AL-‘AKKĀD’S CRITICAL THEORIES,
with Special Reference to His Relationship with the
Diwān School and to the Influence of European Writers
upon Him.

by ‘ABD AL-MUN‘IM KHIDIR AZ-ZUBAIDĪ

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## CONTENTS

<p>| CHAPTER I | Two Cultures: Light and Reflection | 1 |
| CHAPTER II | Al-<code>Akkād: His Life and Intellectual Development | 32 |   | 1. Childhood and Ambitions - 1889-1905 | 33 |   | 2. Formative Years and Cross-Currents 1905-1922 | 43 |   | 3. The Mature Years; Politics and Love Affairs - 1922-1942 | 65 |   | 4. The Years of Retirement; Solitude and Religion - 1942-1964 | 80 | | CHAPTER III | The Dīwān School | |   | 1. The Birth and Development the School | 94 |   | 2. The Diwan School and Maṭrān | 103 |   | 4. The Critical Theory of the Dīwān School | 112 |     | (a) 1907-1913 The Groundwork of al-</code>Akkād's theory | 115 |
| (b) 1913-1921 Elaboration and Evolution in Conjunction with the Diwan School | 121 |
| i Imagination and Imagery | 121 |
| ii Sentimentality and Truth | 135 |
| iii Language and Music | 137 |
| iv Unity and Complexity | 140 |
| v The Poet and His Function in Life | 143 |
| 5. Relationships between al-`Akkād's, al-Māzīnī's and Shukrī's theories | 145 |
| i Al-Māzīnī's theory | 147 |
| ii Shukrī's theory | 162 |</p>
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>CHAPTER IV</th>
<th>Al-‘Akkād’s Criticism after 1921</th>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. Al-‘Akkād’s theories of Beauty</td>
<td></td>
<td>182</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(a) The basis of al-‘Akkād’s theories</td>
<td></td>
<td>184</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(b) Beauty and Freedom</td>
<td></td>
<td>185</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(c) Beauty as Idea</td>
<td></td>
<td>186</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(d) Aesthetic Judgement and Pleasure</td>
<td></td>
<td>196</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(e) The Two Aspects of al-‘Akkād’s Theory</td>
<td></td>
<td>200</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(f) The Importance of the Form</td>
<td></td>
<td>201</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(g) Beauty and Morality - Beauty as Representation and as Truth</td>
<td></td>
<td>203</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Aesthetic Education and the Salvation of Man</td>
<td></td>
<td>205</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Organic Unity, Complexity and Personality</td>
<td></td>
<td>220</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(a) The World as a Whole</td>
<td></td>
<td>242</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(b) The Poem as an Organic Unity</td>
<td></td>
<td>242</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(c) Organic Unity and Personality</td>
<td></td>
<td>259</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(d) Major and Minor Poets - The Work of the Poet as a Whole</td>
<td></td>
<td>267</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. Imagination</td>
<td></td>
<td>274</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(a) Imagination and Knowledge</td>
<td></td>
<td>280</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(b) Imagination and Literature</td>
<td></td>
<td>280</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(c) Imagination and the Poetry of Nature</td>
<td></td>
<td>287</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(d) Fancy and Associative Imagination</td>
<td></td>
<td>296</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(e) Imagery, Suggestion and Obscurity</td>
<td></td>
<td>302</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(f) Wit and Humour</td>
<td></td>
<td>326</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>CHAPTER V</th>
<th>European Influences in al-‘Akkād’s Critical Theories</th>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. Beauty</td>
<td></td>
<td>343</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(a) Beauty and Freedom; Schopenhauer, Schiller, Kant and Coleridge</td>
<td></td>
<td>343</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(b) Truth and Beauty; Hazlitt, Carlyle and Keats</td>
<td></td>
<td>356</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
CHAPTER V (cont'd.)

2. Schiller on Aesthetic Education
   (a) Beauty and Political Freedom 369
   (b) Culture and the Completeness of the Self 372
   (c) The Beautiful as the Objective of Man's Freedom 374

3. Organic Unity, Complexity and Personality
   (a) Coleridge and Carlyle 379
   (b) The Metaphysical Aspect of Coleridge's and Carlyle's Theories, the World as a Whole 387
   (c) Coleridge on the Organic Unity of the Poem 390
   (d) Carlyle on the Organic Unity of the Poem 398
   (e) Shelley and the Organic Unity of the Poem 404
   (f) J.S. Mill and the Unity of the Poem 405
   (g) Smuts, Organic Unity and Personality 411
   (h) Coleridge, Hazlitt and Mill on Major Poetry 411

4. Imagination and Poetic Imagery 417
   (a) Hazlitt 417
   (b) Coleridge on Poetic Imagery 423
   (c) Wit and Fancy in Hazlitt, Coleridge, Wordsworth, Leigh Hunt and Ruskin 427

CONCLUSION 442

BIBLIOGRAPHY 447
CHAPTER I

TWO CULTURES: LIGHT AND REFLECTION

"Cultural change means changing the purpose of life and the capacity for experience. The tension between the will and the power to perform, where a compromise may be reached only through a gradually attained understanding of the self, is felt as conflict between a comforting yet unsatisfying legacy and goals that are deemed to be necessary and yet are disgusting and hazardous: it provokes a battle within the heart of the individual culture participant and in the heart of the community as well."


The years between the British Occupation of 1882 and the outbreak of the First World War in 1914 form a new stage in the renaissance of Modern Egypt and in its relationship with European culture, which began with Napoleon's Campaign in 1798. The political, judicial and educational systems which were organized along French lines underwent many changes and modifications that altered the features of the face of Egypt.

The changes in the educational system did not occur simultaneously but evolved through several stages of which four can be discerned; the first between 1883 and 1888, the second from 1888 to 1897, the third until 1907, and the fourth ending in 1913. New ideas, principles and ends were introduced into the system, but the educational progress was very slow. All the branches of the State Administration were crippled with financial difficulties the pressure of which was felt most heavily in the Department of Education. Even in 1904, when the financial difficulties were over, the budget of education was no more than £E,200,000, whereas the budget of the Government
was more than £E, 12,000,000. Moreover, the system of free education was abolished and pupils had to pay fees for their education. The system was re-organized to produce a class of officials and clerks who could take over the Government service.

However, the new educational system was not without virtues. In 1885 the curriculum of primary education was re-organized. The new syllabus included English, French, arithmetic, drawing and other elementary subjects. English, it is said, was very well taught and the pupils were provided with excellent English textbooks. In the secondary schools, where pupils were taught English, French, Arabic, arithmetic, a little chemistry, geography and drawing, a great deal of importance was attached to the teaching of the European languages. The aim of the re-organization was to reform the teaching-methods, reduce the wide and heavy curriculum to a few subjects, take into account physical education and the education of personality, and introduce a system of examination and certificates into the schools. Emphasis was laid on the development of the intellectual powers of students rather than on the development of their memory. The Medical School and Cairo lunatic asylum were reformed along English lines. In 1886-7 the

schools numbered 38—29 primary schools with 4000 pupils, two secondary schools at Cairo and seven higher schools: The School of Law, the School of Medicine, Dār al-ʿUlūm, The Ecole Polytechnique, Ecole des Arts et Métiers, The Training College, and the School of Military Science.¹

But in these first years, the French influence on the schools remained strong and the hold of French culture on the Egyptian mind persisted. The attempt made by Lord Cromer to introduce English as a medium of instruction in natural science, history and geography ended in failure because of the opposition of Yaʿṣūb Artīn, the Egyptian Minister of Education.² Cairo Secondary School continued to be managed along French lines; the teaching staff of the Ecole Polytechnique and the School of Law still consisted of French scholars and the educational systems of the two schools and of the Ecoles des Arts et Métiers remained French; French was taught from the first year in the primary section of at-Tajhīziyyah Training College and was the medium of instruction in the secondary section.³

The second stage began with the appointment of ʿAlī Mubārak to the Ministry of Education in 1888 and Mr. Douglas Dunlop to the post of General Secretary in the Ministry.⁴

English and less commonly French were introduced into the schools

2. Lord Cromer, Modern Egypt, London 1908; vol.ii, pp.529-30
as the medium of instruction in natural science, history and geography, and as the medium of the technical subjects in the higher schools. A training college, in which students were taught in English, was set up in order to provide the schools with teachers of English and English literature. A new school of agriculture, organized along English lines, was also established. As a result, the number of teachers of English increased remarkably. Yet in the first four years their number failed to reach that of the teachers of French. In 1892 the teachers of the two languages in the primary and secondary schools numbered 129; 80, including 24 of French nationality, taught French, and 49, including 15 Englishmen, taught English. The School of Law remained under French influence and was re-organized by M. Testoud. But the Medical School fell under English influence with the appointment of an English Vice-Principal in 1892. In the other higher schools a struggle between English and French seems to have taken place. Towards the close of this stage the number of European teachers rose to 92.

3. Alfred Milner, England in Egypt, p.375. In 1892 the number of the primary schools increased to 40; six primary schools of lower grade and thirty-four of higher grade.
In the ten years between 1897 and 1907 the English influence reached its culmination. In 1897 English became the sole medium of instruction in the primary and secondary schools; English literary works became prescribed reading for all the pupils from the fourth year onwards. In the higher schools the growth of the English influence was as follows: In 1898 the Medical School was re-organized on English lines and placed, together with the hospital, under an English director, and English became the medium of instruction; the French and other European scholars were gradually replaced by English physicians. In 1904, if not earlier, the faculty of medicine was purely English. The School of Law was placed under an English director and gradually staffed by English scholars. The Ecole Polytechnique was also anglicised. In 1899 the two training colleges were amalgamated and the French Department was closed down. As a result the number of the pupils who preferred English to French increased rapidly. The statistics of 1905 mention 8962 pupils learning English and 370 learning French. This must have been in the secondary schools because earlier than this date French had been dropped from the curriculum of the primary schools.

In 1906 Sa‘d Zaghlūl, at the time one of the moderate nationalists, was appointed to the Ministry of Education. In response to the nationalistic appeal expressed in the newspapers and the Legislative Council, Zaghlūl swung the stream of education back to its situation before 1897. Thus in 1907-8 Arabic was made the medium of instruction in the primary and secondary schools. The only subjects which continued to be taught in English were natural science, history and geography. The second step towards curbing the tide of English was taken under the Ministry of Hishmat Pasha between 1910 and 1913. During these years Arabic was made the sole medium of instruction in the primary and secondary schools. But in the higher schools English maintained its position. English and English literature became additional subjects in the other schools.

The Government schools were one of the channels through which European culture penetrated into Egypt. The other channels were the Government missions to Europe, the missionary schools, and translation.

Between 1882 and 1914 hundreds of Egyptian students completed their studies in European universities. The students who were receiving higher education in Europe in 1888 were 74; 24 of them were on government missions, and the other 50 studied at their own expense. In later years the Government missions were

2. Zaydan, Tarikh Adāb... op.cit. vol.ii, p.53.
suspended. But the well-to-do spared no effort to send their sons to European universities to complete their studies.  

In the years before 1897 Egyptian students favoured going to France rather than to England. After 1897, when English became the medium of instruction in the schools, students were diverted to Britain and there was a shift from scientific subjects to humanities. Under the Ministry of Zaghlul the policy of student-missions was re-established, and a considerable number of students were sent to England and France. In 1914 the students receiving their education in Europe amounted to 614: 373 in Britain, 139 in France, and 64 in Switzerland.

Missionary schools continued to flourish under the British Occupation. By 1887 there were 191 foreign schools with 22,764 pupils and 864 teachers. But the majority of these pupils were Copts and Christian Syrians: the Copts were attracted to the American missionary schools. In 1913 the number of the foreign schools increased to 328 and the number of their pupils to 393,732. Though the American and English missionary schools were well-established at this time, the institutions of

1. 'Izzat, Tarikh at-Ta'ilim, 'Agr Isma'Il, vol.ii, pp.696-7. See also William Fraser Rae, Egypt Today, London, 1892, p.188.
4. Zaydan, Tarikh Adab... op.cit. vol.4, p.36. In his Cultural Survey ..., Mosharrafa gives the total number of the mission-students in the period between 1883 and 1919 as 289 of which 231 students were sent to England and 57 to France. Part ii, p.54. Both Zaydan and Mosharrafa seem to have made use of official records and documents. But the number given by the latter seems to include only the Government mission-students.
the French Catholics remained the most influential. In the same year these institutions numbered 145 with the total of pupils being 22,170. The American schools were 32 with 5,303 pupils, and the English 37 with 2,636 pupils. There were also 6 German schools, 12 Austrian, 47 Italian and 42 Greek. The Italian and Greek schools were almost exclusively for the Italian and Greek communities which were the largest European communities in Egypt.¹

Public awareness of the shortcomings of Government education led to the establishment of private schools and a non-governmental university. The private schools seem to have been created to play a twofold part: to meet the educational demands of the community on the one hand, and to counter the religious influence of the missionary schools on the other. By 1914 these private schools amounted to 739 with the total number of pupils standing at 99,000.² We have only one reference to a privately run institute of higher learning, namely, Boghos Nubar's Commercial School in which students were taught in English and French.³ The non-Governmental University was set up in 1908 on a European model; prominent European scholars including orientalists were given posts as lecturers in literature, history, philosophy and sociology.⁴

The other systems which fell under English influence were the judicial and administrative systems. As early as 1883 the English took in hand the re-organization of the judicial system

1. Zaydān, Tarīkh Ādāb ..., op.cit. vol.4, p.35.
2. Izzawi, Egypt at Mid-Century, p.52.
4. Zaydān, Tarīkh Ādāb ..., op.cit. vol.4, pp.44-5.
which was based on the French model. In the five or six years between 1884 and 1889 eight Courts of First Instance, five in Lower Egypt and three in Upper Egypt, and a Court of Appeal at Cairo were created. The judges of the Court of Appeal included four Europeans, one Englishman and three Belgians. Later, in November 1889, two other Englishmen were appointed to it. But these courts were based on French models and administered a French code.¹ This seems to have been inescapable, for the French code had already taken root in Egypt, and all Egyptian lawyers were trained on French lines. However, an Englishman, Sir Benson Maxwell, was appointed to the office of Procureur-Général. After a while he was succeeded by Mr. Raymond West, an Indian judge. In an elaborate report Mr. West suggested new measures of reform which were put into practice after some time. Other measures of reform were taken under the Belgian M. Le Grelle, who held the post from 1887 to 1895 and who co-operated with the British authorities. In 1891 the office of Judicial Adviser was created and was placed under Mr. (afterwards Sir) John Scott until 1898, when he was succeeded by Sir Malcolm McIlwraith. Sir John Scott introduced a number of important and detailed reforms which changed the features of the whole judicial system.² A Committee of Surveillance was also established; it consisted of Sir John Scott, M. Le Grelle and M. Moriondo, one of the Government legal advisers; these were assisted by three

¹ Alfred Milner, England in Egypt, p.326-8, see also p.161.
Egyptian inspectors. The task of the Committee was to supervise the functioning and procedure of the eight Tribunals of First Instance. At the same time, it issued general circulars in which the judges found explanations and instructions on points of law and practice. The Code of Criminal Justice was revised, and Assize Tribunals were set up. In 1897, the office of the Procureur-GENERAL was occupied by an Englishman, Mr. Corbet.

In the administration English influence was more dominant. As early as 1883 a British official, Sir Colin Scott-Moncrief, was appointed to the post of Under-Secretary of the Public Works Department. He was succeeded in 1892 by Sir William Garstin. From 1889 onwards the office of the Financial Secretary was also held by British officials. The sub-departments of the Ministry of Finance, the Customs, the Lighthouses, and the Post Office, were also under British control. The police force was under the command of an English Inspector-General aided by a handful of British officers. When the post of Inspector-General was terminated in 1894 a British Adviser was appointed to the Ministry of the Interior. There were British representatives in the Railway Administration and the Commission of the Public Dept, which were run on international lines.¹ In 1906 the European employees in the Egyptian Administration numbered 1252.² The majority of them must have been British. In addition, there was a nucleus of British commercial houses, companies and banks which indirectly helped the spread of English as they created

² Ibid, p.299.
opportunities of employment for Egyptians who knew the language.

At this point we are able to estimate the influence which English culture exercised on Egypt. When the British Occupation took place in 1882 Egypt had already been invaded by French culture, and the whole Egyptian intelligentsia had been educated along French lines and nourished by French ideas. Almost all Egyptian schools had been organized either by French scholars and military officials, or by Egyptian graduates of French universities. The British authorities made little effort to bring the Anglophobic Egyptian intelligentsia into line with English culture and thought. Instead of establishing institutes for this purpose they "took ... the schools which already existed and turned them ... into factories of Government officials."¹

The Anglophobia of Egyptian intellectuals remained as acute at the end of the period under discussion as it had been at the commencement of the Occupation. In 1914 the following words were written by an Englishman:

"Here in Egypt we are the victors and the rulers; we run the show, politically and economically; we dominate administrative and military matters; we are the most efficient and potent influence in the country, we are obeyed, and, on the whole, I think we are respected. But we have not insinuated our way into the Egyptian heart. We are not loved; our habits, our customs, our ideals do not appeal to their sympathies. When young Egypt casts its eyes outwards it looks to France. It reads French books, it likes to speak the French language, it sees French plays, it relaxes itself in what it supposes to be the French manner; it cultivates, so far as it can, French society, masculine and feminine."²

There seem to have been diverse historical, cultural and political reasons which account for this state of affairs. The ideal of French education, classical as it was, and the all-round pattern of French culture, whose aim was to produce "l'honnête homme", appear to have been more attractive to the Egyptian intellectual than the ideal and pattern of English culture and education. The image of France, the offspring of the 1789 Revolution and the home of the Rights of Man, was also more attractive to the Egyptian than the image of England, the home of conservatism and traditions. Moreover, France succeeded in gaining the sympathy of the Egyptians by its continuous protest against the British Occupation. The French newspapers in Egypt never ceased to agitate against every undertaking on the part of the British. In his struggle for independence, Muṣṭafā Kāmil, the leader of Egyptian Nationalism, lived under the spell of this image and

1. In his Modern Egypt, Lord Cromer thinks that if French civilization is more attractive to the Egyptian than the English, it is because the Egyptian finds it more easier of imitation. He writes: "On the French side, is a damsel possessing attractive, albeit somewhat artificial charm; on the English, is a sober, elderly matron of perhaps somewhat greater moral worth, but of less pleasing outward appearance." The pattern and process of reasoning of the French mind arrests the attention of the Egyptian because of the quick wit and inclination towards generalization which characterize them. On the contrary, the pattern of the English mind, which rejects a priori reasoning and tends to inductive philosophy and limits the conclusion reached to a precise and proved point, appears dull and unattractive to him. "The Egyptian with his light intellectual ballast fails to see that fallacy often lies at the bottom of the Frenchman's reasoning, or that he prefers the rather superficial brilliance of the Frenchman to the plodding, unattractive industry of the Englishman." Modern Egypt, vol.ii, pp.237-8.
cast his eyes to France, which was to him the defender of liberty and saviour of oppressed nations. In spite of the British Occupation, France remained powerfully represented in Egypt; the town of Ismā'īliyyah was a French colony; the Bank of the Suez Canal was French, and the canal itself was run by French hands; the Mixed Courts represented a French privilege; the voice of France was heard in the Railway Administration and the Commission of Public Debt., the field of Egyptology continued to be occupied by French scholars; the most active foreign schools were those of the French Catholics. The movement of translation, which centred on the Syrian emigrés, who were well-acquainted with French, remained in favour of French thought and literature. These Syrian emigrés rendered many French novels and plays into Arabic such as Hugo's Hernani, and Les Misérables, Bernardin de Saint-Pierre's Paul et Virginie, Alexandre Dumas' Les Trois Mousquetaires, Edmond Rostand's Cyrano de Bergerac, Racine's Phèdre, Athalie, and Bérenice, Corneille's Le Cid, and Cinna, Molière's L'Avare, and Le Médecin Malgré Lui, and Voltaire's Oedipe, and Zaire. A good deal of French poetry was also rendered into Arabic, particularly in the anthology Majāli al-Ghurar. Some French sociological works were translated into Arabic by Fathī Zaghlūl. The share of English literature and thought was very meagre in comparison; a few English novels and plays, including Sir Walter Scott's Talisman and Shakespeare's Hamlet, and Romeo and Juliet, were rendered into Arabic.¹

Out of the contact with European culture there emerged four movements: the religious movement which interpreted Islam in rational terms and in the light of modern knowledge; the social reform movement which called for the education and emancipation of women; the nationalist movement which aimed at the independence of Egypt, and finally a literary movement which studied Arabic literature according to European literary values and criteria.

On his return to Egypt in 1888, after six years of exile in Beirut, France and other European countries, Muhammad 'Abduh applied himself to religious reform. His aim was to rationalize Islam, and in so doing he called for a return to true Islam, i.e. Islam as it was known in the life-time of the Prophet. Islam, says 'Abduh, is the only perfect religion; Judaism has appealed to Man's sensation neglecting his emotion and intellect; Christianity has addressed itself to his emotion neglecting, in turn, his sensation and reason; Islam alone has realized the totality of man and the unity of his faculties. Primarily, Islam is the religion of reason. But in treating Man it has never forgotten his sensation and emotion,¹ nor has it sacrificed his body for the sake of his spirit.² Within Islam religion and reason complement one another. To deny the role of reason in understanding religious doctrines and beliefs is to contradict the teachings and spirit of Islam. To 'Abduh, Islam is also the religion of science, for science is the product of

1. Muhammad 'Abduh, Risālat at-Tawhīd, Cairo, pp.128-32.
Therefore, the duty of Muslims is not to close their eyes to modern knowledge and science but to embrace them. 'Abduh's writings nourished the young Egyptian generation and prepared an appropriate intellectual climate for its activity.

The social reform movement centred on the writings of Kasim Amin and Fathi Zaghlul. The former campaigned for the education and emancipation of women, and for the abolition of polygamy and the veil. For this purpose he wrote two works, Tahrrin al-Mar'ah (The Emancipation of Women) and al-Mar'ah al-Jadidah (The New Woman). The writings of Fathi Zaghlul consisted mainly of translations and were more diverse. Among his translations were Le Bon's La Psychologie du Socialisme, and Les Lois Psychologiques de L'Évolution des Peuples, and Bentham's The Principles of Legislation. Muhammad 'Abduh also served in the field of social reform and called for the education of women and the abolition of polygamy.

The history of Egyptian Nationalism dates from the last years of Isma'il's regime and records three movements, which complemented each other. The first was 'Arabi's in which military men, peasants and many intellectuals found their aspirations. In its origin the movement was a reaction against the corruption of Isma'il and the interference of the European Powers in the policy of Egypt. The second movement was Mustafa Kamil's. Mustafa Kamil received his education in France as a lawyer and pursued his interests in politics under the

patronage and influence of a French lady, Mme. Juliette Adam. His movement represented the Egyptian intelligenzia, which was educated along European lines; it had two facets, the one drawn from Pan-Islamism, and the other from purely national aspiration. The doctrines of Pan-Islamism gave the movement a political weapon against the British Occupation, for Egypt was still regarded as part of the Ottoman Empire. However, Muḥṭafā Kamīl drew his main inspiration from European liberal nationalism. His belief in European civilization was as strong as his belief in his motherland. In an article in Le Figaro he wrote:

"We have realized for over a century now that nations cannot lead an honourable life unless they follow the path of Western civilisation. We were the first Oriental people to shake hands with Europe and we shall certainly continue along the path we have taken."¹

Nevertheless, he was much more a political agitator and orator than a thinker and ideologist.

The movement of Egyptian Nationalism remained without ideological frame until Lutfī as-Sayyid began his career in 1907. In this year the Ummah party was formed. Its members ranged from rich landowners to journalists, writers and social reformers. Among the latter were Faṭḥī Zaghlūl, Kāsim Amīn, Saʿd Zaghlūl, ʿAbd al-ʿAzīz Fahmī and ʿAbd al-Khālīk Tharwat. Lutfī as-Sayyid was the Secretary of the Party and the editor of its organ Al-Jarīdah. During the seven years of his editorship he expressed his socio-political theory in which the

keywords were freedom, evolution and utility. The essential goal of the theory was to establish the liberty of the individual and of the nation, and to determine where these two liberties meet and how they can co-operate within the frame of the community. To Luṭfî as-Sayyid, the two liberties can co-exist only under a constitutional regime and the separation of powers. The natural rights of the individual were expressed as potential and were understood in the light of utilitarian ethics. In his theory Luṭfî as-Sayyid was influenced by many European writers particularly Montesquieu, Rousseau, J.S. Mill, Bentham and Spencer.¹

Unlike Mustafā Kāmil, Luṭfî as-Sayyid called for the independence of Egyptian Nationalism both of the Turks and Arabs and for a return to the Phāronic heritage and civilisation. In his opinion, the essence of the Egyptian character can be found only in that remote heritage and civilisation. On the other hand, the new source of inspiration must be sought in European culture.

The rapid growth of the nationalist movement, the struggle for independence and the considerable freedom enjoyed under the British authorities gave a powerful stimulus to the press. A large number of newspapers, journals and periodicals made their appearance in the principal cities; some newspapers also appeared in the small towns. In the 1890's these newspapers and periodicals were about 150; the majority were devoted to

literature and science. The main newspapers were Al-Ahrām, (pro-French) Al-Mu'attam, (pro-British), al-Mu'ayyad, (the organ of the conservatives), Al-Manār, (the mouthpiece of 'Abduh's religious reform movement), and Al-Watan, which represented the Coptic opinion and supported the British. Muṣṭafā Kāmil's anti-British Al-Liwa' (The Standard) started publication in 1900. Its appearance marked a new era in Egyptian political journalism. Seven years later Al-Jarīdah, the organ of the Ummah Party and the modernists, was issued. The most influential literary and scientific periodicals were in Syrian hands; they were Ya'kūb Sarrūf's monthly Al-Muktataf (published first in Lebanon and transferred in 1886 to Egypt), Jurji Zaydān's monthly Al-Hilāl (1892), Farāh Antūn's Al-Jāmi'ah, and Khalīl Maṭrān's Al-Majallah al-Misriyyah. Al-Muktataf was devoted mainly to scientific studies on physics, biology, agriculture and sociology. Sarrūf, a follower of Darwin, contributed largely to the spread of Darwin's and Spencer's theories of evolution. Al-Hilāl contained many articles and essays on European history, literature, science, sociology and philosophy. As regards Al-Jāmi'ah, its great role was the propagation of eighteenth century French thought. Other important periodicals were the weekly Al-Bayān, Al-Burhān and Mirāt ash-Shārīk, together with al-Muwaylihi's Mīsbāb ash-Shārīk. Some women's magazines also appeared. By 1914 they numbered more than twenty.¹

The theatre continued along the lines established in the

¹ Zaydān, Tarīkh Adab ... op.cit. vol.iv, pp.69-70, 73.
Plays were mainly comedies. When a tragedy was produced it was usually given a musical accompaniment. Theatrical consciousness and critical standards had not yet ripened; theatregoers were attracted to the music and singing rather than to the playwright's or actors' art. However, several troupes were formed. They almost always depended on adaptations or translations of European, particularly French, plays. The most popular troupes were formed by Syrians. From 1884 to 1895 theatrical activity seems to have centred on al-Kardāḥī's troupe whose singer was Salāmah Hijāzī. It also included an actress called Laylā, the first woman to appear on the Egyptian stage. The other popular troupe was that of al-Kabbānī and Iskandar Farah. The third troupe was formed by Farah with Hijāzī as the singer. But this troupe does not seem to have lasted long, for in 1904 Hijāzī established his own troupe. This led Farah to change his methods of production and to present plays without musical accompaniment. The experiment was well received by the critics and the newspapers, but failed to gain a large audience. Farah was then forced to give up the theatre. In the years preceding the outbreak of the First World War, the theatre and play-writing seem to have entered upon a new era. In these years Jurjī Abyād began his theatrical career. He studied the art of the theatre in Paris, and on his return to Egypt formed a new troupe which remained popular for many years. The plays which Abyād presented appear to have been translations from European languages.¹

¹. Ibid, pp.156-7.
The first Egyptian novel, al-Muwaylihi's Hadith 'Isā Ibn Hishām (The Discourse of 'Isā Ibn Hishām), appeared in 1906. Al-Muwaylihi was one of a few conservative writers who were brought into contact with European literature. Thus in writing a novel he chose for his work the Makāmah form and style, which proved too narrow for his purpose. This purpose was to portray Egypt in its hard process of transformation under the influence of European culture, to reveal the painful disintegration which was taking place in Egyptian society and to shed light on the moral decline and perplexity of the age. His choice of the Makāmah form and style reflected his failure to understand that the novel, as a European literary form, is something altogether different from the Makāmah, and resulted in the incoherence of his work, which consisted of scenes, tales and episodes set together within the loose framework of the Makāmah.

Judged by this single work al-Muwaylihi was not without talent as a novelist, but a great deal of his talent was wasted working in the wrong direction. Some of the scenes and characters in his novel, particularly in the last part of it, are successfully depicted. However, his attempt shows quite clearly how the conservative writers understood the cultural change taking place in Egypt and the kind of adjustment which they made to it. A section of the conservative school seems to have realized that immobility meant ultimate defeat, and that if the old traditions and culture were to survive in the life of people, the heritage of the past must be renewed and widened; the people had to be convinced that the legacy of the past was
still rich enough and capable of meeting the new needs, and that in the adaptation of European culture this legacy ought not to be neglected.

The second Egyptian novel was Haykal's *Zaynab*, which he wrote during his student-days in Paris between 1909 and 1912. It is a romantic love story set in the Egyptian countryside and written in the tradition of the French romantic novel such as Lamartine's *Raphaël* and the young Dumas' *La Dame aux Camélias*. Though it suffers from many defects in structure and characterization, it is rightly regarded as the first Arabic novel.

Historical fiction also progressed under the hand of Jurji Zaydan, who wrote 22 historical novels on Islamic and Egyptian themes in the style of Sir Walter Scott. Hastily written, these novels show many weaknesses in structure, coherence and characterization; so often the chapters turn out to be bald historical records because of a lack of imagination and insight on the part of the author.

Unlike the other literary genres, poetry was influenced little by European literature and thought. This is because the poets had a wide heritage and deep-rooted traditions to follow, whereas writers had to turn to European literature in their attempts to produce novels and plays. Thus poetry continued along the old traditional lines. Modern poets often composed their poems in imitation of the poems of ancient poets. They followed these poets in their themes, techniques, language, metrical patterns and imagery. The modern poet was concerned mainly with poetic diction and language; He thought of poetry as
a kind of ornamentation, as embellished language and radiant images. He paid no attention to the structure and unity of his poem and rarely expressed genuine emotions and experiences. Even when he did communicate genuine emotions and experiences he clothed them in traditional phraseology and conventional imagery.

The poets' awareness of the cultural and social change is apparent only in the subject-matter of a certain portion of their works. They wrote poems on the Danshūwāy incident, Lord Cromer's resignation, the signing of the Ottoman Constitution, elegies on the death of nationalist leaders or notable men, eulogies on the accession of a new Khedive or on the anniversary of his accession; they also wrote poems on the emancipation and education of women, the abolition of the veil, the suicide of pupils who failed in their examination, and the like. In this way the poets - I am thinking of Shawkī, Ḥāfīz Ibrāhīm and ʿAbd al-Muttālib - played the role of the ancient bards and became the mouthpieces of the community.

On the other hand, these poets held an odd notion of modernism in literature and poetry, a notion which resulted in the writing of descriptive poems on trains, steam-ships, aeroplanes and clocks. To them these subjects appeared to correspond to modernism. Thus ʿAbd al-Muttālib, for instance, instead of describing the she-camel which the ancient poet used to describe on his journey to his patron, portrays an aeroplane, not forgetting to compare it to the she-camel of the old poet.

Another tendency in the works of these poets is reflected
in the imaginative interest which they took in the past under the influence of the nationalist movement, which cast its eyes back to the Pharaonic age and civilization, and the movement of Pan-Islamism, which called for a return to early Islam. Al-Bārūdī appears to have been the originator of this tendency. One of his poems was written on the Pyramids and the Sphinx. But in this poem he was merely following the old beduin poets' tradition of describing deserted ruins and sand-dunes, which culminated in al-Buhtūrī's splendid poem on the ruined domed-palace of the Persian Emperor. It was not so with Shawkī who early in his life while studying in France was brought into contact with French romantic literature. Shawkī wrote a series of poems on the Pyramids, the Sphinx, the Pharaonic and Roman temples and palaces, and several long historical poems. His interest in history and the past might have grown out of his early contact with French romantic poetry, particularly Hugo's La Légende des Siècles.

Among this generation of poets was one whose works represented a departure from, but not a complete break with, the old traditions of Arabic poetry. This poet was the Syrian Khalīl Matrān, who settled in Egypt after 1892. He wrote his poems under the influence of both classical Arabic poetry and French romantic poetry. Thus his poetry was a blend of the two. The influence of the former appears mainly in his language and metrical patterns, whereas the influence of the latter can be seen in his themes, imagery and the general spirit which runs through his poems. Like the French poet, André Chénier, in the pre-romantic period, Matrān tried to pour new wine into old bottles,
i.e. to set forth new feelings and thoughts in the old and conventional language. But while Chénier was purely classical in spirit, Maṭrān was purely romantic. Maṭrān's style and phrasing, like Chénier's, often appear unsuited to his subjects and emotions. In fact, his emotions and ideas are often stifled by the traditional and conventional phraseology.

While the poets of his generation thought very little of their own lives and emotions and concerned themselves almost exclusively with public affairs, Maṭrān often turned to himself, reflected on his own life and affairs and wrote some romantic personal poems. This might be attributed to his unique position among his contemporaries; he was a Syrian Catholic nourished by French literature and thrown into a conservative Muslim community. Although he did not ignore public affairs and wrote many poems on the political and social events around him, he remained a foreigner in his heart.

Maṭrān's poetry can be divided into two kinds, the lyrical romantic poems, and the impersonal narrative ones. His talent for narrative or epic poetry was restricted by the conditions of his medium and heritage. He had no narrative or epic heritage and no epic metrical scheme to follow. Behind his narrative poems there often lurk moral or social notions suggested through the depiction of dramatic situations and characters. On the other hand, his lyrical personal poems express, like most romantic poetry, sad, sometimes melancholy, emotions and thoughts. In some of them he appears to identify nature with man or to see in it a reflection of the poet's thought and feeling. But he does
not seem to have possessed a particular and unified vision of nature or man. Even in his single poems we rarely find specific, unified visions. His imagery is often diffused and unrelated, and sometimes drawn from the ancient Arab poets and therefore evokes stock responses.

Critics were more alive to the cultural and social changes than poets. Their views of poetry differed according to the differences in their literary concerns and tendencies. Some of them were intensely concerned with the social function of poetry and the relation of the poet to his age, others with poetry as self-expression or as a revelation of the poet's personality. They expressed their views in articles and essays the majority of which are found in Al-Muktataf, Al-Hilāl, and Al-Majallah Al-Miṣriyyah. As early as 1892 there appeared a critical article "On Poetry and Poets" attacking the imitation made by contemporary poets of ancient Arabic poetry. The article was based on the idea that the contemporary poets were representatives of the ancient ages rather than of their own, and that their themes and imagery had no relation to the life around them. The writer of the article seems to have been of the view that the study of European poetry alone can correct, widen and deepen the conception and understanding of the Arab poet and open a new horizon before him. Therefore, he ended the article by a call on his contemporaries who knew European languages to translate into Arabic Homer's Iliad, Milton's Paradise Lost and other European poems. Eight years later Niṣālā Fayyād made a similar attack and called upon the poets to see things through their own eyes,
and not through the eyes of the ancient poets. He argues that for long time Arabic poetry had become like a single-stringed harp on which all fingers play producing the same tone. There were many other critics who expressed similar views and made similar demands. One of them, while urging the poets to be faithful to themselves and their age, says that what characterizes great poetry is its truth in representing the poet and his age.\(^1\)

In the introduction to his first collection of poems, published in 1898, Shawkî, under the influence of French romantic poetry, regarded the true poet as the one who is at home with nature and whose poetry is the expression of the life of nature. He claimed that his poems represented an attempt to attain this end.

All these articles and essays seem to have prepared the way for Matrân's views of the nature of poetry and the relation of the poet to his age. In an article published in July, 1900, Matrân wrote:

"Language is other than imagination and thought. The techniques and traditions of the ancient poets should not be our own techniques and traditions. For the age which these techniques and traditions had suited is no longer ours. The ancient Arabs created the literature which represented their own morals, needs and modes of thought. In turn our literature must represent our own morals, needs and modes of thought."\(^2\)

In an earlier article he had accused the Arab poet of making the unity of the line the basis of his poem and constructing this poem from diverse, disjointed parts.\(^3\)

These views Maṭrān has repeated in the preface to his collection of poems which appeared in 1908. He stresses the importance of the unity of the poem and the faithfulness of the poet to himself and his age. With regard to language he thinks that the modern poet should follow the ancient poets in his language and methods of expression.¹ He appears to have been unaware of the contradictions inherent in his views. He failed to realize that new ideas and feelings demand their own language and expression, and that to convey such ideas and feelings in the old language and conventional phraseology is to hide them from the reader and to destroy their originality.

However, in the few years which followed the publication of Maṭrān's collection of poems the two principles, the unity of the poem and the faithfulness of the poet to himself and his age, seem to have established themselves as the principles of the new poetry.

The modernist critics were opposed by a conservative school which evaluated literature and poetry according to the standards of the ancient rhetoricians and grammarians. At best this school is represented by al-Maṣṣafī's al-Wasīlah al-Adabiyyah (The Literary Method). Like the old Arab critics, al-Maṣṣafī's primary interests were linguistic or rhetoric. The importance of his work lay not in the critical principles that he expressed but in a sizeable collection of beautiful ancient poems which he made the subject of his commentary. These poems together with al-Barūḍī's served as models for the poets.

In 1904 an Arabic poetic version of Homer's *Iliad* was published by al-Bustānī. To his rendering of the Greek epic al-Bustānī wrote a lengthy introduction in which he discussed the social function of poetry and compared Homer's poem with war poetry in Arabic.

Attempts to write the history of Arabic literature along European lines were made by Jurjī Zaydān, Ḥifnī Nasīf and Shaykh Ahmad al-Iskandarī. Zaydān also wrote two other works, one on *The History of The Arabic Language*, and the other on the history of Islamic Civilisation. In the first he applied the canons of the theory of evolution to the development of Arabic. These attempts were, however, merely landmarks on the path towards the systematic study of the Arabic language and Arabic literature. The first systematic literary study came out of the Egyptian University in 1914 and was written under the influence of the Orientalists. This was Tāhā Ḥusayn's doctorate thesis *Dhikrā Abī al-ʿAlā*'. Tāhā Ḥusayn wrote his study according to European principles, particularly Taine's theory of "la race, le milieu et le moment". Thus he studied the cultural, social and political environments, the driving forces of the time in which al-Maʿarrī lived as well as his personal development, the causes which determined this development and the main traits of his thought and literary output. In so doing he has given us a comprehensive study of al-Maʿarrī.

In the years preceding the outbreak of the First World War Egypt was still in the hard process of transition which changed the fundamental character of life and undermined the traditional
Islamic system which for centuries served as the moral, social and political foundation of the community. But no alternative system has yet emerged to replace the Islamic one. As a result the life of society became precarious and unsettled. The dilemma in society and within the individual appeared to be unresolvable.

In writing on the intellectual Europeanized Egyptians Lord Cromer observed that these Egyptians were generally agnostic, that in passing through the mill of European culture the Egyptian Muslim often lost his Islamic faith or the best part of this faith. He, thus, cut himself off from the sheet-anchor of the creed of his community and made the gulf between him and the Azhari Sheikh appear to a European like Lord Cromer wider than the gulf between the latter and the European intellectual. 1 This must not be taken, however, as a charge against the Egyptian intellectual as Lord Cromer and other European writers made. The European intellectual was also agnostic at this time and European culture was in crucial transition; agnosticism was a general tendency in European cultured circles; moral perplexity, loss of faith and disgust for the dogmatic creeds of orthodoxy were the distinguishing features of these circles. Out of science there emerged new truths and beliefs alien to, if not in conflict with, the religious truths and beliefs; the theory of knowledge was re-examined; philosophers and thinkers were building up new ideologies; materialistic philosophies were gaining ground; the bell which science rang sounded louder and more resonant than

curfew-notes and hymns of the church. It is easy to imagine how destructive it was for the Egyptian Muslim to pass through the mill of European culture in these days.

However, European culture was causing a painful disintegration in Egyptian society. The adherents of the old traditions and those of European culture were sharply divided and hostile to each other. Each class had had a distorted and odd image of the other, so that communication between the two became impossible. The most distinguished figures among the conservatives were Hifni Nasif, Sheikh al-Mahdi, al-Muwaylihi and Mustafā Sādiq ar-Rafi'ī. With the exception of al-Muwaylihi, these writers were entirely out of touch with European culture, although one occasionally stumbles upon progressive and modern ideas in their works. At the head of the modernists were the leaders of the Ummah Party.

The writings of a group of young modernists had just begun to appear in al-Jarīdah and al-Bayān. Because of their different European cultural background, these young modernists represented two literary schools, the one almost exclusively French, the other mainly, but not exclusively, English. The former may be called al-Jarīdah school and the latter al-Bayān school. The prominent figures of the French school were Haykal, a graduate of the School of Law at Cairo in 1909 and of the University of Paris in 1912 with a doctor's degree in political economy, and Tāhā Husayn, a student of al-Azhar and a graduate

1. Haykal's education up to 1909 was mainly English; the European works which he read before his journey to France in 1909 were almost exclusively English; they included J. S. Mill's On Liberty, Carlyle's Heroes and Hero Worship and The French Revolution, and Spencer's Justice. Muḥammad Husayn Haykal, a collection of essays by various hands, Cairo, 1956, pp. 12-3.
of the non-Governmental Egyptian University in 1914 and of the Sorbonne in 1919, when he obtained a doctorat d'État, in philosophy. The leading figures of the other school were Shukrī, a graduate of the Training College of Cairo in 1909 and of the University of Sheffield in English literature in 1912, al-Māzīnī, a graduate of the Training College in 1909, and al-ʿAkkād, who received only a primary education certificate.

It is remarkable that the three latter were poet-critics, whereas the representatives of the French school were literary historians or novelists.

These young modernists had not, as it was claimed, cut themselves adrift from the past; their contact with the past was very powerful indeed. During their formative years numerous classical Arabic works came out of the press and formed an influential current of thought besides the European one. Even Haykal's case which might seem to support this claim did not do so. Among his early reading, classical Arabic works such as al-Amālī of al-Kālī, al-Aghānī of al-ʿAṣfahānī, al-Amthāl of al-Maydānī, and al-Bayān wa at-Tabyīn of al-Jāhīz received a great deal of attention. The works of Muḥammad ʿAbdūh and Jurjī Zaydān were also influential in his early literary education.¹

¹. Ibid, pp.12-3.
CHAPTER II

AL-'AKKAD; HIS LIFE AND INTELLECTUAL DEVELOPMENT

Al-'Akkād's life is crowded not with events but with ideas and passions; it is the life of an introverted poet and solitary thinker. His study was, to him, the world at large, and he lived among his books and with his ideas and papers as though among people and with intimate friends. Therefore, in writing al-'Akkād's life a full account must be given of his readings, thoughts and passions, that is, of his intellectual and spiritual development. He himself says that his ideas are inseparable from his life and character, and that each of them forms an essential part of this life, and not a mere fleeting notion. Each idea, he contends, has its history and life even as any human being enters upon one stage of life after another, and passes from childhood to youth and manhood. When it occurred to him to give a final expression to any of his ideas, he usually traced back its development and examined the various forms which it had taken in this development with the feeling of a father looking back on one of his sons. As he lived his ideas, their happy and unhappy days became inseparable from his own days. He was even inclined to imagine that they would have their rebirth with him on the day of Judgement.¹ He also says that in the books he read he did not merely scan words and lines but lived in them, and in them sought to find more than one life.²

1. Al-'Akkād, Murāja'at fī al-Ādāb wa al-Funūn, Cairo, 1926, pp.7-9.
1. Childhood and Ambitions - 1889-1905.

In the afternoon of Friday, 28th June 1889, al-'Akkād was born in Aswān of a middle class family. His great-grandfather had been a spinner; hence his surname (Lakāb), al-'Akkād; his father, a devout, solemn man, was the director of the Aswān Stationery Office. He spent his time reading religious works, performing his five daily prayers and leading a quiet life. His belief in duty was so stringent that he laid upon his sons, even in their early years, the moral and religious responsibilities of adults. He was also fond of literature and frequented the literary circles of the town. He appears to have been one of the supporters of 'Urābī and of the Pan-Islamist movement of al-Afghanī and Muḥammad 'Abduh. Among his papers and books he kept a number of al-'Urwah al-Wuthkā and newspapers and periodicals issued under 'Urābī's regime.

At the time of al-'Akkād's birth his mother was a girl of fourteen or fifteen. Like her husband, she was pious and devout, and led a very secluded life. Her ancestors were Kurds who lived between Diyār Bakr, 'Urfah and Mur'ish and emigrated to Damietta in Egypt some three hundred years earlier. They were mostly pious men and women known as the Sharīf family because they claimed that they were related by marriage to some

1. 'Āmir Ahmad al-'Akkād, "Al-'Akkād fi Mashtāh", in Al-'Akkād Dirāsah wa Taḥiyyah, p.262.
3. Ni'mat Ahmad Pu'ād, "Lamahat min Hayāt al-'Akkād", in Al-'Akkād Dirāsah wa Taḥiyyah, p.112.
6. See an Interview with al-'Akkād, Akhir Sa'āh, No.1467, 5th December, 1962.
descendants of the Prophet. She was of mixed blood for her forefathers had married Sudanese girls. Her grandfather, 'Umar Agha ash-Sharif, a soldier in the Kurdish regiment of Muhammad Ali during the invasion of the Sudan, was the first to settle in a village around Aswān on his return from the Sudan. She does not seem to have been the first wife of Mahmud al-'Akkād, for al-'Akkād had a brother or brothers older than he.

Al-'Akkād was brought up under the control of his dignified father, in whose image his ego-ideal was formed. When approaching the age of seven, he was introduced into the circle of his father's friends, serious old men, where he heard debates and discussions on religious, political and social affairs. In this circle the course of his psychological evolution was determined. At this early time his sense of dignity and self-respect grew intense and deep-rooted. Unlike his school-followers, he constantly refused to wear short trousers, and was very much aware of the need of self-respect in his relationships with others.

The domestic religious atmosphere also had a powerful influence on him. The most vivid image which remained in his memory from childhood was that of his father engaged in his early morning prayer.

"I still remember him in the position that met my gaze since first I opened my eyes to the world until I left my native town to enter government service. It was the sight of him engaged in the performance of his dawn prayer and sitting on the prayer-carpet reciting Koranic verses and religious invocations ..."\footnote{1}

The memory of his mother similarly occupied in performing her five daily prayers also remained fresh with him.\footnote{2}

The impact of this domestic religious atmosphere was strengthened by what al-‘Akkād calls the Pharaonic religious climate of Aswān. In Aswān province Pharaonic ritual ceremonies and customs were preserved; the cult of saints, says al-‘Akkād, reflected the worship of the Pharaonic gods and goddesses; the local ceremonies relating to the seasons, to the Nile-flood, and to festivals and funerals were much the same as they had been in Ancient Egypt. In his childhood al-‘Akkād often visited local shrines, where he heard stories about the saints intermingled with others about the Pharaonic gods. He also went to shrines outside Aswān in order to have his younger brothers' locks cut in dedication to the saints, and as a charm against ill-health.\footnote{3}

At the age of eight he was sent to the government primary school in Aswān.\footnote{4} At school his talents did not fail to attract the attention of his teachers. He was a precocious child, particularly good at arithmetic, Arabic and English. In the

\begin{itemize}
  \item \footnote{1}{Al-‘Akkād, "Abī", op.cit. p.7.}
  \item \footnote{2}{Al-‘Akkād, "Ummī", op.cit. p.22.}
  \item \footnote{3}{Al-‘Akkād, Sa‘āt Bayn al-Kutub, 3rd edition, Cairo, 1950, Vol. 1, p.383.}
  \item \footnote{4}{Al-‘Akkād, "Mu‘jaz Tarjamati", quoted by Ramzī Miftāh, Rasā’il an-Nakāh, Cairo, 1934, pp.61-2. See also al-‘Akkād "Kunt Shaykhan fī Shabābī", al-Hilāl, April, 1953, p.29.}
\end{itemize}
fourth year, he knew enough English to be able to read some English literary works.¹

The school years were a period of self-discovery, and they gave him an orientation that he followed until his last days. When about nine he was much impressed with the behaviour of living creatures. He used to spend much of his leisure-time watching the flights of birds which crossed the Aswān sky or landed on the desert on their way to Central Africa. Inclined to solitude, he used to slip out of large gatherings in order to gaze at the moon and the stars. To his classmates he appeared odd, and they made fun of his interest in migratory birds. Even members of his family took him to be a fool and laughed at him. The lack of understanding and sympathy wounded his heart and made him shrink into himself with bitterness and suspicion.

Some two years later a comforting voice came to him from essays he read in the journal al-Muktaṭaf. Here he read that birds and animals had often before impressed scientists and travellers and occupied a significant place in their studies. Elsewhere he read that nature always played an important role in the works of writers, and that many great poets received the message of the Muse while in communion with nature.

He coincided with his interest in mental arithmetic. He trained himself to answer problems beyond the reach of his classmates. On one occasion his painstaking attempt to answer a certain problem, although successful, failed to receive the

appreciation of the teacher or of his class-mates, and was regarded as a waste of time. To this trivial event al-Akkād attributes his self-confidence and courage. It taught him, he says, that the majority is not infallible and that its opinion must not always be taken into consideration.¹

The years between ten and fifteen were years of ambitions. When about ten he fell under the spell of the occult. Tales of the secret knowledge and miracles of saints and sufī dervishes fired his imagination. He then set himself to the acquisition of this secret knowledge which, he thought, would enable him to accomplish his own miracles, to fly in the air, for example, and to walk on water. As he failed to distinguish between religion and magic, he plunged into indiscriminate reading on the lives and miracles of saints and pious dervishes and on witch-craft.² At this time he appears to have attended religious readings held in his uncle's house, which were mainly from the Traditions of the Prophet, and al-Ghazālī's Thāfi' Ulūm ad-Dīn.³ He also joined the congregation of worshippers in the mosque. This intense religious phase was, however, of short duration. After a while he seems to have discovered that he was not destined for a religious and devout life. Thus, because he was disappointed in a certain Imam, from whom he hoped for much, but who proved false, he abandoned his religious ambitions.⁴ But as his religious sentiment was deep-rooted, he continued to frequent the mosque.

for Friday prayers. 4

Turning his face from the religious life, he fell under the spell of military leadership. It was now the image of a general exercising command over his troops that aroused his imagination. These were the days of al-Mahdi's revolt in the Sudan, which gave rise to a flood of rumours and fearful tales about the Darawish who were depicted as brutal and barbarous slaughterers of men, women and children. Aswan was then a military base or halting-place for the British and Egyptian troops on their way to the Sudan. In addition, professional narrators of the so-called popular romances such as the Sīrah of 'Antar, the Sīrah of az-Zahir Baybars, and the like were found in profusion in the town. These found a ready echo in the games of schoolchildren. They enacted single combats, or divided themselves into groups representing the British, Egyptian and the Darawish armies. The games were accompanied by the recitation of poems borrowed from these romances. Once, al-

'Akkad, given the part of the leader of the Egyptian troops, found himself fascinated by the poetical recitation rather than by the games. He was emboldened to write some poems which received the appreciation of his friends.

Still retaining his interest in animals and plants he was next attracted to agricultural science and natural history. At one time he even expressed to his father his desire of completing his study in the School of Agriculture rather than joining Government service. 2

1. Al-'Akkad, "at-Tumah wa at-Tamanni", Yas'alunak, Cairo, 1946, p.33
Of these early ambitions al-'Akkād has given us his own interpretation. He rejects ambition as a primary motivation, but does not deny the desire for self-expression and assertion. He writes that these desires were an indirect expression of his literary inclination. The search for reality, the wish to discover the secrets of the Universe - that was his principal motivation. It led him first to join the dervishes’ circles, next to seek military leadership; at first sight the two desires seem utterly different, but close examination shows that they are alike. Struggle has always been an essential feature of every religion; examples can be seen in the notion of eternal war between the God of Light and the God of Darkness, or in the contest between God and His angels on one side, and Satan and his followers on the other. He says that he passed from one stage to another, yet both his religious and his military desires were ever implicit in his literary career. To him literature is self-expression, and self-expression means penetration into the mysteries of both the soul and the universe. Hence the affinity between literature and religion. The former expresses the secrets of the soul, the latter those of the universe. Thus the poet’s tower stands close to the temple.¹

It was under the impact of two Azhari ṣayḥas that al-‘Akkād began his literary career. The first was Ahmad al-Jaddāwī, one of al-Afghānī’s disciples, who settled in Aswān during al-Mahdī’s rise in the Sudan. Al-Jaddāwī appears to have had a number of

¹ Al-‘Akkād, "Wa Umniyatī" and "at-Tumūh wa at-Tamannī", Yasa’alunak, pp. 34, 121-3. See also Al-‘Akkād, "Umniyatī", ar-Risālah, No. 439, 1st December, 1941, p. 1446, and Al-‘Akkād’s Memoirs, Akhir Sā’ah, No. 1190, 14th August, p. 11.
students to whom he lectured on various religious and literary subjects, and with whom he read the *Makamāt* of al-Hamadhānī and al-Ḥarīrī. Among al-Jaddāwī's friends and admirers was al-'Akkād's father. Late in 1900 al-'Akkād accompanied him to al-Jaddāwī's circle, where he heard religious and literary readings and discussions. Moved by al-Jaddāwī's recitation of poetry and his commentary on it, he began to attend these lectures regularly.¹

The other Azhari shaykh was Fakhr ad-Dīn ad-Dishnawī, a teacher of Arabic and history in Aswān primary school and probably one of Muhammad ʿAbduh's disciples. Ad-Dishnāwī seems to have held modernistic literary views, and called for a style free from rhetorical ornaments. He, thus, encouraged his pupils to write on modern themes and form their own style. Al-ʿAkkād was one of a few pupils who truly understood and applied this teacher's standards.²

The muezzin of the mosque also figured in al-ʿAkkād's early literary life. The muezzin's recitation of religious, particularly Sufi, poems in the early morning and at Friday prayer often charmed him. Later he was given permission to accompany the muezzin in his recitations and also to recite alone some poems by al-Burāfī and other Sufi poets. In imitation of these Sufi poems al-ʿAkkād wrote some verses, which he also recited.³

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The Arabian Nights, al-Mustāṭraf fī Kullī Fannī Mustāṭraf, al-Bāhā' Zuhayr's collection of poems, a volume of al-Bustānī's Encyclopaedia, and a number of newspapers such as an-Nadīm's al-Ustādī, Muhammad 'Abdūh's al-'Urwāh al-Wuthkā, and Sannū's Abu Naddārah, figured in al-'Akkād's early reading. Of the first two he wrote in 1927:

"I still feel the influence of The Arabian Nights and of al-Mustāṭraf on my taste and literary tendencies."²

His earliest prose piece was an article in imitation of an-Nadīm's essay "Law Kuntum Mithlanā Lafā'altum Fi'lanā". He also produced on the model of an-Nadīm's al-Ustādī (The Teacher) a hand-written newspaper entitled at-Tilmīdī (The Pupil). Yet he felt an-Nadīm to be affected in his style and undignified in his life, so he never made him his literary model.³

In the last days of his primary schooling al-'Akkād became more and more inclined towards intellectual life; his literary reading very often kept him up until the early hours of the morning; he took no heed of his ill-health. (He often had bouts of fever in his childhood.) He also refused to take part in school-sports and preferred punishment. This was one of the few things he regretted in his later years.⁴

In these days he was introduced by ad-Dishnawi to Muhammad 'Abduh, who was visiting the school. Muhammad 'Abduh quickly recognized his talent, discussed with him his educational prospects and advised him to continue his studies, not to bury his talent and ambition in government service. A few days later he appears to have enjoyed another meeting with Muhammad 'Abduh. The two meetings produced a profound impression on him.

Muhammad 'Abduh's sober and sedate character satisfied his strong sense of dignity and appealed to his heart. He then read Muhammad 'Abduh's works and biography in which he found his ideal of the man and of the thinker.1

In 1903 al-'Akkad obtained his primary studies' certificate, and moved to the secondary school, but he never finished the course.2 In the following year he gave a course of lectures in the Mu'asah Islamic Primary School, where he met Mustafa Kamil, who was visiting Aswan accompanied by Mme Juliette Adam and an English lady, Mrs. Young, a member of the Liberal Party. The meeting took place in the fourth year class where al-'Akkad was teaching the lesson by dictating to one of the pupils a line from al-Ma'arri

1. Al-'Akkad, Sa'id Zaghlul, Sirah wa Tahiyyah, Cairo, 1936, pp.600-1. See also Al-'Akkad, 'Ala' al-Athir, Cairo, 1953, p.32, Al-'Akkad Memoirs, Akhir Saffah, No.1191, op.cit. p.12.
3. The man whose life is of no use to others
Is like a cloud which hides the sun, but brings no rain.
and asked him to explain its meaning and syntax. But the line proved to be beyond the comprehension of all the pupils. This annoyedMustafā Kāmil. In an attempt to do the pupils justiceal-ʿAkkād commented that in Aswān people do not recognize such a cloud, for the cloud which brings them no rain, at least gives them shelter from the hot sun. Al-ʿAkkād's comment was received byMustafā Kāmil with a frown of dissatisfaction. The meeting left an unfavourable impression on al-ʿAkkād and coloured his views of Mustafā Kāmil until later years. His image ofMustafā Kāmil was, and remained, that of an intolerant and vain man.1

With the close of the year a cycle of al-ʿAkkād's life was completed.

2. **Formative Years and Cross-Currents - 1905-1922.**

"It was an unsettled and perplexing age, a mixture of two epochs, the one approaching its close, while the other was not yet apparent or settled; it was like a tower of Babel rebuilt, year after year, in which different languages and sounds mingled producing much confusion; it was the age of Pan-Islamism, of nationalism, of the revival of old traditions, and of Europeanization all at once. Nothing was obvious before our eyes, and no doctrine certain about the chief and complex questions of our life ... In addition, there were many other voices which increased the confusion in the tower ... It was, in short, the age of perplexity and paradox."—Al-ʿAkkād's Memoirs

"We are in an age characterized by profound re-thinking, deep anxiety and fearful doubt, the age in which the mind feels oppressed and the heart weary. Darkness besieges our world of politics, morality and thought. We are

launching on a wide and agitated ocean, while the cries of scepticism, the thirst for knowledge, and yearning for the light echo in our dark nights."  

Al-Ma‘zini, ad-Dīwān.

"The past ages of ignorance and evil are more endearing than this age which is falsely called the age of knowledge and tranquility. The past was an age of faith and belief; today we know but have no faith."

Shukrī, ath-Thamarāt.

In 1905 al-‘Akkād left his native town to enter government service in Kinā.¹ His father appears to have suffered a breakdown in health, which left him no more than two years to live, and al-‘Akkād was forced to give up his secondary studies. He says that he began his job with a distressed heart and felt as though he had received a life-sentence.²

Al-‘Akkād's work in government administration, first in Kinā and later in az-Zakāzik, lasted for two years or so. It was a period of disappointment, frustration and dissatisfaction. In Kinā he enjoyed the close friendship of Ḥusayn al-Ḥakīm, who shared with him his disillusion in life and interest in literature.³ Together with other friends they formed a literary society, which met every Thursday in a protestant church by the permission of the minister.⁴

During this period al-‘Akkād's literary reading centred on al-Ma‘arrī's pessimistic poetry and philosophical writings, which seem to have given an outlet to his own disillusion and dejection. Since this time al-Ma‘arrī occupied a significant place in his

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³ Al-‘Akkād, Ḥadiyyat al-Karawan, Cairo, 1933, pp.48-9.
literary life, a place which only two other poets in Arabic, namely Ibn al-Kāʾimat al-Muḥafīz and Yaqūb Sarrūf, later succeeded in sharing. He also read az-Zahāwī’s al-Kāʾimat and Yaqūb Sarrūf’s philosophical works. His taste was veering towards philosophical literature, aesthetics and metaphysics.

In imitation of al-Maʿarrī’s famous poem

هَلَوَأَكَّرِيْنَىَّ نِعْبِيْنِ ذَكْرَائِيْ

he wrote a poem, in which he expressed his longing for his native town, opening thus

ذَكْرَائِيْ نِعْبِيْنِ ذَكْرَائِي

The poem was well received by his friends and he was encouraged to publish it. He then thought of issuing a literary newspaper under the title al-Ṣāda (The Echo), and of resigning from government service. He travelled to Cairo to inquire about the cost of printing. But nothing came of the idea because he found a journalist’s life to be undignified and the profession unworthy of his enterprise.³

In the summer of 1906, when the Danshawāy incident took place, al-ʿAkkād was in Aswān on a short holiday. He was deeply impressed by the description of the four peasants who were put to death. ⁴ A short while later we hear of him in Cairo following a course in telegraphy and receiving instruction

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in chemistry and electricity. These were his last days in government service. He considered taking a job as a translator in al-Liwa' when Mustafa Kamil decided to issue it in English and French versions as well as in Arabic. But the unfavourable impression which he had already received from Mustafa Kamil discouraged him from carrying out the idea. After a few weeks, however, another opportunity came to him. He was informed of Farid Wajdi's decision to publish his mouthpiece ad-Dustur (The Constitution) and of his need of an assistant. He applied for the post, and a few days later found himself working hand in hand with Wajdi.

With one short break, al-'Akkad worked on ad-Dustur from its first appearance in November, 1907, until its closing in 1909, a period of nearly two years. The differences between his views and Wajdi's failed to put an end to their collaboration, and he enjoyed a free hand in his work and writings. On one occasion their conflicting views seem to have created a gulf between them. Ad-Dustur was a mouthpiece of Pan-Islamism and of the National Party as well. On the death of Mustafa Kamil, ad-Dustur appeared in mourning but without any article bearing al-'Akkad's name. Though on several occasions al-'Akkad wrote in support of Mustafa Kamil against his opponents and critics, his views of Mustafa Kamil were not very high. Thus on the death of the latter he preferred silence to a tribute. This attitude seems

to have dissatisfied Wajdi.

In these days al-'Akkād remained free from political party affiliation, but he was not without political inclinations and views. Al-Jaridah, the organ of the Ummah Party, was his favourite literary newspaper, and Muṣṭafā Kāmil's al-Liwa' his favourite political one. He also read regularly 'Alī Yusuf's al-Mu'ayyad for its many essays on Islamic and Oriental subjects. In al-Jaridah he followed Lutfi as-Sayyid's political and social essays, which he greatly admired, and Muḥammad as-Sībā'ī's sketches. When al-Jaridah devoted some of its columns to young writers, he had some of his essays and poems published in it. On a visit to al-Jaridah he enjoyed a meeting with Lutfi as-Sayyid, and was favourably impressed by him.\(^1\)

In 1908 Sa'ād Zaghlūl's educational policy was a subject of severe criticism initiated by the National Party. At this time al-'Akkād had no relationship with Zaghlūl and no knowledge about him save that he was one of Muḥammad 'Abduh's faithful disciples, and was known to have passed a fair judgement in regard of an inheritance case which aroused a great deal of trouble in Aswān. The fact that Zaghlūl was a disciple of Muḥammad 'Abduh seems to have been sufficient for al-'Akkād to side with him against his critics. Thus in order to do Zaghlūl justice, al-'Akkād interviewed him in the Department of Education and published his answers concerning the educational policy, in general, and the recently established University in

particular. During this interview Zaghlūl deeply impressed al-'Akkād and put him under his spell.

"I found myself in the presence of an open-hearted and firm-willed man, who likes to do justice not only to himself but also to his opponents; denigration does not appeal to him, and gratitude does not fail to receive his approbation."1 When I left his office, there was in my mind a perfect image of the reformer whom I had admired at a distance."2

The two years that al-'Akkād spent working on ad-Dustūr were very productive and influential in his intellectual and literary development. Once he found the columns of ad-Dustūr open to his writings he lost no time in expressing all the feelings and ideas that occurred to him. He was obsessed by a desire for reputation and by his strong tendency to self-assertion. He was, therefore, a very hard task-master to himself; his reading and writings often kept him up until the early hours of the morning. He read a great deal of English literature, particularly the works of Macaulay, Hazlitt, Leigh Hunt, and Matthew Arnold. He had already been introduced to Carlyle while teaching in the Mu'āsah school in Aswān. The French Revolution was the first work by Carlyle that he read. His admiration of the Scottish writer was not merely literary. He says that with Carlyle he always felt in the presence of a saint. His reading in philosophy was concerned mostly with David Hume, Nietzsche, Tolstoy, Burke and J.S. Mill. He also read a good deal of materialistic philosophies and Darwin's theory of evolution. Among the influential works that he perused were Burke's

1. Al-'Akkād, Sa'd Zaghlūl, pp.600-3.
Philosophical Inquiry into the Origin of Our Ideas of the Sublime and the Beautiful, and Mill's On Liberty. He was much disturbed by his philosophical reading and felt as if standing on shaking ground. Under the influence of Darwin's theory of evolution he held the belief that man is essentially animal, and not a divine creature, a belief which oppressed his heart. 1

Though al-'Akkād began his literary career as a poet rather than a prose writer, he seems to have read very little English poetry, and to have been more concerned with literary criticism. This might be due to the difficulty of the language of poetry and to the fact that the differences between the experiences, modes of thought, atmospheres and patterns which English and Arabic poetry represent are so profound and subtle, that the reader of one can hardly respond to the other. His knowledge of English poetry was confined to a few anthologies, particularly F.T. Palgrave's Golden Treasury. 2 He also read Fitzgerald's The Rubā‘iyat of Omar Khayyām. 3

Yet he was not neglecting Arabic literature. In Arabic his reading centred on the works of the ‘Abbāsid poets, particularly al-Ma‘arrī and al-Mutanabbi. 4 He read these poets in the light of English criticism, that is to say, with a new eye and a new sensibility. In their works he looked for the poet's

2. Interview, June, 1963.
personality, experience and vision of life, and for the unity of the poem.

In the meantime he came into contact with many journalistic and literary circles. He often frequented coffee-houses where he heard, or took part in, discussions on the theory of evolution, socialism, and the education and emancipation of women, which were the topical subjects of the day. He also visited the theatre once or twice a month.¹

After the closing down of ad-Dustūr in 1909, al-'Akkād stayed in Cairo for a while. His hope of taking a job with another daily newspaper bore no fruit. After a few weeks he found himself in need of money, forced to sell the books which he had bought during the last two years, and involved in trouble with his landlord. He left then for Aswān, where his health broke down. He was suffering from malnutrition and debility. His illness lasted for about two years during which he was overwhelmed by despair and haunted by the dark vision of death. Existence as a whole and his life in particular appeared to him purposeless and absurd.² This condition might have been aggravated by his inability to meet the cost of medical treatment.³ His family was not in comfortable conditions after the death of his father, which occurred in 1907 while he was in Cairo.⁴

However, the vision of death, he says, was not in itself

frightening. What frightened him was to die before fulfilling his literary promise. Under this double-edged fear he selected various papers and passages from his diary, which he wrote during his residence in Cairo, and prepared them for publication. The book appeared in 1911 under the title Khulasat al-Yawmiyyah (The Quintessence of The Diary) and consisted of critical pieces, speculations and short poems. It exhibits a split between mind and feeling. In writing on social and religious questions al-'Akkād expresses himself in rationalistic and realistic terms, but in dealing with literature he thinks in imaginative and romantic way. This split indicated in his conception of the poet as an unhappy man, a victim of the conflict between dream and reality.

The moral perplexity of the age made him see the world as unreal and in chaos. In the following words, which occur in his essay "Baʿd al-Arbaʿīn" (After the Age of Forty), al-'Akkād has described his state:

"At the age of twenty I had a realistic view of the world and believed in man's power of understanding. But in my personal life I was like a traveller who dreamt of most beautiful scenery and exciting happenings, and felt disappointed in the things which met him on his journey, for they were not as beautiful as he expected. In my dissatisfaction with life I was like a lover who demanded too much and rejected the little it offered him."

During his stay in Aswān al-ʿAkkād pursued his philosophical and literary inquiries; he read Shībīl Shumayyil's philosophical works, which had just appeared in two volumes.

By the close of 1911 he returned to Cairo after he had recovered his health. He spent a few weeks in Cairo, during which he published *The Quintessence of the Diary*. But the heat was harmful to his health, so he left for Alexandria, where he spent two months. The vision of death which accompanied him on his return to Cairo vanished in Alexandria.\(^1\) He was still, however, plunged in his philosophical reading and meditations. In his last days in Alexandria he was introduced to 'Abbās 'Abd al-Bahā', one of the Bahā'ist leaders, with whom he discussed religious and social affairs. Though 'Abd al-Bahā's sober and dignified character arrested his attention, the meeting produced no effect on him.\(^2\)

After his return to Cairo, al-'Akkād began to contribute to al-Barkūkī's *al-Bayān*. This contribution consisted mainly of reviews and summaries of European works such as Max Nordau's *The Conventional Lies of Society*, and some works of Nietzsche and Emerson.\(^3\) In the office of *al-Bayān* he met 'Abd al-Kādir al-Māzinī, one of the young writers who contributed to the journal. The meeting was followed by a profound friendship, which lasted until the death of al-Māzinī in 1949. A few months later al-Māzinī introduced him to 'Abd ar-Rahmān Shukrī, who had just returned from England, where he had studied English literature.\(^4\) The three writers soon found themselves forming

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a new literary school, which called for new literary principles and initiated a strong battle against the traditional poets such as Shawkî, Hafîz İbrahim, Abd al-Mu'talib and others.

After a short while Shukrî returned to Alexandria, his home city, where he spent the rest of his life. Al-‘Akład and al-Mażinî continued to meet every day and to read together in Arabic and English literary works. Their reading in English was concerned mainly with the works of 19th century poets and critics and with Shakespeare's plays. Al-‘Akład also continued to read philosophy, particularly Kant, Schopenhauer and Nietzsche.1

Early in 1912 he rejoined government service and worked in the Wakf Department, where he met al-Muwaylihî, ’Abd al-‘Azîz al-Bîshrî, Âhmâd al-Kâshîf, ’Abd al-Ḥâlîm al-Mîsîrî, ’Alî Shawkî, Mahmûd ’Imâd and other men of letters. The Wakf Department had not yet been raised to a ministry. This gave the Khedive a free hand in the treasury and the foundations of the Department. When al-‘Akład started his work there was already a group of reformers fighting against the Khedive's interference in the affairs of the Department. He soon sided with them and wrote a series of anonymous articles in which he pointed out the aims and methods of the required reform. The articles were welcomed by the British authorities who were also working to curb the power of the Khedive and looking for a suitable writer to take over al-Mu'ayyad after the death of ’Alî Yusuf. As a result, a meeting was arranged between the British Secretary and al-‘Akład. But al-‘Akład's views, which were against foreign

1. Ibid, p.149.
interference, displeased the British Secretary, and the meeting brought no agreement. However, a few weeks later, al-‘Akkād resigned from the Wakf Department and joined Hafiz ‘Iwad, al-Mu’ayyad’s new editor-in-chief, as editor of the literary supplement. Here again he found himself face to face with corrupt practices, and he resigned after a few months.1

In the last months of the winter of 1914 al-‘Akkād appears to have had an unhappy love affair; his nights were sleepless, and his wound appeared incurable; spring brought him no relief; the songs of birds were sad to his ear, and the fresh blossoms a sign of mourning.2 After his resignation from al-Mu’ayyad he prepared himself for a holiday in his native town, where he thought he would find a remedy for his unhappiness and devote himself to literary reading and writings.3 But nothing there delighted him. The town was dull under a grey and gloomy sky; it was deserted by the tourists who used to flock to it in the winter. On the horizon nothing appeared save the peaks of naked and desolate hills. He felt a foreigner among his neighbours sharing none of their interests and desires. He could no longer deceive himself. His problem was that of a man who in his


2. This love experience is depicted in several poems published in al-‘Akkād’s first collection of poems Yajazat as-Sabah (The Awakening of Morning), which appeared in 1916. See Diwan al-‘Akkād, Cairo, 1928, pp.35, 66-7, 79, 110, 116-17.

freedom has no choice, a prisoner, though without bonds and guards. Yet his visits to the Pharaonic ruins and monuments on the outskirts of the town gave him many happy hours when he read, meditated and dreamed in solitude.

