SOME ASPECTS OF THE POLITICAL AND COMMERCIAL HISTORY OF THE MUSLIMS OF SRI LANKA WITH SPECIAL REFERENCE TO THE BRITISH PERIOD

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ABSTRACT

This thesis is an attempt to present a detailed thematic account of the history of the Muslims of Sri Lanka, concentrating chiefly on the British period between 1796 and 1949. Use has been made of all the known primary materials currently available for this topic in both Sri Lanka and Britain. Special attention has been devoted to the fields of Muslims in politics and Muslims in commerce in Sri Lanka during the British era.

The introductory chapter (I) sketches the arrival of the Muslims in Sri Lanka, outlines the relationship between the Muslims and the Sinhalese kings and deals with the fate of the Muslims in the Portuguese and Dutch periods.

The second chapter deals with Muslims' responses to the arrival of the British. It looks at Muslim involvement in the conquest of the Kandyan kingdom and in the Kandyan rebellion. The third section of this chapter surveys the Colebrooke-Cameron reforms; and the fourth section deals with the appointment of the Muslims by the British as Civil Servants and as Consuls.

The third chapter deals with Muslims in politics; special attention is given to Muslim membership in the Legislative and Municipal Councils on the island. The fourth chapter deals with Muslims and the struggle for
independence.

The fifth chapter gives a brief outline of Muslims in trade during the British period. It deals with gems, pearls and coconut. The sixth analyses the communal outbreak of violence between Muslims and Sinhalese in 1915. The seventh chapter discusses the Egyptian Nationalist ‘Arābi Pāsha and his exile in Sri Lanka.

The eighth chapter attempts to summarise the thesis as a whole.
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Perhaps never in the study of the history of the Muslims of Sri Lanka has so much been owed by so few to so many. My debt is to a very wide range of people scattered through two different countries: Sri Lanka and Britain. Alas, they are too many all to be mentioned by name.

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CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION

i. Islam Comes to Sri Lanka - The Pre-British Era

The history of the Muslims of Sri Lanka is part of the history of Arab civilization in the East. Arabs, even before the Prophet of Islam, had spread far and wide in the East in the course of their trading activities. Prior to the sixth century A.D., the pre-Islamic Arabs dominated the trading of the Indian Ocean and participated in trade with Malaysia, Indonesia and China. 1

In the sixth century A.D., the peoples of the Arabian peninsula called Sri Lanka Jazirat-ul-Yaqūt 2 (Land of Rubies), Serendib and Singladib. 3 Later they called it Saheelān (Ṣaḥīl) or Lanka. 4 From the word Saheelān, the Portuguese derived the name Ceilão 5 and the Dutch derived the name Si'lon 6 and the British their

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name of Ceylon. In 1972 the country became known internationally by the name chosen by its government, Sri Lanka.

The commercial relationship between Arabia and the East had extended as far as China long before the birth of Islam. With the advent of Islam in the middle of the sixth century A.D. and the subsequent expansion of the Muslim Empire under the caliphs, Arab commercial activities in the Indian Ocean rapidly began to make a major impact upon the peoples of coastal Asia, particularly South-Western India and Sri Lanka. Soon the settlement of Muslim traders in Sri Lanka began. Eventually, by reason of their long residence, they intermarried with local women. As far as we are able to ascertain, merchants did not normally take their wives with them while travelling to the countries of the Indian Ocean. Since it was customary to remain in the East for several seasons, long years of separation ensued.¹

Nadvi Sulaiman, an eminent literary scholar and historian, refers to the existence of a number of Muslim settlements in South India long before the Muslim conquest of North India.² Further evidence for this is found in an ancient document held by a Muslim

² Sulaiman, Nadvi, "Muslim Colonies in India before the Muslim Conquest", I.C. vol. VIII, Hyderabad, 1930, p. 95.
family of Beruwala. There it is said that in the 22nd year of Hijra (which corresponds to 604 A.D.) a fleet of four vessels conveying three Sultans left Yemen in the time of the second Caliph, Omar Kathāb. The three distinguished pioneers were Badi-Ud-Dīn, Salaha-Ud-Dīn and Muhammad. The first named is supposed to have landed at Cannore in South India. Salaha-Ud-Dīn is also said to have made for the Indian coast, arriving at a place named Periya Paṭṭnām, while his son, Shams-Ud-Dīn, cast his anchor at Mannar, in the north-west coast of Sri Lanka. The fourth vessel, which conveyed Muhammad and his son Sad-Ud-Dīn, sailed further south and landed at Beruwala, where they are said to have settled. Today there are a few Moor families in Sri Lanka who trace their ancestry back to these migrants. If the account is accurate, it suggests that Beruwala is one of the oldest Muslim settlements in the country.

Other examples are known to support the view that Muslim settlements existed in Sri Lanka during the first century of Islam. There is a popular legend that the King of Sri Lanka sent to Hajjāj-ibn-Yusūf, the Viceroy of Iraq, some local Muslim women whose fathers had been merchants but who had died in the island. The ships conveying the women were supposedly attacked by some pirates near the seaport of Al-Daybal (near Karachi

in Pakistan). One of the captured women of the tribe of Banu Yerba is said to have cried, "Oh! Hajjaj! Come to my help." When this news reached the Viceroy, he sent a message to Raj Dahir, the ruler of Sind, demanding the immediate release of the captives. Since the ruler did not respond to the request, there commenced a series of raids against the kingdom of Sind in 715 A.D.¹

There has long been a dispute about the precise date of the arrival of Muslims in Sri Lanka and of the start of their settlements. Here, historians have relied upon what they saw as the treasured traditions of the community. According to one British writer of the early nineteenth century, Sir Alexander Johnstone, the first Muslim settlement in Sri Lanka was started in the early part of the eighth century A.D.² The settlers were supposedly descendents of the Hashemite clan, who had left Arabia in the seventh century, on account of the persecution of the Omayyad dynasty. When Caliph Abdul Melik bin Merwan was ruling Iraq, he is alleged to have persecuted and ill-treated the surviving

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Companions of the Prophet. In the course of his ruling of the Islamic empire, he is said to have put to death nearly 150,000 men, many on false charges.¹ These Arabs, therefore, claimed to belong to one of the highest clans of Arabian society. The reason for the Caliph's hostility to the Prophet's family is said to be that the Ommeyade rulers feared rivals to the throne. With such disturbed conditions in the Arabian peninsula, some Muslims are thought to have left their motherland and come to Sri Lanka as refugees. There they began to settle down in the coastal areas such as Tricomalee, Jaffna, Puttalam, Colombo, Beruwala and Galle.²

It is known that a religious teacher was sent to Sri Lanka by the Caliph of Baghdad at the request of Muslims of Sri Lanka.³ This shows that a relationship had been established between Muslims in Sri Lanka and Baghdad when it was the capital of the Abbasid empire. Moreover, Khātib Baghdad refers to a scholar by the name of Abdūr Rahmān Bin Musā al-Sa’īlanī, who was present in Baghdad in 877 A.D.⁴

The political ascendancy of the Abbasids during the

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¹ Ameer Ali, S., A Short History of the Saracens (Lond., 1899), pp. 98-100.
⁴ Ibid.
9th and 10th centuries coincides with the Polonnaruwa period of Sri Lankan history. The patronage extended by the Abbasids to all Arab trading activities enabled them to dominate the Indian Ocean trade and to establish the Persian Gulf as the main centre of their commercial activities. Their heyday was contemporaneous with the zenith of Polonnaruwa as a capital city. ¹

The Muslims in Sri Lanka gradually assumed significant positions in respect of the island's trade, and trade became a powerful factor in the island's international standing.

As foreign trade grew in importance, the Arab Muslims appear to have settled down in even larger numbers in the coastal areas, from where they, in the course of time, moved on into the interior. Most of their settlements seem to have developed in the vicinity of lagoons.² As the Arab settlements increased, the local Sinhalese rulers seem to have responded tolerantly and benevolently towards them and towards the religion of Islam.³

During the period of the ninth and tenth centuries A.D., we also observe increasing references to Sri Lanka in Arab chronicles, especially in the works of those Arab seafarers

² Ibid., p. 72
who had journeyed to the island, either seeking opportunity or with the idea of visiting Adam's Peak. Sulaiman Tajir visited Sri Lanka in 850 A.D.; his impressions are incorporated in Silsilat-Ul-Tawarikh. Abū Zaid-As-Sīrafi visited Sri Lanka in 900 A.D. Al-Masudī came in 930 A.D. and gives a vivid description of the geography and of the manners and customs of the people of Sri Lanka in his famous work Muraj-al-Dhahāb. Though most of the Arab geographers of this period, such as Al-Iṣṭakri (950 A.D.), Ibn Hawqal (977 A.D.) and al-Maṣḏiṣi (985 A.D.), did not visit Sri Lanka, they obtained valuable information about Sri Lanka from Arab travellers and sailors and this they incorporated into their works.1 The information supplied to Arab geographers of the period reveals a very large amount of Arab commercial activity in Sri Lanka.2 With this commerce came a corresponding growth in settlement and thus of the spread of Islam in Sri Lanka. The settlers seem to have been a conglomeration of Persians, Arabs and Abyssinians, and they brought both Islam and the Arabic language.3 The religion of Islam and the Arabic language were doubtless the factors that distinguished them and made them a distinct cultural

1. S.M.H. Nainar, Arab Geographers Knowledge of South India (Madras, 1942), p. 221.
entity once a generation or two had passed.

We find from the notices of the Arab travellers and writers of the ninth and tenth centuries that Arabic was then spoken in Sind.⁠¹ We may assume, therefore, that the Muslims of Sri Lanka, too, at that time, who were also of Arab origin, must have spoken Arabic, and this would have greatly helped them in their dealings with the wider Muslim world. This would certainly be true of Baghdad, with which they seem to have had some cultural contacts during this period.

There is a local tradition that a teacher was sent by the Caliph of Baghdad to Sri Lanka. The teacher is said to have died in Sri Lanka in 957 A.D. The Caliph then supposedly sent a stone to the island, inscribed in Arabic, giving details about the teacher's life and this was placed on his grave in a cemetery which belonged to the Muslim community of Colombo. Sir Alexander Johnstone claims that the cemetery was later abandoned and that the stone was taken away by an official and placed at the entrance to his house as a stepping-stone. He says he learned this from Government officials. He was able to make an ink impression of the Arabic script and to send this to England. The Arabic was deciphered and a translation, which Johnstone published, was made by Sir

Samuel Lee, Professor of Arabic in the University of Cambridge.¹

As a result of increasing contacts, commercial and cultural, with the Muslims of Malabar, a new element, a South Indian one, was added to the composition of the Muslim (Arab) society of Sri Lanka.² It then lost its exclusively Arab character.

Today in Sri Lanka, the Moors include so-called "Coast Moors" and "Ceylon Moors". It seems likely that the Coast Moors came originally from South India, during the early period of British rule. In Sri Lanka "Coast Moors" are called Sammekerān or non resident population, implying that they are based in India.³ Samankara is believed generally to derive from the Malay word Champana which means boat.⁴ Many Muslims came from South India over the centuries to engage in trade and no doubt many did settle down in the island. But others were merely temporary residents, travelling periodically from South India to Sri Lanka for the purpose of trade.

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The "Sri Lankan Moors" are regarded as the much longer settled and so now permanent residents. Even today the Sri Lanka state uses the term "Sri Lankan Moor". Yet there are those who claim that both these groups must have had some ancestors who originally came from Arabia.

One of the important factors which contributed towards the growth of a harmonious relationship between natives and Muslim settlers was that Islam did not come to Sri Lanka as a conquering or proselytising force in the manner of its arrival in North India. Instead, Muslims, as traders, went about their business peacefully, seeking cordial relations with the islanders and seeking the favour and patronage of their court.

ii. The Muslim Relationship with the Sinhalese Kings

As the Muslims in Sri Lanka remained primarily traders, they continued to co-exist peacefully with the local peasantry. With the increase in the importance of foreign trade, however, Muslim settlements on the coast and even inland increased. With the Muslim increased trade activity, there came also a new development. Arab

2. Ibid., p. 47.
traders became, on occasions, advisers to the Sinhalese kings on foreign trade.

During the thirteenth century A.D., when Cairo was under the Mamuluke dynasty, a mission was despatched by Bhuvanekabāhū I of Yappahu (1272–1284 A.D.) to the Sultan of Egypt. This mission was headed by "His Excellency, Al-Haj, Abū 'Uthmān". He was described as a "Prince of Ceylon"; the Ambassador carried a letter from his master, which was wrapped in stuff made, it was said, from the bark of a palm, and the letter was contained in a gold box. The letter read:

Ceylon is Egypt and Egypt is Ceylon. I desire that an Egyptian Ambassador accompany mine on his return and that another be sent to reside in the town of Aden. I am possessed of prestigious vessels, elephants, muslin and other stuffs, brazil wood, cinnamon and other objects of commerce, which are brought to you by the banian merchants. My kingdom produces trees, the wood of which is fit for making spears. If the Sultan asks me for twenty vessels yearly, I shall be in a position to supply them. Further, the merchants of his dominions can with all freedom come to trade in my kingdom. I have received an Ambassador of the Prince of Yemen, who has come on behalf of his master to make me proposals of alliance. But I have sent him away through my affection for the Sultan. I possess twenty-seven castles of which the treasuries are filled with precious stones of all kinds. The pearl fisheries are part of my dominions and all that is taken there belongs to me.

This suggests that the main reason for the King to send an Ambassador to Egypt was to try to edge out the Indian middlemen and enter into direct trade with Egypt and West Asia. The use of a Muslim Ambassador for a mission to a Muslim court needs no further explanation; but the description of him as a "Prince" does suggest a surprising degree of eminence for a member of a recent immigrant community.

Many other, if less exalted, posts were held by Muslims in Sri Lanka. By the seventeenth century A.D. some Muslims of Sri Lanka had apparently come to be regarded as trustworthy, reliable and loyal servants to the Kandyan Kings. They had become specialists in one important sphere as servants of the Crown, namely the Royal betge or department of King's physician, which functioned under the betge Mohandiram nilame. This was held by successive generations of a highly respected Muslim family. Their family name was Rajapaksa Waidytillake Gopala. This name, which owes nothing to Islam, is an indication of the extent to which either the religion or the family had been Ceylonised. A grant of 1747 shows

that the King gifted land in the fertile districts of Siduruvana (an area situated in the Kandyan Province) and of Udunavar (also in the Kandyan Province) to Gopala Mudaliyar, a loyal and faithful physician to the King.¹ In 1786, Buvalikuda Vedaralage Abu Bakr Pulla, who was physician in the King's betge, attended on the favourite secondary wife of King Rājadhirājasimha (1782-98 A.D.) and he was reputedly rewarded for his services with land.²

Muslims were also appointed for service in the Ulpange or Royal Bath House. There were some 500 families who held land in return for such services. This was an elaborate organisation, and it is not known in what capacity they were employed. It could be that they were given the privilege of washing His Majesty's feet, which was an honour bestowed only on very privileged citizens, or Muslims may have been more remotely associated with the Ulpange as suppliers of firewood to heat the bath. They were also employed in the Palace in the Multange or supervision of the Royal kitchen.³

² Ibid., p. 134.
³ Ibid., p. 561.
iii. The Muslims under the Portuguese

The history of Sri Lanka after the Portuguese conquest of the island owes much to records kept by the Portuguese themselves. As a result, a bias appears in the evidence against the Muslims, who were trade rivals and religious enemies of the Portuguese.¹

When the first Portuguese Captain, Dom Lourenço de Almeida, arrived on the island,² he notified his presence to Vira Parākrama Bāhu VIII (1477-89), King of Kotte. Eventually a mission was sent to the Sinhalese King, asking for permission to erect a fortress in Colombo.³ The King informed the Portuguese authorities in Colombo that he had to consult his councillors. The chronicles claim that the Muslims of Sri Lanka then advised the councillors not to allow the Portuguese to erect their fortress.⁴

2. Ibid., pp. 178-179.
More recent historians have suggested that, if they did so, there were sound reasons for the Muslims to do this. The Muslims had used only storehouses or "Bangasalas" in Colombo. A fortress, which was an armed stronghold of the King of Portugal, would be a positive threat to their established trade dealings in the island. The Muslims of Sri Lanka must also have been aware that the Portuguese had destroyed Muslim trade on the Coromandel Coast of India. They obviously feared that the Portuguese might do the same in Sri Lanka.¹

Yet, Bhuvaneka Bāhu VII (1521-51), the King of Kotte, granted permission to build this Fort. At this time, he and his brother Mayadunnē (1521-81), King of Sitavakā, were engaged in a fierce struggle for the throne of Kotte. On the pretext of helping Bhuvaneka Bāhū VII, the Portuguese succeeded in establishing their authority on the island.²

The Portuguese in Sri Lanka treated the Muslims as their enemies because of deep-rooted hostility between Portuguese and Muslims elsewhere. Portuguese Roman Catholicism had long been at odds with Islam since

Muslims had captured Spain and Portugal from their base in Morocco and had met Charlemagne on the plains of France. Both were also long standing trade rivals.

The Portuguese in Sri Lanka were subsequently attacked by the forces of Pachchi Marikar, a Malabar Muslim, who led a band of warriors. In the ensuing conflict, Pachchi Marikar was killed in Kotte. By the middle of the 1520s, however, the situation changed radically. Bhuvaneka Bāhu VII (1521-51) of Kotte, allied with the Portuguese, was persuaded to expel Muslims from his kingdom. However, his brother, Māyadunne of Sītawaka, accepted the Muslims into his domains, and they served him as soldiers in his campaign against the Portuguese and also as diplomatic agents who brought him men and material from the Raja of Calicut. Yet even Māyadunne himself surrendered some Malabar Muslim allies to the Portuguese when he found it opportune.

In 1551 on the death of the King of Kotte, the Portuguese Viceroy, de Noronha, invaded Sri Lanka with a large army and captured Kotte. In 1565, he abandoned Kotte and concentrated on Colombo. In order to build a

stronger fort in Colombo (on the site where the present breakwater begins), the Portuguese authorities destroyed a mosque there. On the following day the Portuguese burnt down the Grand Mosque of Colombo.¹

The Portuguese authorities tolerated the Muslims in Sri Lanka until 1640. One reason for this may have been that if the Muslims of Sri Lanka were expelled from the Maritime Provinces of the country, they would moved to Kandy and strengthen the Kandyan King, Vimala Dharmasuriya I (1591-1604) in his fight against the Portuguese.²

But restrictions were placed on Muslims. One of these, on their residence, resulted in the gradual establishment of new Muslim trading communities along the coast, which soon spread into the interior of the island. The influx of coastal Muslims into the hinterland was welcomed by the Kandyan kings, perhaps because the kingdom was then denuded of manpower after the earlier wars and invasions. Hitherto Muslims had come to Kandy only in search of merchandise, which they carried away to the coast and beyond; but now, in the face of Portuguese oppression, they came both as refugees and as invitees of the kings of Kandy. There is evidence that at least 4,000 Muslims were well received by King

Senarat (1604-35) and some were accommodated in fertile lands around Batticaloa, which was not then occupied by the Portuguese.¹

Muslims fared no better when the Dutch sought to challenge Portuguese power over the coastal regions. In this struggle between the Portuguese and the Dutch, the Muslims, along with other coastal dwellers, were caught in the crossfire. They had to suffer at the hands of one side or the other, whenever they were suspected of disloyalty. On one occasion a fearful massacre of the Muslims of Matara was carried out in 1643 on the orders of the Portuguese captain Antonio de Amiral. This resulted in the killing of 200 to 300 men, and women and young children were sent into slavery in Colombo. During the same period, a second massacre occurred amongst the Muslims of Alutgama.²

After this instance, the Muslims actively sought peace with the Portuguese.³ They were then allowed to continue to trade with the Kandyan kingdom; they sold goods, 

such as salt, clothing, household items and crockery, and bought in exchange spices, such as cloves, nutmeg, pepper and cardamons, which they traded with the Portuguese. ¹

The so-called "Thavalam" or Pack Bull trade was another field controlled by the Muslims. ² While the Portuguese ruled in Sri Lanka, Kalpitya was the Muslims' principal seaport in Sri Lanka. The Sri Lankan Muslims smuggled through Kalpitya arms and ammunition from South India for the Kandyan kings. But the port was carefully watched by Portuguese officials. ³ Freedom of worship, too, was restricted in Portuguese Sri Lanka, Muslims not being allowed to worship in public at their mosques. But in the villages they had their own qaazi or judge and were allowed to practice Muslim personal laws. ⁴

During the 150 years of their presence in the island, the Portuguese implemented policies towards the Muslims which were very unpopular. The Muslims in Sri Lanka had maintained a peaceful relationship with the native population and developed their trade before the arrival of the Portuguese. After their arrival, the Portuguese

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destroyed much of this trade. In Sri Lanka, the Portuguese found some low country Sinhalese and low caste Tamils open to conversion to the Catholic religion, but the Muslims were not. The Portuguese also faced the Malabar Muslims who came to help the Sinhalese kings. Later, to some extent they tolerated the Muslims, but the Muslims' presence in Sri Lanka was always suspect and they were often harassed. The Portuguese rule over the Muslims in Sri Lanka was marked, therefore, by discrimination and repression.¹

iv. The Muslims under the Dutch

The Dutch sought to control Sri Lanka primarily for trade. They were helped in this when the Kandyan King invited the Dutch to drive away the Portuguese from Sri Lanka.² The Dutch landed in Batticaloa in 1602. In 1639 they captured Tricomalee; Negombo was captured in 1640; and in the same year the Portuguese sustained their final defeat in the Maritime Provinces of Sri Lanka. Soon afterwards, King Raja Simha II (1628-83) of Kandy sent a Muslim agent, Chipatin, named Yusuf Lebbe, to negotiate with the Dutch over

access to the cinnamon and spice trade in the Maritime Provinces of the island.¹

But the Dutch, too, often treated the Muslims as their enemies. They were conscious that their faith and that of the Muslims differed fundamentally. The Dutch were Calvinists, stern believers in a rigorous Christianity; the Muslims consistently rejected opportunities offered them for conversion. The Muslims were also seen as obstacles to Dutch trade; therefore the Dutch, too, were aggressive towards the Muslims of Sri Lanka and described them as "Pirates" and as "Peddlers".² All their devices to crush Muslim trade, however, failed. The Sinhalese kings continued to trade with the Muslims.³

It is clear that the relationship between the Sinhala kings and some Muslim families during this period was a cordial one. This was despite attempts by the Dutch to create rifts between them. In one case, the Dutch wrote to the Kandyan King that the Moghals, Muslim rulers, who were dominant in North India, were threatening to come to Ramesvaram (in South India) and thence to Sri Lanka, and that the Muslim traders of the

coast would betray the country to their co-religionists.\textsuperscript{1} However, this rumour was not believed, and the Sinhala-Muslim accord remained.

Dutch restrictions on Muslim trading practices, however, grew. In 1670 a law was passed ordering the Muslims to quit Colombo and take up residence in the region between Alutgama and Galle. They were also subjected to the enforcement of 'Uliyam or compulsory labour for a stipulated number of days a year. In 1743, the Dutch enacted a law making the confiscation of lands the penalty for evasion of 'Uliyam or compulsory labour. Furthermore, the head of each Muslim family was required to pay a special poll-tax of six dollars.\textsuperscript{2} The tax was, however, removed in Matara and Hambantota districts in 1708, on the recommendation of Captain Jan Schreuder. Muslims had been obliged in former times to work at Galle and Matara in various Government Services. In lieu of such duty, they were now required to pay six dollars (Rs. 450) annually to the Government.\textsuperscript{3}

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{1} Arasaratnam, S., "Vimal Dharmasuriya II (1687-1707) and his relations with the Dutch", C.J.H.S.S., vol. 6, no. 1, Jan.-June 1963.
\item \textsuperscript{3} Denham, E.B., Ceylon at Census of 1911 (Colombo, 1912), p. 236.
\end{itemize}
But, in general, the initial hostility to Muslims had waned by the beginning of the eighteenth century. An example of this was the attempt by Governor Falck (1765-85) to discover the laws and customs of the Muslim community in the island. He even formulated a code for them.¹ And in 1784, the Muslims were given a concession with regard to ‘Uliyam or compulsory labour. Those who did not want to labour could pay a poll-tax in lieu of this service.²

Although the Muslims were still trading in Sri Lanka, the Dutch were prepared to tolerate them for two reasons. Firstly they were seen as fellow outsiders to Sri Lanka, potential allies, and, secondly, the Dutch were primarily interested in developing trade as far as they could.³

There were moments when Dutch policy towards the Muslims in Sri Lanka was not less extreme than the Portuguese in its open persecution, and the Dutch were more methodical in their operations. Also, unlike the Portuguese, the Dutch were highly skilled in commerce. Hence, their policy of ousting the Muslims from key commercial positions was more ruthless and uncompromising.

¹. S.L.N.A., no. 6/469, Governor General of Batavia to Falck, 20 Feb. 1776.
When the Dutch stepped into the shoes of the Portuguese as masters of the Maritime Provinces of the island in 1658, the outlook for the Muslims on the coast seemed as bleak as ever. To the Dutch Trading Company, economic considerations superseded everything else.¹

Yet, by the end of the Dutch rule, the Muslim community in Sri Lanka had managed to gain for itself a special position with the Company, despite the original hostility towards them. The Dutch had, it is true, taken more and more steps to expel them from their towns, which meant that more and more Muslims had taken refuge in the Kandyan kingdom. But these Muslims prepared to obey the strict law of the Dutch Company were able to gain some benefits in religious liberty and trade.

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CHAPTER 2

MUSLIMS AND THE BRITISH ADMINISTRATION

i. British Policy and the Muslims in the Eighteenth and Nineteenth Centuries

The history of Muslims in Sri Lanka between 1762 and 1805 is not well documented. There are only four major occasions when Muslims feature in the British records. The first such occasion occurred during the secret mission to Sri Lanka of John Pybus. The British East India Company had dispatched this mission from Madras in 1762, conceiving of it purely as an intelligence-gathering project, designed to enable them to study, at close quarters, the political problems which they were likely to encounter should they attempt to intervene in the island. But, although the Kandyans hoped otherwise, John Pybus was not in a position to offer to negotiate any substantial agreement on the part of the British government with regard to their future plans for the island. He was an intelligence agent, not a diplomat. Thus for Kandy the mission was destined, politically, to achieve nothing. ¹

On May 5th, 1762, John Pybus reached Trincomalee and moved on to a village called Muttur.² This village was inhabited by Muslims, and he was welcomed there by a

2. A village near Batticaloa in the Eastern part of the island.
Muslim Hadjee.  

Pybus then continued his journey towards Kandy. On the third night of his journey to Kandy, Pybus stopped at a village called Panguranā, situated at a distance of twenty-one miles from Tricomaalee. Pybus reported that this village too was inhabited by Muslims and he took an interest in the villagers' appearance and customs. They, like other Kandyans, practised animal husbandry and agriculture, and were mainly peasants. He also remarks that they wore for their personal attire a simple cotton cloth. That Pybus on his journey should have been twice put up at a Muslim village may suggest that it was thought that, as a known intelligence agent, he would gain less useful information there than in a Sinhalese village. But, whatever the reason for his residence, his observations are of interest to historians, as they prove that Muslims had settled and established themselves within Kandyan territory in both Eastern and Central Sri Lanka well before the arrival of the British.

When Pybus arrived at Gannoruwa, which is located close to the capital of Kandy, an official representative of the Kandyan king met him. This, it transpired, was Udman Lebbe, son of Maulana Mohandiram, a Muslim.

1. Title given to an influential member of the Muslim community.
3. Ibid., pp. 36-7.
Throughout the mission, this man frequently accompanied the British party. The ambition of the king of Kandy, Kirti Sri Rajasimha (1742-82), in entertaining this mission, was to enlist the aid of the British in order to drive the Dutch out his native land. Interestingly, he seems to have felt that a Muslim representative might aid him greatly in this matter. It is known that, despite ultimately the negative result of this mission, the king showered Udman Lebbe with gifts of gold.

Why the Kandyan king should have used a Muslim for this mission, rather than a Sinhalese, is open to argument. Perhaps, as traders, Muslims, who were frequently on the move, especially between India and Sri Lanka, were considered useful intermediaries. Perhaps their value lay in their linguistic ability to communicate with the British. But at least it seems clear that by the middle of the eighteenth century some Muslims must have been considered very loyal supporters.

2. The desire of the Kandyan king was to drive the Dutch out of his native land because he was unhappy with the Dutch handling the island's cinnamon trade. See de Silva, K.M., A History of Sri Lanka (New Delhi, 1981), pp. 138-9.
of the Kandyan king before one could have been selected for such an important foreign assignment.

The second contact between Muslims and the British was not until February 1796. When the British began their occupation of Colombo, some Sri Lankan Muslims joined forces with the Dutch against them. The British commander, Colonel James Stewart, noted upon entering Colombo that there were 260 Muslims in the Colombo artillery fighting alongside the Dutch, though half of them had by then deserted. The reason for their desertion, it may be supposed, is that they were merely mercenaries in the pay of the Dutch. Thus, with the capture of Colombo by the British imminent, a switch of loyalties might have seemed expedient.

A third official contact between the Muslims and the British followed soon after. A British officer, Captain Martin of Madras, was ordered to raise two separate battalions in Sri Lanka: the first was intended for the purpose of internal defence against the threat of attack from the Kandyan kingdom, and the second for general services. In the latter battalion he included some five hundred locally-raised Muslim troops. It is also clear that once these Muslims had given their loyalty to the

2. Ibid.
British, the British trusted them.  

Muslims were also the subject of an official complaint by the British to Kandy during the governorship of Frederick North (1798-1805). An incident took place which was of some lasting significance to the Muslims of Sri Lanka. In March or April of 1802, some Muslim merchants were returning from a trading expedition to the Kandyan province with a consignment of areca-nuts when they were stopped at the Puttalam bazaar. Their arrest was on the orders of the first Adigār, Pilimatalauve, a man who claimed royal Kandyan descent. Their entire consignment of areca-nuts was confiscated and later sold to some traders from Colombo, whilst the Muslims were permitted to leave with only their cattle. This incident was reported to Governor North, who, in September of the same year, sent a curt personal letter to the king inviting him to comment on the circumstances. On 4th October, the Adigār sent a note to the governor, stating that he had had those responsible for the

2. Adigār means chief officer of state in the Kandyan kingdom.
4. C.O. 54/7, North to Hobart, 31 July 1802.
5. C.O. 54/6, North to Hobart, 4 Sept. 1802.
confiscation questioned. Their defence was that they had been renting the areca-nut farms of the Disāvanies\footnote{Disāvanies means governors of a province in the Kandyan kingdom.} at the time the incident took place. In other words, they were arguing that the Muslim traffic was illegal and was an infringement of their monopoly as renters. The Adigār declared, however, that the Muslim arrests had taken place before the farms had been rented, and he therefore promised that restitution would be made to the parties concerned, if and when they should apply for it. That North should have written in strong terms to the king of Kandy, demanding an explanation for what was in fact a very minor incident, suggests that the British wished to make clear that they were treating the Muslims as their citizens. North probably planned to use the incident as an excuse for action against the Kandyan kingdom at some time in the future. He in fact later attempted, both in 1803 and 1805, to capture the Kandyan kingdom, and ultimately he participated in a disastrous war. It was left to Sir Thomas Maitland to end hostilities in 1805 and to try to secure a treaty with the Kandyan king.\footnote{de Silva, C.R., Ceylon Under the British Occupation, vol. I (Colombo, 1953), pp. 120-127.} During his governorship of Sri Lanka, North clearly treated the Muslim community tolerantly. There were good reasons for this: the Muslims constituted a community potentially loyal to
the British government. They were also active in the promotion of commerce, undertaking trading enterprises both inside and outside the country. In their capacity as traders, they were able not only to help improve the country's economy but, owing to their links with the Kandyan community, it was hoped that they could provide assistance in other ways. Muslims were also used by the British in eliciting military data for them. The British kept records which reveal that in 1810 there were 400 Malabari, 250 Muslims and 200 Malay recruits in the Kandyan army.

In view of such factors, North was sympathetic in his handling of the Muslim community, increasing, for example, their opportunities to lease rented property. North in addition recruited more Muslims into the army. He also refused to levy the earlier poll-tax upon the Muslim community, regarding this former practice of the Dutch government as a discriminatory policy, since it was not applied to other commercial groups in Sri Lanka.

1. S.L.N.A., No. 7/43, North to Clive, 1 July, 1803. By contrast, the Malay soldiers were not loyal to the British, and they fought against the British in the Kandyan war. The Malay Muslims originated mainly from the island of Java or elsewhere in Indonesia. For further details, see, Hussainmiya, B.A., ORANG REJIMEN: "The Regiment People", A Study of the Malays of the Ceylon Rifle Regiment, 1827-1873. (Unpublished Ph.D. University of Sri Lanka, Peradeniya, 1984), pp. 2-3.


3. Ibid.


5. S.L.N.A., No. 7/43, North to Hobart, 9 July 1803.

6. Ibid.
But it was not until the recommendation of the Colebrooke-Cameron Commission\(^1\) that this system of *uliyan* or poll-tax was finally officially abolished, through Regulation 25 of the 28th June 1830.\(^2\)

ii. The Conquest of the Kandyan Kingdom

Sir Thomas Maitland, who served as governor in Sri Lanka from 1805 to 1811, failed, like his predecessor, North, to win any political agreement with the Kandyan kingdom. He was succeeded by Sir Robert Brownrigg, who was Governor from 1812 to 1820. During this period, some Kandyan chiefs, between whom differences had arisen, and who were bent on the overthrow of the king of Kandy, welcomed the idea of British intervention in the Kandyan kingdom. A period of confrontation between the British and the Kandyans developed, and during this time some Muslims of the Kandyan kingdom gave their tacit support to the British. When the Kandyan king was preparing himself for war against the British in 1813, a Muslim village, Vellassa, was razed to the ground by the Sinhalese as a punishment for its failure to obey

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1. The Colebrooke-Cameron Commission Reforms will be discussed later in this chapter.
2. C.O. 50/12, Secretary of State to the Governor, 28 June 1830. The Malay soldiers had been exempted from the poll-tax because of their loyalty to the Dutch. S.L.N.A., No. 1/68, Minutes of the Dutch Political Council, 30 Sept. 1743.
the call to military service. The Muslims were said to have refused to fight on behalf of the king because they were principally traders with no military training.\(^1\) But it may be that they also realized that the overthrow of the king was inevitable as the British troops were well equipped with the latest military weapons.\(^2\) However, Sir Robert Brownrigg was careful not to miss his opportunity to occupy the kingdom. On his orders, British troops advanced on the city of Kandy on the 10th January 1815, and, within forty days, captured it. They found the city empty; not a living creature was to be seen apart from a few pariah dogs.

On 18th February 1815 the independent Sinhalese kingdom was formally ceded to the British and the king deposed. The king was finally captured by the British on 2nd March 1815. The famous Kandyan Convention was then signed at the Royal Palace.\(^4\)

With the signing of this convention, Kandyan sovereignty was transferred to the British Crown; but provisions were made carefully to preserve and safeguard the local political and religious institutions. Amongst the signatories therein are to be found the names of

\(^1\) C.O. 54/47, Brownrigg to Bathurst, 30 April, 1813. We note, however, that there were still other Muslims in the king's military service who fought alongside the Kandyan troops.

\(^2\) S.L.N.A., No. 5/6, Brownrigg to Bathurst, 13 Mar. 1813.


\(^4\) Ibid., pp. 164-166.
only the Sinhalese élite of Kandy. No Muslim name appears. Perhaps the Muslims were not sufficiently important to rank as signatories of Kandyan treaties, or perhaps they were overlooked in this document on account of their questionable loyalty during the Kandyan war. They may have engendered a general mistrust of Muslims amongst the Sinhalese community. But it may be significant too that a Kandyan king, who had used a Muslim envoy to negotiate with the British in order to drive the Dutch out his native land, now ignored Muslim intermediaries altogether. The British, too, clearly did not insist on including any Muslim in this document, although the Muslims were used by them two years later to put down the rebellion of 1817/1818.

