DETERMINISM IN HUMANIST HISTORIOGRAPHY:
FACIO, PALMIERI AND PLATINA

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Those rules of old discover'd, not devis'd,
Are nature still, but nature methodiz'd.

Pope

Allow they be shap'd, systematiz'd,
Not imperative, if categoriz'd.

Palermino

Declaration

This thesis has been entirely researched and composed by me: any dependence on the work of other scholars has been duly cited at the relevant place.
Acknowledgements

I should like to express my gratitude to my supervisor, Professor Denys Hay, for being both kind to me and tolerant towards my endeavours beyond what a student may reasonably expect from a supervisor. If there is any individual to whom I owe a great debt in the completion of this work, it is Professor Hay. To my colleagues at Glasgow University, especially to Professor Alfred Brown, I wish to extend my thanks for their being patient and accommodating in allowing me to fulfill my teaching duties without seriously jeopardizing my thesis research. I would also like to offer my heartfelt appreciation to my typist, Miss Anna Campbell, who has demonstrated a patience in the production of this typescript which no fee can repay. Finally, to Miss Lydia Tartaglia and to Miss Susan Kelly must go no small measure of gratitude for their interest and their encouragement during the early stages of this enterprise.
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Scholars have written an immense amount about the Italian humanists of the fifteenth century and their basic attitudes towards the world around them. As philosophers without the intellectual consistency or rigour of, for example, the Scholastics, the humanists have provoked widely varying interpretations of their ideas on any number of subjects. This thesis attempts to answer some time worn questions concerning humanist ideas on free will, the secularization of man's world and so on. In doing this it makes two basic departures from traditional scholarship. The first of these is to exploit the fact that most humanists, aside from writing philosophic tracts of relevance to such issues, also wrote history. By studying determinism not just in terms of philosophic tracts (beliefs stated) but also in terms of historiography (beliefs expressed through descriptions of action) an additional and important measure may be employed for attacking these problems. In writing history an historian less consciously gives his opinions on how the real world functions and it would be helpful in the confusion caused by studies of Renaissance thought to come to the problem through the back door and to analyse the patterns of causation manifested in a humanist's historical work.

The second respect in which this thesis will appear to be different is that it will employ a highly systematic and graphic technique for presenting the data on which its conclusions are based. All of the instances where an historian assigns a cause to an event will be tabulated and footnoted. By such a complete compilation of data, many of the arguments occasioned by a less thoroughgoing
scholarly apparatus may be attenuated.

From a list of all the histories written between 1417 to 1527, a selection was made of historians who had a reasonable output both of historical literature and of works philosophizing on issues of relevance to determinism. Bartolomeo Facio, Matteo Palmieri and Bartolomeo Platina seemed to meet these requirements best. Subjecting these three humanists to this particular approach in conjunction with more traditional methods has, hopefully, not only clarified the nature of the issues under discussion but also answered some of the questions which these issues have raised. In fact, this thesis tends to confirm some long held ideas on determinism in Renaissance thought or the increasing secularization of man's outlook although it does not always confirm many traditional views on the sources for such beliefs. At the same time it provides, hopefully, useful data for the investigation of other features of Renaissance humanism.
INTRODUCTION:

To Subject

An immense amount has been written about the Italian humanists of the fifteenth century and their basic attitudes towards the world around them. Several centuries of scholarly research on this topic has yielded widely variant interpretations of basic issues like the concept of free will and man's ability to choose his own destiny, active moral philosophy, the secularization of man and so on. Numerous yet conflicting attempts have been made at generalized statements regarding individuals, "schools" of individuals (usually by city) or humanists as a whole. Accordingly my decision to journey upon such well worn avenues of research was made with some misgivings. Had more scholars in travelling these ostensibly plainly marked paths finally reached the same location, there would be little justification for what I propose to do; as it is, their respective routes had to have diverged at some point without their often seeming to know it.¹

In that this thesis will not immediately strike out in any new directions, it is not a pioneering venture. Its novelty will consist in proceeding along established ways with a strong resolve for clearly navigating and recording its progress. Wherever it goes, the reader will, I hope, know precisely how it got there. In keeping with a Renaissance tradition, I shall apply, in conjunction with other

¹. The need for a book like Wallace K. Ferguson's The Renaissance in Historical Thought is testimony to the lack of agreement among scholars. The book chronicles many of the disagreements over one of history's most fiercely debated periods, the Renaissance.
approaches, a systematized method to a definite end. The intent is to put a greater emphasis on clarification, on definition and hence, incidentally, on the resolution of controversy.

Trying to pin down intellects with as many apparent internal contradictions and inconsistencies as those of the Italian humanists has developed into quite a sport for later generations of students of intellectual history. The fact that the humanists had a decidedly rhetorical bent has not made things any less complex. The disputes among historians have sometimes reached an intensity that might even have caught the attention of the humanist polemicists themselves. A major source of this problem seems to be in passing from what the humanists said or wrote to what they believed.

This difficulty, however, is not unique to the study of fifteenth century history: it is encountered whenever one tries to pass from someone's philosophising to his actual or working philosophy. With the Italian humanists, by necessity of course, our study is usually limited to their written works and it is left to the historian to make what he can of them. Rather than merely accept any humanist's assertions at face value, the scholar tries to bring in a number of critical techniques to put the statements in their proper context, to assess them against the humanist's other works, to examine the reason he is writing and so forth. Yet the actual application of this sort of highly specialized, critical approach has been so varied in the angles from which it has been directed that, to a large extent, the arguments as phrased are

1. Neal W. Gilbert, Renaissance Concepts of Method (New York, 1960) is the best discussion of the Renaissance idea of methodus to be found; see especially pp. 69-70 and 72.
irreconcilable because they are often not in logical opposition.\footnote{An example of this might be to argue over the applicability of a word to the era without first settling upon a common meaning for that word. The argument now has, in effect, too many terms and with each disputant employing their own usages, true logical resolution is impossible. Burchardt's use of the word "individualism" and all the debate it has aroused comes to mind. Norman Nelson, "Individualism as a Criterion of the Renaissance", Journal of English and German Philology, XXXII (1935), 316-334, is a broad analysis of this heated controversy and the author is led to such illustratively satirical remarks as "If the Franciscan movement fostered a certain kind of subjectivity, there is your fons et origo of Renaissance individualism. If German peasants of the sixth century owned their own farms, then the Renaissance must no longer be called the age of individualism." p. 318. Lee Benson, commenting on American political history, makes a few points of relevance for us here: "In the absence of a well-defined common methodology, and the presence of a near-universal dependence upon impressionistic techniques and data, one might reasonably expect to find that different frames of reference, training, interests, access to data, etc., result in a splendid profusion of varying interpretations;" Toward the Scientific Study of History: Selected Essays (New York, 1972), p. 3.}

There are a goodly number of other ways in which difficulties may arise from a not very systematic scholarly approach. I cannot say which is the more valid - the metaphysical conflict of insight with objective proof is not one for which I have the time. My concern for the moment is to show briefly some of the ways the former leads to a lack of agreement that might have been avoided through an employment of the latter.

One way in which the less systematic (yet more flexible?) scholar may breed confusion is by using a too limited sampling for the implied limits of his enquiry or in the treatment of a problem's quantitative aspects. On the question of "limits" we might note pages 78-81 of this thesis where we find a discussion of a scholar making an unjustifiably generalized statement about the thought of Bartolomeo Platina on the basis of one tract. Regarding a problem's quantitative aspects, we might take Donald Wilcox's...
discussions of the significance of psychological factors in the historical works of Leonardo Bruni and Matteo Palmieri. As we shall see, a great many causal explanations and interpretive frameworks appear in works of history (Palmieri appears on pages 84-131 of this thesis). Is Wilcox justified in citing a limited number of occurrences in order to cast that significance into relief? Beyond the question of what qualitatively remains from what Wilcox has pulled from the history, is there not possibly also a quantitative aspect to the problem where sheer numbers might be of import? It is not that Wilcox is necessarily wrong, it is just that fewer disputes might arise if more of the cards were out on the table. The likelihood of providing a stimulant to controversy is one of the unavoidable dangers of being selective in the presentation of evidence however judicious the individual historian may have been in making his choice.

Another source of difficulty is the already mentioned inability of scholars to agree on a common meaning for commonly used words or to clarify the actual meaning intended by their own employment of a

1. See Donald Wilcox, "Matteo Palmieri and the De Captivitate Pisanum Libri", in Renaissance Studies in Honor of Hans Baron, Anthony Molho and John A. Tedeschi eds. (Dekalb, Illinois, 1971), pp. 275-276 and 280-281; and for Bruni alone (where Wilcox seems to have been the more acceptably selective) see Wilcox's The Development of Florentine Humanist Historiography in the Fifteenth Century (Cambridge, Mass., 1969), pp. 45-63, particularly though pp. 45-53; on p. 48 of the latter work Wilcox comes his closest to telling us just what he means by the word "psychological": "Clearly, behind the institutions, behind political history, behind the very moral concerns which inform the Historiae lies the vision of historical reality as fundamentally intangible, founded in human psychology - motivations, moods, character." One thing that scholars often fail to concede when attacking Burckhardt is that although he uses possibly too little to prove too much, he does admit that he is writing an essay, not a record of completed research; Civilization of the Renaissance in Italy, trans. S.G.C. Middlemore (New York, 1954), p. 39.
word in a specific context. In tracing the changing patterns in usage of the word "Renaissance", R. S. Lopez "... wonders whether any meaning is left to the term Middle Ages [or, I might add, to Renaissance]." Another key word which has been the subject of controversy is "humanist". Aside from the perils of allowing later, more modern meanings to creep in when using "humanist" in a decidedly fifteenth century context, we find a decided lack of consensus over the definition appropriate to the fifteenth century. Does it refer to a person involved in the cultivation and teaching of the studia humanitatis (a definition I tend to accept for the moment) or is it someone who follows a particular outlook which we might try to identify with something called Renaissance humanism such as participating in a secularized vita civile? Finally we might add

1. The entire passage is worth repeating. "The outer works of the medieval citadel already have crumbled under a concentric attack. On the one hand, Pirenne has shown that Roman institutions, economy, and culture survived in Western Europe up to the time of Heraclius and Mohammed in the seventh century. On the other hand, Michelet's and Burckhardt's Renaissance - with a capital R - has been extended backward until it has amalgamated, as it were, with Haskins' twelfth-century renaissance, which in turn has been traced to causes deeply rooted in the religious, political, and social stirrings of the late eleventh century. There still remained some three or four hundred years of medieval bleakness - but even this is so illuminated by the Carolingian renaissance, the Anglo-Saxon renaissance, and the Ottonian renaissance, that one wonders whether any meaning is left to the term Middle Ages;" Robert Sabatino Lopez, "Still Another Renaissance?" American Historical Review, LVII, 1 (October, 1951), 1.

2. Paul F. Grendler gives a good review of this debate, particularly on pp. 447-448, in "The Concept of Humanist in Cinquecento Italy" in Molho and Tedeschi eds., pp. 447-463.
perplexities which arise both from scholars prejudging a situation and directing their research accordingly and from historians attempting to determine on all levels exactly what an author from the past meant by what he wrote.

Earlier it was stated that this thesis would examine the world views\(^1\) of a select body of Italian humanists. Beyond trying to introduce to my research greater organization and areas of common reference so that its contents might be capable of being focused or digested, it would also seem worthwhile to go back to the basic intellectual stances on which the components of a world view would depend. Those attitudes would have to be expressions of the greater framework from which they are derived. Even within the confines of a more traditional scholarly approach, it would be an expedient exercise to commence such a study since it could lead to that clarification of the issues involved in discussions of selected fifteenth century writers for which I have pleaded.

One essential distinction from which this sort of analysis might proceed is that between fundamentally deterministic and nondeterministic outlooks. A complete definition of what is meant by these terms and a consideration of their importance in an exploration of someone's outlook will be introduced later (see particularly pp. 15-16). For the moment it is only necessary to suggest them as worthy of study no matter how their study is approached.

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1. Exactly what is meant by this term will become increasingly evident as we progress; for now it might suffice to employ the German word *Weltanschauung*. 


Modern scholarship has been directed at separating, to the greatest extent possible, the historian from his subject matters. It has striven to put controls on the student of history so that his subject is not entirely at his mercy. Perhaps an additional control might be to shift one's attention away from statements of belief to statements which are a consequence of belief. The diversity of the writings of the Italian humanists provides a fertile ground for such an attack "from within" since they often engaged in the writing of history.

If it is possible to assess the causation through which the humanists interpreted the world, it may prove a method for catching them out, in a sense, when they are not looking. It might be one step closer to seeing them as they are rather than as they represent themselves to be. By taking a suggestive sampling of histories, analyzing their contents in the manner proposed, collecting the results and only then deciding where the patterns if any fall, the first steps towards a more balanced result may be achieved. Thus both of the objections to the difficulties of more traditional research may be attenuated.

This procedure is akin to what is termed the "pragmatic rule" or assigning meaning according to consequences. On the level at

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1. For a brief explanation of this proposition we may refer to two of the most important figures in what has become a philosophic movement. Charles Sanders Peirce wrote of the meetings of the Metaphysical Club, "In particular, he [Nicholas St. John Green] often urged the importance of applying Bain's definition of belief, as 'that upon which a man is prepared to act.' From this definition, pragmatism is scarce more than a corollary..." Herbert W. Schneider, A History of American Philosophy (New York, 1957), p. 279, quoted from Charles Hartshorne and Paul Weiss eds., Collected Papers of Charles Sanders Peirce, V (Cambridge, Mass., 1931-1935), 7-8. In the preface to his Logic, John Dewey explains (cont'd.)
which I am using it, it merely asserts that when interpreting a humanist’s claims for the virtues of poverty, for example, one might do well to look beyond those assertions and to check instead the effects of poverty in the world as the humanist reflects them in his history. If poverty is there represented as being the cause of war, famine, ignorance and other assorted miseries (as he judges misery), then his philosophic praise of poverty (a rationalization from a poor scholar?) is open to criticism and qualification. Better yet, are we to accept at face value a humanist’s thesis that man has the freedom to be whatever he wishes to be if the humanist writes histories in which man’s world is predetermined?

This discussion is merely meant to be an introduction to what lies behind the "pragmatic rule" as I am going to apply it; further elucidation may be obtained when I outline the method itself. At any rate the "pragmatic rule" in the form in which I am going to use it ought not to raise the objections that it does as a tenet of the Pragmatic philosophers since I am not intending it as a single criterion of truth. By way of interest, but not necessarily defence, it must be acknowledged that it is one of the bases for the success of the sciences and may be of use here if it is in any way capable of being applied. Whether or not its peculiar quantitative aspects are of value remains to be seen.¹

¹. Of course all historians use quantification in one form or another
The dangers of this project are greater than merely the chance that such quantification may prove irrelevant. For one I may unwittingly be structuring the results more than I represent myself to be doing — the reader must remain wary in the face of apparent objectivity. I may even be trying to quantify what cannot be quantified. It remains to be seen if the controls I have devised will remove these difficulties.

Finally there are the worrisome hazards presented by instances where an historian is taking information wholesale from another source — how much can be imputed to our author? Of course to copy, say, the style of Livy or Sallust does not necessitate agreement with their explanations; is the act, then, of relating what another wrote grounds for the assumption that it has been accepted as reasonable even if it is hidden in phrases like "most humanists", "some soldiers" etc. Whether or not "most historians" would accept my extension of the principle, qualified though it may be, is questionable. I agree with David Hackett Fischer, Historian's Fallacies (London, 1970), p. 90, that "The quantitative fallacy is the latest form of insignificance which consists in the idea that the facts which count best count most. It should not be confused with quantification [counting] proper ... "

1. My cover page expresses my wariness over the absolute validity of my method. Most of my categories, for example, are meant to be suggestive rather than hard and fast pigeonholes and no more can be directly read into them than has been defined and limited by this thesis. I can only concur with John Dewey when he wrote: "Classifications suggest possible traits to be on the lookout for in studying a particular case... They are tools of insight; their value is in promoting an individualized response in the particular situation;" Reconstruction in Philosophy (New York, 1920), p. 169.

2. Fortunately Latin with its often clear cut signs of possible causal explanation (ablative of cause/agent/means, cum with the subjunctive etc.) is in some ways better for this technique than is English.
and palatable? Naturally protests like these can just as easily be invoked against anyone else who has ever tried to interpret past historians but this provides one with scant comfort in trying to establish a base for a less subjective treatment of specific problems. Some of the ways in which I shall endeavour to overcome these obstructions will be considered soon.

Whatever value such a method may prove to have in and of itself, it ought to provide additional perspectives along more conventional lines. There are, as will be seen, a wide range of categories on which information has been found; but merely to have a summary statement on the world view of a few fifteenth century historians might prove of some value for its own sake. If the sampling of histories and historians is ever wide enough, it may be possible to make some judgements or suggestions as to what affects, if anything at all, one's outlook according to the patterns that result: being a humanist, being a Florentine, being educated by Guarino or what have you. Such findings might also help to answer questions on the uniformity of Renaissance culture. At the very least source material may be provided for the work of other scholars. Having chosen the mutually exclusive categories of determinist and nondeterminist as points of departure, it will be particularly interesting and worth-

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1. For example, it is widely accepted that "... the Italian humanists abandoned 'the medieval habit of seeking supernatural causes for historical events;" A. L. Rowse, The Elizabethan Renaissance. The Life of the Society (New York, 1971), p. 2. Rowse is quoting Ferguson, p. 4, in citing what has become a commonplace among scholars. How difficult, however, it is to prove a statement like that and to qualify it without the sort of extensive documentation in which I am going to indulge.
while to see how humanists align themselves in practical terms regarding a subject of intense speculation both then and now, man's free will.

Since this thesis will be attempting something that seems unorthodox, it appears necessary to make every effort at an explicit uncovering of its own foundations, how it came to be and its possible weaknesses. It will lay itself bare in a manner that other, often do not. This is of concern, for it exposes my thesis to criticism on two fronts: the execution of my scholarship and the assumptions on which it is based. The latter of these, actually possessed in some form by all historians, normally can be and usually is ignored to whatever extent the historian's presuppositions agree with those of the reader. Even when they do not agree with those of the reader and result in conflict, since they are kept hidden from sight, they are difficult to expose as the cause for disagreement. It is with a sense of necessity tempered by anxiety that this introductory exposition of my procedure is presented.

