements in the object itself, but we might now modify this idea and say that beauty is a harmony of some sort between the abject and its perceiver. One of two things may have happened when a person ceases to perceive something as beautiful; it may be that the object, under further observation, ceases to satisfactorily manifest the metaphysic they desire to exist, and thus ceases to be symbolic; or the metaphysic is made to some extent conscious, becomes a deliberate interest, and is found to be itself unsatisfactory.

'Beautiful' in regard to literature is, then, a species of 'good', and it is to this term that I shall now address myself. When we say that something, for example a knife, is a 'good' knife we are stating that the grounds for our liking consist of the capacity of the knife to perform in a certain way, fulfil a certain role, that is expected of its kind; it successfully fulfils the function of the class of objects to which it belongs. Statements of value, then, are proposed solutions to the problems arising from situations in which a choice has to be made between particular actions (using this or that to fulfil the function of a knife), and are always concerned with the projected consequences of those actions. The commendation requires some end in view, not called into
question at the time of choosing; what Howell-Smith calls the 'contextual-background' of the use of 'good' in any particular situation. Thus, for example, 'good' poetry for Minturno would be poetry that accomplished the ends he proposes for it, that is, to 'teach, delight, and move', for Johnson it would be poetry that succeeds in 'uniting pleasure with truth, by calling imagination to the help of reason.', and for Stevenson it would be poetry that makes 'man's knowledge...answerable to the facts of life'. However Minturno does not question the value of teaching, delighting, and moving, Johnson the value of pleasure and truth, nor Stevenson the value of making our knowledge 'answerable to the facts of life'; for each of these writers the value of these things is given, it is the contextual-background of their particular evaluations. The connection between even acknowledged ends and immediate instrumental satisfaction may, however, be weak or strong. There are, nonetheless, several sources of evaluative criteria for literature which we can discount at the outset; these I have already dealt with in the chapters 'Literature and Reality', 'Form and Content', and in the first part of 'Literature and Rhetoric'. Indeed, all that has been said so far has been said with the aim of, firstly, accounting for effects in literature, and, secondly, of finding out what makes sense in literary criticism, that is, what can be legitimately said and how we can verify our intuitive feelings about a pronouncement on a work. Literary criticism is a field in which interpretations and evaluations are made, at least in its informal aspects, largely unreflectingly - the reconstructed logic of the two often bearing no relationship to their actual logic - with the consequence that all that seems left for us to do is to agree or disagree with the pronouncement, without ever being able to get to grips with how it was formulated.

Evaluative statements, when they are overtly made, come in many shapes and sizes which I will divide, for convenience, into four groups. The first group we might look at are those statements of value made on generic grounds; the work is good because it fulfils the artist's intentions, is an example of successful expression, is skilful, is new and original, is sincere. All of these statements, along with those related ones based on historical criteria (the work is good because it is 'radical', 'experimental', 'important in the history of'), I have already dealt with in Chapter 2.
The second group are statements which we might characterize as 'moral' evaluations, or evaluations based on the pragmatic value for the reader; the work is good because it is uplifting and inspiring, is morally edifying, promotes desirable social and/or political ends, is effective social criticism, is subversive. The last three of these, and perhaps the second, would be difficult to prove of any literary work; the legitimacy of such claims could only be established by demonstrating not only that the work was potentially these things, but that it had actually produced an effect on society, or had morally edified. If we claim a work is good because it fulfils a certain function then we must prove that it does in fact fulfil that function. (It may turn out that such evaluations are only possible on a private, personal level.)

Thirdly, there are those evaluative statements which implicitly claim that the work is informational in some way; the work is good because it is profound, has something important to say, conveys a significant view of life, gives us insight into a universal problem. I have already dealt with the objections that might be made to these criteria of evaluation in Chapters 2, 3, and 4.

Lastly, there is that group in which evaluation appears to be based on affective reasons; the work is good because it gives pleasure, is interesting, is exciting, is moving, has a powerful emotional import. This last group could be derived from either the second or third groups above, if we take, as I believe we must, the effects produced as deriving from a pleasure in the edifying or profound.

It may seem odd not to confront such evaluative descriptions head-on, to have made such statements as "New and original describes a work's historical status, not its value", or "There is much writing that is exciting, but which is not good". However those statements listed in the four groups are normative ones; they each presume, as a basic premiss that originality, or the production of excitement, or whatever, is the standard of value for literary works. Each of these evaluative statements thus implies the following argument.

If a work is x/produces x then it is good.
This work is x/produces x.
Therefore this work is good.
If we replace x with one of the qualities from our group of evaluative statements then we can see that in many cases the resulting argument is
one to which perhaps no critic has ever assented, and yet all of the evaluative statements listed above are quite commonly employed. The advantage of formulating the critical evaluation in the way I have done, so as to bring out its implicit premiss, is that it makes us aware of the implications of what is being said. By following the evaluation back to its source we can begin to discover the poetics, the definition of literature, that underlies it. Here, as elsewhere, I am concerned with what literature can be.

But why should the question of evaluation appear in a work concerned with interpretation, at all? Because criticism is not criticism without an evaluative aspect. Psychology, sociology, history, stylistics, and linguistics will yield the 'how?' and the 'why?' of a work. Criticism is concerned with the 'so what?' - and this is a matter of evaluation. The one type of evaluative statement that I will here pursue at any length is, therefore, that which is concerned with the pragmatic consequences of the work for the reader on an affective level, that is, those evaluative statements that express moral or ideologically orientated theories.

Moral or Ideological Criticism

A moral or ideological approach to literature is usually defined as one that evaluates it with reference to the world 'outside' literature, to society or a general ethical sense, in short, to life. This is usually contrasted with a formal or intrinsic approach, which evaluates literature in terms of its 'intrinsic nature' which evaluates it as a more or less autonomous thing. So long as we consider the aesthetic response as a 'feeling', writes Ducasse, 'its value is immediate and intrinsic, and consists in the pleasantness or unpleasantness of the state.', but when the aesthetic response is considered as an 'impulse' or the seed of an 'impulse' then 'its value is as usual to be measured in terms of the eventual significance of the impulse...[and] the terms in which we commonly appraise conduct are therefore potentially applicable to it.'

Now, as we saw in the last chapter, the literary metaphysic is just this, the 'seed of an impulse', even when considered only from the point to view of feeling. Moreover, in literature there is no formal quality without a characterizing significance and no significance which does not
exist by virtue of the relationship between the work and the world. Therefore, every 'formal' theory of value is, in reality, either a disguised ideological/moral theory or not a theory of value at all. This point is another example, and literary theory and aesthetics abounds with such examples, of the fact that what we say about literature looks very different depending upon whether we are considering it as a 'great abstraction', as Art, or as a common and ordinary experience, as reading a book.

Richards comments that until 'This is beautiful' is translated into '[this] causes an experience in us which is valuable in certain ways.' it remains a 'mere noise signalling that we approve of' the object we have so designated. This is so, but Richards is unduly optimistic about this philosophical breakthrough, for by the same lights the terms in which we explain why the experiences it causes are valuable will also be 'mere noise'. As I shall argue later, this very postponement of the 'noise of approval' is of great significance to criticism, for criticism only exists at all by virtue of it. (For the moment let me say that there is something naive in Richards' account, for although the usual counter to 'This is beautiful' is 'No it isn't' rather than the apparently more philosophically defensible 'No, you don't', that such a statement is a statement about oneself is implicit in its role, at least in informal contexts; such statements of preference always signal that a conversation has moved to a more intimate level, they are, indeed, more personally informative about oneself than are 'personal details'. The critic, according to Richards, must have a 'general theory of value' if his statements are to be neither vague nor arbitrary. Richards' own 'psychological' theory of value is reminiscent of Utilitarianism in its rather reductive appeal to appetencies and aversions, psychological necessities, and the desire for 'maximum satisfaction'. Like Mill, also, he is too much committed to a reasonable, liberal humanism to doubt that one can get from thirst to Shakespeare in a smooth series of logical steps. Indeed to build up a profound ideology, in logical steps, from such simple and basic foundations is an impossibility, as the great variety of ideologies that have been so built demonstrates. This is not to say that Richards' had no ideology, only that, like a great many Anglo-Saxon critics, it was of the only half-conscious, implicit sort that is left
untouched by introspection or speculation. This should not be taken as a
derogation of this sort of ideology, for, given the nature of ideologies,
it is no more nor less 'true' than a conscious, explicit one - it may
sleepwalk but it does so no less sure-footedly for that, and, though this
may be a taint of Anglo-Saxon prejudice in myself, it is probably more
likely to be sincere than the sort of ideology that can be made explicit.

However, an "ideology", as it is popularly conceived is just that
which is specific about what constitutes the 'good' and the 'bad', the
desirable and the undesirable. Moreover it is commonly distinguished from
morality on the grounds that while morality is a matter of conscience, of
feeling, an ideology is a matter of intellectualization - that they are
private and public things respectively. That such a distinction belongs
only to appearance is explicit in the distinction itself, for it supposes
that the ideologist believes in what they do not believe. This point is an
important one, for it is impossible to talk about ideological criticism as
distinct from any other sort without subscribing, albeit momentarily, to
this popular conception. This I shall return to later, but for the moment
let us look at those evaluative approaches that are "recognizably
ideological".

**Ideological Criticism**: Perhaps the most famous statement of an
evaluative procedure in which the aesthetic object is to be judged solely,
or chiefly, with respect to ideological standards occurs in Plato's
*Republic*:

> But if the state is to be run on the right lines, every possible
> step must be taken to prevent anyone, young or old, either saying
> or being told, whether in poetry or prose, that god, being good,
> can cause harm or evil to any man....We agree, surely, that our
> good man does not think death holds any terror for another who
> is a friend of his....Then we should be quite right to cut out
> from our poetry lamentations by famous men. We can give them to
> the less respectable women characters or to the bad men, so that
> those whom we say we are bringing up as guardians of our state
> will be ashamed to imitate them....I am afraid that we shall find
> that poets and story-tellers are in error in matters of the
greatest human importance. They have said that unjust men are
> often unhappy and just men wretched, that wrong-doing pays if
> you can avoid being found out, and that justice is what is good
> for someone else but is to your own disadvantage. We must forbid
them to say this sort of thing, and require their stories and poems to have quite the opposite moral.68

Yet, at the same time, he states that his reason for banishing such works from his ideal state is 'not that they are bad poetry...indeed the better they are as poetry the more unsuitable they are for the ears of children'.69 What then is this 'good' poetry, which he considers 'bad'? His answer does not come until much later; if his taste does not square with his ideological convictions it is because his taste has been formed by a flawed society, it is because his taste is in error. Plato is here critically reflecting on his own response in the light of certain convictions about truth and reality. He judges the effects of poetry in the light of what he believes to be an ultimate reality lying beyond that of appearances. However he neither describes, nor claims to have direct knowledge of, this Good, which would explain why he is still willing to admit that he may be wrong in his argument.70

Plato's two main charges against poetry are worth repeating in full here. Firstly; that 'If he [the poet] really knew about the things he represented, he would devote himself to them and not to their representations...We may assume, then, that all poets...have no grasp of truth but merely produce a superficial likeness of any subject they treat, including human excellence.'71 Secondly; that poetry 'has a terrible power to corrupt even the best characters, with very few exceptions', so that '[The] only poetry that should be allowed in a state is hymns to the gods and paeans in praise of famous men; once you go beyond that and admit the sweeter lyric or epic muse, pleasure and pain become your rulers instead of law and the rational principles commonly accepted as best.'72

He concludes, however, that;

Brought up as we have been...we are bound to love poetry, and we shall be glad if it proves to have high value and truth; but in the absence of such proof we shall, whenever we listen to it, recite this argument of ours to ourselves as a charm to prevent us falling under the spell of childish and vulgar passion...because the issues at stake, the choice between becoming a good man or a bad, are even greater than they appear, and neither honour nor wealth nor power, nor poetry itself, should tempt us to neglect the claims of justice and excellence of every kind.73
What perhaps makes us feel unsympathetic towards Plato's attitude, if indeed we do feel unsympathetic towards it, is not so much that he would banish certain types of literature - it would be a rare kind of critic who would finish a condemnatory review with an exhortation to the author for more of the same - but that, firstly, he divorces his feelings towards literature from his convictions about it, and secondly, his convictions about reality and the ideal state are probably not our own. But let us consider a few more "recognizably ideological" critical positions.

Mazzoni considers that the 'norm and rule' of poetry should be the 'civil faculty', that is, that faculty which is concerned with man as a social or civil being, since the proper mode of recreation is no less a civil matter than the legality of actions.  

Now this delight that is brought about by poetry can be considered in two ways, that is, either for itself alone, free and untrammeled by all laws, or as subordinated to and ruled by the civil faculty. Of the first sort is the end of that poetry that was subordinated to sophistic, and therefore deserves censure, for it is such as disorders the appetite with immoderate pleasure and renders it in every way a rebel to reason, and causes infinite injury and harm to virtuous life.

This division allows him to assert that Plato, whose treatment of poetry in the Republic was something of an embarrassment to Renaissance writers, had only intended that the sophistic sort of poetry should be driven out of his ideal state. Likewise Comte, while not banishing poets from his ideal state, would exclude them from 'political authority', because the very 'mental and moral versatility which makes them so apt in reflecting the thoughts and feelings of those around them, utterly unfit them for being our guides.' He too identifies art and rhetoric, describing poetry as the most 'idealizing' of the arts, and oratory as 'only Poetry in a simpler phase'. Nevertheless, like Plato and Mazzoni, he sees a role for the right sort of poetry in idealizing the values of the state, for art can serve 'to construct types of the noblest kind, by the contemplation of which our feelings and thoughts may be elevated....it should surpass realities so as to stimulate us to amend them.' This judging of the worth of literature by reference to a theory of social values also characterizes the approach which perhaps most readily
springs to mind when one thinks in terms "ideological criticism", that is, Marxist criticism. (It is easier to speak of the critical practice of Marxists rather than of 'Marxist critical practice', since this latter covers a variety of different approaches.) Lukács, for example, is concerned with the 'realized intention' of the work, the 'ideology or weltanschaung' that underlies it and in relating it to the historical class struggle. Thus in his 'Ideology and Modernism' he concludes by asserting that 'the obsession with psychopathology in modernist literature' is to be understood as expressing a 'desire to escape from the reality of capitalism', a desire which, moreover, implies 'the absolute primacy of...the condition from which it is desired to escape....[And] the unalterability of outward reality'. From a Marxist point of view then, if 'modernism' celebrates the impotence and meaninglessness of human activity then 'modernism' is bad. Of course criticism that grows from such broad ideological premises as Marxism can become quite double-jointed in its application, thus another Marxist critic might argue that 'modernism', in making objective, in demonstrating the ideology that Lukács delineates, in fact works against the status quo.

The only thing that remains consistent, through the various Marxist literary theories is the terminology and the reference to Marxist theory as the evaluative standard. Thus Etienne Balibar and Pierre Macherey, in their 'On Literature as an Ideological Form', assert that to grasp the ideology of a work one must be able to 'analyse the nature and expression of class positions in literature'. What is novel in their approach is that they consider that the study of literature should be approached 'in terms of a theory of the history of literary effects'; the evaluative standard is thus made actually intrinsic to such a study, for it is the relationship between history and literature which makes literature ideological, and what history should be, from a Marxist point of view, is a constant. Since, according to Balibar and Macherey, literature in a bourgeois society is founded on 'the imaginary solution of implacable ideological contradictions', that is, 'a presentation as solutions of the very terms of an insurmountable contradiction by means of various displacements and substitutions.', the first principle of analysis should be the discovery not of the works unity, 'which is illusory and false', but of 'signs of the contradictions (historically determined) that produced' the work and appear as 'unevenly resolved conflicts' within
The work, or perhaps it would be better to say 'text', then, in making an 'imaginary synthesis' between the class position of the author and the 'contradiction' of reality, rather than simply 'expressing' (sa mise en mots) an ideology, actually 'displays' (mise en scène) it; so that the work's 'inability to subsume' a hostile ideology reveals the limitations of that ideology. However, literature by taking a 'standpoint', making a 'declaration' from within the 'contradictions' of bourgeois society contributes to the development of that 'contradiction'. Thus, from a point of view of literary effect, once placed within 'a general schooling process', literature will contribute to the maintenance of bourgeois ideology as the dominant ideology. Balibar and Macherey conclude; 'We can now say that the literary text is the agent for the reproduction of ideology in its ensemble. In other words, it induces by the literary effect the production of "new" discourses which always reproduce (under constantly varied forms) the same ideology (with its contradictions). This, I take it, is a broad condemnation of bourgeois literature in terms of its social effect, but there is some conflict in it; for, if the bourgeois text can only cause the production of more bourgeois texts, how did this piece by Balibar and Macherey come about? Furthermore it is difficult to tell whether from the standpoint of social effect, which is necessarily an evaluative criteria in a Marxist context, the same bourgeois literature might not be 'good' in another type of post-bourgeois society? These questions are, however, by-the-by, for what I primarily wished to demonstrate, in following Balibar and Macherey's argument, are the twists and turns, the double-jointedness, the seemingly quite arbitrary reversals that can characterize an evaluation of literature in terms of its social effects. The question of effect is, after all, primarily an empirical rather than theoretical one and the insurmountable difficulty, in this regard, is the absence of a control - we do not have the same literary output in two or more different historical contexts, nor two or more different literary histories corresponding to the same historical context. This is not so great a problem when making connections between local literary effects and short-term fashions in sensibility but on any larger historical or social scale the difficulties are insurmountable. When it comes to the discussion of an individual work the use of such concepts as 'bourgeois ideology', 'class struggle', and 'means of production', are like trying to paint a miniature
using a house-brush - held between the feet. However, though it is possible to reject Marxist critical practices for being crudely ideological and/or based on erroneous premisses, it is not possible to reject them merely on the grounds that they are ideologically motivated, for this rejection itself expresses an ideology and can only be made on ideological grounds. 'Bourgeois anarchist individualism' has its manifestoes too, it is just that they are rarely so conspicuous as such.

If Plato or Marxist critics are so often held up as models of ideologically dogmatic attitudes towards literary evaluation it is not because they are doing anything fundamentally different from other critics, but because they appear so systematic, so calculating, so dogmatic about it. When Wilson points out that the weakness of of the Symbolists was their tendency to 'overemphasize the importance of the individual', to have been 'preoccupied with introspection sometimes almost to the point of insanity', and to have 'endeavoured to discourage their readers, not only with politics, but with action of any kind', we are more likely to ask ourselves if these qualities can be fairly attributed to the authors in question, than to ask if such qualities are actually weaknesses. The difference between what we perceive as evaluative and what we perceive as merely descriptive is a function of the extent to which we share the contextual-background of the critic's own values. Some critics, like Sartre, will declare it openly:

We assert against certain critics and against certain authors that salvation is achieved on this earth, that it is of the whole man and by the whole man and that art is a meditation on life and not on death.30

Though we may, of course, still have to wait for more specific comments before we can grasp what they mean. Others, perhaps more wisely circumspect, like Wilson, simply assume a shared contextual-background of values with their reader. How many of us, indeed, could sum up and communicate our beliefs and our values in a way which we believed would do justice to them? More often, I would say, we only discover or become aware of them through the friction they create when brought into contact with the beliefs and values of another. Our formulation of them will then take the form either of negation or affirmation - this is, indeed, how value emerges in the critical work.
All explicitly "ideological" approaches to literary evaluation are based on the premiss that we should not 'neglect the claims of justice and excellence of every kind', though perhaps not all exponents of them would admit, as Plato reluctantly does, that literature could do so and still be 'good'. The most conspicuous, as I have said, are those whose idea of the claims of justice are most systematized and self-conscious, such as the religious or Marxist. But the connection between this idea of justice and the role assigned to literature, and therefore the evaluation of individual works, is open to a wide variety of interpretations - probably many people have held views on life and social justice that are similar to Tolstoy's but Tolstoy's own personal idea of this connection produced a comparative evaluation of works which very few have ever agreed with. The one constant is that the overtly ideological critic, as the moralistic critic, is that one who appears to treat the book as though it were propaganda. But the evaluation of literature is always based upon an appraisal of its effect, if not necessarily on a belief that it will lead to immoral acts or contribute to the ascendency of bourgeois values, at least on whether or not its metaphysic is worthy of our sympathies. No work is devoid of a reflexive predicate because all, as works, posit that they are worthy of attention, that they are, as we have seen, significant in some general way. The arguments against ideological or moralistic criticism usually assume that only certain individuals have an ideology or a morality, that it is, moreover, something extrinsic to those individuals, and that what is possessed by 'the rest of us' is no more than a natural common sense. Thus it is usually attacked for applying standards to the evaluation of literature that are foreign to the nature of literature; an identifiable system of values is, after all, the possession of other people - our own is invisible. But let us now turn to what is "recognizably moral" criticism.

*Moral Criticism*: All those innumerable normative descriptions of literature that describe its purpose in ethical terms imply that moral effect may be an evaluative criteria for literature. Thus Eliot;

*Literary criticism should be completed by criticism from a definite ethical and theological standpoint. In so far as in any*
age there is common agreement on ethical and theological matters, so far can literary criticism be substantive.\textsuperscript{51}

The Renaissance, as I have said elsewhere, was particularly explicit about this moral function; Cinthio declares that both comedy and tragedy 'endeavour to introduce good morals', Minturno that by seeing and hearing what horrifies us in the theatre we may learn to be more stoical, and Guarini that comedy and tragedy, between them, restore the 'symmetry' of life, the former by dispelling the gloom that settles as a result of too much seriousness, and the latter by calling back 'the relaxed and wandering soul' to solemn matters.\textsuperscript{52} Minturno's image of the tragic poet as 'physician' - the primary sense of Aristotle's \textit{catharsis} was a medical one - recurs in Collingwood's \textit{Principles of Art} where art is described as 'the community's medicine for the worst disease of mind, the corruption of consciousness.', in Artaud, when he writes that 'Theatre is the only place in the world, the last group means we still possess of directly affecting the anatomy, and in neurotic, basely sensual periods like the one in which we are immersed, of attacking that base sensuality through physical means it cannot withstand.', and in Richards' \textit{Principles of Literary Criticism}, in a negative sense, where he describes how 'bad literature, bad art, the cinema, etc., are an influence of the first importance in fixing immature and actually inapplicable attitudes to most things.', in making their consumers 'functionally unable to face facts'.\textsuperscript{53} Eliot, too, is explicit;

The fiction that we read affects our behaviour towards our fellow men, affects our patterns of ourselves. When we read of human beings behaving in certain ways, with the approval of the author, who gives his benediction to this behaviour by his attitude towards the result of the behaviour arranged by himself, we can be influenced towards behaving in the same way....The author of a work of imagination is trying to affect us wholly, as human beings, whether he knows it or not; and we are affected by it, as human beings, whether we intend to be or not. I suppose that everything we eat has some other effect upon us than merely the pleasure of taste and mastication; it affects us during the process of assimilation and digestion; and I believe that exactly the same is true of anything we read....What happens is a kind of inundation, of invasion of the undeveloped personality by the stronger personality of the poet....So far as we are taken up with the happenings in any novel in the same way in which we are taken up with what happens under our eyes, we are acquiring at
least as much falsehood as truth... We are learning something about life from these authors direct, just as we learn something from the reading of history direct; for these authors are only really helping us when we can see, and allow for, their differences from ourselves.34

So direct a relationship as that which Eliot proposes, between the moral health of art and the moral health of the individual is, however, rarely made, at least in such explicit terms. Tolstoy's program is exceptional in this respect.

The task of art is enormous. Through the influence of real art, aided by science, guided by religion, that peaceful co-operation of man which is now maintained by external means... should be obtained by man's free and joyous activity. Art should cause violence to be set aside. And it is only art that can accomplish this.35

But, as I have said, the comparative evaluation of works that Tolstoy arrived at through the application of this standard has been found by most subsequent critics to be so unsympathetic as to discredit Tolstoy's concept of the 'task of art' itself. Richards, for example, despite his emphasis on the usefulness of art, writes that one of the ends of having a general theory of value is to enable the critic to 'defend accepted standards against Tolstoyan attacks'.35 The connection between literature and morality is now usually made in a more circumspect way, it will appear either only implicitly or as a connection between art and civilization', art and 'culture', art and 'ideology' (bourgeois, patriarchal, and so on). That the connection will appear is almost inevitable, particularly in a theoretical context, for as soon as the critic is called upon to explain why literature should be of any serious interest some argument, clear or obscure, will emerge as to how it tends, in Howells' words, 'to make the race better and kinder'.37 Thus Hough, for example, writes that literature 'offers us the raw material for moral judgements and it offers us far more material than any one individual life can do.' and is, thereby, 'an extension of our moral experience.'38 He takes it as self-evident that this extension is valuable and, with unconscious irony, quotes Milton to that effect - 'I cannot praise a fugitive and cloistered
What, indeed, could be more fugitive and cloistered than a morality based upon one's experience of literature?

If we want to assert that literature, or art in general, has, or is capable of, a beneficial moral effect then the onus is on us to produce evidence to this effect. For myself I have never been struck by any moral superiority in those who have had the privilege of a literary education, neither is it immediately obvious to me that it is the want of this particular privilege that can easily account for what is generally agreed to be anti-social behaviour. Throughout his career, George Steiner has been asking himself and his readers one fundamental question, upon the answer to which, he believes, rests the whole ideal of the humanities - How can literary and artistic values and hideous inhumanity exist in the same community? Although Steiner disavows the tradition which makes literary excellence depend upon moral effect he is still, in his concern for the relationship between the two, very much within it. Indeed, as I wrote above, it is almost impossible to consider literature in a larger theoretical context or in connection with ends without confronting this question. Clive Bell cuts this particular Gordian knot by stating that 'Rapture suffices.'

Further we cannot go. When asked why we hold a particular state of mind to be good, the state of aesthetic contemplation for instance, we can but reply that to us its goodness is self-evident. Some states of mind appear to be good independently of their consequences. No other things appear to be good in this way. We conclude, therefore, that good states of mind are alone good as ends. To justify ethically any human activity, we must inquire - "Is this a means to good states of mind?" In the case of art our answer will be prompt and emphatic. Art is not only a means to good states of mind, but, perhaps, the most direct and potent that we possess.

I will have more to say about this attitude in the next section. Nowadays it is, however, those positive appraisals of literature in general which are not too specific about what might constitute a beneficial moral effect, which appear most reasonable. We may remember Lawrence's injunction against nailing down the novel with a moral, an injunction that seems just as much directed towards the reader. There is, however, a morality contained in this, for the novelist, according to Lawrence, 'commits an immoral act' by trying to enforce a predilection, because he
'prevents the possibility of a pure relationship, a pure relatedness' between 'a human being and the other human being or creature or thing' they are related to by emotion, and this relationship, according to Lawrence, is 'the only thing that matters'. Baudelaire too seems to claim that 'Rapture suffices.' when he writes that art is useful 'Because it is art.', and that 'Beauty is the single ambition, the exclusive aim, of taste.' A whole crowd of people imagine that the aim of poetry is some sort of lesson, that its duty is to fortify conscience, or to perfect social behaviour, or even, finally, to demonstrate something or other that is useful....If we will even briefly look into ourselves, question our souls, bring to mind our moments of enthusiasm, poetry will be seen to have no other aim but itself....Poetry cannot, except at the price of death or decay, assume the mantle of science or morality; the pursuit of truth is not its aim, it has nothing outside itself. But in the same essay he shows, like Lawrence, that his attack on morality is really a defence of morality, for he also asserts 'I do not mean to say that poetry does not ennoble manners - that its final result is not to raise man above the level of squalid interests; that would clearly be absurd.' Rather he believes that the deliberate pursuit of a moral aim will not serve the ends of morality. As he writes elsewhere; Virtue is no laughing matter to be sure, and no writer in his senses has ever thought of taking the line that works of art ought to run counter to the great moral laws. The question at issue therefore is to determine whether the so-called virtuous writers are tackling successfully the problem of inspiring love and respect for virtue, whether virtue is satisfied with the way her cause is being served. The retreat from overt moral criticism takes the form of either very abstract, implicit notions of value, or evaluative statements being reserved for generalizations about literature and art. Aestheticism: Not surprisingly, the activities of overt moralizers or ideologists have prompted, from time to time, a reaction which has taken
the form of asserting that only aesthetic, not moral, judgements should be passed on literature. Thus Wilde:

There is no such thing as a moral or an immoral book. Books are well written, or badly written. This is all.108

The password of the Aesthetic Movement which, for many, Wilde represented was 'art for art's sake', or, as Pater modified it, 'art for its own sake'.109 Aestheticism claims to judge literature purely on the basis of its "intrinsic value", rather than by any standard which is foreign to it; by what it is rather than by what effect it has.110 As we have seen, however, there can be no such thing as intrinsic value. An object can only have value as a means to something else, and this was in fact assumed in the criticism of aesthetes such as Baudelaire, Whistler, Wilde, and Pater; for them a good work was one which provided pleasure through possessing a certain formal quality they called 'beauty'. What the slogan 'art for art's sake' rather misleadingly expresses is in fact primarily an attitude towards life rather than a definite critical standard for evaluating works. Thus Pater, in his 'Conclusion' to The Renaissance:

The service of philosophy, of speculative culture, towards the human spirit is to rouse, to startle it to a life of constant and eager observation. Every moment some form grows perfect in hand or face; some tone on the hills or the sea is choicer than the rest; some mood of passion or insight or intellectual excitement is irresistibly real and attractive to us, - for that moment only. Not the fruit of experience, but experience itself, is the end. A counted number of pulses only is given to us of a variegated, dramatic life. how may we see in them all that is to be seen in them by the finest senses? How shall we pass most swiftly from point to point, and be present always at the focus where the greatest number of vital forces unite in their purest energy? To burn with this hard, gem-like flame, to maintain this ecstasy, is success in life....Well! we are all condamnés, as Victor Hugo says; we are all under sentence of death but with a sort of indefinite reprieve...Some spend this interval in listlessness, some in high passions, the wisest, at least among "the children of this world", in art and song. For our one chance lies in expanding this interval, in getting as many pulsations as possible into the given time....Of such wisdom, the poetic passion, the desire of beauty, the love of art for its own sake, has most. For art comes to you proposing frankly to give nothing
but the highest quality to your moments as they pass, and simply for those moments' sake.111

This is itself an ideology, a morality, it proposes a 'good' and claims that art is the best means of achieving this 'good'. In that it judges art primarily as a source of pleasure, Pater's view is closer perhaps to the average person's evaluative standard than many other apparently less exotic critical ideologies. (Indeed, Wilde's 'Art never expresses anything but itself.' is the logical conclusion to the ubiquitous Kantian notion of aesthetic pleasure as 'disinterested',112) Any person who reads for no other reason than to pass the time to some extent leans towards aestheticism.113 Pater's statement of the argument is distinctive because of the place he affords the pleasure derived from art in his felicific calculus - at the top.

What is interesting about this passage, and why I have called the slogan 'art for art's sake' misleading, is that in it Pater appears to abjure all ideology;

With this sense of the splendour of our experience and of its awful brevity, gathering all we are into one desperate effort to see and touch, we shall hardly have time to make theories about the things we see and touch. What we have to do is to be forever curiously testing new opinions and counting new impressions, never acquiescing in a facile orthodoxy, of Comte, or of Hegel, or of our own.114

Plainly he associates all ideology with a certain betrayal of the self, and a certain obscuring of the true nature of the artistic object.115 That his own argument is the statement of an ideology is not apparent to him. Adorno's pronouncements on ideology, strikingly similar to Pater's, again can only, like the latter, make sense when seen as a reaction to what they find to be an uncongenial relation between art and the prevailing ideology;

We must be especially wary of the present insufferable tendency to drag out at every slightest opportunity the concept of ideology. For ideology is untruth - false consciousness, a lie. It manifests itself in the failure of art works, in their intrinsic falsehood, and can be uncovered by criticism...The greatness of works of art lie solely in their power to let those things be heard which ideology conceals.116
Just as Pater and Wilde were reacting against the Victorian idea of a 'literature of purpose', and Baudelaire against the 'école du bon sens', Adorno is reacting against the prevailing Marxist approach. Both accuse the opposition of seeing art only as instrumental to some further end. What Adorno, 'in contrast', values it for is that, in preserving man's prehistoric sense of unity with nature, through its mimetic power, it prefigures the possible restoration of that condition by political and social transformation. 'Good' or 'genuine' art, for Adorno, is that which is 'de-aestheticized', aware of its own illusory nature, and which, therefore, does not offer consolation to the undesirable present, but presents a hope for the future which may aspire to imitate it at its most utopian. If Pater's creed was 'art for the intensity of living's sake' then Adorno's is 'art for the future of man's sake'; neither of them can claim to value art 'for its own sake'. An interesting variation on the political approach, reminiscent of the ambiguity to be found in Plato, is that of Marcuse;

Art can express its radical potential only as art...Art obeys a necessity, and has a freedom which is its own - not those of the revolution....The abolition of the aesthetic form, the notion that art could become a component part of revolutionary (and prerevolutionary) praxis...is false and oppressive: it would mean the end of art....The tension between art and revolution seems irreducible. Art itself, in practice, cannot change reality, and art cannot submit to the actual requirements of the revolution without denying itself.

The 'revolution' is for Marcuse a 'good', a desired end, but so also are the effects of art, his conception of which he outlines earlier in the essay. If he appears more flexible, less ideologically motivated than Adorno, it is because he is prepared to allow that he finds in art a value that makes him unwilling to countenance the destruction of that art, even if it will serve the larger aims of the ideology to which he owes his main allegiance. This is not, of course, to say that his grounds for valuing art are not based on a belief that it produces effects which he considers desirable, that there is not an ideology, however vaguely conceived, behind his evaluation. Naturally a politically or religiously motivated person can declare "I know it is a good book, but I would not let it be published", but this is quite a
different class of statement from a purely evaluative one. The first part is an evaluation of the book itself, the second, most probably, the expression of a belief that it would have what the speaker considers an undesirable effect on the reading public; the two are not incompatible.

The Place of Evaluation in Criticism

It is the metaphysic of the work, as earlier defined, which provides the basis for the only type of evaluation that can truly be said to be 'aesthetic', in the sense of concerned with the work as literature, because, given that words are neither beautiful nor ugly in themselves, we must refer to import before we can begin to evaluate. However, there is, as I wrote before, no procedure we can use to discover whether any particular metaphysic is "better" than any other one, for all metaphysical claims can have, by definition, no validating procedure that would turn them into truth. The evaluation of literature depends upon the question 'What sort of person do I want to be?', but this question is itself subjective, it rests upon no foundation other than my own sense of value, my own sense of what sort of person I want to be. Aesthetics rests upon aesthetics.

But if the question of literary value is, then, circular, there is, nevertheless, much that can be meaningfully said at various points on this circle. If all value judgements are, ultimately, nonsensical, then we can at least, as I wrote above, postpone the nonsense within literary criticism, for, while the placing of value upon any work may be non-logical it need not be unaccountable. As we have seen with 'good' most evaluations have a contextual-background of values derived from the attitudes and larger interests of those who make them, and this is also, I have proposed, the case with aesthetic value. Most theories concerning beauty as an evaluative criteria do not appear to share this assumption, but in most of them it is tacitly made. We do not move from one set of values to another without some connecting process; we discover value, distil it out of our existing values and the experience of our own responses. This does not necessarily commit us to an infinite regress in explaining the grounds of our evaluative judgements, only some exploration of the consequences we believe that imaginative participation
in, or sympathy with, the metaphysic would entail. Again this must inevitably be largely a private matter, for the question of effect on a public scale is an empirical one and if the critic deliberately addresses it then they are in the realm of hypotheses. "Gentlemen," writes Anatole France, 'I am going to speak of myself in connection with Shakespeare, Racine, or Goethe,' and this is as much as the critic can do—what use it may be is for the critic's readers to decide. If we cannot argue about taste, then we can at least discuss it, for even without a norm, though such a norm could conceivably exist, we can say that I prefer things more sweet or you prefer things more bitter than some specified x—such statements establish the norm of the speaker. Thus if I say x is banal you may say "Look at these riches, this profundity, this truth"—but I can answer that it is comparatively rich, but not sufficiently, that this truth is a truism, that taken all in all x is still banal and you, being shallow, are easily impressed. (The night is only comparatively darker than the day, but it is the night.) This may have been what Wilde had in mind when wrote that 'The highest, as the lowest, form of criticism is a mode of autobiography.' "This work is good" is not the sort of construction which often appears in critical work, outside of the reviewing kind, nor do definitions of the critic's values often precede their discussion; criteria for evaluation are implicit in their comments of the work itself, their emphasis, perhaps even their choice of work. For instance, at the end of an introduction to Laclos' Les Liaisons Dangereuses, Stone writes:

Towards the end of his life he proposed writing another book to show that true happiness could be achieved only in family life. Admirers of this book will probably not regret that so worthy an intention remained unfulfilled.

At a stroke he declares that if we admire the book we do so because we sympathize with the 'glamour' of its 'charming monsters'. Similarly Karl and Hamalian, writing about the murderer Moosbrugger in Musil's Man Without Qualities and 'existential literature' in general:

Moosbrugger, despite the horrors of his crime, is perhaps vaguely superior to those around him, for he understands his unique situation...he gains a kind of freedom denied to those shackled
by externalities....Existential fiction is painful for the very reason that it strips life of its deceptions...125

(You may have had the experience of being disinclined to read a work precisely because of the criteria by which its champions have praised it.)

If, as I said before, two critics are divided as to the value of a work yet in agreement about its "interpretation", what they may still debate are the criteria they derive from their contextual-background of values, and these are founded in the two respective critics' beliefs about the world. "No you don't" is not the only disagreement we can make with "I like it", we can also approach the problem thus - "If you understood what your position entails, what its implications are then perhaps you wouldn't". When faced with a different evaluation of a work, the nature of which is fixed, there are really only two courses open to us; we can see the reasons for the contradictory evaluation and agree with it, or we can see the reasons for the contradictory evaluation and dissent from it. If we understand the reasoning behind the evaluation, disagree with it, and yet still allow that it is valid, then we are contradicting ourselves. "This is good" does not only equal "I like it" but also "I like it because p, q, r, and so on". If we have good reasons for liking a work then we have good reasons for saying why others might also. This is not the same as saying "What I desire is desirable", though the contrary position assumes that human nature varies so radically from person to person that any form of education would be impossible. Critical judgements, particularly of value, are not made independently of any other sort of judgement; even when they are merely inherited they are still made with the desire to conform.

This contextual-background of values was, naturally, much emphasized in the eighteenth-century; Gerard, for example, writes that a 'prevailing turn or disposition of mind', by which he means a narrowness of mind, 'often makes us unable to relish any thing but what falls in with it, and thus perverts and prejudices our judgement.'126 Moreover it is such a narrowness or pervertedness, he continues, that gives rise to 'the depravity of public taste, and the pernicious influence it has on public entertainments and dramatic works: and hence, in a great measure, the connexion of the taste of a people with their morals.'127 This has
probably been so in every age, though the intelligentsia of any age, particularly when they approve 'on principle', are just as likely to demonstrate a similar narrowness. Coleridge, like Gerard, emphasizes 'the close and reciprocal connexion of just taste with pure morality.', and goes so far as saying that no person can understand the writings of Shakespeare without a knowledge of 'the heart of man' that is informed with Christian humility.\textsuperscript{12} Eliot, less specifically, asserts that 'the development of genuine taste, founded on genuine feeling, is inextricable from the development of the personality and character... One's taste in poetry cannot be isolated from one's other interests and passions; it affects them and is affected by them, and must be limited as one's self is limited.'\textsuperscript{128} Even less specific and more formal again is Richards who writes that 'literature and the arts' are the chief means by which, under the influence of other minds, we pass 'from a chaotic to a better organized state', and that they are, therefore, essential to a 'free, varied and unwasteful life'.\textsuperscript{130} He holds that literature is valuable because it generates what he considers the 'most valuable states of mind', which are 'those which involve the widest and most comprehensive co-ordination of activities and the least curtailment, conflict, starvation, and restriction.'\textsuperscript{131} As a corollary of this he believes that 'bad taste and crude responses are not mere flaws in an otherwise admirable person' but, rather, they are 'a root evil from which other defects follow.'\textsuperscript{132} Helen Gardner, who holds that the 'primary critical act is a judgement, the decision that a certain piece of writing has significance and value.', asserts that literature 'appeals through my senses and imagination to my capacity to recognize order and harmony and to be delighted by them... to my experience as a human being, to my conscience and moral life.'\textsuperscript{133} Aldous Huxley, likewise, writes that we 'tend to think and feel in terms of the art we like; and if the art we like is bad, then our thinking and feeling will be bad.', and, more interestingly with regard to the idea of literature as a 'cultivation' of reality, that 'Just as the uncivilized try to copy the civilized - even when the civilized are quite unworthy of imitation - so does life try to copy art - even when it is bad art.'\textsuperscript{134} This may not seem a serious enough problem, the problem of literary evaluation, to be the subject of a discussion that appears to border on the ethical, but I too believe that what people do with their imaginations and the quality of the alternative worlds they are offered is,
demonstrably, of fundamental importance to so many aspects of their life as to encompass the quality of the whole.

Because literary taste is neither so refined as that of the intellect nor so gross as that of the palate, the question of the relationship between enjoyment and approval is a complicated one. As Gerard points out, even with regard to the 'external senses' a 'person may perceive in himself an unconquerable antipathy to a particular species of food; and yet, if he can trace its origin to an accidental disgust, he will not...pronounce that food either unwholesome or unpalatable, he will not be surprised that other men are fond of it, but on the contrary believe, that himself also should have been fond of it, if he had not happened to contract an unreasonable prejudice against it.' Moreover, as he writes elsewhere, there is 'a remarkable difference between sentiment and opinion: no man can hold an opinion for a moment after he has discovered it to be false; but a man may clearly perceive a sentiment to be wrong, and yet find it for a long time impossible to abandon it.' Eliot, likewise, writes that for 'literary judgement we need to be acutely aware of two things at once: of "what we like", and of "what we ought to like"... which requires an awareness of both of "what we really feel" and of our shortcomings; for we do not really know what we ought to like unless we also know why we ought to like it, which involves knowing why we don't yet like it.' We find this tension between principle and instinct expressed in Saint-Evremond's Of Tragedy, Ancient and Modern (1672), for though he is obviously an admirer of Greek tragedy and believes that 'the most Christian actions, and the most useful truths would produce a kind of tragedy that would please us the least of anything in the world,' he can write that 'should a man translate even the Oedipus, the best performance of antiquity, into French, with the same spirit and force as we see it in the original... nothing in the world would appear to us more cruel, more opposite to the true sentiments which mankind ought to have.'