Muslim trade was interrupted by the British conquest. The barter trade between the maritime provinces of Sri Lanka and the Kandyan kingdom had been largely conducted by Muslims. The Kandyans bartered, for example, for dry grain, salt, areca-nuts, jaggery, salt fish and cloth from the maritime provinces, all through Muslim traders. This trade was not only adversely affected by the Kandyan war, but also, to a certain extent, by the first Kandyan

2. The first Kandyan Rebellion (1817-18) will be discussed in the following section.
rebellion of 1817-18.¹

iii. The First Kandyan Rebellion (1817-18)

The first Kandyan rebellion was led by a former bhikku,² who claimed to be the chosen king of Sri Lanka on the authority of the god Kataragama. Rebellion first broke out in Ÿva³ in September, 1817. It took the British government in Sri Lanka by surprise.⁴ On 11th September 1817, the Government Agent in Badulla,⁵ Mr. Wilson, informed John D'Oyly, a British expert on Kandyan affairs, that a suspicious party had been seen in Ÿva, including a Malabari stranger and a company of eight priests. Mr. Wilson decided to have this party captured. He entrusted the mission to a certain Hadjee, who duly set off with a small group of fellow Muslims. Upon hearing that the party in question was in the Kandyan village of Koṭėrvela with two hundred Vāddas, Hadjee and his men marched there. At the village of Inavalla, Hadjee captured a number of suspects and sent them to

². A Buddhist monk or priest.
³. Ÿva province situated between central province and southern province of Sri Lanka.
⁵. The capital town of Ÿva province.
Badulla. He then with his party attempted to make a further advance, but he was attacked by the rebels, captured and put to death.¹

During the rebellion, the British government made other uses of the loyalty of the Muslim community. They established their principal military post of communications in the Muslim village of Kotabōva, situated between Batticaloa and Badulla, which proved to be of considerable service to them.² As for the Muslim communities of Ūva and Vellassa, they supplied the commissariat with transport in the form of bullock carts, for the purpose of conveying military equipment to their stores from the country's maritime province.³

All in all, the loyal support the British received from some Muslims, and especially the information they passed on regarding the Pretender, proved to be of major importance in enabling the rebellion to be put down.⁴

The support of the Muslims in the Kandyan province was immediately rewarded. Section 52 of the proclamation of 21st November 1818, issued by the governor, required "the moormen .... when living in villages where Kandyans also reside" to obey orders of the Kandyan chief or headman of the village "on pain of punishment by the Agent of Government for disobedience."⁵ This in effect gave the

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1. C.O. 54/66, Brownrigg to Bathurst, 7 Nov. 1817.
2. C.O. 54/56, Hardy to the governor, 20 July 1815.
3. Ibid.
4. S.L.N.A., No. 5/6 Brownrigg to Bathurst, 28 July 1815.
5. C.G.G., 28 Nov. 1818, Sec. 52.
Muslims an appeal to the British officials, whereas article eight of the Kandyan Convention of 2nd March 1815 had put the power of punishment over non-Sinhalese exclusively in the hands of the Sinhalese chiefs.¹

The proclamation of 21st November 1818 also further guaranteed that religious toleration was to be exercised in respect of Muslims. Article sixteen of the proclamation stipulated that the protection of the government was guaranteed to the peaceable exercise by all persons of the religion which they respectively professed. The erection of places of worship, however, was prohibited without licence from the governor.² It is possible that before this proclamation permission to erect a place of worship was awarded by the chiefs of the Kandyan province.³

The same proclamation also guaranteed a reduction in the grain tax for those regions which had remained loyal to the British during the rebellion; this was of particular benefit to Muslims from the districts of Ratnapura and Kegalla.⁴

The Muslims were to benefit, also, from a government promise that full compensation would be

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2. C.G.G., 28 Nov. 1818, sec. 16.
made to every Muslim who suffered injury to person or property during the rebellion.¹

There was yet another development to arise out of Muslim support for the British during the rebellion. Out of what they claimed was resentment towards the Muslims for the part they had played, some Sinhalese chiefs in the Kandyan province resorted to taking certain goods, such as salt, from Muslim traders and refusing payment. As a consequence the Muslims complained to the governor and asked to have a Muhandiram² appointed to protect them.³

This appeal too could now be entertained as, on 30th September 1810, in a document containing instructions to accompany the charter of justice which had been despatched from Downing Street, it was stated:

All members of the Landraads and other inferior courts, all justices of peace, sitting magistrates, all Modeliers and Muhandirams in the Cingalese part of the British territories, and all native headmen of a similar rank in the Malabar part shall be appointed by the Governor in Council under the Great Seal.⁴

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1. C.G.G., 7 March 1818.
2. Chief revenue officer in the Kandyan province.
3. S.L.N.A., No. 4/3, Brownrigg to Bathurst, No. 46 of 8 June 1816.
The governor chose to use this authority to appoint the first Muslim Muhandiram with power over a Muslim community. This was Uman Lebbe Marikar Shiekh, Abdul Cader, who received his post on 10th June 1818.¹

Later other such appointments were nominally opened up to any local candidate, rather than being the preserve of the Sinhalese or Tamil elite of the region. It was stipulated that any native sufficiently well-qualified for the post of Muhandiram or headman might be appointed.² Muslims were also now permitted other privileges. For example, they had the right for the first time to enter the business of revenue farming.³

Under British rule, then, Muslims began to receive benefits and one Muslim was appointed to the office of Muhandiram, an office which would have been denied him during the period of Dutch domination in Sri Lanka.⁴

iv. The Colebrooke-Cameron Reforms⁵

The Muslims in Sri Lanka were to find their positions further affected by the Colebrooke-Cameron

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1. S.L.N.A., No. 13/12, Secretary of State's despatch No. 45 of 10 June, 1818.
3. S.L.N.A., No. 4/6, Governor to the Secretary of State, Despatch No. 28, 23 August 1828.
4. S.L.N.A., No. 4/12, Secretary of State to the Governor, Despatch No. 247, 26 Feb. 1828.
5. The Colebrooke-Cameron papers consist of three reports.
Commission. Colebrooke, the chief commissioner, arrived in Sri Lanka on 11th April 1829 and left, with Cameron, the legal commissioner, on 14th February 1831. These commissioners were sent to Sri Lanka to investigate why the expenditure of the island exceeded the revenue. In order to place the finances on a sound footing, various recommendations were made by them. On 24th December 1831, Colebrooke submitted a first report to the Rt. Hon. Viscount Goderich (Secretary of State). This dealt with proposals for the future administration of the government of Sri Lanka. The second report was submitted on 31st January 1832 and concerned the revenues of Sri Lanka. The third (confidential) report was submitted on March 16th, 1832 and was on the compulsory services in Sri Lanka. These reports gave little attention to the cultural variety of the country, but the reforms proposed by Colebrooke and Cameron were still to be of some significance for the Muslim community. Indeed, Sri Lanka was, in consequence, to undergo a substantial

1. Colebrooke served as a first lieutenant in the Royal Artillery in 1803. In 1809, he was promoted to captain in the army. He was the son of Colonel Paulet Welbone Colebrooke.
2. Cameron was a lawyer from London. His father was Charles Cameron who had been Governor of the Bahamas.
change in its administrative and economic systems of importance for all.

Upon the arrival of Colebrooke and Cameron in Galle, on June 1829, a complaint was lodged with them by the men of the Muslim community. The Muslims asserted that in Galle they were on occasions obliged to work without wages, even without subsistence, such as was permitted criminals in prison, and that they were subject to corporal punishment, and were often reduced to poverty and distress by their arbitrary removal from their chosen occupations. Following their complaint, Colebrooke investigated and agreed that they were suffering from an "objectionable system". He supposed that their treatment derived from caste obligations, which had probably been devised by the Sinhalese kings in favour of the Sinhalese elite. In his report, he recommended that all such obligations be abolished. Governor Horton, however, who held office from 1831-7, had earlier opted, on the contrary, to make use of such labour services for the purpose of a road construction project, which had been initiated by Sir Edward Barnes (Governor from 1824-31). The project was intended to link together

1. C.O. 54/145, Colebrooke to Secretary of State, 16 March 1832.
2. Ibid.
all the major towns on the island. Nonetheless, all systems of compulsory labour, or Rajakariya, were legally abolished on 3rd May 1832. This was particularly to benefit those Muslims of Sri Lanka whose principal occupation lay not in working the land but in trade and industrial ventures.

The abolition of compulsory labour was not, however, total; the imperial government decided to make an exception with regard to the services attached to the Temples and Devala land. Accordingly, tenants of the latter were obliged to continue their customary services. This exception concerned even Muslims who had been accommodated into the scheme of compulsory labour attaching to the Temples and Devalas. The Temple Land commissioners observed in 1859 and 1870 that Muslims yearly supplied a certain number of candles and gallons of oil for the Temples.

Another important recommendation in the Colebrooke-Cameron reforms was that the government of Sri Lanka should remove any discriminatory laws which hindered

2. C.O. 55/72, Secretary of State to Horton, 3 May 1832.
3. Land attached to shrines.
4. C.O. 55/72, Secretary of State to Governor, 3 May, 1832, "Abolition of Compulsory Services".
social reforms and development, and fettered the free activities of the people.¹ This was supposedly the basis of regulation No. 2 of 1832, by which the Muslims of Sri Lanka were permitted, for the first time, to own properties in the areas of Pettah and Fort. On 25th January 1833, a letter was sent from Downing Street to the governor, Sir Robert Wilmot Horton, confirming the king's approval of the regulation whereby the restrictions which had been imposed on Moors and Malabaris under Portuguese domination were to be removed.² Once these restrictions were lifted, Muslims had the opportunity to indulge in a novel range of commercial activities.

Yet another recommendation made in the Colebrooke-Cameron reports was that posts in the lower grades of the Civil Service might be filled by local candidates,³ and, further to this, that revenues should be collected through native receivers, who were generally to be the majoraal and village heads who superintended the cultivation of the lands. Such public functionaries, who had earlier received small salaries, might be remunerated in future by the assignment of lands, called "accomodessans", which they were to hold free from taxes and services.⁴ Muslims had held such posts

1. C.O. 55/122, Colebrooke to Secretary of State, 31 Jan. 1832, "Assessment of the House".
3. C.O. 54/122, Colebrooke to Secretary of State, 24 Dec. 1831, "Employment of Natives".
4. Table I.
in the 1800s; they were now to benefit further from the implementation of these proposals.

v. Muslims and Civil Service Appointments

The imperial government, regarding Muslims as loyal, reliable and trustworthy, now began to select them as cashiers, assistant cashiers and shroffs, particularly in the areas of Galle and Colombo. In these capacities, they were responsible for the collection of taxes from the farmers, which was an important source of income for the imperial government. Muslim tenure of such jobs, which lent them some prestige, also often served to incur prejudice against them in the minds of Sinhalese.1

Another new avenue of opportunity opened for those Muslims in Colombo who could speak Sinhalese, Tamil and English (or even Portuguese). Such men were often appointed after 1800 as interpreters in Colombo courts, on account of their multi-lingual abilities.2

## Table I

**Muslim Appointments in Public Service Positions: Cashiers, Shroffs, Translators**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Names</th>
<th>Nature and Places of Occupation</th>
<th>Date of Appointment</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Mr. J.C. Abdul Cader</td>
<td>Assistant shroff, cashier of the General Treasury of Colombo</td>
<td>7th Feb. 1808</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Marikar</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mr. Wil Cassim</td>
<td>Shroff, Galle Katchary</td>
<td>1st Jan. 1848</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mr. E.L.S. Abdul</td>
<td>Assistant cashier of the General Treasury of Colombo</td>
<td>1st May. 1863</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Majee</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mr. C.I. Abdul</td>
<td>Assistant shroff, cashier of the General Treasury of Colombo</td>
<td>10th Feb. 1877</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mr. A.L.M. Wil Cassim</td>
<td>Shroff, Galle Katchary</td>
<td>7th May, 1888</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mr. Ahmad Hussain</td>
<td>Assistant shroff of the General Treasury of Colombo</td>
<td>15th June, 1886</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mr. Udman Lebbe</td>
<td>Shroff, Galle Katchary</td>
<td>10th Feb. 1892</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mr. Abdul Azeez</td>
<td>Assistant shroff of the General Treasury of Colombo</td>
<td>7th July, 1893</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mr. C.M. Lebbe Marikar</td>
<td>Tamil interpreter, Colombo courts. Salary Rs. 1,200 per annum</td>
<td>10th May, 1875</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mr. Abdul Jabbar</td>
<td>Tamil interpreter, Galle courts. Salary Rs. 1,200 per annum</td>
<td>10th June, 1878</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mr. Abdul Hamid</td>
<td>Tamil interpreter, Puttalam courts. Salary Rs. 1,200 per annum</td>
<td>11th May, 1880</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mr. Meer Lebbe Marikar</td>
<td>Tamil interpreter, Colombo courts. Salary Rs. 1,400 per annum</td>
<td>11th Jan. 1886</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mr. Ibrahim Marikar</td>
<td>Tamil interpreter, Galle courts. Salary Rs. 1,400 per annum</td>
<td>1st May, 1888</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mr. Hamid Hussain</td>
<td>Tamil interpreter, Puttalam courts. Salary Rs. 1,500 per annum</td>
<td>1st June, 1892</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

2. S.L.N.A., No. 5/278, Secretary of State's despatch, No. 275 of 1 Jan. 1848.
3. S.L.N.A., No. 5/72, Secretary of State's despatch, No. 47 of 1 May, 1863.
5. S.L.N.A., No. 6/72, Secretary of State's despatch, No. 47 of 7 May, 1888.
7. S.L.N.A., No. 6/72, Secretary of State's despatch, No. 30 of 10 Feb. 1892.
8. S.L.N.A., No. 7/72, Secretary of State's despatch, No. 48 of 7 July, 1895.
14. S.L.N.A., No. 4/49, Secretary of State's despatch, No. 28 of 1 June, 1892.
vi. The Appointment of Muslims as Consuls in Turkey and Persia

Sir Hercules Robinson, governor of Sri Lanka from 1865 to 1872, was also distinctly sympathetic to the Muslim community; he was even prepared to employ them in the consular service. Muslims were appointed as consuls to such Muslim countries as Turkey and Persia, which were then playing an important rôle in the international political arena. The Persians were at this time opening their doors to European investment, and they acted as one of the important commercial bases between Britain and India. ¹ Turkey, too, was part of an important trade route between Britain and India, though its leading trade partners were France and Russia. ²

The Muslim consuls were not really diplomats, as such. Rather they looked after the commercial interests of Britain and its colonies in Turkey and Persia. They might better be described as "commercial agents for the British Empire".

Muslims selected for such high ranking posts were those regarded as eminently loyal to the British. They usually came from the leading families and especially from the ranks of the gem merchants. One such was Sir

Mohamed Macan Markar. His father, O.L.M. Macan Markar, had business connections with the British royal family; his clients included the Prince of Wales, later H.M. King Edward VIII (1875), and the Duke of Cornwall and York, later H.M. King George V (1901), both of whom purchased gems from him.¹

The British apparently chose to appoint Muslims to such posts on account of their knowledge of overseas societies, their international connections, their language abilities² and, of course, their loyalty.³ Muslims continued to receive such appointments until 1928.⁴

1. Sir Mohamed Macan Markar was elected in 1924 as the first member for the Muslim seat on the Legislative Council, representing the Muslims of the whole island. He was subsequently elected member of the State Council for the South constituency, by defeating Mr. E.R. Thambimuttu, a seat which he held from 1931 to 1936. He later held the office of Minister of Works and Communications. It was said that his was the deciding vote in the Board of Ministers (1931) when an income tax was introduced in Sri Lanka. He was also the first Muslim openly to favour the establishment of a Sinhalese majority government, provided that justice and fair play was ensured for the minorities. Sir Mohamed Macan Markar received a knighthood in 1938.

See the following sources:
C.B.B., 1924 (Colombo, 1925), p. 34.
C.B.B., 1936 (Colombo, 1937), p. 34.
Ceylon Times, 10 August 1931.
Hansard, vol. II (State Council) 1933, p. 2638.
Ceylon Times, 10 July 1938.

2. Cordiner, James, A Description of Ceylon, vol. I (Lond. 1807), p. 139.


4. Table II gives full details concerning these appointments.
## TABLE II

THE APPOINTMENT OF MUSLIMS AS CONSULS IN TURKEY AND PERSIA

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Names</th>
<th>Date of Appointment</th>
<th>Date of Termination</th>
<th>Country of Appointment</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. H.E. Hussain Lebbe Marikar</td>
<td>27th Feb. 1865¹</td>
<td>1890²</td>
<td>Turkey</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. H.E. H.L.M. Abdul Madjid</td>
<td>13th March 1891³</td>
<td>1904⁴</td>
<td>Turkey</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. H.E. Mohamed Ismail</td>
<td>25th Nov. 1890⁵</td>
<td>1928⁶</td>
<td>Persia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. Sir Mohamed Macan Markar V.C.</td>
<td>30th March 1903⁷</td>
<td>1913⁸</td>
<td>Turkey</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. H.E. Ibrahim Didi Ali</td>
<td>19th April 1882⁹</td>
<td>1914¹⁰</td>
<td>Turkey</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

H.E. His Excellency. V.C. Vice Consul

1. S.L.N.A. No. 6/154, Secretary of State's despatch, No. 252 of 27 Feb. 1865.
vii. Summary

During the early period of British rule in Sri Lanka, some Muslims were amongst the last supporters of the Dutch. Once the Dutch formally ceded the maritime province of Sri Lanka, however, Muslims became solidly loyal to the British. Overall, throughout the nineteenth century, the Muslims of Sri Lanka benefited from British rule. As the rulers set about their manipulation of the diverse social components of the island, Muslims were seen as potential weapons, as allies who could be used to British advantage. From the time when some Muslims were used by the British to put down the first Kandyan rebellion, their community in Sri Lanka came to benefit from British rule.

Muslims were rewarded with appointments. The post of Muhandiram was created for their community, for example, and they also gained from the recommendations of the Colebrooke-Cameron reports. They were amongst the groups which benefited from the abolition of compulsory labour in the island. They were also helped by being given permission to own properties in the Fort and Pettah areas. They were also appointed to minor subordinate posts in the Civil Service and, much later, as consuls in Turkey and Persia.

The Kandyan provinces were incorporated into the maritime provinces during British rule and Sri Lanka was, after centuries of disunion, once more united under one
sceptre. Thenceforward her way lay along the path of peace and the Muslims of Sri Lanka proved to be one of those enterprising communities which participated in the 19th century economic development of the island.
CHAPTER 3

MUSLIMS AND POLITICS

i. Muslims and Politics under British Rule

Muslims were represented in both the Central Legislative Council and in the Local Municipal Councils. These bodies were created to give representation to the peoples of the island. The formation of the Legislative Council in 1833 provided the first form of all-island political representation for Sri Lankans. The Municipal Councils had the less ambitious scope and function of looking after local affairs in their respective areas.

Although the Legislative Council was created in 1833, no Muslim was appointed as a representative until 1899; all the early Muslim members from then until 1924 were nominated, not elected. Some Muslims did stand for election, but they were unable to win a seat. As Muslims were regarded as a significant minority group, however, a number of them in these years continued to be nominated to places on the Council by the Governor. The nominated members from 1899 to 1924 were all from the elite, mainly gem merchants and by and large loyal supporters of the British government.

2. See Table III.
The only non-mercantile figure was Mr. N.H.M. Abdul Cader.¹

In 1924, Muslims were accorded five seats in the Legislative Council, two to be filled by election from a communal electorate. One of the first Muslim members to be elected was T.B. Jayah. He was neither from the élite nor a gem merchant. He was a teacher by profession.² The other was Sir Mohamed Macan Markar. He, like earlier nominated members, was from the élite and also conformed to type in being a gem merchant. Yet, although they came from very different backgrounds, both were elected in 1924 as all-island Muslim representatives to the Legislative Council. Presumably the Muslim electorate appreciated both the claims of wealth and business skill, in the one case, and professional competence and intellectual eminence, in the other.³

From 1899 to 1915 only one nominated post was assigned to a Muslim representative on the Legislative Council.⁴ This representation was then increased by one further nominated post in 1915 and then by one nominated and two elected

¹ Ceylon Times, 15 June 1907.
² Ceylon Muhammadan, 15 Mar. 1922. Sir Mohamed Macan Markar's life has already been discussed.
⁴ See Table III.
posts in 1924. According to the Secretary of State in 1889, Muslims then merited only one post as this was all that their small proportion of the population warranted.\textsuperscript{1} By 1924, however, their numbers had grown and their representation had also been increased.

Although the Muslim community was made up of different groups, locally described as different races, Sri Lanka Moor, Malay and Bohora, the members appointed to the Council were exclusively from the Sri Lanka Moor community. The British government in Sri Lanka claimed not to differentiate between these three groups, even if their appointments were always from the majority group, the Moors. Once elections were introduced, however, the Muslim electors proved to be more broad-minded. They selected, amongst others, T.B. Jayah, who was from the Malay community.\textsuperscript{2} When the Muslims first entered the Legislative Council, they concentrated on purely community issues. In the 1900s, however, Muslim members started to criticize government expenditure and later moved on to take an interest in such matters as education.\textsuperscript{3}

\begin{enumerate}
\item S.L.N.A., no. 13/15, Secretary of State's despatch, no. 48, 29 Oct. 1889.
\item Ceylon Muhammadan, 10 April 1924. See the section on Muslim members of the Legislative and State Council.
\item Hansard (Legislative Council), 1921, vol. II (Colombo, 1921), p. 230.
\end{enumerate}
ii. The Formation of the Legislative Council

One important feature of the Legislative Council was that, though it long retained an "official" or Civil Service majority, it also required the presence of "unofficial" members. This served to give validity to the idea that the essential purpose of establishing this Legislative body had been to give representation to the inhabitants of the dependency.

From the very beginning, the unofficial members of the Legislative Council, and even some of the local newspapers of the day, tended to regard the Council as a local parliament. Initially, the unofficial representatives were appointed by the Governor on a communal basis. This seemed to the rulers both natural and desirable, as their major role on the Council was to provide information pertaining to local conditions. The ratio at first became fixed by convention at three European members to one each from the Sinhalese, Tamil and Burgher communities. On several occasions after 1833, there was some agitation on the part of the local Sinhalese and Tamil elites to turn the Legislative Council into a more genuinely representative body; and gradually over this period the Council's powers were, in fact, enlarged.¹

iii. Ramanthan and Muslim Ethnicity

In October 1889, Sir Ponnambalam Ramanathan, a leading Tamil, was appointed to the Legislative Council as an unofficial representative.¹ In 1888, in an article, entitled "The Ethnology of the Moors of Ceylon",² he tried to prove, for the benefit of his readers generally and of the Imperial Government in particular, that the Muslims required no separate representation as they were part of what he called "the Hindu community".

In his article, Ramanathan concluded that the Muslims of Sri Lanka were ethnologically Tamils, principally on the grounds that they spoke Tamil and also because, in his view, historical evidence existed which showed that the Muslims had all come originally from Tamil Nadu, and in particular from such places as Kayal Paṭṭnām.

His thesis is open to challenge. The evidence he adduced does not prove that the two communities were one and the same. If there were common elements between the Muslims and Tamils of Sri Lanka, there were also important differences in culture, history, language and religion.

Some years later Ramanathan was strongly attacked for

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¹ S.L.N.A., no. 14/16, Secretary of State's despatch no. 49, 7 Oct. 1889.
his views by Mr. I.L.M. Abdul Azeez.\footnote{Abdul Azeez, I.L.M., Ethnology of the 'Moors' of Ceylon (Colombo, 1907), p. 22.} Azeez did not deny that there were, indeed, cultural similarities between Tamils and Muslims; but in his opinion this could be explained in terms of the inevitable result of the acculturation of a minority group to the dominant element in local society.\footnote{Tbid., p. 41.}

The use of Tamil as the everyday language of the Muslim community could, similarly, be explained. Tamil was the lingua franca of commerce in the Indian Ocean at the time that Arab traders made their entry into the area; and thus it may well have been adopted for obvious reasons of convenience.\footnote{Hardy, P., The Muslims of British India (Cambridge, 1972), p.8.} But this did not mean that Arabic was forgotten; the importance with which it was still viewed by Sri Lankan Muslims was reflected in the place they continued to give it in their educational system.\footnote{Abdul Azeez, I.L.M., Ethnology of the 'Moors' of Ceylon (Colombo, 1907), p. 48.}

As for the supposed physical resemblance that Muslims bore to the Tamils, a point emphasized in Ramanathan's analysis of their ethnicity, this was fervently discounted, and, instead, the "Arab" profile of the members of this community was strongly asserted. Even Azeez could not
deny that there was a mixture of Arab and Tamil blood in the Muslim community. It was, in fact, even admitted that some of the original Arab traders had taken Tamil women as their partners when they settled in South India, something which was thought quite inevitable, given their circumstances. ¹ Nonetheless, it was asserted that this factor alone could and should not obscure the fact that the true origins of the community were to be traced back to the Arab traders. ²

Though claiming in his article a blood relationship with them, Ramanathan was not known later for his love of Muslims. For example, when the troubles of 1915 between the Sinhalese and Muslim communities broke out, Ramanathan took up the cause of the Sinhalese and wrote of ".... the intolerance and aggressiveness of a small section of the Muhammedans, known to the Sinhalese as 'Hampayas' (boatmen). The Hampayas are the Muhammedan immigrants from the east coast of South India."³ Even if this exonerated the bulk of Muslims, it was a curious comment to make in the light of later evidence.

Ramanathan, in writing his paper on the "Ethnology of the Moors of Ceylon", was equally at odds with Muslim

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political pretensions. Having himself obtained membership as a Tamil on the Legislative Council, he was now seeking to dissuade the British government from appointing a separate Muslim member to the Council. But he was still prepared a little later to castigate a section of the Muslims as immigrant boatmen, when his personal interests were better served by that approach. Ramanathan, of course, had been thwarted on the first point; a Muslim appointment to the Legislative Council was made in 1889, explicitly in fairness to the Muslims as "a minority community".

The Muslim community already had representatives on the Municipal Councils and on other local bodies. But, in the 1880s, the Muslims, along with the Kandyan Sinhalese, began to agitate for membership of the Legislative Council. Muslim activists were quite clearly no longer willing to acquiesce in the arrangements which had subsumed them under the Tamils in the all-island political arena. The upshot was that, despite Ramanathan, in 1889 the Governor made provision for two new members on the Legislative Council, one from the Kandyan and one from the Muslim community.

3. See the next section of this chapter.
4. S.L.N.A., no. 13/15, Secretary of State to the Governor, 29 Oct. 1899. For Muslim members, see Table III.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Names of council members</th>
<th>Date when nominated/elected to the council</th>
<th>Date of membership termination</th>
<th>Elected/nominated</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2. Hon. Ahmadu Lebbe Muhammad Sheriff</td>
<td>18th July, 1899</td>
<td>1900</td>
<td>Nominated</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Hon. W.M. Abdul Rahman</td>
<td>22nd Sept., 1900</td>
<td>1935</td>
<td>Nominated</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. Hon. S.R. Muhammad Sultan</td>
<td>2nd May, 1924</td>
<td>1927</td>
<td>Nominated to the Legislative Council</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6. Hon. M.T. Akbar</td>
<td>2nd May, 1924</td>
<td>1927</td>
<td>Nominated to the Legislative Council</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7. Hon. T.B. Jayah</td>
<td>1924</td>
<td>1930</td>
<td>Elected to the Legislative Council</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8. Sir Muhammad Macan Markar</td>
<td>1924</td>
<td>1927</td>
<td>Elected member for Legislative Council and then to State Council (Nominated)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10. Sir A. Razik Fareed</td>
<td>10 April, 1936</td>
<td>1968</td>
<td>Elected to the Parliament</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Hon. = Honourable

3. S.L.N.A., no. 2/17, Secretary of State's despatch no. 48, of 18 July, 1899.
5. S.L.N.A., no. 12/21, Secretary of State's despatch no. 58, of 22 Sept. 1900.
9. S.L.N.A., no. 12/19, Secretary of State's despatch no. 48, of 2 May, 1924.
11. S.L.N.A., no. 2/177, Secretary of State's despatch no. 49, 2 May, 1924.
17. S.L.N.A., no. 2/185, Secretary of State's despatch no. 49, 2 May, 1931.
19. S.L.N.A., no. 2/197, Secretary of State's despatch no. 47, 10 April, 1936.
iv. **Muslim Members of the Legislative and State Councils**

The four Muslim members nominated by the British to the Legislative Council before 1916 came from amongst the leading English-speaking families. All were from the elite, all gem merchants, all conspicuously loyal to the British.¹

The first Muslim member to be appointed was the Hon. M.C. Abdul Rahman, who held the post from 1889-99.² His principal contribution as a representative of the Muslim community was to persuade the Legislative Council of the necessity of including amendments to the Marriage Registration Ordinances no. 8 of 1886 and no. 2 of 1888, in order to ensure that Muslim marriages would also be officially registered.³ Until then registration was kept only by the priest of the local mosque in what were called *kaduttam*.⁴ Rahman is otherwise little remembered. The second nominee achieved little. The third nominee to be appointed to the Legislative Council, the Hon. W.M. Abdul Rahman (1900-1936), became far better known than his predecessors, and not just in Muslim circles.⁵ He

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2. See Table III.
4. *Kaduttam* is a deed of settlement of dower among Muslims. See *Tamil Lexicon*, vol. II (Madras, 1926), p. 673.
5. See Table III.
belonged to a wealthy family from Colombo and was given an English education at Wesley College in that city. He was a building contractor by profession.¹ His father was Mr. A.M. Wapachcha Marikar, a well-known contractor, responsible for the building of the Colombo Museum. At the opening ceremony in 1877, Wapachcha Marikar made a successful appeal to the Governor that the museum, as a mark of respect to Muslims, be closed on Fridays.² The practice has been continued to this day.

His work on the building earned the good opinion of the Governor, and no doubt led later to the appointment of his son to the Legislative Council.³ The Hon. W.M. Abdul Rahman was a creative addition to the Legislative Council. A man with strong views on government expenditure, he was active in several ways. Early in 1909, he opposed the raising of large monetary loans for the Lake Scheme (a scheme to develop the Dutch canals in Sri Lanka), arguing that there was more urgent work, such as road building and improved housing, being thereby kept in abeyance.⁴

But, though often acting on behalf of what he

2. Ceylon Times, 10 Jan. 1877.
3. See Table III.
considered the general welfare, Rahman also paid some attention to the particular needs of the Muslim community. For example, on 25th February 1909, he proposed that the Governor should have the power to appoint deserving individuals to some of the higher posts in Government Service, without their having to undergo competitive examination. He openly admitted that his motion was intended to benefit Muslims and members of other minority groups who had felt that their educational differences meant that they seldom attained higher posts in government service. But the motion was defeated. ¹ Outside the Council, he presided at a mass meeting of Muslims protesting in 1912 against the Italian invasion of Tripoli - during this time, of course, Tripoli was ruled by the Turkish sultan. ²

He was also active on parochial Muslim issues. In 1921, when the Hon. N.H.M. Abdul Cader, another Muslim representative, submitted a bill to the Legislative Council proposing the incorporation of a new managing body for the Maradana Mosque in Colombo, Abdul Rahman objected to it. He proposed certain amendments designed to safeguard the interests of those members of the congregation who were permanent residents of the area of the mosque and so to give them a voice in its running.

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² Ceylon Times, 10 March 1912.
The bill was then passed in its amended form by the Legislative Council.\textsuperscript{1} Rahman feared that if this amendment had not been included in the legislation, outsiders might have started to control the affairs of the mosque and that this would have caused division among the Muslims.\textsuperscript{2}

Yet another notable figure from the Muslim community to attain a post on the Legislative Council was the aforementioned Hon. N.H.M. Abdul Cader, who also served as a member of the Colombo Municipal Council for thirty years.\textsuperscript{3} He was a lawyer by profession,\textsuperscript{4} and a keen supporter of Muslim education. In 1921 he obtained for Zahairra College in Colombo a government grant of Rs. 25,000.\textsuperscript{5} He is also remembered for the battle he fought in 1921 for the retention of the words "Ceylon Moor" (as opposed to "Muslim") in the bill he submitted for the creation of a managing body for the Maradana Mosque of Colombo.\textsuperscript{6} His intention was to try and ensure that Indian Muslims and Malays were kept out of the management of the mosque. He saw the mosque as a

\textsuperscript{1} Hansard (Legislative Council), 1921, Vol. II, (Colombo, 1921), p. 36.
\textsuperscript{2} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{3} See Table III.
\textsuperscript{4} Ceylon Times, 15 June 1907.
\textsuperscript{5} Hansard (Legislative Council), 1921, vol. II, (Colombo, 1921), p. 230.
\textsuperscript{6} N.L.R., 1921 no. 240, 2nd schedule, "Maradana Mosque Act of 1921" (Colombo, 1922).
community centre, not just a religious institution, and so wished to preserve its local character.¹

Justice M.T. Akbar, who was nominated to the Legislative Council on 2nd May 1924,² was a distinguished intellectual. He had graduated from Cambridge University in 1900 with a degree in engineering and subsequently went on to study law, being called to the bar at Gray's Inn in 1904.³ Whilst on the Legislative Council, he piloted through a resolution to accept a recommendation of the University Commission, of which he had been chairman, that a university campus be established in Kandy. This motion faced strong opposition from such people as Sir James Pieris (a representative of the Sinhalese in the legislature), Sir Ponnambalam Ramanathan (Tamil representative) and Mr. G.A. Wille (Burgher representative) who all wished the campus to be situated in Colombo. Akbar envisaged this university as a great centre of learning for the whole of Asia.⁴ In subsequent years, when a university was created for Kandy, the university authorities named one of their halls of

2. See Table III.
residence after him. Akbar also made an outstanding contribution to the development of Muslim law in Sri Lanka and played a major part in the creation of new legislation regarding laws of inheritance and waqf (the established Muslim charity fund). He was also responsible for Muslims being allowed to benefit from the widows and orphans pension fund, from which they had hitherto been debarred.

Aware of the educational backwardness of his fellow Muslims, Akbar served for a number of years as a founder member of the Colombo Muslim Educational Society, first established in 1891, and was one of those who helped to start the Hussaini Boys' School and the Fathima Girls' School, both in 1942, which came to be highly regarded by the Muslims of Colombo.

In his capacity as Solicitor-General, he served as an ex-officio member of the Law Committee. This in 1924 put forward in a sessional paper a recommendation that the word "Mohammedan", a word used by the British, be changed in all legislation to "Muslim". The committee was unanimously of the opinion that the word "Mohammedan", in whatever form it might be spelled, was incorrect.

1. Ceylon Times, 10 April 1950.
3. Ceylon Times, 10 April 1926.
4. Ceylon Times, 10 Jan. 1891.
5. Ceylon Times, 10 May 1942.
Instead it advocated that the word "Muslim" be used to designate "a person professing the religion of Islam." The amendment, which displayed greater sensitivity to local feeling, was endorsed.

Another Muslim political figure who made his mark on local politics was the Hon. T.B. Jayah. In his early days, he passed the London University B.A. examination. Later he took to politics and was elected in 1924 third member of the all-island Muslim representatives in the Legislative Council. There were then six Muslim members in all. He was an appointed member of the State Council from 1936 to 1945 and subsequently, in 1947, was elected to the first independent parliament as second member for the Colombo Central constituency. He became Minister of Labour in the Hon. D.S. Senanayake's Cabinet in 1947.

Once the State Council was formed in 1931, the

1. Ordinance no. 27 of 1929, the first enactment in which the correct expressions "Islam" and "Muslim" are used, followed the recommendation made by a committee composed of M.T. Akbar (Solicitor-General, Chairman), Hon. N.H.M. Abdul Cader, Hon. H.M. Macan Markar, Hon. T.B. Jayah and Hon. S.R. Mohamed Sultan whose reports were published as C.S.P. no. XXXV, 1924 (Colombo, 1924), "Muslim".
3. See Table III.
7. Ceylon Times, June 1931.
Muslim members of the old Legislative Council became members of the State Council. They were appointed as nominated members by the Governor, as it was thought - correctly - that Muslims were unlikely to win in open elections a number of seats commensurate with their numbers in the population, since communal electorates were now abolished.

What contribution did these Muslim representatives make in general to the Legislative Council? For all their concern with the Muslim community, Muslim members of the Legislative and State Councils were most characterised by their marked loyalty to the British government. It was only, they felt, with the help of the Imperial government that they could benefit their community, especially in the fields of law, education and trade. But although they were keen supporters of British rule and although they did not always agree with the majority Sinhalese leaders, these Muslims were not without nationalist sentiment themselves, and this was sometimes recognised quite widely. It is true that Muslims were handicapped by being scattered all around the country. Only a few concentrated Muslim settlements existed in the coastal towns, such as Mannar, Puttalam,

Colombo, Beruwala, Galle and Batticaloa. But after 1931 they did sometimes stand as candidates in these regions, both in Sinhalese and Tamil dominated areas, and, even if more often defeated, they were sometimes elected. This may show that even the majority communities felt some sympathy toward the Muslims, and that what Muslims really sought was a balance between the interests of the Imperial government and the interests of the local communities.¹

v. Muslim Membership of the Municipal Councils

During the governorship of Sir Hercules Robinson (1865-72), the Municipal Councils of Colombo, Kandy and Galle were established by Ordinance No. 17 of 1866 and No. 27 of 1867.² The establishment of these councils marks a further stage in the development of the process of political representation in Sri Lanka which began with the publication of the Colebrooke-Cameron reports.

