BASIC VALUES AND DERIVED VALUES

BY

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CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION
1. Aims of this Work

This work has three distinguishable but closely related aims. Firstly, I shall seek to give a systematic account of the total field of the value qualities in the things and experiences that we call "good" or "valuable", endeavouring to show the inter-relationships of all values to all other values. Secondly, such a comprehensive account of the field of values will lead, I hope, to a re-orientation of the study of each of the various disciplines within this field, as, for example, aesthetics, ethics and part at least of what is included under philosophy of religion. Thirdly, this account is intended to substantiate, both directly and indirectly, the objectivist point of view upon which it is built. I shall now say something in greater detail about each of these aims.

2. (1) A Correlation of the Total Field of Values

The kind of purpose that I have in mind here can be indicated by referring to the work of the German philosopher and axiologist Nicolai Hartmann. It is not the details of Hartmann's work but his general intention that seems important to me. This, he tells us, is to achieve a point of view from which it is possible to survey the total field of values and to understand the inter-relationships between the various things
that we call "good" in such diverse realms as art, morality, religion, economics and in whatever other contexts we talk of things being "good".

In spite of its availability in translation the details of Hartmann's work are relatively unfamiliar to most English speaking philosophers. I shall not, therefore, bother my readers with discussing any of the details of the work with much of which I find myself in disagreement. Rather I should like to pinpoint two features in his general intention which I have sought to emulate.

The first is the ideal of comprehensiveness. It is not only in the field of morals that the concepts of "good" or "valuable" are used, but also in those of religion, aesthetics and economics. It is not satisfactory surely that these fields should almost always be studied separately if there is any ground at all for believing that they share some common features. Evidence that such grounds exist is given in the use of the same words such as "good" and "valuable" and many other words common to these diverse fields; and more important is the "felt analogy" (to use a phrase of Otto's) between religion, aesthetic and moral experience. It is from this "felt analogy" that the use of this common language has arisen. These considerations may fall short of proof that these fields possess common features which would justify a synthetic study of them. Yet it could scarcely be seriously denied that they provide prima facie grounds for attempting such a synthetic enquiry.
The second feature of Hartmann's work which has influenced my own is what he calls, perhaps not entirely happily, "deduction". "Deduction" in my own case is only one of a series of activities in my investigation of values. This investigation begins with the discovery of a distinction within the realm of all the things and experiences that we call good or valuable, between those kinds of things which are good in the most basic sense and those which are good in some derived sense. There are so far as I can discover four basic values, namely: the order of nature, living things, persons and a holy Being. To the discussion of each of these I shall devote a chapter. It is from these basic values that the derived values derive their worth in several different ways which I call "principles of derivation". I wish to point out that the distinction between basic and derived values is one which exists in re and which one discovers. Likewise the "principles of derivation" are discovered because they summarise the relationships which occur in re and are used as the most appropriate descriptions of the relationships which in fact exist between basic values and derived values.

Having once discovered the distinction between "basic values" and "derived values" and the "principles of derivation" it is then possible by the application of these principles to the basic values to determine deductively a priori what the precise value quality of any thing or experience will be. It is not the purpose of this work to do these deductions in detail. My main purpose is to construct the conceptual framework within
which such deductions could be carried out. Any deductions which I make are given by way of illustration only.

This task will require the employment of a special terminology to take account of a parallelism to be explained in due course in the diverse fields in which we find things that we call "good", in particular in the fields of religion, morality and art.

One of the merits of a procedure such as this is the well known merit of "Occam's razor" attested alike in science and philosophy. This is the merit of simplicity. Its danger is that of contorting one's experience of values to make it fit into a particular mould. This is the danger of a false simplification. I shall have to leave it to others to decide whether the simplification here suggested is a true or a false one.
2. (2.) A Re-Orientation of the Study of Religion, Morality and Art.

The first aim which I have just described necessarily involves this second one; and any success in the former might reasonably be expected to carry with it some success in the latter also. I shall in due course argue for the need of such a re-orientation on the grounds that any definitions of the fields covered by "religion", "morality" and "art", as these words are commonly used, are so riddled with ambiguity as to make their employment for the purposes of precise discussion virtually impossible.

To attempt to redefine these terms for philosophic purposes seems to me to be unwise because such redefinitions would be so different from the common usage of these terms that they would be positively misleading. When I use these terms I shall, therefore, use them in their popular and ambiguous sense. My more important statements, however, on the subjects to which these terms rather vaguely refer will employ the technical terminology which I have already mentioned. This terminology is based on an examination of the complex phenomena of the personal life of man; and in its adoption I try to take account of the interlocking nature of the various phases and aspects of man's personal experience and activity. It seems to me that any simple division of man's personal life into disparate parts as is suggested by common speech, almost certainly is a false one. In contrast, therefore, the terminology I propose is designed to take cognisance of the complex and
interlocking nature of the several elements of man's personal life.

A re-orientation such as this will, I hope, provide a more adequate understanding of the field of values as a whole, and will also give a clue to the solution of some traditional problems in theology, ethics and aesthetics.
4. (3.) **A Substantiation of Objectivism**

This third aim I hope to achieve in two rather different ways. Firstly, I shall argue that no general defence of objectivism is possible in advance of an examination of some of the varied ways in which we use the word "good", nor in advance of an examination of some of the things that one claims to be objectively and intrinsically good. It is only of the four basic values and of the internally derived values that I, in fact, make the claim that they are good in themselves. In the chapter which I give to each of the four basic values in turn I shall discuss their nature and also try to exhibit their goodness. I wish to stress the obvious point, which alas is often overlooked, that it is not incumbent upon an objectivist to argue that all uses of the word "good" refer to objective value properties in things. He need defend only the objective nature of the value property in those things for which he makes the claim that they possess it. A corollary of this is that no general attack on objectivism which is based on the fact that some uses of the word "good" do not refer to an objective value property has any force against an objectivism of the precise and limited type which I recommend.

Secondly, the later chapters of this work on the "derived values" are also relevant to the strengthening of the objectivist claim, but in a rather different way, by providing an alternative explanation for the facts which most of all seem to tell against objectivism. The facts to which I refer are the enormous number of conflicting moral judgements and value judgements
generally that are made by different people, and the failure of objectivists to provide a clearly defined scheme by which it can be settled which of these judgements are right and which are wrong. This work claims to offer such a scheme; and if this scheme is correct even in its general outline then it should be apparent that the system by which different things are said to be good or valuable in one of the "derived" senses is exceedingly complex. It is not surprising therefore that individuals and social groups should make mistakes, become muddled in their value judgements, and sometimes be reluctant or even unable to examine a matter of such complexity.
5. **Establishment of the Starting Point**

Every philosophical work must begin somewhere, and must make certain assumptions if it is to get started at all. Few thinkers today would accept the Cartesian ideal that our knowledge can and should be built of proved statements resting upon bedrock certainties. The hope of such certain knowledge was an illusion of a Rationalism of a bygone day. In some quarters it has been replaced by a modern irrationalism and elsewhere by a despair of any knowledge at all, except the most mundane. Neither of these alternatives seems acceptable to me. It appears to me that a modified form of the Cartesian ideal is sound. Obviously we must ensure that our foundations and their superstructure are as secure as possible. We should know what we are proving and what assumptions we are building upon. Also we should distinguish between reasonable and unreasonable assumptions, and endeavour to provide some indication of the reasonableness of the assumptions upon which we build. This is what may be called the establishment of one's starting point; and to this I now turn.

This task seems to me in principle to fall into two parts:

1. establishing what I take to be the meaning of the concept "good" or "valuable", and differentiating this meaning from some unacceptable accounts of the usage of these words.
(2) considering the question "what things are intrinsically good?" Beginning by looking at some suggested accounts of what things are good in themselves, I shall then indicate what seem to me to be inadequacies in these schemes; and this should lead on to some positive suggestions on this matter.

It is not possible in practice to keep these two tasks entirely apart even if we must continue to distinguish between them in their theoretical significance. The reason for this is that in the discussion of the meaning of "good" or "valuable" it is inevitable that one should cite examples of things or experiences that are called "good" or "valuable." Now it seems to me that by a biassed selection of such examples the scales of the argument can be quite unfairly weighted in favour of one type of theory of the meaning of "good" or "valuable." Further, the consideration of whether or not certain examples of things said to be "good" or "valuable" is a biassed selection is a consideration of Question Two regarding what things are good in themselves. I shall none the less consider these two matters in the order suggested so far as this is possible, but the reader must expect the kind of overlap that I have indicated as inevitable. In the discussion of Question One, the meaning of "good", I shall make certain assumptions regarding Question Two, what things are good in themselves, in order to illustrate my position. The establishment of these values will be attempted later. No
circularity is involved in this for these values will be cited only to illustrate, but not to prove my position about the meaning of "good". It seems to me, however, that some of those holding opposing theories to mine have built their case upon an argument that involves such a circularity, by using a biased selection of types of valuable things as paradigms of all values and thereby offering a proof of what they take to be the meaning of "value". 4
6. The Meaning of "Good" or "Valuable"

The position which I shall maintain is a type of that commonly known as "objective intuitionism". The clearest statement of this position, in my judgement, was given by G.E. Moore in the first chapter of *Principia Ethica*. "Good" for Moore was the name of a simple, indefinable, "non-natural" quality present in all things that are good in themselves. "Good" is never to be identified with any of the things which we call good, such as pleasure. Otherwise it would become meaningless to ask whether pleasure is good. Another way of putting this is to say that sentences with the word "good" in them are always synthetic, never analytic. To analyse "good" in terms of anything other than itself is to commit what Moore called "the naturalistic fallacy". Goodness is unanalysable because it is simple and therefore unable to be broken up into parts. As in the case of "yellow" one may point to examples of it: but a definition of what is simple such as "yellow" or "good" is impossible.

Moore, of course, distinguishes between the assertion that a thing is "good-in-itself" or "intrinsically good" and the assertion that a thing is good as a means. It is in the former only that the "non-natural" quality called goodness is said to be present. This is a fairly obvious and fundamental point. Yet many of Moore's critics, although paying lip service to this point, have failed to appreciate it fully, and have built up a criticism of Moore that rests ultimately on a blurring of this obvious distinction. I shall have occasion to revert to this matter at a later point.
I do not, however, wish to follow Moore in detail in the meaning he gives to the notion of "intrinsically good" or "good-in-itself". I prefer to adopt A.C. Ewing's wider use of these terms which he explains thus, "By calling anything 'intrinsically good'or 'good-in-itself' I do not mean to commit myself to the view that it would necessarily be good in all contexts or would still be good if everything else in the universe were different ... What I mean by 'good-in-itself' is simply 'good itself' in opposition to good as a means; that is, I mean that the thing called good really has the characteristic goodness in its primary sense, and is not merely called good because it produces something else which has the quality in question. As far as I can see, something might really have the characteristic goodness in some contexts and not in others, or have it only in a lower degree, as a poker is really hot when placed near the fire and not hot or not so hot when placed elsewhere". These remarks are particularly relevant to my own position since I shall argue that an important group of values which I shall call "the internally derived values" and which includes such things as the personal enjoyment of beauty, friendship, etc. and creative and other personal activities, are intrinsically valuable albeit their value is derived from a context of basic values as I shall in due course explain.

The strength of the objective intuitionist position is that it gives a more adequate account than any alternative theory of what is involved in making a value judgement.
I make a statement about value, as for example, "Life is sacred", or "Truth matters", whatever else I am doing, the most significant thing is that I am saying something that, whether rightly or wrongly, I believe to be true. I am not simply expressing the conventional opinions of the society in which I have been reared, because sometimes I find myself making value judgements which are opposed to conventional opinion. Nor am I describing my own desires or interests, because sometimes I know that my duty is opposed to all my desires or interests either immediate or long term. Still less am I expressing an emotion, because some of the value statements I make have no significant emotional concomitant. Even when they have an emotional accompaniment, this is quite a different thing from the judgement itself. Nor is a value statement a kind of disguised command or commendation because I can conceivably have opinions on morals which I do not intend to impose either on myself or on others. In short, when I speak about values I am making judgements and claiming that something is the case, i.e., that something is true.

The implausible account of value experience and of the value judgement offered by every type of subjectivist theory compels me to seek for a more satisfactory account of value in an objectivist theory. But this does not mean that an objectivist account of values is without problems. There are two matters in particular about which much argument has centred and to these I now turn. They are (1) what is the nature of this "non-natural" quality that is called goodness? And, (2) what epistemological account
be given
is to / of our awareness of this quality?

What kind of quality is goodness? Many thinkers have
found it so difficult to answer this question with any degree
of precision that they have been led to the conclusion that
goodness cannot be said to be a quality at all. I would
like to look at two different ways of putting these consider-
ations: one from the radical point of view of empirical
analysis, and the other from the more moderate point of view
of new Idealism.

7. **Empirical Properties and Values**

P.H. Nowell-Smith in his "Ethics" argues from the position
that all "empirical properties" are known by sense perception,
and that only such properties are objective. The main consideration
which he cites in support of this position is that with regard
to "empirical properties" we can distinguish between what a thing
"looks" or "feels" and what it "really is". No such distinction
is possible, so he alleges, in the case of values. Our ability
to make this distinction between "looks or feels" and "really is"
with regard to "empirical properties" depends, the argument runs,
upon our ability to apply tests. These tests are of two kinds
appropriate to different cases.

(a) The first type of test is to ask how the particular
property, the colour of some article for example, appears to
the "normal observer", under "standard conditions". However, does not tell us the tests for ascertaining whether we have a "normal observer" and "standard conditions". These phrases are ambiguous. The "normal observer" might mean the "average observer" or "observer who conforms to majority judgments", and in his discussion of the case of the colour-blind man, which I shall examine shortly, this seems to be the sense in which he takes the phrase "normal observer". However, at another place he writes: "Our ordinary language allows for the possibility, however remote, of everyone being mistaken", and that the truth is not settled by a Gallup Poll. This suggests a quite different meaning for the phrase "normal observer". He could, for instance, mean something like "The observer who is least influenced by subjective elements and in a position to know the truth". This seems to me to be a legitimate meaning to give the phrase "normal observer" but with this meaning it would become impossible to be sure when we had a "normal observer": and if we cannot be sure when we have obtained the services of a "normal observer" we cease to be able to use him to provide a test as to what "really is" as distinct from what "looks" or "feels". But I cannot find that Nowell-Smith clears up this ambiguity.

In discussing the case of the colour-blind man and of how he accepts the judgment of those who have colour vision as more correct than his own ("It must really be brown since everyone else says that it is brown.") Nowell-Smith is here clearly taking the meaning of "normal" observer to be "average" or
"majority". But in this account of the colour-blind man, surely he is wrong. It is not because persons with colour vision are in the majority that the colour-blind man accepts the judgements based on their vision as more correct than his own; but rather because their judgements indicate that their colour vision is more discriminating than his own that he comes to accept it as more valid than his own. Even if colour-blind persons were in the vast majority in society and persons with colour-discrimination were few, I think it not improbable that even here all the more intelligent colour-blind persons would still accept the colour-discriminating vision of the minority as being more valid than their own.

Now I suggest that we have a situation analogous to this in awareness of value. It is surely possible to find the devotee of ragtime who will admit that, although he does not appreciate Bach and Beethoven himself, yet he is prepared to grant that the enjoyment of classical music is higher than his own enjoyment. If we were to question him in Socratic fashion as to how he can make this admission it would certainly not be that the devotees of the classics are in a majority but rather that he recognises that they have a more discriminating sensitivity than his own. So too, we could illustrate and press the point with regard to the appreciation of different levels of literature and the plastic arts. So too, it is not impossible to get the roue to admit that the way of life of the scholar of the saint is much superior to his own.
(b) The second type of test which Nowell-Smith cites for enabling us to make the distinction between what a property "really is" and what it "looks" or "feels" like is the use of instruments such as scales and thermometers. For example, we can decide what the temperature "really is" as opposed to what it "feels" like by taking a thermometer reading. "If these conditions were not fulfilled", i.e., the condition of having precise techniques of measurement, "we should have, in short, no use for the double language of 'feels' and 'is.'" We are able to contrast real weight with felt weight, not because we have some mysterious insight into an unobservable real property, . . . but because there is a marked contrast between the balance test and the feeling test." Since there is no corresponding instrument for giving us precise measurements of values, we cannot, therefore, make the distinction between "is good" and "seems good".

This seems to me to be an unacceptable argument for several reasons. Firstly, there was a time before thermometers and scales were invented. Does Nowell-Smith seriously suggest that before their invention no distinction could be drawn between the real and the apparent weight or temperature? He seems to be confusing man's ability to make this distinction with his ability to settle his arguments about it in a precise way. Then again, supposing it were discovered that the thermometer were false, that, for example, the difference between certain units of temperature as these are registered on a mercury thermometer did not exactly correspond to the difference between these same
units of temperature when measured by some other device, would this mean that the distinction between real and apparent temperatures could no longer be drawn? Indeed, I understand that there is, in fact, a difference between the mercury thermometer and the absolute thermometric scale which is, of course, independent of the expansion and contraction of any particular substance and depends upon the fundamental properties of heat itself. I am informed that this absolute measure of temperature was first given by Lord Kelvin who based his system upon Carnot's thermodynamic cycle. Now there are no a priori reasons for believing that any scientific instrument ever devised, or yet to be devised, should not subsequently prove to be providing a system of measuring heat, weight, or any other natural quality, which was clearly at variance with the system of measuring used by some other type of instrument which measured the same phenomenon by a different means. At this point we could quite reasonably ask the question: "Which instrument provides the means of measuring the real temperature?" And it is important to notice that we could ask this question before we had any clue as to how to answer it. These considerations show clearly that the ability to make and understand the distinction between real and apparent temperature, weight, etc., is independent of the means of measuring them scientifically. Now if making and understanding the distinction between real and apparent in the case of natural properties does not depend upon instruments of measurement, then clearly the absence of such instruments of
measurement in the case of value qualities should not discredit
the distinction between real and apparent in the case of value
qualities either.

Although I think I have proved my point, I would like to
press the argument a little further by making a very tentative
suggestion. There seems to me to be no reason in principle why
there should not be instruments to measure the value qualities
of things. Perhaps we have some indication of the kind of thing
that this might be in the case of intelligence tests in children.
Should we not also be able to devise means of testing other
elements in personal worth such as courage, loyalty, etc.?
And do we not already have some achievement in this direction
in the various personality inventories which educational
psychologists have devised? 13

It would be rightly retorted to this suggestion that what
is being measured in these cases is not the same as our experience
of personal worth and of what we mean by it. Of course not,
but then it should also be pointed out that neither is the
movement of the mercury in the thermometer the same as our
experience of heat and cold and of what we mean by these terms.
In the case of heat and cold, although we continue to mean
something quite independent of thermometer readings by these
terms, we none-the-less accept the thermometer readings as
relevant, because loosely correlated with the same heat and
cold that we feel. So too "mutatis mutandis", the meaning of
personal worth is not given us by an examination of the
techniques of measuring it; yet there is no reason why these
techniques should not similarly be relevant to what we experience and mean by personal worth.

I am quite aware of the controversial nature of this last suggestion. Since, however, my argument against Nowell-Smith does not, it seems to me, depend upon this particular point, I shall not try to substantiate it any further in the meantime.

Let us consider the point that we have now reached in our argument. In recommending a type of objective intuitionism like that of G. E. Moore's I came to consider Nowell-Smith's attack on the suggestion that good is the name of a simple, "non-natural" quality present in the things that are good in themselves. Awareness of an objective property, he had argued, depends upon the making or understanding of the distinction between what the property of a thing seems to be and what it "really is". Making this distinction depends, in turn, upon one or other of two devices by which we can test or measure what the property of a thing really is. This argument, I have shown, is unsound. Our ability to make the distinction between what the property of a thing "seems" and what it "really is" does not at all depend upon these tests by which we can gauge what the property really is. Exactly the reverse seems to be the case; that we make and understand the distinction between what the property seems to be and what it really is before and as a necessary condition of being able to test or measure that property. Therefore the argument that we cannot make the distinction between apparent and real value qualities because
we have no means of testing or measuring these qualities obviously fails. And the impossibility of making this distinction cannot therefore be used as an argument against the objectivity of value qualities.
8. Misleading Assumptions

I think it is instructive to enquire at this point how it is that Nowell-Smith comes to use arguments that are so clearly untenable. I wish to suggest four features in his approach to the subject which mislead him. Firstly he limits his field of value enquiry to moral enquiry. If my contention be correct that the nature of morality is only to be adequately understood when seen in the perspective of the total field of values, then it is not surprising that this restricting of his field debars him from certain insights he might otherwise have. So, too, the chemist who ignores physics is debarred from certain insights in the understanding of his own subject which a fellow scientist with a wider field of understanding is likely to have.

The insight in particular which I hope to offer is in making clear that the morality of any mode of conduct derives from the basic values and primarily from the higher basic value of persons. Now it is easier to find agreement about the worth of the higher basic values such as persons than about the morality of particular modes of conduct because of the complex means by which the value of the latter is derived. When, therefore, the derived nature of the value of particular modes of conduct is understood, an insight is then given into the nature of the disagreements that arise concerning them and such disagreements, therefore, cease to surprise or worry us so much; but when this is not understood such disagreements are more likely to seem final and irreconcilable.
Secondly, Nowell-Smith takes a rather one-sided view about the nature of measurement. He is over-impressed by the precision that is possible in the measurement of empirical properties by means of scientific instruments. Because this same precision in the measurement of moral properties is not achieved he, therefore, concludes that these properties do not exist. But this one-sidedness is surely wrong. In all measurement there is a penumbra of vagueness which, although it may be progressively reduced through increasing perfection of the instruments of scientific measurement, can never be entirely eliminated. He quotes Sir W. David Ross from Foundations of Ethics that "while we know certain types of action to be prima facie obligatory we have only opinion about the degree of their obligatoriness ... Each person must judge according to his individual sense of the comparative strength of various claims." Nowell-Smith finds this "concession to subjectivism" as he calls it incompatible with the claim to objectivity. I cannot discover however, that Ross commits himself to the view that there are no means by which such moral opinions can become sharpened and increasingly precise. So far as Ross is concerned it seems to me that the issue is left open. My own view is that there are means by which value measurements may become increasingly precise and the penumbra of uncertainty reduced even if as in all measurements it can never be altogether eliminated.
Thirdly, Nowell-Smith considers mainly that type of objective intuitionism that is associated with the deontology of Sir W. David Ross. It seems to me that this is a particularly vulnerable type of objectivism. I have to grant that the notion of measuring the strength of a "claim" as a "duty" is a particularly baffling one because the notion of a "claim" or a "duty" is a very complex one. (I shall give my own views on this matter later). In any measurement it is essential that the things to be measured should be sorted out and understood before any measurement can take place. Some particularly complex types of things require much more sorting out than others as a preliminary to measurement, as for example, the relative humidity of the atmosphere, or Stock Exchange fluctuations. Now the measurement of values is more like these measurements than it is like the measurement of simple things such as distance, weight or temperature. The kind of sorting out of the values which I have to offer in this work may be seen as an attempt at this essential preliminary to the task of measuring them.
Fourthly, there is an implicit assumption which seems to be present in Nowell-Smith and other thinkers of this school that there are irreconcilable differences in the value judgements made by persons of different cultures, e.g. by Muslim and Christian on the number of wives one may have. The truth of this kind of assumption, it seems to me, is very much less obvious than it once was. Nowell-Smith shows no awareness of the kind of position argued by A. Macbeath in his Gifford Lectures that a common ground can almost always be found between the apparently most irreconcilable moral judgements of different religions and cultures. It is obviously only the most intelligent and tolerant members of these diverse cultures who can discover this common ground, but that they do so at all is surely significant. Take, for example, the Muslim and Christian on the question of the number of wives permissible. It is now possible to find some thoughtful members on both sides agreeing that it is not the number of wives that matters, but respect for the personality of women. The Christian for his part is prepared to concede that there is no absolute Biblical injunction of monogamy, but that monogamy is the working out of what seems the most reasonable application of this basic principle of respect for the personality of women. The Muslim also acknowledges this basic principle and points out that in the Quranic requirement that all wives be treated exactly equally, this basic attitude of respect is operative. Some Muslims
take the further interesting step of arguing that the Quranic requirement of equal treatment, since it is an impossible condition for any man with more than one wife, is really a roundabout way of indicating the desirability of monogamy.

9. The "Forms" of Goodness

The second type of criticism of Moore's notion of goodness as an indefinable, non-natural quality that I want to consider is that made by Professor Brand Blanshard in his Gifford Lectures, Reason and Goodness. It is important to realise that this is a position very much nearer Moore's and indeed he shares with Moore the general objective intuitionist standpoint. Blanshard's difficulty, which, he tells us, was found also by Joseph, Taylor, Paton and Ewing, is that he cannot discern this quality called goodness which is the same in all the things we call good and yet is separable from the "good-making characteristics" of these things. Let us look at these two points in turn. The
quality yellow is identifiable and sufficiently the same in a yellow leaf, a yellow umbrella, and a yellow lemon pie; but we cannot isolate and identify the goodness of knowledge, of a chocolate eclair and The Moonlight Sonata in the same way. Further, although in the case of the colour yellow we can distinguish between the extended surface of cloth, metal or any other material and its yellowness, we do not seem to be able to make any corresponding distinction between a pleasurable experience and its goodness, or between an experience of knowledge or beauty, etc., and its goodness. This seems to be very odd, Blanahard thinks, if indeed goodness is a quality at all. Therefore he suggests that it is better to follow the example of Aristotle and talk about goodness being found in as widely differentiated forms as the categories of being itself. "To be wise", Blanahard says, "is to realize goodness in one of its forms." So, too, pleasure, beauty, etc., are all alike different forms of goodness. Thus Blanahard offers a theory of goodness as objective without being an objective quality.

It does not seem to me to be of vital importance to my own position whether I prefer an objectivism of Moore's or Blanahard's type. I shall not at present, therefore, develop and weigh the arguments for these positions with the care that they otherwise merit. I shall, however, indicate the considerations that still incline me more towards Moore's position than towards Blanahard's.
1. I think the question has to be asked of Blanshard's theory: "How do we know that pleasure, knowledge, beauty, etc., are different "forms" of goodness?" The answer, I think, must take one or other of two possible lines. Either one may try to point to some common feature, however elusive it may be, by which one recognises that these are different forms of goodness, i.e., one has to resort to Moore's non-natural quality present intrinsically in each as evidence that they are different forms of goodness. On the other hand, one may make reference to some "pro-attitude" on man's part, such as human desire, interest, approval, etc., i.e., one may resort to one of the many possible types of subjective explanation of goodness. Thus it seems to me that Blanshard's position is an unstable one which must ultimately be resolved in one or other of these directions.

2. I would suggest that the difficulty which Blanshard and some other objectivists find with Moore's position might be resolved if more attention were given to the idea of a "non-natural" quality. The point of this description is to indicate that goodness is not a quality like yellow or any other quality that is known through sense perception. This is admittedly a negative account of it; and it is perhaps not possible to say very much more positively about the kind of quality goodness is until we look at the question of how it is known. And this I propose to do shortly. In the meantime it should be sufficient to say that all that I mean by the term "a non-natural quality" is "a quality that we meet with by means other than sense-perception". That we do encounter qualities
in things by means other than sense, I shall try to indicate in due course.

3. Professor Blanchard makes the task of identifying the non-natural quality of goodness unnecessarily difficult by deliberately putting side by side the most diverse "forms of goodness". He writes for example: "There are a good many things that we regard as thus intrinsically good. There is the good man, the good picture, the good holiday, the good dessert, the good walk, the good scientific theory." And again a few pages later he refers to the goodness "found in a chocolate eclair and The Moonlight Sonata". I have already pointed out that Moore distinguishes between intrinsic goodness and instrumental goodness; and it is in the former only that the non-natural quality called "goodness" is said to be present. Are not "the good holiday", "the good dessert" and "the good walk" all instances of instrumental goods rather than intrinsic goods? Further, does "the good man" possess the same kind of goodness as the goodness of his experiences, such as his experience of "the good scientific theory", of "the good picture" and of "The Moonlight Sonata?" The good man, it seems to me, does not depend upon any human appreciation for his goodness, but good theories, pictures and music do depend upon human appreciation. In other words one must distinguish between basic goodness and derived goodness; and also there are various ways that goodness can be derived. Perhaps this is a similar point to Blanchard's that there are many diverse "forms" of goodness. But this does not discredit
Moore's "non-natural quality" provided one can show (a) how one form is derived from more basic forms, and (b) that this quality is present within the basic forms. The demonstration of the systematic derivation of the different forms of goodness or value is the main intention of this work.

4. It should be admitted, however, that Moore's example of yellowness as a property to which goodness is analogous is misleading. It would be better, I think, to say that goodness is a property like colour. Then one can point out that just as there are different kinds of colour, such as yellow, blue, red, etc., so also there are different kinds of goodness, such as beauty, life, personality, etc. Perhaps this is Blanshard's point; but I cannot see that it involves the rejection of the notion of goodness as a quality. This change in the analogy may meet some of the difficulties that some thinkers have found in describing goodness as a quality.
Further Discussion of the Meaning of "Good" or "Valuable."

It is clear that when Moore described good as indefinable he was referring only to definition by analysis and was saying that goodness, being a simple unanalysable quality, could not therefore be defined in terms of its parts for it had no parts. This did not mean that no other kind of indication of the meaning of goodness could be offered. Indeed on a later occasion Moore suggested that good meant "worth having for its own sake". This particular suggestion seems to me to be unsatisfactory on the grounds that there are some things of value in which the possibility of "having" or possessing them does not arise. Living things and persons do not depend on being possessed or enjoyed by other persons for their goodness. Their goodness is intrinsic. However, the effort to indicate by the use of synonymous words and phrases the meaning of good or valuable is undoubtedly right and proper; so let us continue to try to bring out this meaning.

When I am aware of some thing or some being having value in the basic and primary sense of the word I am aware of it as having significance or importance, not any kind of significance or importance, (for evil things also have this), but a positive and intrinsic significance or importance. In other words, it is a
positively, being that matters. Now all these words can be taken in more than one sense, and so I have to define precisely the sense that I intend. If some one were to ask: "To whom then does the good thing have significance or importance? To whom does it matter?" then I have to protest that this is not the sense of these words that I intend. The quality of goodness that I am speaking of, the quality that I am aware of some things or beings possessing is the quality of being significant or important in itself, i.e., intrinsically.

Not all the things that we refer to as "good" or "valuable" possess this quality of goodness, value, significance or importance intrinsically. Many things, indeed I believe the vast majority of the things that we call "good", are good only in a secondary sense, because of some relationship that they have (or are thought to have) to things that are intrinsically good. The existence of large numbers of things that we call good in a secondary or derived sense in which it is quite proper to ask the questions: "Good to whom?" and "Good for what?" has tended to obscure the existence of the few much more significant intrinsically good things. Indeed, some recent writers, it seems to me, have deliberately played on this fact by analysing the use of the word "good" as employed in this secondary or derived sense and presenting their results as a paradigm for all uses of the word good. To explicate the use of "good" with regard to apples as Urmson does, or with regard to motor cars and South Bank Exhibitions as Hare does, does not seem to me to help at all.
in the understanding of the primary sense of the word good. None of the examples of the use of the word good cited by these and other recent writers refer to things which an objective intuitionist would normally consider possess goodness intrinsically. Their arguments, therefore, have validity only for the type of examples they cite and do nothing whatever to discredit the objective intuitionist contention that there are other things or beings which possess goodness intrinsically.

It may be that the number of kinds of intrinsically good things is a very small number. In fact, I believe it is a very small number indeed. It is no less important for that reason; because in the kind of work in which we have engaged the discernment of those things which possess goodness intrinsically and thereby provide the source or sources by reference to which other things are described as good in a secondary sense is of the very first importance.

11. The Logic of "Value," "Valuable," "Evaluate"

I wish to clarify my position further by considering the logical relationship of the words "value," "valuable" and "evaluate." It is argued by some contemporary thinkers that the verb "to evaluate" (and its near equivalents such as "to commend," "to choose," "to grade," etc.) has logical priority over the adjective "valuable" (and its near equivalents, "commendable," "good," etc.). That is, things are said to be "valuable" simply and solely because we "evaluate" them. The abstract noun "value" arises logically
last as a general word to indicate all those things that we have evaluated in those respects, at least, in which we evaluate them.

Now it seems to me important to point out that the order of logical priority of noun, adjective and verb in the case of "value", "valuable" and "evaluate" is a matter to be settled not by looking at the words and how we use them, but by looking at reality, and "dividing reality at the joints" (to use a phrase of Plato's). Surely it is clear that it is the nature of reality that is the touchstone for the right use of words, and not our use of words that is the test for the right description of reality?

Plato, we may remember, would have put the logical order of these words in exactly the reverse order from those contemporary writers I refer to. For him the noun "value" had logical priority over the adjective "valuable", because things are "valuable" only in so far as they participate in the form of "value", and we "evaluate" things because they are "valuable".

The truth of the matter seems to me to be somewhere between these two extreme positions. I think it is important to notice that what may be the logical relationship of these words when describing one part of reality does not necessarily hold even for these same words when describing another part of reality. For example, in speaking of cars, the statement: "I value Dauphines more than Volkswagens", certainly has logical priority over the statement: "Dauphines are more valuable than Volkswagens". But it certainly does not follow from this, or even from a vast
multitude of examples like this, that the verb "to value" or "to evaluate" always has logical priority over the adjective valuable. In the two propositions: "I value persons more than animals", and "Persons are more valuable than animals", the position is reversed; and here the adjective has logical priority over the verb. That this is so can be seen, I suggest, if we consider the different nature of our reaction to a case of disagreement about the relative value of cars and our reaction to a case of disagreement about the relative value of a person and an animal. In both cases we may well participate keenly enough in the argument. However, in the former case in the last resort most of us, I think, are prepared to admit that there is room for difference of opinion, and that ultimately it is a matter of taste what one's preference is. In the latter case, however, most of us, I think, find such disagreement incredible. It shocks and appals us. We look for a way out: "Is he leg-pulling?" "Is he using words in the same sense as we are?" "Is he just showing off his dexterity in argument?" This kind of issue is not just a matter of taste at all: it is a matter of moral sense; and we feel helpless in knowing how to deal with the person who really lacks such moral sense. An important and interesting exception to this feeling of shock would be if a philosopher were to defend the proposition that persons are not more valuable than animals. This we should probably feel did not really represent an instance of lack of moral sense, but rather an instance of a certain kind of taste in philosophic theory. Therefore I submit
that there are some cases, such as the one I have considered, in which the adjective "valuable" has logical priority over the verb "to evaluate". Turning briefly to the question of the logical status of the abstract noun "value", I have no desire to differ from most contemporary thinkers that the abstract nouns "value" and "values" arise logically as general words to indicate all those things that we value, or that we perceive possess value in those respects, at least, in which we value them or perceive that they are valuable. There is no matter of dispute here. It is with regard to the logical priority of the adjective "valuable" that differences arise; and it is on the assertion that in some at least of its usages the adjective "valuable" has priority over either the verb "to value" or the noun "value" that I take my stand.

There are two reasons, it seems to me, why many people find it difficult to see this.

1. In both cases the genetical or psychological order of knowledge is the same, viz., the verb has psychological priority over the adjective; i.e., we can know the value of animals, persons, Dauphines or Volkswagens only through the experience of valuing them. But this ratio cognoscendi in no way determines the ratio essendi. In the case of cars the experience of valuing is both the ratio cognoscendi and the ratio essendi of their value. In the case of animals and persons the experience of valuing is the ratio cognoscendi of their value; but their value is the ratio essendi of the experience of value and this reversal of the order is of first importance.
2. The second reason for this type of disagreement is an axiological rather than an epistemological one. The activity of evaluation of valuable things is itself a valuable experience. It is, as I will subsequently attempt to show, a derived personal value. Therefore in the evaluation of beautiful things and living things, the activity of valuing, although a derived value is a value belonging to a higher plane of values than the objects being evaluated, and this is liable to obscure the fact that beauty and life are basic values even if they are values on a lower level than the appreciation of beauty and life (which are personal values). In a systematic account of the value quality in things such as I am here attempting, this distinction between basic and derived values is of the very first importance.

This particular type of confusion, of course, is not likely to arise in the evaluation of the worth of persons or of the holiness of God because these two values are respectively on the same and on a higher level of value than the value of the experience of these values. Therefore the person who has genuine religious experience or the person who genuinely respects his fellow-men is rarely inclined to say that God's holiness or the worth of other persons is derived from his awareness of these values as the person even of genuine aesthetic sensitivity or with genuine affection for animals may sometimes be inclined thoughtlessly to suppose that the value of beauty or the value of animal life is derived from his sensitivity to these things.
12. An Epistemology of Goodness

It should be apparent from what has already been said that my approach is an empirical one. One only knows that certain things are good because one experiences them as good. I do not know courage, or sympathy until I have seen or at least heard of courageous and sympathetic persons and actions.

But a difficulty immediately arises. I know that the grass is green because I see it is green with my eyes and I know that the ice is cold because I touch it with my fingers. But where are the sense organs by means of which I perceive that a courageous or sympathetic person is good in virtue of his courage or his sympathy; and that a cowardly or selfish person is lacking in goodness, in virtue of the lack of courage of sympathy? It would be a very dogmatic empiricism, an empiricism far removed from the true spirit of empiricism, that would delimit experience to sense experience by means of the organs of sense that we commonly recognize. There are after all no rational grounds for believing that man is incapable of developing other organs for apprehending the world in addition to the organs of sense perception. Nor is there any a priori ground for assuming that there must be a particular physical organ at all corresponding to each particular mode of empirically apprehending the world. Telepathy and clairvoyance are now fairly well attested types of extra-sensory perception; and yet they do not depend, so far as we know, upon any particular physical organs for their function.

All this may be granted. Yet it is not unreasonable to ask for a fuller account of the nature of our apprehension of the
value quality in things. Clearly the apprehension of values is not just another possible mode of apprehending the world in addition to vision, touch, hearing etc. It is not parallel to the ways of apprehending the world by the senses but rather presupposes these. And is built upon them. Unless I hear with my physical sense the sound of the orchestra playing the symphony I cannot be aware of the beauty of the piece. Unless I see the marks which indicate that a certain object is a living creature then I cannot be aware of it as having that special kind of worth that living things possess. Thus, although goodness itself is a simple, unanalysable quality, it seems invariably to be a quality of things which are not at all simple but are wholes made up of a complexity of parts. There has been much discussion among philosophers on the precise nature of the relationship between the constitutive attributes of a thing and its goodness. W.D. Ross seems to me to make a useful point in describing goodness as a "toti resultant property", i.e., a property which is dependent upon the characteristics of its possessor as a whole. These characteristics may appropriately be referred to in C.D. Broad's phrase as "good making characteristics".

Now awareness of the goodness of anything would seem to presuppose the awareness of the thing as a whole. Such an awareness of a thing as a whole does not require a detailed knowledge of its parts, and is in fact compatible with a very meagre knowledge of these parts. On the other hand it is possible to have a detailed knowledge of the parts of a thing without ever knowing the thing as a whole.
Also knowledge of the thing as a whole is a pre-condition of knowledge of its goodness, but these two are not to be identified, because it seems to me that it is possible to have knowledge of the thing as a whole without being aware of its goodness. Identification of these has led to the suggestion that awareness of value is to be epistemologically understood as a kind of "intellectual discernment". Mr. O.R. Jones, discussing the nature of our awareness of holiness, compares it to our experience of eventually making sense out of a strange drawing. "Yes, I see now that it is a duck's head." Such an experience, it seems to me, comes very close to our experience of value and probably normally gives rise to the awareness of value. Yet they are not the same. Seeing a thing as a whole is an intellectual activity appropriately described as "intellectual discernment". But it seems clear to me that seeing what a thing as a whole is may still leave one asking the question: "What is this thing worth?" If this be so then clearly seeing a thing as a whole and awareness of its worth cannot be the same. Awareness of worth, value or goodness is a further type of cognition which is not the same as the sense perception of the colour and shape of the parts of a thing, although it may frequently presuppose this; nor is it the same as the intellectual discernment of the nature of the thing as a whole, although it may usually presuppose this also. It consists of acquaintance with a further quality of the thing as a whole, namely, the thing's significance, importance, worth, value or goodness.
Admittedly to pile up the synonyms does not necessarily explain to the one who is blind to value what value awareness is. To draw attention to one further feature may, however, bring out the nature of this awareness. Awareness of a thing's value seems to me always to involve cognition of that thing as having more or less value than other things. In this respect value awareness is like sense perception. Awareness of sound always includes, latently at least, cognition of such and such a comparative pitch, loudness, etc. Awareness of touch includes cognition of comparative temperature. Vision includes comparative brightness, etc. So, too, awareness of intrinsic value is always a comparative awareness. Living things are more valuable than inorganic things. Persons are more valuable than other living creatures. It does not seem to me, however, that awareness of value is entirely described in terms of this placing of a thing in its place on the value scale, any more than sense perception is exhaustively described in terms of the placing of things in their appropriate places in scales of temperature, pitch, brightness, etc. This, however, seems to me to be a sufficient indication for my present purposes of the kind of awareness that value awareness is. It is a kind of sensitivity and I think the most useful word to indicate the nature of this kind of apprehension is "intuition".
References


2. Vide pp. 254-266 for the details of this argument.

3. Vide pp. 225-229 for an expansion of this argument; also pp.357-361.

4. Vide pp.37-38 for expansion and illustration of this point.


8. Ibid., p.52.

9. Ibid., p.55.

10. Ibid., p.59.

11. Ibid., p.54.


13. Much has been published on this in recent years primarily in the United States. See, for example, Renners and Gage, Educational Measurement and Evaluation, (Harper,1943 and 1955); and A.M. Jordan, Measurement in Education (McGraw Hill, 1953).


15. Ibid., p.60.


18. Ibid., p.271.
19. Ibid., p.266.
20. Ibid., p.270.
24. See, for example, W.D. Ross, The Right and the Good, (Oxford University Press, 1930), chapter 4.
25. Ibid., p.122.
CHAPTER II

THE BASIC VALUES
13. What Things are Good in Themselves?

I propose to approach this question by considering the kind of answers that other thinkers have given to it, and by noticing defects in their systems I hope I shall be led on to recommend a more satisfactory answer.

14. Truth, Beauty and Goodness

I start with this traditional trinity of values, not because it has any serious philosophic claim on our attention, but simply because it has held an important place in popular thinking and in the writings of poets, preachers and some philosophically more superficial thinkers. It seems to me that it is often useful to begin with the notions of ordinary people, extract what wisdom they contain, find wherein precisely they are defective and so proceed to formulate a more reasonable account.

This traditional trinity poses many questions for us about what precisely is meant by each of these terms. Do they refer to the Platonic forms of the true, the beautiful and the good, "stored up in heaven", towards which the true, beautiful and good things of this world approximate and from
which they derive what measure of truth, beauty and goodness they possess? The use of the abstract nouns, frequently printed with capital letters, certainly has such a Platonic flavour. It may even suggest personified, supernatural beings who embody these virtues. Such ways of thinking would meet with little approval from most contemporary thinkers, and I share their point of view in the matter. Undoubtedly we must begin by thinking clearly about the valuable things and experiences of this world before we are entitled to embark on aery speculations about a Reality beyond.

There is no need, however, to take this traditional trinity of values in a Platonic sense. The use of the abstract nouns may simply be a short hand way of referring to true things, beautiful things and good things. But in this case questions still arise: "What precisely does truth mean?" "Does it refer to collections of true statements in books; or to the apprehension of true notions by human minds?" Surely it must be the latter, for statements are only potentially valuable as the means of informing human minds? In this latter sense then it would seem that truth should be taken to mean knowledge.