D'Alembert observes that though it appears 'a miserable occupation...to be disputing against our agreeable sensations' and though we may ask 'what obligations shall we lie under to philosophy if it manifestly tend to diminish our pleasures?', yet such is 'the unhappy lot of humanity that the knowledge we acquire serves only to give us a mortifying view of the scenes of error and illusion, through which we
have passed, and is, almost always, attended with the diminution of our pleasures.'\textsuperscript{133} When one feels constrained to consider all things as equal, or the freedom to choose as good in itself, then choice evaporates. One cannot argue about feeling? Perhaps, but one can recognize a shallow feeling, a false feeling or a mean feeling, a feeling that is not what it at first declares itself to be. Yet, as Johnson writes, 'To convince a man against his will is hard, but to please him against his will is...above the realm of human abilities.'\textsuperscript{140} Moreover, so convenient a distinction between notional and real assent can quickly lead to the manufacturing of 'appropriate' emotion rather than true response. But this is an artificial problem, for why should it be part of the critic's role to convince a person to like something against their will? Rather like Frye's idea that the critic can be 'wrong' or 'right' about a work's value, depending on its reputation, this is a pseudo-problem that often arises in connection with evaluation and stems from the critic's desire to justify or validate their criticism before the fact. According to this position, a self-guaranteeing criteria for the use of the word 'good' runs thus; 'x has a higher aesthetic value than y' means 'x is, or would be, liked better than y by all qualified perceivers'. Gerard, for example, writes that the 'polite and knowing are chiefly touched with those delicacies which would escape the notice of a vulgar eye.' and John Dennis, in his \textit{Taste in Poetry} (1702), remarks that 'To conclude that a Play is good because Mr.Granville is pleased by it, is but a reasonable way of arguing. But to say that it is good because it pleases the generality of an Audience is a very absurd one.'\textsuperscript{141} But what are the qualifications of the qualified perceiver? If an individual has read all those books liked by the critical establishment of their day, then they will perhaps be qualified to perceive when these qualities, which they believe them to have in common, occur in a new book. If an individual has read every top-ten bestseller in the last fifty years then they will perhaps be qualified to perceive when these qualities liked by the majority of the reading public of their day, occur in a new book. Surely the difference lies in the literary critic being able to produce a reasoned argument for their preferences. But on what is this argument to be based? We are back once more at the beginning; to claim that the critic's ability to interpret, to discover and demonstrate the metaphysic of the work, to account for the imaginative suggestion, justifies the critic's evaluation of that work is a non sequitur. For
nothing can \textit{ultimately justify} evaluation. Yet there is something in Gerard's and Dennis' argument; Cicero relates how when Antimachus Clusius, a poet, was abandoned by his entire audience but for Plato, he read on because Plato was 'worth all the rest', and there seems some justification in this.\textsuperscript{142} Here is Addison's suggestion to anyone wishing to know if they have 'a fine taste in Writing':

\begin{quote}
If a Man would know whether he is possessed of this faculty, I would have him read over the celebrated Works of antiquity, which have stood the Test of so many different Ages and Countries; or those Works among the Moderns, which have the sanction of the Politer Part of our Contemporaries. If upon the Perusal of such Writings he does not find himself delighted in an extraordinary Manner, or if, upon reading the admired Passages in such Authors, he finds a Coldness and Indifference in his Thoughts, he ought to Conclude, not (as is too usual among tasteless Readers) that the Author wants those Perfections which have been admired in him, but rather that he himself wants the Faculty of discovering them.\textsuperscript{143}
\end{quote}

If there is a qualified perceiver who is qualified independently of their commitment to a standard that is derived from some external source then it is the perceiver who \textit{critically reflects on their own response}, and an integral part of this reflection must be a consideration of the descriptions of, and arguments for, the value of works that are provided by other critics/readers. But if a critic wants to influence then they must write influentially, being a critic does not confer a mandate in the realm of aesthetics. Who, then, is to be the final arbiter of whether or not a work is 'good'? The answer is simple: I am. Yet Montaigne's motto 'Que \textit{s\textsuperscript{a}cis-je}?' entails the rather large responsibility of finding out.

\textit{Taste as Discernment}

To be a critic, then, is to be concerned with value in general, for 'literary value' only exists in the context of other values. This is made explicit by Richard's when he writes that 'The critic...is as much concerned with the health of the mind as any doctor with the health of the body.', for 'To set up as a critic is to set up as a judge of values.'\textsuperscript{144} (This is not to say that such is the critic's conscious aim.)
Gerard writes that the 'chief utility of criticism lies in promoting correctness of taste.', a sentiment that is echoed by Eliot when he writes that the end of criticism is 'the elucidation of works of art and the correction of taste.' Apropos of this elucidatory aspect of criticism, Gardner defines the function of the critic as 'to assist his readers to find the value which he believes the work to have.' However, the critic cannot prove that any work has value, for proof and value are oil and water. What the critic can do however is prove that a particular work has the value which they attributed to it. Evaluative statements may be just noise but in the postponement of this noise consists the discipline of literary criticism.

This brings us to that other meaning of 'taste' which those eighteenth-century writers, mentioned above, often emphasized - taste as the power of discernment and analysis. Thus Gerard writes that 'vigorous internal senses' even when 'attended with the greatest delicacy of passion.' are not alone sufficient for 'good taste', but must be 'aided with judgement, the faculty which distinguishes things different, separates truth from falsehood, and compares together objects and their qualities.' 'A Man of fine taste in Writing', declares Addison, 'will discern after the same manner, not only the general Beauties and Imperfections of an Author, but discover the several Ways of thinking and expressing himself, which diversify him from all other Authors, and should be able to 'enter into the very Spirit and Soul of fine Writing, and show us the several Sources of that Pleasure which arise in the Mind upon the Perusal of a noble Work.' Voltaire writes that the perception of beauty, 'in order to constitute true taste, must not be a vague and confused sensation; but must be attended with a distinct view, a quick and comprehensive discernment of the various qualities, in their several relations and connexions, which enter into the composition of the object we contemplate.' and D'Alembert that 'the philosophical analysis of a work consists 'in distinguishing well [the various sources of the pleasure we receive from the work] and keeping them separate from each other, that so we may refer to each what properly belongs to it, and may not attribute our pleasures to causes that have no sort of influence in their production.' This separation of legitimate from illegitimate criteria for critical analysis and evaluation has been the main subject of this thesis so far and it is, indeed, the critical, or uncritical, habit of
catching the nearest way which has occasioned my project." However, as I have written above, discovering the source of the pleasure one derives from a work is not the same thing as tracing the sources of those pleasures per se. D'Alembert elsewhere defines 'taste' as 'the Faculty of distinguishing, in the works of art, the various qualities which are adapted to excite pleasure or disgust, in minds that are susceptible of delicate sentiments and perceptions.', and this is perhaps the more correct emphasis. I will let Gerard summarise this eighteenth-century ideal:

A critic must not only feel, but possess that accuracy of discernment, which enables a person to reflect upon his feelings with distinctness, and to explain them to others. Taste perceives the particular beauties and faults, and thus supplies the facts for which we are to account, and the experiments from which our conclusions are to be deduced. But these conclusions cannot be formed without a vigorous abstracting faculty, the greatest force of reason, a capacity for the most careful and correct induction, and a deep knowledge of the principles of human nature. One does not merit the name of a critic, merely by being able to make a collection of beauties and faults from performances in the fine arts; to tell in general, that those please, these displease; some more, some less...They are its rude materials, and nothing more. And to exhibit them is the whole that taste can do. In order, therefore, to form an able critic, taste must be attended with a philosophical genius, which may subject these materials to a regular induction, reduce them into classes, and determine the general rules which govern them. In all this operation, respect must be had to the subjects in which the excellencies or blemishes reside, and to the similitude of the qualities themselves, or of the sentiments which they excite....It is not enough to discover that we are pleased or displeased; we must ascertain the precise species of either; and refer it to the sentiment or the expression; to the design or the execution; to the sublimity or beauty; to wit or humour.

This is also my ideal. What, as a critic, I must be able to discover is the 'I know not what' from which my pleasure or distaste springs; a quality that is both in myself and in the work. This concept of the 'I know not what' went, naturally enough, hand in hand with the idea of taste as discernment in the eighteenth century. Thus Feijoo; 'In many productions of Nature and even of Art men find, beyond those perfections subject to their comprehension, another kind of mysterious beauty which
torments their intelligence in proportion as it pleases their taste, which
their senses can touch and reason cannot decipher; so it is that when
they wish to explain it, not finding words that satisfy their idea of it,
they let themselves fall, discouraged, into the formless assertion that a
certain thing has an "I know not what" which pleases, which enchants,
which bewitches; and there is no profit in asking them for a clearer
revelation of this natural mystery. Montesquieu describes those
'qualities to which we give the name of Je ne sçai quoi.' as a separate
category from the 'beautiful, good, agreeable, natural, delicate, tender,
graceful, elegant, noble, grand, sublime, and majestick', but none of these
terms, within the realm of literature, is itself an explanation, and so,
though they may be a rough division of response, each contains an 'I know
not what'. What is important to note here is that, because I cannot
examine the source of pleasure within myself beyond a certain point,
anything like a complete answer to this enigma can only be found in the
other direction, that is, in the discovering of just what properties of
the work produce the feelings that I have. It is the discovering of this
'I know not what' that constitutes the entire discipline of literary
criticism, as distinct from more general literary studies, and it is the
willingness to look, and, perhaps, the ability to find it, which defines
the critic. For when it is asserted that there is no disputing about
taste, what the speaker has in mind is not the 'what' of values but the
'why'. The 'what' of the sources of pleasure in a work may be divided into
various categories and examined; 'What was the effect? Did it proceed
from this or that quality?'. It is for this reason that, as I have written
elsewhere, a wide critical acquaintance with literature is important, for
an essential part of this process of discovery will be the comparing of
the effect produced by such and such a quality in this context and the
effect produced by it in another. In this way the ascription of that
effect to the specific qualities of the work is refined, almost by a
process of elimination.

It is to this process, of discovering what properties of the work can
account for the feelings the work inspires, that I shall now turn.
CHAPTER VI

Interpretation

Without pursuing that curious and obscure problem of the meaning of interpretation farther, it occurs to me as possible that there may be an essential part of error in all interpretation, without which it would not be interpretation at all...

T.S. Eliot

'Critics explain!' What do they explain? The artist, if he is a real artist, has by his work transmitted to others the feeling he experienced. What is there, then, to explain? If a work is a good work of art, then the feeling expressed by the artist - be it moral or immoral - transmits itself to other people. If transmitted to others, then they feel it and all interpretations are superfluous. If the work does not infect people, no explanation can make it contagious. An artist's work cannot be interpreted. Had it been possible to explain in words what he wished to convey, the artist would have expressed himself in words. He expressed it by his art, only because the feeling he experienced could not be otherwise transmitted.

Tolstoy
Against Interpretation

Before beginning to discuss interpretation, it will be well to consider if there is not a real and, moreover, quite common grievance expressed by the slogan 'art for art's sake'. This is a grievance against the perceived insensitivity of certain types of critical analysis towards the objects of their study, and often against what is believed to be the insensitivity of critical analysis per se. There are several different expressions of this, from the anti-intellectual "What has all this got to do with a simple story?" to a more intellectual position which may take the form of one of two related convictions; that criticism, even if possible, serves no purpose, or that what is valuable or 'great' about a work is not available for analysis and that it is, therefore, 'murder to dissect'.

I will try to deal only with the second of these two convictions here. This rests on the belief that what is essential to any work cannot be conveyed by anything but that work. There is little criticism, however, that would claim to reproduce exactly the effect of the work which it discusses; this is a function which the work itself performs perfectly. What the critic will probably produce is a summary of what they consider to be the salient points, but, given that, as we have seen, every part of a work must be considered immanent in every other, will any summary or abstraction ever be able to faithfully describe the original effect of the work? This question of how a statement can be 'true to' what it purports to describe is one which draws us into what are, philosophically, rather deep waters. The argument, of which Hegel's is perhaps the most systematic expression, is that one cannot claim to understand a statement until one knows everything which characterizes the entities which it describes, and everything which, in turn, characterizes those characteristics ad infinitum. Thus every statement is chronically suspect;

Truth is at first taken to mean that I know how something is. This is truth, however, only in reference to consciousness; it is formal truth, bare correctness. Truth in the deeper sense consists in the identity between objectivity and the notion.¹

For Hegel 'truth' is not simply the correspondence between an actual state-of-affairs and our idea of it ('mere correctness') but rather the

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correspondence of a thing with itself, thus an abstract truth must be 'false' because it appears as something other than its object. 'Truth', then, for Hegel, is a kind of genuineness. But I am dealing with this problem on a smaller scale than that on which he envisages it; that is, as it effects the work and its critics, rather than the universe and the mind. Taken at its face value the argument that any description or definition of a thing, since it is not the thing itself, can neither be simply true or false, has rather extraordinary implications, not least of all for the argument itself. The fact is that the truth and falsehood provided by 'mere correctness' are the basis of our knowledge and this correctness is quite sufficient to legitimize our normal usage of the two terms. All we need to know about an entity in a statement in order to be able to understand that statement are those properties which enable us to recognize the entity; we do not need to know everything about a thing's relationships with everything else in order to recognize it. Nor do we need to know, or take into account, these relationships in our discussion providing we do not violate what we believe to be the integrity of the work.

But what of this integrity; for there is some truth, with regard to literature, in the idea that all formulations about a text, to a certain extent, point away rather than towards that work as it actually is. Consider Poulet;

I am constrained to acknowledge that all subjective activity present in a literary work is not entirely explained by its relationship with forms and objects within the work. There is in the work a mental activity profoundly engaged in objective forms; and there is, at another level, forsaking all forms, a subject which reveals itself to itself (and to me) in its transcendence relative to all which is reflected in it. At this point, no object can any longer express it; no structure can any longer define it; it is exposed in its ineffability and in its fundamental indeterminacy. Such is perhaps the reason why the critic, in his elucidation of works, is haunted by this transcendence of mind. It seems than that criticism, in order to accompany the mind in this effort of detachment from itself, needs to annihilate, or at least momentarily to forget, the objective elements of the work, and to elevate itself to the apprehension of a subjectivity without objectivity.2
This passage is a good description of the problem which the 'mutual immanence' of the work poses for the critic, but it also contains an objection to criticism arising from an idea we have already met in considering the nature of metaphor, that is, that the truths proposed and the effects created by great works of literature are to some extent mystical, and, therefore, beyond the reach of analytical explication. Lowell, too, writes that 'Precisely what makes the charm of poetry is that we cannot explain anymore than we can describe a perfume.' 3 (Why this might be so we have already seen in Chapter 4.) 'Whereof one cannot speak', as Wittgenstein says at the end of the Tractatus, 'thereof one must be silent.'4 But this is a necessary truth which cuts both ways; if the mystic is not a matter of words, then it is no more a matter for literature than for criticism. As Neurath commented, in connection with Wittgenstein's remark, 'One must indeed be silent, but not about anything.'5 Moreover it should be remembered that criticism is a junction, a meeting place of two reader's, that is, the critic and the reader of the criticism as readers of the work under consideration. Unless we keep in mind that the work is a 'given', nothing that can be said about criticism will make sense.

But what of the transcendental aspect of literature, particularly in intensely poetical uses of language? Consider Hegel's description:

This double usage of language, which gives to the same word a positive and negative meaning, is not an accident, and gives no ground for reproaching language as a source of confusion. We should rather recognize in it the speculative spirit of our language rising above the mere 'Either-or' of understanding...This content is called a mystery, because it is hidden from the understanding; for the latter does not get the length of the process, which this unity is, and thus it is that everything speculative, everything philosophical, is for the understanding a mystery.6

I would agree with Hegel that the ambiguous nature of language usage can be used, as it is in poetry and paradox, to subvert an habitual way of perceiving the world, to reveal to us a previously unconsidered rigidity in our conceptual manipulation of the world. However, for Hegel, the 'either-or' which such language transcends is not merely that of opinion but of understanding itself, the logical principles of identity (if p then
I, or, and contradiction (if \( p \) then not not-\( p \)) which make language possible; yet Hegel himself can differentiate between between the negative and positive meaning that the same word may possess. We can report an experience on the edge of words but never one beyond them. We may occasionally feel that language is too 'anaemic' to faithfully report what we know, but even if we define our experience only in negative terms we are still inside language. To quote one more variation on Wittgenstein: 'That which one would insinuate, thereof one must speak.' Moreover there is nothing so futile as complaining about the inadequacy of language, for it announces that whatever one is about to say is a lie.

A metaphysic, by definition, can 'mean' no more than what the holding of it entails. There is an important sense, however, in which I am not simply appealing to the idea of a logic of the emotions, as expressed in Pascal's famous phrase 'The heart has its reasons which reason knows nothing of.' There is a piece of metaphysical equivocation in this phrase which is important here, for if we take this to mean anything more than 'Our knowledge of the workings of the mind is incomplete.', we fall into the same confusion occasioned by a shift in syntax as we did with 'The world is my idea'. The equivocation lies in the fact that it suggests not just that we are motivated in ways and by means unknown to us, but that there is an alternative standard of reason to the one which rests on such principles as 'black is black' and 'white is white' (and 'grey is grey'), a standard which presumably rests on other principles but which is still analogous to the reason of which we are aware. But these rules, the logical principles of identity, non-contradiction, and the excluded middle, are those without which no other truths could be formulated and which are thus presupposed in every linguistic utterance; they are the presuppositions of all consistent, non-self-contradictory thinking. Any A of which we speak is itself, and not not-itself, nor does it have a property and not have it. The idea of language exists only by virtue of such principles. (I am not suggesting that it is for the expression of this idea that Pascal's phrase is remembered, or that when it is quoted it is in order to express this idea, only that it is remembered, is quoted, is felt as profound, because it contains this suggestion of the impossible, that is, because as one passes through it to its sense, as one resolves its paradox, one encounters a metaphysical proposition along the way; the heart does have reasons of which reason
knows nothing.) There may be elements in our life we cannot express, but 'cannot' means 'cannot'; what I cannot verbally formulate to my own satisfaction I can hardly expect to communicate to another by means of language. Even if we do accept that they may be an alternative standard of reason we cannot hope to talk meaningfully about it. I have already said, however, that logic, though indispensable to the construction of argument, cannot be the substance of an argument where literature is concerned. One of the curious aspects of the common and false notion that 'logic' and 'emotion' are antonyms, is that it seems to rest on the idea that emotions are not facts, that an account of the emotions cannot be an account of facts. If one conceives of the work as an object of criticism, that is, the work as literature, lying beyond the grasp of words then there is no form of criticism, in words, that is of any relevance to it. There is a choice then, to put one's faith in language and criticize or to subscribe to the ineffability of literature and have nothing more to do with its discussion; for the idea of ineffability cannot exist within discussions of literature and certainly cannot be a premiss in a particular criticism.

Before leaving this subject I shall consider one last approach which has sometimes been described as an aninterpretative, that is Deconstruction. Because, however, there are so many Derrida's in circulation at the moment, before proceeding I will just set out what I understand by the word.

What Derrida sets out to prove is that what is called a 'modification of presentation', that is, 'representation', is not something that happens to presentation but is rather something that 'conditions it by bifurcating it a priori.' He begins from the observation that appears to be no way, there in Husserl's philosophy, of distinguishing between the transcendental ego which guarantees truth and the worldly self, that is, no difference that would allow for the development of a language in which truth is not 'deformed by some real contact'.

Since self-consciousness appears only in its relation to an object, whose presence it can keep and repeat, it is never perfectly foreign or anterior to the possibility of language...But since the possibility of constituting ideal objects belongs to
the essence of consciousness, and since these ideal objects are historical products, only appearing thanks to acts of creation or intending, the element of consciousness and the element of language will be more and more difficult to discern. Will not there indiscernibility introduce nonpresence and difference (mediation, signs, referral back, etc.) in the heart of self-presence?19 From 'the outset', then, we 'operate (within) a structure of repetition whose basic element can only be representative.' for a 'sign which would take place but "once" would not be a sign; a purely idiomatic sign would not be a sign.'14 Since a 'signifier (in general) must be formally recognizable in spite of, and through, the diversity of empirical characteristics which may modify it.', and in spite of 'the deformations which the empirical event necessarily makes it undergo', and since 'each signifying event is a substitute (for the signified as well as for the ideal form of the signifier).', then 'I cannot enter into an "effective" discourse without being from the start involved in unlimited representation.'15 The 'presence of the perceived present' can, then, 'appear as such only inasmuch as it is continuously compounded with a nonpresence and nonperception, with primary memory and expectation' - 'As soon as we admit this continuity of the now and the not-now, perception and nonperception, in the zone of primordiality common to primordial impression and primordial retention, we admit the other [that is, nonpresence and nonevidence] into the self-identity of the...blink of an instant.'16 This 'alterity', Derrida proposes, 'is in fact the condition for presence, presentation, and thus for Vorstellung [representation] in general; it precedes all the dissociations that could be produced in presence, in Vorstellung.'17 The idea of this 'bending-back' that is 'irreducible in presence or in self-presence', leads Derrida to assert that 'trace or difference is always older than presence and procures for it its openness'.18 Moreover, he asks, should it not 'prevent us from speaking about a simple self-identity "[in the blink of an instant]"?'.19 The 'ideal object...independent of the here-and-now acts and events of the empirical subjectivity which intends it' is nothing outside the world but 'must be constituted, repeated and expressed in a medium that does not impair the presence and self-presence of the acts that aim at it'.20 The element in which this appears to happen is that element which does not
appear to have a worldly form - the voice; 'My words are "alive" because they do not seem to leave me; not to fall outside me, outside my breath, at a visible distance; not to cease to belong to me, to be my disposition "without further props."'.

But this apparent transcendence of the voice, this 'self-presence of the animating act in the transparent spirituality of what it animates, this inwardness of life with itself...supposes, then, that the speaking subject hears himself in the present'.

The operation of "hearing oneself speak", continues Derrida, is an auto-affection of a unique kind., for 'the subject can hear or speak to himself and be affected by the signifier he produces, without passing through an external detour, the world, the sphere of what is not "his own."'.

However, this 'proximity', this apparent ideality, is 'broken when I hear myself speak, I see myself write or gesture.' To admit that autoaffection is the condition for self-presence is again to deny that 'pure transcendental reduction' (that is, the suspension of individual realities to arrive at what Husserl called 'a science of pure consciousness') is possible - we cannot grasp it in 'its identity, its purity, or its origin, for it has none.'

This discontinuity, Derrida describes as differance:

This movement of differance is not something that happens to a transcendental subject; it produces a subject. Auto-affection is not a modality of experience that characterizes a being that would already be itself (autos). It produces sameness as self-relation within self-difference; it produces sameness as the nonidentical...All the concepts of metaphysics - in particular those of activity and passivity, will and nonwill, and therefore those of affection or auto-affection, purity and impurity, etc. - cover up the strange "movement" of this difference. But this pure difference, which constitutes the self-presence of the living present, introduces into self-presence from the beginning all the impurity putatively excluded from it. The living present springs forth out of this nonidentity with itself and from the possibility of a retentional trace. It is always already a trace. This trace cannot be thought out on the basis of a simple present whose life would be within itself; the self of the living present is primordially a trace...This protowriting is at work at the origin of sense. Sense, being temporal in nature...is never simply present; it is always already engaged in the "movement" of the trace, that is, in the order of "signification."
does not accidentally happen to be affected by the outside of indication.'; they are inseparable from the start, or as Derrida terms it, the addition of indication to expression, and expression to sense 'comes to make up for a deficiency, it comes to compensate for a primordial nonself-presence.'

Understood thus, what is supplementary is in reality difference, the operation of differing which at one and the same time both fissures and retards presence, submitting it simultaneously to primordial division and delay. Difference is to be conceived prior to the separation between deferring as delay and differing as the active work of difference. Of course this is inconceivable if one begins on the basis of consciousness, that is, presence, or on the basis of its simple contrary, absence or nonconsciousness.

What Derrida is ultimately trying to show is that the concept of a pure 'for-itself of self-presence' is not so much the primordial basis of perception as a 'supplement', a 'primordial substitution', an "'in the place of'", an 'in-the-place-of-itself' - 'The strange structure of the supplement appears here: by delayed reaction, a possibility produces that to which it is said to be added on.' So what? Every statement, even such a straightforward perceptual one as "I see a particular person by the window", structurally implies, according to Derrida, that its content 'is ideal and that its unity is not impaired by the absence of perception here and now.' Moreover it is a statement that can be understood by anybody (of the same language community) irrespective of whether they are present or 'infinitely removed in space and time'; that this should be so is the very condition for the possibility of meaning, of speech. However, Derrida holds that 'My nonperception, my nonintuition, my hic et nunc absence are expressed by that very thing that I say, by that which I say and because I say it.' For 'the general structure of signification' actually requires this separation of intuition from speech for it is only the fact that 'the total absence of the subject and object of a statement - the death of the writer and/or the disappearance of the objects he was able to describe' does not prevent a text from meaning something that 'gives birth to meaning as such'. Even when I tell myself 'I am' this expression 'has the status of speech only if it is intelligible in the absence of its object, in the absence of intuitive presence - here, in the
absence of myself.' ('That I am also "alive" and certain about it figures as something that comes over and above the appearance of the meaning.'33) This leads him to assert that the 'anonymity of the written I, the impropriety of the I am writing, is...the "normal situation."' for 'The autonomy of meaning with regard to intuitive cognition...has its norm in writing'.34 This is, almost certainly, a new thought though not a particularly controversial one. Neither we might say is his conclusion that the notion of being as presence, that is 'the absolute proximity of self-identity, the being-in-front-of the object available for repetition...whose ideal form is the self-presence of transcendental life', is undermined by the fact that in reality the living present is, in one sense, deferred ad infinitum, or modified a priori.35 All this could perhaps be just another example of philosophy running on the spot; for the question 'So what?' still receives no answer in my here and now. My 'here and now'? Let me explain. * What am I to made of this insight I had been having now?

But, to proceed deconstructively (like Icarus, as Derrida writes?), that is to proceed by way of hypallage, (hysteron proteron? hyperbaton? metalepsis?), what was this deconstruction now, that, in becoming non self-contradictory, became, even as, it being self-contradictory, it disappeared? How did his followers create/reconstruct Deconstruction in Derrida? Let me return to the more familiar "metaphysics" of time. To prevent confusion in the following I shall use 'Deconstruction' to refer to the practice of those critics who acknowledge, or have acknowledged, the writings of Derrida as their theoretical reference point. Like all work that is at once complicated and replete with paradoxical flourish, Derrida's is especially prone to derivative 'slogan philosophizing' - a venerable tradition in literary theory that goes at least as far back as Castelvetro's Aristotle's 'three unities'. Like those other flourishes I considered when talking about metaphysical language, they are, if taken literally, at once significant and meaningless - 'The sign is wrought by fiction.', 'A text remains forever imperceptible.', 'Speech is the representation of itself.'36 The first thing to note, then, is that Deconstruction, in the literary critical sense, is nothing so fundamental as a strategy (except in the etymological sense, in that it believes itself a body of combatants led by a general), but is rather a collection of manoeuvres, and, as such, only of interest to me here in so far as it
implies a poetics, a definition of literature. I shall therefore consider only two of these manoeuvres, but two which are especially pertinent to my concerns – the discovering of 'self-subversion' in the text, and the constant gesturing towards an infinite regress in meaning.

Derrida himself has written that it is the critic's task to 'produce' the significance of the relationship between the way a writer uses language and the way that writer is (unknowingly) dominated by language.37 He demonstrates what this procedure might be in his discussion of Plato, where he writes that 'the system here is not, simply, that of the intentions of an author who goes by the name of Plato.', not 'primarily that of what someone meant to say'.38 This may certainly be a striking thought when applied to philosophical works (though here, as elsewhere, Nietzsche precedes Derrida), but as our discussion of intentionalism has shown, it is certainly not a new one in literary criticism.39 What is important however is the effect of the adoption of this particular (apparently) anti-intentionalistic standpoint back into literary criticism. That a work can mean (to me) something quite contrary to what it means to mean, is a statement that only makes sense, as we saw with Hurd and Schorer, from an intentional point of view. Deconstruction, in this respect, takes a step forward only by stepping backwards. To distinguish itself from what might appear to be merely reinterpretation, it invokes a meaning that is intentional (a vouloir-dire), and sets itself in opposition to it. But intentionalism, when it really is intentionalism, is only, as we have seen, an absence of interpretation. Thus the whole manoeuvre becomes a pleonasm, a revolution that preserves the tyrant in order to preserve the revolution. The idea of a text that subverts itself, like the idea of a 'technical failure', only makes sense if we hypothesize two texts, the one we have and an ideal one existing either in my expectation or the author's intention. It might be objected that I have followed precisely this path in discussing Schopenhauer's 'The world is my idea', and Pascal's passage about the 'thinking reed' that is crushed by the universe. But what I set out to prove with these two examples was simply that, whatever shelf marks the respective volumes bear, these passages can only be read for what they are as literature; no concept of intention is involved.

This last brings us to the second of the two manoeuvres I wish to consider, the gesture towards the infinite regress of meaning. Derrida
may be a literary critic of philosophy but like many critics, perhaps all, he philosophizes about the works he criticizes. In claiming him as a model, then, Deconstruction has reasserted, even if only implicitly, the notion that works can 'tell', 'show', 'reveal', and so on. Indeed the notion of a work consisting of intentions and counter-intentions requires that the work be given some kind of philosophical status to begin with, for how can inconsistency be a feature unless consistency is a implicit model? As with the first manoeuvre, the assertion is contained in a denial, in this case the denial of a final meaning to be found in a work. But what would a final meaning be? Everything one writes about a work, given that what it expresses can be described, albeit reductively, as no more than a mood, is provisional from the standpoint of the future - but one is never in the future. What Deconstruction seems to envisage is what Chirico called 'the solitude of signs' - 'an eminently metaphysical solitude...which excludes a priori every logical possibility of...psychic education.' *(This I believe is probably the result of trying to consciously 'think differance'.) Yet Deconstruction carries on writing, even indulging in that 'we' which becomes inexcusable with the very first burgeoning of real scepticism. The gesture towards the infinite regress of meaning serves, indeed, only to confine scepticism, for it brings it into the discussion, makes it discussable. Doubt is only meaningful (possible) in cases where testing is possible, and the possibility of testing, of enquiring, presupposes something that is not doubted and not tested. The certainty, the lever which is used to overturn certainty, is, in this case as in every case, language itself! To lapse back into the idiom once more - Deconstruction, to be such, must remain hidden in what is thought after or during the writing, it can never be written; Deconstruction can have no audience.

At this point we may look at some of the complaints - aside from those of irrelevance, already mentioned at the beginning of the chapter - traditionally brought against criticism, to see if some of the points already discussed in this thesis, arising as it does from theoretical considerations, find a reflection in non-theoretical contexts. Consider, for example, Johnson;
Criticism has sometimes permitted fancy to dictate the laws by which fancy ought to be restrained, and fallacy to perplex the principles by which fallacy is to be detected; her superintendence of others has betrayed her to negligence of herself, and like the ancient Scythians, by extending her conquests over distant regions, she has left her throne vacant to her slaves.41

The main complaint against critics is that, in Jonson's words, they 'bring all wit to the rack', or, as Pope writes 'In search of wit, they lose their common sense'.42 The whole set of 'em', writes Sterne, 'are so hung round and befetished with the bobs and trinkets of criticism...their heads...are stuck so full of rules and compasses, and have that eternal propensity to apply them upon all occasions, that a work of genius had better go to the devil at once, than stand to be pricked and tortured to death by 'em.'43 Likewise Johnson writes that 'A commentator has indeed great temptations to supply by turbulence what he wants of dignity, to beat his little gold to a spacious surface, to work that to foam which no art or diligence can exalt to spirit.', and Voltaire that; 'The world is filled with critiques, which, by the aid of commentaries, definitions, and distinctions, have succeeded in obscuring the simplest and clearest knowledge....[The critics] have talked learnedly concerning things which should be felt with ecstasy; and, even if their rules were correct, of what little benefit they are!'.44

I have quoted predominantly from eighteenth-century authors because, though they are speaking of critical practices that are quite different from those of the present, I intend that the reader should find what is appropriate in them, should find how what is said is applicable to contemporary criticism. But the historical dimension is germane, for we tend to look back in wonder at the more arcane subjects and disciplines of the past, to ask in wonder 'How could anyone have studied this?', 'How could people have gone on for generation after generation without ever realizing the vacuity of what they were doing?'. We can do so because we forget that we are seeing the subject through the eyes of its subsequent critics, that when a subject is part of 'learning', of knowledge, all one's energies are involved not in criticizing but in mastering that learning, in becoming like one's teachers. (Many a school thrives on the principle that wherever two or three are gathered together in my name, there I can
get away with anything.) The current (?) vogue of theory has not improved this state of affairs, for this too has its schools, its dogmatism, its obfuscatory jargon; the main change is that now works of theory have pride of place over works of literature on the student's bookshelf. Critical theory, in the latter half of this century, has moved from a chatty, instinctive, enthusiastic nonsense, to a tortuous, artificial, jargon-ridden (and, therefore, elitist), nonsense. In this chapter I will address some of the reasons why this should be so, that is, why the republic of letters should periodically find it necessary to cry out for a dictator.

But do critical principles matter? What the history of criticism seems to show, particularly in its pre-professional stage (chronologically the longest), is that the quality of criticism is unconnected with the soundness of avowed critical principles. But today critical theory is a subject in itself and if we are to have avowed principles (implicit principles we must have), if we are to turn our attention to principles, even only as objects in themselves, then their soundness does matter. As has emerged in previous chapters, the greatest obstacle to literary theory has been the tendency to explain the poetical with the poetical, so that amidst the bustle of debate it is eloquence rather than reason which carries the day, and even the most extravagant of hypothetical poetics can find followers if it is presented with sufficient panache. Pseudo-science, it should be noted, has ever been one of the most popular forms of poetry.

Criticism

Before going on to consider what critical interpretation is, or can be, let us begin by asking what its function has been supposed to be: What, then, is criticism for?

Then criticism the Muses' handmaid proved,  
To dress her charms, and make her more beloved...

These lines by Pope express perhaps the most common conception of criticism, that is, to introduce, to explain, to second literature. The idea
that criticism is of direct help to the creation of literature is, however, not common. So direct connection as that posited by August Schlegel when he writes that 'The comparing together and judging of the existing productions of the human mind, necessarily throws light upon the conditions which are indispensable to the creation of original and masterly works of art.', or by Lunarcharsky, when he writes that 'the...critic must be a teacher in his attitude towards the writer....[It] is, in fact, precisely as a result of the cooperation between the important writers and the most gifted literary critics that truly great literature has always arisen and will continue to arise.', is rarely asserted. Arnold writes that criticism may 'prepare for' or 'render possible' great literature;

It is the business of the critical power...'in all branches of knowledge, theology, philosophy, history, art, science, to see the object as in itself it really is.' Thus it tends, at last, to make an intellectual situation of which the creative power can profitably avail itself. It tends to establish an order of ideas, if not absolutely true, yet true by comparison with that which it displaces; to make the best ideas prevail. Presently these new ideas reach society, the touch of truth is the touch of life, and there is a stir and growth everywhere; out of this stir and growth come the creative epochs of literature.

Patmore makes a similar point when he asserts that 'although good criticism cannot produce art, it removes endless hindrances to its production, and tends to provide art with its chief motive-power, a public prepared to acknowledge it.' But it is James who is most enthusiastic about the role which criticism may play; the critic, for James, can be 'the real helper of the artist, a torch bearing outrider, the interpreter, the brother.' Unlike Arnold he sees the critic's role as seconding the existing work rather than creating the conditions for its creation, but elsewhere he writes in terms that seem to imply that critical analysis can actually produce better art. Thus, in 'The Art of Fiction' he writes that the English novel, which 'had no air of having a theory, a conviction, a consciousness of itself behind it', might be improved if the novel itself became more 'discutable', that is to say, more an object of analysis. This is a dubious proposition, for I remember myself being under the illusion that whatever can be explained
in an arty way must be art, and it is an illusion the effects of which I still see everywhere demonstrated. We are prone to overrate a work in proportion to the trouble it has cost us, whether in reading, or, even more so, in the ingenuity we had to employ in criticizing it. But this is something I shall come to shortly.

By far the most common concept of the role of criticism is that it seconds literature for the reader. 'The critic's task', writes Gardner, 'is to assist his readers to read for themselves....to display the work in a manner which will enable it to exert its own power.' Elsewhere she writes that;

Elucidation, or illumination, is the critic's primary task as I conceive it. Having made the initial act of choice, or judgement of value, I want to remove any obstacles which prevent the work having its fullest possible effect. Because a poem already speaks to me I want to find ways to ensure that, as far as possible, it says to me what it has to say and not what I want it to say, and that it says it in its own way and not in mine.

Gerard, in similar vein, writes that every critic 'who really merits the name...teaches justness of thinking, by explaining the kind and degree of every excellence and blemish, by teaching us what are the qualities in things to which we owe our pleasure or disgust, and what the principles of human nature by which they are produced.' Gerard's ideal, that the 'chief utility of criticism lies in promoting correctness of taste.', is echoed in a more modern idiom by James' assertion that criticism should be 'the very education of our imaginative life';

The effect, if not the prime office, of criticism is to make our absorption and enjoyment of the things that feed the mind as aware of itself as possible, since that awareness quickens the mental demand, which thus in turn wanders further and further for pasture.

Thus the critic is, in Frye's words, 'the pioneer of education and the shaper of cultural tradition.'. But how is this enjoyment made self-conscious? Thus Knights;

We have to elucidate the meaning...and to unravel ambiguities; we have to estimate the kind and quality of the imagery and determine the precise degree of evocation of particular figures;
we have to allow full weight to each word, exploring its 'temperamental roots', and to determine how it controls and is controlled by the rhythmic movement of the passage in which it occurs. In short, we have to decide exactly why the lines 'are so and not otherwise'. As we read other factors come into play. The lines have a cumulative effect. 'Plot', aspects of 'character' and recurrent 'themes' - all 'precipitates from the memory' - help to determine our reaction at a given point. There is a constant reference backwards and forwards....A play of Shakespeare's is a precise particular experience, a poem - and precision and particularity are exactly what is lacking in the greater part of Shakespeare criticism, criticism that deals with *Hamlet* or *Othello* in terms of abstractions that have nothing to do with the unique arrangement of words that constitutes these plays.33

This emphasis on discernment and detail, on 'the unique arrangement of words', is one that I myself made at the end of the last chapter, but is it really any more than an injunction to tell the truth about a work to the best of one's ability? And, seen thus, seen as an injunction to tell the truth about a work, does precision of statement necessarily entail particularity of description? That what can be said of this work can also be said of that work does not mean that when it is said of this work it does not have a different meaning, point to a different and unique set of facts, to that which it has when it is said of that work. The critical discourse, writes Croce, 'is empty for the reader who does not enter into a relation with' the original; moreover if it is to be precise enough to be of interest to one who has entered into some relation with the original, then perhaps it must inevitably be empty for one who has not.57

The 'main function of criticism', according to Knights, 'is to prompt other readers to fresh insights, based on fresh disciplined explorations of their own.'58 This statement is at once liberal and dogmatic, it proposes criticism as an open ended subject but also limits criticism to the sort of detailed analysis, the 'disciplined exploration', which is described above. There are two questions we might ask about this approach: Is it the best way of producing fresh insights? Does it constitute being a 'handmaid to the Muse'? 'Particular criticism' is always, for reasons already discussed in Chapters 2, 3, and 4 of this thesis, an approximation. It is an approximation because it can never do what the work does, so that, however detailed it may be as criticism it must always rely on the force
or precision of its abstractions in order to tell the truth about the work. 'By breaking the forms of poetry into words and metaphors, comparisons, figures, syntactic connections, rhythmic schemes, and so forth,' writes Croce, 'we do not grasp the character of poetry, which is revived and contemplated only in the total intuition of its oneness; but we end up by putting together a pitiful heap of lifeless fragments, which can be discarded as worthless.' When I was 'doing literature' in school and as an undergraduate it was always the 'particular', scholastically complicated, 'mechanical', critical works to which I went in order to be illuminated about an author; this meant a preference for the book over the essay, the new over the old, the analytical over the discursive, the detailed over the vague. What I wanted from criticism, and expected from criticism, was, in short, hard facts about the 'meaning' of the work, hard facts with which to beat out my little gold into the required essay. But what gave rise to, what has been the draw of, 'particular criticism'? It is tempting, and would perhaps be justified, to propose a causal connection between the rise of 'particular criticism', the existence of 'Literature' as an academic subject, and the demise of a general public for critical works. But there is something more fundamental to the nature of literature at issue here. What I wanted from criticism, and, indeed, from 'Literature', was that it should open works to me. Were they, then, closed? No. What I wanted, however vaguely I then conceived the desire, was a knowledge. My conception of what form this knowledge might take has grown vaguer still with time, but I would hazard to say that it had some connection with the validation of the literary.

'Particular criticism', then, arises in response to the very dreamlike, intractable, nature of our memory of the work. 'There is nothing more that can usefully be said about a novel', writes Lubbock, 'until we have fastened upon the question of its making', for 'there are times when a critic of literature feels that if only there were one single tangible and measurable fact about a book... it would be a support in a world of shadow'. Among these shadows, he continues, 'there is a spark of light that tempts us, there is a hint of the possibility that behind them, we may touch a region where the shadows become at least a little more substantial'; this saving light lies in the fact that the 'author of the book was a craftsman', and, therefore, the critic must overtake him at his work and see how the book was made.' Even when this is not explicitly
stated as a guiding principle in any particular criticism it is implicit in the vocabulary used, thus Empson writes of a 'subdued pun' being 'made to imply', and how a writer 'by the failure of the antithesis shows he is merely thinking of...'.\textsuperscript{62} Knights declares that the 'Malcolm-Macduff dialogue has at least three functions.', but 'the main purpose of the scene is obscured unless we realize its function as choric commentary.'\textsuperscript{63} This may begin merely as a matter of diction rather than response, for it can be simply one way of talking about effect, but it can also turn criticism into a detective mystery, and lead, as I believe it has done, to the idea that everything in 'great literature' is explicable in terms of purpose, and that whatever can be so explained is somehow automatically art. This mannerism, if mannerism it is, has the advantage of lending an air of objectivity to the critic's response. This element 'serves to', this element 'is intended to make the reader', this element 'is placed here in order to' - these are things that can be equally said of claptrap, they are simply ways of avoiding the personal pronoun. But there is a reason, more important than any of these, against the use of such formulas, which is that they give a totally misleading impression of the experience of literature.

The same motivation and result can be found in what I will call 'thematic' or 'aspectival' criticism. The 'themes' of a work are not the metaphysic, as I have described it elsewhere, though they will contribute to it, rather they are those parts of the narrative which appear to 'move', to 'develop'. As such they are what the text declares and one's tendency, in criticizing, is to grab at this declaration as at a safety-line, a reassuring rationality in the largely uncanny experience of a work. This process of abstraction I have called 'taking the text at its word', that is, the searching out of themes, of what is declared by its development, what used to be called the 'message', and its removal from the work in the interest of a neat elucidation. This process of abstraction and independent development can be extended, a second or third reading produces more examples to illustrate the particular theme, or it can begin again with a different object; and in this manner the critical world unravels the original fugue of the work. Thus we have essays on 'Themes in the Alexandria Quartet', the Alexandria Quartet as 'Word Continuum', as 'Gnosticism', as 'Time, Space, and Eros' or 'Time, Space, and Language', as 'Heraldic Universe', as 'The Problem of Structure',

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as 'Romantic Anachronism', as 'Baroque Novel', as 'An Investigation of Modern Love', as 'Tarot', as 'Groddeckian It', as 'New Romanticism', as 'The Evolution of the Artist'. It is a very democratic form of criticism.64

Aspectival or thematic criticism proceeds by the discovering of such characteristics as the occurrence of synonymous terms or ideas, often as metaphorical restatements (tautologia), the repetition of key words (tautos), and the repetition of terms surrounding clauses - in the manner of sentential functions - by which a correspondence emerges through two elements resolving similar problems with similar solutions (symploche). Thus, for example, we are spontaneously aware of a significance in a work's ending in the same place that it began (epanalepsis). As the parentheses in the last two sentences suggest, these characteristics form a rhetoric which we employ in elucidation; they are the empirical data of criticism, whether we employ them consciously or otherwise. As such they are indispensable and I have no quarrel with them. The study of rhetoric, as we saw in Chapter 4, can show us how the work becomes significant, can 'trace the operations of the intellect and imagination' and disclose 'the lurking springs of action in the heart.' and thus, perhaps, show why the significant is such. But if they are a safety-line to the critic, the means of justifying the critic's thesis, then they are often one which will lift the critic out of the work as a whole, because what the text declares, its most overt characteristics from a critical point of view, is not identical with what that text is as a work. This more elusive, atmospheric thing is the vehicle of the metaphysic, the imaginative suggestion. The thematicization of the text is certainly the most straightforward procedure but we might liken it to filleting a fish; the bones are undoubtedly part of this fish, but once they are removed most of the fish is still left behind - dead.