The Imperial Government had decided to delegate some powers pertaining to the day-to-day running of local matters to Municipal Councils. The main administrative duties were to consist of superintending housing, making civic improvements, collecting corporation

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rents and raising annual taxes. Almost from the beginning, the Muslims of Colombo, Galle and Kandy took part in the local politics of their respective areas. Eventually, some Muslim members were elected and others were nominated to these councils.

Muslim representation on the Municipal Councils began in 1866, long before their representation on the Legislative Council. But although the Colombo Municipal Council Ordinance was passed in 1866 and elections were held in the same year, and although a large number of Muslims lived in the capital, their first representative on the Municipal Council was not an elected member but a member nominated by the Governor. Muslims first stood for election in local politics only in 1886. Mr. M.L.M. Zainudeen was then elected from the Maligawatta ward, in which a large number of Muslims lived. Between 1866 and 1885, Muslims seem to have taken only a minor part in local politics, although at this time they were very active in trade.

After 1885, they were more active politically. The powers of these council members were limited and their role was initially slight. Muslim members of the councils seem to have been mainly interested in obtaining

2. See Appendix III.
3. Ibid.
licences to open business premises. Some, however, were also involved in allocating council houses and flats to the people of their respective areas. Others took a keen interest in civic improvements in their wards, for example in the establishment of children's parks, swimming pools, new housing, and the distribution of water to houses and flats. If the interests of Muslims on the Legislative Council tended often to be narrowly communal, those who sat on the Municipal Councils can sometimes be considered even more distinctly parish pump politicians.

Their backgrounds cause no surprises. Of those who served on the Colombo Municipal Council between 1866 and 1937, two were lawyers, Mr. N.H.M. Abdul Cader and Justice M.T. Akbar; the others were all businessmen. Four members were nominated by the Colonial government in this period, nine were elected and one appointed ex officio. The nominated Muslim members were all chosen as representatives of the whole Muslim community of the area.

The first Muslim member of the Colombo Municipal Council, Mr. Mass Sodma Jayah Akbar, was nominated on 4th May 1866. Although he was from the Malay community, he, too, of course, was appointed as a representative

1. C.B.B. 1866 (Colombo, 1867). See the section on Municipalities.
2. See Appendix III
of the whole Muslim community. He is now little remembered. The second nominee, Mr. Mohamed Ismail, has left even less of an impression. Indeed few of the total were very distinguished.

Two of the inter-war appointments did excite a little interest. These were those of Mr. Adamjee Lukemanjee and Mamujee, both of whom were nominated as a result of agitation by the members of the Bohora community. But they, too, as council members, were said to have mainly helped their own Bohora and Moor communities, for example by securing licences for their business premises in Colombo. Justice M.T. Akbar's appointment was also particular in that he was nominated to the Colombo Municipal Council ex officio. He was Solicitor-General at a time when holders of that office automatically were accorded a seat in the Colombo Municipal Council.

Of the elected members, Mr. Peston Khan and H.K. Khan were elected from the Slave Island ward in 1904. Abdul

1. See Appendix III.
2. Ibid.
3. Bohora was a Muslim group from western India, mainly of Hindu descent, and for the most part from the Shi'a sect. They came to Sri Lanka in the early period of British rule: for the details, see, Encyclopaedia of Islam, vol. I (Brill, 1913), p. 138.
5. See Appendix III. His life has been already discussed.
Cader was elected from the Pettah ward in 1908. Sir Razik Fareed was elected from the Maradana ward in 1932. These were all areas with large Muslim populations. The other elected members, however, were all chosen by wards in which Muslims constituted only a small minority of the electorate.

Of the Muslim members of the Kandy Municipal Council between 1865 and 1940 (see Appendix IV), only the first, Mr. M.C. Siddi Lebbe, was nominated, the rest were elected. Mr. Siddi Lebbe came from a distinguished Moor family of Kandy. He qualified as a proctor (solicitor) of the District Court, Kandy, in 1862. Two years later he became a proctor of the Supreme Court in Colombo. His chief claim to fame was his proposal in 1891 of a scheme for improving Muslim education in Sri Lanka. This resulted in the establishment of Zahaira College, Colombo, patronised by the cream of the Muslim community and supported by the munificence of Wapachcha Marikar. But

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1. See Appendix III. Mr. N.H.M. Abdul Cader's life has been already discussed. Sir Razik Fareed's life will be discussed in the next chapter.
5. Ceylon Times, 7 May 1865.
Siddi Lebbe also managed and financed several girls' schools in the Central Province of Sri Lanka, for example in Gampola. He also founded a girls' school in Kandy. To provide a further service to the Muslim community, he started a weekly journal called "The Muslim Friend".

Although the Kandy municipal area was predominantly Sinhalese, it is clear that a number of Muslims stood for election there and won places, even if rarely and only intermittently, on the Council. It is also interesting to note that although a severe outbreak of anti-Muslim communal violence occurred in Kandy in 1915, this could not have been an adverse reflection on Muslim power in local government, as at that time there were no Muslim members on the Council. But, over the period as a whole, Muslims did continue to participate and, even as late as 1937, they occupied a greater proportion of seats on the Kandy Council than their population figures warranted.

The Galle Municipal Council (see Appendix V) was established in 1867. Muslim members first entered that Council in 1882, and there the first Muslim member was an elected representative. Although Galle is, overall, predominantly a Sinhalese area, there were certain pockets, such as Galle Fort, which were predominantly

2. Muslim Naisen (Muslim Friend), 27 June 1882.
3. This will be discussed in another chapter.
4. See Appendix VII.
Muslim. From 1906 onwards, a few Muslims were nominated as members, generally gem merchants from the English educated élite, consciously loyal to the British government. Among them was Macan Markar. Interestingly, the elected members were neither gem merchants nor from the élite, but were shop-keepers and petty traders.¹

Even in Galle, although their proportion of elected members dipped below their proportion of the electorate in 1901, 1903, 1911, 1914, 1917, 1920, 1923, 1926, 1930 and 1934, Muslims still performed well, and in 1937 they were again over-represented in relation to their voting strength.²

The evidence from these three Municipal Councils strongly suggests active Muslim participation in local politics. In Colombo, for example, in 1885, when they constituted only 6.79% of the city's population,³ Muslims fielded two candidates (that is over 11% of those standing). In 1900, they fielded seven (25%) and in 1904 six (over 21%). From 1908 until 1920, they fielded seven candidates (constituting between 16.6% and 21.9% of the total). Their number of candidates fell in the 1920s, but recovered again in the thirties and forties, reaching 20% of the total in 1940.⁴

2. See Appendix VIII.
4. See Appendix VI.
Not only did they participate out of proportion to their numbers, they were also able to win selection. If we aggregate the figures in Colombo for seats won at the elections, Muslims constituted only 8.11% of voters in 1900 to 1912 but won 20% of the seats; only 9.76% of voters in 1916 to 1928 but won 13.4% of the seats; and only 2.64% of voters in 1932 to 1944 but won 10.81% of the seats.¹

Even with the percentage of Sinhalese in the electorate of the city rising astronomically - to reach 97.91% by 1944 - Muslims held on to their seats in the Council. Between 1940 and 1944 Muslims fell as a proportion of the Colombo electorate from 8.71% to 1.02%, but their percentage of the elected members actually rose from 10.53% to 15.79%.²

The picture in the other councils is not strikingly different. In Kandy, taking only the elections where they won seats, in 1902, 1923 and 1927, Muslims fielded 14 candidates in all, 23.6% of the total, and yet they constituted on average only 8.16% of the electorate in these years.³

In Galle Muslims supplied 21.5% of the candidates between 1882 and 1903 though only 9.6% of the electorate and they won 13.4% of the elected representatives. They fielded many fewer candidates and won no seats at all between 1906 and 1914, yet again featured prominently

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¹. See Appendix VI
². Ibid.
³. See Appendix VII.
as candidates from 1917 to 1926 (with no better luck in terms of seats), before emerging in the 1930s with 29.7% of the candidates, 13.8% of the voters and 7.4% of the seats. If this was a disappointing showing, it was by no means discreditable.\(^1\)

It is harder to be sure about percentages of voters in the population as a whole. Not everyone had the vote, of course, until 1931. Before that date, voters had to have certain qualifications. They had to be not less than 21 years of age, male British subjects, able to read and write in English, Tamil or Sinhalese; they also had to possess an income of not less than Rs. 600 or immovable property valued at not less than Rs. 1,500, or they had to occupy premises of not less than Rs. 400 annual value in town and not less than Rs. 200 annual value elsewhere.\(^2\)

Their presence in such a high proportion amongst the voters must reflect the fact that Muslims were increasingly an urbanised community and that they were for a time relatively prosperous.\(^3\)

The Muslim population of Colombo went up by nearly

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1. See Appendix VIII.
2. C.B.B., 1885 (Colombo, 1886). See the section on "Political Franchise".
3. See the chapter on Muslim trade - Appendix XI.
154% between 1885 and 1944, that of Kandy by 195% and that of Galle by 296% in the same period.\(^1\) The prosperity of these urbanised Muslims is evident from the fact that they constituted a higher percentage of the voters than of the general population in Colombo up to the Second World War. In Kandy and Galle, by the same measurement, they remained relatively prosperous even in the mid-1940s. Indeed, if their percentage of the voting roll is a valid test, they actually became increasingly prosperous in all three cities between the 1880s and the 1920s.\(^2\)

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1. See Appendix XI.
2. Ibid. (After 1931 there were of course, no wealth qualifications, but not everyone registered for the vote.)
CHAPTER 4

ISLAM AND NATIONALISM IN
SRI LANKA DURING BRITISH RULE

i. Muslim Leaders and the Early Nationalist Movement

In the twentieth century, two Commissions, the Donoughmore Commission and the Soulbury Commission, were set up by the British Government to propose changes in the Constitution of Sri Lanka. The Muslim community was deeply involved in both these enquiries and in their outcomes.

In 1919 the Ceylon National Congress had been formed with the ultimate objective of securing for Sri Lanka responsible government and the status of a self-governing member state of the British Empire.¹ From this organisation the Muslims had stood aloof, being apparently somewhat apprehensive of its aims.

In particular, the formation of the National Congress roused Muslim fears of Sinhalese domination, the memories of 1915 being no doubt still fresh in their minds.² The Temperance Movement³ was one of the influences behind this newly formed Congress and that movement had been openly accused, even by the British authorities, of

¹. Ceylon Morning Leader, 12 Dec. 1919.
². This will be covered in a later chapter.
³. The Temperance Movement will be discussed in the chapter on the communal troubles of 1915.
having taken a leading part in fomenting the 1915 Muslim-Sinhalese communal troubles.¹

This was also the time when the political prestige of the Tamil leaders was at its height. Twice, Sir Ponnambalam Ramanathan had been elected in preference to a Sinhalese rival by the 'educated Ceylonese electorate'. His first victory, in 1911, had been over the formidable Dr. Marcus Fernando (later Sir Marcus), in a tightly fought campaign, the first popular election campaign to take place in Sri Lanka.² Then, in 1917, he won his second victory over a Sinhalese opponent, when Mr. E.W. Perera suffered a humiliating defeat.³

What most helped to determine the Muslim response was the leadership which was decided upon at the first meeting of the Ceylon National Congress in 1917. This was devised by Sir Ponnambalam Ramanathan's equally distinguished brother, Sir Ponnambalam Arunachalam, whose status within the party was readily acknowledged and accepted by the Sinhalese leaders of the day.⁴ All the leading Muslim political spokesmen raised their voices against his choice of leaders. The Hon. W.M. Abdul Rahman

² Ceylon Morning Leader, 6 Dec. 1911.
³ Ceylon Times, 7 May 1917.
(who was then serving as a member of the Legislative Council), the Hon. N.H.M. Abdul Cader (who also served on the Legislative Council) and Sir Mohamed Macan Markar (who served from 1924 to 1931), all made known their opposition. None of these men was prepared to join the National Congress and all were critical of the prominence within Congress of Sir Ponnambalam Ramanathan. They remembered that whilst on the Legislative Council Ramanathan had supported the Sinhalese in the aftermath of the Muslim-Sinhalese conflicts of 1915.

However, when Sinhalese-Tamil unity broke down in 1921, over the Tamils' refusal to relinquish their claim to a special reserved seat in the Legislative Council for the Western Province, the picture altered. A conflict arose between the Sinhalese and the minorities. The Muslims had initially wanted a Muslim electorate in the Western Province while the Tamils thought they should be represented by a Tamil electorate. But when the Sinhalese leadership wanted neither community to have such representation, Tamils and Muslims moved closer together. This was to be reflected in the campaigns mounted after November 13th, 1927, when the Donoughmore

1. See Table III.
Commission arrived on the island.¹

The arrival of the Donoughmore Commission had the immediate effect of exacerbating communal and political rivalries on the island. Both groups and individuals made many rival claims and demands for special representation, in the hope of influencing the work of the Commission and the recommendations it would make as to the future politico-constitutional structure of the island. Universal suffrage, for example, became an important and divisive issue in the island's politics. But there the minority communities found the prospect of universal suffrage no more unpalatable than did those Sinhalese leaders who made a public stand against it.²

When the Donoughmore Commission arrived on the island, various "Moor" and "Malay" organisations were mushrooming to compete for the political status of being the Muslim voice on the island.³ There were two major Muslim organisations in the country: the Young Muslim League, under the leadership of T.B. Jayah, and the Muslim Social Union, under the leadership of N.H.M. Abdul Cader. Both organisations had the same political motives, namely to promote "a broad fellowship among

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the members of the Muslim community, to foster the natural ties which exist between one Muslim and another, and to make each one conscious of his duty to his fellow Muslims."¹ Their differences related entirely to the separate ethnic identities of their leaders, the Muslim Social Union being Moor and the Young Muslim League largely Malay.

ii. Communalism Within the Muslim Community

Divisions among the Muslims were compounded by the earlier communal troubles between Muslims and Sinhalese which had complicated Muslim responses to the majority community enormously. As Sir Hugh Clifford put it:

There can, I fear, be no doubt that the racial antagonism which was at that time engendered between the Sinhalese and the Moors still lingers, especially among the more ignorant sections of the former. Outwardly peace has been completely restored, but I am informed, on what I believe to be reliable authority, that rich Moors are not infrequently insulted when they visit outlying parts of the country, and that many of their leaders are apprehensive concerning the general attitude of the Sinhalese villagers towards them. They look to the Government for protection, but, at the same time, are ² anxious to conciliate Sinhalese opinion.

The Muslims of Sri Lanka now considered themselves a

¹. *Ceylon Independent*, 7 Feb. 1927. There were other minor Muslim organisations on the island, see, *Donoughmore Report*, Appendix II.

². C.O. 337/692, Clifford to Secretary of State, 20 Nov. 1926.
separate minority (or separate minorities) in the country, although they generally lived in close proximity to the Tamils and Sinhalese. As T.B. Jayah put it:

The riots forced the Muslims into a cocoon mentality.¹

At the time of the arrival of the Donoughmore Commission in Sri Lanka, "Moors" and "Malays" were terms used to identify different groups within the Muslim community. Their differences were widely recognised. Sri Lankan Moors were mainly engaged in commerce or in agriculture; Malays were more likely to be in the police force or in the government clerical service.² The Sri Lankan Moors believed that they were the descendants of the original Arab settlers.³ The Malays believed they originated in Java. The Malays argued that there were also differences in religious practice: most mosques on the island were controlled exclusively by one or the other group, though, in fact, the Malays often also used Moor mosques.⁴ The Malays tended to be liberal in politics, but the Moors were more known for their political conservatism.⁵

1. C.O. 54/900, T.B. Jayah to the Secretary of State, 27 Mar. 1930.
3. See introduction.
5. Ibid.
One great source of contention between them derived from the exclusion of the Malays from the Board of Electors of the Maradana Mosque in Colombo. It was made clear that only Moors were eligible to serve. This made the Malay community feel that they were being treated as aliens.\(^1\) The Malay community had set up their own political organisations, such as The Malay Political Association, under the leadership of Mr. J.A. Kuttilan, and the Kandy Malay Association, under the leadership of Mr. M.J. Majeed, both of them outspoken supporters of Malay separatism.

Both Moors and Malays requested the Commission to provide separate representation for them, instead of having to rely upon general Muslim representatives.\(^2\)

Earlier, Muslim members had been elected and nominated, both to Municipal Councils and to the Legislative Council, irrespective of their group loyalty. From 1927 onwards, first the Malays seemed dissatisfied with this and then their demands were taken up by the Moors. Both felt that the answer lay in providing more Muslim representatives on the council.\(^3\)

But some opposition to this emerged from T.B. Jayah,

\(^1\) *N.L.R.,* 1921. Ordinance to incorporate the Board of Electors of the Maradana Mosque, ch. 241. Schedule 2nd, "The Rules and Regulations of the Corporation Act of Zahaira College" (Colombo, 1921).

\(^2\) *Donoughmore Report*, p. 94.

who came from the Malay community. He was keen to have one general Muslim system of representation rather than one for Moors and another for Malays. He wanted to see both communities working together, and so made a strong attack on the separate Malay organisations. In his view:

The so-called Malay Political Association was perhaps a refuge for aspirants to the Legislative Council seats, and it counted at least two members who failed to get seats in the Council in the last elections and who were endeavouring to drag in a third who had met with a similar disappointment.¹

T.B. Jayah could afford to be critical of his own community, as others could not, since his fame and influence were so immense that he could hope successfully to try his hand at Muslim communal politics. But his belief in the need to preserve the unity of the Muslim community was unquestionably sincere and doubtless some others agreed with him.² By 1928, T.B. Jayah also differed from other Muslims in the welcome he was prepared to give Congress. He even went so far in his sympathy as to remark:

The Congress came into being; its doors open to all. There was no exclusion of any community whatever. Muhammadans, Indians, Tamil, Burghers and Sinhalese were all to determine the destiny of the country.³

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Differences appeared even amongst the Moors of the island. Immediately prior to the arrival of the Commission, numerous Moor associations had been formed: the Muslim Political Committee, under the leadership of the Hon. N.H.M. Abdul Cader; the Moors Political Association, under the leadership of Mr. M.L.M. Reyal; the Batticaloa Muslim Association, under the leadership of Mr. A.K. Kariapper; the Galle Muslim Association under the leadership of Mr. F.M. Ismail; and the Young Muslim League, Galle, and Young Muslim League, Colombo, both under the leadership of Mr. S.A. Marikar. All these associations presented their own views independently to the Commission. Each association wanted to increase the number of Muslim members in the Council and each wanted to claim that it had brought about the increase. These parties also reflect divisions which existed between the younger and older generations in the Muslim community, each of whom wished to take control. It was also during this period that divisions appeared between the Muslims of Colombo and those of other regions.

During the hearing of the Commission, the differences between Malays and Moors became particularly embittered. Mr. M.J. Majeed openly criticised the Moors, remarking:

1. Donoughmore Report, Appendix II, p. 158.
We preferred and will always prefer the company of the progressive Malays to that of the backward Moors. That is why we claim a separate Malay seat.¹

The Moor associations then also criticised the Malays:

We express profound indignation at the insulting and uncalled for remarks made by M.J. Majid, the spokesman of the so-called Malay deputation before the Special Commission at Kandy, and also condemn the attitude of Mr. Z.H. Mantara in using the term 'thamby'² to designate the Moors, which is highly offensive, at the Malay mass meeting in Colombo.³

iii. The Donoughmore Report

Despite these divisions and disagreements, perhaps because of them, the Donoughmore Commission came to the conclusion that it would be in the best interest of all Muslims to work together with all the other communities. The Commission was aware that this suggestion might "not be immediately acceptable to the general body of Muslims, but we are satisfied that there is little fear of religious intolerance in Ceylon, and that it will be in the best interests of the Muslims themselves that communal representation for them should cease and they should now be identified with the general electorate."⁴

2. "Thamby" means brother in Tamil, but it had acquired a pejorative meaning.
4. Donoughmore Report, p. 94.
The Moors reacted to this report, published in 1928, with various protest meetings around the country. They believed the recommendations to be unworkable and impractical. They were particularly uneasy about, even if they were not always adamantly opposed to, the prospect of universal suffrage, as they felt that that would affect their community adversely.

Despite all its progressive features, the Donoughmore Report satisfied none of the major political groups in Sri Lanka. The minority communities were bitterly hostile, largely on account of its forthright condemnation of communal electorates. In devising an electoral structure which made no provision for communal electorates, the Donoughmore Report, unlike the earlier Montagu-Chelmsford Report on Indian constitutional reform, may be seen as taking, as its basic premise, the entire subordination of communalism to national identity. In the eyes of minority

1. C.O. 54/892, Young Muslim League meeting, 31 Oct. 1928; China Fort Muslim Association, Beruwala, 12 Sept. 1928.
2. Ibid.
representatives, the proposed new constitution would transfer a significant degree of political power to Sri Lanka, with quite inadequate safeguards for the protection of their interests. The prospect of universal suffrage, and so of majority rule, made the proposals of the Donoughmore Commission no more palatable to them. T.B. Jayah wrote to the Secretary of State:

The Muslims in Ceylon justly feel that they have been differently treated from their co-religionists in India and look with confidence to the authorities in England to redress the wrong that has been done to them. ¹

However, by July 1929, when the Donoughmore Constitution was debated in the Legislative Council, T.B. Jayah introduced a new note into Muslim politics when he tried to draw a distinction between majority rule (which he claimed to favour) and the Donoughmore proposals on abolishing communal electorates (which he opposed outright). Of the former he remarked:

I am not afraid of domination by the Sinhalese people. We have no objection to the majority community ruling this country. Let them govern. We will help them. ²

In thus supporting Sinhalese majority control, he lined up with two small but influential groups which emerged as sympathetic to Donoughmore, Goonesinha's Labour Union

1. C.O. 54/900, T.B. Jayah to Secretary of State, 27 July 1930.
2. Hansard (Legislative Council), 1929 (Colombo, 1929), col. 843.
and the Unionist Association.¹

Yet all the minority representatives, including the Muslims, voted against the adoption of the Donoughmore proposals when they came up for debate in the Legislative Council. The proposals were only accepted by a very slim majority (19 votes to 17).² Afterwards, Sir Ponnambalam Ramanathan, as a spokesman for the Tamils, made a well-publicised - but entirely fruitless - visit to Whitehall to try to persuade the Colonial Office to reject the Donoughmore proposals.³

On July 27th 1930, T.B. Jayah sent the Colonial Office a memorandum entitled "Muslims and the Proposed Constitutional Changes in Ceylon",⁴ in which he complained of the Muslims being subjected to a scheme wholly injurious to their interests. In his memorandum, he suggested that special Muslim electorates should be set up to ensure that Muslim representatives would always be voted onto the Legislative Council.⁵ T.B. Jayah's memorandum was submitted and scrutinized in the Colonial Office soon after the publication of the Donoughmore Report. But whilst the Colonial Secretary, Lord Passfield, was not unsympathetic and willing to

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¹ Ceylon Times, 15 June 1929.
² Hansard (Legislative Council), 1929 (Colombo, 1929), p. 325.
³ The London Times, 19 April 1930.
⁴ C.O. 54/900/7, File no. 73230/10, T.B. Jayah's memorandum of 27 July 1930.
⁵ Ibid.
concede that a Muslim member might be appointed to the Council, he rejected the memorandum's appeal for a separate electorate.  

Meanwhile, yet another Muslim group appeared and demanded separate representation. One Mr. Muhammad Hussain Khan submitted a memorandum to the Colonial Secretary asking him to appoint an Afghan Muslim to the Legislative Council. This however, was totally rejected. The Governor felt that this group - its membership was tiny - had no very powerful claim to be regarded as a separate constituent political unit.

The Muslims, like the other minorities, continued to have grave misgivings about their position under the new system. Their apprehension turned to dismay when it became known that, instead of the 65 constituencies recommended by the Donoughmore Report, there were to be only 50, and these were to be single member constituencies. For the Muslims, this was a bitter blow. For when the report of the Delimitation Commission of 1930 was published, it was evident that there was not one single constituency in which they had a majority position.

2. C.O. 54/900/7, File no. 73230/10, Muhammad Hussain Khan to the Colonial Secretary, 11 Nov. 1930. The Afghan Muslims were mostly Pushtu speaking people from Afghanistan; most of them were engaged in the money lending business. See, Ranasinha, A.G., Census of Ceylon, 1946 (Colombo, 1951) pp. 117-118.
Moreover, there were only 3 (Colombo Central and 2 Eastern Province seats) in which they appeared to have a reasonable chance of success. As it turned out, their worst fears were not entirely realised, but only one Muslim was elected to the State Council in 1931, when Mohamed Macan Markar was returned by the Batticaloa South electorate. Jayah lost Colombo Central. With one nominated member (M.K. Saldin), the Muslims now had only two members in a house of 60 (50 elected, 7 nominated and 3 Officers of State), where previously, under the Manning Constitution and its system of communal electorates, they had had 3 elected members.

There was some small consolation for them, however, with the election of Sir Mohamed Macan Markar to head the Committee on Transport and Works, the first Muslim member of the Board of Ministers.

iv. From Donoughmore to Soulbury

Some serious weaknesses in the representation of minorities on the State Council remained. Sir Ponnambalam Ramanathan had died in 1930, and among

2. See Table III, Muslim members in the Legislative Council.
the Tamil leaders there was no one of equal stature to replace him. This might have presented an opportunity for a Muslim to assert his leadership over the minorities. The only likely candidate, Sir Mohamed Macan Markar, failed to do so, however. Not only was he too tepid in his leadership, but he was also notoriously over-cautious.¹

On 20th July 1931,² soon after the General Election, a meeting was held in Colombo to protest about the inadequate Muslim representation in the Council and to request two additional communal representatives.³ The British Governor, Graeme Thomson (1931-3), felt that the Muslims were wasting their time on this issue, and that they had no case to present. He reported to the Secretary of State that "the deputation, who represented their case with a marked lack of ability, wholly failed to convince me that there is any danger that Muslim interests will be disregarded by the State Council. The objections ... appeared to me to be purely theoretical, and I have little doubt that the movement to approach you in the matter has been largely engineered by Messrs. Jayah and Abdul Cader, who were disappointed at not having obtained seats in the State Council themselves."⁴

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4. C.O. 54/907, Graeme Thomson to Secretary of State, 14 Oct. 1931.
Eventually, the Muslim wounds from the time of the Donoughmore Commission began slowly to heal. In a memorandum sent as early as November 1931 to the Colonial Secretary of State, the Eastern Province Muslims, who were the most densely settled of all non-Colombo Muslims, asserted their support for the Donoughmore Report and disassociated themselves from the other Muslim spokesmen on the island. They felt that the Donoughmore Report, by abolishing communal representation on the island, would thereby unite all the communities. They also wanted to improve relations with the British in order to gain greater influence with them.¹

T.B. Jayah was very keen to travel to London to meet the Secretary of State and to discuss Muslim representation on the Council. But the Colonial Office in London initially refused to see him. The Colonial Office did see in his opposition to the proposals, however, a helpful development. The minutes of W.M.R. Croise, of the Ceylon Department at the Colonial Office, read:

Not an unwelcome complication as the Secretary of State will have some reason to delay the whole thing.....²

T.B. Jayah decided to reject the advice not to travel to

London. There the Sri Lankan Muslim delegation was met by the Under Secretary of State, Sir Robert Hamilton, not by the Secretary of State, who said he was otherwise engaged. It was Sir Robert Hamilton, therefore, who now informed the Muslims that their request might be sympathetically considered and who even indicated that the Colonial Office was prepared to revise the Constitution for their sake.¹

The Colonial Office's attitude to the minorities had by then begun to change. If a balance of power was to be struck, the majority would have to be restrained. It was now felt that the Donoughmore Commissioners had been too dogmatic in their strictures on communal representation, and that their report had led to a worsening of communal relations in Sri Lanka. This was doubtless why the British government did not initially welcome the Muslim delegation's visit to Britain to discuss their grievances but then changed its mind. The British, in fact, now wished perhaps to use a "divide and rule" policy. They could use the Muslims to reduce the majority power in the Legislative Council. But if this was the plan, it did not work as expected.²

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The Muslims of Sri Lanka had been expected to rely on one prediction in the Donoughmore Report:

The Muslim community in Ceylon have for centuries served a useful purpose, especially as traders and merchants. ... As long as they contribute, as they do now, by their special qualities, to the general prosperity and welfare of the country, there is little likelihood that their interests will be adversely affected by any action of the Legislative Council.¹

If this sounded reassuring, the new State Council elections, held on 10th March 1936, suggested otherwise. The elections were an unmitigated disaster for the Muslims: not a single Muslim was elected. Without Sir Mohamed Macan Markar, who was defeated, or T.B. Jayah, who again lost in the Colombo Central constituency, the need for a more assured form of representation of a reasonable number of Muslims was now raised as a battle-cry by the Muslim community.²

By way of compensation to the Muslims, two of their community were now nominated as members - T.B. Jayah, despite his defeat, and a newcomer, Sir Razik Fareed,³ who was to make a notable contribution in paving the way for a change of policy among the Muslims themselves in relation to the Nationalist Movement and to the

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1. Donoughmore Report, p. 94.
transfer of power.1

With the arrival of Sir Razik Fareed, the political prospects of the Muslims of Sri Lanka subtly changed. A struggle ensued among the leaders, who had began to appeal directly for support to the Muslims in the country.2

v. The Political Role Played by Muslims During the Independence Era

By 1942 the effects of this change in their prospects was reflected in Muslim attitudes to the Nationalist Movement. In that year their ranks in the State Council were increased by one when Dr. M.C.M. Kaleel won a by-election for the Colombo Central seat caused by the removal of Mr. A.E. Goonesinha. The poll was small (only 25% of the total electorate voted) and the vote was split amongst a number of candidates, none of whom was a national figure, but in the low poll Dr. Kaleel won a narrow victory.3

3. Mr. Goonesinha was removed for election offences committed during the campaign for the Colombo Central seat at the by-election held on 25 Feb. 1942. This information was obtained from Dr. M.C.M. Kaleel, who is a medical doctor by profession. He studied at the University of Edinburgh in 1926. He was formerly Minister of Labour in the United National Party Government of 1952, and at present he is the Treasurer of the United National Party. About the same time, in March 1942, Sir Razik Fareed, who had been a member of the Executive Committee on Local Administration, switched over to the Education Committee, giving that committee now two Muslim members (the other being T.B. Jayah).
A changing Muslim attitude to the majority community became perceptible during the voting in the State Council on J.R. Jayewardene's motion, debated in May 1944, to make Sinhalese the national language of Sri Lanka. Differences in opinion between Sir Razik and T.B. Jayah were clearly demonstrated on this issue.

When J.R. Jayewardene first introduced his motion in 1943 there was much opposition to it on the grounds that it made no provision for Tamil. By the time the motion came up for debate in 1944, however, J.R. Jayewardene had agreed to alter his proposal so as to include Tamil along with Sinhalese to make two national languages. With the mover's consent, a Tamil member, V. Nalliah, moved a formal amendment, that the words "and Tamil" be added after the word "Sinhalese" whenever the latter occurred. The amendment was debated, put to the vote on 25th May 1944 and carried by 29 votes to 8. T.B. Jayah voted for the amendment; Sir Razik joined 7 others voting against it. Among those who voted against were the 3 European appointed members and a Burgher. They were opposed to the whole idea of either Sinhalese or Tamil replacing English as the official language. But there were also four Sinhalese who were opposed because they wanted Sinhalese to be the sole national language: they were B.H. Aluvihare,

Sir Razik's reasons for how he voted on this occasion were made clear in his speech—a brief one—and are worth quoting. He said:

I feel that in the best interest of Lanka, my mother country, I must stand up for the motion of the honourable member of Kelaniya (J.R. Jayewardene); that is that Sinhalese should be the official language of the country. However, there is not the slightest doubt that this cannot be done in a hurry, in a year or two, or even in ten years. I certainly feel that it is in the best interests of Lanka and her people. One language will bring unity among our people. We are already divided at the present moment. Each community has its own language. But if we all take one language, then we will not think in terms of Tamils, Moors, Sinhalese, Burghers, Malays and so on.

His position, therefore, in wishing to see the whole matter postponed, was closer in some respects to that of the European members than it was to the Sinhala-only group. It was for this reason that Sir Razik Fareed joined with Dr. M.C.M. Kaleel to support an amendment proposed by T.B. Jayah. This amendment would have had the effect of postponing a decision, as it sought to leave the implementation of the policy on language to the recommendations of a Commission to be appointed by the house. But Jayah's amendment attracted only 12 supporters. There were 25 against.

2. Ibid., p. 812. Razik's speech of 25 May 1944.
S.W.R.D. Bandaranike gave Jayah's amendment strong support in this debate, describing it as "the wisest, the best amendment";¹ but, curiously, when it came to voting, he preferred to remain neutral. He was the only member present to decline to vote on this amendment.²

Looking back on it now, this debate on language policy was clearly one of the land-mark of the last years of British rule. The Sinhalese leadership was then divided on how to proceed, some preferring both Sinhala and Tamil, others Sinhala-only, while the Tamils were solidly against Sinhala-only. But, it became equally clear in that debate that the Tamils could no longer rely on solid Muslim support in their political opposition.

When G.G. Ponnambalam's vociferous campaign for balanced representation had begun in 1937, he counted on the support of the Muslims. They, naturally enough, were in a disgruntled mood in the aftermath of the debacle of the General Election of 1936. Ponnambalam's campaign, "the 50-50 Campaign", as it was called, enjoyed the full sympathy and support of the Muslims in its earliest phase.³ But that support became less enthusiastic in

². Ibid., p. 816.
³. Hindu Organ, 28 May 1937.
time, and had become uncertain by the early 1940s, as the political alliance between Tamils and Muslims came apart over conflicting attitudes to the transfer of power. Some Muslims seemed to prefer to agitate on their own, or more significantly were even prepared now to back the Sinhalese leadership in the latter's political campaigns.¹

vi. The Soulbury Report

In May 1943, the Board of Ministers learned of a significant promise from Whitehall on the post-war constitutional status of Sri Lanka.² This formed the basis of the so-called pronouncement of May 1943. By this, Whitehall insisted that approval of any new constitution must be by a majority of three quarters of the total members of the State Council (save the speaker of the Assembly and 3 Officers of State), which meant a minimum of 42 votes, an impossible task unless the minorities gave their support. Indeed this requirement was a guarantee that the wishes of the minorities would be given a great deal of consideration.³

Inevitably, all political groups in the island then turned their attention to the mechanics of the next stage in Sri Lanka's constitutional evolution, and the minorities now looked to their particular needs in the next phase of the transition to Dominion Status.⁴

By the early part of 1944, a process of constitution-drafting had been completed. The next step was to be the examination of the draft by a Commission sent out from England once the war was over. Thereafter, the constitution had to be finally approved in the State Council by the special majority mentioned earlier. By the time the debate on language policy took place in 1944, there had therefore been a great change in the political situation.

A period of heightened expectations had arrived. The campaign for constitutional reform received a further major boost in 1944 when Whitehall was persuaded to advance the process of examining the Ministers' draft constitution instead of waiting till after the war was over. 1

A Commission under Viscount Soulbury was appointed for this purpose and arrived in the island on December 22nd, 1944. One of its aims was to study the problems of the minorities. 2 At this time there were many Muslim organisations in the island, each viewing the other suspiciously and each making claims and counter-claims for constitutional concessions: the largest were the All-Ceylon Muslim League, under the leadership of T.B. Jayah, the All-Ceylon Muslim Political Conference,

under Sir Mohamed Macan Markar and T.B. Jayah (members of the State Council), and the Ceylon Moors Association, under the leadership of Sir Razik Fareed (member of the State Council). There were also three Malay organisations: the All-Ceylon Malay Congress, under the leadership of Dr. M.P.C. Drahman, the Malay Political Association of Ceylon, under the leadership of Mr. Z.D. Musafer, and the All-Ceylon Malay League, under the leadership of Mr. T.K. Burah.

When the Soulbury Commission began its sessions on the island, the various Moor and Malay associations were still arguing for separate representation on the Council. The All-Ceylon Malay Congress still held that there were fundamental differences between Malays and Moors. The Malay Political Association also wanted a separate Malay member on the Council. They both still argued that while the Malays were more open and fluid in their social relationships, the Moors were conservative, and that each community belonged to a different ethnic group.