What does "goodness" mean in this trinity? It can hardly mean goodness in general, or value: otherwise a tautology is committed of the form: "The values are knowledge, beauty and value". Presumably, therefore, "goodness" refers to moral goodness, or virtue, and thus our trinity becomes knowledge, beauty and virtue.
Two of these three, namely knowledge and virtue are attributes of persons, knowledge being an attribute of the intellect, and virtue being an attribute of the will. One wonders why only these two personal attributes were listed. It might be suggested that behind this traditional trinity of values lies the old faculty psychology in which intellect, will and emotion were thought of as constituting the human mind. If this is so, then why was not pleasure (or happiness), the attribute, one would have thought, of the emotions, listed as one of the values? It might be suggested that beauty, rather than pleasure, fills this role, and that beauty means simply "what satisfies the emotions". The difficulty with this view is, however, that it is far removed from the ordinary meaning of beauty and could only have been suggested as the result of philosophic thinking about beauty. But whatever one may think of this as a philosophic account of the meaning of beauty, it will hardly do as an account of its ordinary meaning, and therefore is not acceptable as its meaning in the popular trinity of "truth, beauty and goodness". (I have, in fact, no intention of accepting the old faculty psychology, nor of building an account of personal values upon that. What I recommend and shall endeavour to achieve is an enquiry into the nature of a person and a deduction of the personal values from the results of this enquiry.)

Beauty, then, stands alone in the traditional trinity as
the only one of the values that is not a personal attribute. Did the formulators of this trinity of values really believe that beautiful things are valuable apart from the human appreciation of them? Or did they perhaps really intend "beauty" to stand for "appreciation of beauty"?

Assuming, however, that beauty is intended to be considered as valuable apart from human consciousness, one then wishes to ask why beauty alone should be put in this class. One thinks, for example, of animal life other than human, animal life that existed in the millennia before the emergence of man, and animal life that still exists in jungles remote from human ken. Has this life no value in its own right? Few things seem more self-evident to me than that animal life has intrinsic worth; and that the animals which are the servants, or pets, or biological curiosities of men do not derive their worth from our interest in them but have it in their own right. I shall return to this later.

Then in addition to beautiful things and living creatures there are those objects of religious significance which are described by religious people as "sacred" or "holy". Now whatever non-religious people may think of these things, it seems impossible to me that any religious person can overlook the importance of "holy" things or can entertain the view that their worth is derived from any human source. We shall discuss this matter at greater length later and shall take note of the disagreements among religious people about the
nature of holy things. But in one thing we shall see that there is unanimity, namely that holiness is of supremely great worth and the source of this worth is one that transcends all human or personal life.

Now to revert to those values that we have described as personal attributes; virtue, knowledge, happiness and whatever others there may be, it is necessary to ask a very obvious question, namely: "Do these personal values derive their worth from being the attributes of persons; or do persons derive their worth because they possess some or more of these attributes?" Or is there perhaps a third possibility? This third position, a combination of the other two, is the one that seems most reasonable to me. It is that these personal attributes have neither existence nor value save as attributes of persons, and therefore, it is in human persons that we find the basic value from which personal attributes derive whatever worth they have. At the same time the precise value of a human person is determinable by reference to those attributes which are the specific marks of a person.
I link these two thinkers together not because they offer the same answer to the question: "What things are good in themselves?" There are in fact very significant differences in the answers they give; but none the less, there is sufficient in common in their approach to this question for my purpose, and they provide an illustration of two thinkers to whom "personal values" are the only conceivable values. The kind of criticism I wish to make is essentially the same in each case.

Kant opens his *Fundamental Principles of the Metaphysic of Ethics* with the famous assertion that, "Nothing can possibly be conceived in the world or even out of it, which can be called good without qualification, except a Good Will". Then he goes on to consider other things that might possibly claim to be unconditionally good, such as talents of the mind or gifts of fortune that men may possess. It is interesting and important, it seems to me, to note that the only claimants to unconditional worth that Kant considers, have all got a personal reference.

The other example I want to cite is that of W.D. Ross who in a chapter entitled, "What things are Good?", writes:
"Four things, then, seem to be intrinsically good - virtue, pleasure, the allocation of pleasure to the virtuous, and knowledge (and in a less degree right opinion). And I am unable to discover anything that is intrinsically good, which is not either one of these or a combination of two or more of them. And while this list has been arrived at on its own merits, by reflection on what we really think to be good, it perhaps derives some support from the fact that it harmonizes with a widely accepted classification of the elements in the life of the soul. It is usual to enumerate these as cognition, feeling and conation. It should be noted that the sole source from which Ross suggests that these values are derived is "the life of the soul".

To summarise, both these writers are discussing what things are valuable in themselves. This is a question not just about moral values or personal values. Reference to the context of these quotations will make it clear that they are both speaking about values in general; and yet both have come to the conclusion that all intrinsic values must be personal.

It has seemed worth while to bring out the position of these writers; and many more might be cited who take a place somewhere within this general outlook. I find this puzzling because I am convinced that this position in any of its variations
is wrong. I have already, in discussing the traditional trinity of truth, beauty and goodness, indicated in a preliminary way what my own position is. I shall now repeat it in a rather different form with reference to these two thinkers under discussion. Two main points have to be made.

(a) The personal values, moral virtue, knowledge, aesthetic enjoyment, sociability of persons and whatever further kinds of personal enjoyment there may be (and it seems to me that most moral philosophers have been lacking in imaginative appreciation of how complex and diversified the list of human enjoyments is), all of them are derived from the value of the person as such. I can understand why subjectivists might wish to deny that persons as such have value. But the thinkers we are discussing are both, in some sense of the word, objectivists. I find their position, therefore, rather puzzling. They do not deny that persons have intrinsic value. Indeed the view that persons have intrinsic worth seems to be implicit throughout their work. Yet for some reason it is never made explicit that the basic value from which all personal values are derived is the person.

(b) Some beautiful objects, living creatures and holy beings are, it seems to me, commonly apprehended as possessing a worth that is in no way dependent upon their relationship to men. Again, it is interesting to notice that the thinkers I am considering do not deny this fact but simply overlook it. One might compare the position of G.E. Moore who presents
what I consider an important argument for the objective value of beautiful things. He ignores the value of living things, however; although many people would hold that the value of living things is of a higher order than the value of beautiful things; and to religious people the value of holy beings is the highest of all.

16. Method of Demonstration Proposed

Since these matters have not to my knowledge been denied but simply overlooked, I am in the advantageous position of not requiring to controvert false arguments. I can start from scratch with a positive statement of my own.

We have then, it seems to me, four basically valuable types of things, namely, beautiful things, living creatures, persons and holy beings. In the case of each of them in turn I propose to do two things.

(a) I shall offer some kind of account of the structure of the intrinsically good thing. My purpose in this is, firstly, that we may have a clear notion of what we are discussing. Secondly, the goodness of these things depends upon certain features of their structure. This dependence is not that of entailment in the kind of way that being a triangle in Euclidean space entails the possession of three angles whose sum is two right angles. Rather the goodness of a thing, I suggest, results from the structure of the thing which possesses it in a way analogous to that in which the chemical qualities of a substance result from the atomic structure of that particular substance.
Thirdly, the account of the structure or nature of these valuable things will be found to be important when we come later on to discuss the relationship of some derived values to these basic values.

(b) I shall then try to exhibit the goodness of the thing whose nature I have endeavoured to describe. I use the word "exhibit" rather than "prove" because in the last resort no finally coercive proof is possible one way or the other in these matters. The failure to see that these four types of things possess intrinsic value is due, I believe, ultimately either to a failure of sensitivity or to a misinterpretation of experience. It is not surprising that there should be value-blind persons who fail to intuite the value qualities of things; just as there are the colour-blind who fail to perceive the colour qualities in things. But I regret that this group of truly value-blind persons are not likely to be greatly helped by my invitation to look more steadily or to look from different vantage points at these four basic values. It is another group whom I have chiefly in mind, namely those who are assuredly sensitive to values but misinterpret their experience. So completely is it possible to do this that they may deny vehemently that they have any awareness of values at all. It is possible to hear one such say: "Yes, it is self-evident to me that human personality has intrinsic worth", or something to that effect. Then in the next breath: "I know that all my value judgments are simply expressions of my emotions", or perhaps, "of my social upbringing", etc. Such a
person is prepared to misinterpret, doubt or deny his own experience in the interests of what he thinks is a well established theory. It may be that he is acquainted with a type of ethical position of a subjectivist type which seems to him highly respectable, and he lacks the intellectual acumen to assess it in the light of his own experience. Or it may be that such a position seems to him more logically and scientifically coherent and that such coherence is a more compelling influence in his beliefs than the facts of his own experience. Whatever is the explanation of such misinterpretation of value awareness, it is such persons that I have chiefly in mind as I try to give an account of the nature and an exhibition of the worth of these basic values.

In exhibiting the worth of each of the four basically valuable types of "thing" or "being" I shall have in mind (and I invite the reader to keep in mind also) that the intrinsic value of any basic value can always be intuited comparatively to the value of some other things. Thus, orderly things qua orderly things are lowest in the scale of values. Living creatures are more valuable than orderly inorganic things. Persons are more valuable than living creatures other than persons. The holy Being is more valuable than human persons and is the highest in the scale of values.

Because this is a scale of more and less valuable "things" it is to be expected that it will be easier to intu...
of the "things" of higher value in the scale and more difficult to intuit the value of the things of lower value. Observe that I do not say that it is "easier to intuit the things of higher value than the things of lower value" but rather that it is "easier to intuit the value of the 'things' of higher value than the value of the 'things' of lower value", that is, assuming that one is aware of the "things" or "beings" at all. The importance of this point is that there is a special problem about experiencing holiness. The problem in this case, however, is about whether we are aware of holiness at all; but for those who have the awareness there is no difficulty in intuiting holiness clearly as the highest of the values.

There are some people, then, who have no difficulty in intuiting the intrinsic value of holiness (if they intuit holiness at all), the intrinsic worth of persons, and perhaps also the intrinsic worth of some of the higher forms of life such as the mammals, for example, but who have difficulty in intuiting any intrinsic value in any form of plant or insect life, and still greater difficulty in intuiting that orderly things as such have any intrinsic worth. I have to confess my own uncertainty at some times as to whether I really do see these lesser basic values as being values at all. It is rather like looking at what seems to be a very low magnitude star or like listening to what seems to be a very faint and distant bird's song and being only partly convinced that one
sees or hears anything at all. Such doubts about particular cases, however, do not and should not raise general doubts about the reliability of the visual or auditory senses nor about the reality of the objects of these senses generally. No more should doubts about the value of things for which it is claimed only that they are very low on the value scale raise general doubts about the reliability of the intuition of values nor about the reality of value qualities generally. It would, however, be quite another matter if some persons were to intuit the scale of values in one order and others were to intuit the scale in an entirely different order. If, for example, some people were to intuit the inorganic world as of supreme intrinsic worth, the world of microbes, mushrooms, etc. as of scarcely less value, while the world of men and women appeared to them to be of small worth, and the holiness of God were experienced as the lowest possible value of all, such a reversal of the normal value scale would indeed raise radical problems for my position. But I do not know of any persons who, while sincerely claiming to be aware of the value of these things, would yet place them in such an utterly different order from my own. We can therefore neglect such imaginary cases.

Indeed I wish to draw particular attention to this fact which is of crucial importance for my argument, that among those who claim to intuit value in either some or all of these "things" the comparative order in which they would place those things
which they experience as valuable with respect to their value would show a striking unanimity of opinion, and this is difficult to account for except on an objectivist basis.

To those who cannot intuit any worth in orderly inorganic things, or in the lower forms of life, I would say that the remainder of my argument does not entirely rest upon the recognition of those things as having intrinsic value. Indeed a substantial part of my argument remains if persons alone are recognised as of intrinsic value. On such a basis, however, the account given of the derived values would have to be modified in certain ways.
References

1. Vide Chapter VI entitled "The Nature of Holiness".


CHAPTER III

THE ORDER OF NATURE
17. **Search for a Definition.**

It is difficult to define the word "nature" because in one sense it means simply "all that is". To use the word in this sense, however, is too wide to be useful for most purposes, and it is consequently more common to use it in a way that implies a contrast either between nature and culture (or civilization, etc.) or in a way that implies a contrast between nature and God. However, I propose to use the word without implying either of these contrasts and shall use it to mean simply "all that is" without intending to exclude man and his works, or God (if there be a God) and His works from its denotation.

By "the order of nature" I mean primarily "the orderliness of nature" and I shall frequently use the word "order" to mean no more than "orderliness". However, the phrase "the order of nature" seems to me to tend to have a further reference to the orderliness of nature as a whole, or as a system, as distinct from individual orderly things or orderly events in nature. I shall make more of this distinction in Chapter VII when I come to consider "derived order values" which refers to individual orderly events as distinct from the basic value of the orderliness of nature as a whole. But I shall not develop this distinction in the meantime. By "the order of nature", therefore, I shall mean "the orderliness of the system of nature as a whole".
We must still ask for further elucidation as to what we mean by "the order" or "the orderliness" of nature. Equivalent or near equivalent expressions would be the "uniformity", "harmony", "balance" or "regularity" of nature. But to find synonyms for this phrase is not, of course, to give an account of it. This I find no easy task. I propose, first of all, to look at some of the things that "the order of nature" does not mean in order to clarify what it does mean.

(a) "The order of nature" does not refer to nature being determined by causal laws. Different accounts can be and have been given regarding the presence of causality in nature. David Hume writes, for example, "All our reasonings concerning causes and effects are derived from nothing but custom; and that belief is more properly an act of the sensitive than of the cognitive part of our natures". But the question as to whether the regular conjunction of events entails a causal or necessary connection, or whether this is a rational assumption and precondition of our knowledge of nature, is not our concern at this moment. My point is simply that an orderly or regular sequence of events does not mean the same thing as a necessary or causal sequence. One may admit that natural events are orderly without assuming that they possess any necessary or causal relationships.
"The order of nature" does not refer to nature fulfilling a purpose. Throughout the history of Western philosophy and Western Science, discussion of the order of nature has been closely tied to the conception of purpose. R.G. Collingwood distinguishes three periods in the history of philosophy of nature:

1. The Greek, in which nature was viewed as an organism indwelt by intelligence which is the ground of the orderliness in Nature.

2. The Renaissance outlook, in which nature is a vast machine. This does not so much involve the rejection of teleology, (although Collingwood seems to think it does) as the replacement of an immanent teleology by a transcendent one.

3. The modern view, which, he alleges, involves a reintroduction of a teleology by conceiving nature as an evolutionary process. This involves the rejection of a mechanistic view of nature for(to quote Collingwood) "The only kind of change that a machine can produce in itself by its functioning is breaking down or wearing out. This is not a case of development, because it is not the acquisition of any new function, it is only a loss of old ones".
It would be interesting to pursue the question whether or not the orderliness of nature presupposes a purpose or purposes. Even if purpose is not of the essence of the order of nature, it seems to me probable that purpose is one of the forms in which the order of nature is found. But that is hardly the point. The point is one of meaning. One can deny that there is any purpose in nature without questioning that nature is orderly. Therefore clearly the notions of the order of nature and purpose in nature are not the same thing.

(c) A third view that should be considered and rejected is that "the order of nature" (or indeed, order generally, for that matter) is a general name for the categories of thought which the human mind imposes upon nature (or anything else) in seeking to understand it. Karl Pearson clearly illustrates this position in describing the mind as a "sorting-machine". He writes: "It is not hard to imagine by extension of existing machinery a great stone-sorting machine of such a character that, when a confused heap of stones was thrown in pell-mell at one end, some sizes would be rejected, while the remainder would come out at the other end of the machine sifted and sorted according to their sizes. Thus a person who solely regarded the final results of the machine might consider that only stones of
certain sizes had any existence, and that such stones were always arranged according to their sizes. In some such way as this, perhaps, we may look upon that great sorting machine—the human perception faculty........ From this standpoint the nomic natural law is an unconscious product of the machinery of the perceptive faculty, while natural law in the scientific sense is the conscious product of the reflective faculty, analysing the process of perception, the working of the sorting machine. The whole of ordered nature is there seen as the product of our mind—the only mind with which we are acquainted...." 5

Stephen Toulmin also argues to a rather similar conclusion. He denies that science has any need of an assumption about the uniformity of nature. "So it is not Nature that is Uniform but scientific procedure; and it is uniform only in this that it is methodical and self-correcting." 6

Ernest Nagel in a recent important work also concludes "For these reasons it is extremely difficult if not hopeless to regard the principle of causality as a universally valid inductive truth concerning the pervasive order of events and processes" and thinks that it is better to regard the principle of causality as "a regulative or methodological rule of enquiry". 7

On the other side a considerable amount of philosophic and scientific opinion can be cited in support of belief in the orderliness of nature. The locus classicus of this position is J. S. Mill's System of Logic. Mill writes: "The universe, so far as known to us, is so constituted, that whatever is true in
any one case is true in all cases of a certain description.....
This universal fact, which is our warrant for all inferences from
experience, has been described by different philosophers in
different forms of language; that the course of nature is uniform;
that the universe is governed by general laws; and the like......
Whatever be the most proper mode of expressing it, the proposition
that the course of nature is uniform is the fundamental principle
or general axiom of induction. It would yet be a great error to
offer this large generalisation as any explanation of the inductive
process. On the contrary, I hold it to be itself an instance of
induction, and induction by no means of the most obvious kind.
Far from being the first induction we make it is one of the last...
The truth is that this great generalisation is itself founded on
prior generalizations. The obscurer laws of nature were discovered
by means of it, but the more obvious ones must have been understood
and assented to as general truths before it was ever heard of

In similar vein A. N. Whitehead writes: "There can be no
living science unless there is a widespread instinctive conviction
in the existence of an Order of Things, and, in particular, of an
Order of Nature".

Also Professors A. Einstein and L. Infeld in a joint work
say: "Without the belief in the inner harmony of our world there
could be no science".

These two writers, it will be noticed, refer to the "order
of nature" as a belief rather than a well attested fact, "this
universal fact" as Mill calls it. But there is no hint that they
do not regard this as an entirely valid belief.

However, this issue is not to be settled by quoting rival thinkers: but by sound argument. Those who deny that nature is orderly in itself and allege that the order that we apprehend in nature is provided by the human mind generally rest their argument on this supposition, among others, that the mind can only apprehend what is orderly. Granted that to express the content of a cognition in a judgement requires the use of categories and consequently the ignoring of whatever elements refuse to be comprised under those categories, yet it is far from proved that the mind is unaware of those elements that it ignores in the making of judgements. Indeed it is apparent to me that my cognitions almost always extend beyond my expressed judgements. Another way of putting this is to say that the objects of my cognitions almost always possess an individuality, a uniqueness, that no number of judgements can cover. Yet I do in an important sense apprehend their uniqueness and their jagged edges even if I am unable to cover them with categories.

Now if in spite of my awareness of this individuality, this uniqueness and the jagged edges of the world that I experience I am still prepared to say that the world is orderly, then clearly I say this not because I am incapable of apprehending anything that is not already ordered by my mind, but for some other reason, presumably because the world that I apprehend is one that I find to be by and large an orderly world. It will be clear from what I have just said that in contending for the orderliness of
nature I do not mean that there are no chaotic elements in 
nature. There are certainly elements which appear \textit{prima facie} 
to be chaotic. Whether there are elements which appear not only 
\textit{prima facie} but also on a more adequate understanding to be still 
chaotic is a matter which I am content to leave for the present 
as an open question. To find that there are such would not alter 
the basic assertion that nature as a whole is an ordered system.

It remains for me to say something positively about what the 
order of nature is. I do not find it easy to be sure what the 
\textbf{essential} feature of order is: for each feature as I consider 
its claims turns out eventually to be not the essential feature 
but one of the various \textit{forms} that order may take. For example 
if we consider the notions of "designed or apparently designed 
to fulfil a purpose", as any particular part of an animal's 
body is most clearly explained by reference to its function in 
the body as a whole, and put beside that the notion of "occurring 
in an identical or even approximately indentical form" as the sun 
rises at more or less the same time each morning, and one cat is 
more or less like any other cat, these are undoubtedly both 
examples of what we mean by order in nature. I can see, but cannot 
\textit{explain} what these two very different forms of order have in common.

They are admittedly both instances of how the human mind can 
and relate and comprehend the world, \textit{it is tempting to conclude 
from this that the order is imposed by the human mind or that 
order is nothing more than "a general name for the categories 
of thought which the human mind imposes upon nature in seeking 
to understand it"}. We have already considered this view and found
it unacceptable. But it is possible to hold that, although order is only known when comprehended by the mind, the rational arrangement in nature which makes this comprehension possible is already there independently of any human mind. If it be pointed out that "rational arrangement" is simply a synonym for "order" and gives no fuller account of the meaning of "order", I reply that I am content to leave it at that, because it would appear that in the notion of order we have come up against an ultimately unanalysable and therefore indefinable notion.

That the Order of Nature is Good in Itself

We must now consider the assertion that the order of nature is good in itself. The phrase "in itself" is important for there would be considerable agreement that order is good as the sine qua non of other things that are generally recognised as good. For example, knowledge of the world, as I have already indicated, presupposes order and upon knowledge in turn rests all man's ability to utilise nature for human benefit. Life itself is inseparable from an order usually described in terms of biological laws. Personal life in all of its phases, whether moral awareness or action, aesthetic experience of nature or of art, or artistic creation, presupposes as a condition of its existence or involves in its exercise, order of some kind or another. Indeed it would not be a rash speculation to say that there probably is nothing of any kind of value that does not involve order.
It is this very fact, I suspect, that is liable to obscure the more basic fact that order is good in itself and not only as a sine qua non of other good things.

To exhibit that order is good in itself, I wish to make use of the argument that G. E. Moore used against Sidgwick in Principia Ethica to exhibit that beauty is good in itself. The argument is stronger, I believe, when order is substituted for beauty because of the difficulty of defining beauty without making some reference either to the one who creates or the one who enjoys beauty. If there is difficulty in defining beauty without reference to man then a fortiori there is difficulty in proving that its worth is intrinsic. If, however, the foregoing account of the nature of order has been accepted then this objection will not apply to the attempt to prove that order is of intrinsic worth.

Sidgwick had written: "No one would consider it rational to aim at the production of beauty in external nature apart from any possible contemplation of it by human beings". To this G. E. Moore replies: "I for one do consider this rational". He asks his reader to imagine a world with every kind of beauty in it but quite isolated from any consciousness of it and to contrast that with a world containing every kind of ugliness also isolated from any consciousness of it, and then he concludes: Is it rational to hold that it is better that the beautiful world should exist than the one which is ugly? Would it not be well in any case, to do what we could to produce it rather than the
other? Certainly, I cannot help thinking that it would. My argument requires that for the words "beauty" and "ugliness" the words "order" and "chaos" be substituted.

Someone might object to this that it is a vicious abstraction because it is not possible to imagine a world of order apart from some consciousness of it because in the very act of imagining it one is conscious of it. Such an objection implies a Berkeleyan epistemology, and for various reasons an account such as this which would make the existence of physical things depend upon the human or divine awareness of them is not generally acceptable. If there is, however, any sort of existence external to our minds then we have seen reason to believe that order must be one of its qualities.

To this, however, it might be objected that even if an ordered world be admitted to exist apart from any consciousness of it, yet it is a different thing to hold that this order has any value apart from the consciousness of it, and that this has still to be proved. To this I reply by referring to the choice that Moore asks us to suppose. The difficulty of seeing that we would have a duty to create natural beauty or order for its own sake is that in any choices which we actually have to make the consideration of their possible effects upon conscious beings is always more important than whether or not they lead to beauty or order. "This only means", says Moore, "that in our present state, in which but a very small portion of the good is attainable, the pursuit of beauty for its own sake must always be
postponed to the pursuit of some greater good, which is equally attainable. But it is enough for my purpose, if it be admitted that, supposing no greater good were at all attainable, then beauty must in itself be regarded as a greater good than ugliness; ..."

There are two other arguments that I wish to cite, though recognising that they both rest on certain assumptions and their effectiveness is limited accordingly.

(a) The theological argument is that since God made the world and God is good, therefore all his works are also good. The world is God's work and therefore, the world is good. The recurring refrain of the first chapter of Genesis occurring at the end of each epochal day of creation even before man's appearance on the scene, "and God saw that it was good", expresses this argument. (This point will be expanded under the discussion of "derived holiness values").

(b) The ethical argument which Moore himself includes in his argument but does not pin-point, I now wish to pin-point. It is that if one had the choice of creating a world of order or a world of chaos (again supposing/no consciousness of either) one should choose the former. And one might add if one had the choice of preserving some order that already exists or of destroying it (again assuming no consciousness of it) we should choose the former. What is it, for example, that makes some persons refrain from casting litter about, even in the remotest corner of the remotest glen? It is not the thousandth chance of another visitor to that spot before his litter has joined the elements whose aesthetic enjoyment he has in mind. Rather it is something
much simpler and more immediate, namely, a respect, probably an instinctive and unconscious respect, for the beauty of the place itself. Now I know that this argument will not work with one who is a deontologist, for he would argue that the rightness of producing and preserving beauty and the wrongness of destroying it are intrinsic qualities of these actions themselves and are not derived from the worth of the beauty or orderliness of the place. Now, I cannot refute deontology in a parenthetical note. I can only offer the assurance that the refutation of deontology is one of the things which this thesis will eventually try to accomplish.

19. Consideration of an Objection to the Foregoing

Objection might be made to the assertion that order is good in itself on the grounds that often we judge that an unrelieved order is monotonous and that the intrusion of an element of disorder banishes the dullness and greatly enhances one's enjoyment of an object. Did not Robert Herrick delight in a "sweet disorder in the dress" and do not we all prefer, for example, wild mountain scenery, irregular in its shape, and still more if there be violent contrasts of colour such as that given by the snow peaks of the Himalayas and the brilliant colours of the flora found in its foothills, to the drab sameness both in colour and in feature of the yellow sands of the Sahara?

There are two points to be made in answer to these questions.

1. None of these occasions on which disorder improves or
increases the worth of a situation at all proves that order as such is not valuable, for it is only in a situation that is basically orderly that an element of disorder has this beneficial effect. We shall show in a moment why this is so, but in the meantime we draw attention to the fact that total disorder is to be never judged of value. Our difficulty here is in picturing to ourselves a situation of total chaos. At the best, perhaps, we can only achieve approximations to it. Imagine some inkblots smudged on a paper. The imagination may get to work imposing design upon them where objectively there is none and so finding worth in them. There are differences in the extent to which design may be objectively present in the smudges at the outset. Let us assume that there is none. But fold the paper in two as is done in the preparation of the Rorschach inkblot tests and immediately we have a mirror image of the original smudges. Every element in every smudge is repeated in detail. The result is a simple two-fold order which is beautiful and perhaps meaningful also. Another similar example is given in the children's toy known as a kaleidoscope in which if one looks in at the wrong end one sees only some irregularly shaped bits of coloured glass, which looked at from the right end of the toy are reflected by a system of mirrors to produce ever changing designs of extraordinary beauty and fascination. In both of these cases a chaotic element is given order and hence value by a two-fold or three-fold repetition being imposed upon it. The value of the whole depends
partly upon the order and partly upon the chaotic element which is ordered. But notice this, that although the order has value with or without the chaotic element, the chaotic element has no value without the order imposed upon it, and this is not at all incompatible with the recognition that the presence of a chaotic element may increase the value of order.

It is to be noticed that there are two different ways in which order and chaos may be combined: (a) order may be superimposed upon the chaos as in the Rorschach inkblots and in the kaleidoscope, or (b) chaos may be superimposed upon order as in most natural beauty.

2. Now we have to answer the question why it is that the presence of chaos increases the worth of an already orderly object. The answer is to be found in the symbolic relationship of the chaotic element with values of a higher level than order. This is a matter which I shall deal with at greater length under the heading of personal and religious symbolism. An outline will suffice for the present. It will probably be generally admitted that Robert Herrick is right, that the "slight disorder in the dress" suggests something about its wearer's character, while unrelieved and perfect order tells us nothing at all or at the most indicates only the presence of what I have called elsewhere "taboo virtue". On the other hand much is revealed by the interruptions in the order.

Let us look more closely at the chaotic element in the world. Other near synonyms for it are the random or arbitrary element,
and special forms of it are interruptions and ugliness. Common examples of it would be idiosyncrasies of speech or gesture or furrows that destroy the perfect form of a face. Now I want to draw your attention to a feature of our experience of these things which I believe illuminates this discussion. On first acquaintance with someone, how often it is the case that some feature of speech, gesture, face or even of dress seems meaningless or awkward, in fact a chaotic element, which, however, on closer acquaintance becomes accepted as appropriate because it expresses some feature of the person's character to which it stands in a symbolic relationship. This does not mean that there is not a sense in which this element is not still a chaotic element. We must, in fact, pass two judgements upon it. On the one hand we must say that, relative to the conventions of English grammar and speech or relative to the sartorial standards of his profession, this feature of speech or dress or whatever it may have been was quite chaotic, but on the other hand, relative to his character there was here a consistent and symbolic expression. By the very nature of the case this second type of judgement could only be made after a time lapse during which one had gathered an idea of the man's character, and this knowledge of his character is gained not by looking at his character directly, for this is impossible, but by observing a variety of his expressive activities. Also it is to be noted that there is no guarantee in advance of experience that the chaotic will come to be seen as meaningful and the gauche as appropriate. Although furrows on the brow may soon
be seen as the expression of a subtle and wrestling intellect, an ugly boil on the chin remains an ugly boil on the chin, and the gestures and speech of the young sometimes remain gauche, for they are essentially experiments in expression and some of these experiments fail.

This helps us to understand the mixed reception that is normally given to any new movement in any of the arts. Relative to conventional style a new type of poetry, painting, or music seems chaotic and meaningless. The artist is trying a "leg-pull", some will say, and indeed this is possible. It is only further compositions that will show whether or not this is a new symbolism which, when understood, conveys meaning.

Now apply this to the experience of the chaotic element in nature. To put what I have to say in the context of aesthetic theory let me remind you of the theories about "the sublime" originating with a Greek writer of the first century and usually attributed to Longinus of the third century, discussed by Burke in his Essay "Sublime and Beautiful", by Lord Kames and - most important of all - by Kant in his Critique of Judgement.

Many recent writers, however, such as Croce and Carritt suggest that this is a sterile theme which has now become quite exhausted and has rightly fallen out of discussion in aesthetic theory.

It is false, however, to think that the discussion on the sublime has ceased. It has not lapsed but rather is now carried on in a different context, namely, that of religious philosophy concerning the holy and the numinous by thinkers such as
Rudolph Otto in *The Idea of the Holy*, and is now classed more appropriately with the philosophy of religion than with aesthetic theory.

To explain the relationship of the sublime to the holy I want to make use of a concept which I shall develop later, namely that of a "token", (cf. a sacrament). The chaotic element in nature becomes acceptable to us in the same sort of way as the chaotic element in dress, gesture or speech becomes acceptable when it is seen as having some meaning and functions as a token which conveys something to us from beyond itself.

To apprehend such chaotic elements as meaningful one does not have to know what their meaning actually is. One has only to grasp in a general sort of way that they are meaningful. Now the apprehension of chaotic facts of nature as meaningful, especially facts of great magnitude such as jagged mountain ranges or storms at sea, is the essential element in knowing that they are sublime. One may follow Kant in denying that the meaning belongs to nature and argue that it arises in contrasting oneself, small and insignificant and yet rational, in comparison with the magnitude and might of nature. Meaning then of some kind there must be, although, I believe, wrongly understood by Kant.

My own view is that things apprehended as sublime are meaningful because they are tokens by which holiness is conveyed in a way analogous to that in which any chaotic personal gesture
becomes meaningful and hence becomes a token by which an encounter with another person is made possible.

The association of sublimity with magnitude is usual but not essential. This association arises out of the fact that the supremacy of holiness to the other values is normally and aptly expressed by spatial symbols such as "highest" or "greatest". That such spatial symbols are not the only possible ones is seen in the fact that certain human actions and types of character are sometimes experienced and described as sublime.

A fuller discussion of these matters must be postponed until we come to the description of the nature and the value of persons and of holiness.
The Relation of Beauty to the Order of Nature

It may seem surprising that I do not consider beauty as one of the basic values since traditionally it has held a place among the things of greatest worth. There are two reasons, however, why I find it difficult to rate beauty as a basic value. Firstly, its meaning is too varying and ambiguous, and secondly it is too complex.

Consider, firstly, the range and variety of things that are normally considered beautiful. The main groups are natural objects on the one hand and works of art on the other. The difference between these is considerable and I find difficulty in being sure that we mean the same thing when we talk of a natural scene as beautiful and when we talk of a work of art as beautiful. What at least is common in both cases, it seems to me, is the presence of order. In the case of a work of art the order is created by man; but since man is a part of nature the order given by man may also be considered as derived from the order of nature.

Clearly, however, both natural beauty and artistic beauty are much more than simply order. That is, beauty is a complex notion. This further element is not necessarily the same in these two cases. In the case in which we judge that a work of art is beautiful it seems to me that we are usually conscious of it as possessing a meaning of which we approve. The presence of any kind of meaning requires the use of a symbolism and the
employment of any symbolism presupposes a community in which this symbolism is understood. It is difficult to say this of natural beauty for it is not obvious at first sight that nature presupposes a community in which its meaning is understood. Therefore either nature has no symbolism, or if it has, we have to give a somewhat different account of it. We may say that nature possesses a symbolism by which God speaks. Or, following up the suggestion of the last section, we may prefer to speak of nature offering tokens by which the holiness of God is conveyed. Or, taking a more sceptical line, we may say that nature has really no meaning at all but that man sometimes reads a meaning into it. But whatever we do say, it is clear that we have to say something rather different about meaning in nature and meaning in art. If I am correct in my suggestion that beauty means order plus the presence of some kind of meaning or imagined meaning then it follows that "beauty" is not only an ambiguous notion but that in the two usages I have considered it is a derived value and not a basic value.
References

1. Vide Chapter VII, "Internally Derived Values (1)", section 45.
4. Ibid, p.15.
11. See also the essay by Karl R. Popper, "Three Views concerning Human Knowledge" in Contemporary British Philosophy - Third Series, ed. H.D. Lewis, (Allen and Unwin, 1956), pp.355. The argument here against "the instrumentalist view" of scientific knowledge could be applied against taking the principle of causality as no more than "a methodological" principle.
15. It is a weakness of Geddes MacGregor's discussion in Aesthetic Experience in Religion, that he follows Croce too much in this and because of the fact that he pays no attention to Otto fails to recognise that the sublime is a supremely important concept on the borderline of religion and aesthetics.

CHAPTER IV

LIVING THINGS
Any text book of biology contains a good deal of specialised knowledge on the nature of living things which goes well beyond our present requirements. What we are looking for at this stage is not a specialised account of the nature of living things, but a simple articulation of what men of common sense have always known living things to be. It is important to point out that we all know perfectly well (in one important sense of the word "know") what a living thing is even if we may find considerable difficulty in putting this knowledge into words. It is usually easy enough to recognise a living thing and also easy enough to describe it up to a point; but when we are pressed to name only the essential as distinct from the inessential characteristics and to include only those characteristics that belong to all living creatures, puzzles arise. We might expect to find help from the text books of biology and to some extent we do; and yet puzzles still remain. Most biology text books decline to give a definition of a living thing but offer instead a list of what they call the "characteristics" or "unique characteristics" of living things; but there is a fair amount of variation in these lists.

J. Arthur Thomson, for example, cites nine different characteristics arranged in groups of three, namely,
1. Progressiveness, that is the possibility of evolving into something **better** from one generation to another; 2. Effectiveness, that is the ability to direct its action even if only in a very small degree towards some end; 3. Profiting by experience. Even a creature with no brain nor central nervous system can still, in some sense, **learn** from experience; 4. Growth of an active and regulated type. This should be contrasted with the growth of a crystal which grows simply by the **accretion** of other particles of the same substance. An animal, however, grows by taking particles of **other** substances and **changing** them into itself. This process is commonly called **nutrition**; 5. Multiplication or reproduction. All living creatures have the power of producing other individuals of the same kind as themselves; 6. **Development** from a tiny blob or seed of living matter into a full plant, animal, etc.; 7. Ceaseless change in the body. When one part of an animal body wears out or is damaged it is normally repaired. This process is known as **metabolism**; 8. Living matter is in a **colloidal** state; 9. Power of persistence, that is a living creature, in spite of the many changes continually happening in its body, remains the same individual, itself and no other.

This list of characteristics is open to some criticism. One might suggest that growth, development and change might all be classed together and related to nutrition. Clearly the
logical arrangement might be improved in some such way.

More serious is the omission of what most biologists call "irritability" or "sensitivity". All the other textbooks I consulted gave high priority to this characteristic. E. T. Hatfield gives as the chief characteristics of living protoplasm: 1. Irritability; 2. Metabolism; 3. Excretion; and 4. Reproduction, and she describes irritability as "the power of responding to stimuli; it can react to changes in its environment". And further, "To be sensitive to stimuli is one of the most characteristic properties of protoplasm..... An amoeba can perform movements of locomotion, and is vaguely sensitive to its immediate environment. It can distinguish between certain stimuli, for it will ingest a tiny diatom, but not an inorganic particle of similar size and shape."

L. L. Woodruff lists as the "unique characteristics of living matter" the following: "specific organization, chemical composition, metabolism involving the power of maintainance, growth and reproduction, and irritability resulting in the power of adaptation." On this last feature he writes, "As a matter of fact the plant or animal retains its individuality - lives - solely by its power of developing and maintaining exquisite adjustments, adaptations, to its environment. This results from the irritability of living substances, its inherent capacity of reacting to environmental changes, by changes in the
equilibrium of its matter and energy. The inciting changes, known as stimuli, may be chemical, electrical, thermal, photic or mechanical, but the nature of the response is determined rather by the fundamental character of protoplasm itself than by the nature of the stimulus. This power of adaptation, as exhibited in active adjustment between internal and external relations, overshadows every manifestation of life and contributes, more than any other factor, to the imposing gap that separates the organism from the inorganic world.

Finally I cite W. F. Wheeler who, writing on "Irritability," says: "We may, perhaps, argue that non-living things are affected by external conditions. Thus it is difficult to start up a car in cold weather, simply because the petrol vapourises less readily. Similarly a photographic plate is affected by light. But there is one fundamental difference between living and non-living things in respect of the effect of external conditions. As a result of its response, the living organism is almost always better adapted to its environment. Thus such response may result in approach to food, escape from danger or the attainment of better living conditions, as when a plant grows towards the light. Clearly there is no such adaptation in the case of non-living things."

For our purpose, not all the characteristics in these lists are equally interesting. It may well be true that all life is
in a colloidal state, for example, but it does not seem to me to matter in quite the same way as some of the other characteristics. This raises the question of what does matter in one's search for the defining characteristics of anything. The answer surely is that such defining characteristics are relative to the interest of one's own thought. In this work, therefore, in which our discussion of the nature of life is a preliminary to the exhibition of its value the relevant defining characteristics are those which are the grounds of its value. If I may then anticipate subsequent discussion, it is not difficult to make a selection of the relevant characteristics from those already mentioned. I suggest that a capacity for sensitivity to its environment and adaptation in relation to it are of primary significance. The capacity for adaptation should be further expanded by reference to Thomson's first three characteristics of effectiveness, profiting by experience and progressiveness from generation to generation. We might say simply that the capacity for sensitivity and adaptation are associated with progress in learning in the life of the individual and that this progress tends to be cumulative from one generation to another.

Sensitivity and Adaptation

It is now essential to enquire into what precisely the biologists mean when they talk of "sensitivity" and "adaptation".
Taking into account the various passages that I have quoted about "sensitivity" of and "adaptation" to the environment it is reasonable to believe that "sensitivity" includes in its meaning some kind of experience of sensitivity of the environment, and that "adaptation" includes in its meaning some kind of experience of the activity of adaptation in relation to the environment. That is, both "sensitivity" and "adaptation" involve some kind of experience of the environment.

We are now faced with two problems; the one a problem of meaning, the other a problem of the nature of our claim to knowledge. We must try to keep these problems distinct so far as this is possible. What precisely do we mean by terms such as "experience of sensitivity" and "experience of the activity of adaptation" when applied to what we might call the "inner states" of living things other than man? Clearly we do not intend to mean precisely the same thing as we mean when we use these same terms of our own "inner states". Yet the words derive their meaning largely from their use in referring to human experience. We must be continually on our guard, therefore, against incorporating too much meaning into them from the analogy with our own experience of "sensitivity" or "activity of adaptation", and we must qualify this transferred usage with a sufficient number of question marks.

Apart from the question of what we mean by these terms, there is also the question of whether we can make any claim at all
to know anything about the "inner states" of living things other than man or even whether they have such "inner states". Unless in some kind of way we can make this claim we would not be entitled to use these words at all with regard to living creatures other than ourselves. We are faced with a very serious problem of methodology. On the one hand, clearly we cannot claim to know anything of the "inner states" of living things other than man from the point of view of their experience. Yet, at the same time, the biological evidence seems to require the postulation of some such "inner states". This evidence, and even the ordinary man's observation of forms of life other than the human, suggests some kind of analogy to our experience. Most people would grant this with regard to those animals that are most like ourselves; but lower down the scale of life their doubts would increase. It seems to me, however, that there is no logical stopping place anywhere in the scale and that it is reasonable to assume some kind of condition, even in the most elementary forms of life, that is analogous, however remotely, to human experience and its most basic modes.

The problem of understanding the inner states of living things other than man is a comparable problem to, only much more complicated than, that of understanding the inner states of other persons. The nature of this latter problem has been well discussed by John Wisdom. The gist of one's doubt about
the possibility of knowing another person's mind is that "one's evidence is about outward and visible things and one's conclusion is about an inward and invisible state". The problem of knowing the inner states of living things other than men is clearly immensely greater, for as we go further and further down the scale of living things the relevant outward evidence becomes less and less like our own human behaviour. Yet it is never altogether lacking; and the problem of deciding whether the surmises about the inner states of living things that we build upon this evidence have any validity seems to be in principle the same kind of problem.

To put these problems in the widest perspective I hope I may be forgiven for introducing a still further comparable problem, namely that of understanding the inner states of the divine Being. Clearly this is in some ways a very different problem. The nature of the evidence is different. The problem of how we are to think of the inner states of the divine Being is different. Yet in principle there seems to be some similarity in the nature of these three problems. Of these three problems, any one of which could occupy us for a life time, the problem of understanding the inner states of other human beings, the problem of understanding the inner states of the lowest forms of living things, and the problem of understanding the inner states of the divine Being, it is the discussion of the first of these that has logical
priority and it is from it that we would expect to find some clues for the understanding of the other two problems.

To illustrate the nature of the two latter problems and the difficulty of their solution, in the one case, that of knowing the inner states of lower forms of living things, we must presumably try to subtract from our human experience those elements that are contributed by the fact of being a person. The difficulty arises then; how are we to know precisely what aspects of our experience are contributed by being a person unless we already know what our inner experience would be like if we were one of the lower animals? Further it may well be that our animal nature is so vastly altered by the fact of being a person that it is quite impossible to disentangle the one from the other. In the other case, that of understanding the inner states of the divine nature, we must presumably try to add those elements to our human experience that are contributed by the fact of being the divine Being. The difficulty arises in this case that this is precisely what we do not know. Further it may be that in the case of knowing the inner states of the divine Being the nature of being a person is so completely altered by the fact of being the divine "Person" that it is not possible to disentangle the one from the other. For these reasons it may be questioned whether any transition is possible from knowledge of our experience as human beings to knowledge of the inner experience either of the lower forms of life or of the
divine Being. And if knowledge is not possible by such a transition from our own human experience, then it is to be doubted whether knowledge of the inner states of the other living creatures or of the divine Being is possible at all. We thus seem to be forced to a position of complete agnosticism with regard to our entitlement to knowledge both in respect of the inner states of the lower forms of life and of the divine Being.