In attempting to find out something about the frame of reference of fifteenth century Italian humanists, it was decided, as has been mentioned, to work with historians. As can be seen from the master checklist on pages 19-22, the major concern will be with what might be called their substantive philosophies of history, that is, their patterns of explanations for events, in a more quantitative manner than is usual. The number of possible divisions and subdivisions

1. This, of course, is the lynch pin of all the talk on the dignity of men, his ability to make what he will of himself (even a god), la vita attiva etc.
chosen ought to provide a fairly comprehensive survey of their world views. Again this whole process is dependent upon the premise that a person's philosophy of history (explanations for events in history), especially when one speaks of the humanists, might prove a more personalized statement than would be, say, a philosophic tract.

Before any work had been done to see how the system would work in practice, it was realized that some purely arbitrary decisions had to be made to put the topic within manageable bounds. These limitations were made with the idea that they would in no way impair what it was hoped the thesis would accomplish. They included a determination to examine only histories written, as suggested by my supervisor, within the time period of 1417-1527. Another restriction was that histories written by Italians would be used exclusively. One other qualification that was immediately struck upon is that simple chronicles of the sort that are nearly totally lacking in both prose style and, more important, historical analysis would be ignored since they would have little data to be collected.

Despite these trimmings, it seemed there was still an immense body of literature available to me and that any further cuts would be based upon keeping my method as experimentally foolproof and controlled as possible. A little research disclosed an initial total of one hundred and forty-four works by seventy-four authors that still qualified if Italians are eliminated who were writing while out of Italy (a circumstance with which it would prove very difficult to cope in a first study such as this). Autobiographies were also left out of this figure because there did not seem to be enough of them to warrant introducing such a variable to the study as a whole.
Since to examine adequately the above number of histories would take an immense amount of time - the histories were not evenly distributed among the historians often resulting in one author writing but one history - the choice was made to limit the sampling yet again. If studies could be made only of historians who had written two or better yet three histories, the sampling would be more representative of the historians and also would possibly further balance the method and its feasibility. Taking at this point historians who have written more than one history, there are forty authors and one hundred and ten works, and for historians who wrote at least more than two histories, there are eighteen authors and sixty-six works. It was soon discovered that to apply and to refine this technique would have entailed an incredible amount of time; as a result a final decision was made to do an in depth analysis of three historians only. It was easy to choose from the eleven names; only three had written much on the philosophic topics of interest to this thesis in addition to having produced at least one substantial work of history. The three humanists are Bartolomeo Platina, Matteo Palmieri and Bartolomeo Facio.

In another move towards an adequate sampling, this time internal, a determination was reached to examine histories of no less than two thousand words in length. The reason for this is that a shorter piece would be very unlikely to have sufficient material for a study of the sort on which I am embarking.

There were two final circumstances to which my attention had to be directed before a history could be looked at and those were the decision as to what made a recorded occurrence a cause and the construction of a listing of categories from which a start might be
made. On the former point my interest in causation is obviously not a purely philosophical one. It extends no further than gauging, as best I can, what it is an historian thinks has primarily resulted in a change or development having taken place. This, by necessity, must refer to actual events (otherwise we are no longer analysing his historical sense). There must therefore be action/consequence to show that he actually believes the cause leads to the effect: the historian cannot declare, to have a causation recorded by me under say "pity", that the women of a city plead with its besiegers for mercy and were granted it but must report something more along the lines that out of pity the besiegers of a city were moved by the pleas of women to spare the city.

In regards to the latter of these two instances, constructing a series of categories, such a listing would be only indicative of the main points which I wanted clarified while subdivisions within it - individual variations - would be drawn from what was found in each history. The means by which I tried to avoid forcing my data into slots, none of which they could possibly fit, was to choose major categories that are mutually exclusive; i.e., determinist/nondeterminist, spirit/nonspirit and supernatural/(nonsuper)natural. This way I can do no worse than to assign something to the wrong one of only two slots; error is also more unlikely with only two strikingly different categories (which additionally are mutually

1. My experience to date indicates that historians tend to identify most closely here with Aristotle's moving or "efficient" cause as the primary cause; The Metaphysics, Rev. John H. M'Mahon trans. (London, 1874), pp. 16-17 (Bk. I, Ch. iii) and pp. 112-115 (Bk. IV, Ch. ii).
exclusive) than with a larger selection of categories. Hence my findings at least thus far ought to provide some grounds for comparisons since these categories will apply to all historians. With the secondary categories, the interest will lie in the possibilities for contrasts in addition to those of comparisons.¹

By referring to the master checksheet on pages 19-22, a good overview may be obtained of the direction in which this work proceeded. The major classification has been, as can be seen, "determinist vs nondeterminist" before the proper qualification was applied. Before giving an idea of what the major headings signify, it ought to be noted that each datum was recorded under the lowest subheading within the classification to which it refers. Hence, nothing would be classified simply as "IA1" but "IA1(a1)" or "IA1(a2)" these being examples of the most limited divisions available. If the smallest division available on the master sheet did not apply in a particular case, then the proper adjustments were made by the creation of a new category. The sheets and their qualifications became as complex as the causations presented by the historian. In this way the master sheet was continually refined by the direction in which the histories steered it.

The major interest is, as has been stated, in what must be one of the great assumptions that can be found in a person's outlook: whether the world in which he acts is regarded by him as "determined" or not. For my purposes the term deterministic will denote a situation in which individual man is at the mercy of forces that are

¹ Progression through the secondary categories leads to increasing subjectivism.
outside his control and, accordingly, he has no freedom of choice. Cause and effect are in a sense fixed before the event occurs, the whole affair is "rigged". In short the origin of an event's motive force is unavoidably outside the individual man. The obverse, nondeterministic, therefore may be phrased in terms of opposition: the origin of an event's motive force is within the individual man suggesting that man is not helplessly going through the motions of a drama whose script is being strictly adhered to. In fact it opens up the possibility of chance, accident and choice. Omissions in the definition are therefore omissions in the histories being studied.

The next division under both of the above categories is that of supernatural/(nonsuper)natural. Here a definition is more difficult. An indication of what is implied is to define natural as the tangible world within which man normally moves. Supernatural might then be accepted, as the O.E.D. suggests, as those things beyond the ordinary course of nature. It is hardly to be expected that a suitable broad definition of these terms will be struck upon - I do not claim to be able to do what has eluded centuries of thinkers. That my definition does not "work" in that sense is immaterial to the purpose at hand for which the preceding definitions, within the confines of what are given as subdivisions of them on the checklist, ought to suffice. To a degree it is definition by example in which the definition is not intended to go beyond the examples. Omissions in the definition are therefore omissions in the histories being studied.

1. Further definition of these and the points which follow them occurs on pages 23-31 of this thesis.
and thus are irrelevant to this thesis. The other subdivisions are, hopefully, explicit enough not to need exposition just yet.

It now seemed possible to subject the whole process to a combination of testing and refinement. Being fairly conversant with all the writings by and about Bartolomeo Platina and having included him among the three historians whom it is my intention to examine, he seemed the logical first choice.

His History of Mantua was selected since it is his longest historical work after his History of the Popes, the substantive philosophy of history of which I had already studied. Its approximate length is seventy-seven thousand words so it is long enough to provide an interesting "first run." A crude checksheet was drawn up similar to the master sheet as far as the "mutually exclusive" categories. Each incidence of causation was totalled numerically on the sheet and was also fully recorded on its own "3 x 5" card. The information on these "3 x 5" cards has enabled me to make qualitative distinctions beyond the quantitative ones occasioned by mere tabulation. A secondary consideration is that knowing the number of words and the number of times the historian attempts to explain how it is that events came about, some very summary judgements might be made about how analytical, though not in a qualitative sense, any particular historian may be in writing history.

The "3 x 5" cards help to contain the tendency towards oversimplification - a danger of all attempts to organize knowledge. In fairness it might be remarked that this sort of summarizing and generalizing is indulged in by all historians of ideas, the major difference being that they rarely explicitly lay so bare the means by which they attain their generalizations. Nor do they seem to
employ such a systematic framework, however valuable it may be, from which to operate. Perhaps one of the more interesting facets of a check sheet is the degree to which it is a presentation of data to which a reader can refer in addition to the summary judgements that are made from it. Naturally the criticism may be raised that the sheets are still, a possibility of which I warned on page 9, a structuring of results by an historian but on a different level; even if that is so, to whatever extent it is that farther removed from the historian himself and is done in an open manner, it seems that much more desirable than a more subjective technique.
MASTER CHECKSHEET

I. DETERMINIST  (No choice; men at mercy of; cause and effect fixed before event occurs; outcome, whole thing "rigged"; origin of moving force outside individual men).

A. Supernatural
1. Spirit (Personifications/individuated)
   a. God (Christian)
      1). Visions, dreams and presages
      2). Direct acts - individuated
      3). Indirect acts - foreknowledge on individuated level
      4). Historical patterns (overall)
         a). Linear
            1. Regressive
            2. Progressive (Augustine, Joachim, Daniel?)
         b). Cyclic (Stoic?)
   b. Devil
2. Nonspirit - "abstract forces" (but otherworldly)
   a. Magic
   b. Fate/fortune/astrology?
   c. Historical patterns
      1). Linear
         a). Regressive
         b). Progressive
      2). Cyclic (Pagan).

B. (Nonsuper)natural (Naturalist, of this world; occurrence leaves one with no choice, not even lesser of two evils).
   1. Social factors (Behaviourist)
      a. Economic
      b. Population
   2. Physical
      a. Organic
      b. Inorganic
   3. "Human nature" (Cultural/genetic)
   4. Historical patterns
      a. Linear
         1). Regressive
         2). Progressive
      b. Cyclic
   5. Physical necessities (self preservation: food, etc.)
      a. Real
      b. Comfort

II. NONDETERMINIST (Man not just going through motions - accident - chance - choice; things do not always happen from complete necessity - origin of motive force not outside individual man (not a world pattern and also consequent not by necessity, within control).

A. Supernatural
1. Spirit
   a. God (Christian)
      1). Visions, dreams, presages, signs portents - as warnings of possible occurrences
      2). Operatives for man's use to affect destiny (Have to be ones that work, otherwise under "II.B.6.a.").
a). Prayers  
b). Relics  
3). Direct acts by God  

b. Devil (Involvement by man's choice; getting in league with?)  

2. Nonspirit  
   a. Astrology (As a framework within which choice is allowed).  
   b. Fortune (As "blind luck")  
   c. Magic  

R (Nonsuper)natural  
1. Signs/portents (As warnings)  
   a. Human derived  
      1). Visions, dreams, presages etc.  
      2). Behavioural  
   b. Physical (earthquakes, comets etc.) (not accidents)  

2. Social Factors (Societal)  
   a. Economic ("Materialist")  
   b. Educational (and lack of it)  
      1). Rhetoric  
         a). Spoken (oratory)  
         b). Written  
      2). Other liberal arts and knowledge  
         a). Zeal for  
         b). Operative (use/useful)  
         c). Lack of  
   3). Experience/practice in rebus agendis  
   c. Political (Institutions: anything which relates to man's attempts to govern within a system or unit)  
   d. Population  
   e. Customs  
      1). Secular  
      2). Religious  
   f. Religion (The Church, The Faith)  
   g. Common good  
      utilitas  
   h. Group fickleness  

3. Psychological and character and intellectual factors  
   a. Emotions and traits  
      1). Anger and outrage  
         ira, incendo, indignatus  
      2). Greed (incl. power and ambition)  
         cupiditas, libido, ambitio, avaritia, rapacitas  
      3). Hatred  
         odium  
      4). Envy  
         invidia, livor  
      5). Fear  
         timor, metus, terror  
      6). Mercy  
         misericordia, clementia  
      7). Pity  
         miseratus, pietas  
      8). Kindness  
         benevolentia, beneficentia, beneficum and benignitas (as kindness)  
      9). Shame  
         pudor
10). Fame  
gloria, fama

11). "Patriotism"  
salus or charitas patriae

12). Friendship  
amicus

13). Memories of old animosities

14). Betrayal  
perfidium

15). Revenge  
vindicatio

16). Insult, affront  
indignitas, contumelia

17). Courage/spirit  
animus, fortitudo

18). Love of family (and their wellbeing)

19). Unspecified emotion resulting from adultery  
amor

20). Romantic love, "uncomplicated"

21). Amor pacis

22). Cruelty  
cruelitas

23). Respect  
veneratio, gratulatio (wishing respect)

24). Piety  
pietas

25). Impiety  
impietas

26). Arrogance/haughtiness  
arrogantia, superbia, fastus

27). Solicitude

28). Licentia

29). Diligentia

30). Pertinacia

31). Honestas

32). Fides

33). Gratia

34). Ingratitudo

35). Desidia

36). Strenuitas (in doing things)

37). Mansuetudo

38). Petulantia

39). Placeabilitas

40). Innocentia

41). Sanctitas

42). Maiestas

43). Dignitas

44). Liberalitas

45). Humanitas

46). Honor

47). Integritas

48). Auctoritas (derived from individual, not institutional associations)

49). Moderation  
modestia, moderatio

50). Continentia
51). Mores
52). Temeritas
53). Derisus
54). Taedium
55). Suspicio
56). Gravitas
57). Ardor
58). Studium
59). Desiderium
60). Verecundia

b. Ratio
c. Exemplum/imitation
d. Retribution/guilt
e. Prudentia
f. Corruptible by material things (can be bought or motivated)
g. Intelligence/cleverness/cunning
   - astus, versatus, ingenium
h. Stultitia
i. Iustitia
j. Virtus
k. Necessitatem

l. Unspecified psychological factor causing reaction

4. [Unassigned and therefore blank]

5. Physical (acting in response to?)
   (Not fatalistic - general concept of thing: natural and something with which one can deal or manipulate in some way. General, for example, accepting of medicine - in wider context).
   a. Organic
   b. Inorganic (accident only)
      1). "Unfixed"/Disasters/Wind/Weather
      2). "Fixed"/Geography - not without choice or "helpless against"

6. Direct operatives (not listed above or below - causation "hidden")
   a. Trickery, deceit
   b. Stratagems, acts (militarily related).
   c. Other overt acts (taken to shape own destiny - influence events)
      1). To an end
      2). Causing unspecified psychological state or response
      3). Causing specified psychological state or response
d. Negligence/failure to act

7. Physical necessities (self preservation: food, etc.)
   a. Real
   b. Comfort
INTRODUCTION:

To Master Checksheet

Beyond what has already been said regarding the master checksheet and plan of organization, it might be best to look at some of the categories that seem to need greater clarification. It might also be emphasized again that the general explanatory technique on which I ultimately prefer to rely is the listing of examples which may be consulted using Appendix I in conjunction with the relevant history. The categories, most particularly those which are not meant to be mutually exclusive, can be tempered once again with the advice that they be taken more as suggestive than imperative: with this in mind, experience through examples can often be as helpful as definition.

To aid us in this task of definition, occasionally instances from Platina's *History of Mantua* will be summoned for the sake of illustration. As the history first consulted, it is the work which first helped to shape the categories and this, therefore, is the work here used as a matter of convenience. Any of the other histories might have served this same end since categories were only created in response to actual occurrences. No occurrence was forced to fit a category but resulted in the birth of a new one when it failed to fit an already existing category.

Section "I" of the master checksheet is a difficult category with which to deal. It is often not easy to decide whether the author intended to leave man as helpless as his causation might imply.

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"I. A. 1. a."

or "Determinist/Supernatural/Spirit/God," for example, refers to God's entering into human affairs in such a way as to determine the outcome of an event with no choice left to man. If someone has a vision from God which foretells an event which necessarily will occur, it is assigned the "I" rating. If there had been any choice for man at all, even if it had been through a vision depicting but two possibilities for action (and hence God is still determining in a sense the final outcome), the "II" or "Nondeterminist" rating would be selected as leaving man some means to influence his destiny, however restricted it may be. Hence it is sometimes a matter of judgement from context whether an occurrence gets a "I" or "II" rating. An example might be the following: having failed to storm Mantua, "Verum, Deo ita volente, ad Governolum [Jacobs] movens, respirandi ac colligendi se ex tanta trepidatione Mantuanis tempus dedit." (col. 779). Here, since divine volition is expressed with no apparent limitations attached, the category "I. A. 1. a. 2)." was assigned.

Another unusually problematic specimen of how I have attempted to resolve the interpretive difficulties that arise is this example of "organic" causation which Platina relates concerning an epidemic of plague.

Vidisses in agris marcesentes segetes, francesentes segetes, francesentes uvas, pecora sineullo custode passim vagantia; patebant domus, patebant villae, nec erat, qui privatae aut publicae rei curam ullam haberet, tantus terror ex Deorum ira mentes omnium invaserat. [Platina has not said or implied that the plague, in his own opinion, has anything to do with God; in fact, he has not ascribed causation yet.] ... Quam quidem pestem eo vagatum latius per Europam arbitrur, quod Jubilaeo aperto, et Christianis

1. See also p. 16 of this text.
nationibus undique in Italian confluentibus, contagiones, quae nullum modo in diversoriis et frequentia hominum vitari potest omnia infecit. (col. 739).

Platina has not named a cause for the origin of the plague although he has assigned one, "terror", for the inattention of the populace to their affairs and thus a II.B.3.a.5 notation was made. He has given his opinion of the reason for the spread of plague, contact among men, which certainly puts this causation among the "Nondeterminist/(Nonsuper)natural/Physical/Organic" or "II.B.5.a." causations. Hence there are, in my opinion, but two identifiable causations in this passage.

Whenever the context gives us any reason at all to suspect determinism in a sequence of events, that overall category will be chosen because that is behaviourally the more absolute and all embracing classification. The weakness in my methodology suggested by such circumstances is ameliorated by two considerations: that such occurrences are rarities and that they are qualified in the commentary after the check sheet. Again it might be mentioned that I feel it unlikely that any of the historical checksheets can stand alone without extenuation.

One of the classifications with a name of my own devising is "physical" under the heading of "(Nonsuper)natural." It is a catch all for every possibly material causation which does not fit into the other natural categories and does not merit a category of its own. It divides into "organic" and "inorganic", both of which terms are modified applications of modern chemical usage. It is not directly a matter of forcing the quattrocento mind into modern abstractions; these causations fell into these categories; the categories had not occurred to me until individual causations forced me to create the
"Organic" causations relate to living structures based on hydrocarbon molecules excluding man himself (this is my distinction) whereas "inorganic" causations are simply the negation of organic ones. Organic causations under this class would be living and inorganic would not. Organic entails disease, medicine and similar factors while inorganic would involve such things as wind and other climatic factors, geological phenomena and geography.