The All-Ceylon Malay League held that there was internal economic rivalry between Moors and Malays and that Moors coveted Malay jobs in the forces and in the Government.

clerical service. They also claimed that the Moors would try to dominate the Malay community unless the Malays had a separate member on the Council.¹

However, T.B. Jayah repeated his advice to Donoughmore and requested the Soulbury Commission to set up only one separate Muslim electorate on the island.² Sir Razik Fareed now supported him, arguing that the Muslims ought to be treated as a single "down-trodden" community, which had never been adequately represented in the National Legislature. To wipe off this past injustice, he pleaded for the provision of 12 seats.³

The Soulbury Commission rejected both Sir Razik Fareed's and Jayah's appeals but made provision for members to be elected from minority communities by the

2. The Memorandum to the Soulbury Commission by the Ceylon Muslim League. (Ceylon Muslim League, Colombo, 1945), p. 15.
old method of boundary revision, to be determined by a
Delimitation Commission:

... Wherever it should appear to the
Delimitation Commission that there was
a substantial concentration in any area of
a province of persons united by a community
interest, whether racial, religious or
otherwise, the Commission should be at
liberty to modify the factor of numerical
equality of persons in that area and make
such division of the province into
electoral districts as might be necessary
to render possible the representation of
that interest. 1

With the Soulbury commissioners in the island, the
State Council debated a motion directing the ministers
to introduce forthwith a Bill providing for a constitution
of the recognized Dominion type for a free Lanka. This
went well beyond the limits set by the Pronouncement
of May 1943 and was therefore not more than a political
gesture, meant to convey a message to the commissioners.
It had no chance at all of Whitehall approval. 2

The motion was, none the less, carried by a vote
of 26 for and 3 against, with 6 abstaining. All the
Muslim members supported it: Jayah and Dr. Kaleel spoke
in favour, 3 and Sir Razik and Dr. Kaleel voted for it

1. Soulbury Report, p. 73.
2. Hansard, vol. II (State Council), May 1944
   (Colombo, 1944), p. 150.
3. Hansard, vol. II (State Council), 1944 (Colombo,
   1944), pp. 2635-2638 and 2671 for Jayah's speech,
   pp. 2668-70 for Kaleel's contribution and 2704-5
   for Razik's speech.
(Jayah was not present for the vote). On 9th November 1945, the historic vote took place on the acceptance of the Soulbury proposals. All the Muslim members voted in favour. Two of them, Jayah and Sir Razik, spoke on that occasion, each in support. But their speeches were a study in contrasts, as a few extracts from them will show.

T.B. Jayah's speech on the Soulbury proposals was delivered in a sombre mood. His was a phlegmatic contribution. He refused to call himself a Moor, but described himself and his community as "Muslim". It seems that he was determined to insist that Moors and Malays must now acknowledge a common identity as Muslims. Although he supported the Soulbury proposals to obtain independence for the Motherland, he, as a member of a minority community in the Council, felt uncomfortable with them. He suspected that once Sri Lanka got her independence, the Sinhalese community would dominate over the Muslim community in the Council. The Soulbury proposals would not absolutely guarantee

3. Ibid., col. 7009-7013 for Jayah's speech.
4. Ibid., col. 7009-7013.
that even one Muslim member would be elected to the Council.¹

Sir Razik Fareed's tone was altogether different. He spoke with a zest and enthusiasm which was lacking in T.B. Jayah's contribution. There was a more total sense of commitment to the nationalist cause, which came from a clearer commitment to the forces of change at work in Sri Lankan society. But what set him most apart from Jayah were the frequent criticisms he made of the Tamils in his speech, not sparing even their leader G.G. Ponnambalam, who was a notable absentee at this memorable debate.² Sir Razik Fareed preferred to use the word "Moor" rather than "Muslim". He said that, as a member of the majority Muslim community of Sri Lanka, he had full authority to speak on its behalf. However, in the end both T.B. Jayah and Sir Razik Fareed were agreed in accepting the leadership of the Sinhalese politician, D.S. Senanayake, and in pledging their support for his political programme for the attainment of independence.³

1. Hansard, vol. II (State Council), 1945 (Colombo, 1945), col. 7009-7013. Jayah was the last Malay member in the Council.
vii. Toward Independence

In 1946, the United National Party was formed.¹ The Muslims in the past had remained communally separate, but now they joined this new political party. Sir Razik Fareed became one of the Joint Treasurers of the party, along with J.R. Jayewardene.² Jayah, now an elder statesman, was assured of a leadership role within the new party.³ Yet the years 1942 to 1947, as British rule began to approach an end, were a difficult period for the Muslims of Sri Lanka. The Muslim leaders continued to quarrel among themselves over the political issues facing the country. Though they, on the whole, kept to the side of those Sinhalese leaders who guided the United National Party, the Muslims were in disagreement about the Tamils. The Muslim spokesmen, like Sir Razik Fareed and T.B. Jayah, still argued also over who should provide leadership for the community.⁴ Sir Razik Fareed and T.B. Jayah were socially at odds. Sir Razik Fareed belonged to an

élite family; but though he was a man of wealth, he had no university education. He had been elected, however, as President of the prestigious Ceylon Moor Association.¹ T.B. Jayah did not come from an élite group. He held a B.A. degree from the University of London and had risen to be President of the Muslim League.²

viii. Sir Razik Fareed - "Somersault Leader" ¹⁸⁹³-¹⁹⁸⁷

Sir Razik Fareed began his career in party politics as the Joint-Treasurer of the United National Party in 1946. His first attempt to enter the new Parliament was at Pottuvilu in 1947.³ He was defeated.⁴ In November 1947, he became a member of the Senate.⁵ In 1952, he resigned his membership of the Senate and stood as an Independent candidate in the Colombo Central constituency and won the seat. In 1952, the then Prime Minister of Sri Lanka, Sir John Kotelawala, persuaded him to join the United National Party government.⁶ He was thereupon elected as the Member of Parliament for

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3. East Coast of Sri Lanka.
Colombo Central.\(^1\) In 1958 he resigned from the United National Party and joined the Sri Lanka Freedom Party, which then formed the principal element in the government. Even earlier he had voted with them to save the government on a no confidence motion.\(^2\)

In the March 1960 General Election Sir Razik Fareed again contested Colombo Central, this time as a candidate of the Lanka Prajantantravadi Party.\(^3\) But he lost.\(^4\) For the General Election held in July 1960, he resigned from the recently formed Lanka Prajantantravadi Party and became a member of the Sri Lanka Freedom Party again, once more contesting the Colombo Central constituency. He again lost the election.\(^5\) In 1965 he resigned from the Sri Lanka Freedom Party and rejoined the United National Party. He contested Colombo Central and was defeated.\(^6\) However, he was asked to serve as a nominated Member of Parliament in 1965 and remained in Parliament till 1968.\(^7\) He then went as the Sri Lanka Ambassador to Pakistan, returning to Sri Lanka in 1977.\(^8\)

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3. *Ceylon Citizen Right's Party*. This party was formed by Dr. W. Dahanayaka.
Fareed remains the only Member of Parliament who has been at various times a supporter of the United National Party, the Sri Lanka Freedom Party and the Lanka Prajantantravadi Party. The Hon. Shirley Corea, when Deputy Speaker, paid an ironic tribute to him by remarking in 1966:

Governments may come and Governments may go but Sir Razik Fareed goes on for ever. 1

Yet, in the context of Sri Lanka politics, Sir Razik Fareed's opinions and ideas can be held to reflect much deeper Muslim attitudes and interests. In 1948 and 1949 a number of Acts - the Citizenship Act, the Official Language Act, the Indian and Pakistani Residents (Citizenship) Act and the Ceylon Parliamentary Election Amendment Act - had the effect of disenfranchising many Indians who worked on the tea plantations. These Acts of Parliament, which openly operated against one minority group, were passed during the Premiership of D.S. Senanayake. Most of the Sri Lanka Tamil members of Parliament supported them. The Ceylon Tamil members were seen by the Indian Tamils as betraying them, yet they and the Muslim members at that time continued to support the government.2

The Indians included a number of Muslims. According to the 1946 census, the Indian Muslim population was about 35,000; the non-Muslim Indian Tamils were about 780,000.\(^1\) The Indian Muslims were said to regard Sri Lanka only as a temporary home. They supposedly stayed in Sri Lanka only to engage in trade, to accumulate wealth and then to return to India. The fact that the local Muslims supported the government bill is surely an indication that they accepted this view and thought that the Indians may have deserved sound economic prospects, but not the prospect of citizenship. In all probability, the Sri Lankan Muslims resented the economic competition of their Indian co-religionists and so saw no reason why Indian Muslims should enjoy rights of citizenship.

The afternoon that the Citizenship Bill came to be voted upon in Senate, Sir Razik Fareed was boarding a plane to Mecca for Hadj. Before leaving for the airport, he had gone to the Senate and made a speech:

> We the Ceylon Moors have suffered most in the past from want of a citizen bill. We ... have been treated very badly by certain people, under the guise of Muslim brotherhood. We have very unfortunately played ourselves into the hands of other people.\(^2\)

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What this means is not entirely clear, but Fareed seems to have intended to criticise Pan-Islamic loyalties and to have sought to make clear that, unlike Indian Muslims, Sri Lanka Muslims were Sri Lankans first and Muslims only secondarily.

Much later he was to return to the subject:

The Ceylon Moors had a flourishing trade in Main Street, Pettah, barely 40 years ago, but today you find the whole of the trade in the Pettah, even the property which the Moors owned in the Pettah, in the hands of non-Ceylon traders.¹

This was clearly aimed at Indian Muslims. Fareed claimed that he had supported the Government on its Sinhala-Only Language Bill in 1944 for precisely this reason, though it was then too early to make this policy into a reality.² The "Sinhala-only" policy tended, of course, to divide Tamils and Sinhalese. Sir Razik Fareed saw giving support to the Sinhalese on such questions as a useful political strategy which allowed him to win substantial benefits for the Muslim community, for example, in the field of education.

ix. Education

The Tamil teachers, who dominated the field of education among the Muslims until 1950, were repeatedly attacked by Sir Razik Fareed in the

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State Council. He described them as a "tyranny". He remarked:

By the end of the 1930s there were no fewer than 195 (Muslim) schools with a total of only 25 Muslim teachers....

In 1948 there were 253 Government vernacular Tamil schools, in each of which more than 50 per cent of the students were Muslims. But there were only 50 permanent Muslim headmasters and 238 permanent Muslim teachers. Of the latter, only 125 were trained teachers. Two years later it was found that a total of 1,070 Muslim teachers were required to staff all Government schools where Muslim students were in a majority; but there were only 433 available at that time.

Sir Razik Fareed's campaign in Parliament for Muslim teachers and schools, however, encouraged other Parliamentarians to criticise the Muslim Educational System. Dr. N.M. Perera, the Sinhalese Trotskyite leader, was very critical of what was taught in Muslim schools. He said:

We want our religion safeguarded. Why should Muslim children read about the history of others, when we have a better culture?

2. Ibid., p. 4265.
But although he was determined to have Buddhist Sri Lanka history emphasised, he was willing to make some concessions. He favoured teaching minority community history alongside majority community history, and so he was prepared to support the employment of Muslim teachers for Muslim area schools.¹

Sir Razik Fareed and his fellow Muslim Parliamentarians gave whole-hearted support to the government on important issues, such as that of the National flag, the Citizenship Act and the Sinhala Official Language Bill.² By thus supporting the government, the Muslim community believed that it might gain some advantages. In 1956, the Muslim Mosques Charitable Trusts and Waqf Bill was passed in Parliament, which prevented several malpractices earlier prevalent in the mosques.³

In the same year, the government also declared the Prophet Muhammad's birthday a public holiday.⁴ In 1957, Sir Razik Fareed secured a concession from the government permitting attendance at the Friday noon prayers by government servants.⁵

². The motion regarding the National flag of Sri Lanka was moved by Mr. A. Sinne Lebbe, the Member for Batticaloa. See Hansard, vol. III (House of Representative), 16 Jan. 1948 (Colombo, 1948), p. 1171.
⁵. Daily News, 10 March 1957.
When, in 1917, the National Congress was formed, Muslims played no part in it, perhaps because during the Sinhalese-Muslim conflict of 1915 they had lost some of their wealth and influence. For some time afterwards, the Muslims did not support the Sinhalese majority group.

By 1944 they had come round to favouring the report submitted by the Soulbury Commission, which argued for Dominion Status and a type of democratic rule in Sri Lanka, even though they still had reservations about how the larger Sinhalese community might respond to the minority communities. During the course of the 1940s, the political attitudes of the Muslim leadership were not consistent. Dr. T.B. Jayah was a stalwart of the United National Party and gained a place in its government, formed in 1947. Sir Razik Fareed, however, was more flexible in his loyalties. His fickle behaviour aroused the distrust of the Sinhalese community, so that, eventually, neither the Sri Lanka Freedom Party nor the United National Party would offer him a ministerial post.

How, then, did the Muslims themselves perceive their role in Sri Lankan politics? What were their tactics and what their gains? After Sir Razik Fareed's entry into politics in 1936, there was a great deal of in-fighting among the Muslims. Some of their differences found expression in the controversy which broke out over the use of the terms "Moor" and "Muslim", and over which of the two was the
more appropriate for the community. Those, like Sir Razik Fareed, who were in favour of the term "Moor" had in mind the claims to Arab historical origins for the community. Others, like Jayah, felt this term to be too exclusive and even elitist. They favoured the term "Muslim", as it covered also all other Islamic groups (especially the Malay and Bohora communities). But the term "Moor" was well established, and even today the Sri Lankan government tends to use the word "Moor" rather than "Muslim".

The objections of Jayah to the term "Moor" as a description of the Muslims of Sri Lanka must surely be attributed to the fact that he came from Sri Lanka's Malay community. Had all the Muslim groups in Sri Lanka been described simply as Muslims, the Malay community might have been more ready to merge with the other Muslims. As it was, they felt unable to do so, and so the Malays still preserve an individual identity.

Muslim leaders, then, adopted a variety of tactics during this period. Though Sir Razik Fareed's shifts of affiliation were somewhat eccentric, his actions were, in a way, a pointer to the benefits that might be derived

for the community by supporting whichever group, left-wing as well as right-wing, had power. It can be argued that by these means Muslims did win concessions, especially in the fields of Law and Education. By supporting both major Sinhalese parties, Muslim leaders were able to solicit help from both sides. They found it unprofitable, however, to support the Tamil leaders, whom they also saw as tending to exploit them in order to realise their own ambitions, and, this done, to then push them aside.

The Muslims of Sri Lanka had little prospect, unlike the Tamils, of creating a separate State.\(^1\) Pakistan was successful in breaking away from India, overwhelmingly Hindu, and adopting Muslim rule.\(^2\) Unlike the Tamils, however, the majority of whom live in the northern and eastern parts of Sri Lanka, the Muslims, though clustering in certain areas, lived scattered all around the country. The Muslims of Sri Lanka were therefore denied any prospect of forming a separate State.\(^3\) In any view, the Muslim leaders saw it as preferable to support the two major National Parties.

The Roman Catholics, too, followed the same political attitude as the Muslims of Sri Lanka. They

\(\text{\textsuperscript{1}}\) Wilson, A.J., Dennis Dalton (ed) The States of South Asia (Lond., 1982), p. 298.
\(\text{\textsuperscript{2}}\) Ibid., p. 25.
were the first group which had disputes (from the mid-1840s) with the majority Buddhists. The Roman Catholics benefited from Colonial rule, for example in the Civil Service and the professions, and this caused jealousy among the Buddhists. However, in the 1960s the Catholic community, like the Muslims earlier, accepted the fact that they had to give way to the majority Sinhalese community if they were to preserve their ethnic identity.¹

CHAPTER 5

MUSLIM TRADE IN SRI LANKA DURING THE BRITISH PERIOD

1. Muslim Participation in the Export and Import Sector

This chapter deals with three main groups of Muslim traders in the island. The first consists of those who were involved in the country's export sector. This group of international traders mainly exported gems and imported diamonds and, later, motor vehicles and household items. The second group of Muslims consists of those involved in pearl fishing. They were not involved in international trade: they collected pearls from the Gulf of Mannar and sold them to the international Muslim traders. The third group consists of those who bought and sold coconuts. This group was more independent. They did not sell their coconuts to the large traders but exported them directly to South India.

The earliest Muslims in Sri Lanka were traders. From Sri Lanka, Muslim merchants had acquired gems, cloves, cardamom, elephants and elephants' tusks. The most valuable to them was the gem trade. Sri Lanka is even today famous for its gems, ranging from sapphires to topaz, malachites, opals and even rubies.1 During the pre-colonial period, the mining of gems seems to have

been a royal monopoly. Individuals were allowed to mine gems, but only under the supervision of royal officials; and the king retained full rights over the most valuable gems. But some gems were sometimes sold to Muslim merchants who then traded them overseas.

After the Kandyan kingdom was captured in 1815, Muslim trade in Sri Lanka began to flourish again. The Muslims of Sri Lanka were permitted to own property in the areas of the Pettah and Fort, a right they soon began to exercise. Furthermore, when the British adopted a policy of liberalising trade, this also helped the Muslim community. Under this encouragement, Muslims began to regain a major place in the commercial life of the island. A number of Muslim companies sprang into existence to exploit the new opportunities. (See Table X.)

The offices of the early Muslim companies in Sri Lanka were all situated in the Pettah. Later some were based in the Fort, which was more prestigious, being the area where the Governor of Sri Lanka had his official residence. One company in the 1860s had its headquarters in Galle, most probably because its founders lived there.

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3. S.L.N.A., no. 4/150, Secretary of State to the Governor, despatch no. 48, 25 Jan. 1833.
4. C.O. 54/122, Colebrooke to the Secretary of State, 31 Jan. 1832.
Galle is a town where many Muslims live. Another company opened a branch in Kandy. (See Table X.)

The growth of Muslim businesses in Sri Lanka seems to reflect developments in Sri Lanka's trade as a whole. Between 1820 and 1860 only six Muslim companies were formed. Two were set up in the year 1840 and three in the decade 1850-1860. These dates correspond to the periods of rapid growth in the export trades generally, largely because of the success of the coffee industry. However, in 1860 the coffee plantations began to suffer losses because of their dependence on the London Money Market at a time when European investors were increasingly wary of plantation agriculture in the Indian subcontinent. The resultant loss of business confidence may explain why there was only one Muslim company formed between 1860 and 1870. In 1869, a leaf disease known as hemileia vastratrix attacked the coffee plantations and the coffee market slowly collapsed. Perhaps this in turn is reflected in the fact that only one company emerged in the 1870s. In 1886, no less than three companies were formed. Tea cultivation had become a

commercial success by then and capital was again pouring into the island.¹

The first of Sri Lanka's Muslim companies to be established was that of Mr. O.L.A.L.M. Alim in 1820. From 1820 to 1870, the company kept afloat, though very little is known of its operations. After the death of Mr. Alim, the first proprietor, in 1870, however, it ran into problems. The government of Sri Lanka had estimated his estate to amount to some Rs. 1,500,000/= when his will was filed in the courts of Sri Lanka.² But litigation concerning the will began immediately and went on for a long period after his death. The company was obliged to pay for the case. The terms of the will had been challenged by one of his sons, and the affair was settled only after the rest of the surviving family agreed to major revisions.³

In 1917, new partners were brought into the company. These were Messrs. A.L.M. Haniffa (who acted as General Manager) and A.L.M.M. Isadeer.⁴ After these new partners came into the firm, however, business

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3. Personal communications from the late Mr. Hamvi Haniffa (Lawyer), 17 Walukarama Road, Colombo, 3, Sri Lanka, who is the great-grandson of the first proprietor, Mr. O.L.M.A.L.M. Alim.
declined. The quantity of hardware and crockery which they imported dropped, reputedly owing to some financial problems the company was facing. By 1920 these had grown so serious that the company was finally wound up.¹

During British rule in Sri Lanka the Muslims were heavily involved in the gem trade. One example was Macan Markar and Company. This company played a role of the first importance in the island's gem trade. When he first began trading in 1860,² Mr. O.L.M. Macan Markar used to travel to the mines and gem fields in Rakwana (a major gem-mining area of Sri Lanka, some 70 miles from Colombo) and Ratnapura (which is situated some 60 miles from Colombo), buying rough stones from the villagers. These he cut and polished and then either sold them in Colombo or exported them to countries abroad. One of his largest acquisitions was a catseye, which weighed 105 carats. In 1875, Macan Markar caught the attention of British royalty and sold a stone to the Prince of Wales (later His Majesty, King Edward VIII).³ In 1898, Macan Markar's sons, Sir Mohamed Macan, S.D. Macan Markar and A.V. Macan Markar, became partners in the company.⁴ They numbered amongst their customers

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the Duke of Cornwall and York /later H.M. King George V/. 1

Another rare gem acquired by the Macan Markar Company was a blue sapphire which was, at that time, the largest in the world. It was discovered at Ratnapura in 1907 and weighed 466 carats. In 1908, this stone was sold to T. Pierpont Morgan, the American multimillionaire, who was a famous collector of art and gems. 2 In 1912, Macan Markar's became the second Muslim company in Sri Lanka to establish branches abroad. They opened branches in Semiramis Hotel and the Intercontinental Hotel in Cairo, as well as in the King David Hotel in Jerusalem. 3 In April 1941, however, while World War II raged and Egypt was threatened by the panzers of the German Army's Africa Corps under General Rommel, the company and its staff in Cairo and Jerusalem decided to evacuate and return home. 4 These branches never re-opened, owing partly to various restrictions regarding the employment of foreigners which were introduced by the post-war Egyptian government. 5

2. Ceylon Times 10 March 1908.
4. For the background see Richmond, J.C.B., Egypt 1798-1952: Her Advance Towards a Modern Identity (Lond., 1977), p. 204. See also, Ceylon Daily News, April 1941.
The Macan Markar Company did, however, continue to trade with the British élite: a blue sapphire found in a paddy field at Palmadulla (a town near Rakwana) in 1926, weighing 400 carats and known as the "Blue Belle of Asia", was purchased in 1937 by Lord Nuffield, the British motor car magnate. On 16th January, 1928, the company had moved into its new premises in the Grand Oriental Hotel in Colombo. Its showrooms were declared open by the Governor, Sir Herbert J. Stanley.

In 1933, there was a change of company policy. For the first time, it introduced a scheme to enable employees to become shareholders. According to this scheme, twenty five per cent of the net profits were to be apportioned and allocated in pre-determined proportions to the company's employees. The scheme was apparently designed to act as an incentive for the employees to give of their best to the company.

During this period, the gem trade on the island was flourishing, the Macan Markar Company being amongst those increasing their sales. On 1st July, 1944, the partners purchased from Colombo Hotels Ltd. a building as its future headquarters, at the junction of York Street and Princess Street in Colombo, then occupied by Colombo Apothecaries Ltd., of Fort, Colombo. On 30th January,

1. Ceylon Times, 10 March 1937.
3. Ceylon Muhammedan, 10 Jan. 1933.
1947, this was named The Macan Markar Building.¹

On the 18th December, 1942, the company again had a change of policy. It was converted into a limited liability company with a special class of "A" shares, valued at Rs. 10/= each, the majority of which were allocated to its members of staff, and, which, for dividend purposes, had a relatively greater value than the "Ordinary" Rs. 100/= shares originally allocated to the partners.²

The Macan Markar Company continued to supply gems to members of the British royal family. In 1954, the company sold precious stones to H.M. Queen Elizabeth II.³ This company was, beyond doubt, one of the most prestigious companies in the island and its customers had long included members of the British elite and even of the royal family. The Macan Markar Company was also a very progressive concern. Yet though they were the biggest and best known, Macan Markar were by no means the only Muslim company to specialise in trading in precious stones.

Other companies included, for example, Marikar Bawa and Sons, which imported diamonds from the United Kingdom for resale.⁴ Another major company was Hamid and Company, which was established in the Fort, Colombo and also had

branches in the Hotel Majestic and the Tajmahal Hotel in Bombay.¹ This in fact was the first Muslim company to open branches abroad. They, too, imported diamonds from the United Kingdom and also exported pearls from Sri Lanka. Soon after World War II, however, their two Indian branches were closed down, when they encountered stiff competition from Indian gems which were then coming onto the market.²

Abdul Gaffoor and Sons were also active in the country's gem trade. Abdul Gaffoor himself was, by special appointment, given the privilege of exhibiting pearls, diamonds, rubies, sapphires and jewellery to the Prince and Princess of Wales at the Kandy Pavilion in 1901, during a royal visit to Sri Lanka.³ His stall was also given a prominent place at the Wembley Exhibition of 1924 in London. H.M. Queen Mary personally visited his pavilion and made purchases.⁴ At his own expense, Mr. Abdul Gaffoor took part in various world gem exhibitions: the St. Louis Exhibition in the U.S.A. in 1903;⁵ the All-Ceylon Exhibition in Kandy in 1912;⁶ and the Philadelphia Exhibition in 1925.⁷ He was said in

². Personal communication from Mr. M.K. Hamid, 47 Main Street, Galle, Sri Lanka, who is the grandson of the original proprietor, Mr. A.H. Hamid.
³. Ceylon Times, 25 April 1901.
⁴. Ceylon Times, 10 June 1924.
⁵. Ceylon Times, 10 March 1903.
the 1920s to have the finest collection of gem stones in the country, and in 1925 was congratulated by the Governor, Sir. Hugh Clifford (1925-7) on the valuable work he had done.¹

However, the Muslim traders of Sri Lanka did not concentrate only on exporting gems. They were also involved in importing other items. For example, in the 1840s one firm of importers was that of I.L.M. Noordeen Hadjar. This was the only company permitted by the government of Sri Lanka to import small firearms and ammunition from the United Kingdom.² This suggests that a degree of trust had grown up between the British authorities and these Muslim traders.³

Much later, some Muslim companies were amongst the first to import cars from Europe. One company involved in this business was that of S.L. Naina Marikar and Company.⁴ This particular company did well until 1930, after which family disagreements forced it to close.⁵

Such prominence did Muslim traders gain in the gem, jewellery and motor-vehicle trades, that they must have

¹. Ceylon Muhammedan, 10 July 1925.
⁵. Personal communication from S.L. Naina Marikar, No. 8 Galleface Court, Colombo, 3, who is the grandson of Mr. S.L. Naina Marikar.
come close to monopolising them. But other trades interested them as well. Four Muslim companies concentrated upon importing household items. They catered primarily to the local élite and perhaps also to the resident British community.

The main reason for Muslim success in the gem trade was believed to lie in their skill in the techniques of valuing and in cutting and polishing gem stones. The gem stones were cut into fine shapes by the Muslims before being exported from Sri Lanka. Yet one distinguished writer accused Muslim traders of being "so primitive and their skill so deficient that a gem generally lost its value by having passed through their hands." Another critic suggested that Muslim cutters were also guilty of sacrificing brilliancy and style for size and weight. But these charges cannot apply to all, because some Muslims of Sri Lanka were sophisticated enough to command an international reputation for their gem stones.

One reason for the Muslims concentrating on the gem trade may have been the highly skilled yet relatively small labour force involved. The actual mining was done mainly by the Sinhalese, while the

Muslims confined their work to cutting and polishing the stones.¹ Profits accruing from the gem trade were great. Yet the British never took any interest in it. John Davy merely observed that "like mining in general, the occupation of searching for gems is a very precarious one, and, therefore not a profitable pursuit."² In the eyes of the Colebrooke-Cameron commissioners, too, "the gems of Ceylon .... were the least important of its mineral productions."³ Such an attitude suited the Muslims of Sri Lanka who were careful to keep trade secrets within the family. When Muslim companies were established they consisted almost invariably of a cooperative venture between sons and brothers. This was clearly in part because they were wary of outsiders. While the Macan Markar Company was prepared to allocate shares to its employees, the majority of its shares, and thereby the major profits, remained in the hands of family members. Perhaps owing to this chauvinism, however, members of elite Muslim families were often divided by class, like the Macan, Gaffoor and Bawa families, and not a few companies, like S.L. Naina Marikar and Company, even had to close as a result of infighting.

3. C.O. 54/122, Colebrooke to Secretary of State, 24 Dec. 1837.
between family members. Interestingly enough, this was replicated elsewhere. In Syria, the Muslim elite was at this time also becoming socially divided, owing to family struggles and competitions for control within their various companies.\(^1\)

During early British rule, economic policy in Sri Lanka was ultimately decided by the British government. But more and more decisions came to be made within Sri Lanka, and, in 1931, the power to pronounce on economic matters was transferred to the State Council.\(^2\)

By about 1947, nationalist sentiment had deeply penetrated Sri Lankan economic thought. British policy was now held to have created a wedge between the people and the legislature. The members of the legislature now expressed an ambition to change the country's economic policy from what they saw as a colonial to a national character, arguing that this would ensure a higher standard of living for Sri Lankans, even one comparable to that of Western countries.\(^3\)

It was largely under such arguments that Prime Minister S.W.R.D. Bandaranike (who held office from April 1956 - September 1959) propagated the idea of

3. Ibid., p. 12.
State controlled trade in Sri Lanka. During his premiership, the government formed State corporations in order to control trade: in 1958 the Textile Corporation was formed, and in 1959, the Hardware Corporation, both by act of Parliament. Later a Gem Corporation Act was passed by Parliament in 1973, when Mrs. Bandaranike was Prime Minister.

Once these corporations were established, the State controlled the import of hardware and textiles and the export of gems. Sinhalese were brought into these State created bodies, both as Chairmen and as members of the Board of Directors. For the Muslims, it meant the final disintegration of their former monopoly in the textile, hardware and gem trades.

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5. See Table XII. The Closure of the Muslim Companies.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date of Formation and Termination</th>
<th>Company Addresses</th>
<th>Main Import/Export Commodity</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1820-1920</td>
<td>3rd Cross Street, Pettah, Colombo.</td>
<td>Importing hardware and household items.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1846 &amp; Sons</td>
<td>6, China Street, Pettah, Colombo.</td>
<td>Importing iron, steel, metal goods, hardware, small firearms, ammunition and electrical goods.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1869 &amp; Sons</td>
<td>No. 12 Grand Oriental Hotel, Colombo.</td>
<td>Exporting jewellery and gems.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1886-1963</td>
<td>9 &amp; 10 Bristol Building, Fort, Colombo.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1895-1967</td>
<td>Gaffoor Building, Bristol Street, Fort Colombo.</td>
<td>Exporting gems, pearls and jewellery.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**TABLE IV**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name of the Company</th>
<th>Co. = Company</th>
<th>Bros. = Brothers</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>N. Marikar Bawa &amp; Sons</td>
<td>A.</td>
<td>Ibid. p. 341.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dul Rahib &amp; Sons</td>
<td>A.</td>
<td>Ibid. p. 337.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dul Hussain Jefferjee</td>
<td>A.</td>
<td>Ibid. p. 394.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dul Abdul Gaffoor Sons</td>
<td>A.</td>
<td>Ibid. p. 305.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

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1. In 1900, another branch was opened at 15
dChurch Street, Fort Colombo. | Exporting diamonds. |
### TABLE V

#### THE CLOSURE OF THE MUSLIM COMPANIES

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Names of the Companies</th>
<th>The Date of Termination</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2. O.L.M. Macan Markar &amp; Co.</td>
<td>The gem department was closed down in 1976 and reopened in 1977.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Silk import was closed down in 1960.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. A.H. Hamid &amp; Co.</td>
<td>The gem department was closed in 1968.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6. N.D.H. Abdul Gaffoor</td>
<td>The gem department was closed in 1972 and reopened in 1977.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


5. Ibid.


7. Ibid.
ii. **Pearl Fishing**

The second group of Muslims was composed of those engaged in pearl fishing. Muslim participation in the export of pearls from Sri Lanka was merely a part of the community's role in the entire business of pearl fishing. Even though this industry was a government monopoly until 1833, the manner in which it was operated provided ample opportunities for Muslims to engage in the enterprise in various capacities. The government usually rented the fishing right to speculators, on condition that they fish within a predetermined area, for a specified number of days and with a stipulated number of boats. Even after 1833, this system remained largely intact, with the difference that, instead of renting the right to fish, the government now hired the divers, who worked under official supervision and sold their oyster catch to pearl merchants at public auctions.¹

Before the actual commencement of the fishing season, the government inspected the respective pearl banks and collected samples of oysters in order to assess the prospects and profitability of the venture. The pearls collected from this sample were "sorted, classed and valued by an assembly of five, or six

native pearl dealers .... respectable Moormen, who considered it a compliment to be called to this service."¹

At the beginning, this was performed gratuitously, but later they were paid for their services. Even toward the end of our period, pearl valuing appears to have been a special skill monopolized by Muslims. For example, in each of the five member committees of pearl valuers appointed in 1881 and 1905, all, except the Inspector of Pearl Banks and Adigār (chief revenue officer), were Muslims.²

After assessing the prospects of the forthcoming season, the government published the date for fishing. Before 1833 the renters were mostly South Indian Chetties,³ but after that there came a variety of merchants, among whom many were Muslims. In 1856, for example, of the 42 Kottūs (a Tamil word for a ground pit where oysters were dumped on a mat to dry and rot) allotted for pearl merchants, 13 were taken by Muslims, of whom 9 were Indians, 3 from Mannar and 1 from Colombo.⁴

In 1889, the Government Agent of the Northern Province reported that there were Chetties and Moorish merchants from Madurāi, Negapaṭṭinām, Keelakurāi, Tondy

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¹ James Stewart, An Account of the Pearl Fisheries in Ceylon (Cotta Church Mission Press, Colombo, 1843) p. 11.
² C.S.P. no. 11, 1881 and no. 33, 1905 (Colombo, 1881 and 1905), pp. 25 and 75.
³ S.L.N.A., no. 31/18 Mannar Kachcheri Diary, 1856.
⁴ Ibid.
and Adrampaṭṭānām,\(^1\) and from Colombo and Jaffna, who had come to participate in the fishery of that year.\(^2\) He also regretted the absence of Muslim merchants from the South Indian town of Nagore, who were there the previous year,\(^3\) but who were now busy on the textile trade in Nagore. In 1905, of the three largest purchasers of oysters, two were Muslims, one from Bombay, and the other from Keelakari; the third was a Chetty.\(^4\) A year before that, a merchant from Mecca named Mr. Abdullah had purchased oysters from Mannār Muslims.\(^5\) While the bulk of these Muslims returned to their homeland when the season ended, a few remained in the island and became permanent residents.\(^6\)

A more important branch of this industry from the point of view of employment was diving for pearls. Hundreds of Muslims, both indigenous and foreign, were involved in this. In 1856, for instance, of the 323 boats which arrived at the fishing site (along with 678 merchants, 1,926 divers and 4,698 workers), 19 boats came from Kalpitya and 3 from Mannar (a town in the North Western Province), all carrying Sri Lankan Muslims, while another 72 boats came from Keelakari, 24 boats

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1. All South Indian towns.
3. Ibid., p. 127.
4. C.S.P. no. 33, 1905 (Colombo, 1905), p. 35. The Muslims were Mr. Osman from Bombay and Cader Saibo from Keelakari.
6. Ibid.
from Tondy and 5 boats from Kayalpaṭṭinām (towns in South India) carrying South Indian Muslims. From four years later, there were 200 boats from Keelakari alone. In 1890, of a total of about 1,300 to 1,400 divers, Muslims from Keelakari, Paumben and Tondy together accounted for 800, while another 200 Indian Muslims, mostly of Arab stock, came from Bombay. In that year there were also 300 Sri Lankan Muslim divers, mostly from Erukkalampity (a village 6 miles from Mannar) and Mannar. Again, in 1903, out of a total of 242 boats and 7,408 divers, 150 of the first and 3,732 of the second arrived from Keelakari alone. In the following year, Muslims from that place so dominated the diving that they were described in a government paper as "the backbone of the fishery." Finally, in 1905 and 1906 there was a marked increase in the number of Arabs to 923 and 4,090 respectively, out of a total of 4,991 in the first and 8,368 in the second year.