Criticism, it might be said, is always concerned with the apprehension of a quality so complex, so dependent upon its original expression, as to forever elude point by point analysis. This emphasis on being right, then, should not obscure the fact that the value of some of the best criticism lies in its being a starting point rather than a conclusion, and a starting point not for further criticism but for increased enjoyment.65 Ambiguity, abstraction, the absence of exemplary instances, then, does not necessarily mean a lack of precision or a rejection of the role of criticism as seconding literature. On the
contrary, while 'particular criticism' may be invaluable in creating the new 'particular essay' there are many reasons, why it should not best answer that end. But 'particular criticism' is only a means, a justification, or a prelude to what is popularly considered the end of criticism, that is, the discovery of the 'meaning' of the work. And here we see why, in a formal setting, so much emphasis should be placed upon it - for to say something, already possessing a meaning, has another 'meaning' not immediately obvious, to say, in fact, that this everyday object has a hidden meaning, is a proposition that stands in need of justification. What Frye has to say about the necessity of criticism is interesting in this respect, because it makes explicit what is only implicit in the writings of most critics:

[Criticism] has to exist. Criticism can talk, and all the arts are dumb....And, whatever it sounds like to call the poet inarticulate or speechless, there is a most important sense in which poems are as silent as statues. Poetry is a disinterested use of words; it does not address a reader directly....The artist, as John Stuart Mill saw in a flash of insight, is not heard but overheard. The axiom of criticism must be, not that the poet does not know what he is talking about, but that he cannot talk about what he knows."

I have already discussed Mill's moment of blindness in Chapter 4. Poetry 'knows' nothing. From whence, then, does criticism derive the 'knowledge' it passes on?

There are three meanings we can give to 'interpretation', based upon the three meanings of the Greek verb hermeneuein from which comes 'hermeneutic'; firstly, to express or to say; secondly, to explain; thirdly, to translate." The first of these I shall leave aside for the moment, for it will become important later on, the second is relevant to criticism only in the sense in which it refers to 'accounting for' what is expressed, the third might characterize the form of criticism we are now concerned with, and is, as I wish to show, irrelevant to the text as a literary work. What I will here call the 'occult school' of criticism thinks of itself primarily as these last two - explanation and translation. I have called it the occult school after Hazlitt's description;
There is another race of critics who might be designated as the Occult School-vere adepti. They discern no beauties but what are concealed from superficial eyes, and overlook all that are obvious to the vulgar part of mankind. Their art is the transmutation of styles.63

This approach to criticism holds that the work must contain a hidden or latent meaning or sense, a conceptual unity that is more than or other than the what is overtly presented, that is the story, in the case of a narrative, or the 'literal' statement, in the case of a poem. There is something alluringly arcane in this notion; the critic becomes an expert as deciphering. The praise which this school seeks and, within its own ranks, recieves is not so much, 'Yes, that is it exactly.' as 'How clever, I would never have thought of that.'.

One of the key concepts for this school is that of 'symbolization', a concept which is essential to the belief that whatever can be explained in an artsy way must necessarily be art, and, moreover, that the degree of sophistication in this explanation is necessarily an index of the aesthetic value of what is being explained. 'Symbolizes' is used to replace everything from 'represents', through 'is symptomatic of', to 'is an example of', because it carries with it an (undeserved) aura of interpretive subtlety. The hero arrives at the castle, a symbol of his safety from the world.why 'symbol'? The hero reenters the symbolic womb of the castle.why 'womb', with all it connotes? Why not simply 'The hero returns to a place of safety.'? 'Place of safety' is as abstract as one can become unless one wishes, and the wish is evident in the first two examples, to create, by introducing the dubious third term, a junction between the facts of the work and just about anything else one feels like saying at that moment.

To criticize a work, according to these lights, what one requires is an Idea. The Idea is the thing. How is one to approach the work? There it lies, one has read it and now one has something to write, or rather, one has to write something. The result is a turning of the whole of literature into a concept-association test. Moreover it is always the unobvious that is fundamental to 'critical progress'.69 The need to justify criticism at each critical instance, coupled with the 'pretence to empiricism' described elsewhere, has made this method the norm. But what would be lost by a critical essay on work x being known by the name of that work?
Certain possible answers to this question will emerge in the rest of this chapter but we might note two effects of such a procedure here; firstly, it appears to introduce no third term, no thing to be known about work $x$; secondly, it places a great emphasis on the critic's name.

There is one last manifestation of the 'will to objectivity' (or 'pretence to empiricism'), which I wish to turn to before leaving the subject. This is a form which does not appear to create any of those faults which we have heard complained about above. Eliot presents the case for this form thus; 'Qua work of art, the work of art cannot be interpreted; there is nothing to interpret; we can only criticize it according to standards, in comparison to other works of art; and for "interpretation" the chief task is the presentation of relevant historical facts which the reader is not assumed to know.'

[It] is fairly certain that 'interpretation'...is only legitimate when it is not interpretation at all, but merely putting the reader in possession of facts which he would otherwise have missed....Of course the multiplication of critical books and essays may create...a vicious taste for reading about works of art instead of reading the works themselves, it may supply opinion instead of educating taste. But fact cannot corrupt taste; it can at worst gratify one taste - a taste for history, let us say, or antiquities, or biography - under the illusion that it is assisting another. The real corrupters are those who supply opinion or fancy...71

But taste, as we have seen, cannot rely on fact. Can we, then, 'educate taste' (Eliot's definition of the function of criticism) with fact?

In order to 'understand the arts thoroughly', writes Voltaire, 'it is necessary first to understand the manner of their development'.72 But in what sense 'understand'? Certainly to understand the development of literature we must understand the manner of its development, but to say this is to say nothing. Wellek asserts that literary history is 'highly important for literary criticism as soon as the latter goes beyond the most subjective pronouncements of likes and dislikes.', and that the critic 'who is content to be ignorant of all historical relationships' will 'constantly go astray in his judgements.'73 It is this proposition that I will examine here.
In his essay 'The Teaching of English and History' L.C. Knights describes literature as 'simply the exact expression of realized values', values that are 'never purely personal' but which are bound to be 'rooted... in a social milieu - to the life of the time'.' But if the values are exactly expressed, perfectly realized, in the work itself then a consideration of literary history or the life of the time is, theoretically at least, redundant in the criticism of that work; the kind of judgements that a knowledge of literary history might produce, such as 'original', 'derivative', 'radical', 'important in the history of', or even 'fake', are, as we have seen, not aesthetic judgements. Looked at from the point of view of the usefulness of literature to history what Knights has to say is equally curious, for he asserts that the work of poets 'can be made to yield highly important evidence of the standards current in their generation: evidence that cannot be obtained in any other way.' If the evidence cannot be obtained in any other way then it is only evidence about the values expressed in the works themselves. The problem is the same from whichever side we approach the question; if we say that history is necessary to supply evidence about the values embodied in a work then we are saying that the values to be found in a work are something other than those we find in the work itself, if we say that something is true of a social milieu on the basis of evidence provided solely by literature we presuppose a direct connection the existence of which it was our very task to discover, that is, we prejudge the issue of whether or not literature, in this particular instance, provides us with evidence about general social values. In the absence of a control all we can say is that this particular period of literary history was simultaneous with that particular period of time, for, having only one example of history and one example of literary history, we are not in any position to experiment with alternative connections between the two and therefore prove the necessity of the connection which exists. Literary history is only evidence, in any scientific sense, about literary history.

But what of the relation of literary history to the individual work? Johnson writes that 'though to the reader a book be not worse or better for the circumstances of the author, yet there is always a silent reference of human works to human abilities, and as the inquiry how far man may extend his designs, or how high he may rate his native force is
of far greater dignity than in what rank we shall place any particular performance, curiosity is always busy to discover the instruments, as well as to survey the workmanship, to know how much is to be ascribed to original powers, and how much to casual and adventitious help.'

This, as we have seen with intentionalism in Chapter 2, the critic must resist ceaselessly if they are to be concerned with the aesthetics of the work, with the work as literature. Nevertheless, several writers have emphasized the dependency of art on its background, on, in Taine's formula, la race, le milieu et la moment, from which it sprang or, not to prejudge the issue, in which it first existed. Hegel, for example, had earlier written that 'every work of art belong to its own time, its own people, its own environment, and depends on particular historical and other ideas and purposes'.

Literature, writes F.Schlegel, is 'the quintessence of the most distinguished and peculiar productions by which the spirit of an age and the character of a nation express themselves', and that it is in literature that 'the genius of an age or the character of a nation is unmistakably expressed'. This is an idea that has also received more modern expression, for example by Tomars in his Introduction to the Sociology of Art - 'Esthetic institutions are not based upon social institutions: they are not even part of social institutions: they are social institutions of one type and intimately interconnected with those others.' - and Duvignaud in his Sociology of Art:

The only guarantee the artist has of success depends on the extent to which he can make a group of people believe in him and respond to his work; he cannot, then, be indifferent to the values of that group. This is precisely what the artist is concerned with: nature as the artist describes it cannot be nature 'as it really is' because it has been twice transformed - once by society and again by the artist....No artist, therefore, imitates or merely rediscovers a nature which, already transformed into an image and reshaped by societies, cultures and different groups, is for him nothing more than a symbol whereby he can increase his audience's participation.

One can see how a sociologist or an historian might be interested in this relationship between a work and its epoch, but what is the significance of the relationship for literary criticism? Sainte-Beuve writes:
I maintain that in reading over old papers and their most successful critiques we never find more than half the article in print - the other was written only in the reader's mind. You are to suppose a printed sheet of which we read only one side - the other has disappeared, is blank. And this other side, which would complete the thing, is the disposition of the public at the time, the office or part of the editor which it supplied, and which sometimes was not the least intelligent or effectual part. To be just we must effect a restoration of this disposition now, when we judge these old critics, our forerunners.\textsuperscript{90}

Likewise August Schlegel holds that 'no man can be a true critic or connoisseur without universality of mind, without that flexibility which enables him, by renouncing all personal predilections and blind habits, to adapt himself to the peculiarities of other ages and nations - to feel them, as it were, from their proper central point'.\textsuperscript{91} But there is a difference between a personal predilection and a blind habit. For while it is true that the critic, to understand the work as a unity, that is, to be honest to what is in the work, must feel it from the centre, the critic does not do so by becoming a Medieval or Elizabethan or Second Empire person, for these too would have blind habits that would obscure the significance of the work. What I mean by this is that, for example, while the sixteenth-century ideal of kingship might tend to appeal to us most directly as an historical curiosity rather than an emotional complex, in that it is significant, as an element of a work, only by virtue of analogy, we might say that the ease of sixteenth-century 'interpretation', that is, contemporary familiarity with what is portrayed, was just as great an obstacle to criticism as our present unfamiliarity.\textsuperscript{92} One can indeed tell when one has begun to separate nature from nature (and the critic is always looking for nature); the contemporary begins to look old fashioned begins to show its style, so that even the latest television advertisement looks "dated", in that one sees the blind habits from which it springs and to which it appeals. (A thing becomes "dated", as opposed to simply not contemporary because it is not, in essence, what it thinks it is - this is why the "dated" always appears overly self-conscious.) 'Beauty', writes Baudelaire, 'is made up, on the one hand, of an element that is eternal and invariable, though to determine how much of it there is is extremely difficult, and, on the other, of a relative circumstantial
element, which we may like to call, successively or at one and the same time, contemporaneity, fashion, morality, passion.\textsuperscript{33}

The dependency of aesthetic worth on its age is implicit also in those writers who have asserted the need to be contemporary. Saint-Evremond writes that, though he admires 'the design, the economy, the elevation of spirit, the extent of knowledge which are so visible' in the works of the ancients he believes that 'the differences of religion, government, customs, and manners have introduced so great a change in the world that we must go, as it were, upon a new system, to suit with the inclination and genius of the present age.'\textsuperscript{34} Robbe-Grillet too writes that 'the systematic repetition of the forms of the past is not only absurd and futile, but that it can even become harmful: by blinding us to our real situation in the world of today, it keeps us ultimately, from constructing the world and the man of tomorrow.'\textsuperscript{35} As this quotation shows, this call to contemporaneity should often be understood as simply one way of recalling contemporary artists to the importance of artistic evolution, that is, it implies that repetition and imitation can lead to the nonaesthetic - though theoretically this is not inevitable. The fallacy which it nevertheless contains is demonstrated by Robbe-Grillet himself when he writes that a writer 'who produces a pastiche skilful enough to contain pages Stendhal might have signed at the time would in no way have the value he would still possess today had he written those same pages under Charles X.'\textsuperscript{36} This, as we have seen in Chapter 2, can only make sense from an intentionalistic point of view, that is, it does not make sense from an aesthetic one.

Treating a work as the communication of someone separate from that work is, as we have seen, a common practice, but we can draw a distinction between seeking to reconstruct the author's intentions from the work and seeking to restore them from other sources or on the basis of certain presuppositions about the nature of the work. The former need be no more than one way of talking about what is really on the page, for to talk about the author's intentions in this way is to talk about what was done in terms of what the 'author' did. It is the latter that can lead to distortions in the perception of the work itself. The phenomena of historical intentionalism, as we saw in Chapter 2, can be said to encompass certain approaches that rely on historical criteria for deciding on significance. (What I mean by 'significance' here is the role
something plays in the imaginative suggestion, the metaphysic of the
work.) Much of the obfuscation that exists within criticism and much of
the hostility that exists towards it is the result of confusing
'significance', as it is here defined, with meaning; meaning is what can
be preserved in paraphrase, significance is what cannot. Though as a
critic I must 'read as an Elizabethan' with regard to meaning, I can only
read as a critic with regard to significance. The significance of the
work as an object of criticism, that is, the significance of the work per
se, is, in this sense, timeless because, as a critic, this is always the
significance it has for me. Moreover, while it is an interesting exercise
to see how a work may reflect or react against values that were
commonplace at the time it was written, but it is only seeing how a work
reflects or reacts against my own values that actually constitutes what
might be called aesthetic criticism. As I wrote with regard to evaluation,
the question of my limitations as a late twentieth-century man is of no
interest to me, I have never been anybody else and I never will be anybody
else, such limitations as I know I have I can strive to overcome, such
limitations as I cannot know I have I cannot take into consideration. As
a critic I wish to know the effect of the work and that is something I
can only verify with reference to myself.87

But what does it mean to call significance 'timeless'? Shakespeare,
according to Johnson, 'holds up to his readers a faithful mirror of
manners and life.', but he does so, Johnson continues, because his
characters 'are not modified by the customs of particular places,
unpractised by the rest of the world...or by the accidents of transient
fashions or temporary opinions: they are the genuine progeny of common
humanity, such as the world will always supply, and observation will
always find.'88 Elsewhere he writes that 'as poetry has to do rather with
the passions of men, which are uniform, than their customs, which are
changeable, the varieties which time or place can furnish will be
inconsiderable.'89 All social forms, all variations, we might say, are
'nature methodized' and their significance is therefore amenable, if a
history has not effaced their formality, to the critic. Forster appears to
take this line when he dismisses considerations of periods, schools,
biography, tendencies, influences, dates, 'gossip', which he classifies as
'pseudo-scholarship', in favour of imagining all the novelists of history
at work simultaneously in the same room.90 This can however lead to a
rather parochial attitude towards the foreign and ancient, a way of making everything over in our own image; this is no fault so long as that image is self examined, so long as we are reading not as a representative but for ourselves. But we should not emphasize translation or transformation either, for I am merely talking about what is inevitable, that is, the fact that what I can understand of a work, the significance I find in it, whether I believe I am reading as an Elizabethan or not, is the significance I find.91

I wrote above that literary history was, theoretically at least, redundant to the criticism of the individual work. Why 'theoretically'? Eliot writes that 'The danger of studying [Shakespeare] alone is the danger of working into the essence of Shakespeare what is just convention and the dodges of an overworked and underpaid writer; the danger of studying him together with his contemporaries is the danger of reducing a unique vision to a mode.'92 In the best of all possible critical worlds this point would make no sense if Shakespeare does contain weaknesses, whatever their source, then a consideration of Shakespeare should show them as such even if we do not study his contemporaries, on the other hand if he is a great writer, standing head and shoulders above his contemporaries, then, if we approach the work as a work, the greatness we delineate must be left untouched by any subsequent knowledge of his contemporaries. Gardner, even while championing an historical approach, likewise writes that part of the 'fundamental danger of the approach to a writer through the study of his age is that it encourages us to attempt to interpret...the exceptional by the average.'93 But again this would seem to make sense only if we allow into criticism those non-aesthetic and therefore non-critical judgements from intention, such as 'original', 'derivative', and so on. But, as I have said, literary history is only theoretically redundant. It is true that, although aesthetic value, like all value, is comparative, we do not need to know all of a writer's contemporaries in order to be able to see or say why that writer is great, but it is nevertheless often useful, just because we do not live in the best of all possible critical worlds, to have this knowledge in order to see in what manner that writer is great. A wide knowledge of literature, a knowledge of the possibilities of literature, is, in practice, necessary for criticism because it is only by making comparisons that we can come to refine our ascription of what effect belongs to what cause. I
may want to say that this work by Shakespeare has this effect because it has properties x, y, and z, but I read another work which has properties x, y, and z, which does not produce the same effect. So I must return to Shakespeare and look more closely. Thus every work I read, of whatever sort, better enables me to criticize, because every work introduces me to a new configuration of variables. A writer's contemporaries may be, then, especially relevant to the 'understanding' of that writer because they not only provide more variables but also variables that are probably more closely related to the style of work under consideration, and a consideration of which will, therefore, lead to a greater refinement in the description of just what it is that produces this affect in this work. That the relationship is historical is, however, only accidentally relevant.

Significance - 1

We might, provisionally, describe the significance of a work as its 'So what?'. For the work, by virtue of its rhetorical nature is always a pressure, an invitation, a confirmation, a denial, a resistance, an embrace. It requires me to occupy a certain place with regard to its very existence, and the significance of this place to me is the significance of the work. Significance, then, is a pragmatic thing, it is the relationship between the work and the reader's life. For this reason criticism is not simply a matter of learning to 'speak the language' of the work's milieu or of making that work 'speak our language', rather it is a matter of assimilating the concerns of the work, of collapsing these two things. Barthes, too, describes the task of criticism not as the discovering of something 'hidden' in the work, but rather as the 'fitting together' of the 'language of the day...and the language of the author', so that 'If there is such a thing as critical proof it lies not in the ability to discover the work under consideration but, on the contrary, to cover it as completely as possible with one's own language.' This could be a description of what I mean by a criticism which is true to the literariness of the work but for one thing, which instead turns it into simply a description of just one of the present types of occult criticism; for by 'language of the day' Barthes means the vocabularies of Existentialism, Marxism, Psychoanalysis, and Structuralism. These
languages are no less external to me, no less historically determined, than the 'language' of the work. Indeed, in that at least three of them are, as autonomous theories, primarily metaphysical in nature, their deployment in criticism is more likely to bury the work than simply 'cover' it. The language I must 'cover' the work with must be a language that can be altered by this very process, that is the language of myself. Such a language, as I have pointed out in the section on intentionalism, cannot be described as 'historically determined' for whereever determination appears to me as such it ceases to exist, indeed this language of myself is the only language that I can know which is not relative. Thus it is the only language I know that can adequately describe the significance of the work in itself. This I shall return to in a moment.

This question of significance depends upon another, that is: What does imaginative participation in the metaphysic of the work entail, what is its nature? Thus Dilthey;

The possibility of experiencing religious states in one's own life is narrowly limited for me as for my contemporaries. But when I read through the letters and writings of Luther, the reports of his contemporaries, the records of religious disputes and councils, and those of his dealings with officials, I experience a religious process, in which life and death are at issue, of such eruptive power and energy as is beyond the possibility of direct experience for a man of our time. But I can re-live it. I transpose myself into the circumstances....Only in this way do they [Luther and his contemporaries] become accessible to us. Thus the inner-directed man can experience many other existences in his imagination. Limited by circumstances he can yet glimpse alien beauty in the world and areas of life beyond his reach. Do I 'transpose myself into the circumstances' to which the work directly refers, reconstruct the significance that it might have for a religious person? Only indirectly, so indirectly indeed that it is misleading to describe the process thus. Rather I transpose it into my circumstances, for another's beauty is no beauty to me, a significance is only a significance for me. Hence my emphasis on metaphor as a model of the literary in this thesis, for what I feel I feel in other terms - without this transposition, which the figurative invites and allows, literature
would be truly a dead letter. We can be said to understand a word or sentence only because we should have spoken it ourselves. This is true, but it should be added that we can understand it only as we could have spoken it ourselves.

The question of whether the meaning of the work resides independently of the reader's relation to it, that is whether significance is a property of the work or an activity of the reader, is meaningless. But it is a question which I must address, if only because of its persistence elsewhere. Moreover I must make it clear that when I have used the personal pronoun here, as when I used it in the last chapter, it was not intended as a mannerism, not a substitute for 'one', I was not using myself as a representative critic, or describing what we do; when I say 'I' I mean just that - myself. Some have given the reader the role of co-creator; thus Lubbock writes that 'The reader of a novel - by which I mean the critical reader - is himself a novelist; he is the maker of a book which may or may not please his taste when it is finished, but of a book for which he must take is own share of the responsibility.' Likewise Wilde, perhaps more ambiguously, writes that 'It is the spectator, and not life, that art really mirrors.' Empson expresses it thus:

Lacking rhyme, metre, and any overt device such as comparison, these lines are what we should normally call poetry only by virtue of their compactness; two statements are made as if they were connected, and the reader is forced to consider their relations for himself. The reason why these facts should have been selected for a poem is left for him to invent; he will invent a variety of reasons and order them in his own mind. This, I think, is the essential fact about the poetical use of language.

Todorov, in a similar vein, describes the goal of allegorical exegesis, which he identifies with criticism, as being to find 'a different meaning for a text (or for a segment of text) already possessing one.' Gadamer, apparently in contrast, holds that the work 'does not exist in itself nor is it experienced in a communication accidental to it, but it gains through being communicated, its proper being.' But to what
extent are 'invents', or 'different meaning', or even 'proper being', justified here? Is it not more honest, though less dramatic, to say that the reader supplies what the work only implies? If this is so, then the meaning, or, it would be better to say, 'significance', which the reader supplies must be potential in the work, implied and controlled by it, and also finally accountable to it. If we wish to make 'responding to' synonymous with 'creating' then the reader could be described as a co-creator, novelist, poet, but this is merely a poetical way of talking and can mean no more than has ever been meant by 'reading'. Martin Buber probably comes closest to the mark when he writes that 'We do not find meaning lying in things nor do we put it into things, but between us and things it can happen.' But what of the significance I find?

It is the nature of criticism to deal with what cannot be systematized and objectified, that is with metaphysics, but metaphysics is itself an attempt to systematize and objectify what is not amenable to these two processes; it is the very impossibility of this project which, as I have said, creates the metaphysical and makes it significant. Perhaps it is a reflection of this desire that has periodically created a similar demand within criticism for objectivity and system. For such demands have usually entailed beginning with a denial that considerations of affect are essential to criticism, that is with a denial of the literariness, the metaphysicality, of literature. (This desire, then, is itself, a metaphysical one!) Thus criticism, according to Ransom, 'must become more scientific, or precise and systematic' and will only achieve this by abjuring all 'vocabulary which ascribes to the object properties really discoverable in the subject, as: moving, exciting, entertaining, pitiful...great...admirable...beautiful'. Likewise Frye writes that the 'first step in developing a genuine poetics is to recognize and get rid of all meaningless criticism, or talking about literature in a way that cannot help to build up a systematic structure of knowledge.' What Frye wants of criticism is 'progress', and a thus a way of distinguishing, a priori, what is genuine criticism and what is not. To this end he demands that the critic should 'let his critical principles shape themselves solely out of his knowledge of literature.' He is right to demand as much for, as he says, 'to subordinate criticism to an externally derived critical attitude is to exaggerate the values in literature that can be related to the external source', but fails to see
that the scientific model is just such an external source, it is indeed
the model of all those other sources that so distort the literary
work.' It is clear', writes Frye, 'that criticism cannot be a systematic
study unless there is a quality in literature which enables it to be so.';
Frye's 'literary anthropology' is certainly concerned with what is a
quality of literature, but it is only a quality, an aspect, for the
delineation of archetypes, as Jung often stressed, does not constitute an
explanation, that is, it is a starting point not a goal. Whatever
'dithers or vacillates or reacts is mere leisure-class gossip' writes
Frye, but who could argue that literary criticism has ever been more than
'leisure-class gossip', or ever could be more while still faithfully
reflecting the nature of its object, for whatever dithers, vacillates, and
reacts, is alive.

This is my objection to aspectival criticism, that is, criticism which
discusses the work 'as x' or 'x in' the work, that, in destroying the
integrity of the work, it cannot be said to be concerned with literature
except in a very marginal way. Moreover it distorts the nature of
literature, for the aim of criticism, whether explicitly stated or simply
implied, in that a poetic must underly every critique, is to teach us 'how
to read'. A method of criticism is already an interpretation of literature,
in that, as a method, it must contain a definition of its object, and this
definition will, perforce, delimit what is seen and how what is seen is
understood. Aspectival criticism, then, encourages us to read literature
as something other than literature, to read the work as a text. Dissection
is not, of course, strictly speaking, murder, though vivisection is - if
thematic or aspectival criticism does not immediately strike us as a form
of violence then it is because these forms of criticism have taught us to
forget that the work is a living thing, as much an experience as an
object.

Genuine criticism, according to Hazlitt, should not so much give the
'superficial plan and elevation' of a work, as if it were 'a piece of
formal architecture', as 'reflect the colours, the light and shade, the
soul and body of a work': if this second set of terms seems hopelessly
vague in its figurativeness, it should be noted that it is no less so than
the first. This conception of criticism is shared by Sainte-Beuve, who
writes that the 'essential thing for active and practical criticism...is
not so much a profound knowledge of things as a lively feeling for them,
a power of inspiring taste for them, and of surrounding oneself with its atmosphere.' and Lawrence, who writes that;

Literary criticism can be no more than a reasoned account of the feeling produced upon the critic by the book he is criticizing. Criticism can never be a science: it is, in the first place, much too personal, and in the second, it is concerned with values that science ignores. The touchstone is emotion, not reason. We judge a work of art by its effect on our sincere and vital emotion, and nothing else.'

Yet this idea that the personal is the guiding and controlling element, the essence, of critical procedure will, apparently, hardly yield criticism as an academic subject, as a discipline, let alone a science, and, for this reason, it is an idea that critical theory has constantly attacked. Bodkin, for example, advises that 'unless we attempt, by the help of comparative psychological study, to measure and allow for our own "personal equation" in criticism, we are apt to feel as though our own personal responses were "matters of universal experience".'117 For James the critic is one who offers 'himself...as a general touchstone...He has to understand for others, to answer for them; he is always under arms.'119 Richards likewise warns against 'mere autobiography', for the critic's 'judgement is only of general interest in so far as it is representative and reflects what happens in a mind of a certain kind, developed in a certain fashion.'119 Riffaterre develops this idea that, as Wimsatt and Beardsley write, the poem is 'not the critic's own and not the author's' but 'belongs to the public', by proposing the concept of a 'superreader'; 'what is blurred in a response is its content, the subjective interpretation of that response', thus the critic must employ a "superreader" composed of other critics, translators, historical dictionaries, philological footnotes, other readers.120 The critic will then be able to follow, according to Riffaterre, the 'normal reading process' of perceiving the poem as its linguistic shape dictates, for everything that 'holds up' this supperreader can be described as 'a component of the poetic structure.'121 But is this 'supperreader' anything more than myself, for I can be an informed I, without being false to my individuality? This I shall return to, for it is essential to this argument, but for the moment it is important to note why Riffaterre believes this concept is necessary. He requires some outside validation
of, some general consensus on, what is poetical in the poem because he believes that 'the poem may contain certain structures that play no part in its function and effect as a literary work of art'.\textsuperscript{122} But as we have seen a literary work of art is just that type of text in which everything must be considered as essential; coincidentally it is Baudelaire himself, whose poetry is the specific subject of Riffaterre's essay, that best expressed this when he wrote that 'There are no minutiae in matters of art.'\textsuperscript{123}

Some critics have advocated a deference to psychology as one solution to the 'problem' of relativism. Richards, for example, writes that it is a 'prime necessity' for criticism to analyse, in psychological terms, 'the mental events which make up the reading of a poem'.\textsuperscript{124} Psychology, as a science, he writes elsewhere, has a direct bearing on what he considers to be the three qualifications of a good critic - the ability to experience, 'without eccentricities, the state of mind relevant to the work of art he is judging', the ability to 'distinguish experiences from one another as regards their less superficial features' and the "ability" to be 'a sound judge of values'.\textsuperscript{125} Read makes a similar point when he writes that in order to save criticism 'from becoming the province of emotional dictators, we must hasten to relate it to those systems of knowledge which have to a great extent replaced transcendental philosophy.' and preeminently, because 'it is so directly concerned with the material origins of art', psychology.\textsuperscript{126} This might be so if the mind, as it is presently conceived by psychology, was in any way coextensive with the person, but this is not the case. What psychology gives us are rigmaroles, the rigmaroles of affection, of prejudice, of sexual attraction, of grief, that is, the description of an object which is already, in the first instance, 'nature methodized'. For this reason the 'emotional dictatorship' of psychology and psychoanalysis is far worse than any I can invent as an individual, for their vocabularies give a pseudo-objectivity, they replace explanation with taxonomy. With psychoanalysis I can prove that I love what I hate and hate what I love, that I am repelled by what attracts me and attracted by what repels me; for this reason its value to occult criticism is immeasurable. With regard to the psychological aspect of the experience of reading, then, nothing could be more harmful than a deference to established psychological categories, for it offers me the chance to name rather than
explain, to tidy up rather than inspect, to blind with "science" rather than persuade with insight. This is no less true of an informed, academically respectable, grasp of psychology than it is of the layman's popular idea of psychology. Apropos this last I might make the more general point that the popularization of psychological concepts has made it more true than ever that perhaps the greatest obstacle to self-knowledge is self-analysis.

There is one particular form of what might be called 'psychological criticism' which deserves special mention here, if only because it does seem to be a genuine contribution to knowledge — archetypal or myth criticism. The question is, however, whether or not it is literary criticism. This is a form which, in that it can be said to encompass allegorical interpretation and the idea that literature presents representative or ideal types, has had a long history. I will quote at length from Boccaccio because what he says is important not only as an early example of myth criticism but also, in a more general way, to my later argument.

[The] ancient poets, so far as it is possible to human capacity, followed in the footsteps of the Holy Spirit, which, as we read in the sacred Scriptures, revealed its lofty secrets to future times through the mouths of many writers, making them beneath a veil speak what it intended at the proper time to show in deeds, without any veil....In the green bush in which Moses saw God like a burning flame, the Holy Spirit wished to show us the virginity of Her who was purer than any other creature, and that she was to be the dwelling and shelter of the Lord of nature and that she would not be defiled by the conception or the birth of the Word of the Father. By Nebuchadnezzar's vision of the statue made of several metals struck down by a rock that was changed into a mountain, the Spirit wished to show all succeeding ages that they ought to submit to the doctrine of Christ, who was and is the living rock, and that the Christian religion born of this rock would become a thing immovable and eternal, as we see that the mountains are....Similarly our poets, when they feigned that Saturn had many children and devoured all but four of them, wished to have understood from this fiction nothing else than that Saturn is time, in which everything is produced, and as everything is produced in time, it likewise is the destroyer of all and reduces all to nothing. Of the four children that he did not devour, the first is Jove, that is the element of fire; the second is Juno...that is the air...the third is Neptune...that is the element of water; the fourth and last is Pluto...that is the earth, lower than any other element. Likewise our poets feigned
that Hercules was changed from a man into a god, and Lycaon into a wolf. By this they wished to show that by acting virtuously, as Hercules did, man becomes a god by participation in heaven, and that by acting wickedly, as Lycaon did, though he appears a man, he is truly to be called by the name of that beast which is known by everyone to have the quality most like his vice. So because of his rapacity and avarice, qualities like those of a wolf, it is feigned that Lycaon was changed into a wolf. Likewise our poets feign the beauty of the Elysian Fields, by which I understand the sweetness of paradise. From the darkness of Dis I learn the pain of the inferno.127

For the present moment what I am mainly interested in is the latter part of this passage, where Boccaccio identifies the pagan Elysian Fields and Dis with the Christian Heaven and Hell. A similar conception of interpretation is found in Frye’s discussion of Milton’s Lycidas: ‘If we ask, who is Lycidas? the answer is that he is a member of the same family as Theocritus’ Daphnis, Bion’s Adonis, the Old Testament Abel, and so on.’128 Such an answer, Frye holds, ‘goes on building up a wider comprehension of literature and a deeper knowledge of its structural principles and recurring themes.’129 It is true that such an approach makes the circle of our references ever wider, the display of our erudition increasingly impressive, but is our comprehension deepened? This approach, when properly conducted, implies that we understand the particular instance well enough to be able to discover parallel instances in other contexts but if that is all we understand of the instance then what we are doing is intrinsically anti-aesthetic in that it does not address the unique nature of the work; what is produced is a sort of literary anthropoplogy in which the work becomes an anthropological or psychological text. With regard to literary criticism, then, if the element which is regarded as archetypal in the work is really potent, that is, significant in a general way, then that significance belongs to the work in question, to follow it from its context to the world of myths and thence to its significance is an unnecessary detour, and one which is likely to result in a blunting of our sense of its particular significance in the literary work.130 If we feel that we could not find the full significance of the element as the expression of an archetype just by consideration of the work on its own, then we must allow that this element does not express the archetype that we have in mind. If
literature contains archetypes then to criticize it, as literature, we do not need to make these sorts of comparisons, if it does not then, to criticize it as literature, we cannot make these sorts of comparisons.

Let us return to Boccaccio. When he draws the parallel between the Elysian fields and Heaven or the burning bush and the Immaculate Conception, the justification of what he is doing is that the former things tell 'beneath a veil' what will one day appear in deeds, that is, literally. The simple multiplication of instances cannot be so justified. Consider Fielding;

Though perhaps, during the changes which so long an existence may have passed through, [Mrs.Tow-wouse] may in her turn have stood behind the bar at an inn, I will not scuple to affirm she hath likewise in the revolution of ages sat on a throne. In short, where extreme turbulency of temper, avarice, and an insensibility of human misery, with a degree of hypocrisy, have united in a female composition, Mrs.Tow-wouse was that woman; and where a good inclination, eclipsed by a poverty of spirit and understanding hath glimmered forth in a man, that man hath been no other than her sneaking husband.'

To say that a certain character is an instance of a Trickster figure or a Mrs.Tow-wouse will tell us something of that character, providing we understand the nature of the archetype, and may be useful if we have not read the work in question! But otherwise to so name a character is only to lead us to look for attributes that the character may not contain, to bring it into line with a type and enable us to talk about aspects of something quite other than the work as a unique work. Such a naming may be useful if we are making a catalogue of instances of the Trickster figure, which is why I have said that archetypal criticism may be a contribution to knowledge, but with regard to aesthetic criticism, that is, criticism concerned with literature as literature, this procedure is only a potentially misleading distraction. To give a thing a name rather than an explanation is to create only the illusion of analysis. If Boccaccio's comparison of the burning bush and the Immaculate Conception seems, like the comparison drawn by Augustine between Noah's Ark and the crucifixion, enlightening it is because it tells us, whether we believe in the same literal truth or not, about the possible human significance of both instances. To draw the parallel between the burning bush and the
Immaculate Conception, or the Elysian Fields and Heaven, is only of interest, then, if we can account for both; 'account for' in the sense of discover what values the instance embodies, what complex of emotions it appeals to. These examples are extremely complex but at a simpler level I might show the difference by considering, for example, the fact that heroic trials in fairy tales and folk stories usually come in groups of three. On coming across an example of this we may allude to every other example of a similar situation we can think of, collate them and announce that three is an archetypal figure, with a significance that resides in the very structure of the psyche. (Boccacio or Augustine would probably relate all instances of three's to the Trinity.) Alternatively we can simply note that two is the minimum number of instances required to establish a pattern, so that by the third instance we are prepared to have our expectations confirmed or overthrown, and, therefore, that three is the minimum number of trials in which the hero can encounter the pattern, learn from it, and bring events to a crisis. With the case of making Saturn stand for Time, the 'accounting for' is complete and we need hardly go any further, for time does not 'stand for' anything else, at least not in the sense that the Elysian Fields, Dis, Heaven, and Hell do.132 The case of Lycaon's transformation into a wolf is similarly straightforward, though that of Hercules transformation into a god is not.

In some instances reference to the psychology of the possible audience can be simply one way of talking about the possible effect of a work; such is the case when Addison describes how 'The Ladies are wonderfully pleased to see a Man insulting Kings, or affronting the Gods, in one Scene, and throwing himself at the Feet of his Mistress in another.'133 But in this, rather limited, sense all criticism is psychological.

Certainly we go to others to discover what we may have overlooked, to see if they can account for effects for which we cannot, but unless I can validate their conclusions myself, that is, make them my own, deference to them is no more than falsifying my experience of the work. But why should my experience of the work be of any interest to anybody else? This is the question that has prompted the mistaken urge to objectivity, for the answer it requires is one that will validate the critical procedure per se, that is, that will ensure the value of my
criticism before the fact - and this cannot be done. There is no reason why my experience of the work should be of interest to anyone, the best I can hope for is that it may turn out to be. 134 (It is quite a different question to ask "How can I criticize?"; this is a question I have tried to answer in the rest of this thesis.) But what of that which I do not know, or have not noticed? I do not know it and have not noticed it, and afterwards if you can show me why I have written drivel as a consequence and I will then know and notice and do better next time. But I can only ever write what I know. What the call to objectivity is really asking me to do is to defer or appeal to knowledge - psychological, 'philosophical', anthropological, sociological, and so on - which I cannot verify myself, it declares that only when I am talking about what I do not have direct experience of am I saying anything worth saying. As for my idiosyncracies, as I have written before, if I could take them into account they would not be an issue for me, if I cannot take them into account then they are not an issue for me. It is important to remember that the work exists, is available, and will not be hanged on my testimony. Criticism is useful, according to Addison because it is 'impossible for a Man of the greatest Parts to consider anything in its whole Extent, and in all its variety of Lights'. 135 Eliot likewise writes that criticism 'from age to age, will reflect the things that age demands; and the criticism of no one man and of no one age can be expected to embrace the whole nature of poetry or exhaust all its uses.' 136 Nevertheless if I do not try and embrace and exhaust the whole of poetry for myself, I have not even criticized.

Significance - II

Throughout this thesis I have been concerned with the idea that a certain critical emphasis, in making literature perform the function to which it is least suited, deprives the text of its aesthetic centre of gravity, and can, incidentally, create a type of discourse in which life, as it is discussed by the critic, also loses its centre of gravity - a centre which if not located in one's own experience is located nowhere. What form, then, could a genuinely aesthetic criticism take? Only one, I would argue, that keeps a constant awareness of our immediate, pre-
reflective response to the work; and examine this not in relation to history, or to knowledge, or even to another systematic non-literary metaphysic, but rather in relation to our wider interests as they can be reflected in literature. This form, then, is an extension of what I might call the 'natural response' to a work, for, though we may not be able to say precisely what mental states are invoked by the reading process, everyone knows when they find a book depressing or exhilarating, exciting or dull. The work is an enigma only for criticism, that is, the problem of interpretation is only the problem of the formal description of the work's effect. (For even when a reader's description is nonsensical, as when they describe a work as 'sincere', 'predictable', 'unrealistic' - these non sequiturs often do reflect genuine, if "undiscovered", properties of the work for that reader.)

Aesthetic criticism, then, would trace back these feelings into the work which has invoked them, and delineate the connection, that is, critically reflect on its own response. For if we wish to be still talking of what is essential to our experience of reading a work, then it is as a metaphysical suggestion, or statement, that we must discuss it, and this is a matter not just of our opinion about literary form but also our opinions about reality. To take a famous example of a work in which the imaginative suggestion is a matter of debate, we might consider Paradise Lost; whether we believe that the work is predominantly on the side of the angels or predominantly on the side of the devils is very much a matter of which we consider to be the more valid representation of human potential - the description of Adam and Eve in Paradise, or the speeches of Satan. The strictly philosophical aspect of such a question lies not in the response itself, but in the refining of the assertions we make about that response. There is no reason why one person's 'answer' to Paradise Lost should be the same as another's. This is why, if I listen closely, every time I hear a 'we' or an 'our' in such contexts I also hear a sermon.

The aim, then, that I appear to be proposing for criticism, as an activity concerned with literature as literature, is the reconstruction of the experience of reading the work. But how is the memory of reading related to the literary work? For is not this memory the most intangible of things? Thus Lubbock;
To grasp the shadowy and fantasmal form of a book, to hold it fast, to turn it over and survey it at leisure - that is the effort of the critic of books, and it is perpetually defeated. Nothing, no power, will keep a book steady and motionless before us, so that we have time to examine its shape and design. As quickly as we read, it melts and shifts in the memory; even at the moment when the last page is turned, a great part of the book, its finer detail, is already vague and doubtful. A little later, after a few days or months, how much is really left of it? A cluster of impressions, some clear points emerging from a mist of uncertainty, this is all we can hope to possess, generally speaking, in the name of a book. The experience of reading it has left something behind, and these relics we call by the book's name; but how can they be considered to give us the material for judging and appraising the book?137

But Lubbock is here inverting what should be the task of criticism for the first reading, the reading of the work as a work, must be the immediate object of reflection for aesthetic criticism. The work as one examines it subsequently, in order to discover what properties or qualities might be responsible for the significance one found upon first reading, can more properly be called a relic or artifact, for now one is reading it as a text, that is, as a source of information. This memory is a better grasp of the imaginative suggestion of the work than one can subsequently reconstruct from an examination of that work precisely because of its vague nature, its lack of detail, for it is the very nature of a literary work that part is swallowed into the whole, that significance is cumulative. The examination of the work that accompanies reflection on the first reading is made in order to clarify, that is, to become aware of distinctions within the imaginative suggestion that will account for that suggestion, but these distinctions and connections, if their delineation is to faithfully illustrate the imaginative suggestion of the work, must be those that were contained in the original experience itself. An opinion of a work, then, is something one starts with, not something one arrives at. Analysis is not discovering what one thinks of a work, but why one thinks what one thinks.