Al-ʿAkkād's arrival in Aswān preceded the outbreak of the First World War, which brought a heavy pressure to bear on Egypt; martial law and press-censorship were declared, and court martial was established. Thus, life became hard for a large number of Egyptians. The pressure of war lay heavy on Aswān. The provincial governor and local authorities enjoyed a free hand in the affairs of the province; a number of people were pressganged as working-details, others arrested on suspicion, various duties were also imposed. Some members of al-ʿAkkād's family were among those who suffered. In this state of affairs al-ʿAkkād could not keep silent or remain indifferent. His writings included a satirical essay, "Nādi al-ʿUjul" (The Calves' Club), which symbolized a recently established club for the local dignitaries and the elite of the town. The essay reverberated like thunder and was read everywhere. It gave the local governor an opportunity to put al-ʿAkkād under surveillance and to win favour with the English Inspector with whom al-ʿAkkād had had trouble. A short while later al-ʿAkkād was informed of a secret report sent to the Ministry of the Interior at Cairo demanding his arrest and exile. Therefore, he decided to flee from Aswān in the early hours of morning. Next day he was in the office of the British

1. See the poem "Fi Aswān", Diwan al-ʿAkkād, pp.115-16.
2. Al-ʿAkkād, al-Fusul, Cairo, 1922, pp.87-94. See the footnote, p.127.
Adviser in the Ministry of the Interior at Cairo, to whom he had to present himself every day for some time.¹

The war years represented in al-‘Akkād’s life a crucial point. They were a period of spiritual and religious crisis the germ of which had been sown in the previous years, when he awoke to find himself in an alien world, when the moral perplexity and paradoxes of the age made him see the world as an illusion, and death as the sole truth. In 1913 he wrote:

"We live in an age which shatters the tranquility of the spirit and shows itself to be hell-on-earth, an age characterized by dismay, vacillation, boredom, and weariness. The past is too old and the future uncertain. The gulf is so wide between what ought to be and what is, that vexation grips the heart and darkness envelops our world. It is a strange world which confronts every man. It is the poet, the man of imagination and keen sense, who suffers; to him the gap between the ideal world and reality is much wider than it appears to the ordinary man. It is inevitable that the modern poets should appear discontented and morbid... The transition is so radical and destructive that one is ever reminded of the pre-French Revolution period, which was likewise an age of doubt, bewilderment, and perplexity... Today we see nothing but moral degeneration and distortion of nature."²

In spite of this mental suffering and ennui he still retained his hope. But the war seems to have hastened the course of his spiritual crisis, which, then, took on a religious colouring.

"The years of the First World War were years of mental and spiritual anguish to the three of us (al-‘Akkād, al-Mazīnī and Shukrī). Shukrī gave vent to it in the gloomy and angry poems in the third and fourth collections of his poetry, and I in the long poem Tarjamat Shayṭan (The Biography of Satan), which I wrote in the (European) tradition of epic poetry."³

³ Al-‘Akkād, Ba‘d al-A‘āṣir, Cairo, 1950, p.145.
painful experience regarding moral values, the social system and the intellectual life of humanity."

He believed that the past ages had never seen such experiences, and that the chronicles of history recorded no such period of terror.¹

In the days preceding the War al-‘Akkād had been engaged in re-reading Darwin's theory of evolution and Nietzsche's philosophy of will-to-power and Superman; these left him obsessed by the notion of the struggle for existence.² But, as has already been said, his hope was still strong. In his treatise Majma’al-Ahyā’ (The Congress of the Living), written at the beginning of the War, he expressed his hope in the form of a belief that the law of God and the law of nature work in harmony towards one end.³ In the course of the War, which seemed endless, this hope faded leaving him in the grip of despair.

There were many factors which contributed to al-‘Akkād's spiritual crisis and gave it a religious tinge. The War years were years of moral degeneration in Egypt; young men were driven to sins and loose-living, and pursued every kind of enticement. The piety of the old men appeared as false as that of a disarmed thief. This state afflicted al-‘Akkād's heart and found expression in his poetry. The unsettled economic state, the rise of prices, the gathering of the national wealth in the hands of a small minority, and the suffering of the

poor. he conceived as a choice between spirit and matter.¹

Al-‘Akkād’s reading also contributed to his spiritual crisis. It included Schopenhauer’s pessimistic philosophy, which speaks of the irrational as the real, the will-to-live as blind and purposeless, represents human actions as evil, and reason as the agent of the blind will. He also read Nordau’s The Interpretation of History, which denies any purpose in the process of history, any world-order, and any divine will in the life of man, and depicts history as a painful meaningless course, as a biography of might, or as an uninterrupted conspiracy against the truth, life force as blind, parasitism as the sole motive behind human institutions and civilisations, and human beliefs as a world of illusion. Milton’s Paradise Lost and Goethe’s Faust were also among the books that he read. The Arab poet who occupied a good deal of his time was al-Ma‘arri, whose poems portray life as being sinister, and existence as a destructive drama, the life of the individual as a painful course which should be avoided, the irrational as the real, the knowledge of reality as beyond the reach of man, and raises many doubts in the face of religion.²

It was natural that he should have seen life in a sinister guise, and represented it as a stage held by ‘satans’. He grew weary of life, despaired of knowledge and acutely sensitive of death. His eagerness for death conflicted with his love for life,

1. Diwān al-‘Akkād, pp. 49, 105, 111.
and the dilemma led him to desire death as a trance, as an absence of sensation, or as a sleep from which he could return to life.\(^1\)

He was still suffering from an unstable financial life, for he was unable to compromise his principles for the sake of work. After his arrival in Cairo he was appointed to the office of censorship. But a few days later he found himself free from the work. He says that he resigned because he was charged with work which disagreed with his political views and national feeling. Later he was employed for a year with al-Mazin\(\ddot{\text{i}}\) in Cairo Secondary School, and for another year in W\(\ddot{\text{a}}\)d\(\ddot{\text{i}}\) an-N\(\ddot{\text{a}}\)l Secondary School. In the former he met Ahmad Hasan az-Zayyat and ‘Al\(\dot{\text{i}}\) al-Jundi.\(^2\)

At the beginning of 1918, when his spiritual crisis and mental suffering reached their culmination, he was unemployed living in the Sharif suburb on the fringes of the desert. He describes the suburb as a stage between the world of life and the world of death.\(^3\) In these days he appears to have composed his poem The Biography of Satan which he introduced thus:

"A gloomy cloud of doubt had enveloped my mind, oppressed my spirit, and shattered the very basis of my thought, so that I saw the world as a vanity of vanity and vexation of spirit."\(^4\)

The poem was written under the influence of Milton's Paradise Lost. It relates a story of a devil who grows bored with

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4. Quoted by Ramzi\(\ddot{\text{m}}\) Mift\(\ddot{\text{a}}\)h, Rasa‘il an-Nak\(\ddot{\text{d}}\), p.88.
tempting people and loses his faith in evil because he finds no differences between the virtuous and libertines. He, thus, abandons his evil plots and breaks with his divinely appointed task of putting people to temptation and suffering. Yet God accepts his repentance and admits him to Paradise. In Paradise he also grows tired of his idle life and aspires to divinity and perfection, that is, to God's position. This results in his organizing a revolt against God. Having failed to achieve his ambition, he prefers the punishment of being a lifeless statue to subjection. His statue, a beautiful work of art, does not fail to charm people and teach them the magical powers of art which infuses life with the colours of perfection and by which man transcends his mortal conditions and becomes a creator, that is, a rival to God.¹

At its roots, the poem is a political one expressed in religious form. In it 'evil' is synonymous with 'tyranny', and 'goodness' with 'liberty' and 'equality'. Its Satan is not a lover of evil but a seeker of freedom, equality and perfection. In his rebellion against God he was revolting against his pre-determined destiny; he is merely refusing to be a subject or an agent without will and freedom. God is depicted as a tyrant, an absolute ruler who governs His subjects, not according to their will, but to His own, and by methods totally incomprehensible to them. He bestows His graces on those who demand nothing and denies them to those in need of them. He also punishes those

¹. Diwan al-'Akkad, pp.238-54.
who seek knowledge, and favours the contented and ignorant.

Thus the disaster of the War, the killing and famines, despotism and oppression of people shook al-‘Akkād’s religious faith. He saw the religious creeds and their followers as supporting ruthless kings and rulers, and found no hope in the world. The failure of his satan or hero, that is, of the fighter for liberty, equality and perfection, appeared to him inevitable. Hence his views of the world as vanity of vanity and vexation of spirit. But in so far as the poem is religious, it does not exhibit a loss of faith but only dissatisfaction with the religious conceptions of God and man.

After the War al-‘Akkād appears to have recovered his hope, but not his faith. In an essay on Jibrān’s al-Mawākib (The Processions), which calls for a return to nature as a remedy for the evils of life, attributed to society and civilisation, he criticises the philosophy of rebellion which he had already advocated in The Biography of Satan.

"Rebellion against the bonds of social life, and return to the forest are wrong and harmful. Nature is the mother of all bonds, and is crueler than society. Its laws are more ruthless than those of society. Civilisation polishes and ornaments the chains in order to make them bearable, whereas nature does not heed the chains or the chained. Civilisation may suffer defects, but primitive life is unbearable."  

Whatever discontent the essay shows, it marks a step on a new path.

Al-‘Akkād wrote this essay in 1919 while working on the Alexandria newspaper al-Ahālī, the organ of Muḥammad Sa’īd Pasha.

He began his work, which lasted for a year, towards the close of the War, and resigned when he could no longer agree with the policy of the newspaper.\(^1\) When the 1919 Revolution took place, he joined, it is said, the secret organization known as The Group of the Black Hand, and wrote its leaflets.\(^2\) After the failure of the Revolution, he lived in fear of trial, which led him to burn his diary of the previous months and a parcel containing his papers, letters and photographs.\(^3\) He seems to have remained engaged in politics until 1921 and worked on the newspaper \textit{al-Ahram}.\(^4\)

In the middle of the winter of 1921 he fell ill and left for Aswan, where his illness grew serious and left him no hope of recovery. He was overcome by despair and haunted by the vision of death.\(^5\) However, the critical stage of his illness was of short duration. In the summer he travelled to Cairo to publish his third collection of poems \textit{Ashbah al-Assil} (The Afternoon Shadows), which he presented to Zaghlul, his nationalist hero, as a sign of admiration.\(^6\) During the period of his illness reading offered him some solace; and as he sought imaginative compensation, his reading was confined to works dealing with sensual pleasures, and religious and philosophical questions such as the existence of God, the world of the unknown and life after death.\(^7\)

\(^2\) Muhammad Tahir al-Jablāwī, "Al-\'Akkād as-Siyāsī", in \textit{Al-\'Akkād, Dirāsah wa Tahiyyah}, p. 62.
\(^5\) Abd ar-Raḥmān Śidkī, "Al-\'Akkād Kama \textit{\'Araftuh}", in \textit{Al-\'Akkād, Dirāsah wa Tahiyyah}, p. 102. See also Al-\'Akkād, \textit{\'Alam as-Sudūb wa al-Kuyūd}, Cairo, 1937, p. 41.
\(^6\) Al-\'Akkād, \textit{Sa\‘d Zaghlūl}, p. 604.
\(^7\) Al-\'Akkād, \textit{\'Alam as-Sudūb wa al-Kuyūd}, p. 41.
In the winter of 1922 he paid many visits to the Pharaonic ruins and monuments, where he spent, in solitude, happy hours speculating on religion and history, and where he felt the holiness of history, the purity of divine and abstract beauties, and the presence of eternity. On a visit to Luxor he read Tagore's religious lectures Sadhnah, which set him to re-thinking about religion and modern culture. When he came to the end of Tagore's work he wrote to one of his friends, probably al-Māzīnī, in Cairo:

"I have just read Tagore's Sadhnah in its entirety. It is one of the greatest and most worthwhile works in the world. I do not mean that I have received it in absolute faith, nor that it says everything about the secret of life ... I do not doubt that Tagore has derived many of his ideas from ancient Hindu philosophy. Yet he is so original and creative in his interpretations, that he never fails to convince his readers."

Four years later he also wrote:

"I read the book among the monuments and ruined temples of Luxor. Thus I could interrelate Hindu wisdom with that of (Pharaonic) priests, despite their differences in outward form and essence. The one rejects matter and moves from body to spirit and the origin of life; the other holds sacred matter and its various forms, be they animals, plants, or inanimate objects, and gives to every spiritual notion a concrete and visible shape. The one regards this life as casual and vain, and as a passage to an eternal life in which there is no nourishment, pleasure, or hope save the relationship with the origin of existence and the secret of secrets; the other conceives death as a path leading to another life in which man enjoys sustenance and every necessity and hopes for former sensuous pleasures. This contrast between the two kinds of wisdom was perhaps that which revealed to me their ultimate aims and essence."

In the letters which al-‘Akkād wrote to his friend he discussed religion and European civilisation in the light of Tagore's views.

"I firmly believe that no Western (thinker or saint) whom we know has reached the spiritual peak already reached by the saints and philosophers of the East... To believe this you need only recall the fact that no prophet has come from Europe, and that the religion of Europe itself was produced in the East. After reading Hindu philosophy one can see the smallness of the greatest spiritual hero of the West compared with the prophets of India. It seems to me that the function of Western civilisation is nothing more than to raise our material life to a level parallel to that of Eastern spirituality... In this way the West appears like a strong servant travelling along the road which his Eastern master had already crossed... "Modern Western civilisation has no deep root in the spirit of man. In three or four decades Japan has acquired knowledge and produced industries in no way inferior to the knowledge and industries of the West. "I deny that Western civilisation has produced spiritual progress equal to that of the East. "What it produced is sciences and industries which may succeed in narrowing the gap between the spiritual and material facets of man's life."1

The letters say nothing about al-‘Akkād's new faith. If we are to get at this faith we must go to his essay "Bayn Allah wa al-Tabī’ah" (Between God and Nature), which seems to have been written among the Pharaonic ruins. The essay breathes a mystical atmosphere in which God is identified with Nature. The most characteristic passage is:

"(In this garden) each tree is a living being, a branch growing out of the heart of the Power which has created life... To think of the origin of life, of its beginning and end; is to find yourself perplexed and confused... But the moment you sit down in a fragrant garden and see the spirit of life moving in the trunks, boughs and leaves, you find yourself in the presence of the Power which created you, and in which lies your beginning and end, at the eternal fountain of life separated from absolute death by millions and millions of years... Each bush appears to have a story to tell you, an old hidden secret to whisper to you... Every time I have listened to this whispered word or secret I have found myself face to face with the questions: Is there a better place than this for the worship of God? Is not God closer to us in the places where life breathes and plants grow? Why do people not worship their Lord in orchards and meadows?"

1. Al-‘Akkād, al-Fusul, pp.139-131, 145.
In the gardens, I know, man is in the presence of life, but he is in the presence of eternity in the temples, where he can think of death rather than of life, or of that all-inclusive and everlasting life, not the life of an ending being.

... Worship and death are closely related to each other. Therefore, if we have to worship God, where life grows and plants live, let us worship Him in distant and abandoned forests which remain after the death of man.\

In these words al-‘Akkad seems to associate the religious experience with the aesthetic one, and to think that through the aesthetic feeling of beauty man performs his religious function. He thinks of the world as something eternal and everlasting, something which has no end other than itself. He also thinks of beauty as the ultimate aim of the world. He believes in the identity of spirit and matter and conceives the world as material and spiritual at the same time. To him, the belief in the oneness of existence, in the identification of God with the universe, or in the sensuous aspects of the world as sacred manifestations of God is an essential feature of every religion and creed.

3. The Mature Years; Politics and Love Affairs. 1922-1942.

"After he (al-‘Akkad) recovered his health his love of life grew deep-rooted and vigorous. The triumph over illness strengthened his vanity, self-esteem, self-confidence, and above all his sense of dignity. It also gave energy to his tendency towards fighting, rivalry and resistance, which are all evident in his literary production."

Mahmūd Taymūr, Malāmīḥ wa Ghuqūn

1. Al-‘Akkad, Muṭala‘āt ... op.cit. pp.192-4.
2. Al-‘Akkad, al-Fusūl, p.A.B.
"Al-Ma'arrī was my intimate friend in the past twenty years ... His dissatisfaction (with life), his pride which is mixed with bitterness, his sorrows, his silent rebellion, and his true anger which refuses repentance were what attracted me in him. With the lapse of time I cherished every kind of suffering and met every type of bad man that I have already imagined. Yet instead of growing more discontented with things and more inclined towards rebellion ... I felt changed. I opened my second volume of life with a digression irrelevant to the context of the first volume. Today I respect al-Ma'arrī but never consult him. I listen to his words but not to his discontent with life..."¹

In these words, which occur in an essay on al-Ma'arrī written in 1923, al-'Akkād has recorded the change that he underwent after his recovery. His mental outlook and views of the world, essentially changed. Yet his psychology remained almost the same; his sense of the meaninglessness of life retreated to a dark lair, but did not die. Leopardi, Heine, and Thomas Hardy, the three great European pessimistic spirits, remained his most favourite poets. In their poems he heard the voice of his own soul.² However, he became more settled and content, more realistic and less of a dreamer.³

The change is shown both in his thought and his way of life. He adopted vegetarianism and followed a strict and regular system in his meals, sleep, and leisure-hours. Moderation became his first principle in life.⁴ He abandoned the belief in rebellion and saw in it a superficial wisdom. He says that our sympathy and admiration must be directed not towards the pessimist who rebels against life because he finds nothing in it save evil and disorder, but towards the optimist who rebels

1. Al-'Akkād, Muṣala'at ... op.cit., p.74.
2. Al-'Akkād, A'qāṣīr Maghrib, p.5.
against the obstacles and bonds because he sees in life righteousness, splendour and beauty. He also says that the bonds of necessity are the measure of our capacity for freedom in the way the restrictions of the acrobat are the measure of his skill and art. Our duty is not to complain of the shackles of life but to learn how to move and run with them as though we were altogether free. For without rules and laws life turns into chaos, and without necessity freedom has no meaning. We must create liberty out of law, joy out of duty, and order out of disorder.¹

He thinks of pain as a necessity, as a virtue of life, as something indispensable for human life, and describes life as man's capacity for pain. He writes that without pain life cannot exist, that man can be aware of himself only when he is aware of other things in harmony or out of harmony with him in the world. If he is to enjoy pleasure and love, he must know pain and hatred. The man who desires a painless life is a man who wants to live alone in the world, life which cannot be imagined, and if imagined is scarcely else he wants not is bearable; or to be in complete unconsciousness of the other things around him in the world, life which in no way differs from death; or to find pleasure in all things, whether in harmony or disharmony with him, life which includes the thing and such a attempts to combine two opposites, and such a contradiction. Therefore, al-'Akkād concludes that the man who rejects pain has to reject life.²

Life was no longer meaningless to him, though its meaning, he says, is to be created by man. In his view, man can make

¹. Al-'Akkād, Muṭala'at ..., op.cit. pp.17-8, 209, 219.
². Ibid., pp.254-5.
life meaningful by fulfilling his duty, living in sympathy with others, developing his spiritual powers, and subjecting his desires to his intellect. Sacrifice, not utility, must be his principle in life. Man suffers not from death but from imperfection. His task is, therefore, to elevate the level of his life and increase its scope. Al-‘Akkad also says that the meaning of life depends on our belief in the Hidden Will which has created us and which stands behind our moral sentiment. This belief, he writes, must be the basis of every research.¹

In al-Ma‘arrī he found a thinker who, because of his lack of imagination and insight, failed to distinguish between truth and falsehood, between the will of the individual and the will of life, and saw the former alone at work in the world. While criticizing al-Ma‘arrī he writes:

"We must condemn every philosophy which rejects what is called the fallacies of life", for to him

"there is nothing truer and deeper than these fallacies."² Max Nordau appeared to him as a writer without a message. He lacked the three characteristics of every great writer, deep insight, sound apprehension, and enthusiasm of spirit.³ He also wrote several essays in the criticizing of Anatole France and other agnostic writers. He says that the Power which directs the course of life can never be agnostic, and that the statement "Everything is equal to nothing" is meaningless.⁴

Al-‘Akkād's sojourn in Aswān lasted for eighteen months or so. In the summer of 1922 he returned to Cairo.¹ At the time the nationalist movement was re-establishing itself with the emergence of the Wafād Party under the leadership of Zaghlūl. The new political situation and the struggle for independence soon drew al-‘Akkād to the centre of the battle. His political views were clear and firm from the very beginning. In an essay, written in 1922, on the Arabic translation of Le Bon's Les Lois Psychologiques de L'Évolution de Peuples he expressed these views. He enthusiastically defended democracy and socialism against their critics. To him, democracy and socialism are indivisible; the one means freedom and individualism, the other equality and justice. He writes:

"It is not the aim of socialism to establish absolute equality between people. Rather its aim is to establish a correspondence between wages and labour, to assign wages according to labour, to offer the opportunity of work to every member of the community, and to benefit the community from the capacity of every member. In aiming at equality, socialism does not deny the natural differences between men, between their capacities and powers, but pays sufficient attention to them. Otherwise socialism turns into tyranny and injustice."²

In October, 1923, if not earlier, he joined the staff of al-Balāgh, the organ of the Wafād Party. This brought him into close friendship with Zaghlūl, which lasted until the death of the latter in 1928. He retained, however, his independence of Zaghlūl, and did not officially become a member of the Wafād Party. When he sometimes followed Zaghlūl's views he did so because he found them in harmony with his own views.³

¹. 'Abd ar-Rahmān Sidkī, "Al-‘Akkād Kama 'Arafahu", op.cit. p.102.
³. Al-‘Akkād, Sa'd Zaghlūl, pp.558,604.
In the following years his literary and political activities went side by side. Politics and literature meant much the same to him.

"Like literature, politics attract me as a humanistic principle, and not as fanatical enthusiasm and partisanship, as an artistic task, and not as the application of rigid laws and rules. In my political career I am like a man reading history or fiction, siding with the honest person who finds himself in a weak position against his ignoble but able opponent. I am not the politician who works for the sake of politics and sees nothing in the world save voters and parties, support and opposition, bills and constitutions."1

Yet sometimes politics left him very little time for literature.

During his work on al-Balagh al-'Akkad was introduced to the literary salon of Mayy Ziyadah, where he met the outstanding figures of the age. Since this time he began a close friendship with Mayy. He says that his views often conflicted with hers. Yet their divergence of views failed to drive them apart, and his admiration for her both as a writer and as a woman remained deep.2

It is said that Hind in al-'Akkad's novel Sarah and in the collection of poems entitled Ashjân al-Layl (The Night Sorrows) is Mayy under another name.3 In the former we find two or three references to Hind; the main one being:

"When Hammâm (the hero of the novel) met Sarah he was already in love with another woman ... for whose letters or telephone calls he waited with as much longing as a lover awaiting the hour of meeting his beloved. They corresponded and conversed frequently ... Yet they remained strangers to each other like two trees whose branches touch in the air while their trunks stand poles apart, or like two actors in a drama of love playing a part and nothing more..."4

1. Al-'Akkad, Muraja‘at fi al-‘Adab wa al-Funun, pp.24-5.
3. Nim‘mat Ahmad Fu’ad, "Lamahat min Hayat al-‘Akkad", op.cit.p.121
The Night Sorrows contains two short poems concerning this love. They depict it as a brief experience which faded before it had ripened, and express a deep regret for its premature death.\(^1\) It is difficult to know how faithful al-'Akkād was to reality in these writings of his. What seems to be certain is that he felt a passion, something like love, for Majy. He continued to visit her until her last days.\(^2\) Her death left him stricken with grief, which he expressed in a sad elegy.\(^3\)

Al-'Akkād's love for Sarāh seems to have taken place in 1924 and to have lasted for more than a year. It began one winter and ended in the following one. Sarāh was a divorced, highly educated Christian girl of twenty-three. In the first two or three months, which were a happy period, they used to meet frequently. They spent their evening either in his flat or went to a picture-house. At some weekends they went on picnics to the Pyramids or the suburbs of Cairo. He was quite happy with this course of events. But Sarāh was a restless woman whose life floated according to her desires. The summer was a period of crisis and suffering. She left for her summer residence, while he stayed in Cairo. Both were in despair of meeting each other again. In her summer residence she had some love-affair with another man. After her return to Cairo she told him everything and asked him for forgiveness. He seems to have had no choice but to accept the fact. But since then their

\(^1\) Diwan al-'Akkād, pp.299-300.
\(^2\) Al-'Akkād, Bayn al-Kutub wa an-Nās, Cairo, 1952, pp.93, 96.
\(^3\) Al-'Akkād, Aqṣīr Maghrib, pp.112-18.
relationship grew uneasy. He could no longer trust her, yet he continued to nourish his love. They quarrelled and sometimes parted for a week or two at a time. As time passed his suspicions grew deep-rooted. They were, he says, like the walls of a dark prison drawing closer and closer every day until the prisoner felt breathless.

In the novel al-‘Akkād is a neurotic man, a dreamer painfully divided within himself. He is often portrayed listening to conflicting voices and unable to make a decision. In indulging in self-deception he felt as if he was playing a cheerful role at his own funeral. Eventually he could not escape the reality. He felt that his pleasures had gone leaving no trace of the past. Thus after a quarrel he returned to Sarah her letters and photos and received from her his own tokens. Their final separation left him in distress and grief. His life appeared to him meaningless and hollow. He sought consolation in books, music and other kinds of entertainment.

In these years al-‘Akkād spent his leisure-hours reading and going to the theatre, where he saw Shakespeare’s Hamlet and Othello, and Ibsen’s Ghosts. In the Opera House he spent enjoyable hours watching the famous Russian dancer Pavlova or listening to European orchestras. Among the European writers who received his admiration were Blasco Ibáñez, Merezhkovsky, Pirandello and Paul Bourget. In Merezhkovsky’s novels he admired the portraying of history as an oscillation.

between two tendencies or principles, the Hellenistic principle of the purity of flesh, and the Judeo-Christian principle of the purity of spirit, and the representation of the goal of history as being the synthesis of the two principles.\(^1\) He also read Kipling, Shakespeare, Tagore, Maurice Maeterlink, Lessing, Ibsen, Goethe, Schiller, Heine, Bernard Shaw and Thomas Hardy, and published essays on most of them. His admiration of Lessing was particularly directed towards *The Laocoon.*\(^2\) In Kipling he admired what he calls "the poetry of the passer-by", the poetry which portrays the objects and situations of daily life in the colours of the dream-like.\(^3\) In Hardy's poetry he found himself very much at home, saw his self-image and heard his own voice. Yet he did not think of Hardy as one of the first rate poets. However, he regarded his poetry as a true record of life.

"Hardy's pessimism is not the pessimism of an angry soul which cuts itself off from the world and feels no sympathy with people, or the pessimism of a sordid, selfish spirit that sees nothing good in the world and condemns people. It is rather the pessimism of a man who shows an immense and profound sympathy with his fellow-men and mourns for their savage and cruel destiny. If he wishes their death, he does so not because he hates them but because he feels in sympathy with them and pities their sufferings."\(^4\)

In 1927 he took a special interest in biography. Already at an earlier date the biographies of Carlyle and Plutarch had excited his admiration. He now turned to the modern biographies such as Emile Ludwig, André Maurois and Lytton Strachey.\(^5\) He

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3. Ibid, pp.399-400.
spent the winter of the following year reading literary and scientific works on birds and sought in them imaginative pleasure and compensation.

"In these writings I found compensation for the songs of the birds which had flown away or were silent in the winter months. I accompanied Benjamin Kidd in his solitary communion with nature, travelled with Cole Porter in his world of music, and listened with Edward Gray to the songs of spring and autumn."

These months might have been a period of preparation for writing the collection of poems *Hadiyyat al-Karawan* (The Present of The Curlew), which appeared five years later.

In 1928 Egypt was suffering from the dictatorship of Muhammad Mahmud Pasha. Fighting against the tyranny of the King and his prime minister, al-'Akkad rode the storm to the end. His political writings in *al-Balagh* and *Kawkab ash-Shark* led the government to close them down. He then wrote *Al-yukm al-Mulak fi al-Karn al-‘Ishrin* (The Absolute Government in the Twentieth Century), in which he defended freedom and democracy against all kinds of dictatorship. The following year the Wafd Party was in power, and al-'Akkad was a member of the Parliament. A new constitution was formulated, but King Fu‘ad, dissatisfied with it, suppressed from it two items "The Nation is the source of all powers" and "The Government is responsible to Parliament" and worked to win to his side the members of the Parliament. In an essay al-'Akkad argued that the Parliament is the only authority which has the right to discuss and modify the constitution. A short while later the Wafd Cabinet was

dismissed by the King and a new one formed. In a speech in the Parliament al-‘Akkād referring to the King said: "The supreme head is ruining the constitution". He also wrote many essays against the new government.¹

In the summer of the next year he intended to visit London and other European cities as a member of the delegation to the international parliamentary conference which was held in the British Capital. But a few days before the date of his journey he was informed that his political writings were being examined by some governmental body in order to find justification for putting him in jail. This led him to give up his journey and stay in Cairo. On 12th October he was summoned to appear in court. The following day he was tried and put in jail.²

Prison conditions considerably affected his health. The bad conditions of prison caused him a great deal of trouble in his health. He spent his time, however, reading, observing the other prisoners and attending the circles of the preachers who visited the prison from time to time. He read H.G. Wells' The Outline of History and André Maurois' biography of Byron, in which he sought in imagination for the movement he lacked in reality. He says that he chose these two works because the one is a voyage across the ocean of history, and the other a biography of a poet whose life was a journey. He also spent some of his time learning French. But he does not seem to have persevered in it. On 8th July, 1931, he was released. Zaghlūl's tomb was the first place he visited.³

3. Ibid., pp.40-41, 46, 56-7, 84-6, 98, 165-73.
The years which followed were years of literary activity, political struggle, and love affairs. To the end of 1931 al-'Akkād published his famous study on Ibn ar-Rumī, which he began in 1928, and in which he appears under the influence of Carlyle's biographies of Schiller and Goethe; also his essay on Burns. In the same year he wrote his critical essay on Shawkī's play Kambīz. In the next year he wrote his study Tadhkar Goethe (The Commemoration of Goethe). In 1933 he published two collections of poems The Present of Curlew and Vaḥy al-Arba‘īn (The Inspiration of the Age of Forty). The former shows echoes from Wordsworth poems The Green Linnet and To The Cuckoo and Shelley's To A Skylark. The two collections raised a storm in the literary atmosphere. There was a new group of romantic poets gathering around Abū Shādī whose mouth-piece was Apollo. In his journal Abū Shādī published an essay on The Inspiration of the Age of Forty. Though the essay was accurate on many points and of moderate tone, it dissatisfied al-'Akkād. Thus the essay was the starting-point of a literary battle between the Apollo group and al-'Akkād and his disciples such as 'Abd ar-Rahmān Sidkī, Sayyid Kuṭb and Kāmil ash-Shinnāwī. At the same time Muṣṭafā Ṣādik ar-Rāfī’ī and Ramzī Miftāḥ published a series of inaccurate and slovenly essays on al-'Akkād's poetry and personality. In return al-'Akkād wrote several violent essays in al-Jihād newspapers attacking the Apollo group, ar-Rāfī’ī and Miftāḥ. Several newspapers such as

al-Ahrām, al-Balāgh and Rose al-Yūsuf sided with al-'Akkād against his critics.

The quarrel was not, however, merely literary; it was political as well. Though the Apollo group was purely literary, writers such as al-'Akkād and Tāhā Husayn, who were staunchly fighting against the dictatorship of Sidkī, suspected it of supporting Sidkī's regime. This might have been connected with the financial aid which the Apollo group received from the government.

In these days al-'Akkād's political writings were echoing throughout Egypt, and his large audience as a political writer thought of him as the greatest writer of the age. On 27th April, 1934, The Wafd Party organized a ceremony for al-'Akkād as the nationalist poet. Tāhā Husayn was among the speakers. In his speech he said that in modern times no Arab poet save al-'Akkād had received his admiration. For in al-'Akkād's poetry he finds the voice and image of his own soul as well as the voice and image of the new Egyptian generation. In his view al-'Akkād has opened a new horizon to the Arab poets. He went on to say that if we are to find a poetical genius comparable to al-'Akkād's, we must look for it not among Arab poets but among the European ones such as Goethe, Valléry and Milton. He ended his speech with the words:

"Give to al-'Akkād the standard of poetry and say to the poets and writers 'gather around it' ..." [1]

Tāhā Husayn's speech initiated a long controversy in the newspapers, periodicals and literary circles.

1. Al-'Akkād, Dirāsah wa Tahiyya, pp. 227-32.
The year 1934 saw the fall of Ṣiḏkī and the rise to power of Tawfīk Nasīm who was supported by the Wafd Party. The Wafd Party believed that the function of Nasīm's government was to prepare for a new general election and for the promulgation of the constitution. Al-‘Akkād, however, realized there was an intended deception behind Nasīm's government and argued that Nasīm did not differ from his predecessor. He wrote, therefore, a series of violent essays against the new government, in which he exposed the trick and the intentions of Nasīm. This led him into a dispute with Mustafā an-Nahḥās, the leader of the Wafd Party after Zaghlūl. A meeting was held between the two men, but it failed to bring about a reconciliation. The hot argument which occurred between them put an end to al-‘Akkād's relationship with the Wafd Party. He left al-Balāgh and joined Rose al-Yusuf, where he continued his severe, sometimes satirical, criticism against Nasīm's government.1 However, a short time later the Wafd Party withdrew its support from Nasīm and turned against his government. This paved the way for al-‘Akkād's return to al-Balāgh in the following year.2

In 1936 al-‘Akkād was elected to Parliament as an independent member. The rift was growing wider between him and the Wafd Party which won the election and formed the Cabinet. When the Wafd government signed the Anglo-Egyptian treaty of 1936, he wrote a series of articles in Misr al-Fatah in which

he bitterly criticised the new Agreement. During his four years membership of the Parliament he joined the Sa‘d Party and came to an understanding with the Court.

In these years al-‘Akkād seems to have had two love-experiences; the one began late in 1931 and lasted for some months; the other took place in 1939 and lasted for four years or so. Like his love of Sārah, the first ended in failure, but was less bitter. His poems depict the first days of it as a happy period. He heard of him either of meeting with his beloved or of anticipation and yearning for her letters. Yet his happiness was checked by the malignity and interference of people which caused him a month of separation, a month of longing and bewilderment. During this month the warbling of birds was a sad lament to his ears, and the sparkling stars were dimmed in his eyes. When he was reunited with his beloved the world recovered its vividness, joyful colours and magical sounds. But his new happiness was brief. He soon fell a victim to doubts, imaginings and morbid thoughts. He used to imagine his beloved surrounded or followed by the eyes of others, or betraying him with another man. This image struck like a knife in his veins. Their final separation left him broken-hearted, and his life seemed to him a burden he was carrying on his shoulders.

2. This is suggested by a poem composed by al-‘Akkād in 1933 in praise of King Faruq, See A‘āslr Maghrib, pp.85-8.
The second experience was, generally speaking, a happy one, though it was interrupted by a crisis and short separation. In it al-‘Akkād appears less sentimental than he was before and more capable of curbing the flow of his emotion.1

With the outbreak of the Second World War the tide of the local political struggle ebbed leaving the stage to the world strife between the fascist and liberal camps. From the very beginning al-‘Akkād, who sided with the democratic camp, foresaw the defeat of Hitler, for, to him, tyranny can never win a final triumph. In 1940 he wrote two books Hitler fī al-Mīzān (Hitler Examined) and Al-Nāziyyah wa al-Adyan (Nazism and Religions) denouncing the naziist and fascist doctrines. (The second is a collection of broadcast lectures). But with the following year his political activity came to an end, though he was a senator for the nine or ten years between 1941 and 1950.

4. The Years of Retirement; Solitude and Religion.
1942-1964.

O' our Lord, have we not given thee our souls
In the past and present wars?
So give us peace in our remaining days.

Al-‘Akkād, A‘āsīr Maghrib.

"While I was thinking of publishing my new collection of poems and choosing a suitable title for it I read

Thomas Hardy's lines:

"I look into my glass
And view my wasting skin
And say, 'Would God it came to pass
My heart had shrunk as thin.

For then, I undistrest
By heart grown cold to me,
Could lonely wait my endless rest
With equanimity.

But time, to make me grieve,
Part steals, lets part abide;
And shakes this fragile frame at eve
With throbings of noontide."

When I came to the end of these lines I had already chosen
the title of this collection of poems ... 'Storms in the
Sunset' is a suitable title for the poems contained in this
collection, for they were written when the world was in the
grip of storms and when my heart had its own storms
similar to those which shook the old Hardy and led him to
wish that his heart had shrunk like his wasting skin.'

In these words al-‘Akkād has referred to his new spiritual
dejection during the years of the Second World War. He has
expressed this dejection in many poems such as 'Ya Rab wa Ya
Khalk', 'Karibun Karib', 'Ba's at-Tughān', and 'Kult Lih-Mirrih'. In
June, 1942, when the German troops reached the western frontier
of Egypt, his crisis and suffering attained their culmination.
Overwhelmed by despair he left Cairo for the Sudan, where he
stayed until the defeat of Rommel. He has recorded his
feelings the night before his trip in the following words:

"When Rommel's troops reached al-‘Alamayn and were about to
cross it to al-‘Amiriyyah, Cairo and Alexandria, the tragedy
was precipitated. I considered death rather than
capture at the hands of men who were experts at punishment
and torture. To wait for humiliation was to contradict
all the human principles that man lives for. This was not,
however, the whole tragedy. The night before, the night of
slaughter as it was later called, was more disastrous."

1. Al-‘Akkād, A’asir Maghrib, pp.6-7.
It saw my boldest struggle against the past, a struggle incomparable with any struggle against the future which is unknown. In the light of death all my possessions seemed worthless. I left my books to the mercy of God ... There was nothing else worthy save a parcel of papers which contained the secrets and treasures of my life, in defence of which man prefers to die. Two hours of deep thinking passed before I tore up the first paper, but in a few minutes the parcel was reduced to a blackened heap of ashes."

With this crisis opened the fourth and last chapter of al-'Akkād's life. In the following years he devoted himself mainly to religious studies and writings. Solitude became the distinguishing feature of his life. He lived in his study as though in a monastery, and found in solitude and religious reading relief for his spleen and mental sufferings. In fact, solitude meant, to him, independence, self-discipline, and the love of freedom. He even worked out and preached a new philosophy of life based on solitude.

"Solitude or self-discipline" he says "is a virtue. The man who lives among the mass and cannot enjoy his time alone is a lost man. The mass is a zero which has no identity independently of the other numbers. It is the duty of every man to cultivate his capacity for solitude if he is to be the master of himself, and not the servant of the mass ... Man's independence and capacity for solitude are the origin of all the social virtues ..." "If I were to test the moral power of men, I would make them spend their leisure-hours locked up, each alone in a room. The one who can spend his leisure-hours alone in his room is a man of moral strength, independent thought and powerful character, whereas the one who has no capacity for solitude is hollow and useless." 2

Thus, from time to time he locked himself up in his room for a week or two. He never felt tired of solitude even when it was


coupled with the absence of every kind of entertainment. 1

Though he says that his solitary life corresponds in no way to misanthropy or a lack of sympathy with people, 2 his love of solitude was strengthened by his loss of trust in people. His last three collections of poems Abir Sabil (A Passer-by), 'Aqṣir Maghrib (Storms in the Sunset) and Bād al-'Aqṣir (After The Storms) bear evidence of his bad opinion and distrust of people. It is sufficient to mention the poem Bayt Yatakallam (A House Speaks) in which the house symbolizes the world, and the tenants exemplify different kinds of people. 3 In fact, he made no secret of his distrust of people.

"My principle in life is to depend on myself, not on the goodness of people, as though I trusted nobody." "If I have a bad opinion of people, it is because I used to think well of them in the past ... My first reaction to a man who commits a misdeed is to condemn him for a bad intention, and not to ascribe his action to ignorance or inability to distinguish between right and wrong ... People do not do honour to those who deserve it but to those who are deprived of every virtue ... I do not hope for much from people, nor do I expect them to do me justice ..." "If I were to choose a place where I can spend the rest of my life, I would choose a hill by the Red Sea away from people and their affairs. I would also prefer the companionship of an honest dog to that of a great/famous man." 4

However, he had not cut himself off from people or denied them sympathy. In fact, he preached sympathy with all creatures and made it the basis of his own life. He opened his house on Friday mornings to all students and enquirers and answered their questions and requests.

2. See Anwar al-Jundī, Aqwa' 'Alā Hayāt..., op.cit. p.73.
3. See the poem in Abir Sabil, pp.11-18.
In the twenty-one years between 1942 and 1961 he published sixty-four works apart from a very large number of essays that he contributed to magazines and periodicals such as *ar-Risālah*, *al-Hilāl*, *al-Kitāb*, and *The Journal of the Academy of The Arabic Language*. These works consisted mostly of the biographies of Muslim personalities - The Prophet and his companions - of studies on Islam such as *al-Falsafah al-Kur'āniyyah* (The Koranic Philosophy), *Māṭla‘ an-Nūr* (The Rise of Light), *al-Insān fī al-Kurʾān al-Karīm* (Man in the Noble Koran), *al-Mar‘ah fī al-Kurʾān al-Karīm* (Woman in the Noble Koran), *at-Tafkir Fāriḍah Islāmiyyah* (Thinking is an Islamic Duty), *Makā'īk al-Islām wa Abātīl Khuṣūmīh* (The Realities of Islam and The Fallacies of its Opponents), and *ad-Dīmūkraṭiyyah fī al-Islām* (Democracy in Islam) and several small studies on Muslim thinkers and philosophers like Ibn Sīnā, Ibn Rushd, al-Ghazālī, al-Kawākibī, and Muḥammad ‘Abduh.

In his solitude he derived pleasure from reading, speculation, and listening to music. His reading covered literature, painting, music, philosophy, physics, theology, botany, biology, astronomy, psychology and politics. He also gave a good deal of his time to reading travel books in which he sought an outlet for his desire for movement. He says that he loves reading not because he rejects life, but because one life is not sufficient to him, and the books alone offer him more than one life by expanding and multiplying his feelings and ideas. A book was, to him, a magnifying lens and a bridge to life. In his study he felt not like a monk in a cell separate from the
outside life, but in the midst of life where he could hear the throbs of its heart. Thus, the acquisition of knowledge became, to him, the standard by which to measure his capacity for life.¹

His pure literary reading was almost confined to poetry,² and the anthology 'Arā’is wa Shayāṭīn (Nymphs and Devils), which consists mainly of modern English poems, gives an idea of his range. He seems to have been impressed by Laurence Hope's love-poems. He wrote an essay on her in 1954 and rendered into Arabic some of her poems.³ He read comparatively few novels, mostly by Dostoyevsky, Tolstoy, Proust, Pirandello, Dickens, Bourget and Pasternak.⁴ He also translated into Arabic a collection of American short stories.

His love of music, which was always an essential element in his life, was strengthened by this solitary life. In the late hours of the winter nights he used to turn away from his bookshelves to his gramophone and records. In the summer he listened to music during the day time, and in the late hours of the night enjoyed listening on his balcony as if in a dream to the profound silence of the night, in which he found deeper and more significant music than that of the strings and instruments.

3. See al-Kitab, No.1, January, 1945, p.689 onwards. See also 'Arā’is wa Shayāṭīn, Cairo, 1945, pp.58-60.
His admiration of great composers such as Beethoven and Wagner was equal to, if not greater than, his admiration of great reformers and political leaders like Muhammad ‘Abduh and Zaghlūl. He thought that great composers were rarer in the history of humanity than the great reformers and leaders.¹

From 1950 he used to spend the winter months in his new residence in Aswan, where he visited the Pharaonic ruins and monuments and recalled there his childhood and youth. He also went on trips to the countryside and the villages outside Aswan and spent hours in the vineyards, meadows and pastures.²

His love of solitude and freedom prevented from marriage. Marriage was, to him, a chain and problem.³ In 1935 he wrote that he did not think of marriage because his life was still unsettled and his future uncertain.⁴ Six years later he said that he had not met the woman who could suit him as a wife and accept him as a husband.⁵

In his solitude he developed his religious faith, his consciousness of the universe and his sense of death. Though he was an introvert and introspective poet, he was acutely aware of things and people around him. He lived in search of sympathy with the whole of creation and of assurance that he was not cut

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adrift from the world, nor that his life was insignificant or a forgotten drop in the infinite ocean of the universe, and that the Power which created everything was aware of him and in sympathy with him.

He moved back closer to the Islamic faith. Yet the germ of the belief in the oneness of existence remained alive in his recovered faith. Religious faith remained to him, a living experience rather than a matter of thought or reasoning, a feeling stemming from the inner soul of man, not a rational idea.\(^1\) Though sometimes he thought of man as a unity or whole, he drew a distinction between man's soul and reason in relation to the religious experience;\(^2\) and in spite of his belief that natural sciences work in harmony with religious experience, he seems to distinguish between two worlds, the world of matter and the world of abstract ideas or reality.

However, he saw in the scientific idea that matter is essentially energy a new proof of the validity of a religious approach. Natural science, he says, has bridged the gap which for long separated it from religion; in conceiving matter as a mathematical notion, the natural scientists have completed the work of the theologians who hundreds of years ago established a bridge between the world of nature and that of spirit.\(^3\) He also regarded Darwin's theory of evolution as consistent with religious faith. The theory of evolution, he says, has explained the multiplicity of species without denying the fact

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3. Ibid, pp.52-4.
that these species emerged from the germ of life that God has created.¹ In his view, there are two questions or problems which face man, the question of life, his knowledge of himself and of the world he lives in, and the question of eternity. Modern sciences have succeeded in providing us with a somewhat satisfactory answer to the first question, but the answer to the second question has remained beyond their reach. Religion alone can provide us with this answer. It is, therefore, indispensable to mankind.² In his search of religious faith man is in search of the core or origin of life and of eternity. He is seeking a satisfactory answer about his place in the universe. Religion gives him the feeling that his life is inseparable from the life of the universe and brings him into contact with the universal spirit. In other words it gives his life a root and meaning.³

In developing his religious experience and faith, al-‘Akkād remained concerned with man's relationship with the universe. The religious creed, he says, represents a manifestation of man's affinity with the universe. Man has a cosmic consciousness which is one of his cognitive faculties, though not possessed by everyone. His affinity with the universe depends on this cosmic consciousness rather than on his senses and intellect. The function of religion has always been to afford man with an explanation of his cosmic consciousness and to represent this

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1. Ibid, pp.55-8.
3. Al-‘Akkād, Al-Falsafah al-Qur‘āniyyah, Cairo, 1947, pp.3-4
consciousness in words and symbols. The faithless man is unsettled and ill in mind. Disbelief is an unhealthy state which conflicts with the canons of creation; it reflects a defect in the nature of the unbeliever. The healthy minded man is not the one who lives and dies without paying attention to this everlasting world, without feeling excited to his depths before it. This led him to establish a correspondence between one's religious faith and one's feeling of the greatness and splendour of the universe.

When he concerns himself with the existence of God he says:

"I think the question of the existence of God is, before all, a question of consciousness. In addition to his self-consciousness man possesses a consciousness of the Highest Existence and the Universal Reality, for his own existence is related to this Highest Existence and receives its meaning from it." 2

Though this Highest Existence is beyond the reach of man's senses, it is not thoroughly outside the range of his cognitive powers. The perplexity of man is due to his failure to use the right faculty by which he can obtain the right knowledge of this Highest Existence. He often tried to reach this knowledge through reason which cannot grasp what lies beyond senses. Intuition, not reason, is the faculty which can provide us with a sound idea of God. It must be understood that intuition is indispensable to both reason and science in their concern with the existence of God. 3 In his research the scientist cannot

2. Ibid, p.211.
avoid depending on intuition if he is to comprehend the subject of his study, whether it falls under the reach of senses or not. In fact, theology and science work in the same direction. Theology or philosophy does not claim that the secrets of the Ultimate Reality are attainable, but that this Reality is an unavoidable hypothesis in every research.¹

Al-‘Akkād’s final faith or idea of God suffers from ambiguity, which he tried to resolve in a verbal way. He believed in God as a Personality, yet absolute and perfect. He preferred the Arabic term "dhat" to the English "personality", because he thought that the former does not restrict the notion of absoluteness and perfection.² However, he says that he reached his belief in God after long research, and it is based on philosophical rather than religious grounds.³ He found it easier to follow the view that the world is the creation of God than to follow the views of the materialists, for all the schools of materialistic philosophy, he says, suffer from contradictions and lead, therefore, to no truth, or are based on prior assumptions which cannot be proved. He also found it easier to believe in the priority of reason to matter because matter cannot create something superior to it.⁴ He remained faithful to his view that the function of Western civilisation is to narrow the gap between the material and spiritual facets of man’s life.⁵

3. Al-‘Akkād, Fi Bayti, p.60.
4. Al-‘Akkād, "Imani", op.cit. pp.23-4
In developing his religious faith he also developed his acute and morbid sense of death. Though his feeling of death remained strong, it became less painful than it was before. He sought consolation in the belief of the immortality of the soul and in the religious view that death is a path to a higher kind of life. Yet, the question of death often disturbed his spiritual tranquility and left him in doubt and perplexity. Sometimes he saw the procession of humankind as a guideless caravan which knows neither the purpose or the end of the journey nor the route.¹

This introverted and solitary life intensified his tendency to introspection and self-examination, which was what he hated most in himself and without which, he says, he would have been better satisfied with himself and with people.² Though self-examination was painful to him, it was less so than self-betrayal. He hated to unveil himself to others, even to his close friends, and to see himself stripped naked before them. He used to keep his inner feelings and secrets to himself. Self-betrayal was as painful to him as the confession of a sin for which one seeks forgiveness. His mental tensions and troubles found an outlet in poetry rather than in baring them to others or expressing them in a diary.³

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His self-consciousness, which breathes everywhere in his writings, also grew acute and vigorous. After an interview with him in 1957 a friendly journalist wrote:

"The first impression that one who enjoys a meeting with al-'Akkad receives is that the number of the first person pronouns, which he never tires of repeating, is greater than the minutes of the meeting. This self-consciousness is what his enemies call "pride", and is the most apparent characteristic of his personality. He never ceases to remind his listeners of the views which he held thirty or forty years ago, and to convince them that never in his life has he held false views."¹

¹ Ḥakhir Sāʿah, No.1190, 14th August, 1957, p.12.
"The new generation of poets who came after Shawki belonged to a school altogether different from any other school which preceded it in modern Arabic literature; they were well acquainted with English literature; and unlike the poets who appeared towards the end of the last century and whose reading in European literatures was confined to some pages of French, the new poets were well read mainly in English, but also in German, Italian, Russian, Spanish, Greek and Latin. This school benefited more from English criticism than from poetry and other literary genres. I shall not be far wrong if I say that Hazlitt was the master critic of the new poets; he taught them the meaning and function of poetry, literature and art and the methods of comparison and illustration; the new Egyptian writers greatly admired Hazlitt and read him again and again...

However, this school has not imitated English literature, but benefited from it and understood things in its light; it had its independent views of English writers; it appreciated every writer according to its own view, and not according to the views of his fellow-countrymen...

The romantic school was most predominant in English and American thought at the end of the 18th and the beginning of the 19th century; Carlyle, J.S. Mill, Shelley, Byron and Wordsworth were among the luminaries of the school. This school was followed by another school which combined romanticism with realism. The new brilliant names were those of Browning, Tennyson, Emerson, Longfellow, Poe, Whitman and Hardy... From these writers much has penetrated into the works of the Egyptian poets who came after Shawki... But the literary similarity is due to the similarity of temperament and the tendencies of the age, and not to imitation...

Al-‘Akkād, Egyptian Poets and Their Milieus in the Last Generation

"Carlyle is one of a few writers about whom we avoid to write; for our duty towards him cannot be expressed in one or ten essays; in order to explain his views we must trace back our whole literary life and recall our intellectual and spiritual experiences from their very beginning up to this moment; we have read the majority of his works and recommended them to others. His influence on the new generation of Egyptian writers who read English cannot be compared to the influence of any other writer."

Al-‘Akkād "Falsafat al-Malābis" (The Philosophy of Clothes) 1927.
CHAPTER III

THE DIWAN SCHOOL

(1) The Birth and Development of the School

While on the staff of ad-Dustur between 1907 and 1909 al-ʿAkkād engaged in formulating a new theory of poetry and expressing new critical principles. With this aim in mind he wrote critical essays on Arabic and Persian poets. The most characteristic passages were reprinted in his The Quintessence of the Diary, which appeared late in 1911.

In 1909 there also appeared a collection of poems which illustrate al-ʿAkkād's new principles. This was Shukri's volume Ẓawʾ al-Fajr (The Light of Dawn). Both al-ʿAkkād and Shukri were writing under the influence of 19th century English literature. While al-ʿAkkād was deriving his critical views from his reading of Matthew Arnold, Hazlitt and Macaulay, Shukri was drawing on the poetry of Shelley, Byron and Wordsworth as represented in Palgrave's anthology The Golden Treasury. Al-ʿAkkād was also acquainted with this anthology and wrote a number of poems along the new lines.

Beside the English influences, mainly confined to the poetic themes, structures and moods, there appear in the poetry of both Shukri and al-ʿAkkād other vigorous influences exercised by al-Bārūdī and the ʿAbbāsid poets. At any rate, the two works, al-ʿAkkād's The Quintessence of the Diary and Shukri's The Light of Dawn marked the birth of a new movement in modern Egyptian literature, which was to flourish between 1913 and 1921.

Shukri was a student in the Teachers' Training College
at Cairo. Al-Marsafī's *The Literary Method* was the most influential Arabic work in his early literary education; it formed his literary taste and led him to al-Barūdī and the 'Abbāsid poets, particularly ash-Sharīf ar-Rādi and Abū Nuwas. The *Makāmat* of al-Hamadānī were also among his early reading. The two English poets who produced profound influence on him were Byron and Shelley. They counterbalanced the influences of the 'Abbāsid poets, their conceits and hyperboles, and enabled him to discriminate the poetry of art, represented by Muslim Ibn al-Walīd, Abū Tammām, al-`Abbās Ibn al-Ahnaf and Ibn al-Mu'tazz, from the poetry of nature and passion. In Byron Shukrī admired his strong passion and language, his revolt against the lies of society, and his cult of freedom. Shelley also attracted him by his aspiration to the world of ideal, his love of freedom and his hatred of hypocrisy. While the two English poets inspired him to knowledge, freedom, ideal and perfection, they planted in him a melancholy sense of life. Love as a vital power of existence, beauty (in the romantic sense), and death as the destroyer of all beautiful things became the central themes of his poetry.

At the Teachers' Training College Shukrī met another student, al-Māzinī, who became the third member of the new movement. At the time al-Māzinī's knowledge of Arabic poetry


2. Shukrī, 'Fasl Thānī Min Nash'atī al-Adabiyyah,' al-Muktataf, No. 1, Vol. 95, pp 33-4
was almost restricted to the works of Ibn al-Fārīd, Ibn Nubātah, and al-Bahā‘, Zuhayr. He found in Shukrī, however, a guide who introduced him to the ‘Abbasīd and English romantic poets. Ash-Sharīf ar-Rādī and Shelley became then his two favourite poets. Both Shukrī and al-Māzīnī spent their time reading Byron, Shelley, Wordsworth, Burns, Hazlitt, Carlyle, Leigh Hunt, Lamb, Macaulay and other English writers. Palgrave’s The Golden Treasury was the English work which reshaped their literary taste and poetical tendencies.

In 1909 Shukrī was sent to England on a governmental mission to study English literature. Al-Māzīnī who remained in Cairo continued his studies in Arabic and English literature. In English his reading concentrated on the writers of the 19th century. He also read Shakespeare’s works and Johnson’s The Lives of the Poets. In Arabic he read al-Jurjānī and al-Jāhiz and some outstanding literary works such as al-Aghānī, al-Amālī, al-Kāmil, and al-Iṣlāq al-Fārid. Beside ash-Sharīf ar-Rādī, Ibn ar-Rūmī became his second Arabic favourite poet.

Shukrī’s stay in England, at Sheffield University, between 1909 and 1912 represented a crucial point in his intellectual development. He recorded the new influence in the following words:


The variety of natural scenery in England has left a great effect on me. I still remember my first impression, while I looked through the window of the train, of the difference between the new scenery and that which I used to see in Egypt. Whereas in Egypt the land is as flat as though it had been drawn on a paper by an architect all on one level, in England even within a small area there are great varieties in height and appearance. The effect of this varied natural scenery has survived in me even after my return home. In England I have seen small valleys surrounded by mountains, hills and mountains covered with trees and snow, and the remains of ancient large forests whose impacts on the observer were by no means smaller than those of the ancient forests themselves. I have also seen waterfalls tumbling down from high peaks ... I have seen snow covering the roads and the houses and giving the sunny day the appearance of a moonlit night ... the sight of this varied scenery has increased my power of description and inspired me to write many poems during my stay in England as well as after my return to Egypt. I wrote thus a poem about the forest and another on a waterfall: in the first I described the different forms, sound and effects of the forest, and compared the life of the ancient with the life of modern man in the city." "The new social and artistic life was also a source of education to me. I remember how I used to remain silent in the public gardens after I had heard some music played. It was that feeling which I expressed in my poem *as-Sukūn Ba'd an-Nagham* (Silence after Music).

In England Shukri plunged into the works of Carlyle and Emerson, and these led him to the works of Goethe and other German writers. He ranks the influence of Goethe upon him as equal to that of the new life and nature and compares it with the early influence of al-Maṣarṭī. In Goethe he found his ideal thinker and poet who inspired him to seek after all-inclusive knowledge and deepened his sense of beauty. The other influential German poets were Heine and Schiller. Shukrī also continued his reading of Byron, Shelley, Browning, Swinburn and Tennyson and wrote many poems under their influence.

Thus the early influence of Byron and Shelley remained strong. He began to see, however, in Shelley's imaginative poetry a divorce from the realities of life, and in his abstract mixed imagery a defect rather than a merit. He also began to criticise Byron on the ground that the characters which his poems portray are narrow, similar and sterile in some of their actions and feelings. Another new source of inspiration was Greek mythology; several of Shukrī's new poems were based on Greek myths.

Late in 1911 or early in 1912 al-ʾAkkād met al-Māzīnī in the office of al-Bayān. Al-Māzīnī was among the young writers who contributed to al-Bayān. At the time al-ʾAkkād's writings in al-Bayān consisted of reviews and summaries of European literary and philosophical works. This meeting between the two young writers was followed by a profound friendship which lasted until the death of al-Māzīnī in 1949.

Towards the close of 1912 or at the beginning of the following year al-Māzīnī introduced al-ʾAkkād to Shukrī who had just returned from England. Sharing the same views and taste, the three writers found themselves soon forming a new literary school, which called for humanism and individuality, faithfulness to nature, truth and simplicity against national fanaticism, artfulness, rhetoric and imitation. The three writers not merely shared the same literary views and taste, but had

much in common in their personalities; they were introverted, introspective, pessimistic and given to dreaming poets; their sense of death and of the meaninglessness of life was very strong; they were all suffering from doubt and from a sharp conflict between dream and reality; the lack of faith represented to them a painful intellectual problem; while they found no satisfaction in doubt, they could not accept faith.

In forming the new literary school they used al-Bayān and Fahmī Kandīl's newspaper "Ukāz" as their mouthpieces. Their task was twofold, to advocate new literary principles and to initiate a strong and lasting battle against the traditional movement of poetry, which was reaching its culmination in the works of Shawklī, Ǧāfiḍ Ibrāhīm, and ʿAbd al-Muṭṭalib. Al-ʾAkkād seems to have played the part of the exponent and spokesman of the school. Thus the first two works of the school, Shukrī's second volume of poetry Laʿāliʿ al-Afkār (The Pearls of Thoughts) and al-Māzinī's first collection of poems, which were published in 1913, bore magnificent prefaces written by him.

In his preface to Shukrī's The Pearls of Thoughts al-ʾAkkād discussed the function of passion, imagination and imagery in poetry, and in his preface to al-Māzinī's collection of poems he spoke of imitation and originality, the music and social function of poetry. In both of these prefaces he made a strong assault on the castle of the traditional poets: their imitation of the ancient Arabic poets, their mannerism and affectation, their hyperboles and conceits, and finally their unfaithfulness to themselves and to their age.
But before al-ʿAkkad made this assault there appeared in 1912 on the pages of al-Jarīdah a series of essays written by al-Māzini criticising the traditional poets. Al-Māzini's criticism was based on the ground that modern Egyptian poets are merely copies of the ancient Arabic poets. The reader may find refined language and radiant images in their poetry, but seeks in vain for their personalities and the spirit of the age. To al-Māzini true poetry is a revelation of the poet's individuality, and faithfulness to the spirit of the age is the supreme aim of the poet. But faithfulness to the spirit of the age means in no way that the poet should be a mouthpiece of the political and social events of daily life. That is the task of the journalist, and not of the poet. A year later al-Māzini wrote his critical essay Shiʿr Ḥāfiz (Ḥāfiz's Poetry) in which he criticised Ḥāfiz Ibrāhīm according to the same principles.

Shukrī did not write much in criticism of the traditional school of poetry. Yet in his The Pearls of Thoughts we find two poems entitled "Shakwā Shāʿir" (The Complaint of a Poet) and "al-Adīb al-Mutakallim" (The Affected Man of Letters). In these poems he criticises the old trends of poetry, the imitation of ancient poets, the affectation and mannerism of modern poets and the poems which these poets used to write on political and social occasions. In the preface to his collection of poems Zahr ar-Rabīʿ (The Flowers of Spring), published in 1916, he also criticised the oratoric spirit and language of modern Egyptian poets, and in the preface to his other collection of poems al-Khaṭārāt (Reflections) he attacked
the hyperboles, conceits and imagery of both modern and ancient poets.

The years 1913–1917 saw the greatest activity of the school. In these years al-‘Akkād published many critical essays, which he collected in his two works ash-Shudhūr (The Fragments) and al-Fuṣūl (The Papers), and his two collections of poems Anwār as-Sabāh (The Lights of Morning) and Wahaj az-Zahirah (The Glow of Noon), which bore two prefaces written by him. Al-Māzinī also published several essays on poetry and two collections of poems. Shukrī was the most active member of the school; his publications included four collections of poems The Pearls of Thoughts, Anāshīd as-Sībā (The Songs of Youth), The Flowers of Spring, Reflections, and three prose works, ath-Thamarāt (The Fruits), Ḥadīth Iblīs (The Discourse of Satan) and al-‘I’tirāfāt (The Confessions).

Towards the end of 1916 the school suffered from a dispute between al-Māzinī and Shukrī. The dispute was initiated by Shukrī’s preface to his Reflections, which seems to have been written as a critical reply to al-Māzinī and al-‘Akkād with regard to their views on imagination and language. Shukrī criticised al-Māzinī on the ground that some of his poems such as "Fata fi Siyāk al-Mawt" (A Young Man on the Road of Death), "Kabār ash-Shi‘r" (The Tomb of Poetry), "adḥ-Dhikrā" (Memory), "al-Wardāh ar-Rasūl" (The Messenger Rose), "ash-Shā‘ir al-Muḥteṣād" (A Poet in the Throes of Death) and "Shawkat al-Ḥusn" (The Thorn of Beauty) were merely translations from Shelley, Burns, Heine, Thomas Hood, Tennyson, Wells and Lowell.
This was followed by a literary quarrel between al-Māzinī and Shukrī on the pages of an-Nizām and al-Afkar newspapers. Al-'Akkād's attempts to remedy the dispute brought only temporary success. In January, 1917 Shukrī repeated his critical remarks about al-Māzinī on the pages of al-Muktaṭaf, and in 1919 and 1920 it is said that he wrote several essays criticising both al-Māzinī and al-'Akkād.

The quarrel attained its height in 1921 when al-Māzinī published two essays criticising Shukrī under the title "Ṣanam al-Alā‘īb" (The Idol of Trickery). In these two essays al-Māzinī severely criticised Shukrī's personality and poetry and portrayed him as a victim of the fear of madness.

The years which followed the dispute between Shukrī and al-Māzinī were a period of ebb in the activity of the school. Al-'Akkād and al-Māzinī involved themselves in politics and published nothing significant between 1917 and 1921. It was not until 1921 that they wrote their critical study ad-Dīwan (The Tribunal) in two volumes, which they devoted mainly to the criticism of Shawkī's poetry and al-Manfalūṭī's novels and short stories. In the same year al-'Akkād also published his third collection of poems Ashbah al-Asīl (The Shadows of Afternoon). After 1917 Shukrī published two collections of poems al-Afnān (The Boughs) and Azhār al-Kharīf (The Flowers of Autumn) and one prose work as-Saḥā'if (The papers), and in 1919

he abandoned poetry-writing and fell into a deep silence which lasted until 1933. In 1920 al-Mazini underwent a personal crisis following which he abandoned poetry and directed his energy to novel and essay-writing. Al-'Akkād was also about to enter upon a new stage of his life and literary career.

(2) The Diwan School and Maṭrān

There has been much talk about the leadership of Maṭrān in modern Egyptian poetry and about his influence on the Diwan school. Many Arabic critics and literary historians have held the view that Shukrī, al-'Akkād and al-Mazini were followers of Maṭrān. This view, though common today among Arabic critics, has never been more than a conjecture or an assumption; none of these critics has been able to give it solid ground, i.e., to bring forth historical evidence and to show a similarity between the output of the school and Maṭrān’s. Their whole argument is based on Maṭrān’s views in favour of the unity of the poem and the poet’s faithfulness to himself and to his age. Ignorant of the school’s aesthetics and theory of knowledge, and of the English and German influences under which al-'Akkād, al-Mazini and Shukrī reached their critical views, these critics see in Maṭrān’s calls the basis of the school’s doctrine. Before discussing this wrong view it seems better to trace back its history. For this history shows it to have its beginning in partisanship.

The question of the leadership of Maṭrān in modern Egyptian poetry rose out of the literary quarrel between al-
'Akkād and the Apollo group in 1933-34 and was first expressed in the Apollo periodical. Matrān was the honorary president of the Apollo group after Shawkī. To know this historical fact is to realise how the whole argument was based on false grounds and was mere propaganda. In an article entitled "al-‘Akkād Nebīl" (al-‘Akkād is Noble) the writer, Hasan Faraḥat, in an attempt to deny the originality of al-‘Akkād writes:

"Shukrī was the leader of a new school that emerged out of Matrān’s poetry. When Matrān settled in the Valley of the Nile there began a new era in the history of Egyptian literature..."¹

In the next year another writer, Muhammad ‘Abd al-Ghafūr, repeated the same contention asserting that Matrān’s romantic message had nourished the new school of poetry and a complete generation of poets. Among the outstanding disciples of Matrān he mentions Shukrī, Abū Shādī and Khalīl Shaybūb. He also regards Shukrī as the leader of the Diwān school².

In the same year Mukhtār al-Wakīl, one of the Apollo poets and a disciple of Abū Shādī, published his pamphlet Ruwwād ash-Shī‘r al-Ḥadīth (The Pioneers of Modern Poetry) in which he devoted a chapter to Matrān, another to Shukrī, and a third to al-‘Akkād. In his turn al-Wakīl claimed that Shukrī, al-Mażīnī and al-‘Akkād were followers of Matrān and wrote their poems under his influence. He also claims for Shukrī the part of the leader in the school. Ignorant of the history of Arabic poetry, he regards Matrān’s poetry as the first poetry of passion

¹ Majallat Apollo, No. 9, vol. i, May, 1933, pp 1069-70
² Ibid, no. 9, vol II, May, 1934, p. 874
in which the principle of the unity of the poem found a manifesta-
tion.¹

Three years later and in an address to Matrān Tāhā Ḥusayn made the same assertion. Carried away by his admiration for Matrān Tāhā Ḥusayn portrays him as the leader of modern Arabic poetry and the teacher of all modern poets. He thinks that contemporary poets are mere followers of Matrān's teachings and poetry though in varying degrees.²

All these essays and studies prepared the way for Ismā'īl Adham's work Matrān Sha'īr al-'Arabiyyah al-Idārī (Matrān, the Creative Poet of Arabic) in 1939. Adham repeated the views already expressed by the Apollo periodical and al-Wakīl. And like those of the other writers, many of his views were mere conjectures and assumptions. He sees thus in Shukrī, al-'Akkād and al-Māzinī disciples or followers of Matrān. He even claims that they have imitated Matrān's poems and imagery³. He offered no evidence for his contention, and indeed appears not to have examined the works of Shukrī, al-'Akkād and al-Māzinī very closely.

After Adham's study on Matrān these views became common among Arabic critics and literary historians. They were repeated by Mustafā as-Sahartī in his work ash-Shi'īr al-Mu'āṣir 'Alā Daw'ān-Nakḍ al-Ḥadīth (Contemporary Poetry in the Light of

1. Mukhtār al-Wakīl, Ruwwād ash-Shi'īr al-Ḥadīth, edit., 1934, Cairo, pp. 44-15, 30
3. Al-Muktaṭaf, no. 3, vol. 92, Mars., 1939, p. 300. See also ar-Risālaḥ, no. 301, 10th April, 1939, p. 746.
Modern Criticism), by Muhammad Mandur in his short studies on Matran and al-Mazini (the former is no more than a summary of Adham's study), by Umar ad-Disuki in his Tahrin al-Adab al-Hadith (On The History of Modern Literature), and by many other writers.

Both al-'Akkad and Shukri have denied that Matran had any influence on their works and accused their critics of ignorance and dishonesty. In 1938 before Adham wrote his study on Matran, al-'Akkad wrote:

"... Matran is a poet who belongs to the generation of Ahmad Shawki and Hafiz Ibrahim. He had no influence on the Egyptian poets who came after him. These poets were well acquainted with ancient Arabic poets and were in strong contact with European literatures, particularly English literature. Thus they were able to learn their language from ancient Arabic poets and the new trends of poetry from the European poets. Matran does not represent a link in either of these cases. Unlike Matran, the new poets were readers of English ... and in their criticism they did not look to French criticism or follow Musset, Lamartine and other French poets who were regarded as the masters of eloquence in the formative years of Matran."

Al-'Akkad goes on to claim that the school had some influence on Matran and Shawki, not the contrary. This influence appears in Matran's translation of Shakespeare's plays instead of the plays of French dramatists.

Soon after the appearance of Adham's study in al-Maktab al-periodical, Shukri wrote an article in which he accused Adham of ignorance and challenged him to offer any evidence or show any similarity between his poetry and Matran's. He asserts that his acquaintance with ancient Arabic poetry and European

1. Al-'Akkad, Shu'ara Misr wa Bistuhum fi al-Jil al-MadI, p. 200, edit. 1950
literatures was made while he was still a pupil in the primary and secondary schools. He finds himself and Matrān poles apart. While Matrān was under the influence of French literature, he was under the influence of English and German literatures. The tendencies towards psychological analysis, irony, and European trends of thought which characterise his poetry have no counterpart in the poetry of Matrān. Moreover, he says that he had a poor opinion of Matrān, for he was disappointed in the few poems that he read from Matrān's poetry.

Al-Maźinī has expressed his views on the pages of as-Siyāsah newspaper. Though he says nothing about the influence of Matrān, he regards the school as a leading one, independent of any other literary school in modern Egyptian literature. He also thinks of it as the genuine beginning of modern literature.

Now that we have traced back the Apollo group's claim about the leadership of Matrān in modern Egyptian poetry and shown how it became a common view among Arabic critics in spite of al-'Akkād's and Shukrī's denials, we can go into a further discussion. While Matrān's demands for the unity of the poem and the poet's faithfulness to himself and to his age were regarded as the basis of the Diwān school's critical doctrine, no critic has ever tried to examine Matrān's notion of the unity of the poem and al-'Akkād's theory of the organic

1. See ar-Risālah, no. 302, 17th April, 1939, pp. 792-3.
2. See Anwar al-Jundī, al-Maṣārik al-Adabiyyah, p. 625
structure of the poem. The conception of the organic unity of the poem does not exist in the writings of al-Măźinī between 1913 and 1921 and is not explicit in Shukrī's preface to his collection of poems *Reflections*. It was held by al-‘Akkād alone and was not advocated by him until 1921. In fact, it was not until that year that this conception entered into Arabic literature. In formulating his theory al-‘Akkād is indebted not to Matrān but to Carlyle and Coleridge. To Matrān the unity of the poem was no more than a mechanic unity of theme. What he demands of the Arabic poet is merely that he should give his poem a unity of theme and establish some kind of link between the parts of the poem. The conception of the organic structure of the poem is not as simple as this.

In al-‘Akkād's writings, as in Coleridge's and Carlyle's, the notion of the organic unity of the poem is a part of a wide philosophy of nature, evolution and imagination. The unity of the poem and the poet's faithfulness to himself and his age were only two principles among many others advocated by the school. They even bear meanings different from those given to them by Matrān. The school acquired these two principles not from Matrān but from Carlyle, particularly Carlyle's essays "The State of German Literature" and "Goethe". However, the main concern of the school was not the unity of the poem, but the function of imagination and imagery. The unity of the poem is a subsidiary principle which emerges out of the function of imagination.

When Matrān's collection of poems appeared in 1908 it
contained many traditional poems, elegies, panegyrical poems, and poems written about political and social events of daily life. Even his love poetry was full of traditional ideas and images. It is important to notice that when Arabic critics speak of Matrān's emotional poetry they almost always refer to his poem "al-Masā'" (The Evening) which is unique among his poems. In short, Matrān, as Shawkī Da'īf points out, "had carried with him to Egypt the same style and form that the reader finds in the poetry of al-Bārūdī and Shawkī". In his attempt to renew Arabic poetry he was very conscious of its ancient tradition and form. He was also an admirer of the traditional poets, Shawkī, Ḥāfiz and ʿUffūnī Masīf and held high opinions of them.