Culturally and historically, Muslims in Sri Lanka have an ancient connection with pearl fishing. The

1. S.L.N.A., no. 31/18, Mannar Kachcheri Diary, 1856.
2. S.L.N.A., no. 31/25, Mannar Kachcheri Diary, 1860.
Qur'ān states:

He it is Who has made the sea subservient that you may eat fresh fish from it, and bring forth from it ornaments which you wear. ¹

Perhaps in keeping with the spirit of this verse, Muslims took to pearl fishing from very early times. Tennent cites the Arab geographer Mausudi's description of the habits of Arab Muslim pearl divers in the Persian Gulf in the ninth century.² As Islam spread, Muslims in other areas also took to pearl fishing and in Sri Lanka it became a vocation practised by members of that community right down to the end of the 1960s. The expertise thus developed appears to have enabled Muslim divers to dive to great depths and stay under water for long periods. Of the four groups that participated in diving in Sri Lanka, namely, the Malayalees, Christian Tamils, Moors and Arabs, the last were rated the best, the Moors ranked second, the Tamils and Malayalees third and fourth respectively.³

Even though the Muslims shared widely in pearl fishing, a large proportion of them were not Sri Lankan. There were a small number of Mannār and Kalpitiya Muslims and a few from the Vannarponnai area in

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Jaffna, but the bulk came from either India or the Persian Gulf. There were probably two reasons for this foreign dominance. Firstly, the Dutch had adopted discriminatory policies against the local Muslims between 1550 and 1750, and the absence of frequent pearl fisheries during the Dutch regime must have made the local Muslims lose many of their skills in pearl fishing over a period of time; and secondly, the British adopted the practice of advertising contracts for pearl fishing in India, which helped wealthy traders there to submit tenders and recruit divers locally before setting out for Sri Lanka.¹

What the local Muslims gained mostly from the fishery was the opportunity to trade with foreigners who arrived at the fishing site; sometimes a crowd of 30,000 to 40,000 gathered at the place and remained there for a month or so until the season was over. A sandy, desolate spot along the Mannar coast became a crowded town of merchants, divers, workers and officers, living in temporary huts and palm leaf sheds, trying to maximise their earnings within a short space of time. Though trading was brisk, it was not the monopoly of the local community. There was stiff competition from South Indian Muslims.²

2. Ibid.
In 1856, for example, of the 127 boutique allotments, only 24 were taken by Sri Lankan Muslims. Of the rest, except for one which was allotted to a Pathan Muslim from Kabul, all were shared by Muslim traders from Tondy, Keelakari and Kayalpatnam.¹

The seasonal character of the industry generally shortened the period of trading. But that short duration sometimes became even shorter, as in 1858, with outbreaks of epidemics.² Even when healthy, the entire industry was of a speculative nature, as it depended on the availability of oysters. These oysters appeared and disappeared periodically and seriously disrupted trading from time to time. Such disruption occurred several times in the 18th century, and in the 19th century there were disruptions from 1820 to 1828, from 1846 to 1849, in 1853, 1861, 1876, and from 1893 to 1896.³

When the pearl trade was flourishing in the Gulf of Mannar, Colombo Muslims were engaged in exporting pearls abroad. N.D.H. Abdul Gaffoor and Sons, of Colombo, were enterprising enough to take the lead.⁴

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¹. S.L.N.A., no. 31/18, Mannar Kachcheri Diary, 1856.
². S.L.N.A., no. 31/18, Mannar Kachcheri Diary, 1858.
³. C.S.P. no. 32, 1907 (Colombo, 1907), p. 29.
⁴. See Table XI, no. 12.
Some of the Muslim pearl merchants of Mannār sold their pearls directly to Colombo merchants. The Colombo merchants then exported these pearls abroad. The various records available illustrate the fact that only Muslims and Hindus took a very active part in this trade.¹ The Sinhalese did not take part in pearl fishing.²

Owing to the gradual disappearance of oysters in the Gulf of Mannār, the government of Sri Lanka officially banned all pearl fishing in that area in the 1960s.³ A long established Muslim industry was thereby closed.

iii. Muslim Merchants and Coconut Exporters, with Special Reference to Kalpitya

The third group of Muslims engaged in the coconut trade. Of the several cash crops harvested in Sri Lanka, that which proved the most attractive to Muslims was coconut. Although coconut was widely cultivated in Sri Lanka, its production on an international commercial scale was less widespread. In the mid-nineteenth century Muslims were said to be "almost the only section of the native population who divided

1. C.S.P. no. 32, 1907 (Colombo, 1907), p. 32.
this valuable culture with the English."¹

At the end of the nineteenth century, the Muslims of Kalpitya in the north-west of Sri Lanka and Tuticorin on the southern tip of India were amongst the principal dealers in Sri Lankan coconut.² South India and Kalpitya had very close links because South India is only a short distance across the sea from Kalpitya, roughly about 60 miles.³ The export from Kalpitya included as well as coconuts, gingelly seeds, dried and salt fish, turtles, cadjans, logs, curry stuffs. It imported sugar, goats, cows, spices, grain, pulse and flour.⁴ Sri Lanka, which never produced sugar on a sufficiently large scale for all its consumers, imported this, too, from India. At the same time, however, India, itself, was not producing enough sugar for its own consumption needs and did in fact, import

³ Frank, Modder, Gazetteer of the Puttalam District (Colombo, 1908), p.1.
sugar from Java.\(^1\) Therefore, the sugar which was coming from India to Kalpitya may possibly have been Javan.

Historically, the port of Kalpitya played an important role in the field of trade well before the arrival of the Europeans. It remained a major exporting port into the 19th and 20th centuries. The port was run by tide surveyors and tide waiters under the supervision of the local Mudaliyar,\(^2\) who was the sub-collector. All these posts were held by Muslims of Kalpitya. In 1927, the Mudaliyar was Udman Lebbe. In his day the trade was quite extensive. In 1926, 41,358 coconuts were exported from Kalpitya to Tuticorin and, in the same year, 56 vessels arrived to deliver and collect goods from the port. In 1927 there were 58 vessels in this port.\(^3\)

Trade in Kalpitya was virtually monopolised by the Muslims. One notable merchant, one Cassim Marikar, owned four vessels which he used for a transport service between Kalpitya and Tuticorin.\(^4\) He also owned 10,000

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2. Native official, chief aid to the Governor of the colony under the British rule and the highest rank in the hierarchy of native officials.
4. Personal Paper "Deed no. 275 of Mr. Cassim Marikar 10 March, 1920". Obtained from his grand-nephew Mr. T. Naina Marikar of Main Street, Kalpitya, Sri Lanka.
acres of land, for paddy and coconut, located in or around Kalpitya. These lands were registered by the British Government Agent of Puttalam. Unfortunately Cassim Marikar and the Marikar clan got into debt, and, in 1930, he was forced to mortgage the land to the Chetties of Puttalam, the people from whom he had originally bought the land.

The Muslims of Kalpitya specialised in coconut for sound reasons. Kalpitya is situated in the dry zone, the climatic conditions thus being highly suitable for the cultivation of coconut. The maintenance of coconut was simple and relatively cheap, most of the cultivation being undertaken in small holdings, often at the expense of paddy. The amount of labour required to work a coconut plantation was far less than that needed for coffee, rubber or tea. Furthermore, the cultivation of coconut afforded villagers who lived close by part time employment, which could conveniently be fitted into their normal patterns of cultivation. The capital involved in maintaining a coconut estate was therefore proportionately less than that needed for tea or rubber.

1. Personal Paper "Deed no. 275 of Mr. Cassim Marikar, 10 March 1920". Obtained from his grand-nephew Mr. T. Naina Marikar of Main Street, Kalpitya, Sri Lanka.
2. The Bankers of South India. For details, see, Karunatilake, H.N.S., Banking and Financial Institutions in Ceylon (Colombo, 1968), p. 15.
3. C.B.B., 1938 (Colombo, 1939), see the list of coconut estates which shows the names of the Puttalam Muslims. For example, E.S.M. Mohamed Cassim Marikar.
When, on Colebrooke's recommendation, export duties on coconuts and coconut oil were abolished on the 23rd March, 1833, prospects for Muslims improved. In the 1880s in the North Western Province 37 per cent of the total area under cultivation was devoted to coconut, and this was largely in Muslim hands. Puttalam became one of the most important of the coconut producing areas on the island. In 1907-9 the railway network which ran from Negombo to Chilaw was for this reason extended to Puttalam.

The processing and shipping of coconut destined for export to Europe by the British in the 1880s was undertaken by commercial companies. Once Colombo harbour was developed under the supervision of William Gregory (Governor 1872-77), trading activities between Sri Lanka and India were slowly shifted there. Trading none-theless continued between Puttalam and Kalpitya and India until the 1940s. In fact his family claim that it was not until Cassim Marikar lost his fortune in 1930 that the trade between Kalpitya and South India fell into a

1. C.O. 54/122, Colebrooke to Secretary of State, 24 Dec. 1831.
2. C.O. 54/74, no. 114, despatch from Secretary of State to Governor, 23 March 1833.
4. Ibid., p. 20.
sharp decline and eventually ceased to be. 1

Most of the coconut lands in Puttalam were owned by Muslims and the Marikar clan of Puttalam remained economically prosperous until the 1970s. Under the Prime Minister, Mrs. Sirmavo R.D. Bandaranike, a land reform Act was passed which allowed every family only 50 acres of land, and every child over 18 years of age another 50. 2 As a result, the Muslims of Puttalam lost much of their coconut and paddy lands to the government. 3

The Muslims of Batticaloa were also engaged in the cultivation of coconut, but they exported no coconuts to South India; their trade was dependent upon the British commercial companies. As for the Muslims of Colombo, they invested in coconut estates, but were not directly involved in the exportation of coconut. 4 They concentrated instead on exporting other goods.

1. Personal communication from Mr. T. Naina Marikar, Main Street, Kalpitya, Sri Lanka, who is the grand-nephew of Mr. Cassim Marikar.
2. Gazette of the National State Assembly (Colombo, 1972), "Land Reform Law no. 1 of 1972".
The financing of all the trading activities of the Muslims was simple and straightforward and was usually of a short-term nature. Systems of accounting were also simple, and were, for the most part, interwoven with personal household finances.¹ The idea of long-term financing of the type needed for manufacturing was quite foreign to Sri Lanka. Nor were Muslims proficient in the intricacies of company finance and management accounts. Most traders had founded their businesses by drawing the greater part of their initial capital from personal and private fortunes, other businesses, where they had any, and the pooling of resources from family and relations, especially by the sale of property and other possessions.²

Available evidence shows that most businesses began in a very small way. For large scale ventures in international commerce, such private sources alone were inadequate to meet business requirements. In a number of cases, funds were raised only at the cost of considerable hardship and sacrifice to the entrepreneur and his family. Yet the total sum raised from such sources could not have been very great, and, therefore, a business had necessarily to be operated on a small

². Ibid.
scale.  

Muslims were sometimes dependent on a certain group of people who were both traders and money-lenders. These people came from the South Indian district of Chettinadu and, in Sri Lanka, were generally called "Chetties". Around the beginning of the nineteenth century, they were well-established in Sri Lanka as money lenders, and, for almost three quarters of a century, they played a very important role in the country's credit structure. The first Savings Bank was not established in Sri Lanka until 20th August, 1832. By 1910, the Sri Lankan Muslim traders were making much use of a new economic system which was termed "rolling money". Under this system, money was repeatedly borrowed over short periods of time from a bank or from individuals. These loans may have substituted for the earlier dependence on the Chetties. Trading between India and Sri Lanka was largely conducted from the Sri Lankan side by foreigners, mainly Malabari Muslim traders, who had blood relations living in Mannār, Galle and Batticaloa. 

Whilst Muslims were deeply involved in trade with India, the Middle East and Europe, the enterprising Sinhalese preferred to concentrate on other economic enterprises. They lived more typically in agriculturally developed areas and were chiefly cultivators of the land in Sri Lanka. This made the business-minded British accuse the Sinhalese of being unenterprising commercially. But Sinhalese thought land cultivation a highly prestigious form of employment. As for the Tamils from the north of Sri Lanka, they were less favoured as agriculturists and sought security in employment within various fields of the country's administration. The Muslims of Sri Lanka, however, were not found generally seeking security in government employment and only coconut planting attracted them to commercial agriculture, but, rather, they aspired to dominate in international trade.2

After 1855 (in which year a Sinhalese commercial journal was started with a view to promoting trading activities within the Sinhalese community),3 the image of trade as a desirable occupation for all began to change. This resulted in a relatively late Sinhalese

2. Ibid.
3. Valanda Sanhanava (Growing Trade), 10 Feb. 1885.
expansion into the field of trade. Hewavitharanes, for example, who had been furniture dealers, began in 1915 to extend their business to cover cutlery, groceries and glassware, trades hitherto dominated by Muslim merchants. But the sale of jewellery and the gem trade itself remained largely in Muslim hands. The wealth, power and influence acquired through their involvement in trade provided the foundation for the rise of a Muslim élite alongside Sinhalese and Tamil élites.

Accordingly, Muslims, who had been an oppressed community during the periods of Portuguese and Dutch domination, now often felt on a par with the Sinhalese and Tamil communities and acquired a relatively high status during the course of the nineteenth century.

Overall, theirs was an enterprising contribution to nineteenth century economic development in Sri Lanka. Nevertheless, there were problems confronting the community, problems which arose partly from foreign competition and partly from local reaction to the growing economic dominance of the Muslims in their particular sphere. These problems continued to grow and were slowly to bring major difficulties for the

1. Dinamina (Daily Star), 1 Feb. 1915.
Muslims, the most devastating of which were the Sinhalese-Muslim riots of 1915.
TABLE VI

The following Muslims lost coconut and paddy lands to the government under the Land Reform Law No. 1 of 1972:

1. Mr. Abdul Hamid Marikar - 50 acres
2. Mr. Ali Marikar - 200 acres
3. Mr. Hamied Hussain Marikar - 300 acres
4. Mr. Junideen Marikar - 250 acres
5. Mr. Mohamed Cassim Marikar - 2000 acres
6. Mr. Naina Marikar - 300 acres
7. Mr. Sahul Hamied Marikar - 150 acres
8. Mr. Salhi Marikar - 300 acres
9. Mr. Tamby Naina Marikar - 200 acres
10. Mr. Udman Lebbe Marikar - 150 acres

CHAPTER 6

MUSLIMS AND COMMUNALISM

i. Communal Violence Between Sinhalese and Muslims During the British Period

The riots of 1915 between Muslims and Sinhalese were a revelation. They demonstrated two unexpected factors: the weakness of the British colonial police force in the face of civil unrest and the changed attitude of the Sinhalese to the Muslims. Earlier, during the Portuguese and Dutch periods, Muslims had even sometimes been protected by the Sinhalese. In 1915, the whole Muslim community felt at risk from Sinhalese rioters.¹

In the early part of June 1915, news arrived in London of the outbreak of serious rioting in Sri Lanka. The Ministry of Military Affairs in Singapore (which was the headquarters for British military intelligence for South and South-East Asia) had initially suggested that this could be the work of Germans, trying to foment political unrest in Sri Lanka.² But a telephone call

² C.d. 8167, Governor to Secretary of State, 11 Aug. 1915.
from the Governor, Sir Robert Chalmers (1913-16), convinced the British authorities that this was not so and that the riots had resulted from what they called racial friction between Muslims and Sinhalese, intensified by trade animosities.  

The Germans could not be held to be responsible. The rioting broke out first of all in Kandy, in the early hours of the morning of May 30th. There it had died down by the evening of May 31st. But it soon spread rapidly elsewhere.

There had, of course, been differences between Buddhists and Muslims at least since the early period of British rule. But by the twentieth century matters had become very serious. In 1907, the coast Moors of Gampola constructed a new mosque on Ambagamuwa Street. After its construction, the Basnayake Nilame of Walhangoda Dewalaya organised a Buddhist Perehera. He proposed that it should follow the usual route of such processions, claiming this as a privilege supposedly guaranteed by the Kandyan Convention of 1815. On this occasion, however, the Muslims objected to the route,
which passed in front of their newly constructed mosque. They registered a protest with the Government Agent, Saxton, against the procession, first in 1907, and then again in 1908. Nothing was done, however, until a third protest in 1909, upon which the Perehera procession was re-routed by a police decision, in spite of the counter-pleas of the Basnayake Nilamē. But when the argument was raised yet again, in 1911, the Government Agent agreed to a return to the traditional route past the mosque.¹

In 1912, the Government Agent, Saxton, issued the licence for the procession, but now only on condition that music would be banned when it passed before the Muslim mosque and other places of worship. This ruling was unacceptable to the incumbents of the Walhangoda Dewalaya because it meant a restriction on what they saw as a traditional right. The Basnayake Nilamē instituted a suit against the Attorney-General of the colony in the District Court of Kandy, and Judge Paul E. Pieris handed down a decision in his favour on 4th June 1914. The judge ruled that the Government Agent had deprived the Walhangoda Dewalaya of a valid ancient right, assured by the binding compact of the Kandyan convention.²

¹. Sarasavi Sandaresa, 7 April 1914 (Sinhalese newspaper). See also Sinhala Buddhaya, 18 Oct. 1914 (Sinhalese newspaper).
². C.O. 54/781, Governor to Secretary of State, 31 May 1915.
On February 2, 1915, an appeal against this decision was lodged in the Supreme Court of Sri Lanka. The appeal was upheld, the decision of Judge Pieris being overturned by Justices Shaw and De Sampaye, who found that the local Board and Police Ordinance effectively superseded the terms of the Kandyan convention. Justice De Sampaye said he felt "as a Sinhalese thoroughly ashamed" of the earlier decision. This appeal verdict, however, caused widespread dissatisfaction among the majority religious community in Sri Lanka. It was felt to be a defeat for Buddhists, and resentment built up against the government and against the Muslims.¹ The Gampola Buddhists even lodged an appeal against the decision with the Privy Council in London.²

This case took another turn later in 1915. The parties at odds over the Esala Perahera had, with the help of government officers, arrived at a new arrangement. Certain times were agreed for the processions to take place so as to threaten no likely offence or disorder. The Crown's view was that there was no further reason to intervene, since the government's sole objective had been to preserve public tranquility. This decision appears to have been seen as a satisfactory compromise,

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2. C.O. 54/783, Governor to Secretary of State, 16 Aug. 1915.
3. The Buddhist religious procession accompanied by dancers and musicians on a full moon day.
for the appeal to the Privy Council was then withdrawn. But unrest still grew, and there were further clashes between Muslims and Buddhists, in such places as Kandy, Kurunegala and Badulla.¹

The instigators of these new communal troubles were believed by the Government to be the Buddhists. The Colonial Secretary was sent to Kandy by the Governor, Sir Robert Chalmers. There trouble had broken out over an attempt by some Buddhists to block the pavements in front of Muslim shops, on the route of Buddhist processions at a spot where, in former years, the procession would halt and distribute alms.²

These disturbances were reported in an article in Dinamina (Daily Star) which also published the text of the 1815 Convention (in Sinhalese) and various articles expressing the view of nationalist minded leaders. Another pro-Buddhist paper, in March 1915, carried a report on "outrages" of Muslims against Buddhists.³

May 29th 1915, being Weasak Day (the Buddha's birthday), was a public holiday. After nightfall in Kandy, a procession of seven elephants, led by the Māligāva (Temple of the Tooth at Kandy) giant tusker, wearing its special silvered tusks and bearing the tooth

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¹ Dinamina (Daily Star), 2 March 1915.
² C.O. 54/781, (29055) Governor to Secretary of State, 1 July 1915.
³ Sinhala Jatiya (Sinhala Race), 2 March 1915.
of Lord Buddha in a jewelled casket, made a stately circuit of the town, accompanied by drummers, dancers and torch-bearers. At about 1 a.m., the procession, now including a band of musicians in a decorated cart, turned from King Street into Castle Hill Street.¹ There the Muslim mosque was open and lit up, and groups of Muslims stood on either side of the street. Inspector Cooray, observing what he saw as a deliberate stance on the part of the Muslims, instructed the Buddhist carol-singing party to divert into Cross Street, to avoid the mosque altogether. The leaders of the procession obediently turned the cart into the street indicated. At this moment, the Muslims began clapping and jeering, which proved to be more than the Sinhalese could bear. They halted indecisively, looking towards the mosque. As they stood, a still larger crowd, headed by another party of carol singers in a second cart, turned into Castle Hill Street. They joined the first party. As they all advanced, a number of stones and empty bottles fell on them, hurled from the upper storeys of two nearby shops and from the platform of the mosque. The crowd rushed forward, picked up stones and threw them at both mosque and shops. They then rushed into the mosque, pulling down its iron bars and smashing its glass window-

¹. C.O. 54/781, Despatch no. 320, Governor to Secretary of State, 31 May 1915, pp. 1-2.
panes. They also broke into the adjoining shops, where they seized boxes of grain and groceries and flung them into the street.\(^1\)

The police presence, consisting of one inspector and six constables, was unable to make itself felt. Mr. Cooray sent to the police station for reinforcements, who, on their arrival, arrested 25 men on charges of riot and house breaking. Meanwhile, there had been further signs of trouble in other parts of Kandy on the same night. An inquisitive crowd had gathered outside a Muslim shop at around 8 p.m. and a fire was started near-by. A servant boy had been reputedly thrown to his death from the upper storey of Kingswood College, Kandy. The few constables standing by near the college made no move to make an arrest, although exhorted to do so by the crowd. Claiming that the murderer was a Muslim, the crowd started looting goods from the Muslim shops and burning their booty in the middle of the road, which caused the police some alarm.\(^2\) On the outskirts of the city there was trouble too. All along the Peradeniya Road, as far as Gatembe, the streets were littered with piles of burning loot, and in Gatembe the mosque was burnt down. In Pahatha Dumbara (Lower Dumbara) and Uda Dumbara (Upper Dumbara) Muslim shops and houses

\(^1\) C.d. 8167, Governor to the Secretary of State, 31 May 1915, pp. 1-2.

were looted and burnt, reputedly by members of the Rodiya caste (an untouchable caste); but there were no casualties in these areas.¹

Troubles were also brewing outside Kandy. At about 10 o'clock on the same night, the superintendent of Kandy railway station received a message from the Government Agent at Colombo to stop the night mail at Kadugannawa, as he believed that a large crowd of Muslims were travelling from Colombo to Kandy to join forces with the Muslims of Kandy against the Buddhists. The superintendent contacted the station master at Kadugannawa, telling him to detach the carriage containing the Muslims there, while the rest of the train should be allowed to proceed. A crowd of Sinhalese, who had got wind of this move, gathered outside the station gates; but the station master had the gate shut. The police found some Muslims and gave them the option of remaining in their carriage and returning to Colombo by the next train or being marched to the police station. They chose to return to Colombo.²

Finally, on the morning of May 30th, the Inspector General of Police, H.L. Dowbiggin, arrived in Kandy by special train with a number of Panjabi soldiers; and

1. C.O. 54/782, (33884), Governor to Secretary of State, 1 July 1915.
2. C.d. 8167, Governor to Secretary of State, 29 June 1915, p. 5.
peace was gradually restored. ¹

Elsewhere, greater calm prevailed. In the North-Central and North-Eastern provinces, perhaps primarily because these were Tamil-speaking areas, there were only isolated incidents, such as attacks in Nattandiya, reputedly by a well-known local criminal called Aron Appu, who set fire to many Muslim shops and homes. ²

Rumours of Muslim attacks on Buddhist property in such places as Kadugannawa, Matale and Gampola spread quickly along the railway line. This apparently aroused Sinhalese hostility in Rambukanna, Veyangoda, Henarthgoda, Kelaniya, Angulana, Rawawatta, Ambalangoda, Galle, Matara, Negombo, Kochchikada, Nattandiya, Madampe, Minuwangoda, Divalapitiya, Kuliapitya, Kurunegala and Colombo, the capital. ³ In all these places, the local Muslims had trouble from the mobs. In Matale, too, Muslim property was damaged, although not as badly as elsewhere, and two Muslim men were found dying of knife wounds. When crowds descended on Rambukanna from Kandy and looted both shops and houses, the Muslims had recourse to gun-fire to

1. C.O. 54/782, (26639), Governor to Secretary of State, 9 June 1915.
2. C.O. 54/783, Governor to Secretary of State, 16 August 1915.
See also, Sarasavi Sandaresa, 9 June 1914; Dinamina, 9 Feb. 1915 (Sinhalese newspapers).
defend themselves. In Gampola, too, they fired on a crowd to defend the mosque. On the night of May 30th, a Buddhist mob, apparently inflamed by the address of a Buddhist priest, cried out, "Sadu" and started attacking Muslim shops. Significantly, neighbouring Sinhalese, Tamil and Chetty shops were untouched.

In the North-Western province, rioting broke out at Polgahawela on May 31st and at Alawwa on June 1st, both incited by crowds arriving from Kegalle. In the Southern province, the area from Panadura to Kalutara was also the scene of many incidents. Most of the rioters there belonged to the Karawa caste (Fisher caste). Rumours spread that Sinhalese women were being assaulted and that Viharas (Buddhist temples) were being attacked. The rioters also burnt Muslim shops and houses in the towns and villages of the area between Colombo and Matara. There, too, the culprits were reputedly the Buddhist Karawa, who were also said in one account to have slaughtered large numbers of Muslims in these areas "like so many fish".

2. "Sadu" means "Holy".
3. C.O. 54/782, Governor to Secretary of State, 16 July 1915.
5. C.d. 8167, Governor to Secretary of State, 1 June 1915.
6. Ibid.
It was in Colombo, however, that the Muslims suffered most, and the events of these days are the worst recorded incidence of violence against Muslims in the history of Sri Lanka. The city of Colombo had been the first Muslim settlement in Sri Lanka and now had a large Muslim population with a flourishing trading base. This, one historian has suggested, may have provoked jealousy on the part of the low country Sinhalese.¹

According to one of the best-known merchants of Colombo, Mr. S.L. Naina Marikar, the Colombo police took no action to deal with the violence. The mob's main objective was looting and the merchants had to take steps to defend their properties.² Mr. Marikar faced a mob of 50 Sinhalese who assembled at his gate and demanded a sum of Rs. 50 as protection money. Mr. Marikar ordered his own guard to shoot if necessary, and the crowd dispersed. His son-in-law, Mr. Macan Markar, told similar stories of intimidation and violence by mobs in the city.

2. This information was obtained from the following: Macan Markar, A.H., Short Biographical Sketches of Macan Markar and Related Families (Colombo, 1977), pp. 17-18.
3. Ibid.
At about 4 p.m. on May 31, J.G. Frazer, Government Agent for the Western province, was presiding in Colombo over a meeting of the Sanitary Board. He was called by J.H. Daniels, Superintendent of Police, and informed that Sinhalese railway fitters, regarded by colonial officials as a chronically unruly group, had clashed with Muslims near the factory yard. Daniels asked Frazer to call out the troops. Frazer obliged. While this was being done, Frazer went to the yard accompanied by several Sinhalese political figures. After this confrontation, the workers dispersed quietly.¹

The shops along Maradana Road and Skinner's Road were immediately closed. Eight men were arrested and taken for questioning to Maradana police station, followed by a crowd of Sinhalese clamouring for their release. Mr. Daniel finally ordered them to be set free. Similar incidents took place elsewhere in Colombo when Sinhalese men, arrested for arson and looting, were set free by the police apparently on the demand of the mob. Some Muslims, fearing for their safety, tried to disguise themselves by wearing Sinhalese garments. Some women and children from Wolfendhal Street, Siripa Lane, Newmoor Street, Silversmith Lane and Aluth Kade tried to take refuge in Dam Street police station. But there they were ill-treated and prevented from returning to their homes.²

1. C.d. 8167, Governor to the Secretary of State, 29 June 1915, p. 4.
On the same day, there had also been trouble in Pettah, Maradana and Borella, which the police were completely unable to control.  

F.R. Senanayake, a member of Colombo Municipal Council and a Buddhist, joined by other Sinhalese leaders, drove around Colombo attempting to calm the crowds. At the Kolonnawa Temple, he said:

We have been told that a person calling himself "Egantha Hamudurwo (our leader) has informed people that the Muslims are coming in their thousands to attack the temple.

This story had apparently preceded Senanyake's party everywhere. He firmly denied the truth of it; but it was too late. As far away as Hanwella (30 miles from Colombo), the same rumour inspired an impromptu Perehera, led by an elephant. Thousands followed it, including even a few Tamils and Burghers.

The Governor was at the King's Pavilion in Kandy when he heard, around 6 o'clock in the evening, that Buddhists in Colombo were attacking Muslims. Next morning, the Colonial Secretary, Stubbs, arrived; but the problems in Colombo were now getting out of hand. He informed the Colonial Secretary, A.E. Collins, of the situation in the most frightening terms; on June 1st looting had lasted all day long, the police were

1. C.O. 54/782, Governor to Secretary of State, 16 July 1915.
ineffectual, volunteers and the town guard all too few to cope with the constantly shifting, regrouping gangs. At 9 a.m. the troops had fired on the mobs, clearing the streets. Martial law had been declared in several Western provinces on June 2 and then in Colombo where 150 Muslims had been killed.¹

Sir Robert Chalmers, the Governor, met with leaders of the Muslim community, such as the Hon. W.M. Abdul Rahman and Sir Muhammad Macan Markar, who had toured the devastated areas in order to try to restore calm.²

The Governor rapidly concluded that martial law had to be imposed. It was necessary for several reasons: to permit the authorities to arrest and detain those denounced by Muslims as murderers or criminals; to permit the imposition of more severe sentences on such people than would be tolerated by the Civil Courts; to enable them to assess and exact the compensation due to the Muslims by methods which civil law would not permit; to bring a speedy end to the disturbances; to ensure adequate food suppliers and, as a related measure, to restore the Muslims to their role in the community; and finally to ensure punishment of the guilty.

Under martial law, the Government took the steps it

1. C.O. 54/782, R.E. Stubbs to A.E. Collins, 2 June 1915.
2. C.d. 8167, Governor to Secretary of State, 29 June 1915, pp. 1-3.
considered necessary to control the troubles. The trouble-makers were punished and summary justice was meted out to those accused of murder.¹

Early in July, the Governor in the Executive Council reviewed those cases for which capital punishment had been used under the General Courts martial. One case in particular, that of Pedris of the Washer caste, was noted: as with other cases, the Brigadier-General had not considered it necessary to consult the Government. But he had ordered the execution of the convicted man on the morning of July 7. What made this case exceptional was that the local Buddhists had offered to pay the Sri Lankan government his weight in gold for Pedris' release.²

On July 8, however, the Governor received a memorandum reflecting growing Sri Lankan indignation about these trials from two Tamil members of the Legislative Council, Sir Ponnambalam Ramanathan and K. Balasingham. This document had been signed also by James Pieris, H. Marcus Fernando and W.H. Rigby among others. The burden of the appeal was that, however restrained military men acting as judges might be, their lack of knowledge of the customs of the Sri Lankan people

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¹ C.d. 8167, Governor to Secretary of State, 8 July 1915, p. 24. See also Ceylon Morning Leader, 8 July 1915.
² C.d. 8167, Governor to Secretary of State, 8 July 1915, p. 24. See also Ceylon Morning Leader, 8 July 1915.
disqualified them as judges. They requested that a special tribunal of experienced judicial officers of the colony should supercede them in such cases.\(^1\) By 3rd November, 2,722 people had been tried, either in district courts or before special commissioners. Of these, 412 serious cases had been remitted to the general courts martial, which found 358 guilty, while acquitting 54.\(^2\) 248 sentences of penal servitude were handed down of various terms of imprisonment. Of these, 233 of the convicted were Buddhists, 7 Roman Catholics, 4 Muslims, 2 Protestants and 2 Hindus. A further 25 people were sentenced to imprisonment with hard labour; and 83 were sentenced to death, although those sentenced were later commuted to penal servitude or rigorous imprisonment. In the Western and North-Western provinces, 6 people were executed; in the Southern and Kandyan provinces, 34 were executed.\(^3\)

As for Matale, De Souza says:

In case no. 4043 in the police court at Matale, 17 villagers of Gurubella were tried for rioting and for burning two boutiques run by Muslims. Of the accused, one died while the case was pending, one was acquitted and the rest were fined heavily and sentenced to two years rigorous

\(^1\) C.d. 8167, Governor to Secretary of State, 8 July 1915, p. 24.
\(^2\) C.d. 8167, Governor to Secretary of State, 11 August 1915, p. 47.
imprisonment. On June 17th in Kandy, after the riots, nine persons were charged with treason and riotous demolition of buildings. They were all convicted and sentenced to death, and, although none of the charges involved murder or manslaughter, all nine sentences were confirmed by the Governor and duly carried out. Seven other persons charged with riotous demolition of buildings who came before the same court were all convicted and sentenced to penal servitude for life. On July 27th in Colombo 13 persons were charged with riotous demolition of buildings. All were convicted and sentenced to penal servitude for life.  

During the communal troubles, a number of leading political activists were arrested on suspicion of conspiracy and treason, including the Hon. D.S. Senanayake (later to be the first Prime Minister of Sri Lanka), his brother F.R. Senanayake (M.M.C. Colombo), D.B. Jayatillake and C.P. Dias (M.M.C. Colombo) and C.A. Hewavitarane. All of them were released subsequently on a high bail bond. But the brother of the Buddhist leader Anagarika Dharmapala, C.A. Hewavitarane, was brought to trial, found guilty of riotous activity and sentenced to penal servitude. Bitterly worded complaints about this were addressed to the British Governor of Sri Lanka. One of the charges brought against the Hon D.S. Senanayake was

2. C.O. 54/782, (29924) R.E. Stubbs to A.E. Collins, 8 June 1915.
that having rented a shop to a Muslim he tried later to drive the Muslim away. This was admitted, but its relevance to the riots was disputed. On the contrary, it was claimed that when the troubles started Senanayake's attitude toward his tenant changed, and he had now befriended him.¹

The Riots Damage Ordinance, which was not even published, outlawed the dissemination of scurrilous literature concerning Muslims and made provision for the indemnification of these Muslims who had suffered losses.²

The damage done to Muslim property was assessed as follows:

1. Western Province
   Colombo - Rs. 3,195,271.

2. The Sabaragamuwa Province
   Kegalle - Rs. 552,600

3. Central Province
   Kandy, Gampola, Matale - Rs. 536,205.

4. Southern Province - Rs. 341,021.

5. North Western Province - Rs. 152,646

The total assessment for damage to Muslim property came to Rs. 5,427,745.³ It was also estimated that the

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2. C.d. 8167, Governor to the Secretary of State, 15th June 1915.
cost of putting down the disturbances and maintaining order was approximately Rs. 1,000,000. Many of the Muslim claims for damages were reduced after enquiry. In the municipal area of Colombo, Muslims claimed damages amounting to Rs. 3,141,017.66; the sum awarded them was Rs. 916,696.83. In Moratuwa, the sum claimed was Rs. 916,696.83. The sum awarded was Rs. 428,000. A Muslim widow who claimed Rs. 59,280 was awarded Rs. 250/=.

One Muslim who claimed Rs. 6000/= was awarded Rs. 75/=; another claimed Rs. 17,287, and was awarded Rs. 2,403. Yet another, who claimed Rs. 3,254 was awarded Rs. 200/=.

In no case was the award higher than the claim. Even if it were true that the Muslim claims had been deliberately inflated in all those cases, it is striking that no Buddhist or Tamil leaders made any representations to ask for any more substantial damages for the affected Muslims.

During the outbreak of trouble in Colombo, Sir Ponnambalam Ramanathan was in India. He did not return to Sri Lanka till 9.15 a.m. on Wednesday, June 2. He then made a tour around Sea Street, Pettah, and around Kotahena. Finally he visited the premises of the Hindu Temple in Pettah. His apparent sympathy for the Muslims

3. Ibid., pp. 39-43.
surprised them. The Muslim leaders, like Messrs. S.L. Naina Marikar and O.L.M. Macan Markar had seen Ramanathan as sympathetic to the Sinhalese, not the Muslims. Yet Ramanathan had tried to act the pacifier. However, once the troubles were over, Ramanathan proved to be a critic of the Muslims of Sri Lanka.

On June 15, Sir Ponnambalam Ramanathan rose in the Legislative Council, armed with hundreds of petitions from Buddhists, to speak against the Muslim role in the riots and on behalf of the Sinhalese leaders. He demanded a Royal Commission to inquire into the communal troubles and argued fearlessly in condemnation of the excesses perpetrated by the British forces in suppressing the riots. He condemned both the Act of Indemnity, which placed the civil and military authorities beyond the reach of the law, and the Riot Damages Ordinance, which exacted collective retribution in the form of compensation levied from the Sinhalese residents of specified localities, irrespective of whether they had been implicated in the riots or not.