Proof of our entitlement to knowledge is one thing. Confidence that we know is another; and it is not uncommon for such confidence in knowledge to persist even when the grounds to this entitlement are quite uncertain. There are a number of spheres in which philosophers have been unable to produce coercive proof that we are entitled to our beliefs and yet these beliefs have persisted. There is, for example, the question of belief in the existence of a material world. There is also the question we have just alluded to of belief in the inner experience of other persons. In both of these cases the evidence falls short of coercive proof of that which it is taken to indicate. Yet probably most thinkers to-day would accept the common sense position that although we cannot coercively prove the existence of a material world or the inner states of other people's minds the wisest thing is to continue to assume the existence of these. Why should there
not, we may ask, be other spheres in which the evidence falls short, perhaps even further short, of logical entitlement to belief and in which the wise course is still to take for granted the existence of those things?

On the other hand, this permission, if granted, is not intended to open the flood gates to whatever superstitious and fanciful notion the mind of man is capable of conceiving. How then are we to distinguish between reasonable notions and fanciful ones? It depends surely upon the presence of the relevant evidence. But the question recurs in an amended form, "How are we to distinguish relevant, even if not coercive, evidence from fanciful?" This is a large and complicated enquiry which would unfortunately detain us too long were we to deal with it adequately. I must, however, make a respectful acknowledgement of its importance and regret that I must pass on.

I take it then that living things experience states of sensitivity and activity which bear some remote resemblance, very, very remote in the lowest forms of life, to what we mean by these terms when used of human experience.

Trying therefore to summarise my definition of the nature of living things, living things possess the "unique characteristics" (the phrase the biologists use) of sensitivity to their environment and manifest the activity of adaptation to it. It is important further to recognise that these two features of living things have a double aspect:

(a) There are the observed facts of sensitivity and
adaptation in animal and plant behaviour, and

(b) The postulation of experiences of sensitivity and adaptation analogous (remotely analogous in some cases) to what we mean by those terms when used of our own experience. It is this second aspect of these "unique characteristics" that is particularly important to my account; and upon the nature of living things as thus defined the next part of my argument will be built.

23. That Living Things are Good in Themselves and are more Valuable than Inorganic Orderly Things

We must now consider the assertion that living things are good in themselves. The phrase "in themselves" is important. There would be a considerable body of opinion that many living things are good as the means to other good things. Apples and carrots, cows, sheep and pigs, are very useful for the sustenance of human life. Donkeys, camels, St. Bernard dogs and carrier pigeons are very useful for carrying things. All this I readily grant; but the point that I wish to make is a much more basic one. It is that living things are good not simply because of
their usefulness to us humans but that they are good in themselves.

The point has to be further clarified because it is possible that some might grant that living things are good in themselves for reasons other than their usefulness, but still not allow that they are good in themselves and in virtue simply of being alive. For example it might be held that the fragrance of apple blossom and roses, the beauty of jacaranda trees, butterflies and gazelles, and the grandeur of pine trees, eagles and lions is what constitutes their worth. That most living things are beautiful and have worth in virtue of their beauty I readily also grant, but this is still not the point that I wish to make. It is that living things are good not simply because of their usefulness, but that they are good in themselves; and that they are good in themselves not just because of their beauty but primarily in virtue simply of being alive.

I have already indicated what I mean by the state of being alive in virtue of which living things have worth. It is what the biologists have cited as "sensitivity" (or "irritability") and the activity of "adaptation". These two features which are the grounds of the value of living things, I have already indicated, have a double aspect:

(a) There are the observed facts of sensitivity and adaptation in animal and plant behaviour, and

(b) The postulation of "experiences" of sensitivity and
adaptation analogous (remotely analogous in many cases) to what we mean by those terms when used of our own experience. It is upon this second aspect of those features that the worth of living things is grounded. That is, it is because of these postulated inner states of "experiences" of sensitivity and activity of adaptation to their environment that living things are valuable.

There are some, I have no doubt, who would agree with my basic proposition that living things are valuable in themselves and in virtue primarily of being alive, but who would go no further with me. Some would be quite inarticulate about there being any basis on which this worth is grounded. Into this class would come most of those who believe it is good "to be kind to dumb animals", and who support societies for the prevention of cruelty to animals. Many of those who approve the building of game reserves also belong to this class; (although there are other legitimate and perhaps at least as prevalent motives for the building of reserves apart from respect for living things). Perhaps the most notable member of this group is St. Francis of Assissi who showed in his own inimitable way a respect for the worth of living things, but, so far as I am aware, did not attempt to analyse the grounds of this worth. I have no disagreement with this large and important group. Indeed I cite them as evidence that the ordinary sensitive man naturally and spontaneously recognises that
living things have worth in themselves. I believe that the admission of this fact is more important ultimately to my argument than the acceptance of my account of the grounds of this worth. Yet I suggest that in many cases the grounds that I have suggested would only require to be put clearly to elicit a response of approval from most members of this group of persons.

Then there are those who accept my basic proposition that living things are valuable in themselves in virtue primarily of being alive, but who would disagree with the grounds upon which I have claimed this worth is based. This worth, I have heard some say, is based simply upon the greater complexity of the living from the non-living. This does not seem to me to be a tenable position for the following reason. The average man or woman who has a feeling of respect for a living creature may in all probability be totally unaware of any of the complex biological or biochemical facts about the nature of life. His awareness of their worth is clearly not based upon knowledge of this complexity. From this I argue that the value is not in fact grounded upon this complexity. Further this average person who feels respect for living creatures if persuaded to become articulate about the grounds upon which he thinks their worth is based would be much more likely to give some reason more or less like the one I have offered than to say anything about complexity. But I do not know whether any obliging sociologist
has already made enquiries or is likely to do so in the near future regarding what people do say about the grounds for respecting living things. The results of such an enquiry would certainly be very pertinent to my argument.

An extremely important writer who accepts my basic proposition but offers quite different grounds for it is Dr. Albert Schweitzer. For Schweitzer respect for life is the essential root of all morality. His position is set out in his work *Civilization and Ethics*. Many features of Schweitzer's work are obscure to me; and where the argument is clear I frequently find it unacceptable. These serious defects, as they appear to me, do not, however, destroy the considerable merit of this work in offering an eloquent testimony to man's awareness of the worth of all living things. Even those passages which seem to contain considerable exaggeration are none the less, I suggest, exaggerations of an apprehension of value which is authentic. Schweitzer writes, for example, as follows:

"A man is truly ethical only when he obeys the compulsion to help all life which he is able to assist, and shrinks from injuring anything that lives. He does not ask how far this or that life deserves one's sympathy as being valuable, nor, beyond that, whether and to what degree it is capable of feeling. Life as such is sacred to him. He tears no leaf from a tree, plucks no flower, and takes care to crush no insect. If in summer he
is working by lamplight, he prefers to keep the window shut and breathe a stuffy atmosphere rather than see one insect after another fall with singed wings upon his table.

"If he walks on the road after a shower and sees an earthworm which has strayed on to it he bethinks himself that it must get dried up in the sun, if it does not return soon enough to ground into which it can burrow, so he lifts it from the deadly stone surface, and puts it on the grass. If he comes across an insect which has fallen into a puddle, he stops a moment in order to hold out a leaf or a stalk on which it can save itself.

"He is not afraid of being laughed at as sentimental. It is the fate of every truth to be a subject for laughter until it is generally recognised. Once it was considered folly to assume that men of colour were really men and ought to be treated as such, but the folly has become an accepted truth. To-day it is thought to be going too far to declare that constant regard for everything that lives, down to the lowest manifestations of life, is a demand made by rational ethics. The time is coming, however, when people will be astonished that mankind needed so long a time to learn to regard thoughtless injury to life as incompatible with ethics.

"Ethics is responsibility without limit to all that lives."
This passage probably seems to most of us as inclined to overdraw our responsibility to the lower forms of life. This, however, does not discredit the main points that Schweitzer is making, namely that we are all capable of feeling some degree of respect, small or great, for all living things, even if that respect has long been unawakened or stifled; and also that when that respect dawns upon us we recognise its entire appropriateness. In many of us, perhaps, this feeling for animals has little manifestation beyond a general approval of the work of an organisation such as the Royal Society for the Prevention of Cruelty to Animals; but this at least is enough to illustrate the point.

It is, however, in his discussion of the grounds of the value of living things that I find myself in disagreement with Schweitzer. His position is a highly subjectivist one. He writes, for example, "I give value to my own life and to all the will-to-live which surrounds me, I persevere in activity and I produce values". Also, "Reverence for life, veneratio vitae, is the most direct and at the same time the profoundest achievement of my will-to-live". The phrase "will-to-live" is an indication of the nature of the basis of his evaluation of his own life. He claims no more objective basis for the evaluation of human life than for the evaluation of the worth of other living things. This is consistent. I have indicated
in an earlier chapter the reasons why I cannot accept this kind of account. In Schweitzer's case, with the moral earnestness of his appeal, my difficulty is all the greater. Briefly let me recapitulate arguments I have already used, adapting for the moment Schweitzer's terminology.

(a) "Reverence for life" must be more than an expression of "my will-to-live" just as surely as it must be more than a kind of feeling or desire if the claim that we ought to accept it is to be a claim on our reason. It must be in fact a cognition.

(b) It must also be a cognition of a worth which belongs objectively to living things. Only on such a basis is there any kind of security for a doctrine of reverence for life.

On a basis of mere feeling, or mere "will-to-live" there is no reply to the person who says: "I happen to feel totally indifferent to all living things except my own life and those lives with which my own is most intimately tied", or some variant of this. To each of Schweitzer's demands that one should reverence life one is disposed to enquire, "But why should I reverence life unless life is in fact valuable?"

I cannot find any clear answer to this question in Schweitzer's work. There are, however, several passages which superficially look like an answer and may indeed be intended as an answer to this sort of question. They are not, however, strictly answers to the question, "Why should one reverence life?"
but rather are they answers to the question, "How have men in fact come to reverence life?" I shall consider two of these.

The first of these passages that I refer to is consistent with Schweitzer's general position and seems to me to provide a useful *reductio ad absurdum* of that position. It is based upon an argument of Wilhelm Stern's, a Berlin physician and writer on ethics who built his ethics on the science of Darwin, arguing in his *Foundations of Ethics as a Positive Science*, published in 1897, that (to quote Schweitzer), "animate beings of the most varied kinds have been obliged through countless generations to fight side by side for existence against the forces of nature, and in their common distress have ceased to be hostile to one another. .... There is developed by the same experience a kind of solidarity with all that lives".

This is a curious argument which seems to entirely overlook the fact that among the principal forces of nature that animate beings have to struggle against are other animate beings. It is a strange solidarity that is represented by the bird trembling beneath the paw of the cat, or of man enduring the attacks of a blood-sucking mosquito. The experience of the attacker is quite a different kind of experience from that of the attacked. There is no solidarity of interest between them; nor do I think that man or any other living creature is aware of any such "solidarity with all that lives". Yet it seems probable to me that if one denies
an objective basis for the principle of "reverence for life" it is to the expedient of an argument such as this that one must look.

The second passage to which I refer is rather more acceptable to me and has some affinities with my own position. Schweitzer writes, "The unlearned man who, at the sight of a tree in flower, is overpowered by the mystery of the will-to-live which is stirring all around him knows more than the scientist ....... The nature of the manifestations I do not know but I form a conception of it in analogy to the will-to-live which is within myself .... The knowledge ... fills me with reverence for the mysterious will-to-live which is in all things". The suggestion here seems to be that there is a kind of argument by analogy from the worth of my own life to the worth of other lives. It does not seem to me at all unlikely that such an argument by analogy from self-consciousness to the consciousness of others and even of the consciousness in all living creatures sometimes takes place and considerably strengthens the respect that we feel towards all living things; but that it is the source of this respect I am inclined to doubt.

My own position is in some ways similar to this, and it therefore requires some care to distinguish it from the one just indicated. It is that the worth of anything, and hence the worth of living things, is based on certain characteristics of
those things. Also the awareness of worth is in turn sometimes (although probably not very often consciously) based upon awareness of those characteristics. In the case of living things the characteristics upon which their worth is based are their "experience" of sensitivity, and of their activity of adaptation. Consequently when the grounds of one's awareness of the worth of living things becomes explicit, it is found to be based upon an awareness of their sensitivity and their activity of adaptation. Further it has to be pointed out that one's knowledge of the meaning of sensitivity and activity of adaptation is undoubtedly derived from one's own experience of those things in oneself. But it does not follow from this that one's evaluation of sensitivity and adaptability in other living things is based upon an evaluation of this in one's own experience. The evaluation seems to me to be much more immediate. My reasons for saying this are several:

(a) I cannot discover in examining my own experience any such arguments from evaluating myself to evaluating others.

(b) Sometimes in the case of other persons I am capable of evaluating their worth more highly than my own. In such cases it seems rather unlikely that my awareness of their worth is based upon an awareness of my own worth.

(c) If it be the case that some of the things we evaluate such as beauty and holiness do not have those marks of similarity to ourselves then it is clear that the experience of evaluation generally is not based upon the experience of evaluating one's
own worth. It therefore seems to me to become increasingly doubtful whether it ever has this basis.

(d) It seems to me to be important to distinguish between the characteristics upon which value is based and the tokens by which value is conveyed. If I may anticipate an argument which I shall work out in greater detail later, in the case of holiness, it seems to me impossible to know directly the characteristics on which the value of some things is based, and we only in fact know it through the tokens which convey it. If this be a correct account of the nature of our knowledge of the value of some basically valuable things (e.g., persons and a holy God), it seems to me not improbable that our awareness of the value of living things, and indeed of all valuable things, is similarly derived, not from an awareness of the ground of the value, but rather from an awareness of its manifestations or tokens.

Although I have been compelled to disagree with Schweitzer's arguments, I cannot but accord high praise, as I have already indicated, to his writing as an eloquent testimony to man's awareness of the worth of all living things.

24. Consideration of Criticisms

There are two types of argument against the case for holding that living things are intrinsically valuable that merit particular
1. It can be argued that the many types of cruelty to living things that are either wantonly or deliberately practised by men seem to provide a *prima facie* case against holding that human beings have any innate awareness of respect, conscious or even latent, towards living things as such: and therefore that living things do not possess any intrinsic worth.

(a) Animal and human sacrifices provide us with some of the most gruesome instances of cruelty to living things. Yet a little reflection shows that such sacrifices do not at all disprove that there is awareness of any respect for the creatures sacrificed. The motive for sacrifice of living things is one of reverence for a deity or some great person who has died; and it is essential to the expression of this reverence that the thing sacrificed should be deemed to have sufficient worth, otherwise the sacrifice is in vain. The old story of Cain offering "the fruit of the ground" and Abel offering one of "the firstlings of his flock", with the comment that "the Lord had regard for Abel and his offering, but for Cain and his offering he had no regard", furnishes us with an admirable illustration of this point.

(b) The atrocities of Nazi concentration camps and the many brutalities with which history is crammed
present a problem not quite so easily disposed of. It is essential, however, that such things should be viewed in the appropriate perspective. It is so easy to see them disproportionately and to assume that all the members of a race have indulged in or at least condoned the cruelties of which in fact only a few of their members have been guilty. The detailed discussion of the historical evidence here is well beyond the scope of this work. I can only invite the reader to consider the suggestion that the vast masses of the people of all races recognise that deliberate cruelty for its own sake, whether to fellow humans or to animals, is wrong. The existence even of a significant minority who think and behave otherwise does not annul this common judgement of mankind.

(c) There is a further type of cruelty which I describe as wanton rather than deliberate. The suffering caused may be just as great as that involved in deliberate acts of cruelty, but the motive is very different. The suffering is merely incidental, and the very existence of it is sometimes even denied. I am thinking especially of blood sports in which the sportsman sometimes argues that the animal feels no pain, or at least that the pain that the animal suffers is of such a minimal amount in relation to the pleasure that the sportsman enjoys that it is
justified, or perhaps sometimes even that the animal actually also enjoys the sport. Usually, however, sportsmen do not argue about such matters. But when they can be persuaded to argue, the form of their defence will rarely be that animals do not matter or that animal pain is unimportant, but rather that it is negligible or is justifiable in some kind of way. In other words they are usually prepared when they do argue to argue from premisses that imply a respect for life, and this lends an additional support to the position I am maintaining. Those who do not take this line of defence are most probably members of that large body of people whose sensitivity to value has either been dulled or has never been properly awakened. The existence of such a body of people in no way proves that the value quality of things generally has no objectivity or that the value quality of any particular kind of thing, such as living things, has no objectivity, provided always that there is a sufficient consensus of opinion about the value quality of that particular kind of thing among those whose value sensitivity has been awakened, and who have directed their attention to the question of the value of that particular kind of thing.
2. It would be agreed by most people that in the interests of human health and comfort the destruction of vermin, insect pests, bacteria and, indeed, any form of life that threatens man's welfare is amply justified. It should be further noted that the rearing of cattle, sheep, pigs and poultry and the killing of these for human food is almost a universal practice that is endorsed by the conscience of most of mankind. In the light of these facts, it may be questioned by some, can we still maintain that all these forms of life have intrinsic worth?

The answer to this question is not difficult. It consists of two points. Firstly there are many different forms of life, and these can be placed in a scale of higher and lower value. We commonly talk of the "higher" and "lower" forms of life; and this is a clear indication of our recognition of their place in a value scale.

The second part of the argument is that in the interest of the higher forms of life the destruction of the lower forms is normally considered appropriate. This, however, in no way tends to prove that these lower forms of life do not possess intrinsic value; but simply that their intrinsic value is of less importance than their instrumental value or disvalue in relation to some higher form of life such as man.
References


10. Ibid


14. For example, human sacrifice among the Ewes is described by Speith, and animal sacrifice by M. J. Field, *Akim-Kotoku* (Crown Agent for the Colonies, 1943), pp. 42-43.

15. *Genesis* 4, vv. 1-7

16. For a fuller discussion of this subject I must refer to the section on "Instrumental Values and Disvalues".
CHAPTER V

PERSONS
What is a Person?

In asking this question we should first make clear what we are asking about. We are not asking simply, "What is a human being?" We are interested in more than the biological differentia of man from the other living creatures. In using the word "person" we are already perhaps assuming a certain sort of view of man's nature, the view that belongs to the discourse of "personal responsibility", "personal encounter", and perhaps also "Persons in the Trinity". This last example reminds us that in talking of persons we may not be talking simply of men but may be employing a more inclusive category which includes men (or at least some men) and other beings too.

But is this notion of a person a sound one? Can we cite its empirical grounds? Or is it perhaps a myth created about man for theological reasons, like Plato's myth about the different metals in men's make-up created for political reasons? The concept can only be of use to us if, (a) we can clarify it and (b) show what it means in terms of human experience. In order to do this we may find that we require to discard some of the associations that it has often carried no matter how important these may have been in the etymology and history of the word. I will mention two of these:
Historically the word "person" came into common use through the theological doctrine about the relations of the three persons in the Godhead. The Latin word "persona" meaning the mask used by actors on the stage, was used to translate the Greek word ὑποστάσεις perhaps best translated as "substance". C. C. J. Webb writes, "Thus what we may call the philosophical use of person in the modern European languages has been determined by the use in the formulation of the Christian doctrine of the Trinity of ὑποστάσεις and "persona" as equivalent expressions, and we shall find that ambiguities derived from the very different origins of the two words thus associated together have left undeniable traces in the treatment of the word "person" by different thinkers in our own time".  

Both in classical Latin and in old English the word had the sense of a "party" as we might use that word in commercial or legal transactions.  

But neither of these usages offers much guidance as to the modern meaning of the word which is used, I suggest, to denote man as the possessor of certain qualities which mark him off from the rest of the world. This at least is the sense in which I propose to use the word "person". Therefore in asking the question, "What is a person?" we are asking "What are the
distinctive qualities that mark man off from the rest of the world?"

Let us hazard a guess at the answer to the question. Clearly there seems to be a number of things that distinguish man from the animals:—the gift of speech and thought, aesthetic and artistic activities, a sense of moral responsibility, engagement in social intercourse, a self-consciousness of a peculiar quality, and religious awareness and worship.

There are two different types of reason why a list like this will not do.

1. Firstly it is a list; and what we are looking for is a definition of person, not a list of qualities about persons. A satisfactory definition of "person" must be such as to make evident how all these features that are rightly considered to be normally found in man are subsumed under this definition.

2. Secondly, evidence is required to show that these characteristics are peculiar to man, for it might be argued that each one of these characteristics has its embryonic counterpart in the behaviour and consciousness of animals. H. Munro Fox reminds us that animals have language, intelligence and ritual. Admittedly the difference of these animal activities from human activities may be wide; but there is also a wide difference between a primitive and a highly cultured man. By what right, then, we can be asked, do we draw a dividing line between man
and the other animals? Are there not a very large number of very small gradations running through the whole animal kingdom including man?

We have therefore to find a definition of a person that will meet these two points, i.e., that will be a definition that (a) will cite the essential features of all the varied characteristics of personal life and (b) will cover the differentia of persons from animals. To do this I want to make use of two different notions, namely (a) the intuition of values and the response thereto, and (b) the suggestion of Ernst Cassirer and Suzanne Langer that man is an "animal symbolicum".

**Intuition and Response**

"Intuition" is the awareness of the worth in itself of something or being. "Worth in itself" is quite different from "worth to me". Animals are conscious of the latter but only persons of the former. We denote the latter relationship by the word desire and the former by intuition. An animal "licks the hand that feeds it". It reacts positively to what it desires and negatively to what it fears. And though the reaction may be conditioned or may be delayed or may in the case of the more intelligent creatures involve the use of more complicated techniques in order to achieve ends, this principle is not altered.

Wolfgang Köhler, a writer of considerable authority on
the matter of animal psychology says of the language of animals that it is entirely "subjective", and that it "can only express emotions, never designate or describe objects". This does not mean that animals have no awareness of objects; but that such awareness is never an awareness of the object for its own sake but always relatively to the fulfilment of animal desire.

In personal awareness, however, one may be aware of the worth even of someone whom one fears and whose behaviour is detrimental to one's own welfare. One may be aware that such a person has rights and claims upon mankind and upon oneself. Not only another person, but also a thing, a painting or a wounded bird, have worth in themselves in virtue of which they exert claims upon me that I behave towards them in a certain kind of way.

A response is the word which I shall use to indicate the distinctively personal activity by which persons acknowledge the awareness of worth in some thing or being. Personal responses have to be contrasted to animal reactions by which an animal adapts itself to its environment or changes its environment to suit itself in some way. Animal reactions are designed to bring greater comfort to the creature whose reaction it is. Personal responses are designed as a kind of vote of thanks to what already is. Such responses may be embodied in any of a variety of possible expressions which I shall discuss in due course.
Clarification of the Definition

It is necessary in order to avoid misconceptions to distinguish this account of a person which I am offering from certain other views.

1. Intuition, in the sense in which I am using it presupposes perception. It does so for two reasons.

(a) It seems reasonable to suppose, as we have seen, that the higher animals, at least, have ability to perceive the world around them and that they react to it in various ways. This simple apprehension by sense of some at least of the facts of one’s environment is more elemental than awareness of worth. It seems very clear to me that whatever other means of apprehending the world that man has, his apprehension of it by the means of sense perception is basic.

(b) Now an intuition of worth in things presupposes a perception of the nature of these things. This is because value is a "toti-resultant property" (to use Sir David Ross’s phrase) and therefore awareness of value presupposes an awareness of the differentiae (or constitutive attributes) of the thing that is valuable.

2. Intuitions are cognitive not emotional. It seems to me important to say this in opposition to a point of view which is found among some aestheticians, some philosophers of religion and some moral philosophers that the distinctively artistic,
moral or religious action consists in making an appropriate
response to an emotion. Collingwood, for example,
characterises the artistic act as "the expression of emotion". This seems to me to be unsatisfactory on the grounds that in all distinctively personal action whether in art, morality or
religion we commonly discriminate between the true and the false; and this kind of discrimination is not really possible save on the basis of whether these expressions are indeed the
expressions of the response to the intuition of objects of such and such worth, or not. There are perhaps many points at which falsity can enter into an expression apart from the
failure to intuit the object whose worth has been ostensibly expressed. In calling an expression true, genuine or
authentic it is required that it be an expression of the response to the intuition of an object whose worth has been more or less accurately apprehended. That is, the truth of an expression presupposes the truth of an intuition and intuitions must be of objects of worth.

It might be argued, however, that to call an expression true, genuine or authentic implies only that it bears an appropriate relationship to the emotion of which it is an expression and that no further reference to the apprehension of objects is required to account for this description of expressions as true.
In reply to this I am prepared to accept it that expressions may sometimes be described as true in this sense; but would hasten to add that there is another way in which expressions may be described as true or false, which arises from the description that we give to the emotion. It is quite normal surely to say: "I do not doubt that he is expressing what he feels: but what an odd way to feel!" For example, in a case of the sexual perversion known as fetishism a person may be fascinated by an object such as a woman's shoe and may accordingly lavish affection upon it. His actions are true in one sense of being appropriate expressions of what he feels; but there is another sense in which we want to say that this lavishing of affection is false because it is an expression of an emotion which is false. Now what do we mean when we say that an emotion is true or false? It may be false in any one of several ways; but to be true, I submit that it must be the emotion appropriately accompanying the apprehension of some object. What this ultimately comes to is this, that emotions (and responses which are said to be "the expression of emotion") are only metaphorically described as true or false. Strictly it is only cognitions which can be true or false and emotions are only describable in this way when they are associated with cognitions which are true or false. This same principle still applies if we speak, instead, of emotions as being proportionate or disproportionate. What determines the proper proportion of an
emotion save the nature of the object intuited?

It is relevant here to draw attention to the fact that nowhere does R. G. Collingwood give any reasons for preferring to speak of "the expression of emotion" rather than "the expression of intuition". He argues simply as follows:

"Art has something to do with emotion; what it does with it has a certain resemblance to arousing it, but is not arousing it...... Since the artist proper has something to do with emotion, and what he does with it is not to arouse it, what is it that he does?...... Nothing could be more entirely commonplace than to say he expresses them ... Later on we shall have to see whether it will fit into a coherent theory." When "later on", however, in Book 3 Collingwood comes to discuss the matter on a more philosophic plane he writes:

"This rules out all theories of Art which place its origin in sensation or its emotions, i.e., in man's psychical nature: its origin lies not there but in his nature as a thinking being. At the same time it rules out all theories which place its nature in the intellect, and make it something to do with concepts!" Yet this question of origin is never, so far as I can see, further clarified and two pages later he seems to revert to his earlier naive position when he writes: "The aesthetic experience or artistic activity is the experience of expressing one's emotions, and that which expresses them is the
total imaginative activity called indifferently language or art. This is art proper."

This is disappointing. It indicates, however, that no sufficient case has been made out for describing art as the "expression of emotions". Since we have seen that there are substantial grounds for describing it as a "response to an intuition", in which the word intuition is taken to refer to the cognition of an object of worth, we shall consider this matter settled in the meantime.

3. "Intuition", as I propose to use the word, will refer not only to aesthetic awareness, but will be used to cover all awareness of objects of value whether it be aesthetic, moral or religious. Similarly, "response" is to be used to cover the responses that are made on the intuition of any type of thing of intrinsic value. In this I am differing from Croce who limited the term to indicate awareness of the aesthetic fact. But I am departing no less from the position of those moral philosophers who would hold that the awareness of moral worth is sui generis. I am parting company with those "personalist" philosophers such as Martin Buber and John Macmurray who hold that a personal relationship or a personal encounter is sui generis. I part company no less with those philosophers of religion such as Schleiermacher and Otto who would wish to give to religious awareness or "divination" this distinction of
This should not be taken to mean that I am not deeply indebted and believe that I have some affinity of outlook to each of those philosophers I have just named. There is a sense in which aesthetic, moral and religious experience are each *sui generis* but what is unique in each experience is, I believe, given in each case by the different type of object in those experiences and not by a different type of awareness on man's side as an apprehending subject.

I wish to bring out and strengthen this account of the nature of a person by comparing it with two other accounts in some ways similar that have been offered by recent writers on this subject, namely John Macmurray's description of rational behaviour as the characteristic of personal life, and Martin Buber's "I-Thou" philosophy.

### Macmurray and Reason

John Macmurray writes that reason is "the characteristic of personal life" and he further defines reason as "the capacity to behave consciously in terms of the nature of what is not ourselves". Such behaviour in terms of what is other than ourselves implies a prior knowledge of the Other; and animals have neither the capacity for this "knowledge" nor
for this objective behaviour, i.e., behaviour in terms of the object. He suggests that animal consciousness is analogous to our dream consciousness which is an "adaptation to the stimulus of the environment", but is not an awareness of the environment. In his Gifford lectures Macmurray says: "Below the level of the personal, then, there is no cognition, since knowledge, in any sense of the term, presupposes the 'I do'; there is no action, but only reaction to stimulus". By the "knowledge" from which the lower animals are excluded Macmurray does not mean the kind of knowledge that is contained in judgements and propositions, but something more basic, rather like what some philosophers mean by "acquaintance". "All thought presupposes knowledge", he writes. "It is not possible to think about something that you do not already know." I would readily allow that animals do not have the kind of knowledge that required the formulation of judgements and propositions; but it is important to notice that it is knowledge in the much more elementary sense that Professor Macmurray denies to animals other than man.

There is much in Macmurray's account of what constitutes personal life that I accept. The view that the understanding of the nature of action has priority over the understanding of the nature of thought, that both thought and action presuppose knowledge, all this and much more seems to me to be of considerable importance and the sine qua non of a description
of what being a person means. But at one crucial point I think his account is insufficient. Some of the higher animals other than man, surely, are capable of this kind of "knowledge" and "objective behaviour" that Macmurray proposes as the differentia of being a person.

Take, for example, my cat looking out through the mosquito netting of my study window, as he was a short while ago, at a lizard outside. He mewed and clawed at the netting and seemed generally frustrated. But now his tactics have changed. He has gone out of the room and at this moment is silently stalking his prey around the outside of my bungalow. Is not this a case of behaviour in terms of the Other? Does it not imply a process by which he related his desires in connection with the lizard to his knowledge of the plan of my bungalow? The analogy of dream-consciousness seems to me to be quite inadequate to explain this type of behaviour which we find in many of the higher animals other than man. Admittedly the butterfly which battered itself against that same netting until it fell exhausted did not show the same ability to behave in terms of the Other. Yet I would hesitate to assert that it was totally devoid of this capacity. In fact it seems to me that "adaptability" which we have had reason to take as one of the distinguishing marks of living things, must include "behaviour in terms of the Other", and that it presupposes knowledge and possibly even thought in some rudimentary form. The difference
between my cat's behaviour and the butterfly's was a difference in the degree of intelligence in the behaviour that took place. One might dispute whether behaviour which is conditioned by knowledge and more especially by a considerable degree of intelligence in the use of should be described as "reaction to stimulus". My own preference, however, is to allow the description of all such animal behaviour as "reaction", because on the last resort it is determined by reference to the creature's desires for comfort, security, etc.

The difference of personal behaviour from all animal behaviour is illustrated in the fact that my own desire to kill the lizard, supposing I had such a desire, might quite possibly be interrupted by something more than thought and more even than intelligent thought about how best to accomplish this desire. There might quite possibly arise in my mind a consideration of the beauty of the creature or awareness of its own enjoyment of the sunshine, the air and whatever else lizards do enjoy. These considerations might not be sufficient to prevent my killing the lizard if I thought I had other better reasons for doing so; but it is the presence of such awareness of worth and the modifications that the responses to worth produce in behaviour that mark the essential difference of personal behaviour from animal behaviour.
Martin Buber, the German Jewish philosopher and theologian, has put forward an account of the nature of a person which has had considerable influence on many thinkers in recent years. It is not easy to summarise his position briefly and also fairly, because he writes in a poetic and mystical rather than in a philosophically systematic style. Since, however, his views have had considerable influence and differ significantly from my own, some account must be taken of them. I shall summarise his position rather freely so far as I understand it.

The gist of his account is that "relations are primary", and that of the two primary relations, "I-Thou" and "I-It", the former is the more basic and all else is an abstraction from this. This basic relationship is essentially a mutual relationship, and this mutuality is also basic. That is to say the nature of a conversation is not built up of (a) I speak to you, plus (b) you hear me speak to you, plus (c) you speak to me, plus (d) I hear you speak to me. Rather in Buber's view we begin with the conversation as a whole and the various items, a, b, c, and d, can be abstracted out of it.

This position clearly differs from my own in several ways. The experience of a personal encounter, according to Buber, would not be in any way parallel to aesthetic awareness or any other type of value awareness in which one's self is a subject
observing certain valuable objects or beings. This is because, in his view, but not in his terminology, in a personal encounter one is not only a subject but also in one sense an object, who is addressed, challenged, questioned, etc. Yet to say one's self is object will not do, for clearly objects, although they may be observed or moved, are not addressed, challenged, etc. In a personal encounter then one becomes a rather special kind of "object". But equally one also becomes a special kind of "subject" for whereas a subject in a normal subject-object relationship may observe or move an object one does not address, challenge, etc., an object; but the "subject" of a personal encounter does address, challenge his "object". Another way of making this point is to say that the logical analysis of the terms "address", "challenge", "offer sympathy to" is different from the analysis of the terms "observe", "move", etc. It follows from this, on a view such as Buber's, that since the normal usage of the terms "subject" and "object" belongs to the discourse of observing, moving, etc., and not to the discourse of addressing, challenging, etc., that it would be better to drop them in this context and to use other terms. For this reason the terms "I" and "Thou" have been proposed in contrast to the terms "I" and "It"; or more correctly the term "I-Thou" has been proposed in contrast to the term "I-It". Maurice Friedman quotes Karl Heim as saying that this distinction
between "I-Thou" and "I-It" is "one of the decisive discoveries of our time, .... the Copernican revolution of modern thought."\(^{16}\)

Now I proceed to a criticism of the I-Thou philosophy. I wish to argue that although it has said something of supreme importance it has not said it quite accurately. It has shown, I believe, that our knowledge of other persons cannot be accounted for in terms of any of the traditional theories of the perception of objects. It is not that we have perceptions of the words and behaviour of others and infer their nature as persons by some kind of analogy from our own self-consciousness and behaviour. There is some sense in which we know other persons directly. What the nature of this awareness is we will endeavour shortly to make clear. Where I believe the I-Thou philosophers are in error is in failing to recognise that the awareness of other persons is neither unique nor is it the basis of other types of awareness. It is one example among others of the awareness of value. Because it is the most common example and genetically the condition of the most fruitful development of other types of value awareness it has seemed to some to be a unique awareness and a condition of all value awareness. That this claim cannot be substantiated I believe is proved by the fact that there are many instances of aesthetic and religious experience which would normally be considered among the highest of human experiences which do not require the
presence of other persons either as their condition or for their completion. The enjoyment of beauty and the contemplation of holiness are assuredly experiences that are ends in themselves and do not have to lead on to words of appreciation on the part of the one who enjoys or contemplates. Such words of appreciation are indeed sometimes grotesquely inappropriate and would be better left unsaid. But even when a more or less appropriate response to the appreciation of beauty or the contemplation of holiness is made, it still does not necessarily require a social medium for its expression. Poets do not have to publish their verses. Painters do not have to exhibit their paintings. Religious mystics may or may not be called to prophecy to mankind. Indeed many great creative artists and mystics prefer to shun the social activity of publication, exhibition or prophecy; and even when they do engage in this, it is often a totally different activity and relatively independent of the earlier experiences of awareness of beauty or other value and the creative responses made to these.

These considerations seem to me to prove that personal relationships are not the necessary condition of other types of personal activity. But personal relationships may still be unique. Can the experience of addressing another person and of being addressed by another person, (which has been cited as the crux of the I-Thou philosophy), be analysed into terms of
value awareness and response? I believe so. Experience of persons is, I suggest, to be analysed into one or more of the following elements.

1. **Awareness of the worth of another person**

   This awareness is possible without one being in the position of addressing or being addressed by the other. One is eavesdropping perhaps on a conversation among a group of which one is not a member. Provided one is near enough to hear sufficient of the conversation, to notice facial expressions and bodily gestures, provided also that one has some independent means of knowing any necessary background to the conversation, then one may be as fully aware of the personality of any of the members of the group as one who is actually participating in the conversation. Perhaps one may be more aware in virtue of being an observer rather than a participant.

   To be aware of another person in this way it is not even necessary that the other person should be physically present. From reading his speeches, listening to anecdotes about him, seeing him on the films, looking him up in *Who's Who*, one can come to have an awareness of him which could be fuller and more precise than that of the bus conductor who actually "encounters" him every morning but knows nothing of his life or character. Now all historical knowledge of persons is essentially of this type, and there is a metaphorical sense surely in which students of history live
with the men and women of the past and enjoy their company even if they have never encountered them.

2. **Responding to the worth of another person**

Such a response does not presuppose what we, along with the personalist philosophers, have called a "personal encounter" or a "personal relationship". It presupposes only what we have just been describing, namely, the awareness of the worth of another person. One can write the biography of one whom one has never met; sing songs in his praise, build monuments in his honour and do deeds of kindness or exploits of heroic self-sacrifice inspired by his life. Jesus of Nazareth has elicited all these varied types of response from many more persons than ever encountered him in Galilee. But would not the believer claim that there is involved an "encounter" and a "personal relationship" with Jesus even across the centuries? Admittedly Jesus is a special case and we shall have to revert to this later. But what of Robert Burns? He also elicits biographies, monuments, songs, suppers and other jovialities from those who never met him. Or would his admirers claim to "meet" him too in some special sense? Certainly this would be an odd sense of the word "meet" for Burns clearly does not intend such encounters, and it would be an odd use of the word "encounter" without there being an intention to communicate on one side at least and a willingness to accept that communication on the other. If Burns celebrations
are allowed to pass as types of what is meant by "personal encounter" then I would wish to point out that this is being used to include nothing that is not covered by my two phrases "the intuition of personal worth" and "the response to personal worth". This, however, would be a misleading use of the term "personal encounter" because that term tends to suggest two further elements that are some times present in encounter, and these I now proceed to cite.

3. **Using another person as a medium in which to express oneself**

   This includes all that is contained in the more usual words such as "addressing", or "challenging" someone; but it also contains much more. It is a more satisfactory expression for several reasons. (a) It draws attention to the fact that it is not only in addressing a person that one uses him as a medium of expression, but also that in gestures of affection, in acts of retaliation or self-sacrifice one acts in the medium of other persons. (b) This way of describing social action indicates its analogy with artistic action. Just as one may act creatively in a medium of paint and canvas, or musical sounds, so too can one act creatively in the medium of another person or a social group. (c) Most of all this way of describing it enables us more adequately to account for many of the varied types of personal relationship that arise. For example, in
using other persons as media of expression one can clearly
distinguish between the person who uses others merely as media
of expression and the one who is also aware of and responds to
their worth as persons.

If it be objected that to talk of using another person as
a medium of expression is a degrading way to speak of a personal
relationship and to treat a person in this way would be an
immoral way to act, my reply is that this would only be so if it
were assumed that media of expression cannot have intrinsic
value of different orders. Clearly persons are a different
kind of medium from other media and the appropriate way to act
in a personal context is different from that in a context of
paint and canvas. It is equally clear, however, that not every
one sees this or acts in this way. They address other persons,
and in terms of the I-Thou philosophy, an I-Thou encounter has
taken place. Yet they address them without respect for them.
In terms of the I-Thou philosophy there is no ready means of
describing this deficiency in the personal relationship. But
in terms of the more detailed analysis of a personal relation-
ship here offered such a defect in a personal relationship is
clearly described by saying that they treat them as media of
expression without responding to their worth as persons.
4. Being used by another person as a medium in which he expresses himself

This includes all that is included in the phrase "being addressed by someone", and much more. It is a more satisfactory concept for similar reasons given in support of the previous expression. (a) It is a broader concept and so takes account of the fact that there are other ways that one can be treated as a medium besides being addressed. The points made above as (b) and (c) can also be made again here.

In some such way as this it seems possible to analyse the experience of a personal encounter into the various elements that make it up. All four of these elements are not necessarily present in every personal encounter. It is possible to see and hear someone without speaking to him. It is possible to respond to someone without his ever being aware of one's response. It is possible to speak to someone without properly appreciating his worth as a person. It is possible to be spoken to by someone without appreciating him or replying to him. But in the most typical personal encounter of holding a conversation in which one both speaks and listens, appreciates and is appreciated, all four of these elements can be readily distinguished.

I wish to make it clear that I do not claim that this is an exhaustive analysis of what happens in a personal encounter. There is very much more that might profitably be said on this
matter: but it would not necessarily be relevant to my present purpose. I am content if I have shown that a personal encounter is an analysable experience, analysable into terms of intuitions of value and responses to value. If it is analysable in this particular way, then Buber's contention that the I-Thou relationship is primary and unique falls. It should be quite apparent that there is at least one important respect in which I am not in disagreement with Buber. The analysis of a personal encounter which I offer is not in naturalistic terms; but in value terms. I have no intention of replacing the "I-Thou" relationship with an "I-it" one which seems to me even further off the mark. Persons are unique in worth and therefore the awareness of persons and the responses we make to them are also unique in worth. But there are different orders of uniqueness. The special quality of the intuitions of the worth of persons and of the responses made thereto are not unaccountable but are derived from the basic and intrinsic value of the persons who intuite and respond and from the persons whose worth is intuited and to whom responses are made. But this is not our concern at the moment. A more detailed discussion of the nature of the derivation of such derived values from the basic values will be given in due course.
The Place of Symbolism in Personal Life

Strictly our definition of a person is complete in terms of the intuition of values and the responses made to these. What then are we to make of the suggestion of Ernst Cassirer which is followed by Suzanne Langer and others that the defining characteristic of man is his use of symbols? I believe that what these writers say is of considerable importance, but that they err in making this the defining characteristic of man. Rather symbolism arises at a secondary even if still an important place in personal life. It has to do, firstly, with the way expressions may be encountered. Thus, when an expression is encountered not just as a thing in itself but in relation either to the person whose expression it is, or in relation to that object the intuition of which has given rise to the expression, then that expression is a sign, symbol or token, of that person or that intuited object. Secondly, when persons know or intend that their expressions may be encountered as expressions, symbolism enters into their expressions from the start when a person is expressing himself in a personal medium. But it does not belong to the nature of expressions as such that persons should intend that their expressions should have meaning or be symbolical, although expressions are always capable of being interpreted in this way; and may also be
intended to be interpreted thus.

In order to clarify this matter, we must distinguish between signs and symbols. Both Cassirer and Langer make this distinction which is roughly as follows. Two things found invariably or even normally together can be signs the one of the other. A flash of lightning is a sign that there will be thunder. Equally a roll of thunder is a sign that there has been lightning. In natural signs the roles of sign and significatum are often interchangeable. In artificial signs this is not so. The sound of the gong is a sign that dinner is ready, but here we cannot reverse the roles. The reason for the use of signs is man's interest in the objects that they signify and the greater availability of the sign than the object.

The use of symbols involves a more complex pattern. A symbol stands for a thing whether the thing be present or absent. Because it stands for it, a symbol therefore provokes the idea of the thing and ideas may be entertained even when their objects are absent; but signs indicate the imminence of their objects. A sign, therefore, normally leads to the reaction appropriate to the imminence of its particular object, and the simplest example of this is given in the conditioned reflex reaction as demonstrated by the psychologist Pavlov. What makes an entity a symbol rather than a sign is that instead of an overt reaction it leads to thought about its object. Clearly then the same
entity may be either sign or symbol or neither of these, according to the kind of response which is given to it.