(3) Shukrī and the Leading Part in the School

The influence that the members of the school exercised on one another also deserves some discussion. The view which claims for Shukrī the leading part in the school was first expressed by Abū Shādī and his disciples. In an essay entitled "ʿAbd ar-Rahmān Shukrī" Abū Shādī has claimed for Shukrī an influence on both al-ʿAkkād and al-Māzinī and denied al-ʿAkkād any influence in the school. In his opinion al-ʿAkkād and al-Māzinī wrote their poems according to the teachings of Shukrī.

2. Khalīl Matrān, "at-Tajdīd fī ʾash-Shīr", al-Hilāl, no. 1 November, 1933, p. 10
and in imitation of his poetry\(^1\). Abu Shādī’s views were repeated by al-Wakīl in his work *The Pioneers of Modern Poetry*. Al-Wakīl writes that when al-’Akkād met al-Mazīnī and Shukrī there was nothing extraordinary in his literary education, and he could not avoid falling under the influence of al-Mazīnī and Shukrī\(^2\). In support of these views Ramzī Miftāḥ published in *The Apollo* periodical a series of essays, which were collected later in his book *Rasā’il an-Nakd*. In these essays Miftāḥ endeavoured to show that al-’Akkād had merely echoed and imitated Shukrī’s poems.

The reality was entirely different from what these writers assert. These writers were not critics who endeavoured to shed light on the reality, but to deny the originality of al-’Akkād and his influence in modern Egyptian literature. For this purpose they wrote their essays and studies which often appear as personal criticism. However, the truth has to be sought not in these essays but in the writings of al-’Akkād, al-Mazīnī and Shukrī.

Al-Mazīnī has many times acknowledged his debt to Shukrī. But al-’Akkād has denied that Shukrī had any influence upon him. After al-Mazīnī expressed his debt to Shukrī in 1934 al-’Akkād wrote an article *"I’tirāfāt al-Mazīnī"* (The Confessions of al-Mazīnī) in which he showed that his role in the school was different from that of al-Mazīnī. He says that

1. Majallat Apollo, no. 2, October, 1934, p. 99
2. Mukhtār al-Wakīl, Ruwwād ash-Shi’r..., p. 65
when he met al-Māzini and Shukrī his literary taste and tendencies as well as his system of study and education were already formed and did not change after this meeting. It was rather Shukrī and al-Māzini who fell under his influence and began to pay attention to the scientific literature and philosophical literary criticism. Thus they began to read the works of Max Nordau, Lessing and Nietzsche after they were wholly devoted to imaginative literature and pure literary criticism. Al-‘Akkād also says that when he met Shukrī his literary opinions were already shaped, and it was Shukrī who asked him to write an introduction to his *The Pearls of Thoughts*.

Al-‘Akkād’s assertions were supported by al-Māzini in an article called "Ḥawl Iʿtirāfī" (About My Confessions). Al-Māzini writes that at the time he met al-‘Akkād the latter was quite known as a poet and critic, and that their positions in the school were in no way the same. In spite of our strong relationships, says al-Māzini, each of us had his own literary concerns, methods and system of study.  

Shukrī also supported this view. In his article "ash-Shuhrah wa al-Khulūd" (Fame and Immortality) he wrote that when he first met al-‘Akkād, for the first time al-‘Akkād was well acquainted with Arabic and European literatures, and had composed the greatest part of his first collection of poems. "As I lived in Alexandria and al-‘Akkād in Cairo," says Shukrī, "we did not meet much, nor did we correspond much with each other."

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1. See al-Jihād newspaper, 4th September, 1934
2. See al-Balāgh newspaper, September, 1934
He also rejects Ramzi Miftah's view that he was the leader and exponent of the school. After Adham wrote his study on Matran, Shukri repeated himself asserting that the similarity between his poetry and al-Akkad's is to be attributed to the similarity of their literary education, and not to an influence exercised by him on al-Akkad. In fact, Shukri's opinion of al-Akkad as a poet was very high.

In his writings al-Akkad mentioned some minor differences between the three members of the school and attributed them to the differences in their literary taste and tendencies. As they differed in their views of poetic language they also differed in their appreciation of some Arabic poets. And though poetry was their primary concern al-Akkad was inclined towards philosophy and aesthetics, and al-Mazini towards story-telling. Shukri was more concerned with poetry than al-Akkad and al-Mazini.

(4) The Critical Theory of the Diwan School

In studying the Diwan school's theory of poetry my aim is not to represent the school as a coherent body or the theory as unified and consistent, but rather to discuss in historical order the contribution of each of the three members of the school to this theory and to its development. To represent

1. See al-Ahram newspaper, 12th September, 1934.
2. Shukri, "Hawl Makal 'Khalil Matran'", al-Muktafat, April, 1939.
the theory as a coherent body is to misrepresent it and to obscure al-‘Akkād's part in it. For though there is a great deal of similarity between the critical views of the three members, there remain substantial differences between them. These differences are shown in their philosophical grounds and their views on the aim of poetry, on poetic diction and music. There are also some minor differences between their conceptions of the poetic imagination. But this is not to say that there is no common critical basis among them. The differences, however substantial, have enriched the theory rather than destroyed the common ground. Even when al-‘Akkād and Shukrī use different terms they mean much the same.

However, the similarities and differences whether in views or terms are to be attributed to the English and German influences under which the three writers reached their critical ideas. Shukrī borrowed or derived many of his views from Goethe's writings, Wordsworth's prefaces to The Lyrical Ballads, and Coleridge's lecture "Shakespeare's Poetry"; al-‘Akkād from Hazlitt's lectures "On Poetry in General", "On Wit and Humour" and "On Dryden and Pope" and from Matthew Arnold's essays "The Study of Poetry" and "Thomas Gray"; al-Māzinī from Shelley's A Defence of Poetry, the influence of which also appears in Shukrī's and al-‘Akkād's views, Hazlitt's "On Poetry in General", "On Shakespeare and Milton", Edmund Burke's A Philosophical Inquiry into the Origin of our Ideas of the Sublime and the Beautiful, and Wordsworth's 1798 preface to
The Lyrical Ballads. The influence of Carlyle's lecture "The Hero as Poet" and essays "The State of German Literature", "Goethe" and "Burns" can also be shown in the views of the three writers.

Because of the commonly accepted view that claims for Shukrī the role of the leader and theorist of the movement I have followed a historical order, treated al-ʿAkkād's theory first, al-Māzinī's second and Shukrī's later, and tried to show that al-ʿAkkād's critical theory differs on many points from that of Shukrī, and that even when the two writers express a similar idea they use different terms. And in order to dismiss the other wrong view, held by some of al-ʿAkkād's disciples, that al-Māzinī has borrowed or derived his views from al-ʿAkkād's writings I have emphasised the differences between al-ʿAkkād and al-Māzinī and tried to show that al-Māzinī has borrowed his views not from al-ʿAkkād but directly from Burke, Shelley, Hazlitt, Carlyle and Wordsworth, and that on several points he expressed views different from, if not opposite to, those of al-ʿAkkād and Shukrī. I have also tried to show that al-ʿAkkād's critical theory expressed between 1913 and 1921 has its roots in his pamphlet The Quintessence of the Diary, which consists of fragments and passages written before 1909 and reprint¬ed towards the close of 1911. However, my aim is not so much to do
justice to al-‘Akkād and al-Māzinī, but rather to present things in their historical order which is in itself a refutation of all these wrong views. I start now with al-‘Akkād’s critical theory which he formulated between 1907 and 1909 and as represented by The Quintessence of the Diary.

(a) 1907-1913 The Groundwork of al-‘Akkād’s Theory

To al-‘Akkād, the poet is a passionate unhappy dreamer cut off from real life and action and is in the hold of his momentary desires and emotions. Deprived of the capability of enjoying the pleasures of real life, his life represents an imaginative oscillation between past and future jumping over the present. His unhappiness springs out of the dilemma between imagination and reality. What differentiates him from others is his great gifts of imagination and sensibility.

This image of the poet as an isolated dreamer cut adrift from society and action has not led al-‘Akkād, however, to conceive of the poem, the poet’s product, as a dream or dream-like. On the contrary he thinks of genuine poetry as a representation of essence and truth and attacks the hyperboles of other poets as a distortion of reality. But the essence that the poet perceives and represents is emotional and visionary, not rational or sensational.

Thus passion constitutes the core of poetry. Al-‘Akkād defines poetry as:

"the art of the communication of passion through the medium of language".
He thinks of passion as the essence of man and life and as prior to thought in the history of mankind. Yet he does not pay much attention to it in his discussion and argument. His attention is rather focused on the poetic language and imagery. In his view, the poet's use of language is one of his distinguishing qualities. This is probably because the poet's medium, as al-‘Akkād seems to think, is inferior to his deep feeling and vision and represents a handicap in the poetic process of communication. In fact, many of the poet's thoughts and emotions remain outside the range of language.

To remedy the inadequacy of his medium the poet is forced to express himself in a metaphorical way, to rely on the suggestive powers and associations of words and to treat language as a system of short-hand writing or as a system of symbols and images. This is of course an attempt on the part of the poet to exercise a command over his medium, by being well-acquainted with the languages and methods of expression of the great masters of his literature and to have always in his mind lines and expressions of these great masters which exhibit ideas and emotions similar to his own and apply them as touchstone. This is Matthew Arnold's touchstone theory with slight modification.

Thus while al-‘Akkād speaks of the poet as a man distinguished by his intense sensibility, "the man who feels", his discussion and argument give the impression that the poet is a man who uses a particular language and discovers the potentialities of words: their suggestive powers and emotional
associations. The use of language, the methods of expression and the knowledge of the minute differences between the meanings of the words are, al-ʾAkḵād appears to think, one of the qualities which distinguish the major poet from the minor one. He dismisses the poet who has no particular medium of his own from the realm of poetry.

However, the ultimate aim of the poet is greater than mastering his medium. It is to communicate a particular human experience or vision in a particular language. In fact, al-ʾAkḵād strongly criticises the poets who think of poetry as an ingenious game played with words, images, metaphors and tropes and those who regard the poet as an orator or decorator. The importance of language should not be stressed at the expense of the poetic experience.

In Ḥafīz Ibrahīm al-ʾAkḵād finds an example of the poet who depends entirely on the evocative power of language and whose poetry contains no particular poetic experience or vision. He says that though Ḥāfīz's language and music might be described as sublime, his poetry is poor in experience and thought. It is the poetry of sensation rather than of the soul.

Sometimes al-ʾAkḵād appears to think that the nature of poetry is determined not by its medium but by its end. It is not the adequacy or inadequacy of language which makes poetry the art of suggestion but its kind of appeal. Poetry is not rational knowledge or logical argument. Clarity and logic are the opposite of poetry and have to be avoided by every good poet. This is what distinguishes poetry from prose.
In al-ʿAkkād's theory poetic imagery is closely related to language. The function of simile, he says, is to represent the unknown in the image of the known whenever the scope of the external world grows narrower than the inner world of the poet. In expressing his vision, the poet is forced to depend on the means of metaphor, tropes and similes as well as on the suggestive powers and associations of words. Al-ʿAkkād says nothing more concerning poetic imagery, but in the light of his views on poetic language, originality, and suggestiveness seem also to be demanded in the poet's imagery.

The role of music in the poetic process of communication does not receive from al-ʿAkkād the attention it deserves. Even in his definition of poetry the element of music is neglected. Nevertheless, his views on the relationship between emotion and sound is significant in this respect. He writes:

"There exists a strong connection between emotion, sound and movement ... primitive people, children and women express their feelings in sound and gestures. Every emotional state has its own tone. The tone of the voice of the orator is very expressive of his emotional state ... Every musical rhythm evokes in the soul a certain feeling as if the rhythm and the feeling are one."

In these words al-ʿAkkād is repeating Hazlitt's view that there is a correspondence between music and the pulses of passion. In this view is implied an attempt on the part of the poet to achieve a harmony between his passion or state of mind and the music of his poem. It is of course a spontaneous harmony or correspondence which means that the metre grows organically out of the poetic experience and is not a superadded element to
the poem.

This is in harmony with al-‘Akkād's notion of the unity of the poem. He says that the poem should be an embodiment of a unified vision or experience, and not an aggregation of separate lines and disunited thoughts. He denies the name 'poem' to any composition fabricated of various and disharmonious strands and regards thus Ḥāfīz Ibrahim's poem

poem as a kind of jugglery or something similar to the notorious patched-garment of the Sufi dervishes rather than a work of art.

Al-‘Akkād deals with the poetic experience or rather the human experience as subject to two categories, the sublime and the beautiful, which are to him two different species and not two states of one species. In his view there are two leading passions in the human soul, the love of life and the fear of death. Objects and situations which arouse the passion of life are to be described as beautiful, and as sublime those which evoke the fear of death. Under the category of the beautiful he mentions spring, morning, light, health, youth, exhilarating natural scenery and ornate buildings, objects and situations which give a rise of delight in the soul and refresh man's senses and passion for life. On the other hand, ruined monuments, temples, desolate soundless desert, gloomy winter, dark night, senility and disease are given as instances of the sublime. They are objects and situations that depress man's senses and soul or arouse in him the feeling of humility,
impotence, insignificance and solemnity.

On this psychological ground al-’Akkād prefers the beautiful to the sublime and thinks of man’s response to the former as more profound and significant than his response to the latter. In his opinion the response towards the beautiful is rare among people; whereas the sublime imposes itself on man’s sense, the beautiful can be felt only by a man who possesses spiritual education, subtle taste and a sense or knowledge of art. Thus the deeper or higher aesthetic experience is connected with the beautiful rather than with the sublime. This might appear to be a call for the poetry of the beautiful implying that the social function of poetry is to educate man’s spirit, deepen his sense of beauty and strengthen his passion for life. Al-’Akkād seems to have reached these views through his reading of Burke’s Philosophical Inquiry into the Origin of Our Ideas of the Sublime and the Beautiful. But he differs from Burke in his psychological analysis and in his favouring the beautiful.

However, al-’Akkād’s sole demand is for truth and sincerity or faithfulness to nature rather than for a particular kind of aesthetic experience. With regard to poetic truth he says that poetry is not antithetic to science, nor that with the progress of empirical knowledge the imaginative power of man loses its function in life. Poetry represents truth different from that represented by science. Therefore, science cannot provide a substitute for poetry, nor can the scientist occupy the place of the poet in human knowledge. Furthermore,
al-'Akkād thinks that the advancement of science and the development of civilisation work in the service of poetry by forcing the poets to abandon rhetorical hyperboles and exaggerations and to depict the essential not the accidental. Thus the future of poetry is immense. Here al-'Akkād appears to be under the influence of Arnold's "Literature and Science" and Hazlitt's "On Poetry in General".

(b) 1913-1921 Elaboration and evolution in Conjunction with the Diwan School

This is al-'Akkād's theory before 1913. The years between 1913 and 1921 in which his critical writings were connected with al-Mazini's and Shukrī's were years of development and expounding of the theory. The function of imagination and imagery in poetry was the chief and common concern of the new movement. Al-'Akkād's new writings mark, therefore, a shift towards laying the stress on imagination and dealing with language as subsidiary subject. He also seems to have turned in favour of the sublime or to have identified the sublime with the beautiful.

(1) Imagination and Imagery

Al-'Akkād's theory of poetic imagination and imagery found its first expression in his preface to Shukrī's The Pearls of Thoughts. It is important to mention here that al-'Akkād wrote this preface a short while after his meeting with Shukrī. Shukrī prepared his second collection of poems, which consists mainly of poems written during his student years in England, for publication immediately after his return to Egypt
towards the end of 1912. It is also important to notice that al-‘Akkād’s views on poetic imagination and imagery in The Tribunal is no more than an elaboration of what he has already said in this preface. The philosophical ground of the theory is the same in the two works.

In his preface to Shukrī’s collection of poems al-‘Akkād writes:

"Poetry is not nonsense or amusement for one’s leisure hours. If so, it would have no function in the life of man. In fact, poetry is the truth of truth, the essence of all that has existence in the realms of senses and reason, and the true expression of the soul. If the genuine feeling of the soul is fallacious, the poet is then a liar, the world an illusion, and reality has no place anywhere.

In its essence genuine poetry does not overlap the frontier of reality, though it might appear different from reality in its image; for there is no reality apart from what exists in the soul and feeling; thus in expressing the poet’s emotion a poem cannot be regarded as a falsification of truth but rather as an embodiment of inspiration ... Does the eye see or the ear hear except through the soul? Do the senses tell us anything when the soul grows heedless of the world and the mind unaware of things? ... there is nothing in the world which pleases or displeases by itself; things please and displease by the notions and forms which the mind ascribes to them. Poetry alone can show us things in the forms which satisfy our thoughts and delight our spirits."

This is the opening and also the key passage in al-‘Akkād’s preface. We may observe that it adds nothing substantial to his theory expressed in The Quintessence of the Diary. However, he is more explicit here. He seems to think of the world and man as correlatives; the world has no essence or reality apart from man’s feeling and perception. He distinguishes between the essence and existence of things, i.e. between things-in-themselves and man’s sensory impressions
of them. He rejects the sensational perception as illusory and restricted to the outer forms of things, and regards the senses as mere agents of the soul or as its gates opening on the outside world, and not as agencies of knowledge by themselves. In his opinion reality is a vision, the human soul's vision of the world, and truth has no existence outside the range of man's passion and experience; true knowledge can be obtained only by the soul. What the soul feels and conceives constitutes the essence of the world and man.

These views are expressed more fully in al-‘Akkād's essays on Shawkī's poetry in The Tribunal. Here again he distinguishes between Existence and Essence, the external and the internal, or the accidental and the permanent, identifies Nature with Man or rather with the Human Experience, and thinks of the world as having no essence outside the Human Experience. The belief in the Human Experience and Human Personality is the key to all al-‘Akkād’s writings, and not only to his aesthetic criticism. This belief may be expressed as Truth is feeling, and feeling is Truth. But feeling to al-‘Akkād is a complex process, connected with the intellect. He again rejects the sensational truth as accidental, transitory, and casual, and thinks of the poet's inner vision provided by experience as the deepest Truth (truth as visionary and emotional) and of intellectual truth as insignificant and invalid unless it is reached through human experience and by a human personality, and of the emotional value as the only valid value.

To al-‘Akkād, Essence is what may be called the Living
or Organic Existence, a dynamic, flowing process capable of being grasped only by the Imagination or rather the Intuitive Sympathetic Imagination; Existence or sensational Existence is dead and inorganic matter. He seems to deny the objectivity of knowledge, for the emotional truth is manifold, various and differs from situation to situation and from person to person. But emotional visionary truth is not divorced from what may be termed "The Objective Reality", for the subject of Human Experience is the outside world, and Imagination is an agent of Nature or a power working within the laws of Nature. However, the whole argument seems to declare that the Human Experience or feeling is the measure of Truth, and the sensational truth has little value and significance in human life, knowledge, and action. What matters in human knowledge is not so much the truth itself but its nature, its source and the human experience which stands behind it and gives it its nature. The distinction is drawn between two kinds of knowledge, the Intellectual (called sensational) knowledge or the knowledge of common life and the Living or Visionary knowledge provided by a deep human experience. The latter is the fountain of religion and poetry. What makes the poetic visionary truth more significant, truer and closer to the essence of life than the arithmetic axiom is the poet's profound feeling which leads to it, and not its correspondence with common life.

Now we must return to al-'Akkād's preface to Shukrī's collection of poems to examine his views on imagination and imagery. He thinks of imagination as a vital power indis-
pensable to man in general and to the poet or artist in particular - to man because it is his capacity for life, i.e. the power which brings him into sympathy with others and with Nature and illuminates the dark moments of his life by creating for him new hope from time to time, and to the poet because it is his approach to the inner reality, because the social and moral function of poetry as a substitute for religion in modern time depends on it, and because the aesthetic pleasure produced by poetry is related to it.

To al-'Akkād imagination is not antithetic to reason or science, nor does the function of reason invalidate that of imagination. The territory of reason or science does not cover the whole range of existence, and leaves, therefore, no room for imagination in human knowledge. The scientist's empirical knowledge cannot provide a substitute for the poet's imaginative vision. For outside the province of senses and reason there exist many things which man can conceive or come into touch with only through his imagination and feeling. If the scientific and material progress of man have changed his position in the universe, his feelings towards Nature and natural objects have remained the same. Nature has remained, and will ever remain, to him mysterious and greater than his sciences and knowledge. Knowledge might affect man's mentality and understanding, but it cannot change his passionate essence. Therefore, science and civilisation do not kill poetry; poetry is something deep-rooted in the nature of man; it represents man's living eternal relationships with Nature and the universe
In his preface al-'Akkād contrasts imagination with sensation or seems to distinguish between two kinds of imagination, the one mythological and sympathetic, and the other sensational. The former, which is possessed by the Aryan poet, receives its power from the inner sense and feeling, whereas the latter, which is the gift of the Semitic poet is related to the outer senses and wit. The mythological imagination is a faculty which animates Nature and attributes life, motion, and physiognomy to the natural objects. This distinction between two kinds of imagination implies another distinction between two kinds of imagery; personification and myth on the one hand, simile, metaphor, and trope on the other. The difference between these two kinds of imagery is a difference between two kinds of poetic experience, between the living imaginative experience of the Aryan poet and the sensuous experience of the Semitic one. The Aryan poet, due to his power of imagination and passion, finds in Nature a living being who shares with him the feelings of love, jealousy, anger, and revenge, whereas the Semitic poet, who is characterised by his power of sensation and wit, sees in Nature merely forms and colours.

However, what matters to al-'Akkād is not to distinguish between one image and another, but to use the image, whether a metaphor, simile, or personification, as a representation of the psychological relationship between the poet and the world. He says that when a poet compares his beloved with the moon, his patron with a rain-giving cloud, or when he describes the roar of the lion as a thunder, and finds the sun dark after the
departure of his beloved, he is expressing emotions and visions that things evoke in him, or his relationships with the world: his delight alike in meeting his beloved and in the moonlit night, his fear or awe at the roar of the lion and at the sound of the thunder, his hope in the rain and in his generous patron, his sorrows after the departure of his beloved and in the dark night. The poetic image should not be a representation of a visual or auditory sensation but of a living psychological or mental relation between the poet and the outside world; and the importance should be attached not to the semblances of things but to something more substantial, to the emotions associated with the objects described. The poet's attempt is to deal with the visionary not the sensational and to depict things as he conceives them in his soul and imagination rather than in his senses and reason. Therefore, the poet's vision should not be judged on empirical or sensational ground and dismissed then as a distortion of truth. Poetry, being the embodiment of the poet's living experience and vision, represents a knowledge higher than that represented by science; it is a revelation of the deepest reality, the core of truth, and the inner essence of things.

The elaboration of al-'Akkad's views on myth and personification is found in his essay "Dirāsah fī al-Asātīr" (A Study on Myths), which he wrote about the middle of 1914. Here he regards the tendency to personification as a part of the living nature of man and as the origin of mythology. This tendency, which he also calls the faculty of fancy, "Wahm,"
appears at its full strength in the child and the primitive brutal man. Al-ʿAkkād relates the linguistic metaphor to myth and describes it as a shoot that has grown out of myth. He lays the stress, however, not on fancy but on imagination. In fact, he uses the two terms "fancy" and "imagination" exchangeably and seems to regard the former as a degree or branch of the latter. He renders "fancy" into the Arabic term "حَدِّى", i.e. "intuition", which may suggest that he connects imagination with intuition and thinks of the poet's vision as intuitional cognition.

In his essay al-ʿAkkād is not concerned primarily with the relationship between poetry and myth. Yet his criticism of Arabic language and literature and the distinction which he makes in his preface to Shukrī's collection of poems between Aryan and Semitic literature suggest that he regards myth as a good means of expression for the poet; it offers the poet living symbols for his notions and visions of the world and life, and gives these notions and visions concrete shapes and significance. The truth of myth in relation to the order and laws of Nature does not seem to represent a problem to him. He says, therefore, nothing about it. His sole concern is with myth as a manifestation of man's identification and sympathy with Nature, as a product of vital imagination, and as a poetic source or means. However, in the light of his views on imagination we can safely assume that myth represents to him an explanation of the inner truth and life of Nature.

Al-ʿAkkād criticises Arabic literature and language on
the ground that they are poor in imagination and mythology.
While he thinks of mythology as evidence of profound feeling and
sympathetic rich imagination, its absence in the literature and
language of a nation indicates, to him, a lack of feeling, symp-
pathy, and apprehension, and a narrowness in the scope of life.
He says that the Arabs, because of
their geographical environment,
possessed the faculty of imagination only at a very low degree.
In their language and literature the reader finds a great deal
of sensation and wit but little sympathy, passion and imagina-
tion. The Arab poet's vision of the world is sensational
rather than imaginative. It receives its power from memory,
not from passion and sympathy. When this vision grows subtler
the Arab poet for a moment catches sight of the visionary realm
of the world and describes sounds and phantoms recalled from
memory.

Al-‘Akkād has dealt with the poetry of wit in two places,
in his essay on Ibn Zaydūn, written in 1914, and in the preface
to his collection of poems The Lights of Morning, published two
years later. In the latter he insists on the distinction
between the literature of wit and that of nature or passion as
indispensable in any literary evaluation. Like Kent, Coleridge,
and Carlyle, he distinguishes between "al-Fahm", i.e. "understanding"
and "al-‘Akl", i.e. "reason", and connects wit with the former
rather than with the latter. While he relates reason to the
living intimate nature of man, he seems to think of understand-
ing as a mechanical power confined to the realm of phenomena
and connected with the senses. Understanding counts as nothing,
to him, unless it is deepened by a lively human experience. However, the distinction is vague and ambiguous. Al-‘Akkād says nothing about the relationship of imagination with reason.

In the essay on Ibn Zaydūn he regards the poetry of wit as a falsification of truth and nature and contrasts it with the poetry of passion and imagination. Wit seems to mean to him art, ornamentation and conceit; its language, materials and imagery are the language, materials and imagery of conceit. He thinks of Ibn Zaydūn as a poet of wit rather than of passion and imagination. In his poems he finds more prose than poetry, more wit than passion, and more artfulness than naturalness. In using the word "prose" he does not mean bare or flat language but the very imagery and colours of Ibn Zaydūn's poetry, that is, the imagery which is founded on arbitrary, accidental and unexpected analogies between things, or on verbal resemblances which have nothing to do with the objects described. He says that Ibn Zaydūn's poetry might arrest the attention of the reader or receive his admiration by its ornamentation and elegance, but it never excites his passion or stirs his spirit and imagination. Thus al-‘Akkād distinguishes between poetry and wit. Poetry means to him passion and imagination, and wit prose and fallacy.

These are al-‘Akkād's views of imagination and poetic imagery between 1913 and 1916. His criticism of Shawkī's poetry in The Tribunal adds nothing essential to them. It merely elaborates and illustrates them. The most characteristic passage is:
"The poet is a man who delves into the essence of things, not merely one who enumerates them and describes their external forms and colours. He says what the object he describes is, not what it resembles, and reveals its core and relation to life. What people seek in poetry is less sensation than sympathy and feeling; they seek to increase the range of their experience and understanding rather than the range of their senses (sight and hearing). When a poet uses a simile his aim is not to establish a comparison between natural objects, to compare two red things with each other, but to evoke in the mind of the reader a vivid image of what he conceives in his soul. Simile was created not as a means of painting the forms and colours of things, for all people see these forms and colours as the poet sees them, but rather as a means of emotional correspondences from soul to soul. What distinguishes the poet from others is the strength, depth, extent, intensity and penetrating power of his feeling into the recesses of things. It is his feeling which lends pleasure and emotive force to his work. Like a mirror which increases light while it reflects it, poetry increases the range of life, the existence of the object described and our feeling of it."

1. Compare this passage with the following one by Hazlitt which occurs in his lecture "On Poetry in General".

"... Poetry is the most emphatical language that can be found for those creations of the mind 'which ecstasy is very cunning in'. Neither a mere description of natural objects, nor a mere delineation of natural feelings, however distinct or forcible, constitute the ultimate end and aim of poetry, without the heightenings of the imagination. The light of poetry is not only a direct but also a reflected light, that while it shews us the object, throws a sparkling radiance all around it: the flame of the passions, communicated to the imagination reveals to us, as with a flash of lightning, the inmost recesses of thoughts, and penetrates our whole being. Poetry represents forms chiefly as they suggest other forms; feelings, as they suggest forms or other feelings. Poetry puts a spirit of life and motion into the universe. It describes the flowing, not the fixed. It does not define the limits of sense, or analyse the distinctions of the understanding, but signifies the excess of the imagination beyond the actual or ordinary impression of any object or feeling"

The similarity between the two passages is evident. In Hazlitt's passage we also find the analogy of poetry with "a mirror which increases light while it reflects it." "The light of poetry is not only a direct but also a reflected light..."
In this deep and fine passage al-‘Akkād is expressing his views of the function and nature of poetry not only the function of poetic imagery. True poetry is an expression of profound and lively experience, a revelation of the deepest reality, and a glimpse into the core of things. This deepest reality or core is nothing more than the inner vision of the poet, and it is emotional reality. Deep feeling is the only access to the essence of the world, and the measure of its truth. Poetry represents then a knowledge of the real Truth that lies at the bottom of things, and is self-knowledge at the same time. Being a correlation of emotion and sympathy it establishes a bridge between men and men and between men and Nature.

The poetic image is conceived as a symbol through which the process of emotional correspondence is fulfilled. It is a representation of the psychological relationship between the world and the poet, a mode of passion and perception. It is a unification of emotions and meditations in an instant of time, a suggestion, not description. By saying "what the object described is" al-‘Akkād means the emotional associations of the natural object and the spiritual affinity between the poet and Nature, the feeling of desolation, awe, and the memories which the solitary moon, for example, evokes in the poet. To him, the poetic image that represents no mode of passion has no significance or value. He attacks the use of similes and metaphors as rhetorical and verbal ornaments and as similes in themselves. They are to be used as symbols, as means by which the poet can make his inner visions and deep emotions intelligible.
The visual and auditory relations between things, and between the poet and Nature are regarded as accidental and insignificant, and the whole emphasis is laid on the psychological relationships. What matters in poetry is not the outer forms of things but the inner visions evoked in the poet's mind or soul. When a poet describes the crescent moon as a silver sickle and the stars as narcissi, and goes on to establish other relationships between the crescent moon and the stars based on the free associations of memory so that the crescent moon becomes a sickle culling narcissi, he is falsifying the relationships between things and establishing an artificial relationship conceived in the senses not in the soul and imagination. Another parallel example is the poet's description of the crescent moon as an anklet and the night as a negress.

This kind of imagery seems to illustrate what al-'Alqad has called a few years ago the poetry of wit, whereas the imagery which is based on psychological relations between the poet and the world illustrates what has been called the poetry of nature or imagination. Thus in Shawki’s lines

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كرمه الدرب توكلت صويلي نا
فربت من كل شعب وجبل
تطلع الشمس بنين تطلع صبحا
وتنجني منجل حصاد
تلك حراء في السماء وهذا
أوجع النصل من مراس الجلاد
د الغياب الذي على صفحتها
دوران الرحم على الأجسام
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he finds falsification of the relationships of things and the relationships of the human soul with natural objects. The
images of the earth's sphere which has cast down the sceptres of many kings, killed many horses and destroyed many stadiums, the bleeding sun which is slaughtered by the sickle moon, and the earth as a stone grinding the bodies of dead have no functions and moods of passion, and therefore no significance. They are images based on false sensational perceptions and free associations of memory, not on the emotional associations and correspondences of things. They are products of sensory and mental aberration. Again when Shawkī writes:

al-ʻAkkād states that the resemblances between the beats of the heart and the ticking of the clock are accidental and transitory, and say nothing about the mysteries of life and death and the existence of the world. They are a falsification of the seriousness of the deep meaning of Human Experience and Ultimate Reality. On the other hand, al-Ma‘arri’s line:

is given as an example of the poetry of nature or imagination. The image of the tomb as an incessant burial place for dead, mocking at the paradoxes and contradictions of human existence thus crowded together, is regarded by al-ʻAkkād as an expression of deepest reality, for it is based on a true conception of life and death provided by a deep experience.

Al-Ma‘arri’s elegy

in which the above mentioned line occurs, is taken as an instance of true poetry, for to al-ʻAkkād it is a revelation of the Human Experience of life and death and of Ultimate Truth
The example of the poetry of art he finds in Shawki's elegy

کل حيّ على المحبة عاد تتولى الركاب وموت حاد

which is written in imitation of al-Ma‘arri's. In his view, Shawki's poem lacks the deep vision which the reader finds in that of al-Ma‘arri. It is a collection of common, intellectual truths, and it receives its power from the sensational perception of life and death. Whereas behind al-Ma‘arri's elegy stands a poet who has penetrated into the secrets of life, and known its suffering, deceptiveness and purposelessness, Shawki's poem has no vision, no experience and no particular voice, but merely common thoughts on life and death. To al-‘Akkād the function of poetry is not to represent pure intellectual truth, but that kind of truth which the poet finds in the deep intimate region of his being.

In all these views al-‘Akkād is largely indebted to Hazlitt's lectures "On Poetry in General", "On Wit and Humour", "On Chaucer and Spenser" and "On Dryden and Pope", where Hazlitt deals with imagination and wit, the relationship between poetry and Nature, poetic or imaginative truth, the poetry of art and the poetry of nature.

(ii) Sentimentality and Truth

Sentimentality was one of the subjects that received much attention from al-‘Akkād, so that he devoted to it a long separate essay under the title "al-Ghazal at-Tabī‘ī" (The Natural Poetry of Love). In his opinion a sentimental poem is a bad one; it is, like the poem of wit, a falsification of
truth, nature and human experience. He finds faithfulness to truth or nature the supreme aim of the poet and the first virtue of genuine poetry; passionate truth, however crude and violent, rather than refinement and tenderness should be the aim of the poet even when he writes love-poetry; for the measure of good love-poetry is not the refinement, softness and sorrow of its emotions but the truth and depth of these emotions. The notion that regards a refined tender emotion as a mark of the sensitive civilized man is, says al-‘Akkād, a harmful fallacy in poetry. Poetry is not the expression of the refined soft emotion alone, nor is it a product of one civilized age rather than another. Poetry is the true expression of passion, however tender or crude it may be. Sentimentality is not a mark of civilization as some poets think, nor is crudeness or violence a feature of primitive ages. Sentimentality indicates rather a misunderstanding of the nature of poetry and the function of the poet; it reflects a sick mentality, narrowness of taste and understanding, and a moral decline. The sentimentalist poet is characterized by the poverty rather than richness of feeling; he thinks and feels within the range of one particular fashion of thought and feeling. Love poetry, where the Arab poet likes to express tender and sentimental emotions, should be the true record of the poet's love experience, its soft sweet phases as well as its crude violent ones. For love is a complex and often harsh brutal passion adequately expressed by wild vibrating music.
Al-‘Akkad does not reject the poetry which conveys tender and refined emotions when he finds it true and natural. He rejects only sentimentality as a measure of good poetry. He praises al-Māzinī's love-poetry for its strong warm passions as he praises it for its truth and naturalness. He also praises Shukrī's poems which express tender and refined feelings because they are genuine and sincere. But he remarks that in all his poems Shukrī shows a manly spirit and a control over the overflow of his passions.

(iii) Language and Music

During the eight or nine years, 1913-1921, in which al-‘Akkad's critical writings were connected with al-Māzinī's and Shukrī's, language became, as has been mentioned above, subsidiary to imagination in his theory of poetry. Among the numerous essays that he wrote in this period we find only one short article concerned with language and its relation to thought.

The article is based on the view that there exist in the mind thoughts and feelings which no language can express, for they are beyond the range of language and words. Yet they are to be expressed by language and words. The writer who is forced to depend on the suggestive powers of words, the use of symbol and the brevity of concentrated distilled expressions cannot avoid ambiguity and obscurity and has to rely on the reader's power of apprehension, insight and imagination. The best poetry of the poet is that which remains dormant in his mind and which can find its adequate
expression only in deep suggestive silence. Even when the poet succeeds in expressing himself, a good deal of his ideas and emotions remains outside his words, and what is contained in the words suffers from vagueness and ambiguity. The able writer is the one who knows how to use words as symbols and signs and whose knowledge of language and the potentialities of words never fails him. At his best the poet can only evoke in his reader a particular state of mind. He is no more than an illusionist; the apprehension of his vision or experience which lurks behind the illusion is the role of the reader. The reader is asked to be capable of grasping at the slightest hint what the poet intends to express.

Thus at the basis of the article we find the belief in the interdependence of writer and reader, and in symbol as the proper medium of poetry and of art in general. To al-‘Akkad, the inadequacy of language and its inferiority to thought lead to a demand for creating a new medium of communication higher and more adequate than language. He even shows contempt for that literature which wholly depends on the expressive means of language and words.

The belief in the inadequacy of language and the difficulty of poetic communication has not led al-‘Akkad to stress the importance of music in the process of communication as one would expect. Rather he thinks of pure poetry as an art in which the part of imagination and language is greater than that of music. In his preface to al-Mazini’s collection of poems he regards the regular pattern of metre as an
artificial device or a superadded element to the poem which corresponds only to the momentary excitement and sensation. He argues that in old times when poetry was recited the metre and rhyme were created to the accompaniment of music and dancing. Though with the passage of time poetry has become independent of music and dancing, the regular patterns of metre and rhyme survived in it. He seems to think of pure poetry as something similar to free verse in English. But how is this pure or free poetry to be written in Arabic? His preface offers us no answer. All what pure poetry means to him is freedom from rhyme and the regularity of metre.

These views al-ʾAkkād has expressed in defence of Shukrī's poems which abandon rhyme, but retain the old regular pattern of metre. He thinks of these rhymeless poems as a step towards pure or free verse. If we are to establish harmony between these views and his theory of the inadequacy of language, we might claim that he wants to replace the simple regular patterns of metre and rhyme by a complex varied rhythmical pattern. This is perhaps because he thinks of the poetic experience as a complex intricate process which can find its correspondence in a complex intricate musical pattern, rather than in a simple regular one. However, his statement is much more concerned with epic and dramatic poetry than with the lyrical poem. In the lyrical poem which aims at emotional excitement the regular pattern of metre, he says, is to be retained.
(iv) Unity and Complexity.

In al-'Akkād's theory the principle of the unity of the poem comes next in importance to imagination and faithfulness to nature. In his preface to Shukrī's *The Pearls of Thoughts* he thinks of complexity and variety of passion, depth of thought, and subtlety of rhythm as the essential characteristics of difficult or rare poetry. Shukrī's poetry he gives as an example. He compares it to a profound wide sea that swells out in tranquility and quietness rather than to a rapid clamouring torrent. He also compares it to a concert or symphony composed of various but harmonious tones. Though al-'Akkād is concerned here with the complexity of poetic experience, and not with the unity of the poem, his description and analogies suggest that the complexity of poetic experience appears at its highest degree in the harmonious whole or unity of the poem. But there is nothing in his preface to suggest that he thinks of the unity of the poem as an organic growth.

In the preface to his collection of poems *The Lights of Morning* he finds that the function of reason in the process of poetic creation is to curb the overflow of feeling, organize the stream of passion, and establish a balance between the various elements of the poet's experience. It is thus a double function: to arrest any inclination towards sentimentality on the one hand, and to organize the structure of the poem on the other. In this way al-'Akkād seems to think of the unity of the poem as a symmetry organized by
reason in a state of consciousness.

It was not until 1921 that he expressed his theory of the organic unity of the poem. The unity of the poem was the second principle that he invoked against Shawki in The Tribunal. Here he thinks of evolution as a process leading to complex organic wholes. Every higher structure in Nature represents to him a complex, unique, distinguishable unity incomparable to any other unity or structure. It is a unity-in-complexity, a harmonious intimate synthesis of various elements or parts. Oneness is the principle of Nature and evolution, and is the characteristic of every higher organic being. In a higher living being, every organ, though harmonious with the whole and other organs, is unique and distinguishable from other organs, so that no organ can provide a substitute for another organ and fulfil its function. Thus to al-‘Akkād the distinctions between organs and the unity of the organs with their functions are the basis of the living process of evolution. In a backward state of natural evolution, as well as in a decadent cultural period, this higher organic order does not exist.

This theory of evolution has led al-‘Akkād to conceive every work of art, whether a lyrical poem, a play, or a novel, as an organic unity or structure which grows from within like any living being. To him, the poet is an agent of Nature who constructs his work in accordance with the laws of living organism. As in the organic body the ear cannot be a substitute for the eye and fulfil its function, so in a good
no line can be a substitute for another and occupy its place. To change the order of the lines of the poem is to destroy the poem, its totality and integrity. Al-'Akkād finds the true analogy of the poem in the tree. In the tree every part has its own place and function which cannot be replaced by any other part; every organ is distinguishable from the others, and by virtue of its peculiarity of constitution it contributes to the wholeness and living process of the tree. Thus as all the parts of the tree work in one harmonious entirety and fulfil one purpose, a poem should represent a whole and a unified experience, not separate thoughts and feelings. Its unity must grow from inside the poetic experience, and not to be introduced from outside. This analogy of the poem with the tree seems substantial in al-'Akkād's theory, though it is confused by other inorganic analogies. While he thinks of the poem as a unified organic structure, as a living process growing from within, he describes it sometimes as a geometrically designed building and compares the poetic mind to a fixed star, the lights of which are connected and represent one continuous process, not separate flashes.

The poem which lacks integrity and unity is compared to an embryo and the lowest living cell, in which there is no distinction between organs and functions. The example of this kind of poem al-'Akkād finds in Shawāfi's elegy:

المشرقان عليك ينتميان
تاصيبها في مأتم وداني

a
He changes the order of the lines of this elegy showing that such a change does not affect the poem, because it has no organic order, and is merely a compilation of separate lines and ideas; that the unity which it possesses is no more than a unity of metre and rhyme. Therefore, he expels it from the realm of poetry and art.

Al-‘Akkād seems to think of the organic unity of the poem as a product of imagination. It is a unity superior to any unity shown in the works of reason, and different from the geometrical or logical unity and structure.

Al-‘Akkād appears to have reached these views through his reading in Carlyle’s and Coleridge’s critical writings, particularly Carlyle’s two essays “Characteristics” and “Goethe”. The influence of Coleridge may be traced back to the Chapter XIV in Biographia Literaria, to the lecture on Romeo and Juliet, and probably to the essay “The Theory of Life”.

(v) The Poet and His Function in Life.

In al-‘Akkād’s writings during the period under discussion we find two images of the poet, the one appears in his criticism, and the other in his poetry. In the preface to Shukrī’s The Pearls of Thoughts he thinks of sympathy as a basic value both in life and art, as a moral and aesthetic value at the same time. Therefore, the old image of the poet as a dreamer and isolated individual turns into the image of the poet as a moral and religious agency living at the heart of the community. Poetry comes to represent a substitute for
religion as a moral and social power, and the poet is called upon to play the part of the prophet, who has lost his function in the life of modern man, by embodying in his poems the hope of man in the future and drawing the picture of a new paradise established not in heaven but on earth. Al-‘Ak̲k̲ād seems to think that religion has failed or lost its power before modern science, and it is time for poetry to represent a new redemption of the spirit of modern man who suffers from doubt and despair; its task is twofold: to stress the importance of emotion and vision rather than that of the concrete or sensational reality, and to create a radiant image of future. To him human life is an oscillation between necessity and hope (freedom). The latter is the offspring of imagination, which is at its full power in the poet. Poetry represents to man a wide gate opening on pleasure and happiness, for it portrays things as he wishes them to be, and clothes them in the images which satisfy his thoughts and please his spirit. Thus poetry is conceived as emotional therapy, and the poet as a mental and spiritual healer. In poetry man finds a power which frees him from the bonds of the present to live in the future, and lifts him from the range of necessity into that of hope or freedom.

In his preface to al-Māzinī's collection of poems al-‘Ak̲k̲ād appears to think of poetry as "criticism of life" in Matthew Arnold's moral sense and of the poet as the alarm-bell ringer and the critic of his age. He calls upon the new poets to unveil in their works the moral and social defects of
the age and to portray at the same time an image of the ideal. This does not mean that he thinks of poetry as preaching and of the poet as an evangelist. All that he demands from poets is that they make their poetry a true record of themselves, their age, and human nature. To him this is not a triple part but a single one. By representing himself the poet is a representative of his age and of human nature at the same time. He must see the spirit of the age in himself and depict what he feels and thinks.

The second image of the poet is found, as has been mentioned above, in al-‘Akkād’s poetry. In a poem entitled al-Azz ash-Shu‘arāʾ (The Destiny of the Poets), the poet is depicted as an intense man, an unhappy dreamer cut off from society and action, alien among his fellowmen, a victim to the dilemma between dream and reality, and at home only with Nature. To him alone the secrets of Nature are open.

(5) Relationships between al-‘Akkād’s, al-Māzīnī’s and Shukrī’s theories

In the following pages an attempt has been made to show the relationships and differences between al-‘Akkād’s theory and the theories of al-Māzīnī and Shukrī. Such an attempt seems necessary because many of al-‘Akkād’s views are inseparable from those of Shukrī and al-Māzīnī. There are, however, some other important reasons which make this attempt necessary. As we have seen, the relationship between the three writers has been misrepresented by all those who wrote
about them. All the Arab critics who wrote about the school claim that al-‘Akkād’s views are mere echoes of Shukrī’s and al-Māzini’s. Some of them even claim that al-‘Akkād’s critical writings after 1921 add nothing essential to Shukrī’s theory; they are merely repetition, elaboration and illustration of Shukrī’s views. It is time now to show that Shukrī has borrowed or derived the majority of his views from English and German sources with which al-‘Akkād was also acquainted. The most influential English critics in Shukrī’s theory of poetry were not Hazlitt and Carlyle under whose influence al-‘Akkād formulated his theory but Wordsworth and Coleridge. Al-‘Akkād’s statement that Hazlitt was the master critic of the three writers requires some correction. Hazlitt’s influence in Shukrī’s theory cannot be compared to that of Wordsworth or Coleridge. It appears only in one or two minor points. Shukrī has learned much more from Goethe, Coleridge, Wordsworth and Schiller than he learned from any other European writer.

The relationships and differences between beauty and freedom, poetry and philosophy, and imagination and fancy with which al-‘Akkād concerned himself after 1921 were already mentioned by Shukrī and al-Māzini. But this does not mean that al-‘Akkād’s interest in these questions arose under the influence of Shukrī and al-Māzini. Shukrī’s views concerning beauty and freedom, imagination and fancy are very often a repetition of Schiller’s, Goethe’s, Coleridge’s and Wordsworth’s views which were also known to al-‘Akkād. As regards al-
Māzīnī's views of the relationships between poetry, philosophy and religion they are mere echoes of Carlyle's views expressed in "The Hero as Poet" and "The State of German Literature", and Shelley's views in his A Defence of Poetry.

(i) Al-Māzīnī's theory

Between 1913 and 1916 Al-Māzīnī wrote four essays in which he set forth his theory of poetry; they are "Ḥāfiẓ's Poetry", published late in 1913, "Ibn ar-Rūmī wa Ḥayātuhu" (Ibn ar-Rūmī and His Life), 1913-14, "ash-Shi'r Ghāyātuhu wa Waṣā'iṭuhu" (Poetry, its Ends and Methods), written in 1915, and the preface to his second collection of poems, 1916.

In the essay "Ḥāfiẓ's Poetry", Al-Māzīnī is concerned mainly with the truth and originality of the poet's work, and with poetry as a revelation of the poet's personality and the spirit of his age. With regard to these principal points he adds nothing essential to what Al-'Akkād has already stated in the same year. But this does not mean that Al-Māzīnī was merely echoing Al-'Akkād. Rather it means that their similar views were a part of the school's doctrine. It seems that both of them were writing under the influence of Hazlitt's lectures "On Poetry in General" and "On Dryden and Pope" and Carlyle's essays "The State of German Literature" and "Burns".

The greater part of "Ibn ar-Rūmī and His Life" is devoted to the discussion of poetry, history, and genius. Victor Hugo's William Shakespeare, book III "Art and Science", or Hazlitt's lecture "On Shakespeare and Milton" is a dominant
influence in the essay. Al-Mázini's views on the relationship between poetry and science are merely a repetition of Hugo's or Hazlitt's views (Hugo himself seems under the influence of Hazlitt). The influence of Carlyle's *Heroes and Hero Worship* comes next in importance.

The essay *Poetry: its End and Methods* is the most important critical work that Al-Mázini has ever written. In it he expressed his theory of knowledge and poetry and discussed four fundamental questions, which had already been discussed by Al-'Akkâd: the function of poetry and its relation to life, passion and thought, the function of imagination and imagery, and poetic language. He differs from Al-'Akkâd in his philosophical grounds, his views on the place of reason and imagination in the process of knowledge, and his views on the metre and music of poetry. Nevertheless, the essay shows a good deal of similarity with Al-'Akkâd's theory of knowledge and poetry. The similarity is, however, to be attributed to the fact that both writers were under the influence of Hazlitt's, Carlyle's and Shelley's views on poetry and the poet, and Al-Jurjânî's views on language. The most influential English works in Al-Mázini's essay are Carlyle's essay "The State of German Literature" and his lecture "The Hero as Poet", Hazlitt's lecture "On Poetry in General", Shelley's essay *A Defence of Poetry* and Burke's *Philosophical Enquiry into the Origin of our Ideas of the Sublime and the Beautiful*. Al-Mázini seems also to have been influenced by Locke's representative theory of knowledge.
It is for the sake of brevity and clarity and in order to facilitate comparisons that the scattered elements of al-Māzīnī's thought are here presented in a more orderly form than he had patience for.

The key passage of his theory of knowledge occurs in the opening pages of the essay:

"Senses are, you know, our primary sources of knowledge and of our conceptions of sensible objects, their attributes, motions, and relations to each other. But no doubt our sense-knowledge of the world is far too scant to rely on; without our other faculties of knowledge we know almost nothing. However, knowledge is a process connected with the mind. The echo that sensible objects leave in the mind explains the mind-characteristic which we call 'memory'. This process of effect is usually accompanied by the mind-activity of creating mental images which lack the concreteness and the clarity of sense-objects... These mental images are very often replaced by abstruse symbols, for words, the forms of thought, are themselves symbols. This is perhaps the reason for the mind's misconceptions. When anyone examines his mental images of things, he often finds them obscure."

In this passage al-Māzīnī is expressing his representative or symbolic theory of knowledge. Though he connects knowledge with reason, reason is, to him, no more than a creator of symbolical images or perceptual modes of representation (he seems to use the word "image" as equivalent to "idea"). Sense-experience has nothing to do with the nature of things, for its range is limited to the external phenomena of the world. Knowledge is thus a mental reflection, and not mere sensation. But our mental reflection does not acquaint us with things themselves but rather with mental abstractions or symbolical modes of representation. Both the mind and the world exist independently of each other, and there is no
direct relationship between them. When this relationship exists, it is indirect and symbolical. In the process of knowledge there are thus three factors: the mind, the outside world, and the mental image or the mind's idea of the outside world which stands between the two. What the mind perceives of the world is no more than the echo or the indirect effect which the world produces on it. In the mind the outside world is an abstract, vague concept or image. We cannot say how far these concepts or images correspond to reality. These mental images which are originally perceptual representations of sensible objects often lose their representative functions and become objects in themselves.

On examining the whole argument we see that al-Māzinī is denying the possibility of objective knowledge. He denies the attainability of knowledge of eternal truth or ultimate reality. All truths are temporary and changeable. What we believe today can be doubted tomorrow.

While al-Māzinī assigns an eminent place to memory in the process of knowledge (memory is the storehouse of mental images and symbols wherefrom they are recalled as mental reproductions of past perceptual experiences), his views on imagination suggest that imagination has nothing to do with the objective nature of reality. He seems to distinguish between reality (the object in itself), sensation (the sensational appearances of the object) and emotion (the emotional associations of the object). Imagination is concerned with emotion or rather the emotional associations
of the object, not with the object itself. Imagination clothes things in garments of its own. Thus the image of the object is not the object itself but its effect on human passion. The world remains obscure and reality unattainable. However, our mental images or abstract symbols of the world are not entirely the creatures of the mind. They are rather derived from the outside world and refer to something inner and invisible. They are both representations and presentations. In denying the possibility of knowledge of objective reality, al-ṣ Mazinī thinks, however, of the emotional truth as the only valid truth for which we can claim some lasting value. Thus his theory of knowledge has very little in common with al-ʿAljūdā's.

Al-ṣ Mazinī's views on language, the medium of knowledge, do not show much harmony with his views on the process of knowledge. Although he holds that sensible objects have no objective entity in the mind and are mere symbolical images or abstract modes of representation, he also asserts that there are words which stand directly for sensible objects and that there are simple, sensible objects capable of being grasped easily by the mind. Here he is following Burke's classification of ideas and words without examining its inconsistency with his views of the process of knowledge which he seems to have reached under the influence of Locke.

The words which stand for simple ideas or images of sensation easily grasped by the mind al-ṣ Mazinī calls, following Burke, the aggregate words; they represent sensible objects such as horse, tree and man. (One cannot help
noticing that these are by no means simple ideas in the sense that they are uncompounded) Al-Māzinī also seems to think of the compounded ideas represented by the nouns "greenness", "redness" and the verbs "sit down" and "stand up" as capable of being grasped easily, though the mind has to take account of all the parts of the image. The only vague words, to him, are those which refer to complex, abstract, general notions or ideas such as honour, virtue and freedom.

However, this classification of words and ideas, which al-Māzinī borrows from Burke and which he unsuccessfully tried to combine with al-Jurjānī's views on language, does not have much effect on his claim about the inadequacy of language. To him, language is in the main a representative symbolical system of images and ideas; the word is a sound-abstraction which stands for an image, whether mental or sensational. This makes language an inadequate medium of communication inferior to thought; it scarcely offers adequate expression for our deep feelings and profound thoughts. The words are described as "dumb signs", "hollow echoes of ideas", and "fossilized thoughts"; they hardly evoke clear images of the objects and meanings for which they stand. Language is, at its best, a suggestive rather than expressive medium. In the process of communication, we are forced to depend on the suggestive and symbolical powers of words and their emotional associations and on the expressive means of simile and metaphor. Here al-Māzinī comes very close to al-‘Akkād; he seems to be repeating al-‘Akkād's views or expressing views
which had formed a part of the school's doctrine.

On this theory of knowledge al-Māzīnī has tried to base his theory of poetry. Following Hazlitt, he conceives of poetry in connection with dream. But to say that poetry is a dream is not to lay a charge against poetry, for life itself is much the same and the matter of poetry is the very stuff of life. Though the poet is a dreamer, his product is truer than any rational truth. Thus Homer's dream The Iliad remains truer than Plato's Republic from which Homer was banished. Al-Māzīnī does not go further than Hazlitt, nor does he develop the relation of poetry to dream. But in the light of his theory of knowledge, which regards the mind as the creator of symbolical images and which assigns an eminent place to memory, the storehouse of images and symbols, in the process of knowledge, one can see that the relationship between poetry and dream goes deeper: dream is, it might be said, a film of memories and images that emerge in an instant of time in which the mind has no control over itself, and poetry is likewise a tide of memories and images that flows in an instant of time in which the poet is subject to strong emotion and the mind's control over itself is weakened. To al-Māzīnī memory has much to do with the process of poetic expression and selection of symbols. One of the essential characteristics of the good poet is that he has a powerful memory for images and symbols (word-symbols). He also believes in the spontaneity of the poem against mannerism and affectation; the poem (like the dream) springs spontaneously in a moment
of strong passion. Moreover, poetry represents, in his view, a knowledge different from logical knowledge. The poem, one might claim then, resembles a dream in its atmosphere and symbolic logic. But al-Māzinī is not always aware of the implications of his views. He often expresses himself in rhapsodies of words and metaphors and at times seems at variance with views he has previously expressed.

At any rate, to him, as to al-‘Akkād, poetry is the expression of the essence, not of the external appearances of things or the world of phenomena. Its stuff consists of mental images and imaginative symbols which stand for something inner and invisible. Here al-Māzinī is quoting Hegel. He appears to refer to Hegel's view that "the content of art is the Idea, and the forms of it display the configuration of the sensuous plastic image", or that art is a sensuous symbol or image of Ideal content. In his essay on Ibn ar-Rūmī he defines poetry as "the struggle between the human will and material necessity" meaning that it is a manifestation of the soul in its relations and struggle with the material world. Without this struggle, he says, poetry does not exist. It is the soul's strife against the material world which gives birth to poetry. In all this he thinks of the province of poetry as the world of the Ideal and supersensible to which the sensible refers. The function of the poet is not to represent the sensible objects as they appear in the world of Nature but the spirit's idea of them and to reveal the hidden relations between things conceived in that deep region of the
heart. The poem should be a sensuous representation of the world of spirit.

Al-Māzīnī co-ordinates poetry with religion and philosophy. To him poetry differs from religion and philosophy only in its way of representing the Idea. He writes:

"Religion, philosophy and poetry are one and the same; though each has its particular character, they are all representations of the Idea as it appears in the age; the philosopher analyzes it and the poet represents it as sensation".

Here al-Māzīnī is drawing on Fichte's views as represented in Carlyle's essay "The State of German Literature". He is also trying to combine Fichte's views with Hegel's. Therefore, he calls the Idea "The Religious Idea"; "The Ideal of the Age" and "The Spirit of the Age" at the same time. But his conception of the Idea seems to be essentially moral. There is no rational idealism behind his views, nothing to suggest Hegel's notion that it is a rational world "animated with indwelling somnolent rationality in a process of gradual emergence". Following Fichte, he thinks that though the Idea represents a unified Whole, it might appear in different forms and as if it were constituted of un-unified elements. On this point he is not very explicit. He seems to think that the Idea, which is the Spirit of the Age, is manifold. It requires, therefore, more than one poet to represent it; one poet, however great, cannot grasp it and represent it fully. However, in representing the Idea even partially the poet is a representative of his age.
It is difficult to see how these views, which al-Māzini has borrowed from Hegel and Fichte, harmonize with his theory of knowledge, in which Locke is the dominant influence. Al-Māzini does not seem to have been aware of the inconsistencies of these views. Moreover, in the opening pages of the essay he quoted Shelley in support of his idea that the poet is the spokesman of the Divine Wisdom or Idea and is co-ordinate with the prophet. Shelley's words are:

"But poets ... are not only the authors of language and of music ...; they are the institutors of laws and the founders of civil society, and the inventors of the arts of life, and the teachers, who draw into a certain propinquity with the beautiful and the true, that partial apprehension of the agencies of the invisible world which is called religion ... Poets, according to the circumstances of the age and nation in which they appeared, were called, in earlier epochs of the world, legislators or prophets; a poet essentially comprises and unites both these characters. For he not only beholds intensely the present as it is, and discovers those laws according to which present things ought to be ordered, but he beholds the future in the present, and his thoughts are the germs of the flower and the fruit of latest time. Not that I assert poets to be prophets in the gross sense of the word, or that they can foretell the form as surely as they foreknow the spirit of events; such is the pretence of superstition, which would make poetry an attribute of prophecy, rather than prophecy an attribute of poetry. A poet participates in the eternal, the infinite, and the one..."

On the next page al-Māzini rejects Schlegel's view that poetry is the representation or mirror of the eternal true ideas. His criticism is based on the view that the poet cannot look further than his age, and that he is the spokesman of the Idea of his age, not the Idea of future. He seems to doubt that the poet has any access to the Eternal Truth or Idea.

To attach poetry to the world of Ideal and essence,
the world of spirit and mind, is not to cut it off from life, but only from daily events and common situations of life. Poetry about the common (presumably social and political) events of daily life is a subject of al-Māzinī's criticism and is banished from the realm of poetry to that of prose. The relationship between poetry and life appears both in the form and the aim of the poem. Since what matters in life is passion not reason, and since the emotional truth is the only truth for which we can claim some lasting value, "the province of poetry is", says al-Māzinī, "the world of passion not of reason, of sensation not of thought". But this is not to say that poetry has to estrange itself from the world of reason and rational ideas. Good poetry cannot be purely emotional, nor can the poet draw a border line between his territory and the philosopher's. It only means that the poet has to represent his rational ideas as sensations or emotions and to depict them not for their own sake but for their connection with the sensations and emotions which evoked them. The poet's aim is not to increase the range of the reader's sensibility alone but also the range of his understanding, to represent all that which has existence in the realm of passion and reason. The similarity between these views and al-ʿAkād's is very evident.

The importance that al-Māzinī attaches to passion is, however, a result of his moralistic theory of poetry. Like al-ʿAkād, he rejects the view of poetry as sheer pleasure or amusement, and conceives of the aesthetic experience as
connected with religious sentiment, of poetry as emotional therapy, and of the poet as a mental or spiritual healer. The end of poetry is to represent an emotional and moral catharsis, to awaken man's dull sensations and stagnant passions. The stress is laid on painful experiences, the feelings of guilt and evil, of fear and horror. Yet al-Māzinī thinks that beauty is the cause-factor in this poetic process of purgation. This is what differentiates poetry from religion. Here al-Māzinī is combining Carlyle's views of the relationship between poetry and religion in his lecture "The Hero as Poet" with Aristotle's theory of dramatic catharsis.

Poetic language has received much attention from al-Māzinī. How is the poet to express himself since he is talking about something visionary, something hidden and beyond the range of language? Al-Māzinī's answer is the following. Like al-‘Akkād, he thinks that the poet has a hard task to fulfil. Poetry is a suggestive not a descriptive art. The poet, because of the inadequacy of his language, is forced to express himself in metaphorical language, in symbols and images, and to rely on the suggestive powers, emotional associations, and music of words. But poetic imagery and musical language should not be used as rhetorical ornaments. Nor should the poet make his poem a jungle of images and radiant words. For poetry is not an ingenious game played with images and words. However, the language of the poet should be distinct from the common language of life. In al-Māzinī's view the poet is a divine spokesman who speaks on a
level much higher than that of everyday life. He has to discriminate between two kinds of words, ignoble and noble, the former being commonly used and associated with bad recollections, and the latter the contrary.

Al-Māzinī's views on metre and the music of poetry show little harmony with, if not oppose, those of al-‘Akkād. They are, however, consonant with al-‘Akkād's views in The Quintessence of the Diary. To al-Māzinī, the poet has to find the correct musical correspondence to the flow of his passion, the metre which answers the pulse of passion. The metre is an element inseparable from the poem; it is the sensuous life of the poetic experience. Following Hazlitt, he says that every deep prolonged passion requires a musical language which corresponds to its pulse and flow. The only emotions which have nothing to do with music and metre are the short and sudden emotions. He seems to think, like Carlyle, that profound passions and thoughts are musical in themselves, and that music is the language of deep things. He assigns to the metre another end, namely, that it makes bearable the pain in the poet's experience (by its regular pleasurable pattern). Here he seems to follow Wordsworth. He does not mention delight in the poet's experience. He probably thinks of the poet's experience as intrinsically painful.

Like al-‘Akkād, al-Māzinī believes in the inter-dependence of the poet, the poem, and the reader; the role of the reader is not supplementary but substantial; the reader is the interpreter of the poem. In the process of poetic
communication the poet has to depend on the imagination of the reader. Yet he has to avoid vagueness and obscurity by using suggestive words and images, establishing a balance between imagination and sensation, and giving the poem a coherent body.

Al-Māzīnī's call for clarity deserves some consideration, for we shall meet the same call in al-ʿAkkād's writings after 1921. In the essay he gives Kuthayyir's lines

بِذِلْ عَمَّ مُسَبَّبَةٍ،
تَجَاكِنْتُمْ مَعَ لُحْلَةٍ لَّيْلِيَةٍ

as an example of good poetry and writes:

"Though these two beautiful lines contain no splendid meaning or deep thought, they penetrate into the soul, for there is in them a great imaginative power. The poet has substituted illusion for clarity, and suggestion for direct description; he has mentioned his beloved's coquetry but said nothing about it, alluded to its effect and again said nothing about its nature. The poet has, thus, left a wide horizon for the flight of the reader's imagination ... Had he described all that he felt, he would have narrowed the range of imagination ... A good poem is that which says something new on every reading, not that which leaves the reader's imagination nothing (to discover)."

Here al-Māzīnī is very explicit. He is not demanding clarity at the expense of the poet's deep experience and thought. To him poetry is suggestion not description. And the value of the poem is not confined to what it contains in itself but to what it suggests and to its ability to evoke a continuous imaginative movement in the mind on every reading. The power of imagination seems to mean to him the power of rendering the
poet's emotional state or the power of suggestive language.

The final point that al-Māzini has discussed in his essay is the form and technique of the poem. Poetic technique is what he calls "the art of representation". But on this point there is much ambiguity and confusion in his statements and terms. While he seems to attribute the art of representation to the function of imagination rather than to reason, as a process based on the apprehension of the deep relations of things which do not come under any rational categories, he discerns two functions in the process of poetic creation: the function of the thinker who apprehends the relations of things and the function of the man of letters who gives expression to them. He thinks of the latter as deliberate and laborious. He also uses al-Jurjānī's term "an-Naẓm" as equivalent to the "art of representation". But while al-Jurjānī means the mere grammatical construction and the connection between phrases and sentences, al-Māzini seems to include under it the technique by which the poet represents his ideas, the style, the arrangement of phrases and sentences, and the structure of the poem as a whole.

In al-Māzini's writings, as in al-'Akkād's, we find two images of the poet. What we meet with in his poetry is the image of the poet as an isolated individual, an unhappy dreamer who lives in isolation - estranged from men and in search of eternity. The other image of the poet as a religious or moral and social agency appears in his critical writings.
(ii) Shukri's Theory

In his pamphlet *The Fruits*, 1916, and in the prefaces to his five collections of poems, which appeared between 1915 and 1919, Shukri has expressed his own views on poetry and discussed the relationship between the poet and Nature, imagination, reason and reality, and between thought and language. On several points Shukri echoes al-'Akkād and al-Māzini, but he also expresses views which differ from and sometimes oppose those of al-'Akkād and al-Māzini. He even seems to have written his most important critical work, the long preface to his *Reflections*, which appeared late in 1916, as a critical reply to al-Māzini and al-'Akkād with regard to their views on language and imagination. On close examination, the similarity between Shukri and al-'Akkād seems greater than the differences, and though Shukri would appear to differ greatly from al-Māzini, in fact he has a good deal of similarity with him. In his theory, Shukri, as we have already mentioned, has drawn extensively on Goethe, Schiller, Coleridge and Wordsworth. There are also some other influences exercised by Shelley, Carlyle and Hazlitt.

It is difficult to find a suitable starting point in presenting Shukri's theory of poetry, yet his views on the Sublime and the Beautiful might assist us in this respect.

Both in his prose and poetical writings Shukri has left us many remarks, though brief and incomplete, concerning the Sublime and the Beautiful. The theory underlying these remarks is grossly ambiguous. In fact, some of his statements
are inconsistent. However, this theory seems to be a combination of Schiller's views with those of Goethe. But this is not to say that it has no origin in his feeling. We do not know when the idea of the Sublime and the Beautiful claimed his attention. We know only that his acquaintance with Goethe's and Schiller's writings was made during his student days in England. There is one question which may be raised here, though it cannot be answered. Had Shukrī become interested in the relationship between the Sublime and the Beautiful under the influence of al-Ākkād who was already interested in it and acquainted with Burke's *Philosophical Inquiry into the Origin of Our Ideas of the Sublime and the Beautiful*?

The first remark which Shukrī made about the Sublime and the Beautiful is found in his collection of poems *The Pearls of Thoughts*, 1913, where we find a poem entitled "Daw' al-Ḵamar 'alā al-Kubūr" (The Moonlight over the Graves) and introduced thus:

"When one beholds the moon shedding her beams over the roses, one is humbled before the sublimity of the scene, but when one sees the tombs in the light of the moon, one is horrified by the sight of Beauty destroyed in death".

In these words, which Shukrī seems to have written in 1913, he distinguishes between the Sublime and the Fearful and connects the former with the Beautiful. To him, as to Goethe, the Sublime exists within the frontier of the Beautiful. It is the calm, solemn phenomena of the Beautiful where darkness and light melt into each other and where man feels uplifted.
This is in fact one kind or mode of the Sublime. The Sublime is that natural event or object which evokes at the same time the feeling of humility and intellectual ecstasy and gives birth to a sense of peace and harmony, i.e. when the feeling of humility is transformed into delight and the mind undulates in a peaceful contemplation. In the same collection of poems Shukrī describes the lofty peaks of mountains as being Sublime and fearful. He also speaks of waterfalls, thunderstorms, and seas as Sublime and fearful. Their sublimity belongs to their greatness, powerfulness, and immensity. To Shukrī the awe or fear aroused by the Sublime is akin to joy; it is not a negative pleasure.

It was not until 1916 that Shukrī developed his views and expressed himself to a greater extent. In his pamphlet The Fruits, which appeared in that year, we read:

"The Beauty of Nature exists within itself, though it appears in diverse forms and images. The moonlit night, the green garden and the bright day do not hide the sublimity of the dark night and overcast sky. The sight of beauty awakens in the heart the passion of mercy, compassion and generosity. "Our pleasure in Beauty sets us free from the chains of habit and replaces them with the chains of Nature, while our feeling of the Sublimity of Beauty sets us free from the bonds of Nature to live unrestricted in her kingdom. So our delight in Beauty is the rapture of Freedom, and the Sublimity of Beauty is the awakening from this rapture."

Here Shukrī conceives Beauty as objective and existing within itself, and connects it with Freedom (Freedom from our earthly burdens which oppress us), pleasure and spiritual purification. He seems to distinguish between two kinds of Beauty or
beautiful objects, the one might be called "The Pleasurable" and the other "The Sublime". "The pleasurable" (The Beautiful) raises us above our daily circumstances, frees us from the routine of life and attaches us to the world of Nature where we feel the rapture of Freedom. "The Sublime" lifts us above the realm of the laws of Nature into that of freedom and will. Since "The Pleasurable" is a feeling of rapture, it appears to correspond to sense and imagination. "The Sublime", on the other hand, being an awakening from rapture, corresponds to reason and comprehension. These views Shukri seems to have derived from Schiller's essay "The Sublime", where Schiller writes:

"... Beauty is an expression of freedom, but not of that, which elevates us above the force of nature and releases us from all corporeal influence - only of that, which we enjoy in the midst of nature as men. We feel ourselves free through Beauty, since the sensuous impulses harmonize with the law of reason; we feel ourselves free through Sublimity, since the sensuous impulses have no influence upon the legislation of reason, since the spirit acts here, as if it existed under no other laws than its own.

The feeling of sublimity is a mingled feeling. It is a composition of woefulness, which in its highest degree appears as horror, and of joyfulness, which can amount to transport; and although it is not strictly pleasure, it is still far preferred to all pleasure by spirits of refinement. This union of the diverse perceptions in a single feeling, proves incontestably our moral independence. For as it is absolutely impossible, that the same object should stand in two opposite relations to us, it follows hence, that we ourselves stand in two different relations to the object - that therefore two opposite natures must be combined in us, which are interested in a manner totally opposite in the representation of this object. We perceive, then, by the feeling of Sublimity, that our spiritual condition is not necessarily moulded according to our sensuous condition, that the laws of nature are not necessarily
also our own, and that we possess an independent principle, independent of every sensuous emotion". 1

But unlike Schiller, Shukrī sees the Sublime and the Beautiful not as two species but as two forms or modes of one species. Like Goethe, he believes in the synthesis of the Sublime with the Beautiful, the Sublime being the extension or the highest manifestation of Beauty.

The notion of Freedom reached through the Sublime is ambiguous in Shukrī's words. What are the characteristics of the Sublime and what is this Freedom that we gain? Shukrī's pamphlet offers us no sufficient answer. He speaks of the ancients as having been closer to Truth than we are today, asserting that Nature was to them a sublime, significant, living Being in which they found the true doctrine of Life. In every organ of Nature they perceived a profound significance. Diverse emotions such as solemnity, humility, reverence, yearning and love were experienced by them in the presence of Nature. All these emotions Shukrī allies to Worship. He seems to connect the Sublime with religion and morality or spirituality. But he says nothing about Freedom. Thus the notion of liberty remains inexplicit. Shukrī's example "the dark night and the overcast sky" may provide us with a clue to his conception of man's freedom in the presence of the Sublime. In his poetry he often speaks of "the dark night" and "the

1. The translation of Schiller's words is taken from J. Weiss', The Philosophical and Aesthetic Letters and Essays of Schiller, London, 1845, p.249.
"gloomy day" as being Sublime and Fearful. His poem "Yawm Maṭīr" (A Rainy Day) portrays the Sublimity of the gloomy day as a fascination akin to the pleasantness of sadness. Though it oppresses the heart, it captivates the soul with delight different from that of a bright day. The Sublime thus evokes a pleasure derived from pain and exists in the oppressive, yet pleasurable, phenomena of Nature. Shukrī's poem "al-Layl" (The Night) likewise echoes this sentiment.