Here again the important distinction is whether these factors present man with a situation for which he can conceivably either have but one response necessitating but one outcome or to which he can respond in more than one way (there is room for manipulation) no matter how many limitations are put on his choice. Thus if there were a naval battle in which one fleet were sunk (in the historian's opinion) by incredible winds against which it could take no possible action - the winds arose too suddenly and with perhaps too much force - then it would receive a "I. R. 2. b. " classification. If that same fleet had instead been sunk because it (in the historian's estimation) failed to respond properly to the challenge - it was within their power to do so - then the incident would be labelled "I. R. 5. b. 1."

Under the "I. R. 5. b. " class it is obvious that these occurrences must be those of accident only and pursuing that class further, we might say that "unfixed" causations are those which are changing or irregular like the weather as opposed to "fixed" totally knowable features like mountains. In the same vein a flooding river is "unfixed" while a river with which man must contend under normal

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1. Additionally it might be noted that had the irresistible winds been sent by God, then the "I. L. 1. a. 2. " classification would have been used: the origin, not substance, of the causation is the most important factor in assigning class.
circumstances is "fixed."

Factors of "human nature" [I.R 3.1 refer to those cultural traits which the historian feels are inherent and are accordingly beyond an individual's control. Had the historian had much of an idea of heredity, he might have called some of these factors genetic; concepts of present day social science might bring to his mind terms like "behaviourism" (social environmental determinism) as the result of cultural factors. As an example of what is meant: "Verum hi, ut Gallorum natura est, frigoris ac caloris impatientes, urgentem jam hiemem perosi, hibernatum in Placentinum agrum proficiscuntur." (col. 856). Since it was winter's approach which started this causal sequence, a notation was also entered under "II. B. 5. b. 1."

Under category "II" there are a number of subdivisions which might be better understood with an exposition of their exact usage. This is especially true of "Nondeterminist/Supernatural" [II.A] causations since it would appear that any supernatural intervention into human affairs might be determinist by its very nature. The class [II.A.1.e.1.] of visions, dreams etc. is meant to denote warnings of possible events. Therefore a divinely inspired vision would get a "II" rating, as mentioned on page 23, if there is left to man "alternatives" of behaviour: something along the lines of say, "If you behave, then you will live happily; if you do not mend your ways, get ready for a taste of thunderbolt." Distasteful though one of the options may be, there is an element of choice.

1. Arguable as this may be in a strict sense, we are only concerned with it to whatever extent the historian under scrutiny believes it to be so, however misguided we may feel him to be regarding the possibility of freedom of will and such.
The term "operatives" in "II.A.1.a.2)," is used in this division for "tools" God has provided for man to influence the outcome of events. This category is closely affiliated to "II.A.1.a.3).", "direct acts by God", except that the former puts more of an emphasis on an individuated manipulative act taken by man. As an example of the latter we might consider where Platina describes the corruption of a man despite the fact that "Dii ei meliorem dedissent mentem." (col. 847). It is an instrument of which he failed to take advantage although the chance was there to do so.

Nondeterminist causations that are (Nonsuper)natural [II.B.] is a category that places man firmly on earth, molding his world with some degree of freedom of will: it is a section in which more traditional Renaissance scholars would take a goodly amount of interest. "II.B.1.a.2)." is listed as "behavioural" in the sense of man's observations of behaviour and events serving as an advisement on what sort of action he should take in a given situation. This, as with visions and the like, ["II.B.1.a.1)."] which are not supernatural in origin, is separated from physical warnings and signs like earthquakes ["II.B.1.b." since it appears more a human centred causation: "Pugnae etiam simulacra sunt edita, indicia certe futuri belli, in quibus populares quidam fortissime et constantissime dimicarunt." (col. 758). Physical phenomena under the "II.B.1." classification are not accidents otherwise they would not have a predictive intent and would be "II.B.5.b.". It should also be recognized that their agent is not specified beyond the implication that they are of natural origin.

The class "social factors" needs a good deal of qualification. As a whole it refers to group not individual factors along lines
that are admittedly twentieth century concepts. Economic might be trade (col. 653) or river rights (col. 657);\(^1\) again it is a question of group involvement. The subclass "oratory" [II.B.2.b.1.] under "educational" refers to the power to effect something with words themselves via the form of presentation; if it is the content of the words rather than the form and delivery which activates, the causation is classed elsewhere. The distinction may seem unnecessary but may have some importance in regard to the humanist concept of education and its uses. The other member of this class which might cause confusion is "political." Here we are referring to cases directly involving institutions and man's operating through institutions: anything which relates to man's attempts to govern himself and connected affairs of state.

The question of "psychological/character" factors [II.B.3.] raises a spectre of conflict with "social" factors since it happens that it is often difficult to separate the two completely. The procedure adopted has been simply to award the notation to the class within which the other operates, the concern being with primary causation. Thus an individual's lust for power causing him to organize a sedition against the established government would receive a "II.B.3.a.2." rating rather than a "II.B.2.c." Delineation of this class is limited to the Latin terminology chosen by the author as tabulated on both the individual history and master checksheets. On the individual history checksheets like "II.B.1.a." on Platina's History of Mantua, the further qualification is made that the Latin

\(^1\) See also col. 719, for example: "Bellum deinde oritur inter Mantuanos et Cremonenses quod utraque Civitas vindicare sibi possessionem Padi contendebat."
terms are listed in order of incidence with the most frequently occurring being first in order.

Regarding "traits" [II.B.3.a.] the observation might be made that "virtue" only lists actual instances where the word *virtus* is chosen by the author (the same may be said of *ratio* etc.). Should it be assumed that he would have included *modestia*, for instance, within the concept *virtus* then I shall have to leave it, as far as the checksheet goes, to the reader to make that assumption while, for my part, noting the occurrence under *modestia*. This sort of arrangement - aiming only at what is specified by the author - is a ruling principle of the checksheets, my interpretation being left to the qualifications that accompany them.

"Direct operatives" [II.B.6.] is a general class of causations which cannot be placed in any more definitive category within "II.B."

They are essentially cases in which the exact agent of causation is not specified by the historian but there is an obvious instance of man for some unspecified reason acting with a purpose all his own. There is not enough given by the author to let us know exactly what he feels the cause to be yet there is enough for it to be clear that the agent truly does not arise from matters over which he has no control. The category was included as a means of saving causations which would have been lost only because the historian was not specific enough. It is a factor which prevents the causation count and the degree to which the historian allows man to operate freely in the world to be unduly biased against the historian who is a bit more careless about identifying causation with exactitude.

1. All "II's" are, of course, direct operatives; the ones discussed above are merely causally unspecified ones.
Finally we have the category of "Nondeterminist/
(Nonsuper)natural/physical necessities." Into this division are
placed actions motivated by things specifically named such as
starvation, anything necessary to self preservation. To the
suggestion that in the sense that they are necessities and therefore
are determinist, the reply must be that within the context of an
individual situation, one may, among other things, choose to starve
rather than surrender to a besieging enemy (holding out longer or
too long in the hope of aid?), or to eat shoes, or to capitulate
earlier than expected... again, as long as there is some option
left within the context of the situation, no matter how unappetizing
and hence limiting that alternative may be, then the "Nondeterminist"
category is assigned.
Chapter I

Determinism in Western Thought Prior to Italian Humanism

By the time of the fifteenth century the debates on determinism were already nearly two thousand years old. This makes it unusually difficult to identify the immediate sources for any individual humanist's ideas on such a topic. Of course the main issue for this thesis is what the humanists believed about the nature of the universe and what might be man's position in it. However, beyond other academic interests, the broad origins of their beliefs are of some relevance in providing a point of reference for understanding the terms and categorizations used in analyses of humanist thought. Beyond this, like it or not, such labelling is the foundation for any scholarly discussion and one can only hope that the labelling will be done with sufficient discretion as to establish, to illustrate and to clarify particular issues rather than to pigeonhole and to oversimplify them.

The humanists, like all mortals, were not free of the past. As it happened they had arrived after the limits for discussions of determinism had already been pretty much marked off by ancient and, to a far lesser extent, medieval thinkers. The humanists did not meaningfully pass beyond the efforts of pre-quattrocento thought because their predecessors had exhausted the broad possibilities implied by the dualism of Western philosophy. To break new territory, to alter the field of play would mean stepping outside the boundaries of the still dominant Western philosophical tradition as established by the ancient Greeks.

Being a part of that tradition, the humanist debt to ancient and,
as modern scholarship is ever more eager to point out, to Patristic
and medieval thought demands that the student of humanism have some
sort of inkling as to what came before the humanists. This
background is offered as an attempt at suggesting some of the
relevant, influential stances taken in relation to the limits to
man's action in the universe. It is by no means meant to be a survey
of free will in Western philosophy. Instances where a direct
influence on one of our humanist historians has been found will be
noted later in the analysis of that historian's works. For now it is
only desirable to outline the fundamental issues in order to give the
reader a basic orientation for the discussions which follow.

This outline will be nothing more than a general hint at the
problem. In this the crude opposition of Plato to Aristotle will be
maintained both because the "pros" and "cons" of the debate on
determinism most easily align this way and because scholars have
tended to act accordingly. Such a division is not always due to what
Aristotle or Plato directly argue as much as to the nature of their
influence and the tendencies of the followers of their respective
camps. Granting that Aristotle's philosophy is the more
naturalistic and mechanistic of the two, especially as presented by
his Arabian commentators, it is he who is the more associated with
determinism. (A truer picture of Aristotle's position will be
evident later). While Aristotle brings to mind debates on
contingency, Plato has been credited with stimulating discussions on
man's ability to choose to raise or to lower himself.  

1. See, for example, Gordon Leff, Medieval Thought (Harmondsworth,
especially.
Aristotle's concern with causation in works such as the *Metaphysics* intimates that upon which a more materialistic determinism could be most firmly founded. If all things have a cause, then any action which is not at the start of the causal sequence is little more than an effect. Groups as distant in time as are the Stoics to today's social scientists, particularly of the behaviourist school, lean on such a concept in accounting for men's situation in the world. Although Aristotle allows for spontaneity, chance and "fortune as chance," he strips them of their accidental qualities by reducing them to the class of "hidden causes".\(^1\)

Leading one ever back to "prior" intelligences and "prior" natures, the implications of Aristotle's thought seem clear. This is so despite his putting a supernatural intelligence at the head of it all and thereby avoiding the entirely materialistic view of Democritus and of the Epicureans.

The ancient school of philosophy which carried determinism itself to an extreme and to which the humanists would have had some exposure was that of the Stoics. The preoccupation of their metaphysics with interlocking causes and with fate was lent further emphasis by other less philosophically rigorous expressions of their position. Their maxim-like admonitions on the futility of individual action has led to the tendency of later generations to refer to any such sentiment by an author such as, say, Petrarch as stoic [properly with a small "s"]. Popular writers such as Marcus Aurelius fly directly against concepts dear to the Renaissance like *fama* in

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passages as sharply graphic as the following: "Look at the minds of those who seek fame, observe what they are, and what kind of things they avoid, and what kind of things they pursue. And consider that as the heaps of sand piled one on another hide the former sands, so in life the events which go before are soon covered by those which come after." Or to put it more succinctly "Thou art a little soul bearing about a corpse, as Epictetus used to say." The most optimistic field of action which the Stoics consistently concede to man is that of the pursuit of honestas or moral worth: all else is beyond any realistic control. This is hardly a call to la vita attiva.  

The usual contraposition of the Stoics to the Epicureans seems to work here. Although the Epicureans are hardly more optimistic over the sensibility of engaging in la vita attiva (Fragment 86 of the writings of Epicurus states bluntly "Live Unknown"), their position on free will is directly opposed to that of the Stoics. This is partly due to their belief in chance which is that element, not determinism, which makes engaging in the active life such a

1. *Meditations*, Bk. VII, ch. 34 and IV, 41 respectively; see also IV, 49.


hazardous pastime.

The freedom of the Epicurean’s is one partially posited in man’s disbelief in God or at least a release from fear of any God (hence the tendency in the Renaissance to brand a suspected atheist an Epicurean). Of greater import to free will is the cardinal tenet of Epicurean metaphysics, the motion of matter both as a creative and destructive force. Since this motion is not absolutely consistent and predictable in its direction, interlocking causal sequences are not necessarily present or continuous and man’s free will remains intact. Epicurus himself well summarizes the import of this view in addressing himself to Menoeceus:

He [a prudent man] understands that the limit of good things is easy to fulfill and easy to attain, whereas the course of ills is either short in time or slight in pain: he laughs at destiny, whom some have introduced as the mistress of all things. He thinks that with us lies the chief power in determining events, some of which happen by necessity and some by chance, and some are within our control; for while necessity cannot be called to account, he sees that chance is inconstant, but that which is in our control is subject to no master, and to it are naturally attached praise and blame. For, indeed, it were better to follow the myths about the gods than to become a slave to the destiny of the natural philosophers: for the former suggests a hope of placating the gods by worship, whereas the latter involves a necessity which knows no placation. As to chance, he does not regard it as a god as most men do (for in a god’s acts there is no disorder), nor as an uncertain cause of all things: for he does not believe that good and evil

1. Lucretius, p. 102 (II, 251-260):

Denique si semper motus conectitur omnis et vetere exoritur semper [sic] novus ordine certo nec declinando faciunt primordia motus principium quoddam quo fatti foedera rumpet, ex infinito ne causam causa sequatur, libera per terras unde haec animantibus exstat, unde est haec, inquam, fatis avolsa voluntas per quam progredimur quo ducit quemque voluntas declinamus item motus nec tempore certo nec regione loci certa, sed ubi ipsa tulit mens?
are given by chance to man for the framing of a
blessed life, but that opportunities for great good
and great evil are afforded by it.

Meditate therefore on these things and things
akin to them night and day by yourself and never
shall you be disturbed waking or asleep, but you
shall live like a god among men.

(In Cates ed., p. 33).

No similar brief yet so comprehensive and unqualified a statement of
man's free will survives from antiquity. In fact modern Renaissance
scholars such as Saitta, Gentile and Toffanin would have been pleased
indeed to find anything comparable from the Renaissance itself.

This failure on the part of the Renaissance is partly due to the
fact that both the Platonic tradition and the tradition of the Church
Fathers are more those which influence humanist ideas on themes such
as the dignity of man. This is not to say that any particular
Renaissance idea on man's free will and the unfixed, protean nature of
his place in the universe come directly or essentially from Plato;
Plato himself was often poorly known during the middle ages and the
quattrocento. It is to say that the dominant tradition, most
particularly in terms of the basic philosophical position however
indirect and bastardized the progress from its source, is the Platonic
one. Although Plato did not make free will a theme of a dialogue,
his brand of idealism is antithetical to any systematic sort of
determinism. The closest one can come to a hint of determinism are
little phrases of a colloquial yet possibly determinist nature
snatched from a few of his works.¹ One of Plato's later dialogues,

¹. For example "Now everything that becomes or is created must of
necessity be created by some cause ...;" Timaeus, 28; similarly
Philebus, 26-27; however, in direct contradiction of the sort of
argument for determinism implied by the preceding, Laws, X, 895.
Determinism as discussed here has little to do with criticisms of
Plato as suppressing the individual in the interests of society [see
an example]; this is the fault of his politics, not his philosophy.
Laws (I, 644-5; VII, 303 and X, 904-905) contains the only seemingly direct statements by Plato in favour of determinism: the "puppet" image of man under the "guardianship" of the Gods. However the analogy is explained as meaning little more than that the Gods dangle man by the strings of virtue and vice and that man using reason must choose rightly which cords to grasp.  

A representation of man as the chooser of his fate is that which ends the Republic (X, 614-621), the vision of Dr. This long look at the nature of man's destiny is an extended statement on free will which, due to its being couched in myth, makes one wonder how strictly Plato wished it to be interpreted. In any event in this allegory man, by permission of the Fate Lachesis, chooses his destiny prior to living out that particular life on earth. Once his choice is made, he is fixed to it, he drinks of Forgetfulness, and then goes off to lead that life. If he is wise, he will choose the life of virtue. This will determine what happens to him after death. "Virtue is free, and as a man honours or dishonours her he will have more or less of her; the responsibility is with the chooser - God is justified." (X, 617). It is not difficult to see how Platonism in whatever form helped to keep intellectuals within the limits of orthodoxy on the matter of free will.

The crucial position of the transcendant and immortal soul which has mobility, most especially that of being able to rise to the spiritual world in which for Plato resides reality, helps to save man from slavery to any sort of mechanistic materialism. This is important

1. Rankin, pp. 20-21 and 131-132 also considers the puppet image one capable of being overread.
to a philosophy's potential popularity within the Christian world. However, it is by not making causation a chain of necessity that Plato's more mystical and flexible philosophy makes its fullest contribution towards freeing man from determinism.¹

Here Boethius follows Plato. In terms of contingency he follows Aristotle. Boethius thereby lives up to his reputation as a synthesizer of ancient philosophy within a Christian context. It seems to me that instead of resolving the tension between the "Platonic" and the "Aristotelean" approaches, all Boethius really succeeds in doing is complicating the issue further by the introduction of the Christian God. This presents to the West one of the first broad statements of the complexities involved in assimilating the concept of Divine providence and Divine will as usually understood by Christians. Boethius succeeds in setting the issues of the debate for free will despite God's Providence as taken up, for instance, in the Renaissance by Valla (De libero arbitrio) only later to be opposed by Protestant critics. Because Boethius does such a good job of keeping the issues distinct, it may be helpful to look at him before St. Augustine.