There is an ambiguity, however, at which we have already hinted which must be cleared up. An act of expression may be intended as a symbol but not taken as such; or, on the other hand, it may simply be an expression without symbolic intent which is none the less taken as a symbol; or, thirdly, it may be both symbolic in intention and in reception. We propose, therefore, to denote these three different types of meaning as symbolically intended, symbolically interpreted and symbolically intended and interpreted. Further it is to be noted that expressions intended to be responded to as signs may be interpreted as symbols; and expressions intended as symbols may be responded to as signs. One of my main points has been that symbolic interpretation is genetically prior to symbolic intention; and that symbolic intention presupposes and requires a higher degree of sophistication than symbolic interpretation.

For Cassirer and Langer it is the presence of symbolism that gives rise to the awareness of objects as objects of some significance or worth. But this surely is a reversal of the true order. Unless there is first of all the awareness of our object as an object of some significance then there is no incentive to make any kind of response to it. Now if symbolism is a property that belongs to some responses then clearly there cannot be
symbolism prior to the making of a response and a fortiori there
cannot be symbolism prior to the awareness of an object as an
object of some significance. This is the position of A. N. White-
argues that awareness of "importance" must have genetical
priority over "expression" and "understanding".

Now according to Cassirer and Langer animals other than man
are capable of responding to *signs*; but only man can understand
or make use of *symbols*. With this I am on the whole in agreement.
Symbolism is a characteristic of personal life as distinct from
animal life; but I have already indicated why it cannot be
considered as the characteristic of personal life. I cannot
discover, however, that Cassirer and Langer ever clearly consider
the difference between these two positions. They seem to claim
that it is the characteristic, and yet I doubt whether any of the
evidence or argument that they offer proves that it is any more
than a characteristic of personal life.

I must, however, reiterate a doubt already expressed. It
concerns our ability to claim too dogmatically what animal
experience does or does not contain. It might be argued that
animals are capable of thought, (indeed it might be said that
I implied this at an earlier point in the discussion), and that
thought involves the manipulation of concepts, or at least of
images. Now what is an image but a kind of symbol? It would
therefore seem to follow that animals make use of symbols. This,
however, is sheer speculation. The evidence that we have before us is, I suggest, (a) that living things are capable of behaving in terms of the object, and (b) that they show different degrees of intelligence in such behaviour. However, migratory birds behave in terms of the objective situation and do so with what seems to be considerable intelligence. Yet since birds migrate to places they have never been to before it is difficult to say that thought is involved. There are similar difficulties in attributing to a thought process the capacity that cats and carrier pigeons have of finding their way back home. A thought process is ruled out in such cases because of the sheer impossibility there is in many of such instances of discovering sufficient data for thought to operate upon. If we use the word "thought" of such activities we must put it in quotation marks. It is surely wiser and more usual to talk of "instinct" and perhaps allow that there can be varying degrees of intelligence in instinctive behaviour. If it belongs to the nature of animal instinct to enable living creatures to behave in terms of the objective situation then there is no need to assume a thought process involving the use of symbolism in order to provide an explanation for this animal capacity.

So I conclude that symbolism belongs to the life of persons and is one of the characteristic features of personal experience, albeit not the defining characteristic.
Symbolism is a large and complex subject that calls for close philosophic examination. I have only touched on the matter here to the minimum extent that seems necessary for my purpose. There is, however, a closely related matter which has considerable relevance to my argument as it will develop later. It concerns the nature and function of tokens. This seems the most suitable point to deal with this matter.

31. The Nature and Function of Tokens

We have seen that an expression is a sign, symbol or token when that expression is encountered not just as a thing in itself but is encountered as an expression, that is when it is seen in relation either to the person whose expression it is or in relation to the intuited object which has given rise to the expression. It is a sign when it leads to the overt response normally made on the imminence of the person whose expression it is or of the intuited object. It is a symbol when it stands for and leads to thought about the person or intuited object. It awareness of is a token when it conveys the person or intuited object and is the means by which an intuition of another person or valuable object is made possible.

The same expression can often be taken in any one or more of these three possible ways. Let us suppose that someone
arrives at my door and says "Good morning". Taken as a sign, these words would be to me an indication of his arrival and I would make the appropriate response, "Come in". Or instead I may take these words as a symbol which represents an idea which starts a train of thought in my mind which concludes with the retort, "Not bad for the time of year". Or again, I may take these words as a token which makes me aware of the presence of another person as a person whom perhaps I either respect or despise, love or fear, etc. Even if I have never met him before his words can be the means by which I become aware of his being as a person with all the varied possibilities of significance that a person newly encountered can have.

I wish to argue that the taking of expressions as tokens is an indispensable condition of knowing another person as a person. Of course one might know another person in other ways, as, for example, a material body of a particular size, shape, weight and chemical composition. One might also know him as an animal organism with certain biological functions. One might even be aware of his worth as part of the order of nature and of his greater worth as a living creature. All of these types of knowledge, however, fall short of knowledge of him as a person.

Also we must make a further distinction between knowing that someone is a person and knowing him as a person. We may
well know that human beings whom we have never observed making any personal expression are persons and may treat them as such because they look more or less like other humans whom we have known as persons. This kind of knowledge of persons seems to me to be of an inferential kind but it presupposes that direct knowledge of persons as persons. It is this latter kind of knowledge that requires some token of another's personality. Such a token may be a word or gesture, perhaps a smile or even a shrug of the shoulders. So long as another person remains silent and completely motionless one may know that he is a person, but one cannot know him as a person.

Yet we do know persons as persons, that is as beings having a particular kind of significance or value. This seems to me to be the indubitable datum that we are trying to give some account of. How do we then come to know someone as a person? The simplest answer is because he says or does something that reveals himself to us. Thus there must be an occasion in which we come to know him as a person and such an occasion requires the presence of a personal expression which becomes the means by which we are enabled to know him directly as a person, that is as a being of the peculiar kind of value and significance that persons have. Such expressions are from our point of view as observers tokens or revelations of the other person.

There are internal expressions as well as external expressions.
Thought, for example, consists of internal expressions. But an only/external expression can be a revelation or a token of one's personality. In this I disagree with Martin Buber who writes of two men sitting together on a bus or train. To begin with there is no communication between them. Then one lifts the barriers. "Communication streams from him", but he "does not speak a word, does not stir a finger". This is the "silence which is communication". But surely this is not so? It may be only the flicker of an eyelid or the curl of a lip, but external expression of some kind there must be. This I believe is shown by the frequency with which our guesses about people we have only seen but not heard speak are wrong. More important, however, is our awareness that our ideas about people we have only seen but not heard speak are in the nature of guesses and not knowledge.

Yet in one way Buber is right. That is, that although our intuition of a person may be dependent upon the tokens by which he expresses himself, the intuition of his personality goes beyond anything contained in these tokens or logically inferred from them; and is in an important sense immediate. To clarify this account I wish to make several points about the relationship of our awareness of tokens to our awareness of the personalities that they convey.

(a) Our awareness of a person as a person possessing the kind of significance that persons have is immediate although
dependent upon the tokens by which he expresses himself. The
paradoxical appearance of this way of describing the situation
may be avoided if we follow the example of F.R. Tennant and
H.H. Farmer in distinguishing between the "psychical immediacy"
of our awareness of persons and its psychological dependence
upon their expressions. Another example, similar but not
identical, of this paradox is seen in the field of art where
the psychically immediate awareness of the beauty of a play,
symphony or ballet, as a whole, is none the less psychologically
dependent upon the awareness of each part of that play, symphony
of ballet whose parts have been spread out over a time series.

(b) These illustrations from appreciation in the arts are
intended to give no more than a hint of the difference between
psychical immediacy and psychological dependence, and the
relationship between them. Expressions do not, of course, belong
to the person whose expression they are in the kind of way that
parts of a work of art belong to the whole. To know the whole
of a play, symphony or ballet one needs to know all of its parts,
or at least a fair proportion of its parts. But knowledge of a
person is possible on the basis of one token of his personality.

When we say that we get to know a person better as a
result of further experience of him, this is to use the word
"know" in a different sense. The distinction between knowledge
by acquaintance and knowledge by description is a familiar one
in philosophy. The point I wish to make here is that knowledge by description can increase more and more but knowledge by acquaintance seems to me to have no degrees. It either is or is not. I can know (be acquainted with) another person as a person on a basis of one expression of his personality. I can know him more fully (have a more adequate description of him) as a result of more of such expressions; but these do not add anything to my original awareness of him as a person even if they enable me to describe more precisely the kind of person he is.

(c) Awareness of a person through awareness of the tokens in which he expresses himself, is immediate, and is not the result of intellectual inference from the tokens to the person. How could it be the result of an intellectual process? There is no evidence for such an activity of inference here. Also the nature of the awareness given by inference is of a propositional type that such and such is so and so; whereas the kind of awareness of a person which I am trying to pinpoint is not at all this type of awareness but is an awareness of a being possessing a certain significance or value. This kind of awareness of a being cannot be the result of inference, but is the datum from which inference starts.

Equally we must protest against the suggestion that the awareness of a person is simply a construction of a more complex kind built out of the sum total of the expressions of a particular
person that one has experienced, combined with one's expectation of future expressions, that this in turn is combined by analogy with one's own inner experience; and that when we think we are aware of another person as a person we are aware of nothing but the product of this construction. Such an account will not do, Not only is there no empirical evidence for an activity of construction such as this theory suggests, but also our experience of another person is not an experience of a logically constructed product such as this theory requires, but is an experience of a being of a particular significance and worth.

A further reason for rejecting the theory that the awareness of another person is an awareness of an intellectually constructed product is the difficulty that such a theory must have in accounting for our awareness of another person's worth. It seems that there are two possible accounts of our awareness of personal worth that the upholders of such a theory might offer. (i) It might be suggested that our awareness of a person's worth is derived from an awareness of the worth of his expressions. But this is hardly tenable; because the worth of a person and the worth of the things he says and does belong to different orders. His words and deeds may be quite trivial in significance; and yet we still are aware of an obligation to respect him as a person. (ii) Or it could be held that our awareness of another person's worth is derived by analogy from awareness of our own worth. But this also seems unsatisfactory, because
although one may have strong subjective emotions pertaining to one's own welfare, the precise nature of one's awareness of one's own worth may as likely as not be that one has less worth than some other person.

(d) The occasion of appreciating an expression as a token and of intuiting someone as a person by means of that token does not necessarily happen at the same moment as that of the making of that expression. There is usually, for example, a time lag and also a space gap, in the case of the word written and subsequently read, of considerably greater dimension than in the case of the word spoken and then more or less immediately heard, perhaps in the same room. Strictly there is a time lag and space gap in both cases, but in the case of the writing and reading of letters it is of sufficient length to raise a number of questions of some importance. What about receiving a letter from someone who has died since writing it, or of re-reading an old letter of someone long since departed? What about the practice indulged in by some of having "pen-pals" whom they have never met? What about reading books, looking at paintings, listening to music whose creators we have never met? Perhaps we do not even know their names. In what sense are these works of art tokens which make us aware of their creators? More questions occur than will allow of a detailed answer to each of them at the moment.
In principle, the question underlying all these other questions concerns the importance of the presence of the physical body of a person known. The answer to this question is that the presence of a person's physical body provides the simplest and clearest evidence as to how diverse tokens are to be organised in groups each belonging to the intuition of a particular person. Without this evidence doubt might persist as to which tokens belong to the intuition of one person and which to another. A physical body is not, however, the only evidence nor even the most significant evidence that a group of tokens are tokens of one person. A knowledge of Shelley's poetry, for example, possesses its own intrinsic evidence that it was all written by one person. But this evidence is not coercive. In some cases a nagging doubt might remain. But had I been present when Shelley actually wrote his verses and had observed that they all came forth from that one physical source then my evidence would have been of a well-nigh indubitable kind. Doubtless had I been present at such memorable literary occasions I would also have benefitted from many unpublished comments and idiosyncratic gestures and my knowledge of the poet's personality would have been of a much fuller kind. But what would Shelley's body in itself have contributed as distinct from the expression-tokens which it produced? The answer seems to be nothing at all, save this coercive evidence of unity. Had I merely seen Shelley motionless, silent and perhaps asleep, I should have been less
entitled to claim that I knew him as a person than one who over a century later reads and enjoys his work.

32. That Persons are Good in Themselves and are more Valuable than other Living Creatures or Inorganic Orderly Things

We must now consider the assertion that persons are good in themselves. It is with much greater boldness that I make the claim for the intrinsic worth of persons than the claims that I have made for the worth of orderly things and living things. I have considerable confidence that my effort to exhibit the intrinsic worth of persons will meet with a ready response from many who may have continued to doubt the intrinsic goodness of order and of life. I do not, of course, expect to witness the conversion of hardened positivists and subjectivists. But I do expect that those whose starting point is an objectivist one will assent to the claim that here at least we have something whose value is intrinsic and basic. I shall therefore refrain from belabouring a point which to anyone who has broadly accepted my argument so far must be a fairly obvious one.

I shall, however, discuss two considerations which seem to me sufficiently to prove the case: (1) that persons possess intrinsic worth is implicitly accepted by many diverse systems of ethics which make little or no explicit mention of this
matter;  (2) that many upholders of points of view altogether
different from the one here maintained none the less show in
much of their behaviour and in their spontaneous moral judgements
an implicit acceptance of the assumption that persons possess
intrinsic value.

(1) The intrinsic worth of persons is implicitly
accepted by many diverse systems of ethics which make little or
no explicit mention of this matter. Ideally I should survey
the whole history of ethics in proof of this assertion. A much
less ambitious procedure will have to suffice. I take three
systems chosen more or less at random to illustrate this
point.

(a) Bishop Joseph Butler, in his Fifteen Sermons preached
originally in the Rolls Chapel and later published in 1726,
attaches considerable importance to "Self-love" and "Benevolence"
as "natural principles" whose existence is given in experience.
The form of Butler's argument is psychological, but a
teleological pattern is assumed throughout his examination of
human nature. It is the function of Self-love to superintend
the various appetites and passions that seek the welfare of
the self and to ensure that the fulfilment of these is
controlled in the interest of the self as a whole. Similarly,
it is the function of Benevolence to superintend the various
appetites and passions which seek the welfare of
society and to ensure that the fulfilment of these is
controlled in the interest of society as a whole.

Butler does not, so far as I can see, directly raise the question of the validity of these two principles. Yet an acquaintance with his work leaves one in little doubt that the validity of these principles is assumed throughout. Certainly in speaking of the authority of the principle of Conscience his words are memorable and unambiguous. "Had it strength, as it has right; had it power, as it has manifest authority; it would absolutely govern the world". One can scarcely doubt that Butler intends his words about the authority of Conscience to include the notion of the validity of that authority. Now, according to Butler, Conscience stands in a position of superintendence to Self-love and Benevolence in a manner roughly corresponding to the position of superintendence that these two principles hold in relation to the particular appetites and passions. It would seem to follow that the authority and validity of these two principles, even if more restricted than the authority and validity of Conscience, is also part of Butler's general position.

If this be granted as a more or less fair resume of Butler's ethical teaching and of what it implies, it seems reasonable at this point to press him for a fuller explanation. What are the grounds, we might ask, of the validity of the
principles of Self-love and Benevolence? To be still more explicit, what are the grounds, we might enquire, of the rightness of seeking the welfare of the self as a whole and of seeking the welfare of society as a whole? Since Butler has informed us that these are rational principles we are entitled to expect that questions about the basis of their validity are capable of being rationally answered. Must he not, sooner or later, answer these questions in a manner something like this? We ought to seek the welfare of ourselves and of other because all persons whether one's own self or other persons have a peculiar kind of worth in themselves in virtue of which we ought to treat them in certain kinds of ways and avoid treating them in certain other ways. Thus the view that persons are good or valuable in themselves seems to be the implicit basis of an ethical system such as Butler's.

(b) Let us try a similar experiment with Kant. His *Grundlegung zur Metaphysic der Sitten* was first published in 1785 and is a convenient source of information on his ethical teaching. It is hardly necessary to go through the details of Kant's ethical teaching in order to make my point. I shall begin at a point that Kant reaches after considerable argumentation, namely the third formulation of the categorical
imperative. It runs, "So act as to treat humanity, whether in thine own person or in that of any other, in every case as an end withal, never as means only".  

It is reasonable, however, to press Kant for a fuller explanation. Why should we treat human nature as an end? The only satisfactory answer would seem to be, "Because human nature is in fact an end". And this indeed is more or less what Kant says. "Now I say: man and generally any rational being exists as an end in himself, not merely as a means to be arbitrarily used by this or that will."  

Note that Kant admits the theoretical possibility of the existence of rational beings other than men, as I admit theoretically the distinction of the class of persons from the class of human beings. It is beyond the scope of our present discussion to consider the extent of the agreement and difference between Kant's account of a "rational being" and my own account of a "person". Nor is such an enquiry necessary, because the point I wish to make does not depend upon agreement on this matter. The point is simply that morality presupposes the existence of beings of intrinsic worth (Kant's "ends in themselves"). Whether we call them "persons" or "rational beings" and even whether we mean more or less the same thing by these terms is of secondary importance compared with agreement on this matter that human
beings generally possess certain characteristics in virtue of which they are intrinsically valuable, and that it is in the recognition of this worth and in the treatment of them in the light of it that morality begins.

(c) The third example I wish to cite is the Utilitarian teaching of John Stuart Mill. In his famous essay entitled "Utilitarianism", first published in Fraser's Magazine in 1861, he defines his creed in the oft quoted words, "The creed which accepts as the foundation of morals, Utility, or the Greatest Happiness Principle, holds that actions are right in proportion as they tend to promote happiness, wrong as they tend to produce the reverse of happiness. By happiness is intended pleasure, and the absence of pain; by unhappiness, pain, and the privation of pleasure".

We might point out to Mill that happiness and pleasure are not conditions that exist apart from living creatures; and we would therefore question him as to whose happiness or pleasure he refers. The question might be divided into two parts: (a) Does he mean that it is our duty to seek the happiness or pleasure of human beings or of other animals also? and (b) Does he mean that we ought to pursue the happiness or pleasure of some human beings or other animals or the happiness or pleasure of all human beings or all animals? The first of these questions is answered in principle in
the passage about differences in quality of pleasures, and the implied instruction that it is our prior duty to seek the pleasure of those beings who are capable of enjoying the higher quality of pleasure. That means presumably that our duties to men take precedence over our duties to the lower animals. The second question is answered in principle in the long and closely argued chapter on Justice, concluding with the passage, "That principle [the Greatest Happiness Principle] is a mere form of words without rational signification, unless one person's happiness, supposed equal in degree (with the proper allowance made for kind), is counted for exactly as much as another's. These conditions being supplied, Bentham's dictum, 'everyone to count for one, nobody for more than one', might be written under the principle of utility as an explanatory commentary."  

In view of all this and much more that might be cited from Mill's argument it is difficult to avoid the conclusion that Mill's teaching could be put in a much simpler and more logically satisfactory form if he were to say that all living creatures possess an intrinsic worth in virtue of their capacity for sentient experience, that some living creatures, namely men, possess a higher intrinsic worth in virtue of their capacity for a higher quality of experience, and that it is our duty to treat both men and the lower animals with regard to their intrinsic worth and with
regard to the difference between the worth of men and the
worth of the other animals. The main point about this
reconstruction of Mill's teaching is that it recognises that
the basic values are beings such as men and animals and not
simply states such as pleasure or happiness.

Unless such a reconstruction is made two questions
about Mill's teaching remain unanswered, namely (a) If
the states of pleasure or happiness alone are valuable, how
can it be that, as Mill says, "It is better to be a human
being dissatisfied than a pig satisfied; better to be
Socrates dissatisfied than a fool satisfied"? (b) Also
if the states of pleasure or happiness alone are valuable
how does it come about that it matters at all whose states
these are? Why should Mill, following Bentham, hold that
there should be a fair distribution of happiness among mankind
which might be quite incompatible with the existence of the
greatest amount of happiness on the whole?

It might properly be pointed out that acceptance of
the intrinsic worth of persons is more clearly implicit in the
teaching of Butler and of Kant than in that of Mill. In Kant
indeed it might even be described as explicit. In the case of
Mill it is only in one strand of his teaching that the intrinsic
worth of persons as such is implied. But even with these
differences it might be said that these three are a selected group. What about thinkers whose starting point is totally different from my own? To the consideration of the position of such persons I now turn.

(2) It is my contention that the upholders of points of view altogether different from the one here maintained none the less very often show in much of their behaviour and in their spontaneous moral judgements an implicit acceptance of the assumption that persons possess intrinsic value.

Any adequate proof of this contention would obviously be quite a considerable undertaking. Its method would have to be first of all a sociological one rather than a philosophical one. It would consist (a) of collecting information for the purposes of making a systematic survey of the behaviour of convinced subjectivists, positivists, nihilists, Marxists, etc., and (b) of making a similar survey of the spontaneous moral judgements of these same groups. In the interpretation of (a) we should have to remember to make allowance for the discrepancy that invariably exists between a person's basic moral convictions and the details of their behaviour. Because a person is sometimes cruel does not mean that he does not basically believe that cruelty is a bad thing. The importance of our survey of these persons' behaviour is to provide us with clues about their basic
spontaneous moral convictions. The clues however are imperfect because there are other influences affecting human behaviour in addition to basic moral convictions. It might therefore seem wiser to concentrate on (b), that is our survey of the spontaneous moral judgements that these persons make. Our difficulty here, however, is to be sure when we really have a spontaneous moral judgement as distinct from a moral judgement that has been influenced by a philosophical point of view that these persons have become accustomed to defending. This, however, in spite of its difficulties is the task that we ought to undertake to establish or refute the position for which I am contending. In the absence of the accomplishment of such a sociological enquiry it may be presumptuous to hazard a guess about what its outcome would be. Yet one's hunch in this matter is not entirely without foundation in the observations one continually makes about the behaviour and spontaneous moral reactions and judgements of one's friends and acquaintances whose philosophical position is vastly different from one's own. It is that in most cases their behaviour and spontaneous moral reactions and judgements seem to imply the acceptance of the assumption that persons possess intrinsic worth, an intrinsic worth which is greater than the worth of inorganic things or the worth of other living creatures, and that they have this worth simply in virtue of being persons.
Now even supposing all this were adequately proved there still remain several *philosophical* questions of considerable complexity. The first question concerns my entitlement to move from observations regarding persons' moral behaviour, reactions, judgements, etc., and the moral assumptions that *seem* to be implied by these, to the assertion that such moral assumptions are *actually* held by these persons. The second question concerns my entitlement to make the further move from a statement regarding some people's moral assumptions about the intrinsic worth of persons, even if such assumptions be held universally or nearly universally by mankind, to any statement about the validity of these assumptions, that is, to the statement that persons are in fact intrinsically valuable.

Clearly the detailed discussion that these questions deserve is not possible here and now; but I shall attempt an outline of how the argument might proceed. All human behaviour, and indeed all animal behaviour, consists in doing things to the world the awareness of which is a precondition of any behaviour at all. It is this fact that entitles us to say that certain assumptions about the world underlie all human behaviour. But other factors in addition to assumptions about the nature of the world are also influencing human and animal behaviour, as, for example, desires, tastes, and other non-cognitive factors. The first question to be settled is whether the factor that leads
to the treatment of persons as beings of intrinsic worth is primarily an assumption about their nature, that is whether it is primarily ostensibly a cognitive factor, or whether it is merely a matter of taste or some other ostensibly non-cognitive factor. The argument for its being an ostensibly cognitive factor is the near universality of behaviour which seems to imply an awareness of an obligation to treat persons as beings of worth (assuming our sociological survey to have vindicated our hunch in this matter). Such near universality is difficult to reconcile with a mere matter of taste. Indeed it is impossible to reconcile the suggestion of its being a matter of taste with the fact that men's desires in this matter are often in conflict with their sense of obligation. So I conclude that there is evidence of a nearly universal assumption in diverse cultures, and sometimes held along with a philosophical point of view that ill accords with this assumption, that persons are beings of intrinsic worth who should be treated accordingly.

The next step is to prove the validity of this assumption. Assumptions may, of course, be nearly universally held and yet be incorrect, as, for example, the assumption held by most people at one time that the earth was flat. It is important to ask what kind of proof of any assumption we ought to expect before being entitled to consider it a reasonable assumption. No finally coercive proof has yet been produced regarding the
existence of the material world, and yet most of us consider this a reasonable assumption. Is there any means by which we can distinguish between reasonable assumptions and more dubious ones? There seem to me to be two important criteria which may serve our purpose. One is that we should distinguish between an assumption that is directly based upon what is indubitably given in immediate experience and an assumption that involves an interpretation of the given. For example, it is indubitably given in my immediate experience that the earth surrounds my bungalow on every side, that it stretches away in every direction and that, so far as I can see, it is more or less flat. It would be an interpretation of this to assume that the earth as a whole is flat. Similarly it is indubitably given in my immediate experience that I live in a world of persons whose significance or worth I am obliged to take into account quite apart from whether I happen to like them or not, and apart also from whether they or anyone else is likely to compel me to fulfil this obligation. It would be an interpretation of this to assume that I ought to seek their greatest happiness, always speak the truth to them or treat them in any other particular way.

A second criterion of a reasonable assumption in contrast with a more dubious one is that we should distinguish between an assumption which is presupposed as a condition of knowledge of any general kind and an assumption of a particular item of belief.
For example, the assumption of the existence of an external world is presupposed by and is clearly, therefore, more basic and more securely grounded than the assumption of a particular belief about the world, such as that the earth is flat or has any particular shape or composition. So I would argue also that the assumption of the significance or worth of persons is one that is presupposed as a condition of all moral awareness and moral action and is not simply a particular item of moral belief like that of an obligation to make others happy or to speak the truth. (Exceptions to this generalisation are those parts of morality which arise out of our awareness of the worth of orderly things and out of our awareness of the worth of living things. Here, however, it seems to me that there is a terminological question whether these parts of "morality" are to be appropriately classed as morality at all.)

If the arguments outlined here could be reinforced in detail, as I believe they could, then I submit that we should have fully established the case that persons are good in themselves and are more valuable than other living things or inorganic orderly things.
A Value Scale of Living Things and Persons

From the definitions that I have offered of a living thing and of a person it is clear that in one sense some things are more fully alive than others and some human beings are more fully persons than others. In another sense, however, it may be objected that such a statement is nonsensical, that a thing must either be alive or not alive, and that a living thing is either a person or not. We cannot, it may be argued, say that a horse is more alive than a jelly fish; nor that a sophisticated scholar is any more a person than a newly born infant. The problem is one of finding the clearest way of describing differences in value between different living things and different persons that on the definitions offered undoubtedly exist.

Let us indicate these obvious differences. A living thing has been defined as a thing that has sensitivity to its environment and adapts itself to its environment. Now there are among living things considerable differences in the precision and adequacy with which they are sensitive to their environment; and there are considerable differences too in the ability, speed and completeness with which living things can adapt themselves to their environment. At the top of the scale on both counts is man with a very high degree of sensitivity that includes both the perception and the understanding of his
environment; and a considerable ability not only to adapt himself, but, more significantly, an ability to master and control his environment for his own benefit. However we choose to describe these differences (and I do not see any serious objection to saying that man is more fully alive than the amoeba), these are differences not only of fact, but, if my earlier arguments are sound, also differences of intrinsic value.

A person has been defined as a being that intuits the intrinsic worth of different things and responds to these intuitions of worth. But there are among persons considerable differences in the precision and adequacy of their intuitions of the value of things; and there are considerable differences also in their ability to respond to these intuitions of the value of things. The more detailed discussion of these differences in response must await the discussion of the different types of response. However one may describe these differences, (and I see no serious objection to saying that some men are more fully persons than others) these are differences not only of fact, but, if my earlier arguments are sound, these are also differences of intrinsic value between men.

A doubt however arises about the meaningfulness of this distinction in the value of different persons. Can we show how these value differences can be measured, roughly at least, even if not precisely? And if they cannot be measured in some kind
of way, can the use of the notion of such value differences between persons be legitimately maintained? The difficulty is that we are talking of value differences between persons, and this, as we have seen, refers to different personal capacities for having intuitions and for making responses. Yet a capacity for making responses cannot be measured in itself but only when it is realised in responses; and a capacity for having intuitions can only be measured even less directly through the responses to which they give rise. Now there is no means of knowing, so far as I can see, whether what is called the realisation of one's capacity is in fact the realisation of one's full capacity. We only know what a person can do by seeing what he has done; but we can never know how much more he might have done. Intelligence tests and personality inventories always turn out on close scrutiny to be in fact achievement tests which measure not so much full capacity as minimum capacity.

On the other hand the very fact of personal development among human beings, of the realisation of many and varied capacities during the growth from babyhood to manhood and maturity, and the existence of educational systems as practical sciences which are concerned with this development, makes it reasonable to talk about capacities even before they have been realised. In addition to these objective observations there is also the inner consciousness of most persons that there are some things which they could
do if they chose and other things which they could possibly do if they tried which for one reason or another they choose not to do in the one case or not to attempt in the other.

I propose therefore to continue to write about capacity and capacities while allowing that the means of demonstrating these precisely is beset with difficulties. I shall also write of comparing or measuring persons and personal capacities while stressing that the practical means of doing this is very dubious and that the notion itself involves this ambiguity that I intend to refer to a capacity or capacities but that all that one can even attempt to compare or measure is achievement.
References


2. Ibid, p. 46.


4. Ibid. See the chapter on "Intelligence".


10. Ibid., p. 275.


14. J. Macmurray, *Interpreting the Universe*, Faber, 1933, p. 15


17. Vide E. Cassirer, An Essay on Man, Yale University Press, 1944, Chap. 2 and 3; and S. Langer, Philosophy in a New Key, Harvard University Press, 1942.

18. Thought itself is nothing but the intuition and internal expression of symbols; but further discussion of this would take us too far away from our main theme. Vide John Macmurray, Interpreting the Universe, Chap. 2, on "Thought as Symbolic Expression" for an exposition of this way of describing thought.

19. Cf. R. G. Collingwood, Principles of Art, Chap. XI on "Language" for an example of this general position. I dislike Collingwood's terminology, however. He wishes to equate "expression" and "language" and to restrict "symbolism" to that type of language in which there is agreement about the precise meaning of the terms. Surely this is to reverse the normal meanings of "symbolism" and "language"?

20. A. N. Whitehead, Modes of Thought, (U.P.Cambridge, 1933), Chapter I.


26. Ibid., p. 57.


28. Ibid., p. 46. The italics are Kant's.


30. Ibid., pp. 8-9.

31. Ibid., pp. 38-60.

32. Ibid., p. 58.

33. Ibid., p. 9. The italics are mine.
CHAPTER VI

HOLINESS AND THE HOLY BEING
A Problem of Denotation

Our discussion of the nature of holiness is beset with an initial problem which hardly exists in the case of the other basic values. Our problem there largely concerned the connotative definition of these values but there was (marginal instances apart) little doubt about the denotative or ostensive definition. The initial problem about holiness is that no kind of agreement seems likely even about the denotation of this term. Most men would find themselves in general agreement if asked to point to instances of orderly things, living creatures, and persons. Even in the marginal cases between the non-living and the living such as the viruses, and between the living and the personal, such as the ape-men, there would generally be agreement that here we have marginal and therefore arguable cases. Such general agreement about the denotation of these values precedes and is not dependent upon agreement about the precise differentia of these groups.

However when we consider holiness there is no corresponding agreement about the denotation of the term. Indeed it is with regard to the question as to what things are holy that disagreement seems most acute. The devotees of one religion consider certain days of the week or of the year holy; those of another faith observe other days; and others again hold all days alike. There
is similar disagreement about holy places such as cities, rivers and mountains. And in determining which events and actions, which persons and animals are to be reckoned holy we are confronted with similarly conflicting and confusing opinions. So general is the disagreement that it might seem at first glance as if we have moved into a realm of complete fancy in which the possibility of discerning any pattern at all was very slight. There are several considerations, however, I believe, which save us from this conclusion.

1. In spite of the disagreement about the denotation of the term, there is an implicit agreement about its connotation.
2. The instances of holy things that can be cited in every religion turn out on examination to be less than holy in the full and proper sense but to be called holy in some secondary sense. They are instances of derived holiness and it can, I submit, be shown that they derive their holiness according to a scheme to be explained later in this thesis.
3. From the essential meaning of holiness it is not surprising that the possessor of this value in its basic sense is not a type of object that can be easily and precisely indicated, but lies beyond the ordinary objects of sense experience.

Let us examine these points more fully.
In order to arrive at the meaning of holiness we have, it seems to me, no alternative but to survey the usages of this word, its near synonyms and derivatives in the world's religions both primitive and highly developed, in order that from these usages we might elicit its essential meaning. We are however saved from this rather arduous task by the fact that it has already been done by Rudolph Otto in his book, The Idea of the Holy. We shall not therefore re-examine this field; and yet we must sort out some of the things that Otto says.

An important part of his work is concerned with the analysis of religious consciousness. The psychological form of this analysis must not mislead the reader into thinking that Otto has any doubts about the reality of the object of religious consciousness. Criticising Schleiermacher's account of religion in terms of a "feeling of dependence upon the infinite" Otto argues that this way of describing religion suggests that it is primarily a kind of self-consciousness whereas in fact its primary reference is to an object outside the self. He therefore prefers to speak of "creature consciousness" which he says is "a first subjective concomitant and effect of another feeling-element, which casts it like a shadow, but which in itself indubitably has immediate and primary reference to an object outside the self". And
again: "The numinous is thus felt as objective and outside the self." The objectivity of the Holy is also brought out by the phrase "the wholly other" by which Otto seeks to describe the "mysterium".

This fundamental point of Otto's is somewhat obscured by his habit of speaking of the "feeling" or the "emotion" of the Holy. In normal usage the words "emotion" and "feeling" are non-cognitive, although the states to which they refer may accompany cognitions and may take their peculiar flavour from the content of the cognition. Otto, however, describes the religious experience of holiness sometimes as an "emotion", sometimes as a "feeling". Yet clearly in his usage these are cognitive emotions and feelings. This might suggest that it is some kind of sensation that he has in mind. Yet he explicitly repudiates a sensationalist interpretation of his views in favour of the a priori nature of the apprehension of holiness. In Chapter 18 he writes of the "divination" of "the holy". This word has the merit of bringing out the cognitive nature of the experience; but it also has a rather specialised meaning which we shall discuss later. My own preference is to speak of the intuition of holiness in order to indicate the epistemological similarity of the apprehension of holiness with the apprehension of other values.
We now turn to consider whether Otto offers us a satisfactory account of holiness. Holiness is a complex notion, he tells us, and the most distinctive element in it is what he calls "the numinous". This word he chooses to denote the essentially religious element in holiness over and above all the moral and aesthetic ideas which have come to be associated with holiness. Some may find this a helpful clarification; but it seems to me to be a needless multiplication of terms, and I propose therefore to stick to the term holiness and to use it in its specifically religious sense.

The nature of holiness is known according to Otto "as it is reflected in the mind in terms of feeling". The results of the analysis of this feeling are most conveniently summarised in Otto's phrase *mysterium tremendum et fascinans*. The substantive *mysterium* is qualified synthetically, we are told, by the adjectives *tremendum* and *fascinans*. This is doubtless a correct analysis of the grammar of the phrase; but has it any philosophic worth? How can Otto be quite so sure of this in view of what he tells us of the incomprehensible nature of the mysterium? It is surely wiser to speak more cautiously of all three words as denoting features in holiness.

Of *mysterium*, Otto says, "The truly mysterious object is beyond our apprehension and comprehension, not only because our
knowledge has certain irremovable limits, but because in it we come upon something inherently "wholly other" whose kind and character are incommensurable with our own, and before which we therefore recoil in a wonder that strikes us chill and numb".

A comment is necessary at this point. The description of holiness as the "wholly other" has been much canvassed by some Old Testament scholars and some students of primitive religions, and has even been erected into the defining characteristic of holiness by some. The influence of Kierkegaard who speaks of "the infinite qualitative difference between God and man" has also tended to support this position and has affected many modern theologians. This is going too far. When used analogically the phrase "wholly other" is a useful description of holiness, but when taken literally, as it sometimes is, and used as a definition of holiness it seems to me to lead to an impossible position for the following reasons:

(a) It would make impossible some of the most typical features of religion, e.g. revelation and communion. If the holy is quite literally "wholly other" then there can be no means by which it can become known to us, and still less is there any possibility of a reconciliation or communion with it. There would be no possibility of the holy coming into human life or of the raising of the human life to the level of the holy. Yet these are central
features in Christianity and other religions also. This kind of definition of holiness is as Professor H. H. Farmer pointed out "self-refuting" 7.

(i) The only ways in which one might retain the idea of the "wholly other" as the central meaning of holiness would be either by insisting that reconciliation and other such features of spiritual religion are illusory, or else by making a distinction between primitive and spiritual religion and disallowing the notion of holiness in the latter. But either of these expedients it seems to me would involve doing serious violence to an honest description of the facts of religion. To illustrate this one might consider that well known paradigm of the experience of holiness, namely Isaiah's vision in the Temple (Isaiah 6:1-8). The experience of religion here represented is not different in kind from the mana-tabu holiness of primitive religion. It possesses all those features that are indicated by the phrase "the wholly other". Yet at the same time the story includes a movement of reconciliation from the side of the holy, the purging away of Isaiah's sin, and his call to service. It seems to follow from this that the holy in this case is not literally and entirely "wholly other", but only describable thus in a figurative sense.

(ii) If "wholly otherness" be made the essential characteristic of the holy it is not possible to see how other characteristics that invariably belong to holiness are derived from this
alleged essential character. How for example does the quality of supreme value derive from the "wholly other"? If however we try the alternative approach and make supreme value the essential characteristic then it is quite possible to understand how from this the holy may also be said to be "wholly other", not admittedly in a literal but in a symbolic sense.

(b) A serious consequence follows for the autonomy and ultimately for the validity of religious experience if "wholly otherness" is taken as the defining characteristic of holiness. C. A. Campbell has some instructive things to say on this matter. He points out that if the essential character of the holy be the "mysterium" or the "wholly other" as Otto seems to say, then the crucial question to be asked is whether this is something peculiar to the religious consciousness, "So that the religious consciousness cannot conceivably be explained in terms of anything other than itself". He regrets that Otto's treatment of this question is "disappointingly perfunctory". Campbell cites our experience of dreaming in which we encounter mysterious shapes and events which are "wholly other" and often completely discontinuous with events in the real world as a possible source of the notion of the "wholly other". "It seems to me, therefore", writes Campbell, "that one need not look beyond dream phenomena to find ample justification for those who think that man's sense of the mysterious, even in its
non-natural or supernatural meaning of the "wholly other" is easily enough accounted for independently of religious experience".

This argument against the autonomy of religion seems to me to be very strong if the holy be defined literally in terms of the "wholly other". Since this would appear to be the sense in which Campbell understands Otto to define the holy I have therefore some difficulty in seeing why Campbell attaches so much importance to Otto.

But, we must ask, is this the correct or the only way in which Otto may be taken? I regret to have to confess considerable uncertainty as to the logical priority of the various things that Otto says about "the holy". But in this matter it seems to me to be less important to enquire into the question of what Otto actually says than into the question of what Otto ought to have said, or of what is the truth about holiness. The suggestion that I will make is that the holy be defined in terms of supreme value, that such a definition is at least suggested by Otto and is quite compatible with the further analysis of the holy that Otto offers. Most important of all, such a definition truly represents the facts of religious awareness and provides a basis for the autonomy of religion.

In my view the most fruitful suggestion that Otto makes occurs in Chapter 8, "The Holy as a Category of Value". Some
quotations should bring out his main point. Otto writes that the worshipper "passes upon the numen a judgement of appreciation of a unique kind by the category diametrically contrary to the profane, the category holy, which is proper to the numen alone, but to it in an absolute degree; he says *Tu solus sanctus.* This sanctus is not merely perfect or beautiful or sublime or good, though being like these concepts also a value, objective and ultimate, it has a definite perceptible analogy with them. It is the positive numinous value or worth, and to it corresponds on the side of the creature a numinous *disvalue* or unworth." And again he writes, "It is not that the awe of holiness is itself simply 'fear' in the face of what is absolutely overpowering, before which there is no alternative to blind, awe-struck obedience. *Tu solus sanctus* is rather a paeon of praise, which is so far from being a merely faltering confession of the divine Supremacy, recognises and extols a value, precious beyond all conceiving."

These and other such passages suggest a definition of holiness in terms of value.

**Holiness is that value which is given in experience as and surpassing all others/than which no higher value can even be conceived.**

This definition *per genus et differentiam* is enough to start with and is not incompatible with the further analysis of holiness.
that Otto offers.

One of the main strengths of a definition such as this is that it provides a more solid basis for arguing for the autonomy of religious experience than a definition in terms of "the wholly other".

There are two complementary features about this definition that I wish to underline. (a) It does not make holiness discontinuous with the rest of human experience but allows that holiness is a value and hence belongs to the same genus as moral and aesthetic values. (b) It indicates none the less that the holy is a unique value: in fact the supreme value. Yet a further clarification of the meaning is necessary here. The idea of supreme value is not just a logical construct created by thought. As we might from the ideas of "big", "bigger" and "still bigger" arrive at the idea of "the biggest possible", so from the ideas of "valuable", "more valuable" and "still more valuable" it could be argued that we construct the notion of "the most valuable possible". Holiness is not the concept of a value constructed by thought; but is a value immediately intuited in experience. It seems to me that Otto's repeated description of the holy as a "category" especially when he refers to it as an "a priori category" is misleading. Basically holiness is known by intuition, and it only becomes a category because it is first of all known by intuition. What Otto means by calling it a priori will be
discussed later, but any plausibility that the assertion of its apriority can have seems to me to rest on its being an *a priori* intuition, rather than an *a priori* category.

I have written an appendix of notes on Otto's work in which I have tried to clarify some of the things he says and to consider some of the attacks made against Otto by his critics. This is necessary because undoubtedly Otto has been guilty of much obscurity. Yet, I believe, in spite of all that has been said by Oman, Hodgson, Baillie, etc., basically Otto makes sense and has said something of profound importance. Let us try to summarize what this is: in spite of the vast disagreement about what things are to be considered holy there is none the less an implicit agreement about the essential meaning of the term, namely that it is the greatest value known or knowable.
36 (2) Holiness and "Holy" Objects

We must now turn to our second main proposition, that the instances of holy things that can be cited in every religion turn out on examination to be less than holy in the full and proper sense but to be called holy only in some secondary sense. Religious language is both deficient and ambiguous at this point. This must follow from the first proposition about the meaning of holiness: for it would be accepted even by the devotees of a religion that their holy places and objects do not possess a value than which no higher value can be conceived. Yet they would wish to insist that these 'holy' objects have some kind of connection with the supremely valuable Being. Perhaps some further argumentation might be required to elicit agreement on this. It could be pointed out, for example, that a distinction is drawn between degrees of holiness. One can find illustrations of this in the religion of ancient Israel. Here we have a gradation from High Priest through priests to Levites: and in the Temple rigid distinctions were drawn between the outer court, the inner court, the altar and the Holy of Holies. The Levite could not approach the altar; the priest could not enter the Holy of Holies and even the High Priest could only enter it once a year after appropriate ceremonies of purification. So also there were distinctions in types of offerings. All these
degrees of holiness are to be understood in terms of the proximity to God that is assumed to belong to different persons, places and objects.

The implication behind this whole system is that God only is holy. I quote J.K.S. Reid, "The constant witness of Scripture is that holiness belongs properly to God alone ... If anything else is holy it is in a sense derivative from Him or dependant on Him or on His will". Another recent writer, O.R. Jones, on this subject in a work entitled The Concept of Holiness writes, "So close is the kinship that one may say that holiness is the very essence of God, so that God is sometimes called 'holiness'. Further it follows that talk about God provides the paradigm use of the words 'holy' and 'holiness'; other people and various objects will only be called holy in virtue of their relationship with Him". Corresponding evidence to this, I believe, could be produced concerning the implications of all other religions primitive and developed. I regret that the detailed empirical substantiation of this is beyond the scope of the present work.