In the last chapter I wrote that literary criticism can be called a discipline only in so far as it postpones the noise of metaphysics, that is, that taste must be considered as a power of discernment as well as a state of sensibility. The whole of the discipline of criticism rests on
Dryden's proposition that figures may 'be hidden sometimes by the address of the poet' and thus 'work their effect upon the mind without discovering the art which caused it.' Thus Gerard writes that, 'Our mental operations, though of all things the most intimately present to us, are of such a subtile and transitory nature, that, when they are reflected on, they in a great measure elude our view, and their limits and distinctions appear involved in obscurity.'

It is the critic, it is he who not only feels strongly, but is also capable of reflecting on his feelings, of accounting for them, of distinguishing their objects, and tracing out their causes, that is naturally allowed to take the lead in pronouncing concerning works of taste...

This power of discernment is something that has often been insisted on. Addison, for example, writes that an aspiring critic should read Locke, for 'an Author who has not learned the Art of distinguishing between Words and Things, and of ranging his Thoughts, and setting them in proper Lights, whatever Notions he may have, will lose himself in Confusion and Obscurity.'; Sainte-Beuve that the proper enquiry of the critic concerns 'how the work was done, not on what or why.'; and Leavis that the critic is only such 'in so far as he observes a disciplined relevance in response, comment and determination of significance,' and remains concerned with the work 'as something that should contain within itself the reason why it is so and not otherwise.'

The fine distinction, it emerges, is everything in criticism; a simply plausible account will not do. This is why I have stressed the importance of wide reading, for every new work we read, by bringing to our notice the affect of a new configuration of variables, will make us better able to distinguish between what is essential and what is accidental to an affect, make us better able to criticize. This places the function of 'critical principles' in a new light. (By 'principles' I here mean not those concerning the self-consistency of the critical project per se, that is, such principles as I have tried to establish in this thesis, but rather those principles that emerge from criticism itself, which are concerned with what element in a work can be credited with having produced what affect.) The creation of principles is, indeed, periodically proposed as the goal of criticism. But such an emphasis is misleading,
for though principles may emerge and though, as Gerard notes, we tacitly acknowledge such principles whenever we give reasons for a critical judgement, these 'principles' must always be held to be more provisional than any in science.142 Given the invisibility of rhetoric and the difficulty of accounting for every variable that may be operative in any effect, one should set out on any particular criticism with the aim more of modifying than confirming them; as if, indeed, each work were the first work one had ever read. With regard to criticism one's acquaintance with literature comes into play when, having formulated a causal connection between the work and its affect one tests this formulation against past experience. I may, indeed, have to replace my formula with some other description, but only in the interests of becoming truer to the actual affect I first felt.

In general we can say that every enquiry begins with an assertion that is vague and complex, and proceeds by replacing it, where possible, with a number of separate but more precise assertions, each one of which will be less complex than the original. We may analyse a complex assertion into several separate ones, some of which are true and some false - this is what happens when an old theory gives way to a better one - but a vague assertion may be neither. The force of any generalization depends on the amount that it excludes; its ability to lead us to expect one thing instead of another, one state of affairs rather than another. A proposition, or hypothesis, which is consistent with anything whatsoever, in the sense that nothing can count as refuting it, explains nothing.

Perhaps the most striking and consistent example of criticism as accounting for effect that comes to mind is De Quincey's 'On the Knocking at the Gate in Macbeth';

From my boyish days I had always felt a great perplexity on one point in Macbeth. It was this:— The knocking at the gate which succeeds to the murder of Duncan produced to my feelings an effect for which I never could account. The effect was that it reflected back upon the murder a peculiar awfulness and a depth of solemnity; yet, however obstinately I endeavoured with my understanding to comprehend this, for many years I never could see why it should produce such an effect. Here I pause for one moment, to exhort the reader never to pay any attention to his understanding when it stands in opposition to any other faculty of his mind.144
He recounts how despite that his reason told him the passage could not produce the effect it did, he 'waited and clung to the problem until further knowledge should enable me to solve it.'\(^{145}\) He finally does so by analogy;

Or, if the reader has ever been present in a vast metropolis on the day when some great national idol was carried in funeral pomp to his grave, and, chancing to walk near the course through which it passed, has felt powerfully, in the silence and desertion of the streets, and in the stagnation of ordinary business, the deep interest which at that moment was possessing the heart of man, - if all at once he should hear the death-like stillness broken up by the sound of wheels rattling away from the scene, and making known that the transitory vision was dissolved, he will be aware that at no moment was his sense of the complete suspension and pause in ordinary human concerns so full and affecting as at that moment when the suspension ceases, and the goings-on of human life are suddenly resumed. All action in any direction is best expounded, measured, and made apprehensible, by reaction.\(^{146}\)

To paraphrase, or even quote in part, the way in which this insight is applied by De Quincey to the scene in *Macbeth* could not do justice to that application. I therefore refer the reader to the original. It is short, apparently full of digressions, and without any specific references to or quotations from the play, but it is also appears to me to be one of the most purely critical pieces in the history of criticism. What is interesting to note about the process De Quincey describes is that he has had to *wait* for the rhetoric of the scene to discover itself to him. Rather as with a dream, deliberate self-analysis emerges as an obstacle to self-knowledge. It is for this reason that criticism to order can be described as one of the greatest enemies of sound criticism, for it encourages the construction of makeshift explanations, encourages one to find a reason rather than the reason for affect, and, ultimately, to the misrepresentation of that affect in the interests of consistent argument - to a *reductio ad rationem*. But De Quincey's account could serve not simply as an example of the critical process, for it also (coincidentally?) contains a description of the analysis of literary metaphysics per se, in that a metaphysic only appears as such, only allows its significance to appear as a construct, in the cessation of its immediate significance for me, that is, through contrast or reaction.
In what has been said so far many of the reasons for my preferring to approach the work on the basis of its imaginative suggestion, that is, its literariness, will have been made clear, however, given that this method is both laboursome, and less 'conclusive' than that which elucidates the work thematically, it will be as well to recall what was said about evaluation in the last chapter. Its advantage is principally that it is closest to the experience of reading, to what is actually in the work itself, and thus to the true basis of evaluation. This makes it more relevant to what I believe to be the main point of criticism - the exploration of literary taste as an integral part of thought and feeling, for literary taste is no more than intellect and feeling as experienced in the interaction of the individual imagination with the work.

The metaphysic, however, in contrast to the themes we may find, can only be given in blurred outline. It is, by definition, the suggestion of the whole and is only manifested in the whole, and yet, in delineating and illustrating it, I am constrained to use such connections as 'contributes to' and 'another aspect of' and to describe it in a reductive, sequential pattern. The critical process, then, almost invariably, falsely implies a starting point in our conception of the work, for, at least at the stage of reflection, each element is a factor in the nature of every other, each occasion presupposes the antecedent world as active in its own nature. This mutual immanence is a natural fact of the work that cannot easily be represented in criticism, though without it criticism would have no subject. This difficulty is related to another problem, that of the 'hermeneutic circle', which it will be well to consider here, for despite the relationship it would be a great mistake to identify the two. Dilthey describes this 'general difficulty of all interpretation' thus; 'The whole of a work must be understood from individual words and their combination but full understanding of an individual part presupposes understanding of the whole.' The notion of the hermeneutic circle, then, is that there is no starting point for understanding, no understanding without presupposition. The concept of mutual immanence appears to confirm this, for we might say that in the literary work each sentence, with regard to significance, follows from its successor. Spitzer
applies this idea to the creation of the critical work in the following manner;

Why do I insist that it is impossible to offer the reader a step-by-step rationale to be applied to a work of art? For one reason, that the first step, on which all may hinge, can never be planned: it must already have taken place. The first step is the awareness of having been struck by a detail, followed by a conviction that this detail is connected basically with the work of art; it means that one has made an "observation," - which is the starting point of a theory, that one has been prompted to raise a question - which must find an answer....The inference from "patterns" is nothing but an anticipation of a whole deduced from the known examples.149

The critic, according to Spitzer, must 'work from the surface to the "inward life-center" of the work: first observing details about the superficial appearance of the particular work...then, grouping these details and seeking to integrate them into a creative principle...and, finally, making the return trip to all the other groups of observations in order to find whether the "inward form" one has tentatively constructed gives an account of the whole.'150 That is, the critic passes from the style to its 'psychological etymon', the 'radix' in the writer's soul, which is the Weltanschaung of that writer/work.151 This 'psychological etonym' is 'a kind of solar system into whose orbit all categories of things are attracted: language, motivation, plot, are only satellites of this mythological entity'.152 Although Spitzer places this 'psychological etonym' in the mind of the author it is not necessarily an intentionalist concept, and we can, for the present purpose, identify it with what I have called the metaphysic of the work. However Spitzer believes that the hermeneutic circle means that intuition must be a necessary component of criticism, for this mens, which creates a unity in the style of the work, can be initially no more then a hypothesis for the critic.153

But though understanding is sequential, in that we can identify it with the first reading (which cannot be other than sequential), while criticism may be about the first reading it is not that first reading. Spitzer's position presupposes that criticism, as the activity of creating a critique, is simultaneous with reading - which it is not. This mens or 'psychological etonym', what Croce calls the 'generating motif which
shapes and animates' the work as a whole, is necessarily not an hypothesis, or belief, for the affect of the work is known, is a given for criticism. The 'inward form' is immediately present in the experience of the work as a whole; what the critic seeks is the means of transmission, that is, the source. Criticism, then, does not involve us in the hermeneutic circle for we are not seeking to discover something which we must already have found in order to know what we are looking for, rather we are asking 'How did I discover what I have?'. This search may, as I have said above, enable the critic to formulate more precisely this etonym or metaphysic, but this is itself only giving a more faithful reconstruction of the original significance as it first struck one, before one had formulated it.

I wrote above that the mutual immanence of the elements of a work cannot easily be represented in criticism, though without this mutual immanence criticism would have no subject. Criticism would have no subject because this mutual immanence is simply a reflection of the fact that form and content are inseparable within literature, that is, that no element in the text is surplus or contingent when that text is considered as a literary work. Criticism, however, must necessarily introduce what we might call, borrowing a term from Derrida, differance. This manifests itself in two ways: Firstly, the deferral of significance we must make in reading is almost inevitably erased by the omniscience of hindsight in writing the criticism itself. Secondly, there is the substitution of elements and the reversal of relationships that we mentally rehearse in trying to discover the precise source of an affect, which, while arising from a recognition of the inseparability of form and content, appears at the same time to treat the two as separate. This substitution and reversal, by which we arrive at why the work is as it is, why it has this effect, is even less likely to be explicit, either to the critic, or in the criticism. "But it just says..." complains the ani-interpreter, yet change one word and the entire effect is different.
Conclusion

Throughout this thesis I have tried to serve a maieutic function with regard to certain themes in the history of literary theory, to make explicit certain ideas only latent in this tradition. Thus, for example, I have tried to show how far the limits of 'truth to life' can extend before we begin to involve ourselves with non-literary standards, what the notion of non-paraphrasability implies about the relationship between form and content, and how the justification of literature must always involve the justifying of rhetoric. But above all I have tried to demonstrate how everything that can be meaningfully said about literature points towards its being essentially metaphorical. (If I have leaned more towards the history of criticism prior to the beginning of this century, despite that, in terms of volume, this might seem an imbalance, it is because it is only what is said in wonder, in admiration, and, perhaps, in puzzlement that really reveals the paradoxical nature of literature - what has been written with one eye on literature and one eye on theoretical consistency almost inevitably misses its mark.) Coming now towards the end I wish to turn to one last 'moment' in this tradition, a point at which several of the latent ideas I have been concerned with brush so close together as to almost constitute an explicit statement of one of the main theses of this work. This is De Quincey's description of the 'literature of power';

There is, first, the literature of knowledge; and, secondly, the literature of power. The function of the first is - to teach; the function of the second is - to move: the first is a rudder; the second, an oar or sail. The first speaks to the mere discursive understanding; the second speaks ultimately, it may happen, to the higher understanding or reason, but always through affections of pleasure and sympathy. Remotely, it may travel towards an object seated in what Lord Bacon calls dry light; but, proximately, it does and must operate, else it ceases to be a literature of power, on and through that humid light which clothes itself in the mists and glittering iris of human passions, desires, and genial emotions....What do you learn from "Paradise Lost"? Nothing at all....What you owe to Milton is not any knowledge, of which a million separate items are still but a million of advancing steps on the same earthly level; what you owe, is power, that is, exercise and expansion to your latent capacity of sympathy with the infinite, where every pulse and each separate influx is a step upwards - a step ascending as upon a Jacob's ladder from earth to mysterious altitudes above...
the earth. All the steps of knowledge, from first to last, carry you further on the same plane, but could never raise you one foot above your ancient level of earth: whereas, the very first step in power is a flight — is an ascending movement into another element where earth is forgotten.\(^{157}\)

Here we have the rejection of direct referentiality, and the emphasis upon an appeal 'through affections of pleasure and sympathy', but here also there is the movement towards transcendentalism, towards 'sympathy with the infinite' in a realm 'where earth is forgotten'. But what is this realm? It is, according to De Quincey, that of the 'great moral capacities of man'.\(^{158}\) It is true, then, that literature teaches nothing, for their is no knowledge to be communicated in this realm. (At the most we may learn about ourselves, through reaction.) It is giving the world *ad hominem*.

Scriptures speak not of the understanding, but of the "the understanding heart," — making the heart, i.e., the great intuitive (or non-discursive) organ, to be the interchangeable formula for man in his highest state of capacity for the infinite. Tragedy, romance, fairy tale, or epopee, all alike restore to man's mind the ideals of justice, of hope, of truth, of mercy, of retribution, which else (left to the support of daily life in its realities) would languish for want of sufficient illustration....What is didactic poetry?...The predicate destroys the subject: it is a case of what logicians call *contradictio in adjecto* — the unsaying by means of an attribute the very thing which is the subject of that attribute you have just affirmed. No poetry can have the function of teaching....Poetry, or any one of the fine arts (all of which alike speak through the genial nature of man and his excited sensibilities), can teach only as nature teaches, as forests teach, as the sea teaches, as infancy teaches, viz., by deep impulse, by hieroglyphic suggestion. Their teaching is not direct or explicit, but lurking, implicit, masked in deep incarnations.\(^{159}\)

Which is to say that is 'impresses'. But what is it that speaks to the understanding of the heart, that speaks to the excited sensibility in terms of the reality of ideals? Poetry does not teach, writes De Quincey, and poetry teaches 'as nature teaches, as forests teach, as the sea teaches, as infancy teaches, viz., by deep impulse'. This is his own *contradictio in adjecto*. Perhaps he has in mind Wordsworth's 'impulse from a vernal wood', which again can 'teach' the 'heart' ('That watches and receives') about good and evil.\(^{160}\) But this 'impulse' also echoes another...
- that 'impulse' which, according to De Quincey is the goal of rhetoric. That which speaks to the understanding of the heart, which impresses without passing on knowledge is rhetoric, or, more particularly, the rhetoric of metaphysics. And perhaps this is why De Quincey feels he must try, as we saw Mazzoni, Bacon, Wordsworth, Hazlitt, Newman, Mill, James, and Robbe-Grillet also try, to dissociate the description of literature from the description of didacticism, or spiritual colonialism, which it constantly threatens to become. At the best, as we saw with Bacon and Mill, all that can be achieved is a distinction between two types of rhetoric.

Thus those writers who emphasize the unique nature of art, that is, those writers who wish art to be valued 'for its own sake', almost invariably tend towards a realization of its rhetorical nature. 'A Truth in art', writes Wilde, echoing De Quincey's definition of the questions to which rhetoric applies, 'is that whose contradictory is also true.' But the same 'realization', less self-consciously expressed, lies dormant in Hazlitt's declaration that nothing is a subject for poetry 'that admits of dispute.', in Wordsworth's opinion that the 'truth' of poetry does not stand upon 'external testimony, but is carried alive into the heart by passion', and in Gadamer, when he writes, 'That truth is experienced through a work of art that we cannot attain in any other way constitutes the philosophic importance of art, which asserts itself against all reasoning.' It is also there in those innumerable writers, representing almost every critical school, who make of literature what I have called 'a correspondence course in the University of Life', that is, who write as if literature could 'tell', or 'show', or 'provide data'. (From a rhetorical point of view, the definition of rhetoric as the giving of judgements on cases in which no basis can be found for decision, places rhetoric within the category of aporos, which Fortunatanius classifies under asystata, that is, those issues which have no right to be considered at all!)

We are all sometimes like Vathek, we wish to know even such sciences as do not exist, and cannot exist; sciences of fate, of God, of love. Literature, as affirmation, is a means, both inside and outside of criticism, for the tacit construction of such sciences. Just as philosophical metaphysics and those expressions, the main power of which relies on the distortion of logical syntax in the direction of the
desirably impossible, literature too provides us with a vehicle, in the form of metaphor, of poetical conceit, by which our fears are overcome or given in to, our desires neglected or affirmed, in which what we want (or perhaps know?) of reality is manifest to our own satisfaction. To contrast philosophical and literary metaphysics is, however, a false way of approaching the problem. Metaphysicality may appear in philosophy only where philosophy is not philosophy, where it is primarily literary, in that we find it beautiful (the persuasive expression of a desirable impossibility). From the point of view of literature, as an evaluative or aesthetic category, we may say, then, that metaphysicality is the property of an expression which makes it literary. If we look back now at the problem posed in the conclusion to Chapter 1 (that is, what form of analogy is involved in the relationship between scientific and metaphysical analogy) we might now say that analogy is what appears in science, but that when this analogy is misunderstood, or when our interest stops with its expression isolated from its scientific usefulness, then we have metaphor in the literary sense. It does not matter which word ('analogy' or 'metaphor') we assign to which type of discourse (science or literature), so long as we recognize that they are distinguished by our state in contemplating them. Perhaps 'metaphor' should be reserved for literature, since, while scientific analogy can be taken in a metaphysical/literary way, that is, as metaphor, metaphor in literature cannot be taken in a scientific way - though it is, in fact, just this momentary taking in a scientific way which produces metaphysics. As we have seen, it is only by denying the figurativeness of the metaphysical assertion that it can be made an assertion about the world, though it exists only by virtue of this figurativeness. The significance of the metaphysical is that nostalgia left behind by its cancelling out what it appears to assert. If the aesthetic appears disinterested, that is, independent of the will and intellect, it is because the appeal of metaphysics must always run counter to reason - for we do not allow the metaphysical assertion to collapse on itself, to totally disappear. The pleasure of the beautiful, then, is always a pleasure derived from the momentary abnegation of reason.

To describe the impression that poetry leaves in the human mind, the word "melancholy" was spontaneously born on man's lips. And indeed the conciliation of the opposites, in whose conflict alone
life throbs; the vanishing of passion, which together with suffering bring an indefinable but voluptuous warmth; the detachment from terrestrial surroundings, which render us brutal, even if they are the surroundings where we enjoy, suffer, and dream; this elevation of poetry to the heavens - all is like a looking back, with no regret, but at the same time not without tears...A veil of sadness seems to envelop beauty, but it is not a veil: it is the very face of beauty.164

The aesthetics of Benedetto Croce, from whom the above quotation comes, is constantly poised on the edge of this realization that the 'conciliation of opposites' which the aesthetic is said to produce is in fact the self-contradiction of metaphysics. (His assertion that, in the aesthetic, language is its own end, leads him to speak of the concept of 'art for art's sake' as 'unchallengeable and indeed a "truism" or...tautology'.165) We look back without regret because we appear to find the solution to the 'brutality' of thwarted transcendence, the sadness enters in because this transcendence thwarts itself. The aesthetic, then, can be described as that state or act wherein I deceive myself as to the epistemological content of the work. Can we ask for a characterization of this deception? This question makes no sense, for we are asking for what we already have, indeed, for that which we had to begin with - the aesthetic. (The problem is to recognize the solution as such.) But it is precisely because the aesthetic is that which I wish to remain ineffable that the subjects of aesthetics and literary theory are so replete with paradox with contradictio in adjecto, that the definition of the aesthetic itself is almost invariably paradoxical.

This truth about art is implicit in the first instance of the use of the word aesthetic in connection with it, in Baumgarten's Reflections on Poetry. He there defines that which is aesthetic in contrast to logic, which he describes as 'the science of knowing things philosophically, that is...the science for the direction of the higher cognitive faculty in apprehending the truth'.166

The Greek philosophers and the Church fathers have already carefully distinguished between things perceived...and things known...It is entirely evident that they did not equate things known with things of sense, since they honoured with this name things also removed from sense (therefore, images). Therefore, things known are to be known by the superior faculty as the object of logic; things perceived (are to be known by the
inferior faculty as the object of the science of perception, or aesthetic.167

We cannot know what is not true. What is aesthetic is what we do not make known to ourselves. That he does not equate perception with the visual can be discovered from the course of his argument.168 The 'lower cognitive faculty', that which perceives the perfect sensate discourse of the poetic, may be equated with De Quincey's 'heart', that which will respond to rhetoric. For the defining property of the 'sensate' for Baumgarten is its indistinctness; thus he describes desire as 'sensate', in that it may derive 'from a confused representation of the good'.169

If my evaluation of a work changes, then, from day to day it is because my 'conception' of my life changes from day to day. Though I bring presuppositions to the work it does not follow from this that I presuppose the nature of the work. (We have seen, however, with New Criticism, how such presuppositions can enter in.) Rather the relationship between before and after the work is always, within limits, an undecided one, for my life is something that constantly lies before me, as a possibility, my reality is always a series of from now on's.170 A critical method which, instead of concentrating on literature's metaphorical rendering of affective experience, its interpretation of life, treats it as a report of objective truth which can be superimposed upon experience, which instead of seeing it as a manifestation of that desire which can only be fulfilled by metaphysics, sees it as information about the world, introduces an artificiality into its account of our experience of reading. The work does not show us anything; it either tries to suggest something to us, or reminds us of something. Metaphorical aptness is not scientific truth, thus, though, while actually reading, the idealization of the metaphysic must perforce stand between us and reality, if we do not afterwards set it in its rightful place, that is, beside reality, we involve ourselves in a morass of deception, of artificial perception and sentiment, for just in so far as we concern ourselves only with emotionally neutral elucidation of what seems most systematically organized in the work - its themes - just in so far do we sever that
connection with the world which gives the work its significance, or
denies the work its significance.

But no metaphysic, it would appear, can be more true than another. If,
then, aesthetic value lies in the metaphysic, should we not conclude that
there is nothing to choose between works, and nothing to do in the way
of interpretation but explode their metaphysicality? What, then, of the
critical approach which concentrates on the imaginative suggestion, of
the work? At this stage it is easier for me to explain how one might
proceed with a metaphysic with which one is not in sympathy, though, of
course, one can say nothing about a work without that degree of sympathy
which constitutes understanding. The first means is by constructing an
argument which takes as its premiss something that is assumed in the
metaphysic, and deducing a consequence from it that would be unacceptable
either to one's audience or to the more explicit intentions of the
metaphysic. (By 'intentions' I mean not those of the author but rather
those intentions made explicit by the placing of emphasis within the work
what is made the centre of attention, where, and for how long.) This
procedure of demonstrating that the first stated principles of a position
require a conclusion that the holder of the position themselves would
find repugnant, is the usual way in which arguments on value are carried
out, since, as we saw in the last chapter, without certain shared criteria
of value no argument as to comparative value is possible. This assumes a
shared contextual background of values, certain common concerns, in one's
audience, however remote from the multitude of explicitly stated ones,
but, insofar as the alternative of not making this assumption is not to
discuss questions of value at all and, therefore, never to find out
whether it is the case or not, we can pragmatically justify the adoption
of this assumption.

Though by far the easiest thing to do with a metaphysic, from an
analytical point of view, is to explode it, to be worth criticizing a work
must first of all be worth reading, and this description seems to limit
criticism only to an anti-aesthetic, a philosophical, role. Perhaps the
usefulness, or even greatness, of any piece of criticism, of whatever
persuasion, lies in showing us that a work is interesting and
entertaining in a way we might not have discovered for ourselves. Yet
there is more than a little truth in Poe's assertion that 'poetical
excellence' is not excellence if it require to be demonstrated as such:
and thus, to point out too particularly the merits of a work of art, is to admit that they are not merits altogether. Why this might be so we have seen from the description of the metaphysicality of the aesthetic.

Does a recognition of the nature of the aesthetic, then, bring us inevitably back to the idea of the ineffability of literature? If this were so it would certainly account for the notion of the critical process as itself not open to analysis, as what Plato would have called an areté, something that can be learnt by experience but the principles of which cannot be communicated. This belief has been expressed by several critics. Thus Arnold, for example, having given a collection of lines from Homer, Dante, Shakespeare, and Milton, writes;

If we are thoroughly penetrated by their power, we shall find that we have acquired a sense enabling us, whatever poetry may be laid before us, to feel the degree in which a high poetical quality is present or wanting there. Critics give themselves great labour to draw out what in the abstract constitutes the characters of a high quality of poetry. It is much better simply to have recourse to concrete examples; - to take specimens of poetry of the high, the very highest quality, and to say: The characters of a high quality of poetry are what is expressed there...But if we are asked to define this mark and accent of great poetry in the abstract, our answer must be: No, for we should thereby be darkening the question, not clearing it. The mark and accent are as given by the substance and matter of that poetry, by the style and manner of that poetry, and all other poetry which is akin to it in quality.

Poe too, in his 'The Poetic Principle' seeks to convey his 'conception' of this principle by quoting a collection of poems which he believes demonstrate it. 'Even the most accomplished of critics', writes Eliot, 'can, in the end, only point to the poetry which seems to him to be the real thing.'

What then of discernment? Of the reconstruction of reading? Here is an impasse. Reference to experience does not help; memory tells one that this or that piece of criticism encouraged one to read, or reread, or 'illuminated', that work, but on returning to the criticism in question one finds that it rarely achieved this by 'critical' means, that is, by statements about the work consistent with its being a literary work. Thus, for example, it has been, strangely enough, historical criticism, or perhaps it would be better to say, literary history, which has most often
served, for me, the ends that are traditionally proposed for criticism. This fact has much puzzled me, for such historically orientated studies, as I have written elsewhere, cannot be identified with literary criticism as a discipline in itself. But I believe the solution to this puzzle may lie in the fact that an historical study, in telling me about a work while placing it in a strange and exotic context (its period), foreshadows the experience of reading, in that it makes the work seem at once strange, exotic, uncanny, an adventure that is ultimately intelligible only in terms of a leap of sensibility. Strictly literary criticism, on the other hand, appropriates the work, for if it can be mediated in this way for me then it is part of the 'new', amenable to what I already know, and therefore uninteresting. This is a paradox to which there seems no solution. For when you read, inspired by criticism, you read to confirm or confute, to explore other avenues of the present, the all-too-narrow present, and this is no adventure. Perhaps, then, the most criticism can hope to do is to replace, by whatever means, the puzzled or indifferent distance with a more enticing one, to prompt curiosity, to encourage the reader to pay attention. This distance must remain, however, an absolute distance, a distance I can only bridge imaginatively. Thus when I read about Seneca's career under Nero I am placed at an intriguing distance; when I read of Eliot 'dining at his club' I am simply estranged. Perhaps I could say, then, that this distance is itself an aesthetic one, in that its truth does not matter.

Since poetry, or literariness, depends on that moment when we entertain the existence of a desirable impossibility, and on letting that moment pass as what it is, on metaphysicality, we can, in one sense, speak of destroying it by analysis. For in directly addressing what is said, in seeking to halt the moment and examine it, we take away all that poetry consists of. The individual work, or the moment can reconstitute itself, the reader may gather up its pieces, and it may thus become again, even for the critic, simply the poetical moment. But is this direct address, the address of analysis, anti-literary and therefore uncritical? It is true that it can concern itself with the literariness of literature, but at the same time it will not answer the traditional end of criticism as the 'handmaid of the Muse', as seconding art. Perhaps, then, it is best not to address the poetical directly, with analysis, but rather to approach it obliquely, to illuminate rather than dismantle, to recall the
moment rather than record its passing; to talk of literature in terms derived from its own essential nature, to be poetical about poetry. It may be so.

Telling the truth about a work is something quite different from being truthful about a work - in the sense that discernment and particular analysis aim at truthfulness, aim at being truthful accounts. There is another 'moment' in the history of criticism, or poetics, which, like the echoes of De Quincey's definition of rhetoric in his description of the 'literature of power', appears to me as especially revelatory. It is J.Middleton Murray, in, aptly enough, an essay on metaphor;

Probably the world of true imagination of which these miracles are the common substance is for ever inviolable by intellectual analysis. Even to apprehend its subject-matter the intellect must suffer a sea-change, so that it is no longer itself and cannot perform its proper function. Restore its power to the intellect again, and that which it seeks to understand has ceased to exist as what it really is.175

I am not suggesting that the interpretation of literature is impossible, not in the sense, at least, in which those writers against interpretation such as Hegel or Poulet, imply that it is impossible. Rather I am suggesting that the perfection of those 'methodical', 'analytical' approaches to literature which constitute criticism as a discipline, can only result in the bypassing of what is essentially literary about literature. Such criticism is merely an attempt to square the circle. In contrast, discussion of a work that is truly aesthetic, that is, criticism made up of statements about the work consistent with its being a work must, so to speak, abandon geometry. Why, then, have I spent so many pages arguing for rationality in criticism? Because the irrational, illogical, elements of criticism I have addressed - the reference to 'realism' as a standard for literature, the separation of form and content, the notion of literature as a matter of knowledge, the idea of value-free criticism - are all attempts to make the experience of literature something other than it is, are all a reductio ad rationem of the aesthetic, a 'de-aestheticizing' of the aesthetic.
In Chapter 3 I argued that if literature was to be meaningful it must be amenable to paraphrase but that it is not paraphrasable as literature. I have rejected the idea of the ineffability of literature here for the same reason. (We do not, of course, have any qualms about making explicit what is implicit in works we dislike - they are 'failures of art'.) The notion of transcendence always involves, we might say 'exists for the sake of', positing a distance - the distance between that which transcends and that which is transcended - as a value. But we might equally say that literature, as a use of language, does not 'come up to' that, the world, which it has so often been said to surpass, to transcend. All transcendence, since there are no two sides to language, is this - a 'falling short' that produces the illusion of meaning I have called 'significance'. The 'restored intellect' thus always finds that the aesthetic 'has ceased to exist as what it really is.'. The great difficulty here, particularly as we are so accustomed to the emotional charge of the idea of transcendence, is not to allow this statement of relative position to become a statement of comparative value. The aesthetic, while it may be the antithesis of reality, is not the antithesis of life; rather it is a form of life.

That the aesthetic is what we wish to be ineffable is a truth which everyone who, starting from a love of literature, has gone on to 'do' literature, will have discovered; the aesthetic apprehension of literature, that is, the apprehension of its imaginative suggestion, which we begin with, is the truest apprehension of the aesthetic we will ever have - critical knowledge serves, in the main, only to erase it. In this sense, all the various problems I have addressed in this thesis are the same problem - how to preserve intact, within literary theory, the aesthetic nature of literature, how to define the text as a literary work. When criticism does prove useful, in an aesthetic way, it does so, I believe, either by accident - by creating an intrigue in connection with the work - or through its suggestiveness, that is, through allowing us to re-experience some dominant aesthetic quality in the work simply by giving voice to it. Such suggestive criticism would be Eliot's description of Donne feeling thought 'as immediately as the odour of a rose', or Renard describing Mallarme as 'untranslatable, even into French'. Such stray phrases are, I believe, genuinely aesthetic criticism. (Perhaps the ambiguity of that last sentence should be left intact?) But the creation
of such phrases could hardly constitute an academic discipline. What, then, of the discipline of criticism? Occult criticism (aspectival, thematic, psychoanalytical, and so on) is worse than useless from an aesthetic point of view, because the race for ingenuity which it depends upon is fundamentally anti-aesthetic. 'Particular criticism' (that which relies on what I have called 'discernment') and literary history are useful as mental disciplines, in the way that all mental disciplines are, and do give a knowledge of literature in itself. From the point of view of aesthetic criticism, of 'saying the aesthetic', they lay the ground, create an intimacy with literature in which such 'saying' may take place. However, with regard to the essential nature of the literary all interpretation, all 'talk about books', is a form of displacement activity - something we do in the face of that which seems to demand we do something while forbidding us to do anything.
APPENDIX

Formalism
By 'formalism' I here mean any approach to the work which is primarily interested in what it discerns as the formal properties or structure of the work. In the history of aesthetics in general such an approach, more often associated with the visual arts, has usually been part of an attempt to systematize the aesthetic itself, and thereby bring a certain scientificness to its study. The more contemporary formalistic approach to literature, represented here by Todorov, Barthes, and Jakobson, that I want now to consider is not primarily concerned with measuring the beautiful, but the scientific aspiration is still explicit; Todorov, for example, writes that 'the structural analysis of literature is nothing other than an attempt to transform literary studies into a scientific discipline...a coherent body of concepts and methods aiming at the knowledge of underlying laws.' Barthes, too, considers that the 'text', at the same time as it is 'a critical value' is also 'a scientific (or at the very least, epistemological) concept', and he is concerned to show that discourse has its 'units, its rules, its grammar', that a discourse is, indeed, 'a long "sentence"' and the proper object of a 'second linguistics', just as the sentence is itself the object of existing linguistics. It is, then, the discernment of the language (langue) of which each narrative is an 'utterance' (parole), that is Barthes' aim. Jakobson proposes a similar project; 'the history of literature (art), being simultaneous with other historical series, is characterized, as is each of those series, by a complex network of specific structural laws. Without an elucidation of these laws it is impossible to establish in a scientific manner the correlation between the literary series and other historical series.' Jakobson, therefore, holds that 'the essential literary-critical question' is the 'individuality and comparative characteristics of poems, poets, and poetic schools', and, like Barthes, believes that this is a question that 'can and should be posed in the realm of grammar.' In an essay by Jakobson, such as that on Yeats' 'Sorrow of Love', there is much detailed talk of -ing-forms, nouns, prenominal and post positive attributes, pronouns, adverbs, articles, connectives, finite verbs, sound, predication, and the coordination and subordination of clauses; but what, one might ask, does 'Doomed like Odysseus' mean, what is its effect? He concludes an essay on two poems by Pushkin by writing that, despite 'their differences, both "I loved you"
"What is there for you in my name?" (Cito u ime!
"Ja v liubil") and "What is there for you in my name?" (Cito u ime!
"Ja v liubil") and "What is there for you in my name?" (Cito u ime!
"Ja v liubil") and "What is there for you in my name?" (Cito u ime!
"Ja v liubil") and "What is there for you in my name?" (Cito u ime!
"Ja v liubil") and "What is there for you in my name?" (Cito u ime!
poet, and that from the proper dispositions of single sounds results that harmony that adds force to reason and gives grace to sublimity, that shackles attention and governs passion:' an observation that the critic should take to heart, for the way in which the work 'shackles attention and governs passion', that is, the rhetoric of the work, is the province of the critic.\textsuperscript{12} This does not entail, however, that the critical work should be an inventory of metre and phonetics, for while I agree completely that, in the unfortunate phrase of the school Jakobson epitomizes, the 'proper decoding' of the work depends upon a consideration of the minutiae of its structure, and that this is an end in itself for the linguistic essay, which has as its final goal a comprehensive theory, it is only the groundwork for the critic, who is principally interested in the individuality of the work. Moreover it is a groundwork which need not necessarily appear at all in the critical essay. If everything one wants to say can be traced back to the words of the work why then produce evidence of this, why not simply assume the connection? One addresses readers, after all. Rather as I.A.Richards does in his \textit{Principles of Literary Criticism}, the formalist or structuralist approach begins 'too far back' for its methods to be of any direct use in discussing the finer nuances of literary effect, and thus, in an essay which attempts to combine the two disciplines, the final impression is often of a small insight squeezed out of a heap of technicalities; an insight, moreover, which might have been obtained with much less trouble to the reader.\textsuperscript{13}

It is not, then, so much a matter of what is to be looked at, as of what is to be talked about, for linguistics is to criticism what forestry is to piano-playing. In Chapter 4, 5, and 6 I will be much concerned with literature as rhetoric and criticism as the analysis of rhetoric but here, in discussing formalism, it will be well for me to explain why I would distinguish my approach from a formalist one. Barthes, in the essay mentioned above, specifically states that the 'linguistics of discourse' he proposes once bore the name of 'Rhetoric', and in an essay written in the same year, called 'Rhetorical Analysis', declares that it is rhetoric that makes 'a verbal message a work of art'.\textsuperscript{14} He goes on to describe how the 'sign' of the text is formed by the 'function' of expression, the 'signifiers', and content, the 'signifieds'; a distinction the usefulness of which he appears about to renounce when he declares that literature is a 'connotative semiotics' since the signifier 'may' contain a signified that
'is different from the signifieds of the language', as, for example, *Faites avancer les commodités de la conversation* ('Bring forward the comforts of conversation') which signifies both an instruction and 'preciosity'.15 Though he concludes that literature is, therefore, 'specifically a message which puts emphasis on itself.', his primary interest is in its rhetoric (again it is made to sound as though it is something the work has!), in the construction of 'a general system of sub-codes, each of which is defined in a certain state of society by its differences, its distances, and its identities with regard to its neighbours', that is, a 'sociology of forms of classification' - a project that is strangely reminiscent of Taine's.16 Even at this stage in the argument, if the crudity of the Saussuerian model, and the erroneous belief that all rhetoric is both 'given' and literature, could be overlooked, there appears no a priori reason why such a project might not be in harmony with, or, indeed, be the distant goal of, a literary criticism which concerned itself primarily with affect and the production of affect; but in the final paragraph Barthes asserts that 'the formal nature of the object [rhetorical analysis] seeks to study (the literary message) obliges us to describe in an immanent and exhaustive fashion the rhetorical code (or codes) before setting this code (or these codes) in relation with the society and history which produce them and consume them.' - and this, it seems to me, purely as a matter of logistics, cannot be commensurate with literary criticism as a subject distinct from linguistics.17 In his 'Introduction to the Structural Analysis of Narratives' Barthes writes that 'meaning must be the criterion of the unit : it is the functional nature of certain segments of the story that makes them units - hence the name "functions" immediately attributed to these first units.', but does not appear to realize that there is no such thing as a non-functional unit in literature for a 'functional' unit to exist in contrast to, nor that to talk of significance only at an elementary level is to ignore the significance of the work as a whole, for to work from such units 'upwards' in an exhaustive fashion in never to arrive at the work per se.18 Auerbach, in his *Mimesis*, moves from close stylistic analysis to considerations of genre and effect that are very broad indeed, but he does so in leaps and bounds; one realizes very quickly that he is in fact working 'downwards', that is, justifying to himself, and, more often than not, to the reader, his overall impression of the work in question.19
If what balance of stylistic or formal 'criticism' and affective or impressionistic criticism any theoretical piece is advocating is difficult to decide until its author begins to apply its principles, how am I here to distinguish my own approach from that of the 'formalists' described above? By the following anecdote from Addison about a pedant;

Upon enquiry I found my learned friend had dined that day with Mr. Swan, the famous punster; and desiring him to give me some account of Mr. Swan’s conversation, he told me that he generally talked in the Paranomasia, that he sometimes gave in to the Plocé, but that in his humble opinion he shone most in the Antanaclasis. The formalist would, theoretically, be quite satisfied by this answer though they would probably prefer to also have the relevant proportions and the order of the figures. This is not disparagement - the rhetoricians interest is rhetoric. Jakobson or Barthes would eventually use this data to decide what class or group Mr. Swan belonged to and to advance more general propositions about this class or group, but the answer, even as it stands, would certainly be useful to them. A much wider variety of interlocutors, representing a variety of critical approaches, would find this answer totally inadequate. The reader, that is, the person who is asking because they are thinking about buying the book, or inviting Mr. Swan to dinner, would want to know what he said, or what he was like. My analogy should not be taken as meaning that Mr. Swan stands for 'the author'; Mr. Swan, on the contrary, is, to all purposes, the work, for the learned friend can speak with certainty about nothing other than his experience of Mr. Swan. The psychoanalytical critic, of all potential critics other than the formalist, might be most interested in knowing that Mr. Swan used the Paranomasia, Plocé, and Antanaclasis, for it may be that such figures, whatever their 'content', follow and reveal the springs and levers of buried neuroses and psychoses, that is, that they are the psychological content of the text. For most, however, even if they were familiar with the specialized vocabulary of rhetoric, such an answer would seem inadequate, though not irrelevant, because it would not be sufficient information to form a distinct impression of Mr. Swan’s conversation. My own approach could be characterized by the following two questions - 'What was it (the meeting) like?' or 'What was he (the work)
like?', and 'What made you think that?'. 'Like' is, as emerged in Chapter 1, a word of vague though subtle use, but if, at this stage, you imagine what sort of information either form of the first question would normally elicit, and what information about a work would be analogous to it, then a clear picture begins to emerge. This is, however, something I will return to. The second of these questions is, in fact, a request for the sort of information, though a little more detailed, that the learned friend gives, and if a critique is to be a critique, and not just a bald statement of opinion, then such information must be an integral part of it.
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2. Ibid., p. 323.

3. Ibid., p. 338.

4. In conversation they should always appear in this last light, for here they seem to demand that they should be followed by reverential silence and they therefore break the rules of spontaneity, free-exchange, and self-expression which belong to conversation.

5. Francis Bacon 'Of Studies', Essays (1625), many editions.


9. Ibid., p. 61, (1457").

10. In Twining's translation our first example is rendered as 'Secure in yonder port my vessel stands' and the explanation as 'For to be at anchor is one species of standing or being fixed.' This strikes me as more clearly metaphorical than the rendering in Dorsch's translation, though which is more true to the original Greek I cannot say.

11. Aristotle Poetics, ch. 21, p. 61, (1457").

12. Ibid., p. 61, (1457")

14. 'Analogy or proportion is an extra quality which all metaphors contain, more or less obviously...Aristotle is not very perceptive in making metaphor by analogy into a separate category since analogy applies to all metaphors.' Christine Brooke-Rose A Grammar of Metaphor (London, 1958), pp. 4, 206. (She also mistakenly asserts that he abandons the distinction in the Rhetoric.)

15. Aristotle Rhetorica, 1407a. Roberts comments on this passage, in the index, that Aristotle's analogical or proportional metaphor is 'metaphor in its modern sense'. This remains to be seen.


17. Aristotle Rhetorica, 1405a. The distinction between 'kindred' and 'similar' will occur again.

18. For instance, though I cannot see the resemblance, which others can, between any particular baby and any particular adult, I have no doubt that, with the aid of careful measurement, its existence could be demonstrated to me. I would still hesitate, however, to call it a likeness.


20. The second example is the first sentence of James Joyce's 'The Dead'.


22. Ibid., p. 89.


27. Richards Philosophy of Rhetoric, p. 94.


29. Ibid., p. 94.

30. Max Black 'Metaphor', Models and Metaphors: Studies in Language and Philosophy (New York, 1962), pp. 25-47, (p. 38). See also Wimsatt and Beardsley; 'in understanding the imaginative metaphor we are often reduced to consider not how A (vehicle) explains B (tenor), but what meanings are generated when A and B are confronted or seen each in the light of the other.' W.K.Wimsatt and Monroe C.Beardsley The Verbal Icon: Studies in the Meaning of Poetry (Kentucky, 1954), p. 127. Also Levin; 'the meanings P and Q fuse into a whole...yet preserving their relative independence; this results in a fluctuation of perception between P and Q in which each meaning as it filters through the other'. Yu.I.Levin The Logic of Metaphor' (1969) translated by Christopher English in Russian Poetics in Translation, vol. 2, Poetry and Prose (Oxford, 1976), pp. 5-21, (p. 7).