Boethius clearly posits a belief in free will. As most simply stated in his De fide catholica: "... He [God] adorned him [man] with freedom of choice ..."² A fuller explanation suggests both the

1. Followers of the tradition are more direct here. Plotinus, for example, argues unqualifiedly at length against fate and any other form of determinism as it affects the material world. On a higher plane, he also allows to the One very little interference in the free will of corporeal man while keeping the freedom of the soul clearly intact; The Six Enneads, Stephen MacKenna and B. S. Page trans., vol. 17 in Great Books of the Western World (Chicago, 1955, 1st published 1952), pp. 78-97 (Third Ennead I-III) and pp. 342-353 (Sixth Ennead I-VIII).

approach implicit in Plato and Boethius' own escape route from the
determinism of contingency: "But in this rank of coherent causes,
have we any free will, or doth the fatal chain fasten also the
motions of men's minds?" 'We have,' quoth she, 'for there can be no
reasonable nature, unless it be endured with free will.' 'But the
minds of men must needs be more free when they conserve themselves in
the contemplation of God, and less when they come to their bodies, and
yet less when they are bound by earthly fetters. But their greatest
bondage is when, giving themselves to vices, they lose possession of
their own reason.'" In granting to man the ability to elevate and
to lower himself with their attendant effects on him, Boethius comes
near to Plato's point of view; however, merely as an escape route
from contingency, necessity, fortune and fate, he comes closer to that
of the Stoics. Plato did not suggest that the spiritual world, that
of the forms, was a creation of God. Boethius puts all under the
sway of God. Therefore divine reason rules out chance and, following
Aristotle, chance has a hidden cause. [Consol. phil., p. 167 (Bk. I,
ch. vi) 51-54; pp. 367-369 (V, i) 18-58]. In closing the passage
just cited in Book V, Boethius demonstrates how contradictory or
difficult things can appear with the introduction of an omnipotent
God: "Wherefore, we may define chance thus: That it is an
unexpected event of concurring causes in those things which are done
to some end and purpose. Now the cause why causes so concur and meet
so together, is that order proceeding from inevitable connexion, which,
descending from the fountain of Providence, disposeth all things in

1. Philosophiae consolationis, "I. T." (1609) trans. revised by H. F.
Stewart, Loeb Classical Library (London, 1918), p. 371 (Bk. V,
ch. ii) 2-6 and 16-21.
their places and times."

Providence is divine reason and when divine reason is operative in the temporal sphere it is a matter for fate and fortune. The closer one is to the unchanging and stable, the closer one is to the spiritual and away from the material, then the less one is under the jurisdiction of fate and fortune. Man can conquer each by a combination of Platonic elevation and Stoic withdrawal from the things of this world. The implications of this line of argument fall farthest from the supposed Renaissance ideal in its repeat of the Stoic denial both of the active life and of the pursuit of fame [Consol. phil., pp. 209-219 (Bk. II, ch. vi) 44-85]. However with the concept of movement to the spiritual and to the divine and the allowance that man can thereby make himself like a god (by participation, not nature), Boethius stands fully within the traditions, Platonic through the Neo-Platonists and the Church Fathers, that find expression in the Renaissance.1

1. Gordon Leff allows Boethius out of this free will dilemma much as Valla attempted his own escape: "... for God to foresee the free acts of free will does not destroy their freedom and contingency; for God sees all things concurrently and eternally, even though they take place through the succession of time in the created world;" p. 43. The counter argument as best expressed during the Reformation is, of course, that by foreseeing, God has necessarily ordained.


Possibly it is St. Augustine who is the first great proponent of free will within a Christian context. This is because he begins to resolve the basic dilemma of God's foreknowledge as it affects free will into the orthodox Catholic view. St. Augustine paid a tribute to the importance of free will in Christian theology by devoting an entire tract to that issue alone, his *De libero arbitrio*.¹

It is not that St. Augustine's interest in this is purely academic; as with all his works, he writes in justification of the Christian faith. Here the problem is to argue in favour of man's free will in order to protect an omnipotent God from the charge that He must bear the burden for the evil on earth. St. Augustine therefore attacks heretics such as the Pelagians and their denial of original sin since such a doctrine places on God the blame for man's miseries rather than on man and his freedom to sin.

Although St. Augustine defends free will for theological and not humanistic reasons, he manages to strike to the core of the issue regarding God's foreknowledge as it will be understood in the middle ages and the Renaissance: "Certe enim hoc te movet, et hoc miraris, quomodo non sint contraria et repugnantia, ut et Deus praescius sit omnium futurorum, et nos non necessitate, se voluntate peccemus."

"Attende enim, quaeo, quanta caecitate dicatur, si praescivit Deus futuram voluntatem meam, quoniam nihil aliter potest fieri quam praescivit, necesse est ut velim quod ille praescivit: si autem necessae est, non jam voluntate, sed necessitate id me velle fatendum est. O stultitiam singularem! Quomodo ergo non potest aliud fieri

¹ All citations for St. Augustine are from his *Opera omnia*, I (Paris, 1836), col. 930-1040.
quam praescivit Deus, si voluntas non erit, quam voluntatem futuram ille praesciverit?" "Si enim necesse est ut velit, unde volet cum voluntas non erit?" [coll. 996 and 998 (bk. III, ch. 3)]. Although Augustine precedes Boethius, with Augustine we see more sharply focused such complications for free will as assuming that God's foresight would fix the will to act any more than it would fix the act itself. This is aside from the argument that merely seeing something obviously does not make it happen.

Abelard puts this particular debate under the strictest scrutiny and it would be fair to say that no Renaissance humanist approaches his intellectual discipline although most humanists will write with greater imagination. Only St. Thomas will exceed Abelard's concise yet intense and progressive dissection of these problems; this is especially true for Abelard's _Introductio ad theologia._ Although relying very much on Boethius and Saints Jerome and Augustine in presenting and resolving a goodly number of difficult propositions, he invokes Aristotle in preserving God's foreknowledge from the stigma of predetermining events to the detriment of man's free will and his ability to avoid sin. Particularly useful in this defence are Aristotle's warnings against employing the future tense in an argument which also involves the present tense. Thus Abelard can say of Aristotle: "Dicit itaque quia necesse est navale bellum cras esse futurum vel non esse futurum. Non tamen ideo vel navale bellum cras esse futurum necesse est, vel non cras esse necesse." "Igitur esse quid est, quando est, necesse est: et non esse quod non est, quando non

est, nesc esse est." (pp. 142 and 143). Abelard provides a ready and summary introduction to the Schoolman approach. There is, it is worth noting, not the slightest hint of the Platonic tradition or the attitude of the humanist. Abelard looks at the issue only as might a theologian who takes his logic seriously.

It is now possible to complicate the debate yet at the same time to give a clearer picture both of Aristotle and of the basis for the medieval view. So far we have looked at the situation mostly in terms of the overall "structure" of the universe, its cosmology or fundamental causes and processes, rather than taking the individual as our starting point.

Aristotelianism is pessimistic for free will when it comes to the former and optimistic when it comes to the latter. This latter sense is partly that which helped to make Aristotelianism so congenial to medieval Christianity. It is Aristotle to whom the medieval theologians turn to establish their particular concept of free will - an act of choice through will that the individual makes using knowledge or reason. Aristotle never bandied about ideas such as free will or liberty but he did elaborate a theory of choice or electio. Etienne Gilson argues that if the medieval theologian premises man as in the image of God and as therefore having a "mini" will of his own, it is not difficult to develop the following generalized theory of free will in an Aristotelian context: "Just as, then, prior to the choice of means, there must be the will to the end, so also, prior to his will, there must be the actuality of the human being. Here again the first act is the root of the second act, being is the cause of operation. The will, therefore, is simply the organ of that efficient causality which is proper to man, and voluntary
choice, first and foremost, expresses the spontaneity of a nature which contains in itself, or rather which is, the principle of its own operations. Gilson demonstrates how medieval philosophy from Boethius onwards developed this argument and, although all do not complement the spontaneity of the will with reason as does Boethius, all allow this basic premise on Aristotelian grounds. It is within the context of electio rather than the "chains of causation" (where Abelard is so prominent) that St. Thomas makes his most interesting contributions and there he classifies the conditions under which the will has liberty of action.

If we look at St. Thomas in terms of our earlier discussion of causation, we again see Aristotelianism endangering free will. However Thomas does as good a job as anyone in arguing away the hazards presented by too great a concern for causation and contingency. Here, especially in his Summa theologica, he displays an impressive breadth and variety of argument in carrying to fruition the discipline of an Abelard. Particularly noteworthy are his efforts towards preventing the knowledge and power of God from making contingent events into necessary events (in the strictest Aristotelian sense).

The resolution of this problem is of extreme importance in keeping both the omnipotence of God and man's free will intact. Although


3. See particularly pp. 82-117 (Ia., XIV 8-XIX).

4. Pp. 82-87 (Ia., XIV 8-13).
Reformation reformers attack the possibility of this separation. St. Thomas gives as succinct a statement as any as to why man's free will has always been central to the Christian world view: "Erroneum enim est dicere, quod actus humani et eventus, praescientiae et ordinationi divinae non subsint. Nec minus est erroneum dicere, quod praescientia vel ordinatione divina humanis actibus necessitas iniungatur: tolleretur enim libertas arbitrii, consiliandi opportunitas, legum utilitas, sollicitudo bene operandi, et praemiorum et poenarum iustitia." St. Thomas accepts free will as essential to any sense of an active Christianity, or an active social or ethical system. In this we see the foundation for the Catholic belief in the efficacy of good works. In short for St. Thomas, if free will did not exist, it would be necessary to invent it. The alternative is the relativism and passivity engendered by a belief in "fated" actions: how can one accept the "praemiorum et poenarum iustitia," for example, if events occur independently of the intentions of the participants? On a simpler level, if the Christian cannot affect the course of events, why should a preacher take advantage of "opportunitas consiliandi" and give sermons to his congregation? It is impossible for them to be translated into action. Otherwise one is talking a Stoicism with an emphasis on the capital "s" dictated by a God with a similar emphasis on the capital "g".

Although the Renaissance humanist chose to argue to the same conclusions as St. Thomas but often from different propositions, although the humanist usually rejected the structured and highly structured and.

analytical approach of the Schoolmen, he would find nothing disagreeable in the goals of a St. Thomas. As far as the basic debate goes, all the central issues had been covered by the time of St. Thomas so there is no further need to continue this survey in this format. General or specific points about the Renaissance will only be invoked when they have some direct relevance to one of our authors. Beyond this the Renaissance, and I might add the Reformation, have little to say.
CHAPTER II

BARTOLOMEO PLATINA

(1421-1481)
I. DETERMINIST [1]
   A. (Non)super/natural (1)
      3. "Human nature"

II. NONDETERMINIST [86]
   B. (Non)super/natural (86)
      2. Social factors (12)
         b. Educational
            2). Other liberal arts and knowledge
               a). Zeal for
               b). Operative
            f. Religion
            g. Common good
      3. Psychological and character factors (11)
         a. Emotions and traits
            23). Respect
               a). avaritia
               28). Licentia
               29). Diligentia
               33). Gratia
               34). Ingratitudo
               38). Petulantia
               48). Auctoritas
               49). Moderation/propiety
                    modestia
               g. Intelligence/cleverness/cunning
                    ingenium
         j. Virtus
      5. Physical (3)
         a. Organic
      6. Direct operatives (60)
         c. Other overt acts
            1). To an end

87 causes or 1 per 57.2 words
Platina's life of Vittorino was written some time between the years 1462-1465.¹ This would mean that the work was undertaken during that period when Platina had first come to Rome and was constantly finding it necessary to seek employment; in fact, his dismissal from the College of Abbreviators dates from this period.² It is therefore possible that his motivation for writing this first of the biographies of Vittorino goes beyond his avowed intent of commemorating the life of a great teacher.³ The volume consulted is the only printed edition and was edited by Giuseppe Biasuz. The Latin text is accompanied by an Italian translation.

As a work of history this biography would appear to be difficult to analyse for our purposes. Beyond being of a brevity that would seem to make it less significant for us than Platina's other works, it is less a relation of events with explanations than it is an extended character sketch. There is much on Vittorino's methods of teaching, his living habits and so on. This fact does not substantially affect our results since our main interest is in examining the nature of the cause at those points at which Platina does ascribe a cause to an event. Nevertheless it may be a matter of surprise to learn that the causation factor is 57.2, the lowest of all Platina's histories.

Overall the consistency found in the History of Mantua is repeated in that the vast majority of occurrences have been assigned to the "Nondeterminist" category. The one "Determinist" causation could arguably have been made a "I" or "II" and was assigned to category "I" in keeping with standard practice: Platina remarked in describing Vittorino's disciplinary technique for a certain type of student, "Verum ubi eos ad libidinem pronos vidisset, ut est hominum natura alia aliis libidinosior ...." (p. 30). Here Platina could have meant that such behaviour, being due to some factor inherent in one's nature, has put control of one's self out of the student's hands. The obverse could also be true and Platina may have instead been using "natura" in the more limited sense of one's character or a character trait at a particular moment only, thereby leaving it yet subject to change. This is the sort of debatable situation on which it has already been remarked that the tendency will be to place the causation in the "Determinist" category with due qualification.

Aside from the preceding, all other causations fall into the "Nondeterminist/(nonsuper)natural categories which seems to be setting a pattern of sorts for Platina in this regard. As can be seen, this history has more "social" than "psychological and character factors" although these "social" factors are almost exclusively "educational." More than likely this would simply be the result of his subject being an educator. Actually, had Platina been more explicit in his explanations, a goodly number of the "II.B.6.c.1.'s" or "Nondeterminist/(nonsuper)natural/direct operatives to an end" would probably have found their way to the "educational" class also. By way of a more marginal illustration than is usual for him, Platina observes that Vittorino "Aestate enim,
quia civitas plerumque parum salubris esse consueverat, [moved] discipulos ad loca salubria et amoena ...." (p. 32). Is it simply a matter of illness prevention? Or is it that a sick student cannot be educated? Or are the more pleasant surroundings more aesthetically conducive to education? There are endless possibilities suggested by Platina's statement and in cases like this the "II. B. 6. c. 1)." class has been chosen as the safest way to avoid the dangerously arbitrary despite it often seeming that the "II. B. 2. b." class would have been a more likely choice by implication.
PLATINA

In historiam urbium Mantuae

77,287 words [5.2 x 14.863]
687 causes or 1 per 112.4 words

I. DETERMINIST [6]

A. Supernatural (3)
   1. Spirit (1)
      a. God
      2. Direct acts - individuated
   2. Nonspirit (2)
      b. Fate/fortune/astrology

B. (Nonsuper)natural (3)
   1. Social factors (2)
      a. Economic
      b. Population
   3. "Human nature"

II. NONDETERMINIST [681]

A. Supernatural (8)
   1. Spirit (5)
      a. God (Christian)
         1). Visions, dreams etc.
         2). Operatives
             b). Relics
         3). Direct acts by God
   2. Nonspirit (3)
      b. Fortune as "blind luck"

B. (Nonsuper)natural (673)
   1. Signa/portents (as warnings) (3)
      a. Human derived
      2). Behavioural
      b. Physical (earthquakes etc.)
   2. Social factors (31)
      a. Economic
      b. Educational
         1). Oratory
         2). Other liberal arts
      c. Political
      d. Population
   3. Psychological and character factors (136)
      a. Emotions and traits
         1). Anger and outrage
            ira, incendo, indignatio
         2). Greed (inc. power and amb.)
            cupiditas, libido, ambitio
         3). Hatred
            odium
         4). Envy
            invidia, livor
         5). Fear
            timor, metus
         6). Cruelty
            crudelitas
         7). Mercy
            misericordia
8). Shame
   pudor
9). Fame
   gloria, fama
10). "Patriotism"
   salus or charitas patriae
11). Pity
12). Friendship
   amicus
13). Moderation/propriety
   modestia
14). Memories of old animosities
15). Betrayal
   perfidium
16). Revenge
   vindicto
17). Insult
18). Courage/spirit
   animus
19). Kindness
   benevolentia
20). Love of family
21). Of unspecified emot. adult.
22). Love of family
23). Romantic love, "uncomplicated"
   amor
24). Amor pacis
25). Honestas
26). Gratia
27). Diligentia
28). Integritas
29). Justitia
30). Virtus

5. Physical (30)
   a. Organic
   b. Inorganic
      1). "Unfixed"/Disasters/Weather etc.
      2). "Fixed"/Geography etc.

6. Direct operatives (459)
   a. Trickery/deceit
   b. Strategies and acts (military)
   c. Other overt acts
      1). To an end

7. Physical necessities
   14
This history was written by Platina during the period 1465–1469 as an attempt to ingratiate himself with the Gonzaga family of Mantua at a time when his fortunes appear to have been at a low point and he was even desirous of returning to Mantua from Rome. The edition consulted is that of Muratori as cited earlier in this thesis; it is the only published edition.

It is essentially a military history with every pain taken at suitable moments to dramatize the importance of the Gonzaga in the history of the city. The organization of its contents, although enhanced by fine, decorative Latin prose, is basically annalistic in structure. It is little more than a relation of the city's military involvements with campaign after campaign following upon one another, punctuated here and there by descriptions of internal civic strife occasioned by class factions and struggles for power.

On the whole there seems to be much of irrelevance to a history of Mantua; for example, a great deal of attention is given to the deeds of Sordellus, a Mantuan knight, including several hundred lines on his romance and marriage (coll. 680–686). Similarly the large numbers of speeches in the work give the impression of having been inserted more for narrative than any analytic effect. That the text


is liberally sprinkled with speeches, most particularly over the second half of it, ought to be taken into account in assessing his causation factor of 112.4 words.

On the other hand the causation ratio would be greater than might be expected when one considers that this is a military history. This would be the result of the unavoidably high number of "II.R.6.a's" or "Nondeterminist/direct operatives/stratagems."

Looking at the checksheet, the greater preponderance of nondeterministic occurrences becomes immediately apparent. It is perhaps surprising that there were only five deterministic causations: such consistency was hardly to be expected. Of these five the inclusion of only one as deterministic is questionable. This is in regard to "Deterministic/Supernatural/Nonspirit/fate, fortune" and the problem concerns Platina's relation of several disasters followed by the announcement of a very destructive earthquake "... ne ullam genus mali superesset ...."¹ Within this context it appears more likely that Platina was not engaging in a figure of speech but a causative explanation - as has been stated, the deterministic category is accepted when seeming contextually the more likely.

On the surface at least it is to be wondered that supernatural causative agents were so infrequent. They certainly would have been the easiest route to a thoroughgoing determinism yet there are more of them in the nondeterminist section and as many (nonsuper)natural as supernatural on the determinist side. Without bothering yet with how

¹. Col. 752. My presenting, as here, the possibly controversial occurrences is yet another control on my method.
Platina measures up against other historians, on his own he might so far be definitely considered as allowing man freedom of will with very little divine interference.

Looking at both determinist and nondeterminist factors, it might also be remarked that his causation is very simple. For the psychological factors, this might be expected from what is already intimated on the checksheet and typical is the following: "Pace ubique parta, quictura aliquamdiu omnia videbantur, ni Philippus, novarum rerum [territory] cupidus, semina magni futuri belli clam per Italian sparsisset." (coll. 812-813). The other factors are presented in hardly a more complex manner. In describing a political situation, "Triennio post quietem Civitatis nova seditio perturbavit. De creando Praetore erat contentio." (col. 722). It is further explained that two groups arose wanting control of the office and resorted to force; no further explanation is given beyond these things.