Even granting the point that has just been made, we are still not rid of our problem, but we now have it in a rather different perspective. It appears that the disagreement that had puzzled us was not about what things possessed the basic value
of holiness but about what things possessed derived holiness. The suggestion is that about the possessor of basic holiness it is possible to indicate a larger general implicit agreement than the explicit creeds and theologies of different religions at first glance seem to have. Is this suggestion correct?

This brings us to our third main point.
"God" Alone is Holy

From the essential meaning of holiness it is not surprising that the possessor of this value in its basic sense is not the kind of object that can be easily and precisely indicated but lies outside the ordinary objects of sense perception. I have just made the rather negative point that there seems to be evidence of general agreement among all religions that nothing other than God is basically holy. I now wish to argue the positive corollary of this that there is a general implicit agreement among all religions that God is holy. An adequate discussion of this proposition would require research in religious anthropology far beyond my present scope. Some indication of the reasonableness of this position is all I can hope to give at present. The possibility of this turns largely (a) on pointing out that we are talking about implicit beliefs rather than explicit theological statements, and (b) on refraining from incorporating too much meaning into the word "God". Suppose we limit the word "God" to mean the "ground of all existence" or something like that, then I think we might manage to sidestep most of the difficult theological issues that divide polytheists and monotheists, deists and pantheists. It is just possible that we could include the Nirvana of the Buddhists and Matter of the Marxists under the concept of "God" if by God we
mean no more than "what ultimately is". Now it is not at all unreasonable to use the word "God" in this relatively unspecified way. There is an element of agnosticism in all religions about what one is to say about God. The "high Gods" of primitive religion remain vague and remote. Vishnu of Hinduism is known only in his "incarnations". Buddhism is dogmatic in its agnosticism about Nirvana. The greatest of Christian saints claimed only "to see through a glass darkly".

We may look at the matter historically. Man begins with awareness of "holy objects". The explication of what is implicit in being a "holy object" leads to a movement away from them to the awareness of some Being which they betoken and to which holiness properly belongs. This movement is one of the central themes in the long story of man's religious evolution.

If this be granted then it might be claimed that the one thing that we most surely know about God is that He is holy, and that it is primarily through experience of His holiness and through working out the further implications of this holiness that we come to know whatever else we do know of Him.

This is an interesting reversal of the order of knowing in the case of all the other values. We recognise that certain things are orderly, before and even whether or not we come to recognise any value in that orderliness. We recognize that certain things are alive and that human beings are persons.
before and apart from the recognition of the worth of life and personality. But with God and holiness the order is reversed. The awareness of holiness comes first and apart from awareness of the Being in which it inheres. Indeed the intuiting of holiness is occasioned by things such as mountains, cows and cups. At first glance it might seem that holiness belongs to these things but on closer inspection it is clear that it does not, that from the very nature of holiness that it could not belong to these things and that it must belong to something, we know not what, that is beyond all these ordinary things, something that is the ground of all existence, the unknown God. It is not that man knows God as such and such a being and then sees or infers that He must be holy. Rather he experiences holiness and then infers from the nature of holiness it must belong to such and such kind of Being. This is the religious argument for God's existence: and ultimately the most satisfactory one.
Two questions arising out of this account of holiness come to mind, the one metaphysical and the other epistemological. Since the discussion of these questions seems to me to overlap I shall formulate them together.

1. What is the relationship of the holy God to the holy objects and events about which there is so much disagreement?

2. How is it epistemologically possible to be aware of holiness prior to being aware of the Being to which it properly belongs?

It would be unreasonable to expect easy and precise answers to these questions because (a) of the great complexity of all ultimate questions in epistemology, and (b) of the lack of detailed content in the concept of God as I have just defined this word. However, provided we bear these things in mind, and do not expect more precision than the nature of the discussion allows, some kind of answer to these questions may be attempted.

The clue to the answer of both questions is, I suggest, to be found in the discussion of our knowledge of persons. Let me recapitulate what I said on this subject. Our awareness of persons as persons is "psychologically dependent" upon the tokens by which they express themselves. Yet having been
established, the awareness of another person is then a "psychically immediate" fact. This awareness of a person goes beyond anything contained in the tokens by which it has been brought about. It does not depend upon these tokens as a whole depends upon the parts of which it is constituted. Nor is this awareness built up by any kind of logical inference from these tokens but is an immediate non-conceptual awareness suitably described as an intuition. Further, apart from the original stimulation of this awareness there is no close spatial or temporal connection between awareness of the tokens and awareness of the persons whose tokens they are.

The suggestion I have to make is that the "holy objects" of religion bear a similar kind of relationship to the Holy God that personal tokens bear to the persons whose tokens they are.

Now Otto's teaching on the a priori nature of our awareness of holiness seems to me to be very relevant to this discussion. What he says on this is closely parallel, even if the terminology is different, to my description of our experience of persons. I shall therefore quote Otto trying to bring out this parallelism by referring in parenthesis to my preceding account. He writes that our awareness of holiness "comes into being in and amid the sensory data and empirical material of the natural world," ("holy objects" paralleled by personal gestures etc.), "and
cannot anticipate or dispense with these, yet it does not arise out of them" (i.e. it is "psychically immediate"), "but only by their means" (i.e. it is "psychologically dependent"). "They are the excitement, the stimulus, and the 'occasion' for the numinous experience to become astir, and, in so doing, to begin - at first with a naive immediacy of reaction - to be interfused and interwoven with the present world of sensuous experience, until, becoming gradually purer, it disengages itself from this," (i.e. "there is no close spatial or temporal connection between awareness of the tokens and awareness of the persons whose tokens they are".) "and takes its stand in absolute contrast to it ... We find involved in the numinous experience, beliefs and feelings qualitatively different from anything that 'natural' sense perception is capable of giving us" (i.e. "This awareness of a person goes beyond anything contained in the tokens by which it has been established.") "They are themselves not perceptions at all, but peculiar interpretations and valuations, at first of perceptual data, and then - at a higher level - of posited objects and entities, which themselves no longer belong to the perceptual world, but are thought of as supplementing and transcending it," (i.e. "an immediate non-conceptual awareness suitably described as an intuition").
There are two further negative points that I made regarding awareness of persons and these also, I suggest, can be made equally of the awareness of holiness. Awareness of holiness "does not depend upon these tokens as a whole depends upon the parts of which it is constituted. Nor is this awareness built by any kind of logical inference from these tokens."

Another relevant point that should be further elucidated concerns the reasons for describing the awareness of holiness (or of a person) as a priori (or "psychically immediate"). There seem to me to be two reasons equally sound in the case of persons and of holiness. (1) The nature of these values is "qualitatively different from anything that 'natural' sense perception" (their tokens) "is capable of giving us," i.e. their origin cannot be empirical. (2) Once apprehended by the mind, even if initially through the stimulus of tokens, the continued and subsequent apprehension of persons and of holiness does not always require the help of tokens. One might cite the case of telepathic awareness of other persons. Telepathy is, however, simply the most convincing because extreme form of what I take to be a normal feature of our experience of other persons especially of those that we love. That is, we have an awareness of their presence which does not depend on sight, sound, or even memory. Mystical experience provides the parallel experience in religion of our awareness of holiness after all tokens have been removed.
We are now in a better position to try to answer the question that we posed. That was "what is the relationship of the Holy God to the holy objects and events about which there is so much disagreement?" It would now seem that these holy objects and events are tokens of the Holy God. There are two ways of putting this relationship, the one epistemological and the other metaphysical. Epistemologically, religious objects and events seem to be rather like tokens of the Holy God in a similar kind of way to that in which personal gestures etc. are tokens of persons. Metaphysically, religious objects and events, it would seem to follow if our analogy is correct, might be considered to be expressions of the Holy God.
39. Genuine Tokens and Mistaken Tokens

But are all tokens in fact expressions? Common sense would seem to indicate that if anything is a token which arouses awareness of either man or God it can only be so because it is an expression of the person or of the Deity whom it conveys.

The trouble with this view, however, is that it seems difficult to reconcile with the variety of holy objects and events that we have already noted. We might be inclined to allow that they are all tokens of the Holy God on the grounds that they give rise to an awareness of holiness which we have already argued must belong to God alone. But to call them all expressions of God seems to suggest an irrational and fanciful kind of behaviour on God's part. Here, however, it would be unwise to assume that we know what we do not know. What grounds have we for holding that God's behaviour must be rational? Or more pertinently we might ask, why should we assume that we can know so clearly the marks of divine rationality? Or to be more concrete, why should not God express Himself in the holy cows of Hinduism, the Arabic words of the Quran and in the bread and wine of the Eucharist without thereby contradicting Himself? These questions surely require to be examined before we can give a clear answer to our earlier question as to whether all religious tokens are in fact expressions.
However, if we consider personal tokens and ask the question whether all of these are in fact expressions, the answer is rather easier. One thinks on the friendly wink that puts us in rapport with an erstwhile stranger; but the wink turns out on closer acquaintance to be only a nervous twitch. On a rather different level, words of endearment which betoken a particular quality of personality sometimes turn out on longer acquaintance to be simply routine ways of speaking. This would not necessarily mean that they are not personal expressions at all, but only that they are not expressions of that particular quality of personality that they had seemed to betoken.

Clearly then we are entitled to say that not all tokens are in fact expressions of what they betoken. We have seen that this is so in the case of personal tokens. It would seem reasonable to extend this to religious tokens, and without making any judgement of fact to say generally that not all religious tokens are necessarily expressions of the holy God that they betoken (without unduly prejudicing the answers to the questions about divine rationality, holy cows, Arabic words, etc.).

In order to clarify terminology I wish to distinguish between "mistaken tokens" and "genuine tokens". Both of these, I propose, are to be called "tokens" on the grounds that they
both convey the values that they betoken; but only a **genuine**
token is an **expression** of the person or of the Holy God whom
it betokens.

But how are "mistaken tokens" possible? A token which
conveys a value of which it is not in fact an expression could
only do this, it seems to me, if the awareness of that value
is already, in some sense, in the mind **a priori**. This does
not necessarily involve an absolute **a priori** awareness of that
value apart from all experience but only the kind of **a priori**,
or "psychically immediate", awareness of personality or of
holiness that I have just described.

There are many who might be inclined to argue from the
**possibility** of "mistaken tokens" of holiness to the **probability**
that many of the religious objects of mankind are in fact
"mistaken tokens". I would myself have much sympathy with this
argument even if I should wish to proceed cautiously in dis¬
criminating between the **genuine** and **mistaken** tokens. What
criteria are we to use in this discrimination? One might be
inclined to distinguish between objects and events that occur
in **nature** on the one hand and objects and events that are the
consequences of human intentions in **history** on the other. The
former being clearly not the work of men might seem more likely
to be expressions of the holy God than the latter. This line
of argument would suggest that the starry heavens, mighty
mountains, trees and flowers are more likely to be genuine tokens of holiness than Arabic words or bread and wine.

On the other hand it could be argued that some things in nature might be considered to have more significance as tokens than others. Now human personality itself as part of nature is one of the ways it could be held in which the holy God is expressing Himself. We have already seen that human personality is the most valuable thing in the world apart from holiness. It would seem to follow from these considerations that human personality and all the creations and actions of persons in history may be tokens of holiness and where these are genuine tokens they will be tokens of greater significance than the tokens that occur in nature apart from man. The consequence of this line of argument would seem to be that if Quranic words, or chalice and patten are genuine tokens of holiness then they are tokens of greater significance than stars or snowdrops. Thus it might be that we have an inverse relationship between the degree of assurance of the genuineness of a token and its significance. It will be appreciated, of course, that I am here touching the edge of a vast and complex field and am trying to give no more than hints as to what might be profitable avenues of enquiry.

Talk about the relationship of holy objects and events to the holy God does not, however, cover the discussion of the status of such objects and events in a system of values. There
is also the question of their relationship to persons. Even in the case of "mistaken tokens" of holiness which are not expressions of the holy God, it seems not unlikely that they may yet have worth as expressions of persons arising as personal responses on the awareness of holiness. This, however, would raise a puzzle as to how the intuition and response to a "mistaken token" can have any worth. This puzzle, however, is not limited to the intuition of "mistaken tokens" of holiness, for intuitions of an illusory nature are possible in connection with any of the values.
Let us turn now to the second of the two questions that we posed earlier. "How is it epistemologically possible to be aware of holiness prior to being aware of the Being to which it properly belongs?"

A question such as this presupposes the acceptance of a number of notions which should be examined. Is it even conceivable that we should be directly aware of "the ground of all existence"? As an intellectual concept, yes; but this is not the point. Can we be directly aware of God as distinct from the expressions, revelations or tokens by which "He" manifests "Himself", and as distinct also from that awareness of "His" supreme significance which we call "His" holiness? I think not. Whatever further cognition of Deity there may be, and this may be considerable, is not direct but the result of thought. One of the most profound and sensitive of the world's religious thinkers says emphatically, "No one has ever seen God." I take him to be excluding both direct sense perception and direct metaphysical perception as possible ways of cognising Deity, although not, of course, cognition of His "glory", as the context makes clear, through the tokens of His revelation.

Now is this significantly different from the nature of our cognition of persons? We are directly aware by sense perception of the tokens by which persons express themselves, and of their
personal worth which these tokens convey. That there is such an awareness of personal worth, we have argued, is obvious to most of us, and it is this awareness of personal worth which makes intelligible most moral behaviour and is implicit or explicit in very many systems of ethics. All this I have already argued. But I have not argued, and it is not apparent to me, that there is any unmediated awareness of persons as such apart from their behaviour and apart from their worth. The elusiveness of the self has been argued by David Hume and by many more recent thinkers; and I am not aware that anyone has yet successfully caught and exhibited it. This does not mean that I do not think that the self or the person is a reasonable inference of thought. It is, but beyond awareness of a person's expressions, revelations or tokens by which he manifests himself, and awareness of his personal worth, whatever further cognition of his person there may be, and this may well be considerable, is not direct, but is the result of thought. In all this, it seems to me, the epistemology of our awareness of persons and the epistemology of our awareness of the Deity are similar.

In one respect, however, there is a conspicuous difference. Persons have physical bodies. Bodies are important because they provide an obvious centre of correlation of personal behaviour which conveys personal worth. God, however, has no
body, it would seem, and therefore we lack an obvious centre of correlation of the divine behaviour such as we have in human behaviour. It is in the desire to fill this lack, doubtless, that theological doctrines such as the incarnation and the doctrine of the Church as Christ's body, at least partly, owe their origin. Another type of suggestion on this theme is that the whole universe is God's body through which He works. All these suggestions have some merit and are worthy of more careful investigation than we can accord them at present. The lack of God having any obvious body need not, however, destroy the basic parallelism that I have presented for the following reasons:

1. It seems clear to me that it is not the body whose worth we respect (although we may well respect it as having value as a living thing, and indirectly as the body of a person), when we are aware of giving respect to a person; nor is it the body that we mean to refer to (although we may include the body in our reference) when we speak of a person.

2. Although a person is dependent upon his body for the creation of expressions, he is not dependent upon his body for the continuance of these expressions. The words he speaks or writes and the plastic art he creates, once created, have an existence and worth of their own. In these respects, it seems to me, the basic parallelism between our knowledge of personal worth and our knowledge of holiness is seen.
41. **A Concluding Note on the Basic Values**

It should be apparent to anyone who has followed my argument so far that I have been concerned to maintain that one of the essential characteristics of any instance of a basic value is to be more valuable than some basic values and less valuable than others. The one exception to this is holiness than which, as we have seen, nothing can be more valuable. Thus all instances of basic values have their place on a scale of values. This point has, I think, already been sufficiently stressed.

It would be tempting, however, and indeed entirely proper, to enquire whether any other kind of relationship exists between the basic values apart from that of belonging to a scale of greater and lesser values. For example, so long as we have four basic values rather than one basic value from which all others can be seen to be derived it would appear that we have partly failed in the aim of this work, which is to demonstrate the systematic derivation of all values from one source.

I do not wish to allow this conclusion to be lightly accepted. Indeed it seems to me not at all improbable that in the Holy God we have that one source from which all other valuable things are derived. The discussion of this chapter on the nature of Holiness contains some clues which if properly followed up
might lead us to this conclusion. This seems to me to be a not unreasonable speculation; but to claim more in the absence of further discussion would be unwarranted. The detailed working out of this hypothesis, however, would necessarily lead us far into metaphysical arguments beyond the scope of this present work; and I must beg leave in the meantime at least to be excused from this task.
References


2. Ibid., p. 11.

3. Ibid., p. 116.

4. Ibid., p. 12.

5. Ibid., Chapt. 4-6.

6. Ibid., p. 25.


10. Ibid., p. 53.

11. Ibid., p. 54.

12. Vide Appendix, "Otto and his critics, and other notes on Otto's work".


15. Vide Chapter V, "What is a Person?", pp. 148-157 above.


17. Otto, *op. cit.*, p. 117. All the parenthetical notes are references to my penultimate paragraph in order to bring out the parallelism.

APPENDIX

A Further Discussion of Otto's Position with Special Reference to some Criticisms that have been Made against it

It was the great contribution of Otto to the philosophical study of religion to have identified and described the distinctively religious moment in human consciousness in such a way that it seems to many that it is not now possible reasonably to question the autonomy of religious experience. If Otto is basically correct, as I believe he is, it will not do to reduce religious awareness to a type of moral awareness, metaphysical speculation, social consciousness, or one type or another of emotional reaction.

It is a pity, however, that Otto's success at this main point should have been obscured by some confusions in the way in which he has presented his thesis. These confusions have been pointed out by various writers; but the reader is not always left with a clear idea whether or to what extent the main thesis of Otto has been discredited. It is in order to examine this question that some further discussion of Otto's position, with special reference to some of the criticisms that have been made against it, is necessary.
Otto describes the central moment in religious awareness as *mysterium tremendum et fascinans*, and some examination of these terms is therefore desirable. I have already indicated my reasons for making "supreme value" the defining characteristic of holiness rather than *mysterium*; but it seems essential that all these terms should be taken mutually to qualify and delimit one another.

The *mysterium* is not simply a mystery in the sense of a problem which has not yet been solved. "The truly mysterious object is beyond our apprehension and comprehension, not only because our knowledge has certain irremovable limits, but because in it we come upon something inherently 'wholly other' whose kind and character are incommensurable with our own, and before which we therefore recoil in a wonder that strikes us chill and numb. One might develop this point in reply to those who would reduce all mysteries either to problems whose solution depends upon the increase of scientific knowledge or else to puzzles which are dispelled by the clarification of the use of language. This has already been done by others, and in the meantime anyway I must be content to refer to their work.

Closely associated with *mysterium* are the two complimentary adjectives, *tremendum* and *fascinans*. The *tremendum*, Otto tells us, has three distinguishable features of awefulness, over-
poweringness and energy. The fascinans suggests the ideas of love, mercy, pity and comfort. None of these terms, he says, is to be understood in its ordinary sense. Whatever words we choose from the field of the natural emotions to explicate the meaning of tremendous or fascinans we always use them in a transferred sense because they ultimately are qualified by the mysterium which has "a kind and character incommensurable with our own". For example, the "fear" of the Holy (rather like the "fear" of a ghost) belongs to quite a different order from the fear of a tiger. The word fear properly describes our reaction to such things as tigers and only by special permission can it be used to describe our reaction to ghosts or to the Holy. So too with all the other descriptive words applied to the mysterium.

The dual character of the Holy which both "terrifies" and "fascinates" requires to be stressed. The ignoring of the fascinans character of the Holy has led astray at least one important thinker in understanding Otto's work. Different types of religious experience and practice are grounded, some more on the one, some more on the other of these two characteristics. The tremendous gives rise to confession and propriation; the fascinans is the source of religious mysticism, "the peace that passeth understanding," and the beatific vision. It does not
seem to me to be correct to find in the *fascinans* alone the source of valuation and ethical ideograms as C. A. Campbell suggests: for Otto writes of the *tremendum* itself as implying the "application of a category of valuation". Otto also asserts that certain ethical concepts such as "justice", moral Will", and "the exclusion of what is opposed to immorality" are related to the *tremendum* and others such as "goodness, mercy and love" are related to the *fascinans*.

One of the most important recurring discussions in Otto's work is concerned with the explanation of how it is possible for natural concepts to be applied to the numinous which is "beyond our apprehension and comprehension". The chapters that mainly concern us are Nos. 7, 14 and 17. Since the concepts in question come from the fields of the moral and aesthetic, these chapters also provide the key to Otto's thought on the relationship between the religious on the one hand and the moral and the aesthetic on the other. Unfortunately, however, Otto's argument is far from clear and consequently much controversy has arisen regarding it. We now proceed with a critical exposition of his position.

In Chapter 7 Otto argues as follows. In an individual the feeling of *group restraint* can, through the law of the Association of Feelings, give rise to the feeling of moral obligation. It is not that the former turns into the latter, for that would be
impossible, but that the former suggests and then is replaced by the latter. Now there is an analogous situation with regard to the "feeling" of the sublime and the numinous. The "feeling" of the sublime by the same law of the Association of Feelings suggests and then is replaced by the "feeling" of the numinous. Awareness of the numinous like awareness of moral obligation is of a content that is *sui generis*. Therefore its stimulation by an associated feeling would not be possible did it not already exist *a priori* in the mind.

Now Association of Feelings like the Association of Ideas, according to Otto, sets up not merely accidental connections, but connections of a permanent type in accordance with an internal principle of affinity. Otto compares this connection between the numinous and the rational concepts, such as that of the sublime, which are associated with it in the composite idea of the Holy, to Kant's schematization of the categories. Apart from the difficulty about being sure of Kant's precise meaning in this doctrine, the similarity in what Otto is speaking of seems too remote to make this comparison more than vaguely useful. The main point in using the Kantian terminology seems to be to indicate that the connection between the numinous and the moral and aesthetic concepts which are associated with it "is not chance external resemblance but essential correspondence and ...
a necessity of our reason".

In order to indicate what he means by the schematization of the numinous, Otto cites two other instances of this from human experience which are intended to throw some light on his meaning. Those are from sex and music.

(a) Although sex desire is unique and irreducible to terms of personal affection, yet it is interwoven with the personal life and has felt analogies to this. In consequence it borrows the language of personal relationship and so rationalizes itself or schematizes itself by the use of such concepts as "love".

(b) So too the experience of music is beyond words; and yet the felt analogies to other experiences prompt us sometimes to find correlates in song or verse; and in this we have a further example of schematization or rationalization.

One doubts whether these examples illustrate what Otto wants them to illustrate. Sex desire is not limited to one set of terms chosen from personal life. It can select and reject from a wide range of possible terms, according to the particular circumstances. It does not necessarily have to choose even the word "love" and is on some occasions combined with emotions such as "fear" or "disgust". So too with music. A particular composition can, without difficulty, be correlated with quite different sets of words. One thinks of Tannenbaum, the German song about a Christmas tree, and recollects that to many people
the tune of this song is associated primarily with the words of "The Red Flag". It is difficult therefore to see how these examples help to illustrate Otto's point about an "essential correspondence".

In Chapter 17 Otto gives a rather more substantial argument for this contention that "the same a priori character belongs to the connection of the rational and non-rational elements in religion, their inward and necessary union". He cites the fact that when Amos declared that God is righteous and that His judgments fall impartially on foreign nations and Israel for their sin this was a novel doctrine in Israel; and yet Amos neither attempts to prove it nor to appeal to any external authority. He expects it to be accepted on the authority of the religious conscience alone; and so eventually it is. So too he points out missionaries frequently report that it takes a surprisingly short time for pagans to accept ideas of the unity and goodness of God even when such teachings are new to them. Here it seems to me that Otto is arguing on strong ground and that the facts do point to a necessary connection of some kind between man's religious awareness and his moral awareness.

However, there is one feature of Otto's argument that seems to me to raise serious objections. He assumes throughout his work that the "schematization" of the Holy is a historical
process. The Holy originally without any association with the moral at all comes, it is said, in the process of evolution to have moral concepts associated with it. He writes, "The histories of religion recount indeed, as though it were something axiomatic, the gradual interpenetration of the two, the process by which 'the divine' is charged and filled out with ethical meaning".

Otto has here made the all too common mistake of comparing primitive religion with highly developed morality, and finding no connection between them has thereby concluded that primitive religion is amoral. He has overlooked the rather obvious fact that man's moral ideas have also undergone a long evolutionary process just as much as his religion. The truth of the matter is surely that there is a systematic connection of primitive religion with primitive morality just as there is a systematic connection of developed religion with developed morality.

There are other features of Otto's account that fall short of complete clarity. His description of the numinous as non-rational seems to Leonard Hodgson to involve an equivocation. Does he mean any more by this term than that the numinous is sui generis and hence indefinable? This is all he ought to mean; but according to Hodgson, "Having established the existence of a non-rational something in the sense of something emotionally apprehended or indefinable, he then slips into using the term as meaning that of which no rational account
can be given and which has no rational connection with the rest of the universe". It would occupy us unnecessarily long to examine all the relevant passages in Otto's work to ascertain whether this is a fair indictment of Otto. His use of the phrase "the wholly other" could be taken to indicate a complete rational discontinuity of the numinous from the rest of the universe. I have already argued that this phrase can and should be taken in a figurative sense. What Otto himself intended seems to me to be far from clear. But at least we can make good sense of Otto if "non-rational" be taken to mean "indefinable" because it is sui generis, and "the wholly other" be understood figuratively. I base my case here on those passages I have cited from the chapter on "The Holy as a category of value" in which he states explicitly that the holy is a value like the values, "perfect, beautiful, sublime and good". This implies some rational continuity of the holy with the rest of the universe: and allows us to make sense of Otto's work as a whole.

"Another very baffling aspect of Professor Otto's theory", writes John Baillie, "is his apparent equation of the rational with the ethical. He speaks almost indifferently of the 'rationalisation' and the 'moralisation' of the idea of God". Again one has to regret an unfortunate looseness in Otto's presentation of his position. But surely Baillie is being
insufficiently sympathetic in his reading of Otto? What Otto is saying might be put thus. Basically the Holy is unique and indefinable save that it is the value that surpasses all other values. We can only think of it when we think analogically by applying concepts to it from those fields that come nearest to it, that is from the fields of values in morals and aesthetics. Thus at the same moment that we "rationalise" the holy, we also may be said to "moralise" it: or even to "aestheticise" it. But to suggest that this involves "an equation of the rational with the ethical" or with the aesthetic, is to fall into a logical confusion.

We have tarried perhaps too long over Otto and his critics, but we have done so because we believe that in spite of Oman, Hodgson, Baillie, etc., and in spite of the obscurity of which undoubtedly Otto is guilty, yet basically what he says is correct and is of considerable importance for the philosophical understanding of religion.
References to Appendix

1. Otto, op. cit., p. 28


3. Vide John Oman, Natural and Supernatural, p. 60 et seq.; and vide also C. A. Campbell, On Selfhood and Godhood, p. 342, for a discussion of Oman's error.

4. Ibid., p. 343.


6. Ibid., pp. 144-145.

7. Ibid., p. 46.

8. Ibid., p. 140.


CHAPTER VII

INTERNALLY DERIVED VALUES (1)
INTERNALLY DERIVED VALUES (i)

42. **The Significance of this Derivation**

We have now considered the nature of the four basic values, or, more correctly, the nature of the four basically valuable types of thing or being. All the other things and experiences that we call good or valuable derive their value in one way or another from the value of these four basic values. I shall shortly state in summary manner the three primary principles by which all other values are derived; and then I shall go on to consider each in turn in greater detail.

Before embarking on this task, however, it is desirable to say something further about its significance. Those of us who hold that value judgements are objective have to take account of a number of considerations that are often brought against this position. One consideration is the enormous variety of conflicting moral judgements and value judgements generally that are made by different people, and the general failure of objectivists to provide some clearly defined scheme by means of which it can be settled which judgements are right and which are wrong.

Now this present work claims to offer just such a scheme. A study of this scheme will make clear that if it is at all
correct even in its general outline then the system by which values are derived is an exceedingly complex one, and that it is therefore not surprising that persons frequently make mistakes in their value judgements. One of the complexities that most often frustrates the making of a clear and simple value judgement is that any one thing or experience may at the same moment possess several different values and even disvalues derived by different principles which are none the less valid principles of the one general system of derivation. Thus it may well be appropriate to say of a certain activity x, for example, that it has derived intrinsic worth in virtue of principles of derivation A d ii (in which A, B, C, D, etc. stand for primary principles of derivation, and a, b, c, d, etc., and i, ii, iii, iv, etc., stand for different subsidiary principles of derivation); but that it also has derived instrumental disvalue in relation to a certain basic value M; and further that it also has an apparent additional value in virtue of a certain contrasting relationship with another derived intrinsic value y. Thus it becomes clear that we cannot simply say of activity x that it is very good, moderately good, or bad. All three judgements might well be true within prescribed limits. Nor is it at all apparent that there is any means by which these three judgements could be added together and the result expressed in one judgement. Yet this is precisely what the ordinary man is disposed to do. He does so by grossly oversimplifying the complex value characteristics of activity x and perhaps ignoring those characteristics
which happen to be of less interest to him at the particular moment of judgement. Even so, whatever he does say, he may still quite reasonably be making a **claim** to objectivity even if he has grossly oversimplified the means by which a **justifiable claim** is to be reached.

Let me give an illustration of an activity which invites many diverse judgements which cannot be combined in a single judgement. I give this illustration with the advice that it will only be fully comprehensible in the light of subsequent discussion. Consider a portrait painter of great merit. His **response** to a facial gesture is an example of a **primary principle of derivation**. The fact that this response is partly "mimetic" and partly also **creative** is an example of a **subsidiary principle of derivation**. The **nature of the intuition that gives rise to the response** is a **second subsidiary principle of derivation**; and in this case it is relevant whether he only intuits the **form of the face** ("aesthesis"), or whether he intuits it as the face of a **person** ("respect"). The medium in which he expresses his response and his way of handling it is a **third subsidiary principle of derivation**. The precise account of the internally derived value of one of his portraits should take notice of all of these things and more.
Let us suppose, however, that this artist through pre-occupation with his work neglects his child who consequently falls in with evil companions and becomes delinquent. His activity of portrait-painting may therefore also be said to have instrumental disvalue in relation to the basic value of his child as a person.

Let us suppose, further, that before this man became an artist he had been a minor clerk in a booking office. A friend of some artistic sense had been convinced of his artistic ability and persuaded him at all costs to paint. Thereafter in that friend's judgement all his activity of painting had an "apparent additional worth" (to be explained later) compared with the relative unimportance of his clerical job.

His neglect of his child, however, has also "apparent additional disvalue" compared with his intuition of and response to the value of so many other people and things. In a patriarchal society this neglect would acquire the still further "apparent additional disvalue" of failure to intuit and/or respond to the social mores concerning the care of one's own children. In a matriarchal society this latter "apparent additional disvalue" would not occur.

In spite of this complexity of many of the value characteristics of things and experiences, it does not follow that we can never make reasonably precise value judgements within certain limits. It is of the essence of value judgements that they are comparative; and the kind of precision that we might
hope for at the least is one of the type that $x$ is more valuable than $y$, but less valuable than $z$. But even this degree of precision clearly depends upon $x$, $y$ and $z$ being on the same scale; and there are as many scales of comparison of values as there are primary and subsidiary principles of the derivation of values. What we may then more normally hope for is not a simple straight-forward comparison of values but rather the placing of our judgements of value on a value system or map where their significance can be seen in relation to other value judgements placed on the same system.
A Summary of the Primary Principles of the Derivation of Value

I shall now state in summary fashion the three primary principles by which all other values are derived from the four basic values. Subsequently I shall go on to consider each of these in greater detail. At the moment I restrict myself to primary principles; but I give advance notice that within these, and especially within one of these primary principles, there are a number of subsidiary principles of derivation.

1. Internally derived values

Any manifestation of the essential character of a basic value (I shall use the phrase "a basic value" as a short hand way of referring to an instance of a basically valuable thing or being), that is, any manifestation of those characteristics on which its value is grounded, is also intrinsically valuable. I shall refer to such valuable manifestations as "internally derived values". I shall illustrate and discuss these internally derived values in relation to each of the basic values from which they derive in this and the following chapters.

2. Externally derived or instrumental values and disvalues

Any event or anything which occasions an event or is capable of occasioning an event which brings into existence, or maintains in existence, or which helps bring into existence or maintain in existence a basic value or an internally derived
value, or which helps develop those characteristics upon which the value of a basic value or an internally derived value is grounded, is also to be considered valuable, but not intrinsically so. I shall refer to this group of values as "externally derived values" or "instrumental values".

Also, any event or anything which occasions an event, or is capable of occasioning an event which destroys or helps destroy a basic value or an internally derived value, or which prevents or helps prevent a basic value or an internally derived value coming into existence, or which prevents or helps prevent the development of those characteristics on which the value of a basic value or an internally derived value is grounded, is usually considered bad, but not intrinsically so. It is better to consider such events, and things, as disvalues; and I shall therefore refer to them as "externally derived disvalues" or "instrumental disvalues". I shall illustrate and discuss this matter in chapter 9.

3. Apparent disvalues and apparent additional values

When two basic values or internally derived values stand in such a relationship to each other that it is possible to compare them in respect of /, then the one of less value may seem to be actually disvaluable when viewed in this contrasting relationship. We may say that it has acquired an "apparent disvalue".
Also in a situation in which an apparent disvalue has arisen as a result of such a contrast, the greater value may seem to acquire a still greater value as a result of the contrast with the apparent disvalue. We may say that it has acquired an "apparent additional value" as a result of this double contrast. I shall illustrate and discuss this matter in Chapter 10.

This concludes my summary of the primary principles of the derivation of derived values. I now proceed to examine these principles in greater detail.
44. **Internally Derived Values**

Any manifestation of the essential character of a basic value, that is, any manifestation of those characteristics on which its value is grounded, is also intrinsically valuable. I shall refer to such manifestations as "internally derived values".

Yet this description is not an arbitrary one, and I shall try to make clear its reasonableness. The value of such a manifestation I call "derived" because it only comes into existence either as a part of a whole or as an expression of a whole that is a basic value. Although thus "derived" its value is none the less "intrinsic", that is, its value depends neither upon human appreciation, nor even upon human apprehension, nor upon the production of any benefits to man. It is relative only in the sense of being dependent both for its existence and for its value upon that whole of which it forms a part, or of which it is an expression; and this is what the phrase "internally derived" is intended to indicate.

The paradoxical appearance of calling this group of values "intrinsically valuable", albeit "derived values", requires further explanation. In describing their value as "derived" I am referring to the *genesis* of their value and not to its *continuing status*. Having been once derived, if such values
continue to exist as valuable entities they may well do so without any further reference to their origin. Here one may contrast the very fleeting existence of a dance executed by an expert ballet dancer and the continuing existence of a great painting by a great artist. The dance has no continuing existence apart from the dancer. The painting may have a continuing existence for many centuries after the artist's decease. Yet both derive their existence and hence their value from that of their respective creators' worth. Some account should, however, be taken of the difference between fleeting expressions, such as a dance, and of expressions which leave continuing results in permanent works of art.

A preliminary point about the comparative value of internally derived values has to be made. There are, as we have seen, four basic values which are found in relation to each other on an ascending scale of values which rises thus: the orderliness of nature, living things, persons and a holy God. It follows that values internally derived from any one of these stand in a corresponding relation to values internally derived from any other of these basic values. Thus, other things being equal, derived life values are more valuable than derived order values. Derived personal values are more valuable than derived life values. Derived holiness values are more valuable than derived personal
values. It is important that in each case in which we compare derived values that the qualifying phrase, "other things being equal" should be added, because whenever a subsidiary principle of derivation operates within a primary principle then the precise value of any particular value is modified.

I shall now proceed to illustrate the principle of internal derivation in the case of each of the four basic values in turn. These illustrations are intended to provide support for the reasonableness of this way of looking at the nature of this class of derived values. In the case of "derived personal values" several subsidiary principles of derivation operate, and in this case I shall endeavour to explain how these subsidiary principles further determine the precise placing of these values on the value map.
The order of nature is good in itself, and each of the many manifestations of that order derives a worth from the worth of that basic order. I propose to refer to the value quality of all such manifestations of the order of nature as "derived order values".

Instances of such manifestations of the orderliness of nature are all around us in, for example, the regularity of the beating of the waves upon the shore, the parallelism of falling raindrops, the recurrence of day and night, summer and winter, the harmony of colours, shapes and sounds in nature. All these and many more instances of constancy, regularity and harmony in nature are good not simply because of the benefit provided by a reliable background to human life; (the constancy of nature does not, it should be noted in passing, always benefit man as when, for example, the sea drowns or gravity kills); nor is such constancy, regularity, etc. good because it is a precondition of all our scientific understanding of nature, but these instances of constancy, regularity, etc., are good in themselves and their goodness is derived from the goodness of the basic order of nature.

Questions, however, at once arise, Firstly, is it legitimate, it may be asked, to make such a distinction between the orderliness
of nature and the various manifestations of that orderliness? Has this order or orderliness (I use the words synonymously) any existence apart from its manifestations? Are we not in danger in speaking thus of hypostasising order? One may speak, for example, of the parallelism of falling raindrops as a manifestation of the law of gravity; but what is the law of gravity, or any natural law for that matter, but a generalised description given by scientists of a certain type of natural event? The distinction then, it might seem to follow, between the order of nature and the manifestations of that order is one that is relative to human experience and not one that belongs to things as they really are.

We may concede, I think, that the formulation of the laws of nature is relative to human experience and understanding in man's effort to comprehend the order of nature. But if this is so, what then is the point, one may ask, of speaking of manifestations at all? For presumably a manifestation must be a manifestation of something; and a law which is a generalisation of particular instances is not some thing.

What then are we to say? We could speak simply of instances of order, rather than manifestations of order. This would be correct so far as it goes for certainly we could not use the concept of order at all unless we were aware of instances that fall under the general concept. This is a minimum requirement of using this word, or indeed of using any word at all. The defect of this,
however, is that it does not cover all that we want to say about the instances of order in nature.

The more interesting feature about natural events that we want to draw attention to is that we are aware of the various instances of order in nature as belonging to the system of nature as a whole; and their occurrence is normally taken to be not haphazard but a manifestation of this unitary system of nature. Evidence of the reasonableness of this assumption is given in the fact that scientists continually endeavour to understand the findings in one field of science in terms of larger and more comprehensive wholes; and this assumption that there are such larger and more comprehensive wholes is generally vindicated eventually. This would not be so if the order in the various parts of nature were autonomous and unrelated to the order of nature as a whole. The "laws" of nature that scientists disclose are undoubtedly abstractions from the system as a whole. But the system of nature as a whole is no abstraction. Our difficulty in speaking of "the system of nature as a whole" is that it goes beyond our experience, and even beyond the capacity of our imagination. None the less it is, I submit, a necessary postulate of scientific thought. We only encounter it piecemeal; and we can only think of it precisely by abstracting features from the whole. Yet all our most significant experience of nature and our most profound scientific thinking compels us to postulate the existence
of nature as a unitary system.

I have endeavoured to justify the distinction between nature as a whole and its various parts and the description of these as manifestations of the whole. But two further questions remain. These concern, (a) the description of the order in these manifestations as *deriving* from the order of the whole; and (b) the further description of the *value* of that order as also deriving from the value of the order of nature as a whole. Proof of the reasonableness of these points has already in principle been given in the account of the relationship of the manifestations of nature to nature as a whole unitary system.

(a) It is involved in being a part of a whole which is a systematic unity that the part derives its character as a part, i.e., in this case, its order, from its relationship to the whole. It is this systematic relationship of the part to the whole that I allude to in calling it a *manifestation* and not just a *part*. This *systematic* relationship might be contrasted with the *accidental* relationship of a part to a whole in the case of the last shovelful of coal required to complete a ton truck load. If it be objected that such a systematic relationship of parts to wholes is always involved in speaking of parts and wholes, then I am happy to accept this restriction on the use of the words "part" and "whole"; and I accept also the corollary that in all instances of parts and wholes (in this restricted usage) the part derives its order from its
relationship to the whole.

(b) Now regarding the derivation of the value of the part from the value of the whole, if my earlier argument that the order of nature is good in itself has been granted, then it follows that since the various manifestations of the order of nature derive their order from the order of nature as a whole they therefore also derive their value from the value of the order of nature as a whole.

I wish to add a note safeguarding against a possible misunderstanding of the foregoing. I have said nothing at all so far about the derivation of human knowledge of the order or of the value of nature either as a whole or in its many manifestations. Nothing I have said should be taken to suggest (and I do not in fact believe) that our cognition either of the order or of the value of a manifestation of the order of nature depends upon our knowledge of the order or of the value of nature as a whole. In fact I believe the very reverse to be the case. Our cognition of the order and of the value of the various manifestations of the order of nature is an immediate cognition in no way dependent upon any knowledge of nature as an orderly and valuable whole. Indeed it is these manifestations of nature with their intrinsic orderliness and value that suggest or betoken the orderliness and value of nature as a whole. Here, as in other instances which we have already noticed, the ratio cognoscendi is the reverse of the ratio essendi.
A living thing is good in itself and therefore any expression of that nature on which its worth is based is also good. We have already seen that the distinctive characteristics of living things are sensitivity and the activity of adaptation. Therefore any instance of the sensitivity or of the activity of adaptation of a living thing is also good. I propose to refer to the value quality of all instances of such sensitivity or activity of adaptation as "derived life values", or, more fully, "internally derived life values". As examples of derived life values I should cite activities of eating and sex, care for one's own welfare and that of one's mate and offspring, the provision, for example, of shelter, comfort and means of recreation. In the case of the more intelligent living creatures, efforts are made to provide these things not only for the present but also to ensure them for the future.

I wish to draw attention to a paradox in the relationship of a living thing to its significant states. On the one hand a living thing is valuable because it has states of sensitivity and of the activity of adaptation. Yet, on the other hand, these states cannot exist and hence cannot have any value except as states of a living thing. In other words their value is not basic but derivative.

Living things depend for their very existence and for the expression of their significant states, on other things, both
living and non-living, outside themselves. Not only do they obtain nutrition from their environment, but, more significantly from the point of view of our present interest, it is their environment that offers stimulation to their sensitivity and provides a context for their activities of adaptation. It does not follow from this, however, that living things or their significant manifestations derive their value to any great extent, if at all, from their environment; because although they need some environment as stimulus and context, almost any environment within limits will do. Thus neither they nor their significant states belong to their environment in the kind of way that significant states belong to a whole living thing.

In my definition of a living thing I distinguished two significant characteristics, namely sensitivity and the activity of adaptation; and pointed out that both of these may be understood from two different aspects, namely from the point of view of inner experience and from the point of view of an external observer. In the case of the "derived life values" these same two aspects are distinguishable. It is, however, the former only, that is, the inner experience of sensitivity and of adaptation to environment, that are "derived life values", deriving their worth from the basic value of the living creature whose states they are. The facts observed by an external observer derive their worth primarily from the basic value of the observer.
Persons and the Expressions of their Personality

Persons are good in themselves and therefore any expression of those characteristics upon which their worth is based is also good. We have already seen that the distinctive characteristics of persons are, (a) the ability to intuit the value quality of things, and (b) the ability to respond in various ways to the values which have been intuited. Therefore any instance of intuition of value or of response to value is also good. I propose to refer to the value quality of all instances of such intuitions and responses as "derived personal value", or, more fully, "internally derived personal values". Examples of these are aesthetic, moral and religious experiences and activities. I shall shortly offer a more detailed classification of these.

A corresponding paradox to the one noted in the case of living things and their significant states is also to be noted in the case of persons and their significant states. On the one hand a person's worth is based on the fact that he can intuit and respond to values. Yet, on the other hand, the activities of intuiting and responding to values cannot exist and hence cannot have any value except as states of persons. In other words, the value of intuitions and responses is not basic but derivative.