The idea of the Sublime is more explicit in the poems "The Waterfall", "The Mountain" and "The Sight of the Sublime and the Memory of Beauty". But the last two poems belong to Shukrī's later years and were not published until 1935 and 1938 respectively. In the first poem occur the following lines:

"O' brother of silence and mighty wind in majesty and awe, The image of my spiritual courage and hope, When I see eternity pouring in your torrent The everlasting anguish which seethes within my heart Is swept away and my soul dissolves, And a stream of rapture in my blood springs, Unmoving, swamplike, the gloom of life oppresses the soul. Grant me your power that my stagnant being may revive And powerful like you may I feel again. Then like your waters between earth and heaven may life flow. And like some watcher of earth in his tower My soul enraptured feels, Or like the dews of dawn diffuses in your majestic presence. I then feel carried along by your abounding torrents As though my garment is the world And in Nature moves my spirit. You awaken me from my deep sleep And in the roar of your waters I hear The call of my past courage and will. You who resemble youth in radiance and might,
You the symbol of eternity who fall like fate on earth,
And who know not the conquest of time and the fear of death.

In these lines the waterfall, a Sublime natural object, is presented as the image of spiritual courage and moral will of man. Being eternal and imperishable it inspires man, at the moment it reflects his impotence and mortality, to seek after perfection and eternity. Thus in the presence of the power of Nature man experiences a spiritual awakening. He recalls his moral strength and will, and thus he is able to transcend his mortal condition and lifts himself above the laws of Nature. The feeling of awe and humility is transformed into pleasure. And through his spiritual awakening he perceives the power of Nature as being the image of his spiritual or moral courage and will, and identifies himself with the world. The world becomes fearless, powerless and external vehicle, i.e. his garment, and his spirit pervades Nature. Thus the chief characteristic of the Sublime is its ability to evoke a spiritual awakening in man and enable man's spirit, oppressed by the routine of life and

1. Compare Shelley's stanza in "Ode to the West Wind":

"If I were a dead leaf thou mightest bear;
If I were a swift-cloud to fly with thee,
A wave to pant beneath thy power, and share
The impulse of thy strength, only less free
Than thou, O, uncontrollable! If even
I were as in my boyhood, and could be
The comrade of thy wanderings over heaven,
As then, when to outstrip thy skiey speed
Scarce seem'd a vision, - I would ne'er have striven
As thus with thee in prayer in my sore need.
Oh! lift me as a wave, a leaf, a cloud!
I fall upon the thorns of life! I bleed!
A heavy weight of hours has chain'd and bow'd
One too like thee - tameless, and swift, and proud."
the heavy course of time, to renew its energy and recall its moral will and courage. Here must lie the notion of Freedom, Schiller's notion of the freedom that man gains in the presence of the Sublime, though not the same, is similar. He says that in the presence of the Sublime

"The physical and moral man are ... most rigorously distinguished from each other; for exactly in those objects where the first only feels his limitation, the other experiences his power, and is infinitely exalted by the same thing which humbles the other to the dust".

"... A single sublime emotion is often sufficient ... to restore at once to the fettered spirit its whole elasticity, to impart a revelation of its true destiny, and to force upon it, at least for a moment, a feeling of its dignity."\(^1\)

Amidst wild natural scenery man discovers "something permanent in his own being", and the "external, relative greatness" of nature becomes "the mirror, where he sees reflected his internal, absolute greatness."\(^2\)

"The aspect of boundless distance and immeasurable height, the wide ocean at his feet, and the greater ocean above him, rescue his spirit from the narrow sphere of the actual and the oppressive confinement of physical life".\(^3\)

Shukri, as we have seen, relates Beauty to pleasure and to Freedom from the chains of habit, and thinks of the Beautiful as objective and self-contained. Yet, in his view Beauty belongs to the judgement of taste, which is a personal quality. Sometimes he even seems to deny the objectivity of

1. Ibid., pp.250-252.
2. Ibid., p.253.
3. Ibid., p.254.
Beauty and attaches it to the sentiment and to the creation of the artist. In his preface to The Flowers of Spring he regards beauty as the creation of the artist rather more than of Nature. Elsewhere in his poetry he says that Beauty is the light of the soul which reveals her purity and which lurks behind the work of the artist. However, Beauty is connected with life, truth, goodness and love in its diverse forms. Beauty is truth and is a form or mode of goodness. It is, therefore, a power in the social, cultural and spiritual evolution of man. It belongs to the realm of Nature, the human mind or soul, morality and the human body. This is why Shukri speaks sometimes of Beauty as mortal and perishable, and sometimes as eternal and imperishable. On the other hand, ugliness is connected with death and evil. It is a form or mode of evil. In these views Shukri seems to be indebted to Carlyle and Keats.

Harmony is, to Shukri, the chief characteristic of the Beautiful. The soundest judgement of taste is that which takes account of the parts which constitute the whole before judging the whole, and of the whole before judging the parts. Therefore, the good work of art is that which shows a unity in which the parts are fused into each other.

Shukri's view of the objectivity of natural Beauty is not, as it might seem, in contradiction with his other view which regards Beauty as the creation of the artist. To him the principles of Beauty are not the creation of the artist but of
Nature. The function of the artist is to discover the hidden principles and laws of Nature and to make them the laws of his work and creation. Under the influence of Goethe he writes:

"The knowledge of the laws of Nature enables the poet to distinguish between things, between false and true imagination, to select his objects, and to refine his taste; it also teaches him the truth of logic, and the splendour of simplicity, at the same time, guards him from hyperboles and conceit; it opens before him a new vista of imagination, strengthens his passions for the worship of the manifestations of the universe, purifies his heart and widens the sphere of his mind."

Here he seems to think of the laws of Nature as the laws of true imagination and art. He also seems to think of these laws as the true, deep relations of natural objects and phenomena, the laws which oppose the analogies of hyperboles and conceits. The revelation of these laws is the function of the poet.

"The function of the poet is to reveal the relationships which exist between the objects and phenomena of Nature, for the origin of poetry lies in the constitution or combination of realities. The poet should be, therefore, a deep-sighted man whose aim is to seek after Truth rather than after the external appearances. He should distinguish between the eternal and transitory ... Every genial poet is a seer, a prophet who lifts the dark veil of Nature and reveals the secrets of eternity ... He is the apostle of Nature, and his poetry is the expression of eternity."

Here Shukri is writing under the influence of Carlyle's lecture "The Hero as Poet" and Shelley's A Defense of Poetry. The notion that the hidden laws of Nature are the true, deep relations of things and natural objects is explicit in his words. To him, Nature is the teacher of the poet, and his
poetry is a revelation rather than creation. But it is creative revelation, for the poet has to discover these hidden laws not in the outside world but in himself. The great poet does not reproduce the objects of Nature faithfully. He aims to create a work which has the truth of Nature and at the same time a higher ideal. In Nature both Beauty and ugliness exist one beside the other, while the world of art is the world of Beauty, Ideal and Perfection. The artist or poet can only be a creator by learning the laws of Nature and then strive after a higher perfection. The characteristic of the artist is to create Nature anew in himself, to turn the ugly into Beauty and to clothe the natural objects in beautiful garments of his own creation. Thus the role of the artist is not passive, nor is he an imitator of Nature. In Nature the poet should seek the significant and eternal, select carefully his subject-matter and neglect the trivial and insignificant. His subject-matter should be the preoccupations of the human mind and soul, not the common events and objects of daily life. He should not follow a certain literary school, nor be the exponent of a particular philosophical doctrine, for all literary schools and philosophical doctrines are transient and temporary.

In these views of Shukri Goethe seems to be the main influence. Next come Carlyle and Shelley. Goethe's influence appears in the relationship between the poet and Nature and the selective process of his subject-matters,
while the influences of Carlyle and Shelley are in the views which regard the poet as a seer or a prophet, the exponent of the eternal and ideal who is ever in search of truth, perfection and beauty. Where Shukrī seems under the influence of Carlyle and Shelley he is close to al-‘Akkād and al-Māzinī. He is, like al-‘Akkād and al-Māzinī, opposed to the currents of the poetry of his era represented by Shawkī, Hafiz Ibrāhīm and others. With this aim in mind he writes that the true poet is not a mouthpiece of a certain class, nation, or age, but of the human heart and soul, a representative of all classes, nations and ages. But to be a representative or spokesman of mankind in no way means that the great poet is not the representative of his own nation and age. In fact, the great poet is first of all a representative of his own people and age and can communicate with man only in this way.

Now let us see Shukrī’s conception of imagination. In his preface to Reflections Shukrī dealt with poetic imagination and diction at length. But while in The Fruits he is under the influence of Goethe, he is here under the influence of Wordsworth and Coleridge. The influence of Wordsworth appears both in his views of imagination and fancy and of poetic diction, and that of Coleridge in the distinction between fancy and imagination. These influences may be narrowed down to Wordsworth’s prefaces to the second edition of The Lyrical Ballads, and the edition of 1815, and to Coleridge’s lecture "Shakespeare’s Poetry".
Even before he wrote the preface to Reflections Shukri had spoken of imagination not as free power contradictory to reason but as a power co-operating with reason; it shares with reason the function of understanding, interpreting and giving expression to the passions of the soul. The greater part of the preface to Reflections Shukri devoted to the discussion of imagination. Following Coleridge's celebrated distinction between imagination and fancy, he begins by distinguishing two kinds of imagination, true and false. The former is a faculty connected with reason and works within the laws of Nature. Its function is to interpret reality and discovers the true relations of things. The term "reality" seems to be used by Shukri to include all the modes and objects of passion, reason and sense. False imagination is a power free from every law and divorced from reason and reality. Its laws are the laws of hyperboles and conceits. It combines separate realities into false artificial order, if not disorder. False imagination is then termed "Tawahhum", i.e. "Fancy", and true imagination as Imagination alone "Khayal" or "Takhayyul". Shukri goes on to say that imagination is the power whereby the poet reveals the true relations between things and realities, whereas fancy is the power by which the poet attributes to things relations which do not exist in them. These relations are due entirely to the artificial world of the poet. Al-Mašri's lines:

1. Attack the wing of night, though it be a pugnacious lion whose claw is the crescent moon.
are given as illustrations of fanciful poetry. The image of night as a preying lion whose claw is the crescent moon is regarded as artificial and a distortion of truth. In the line the relations between the night and the lion, and between the crescent moon and the claw are unnatural. They have no existence outside the mind of the poet. It is worth noticing that the two examples of fancy are drawn from the poetry of al-Ma'āmī who was a sightless man and whose descriptive poetry often appears surprising, playful, having no modes of passion, and based on casual external resemblances or free associations of memory which are, in their turn, based on indirect perceptions.

On the other hand, al-Buhturī's line:

(2) كالكوكب الدربة أخلص نزره حلقة الدجىح تألق واحداء

and ash-Sharīf ar-Rādī's line:

(3) باليزمان رائقي فرعوزهم نظائر المقعف لا صلة العجر

are taken as examples of imaginative poetry. The analogy between the poet's noble, generous patron and the bright star that illuminates darkness is regarded by Shukrī as a representation and illustration of a reality, that is, as a natural

(1) The swords of (his) enemies smeared him (Canopus) with blood And Sirus and Procyon wept compassionately for him.

(2) (He is) like a shining star whose brilliance illuminates the darkness of night.

(3) Why should time take my people as its target And shatter them like a glass hit by a stone.
relation rather than a mental invention.

Imagination, in Shukri's view, amounts to good poetry, and fancy to bad poetry. The former is that of major poets, the latter of minor ones.

"The value of a simile", says Shukri, "is its ability to recall a memory, evoke a hope or a passion in the soul, or to reveal a reality. Simile should not be used for its own sake. Nor should things be described for their own sake, but rather for their relationships with the soul and mind of man ... The mere description of things does not produce poetry unless it is connected with the emotions, ideas, memories and desires of the poet".

In these words Shukri seems to be expressing the theory of the emotional associations of things which had already been stated by al-'Akkād. Like al-'Akkād, he attaches the importance to the emotions and ideas associated with the objects described rather than to the objects themselves. He distinguishes between two kinds of description or poetic image, the one he calls "mechanical", and the other may be called "dynamic". The former is that which represents no mode of passion and is a description of things as they appear to the poet's sight. The latter is a representation of a mood of passion or a state of mind, and a revelation of the relationship between the poet and the outside world. This is what al-'Akkād and al-Māzinī have already said. The three writers seem to have been following Coleridge and Hazlitt.

To Shukri, the function of imagination is not confined to the creation of similes and metaphors; it appears in every element of the poem, in the spirit that runs through it.
Imagination includes all that which the poet imagines of life, his interpretation of the passions of the soul, his reflections and ideas, his poetic themes and motivations. A poem may be poor in imagery, yet rich in imagination. The power of imagination lies in the representation of the passion of the soul and in the delicacy and suggestiveness of expression rather than in the poet's far-fetched images and conceits.

Thus in Shukri's thought, as in al-‘Akkād's, imagination is very prominent. He differs from al-‘Akkād on two points, the relationship between imagination and language, and the belief in two kinds of imagination. He opposes al-‘Akkād's view which says that the poet's medium and the characteristics of language have a strong effect on his imagination and imagery, since language is inseparable from thought. A sensuous language, like Arabic, represents an obstacle to the poet's imagination. Shukri regards imagination as a power which works in detachment from language or free from the influence of language and its characteristics. He says that the influence appears only in the poet's paradoxes of logic and fanciful images. He seems to mean the paradoxes and relations which are based on verbal connections and nominal resemblances. He also denies al-‘Akkād's distinction between two kinds of imagination, sensuous, and sympathetic or mythological. The former is possessed by the Semitic or European poet, and the latter by the Aryan or the Arab poet.
Years later Shukri repeated al-’Akkād’s distinction and claimed that Mihyār’s poetry exhibits the qualities of the Aryan imagination.

The distinction between fancy and imagination or the poetry of fancy and the poetry of imagination reminds one of al-’Akkād’s distinction between the poetry of wit and that of nature. What Shukri calls fanciful poetry is what al-’Akkād has called "the poetry of wit". In both, the poetical material and imagery are artificial and are based on external, accidental and arbitrary resemblances of things which have nothing to do with Reality, or the emotional associations of natural objects. On the other hand, the poetry of imagination and the poetry of nature or passion are revelations of the psychological relationships between the poet and the world. Their imagery is based on natural or emotional analogies of things. In fact, Shukri has nowhere made use of this distinction between fancy and imagination. In his essays on the ‘Abbāsid poets, written many years later, he uses the phrases "the poetry of wit" and "the poetry of passion" as contrasting types, and as equivalent to the poetry of fancy and the poetry of imagination. Again al-Ma‘arrī is regarded as a poet of wit, and ash-Shārīf ar-Raḍī as a poet of passion. Like al-’Akkād, he speaks of the poetry of wit as a type of poetry which is characterized by its verbal images, artificial material and rhetorical refinements. However, the two writers reached their views under different influences. Al-’Akkād was
drawing on Hazlitt, whereas Shukrī was following Coleridge. It is important to mention here that Hazlitt's conception of wit and Coleridge's notion of fancy are almost the same.

To Shukrī, as to al-'Akkād and al-Mazinī, passion constitutes the essence of poetry. He thinks of the poetry of passion as the whole poetry. This does not mean, however, that he separates poetry from thought. He rejects the distinction between the poetry of passion and the poetry of thought and regards it as a fallacy. In his view, no good poem can be entirely emotional. The poet should establish a balance between the elements of his poem, a harmony between thought and feeling, in the way the painter distributes light and shade on his canvas.

The unity of the poem was one of the principles which Shukrī advocated in his preface to Reflections. It is important to examine here his views and see their relationship with al-'Akkād's theory of the organic structure of the poem. He writes:

"... The value of the line lies in the relationship between its meaning and the theme of the poem; the line is an integral part of the poem; it should not be independent of the poem or unrelated to its theme. In order to see the beauty and significance of the line we must understand its relationship with the theme of the poem ... We must treat the poem as an integral object, and not as a collection of independent lines. When we do this we discover that the line which appears insignificant to the reader and fails to attract his attention is significant and necessary for the understanding of the poem. The poet who does not pay sufficient attention to the unity of the poem is like an artist who gives the same amount of light to all the parts of his painting", 
These are Shukri's words about the unity of the poem. We can see that the conception of the organic unity of the poem which is a living unity growing from within, an intimate synthesis of various but harmonious parts, or a unity-in-complexity, does not exist in them. What we find in them is merely a belief in the integrity of the poem. Al-‘Akkād's notion of the organic structure of the poem is much more complicated and is a part of his philosophy of Nature, evolution and man.

Poetic language has received more attention from Shukri than from al-‘Akkād. In a poem entitled "Ma‘ānāt Yudrikuha at-Ta‘bīr" (Thoughts Beyond Expression), published in The Pearls of Thoughts, Shukri regards, like al-‘Akkād and al-Māzini, the poet's medium as inferior to his thought and representing a handicap in the process of poetic creation. To him, deep thoughts and passions escape expression and can be conveyed only through silence. Five years later he returned to this view and commented that the poet's best poem is that to which he fails to give expression and which remains dormant in his mind. Because of the inadequacy of language the process of poetic expression often leads to a failure. Thus the poet lives in sorrow due to his failure and in the hope of future success.

While Shukri considers language as an inadequate medium, he makes no demand for a distinct poetic language. In his preface to Reflections, where language comes next to
imagination in importance, he opposes al-Māzīnī's views of the categories and emotional associations of words and rejects the distinction between the language of poetry and prose. He says that the distinction between two categories of words, noble and ignoble, narrows the scope of taste and leads into literary chaos. To him all words are equal and the distinction has no validity. The language of poetry cannot differ from that of prose. He calls then for a common poetic diction and writes in defence of the common words and current phrases in the poetry of ash-Sharīf ar-Raḍī and other Arab poets: He says that the poet has no choice but to use common diction, for the current words compose three-quarters of language, and that if we are to accept the distinction made between noble and ignoble words, we are apt to think of the ignoble word as that which is used in an improper place, and the noble that which is used in the proper place, not the rare word. The noble word is that which conveys the idea of the poet, and the ignoble that which obscures the idea and breaks the rhythm of the poem.

Thus to Shukrī the duty of the poet is not to discriminate between words but to study the whole literature of his language and explore the sources of his medium which will result in his being able to distinguish between good and bad styles. In all this he appears under the influence of Wordsworth's views of poetic diction expressed in his preface to the second edition of The Lyrical Ballads.
The years after 1921 represent a new stage in al-'Akkād's intellectual life and literary career. Though the main streams of his aesthetic criticism remained the same, his critical theories were greatly affected by the change in his religious faith and views of the world; and though he remained faithful to the spirit of the Dīwān school, his reading or re-reading of German literature and philosophy - the works of Lessing, Kant, Goethe, Schiller, Schopenhauer and Heine - made a powerful impact on the development of his critical views. He became possessed by the idea of beauty, both in nature and art, and found in aesthetic education and art the salvation of mankind. Thus began a new phase in his career as a critic of art. His political struggle against the British occupation and local autocracy in its turn influenced his aesthetic criticism and made the notion of freedom an essential principle in his theories. But while he called for democracy and socialism on the political side, he remained faithful to the belief in individuality and intellectual elite in his literary writings. He never tried to resolve this dualism of which he was little aware. The years 1926 and 1927 saw al-'Akkād's interest in biographical writing, which reinforced his tendency towards psychological analysis in criticism and to his idea which regards the work of art as a revelation of the character of the writer.
not, however, diminish the English influence. It rather widened and deepened his critical views and strengthened his philosophical thinking. Hazlitt and Carlyle remained his master critics. The former's influence is most noticeable in his theories of poetry and imagination; the latter's influence, for the greater part, in his theory of the organic structure of the poem and in his critical methods. The influence of Coleridge is also remarkable in his new writings.

Al-‘Akkād also read a good deal of French literature, in particular, the works of Rousseau, Voltaire, Hugo, Baudelaire, Anatole France, Bergson, and Pierre Loti, but none of them, with the exception of Bergson, has exercised a marked influence on him. In fact, al-‘Akkād had always thought that French culture and literature were unsuitable to Egypt in its renaissance, and as he believed that French writers such as Lamartine, Hugo, Baudelaire, Anatole France and Loti are essentially unhealthy writers and thinkers, he wrote several essays against their influence in modern Egyptian literature. He often criticised his contemporaries who followed the trends of French literature and poetry, and called for the study of English and German literature. He finds in English and German literature seriousness, simplicity, naturalness and truth, and in French literature elegance, wit, sentimentality, and ornamentation. This attitude towards French literature and culture al-‘Akkād seems to have adopted under the influence of Hazlitt, Carlyle and Coleridge who also criticise French literature on similar grounds.
1. **Al-‘Akkād’s theories of Beauty.**

What is beauty? What are the characteristics of the beautiful? What is the function of beauty in the life of man? For a period of more than six years—from 1922 to 1929—these three questions were at the very basis of al-‘Akkād’s literary career. During this time al-‘Akkād seems to have read or re-read Kant, Schopenhauer, and Schiller under whose influence he formulated a new theory of beauty which, though based on totally different ground, bears a great resemblance to the theories of these three German writers. Al-‘Akkād’s new theory borrows its ground from Lamarck’s theory of evolution, which says that the function precedes and creates the organ. In fact, al-‘Akkād’s writings in the above mentioned period give expression to three theories, not one. Between May, 1924 and June of the following year he expressed the first two. The one conceives beauty as Freedom, the other as Idea. The two theories are, however, correlated. Later, in 1928, al-‘Akkād expressed his third theory in which beauty is regarded as Form or Representation. This third theory recalls that of Kant which defines the beautiful as an object of delight apart from any concept or interest. It can also be linked with the first two theories, though the link may not be grasped at first sight. There is also a fourth theory which regards beauty as Truth. But this fourth theory is almost entirely confined to literature and to beauty as it appears in the realm of art. In it al-‘Akkād seems under the influence of Hazlitt, Carlyle and Keats.
(b) The Basis of al-'Akkād's Theories

In his essay "al-Ashkāl wa al-Ma‘ānī" (Forms and Ideas) we come across the following passage, in which we find the basis of al-'Akkād's theories of beauty.

"By looking beyond the external images to the internal ideas one can free one's mind and spirit from the narrow sphere of the inevitable which for the majority of people represents object of sense as fixed external patterns of forms, never subjected to change or development... as though every form is self-contained and not as a representation of an idea, affected by changes of the idea for which it stands. There is nothing worse for the intellect and soul, and for the destruction of their functions than the view which represents natural objects as forms and restricts existence to appearances, as though the forms precede the ideas in the process of creation, as occurs in the process of perception and realization. It is undeniable that the Absolute Mind does not see any object restricted to one unchangeable form. Nor is life incapable of showing itself in thousands of varied forms other than the known forms of animate beings... The image of 'Human Life' has never been the same in any period of time, nor can it be a fixed unchangeable pattern. Life has, and still has, within its power the ability to show itself in a body devoid of the members we possess, and which represent the functions of life..."

In this passage al-'Akkād sees the world in a process of creative evolution in which the idea is inseparable from the form, and matter from spirit. Nothing is subject to fixed patterns of forms, but in a changing and developing operation. He relates this process of evolution to what he calls "Absolute Mind", which seems to be the intellectual nature or rational Will of the universe. This rational Will, which directs the process of evolution, seems to be conscious of itself and has a purpose. Freedom or Freedom-Beauty is the ultimate aim of it. In the process of evolution there are
three factors, the Idea, the Form, and Freedom. Life as a free function prior to matter is called Idea, and life as objectification (organ) is called Form or pattern. The essence of the world consists in the Will-to-Freedom. Life, the cosmic inner Reality or the free function, manifests itself in various patterns of forms and at various levels of development. Though the Form is inseparable from the Idea, its role is merely representative. It has no value apart from the Idea to which it refers. The world is Idea or Spirit in a process of externalization.

(b) Beauty and Freedom:

In May, 1924, al-ʻAkkād expressed his first theory, which regards beauty as freedom. He seems to have formulated it out of his reading of Kant's, Schiller's and Schopenhauer's theories, out of his study of biology and natural history, and out of his own speculation. As a result the theory was based on biological rather than metaphysical grounds, and was put forward in terms of functions and organs. But this does not mean that the theory is not a metaphysical one. It would seem that at a time when the problem of freedom was uppermost in al-ʻAkkād's mind, he found in the writings of Kant, Schiller and Schopenhauer the key to a satisfactory connection between beauty and freedom which he then expressed in terms of his own interests.

The theory was expressed in four essays and some passages, "Masafat al-Jamāl wa al-Hubb" (The philosophy of
Beauty and Love), published in May, 1924, the preface to Muṭālaʿat fī al-Kutub wa al-Hayāh, published later in the same year, "Maʿnā al-Jamāl" (The Meaning of Beauty), and "Raʿy Schopenhauer fī Maʿnā al-Jamāl" (Schopenhauer's View of the Meaning of Beauty), both of which were published in May, 1925. Read together, they reflect much confusion and inconsistency. The term "freedom" is used without precision to indicate different things. For the greater part, the confusion is due to the dualism of the theory. Beauty is conceived at once as freedom and as idea.

The theory is concerned primarily with animate beauty, and it regards beauty as a characteristic of organic nature. The inorganic objects are regarded as beautiful in so far as they resemble the organic ones.

In his essay "The Philosophy of Beauty and Love" al-ʿAkkād writes:

"What is the beauty of the human body? In short, beauty is freedom. But before the reader shows surprise, let me explain at once what I mean. The function creates the organ. This is undeniable fact. Man does not walk and see because he possesses feet and eyes; rather because he wants to walk and see he has feet and eyes. The same goes for man's other organs and limbs. Thus life is a function or functions. The body and its organs are the instruments through which life's functions are performed. They are the means whereby life manifests its impulses and feelings. The body and its organs are constructed according to life, and whenever life's functions are apparent and free in their movement, the organs are healthy and work properly ..., that is to say, free from defect, corresponding to the demands of life and fulfilling its freedom; in other word, beautiful."

In these lines al-ʿAkkād has given us the core of his theory. Life is a free function, a desire or will prior to matter and
in continuous process of objectification. It is the inner, cosmic, ultimate Reality which stands behind the whole process of creation. The sensible objects (the bodies and their organs) are the objectification of it. The beautiful is that object which shows the freedom of life in this process. It is a free manifestation of life force in matter or a free correspondence of matter to life force. It is thus the object which shows freedom both in appearance and concept and satisfies, thereby, our sense of freedom or gives rise to it. "In short, beauty is freedom".

There are three factors in the process of creation, life, the cosmic, inner Reality; matter; the externalization; and freedom, the ultimate aim. When life reaches or comes nearer to its aim, the object which reflects this is called the beautiful. The world is thus freedom in its essence and beauty in its outer form. But since life is in a successive process of objectification, the beautiful objects differ in degree and are subject to various categories according to the appearance of freedom in them. They represent successive grades and transcend each other by virtue of their freedom. These successive grades are what is usually called species.

"Whenever we seek the characteristics which raise one beautiful object above another we find nothing save freedom of choice, by virtue of which man ... excels animals which in their turn excel plants, and plants excel inorganic objects. Inorganic objects also differ in degrees of beauty, according to the illusion of free movement and likeness of will which they evoke in the observer. Thus fires, winds, waters arouse our admiration and sympathy, emotions which we do not feel towards other inorganic objects. They have no distinction over other inanimate objects except the illusion of freedom of will and the resemblance of life."
In these words the degrees of beauty are arranged according to the grades of species, and the grades of species according to the appearance of freedom or free choice. Because man, who stands at the top of the ladder of evolution, represents the highest degree of freedom he is regarded as the highest manifestation of beauty. Next come animals, and after animals plants. The inorganic nature represents a lower kind of beauty since it shows a lower degree of freedom. An object is more beautiful than another because it expresses better the freedom of life and represents a higher level of its development. Freedom of choice is the source of beauty both in animate and inanimate objects, though it is mere illusion in the latter. Objects which show no free will or choice and evoke no illusion of freedom seem to be regarded as devoid of beauty. According to al-’Akkād’s theory a tiger or a hawk is more beautiful than a tree or a rock can be, and waters are more beautiful than a cliff can be.

Freedom in al-’Akkād’s theory means many things, but it is allied, in particular, to lightness "Khiffah" and gaiety or relaxedness "Talākah".*

"What is the beautiful body? We cannot answer this question more precisely and truly than to say that it is the free light body. Whether we consider the body as a whole or every organ separately we find that freedom and lightness lie behind their beautiful qualities ... Beauty is something in contradiction to weight and is equivalent to lightness or ease."

* In Arabic the term "Talākah" suggests gaiety, freshness, relaxedness, brightness, ease of movement, and release.
Al-'Akkād also connects "ṭalahākah" with play or play-impulse. To him "ṭalahākah" and play are inseparable from each other. "Ṭalahākah is the permanent companion of play". Both are expressions of freedom, life and power. "Play is life in its flow ... Man does not play when he is sick, grieved, overwhelmed (by external powers), or deprived of his will. He plays only when he is in his full health; when he feels possessed by delight and capable of doing what he wants.

Play is the expression of the freedom of life, of its overcoming the barriers of matter. It is something rooted in the nature of all beings. Al-'Akkād distinguishes play from amusement and all kinds of sport which lead to ends other than themselves. To him play is disinterested and spontaneous action which includes the creation of the artist, the singing of birds and all other spontaneous activities of life. In this respect he seems to think of beauty as the object of play-impulse.

Al-'Akkād's theory claims that lightness, radiance, smoothness, ease of movement, elegance, grace, gaiety, play, mirth, animation, and youth are qualities of beauty, being indicative of freedom. On the other hand, weight, sluggishness, inertia, inelegance, senility and weakness are qualities of ugliness, being indicative of want of freedom. Thus many things are interpreted in the term of freedom. But in saying that beauty is freedom we are by no means specifying the qualities of the beautiful. This is perhaps why al-'Akkād's theory speaks of the beautiful as the free object and yet discerns many characteristics of beauty other than freedom.
and interprets them in the sense of freedom.

A year after al-‘Akkād wrote his essay "The philosophy of Beauty and Love" the formula "beauty is freedom" was modified to "beauty is the conquest of necessity by freedom". This change seems to have been necessary if his theory was to suit his views of the world:

"The universe, life - which, in my opinion, is greater than the universe - art, and natural scenery are all manifestations of harmony and conflict between freedom and necessity, beauty and utility, spirit and matter, the free impulse of art and its rules: absolute forces and laws which govern them. Whenever these forces and laws are unified things become nearer to art and acquire beautiful order in which matter reflects the purity of spirit, and fetters indicate the depths of freedom."

This belief in dualism or unity of opposites as the universal law of existence and of the process of evolution has formed the basis of al-‘Akkād’s theory of beauty. Freedom becomes a free order or a free conformity to order. When al-‘Akkād speaks of life as a free function he conceives it as a function prior to matter and in process of externalization. The successive grades of this process mean at once a struggle against material necessity and a conformity with it. When freedom gains the upper hand over necessity in the process of externalization the object which exhibits this is called beautiful, and when life shows a minimum of conformity to necessity in an object this object is then the highest manifestation of beauty. Thus life gains its existence when it is in conformity with the laws of matter. In other words, freedom exists only within the realm of law and order. When al-‘Akkād defines his concept of freedom he writes:
"Does freedom have any meaning other than the overcoming of obstacles? When we measure the freedom of a runner we set up obstacles in his way and limit the time and length of his course. We also estimate his freedom by taking into account that of other runners... Thus we measure his freedom according to the obstacles which he overcomes and the rules he must observe. In like manner, life measures our freedom according to the necessities and duties which it imposes upon us,... hence beauty may be defined more precisely as the conquest of necessity by freedom."

In these words a free act or work is an act or a work within restrictions and rules. It is free in the sense of being at once a free submission to organization and an attempt to overcome it. The aesthetic pleasure of beauty, whether in art or play, is nothing more than man's pleasure in conquering the rules and restrictions, and expressing his freedom within these rules.

This law of beauty is at work not only in the aesthetic realms of nature, art and play, but in that of morality as well. In the realm of morality the beautiful is that act which shows man's self-determination and self-control, his courage, chastity, endurance, patience, and pride, that is, his freedom of will and his conquest of necessity.

In his theory al-'Akkād has paid special attention to the relationship between beauty and harmony and discussed at length the view which conceives harmony as the secret of the beautiful. In his theory the relationship between beauty and harmony appears to be a relationship between freedom and order. In the above-discussed concept of freedom rather than in harmony he finds the mystery of beauty both in nature and art. The beautiful is not the object which exhibits harmony, but
that which has an appearance of freedom and gives rise to a special sense of freedom in the observer; or it is the object which shows a unity between freedom and necessity in which the former dominates the latter. Al-‘Akād thinks that every beautiful object is harmonious in itself and has its unique and particular harmony, but not every harmonious object is beautiful. He writes:

"What is harmony? When does a harmonious object appear beautiful? ... Harmony means that an organ ought not to be bigger or smaller, thinner or thicker, longer or shorter (than life's functions demand). Nor should its structure and colour be unsuitable to its function ... Harmony is not an end in itself. There exists another end which harmony stands for. What is this end? Nothing save life's function which harmony follows ... When we disapprove of the long neck of a man, it is not the long neck itself we disapprove of, for we do not disapprove of the long neck of a giraffe, ostrich or goose. Rather we disapprove of the disorganization of life's functions or of the unsuitable forms through which these functions appear".

And again

"Harmony has nothing to do with the essence of beauty. Beauty is due to the freedom of life's functions and movement in the body. An organ might be big in some living beings, and small in others, long in some species, short in others. Our approval of it belongs, first of all, to the freedom of the function in it, and not to its fatness or thinness, length or shortness, or to its harmony with the body. For instance, the thinness of the legs of a deer or a sparrow does not represent a defect. Yet it is a defect in man, because in man it indicates a lack of vitality and shows the disorganization of life's functions".

Thus freedom rather than harmony is the cause of beauty. Harmony is a result which emerges out of the freedom of life's functions in the organs or the autonomy and self-determination which the organs show in their work. Harmony is the free correspondence of the organs to the functions.
Beauty is freedom which irradiates the harmony of an object and not harmony itself. A beautiful object is not necessarily harmonious, nor is every harmonious object beautiful. A face might have a harmonious shape, yet it fails to evoke our sense of beauty and receive our admiration, because it does not satisfy our sense of freedom and life. When we examine an ugly face we find its ugliness to be the result of a lack of freedom of life's functions, which it represents, rather than of a lack of harmony in its shape.

In al-‘Akkād's theory the disorganization of life's functions in a body does not mean a mere disharmony, but a lack of autonomy and self-determination on the part of the organs. It means that an organ or organs are subject to causes extraneous to them. If an object is to be beautiful, it must show freedom in appearance and arouse a feeling of freedom in the percipient, and not only a feeling of harmony. Though al-‘Akkād denies harmony as the cause of beauty, he does not deny it as a cause of pleasure and admiration. The harmonious shape of a flower is in all cases a source of joy. Yet even here he thinks that the source of pleasure goes deeper than harmony. The pleasure that we take in a beautiful object belongs to the sense of freedom which the object evokes in us. Thus he regards the shining colours of the flower as the real source of pleasure and connects light with freedom.

"I never doubt that our sense of light, our sense of the first movement and first freedom, is the origin of our feeling of beauty. The joy which the eyes take in light is the joy which they take in a flower and its various colours."
To say beauty is harmony, al-`Akkād thinks, is to leave the problem of the beautiful unresolved. If we are to resolve this problem, we must look further than harmony. Again, to say beauty is harmony is to say a part of the truth and not the whole of it, and to attach beauty to the effect rather than to the cause.

However, if al-`Akkād seems to reject the harmony of the form or the harmony of the part with the whole as the cause of beauty, he has replaced it by another kind of harmony, the harmony of organs with functions, of form with idea, of means with end. The freedom of life's functions is nothing more than the harmony of organ with function or the correspondence of the former to the latter, whether freely or not. The difference arises only when we say that the beautiful is that organ or object which shows freedom or free choice and evokes, thereby, a special sense of freedom in the percipient. However, in al-`Akkād's theory freedom means many things including harmony. To say beauty is freedom in the object or the representation of a free function in the organ is to regard beauty as mere illusion in the mind of the percipient or as a correspondence of the object to a prior concept in the mind of the observer. Yet not every percipient will see in the beautiful a manifestation of freedom or a conquest of necessity by freedom. In fact, al-`Akkād's theory implies that an object might display no freedom and give rise to no sense of freedom, yet remains beautiful.

This implication appears when the theory tries to interpret
many qualities of beauty other than freedom as indications of freedom. A rock can be very beautiful without showing freedom or evoking a sense of freedom, and an inorganic heavy object might indicate sublimity, stability and power rather than deprivation of will and stagnation. At any rate, al-'Akkād's theory remains narrow, and its validity, if it has any, is confined to organic nature. Beauty is not one characteristic, nor can the beautiful be defined as one particular thing and not another. Al-'Akkād himself admits this fact and writes:

"Beauty is not one particular attribute. Rather it consists of many and various attributes which appear in forms, colours, sounds and ideas. When these attributes appear in one object, beauty is then at its perfection. The meanings and effects of beauty vary according to the completeness (or incompleteness) of these attributes. A body might show many signs of vitality and freedom, yet it does not receive our admiration because it is black, for instance, while we like to see these signs of beauty in a white, bright body."

(c) Beauty as Idea.

So far we have discussed only one phase of al-'Akkād's theory, that is, beauty as freedom in appearance or form. The theory remains incomplete without comprehending the other phase: beauty as Idea or as freedom in Idea.

In order to understand this second phase and its relationship with the first we must read three essays together, "Forms and Ideas", "Schopenhauer's View of the Meaning of Beauty" and "Beauty in Style and Idea" (at-Tajmīl fī al-Uslūb wa al-Ma‘ānī). There are also some passages concerning the theory in other essays, written later on, such as "Dancing and
Dancing" (Rāks wa Rāks) and "The Values of Beauty" (Kiyam al-Jamāl), published in 1939 and 1948 respectively. In the third essay al-ʿAkkād's chief concern is the relationship between beauty and truth, but this is not our concern in reading the essay here. What does concern us is the distinction al-ʿAkkād makes between the role of sensation and that of reason and imagination in aesthetic judgement and pleasure. But to read these essays together is to find much confusion and inconsistency. In the first essay al-ʿAkkād conceives beauty as an attribute of the idea rather than of form and does not distinguish between the degrees of beauty in one idea and another. In the second he draws a clear distinction between the beauties of ideas and classifies them according to the hierarchy of species and their suggestiveness of freedom. In fact, the first essay contains passages which show little harmony even with each other. At any rate, this second phase of the theory remains interconnected with the first and a natural consequence of it. The foundations of the two phases remain the same. The world is still function or will in externalization, spirit in materialization. But here the function is called Idea, and the externalization form. Thus the world is Idea in its essence and Image in its appearance. An object has no essence independent of its concept, for the concept is the cause of its existence.

Since the world exists only as Idea, and since every object is an embodiment of a concept, it is natural then to attach beauty to the world of ideas and deny it in that of
forms. In the essay "Forms and Ideas" al-‘Akkād writes:

"In life the function precedes the organ which is its representative. You cannot imagine the human body not representing an Idea or performing a function. Thus the organ has no value apart from the idea and function which it represents and performs ... the effects which the forms exercise on our taste vary according to the ideas and functions which they represent ... In most living beings we regard fleshlessness and leanness as defects. Yet we do not apply this to the hound, for in the case of the hound our attention is directed from its bony frame to the free, swift movement, ease of running and elegance of pace, which the hound represents".

And

"Beauty, whether in nature or art, is an attribute of idea rather than of form. When some forms arouse our sense of beauty and gain our admiration they do so not by themselves, but by the ideas they suggest and signify. This may be applied to all forms, whether of human faces and living organs, or the forms of other objects which are not so expressive of their ideas ... The distinction between the degrees of beauty, the grades of animate beings and species is due to the ideas which the forms stand for, and not to the forms themselves."

These are al-‘Akkād’s most significant words in the essay. They portray nature as a system of ideas and mental visions, as a domination of matter by mind. The world of beauty is a world of abstraction and purely reflective ideas, rather than of sensation and concrete forms. The role of the form is merely representative. Once this role is played the form must disappear. The beautiful is not that object which arrests attention by its form, but the object which represents a concept or serves a purpose, and its beauty differs in degrees according to this concept or purpose.

Though al-‘Akkād seems to distinguish between the degrees of beauty of concepts, and though he concludes his essay saying that beauty is a free abstract idea, the essay
as a whole suggests that every object which represents a concept or serves its purpose is beautiful, and that the non-beautiful is the object which misrepresents its concept, or the object which represents no concept.

However, here we must turn to the other essay "Schopenhauer's Opinion of the Meaning of Beauty" where al-'Akkād distinguishes between the formula "beauty is Idea" and "beauty is Freedom", and thinks that the former remains incomplete without the latter. Beauty is not the idea in itself, but the freedom which irradiates the idea. The beauty of an object or idea lies in its freedom from the nexus of causes and necessities, in its self-determinant will and autonomy. Ideas differ in the degrees of their beauty according to the appearance of freedom in them. Al-'Akkād classifies ideas according to the hierarchy of species or the grades of evolution and writes:

"The tree is beautiful not only because it represents an idea. For if so, we will have no reason to prefer the idea of man to that of the tree, or to claim that man is more beautiful than the tree. We know that the idea of man is other than that of the tree, and that by virtue of some characteristic, the former stands higher in the degrees of beauty than the latter. What is this characteristic? It is Freedom. Since man enjoys more freedom than the tree, he is more beautiful and stands higher in the degrees of perfection. Thus ideas excel each other, ... and it is freedom which constitutes the beautiful element in the idea or the power which gives the idea its beauty."

Again al-'Akkād denies beauty to inorganic objects. He does so not because inorganic objects represent no ideas, but because they present the sense (idea) of stagnation, motionlessness, deprival of will, and submission to law and
necessity. Thereby they produce an oppressive effect on the observer. He sums up his theory writing:

"We are oppressed by things due to their expressiveness of submission and lack of will, and we are uplifted by their signifying freedom and will."

(d) Aesthetic Judgement and Pleasure

Al-'Akkād seems to regard aesthetic judgement and pleasure as purely contemplative and to deny sensation any part in them. The beautiful is an object of delight, being an embodiment of an abstract concept. Aesthetic delight is due to the mental reflection, which the object evokes in the mind. Beauty has nothing to do with sensation and sensuous forms; it is purely mental vision in the object. Aesthetic judgement can be attained only through intellectual reflection. Al-'Akkād has asserted this view in his essay "Beauty in idea and style."

"Ornamentation is other than beauty, though it is thought by many to be a part of it. Some even imagine ornamentation as beauty in excess... In fact, ornamentation is contradictory to beauty... It is a superficial thing, which achieves its aim by attracting attention and nothing more... It is a yoke which arrests the growth of feeling, imagination and thought. Beauty is the opposite of this. It manifests little of itself at first sight... (unlike ornamentation,) it does not arrest the growth of feeling, imagination and thought, but gently releases the psyche (mind) and gives rise to a feeling of acquiescence and deliberation... Ornamentation is something materialistic and sensuous, whereas beauty does not place stress on sensation... It produces rather spiritual rapture... In short, the distinction between ornamentation and beauty is one of restriction and release, of sensational and spiritual (intellectual) appeal."

The contrast made by al-'Akkād between ornamentation and beauty is a contrast between form and idea. He is
criticising ornamentation or the decorative form because it arrests attention and detracts from the idea it represents or because it represents no idea and serves no purpose. To al-`Akkād the function of the form is to elucidate the idea, since the idea is the cause of its existence, and since aesthetic judgement is a mental reflection on the idea. This is why he continuously emphasises that the form must disappear the moment it has played its representative part, and leave the mind with the idea alone.

"Beauty does not exist in a meaningless form or appear to the senses independently of the mind ... The function of the form is to disappear after it has led you to the idea, to fall into oblivion and leave you with the idea alone. Thus the best and most suitable form is that which facilitates the transition to the idea, for the world of art is a world of abstract ideas rather than of sensuous forms."

(e) The two aspects of al-`Akkād's theory

In his theory al-`Akkād appears at once an intellectualist and an emotionalist; thus his beautiful object is subjective and objective at the same time. To attach beauty to an inner mental vision in the object is to conceive it as subjective. For the mental vision, which lies behind the form, depends on the percipient and differs from person to person. An object which conveys a flood of ideas to one observer may seem meaningless to another. One may even be accused of injecting into things ideas and meanings, which they may not express and possess. The idea an object suggests may exist only in the mind of the observer and reflect itself in the object. In fact, we often see things in the light of our feelings and
ideas, so that the same object appears different from time to
time.

In 1928 al-'Akkād asserted that there are two facets of
the beautiful, the objective and subjective.

"I believe that our mental moods exercise a great
influence on our admiration of the works of art. A
picture which excites your sorrow, attracts your
attention and gains your admiration might seem stripped
of beauty to others. This is due to the fact that you
look at it with a preconceived idea, while others see
it in another frame of mind; so its beauty escapes them
... A man may see the same picture on two different
occasions as though it were two different works
produced by two different artists and representing two
different moods of mind ... A work of art excites our
admiration partly by its own qualities of beauty and
partly by the reflection of our moods in it ... The
true estimation of a work of art requires a certain
mental mood, since this estimation depends on
imagination and feeling."

Some years later al-'Akkād shifted the emphasis to the
subjective facet alone.

"It is our feelings which imbue things with pleasure
and spirit and give them their poetic (beautiful) and
ugly ideas. Let us possess life and feeling and we
will find poetry in everything ... The magnificent
garments in which the hopes of the unseen and the
visible objects appear are the creations of our
imagination ... It is not within the power of beautiful
objects to excite us unless responsive feeling and
lively imagination beautify them for us."

Thus to al-'Akkād men's passions and imagination are not
passive in the presence of the beautiful. The message of a
beautiful object differs from person to person according to
their education, mental capacity and possession of feeling and
imagination. While it escapes the majority of people, it is
felt in different degrees by the few who, by the virtue of
their intense feeling and long aesthetic education, can feel
and understand it.
However, beauty in al-'Akkād's writings is neither objective nor subjective. It has the characteristics of both. It does not exist in the object independently of the percipient, but in the relationship between the percipient and the object. When the percipient is in a state of unawareness, dim senses and unsuitable mood of mind, the beauty of the object has no existence for him. For this reason beauty can reveal itself only through pure mental reflection on the part of the percipient.

(f) The importance of form

When al-'Akkād regards aesthetic judgement as pure mental reflection on idea he does not deny the importance of the form in this judgement. His theory does not conceive the idea as independent of the form, but attaches a great importance to the form's power of expressiveness and suggestiveness. In illustrating his views al-'Akkād writes:

"A few days ago I saw Davis' painting 'Mother and Son' portraying a mare watching over her little foal. In it I observed motherhood, its love and sacrificing, as the mother woman or mare, and the son child or foal. Had the artist replaced the mare and foal by mother and child my feeling would still be the same, for I would have again passed from the outer representation into the inner idea. Yet the image of the mare and foal may be more expressive and representative of motherhood's affection, as we do not expect this passion from animals. Thus we feel more sympathy with the mare, a deeper pleasure and a higher kind of contemplation. Herein lies the mastery of the artist, who brilliantly chose an image which portrays womanhood's affection at its best, and thus preferred an animal image to a human one."

Al-'Akkād is very explicit here of the importance of the form, object or situation which the artist or poet chooses for
expressing his idea or feeling. The significance and beauty of the idea or emotion expressed depend largely on the suggestive power of this form, object or situation. Sometimes al-'Akkād attributes the failure of a poem or a painting to the poet's or artist's inability to choose the image, object or event which corresponds to or symbolizes his idea or emotion, and not merely to his lack of feeling and truth. Therefore, he describes the artist as "that man who, by virtue of his nature, succeeds in choosing the forms most expressive of his ideas." In this way he thinks of the form as inseparable from the idea.

Thus al-'Akkād's theory, taken as a whole, makes no separation between the idea and the form, the two are indissolubly fused in total aesthetic structure. When he wrote in the essay "Dancing and Dancing": "Beauty is the domination of matter by the intellect, of form by idea", he seems to have had in mind the expressive function of the form. Beauty can be a characteristic of idea only when we consider it as freedom in idea. Yet even here freedom is at once a characteristic of idea and of form. For the idea does not exist independently of the form. In man, the highest manifestation of beauty, freedom appears both on the mental and physical levels. On the former it appears as a free choice or free discrimination between things, and on the latter as a free movement and action. The mind and the body, the idea and the form, are correlatives and mutually affect each other.
(2) Beauty and Morality

Beauty as Representation and as Truth:

Al-‘Akkād's other theories of beauty, beauty as Representation or form, and beauty as Truth, though expressed independently of each other, must be studied as one theory or as two phases of one theory. Otherwise al-‘Akkād’s unity of thought will escape us. In both phases of the theory al-‘Akkād’s primary concern is the relationship between beauty and morality. The theory was set forth in five essays, "Beauty in Style and Idea", "as-Sahīh wa az-Zā'if min ash-Shi'īr" (True and False Poetry), both published in 1927, "al-Jamāl wa ash-Sharr fī al-Funūn" (Beauty and Evil in the Arts), "Awd Ilā ash-Sharr wa al-Jamāl", (A Return to Evil and Beauty), the last two written in the following year, and "al-Fann Bayn as-Sīdīk wa al-Kadhīb" (Art between Truth and Untruth" issued many years later in 1949. The first essay was written in the criticism of the view which claims that Renan, due to his love of beauty, had often sacrificed "true expression for the sake of a beautiful one", while the third and fourth were written in connection with Baudelaire's poetry. There are also some passages concerning the relationship between poetry and truth or painting and truth in al-‘Akkād’s essays "al-Hakīk ash-shi‘riyyah" (Poetic Realities), "Fann at-Taswīr" (The Art of Painting) and "al-Insāsiyyah fī at-Taswīr" (Impressionism in Painting), all three of which were published in 1928, and the pamphlet Shā‘īr al-Ghazal (The Poet of Love), published in 1942.
The relationship between the two phases of the theory lies in the conception of truth as a moral and aesthetic value at the same time. In his essays concerning beauty and evil al-ʿAkkād seems to separate beauty from morality, and the aesthetic values from the moral ones; he distinguishes the beautiful from the good and useful and conceives beauty as a quality of Representation or Form. But on closer examination of the essays this separation appears mere illusion.

In the essay "Beauty and Evil in Art" al-ʿAkkād writes:

"Evil and beauty often appear side by side in nature and life. If so, why do they not appear likewise in poetry and the other arts? In fact, ugliness itself - the negation of beauty - has always been dealt with in the fine arts, poetry, theatre and painting. However, the fact that an actor, a painter or a poet portrays evil and ugliness does not astonish us, nor does it prevent us from appreciating the good and beautiful representation of them. The motto of fine arts is, in general, that everything the artist can represent in a beautiful way is a worthy subject for the pen, the brush and the stringed instrument. In accordance with this, the poet offers us beauty even when he describes for us a decaying corpse in a poem highly descriptive and representative or expressive. Likewise, an actor does a fine thing if he successfully portrays those who perpetrate baseness, crime and other despicable vices.

The erupting volcano is one of the most beautiful sights, which delight the eye and move the soul, ... but when we say that the volcano is beautiful ... we separate the beauty in it from evil, both in cause and outward appearance ... there is nothing in the world evil in itself and for itself. An object is evil only in relationship with other things ... Evil does not conflict with beauty, nor does the artist commit an error when he directs towards it the power of fine art. Suppose that there are things which always appear ugly and fearful - is not the function of art to evoke our feelings of life, present us with all things in the world and make us aware of them? The artist does not commit an error when he portrays fearful evil, for fear in itself does not differ from delight, if we are to measure them by the standard of feeling, and do not consider the causes and effects."
And in the essay "A Return to Evil and Beauty" he says:

"... It does not agree with my views of a higher ideal and morality to expel an artistic poem from the world of art or to confuse the values of literature with those of morality." 

In these two quotations al-ʻAkkād appears to separate the moral values from the aesthetic ones and to claim that beauty, both in nature and art, is an attribute of representation or form, rather than of content or idea. He seems to distinguish between two things, the beautiful object in itself and its moral or immoral effects on the observer. Beauty is a quality of the object in itself independently of its causes and effects. The moral or immoral effect that the beautiful object produces has no bearing on its beauty. For the beautiful object stands by itself and for itself, and is beautiful not relatively but in its proper self. It pleases on account of its form independently of any interest or use, or apart from its causes and effects. An object is beautiful not because it is useful or good, but because it gives rise to a sense of delight in the percipient. This aesthetic delight, which is spontaneous and disinterested, is due to the form of the object. Thus beauty is representation and expression, and aesthetic judgement is pure reflection on form. Therefore, the beautiful is objective and self-contained and has universal validity. In poetry beauty as representation must include structure, language, music and imagery.

The two passages seem to support the belief in "art for art's sake" or 'beauty for beauty's sake' and bear some relationship with al-ʻAkkād's view which connects beauty with
play and regards the beautiful as the object of play-impulse. But we misunderstand al-'Akkād if we read these passages alone and do not examine closely his theory as a whole. When al-'Akkād distinguishes the thing in itself from its causes and effects he does not separate the moral values from the aesthetic ones or draw a line between the realm of morality and that of beauty. He thinks that art, like science, is knowledge, and that the function of the artist is to present us with all things in the world, whether good or bad, and provide us with a complete image of life and human nature. He thinks that an object has many facets, and reality is manifold. The same thing can be seen from various points of view and judged by different standards:

"The court of criticism is one abounding in judges and laws. No judge presides and no one law prevails in it ... If you were to judge a wild beast like a tiger, many points of view would emerge and diverse judgements would be passed on it. Judge it according to the peasant and you will kill it; judge it according to the zoologist and you will regard it worthy of a cage and food; judge it according to the artist and you will be occupied in observing it and portraying its movements and colours; judge it according to the poet and you will experience fear at its roar and sinuous stealthiness; judge it according to the merchant and you will value it for its skin; judge it for itself and you will accord it the right to prey on animals and attack people; and judge it according to God, its Creator, and you will recognize it as a part of life. So there is no one law by which you can condemn it to death or grant it life. If this is the case with the tiger, how much more is it so as regards man, especially the poet ..."

Al-'Akkād also thinks that the idea of utility was, and is still, a cause of much misunderstanding in literature and art, and of much confusion in apprehending the distinction between the beautiful and useful.
"The condition of utility is dangerous and harmful in both scientific and literary spheres. For utility is something which defies definition and true estimation. For some, it is bread and water, for others wealth, for others power, for others pleasure, etc. etc.... it differs from person to person, from situation to situation... If we were to stipulate that every scientific observation be immediately useful, the outcome would be the total disappearance of science and the annihilation of scientific research and the stagnation of thought... If we were to make utility the yardstick of thoughts and ideas they would soon be stifled... The history of science informs us of many benefits which man strove after but failed to achieve, and from which there occurred instead other unexpected benefits...

This being the case with science, how then do you consider poetry which reflects the thoughts and feelings of the soul...? How will you assess its benefits from moment to moment? How will you measure it by the standards of every day life, politics or economics? Poetry may be greatly useful, yet its benefit lies in the motivation it evokes in the soul (and in its themes and subject-matter)."

Al-‘Akkād goes on to regard beauty itself, whether in art or nature, as a moral value and educational power in the life and progress of man.

Al-‘Akkād’s theory remains moralistic at its roots. For while he separates evil in itself from the beautiful expression of it and thinks that the vicious is not necessarily non-beautiful, he writes:

"I do not dismiss Baudelaire's poetry from the range of art because he describes decaying corpses and evil sights, for his poetry shows fine description, true expression and honest feeling. Yet I do not acquit him from the charge of distortion and deviation when I read his poetry and find nothing in it except evil, ugliness, fear and depression... I read him, but I wish that he had not written his poems. And had I been his judge I would have suppressed much of his poetry and sent him to a hospital or a jail..."

In al-‘Akkād's view the morality of the poet appears in his
faithfulness to Truth, and in his honesty to reality as he grasps it in himself and in the world without.

"You cannot deny a poet eloquent provided he is sincere and truthful in the presentation of people and his feelings, and provided he shows a mastery of expression."

Thus poetry is not merely an attribute of representation or form. It is rather an artistic representation of true, genuine and profound feeling. Baudelaire remains, in spite of the subject-matter of his poetry, a great poet because the reader finds in his poems fine representation of true and deep passion.

Both "Beauty and Evil in Art" and "A Return to Evil and Beauty" are concerned with Baudelaire's works. It is important to notice that al-ʿAkkād does not charge the French poet with immorality, and shows a great sympathy with him.

In fact, the two essays were written in defence of him.

"If I condemned him in a public court, I would yet judge in his favour were I arbiter of destiny consulting the laws of existence. If he came to me demanding justice against life I would see to it that life was just and give him the recompense due to him ... Since he is truthful in his sin, frank in his pain and glorious in his frankness, he can win absolute justice for himself against life ... His unsuccessful revolt against nature was somehow a revolt of conscience against injustice and evil."

The second phase of al-ʿAkkād's theory, beauty as truth, is also connected with the relationship between beauty and form or expression. The key passage occurs in the essay "Beauty in Idea and Style".
"We very much doubt the existence of artistic taste, which, by nature, appreciates true beauty and will sacrifice Truth for the sake of Beauty; for the intentional sacrifice of truth is a deception far from the nature of good taste. The man who knows that he has stumbled upon true meaning, yet abandons it and puts in its place a glittering, reverberating expression will commit the sin of being false to himself and of contradicting the nature of beauty and good taste. Thus to say that a writer knowingly sacrifices a true expression for the sake of a beautiful one is to misunderstand both truth and beauty ... A writer may sacrifice truth to false ornamentation because he does not appreciate the beauty of truth nor the simplicity of beauty. But it is beyond understanding that a writer should intentionally sacrifice truth for the sake of beauty ... It is understood that a writer may abandon truth in order to arrest the reader's attention by lustrous, though false, ornamentation; for truth, unlike ornamentation, does not please, or receive the admiration of, the simple reader ... Both truth and beauty have one end and excite the same pleasure in the soul. The love of beauty does not distract the soul from truth. A writer may abandon true meaning for the sake of beautiful expression because he is unable to give his true meaning a beautiful form ... Thus he abandons true meaning for another meaning, whether beautiful, true or false ... Truth does not conflict with beauty, nor can a writer sacrifice truth to what is called good taste ... Truth is the essence of beauty, the basis of eloquence and the core of good taste".

In this characteristic passage al-‘Akkād has established the identity of beauty and truth and the unity of form and content. To him, as to Hazlitt and Keats, beauty is truth and truth is beauty. He denies the validity to the distinction between the two terms and regards it as harmful in art. However, he thinks that the genuine artist is guarded against it by his true artistic nature and good taste. No artist can sacrifice a true meaning to a beautiful expression or form, for the true meaning is beautiful in itself. When an artist abandons his true meaning for the sake of a beautiful expression he does so from his inability to give a
suitable form to his meaning, and not from any distinction between beauty and truth. He sacrifices one meaning to another, and not a meaning to expression or form. An artist who abandons truth for the sake of expressional beauty abolishes the validity and function of his work and becomes a mere player with words, colours or sounds, rather than an artist whose function is to communicate a true human experience to his reader, hearer or observer, to increase the range of his sensibility, knowledge and imagination, and to enable him to make sense of his life and take pleasure in it.

In order to establish the unity of beauty and truth al-‘Akkād has to distinguish between beauty and ornamentation. He ascribes beauty to the sphere of mind and spirit, and ornamentation to that of senses and matter. He denies any value and function to ornamentation in human life and criticises it as insignificant form. On the contrary, beauty or the beautiful cannot be meaningless.

The nature of artistic truth, its relationship with historical truth and its correspondence to sensational realism are discussed towards the close of al-‘Akkād's essay.

"Truth in art is not the same as correspondence to the historical facts ... It is an insight into the spirit of the object described and a comprehension of its essence ... As for correspondence to the historical facts, it can result only in producing some external knowledge which has nothing to do with the spirit and essence of the object ... Truth is manifold. It cannot be restricted to events and statistics, nor can it be fully apprehended by the senses of sight and hearing ... However, to the artist there is only one truth. It is that kind of truth which reveals the essence of the object described, and according to which the distinction between one character and another and one object and another becomes possible."
(In his *The Life of Christ*) Renan was nearer to truth than his critics who demanded historical facts and authorities. He was nearer to the spirit of Christianity than those who cared about ritual ceremonies and historical texts... though his study is somewhat ornamental and does not always agree with historical truths and texts, he was striving after that beauty which corresponds to artistic truth and higher ideal."

In these words we are met with Hazlitt's belief in the pluralism and variety of truth and his distinction between imaginative or poetic truth and the facts of history and science. Like Hazlitt and other English romantic critics, al-‘Akkād distinguishes between two kinds of truth: truth in art, and truth in history, i.e. between the imaginative and actual truth. The historian confines himself to what really happened, and recounts or represents actual events and situations, while the poet does not care much about the literal actual truth, and confines himself to the inner ideal reality. The poet treats actual events and situations in a way which illuminates in them the essence of life and human nature. Thus art reflects a more profound and significant truth than history does. A work of art represents a glimpse into the heart of nature and history, and reveals their living dynamic realities. In history truth is an imitation of outward appearance, and in art a revelation of inward essence. Though al-‘Akkād does not define the qualities of artistic truth, the context of his words shows it as a living psychological or emotional, rather than sensational, perception.

In the other essays mentioned al-‘Akkād's chief concern
is the nature of poetry and painting and literary truth, and not the relationship between beauty and truth. In November, 1927, he wrote three essays on Shakespeare. The first of them echoes Hazlitt's preface to *Characters of Shakespeare's Plays* and Dr. Johnson's preface to his edition of Shakespeare's works. In this essay al-‘Akkād writes:

"To write about Shakespeare is much the same as to write about human nature, or the nature of poetry. Shakespeare's plays are peopled with many characters, which act, speak and think as one imagines they should do in their circumstances. They differ in their ranks and positions; some of them are kings, others ministers, others military generals, others merchants, others craftsmen, others beggars or idlers. They differ in their nature and morals. Among them you find the noble and the ignoble, the generous and the scheming, the wise and the stupid, the learned sage and the ignorant fool, the powerful and the humble, the capable and incapable. You also find the victorious and the defeated, the contented and the irate, the happy and the desperate, the yearning and the consoled, the avid and the abstemious. They also differ in age; some are old, others middle-aged, others young men, others boys. Yet all of them are portrayed with exactness and precision. They act, speak, think and behave as befits their situations, morals, age and positions. By virtue of his knowledge, gleaned not from scholars and the study of books, the poet portrays kings in every mental state and recorded every word they may have uttered. He represents every person as he would appear in reality. His plays are like a complete map of the world from whose lines the world could be reconstructed, should it be destroyed.

More surprising are the female characters of his plays. They differ in age, temperament, morals, social rank and circumstances; some of them appear in love, yet in various degrees of love; others are of good nature, but differ in their goodness; others are cunning, but their cunning schemes show little in common. Notwithstanding, all are perfectly portrayed. None of them suffers from misrepresentation or exaggeration. It is the poet's penetrating inspiration and true insight which enabled him to paint every aspect of life with the same clarity and perfection."
You see his characters and hear the words they utter as though they were the people of a town you have been familiar with for twenty years. Nothing of it is hidden from you and nothing is strange to you... While wandering through it you are not startled by what you see and hear. Everything appears very usual and true to life... This is the outstanding peculiarity of Shakespeare... The odd thing in Shakespeare's representation of truth is that you find nothing odd in it... Even the sights of ghosts, spirits and phantoms appear true to nature. The poet has clothed them with garments of truth and given them characters in harmony with the people's ideas of them. Thus you see them as though they were familiar to you."

In all this al-‘Akkād is following closely Hazlitt and Dr. Johnson. Though he is discussing Shakespeare's plays, his words imply a certain view of poetry and of the nature of poetic truth. Shakespeare is distinguished from all other poets as the supreme poet of human nature or of nature in general. He is praised for the truth and naturalism of his characters, for the large variety of these characters and for the psychological realism of his plays. Here al-‘Akkād finds the greatness of Shakespeare. The reader of the plays is never struck by hyperboles or exaggeration in their description, or by the supernatural element which some of them contain. Rather he is struck by the delicacy of their representation and their faithfulness to nature and life. To the reader they are like something remembered. He is not reading works of imagination, but recalling memories of himself and of others whom he knew in the past. In Shakespeare the truth is not historical or rational, but psychological and emotional. It is that kind of truth for which the poet should care, and which he can attain only through his intuitive perception and sympathetic imagination, and not through reasoning and
scholarly knowledge. By depicting this psychological truth and realism the poet remains faithful to nature even when he represents supernatural events and situations.

In the essay al-'Akkād says nothing about the relationship of beauty with truth. When he writes of beauty in Shakespeare's plays he mentions it in connection with expression, language and imagery. Thus he speaks of truth as a quality of the content, and of beauty as a quality of the form. He also speaks of truth as a quality of representation. However, since beauty is truth, and truth beauty, and since the form is inseparable from the content, we cannot distinguish between the two. A work of art should be considered in its totality.

In his essays "The Art of Painting" and "Impressionism in Painting" al-'Akkād has repeated his views of psychological imaginative truth; to quote him:

"Humanistic art is that kind of art which is truthful in the representation of the nature of man, his genuine feelings and emotions, which do not change with the change of time and place ... A painter does something fine when he clothes trees with dark or grey colours if he is to convey a mood of quietness and tranquillity. Such a change in the colours of trees will be more expressive of the spirit of the scenery than the photographic truth." "The virtue of fine art resides in representing the object described as it appears in the mind of the artist, and not as it is perceived by senses. The painter who succeeds in depicting a tree as he imagines it without any regard to time, be it morning or evening, be it spring or winter, is an impressionist. For true impressionism is to portray things from within, not without, and to represent the essence, rather than the appearance, of things."

In these words al-'Akkād is expressing his views of inner psychological or imaginative reality, and of the artistic way
of seeing as the only accurate one. Ideal inner truth can be attained only through the artist's identification with nature and seeing things from within. To al-'Akkād the artist is an interpreter, rather than imitator, of nature, and his work is an expression of imaginative vision. When the artist depicts this imaginative or psychological vision he achieves a reality higher or more profound than that represented by the appearances of things, which we meet every day. Furthermore he seems to think of this ideal truth as particular and universal at the same time.

Al-'Akkād's concept of artistic literary truth has found its full expression in the essay "Art between Truth and Untruth".

"What is truth? It has been defined as correspondence to reality. But what is reality? How can we respond to it? Are we to respond to it according to our sensational perception, linguistic understanding, or feeling and imagination? Each of these is a correspondence to reality, and each is true, with regard to that definition. Yet they differ greatly from each other both in representation and expression."

Al-'Akkād goes on to regard the imaginative psychological correspondence to reality as the highest and ideal one. He distinguishes literary truth from both the scientific and historical ones. When a poet describes an object or a scene in imaginative visionary language he does not tell a lie but the truth, whether his description agrees with the facts of science and the senses or not. Though the scientist might accuse him of falsifying things, he remains more truthful to nature and reality than the scientist. Thus al-Mutanabbi's line
which describes the roar of the lion that he saw in Syria as loud enough to be heard in Iraq and Egypt, remains truthful to nature, in spite of its disagreement with the facts of science. Its truthfulness must be judged according to the facts of feeling and imagination, and not to the facts of physics.

For what al-Mutanabbī has described is not the roar of the lion itself, but the feelings of fear, awe and caution which it excited in him. The roar of the lion had filled up the air around him and he was apt to imagine that it must have been heard on the shores of the Euphrates and the Nile. Likewise when in this line:

ربّ لعده نصّ ماردًا مارًا ضاحکُ من تراهم الأضداد

al-Ma'arī describes the tomb as having served as a burial place for the dead of one generation after another, and as mocking at the paradoxes and contradictions thus crowded together, he does not tell a lie, but presents us with the deepest truth.

"The realism in feeling and the correspondence to feeling are truer than any other realism and correspondence ... It is the same with regard to historical truth. The poet remains truthful when he portrays a historical hero of another age and circumstances than his own (since he is faithful to human nature). He might be regarded by the historian as guilty of misrepresentation,... but we cannot deny the truth of his work."

Thus the psychological visionary truth is the only truth that al-‘Akkād demands of the poet and writer. It is this kind of truth which he identifies with beauty. Truth in poetry and art is not to be verified by the methods of the historian and scientist. Though al-‘Akkād thinks that the
truth of the poet must be judged by the standards of feeling
and imagination, he mentions no method whereby this truth can
be ascertained. In the essay "True and False Poetry" he writes:

"How can we distinguish false from true poetry? To
me this question is like the other question: How can we
distinguish between kinds of feelings? The
distinction between two feelings or two poems is
much the same. It is something up to the reader him¬
self, his capability, education and mental states, and
not a matter of applying a certain rule or a certain
knowledge ..."

In an attempt to distinguish between true and false poetry,
i.e. the poetry of art and that of nature, al-‘Akhād quotes
the anonymous lines:

وكانا للحجة الرضاء دان
تحوى المرضعات على النظم.
الذين من المدامة للندم.
فحيحها ويأتون للفسم.
تقتسم جنب العقد الترميم.

and al-Mutanabbi's lines:

ملعقة جنة لوسار فيها
عليها لسار ترحمان.
خشيت جراء كرم في الهر.
قد مواصيناuent الأغصان فيها.
صررت فوق حبين العزاق.
واذنى الصرا نوها بيا بي.
والتي الشرة منها في البي.
مِّيناء تعبر من البنان.

He praises the two passages for their truth in description
and simplicity of expression except the line:

يروع حصابا حالية العزارى،
فلم جنب العقد النظم.
which he criticises as a falsification of truth. The image of the bejewelled girls, who at the jewel-like pebbles examine their necklaces to make sure the thread had not broken, is regarded by al-'Akkād as an ingenious game with words. He compares it with the other image of al-Mutanabbī:

and writes that the simile in al-Mutanabbī's line, in which the sound made by the water as it rushes over the pebbles is compared to the tinkle of a girl's bracelets, is true to nature and not mere ornamentation. In the first line the poet deceives his reader with an unnatural image and distracts his attention from the reality of the description, whereas al-Mutanabbī communicates a true meaning to him.


In his writings between 1923 and 1929 al-'Akkād made many remarks concerning aesthetic education as a path towards the salvation of man and the human soul in modern times. The main points occur in his two essays "al-'Adab Kamā Yafhamuh al-Jīl" (Literature as Understood by the present Generation), written in 1923, the preface to his collection of essays Reading in Books and Life, written in 1924; and his series of essays, eight in number, "ash-Shīr fī Mīṣr" (Poetry in Egypt) and the essay "Timthāl an-Nahdah" (The Statue of Renaissance), all written five years later in 1928. In later years al-'Akkād developed his theory in several other essays such as
"al-Wahy al-Fanni" (Artistic Inspiration), the preface "Mawdū'at ash-Shīr" (The Poetic Themes) to his collection of poems A Passer-by, "al-Ladī Nurīduhū" (What We Want), "al-Īlm wa al-Adāb" (Science and Literature), "Ma'na ath-Thakāfah" (The Meaning of Culture), "Mādhā Na'mal" (What are We to do) and "Lānahkda' Anfusā Ḥattā Yakhda'ūnā" (We do not Deceive Ourselves Before They Deceive Us). In all these essays and prefaces al-'Akkâd's aim was not merely literary but essentially educational. In fact, in all his writings which aimed at a literary reformation al-'Akkâd's concern was specifically educational. For a literary reformation was to him a reformation of the nation's life and the standards of this life.

"The life of a nation can be measured by its production of poetry, music, literature, discourses and dreams. We can imagine a nation greatly advanced culturally and morally, yet without sciences and industries, but we cannot imagine such a nation without literature and arts. A nation whose literary standards are false, and whose members evaluate literature wrongly, is a nation whose life is misguided. A nation which has failed to appreciate human sentiments as expressed in literature and painting is a nation lacking feeling. Thus when a nation's principles of literature are reformed, it does not merely acquire words and letters, but a transfusion of new blood in its veins, a new feeling in its heart, and a new light in its spirit."

In another essay, written in 1925 and entitled "al-Īslāh al-Adabī" (Literary Reformation) al-'Akkâd writes:

"Every reformation in any aspect of the nation's affairs which does not concern the standards of life, particularly those of belles-lettres and arts, is mere absurdity. It must be understood that the reformation of literature is other than the refinement of word-formations, the modification of poetic metres, or the revision of grammar and etymology. Indeed, it is no less than an amelioration of the nation's life and the methods of its expression. Thus it is a rebirth of the nation."

Al-‘Akkād’s theory of aesthetic education has its root in his philosophy of feeling and imagination. For it is an education of the sensibility, feeling and imagination of man. It is also related to his ethics and metaphysics. It might seem strange that al-‘Akkād, the moralist and the fighter for democracy and socialism, should advocate an aesthetic education of man as a remedy for all human ills. To him, however, this is not an escape from practical reality into a world of shadows and dreams. At the basis of his theory is the assumption that man’s deepest need is to make sense of his life, to reconcile himself with the world and others around him, and to learn how to exercise a free conformity to the laws of nature and material necessity. In his opinion aesthetic education provides man with an answer to all these needs. He sees aesthetic experience as embracing both the moral and religious experiences. The need of modern man for aesthetic education stems from the fact that the gap between his rational and emotional life has grown too wide, and that man’s advancement in science and rational knowledge has deprived life of its meaning, rather than offering him happiness.

Before dealing with al-‘Akkād’s theory something must be said about his views of feeling and moral experience, for without a grasp of the relationship between these views and his theory of aesthetic education this theory cannot fully be appreciated. In fact, al-‘Akkād thoughts expressed between 1922 and 1929 – an important formative stage in his
intellectual life - and even in later years should be considered in toto. His ideas during this period are inseparable from each other, and cannot be fully comprehended when treated independently. His moral and metaphysical views are essential to understanding his literary criticism. The moralist in al-ʿAkkād lurks behind all his activities in literature and politics.