Unfortunately this is not a simplification resulting from my looking at one or several sentences that are easily recorded on small index cards. The wider background of events against which Platina makes his analysis is no more sophisticated nor does it imply a causative sequence of any greater complexity than is obvious from the isolated single causation. His history progresses through little groupings of events with little done to interrelate them. A further result is that scant idea is given of institutional or cultural change over the period of the city's history covered.¹ Even the wars occur in an individualized sequence with no synthesis or attempts to tie

¹. Although Platina goes back to the supposed founding of Mantua by the Etruscans, he effectively begins his history with the twelfth century.
them to major themes (like the Mantuan role in a struggle between the papacy and Empire?) or any such thing.

Perhaps it is a matter of looking for a reflection of ourselves in chiding Platina for being simple in his causation and reacting strongly to the prominence of place he gives to psychological and character factors over social factors. This is possibly a significant point of comparison because these two groupings would seem to be less of a restriction to his interpreting things himself from his historical sources. It is also likely that they would be more easily interchangeable depending on one's outlook than would something like physical phenomena (weather, geography, etc.). That Platina uncontestably tended to opt for the individuated psychological and character factors in a way that might be surprising in a modern historian is a curious circumstance which will merit further comment in relation to his other works and those of other historians. His toning down of the supernatural may also prove of significance.

As a final observation it might be noted that the large number of direct operatives is obviously the result of his *In historiam urbis Mantuae* being largely a military history as suggested earlier. Especially true for the incredible number of stratagems, it would be an additional reason for his history failing to show institutional growth and development; that is, it lacks an organic view of the past.
I. DETERMINIST [15]

A. Supernatural (12)
   1. Spirit (11)
      a. God
         1) Visions, etc.
         2) Direct acts - individuated
   2. Nonspirit (1)
      b. Fortune (1)

B. (Nonsuper)natural (3)
   2. Physical (3)
      b. Inorganic (3)

II. NONDETERMINIST [1754]

A. Supernatural (38)
   1. Spirit (35)
      a. God
         1) Visions, etc.
         2) Operatives
            a) Prayers
            b) Relics
         3) Direct acts by God
   2. Nonspirit (3)
      a. Astrology (1)
      b. Fortune (2)

B. (Nonsuper)natural (1716)
   1. Signs/portents (12)
      a. Human derived
         1) Visions, dreams etc.
      b. Physical (earthquakes, etc.)
      2. Social factors (170)
         a. Economic (8)
         b. Educational
            1) Rhetoric
               a) Spoken (oratory)
               b) Written
            2) Other lib. arts and knowledge
               a) Zeal for
               b) Operative (use/useful)
               c) Lack of
            3) Experience in rebus agendis
               1)
            c. Political (49)
            e. Customs
               1) Secular (1)
               2) Religious (2)
            f. Religion (68)
            g. Common good (3)
      3. Psychological, character, intell. factors (279)
         a. Emotions and traits
            1) Anger and outrage
               ira, indignatus, incendo
         1769 causes or 1 per 100.4 words
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<td>35</td>
<td>Desidia</td>
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<tr>
<td>36</td>
<td>Strenuitas</td>
<td></td>
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<td>37</td>
<td>Mansuetudo</td>
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<td>Placabilitas</td>
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<td>Innocentia</td>
<td></td>
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<td>Sanctitas</td>
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<td>14</td>
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<td>Maestas</td>
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<td>1</td>
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<td>Digestas</td>
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<td>1</td>
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<td>Liberalitas</td>
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<td>10</td>
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<td>46</td>
<td>Honor</td>
<td></td>
<td>9</td>
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<td>47</td>
<td>Integritas</td>
<td></td>
<td>7</td>
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<td>48</td>
<td>Auctoritas</td>
<td></td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
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<td>49</td>
<td>Moderation</td>
<td></td>
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</table>

b. Ratio

c. Exemplum/imitation
d. Retribution/guilt 1

e. Prudentia 1

f. Corruptible by material things 19

g. Intelligence/cleverness/cunning
   ingenium, astus 4

h. Stultitia 1

i. Iustitia 1

j. Virtus 15

5. Physical (69)
   a. Organic 58
   b. Inorganic
      1). "Unfixed"/Disasters/Wind/Weather, etc. 4
      2). "Fixed"/Geography, etc. 7

6. Direct operatives (1177)
   a. Trickery, deceit 24
   b. Stratagems and acts (military) 579
   c. Other overt acts
      1). To an end 569
      2). Causing unspec. psych. state or response 5

7. Physical necessities (9)
   a. Real 4
   b. Comfort 5
The Liber de vita Christi ac omnium pontificum, or more conveniently Vitae, is Platina's major work from both the stand-points of length and influence. In fact the book has undergone eighty-three separate printings in six languages starting with the 1479 Venetian edition and ending with the edition used here, that of Giacinto Gaida, RR II SS, III, i (Città di Castello, 1913–1932). The period of composition is approximately 1473–1474/5, the latter date coinciding suspiciously with Platina's appointment to the post of Vatican librarian.¹

The basic format of the Vitae is a series of individual biographies of each of the popes in chronological order from St. Peter to Sixtus IV all of which is preceded by a life of Christ. In actual fact the biographies as such are often not as complete as might be expected;² they usually concern themselves with the individual pope as pope, his pontificate then serving as the vehicle for a universal history, within that time period, of secular and religious events. Whether or not those events have any direct bearing on the papacy is often immaterial to Platina.³

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2. This is less true of the fifteenth century biographies for perhaps obvious reasons such as a greater availability of information and so on.

3. In my M.Litt. thesis I outlined the basic pattern as follows: "... Platina briefly introduces the pope... next he gives a narrative of the various civil events that occurred during that particular pope's reign with character sketches of the major military and political figures if those sketches could be made to serve a purpose. Platina then recounts the actions of the pope..."
Naturally this format would not lend itself easily to the development of causations of any great complexity in nature or sequencing - here as in his other works his causation is simple by modern standards. Nevertheless there are a few exceptions where he fits events within a great schema. In this, at least, his *magnum opus* is more developed than his other histories.

The circumstance is his overall explanation for the growth of abuses among the clergy and the popes since early Christian times. The explanatory device for this decline is materialism resulting from the Church's success. It is the classical commonplace of virtue leading to greatness which leads to wealth and decline. If statements of belief were our sole guide, it would seem Platina took this paradigm very seriously. Although the model does not appear all that often on the checksheets (essentially the occurrences fall into the "II.B.3." classification since the actual events which express this pattern are individual instances of "greed" or "corruptability"), it does seem to be used with great verbal emphasis whenever allowed by circumstances.

This schema illustrates in another way the danger of a too unqualified use of the checksheets beyond the first three subdivisions: that the historian may not have chosen a particular subcategory because, on the basis of the evidence, it just does not fit; this is impossible with the first three categories.

---

1. Palermino, pp. 72-73 and 123-128.
Nevertheless with Platina it appears that he truly attached a great deal of importance to the theme we have been discussing (this is all the more likely considering his didactic aims) but that the number of occurrences is smaller than expected because a greater number of opportunities to use this schema were not there in the story of what happened.

This issue is only raised as an instance of a likely point of some significance which the checksheets seem to have failed to bring out adequately. The other possibility is that the theme did not tabulate well because it ought not to have – Platina's talk of the decline of the church is akin to a moralistic statement of belief of the sort the checksheet is an attempt to test, belief not tied to a concrete act of committal or a visible consequence (pp. 7-8 of this thesis). The question of which of the two likelihoods to accept is, as we shall see, not always directly answerable but the great value of the checksheets is to awaken us at least to the problems raised by the existence of the latter. After taking all things into consideration in this instance, we must grant him an interpretive framework which does not receive adequate attention on the checksheets.

A perfect example of this difficulty and of the subject under discussion in this thesis is the only direct statement Platina makes in the Vitae on the question of determinism. In the life of Sixtus IV Platina wrote that "Scripsit [Sixtus] etiam de futuris

1. For a general background to didacticism in the Vitae, see Palermino, pp. 7-16; for Platina's goals in this regard specific to the Vitae, Palermino, Chapter V, pp. 107-134.

The fact that Sixtus IV happened to be Platina's patron in a certain sense ought to make us wary of praise of Sixtus' opinions on this matter.¹

In looking at the checksheet, we find a less conscious agreement with Sixtus. The overall figure of fifteen "Determinist" causations as opposed to one thousand seven hundred and fifty-four "Nondeterminist" ones exhibits a marked degree of uniformity in favour of the latter, more especially when one considers that the subject is ostensibly and essentially religious and that there is a goodly amount of reserve with which many of those "Determinist" occurrences were assigned to that classification.

On the first point we would expect a substantial number of supernatural causations in a History of the Popes, one which includes a life of Christ. The opportunity was there for Platina to allow more of them into this history than the other works by him which we are examining. The supernatural causation is, as has been mentioned, the least likely to leave man freedom of choice. It is perhaps of some import that of the total number of such causations (fifty), thirty-eight were "Nondeterminist."

On the second point there are fourteen possible "causations"

¹. Palermino, pp. 85-89. Another related statement Platina has left us on this issue is noted on page 82 of this thesis.
not recorded on the sheet. These relate to a problem which arises from what I feel to be merely a turn of phrase used by Platina. They could be a very revealing bit of determinism if one wants to accept them as literal statements. They are mostly negative subjunctive clauses of purpose which all show a decidedly pessimistic outlook. Typical is the following which comes after a list of unfortunate happenings: "Ne quid autem deesset ad perturbandum Christianorum quietem," war arose between France and England. (p. 256).

The fourteen usages of this sort are listed in Appendix I at the beginning of the citations for the Vitae. They are there simply noted as "Et ne quid deesset." Their widest meaning is a definite sense of determinism occasioned by the necessary completion of a series for the making of a whole. The agent of this tendency to unity is not specified. However, there are several factors which argue against our accepting them in this light.

For one Platina, though showing a pessimism of sorts in this and his other works,¹ nowhere exhibits a systematic statement of such a position or anything like it. His pessimism is one of evaluation of actual events as part of his plan for showing how things ought to be reformed. It is not the sort of fatalistic course of events beyond man's control which we have implied. It is a pessimism of men often failing to control his destiny in the proper manner: it is nondeterminist.²

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1. See above and the discussion on pp. 78-83.

2. But for shortsightedness it is impossible for a nondeterministic interpretation of the world to be rationally pessimistic except in retrospect - the possibility is then still there for deviation from the established course of events. Otherwise, the writing of didactic histories and tracts would be a senseless enterprise.
Another factor is the off-hand, very casual manner in which these phrases are sprinkled evenly through the narrative like a convention of style: in context they appear more to be phrases used as conjunctions for ornately adding one final misery to a host of others. Nevertheless, should anyone dispute my interpretation (which removes the agent of causation and thereby prevents their tabulation on the sheets), the incidences are at least recorded for his referral.

Among the twelve causations actually assigned to the "Determinist" class, seven might also arguably be labelled a turn of phrase. In this instance the phrase is the problematic (pp. 23-24 of this thesis) "Dei nutu" or some equivalent. Still they probably ought to be included under the "Determinist/supernatural" class. It is noteworthy that only two of the supernatural causations (determinist or nondeterminist) appear in the Vitae after the year 1300 A.D. These are on page 331 (nondeterminist) and page 399. The first relates that a plague came as a judgement of God Who was angry with the behaviour of mankind. The second tells of the inspired dream Sixtus IV's mother had wherein it was revealed to her that he was to be consigned for life, upon pain of death, to the Franciscans. Considering the fact that Platina was writing with an eye to Sixtus, his sincerity in this case may be in doubt. In

1. However "bad" things may have seemed to Platina at any one moment, surely he could not have thought things could not have been worse.


3. See p. 24 of this thesis.
conclusion it is obvious that Platina, especially when writing of events close to his time, very rarely invoked the supernatural for purposes of explanation. This tendency is the stronger for qualification beyond what is evident from the checksheets and is truly surprising in a history of the popes.

The figure of one thousand seven hundred and fifty-four represents a vast preponderance of "Nondeterminist" causations. Of these, the one reference to astrology merits further examination. It is not a clear cut case of Platina clearly stating that in a certain situation, man used astrology to good effect and the result obtained was truly the result of astrological prediction. He merely states that in the siege of a certain town, an astrologer gave advice as to the proper time to attack to break the town's encirclement. Upon his signal the townspeople joined battle with great success. (p. 252). That Platina did not contest the tale (he was not entirely adverse to doing so) seems to suggest the possibility that he accepted it and that it ought to be recorded on the checksheets. On the other hand, the paucity of instances where astrology enters the narrative in a successful manner implies astrology was not very important to Platina in interpreting the world around him.

Looking to the vast number of secular causations such as military strategems or political factors, for example, it might be noted that Platina simply has not written of just religious affairs, in fact he often narrates his history seemingly to their exclusion.

1. Palermino, pp. 64-66.
It is a matter on which he has received some criticism. Beyond the additional didactic opportunities such an expanded topic provided, Platina supplied an explanation for this course of action in the Prohemium: "... huic prohemio finem imponam, ubi lecturos prius admonero, non esse mirandum, si cum pontificum vitas et mores scripturum me pollicitus sum, imperatorem quoque principum, ac ducum res gestas inseruerim. Adeo enim haec simul connexe sunt, si primos imperatores dum Christianis adversantur, si ultimos dum favent inspicis, ut alterum integre sine altero exprimi nequiverit." (p. 4).

Platina astutely realized that to tell the story of the popes, he had to include civil affairs. The result is not merely a string of papal biographies but a history of the papacy.

Although he has shown us why his subject matter is often secular, the point made by the check-sheets is that his outlook is also in the sense of his keeping the supernatural out of human affairs. Again it must be emphasized that this is all the more meaningful for this tendency having appeared in an ostensibly religious topic. The same might be said for his lack of determinism.


2. A good example of this appears on p. 24.
II. NONDETERMINIST [67]
B. (Nonsuper)natural (67)
   2. Social factors (10)
      b. Educational
         2). Other liberal arts and knowledge
            a). Zeal for 1
            b). Operative (useful) 5
            a. Political 2
            f. Religion 2
   3. Psychological, character, intelligentsia factors (25)
      a. Emotions and traits 2
         2). Greed  avaritia
         10). Fame  fama
         11). "Patriotism" 1
         24). Piety  Pietas
         27). Sollicitudo  Pietas
         29). Diligentia 4
         30). Pertinacia 2
         44). Liberalitas 1
         47). Integritas 1
         48). Auctoritas 1
         49). Moderation 1
            modestia
            50). Continencia 1
            51). Mores 1
            e. Prudentia 2
            q. Intelligence/cleverness
               ingenium
               1
      j. Virtus 1
   5. Physical (2)
      a. Organic 2
   6. Direct operatives (30)
      b. Strategems and acts (military) 3
      c. Other overt acts
         1). To an end 25
         2). Causing unspec. psych. state or response 1
      d. Negligence/failure to act 1
Platina's brief biography of Mellini, written sometime after August of 1478, appears to have been Platina's last literary effort. The text consulted is that published by Andrea Victorelli in his annotated edition of Alonzo Chacon's history of the popes.¹

The life of Mellini is an example of that strange humanist mixture of panegyric with historical biography which seems so methodologically weak to the modern historian. The full extent of Platina's association with Mellini is not known² but from the biography we see that the friendship, apparently based on Platina's merits as a humanist being recognized by a fellow Academician, a lover of learning with position and means, was of some consequence to Platina. It was Mellini who secretly disregarded the orders of Paul II and had money given to Platina when he was in prison in 1468 (coll. 1288 and 1292). The *Vita* might be Platina's repayment of his debt to Mellini.³

Nearly one quarter of the biography first introduces Mellini's family background, the nobility of his ancestry and their great deeds. Next comes a general outline of some of the major events of

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1. All that remains before his death is his compilation of church privileges from the archives of the Vatican while librarian; Gaida, p. xxxi. Gaida, p. xxx, is wrong in dating the *Vita* 1471 since Platina describes, correctly, Mellini's death as occurring in August of 1478: II, coll. 1259 and 1290. *Vita amplissimi patris Ioannis Mellini* in Alphonso Chaconio [Alonzo Chacon], Francesco Cabrera Morali, and Andrea Victorelli, *Vitae et res gestae Pontificum Romanorum* (Rome, 1630), II, coll. 1259 and 1290 and 1285-92, respectively. The manuscript survives as Vat. lat. 360a.

2. I have yet to see their names together in any other connection than what is mentioned in the biography.

3. Platina is also possibly looking to continued good relations with the Mellini family as witness the general talk on the family and the extended praise of still living members (coll. 1290-1).
Mellini's career. The final sixth of the biography is a character sketch in the style of Suetonius - such pithy observations of personality are reminiscent of those found in the individual lives of the popes in the Vitae. Although Platina tells the story of Mellini's life, he appears to this observer to be too stylized at times in his approach, most particularly in his choice of fairly conventional phrases, to give the impression of truly capturing the man. The biography seems to lack the insight of some of his other efforts at contemporary biography such as his lives of Pius II and Paul II.