Let us consider in more detail the nature of this dependence of these significant states, both of living things and of persons, upon the living things and persons to which they belong. This dependence is not simply a case of dependence for their existence
in the kind of way that all living things, including persons, depend for their existence upon the world of nature from which they derive food and find a material context for their existence. It is a more intimate kind of dependence and is rather like the dependence of the parts of a thing upon the whole whose parts they are. Yet it is not quite the same kind of dependence as this either, and the differences are to be noted. In the case of wholes and their parts there is a mutual interdependence. Not only can there be no parts without the whole of which they are parts; but also there can be no whole without the parts which make it up. In the cases, however, of living things and their significant states, and also persons and their significant states, the dependence is much more a one way dependence, and yet not entirely so. The significant states of living things and also of persons depend upon the living things and persons whose states they are, absolutely. Living things and persons, however, do not depend upon any particular significant states for their existence as living things or as persons; but they do depend upon the capacity for having some significant states for their existence as living things or as persons.

As in the case of living things, so also in the case of persons it is essential to distinguish between the point of view of inner experience and the point of view of an external observer. It is
primarily the inner experience of intuiting and responding to valuable things that possess personal value derived from the basic value of the person whose intuitions and responses they are. These responses as intuited in turn by an external observer derive their value from the basic value of the observer. From either point of view we have instances of derived values, the former being internally derived personal values and the latter externally derived or instrumental values.

Between the experience of making a response and the observer's intuition of that response there is, however, a third entity which must not be overlooked. That a response is not entirely comprised by the agent's activity of responding and an observer's cognition of that response is most clearly seen in the case of responses which have continuing and significant effects, as for example, works of art such as continue to hang in galleries even after the last visitors for the day have gone and the curators have locked the doors. That such works of art exist independently both of their creators and of their spectators, I suppose, very few would doubt. But whether they possess value independently of both creators and spectators is a more controversial matter.
To avoid a possible misunderstanding, it is important to notice that not all the activities of persons are necessarily personal. Persons, or at least human beings, are also living creatures or animals, and like other living creatures we have the capacity of sensitivity and of the activity of adapting ourselves to our environment; and as in the case of the other animals we may, and usually do, use what intelligence we have to accomplish these adaptations. Because our intelligence is considerably higher than that of other animals our techniques and instruments for controlling our environment are considerably more complicated and our success is considerably more remarkable. So much so is this the case that to a superficial view it might easily seem that it is in the use of tools and techniques and in the mastery of his environment that the distinctive qualities of man consist. We have, however, seen reason to believe that his distinctive qualities lie elsewhere. This, however, in no way detracts from man's worth as a living creature; nor should we hesitate to recognise that even as a living creature he is of the very highest worth compared with other living creatures. Human beings have in fact value both in respect of being living creatures and in respect of being persons.

Following on this the experiences and activities of human beings may have worth either as being the experiences and activities
of living creatures, or as being the experiences and activities of persons. Indeed it seems to me that it is rarely a case of human experience and activity being valuable in one respect or the other. Most frequently human experiences and activities are valuable on both counts. But most activities are either predominantly animal activities or predominantly personal activities. Except in the case of morons at the one extreme or saints at the other, most human animal activities are modified and overlaid with personal elements; and most personal activities are modified by animal elements.

It is important to state these matters and to bear them in mind during the discussion that follows on personal intuitions and responses. In this discussion unless it is to be unduly complicated we must abstract man's personal intuitions and responses from his animal experiences and activities and consider them in isolation. It is necessary in order to think clearly that we should think about one thing at a time. Yet in applying the results of this analysis to any actual situation we must not expect to find very often, if at all, personal intuitions and responses in isolation from animal experiences and activities.
48. **Classification of Intuitions and Responses; and Subsidiary Principles of the Derivation of Values**

Personal intuitions and responses are classifiable in several different ways of which the following are the most important main divisions: (a) by reference to the type of value of the object intuited, (b) by reference to the nature of the response, and (c) by reference to the medium in which the response is expressed. These three methods of classification also provide us with three subsidiary principles of the derivation of values, corresponding exactly to these three methods of classification. The use of these subsidiary principles enables us to place any intuition or response more precisely on the value map. We shall examine each of these methods of classification and the related subsidiary principles of derivation in turn.

49. **A. Classification of Intuitions and Responses by Reference to the Value Nature of the Object Intuited**

Since there are four basically valuable types of things, we can divide the intuitions and consequent responses made to these into four main groups. The intuiting and responding to the orderliness of nature and its manifestations I propose to call "aesthesis". The intuiting and responding to living things and the manifestations of their life I propose to call "affection". The intuiting and responding to persons and the expressions of
their personalities I propose to call "respect". The intuiting and responding to holiness and things or events which are taken to be manifestations of holiness I propose to call "worship". I propose further from now on to use these four terms, "aesthesis", "affection", "respect", and "worship" in the technical senses just defined. These technical senses have a considerable overlap with the normal usage of these terms, and this is why I have selected these terms; but these technical senses are much more precise. One feature of these technical senses that should be particularly noted is that what makes an intuition or a response an instance of aesthesis, affection, respect or worship has nothing to do either with the particular form in which the response is expressed or even with the particular medium of expression, but solely and entirely with what is taken to be the value quality of the object or event intuited and subsequently responded to. It is this alone that determines its placing in this particular classification.

It is not at all suggested that form or medium of expression are unimportant or irrelevant to the precise value placing of intuitions and responses. My purpose is simply that the various means by which intuitions and responses can be classified and by reference to which their value placing can be more precisely determined should be quite clearly distinguished from each other. To achieve this aim it seems a useful device to enlist the aid of a number of technical terms such as here suggested for each type of classification.
50. The "Object" of Intuition

I have written and will doubtless continue to write about "the object of an intuition", "the intuited object", etc. in a way which might suggest that the only entities presented at one moment of intuition are instances of one or other of the four basic values. In fact what is frequently, perhaps always, presented is a situation containing a complex of basically valuable beings and their derived values. Such a situation might perhaps have a claim to be called "the object of intuition". But in fact this is rarely how I shall use such a phrase for the following reason. It is fundamental to my position that the value of a situation of any complexity presented in a moment of intuition is in principle analysable into instances of basic values and derived values; and in a systematic account of basic values and derived values such as I am attempting it is important to take cognisance of this.

Although such a situation is in principle analysable, it does not follow that many people in fact carry out such analyses upon the situations of significance that are presented to them. Nor is it to be assumed even that anyone can carry out such an analysis completely and easily, if at all. Valuable elements in any situation are liable to be overlooked; and other valuable elements of an illusory nature are liable to be read into any situation. It seems to me that what often happens is that an observer partly
analyses a situation and has appropriate intuitions and responses to what he analyses out of it; but he is probably also aware that the situation contains much at which he can only guess, and in this case he probably has a kind of tentative respectful or worshipful attitude according to the nature of his guesses in relation to the partly known, partly unknown, elements in the situation.

What does seem to be clear is that personal intuition responses (with one exception, which I shall shortly mention) only arise in relation not to situations intuited as a whole, but in relation to instances of basic and derived values in so far as these are analysed out of the total situation. The exception to this is that any situation as a whole as part of the order of nature almost certainly possesses some kind of orderly pattern, and in relation to this it is to be expected that the intuition-response which I have called aesthesis should occur. My reasons for holding that, with the exception just mentioned, "significant situations" are not significant per se but are situations out of which basic and derived values are analysable, are that if one questions someone who claims to find a situation significant as to why he finds it so, most people would consider him under an obligation to attempt some kind of answer or to give up the claim. His answer, as I have already indicated, might well be of a tentative nature, but so far as it goes, and whatever
language he employs, he would, I submit, be pointing to those entities which I have called basic values and derived values.

Thus out of a situation of manifold elements there may be analysed and intuited one or more objects. By an "object", however, I include not only any instance of a basic value but also any instance of a derived value. A derived value may be intuited either as a derived value in relation to the basic value (or values) from which it is derived, (all derived personal values are derived from at least two value sources, the person and the value intuited); or it may be intuited as an isolated thing or event; or again, there are several intermediate possibilities in which it may be intuited as a significant thing or event in itself along with a dim intuition of the basic value (or values) from which it has been derived. The intuition of a derived value in relation to the basic value (or values) from which it is derived, and the response to which such as intuition gives rise is a more significant intuition and response than the intuition of and response to a derived value in isolation from its source.

The intuition of a derived value in relation to its value source (or sources) I shall also describe as "an object of intuition", but clearly this is a more complex "object" than a value, basic or derived, intuited in isolation. The complexity of such an "object of intuition", however, is not to be confused
with the complexity of the situation immediately presented to sense from which valuable objects of intuition are analysed out.

There is no limit to the degree of complexity that an "object of intuition" may have. This follows from the fact that derived personal values have two value sources, namely, the person whose intuition and/or response is being considered and the intuited object. But the intuited object itself may be a derived personal value with two further value sources, and so on indefinitely. One may frequently be uncertain, of course, that one has intuited the full complexity that any object of intuition actually has.

This complexity of an object of intuition may be described from another perspective, namely in terms of stages of derivation. The intuition of a basic value and the response thereto may be described as derived personal values of the primary stage. The expression of such a response may in turn be intuited and responded to; and these would be derived personal values of the secondary stage. And so on to the tertiary and quaternary derived values. One might illustrate from the works of John Keats by citing his "Ode on the Grecian Urn" as an example of a secondary derived value, and the sonnet, "On first looking into Chapman's Homer" as an example of a tertiary derived value.
51. The Dilemma of Defining Art, Morality and Religion

The classification of personal experiences and activities by reference to the nature of the value of the object intuited and subsequently responded to is not the only means of classifying personal experiences and activities, nor would I wish to claim that it has a clear priority over other methods of classification that might be considered, and some of which I shall in due course examine. Yet it seems to me that the importance of this means of classifying derived personal values is greater than is commonly recognised and may be of the highest priority. At any rate I am going to try to make out a case for claiming that this is a legitimate method of classifying and that it provides us with a principle of the derivation of the value qualities in personal experiences and activities, and that possibly this is the most important method of classification and principle of derivation of the value qualities in personal experiences and activities.

I wish to argue in support of this claim by considering one of the most usual methods of classifying personal experiences and activities and showing the dilemma to which it leads, a dilemma which I shall argue can best be resolved by giving higher priority to the method of classification which I am recommending.
This more usual "method" of classification to which I refer is the method of the man in the street and consequently, as we might expect, there is no one clearly defined and unambiguous statement as to what this "method" is. Indeed to call it a "method" at all is a purely honorary description of the unsystematic but none the less common usage of certain terms; namely "art", "morality", and "religion".

Many would speak of "art", "morality", and religion as among the most, or perhaps indeed, the most distinctively personal and significant types of human experience. Some might wish to add science to this list. But it is not at all clear in precisely what sense these terms are commonly used, or that any one systematic account of the distinction between the activities to which they refer can be readily offered. It seems to be partly by reference to the medium or context in which certain activities take place, and partly by reference to the form of these activities that these terms are generally understood. If this is so, then this seems to me to be classification by reference to two of the more superficial features of personal experience. Also undoubtedly the meaning of each of these terms involves considerable ambiguity, variety and controversy. For these reasons, therefore, it seems very doubtful whether it will be possible to adhere to the common usage of these terms and also to justify the claim made on behalf
of the experiences to which they refer to be the most significant of personal experiences.

Consider "Art" for example. This commonly refers to expression in a certain form (perhaps a beautiful form, or perhaps rather a meaningful form which is not necessarily beautiful, or perhaps again just a form or proportion which is not necessarily either beautiful or meaningful). The media within which art is expressed are so many and varied (stone, paint on canvas, sound, words, movements of body and limbs, etc.) as to make the use of any particular medium or range of media inessential to its nature as art. At the moment I find it impossible to think of anything at all which could not conceivably be made the medium of artistic expression. When, however, one starts a philosophical enquiry into the nature of art one is compelled to go well beyond what is contained in the popular usage of the term in order to understand what is distinctive and significant about the nature of the activity to which the term "art" rather clumsily refers. One is compelled to ask principally the questions, "But what precisely is expressed in the expression that we commonly call "art"?" "Is it emotion, as Collingwood says; or is it intuition, as Croce argues?" If it is an intuition, then of what is it an intuition?" And so on.
I have already given my answers to those questions, along with a criticism of Collingwood's position. Art is a response to the intuition of some object of significance expressed in one of a large variety of possible media. I am immediately aware, however, of the defect of this definition, that it is much too wide. The word "art" could be replaced by either "morality" or "religion", as I shall shortly show, and the statement could then serve as a definition of these activities also. We might try narrowing the definition by specifying the media or forms of art more precisely; but this would indicate a failure to appreciate the almost limitless number of media and forms in which art may be expressed. On the other hand we might specify the type of significant object whose intuition leads to artistic expression; but in this case we would erroneously restrict the kind of sources of inspiration that can lead to what is normally called artistic expression. The dilemma of defining "art" seems insoluble, if we wish to retain a meaning for the word at all approximating to its normal usage.

When we turn to examine the meaning of "Morality" we find a not dissimilar state of affairs. The word as popularly used seems generally to refer to human activity within the context or medium of other people and sometimes of animals. To say, however, what
is the form of moral activity is no easy task. Very, very generally, perhaps, we may characterise the form of morality as the type of activity which conforms to what the particular society, within which it takes place, approves. But this tentative definition, although perhaps satisfying the man in the street at the lowest level of enquiry, does not long survive any philosophical scrutiny. Even the man in the street, when pressed on the matter, will acknowledge that society does not always approve or disapprove what it ought to approve or disapprove, and that morality is not so much the kind of activity of which society actually approves as that of which it ought to approve.

Further enquiry has then to be made into the question of what kind of activity society ought to approve. Tautological answers to this question come most readily to mind, for example, that society ought to approve the kind of activity that is right; but such answers only invite the reformulation of the question into the form of "what kind of activity is right?"

An escape is made from this circularity when it is suggested that the moral activity, the activity of which society ought to approve, the activity which is right, is the activity which is appropriate or fitting. But the use of the words "appropriate" or "fitting" invite the still further question, "appropriate or fitting in relation to what?" Now there are several answers to
this question and each one of them seems to me to be quite legitimate. (It is in these answers that the parallelism between what is commonly called "art" and what is commonly called "morality" begins to be evident.) We might reply either: (i) "Appropriate in relation to the context in which the activity takes place", or, (ii), "Appropriate in relation to the particular motive of the person whose activity it is", or, (iii) "Appropriate in relation to the character of the person whose activity it is". (We condemn any "artistic" activity which fails to achieve appropriate expression in any of these ways.) In respect of appropriateness type (i), we speak of the "right word" or the "right note". In respect of appropriateness types (ii) and (iii), which have much in common, we speak of the "integrity of a work of art". "Appropriate in relation to the particular motive" refers to the intuition of an object of such and such significance which is being expressed. "Appropriate in relation to the character" of, for example, the artist, refers to the sum total of his intuitions and responses which have made him the kind of person he is.) There may well be other relationships than these with regard to which human actions may be considered appropriate or inappropriate.

But the question may be further pressed, "Which is the particular relationship with regard to which human actions are
judged appropriate or inappropriate in the distinctively moral way?" I must confess that I find myself unable to give any simple answer to this question; and become increasingly convinced that the kind of answer that the questioner expects does not exist. All relationships and aspects of human actions can be the subject of some judgement that we may properly pass. The aspect that we are particularly interested in making a judgement upon will vary according to varying circumstances; and this is a matter which I shall discuss later when we come to consider "Apparent Values".

Disvalues and Apparent Additional/ The assumption that the words "right" and "wrong", "moral" and "immoral" must have one clear and precise meaning has been responsible for much waste of time and ink. Although these are sufficiently meaningful terms at a superficial level of talking, they are much too ambiguous to be useful at a more sophisticated level.

The only way out of this dilemma is, as I have just indicated, that all aspects of human actions are appropriate subjects for some judgement or evaluation. Now if my account of the nature of a person is more or less correct then the most reasonable way to understand personal action is as a response to the intuition of some object of worth. Thus if a definition of "morality" is insisted upon the best I can offer is that morality is a response to the intuition of some object of significance expressed in a
suitable medium. But this definition is precisely the same as the one I recently offered of the nature of "art", and I am therefore acutely aware that it is much too wide to be acceptable. We might try to narrow the definition by specifying the media or forms of morality more precisely; but this would indicate a failure to realise the almost limitless forms and contexts of human actions upon which men pass what they at least think are "moral judgements". The man in the street does not hesitate to make what is commonly called "a moral judgement" on, for example, what is commonly called "a work of art". On the other hand we might narrow our definition by specifying the type of significant object whose intuition leads to moral action; but in this case we would erroneously restrict the kind of sources of inspiration that can lead to what is normally called moral action.

To illustrate this last point and to indicate the very different kinds of intuition that might give rise to actions, the form of which is otherwise the same, I would refer on the one hand to Wordsworth's opinion that the scenes above Tintern Abbey on the Banks of the Wye and the feelings which they generated had been in his experience,

"such perhaps,
As have no slight or trivial influence
On that best portion of a good man's life,
His little, nameless, unremembered, acts
Of kindness and of love." 6.

In his own and other men's lives Wordsworth believed that the
intuition of natural beauty gave rise to valuable responses in the context of persons. On the other hand it is not difficult to think of many instances of persons moved by an apprehension of the holiness and love of God whose lives have been similarly marked by "little, nameless, unremembered, acts of kindness and of love", in response to this religious inspiration. Thus it is clear that we may well have actions performed within similar contexts and with similar forms whose sources of inspiration are vastly different.

I therefore conclude that the dilemma of defining "morality" like that of defining "art" is insoluble, if we wish to retain a meaning for the word at all approximating to its normal usage.

Considering thirdly the case of the meaning of "Religion", the same argument holds here also. A popular first definition of religion would tend probably to make reference to what people do in churches, mosques and temples and would take account of the ritualistic form of this activity. But as soon as the questions are raised, (a) whether all that is done in churches, mosques and temples and has the appropriate ritualistic form is necessarily genuine religion, and further, (b) whether one cannot be genuinely
religious without attending church, mosque or temple at all, or following any standard ritual; then it would generally be granted that what determines the genuineness of one's religion is neither the place nor the form of its expression. It could be further pressed and doubtless granted that in seeking to give an account of religion it is genuine religion that one has in mind; and therefore one becomes obligated to give an account of the motive that typifies genuine religion.

Now anyone who holds that there is genuine religion, as distinct from the person who holds that all religion is spurious, would most likely be inclined to describe the motive of genuine religion in terms of a cognition or intuition, rather than in terms of an emotion, for the kind of reasons that I have already given. Thus religion may be defined, like art and morality, as a response to the intuition of some object of significance expressed in any of a large variety of possible media and forms. Unlike the dilemma that we found in the case of defining "art" and "morality" the demand to narrow the definition by specifying the nature of the worth of the intuited object would normally be readily accepted. Religion is the response to the intuition of holiness, or to the intuition of the holy Being, expressed in any of a large variety of possible media and forms. Thus the more sophisticated definition is less far removed from the more popular one than in the case of the definitions of "art" and
"morality": but there still remains a conflict between the popular desire to specify the context and forms within which religion should be expressed and the more sophisticated refusal to allow this.

Thus we have seen that in all the three cases of art, morality, and religion, we are involved in dilemmas about their meaning, which although not identical dilemmas have certain similar features. The similarity running through these three dilemmas tends to be that each of these terms in its most popular and superficial usage lays stress upon features, namely medium or context, and form, which turn out at a more sophisticated level to be quite secondary and unimportant; and also each (except religion) tends to overlook or to be positively misleading about a feature, namely that of the nature of the significance of the intuited object to which personal response is made, a feature which turns out at the more sophisticated level to be of the first importance in evaluating personal activities.

Further it is also evident that the intuition of objects of a similar value can give rise to activities of very considerable diversity; and also the intuition of objects of quite dissimilar worth can give rise to activities of not dissimilar form. The conclusion to be drawn from these considerations is that it is impossible to recognise any simple correlation between the intuition
of objects of a similar value and personal activities of any one particular form or in any one particular medium.

One might try to escape from this dilemma by trying the expedient of redefining "art", "morality" and "religion" by reference to the nature of the value quality of the object whose intuition has given rise to any personal activity, irrespective of the form or context of that activity. I am not entirely unsympathetic to this suggestion; but on the whole it seems to me to be unwise for two reasons. Firstly, such prescriptive definitions of "art", "morality", and "religion" would be so far removed from that of popular usage that it would be likely to cause continual confusion in the use of these terms. Secondly this device might seem to imply that the context and form of a personal activity are irrelevant to its true evaluation, and that the only thing that matters is the value quality of the object of the intuition that gave rise to the activity. This is not what I believe. My position is that the value quality of the object of any intuition is of high, perhaps of primary importance, for the placing of any personal activity on the value map; but the context (or medium) and form of an activity, even if not of primary, are none the less of considerable secondary importance. For these reasons, therefore, it seems to me wiser to drop the
terms "art", "morality", and "religion", altogether when speaking precisely and to use some such terms as those I have been here recommending, namely "aesthesis", "affection", "respect", and "worship". This need not, of course, forbid the use of the terms art, morality and religion, when from time to time I may wish to speak more popularly and to use these terms with the usual vagueness that they have.
52. An Account of Greatness and Triviality in Personal Responses

So far I have endeavoured to show the necessity in the case of those personal activities that are normally called "art", "morality" and "religion" of taking into account the value quality of the object of intuition that has given rise to any of these activities. I wish now to argue further for the importance of the value quality of the intuited object in determining the value placing of any personal activity. (It should hardly be necessary to repeat that I am speaking at present of the intrinsic value of personal activities and am in the meantime at least excluding consideration of any instrumental value that such personal activities may also have.)

The gist of my argument is that in art, morality and religion (using these words in the popular and ill-defined sense), we can and do make a distinction between what may be called trivial or superficial on the one hand, and what may be called great, noble or sublime on the other; and this difference when investigated is explicable only, I submit, by reference to the value quality of the object whose intuition has given rise to the particular responsive activity in question. Let us look at this argument in more detail.

That we do make such judgements as trivial, etc., or great, etc., in the spheres of art, morality and religion can hardly be
doubted. Nor are these judgements readily confused with judgements of other types of virtue that actions of an artistic, moral, or religious kind may or may not have. They should be readily distinguishable from the judgement, for example, that a work of art, of morality, or of religion has a perfection of form, that it has subtlety, originality or complexity, that it is a "good" (i.e. typical) example of a certain tradition, etc. Indeed the judgement of greatness is so clearly distinguishable from other judgements of a laudable type that a work of art, a moral or a religious action may lack many other grounds of praise, may to some degree be gauche or imperfectly executed and yet convey elements of greatness. On the other hand any work of art or morality may have finesse of style and yet be trivial. Since, however, the conveyance of these elements of greatness depends upon the artefact or action, a poorly executed artefact or action may seriously impede even if it does not entirely stifle, the elements of greatness.

But, and this is the crucial question, to what do such judgements of greatness or triviality refer? They refer to something that would most commonly be called the meaning or significance of the personal action. Now the meaning of a work of art, of a moral or religious action, is something outside the action itself to which it refers and which gives it this most important
part of its distinctive quality.

To make this point clear I must refer the reader to my earlier discussion on the nature of, and function of, symbols and tokens in personal life (1). It will be recollected that I argued that a personal response can be received and/or intended as a symbol or a token of either the person whose response it is or of the significant object whose intuition has given rise to the response. Thus to describe a particular response as trivial, etc., or great, etc., is to indicate an awareness of either its symbolic or its betokening relationship either to the person whose response it is or to the significant object of his intuition. It therefore follows, if this account is correct, that personal responses can be trivial or great in two different senses, namely: (1) as the responses of men of trivial or great character, or (ii) as the responses to objects of slight or of considerable worth. Now it does not seem to me to be at all difficult to recognise in actual experience these two different ways in which we are aware of, and consequently speak of, personal activity as being either trivial or great.

We now have seen that there are two distinct principles which enter into our assessment of the degree of triviality or greatness of personal activity. The greatest personal action would be one which is great in both respects, namely the action of a man of
great character responding to a situation of truly significant objects; and the most trivial would be the action of a man of trivial character responding to a situation of objects of small significance. Between these two extremes it should be apparent that there now are two separate intersecting scales by which we might try to plot on the value map the worth of any personal action.

Yet a qualification to the separateness of these two scales must be indicated, or more correctly, re-iterated. Greatness of character is itself analysable into two elements, namely: (i) the sum total of intuitions of significant objects and responses thereto that a person has had, and, (ii), the capacity for having such significant intuitions and responses. The relationship between these two elements is a controversial matter and further analysis of the nature of greatness of character seems highly probable; but I shall not at present pursue this question.
Statement of Subsidiary Principle (a) and its Application in Determining the Worth of Intuitions and Responses

I turn now to the question as to how this classification by reference to the type of valuable object intuited provides us with a subsidiary principle of the derivation of values. The subsidiary principle may be defined as follows: other things being equal, the intuition of, and consequent response to, a higher basic value is a more valuable intuition-response than the intuition of and response to a lower basic value. I have already argued that the expressions of personality derive their value from the basic value of the person whose expressions they are, just as the manifestations of the orderliness of nature derive their value from the basic value of the order of nature as a whole, and as the expressions of the life of a living thing derive their value from the basic value of the living thing whose expressions they are. These are all instances of the application of the primary principle of the internal derivation of values. In the case of internally derived personal values, however, the value of any such personal expression, we now observe, is more precisely determined by the subsidiary principle of derivation just defined. That is, all personal intuitions and responses derive their value primarily from the value of the person whose intuitions and responses they are; but they also derive their value partly from the value of
the objects or events intuited and responded to.

The word "primarily" in the foregoing sentence needs to be carefully defined to avoid an ambiguity. What is meant is that the prime source of the value of personal intuitions and responses is the person whose intuitions and responses they are. It is not intended to mean that the value contributed by the person whose intuitions and responses we may be considering is necessarily greater in value than the value contributed by the extra-personal object intuited and responded to. This comes out in the case of worship in which the main "quantity" of the value of worship comes from the person whose worship it is; but the value contributed by the holiness intuited and responded to, although less in "quantity" may quite well be greater in value than the value contributed by the person concerned. Also for the purposes of the argument at the moment I am not considering differences in the character or worth of different persons but am assuming a uniformity of character and of all other things to demonstrate only the effects of variation in the worth of the intuited object.

We are now in a position to draw some conclusions about the comparative value of personal intuitions and responses by an application of the subsidiary principle of internal derivation of values by reference to the comparative value of the objects intuited and responded to. Thus it follows that affection is more intrinsically
valuable than aesthetics, respect is more intrinsically valuable than affection, and worship is more intrinsically valuable than respect.

I now wish to look more closely at the distinction between the intuition of, and response to, the four basically valuable types of things. I propose to indicate this distinction by the use of the adjectives "intuitive" and "responsive". Thus we can now consider eight classes of internally derived personal values on a basis of this classification. These are "intuitive aesthetics" and "responsive aesthesis", "intuitive affection" and "responsive affection", "intuitive respect" and "responsive respect", "intuitive worship" and "responsive worship". These eight derived personal values fall into two groups of four, namely, "intuitive aesthetics", "intuitive affection", "intuitive respect" and "intuitive worship", which group I shall refer to as "derived personal intuition values"; and the rest, namely "responsive aesthetics", "responsive affection", "responsive respect", and "responsive worship", which group I shall refer to as "derived personal response values".

The question now arises how this further classification of derived personal values determines their comparative value; or, more precisely, whether intuition values or response values are more valuable. Since response presupposes, and hence in a sense includes, intuition we may at once be inclined to conclude that
responses are more valuable than intuitions; and in this special sense that is obviously so.

We may, however, make another type of comparison between them, by first of all separating them in our experience in order that we may consider responses by themselves in comparison with the respective intuitions that give rise to them. A number of features are to be noticed about any response compared with its corresponding intuition. Firstly a response seems to be a fuller and certainly a more active personal experience than an intuition, and hence it would seem to follow that it contains a greater "quantity" of value than the preceding intuition. This however does not necessarily imply that its total intrinsic value is higher than that of the intuition, for one has also to take into account in determining this the value contributed by the object intuited and responded to, and although this is less in "quantity" it may well be higher in value. Secondly we should note that in both intuitions and responses a greater "quantity" of value is contributed by the person whose intuition or response it is than the "quantity" of value contributed by the valuable objects that are being intuited and responded to. Thirdly we have to consider the relative "quantity" of value contributed by the valuable object to responses compared with that contributed to intuition. On this question there seem to me to be four possible hypotheses. Either
the valuable object contributes more value to any response than to the preceding intuition; or else, secondly, it contributes the same value to any response and to its preceding intuition; or again, thirdly, it contributes less value to the response than to the preceding intuition; or a fourth possibility is that it contributes no value at all to the response in question.

These four possibilities merit some discussion. Clearly the first hypothesis, that the valuable object contributes more worth to a response than to the preceding intuition, is untenable, for whatever value it contributes to any response must come by way of the preceding intuition. The second possible hypothesis, that the object contributes the same value to any intuition and to its subsequent response, seems to me a tenable position; and if it be true then it would follow that in each case the personal response value is higher than the preceding intuition value. Thus responsive aesthesis would be more valuable than intuitive aesthesis, responsive affection than intuitive affection, responsive respect than intuitive respect, and responsive worship than intuitive worship. This seems to me a not unacceptable account.

The third possible hypothesis, however, seems at least equally, and perhaps even more, tenable. It is that the object contributes less value to the response than to the preceding intuition. This would be the case if somehow between the moment
of intuition and the moment of response something of the significance of the object intuited were to be lost. This seems to me to be very generally, and perhaps even universally, to be the case. Yet I would hesitate to say that it is necessarily the case. Where this third hypothesis holds, however, we probably have an interesting reversal of the relative value of one of the response values to its preceding intuition value. Although on the third hypothesis as on the second responsive aesthesis would be more valuable than intuitive aesthesis, responsive affection than intuitive affection, and responsive respect than intuitive respect, yet in the case of worship the position would be more doubtful and would, it seems to me, be the reverse. We cannot say that responsive worship would be more valuable than intuitive worship because we do not know whether the amount by which the "quantity" of value contributed by holiness to intuitive worship exceeds that contributed by holiness to the subsequent responsive worship is higher in value than the amount by which the "quantity" of value contributed by the person to his responsive worship exceeds that contributed by him to his intuitive worship. Yet since, as we have already seen, holiness is higher in worth than any other actual or conceivable value, it seems most likely that no "quantity" of value however great contributed by a person can equal in value even a small "quantity" of value contributed by holiness. Thus
it would seem to follow that on this third hypothesis intuitive worship must be more valuable than responsive worship.

The fourth hypothesis, that the object intuited and responded to contributes no value at all to the response, seems to me quite unacceptable. On this view it would follow that the worth of any response derives entirely from the worth of the person whose response it is, and that, therefore, other things being equal, responsive worship is equal in value to responsive virtue, responsive affection and responsive aesthesis. This hypothesis would appear to be the position of not a few eminent aestheticians such as Roger Fry, Clive Bell, and the advocates of art as significant form; and also at an earlier period this would have been the position too of the school of "Art for art's sake".

It is common to all of these to hold that the subject of a work of art is irrelevant to its worth. Against this, however, most of us sense that however excellently a work of art may be conceived and executed it is not a matter of indifference whether the subject of the work be trivial or great. Without some reference to this subject matter we are left without any explanation or criterion of the felt difference between triviality and greatness. When we move beyond art to morality and religion the difference between the trivial and the greatly significant is even more evident, and this difference is not to be accounted for by reference to the
person, or to the form of his expression or his choice of medium, but by reference to something beyond him which is the ultimate source of inspiration that gave rise to his activity. But I have already argued this matter in some detail; and I need say no more on it here. Our experience, therefore, compels us to say that responsive worship has more significance than responsive respect and the latter in turn is of higher worth than responsive affection and higher still than responsive aesthesis.
References


2. Vide, Chapter X, "Apparent Disvalues and Apparent Additional Values".


6. William Wordsworth, Lines Composed a few miles above Tintern Abbey ... 1798, ll. 31-35.


CHAPTER VIII

INTERNALLY DERIVED VALUES (11)
54. B. **Classification of Responses by Reference to the Nature of the Response**

Personal responses are of three main types which I shall call, i, Taboo, ii, Mimetic, and iii, Creative. These, however, are not to be looked upon as rigidly exclusive groups. Indeed it is most frequently the case that particular responses have features of two and even sometimes of all three of these types. The basic distinction between these types of response is one of motive, and usually one or other type of motive is predominant. Let us look at them each in turn.

55. **i. Taboo Responses**

A Taboo response is essentially negative and in this respect has less in common with the other two types of response which are of a positive type. Originating, however, in a positive intuition of the worth of something or other, a taboo response consists in refraining from doing anything that might damage or seem to show lack of awareness of the worth of some valuable object. There are, of course, taboo responses in relation to each of the four basically valuable types of things and their derivations. Thus we, or many of us at least, would refrain from damaging natural beauty wantonly. Most of us would avoid causing needless pain to animals. Also most of us would shun giving offence to any other person, unless in some special instance we had, or thought we had, some reason for being offensive. Finally, most clearly those of
us who are religious are aware of the compulsion to forbear
presuming an easy intimacy with the Holy God or handling
holy objects lightly.

Appropriate names for these four types of taboo
response would clearly be, "responsive taboo aesthesis", "re-
sponsive taboo affection", "responsive taboo respect", and
"responsive taboo worship". Since, however, taboo is essen-
tially a type of response and there are no taboo intuitions we
might well drop the word "responsive" and speak more simply
of "taboo aesthesis", "taboo affection", "taboo respect" and
"taboo worship".

I doubt if anyone with any awareness of the value of
things will have much difficulty in recognising these taboo
responses in his own experience. This is the simplest and
most immediate response to any object of worth; and this
response is usually present whether or not it is followed by
one of the more positive responses. There are many other ways
that we may describe our taboo responses; such as "a sense
of delicacy", "respect", "awe", etc.
Regarding the value of taboo responses, since they are essentially negative, their value must be also of a negative instrumental variety. They are in fact examples of "apparent/value" which we shall discuss in due course. This appearance of worth which they have arises in contrast with the imagined situation of disvalue which would arise were a thing of intrinsic value to be violated in some kind of way.

56. ii. Mimetic Responses

Mimetic responses are positive in that they consist in doing and making things. Yet they are not creative. That is, nothing new comes out of them, but only a copy or near copy of what already exists, or, much more likely, a copy or near copy of some feature, such as the colour and/or shape of what already exists.

Thus there is a type of drawing, painting and expression in the plastic arts generally which aims at nothing more than the production of the closest possible likeness of natural scenery, flowers, trees, animals, persons and other natural objects. The representation of living things, of persons, and of holy objects may have different motives which have to be distinguished. They may be represented as part of the order of nature, or as living things, or as persons, or as holy objects. A study of the drawing, painting, sculpture, etc. in itself will not necessarily readily disclose which particular
motive has been at work. The representation of a person, for example, could have four possible different mimetic motives, namely, a mimetic response to a natural object, that is, to an object manifesting the order of nature, a mimetic response to a living thing, a mimetic response to a person, or even, in some cases, a mimetic response to a holy person, that is, to a person as a token of holiness.

Appropriate names for these four types of mimetic responses would clearly be, "responsive mimetic aesthesis", "responsive mimetic affection", "responsive mimetic respect", "responsive mimetic worship". But, as in the case of taboo responses, we may simplify our terms into the shorter forms, "mimetic aesthesis", "mimetic affection", "mimetic respect", and "mimetic worship".

Mimetic responses are not, of course, limited to drawing, painting and the plastic media of expression. In the case of mimetic responses to persons the simple action of copying another's behaviour would be a mimetic response. Whether such an action were an instance of "mimetic aesthesis", "mimetic affection", or "mimetic respect" would depend upon whether the value intuited in the other's behaviour was purely the form or order of the behaviour, its worth as a vital activity, or its worth as a personal expression. The person making the response would, I think, know fairly clearly which of these it was; but even this would depend upon his ability and honesty in introspecting his own motives. In the case of an external observer, it would depend upon whether his observation of the other's behaviour was limited to an interest in the behaviour
as such, or whether it included also an interest in its symbolic
or betokening reference. If such an observer had, however, a
wider knowledge of the other's character as a whole he would be
the more able to make shrewd guesses about the motives of particular
responses.

57. iii Creative Responses

Creative responses, like mimetic, are positive; but in a
creative response something new happens or comes into existence.
This does not mean that what is substantially a creative response
is entirely new through and through. Indeed it is very doubtful
whether any human being is ever capable of an entirely creative
response, that is, a response that makes use of no mimetic
elements at all. Such pure creativity would seem to be the
privilege of God alone. All "creative" responses, it seems to
me, contain also some mimetic elements; and because of this
their classification is open to some doubt and arbitrariness.

There has in the course of the history of aesthetics, been
much unnecessary discussion on the question whether "art" is
mimetic or creative. There might with equal justification
have been discussion on whether "morality" and "religion" are
mimetic or creative. The truth is that either of the extreme
positions on any of these three questions overlooks a whole
stretch of personal activity. Some arts, some morality and some
religion are mimetic; and some arts, some morality and some
religion are creative. But above all it seems to me that a
very considerable amount of art, morality and religion is both mimetic and creative at the same time. What seems to matter most for the purposes of classification is whether the predominant motive is a mimetic or a creative one.

There are creative responses in relation to each of the four basically valuable types of things and their derivatives. Thus the drawing and painting of natural scenery which is commonly called "art" is usually more than simply a representation of the nearest possible likeness to the original. It normally contains also the artist's creative response to nature and this may well be its most significant feature. There are likewise creative responses to living things, to persons, and to the holy God; and to the derivations of each of these. As in the case of mimetic responses, so also with creative; different motives may possibly be operating in very similar instances of response, and these can be distinguished, although only by the sensitive observer. A living thing may be creatively responded to either as a part of the order of nature or as a living thing. A person may be creatively responded to either as a part of the order of nature, or as a living thing, or as a person, or as a holy person, that is, as a person taken to be a token of holiness. The holy God, it seems to me, can probably only be creatively responded to as the holy God; but holy objects or tokens may be creatively responded to as part of the order of nature, as living
things (where the holy object is in fact a living thing), or as persons (where the holy object is in fact a person).

Appropriate names for these four types of creative response would clearly be "responsive creative aesthesis", "responsive creative affection", "responsive creative respect", and "responsive creative worship". As in the case of taboo and mimetic responses, here also we may use the shorter forms, namely, "creative aesthesis", "creative affection", "creative respect" and "creative worship".

As in the case of mimetic responses a person's ability to recognise the motivation of his own responses depends upon his introspective ability and his general integrity. Recognition by an external observer depends upon his sensitivity to the symbolic or betokening reference of the other's responses, and of his knowledge of the other's character as a whole. But there are obvious reasons for greater difficulty in recognising the sources of motivation of creative responses than of mimetic responses.

Of someone looking at a banana tree and at the same time producing an unimaginative representation of the banana tree we may safely say that he is making a mimetic response to it. Of someone, however, producing a picture which has some likeness to a banana tree and yet is unlike any banana tree ever seen, especially if there is no banana tree present for him to observe, and provided also we know that the unlikeness of his picture to
a banana tree is not due to inability to remember what a banana tree looks like, nor to a technical inability to paint what he intends to paint, then we may rightly conclude that this is not a mimetic response at all. It is a creative response, but not necessarily a creative response to a banana tree. The banana tree may simply provide the symbolism for a response to something quite different. Perhaps a knowledge of the artist's life and work would make the source of his motivation clear to a sensitive observer. But even apart from such intellectual knowledge of the artist's life and work and of the symbolism he employs and the consequent inferential knowledge of the significance of a particular painting, a sensitive observer may still have an awareness of the greatness or of the triviality of the work; and this, as I have already argued, is nothing other than an awareness of the symbolic or betokening reference either to the kind of person the artist is or to the kind of significant object to whose intuition the painting in question is a response. To the insensitive observer such knowledge of the signification, especially of creative responses, must remain obscure.

Questions also frequently arise as to whether a response is creative, mimetic, or even taboo. Consider, for example, the usual gentlemanly gesture of standing up when a lady enters the room. The first man who made this gesture was doubtless
making a creative response, perhaps a combination of aethesia, affection and respect for the lady. But most men who make this gesture nowadays are doing something quite different. In a company of people some of the men who stand up when a lady enters are simply following the example of the other men who stood up first. This is a mimetic response to the behaviour of the other men. The men who stood up first are in all probability simply following a strict social convention. The most reasonable account of their behaviour is that it is a taboo response to a social convention which they would abhor to violate.

A more interesting feature of this gesture than the fact that it illustrates the element of ambiguity in interpreting the nature of personal responses, is the fact that it illustrates the growth of human culture and civilisation. The first man in history who stood up when a woman entered was a creative genius. The next were either imitators, making mimetic responses, or conformists, making taboo responses. So too with the first man who wrote a sonnet, said a prayer or showed concern for the poor and needy. The rest in some ways were mainly imitators and conformists. But not entirely so. Within the sonnet form there is room for variety and creativity; and so too with the forms of prayer and charity. The contrast still remains, however, between the pioneer artists, saints and reformers, and the rest of us who imitate and conform to the standards they have set.
The possibility of creativity for the ordinary man depends to some extent upon the particular medium within which he is making his response. The possibility of creative originality in the way one offers one's seat to a lady doubtless exists but it is meagre and restricting. A special opportunity for creativity lies in the discovery of a new medium of expression. To the discussion of the nature of the medium of expression I shall come in due course. Our immediate concern, however, is whether this classification of responses by reference to their nature provides us with a subsidiary principle for evaluating responses.
58. Discussion of the Possibility of a Subsidiary Principle (b) and its Application in Determining the Worth of Responses: or the Evaluation of Taboo, Mimetic and Creative Responses

From the classification B of responses into taboo, mimetic and creative, can we make a statement of a corresponding subsidiary principle (b) regarding the more precise derivation of the value of responses? And can we demonstrate its application in giving a more precise determination to the worth of any particular response? This is a complex question. Let us tackle it as far as we can.

I have already said that since taboo responses consist in refraining from doing things there is a difficulty in saying that they have any positive worth. They do, however, appear to have value, and this "apparent value" arises, I have suggested, in contrast to the imagined, and sometimes actual instrumental disvalue of an action which violates or destroys a basic value or a derived intrinsic value.

But do taboo responses have no intrinsic value at all? This does not follow. They are surely so closely connected with the intuitions that give rise to them, and since these intuitions have intrinsic worth it seems to follow that even a negative response, which is, after all, a conscious response to an intuition of worth, must have some value carried over from the value of the intuition. Perhaps it has the same intrinsic value as the
intuition? What it lacks is the additional positive value of a response that does something.

Clearly then we can say that mimetic and creative responses are more valuable than taboo responses. But can we say that creative responses are more valuable than mimetic responses? Prima facie creation seems a more significant activity than imitation. But the matter is complicated; and in some way relates to the problem already discussed concerning the relative value contributed by the valuable object intuited and responded to compared with that contributed by the person whose intuition and response it is. Consider, for example, the case of a technically expert but unimaginative musician. The activity of such a one in rendering a piece of one of the great composers is surely a more significant experience for himself and for his hearers than would be his activity in creating a new composition of his own.

Consideration of a case such as this indicates that the determination of the relative value of mimetic and creative responses depends upon two kinds of factors, namely:

(i) certain qualities in the person whose response it is, such as technical expertness, formed character and creative imagination; and, (ii) the value of the intuited object which is being responded to. One point to notice about the first type of factor is that the value of the response is greater when any person is making the kind of response for which his capacity is greatest: a rather
obvious statement but none the less important for that. A point to notice about the second type of factor is that the determinative importance of the value of the intuited object is greater in mimetic than in creative responses. It will therefore tend to be the case that mimetic responses to more valuable "objects" should be more valuable than creative responses to these same "objects", and that creative responses to less valuable "objects" should be more valuable than mimetic responses to these same objects. I cannot without closer scrutiny of the matter be more precise than this, because, of course, the factors which I have called "certain qualities in the person" are complex and variable and these factors always affect the precise value of any response.