31. Black 'Metaphor', pp. 38-39. This 'interactive' view is anticipated in Schleiermacher's description of metaphor: 'Upon closer scrutiny this distinction [between between the literal and the figurative] disappears. In similes two parallel series of thoughts are connected. Each word stands in its own series and should be determined only in those terms. Therefore, it retains its own meaning. In metaphors this connection is only suggested, and often only a single aspect of the concept is emphasized. For example...we speak of the lion as the king of the animals. But a lion does not govern, and kings are not entitled to devour others on the principle that "might makes right." Such a single usage of the word has no meaning, and usually the entire phrase must be given.' F.D.E.Schleiermacher Compendium of 1819 (1819, 1828) in Hermeneutics: The Handwritten Manuscripts by F.D.E.Schleiermacher, edited by Heinz Kimmerle, (1958), translation of second edition (1974) by James Duke and Jack Forstman, (Missoula, 1977), XIV.8.

32. Ibid., p. 39.


34. Richards Meaning of Meaning, p. 213.


39. Interestingly, to use the seasons metaphorically to apply to the progress of life is, despite the contrast spoken of, to cast life in a more optimistic light than some alternative might—the seasons are, or at least appear, immortal. ‘Everything in Nature, by our strange inclination to Resemblance, shall be brought to represent other things, even the most remote, especially the Passions and Circumstances of human Nature in which we are more nearly concern’d.’ Francis Hutcheson An Enquiry into the Original of our Ideas of Beauty and Virtue (1725), third edition, (London, 1729), IV, iv.


41. ‘Elegy 19: To his Mistress Going to Bed’, l. 27.


43. Black ‘Metaphor’, p. 40. Guibert de Nogent makes the same point with regard to biblical interpretation: ‘As I have already shown, [the writer] can show examples from other scriptural texts; and if no such examples are available, he uses his reason: through consideration of the nature of whatever symbol he is treating he can find the appropriate allegorical or moral meaning. For example, if the text speaks of precious stones, of birds, of beasts, or of anything to be taken figuratively, there is always a connection to be drawn based on the natural qualities; and even if this is not clearly stated anywhere in the Scriptures, still an examination of the nature of the thing will certainly reveal it.’ A Book about the Way a Sermon Ought to be Given (c.1100), translated by Joseph M. Miller in Joseph M. Miller, Michael H. Prosser and Thomas V. Benson (eds.) Readings in Medieval Rhetoric (London, 1973), pp. 162-181, (p. 177).


45. Ibid., p. 46.

46. Ibid., p. 41. ‘Metaphorical statement is not a substitute for formal comparison or any other kind of literal statement, but has its own distinctive capacities and achievements...It would be more illuminating in some of these cases to say that metaphor creates the similarity than to say that it formulates some similarity antecedently existing.’ p. 37. Metaphor demands ‘simultaneous awareness of both subjects’ but is ‘not
reducible to any comparison between the two.' p. 46. Black is perhaps being overzealous in defining 'interaction'.

47. Ibid., p. 41.


49. Ibid., p. 73. Also 'a set of terms, of alternative labels, is transported; and the organization they effect in the alien realm is guided by their habitual use in the home realm.' p. 74. A similar point is made by Edward Stankiewicz, who states that metaphor and metonymy are produced by 'transpositions between semantic domains....Both have the function of introducing multiple semantic dimensions.' 'Linguistics and the Study of Poetical Language' in Thomas A. Sebeok (ed.) Style in Language (London, 1960), pp. 69-81, (p. 72). Geoffrey of Vinsauf expresses it more poetically: 'In order, then, that your theme may assume a rich costume, if the expression is old, be a physician and make the old veteran a new man. Do not always allow a word to rest in its usual place; such monotonous lodging is a shame to the word itself; let it avoid its usual haunts, and wander elsewhere and build a pleasing abode on another's site; let it be there a novel guest and give pleasure by reason of its novelty. If you mix this antidote, you will make the face of a word grow young....See, here, what I mean: In strictly correct speech one says "yellow gold," "white milk," "scarlet rose," "sweet-flowing honey," "fiery flames," "white mass of snow." Say therefore: "snowy teeth," "flaming lips," "honied taste," "rosy face," "milky forehead," "golden hair." Well suited to each other are: "teeth" and "snow"; "lips" and "flames"; "taste" and "honey"; "face" and "rose"; "forehead" and "milk"; and "hair" and "gold."' The New Poetics (c.1210), translated by Jane Baltzell Kopp, in James J. Murphy (ed.) Three Medieval Rhetorical Arts (London, 1971), pp. 27-108, (pp. 60-61).

50. Goodman describes it as a 'calculated category-mistake'. Languages of Art, p. 73.

51. Richards (Meaning of Meaning, p. 213. For this reason Schleiermacher writes that words that are common to both spatial and temporal vocabularies are in neither case metaphorical: 'The two meanings are essentially the same because we can determine space only by reference to time, and vice versa. Terms for form and movement are also interchangeable, and so a "creeping plant" is not a figurative expression.' Compendium of 1819, XV.

52. 'Thus the model of wolves may seem a good one if just part of the vocabulary needed in fully describing wolves can be translated into part of the vocabulary suitable in describing men, and if just these truths regarding wolves pass into truths about men which can be expressed by means of this partial vocabulary.' Rolfe Eberle 'Models, Metaphors, and


55. Eco *Semiotics and the Philosophy of Language*, p. 115.

56. Ibid., p. 116.

57. Ibid., p. 116.

58. 'A picture naturally leads our thoughts to the original: the mention of one apartment in a building naturally introduces an enquiry or discourse concerning the others: and if we think of a wound, we can scarcely forbear reflecting on the pain which follows it.' Hume *Enquiries*, p. 24.

59. Eco *Semiotics and the Philosophy of Language*, p. 117.

60. Ibid., 81. 'A given expression can be interpreted as many times, and in as many ways, as it has been actually interpreted in a given cultural framework; it is infinite because every discourse about the encyclopedia casts in doubt the previous structure of the encyclopedia itself.' p. 83.

61. Ibid., p. 68.

62. Ibid., pp. 129, 127. As for example in such cases as 'leg of the table'.

63. Aristotle *Rhetorica*, 1405b.

64. Eco *Semiotics and the Philosophy of Language*, p. 118.

65. Ibid., p. 119.

66. Ibid., p. 119.

67. Ibid., p. 120.

68. Eberle 'Models, Metaphors, and Formal Interpretations', pp. 228-29. See also Paul Henle; 'the aptness of metaphor depends on the capability of elaborating it - of extending the parallel structure.' *Metaphor* in Paul Henle (ed.) *Language, Thought and Culture* (Ann Arbor, Michigan, 1958), pp. 173-195, (p. 180). Dan R. Swanson suggests that 'the pleasure and power of

69. The examples of kennings are from G.W.Turner Stylistics (Harmondsworth, 1973), pp. 131-32. Turner uses them to illustrate his own discussion of metaphor.

70. Both Black and Eco are aware of this but do not expand on the point. See Black's 'Metaphor', p. 46, and Eco's Semiotics and the Philosophy of Language, pp. 124-25.


74. Nowottny Language Poets Use, pp. 81, 83. See also Wayne C.Booth; 'What any metaphor says or means or does will always be to some degree alterable by altering its context.' 'Metaphor as Rhetoric : The Problem of Evaluation' in Sacks On Metaphor, pp. 57-70, (p. 173).


77. I have deliberately left out the personal as a potential context here, since it will become more important later.

78. 'Now, no discourse can claim to be free of presuppositions for the simple reason that the conceptual operation by which a region of thought is thematized brings operative concepts into play, which cannot themselves be thematized at the same time.' Paul Ricoeur The Rule of Metaphor : Multi-disciplinary studies in the creation of meaning in language (1975), translated by Robert Czerny, (London, 1978), p. 257. This is not meant to be a negative appraisal of such a procedure per se; for
while I consider it undesirable in literary criticism, it is inescapable in literary scholarship.


81. Eco Semiotics and the Philosophy of Language, p. 89.

82. Aristotle Rhetorica, 1412a.


85. Hymes in Sebeok Style in Language, p. 101. His example is 'The night fears the boy'.

86. Aristotle Rhetorica, 1413a. The situation referred to is somewhat analogous to the introduction of rabbits into Australia. Aristotle refers to this as a metaphor from species to species, and the difficulty of deciding whether it is 'the same experience' is perhaps the clue to Aristotle's distinction.

87. C.W.Emmet 'Parable in the Old Testament' in James Hastings (ed.) Dictionary of the Bible (Edinburgh, 1909), pp. 678-78. (Emmet's distinction between 'parable', 'fable', and 'allegory' is not relevant to this discussion.


89. St. Thomas Aquinas Theological Texts, selected and translated by Thomas Gilby, (London, 1955), § 28. (Originally Quodlibets vi, 14, c. & ad 1-4; 15, c & ad 1; 16c.)

90. Ibid., § 33. (Originally Summa Theologica 1a, i, 10, ad 3.) Could we even say that he 'literally' wields power? The 'Doctrine of Analogy' which Aquinas is more specifically associated with will be discussed later.

91. Augustine[City of God, Bk. XIII, ch. 22, p. 534.

92. Ibid., p. 535.
93. Ibid., Bk. XVI, ch. 3, p. 652.

94. Ibid., Bk. XV, ch. 26, pp. 643-44.


96. It must however be rivalled today, though not with regard to a single text, by the literature of psychoanalysis.


99. Aristotle Poetics, ch. 21, p. 61, (1457a).

100. Percy Bysshe Shelley 'A Defence of Poetry' (1821) in The Prose Works of Percy Bysshe Shelley, edited by Richard Herene Shepherd, 2 vols., (London, 1906), I, pp. 1-38, (p. 4). Emerson expresses the same idea; 'The etymologist finds the deadest word to have been once a brilliant picture. Language is fossil poetry. As the limestone of the continent consists of infinite masses of the shells of animalcules, so language is made up of images or tropes, which now, in their secondary use, have long ceased to remind us of their poetic origin.' Ralph Waldo Emerson 'The Poet' in Essays: Second Series (1844), The Collected Works of Ralph Waldo Emerson: Volume III, edited by Alfred R. Ferguson and Jean Ferguson Carr, (London, 1983), pp. 133-145, (p. 13). This idea has interesting parallels with Nietzsche's 'On Truth and Lies in a Nonmoral Sense' (1873) which will be discussed later.


102. Langer Philosophy in a New Key, pp. 147, 141.


104. Ibid., pp. 73-74.

105. Ibid., pp. 70-71. 'Transfer can be determined...by the most varied associations, and if it has occurred in the remote past, it is impossible to reconstruct the connections without knowing exactly the historical background of the event.' pp. 74-75.
106. Demetrius On Style, translated by T.A. Moxon in Moxon Aristotle's Poetics, Demetrius on Style and Other Classical Writings on Criticism, pp. 197-268, (§ 86, p. 222). His examples are 'silvery voice', 'keen man', 'rough nature', and 'lengthy orator'.

107. Langer Philosophy in a New Key, p. 139.

108. Goodman Languages of Art, p. 80.

109. Wimsatt and Beardsley The Verbal Icon, p. 128.


111. It is useful to imagine the possible effects of Charles I in, for instance, an historical drama, using our first example.


113. One might also consider 'not enough room to swing a cat' which, rather than suggesting what is probably its more immediate origin in 'cat-o'-nine-tails' more readily suggests, for historical reasons, the original root of the name for the whip, that is, a member of the genus Felis.


117. Aristotle Rhetorica, 1411b.

118. Joseph Addison The Spectator No. 421, 3 July, 1712.


121. Ibid., p. 142. Hence the two terms in the title.

122. Ibid., pp. 143-44.

123. Ibid., p. 140.
124. Ibid., p. 141.

125. Ibid., p. 145.

126. Ibid., pp. 146-47.

127. Whether they are the addition of the carver or the original observer, or if they entered in at some intermediate stage between the two, is not material to the argument.

128. This presumes the pupil understands the conventions of representation, that is, that the word 'elephant' does not refer to the size, colour, woodenness, and so on, of the carving.

129. This example owes an obvious debt to Wittgenstein, whose later philosophy arguably proceeds almost exclusively by means of such suggestive metaphor.

130. 'The home realm of the schema is the country of naturalization rather than of birth', writes Goodman, for 'what is literal is set by present practice rather than by ancient history.' Languages of Art, p. 77.

131. Lewis 'Bluspels and Flalansferes', pp. 151-52.

132. Ibid., p. 154.

133. Ibid., p. 151.

134. Ibid., p. 155.

135. See note 8.


137. Metaphor 'requires attraction as well as resistance - indeed, an attraction that overcomes resistance.' Goodman Languages of Art, pp. 69-70.

138. 'Application of a term is metaphorical only if to some extent contra-indicated.' Ibid., p. 69.

139. Demetrius On Style, 86, p. 222.

140. Ibid., 87, p. 222. A similar view is taken by Bede; 'Catachresis] differs from metaphor in that metaphor bestows another name to an object which already has a name; catachresis makes use of another name because the object lacks a specific name.' The Venerable Bede Concerning Figures and Tropes (c.700), translated by Gussie Hecht Tannenhaus, in Joseph M. Miller et al (eds.) Readings in Medieval Rhetoric, pp. 96-122, (p. 108).
This distinction relies on the, untenable, view that metaphor is always a substitution.


142. 'We could not "cross kinds" to advantage were such crossings the usual things - for then we could neither call it crossing nor would we have kinds to cross.' David Burrell Analogy and Philosophical Language (London, 1973), p. 221.


144. 'The mind will always try to find connections and will be guided in its search by the rest of the utterance and its occasion....Words are the occasion and means of that growth which is the minds endless endeavour to order itself.' Richards Philosophy of Rhetoric, pp. 126, 131.

145. Some of the classic psychological experiments in concept formation and language acquisition have been based on such a procedure. See, for example, Edna Heidbreder 'The attainment of concepts : Terminology and methodology' Journal of General Psychology, 1946, 35, pp. 173-189. J.Berko 'The child's learning of English morphology' Word, 1958, 14, pp. 150-177.

146. 'Metaphor, or something like it, governs both the growth of language and our acquisition of it.' W.V.Quine 'A Postscript on Metaphor' in Sacks On Metaphor, pp. 159-160, (p. 160). Richards Philosophy of Rhetoric, p. 92.


149. As Langer writes, 'the context, seen or stated, modifies the word and determines just what it means.' Philosophy in a New Key, p. 139.

150. Aristotle Poetics, ch. 22, p. 63, (1458a). There are certain texts, those for example of Heidegger and Derrida, which have very much the appearance of riddles to me, simply because of the density of metaphors and the reliance of the sense on them.
151. Leech, starting from a similar conception, comes to the conclusion that the 'linguistic basis of metaphor' is a 'juxtaposition of semantic incompatibles'. G.N. Leech 'Linguistics and the Figure of Rhetoric' in Roger Fowler (ed.) Essays on Style and Language: Linguistic and Critical Approaches to Literary Style (London, 1966), PP. 135-156, (p. 150). However, if the terms are simply semantically incompatible then the expression is meaningless and what we have is nonsense, not metaphor.

152. Quine 'A Postscript on Metaphor', p. 160.


156. While an analogy can suggest a conclusion it cannot, of course, establish one.


159. Ibid., p. 64.

160. Ibid., p. 64.


162. Ibid., ch. IV, p. 18.


164. Ibid., p. 81.

165. Ibid., p. 82.

166. Ibid., pp. 83, 84.

167. Ibid., p. 84.

168. Ibid., pp. 84, 85.

169. Ibid., p. 81.

170. Ibid., p. 79.
171. How we might characterize, and what terms we might use to
designate, a figure which only appears to be a metaphor is something I
shall take up again at the end of this chapter.

172. Nietzsche 'The Philosopher : Reflections on the Struggle Between Art
and Knowledge' (1872) in Philosophy and Truth, pp. 1-58, (§ 79).


174. Locke quoted in Paul de Man 'The Epistemology of Metaphor' in Sacks
On Metaphor, pp. 11-28, (p. 15).

175. Ibid., p. 15. Does 'motion' require this sort of definition?


177. Ibid., p. 12.

178. De Man's choice is an odd one for Locke demonstrates an unusual
interest in linguistic questions for a seventeenth-century philosopher. In
the chapter before the one which de Man quotes there is a remark very
reminiscent of J.L.Austin: 'The ordinary words of language, and our
common use of them, would have given us light into the nature of our
ideas, if they had been but considered with attention.' John Locke An
Essay Concerning Human Understanding (Abridgement of the 1700 edition),
Compare; 'It is impossible to speak clearly and distinctly of our
knowledge, which all consists in propositions, without considering, first,
the nature, use, and signification of language'. Bk. II, ch. XXXIII, 19, p.
200. See also Bk. IV, ch. XXI, 4.


180. Harries makes this point in her distinction between philosophical
and literary metaphors; 'The metaphors of philosophy should thus be
contingent and questionable. They invite paraphrase and interpretation
that has as its goal the recognition that a particular metaphor is
dispensable. Poetic metaphor, too, invites interpretation. But here
interpretation does not have as its goal the recognition of the
metaphor's contingency but rather its necessity. The Poet's incarnation of
meaning forbids translation and paraphrase.' Karsten Harries 'The Many
Uses of Metaphor' in Sacks On Metaphor, pp. 165-172, (p. 168). I do not
believe, however, that this is a satisfactory account; understanding may
exclude translation and paraphrase but interpretation does not.

linguistics' in Margins of Philosophy (1972), translated by Alan Bass,
(Brighton, 1982), p. 178.

183. Ibid., p. 212.


185. Derrida 'White Mythology', p. 213. One might compare Fenollosa; 'Our ancestors built the accumulations of metaphor into structures of language and into systems of thought....Metaphor, [poetry's] chief device, is at once the substance of nature and of language. Poetry only does consciously what the primitive races did unconsciously....Metaphor was piled upon metaphor in quasi-geological strata....The known interprets the obscure, the universe is alive with myth.' Ernest Fenollosa The Chinese Written Character as a Medium for Poetry (1918), Idiographic Series I, edited by Ezra Pound, (London, 1936), pp. 28, 27.


187. Ibid., pp. 219-220.

188. Ibid., p. 264.

189. We may presume that he does believe in some type of what Russell calls an 'object-language', but not in any meaningful discussion of it. See Bertrand Russell An Enquiry into Meaning and Truth (London, 1940), ch. 4.

190. There is, indeed, a great deal more in Derrida's essay and also a suggestion that he does not conflate new sense with original sense (p. 270) but the main impetus of the essay is in the idea outlined.

191. Derrida does in fact refer to Nietzsche's essay in 'White Mythology'.

192. In this respect he appears to be arguing that the existence of terms in a philosophical context in some way precedes their essence, defining properties, for that context. Such 'existentialist' overtones may not be accidental; 'deconstruction' can be seen as another expression of le gout du néant which has been such a recurrent theme in French intellectual life this century.


194. 'The only fallacy [in the idea of all abstract words originating in concrete metaphors] is the assumption that the attached metaphor must necessarily be the one implied in the etymology of the word....it looks as though abstract words and ideas were on loan, so to speak, from a latent concrete formulation which is to be found, not in the history of the word
used, but in the structure of the argument into which the word is fitted.' Northrop Frye Anatomy of Criticism: Four Essays (Princeton, 1957), p. 336.

195. I have deliberately chosen 'intention', as a problematic concept, one that resists comprehensive definition, for it is its ability to appear within contexts to which, despite its ambiguity, it recognizably belongs, that I want to highlight.

196. In the passage from Austin quoted above, he concludes that 'tampering with words in what we take to be one little corner of the field is always liable to have unforeseen repercussions in the adjoining territory.' Austin Sense and Sensibilia, p. 63.

197. A hypothetical objection which Pap makes to the verifiability principle is relevant here. "How could you find out that the statement was in principle unverifiable unless you understood it? Unless you understood it, you would not be able to conclude that the very supposition of its being either confirmed or disconfirmed by observations contradicts what it asserts." Arthur Pap An Introduction to the Philosophy of Science (Glencoe, 1962), p. 8.

198. (If an etymology sometimes seems revelatory, as for example if we consider 'employ the expression' in the light of 'twine in what is squeezed out', or 'rehearse a question' as 'harrow again a searching', it is because we have in mind two separate concepts whose interaction we find suggestive.) 'In order to find the meaning of a sentence we have to transform it by the introduction of successive definitions until it contains only words that are not further defined, but whose meanings can be given only by direct ostension.' Schlick quoted in Paul Marhenke The Criterion of Significance Proceedings and Addresses of the American Philosophical Association, XXIII (1950), pp. 1-21, (pp. 12-13). As Marhenke points out, this is not a sufficient definition of 'significance' but that is not relevant to the distinction we wish to draw.


201. Bacon The Advancement of Learning, Bk. II, IV, 1, pp. 89-90.


204. Jakobson defines the 'poetic function of language' as the presentation of the message 'for its own sake' and argues that while such an orientation is not confined to poetry it is the defining function of it and only accessory to other verbal activities. See Jakobson 'Linguistics and Poetics', p. 356. This is an account which, as we shall see, has its counterparts in many theoretical writings on literature and which is at best misleading, at worst nonsensical.

205. Leech 'Linguistics and the Figures of Rhetoric', p. 140. 'Deviant' in this context refers to any word or usage the instances of which are statistically low, though metaphor, as we have seen, is the form of linguistic deviance par excellence.


207. Garvin in the introduction to Prague School Reader on Esthetics, p. viii. Like Jakobson, Garvin describes the poetic as what becomes 'the focus of attention for its own sake' p. vii. See Jakobson 'Linguistics and Poetics', p. 356. This is, I believe, an oversimplification.


210. Puns are created on a similar basis but, though metaphor may be involved, it is accidents of sound, rather than analogies in sense which characterize the form.

211. We might remember Aquinas' distinction between the 'literal sense', when things are signalled by words, and the 'spiritual sense', when things are signalled by other things, in scripture.


213. 'The function of metaphor in general is to extend language'. Henle 'Metaphor', p. 186.


216. Ibid., p. 11.

217. Hobbes *Leviathan*, Pt. I, Ch. VIII, p. 34. Locke, echoing Hobbes' division, contrasts 'Judgement' with 'Wit', and goes as far as to say that the processes of judgement are 'quite contrary to metaphor and allusion'. Locke *Essay Concerning Human Understanding*, Bk. II, Ch. XI, 2, p. 60.

218. Alexander Gerard *An Essay on Taste, With Three Dissertations on the Same Subject by Mr. De Voltaire, Mr. D'Alembert, Mr. De Montesquieu* (London, 1759), Pt. III, Sec. II, p. 174.


220. Shelley 'Defence of Poetry', p. 1. 'Reason respects the differences, and imagination the similitudes of things.' p. 1. We might compare Shelley's 'reason' with conceptual thinking, which demonstrates abstraction and analysis, and his 'imagination' with complex thinking, the function of which is to establish bonds and relationships. See Vygotsky *Thought and Language*, p. 76, and the discussion of chain complexes above.


224. Ibid., Ch. 17, p. 127. Ch. 32, p. 141.

225. Ibid., Ch. 32, p. 142. This is implicit in his discussion of the passage from Plato's *Laws*.


227. Ibid., 1410b.

228. Eco *Semiotics and the Philosophy of Language*, p. 100.

229. Langer *Philosophy in a New Key*, p. 149.

230. Lewis 'Bluspels and Flalansferes', p. 137.

234. Ibid., p. 201.
237. Dryden 'Apology for Heroic Poetry', p. 205. The images are from Virgil's Aeneid, 'They storm the city, buried in sleep and wine.' II, 265, and Dryden's State of Innocence, I, i.
239. Demetrius On Style, 82, p. 221.
241. Ibid., p. 45.
242. Ibid., p. 56. With regard to obvious paradox Donne is, of course, a special case, but if we allow that all metaphor does contain some element of rhetorical paradox then Brook's statement does have more general application. Compare; 'metaphor turns its back on ordinary descriptive meaning, and presents a structure which literally is ironic and paradoxical...All poetic imagery seems to be founded on metaphor'. Frye Anatomy of Criticism, pp. 123, 281.
244. Bacon Advancement of Learning, Second Book, IV, 2, p. 81.
245. Herbert Read Collected Essays in Literary Criticism (1938), second edition, (London, 1951), p. 98. 'Metaphor, in fact, for such a poet becomes the normal mode of expression, and I think we should always be prepared to judge a poet, to the exclusion of all other qualities, by the force and originality of his metaphors.' p. 96.
246. Ibid., pp. 98, 100.
247. André Breton First Surrealist Manifesto (1924) translated by Patrick Waldberg in P.Waldberg (ed.) Surrealism (London, 1978), pp. 66-75, (pp. 66, 72). To go into the connection between metaphorical processes and dream symbolism would mean never coming to an end of this essay;
suffice it to say that I believe both metaphor and metonymy to govern the relationship between dreams and the waking-life of the dreamer.

248. 'Exquisite corpse: Game of folded paper played by several people, who compose a sentence or drawing without anyone seeing the preceding collaborations. The now classic example, which gave the game its name, was drawn from the first sentence obtained in this way: The-exquisite-corpse-will-drink-the-new-wine.' André Breton The Exquisite Corpse (1948) in Waldberg Surrealism, pp. 93-95, (pp. 93-94).

249. Ibid., p. 93.

250. Ibid., p. 95. Elsewhere Breton writes; 'I have never experienced intellectual pleasure except on the analogical plane. For me the only evidence in the world is commanded by the spontaneous, extralucid, insolent rapport which establishes itself, under certain conditions, between one thing and another, and which common sense hesitates to confront...The word like is the most exalting at our command when it is pronounced familiarly. Through it human imagination fulfils itself and the highest destiny of the mind comes into play...The first duty of poets and artists is to re-establish analogy in all its prerogatives', André Breton 'Rising Sign' (1947) translated by Stephen Schwartz in What is Surrealism? Selected Writings, edited by Franklin Rosemont, (London, 1978), pp. 280-283, (pp. 280, 282). In the same essay, however, he also writes that 'Poetic analogy differs profoundly from mystical analogy in that it never presupposes, beyond the bounds of the visible world, an invisible universe tending to make itself manifest.' (p. 281).

251. Magritte was a master of the true visual metaphor.

252. Breton First Surrealist Manifesto, p. 66.

253. Joseph Addison Spectator No. 62, Friday, 11 May, 1711. Compare; 'metaphor may arise from the wit of subjective caprice which, to escape from the commonplace, surrenders to a piquant impulse, not satisfied until it has succeeded in finding related traits in the apparently most heterogeneous material and therefore, to our astonishment, combining things that are poles apart from one another.' Hegel Aesthetics, p. 407.

254. Addison Spectator No. 62.


256. D.G.James 'Metaphor and Symbol' in Knights and Cottle Metaphor and Symbol, pp. 95-103, (pp. 98-99). According to Murray 'All metaphor and simile can be described as the analogy by which the human mind explores the universe of quality and charts the non-measurable world....'[The]
predominant passion of the poet's mind is but the counterpart of a predominant quality of the region of the universe which he contemplates. His passion roused by the quality is reflected back upon the quality, and gives it redoubled power; so that it begins to dominate all other qualities and properties, to suffuse them with itself till it becomes as it were the living and governing soul of that which the poet contemplates. By means of his passion the actual realizes its own idea. However much we struggle, we cannot avoid transcendentalism, for we are seeking to approximate to a universe of quality with analogy for its most essential language through a universe of quantity with a language of identities. Sooner or later, and sooner rather than later, a transcendentalism (which is only the name for a prodigious metaphor) is inevitable.' Murray "Metaphor", pp. 9, 14-15.

257. Nowotny/Language Poets Use, p. 86. Elsewhere she explicitly states that she does not consider metaphor to be a 'peephole on the nature of transcendental reality', p. 87. However, any means of rising above an idealism as rigorous as that of her description of consciousness can only be transcendental.


259. Ibid., p. 88.

260. Booth 'Metaphor as Rhetoric', p. 68.


262. Ibid., p. 70.


264. Ibid., p. 133.

265. Ibid., p. 131. The theologian Rudolf Bultmann, outlining his program for 'demythologizing' the New Testament, writes: 'The real purpose of myth is not to present an objective picture of the world as it is, but to express man's understanding of himself in the world in which he lives...Myth speaks of the power or the powers which man supposes he experiences as the ground and limit of his world and of his own activity and suffering. He describes these powers in terms derived from the visible world, with its tangible objects and forces, and from human life, with its feelings, motives and potentialities. He may, for instance, explain the origin of the world by speaking of a world egg or a world tree. Similarly he may account for the present state and order of the world by speaking of a primeval war between the gods. He speaks of the other world in terms of this world, and of the gods in terms derived from human life. Myth is an expression of man's conviction that the
origin and purpose of the world in which he lives are to be sought not within it but beyond it - that is, beyond the realm of known and tangible reality...' Rudolf Bultmann 'New Testament and Mythology' (1943) in Hans Werner Bartsch (ed.) Kerygma and Myth : A Theological Debate (1948), translated by Reginald H.Fuller, (London, 1963), pp. 1-44, (p. 10). 'On Bultmann's definition', comments Ernest Lohmeyer, 'it follows that myth is the language of all religion, the form in which it is expressed, and that to demythologize a religious proclamation of whatever kind is to condemn every religion to silence and therefore to destroy it.' 'The Right Interpretation of the Mythological' (1944) in Bartsch (ed.) Kerygma and Myth (1948), pp. 124-137, (p. 126). Bultmann's reply is the traditional one; religious belief is a matter of faith! (See 'Bultmann Replies to his Critics' (n.d.) in Bartsch (ed.) Kerygma and Myth (1948), pp. 191-211, (pp. 209-211).


269. William Shakespeare The Rape of Lucrece, ll. 764-770.


272. George Herbert Prayer (1).


274. Ibid., p. 183.

275. Ibid., p. 184.

276. Ibid., p. 183.

277. Read Essays in Literary Criticism, p. 100.

278. James 'Metaphor and Symbol', p. 97. Compare; 'The truth values, however, as far as they are - to say with the logicians - "extralinguistic entities", obviously exceed the bounds of poetics and of linguistics in general.' Jakobson 'Linguistics and Poetics', p. 351.

279. James 'Metaphor and Symbol', p. 100.
280. Ibid., pp. 100-101.
283. Aristotle Rhetorica, 1410b.
284. Addison Spectator No. 421.
286. Demetrius On Style, § 80, p. 220.
289. Ibid., p. 30.
292. Goodman Languages of Art, pp. 78-79.
295. Ibid., p. 84.
296. Black 'Metaphor', pp. 46, 49.
297. Ted Cohen discusses the transactional aspect of metaphor in 'Metaphor and the Cultivation of Intimacy' in Sacks On Metaphor, pp. 1-10.
298. Nowottny Language Poets use, p. 75.
299. Ibid., pp. 72-73. We might think here of much of the formalist criticism inspired by contemporary linguistics.
301. See Black 'Metaphor', p. 41. 'When you transsume [by the use of metaphor and simile] your own material, it has more pungency because it derives from what is your own. Such transsumption of language is like a mirror for you, since you see yourself in it and recognize your own sheep in a strange field.' Geoffrey of Vinsauf The New Poetics, p. 62.

302. Percy Bysshe Shelley 'Peter Bell the Third', Pt. III, 1.

303. William Langland The Vision of Piers Plowman (B-Text), Passus II.

304. Samuel Johnson observed in 1739 that 'a Frenchman's genius...snatches every opportunity of talking of love, and misses not the least hint that can serve to guide him to his darling subject.' 'Annotations to Crousaz' Commentary on Pope's Essay on Man' (1739) in The Oxford Authors : Samuel Johnson, edited by Donald Greene, (Oxford, 1984), pp. 84-95, (p. 94).


306. George Campbell 'Introduction' to The Philosophy of Rhetoric (1776) in Scott Elledge (ed.) Eighteenth-Century Critical Essays, 2 vols., (New York, 1961), vol. 2, pp. 932-942, (p. 938). Antonio Minturno, for example, presumes the kinship of poetry and rhetoric in his L'Arte Poetica (1564), and Sir Philip Sidney, in his Apologie for Poetrie (1583), Jacopo Mazzoni, in his Defence of the 'Comedy' of Dante (1587), and Torquato Tasso, in his Discourses on the Heroic Poem (1594), all emphasize the affinity even while arguing for a distinction. See Allan H.Gilbert (ed.) Literary Criticism : Plato to Dyrden (New York, 1940).


308. Demetrius On Style, 79, p. 220. 'It is very important to note that one can establish the validity of a metaphor only in its own application of the comparison; the same sense will not apply if the terms are clumsily turned around.' Flowers of Rhetoric, p. 148.

309. Longinus On the Sublime, Ch. 30, p. 139.


311. Eco Semiotics and the Philosophy of Language, p. 121.

312. Ibid., p. 122.

313. Ibid., p. 121.

314. We might recall how Schopenhauer, among others, declared that only the adult human male is properly a human being, properly 'Man'. Such a controversial reading is not, however, intrinsic to the metaphor. The
gratia sui or 'ornamental' possibility of the metaphor can, however, be forced to the fore by the principal subject through incongruity, as it is in the unconscious irony of Gorky's figure: 'Socialist individuality, as exemplified by our heroes of labour, who represent the flower of the working class...' (emphasis mine) Maxim Gorky 'Soviet Literature' in All-Union Congress of Soviet Writers *Problems of Soviet Literature: Reports and Speeches at the First Soviet Writer's Congress* (1934), edited by H.G. Scott, (London, n.d.), pp. 57–69, (p. 65).

315. Richards makes an interesting connection between the concept of 'transference' in psychoanalysis, and metaphor. 'The victim is unable to see the new person except in terms of the old passion and its accidents. He reads the situation only in terms of the figure, the archetypal image, the vehicle [subsidiary subject].' Richards *Philosophy of Rhetoric*, p. 135.


319. Hegel *Aesthetics*, p. 415. Ortega y Gasset takes this 'escapist' view a step further by associating metaphor with taboo; 'A strange thing, indeed, the existence in man of this mental activity which substitutes one thing for another - from an urge not so much to get at the first as to get rid of the second. The metaphor disposes of an object by having it masquerade as something else. Such a procedure would make no sense if we did not discern beneath it an instinctive avoidance of certain realities.' José Ortega y Gasset 'The Dehumanization of Art' in *The Dehumanization of Art and Notes on the Novel* (1925), translated by Helene Weyl, (Princeton, 1948), pp. 3–54, (p. 33).


321. Demetrius *On Style*, 60, p. 216. Alberic of Monte Cassino, as a firm believer in moral realities, can take both the escapist and revelatory view of metaphor; 'The metaphor is a trope which frequently appears in writing and which contributes a certain apparent dignity. For the method of speaking in metaphors has this characteristic; it turns one's attention from the particular qualities of the object [being described]; somehow, by this distraction of attention, it makes the object seem something different; by making it seem different, it clothes it, so to speak, in a fresh new wedding garment; by so clothing it, it sells us on the idea that there is some new nobility bestowed. And what else can I call it but "selling us," when a man takes a story that it petty in its content and
heightens it by his treatment so as to convince us that it is all new, all delightful?...Here we should add to metaphor a kind of figure which we may call enlightenment; indeed it truly is a beam of light, because it pierces as with a bright ray whatever elements of the metaphor are obscure, it seeks them out, it illumines them....Take an example. The filth and slime of sensuality befoul the life of a man; the mire of unspeakable lust is like grime. For what other name than mud and grime can I give to something that causes the soul to wallow like a pig in its own vices', Flowers of Rhetoric, pp. 146-47.


323. Ibid., p. 92. The use of 'allegory' to cover this range of figures can also be found in medieval writings on rhetoric; Bede, for example, writes that 'Allegory is a trope in which a meaning other than the literal is indicated....This trope has many varieties, of which seven are prominent: irony, antiphrasis, enigma, euphemism, paroemia, sarcasm, and asteismos.' Concerning Figures and Tropes, p. 116.

324. 'By allegory', writes Baumgarten, 'we mean a series of connected metaphors', Alexander Gottlieb Baumgarten Reflections on Poetry (1735), translated, with the original text, by Karl Aschenbrenner and William B.Holther, (Berkeley, 1954), p. 69, §85. 'Allegories are also closely connected with [metaphor], insomuch that metaphors are called contracted allegory, and an allegory is named by some a diffused metaphor.' Adam Smith Lectures on Rhetoric and Belles Lettres (1762-63), edited by John M.Lothing, (London, 1963), p. 27.

325. Something of this tension can be found in Derrida's description of 'metaphoricity' as 'the logic of contamination and the contamination of logic.' Jacques Derrida 'Plato's Pharmacy' (1968) in Dissemination (1972), translated by Barbara Johnson, (London, 1981), pp. 61-171, (p. 149).
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7. Ibid., p. 111.

8. Ibid., p. 110. His attitude to this question is part of a concern that interpretation 'should never go beyond that in the text which is within the reach of just any sensible reader.', p.123.

9. Ibid., p. 117.

10. What 'best' means here will depend on the individual reader, and, even more markedly, on the individual critic. However, this concept of consonance may have an important bearing on evaluation.


13. Ibid., p. 29.


18. See Plato's Ion, 533c, and Apology, 22.

19. Richards Principles, p. 243. This is a sentiment which came to prominence with the 'Romantic Movement'. Thus Wordsworth; [A Poet] is a man speaking to men: a man, it is true, endowed with more lively sensibility, more enthusiasm and tenderness, who has a greater knowledge of human nature, and a more comprehensive soul, than are supposed to be common among mankind; a man pleased with his own passions and volitions, and who rejoices more than other men in the spirit of life that is in him; delighted to contemplate similar volitions and passions as manifested in the goings-on of the Universe, and habitually impelled to create them where he does not find them. William Wordsworth 'Preface' to the 1850 edition of Lyrical Ballads in The Prose Works of William Wordsworth, edited by W.J.B.Owen and Jane Worthington Smyser, 3 vols., (Oxford, 1974), I, pp. 119-159, (p. 138).

20. Lodovico Castelvetro writes, apropos this concept of furor poeticus; 'This opinion had its origin and source in the ignorance of the common people and has been increased and favoured by the vain-glory of the poets...This belief of the people, though false, was pleasing to poets, since through it great reputation came to them and they were looked on as dear to the gods.' The Poetics of Aristotle Translated and Annotated (1571) translated by Allen H.Gilbert in Gilbert Literary Criticism, pp. 305-357, (pp. 310-11).


23. Ibid., pp. 1-2.
24. Ibid., pp. 4-5.


27. Ibid., p. 20.

28. Ibid., p. 20. Compare Spitzer; Now, since the best document of the soul of a nation is its literature, and since the latter is nothing but its language as this is written down by elect speakers, can we perhaps not hope to grasp the spirit of a nation in the language of its outstanding works of literature? Leo Spitzer Linguistics and Literary History (Princeton, 1948), p. 10. To what end, though, other than a characterization of a nation's literature? Lucien Goldmann, in seeking to overcome these problems, arrives at a separation of the critical and sociological or historical analyses which gives criticism and, therefore, literature a true autonomy. He begins by rejecting the type of sociological approach to literature that concerns itself with discovering a relationship between the 'content' of the work and the 'collective consciousness' of daily life. This approach has led, he continues, to a concentration on both the author and 'whatever in the work is merely the reproduction of empirical reality and of daily life.'. In contrast his own 'genetic structuralist sociology' starts from the premise that 'The essential relationship between the life of society and literary creation is not concerned with the content of these two sectors of human reality, but only with the mental structures, with what might be called the categories which shape both the empirical consciousness of a certain social group and the imaginary universe created by the writer.' Thus even a fairy tale 'may, in its structure, be strictly homologous with the experience of a particular social group or, at the very least, linked, in a significant manner, with that experience.' This means that the subject of interpretation is 'the internal coherence of the text, which presupposes that the text, the whole of the text and nothing but the text, is taken literally and that, within it, one seeks an over-all significant structure.' Intentionalism is thus banished. 'Once the research worker has advanced as far as possible in the search for the internal coherence of the work and its structural model, he must direct himself toward explanation...To look for an explanation means to look for a reality external to the work which presents a relationship to the structure of the work which is either one of concomitant variation (and this is extremely rare in the case of the sociology of literature) or, as is most frequently the case, a relationship of homology or a merely functional relationship, that is to say, a structure fulfilling a function (in the sense in which these words bear in the sciences of life or the sciences


30. Emile Zola 'Letter to the Young People of France' in *The Experimental Novel and Other Essays* (1880), translated by Belle M.Sherman, (New York, 1893), pp. 55-106, (pp. 102-103). Richards, despite his insistence on the non-referentiality of literary language, makes a similar point; 'The arts, if rightly approached, supply the best data available for deciding what experiences are more valuable than others.' He holds that literary works 'record the most important judgements we possess as to the values of experience.' Like Zola he considers literature as a 'body of evidence'! Richards *Principles*, pp. 32-33.


32. 'A fine anatomist morally, he certainly discovered new veins; he found, and as it were injected, lympheducts till then unperceived, and he also invented them. There is a point in his analysis when the real and actual plexus ends and the illusory plexus begins, and he does not distinguish between the two.' Charles-Augustin Sainte-Beuve 'Balzac' (1850), *Causeries du Lundi*, II, in *Essays by Sainte-Beuve*, translated by Elizabeth Lee, (London, 1892), pp. 75-88, (p. 79).


35. Henry James 'The Art of Fiction' (1884) in *Selected Literary Criticism*, pp. 78-97, (pp. 79-80).

36. Ibid., pp. 86-87.


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40. Sidney *An Apologie for Poetrie*, p. 38.

41. Pierre Corneille *Discourses* (1660), translated by Clara W.Crane in Gilbert *Literary Criticism*, pp. 575-79, (p. 578). However, 'It is neither true nor in accord with verisimilitude that Andromeda, exposed and at the mercy of a sea-monster, should have been rescued by a flying knight with winged feet; but that is a fiction which antiquity accepted, and as it has been transmitted to us, no one is offended at seeing it on the stage.' p. 576.

42. Torquato Tasso *Discourse on the Heroic Poem* (1594) translated by Allen H.Gilbert in Gilbert *Literary Criticism*, pp. 476-503, (p. 480). Though he also considers that 'the same action can be both marvellous and true.' p. 481.