The foregoing aside, with a causation factor of 65.5 the Vita Mellini is on the whole more analytical in its historiographical technique than all his other works excepting the life of Vittorino. However, since the life of Mellini is so much shorter in length than his other works, any conclusions about it in terms of the checksheets tend not to carry much weight. One point of significance is that once again Platina keeps "determinism" out of his history when concentrating on contemporary affairs. He also has managed to keep the supernatural from entering man's world, even that of a religious leader, and to depend again principally on psychological causation. Otherwise there is little else which for our purposes is remarkable about the Vita Ioannis Baptistae Mellini.
I. DETERMINIST [22]

A. Supernatural (15)
   1. Spirit (12)
      a. God
         1). Visions, etc. 1
         2). Direct acts - individuated 12
   2. Nonspirit (3)
      b. Fate/fortune 3

B. (Nonsuper)natural (7)
   1. Social factors (2)
      a. Economic 1
      b. Population 1
   2. Physical (3)
      b. Inorganic 3
   3. "Human nature" 2

II. NONDETERMINIST [2588]

A. Supernatural (46)
   1. Spirit (40)
      a. God
         1). Visions, dreams etc. 6
         2). Operatives
            a). Prayers 5
            b). Relics 3
         3). Direct acts by God 26
   2. Nonspirit (6)
      a. Astrology 1
      b. Fortune as "blind luck" 5

B. (Nonsuper)natural (2542)
   1. Signs/portents (15)
      a. Human derived
         1). Visions, dreams etc. 1
         2). Behavioural 1
      b. Physical (earthquakes, etc.) 13
   2. Social factors (223)
      a. Economic 19
      b. Educational
         1). Rhetoric
            a). Spoken (oratory) 14
            b). Written 3
         2). Other lib. arts and knowledge
            a). Zeal for 11
            b). Operative (use/useful) 30
            c). Lack of 1
         3). Experience in rebus agendas 1
      c. Political 64
      d. Population 1
      e. Customs
         1). Secular 1
         2). Religious 2
      f. Religion 72
g. Common good

3. Psychological, character, intell. factors (451)

a. Emotions and traits
   1. Anger and outrage
   2. Greed (incl. power and amb.)
   3. Hatred
   4. Envy
   5. Fear
   6. Mercy
   7. Pity
   8. Kindness
   9. Shame
   10. Shame
   11. "Patriotism"
   12. Friend(ship)
   13. Memories of old animosities
   14. Betrayal
   15. Revenge
   16. Insult, affront
   17. Courage, spirit
   18. Love of family
   19. Unspecified emot. result. from adultery
   20. Romantic love, "uncomplic'd"
   21. Amor pacis
   22. Cruelty
   23. Respect
   24. Piety
   25. Impiety
   26. Arrogance, haughtiness
   27. Sollicitudo
   28. Licentia
   29. Diligentia
   30. Pertinacia
   31. Honestas
   32. Fides
   33. Gratia
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<th>No.</th>
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<td>Ingratitudo</td>
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<td>35.</td>
<td>Desidia</td>
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<td>36.</td>
<td>Strenuitas</td>
<td>1</td>
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<td>37.</td>
<td>Mensuetudo</td>
<td>4</td>
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<td>38.</td>
<td>Petulantia</td>
<td>1</td>
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<td>Placabilitas</td>
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<tr>
<td>40.</td>
<td>Innocentia</td>
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<td>41.</td>
<td>Sanctitas</td>
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<td>42.</td>
<td>Maestas</td>
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<td>43.</td>
<td>Dignitas</td>
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<td>46.</td>
<td>Honor</td>
<td>9</td>
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<td>47.</td>
<td>Integritas</td>
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<td>Mores</td>
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<tr>
<td>h.</td>
<td>Ratio</td>
<td>2</td>
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<tr>
<td>c.</td>
<td>Exemplum/imitation</td>
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<tr>
<td>d.</td>
<td>Retribution/guilt</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>e.</td>
<td>Prudentia</td>
<td>3</td>
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<tr>
<td>f.</td>
<td>Corruptible by material things</td>
<td>19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>g.</td>
<td>Intelligence/cleverness/cunning</td>
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<tr>
<td>h.</td>
<td>Stultitia</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>i.</td>
<td>Iustitia</td>
<td>2</td>
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<tr>
<td>j.</td>
<td>Virtus</td>
<td>21</td>
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<td>5.</td>
<td>Physical</td>
<td>(104)</td>
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<td>a.</td>
<td>Organic</td>
<td>72</td>
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<td>b.</td>
<td>Inorganic</td>
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<td>1).</td>
<td>&quot;Unfixed&quot;/Disasters/Wind/Weather, etc.</td>
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<td>2).</td>
<td>&quot;Fixed&quot;/Geography, etc.</td>
<td>13</td>
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<td>6.</td>
<td>Direct operatives</td>
<td>(1726)</td>
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<tr>
<td>a.</td>
<td>Trickery/Deceit</td>
<td>32</td>
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<tr>
<td>b.</td>
<td>Stratagens and acts (military)</td>
<td>954</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>c.</td>
<td>Other overt acts</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>1).</td>
<td>To an end</td>
<td>733</td>
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<tr>
<td>2).</td>
<td>Causing unspec. psych. state or response</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>d.</td>
<td>Negligence/failure to act</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7.</td>
<td>Physical necessities</td>
<td>(23)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>a.</td>
<td>Real</td>
<td>18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>b.</td>
<td>Comfort</td>
<td>5</td>
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Consonant with Platina's reputation among scholars as a humanist of the second rank, not much has been written about his attitude towards the terms upon which man operates in his world. In fact there has been very little study at all of Platina's thought in general. One reason for this is the simple fact that those of his works which relate to the "important" issues of his day, tracts such as De vera nobilitate, De optimo cive, De falso et vero bono and so on seem to add nothing of significance to the intellectual movements of the day: they are late arrivals to an already established body of literature.¹ For instance the value to the modern historian of Platina's De flosculis quibusdam linguae latinae appears to be the manner in which it relates to the greater work by Valla which it emulates. The tendency would be to look at Platina rather as an expression of his age than as one of its creators. Those areas in which he might have made a singular contribution are often too much overlooked or are thought to be of minor significance.

In the former category we might place the issue of Platina and his comrades being imprisoned by Paul II in 1468 on charges of heresy and conspiracy as one of major importance in the history of humanism and the "too zealous" study of the classics.² Also Platina's general

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² I have an article soon to appear in Archivum Historiae Pontificiae on this topic but basically it only relates to the question of guilt in 1468 with little attention to the wider issues broached above; for 1468 at least Platina is "acquitted."
reputation as an Epicurean has been inadequately examined. Though apparently well-known as an epicure (refer to his De honesta voluptate)\(^1\) there is danger in extending the term to mean the pagan school of philosophy, the Epicureans. We have no available evidence to prove that Platina was an Epicurean and adhered to central beliefs of that system such as there being no afterlife. The Epicurean idea that the gods have no influence in human affairs, although a tendency of his thought, could be contested from what was found on the checksheets. Most importantly the opinion that one of man's most artificial and unnecessary needs is that of political power and fame is not answerable from the checksheets but certainly is from Platina's nonhistorical works.\(^2\) Even Platina's thoughts on voluptas fall between Epicureus' bare ideal of simply meeting one's needs and its vulgarization into extreme hedonism.\(^3\) A more

1. Testimony to this general reputation is its exploitation by a popular humorist: it forms the basis for Cent. I, Ragguagli XXXIV of Traiano Boccalini, Ragguagli di Parnaso, ed. Giuseppe Rua (Bari, 1910), I, 162-163.

2. This affirmation of fame and political distinction is such a commonplace in Platina's writings it is not possible to do more than cite a few examples: Prohemium to Vitae, pp. 3-4; Tractatus de laudibus pacis, printed in T. Vairani, Cremonensium monumenta Romae extantia (Rome, 1778), I, 110; Oratio de pace Italica componenda et bello thurcis indicendo in De honesta voluptate et valitudine (Paris, 1530), foll. 114-116; and a letter to Paul II in Vairani, I, 30-31. Platina fits well the model of the civic humanist short of De falso et vero bono which is a special problem as we shall see.

3. Platina's most direct statement is in De honesta voluptate where he argues for pleasure that is moderate, neither overly indulgent nor an effort of denial; fol. 125-127.
disciplined analysis of Platina along these lines would be welcome. 1

The latter point, those areas where Platina made a singular contribution, do appear to be of little import in terms of those issues which are presently of concern to Renaissance scholars. He was one of that first generation of humanists, for instance, to avail himself of the printed word: his cookbook and his history of the popes each seem to be the first printed examples of their respective genres. Both of these books enjoyed an enormous popularity for several centuries. Lastly we might bring forward his extensive and innovative reorganization of the Vatican Library. 2

Returning to the problem of Platina's Weltanschauung, we find a relevant comment from Charles Trinkaus. As one of the few samples of a summary judgement on this point by a scholar and as an illustration of the tendency to read possibly too much from too little, I shall quote from it extensively. Although looking at only Platina's De falso et vero bono, Trinkaus states: "The humanist conception of the self-realization of man through his intellect and will resulting in the works of human civilization could also be sustained in combination with a Neo-Stoic outlook such as that of the Lombardo-Roman humanist ... Platina."

"The tone of the dialogues [the three books of De falso et vero bono] by this latter-day Boethius is almost entirely

1. Past scholarship has been too sloppy on major questions like was Platina a pagan? For instance Roberto Weiss called Platina an atheist without justifying the use of such a label; The Spread of Humanism (London, 1964), p. 13. Giovanni Fioretto, on the other hand, rationalized his use of the term by quoting the first line of the Vita (where Platina gives Plato's four part division of nobility and shows how Christ excelled in them all) and then remarking, "quindi s'intrattiene lungamente a parlare d'Augusto, delle sue sontuosità, del suo amore alle lettere. Che spirito cristiano, eh?" Gli umanisti e lo studio del Latino e del Greco nel secolo XV in Italia (Verona, 1831), p. 29.

2. Palermo, pp. 140-141, 141, n. 1 and p. 44 for each of these two points respectively.
pessimistic, reflecting his actual situation, perhaps, but also rejecting any kind of endorsement of this-worldly goods." Trinkaus has brought out, in examining this dialogue, several points which merit further consideration.

One is that Platina, not only here but in all his writings, gives men the potential for self-creation and the ability to shape his world this the check-sheets very definitely confirm.

However, in calling Platina a Neo-Stoic on the basis of De falso et vero bono, certain difficulties are being overlooked and Trinkaus has some companions in this, more temperate though their remarks may be.

Umberto Caregaro-Negrin felt the work a conciliation of Stoicism and Christianity although it is the more Christian, especially in the third book (on the strength of such things as holding Christ up as the example for us all). Caregaro-Negrin does allow that the work was dedicated to Sixtus IV and that Platina's torture and imprisonment ought to be kept in mind. Unfortunately this point, like Trinkaus' obscure reference to "reflecting his actual situation, perhaps," does not receive further explanation: it is of some importance.

Vladimiro Zabughin was possibly correct in quite plainly stating that Platina wrote the dialogue as a "passport to orthodoxy."
It would seem that unlike Boethius, Platina, our "latter day Boethius," was writing having been released from prison, not in it and also unlike Boethius, Platina had been imprisoned and lost his career on the charge, among other things, of not being a Christian (substantive differences will be treated shortly).

The circumstances are may be coincidental. The dialogue was written in 1471. This date matches well with the death of Paul II, Platina's former adversary, and is dedicated to the new pope, Sixtus IV with whom Platina had already been on good terms. In the dialogue itself Platina is led by the other disputants to see the errors in pagan thinking (Bks. I and II) and is brought (Bk. III) to the opinion that the sole true "good" is contemplation of God. Whether or not De falso et vero bono is meant to be an allegorical comment on Platina's real or pretended conversion, considering his need to change his reputation in Rome to aid his return to the curia, the work's conclusion appears quite understandable and expected.

Our problem is not so much what did the work conclude but did Platina himself believe those conclusions. Hans Baron referred to the Roman Academy as an example of a late stoicism which was exemplified by Platina. Platina, Baron felt, retained the civic philosophy of Florence; by explaining in his De vera nobilitate the decline of the Church in terms of the loss of the ideal of paupertas because its success led to corrupting wealth, Platina was giving a

1. Caida, p. xxviii; Palermino, p. 148, n. 2 and Mario Enilio Cosenza, Biographical and Bibliographical Dictionary of the Italian Humanists (Boston, 1962), IV, 2840. No one that I have encountered has contested this date.
2. Palermino, p. 42.
3. De falso et vero bono in De vitis ac gestis ..., pp. 29-30.
mere repetition of that consciousness achieved in Florence a century before in Salutati and Petrarch. ¹

The reason Trinkaus, Caregaro-Negrin and Baron have been brought into the discussion is that to consign Platina to Stoicism, depending on which variety of Stoicism to which one is referring, could lock Platina into a determinism of the most extreme sort. It is unfortunate that so many people use the word Stoic to mean merely the denial of materialism and the goods of fortune yet do not seem to realize that the use of a capital "S" can signify so much more. Baron comes out the best for this and from the context of his article we can gather that he intended the word to be taken loosely; Platina exemplifies the stoen elements in the classical historians who, influenced by the Greek Stoic philosopher Panaetius, were writing against the excesses of the Roman emperors. ² This sort of call back to moral worth or honestas agrees with Platina's moralizing not only in De vera nobilitate but all his other works, most particularly the Vitae. ³

Beyond this circumscribed stoicism, how much more is intended by Trinkaus and Caregaro-Negrin in labelling Platina a "Stoic/Christian" or a "Neo-Stoic?" We can only wish they had been more explicit. For instance are we to include the Stoic concept of interlocking causes which predetermines events and gives rise to a fate which can be known through divination?

². See George H. Nadel, "Philosophy of History Before Historicism", History and Theory, III, iii (1964), 294-295 on this kind of limited stoicism. See also Chapter V of this thesis.
³. See page 63 of this thesis.
On the basis of Platina's nonhistorical works and the checksheets, we do not seem justified in making Platina any the more "stoic" than has Baron. On page 65 of this thesis we noted Platina's agreement with Sixtus IV and with Aristotle that events are not predetermined. None of Platina's writings contest this. "Determinist" factors hardly creep into his explanations at all if we note that out of two thousand five hundred and ten total causes in his histories, merely twenty-two are "Determinist." Of that total only ten, the "nonspirit" and "(nonsuper)natural," are of the sort that refer to a Stoic outlook. The more obvious aspects of Stoicism, fate and fortune, account for but three explanatory occurrences. In a prison letter to his jailer, Rodrigo Sanchez, Platina claimed:

"Non praetermisit Aristoteles, dum causas rerum in phisicis commemoraret, inter easdem fortunam numerare, quod sit earum rerum domina, quae per accidentes in vita contingunt. Ab hac quoque opinione non multum discrepare Doctores nostri videntur, cum et bonam fortunam, et malam proponant." This statement is corroborated by the appearance of this accidental class of causes in the checksheets, minimal though that appearance was. The checksheets interpret it more as nondeterminist occurrences however (the five under "II. A. 2. b." as opposed to the three of "I. A. 2. b.").

Although there is great difficulty in reconciling many of

1. Related to this is a comment in his life of Vittorino where Platina says sympathetically of Vittorino: "Conjectores, vates, somniorum interpretes, geomanticos et caeteros id genus, quorum stultitia et inani polllicitatione homines falluntur, contempsit;" p. 35.

Platina's expressed beliefs with one another as they are framed in his works, there is no reason to argue against that which has been indicated by the checksheets on the basis of his nonhistorical works beyond what has already been said. Our checksheets at the very least give us a systematic tabulation of the sorts of forces Platina felt operative in the world and they are decidedly ones which leave him in control of his own destiny. Platina, in his emphasis upon the natural as opposed to the supernatural, by making greater use of the more individualized psychological factors at the expense of the social and by leaving man free will is well within the Burckhardtian tradition.

1. The possibility that, for example, the pagan commonplaces ("fortitudo," "iustitia," "temperantia," "prudentia," etc.) of his "true nobility" in De vera nobilitate (ca. 1475-1476: Gaida, p. xxxi) might conflict with the "true good" of De falsae et vero bono: in De vita ac gestis..., p. 52 and pp. 29-30, respectively.
CHAPTER III

MATTEO PALMIERI

(1406–1475)
## I. Determinist (2)

A. Supernatural (1)
   1. Nonspirit (1)
      a. Fortune

B. (Nonsuper)natural (1)
   2. Historical patterns (1)
      b. Cyclic

## II. Nondeterminist (175)

B. (Nonsuper)natural (175)
   1. Signs/portents (1)
      a. Human derived
         1. Visions, dreams etc

   2. Social factors (20)
      a. Economic
         1. Rhetoric
            b. Written
      b. Political
         10
      f. Religion
         8

3. Psychological, character, intell. factors (25)
   a. Emotions and traits
      1. Anger and outrage
      2. Greed
      5. Fear
      6. metus
      8. Kindness
      10. Fame
      11. "Patriotism"
      13. Memories of old animosities
      15. Revenge
      17. Courage/spirit
      32. Fides
      38. Petulantia
      a. Exemplum/imitation
      e. Prudentia
      f. Corruptible by material things
      j. Virtus

5. Physical (6)
   a. Organic
   b. Inorganic

   2. "Fixed"/Geography etc

6. Direct operatives (118)
   a. Stratagems and acts
      (military)
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>c. Other overt acts</th>
<th>40</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>7. Physical necessities (5)</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
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</table>
The *Vita Nicolai Acciaioli* appears to be Palmieri's first effort at the writing of polished history. Gino Scaramella, editor of the edition I have utilized, dates the work at around 1440 and notes that the book appeared immediately after Palmieri's famous *Della vita civile.*\(^1\)

In making a general comment on the *Vita Acciaioli* one is caught, as with any *quattrocento* piece of history, between assessing it against the historical standards of Palmieri's day and those of today. In some respects Palmieri has offended against the former no less than the latter. Worst in this regard is the fact that here his Latin style too often lacks the proper flow and eloquence expected of the humanist historian. In actuality the tendency is sometimes more towards the choppy prose of the chronicler than the smooth flow of words expected of the accomplished humanist historian. These and similar comments on his diction and grammar failing to meet the standards of a more "pure" Latinity are echoed by Scaramella when remarking upon the Latin of Palmieri's *De captivitate Pisarum liber.*\(^2\) Scaramella attributes this to Palmieri's being of that first generation of humanists. Since this status did not seem to have been as great a problem for Bruni, Salutati, Bracciolini, Platina

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1. *RR II SS.* XIII, ii (Città di Castello, 1934), p. vii. See page 95 of this thesis for a look at the problem of dating the *De captivitate.*

2. See p. 94 of this text for Scaramella's own words. Vespasiano da Bisticci says of the *Vita Acciaioli* that it was written "... in latino, d'uno ornatissimo istile;" *Vite di uomini illustri del secolo XV.* Paolo D'Ancona and Erhard Aeschlimann, ed. (Milan, 1951), p. 303.
et al., one would therefore expect that Palmieri, though a competent orator, was less well educated or less competent in the writing of history in Latin. Nevertheless Scaramella calls the Vita Acciaioli the best of Palmieri's Latin writings "... per maggior vivenza di stile e purezza di lingua." (p. 11).

The actual structure of the work is rather simple and the major value the Vita Acciaioli has for the modern historian, as Scaramella states, is as a source for certain historical details that would otherwise have been lost. The biography in itself has nothing to add by way of development of themes or insights into Acciaiuoli's character along the lines of the delineation of the unique qualities of individual men as envisaged by Burckhardt: it is marred too much by being a series of deeds presented in a seemingly formalized and distant manner. Scaramella identifies Plutarch as the model used for compositional purposes. (p. v).