It is a task well beyond my present scope to consider the effects of all possible permutations and combinations of the variable members of these two groups of factors in relation to the determination of the value of mimetic and creative responses. At the most I can only indicate the kind of task that has to be done. In this connection I wish to look more closely at the qualities in a person that help determine the nature of any response. I mentioned three of these types of quality that seem to matter, namely, technical expertness, formed character and creative imagination.
**Technical expertness** is a person's ability to do what he intends to do. Such ability is not limited to persons but belongs also to a greater or less degree to other animals. It is the nature of the intention and not the technical expertness required to accomplish it that makes a mimetic response a personal rather than a merely animal activity. Technical expertness is determined partly by intelligence, and partly by experience, especially the experience of practising a thing many times until it becomes a habit. Technical expertness can be learned from others, and the association with other technically expert persons may account for one's own degree of expertness.

Technical expertness enters into both mimetic and creative responses, because in both cases one may succeed to a greater or less extent in doing what one intends to do. It seems, however, to be more important in the cases of mimetic responses. This is because in mimetic responses it is more clearly evident whether and to what extent a person succeeds in doing what he intends to do, because the original which he seeks to imitate serves also as a standard by which it can be judged to what extent he succeeds or fails in his efforts. But no such readily applicable and precise standard exists by which the success or failure of creative responses can be judged.
His formed character is what a person is as a result of what he has experienced. And what he is, conditions in turn what he will experience and do in the future. It is not only persons but also other animals that have formed characters. A human being has a formed character both in respect of being an animal and in respect of being a person. This does not mean that these two aspects of a man's character are readily separable, even by thought, except in the most general way; but in some cases the distinction may be more clearly seen.

At the moment our interest in a person's formed character is in regard to its conditioning effect on the nature and value of his intuitions and responses. The effectiveness of this conditioning depends upon a person's memory; and there is an unconscious as well as a conscious remembering. The conditioning operates by the associating of ideas so that what a person intuites in any object becomes immediately associated with other past experiences of a similar kind, and in responding either mimetically or, more especially, creatively, a person makes use of these associations from past intuitions and responses. These associations when embodied in responses have a symbolic relationship with past experiences; and this symbolism may be fully consciously understood and intended, or only partly so, or not at all.

Memory, association of ideas, and symbolism are large topics to raise so cursorily and I am well aware of the controversial nature of each of them. My excuse for such hasty treatment is
that I claim only to be trying to point out areas in which fuller investigation is required before precise conclusions can be arrived at on the subject of my enquiry, i.e., the determination of the worth of certain personal responses. Each of these factors, memory, association and symbolism, modify or help determine the worth of any response. Yet my main point is neither so complicated nor controversial as this discussion may suggest. It is simply that the *intrinsic* worth of a person's action at any moment is conditioned by the kind of person he *is*, and this in turn is conditioned by his past experiences and by the various factors by which these past experiences are mediated to him in the present.

I have been careful in the foregoing discussion to use the word "condition" and the phrase "help determine" rather than the single word "determine", because a person's "formed character" is only one of several personal qualities that go to determine the nature and worth of his responses. Technical expertness and creative imagination are also personal qualities with conditioning effects upon responses. I would not claim dogmatically that this exhausts the list of those personal qualities; but they seem to me to be the most important.

Further the precise differentiation of these personal qualities is open to dispute. Should not technical expertness be considered a part of formed character? Perhaps yes, but even so it would still be a sufficiently distinguishable part of formed character.
Can we cite any element in the activity of the creative imagination that is not conditioned by formed character? Perhaps not; and yet our inability to point precisely and surely to any such elements does not permit us to deny the experience that in creative action there are elements which are not to be accounted for in terms of one's character as formed by past experience. I have purposely used the term "formed character" to allow anyone who pleases to include the creative imagination within the wider category of character, and to allow myself to insist that there are elements in the creative imagination that go beyond character as formed by past experience. And yet I am willing to grant that many riddles still remain about the relationship of "formed character" to the creative imagination.

The difficulty in describing the relationship between one's formed character and one's creative imagination may be brought out in another way. One's character in general, it might be suggested, is constituted by two elements, namely (i) the sum total of one's past experiences especially by one's significant intuitions and responses, and (ii) one's capacity for certain experiences and activities especially for having intuitions of valuable objects and making responses to them. Now it is important to notice a certain difference between (i) and (ii). It is at least conceivable that some day we might have the means of measuring the sum total of intuitions and responses that an
individual has had up to date. Yet it does not seem even conceivably possible that we should ever be able to measure, even in principle, a person's capacity for having intuitions and making responses. We can know something of his capacity for having intuitions and making responses only after he has actually had them. Yet this knowledge is only about what his past capacity was; and even this knowledge is only about what his past minimum capacity was, and never knowledge about his full capacity. Because a person has done something, we know that he was at least able to do that thing. We cannot know how much more he might have done.

Thus we seem to be involved in a vicious circle. On the one hand the value of the creative element in personal responses is largely derived from the formed character of the person making the creative response, and this in turn consists partly of his capacity for making creative responses; and so we might have expected to be able to measure the creative element in a response from a knowledge of a person's capacity for making such creative responses. But this in fact is impossible because the only way of measuring such capacity is by measuring the lower limit of the capacity from a knowledge of the creative responses actually made. Clearly, therefore, we have to measure this, if at all, by directly examining these actual responses.

So we seem to be driven reluctantly to the conclusion that the knowledge of the source of the worth of the creative element
in personal responses does not provide us with a subsidiary principle (b) for measuring the worth of personal responses. What is even more serious is that failure at this point considerably reduces the significance of what we thought we had already achieved. Thus the application of subsidiary principle (a), that is, evaluation of responses by reference to the intrinsic value of the intuited object, depended upon "other things being equal". We have now discovered that we have no means of knowing whether one of those "other things" does remain equal or not since we seem to have no means of discovering what its value actually is.

It does not follow from this that our earlier arguments and conclusions are therefore entirely vain and useless. If these arguments were founded upon adequate facts and rationally carried out, then there is no good reason for doubting the distinctions therein made and the conclusions drawn about the sources of the derivation of the value of personal responses. Even if they have not provided us with the techniques of measuring the worth of those personal responses, it is not entirely without interest to know more clearly what are and what are not the difficulties in the way of providing such an instrument of measurement.

Further, even if reasoned argument has failed in the provision of this instrument of measurement, it does not even follow that we are thereby without the means of making any assessment of the worth of personal activities and of the relative contributions of the
several sources of the worth of these activities. Where reason fails it may be that intuition can provide us with the knowledge we seek. Indeed it seems to be that in the experience of intuiting any particular personal response as a token we sometimes make the distinction between the worth of the character it betokens and the worth of the betokened object whose intuition has given rise to this particular response. And we are sometimes at the same moment aware further of how much of the significance of the response is owed to the one of these sources and how much to the other.
It is perhaps more difficult to make any general statements about creativity than about any other element in man's experience, because it is of the essence of a creative action that it is individual, unique. Some things, however, seem to me to be clear.

It is in his creativity that man is most evidently free. Many thinkers would disagree with this statement on the grounds that the clearest example (perhaps some would say the only example) of freedom of choice is to be found in the situation of "moral" choice, especially when there is a conflict between duty and desire. I disagree with their position. It seems evident to me that actions which are unique, such as Shakespeare's writing of Hamlet, Beethoven's creation of the Fifth Symphony, Beveridge's creation of a design for the social welfare state, Dr. Nkrumah's founding of a modern state in tropical Africa, these and many other less well known creative actions more clearly demonstrate the reality of human freedom than one's decision to keep a promise or to tell the truth in the face of temptation to do otherwise. I do not wish to deny the reality of the freedom in the latter type of case. I simply
fail to see that it is more clearly a case of freedom than the freedom involved in creative action.

The freedom of a creative action is seen if we consider a question such as "what were the other possibilities open to Shakespeare instead of writing Hamlet as he did write it?" Clearly it was not a simple choice of writing Hamlet or not writing it. He might have written a comedy instead of a tragedy or a very different kind of tragedy, or a tragedy more or less like Hamlet, but with Hamlet's character modified in any one of a hundred possible ways, or with the plot altered in any one of a hundred possible ways. In short there were a very large number of possible choices that Shakespeare was free to make. Now compare this with the alternatives open to our considering, for example, whether or not to keep a promise. From the point of view of the upholders of the Freedom-seen-only-in-temptation argument, there are only two alternatives, namely that one should either keep one's promise or not keep one's promise. Granted that instead of being at an appointed place at an appointed time, one might stay at home, go to one's club, visit a friend, etc., etc., yet from the point of view specified, namely that of the conflict of duty and desire, the only options that count are two, whether to do one's duty or to shirk it. These are the only significant alternatives, if one defines the situation, as the upholders of the position I am criticising do, by ruling out as irrelevant to
the question of freedom the creatively different things one might do instead, if one shirks one's duty, or the creatively different ways in which one may sometimes fulfil it.

Now to show that creativity involves such a variety of possibilities seems to me to prove that it involves freedom; for surely it is of the essence of determinism that it holds that, whatever may seem to be the alternative open possibilities, these possibilities are illusory and in fact one can only do what in fact one does. Thus to prove a larger number of open and significant possibilities is surely to prove a larger freedom.

There is an interesting corollary that follows from this position (for which I am here arguing) in connection with the theological problem of Evil. In dealing with this problem which arises for any theistic account of the world, the most usual defence of Christian theologians has been the Free-will defence. Now this defence normally rests on the assumption that the most significant instance of human freedom arises in the choice between good and evil. If, however, this assumption is incorrect then clearly Christian theologians will require to re-examine this traditional defence. I mention this point only in passing because of its interest. Since it is not, however, relevant to my present purpose I shall not discuss it further.

Although I have argued that it is in his creativity that man is most evidently free, this does not mean that man is ever completely free.
most fantastic imaginings man is always bound in a considerable number of ways.

He is bound for example by the medium in which he is expressing his creative response. Some things can be done with paint on canvas and some things cannot. Each medium has its own limitations and its own possibilities. Even words, one of the most flexible of all media, have their limits; and each language sets its own limits to what can be said by means of it.

There is another rather different group of limitations to human freedom in creative action. These may be called conditional limitations; that is, one must accept them if one is to make a significant response. All responses are made within certain conventions which have become associated with the use of each particular medium. Some of these conventions are much more precise than others; but one can never avoid them altogether. There are, for example, the conventions of the sonnet form in poetry, and of the symphonic form in music, just as there is an etiquette governing most types of behaviour in relation to other people. Such conventions are never absolutely binding. They are not limits to the freedom of the will in the kind of way that the presence of the Atlantic prevents any decision to walk to America. They are, however, conditionally binding in the sense that unless one takes cognisance of them one is prevented from doing anything significant, which means also that one is
prevented doing anything creative. One can of course do something, as when one shouts and storms meaninglessly, bangs the keys; spills the ink, makes a mess of things in any one of a multitude of ways in any medium of potential expression. But such activities have no value. They are neither taboo, mimetic, nor creative responses.

Yet the formal conventions are always capable of being changed or modified but never entirely ignored. Provided one has taken sufficient cognisance of the appropriate conventions, and provided also that there is sufficient point in going beyond, or in modifying a particular convention, other than sheer iconoclasm, then one may in an appropriate situation violate a convention and still make a significant expression. Indeed it may, in such conditions, be all the more significant because of these departures from normal convention.

There is another conditional limitation I wish to consider. As distinct from the general limitation of conventional form, there is also a special limitation of internal form peculiar to each creative expression, which comes into existence at the same moment as the creative activity itself. Whatever one is creating has got to be a coherent, consistent and ordered whole. This means that from the moment of commencement of a creative action limits are set to the kind of way which that particular creative action can be completed. This does not mean that there is any
physical barrier to one's doing otherwise and making a mess of one's work. But one ignores or violates this internal design at the cost again of one's work having any significance, and indeed of its continuing to be a creative response. As with conventional form, so also with the form peculiar to particular responses, there are moments at which it may be modified or even violated in the interests of achieving a creation of still greater significance.

This form or order which is a feature of all personal responses provides a kind of basic minimum worth to all responses, just as the order of nature, the lowest of the basic values, is present also in all instances of the higher values. This order is an essential part of what is alluded to when one speaks of the beauty of any personal expression. Just how much more is sometimes also indicated by that ambiguous word "beauty" I shall not at present discuss.

Whatever we may say about the limits within which creative activity takes place, none of this discussion succeeds in catching the distinctive feature in a creative action; which is, that it is free, as we recognised from the start of our discussion. But what does freedom mean? We have illustrated it from examples. We have indicated some of its limitations. But this hardly tells us its essential nature.
We may try to indicate its essential nature by the use of near synonyms such as "imagination" and "fancy". There is a legitimate use of these words other than their etymological use, for we sometimes speak of an imaginative or fanciful way of doing things in the sensible, concrete world; and it is to such ways of doing things that I refer by the use of the words "imagination" and "fancy". I do not see any evidence for the theory, (suggested partly by a stubborn adherence to the etymology of the words), that all imaginative activity takes place first of all in the mind, and that it may thereafter be copied in to a concrete medium. On the other hand I do not deny that this sometimes happens. It is, however, important to point out that such mental imagining presupposes a sensible medium for its embodiment. Thus there cannot be imaginative mental activity that does not make use of the mental images of either colours, shapes, sounds, words, physical movements or some other sensible medium of expression. And if there always is a reference to some sensible medium of expression, there would seem to be no reason for assuming that such imaginative activity could not have been expressed directly in that sensible medium in the first instance.

For these reasons I cannot agree that a study of the mental activity of the imagination or any other kind of mental activity will help us in understanding the essential nature of creativity. Yet undoubtedly mental imagining offers a particularly vivid
example of creativity. This is because the limitations which are imposed by all sensible media on creativity can well be ignored in the case of mental creativity. But it is possible that this feature of mental creativity might well render it an untrustworthy example of creativity for the purposes of investigating the essential nature of creativity or freedom in general.

This discussion, I regret, has consisted largely of obiter dicta which only touch the fringe of one of the most central problems in philosophy. There are many aspects of the subject which I must pass over altogether. I would doubt, however, whether any account of the essential nature of creativity or freedom is possible which will provide the kind of precise analysis which will satisfy all intellectual demands. Fortunately this does not prevent us from having the kind of knowledge of this activity which is given in immediate experience.

It remains to ask what we have learned that is particularly relevant to this work. Our findings are of two kinds. We have marked off several features that belong to creative responses, features of more or less definable characteristics, whose contribution to the worth of a creative response is consequently in principle more or less assessable. Yet there remains a central element in any creative response that somehow eludes our grasp, an unanalysable surd which because it is unanalysable is consequently unmeasurable.
C. Classification in Terms of the Medium of Expression

Any response which is to be expressed requires a medium for its expression. There is no limit to the number of possible media that may be used. The discovery of a new medium is itself a type of creative response. A response which uses standard media may be considered to be mimetic in this respect; and so even a creative response which uses a standard medium may be looked on as having this mimetic element in it.

It is only creative and mimetic responses which are expressed in media. A taboo response is not expressed, but is a response which consists in refraining from doing damage, etc. It does not therefore require a medium. Taboo responses, however, often occur as features in creative and mimetic responses, in which case they may seem to be related to the particular media of these responses.

Media of expression may be inorganic, living or personal. The commonest examples of inorganic media are canvas and paint, musical sound, and words which may be either spoken or written. Expressions in a living or personal medium always seem to involve the use of an inorganic medium as well. Thus in addressing someone there is expression in the medium of words and also in the medium of another person. In the case of such a double medium the one of these media may be more important than the other. Thus a man may be more interested in his own eloquent utterances
than in the effect they are having on his hearers; in which case the words are the true medium and his hearers a purely incidental secondary medium. On the other hand he may be primarily concerned to bring about a change of mind in his hearers; in which case the hearers are the true medium and the words are an instrumental medium in relation to what he is seeking to create in the minds of his hearers.

It is important both to distinguish and to relate the source of intuition and the medium of expression of a response. The terms "aesthesis", "affection", "respect" and "worship" denote the type of object whose intuition gives rise to a response; and tell us nothing about the medium within which that response may be expressed. Thus, for example, within "worship" I include not only the silent communion of the soul with the divine, but also the singing of hymns, the writing of hymns, the building of cathedrals, works of social reform which have a religious inspiration such as Wilberforce's campaign for the abolition of the slave trade, and missionary enterprises like Livingstone's treks across Africa. What makes an activity one of "worship", on this definition, is not the medium of its expression but the source of its inspiration. Of course the saints have known this for long. The ancient saying, "laborare est orare", is proof enough of that.

We are perhaps less used to thinking of "respect" being expressed in such a variety of media, that it should include not
only acts of generosity to persons, but also the writing of lyrics, songs and biographies. It can even be expressed in a divine medium when one gives thanks to God for one's friends. But, of course, the most normal medium of expression for "respect" is the personal medium, as for example when one shakes a friend warmly by the hand, raises one's hat to someone in the street, offers words of congratulation, or performs acts of generosity.

Similar remarks might be made about "affection" for living things and "aesthesis" of the beauty or order of nature, concerning the variety of media in which any of these may be expressed. Appreciation of the beauty or order of nature can be expressed not only with paint on canvas, in sonnets and in sound waves, but it can also set one praising God and in Wordsworth's estimation, as we have already seen, was responsible for "His little nameless, unremembered acts Of kindness and of love."

In the case of Wordsworth's "good man" there would seem to be present also an awareness of the worth of the medium, that is, an attitude of respect towards those persons to whom he performs these "acts of kindness and of love". On the other hand there is a kind of activity within the medium of other persons in which one uses those other persons merely as a medium. Such for example is the activity of a Machiavellian who, however great may be the vision he is expressing, is indifferent to the value of the personal medium within which he works.
We might try to find terms to indicate very broadly the main types of media within which responses may be expressed. Those expressed in an inorganic medium may be said to have a "materiamedium". I use the word to indicate more than a medium of matter in its primary sense; but to include any non-organic stuff of which anything is composed, as, for example, the words which are used in making a poem, the sounds manipulated to provide music, the movements which constitute a dance, etc. Responses expressed in living medium may be said to have a "vitamedium"; and those within the medium of persons, to have a "homomedium".

One of the reasons for inventing these terms, "materiamedium", "vitamedium" and "homomedium" is to provide terms which are sufficiently neutral as to whether or not any cognisance has been taken in making any particular response regarding what the intrinsic worth of its medium of expression may be.

Responses either may or may not take account of the worth of the medium within which they are expressed. Thus what is commonly called "art" is a response expressed within a materiamedium which takes cognisance of the worth of that medium and exploits it with care and sensitivity. Similarly what is commonly called "virtue" is a response expressed within a homomedium which takes cognisance of the worth of the persons involved and treats them with respect appropriate to their various natures.
On the other hand responses are frequently made within each of the possible media which entirely ignore the worth of the medium they exploit. This can happen in the use of any medium. It is most clearly illustrated in those responses which employ a double medium, and where the primary medium is duly respected and the secondary medium shamelessly exploited. Consider, for example, the case of human speech with its double medium of words and gestures on the one hand and the minds of the hearers on the other. There are two extremes of speech. There is the speech which delights in the manipulation of sentences, the building up of arguments and in the perfect control of voice and gesture; and the hearers are a merely conventional yet somehow necessary, even if entirely secondary, medium, whose significance as persons is liable to be shamelessly ignored and in consequence to be exploited and violated.

Then there is another type of speech which is sensitive to the significance of its audience as persons and takes cognisance of their probable hopes and fears, achievements and frustrations, etc. Even if it may "murder" the language it employs, ignore the logic of sound argument, and perhaps rasp on the ears, yet it none the less treats its audience with the respect which is appropriate to them. Between these extremes there is a considerable range of graduations and possible combinations.

It is important to enquire into what is happening when one
takes account of the worth of any medium. The answer is, I think, implicit in the correct formulation of the question. The medium in such cases surely becomes more than a mere medium. It in fact becomes a further intuited object of a certain worth which is responded to in one or other of the various ways in which intuitions of worth may be responded to, namely, taboo, mimetic or creative, or a combination of these.

This then suggests the further question, in what way precisely does a medium whose worth is being thus responded to differ from the object the intuition of whose worth is the primary motive of the response? There seems to me to be no difference in principle. However, there may well be a difference in the attention directed to these different valuable objects. Such a difference in the forms of attention may be indicated by speaking of a primary object of intuition and a secondary object of intuition.

Is it possible then that a medium of expression should ever be at the same moment the primary object of intuition or even perhaps the only object of intuition, motivating a response? Yes, surely. In fact varieties of personal activity of this kind are exceedingly common. Examples of such personal activities are what are sometimes referred to as "art for art's sake", and "virtue for virtue's sake", in at least one of the legitimate meanings of each of these phrases. (The case of "duty for duty's
sake" is a rather special case which we shall look at later.)

It follows from this discussion that in the evaluation of personal responses account must be taken not only of the value of the primary object of intuition, but also of the secondary object of intuition; and it is also of relevance whether the response to the secondary object of intuition is of a taboo, mimetic or creative variety.

These reflections should cause us to re-examine the account just offered of the different types of speech. A more detailed analysis is required because there are three valuable objects of intuition to be taken account of and consequently three different possible ways that speech may be defective. There is the value of the message, the ostensibly primary object of intuition, the value of the materiamedium (language, logic, voice, etc.), and the value of the homomedium (the audience). Speech may consequently be defective because of an imperfect intuition of the significance and/or nature of the message, an imperfect intuition of the worth and/or nature of the materiamedium, or an imperfect intuition of the worth and/or nature of the homomedium. On each score there is, of course, a range of graduations from success to failure; and between these three scores a vast variety of permutations and combinations of the success-failure of speech is possible. An analysis such as this might be used as a kind of map for
plotting the success-failure of any particular speech; and it might be the basis for evaluating any particular performance of a political agitator, a gospel preacher, an actor, or an ordinary conversationalist.

How then does the medium of expression determine the value of any particular response? The medium as such, in an important sense, contributes nothing at all. It is only in so far as its worth is intuited and subsequently responded to that it can contribute any worth to a response. A valuable medium whose worth is ignored and consequently probably violated contributes nothing to the intrinsic value of a response. Neither, however, it should be noted, does such a violation of the worth of a medium detract from the intrinsic value of a response, although it does, as we shall see later, give both an instrumental and an apparent disvalue to that response.

A medium of expression whose value is intuited and subsequently responded to, however, does contribute to the intrinsic value of the response in accordance with the subsidiary principles of the derivation of value already discussed. That is, a more intrinsically valuable medium whose value is intuited contributes more than a less valuable medium. Also the nature of the response to the valuable medium, taboo, mimetic, or creative, in so far as the value of these types of response is determinable, further determines the value of the whole response within which any subsidiary response is incorporated.
All personal intuitions of objects of significance take place and all personal responses are expressed within a particular society having a particular culture and belonging to a particular moment in history with its own historical background. Society, culture and history set limitations and possibilities both in respect of what objects of significance can be intuited and in respect to how responses to them may be expressed.

A distinction requires to be made between the immediate social, cultural and historical setting to any intuition-response and its general or wider social, cultural and historical background. However, there is no rigid dividing line between the immediate setting and the more general background.

Firstly let us consider the various limitations set by the immediate social, cultural setting, illustrating this by a more detailed look at the speech of a political agitator, a Gospel preacher, an actor and a private conversationalist. Basically the same principles of evaluation can be used in each of these four very different kinds of speech. Yet cognisance should be taken of what is and what is not possible in each of such types of speech, and indeed also of the more severe limitations in many individual instances that one may seek to evaluate.

Each of these four types of speech has to take account of the different "homomedium" within which it works, a difference,
in particular, of interest and expectation which is apparent in each case.

There are also limitations set by the social group from within which one speaks as well as by the homomedium to which one speaks. These may be identical, or quite different, or may be partly identical, partly different. The other members of the cast are most clearly distinguishable from the audience. This distinction hardly exists in the case of a private conversation. It may or may not exist in the case of the political agitator or Gospel preacher, according to whether he is speaking to the converted or to the outsider.

Limitations set by the group from within which one speaks include the nature and significance of the intuited object; as, for example, the aims and ideals of the political party or splinter group; the doctrine of the Church or sect; the nature of the theatre company, whether repertory, amateur, etc., and the play actually being put on, what has already been said in any particular conversation and what is taken to be the attitudes of other persons present. The actor is most severely limited in this matter and the conversationalist least of all. The actor is responding primarily to a particular play and his response is largely but not entirely a mimetic one. The political agitator and Gospel preacher also have considerable mimetic elements in their responses; but their freedom in interpretation has wider limits than the actor but not as wide as the conversationalist. It does not follow, of course, that because his response is largely mimetic that the
actor's speech is less valuable than that of these others provided that he is playing a leading role in a good play.

The group from within which one speaks also sets limits to the form of expression that responses may take. Instructions of director and producer, discipline of Party and Church, explicit and implicit, etiquette of any conversational group, all these set limitations to the form of expression that any speech may take. These limitations, in all cases, may be either clearly or vaguely understood and even when understood may be either observed or violated. The violation of such forms may not necessarily destroy the worth of the response in any particular instance; it may even sometimes increase its worth. It may, however, involve the wider risk of reducing or destroying the opportunity for the speaker involved to have significant intuitions and responses of that particular type by endangering or severing his connection with the group from within which he has been speaking. Such severance of association with a particular group may be an event of either instrumental value or instrumental disvalue according to whether it provides the occasion for more significant intuition-responses, perhaps within another group, or reduces the occasion of significant intuition-responses altogether.

About the more general background social, cultural and historical, which sets limits to the nature of the homomedium of any response, to the nature of the intuited object, and to
the form of expression, it is hardly necessary to speak. We are all aware of the limits set by language, nationality, education, economics, climate, history and other kinds of general facts of man's life. Perhaps, however, we are insufficiently aware of the endless variety of modifications and of combinations of these factors/setting endlessly varied possibilities to what can and what cannot be said. It is clear that the dividing line between the general background and the immediate setting of any particular intuition-response here becomes impossible to define.

The relevance of all these matters to our general enquiry is this, that the assessment of the worth of the intuition-response of any particular person on a particular occasion is not a matter that can be considered apart from the particular social group in which it takes place, and this in turn is not separable from the wider social, cultural and historical background of the group.
The Nature and Value of Feelings and Emotions

It should be clear from references made throughout this work that I assign to feelings and emotions a less important role in animal and personal life than do some thinkers. In my criticism of such writers as R.G. Collingwood I have contended that it is not emotions but rather intuitions that give rise to responses. Also, in the primary place I have given to "the activity of adaptation" in the case of animal behaviour and to "responses", it should be clear that I have left little or no place for the view that pleasure or happiness or any other feeling or emotion is (or ought to be) the aim of either animal or personal activity.

Yet this difference from some other thinkers on the subject is perhaps less than may at first sight appear. It is only partly a difference of opinion about the psychological facts of the case. It is also a difference about what seems to be the wiser choice of words in describing the matter. In common speech we often talk, for example, of "enjoying" beauty or friendship, and sometimes we use even stronger expressions, such as being "thrilled by" or "passionately attached to" one thing or another. The question to be examined is whether the experience to which such phrases refer are more accurately described as "emotions with cognitive elements" or, on the other hand, as "cognitions with emotional concomitants", (or "volitions
"with emotional concomitants" as the case may be). The language of the man in the street frequently suggests the former; but there is no excuse for the psychologist or philosopher assuming that the speech of unreflective men is an accurate indication of the truth of the matter. Examination of the subject suggests rather that cognitions and volitions have priority over emotions in man's life and that emotions accompany one or the other of these primary experiences.

Let me recapitulate the position I have already tried to establish on this matter. The essential elements in the "experience" of living things are a sensitivity to their environment, (in the case of the higher animals this sensitivity has considerably greater precision and is called "perception"), and the activity of adaptation to their environment. The essential elements in the experience of persons are the intuition of the intrinsic value of things and their manifestations and the making of responses to these intrinsically valuable things and their manifestations.

However, we know quite well that the sensitivities (or perceptions) and activities of animals are accompanied by feelings: and I propose to restrict the word "feeling" to refer to any concomitant inner experience that is non-cognitive and non-volitional and that is associated with an animal sensitivity or activity. Also we know that the intuitions and responses of persons are accompanied by emotions: and I likewise propose to restrict the word "emotion" to refer to any concomitant
inner experience that is non-cognitive and non-volitional and that is associated with a personal intuition or response. My usage of the words "feeling" and "emotion" is thus more restricted than that of ordinary speech; but it does not seem to me to be grossly at variance with ordinary speech; nor should it be difficult for anyone who attends to the matter to recognise those concomitant features of the perceptions and activities of animals and the intuitions and responses of persons to which these words refer. Since we human beings are both animals and persons we should be able to recognise many types of feeling and emotion within our own experience. Let us look at some of these.

Feelings and emotions each seem to fall into four main groups, namely, 1. those which precede perceptions or intuitions; 2. those which follow perceptions or intuitions; 3. those which precede animal reactions or personal responses; 4. those which follow reactions or responses. Thus we have four main types of feeling and four main types of emotion. It is not altogether easy to indicate each group with words whose common usage is sufficiently akin to the reference we wish to make. However, it is not unreasonable to call the feeling preceding animal reaction "desire"; and the feeling that follows a successful adaptation "pleasure". Let us further call the emotion which precedes a personal response "impulse"; and the emotion which follows a personal response "satisfaction". I leave for the present the task of finding suitable names for the feelings and emotions that accompany perceptions and intuitions, for on the
whole they seem to be of rather lesser importance.

In the case of personal emotions we have many subdivisions corresponding to the different types of object whose intuition gives rise to a response, namely aethesia, affection, respect and worship; and corresponding also to the different types of response, namely taboo, mimetic and creative. Rather than search for twenty-four suitable names to indicate these twenty-four types of emotion associated with personal responses (apart from those associated with personal intuitions) I propose simply to speak, for example, of "the impulse to creative aethesia" or "the satisfaction of taboo worship" and so on.

It should be noted that the feelings or emotions which precede an animal adaptation or personal response are more clearly separable from the act of adaptation or response than are those feelings or emotions which follow those activities. That is, desire and impulse appear to have some degree of independence from the acts of adaptation or of response to which they normally lead. This is clear from the obvious fact that desires and impulses are not always fulfilled in an appropriate act of adaptation or of response. Perhaps then we ought to allow desire and impulse a rather special status and not simply describe them as "a concomitant feeling" and "a concomitant emotion" respectively.

It is important to remind ourselves just what our purpose is in raising questions of this kind. This is not a work on psychology but on axiology. Yet undoubtedly the direction in
which the discussion has led us has shown that the answers to many questions on axiology presuppose answers to questions of a psychological kind. If my treatment of psychological issues has appeared dogmatic, as indeed it is, I can only point out the existence of a dilemma which must to a greater or lesser degree beset every philosophical work of a synthetic and speculative nature. One cannot obviously discuss all subjects at the same moment. Therefore unless one is to remain for ever silent on speculative matters which touch on many fields of enquiry, or unless one's work is to be inordinately long, one must be permitted to make some dogmatic statements, the grounds of which one has not as yet adequately established. This is surely permissable provided one is explicit about the assumptions one makes, and provided also one gives some sort of prima facie indication of their reasonableness.

In saying that my purpose is, ultimately, an axiological one I mean that my reasons for being concerned to discuss the status of feelings and emotions in relation to cognitions and volitions is to discover what is the source of the value of these feelings and emotions. If I am correct in holding that feelings and emotions have the kind of "concomitant" status that I have described, then it follows that the value that they have is essentially related to the value of the cognition or of the volition that they accompany. To illustrate this point I can, I think, distinguish between the intuition of a beautiful scene and the enjoyment which is normally but perhaps not universally
associated with such an intuition of beauty. I can also distinguish between a **creative response** to beauty and the satisfaction normally but perhaps not universally associated with such a response. I have already suggested reasons for considering creative responses more valuable than intuitions of the same valuable object. It seems to me to follow from this that the satisfaction associated with such a creative response is therefore more valuable than the enjoyment associated with intuition which gave rise to that response. We could, if we had the patience and the inclination, set out a complete list of the comparative value of the enjoyments and the satisfactions associated with the varied types of intuitions and responses so far as we have been able to compare these with each other.

I might further illustrate this point by reference to animal perceptions and activities and personal intuitions and responses. We have already seen reasons for considering that derived personal values are more valuable than derived life values. Given, therefore, the concomitant status of emotions and feelings in relation to personal intuitions and responses, and to animal perceptions and adaptations respectively, it follows that emotions are more valuable than feelings; and to illustrate this point more precisely, impulses are more valuable than desires and satisfactions are more valuable than pleasures.
CHAPTER IX

EXTERNALLY DERIVED VALUES AND DISVALUES
EXTERNALLY DERIVED VALUES AND DISVALUES

63 Definition of Externally Derived Values

Any event or anything which occasions an event or is capable of occasioning an event which brings into existence, or maintains in existence, or which helps bring into existence or maintain in existence a basic value or an internally derived value, or which helps develop those characteristics upon which the value of a basic value or an internally derived value is grounded, is also considered valuable, but not intrinsically so. I shall refer to this group of values as "externally derived values" or "instrumental values".
64. **Contrast of Internal and External Derivation**

The contrast between internally derived and externally derived values is to be noticed. The former have a homogeneous nature with the basic values from which they are derived. The latter have none. External values are related only in time and space and causality to the basic or internal values from which they are derived; but their nature has no kind of likeness to the nature of the values to which they owe their worth. The purely causal nature of their relationship to the values from which they derive gives reason to question whether we ought to speak of them as "values" at all. A strong case could, in my opinion, be made out for refusing them that title altogether. Such a refusal would surely eventually lead to greater clarity in our thinking and speaking. However, this would be so opposed to common usage as to cause confusion that I shall be content with calling them "external values" or "instrumental values" and with stressing the honorific nature of the word "value" when applied to members of this group.

The difference between an internal and an external value can be further indicated by pointing out that an internal value although derived from a basic value is none the less intrinsically valuable. That is, although its existence depends upon the existence of the basic value from which it comes and its value
derives from the same basic value, yet the value which it has thus come to possess is now its own. It is only in its genesis that its value is derived: in its continuance its value is intrinsic. Take for instance a work of art such as a painting. Its existence and its value are derived from the creative response of the artist to whatever valuable object or objects inspired him. Yet having been created it then continues to possess this worth without reference to the artist who painted it. That is, its value is derived but intrinsic.

Instrumental values, however, are derived and extrinsic. An Irish stew which I am about to have for dinner is valuable because it will help maintain my existence as a living being and as a person. The money in my pocket is valuable because it will buy food for physical sustenance and books for mental enlightenment and pleasure. Neither of these things have a value in themselves. Let us not be side-tracked by consideration of the fact that the existence of the culinary art and of numismatic study point to the presence of an intrinsic worth, of an aesthetic type, in a well served meal and in coins ancient and modern. This I do not deny; but it is not because of their intrinsic worth that Irish stews and pound notes interest most of us, but because of what they can accomplish. There is perhaps nothing that does not have some intrinsic value however meagre, but in the cases we are now considering it is their instrumental value in relation to the maintenance or achievement of intrinsic values that presently concerns us.
All economic values, clearly, are instrumental values. The simplest examples of these are cockle shells, coins, notes or whatever else a society uses for its money. Of course, great works of art, many living creatures and human beings also have their economic price in addition to their intrinsic value. This draws further attention to the fact that the same thing may very well have both an intrinsic and an instrumental value.

Artists have to live and the sale of their pictures is the obvious means by which they keep alive and continue to work. All of us have to live and the salary which we contract to receive from our employers is the means of doing this. The fact that great pictures have their price, that is, their potential instrumental value in relation to the maintenance of the artist's life, and the fact that most of us have a salary status, that is, an instrumental value in relation to whatever our trade or profession seeks to produce, clearly do not alter in the very least (although they may unfortunately sometimes obscure it) the more significant fact that great pictures have an intrinsic internally derived value and human beings have the intrinsic basic value of persons.
External or instrumental values seem to arise only in relation to the basic value of living things, of persons, and of the internally derived life and personal values. So far as we know there are no events that either cause or make possible or increase the existence or value of the basic value of the Holy God and of the order of nature. However, we know that certain events in animal family life bring about the existence of more living creatures, and events in human family life bring about the existence of more persons.

Also, there are many things that make possible the development of life and personality, the former by the provision of food and shelter, the latter by the provision of schools, libraries, churches, laboratories, theatres, art galleries and all the complex paraphernalia of the arts, science and religion, that make up our culture. All these things are derived instrumental values in relation both to the basic value of the personalities and to the various expressions of the personalities of those who benefit from them. The fact that these things are provided by the combined labours of teachers, writers, artists, scientists, statesmen, craftsmen, etc. is quite irrelevant to their instrumental worth. If schools, theatres, etc. were unaccountably produced by a tornado, thunderbolt or some other natural cataclysm their instrumental value would be no whit altered and the natural cataclysm itself
would have precisely the same instrumental value as that of the sum of the actions of teachers, writers, craftsmen, etc. who normally provide these things. The fact that schools, libraries etc. and the things they contain are normally instances of internally derived values and the fact that the provision of these things for the education and enjoyment of the young and of the rest of us are also instances of internally derived values, these facts do not at all affect their worth as instrumental values in relation to the education and enjoyment which they produce. In short, although some things and actions may possess both intrinsic internally derived value or even basic value, and also instrumental value, we must not confuse these quite distinct value features which such things happen to possess at the same time. Both these value features derive from one or other of the few kinds of basically valuable kinds of things or beings; the internally derived value deriving from the person whose creative or mimetic response it is, and the instrumental value deriving from the child or other person or persons whose education or enjoyment it has made possible.
Utilitarians and Intuitionists.

I have taken some pains to stress the fact that many things possess these two quite distinct value features, because too often this has been overlooked. There has been an understandable reluctance to appreciate the necessity that two quite distinct value statements sometimes require to be made regarding the same thing or event. This, I believe, was one of the root causes of the Nineteenth Century conflict between Utilitarians and Intuitionists.

The Utilitarians saw clearly that actions that produced good consequences merited approval. The Intuitionists saw equally clearly that actions which expressed an appreciation of various kinds of value merited approval. Both were agreed in the desirability of a unified system of ethics; but neither could see how this could be done while allowing two quite different types of value statement to be made about the same thing or action. This, I believe, I have now done by showing that two quite different types of value feature can belong to one thing or action; and that these different value features are none the less derived from the same kinds of basic values, and thus a unified system of ethics is maintained.
Definition of Externally Derived Disvalues

Any event or anything which occasions an event, or is capable of occasioning an event which destroys or helps destroy a basic value or an internally derived value, or which prevents or helps prevent a basic value or an internally derived value coming into existence, or which prevents or helps prevent the development of those characteristics on which the value of a basic value or an internally derived value is grounded, is usually considered bad, but not intrinsically so. It is better to consider such events, and things, as disvalues; and I shall therefore refer to them as "externally derived disvalues" or "instrumental disvalues".

Most of what I have written about the derivation of external or instrumental values is paralleled in the case of the derivation of external or instrumental disvalues and need not be repeated in any detail here. The instrumental disvalue of any event or any thing is derived entirely from the consequences in the destruction of intrinsic value or in the prevention of its existence. Its disvalue has nothing whatever to do with motive. Whether one is killed by an earthquake or a rival suitor the destruction of value is the same and the instrumental disvalue of the event consequently the same. The action of such a rival may indicate that he has not respected one's personality, and several comments might be made about this under another heading, but his motives do not make his action instrumentally either better or worse.
It is proper to raise a question about the distinction between "disvalue" and "evil". I take it that the word "evil" when carefully used is intended to refer to an intrinsic quality of badness which stands opposed to the intrinsic quality of goodness. Whether there are any such intrinsic qualities of badness is a question which I wish only to raise but do not propose to discuss in this work. It is, however, relevant to raise it in order to consider how much of what is normally referred to by the generic word "bad" is not covered either by the notion of "instrumental disvalue" or by the further notion which I shall shortly discuss of "apparent disvalue". When that has been discussed I invite any reader to ask himself the question "What if anything remains to be accounted for of what we normally call 'bad' or 'evil' that is not covered either by the notion of 'instrumental disvalue' or by that of 'apparent disvalue'?"
CHAPTER X

APPARENT DISVALUES AND APPARENT ADDITIONAL VALUES
Definition of Apparent Disvalues

When two basic values or internally derived values stand in such a relationship to each other that it is possible to compare them in respect of their value quality, then the one of less value may seem to be actually disvaluable when viewed in this contrasting relationship. We may say that it has acquired an "apparent disvalue".

Holiness and Sin

I shall illustrate this in a number of ways. Firstly consider the contrast between the Holy and the personal. In a chapter that we have already discussed, "The Holy as a 1 Category of Value", Rudolph Otto points out that in the moment of awareness of holiness there is also present a consciousness of the disvalue of all else. Isaiah's experience of holiness in the temple is immediately followed by a judgement of disvalue not only upon himself but also upon the people to whom he belongs. "I am a man of unclean lips and dwell in the midst of a people of unclean lips; for mine eyes have seen the King, the Lord of Hosts". Similarly Simon Peter's response to the holiness of Jesus is, "Depart from me for I am a sinful man, O Lord". I am not sure, here as elsewhere, that I follow all the suggestions that Otto makes; but the main points are clear, and I think
acceptable. The awareness and consequent judgement of disvalue on persons and all else is a typical concomitant of the first dawning of awareness of holiness.

This awareness and judgement of disvalue is not essentially that of moral depreciation, nor does it presuppose any transgression of any moral law, or any other moral defect. This is made clear by the fact that even the most moral way of life may take on this same appearance of disvalue when seen in the context of holiness: witness Isaiah's statement that even "all our righteousnesses are as filthy rags". However, where such moral transgression or defect is present it will most probably be included in the awareness and judgement of disvalue that some religious persons experience. The technical name for this disvalue in religious and theological language is "profanity"; and this is one important element in the more complex notion of "sin". In all this I am in agreement with Otto.

Otto errs, however, in overstressing the utter uniqueness of this disvalue. In one sense it is unique because holiness is a unique and supremely great value. Whatever, therefore, is contrasted with it takes on an apparent disvalue of a unique kind as a result of being seen in this contrasting relationship. What ought to be more clearly said, however, is that when awareness of disvalue arises as a result of such a contrasting relationship this disvalue should surely be described as "apparent" rather than "real". Also it is important to notice that this particular contrast is not the only one that gives rise to apparent disvalue. I turn now to another example of this.
72. **Virtue and Vice**

The second case of apparent disvalue that I wish to cite occurs in the contrast between the personal and the animal. We have already seen that both persons and living creatures are basically valuable types of beings. Yet there are situations in which the personal and the animal are contrasted with each other in such a way that the merely animal assumes an apparent disvalue as a result of the contrast. This is seen especially in the lives of human beings who are, of course, both persons and animals, and to whom the possibility so far as we know is always open either to be more of a person and less completely an animal, or less of a person and more completely an animal. Any man who either by choice or circumstance gives little evidence of more distinctively personal activities and whose animal activities are hardly modified by the marks of personality elicits from most of us a reaction of abhorence and a derogatory moral judgement. The complete glutton and the complete profligate who has nothing else to commend him is usually despised. Yet the activities of eating and of sex, if my account of these is correct, are actually derived life values. How then can our reaction to them and our judgement upon them in some cases be so unfavourable? The explanation surely is that they have acquired an apparent disvalue as a result of being in a contrasting relationship with a higher value, namely derived personal value.
73. **Occasions of Contrast**

The comparison that may be made between two basic values or internally derived values are multitudinous and an exhaustive account of these is not to be expected. A reference to the discussion in chapters 7 and 8 in which I attempt to grade different values with respect to their value qualities will confirm this. Not every possible comparison of values, however, gives rise to apparent disvalue. There has got to be some occasion and reason for making the comparison.