We have seen in the last chapter that between 1913 and 1921 the keynotes in al-ʿAkkād's literary criticism were feeling and imagination, and that feeling and imagination are man's access to deepest reality. To him, deepest reality is emotional, rather than rational. In the years 1922-1929 he expressed the view that the essence of religion is not the belief in a great and wise power, but the emotional sympathy between man and this power or between man and the universe. He thinks that man's concern in life is not to know the world around, but to come into a relationship with it. Emotion to him, rather than reason, is the basis of this relationship. Reason has no affinity with man's beliefs, nor can it provide man with a true knowledge of things. He gives passion precedence over reason and regards emotional knowledge as living knowledge, and rational knowledge as lifeless. He also regards feeling as the essence of man and substance of life:

"You have no access to reality save by feeling. Feel everything in life whether pleasurable or painful ... and you will gain all the knowledge that life offers. We are apt to trust feeling, rather than reason, and listen to the voice of the heart. Feeling constitutes the substance of life, while reason is additional. Man does not live by reason, nor does reason organize
the functions of his life. Nor does it satisfy hunger or the need of love. Blood flows in the veins independently of reason . . ."

Al-'Akkād condemns every philosophy which does not take into account passion and the unknown as being unconcerned with man's reality.

"Man comes into contact with the universe not through reason alone but through imagination and feeling. No logic which ignores passion and the unknown, the two things which surround us everywhere and are deeply rooted in us, can be true. A philosopher in whose philosophy passion and the unknown have no place can give us only a philosophy which does not concern us and the world we live in. His logic might have some bearing on the world of numbers and statistics, but nothing concerning our world of feeling and life."

Al-'Akkād also rejects the empirical and material philosophies, which confine knowledge to man's senses and ignore feeling, imagination, intuition, and other inner cognitive faculties.

"Life is the creator of man's senses, their cultivator and refiner, the provider of their awareness of things. Life is more far-reaching than senses, and has a deeper contact with the universe - a contact which existed prior to the creation of our senses of smell, taste, hearing and sight. Senses themselves excel each other by virtue of their degree of feeling, which they receive from within the soul, and not from the world without ... Even in science and industry the knowledge of man's senses is limited ... We must not forget that beyond our senses there exists an inexhaustible source of understanding, which may acquire expression in limitless forms and ways ... So we understand many things through intuition, imagination and deep sympathetic feeling. Imagination has proved for thousands of years more true than reason ... Man's relationship with the universe is not confined to his external senses or to his intellect, nor can his knowledge be limited to that which he receives from the world without, for man is also a part of the inner and outer universe ... thus he is capable of knowing realities beyond the range of senses."

In this way al-'Akkād thinks that man's relationship with the world does not depend on his senses and reason alone but on many other faculties, which he calls, after Kant and
Coleridge, inner senses. Man understands the world around him by his life force, which is a unification of sensation, instinct, passion, sympathy, imagination, intuition and reasoning.

In the moral experience al-‘Akkād conceives freedom as the source of all goodness and right. The virtue of man as a moral agent is due to the freedom by which he excels other animate beings. Man can be so only by acting from the principle of freedom and following his own inspiration. If a moral action is to be a positive virtue, it must issue from free choice. But in al-‘Akkād’s moral theory the principle of freedom is distinguished from that of pleasure. When man acts from the principle of pleasure, he is not a free agent but subject to his inclinations. Therefore, al-‘Akkād conceives moral freedom as being connected with duty. The notion of duty is due to the fact that the existence of the ego is not independent of the existence of the alter ego. Man is not an isolated individual, nor can he live in isolation from others. Without the relationship to the alter ego the existence of the ego is meaningless. Thus man’s moral freedom is meaningful only within a social framework. In acting upon the principle of freedom he is making a law for himself and for others.

In the moral realm the principle of duty recalls that of necessity in nature. Al-‘Akkād relates the moral to the beautiful or connects each with the other. He seems to think that the principle of beauty is at the basis of the moral
experience, and that the moral experience is inseparable from
the aesthetic one. In these views and in his theory of
aesthetic education in general al-'Akkād is heavily indebted
to Kant, Schiller and Goethe.

In 1922, the year in which al-'Akkād became obsessed by
the idea of beauty and its function in human life, he
introduced his book The Papers thus:

"Beauty is the ultimate aim of life. The good in the
human soul is that which resembles the universe in its
beauty and disinterestedness, and not what is useful.
The useful is accidental and transient, while the
beautiful alone is eternal ... In the world there is
also power and truth, neither of which exists
independently of beauty. Beauty, Power and Truth
are thus different names for one Reality, from which
everything begins, and in which everything ends"

Al-'Akkād's theory of aesthetic education seems to have been
developed from this view, which regards beauty as the essence
of creation and the ultimate aim of life and relates goodness,
truth and power to it. It can also be traced back in his
writings before 1921. In the following years al-'Akkād was
occupied with the idea of freedom both in politics and
morality. The two concepts, beauty and freedom, were then
identified in his mind. He could not conceive one without
the other, and when he uses either of the terms, he means the
other as well.

As we have seen, freedom in al-'Akkād's view meant free
order or free conformity to necessity, and beauty "The
conquest of necessity by freedom" or of matter by spirit.
This dualism or unity of opposites was, and remained, an
essential element in his thought. The advocacy of aesthetic
education is thus a natural consequence of his view, since beauty is the ultimate aim of life, the source of goodness, and a manifestation of freedom. Also at work in al-‘Akkād’s mind at this time was the idea that man’s concern in the universe is not to understand, so much as to maintain a sympathetic and intimate relationship with it while being a living part of it. There was, however, another idea connected with the theory, namely, the belief in the totality of man and the unity of human faculties. Out of all these ideas al-‘Akkād formulated his theory of aesthetic education.

Between 1922 and 1929 he was concerned primarily with the notion of freedom in the theory. In later years, particularly from 1933 to 1942, the emphasis was shifted to imagination and feeling. Whatever the reason behind this transition, the two periods represent the two phases of the theory. In fact, the two phases are interconnected, and elements of each appear in both periods. The distinction between the two periods is due to the emphasis which al-‘Akkād laid on freedom in the first, and on imagination and feeling in the second.

In 1923 al-‘Akkād wrote:

"Without an artistic spirit life becomes mere absurdity. . . . If man is to live life to the full, he can do so only by giving a free rein to his senses, and imbuing his imagination with the objects of his senses. This is what I call the artistic spirit. It is not, however, an unattainable goal. To reach this goal man is in need of the education which enables him to see life artistically, to appreciate its artistic facets and embrace its beauties and charms . . . Only an artisan who possesses the sensibility and imagination of the artist can produce something valuable. An artisan who has no taste for beauty and no artistic skill in handling things as the artist does can produce nothing meritorious in industry, commerce, agriculture and any other sphere of knowledge."
In these words, al-‘Akkād for the first time has expressed man's need for aesthetic education, which gives him a sense of beauty and a taste for it, invigorates his imagination and increases the range of his sensibility. Thus it enables him to see and treat things as the artist does. If for years al-‘Akkād continually put forward his belief in an aesthetic education for man, he did so from his conviction that the comprehension of beauty is the rarest thing in men and that the vast majority of men live and die without realizing the beauties of the universe. To him man can make sense of his life only when he makes sense of the beauty which surrounds him, and penetrates its mysteries. Unless he does so, life remains meaningless for him. This belief seems to be allied to his idea that modern civilization has weakened man's spirit and senses by detaching him from nature, the source of his being, and neglecting the requirements of feeling and imagination. Aesthetic education seems then a new path by which man re-establishes his contact with nature. To al-‘Akkād, as to Schiller, culture is the completeness of the self by satisfying its demands for knowledge and feeling. If modern civilization has increased man's knowledge and capacity for industry, it has done so at the expense of his integration and completeness of self. Aesthetic education serves then to bridge the gulf between the emotional and rational facets of man's life and restore his unity.

Thus in his theory, al-‘Akkād is seeking an answer to more than one question. For years the problem of modern man...
appeared to him essentially religious. In these years the lack of faith represented a painful intellectual problem to him as well as to Shukrī and al-Mazini and pushed the three writers to seek a resolution of it in poetry. Thus, under the influence of Carlyle and Shelley, they conceived of the poet as a prophet and co-ordinated poetry with religion. In 1913 al-'Akkād stated a belief in poetry as a substitute for religion and called on the poets to fill up the vacant place of the prophet, to express a new faith for man, and to draw the image of a new paradise. He also, following Hazlitt and Shelley, believed in the poetic imagination as a moral power and allied it to sympathy and hope (freedom). This belief in poetry or art as a substitute for religion seems to have survived in his mind and expressed itself in a new form. In the new stage his belief in the oneness of existence and the belief in the moral function of beauty are identified. He thinks that so long as man maintains a living relationship with the universe and co-operates with the Universal Will life has a purpose and the existence of the individual is meaningful. Even what might be illusory and false does not appear so. The purpose of life vanishes and the world appears unreal only when man loses his sheet-anchor in the universe, cuts himself off from the inner stream of existence and the Universal Will and sees his will alone at work. In all this man's first concern in life is to acquire faith, rather than knowledge, to seek trust in the universe and to make sense of his life. In aesthetic experience al-'Akkād seems to find a resolution to
man's religious problem. Faith has become to him "a harmony between the human soul and the universe in which it lives". He writes that a human soul which has no contact with the inner stream of existence can acquire faith from nowhere. Like a tree, which sends its roots deep in the soil to seek water, the human soul must seek faith from within that inner stream of existence by establishing contact with it. In his theory of aesthetic education the aesthetic feeling of beauty is conceived as the sole path to this inner stream of existence. Through aesthetic experience, that man undergoes in the presence of nature where everything is to be seen as a beautiful work of art, man becomes identified with the universe and shares with nature its inner life. Through the aesthetic feeling of beauty he establishes or re-establishes his contact with the inner Reality or the inner fountain of life wherefrom faith springs spontaneously as water rushes from inside the soil into the tree. This is why al-‘Akkād thinks that man is nearer to God in green gardens, meadows and pastures, where life breathes and plants grow, i.e. where he feels the beauty of the universe and the spirit of life, than in the sublime dark temples, where everything evokes in him the feeling of awe and fear and reminds him of death. He thinks that man's religious function is performed through the aesthetic feeling of beauty.

When al-‘Akkād speaks of the artistic way of seeing as the only adequate way and gives it superiority over both the scientific and philosophical ways of seeing, he considers
this function of aesthetic experience. When aesthetic experience unifies man with nature, it enables him to understand the universe from within. In his view, the scientific and philosophical ways of seeing detach man from nature, cut him adrift from the inner Reality and attach him to the world of phenomena. He can see then only the outer appearances of things. If man is to penetrate the mysteries of the universe and come nearer to the divine Power in it, he must see things from the artistic point of view.

To see the universe from the artistic point of view is to see it as a unity of opposites, freedom and necessity, spirit and matter, idea and form, and as a conquest of the latter by the former; to see it is a work of art, in which the freedom of imagination meets the shackles of metre, and the joy of free impulse the fixed pattern of rhyme.

The second point of al-'Akkād's theory of aesthetic education springs from this conception of beauty, which regards the beautiful object, whether in nature or art, as a manifestation of freedom or a conquest of necessity by freedom.

"Every animate being ... represents a unity of two great powers, the one preserves it and the other lifts it above itself, the one is material and the other spiritual, the one co-operates with necessity and conforms itself to it, and the other revolts against necessity and aspires to freedom. The latter expresses itself in man's vague yearning for the unknown, imaginative hopes and aspiration to the Ideal, which in turn find their expression in the works of art and literature ... By this supersensible element literature and fine arts excel other crafts and industries which are subject to the material necessity, ... and give rise to a feeling of freedom in the soul".

In these words al-'Akkād is describing at once the dual nature
of man and the function of aesthetic experience in his life. Through aesthetic experience man reaches a state of self-completeness, establishes a harmony between his two elements, spirit and body, intellect and sense, and wins his freedom. The state of harmony between spirit and body, the impulse of freedom and that of necessity, is due to the free conformity which the former exercises in respect of the latter, while it continues to pursue a domination over it. However, it remains a manifestation of man's freedom. Through aesthetic experience man learns the true meaning of freedom, freedom being a unity of opposites, will and rule or the conquest of rule by will. At the time aesthetic experience gives rise to a sense of freedom in the soul it reconciles the soul with matter or material necessity. Thus the aesthetic feeling of beauty lifts man over the realm of necessity, matter and form into that of freedom, spirit and idea and enables him, at the same time, how to live within the bonds of nature as though he were altogether free. It teaches him how to create freedom out of law, unity out of opposites, harmony out of disharmony, and joy out of duty. When aesthetic experience teaches man the principle of freedom, it reconciles him with himself and with the world around him. It also brings him into sympathy with others, particularly in the realm of literature and fine arts, and releases him from isolation. It teaches him that life is an art, and that art is not a free game, nor is the artist a free creator. In aesthetic experience man discovers his totality and integrity and his
oneness with the universe.

Al-ʾAkkād thinks that whenever the principle of combining freedom with necessity is at work, it indicates the higher degree that an individual, a nation, or a culture has reached in the process of evolution. It is the measure whereby the elevation, nobility and progress of an individual, a nation, or culture are to be judged.

To al-ʾAkkād the fighter for democracy and socialism the political freedom of a nation counts as nothing unless it is accompanied by a renaissance in arts and literature or unless the sense of beauty has grown deep-rooted in the heart of the nation. Thus he thinks that man’s need for aesthetic education is prior to his need for political freedom and ranks the poet or the artist higher than the political leader in the national struggle for freedom.

"Give us the poet who writes a poem which teaches the Egyptians the love of flowers, and I assure you of a true renaissance and great national rise. For a nation which loves flowers loves gardens, organization, harmony, cleanliness and beauty, and can no longer accept poverty, ignorance and squalor. Give us the poet who teaches us fine courtesy, and I assure you of a noble nation whose children grow with noble passion, fine taste and health. For the poet who knows how to write love poetry also knows how to value woman, educate people and make laws and constitutions. Give us the poet who teaches us the love of pleasure and enjoyment, and I assure you of a nation whose members live as human beings, and not as animals subject to the demands of the body ..."

And again:

"When a poet teaches us the love of beauty, he teaches us how to revolt against tyranny and despotism. For the soul which apprehends the meaning of beauty cannot accept tyranny and isolation and rebels against obstacles and bonds".
Thus the artist's message of beauty is a message of freedom at the same time. The true artist is an educator, a preacher of freedom, a maker of laws and constitutions, a social reformer, a political leader, and above all a prophet. Political freedom has no significance where beauty has no appeal to man. Therefore, man's sense of beauty, or love of fine arts is the only measure of his degree of freedom and his appreciation of it.

"All nations plough land, draw water, sink mines and establish markets. But in all these man is subject to nature. Nations know freedom only when they discriminate between things, between what is beautiful and what is more beautiful, what is lovable and what is not, what gives pleasure to the soul and what does not, what satisfies the faculty of taste and what does not, that is to say, when they love beauty whether in nature or art, whether in the objects of sight or of hearing, and whether in the objects of the soul or senses ... There is no freedom where there is no love of beauty; no contempt for tyranny where man is subject to the demands of necessity".

In al-'Akkād's view, the existence of a museum is more indicative of a nation's freedom than a thousand constitutions. "To know the degree of the freedom and human dignity of a nation you need ask only about a museum. If you find it you will know the reality. For in it you can see the spirit, feeling and thought of the nation."

The moment a nation takes to heart the message of art it begins to understand the value of life, freedom, humanity, dignity, harmony, order, passion and thought.

Al-'Akkād expressed these views, in which the influence of Schiller's *On the Aesthetic Education of Man* seems very profound, in the six or seven years between 1922 and 1929.
In the four following years his writings contain almost nothing concerning beauty and aesthetic education. However, between 1933 and 1942 he published many essays in which he developed his theory. In these essays, as we have already said, al-‘Akkād lays emphasis on the nurturing of feeling and imagination. He seemed to have realised that if man is to embrace beauty, make sense of it, and penetrate its mysteries, he must acquire first the education which enables him to do so. In this second period the view which regards the aesthetic feeling of beauty as the sole path to freedom had received little attention from al-‘Akkād. The two essays "Ḫurriyyat al-Ādāb" (The Freedom of belles-lettres) 1936, and "al-Fann wa al-Ḫurriyyah Sadīkān Kadīmān" (Art and Freedom are two old Friends), 1950, add nothing new to his earlier views. However, he seems to have discovered a new sense of freedom in the completeness and unity of the self which man gains through aesthetic education.

In the first essay concerning aesthetic education and published in 1933 al-‘Akkād attributes the backwardness of Easterners to a lack of imagination and sensibility and thinks that if the East is to progress, its imagination and feeling must increase. He writes:

"It is a misconception to represent imagination as contradictory to action ... Imagination is the grasping of realities and filling up life with them. Without imagination we treat life's affairs as though they were mathematic problems, which can be understood but which give no rise to movement in the soul, nor do they imbue life with beauty and yearning... The imaginative inventor is he who imagines 'the end product' as though it were a beautiful living body and does not rest
until he succeeds in his work. The imaginative pilot is he who imagines the obstacles of the sea and the dangers to be surmounted ... so that he is filled with living desires and does not feel contented until he has seen his desires as realities ... The imaginative merchant is he who imagines the market filled up with money and prices going up and down, and takes pleasure in his efforts to be the centre of this commercial movement ... The idle person who builds up palaces in the air and the hungry person who eats his bread in dream are not imaginative. For neither is comprehending reality and imbuing it with beauty. Rather they are idle sensationalists transforming reality into a world of dream, and not imaginative beings transforming imagination into the world of reality ... and increasing the range of life ... If the East have no place in the world of realism, it is not because eastern people are too imaginative, but because they know nothing about imagination."

This conception of imagination as a faculty of apprehension and action, the faculty whereby man grasps reality and fills up life with it, will seem odd to the majority of readers. According to this conception the imaginative person is the one who has a vision of reality and fits his own activity with it, and not that dreamer who takes pleasure in his dream and feels contented with it. However, all that al-'Akkād wants to say is that imagination is a creative power which provides man with the motivations of life and sets him, thereby, at work. Action is a result of apprehension and desire which are, in turn, a result of the activity of imagination.

This is in harmony with al-'Akkād's philosophy of feeling which attaches the whole importance in the process of man's cultural progress to psychological motivations, rather than to the aims or ends. Without these psychological motivations the process of evolution and progress ceases to exist. In connection with this he writes:
"For a long time people used to speak of will (desire) and action as though they were two separate powers, of passion and thought as though they were disconnected things, and of imagination and understanding as though they were contradictory faculties... This is, however, an error in representing realities inevitably followed by another error in prescribing remedy. Will and action do not represent two separate lines, the one starting where the other ends. Rather they represent two facets of the self which belong to one indivisible origin. When the self is filled up with will, it is filled up with a power of action at the same moment."

Imagination in al-ʿAkkād's writings is the cause-factor of man's cultural progress. Indeed, it is man's capacity for life. Without imagination the world grows narrow and man's impulse of life or will-to-work vanishes.

"A nation may suffer nothing worse than lacking imagination and being imprisoned within the boundaries of realism. For living within the boundaries of realism is a feature of animal life rather than of human experience. The need of the human soul is to lift itself above the realm of realism into that of the ideal and free itself from the fetters of the present to live in the hope of the future... Imagination is the power which enables the soul to do so."

It enables man to understand the past and the present and to throw himself into future and the range of the unknown. It thus enlarges the prospect of his life and increases his power of feeling, thinking and action. When imagination attaches man to the world of the ideal it inspires him to achieve the ideal in his daily life. Thus continues the process of evolution and progress. Imagination does not stand in contradistinction to understanding or reason but to the limitation of life and man's imprisonment within the bounds of realism and senses.

"To know imagination and dream is to know hope and aspiration. If the airplane is reality today, it
is so because it was the dream of yesterday. What man needs is more imagination and less of the cult of realism."

Al-ʿAkkād argues that if a man does not act, it is because he possesses no will and desire for action, and that he possesses-no will and desire because he lacks imagination and feeling. Before man seeks reason for movement and action he must seek feeling and imagination. Al-ʿAkkād might have surprised his readers when he addressed the following words to those who attribute the backwardness of the East to its excess of imagination and sensibility:

"No ... Cure it (the East) of the lack of feeling, and not of the excess of it, of the poverty of imagination, and not of the immoderateness of it. Teach it how to feel and you will teach it how to will and act."

Elsewhere he has made this view more explicit:

"The Westerners do not excel us by their industries which produce airplanes, cars, ships, tanks and clothes, but by their power of observation, creation and invention, i.e., by the science which requires a far-sighted eye, a penetrating insight and the imagination which grasps the parts separately and in relationship with the whole, i.e. by the faculties of feeling and imagination which enable a sculptor to produce a statue, a musician to compose a symphony, a poet to write a poem and an inventor to create a new industry. What we need is to feel the world around us, to compare our feelings with each other and create out of them a complete image of the world, whether in the sphere of science, art, or commerce."

In 1937 al-ʿAkkād published his collection of poems 
A Passer-by with a significant preface. The aim of the collection was not poetical so much as educational. When al-ʿAkkād chose common situations and objects of everyday life as subject-matter of his poetry, he did so from his belief in aesthetic education as a path to the salvation of mankind.
Thus his aim was not, as Arabic critics thought, to create something new in poetry or to oppose the general trends of the poetry of the day and call the attention of the poets to the world of realism. Rather his aim was to evoke in his readers a feeling of beauty towards the common objects of daily life and enable them to make sense of their lives.¹

"In my opinion, we, the people of the present day, are in need of this attempt to save the human soul, and not only as a matter of artistic talent. "When we give our attention to things we can find something valuable in them and save our souls from the insipidity of life, which is so common today."

He also writes:

"It is our feelings which imbue things with pleasure and spirit and give them beautiful or ugly meanings. Let us possess life and feeling and we find poetry everywhere. Everything becomes a source of poetry when we clothe it with our sensation and imagination, interpenetrate it with our consciousness and permeate it with our thoughts, dreams and fears... The superb garments with which we clothe the hopes of the unseen and the objects of the visible world are the creation of imagination. Let us possess imagination and desire and we will find an inexhaustible source of poetry in everything that we see and taste. Let us direct our senses towards things and we will find pleasure both in feeling and expression... Let us feel everything around us, clothe our present moment with the imaginative beautiful garments that we create for the past and we will save ourselves from the insignificance of life."

¹ In writing this collection of poems al-‘Akkād might have been influenced by the aim which Wordsworth set to himself in The Lyrical Ballads and which Coleridge describes thus: "Mr. Wordsworth... was to propose to himself as his object, to give the charm of novelty to things of everyday, and to excite a feeling analogous to the supernatural, by awakening the mind's attention from the lethargy of custom, and directing it to the loveliness and the wonders of the world before us; an inexhaustible treasure, but for which, in consequence of the film of familiarity and selfish solicitude we have eyes, yet see not, ears that hear not, and hearts that neither feel nor understand". Biographia Literaria, edited by J. Shawcross, 1907, vol.II, p.6.
Thus al-‘Akkād’s aim was not to preach a new poetic message to the world, but to put poetry in the service of the education of man and enable his readers to take to heart the beauty which surrounds them in everything and make sense of their lives.

Al-‘Akkād never felt tired of repeating his views. The essays which he wrote after the issue of his A Passer-by repeat each other. There is, however, one essay in which his theory of aesthetic education found its full expression. This essay is “The Meaning of Culture”, which he delivered as a lecture in 1942. Here we need to quote al-‘Akkād at length:

"Culture is the disciplining of the human faculties and of their functions by their being granted full lives ... the functions of life are too numerous to be counted, too deep to be defined by names ... Life is bestowed upon us as a field prepared for sowing and reaping, ... and culture is the craft whereby we reap the fruits of this our sole field ... The demands of culture can be divided into three categories; the demands of sense, the demands of movement, and the demands of thinking ... The need of sense for education and discipline is greater than people think. He who wants an increase in the range of sensibility wants an increase in the range of life as a whole. For this reason the measure of true sense is its response to external effects, and not its mere receptiveness of them. The response which reveals a depth of feeling and the ability of the function of life to answer and embrace all objects of sense is that which enables us to understand what the listener has sensed and become conscious of, if he has the proper instrument for receiving external effects around him."

Al-‘Akkād goes on to assert man’s need for more sensibility, more passion and more imagination.

"Imagination gives insight to our comprehension of reality ... enables us to penetrate its depths and infuse it with beauty."
Imagination to him is a faculty of knowledge, action and pleasure at the same time. Of passion he writes:

"Passion is the motivation and impulse of life; it is the power behind our preservation of and striving for it and developing it to the highest level of progress ... Strong passion is what we need, and it is not an addition which we can do without."

He raises even the question: "Does the Easterner progress by virtue of passion or of reason?" and answers: "By passion before reason". Again the emphasis which al-‘Akkād lays on passion and imagination is due to his view regarding life as impulse or motivation. He speaks of the ends and results as unreal and less important than the impulses. Imagination and passion are the faculties which provide man with the impulse of life and stand behind his progress.

However, al-‘Akkād believes in culture as the completeness of the self and the unity of human faculties. He thinks of man as a totality, as an integral personality, or as a unity of sense, intellect, imagination and passion. To him the object of education must be the personality of man as an indivisible whole, and not one of its faculties. Its aim is to enable this personality in its development, in its fulfilling the numerous functions of life, and set thus both the soul and the body at work.

Because of all what has been said al-‘Akkād regards literature and fine arts as indispensable to man and not "cheap superfluities" without which man can live and evolve. He argues that man can live so long without the sense of sight or hearing, but he cannot live more than a few days..."
without bread. Thus things must not be evaluated according to whether we can live without them or not, but according to whether we can live a perfect life without them or not. When we lose fine arts we do not merely lose a picture, a poem or some other ornamentation, but the best part of our lives and the best part of our relationship with the universe. Without literature and fine arts we are cut off from the world and stripped of our humanity, dignity, and freedom. The man who asks what is the use of fine arts? is apt to ask what is the use of sight and hearing? What is the use of feeling and life? By fine arts alone man perfects life and its freedom, and finds a remedy for its necessities and bonds. The manhood of man and of his spirit appears only in the disinterested search for beauty and the disdain of ugliness.

3. Organic Unity, Complexity and Personality
(a) The World as a Whole:

In the introduction to his collection of essays Murājaʿat fī al-Ādāb wa al-Funūn (Re-readings in Literature and Arts), published in 1925, al- Ḥakīd writes:

"The approach which by virtue both of my nature and my experience I prefer to all others is to see the world as a Whole, rather than as Fragments or Details. Life, time, and the universe, from their very beginning to their very end, represent to me One Unified Whole of which individual phenomena are accidental parts. These parts vary in value according to their possession of the properties of that Great Whole. Thus individual phenomena appear as banknotes, which have no value in themselves ... and which must be assessed according to the Living Labour and concrete assets they represent. As a result, this approach goes beyond the limits of common conventions, usage of..."
language and details of things. This explains many of the views which I expressed in these essays, particularly the view which ascribes beauty to inner ideas, rather than to bodies and forms.

It may be asked: Does this approach not conflict with Reality, on which every true knowledge must be based? I reply No. It rather widens the sphere of Reality and corrects our criteria... Businessmen and those who call themselves men of common sense do not see Reality but a limited part of it revealed at a certain moment. Man was not created to imprison himself within the bounds of his place and time, but to take into consideration his numerous relations with the Whole Universe and with All the generations of life. Here lies True Reality, though it is regarded by many as an illusion and fancy... it is in accordance with this way of seeing that I think and write".

In this characteristic passage we find the key to many of al-‘Akkad's critical views and currents of thought. We also find in it the link between his theories of beauty. Behind the idea of the whole and wholeness lurks al-‘Akkad's theory of evolution which represents the world as a continuous enduring process of creative evolution leading to new structures and forms. To read this view in the passage is to conceive evolution as a process which aims at the creation of organic complex wholes or structures capable of answering the freedom and numerous functions of life. But before showing the link between al-‘Akkad's theories of beauty let us examine the passage.

In al-‘Akkad's opinion the philosophical process of knowledge must be synthetic, rather than analytic. It must aim at the comprehension of wholes, not of parts. For in this way alone knowledge can be vital and Reality can be apprehended. Thus to al-‘Akkad life, time and the universe form one unified whole in which individual objects and events
are merely casual appearances. This approach seems to involve two things, seeing the whole as such, and seeing individual things as parts of the whole. Things represent interrelated wholes none of which can be grasped in their parts or as sum totals of the parts, or independently of the other wholes. The wholeness of objects constitutes their very essence and functions and determines their inner characters. The importance of the parts depends on their contribution to the whole or on their possession of the properties of the whole. Indeed, the parts have no value or significance outside or independently of the whole. Therefore the parts must be seen in the whole, and the whole in the parts.

Though al-ʿAkkād's concept of the whole and wholeness is not very explicit here, the implication is that the whole is a complex unified structure, a unity-in-muliteity or a harmonious synthesis of various parts. We have already seen this idea in his criticism of Shawkī in 1921. In his essays on Shawkī the organic whole is conceived not as a sum total of the parts but as something greater than the parts and more than their sum total. The principle of the whole precedes and is the cause of the existence of the parts. Therefore, the parts cannot explain the whole. In order to understand an organic structure we must see not only the component parts but the whole to which these parts owe their existence. In an organic structure or whole the parts are subject to a specific order and particular relations determined by the whole. These
relations affect greatly the characters, structures and functions of the parts. Thus the relationship between the parts and the whole is essential to both. Each influences the other; each shapes and determines the character and function of the other. In the whole the parts amount to something greater than themselves. They are representative not of themselves but of the synthesis which is formed from them and which is more than their sum total. Therefore, to see the parts separately from each other and independently of the whole is to deprive them of their characters, functions and values - in other words, to destroy them. We shall meet this idea in many places in al-‘Akkad's writings. To him true Reality can be comprehended only as a living whole. Analysis and division mean a destruction of Truth. For Truth is something living, something organic and dynamic. The analytical way of knowledge, which treats every part alone and then moves from the parts to the whole, is dangerous and erroneous. It represents a departure from Truth, rather than a path to it.

Al-‘Akkad's rejection of the common view which represents things and events as though they were independent of each other is due to his conception of the universe as an indivisible organic whole in a continuous process of evolution, and of history as a unity. To him every natural object represents an event in the course of evolution and is interconnected with the other events or objects. In order to see its full significance and function we must treat it as a part
of a greater whole; we must see its past, present and even its future. The "commonsensical" approach which restricts every object or event to its time and place, as though all of it were there, is wrong and harmful. Time is a unified continuous process or duration, rather than separate units. The present moment is inseparable from the one which preceded it and the one which follows it.

Al-'Akkad has made this view more explicit in his study On God, which he published many years later:

"What is time? We imagine it in many forms ... We think of it as though it were a sea which increases little by little and moment after moment, and in which there is always an empty place waiting for water ... We also imagine it as a whole which identifies in itself past, present, and future. We advance in it like a traveller in a foreign land. The land has always existed, though it is unknown to the traveller. It is the same with the future, which we do not see until it comes within the range of our sight. On other occasions we imagine time as an ever-stretching line and think of hours as its innumerable points ... We also imagine it as a divisible thing, but we do not feel satisfied with our measurements of it. Yet when we divide time, we conceive it as something limited and measurable ... If time can be divided and limited, there remains eternity which cannot be divided into past, present and future or imagined with a beginning and an end ... If the future does not exist in the limited time, it must exist in the unlimited eternity. In fact, time has many dimensions in some of which past, present and future appear inseparable from each other."

Al-'Akkad goes on in his argument to claim truth only for the representation of time as a unified whole including past, present and future.

This way of seeing and thinking led al-'Akkad to treat all things and events with their infinite multiplicity and diversity as one unified experience which refers to one idea. There is nothing which stands by itself and for itself.
Everything in the universe represents a limited revelation of something unlimited. Behind the vast variety of things and events there stands one law or One Reality.

The emphasis on the unity of things, on the oneness of spirit and matter, and on the revelation of the Absolute through the limited are remarkable in al-`Akkād's writings between 1922 and 1928. There are many passages which can be quoted here. In the preface to his Readings in Books and Life, published in 1924, al-`Akkād writes:

"The universe is spirit apprehensible only through matter. The spirit constitutes the reality, and matter the instrument."

And speaking of the futility of the evidence that some would adduce from spiritualism, he adds:

"In this world I see much evidence of spirituality which makes unnecessary such simple testimony as that of spirits recalled. What is the value of a witness when the thing in question is itself before our eyes? ... I cannot hide my surprise at the view which regards the world of matter and that of spirit as two separate and contradictory worlds ... To me the world is composed of powers the nature of which are indistinguishable from that of spirit. The differences between their external and internal aspects are due to our ways of understanding and feeling."

In the essay "`Ind aṣ-Ṣaḥrā'" (Before the desert), written in 1925, he says:

"Every time I see life in a desert I imagine that greatest miracle - the emergence of life from lifeless matter - repeated before my eyes ... To spend one moment in recalling the miracle is to see the journey of life in its wholeness and completeness ... and probe that depth where life is an Absolute Whole, rather than a collection of individuals and species ... It is that life from whose fountain all beings drink deep. When the sight of a creeping insect evokes this feeling in you it heightens your existence and elevates your life by revealing the affinity between you and it."
In another essay "al-Imān al-‘Ilmī" (The Scientific Faith) he thinks that behind the diversity of natural objects and phenomena there exists One Comprehensive Whole, but, due to the limitation of our mind and the inadequacy of our senses, we fail to perceive it and stumble on the differences of things. Yet it is not altogether incomprehensible. It can be intuitively perceived. Provided we possess the required powers of intuition all the differences between things disappear and all objects melt into One Absolute Spirit.

In the twenty following years al-‘Akkād's writings contain nothing which can be treated as a development or elaboration of these views. It was not until 1947 that he published his study on God and the evolution of the Divine Idea. In this study we find a full account of his religious beliefs and views of the world. But here he abandons the belief in the oneness of existence and returns to the Islamic faith. However, the belief in the oneness of existence was superseded by the belief in the oneness of God. This was not in his view a reversal of his current of thought. To him the beliefs in the oneness of existence and in the oneness of God represent two successive stages in the intellectual and religious development of man. Man had passed from Polytheism to Henotheism and from Henotheism to Monothism. Later when he became capable of reconciling the opposites into one harmonious whole or when the many became to him an extension and expansion of the one he believed in Pantheism. The belief in the unity of God was the fruit of the next stage.
With the Islamic conception of God as the Eternal One, the First and the Last, the Seen and the Unseen, the Absolute Whole which surrounds and includes all things the religious creed of man attained perfection. Thus the history of man’s religious creed represents his progress on the path of culture and the evolution of his intellectual faculties from senses to intuition or intuitive reason.

Al-‘Akkād’s new belief in the unity of God is a belief in God as a personality "dhāt". He cannot think of God as a Whole and yet not a personality. For to him a living unity is meaningful only in a personality or as a personality. Personality is the supreme whole without which an object or being is merely a bundle of aggregates. It is the ultimate aim of evolution which is a process making for wholeness and unity. When this process reaches its culmination it emerges as a personality.

"Personality represents the highest grade in the hierarchy of beings... Progress or evolution means a transition from an object without personality into another object possessing personality and self-consciousness. A lifeless object which shows no personality represents a lower grade than that represented by another lifeless object which possesses personality and shows a certain form and attributes. In its turn this object stands lower than plants. Plants themselves vary in their degrees of progress according to their possession of personality. With evolution and growth plants become more distinguishable from each other. They move from generality into particularity. The same law is at work in animals and men. Thus when an object reaches the climax of its evolution, it becomes a personality distinguished from all other personalities. In accordance with this standard the degrees of perfection must be arranged. The Perfect Being (God) cannot be without personality, nor can He be imagined as a mind deprived of character. There is no doubt that every mind is self-conscious.
When a mind becomes self-conscious it grows into a personality." "The conception of God as a personality is not a transmitted and unconsidered attitude ... Man conceives God as a personality because a divine personality represents the highest grade of existence imagined by the mind... The philosophers who think of God as Idea do so from a well-intentioned desire to raise God above personality. But God cannot be greater than a personality by possessing no personality."

Personality means to al-‘Akkād unity, wholeness, individuality, particularity, distinctness and above all self-consciousness. It is a particular self-conscious intellect. It is also a body or form. Personality is the unity of the mind and body. Though the mind is the basic element of it the body remains an indispensable part. When al-‘Akkād conceives God as a personality or as a self-conscious mind he seems to conceive Him as a form or a body at the same time. This is why he rejects the conception of God as Idea without Form. God is a personality or a body irradiated by a mind. Personality is to al-‘Akkād a unique, novel and growing structure characterized by its self-consciousness, self-activity and unity of thought and action. It is an intimate synthesis of numerous powers or faculties. These faculties do not mean divisions or independent parts. Rather they represent personality in its many aspects and various activities. To speak of personality in the terms of consciousness, emotion, feeling, conscience, mind, imagination, intuition, memory, etc. is to mention its manifold activity. Al-‘Akkād even goes further and claims that to speak of personality as various powers is merely a convention imposed by language.
Though he thinks of God as a personality and of personality as the culmination of the process of evolution, he gives God priority over the universe and relates the process of evolution to Him. He separates God from the universe or seems to do so, but he remains faithful to the belief in the unity of spirit and matter, of mind and body. He rejects the dualism of spirit and matter as an illusion and emphasizes again and again the spirituality of the universe.

The effect of al-'Akkād's new theological stand-point appears mainly in his views of evolution. The course of evolution loses its freedom and becomes pre-determined. Every event and change in the world become actualizations of prior divine ideas. Evolution is no longer a free or self-determined process leading to new forms and structures through which the Will of life achieves its freedom. Al-'Akkād can no longer think of the process of evolution as something originated in the universe, something growing from within. It is rather related to God and imposed on the universe from without. The germ of life lies in God, rather than in the universe. However, he maintains his rejection of the mechanical interpretation of the universe and evolution. He still thinks that the mechanical laws of matter cannot explain the secrets of life. The universe remains to him a living, growing being, and evolution a process towards unity, complexity, particularity and ultimately personality. Complexity and unity are the fundamental characteristics of life and of every living being.
"Variety is the attribute of life without which life does not exist. Movement and growth are other attributes. Diversity and variety of structures are the most necessary conditions for the existence of life. When they cease to exist life disappears."

In his study on God al-‘Akkād has elaborated his theory of organic structure as a unity-in-complexity or variety, which he adumbrated in his criticism of Shawki in 1921. He now distinguishes between two kinds of structure, organic and mechanic. The organic structure is a complex synthesis of various parts or units. By virtue of their particular constitutions, structures and functions these parts and units contribute to the wholeness of the synthesis. On the other hand, the mechanic structure is composed of parts or units which resemble each other in their constitutions and forms and fulfil, therefore, the same function. For this reason the mechanic structure is simple, fixed and lifeless.

"The characteristics which the structure of a living cell possesses can be found in no other structure in the world of matter. These characteristics are the cell-powers of reproduction, variation, self-restoration and regeneration of the species. All the cells of a living body co-operate in one system. Each one fulfils its function in the right direction and at the proper moment. More astonishing is the variation of the germ-cells, their divisions and fusions out of which there grows a unified harmonious structure. Through this new structure all the functions of life are performed ... It is ridiculous to compare this wonderful system of cells, with their variation of functions, differences of sizes and unity of substance, to the system of crystals which are all alike. The system of crystals shows a mechanical repetition produced by mechanical laws, whereas the system of cells is a living coherent structure beyond the creation of mechanical laws."

In this passage, organic structure is exemplified by the system of cells, and the mechanic one by the system of crystals. The differences between the two structures or systems are due to the differences between the laws of
organism and those of lifeless matter. What distinguishes the organic structure from the mechanic one is not its unity but its complexity or unity of complexity. In an organic structure every part has its own particular constitution or structure, place, and function, so that no part can replace another or fulfil its function. It is the reverse with the mechanic structure. There are two fundamental principles or factors at work in producing an organic whole, the differentiation of the parts from each other and their submission to the whole.

All these ideas are at the basis of al-‘Akkād’s theories of beauty and poetry. In 1921 he expressed for the first time his theory of organic structure or unity-in-complexity. The theory was based on the distinction and unity between organs and functions in higher animate beings. The same principle has served as a basis for his theory of beauty. Unity-in-complexity appeared then as a unity of opposites, and the unity of spirit and matter as a unity of idea and form. The belief in evolution as a creative process leading to complex wholes or structures was also behind the theory. Beauty was confined to animate nature, to organic structures and forms, and was conceived as a manifestation of the freedom of life or as subjection of matter to spirit. The beautiful is that organic structure which, by virtue of its unity-in-complexity, answers the freedom of life or spirit. Freedom
in al-'Akkād’s theory of beauty can assert itself only on the level of the whole, the organic whole. It means order, wholeness and integration. An individual organ is beautiful not because it represents and performs a function, but because it represents and performs a function in a whole. It is beautiful not because it is free, but because it freely fits in with the law of the whole and is bound by its function which is determined by the whole. The ugly organ is not the non-free organ, but the organ which ceases to contribute to the whole or which functions according to a law alien to that of the whole. If beauty is freedom it is wholeness or unity-in-complexity at the same time. An organic structure is a unique unity of various organs and functions. Hence al-'Akkād’s view which regards every beautiful object as harmonious in itself and unique in its harmony. Thus freedom and organic unity mean much the same in al-'Akkād’s theories of beauty and poetry. A perfect organic unity means a perfect manifestation of the freedom of life. The free is that object which constitutes an organic structure or whole.

In 1921 al-'Akkād regarded organic unity as the end, and therefore the measure, of the process of evolution. He wrote:

"An object which represents a lower grade in the hierarchy of creation shows no distinction between its component parts. Thus the atoms of an inorganic object resemble each other. There are no differences between them in constitution, structure or colour. Therefore, each atom can substitute for the other and occupy its place. In plants the case is different. The leaves of a tree differ from the roots in their constitution, structure and functions. This distinction between the component parts is more apparent in higher organic beings and organizations. This law is at work in all beings and species."
In the year 1924-25 the term "freedom" was substituted for "organic unity". Now freedom is the end and the standard of evolution. It is freedom which distinguishes a higher structure from a lower one. By virtue of his freedom man transcends plants, and plants transcend inorganic objects.

It is now clear that the freedom of an animate being springs from its organic wholeness or integrity, from the unity of its various organs and functions. The beautiful organ is free only from laws and causes extraneous to the whole. It is also free in the sense that it maintains its life and identity within the whole. But its freedom is real only in its functioning within the whole and in accordance with the principle of the whole. The freedom of an object seems to mean its power of action, creation and evolution, which is due to its organic wholeness or unity. Beauty is then the manifestation of this dynamic and creative power. When an organ loses its connection with the other organs the body becomes defective; it loses its freedom, and its beauty fades away. Thus organic unity, freedom and beauty are three different terms for one meaning.

Now the link between al-'Akkād's theories of beauty seems understandable. The beautiful, being an organic creative whole, corresponds to freedom, form, idea and truth at the same time. The relation between wholeness and truth is clear in al-'Akkād's theory of knowledge. The two formulae "beauty is truth" and "truth is wholeness" are interrelated. Beauty is a living whole, and a living whole means freedom and truth.
It also means a unity of spirit and body, of idea and form.

Al-‘Akkād’s views of the world as an organic whole and as a beautiful work of art mean much the same. Therefore, the two views must be regarded as one. The world is a beautiful work of art, being an organic whole. Unity of opposites or unity-in-complexity is the divine law of creation, which every artist must adopt as his own law. Aesthetic pleasure is due to the organic unity which an object or a work of art shows. To see the parts in the whole and the whole in the parts, i.e. the many in the one and the one in the many, is to find pleasure in everything around us. The synthetic way of knowledge leads not only to truth, but to pleasure as well. In his essay, published in 1926, on Tagore’s Sadhna al-‘Akkād writes:

"In learning and memorizing the letters of the alphabet the child takes no pleasure in knowledge. Knowledge becomes pleasurable to him only when the letters, through their connection with each other, form meaningful sentences and phrases. Likewise, the isolation of images taken from life and the fragmentation of things give no pleasure to man. Man takes pleasure in things only when they appear connected with each other and form one total whole. In spite of its materialism, modern science represents a path towards the inner Reality of the universe and life. What is the aim of science when it enumerates natural events and facts? When you say that the apple falls from the tree, and the rain from the cloud and go on to mention other similar events and facts, you get nowhere. But when you pass from these phenomena to the law of gravitation, you get at their unity and integrity, at the law which implies other laws within itself. You may go on in your research until you penetrate the comprehensive unity of all things. Thus science links the outer appearances of things to one another and relates them to the inner Reality."

In another essay "al-Musīkā" (Music) (1927) he says:
"To know that music is an expression of the hidden harmony of souls and things is to find pleasure in many sounds which seem unpleasurably to the majority of people." Man's response to music is an echo of that harmony of things in the universe, ... of that accordance which unifies all the laws of existence and which is comprehensible to the musicians and mathematicians."

Thus to al-'Akkād an object or a work of art pleases by revealing in its unity and harmony the total unity and harmony of things. Man's delight in knowledge, music and other arts springs from his seeing the parts in the whole, and the whole in the parts, or from his seeing unity in variety. Music is more delightful than other arts because it is more expressive of the inner unity or harmony of things. The genuine artist is a musician or mathematician, i.e. a man whose deep insight enables him to reveal the totality and unity of all objects and events.

This idea of the artist as seer and revealer of the wholeness of things has always been a basic principle in al-'Akkād's criticism of literature and art. In the essay "Voltaire, as-Sakhir" (Voltaire, the Mocke) he charges the French writer with lacking the breadth of spirit and depth of thought, which are essential to poets, philosophers and historians. He thinks that the lack of breadth of spirit and depth of comprehension prevented Voltaire from seeing the truth and the total whole behind the isolated parts. He repeats Carlyle's charge against him:

"The glory of knowing and believing is all but a stranger to him; only with that of questioning and qualifying is he familiar. Accordingly, he sees but a little way into Nature: the mighty All, in its beauty, and infinite mysterious grandeur, humbling the
small Me into nothingness, has never even for moments been revealed to him; only this or that other atom of it, and the differences and discrepancies of these two, has he looked into and noted down. His theory of the world, his picture of man and man's life is little; for a poet and philosopher, even pitiful. Examine it in its highest developments, you find it an altogether vulgar picture; simply a reflex, with more or fewer mirrors, of self and the poor interests of self. 'The Divine Idea, that which lies at the bottom of Appearance' was never more invisible to any man. He reads History not with the eye of a devout seer, or even of a critic, but through a pair of mere anti-catholic spectacles ...

In his short study Tidhkar Goethe (The Commemoration of Goethe) al-‘Akkād criticises the German poet on the same ground.

"The fragmentation of Goethe's works is due to his nature which led him to attach all importance to the direct reality, to see life in its present moment and to take the world part by part and time hour by hour". "Goethe was never comprehensive in his thinking or thorough in his inquiry and research ... Realities were to him fragments and divisions, each of which must be studied alone and for its own sake. Were they to form a whole in the mind it must be left to them to do so."

And again:

"At the back of Goethe, the poet, thinker, scientist and philosopher lurks his artistic nature which treats things at a particular moment and each alone. It appears in his scientific studies as well as in his poems and songs..."

To al-‘Akkād Goethe is at home in Leibnitz's philosophy of the individual and isolated monads which exist, function and evolve independently of each other and which are subject to separate laws. He is at his best when he writes a short poem and portrays an isolated character, and not when he writes a play or a novel, a complicated work which treats many characters in connection with each other and reveals the unity of diverse events.
The Poem as an Organic Unity:

In 1921, as we have already seen, al-‘Akkād based his criticism of Shawkī on two interconnected principles, the organic unity of the poem and the distinction between poetic imagination and the free associations of ideas. Though the connection between the two principles was not very explicit, a close study of al-‘Akkād's views shows that the organic unity of the poem is an offspring of the power of imagination. Imagination was conceived as a living dynamic power which grasps and reveals the inner relations of things, whereas the free associations of ideas were related to the mechanical functions of sensation and memory. Because of their lack of imagination Shawkī's poems possess no organic structures.

In the seven following years al-‘Akkād's aesthetic writings were concerned largely with the problems of beauty and aesthetic education. During these years he wrote almost nothing about the organic unity of the poem and its relation to the power of imagination. Of course, the idea of organic whole and wholeness was there behind his theories of beauty. But his essays show no explicit relationship with the organic unity of the poem and make no direct reference to it. In his collection of essays Re-reading in Literature and Arts one finds two brief passages connected with the unity of the poem. They occur in the essays "al-Uslūb al- İfranjī" (The Foreign Style) and "Bayn as-Siyāsah wa al- Adab" (Between Politics and Literature), both of which were published in 1925. In the first essay al-‘Akkād writes:
"The pre-Islamic poems which we possess cannot be regarded as models to be followed. They are merely collections of separate lines set within one rhyme-scheme. In them the poet moves from one theme to another or returns to his earlier idea after he had left it without any arrangement and unified plan."

The other passage reads:

"In their (the conservatives') opinion literature at its highest level is a matter of geometrical ornamentation... It is not a living thing, which corresponds to the beauty of life and resembles animate beings in their growth... By geometrical ornamentation I mean that form which has no relation to life and which is measured by a ruler and compass or produced by a mind which in no way differs from the ruler and compass."

This second passage shows no direct relation to the unity of the poem. Yet it seems to say something about the function of imagination and poetic creation. It is a criticism of the old notion which considers the work of art as a mechanical product and judges it by mechanical standards. To al-'Akkād the poem is not a geometrical pattern but an organic structure which cannot be produced or judged according to the mechanical laws of geometry and science. It is a product of a living mind and can be judged only by the organic standards of life.

The development and elaboration of al-'Akkād's theory can be found in his writings between 1928 and 1932. In 1928 he published his essay "ash-Shi'r al-'Arabī wa ash-Shi'r al-Injilīzī", (Arabic and English Poetry), in which he studied the similarities and differences between the two poetry. The key difference to which he relates all other differences is the poverty of imagination and passion in Arabic poetry and their richness in English poetry. In Arabic poetry he finds more sensation and wit than passion and imagination and
attributes the witty remarks of the Arabic poet to his power of understanding. He also finds wit in English poetry, but he allies it to passion, rather than to understanding. The effect of this difference appears both in the imagery and structures of the Arabic and English poem.

"In his description the Arabic poet is concerned with the external, rather than internal, images of things. He compares the crescent to a sickle, the full moon to a silver shilling, and the garden to carpets and saddle pads. He does not describe the effects of these objects on his soul, but their impressions on his eye."

This results in the incoherence and disintegration of the imagery of the Arabic poem. On the contrary, the English poet describes the internal images of things, i.e. their emotional associations and their effects on his soul. Therefore, the imagery of his poem shows coherence and integration. Of the structures of the Arabic and English poems Al-'Akkād writes:

"The lack of integration of the Arabic poem and the unity of the English one is related to the same difference. While the lines of the English poem revolve around one unified subject, the unity of the line has formed the basis of the Arabic poem. The lines of the Arabic poem represent separate leaps, and the lines of the English one are interconnected waves of one flowing stream. This is because the fusion of the ideas of the English poem depends on imagination and passion, rather than on sensation. When man learns how to imagine, feel, and experience sympathy with things, he learns how to grasp ample ideas and many-sided feelings. Therefore, his idea cannot be expressed in a single line or set forth in a few words. On the contrary, the man who knows only the impressions of the outer senses is confined to the apprehension of fragments. If he is a poet he is then satisfied with the unity of the line."

Al-'Akkād goes on in his argument:

"The passions which Arabic poetry exhibits are simple and homogenous. They lack variation and complexity. You rarely find in it varied, complex and many-sided feelings which originate from the complexity of culture, variation of social relations and duties, and breadth of
knowledge concerning the human soul in its different moods and stages of development. Human life which the English poet portrays covers all the ranks, relations and duties of social life, and the morals, beliefs and cultural trends of the classes and individuals... To the Arabic poet the relations of human life are limited, and the secrets of the soul are unknown. The simplicity of passions constitutes his chief characteristic. He does not know complex passions which originate in the complexity of human relations in civilized societies."

Here al-‘Akkād is very explicit about the relation of the organic unity of the poem to the power of imagination. Imagination is a vital faculty which harmonizes and reconciles the elements of the complex poetic experience into a total aesthetic structure. The distinction which al-‘Akkād made in 1917 between reason or intuitive reason and understanding stands behind his new distinction between the poetry of passion and that of wit. But here reason is replaced by imagination. Imagination is still allied to sympathy and passion, and understanding to sensation and sense-impressions which follow no order and show no unity.

In the paragraph we find two images or analogies neither of which is organic. They are the analogies of the poem with the separate leaps and with the interconnected waves of a flowing stream. They recall the two other analogies which al-‘Akkād made in his criticism of Shawkī in 1921, the separate flashes of lightning and the rays of the fixed star which form a unified and continuous process. The other analogy of the poem with the tree does not come in here. However, the image of the interconnected waves of the flowing stream is associated in al-‘Akkād's mind with organic objects
and animate nature, while the image of the separate leaps seems to refer to the inorganic structure and lifeless matter.

Behind the organic structure of the poem there stand two factors, a living complex experience and a vital power of imagination. The Arabic poem lacks not only imagination but also a complex or manifold experience. Al-‘Akkād charges the Arabic poet both with the inability to produce a unified poem and with a lack of deep feeling and wide knowledge.

Al-‘Akkād's discussion of Ibn ar-Rūmī's poetry sheds more light on the relation of the unity of the poem to imagination. In his study Ibn ar-Rūmī: His Life from his Poetry and under the sub-title "Personification and Description" he writes:

"Personification is a creative faculty which receives its power from the breadth and acuteness of feeling..., rather than a verbal device imposed by the necessities of expression or suggested by the associations and succession of ideas... The poet who sees a setting sun may describe it as a beautiful departing woman and imagine it next as a woman in love and invent a love-story about it. This is because the sun is feminine in Arabic and because the ancient poets used to compare it to a beautiful woman. It is a story which has its origin in accidental verbal associations, rather than in feeling. However, the thing which cannot be invented by the accidental associations of ideas, words and similes is (Ibn ar-Rūmī's) profound feeling of the desolation which represents the sun as someone in perplexity, humiliation and disappointment as though it were a sick person surrounded by (sympathetic) visitors. These visitors are the dewy blossoms which are depicted as humble eyes bathed in tears and sharing with the sun its painful silence. Thus personification must be preceded by a feeling which gives it colour and life."

In this passage al-‘Akkād is not merely discussing poetic imagery. The object of the discussion is the unity of poetic experience as manifested in the imagery of the poem.
In his view the unity of the poem can be seen in its imagery or in the integrity of the poetic vision which it embodies. He distinguishes between two kinds of imagery, the one mechanical and the other organic. The former is based on the free associations of ideas and memories, whereas the latter has its origin in the poet's living sympathetic imagination and broad subtle feelings. In a poem which possesses an organic structure no image stands by itself and for itself, and no image can be fully grasped alone. The function of the image is not to attract attention to itself, but to contribute to the comprehension of the poem as a total living whole. It does so by its correspondences and relationships with the other images or other parts of the poem. On the other hand, diffusive imagery reflects the disintegration of the poem and indicates a want of imagination. In this diffusive imagery every image represents a whole of itself and impresses with its own individuality.

Since the passage is concerned with the poetry of Ibn ar-Rūmī it must be read together with the other passages which deal with the art of the same poet. Al-‘Akīkād praises Ibn ar-Rūmī for the wholeness of his single poems and of his entire output even as he has praised him for the power of his imagination. He says:

"The prominent attributes of Ibn ar-Rūmī's poems are their length, elaboration and thorough expression of ideas which resulted in his freedom from the tradition of the ancient verse-makers who made the unity of the line the basis of their poems".

Therefore, each of his poems represents "a total unified whole"
or "an integral object which does not finish until the poem comes to its end and reveals all its folds." Yet al-ʿAkkād does not conceive Ibn ar-Rūmī's poems as organic wholes. They represent to him a degree in the development of the mechanic disintegrated structure of the ancient Arabic poem towards an organic whole. The unity which a poem by Ibn ar-Rūmī contains does not represent an organic spontaneous growth but a deliberate coherence of ideas and feelings brought together according to the law of association. Al-ʿAkkād regards Ibn ar-Rūmī's imagination as associative and attributes it to his abnormal structure of mind and intensity of feeling. He says that Ibn ar-Rūmī's power of association of ideas is noticeable in his whole work. It can be seen in every poem he wrote and in every theme he treated. When an idea occurred to him it was usually followed by a group of other ideas prompted by it. He does not finish a poem unless he has exhausted all the associations and suggestions of his ideas and found himself forced to do so. Thus al-ʿAkkād thinks of Ibn ar-Rūmī's poems as a product of associative imagination and consciousness. Consciousness was, he says, the power responsible for the whole poetry produced by the age of Ibn ar-Rūmī. The poets used to write and organize their poems in a state of full awareness. Though the reader finds some organization in these poems, he also finds many defects in them.

In his study The Commemoration of Goethe,(1932) al-ʿAkkād criticises Faust and Wilhelm Meisters on the ground that they lack organization and unity. He writes that a literary work
by Goethe is often composed of separate pieces written at different times and set together without harmony.

"Were this work a play the reader would find well-drawn characters, but no successive events and no harmonious acts."

Of Faust he says:

"There are many interruptions in the play. Its disintegration is evident, and its parts are constructed with little success. Though it mirrors a wide life and contains many manifestations of art, knowledge and deep thought, its reader does not connect them with a human character congenial to him and capable of evoking his sympathy and passion. They are scattered here and there like jewels in a vast desert waiting for the reader to pick them up. The first part of the play shows more harmony and better organization than the second. Yet on close examination you find in it complete scenes which have no relation to the core of the play. It even begins with an irrelevant conversation between a poet, a theatre director and a friend. An odd example of Goethe's carelessness can be seen in the satirical lines which he wrote against his critics, but due to his failure to get them published in a journal, he inserted them into this part without any introduction or explanation.

In addition to its obscurity, the second part suffers from complete disorder. It is odd enough to know that the whole part is based on a poem which Goethe wrote before the appearance of the first part and published in 1827 as an independent work. As he was aware of its incoherence he called it Classic-Romantic Phantasmagoria. It is this poem which has formed the centre of the second part of the play."

Al-‘Akkād ascribes the formlessness and disintegration of Faust and other works of Goethe not to a lack of imagination and feeling, but to a personal nature which shrinks from the whole and turns to the parts, and which divides things in order to be at ease with them. It is an indifferent nature which lacks sympathy with others and at times is not above distorting of truth.
(c) Organic Unity and Personality,

The Unity of the Poet with his Works.

Al-'Akkād's criticism of Shawkī after 1921 marks a shift of emphasis from organic unity to personality. In the four essays which he wrote on Shawkī and which were published in his study Egyptian Poets and Their Milieus (1937) he criticises Shawkī on the ground that his poems, whether read singly or together, reveal no particular personality or individuality. This does not mean a change in al-'Akkād's criticism as some critics and readers might think. It rather indicates the development of his conception of organic structure or whole. We have already seen that he does not distinguish between organic whole and personality. The two mean one thing to him. When the process of evolution reaches its culmination, it emerges as an organic whole, as a personality, and as freedom.

The development of al-'Akkād's conception of organic structure belongs to the years in which he was formulating his theory or theories of beauty. But it was not until 1927, the year which saw the beginning of his interest in the art of biography, that he gave his new conception a theoretical ground. In the essay "an-Nakd" (Criticism), published in this year, he writes:

"Criticism means discrimination, and discrimination demands a particular attribute. Nature itself teaches us the laws of criticism and discrimination when it ignores commonplace features and maintains every distinctive characteristic which appears in the species. When we examine the nature of woman and that of the artist - the two creative natures in the worlds of bodies and ideas - we find the same law at work. Both of them aim at one end, namely, the selection and eternalization of the distinctive characteristics and
the neglect of the common ones ... Creative criticism is that which follows the locus of nature or which searches for the distinctive models in order to bring them into light. It is that kind of criticism which presents us with the novel personalities which appear in life."

He goes on in his argument to say:

"Find the personality first and you will be sure that you have found the writer who is worthy of your criticism ... He may be a poet whose poems show no splendid line, no attractive idea and no elegant style. Yet when you read his poems as a whole you find a personality which represents a particular and novel model of life. It is this kind of poetry which must be read and retained. Had it appeared in the world of bodies it would have attracted the attention of nature and would have been revealed as something specific and eternal."

Al-‘Akkād’s views of evolution which he first expressed in his criticism of Shawālī in 1921 seem to be at the back of this passage. Unity and variety which were regarded as the two fundamental laws of nature are expressed here in other forms. Nature aims at "maintaining the particular, eternalizing the distinctive models and diversifying their characteristics." It searches for the particular and distinctive to make them specific and general, that is to say, it seeks unity and variation. It searches for a distinctive personality or a novel organic whole.

The idea of the whole and wholeness also appears in the demand that the reader must treat the poet's works as an integral whole and as a total revelation of his personality. The reader must not look in the poem for a single splendid line or a single attractive idea, for in doing so he destroys the poet's works and neglects his personality which stands behind these works as a unified total whole. He must seek a
particular personality which widens and deepens his sensibility and understanding of life.

The poetry of personality means in al-‘Akkād's writings the poetry of genuine experience, of nature as opposed to art. It is an expression of the poet's personality or soul in its relations with nature and with other souls. We have already seen that the organic unity of the poem is a reflection of the living unified complex experience of the poet. The relation between the organic unity of the poem and the poet's personality and experience is explicit in the following words which occur in al-‘Akkād's essay on Mīkha‘īl Naʿīmāh's Mārdād:

"Every experience is, like the soul, a total indivisible whole. Division means destruction to it. For to divide an organic structure is to deprive it of life and to destroy its parts."

In al-‘Akkād's criticism of al-Bakrī's poetry we also find the relation of the unity of the poem to the integration of the poet's personality.

"The conflict between the old and the modern trends of poetry is very strong in him (al-Bakrī). To read a poem by him is to find two personalities in the same work. His modern spirit has led him sometimes to write blank verse. But he wrote blank verse in order to express his longing for the places which the ancient poets have described. This is what he has done in his poem 'Dhāt al-Wālī'. This characteristic is more evident in his other poem "Miṣr" (Egypt) which appears as though it has been written by two poets, the one overwhelmed by his feeling and the other by his tendency towards the imitation of ancient poets. The two works could not have coalesced or remained hidden within the folds of the poem. They have remained separate so that you can see where the one ends and where the other begins."

In these words the lack of integration of al-Bakrī's poems is attributed to the lack of integration of his personality. It
is a lack of integration between the form and the content of the poem on the one hand, and the various parts of the content on the other. To al-‘Akkād a true poem or a work of art cannot be produced by two poets or artists. For a true poem is an organic indivisible unit which reflects the living unity of the poet's mind and bears the characteristics of his particular personality.

The demand for a distinctive personality or for the unity of the poet and his works has found its best expression in al-‘Akkād's series of essays "Poetry in Egypt", his study on Ibn ar-Rūmī and his essays on Shawkī. In the third essay of the series "Poetry in Egypt" he writes:

"Why do we not find in the works of Egyptian poets a broad conception of the universe and a comprehensive feeling of its many-sided beauty and the secrets of life? Why do we not find among the Egyptian poets living manifestations of feeling, thinking and expression which we find in European literature? Why do we not find among them the peers of Wordsworth, the self-denying ascetic and lover of nature? Of Coleridge, the mystic and stoic philosopher? Of Byron, the discontented sensualist? Of Shelley, the ambitious singer? Of Heine, sternly mocking and sadly laughing? Of Schiller, the reluctant savant? Of Goethe, calmly arrogant? Of Dante, ardent and dismayed? Of Leopardi, sad and gentle-hearted? Why do we not find among them the poet who is in love with the sea, or the poet who is attracted by birds, or the poet who is charmed by the sky? Find these poets and you will feel the breadth, height and depth of life. Why are the Egyptian poets all alike as though they were one character?"

At its root al-‘Akkād's demand for the unity of the poet with his work is an attempt to relate poetry to life and nature. It is also a demand for originality against imitation. If Egyptian poetry lacks life and naturalness, it first lacks a variety of personalities and experiences.
To al-ʿAkkād no man can be a distinguished poet without being a distinctive personality. His value as a poet depends on his ability to express a particular personality in his work and to establish, thereby, a close contact with his readers. This demand al-ʿAkkād has theorized in the preface to his study on Ibn ar-Rūmī. He says:

"There is one characteristic without which no man can be a poet. It may be called the artistic nature ... or the nature which makes the art of the poet a part of his life ... At its perfection it means that the poet's life and art are one indivisible thing ... or that the poet's collected poems represents a biography of his soul."

In this extreme statement al-ʿAkkād conceives poetry as self-expression and the poet's works as a biography of his life. At first sight this view seems to narrow the domain of the poet and to take into consideration only lyrical poetry. Therefore, it has always been an object of criticism. But al-ʿAkkād who thinks of Shakespeare as the supreme poet and ranks Sophocles, Homer, Milton, Dante and Goethe higher than all other poets cannot mean that poetry is self-expression merely in the sense of a direct and immediate exteriorization of personal sentiment. This is clear from some of his judgements on these poets. In connection with Shakespeare, for example, he writes:

"There is no genuine poet in any of the languages of the world who cannot be known from his poems or from his description of others. Shakespeare, who comes at the head of all poets, can be fully known from the character of his plays and from his sonnets ... The reader who fails to know Shakespeare the man after he has read his plays, which portray many characters, men and women, old and young, noble and base, cannot himself be a man ... 'The poet has portrayed his personal life in his writings. We can find him everywhere in these writings if we know how to read and understand them.'"
In the essay "Shakespeare and Hamlet" (1927) he also writes:

"In the character of Hamlet there are many indications of Shakespeare. In fact, Shakespeare has expressed much more of himself through Hamlet than through his other characters. The complaints of Hamlet are Shakespeare's. They represent Shakespeare who was dissatisfied with life and with people. There is much of Shakespeare, the weary poet and actor, in Hamlet's soliloquies, which could have been spoken by Shakespeare ... Hamlet's soliloquy at the beginning of the third act fits Shakespeare somewhat better than a desperate crown-prince. The noble prince might have felt bored with his contempted love, the conceit of the stupid, the pride of higher officials, and the scorn of the incapable for the capable, but you cannot mistake here the voice of Shakespeare, despairing of life and thinking of death. Needless to say, it was Shakespeare who made the young prince interpret and justify his boredom of life in this way. It was Shakespeare who suffered from the contempt of love, the pride of higher officials, and the scorn of fools. It was Shakespeare who used to think in this way and who put this soliloquy on the tongue of his grieved prince."

Referring to the political function of poetry he writes about Milton's *Paradise Lost*:

"Milton, the great English poet who appeared among the troubles of the English revolution and who was a follower of Cromwell, the leader of the revolution, wrote no poem concerning the revolution during the years in which he was busy with politics and social reform ... This does not mean that the revolution had produced no effect on him as a poet. In his famous poem *Paradise Lost* the argument of Satan and his followers in hell is a psychological survival of these years of political fighting ... You can say the same about Dante, Manzoni and Marducci, who lived at times of political troubles and revolutions. The inspiration which they received from these political troubles has appeared in the form of imaginative works which represent some kind of imaginative rebellion and express particular states of mind."

In these passages we find an explanation of al-'Akkād's view of poetry as self-expression and as a revelation of the poet's personality. The poem is not direct self-expression, but an imaginative or artistic expression of the poet's experience.
and personality. It is a personal experience modified and expressed sometimes in an impersonal form. The poet feels things around him, but expresses his feelings and thoughts in the form of a play, an epic or a narrative poem which might seem to bear no relation to his life and age. At bottom it remains an expression of his personality and life.

When al-'Akkād deals with Shawkī's plays he attributes the failure of Shawkī as a dramatic poet to his lack of imagination and feeling, and his lack of imagination and feeling to his lack of personality. He says:

"The characters of Shawkī's plays are indistinguishable from each other ... All of them, except those made important by history or love, ... are failures. This is because Shawkī did not possess the powers of imagination and feeling which would have made it possible to create dramatic characters."

He goes on to write:

"The lack of characters which marks Shawkī's plays, elegies and panegyrics is due to his lack of personality. As he had no distinctive feeling, so he was unable to understand the distinctions and differences in the feelings of others."

Al-'Akkād seems to think of imagination as the central and supreme faculty of personality as a whole and reveals in turn the particularity, unity and growth of personality. Shawkī's lack of personality is equated with a lack of imagination and feeling. When al-'Akkād says that the characters of Shawkī's plays are indistinguishable from each other he means that Shawkī, due to his lack of imagination, was unable to see every character as a distinctive unity or whole.
Let us follow here his whole argument against Shawkî.

"In Shawkî the poetry of art has reached its highest pinnacle, while the poetry of personality has fallen to its lowest level where no man is distinguished from another ... You seek in vain in his whole work a particular man called "Shawkî" who differs from the members of his class and generation . . .

Both life and art search for the new individual. They require particularity and distinction to substantiate, universalize and, then, use as a path towards other particularities and distinctions ... The poet whose works do not reflect his personality is not a poet marked out by nature. It is not necessary to us to know the birthday, origin, education and life-events of the poet ... but it is necessary to know his personality and the world he lived in. It is necessary to know how he used to see, feel and imagine things around him ...

Shawkî's poetry of nature shows no interest in any particular object of the world. To him the forest is not preferable to the river or the star to the flower. Nor is the feeling of tranquillity and peaceful meditation preferred to that of agitation and violence..."

Al-'Akkād's argument contains a group of ideas which gather around one central point. The poet of a particular personality means a poet who has a particular and integral world. As Shawkî's poems, taken as a whole, reveal no distinctive or integral world they remain fragments and disintegrated pieces. They show no unity because they reveal no particular personality.

(d) Major and Minor Poets,

The Works of the Poet as a Whole.

We have seen that al-'Akkād's demand that the poet express a particular or distinctive personality implies another demand made of the reader, namely, that he should treat the poet's works as a whole and appreciate them in their totality and integrity. By reading the whole works of the
poet we come to know his personality as a whole, and by
knowing the poet's personality as a whole we can see the full
significance of each of his works and appreciate them as a
total revelation of his personality. At the bottom of the
demand lies the idea that the whole is more than the parts
and that the knowledge of the mutual relations and influences
between the parts and the whole is necessary for the under-
standing of the parts. The demand is twofold. Every
individual work of the poet must be treated as an indivisible
whole in itself and as an inseparable part of a greater whole
formed from all the works of the poet.

The idea of the whole and the parts has served as a basis
for al-'Akkād's distinction between major and minor poets.
He has first made this distinction in his two essays
"Shukrat al-Mutanabbi-Ḥadd ash-Shā'ir al-'Azīm" (The Reputation
of al-Mutanabbi - The Definition of the Great Poet) and
"Falsafat al-Mutanabbi" (The Philosophy of al-Mutanabbi),
published in 1923. In the first essay he describes the minor
part as

"the one who excites our feeling and admiration as
either a love-poet or a descriptive poet, or an elegiac
and mournful poet. His works give one kind of
pleasure and within the limitation of one subject.
In them the soul finds the satisfaction of one of its
needs ... The minor poet is like a single-stringed
instrument which echoes one of the voices of life,
rather than its great symphony which is composed of
numerous voices and varied tones."

In these words al-'Akkād conceives the minor poet as a man
of one-sided personality. His works display one phase of
life and echo one tone of the soul. He has no eye or ear
for the other phases and tones. He speaks on one plane and addresses one faculty of the soul, rather than the soul as a whole. The analogy of the minor poet with a single-stringed instrument shows that it is the principle of the part, not the whole, which characterizes his works or that the principle of unity in complexity or variety is alien to him.

Of the great or major poet al-"Akkād says:

"To me the great poet is the one whose works, taken as a whole, reflect a complete picture of nature ... and exhibit a particular philosophy or doctrine of life ... The soul of the great poet is like an observatory which gathers all the lights of the sky, however distant and dark their spheres. It is a soul of genuine and acute feeling, aware of all the objects of sense and imagination in the world around it ... When the great poet writes about nature he shows you the first creation expressed in a word and the whole universe turned into a rhythm. In his poems you hear the deep pulses, the loud strains, the overheard thoughts, the hidden doubts, the secret prayers and spells, the many pleasant voices of the world ... He transforms into his hieroglyphic language all the words and symbols which the book of nature contains and all the letters and names which its tongue utters ... When he turns his face to life, to the passions, motivations, relations and differences of men he echoes all the tones of the soul, the tones of its yearning and depression, of its goodness and evil, of its sorrows and joys, of its hopes and dreams. He also renders its mysterious symbols and allegories into delightful and intelligible language and expresses its separate thoughts, fears and feelings in integral and sensible forms in which you find life represented as a whole after it was divided into parts."