Finally, he asked the Council to appoint a Select Committee of the Legislative Council to investigate certain charges of grave miscarriages of justice and

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needlessly harsh repressive measures. These charges, he said, had been brought against British officials, both military and civil, and others, such as planters. None of them concerned the Sinhalese leaders. In the ensuing debate, an English resident and member of the Council, Harry Creasy, supported Ramanathan.¹

On August 11, Chalmers defended the Government in the Council. He argued that not a single man had been shot without trial in Sri Lanka, and the executions had been necessary for the maintenance of law and order. A commission of enquiry was, nevertheless, appointed, to investigate the accusations. This made much play in its report of the fact that the immediate cause of the riots was the attempt by Muslim traders in Gampola to prevent by force the passage of the Buddhist Perehera along the road of the Kahatapitiya mosque in Gampola.²

In a confidential report to the Governor in the same month, Dowbiggin, the Inspector-General of Police, provided a twist to the tale by laying the blame on the leaders of the Theosophical Society. They, he claimed, had stirred up trade rivalries between the communities.³ Some Muslims and some Chetties had become landowners in Sri Lanka. Dowbiggin saw this as exciting envy. He also

² C.d. 8167, Governor to Secretary of State, 11 Aug. 1915, p. 31.
saw the main aim of the writings of the Buddhist leader Anagarika Dharmapala as one of keeping Sinhalese tradition alive at the expense of the other communities, such as Muslims, Hindus and Christians. He, too, had used his writings to inflame the feelings of the Sinhala people against the Muslims. Dowbiggin was also convinced by a telephone conversation taped by the police that the Temperance Movement had played a part in the outbreak of the troubles.

The Temperance Movement was a powerful agent which he saw as conducting a persistent crusade against the Muslims. It had been financed by Buddhist leaders, like D.D. Pedris and N.S. Fernando.

   The Temperance Movement was started by Dr. C.A. Hewaritharane (brother of Anagarika Dharmapala). The organisation campaigned against the consumption of liquor and against westernisation and Christianisation. The organisation was at its peak in 1903-5. It drew crowds from the rural areas. Between 1911-14 members of the Sinhalese elite became leaders in the organisation, like D.S. Senanayake who had made a fortune in the plumbago industry. For further details see Gunawardena, R.D., "The Reform Movement and Political Organisations in Ceylon with Special Reference to the Temperance Movement and Regional Association 1900-1930" (Unpublished Ph.D. University of Sri Lanka, Peradeniya, 1976), pp. 14-73.
After the Governor's speech in the Legislative Council, which was partly based on Dowbiggin's confidential report, the Sinhalese community held a public demonstration. At a meeting on September 15, 1915, they demanded a Royal Commission to inquire into both the causes and the suppression of the riots. The demonstration was coordinated with the help of several leaders, like E.W. Perera, Sir Ponnambalam Ramanathan and D.B. Jayatillake, who later joined with James Peiris and others to draw up a memorandum calling for the release of a number of still-imprisoned persons and for the reduction of the severe fines. Affadavits were presented to the Government of Sri Lanka for forwarding to the Colonial Office. The memorandum made several points: firstly, that men had been shot in cold-blood, sometimes in the presence of their families; secondly, that after the riots, hundreds of men, especially in the Kelani valley and Ratnapura areas, were flogged, often on the orders of the military or volunteer officers and without preliminary investigation; thirdly, that evidence and some confessions were obtained by the police and military by means of force or intimidation; fourthly, that prominent Sinhalese gentlemen were arrested and held without charges being brought against them for weeks, only to be released later, after depositing cash and a securities bond; and fifthly, that the Punjabi soldiers - "mostly Muhammedan" - were guilty
of harsh and improper conduct.1

After the public meeting, the Christian leader Mr. E.W. Perera left for England to enlist the sympathy of the British Government. The Buddhist leader Mr. D.B. Jayatillake and the Hindu Tamil leader Sir Ponnambalam Ramanathan joined him there later. The ostensible reason for sending Ramanathan to London was to try and prevent the assent of the Secretary of State being given to the Riot Damages Bill. The Governor of Sri Lanka advised the Colonial Office to see that he was not given an interview with the Secretary of State. The Secretary of State readily agreed to that suggestion because he felt that Ramanathan was a self-advertiser and a mischief-maker.2 But D.B. Jayatillake remained in London for three years until the release of the Sinhalese who had been imprisoned by the Government of Sri Lanka.3

As a result of these élite Sinhalese representations, the attitude and policy of the senior administrators towards the Muslims changed. Previously, the principal source of trouble to the British administration had been the western-educated, middle-class, low country

1. C.d. 8167, E.W. Perera to the Secretary of State for the Colonies, 22 Oct. 1915, p. 49.
2. C.O. 54/785, Governor to the Secretary of State, 28 Oct. 1915, Minutes of Collins, 24 Nov. 1915.
Buddhists from the Karava caste, the very group who had been leading agents in the Buddhist revival and in the Temperance and the Proto-Nationalist movements. The British almost automatically assumed that the rioters must have belonged to the same groups. Later this interpretation gave way to the notion that the riots did not constitute an uprising against the Crown, but were rather a reflection of Sinhalese-Muslim communal problems.¹ The Gampola case, which came before the Privy Council in London, was settled by taking this view. An agreement was reached in 1916 that the organisers of Esala Perehara should come to an arrangement by which the times for the procession were to be so arranged as to cause no offence. Once the Gampola Perehara case was settled,² it was not difficult to allow the release of the Sinhalese leaders.³

Sir Ponnambalam Ramanathan returned to Colombo in 1918 to a hero's welcome, and was acclaimed as a leader of the Sinhala community.⁴ Soon after the troubles, the British government replaced the Governor of Sri Lanka, perhaps to appease the embittered educated educated

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leaders. The new Governor, Sir John Anderson (1916-18), even went as far as to criticise some European volunteers, who were found guilty of a number of unwarranted shootings after the disturbances were over.

2. C.O. 54/805, Governor to the Secretary of State, 26 May 1917.
ii. The Causes and Consequences of the Communal Troubles of 1915

To interpret the riots of 1915 merely as a reflection of religious tensions is to disregard a number of significant economic, social and political developments which influenced the course of events. The stress on religious differences may also obscure the important question of why the British colonial officials should have taken such drastic measures during the riots and exacted such severe reprisals long after the riots were over.

Even the exact nature of the communalism displayed in the riots is controversial. Some commentators have suggested that only coastal Moors were involved and that they were responsible for initiating the unrest.¹ This was clearly untrue. The main trouble in Kandy, for example, involved, and partially was initiated by, the Sri Lankan Muslims.² Elsewhere coastal Moors were always in a minority amongst the Muslims caught up in the troubles.³

1. Sarasavi Sandaresa, 7 April 1915 (Sinhalese newspaper). See also Sinhala Buddhaya, 18 Oct. 1915 (Sinhalese newspaper).
2. C.O. 54/781, Governor to Secretary of State, 31 May 1915.
Whatever offence Muslims gave, the attacks upon them were grossly out of proportion. The explanation for such an over-reaction can only be complex; some Sinhalese regarded the Muslims as rivals or threats. They were principally concerned not about matters of religious ideology but about commercial concerns, especially the impression which they had that they were at a disadvantage against Muslim traders. The Buddhist anti-Muslim campaign was largely sponsored by Buddhist businessmen who were commercial rivals of the Muslims and by their spokesman amongst the educated leaders.¹ The Buddhists often accused the Muslims of being overly aggressive in business.² These facts suggest that economic rivalry itself could inspire Sinhalese anti-Muslim feeling.³ The flourishing trading enterprises of some Muslims bred resentment. As the Sinhalese emerged within the business arena, Muslims who had earlier been active in trade, both inside and outside the country, came to appear as an obstacle.⁴ Another source of anti-

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2. Sarasavi Sandaresa (Sinhala newspaper - Daily Express) 6 Feb. 1915.
3. Sinhala Buddhaya (Sinhalese Buddhist) 3 June 1915 and 15 July 1922.
4. See the chapter on Muslim trade.
Muslim prejudice stemmed from the spread of racial ideas. Some writers tried to make the Muslim community out to be an alien society, primarily loyal to Muslim countries in the Middle East (countries such as Turkey, Egypt, etc.) rather than to Sri Lanka.¹

The same source may account for the claim by some commentators that the Muslims made their money by dubious means, selling foodstuffs, for example, at exorbitant prices. This allegation, it has been suggested, emerged during the period of the First World War when, as a result of the scarcity of imports, the price of commodities had soared. Muslim traders were thus obliged to increase their prices above the pre-war levels.² The Colombo municipality attempted to control this by issuing an official price-list each week to ensure that consumers might purchase necessities at a fixed price.³ Yet it is interesting (and perhaps revealing) to note that the Indian Tamil population, 80% of whom were labourers, often with salaries lower than their Sinhalese counterparts, made no complaint about the methods of Muslim traders.⁴

² Sinhala Buddhaya, (Sinhala Buddhist) 3 June 1915.
⁴ Ibid.
Religious differences, too, do seem to have played a part. During the communal unrest of 1915, many Buddhist priests became involved. They were even held by some commentators to be responsible, for example, for spreading certain rumours against the Muslims.¹ One such persistent rumour in Kandy was that the Muslims were approaching - with the intention of attacking - the Dalada Maligawa (Temple of the Tooth). Sinhalese laymen were also said to spread similar rumours, suggesting that large numbers of Muslims were about to attack buildings, Buddhist temples and Sinhalese houses.² Yet the evident fact was, on the contrary, that it was Buddhists who were responsible for attacking Muslim houses, mosques and other buildings, killing, in the process, many Muslim men, women and children.

On May 29th 1915, for example, the mosque at Gatembe, situated on the Peradeniya road in Kandy, was burned to the ground.³ Other mosques at Kachchiwatte in Galle and Kochchikade in Colombo were also attacked, reputedly by Buddhists and Catholics respectively. At Handala, Negombo and Kochchikade, it was Catholics who were

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1. *Sinhala Buddhaya*, (Sinhala Buddhist) 7 June 1915.
2. *Dinamina*, 9 June 1915
3. C.O. 54/782, Governor to Secretary of State, 1 July 1915.
reported as taking the lead in the riots.\textsuperscript{1} Even some Tamils, however, looted Muslim properties.\textsuperscript{2}

The Malay community was not attacked by the Buddhists during these troubles. Nor were the Boroah rice stores and textile shops harmed by the Sinhalese mobs.\textsuperscript{3} This seems to illustrate the fact that the focus of the troubles was not primarily religious, but was a community feud between Moors and Sinhalese.

The Inspector General of Police's confidential report to the Governor, alleging that the Temperance Movement had played a prominent role in the troubles of 1915, led to Sir Ponnambalam Ramanathan calling for Dowbiggin to be dismissed from the Service. He was accused of inefficiency in the handling of the riots. He was asked, "in the interests of good government,"\textsuperscript{4} to resign. He did not oblige.

Some historians believe that members of the Temperance Movement did not take an active part in these troubles.\textsuperscript{5} But some evidence exists to show that

\begin{itemize}
  \item \textsuperscript{1} Jayasekera, P.V.J., "Social and Political Change in Ceylon 1900-1919 with Special Reference to the Disturbances of 1915" (unpublished Ph.D. University of London, 1970) p. 293.
  \item \textsuperscript{2} Ceylon Independent, 30 June 1915.
  \item \textsuperscript{3} Ibid.
  \item \textsuperscript{4} Hansard, (Legislative Council) 24 Oct. 1917.
  \item \textsuperscript{5} Jayasekera, P.V.J., "Social and Political Change in Ceylon 1900-1919 with Special Reference to the Disturbances of 1915" (unpublished Ph.D. University of London, 1970) pp. 360-1.
\end{itemize}
Temperance Societies did actively harass Muslims in places such as Akuressa, Kumburupitya and Weligama.¹ These areas were predominantly populated by low country Sinhalese supporters of the Temperance Movement, who had even gone so far as to call upon Sinhalese traders and societies to boycott Muslim shops.²

Other historians argue that the mobs which attacked Muslim shops and houses in Colombo were drawn principally from the working class in what was a proletarian movement. Because these people were poor and the food prices in Colombo high, their hunger drove them to riot against those Muslim traders who were exploiting them.³ While the mobs may, indeed, have contained members of the working class, the bulk of the people who were held to have instigated the troubles were not. They came not from one class but several, being farmers, traders, washermen, etc.⁴

P.T.M. Fernando has accused the British government of high-handedness in suppressing the riots and has

4. Ceylon Morning Leader, 8 July 1915.
suggested that the government should have acted with greater caution. During these troubles many people were harassed and flogged, without trial or even accusation. Rumours were flying about to the effect that many were being executed without trial. But it must be allowed that the British government had few choices in trying to control the troubles. The government had no experience of such extensive communal violence and had not expected such troubles to spread throughout the country. It was forced to declare a state of emergency and severely punish people heavily involved in the unrest in an attempt to guard against further disintegration of law and order in the country.

Contrary to Fernando's view, Muslims in Colombo complained that the police there took no action to deal with the violence. But his view finds support with one relatively impartial witness, the Malay leader M.T. Akbar, who also criticised the British authorities. He felt, "the English Government backed them (Muslims) too strongly and it threw the other groups into one solid mass."

2. Ibid.
In an attempt to have Sinhalese leaders released from jail, the Christian Sinhalese leader, E.W. Perera, made use of British newspapers to call for support. He was remarkably successful. Newspapers and journals, such as The Manchester Guardian and The New Statesman, were contacted, and all wrote sympathetically about the plight of the Sinhalese people at the hands of the local government, but not about the plight of the Muslims at the hands of the Sinhalese.¹

From the evidence now available, it seems that there were several principal causes of the riots. Buddhist revivalism had been particularly strong before 1915 and Buddhist frustration at their lack of power particularly marked. 1915 was the centenary year of the Kandyan convention, which was now interpreted as giving a full guarantee of the primacy of Buddhism for the future of the whole of Sri Lanka.² Muslim claims offended such Buddhist revivalist thinking.

Secondly, the low country Sinhalese had become commercial rivals of the Muslims and wished greater control over trade in Sri Lanka.³ Thirdly, politically active western-educated Sinhalese Buddhists were aware of the need to foster community consciousness and of the

³ Ibid.
need to promote Sinhalese rights, over the rights of other groups. This the Muslims resented.\footnote{1} Fourthly, those lower and middle-class Buddhists who were followers of Dharmapala had embraced racial views which branded Muslims as aliens. They saw Muslims as threatening or destroying nativist Buddhist customs. Their main target was the promoting of liquor. But Islam too was suspect. The censorious attitude at Temperance meetings was usually directed against what they regarded as alien influences supposedly perverting their own culture.\footnote{2}

Muslims, too, were presented as "foreign". At Gampola, the signs of trouble were numerous. Articles in the vernacular press denounced Islam. Meetings were announced from which Muslims were excluded. A series of bizarre and disturbing rumours and warnings surfaced about Muslim plans to interfere with the Vesak procession.\footnote{3} All these seem to have contributed to a mood of crisis.

Lastly, Tamil Hindu leaders, like Sir Ponnambalam Ramanathan, chose for whatever reason to side wholly with the Sinhalese and to suggest that Muslims were entirely at fault. Yet even the Sinhalese leaders were

2. Ibid.
to admit, ultimately, that the Muslim community had been done a great injustice during the communal troubles. After the riots of 1915, a public meeting was held which protested against the harsh measures meted out to the Muslims by the Sinhalese. At this meeting Sir James Pieris remarked:

Just as we are met here to ask for justice to our race, we should see that justice is done to the Moors. I take it that you all agree that the greatest wrong had been done to the Moorish community. Their property has been destroyed and a great injury done to them; they must be compensated.¹

A.E. Goonesinha, one of the nationalists arrested following the riots, was also aware of this. He proposed a day of mourning for the dead, both Sinhalese and Muslims.² Even so, there were those Sinhalese who spoke unrepentently of the attacks made against the Muslims in 1915.³

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CHAPTER 7

AHMAD 'ARABI PASHA AND THE
EGYPTIAN EXILES IN SRI LANKA

i. Revolt, Trial and Exile

During the 1880s, the Muslims of Sri Lanka were brought into close contact with Ahmad 'Arabi Pasha, the Egyptian nationalist. The Muslims were then at the peak of their economic prosperity and receptive to new influences. 'Arabi was exiled along with some of his brother officers after an Egyptian Army uprising. They arrived in Sri Lanka in 1883. They had all become involved in a celebrated revolt against the government of the Khedive Ismail and his successor, Tawfiq.¹

Ismail's follies of palace building and the extravagance of his royal entertainments had plunged his country into financial difficulties. To find new funds, he began to fleece the peasants; but he also became more and more financially indebted to the British and French. Ultimately these two powers were to gain control over Egypt. Due to his unsound finances,

¹ The title of "Khedive" was changed to "Sultan" during the First World War and this was later changed to "King". See Al-Kassab, Khalil Ibrahim Mohammad, "A Comparative Study of Industrial Relations in Iraq, Egypt and Syria" (Unpublished Ph.D., Edinburgh, 1972), p. 23.
Ismail was then replaced by Tawfīq. 'Arābi Pāsha emerged into prominence at about this time. In the Egyptian Army, the highest ranks were monopolised by the Turkish officers; but the lower ranks were held by Egyptians, and the Egyptian officers resented the fact that they were required to do the more menial tasks. The discontented in the army found in the young Egyptian officer 'Arābi Pāsha an eager leader. A nationalist movement grew up around him, which made its target the government of Khedive Tawfīq.

By the time he came to Sri Lanka, 'Arābi enjoyed a wide reputation as a heroic nationalist revolutionary. He had been born in 1840 in Horiyeh, near Zagazig, in Egypt, the son of a village Sheikh and a member of a fellāhin (peasant) family with strong religious affiliations. After a short period of study at Al-Azhar in Cairo, 'Arābi was conscripted into the army at the age of 14 and rose up from the ranks. Due to the favour of Said Pāsha, he became a lieutenant at 17, captain at 18, major at 19 and lieutenant-colonel at 20. The Khedive Ismail made him a Pāsha and allowed him a wife from the Khedive's family. But 'Arābi soon espoused the cause of the oppressed Egyptian soldiery and, by standing against the policies of Tawfīq, he won widespread support. He became in Egypt a popular and powerful figure, even if only for
In 1880, 'Arabi Pasha founded hizab al-waṭani, the nationalist party, whose object was to unite the peasants and the Turkish élite in Egypt, in order to give forceful voice to their discontent at the autocratic nature of Tawfīq's rule as conducted through his lieutenant, Riaz Pasha. The slogan of this party was "Egypt for the Egyptians". In time the party became the principal opposition to Tawfīq's rule. 'Arabi Pasha made three demands of Tawfīq: firstly, that the Ministry headed by Riaz Pasha be replaced by a nationalist one; secondly, that a constituent assembly be set up; and, thirdly, that the army be increased to 18,000 men. But Cookson, the British consul in Alexandria, advised Tawfīq to take a firm stand against the army's demands.

This advice precipitated a major crisis. The Khedieve decided to arrest the army colonels instead of inquiring into their grievances. They were asked to attend his palace, Kasr al-Nile, but, on arrival, were arrested and dismissed from the Service. The soldiers of Ali Fehmi, who were guarding the palace, however, rescued the colonels and compelled the Khedieve to dismiss the War Minister and appoint Mahmood Sami

Pasha in his place. The colonels then marched back to their barracks in triumph.

The Khedive sought to recover from this reverse by attempting to send the regiments of 'Arābi Pasha and Abd-al-Aal-Hilmi out of Cairo, one to Alexandria and the other to Dimiyate. Mahmudu Sami Pasha resisted this suggestion and was dismissed. The colonels, on hearing of this, marched their regiments to the Abdion Palace, and Tawfiq once again capitulated. This time he had to agree to the elevation of Mahmudu Sami Pasha to the post of Prime Minister and of 'Arābi to that of Under Secretary at the War Office. The Egyptians seem to have welcomed these appointments. 'Arābi was then popularly referred to as "al-Wahid", the only one, and "al-Misri", the Egyptian. Within two days, Sherif Pasha came to the conclusion that these nationalists enjoyed considerable support, and he felt obliged to appoint Mahmudu Sami Pasha Prime Minister and 'Arābi Minister of War.

At this point, Britain became involved in 'Arābi's fate. The deposed Khedive Ismail was planning a counter revolution from Naples. Rumours of a coup spread, so that 'Arābi and his friends became afraid of assassination. It was rumoured that 19 officers were planning to murder 'Arābi. They were seized and court martialled, allowed no defence, and exiled to the Sudan. But in July 1882, attacks on foreigners suspected of supporting Ismail grew steadily more severe, and a mob in Alexandria set
fire to the city. The French fleet felt compelled to leave Port Said. Public opinion in England was now roused.

Sir Garnet Wolseley was sent to Egypt to halt the unrest and violence. He occupied the Suez Canal zone. 'Arābī and his associates tried to organise themselves to meet the challenge. Other officers were deployed. Abd-al-Aal-Hilmi was kept at Dimyūt. Allī Fahmi was sent to the Canal zone and Mahmudu Fēmī went to Tel-al-Kabir to complete the lines there. But before long Allī Fēmī was contained and Mahmudu Sami captured and made prisoner by a small party of British soldiers. 'Arābī Pāsha was without support and, within forty minutes of desultory fighting, his forces were rounded up by the British. 'Arābī himself took refuge in flight. By then a thousand Egyptians were believed to have been killed and wounded. The British gradually brought the riots in Alexandria under control. Soon afterwards, 'Arābī was taken prisoner and handed over to the British Commander, Drury Lowe, in Cairo.¹

Wilfrid Scawen Blunt and his wife, a grand-daughter of Lord Byron, were in Egypt during this period. They

¹ For a detailed account, see Blunt, Wilfrid Scawen, Secret History of the English Occupation of Egypt, (Lond. 1895), pp. 20-417; see also, Afaf Lutfi al-Sayyid, Egypt and Cromer (A Study in Anglo-Egyptian Relations), (Lond., 1968), pp. 1-22.
were attracted to the study of Egyptian affairs and knew Arabic. When 'Arabi-Pasha became powerful, Blunt became his guide, philosopher and friend.¹

He now endeavoured to help 'Arabi by rousing public opinion in England to support him, through the press and through his powerful political contacts. Many British politicians clearly admired 'Arabi Pasha, whom they considered a nationalist leader, and were concerned about his health and safety.

For example, in the British Parliament, Lord Randolph Churchill asked the Prime Minister whether 'Arabi's life was safe,² and Sir Wilfred Lawson asked the Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs whether there was any truth in the story that 'Arabi and the prisoners had been tortured.³ Torture had, it was claimed, been inflicted on Mahmudu Fehmi, the Engineer-General, and the thumb screw and kurbush had been reputedly freely used.⁴ Sir Charles Dilke, Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, replied that Sir Charles Wilson, his representative, had visited the Egyptian prisoners often and had reported that there

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3. Ibid.
was no truth in these allegations. Wilson's visits, so the government claimed, would ensure the prisoners' future safety and keep them free from torture. ¹

Other questions were addressed to the Prime Minister. He was asked whether the government would bear the expense of the defence of the Egyptian officers or whether, as was rumoured, Wilfrid Scawen Blunt was to meet these costs. This claim was based on a letter written by Blunt to the London Times. ² Gladstone, the Prime Minister, replied that such expenses could not be met from public funds. ³

The Egyptian government had decided to charge 'Arābi and his associates under three counts: firstly, that of pillaging and burning the city of Alexandria; secondly, turning the Egyptian Army against the Khedive; and thirdly, inciting the people to civil war. ⁴

To support these charges the prosecution proposed to call 140 witnesses. 'Arābi Pāsha in turn contemplated calling 400 for his defence. To meet the enormous expense of what was likely to be a protracted trial, a public fund, called the 'Arābi fund, was floated in

Britain. Eminent figures, like Lord Randolph Churchill, General C.E. Gordon and Sir William Gregory made generous contributions, but the fund did not swell up as expected.¹

This compelled Blunt and his Egyptian friends to try a different tack. ‘Arābi and the leading prisoners offered to plead guilty to the main charge of rebellion if they were allowed clemency.² Mahmud Fehmi, Yacoub Sami, Toulba Ismath, Abd-al-Aal-Hilmi and Ahmad Abd-al-Ghaffar all then pleaded guilty, were formally sentenced to death and then had their sentences commuted to exile. (It is interesting to note that Queen Victoria was one of those then in favour of hanging ‘Arābi Pāsha and his friends. She felt that ‘Arābi was no more than a common rebel against the Khedieve.³) Various countries were suggested as suitable places of exile for ‘Arābi and his fellow conspirators, such as Cape Colony, Bermuda, one of the West Indian islands and Fiji.⁴ Queen Victoria objected to sending ‘Arābi to Cape Colony because of

2. Ibid., p. 471.
political unrest there. Finally, the British government agreed to send him and his co-conspirators to Sri Lanka.¹

Soon after the decision was reached, 'Arabi and his companions were required to make the following declaration on oath:

We, the undersigned swear by Allah, Who gave the Qur'ān, and by our personal word of honour, that we will agree to go to the place which the Government should designate for us, and to stay there. ²

The Egyptian government agreed to the decision to send 'Arabi and the other political prisoners into exile, but in 'Arabi's case they insisted that he must forfeit his property. As some compensation for this, they also agreed that they would provide a maintenance allowance for his women and children.³

Why Sri Lanka should have been chosen as the place of exile is not known. Obviously it was of importance that it was situated some distance away from Egypt. The rebels would not easily be able to communicate with Egypt, and so 'Arabi Pasha would find it hard to start another revolution from there. It is possible that a second reason may have been that in Sri Lanka Muslims formed only a minority community and were loyal to the

¹. C.O. 30/29/141, Ponsonby to Granville, 22 Nov. 1882.
². S.L.N.A., No. 4/158, Secretary of State to the Governor, despatch no. 32, 17 Jan. 1883. Translated from Arabic by the author.
³. C.O. 78/3856, Dufferin to Granville, 19 Nov. 1882.
British. 'Arabi would not be likely to find enough support there for a revolt against the British government. A third reason for sending the exiles to Sri Lanka may have been its reputation as a peaceful country, politically quiet since 1848, and it was unlikely that the exiles would be able to provoke any general political unrest there. The inhabitants of the country chiefly spoke Sinhalese, while 'Arabi could speak only Arabic and therefore would not be able to communicate easily with them. One positive reason may also have been influential. Sri Lanka was, of course, well known to Muslims, for whom Adam's Peak was regarded as a sacred mountain. According to the legend, when Adam was cast out from Paradise, he placed one foot on the mountain and the other foot on the sea. Perhaps this association made it seem a suitable place of exile for a Muslim nationalist.1

ii. The Life of 'Arabi Pasha and the Egyptian Exiles in Sri Lanka

All the exiles and their families, with the exception of Abd-al-Ghaffar and his family, left Suez on 27th December, 1882 in the specially chartered ship S.S. Mariotis. They were put under the charge of Maurice Bey, an Englishman in the service of the Khedieve.

He was assisted by Salimattalah, a Syrian. Two of the exiled officers, Abd-al-Aal and Toulba, were not accompanied by their families. 'Arabi Pasha's first wife, a friend of Lady Gregory, also remained behind, as she was expecting a child. The Secretary of State informed the Governor of Sri Lanka, Sir James R. Longden, by telegram:

Twenty seventh December - Egyptian Exiles proceed Colombo. Provide temporary quarters and funds avoiding unnecessary expense. Will ultimately choose residence in the island. Eight chiefs, seventeen male children, nineteen wives and female children. Total fifty-eight. Despatch follows. 1

This was followed by another telegram which indicated that only 7 chiefs and a grand total of 54 were coming. Ghaffar and his family made up the difference. 2

The arrival in Sri Lanka of these distinguished Muslims, nationalists, patriots, revolutionaries, inevitably became an event of popular interest and was to have long-term effects on the local Muslim community. It was clear from the outset that the colonial government treated the exiles as people of some importance and were cautious in their dealing with them. On 3rd January, 1883, the Ceylon Times reported that Lake House, the property of the business firm Loos and Van Cuylenberg, had been engaged by the

1. S.L.N.A., no. 4/157, Secretary of State to the Governor, despatch no. 28, 28 Dec. 1882.
2. S.L.N.A., no. 4/157, Secretary of State to the Governor, despatch no. 35, 30 Dec. 1882.
government for 'Arabi Pasha.\(^1\) Next day it reported that a telegram had been received asking the government to provide quarters for 'Arabi Pasha and his seven companions and that Messrs. Venn and Company had engaged Lake House, Haarlem House, Braybrooke Lodge, Struan House and probably The Priory for their accommodation. All these were large houses in the city of Colombo.\(^2\)

The Ceylon Times seems to have obtained this information even before the Government Agent of the Western Province (Mr. F.R. Saunders), under whose authority they came. On 4th January, Mr. Saunders inquired from the Colonial Secretary whether the information given by the newspapers was correct. Several people who had houses to sell had made inquiries from him. He recommended to the government two particular houses and added that there were others available too. The Savings Bank had a large house, the Whist Bungalow, with extensive grounds, which the trustees would be glad to let and which would be a most suitable residence for a large party. Not far from it was another house, belonging to the estate of the late Mr. Daniels, which had been offered. The house contained 14 bedrooms and had 20 to 30 acres of

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land attached to it.¹

Mr. F.R. Saunders felt that the choice of a residence should be made with care. He suggested - obviously with security in mind - that the exiles must "desire retirement and seclusion," rather than seek "the most fashionable and conspicuous parts which I have heard mentioned."² But he was over-ruled. The Governor asked the Colonial Secretary to inform Saunders that it was considered undesirable to place these exiles in seclusion, and that Lake House, Haarlem House, Struan House and Braybrooke Lodge had been selected. Ultimately, however, the exiles, were, like any other refugees, to be allowed to choose their own residences in the island.³

On 10th January 1883, the chartered ship, S.S. Mariotis, anchored in Colombo Harbour. The Master Attendant (Captain Donnan) and Port Surgeon (Dr. Garvin) boarded the vessel. The Lieutenant Governor, Sir John Douglas, and the Clerk of the Executive Council, G.T.M. O'Brien, followed them aboard, and it was agreed that the exiles would come ashore the next day.⁴ The excitement which their arrival occasioned was very

¹ S.L.N.A., no. 6/6566, letter of Government Agent, Western Province to the Colonial Secretary dated 4 Jan. 1883.
² Ibid.
³ Ibid.
⁴ S.L.N.A. no. 5/213, Governor to Secretary of State, despatch no. 42, 13 Jan. 1883.
widely reported. On 11th January, the local Muslim community gathered in large numbers on both sides of the road from the harbour to the barracks, a distance of nearly a quarter of a mile. At this date, there were supposedly 97,775 Muslims in the island, 32,208 of whom lived in Colombo, and a considerable number must have turned out on this occasion.¹

According to government orders, the exiles were ultimately allowed to reside in any part of the island except the Northern and Eastern Provinces. The restriction did not apply to the wives, children and dependants of the exiles, who could travel as they pleased, within and outside Sri Lanka. The exiles were to be under police surveillance, coming directly under the Inspector-General of Police, and it seems that the remoteness of the Northern and Eastern Provinces was seen as preventing effective supervision. Hence the limits on their travel within the country.²

After their initial enthusiastic reception, the exiles attracted attention wherever they went and whatever they did. On Friday, 12 January, 1883, ‘Arābi paid his first visit to the Maradana Mosque in Colombo.³ On this occasion the local Muslims followed him in a procession. In April, too, some Muslims went in a

1. S.L.N.A., no. 5/213, Governor to Secretary of State, despatch no. 42, 13 Jan. 1883.
2. S.L.N.A., no. 6/8856, letter of the Inspector General of Police to the Colonial Secretary, 19 May, 1890.
procession to Lake House to call on him. This type of attention was paid not only to 'Arabi but to the others also. The government thought that this sort of enthusiasm would go after a short time. They claimed to see the attraction wearing off and hoped there would soon be an end to it.

In the Police Administration Report of 1883, it was observed:

The advent of Ahmad 'Arabi and other Egyptian exiles to our shores was the cause of some excitement among the native population, prior to and after their arrival and particularly on the day of landing. The novelty, however, soon wore off and the exiles now move about attracting scarcely any attention.

This may have been partly true regarding the local interest in them; but 'Arabi continued to hold a special attraction for visitors to the city. He was on one occasion likened to the Uplands Tortoise. This tortoise was a very large one of unknown age, living in the uplands of Mutuwal. All those who called at Colombo supposedly endeavoured to see both.

Shortly after their arrival, the Governor, Sir James Longden, interviewed the exiles at Queen's House in Colombo. His object was to become personally

1. Ceylon Times, 16 April 1883.
2. Ibid.
acquainted with them and to learn if they desired to remain permanently in Colombo or instead preferred to remove into the interior. The possibility of the exiles shifting to Kandy, the interior capital, may have been under consideration by the government. At the interviews, 'Arabi Pāsha acted as spokesman for the others. He asked for two further houses, one for Abd-al-Aal-Hilmi Pāsha and the other one for Toulba Ismath Pāsha, who were both staying with him at Lake House. He also requested an English education for his children, and the attention of an English doctor for his family, and he complained of the inadequacy of their allowances. Immediate steps were taken to meet most of these requests. Houses were soon found, for example, for both Abd-al-Aal-Hilmi and Toulba Ismath Pāsha. In the meantime, there were many sympathisers in England who kept up the pressure on the government. They asked particularly what the status of the exiles was in Sri Lanka. Mr. Labouchere, the Member of Parliament for Northampton, broached this subject. Lord Edmund Fitmaurice answered:

'Arabi Pāsha is not retained as a prisoner, but remains in Ceylon in accordance with

1. S.L.N.A., no. 4/158, Governor to the Secretary of State, despatch no. 41, 30 Jan. 1883.
2. S.L.N.A., no. 4/158, Governor to the Secretary of State, despatch no. 67, 21 Feb. 1883.
a solemn undertaking in writing, which was signed by himself and witnessed by his European Counsel, to the effect that he would remove to any locality indicated by the Egyptian government and remain there until invited to change his abode. 1

This clearly applied to the others as well, for they all gave this undertaking on oath and signed the declaration.

When 'Arabi Pasha arrived in the island he had with him one son and one wife, a girl of 17 years. His first wife, the friend of Lady Gregory, had of course, stayed behind. 2 Soon after his arrival, 'Arabi endeavoured to get his first wife to join him, but she did not want to leave Egypt. The position with regard to her right to join her husband was made clear in November, 1883 by Evelyn Baring:

The Egyptian Government say that they certainly have no objection to this arrangement being carried out, but that Madam 'Arabi Pasha has stated that she has no wish to leave Egypt. 3

She apparently did not change her mind, for the four wives who ultimately returned with 'Arabi to Egypt were said to be "Kaffir" (i.e. Bedouin Arab) women. But there is no certainty on this point. The wives and children, of course, possessed the freedom to move from Egypt to

2. The Ceylon Patriot, Jan. 1883.
3. S.L.N.A., no. 4/162, Secretary of State to the Governor, despatch no. 14, 20 Nov. 1883.
Sri Lanka and back again, and their movements are not easy to trace.  

Since there were no places in suitable English boarding schools available, the government decided to allow the sons of the exiles to occupy vacant places in the government's normal school, whose principal was Mr. Hill. They were allowed these places "free of rent for the time being." The boys came under the care of one Mr. James. Two sons of Abd-al-Aal-Hilmi attended Girton School, Maradana, in Colombo. The girls attended English Christian schools. Later, when they moved to Kandy, the sons of 'Arabi Pasha and Toulba Ismath attended Kingswood College, Kandy. It was perhaps through these arrangements that 'Arabi came to recognise the paucity of modern educational provision for Muslims in Sri Lanka.

The Governor of Sri Lanka, Sir James Longden, took a personal interest in the reception, accommodation and well-being of the exiles. In February, 1883, the Secretary of State asked him to allow the General officer commanding His Majesty's troops in Sri Lanka to obtain any useful military information which the exiles

1. S.L.N.A., no. 4/157, Secretary of State to the Governor, despatch no. 142, 28 Dec. 1887.
2. S.L.N.A., no. 6/6668, letter of Acting Director of Public Instruction to the Colonial Secretary, 21 Feb. 1883.
3. S.L.N.A., no. 4/158, Secretary of State to the Governor, despatch no. 67, 21 Feb. 1883.
might possess regarding the Egyptian War. The Governor thought this a valuable suggestion.¹ He was also willing to devote attention to the exiles' medical needs, placing them under the care of a European physician, Dr. White.²

iii. The Increase in the Exiles' Allowances

With regard to the complaint of the exiles that their allowances were inadequate, however, no immediate response was given. They remained dependent upon the first allowances of the Egyptian government, which had arranged with the Imperial Ottoman Bank of Alexandria to pay each exile a sum of £30-15s.-4d. per month.³

The Egyptian government took some time to settle the problems regarding the property owned by the exiles and the property jointly owned by them and their wives. Until this was settled, a fair and final distribution of any increase among them was not possible. But on the recommendation of the Governor, Sir James Longden, an interim increase was eventually made.⁴

¹. S.L.N.A., no. 4/158, Secretary of State to the Governor, despatch no. 67, 21 Feb. 1883.
². S.L.N.A., no. 6/6668, letter of Acting Director of Public Instruction to the Colonial Secretary, 20 Feb. 1883.
³. Ibid.
⁴. S.L.N.A., no. 4/158, Governor to the Secretary of State, despatch no. 69, 21 Feb. 1883.
In 1883 the proposed increase in ‘Arabi Pasha’s allowance came up for discussion in Parliament.