The simple contiguity of two contrasting values may or may not provide an occasion for contrasting them and for becoming aware of the apparent disvalue of the lesser value. It is clear from the records of religious experience that awareness of the contrast between the holy and the profane is not necessarily a continuous or even frequently recurring experience. Indeed those who live most consistently in a state of perpetual awareness of the holiness of God see the world not as profane but rather as suffused with a beauty and holiness which is indeed a case of derived holiness. A reference to William James's distinction between "the once-born and the twice-born" should help to bring out the point that I have in mind. James offers quotations from the religious writings of men such as Theodore Parker, Walt Whitman and others to indicate that their sense of the presence of God was untouched by any sense of sin. These are the "once-born". It is in the case of the "twice-born" upon whom on some occasion the sense of holiness dawns with a vividness
they had never known before that the contrast of holy and profane occurs. It seems often to be the moment of this first dawning of the consciousness of holiness which provides the occasion for the apprehension of the contrast of the holiness of the supreme Being with the profanity of all mundane existence.

Another type of occasion for the apprehension of a contrast in values is that provided by the opportunity of human choice. By bringing alternative lines of action into mind an occasion of choice usually offers an opportunity of seeing such a contrast. The choice may either be that of one who is contemplating the contrast between two lines of possible action that he himself may engage in, in which case he is contrasting two imagined lines of action; or one may apprehend the choice that someone else has made or seems to be about to make in contrast to the choice that he might have made or might yet make. Or again one may contrast the different choices that two different persons have actually made. In all of such contrast of choices whether actual choices or imagined choices, apparent disvalue is likely to attach to the less valuable action.

We have still to ask for a reason for this appearance of disvalue. Let us put the question thus. Granted that when two things are found in situations that invite comparison between them the appearance of each is affected by the facts about the other, why is the appearance of those activities we have been
considering one of disvalue and not simply one of less value than they actually have? Thus a child of average intelligence in the presence of dim-witted children is likely to seem more intelligent than he actually is and in the presence of very bright children is likely to seem less intelligent than he actually is. Yet, in the latter case he does not necessarily appear dim-witted or unintelligent. On the other hand, in some such instances he may appear to be actually unintelligent. (I am, of course, excluding for the purposes of this argument the possibility that he shows off in the presence of dim-witted children and is tongue-tied in the presence of bright children.)

It may help to clarify our thinking on this matter if we introduce two new categories, (i) "apparent additional value" to describe such cases as the child of average intelligence appearing to be more intelligent than he actually is, and (ii) "apparent diminution of value" to describe such cases as the child of average intelligence appearing to be less intelligent than he actually is.

Now apparent disvalue is simply an extreme instance of the more general case of apparent diminution of value. The occurrence of apparent disvalue as distinct from a mere apparent diminution of value seems to me to depend upon the combination of several factors. The main factors are as follows.
(a) The **degree of the contrast**. Thus one who pursues
the pleasures of the flesh only slightly disproportionately
to the activities of the mind and only slightly more than his
colleagues and companions will probably acquire an **apparent
diminution of value**; but someone else in whom the disproportion
of animal over personal activities is much greater and whose
way of life contrasts much more flagrantly with that of other
members of his group will acquire an **apparent disvalue**. Holiness,
however, offers such a very great contrast to the value of all
other things and is liable to produce in them such extreme
**apparent diminution of value** that they acquire **apparent disvalue**.

(b) **The point of view of the observer** and in particular
his **expectation** in relation to any matter. The mere contrast
between the ways of life of a dog and a man does not make one
judge the former as having disvalue because one does not
expect a dog to behave as a man. But a man who behaves as a
dog shocks one by the contrast with what one expects, and
produces **apparent disvalue**. Such other considerations as
cultural, social and religious background are also important
in influencing the point of view of any observer. So we might
go on, because there are a very large number of things that **may
affect an observer's point of view and expectations** and may
determine the kind of contrasts that occur to him.
It seems to me also of interest that although the occurrence of apparent disvalue as distinct from apparent diminution of value is due only to the difference in the degree of value of a thing or activity and to the rather arbitrary factor of the point of view of an observer, yet apparent disvalue claims much more attention than mere apparent diminution of value. Indeed we rarely comment upon the latter although we are continually apprehending instances of it. For this reason apparent disvalue rather than apparent diminution of value has more importance in ethical discussion.
It should not be thought that the contrasts that we make are limited to those between the Holy and the personal, and between the personal and the living. There is indeed no limit to the kind of contrast that we are capable of making and of the apparent disvalues that may consequently occur to us. I shall mention only some of the most obvious.

Pride is an example of an apparent disvalue and our apprehension of it arises as follows. The properly developed person intuitively and responsively respects both himself and other human beings. As a living creature he seeks the welfare of himself and also of his kith and kin; and as a person he has intuitive and responsive affection for himself and for others as living creatures, and also intuitive and responsive respect for himself and for others as persons. These three distinguishable strands enter into the attitude of the properly developed human being towards himself and others. There are consequently at least three distinguishable corresponding ways in which a man's attitude to himself and others may be defective and at least three apparent disvalues that may arise. Pride arises in the case of a particular defect in either of the last two of these three.
The properly developed person, then, intuitively and responsively respects both himself and others. Now someone who respects himself but does not respect others is consequently defective in this respect. Yet we cannot say that there is anything positively evil in respecting himself, for such self respect is entirely proper. It is in comparison with the person who respects both himself and others that he is seen to be defective and in consequence his attitude and possibly also his way of life takes on an apparent disvalue which largely corresponds to what we call pride. If his respect for others were as developed as his respect for himself we should not grudge him his respect for himself nor would it provoke any derogatory comment at all. from the balanced person. It is easy to distinguish this disproportionate respect for oneself compared to others, from the other form of pride which arises from a disproportionate affection for oneself as a living creature. The former is similar to what is commonly called "spiritual" or "intellectual" pride and the latter would include such types of pride as that of pride in one's appearance.

What we commonly call selfishness seems to be an apparent disvalue that arises in the case of a defect in man's behaviour as a living creature when he seeks his own welfare and ignores the welfare of others of whose welfare one would normally seek along with one's own.
We must beware, however, of expecting to find precise equivalents to the words we normally use to describe human defects in the system I have described: because the words of common speech such as "pride" and "selfishness" have a range of several slightly different meanings.

Although contending that pride and selfishness when considered as intrinsic qualities can be said to have only apparent disvalue, I should also point out that there are occasions on which a proud or selfish man or a proud or selfish action may also have real instrumental disvalue.

I am prepared to accept this implication that there is no real intrinsic disvalue in pride or in selfishness. Notice, however, that the word "intrinsic" is here of vital importance. The disapprobation with which both pride and selfishness are normally viewed is due rather to their instrumental disvalue than to their apparent disvalue.
When we come to consider the case of external derivation we might expect to find both apparent external disvalues and apparent external values, since we have already found here both real external values and real external disvalues. (I use the word "real" to mean "not merely apparent"). Apparent disvalues would arise by the contrast of real instrumental values, and apparent values by the contrast of real instrumental disvalues.

For example, since an event which brings about the existence or increase of a basic value or an internally derived value has instrumental value, therefore an event which does not bring about or an occasion on which no event happens to bring about, the existence or increase of a basic or internally derived value, may in some situations acquire by contrast an apparent instrumental disvalue. It should be clear that such apparent instrumental disvalue must be relative to the point of view of some observer who expected, hoped or thought it possible that events might have turned out differently. Since expectations, hopes and what men think possible vary considerably, then it
follows that what has apparent instrumental disvalue for X may not have apparent instrumental disvalue for Y. Let us suppose that a certain millionaire dies and bequeaths all his money to his family and none to a neighbouring well-deserving orphanage, then this event would probably acquire an apparent instrumental disvalue in the thinking of some of the directors of the orphanage.

Similarly, since an event which causes the destruction or hinders the existence or increase of a basic value or of an internally derived value has instrumental disvalue, therefore an event which does not bring about, or an occasion on which no event happens to bring about, the destruction, or hinder the existence or increase of a basic value or of an internally derived value may in some circumstances acquire by contrast an apparent instrumental value. Here as in the case of apparent instrumental disvalue the acquiring of apparent value is relative to the interests, hopes and—even more in this case— to the fears of an observer. If I extinguish a cigarette before throwing it away, and so do not cause a bush fire (which I might otherwise have caused), then that event has apparent instrumental value in the thinking of all of those who care for the preservation of the bush for whatever reason.

Perhaps I should repeat here what I said already regarding real instrumental values and disvalues. Here as in that case motive has nothing whatever to do with apparent instrumental
disvalues or with apparent instrumental values. It makes no difference from the point of view we are currently considering whether the millionaire had ever heard of the orphanage in question or not, or whether I put out the cigarette intentionally or absent-mindedly. Yet these same considerations would at once become highly relevant were we evaluating these same actions as internally derived values.
We have so far considered the apparent disvalues which have arisen through the contrast of basic values or internally derived values. We have not yet come across any apparent basic values or any apparent internally derived values, nor have we seen any reason to believe that there are any of these. By "apparent basic values" and "apparent internally derived values" I mean, in the one case, things or being which appear to be basic values, and, in the other case, events such as actions which appear to be internally derived values but which in neither case are really so and which are either valueless or else intrinsically disvaluable or evil. If there were any such being or event we might suppose that it would acquire its appearance of value by contrast with some being or event intrinsically evil or more intrinsically evil than itself.

This notion of apparent value must not be confused with that of a basic value or an internally derived value which because of some situation of contrast appears to have a greater value than it actually possesses. To avoid confusion in this matter I shall refer to any instance of this latter case as having an "apparent additional value". It may be defined as follows.
or diminution of value

On an occasion on which an apparent disvalue arises or is thought of as a consequence of some such contrast as these we have been considering, the greater value may seem to acquire a still greater value as a result of a comparison with the apparent disvalue. We may say that it has acquired an "apparent additional value" as a result of this contrast.

Apparent additional values arise primarily but not solely when choice is involved, because in such a situation the thought of contrasting options most readily occurs. I have already referred to profligacy and gluttony as examples of activities which are essentially derived life values but which assume an apparent disvalue when contrasted with distinctively personal activities. I am now making the further point that personal life, in which merely animal activity is reduced to a minimum and is made subservient to personal activities, assumes in turn a further apparent value in contrast with the alternative way of life of a more purely animal type. Thus chastity and more temperance are considered virtuous as a result of the contrast with the apparent disvalues of profligacy and gluttony respectively. I do not say that the chaste and temperate ways of life have merely apparent value. So far as these are personal ways of life they have internally derived personal value; and it is
these that become overlaid with an apparent additional value. If my account is correct, then apparent additional values would not arise were not the ways of life to which they become attached of real value in the first instance. But it is the consideration of actual or possible contrasting and alternative ways of life that focuses attention on some feature of these personal ways of life and so gives them an apparent additional worth.

Let us look at some more examples. We have already seen that pride and selfishness are instances of human behaviour which are essentially of an internally derived personal value in the former case, and of an internally derived life value in the latter case and that in both cases an apparent disvalue has become attached to them because of the contrast of these ways of life, in the one case with the way of life which respects not only one's self but also other people, and in the other case with the way of life which seeks not only the welfare of one's self but also the welfare of others. I now take the further step of pointing out that the way of life in which one respects others as much as one's self assumes in turn an apparent additional value in contrast with the purely proud way of life, and this apparent additional value is partly what we mean by humility. Also the way of life in which one seeks the welfare of others as well as one's own assumes an apparent additional value in contrast with the purely selfish way of life and this apparent additional value is one of the main elements in what we commonly call unselfishness.
I might continue illustrating the nature of apparent additional values by citing many more examples; but enough I think have been given and more might be tedious. I shall leave it to the reader to work out for himself to what extent the evaluation of a man or an action as, for example, courageous, thrifty, diligent, sociable, etc. is dependent upon that man or that action having an apparent additional value. I would, however, make some general comments about this procedure.

1. There is a considerable range of ambiguity in the common usage of most of these terms. This ambiguity affects these terms both when used to indicate factual characteristics
and also when used to indicate apparent disvalues or apparent additional values. It would therefore be futile to look for any one simple analysis of these words either in terms of my system or of any other. The best we can hope for is a rough approximation to common usage.

2. Now the kind of contrasts that are observed or imagined by different persons and which give rise to these apparent additional values vary according to different interests, different points of view and different backgrounds of history and culture. Another way of putting this is to say that apparent additional values are subjective. This should not be at all surprising, because the main point I have been making about these values is that they are apparent, that is, that any objects to which they belong appear to some one to be valuable; and, of course, what appears to X to be the case need not necessarily appear to Y to be so. A consequence of the subjectivity of these apparent additional values is that they often give rise to contradictory judgements about the value of the same thing or event. X judges a certain action to be cowardly because he is comparing it with a more courageous action that he thinks might well have been performed in the circumstances. Y judges the same action to be courageous because he is comparing it with a more cowardly action that he thinks might have been performed in the situation. It is not my business at the moment to give the considerable list of possible reasons why X and Y make different contrasts. That they do give such
different judgements based on different contrasts I do not think can be denied. (I am assuming in this account that X and Y are agreed about the use of the words "courageous" and "cowardly" and that they are conversant with the same facts about the action. Their disagreement is neither linguistic nor on matters of fact, but on the evaluation of the action.)

78. The Importance of this Matter.

The importance of this matter is that a very large number of the common moral sentiments and judgements of mankind arise in the kind of way that we have been considering. Further, it is not only in the apprehension of human behaviour and ways of life, but also in the estimation of works of art, that apparent disvalues and apparent additional values arise. Such judgements as beautiful and ugly, great and trivial often belong to this category. They also occur in the judgements of states of mind such as happy and unhappy, etc. and states of society such as prosperous, unprosperous, etc. Indeed there is almost no sphere, it seems to me, in which apprehension of value and the judgements that are based on these may occur, in which we may not also have apparent additional values or apparent diminution of value and the judgements based on these.
That is, apparent additional value and apparent diminution of value are liable to occur over almost the total field of man's apprehension of value, with one exception which I shall mention shortly. I do not say, obviously, that man's apprehension of things as valuable contains only apparent additional value or apparent diminution of value. Nor do I say that we have no means of ascertaining the presence of apparent additional value or apparent diminution of value. It should be quite clear that the position I am advocating which recognises the occurrence of apparent additional value and apparent diminution of value differs substantially from a generally subjectivist position. I shall mention two points of difference.

(a) The apprehension of an apparent additional value or an apparent diminution of value cannot be wholly subjective because the occurrence of either requires, on my account, an initial contrast of real values before they can occur. Therefore anything judged to have value even if part of that value is apparent additional value must at least have some real value to begin with.

(b) Also, on the position for which I am arguing, we have a clue as to whether any particular thing taken to be of value has largely apparent additional value or is substantially really valuable. The tests for this are as follows. (i) Can we detect the presence of an occasion or a reason for making the kind of contrast which may have given rise to an apparent
additional value? (ii) If we can detect such an occasion or reason for making a contrast, then it is vital to enquire whether when the occasion or reason for making the contrast is absent the thing appears any less valuable than before. If it does then appear less valuable we can conclude that the previous greater value contained apparent additional value.

This point may be illustrated by reference to the one instance of a value which it seems never acquires apparent additional value, that is, holiness. Now if holiness acquires part of its value as a result of a contrast with things of less value, then an exclusive concentration on holiness would surely lead to a decrease in its apprehended value. But evidence that this is not the case is provided by the experience of the saints and mystics who claim that the more completely they become absorbed in the contemplation of holiness the more clearly supreme does its worth become.

This immunity from apparent additional value does not, however, apply to derived holiness. Indeed it is in this sphere that some of the most flagrant and grotesque instances of apparent additional value occur, and things whose connection with the holy Being are of a remotely derived kind are sometimes evaluated far above their intrinsic worth.

One of the consequences of this wide occurrence of apparent additional values and of the possibility of conflicting judgements based on these, is that it is possible to argue with fair
plausibility that moral judgements and value judgements generally have no objective basis whatever. But if the account of the apparent additional values which I am here offering is correct, then it is now possible to understand how the existence of such conflict in popular moral opinion, and value opinion generally, is compatible with a basis for value judgements which is ultimately objective.
References

2. Isaiah 6, 5.
4. Isaiah 64, 6.
CHAPTER XI

RE-ORIENTATION AND CONCLUSION
At the start of this work I gave as one of my aims "a re-orientation of the study of religion, morality and art", and I hoped that such a re-orientation would "give a clue to the solution of some traditional problems in theology, ethics and aesthetics". I now propose to follow up some of these clues in one of these fields, that of ethics. I shall discuss three ethical topics of fairly central importance, namely, the notion of conscience, doing one's duty, and the controversy between utilitarians and intuitionists. I hope that the discussion of these topics will not only have an inherent interest but will also serve as an example of the kind of re-orientation that I have in mind, and will at least suggest the probability of further types of re-orientation not only in ethics but also in theology and aesthetics.
I have already raised the question about the apparently rather special status of desires and impulses, and it now seems expedient to examine these rather more closely. It should be considered, for example, whether and if so to what extent these are separable from the adaptations and responses that they respectively accompany. Several points should be made.

Firstly, desires and impulses are basically, like other feelings and emotions, concomitant upon adaptations and responses. This follows from the fact that the very nature of a desire or an impulse involves of necessity a reference to the adaptation desired or to the response towards which the impulse tends. A desire must be a desire to do something, as, for example, to eat food, to find shelter, etc. Similarly an impulse must be an impulse to respond to something in some way or another. I do not say that the form of adaptation or of the response should be clearly conceived. Indeed the fact that its form is most frequently very vaguely conceived gives some support to the view that the activity of adapting or responding is of secondary importance or perhaps even of no importance at all. But this view is quite false. My point is that whether clearly or vaguely conceived a reference to some activity of adaptation or of response is essential to the very nature of a desire or an impulse.
Secondly, in contrast, a preceding desire or impulse is not necessary to the making of an adaptation or a response. A perception or an intuition provides sufficient occasion to give rise to an act of adaptation or to making a response. Indeed the normal and basic pattern is that perceptions are followed by acts of adaptation, and intuitions are followed by responses. And it seems to me that it is only when some circumstance intervenes to delay or to frustrate the adaptation or the response that desire or impulse respectively arises as a fully conscious feeling or emotion.

Thirdly, desires and even more especially impulses acquire a distinctive character according to the nature of the delaying or frustrating circumstances that have brought them into full consciousness. Such circumstances are of many sorts. There may, for example, be delay due to practical difficulties in obtaining the necessary instruments or materials to make an adaptation or a response. Frustration may occur when an external event cuts short an effort to fulfil a desire or an impulse. Or delay may be due to a number of desires and impulses queueing up and not all able to be fulfilled immediately. There may be intellectual doubt about the best means of fulfilling a desire or response. There may be doubt about the order of priority to be adopted. Frustration may be caused by the mutual incompatibility of ever carrying out two different desires, impulses or a desire and an impulse.
This last kind of frustration is especially worthy of attention. The conflict of desires, of impulses and of desire and impulse is well known in human experience. We speak of "the conflict of duty and desire", or perhaps of "the conflict of obligation and desire". We say sometimes, "I want to do one thing but I ought to do another". The view which I am now recommending is that what "duty", "obligation", "oughtness" essentially is consists of an impulse which has acquired the distinctive character which an impulse does acquire when in conflict either with a desire or with another impulse of a less valuable kind. I do not say that this is all that we mean by "duty","obligation" or "oughtness". Indeed each of these words covers a range of different meanings, and some of these meanings are fairly complex. Yet basic to all of these meanings is a reference to the distinctive character that an impulse acquires when in conflict with desire or with a less valuable impulse.

It should be obvious that this view is unorthodox in several ways. I wish therefore to indicate and to defend its unorthodox features against the more traditional account.

Firstly, I am arguing that what is commonly called "a sense of moral obligation" is basically the same sort of thing as the impulse to creative activity that an artist feels. Against this
it might be argued by a traditionalist that an artist does not have to create, but one simply has (i.e. is obligated) to be moral. In reply to this objection I would make two points. Firstly this seems to me to underestimate the urgent nature of the impulse to creative action which an artist sometimes feels. Secondly, the phrase "a sense of moral obligation" seems to me too often to be arbitrarily restricted to refer only to what I would call "an impulse to a taboo response," and usually overlooks the existence of impulses to creative responses. Such impulses to creative responses especially when experienced in a homomedium and with due account being taken of the significance of the homomedium, are surely among the most important kinds of morality, sometimes referred to as "creative morality". If I am correct in suggesting that the phrase "a sense of moral obligation" is usually thus restricted to refer to an impulse to a taboo response, then it is easy to see how it has a greater definiteness than has the impulse to a creative response with the enormous scope for the free exercise of imagination that we have seen to belong to creativity. This definiteness that belongs to taboo responses tends in the minds of unreflective men to give them a greater importance. But this, as we know from arguments already discussed, is not the case, because creative responses are more significant or valuable than taboo responses.

Secondly, the view I am advancing implies that a sense of obligation is a kind of emotion rather than a kind of cognition.
This must seem to be flagrantly opposed to Butler's notion of conscience as a "principle of reflection in men by which they approve and disapprove their own actions". And it would appear to be equally opposed to Kant's view that the categorical imperative is reason operating in the practical sphere. To avoid misunderstanding many things must be sorted out. "Conscience", "obligation", call it what you will, is not one simple "faculty" rational or otherwise. These are words that cover a considerable number of elements in man's personal experience that require to be distinguished.

I do not at all deny the importance of cognition in relation to what is normally called "moral action". Indeed it is of the very essence of my position that the intuition of intrinsically valuable things and events is what gives rise to personal responses of worth, (or moral actions), without necessarily requiring the intervention of any emotion at all. In other words, men normally act "morally" without any consciousness of "obligation". These intuitions to which I refer are, however, intuitions of already existing valuable things and events; and I do not consider that it is essential to the making of a significant personal response, (or of a "moral action") that there has to be any cognition of the form of one's behaviour before engaging in it. I do not, however, deny that there may be such a mental imagining of one's overt behaviour before engaging in it; but to insist that there must be such mental prefiguring of one's actions involves one in an infinite regress.
Mental imagining is itself a kind of activity and if there must therefore be mental imagining of one's behaviour before engaging in it, then it follows that there must also be mental imagining of one's mental imagining before one can engage in mental imagining; and so on ad infinitum. Since this would be absurd, it follows that we cannot say that there must be cognition of imagined behaviour before it takes place.

We must therefore press the question upon those advocates of the view that conscience (sense of obligation, sense of duty, call it what one will) is a kind of cognition, "Of what precisely is it that one is cognisant in the peculiar sense of moral obligation?" The answer which many would give would be that it is of moral laws, principles, or imperatives. I shall shortly go on to consider just what this answer means. However, it should be already apparent, and I hope it will become yet clearer, that the cognition of laws, principles, imperatives fails in several respects to cover all that we mean by conscience, sense of obligation or of duty. In particular two elements seem to be lacking. 1. It is difficult to see how the cognition of mere laws etc. can impel to action in the kind of way that we associate with conscience, sense of obligation, etc. 2. The activity of conforming to laws, etc. is such a small part of what is included in significant personal behaviour. It overlooks entirely what we have already referred to as "creative morality", and surely it is not only towards the conforming to laws but just as much to creative
behaviour that "conscience" impels: and yet it is difficult
to see that it necessarily involves a cognition of such
behaviour prior to this behaviour. Therefore I conclude that
the words "conscience," "sense of obligation," etc., refer not
to the cognition of laws but primarily to the emotion that
I have called "impulse" that sometimes, on certain occasions,
intervenes between the intuition of some object or objects
of worth and the creative or other types of response that
we may make to such intuitions of value.
Questions arise concerning the place of that important part of morality which is sometimes referred to as "conforming to laws", or "the morality of rights and duties", or more simply "doing one's duty", and it is necessary to give an account of this part of morality in terms of the system that I am recommending.

Generally this type of morality is to be included under what I should call "taboo aesthesis", that is, taboo responses to the intuition of order. The order in question is the order of personal behaviour and personal relationships. This statement, however, calls for some explanation. What kind of order is the order of personal behaviour and personal relationships? and how does it relate to the order of nature that we discussed earlier? The answer is, in brief, that there are several different levels within the order of nature. It is quite erroneous to think of the order of nature as comprised solely by inorganic things, and describable only in terms of physical and chemical laws. We know of at least two other levels.

Living creatures are equally part of the order of nature; and the biological laws by which the functioning of living things are described do not seem to be readily reducible to the laws of inorganic things.
Several things should be noticed about the order of living things. This is an order that comprises living things not only as individuals but also all living things collectively. That is, all the members of one species are biologically related to one another in their genesis; and indeed the whole life process from amoeba to man is similarly organically inter-related. In so far as these relations are of an orderly kind they are included under the descriptions which we call biological laws. It should be noticed that within the group of living things many levels are distinguishable; and the laws which describe the behaviour and relationships of the creatures at the higher levels are considerably more complex than those which describe the creatures at the lower levels. Also, there are other differences between one group and another which we may describe as collateral and the laws which describe them are peculiar to the members of that group. Thus the laws which describe the behaviour of female marsupials in carrying their young in a pouch are not entirely reducible to any other biological laws although they can be partly embraced under more general laws describing the procreation and nurture of offspring.

Now, above the level of living creatures are persons; and much of the behaviour and relationships of persons shows a corresponding orderliness that may be described in terms of the "laws" of persons. This order exists not only in the case of individual personal behaviour but also in the inter-relationship of persons. This collective orderliness is seen in the conventions of social groups both small and large, ranging from promises and arrangements made
between friends, rules of clubs, to the laws of the state. The fact that some groups both large and small employ sanctions against persons who infringe their laws is not essential to the nature of these laws (unless one chooses, as one may, to define the word "law" in a way which includes the use of such sanctions). What is essential is the fact that a large part of personal behaviour both individually and collectively is undoubtedly of an orderly nature. Now the awareness of this order elicits responses of both a mimetic and a taboo type which have the effect of further establishing this orderliness in personal behaviour.

The analogy which I have drawn between the laws of nature and the conventions of society and my recommendation that the latter are in fact to be included as a type of the former will doubtless be criticised on the ground that I am overlooking some fundamental differences between the laws of nature and the conventions of society. It might be said, for example, (a) that natural laws cannot be violated, but that social conventions can be and frequently are transgressed. It could be further argued, (b) that the laws of society come to us as imperatives to be obeyed, but the laws of nature are not imperatives to be obeyed, but general descriptions of matters of fact. (c) Finally it could be said that these differences arise from the fact that personal behaviour is a matter of free choice but no such freedom exists in the case of events described by natural laws. Let us look at each of these points in turn.
(a) It is said that natural laws cannot be violated but that social conventions can be and frequently are transgressed. In reply to this it is necessary to look at the nature both of a "social convention" and a "natural law" rather carefully. When this is done it seems to me that what is called "violating a social convention" can be explained in rather different and more satisfactory terms.

1) Firstly it should be noted that sometimes what is called a violation of a social convention is simply due to a superficial description of what in fact the convention is. Thus if one fails to keep an engagement with a friend because a parent has turned seriously ill and requires attention, such a case of promise breaking is incorrectly described as a violation of the social convention in our society, because the social convention is not simply to keep promises at all costs but allows for situations of crisis in which a promise may be broken without incurring any opprobrium.

II) It might, however, be pointed out that not all societies make allowance for situations in which promises may be broken, as, for example, that of Jephthah (Judges 11, 29-40) in which the conventional behaviour of the best people included a rigid adherence to promise keeping. Now such differences in the mores of one society from those in another seem to make it difficult it might be argued, to maintain that any social convention is a kind of natural law, because universality is an essential feature of any natural law.
Reply to this argument is made by pointing out an ambiguity in the use of the term "natural law" ranging from its use to describe the behaviour of all cases of a small group of phenomena to its use to describe all cases of a very wide and general range. This corresponds to a distinction that I made earlier between the basic orderliness of nature and the manifestations of that orderliness which I called "derived order". Man's apprehension of the orderliness of nature begins with an apprehension of this derived order and his first formulations of any "law of nature" are always of a naive and limited type consisting of descriptions of these manifestations of natural orderliness. From this he moves on to more subtle formulations which approximate more and more to a description of the basic orderliness of nature. Thus we might compare man's early naive formulation of the law of gravity, "All things fall to the ground unless prevented by some other force" with the more sophisticated formulation, "Two bodies attract each other by a force proportional to the multiple of the masses divided by the square of the distance". The difference between these primarily formulations is not one of accuracy but rather one of greater generality. The first formulation does not cover planetary orbits, the second one does. We might say that the latter comes nearer to a description of the basic orderliness of nature. There is a similar movement in all parts of science from the more naive and particular to the more sophisticated and general descriptions as, for example, in biology from the description
of the female kangaroo's use of her pouch to the general account of the female mammal's care of her offspring.

Moving now to the consideration of the laws of persons, the particularity of the convention that holds within one social group seems to be completely analogous to particularity of the kangaroo's use of her pouch or the particularity of things falling to the earth. Within their defined limitation we can give a description of each type of phenomena which is universal within these specified limits. Whether we choose to call these descriptions of a limited group of phenomena "laws" is a matter of secondary importance. In each case with the advance of knowledge these descriptions of a limited group of phenomena can be subsumed under more and more general descriptions. The actual accomplishment of this has gone further in physics than in biology or in the laws of persons. That one can make wider generalisations must obviously be a matter of faith in advance of its actual accomplishment. But that man should attempt and expect to be able to make wider and still wider generalisations about the behaviour of persons seems to me to be no less reasonable than his attempts and expectations in making wider generalisations about the behaviour of living things and of inorganic matter.

iii) Assuming now that a social convention has been accurately described and that one knows the extent of the group small or large within which it operates, then there may still occur events which are described as "violations" of this convention. One or other of two possible accounts of these violations must apply.
The first account is that there has been a defect in appreciation and/or response to some orderly feature of social behaviour and such a defect is a failure to be fully personal in some particular respect. Now such a personal defect has its analogue in the sphere of biology. When a vital function becomes defective or fails altogether, as, for example, when a muscle becomes stiff or atrophied or when the heart valves become sluggish or fail to beat, or when a heliotropic flower fails through some defect to turn to the sun. Such biological defects or failures would not appropriately be described as "violations" of any biological laws. Similarly when a man fails to behave as a fully personal being there is no more reason for saying that he has "violated" a personal law (or "the moral law") than there is for saying that a paralysed arm has violated a biological law because it fails to function, or for saying that a defective flower that fails to turn to the sun has "violated" a botanical law.

The other account which may apply in some cases in which a social convention is said to be "violated" is that it has been counter-balanced in the interest of a more significant personal response. Take, again, for example, a society such as that of Jephthah, rigidly adhering to promises, but (as Jephthah's sacrifice of his daughter in fulfilment of a vow indicates) insensitive to the worth of persons. Now suppose that someone in such a society realises for the first time in his society, as Jephthah did not, that respect for the worth of another
person is more important than respect for a promise and that he acts accordingly. In such a case it is more accurate to say that aesthetic for the convention of promise keeping is counter-balanced by his respect for another person. This also has its analogue at other levels. When I deliberately raise my hand by an act of will involving the contraction of muscles, etc., it would be foolish to say that the law of gravity had been "violated". It might appropriately be said to have been "counter-balanced" in this instance. Perhaps a better analogue might be taken from the sphere of biology. Consider the case of a flower that is a member of a heliotropic species which does not turn to the sun, not because there is a defect of its function but because it is at that moment developing a new mutation which will in some way serve the best interests of the flower in its efforts of adaptation to its environment.
(b) Let us now consider the criticism "that the laws of society come to us as imperatives to be obeyed, but the laws of nature are not imperatives to be obeyed, but general descriptions of matters of fact". This criticism has already in principle been met in the "new theory of conscience" that I proposed in which I argued that what is sometimes described as an "imperative" can be more satisfactorily accounted for in terms of the "emotion" that I called an "impulse".

It is also important to have in mind the different points of view of a scientific observer and of a creature whose behaviour is under consideration. When the event in question is an instance of animal or personal behaviour the scientific description of it must omit something that is present to the creature whose behaviour it is and who experiences it from the point of view of inner experience. To illustrate, consciousness of "my station and its duties" includes at least two things for me, namely, (i) knowledge of how people in a position such as mine do in fact behave, and (ii) the emotion (or "impulse") to respond to that pattern by following it in my own case. The social scientist, however, is interested in my behaviour as one instance out of many of how people in a position such as mine do, in fact, behave.
(c) Turning finally to the point "that these differences arise from the fact that personal behaviour is a matter of free choice, but no such freedom exists in the case of the events described by natural laws", reply can be made in the following way. The relevance of this objection to my argument is to be questioned on the ground that as a matter of fact much free human behaviour is none the less of an orderly kind and is describable in terms of "laws" regarding how people in certain social groups behave. There is no evidence to suggest that a sociologist who believes in the freedom of will is at a disadvantage in giving a general description of the pattern of social behaviour compared with a sociologist who is a determinist.

It might further be suggested that interest in freedom of choice is another feature which depends upon one's point of view. The botanist is not concerned as to whether or not the flower chooses to turn to the sun; nor is the zoologist interested in whether birds choose to fly south in the autumn. Now this lack of interest on the part of the botanist and zoologist regarding whether or not flowers and animals make choices neither tends to prove, on the one hand, the absence of freedom in living things, nor does it tend to discredit, on the other hand, the scientist's description in terms of general "laws" the behaviour of living things.

Thus I conclude that so far as I can see at present there is nothing included in the notion of "doing one's duty", (in the sense in which this is equivalent to "obeying the law or
custom" either of small or large social groups), that is not covered by the notion of taboo aesthesis to the orderliness of personal behaviour within the group or mimetic aesthesis to the behaviour of certain individuals in the group.

There are other senses of "doing one's duty" which do not involve the notion of "conforming to a law". But all these other senses can be included within the general account which I have already given of the nature of "conscience".
The position reached in this work concerning the means of measuring the worth of any human action is clearly different from every type of utilitarian theory. If my position is correct then it entails not so much the wrongness of the utilitarian account as its inadequacy in describing the nature of the worth of any personal action. I should like to bring out this point more fully.

There are many varieties of utilitarianism and these can be classed in several different ways. It is usual to make a distinction between *hedonistic* utilitarianism and *ideal* utilitarianism, the former holding that it is only the pleasure that is present in the consequences of an action that counts in determining the worth of that action, the latter contending that there are things other than pleasure which are good in themselves and that it is the production of these that determines the value of any action.

Cutting across this difference among utilitarians about the kind of consequences that matter there is another issue which divides them. This is whether the morality of an action is to be judged by reference to the kind of consequence that it *actually* produces, or by reference to the kind of consequences that it is *intended* to produce.

At an earlier place I said something in assessment of that type of utilitarian theory that stresses *actual consequences.*
In the meantime I wish to consider that variety of utilitarianism which stresses intended consequences, and to do this by examining the notion of "intention" or "purpose" which is basic to this kind of theory. The gist of my argument is that this notion has only a limited relevance in describing human conduct, and is particularly inadequate in accounting for the most significant types of personal action. This is not a new criticism of utilitarianism. What is new is the provision of a framework of a more comprehensive sort which I believe enables one to estimate both the elements of truth and the serious inadequacy of utilitarianism with greater clarity than before.

It is a common criticism of utilitarianism that it fails to account for the moral value that is normally believed to belong to acts such as truth telling, promise keeping and justice. The worth that such actions have, it is felt by many people, comes not from any goodness in the consequences that they produce but from respect for antecedents to these activities. Utilitarians can and have replied to this that it is not the good consequences directly resulting from a single act of truth telling, promise keeping or of justice that is the ground of its worth, but that each single act of truth telling, of promise keeping and of justice helps indirectly to maintain a state of affairs in which the truth is told, promises are kept and justice is done, and that such a state of affairs is better than its absence. The difficulty with this kind of
reply -/grossly oversimplified admittedly - is that it does not feel to one in the moment of truth telling etc., (perhaps when there is a temptation to do otherwise), that the worth of one's action at that moment derives from those indirect consequences. It feels that the worth of making a true statement derives at least partly from that state of affairs which it truly describes. A true statement is a kind of personal response to a state of affairs, and so derives its worth, on my thesis, partly from the person whose response it is and partly from that situation to which it is a response. If it is spoken to someone then it also has a homomedium and respect for the homomedium is a further factor in determining the worth of the statement.

A radical criticism of utilitarianism was made by J.L. Stocks in an essay which gives the title to his book, The Limits of Purpose. He cites a number of types of human activity usually accounted among the highest such as artistic and religious activity, and shows that the most distinctively valuable features in any of these do not arise primarily from the consequences that they aim at. He also instances sport and argues that if it aims simply at producing an end then the sooner and more effectively that end is produced presumably the better; and yet clearly this would be a grotesque account of any sport. But even actions which have very definite ends in view are seldom evaluated solely by reference to the speed and effectiveness with which these ends are achieved. Many other
qualities about them matter, such as their gracefulness, sensitivity, etc. Such qualities may matter more, in some people's reckoning, than whether an action achieves its end or not.

Following the same line of attack on Utilitarianism is L.A. Reid's work, *Creative Morality.* To this as well as to Stock's essay my own thinking on this subject owes some of its stimulus. Reid's writing on this is much fuller and more detailed in argument and offers many provocative ideas. Both Stocks and Reid seem to me to fail, however, in not giving the kind of perspective that enables us not only to see the defects but also to appreciate the merits in utilitarianism. To put the matter another way, purpose remains an important feature in human action, even if it is not the only important feature. The philosopher should only be content with an account of human behaviour that is adequate enough to show the respective places of both purpose and expression integrated within an account of human behaviour as a whole. I believe the present work offers such an integrated account. Let me illustrate this in several ways by considering different types of human action.

1. Animal activities of adaptation have a common end or purpose in the preservation and improvement of the welfare of the living creature and the perpetuation of the species. Human beings, as living creatures, spend much action on these ends. Much human activity consists of the pursuit of one's livelihood, the provision of food
and shelter not only for oneself but for one's mate, the procreation and care of offspring; and, since human beings are creatures of some intelligence and foresight, this provision includes the efforts to achieve an insurance of these things for the future.

2. Personal action, in contrast to animal action, is not primarily concerned to achieve any particular kind of end but rather to make a response to things and situations of worth that already exist. It must be conceded that the expression of such responses may be seen as having an end in the sense that any expression is made up of parts and its accomplishment is frequently spread out over a period of time; any moment in a sequence that makes up such an expression takes its significance from the expression as a whole and the completion of the expression may properly be described as an "end" or "purpose" in relation to any of these moments. None the less it is clear that when "end" is used in this context as describing the completion of an expression it gives a more limited account of the action than that given by the notion of end as used in the preceding paragraph. To illustrate, whereas the activities of sharpening a pencil, looking up a dictionary, writing a line, crossing out some words and replacing them by others, may all have as their end or purpose the writing of a poem, if we ask, however, for the reason of the poem as a whole it is likely that we shall be told that it is written to give expression to some truth or insight or beauty that the poet has seen. That is the
concept of "end" is enclosed within the wider concept of "expression".

However, it might be said in reply to this that the poet might well have answered that the reason for the poem was to complete a book of verse which he hoped to publish shortly and that he hoped this book would produce some cash which he badly needed.

These two types of reply are not, however, in any way incompatible. Indeed it is a feature of our value judgement which I have been continually anxious to point out that the same thing or event may well possess two or more types of value quality derived by different means and appropriately eliciting different judgements.
33. Conclusion

This work must now be brought to a conclusion. At the start I gave as my three aims in order of priority, (i) a correlation of the total field of values, (ii) a re-orientation of the study of religion, morality and art, and (iii) a substantiation of objectivism. It would be presumptuous and false to claim the complete achievement of any of these aims. At the most I think that I have made some progress towards their achievement; and I should now like to review briefly what I think this progress amounts to.

(i) In offering "a correlation of the total field of values" I have tried to make clear that it is only the provision of "a framework" or "a map" that I have in fact been constructing. Here and there I have filled in some of the details. Yet very much remains to be done. There are some things that we commonly consider good or valuable regarding which I have only given a hint as to where they fit in to this scheme; and there are others that I have not even mentioned. Where, for example, are we to place scientific knowledge and the other intellectual virtues? What account is to be given of justice? Much more surely requires to be said about beauty? So I might go on. The gaps are doubtless all too obvious to require further illustration. Yet my aim has been to construct a scheme into which "all the things that we commonly call 'good' or 'valuable'" could in principle be fitted. I believe, however, that I have shown how
many of the things that we commonly consider good can be fitted into the framework that I have described. Whether or not any other particular things commonly considered good can be fitted into this scheme is a matter for further research. I believe that this system is capable of offering a place for all the things that are commonly called "good". Such a place must, of course, in every case be able to account adequately for the value quality of the thing in question and this account must have scientific simplicity. By its success in thus accommodating all things commonly considered good the merit of this system is to be judged.

(ii) Closely related to the first aim is that of providing "a re-orientation of the study of religion, morality and art". This re-orientation has been implicit throughout the work as a whole and has in several places become explicit. The gist of the re-orientation is that since none of these fields is properly autonomous but each overlaps on the others it is better to see the field of values as the whole that it really is. I have worked out the effects of this new perspective on some particular ethical topics in this present chapter. I hope that these have been sufficient to suggest further topics not only in ethics but also in aesthetics and theology that might be illuminated by this perspective. For example, the question as to whether the finished work of art has value independently of the artist's activity of creating it and of the connoisseurs' enjoyment of it comes to mind as a topic that might be enlightened by this
re-orientation. The need in the comparative study of religion to find a perspective for assessing different religions might to some extent be met in the perspective offered here. Borderline questions between art, morality and religion are likely to benefit from this re-orientation. These and many more matters I should like to discuss, or to hear others discuss, within the general perspective of this scheme. Where the scheme proves helpful it will be indirectly vindicated: where it proves inadequate it will require to be modified or expanded to take account of weaknesses so far undetected.

(iii) "A substantiation of objectivism" has been both a direct and indirect purpose of this work. In this aim I am conscious of considerable gaps in my argument. The discussion on the epistemology of value, in particular, needs much more detailed argumentation to take account of the large amount that has been written on the opposing side in recent years. In defence of this lack I wish to plead that this aim has not been the primary purpose of my work, and that to have argued the case properly would have taken up a disproportionate amount of my attention and have detracted from my main purpose.

However, since my starting point was an objectivist one I could not but give an adumbration of the arguments that inclined me in its favour. This matter is dealt with at some place in each of the first six chapters. In Chapter I, sections 6, 7, 8, 10 and 11 I have tried to refute some well-known and yet, as I believe, false arguments against objectivism. In section 12
I have given the gist of my own epistemological argument in its favour. Chapter II, section 16 contains the germ of what seems to me to be a very strong argument for the kind of objectivism which I recommend. Each of the following four chapters, III, IV, V and VI contains among other things, what I have preferred to call an "exhibition" of, rather than an argument for the value of each of the basic values in turn.

It seems to me also that this work offers some indirect support to the objectivist position by giving an explanation for the great variety of value judgements that men make. This fact has always seemed difficult to reconcile with objectivism. I have tried to show, however, in arguments put forward in Chapter VII, section 42, and in Chapter X, section 78, that this variety of value judgements is quite compatible with the objectivity of value.
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1. Vide Chapter VII, section 62.


3. J.L. Stocks, The Limits of Purpose and Other Essays, (Benn, 1932).

4. L.A. Reid, op.cit.
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