There are two things which characterize the major poet and distinguish him from the minor one. Firstly, his works show a total image or a comprehensive vision of nature and man. Secondly, they contain a particular philosophy or doctrine of life. The major poet is a man of a rounded or many-sided personality. He sees things in their wholeness and integration and portrays the whole, not the part. Thus he enables us
to see the world as a whole, rather than as fragments. Whereas the minor poet satisfies one need or appeals to one faculty of the soul, the major poet, to use Coleridge’s words, “brings the whole soul of man into activity, with the subordination of its faculties to each other.” All this means that the principle of unity in variety has its full meaning in the works of the major poet.

Al-‘Akkād’s description of the minor and major poets imply that the reader of the former need not go through the whole body of his works, whereas the works of the latter require to be wholly read. In the works of the minor poet the part indicates the whole, and the whole is a collection of similar parts, rather than a synthesis of various ones. This means that the mutual relations and influences between the parts and the whole do not exist in the works of the minor poet. But as regards the works of the major one they form a unity and integrity. By reading them as an integral whole we can see the full significance of every individual work of them.

These views have been made explicit in the following passage which occurs in al-‘Akkād’s pamphlet on Goethe:

"Some writers can be wholly known by one of their works or poems. In this single work or poem the writer attains the climax of his art and reveals the best or the whole of himself. Therefore, we need not go through his other works, for we shall find nothing in them but a repetition of the earlier experience. Other writers reveal only a part of their genius in every piece they write. No part of their works indicates the totality of them. Thus it is indispensable for the reader who wants to penetrate and comprehend these works to read them again and again and to judge them as a whole. For with every reading he will get
something new from them. Goethe was one of these genial writers the whole of whose work cannot be known by a part of it. None of his works represents a total revelation of him, and none of his subjects indicates the other subjects. Likewise, no part of any of his work reveals the whole work. As the aspects of his genius were numerous, any one of his ideas is but a small part of his whole thought as the single day of his eighty years remains a small part of his whole life.

Elsewhere after repeating the same views al-'Akkād writes:

"The difference between major and minor writers is due to their nature and to the subject of their writings. Because of their intellectual and spiritual greatness the major writers cannot confine themselves to one aspect of life which absorbs their energies and which they repeat again and again. Therefore, the reader of their works cannot expect the same idea expressed in different forms ... As regards the subjects of their writings they are vital subjects which possess all the characteristics of life."

Al-‘Akkād's conception of the major poet as a man of a particular and comprehensive philosophy of life means that the major poet is distinguished by the unity of his emotional and intellectual faculties as well as by the roundedness of his personality. In the essay "The Philosophy of al-Mutanabbi" we read:

"It is a misconception to think of philosophy as a pure product of reason which has nothing to do with imagination and passion, and of poetry as a product of imagination and passion detached from reason ... In fact, reason, imagination and passion are all necessary, though in varying degrees, to philosophy and poetry. The genuine philosopher is, like the genuine poet, in need of imagination and passion, but not as much as he is of reason. Likewise, the genuine poet shares with the genuine philosopher his need of reason, but to a lower degree. We know no true philosopher who was deprived of poetic nature and no great poet who was alien to philosophical thinking. Can reason cease to function in the soul of such a man as the great poet, who is characterized by a great heart, vivid thought and living intense feeling?... Shakespeare is a philosopher even in his sonnets. Goethe, Schiller and Heine, the great German poets, were philosophers in
their lives, talents and works. The poems of Byron, Wordsworth and Swinburn are rich in thought. The same principle characterizes Dante's works ... Nay, every great poet in every language is a philosopher."

Al-‘Akkād goes on to say that the Arabic major poets such as Abū Nuwas, Ibn ar-Rūmī, Abū Tammām, al-Mutanabbi, al-Ma‘arrī and ash-Sharīf have surpassed the others because they possessed broader and more rounded personalities and combined in themselves the talents of the poet and the philosopher or the capacities of feeling and meditation. He conceived major poetry as a product of the soul as a whole, i.e., of reason, imagination and passion working in close and intimate relations. In other words the major poem is the one which reflects the unity of human faculties and addresses the soul as a whole.

Al-‘Akkād does not mean, of course, that the great poet must be a metaphysician or a philosopher in the restricted sense. He distinguishes between the work of the philosopher and that of the poet. Philosophy is concerned with abstract ideas, and poetry with concrete or visionary incarnation of ideas. Therefore, philosophy and poetry represent different intellectual activities. The poet cannot replace the philosopher, nor can the philosopher replace the poet. The philosophical poet is not half a philosopher and half a poet in one person, but a mind different from that of the philosopher and of the minor poet. In his study on Ibn ar-Rūmī (Chap. VI) al-‘Akkād has explained what he means by the philosophy of the poet.

"Every major poet has a philosophy or a particular understanding of life which distinguishes him from the
minor one ... A major poet must have a particular understanding of the world as a whole and must express this understanding in a particular form of his own. This is what I mean by the philosophy of the poet, and not philosophy in its general sense."

4. Imagination.

(a) Imagination and Knowledge.

In the twenty years from 1922 to 1942, which form the second stage of al-ʿAkkād's intellectual and spiritual life, his aesthetic writings were concerned largely with beauty and freedom, the aesthetic education of man, organic unity and personality, and the oneness of spirit and matter. As we have seen in the last two sections, imagination plays a prominent role in all these theories: aesthetic education is an education of imagination and feeling; imagination is the power which grasps the unity of things, identifies man with nature, imbues things with beauty and life, and makes the work of the poet an organic whole; imagination is at the centre of personality, and is its supreme power; the unity of beauty and truth is a unity of beauty and imagination.

What is imagination? What is its relationship with the mind? What is its part in the knowledge and art of man? In order to answer these questions, we must first know al-ʿAkkād's theory of knowledge which he expressed while formulating and developing his theories of beauty and organic unity between 1922 and 1932.

In his theory of knowledge al-ʿAkkād is an emotionalist,
a subjective idealist, rather than a rationalist. He is very sceptical about the power of reason to apprehend Reality. In his view belief is not the product of reason, but of emotion. Reason is not the sole faculty of man, nor is it the highest of his faculties. Knowledge is not a sensational or rational activity, but an activity performed by personality as a total living being of which reason is a part. Subject and object stand in mutual relationship. They do not exist in isolation or independently of each other. The perceptible world and the perceiving self represent a unity. This coalescence of subject and object or the identification of man with nature is the sole ground for reality and the true approach to it.

These ideas are at the very root of al-‘Akkād’s theory. But it is difficult to present this theory in a systematic way, for al-‘Akkād himself was not systematic in expressing it. The elements of the theory are scattered in different essays and passages written during the years 1924-1928. The main essays are "Tasawwuf al-Khayyām" (The Mysticism of al-Khayyām), "Intikām Tūt’ankhāmūn" (Tutankhamen’s Revenge), "al-Ma‘rifah" (Knowledge), "Kīssat al-‘Akl wa al-‘Ātifah" (The Story of Reason and Passion) and "Kīssat al-‘Akl wa al-‘Ātifah Aydan" (The Story of Reason and Passion again).

The essay "The Mysticism of al-Khayyām" gives us a starting point in al-‘Akkād’s theory. Here al-‘Akkād distinguishes between two kinds of reality, the one is objective or external "Khārijiyyah" and the other subjective or internal
"Batiniyyah". The world of the objective or external realities constitutes the domain of senses and reason, while the world of the subjective or internal realities forms the range of intuition, imagination and inner sense, which are possessed to a higher degree by the musician, the poet, the mathematician, and the mystic. The distinction between the external and internal reality is one between existence and essence, image and idea, body and spirit. In its essence the world is a system of ideas, and in its existence or appearance a system of images. In the essay "Forms and Ideas", as we have already seen, al-‘Akkād uses the terms "idea" and "image" as corresponding to "function" and "organ". He regards the image as the physical manifestation of the idea. It is the idea in its externalization, the spirit in its materialization. Though he gives priority to the idea over the image, or to the function over the organ, and thinks of the former as the cause of the existence of the latter, he does not separate the two. The idea and the image are at once separated from and identified with each other. In other words, every object is an idea and image at the same time. When the idea changes the image changes. The reverse is also true.

In the essay "Knowledge" al-‘Akkād distinguishes between "living" and "knowing" and thinks of the latter as implied in the former.

"Existing (living) is other than knowing. It is not necessary for man to know the nature of existence. Knowledge is not itself existence or life, nor is the lack of knowledge non-existence or death. Man's first
concern is not to acquire knowledge of the secrets of the universe, but to be a living part of it and to maintain his relationship with it; a relationship which is neither purely rational nor purely emotional, and which will continue even should man lose his sensational and rational affinities with the universe."

By the term "knowing" or "knowledge" al-'Akkād means the rational knowledge which is restricted to the world as images, and by the term "living" he means feeling or consciousness which constitutes, in his view, the essence of the world. Man can know the world only by regarding it as an extension of himself or by regarding himself as an inseparable part of it.

"It suffices that he be a living part of the world having his roots in its essence, and that his relationships with it be multilateral. To achieve this is to gain true knowledge."

These words express al-'Akkād's belief in the unity of subject and object. Man and the world are correlates. They exist in relations to each other and under the influence of each other. Therefore, they can be understood only as a unity. In his preface to Readings in Books and Life al-'Akkād also writes:

"To see the world from a scientific or philosophical point of view is to detach yourself from it and to understand it from without. But you cannot see the world rightly while you detach yourself from it. You can see the reality of the world only by regarding yourself as a part of it, that is, affected by it and in turn affecting it ... You can grasp the reality of the world only by seeing it as a living being which responds to you as you respond to it ..."

In all this al-'Akkād conceives knowledge as a living process related to a living self, rather than a relationship between "a knowing mind" and "an existing object". The world is, like the self, a living process, an organic flux
or energy, rather than a static matter which can be grasped by senses and reason. Reason can operate only upon sense-impressions and derive some notions from them which though they widen the range of the senses do not go beyond it.

Al-‘Akkād's three distinctions between existence and essence, image and idea, and knowing and living are basically one. They are distinctions between outer and inner sense, reason and imagination, understanding and intuition, i.e. the faculties which correspond to them. Imagination, being the intuitive mind, is the faculty which enables man both to live and to know, or the faculty which provides the self with its motivations and deals with the world as ideas, emotions and desires. Man's identification with nature is a role performed by imagination. To see the world from "the artistic point of view" is to treat it imaginatively.

Al-‘Akkād seems to distinguish between two kinds of ideas, the ideas of the mind, and the ideas of imagination. The former are reflections of sense-impressions or images of sensation, while the latter are spiritual or psychological visions. Imagination is, in al-‘Akkād's writings, a suprasensible or spiritual power which deals with the suprasensible range of things, with things-in-themselves. It is a creative intuitive faculty which contrasts with sensation. Since the world is in a permanent process of creation and changing, reality is subject to imagination, rather than to reason. For imagination alone can deal with the flowing and growing. On the contrary, reason is a power confined to the fixed and static.
Al-‘Akkād thinks of philosophy as the science of being, and of self-knowledge as the basis of it. If man is to know the world, he must first know himself and see in himself the fundamentals of creation which constitute the essence of the world.

"Man is an integral part of the universe in its inner and outer identity. In him are to be found the fundamentals of creation which are at the same time the essence of the universe. As a result he is made able to comprehend realities beyond the scope of the senses. This ability, which is not possessed by all men to the same degree, is called by metaphysicians the science of being or "ontology", i.e. the science of self-knowledge."

The faculty which is responsible for self-knowledge is the inner sense. In al-‘Akkād’s writings the inner sense appears to be an intuitive emotional power, the source of mystic experience and knowledge. It also seems to be allied to introspection and imagination, which appear in turn to be interconnected. By the inner sense we are aware of our feelings and states of mind caused by things.

In order to understand al-‘Akkād’s exact notion of the inner sense and its relationship with imagination, we must go to his preface to Shukrī’s Pearls of Thoughts, which he wrote in 1913 and in which, for the first time, he used the term "the inner sense".

"If the Aryans possess great imagination, it is due to the fact that their geographical environment is one of difficult terrain whose landscape is vast and awe-inspiring and in which wild animals roam. This has contributed to the widening of their imaginative faculties. It explains the great importance they attribute to the powers of nature. It is well-known that the feeling of fear stimulates extensive flights of imagination and embodies fancies of the mind which lead to vivid imaginings and strengthen man’s tendency to identify himself with natural objects. On the
other hand, the Semites possess little imagination and much sensation, for their flat geographical surroundings do not contribute to the feelings of awe and fear. Consequently, the Aryans are better able to describe in their poetry the inner feelings of the soul, whereas the Semites are better able to describe the appearances of things.

This difference between the poetic talents of the Aryans and the Semites is a difference between inner and outer senses. The Semite compares his beloved to the moon, whereas the Aryan ascribes to the moon life and imagines it as a living being who knows the emotions of love, jealousy and revenge. In so doing, the Aryan widens the realm of poetry and man's sympathy with nature and natural objects... This difference between the Aryan's and Semite's way of seeing explains the richness of mythology in Aryan literature and the scantiness of it in the Semitic."

Here al-'Akkād is quite explicit about the connection between the inner sense, introspection and imagination. The inner sense and imagination are intimate and close faculties which correspond to each other. The inner sense seems to be the source of self-awareness, and imagination the source of sympathy. A year later al-'Akkād also wrote:

"If a nation understands the realities of the world both by its outer and inner sense, it will produce a true literature, this being an indication of its whole life, just as the blossoming flower on a tree is a sign of its total growth."

This means that true literature is a living product which results from the co-operation of the inner and outer senses. In other words, it is a revelation of the unity of subject and object, of man and nature. By the outer sense man is made aware of the external world, and of his awareness by the inner sense. This explains al-'Akkād's following words, which he wrote in the same year:
"The mind cannot be considered as the sole faculty of knowledge. To think that man's relationships with the world are limited to the senses and reason is to deny that imagination is, like the senses and reason, a part of him."

Man can be a living part of the outer and inner world only through the co-operation of his senses and imagination.

(b) Imagination and Literature.

Al-'Akkād's main statements concerning imagination are made in connection with al-Maʾarī's Risālat al-Ghufrān, the 1001 Nights, and Shawkī's and Ibn ar-Rūmī's poetry. They occur in the following essays and works: "al-Khayāl fī Risālat al-Ghufran" (Imagination in Risālat al-Ghufrān), 1923, "Mithāl min at-Taṣwīr 'Ind Ibn ar-Rūmī" (An Example of Description in Ibn ar-Rūmī), 1925, ʿAbd al-Majīd al-Mīzān, (ʿAbdul Majīd Examined), 1931, Ibn ar-Rūmī; His Life from His Poetry, also 1931, Egyptian Poets and Their Milieus, 1936, "We do not Deceive Ourselves before They Deceive Us", 1939, and "The Meaning of Culture", 1941.

In his discussion of Risālat al-Ghufrān al-'Akkād conceives imagination as the power of creation and invention and the source of originality. He regards al-Maʾarī's work, even though it purports to be an account of an imaginary visit to Paradise, as a product of leaning and knowledge, rather than of imagination.

"In it al-Maʾarī is a learned man, not an imaginative poet, a story-teller who repeated what he has heard, and related what has already been told ... He has related a number of anecdotes about poets and savants, and a selection of their poems and literary gems, plus his own dialogues on the analogy of those between
grammarians and narrators. These he has attributed to the poets themselves and put in their mouths his own views about grammatical disputes concerning their poems. ... Thus al-Maʿarrī was either relating tales of former poets and savants ... or commenting on them. In all this there is little imagination or invention."

Here al-ʿAkkād seems to have been following Hazlitt's views of Sir Walter Scott's novels in the essay "Sir Walter Scott, Racine, and Shakespeare". He, like Hazlitt, distinguishes sharply between imagination and imitation. Risālat al-Ghufrān is regarded as a work of imitation, rather than of imagination. It is a copying or reproduction of what has been already known, seen or heard. For al-ʿAkkād imagination seems to be the power which conceives and gives shape to what has not been known or seen.

In denying imagination to Risālat al-Ghufrān al-ʿAkkād has not forgotten that the tales and anecdotes which al-Maʿarrī relates have taken place in Paradise.

"It is true that al-Maʿarrī has transported all these tales to Paradise. He has also described the pleasures of Paradise and the blessings which God bestows on those admitted to it ... But has this description anything new to offer?; has it anything hitherto unknown?; was not the account of heaven which al-Maʿarrī gives already familiar in his day?"

He goes on to say:

"Risālat al-Ghufrān is more akin to geographical writings and travelogues than to poetic innovation and imagination ... It resembles historical accounts, rather than imaginative prophecies and new adventures." "It is a historical book ... rather than an artistic innovation, for knowledge and learning, not imagination, play the greatest part in it."

In all this imagination is conceived as the power which corresponds to creation, novelty, prophecy and originality. Al-ʿAkkād contrasts Risālat al-Ghufrān with great narrative
poems such as Dante's *Divine Comedy*, Milton's *Paradise Lost*, and Goethe's *Faust.*

"It is wrong to treat it as a product of poetic inspiration resembling the great poems and epics which the poets invent or as a work creating a new form and clothing abstract ideas in sensible garbs."

In these words al-'Akkād seems to have given us the key to his understanding of imagination as the poetic power of apprehension and expression, or the power which grasps abstract ideas in general and represents them in concrete forms. This conception of imagination can be found in many places in his writings. Here are two examples: In an essay on Shawkī (1927) he writes:

"In Shawkī's poetry you find no creative imagination which invents new forms, discovers the similarities of things and represents unknown ideas in sensible garments."

In another essay on Shukrī "Shukrī, Rā'īd at-Tajdīd" (Shukrī, of Modernism), the Pioneer (1959), we read:

"Imagination is a description of reality and an expression of the ideas of the mind in sensible forms."

In this sense imagination is alien to *Risālat al-Ghufrān*, but it is at the heart of Dante's *Divine Comedy*, Milton's *Paradise Lost* and Goethe's *Faust*. This is why al-‘Akkād repeatedly mentions these three poems among the great works of imagination and art.

The contradiction between imagination and imitation is also implied in many of al-‘Akkād's statements. For instance in the essay "Philosophy and Art" (1947)

"Aristotle does not differ from the ancient critics who claimed that imitation and reproduction constitute the principles of art, and failed to grasp the reality ...
that creation and invention, rather than imitation and reproduction, are the principles of art."

In other statements the contrast between imagination and imitation is regarded as a contrast between freedom and bondage. In fact, in al-'Akkād's whole writings imagination corresponds to freedom, and imitation to subjection. In an essay entitled "al-Hurriyyah wa al-Funun al-Jamīlah" (Freedom and the Fine Arts), 1924, he made the relationship between imitation and subjection very clear.

"In art imitation is something disgraceful and despicable, for it is a sign of enslavement, rather than of freedom. The copying of nature represents a very low degree of art. It is not the work of living souls, but of lifeless machines. The beautiful work of art is that which imbues nature with the colours of the soul... If you examine why symbolic painting holds a high place among various kinds of art, you will find it only in the freedom of the soul which it reveals."

Al-'Akkād seems to mean that in the process of imitation the artist is not free, but subjected to nature, i.e. to the object imitated. If art is to be creation, it must be a manifestation of the soul in its struggle against matter; the artist must treat the outside world as an extension of the soul; he must not reproduce the outside world, but re-create it. By the activity of imagination alone can man gain his freedom, i.e. create himself and the world. In al-'Akkād's view, the works of art vary in degree according to the freedom of the soul or the power of imagination which they reveal. He does not explain what he means by symbolic art, but he appears to think of the symbol as a concrete presentation of something spiritual, and of symbolism as the language of
the soul. In symbolic art the world of matter is treated as a physical manifestation of spirit. Thus the work of imagination is an expression of the freedom of the soul.

The remarks which al-'Akkād made about the 1001 Nights seem to complement those about Risālat al-Chufrān. He rejects the common view which sees the 1001 Nights as an imaginative work of art, and considers the judgement to imply a misconception of imagination. He writes:

"The 1001 Nights ... has nothing to do with imagination in any of its characteristics. Rather it is the dream of the hungry in the food-market. The imagination attributed to Eastern people is an illusory realism. It has the merits neither of realism nor of imagination. Were it a true imagination, it would have been invention and creation and a search for a new world, rather than realism in everything ...

Are we imaginative, are we dreamers because we live in the world of The 1001 Nights which is a world of palaces, feasts, treasure troves, and beautiful women, a realistic sensible world which can be seen and tasted? ... This is not imagination. Imagination is an idea for the sake of which man renounces the pleasures of the world, the treasures of the earth and the adornments of life. It is a higher ideal, unknown to Shahrazād ...

And again:

"The 1001 Nights is realism awaiting fulfilment; it is replete with palaces, beautiful women, sumptuous banquets and luxuries, but it is only realism which we see everyday; ... it is a common sensation reproduced before our sight and hearing without any need of creation and invention on our part. It is not the imagination which depicts for us realities (ideas) and reveals them in beautiful artistic forms. Rather it is the dream of a hungry person in the bread market. There is no imagination there save a wishing for bread ... It is the imagination which common realism provides us with ... If we possess it, it does not give insight to our comprehension of reality, nor does it enable us to penetrate its depths or infuse it with beauty."

Here we find a new contrast drawn both between imagination and realism or sensation and between imagination and day-
dreaming. Imagination is not a sense-impression or idle-reverie, but a comprehension of inner reality and higher ideal which leads to action, creation and invention. Imagination is not a capacity for relief or relaxation, but a mode of knowing and making. The imaginative person is not a daydreamer, but a man possessed by an idea which he endeavours to bring into being. He is a man who has a vision of Reality and fits his own activity with this vision. The 1001 Nights is not a work of imagination, but of sensation. It is a mere copying or reproduction of what has already been known and seen. To al-‘Akkād the imaginative work of art is that which oversteps the bounds of sensible reality into the suprasensible one and represents the invisible in visible forms, thus increasing the range of man's life and knowledge. It has its origin in man's yearning for the unknown and is an expression of it.

Al-‘Akkād's theory of imagination which underlines his remarks about Risālat al-Ghufrah and The 1001 Nights raises some questions which need to be answered. In what sense is imagination a creative power? How does imagination deal with the objects of nature, the ideas of the mind and the feelings of the soul? How does it fashion what has not been known, seen or heard? The answers to these questions can be found in al-‘Akkād's writings on myth and personification. In his preface to Shukrī's The Pearls of Thoughts he sees myth as the product of man's faculty which "clothes the powers and phenomena of nature with the garments of human life and attributes to them human feelings and actions." He calls
this faculty "the power of imagination and personification" which the Aryan poet possesses to a higher degree and which stands behind the creation of the great epics and imaginative poems in European literatures. In the essay "Study in Mythology" he seems to associate man's power of imagination with his tendency or "faculty of personification". He discusses the two faculties as though they were one. "The faculty of personification" is regarded as the power whereby man identifies himself with the world around him, and sees his personality and life in the powers of nature. Thus he treats the lifeless objects of nature as animate beings who know love, anger, fear, revenge and other kinds of feelings and actions. This faculty is responsible for the myths and fables which the ancients invented about stars, trees, seas, rivers, forests and other objects of nature. Thus to al-‘Akkād creative imagination seems to be closely related with personification. Imagination is creative in the sense that it recreates the world by animating and humanizing nature, infusing the dead objects of the senses with life, will and feelings, and personifying the abstract ideas of the mind.

In his study on Ibn ar-Rūmī al-‘Akkād has discussed personification more fully (pp.296-99). Here again he seems to associate imagination with personification.

"Personification is a creative faculty which receives its vitality from the breadth or acuteness of feeling ... rather than a verbal device imposed by the necessities of expression or prompted by the associations and succession of ideas."

He describes Ibn ar-Rūmī's faculty of personification as the
power which embodies the abstract ideas of the mind and symbolizes the concrete objects of the senses. But he distinguishes between two kinds of personification, the one may be called living personification, and the other mechanic or lifeless. The former is a product of a creative faculty which works in intimate co-operation with feeling, whereas the latter is a mechanical device suggested by the associations of words or ideas. The difference between these two kinds of personification is the difference between the work of imagination and that of memory. In order to explain and illustrate this difference, al-'Akkad writes:

"The poet who sees a setting sun may describe it as a beautiful departing woman and imagine it next as a woman in love and invent a love-story about it. This is because the sun is feminine in Arabic and because the ancient poets used to compare it to a beautiful woman. It is a story which has its origin in accidental verbal associations, rather than in feeling. However, the thing which cannot be invented by the accidental associations of ideas, words and similes is (Ibn ar-Rumi's) profound feeling of the desolation which represents the sun as someone in perplexity, humiliation and disappointment as though it were a sick person surrounded by (sympathetic) visitors. These visitors are the dewy blossoms which are depicted as humble eyes bathed in tears and sharing with the sun its painful silence. Thus personification must be preceded by a feeling which gives it colour and life".

He illustrates his views by several examples from Ibn ar-Rumi's poems. Here are two of those examples. In the first the poet writes of his memories of Baghdad:

(1) It is the city in which youth and boyhood were my companions and where I wore anew the garb of life when it was new. When it emerges in the soul, I see it like one blooming in his youth. I see it with the boughs of youth swaying over it.
In the second he presents a conversation between him and his suspicions and thoughts.

I said when they appeared repugnant to my eyes:

'What ugliness lurks behind the beauty of things!

Would that I had left your veil unorned,

And buried beneath it you had remained.'

They said: 'Had we not been revealed,

The darkness of your doubt would not have dissolved.'

I said: 'How strange you are, eclipsers of light yet revealers of darkness.

You taught me - though thorough my knowledge of friends -

That in bright light darkness may hide.'

They said: 'What a strange man you are,

Who, after finding enlightenment, wishes he were still blind.

It was we who freed you from doubt,

Yet the object of your contempt are we.

Still confused, ignorant and blind you wish to be!

I said: 'By God, would one like me prefer delusion and bewilderment to guidance!

If only I had kept hidden the secrets of my friend

and not sought after truth.
(c) **Imagination and the Poetry of Nature.**

The distinction between sensation and imagination constitutes the core of al-ʿAkkād's theory of the poetry of nature which is found in his discussion of Shawkī's, Ibn ar-Rūmī's and Hardy's poetry.

He begins his criticism of Shawkī’s poetry of nature with a distinction between two kinds of taste or sensibility: the one is receptive or reflective, and the other creative and life-giving, the one is an outcome of learning and knowledge, and the other a natural gift born with the poet. At their roots these two kinds of taste are none other than sensation and imagination. Al-ʿAkkād indicates what he means by creative taste when he says:

"The possessor of the creative, life-giving taste is he who in communicating his feeling of an object, though accessible to all, makes it appear as though it were hitherto unknown, and as if you see it for the first time."

He attributes this kind of creation or recreation to the identification of the poet with the object described or to his treatment of this object as a part of himself. The poet thus infuses into it his own life, feelings and ideas, and enables the reader to see it with new eyes. Al-ʿAkkād goes on to say that if the ancients described nature as a world inhabited by nymphs, ghosts, spirits, demons and devils, they did so from their strong feeling of it which led them to connect nature with their lives and emotions (*Egyptian Poets*, pp.167-8).

This kind of mythological description of nature is what
he regards as imaginative and creative. The elaboration of this view can be found in the following passage with which he introduces his discussion of Ibn ar-Rūmī's poetry under the sub-title "The Love of Nature."

"Many poets have described nature, but few have permeated it with life ... The poet may feel attracted by the white, yellow and green colours of nature, and enchanted by its varied beautiful forms, but the result is that he praises things for which he finds substitutes in colourful jewels, ornamental carpets, and decorated walls;... or sees nature as a charming but lifeless statue, and seeks in it a beautiful face or slender body, rather than life, passion and sympathy. He might also be attracted to nature as to a cool shade and breeze, a soft bosom and a place for rest away from the clamour of the city and the troubles of work, but in this he does not differ from other living beings, who also feel attracted to water, shade and air ...

The intimate, passionate nature for which the poet feels love is that nature which is inhabited by nymphs flying in the air, mermaids swimming in the waves, virgins dancing at the festival of spring, and fairies whispering in the whistle of the breeze, the ripple of the brook, the rustles of leaves, and the tunes of the echo; or it is that nature whose lightning and thunder, skies and abysses signify heroism, greatness, victorious strife, glorious power and fearful danger; or it is that nature which finds temptation in everything and makes the sailor display fear of the sea lest he be lured by the sirens..." (Ibn ar-Rūmī ... pp.289-90).

In this passage the difference between the sensational and imaginative poetry of nature is clearly established. The sensational poet is confined to the outer appearances or material images of things. He, because of his lack of imagination and feeling, sees in nature nothing more than ornamentation, shining colours and attractive forms. In so doing, he is merely a mirror, which reflects what it receives and reproduces what stands before it. On the contrary, the imaginative poet treats nature as a living being and sees in
every object of it a sign of inner or invisible thing. For him the world consists of feelings and ideas, and not merely of images. He sees every natural phenomenon, object, or event as a manifestation of a desire, passion, or action. In so doing, he stands in mutual relationship with the world, i.e. lives through nature and lets nature live through him; he affects things as he allows himself to be affected by them. Thus to the imaginative poet there is no separation between nature and life or between the world and himself.

When al-ʿAḵkād discusses Ibn ar-Rūmī's poetry of nature he says:

"For him there was no distinction between nature and feeling."

He saw nature as

"a pulsing heart, all-inclusive life and a passionate sympathetic soul."

He saw behind its adornment in spring a soul seeking attraction and love:

(1) ترجمت بعد حياة وخشوع تزهُّر الأَنْثُى تصدَّت للذُّكَرَ
(2) هي في رئية البحث، ولكن هي في عينة الحصن، فإنزل
(3) برياذ تجاهل الأرض بها خيالها، المنارة في اليد، رجَّها زوج طيب الولد.

(1) For long bashful and coy, the earth displays her charms like a woman adorning herself to seduce a man.
(2) She (the earth) displays the adornment of a whore, Yet having the chastity of calm, virtuous woman.
(3) In a garden where the earth reveals her charms Like a girl proud of her fine array, A wondrous sight, a perfumed greeting, A father's delight in agreeable sons.
He also saw spring as new life moving in plants, animals and birds as well as a revelation of the secrets of earth:  

(1) 

He relates the pleasure which he receives from the movement of boughs in the wind to the flow of life which runs through them:  

(2)  

Al-‘Akkād gives many other examples from Ibn ar-Rūmī’s poetry. He regards this kind of description of nature as a product of vital imagination and feeling. He finds in it "the longing of a living being for another living being".

While al-‘Akkād praises Ibn ar-Rūmī’s poetry of nature as being imaginative, he thinks of Shawkī’s as sensational. The example he gives from Shawkī’s poetry is the poem which begins with the line:  

(3) 

and in which Shawkī describes spring as follows:

---

(1) In it (Spring) wild animals and birds find abundant nourishment,
    Deer clash antlers, and doves quarrel one with another.

(2) The earth no longer hides her secrets which are now laid bare.
    From brown dust she gives birth
    To a myriad of flowers - embellishments, red and yellow.

(3) When the wind blows its hands toy with them,
    So they rise, but with affection they bend again.
    And when the east wind lends movements to them
    They please with the pleasure of life with which they are imbued.
He contrasts this poem with Ibn ar-Rūmī's lines and comments that for Shawkī spring is a sensuous pleasure and nature is a cool shade and a place for rest and drinking. Unlike Ibn ar-Rūmī's description which penetrates the depths of nature, Shawkī's poem does not go further than "the margins of life". It does not know

"the secrets of spring which is a revolt in the inner life (of nature), a rebirth in the mysterious process of creation, a light proceeding from the inside, and a charm flowing from the soul..."

Ibn ar-Rūmī's lines al-ʿAkkād finds a description of "the inner living spring" which is

"a vital growing power and a delight arising from the depths (of nature) rather than a physical rest or sensuous pleasure and ornamentation".

(1) In these lines Shawkī describes spring as the king of plants whose abode is the whole earth. He is greeted everywhere with delight and joy. The colourful flowers are depicted as though they were flags unfurled on his return, and the green trees as maidens clad in embroidered garments. Shawkī speaks of spring as an invader of houses where it is seen in vases full of daisies and narcissi. Flowers strewn on the ground represent crowns thrown down before his majesty, or heads bowed respectfully. The opening rose-petals are described as if they were worshippers engaged in praising God. The breeze passes over them, lightly kissing them, like lips gently gliding over the cheeks of pretty girls.
This distinction between Ibn Ibrâhîm's and Shawârî's description of spring is one between imagination and sensation, feeling and art.

In the last two essays of his series "Poetry in Egypt" al-‘Akkâd has illustrated his views of true poetry by several poems from Hardy. But for our purpose here we need consider only his opinion of the poems "Nature's Questioning".

When I look forth at dawning, pool,
Field, flock, and lonely tree,
All seem to gaze at me
Like chastened children sitting silent in a school;
Their faces dulled, constrained, and worn,
As though the master's ways
Through the long teaching days
Had cowed them till their early zest was overborne.

Upon them stirs in clippings mere
(As if once clear in call
But now scarce breathed at all)
We wonder, ever wonder, why we find us here!

Has some Vast Imbecility,
Mighty to build and blend,
But impotent to tend,
Framed us in jest, and left us now to hazard?

Or come we of an Automaton
Unconscious of our pains?...
Or are we live remains
Of Godhead dying downwards, brain and eye now gone?

Or is that some high Plan betides,
As yet not understood,
Of Evil stormed by Good,
We the Forlorn Hope over which Achievement strides?

Thus things around. No answer I ...
Meanwhile the winds, and rains,
And Earth's old glooms and pains
Are still the same, and Life and Death are neighbors nigh.

He describes this poem by Hardy as realising "the higher ideal of poetic eloquence" and regards it as an example of a "simple
yet unfathomable poetry." It stands for him as a revelation of the deepest truth, as an expression of a wearied fatigued soul which speaks through nature or lets nature speak through it.

(d) Fancy and Association Imagination.

In his critical writings after 1921 al-‘Akkād uses the two terms "Wahm" or "Tawahhum", i.e. "Fancy", and "Khayal", i.e. "Imagination", though without defining their specific meaning in different contexts. The first use of them occurs in the essay "Naẓrah fi Adab Hugo" (An Investigation of Hugo’s Literature), 1922. Here al-‘Akkād criticises Hugo on the ground that he "cares for the fallacious and external, rather than the true and internal". He goes on to say that Hugo’s

"attention is directed towards the fanciful unreal relationships of things, and not towards the true or real ones".

He seems to connect this with Hugo’s use of highly ornamental imagery and sound in order to produce more effect on the aural and visual senses of the reader. He also attributes it to a lack of intuition, which must mean imagination, for intuition and imagination are interconnected in his writings. He concludes that Hugo

"lacked the true characteristics of higher literature, namely, the simplicity and truth of beauty and the depth of thought".

In al-‘Akkād’s view "the fanciful relationships" seem to correspond to a falsification of things and misrepresentation of the order of nature for the sake of ornamentation and art. Unfortunately he has not illustrated his views with any
quotations from Hugo's poems which would aid us to understand these views more fully. However, fancy seems to be a power which ascribes to nature an order other than its own. It is a mechanical power which receives its sole material from the senses and cares for the external and false relationships of things. Its domain is the cold lifeless world of phenomena. The fanciful relationships are ones which exist only in the mind of the poet and have nothing to do with the real order of things. They are either relationships based on verbal associations of words or unreal similarities and dissimilarities of things. What Hugo seeks is sensory ornamentation, rather than truth and beauty. Thus in al-'Akkād's mind "fancy" seems to contrast with truth, depth and simplicity, and it corresponds to falsehood, artificiality and ornamentation. We have already seen that in his essay "Beauty in Style and Ideas", al-'Akkād contrasts ornamentation with beauty and regards the former as an indication of bad taste and describes it as

"something artificial and material, something superficial and sensational. It lays stress on sensation and suppresses the flow of feeling and imagination".

Thus ornamentation corresponds to the senses, whereas beauty corresponds to imagination and feeling.

Since "fancy" itself corresponds to ornamentation, sensation, art and falsification of things, and imagination to truth, beauty and feeling, the lines which al-'Akkād gives as examples of ornamentation, art and falsification of truth in his essays "Beauty in Style and Ideas", "True and False Poetry", and "Poetry in Egypt", may be regarded as illustrations of his
views of fancy. The other lines which he gives as examples of beauty, truth and faithfulness to nature can be taken as illustrations of his views of imagination. The lines which he uses as examples of fancy are:

al-Wa'awis:

(1) رأصلتهم لوزاعما نرضع وسمت ديرما وعمسها على الغناب بالبرد

al-Mutanabbi's:

(2) أنورهم رسول الله رضى الله عنه في رأسها رياى وفاتها لغصيف في

The anonymous:

(3) شرع حمامة حالية الشاذري في حمامة خاني السعد بن الكتيبة

Shawki's:

(4) رأى مرجل وكبار شعراء لم يليد في لحسر سير رأى

(5) لم يشتبه بالسبيل حالي وصو نبود في البدر رقص

(6) ركأن الدهام يراق فرعون ينبوع على الجياس نحس

Or conversely: They in her

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<td>304</td>
<td>views of fancy. The other lines which he gives as examples of beauty, truth and faithfulness to nature can be taken as illustrations of his views of imagination. The lines which he uses as examples of fancy are:</td>
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<td>305</td>
<td>al-Wa'awis:</td>
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<td>306</td>
<td>(1) She rained pearls from narcissi, watered roses, and bit upon jujube-fruit with hail-stones.</td>
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<td>307</td>
<td>(2) On visiting them the darkness of night is my intercessor, But on my parting the brightness of morning instigates (others) against me.</td>
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<td>308</td>
<td>(3) Its pebbles frighten the bejewelled virgins Who then finger their necklaces (to make sure that the thread had not broken).</td>
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| 309  | (4) My breath is a boiler, and my heart is a sail, 
| 310  | by them in (a sea of) my tears voyage and land find haven. |
| 311  | (5) From the sunset she (The Jazirah) wore an embroidered garment Made in San'a' and Kiss 
| 312  | But rent by the Nile, she hid half-naked behind the bridge. |
| 313  | (6) And the Pyramids are like the scales of Pharoah On a day ominous to tyrants. 
| 314  | Or like his kintars polished 
| 315  | By thousands of tax collectors and customs men. |
He regards the first two lines as pure verbal ornamentation. They falsify things for the sake of ornamentation and stand in opposition to 'beauty', 'truth' and 'eloquence'. The third line, which we have already encountered, is thought of as

"an absurd playful witticism, a blatant falsification, ... a ruse which deceives the reader before he can distinguish between essence and appearance".

Al-ʿAkkād goes on to say:

"Here the poet is deceitful in the representation of his idea. He arrests our attention by the image of bejewelled virgins and detracts us from the real subject he is describing".

He embellishes and distorts things with the result that

"he makes the pebbles of the valley pearls and corals scattered from a broken necklace. Furthermore, not satisfied with this, he playfully continues his artifice, which lacks elegance and skill. He deceives us with a guile devoid of adroitness of movement and subtlety of treatment."

Al-ʿAkkād concludes that

"the poet's image is alien to his idea. It is totally false and shows no artistry or grace. To accept it as a true meaning is much like buying false jewel (a true one). It is merely a trick of the trade".

On Shawki's lines he comments:

"Shawki is much like a juggler in expressing his dismay when he addresses the ship en route for Egypt... and when he describes the 'Jazirah'... and the Pyramids... It comprises a falsification and shows no feeling whatsoever...

To al-ʿAkkād poetry is not

"odd similes and images or far-fetched allegories... based on unexpected relationships between things".

Nor is it "invented ideas and peculiar thoughts".

"The function of the poet is to be a man of psychological images by which he communicates his emotions to others", rather than of "ideas which falsify things".
The lines illustrating imagination are presented in contrast to the preceding ones. They are:

an-Nabighah’s:

(1) You are like the night which never lets me out of its reach, Though vast is the land that stands between us.

(2) Wide, yet like the hunter’s snare are to the fugitive the mountain-tracks
Every trail in which he seeks a refuge is to him a path leading to a killer.

(3) And waters in which pebbles sound
Like the tinkling of the bracelets of pretty girls.
At Bawwān’s ravine says my horse, 'Can such a place be left for the battle-field? But your father Adam was the first who made disobedience a law
And taught you how to abandon Paradise.'

(4) In these lines al-Buhturī describes the domed-palace of the Persian Emperor as a hollow side of a lofty immovable mountain. It pines away in grief that it appears to its visitors disturbed by the departure of a dear friend or oppressed by the divorce of a dear wife. Nights had changed its good luck, and Jupiter, the star of misfortune, made it its abode.
The first two extracts are, in al-‘Akkād’s view, examples of poetry which shows beauty both in meaning and expression. They are "verses the meanings of which appeal to the mind (imagination), not to sensation".

"They do not arrest attention by embellishments and meaningless witticism ... Therefore, they are beautiful and eloquent."

Of al-Mutanabbī’s lines he writes:

"The tinkling of the bracelets of the bejewelled girls is a true simile contributing to the meaning of the poet, rather than a playful absurd witticism."

"The idea which led al-Mutanabbī to express his irony through the horse may seem at first sight a playful witticism, yet it is the truest idea which can occur to the imagination of the poet (in this context)."

As regards al-Buḥturī’s description of the Persian Emperor’s domed palace, it is regarded as a true description expressing the poet’s grief.

"It is the utterance of a soul overwhelmed by a flowing feeling, rather than an aggregation of words ... measured by the standards of rhetoric."

In his lines al-Buḥturī is dealing with a human situation in an artistic way. "It is artistic feeling which led him to write his poem."

Now let us examine these lines against each other and against al-‘Akkād’s comments. In al-Wa’wā’s line we find a group of comparisons; of the tear to pearls, of the eyes to narcissi, of the red-tipped finger to the jujube fruit, and of the cheeks to red roses. All these comparisons are based on accidental and formal similarities. They say nothing of the situation dealt with, and consequently have no function or significance. The poet is not dealing with a human experience
or situation, but playing ingeniously with words, colours and shapes. In formulating these comparisons he has done something irrelevant to the situation to which they refer. Thus he is falsifying things for the sake of art and ornamentation. As a result the effect is repulsive, ludicrous and trivial. To examine the main two images, the description of the tears and the eyes as "pearly drops of rain fallen from narcissi", and the description of the red-tipped finger and teeth as "jujube-fruit bitten by hailstones" is to discover what is fancy. It is reasonable to describe the tears as drops of rain, or even as pearls, or to describe a beautiful pale eye as a white narcissus. It is also reasonable to present an eye bathed in tears as a narcissus bathed in the dew of dawn, but to present the tears as pearl-drops of rain and the eyes as narcissi is to falsify the relations of things and to destroy the order of existence. It is much the same with the second image, which presents the teeth as hailstones and the red-tipped finger as jujube-fruits bitten by the hailstones. The two images are formed according to the law of association; the whiteness of the teeth has recalled the whiteness of snow, while the redness of the finger has recalled the colour of the jujube-fruits. The second step was to present the teeth as hailstones, and the fingers as jujube-fruits. Thirdly, a new artificial relationship was established between the hailstones and the jujube-fruits, which stems from the image of a girl weeping and biting her red-tipped finger. In the other images, the associations seem to have occurred as follows: the tear-drops
recalled the drops of rain, but their appearance recalled that of pearls, while the pale eyes recalled the colour and image of narcissi. Thus the tears are presented as drops of rain and as pearls at the same time, and the eyes as narcissi. Since the original concept was to describe a girl in tears, a new artificial relationship was established between the narcissi, the drops of rain and the pearls.

The two images remain artificial mixtures, rather than natural complex syntheses. Their elements show no unity or harmony. There are no mutual relationships between the parts of the comparisons or the units of the images. The similarities and relationships of these units are accidental and superficial. This being the case, they can be only products of fancy, not of imagination. This seems to mean that fancy is a playful faculty which works in detachment from passion and combines things in an artificial way according to accidental and unexpected similarities. In other words, fancy is the mind detaching itself from nature and substituting for its harmonious order an artificial disharmonious one.

Shawkī's line:

is likewise a product of fancy and art. Its images are fanciful, rather than imaginative, for they are based on fallacious relationships between things and have no psychological function or significance. They represent an artificial combination of dissimilar things "brought together", to use Coleridge's words, "by some one point or more of likeness".
The comparisons of the breath to a cauldron, of the heart to a sail, and of the tears to a sea are based on unexpected, casual and insignificant relations of things. They are hyperboles which distort the order of things for the sake of art. The other image which describes the "Jazīrah" as a woman robed in the beams of the setting sun, her garment rent by the Nile, her lover, and taking refuge behind the bridge, half-naked, is also an artificial product of fancy; for it falsifies both the external relationships of things and human experience, i.e. the relationships of the soul with the outside world. Only a man who suffers from mental disorder or sensory aberration can see the "Jazīrah" in this way or visualize the Pyramids as the scales of the omnipotent Pharaoh by which he weighs the misdeeds of the tyrants.

Before examining al-Mutanabbi's line we must make it clear that al-ʿAkkād does not conceive the hyperbole in itself as a falsification of truth and the relationships of things, or as a contradiction to imagination. He says that the poet who claims that his beloved is more beautiful or more shining than the sun, and his patron is greater than the sea is faithful to reality. For he finds more delight in meeting his beloved than in seeing the sun, and finds his patron more powerful, more generous and more fearful than the sea. In so far as the hyperbole represents a genuine feeling, a psychological relationship between the poet and the world, it remains an expression of truth.

Now we can pass to al-Mutanabbi's line:
in which we find two images, "the darkness of night is my intercessor" and "the brightness of morning is the instigator against me". The idea which the poet is striving to express is that on his visit to his beloved the darkness of night hides him from the eyes of others - this is described as an intercession - whereas on his return the brightness of morning reveals him to them, thus instigating them against him. Al-'Akkād seems to regard these two images as pure verbal ornamentation, i.e. the poet is playing with words, rather than expressing a genuine feeling; he is contrasting the darkness of night with the brightness of morning, and intercession with instigation. But we might disagree with al-'Akkād here and think that the two images represent psychological relationships and are, therefore, imaginative, rather than fanciful. For we can imagine the night as the poet's intercessor in the sense that it facilitates his visit to his beloved by hiding him from the eyes of others. We can also find some imaginative or psychological connection between the brightness of morning and instigation. However, from al-'Akkād's point of view the actions which al-Mutanabbi has attributed to night and morning have no psychological foundations or functions.

The second group of lines, unlike the first, deals with human situations and shows an earnest attitude on the part of the poets towards things. Here the poets are not ornamenters playing with words, colours and shapes, but men
of genuine feelings using similes and metaphors as means in the process of poetic expression. Their images represent psychological relationships between them and things. If an-Nābighah has compared an-Nu'mān, his former patron, to the night, he has done so because both an-Nu'mān and the night are, for him, objects of power, fear and awe. An-Nu'mān is like the night a powerful fearful king from whose kingdom nobody can escape. In the other lines the comparison of the mountain tracks to the hunter's snares is also based on psychological relationship. It is an expression of the feeling of fear which a fugitive followed by enemies may suffer.

As regards al-Buhturī's description of the Persian domed-palace, it represents a good example of al-'Akkād's notion of living personification.

The difference between the two groups of lines is one between playful and serious poetry. Seriousness or earnestness has always been one of al-'Akkād's fundamental principles of poetry. In the first essay on "Poetry as Understood by the Present Generation", where he insists on the seriousness of great literature and on its truth to nature and the human soul, he writes:

"The view which makes of literature as an amusement or an entertaining game is responsible for the false ornamentation, verbal embellishment, and fanciful falsifications or conceits in poetry and other arts of writing."

The idea of imagination which the second group of lines suggests is that imagination is the faculty which grasps the inner or psychological truth and the unity of things, and
deals with human situations, or it is the mind working in close relationship with passion and seeing itself in nature. Al-ʿAkkād's next reference to "fancy" is found in the essay "Imagination in Risālat al-Ghufrān", where he says:

"Imagination was not among the attributes of al-Maʿarrī... He was a blind man who tried to comprehend visual images through his power of fancy."

Here again al-ʿAkkād does not illustrate his views. The elaboration and illustration of these views can be found in the essay "Ghazal Bashshār" (Bashshār's Love-Poetry), 1925, and the study Ibn ar-Rūmī; His Life from His Poetry.

"With Bashshār sensation replaced imagination. Due to his blindness, he represented to himself the qualities of things he could not see... In his fancy he sought to go beyond the range of touch and hearing into that of seeing which was unknown to him. Thus he made forms visible and familiar to others the utmost reach of imagination. As a result, his fancy could not take him beyond the bounds of the senses... In him sight and hearing worked side by side. He listened to sounds and fancied them as colours, yellow or red, and as dyed garments, and as flowers and fruits."

In these words the connection between fancy and sensation is clearly established. Al-ʿAkkād illustrates his view with the following lines of Bashshār:

من حديث كأنه تطلع الرو، رفيع الأجراء والتمرا ردعجاء الحاجس معد 性 حديث كأنه تطلع الجنان ولها سبيل كثر القناص، وحديث كالواصل، ريش الورد وكأنه وجع حديثا تطلع الرو، قبل الرياس كين زهرا

He seems to think of these lines as a product of fancy, rather than imagination. To him Bashshār's comparisons of his beloved's voice to the green plots of garden invested with
colourful flowers, and to soft embroidered garments are based on relationships invented by the poet, not discovered in nature. For this reason they are fanciful not imaginative.

In this context "fancy" appears to be the faculty which finds similarities and relations in dissimilar and unrelated objects or the faculty which combines the objects of different senses in impressionistic fashion. However, al-'Akkād does not always regard images which combine the objects of different senses in impressionistic fashion as fanciful. In his study on Ibn ar-Rūmī (pp.281-82) he quotes the following lines as examples in which Ibn ar-Rūmī co-ordinates visual and auditory objects:

His comment on them is that Ibn ar-Rūmī associates the visual with the auditory and describes the objects of hearing as though they were objects of sight; he thinks of the sound as colours and compares them to painted garments. This al-'Akkād attributes to the intensity and awareness of Ibn ar-Rūmī's senses which do not fail to observe the similarities and dissimilarities of their different objects. He seems to
regard the comparisons of the voice of the singer to a swaying green bough and to a shimmering, flowing, wind-swept stream as imaginative, not fanciful.

How then do Ibn ar-Rūmī's images differ from Bashshār's? We might say that al-ʿAkkād thinks of Ibn ar-Rūmī's images as psychological and of Bashshār's as sensational. In connection with Ibn ar-Rūmī's lines he writes:

"It is not a mere sensation confined to what the eye sees, the ear hears and the nose smells (a sensation of the outer appearances of things). Nor is it a mere acuteness in the senses which performs its aim by combining the visual with the auditory, and the olfactory with the tactual. Rather it is a sensational awareness accompanied by an internal, emotional vividness by which the poet probes the depths of things and describes passions and morals at the same time he describes colours and tunes." (p.284).

In fact, Bashshār's images can also be regarded as psychological, for he is not merely describing the forms of things, but also their efforts on his soul. But we are concerned here not with doing justice to Bashshār, but with expounding al-ʿAkkād's views.

In order to understand al-ʿAkkād's views of Ibn ar-Rūmī's imagery more fully, we must turn now to the essay "An Example of Description in Ibn ar-Rūmī", which he wrote immediately after the essay "Bashshār's Love-Poetry".

"Due to his power of description and association of ideas, Ibn ar-Rūmī links the exterior and interior in a fanciful fashion."

This means that Ibn ar-Rūmī's images are expression of the internal and external at the same time. They are both sensuous and spiritual or psychological. Yet al-ʿAkkād seems
to think of them as a product of fancy or the association of ideas which he explains as follows:

"The association of ideas indicates a faculty whereby artists connect one idea with another ... with a delicate thread belonging to true imagination or false fancy. They relate dissimilar and contradictory things to each other and seek similarity and significance in them, while there appear no similarity and significance in them to other people."

He appears to think of Ibn ar-Rūmī's imagery or of some of it at least as fanciful and attributes it to his associative power of ideas, yet he distinguishes between two kinds of association, imaginative and fanciful; the former is a revelation of the true relations of things, and the latter an invention of unreal relations which do not exist in nature. The fanciful association of ideas seems to be subordinate to memory, and the imaginative ones to feeling. However, this distinction between associative imagination and fancy is not definite. There is no border line between the domain of the associative imagination and that of fancy. Both faculties, if we may regard them as such, search for similarities and for significance in objects which show no similarities or significance. Al-'Askāf does not define where the difference lies between these two faculties.

Now we have to return to his study on Ibn ar-Rūmī, where he has dealt at length with the association of ideas or associative imagination. He thinks of Ibn ar-Rūmī's imagination as associative and relates it to his abnormal structure of mind and intensity of feeling.
"We have sufficient evidence of the disorder in Ibn ar-Rumi's nervous system and the idiosyncracies in his way of thinking and behaving (his poetry provides ample testimony) ... He was one of those who suffered from a fear complex, suspicions and flights of fancy." (pp.127-28). "Among those suffering from this temperament are found poets and artists of genius. They are famed for their incisive observation and rapidity of thought, i.e. the rapid succession and transference of ideas, the recollection of latent associations, elusive similarities of things which lie beyond the reach of the majority of people." (p.130).

Al-'Akkād goes on to say that unless the associative power of ideas becomes excessive and merges into madness (for at its excess the associative imagination is a product of madness), it remains of great use for poets and artists. It enables them to apprehend the profound similarities and relationships of things, ideas and images. Al-'Akkād seems to be saying that in its normal state the associative imagination is the poet's true approach to the inner reality, i.e. the inner relations and correspondences of things. This is in harmony with his theory of knowledge which regards the inner reality as subjective and beknown only through the coalescence of subject and object which is a role identifiable with imagination. In writing about Ibn ar-Rumi's belief in omens he states that the power of association of ideas was so vivid and intense in Ibn ar-Rumi that it never failed to manifest itself in his whole work. It can be found in each of his poems and in every theme he treats. When an idea occurred to him it usually suggested many other ideas. He does not refrain from writing until he has exhausted all the associations of his ideas. Likewise, with regard to words, he pursues
their suggestions and associations to their end. Al-Kakād considers the swift movement of Ibn ar-Rūmī's mind from one idea to another, and from one word to another, according to the law of association, as being a state in which genius and madness stand in collusion (pp. 203-6).

These views of al-Kakād might allow us to claim that the difference between the associative imagination and fancy is one of degree, not of kind. Fancy is the associative imagination at its excess, that is, when the associative imagination overlaps its frontiers and merges into madness; when, like a madman, the poet "speaks incoherently and paradoxically, though within his mind he does not fail to relate and unify things unrelated and disunited."

It would seem that al-Kakād's view which allies genius to madness is an echo of Schopenhauer's theory of genius. In Schopenhauer's opinion both the madman and the man of genius neglect "that knowledge of relations which conforms to the principle of sufficient reason" or to the order of time, space and causality. If fancy is then the associative imagination at its excess, when it merges into madness, it appears to be a power which disregards the principle of sufficient reason or the order of time, space and causality. It is, in Coleridge's words,

"a mode of memory emancipated from the order of time and space ... But equally with the ordinary memory the fancy ... receive(s) all its materials ready made from the law of association."

Al-Kakād also seems to think that the difference between
fancy and associative imagination lies in the kind of materials which they use, and in the kind of relationships which they find or attribute to things. This is, of course, a result of the difference between the nature of the two faculties. Fancy makes a haphazard or arbitrary associations valid only in the poet's (or madman's) mind, whereas the associative imagination, or imagination in general, reveals profound but true associations, associations not necessarily apprehended by reason but part of the nature of things.

In 1959, in connection with Shukri's views of fancy, al-Akkād has criticised the common view which regards "both imagination and fancy as one and the same, as a detachment from reality and a contradiction to truth."

He goes on to say:

"the difference between them is a difference between a shadow projected by an existing reality and an apparition "shabah" seen by a man who suffers from fever, madness or sensory aberration.... Fancy is a fallacy invented by the poet and is peculiar to him."

Here al-Akkād regards peculiarity as the principle of fancy. Elsewhere he illustrates fancy by al-Ma'arri's lines:

\[\text{فِي أَخْلَاقِ الْيَلِينِ فِي حَوْرِ نَعْسِيَةٍ}
\[\text{بَرَنَّتُ أَشْهَادَانُ}
\[\text{فَمَا يَأْخُذُ مِنِّي نَاسَةً}
\]

and imagination by Ibn ar-Rūmī's line:

\[\text{فُجُرَتْ يَأْخُذُ مِنِّي نَاسَةً}
\[\text{أَيُّهَا نُهَرُ إِلَيْكَ}
\]

He conceives al-Ma'arri's images as fanciful because they express ideas which exist only in the poet's mind. But of Ibn ar-Rūmī's image he writes:

"It is a genuine or true image which can occur to any intuitive mind ..."
In order to see the difference between fancy and associative imagination more clearly we must examine al-Ma'arri's and Ibn ar-Rūmī's images. I take Ibn ar-Rūmī's line to be an example of associative imagination. In al-Ma'arri's line we find an image which presents dawn as the blood of 'Alī and of his son, al-Husayn. The power responsible for this image is not imagination but memory and the association of ideas. The poet who was a sightless man could think of dawn only as a red colour and associate it with blood. In turn, the idea of blood was associated with that of martyrdom, and then with the martyrdom of 'Alī and his son. Ibn ar-Rūmī's image is also constructed according to the law of association. But here the process of association is more artful and delicate. The image has its origin in the conception of baldness as an extension of the face. We may notice here that this conception is much like a product of sensory deception. The comparison of baldness to the summer solstice has stemmed from this peculiar conception and from the association of the face, probably white, with day, and the black hair with night. It is important to read here al-'Akkad's following words, which occur in the essay "Bashshār wa al-Hijā" (Bashshār and Satire),
published in
1925.

"Ibn ar-Rūmī was a skilful artist who possessed the faculty of description, imagination, and innovation, and the power of toying with ideas and forms ... His whole satirical poetry consists of description of forms or toying with ideas."

As this comment is made by al-'Akkād while discussing the line last quoted from Ibn ar-Rūmī, we may take it that he
regards Ibn ar-Rūmī's image as a playing with ideas and forms. He sees in Ibn ar-Rūmī's satire manifestations of his power of associating unexpected ideas reinforcing his tendency to irony and humour. The same line he gives with many others as examples. In his view the construction and combination of the parts of their images are products of "a sensational skill" and of "long meditation" or labour.

Though al-Akkād thinks of Ibn ar-Rūmī's image as a kind of toying with forms and ideas, he does not regard it as a falsification of the relationships of things. The relationship between baldness and the summer solstice, though unexpected, remains true and significant. Therefore, it is a product of imagination, rather than of fancy. On the contrary, the relationship in al-Ma'arūf's line between dawn and the blood of 'Alī and his son is arbitrary and insignificant.

In al-Akkād's views, Ibn ar-Rūmī is not only characterized by his associative imagination or associative power of ideas, but by two other characteristics, namely, the intensity of his feeling and his strong tendency to introspection. These three characteristics are interconnected.

"The unique characteristic of Ibn ar-Rūmī is his powerful self-examination resulting in the revelation of the events of his life in his poetry." (p.81). "The reader of Ibn ar-Rūmī finds himself free from the need to observe and examine, for the poet has taken it upon himself to observe his innermost feelings, detect his fugitive thoughts, and the meanderings of his dreams. Thus he was his own inquisitor ... and autobiographer." (pp.82-3). "His collection of poems is not merely a biography of his inner soul but also a chronicle of his life." (pp.109-10). "His observation was keen, his sensation fresh, and his feeling of contradictions ... profound." (p.134). "He was a
child in his humour, laughter, irony and satire. We can understand him only by presenting him as a man whose feeling was ever vivid and fresh, and whose life was a period of childhood which did not know aridity or reach senility. In this way we can explain many of his habits and gifts." (p.142)

Because of all this al-‘Akkād says that what characterizes Ibn ar-Rumī as a poet is not his rare ideas and peculiar images but that his rare ideas and odd images were expressions of lively and profound feelings. They are not empty oyster-shells, false jewels or lifeless ornamentation. (p.7).

Thus al-‘Akkād thinks of associative imagination as a faculty which works in intimate co-operation with feeling, and receives it material which consists of emotions and intuitive ideas from the inner sense. The images which it constructs, even when they are sensory, represent psychological or mental relationships between the poet and nature. These views are asserted in the essay "Artistic Inspiration" where al-‘Akkād regards feeling as the power which determines the associative process of ideas, and introspection as the condition of creation. This makes the association of ideas a process of feelings, and introspection the source of imagination. Thus the associative imagination is not concerned with the sensuous forms of things, but with their reflections in the soul or with the emotional associations of them. If the poet is characterized by his power of imagination, he is first of all a man of intense feeling, possessed by a strong tendency to self-examination. In the process of creation he is two persons, not one; the one feels and experiences, the other observes and examines these feelings and expresses them in
artistic or imaginative forms.

The Arab poet who stands in opposition to Ibn ar-Rūmī, and whose poetry can be taken as an example of fancy is Ibn al-Mu'ṭazz. Al-‘Akkād often contrasts Ibn ar-Rūmī's imagery with that of Ibn al-Mu'ṭazz. To him Ibn al-Mu'ṭazz's images are absurd playful witticisms and lifeless mechanical ornamentation. In the essay "Between Politics and Literature" he says of this poetry that it is a geometrical expression to be measured by a ruler and compass, and not by any standard of life, for it in no way resembles life which is an organic spontaneous growth. At best it is like an abortive child who is not destined to live. He particularly refers to Ibn al-Mu'ṭazz's line:

\[\text{قَدْ أَسْتَدَّلَّهَا حَمْوَلَةَ سَنَغِرَ.}\]

See it (i.e. the crescent moon) like a boat of silver

Loaded down with amber.

which has echoes of Otway's line:

Lutes, lobsters, seas of milk and ships of amber.
given by Coleridge as an illustration of fancy which is analogous to delirium. He describes it as "shining ornamentation, rather than metal of real worth."

These remarks al-‘Akkād has elaborated in his study on Ibn ar-Rūmī and his work *Egyptian Poets and Their Milieus*. In the latter he thinks of Ibn al-Mu'ṭazz's image as "a falsification of appearances and forms," and rejects it on the ground that if we visualize a boat of silver loaded with amber, our feeling for the crescent moon and its beauty will
not be increased or deepened. He goes on to say:

"It is a mechanical simile fitting for the camera, rather than for the poet's imagination and feeling."

He also seems to think of it as a product of a deliberate will which aims at combining and modifying the outer forms and colours of things (pp. 73-4). It is a kind of wit which receives its material from the outer senses and memory and modifies or combines it in artificial fashion. In his study on Ibn ar-Rūmī al-‘Akkād mentions Ibn al-Mu‘tazz's other lines:

\[
\text{كَانَ اِذْرَبْنَهَا دَلَّاَسَ فَنِيَّ کَالِیَهُا}
\]

\[
\text{۲۴۱۴} \text{۲۴۱۵} \text{۲۴۱۶}
\]

and writes:

"The aim of simile is not to compare two white or yellow objects with each other, or two circular or rectangular shapes with each other. Such images are due to the visual sense, rather than to feeling and imagination."

The poet is a man who

"feels, imagines and describes his feelings in words and clear mental (psychological) images."

He repeats the view that poetry is a spiritual, rather than mechanical, activity, and that the poet's function is to describe the effect of things on his soul and mind and to increase, thereby, the range of his reader's life and feeling (pp. 306-8). To him Ibn al-Mu‘tazz's images correspond to nothing in the world, and are based on relationships invented by the poet, rather than discovered in nature. For this reason they are a product of fancy, not of imagination.

(1) Its anemone, in which the sun is reflected, is like a golden jar containing musk.
Al- Akkad also contrasts the imagery of Ibn ar-Rūmī with that of al-Bakrī. The examples he gives are Ibn ar-Rūmī's lines:

لا توعد الدنيا به من صورتها يكون الولد ساعية يوجد،
وإذما بيكية منبها، وإنها للحثعلى، كان فيه راجد

and al-Bakrī's:

ولا ذهن الشر ما أقاسوا صلة الجنارة بين الرواة
وأذن للطفل يوم الولد.

He says that the child who cries immediately he is delivered from the narrow womb of his mother to the wide world is a true example of the contradictions of life, whereas the relationship between the proclamation of the day of birth and the prayer of death is "arbitrary and accidental" and has nothing to do with the nature of life and death. He also compares the lines of Ibn ar-Rūmī:

لم أخضب الشعر للغواي، لطغي عنها ودادة
لكن خفافي على شبابي لبسط من بعده حدادا

with the following line by al-Bakrī:

أول حبظ في الحش.

(1) Because of the vicissitudes of the world that follow
The child cries at the hour of his birth.
If not, what makes him cry from it,
Since it is wider and more pleasant than where he was?

(2) The Congregation made no proclamation when they gathered
to pray on the funeral day;
It was on the day of the child's birth that they made the
proclamation for which they now prayed.

(3) I dyed my hair not to seek love from beautiful girls,
But to mourn my lost youth.

(4) Is it a white hair or the first thread of the shroud?
But here he thinks that both poets are falsifying truth for the sake of art, and that their ideas are based on false logic and have no connection with reality.

(e) Imagery, Suggestion and Obscurity.

Al-‘Akkād's principal discussion of imagery and poetic language is found in five essays, the first two of which "al-Wuḍūḥ wa al-Ghumūḍ fī al-Asālīb ash-Shī‘riyyah" (Clarity and Obscurity in Poetic Styles), and "Fī al-Asālīb" (On Styles), were published in 1923 and 1925 respectively. The three others, two bearing the title "al-Madrasah ar-Ramziyyah" (The Symbolic School), the third "al-Majāz wa ash-Shī‘r" (Figurativeness and Poetry) were written many years later. The central theme of the five essays is the nature of poetic language, and the relationship between obscurity and imagery. Several other passages concerned with the same subject can be found in the essays "Poetry in Egypt" and the two works The Commemoration of Goethe, and Egyptian Poets and their Milieus.

The essay "On Styles", written in criticism of Anatole France's philosophy of art, seems to express views which differ largely from those expressed in the other essays. Here al-‘Akkād advocates difficulty or intricacy, complexity and profundity as the principles of good poetry and art, and opposes Anatole France's demand for facile art and simple expression. He seems to classify poetry according to simplicity and complexity. On this ground he ranks Shakespeare higher than the romantic poets, al-Mutanabbi higher than al-Buḥtūrī, and al-Buḥtūrī higher than the
Umayyad love-poets.

He begins the essay with a quotation from Anatole France in which the French writer couples the beautiful with the simple, criticises obscurity as though it were a contradiction of beauty, and claims that pleasure rather than utility or truth is the aim of the arts. Therefore, the best artist, be he a poet or a novelist, is the one who expresses himself simply and sets no barrier between himself and the reader. He also says that the beauty of art must offer itself without any condition, that is, without any labour on the part of the reader or observer. In commenting on these views al-'Akkād writes:

"Here Anatole France has not only expressed his views of art but also his philosophy of life in general. For him life must have no problem at all, and our concern for it must be confined to the appearances of things which in revealing themselves demand no labour from us. It should not trouble us or lead us to change our opinion when somebody tells us that the world has many mysteries which do not unfold themselves easily, that the profound feelings of the soul cannot always be expressed in words or uttered by poets and novelists, and that beauty has many hidden aspects which are not plain to people at the time."

He also writes:

"It is an absurdity to claim that the pleasures of poetry and other arts require no consideration or concentration, and that they must offer themselves without any labour or preparation on our part. It is true that beauty is simple ..., but it is so only to those who, by virtue of their long experience, good education, and cultivated taste, can grasp and appreciate it. The simplicity of beauty does not mean that it is pleasant to every one or that it does not require reflection and thinking ... It must be admitted that much beautiful poetry and literature remains difficult and vague to many classes of people. Facile poetry might be popular, but it is not necessarily beautiful or artistic ... It might have greater appeal
than difficult poetry which is understood only by a minority of intellectuals, but it cannot be ranked higher or regarded as more worth reading than the latter."

Thus al-‘Akkād distinguishes between two kinds of beauty or art, the one facile and simple, the other difficult and complex. To him facility and simplicity are not the criteria of good art or the test of beauty. Facility and simplicity may be equivalent, sometimes, to superficiality and triviality. On the contrary, good poetry is the art of an intellectual elite. Elsewhere he says that the poet should not be charged with obscurity when the reader fails to comprehend his ideas and feelings because of their complexity or intricacy and uncommon forms of expression. The failure of the reader does not necessarily mean that the poem is obscure and incomprehensible; it may be that it is the reader who lacks the capacity of understanding it. Sometimes al-‘Akkād attributes the failure of the reader to the complex organic structure of the poem; because the reader cannot see the poem in its totality and integrity he finds it difficult and obscure. He also seems to attribute this failure to the unity of thought and feeling which distinguishes the good poem.

"The nature of a poetic idea is that it is a combination of sensation and imagination, or thought interconnected ... with sensation and imagination ... The poet should not be charged with obscurity when he expresses his ideas in forms different from those of the common and unintegrated ones."

The characteristics of difficult poetry appear more explicit in al-‘Akkād’s later writings. In an essay
concerned with the renewal of Arabic poetry, published in 1950, he writes:

"The spirit of lyrical poetry has accompanied the Arabic poem from the very beginning of its history. Thus the Arabic poem moves from one simple and unalloyed feeling to another. It very rarely shows a complex and intricate (interconnected) passion which corresponds to different souls and states of mind. The difference between lyrical (simple) and complex poetry is one between a fiddle which produces a single and regular melody, and an orchestra which, being composed of many and different instruments, is able to produce various but harmonious sounds. It must be understood that the variety and harmony (of tunes) rather than the multiplicity of instruments is what should be aimed at. For the melody produced by a thousand fiddles remains simple and regular, whereas the one produced by a fiddle, flute, tambourine and violin can be complex and harmonious."

This demand for complexity seems to include both poetic experience and language and explains al-'Akkād's other demand for a varied metrical pattern. The comparison of the good poem to the harmonious symphony is significant. It appears to suggest that the poem must be a kind of symphony written in words, that is, the poet must make use of the technique of music or that poetry must be musical and suggestive in its language.

The conception of the poem as a complex of thought and feeling has received its best expression in the preface which al-'Akkād wrote to his collection of poems After the Storms.

"It is a misconception to think of poetry as equivalent to emotion, and of the poet as a man of feeling rather than of thinking ... In fact, higher literature can never be purely emotional. The works of the great poets such as Shakespeare, Goethe, al-Khāyāmī and al-Mutanabbi provide us with ample evidence ... Shakespeare's sonnets represent a group of ideas in which understanding and feeling are intermingled ... Faust, the greatest work of Goethe, is a philosophical poem concerned with the philosophy of life and existence, good and evil, and
knowledge and conscience. It requires no less thinking and concentration than do works of logic, mathematics and chemistry. Al-Khayyám's Quatrains can be described as Al-Khayyám's thought, for each quatrain represents an idea or a group of ideas. As regards al-Mutanabbi, there is no poem by him which neglects thought and which can be considered as purely emotional ... What distinguishes man is his ability to feel when he thinks and to think when he feels ... The man whose power of thinking is neglected is a man whose character is at fault. A literature which represents such a man cannot be perfect."

Al-'Akkád goes on to say that feelings differ in degree and in kind. The feeling of a higher degree or intricate kind appears obscure and baffling to those who cannot rise to it. Therefore, they depreciate it.

Thus to al-'Akkád good poetry, which expresses complex philosophical ideas and intricate feelings cannot avoid being obscure and difficult. In fact, good poetry, being a synthesis of thought, emotion and imagination, is bound to be obscure and difficult. It is important to notice here that al-'Akkád does not attribute the difficulty and obscurity of a good poem to its language, but to its complex organic structure and intricacy of thought and feeling.

In the essays "Clarity and Obscurity in Poetic Styles" and "The Symbolist School" al-'Akkád's principles are not difficulty and complexity, but clarity and lucidity. He charges the French symbolist poets with obscurity and complexity. At first sight, al-'Akkád's views seem to conflict with each other. But a closer examination shows that they represent a consistent theory. In its essence al-'Akkád's demand for clarity is a demand for faithfulness to
poetic experience and for a concrete presentation of it. He accepts the symbol in so far as it represents an intuitive perception, and denies it validity when it is used for its own sake or as an ornament. He even says that a vague symbolic expression is indispensable when the poet's experience is itself vague. He does not object to the obscurity which he finds sometimes in the poems of Coleridge, Browning, Tennyson and other English romantic poets, but welcomes it as an expression of profound intuitive truth. Sometimes he seems to conceive of the good poem as a composition of concrete images which stand for something abstract and invisible. Thus he shares with the symbolist poets and writers many of their views. This must be expected by every one who knows his theory of knowledge, which he formulated under the influence of Kant and Schopenhauer who were also influential in the French symbolist movement. His criticism of symbolism begins thus:

"Like existentialism, symbolism is one of the sound doctrines which are sometimes corrupted by their followers."

The theory of poetic language which the above-mentioned essays express has its root in al-'Akkād's distinction between imagination (this being an intuitive faculty) and reason, or between the intuitive vital truth and the mechanical lifeless one: (the latter, being the concern of the scientist and not admitted by the poet). The realm of poetry is not the world of phenomena but of noumena which is attained by imagination and intuition alone. Thus the difference between poetry and
Science is not merely a difference between two languages, the one vague and the other precise, but between two kinds of knowledge or truth and two ways of dealing with the world; a difference between the kinds of material which imagination and reason use and the ways in which they use it. Therefore, no scientific work can be transformed into a poem, and no poem can be turned into a scientific work. To do so we would need to change not their languages but their materials and systems, that is, we must destroy them and replace them by other works.