Labouchere, the Member of Parliament for Northampton, raised the question. Sir Edmund Fitzmaurice answered that the Egyptian government, with great liberality, had granted an increase of £500 per year, to be distributed among the exiles according to their needs and a further sum of £20 per month for the maintenance of ‘Arabi who was the poorest.\(^1\)

Parliamentary agitation clearly helped to bring results.

Meanwhile further claims were made by Ali Fehmi, Yacoub Sami, and Mahmudu Sami and were sent to the Secretary of State by the Governor with his own observations upon them.\(^2\) This necessitated yet another careful examination to ascertain whether their allowances were sufficient. While this was going on, writs were being served upon them by the Egyptian government concerning their property interests in Egypt. This added to their discomfort and made the rapid settlement of their financial affairs imperative. In Britain the memoranda of the three exiles were therefore carefully scrutinised.\(^3\)

Ali Fehmi’s memorandum reached the Prime Minister along with the comments of Lady Augusta Gregory, the

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2. S.L.N.A., no. 4/165, Governor to the Secretary of State, despatch no. 385, 19 Dec. 1884.
3. Ibid.
wife of Sir William Gregory, who had earlier been Governor of Sri Lanka (1872-77). Of Madam Ali Fehmi, Lady Gregory stated:

This poor woman was of good family and position in Egypt, has been a devoted wife and brought up her children carefully and well (I speak from personal knowledge). It is heart-breaking to her to see her husband and children in absolute poverty and she must indeed be driven to despair when she thinks of leaving them and going away alone in broken health to relieve them of the burden of her support. 1

Madam Ali Fehmi's description of her own plight is even more touching:

I have parted with everything I had, selling my things under their value, till now I possess nothing whatever by which to support life. I am reduced with my children to remain within doors, not having proper clothes for myself and my children whom you saw at Cairo. 2

The Governor confirmed this:

She has been compelled to dispose of much of her trinkets and she and her daughter cannot leave their homes because they have no suitable dresses in which to appear. 3

According to Madam Ali Fehmi, £30 was not sufficient to maintain the 14 persons of her household for more than 30 days.

1. S.L.N.A., no. 4/165, Governor to the Secretary of State, despatch no. 383, 19 Dec. 1884.
2. S.L.N.A., no. 4/166, Governor to the Secretary of State, despatch no. 39, 28 Jan. 1885.
3. Ibid.
Sir William Gregory, assisted by the Inspector-General of Police, made a particular study of the contents of the memoranda. Gregory, who had seen the inside of Ali Fahmi's house, observed that "it was absolutely destitute of furniture." 1

The contents of Yacoub Sami's memorandum puzzled the Secretary of State, and clarification of certain points became necessary:

I am to observe that Lord Granville is not able to judge whether £10 per month may be considered a proper house rent to pay in Ceylon for a person in his position, but his Lordship does not think that a horse and carriage, a gardener, and a watchman, which are items in the exile's expenditure, as described by himself, can be looked upon as reasonable requirements for one representing himself to be without private income. 2

Sir William Gregory pointed out that Yacoub Sami was not living in luxury and that he needed a watchman and a gardener and had to pay a house rent of £10 per month. In the case of Mahmudu Sami, it was established that his wife had a private income of about £300 per year. He, at least, was not considered to be in difficulties.

After studying their cases, the Inspector-General sounded distinctly sympathetic:

They live very quietly and inexpensively in much the style in which a lieutenant-

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1. S.L.N.A., no. 4/166, Governor to the Secretary of State, despatch no. 39, 28 Jan. 1885.
2. S.L.N.A., no. 4/162, Governor to the Secretary of State, despatch no. 274, 14 Jan. 1884.
colonel commanding an English Regiment would live there. If this is considered a suitable style for those who are ex-pāshas and ministers and before were colonels, at the lowest, then their incomes are hardly sufficient, and those of six of them might be increased from Rs. 4,000/= to Rs. 5,000/= per annum, ‘Arābi's left at Rs. 6,000/= as at present. 1

Owing to the difficulties of assessing the real value of the property held by the exiles and their wives, and since the property possessed by some of the exiles' wives was only expressed in land, of which the annual value was not known, the Egyptian government found it hard to make its final decision. Eventually it decided to treat each exile as being equally devoid of private means unless it could be proved that this was not so. 2 Accordingly, ‘Arābi Pāsha's allowance was raised by £19-4s.-8d. a month and the allowances of the others by £7-4s.-8d. On the instructions of the Imperial Ottoman Bank, the Chartered Mercantile Bank of India paid these increases from 31st March, 1886. When Labouchere raised this in Parliament in 1886, Bryce, the Under Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, replied that all the exiles now received £435 a year, except ‘Arābi Pāsha, who received £600 a year. 3

The British authorities suspected that there was some opposition to the more generous treatment of 'Arabi:

I am disposed to agree with the Inspector-General and to believe that there is a strong feeling of dissatisfaction among the others at Arabi being pensioned more liberally,

was Bryce's view, especially as 'Arabi did not share any of his increase with the others.¹

Since the exiles were precluded from earning a living in Sri Lanka, the allowances meant much to them, strangers, as they also were, in a foreign land. Their style of living, the size and standard of the houses they rented and their establishments, all depended on this. They felt it necessary to maintain a certain position among their co-religionists and obviously wished to be free from monetary embarrassments. At first they had to depend entirely on these allowances. Later they became better off when their wives' wealth became available to them.²

If forced to be careful, they were not exactly poor. The allowances they received, Rs. 6,000/= for 'Arabi and Rs. 4,350/= each for the others, compared favourably with the salaries of the Sri Lankan public servants of standing. Their allowances brought them in line with an army colonel, whose salary was Rs. 5,400/=,

¹. S.L.N.A., no. 4/275, Secretary of State to the Governor, despatch no. 245, 17 August 1884.
². Ibid.
a chief surveyor, Rs.5,000/=, a factory engineer, Rs.5,000/= a Crown Counsel, Rs.4,000/=, a lieutenant colonel, Rs.4,800/= and a cadet in the Civil Service, Rs.3,750/=.

After Abd-al-Aal Fehmi's death, the exiles asked to be allowed to share his allowance. The Egyptian government, however, having raised their allowance once, decided not to make any more increases, and, in 1892, the Governor was informed by the Secretary of State that Her Majesty's government was not prepared to press the government of Egypt to depart from its decision, nor itself to increase the allowances. After this, no further appeals for increases of allowances were made.

iv. Foreign and Local Visitors

In Sri Lanka, ‘Arabi Pasha was subject to frequent intrusions on his privacy, not always of a pleasant nature. Prominent personages as well as ordinary mortals dropped in to see him. ‘Arabi endeavoured to meet all who called. Among the early callers were the Russian Count, Boutourlini, who came with Lord Gifford to interview him. As more and more people called on him, it was observed:

2. S.L.N.A., no. 4/275, Secretary of State to the Governor, despatch no. 15, 21 Jan. 1892.
All the distinguished personages that call here will no doubt look upon Arabi as a local sight that ought to be seen, but we shall not be surprised if after a little while Arabi was not at home to his numerous callers. ¹

But 'Arabi Pasha continued to see his visitors. In 1884, the Australian touring cricketers, led by W.L. Murdock, made a point of calling upon him.

The visitors were often gracious and were kindly received. In August 1890, Dr. F. Idrisawa brought for 'Arabi a book, written by Tokai Saasosi bearing the title, "The Memoir of Arābi". Caroline Corner, who wrote an account of her visit to Sri Lanka, recorded that she saw 'Arabi, "seated on his prayer carpet, with the Holy Qur’an his inseparable companion by his side." ³

Mr. C.H.Z. Fernando, a local political figure, also recorded a visit he had made, when he was only 6 years of age. 'Arabi Pasha made him sit in front of him and spoke to him of the love one should have for one’s country.⁴ Incidents of this kind suggest that the exiles were widely respected and, though Muslims, were regarded with affection even by local Buddhists, Hindus and Christians. Their presence must undoubtedly have raised the consciousness of the local Muslim community and increased its sense of solidarity.

2. Ceylon Times, 10 April 1884.
Mr. C.H.Z. Fernando was also a member of the Legislative Council. See, C.B.B., 1930 (Colombo, 1931), p. D.1.
The exiles took advantage of all the opportunities to impress which came their way. One early example of their active participation in a public function was the reception they gave to the Blunts, who came especially to see them. Wilfrid Scawen Blunt and his wife arrived in the island, aboard the S.S. Goorkha, in October, 1883. The exiles, their co-religionists and other well-wishers gathered at Colombo harbour and accorded the Blunts a most cordial welcome. Welcome speeches were made by two lawyers, Messrs. Siddi Lebbe and Fidelis Perera. The Blunts were then taken in a procession to their bungalow. Thirty carriages took part in the drive. Seventy guests sat for breakfast that morning. On 9th November, the Blunts were given a dinner at Lake House. Places were laid for 120 guests, and the catering was done by the Metropolitan Hotel, "in a manner becoming to Muslims." Lake House was at its most splendid. The garden surroundings were illuminated and decorated, and the police band played music. This was followed a few days later by a breakfast party at the residence of Mr. M.S.J. Akbar at Kew Gardens, Slave Island, Colombo.¹

These kindnesses to visitors were not entirely altruistic. For all the note of sustained gratitude and celebration which accompanied their visit, in the

¹ Ceylon Times, 19 Dec. 1883.
month or so which the Blunts spent in Sri Lanka they were given every opportunity to see for themselves the type of life which the exiles led, and what they had to contend with. In fact, the exiles seldom missed an opportunity to place their case before the eyes of influential members of the British community.

It is clear that the exiles always yearned to get back to Egypt. They made use of every opportunity they got to effect their release. They made it a point to meet important visitors to the island, acquaint them of their unhappiness and ask them to use their good offices. As a result, questions were regularly raised in the British Parliament regarding their release. In 1885, Justin Hently McCarthy asked whether, in view of the prevailing situation in Egypt, 'Arabî Pâsha could be recalled. Gladstone, the Prime Minister, replied that Her Majesty's Government could not accept the suggestion.¹

Again, in 1886, Labouchere asked the Under Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, "Whether he will use his good offices to bring the exile of these gentlemen from their native country to a speedy close."² The Under Secretary, Bryce, replied:

Considering the causes which led to the deportation of these exiles and the consequences which might follow their

return to Egypt, Her Majesty's government can hold out no hope that they will use their good offices in the way suggested. 1

v. The Exiles' Petitions to the British Government

In 1887, 'Arabi Pasha, Ali Fehmi and Yacoub Sami publicly demonstrated their loyalty to the British by participating in Queen Victoria's Jubilee celebrations held in Colombo. With others, they marched past the Governor's pavilion. This procession gained much publicity in England. A report in one Sri Lanka paper says:

A jubilee procession being formed to pass before the Governor, armed troops marched by, after which Messrs. Arabi, Yacoub Sami, Ali Fehmi stepped out and in a sad and solemn manner walked past the Pavilion. 2

This matter was also brought up in the British Parliament by Pickersgill, the Member of Parliament for Bethnal Green, who asked the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs whether his attention had been drawn to this procession and whether there was any truth in the reports. He also asked whether 'Arabi and his friends had formed part of the procession as captives of war or as subjects of the Queen. Sir Henry Holland, the Secretary of State, answered that the troops did not

2. Ceylon Times, 27 June 1887.
form any part of the Muslim procession. About 2000 school children and members of the Muslim community, including the exiles, had participated, but entirely voluntarily. These three exiles had presented an address to the Governor to be sent to the Queen. This contained expressions of loyalty, of congratulations and also of gratitude for the gracious treatment accorded to them in Sri Lanka.¹

The exiles never gave up sending petitions to the British government requesting their release. In 1888 a petition was sent to the Queen and forwarded to the Consul-General in Egypt, but no reply was received. The Secretary of State indicated to the Governor of Sri Lanka the attitude of the Egyptian government:

But it is scarcely to be expected that the Egyptian Government will be favourable to the release of those persons whose presence in Egypt they would regard as a danger to public tranquility, and Lord Salisbury does not think that it would be either right or politic to press them to permit it against their judgement. ²

In 1889 the matter of the exiles' health came up in Parliament. William Redmond, Member of Parliament for Fermanagh, asked the Under Secretary of State whether 'Arābi Pāsha had complained that the climate of Sri Lanka was injurious to him and whether because of this he wanted a transfer to another country.³ Sir James Ferguson

². S.L.N.A., no. 4/261, Secretary of State to the Governor, no. 282, 7 Sept. 1888.
replied that no such complaint had been received. In 1890, the matter came up again. Labouchere asked the Under Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs whether a memorandum and medical certificates had been received from the exiles, to show that their health had been severely affected by the dampness of the climate. The Under Secretary of State, Sir James Ferguson, admitted that such a request had been received, but he stated that it had not yet been studied. However, an order had been sent to the Colonial Secretary in Sri Lanka to have the exiles examined by a Medical Board.¹

vi. Changes in Residence

In the meantime, in Sri Lanka, and presumably to cut down on their expenses, the exiles had moved out from their original residences to places quieter and cheaper within Colombo and beyond. In May, 1883, ‘Arābi Pāsha shifted from Lake House to a house in 2nd division Maradana. From here he moved to Bellevue in Mutwal, to a house owned by E.B. Creasey. He was hoping to get occupation of the Whist Bungalow, recently renovated by the Savings Bank. Finally he occupied Elizabeth

House, in Horton Place, Cinnamon Gardens, and continued there till he moved to Kandy in 1892. ¹

Abd-al-Aal-Hilmi moved from Lake House to the Retreat, and from there to Braemar House, ² where he lived till his death in 1891. Mahmudu Fehmi moved out to Struan House, and then to the Retreat at Matakuliya, a house belonging to Mr. Daniels. From there he moved to St. Helen's, Cotta Road, Borella. Mahmudu Samî went to reside in Kandy. Very soon, others followed him. Mahmudu Fehmi, however, stuck on at St. Helen's, Cotta Road, Borella. This was probably because it was more convenient for him as his son attended the Medical College, closeby. The father-in-law of Mahmudu Samî, Yacoub Samî, joined him and also occupied a house in Tricomalee Street. From there he moved to a house in Halloluwa. In 1893, 'Arabi Pasha came to reside in Kandy, where he moved into Hermitage House. Toulba Ismath occupied a house in Tricomalee Street, while Ali Fehmi occupied a house in Upper Lake Road, both in Kandy. ³ Kandy has a milder climate than Colombo, so health as well as expense could have suggested these removals.

2. Now the private residence of the President of Sri Lanka, J.R. Jayewardena, Ward Place, Colombo, 7.
vii. The Health of the Exiles

Although issues regarding the health of the exiles were raised in the British Parliament as early as 1890, a Medical Board in Sri Lanka was appointed only in 1899. The Medical Board was composed of Dr. W.K. Kynsey (Civil Medical Officer), Brigadier Surgeon W.C. Robinson (Senior Army Medical Officer) and Dr. John D. MacDonald, Medical Superintendent, General Hospital, Colombo. Dr. Kynsey was President of the Board.¹

Dr. W. Grace Dort, who treated ‘Arābi Pāsha, reported:

I consider the climate of Ceylon with its diurnal variations of temperature, its frequent changes of weather, its excessive humidity, occasional malaria laden winds, has had a most trying, a most exhausting, and enervating influence on the family.²

Dr. C.W. Vangezil's report on Toulba Ismath stated:

I am of the opinion that the climate of Ceylon is too damp for him to reside in permanently.³

On Abd-al-Aal-Hilmi, had reported:

I am of opinion that the climate of Ceylon

1. S.L.N.A., no. 4/315, Governor to the Secretary of State, despatch no. 6, 13 Mar. 1899.
3. Ibid.
does not agree with him and that the humidity of the atmosphere (which is a marked feature of the climate in Ceylon) is to blame for the attacks of illness.

Philips Britto, a registered medical practitioner, reported thus on Ali Fehmi:

It would appear to me that this humid climate of Ceylon is not conducive towards the health of persons who have been born and bred in a dry climate like that of Egypt.

The Board, however, did not recommend that the exiles be moved to another country, because of the cost to the government. Therefore, in spite of the medical reports, their official conclusion was that the climate of Sri Lanka had had no serious adverse effects on the health of the exiles, except for Toulba Ismath. The Secretary of State directed the Governor to inform the exiles, except Toulba, that they were in good health and that "any change of air that any of them may require can be obtained in Sri Lanka itself."

However, during the exiles' stay in Sri Lanka, two of them were in fact to die. Abd-al-Aal-Hilmi died on March 19, 1891. It was established that death was due to apoplexy. He was followed to the grave by Mahmudu Fehmi in 1894. It was officially held that this death

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2. Ibid.
3. Ibid.
4. S.L.N.A., no. 4/315, Secretary of State to the Governor, despatch no. 6, 18 Aug. 1899.
was due to "natural causes" and that it was in no way accelerated by the climate of Sri Lanka. ¹

viii. Pardons for the Exiles

The wives and children of the exiles also sent petitions asking for their release. Dilronba, the wife, and Gariba, a child, of Yacoub Sami addressed a memorandum to Queen Victoria. So did Inifer, the wife of Ali Fuad, the son of Toulba Ismath, Mahmudu Sami's wife, Amina, and his children, Coumeria, Fatima, Zainab and Mushira also petitioned the Queen. They appealed to her maternal instincts. They said, among other things, that children of the Egyptian exiles had married since the exiles had been banished to Sri Lanka and that their children had now married, and the exiles had never seen their grandchildren. The memorialists felt assured that "Your Majesty as mother and grandmother will be able to enter into and sympathise with their feelings."² In 1899 the exiles themselves sent petitions asking for their release. In a joint memorandum they gave the undertaking that "they would keep away from

¹ S.L.N.A., no. 4/315, Governor to the Secretary of State, despatch no. 118, 19 May 1884.
² S.L.N.A., no. 4/306, Governor to the Secretary of State, despatch no. 315, 11 Oct. 1877.
politics, if released."¹

They were on firmer ground when asking for support on the strength of their good conduct during their long years of exile. The behaviour of the exiles had been exemplary throughout. From time to time official references were made regarding their good conduct. In 1884 Governor Gordon commented thus:

I might add that the behaviour of Arabi and his companions during their stay in Ceylon has been exemplary. They have neither engaged in political intrigue nor assumed the attitude of martyrs, but have, with quiet dignity and good taste, cheerfully accepted and made the best of their position; not thrusting themselves forward into notice, nor, on the other hand, shrinking from society and readily performing the duties which naturally fall to them as well educated members of the Mohammedan community. ²

In 1897, the Governor, West Ridgeway, made a fuller comment on their behaviour:

I feel it however, due to these gentlemen to say that during their 14 years residence in Ceylon they have honourably observed the terms of their exile, have given no trouble to the colonial government and have conducted themselves in a commendable manner. During that period two of their number have died. ³

². S.L.N.A., no. 4/315, Governor to the Secretary of State, despatch no. 118, 19 May 1884.
³. S.L.N.A., no. 4/315, Governor to the Secretary of State, despatch no. 17, 23 March 1897.
It is interesting to note that these exiles did not do anything to create a public stir. No references to them were made in Sri Lanka's Legislative Council, even if regular references to them did appear in the British Parliament. The exiles remained under the care and protection of the Inspector-General of Police and their movements were watched, with the utmost secrecy. In 1890, on the eve of his retirement, the Inspector-General (Mr. Campbell) even asked for a bonus for this work; but, as he was not a detective officer, he was denied it. It was asserted that the Government and Colony of Ceylon had "in no way profited by Mr. Campbell's services in regard to the safety and well-being of the exiles."¹ They were in fact, not a source of trouble or concern during the entire period of their exile.

By the end of the century, the remaining five exiles were virtually harmless and were in declining health. They were all over 60 years of age. Ill health was given as the reason for the pardon granted to Toulba Ismath by the Khedive at the beginning of 1899. Chamberlain, in a despatch to Governor West Ridgeway, asked him to inform Toulba Ismath that "the Khedive has consented to withdraw in his case the prohibition hitherto in force and to allow him to return to his native country."²

¹ S.L.N.A., no. 6/8860, letter of the Inspector-General of Police to the Colonial Secretary, 15 Nov. 1890.
² S.L.N.A., no. 4/315, Secretary of State to the Governor, despatch no. 6, 6 Jan. 1899.
At the same time the other exiles were to be informed in the clearest manner that for the time being no hope could be held out that the permission given to Toulba Ismath would be extended to others in the same category.

Toulba Ismath immediately made all arrangements to leave and departed on 12 February in the German steamer "Preussen". Mahmudu Samī became seriously depressed after this. But, in July, his pardon too came; he remarked:

Anyhow the door has been opened. Toulba has gone. I am going, no doubt the others will follow.  

Now only two exiles, 'Arābī Pāsha and Alī Fehmi, were left behind. Their pardons were delayed and there was a rumour that 'Arābī had declined to accept the pardon. But, in April 1901, after the Duke of Cornwall had interviewed 'Arābī and Alī Fehmi, their pardons were expected to follow. In May the pardons at last arrived. 'Arābī received a telegram from his friend Wilfrid Blunt, offering him his warmest congratulations. At an interview soon after, 'Arābī is reported to have said:

I am an old man now, nearly 61 years of age, and all I ask is to be allowed to die in my dear homeland and that my bones be buried in peace.

2. The Ceylon Times, 12 July 1899.
Alī Fehmi left for Egypt soon after, but 'Arābi had to wait. He had some difficulty in finding the money and the means to take his family across to Egypt. While arrangements were being made, he also had to attend numerous farewell functions. First, there was a farewell dinner for him and his family at the Muslim school in Kandy. After this, he bade farewell to his friends and came to Colombo where he stayed with Carmjee Jafferjee at Essaivilla. He next attended a function at the Al-Madrastu al-Hameediya school at Newmoor Street, Colombo. The school-children lined the road and cheered him as he passed, and boys sang songs in Arabic in praise of him. Their verses were handed to him.¹

On the 19th September 'Arābi's party arrived at the work-place of Carmjee Jafferjee at Pettah. He was accompanied by four wives, "kaffir" (Bedouin Arab) women, heavily veiled, nine sons, six daughters, one nephew, four Sinhalese women servants and five others. A diversion was created by the fathers of the servant women who did not want them to leave. The police intervened and made it clear to both parties that the women were engaged only for the trip. Then 'Arābi Pāsha, driven by two horses, was brought to Colombo harbour. A gathering of about 500 greeted him and a choir of Moorish women sang

¹. The Ceylon Times, 14 Sept. 1901.
a farewell song. A decorated boat took them to the ship.¹

Though 'Arabi Pāsha's departure had been so much delayed, in the British Parliament it was made to seem like a deliverance. The Marquess of Lansdowne, answering a question from Lord Newton, remarked:

Nor will I endeavour to determine whether the noble Lord was right when he told the House that the Mussulman's Paradise was to be found in Ceylon. Whether it be a paradise or not I do not know, but Arabi Pasha was very glad to be allowed to leave it.²

The day on which 'Arabi Pāsha was due at Cairo from Suez, the railway station was crowded with his supporters. But one correspondent expressed an interesting view:

He will be acting wisely if he discourages as much as possible the expression on the part of his friends and admirers of over enthusiasm, which is out of place and date.³

'Arabi Pāsha died on 22nd September, 1911 in Cairo. The death seems to have been kept secret until the funeral was over.⁴ Perhaps the family accepted the

newspaper's verdict and did not wish to have a great many people attending the funeral.

ix. The Influence of 'Arābi on his Motherland and on Sri Lanka

In modern Egyptian history ‘Arābi Pāsha occupies an important place, and, by the people of Egypt, he has not been forgotten. During the bombardment in Alexandria there were several attacks on foreigners. This posture of driving the foreigners from Egypt appeared heroic in retrospect and was said recently to have influenced the later President of Egypt, Gamāl Abdul Nasser, in his decision to nationalize the Suez Canal on 26th July, 1956 and then to drive the British from Egyptian soil.

‘Arābi Pāsha was also important in Sri Lanka. He and the exiles who were sent to Sri Lanka seem to have been unhindered locally and they were able to move about in the island from place to place, even though subjected to close police surveillance. The colonial government in Sri Lanka did not treat ‘Arābi Pāsha in any way as a political prisoner - rather, they treated him as a celebrated nationalist leader. The British government must have felt that one day these exiles might return

2. This statement was made by Muhammad Haikal, one of the famous political historians of Egypt, on television, channel four, in Britain on 2 Nov. 1986.
to their motherland, and it was just as well to remain
friendly with them in the meantime. ¹

‘Arābi Pāsha and the exiles lived in Sri Lanka
for nearly twenty years. During those twenty years
‘Arābi Pāsha had a great influence on the local
communities, Sinhalese as well as Muslim. His influence
on the Sinhalese community in Sri Lanka derived from
his role as a nationalist leader. In Egypt he had
formed the nationalist party called hizab al-waṭānī.²
The main slogan of this party was "Egypt for the
Egyptians". This kind of nationalist thinking, "Ceylon
for the Ceylonese", began to appear amongst the Sinhalese
roughly at the time of the arrival of ‘Arābi Pāsha.³
He was acquainted with various members of the Sinhalese
élite and, as mentioned above, he is known to have
propagated the idea of children being taught to be
patriotic. He is also reported to have told some
adult members of the Sinhalese élite that they should
love their mother country, and that they should strive
for freedom from foreign dominance. He also propagated
the idea that Sri Lanka should ultimately be administered
by Sri Lankans.⁴ Clearly such advice from such a source

¹. Vijaya Samerweera, "'Arabi Pāsha in Ceylon, 1883-
². Blunt, Wilfrid Scawen, My Diaries, (Lond., 1932),
pp. 45 and 876.
³. Ceylon Independent, 15 Nov. 1903.
⁴. Ceylon Times, 24 Sept. 1902. See also, Ceylon
must have had influence. His presence and his reputation must surely have encouraged the Sinhalese to think of themselves as a people struggling to become a nation.

His period in Sri Lanka also witnessed a great growth in the Temperance Movement. This organisation was began by Dr. C.A. Hewavitharane (brother of Anagarika Dharmapala). It did not initially have any explicit political overtones. The main aim of the movement lay in its Buddhist ideas. But it linked consumption of liquor, of which it disapproved, with Westernisation and Christianisation. Some years after 'Arabi's departure, between 1911-14, this organisation was to attract élite Sinhalese families, like the Fernandos, and the Senanayakes, and gradually developed a political nationalist feeling among the Sinhalese.¹ It is interesting to note D.S. Senanayake believed in quiet and peaceful agitation for Independence of Sri Lanka.² If 'Arabi Pāsha was one of their sources of inspiration, it was sad that this organisation was later involved in the 1915 communal violence between the Sinhalese and the Muslims.³

By then, too, in 1915, A.E. Goonesinha had formed the Young Lanka League, the aim of which was to achieve independence ('swaraj') from the British. After the arrival of 'Arabi Pasha in Sri Lanka, religious and cultural sentiment increasingly was exploited for political purposes, and it may not be fanciful to suppose that his presence had helped to bring this about.

'Arabi Pasha's greatest influence, however, was on the Muslim community. One sign of this influence was an Islamic revival which took several different directions. The Muslim revival in Sri Lanka was to be directed mostly towards Muslim law and education. On Muslim law, 'Arabi was acknowledged as a respected authority. For example, in 1885, the Government Agent of the Western Province asked 'Arabi Pasha to give him a report on a Muslim Marriage Ordinance before submitting it to the Legislative Council. 'Arabi Pasha was able to compare the proposed legislation to what he knew of such matters in other Muslim countries, such as Egypt. His recommendations were then incorporated in the Ordinances, thereby helping to modernise Muslim law in the island. He also encouraged the Muslims to start newspapers for themselves. One which was established on his prompting was called the "Muslim Naisen" (Muslim

3. S.L.A.R. Western Province, 1885, (Colombo, 1885), "Muslim Marriage Registration Ordinance".
Historians have argued that the Muslims of Sri Lanka were notoriously educationally backward before the arrival of ‘Arābi Pāsha. The Muslims had continuously shown an interest only in their own particular form of religious-based education as opposed to secular education. They had set up a few Arabic colleges, in such places as Weligama, Galle, Matara, Puttalam, Kiniaya and Maharagama. But most of the Arabic colleges were situated in remote parts of the island. Only one college was founded in the capital and very few of the students who enrolled actually passed the course. It has been suggested that this

1. Muslim Naisen (Muslim Friend), 27 June, 1882.
3. Bauri Arabic College, 1884. See Muslim Naisen (Muslim Friend), 20 Feb. 1884.
4. Ibrahimiyyah Arabic College, 1892. See Ceylon Times, 2 Mar. 1892.
6. Cassimmayh Arabic College, 1893. See Personal Paper, "Last Will of E.S.M. Mohamad Cassim Marikar, no. 1515" obtained from his grandson, Mr. I.N.M. Mohamed Cassim Marikar, Cresent Lodge, North Road, Puttalam, Sri Lanka.
7. Siyyaddiya Arabic College, 1899. See Ceylon Times, 10 April, 1899.
8. Gafforiya Arabic College, 1931. See Personal Paper, "The Last Will of Mr. N.D.H. Abdul Gaffoor, no. 2924" obtained from his grandson, Mr. Rafi Gaffoor, 10 Abdul Gaffoor Mawatha, Colombo, 3, Sri Lanka.
was because involvement in trading was pursued at the expense of devoted study.¹

Most of the students who attended these Arabic colleges were not from élite families. They were the children of petty traders. In the British period, the children of the élite were given Western education in non-Muslim schools. In the Arabic colleges, students were taught Arabic grammar (Nāwa), Arabic literature, logic, Islamic history, Qur'ānic interpretation (Tafsīr) mysticism (Taswūf), rules and regulations for reciting the Qur'ān (Tejwīd), delivery of religious sermons and astronomy. These colleges offered eight year courses in Arabic and Islamic studies, and the graduates were awarded the title "Moulavi"²

During the British period most Muslim children who went to school attended these religious institutions. Clearly Muslims were suspicious of the pro-Christian bias in State-run British schools.³ There were grounds for this. Ever since the British had occupied Sri Lanka, the government's policy was to see the local people

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2. Ibid. The word "Moulavi" is from a Persian word which was introduced along with Sri Lankan Arabic teachers. The word technically means Master of Theology. But in Sri Lanka this word is used to describe the local Arabic teachers. See Haim, S., Persian English Dictionary, (Tehran, 1894), p. 871.
converted to Christianity. The first British Governor, Fredrick North, emphasised that the main religion of the island was to be Christianity.\(^1\) The second British Governor, Sir Thomas Maitland, encouraged the establishment of schools where Christianity was to be taught.\(^2\) Even Colebrooke, in the early 1830s, recommended that the schools to be established should be under the direction of the Christian clergy of the island.\(^3\) It is therefore not surprising if the Muslims of Sri Lanka did not choose to send their children to such schools.

Although the British government encouraged the establishment of Christian schools, however, there was also an attempt, as early as 1800, to create a government school for Muslims in Sri Lanka; and one may even have been opened about that time.\(^4\) But, even if government schools for Muslims were favoured, probably few Muslims were actually prepared to attend them before 1890.\(^5\)

By the 1880s and 1890s, some leading spokesmen for the Muslim community were willing to start

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3. C.O. 54/122, Colebrooke to Secretary of State, 24 Dec. 1831, "Education".
4. S.L.N.A., no. 5/1, Governor to the Secretary of State, despatch no. 98, 30 Jan. 1803.
Western-style schools themselves, believing now that the future prosperity of the community could be ensured only in this way. In November, 1884, the first Anglo-Mohammedan Boys' School (al-Madrast al-Khariyyāt al-Islamiyya) was formed in Colombo.¹ This was a Muslim educational institution, but chiefly secular and distinct from and supplementary to sectarian centres. This school did not last long, however, because the financial resources dried up.²

In 1891 in Colombo a Muslim Education Society was formed. Mr. M.C. Siddi Lebbe, the lawyer, played a key role. He wished to start schools for Muslims, and, in the same year as the society was founded, he appealed to the local Muslims to create an institution for modern Muslim education in Sri Lanka. This appeal was made after Friday Jummāh prayers (midday prayers) at Maradana Mosque in Colombo.³ But the leading members of the community ignored the request.

It was not until 1892 that 'Arābi Pāsha persuaded Wapachcha Marikar to start an advanced school for Muslim boys. There were major personal differences between the two leading authorities on the subject, Mr. Wapachcha Marikar and Mr. I.L.M. Abdul Azeez, over

² Ibid.
³ Ceylon Times, 21 Jan. 1891.
who should start the school, what kind of school should be started and where it should be located. These disagreements were ultimately resolved and a Muslim school was established, under the active patronage of 'Arābi Pāsha, named al-Madrastul - Zahaira (Zahaira College). This school had 85 students and the Director was Mr. A.M. Wapachcha Marikar. In 1894 this college was re-registered as Maradana-Muhammadan Boys School. In 1913, al-Madrastul - Zahaira became Zahaira College. In time, it came to enjoy a very high reputation.

'Arābi Pāsha was loyal to the British government and he behaved with great circumspection as an exile on the island, but he also influenced local communities to think of themselves with pride and, through education, to prepare for the modernisation of their societies.

1. Ceylon Times, 21 August 1892.
2. Ceylon Independent, 12 March 1913.
When historians think about and discuss Islam and Islamic countries, they generally confine themselves to the Middle-East, or perhaps include Central Asia, North Africa and South-East Asia. Little or no attention is paid to other parts of the world, such as South India, Sri Lanka and the Maldives, though Islam spread there and made a significant contribution to the history of those regions. This thesis attempts to direct attention to the Muslims of Sri Lanka under British rule. It asks questions about the political and commercial role of that community in that society and so seeks to broaden our knowledge of both Islamic history and of the history of Sri Lanka.

Muslims form the third largest religious community in Sri Lanka according to the 1981 census, the total population of Muslims was then 1,100,350 (6.7%)\(^1\) and their history goes back at least 1,000 years.

Some historians view the Sinhalese as in part descendants of the Aborigines (Vaddās) and in part of Indian immigrants into the island.\(^2\) Some hold that the

Muslims of Sri Lanka similarly derive partly from locals and partly from emigrant peoples, from the Arabian and Indian peninsulas. The Arabs came first and took Islam to Sri Lanka. Later, around the 10th century A.D., South Indian Muslims began to come to Sri Lanka to trade. The South Indian Muslims, like the Arabs, settled down in Sri Lanka in the coastal areas. They, too, intermarried and became regarded as local Muslims.\(^1\) However, during the period of British rule, later waves of South Indian Muslims who traded in Sri Lanka retained their homes in India and did not settle down locally. These Muslims were widely regarded as being loyal to South India. It was said that the wealth that they made in Sri Lanka was sent back to South India and that they married into the Indian Muslim community. It was even claimed that they had become dominant over Muslim trade in the early twentieth century.\(^2\) Some historians have seen them (and not local Muslims) as the perpetrators of the first major outbreak of communal troubles between Muslims and Sinhalese in 1915. This thesis disputes that and argues also that although the coast Muslims may have been responsible for starting the troubles, Sinhalese reprisals were taken against all Muslims, Sri Lankan and Indian alike.\(^3\)

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1. See chapter 1.
2. See chapter 4.
Ethnic rivalry in Sri Lanka has been reflected in historical disputes. Some Sinhalese historians claim that the Sinhalese speaking peoples migrated to the island before the Tamils; Tamil historians claim that Tamils have an equally good claim to first arrival on the island. All agree, however, that Arabs and Persians came rather later, as traders in the years before Islam. Early Muslim settlement is well documented, and it is known to have taken place even in the eighth century A.D.¹

Muslim trade in the Indian Ocean produced missionaries in the market places. The Muslim shopkeeper was at times the equivalent of a clergyman. Some conversions took place. For a number of these converts, Islam was, no doubt, a highly prestigious religion. Muslims were literate, they had wide-ranging diplomatic contacts, a formal system of education and a simple but effective legal system. They were a modernising force with skills essential for the efficient administration of expanding, developing States or Empires.² But Islam was not seen to pose a threat to Buddhism. The Islamic faith came to Sri Lanka peacefully, unlike in India, where the Muslims invaded the country as warriors. In Sri Lanka Muslims settled into local society, and, like their converts to Islam, they spoke Sinhalese or Tamil, the languages of

1. See chapter 1.
the areas where they settled.\footnote{See chapter 1.}

Muslim society in Sri Lanka raised fundamental questions which have concerned Muslim societies in other areas of the world. Can Muslims, with memories of political dominance, live with honour and security as a minority group in a larger non-Muslim society? Must Muslims seek to define their relations with the majority in order to live their lives satisfactorily? Such questions are the immediate concern of Muslims not only in Sri Lanka but in, for example, the U.S.S.R. and China, and they raise serious issues for Muslim societies elsewhere. The answers which the Sri Lanka Muslim community gave have their own interest.