44. Coventry Patmore *'Cheerfulness in Life and Art' Principle in Art* (London, 1889), pp. 5-9, (p. 5).


46. Horace *Art of Poetry*, 1. 188.

47. Henry James *'Our Mutual Friend'* (1865) in *Selected Literary Criticism*, pp. 31-35, (p. 33).

48. Ibid., p. 33.

50. Ibid., p. 362.
51. Ibid., p. 359.
52. Aristotle Poetics, ch. 9, p. 43, (1451a).
57. Henry Fielding Joseph Andrews (1742), Bk. III, Ch. 1.
58. Ibid. Bk. III, Ch. 1.
59. Ibid. Bk. III, Ch. 1.
60. The phrases are from Otto Brahm's manifestoes for a 'naturalistic' theatre 'To Begin' (1889), translated by Lee Baxandall in Bentley Theory of the Modern Stage, pp. 373-75.
61. Johnson 'Preface' to Plays of Shakespeare, p. 65. 'It was said that the language of tragedy should be according to decorum and suitable, for these figurative and lofty modes of speech are little suited to persons who are weighted down with great sorrow, for it appears hardly true to life that a person crushed by grief could turn his mind to this manner of language', Giraldi Cinthio On the Composition of Comedies and Tragedies (1543), translated by Allen H.Gilbert in Gilbert Literary Criticism, pp. 252-62, (p. 261).
63. Samuel Johnson The Rambler No 4, Saturday, March 31, 1750.
64. Zola 'The Experimental Novel', pp. 11-12.
65. William Dean Howells Criticism and Fiction (New York, 1891), pp. 73, 76.

68. Ibid., p. 106.

69. Ibid., p. 107.


72. The idea that 'realism is best' is implicit in all sorts of practices as well. 'Based on a true story' is an advertising slogan. Edmund Goncourt reports that Wilde told him, whether truthfully or not, that in Texas theatre managers looked for real criminals to play criminal parts, as, for example, a recently released poisoner to play Lady Macbeth. Journal, 5 May, 1883.

73. 'ERNEST. Must we go, then, to Art for everything? GILBERT. For everything. Because Art does not hurt us. The tears that we shed at play are a type of the exquisite sterile emotions that it is the function of Art to awaken. We weep, but we are not wounded. We grieve, but our grief is not bitter.' Oscar Wilde 'The Critic as Artist' in Intentions (London, 1891), pp. 93-217, (pp. 167-68).

74. Johnson 'Preface' to Plays of Shakespeare, pp. 76-77.

75. Johnson The Rambler No. 156, Saturday, September 14, 1751.

76. Johnson 'Preface' to Plays of Shakespeare, p. 76.

77. Unless one counts those prefaces by imaginary editors, as in She or The Riddle of the Sands.

78. Johnson 'Preface' to Plays of Shakespeare, p. 78.


83. A different attitude to this question of illusion is to be found in Lamb; 'It might be inquired whether in certain characters in comedy, especially those which are a little extravagant, or which involve some notion repugnant to the moral sense, it is not a proof of the highest skill in the comedian when, without absolutely appealing to an audience, he keeps up a tacit understanding with them; and makes them, unconsciously to themselves, a party in the scene....To see a coward done to life upon a stage would produce anything but mirth....Why are misers so hateful in the world, and so endurable on the stage, but because the skilful actor, by a sort of sub-reference, rather than direct appeal to us, disarms the character of a great deal of its odiousness, by seeming to engage our compassion for the insincere tenure by which he holds his money-bags and parchments?...They please by being done under the life or beside it, not to the life.' Charles Lamb 'Stage Illusion' (1825) from The Last Essays of Elia. Being a Sequel to Essays Published under that Name (1833) in The Essays of Elia, edited by Alfred Ainger, (London, 1883), pp. 225-28, (pp. 225-27). Jean-François Marmontel makes a similar point in the *Encyclopédie* article 'Illusion'.


87. Robert Louis Stevenson 'A Note on Realism' (1883) in Essays Literary and Critical (London, 1925), pp. 77-83, (P. 79). 'Yet truth to the conditions of man's nature and the conditions of man's life, the truth of literary art, is free of the ages. It may be told to us in a carpet comedy, in a novel of adventure, or a fairy-tale.' p. 79.


89. Johnson The Rambler No. 4. I cannot help feeling that the naturalistic acting of today's films will seem as artificial fifty years hence as that of fifty years ago seems now.

90. Bk. III, Ch. VI.
91. The more specialized historian, or the person who was, or has been, "there" demonstrates their expertise when they judge a fiction 'a true picture' or a 'misrepresentation' - but in doing so they are judging the work as information.


95. Ibid., p. 9. We might here remember Aristotle characterizing poetry as more philosophical than history, for similar reasons.

96. Ibid., p. 9.

97. Schopenhauer World as Will and Idea, I, §§ 36, 34.

98. Ibid., § 34. In recognition, according to Gadamer, 'what we know emerges, as if through an illumination, from all the chance and variable circumstances that condition it and is grasped in its essence.' This recognition is for him fundamental to the work of art. Thus he speaks of the 'joy of knowledge' in connection with the aesthetic: 'imitation and representation are not merely a second version, a copy, but a recognition of the essence. Because they are not merely repetition, but a 'bringing forth', the spectator is also involved in them. They contain the essential relation to everyone for whom the representation exists.' There may be much in this, but the 'joy of knowledge' can be merely the 'joy of opinion', even the 'joy of satisfying falsehood'; recognizing oneself, in Gadamer's sense, need not be identifiable with knowing oneself. Hans-Georg Gadamer Truth and Method (1960), translation of the second edition (1965) by Garrett Barden and John Cumming, (London, 1975), pp. 102-103.

99. Schopenhauer World as Will and Idea, § 36.

100. Ibid., § 52.


102. Heidegger 'The Origin of the Work of Art', pp. 37-38, 44, 46. Compare Ransom; 'The critic should regard the poem as nothing short of a
desperate ontological or metaphysical manoeuvre. The poet himself, in the
agony of composition, has something like this sense of his labours. The
poet perpetuates in his poem an order of existence which in actual life
is constantly crumbling beneath his touch. His poem celebrates the object
which is real, individual, and qualitatively infinite. He knows that his
practical interests will reduce this living object to a mere utility, and
that his sciences will disintegrate it for their convenience into their
respective abstracts. The poet wishes to defend his object's existence
against its enemies, and the critic wishes to know what he is doing, and
how. The critic should find in the poem a total poetic or individual
object which tends to be universalized, but is not permitted to suffer
this fate.' John Crowe Ransom 'Criticism, Inc.' (1937) in The World's Body

103. Heidegger 'The Origin of the Work of Art', p. 56. Chesterton writes,
'I believe, about the universal cosmos, as for that matter about every
weed and pebble in the cosmos, that men will never rightly realize that
it is beautiful, until they realize that it is strange....Poetry is the
separation of the soul from some object, whereby we can regard it with
Shklovsky likewise writes that we usually apprehend things merely as
'silhouettes', through what he describes as 'prose perception'. This
'habitualization', then, 'devours' life. He believes that 'art exists that
one may recover the sensation of life; it exists to make one feel things,
to make the stone stony....The technique of art is to make objects
"unfamiliar," to make forms difficult, to increase the difficulty and
length of perception because the process of perception is an aesthetic
end in itself and must be prolonged. Art is a way of experiencing the
artfulness of an object; the object is not important.' Victor Shklovsky
'Art as Technique' (1917) in Lee T.Lemon and Marion J.Reis (eds.) Russian
Formalst Criticism : Four Essays (Lincoln, 1965), pp. 5-24, (pp. 11-12).

104. Georg Lukács 'Art and Objective Truth' in Writer and Critic and
25-60, (pp. 34-35).

105. Ibid., p. 40.

106. Ibid., p. 40. This concept of 'partisan objectivity' and conflicting
realities can be observed in the gradual erosion of the concept of
'socialist realism' in the following passages: 'Realism means giving a
picture not only of the decay of capitalism and the withering away of its
culture, but also of the birth of that class, of that force, which is
capable of creating a new society and a new culture. Realism does not
mean the embellishment or arbitrary selection of revolutionary phenomena;
it means reflecting reality as it is, in all its complexity, in all its
contrariety, and not only capitalist reality, but also that other, new
reality - the reality of socialism.' Karl Radek 'Contemporary World
Literature and the Tasks of Proletarian Art' in All-Union Congress of
Soviet Writers Problems of Soviet Literature: Reports and Speeches at the First Soviet Writer's Conference (1934), edited by H.G. Scott, (London, n.d.), pp. 73-162, (pp. 156-157). 'Myth is invention. To invent means to extract from the sum of a given reality its cardinal idea and embody it in imagery - that is how we got realism. But if to the idea extracted from the given reality we add - completing the idea, by the logic of hypothesis - the desired, the possible, and thus supply the image, we obtain that romanticism which is at the base of myth and is highly beneficial in that it tends to provoke a revolutionary attitude to reality, an attitude that changes the world in a practical way.' Maxim Gorky 'Soviet Literature' in Problems of Soviet Literature, pp. 57-69, (p. 44). 'Socialist realism', according to Bukharin, will portray 'sensory reality and its motion, and not its fictitious sublimations...real feelings and passions, real history, and not various versions of the "world spirit"...The combination of images, the verbal scoring, will not serve to conjure up the supernatural but to reproduce reality and the real motions of the feelings with the greatest possible vividness. It does not, however, follow from this that realism, from the point of view of form, precludes the employment of metaphors, including personification. Everything that enhances the sensory effect can and does find a place in the poetic lexicon, because it is perceived as a metaphor....If socialist realism is distinguished by its active, operative character; if it does not give just a dry photograph of a process; if it projects the entire world of passion and struggle into the future; if it raises the heroic principle to the throne of history - then revolutionary romanticism is a component part of it...On the other hand, socialist realism does not merely register what exists, but, catching up the thread of development in the present, it leads it into the future, and leads it actively. Hence an antithesis between romanticism and socialist realism is devoid of all meaning.' Nikolai Bukharin 'Poetry, Poetics, and the Problems of Poetry in the U.S.S.R.' in Problems of Soviet Literature, pp. 185-260, (pp. 251-54).

107. Wilde 'The Critic as Artist', p. 110.

108. Pope An Essay on Criticism (1711), ll. 255-56. Elsewhere he describes it as the 'first principle of criticism': 'Whoever reads the Odyssey with an eye to the Iliad, expecting to find it of the same character or of the same sort of spirit, will be grievously deceived and err against the first principle of criticism, which is, to consider the nature of the piece, and the intent of its author.' Alexander Pope 'Postscript' to Homer's Odyssey (1725-1726) in Homer's Odyssey; translated by Alexander Pope, to Which is Added The Battle of the Frogs and Mice, translated by Archdeacon Parnel, and corrected by Mr. Pope (Halifax, 1854), pp. 357-373, (p. 357).


111. Richards *Principles*, p. 29.


114. 'Montaigne was a kind of premature classic, of the family of Horace; but for want of worthy surroundings, like a spoiled child, he gave himself up to the unbridled fancies of his style and humour.' Charles-Augustin Sainte-Beuve 'What is a Classic?' (1850) from *Causeries du Lundi, III* in *Essays by Sainte-Beuve*, pp. 1-12, (p. 8). 'Some judge the author's names, not works, and then / Nor praise nor blame the writings, but the men.' Pope *Essay on Criticism*, 11. 412-13.


119. Pope expresses this approach, which claims that an author can only be judged in the context of his times, thus; 'You then whose judgement the right course would steer, / Know well each Ancient's proper character; / His fable, subject, scope in every page; / Religion, country, genius of his age; / Without all these at once before your eyes, / Cavil you may, but never criticize.' *Essay on Criticism*, 11. 118-123.

120. Thus Knight writes that 'My suggestion as to the poet's "consciousness" must...be considered as either pure hazard or useful metaphor, illuminating the play's nature and perhaps hitting the truth of Shakespeare's mind in composition.' G. Wilson Knight *The Wheel of Fire: Interpretations of Shakespearian Tragedy With Three New Essays* (1930), (London, 1965), p. 6.

122. Imagine a scene in a play which consisted of a striptease, with the audience playing the role of an audience. Are they watching a striptease? The author might say that it was intended as an indictment of male fantasy, but its significance can only be judged by its effect - it is no more nor less a striptease for what its author says.


124. Ibid., p. 5.

125. Gadamer, I believe, misunderstands Schleiermacher in this respect, for he quotes the following passage as indicative of a misplaced historicism; "Hence a work of art, too, is really rooted in its own soil. It loses its meaning when it is wrenched from this environment and enters into general commerce; it is like something that has been saved from the fire but still bears the marks of the burning upon it."

Schleiermacher quoted in Gadamer Truth and Method, p. 148. It is true that we are not in a position to know if the work has 'marks of burning' upon it or not. But Schleiermacher may be thinking here in terms of the sort of distinction I shall make below between 'meaning' and 'significance': 'Historical interpretation is not to be limited to gathering historical data. That task should be done even before interpretation begins, since it is the means for re-creating the relationship between speaker and the original audience, and the interpretation cannot begin until that relationship has been established.'


132. Schleiermacher *Compendium of 1819*, X.18.3.


135. Ibid., P. 271.


137. Wimsatt and Beardsley 'The Intentional Fallacy', pp. 17, 4.


139. My own thought is that this is such a work, that 'Swift' in making the horses admirable by giving them human aspirations, and the human beings detestable, by portraying them as less than human, cancels out the very judgement that seems implied. If the work is misanthropic it is because we are, while reading, under the spell not of direct assertion but of metaphor; mankind are briefly Yahoos.
140. There is a certain oddness in saying that the work, as opposed to
the author, does this or that, but at least it is a formula not so open to
abuse or misinterpretation. Cinthio, after all, sets a precedent when he
has the tragedy Orbecche address the reader. ('An Address to the Reader
by the Tragedy of Orbecche (1541). There is also the epigram to Ovid's
Amores.)


142. If, for example, we were to weave into the criticism of a work by
Gide a criticism of his journal neither need be necessarily used as an
authority on the import of the other. We can use it merely in a
comparative way, as one might use any other frame of reference to refine
one's criticism. Even the biography of a writer could be used thus, so
long as we did not treat it as a collection of facts. From an aesthetic
point of view it might, indeed, be just as enlightening to study a work
by A in the light of B's biography.

143. Johnson's Lives, which seems to promise some sort of biographical
criticism contains little that could be strictly called intentional - his
discussion of William Collins is a good example of this distinction, that
of Milton to some degree an exception.

144. Longinus On the Sublime, translated by T.S.Dorsch in Dorsch
Classical Literary Criticism, pp. 97-158, (p. 113).

145. T.S.Eliot 'The Metaphysical Poets' (1921) in Selected Essays (1932),

146. D.H.Lawrence 'The Spirit of Place' (1924) in Selected Literary

Compare Emerson; 'Criticism is an art when it does not stop at the
words of the poet, but looks at the order of his thoughts and the
essential quality of his mind. Then the critic is poet. 'Tis a question
not of talents but of tone; and not particular merits, but the mood of
mind into which one and another can bring us.' Ralph Waldo Emerson 'Art
and Criticism' (n.d.) in The Complete Works of Ralph Waldo Emerson,
edited by Edward Waldo Emerson, 12 vols., (Boston, 1903-1904), vol. XII
The Natural History of the Intellect and Other Papers (1904), pp. 281-305,
(p. 305).

148. Emilio Betti 'Hermeneutics as the general methodology of the
Geisteswissenschaften' (1962) translated by Joseph Bleicher in Joseph
Bleicher Contemporary hermeneutics : Hermeneutics as method, philosophy
point; 'Interpretation is probably, in a certain sense, re-creation, but
this re-creation does not follow the process of the creative act, but the
lines of the created work which has to be brought to representation in accord with the meaning the interpreter finds in it.' Gadamer *Truth and Method*, p. 107.

149. Betti 'Hermeneutics', p. 57.

150. Ibid., p. 59. Croce approaches the problem in a better way; 'All that which has not become the content of poetry and remains outside it, though linked to the work materially or pertaining to the person of the poet, is excluded from the process whose aim is to grasp and define the generating motif of poetry which shapes and animates all parts of the poem. But the object of this further investigation is human reality in its wholeness', Benedetto Croce *Poetry and Literature: An Introduction to Its Criticism and History* (1936), translation of the sixth edition (1963) by Giovanni Gullace, (Southern Illinois University, 1981), p. 142.

Chapter III: Form and Content


2. Ibid., p. 31. (1447a).


6. Ibid., p. 601.

7. John Henry Newman 'Poetry, with reference to Aristotle's Poetics' (1829) in Essays Critical and Historical, 2 vols., (1871), I, pp. 1-26, (p. 16). T.E. Hulme 'Romanticism and Classicism' in Speculations: Essays on Humanism and the Philosophy of Art, edited by Herbert Read (1924), second edition, (London, 1936), pp. 111-140, (pp. 137). José Ortega y Gasset 'Notes on the Novel' in The Dehumanization of Art and Notes on the Novel (1925), translated by Helene Weyl, (Princeton, 1948), pp. 57-103, p. 75. 'The theme or content cannot...be practically or morally charged with epithets of praise or blame. When critics of art remark that a theme is badly selected, in cases where that observation has a just foundation, it is a question of blaming, not the selection of the theme (which would be absurd), but the manner in which the artist has treated it, the failure of the expression due to the contradictions which it contains.' Benedetto Croce Aesthetic as Science of Expression and General Linguistic (1901), translation of the fourth edition (1911) by Douglas Ainslee, revised edition, (London, 1922), p. 51.

8. I am aware of those distinctions made between these last two terms by Victor Shklovsky, in his 'Sterne's Tristram Shandy: Stylistic Commentary' (1921) and Boris Tomachevsky in his 'Thematics' (1925) (the 'story' is 'the aggregate of mutually related events reported in the work.', the 'plot' is 'the same events...arranged and connected according to the orderly sequence in which they are presented in the work.', pp. 66-67), and also similar distinctions made by E.M. Forster, in Aspects of the Novel (London, 1927), and those subsequently made, along similar lines, by
several 'structuralist' writers; such distinctions, however, as will emerge, are of no relevance to the subject in hand. For Shklovsky and Tomashevsky see Lee T.Lemon and Marion Reis (eds.) Russian Formalist Criticism: Four Essays (Lincoln, 1965), pp. 5-24, 62-95.


10. A similar mistake is made by Pound when he insists that 'rhythm must be interpretative' - as if it could avoid being so. Ezra Pound 'A Retrospect' (1918) in Literary Essays of Ezra Pound, edited by T.S.Eliot, (London, 1954), pp. 3-14, (p. 9).


13. The text can, of course, be analysed into such categories as those described by Tomashevsky ('Thematics') - story and plot, dynamic and static motifs, conventional and free devices, exposition (immediate, delayed, or transposed), situation, conflict, intrigue, ending, exciting force, peripety, climax, foreshadowing - but to write in this way, by simply filling-in these common denominators, is not to write about the text as work. See Appendix on formalism.


17. Thus, for example, J.Middleton Murray's description of the critic's task: 'First, the critic should endeavour to convey the whole effect of the work he is criticizing, its peculiar uniqueness. Second, to work back and define the unique quality of the sensibility which necessitated this expression. Third, to establish the determining causes of this sensibility. (Here the relevant circumstances of the writer's life have their proper place.) Fourth, to analyse the means by which this sensibility was given expression; in other words, to conduct a technical examination into style. Fifth, a still closer examination of a perfectly characteristic passage, that is, a passage in which the author's
sensibility is completely expressed.' 'A Critical Credo' (1921) in Countries of the Mind : First Series (1922), revised and enlarged, (London, 1931), pp. 183-89, (p. 188). (This, despite New Criticism, might still be the unspoken manifesto of all popular criticism.) Because he sees the effect as divorced from the sensibility of the work, the third term – the author – is introduced. Without this intentionalism steps two and four might be identical. Thus by five we have a dissociation of part from whole, the sensibility is detached from the work, and the work itself becomes accidental.


20. Matthew Arnold 'Preface to the First Edition of Poems', p. 601. Ezra Pound 'A Retrospect', pp. 1-4. We can see how what is, in effect, the very condition of communication, becomes a false standard for evaluation, in the following passage from Adam Smith; 'The perfection of style consists in expressing] in the most concise, proper, and precise manner the thought of the author, and that in the manner which best conveys the sentiment, passion, or affection with which it affects - or he pretends it does affect - him, and which he designs to communicate to his reader...In like manner what is it that is agreeable in style? It is when all the thoughts are justly and properly expressed in such a manner as shews the passion they affected the author with, and so that all seemed natural and easy.' Adam Smith Lectures on Rhetoric and Belles Lettres (1762-63), edited by John M.Lothian, (London, 1963), p.51.


22. Ibid., p. 69.

23. Ibid., pp. 76-78.

24. When I was being 'taught Plato' a great many terms were left in the original Greek, simply because they have no English synonyms which are not misleading; this is not the same as saying Plato is not amenable to paraphrase, since it is possible to explain the meaning of each Greek word even if not to replace it with a single English one.


28. Thomas De Quincey 'Rhetoric' (1828) in *The Collected Writings of Thomas De Quincey*, edited by David Masson, 14 vols., (London, 1896-1897), X *Literary Theory and Criticism* (1897), pp. 81-133, (p. 115). A similar sensitivity on De Quincey's part to the way in which form incarnates meaning is to be found in his 'On the Knocking at the Gate in Macbeth' (1823). His essay on 'Style' (1840-41) is disappointing in this respect.


30. Matthew Arnold 'Letter to A.H.Clough' (c. March 1, 1849), in *The Letters of Matthew Arnold to Arthur Hugh Clough* (1845-1868), edited by Howard Foster Lowry, (London, 1932), Letter 26, pp. 100-101, (p. 101). 'Nay in Sophocles what is valuable is not so much his contributions to psychology and the anatomy of sentiment, as the grand moral effects produced by style.' The 'matter', he continues, 'is the expression of the richness of his mind: but on men character produces as great an effect as mind.' D.H.Lawrence 'The Novel' (1925) in *A Selection From Phoenix*, edited by A.A.H.Inglis, (Harmondsworth, 1971), pp. 161-176, (p. 162). Schleiermacher, even while arguing against the separation of 'style' and 'thought', allows intentionalism nevertheless to enter in, through a normative description of style; 'The goal of technical interpretation should be formulated as the complete understanding of style. We are accustomed to restrict the term "style" to the way language is handled. But thoughts and language are intertwined, and an author's distinctive way of treating the subject is manifested by his organization of his material and by his use of language...Since a person always has numerous ideas, the development of any specific one involves accepting something and excluding something else. - Yet when an idea does not develop from the distinctive character of the author, but is acquired by study or custom, or is cultivated for its effect, then there is mannerism, and mannerism is always poor style.' F.D.E.Schleiermacher *Compendium of 1819* (1819, 1828) in *Hermeneutics: The Handwritten Manuscripts* by
31. Oscar Wilde 'Preface' to *The Picture of Dorian Gray* (London, 1891). Whether it is unpardonable, as he also says, depends upon one's ethics. Wayne C. Booth's *Rhetoric of Fiction* (London, 1961) is an excellent description of several of these mannerisms and their import.

32. Alain Robbe-Grillet 'On Several Obsolete Motions' (1957) in *For a New Novel: Essays on Fiction* (1963), translated by Richard Howard, (New York, 1965), pp. 25-47, (p. 44). This is an important point with regard to intention. Consider Croce; 'When we talk of books well thought and ill-written, we cannot mean anything but that in such books are parts, pages, periods, or propositions well thought and well written, and other parts (perhaps the least important) ill-thought and ill-written, not really thought and so not really expressed...If we pass from the consideration of big books to a short sentence, the error or inaccuracy of such a contention will leap to the eyes. How could a single sentence be clearly thought and confusedly written?...The poet or painter who lacks form, lacks everything, because he lacks himself....In this sense, when we take "content" as equal to "concept," it is most true not only that art does not consist of content, but also that it *has no content.*' Croce *Aesthetic*, pp. 24-25. Here, then, the concept of the separability of work and intention and the concept of the inseparability of form and content (from an aesthetic viewpoint), become themselves inseparable, for, as Croce writes elsewhere, 'The poet is...nothing but his poetry.' *Poetry and Literature: An Introduction to Its Criticism and History* (1936), sixth edition (1963), translated by Giovanni Gullace, (Southerb Illinois University, 1981), p. 162.

33. 'Whatever we want to convey, there is only one word to express it, one verb to animate it, one adjective to qualify it. We must therefore go on seeking that word, verb or adjective until we have discovered it, and never be satisfied with approximations, never fall back on tricks, even inspired ones, or tomfoolery of language to dodge the difficulty.' Guy de Maupassant 'The Novel' (1887) preface to *Pierre and Jean* (1888), translated by Leonard Tancock, (Harmondsworth, 1979), pp. 21-35, (p. 33). Matthew Arnold *Essays in Criticism: Second Series* (London, 1888), p. 22. Arnold describes the relation between seriousness in style and in 'matter and substance' as directly proportional, their identification is only implicit. Stendhal 'Letter to Honoré de Balzac' (18 October 1840) in *To the Happy Few: Selected Letters of Stendhal*, edited by Emmanuel Boudot-Lamotte, translated by Norman Cameron, (London, 1952), pp. 364-374, (p. 366, first draft. Joseph Conrad 'Letter to Hugh Clifford' (9 October 1899) in *The Collected Letters of Joseph Conrad*, edited by Frederick R.Karl and Laurence Davies, 2 vols., II, pp. 199-202, (p. 200).

34. Gustave Flaubert 'Letter to Mademoiselle Leroyer de Chantepie', 12 December 1857, in Allot *Novelists on the Novel*, p. 313. 'There is no such
thing as mere form in poetry. All form is expression.' A.C. Bradley 'Poetry for Poetry's Sake' (1901) in *Oxford Lectures on Poetry* (London, 1909), pp. 3-36, (p. 18). 'The impossibility of translation is the very reality of poetry in its creation and re-creation.' Croce *Poetry and Literature*, p. 114.


36. This is not to say, however, that it can be easily analyzed.

37. Sidney *Apologie for Poetrie*, p. 42.


39. Ibid., p.16. This is not, of course, simply a modern dogma; 'Let briefness be your most important study in all things; ponder it, master it, practice it, use it.' Alberic of Monte Cassino *Flowers of Rhetoric* (c.1087), translated by Joseph M. Miller in Joseph M. Miller, Michael H. Prosser and Thomas W. Benson (eds.) *Readings in Medieval Rhetoric* (London, 1973), pp. 131-161, (p. 156).

40. Orwell 'Politics and the English Language', p. 100.

40. It is easy to forget when reading Flaubert or Maupassant or Stendhal on the effort they put into writing that this effort reflects no glory on, and guarantees no value in, their respective works - there was no ideal form of *Madame Bovary*, *Pierre et Jean*, or *Le Rouge et le Noir* except perhaps in the novelist's head. They could equally well have searched all day for banalities. The right word, for the reader, is right only after the event.
Chapter IV: Literature and Rhetoric


3. Ibid., p. 31.

4. Even with clothing, to have "no style" one must dress in a certain manner.


6. Antonio Minturno De poeta libri sex (Venice, 1564), Lib., ii, p. 102. See his L'Arte Poetica (1564) translated by Allen H. Gilbert in Alllan H. Gilbert (ed.) Literary Criticism: Plato to Dryden (New York, 1940), pp. 275-303, (p. 289). This joining of the Horatian emphasis on instruction and pleasure, and Longinus' emphasis on the power of poetry to transport the reader, first appeared in Minturno's Latin work.


8. Ibid., p. 383.


17. I.A. Richards *Principles of Literary Criticism* (1924), second edition, (London, 1926), pp. 32-33. Gadamer values art for similar reasons; 'The aesthetic experience is not just one kind of experience among others, but represents the essence of experience itself. As the work of art as such is a world for itself, what is experienced aesthetically is, as an experience, removed from all connections with actuality. The work of art would seem almost by definition to become an aesthetic experience: that means, however, that it suddenly takes the person experiencing it out of the context of his life, by the power of the work of art, and yet relates him back to the whole of his existence. In the experience of art there is present a fullness of meaning which belongs not only to this particular content or object but rather stands for the meaningful whole of life. An aesthetic experience always contains the experience of an infinite whole. Precisely because it does not combine with others to make one open experiential flow, but immediately represents the whole, its significance is infinite.' And elsewhere; 'Aesthetic experience...is a mode of self-understanding. But all self-understanding takes place in relation to something else that is understood and includes the unity and sameness of this other. Inasmuch as we encounter the work of art in the world and a world in the individual work of art, this does not remain a strange universe into which we are magically transported for a time. Rather, we to learn to understand oneself in it, and that means that we preserve the discontinuity of the experience in the continuity of our existence. Therefore it is necessary to adopt an attitude to the beautiful and to art that does not lay claim to immediacy, but corresponds to the historical reality of man....This negative insight, expressed positively, means that art is knowledge and the experience of the work of art is a sharing of this knowledge.' Hans-Georg Gadamer *Truth and Method* (1960), translation
of the second edition (1965) by Garrett Barden and John Cumming, (London, 1975), pp. 63, 86–87. This step, then, is an existential one, in that it reveals the existential nature of the whole; but as an existential step it is within existence! Thus Jaspers; 'Because this art [which is addressed to consciousness at large] is a pure medium, does not bind us to anything, is neither religious nor philosophical, it cannot be for or against religion and philosophy. It has no source of its own except the endless free play of possibilities....The deliverance we get from the work of art becomes a noncommittal semblance, for in the work there is only the work's own law, not the law of real life. The poetic forms I create seem to relieve me of existential decisions, and the possibilities I conceive seem to obviate my need to deal with reality. Instead of having to decide, I can guess at what might be; instead of having to be, I can content myself with the vistas of my imagination. I may expand without limits in contemplative delight, may be moved by whatever is humanly possible. I am rapture, and I am in despair; I am free to forget myself in a pure, present timelessness without consequences....While a possibility in philosophical thinking is nothing but an appeal to translate it into real self-being, art allows us to live a full life without commitment. It is the intentional delusion of being inwardly moved by a concretely experienced presence of the most profound and distant possibilities of being.' Karl Jaspers Philosophy (1932), translation of the third edition (1956) by E.B. Ashton, 3 vols., (London, 1969), I, pp. 332–33. And elsewhere; 'The satisfaction I feel in the imaginative viewing of art lifts me out of mere existence as well as out of the reality of Existenz....But imagination does not commit me. Instead of causing me really to be myself, it creates a space in which I can be, or a presence whose being changes my inner posture without my taking any real existential step in it....[Without] that noncommittal viewing I am not free to be possible Existenz. Entirely immersed in the reality of existence, or solely concerned with the reality of my Existenz, I would be as though in chains....Without a moment of voiding reality in the language of art I could not freely seize upon reality as Existenz.' Philosophy, III, pp. 169–170.


19. Castelvetro retreats somewhat from this position in discussing the cathartic effect of tragedy.


25. Ibid., p. 23.


27. Ibid., p. 349.

28. Giraldi Cinthio *On the Composition of Romances* (1549), translated by Allen H. Gilbert in Gilbert *Literary Criticism*, pp. 262-273, (p. 270). Such a bald statement of this antithesis and the conclusion drawn from it sounds today, from a popular point of view, like the most damnable of critical heresies; I can think of only certain light American comedy series which overtly demonstrate such a motivation.


31. Edmund Spenser 'Letter to Sir Walter Raleigh' (1589). See also Heywood *An Apology for Actors*.


33. Percy Bysshe Shelley 'Preface' to *The Cenci* (1819).


37. T.S. Eliot 'Religion and Literature' (1935) in Essays Ancient and Modern (London, 1936), pp. 93-112, (p. 99). Lawrence, too, while admitting that the novel must have a metaphysic asserts that this metaphysic 'must always subserve the artistic purpose beyond the artist's conscious aims. Otherwise the novel becomes a treatise.' D.H. Lawrence 'From Study of Thomas Hardy' (1936) in Selected Literary Criticism, edited by Anthony Beal, (London, 1955), pp. 166-228, (p.188).


40. Wilde 'Preface' to Dorian Gray.

41. See Walter Pater The Renaissance: Studies in Art and Poetry (1893 edition), edited by D.J. Hill, (London, 1980). The only truly amoral account of aesthetic experience I know occurs, strangely enough, in Lamb's essay 'On the Artificial Comedy of the Last Century' (1822), where he insists that, while in life 'the moral point is everything', drama is a world unto itself, in the enjoyment of which moral concerns are an irrelevance. It is to 'formalist' or 'linguistic' approaches to the 'text' that we would have to turn to discover an approach that was not explicitly or implicitly concerned with the ideology of the work.


48. The first 'description' is the world as an object of direct individual experience. I have called literature a redescription to emphasize the fact that in reading we are exposed to a "pattern", an ascription of value not primarily our own.

49. Samuel Taylor Coleridge A Course of Lectures (1818) in Coleridge's Essays and Lectures on Shakespeare and Some Other Old Poets and Dramatists (Everyman, 1907), pp. 213-385, (Lecture XIII 'On Poesy or Art', p. 311). Compare Camus; 'Artistic creation is a demand for unity and a rejection of the world. But it rejects the world on account of what it lacks and in the name of what it sometimes is..."I believe more and more", writes Van Gogh, "that God must not be judged on this earth. The world is a study of God which has turned out badly." Every artist tried to reconstruct this study and to give it the style it lacks...[But] there was also in art a tendency to acquiescence...Equally well, no form of art can survive on total denial alone. Just as all thought, and primarily that of non-signification, signifies something, so there is no art that has no signification. Man can allow himself to denounce the total injustice of the world and then demand a total justice which he alone will create. But he cannot affirm the total hideousness of the world. To create beauty, he must simultaneously reject reality and exalt certain of its aspects. Art disputes reality, but does not hide from it...The incontestable importance of the novel, our insistence, in fact, on taking seriously the innumerable myths with which we have been provided, for the last two centuries, by the genius of writers, implies a rejection of reality. But this rejection is not a mere escapist flight, and should be interpreted as the retreat of the soul which, according to Hegel, creates for itself in its deception a fictitious world in which ethics reign alone...The contradiction is this: man rejects the world as it is, without accepting the necessity of escaping it. In fact, men cling to the world and by far the greater majority do not want to abandon it. Far from always wanting to forget it, they suffer, on the contrary, from not being able to possess it completely enough, strangers to the world they live in and exiled from their own country. Except for vivid moments of fulfilment, all reality for them is incomplete...At this point is born the fatal envy, which so many men feel, of the lives of others. Seen from a distance, these existences seem to possess a coherence and a unity which they cannot have, in reality, but which seem evident to the spectator. He only sees the salient points of these lives without taking into account the details of corrosion. Thus we make these lives into works of art. In an elementary fashion we turn them into novels. In this sense, everyone tries to make his life a work of art...But the lives of others always escape us and we escape them too; they are without firm contours. Life, from this point of view, is without style. It is only an impulse which endlessly pursues its form without ever finding it. Man, tortured by this, tries in vain to find the form which will impose certain limits between which he can be king. If only one single living thing had definite form, he would be reconciled...What, in fact, is a novel but a universe in which action is endowed with form, where final words are pronounced, where people possess one another...
completely and where life assumes the aspect of destiny? The world of the novel is only a rectification of the world we live in, in pursuance of man's deepest wishes. For the world is undoubtedly the same one we know. The suffering, the illusion, the love are the same." Albert Camus The Rebel (1951), translated by Anthony Bower, (London, 1953), pp. 222-232.


52. Lowell 'The Function of the Poet' in Allen Literary Criticism, p. 422. and Clark

53. Ibid., p. 430.

54. Hazlitt Lectures on the English Poets, p. 2. 'Fear is poetry, hope is poetry, love is poetry, hatred is poetry; contempt, jealousy, remorse, admiration, wonder pity, despair, or madness, are all poetry.' p. 2.


59. Ibid., p. 127.


62. Coleridge A Course of Lectures, p. 319 (Lecture XIII 'On Poesy or Art').


65. Ibid., pp. 88-89.


67. Ibid., p. 265.

68. Carlyle *Heroes and Hero-worship*, p. 67.

69. Ibid., p. 69.


71. Ibid., pp. 130-33.


73. Ibid., p. 8.

74. 'This preference of the genius to the parts is the secret of that deification of art which is found in all superior minds.' Ralph Waldo Emerson 'Nominalist and Realist' in *Essays: Second Series*, pp. 133-145, (p. 137).

75. Auguste Comte *A General View of Positivism* (1848), translated by J.H. Bridges (1865), second edition, (London, 1880), Ch. VI.


77. Giovanni Boccaccio *The Life of Dante* (1363-64) translated by Allen H. Gilbert in *Gilbert Literary Criticism*, pp. 206-211, (p. 211). Martin Opitz considered that at first 'poetry was nothing but disguised theology', *The Book Concerning German Poetry* (1624) translated by Olga Marx Perlzweig in *Gilbert Literary Criticism*, pp. 565-67, (p. 565). Arnold *Essays in Criticism: Second Series*, pp. 2-3. 'Beautiful art, like the religion peculiar to it, has its future in true religion. The restricted value of the idea passes utterly and naturally into the universality identical with the infinite form; the vision in which consciousness has to depend upon the senses passes into a self-mediating knowledge, into an existence which is itself knowledge - into revelation.' G.W.F. Hegel *Hegel's Philosophy of Mind*, translated from Part III of *The Encyclopedia of the Philosophical Sciences* (1830) by William Wallace, (Oxford, 1894), p. 174 (Section III, § 563).
78. Coleridge *A Course of Lectures*, p. 300 (Lecture XI).


80. Arthur Schopenhauer *The World as Will and Idea* (1818, 1844), translated by R.B.Haldane and J.Kemp, (London, 1883), I, Bk. III, § 36. In the same passage he writes how such a dreamer may write 'and then we shall have the ordinary novel of every description, which entertains those who are like him and the public at large, for the readers imagine themselves in the place of the hero, and then find the story very agreeable.' The same idea is echoed in Sigmund Freud's 'Creative Writers and Day-Dreaming' (1908).


84. The difficulty of distinguishing between the concepts of 'belief' and 'imagination' is that it is belief itself which provides the distinction. The conceptions of belief, as they belong to perception and memory, are 'more intense and steady', as Hume writes, than those of imagination. Hume *Enquiries*, p. 50. False belief, or delusion, is still belief. One can, therefore, say that while imagination can be subject to the will, belief cannot. And yet as soon as one has said so, instances occur to the mind in which belief is based on no more than willing a thing should be so.

85. Casey defines imagination as 'an autonomous mental act; independent in status and free in its action.' Edward S.Casey *Imagining: A Phenomenological Study* (London, 1976), p. ix. If this were the case then any relationship between it and the imaginer's life would have to be put down to coincidence. Imagination is comparatively free, but what is not, aside from direct sensory perception? To be able to talk meaningfully about imagination it must be seen as part of the overall mental functioning, conscious and unconscious, of the individual.


back to an innocence by repressing emotions and imagination' and 'spares us the expense of an exuberant imagination'; this is, however, to claim two things that experience will not bear out - that the aesthetic object does not exercise the imagination, and that the unaided imagination is unlimited. Mikel Dufrenne The Phenomenology of Aesthetic Experience (1953), (Evanston, 1973), pp. 340, 366.


89. Joseph Addison The Spectator No. 421, Thursday, 3 July 1712.


95. D.H.Lawrence 'Why the Novel Matters' (1936) in Selected Literary Criticism, pp. 102-107, (p. 105). He includes the Bible, Homer, and Shakespeare in the category 'novel'!


97. Young Conjectures, pp. 85-36.


99. Ibid., p. 21.
100. Ibid., p. 38.
101. Ibid., p. 21.
105. In fact when he writes that the 'foundation of eloquence...is wisdom', what he is actually talking about is wisdom in selecting what is appropriate to the occasion, that is, decorum. For 'the same thing is often approved or rejected according as it is expressed in one way or another.' Cicero Orator, translated by H.M. Hubbell in Brutus and Orator, Loeb Classical Library, (London, 1939), pp. 306-509, (70, 72). Isocrates too talks of thoughts 'clothed' in language, in Against the Sophists, translated by George Noulin in Isocrates, II, pp. 163-177, (17).
106. The 'naturalistic fallacy'. See G.E. Moore Principia Ethica (Cambridge 1903), pp. 18-20. Quintilian derives enthymemes from syllogisms simply by suppressing a premiss in the presentation, but his syllogisms, containing as they do, evaluative terms, can also be classed as enthymemes! See Institutes of Oratory, I, Bk. V, Ch. XIV, 24-26. Now the enthymeme, which is considered by the Latins to be a mental concept, the grammarians are wont to call it an imperfect syllogism. For the form of this type of argumentation has only two parts; and furthermore, it uses material outside the domain of syllogism, for the purpose of winning belief....wherefore the enthymeme is thought better fitted for the use of the rhetorician than of the dialectician....The parts of the enthymeme are five: 1) the convincible; 2) the plausible; 3) the sentential; 4) the paradigmatic; 5) the compendious.' Isidore of Seville Concerning Rhetoric' from The Etymologies (early 7th Century), II, 1-15, translated by Dorothy V. Cerino in Joseph M. Miller, Michael H. Prosser and Thomas W. Benson (eds.) Readings in Medieval Rhetoric (London, 1973), pp. 79-95, (p. 89).
107. Plato Gorgias, translated by J. Wright (1848) in Five Dialogues of Plato Bearing on Poetic Inspiration (Everyman, n.d.), pp. 205-277, (p. 250). Antonius, in Cicero's De Oratore, holds that it is essential for the orator to win the favour of the audience, for 'men decide far more problems by
hate, or love, or lust, or rage, or sorrow, or joy, or hope, or fear, or illusion, or some other inward emotion, that by reality', De Oratore, I, Bk. II, 178. See also the discussion of ethos at 184.


109. Ibid., pp. 116-17.

110. Ibid., p. 139.

111. Ibid., pp. 140-41.

112. Ibid., p. 116.

113. Ibid., p. 142.


115. Bacon Advancement of Learning, p. 141.

116. Ibid., p. 141.

117. Ibid., p. 141.

118. Ibid., p. 81.

119. Ibid., pp. 80-81. 'Not every sentence, however, is a proposition; only those sentences are propositions to which truth or falsehood belongs, and these do not belong to every sentence... But let us leave the other kinds of sentence out of consideration, since an examination of them belongs more properly to rhetoric or to poetry. Propositions are what concern our present enquiry.' Aristotle On Interpretation, translated by A.E.Wardman and J.L.Creed in The Philosophy of Aristotle, edited by Renford Bambrough, (New York, 1963), pp. 149-159, (p. 149, (4)).

120. George Puttenham The Arte of Englishe Poesie (1589), edited by Gladys D.Willcock and Alice Walker, (Cambridge, 1936), pp. 8, 196. Bacon makes a similar historical claim in his Advancement of Learning, p. 81. Compare Vico; 'Throughout this book it will be shown that as much as the poets had first sensed in the way of vulgar wisdom, the philosophers later understood in the way of esoteric wisdom; so that the former may be said to have been the sense and the latter the intellect of the human race...Wisdom among the gentiles began with the muse' Giambattista Vico The New Science of Giambattista Vico (third edition, 1744), translated by


122. Sidney An Apologie for Poetrie, p. 43. Cicero had described poets as 'next of kin to orators', De Oratore, II, Bk. III, 27. Even the ends of poetry we have seen Minturno propose are echoes from writers on rhetoric. Thus Cicero describes the orator having three styles; the 'plain' (for proof), the 'middle' (for pleasure), and the 'vigorous' (for persuasion), Orator, 69. Quintilian likewise defines the end of rhetoric as 'to inform, to move, to please', Institutes of Oratory, I, Bk. III, Ch. V, 2.