This is the ground of al-‘Akkād's demand for clarity. No one who investigates this ground can fail to see that it leads not to a clear definite language but to a poetic language which depends on suggestion and the use of imagery, and opposes thus the scientific one, which is clear, precise, and direct. The two languages must be different since the one appeals mainly to emotion and imagination, and the other to reason. Al-‘Akkād demands not clarity but a suggestive language which, while leading to "flights of imagination" and evoking "trains of ideas and feelings", does not conceal the poet's meaning. It is at once a revelation and concealment, "a transparent veil which covers but does not hide" the feeling and idea expressed. It is in al-‘Akkād's own words "a clarity pregnant with suggestions and ideas". He illustrates it by Muslim ibn al-Walīd's line:

(1) Fatigued, dismayed, and perplexed the winds moves in it

Seeking refuge in the enclosures of rocks.

(1) تَشْتَريَة بِهِ حَسَبَ مَعْلُوَةٍ حِيْرٍ تَلْوَى بِتَأْيِضٍ إِلَّهَيْكَ
al-Buhturi’s:

آناك الريح أطلق يحتال ضاحيا
(1)
Ibn al-Rumi’s:

وادا سايل في الصحرار رأيتا
(2)
Katari ibn al-Fujaya’s:

ويليهم لواء الخنف كمل به
(3)
and al-Ma‘arri’s:

قال صحبي في ليالي من الحدود
(4)

These lines, which are characterized by their richness in imagery-personification and metaphor- and their power of suggestion, show clearly that al-Akkad does not want a plain and naked language, though he does not reject it when he finds it expressive and precise. He wants simple but subtle language, not rhetorical or ornamental. Kuthayyir’s lines, which he gives in the essay "On Styles", might illustrate it.

(1) The gay spring has come laughing in pride and beauty

As though it were about to speak.

(2) When it emerges in the soul I see it

like one blooming in his youth.

(3) A day of pleasure it was for the seekers of ease and comfort,

but my pleasure was in giving myself to the flaming fires of the war.

Clear was my stand, unmasked the war,

And the sea of death in flow.

(4) (Lost) in two seas of darkness and desert said my companions

When two bright stars rose above us:

“We are drowned, can two stars,

Themselves drowned in darkness, rescue us?”
Imagery.

In the essay "On Styles" al-‘Akkād seems to relate a part of the difficulty of good poetry to its expression and imagery. He says that poetry does not merely consist of words and ideas but essentially of images. He also says that the beauty of poetry is due mainly to its imagery or images. To him the image is a concrete or "sensuous presentation of an abstract truth", and imagination the power which "transforms the language of the mind into that of the senses". This is one of the factors which contribute to the obscurity of good poetry. It explains with the other factors why a good poem

"requires more attention and thinking than (does a work in) descriptive geometry or any other difficult branch of science."

In the essay "The Symbolist School" the object of al-‘Akkād's criticism is not, as many of his readers think, symbolism but obscurity. He writes:

"Life has many mysteries; the world often strikes us with notions which cannot be expressed in words; thus symbolic and metaphorical language is unavoidable; what is shadowy and vague has to be presented in a shadowy and vague form." "Literature cannot dispense with suggestion and symbol; brevity is what characterizes

(1) When we satisfied every need from Mīnah, and he who wished to pass his hands over the corners of the shrine had done so, and when our animals were saddled, and the travellers had departed without waiting for those who came later, we began to pull the fringes of conversation while the flat valleys flowed with the necks of the camels.
good art in which the mind feels emancipated from the bonds of external appearances and attached to the realm of inner ideas which words cannot fully express, but only refer to." "The symbol is an old, rooted feature in man's intuition and power of expression; the dreamer expresses his feeling of distress and fear in the form of a symbolic story in which he imagines a fearful object or beast ...; The mystic also communicates himself in a symbolic way, because he cannot grasp clearly the notions which occur to him in a state of trance, rapture and ecstasy; thus in his expression he is forced to use similes, symbols and allegories ..."

Of the French symbolist movement he says:

"When the symbolist school appeared, it was something desirable, something which the evolution of thought and feeling demanded." "... Unless it turns the whole world into symbols, allegories and phantasies, symbolism is something necessary for man. But it becomes harmful when it adopts 'symbol for the sake of symbol' or 'obscurity for the sake of obscurity' as its motto ... The French symbolists were of great use when they confined themselves to these limits, represented the revolt of intuition against the vanity of reason and science, and liberated French and European poetry from their old rules and regular metres."

It is apparent that al-`Akkād's criticism is not directed against symbolism, but against obscurity. He wants suggestion, not vagueness. He says that intuition shares with reason the right of explaining the world and dealing with the mysteries of life, and that the unconscious mind has always been a source of creation. He also says:

"The more we esteem intuition, and understand the function of imagination, the more we esteem art; for art is not restricted to sensations and sensible objects, nor is imagination divorced from the realities of things; imagination is a creative power which penetrates the deepest mysteries of creation."

But to him the belief in intuition, imagination and the unconscious mind does not invalidate and obliterate the function of the senses and the conscious mind. The world of
phenomena is inseparable from that of noumena, and intuition and imagination are connected with reason. He thinks that when the symbol is used for its own sake it turns into ornament and loses its significance or value. In using the symbol in this way the poet destroys the validity of his work, distorts the nature of his experience and alienates himself from his readers. The symbol must be used only as a poetic means which enables the poet to express his vague notion or as a concrete presentation of an intuitive truth.

However, al-‘Akkad seems more in favour of metaphor and allegory than in favour of symbol. He thinks of metaphor as a kind of symbol, as a picture made of words, and as a means whereby the poet can express himself briefly and suggestively. Yet sometimes he thinks of metaphor, symbol, allegory and simile as though they belong to one category. What matters to him is not to distinguish between one kind of image and another, but to use the image, whether a symbol, a metaphor, or a simile as a concrete presentation of the abstract and mysterious, as a relationship between the soul and the world, and as a unification of thought and feeling. As regards the image which represents sense-impressions, it must be comprehensive and precise. He gives Ibn ar-Rūmī's following lines as examples of this kind of image:

\[
(1) \text{...and a gentle green field of flax over which rain-clouds slumber. When the North wind blows across it, its waves ripple so that you say it is a flowing stream.}
\]
To him these lines give total pictures of the situations they deal with. There is no word in them which does not contribute to the image or which can be omitted.

(f) Wit and Humour.

Al-'Akkad's writings on comic or satirical literature and poetry are concerned with al-Ma'arri, Bashshar, Ibn ar-Rumi, Hifni Nasif, and Bernard Shaw. Among the series of essays which he wrote in 1923 about al-Ma'arri we find two entitled "Malakat as-Sukhr 'Ind al-Ma'arri" (The Power of Irony in al-Ma'arri), "as-Sukhr fī Risālat al-Ghufrān" (Irony in Risālat al-Ghufrān); two years later he wrote three essays on Bashshar one of which was devoted to the discussion of Bashshar's, Di'bil's, and Ibn ar-Rumi's satirical poetry. In Egyptian Poets and Their Milieus he also devoted an essay to Hifni Nasif in which he discussed the difference and relationship between poetry, humour and witticism. The essay on Shaw was published in November, 1945 under the title "as-Sukhriyah 'Ind Bernard Shaw" (Irony in Bernard Shaw). Two other general essays, the one on "Witticism" (an-Nuktah), and the other on "The Philosophy of Laughter" (Falsafat ad-Dahik), were published in 1927 and 1947 respectively. A full discussion of Ibn ar-Rumi's satirical poetry is part of al-

(1) And the roaming moon emerged; the brightness of its watery face is enhanced by the cloudless sky.
The implication which these writings seem to bear is that man is not only in need of imagination and passion but also of wit and humour. The sole criticism which al-'Akkād makes of al-Mutanabbi is that his poetry exhibits little humour or wit. He attributes the absurdities and harshness which one finds in al-Mutanabbi's poetry to an insensitiveness to humour and laughter on al-Mutanabbi's part. He says that al-Mutanabbi was hardly aware of the delicate, ironical relationships of things and the profound sources of laughter in the manners and actions of men.

However, al-'Akkād, like Hazlitt, admits wit only in comic and satirical poetry, but he differs from Hazlitt in that he wants not pure satire or pure wit, but a satirical or comic poetry in which imagination and wit, or sympathy and irony are combined. Yet he seems to have reached his views under the influence of Hazlitt.

The two essays "The Power of Irony in al-Ma‘arri" and "Irony in Risālat al-Ghufrān" which were written immediately after the other essay "Imagination in Risālat al-Ghufrān", seem for this reason of a particular importance. In the essay "Imagination in Risālat al-Ghufrān" al-'Akkād, as we have already seen, denies that there is imagination in this work or in al-Ma‘arri in general. He says that the philosophical mind, rather than imagination, is what dominates al-Ma‘arri's works. Now he says: "Irony, rather than imagination... is the merit of al-Ma‘arri". This may suggest that he finds a
link between irony and reasoning. However, he relates al-Ma‘arrī's power of irony to three factors, his intense sensitiveness to things, his pessimism or contempt of life, and his strong sense of duty. To him al-Ma‘arrī was a man who felt a deep contempt or scorn for life and thought of the world as worthless and insignificant. He was of the view that no human claim is free from conceit or delusion, and no human action bears fruit. He saw vanity and conceit, the principal sources of irony, at the very basis of life. Thus to him every action ends in vanity, and every man is a victim of conceit. This strong belief in vanity and conceit is responsible for al-Ma‘arrī's irony. In al-‘Akkād's view, pessimism or the contempt of life and irony stand in close relationship with each other. To be contemptuous of things is to mock them or to treat them in an ironical way. Thus the pessimist and the mocker in al-Ma‘arrī are interconnected. Al-Ma‘arrī the pessimist was a man who suffered from a conflict between thought and feeling and possessed a strong sense of duty. He was, therefore, very sensitive to the contradictions of life and absurdities of men. To him the gap between what things are and what they ought to be was very wide. Al-‘Akkād describes laughter as

"a quick sudden comparison between appearance and reality (the external and internal) or between what is and what ought to be".

He seems to think of intelligence or wit as the power which apprehends the contradictions of things and which is responsible for laughter. Yet his words
"The mind which is capable of imagining things in their true and ideal forms alone can fulfil this quick and witty comparison",
suggest that laughter is a product of both wit and imagination working together. Laughter is an apprehension of the contradiction between what is sensed or understood and what is imagined. The merit of Risālat al-Ghufrān consists, al-ʿAkkād thinks, in irony and humour. In it al-ʿAkkād is a mocker who reveals the contradictions of life, both on earth and in heaven, and clothes things in the garments of their opposite or treats the causes of pain and despair as though they were causes of delight and hope.

In discussing Ibn ar-Rūmī's satirical poetry al-ʿAkkād also regards irony as a revelation of the contradictions of life and an illustration of the inconsistencies of human actions.

"Ibn ar-Rūmī was the poet of contradictions in an age of contradictions. He was the poet of a lively or revealing wit in an age of hypocrisy, an age characterized by a wide difference between appearance and reality, between what is and what ought to be ... Thus the elements of irony were both in himself and in his age."

What is common between Ibn ar-Rūmī and al-Maʿarrī is that both of them possessed a strong sense of the contradictions of life and suffered from some self-conflicts. In addition, they were men of acute sensitiveness and deep feeling. But Ibn ar-Rūmī's irony was directed by his associative imagination, rather than by a moral sense or a sense of duty. Therefore, they represent different kinds of irony. Ibn ar-Rūmī's satirical poetry reflects his "skill in toying with ideas and
forms" and amount to represent a ludicrous depiction of men's defects, very often physical. Al-'Akkād illustrates his views with many examples from Ibn ar-Rūmī's poetry. Here are some of these examples. They describe a female singer, a hump-backed man, a bearded man, and others.

(1) The tone she sings is suppressed by a choking across her throat. When she sings, the veins in her neck swell as though they were the habitations of wood-frothers.

(2) Short-necked and long in the head, he (the humpback) is like one cowering from a blow, or as though having received one beating and expecting another.

(3) And a beard worn by a fool is like two sails open to the wind; had he set it against the wind, he would not have been able to advance an inch; or had he dipped it into the sea, he would have fished all the whales with it.

(4) 'Iblīs is hard on himself, though he will not live for ever; if he could live harder, then he would inhale only from one nostril.
Al-‘Akkūd seems to regard such descriptions as the product of both wit and imagination (associative imagination). This might mean that associative imagination and wit are connected powers.
CHAPTER V
EUROPEAN INFLUENCES IN AL-‘AKKĀD’S CRITICAL THEORIES

In the following pages an attempt has been made to show the European, English and German, influences in al-‘Akkād’s critical theories. The writers mainly involved are Hazlitt, Coleridge, Carlyle, Wordsworth, J.S. Mill, Shelley, Keats, Smuts, Schopenhauer, Schiller and Kant. Some of them have far-reaching theories, but I have confined myself in this exposition to such of their views as are paralleled in al-‘Akkād’s writings.

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1. Beauty

(a) Beauty and Freedom; Schopenhauer, Schiller, Kant and Coleridge.

In al-‘Akkād’s theories of beauty as freedom in appearance, and as freedom in idea there appear various influences exercised by Schopenhauer, Schiller and Kant. Of Schopenhauer’s influence there is ample evidence. We also know that al-‘Akkād was well acquainted with Kant’s Critique of Aesthetic Judgement. The influence of Schiller alone raises some doubt, for we have no historical evidence for it. Kallias Letters in which Schiller expressed his theory of beauty as freedom in appearance or form does not seem to have been translated into English. But the other series of letters On the Aesthetic Education of Man was twice
translated into English in the 19th century. Here Schiller has expressed a new theory of beauty as a path towards the freedom of man, as "a living form", and as the object of the play-impulse. In al-'Akkād's writings after 1921 we find many references to Schiller, his character, poetry, literary criticism and philosophy. He was well acquainted with Carlyle's writings on Schiller. Towards the close of his essay "Schiller" Carlyle writes:

"Schiller's philosophical performances relate chiefly to matters of Art; not, indeed, without significant glances into still more important regions of speculation: nay Art, as he viewed it, has its basis on the most important interests of man, and of itself involves the harmonious adjustment of these".

Carlyle goes on to say of Schiller's letters On The Aesthetic Education of Man:

"We have already undertaken to present to our readers, on a future occasion, with some abstract of the Aesthetic Letters, one of the deepest, most compact pieces of reasoning we are anywhere acquainted with ...".

In the other essay "The State of German Literature" Carlyle also mentions these letters and quotes from them. It seems that at least through English versions and English studies on Schiller al-'Akkād knew the German writer's theories of beauty.

The influence of Schopenhauer seems inseparable from that of Schiller. But whereas Schiller's influence appears mainly in al-'Akkād's theory of beauty as freedom in

appearance or form, Schopenhauer's influence appears in the other theory: beauty as idea and as freedom in idea. Kant's influence is almost entirely confined to al-‘Akkād's third theory in which beauty is conceived as representation or form, and the beautiful as an object of pleasure without any interest. Coleridge's views of beauty as "subjection of matter to spirit" or as "Mulsedty in Unity", and as a product of man's imagination and feeling might have also influenced al-‘Akkād.

In his essay "Schopenhauer's Opinion of the Meaning of Beauty", al-‘Akkād has expressed indirectly his debt to the German philosopher. He seems to have derived from Schopenhauer his view of beauty as freedom in idea. Though the idea was never fully stated by Schopenhauer, it is implicit in his essay "On the Metaphysics of the Beautiful and on Aesthetics" with which al-‘Akkād was acquainted.

Like al-‘Akkād, Schopenhauer attaches beauty to the world of Ideas, Platonic Ideas, and classifies the beautiful objects according to the hierarchy of species. In his metaphysics the world of Ideas appears as a world of freedom, freedom from Will and causes of matter. This was well apprehended by al-‘Akkād. Thus in his above-mentioned essay al-‘Akkād writes:

"Schopenhauer's conception of beauty is related to his metaphysics and philosophy of life. He divides the world into Idea and Will and claims priority for the

1. The essay was translated into English with some other essays of Schopenhauer by Ernest Belfort Box, Selected Essays of Arthur Schopenhauer. London, 1891. The title of the essay mentioned here is E.B. Box's.
former over the latter. The world as Will is a world of causes, laws and restrictions of things by each other. It is our world of desires, pains and suffering ... Our pleasure in beauty is disinterested reflection on a pure Idea ... free from the world of causes and necessities.

In these few lines al-‘Akkād has made the relationship between his theory and Schopenhauer's very clear. After some critical remarks concerning Schopenhauer's theory he also writes:

"Schopenhauer asserts that inorganic matter has no beauty, gives no pleasure and, moreover, oppresses the heart. Why? Does inorganic matter represent no idea? No. In Schopenhauer's opinion every sensible object stands for an idea. It oppresses the heart because it indicates stagnation and motionlessness, denial of will, want of freedom and submission to law and necessity. Schopenhauer himself has mentioned this reason and has written: "The melancholy impression which this kind of scenery (the scenery which offers to the eye nothing but a mass of bare crags) makes is mainly due to the fact that masses of inorganic matter obey one law only, the law of gravity; and consequently everything is disposed in accordance with it.

Contrarily, the sight of vegetation produces a feeling of direct pleasure, and that too in a high degree; and the pleasure is greater in proportion as the vegetation is rich, various, luxuriant, and left to itself. The more immediate reason of this is that, in the case of vegetation, the law of gravity appears to be overcome, as the vegetable world tends to move in a direction the exact contrary of that taken by gravity. This is, indeed, the direct way in which the phenomenon of life announces its presence, as a new and higher order of things. It is an order to which we ourselves belong: it is something akin to us and the element of our being. And so, at the sight of it, our heart is moved. That straight upward direction is the source of our pleasurable feeling. This is why a fine group of trees looks so much better if a few tall, tapering pines shoot out from the middle of it. On the other hand, a tree that has been cut down has lost all its effect upon us: and one that grows obliquely has not so much (effect) as one that stands straight up. A tree which bends over the earth with its branches obedient to the law of gravity, makes us melancholy; and we call it
The comment which al-‘Akkād made on Schopenhauer's words is significant:

"After reading this passage you think that Schopenhauer is proceeding to the natural conclusion of his statement, that is, that things displease us by their suggestiveness of the notion of submission and delight us by the suggestiveness of the notion of freedom, or that they displease us by their want of will and delight us by their possession of it. But he leaves this conclusion and derives another unexpected one. He claims that the oppressive effect that some objects produce on us is due to the fact that they belong to the world of Will rather than of Idea, and that the objects which please us belong to the world of Idea rather than of Will. Thus he walks with Freedom in the middle stretch of the road and departs from it at its beginning and end."

Thus in his essay al-‘Akkād has put our finger on the origin of his theory which conceives beauty as freedom in idea. The view that inorganic objects are beautiful in so far as they show a resemblance to life and an illusion of freedom also seems to have its origin in Schopenhauer's theory. In his essay "On the Metaphysics of the Beautiful and on Aesthetics" Schopenhauer writes:

"Water neutralizes in a great measure the oppressive effect of its inorganic composition by its exceeding mobility, which gives it an appearance of life, and also by its constant interplay of light and shade. Besides, water is absolutely indispensable for the existence of life."

1. The translation of Schopenhauer's words are taken from The Essential Schopenhauer, pp.31-2. London, Unwin Books, 1962. Schopenhauer's essay is translated under the title "The Metaphysics of Fine Art". In the translation of E.B. Box the passage can be found on pp. 286-7.

2. The Essential Schopenhauer, p. 32.
In order to see more clearly the relationship between al-‘Akkād and Schopenhauer’s theories a brief survey of the latter’s views is required. To Schopenhauer the world is Idea or Will in objectification. Will, the inner reality or the thing-in-itself, is in a continuous successive process of objectification. The levels of this objectification are called Ideas or the Platonic Ideas. Schopenhauer seems to deny the material world any essence apart from mental contemplation.

The beautiful objects are those objects which show Will at its higher grades of objectification or the Platonic Ideas. Thus Schopenhauer’s concept of beauty is, like al-‘Akkād’s, specific. The beautiful objects differ in their degrees of beauty according to the grades of the objectification of Will in them, or according to their expressiveness of the Platonic Ideas. Since the Platonic Idea finds its full expression in man, man represents the highest form of beauty. Inorganic objects, save water, are expelled by Schopenhauer from the aesthetic realm. Between man and inorganic objects come animals and plants.

In his series of letters, the Kallias Letters, which he wrote in 1793 to Korner, a disciple of Kant, Schiller, as we have already said, expressed his theory of beauty as
freedom in appearance or form.¹ His aim was to prove the objectivity of beauty and the self-containedness of the beautiful, but the theory, taken as a whole, seems to conceive beauty as objective and subjective at the same time, that the aesthetic experience has two dimensions, the one objective, and the other subjective.

Schiller thinks of the beautiful as that object which evokes, by virtue of its form which is a manifestation of inner purposive organization or nature, a sense of freedom in the observer. Yet the principle of freedom does not reside in the object itself, but is transferred to it from the observer. He asserts that there exist in nature phenomena and forms the organizations or techniques of which suggest the idea of freedom, and that these phenomena and forms are alone beautiful, that there is a "vital force" in nature which makes some of its objects appear free from the nexus of causes and therefore beautiful. Thus while Schiller attaches beauty to the realm of appearances and forms, he thinks of the appearance of the beautiful object as inseparable from its essence or inner nature. In the beautiful there is a "pure coincidence of the inner being with the form."

To Schiller beauty as "freedom in appearance" means self-determination, autonomy or liberation of the form from

¹ In presenting the theory I have relied upon S.S. Kerry's work Schiller's Writings on Aesthetics, Chapter III, The Kallias Letters, 1961, particularly pp.48-73. But this does not mean that I have repeated his views of Schiller's theory.
influences and causes alien to the inner nature of the object. If any object is to be beautiful, its form must appear to have its own determinant principle and to be able, therefore, to give rise to a sense of freedom in the observer. He thinks of this sense of freedom, which the percipient feels in the presence of the beautiful object, as the condition of its beauty, but he also thinks that the disposition of the beautiful object is the sole cause of its beauty. The tree-leaf he takes to be beautiful because it appears free from the causal nexus of the outside world. It shows a "determinancy of form" and stands as a symbol of freedom. On the other hand, he banishes the broad-based or wide-bellied vase from the region of beauty because it arouses not a sense of freedom but a sense of submission to the law of gravity, a force extraneous to its inner nature. He also regards the Spanish palfrey more beautiful than the cart-horse because it appears lighter and freer. The example of the wave-movement, which we have already met in al-‘Akkād's and Schopenhauer's theories, is also given by Schiller as an object of beauty.

Schiller, like al-‘Akkād, seems to associate freedom and in consequence beauty with lightness, grace and ease of movement, and he contrasts it with weight and mass. But, unlike al-‘Akkād, he does not restrict beauty to animate nature. To him a musical instrument can be as beautiful as a tree, since its form exhibits autonomy and is a manifestation of its inner nature. However, Schiller classifies the
beautiful objects according to their suggestiveness of freedom or exhibition of self-determinant will.

In his theory Schiller has paid some attention to the relationship between beauty and harmony. He speaks sometimes of "technique in freedom" and defines beauty as "nature in artistic technique". But, like al-‘Akkād, he seems to regard harmony not as the cause of beauty, but as a characteristic inherent in the beautiful object and related to the state of self-determination and freedom which the object displays.

In his other series of letters On the Aesthetic Education of Man Schiller defines beauty as a "living shape" or form, meaning that it is a unity of mind and body, spirit and matter, life and form, freedom and necessity. But he does not confine beauty to animate nature. To him a block of marble, though it is lifeless, can become a living form through the architect and sculptor. On the other hand, a living being or a man may remain far from being a living shape. For to be so

"his shape should be life, and his life, shape ... He is a living shape, only when his form lives in our perception, and his life shapes itself in our understanding, and this will always be the case, where we decide that he is beautiful."¹

Like al-‘Akkād, Schiller also regards beauty as the object of the play-impulse:

"Man is only serious with the agreeable, the good, the perfect; but with Beauty he plays". "Man shall only play with Beauty, and shall play only with Beauty".¹

He also distinguishes between play in this respect and common sports which are directed only to material objects. Man's play with beauty is a sign of his manhood and power of life.

"Man only plays, where, in the full signification of the word, he is a man, and he is only entirely a man when he plays."²

-Coleridge seems to be the only English writer who was influential in al-‘Akkād’s theory of beauty as freedom. To him the beautiful is that object "in which the many, still seen as many, becomes one" or as "Multeity in Unity", and as the object which exhibits

"subjection of matter to spirit so as to be transformed into a symbol, in and through which the spirit reveals itself, ... that the most beautiful, where the most obstacles to a full manifestation have been most perfectly overcome".³

He finds no difference between the two conceptions. For beauty and life mean the same to him. He defines life as "the power which discloses itself from within as a principle of unity in the many" or "of unity in multeity",⁴ and thinks

1. Ibid, pp.108-9, 111.
2. Ibid, pp.110, 111.
of evolution as a process leading to organic wholes through which life fulfils its functions. Thus beauty as "Multeity in Unity" means the subordination of the shapeless and lifeless matter to the power of life or spirit.

"The idea of life victory or strife is necessary; as virtue consists not simply in the absence of vices, but in the overcoming of them. So it is in beauty. The sight of what is subordinated and conquered heightens the strength and the pleasure, and this should be exhibited by the artist either inclusively in his figure, or else out of it, and beside it to act by way of supplement and contrast."\(^1\)

The similarity between these views and al-’A这座城市’s requires no discussion.

Coleridge, like al-’A这座城市, also thinks of beauty as the unity of life and form, of spirit and body. It is "the balance, the perfect reconciliation, effected between ... (the) two conflicting principles of the FREE LIFE, and of the confining FORM", or "the union of the shapely (formosum) with the vital".

In the inanimate object or "the dead organic" beauty "depends on regularity of form, the first and lowest species of which is the triangle with all its modifications, as in crystals, architecture, etc.; in the living organic it is not mere regularity of form which would produce a sense of formality; neither it is subservient to anything beside itself. It may be present in a disagreeable object in which the proportion of the parts constitute a whole".\(^2\)

Coleridge seems to regard beauty as specific and arrange

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the beautiful objects according to the hierarchy of evolution. Man who represents in his theory of evolution the highest form of totality in nature must be the highest manifestation of beauty. On the other hand, the crystals and "the lowest forms of the vegetable and animal world", which represent the simplest forms of totality or unity, must stand as the lowest forms of beauty. However, Coleridge does not restrict beauty to organic nature. The frost on a window-pane can be as beautiful as a tree or a sea-weed. For in it, as in the tree and the sea-weed, we can

"trace the parts, and their relations to each other, and to the whole. Here is the stalk or trunk, and here the branches or sprays - sometimes even the buds or flowers."  

An old coach-wheel can also evoke a sense of beauty in us if we

"see how the rays proceed from the centre to the circumferences, and how many different images are distinctly comprehended at one glance, as forming one whole, each part in some harmonious relation to each and to all."  

Here Coleridge seems to think of beauty as harmony. But his theory taken as a whole attributes the beauty of an object to the manifestation of life in it rather than to its harmony. Harmony is something inherent in the beautiful object, and not the cause of its beauty. Beauty is "Multeity

in Unity", and "Multeity in Unity" means life or an organic whole.

"...Proportion is not the positive cause, or the universal and necessary condition of beauty, were it only that proportion implies the perception of the coincidence of quantities with a pre-established rule of measurement, and is therefore always accompanied with an act of discursive thought. We declare at first sight the Swan beautiful, as it floats on with its long arching neck and protruding breast... We ask not what proportion the neck bears to the body; - through all the changes of graceful motion it brings itself into unity, as an harmonious part of an harmonious whole... The long neck of the ostrich is in exact and evident proportion to the height of the animal, and is of manifest utility and necessity to the bird, as it stoops down to graze and still walks on. But not being harmonious with the body by plumage or colour, it seems to run along the grass like a serpent before the headless tall body that still stalks after it, inspiring at once the sense of the Deformed and the Fantastic."1

If beauty is harmony, it is an inner harmony which is due to the principle of life in the beautiful object.

Another point in Coleridge's theory of beauty is that the beautiful is an object of pleasure or "complacency" without "any interest, sensual or intellectual." "The contemplation or intuition of" the beauty of an object "precedes the feeling of complacency". Beauty is something which belongs to the intellect rather than to sensation, and can be grasped only through pure reflection on the object.2

It is difficult to know how far Coleridge influenced al-Ākkād. But the similarity between their views is very evident.

1. Ibid, pp.245-46.
2. Ibid, pp.241-42, see also p.257.
(b) Truth and Beauty; Hazlitt, Carlyle and Keats.

The origin of al-Akkad's theory which distinguishes between the poetic or imaginative truth and both the historical and scientific truth, and identifies beauty with truth can be found in the writings of Hazlitt and Carlyle.

In the lecture "On Poetry in General" Hazlitt thinks of poetry as "the language of the imagination and the passions" or as "the universal language which the heart holds with nature and itself." He also describes poetry as "an imitation of nature" meaning that it is a record of truth.¹ But to him, as to al-Akkad, the truth which poetry represents differs from both the scientific and historical ones. While science represents a "mechanical knowledge" or truth, and history a "literal truth", poetry describes the living or "flowing" truth.

"If history is grave study, poetry, may be said to be a graver; its materials lie deeper and are spread wider". "Poetry puts a spirit of life and motion in the universe. It describes the flowing not the fixed."²

The scientist deals with the outer and lifeless aspects of things or nature, and the poet with the inner and living ones:

"Let the naturalist ... catch the glow-worm, carry it home in a box, and find it next morning nothing but a little grey worm; let the poet ... visit it at evening, when beneath the scented hawthorn, and the crescent moon it has built itself a palace of emerald light. This is also one part of nature, one appearance which the glow-worm presents, and that not the least interesting; so

². Ibid, pp.1-2,3.
poetry is one part of the history of the human mind, though it is neither science nor philosophy."\textsuperscript{1}

Thus to Hazlitt, as to al-'Akkad, imagination is not a departure from reality or truth, but a penetration into it.

The language of the imagination is

"not the less true to nature, because it is false in point of fact; but so much the more true and natural, if it conveys the impression which the object under the influence of passion makes on the mind."\textsuperscript{2}

Poetry

"hold(s) the mirror up to nature; seen through the medium of passion and imagination not divested by means of literal truth or abstract reason."\textsuperscript{3}

Therefore

"the poet and painter of imagination are superior to the mere philosopher or man of science ... They treat of the highest categories of the human soul, pleasure and pain."\textsuperscript{4}

Poetry cannot be condemned as a dream or a fiction. For

"if poetry is a dream, the business of life is much the same. If it is a fiction ... there is no other nor better reality."

Poetry is a revelation of "the inmost recesses of thought" and a penetration into "our whole being."\textsuperscript{5}

When Hazlitt describes poetry as "an imitation of nature" he does not mean a mere copying of nature, but a representation of nature heightened by imagination, which is "the power of feigning things according to nature" or the "unconscious power of the mind which is as true to nature, as itself."\textsuperscript{6}

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represents an "intuitive perception of the hidden analogies of things", and "works unconsciously like nature". Hazlitt seems to contrast poetic truth or knowledge with the scientific and thinks that

"the progress of (mechanical) knowledge ... has a tendency to circumscribe the limits of the imagination, and to clip the wings of poetry ... The history of religious and poetical enthusiasm is much the same; and both have received a sensible shock from the progress of experimental philosophy ... Heavens have gone farther off, and grown astronomical."2

Truth or truth to nature which he calls sometimes "gusto" is Hazlitt's first principle in his criticism of poetry and painting. In his lecture "On Chaucer and Spenser" he writes:

"Nature is the soul of art: there is a strength as well as a simplicity in the imagination that reposes entirely on nature, that nothing else can supply."3

Like al-'Âkîd, he regards Shakespeare as the supreme poet of nature who describes things "as they would be".4 Here in order to see Hazlitt's influence in al-'Âkîd's views of Shakespeare we must quote him at length:

"(Shakespeare) surveyed the generations of men, and the individual as they passed, with their different concerns, passions, follies, vices, virtuous, actions, and motives - as well as those that they knew, as those which they did not know, or acknowledge to themselves ... The world of spirit lay open to him, like the world of real men and women; and there is the same truth in his delineations of the one as of the other; for if the preternatural characters he describes could be supposed to exist, they would speak, and feel, and act, as he makes them ... When he conceived of a character, whether real or imaginary, he not only entered into all its thoughts and feelings, but seemed instantly, and as if by touching a secret spring, to be surrounded with the

3. Ibid, p.28.
4. Ibid, p.46.
same objects, 'subject to the same skyey influences', the same local outward, and unforeseen accidents which would occur in reality. Thus the character of Calibon, not only stands before us with a language and manners of its own, but the scenery and situation of the enchanted island he inhabits, the traditions of the place, its strange noises, its hidden recesses, ... are given with a miraculous truth, and with all the familiarity of an old recollection.¹

Hazlitt, like al-ʻAkkād, attributes this "miraculous truth", which makes things appear to the reader as though they were memories recalled, to Shakespeare's power of imagination or his "faculty of transforming himself at will into whatever he chose" and identifying "himself with the character he wishes to represent".² He praises Chaucer and Spenser for representing the same truth:

"Chaucer's descriptions of natural scenery possess the same sort of characteristic excellence, or what might be termed gusto. They have a local truth and freshness, which gives the very feeling of the air, the coolness or moisture of the ground. Inanimate objects are thus made to have a fellow-feeling in the interest of the story; and render back the sentiment of the speaker's mind."

Of Chaucer's The Flower and the Leaf he says that everything in it is

"expressed with a truth and feeling, which makes the whole appear like the recollection of an actual scene."³

Since the poetic or imaginative truth differs in nature from the historical and scientific truth, it must also differ from them in its language:

"The impressions of common sense and strong imagination, that is, of passion and indifference, cannot be the same, and they must have a separate language to do justice to either." "People continually find fault with the

colours of style as incompatible with the truth of reasoning, but without any foundation whatever ... With respect of moral truth (as distinct from mathematical), whether a thing is good or evil, depends on the quantity of passion, of feeling, of pleasure and pain connected with it ... Passion ... is the essence, the chief ingredient in moral truth; and the warmth of passion is sure to kindle the light of imagination on the objects around it. The 'words that glow' are almost inseparable from the 'thoughts that burn'. Hence logical reason and practical truth are disparates. It is easy to raise an outcry against violent invectives, to talk loud against extravagance and enthusiasm, to pick a quarrel with everything but the most calm, candid, and qualified statements of facts; but there are enormities to which no words can do adequate justice. Are we then, in order to form a complete idea of them, to omit every circumstance of aggravation, or to suppose every feeling of impatience that arises out of the details, lest we should be accused of giving way to the influence of prejudice and passion? This would be to falsify the impression altogether, to misconstrue reason, and fly in the face of nature."

The unity of beauty and truth was also asserted by Hazlitt more than once:

"... To the genuine artist, truth, nature, beauty, are almost different names for the same thing ... The superiority of high art over the common or mechanical consists in combining truth of imitation with beauty and grandeur of subject." 2

And again:

"Besides beauty, there is truth, which is always one principal thing. It doubles the effect of beauty, which is a mere affection without it." 3

He also writes of Chaucer:

"He is contented to find grace and beauty in truth ... His metaphors ... are not for ornament, but use, and as like as possible to the things themselves. He does not affect to show his power over the reader's mind, but the power which his subject has over his own ... There is no artificial, pompous display, but strict parsimony of the poet's materials ... He principally describes external appearances as indicating character, as symbols of internal sentiment." 4

However, Hazlitt does not always identify beauty with truth. Of Spenser he says:

"The love of beauty, ... and not of truth, is the moving principle of his mind."

Here he seems to be identifying beauty with ornamentation:

"At times he (Spenser) becomes picturesque from his intense love of beauty. He is guided in his fantastic delineations by no rule but the impulse of an exhaustible imagination". "The language of Spenser is full, and copious, to overflowing: it is less pure... than Chaucer's and is enriched and adorned with phrases borrowed from the different languages of Europe, both ancient and modern."

Carlyle's theory of poetic truth and beauty has much in common with Hazlitt's and al-'Aḳṣād's. He reached his views under the influence of the German philosophers and writers, particularly Fichte, Goethe and Schiller, and it is in the course of his discussion of these philosophers and writers that he expressed these views. He differs from Hazlitt in that his theory has a religious or moral tinge.

As early as 1824 Carlyle expressed the view that "poetry ... exists not in time or place but in the spirit of man." For poetry is a product of imagination, and imagination is a part of man's nature:

"The divinities and demons, the witches; spectres, and fairies, are vanished from the world, ... but the Imagination which created these still lives, and will forever live in man's soul; and can again pour its wizard light over the Universe, and summon forth enchantments as lovely or impressive, and which its sister faculties will not contradict."

1. Ibid, pp.35, 43.
Carlyle finds, therefore, "the fiction of the poet" not "falsehood but the purest truth" and regards poetry as "the essence of all science" which "requires the purest of all studies".\(^1\) He distinguishes between poetic fiction or truth and the facts of science:

"We are not contending that fiction should become fact, or that no dramatic incident is genuine, unless it could be sworn before a jury."\(^2\)

Poetry and science have "separate purposes" and "laws". The poet or artist conceives "his subject in the secret shrine of his own mind, and knows, with a knowledge beyond all power of cavil, that it is true and pure."\(^3\) Poetic truth differs from mere fact or science in that it is "an immoral and essential truth; a Truth far deeper than the dictates of mere Mode ...".\(^4\)

This truth may be said to be "the sacred mystery of the Universe", the secret which is "open to all" but "seen by almost none",\(^5\) or "the Divine Idea" which "pervades the Universe" and which "lies hidden" from "the masses of men". The poets are the penetraters of this "sacred mystery" or "interpreters of this Divine Idea; a perpetual priesthood, ... standing forth, generation after generation, as the dispensers and living types of God's everlasting wisdom."\(^6\)

To the poet

"The Ideal world is not remote from the Actual one, but under it and within it; nay he is a poet, precisely because he can discern it there."

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3. Ibid, p.133.
Carlyle regards the poet then as "a vates, a seer; a gift of vision has been given him."  He apprehends the inner truth, "the sacred mystery" or "Divine Idea" by his "power of vision" or his "seeing eye", which "discloses the inner harmony of things; what Nature meant, what musical idea Nature has wrapped-up in these often rough embodiments."

This is one aspect of Carlyle's theory. The poet is "a Vates, ... in virtue of being sincere", sincere or faithful to Nature and to himself. Faithfulness to Nature and to the self is the first principle of poetry. Of Diderot Carlyle says:

"... Diderot stands forth as the main originator ... of that many-sided struggle towards what is called Nature, and copying of Nature, and faithfulness to Nature: a deep indispensable truth, subversive of that old error."

But to him Diderot's truth is "a half-truth", for Diderot failed to understand that "Art too is Art, as surely as Nature is Nature." His fault was that he imitated and copied Nature literally. He saw only the outer appearances of it.

In his essay on Burns Carlyle has expressed his notion of truth and faithfulness to nature more fully:

"To every poet, to every writer, we might say: Be true, if you would be believed. Let a man but speak forth with genuine earnestness the thought, the emotion, the actual condition of his own heart; and other men, so strangely are we all knit together, by the tie of sympathy, must and will give heed to him.

This may appear a very simple principle ... but the practical appliance is not easy; is indeed the fundamental difficulty which all poets have to strive with, and which scarcely one in the hundred ever fairly surmounts. A head too dull to discriminate the true from the false; a heart too dull to love the one at all risks, and to hate the other in spite of all temptations, are alike fatal to a writer. With either;

1. Ibid, p.244
or as more commonly happens, with both of these deficiencies combine a love of distinction, a wish to be original ... and we have Affectation, the bane of literature, as Cant, its elder brother, is of morals."  

Of Burns he says:

"He is an honest man, and an honest writer. In his success and his failure, in his greatness and his littleness, he is ever clear, simple, true, and glitters with no lustre but his own. We reckon this to be a great virtue; to be, in fact, the root of most other virtues literary as well as moral."  

These paragraphs seem to have been very influential in al-'Akād's criticism. They remind us of many passages in his writings on Ibn ar-Rūmī, Shawkī, Baudelaire and other poets. To both writers truth represents an aesthetic and moral value at the same time.

Like Hazlitt and al-'Akād, Carlyle regards Shakespeare as the supreme poet of nature:

"Priceless Shakespeare was the free gift of Nature ... I know not such a power of vision, such a faculty of thought, ... All things imaged in that great soul of his so true and clear, as in a tranquil unfathomable sea ... Perfect, more perfect than any other man, we may call Shakespeare in this: he discerns, knows as by instinct, what condition he works under, what his materials are, what his own force and its relation to them is. It is not a transitory glance of insight that will suffice; it is deliberate illumination of the whole matter; it is a calmly seeing eye ... 

Or indeed we may say again, it is what I called Portrait-painting, delineating of men and things, especially of men, that Shakespeare is great. All the greatness of the man comes out decisively here ... The thing he looks at reveals not this or that face of it, but its inmost heart, and generic secret: it dissolves itself as in light before him, so that he discerns the perfect structure of it. Creative, we said: poetic creation, what is this too but seeing the thing sufficiently? The word that will describe The Thing, follows of itself from such clear intense sight of the thing."  

"... There is more in Shakespeare's intellect

than we have yet seen. It is what I call an unconscious intellect... Those Dramas of his are products of Nature too, deep as Nature herself... Shakespeare's Art is not Artifice; the noblest worth of it is not there by plan or precontrivance. It grows up from the deeps of Nature, through this noble sincere soul, who is a voice of Nature."

The similarity between Hazlitt's, Carlyle's and al-'Akkād's views of Shakespeare requires no comment. To see this similarity we need only read their passages together.

The "inward and essential Truth" which Carlyle finds in Shakespeare and other poets is called "eternal Beauty". He speaks of poetic truth and beauty in the same way and even in the same terms. While explaining German criticism he writes:

"Poetic beauty, in its pure essence, is not... derived from anything external, or of merely intellectual origin; not from association, or any reflex or reminiscence of mere sensation; nor from natural love, either of imitation, of similarity in dissimilarity, of excitement by contrast, or of seeing difficulties overcome. On the contrary, it is assumed as underived; not borrowing its existence from such sources, but as lending to most of those their significance and principal charm for the mind. It dwells and is born in the inmost spirit of Man...; or rather, it is... another phase of the same highest principle in the mysterious infinitude of the human soul."

This passage also seems to have been very influential in al-'Akkād's criticism, particularly in his essays on Shawki and other Egyptian poets. To compare these words about 'beauty' with those about 'truth' is to see that the two terms meant much the same to Carlyle. He finds truth rather than pleasure is what constitutes the essence of poetry and poetic beauty.

Like al-'Akkād, he rejects both the principles of pleasure and

2. Ibid, vol. XV, p.44. 3. Ibid, p.47.
utility in poetry and art. But on this point he is at the very extreme:

"Art is to be loved, not because of its effects, but because of itself; not because it is useful for spiritual pleasure, or even for moral culture, but because it is Art, and the highest in man, and the soul of all Beauty."¹

Carlyle may seem to distinguish here between beauty and morality. But this is not the case. To him the provinces of beauty and morality "run into one another, and cannot be disjoined". Both the poet and the prophet are revealers of "the sacred mystery of the Universe"; the one seizes it on "the aesthetic side, as Beautiful, and the like", and the other "on the moral side, as Good and Evil, Duty and Prohibition".

"The one (is) ... a revealer of what we are to do, the other of what we are to love."²

Al-'Aţkâd's attitude towards the beautiful and the moral is much the same.

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Following Hazlitt, Keats has also asserted the unity of truth and beauty. The message of the urn at the end of 'Ode on a Grecian Urn' is very well-known.

"Beauty is Truth, Truth Beauty, that is all ye know on earth, and all ye need to know."

These lines have puzzled many of Keat's commentators and have been interpreted in many ways. For our purpose here we need

only understand them as they stand by themselves. Keats seems to believe in beauty as a manifestation of truth or of what is real. It is the truth of imagination and art, which gives meaning to life and pleasure to man. It is all that man needs on earth, to make sense of his life and take pleasure in it.

In a letter written on 22nd November, 1817 Keats also writes:

"I am certain of nothing but of the holiness of the Heart's affections and the truth of Imagination - What the imagination seizes as Beauty must be truth - whether it existed before or not - for I have the same Idea of all our Passions as of Love they are in their sublime, creative of essential Beauty." [1]

In other letters we read:

"The excellence of every Art is its intensity, capable of making all disagreeables evaporate, from their being in close relationship with Beauty and Truth." "When I wrote it (Endymion) it was a regular stepping of the Imagination towards a truth." "I never can feel certain of any truth but from a clear perception of its Beauty." [2]

In all this Keats is speaking of an imaginative and emotional or sensational truth. The Urn, being a beautiful work of art or a creation of imagination, represents to man a message of truth. However, he seems to lay the emphasis on beauty rather than on truth. Al-'Akkād differs from Keats in this. He puts the stress on truth not on beauty, and perceives the latter from its relationship to the former.

2. Ibid, pp.70, 90, 258.
2. Schiller on Aesthetic Education

In his series of letters On the Aesthetic Education of Man, which he wrote in 1793 during the Reign of Terror in France, Schiller set forth a new theory of education based on the proposition that man's need for aesthetic education is prior to his need for political freedom. These letters, which were twice translated into English in the 19th century, appear to have been very influential in al-‘Akkād's thinking after 1921. The reader of al-‘Akkād's writings in the years which followed this date can find many parallels between his views and Schiller's with regard to beauty, art and culture. Schiller seems to be the European writer to whom al-‘Akkād is most heavily indebted in his theory of aesthetic education. Both writers claim precedence for beauty over freedom and represent freedom as a unity of opposites: of spirit and matter, of mind and body. They also represent freedom as a moral principle rooted in the moral nature of man. They think that through beauty alone man can achieve his totality, the harmony of his spirit and body, gain his liberty and pass from the natural to the moral state. Freedom and moral guidance have no significance where man is alien to the principles of beauty and fine art. Therefore, Schiller writes:

"... In order to solve (the) political problem in experience, one must pass through the aesthetic, since it is Beauty that leads to Freedom." "All other representative forms mutilate man, since they are founded either exclusively upon the sensuous, or upon the spiritual part of his being; only the expression
of Beauty makes a whole out of him, since thereto, both his natures must harmonize. "1

Beauty restores the totality and harmony of both the individual and society and lifts them from the realm of necessity to the realm of freedom.

"The dynamic state can only make society possible, while restraining nature by nature; the ethical state can only make it (morally) necessary, while subjecting the single to the universal will; the aesthetic state alone can make it actual, since it fulfils the will of the whole through the nature of the individual. If need already impels man to society, and reason plants social principles within him, yet Beauty alone can impart to him a social character. Taste alone introduces harmony into society, since it establishes harmony in the individual." 2

Beauty resolves not only the conflict between the individual and society, but also the conflict of nature in the sexes so that

"a fairer necessity knits the sexes together, and sympathy of heart assists in preserving the alliance which was ... (knitted only) by the capricious and fickle moods of desire ... Soul looks into soul, and a generous interchange of inclination supplants a selfish traffic in pleasure. Desire enlarges and elevates itself to love, as humanity beams from its object; and a sordid advantage over sense is despised for a nobler triumph over will." 3

(a) **Beauty and Political Freedom.**

In the second letter, while criticising his age and society, Schiller writes:

"The course of events has given the spirit of the age a direction which threatens to remove it farther and farther from ideal art. This must abandon reality, and rise with decent boldness above necessity; for art is

a daughter of freedom, and must receive her commission from needs of spirit, not from the exigencies of matter. But now necessity rules, and depresses fallen humanity beneath its tyrannical yoke. Utility is the great idol of the age, to which all powers stoop and all talents do homage. The spiritual merit of art has no weight in its clumsy balance, and, robbed of every incitement, flees from the century's noisy mart. The spirit of philosophical inquiry itself seizes one province of the imagination after another, and the limits of art diminish the more those of science are enlarged.

The eyes of the philosopher and the man of the world are turned, full of expectation, towards the political arena, where, as is believed, the great destiny of humanity is now developed.¹

This criticism reminds us of many passages in al-ʿAkkād's writings after as well as before 1921. Al-ʿAkkād's criticism of his age and society is based on the same ground and refers to the same dangers: subjection to necessity, cult of utility, conquest of spirit by matter, abandonment of the art of ideal, and the domination of life by empirical knowledge and mechanical sciences. Schiller goes on to condemn this state of affairs and claim precedence for beauty over freedom. He says that man finds himself in the state before he could freely choose his position;

"need shaped his course according to the laws of Nature, before he could conform it to the laws of reason."

He finds this state in opposition to the moral character of man. For it "springs originally from force and not from law", while "mere conformity should serve as a law" with the moral man who "cannot be content ... with this forced condition, which only results from his natural-destination."²

1. Ibid, pp.55-6.  
But man is not a mere moral agent. He is also a material being. And "the state of nature" is "quite adequate" to his physical character. Therefore, his task is to harmonize in himself the physical with the moral or spiritual character,

"to create a third character, which, related to both of them, may construct a passage from the dominion of mere force to the dominion of law, and without retarding the development of the moral character, may serve as a sensible pledge of it..."  

Schiller finds in beauty and fine art the instrument whereby man can enoble his character and consequently improve his political life and conditions. For "all political improvements should result from the nobility of character", and for the state can improve the humanity of its subjects only by being itself founded on "improved humanity".  

In all this the similarity between Schiller's and al-'Akkād's views is evident. There remains, however, an essential difference between the two writers. Al-'Akkād thinks of freedom not so much as harmony and reconciliation between spirit and matter but as subjection of the latter to the former. This view is rejected by Schiller. He says that whenever man's two characters dominate each other man fails of his destination and freedom.

"The result will be no harmony, only uniformity, and man still remains for ever divided. Undoubtedly there must be subordination, but it must be mutual". "Every exclusive domination of one of (man's) two ground impulses, is a condition of force and constraint for him; and freedom only consists in the co-operation of both of his natures."  

1. Ibid, p.60. 2. Ibid, pp.76. 3. Ibid, pp. 99,117.
Another point of similarity between Schiller and al-ʿAkkād is the demand which both writers make for the principle of variety in unity.

"... It will continually testify, by an education yet deficient, if the moral character can maintain itself only at the sacrifice of the natural: and a government which is only in a condition to effect unity by the abolition of variety, will still remain very incomplete. The state should not only respect in the individual the objective and generic, but also the subjective and specific; and must not dispeople the realm of phenomena, while extending the unseen realm of morals."¹

This is al-ʿAkkād's theory of democracy to which he remained faithful all his life. To both Schiller and al-ʿAkkād the principle of variety in unity means life and freedom or unity of mind and nature.

(b) Culture and the Completeness of the Self.

To Schiller, as to al-ʿAkkād, true culture means the completeness of the self or the perfection of the individual. In the theories of both writers the belief in the totality of man and the unity of his faculties is fundamental. In the sixth letter Schiller offers a new criticism of his society and age:

"...The type of the race is thrown, in parts that are amplified, into individuals, but in fragments, not in different combinations, so that one must inquire from individual to individual, in order to read collectively the totality of the race."²

He goes on to say that with modern man

"the powers of the mind display themselves in experience detached, as they are represented by the psychologist."³

He finds the root fault in modern culture which treats man as disassociated faculties.

"As soon as extended experience and more precise speculation made a nicer distinction of sciences necessary on the one hand, and the more complicated machinery of the state a more rigorous separation of rank and occupation on the other, the essential tie of human nature was rent, and a destructive warfare raged between harmonious powers."¹

As a result mechanism rather than organism has become the main characteristic of modern life, culture and state. The principle of "intensity" has been separated from that of "extension", whereas they are united in organic beings. Man who lost his unity or wholeness in modern culture has consequently lost his humanity and freedom. His speculative mind or spirit which "strives after inalienable possession in the realm of idea" has become "a stranger in the world of sense". He lives as a slave to "the spirit of business" which is "confined within a uniform circle of objects, and in this still more circumscribed by formulas."²

In criticising modern culture or the culture of his age Schiller is criticising the analytic mind which stands behind this culture. To him "the sensibility of the mind depends for its degree upon the vivacity, for its extent upon the richness, of the imagination", whereas "the preponderance of the analytic faculty ... necessarily deprive(s) the fancy of its power and fire". The analytic mind cannot reach a true

¹ Ibid, pp.69-70.
² Ibid, pp.70-72.
knowledge of man and nature, since it analyzes "the impressions which only affect the soul as a whole".¹

(c) The Beautiful as the Objective of Man's Freedom.

Schiller's theory of aesthetic education as a path towards freedom and the salvation of mankind is based, as we have seen, on the belief in the dualism of the nature of man. "Man .. is neither exclusively matter nor exclusively spirit." "He ... is neither matter nor form, neither perception nor reason."²

To the discussion of this dualism he devoted five letters (11th-14th). He begins the eleventh letter by saying:

"It (abstraction) distinguishes in man something that is permanent, and something that changes incessantly. It calls the permanent his person, the changeable his condition."³

In his theory "person" or "personality" and "condition" are inseparable; they mean "the self" on the one hand, and its definitions, i.e. its manifestations in time and space on the other; they are the mind and its activities, the soul as eternal, infinite being and the soul as an existence in time subject to change and development.

"Man is not only person generally, but person which finds itself in a definite condition."

Without this "definite condition" or existence in space and time man's personality would exist only as potentiality, as a "disposition for a possible, infinite development; and so long as he neither sees nor feels, he is nothing more than form and latent faculty."

But his power of sensation in itself as

"distinct from the self-activity of the spirit, prevails no further than to place him ... in communication with matter ... It is indeed his sensation alone, which converts his capacity into activity, but it is only his personality, which secures his efficiency to himself."  

As a result of this dualistic, sensuous-spiritual, nature man finds himself subject to two opposing laws, the one demands "absolute reality", and the other "absolute formality". In order to perform this twofold task he must bring into existence what is necessary within himself and subject what exists outside himself to the law of necessity. That is, both his sensuous and formal impulses must be at the same time at their most active. Of the natures and functions of these two impulses Schiller writes:

"The first ... results from man's physical being or from his sensuous nature, and is occupied in establishing him within the bounds of time and introducing him to matter."  "The second ... results from the absolute being of man or from his rational nature, and is engaged in placing him in freedom, introducing harmony in the diversity of his manifestation, and maintaining his person in every variation of condition."  

But when any of these two impulses acts exclusively man fails of his freedom. He is then either "a simple quantity, an occupied moment of time" or "an ideal unity". In both cases he is no longer himself. In one he is at the highest degree of limitation, subject to all kinds of fetters, and in the other at "the highest amplitude of being", free from all restraints. In the former he is less than an individual, and in the latter no less than a species.

1. Ibid, pp. 90-92.  
2. Ibid, pp.92-3.  
3. Ibid, pp.94, 95.  
At the beginning of the thirteenth letter Schiller raises the question:

"Then how can we restore the unity of human nature, which appears to be completely destroyed by this primitive and radical antipathy?"

And in an attempt to answer this question he formulates his theory of aesthetic education. He says that man's two impulses are not opposed by nature, though they tend to conflict with each other:

"The sensuous impulse demands change ... but not that it should extend itself to person and its province; not that there should be mutation among principles. The form-impulse tends to unity and permanence, but it will not have the condition fixed as well as the person, it does not desire an identity of perception."  

In order to keep each impulse within its proper boundaries and secure it from the domination of the other, at the same time allowing both of them full freedom of activity, man must seek assistance from culture.

To Schiller the task of culture is twofold,

"first, to preserve perception against the encroachment of freedom; second, to secure the personality against the power of perceptions. It succeeds in the former by developing the feeling, in the latter by developing the reason."  

If man is to be a harmonious whole, a free, integrated, self-active being, he must develop both the faculty of mutability and extensity, and that of autonomy and intensity to their highest degree, that is, he must be at once united with the world and independent of it. To fulfil this twofold task is to enjoy "the utmost self-dependence and freedom", and

1. Ibid, p.98.  
"the greatest fullness of being". As a result he will instead of subjecting himself to the world "attract to himself its whole infinity of modes, and subject them to the unity of his reason."\(^1\)

This is of course an ideal image which cannot be achieved in reality, but it remains man's ultimate aim in his cultural progress, "the idea of his humanity."\(^2\)

However, in aesthetic experience, Schiller thinks, man reaches "a complete intuition of his humanity", achieves the unity of his spirit and matter, and passes from the state of necessity to that of freedom. In the beautiful object he finds "a symbol of his perfected destiny", and in the impulse of beauty both his sensuous and rational impulses "act united". The impulse of beauty unifies the two impulses by excluding from them all negative qualities, and creates man an integral, free, and active whole. It brings all his faculties into harmony and action, and provides him with his moral and physical freedom.\(^3\)

Schiller conceives beauty, as we have already seen, as a "living shape", as a unity of reality with form, of passivity with activity, of necessity with freedom. Beauty is due, he says, to "the reciprocity of two opposite impulses" or "principles". The beautiful objects includes the objects of both the sensuous and rational impulses, that is, life and form, and stands as a consummation of man's humanity. Thus freedom, humanity, and beauty are closely inter-related.

\(^1\) Ibid, pp.99-100. \(^2\) Ibid, p.104. \(^3\) Ibid, pp.104-5.
"The ideal of Beauty (is) simultaneous with the ideal of Humanity." While nature "gives us merely the capacity for humanity", beauty makes "humanity possible to us." ¹

The freedom which man finds in the aesthetic state or experience does not mean "lawlessness" or "disorder", but a "harmony of laws."

"The mind in aesthetic conditions acts indeed freely, but in nowise free from laws, and this aesthetic freedom differs from logical necessity in reflection, and from moral necessity in volition, only in this point, that the laws which guide the operation of the mind, do not become manifested, since they meet with no opposition, they do not have the appearance of compulsion." ²

It is freedom in the sense of integrity, wholeness and harmony, and not an emancipation from law and exigency. It is a release from the monarchy of both sensation and reason, matter and spirit. In the contemplation of beauty man finds himself in a happy intermediate point between law and need, form and matter, passion and action.

Schiller thinks of the aesthetic condition as one in which man is "free from all determinations", yet in his full activity morally and physically. The mind is free in the sense that "it is not exclusively determined", "not limited by its determination". ³ This aesthetic state might appear to be a state of negation or an idle reverie. To Schiller it is not "a void infinity", but an "occupied" one. For in it man is thoroughly active though not determined. It is a

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1. Ibid, pp.107-8, 113, 116.
2. Ibid, p.129.
state which restores to him both "the freedom to be, what he ought to be" and the energy to act.¹

3. Organic Unity, Complexity and Personality.

(a) Coleridge and Carlyle.

In studying Coleridge's, Carlyle's and 'al-'Akkād's theories of organic unity and imagination a great deal of similarity can be shown to exist between the three writers. On many points 'al-'Akkād comes very close to Coleridge and Carlyle and expresses views already expressed by the English and Scottish critics. The points of departure and the conclusions reached in their theories are almost the same.

'Al-'Akkād has more than once acknowledged his debt to Carlyle. But nowhere has he acknowledged a debt to Coleridge, nor do his few and general references to that English thinker, poet and critic provide us with any evidence that he had borrowed or derived his views from him. Yet the influence of Coleridge in his criticism seems no less profound than that of Carlyle or Hazlitt.

Both Coleridge and 'al-'Akkād conceive life as an organic unity which "discloses itself from within" and as a unity of opposites or counter-powers - a synthesis of thesis and antithesis - : of spirit and matter, freedom and law. In his essay "The Theory of Life" Coleridge rejects, like 'al-'Akkād, the view that the functions of life in any body or

¹. Ibid, pp.130-31.
structure are the offspring of this structure or that "Life (is) the result of organisation, connected with it as effect with cause". To him the principle of life is prior to any structure through which life manifests itself and is the cause of the existence of that structure.

"I reject the organ as the cause of that, of which it is the organ, though I might admit it among the conditions of its actual functions." "To account for life ... we are supposed to state something prior (if not in time, yet in the order of Nature) to the thing accounted for as the ground or cause of that thing, or ... as its sufficient cause, quae et facit, et subest."

He defines life as "the internal copula of bodies, ... the power which discloses itself from within as a principle of unity in the many" or "of unity in multeity." He also defines it as

"The principle of individuation, or the power which unites a given all into a whole that is presupposed by all its parts. The link that combines the two and acts throughout both ... (is) the tendency to individuation."

Coleridge goes on to say that every living being represents "a whole composed, ab intra, of different parts", and that each part constitutes in its turn "a whole of itself." So in a living being there are mutual relationships and influences between the parts and the whole. Every part is

"reciprocally means and end, is an individual, and the individuality is most intense where the greatest dependence of the parts on the whole is combined with the greatest dependence of the whole on the parts."

2. Ibid, pp.384-5.
Coleridge also thinks that the principle of the whole in an animate being is prior to the existence of the parts and that the component parts cannot explain the whole.

"They necessarily presuppose it as the cause and condition of their existence as ... parts, or even of their existence at all ... That the root, stem, leaves, petals (of a Crocus or any flower) cohere to one plant, is owing to an antecedent power or principle in the Seed, which existed before a single particle of the matters, that constitute the size and visibility of the Crocus, had been attracted from the surrounding Soil, Air, and Moisture." 1

Therefore the dependence of the parts on the whole is "absolute", whereas the dependence of the whole on the parts is "proportional to the importance of the relation which the parts have to the whole, that is, as their action extends more or less beyond themselves." 2 Thus "intensity" and "extension" are the two principles of organic development. According to these principles Coleridge assigns the degree of every object in the hierarchy of evolution.

"The tendency to individuation, more or less obscure, more or less obvious, constitutes the common character of all classes, as far as they maintain for themselves a distinction from the universal life of the planet; while the degrees both of intensity and extension, to which this tendency is realized form the species, and their ranks in the great scale of ascent and expansion." 3

Yet to Coleridge a whole means "many constituting a One". 4

"In order to the full understanding of any Whole, it is necessary to have learnt the nature of the component parts, of each severally and, as far as possible, abstracted from the changes it may have undergone in its combination with the others." 5

2. Coleridge, Miscellaneous, Aesthetics ... op.cit. p.387.
5. Ibid, p.56.
He also says that a "whole is the effect of, or results from, the parts", but is not a "mere total of the parts". This is where an organic whole differs from an inorganic one. For the latter is "nothing more than a collection of individual parts or phenomena". In a living being the whole remains "everything, and the parts ... nothing."¹

What we find in these remarks is al-‘Akkād’s notion that there are two factors which contribute to the constitution of an organic whole: the differentiation—multiplicity and diversity—of the parts and the submission of these parts to the whole. The principle of the whole is necessary to the lives of the parts, but the differentiation of the parts is also necessary to the life of the whole. Thus in order to understand the nature of a living whole we must know the nature of every part, its relationships with the other parts or the whole and the effects of these relationships on it. The principles of intensity and extension mean that a living being represents a unity-in-complexity. The whole in which

"The living power (is) most intense ... has the greatest number of integral parts, presupposed in it",

and

"these integral parts, together with a proportional increase of their interdependence, as parts, have themselves most the character of wholes, in the sphere occupied by them."²

Thus Coleridge conceives the process of life towards

"individuation" or individuality as a process from simplicity to complexity. "The crystals as a union ... of parts" represent one of the "simplest forms of composition" or totality in nature, whereas man represents the highest or most complicated form of this totality.

"In man ... the individuality is not only perfected in its corporeal sense, but begins a new series beyond the appropriate limits of physiology." "The degrees or intensities of Life ... consist in the progressive realization of"

the tendency to individuality. The dawn of this tendency is seen "in the lowest forms of the vegetable and animal world."¹

This is one phase of Coleridge's theory or more properly one of his two theories. He begins the second phase of the theory by saying:

"This tendency to individuate cannot be conceived without the opposite tendency to connect, even as the centrifugal power supposes the centripetal, or as the two opposite poles constitute each other."²

He thinks of dualism as something fundamental in nature. It is a "law essential to all actual existence", the "most general form under which (the tendency to individuality) acts." Coleridge gives then a new definition of life as "the unity of thesis and antithesis, position and counter position."

"In the identity of the two counter-powers, Life subsists; in their strife it consists; and in their reconciliation it at once dies and is born again into a new form, either falling back into the life of the whole,

1. Ibid, pp.389-90  
or starting a new in the process of individuation". "That a thing is, is owing to the co-inherence therein of any two powers; but that it is that particular thing arises from the proportions in which these powers are co-operate, either as predominance or as reciprocal neutralization."1

The laws of individuality and the reconciliation of opposite form, in Coleridge's opinion, the basis of man's existence and life.

"In Man the centripetal and individualizing tendency of all Nature is itself centred and individualized ..." "As the height, so the depth, the intensities must be at once opposite and equal. As the liberty, so must be the reverence for law. As the independence, so must be the service and the submission to the Supreme Will! As the ideal genius and the originality, in the same proportion must be the resignation to the real world, the sympathy and the inter-communion with Nature. In the conciliating mid-point, or equator, does Man live, and only by its equal presence in both its poles can that life be manifested."2

Now after we have presented Coleridge's theory of life and evolution we can see how complete is the similarity between it and al-ʻAkkad's. The belief in the priority of function over organ, in the organic whole as more than the sum total of the parts, in evolution as a creative process to individuality or personality, and in life as unity-in-complexity, and as reconciliation of opposites; spirit and matter, freedom and law, constitutes the essence of the two theories.

1. Ibid, pp.392-3, 408.
In his essay "Characteristics", which received al-‘Akkād great admiration, Carlyle has also expressed the belief in a living being as an organic whole, and in the organic whole as a unity of functions and organs.

"In the body ... the first condition of complete health is, that each organ performs its function unconsciously, unheeded; let but each organ announce its separate existence ... then already has one of those unfortunate 'false centres of sensibility' established itself, already is derangement there. The perfection of bodily wellbeing, is that the collective bodily activities seem one; and be manifested, moreover, not in themselves, but in the action they accomplish ... In fact, unity, agreement is always silent, or soft-voiced; it is only discord that loudly proclaims itself. So long as the several elements of life, all fitly adjusted, can pour forth their movement like harmonious tuned strings; it is a melody and unison ... Thus ... is the state of health well denoted by a term expressing unity; when we feel ourselves as we wish to be, we say that we are whole."

In these lines Carlyle has set forth his theory of life as an organic unity which grows from within, as an unconscious harmony of organs and functions. He goes on to indicate the relationship between this organic unity and freedom.

"... Most of us, looking back on young years, may remember seasons of a light, aerial translucency and elasticity and perfect freedom, the body had not yet become the prison-house of the soul, but was its vehicle and implement, like a creature of the thought, and altogether pliant to its bidding ... Through eye and ear, and all avenues of senses, came clear unimpeded tidings from without, and from within issued clear victorious force; we stood as in the centre of Nature, giving and receiving, in harmony with it ... Our whole being was as yet One, the whole man like an incorporated Will ..."

Thus to Carlyle, as to al-‘Akkād, freedom means oneness or unity of spirit and body, mind and sense. He describes

2. Ibid, p.194.
this state of oneness or unity as the "first state of Freedom and Paradisaic Unconsciousness". In this state of freedom there is a perfect harmony between the body and the soul, between the organs of the body and their functions and between each organ and another. While unity or wholeness means in Carlyle's theory health and freedom, division means disease and bondage.

This theory of life Carlyle applies to all activities of man and society. He thinks that in its healthy state society represented a

"'whole' in both senses of the word. The individual man was in himself a whole, or complete union; and could combine with his fellows as the living member of a greater whole. For all men, through their life, were animated by one great Idea; thus all efforts pointed one way, everywhere there was wholeness."1

The similarity between these views of Carlyle and al-'Akkād's is evident. The only essential difference between the two writers is that Carlyle thinks of unconsciousness as the characteristic of every living whole, while al-'Akkād thinks of the living whole as a personality, and of personality as a self-conscious intellect. The unity of opposites which we find in Coleridge's and al-'Akkād's theories is also there in Carlyle's.

"Our being is made up of Light and Darkness, the Light resting on the Darkness, and balancing it; everywhere there is Dualism, Equipoise; a perpetual Contradiction dwells in us ...."2

1. Ibid, pp.204-5.
(b) The Metaphysical Aspect of Coleridge's and Carlyle's theories, The World as a Whole.

In Coleridge's and Carlyle's theories we also find metaphysical aspects which resemble those of al-'Akkād's. To Coleridge, as to al-'Akkād, the unity which every natural object shows reflects a larger and prior unity which is the world. In its turn the unity of the world is a reflection of another higher and antecedent unity which is God. God is the source of life and the principle of Unity in the world.

"In the world we see everywhere evidences of a Unity, which the component parts are so far from explaining, that they necessarily pre-suppose it as the cause and condition of their existing as those parts: or even of their existing at all ... Reflect on the requisite harmony of all surrounding things, each of which necessitates the same process of thought, and the coherence of all of which to a System, a World, demands its own adequate Antecedent Unity, which must therefore of necessity be present to all and in all ... Now will Reason, will Common Sense, endure the assumption that it is highly reasonable to believe a Universal Power, as the cause and pre-condition of the harmony of all particular "Wholes, each of which involves the working Principle of its own Union, in the material and visible System - that it is reasonable ... to believe this respecting the Aggregate of Objects, which without a Subject (i.e. a sentient and intelligent Existence) would be purposeless."¹

And again

"It is the office, and as it were, the instinct of Reason to bring a unity into all our conceptions and several knowledges. On this all system depends: and without this we could reflect connectedly neither on nature or our own minds. Now this is possible only on the assumption or hypothesis of a One as the ground and cause of the Universe, and which in all succession and through all changes is the subject neither of Time or Change ... The hypothesis of a One Ground and Principle of the Universe ... is ... raised into the Idea of the LIVING GOD, the supreme Object of our Faith, Love, Fear, and Adoration."²

Carlyle, following Fichte, thinks that

"there is a 'Divine Idea' pervading the visible Universe."

To him, as to Fichte, "Literary men are the appointed interpreters of this Divine Idea;" they

"show it in their writings and actions, in such particular form as their own particular times require it in. For each age, by the law of its nature, is different from every other age, and demands a different representation of the Divine Idea, the essence of which is the same in all."

He goes on to say with the German Philosopher:

"There is still ... another division in our notion of the Literary Man, and one to us of immediate application. Namely, either the Literary Man has already laid hold of the whole Divine Idea, in so far as it can be comprehended by man, or perhaps of a special portion of this its comprehensible part, - which truly is not possible without at least clear oversight of the whole; - he has already laid hold of it, penetrated and made it entirely clear to himself, so that it has become a possession recallable at all times in the same shape to his view, and a component part of his personality ... Or else, he is still struggling and striving to make the Idea in general, or that particular portion and point of it, from which onwards he for his part means to penetrate the whole entirely clear to himself; detached sparkles of light already spring forth on him from all sides, and disclose a higher world before him, but they do not yet unite themselves into an indivisible whole."\textsuperscript{1}

Thus under the influence of Fichte Carlyle views the universe as an indivisible Whole or Unity, as a symbol of One Divine Idea. To him things exist and function in relation to each other; there is nothing which stands alone or in isolation from others; what happens now corresponds to what happened in the past. The appearance changes but the essence remains

\textsuperscript{1} Thomas Carlyle's Works, vol. XV, pp. 49-50
the same. To Carlyle change or evolution constitutes the very essence of the world and life. "All human things are, have been and for ever will be, in Movement and change."

It is a universal and inevitable principle that things must change and evolve. Therefore

"Truth ... never is, always is a - being." "Yet Time itself reposes on Eternity; the truly Great and Transcendental has its basis and substance in Eternity; stands revealed to us as Eternity in a vesture of Time. The Present is the living sum-total of the whole Past."¹

Thus the process of life and history is a process towards completeness, integration and wholeness.

Carlyle also thinks that in history things occur simultaneously and as "a group" rather than as "a series".

"It is not in acted, as it is in written History: actual events are nowise so simply related to each other as parent and offspring are, every single event is the offspring not of one, but of all other events, prior or contemporaneous, and will in its turn combine with all others to give birth to new, it is an ever-living, ever-working Chaos of Being, wherein shape after shape bodies itself forth from innumerable elements."²

Therefore Carlyle demands that the historian must be not an 'Artisan' "who labour(s) mechanically", but an 'Artist' or 'Seer' who has an "eye for the Whole" and "feeling that there is a Whole." He must work "with an Idea of the Whole, and habitually know that only in the Whole is the Partial to be discerned." Carlyle then concludes

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¹. Ibid, vol XVI, pp.222-3.
². Ibid, p.499.
"The general sum of human Action is a whole Universe, with all limits of it unknown, does History strive by running path after path, to secure for us some oversight of the Whole."¹

The similarity between Carlyle's views of the world, history and literary man and those of al-'Akkad is very striking. Both writers think of the world as an indivisible whole in a process of evolution, of history as a unity and of the artist or literary man as a revealer of this whole and unity.

(c) Coleridge on the Organic Unity of the Poem

In Biographia Literaria Coleridge begins his discussion of the unity of the poem with a general remark about the philosophical process of knowledge and the result of this process.