On the eve of the Portuguese discovery of Sri Lanka, the Muslims were at the height of their prosperity. Arab merchants from the commercial centres of West Asia kept splendid establishments in parts of Sri Lanka. The Portuguese invasion led to the destruction of the Muslim monopoly of the spice trade. In usurping control of the spice trade, the Portuguese also struck a blow at Islam, thus realising both the commercial and religious goals of their eastern voyages. Unlike the Indian Muslims, the Sri Lankan Muslims never practised Holy War (Jihād) against the Portuguese. But, in the Kandyan Province,
some Muslim soldiers fought with the Sinhalese kings against the Portuguese. The Muslim farming community of the Eastern Province consisted originally of refugees from Portuguese persecution who fled to the Kandyan areas and were settled by the Kandyan king, Senarat (1604-35), in the east. Their exertions and enterprise made them successful. These farmers cultivated tobacco and coconut. The Sinhalese kings also used the Muslims as ambassadors when inviting the Dutch to drive the Portuguese away from the island. The Dutch were rather more tolerant of non-Christian religious groups than the Portuguese had been, but they treated the Muslims with some suspicion and hostility. The Dutch were intent upon breaking the cordial relationship which had grown up between the Muslims and the Sinhalese. One example is the letter the Dutch sent to the King of Kandy, Vimala Dharmasuriya II (1687-1707), saying that Indian Mughals were attempting to move from Ramesvaram (in South India) to Sri Lanka and that the Muslims in Sri Lanka would betray the Sinhalese King to them. But this fabrication did not work.

From 1802, Sri Lanka became a British crown colony, administered through a Governor and Council. It was

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1. See chapter 1.
2. Arasaratnam, S., "Vimala Dharmasuriya II (1687-1707) and his relations with the Dutch", C.J.H.S.S., vol. 6, no. 1, Jan.-June 1963.
acquired largely, if not entirely, for reasons of imperial strategy. During the early period of British contacts with Sri Lanka, some Muslims in the low country were amongst the last supporters of the Dutch. Very rapidly, however, once the Dutch formally ceded the Maritime Provinces of Sri Lanka, Muslims became solidly loyal to the equally commercially-minded British. The colonial administration precipitated important changes in Muslim society. One casualty was the long and close association between the Kandyans and Muslims which broke down once the British came. The Muslims almost immediately became a potential weapon in British hands to undermine the power and influence of the kingdom of Kandy. The British used Muslim traders to elicit military information about the Kandyan kingdom and Muslim supporters helped them put down the first Kandyan rebellion in 1817-18. But when, in 1815, the Kandyan aristocracy finally surrendered their independent kingdom to the British, by signing the famous Kandyan Convention at the Royal Palace in Kandy, neither the British nor the Kandyans considered the local Muslims during these historic events.¹

¹ A climate for further change in inter-communal relations was provided by the transformation which took

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1. See chapter 2.
place during the early period of British rule. A new, more liberal, economic policy emerged. For example, the British government granted Muslims permission to own properties in the Fort and the Pettah areas, replacing ownership restrictions which had been first imposed on Moors and Malabaris by the Portuguese. Muslims were appointed to the lower grades of the Civil Service, to posts such as cashiers, shroffs and translators. They were even appointed to some higher posts in the Civil Service, becoming consuls, for example, to Turkey and Persia. Due to the liberal trade policy which was practised by the British government, the Muslims were able freely to engage in trading activities.¹

With the growth of capitalism and of capital investment in the island, during the course of the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, and particularly with the development of the gem and jewellery trades, the Muslims became increasingly powerful as an economic group. The wealth, power and influence gained through these economic enterprises provided the foundation for the emergence of a Muslim élite in Sri Lanka alongside Sinhalese and Tamil élites. The Muslims used the marketing methods of the West. Élite Muslims modelled their life-styles on Western practices, especially in

¹. See chapter 5.
education and dress. They also sought customers in Britain.¹

But although the Muslim community grew prosperous, this prosperity affected only a minority. The poorer classes were scarcely altered. The wealth of the community was not divided equally amongst its members. The Muslim élite was small and very often quarrelsome.²

Other Muslims took part in the expansion of coconut cultivation and in exporting to South India. Muslims from the districts of Mannar, Puttalam and Batticaloa were involved in fishing, pearl fishing and the cultivation of tobacco. But none, apparently, took part in the arrack trade, to which the community had religious objections. One Muslim newspaper even gave prominence to a reader's letter to the editor, complaining that a certain Muslim in Colombo had rented out his coconut trees to a toddy tapper.³

The élite Tamils turned not to commerce but more to the professions and to service in the bureaucracy. Their lands in the north were sandy, lacked rain and were not fertile. The Sinhalese élite, for their part, were often agriculturists. Cultivating paddy was traditionally a highly prestigious occupation amongst them.⁴ This

¹. See chapter 5.
². Ibid.
⁴. See chapter 5.
doubtless helped the Muslims to prosper in commerce.

On one issue, the Muslim elite closed ranks: they maintained a firm support for the British government. This they saw as central to their commercial prosperity. By the late nineteenth century, however, trade rivalry with the Sinhalese had become marked and culminated in the anti-Muslim riots of 1915. The Sinhalese blamed the British for taking severe action against the riots, but the Muslims felt that State protection was inadequate. The troubles did not take on the positively anti-British tone that such events had in India, however; nor did the Sri Lankan Muslims turn away from their traditional policy of accommodation with the imperial power.\(^1\) After Independence, they may have suffered for this.\(^2\)

Despite friction with the larger communities, the Muslims of Sri Lanka for a time took an active part in politics. They were nominated and elected to the Municipal Councils of Colombo, Kandy and Galle. The members who served on the Municipal Councils and those who sat on the Legislative Council were both communal activists and spokesmen for the wider society. Muslim members who stood for election in predominantly Sinhalese and Tamil areas did sometimes win seats.

\(^1\) See chapter 6.
\(^2\) See chapter 5.
During the Donoughmore period, however, the Muslims experienced a deep, internal crisis within their own community. Ironically, the very political unity of Muslims that had been forged after 1899 seemed to provide a favourable climate for the germination of seeds of ethnic, regional, social and religious divisions. Two main contenders emerged, "Moors" and "Malays". Both groups wanted separate representation in the Legislative Council. But the Donoughmore Report favoured treating the Muslims as part of one community. When the Soulbury Commission arrived in Sri Lanka, the Moors and Malays still wanted separate representation in the Council. But that Commission, too, made the same recommendation as its predecessor.¹ Such divisions no doubt weakened the Muslim community after 1948 when it set out to try and achieve new forms of political accommodation within the novel political arena of independent Sri Lanka.

¹ See chapter 4.
APPENDIX I

LIST OF INTERVIEWS AND PRIVATE CORRESPONDENCE

1. Abdul Jabbar (Businessman)
2. Abdul Latif (Businessman)
3. M.K. Hamid (Businessman)
4. (Late) Hamvi Haniff (Lawyer)
5. M. Hussain (Lawyer)
6. Dr. M.C.M. Kaleel
7. (Late) A.H. Macan Markar (Businessman)
8. Mohideen Hasan (Businessman)
9. I.N.M. Mohamed Cassim Marikar (Businessman)
10. Sir Razik Fareed (Politician)
11. Tamby Naina Marikar (Businessman)
12. (Late) Zain Jaleel (Businessman)
APPENDIX II

MUSLIMS, MOORS, MARAKKALA; THE PROBLEM OF NOMENCLATURE

Bernard Lewis, a Western analyst of Middle-Eastern affairs, once grappled with the question, "What is a Turk?" He answered his question by putting forward the suggestion: "To be a Turk simply means to feel that one is a Turk and is called a Turk." This is not a satisfactory test of the identity of the Muslims of Sri Lanka. They are called neither Sri Lankan nor Muslim.

The names used by the Sinhalese to designate the Muslims of Sri Lanka are Hambayo and Marakkala; this shows that the Sinhalese associated Muslims with the sea: hambayo is from hamban (i.e. champana - a type of boat) and Marakkala means a boatman or sailor. The Tamils of Sri Lanka designated the Muslims as Markayar, which means masters of the ships. They also described the Muslims as Tulugar, which means people from Turkey.

2. Clough, B., Sinhalese-English Dictionary (Colombo, 1892), p. 725. The definitions of (hambana = boat; kara = person from the boat. See also, (ven) Soratha, there, Sumangalasabdakoshaya (Sinhalese, Blessed voice, n.d. n.p.) ) Marakkala is defined among other things as a sailor or boatman.
The Sri Lanka Muslims also called themselves Sonahar.\(^1\) This derives from Yavanar, a Sanskrit and Pali word meaning foreigners and was applied especially to Greeks or Arabs.\(^2\) The word Yavanar originally applied only to the Ionian Greeks, but later it was extended to Arab settlers who had established themselves peacefully on the coast of India.\(^3\) The province of Turkey under Greek rule was called Iona. This word Iona was corrupted into the Sinhalese Yavanar.\(^4\) The word Yavanar then became Sonahar among the Muslims of Sri Lanka.

The Portuguese designated the Muslims of Sri Lanka as Moors. The origins of this word lie in the Spanish word Moro and the Portuguese Mouro or Mauri, meaning the ancient inhabitants of Mauretania, later known as Morocco or Maghrab.\(^5\) The Dutch used the same term to designate the Muslims of Sri Lanka. But the British described them as Muhammadans.\(^6\) After Independence, the Muslims changed that term and called themselves Moors. It may be that the Muslims of Sri Lanka preferred to be identified with Moroccans. Even today the Sri Lankan State uses this word.

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1. Dr. Caldwell testified that the original name Kayal Paṭṭnām (South India) is Songār Paṭṭnām (Muslim town). See Dr. Caldwell, A Political and General History of the District of Tinnevelly in the Presidency of Madras (Madras, 1881), p. 26.
2. E.I., (Tamil, Madras, 1979), "Ceylon".
6. C.O. 54/124-5, Alexander Johnstone's paper on "Ceylon Native Laws and Customs".
## Names of Muslim Members of the Council

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Date of First Membership in the Council</th>
<th>Date of Departure from the Council</th>
<th>Elected/Nominated</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Mr. Massi Sodma Jay Anak</td>
<td>4th May 1866</td>
<td>1885</td>
<td>Nominated</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mr. Mohamed Ismail</td>
<td>1885</td>
<td>1900</td>
<td>Elected</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mr. M.I.M. Zainudeen</td>
<td>1900</td>
<td>1904</td>
<td>Elected</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mr. Peston Jee Khan</td>
<td>1904</td>
<td>1908</td>
<td>Elected</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mr. H.K. Khan</td>
<td>1904</td>
<td>1912</td>
<td>Elected</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mr. N.H.M. Abdul Gader</td>
<td>1908</td>
<td>1913</td>
<td>Elected</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mr. P.D. Khan</td>
<td>1912</td>
<td>1913</td>
<td>Elected</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mr. P.P. Khan</td>
<td>1921</td>
<td>1922</td>
<td>Elected</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Justice M.T. Akbar</td>
<td>1922</td>
<td>1925</td>
<td>Nominated</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mr. E.G. Adamilly</td>
<td>7th April 192220</td>
<td>1925</td>
<td>Nominated</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mr. Adamjee Lukanjee</td>
<td>7th April 192226</td>
<td>1929</td>
<td>Nominated</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sir A.R. Razieh Pareed</td>
<td>1932</td>
<td>1937</td>
<td>Elected</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mr. M. Munjje</td>
<td>7th April 193628</td>
<td>1941</td>
<td>Nominated</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mr. F.G. Hussain</td>
<td>1936</td>
<td>1941</td>
<td>Elected</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mr. M.H.M. Ishak</td>
<td>1936</td>
<td>1941</td>
<td>Elected</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

2. S.L.N.A., no. 5/179, Secretary of State's despatch no. 45, 4 May 1865.
4. Ibid.
6. Ibid.
8. Ibid.
18. S.L.N.A., no. 2/156, Secretary of State's despatch no. 35, 7 April 1922.
20. S.L.N.A., no. 3/197, Secretary of State's despatch no. 28, 7 April 1922.
22. S.L.N.A., no. 12/17, Secretary of State's despatch no. 42, 7 April 1923.
28. S.L.N.A., no. 2/31, Secretary of State's despatch no. 45, 7 April 1936.
### APPENDIX IV

**THE KANDY MUNICIPAL COUNCIL, ESTABLISHED BY ORDINANCE NO. 17 OF 1866**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Names of Muslim Members of the Council</th>
<th>Date of First Membership in the Council</th>
<th>Date of Departure from the Council</th>
<th>Elected/ Nominated</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. Mr. Siddi Lebbe Marikar Muhammad Cassim</td>
<td>10th August 1865</td>
<td>1870</td>
<td>Nominated</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Mr. P.T. Habibu Lebbe</td>
<td>1902</td>
<td>1906</td>
<td>Elected</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Mr. Yusuf Ismail</td>
<td>1923</td>
<td>1930</td>
<td>Elected</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. Mr. M.A.S. Marikar</td>
<td>1937</td>
<td>1940</td>
<td>Elected</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

2. S.L.N.A., no. 2/154, Secretary of State's despatch no. 29 of 10th August 1865.
## APPENDIX V

THE MUNICIPAL COUNCIL OF GALLE

ESTABLISHED BY ORDINANCE NO. 17 OF 1867

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Names of Muslim Members of the Council</th>
<th>Date of First Membership in the Council</th>
<th>Date of Departure from the Council</th>
<th>Elected/Nominated</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Mr. Ismail Lebbe Marikar Mohideen Bawa</td>
<td>1882</td>
<td>1885</td>
<td>Elected</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mr. I.L.M. Bawa</td>
<td>1885</td>
<td>1887</td>
<td>Elected</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mr. I.L.M. Abdul Cader</td>
<td>1887</td>
<td>1894</td>
<td>Elected</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mr. C.L.M. Abdul Karim</td>
<td>9th April 1894</td>
<td>1903</td>
<td>Elected</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mr. Magodon Ismail</td>
<td>14th April 1903</td>
<td>1906</td>
<td>Elected</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mr. Macan Markar</td>
<td>9th April 1906</td>
<td>1932</td>
<td>Nominated</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mr. Magodon Ismail</td>
<td>1934</td>
<td>1937</td>
<td>Nominated</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mr. A.C. Muhammad</td>
<td>1934</td>
<td>1937</td>
<td>Nominated</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mr. A.H. Shaad</td>
<td>1935</td>
<td>1937</td>
<td>Nominated</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mr. A.C. Muhammad</td>
<td>10th March 1937</td>
<td>1940</td>
<td>Nominated</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mr. Hagedon Ismail</td>
<td>1937</td>
<td>1941</td>
<td>Elected</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mr. A.I.H.A. Wahaab</td>
<td>1937</td>
<td>1941</td>
<td>Elected</td>
</tr>
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</table>

10. S.I.N.A., no. 2/155, Secretary of State's despatch no. 57, 14 April 1903.
12. S.I.N.A., no. 2/157, Secretary of State's despatch no. 48, 9 April 1906.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Candidates</th>
<th>Elected</th>
<th>Nominated</th>
<th>Number of Voters</th>
<th>Percentage of Voters</th>
<th>Percentage of Members Elected</th>
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<td>1885</td>
<td>10 (S)</td>
<td>6 (S)</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>30,600 (S)</td>
<td>85.4% (S)</td>
<td>60% (S)</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>6 (T)</td>
<td>1 (T)</td>
<td></td>
<td>2,720 (T)</td>
<td>7.5% (T)</td>
<td>10% (T)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>2 (H)</td>
<td>1 (H)</td>
<td></td>
<td>2,500 (H)</td>
<td>7.5% (H)</td>
<td>10% (H)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1900</td>
<td>15 (S)</td>
<td>6 (S)</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>16,260 (S)</td>
<td>84.3% (S)</td>
<td>60% (S)</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>6 (T)</td>
<td>1 (T)</td>
<td></td>
<td>3,500 (T)</td>
<td>8.1% (T)</td>
<td>10% (T)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>7 (H)</td>
<td>1 (H)</td>
<td></td>
<td>3,000 (H)</td>
<td>7.5% (H)</td>
<td>10% (H)</td>
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<tr>
<td>1904</td>
<td>17 (S)</td>
<td>5 (S)</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>18,725 (S)</td>
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<td>50% (S)</td>
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<tr>
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<td>5 (T)</td>
<td>1 (T)</td>
<td></td>
<td>4,026 (T)</td>
<td>8.1% (T)</td>
<td>10% (T)</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>6 (H)</td>
<td>2 (H)</td>
<td></td>
<td>3,800 (H)</td>
<td>8.1% (H)</td>
<td>10% (H)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1908</td>
<td>13 (S)</td>
<td>5 (S)</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>41,500 (S)</td>
<td>80.0% (S)</td>
<td>60% (S)</td>
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<td>12 (T)</td>
<td>2 (T)</td>
<td></td>
<td>8,900 (T)</td>
<td>11.3% (T)</td>
<td>20% (T)</td>
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<td>7 (H)</td>
<td>2 (H)</td>
<td></td>
<td>4,800 (H)</td>
<td>8.5% (H)</td>
<td>10% (H)</td>
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<td>6 (S)</td>
<td>-</td>
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<td>79.7% (S)</td>
<td>60% (S)</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>12 (T)</td>
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<td>6,000 (T)</td>
<td>11.3% (T)</td>
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<tr>
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<td>7 (H)</td>
<td>2 (H)</td>
<td></td>
<td>4,800 (H)</td>
<td>8.5% (H)</td>
<td>10% (H)</td>
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<tr>
<td>1916</td>
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<td>-</td>
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<td>2 (T)</td>
<td></td>
<td>6,800 (T)</td>
<td>12.3% (T)</td>
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<td>5,200 (H)</td>
<td>9.4% (H)</td>
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<td>15 (S)</td>
<td>10 (S)</td>
<td>1 (H)</td>
<td>44,026 (S)</td>
<td>77.2% (S)</td>
<td>76.9% (S)</td>
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<td>2 (T)</td>
<td>1 (H)</td>
<td>7,120 (T)</td>
<td>12.4% (T)</td>
<td>15.3% (T)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>4 (H)</td>
<td>1 (H)</td>
<td></td>
<td>5,800 (H)</td>
<td>10.2% (H)</td>
<td>7.0% (H)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1924</td>
<td>22 (S)</td>
<td>8 (S)</td>
<td>1 Boreah</td>
<td>45,125 (S)</td>
<td>76.3% (S)</td>
<td>61.5% (S)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>12 (T)</td>
<td>4 (T)</td>
<td></td>
<td>7,920 (T)</td>
<td>13.3% (T)</td>
<td>10.7% (T)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>6 (H)</td>
<td>1 (H)</td>
<td></td>
<td>6,120 (H)</td>
<td>10.3% (H)</td>
<td>7.7% (H)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1932</td>
<td>15 (S)</td>
<td>5 (S)</td>
<td></td>
<td>65,280 (S)</td>
<td>80.1% (S)</td>
<td>58.8% (S)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>15 (T)</td>
<td>5 (T)</td>
<td></td>
<td>8,056 (T)</td>
<td>9.8% (T)</td>
<td>29.4% (T)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>10 (H)</td>
<td>2 (H)</td>
<td></td>
<td>8,160 (H)</td>
<td>10.2% (H)</td>
<td>11.7% (H)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1936</td>
<td>12 (S)</td>
<td>12 (S)</td>
<td>1 Boreah</td>
<td>80,179 (S)</td>
<td>80.8% (S)</td>
<td>60% (S)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>10 (T)</td>
<td>6 (T)</td>
<td></td>
<td>9,850 (T)</td>
<td>9.9% (T)</td>
<td>10% (T)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>9 (H)</td>
<td>2 (H)</td>
<td></td>
<td>9,160 (H)</td>
<td>9.2% (H)</td>
<td>10% (H)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1940</td>
<td>11 (S)</td>
<td>11 (S)</td>
<td>1 Boreah</td>
<td>95,268 (S)</td>
<td>81.9% (S)</td>
<td>57.8% (S)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>10 (T)</td>
<td>6 (T)</td>
<td></td>
<td>10,850 (T)</td>
<td>9.3% (T)</td>
<td>31.5% (T)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>10 (H)</td>
<td>2 (H)</td>
<td></td>
<td>10,125 (H)</td>
<td>8.7% (H)</td>
<td>10.3% (H)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1944</td>
<td>10 (S)</td>
<td>10 (S)</td>
<td></td>
<td>11,79,627 (S)</td>
<td>97.9% (S)</td>
<td>52.6% (S)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>12 (T)</td>
<td>6 (T)</td>
<td></td>
<td>12,850 (T)</td>
<td>1.0% (T)</td>
<td>31.5% (T)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>10 (H)</td>
<td>3 (H)</td>
<td></td>
<td>12,220 (H)</td>
<td>1.0% (H)</td>
<td>15.7% (H)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

S = Sinhalese  T = Tamil   M = Muslim

The percentage of the voters and the members elected were calculated by the author.

2. Ceylon Times, 2 April 1900.
3. Ceylon Times, 10 April 1908.
4. Ceylon Times, 7 April 1908.
5. Ceylon Times, 18 April 1912.
8. See Appendix III.
9. Ceylon Times, 8 April 1924.
10. See Appendix IV.
11. Ceylon Times, 16 April 1928.
13. See Appendix IV.
15. See Appendix IV.
## APPENDIX VII

**MUNICIPAL COUNCIL, KANDY, CANDIDATES AND VOTERS, FROM 1902-1937**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Dates</th>
<th>Candidates</th>
<th>Elected</th>
<th>Nominated</th>
<th>Number of Voters</th>
<th>Percentage of the Voters</th>
<th>Percentage of the Members Elected</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1902</td>
<td>3 (S) 2 (T) 1 (M)</td>
<td>3 (S) 2 (T) 1 (M)</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>20,500 (S)</td>
<td>74.82% (S)</td>
<td>50% (S)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>4,400 (T)</td>
<td>16.06% (T)</td>
<td>33.33% (T)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>2,500 (M)</td>
<td>9.12% (M)</td>
<td>16.67% (M)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1923</td>
<td>4 (S) 2 (T) 1 (M)</td>
<td>4 (S) 2 (T) 1 (M)</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>45,200 (S)</td>
<td>77.93% (S)</td>
<td>57.14% (S)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>7,200 (T)</td>
<td>12.41% (T)</td>
<td>28.57% (T)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>5,600 (M)</td>
<td>9.66% (M)</td>
<td>14.29% (M)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1937</td>
<td>4 (S) 2 (T) 1 (M)</td>
<td>4 (S) 2 (T) 1 (M)</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>116,142 (S)</td>
<td>83.65% (S)</td>
<td>57.14% (S)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>12,500 (T)</td>
<td>9.00% (T)</td>
<td>28.57% (T)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>10,200 (M)</td>
<td>7.35% (M)</td>
<td>14.29% (M)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

S = Sinhalese  T = Tamil  M = Muslim

The percentage of the voters and the members elected were calculated by the author.

1. *Ceylon Times,* 16 April 1902.

Other elections have been ignored.
No Muslim candidates were elected at these.
## APPENDIX VIII

**MUNICIPAL COUNCIL, GALLE, CANDIDATES AND VOTERS, FROM 1882-1937**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Dates</th>
<th>Candidates Elected</th>
<th>Nomination</th>
<th>Number of Voters</th>
<th>Percentage of the Voters</th>
<th>Percentage of the Members Elected</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1882</td>
<td>8 (S) 6 (S)</td>
<td>2 (H)</td>
<td>6,200 (S)</td>
<td>91.18 (S)</td>
<td>85.72 (S)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>250 (T) 350 (H)</td>
<td>3.76 (T) 5.16 (H)</td>
<td>14.28 (H)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1885</td>
<td>9 (S) 6 (S)</td>
<td>2 (H)</td>
<td>6,400 (S)</td>
<td>88.89 (S)</td>
<td>85.72 (S)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>300 (T) 200 (H)</td>
<td>4.17 (T) 6.34 (H)</td>
<td>14.28 (H)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1887</td>
<td>9 (S) 6 (S)</td>
<td>2 (H)</td>
<td>6,540 (S)</td>
<td>86.17 (S)</td>
<td>85.72 (S)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>350 (T) 200 (H)</td>
<td>4.44 (T) 6.34 (H)</td>
<td>14.28 (H)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1891</td>
<td>8 (S) 6 (S)</td>
<td>2 (H)</td>
<td>6,970 (S)</td>
<td>86.18 (S)</td>
<td>85.72 (S)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>370 (T) 720 (H)</td>
<td>4.33 (T) 8.95 (H)</td>
<td>14.28 (H)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1894</td>
<td>7 (S) 7 (S)</td>
<td>3 (H)</td>
<td>7,120 (S)</td>
<td>85.17 (S)</td>
<td>87.50 (S)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>390 (T) 850 (H)</td>
<td>4.65 (T) 10.65 (H)</td>
<td>12.50 (H)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1897</td>
<td>7 (S) 7 (S)</td>
<td>2 (H)</td>
<td>7,250 (S)</td>
<td>84.72 (S)</td>
<td>87.50 (S)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>390 (T) 910 (H)</td>
<td>4.65 (T) 10.65 (H)</td>
<td>12.50 (H)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1901</td>
<td>7 (S) 7 (S)</td>
<td>1 (H)</td>
<td>7,150 (S)</td>
<td>82.77 (S)</td>
<td>87.50 (S)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>410 (T) 1,120 (H)</td>
<td>5.80 (T) 12.61 (H)</td>
<td>12.50 (H)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1903</td>
<td>7 (S) 7 (S)</td>
<td>1 (H)</td>
<td>7,410 (S)</td>
<td>82.42 (S)</td>
<td>87.50 (S)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>450 (T) 1,170 (H)</td>
<td>5.01 (T) 12.57 (H)</td>
<td>12.50 (H)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1906</td>
<td>8 (S) 7 (S)</td>
<td>None (H)</td>
<td>7,640 (S)</td>
<td>82.12 (S)</td>
<td>87.50 (S)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>390 (T) 1,158 (H)</td>
<td>5.30 (T) 12.38 (H)</td>
<td>12.50 (H)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1908</td>
<td>9 (S) 7 (S)</td>
<td>None (H)</td>
<td>7,720 (S)</td>
<td>82.06 (S)</td>
<td>87.50 (S)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>390 (T) 1,215 (H)</td>
<td>5.63 (T) 12.31 (H)</td>
<td>12.50 (H)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1911</td>
<td>10 (S) 7 (S)</td>
<td>None (H)</td>
<td>7,950 (S)</td>
<td>81.92 (S)</td>
<td>87.50 (S)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>390 (T) 1,215 (H)</td>
<td>5.36 (T) 12.32 (H)</td>
<td>12.50 (H)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1914</td>
<td>11 (S) 7 (S)</td>
<td>None (H)</td>
<td>8,025 (S)</td>
<td>80.29 (S)</td>
<td>87.50 (S)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>430 (T) 1,420 (H)</td>
<td>5.50 (T) 14.21 (H)</td>
<td>12.50 (H)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1917</td>
<td>10 (S) 7 (S)</td>
<td>None (H)</td>
<td>8,650 (S)</td>
<td>79.65 (S)</td>
<td>87.50 (S)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>560 (T) 1,650 (H)</td>
<td>5.16 (T) 15.19 (H)</td>
<td>12.50 (H)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1920</td>
<td>11 (S) 7 (S)</td>
<td>None (H)</td>
<td>9,920 (S)</td>
<td>79.42 (S)</td>
<td>87.50 (S)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>650 (T) 1,950 (H)</td>
<td>5.21 (T) 15.37 (H)</td>
<td>12.50 (H)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1923</td>
<td>10 (S) 7 (S)</td>
<td>4 (H)</td>
<td>10,200 (S)</td>
<td>77.40 (S)</td>
<td>87.50 (S)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>950 (T) 2,028 (H)</td>
<td>7.21 (T) 15.39 (H)</td>
<td>12.50 (H)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1926</td>
<td>11 (S) 7 (S)</td>
<td>None (H)</td>
<td>11,100 (S)</td>
<td>75.77 (S)</td>
<td>87.50 (S)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>390 (T) 2,150 (H)</td>
<td>7.51 (T) 16.72 (H)</td>
<td>12.50 (H)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1930</td>
<td>16 (S) 9 (S)</td>
<td>None (H)</td>
<td>20,200 (S)</td>
<td>76.21 (S)</td>
<td>90.0 (S)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>2,600 (T) 3,760 (H)</td>
<td>9.81 (T) 13.96 (H)</td>
<td>10.0 (H)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1934</td>
<td>14 (S) 9 (S)</td>
<td>None (H)</td>
<td>28,900 (S)</td>
<td>78.59 (S)</td>
<td>90.0 (S)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>3,712 (T) 4,160 (H)</td>
<td>10.09 (T) 11.39 (H)</td>
<td>10.0 (H)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1937</td>
<td>11 (S) 7 (S)</td>
<td>None (H)</td>
<td>30,500 (S)</td>
<td>75.27 (S)</td>
<td>90.0 (S)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>4,700 (T) 6,600 (H)</td>
<td>11.24 (T) 15.79 (H)</td>
<td>30.0 (H)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

S = Sinhalese  
T = Tamil  
H = Moslem  

The percentages of the voters and the members elected were calculated by the author.

1. Ceylon Times, 14 April 1882.  
2. Ceylon Times, 19 May 1885.  
3. Ceylon Times, 20 April 1887.  
4. Ceylon Times, 2 April 1891.  
5. Ceylon Times, 9 April 1894.  
6. Ceylon Times, 7 May 1897.  
7. Ceylon Times, 20 April 1901.  
8. Ceylon Times, 6 April 1903.  
9. Ceylon Times, 10 April 1906.  
12. Ceylon Times, 10 April 1911.  
15. Ceylon Times, 18 May 1923.  
## APPENDIX IX

### MUNICIPAL COUNCIL, COLOMBO, CANDIDATES AND VOTERS, FROM 1881-1944

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Dates</th>
<th>Candidates</th>
<th>Elected</th>
<th>Nominated</th>
<th>Number of Voters</th>
<th>Percentage of the Voters</th>
<th>Percentage of the Members Elected</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1885</td>
<td>10 (S)</td>
<td>6 (S)</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>30,600 (S)</td>
<td>85.43% (S)</td>
<td>60% (S)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>6 (T)</td>
<td>2 (T)</td>
<td>1 (M)</td>
<td>2,720 (T)</td>
<td>7.59% (T)</td>
<td>10% (T)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>2 (M)</td>
<td>-</td>
<td></td>
<td>2,500 (H)</td>
<td>6.98% (M)</td>
<td>10% (M)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1900-4</td>
<td>60 (S)</td>
<td>21 (S)</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>155,685 (S)</td>
<td>82.12% (S)</td>
<td>32.5% (S)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-8-12</td>
<td>4 (T)</td>
<td>11 (T)</td>
<td></td>
<td>18,526 (T)</td>
<td>9.77% (T)</td>
<td>27.5% (T)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>27 (H)</td>
<td>8 (H)</td>
<td></td>
<td>15,378 (H)</td>
<td>8.11% (H)</td>
<td>20.0% (H)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1916-20</td>
<td>72 (S)</td>
<td>29 (S)</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>174,651 (S)</td>
<td>77.81% (S)</td>
<td>63.06% (S)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-24-28</td>
<td>47 (T)</td>
<td>11 (T)</td>
<td></td>
<td>27,910 (T)</td>
<td>12.43% (T)</td>
<td>23.9% (T)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>24 (M)</td>
<td>6 (H)</td>
<td></td>
<td>21,920 (H)</td>
<td>9.76% (H)</td>
<td>13.04% (H)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1932-36</td>
<td>130 (S)</td>
<td>43 (S)</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>1,420,754 (S)</td>
<td>94.59% (S)</td>
<td>58.11% (S)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-40-44</td>
<td>74 (T)</td>
<td>23 (T)</td>
<td></td>
<td>41,606 (T)</td>
<td>2.77% (T)</td>
<td>11.08% (T)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>39 (H)</td>
<td>8 (H)</td>
<td></td>
<td>39,665 (H)</td>
<td>2.64% (H)</td>
<td>10.81% (H)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

S = Sinhalese  
T = Tamil  
M = Muslim

The percentage of the voters and the members elected were calculated by the author.

For Footnotes see Appendix III.

## APPENDIX X

### MUNICIPAL COUNCIL, GALLE, CANDIDATES AND VOTERS, FROM 1882-1917

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Dates</th>
<th>Candidates</th>
<th>Elected</th>
<th>Nominated</th>
<th>Number of Voters</th>
<th>Percentage of the Voters</th>
<th>Percentage of the Members Elected</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1882,</td>
<td>34 (S)</td>
<td>24 (S)</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>26,120 (S)</td>
<td>88.23% (S)</td>
<td>85.72% (S)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1883,</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>1,270 (T)</td>
<td>4.29% (T)</td>
<td>14.28% (M)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1887,</td>
<td>8 (H)</td>
<td>4 (H)</td>
<td></td>
<td>2,215 (M)</td>
<td>7.48% (M)</td>
<td>14.28% (M)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1891</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>29,130 (S)</td>
<td>83.64% (S)</td>
<td>87.5% (S)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1894,</td>
<td>28 (S)</td>
<td>28 (S)</td>
<td></td>
<td>1,548 (T)</td>
<td>4.75% (T)</td>
<td>11.63% (M)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1897,</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>4,050 (M)</td>
<td>11.63% (M)</td>
<td>12.5% (H)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1901,</td>
<td>9 (H)</td>
<td>4 (H)</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>31,215 (S)</td>
<td>81.44% (S)</td>
<td>100% (S)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1906,</td>
<td>38 (S)</td>
<td>28 (S)</td>
<td></td>
<td>2,130 (T)</td>
<td>5.34% (T)</td>
<td>13.02% (H)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1911,</td>
<td>2 (H)</td>
<td>-</td>
<td></td>
<td>5,008 (H)</td>
<td>15.77% (H)</td>
<td>15.77% (H)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1911,</td>
<td>13 (M)</td>
<td>7 (S)</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>39,870 (S)</td>
<td>77.86% (S)</td>
<td>100% (S)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1917,</td>
<td>45 (S)</td>
<td>7 (S)</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>3,260 (T)</td>
<td>6.37% (T)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1920,</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>8,078 (H)</td>
<td>15.77% (H)</td>
<td>15.77% (H)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1923,</td>
<td>13 (M)</td>
<td>25 (S)</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>79,600 (S)</td>
<td>75.72% (S)</td>
<td>92.59% (S)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1925,</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>11,012 (T)</td>
<td>10.47% (T)</td>
<td>92.59% (S)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1930,</td>
<td>44 (S)</td>
<td>2 (H)</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>14,520 (H)</td>
<td>13.81% (M)</td>
<td>7.41% (M)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>and 1937</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>79,600 (S)</td>
<td>75.72% (S)</td>
<td>92.59% (S)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

S = Sinhalese  
T = Tamil  
M = Muslim

The percentage of the voters and the members elected were calculated by the author.

For Footnotes see Appendix V.
APPENDIX XI

THE MUSLIM POPULATION OF COLOMBO, KANDY AND GALLE

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Dates</th>
<th>Municipal Councils</th>
<th>Muslim Population</th>
<th>Percentage of Total Population</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1885</td>
<td>Colombo</td>
<td>52,208</td>
<td>6.79%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Kandy</td>
<td>8,276</td>
<td>5.59%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Galle</td>
<td>6,588</td>
<td>4.06%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1921</td>
<td>Colombo</td>
<td>72,837</td>
<td>5.75%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Kandy</td>
<td>13,287</td>
<td>6.01%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Galle</td>
<td>11,500</td>
<td>4.00%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1944</td>
<td>Colombo</td>
<td>156,572</td>
<td>5.17%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Kandy</td>
<td>31,280</td>
<td>6.45%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Galle</td>
<td>45,550</td>
<td>4.16%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

3. Ibid., p. 68.
4. Ibid.
5. Ibid., p. 100.
6. Ibid., p. 66.
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The Deed No. 2571. This deed belongs to Al-Madrasatul-Baari Arabic College, Weligama, Sri Lanka. In the possession of the Principal, Sheikh Abdul Cader, Baari Arabic College, Weligama, Sri Lanka.

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