Before analysing further the structure of the biography, we might remark on the reasons, as far as they concern us here, for Palmieri's choosing to author a biography of Acciaiuoli. Palmieri, of course, presents briefly a few of the usual humanist arguments for recording the deeds of great and glorious men. (p. 3). Yet as a man so very involved in the affairs of state himself and as a member of the Medici clique, we might also look to the possible advantages to be had in praising Niccolò (now dead) and his family with passages

1. According to Scaramella (p. ix) the major sources used by Palmieri are the Cronache of Giovanni and Matteo Villani, Vita of Acciaiuoli by Filippo Villani and two specific autobiographical sources left by Acciaiuoli, a letter and a testament. The letter and the testament are printed by Scaramella as appendices to the biography. (p. ix).
such as the following: "Nulla fere insignis potentia fuit, nulla certe nostris auribus celebrata patria, in qua excellentes Acciaiole gentis viri non fuerint, vel mercaturis pertactandisque negotiis fide et integritate nominatissimi, vel in pace bellove regendis provinciis virtute et gloria prestantes." (p. 6).

The format which the biography assumes is common to this humanist genre. There is first a brief introduction to the family and its background. This is followed by a long history of the political and military affairs in which Niccolò Acciaiuoli was involved in the service of the Republic. This particular narrative section makes no attempt at uncovering the personality behind the deeds performed and too often reads like an undeveloped listing of events; it consumes the bulk of the biography. Next Palmieri turns to a straightforward listing of Niccolò's donations to various churches. It is not until Palmieri concludes the biography with a description of Niccolò's acts of a more personalized religious piety (p. 30) and his building of churches that Palmieri gives us much insight at all into his subject's character.

This lack of development of the biography in areas that would be favoured by his contemporaries is a failing that also arises in the book's depth of causal explanations. The vast majority of explanations of the one hundred and seventy-seven that were found are in the "direct operative" class. This is both the result of the pervading simplicity of Palmieri's sense of the past, which most strikingly appears here ["II.R.6.c.1."]], and of the fact that the biography is so very concerned with military affairs ("II.R.6.b."). It is in the presentation of the causes for this vast complex of military actions surrounding Acciaiuoli's career in the South that we
might have expected details of at least greater quantity if not sophistication. Subtracting the "H.B.6.'s" leaves only fifty-nine explanations of any detail at all and hence we have a low proportion of specific to nonspecific occurrences which is only matched by Platina's *Vita Victorini Feltrensis*. However, in the case of Platina's biography the content is more character sketching than the relation of events and the fault is slightly more forgivable within that context.

Since modern scholarly comment has drawn attention to Palmieri's use of psychological causation but has not done so in direct reference to this biography, my evaluation of that class will be reserved for later on. In this regard, however, the *Vita Nicolai Acciaioli* is not, compared to other *quattrocento* historiography, especially noteworthy either qualitatively or quantitatively.

There are two occurrences of interest, both under the "determinist" category, which very definitely do need to be focused upon. Their significance is lost in the mere quantification of the checksheet. The first of these is the mention of fortune ("I.A.2.h."). The passage in question reads, "In qua re animavertenda est fortune diversitas et quoad rerum humanarum domina esse videatur, cum hic, parva potentia, in ea insula plura possederit oppida multisique dominatus sit populis, quos nec primus Carolus, nec alter subinde Carolus eius filius, nec Robertus nepos, potentissimi quondam eius familie reges, maximis capitis terra marique potentes, unquam sibi adiungere potuerunt." (p. 22). There is the temptation to temper this use of fortune as an interpretive framework and to assign it to the "H.B.2.a." category, fortune as "blind luck" or "chance." In the determinist class, as "... quoad rerum humanarum domina esse
videatur...," Palmieri would be giving a far reaching determinist schema for the understanding of history (having here given a particular illustration of it). The sense of the passage seems to me, and this is a purely subjective comment, to be capable of being accepted as a "I" or a "II." I have assigned it to the "I" class in keeping with my already mentioned standard practice in such matters; by bringing the issue to the reader's attention, I have taken the problem as far as is possible with what we have at our disposal. Had Palmieri written on a wider range of subjects than he did and treated more fully in the biography or elsewhere the question of fortune in a philosophic sense, my opinion may have had another perspective from which to draw beyond what will be discussed in the collation write up. Within the confines of what this thesis is attempting to accomplish, in that Palmieri here invoked fortune in this manner but once, he did not often succeed in actualizing through events what he may have taken as a broad statement of belief. Just how casual he was in seizing upon fortune in this one instance is very much a matter open to debate.¹

The other incidence is another statement which at face value illustrates the postulation of a "determinist" general rule with a specific application: "Verum more rerum humanarum parum duravit quies. Nulla enim magna potentia quiescere diu potest; et quanto maior est, tanto plures ac validiores adinvenit hostes; et, si foris non habet, intra se suis ipse viribus corruit, et tempus omnia vincit." (p. 26).

¹. Problems apparently similar to this and that of the paragraph which follows it are discussed in relation to Platina on pp. 63-64, and 66-67 of this thesis; the distinctions and the similarities appear obvious enough not to merit further attention.
Again, in that Palmieri is giving us a general rule, he is philosophising. He has, but once, ostensibly tied to an event what may best be described as a "cyclic" stance in its long term implications. It too appears only once on the checksheet and more deservedly in the "determinist" category. In the context of the Vita Acciaioli as a whole one cannot be sure that Palmieri meant that this occurrence or that of fortune be taken as assumed primary causes for all the strife and otherwise which he narrates. My approach is not thought to be capable of entirely removing that doubt. Yet remaining within the way in which the passage reads, the interpretive sense it carries plus the fact that it appears but once in the Vita Acciaioli gives some sense of Palmieri accepting nondeterminist causation for individual events themselves. Additionally, and for this thesis most importantly, to whatever extent we accept my application of the "pragmatic rule," Palmieri is on the whole overwhelmingly nondeterminist in his causative patterns.
Table: Causes and Their Frequency

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Category</th>
<th>Frequency</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>I. Determinist</td>
<td>122</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A. Supernatural</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1. Nonspirit</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>B. (Nonspirit) natural</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Fortune</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>II. Nondeterminist</td>
<td>119</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A. (Nonspirit) natural</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1. Social factors</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Political</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Religion</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>B. Psychological, character, intell. factors</td>
<td>26</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1. Emotions and traits</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Anger and outrage</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Greed</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. Hatred</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. Fear</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6. Pity</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7. Kindness</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8. Benevolence</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9. Fame</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10. Glory</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11. Memories of old animosities</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12. Insult, affront</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13. Arrogance, haughtiness</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14. Superbia, fastus</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15. Honestas</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>16. Temeritas</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>17. Derisus</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>18. Corruptible by material things</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. Physical</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>a. Organic</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>b. Inorganic</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1. &quot;Unfixed&quot;/Disasters/Wind/Weather, etc.</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6. Direct operatives</td>
<td>74</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>a. Trickery/Deceit</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>b. Stratagems and acts (military)</td>
<td>51</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>c. Other overt acts</td>
<td>21</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1. To an end</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Causing unspec. psych. state or response</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7. Physical necessities</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>a. Real</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Of the three histories by Palmieri which I am going to study, the De captivitate Pisarum liber is his most successfully ambitious as a Latin history in terms of both the causal complexity of the subject matter chosen and the manner in which the topic is handled. This is not to say that the work is at all a critical triumph but merely that it is a more historiographically grandiose work than his other histories despite its many failings. A less kind way in which to phrase the preceding is to admit that Palmieri, though here at his best, is unimpressive as an historian. Perhaps it is for this reason that Donald Wilcox offered no other justification for his own study of the De captivitate than that "... it is worthy of attention, for it illumines the fifteenth century development of Florentine humanist historiography."2

As mentioned on page 87 of this thesis, Gino Scaramella said some fairly harsh things about Palmieri's Latinity in the De captivitate. Scaramella's full statement reads as follows: "Per lo stile il Palmieri è ben lontano dal raggiungere la perfezione del modello prefissosi. Per non dire dei frequenti barbarismi, nel De Captivitate si riscontra persino qualche offesa alla grammatica e alla sintassi. Siamo ancora nel primo periodo dell'umanesimo. Lo stile del nostro rappresenta una transizione tra il rozzo latino del '300 e la eleganze della lingua dei migliori umanisti."3 Wilcox's estimation

1. The edition I have used is that of Gino Scaramella, RR II SS, XIX, ii (Città di Castello, 1904).
of the *De captivitate* is not meant to be taken to relate to Palmieri's writing style although his assessment could possibly be tied to the quotation from Scaramella. Wilcox is actually referring to Palmieri's use of "psychological" causation. However, these scholars do conflict on the dating of the *De captivitate* and in that I feel that Scaramella's criticisms of Palmieri's style apply equally to all of his Latin works, we are denied a possible clue for gauging a date of composition.

Scaramella makes the flat statement that the *De captivitate* was written towards mid fifteenth century, certainly not later than 1450. (p. xi). Wilcox argues, in a monograph attempting to demonstrate "... the obvious effect of Bruni on the *De captivitate* ...," that "... it was not begun until after the publication of the first six books of the *Historia Florentini populi* in 1429. In that case the probable date can be moved up to the late thirties, since during the late twenties and early thirties Palmieri was occupied with the composition of the *Della vita civile* and with the beginning of his career in Florentine public service."¹ Should we even accept Wilcox's implied propositions that Palmieri could not do two things at once or that he could not interrupt one work with another, we are still left with the question of why could not the date of composition be assigned to the forties which would now be Palmieri's least productive period and hence, on the basis of Wilcox's manner of logic, presents a greater

1. Wilcox, "Matteo Palmieri", p. 267. Hans Baron claims Book Four was a later addition which cannot predate 1437-1439: "Franciscan Poverty and Civic Wealth", *Speculum*, XIII (1938), 23, n. 2. By way of information, the best biography of Palmieri that we have lists his first recorded public office for the year 1432: Antonio Meseri, "Matteo Palmieri", *Archivio Storico Italiano*, Serie V, XIII (1894), 273.
vacuum that is more likely to be filled with prose than the thirties. In actual fact we seem to be left with no more definitive a statement than that the De captivitate was written sometime between 1429 and 1448 but no earlier or later.¹

The De captivitate would appear to fit well within Hans Baron's construct of civic humanism and the rhetorical aspects of Palmieri's history could be placed within that ideal. As an active man of public affairs himself, Palmieri's attention to civic life is less surprising than it would have been if found in the professional scholar. On its simplest level, this very partisan history may be taken as a bit of propaganda and patriotic sentiment consonant with Palmieri's expressed outlook; for example, in the Della vita civile he remarks, "... niuna altra carita maggiormente ci stringe che lamore della patria et de proprii figuoli."²

The case for la vita attiva and the making of good citizens is broader and more elevated in the opening lines of the De captivitate. "Inter humane vite precepta reconditasque doctrinas et laudatissimas artes, quas viri magni imitantur et appetunt, nil est magis secundum naturam, quam pro omnibus gentibus, si fieri possit, conservandis, et, si pro omnibus fieri non possit, attamen pro multis vel pro sua tantum republica ingentes labores suscipere et res magnas atque difficiles cum dignitate et constantia administrare." (p. 3). The plea

¹ Scaramella, p. xi, n. 1, documents the pre 1448 date by noting that Palmieri's biographer Leonardo Dati, placed the De captivitate before Palmieri's De temporibus which was written in 1448.

² Libro della vita civile (Florence, 1529), Bk. III, fol. 61ª.
continues, complete with variations on classical commonplaces lifted from Cicero and others, and states that the study of the deeds of the past is useful to the attainment of prudent government. Though hardly an original thought, this does have wider implications than that simplest of didactic exemplar analyses of history which Palmieri merely echoes in his preface by claiming that "... nihil aliud fere sit historia nisi celebratio virorum illustrium." (p. 3).

To these and other ends Palmieri invokes the prerogative of the rhetorical historian: "Multa enim sunt quae nobis prestat historia, cui non satis est quod factum sit enarrare, sed addere etiam debet, quae ratione, quibus consilijus, quo tempore, per quos et quomodo queque sint gesta; promuntiare etiam quid senatus decreverit; interponere contiones; regiones interdum pugnamque describere; qui vicerint et quod secutum sit demonstrare; clarorum hominum laudes nequaquam silere et nequiter facta damnare: quod aliuud fere nihil est, quam omnium temporum omniumque magnum rerum summam colligere et unius hominis memoria iudicioque mandare." (p. 4). This Livian attitude towards the historian's licence to go beyond narrating merely the simple facts of the matter bodes well for the validity of the checksheets on

1. "Hanc vite doctrinam, qua homines ceteris hominibus prestant, historia, que est rerum gestarum magistra, exponit etque demonstrat alacrioreaque nos ad rempublicam defendendam et magnas res gerendas facit et ad res improbas seigniores." (p. 4).

2. This is all the more necessary if Palmieri is to avoid a mere rehash of what is his major source, the Commentarii of Neri Capponi; see Scaramella, De capt., pp. xi-xxi, on Palmieri's sources.
Palmieri - our approach is based on the premise that the historian will shape the history he writes. At the least the preceding does establish that Palmieri had a theoretical base for allowing man free will as the checksheets essentially show.

Overall the checksheets show an embarrassingly low number of causal occurrences for a history of this sort. Part of the reason for this is the abnormally heavy attention given to reproducing speeches. The most extreme example of this is on pages 30-34 where out of one hundred and seventy-five lines of text, one hundred and thirty-two lines are given to speeches. This means that one thousand five hundred and eighty-four words of the total eleven thousand seven hundred and twenty-six are affected here alone. Analytically, the speeches add up to a quantitative disaster. In this respect Palmieri has not gone beyond the **Vita Acciaioli**, a work of nearly equivalent length, despite a subject matter which is ostensibly more amenable to this sort of thing. The one reply that may be made in Palmieri's favour in this regard is that a greater proportion of those causations listed are of a specified nature than is true for the **Vita Acciaioli**: there are comparatively fewer "II.B.6.'s."

It remains to be seen whether or not I would concur with specific comments Donald Wilcox makes on the significance of psychological factors in the *De captivitate*. In these general

1. The next most extreme instance occurs from page 12(3-31) to page 13(1-3). As Wilcox notes the speeches are virtual translations from Capponi; "Matteo Palmieri", p. 280.
remarks I am presenting on the history I must here agree with Wilcox that the work is causally weak in two respects. The first of these is that his causative framework is too limited. For instance Palmieri notes the immediate causes of the outbreak of hostilities between Florence and Pisa but fails to explain the origins of the enmity without which presumably the war might not have arisen. He has left a series of general explanations for events which might possibly be invoked such as fortune but they are of slight interpretive value unless more specifically used by him. The evidence of the causations recorded by the checksheets substantiates Palmieri's essentially "short term" outlook on causation: like most of the historians we are studying he usually looks to that which is immediate.

The second point to be made is in reality a combination of the first with what may be a failing in compositional style. Wilcox feels there is no encompassing "synoptical" view to the De captitata "... under which the particulars of the narrative can be subsumed." Whether or not one would agree with Wilcox that the "psychological dimension" would be that which would form the reference point for such a "synoptical" presentation is a matter of debate. In any event it must be allowed that the work is still too often a poorly structured listing of events, a fault which minimally is an organizational and thematic weakness. That the same can be said of his other histories does not help since in this one the topic asks for so much more.

1. Wilcox, "Matteo Palmieri", p. 278; I might contend that the partisan speech on pages 30-31 serves this purpose though not very well.

From what this final product results is also a matter of dispute. Scaramella claims that Palmieri used Sallust as a model for his history. Certainly Palmieri was conversant with the ancient historians and esteemed their practices sufficiently to write in the De captivitate's opening salutation to Neri Capponi that he could not formally dedicate and send the work to Capponi because the ancient historians give no example of such a custom. Wilcox admits that although Sallust is the "most obvious model" for the De captivitate, the resemblances are for the most part superficial or too casually coincidental in places as to establish direct borrowing; most importantly, the themes and concerns of Sallust are not there despite the similarity of those of Palmieri's De captivitate to those of Sallust's De bello Jugurthino. Wilcox believes that the important borrowing is from Bruni rather than Sallust and this is the issue that really concerns us here.

The reason this is of such basic interest to us is that it is another point at which Wilcox draws attention to the significance of

1. Scaramella, De capt., p. v.
2. "Hunc librum pisane captivitatis historiam continetem tuo nomini dicassem et ad te misassem, si exemptum haberem, quod idem veteres factitassent. Verum admiror, et cur factum sit nescio, quod, cum plerique aliarum rerum scriptores suos libros excellentibus mittant viris, hoc idem non fecerint historici ... " (p. 3).
3. "Matteo Palmieri", pp. 269-270. Wilcox sums up the significant differences well when he remarks, "Sallust's most explicit question, found in the prefaces to both monographs, concerns the relative importance of intelligence and brute force in military operations, but Palmieri simply does not direct himself to this question. An even more fundamental theme of Sallust's, found both in the prefaces and the narrative, is that of the moral decadence of his own society;" these are not concerns of Palmieri; p. 270; [considering his attitude towards Florence and his reasons for writing, we need not expect them to be].
psychological factors in the *De captivitate*. The truly striking correlation with Bruni and digression from Capponi is that Palmieri applies Bruni's modification of the Livian armalistic form. Thus "Each of the two years in the *De captivitate* is introduced with a generalization pointing beyond the year and drawing the reader's attention to a psychological state."¹ Unfortunately Wilcox is faced with but two years of warfare and hence can offer but two instances of this practice; also he criticises Palmieri for not going beyond this narrative technique, for not using it as more than a simple device — completing his discussion of the year accordingly and thereby making it the focus of a "synoptical" view. Wilcox also states that Palmieri "... narrates as the substance of his history the same intangible and fundamentally psychological dimension which is to be found in Bruni's history."² We therefore have the problem of Wilcox qualifying that statement back to seeming insignificance: it is now nothing other than an example of a not very well handled borrowing from Bruni which only serves a stylistic function.³ In the end we are confused, despite the clarity and cleverness of his internal argumentation, as to just what Wilcox means by the "substance" of his (Palmieri's or anyone else's) history. This is a difficulty very

3. "Matteo Palmieri", pp. 277-281. The significant psychological frameworks which Wilcox faults Palmieri for not filling are as follows for the two years respectively: "Salutis christiane anno quinto supra quadringentos et mille multum variet turbulente erant conditiones Italic;" (p. 6) and "Adveniente igitur huius anni principio, Florentini ad prosequendum bellum intenti, decem novos decrevere viros, quibus belli gerendi cura inesset;" (p. 17); cited by Wilcox, "Matteo Palmieri", p. 277, n. 42.
different indeed from that raised in my Introduction as to whether, out of all the factors in the De captivitate, the psychological may be the most significant or substantial.