123. Longinus On the Sublime, pp. 127-28. Later in the work he writes that 'to apply great and stately terms to trifling matters would be like putting a big tragic mask on a tiny child.', continuing, 'However, in poetry and....'. Unfortunately four pages of the manuscript are missing here, though it is interesting to speculate on the nature of the qualification. 'In the figures mentioned above there is a certain effect of color and a certain gravity which arises from the fact that the statement does not show itself in public with a bare face or avail itself of its own voice, but rather uses a strange voice. And thus it covers itself, as it were, with a cloud (still clear, however, under its cloud)....The thought that has arrived at elegant "color" by such means does not come so as to be clearly detected, but instead reveals itself through signs. It sheds its light from off to one side; it does not care to proceed directly into the light.' Geoffrey of Vinsauf The New Poetics (c.1210), translated by Jane Baltzell Kopp, in James J.Murphy (ed.) Three Medieval Rhetorical Arts (London, 1971), pp. 27-108, (pp. 71, 89).


127. Wordsworth 'Essay Supplementary to the Preface', p. 63. He does not use the word 'rhetoric' but the distinction he draws relies upon the concept of a rhetorical power in poetry.

129. Ibid., p. 4. 'Painting gives the object itself; poetry what it implies.' Hazlitt *Lectures on the English Poets*, p. 10.


135. 'The virtue of art', writes Emerson, 'lies in detachment, in sequesting one object from the embarrassing variety...The power to detach, and to magnify by detaching, is the essence of rhetoric in the hands of the orator and the poet. This rhetoric, or power to fix the momentary eminency of an object, - so remarkable in Burke, in Byron, in Carlyle, - the painter and the sculptor exhibit in colour and stone. The power depends on the depth of the artist's insight of that object he contemplates. For every object has its roots in central nature, and may of course be so exhibited to us as to represent the world. Therefore each work of genius is the tyrant of the hour, and concentrates attention on itself.' Ralph Waldo Emerson 'Art' in *Essays : First Series* (1841), *The Collected Works of ralph waldo Emerson : Volume II*, pp. 207-218, (p. 211). De Quincey, we might remember, defines the result of rhetoric as the mind's being left 'practically under the possession of a one-sided estimate.'

136. Aristotle *On the Art of Poetry* in Dorsch *Classical Literary Criticism*, pp. 29-75, (p. 33, (1448a)). (Hereafter referred to as *Poetics*.)


138. Samuel Johnson *The Rambler No. 4*, Saturday, March 31, 1750.

139. Joseph Addison *The Spectator No. 418*, Monday, 30 June, 1712. Duvignaud expresses a similar idea, when he writes that 'every significant
imagined action is a communication from a distance which is never reconciled to this distance.' Duvignaud Sociology of Art, p. 52.

140. Camus The Rebel, p. 237.

141. Ibid., p. 237.

142. Lawrence 'From Study of Thomas Hardy' p. 188.


145. Ibid., pp. 143-44.


147. Keats 'Ode on a Grecian Urn', 1. 20.


152. Robbe-Grillet 'A Future for the Novel' (1956) in For a New Novel, pp. 15-24, (p. 24). Roland Barthes considers the essence of Balzac's writing as exclusively a matter of cultural codes, that is, as made up of an 'army of stereotypes' and outdated maxims about 'life, death, suffering, love, women, ages of man, etc.'; 'Although entirely derived from books, these codes, by a swivel characteristic of bourgeois ideology, which turns culture into nature, appears to establish reality, "life". "Life" then, in the classic text, becomes a nauseating mixture of common opinions, a smothering layer of received ideas'. Roland Barthes S/Z (1970), translated by Richard Miller, (London, 1975), p. 206.


155. De Quincey 'Rhetoric', p. 92. Cicero, too, has some trouble, after proposing and then rejecting rhythm and verse, in differentiating between
the poet from the orator. His tentative solution is that poets 'have a
greater freedom in the formation and arrangement of words...and also that,
with the approval of some critics, they pay more attention to sound than
to sense.' Cicero Orator, 68.


158. John Stuart Mill 'What is Poetry?' (1833) in Mill's Essays on
Literature and Society, edited by J.B. Schneewind, (London, 1965), pp. 102-
117, (p. 109).

159. Henry James 'The Art of Fiction' (1884) in Selected Literary
Criticism, pp. 78-97, (p. 91). Compare; 'Art is limitation; the essence of
every picture is the frame.' G.K. Chesterton Orthodoxy (London, 1908), p. 69.


161. Heidegger '...Poetically Man Dwells...' (1954) in Poetry, Language,
Thought, pp. 211-29.

162. Robbe-Grillet 'A Future For the Novel', p. 19. Here one might
remember the 'filtering' effect of the subsidiary subject in metaphor.

163. Ibid., p. 23.

164. Ibid., p. 21.

165. If Robbe-Grillet truly believed the first part of his argument he
would scarcely be an author. Barthes also avoids this implication when he
writes of Literature 'having tended for a hundred years now to transmute
its surface into a form with no antecedents, could no longer find purity
anywhere but in the absence of all signs', and describes the work of
Camus, Blanchot, Cayrol, and Queneau, as exemplifying 'the degree zero of
writing'. Roland Barthes Writing Degree Zero (1953), translated by Annette
lavers and Colin Smith in Writing Degree Zero and Elements of Semiology,


167. Ibid., p. 369. 'Since therefore the faculty of eloquence is the key
which makes possible the winning of many either to virtue or to vice, why
not tie it in with the study of the virtues, so that it can battle for
truth just as the wicked now make it serve iniquity and error by
supporting ends that are perverse and evil?' Rabanus Maurus On the
Training of the Clergy, III. 19 (early ninth century) in Miller et al.
168. Ibid., p. 393.


170. Ibid., p. 286.

171. Ibid., p. 286.

172. The metaphors of science or philosophy need not be rhetorical, but only at the expense of being amenable to paraphrase, of being proposed expressly for the purpose of being replaced by better ones.


175. Sidney An Apologie for Poetrie, pp. 4, 16. He writes that, of all philosophers, it is Plato he has 'ever esteemed most worthy of reverence, and with good reason, since of all philosophers he is the most poetical.' p. 33. 'But because metaphysics is the sublime science which distributes their determinate subject mattex-s to all the so-called subaltern sciences; and becuase the wisdom of the ancients was that of the theological poets, who without doubt were the first sages of the gentile world; and because the origins of all things must by nature have been crude: for all these reasons we must trace the beginnings of poetic wisdom to a crude metaphysics.' Vico The New Science, Bk. II, § 367.


177. Lukács makes this point well, though I differ from him in believing that 'truth' has nothing to do with the relationship; 'true to life' is a property of a convincing argument not a true one. The effect of art, the immersion of the receptant in the action of the work of art, his complete penetration into the special "world" of the work of art, results from the fact that the work by its very nature offers a truer, more complete, more vivid and more dynamic reflection of reality than the receptant otherwise possesses, that it conducts him on the basis of his own experiences and on the basis of the organization and generalization of his previous reproduction or reality beyond the bounds of his experiences toward a more concrete insight into reality. It is therefore, only an illusion - as though the work itself were not a reflection of reality, as though the reader did not conceive of the special "world" as a reflection of reality and did not compare it with his own experiences. He acts consistently in accordance with this pretence, and the effect of the work of art ceases once the reader becomes aware of a contradiction, once he senses that the work of art is not an accurate reflection of reality. But this illusion is in any case necessary. For the reader does not consciously compare an individual experience with an isolated event of the work of art but
surrenders himself to the general effect of the work of art on the basis of his own assembled general experience.' Georg Lukács 'Art and Objective Truth' in Writer and Critic, pp. 25-60, (pp. 36-37).


179. An analytical proposition is one which can be proved from definitions by means of logical laws, for example 'Black cats are black', 'Bachelors are unmarried', 'All matter occupies space', the negation of which would be self-contradictory. Empirical propositions are ones which can be verified by recourse to observation.


181. Consider, for example, the tales of the young woman putting off her decision, or the waiter playing at being a waiter, or the narrator's fascination with the honey sliding off the spoon, in Jean-Paul Sartre Being and Nothingness : An Essay on Phenomenological Ontology (1943), translated by Hazel E.Barnes, (London, 1958), Pt. I, Ch. II, sec. 2, Pt. 4, Ch. II, sec. 3.


183. Likewise Kierkegaard's Concluding Unscientific Postscript is the story of a series of mental revolutions, a story which the reader must to some extent imitate to be able to follow at all.

184. I do not allude merely to scriptures that take the form of historical accounts, or to eschatological descriptions; doctrines of sin, forgiveness, and salvation are themselves narratives. Thus Bultmann, after outlining his program for 'demythologizing' the New Testament writes that 'the redemption of which we have spoken is not a miraculous supernatural event, but an historical event wrought out in time and space.' Rudolf Bultmann 'New Testament and Mythology' (1943) in Hans Werner Bartsch (ed.) Kerygma and Myth : A Theological Debate (1948), translated by Reginald H.Fuller, (London, 1953), pp. 1-44, (p. 43).


186. George Campbell 'Introduction' to The Philosophy of Rhetoric, p. 939.

187. This is what Merleau-Ponty, for example, appears to believe; 'The work of a great novelist always rests on two or three philosophical ideas. For Stendhal, these are the notions of the Ego and Liberty; for Balzac, the mystery of history as the appearance of a meaning in chance events; for
Proust, the way the past is involved in the present and the presence of times gone by. The function of the novelist is not to state these ideas thematically but to make them exist for us in the way that things exist. Stendhal's role is not to hold forth on subjectivity; it is enough that he makes it present.' Maurice Merleau-Ponty 'Metaphysics and the Novel' (1945), in Sense and Non-Sense (1948), translated by Hubert L. and Patricia A.Dreyfus, (Evanston, Ill, 1964), pp. 26-40, (p. 26). Compare Taine's assertion that 'art is a kind of philosophy made sensible, religion a poem taken for true, philosophy an art and religion dried up, and reduced to simple ideas.' Hippolyte Taine 'Introduction' to History of English Literature (1864), translated by H. van laun, 2 vols., (Edinburgh, 1871), I, pp. 1-21, (p. 15).

189. Shakespeare The Tempest, IV. 1, l. 156-58.
190. Wordsworth 'Lines Composed a few miles above Tintern Abbey' (1798), l. 91.
193. Ibid., p. 220.
194. The term 'rhetoric' is often used to characterize the relationship between author and reader, that is, the author's manipulation of the reader's response. Satire, for example, is a rich field for such study. However, such an approach presupposes that rhetoric is detachable from some element of the work. So it is, insofar as there are levels of rhetoric. But by cutting out the hypothetical author, or rather by realizing the hypothetical nature of this author, we are left with an overall rhetoric, the rhetoric of the work.
196. Ibid., p. 219.
197. Ibid., p. 221.
199. Ibid., pp. 136-37. 'The tragic emotion is not a response to the tragic course of events as such or to the justice of the fate that
overtakes the hero, but to the metaphysical order of being that is true for all. To see that "this is how it is" is a kind of self-knowledge for the spectator, who emerges with new insight from the illusions in which he lives. The tragic affirmation is an insight which the spectator has by virtue of the continuity of significance in which he places himself. Hans-Georg Gadamer Truth and Method (1960), translation of the second edition (1965) by Garrett Barden and John Cumming, (London, 1975), p. 117.

200. Ibid., pp. 137-38. Eliot probably comes closer to the truth when he writes that what poets like Dante present us with is not a philosophy but "the emotional and sense equivalent for a definite philosophical system". Eliot 'Introduction' (1930) to G.Wilson Knight The Wheel of Fire: Interpretations of Shakespearian Tragedy, With Three New Essays (1930), (London, 1965), pp. xiii-xx, (p. xiii).


203. Ibid., p. 257.

204. Ibid., p. 270.


206. Ibid., p. 34.

207. Ibid., pp. 36-37, 42.

208. Ibid., p. 43.

209. Ibid., p. 34.


212. Schopenhauer World as Will and Idea, I, § 1.

213. (Consider also the relationship between Schopenhauer's 'man's existence is a constant dying' and Webster's 'We...cease to die by dying.'
The White Devil, V, vi, 1. 251.) I have described 'meaningless' as rhetorical in this context because, far from suggesting an assertion the pragmatic consequences of which are confined to the emotional set of the person to whom they are significant, it suggests something that cannot be made significant, that is, pure gibberish.


215. It is just because, to continue the musical analogy, the shift from 'A' to 'A sharp' is so obvious in metaphor that we are not usually misled into taking the terms it uses at their denotational value. In the metaphysic of the novel this is not so obvious, since often the work can seem a mere transcription of the real rather than a metaphor of it.

216. William Wordsworth 'Preface' to the 1850 edition of Lyrical Ballads in The Prose Works of William Wordsworth, I, pp. 119-159, (p. 136). 'Whatever it is we know in this poem, we know only in the poem. It is not a knowledge we can extract from the poem...and carry off.' Archibald Macleish Poetry and Experience (London, 1960), p. 11. Macleish too talks of a meaning that 'goes straight to what we call the heart', p. 13. ('The problem is that this proof of the spirit and of power no longer has any spirit or power, but has sunk to the level of human testimonies of spirit and power...I deny that they can and should bind me to the very least faith in the other teachings of Christ. What then does bind me? Nothing but these teachings themselves.' G.E.Lessing 'On the Proof of the Spirit and of Power' (1777) in Theological Writings, edited and translated by Henry Chadwick, (London, 1956), pp. 51-56, (pp. 52, 55).)

217. There may be an argument here for assimilating certain metaphysical philosophers, at least as they are represented in those works where the interest is not primarily philosophical, into the literary canon.


219. Ibid., p. 29.

220. Ibid., p. 31. We might remember here Sidney's assertion that the poet 'never affirms and therefore never lieth.' See Chapter 2, fn. 12.


222. G.K.Chesterton 'The Optimism of Byron' in Twelve Types (London, 1910), pp. 31-44, (pp. 37-8). 'One of the best tests in the world of what a poet really means is his metre. He may be a hypocrite in his metaphysics, but he cannot be a hypocrite in his prosody. And all the time that Byron's language is of horror and emptiness, his metre is bounding "pas de quatre."' pp. 42-3. What I mean by 'metaphysic' would include what the prosody suggests as well.
223. So 'opinion : fact' as 'dreaming : consciousness', or 'what we call dreaming : what we call consciousness' as 'what we call consciousness : consciousness'. (The same proposition considered literally, as Descartes considers it in the first of his Meditations, quickly reveals itself to be 'meaningless' in precisely the same way as the idealist thesis is 'meaningless'.) The most austere anti-rhetorical statement can also become memorable, become rhetorical, simply through its austerity. Consider the opening of Wittgenstein's Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus; 'The world is all that is the case.' It is the antithesis of Schopenhauer's 'The world is my idea', but, like that phrase, it is given pride of place in the work, isolated, claiming for itself fundamental significance. The fact, then, that it is simply a tautology, paradoxically gives it a rhetorical impact.

224. Suggestibility changes with time, but at an impressionable age I believe that a hero is chosen as a model less for the qualities he/she possesses, which may be the most abject and self-destructive, than for the fact that he/she is the centre of attention.

225. We may also discover the connection between this and its prescriptions to be either logical or illogical. All these positive qualities might be subsumed under the heading of 'beauty', the other merit which Russell claims a metaphysic can possess, and tentatively define this problematic concept as that property which a thing or idea possess when it embodies for us the end of a desire.


227. Peirce 'How to Make Our Ideas Clear'.


229. Mazzoni draws a parallel between the rhetorician who personifies vice and virtue and the tale which presents the two as figures in the action; 'It seems to me, then, it can be reasonably said that poetry deserves to be classified under the ancient sophistic, since poetry too deals with all things according to the credible, and speaks of them with great pride, as professing to know all things through the aid of Appollo and the Muses.' Mazzoni On the Defense of the Comedy, p. 368. Is this not precisely the sort of dualism which Lawrence constructs out of Jude the Obscure in his Study of Thomas Hardy?


231. Thomas De Quincey 'The Poetry of Pope' (1848) in The Collected Writings of Thomas De Quincey, XI (1897), pp. 51-97, (pp. 56-57).

232. Sartre What is Literature?, pp. 27, 38.
233. Ibid., p. 42.

234. Chesterton *Twelve Types*, pp. 36-7.

235. One may read poetry as if sampling different viewpoints but narrative requires immersion.

236. Lawrence 'Morality and the Novel', p. 110.


238. Gestures, of the grand sort, are the quintessence of this desire to make life 'literary'. Lukács essay on Kierkegaard, 'The Foundering of Form Against Life' (1909), is interesting in this regard but falls into the inevitable paradox of giving Kierkegaard's life a "form" through the very terms he uses to deny that Kierkegaard's life had one. Georg Lukács *Soul and Form* (1971), translated by Anna Bostock, (London, 1974), pp. 28-41.

239. Oscar Wilde 'The Decay of Lying' in *Intentions*, pp. 1-54, (p. 53). Like Hazlitt, Shklovsky too describes everyday perception as 'prose perception' in his 'Art as Technique' (1917) in Lee T.Lemon and Marion J.Reis (eds.) *Russian Formalist Criticism : Four Essays* (Lincoln, 1965), pp. 5-24, (p. 11). Take, for example, aphorisms and maxims - though their history is predominantly oral they fall within the category of the written word, for they are 'written into' the language, in that their form is fixed, so that uttering one is like pointing to a text.

240. 'Each of us simply creates for himself an illusion of the world which may be poetic, sentimental, joyful or melancholy, sordid or lugubrious according to his nature. And the writer has no other mission than to reproduce this illusion faithfully with all the artistic techniques he has learned and can bring to bear....The great artists are those who impose their personal illusion upon humanity.' Guy de Maupassant 'The Novel' (1887) preface to *Pierre and Jean* (1888), translated by Leonard Tancock, (Harmondsworth, 1979), 21-35, (pp. 27-28).

Chapter V: Evaluation


2. 'A species cannot do otherwise but thus affirm itself alone. Its lowest instinct, that of self-preservation and self-expansion, still radiates in such sublimities... At bottom, man mirrors himself in things; the judgement "beautiful" is the vanity of the species. For a little suspicion may whisper this question into the sceptic's ear: Is the world really beautified by the fact that man thinks it is beautiful.' Nietzsche Twilight of the Idols, pp. 525-26. The answer is, of course, yes.


10. This definition of art is actually put forward in George Dickie's 'The Institutional Concept of Art' where he writes that 'Something is art because of the place it has in a certain social system...A work of art in the classificatory sense is (1) an artifact (2) upon which some person or persons acting on behalf of a certain social institution (the Artworld) have conferred the status of candidate for appreciation.' in Benjamin R.Tilgham (ed.) Language and Aesthetics : Contributions to the Philosophy of Art (Laurence, Kansas, 1973), pp. 21-30, (pp. 30, 25).


12. Ibid., p. 25.

13. The very concept of value implies comparison. Howell's writes that 'The time is coming, I hope, when each new author, each new artist, will be considered, not in his proportion to any other author or artist, but in his relation to the human nature, known to us all, which it is his privilege, his high duty, to interpret.' W.D.Howell's Criticism and Fiction (New York, 1891), p. 8. But this is ingenious, for, as Johnson writes, 'As among the works of nature no man can properly call a river deep or a mountain high without the knowledge of many mountains and many rivers; so in the productions of genius, nothing can be styled excellent till it be compared with other works of the same kind.' Samuel Johnson 'Preface' to The Plays of William Shakespeare (1765) in The Yale Edition of the Works of Samuel Johnson, vol. VII, Johnson on Shakespeare, edited by Arthur Sherbo, (London, 1968), pp. 59-113, (p. 60). Thus Eliot writes that a writer cannot be evaluated in a vacuum but 'you must set him, for contrast and comparison, among the dead. I mean this as a principle of aesthetic, not historical criticism.' T.S.Eliot 'Tradition and the Individual Talent' (1919) The Sacred Wood : Essays on Poetry and Criticism (1920), second edition, (London, 1928), pp. 47-59, (p. 49). Eliot's concept of the necessity of periodically setting 'the poets and poems in a new order.' has been declared, by some critics, to be the whole of the project of criticism ('Matthew Arnold' (1933) in The Use of Poetry and the Use of Criticism : Studies in the Relation of Criticism to Poetry in England (London, 1933), pp. 103-119, (p. 108)). Thus Sainte-Beuve writes 'Is the work good or is it bad? This is the whole extent of the critical province.' Sainte-Beuve quoted in George Saintsbury (ed.) Loci Critici : Passages Illustrative of Critical Theory and Practice from Aristotle Onwards (London, 1903), p. 418. And Santayana that; 'To substitute judgements of fact for judgements of value, is a sign of a pedantic and borrowed criticism. If we approach a work of art or nature scientifically, for the sake of its historical connexions or proper classification, we do not approach it aesthetically.' George Santayana The Sense of Beauty : Being the Outline of Aesthetic Theory (London, 1896), p. 20. As evidence of this last I quote Maupassant who, beginning from premisses much like Frye's is led into intentionalism; 'A critic really worthy of the name should be simply an analyst, without bias, with preferences, without passions and, like an expert in pictures,
should only appraise the artistic value of the work of art submitted to him. His understanding, open to everything, should so override his own personality that he can reveal and praise even books that as a man he dislikes and that as a judge he is obliged to comprehend....The critic should judge the result only in relation to the nature of the effort; he has no right to concern himself with trends.' Guy de Maupassant 'The Novel' (1887) Preface to Pierre and Jean (1888), translated by Leonard Tancock, (Harmondsworth, 1979), pp. 21-35, (pp. 22-23).


15. Ibid., pp. 68-9.

16. 'To works, however, of which the excellence is not absolute and definite, but gradual and comparative; to works not raised upon principles demonstrative and scientific, but appealing wholly to observation and experience, no other test can be applied than length of duration and continuance of esteem...[What] has been longest known has been most considered, and what is most considered is best understood.' Samuel Johnson 'Preface' to Plays of William Shakespeare, pp. 59-60.

17. According to D'Alembert the true critic will neither attribute 'the pleasures that arise from poetry...entirely to nature on the one hand, nor wholly to opinion on the other.' but 'by examining attentively this difference...will be able at length to determine how far the pleasures we receive...are influenced by habit; what real additions they derive from thence, and what imaginary ones they receive from opinion.' Jean le Rond d'Alembert Reflections on the Use and Abuse of Philosophy In Matters that are properly relative to Taste (1757) in Gerard Essay on Taste (1759), pp. 209-250, (p. 232). Sainte-Beuve, also, defines a 'true classic' as 'an author who has enriched the human mind, increased its treasure, and caused it to advance a step; who has discovered some moral and not equivocal truth, or revealed some eternal passion in that heart where all seemed known and discovered; who has expressed his thought, observation, or invention, in no matter what form, only provided it be broad and great, refined and sensible, sane and beautiful in itself; who has spoken to all in his own peculiar style, a style which is found to be also that of the whole world, a style new without neologism, new and old, easily contemporary with all time.' Charles-Augustin Sainte-Beuve 'What Is a Classic?'(1850) in Essays by Sainte-Beuve, translated by Elizabeth Lee, (London, 1892), pp. 1-12, (pp.3-4). Frye himself, in his conclusion to Anatomy, writes that 'The goal of ethical criticism is transvaluation, the ability to look at contemporary social values with the detachment of one who is able to compare them in some degree with the infinite vision of possibilities presented by culture. One who possesses such a standard of transvaluation is in a state of intellectual freedom. One who does not possess it is a creature of whatever social values get to him first: he has only the compulsions of habit, indoctrination, and prejudice.' Frye Anatomy, p. 348.
18. Friedrich Schiller *On the Aesthetic Education of Man*, p. 77 (Fifteenth Letter).


20. Ibid., §§ 11, 6. 'The consciousness of the causality of imagining the state of the subject as one tending to preserve a continuance of that state, may be said here to denote in a general way what is called pleasure; whereas displeasure is that imagining which contains the ground for converting the state of the images into their opposites for hindering or removing them.' Ibid., § 10.

21. Ibid., §§ 1-6. 'This superior Power of Perception is justly called a Sense, because of its Affinity to the other Senses in this, that the Pleasure does not arise from any Knowledge of principles, Proportions, causes, or of the Usefulness of the Object; but strikes us at first with the Idea of Beauty.' Hutcheson *Enquiry*, I, xiii.

22. Montesquieu 'Essay on Taste', p. 258. Samuel Taylor Coleridge *A Course of Lectures* (1818) in *Coleridge's Essays and Lectures On Shakespeare and Some Other Old Poets and Dramatists* (Everyman, 1907), pp. 213-385, (p. 314, 'Lecture XIII 'On Poesy or Art'). 'In my judgement, no writer can be called a novelist unless he possess the gift of forgetting, and thereby making us forget, the reality beyond the walls of his novel. Let him be realistic as can be; that is to say, let the microcosm of his novel consist of unquestionably true-to-life elements - he will have lost out if he cannot keep us from remembering that there exists an extramural world. Hence every novel is still-born that is laden with transcendental intentions, be they political, ideological, symbolical, or satirical. For those themes are of such a nature that they cannot be dealt with fictitiously, they have meaning only in relation to the actual horizon of each individual. As soon as they are broached we feel expelled from the imaginary sphere of the novel and compelled to establish contact with the absolute realm on which our real existence depends.' José Ortega y Gasset 'Notes on the Novel' in *The Dehumanization of Art and Notes on the Novel* (1925), translated by Helene Weyl, (Princeton, 1948), pp. 57-103, (pp. 92-93). Apropos the definition of metaphysics in the last chapter we might say that this is because beauty is subliminal desire - once we become aware of the explicitness of the solution it becomes involved in the relationship with reality which reveals its contingency too plainly. 'It is...exactly because Hecuba is nothing to us that her sorrows are so suitable a motive for tragedy.' Oscar Wilde 'The Decay of Lying' in *Intentions* (London, 1891), pp. 1-54, (p. 53).


27. Montesquieu 'Essay on Taste', p. 265. His definition of 'excellence' is, therefore, not surprisingly, a formal one; that it is 'in proportion to the number of feelings which [the work] produce at the same instant in the mind.' pp. 289-90.


33. Ibid., pp. 207-208.

34. Joseph Addison *Spectator No. 70*, Monday, 12 May 1711.


36. Ibid., pp. 214, 218-19. Montesquieu likewise claims that there are three different sources of pleasure for the mind - 'one in its internal faculties and essence, another in its union with the body, and a third in those impressions and prejudices, that are the result of certain institutions, customs and habits.' - and that those pleasures which are 'peculiar to its spiritual nature' arise 'from curiosity, from the ideas of its own existence, grandeur and perfections, from the faculty of taking a general and comprehensive view of things, of contemplating a great variety of objects, and of comparing, combining and separating its own ideas.' Montesquieu 'Essay on Taste', pp. 257, 260.


38. Addison *Spectator No 411*, Saturday, 21 June 1712.

40. Gerard *Essay on Taste* (1780), p. 188.


42. D'Alembert *Reflexions*, p. 246.

43. Ibid., p. 234.

44. A.J.Ayer *Language, Truth and Logic* (1936), second edition, (London, 1946), p. 113. Compare Wittgenstein; 'The sense of the world must lie outside the world. In the world everything is as it is, and everything happens as it does happen: in it no value exists - and if it did exist, it would have no value. If there is any value that does have value, it must lie outside the whole sphere of what happens and is the case. For all that happens and is the case is accidental. What makes it non-accidental cannot lie within the world, since if it did it would itself be accidental. It must lie outside the world. So too it is impossible for there to be propositions of ethics. Propositions can express nothing that is higher. It is clear that ethics cannot be put into words. Ethics is transcendental. (Ethics and aesthetics are one and the same.)' Ludwig Wittgenstein *Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus* (1921), translated by D.F.Pears and B.F.McGuinness, (London, 1961), §§ 6.41-6.421.


46. Ibid., pp. 113-14. Compare Isenberg; 'I may be stretching usage by the senses I am about to assign to certain words, but it seems that the critic's meaning is "filled in," "rounded out," or "completed" by the act of perception, which is performed not to judge the truth of his description but in a certain sense to understand it. And if communication is a process by which a mental content is transmitted by symbols from one person to another, then we can say that it is a function of criticism to bring about communication at the level of the senses; that is, to induce a sameness of vision, of experienced content. If this is accomplished, it may or may not be followed by agreement, or what is called "communion" - a community of feeling which expresses itself in identical value judgements.' Arnold Isenberg 'Critical Communication' (1948) in *Aesthetics and the Theory of Criticism: Selected Essays of Arnold Isenberg*, edited and William Callaghan et al., (London, 1973), pp. 156-171, (p. 163).


48. 'When we judge something to be good we always judge it to be good in respect of some property, and it is a question of empirical fact whether it has this property or not....It is an essential feature of judgements that
they are made by reference to standards or criteria; but it is necessary to be extremely careful in discussing the way in which the criteria are related to the verdict or appraisal.' P.H.Nowell-Smith Ethics (Harmondsworth, 1954), p. 164.

49. Monroe C.Beardsley Aesthetics : Problems in the Philosophy of Criticism (New York, 1958), pp. 484, 486. Ducasse, who holds that beauty cannot be proved by appeal to technical principles or canons, writes that 'Tastes can be neither proved nor refuted, but only "called names," i.e., praised or reviled.' Curt J.Ducasse The Philosophy of Art (New York, 1929), Ch. 15, § 13.

50. 'The] Good, which lies beyond, is the Fountain at once and Principle of Beauty: the Primal Good and the Primal Beauty have the one dwelling place and, thus, always, Beauty's seat is There.' Plotinus The Enneads (written 253-270), translated by Stephen MacKenna (1917-1930), third edition revised by B.S.Page, (London, 1962), p. 64.


54. 'The beautiful is neither more nor less than the promise of happiness.' Stendhal De l'Amour, Bk. 1, Ch. 17.

55. Something of this idea is perhaps realized in Schiller's identification of the Beautiful with play; 'Reason demands, on transcendental grounds, that there shall be a partnership between the formal [rational] and the material [sensuous] impulse, that is to say a play impulse, because it is only the union of reality, of contingency with necessity, of passivity with freedom, that fulfils the conception of humanity.' 'Play' he defines as 'everything that is neither outward nor inward necessity,' and our nature 'in the contemplation of the Beautiful, in a happy midway point between law and exigency.' It is, he continues, 'precisely play, and play alone, that makes man complete and displays at once his two-fold nature' for '[Man] is only wholly Man when he is playing. 'This proposition,' he concludes, 'will, I promise you, support the whole fabric of aesthetic art.' Schiller On the Aesthetic Education of Man, pp. 76-80 (Fifteenth Letter). Gadamer, too, connects art with play, though not with reference to its creator nor to the attitude of mind of those enjoying the work, but rather to 'the mode of being of the work of art itself.' Hans-Georg Gadamer Truth and Method (1960), translation of the

56. Plotinus suggests that in perceiving beauty 'the Soul itself acts immediately, affirming the beautiful where it finds something accordant with the Ideal-Form within itself, using this Idea as a canon of accuracy in its decision.' Plotinus, p. 58. What Plotinus has to say on beauty is of great interest here: 'Let us, then, go back to the source, and indicate at once the Principle that bestows beauty on material things. Undoubtedly the Principle exists; it is something that is perceived at the first glance, something which the Soul names as from ancient knowledge and, recognizing, welcomes it, enters into unison with it....This then is how the material thing becomes beautiful - by communicating in the thought (Reason, Logos) that flows from the Divine....Thus there is in the Nature-Principle itself an Ideal archetype of the beauty that is found in material forms and, of that archetype again, the still more beautiful archetype in Soul, source of that in Nature....The beauty in things of a lower order - actions and pursuits for instance - comes by operation of the shaping Soul which is also the author of the beauty found in the world of sense. For the Soul, a divine thing, a fragment as it were of the Primal Beauty, makes beautiful to the fullness of their capacity all things whatsoever that it grasps and moulds.' Plotinus The Enneads, pp. 57, 58, 424, 61.

57. I would suggest that the making conscious of the antitype and the perception of it as unsatisfactory are, in fact, inseparable phenomena. Furthermore our spontaneous 'reaction' of beauty begins to fade as soon as we can begin to imagine what it would be like not to find the work beautiful. This is 'growing out of' a thing.

58. Nowell-Smith Ethics, p. 164.


60. One example of such bogus criteria might be Barthe's distinction between the lisible (readerly) work, that is, the work the form of which is sufficiently familiar for the reader to passively consume, and the scriptible (writerly) work, that is, the work that the reader must actively cooperate in producing. These are evaluative criteria and while the nineteenth-century novel falls largely into the first category, the modern novel falls largely into the second and best, according to Barthes. However it could be argued with equal plausibility that the very friction which the lisible work creates, or should create if we read it as a literary work, through its system of implied values makes such a work more scriptible.
than the newer work which by leaving space for our cooperation makes that cooperation effortless. Obviously the usefulness of any distinction that can be argued so easily either way is questionable. See Barthes S/Z. (Apropos this evaluative standard compare Anatole France; 'All books in general, and even the most admirable, seem to me infinitely less precious for what they contain than for what he who reads them puts into them. The best, in my opinion, are those that are most suggestive, and suggestive of the most diverse things.' On Life and Letters : Second Series (1888-1893), translated by A.W.Evans, (London, 1914), pp. xi-xii.


62. Ducasse Philosophy of Art, Ch. 15, § 15.

63. "Significance", again, is a word that doesn't admit of close definition, and, again, the critic can't do without it. It points to the wholeness of a created work to that which makes it one - to the principle of life that determines its growth and organization. Observations regarding "significance" are intimately bound up with judgements regarding "value"; the two terms are in close attendance upon one another. Discussion of "significance" entails in the most challenging way the anti-Aesthetic reference to life ('Art and Life' - we use the antithesis, knowing that we are not judging it to be meaningless, or anything but useful, when we remind ourselves that art is a manifestation of life or it is nothing'). Henry James quoted in F.R.Leavis 'James as Critic' (1963), preface to Henry James : Selected Literary Criticism, edited by Morris Shapira, (1963), (Harmondsworth, 1968), pp. 13-24, (pp. 18-19).


65. Moreover, for this reason a person who constantly uses the construction 'I like...' appears more rather than less egotistical than if they use the objectifying formula, for they are stating their preferences twice over.


67. Ibid., p. 48.


69. Ibid., 387b, p. 141.

70. A more contemporary idea of censorship can be found in Aristotle's Politics, 1336b 12, or Plato's Laws, 7.801A-8.829C.

72. Ibid., 605c-607a, pp. 436-37.

73. Ibid., 608a-b, pp. 438-39. A much more sinister expression of the necessity of deferring to ideology is to be found in Althusser; "If it is a matter of knowing art, it is absolutely essential to begin with "rigorous reflection on the basic concepts of Marxism": there is no other way. And when I say, "it is essential to begin...", it is not enough to say it, it is essential to do it... Now I believe that the only way we can hope to reach a real knowledge of art, to go deeper into the specificity of the work of art, to know the mechanisms which produce the "aesthetic effect", is precisely to spend a long time and pay the greatest attention to the "basic principles of Marxism" and not to be in a hurry to "move on to something else", for if we move on too quickly to "something else" we shall arrive not at a knowledge of art, but at an ideology of art: e.g., at the latent humanist ideology which may be induced by what you say about the relations between art and the "human", and about artistic "creation", etc. Louis Althusser 'A Letter on Art in Reply to André Daspre' (1966), translated by Ben Brewster, in Lenin and Philosophy and Other Essays (London, 1971), pp. 203-208, (pp. 207-208).


75. Ibid., p. 378.

76. Auguste Comte A General View of Positivism (1848), translated by J.H.Bridges (1865), second edition, (London, 1880), p. 310. 'Government of human life they had never supposed to fall within their province. Indeed no sane man would lay it down as a proposition that Imagination should control the other mental faculties. It would imply that the normal condition of the intellect was insanity; insanity being definable as that state of mind in which subjective inspirations are stronger than objective judgements.', p. 308.

77. Ibid., pp. 325, 318.

78. Ibid., p. 315.


80. 'Literature must become part of the common cause of the proletariat, "a cog and a screw" of the single great Social-Democratic mechanism set in motion by the entire politically conscious vanguard of the entire working class. Literature must become a component of organized, planned and integrated Social-Democratic Party work.' V.I.Lenin 'Party Organization and Party Literature' (1905) in V.I.Lenin Collected Works, 45 vols., (Moscow, 1960-1970), Volume 10 : November 1905 - June 1906, edited by Andrew
Rothstein, (Moscow, 1962), pp. 44-49, (p. 45). 'What must be the criteria on
which the evaluation of a work of literature should be based? Let us first
of all approach this from the point of view of content. Here, generally,
everything is clear. Here the basic criterion is the same as that of
proletarian ethics: everything that aids the development and victory of
the proletariat is good; everything that harms it is evil. The Marxist
critic must try to find the fundamental social trend in a given work; he
must find out where it is heading, whether this process is arbitrary or
not. And he must base his evaluation on this fundamental social and
dynamic idea.' Anatoly V. Lunacharsky 'Theses on the Problems of Marxist
Criticism' (1926) in On Literature and Art, translated by Avril Pyman and

81. Etienne Balibar and Pierre Macherey 'On Literature as an Ideological
Form' (1978) translated by Ian McLeod, John Whitehead and Ann Wordsworth
in Robert Young (ed.) Untying the Text: A Post-Structuralist Reader

82. Ibid., pp. 83-4.

83. Ibid., pp. 88, 87.

84. Ibid., pp. 88-89.

85. Ibid., p. 86.

86. Ibid., p. 84.

87. Ibid., p. 96.

88. Likewise Althusser, in attempting to give art a political seriousness,
finds himself trying and failing (as the innumerable italics, quotation
marks, and persuasive definitions testify) to say that literature both is
and is not the conveying of knowledge. 'I do not rank real art among the
ideologies, although art does have a quite particular and specific
relationship with ideology...Art (I mean authentic art, not works of an
average or mediocre level) does not give us a knowledge in the strict
sense, it therefore does not replace knowledge (in the modern sense:
scientific knowledge), but what it gives us does nevertheless maintain a
certain specific relationship with knowledge. This relationship is not one
of identity but one of difference....I believe that the peculiarity of art is
to "make us see" (nous donner à voir), "makes us perceive", "makes us feel"
something which alludes to reality....What art makes us see, and therefore
gives to us in the form of "seeing", "perceiving" and "feeling" (which is
not the form of knowing), is the ideology from which it is born, in which
it bathes, from which it detaches itself as art, and to which it
alludes....Neither Balzac nor Solzhenitsyn gives us any knowledge of the
world they describe, they only make us "see", "perceive" or "feel" the
reality of the ideology of that world....Ideology is also an object of

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science, the "lived experience" is also an object of science, the "individual" is also an object of science. The real difference between art and science lies in the specific form in which they give us the same object in quite different ways: art in the form of "seeing" and "perceiving" or "feeling", science in the form of knowledge (in the strict sense, by concepts). The same thing can be said in other terms. If Solzhenitsyn does "make us see" the "lived experience" (in the sense defined earlier) of the "cult of personality" and its effects, in no way does he give us knowledge of them: this knowledge is the conceptual knowledge of the complex mechanisms which eventually produce the "lived experience" that Solzhenitsyn's novel discusses. And so on, and so on. Louis Althusser 'A Letter on Art in Reply to André Daspre' (1966) in Lenin and Philosophy and Other Essays (London, 1971), pp. 203-208, (pp. 203-204).


91. T.S.Eliot 'Religion and Literature' (1935) in Essays Ancient and Modern (London, 1936), pp. 93-112, (p. 93). Moreover Eliot appears to enforce the false distinction between 'moral' and 'intrinsic' evaluative criteria when he writes that 'The 'greatness' of literature cannot be determined solely by literary standards', p. 93.

92. Giraldi Cinthio On the Composition of Comedies and Tragedies (1543) translated by Allan H.Gilbert in Gilbert Literary Criticism, pp. 252-262, (p. 252). Minturno L'Arte Poetica, p. 290. Giambattista Guarini The Compendium of Tragicomic Poetry translated by Allan H.Gilbert in Gilbert Literary Criticism, pp. 505-533, (pp. 514-19). Interestingly Guarini writes elsewhere that the purging aspect of tragedy is now superfluous 'since we have the precepts of our most holy religion, which teaches us with the word of the gospel.', p. 523.


92. Eliot 'Religion and Literature', pp. 100-104. (One might compare Chapter IV of Jeremy Collier's A Short View of the Immorality and Profaneness of the English Stage (London, 1698).) While I would certainly agree about the effects of the 'author's approval', the nature of this approval is a very complicated matter - perhaps the complicated matter of criticism. A common critical error - at least one that I was commonly encouraged to make - is to believe that if, for example, there are two female characters in a work and both are unsympathetic then the work is
misogynistic, or if there is an unsympathetic Jewish character then the work is anti-Semitic. Whether or not this is so depends not upon the number or type of the characters at all but on, firstly, the type of presentation and, secondly, the reader. From the point of view of the reader any woman or Jew, however portrayed, will become 'women' or 'Jews' if the reader already sees these two as homogenous groups, as possessing an essence other than biological, in the case of women, or genetic, in the case of Jews. If the reader does see a group as homogenous then they will inevitably read any representative of that group as symbolic of the whole. Reading, as a man, one may tend to take a man as a type or as 'Mankind' but not, except under special circumstances, as 'Men', while a woman can appear as 'Woman'. The picture, with regard to reading as a woman is, due to the influence of the various schools of feminism, more complicated. To describe the reading of a work as 'male' or 'female' is, however, only away of characterizing its shortcomings, for readings are either narrow or comprehensive, subtle or crude, idiosyncratic or balanced, good or bad.

95. Count Leo Tolstoy What is Art? (1898) in Tolstoy on Art, edited and translated by Aylmer Maude, (Oxford, 1925), pp. 121-357, (pp. 331-32)


97. Howells Criticism and Fiction, p. 188. The exceptions are, of course, those critics who aspire to a scientific model, though even here the very aspiration is a homage to usefulness.


99. Ibid., p. 28.

100. See, for example, 'To Civilize Our Gentlemen' in Language and Silence (London, 1965). I am in a curious historical situation; although the generation which experienced the war spoke a great deal, as people often do after terrible things, about the uselessness and inappropriateness of speech, the generation which came of age in the '60's seems, at this short distance at least, to have been, in contrast, optimistic on a grand scale almost to the point of feeble-mindedness. Today my instinct is to consider Steiner's question as being, like the proposed marriage of intellectual endeavour and social revolution in the late 1960's, too naive even to merit discussion. Yet one cannot live the life only of one's times, gently drifting down the river of received opinion; to do so is barely to be alive at all. In this thesis I am principally concerned with how to 'read' literature honestly, rather than with why should read literature at all, but this project itself implies a concern with standards in education, a concern with cause and effect, with the future.

102. Ibid., pp. 113-14. 'But when you treat a picture as a work of art, you
have, unconsciously perhaps, made a far more important moral judgement.
You have assigned it to a class of objects so powerful and direct as means
to spiritual exaltation that all minor merits are inconsiderable.
Paradoxical as it may seem, the only relevant qualities in a work of art,
judged as art, are artistic qualities: judged as a means to good, no other
qualities are worth considering; for there are no qualities of greater
moral value than artistic qualities, since there is no greater means to
good art.' p. 117.

103. D.H.Lawrence 'Morality and the Novel' (1925) in Selected Literary
This declaration against morality in the novel is a famous one, yet the
majority of Lawrence's own critiques consist of the explicit setting forth
of his own moral criteria - few critics have ever so relentlessly demanded
and pursued morality in works of art. Rarely has a critic been so explicit
about his own morality.