"The office of philosophical disquisition consists in just distinction; while it is the privilege of the philosopher to preserve himself constantly aware, that distinction is not division. In order to obtain adequate notion of any truth, we must intellectually separate its distinguishable parts; and this is the technical process of philosophy. But having so done, we must then restore them in our conceptions to the unity, in which they actually co-exist; and this is the result of philosophy."²

Here we are once again with Coleridge's notion that in order to understand the reality of any object we must know the nature of its parts, each alone, and the nature of the whole which these parts form and to which they owe their existence, that is, we must know the reciprocal relationships and

1. Ibid, pp.500, 505.
2. Coleridge, Biographia Literaria, vol. ii. p. 8
influences between the parts and the whole. If knowledge is
to be vital it must be at once analytic and synthetic. The
paragraph continues,

"A poem contains the same elements as a prose
composition; the difference therefore must consist in
a different combination of them, in consequence of a
different object being proposed. According to the
difference of the object will be the difference of the
combination."^1

This seems to mean that every poem is a unique unity or
combination of different elements - ideas, feelings, words,
and rhythms - and that this unity is inherent in the poet's
experience. There is nothing introduced from without.
Coleridge goes on to say that a true or legitimate poem

"must be one, the parts of which mutually support and
explain each other; all in their proportion
harmonizing with, and supporting the purpose and known
influences of metrical arrangement."

He denies then the name of poem to any metrical composition
which is no more than

"a series of striking lines or distiches, each of which,
absorbing the whole attention of the reader to itself,
disjoins it from its context, and makes it a separate
whole, instead of an harmonizing part;"

and to

"an unsustained composition, from which the reader
collects rapidly the general results, unattracted by
the component parts."^2

In all this Coleridge is implying that the metre is not an
element superinduced to the poem and that the unity of the
metre and of the rhyme which a composition possesses does not

necessarily make it a poem. In a true poem the metre is a part inseparable from other parts; it has, like the other parts, its root in the poet's experience; it influences, and is influenced by, the other parts. While the reader must treat the poem as an indivisible whole, he must not ignore that the whole is made of parts and that only by knowing the reciprocal relationships and influences between the parts and whole can he obtain a true notion of the poem. The unity of the poem must represent a progressive process in which the lines lead one to the other. Every line must be interconnected with the preceding and following lines and must represent a link indispensable to the understanding of the particular lines and to the understanding of the whole poem.

"The reader should be carried forward ... Like the motion of a serpent, which the Egyptians made the emblem of intellectual power; or like the path of sound through the air; at every step he pauses and half recedes, and from the retrogressive movement collects the force which again carries him onward." 1

In his lectures on Shakespeare Coleridge distinguishes between two kinds of forms, "organic" and "mechanic" or two kinds of artistic works, the one is a "result and symbol of living power", "a true imitation of the essential principles" of nature, and the other a product of "lifeless mechanism", "a servile imitation, a blind copying of effect." He defines them thus:

"The form is mechanic when on any given material we impress a pre-determined form, not necessarily arising out of the properties of the material, as when to a mass of wet clay we give whatever shape we wish it to

1. Ibid, p.11.
retain when hardened. The organic form, on the other hand, is innate; it shapes as it develops itself from within, and the fullness of its development is one and the same with the perfection of its outward form. Such is life, such the form. Nature, the prime genial artist, inexhaustible in diverse powers, is equally inexhaustible in forms. Each exterior is the physiognomy of the being within, its true image reflected and thrown out from the concave mirror."

This is Coleridge's most important statement about the organic unity of the poem. But in order to grasp it fully we must read with it the other statements which occur in his lectures on Romeo and Juliet and on Beaumont and Fletcher.

In the first Coleridge also distinguishes between "the shaping skill of mechanical talent" and "the creative, productive life-power of inspired genius".

"In the former each part (is) separately conceived and then by a succeeding act put together ... as the pictures on a motley screen ... Whence (arises) the harmony that strikes us in the wildest natural landscapes, - in the relative shapes of rocks, the harmony of colors in the heath, ferns, and lichens, the leaves of the beech and oak, the stems and rich chic(olate) brown branches of the birch and other mountain trees, varying from verging autumn to returning spring - compared with the visual effect from the greater number of artificial plantation? The former are effected by a single energy, modified ab intra in each component part."^2

Of Beaumont and Fletcher he writes:

"What had a grammatical and logical consistency for the ear, what could be put together and represented to the eye, these poets took from the ear and eye, unchecked by any intuition of an inward impossibility, just as a man might fit together a quarter of an orange, a quarter of an apple, and the like of a lemon and of a pomegranite, and make it look like one round diverse colored fruit. But nature, who works from within by evolution and assimilation according to a law, cannot do it."^3

2. Ibid, pp. 4-5.
These three statements explain and elaborate each other. In reading them together we find that the organic form of a poem is inherent in its content, in the poet's experience, and it develops with the development of this content or experience. It grows spontaneously according to a principle innate in the poet's mind. The poet is an agent of nature who builds up his works according to its inner laws of organism. The harmony which his works show, reflects that harmony which we find in the scenery of nature or in a tree. In their development they also resemble the development of natural phenomena. Shakespeare was a poet who

"worked in the spirit of nature, by evolving the germ within by the imaginative power according to an idea — for as the power of seeing is to light, so is an idea in mind to a law in nature. They are correlatives and suppose each other." "In the Shakespearian drama there is a vitality which grows from within,—a keynote which guides and controls the harmonies throughout."

Lear is

"a storm and tempest — the thunder at first grumbling in the far horizon, then gathering around us, and at length bursting in fury over our heads, succeeded by a breaking of the clouds for a while, a last flash of lightning, the closing in of night, and the single hope of darkness! And Romeo and Juliet ... is a spring day, gusty and beautiful in the morn, and closing like an April evening with the song of the nightingale; — whilst Macbeth is deep and earthly, — composed to the subterranean music of a troubled conscience, which converts everything into the wild and fearful."

The organic forms are infinite in number; each one is unique in itself for every poetic experience has its own characteristics which no other experience shares. On the

1. Ibid, pp.43-5.
other hand, the mechanic form is imposed on the poetic experience from outside. It is the poetic experience which follows the form and not the reverse. This means that in a mechanic work of art there is a separation between the form and the content. While the organic form is a "self-witnessing and self-effected sphere of agency", the mechanic one is "the death or the imprisonment of the thing."

How can the artist achieve this organic form? Coleridge's answer is that the artist must not copy "the mere nature, the natura naturate" but

"master the essence, the natura naturans, which presupposes a bond between nature in the higher sense and the soul of man. He must make the external internal, the internal external, ... nature thought, and thought nature." "He must out of his own mind create forms according to the severe laws of the intellect, in order to generate in himself that co-ordination of freedom and a law, that involution of obedience in the prescript, and of the prescript in the impulse to obey, which assimilates him to nature and enables him to understand her." 2

While the artist's mind is

"the very focus of all the rays of intellect which are scattered throughout the images of nature", he is distinguished from nature by his "reflexion, freedom, and choice." His task is, therefore,

"to place these images, totalized, and fitted to the limits of the human mind, ... to elicit from, and to superinduce upon, the forms themselves the moral reflexion to which they approximate ..." 3

By so doing he can "hope to produce any work truly natural in

the object and truly human in the effect." He must see and understand nature in himself, for his spirit "has the same ground with nature" and because "of all we see, hear, feel and touch the substance is and must be in ourselves."1

To Coleridge the organic unity of the poem is a product of what he calls "the secondary imagination" which is a "synthetic and magical power" whereby the poet

"diffuses a tone and spirit of unity, that blends, and (as it were) fuses, each into each." Imagination is the spirit of the poem which "forms all into one graceful and intelligent whole."2

"It dissolves, diffuses, dissipates, in order to recreate; or where this process is rendered impossible, yet still at all events it struggles to idealize and to unify."3 Imagination is an organic vital faculty the rules of which are "the very powers of growth and production." It is a faculty "co-existing with the conscious will" and "first put in action by the will and understanding, and retained under their irremissive though gentle and unnoticed, control ..." Yet "the secondary imagination" has its deep root in the region of unconsciousness. It is the echo of "the primary imagination" which works unconsciously and which is

"the living Power and prime Agent of all human perception, and ... a repetition in the finite mind of the actual act of creation in the infinite I AM." The secondary imagination is identical with the primary

"in the kind of its agency, and differing only in degree, and in the mode of its operation."4

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The relation of imagination and consequently the unity of the poem to the poet's consciousness and unconsciousness might be explained by Coleridge's following words.

"In every work of art there is a reconcilement of the external with the internal; the conscious is so impressed on the unconscious as to appear in it, ... He who combines the two is the man of genius; and for that reason he must partake of both. Hence there is in genius itself an unconscious activity; nay, that is the genius in the man of genius." ¹

A further explanation can be found in his other passage in which it is said that Shakespeare

"first studied patiently, meditated deeply, understood minutely, till knowledge, become habitual and intuitive, wedded itself to his habitual feeling, and at length gave birth to that stupendous power by which he stands alone ..."

Therefore, he was

"no mere child of nature; no automation of genius; no passive vehicle of inspiration possessed by the spirit, not possessing it." ²

While Coleridge thinks of imagination as a power which forms and unifies the elements of the poetic experience, he also thinks of it as a power which

"reveals itself in the balance or reconciliation of opposite or discordant qualities; of sameness, with difference, of the general with the concrete; the idea, with the image; the individual, with the representative; the sense of novelty and freshness, with old and familiar object ..." ³

The aesthetic pleasure which a poem or a work of art gives is due to the organic unity or wholeness of this poem or work.

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³ Ibid, p.12.
"A poem is that species of composition ... (which proposes) for its immediate object pleasure ...; and from all other species ... it is discriminated by proposing to itself such delight from the whole, as is compatible with a distinct gratification from each component part."  

"In order to derive pleasure from the occupation of the mind, the principle of unity must always be present, so that in the midst of the multeity the centripetal force be never suspended, nor the sense be fatigued by the predominance of the centrifugal force."  

And in writing of beauty he says:

"The frost on a window-pane has by accident crystallized into a striking resemblance of a tree or a sea-weed. With what pleasure we trace the parts, and their relations to each other, and to the whole."  

The similarity between all these views and al-ʿAkkād's requires no discussion.

(d) Carlyle on the Organic Unity of the Poem

Carlyle's theory of the organic unity of the poem does not differ from Coleridge's. Its full expression is found in the essays "The State of German Literature" and "Goethe". In the first the emphasis is laid on the organic process of creation which culminates in the unity of the poem.

"The problem is not ... to determine by what mechanism Addison composed sentences and struck out similitudes; but by what finer and more mysterious mechanism Shakespeare organized his dramas, and gave life and individuality to his Ariel and Hamlet ... What is this unity of theirs; and can our deeper inspection discern it to be indivisible, and existing by necessity, because each work springs, as it were, from the general elements of all Thought, and grows up therefrom, into form and expansion by its own growth?"  

1. Ibid, pp. 10, 262  
3. Thomas Carlyle's Works, vol. XV, p. 44
Like Coleridge and al-`Akkad, Carlyle believes in the spontaneity of the organic form of the poem. The poem as an organic whole grows spontaneously from the depths of the poet's mind and is, therefore, a revelation of this mind. It bears the characteristics of the poet's soul or personality. This makes the task of the critic twofold, to understand the poem from within and from without, to treat it as an expression of the poet's personality and as an independent work of art at the same time. The critic must raise and answer the question: Is it a poem, a living work of creation or a piece of ornamentation and eloquence, an indivisible unity or an aggregation of fragments?

These views are further elaborated in the essay on Goethe. Here again Carlyle asserts that the literary critic must judge the poem not as a composition made of parts, but as a living whole. His task is

"to take in the fair relations of the Whole, to see the building as one object, to estimate its purpose, the adjustment of its part and their harmonious co-operation towards that purpose."

For the beauty of the poem resides in its organic whole or in "the clear view of it as an indivisible Unity." The critic must also ask and answer the question that whether the poem

"has grown up naturally from the general soil of the thought, and stands there like a thousand-years Oak, no leaf, no bough superfluous; or is nothing but a paste-board tree, cobbled together out of size, and waste-paper and water-colours; altogether unconnected with the soil of Thought, except by mere juxtaposition, or at best united with it by some decayed stump and dead boughs, which the mere cunning Decorationist ... may
have selected for the basis and support of his agglutinations."

How is the critic to meet these questions? He must, says Carlyle, make it first clear to himself "what the poet's aim really and truly was, how the task he had to do stood before his own eye, and how far with such means as it afforded him, he has fulfilled it."

Secondly the critic must decide "whether and how far this aim, this task of his accorded ... with human nature, and the nature of things at large; with the universal principles of poetic beauty ... Does the answer in either case come out unfavourable; was there an inconsistency between the means and the end, a discordance between the end and truth, there is a fault, was there not, there is no fault." This means that criticism must be at once biographical and philosophical. The critic must interpret the poem in the light of the poet's life and according to the universal principles of truth and beauty. This explains Carlyle's own criticism and critical methods which were followed by al-'Akkād in his studies on Arab poets such as Ibn ar-Rūmī, Jamīl Buthaynah and 'Umar Ibn Abī Rabī‘ah. The application of these methods appears in the same essay on Goethe. Thus Carlyle studies Goethe's works in the light of his life and judges them according to the principles of poetic beauty and truth, Divine Idea and organic unity.

"Several of Goethe's chief productions, and of his smaller poems nearly the whole ... (are) so intimately interwoven with his private history, that without some knowledge of this, no answer to such questions (what were these works, and how did they originate?) could be given."

1. Ibid, pp.226-7.
3. Ibid, p.184
The analogy which Carlyle makes of the poem to a tree is an essential point in his theory. It means that the organic unity of the poem is not simple but complicated. It is like that complicated unity of "a thousand-years Oak". This must contribute to the difficulty which the reader finds in

"that poetry which Masters write, which aims ... at incorporating everlasting Reason of man in forms visible to his Sense and suitable to it ... To know it is no slight task; but rather that, being the essence of all science, it requires the purest of all study for knowing it."

We meet this analogy in many places in Carlyle's writings.

Here are some examples. Of Shakespeare he writes:

"Such a man's works, whatsoever he with utmost conscious exertion and forethought shall accomplish, grow up withal unconsciously, from the unknown deeps in him; as the oak tree grows from the Earth's bosom ...; with a symmetry grounded on Nature's own laws ... How much in Shakespeare lies hid ... like roots, like saps and forces working underground."

And again in connection with the age of Shakespeare.

"The 'Tree Igdrasil' buds and withers by its own laws ... How everything does cooperate with all; not a leaf rotting on the highway but is indissoluble portion of solar and stellar systems; no thought, word or act of man but has sprung withal out of all man, and works sooner or later, recognisably or irrecognisably, on all men! It is all a Tree: circulation of sap and influences, mutual communication of every minutest leaf with the lowest talon of a root, with every other greatest and minutest portion of the whole. The Tree Igdrasil, that has its roots down in the Kingdom of Hela and Death, and whose boughs spread the highest Heaven."2

In the essay "Voltaire" Carlyle distinguishes between mechanic and organic unity.

1. Ibid, pp.228-9.
2. Ibid, vol.iii, pp.89, 84.
"The Method discernible in Voltaire, and this is in all subjects, whatever, is purely business Method. The order that arises from it is not Beauty, but at best Regularity. His objects do not lie around him in pictorial, not always in scientific grouping, but rather in commodious rows, where each may be seen and come at, like goods in a well-kept warehouse. We might say, there is not the deep natural symmetry of a forest oak, but the simple artificial symmetry of a parlour chandelier. Compare, for example, the plan of The Henriade to that of ... Hamlet. The plan of the former is a geometrical diagram by Fermat; that of the latter a cartoon by Raphael. The Henriade, as we see it completed, is polished, square-built Tuiteries: Hamlet is a mysterious star-paved Valhella and dwelling of the gods."¹

To Carlyle the organic unity of the poem stands as a reflection of the unity of the poet's mind and of the unity of nature at the same time. The true poet is a revealer or interpreter of the Divine Idea which pervades the universe, and his poem is a miniature of the universe "informed with the Infinite."² It is a creation of the poet's unconscious mind which works according to the laws of nature. The great poet, Carlyle thinks, is "a man of integrity". Goethe's first characteristic is

"his singularly emblematic intellect; his perpetual never-failing tendency to transform into shape, into life, the opinion, the feeling that may dwell in him."³

He finds this faculty "the very essence" of Goethe's intellect.

¹. Ibid, vol. XV, p.401. Goethe in Wilhelm Meister, which Carlyle translated, also compares Hamlet in its unity to the tree. "It is a trunk with boughs, twigs, leaves, buds, blossoms and fruit. Is not the one with the others, and by means of them?" Wilhelm Meister, Carlyle's translation, London, 1899, vol. 1, p.331.


He also finds Goethe's poetry "the voice of (his) whole harmonious manhood." or "the living and life-giving harmony of that rich manhood."\(^1\) Goethe's mind which was the "most complicated of the species" was also "in unity with itself."\(^2\) Thus to Carlyle the mind of the great poet represents a complex living whole which manifests itself in his works and makes each of these works an organic whole within another larger whole formed from all of them.

"It is not in parts, but in whole poems the spirit of a true poet is to be seen."\(^3\)

In all these views Carlyle resembles both Coleridge and al-Akkād. The only difference between the three writers is that Carlyle regards the unconscious mind as the sole source of the poem and its unity, whereas Coleridge and al-Akkād think of the organic structure of the poem as the offspring of imagination which is connected with the poet's unconsciousness as well as with his conscious will. Sometimes Coleridge seems to think, like Carlyle, that the poet is a mere agent of nature. This is not the same with al-Akkād in spite of the frequent use of the term "inspiration" in his critical writings. However, both Coleridge and al-Akkād reject the view that Shakespeare was a "mere automation of genius", or a "passive vehicle of inspiration possessed by the spirit, not possessing it." Both think of intuition or intuitive imagination as the penetrating power of Shakespeare.

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1. Ibid, p.187.
2. Ibid, pp.222.
(e) Shelley and the Organic Unity of the Poem.

In Shelley's essay *A Defence of Poetry*, the influence of which is deep in al-Akkad's criticism, we also find some remarks relevant to the notion of the organic process of creation and the organic unity of the poem.

"The instinct and intuition of the poetical faculty is still more observable in the plastic and pictorial arts: a great statue or picture grows under the power of the artist as a child in the mother's womb; and the very mind which directs the hands in formation is incapable of according to itself for the origin, the gradations, or the media of the process."  

Like Coleridge, Shelley seems to think of this organic formation or form as a product of imagination which has its deep root in the region of unconsciousness. Imagination is for him "the principle of synthesis," an organizing and shaping power which assimilates things, regards their "similitudes" rather than their "differences", considers thoughts in their integral unity or acts upon

"thoughts and composes from them as from elements, other thoughts, each containing within itself the principle of its own integrity."

It assimilates "the materials of external life" "to the internal laws of human nature," introduces order to the chaos of the world and gives form to the anarchy of life. Of poetry "the expression of the imagination" Shelley writes:

"It ... creates for us a being within our being. It makes us the inhabitant of a world to which the familiar world is a chaos. It reproduces the common universe

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2. Ibid, pp.52-3.
of which we are portions and percipients and it purges
from our inward sight the film of familiarity. It
creates anew the universe, after it has been annihilated
in our minds by the recurrence of impressions blunted by
reiteration.1

The relation of the poem to unconsciousness is explicit
in the following words:

"The mind in (poetic) creation is as a fading coal, which
some invisible influence, like an inconstant wind,
awakens to transitory brightness; this power arises from
within, like the colour of a flower which fades and
changes as it is developed, and the conscious portions
of our nature are unprophetic either of its approach or
its departure."2

This unconscious power enables the poet to conceive the whole
of his work before its parts. Thus "Milton conceived the
Paradise Lost as a whole before he executed it in portions."3

In Shelley's theory, as in Coleridges, Carlyle's and
al-'Akkād's, the unity of the poem may be said to be a
reflection of the unity of "the eternal, the infinite, and the
one" in which the poet "participates", of the "indestructible
order" of things which he imagines and expresses.4

(f) J.S. Mill and the Unity of the Poem.

J.S. Mill's theory of the unity of the poem as a product
of the associative imagination, as a coherence of associated
emotions and of ideas subordinated to emotions, seems to
have influenced al-'Akkād in his views of the unity which he
finds in Ibn ar-Rūmī's poems, and which he also regards as a
deliberate coherence of associated emotions and ideas.

1. Ibid, p. 56.  2. Ibid, pp. 53-4.
Mill writes:

"At the centre of each group of thoughts or images will be found a feeling; and the thoughts or images are only there because the feeling was there. All the combinations which the mind puts together, all the pictures which it paints, the whole which Imagination constructs out of the materials supplied by Fancy, will be indebted to some dominant feeling, not as in other natures to a dominant thought, for their unity and consistency of character — for what distinguishes them from incoherencies."¹

He appears to think of two kinds of unity, the one of emotions, and the other of ideas, the one spontaneous and the other deliberate. In the former "the prevailing associations" are

"those which connect objects and ideas with emotions, and with each other through the intervention of emotions. Thoughts and images will be linked together, according to the similarity of the feelings which cling to them. A thought will introduce a thought by first introducing a feeling which is allied with it."

In the latter "the thought is ... the conspicuous object."

"The objects, whether of sense or of intellect" are arranged as "they have been seen, heard, or otherwise perceived". The result is, therefore, a "mere casual order." The associations are

"chiefly of the successive, not the synchronous kind, and whether successive or synchronous, are mostly casual."²

This is the kind of unity which al-‘Akḳād finds in Ibn ar-Rūmī's poems. It is not an organic spontaneous growth but an arrangement of ideas brought together according to the law of association. Mill seems to find such an arrangement

² Ibid., pp. 224-6
or "casual order" in some poems of Shelley whose idea "starts into life, summons from the fairy-land of his inexhaustible fancy some three or four bold images, then vanishes, and straight he is off on the wings of some casual associations into quite another sphere."¹

However, the unity or wholeness of the poem means to Mill "singleness of expression" or "aesthetic congruity" in which resides the beauty of the poem.² This can be found in Tennyson's poem The Lady of Shalott of which Mill writes:

"There is no stanza ... which can be felt or even understood as the poet intends, unless the reader's imagination and feeling are already in the state which results from the passage next preceding, or rather from all which precedes."³

(g) Smuts, Organic Unity and Personality.

Some years before he wrote his study On God which appeared in 1947, al-ʿAkkād read Smut's Holism and Evolution; he mentioned the fact in the same study and gave a brief account of Smuts' views concerning organic evolution and divinity. The exact date of his acquaintance with the work of the South African leader is unknown. Holism and Evolution was first published in 1926 and reprinted in the following year. But at this early time the book does not seem to have been known to al-ʿAkkād. Before 1947 we find no reference to Smuts or to his work in al-ʿAkkād's writings. It is reasonable to assume, however, that al-ʿAkkād read Smuts' work in its third edition which appeared in 1936. He seems to have been deeply impressed by it and to have developed his theory of organic structure and personality under its influence.

Al-‘Akkād’s theory of evolution and organic unity was already formed before the publication of Smuts’ study in 1926. He was already interested in biology, botany and zoology and acquainted with the works of Lamarck, Darwin and Wallace. Therefore, the similarities and parallels which we find between the views of the two writers must not always be attributed to an influence exercised by Smuts on al-‘Akkād. There remain, however, two points in al-‘Akkād’s theory which show his debt to Smuts. They are the view which regards personality as the supreme organic whole, as the culmination of the organic process of the universe, and the distinction between the system of crystals and the system of cells. These two points belong to al-‘Akkād’s later writings and appear in his study *On God and Man in the Noble Kur‘ān*.

To Smuts, as to al-‘Akkād, personality is

"the highest and completest of all wholes, ... a creative synthesis in which the earlier series of material, organic and psychical wholes are incorporated with a fresh accession or emergency of Holism ... Personality is the supreme embodiment of Holism both in its individual and its universal tendencies. It is the final synthesis of all operative factors in the universe into unitory wholes, and both in its unity and complexity it constitutes the great riddle of the universe."

To both writers personality is a unique, complex, living, creative whole constituted of various powers maintained in harmony, and is greater than the sum total of these powers.

In personality

the structures of matter, life and mind are inseparably blended ... and it is more than any of them." When we analyse material structure into its elements, we can practically afford to ignore everything else besides these elements themselves ... When, however, we go to analyse an organic whole into its elements, we notice at once that there must be something more besides those elements, something commonly called life which holds all those elements together in a living unity ... When proceeding yet higher or deeper, we reach psychic wholes, we become more keenly aware of the presence and unmistakable function, the free creative activity of this holistic something. And when, finally, we reach the level of personal wholes which include all these earlier less complex, holistic types, we find all explanations of action, relation and interaction among the elements futile and hopeless which ignore this deeper relation, this holistic setting, this active creative Holism which unites all the elements into unique wholes."1

Both writers also conceive of personality as a unity of mind and body, of spirit and matter which mutually influence each other and which exist in relation to each other.

"It is impossible to conceive mind as abstracted from the body. The disembodied soul is just as impossible as a concept as the disminded body." "Body and mind are not independent reals and have meaning and reality only as elements in one real substantive whole of Personality ...

Though the mind is "the most characteristic and ... the most important constituent" of personality, the body or the "physical organic factors" remain essential to it.3

"Mind in 'volition' is an inner self-direction of the structure of Body ... Body ... giving rise to mental 'sensation' is simply performing that mutation or creative leap which (is) ... found at every other stage of Evolution."4

Self-consciousness, freedom and creativeness are the main features of personality. "The Personality is

fundamentally an organ of self-realisation" whose root lies in man's "voluntary activity or the will." "Wholeness in self-realisation and self-expression" is the "essential aim and object" of it. In personality "the power of Holism" operates.

"Consciously and purposively to certain ends which increase in complexity and difficulty as the capacity for abstract thinking and rational co-ordination progresses. This fundamental movement is the will, whose activity is dependent not only on the primary forms of feeling, which make the movement slow or rapid according to the strength and volume of the feelings, but also on the growth of intelligence which adjusts means to ends."

What is most important in Smuts' and al-‘Akkād's theories of personality is that personality is

"the subject of Experience to which all the rest is the Object of experience. The Personality as the subject in experience marches right to the centre of the world-picture; it becomes the key and measure of things; to it all things become relative in experience."

Another point of similarity between Smuts' and al-‘Akkād's theories is the conception of freedom as the principle and ultimate aim of evolution. But here as in the last point the similarities do not mean influences. For al-‘Akkād expressed his views before the appearance of Smuts' work. However, to Smuts, as to al-‘Akkād, freedom means self-determination, will, spontaneity, power of creation, plasticity and above all wholeness or integration. Smuts thinks of freedom as something fundamental in the universe, something at the basis of nature and man. It is freedom which distinguishes mind from matter, animate beings from inanimate ones. At its highest

1. Ibid, pp.303-4.  
2. Ibid, p.287.
level it appears in personality.

"... Freedom has its roots deep down in the foundations and constitution of the universe. It is a profound mistake to look for Freedom only in the human will. The correct and fruitful view discloses Freedom, not only as an exceptional development in the universe, as an attribute merely of the human will, but as itself in one degree or another the grand rule of the universe, as the free self-determined activity of Holism in its universal process of self-realisation in Evolution, and as the fundamental principle of each individual whole set free in the course of this Evolution." "While in organic Evolution more or less definite specific modes of reaction to stimuli were inherited, in psychic Evolution ... a general plasticity of reaction was inherited, an indefinite range of acquiring experience, a vast capacity of learning in the individual life how to react to any particular stimulus which might happen to come along ... The free creative, holistic activity of mind appears conspicuously in its hereditary transmission, so that our human inheritance does not fetter us, but by its very nature confers plasticity, freedom and creativeness upon us. What we inherit is not a ready-made affair but a wide possibility and potency of moulding ourselves in our lives. In other words, what above all is inherited is freedom and the capacity of free and self-determined action and development in our individual lives."[1]

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(h) Coleridge, Hazlitt and Mill on Major Poetry.

In his theory of major and minor poetry al-'Akad is largely indebted to Coleridge, Hazlitt and J.S. Mill. Coleridge describes the major or ideal poet as the one who

"brings the whole soul of man into activity, with the subordination of its faculties to each other ..."

He is at the same time

"a profound philosopher. For poetry is the blossom and

1. Ibid, pp. 316, 282-3.
fragrancy of all human knowledge, human thoughts, human passions, emotions, and language."

In Shakespeare's plays "the creative power and the intellectual energy" are "reconciled and fought each with its shield before the breast of the other."¹

Hazlitt's views in this respect are consonant with Coleridge's.

"Impassioned poetry is an emanation of the moral and intellectual part of our nature, as well as of the sensitive - of the desire to know, the will to act, and the power to feel; and ought to appeal to these different parts of our constitution, in order to be perfect. The domestic or prose tragedy, which is thought to be the most natural, is in this sense the least so, because it appeals almost exclusively to one of these faculties, our sensibility ... The tragedy of Shakespeare, which is true poetry, stirs our inmost affections; abstracts evil from itself by combining it with all the forms of imagination, and with the deepest workings of the heart, and arouses the whole man within us."²

In the lecture "On Dryden and Pope" he also writes:

"... By a great poet we mean one who gives the utmost grandeur of our conceptions of nature, or the utmost force to the passions of the heart ... The poet of nature is one who, from the elements of beauty, of power, and of passion in his breast, sympathises with whatever is beautiful, and grand, and impassioned in nature, in its simple majesty, in its immediate appeal to the senses, to the thoughts and hearts of all men; so that the poet of nature, by the truth, and depth, and harmony of his mind, may be said to hold communion with the very soul of nature; to be identified with and to foreknow and to record the feelings of all men at all times and places ... Such was Homer, such was Shakespeare..."³

Shakespeare is distinguished by the generic quality of his mind, its power of communication with all other minds - so that it contained a universe of

(3) Ibid, pp.69-70.
thought and feeling within itself." "He was all that others were, or that they could become. He not only had in himself the germs of every faculty and feeling, but he could follow them by anticipation, intuitively, into all their conceivable ramifications, through every change of fortune or conflict of passion, or turn of thought. He had 'a mind reflecting ages past', and present: all the people that ever lived are there."

On the other hand, Pope was a minor poet because he represented "things as they appear to the indifferent observer", and "in the most ... insignificant point of view." He had no "lofty enthusiasm", no "strong imagination", no "passionate sense of the beauties of nature", and "no deep insight into the workings of the heart". He had rather "a refined sympathy with the sentiments and habits of human nature, as he felt them within the little circle of his family and friends."

Thus to both Coleridge and Hazlitt the works of the major poet offer to their reader a total picture of the human soul and nature, whereas the works of the minor poet provide him only with one and limited aspect of them. The major poet is distinguished by his integrity, by the unity of his intellectual and emotional faculties and the roundedness of his personality, whereas the personality of the minor poet is one-sided. The major is at once a man of intense feeling, lively imagination, and profound thought. In his works these three faculties are blended with each other.

After Coleridge and Hazlitt, John Stuart Mill also conceived the great poet as a great thinker or philosopher.

1. Ibid, p.47.  
2. Ibid, p.69.
"Every great poet, every poet who extensively or permanently influenced mankind, has been a great thinker; he has had a philosophy though perhaps he did not call it by that name; he has had his mind full of thoughts derived not merely from passive sensibility, but from trains of reflection, from observation, analysis, and generalization."¹

Mill associates the development of the poet's works with the development of his intellect and culture.

"The achievements of any poet in his art will be in proportion to the growth and perfection of his thinking faculty."²

The great poet is not only distinguished by his "strong feeling" or "intense sensibility", but also by his "strong intellect". For "strong feelings require a strong intellect to carry them."³

The examples Mill finds in Milton and Coleridge whose "poetic nature (was) united with logical and scientific culture".

He seems to rank Shelley lower than Milton and Coleridge because he lacked

"systematic intellectual culture, in a measure proportioned to the intensity of his own nature;"⁴ he lacked

"that culture by which Wordsworth has reaped from his own inward nature the richest harvest ever brought forth by a soil of so little depth."

In Shelley's poetry, says Mill,

"intentional mental discipline had done little, the vividness of his emotions and of his sensations had done all. He seldom follows up an idea; it starts into

life, summons from the fairy-land of his inexhaustible fancy, some three or four bold images, then vanishes, and straight he is off on the wings of some casual association into quite another sphere."

Therefore, Mill thinks that culture is indispensable to the poet, and describes as "false" the doctrine which claims for the poet an independence of culture, or that his poetic faculty "grows with his growth like any of his bodily powers" independently of education and learning.\(^2\)

In these views of Coleridge, Hazlitt, and Mill we find the basic elements of al-'Akhād's theory.

Note:

Smuts' views of what he calls "the science of personality" or "personology" might have influenced al-'Akhād in his biographies and biographical methods.

"The time may come when the science of personality may be the very keystone of the arch, and serve to complete the full growing circle of organized human knowledge."

The procedure of this science, he says,

"should take cognisance of the special analytical contributions of psychology and physiology, and of all other human sciences, individual and social, theoretical and practical. But it should do more ... It should study the biography of noted personalities as expressions of the developing personalities in each case."

It should study

"personalities synthetically as living units and wholes rather than in the analytical manner of psychology and the other human sciences. In biography we have to follow the development of a person as a whole, as a living biological psychical entity, and we are therefore in a position to correct the one-sided abstract generalised results of the analytical procedure of these sciences."

The biographer should

"select the biographies of people who had real inner histories, lives of the spirit, as well as a fair capacity of continuous development during their lifetime ... The lives of poets, artists, writers, thinkers, religious and social innovators will be found the most suitable for purposes of holistic study. They are often people with inner lives and interesting personalities, with an inner history of continuous development."

"From a series of biographical studies, such as I propose, it will become clear that Personalities follow their own laws of inner growth and development, which will, while conforming to a general plan, show very considerable diversity in details. It will be found that each personality is a psychic biological organism, an individual personal whole, with its own curve of development, and its own series of phases of growth. A person will thus be found to be very different at different stages of his development, but all the stages and phases will be found together by and be the outcome of the identical inner Personality." "Personology as the science of Personality, as the synthetic science of Human Nature, will form the crown of all sciences and in turn become the basis of a new Ethic, a new Metaphysic, and a truer spiritual outlook than we can possibly have in the ignorance and confusions of our present state of knowledge ... the basis for all these great developments can only be laid in a new biographical aim and method, which will give us the facts which are vitally necessary for any sound scientific constructions."

It would be worthwhile - in another work, to study al-‘Akkād’s biographies in the light of these views and see in them the influence of Smuts and also of Carlyle. It would be important for such a study to know the exact date of al-‘Akkād’s acquaintance with Smuts’ work. For it might have been Smuts who led him to the art of biography in 1927.

1. J.C. Smuts, Holism and Evolution, pp. 290-98.
Hazlitt and Coleridge are the two English critics to whom al-\textsuperscript{t}Akkad is mainly indebted in his views of imagination, fancy and wit.

Hazlitt's principal discussion of imagination occurs in his \textit{Essay on The Principle of Human Action}, published in 1805, and his lecture "On Poetry in General", delivered early in 1818. The other essays which come next in importance are "On Reason and Imagination", and "Sir Walter Scott, Racine and Shakespeare."

In his \textit{Essay on The Principles of Human Action}, imagination is discussed in relationship to human experience and action, and in the lecture "On Poetry in General" in relationship to poetry.

In the lecture "On Poetry in General" Hazlitt defines imagination as

"the faculty which represents objects, not as they are in themselves, but as they are moulded by other thoughts and feelings, into an infinite variety of shapes and combination of powers."

He also writes:

"The province of the imagination is principally visionary, the unknown and the undefined: the understanding restores things to their natural boundaries, and strips them of their fanciful (imaginative) pretensions ... It is the undefined and uncommon that gives birth and scope to the imagination; we can only fancy what we do not know. As in looking into the mazes of a tangled wood we fill them with what shapes we please, with ravenous beasts, with caverns vast, and drear enchantments, so in our ignorance of the world about us, we make gods or devils of the first object we see, and

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set no bounds to the wilful suggestions of our hopes and fears."¹

These are not the only remarks which Hazlitt made about imagination. Much of what he says of poetry is relevant to imagination. He defines poetry as "strictly the language of imagination."² Therefore we can replace the word "poetry" by "imagination" without changing the meaning in the passage which says:

"The light of poetry is not only direct but also a reflected light, that while it shews us the object, throws a sparkling radiance on all around it ... Poetry represents forms chiefly as they suggest other forms; feelings, as they suggest forms or other feelings. Poetry puts a spirit of life and motion into the universe. It describes the flowing, not the fixed."³

What we find in these remarks and the ones which we have already met is that imagination is a power which works in intimate relationship with passion and in harmony with nature; it receives its strength from "the intensity of feeling", "works unconsciously like nature", discovers "the hidden analogies of things", brings "every object in nature, whether present or absent, before the mind's eye," and embodies or gives shapes to the passions; it animates and humanizes nature, imbues things with beauty and radiant colours, and identifies man with the world; it penetrates the inner living truth and reveals things as we wish them to be; it also modifies and combines things into new forms, and unifies

(2) Ibid, p.4.
(3) Ibid, p.3.
or "melts down and renders malleable, as in a furnace, the most contradictory materials."¹ Imagination differs from understanding or reason in that it is not restricted to the realm of the senses. But imagination does not contradict reason. Hazlitt speaks sometimes of "reasoning imagination" and "imaginative reasoning."² He also writes:

"Man is an animal compounded both of imagination and understanding; and, in treating of what is good for man's nature, it is necessary to consider both." "Logic should enrich and invigorate its decisions by the use of imagination; as rhetoric should be governed in its application, and guarded from abuse by the checks of the understanding."³

In these remarks we find some of al-'Akkād's basic ideas of imagination. His other idea of imagination as a power which leads to sympathy, knowledge and action seems also to have been borrowed or derived from Hazlitt. To Hazlitt imagination is a universal faculty; it is, like passion, "a part of man's nature." "Without it 'man's life is poor as beast's'. When he calls man "a poetical animal" he means imaginative animal. Because imagination appears in every action of man he says:

"The child is a poet ... when he first plays at hide-and-seek, or repeats the story of Jack the Giant-killer; the shepherd-boy is a poet, when he first crowns his mistress with a garland of flowers; the countryman, when he stops to look at the rainbow; the city-apprentice, when he gazes after the Lord-Mayor's show; the miser, when he hugs his gold; the courtier, who builds his hopes upon a smile; the savage, who paints his idol with blood; the slave, who worships a tyrant, or the tyrant, who fancies himself a god."⁴

All these and others act upon the principles of imagination. Now we must turn to Hazlitt’s Essay on The Principles of Human Action where we find the elaboration of these views. Here Hazlitt describes imagination as the “faculty of multiplying, varying, extending, combining and comparing” man’s impressions, and as the

"faculty of conceiving things which have not been impressed on his senses and of inferring like things from like."1

This is why imagination is indispensable to human knowledge and action; without it man “would not be a rational agent: he would be below the dullest and most stupid brute.” What imagination does is to

"change the order in which things have been impressed on the senses, and ... connect the same properties with different objects, and different properties with the same objects;" "combine our original impressions in all possible forms, and ... modify these impressions themselves to a very great degree."2

Without this process or work knowledge becomes impossible.

Hazlitt also describes imagination as "the immediate spring and guide of action". By it, in regard to future, man "creates the object, he pushes his ideas beyond the bounds of memory and senses;" it enables

"him to throw himself forward into future, to anticipate unreal events and to be affected by his own imaginary interest."

It exerts thus "a direct influence over human actions" and makes the will

"bend to every change of circumstances or probability of advantage, and a power at the same time of controlling the blind impulses of associated mechanical feelings, and of making them subservient to the accomplishment of some particular purpose ..."\(^1\)

The similarity of al-‘Akkād’s views in this respect is striking. Both Hazlitt and al-‘Akkād think of imagination as a moral power which leads to sympathy with others. Sympathy, says Hazlitt, is "the act of the imagination", for imagination enables man to enter into "the feelings and interests of others and of being consequently influenced by them."\(^2\) He seems to have written the essay "On Reason and Imagination" in defence of the latter as a moral power.

In literature and art imagination is to Hazlitt as to al-‘Akkād the power of creation and invention, and the source of originality. He regards the difference between Shakespeare and Sir Walter Scott as a difference between imagination and imitation, "between originality and the want of it."

"Almost all the finest scenes and touches, the great master-strokes in Shakespeare are such as must have belonged to the class of invention, where the secret lay between him and his own heart, and the power exerted is in adding to the given materials and working something out of them; in the Author of Waverley ... the principal and characteristic beauties are such as may and do belong to the class of compilation ..."

Whereas "the creative principle is everywhere restless and redundant in Shakespeare," "Sir Walter’s mind is full of information." He is a "compiler of romances" who "lays the

\(^1\) Ibid, pp.21, 26-8.  \(^2\) Ibid, p.21.
embargo ... on history, tradition, local scenery, costume and manner, and makes his characters chiefly up of these." In Shakespeare Hazlitt finds an "over-weening importunity of the imagination", and in Sir Walter "a matter-of-fact imagination".

In illustrating his views Hazlitt makes comparisons between some scenes and utterances in the works of Shakespeare and Sir Walter:

"The witches in Macbeth are traditional, preternatural personages; and there Sir Walter would have left them after making what use of them he pleased as a sort of Gothic machinery. Shakespeare makes something more of them, and adds to the mystery by explaining it 'The earth hath bubbles as the water hath, And these are of them.' We have their physiognomy too - 'and enjoin'd silence, By each at once her choppy finger laying Upon her skinny lip'. And the mode of their disappearance is thus described - 'And then they melted into thin air'.

... The geese of Micklestane Muir (the country-woman and her flock of geese turned into stone) in the Black Dwarf are a fine and petrifying metamorphosis; but this is the tradition of the country and no more.'

In Shakespeare the events and images evolve from "the ruling passion" and strike by their originality:

"When Lear says, 'The little dogs and all, Troy, Blanche, and Sweetheart, see they bark at me!' there is no old Chronicle of the line of Brute, no black-letter broadside, no tattered ballad, no vague rumour, in which this exclamation is registered; ... the illustration is borrowed from the commonest and most casual images in nature, and yet it is this very circumstance that lends its extreme force to the expression of his grief by shewing that even the lowest things in creation and the last you would think of had in his imagination turned against him ... Again, Lear calls on the Heavens to take his part, for 'they are old like him'. Here there is nothing to prop up the image but the strength of passion, confounding, the infirmity of age with the
stability of the firmament, and equalling the
complainant through the sense of suffering and wrong,
with the Majesty of the Highest. The finding out a
parallel between the most unlike objects, because the
individual would wish to find one to support the sense
of his own misery and helplessness, is truly
Shakespearian; it is an instinctive law of our nature,
and the genuine inspiration of the Muse."

With Sir Walter things are different; his images, though
they might be beautiful and suggestive, exhibit no
originality and indicate no power of imagination.

"Meg Merrilies on her death-bed says, 'Lay my head to
the East'. Nothing can be finer or more thrilling than
this in its way; but the author has little to do with
it. It is an Oriental superstition; it is a proverbial
expression; it is part of the gibberish ... of her
gypsy clan!"

I have quoted Hazlitt at length in order to show how much
his views correspond to the views expressed by al-‘Akkād in
the essay "Imagination in Risālāt al-Ghufrān." Al-‘Akkād's
attitude towards Risālāt al-Ghufrān seems to echo Hazlitt's
attitude towards the novels of Sir Walter Scott.

(b) Coleridge on Poetic Imagery.

The bearing of Coleridge's distinction between imagination
and fancy on poetry appears both in the unity and imagery of
the poem. It is a distinction between two kinds of unity
and imagery, organic and mechanic or static.

"Images, however beautiful, though faithfully copied from
nature, and as accurately represented in words, do not
of themselves characterize the poet. They become proofs

of original genius only as far as they are modified by a predominant passion; or by associated thoughts or images awakened by that passion; or when they have the effect of reducing multitude to unity, or succession to an instant; or lastly, when a human and intellectual life is transferred to them from the poet's own spirit, which shoots its being through earth, sea, and air."

"... still more characteristic of poetic genius does the imagery become, when it moulds and colors itself to the circumstances, passion, or character, present and foremost in the mind." 1

These words seem to have been very influential in al-'Akkād's criticism of the imagery of Arabic poetry. In them we find two cardinal points; the first is that the image should not be used for its own sake, as an ornament, but as an object in the poetic process of communication; nor should natural objects be described as they appear to the senses; rather they should be described as they are reflected in the poet's mind and coloured by his passions. What matters is not the image itself, its novelty or originality, but the emotion associated with it, or its power of evoking the emotion or emotions which the poet wants to communicate to his readers. This means that the image must be particular not general. The other point is that the imagery of the poem must be coherent and subordinated to a predominant passion or thought. We have already seen these views in al-'Akkād's criticism of Shawkī and other Egyptian poets.

Coleridge criticises the poets of his age on the ground that the main object which they propose to themselves is to seek "new and striking images." 2 He also criticises the

imagery of the English and Italian poets of the 15th and 16th century which he finds common and 'almost general'.

"Sun, moon, flowers, breezes, murmuring streams, warbling songsters, delicious shades, lovely damsels cruel as fair, nympha, s, naiads and goddesses, are the materials which are common to all, and which each shaped and arranged according to his judgement or fancy, little solicitous to add or to particularize."¹

The examples of living and coherent imagery which Coleridge gives are all taken from Shakespeare. He finds in Shakespeare's imagery a "particular excellence" by which Shakespeare "in his earliest, as in his latest, works surpasses all other poets."²

'Bethold on row of pines, that shorn and bow'd
Bend from the sea-blast, seen at twilight eve.'

'Full many a glorious morning have I seen
Flatter the mountain tops with sovereign eye.'

'The mortal moon hath her eclipse endur'd,
And the sad augurs mock their own presage;
Incertainties now crown themselves assur'd,
And peace proclaims olives of endless age.'

'Even as the sun with purple-colour'd face
Had ta'en his last leaf of weeping morn,
Rose-cheek'd Adonis hied him to the chase;
Hunting he loved, but love he laugh'd to scorn.
Sick-thoughted Venus makes amain unto him,
And like a bold-faced suitor 'gins to woo him.'³

What we find in these lines is mainly personification, "humanizing imagery and circumstances."⁴ To Coleridge poetry or art is

"The power of humanizing nature, of infusing the thoughts and passions of man into everything which is the object of his contemplation."⁵

This might explain what Coleridge means when he writes of imagination:

"It is essentially vital, even as all objects (as objects) are essentially fixed and dead."  

It is the power which

"acts by impressing the stamp of humanity, of human feelings over inanimate objects."  

Its highest manifestation can be found in Shakespeare's Lear,

"where the deep anguish of a father spreads the feeling of ingratitude and cruelty over the very elements of heaven."  

Thus "the particular excellence" of Shakespeare lies in giving "a passion to the objects which he presents."  

This recalls to the mind al-`Akkād's view of imagination as a power closely connected with personification, a power which

"clothes the objects and phenomena of nature with the garments of human life and attributes to them human feelings and actions."

It also reminds us of his discussion of Ibn ar-Rūmī's imagery under the subtitle "Personification and Description". He finds in Ibn ar-Rūmī's description the same excellence which Coleridge finds in Shakespeare.

To Coleridge imagination is also a unifying and harmonizing power,

"the power by which one image or feeling is made to modify many others and by a sort of fusion to force many into one."

3. Ibid, p.188.
5. Shakespearian Criticism, vol. 1, p.188.
We have seen that in the few remarks which al-‘Akkād made about the poetry of wit he contrasts wit with imagination and identifies it with sensation. To him wit corresponds to art and imagination to nature. Hence the inferiority of wit to imagination. He thinks that, to use Matthew Arnold's words, "genuine poetry is conceived and composed in the soul" rather than "in wit". The poet is not a wit but a man of imagination and feeling. In the whole of his critical writings al-‘Akkād's aim was to oppose the old notion which regards poetry as embellished language and radiant images conceived and constructed in wit or fancy.

This attitude towards the poetry of wit recalls that of Hazlitt and Matthew Arnold. Al-‘Akkād seems to have reached his views under the influence of the two English critics who in their turn were following Joseph Warton. In the Dedication of Warton's Essay on the Writings and Genius of Pope we read:

"We do not, it should seem, sufficiently attend to the difference there is between a MAN OF WIT, a MAN OF SENSE, and a TRUE POET. Donne and Swift were undoubtedly men of wit, and men of sense: But what traces have they left of PURE POETRY?... A clear head and acute understanding are not sufficient, alone, to make a POET ..."

What makes poetry in Warton's view is not "solid observation on human life" or "elegance and brevity" of expression, but "a creative and glowing IMAGINATION, 'acer spiritus ac vis'"

He goes on to say:
"The sublime and pathetic are the two chief nerves of all genuine poesy. What is there very sublime or very pathetic in Pope? In his work there is indeed 'nihil inane, nihil arcessitum.'"

He divides the English poets into four classes and writes:

"In the first class, I would place first our only three sublime and pathetic poets: SPENSER, SHAKESPEARE, MILTON."

These views were repeated both by Hazlitt and Arnold.

In his essay on Thomas Gray Arnold writes:

"The difference between genuine poetry and the poetry of Dryden, Pope, and all their school, is briefly this: their poetry is conceived and composed in their wits; genuine poetry is conceived and composed in the soul." 

Hazlitt has more closely followed Warton. In order to estimate his influence on al-'Akkād we need to quote him at length.

"Dryden and Pope are the great masters of the artificial style in our language ..., Chaucer, Spenser, Shakespeare, and Milton, were of the natural ... This artificial style is generally and very justly acknowledged to be inferior to the other ... He (Pope) was not ... distinguished as a poet of lofty enthusiasm, of strong imagination, or a deep insight into the workings of the heart; but he was a wit, ... a man of sense, of observation, ... with a keen relish for the elegancies of art,... He was, in a word, the poet, not of nature, but of art; and the distinction between the two ... is this - the poet of nature is one who, from the elements of beauty, of power, and of passion in his heart, sympathises with whatever is beautiful, and grand, and impassioned in nature, in its simple majesty, in its immediate appeal to the senses, to the thoughts and hearts of all men, so that the poet of nature, by the truth, and depth, and harmony of his mind, may be said to hold communion with the very soul of nature; to be identified with and to foreknow and to record the feelings of all men at all times and places ...


Such was Homer, such was Shakespeare, whose works will last as long as nature, because they are a copy of the indestructible forms and everlasting impulses of nature, welling out from the bosom as from a perennial spring... The powers of the imagination in them, is the representative power of all nature. It has its centre in the human soul, and makes the circuit of the universe..."1

The influence of this passage in al-'Akkād's criticism of Shawki is very evident. In *Egyptian Poets and Their Milieus* he regards Shawki as a poet of art and sense, and contrasts him with al-Mutanabbi and Ibn ar-Rūmī whom he appreciates as poets of nature and passion. He does not mention 'wit' by name, but it is implicit in his whole argument. Shawki is, in his view, a product of a cultivated mind and an acquired knowledge rather than of imagination and feeling. It is significant that in an article entitled "Mi'raj ash-Shīr" (The Ascension of Poetry), published in 1947, he compares Shawki with Dryden, and Hāfiz Ibrāhīm with Pope.

The remarks which al-'Akkād made about wit and irony or humour in his essays "Arabic and English Poetry", "The Power of Irony in al-Ma'arrī" and "Irony in Risālat al-Ghufrān" have also their origin in Hazlitt's work *Lectures on the English Comic Writers*, particularly in the introductory lecture "On Wit and Humour".

"Humour, as it is shewn in books, is an imitation of the natural or acquired absurdities of mankind, or of the ludicrous in accident, situation and character; wit is the illustrating and heightening the sense of that absurdity by some sudden and unexpected likeness or

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opposition of one thing to another, which sets off the quality we laugh at or despise in a still more contemptible or striking point of view. Wit as distinguished from poetry, is the imagination or fancy inverted, and so applied to given objects, as to make the little look less, the mean more light and worthless; or to divert our admiration or wean our affections from that which is lofty and impressive, instead of producing a mere intense admiration and exalted passion, as poetry does ... Wit hovers round the borders of the light and trifling whether in matter of pleasure or pain ... Wit is, in fact, the eloquence of indifference or an ingenious and striking exposition of those evanescent and glancing impressions of objects which affect us more from surprise or contrast to the train of our ordinary and literal preconceptions, than from anything in the objects themselves exciting our necessary sympathy or lasting hatred." "It might be an argument of the intrinsic superiority of poetry or imagination to wit, that the former does not admit of mere verbal combinations ... It requires something more solid and substantial to raise admiration or passion ... Imagination may be said to be the finding out something similar in things generally alike, or with like feelings attached to them; while wit principally aims at finding out something that seems the same, or amounts to a momentary deception where you least expected it, viz. in things totally opposite."

The influence of these views appears not only in al-‘Akkād’s writings on the poetry of wit before 1922, but also in his writings on the poetry of fancy and irony after this date.

Towards the end of his lecture "On Dryden and Pope" Hazlitt, following Coleridge and Wordsworth, also distinguished between imagination and fancy.

"It should appear, in tracing the history of our literature, that poetry had at the period of which we are speaking, in general declined, by successive gradations, from the poetry of imagination, in the time of Elizabeth, to the poetry of fancy (to adopt modern distinction) in the time of Charles I., and again from the poetry of fancy to that of wit, as in the reign of Charles II and Queen Anne...."
On the preceding page he also writes:

"(Dryden's) the *Annus Mirabilis* is a tedious performance; it is a tissue of far-fetched, heavy, lumbering conceits, and in the worst style of what has been denominated metaphysical poetry. His Odes in general are of the same stamp; they are the hard-strained offspring of a meagre meretricious fancy."¹

Here Hazlitt seems to use 'fancy' in a Coleridgean sense. He distinguishes between imagination, fancy and wit, but he does not define the distinction. He seems to think of fancy as inferior to imagination, and of wit as inferior to both imagination and fancy. He also seems to think of the fanciful images as "far-fetched, heavy, lumbering conceits."

By "the poetry of fancy in the time of Charles I." he must mean metaphysical poetry with which he compares Dryden's *The Annus Mirabilis*. In a lecture on the metaphysical poets he describes these poets as the "wits of the age of James and Charles I." who "spoiled nature by art" and distorted "the natural impression of things" by "far-fetched and improbable" comparisons. Their object "was to match any one idea by any other idea", or "to strain and distort the immediate feeling into some barely possible consequence or recondite analogy", whereas "the object of the poetry of imagination is to raise or adorn one idea by another more striking or more beautiful", or "to illustrate any strong feeling, by shewing the same feeling as connected with objects or circumstances more palpable and touching". They

"left nothing to her (nature) outward 'impress', or spontaneous impulses, but made a point of twisting and

¹. Ibid, p.81.
torturing almost every subject they took in hand, till they had fitted it to the mould of their self-opinion and the previous fabrications of their fancy ... Their chief aim is to make you wonder at the writer, not to interest you in the subject."}

Hazlitt thus appears to think of fancy (in Coleridge's sense) and wit as faculties close to each other. In fact, his conception of wit does not differ much from Coleridge's conception of fancy. In its work we find "incongruous and equivocal combinations" which "startle and shock our preconceptions" of things. On the other hand, the work of imagination shows "powerful and lasting associations of ideas, or striking and true analogies" which "confirm, enforce, and expand" our preconceptions of things. 2 Wit is a "ludicrous invention", 3 a power "opposed to reason or argument" and consisting

"in striking out some casual and partial coincidence which has nothing to do, or at least implies no necessary connection with the nature of things, which are forced into a seeming analogy, by a play upon words, or some irrelevant conceit..." 4

It is "a detection of unexpected likeness or distinction in things" generally unlike. 5 Coleridge defines fancy as

"the faculty of bringing together images dissimilar in the main by some one point or more of likeness distinguished", and describes these images as having

"no connexion natural or moral, but are yoked together by the poet by means of some accidental coincidence." 6

5. Ibid, p.22. Underlines are mine.
6. Coleridge, Shakespearian Criticism, vol.1, p.188.
7. The Table Talk, and Omniana ... op.cit. p.309.
He also describes them as "fixities and definites", and as units of "Memory emancipated from the order of time and space" and brought together according to "the law of associations". 1

He also thinks of fancy and wit as close faculties which cannot be easily distinguished from each other.

"It is not always easy to distinguish between wit and fancy. When the whole pleasure received is derived from surprise at an unexpected turn of expression, then I call it wit; but when the pleasure is produced not only by surprise, but also by an image which remains with us and gratifies for its own sake, then I call it fancy. I know of no mode so satisfactory of distinguishing between wit and fancy." 2

Like Hazlitt, he distinguishes between two kinds of wit. While Voltaire's wit "consists in a mere combination of words", Shakespeare's wit is "produced not by a combination of words, but by a combination of images". 3

Coleridge illustrates fancy by Shakespeare's lines from Venus and Adonis.

'Full gently now she takes him by the hand, A lily prison'd in a gaol of snow, Or ivory in an alabaster band; So white a friend engirts so white a foe'. 4

Hazlitt illustrates wit by Butler's lines which compare "the change of night into day, to the change of colour in a boiled lobster."

'The sun had long since, in the lap Of Thetis, taken out his nap And, like a lobster boil'd, the morn From black to red, began to turn.'

To him the comparison is

4. Ibid, vol. 1, p.188.
"brought from the lowest instance, and with associations that can only disturb and perplex the imagination in its conception of the real objects it describes."  

The same lines were given by Coleridge many years later as an example of fancy which "brings together images which have no connexion natural or moral ..." While Coleridge conceives fancy as something analogous to delirium, as a liberation from the control of reason and the senses, or as "a mode of Memory emancipated from the order of time and space", he comments on Dryden's line

'Great wits are sure to madness near allied'. "True so far as this, that genius of the highest kind implies an unusual intensity of the modifying power, which detached from the discriminative and reproductive power might conjure a platted straw into a royal diadem; but it would be at least as true, that great genius is most alien from madness..."  

The example of imagination Coleridge finds in Shakespeare's following lines from Venus and Adonis which describe "the flight of Adonis from the enamoured goddess in the dusk of evening."

'Look! how a bright star shooteth from the sky,  
So glides he in the night from Venus' eye'.  

Of these lines he writes:

"How many images and feelings are here brought together without effort and without discord - The beauty of Adonis - the rapidity of his flight - the yearning yet hopelessness of the enamoured gazer and a shadowy ideal character thrown over the whole."  

In them Shakespeare has given us "the liveliest image of succession with the feeling of simultaneousness."  

2. The Table Talk, and Omniana ..., op.cit. p.309.  
4. The Table Talk and Omniana..., op.cit. p.233.  
finds the analogy of Adonis with the bright shooting star imaginative, that is, natural, spontaneous and harmonious. There is no "effort" and no "discord" in it. He also finds in it a description of a human situation, the yearning and hopelessness of the enamoured gazer, the rapid flight of Adonis and the dusk of evening. Unlike the fanciful image, "a lily prison'd in a gaol of snow" or "ivory in an alabaster band" which represents artificial combinations of forms and colours based on casual and arbitrary relationships between things, the imaginative image is based on relationships inherent in the nature of the things described. In it the two objects of the comparison coalesce with each other.

Since Coleridge has expressed his views of fancy and wit in connection with Shakespeare, it is revealing to see Hazlitt's views of Shakespeare's imagination and imagery. In the lecture "On Shakespeare and Ben Jonson" he writes:

"Shakespeare was a greater poet than wit; his imagination was the leading and master quality of his mind... The ludicrous was only secondary and subordinate".1

A close examination of Shakespeare's imagery is made in the other lecture "On Shakespeare and Milton".

"He brings together images the most alike, but placed at the greatest distance from each other; that is, found in circumstances of the greatest dissimilitude. From the remoteness of his combinations, and the celerity with which they are affected, they coalesce the more indissolubly together. The more the thoughts are strangers to each other, and the longer they have kept asunder, the more intimate does their union seem to become. Their felicity is equal to their force. Their likeness is made more dazzling by their novelty. They startle, and take the fancy prisoner in the same instant."2

Hazlitt illustrates these views by the following lines from *Troilus and Cressida*. "Aeneas says to Agamemnon,

'I ask that I may waken reverence,
And on the cheek be ready with a blush
Modest as morning, when she coldly eyes
The youthful Phoebus'.

Ulysses urging Achilles to show himself in the field, says -

'No man is the lord of anything,
Till he communicate his parts to others:
Nor doth he of himself know them for aught,
Till he behold them formed in the applause,
Where they're extended! which like an arch reverberates
The voice again, or like a gate of steel,
Fronting the sun, receives and renders back
Its figure and its heat'.

Patroclus gives the inddent warrior the same advice.

'Rouse yourself; and the weak wanton Cupid
Shall from your neck unloose his amorous fold,
And like a dew-dropp from the lion's mane
Be shook to air!' 1

To Hazlitt the images or analogies which we find in these lines are products of plastic imagination which "unites the most opposite extremes". 2 Though the objects of the comparisons are remote from each other and taken from dissimilar circumstances, they remain similar in the main and represent a unity.

After Coleridge, Wordsworth has also expressed his own views of fancy and imagination. Like Coleridge, he thinks of imagination as a power which "shapes and creates" by "consolidating numbers into unity and dissolving and separating unity into number." 3 But he also conceives fancy as a "creative faculty" and says:

1. Ibid, vol.5, p.54. 2. Ibid, p.53
"To aggregate and to associate, to evoke and to combine, belong as well to the Imagination as to Fancy."  

Thus to Wordsworth both imagination and fancy are associative and aggregative faculties. This is what Coleridge denies. However, apart from this difference, though essential, Coleridge's and Wordsworth's views of fancy and imagination remain almost the same.

"When the Imagination frames a comparison, if it does not strike on the first presentation, a sense of the truth of the likeness, from the moment that it is perceived, grows and continues to grow — upon the mind; the resemblance depending less upon outline of form and feature, than upon expression and effect; less upon casual and outstanding, than upon inherent and internal, properties."  

On the other hand, the fanciful comparison or image strikes as 'capricious', 'playful', 'ludicrous' and 'amusing', and is not sustained by "the nature of things."  

While in the imaginative comparison "the two objects unite and coalesce" and modify each other, they remain separate in the fanciful one.

"Fancy does not require that the materials which she makes use of should be susceptible of change in their constitution, from her touch; and where they admit of modification, it is ... slight, limited and evanescent. Directly the reverse of these, are the desires and demands of Imagination. She recoils from everything but the plastic, the pliant and the indefinite."  

One of Wordsworth's illustrations of fancy is the lines (ascribed to Lord Chesterfield).

The dews of the evening most carefully shun,

1. Ibid, pp.165, 163. 2. Ibid, p.164.  
5. Ibid, p.163.
They are the tears of the sky for the loss of the sun'.

on which he comments

"a flash of surprise is the effect ... and nothing more, for the nature of things does not sustain the combination."¹

The other English critics who distinguished between imagination and fancy are Leigh Hunt and Ruskin. To Leigh Hunt, fancy is "a lighter play of imagination, or the feeling of analogy coming short of seriousness". He does, however, associate imagination with truth (emotional truth) and beauty, and fancy with decoration and ornamentation.

"It (poetry) embodies and illustrates its impressions by imagination, or images of the objects of which it treats, and other images brought in to throw light on those objects, in order that it may enjoy and impart the feeling of their truth in its utmost conviction and affluence.

It illustrates them by fancy ... in order that it may laugh with what it loyes, and show how it can decorate it with fairy ornament."²

In his account of fancy in Modern Painters Ruskin follows Leigh Hunt. He thinks of fancy as a power which "sees the outsides of things and is contented therewith". It searches for external and even false analogies between things and catches

"resemblances, which so far as the point she looks at is concerned, are true, but would be false if she could see through to the other side."

The second characteristic of fancy, which is a lack of seriousness, springs from the first. Fancy

"cannot be made serious, no edge-tools but she will play with; whereas the imagination is in all things the reverse".

The third characteristic of fancy is that it sees things in a

1. Ibid, pp.165-6.
partial and fragmented way, and embraces the part rather than the whole.

"... The fancy staying at the outsides of things, cannot see them all at once, but runs hither and thither, and round and about to see more and more, bounding merely from point to point, and glittering here and there, but necessarily always settling, if she settle at all, on a point only, never embracing the whole."^1

Ruskin also distinguishes between different degrees or modes of fancy. He says of the lines:

"Her lips were red, and one was thin, Compared with that was next her chin, Some bee had stung it newly."

"The real, red, bright being of the lip is there in a moment. But it is all outside; no expression, yet, no mind."

He gives then Warner's lines about Rosamond struck by Eleanor.

"With that she dashed her on the lips So dyed double red; Hard was the heart that gave the blow, Soft were those lips that bled."

as an example which marks a step further towards imagination. For in them "the tendency of mind begins to mingle with the outside colour" and "the Imagination is seen in its awakening".

Of Shelley's lines:

"Lamp of life, thy lips are burning Through the veil that seems to hide them, As the radiant lines of morning Through thin clouds, ere they divide them"

he says that they show a higher degree of fancy.

"There dawns the entire soul in that morning; yet we may stop if we choose at the image still external, at the crimson clouds."

The example of imagination is taken from Shakespeare.

"Here hung those lips that I have kissed, I know not how oft. Where be your gibes now, your gambols, your songs, your flashes of merriment that were wont to set the table on a roar?"

In these words Ruskin finds the "essence of lip, and the full power of the imagination."¹

Now after we have presented Coleridge's, Hazlitt's, Wordsworth's, Leigh Hunt's and Ruskin's views of imagination and fancy we can see that al-'Akkād's theory concerning the same subject adds very little to these views. It is almost a combination of these views. Al-'Akkād is also indebted to J.S. Mill. The views of the association of ideas or associative imagination which he expressed while discussing Ibn ar-Rūmī's poetry have their origin in Mill's essays "The Two Kinds of Poetry", "What is Poetry" and "Tennyson's Poems".

In the first essay Mill conceives of the poet as one who is "so constituted, that emotions are the links of association by which (his) ideas, both sensuous and spiritual, are connected together."²

He finds in this associative process of ideas, which is a result of "intense sensibility", the secret of the poet and of his work.

"What constitutes the poet is not the imagery nor the thoughts, nor even the feelings, but the law according to which they are called up. He is a poet, not because he has ideas of any particular kind, but because the succession of his ideas is subordinate to the course of his emotions."³

Thus to Mill, as to al-'Akkād, the poet is distinguished from others not by his thoughts, feelings, or imagery but by the

1. Ibid, p. 160.
associations of his feelings and ideas, and the subordination of his ideas to his feelings.

The similarity between the theories of the two writers goes further than this. Mill, like al-‘Akkād, seems to attribute the emotional associations of ideas in the poet's mind to the particular and peculiar nature of the poet, to his "mental and physical constitution or temperament",\(^1\) to his peculiar "nervous organization" for which he is "indebted to nature". This nervous organization is

"so constituted, as to be, more easily than common organizations, thrown either by physical or mental causes, into states of enjoyment or suffering ..., states of certain duration, often lasting long after the removal of the cause which produced them; and not local, nor consciously physical, but, in so far as organic, pervading the entire nervous system."

Mill, like al-‘Akkād, regards this "peculiar kind of nervous susceptibility" as "the distinctive character of the poetic temperament."

"It constitutes the capacity for poetry; and not only produces ... a predisposition to the poetic associations, but supplies the very materials out of which many of them are formed."

It also makes the poet's "outward impressions vivid and distinct."\(^2\)

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1. Ibid, pp.222-3.
2. Ibid, pp.259-60.
Al-‘Akkād’s critical theories and views have not yet been fully grasped and appreciated by Arab critics and writers. On the contrary, they have often been misunderstood or misrepresented. The reader can find many examples of this misunderstanding or misrepresentation even in the works of most distinguished Egyptian critics who have written on the subject in recent years.

In their work Fi ath-Thakafah al-Misriyyah, Mahmūd Amīn al-‘Ālim and ‘Abd al-‘Azīm Anīs have initiated a new kind of criticism against al-‘Akkād, criticism based on gross misrepresentation of al-‘Akkād's views. They claim that in his criticism of poetry al-‘Akkād differs in no way from the ancient Arab critics and rhetoricians who treat the poem as a collection of separate lines rather than as an organic unity or integral whole. They also say that in his essays on Shawkī in The Tribunal al-‘Akkād has misunderstood and misapplied the notion of the organic unity of the poem. They go on to write:

"The first thing which we want to assert is that the principle of the artistic unity of the literary work is not al-‘Akkād's own creation; it is something as old as Aristotle. It is not difficult to prove that al-‘Akkād has misunderstood what he had read in Aristotle and the critics who came after Aristotle .... To him, the artistic unity of the poem is no more than a unity of theme, a unity of a single idea or meaning .... This is what constitutes, for example, the essence of his criticism of Shawkī's elegy on Mustafa Kamīl .... Thus, to him the artistic unity of the poem was a unity of theme rather than an organic living unity."

1. Mahmūd Amīn al-‘Ālim and ‘Abd al-‘Azīm Anīs, Fi ath-Thakafah al-Misriyyah, Cairo, 1955, pp. 57-61
We do not know what these critics mean by the artistic or organic unity of the poem, but their reference to Aristotle shows clearly that they do not know what they are writing about. Their argument also shows that they know neither al-‘Akkād’s theory, nor the European sources from which al-‘Akkād derived his views. In its origin the conception of the organic unity of the poem was a revolt against the three unities of Aristotle and Greek drama.

Five years later Muḥammad Mandūr wrote three essays on al-‘Akkād under the title "al-‘Akkād Nakidan" (al-‘Akkād as Critic) in which he also misunderstood and misrepresented many of al-‘Akkād’s views. Like al-‘Alim and Anīs, he says that in al-‘Akkād’s writings the notion of the organic unity of the poem is confused with the unity of the poem’s theme. He also seems to think that al-‘Akkād’s criticism of Shawki’s elegy on Mustafā Kamil represents a misapplication of the principle of the organic structure of the poem. In his opinion, this principle cannot be applied to lyrical poetry, for lyrical poetry is usually based on associations of emotions and ideas according to a particular fashion. It can be applied only to epic, narrative and dramatic poetry. Another example of Mandūr’s misunderstanding of al-‘Akkād can be found in his criticism of the latter’s distinction between major and minor poets. When al-‘Akkād describes the major poet as one whose works exhibit a total image or comprehensive vision of nature and man Mandūr says that this view contradicts al-‘Akkād’s other view that the works of the true poet repre-
sents a revelation of his personality. He thinks that to demand from the poet a total vision of nature and man is to destroy the principle of the poet's faithfulness to himself. Of course, there is no contradiction between the two principles. The contradiction exists only in Mandūr's mind. Mandūr has failed to see that al-‘Akkād was merely distinguishing between major and minor poets, between poets such as al-Mutanabbī and ‘Umar Ibn Abī Rabī‘ah, or Shakespeare and Burns.

Māhir Ḥasan Fahmī may be taken as a third critic. In his work al-Madhāhib an-Nakdiyyah Fahmī regards al-‘Akkād as an impressionist critic whose criticism consists of personal interpretations of literary works and is based on his taste.

There seem to be two main reasons responsible for this misunderstanding or misrepresentation. None of these critics has ever tried to examine al-‘Akkād's views as a whole and to trace back their development. On the contrary, they have often extracted these views from their context and general body. This has led inevitably to their misunderstanding and misrepresentation. The other reason is that many of al-‘Akkād's views cannot be fully apprehended without tracing back their origin in the works of Hazlitt, Carlyle, Coleridge, Kant, Schiller, Goethe and Schopenhauer.

At its basis, this study represents an attempt to meet these two demands: to study al-‘Akkād's views in their

entirety and to trace back their origin and development. This appeared to me the only sound approach.

We have seen that al-‘Akkād aesthetic criticism had developed with his intellectual and spiritual development, and was closely connected with his metaphysics and ethic. In the years between his work on _ad-Dustūr_ in 1907 and the appearance of _The Tribunal_ in 1921 he formulated his views under the influence of the English romantic critics, particularly Hazlitt and Carlyle. In these formative years he became a member of the Dīwān School and expressed many of his views in connection with those of Shukrī and al-Māzini. But this does not mean that he has echoed al-Māzini's and Shukrī's theories. The general features of his theory were already formulated before he met al-Māzini and Shukrī. The similarities between the views of the three writers are due to the fact that three of them were writing under the influence of English romantic criticism.

In the twenty years following—from 1922 to 1942—which form al-‘Akkād's third intellectual period, the English influence was combined with German one. The new influential writers were Kant, Schiller, Goethe, Lessing, Heine and Schopenhauer. In this period al-‘Akkād became obsessed by the idea of beauty both in life and art and found in aesthetic education a resolution of man's religious and moral problems.

In the years between 1942 and 1964 he devoted himself to religious and philosophical studies. His new critical writings were merely repetition or elaboration of his earlier views.
Now after we have studied the European, English and German influences in al-‘Akkād's criticism we can see that his views show little originality. The majority of them he has derived and borrowed from English and German writers. This must not be taken, however, as a charge against al-‘Akkād, for when al-‘Akkād began his career as a literary critic there was nothing in Arabic which can be called aesthetic criticism in modern sense. It was inevitable that he should have drawn on European criticism. In fact, there is no modern Arab critic who is free from this charge. There remains one major fact to be admitted, that al-‘Akkād's understanding of English and German romantic criticism was very deep and his application of it to Arabic poetry was very original.
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