104. Charles-Pierre Baudelaire 'Of Virtuous Plays and Novels' (1851) in
Selected Writings on Art and Artists, translated by P.E.Charvet,
(Harmondsworth, 1972), pp. 108-114, (p. 111), and 'Théophile Gautier' (1859)
in same, pp. 256-264, (p. 266).

105. Baudelaire 'Further Notes on Edgar Poe' (1857) in Selected Writings,
pp. 188-208, (pp. 203-204).

106. Ibid., p. 204.

107. Baudelaire 'Of Virtuous Plays and Novels', 108. 'Is there such a thing
as a pernicious form of art? Yes! The form that distorts the underlying
conditions of life,...I defy anyone to find one single work of imagination
that satisfies the conditions of beauty and is at the same time a
pernicious work.' pp. 111-12. Perhaps the most telling quotation about this
relationship between ideology, morality, and aestheticism, comes from
Arnold himself, who, as we have seen, believed that literature addresses
the question 'How to live?'. The principle rule for criticism, he writes, is
disinterestedness; 'And how is criticism to show disinterestedness? By
keeping aloof from what is called "the practical view of things;" by
resolutely following the law of its own nature, which is to be a free play
of the mind on all subjects which it touches. By steadily refusing to lend
itself to any...ulterior, political, practical considerations about
ideas...which criticism has really nothing to do with.' Matthew Arnold


110. 'Art should be independent of all clap-trap - should stand alone, and appeal to the artistic sense of eye or ear, without confounding this with emotions entirely foreign to it, as devotion, pity, love, patriotism and the like. All these have no kind of concern with it', James McNeill Whistler 'Whistler' The Great Artists, Volume 19 (London 1985). '[Art's] business is not to do good on other grounds, but to be good on her own...Art for art's sake first of all', Swinburne quoted in Pater The Renaissance, p. 458.

111. Pater The Renaissance, pp. 188-190.

112. Oscar Wilde 'The Decay of Lying' in Intentions (London, 1891), pp. 1-54, (p. 52). Kant had written that '[There] neither is, nor can be, a science of the beautiful, and the judgement of taste is not determinable by principles.' (Critique of Judgement, § 60, p. 225). Despite that he talks of 'the beautiful' as that 'which pleases in the mere estimate of it (not in sensation nor by means of a concept).' (§ 45, p. 167), and also talks of the perfection of taste through education (§ 60, pp. 226-27). This makes sense, however in conjunction with his definition of taste as 'a critical faculty that judges the rendering of moral ideas in terms of sense', for he then declares that 'the true propaedeutic for laying the foundations of taste is the development of moral ideas and the culture of moral feeling.' (§ 60, p. 227). Hence he implies that the 'moral ideas' are unconnected with a 'concepts'; 'fine art must be clothed with the aspect of nature, although we recognize it to be art. But the way in which a product of art seems like nature, is by the presence of perfect exactness in the agreement with rules prescribing how alone the produce can be what it is intended to be, but with an absence of laboured effort, (without academic form betraying itself,) i.e. without a trace appearing of the artist having always had the rule present to him and of it having fettered his mental powers.' (§ 45, p. 167).

113. 'I am extremely anxious to avoid rhetorical exaggeration. I do not think I am guilty of one in asserting that he who has not been "presented to the freedom" of literature has not wakened up out of his prenatal sleep. He is merely not born. He can't see; he can't hear; he can't feel, in any full sense. He can only eat his dinner.' Arnold Bennett Literary Taste: How to form it, with detailed instructions for collecting a complete library of English Literature (1909), edited with additional lists by Frank Swinnerton, (Harmondsworth, 1938), p. 15.


115. Pater goes on to say that it is only ideas or systems 'we have not identified with ourselves' that have 'no real claims upon us', but this contradicts the sense of our quotation. The Renaissance, p. 189. He is saying that it is right to believe an idea that one really believes!

116. Adorno quoted in Martin Jay Adorno (London, 1984), p. 155. 'The concept of artistic commitment has to be used circumspectly. If it is
employed as a yardstick to censor art, then it merely serves to reinforce that domination to which art stood opposed long before anybody conceived the idea of commitment.' Theodor Adorno Aesthetic Theory (1970), translated by C.Lenhardt, edited by Gretel Adorno and Rolf Tiedemann, (London, 1984), p. 349.

117. Breton, likewise, takes back with one hand what he gives with the other: 'The sole duty of the poet and the artist is to oppose a firm NO to all disciplinary formulas. The ignoble word engagement, which caught on after the war, reeks of a servility which both poetry and art can only loath.' But for Breton 'all contemporary art worthy of the name can tend towards nothing in the end but unconditional defence of a single cause, that of the liberation of man.' André Breton 'Second Ark' (1947) translated by Francis Scarfe in What is Surrealism? Selected Writings, edited by Franklin Rosemont, (London, 1978), pp. 267-272, (pp. 272-270). Indeed, if what this phrase means is the valuing of art for what we see as valuable in it, then, it could be the motto of everyone who values it for whatever reason.


119. 'And we should give [poetry's] defenders, men who aren't poets themselves but who love poetry, a chance of defending her in prose and proving that she doesn't only give pleasure but brings lasting benefit to human life and human society. And we will listen favourably, as we shall gain much if we find her a source of profit as well as pleasure.' Plato The Republic, 607d-e, p. 438.

120. A similar distinction is drawn in Colvin's review of Pater's Renaissance, in which he calls the 'Conclusion' a 'masterpiece of style' but says that the 'philosophy' expounded 'is not ours', (quoted in Pater The Renaissance, p. 445. Colvin sympathizes with that aspect of Pater's metaphysic which delights in the evocation of the sensuous, but he dissents from its evolution into sensuality.


122. Wilde 'Preface' to Dorian Gray.


124. Ibid., pp. 8-9.


127. Ibid., p. 131. 'We may perhaps venture to assert, that every appetite and passion in our nature, except avarice alone, or the love of money for the sake of hoarding, derives its origin and its vigour, in a great measure, from those ideas which imagination borrows from taste, and associates with the object of that passion. This being the case, the passions will naturally receive one tincture or another, in every man, according to the particular constitution of his taste.', p. 187. 'In order to give the foregoing observations their full weight, it is necessary to remember, that many different causes concur in forming the characters of men. Taste is but one of these causes; and not one of the most powerful.', p. 194.


129. T.S.Eliot 'Introduction' to *The Use of Poetry and the Use of Criticism*, pp. 13-36 (pp. 35-36). In a footnote to this he writes 'I refuse to be drawn into any discussion of the definitions of "personality" and "character".'

130. Richards *Principles*, p. 57. 'They are the most formative of experiences, because in them the development and systematization of our impulses goes to the furthest lengths. In ordinary life a thousand considerations prohibit for most of us any complete working out of our response; the range and complexity of the impulse-systems involved is less; the need for action, the comparative uncertainty and vagueness of the situation, the intrusion of accidental irrelevancies, inconvenient temporal spacing - the action being too slow or too fast - all these obscure the issue and prevent the full development of the experience. We have to jump to some rough and ready solution. But in the 'imaginative experience' these obstacles are removed. Thus what happens here, what precise stresses, preponderances, conflicts, resolutions and interinanimations, what remote relationships between different systems of impulses arise, what before unapprehended and inexecutable connections are established, is a matter which, we see clearly, may modify all the rest of life.', pp. 237-38.

131. Ibid., p. 59.

132. Ibid., p. 62.


136. Ibid., p. 219.
138. Saint-Evremond Of Tragedy, Ancient and Modern (1672) translated by Olga Marx Perlzweig in Gilbert Literary Criticism, pp. 659-663, (pp. 660, 662).
140. Samuel Johnson The Rambler No 93, Tuesday, 5 February, 1751.
143. Addison Spectator No. 409.
144. Richards Principles, p. 60.
147. Gerard An Essay on Taste (1780), pp. 82-83.
148. Addison Spectator No. 409.
149. Voltaire An Essay on Taste, p. 214. D'Alembert Reflexions, p. 236. Dryden, too, had written that 'It requires philosophy as well as poetry to sound the depth of all the passions; what they are in themselves, and how they are to be provoked.' John Dryden 'The Author's Apology for Heroic Poetry and Poetic Licence' (1677) in Of Dramatic Poesy and Other Critical Essays, edited by George Watson, 2 vols., (London, 1962), I, pp. 195-207, (p. 200).
150. 'The common defect with which they are charged is, that their observations are too general. This is undoubtedly the case, as criticism has been generally managed: and the reason is, that it has been seldom cultivated by a regular and just induction....Indeed, in whatever regards sentiment, there is a peculiar temptation to pursue this course. For the very feelings excited by qualities that belong to different genera, being
sensibly distinct, direct men, in some measure, to distinguish them, though
not with sufficient precision. But requires attention and acuteness to mark
the smaller varieties of sentiment, which correspond to the species of
each. The matter of fact objected only shows, therefore, that criticism has
been cultivated by a wrong method of induction. The consequence has been,
that even those general distinctions which appear to be ascertained, are
loose, uncertain, and ill defined; a defect that can never be remedied, till
the other sort of induction be applied, and critics be contented to rise
from particular principles, gradually, to such as are more general.' Gerard


152. Gerard An Essay on Taste (1780), pp. 170-7

153. Fr. Benito Jerónimo Feijoo The "I Know Not What" (1676, 1764),
translated by Willard F. King in Milton C. Nahm (ed.) Readings in Philosophy
of Art and Aesthetics (Englewood Cliffs, N.J., 1975), pp. 336-344, (Section

Chapter VI: Interpretation


2. Georges Poulet 'Criticism and the Experience of Inferiority' in R.A. Macksey and E. Donato (eds.) The Structuralist Controversy: The Languages of Criticism and the Sciences of Man (London, 1970), pp. 56-72, (p. 72). This unease is a perennial feature of modern criticism. Thus Cleanth Brooks; 'If we are to get all these qualifications into our formulation of what the poem says - and they are relevant - then, our formulation of the "statement" made by Herrick's poem will turn out to be quite as difficult as that of Pope's mock-epic. The truth of the matter is that all such formulations lead away from the centre of the poem - not towards it; that the "prose-sense" of the poem is not a rack on which the stuff of the poem is hung; that it does not represent the "inner" structure or the "essential" structure or the "real" structure of the poem. We may use - and in many connections must use - such formulations as more or less convenient ways of referring to parts of the poem. But such formulations are scaffolding which we may properly for certain purposes throw about the building; we must not mistake them for the internal and essential structure of the building itself.' Cleanth Brooks The Well Wrought Urn: Studies in the Structure of Poetry (1947), (London, 1968), p. 162.


7. Consider one of the philosopher's favourite examples of an a priori truth - 'All bachelors are unmarried'. Yet one could use the metaphor (paradox?) 'Married bachelor' to point to either of two real states-of-affairs (a married man who behaved as though he was not, or an unmarried
man who behaved as though he was). But one can only do so because there is no ambiguity in the literal uses of 'bachelor' and 'married'.

8. Imagine a dialogue; "I have mystical experiences." "What are they like?" "There is no way of describing them." "How do you know they are mystical." "I have read descriptions of what others have called 'mystical experiences'." "That is a contradiction." "No, for they are described as experiences which defy description, and so are mine." "How do you know that they were the same sort of experience as yours, and how do I know that if I had such an experience I would not be able to describe it?" "You must take my word for it."


10. 'Le coeur a ses raisons que la raison ne connait point.' Blaise Pascal *Pensées*, IV, 277.


12. Ibid., p. 12.

13. Ibid., p. 15.


15. Ibid., p. 50.

16. Ibid., pp. 64, 65.

17. Ibid., p. 65.

18. Ibid., p. 68.

19. Ibid., p. 68.

20. Ibid., p. 75.

21. Ibid., p. 75.

22. Ibid., p. 78.

23. Ibid., p. 78.

24. Ibid., p. 80.


27. Ibid., p. 87.

28. Ibid., p. 88. 'The verb "to differ" [différer] seems to differ from itself. On the one hand, it indicates difference as distinction, inequality, or discernibility; on the other, it expresses the interposition of delay, the interval of a spacing and temporalizing that puts off until "later" what is presently denied, the possible that is presently impossible.' Jacques Derrida 'Difference' (1968) in Speech and Phenomena, pp. 129-160, (p. 129).


30. Ibid., pp. 92-93.

31. Ibid., p. 93.

32. Ibid., p. 93.

33. Ibid., pp. 95-96.

34. Ibid., p. 97. 'Writing supplements perception before perception even appears to itself [is conscious of itself]. "Memory" or writing is the opening of that process of appearance itself. The "perceived" may be read only in the past, beneath perception and after it.' Jacques Derrida 'Freud and the Scene of Writing' (1966) in Writing and Difference (1967), translated by Alan Bass, (London, 1978), pp. 196-231, (p. 224). Gadamer takes the more traditional view, and, in doing so, reveals why Derrida may be right in this respect; 'All writing is...a kind of alienated speech, and its signs need to be transformed back into speech and meaning. Because the meaning has undergone a kind of self-alienation through being written down, this transformation back is the real hermeneutical task.' Hans-Georg Gadamer Truth and Method (1960), translation of the second edition (1965) by Garrett Barden and John Cumming, (London, 1975), pp. 354-355.


36. Jacques Derrida 'Plato's Pharmacy' (1968) in Dissemination (1972), translated by Barbara Johnson, (London, 1981), pp. 61-171, (p. 63), and 'Speech and Phenomena', pp. 56-57. The interpretations of 'deconstruction' which such phrases have given rise to, have prompted Derrida to disown many of his commentators and disciples; 'It is totally false to suggest that deconstruction is a suspension of reference....I never cease to be
surprised by critics who see my work as a declaration that there is nothing beyond language, that we are imprisoned in language; it is, in fact, saying the exact opposite. Every week I receive critical commentaries and studies on deconstruction which operate on the assumption that what they call "post-structuralism" amounts to saying that there is nothing beyond language, that we are submerged in words and other stupidities of that sort.' Jacques Derrida 'Deconstruction and the Other' (1981), dialogue with Richard Kearney in Richard Kearney (ed.) Dialogues with contemporary Continental thinkers: The phenomenological heritage (Manchester, 1984), pp. 107-126, (p. 123).


38. Derrida 'Plato's Pharmacy', p. 95.


40. Giogio de Chirico 'On Metaphysical Art' (1919) in Massimo Carrà (ed.) Metaphysical Art (1968), translated by Caroline Tisdall, (London, 1971), pp. 87-91, (p. 89). The effects of the Deconstructive picture of language in its dotage, remembering only the distant past but blank as to yesterday are anticipated by Chirico: 'I enter a room and see a man on a chair, hanging from the ceiling I see a cage with a canary in it, on a wall I notice pictures, and on the shelves, books. All this strikes me, but does not amaze me, since the chain of memories that links one thing to another explains the logic of what I see. But let us suppose that for a moment and for reasons that are inexplicable and independent of my will, the thread of this chain is broken, who knows how I would see the seated man, the cage, the pictures, the bookshelves; who knows what terror and perhaps what sweetness and consolation I would feel when contemplating that scene.', p. 89.

41. Samuel Johnson The Rambler No. 156, Saturday, September 14, 1751.


43. Laurence Sterne The Life and Opinions of Tristram Shandy (1759-67), Vol. III, Ch. 12.

45. Pope Essay on Criticism, ll. 102-103.


48. Coventry Patmore 'Principle in Art' in Principle in Art (London, 1889), pp. 1-4, (pp. 1-2). He continues, rather naively, that in certain cases of what he considers corrupt schools, 'A few infallible and, when once uttered, self-evident principles would at once put a stop to this sort of representation among artists; and the public would soon learn to be repelled by what now most attracts them.' p. 3.


52. Ibid., p. 14.


57. Benedetto Croce *Poetry and Literature*: An Introduction to Its Criticism and History (1936), sixth edition (1963) translated by Giovanni Gullace, (Southern Illinois University, 1981), p. 139. It is interesting to note that much of Knights' critical work consists of either redundant description or paraphrase, a method he only discards when dealing with a genre he does not like - Restoration Comedy.


59. Croce *Poetry and Literature*, p. 141. 'In completing his judgement, the critic offers neither intuitive re-creations nor logical equivalents of poetry; but he gives a characterization (much as the author does in giving the work a title), which is something different.' p. 140. 'The characterization refers properly to the content of poetry, to the feeling expressed by poetry and by the same expressive act, amplified and transferred within its own sphere.' p. 142. But there is always, according to Croce, an 'abyss' between the characterization and the work.


61. Ibid., p. 274.


63. L.C. Knights 'How Many Children had Lady Macbeth?', p. 28.

64. There is a type of thematic criticism, however, which I wish to pursue at greater length, both because it made a great impression on me in school, and because one of its key terms ('metaphysical') is also a key term in this thesis. This is the critical practice of G. Wilson Knight. Knight rejects as 'false' that criticism which concentrates on those elements, such as 'character', which 'lend themselves most readily to
analysis on the analogy of actual life', and proposes instead that the critic should be concerned with the 'poetic realities' of the work; G. Wilson Knight *The Wheel of Fire : Interpretations of Shakespearian Tragedy, With Three New Essays* (1930), (London, 1965), p. 12. 'To do this we should regard each [work] as a visionary whole, close-knit in personification, atmospheric suggestion, and direct poetic symbolism: three modes of transmission equal in their importance....Each incident, each turn of thought, each suggestive symbol throughout *Macbeth* or *King Lear* radiates inwards from the play's circumference to the burning central core without knowledge of which we shall miss their relevance and necessity: they relate primarily, not directly to each other, nor to the normal appearances of human life, but to this central reality alone...[A] true philosophic and imaginative interpretation will aim at cutting below the surface to reveal that burning core of mental or spiritual reality from which each play derives its nature and meaning.', ibid., pp. 11, 14. ('To remain in the realm of literature,' writes Goldmann, 'the significance of a work does not lie in this or that story - the events related in the *Orestes* of Aeschylus, the *Electra* of Giraudoux and *Les Mouches* of Sartre are the same, yet these three works quite obviously have no essential element in common - nor does it lie in the psychology of this or that character, nor even in any stylistic peculiarity which recurs more or less frequently. The significance of the work, insofar as it is a literary work, is always of the same character, namely, a coherent universe within which the events occur and the psychology of the characters is situated and within the coherent expression of which the stylistic automatisms of the author are incorporated.' Lucien Goldmann *The Sociology of Literature* (1967) in Milton C. Albrecht, James H. Barnett, and Mason Griff (eds.) *The Sociology of Art and Literature : A Reader* (London, 1982), pp. 582-609, (p. 597).) I would agree with all of Knight's propositions, with the reservation that, this 'core', or *mens Macbeth*, *mens King Lear*, and so on, is made to sound accidental in Knight's account, for the unity is simply the natural outcome of the work being one thing. Knight describes the work as 'an expanded metaphor, by means of which the original vision has been projected into forms roughly correspondent with actuality', *The Wheel of Fire*, p. 15. However this type of abstraction can become equally autonomous from its object; Knight's method very easily turns into a drama of symbols, a morality play of metaphysical or super-psychological concepts; 'In so far as we see the action of each play as a perfect and complete statement within its own limits, we are forced to know it as a universal statement. Therefore it is by no fantasy of exaggeration that in interpretation the free-hearted hero ultimately becomes mankind; the villain, creature of cynicism, becomes the Devil, Goethe's prince of negation; and the loved one becomes the divine principle, Dante's Beatrice.', p. 256. Precisely how this is so would be difficult to say, for what is essential in Knight's approach is a vocabulary which defies easy paraphrase; consider these passages from his essay on *Macbeth* and the Metaphysic of Evil'; 'We are faced by man's aspiring nature, unsatiated of its desire among the frailties and inconsistencies of its world. They point us to good, not evil, and their very gloom of denial is
the shadow of a great assertion....Yet we are left with an overpowering knowledge of suffocating, conquering evil, and fixed by the basilisk eye of a nameless terror...[Thi]s world is unknowable, hideous, disorderly, and irrational. The very style of the play has a mesmeric, nightmare quality, for in that dream-consciousness, hateful though it be, there is a nervous tension, a vivid sense of profound significance, an exceptionally rich apprehension of reality electrifying the mind....Macbeth shows us an evil not to be accounted for in terms of "will" and "causality"...It expresses its vision, not to a critical intellect, but to the responsive imagination; and working in terms not of "character" or any ethical code, but of the abysmal deeps of a spirit-world untuned to human reality, withdraws the veil from the black streams which mill that consciousness of fear symbolized in actions of blood.', pp. 140, 147, 158. One of the reasons why Knight rejects the term 'character', and the idea of likelihood in characterization or action as the touchstone of criticism, is because 'it is so constantly entwined with a false and unduly ethical criticism.', p. 9. This 'false' criticism he associates with statements such as "In Timon of Athens it was Shakespeare's intention to show how a generous but weak character may come to ruin through an unwise use of his wealth" or "Shakespeare wished in Macbeth to show how crime inevitably brings retribution" or "in Antony and Cleopatra Shakespeare has given us a lesson concerning the dangers of an uncontrolled passion", p. 9. Yet it is enough to use ethical categories, even without taking sides, to write ethical criticism. Later in the same work he writes that; 'In Othello the poet expresses dramatically the destructive force of cynicism and unfaith directed against that Love to which man aspires, and in whose reality he attempts to build his happiness. Ultimately, in so far as Othello expresses a universal truth, it must be considered to suggest the inability of love's faith to weather the conditions of this world.', p. 249. Knight himself can talk of a plot as a 'philosophic argument', tell us that Apemantus 'represents a philosophic principle, an especial attitude to life.', that King Lear 'illustriates' a problem, that Timon of Athens 'explains the meaning of Othello', that the play 'asserts the inability of any finite symbol to hold an infinite love', and that this 'statement is projected into a human plot', pp. 250-52.

65. The 'purpose of a writer', asserts Johnson, 'is to be read, and the criticism which would destroy the power of pleasing must be blown aside.' Samuel Johnson 'Pope' (1781) in Lives of the English Poets, edited by George Birkbeck Hill, 3 vols., (Oxford, 1905), III, pp. 82-272, (p. 240).

66. Frye Anatomy of Criticism, pp. 4-5.

67. 'Interpret' in the sense of perform could be said to belong to either the second or third of these definitions.

69. Obviously one of the works I have in mind here is Harding’s 'Regulated Hatred'. He writes there that 'This attempt to suggest a slightly different emphasis in the reading of Jane Austen is not offered as a balanced appraisal of her work. It is deliberately lopsided, neglecting the many points at which the established view seems adequate.' D.W. Harding 'Regulated Hatred : An Aspect of the Work of Jane Austen' (1939) in Scrutiny : A Quarterly Review, vol. VIII, No. 4, (March, 1940), pp. 346-363, (p. 362). This, then, is criticism for critics - but the pretence to empiricism has made this approach the norm.


74. L.C.Knights 'The University Teaching of English and History : A Plea for Correlation' (1939) in Explorations, pp. 186-199, (pp. 193, 195).

75. Ibid., p. 197.

76. Johnson 'Preface' to The Plays of William Shakespeare, p. 81.


78. Frederick Schlegel Lectures on the History of Literature (1815) 'Now first completely translated', no translator given, (London, 1859), p. 159 (Lecture VII). He also believes, as we have already seen in Chapter IV, that the proper business of poetry is the 'eternal, the ever-important, and the universally beautiful', p. 260 (Lecture XII).


81. August Schlegel Lectures on Dramatic Art and Literature, p. 18.
82. It is also worth remembering Wordsworth's observation that; 'If there be one conclusion more forcibly pressed upon us than another by the review which has been given of the fortunes and fate of poetical works, it is this, that every author, so far as he is great and at the same time original, has had the task of creating the taste by which he is to be enjoyed' William Wordsworth 'Essay Supplementary to the Preface' (1815) in The Prose Works of William Wordsworth, edited by W.J.B.Owen and Jane Worthington Sayyser, 3 vols., (Oxford, 1974), III, pp. 62-84, (p. 80). 'My book is poetry; and if it is not, then it will be. The conception of poetry in our country, in Norway, shall be made to conform to the book.', Henrik Ibsen 'Letter to Bjørnstjerne Bjørnson' December 9, 1867 Letters of Henrik Ibsen, translated by J.N.Laurvik and Mary Morison, (New York, 1905). Forster is on the same lines when he writes that 'imaginative literature' may alter human nature by enabling individuals to 'look at themselves in a new way' E.M.Forster Aspects of the Novel (London, 1927), p. 220.


84. Saint-Avremond Of Tragedy, Ancient and Modern (1672) translated by Olga Marx Perlsweig in Allan H.Gilbert (ed.) Literary Criticism : Plato to Dryden (New York, 1940), pp. 659-663, (p. 663). 'Poetry, largely consider'd, is an evolution, sending out improved and ever-expanded types - in one sense, the past, even the best of it, necessarily giving place, and dying out. For our existing world, the bases on which all the grand old poems were built have become vacuums - and even those of many comparatively modern ones are broken and half-gone. For us today, not their intrinsic value, vast as that is, backs and maintains those poems - but a mountain-high growth of associations, the layers of successive ages.' Walt Whitman 'A Thought on Shakespeare' (1888) in Complete Poetry and Collected Prose, edited by Justin Kaplan, (New York, 1982), pp. 1150-1152, (p. 1151). The action of Oedipus Rex, writes Artaud under the title 'No More Masterpieces', 'is clothed in a language which has lost any contact with today's crude, epileptic rhythm. Sophocles may speak nobly, but in a manner that no longer suits the times. His speeches are too refined for today, as if he were speaking beside the point....If the masses do not frequent literary masterpieces, this is because the masterpieces are literary, that is to say set in forms no longer answering the needs of the times.' Antonin Artaud The Theatre and its Double (1938) in Collected Works of Antonin Artaud : Volume Four, translated by Victor Corti, (London, 1974), pp. 1-110, pp. 56-57. What Artaud is asking for is a 'rudeness and epilepsy' that we can be at home in! We do not frequent masterpieces for the very reason that they are not literary. It is the contemporary which is self-consciously literary because it always links itself with a contemporary idea of literariness, it is not given as Establishment Art but as Art per se - it is always connected with contemporary 'literary thought'. That is, an Elizabethan Play always has a
greater potential for a crudeness and epilepsy that we cannot be at home in than what is presented to us simply as a Play.


86. Ibid., p. 10.

87. Another danger of looking at the work through the eyes of its own time is that we may find that some aspect, or perhaps the whole of it, was shocking, revolutionary, more profound, on a certain subject than anything of its time, and by that 'silent reference of human work to human abilities' incorporate this response of the time into our own. But today it may be none of these things and they are relevant only to history. The precise tenor of the past is difficult to recover; but this should not lead us to believe that this recovery is a critical virtue. I have read somewhere that the many breasts of the Diana of Ephesus are actually representations of the bulls' scrota sacrificed each year to the *magna mater* Kybele; the image then is not so much ultra-maternal as ultra-emasculating. But how could I now argue that the significance of the image to generations was other than it was, or that the statue cannot embody a maternal ideal?


89. Samuel Johnson *The Rambler No. 36*, Saturday, July 21, 1750.

90. Forster *Aspects of the Novel*, pp. 24-25.

91. Betti is one who in emphasizing the non-historical half of the equation falls into this trap. Thus according to his 'canon of the actuality of understanding' the task of the interpreter is 'to retrace the creative process, to reconstruct it within himself, to retranslate the extraneous thought of an Other, a part of the past, a remembered event, into the actuality of one's own life; that is, to adapt and integrate it into one's intellectual horizon within the framework of one's own experiences by means of a transformation on the basis of the same kind of synthesis which enabled the recognition and reconstruction of that thought. It follows that the attempt of some historians to rid themselves of their subjectivity is nonsensical.' Emilio Betti 'Hermeneutics as the general methodology of the Geisteswissenschaften' (1962), translated by Joseph Bleicher in Joseph Bleicher *Contemporary hermeneutics : Hermeneutics as method, philosophy and critique* (London, 1980), pp. 51-94, (p. 62).

93. Gardner *The Business of Criticism*, p. 34.

94. Walker Gibson is writing about the rhetorical property of literature when he says; 'The fact is that everytime we open the pages of another piece of writing we are embarked on a new adventure in which we become a new person - a person as controlled and definable and as remote from the chaotic self of daily life as the lover in the sonnet. Subject to the degree of our literary sensibility, we are recreated by the language. We assume, for the sake of the experience, that set of attitudes and qualities which the language asks us to assume, and, if we cannot assume them, we throw the book away...A bad book, then, is a book in whose mock reader we discover a person we refuse to become, a mask we refuse to put on, a role we will not play.', Walker Gibson 'Authors, Speakers, Readers, and Mock Readers' (1950) in Jane P. Tompkins (ed.) *Reader-Response Criticism: From Formalism to Post-Structuralism* (London, 1980), pp. 1-6, (pp. 1, 5).


96. Roland Barthes 'Criticism as Language' *The Times Literary Supplement*, 27 September 1963, pp. 739-740, (p. 740). 'Being bound by a situation does not mean that the claim to correctness that every interpretation must make is dissolved into the subjective or the occasional...We saw that to understand a text always means to apply it to ourselves and to know that, even if it must always be understood in different ways, it is still the same text presenting itself to us in these different ways. That the claim to truth of every interpretation is not in the least relativised is seen from the fact that all interpretation is essentially linguistic. The linguistic explicitness that the process of understanding gains through interpretation does not create a second sense apart from that which is understood and interpreted...Rather, it is their nature to disappear behind what they bring, in interpretation, into speech. Paradoxically, an interpretation is right when it is capable of disappearing in this way. And yet it is true at the same time that it must be expressed as something that is intended to disappear.', Gadamer *Truth and Method*, p. 359.


98. Apropos this notion of reflexivity in criticism Eliot writes that, given that 'criticism is as inevitable as breathing' we shall be 'none the worse for articulating what passes in our minds when we read a book and feel an emotion about it, for criticizing our own minds in their work of criticism.', and Barthes that 'All criticism must include (although it may do so in the most indirect and discreet way) an implicit comment on itself; all criticism is criticism both of the work under consideration
and of the critic; to quote Claudel's pun, it is knowledge (connaissance) of the other and co-birth (co-naissance) of oneself to the world. T.S.Eliot 'Tradition and the Individual talent' (1919) in The Sacred Wood, pp. 47-59, (p. 48). Barthes 'Criticism as Language', p. 739.

99. 'The hermeneutical experience', writes Gadamer, 'must take as a genuine experience everything that becomes present to it. It does not have a prior freedom to select and discard. But nor can it maintain an absolute freedom by leaving undecided that which seems specific to the understanding of that which is understood. It cannot unmake the event that is itself.' Gadamer Truth and Method, p. 420. (But, as we have seen throughout this work, this is precisely what it does.) 'Here', continues Gadamer, 'the obvious fact, that every interpretation seeks to be correct, serves only to confirm that the non-differentiation of the interpretation from the work itself is the actual experience of the work.', p. 107. But why then does interpretation have to 'seek'? He further asserts that it is naive to demand that one 'leave one's own concepts aside and think only in the concepts of the epoch one is trying to understand.', because 'To think historically always involves establishing a connection between those ideas and one's own thinking. To try to eliminate one's own concepts in interpretation is not only impossible, but manifestly absurd.', p. 358. ('Even that which is closed to our understanding is experienced by ourselves as something limiting and thus belongs to the continuity of self-understanding in which human existence moves.' p. 86.) 'The essential is not possible consciousness, however infinite, in which the object that is handed down would appear in the light of eternity. Every assimilation of tradition is historically different: which does not mean that every one represents only an imperfect understanding of it. Rather, every one represents the experience of a "view" of the object itself. The paradox that is true of all transmitted material, namely of being one and the same and yet of being different, proves all interpretation to be, in fact, speculative. Hence hermeneutics has to see through the dogmatism of a "meaning-in-itself" in just the same way as critical philosophy has seen through the dogmatism of experience. This certainly does not mean that every interpreter sees himself as speculative in his own mind, i.e. that he is conscious of the dogmatism contained in his own interpretative intention. What is meant, rather, is that all interpretation is speculative as it is actually practised, quite apart from its methodological self-consciousness.', p. 430. But, this being the case, the word 'speculative', as the concept of the contemporary being historically determined which underlies it, has no meaning here - for neither can the interpretation appear 'in the light of eternity'.


103. Empson Seven Types of Ambiguity, pp. 24-25.


105. Gadamer Truth and Method, p. 106. According to Gadamer the interpreter's 'own thoughts' also go into 'the re-awakening of the meaning of the text. In this the interpreter's own horizon is decisive, yet not as a personal standpoint that one holds on to or enforces, but more as a meaning and a possibility that one brings into play and puts at risk, and that helps one truly to make one's own what is said in the text. I have described this above as a "fusion of horizons". We can now see that this is the full realisation of conversation, in which something is expressed that is not only mine or my author's, but common.', p. 350.


108. Frye Anatomy of Criticism, p. 18. Such a procedure is, of course, the antithesis of a scientific method for it assumes in advance what one is looking for!

109. Ibid., pp. 8-9.

110. Ibid., pp. 6-7.

111. Ibid., p. 7.

112. Ibid., p. 17.

113. Ibid., p. 18.

114 Paradoxically, Wordsworth's line is often used as a charm against the impulse to abstract a lesson from a literary work! That every critical method implies a poetics, I can verify from my own experience. At school my education in poetry began, naturally enough, with the twentieth-century and then progressed to the nineteenth-century. In the 'Romantics' I found a greater intensity of 'poetry' than in twentieth-century poetry. The only Renaissance poetry I came across was Shakespeare, but here the question of 'poetry' was side-stepped by a concern with character and action, and the symbolism of these things. The Metaphysical poets introduced me to a slightly expanded poetics but on coming to Jonson I could find only a couple of phrases of 'poetry' in an
entire poem. When I turned to Roman poetry I could not see why it was called 'poetry' at all - I could find nothing to say about it.

115. Hazlitt Table-Talk, p. 294.


121. Michael Riffaterre 'Describing Poetic Structures', p. 204.

122. Ibid., p. 191.


124. Richards Principles, pp. 81-82.

125. Ibid., p. 124.


129. Ibid., p. 437.

130. For an example of how reductive this type of criticism can be see Maud Bodkin's discussion of The Ancient Mariner in Archetypal Patterns in Poetry, pp. 37-53.

132. I should note here that even if we wish to believe in an afterlife, those conventional representations of it which the scriptures of various religions contain are not taken by contemporary theologians as literally true.

133. Joseph Addison *Spectator No. 40*, Monday, 16 April 1711.

134. One might go as far as to say that the more relative the criticism the more interesting it is likely to be to the reader, for the reader probably already knows what they thought of the work.

135. 'Every Man, besides those general Observations which are to be made upon an Author, forms several Reflections that are peculiar to his own manner of Thinking; so that Conversation will naturally furnish us with Hints which we did not attend to, and make us enjoy other Men's Parts and Reflections as well as our own.' Joseph Addison *Spectator No. 409*, Thursday, 19 June 1712.


140. Ibid., p. 243.


142. Thus Johnson, in eighteenth century and contemporary vein: 'It is...the task of criticism to establish principles, to improve opinion into knowledge, and to distinguish those means of pleasing which depend upon known causes and rational deduction from the nameless and inexplicable elegancies which appeal wholly to the fancy, from which we feel delight but know not how they produce it, and which may well be termed the enchantresses of the soul. Criticism reduces those regions of literature
under the dominion of science which have hitherto known only the anarchy of ignorance, the caprices of fancy, and the tyranny of prescription.' Samuel Johnson *The Rambler* No. 92, Saturday, 2 February, 1751.

143. Gerard *An Essay on Taste* (1780), p. 247. Johnson himself seems to have realized this; 'It is impossible to impress upon our minds an adequate and just representation of an object so great that we can never take it into our view or so suitable that it is always changing under our eye and has already lost its form while we are labouring to conceive it. Definitions have not been less difficult or uncertain in criticism than in law. Imagination, a licentious and vagrant faculty, unsusceptible of limitations and impatient of restraint, has always endeavoured to baffle the logician, to perplex the confines of distinction, and burst the enclosures of regularity. There is therefore scarcely any species of writing of which we can tell what is its essence and what are its constituents; every new genius produces some innovation which, when invented and approved, subverts the rules which the practice of foregoing authors has established.' Johnson *The Rambler* No. 125, Tuesday, 28 May, 1751.


145. Ibid., p. 390. 'To press to the sense of the thing itself with which one is dealing, not to go off on some collateral issue about the thing, is the hardest matter in the world. The "thing itself" with which one is here dealing, - the critical perception of poetic truth, - is of all things the most volatile, elusive, and evanescent; by pressing too impetuously after it, one runs the risk of losing it. The critic of poetry should have the finest tact, the nicest moderation, the most free, flexible, and elastic spirit imaginable; he should indeed be the "ondoyant and divers", the undulating and diverse being of Montaigne. The less he can deal with the object simply and freely, the more things he has to take into account in dealing with it, - the more, in short, he has to encumber himself, - so much the greater the force of spirit he needs to retain his elasticity.' Matthew Arnold *On Translating Homer* (London, 1862), pp. 116-118.

146. De Quincey 'On the Knocking at the Gate in Macbeth', pp. 392-93.


151. Ibid., p. 13. 'The unity of the work is to be found in the way the sphere of language has been grammatically constructed. The chief features of composition are to be found in the way the connections between the thoughts have been constructed. Technical interpretation attempts to identify what has moved the author to communicate...[An] author organizes his thought in his own peculiar way, and this peculiar way is reflected in the arrangement he chooses. Likewise, an author always has secondary ideas which are determined by his special character. Thus the distinctiveness of an author may be recognized by the secondary ideas that distinguish him from others. To recognize an author in this way is to recognize him as he has worked with language.' F.D.E. Schleiermacher Compendium of 1819 (1819, 1828) in Hermeneutics: The Handwritten Manuscripts by F.D.E. Schleiermacher, edited by Heinz Kimmerle, (1958), translation of second edition (1974) by James Duke and Jack Forstman, (Missoula, 1977).


153. By the same lights we would have to say that our understanding of every utterance involved 'intuition'. If we do not do so, however, it is because there are limiting conditions in almost every instance of communication, and 'limiting conditions' or presuppositions are precisely what I would not wish to emphasize in the experience of literature - for this emphasis would be quite as misleading as that which it sought to combat.


155. Thus when Riffaterre describes the work as consisting of transforms, he appears to be falling either into intentionalism or literalism, though his notion of 'variations on' is, indeed, only a corollary of my definition of literature as style. See Michael Riffaterre 'Generating Lautréamont's Text' in Josué V. Harari (ed.) Textual Strategies: Perspectives in Post-Structuralist Criticism (London, 1980), pp. 404-420.

156. 'A rather dishonest person one day, in a note contained in an anthology, made a list of some of the images presented to us in the work of one of our greatest living poets. It read:
"The next day of the caterpillar dressed for the ball"...meaning "butterfly".
"Breast of crystal...meaning carafe."
Etc.
No, indeed, sir. It means nothing of the kind. Put your butterfly back in your carafe. You may be sure Saint-Pol-Roux said exactly what he meant.' André Breton Introduction to the Discourse on the Paucity of Reality

157. Thomas De Quincey 'The Poetry of Pope' (1848) in *The Collected Writings of Thomas De Quincey*, XI (1897), pp. 51-97, (pp. 54-56).

158. Ibid., p. 56.

159. Ibid., pp. 56, 88-89.

160. Wordsworth 'The Tables Turned' (1798). For Wordsworth, of course, it is both Science and Art which are 'barren'.


162. Gadamer *Truth and Method*, pp. xii-xiii. Roger Scruton, too, writes of 'forms of understanding...being derived from man's self-conception' which possess 'another kind of objectivity, a convergence upon a common fund of superficial truth, which entitles them to their own claims to knowledge.' He calls upon philosophy, in the form of aesthetics, to protect this 'knowledge', this 'sense of the world' against science; 'Philosophy must repair the rents made by science in the veil of Maya, through which the winds of nihilism now blow coldly over us.' Roger Scruton 'Aesthetics' The Times Literary Supplement Friday 5 June 1987, pp. 604, 606-607, (pp. 606-607).


165. Ibid., p. 62.


167. Ibid., § 116.

168. Ibid., §§ 3, 4, 9, 14, 29.

169. Ibid., § 3.

170. Thought itself is a kind of dialogue; 'It is not himself that the thinker addresses in the stages of the thought's growth, in their answerings, but as it were the basic relation in face of which he has to answer for his insight, or the order in face of which he has to answer
for the newly arrived conceptual form....Signs happen to us without respite, living means being addressed, we would need only to present ourselves and to perceive.' Martin Buber 'Dialogue', pp. 1-39, pp. 26, 10.


175. John Middleton Murray 'Metaphor' (1927) in Countries of the Mind : Second Series (London, 1931), pp. 1-16, (pp. 13-14). 'A great work of literature does not so much satisfy the reason as bring it to birth within ourselves....We have been granted a moment of the pure life of Reason; it is our duty not to degrade it into a function of our ordinary consciousness, but to seek a way to lift our ordinary consciousness to the condition we have been privileged to share. It is, after all, not an alien condition, but our own, because we have been proved capable of it.' 'Reason and Criticism' (1926) in Countries of the Mind : Second Series, pp. 31-44, (pp. 43-44).

176. 'At twilight nature becomes a wonderfully suggestive effect, and it is not without loveliness, though perhaps its chief use is to illustrate quotations from the poets.' Oscar Wilde 'The Decay of Lying' in Intentions, pp. 1-54, (p. 54).
Appendix: Formalism


8. As Ducasse pointed out, at a time when logical positivism was still in its infancy; 'To say that something always happens, is not to give any reason why it ever does...when I say that a certain design is ugly because against the "law of symmetry", I am not giving a reason why it had to give me aesthetic displeasure, but only mentioning the fact that it resembles in a stated respect certain others which as a bare matter of fact also displease me.'


13. Barthes did later become more critical of such 'metalanguages' as those I have outlined here, but the urge to carve up response into a predetermined catalogue of pseudo-scientific categories never seems to have left him. See, for example, his 'Theory of the Text' (1973) from *Encyclopaedia Universalis*, vol. 15, pp. 1014-17, translated by Ian Mcleod in Robert Young (ed.) *Untying the Text : A Post-Structuralist Reader* (London, 1981), pp. 31-47.


15. Barthes 'Rhetorical Analysis', pp. 84-5.


17. Ibid., p. 89.

18. Barthes 'Structural Analysis of Narratives', p. 88. A further, and more damming, consideration comes to mind; to start with and confine oneself to structure', with the exception of phonetic structure, in this way is to take the semantics as read. This is, indeed, implicit in many 'formalist' or 'structuralist' pronouncements; '[Literature] does not serve to set forth, to translate things existing before it, outside it. It does not express, it explores, and what it explores is itself.' Alain Robbe-Grillet 'From Realism to Reality' (1955, 1963) in *For a New Novel*, pp. 157-168, (p. 160). 'Poetry is not made with ideas but with signs, words being only one of the types of signs (...poetry is not about the real world or life, but about itself.).' Linda R.Waugh 'The Poetic Function and the Nature of Language' (1980) in Jakobson *Verbal Art, Verbal Sign, Verbal Time*, pp. 143-168, (p. 146).


20. This difficulty in deciding what balance is being advocated arises from the functional inseparability of 'form' and 'content'.

I have listed here only those works cited in the text. Periodical articles which have subsequently appeared in many different editions, as for example with Addison and Johnson, are given individually and by their original date of publication. Where I have referred to a Classical text but not quoted from it, no specific edition is given.


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