The checksheet itself does not here uncover any particularly meaningful pattern of causation. Aside from what will be said shortly regarding the "determinist" causations found, do we anywhere else encounter any especially noteworthy or interestingly complex causal sequences? In fact the most involved "nondeterminist" explanatory pattern is the series of mostly political developments listed as the immediate causes of the actual outbreak of hostilities. (pp. 6-7). As causative factors, those that are "psychological" do constitute a higher proportion of the total number of occurrences than is true for the other histories of Palmieri but they are not striking in this regard when compared to other historians nor are they of any special interest in themselves aside from what was said when discussing Wilcox's analysis of the De captivitate. Note might be made of the fact that "fear" constitutes eight of the twenty-five incidences recorded.

Before turning to the question of whether the checksheet reflects determinism or indeterminism, we might extract an idea for qualification, especially since it helps us with the problem we encountered with the Vita Accisiodoli, of how seriously are we to take Palmieri's use of the concept fortuna. In narrating that the Pisans had initially looked to heaven for deliverance from the siege of the Florentines before falling back on their own resources, Palmieri offered the opinion, "Verum sepius virorum virtute quam hominum supplicijs salve civitates fuere; nec solum pauperum votis, sed divitum collatione atque opulentia populorum auxilia parantur." (p. 20).
This is a direct declaration of a belief in man having his feet firmly on the ground in a world manipulable through his own efforts to a definite end. It is the sort of light statement of belief which easily conflicts with any acceptance of a general idea of fortune as fate since the opinions in each case are so incidentally expressed. Such "off-the-cuff" assertions, even taken at full face value in situ, each casts equivalent doubts upon the validity of the other. On this level, a qualitative approach is of no avail.

Another way to look at the problem, accepting that Palmieri is intellectually consistent (to whatever extent we believe he is not, any general statements at all about him are proportionately stripped of their import) is to postulate that his use of fortune is more in the sense of "ironic twists to the plot" or even "blind luck." As we shall see in the collation write up, there are many other reasons for us to believe that this is so but limiting our discussion to the De captivitate for now, we find two places (I. A. 2. b.'s) where Palmieri directly invoked fortune.

The first occurs where Palmieri is relating the decline of ancient Rome's power. With a phrasing that is a convention of his, he explains, "Rerum humanarum domina fortuna, quemadmodum ceteris secundis solet rebus, ita quoque Romanis voluit crescendi imponere." In other words it is to be

1. Yet further opposed to this, though not a direct causal link to the overthrow of Gambacurta, is the remark of Palmieri, "Sed vana quidem est hominum spes et nostre sunt cognitiones inanes." (p. 15).

2. Wilcox, "Matteo Palmieri", p. 230, n. 54, lists four all of which he accepts as causal devices. I omit the one Wilcox cites as "Gambacurta's overthrow" (p. 15(25-26)) because as such it is nonexistent and the one he cites on "the fall of Pisa" (p. 27(16-17)) since it falls in a speech by Gino Capponi which is, incidentally, transcribed from Neri's Commentarii; see ER II SS, XVIII (Mediolani, 1731), col. 113D.
noted, Palmieri feels, that the disaster fell when Roman power seemed at its height. Repeating the formulae of the classical historians, the failure was not external but internal due to the decline of virtue and so on which resulted in the ruination of the administration of the state. (pp. 4-5).

Since Palmieri once again seems to be employing the concept of fortune more as a literary convention to express a sense of irony, the temptation is great to place the occurrence in the "nondeterminist" category. This is all the more so because Palmieri does give an entire complex of factors to explain the fall of Rome and not even the origin of these factors is ascribed to fortune. The other seeming use of fortune as an explanatory device has the same impact on the reader: relating the dispossession of Gabriel Maria Visconti, Palmieri states, "Sed adeo est in rebus humanis varia et incerta fortuna, ut, unde presidia querebat, inde ruina provenerit." (p. 8).

A third problem arose over my practice of putting causations like the above into the "determinist" class when there is any doubt at all that they should not be there. Discussing the dispute between Sforza and Tartaglia over which of the two generals was to have precedence over the other, Palmieri observes, "Ceterum more ingenii humani invidia ex paritate orta est, qua irritante Tartalia conduluit in sui pernitiem Sfortiam venenum emisse." (p. 22).

Should we take "humani" to refer to "humanus" or to "man" as mankind, the incident has every right to be left in the "determinist" class under "human nature." However, "humani" may also mean "the man" indicating merely Tartaglia. That Sfortia did not show the same unrelenting behaviour is a bit of evidence to this end. On the other hand, accepting the passage in my first rendering helps to provide a
causal framework for the wider series of disputes which arose within the camp as a result, so my inclination is towards that as the one intended by Palmieri.

It would still seem that the number and variety of "nondeterminist" causations outweigh those occurrences listed as "determinist". This is the more so since once again there is no apparent reason to qualify those tallied as "determinist" into any exceptional significance. Beyond corroborating the nondeterminist trend of Renaissance historiography, the general impression left by the checksheet, both in the nature and in the distribution of these instances of causal explanation, is that the De captivitate Pisarum liber is in no way remarkable. In fact in no way would it appear to be particularly worthy of attention aside from Wilcox’s use of it as an illustration of the development of Florentine historiography and even as an example for such purposes it is of questionable value.
I. DETERMINIST [1]

B. (Nonsuper)natural (1)

3. "Human nature"

II. NONDETERMINIST [75]

B. (Nonsuper)natural (75)

1. Signs/portents (1)
   a. Human derived
   2. Behavioural

2. Social factors (7)
   a. Political

3. Psychological, character, intell. factors (11)
   a. Emotions and traits
      3. Hatred
      5. Fear
      13. Memories of old animosities
      17. Courage/spirit
   b. Political
      fortitudo

j. Virtus

5. Physical (1)
   a. Inorganic
      2. "Fixed"/Geography etc.

6. Direct operatives (54)
   a. Trickery, deceit
   b. Stratagems and acts (military)
   c. Other overt acts
      1. To an end

7. Physical necessities (1)
   a. Real

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1. See p. 109 of this thesis. This sheet is not part of the collation check sheet.
Palmieri's Annales, or as the work is more commonly known, Historia Florentina, was written over the period 1432 to 1474. The Annales, presented partly in Latin and partly in Italian, cover the period 1429 to 1474. It is a year by year description of public events which relate to the history of Florence.

Palmieri candidly states that he is not composing a "real" historical work but is compiling a record of events mostly for his own memory and use. "In quibus rebus erit, si mihi ipsi satisfecer, ..." (p. 131). Additionally we find him arguing for the inclusion of possibly insignificant material "... quod si minime accidet, tamen scribendi cura me aliquid certe iuvabit." (p. 132).

For the writing of history of the sort that would be acceptable to his contemporaries, Palmieri may be said to need such practice at the very least for stylistic reasons. The comments which follow, therefore, must be tempered with the realization that Palmieri has no pretensions regarding the Annales and its value as proper literary history.

1. The edition used is that which appears as an appendix (pp. 131-194) to his Liber de temporibus, Gino Scaramella ed. RF II SS, XXVI, I (Città di Castello, 1903-1915). Palmieri nowhere assigns the title Historia Florentina to the work. In fact, as we shall see shortly, he did not think of this effort as history proper. However he does state at the outset that he is commencing in 1432 to write "... quod, utcunque elaboratum erit, antiqua licentia annales vocitabo." (p. 131).

2. "Multi preter ipsos, quos superius adscripsse, damnati sunt [upon restoration of the Medici], quorum nomine adponam, cum non historiam narrare, sed meo labori membruc que vidit adnotare intendam." (p. 140). Palmieri also says of the Liber de temporibus that it does not represent an attempt to write history. (p. 5). It might be pointed out that Palmieri's opening line in his preface to the Annales suggests he is also recording these deeds for posterity and this would imply their eventual availability to the public in some form. (p. 131).
Gino Scaramella has, once again, justifiably unkind things to say about Palmieri's Latinity yet he does think the work of value as a contemporary source for that period of Florentine history. In short, it is too much a chronicle of events and therefore, as will be seen, is not included in the collation checksheets. Due to the format Palmieri intends for this work, there is perhaps more of an excuse for the Annales' lack of causal development. His aim does not appear to be that of a Sallustian annal and the result is the lack even of themes to interrelate the happenings for each year.

There is a goodly amount of development to the incidents related in the first years of the Annales and the rather arbitrary decision was made to limit the sampling for the individual checksheet to the point at which that development is first lost. This occurs at what is essentially the end of the events for the year 1434 so that the sample incorporates only pages 131-139.

It would seem from what has been said, including Palmieri's own admission that the Annales is not a finished piece of historiography, that the book does not meet the standards set forth in the Introduction to this thesis for its study even if only through an individual checksheet. (p. 11). The specimen chosen is not a mere listing of events and is therefore a borderline case on this point.

1. P. xxvii. On Palmieri's Latin, Scaramella notes "... la sua imperfecta conoscenza della grammatica e del lessico ..." of the part written in Italian he remarks that it "... manca affatto d'eleganza e d'efficacia." (p. xxvii).

2. See, for example, his discussion of the papal/imperial struggle for the years 1432-1434; (pp. 137-138); does he assume we already know the reasons for its occurrence?
However, since it is not a developed humanist history of the sort that my overall sampling is intended to represent, it must be disqualified from the collation checksheet. It will be studied independently for two reasons, one of which is that it is analytical enough to be an additional source of information on Palmieri via a checksheet. The other defence for its examination is that we have here an instance of a humanist not writing a polished history entirely for the public eye and its study may prove a point of comparative interest for that reason.

Working from the framework of the annal in a manner more reminiscent of the medieval chronicler than Sallust, Palmieri does not, as we have already mentioned, go into any great depth in explaining how things have happened in the years covered. This qualitative comment is borne out quantitatively by the checksheet. The bulk of the occurrences are in the less analytical "II.A.6." class. In the Annales the proportion is definitely greater than in his other histories although too much ought not to be made of such comparisons with what is in length a substantially more limited sampling. Here again this situation arises partly from a lack of critical historiography and partly from writing history so very concerned with military affairs. At any rate, however much this situation may inflate the total number of causations tallied, what is immediately obvious from the checksheet is the lack of diversity in Palmieri's choice of causal factors.

1. See pages 213-214 of the collation write up for the problems this circumstance presents in regards to disqualifying Palmieri from this thesis on the grounds of his only having authored two histories acceptable for study.
The one occurrence recorded as "determinist" is the only causation which need concern us here as requiring explanation beyond the simple notation on the checksheet. It is not a particularly definite or portentous instance of determinism but once again it was listed as "determinist" ("I. A. 3.") out of doubts on my part occasioned in this case by the implied generalization in its presentation. Palmieri claims that one of the possible reasons for certain citizens taking a warlike initiative is the presence of the opportunity to take it. (p. 132). The attitude is that man, given the chance, will misbehave. An alternative reading, the one towards which I lean, is that these particular men, given the opportunity, misbehaved. The second rendering knocks the pessimistic determinism out of the statement but since it is not completely clear as to which reading was intended by Palmieri, I placed the causation in the "determinist" class.

Aside from the fact that this little excursion into the Annales lends further weight to the belief that Palmieri writes history from a "nondeterminist" standpoint, there is little else for us to note from the checksheet. It is all fairly standard material but on a simpler scale. Considering Palmieri's own estimation of this work and its purpose, it would be unfair to say much more. One final observation of interest, however, would be that he did not, in writing a chronicle for himself, do anything significantly different from his more polished efforts.
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<thead>
<tr>
<th>I. DETERMINIST</th>
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<td>A. Supernatural</td>
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<td>2. Nonspirit</td>
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<td>b. Fortune</td>
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<td>R. (Nonsuper)natural</td>
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<td>3. &quot;Human nature&quot;</td>
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<td>4. Historical patterns</td>
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<td>b. Cyclic</td>
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<th>II. NONDETERMINIST</th>
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<td>B. (Nonsuper)natural</td>
<td>(294)</td>
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<tr>
<td>1. Signa/portents</td>
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<td>a. Human derived</td>
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<td>1). Visions, dreams etc</td>
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<td>2. Social factors</td>
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<td>a. Economic</td>
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<td>b. Educational</td>
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<td>1). Rhetoric</td>
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<td>b). Written</td>
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<td>c. Political</td>
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<td>3. Psychological, character, intell. factors</td>
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<td>a. Emotions and traits</td>
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<td>1). Anger and outrage</td>
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<td>2). Greed</td>
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<td>5). Fear</td>
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<td>timor, metus, terror</td>
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<td>7). Pity</td>
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<td>miseratus</td>
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<td>8). Kindness</td>
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<td>benevolentia, favor</td>
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<td>10). Fame</td>
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<td>gloria</td>
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<td>11). &quot;Patriotism&quot;</td>
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<td>13). Memories of old animosities</td>
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<td>15). Revenge</td>
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<td>16). Insult, affront</td>
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<td>indignitas</td>
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<td>17). Courage/spirit</td>
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<td>audacia</td>
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<td>26). Arrogance, haughtiness</td>
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<td>superbia, fastus</td>
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<td>31). Honestas</td>
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<tr>
<td>32). Fides</td>
<td>2</td>
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<td>38. Petulantia</td>
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52). Temeritas
53). Derisus
   c. Exemplum/imitation
   e. Prudentia
f. Corruptible by material things
j. Virtus
5. Physical (11)
a. Organic 7
b. Inorganic
   1). "Unfixed"/Disasters/Wind/
      Weather, etc. 3
   2). "Fixed"/Geography etc. 1
6. Direct operatives (192)
a. Trickery, deceit 1
b. Stratagems and acts (military) 129
   c. Other overt acts
      1). To an end 61
      2). Causing unspec. psych.
         state or response 1
7. Physical necessities (8)
a. Real 8
The Introduction to this thesis set the arbitrary requirement that an historian ought to have written at least three histories of the right sort to qualify for study here. (p. 11). A glance at the works of Palmieri had given me the impression that Palmieri met this stipulation. When it became clear that Palmieri technically had but two suitable histories, I continued to examine him, nevertheless, for three major reasons in addition to the desire not to lose the time already invested in Palmieri.

One of these factors was the hope that I could either resolve a questionable instance of an apparently surviving work being attributed to Palmieri or that I could find a now lost history which is supposedly Palmieri's. Several historians, without giving a necessarily reliable authority when it is given, have credited Palmieri with both a history of the translation of the body of Saint Barbara and a History of the Council of Florence. Having already

1. Unfortunately the offending history, the Annales, first encountered under the erroneous and misleading title Historia Florentina, was the last work to be scrutinized; it was studied only after several months had already been expended on the examination of Palmieri and his other works. The Liber de temporibus is disqualified as being merely a rationalization of the chronologies of other historians along more precise lines of chronology in regards to the world's principal dates: Liber de temporibus, p. iv.

2. Flaminio Cornaro [Ucclesiae Venetae antiquis monumentis nunc etiam primum edita illustratae ac in decades distributae (Venice, 1749), II, 181-182.] provides the earliest mention I can find of the history of the translation; since the work as cited there is in Italian, this history might not have qualified for study anyway. Attempts to locate the work have been fruitless. For the history of the translation we may also cite the following as attributing the work to Palmieri: Antonio Messeri, "Matteo Palmieri, Cittadino di Firenze del secolo XV", Archivio Storico Italiano, Serie V, XII (1894), 299 and Girolamo Tiraboschi, Storia della letteratura italiana, VI, ii (Florence, 1805-1812), p. 662 where a typographical (Contd.)
had some luck with manuscript catalogues in finding a Palmieri manuscript that had been overlooked by scholars, I had hoped my success would continue but it did not. At any rate fairly convincing evidence against either work belonging to Palmieri is the fact that neither history is mentioned by Palmieri's contemporary biographers, Vespasiano da Bisticci and Leonardo Dati who was a close personal friend of Palmieri.

Another major reason for retaining Palmieri in this study is that Palmieri, from the start, had seemed such a perfect figure for study within the limits of what this thesis hopes to accomplish. Although Palmieri formally breaks the rule concerning the minimal number of humanist histories written, nevertheless he, of the Florentine civic humanists, comes closest to meeting this standard: it would be of some value to include one of this most important of humanist types in this study.

The final and most important point to be made in favour of including Palmieri is the simple fact that the arbitrary regulation which begs his exclusion, as suggested by my Introduction, was never

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1. Bisticci, pp. 563-7 and Dati, Preface to Città di vita, in Angelo Maria Bandini, Catalogus codicum manuscriptorum latinorum et italicorum Bibliothecae mediceae Laurentianae, V (Florence, 1778), coll. 80-81.

2. In support of this decision it might be noted that Hans Baron has called Palmieri "... the citizen closest to Bruni in thought and feeling ..."; "Franciscan Poverty", p. 22. Additionally Palmieri
meant to have an existence unto itself. It was confected for the sole purpose of helping to limit and to define an otherwise unmanageable sampling. Here it would seem that this thesis would be better served if one of its parameters is deliberately adjusted in order to avoid having the means subvert the end.

Had the tradition been true that Palmieri were of low or modest origins and that he had reached his eventual position of political and financial success through merit alone, we would have added an intriguing dimension to our study. We would have had a second self-made man (the first being Platina) with obvious points for comparison with traditional views of the Renaissance humanists' position on determinism versus man's ability to shape his own destiny. As it is, Lauro Martines convincingly shows that long held ideas on the social standing to which Palmieri was born were wrong: Palmieri's family was one of solid financial position due to the pharmaceutical trade and was of a strong political position. Aside from the query was an active man of affairs who makes up for his inadequate Latin by having authored what has been taken to be a classic statement of the humanist tendency towards secularization, the political man, etc., the Della vita civile. Poggio is our next best bet for a Florentine civic humanist but, aside from the fact that he has only one history to his credit, he violates the date requirement.

1. The Social World of the Florentine Humanists, 1320-1460 (London, 1963), pp. 12, 138-139, and 193. The only possible flaw with Martines' use of the 1427 catasto is the fact that Palmieri would then have been twenty-one years old and hence the circumstances were not entirely those into which he was born; this is a weak objection but otherwise one finds it hard to imagine how so many historians, including contemporaries, were wrong on this. Tiraboschi, VI, ii, 660, is the only one to confirm directly Martines' view. Those who argue that Palmieri was of "low" birth are Vespasiano, p. 302; D'Ancona and Bacci, II, 92; John Addington Symonds, Renaissance in Italy: Volume II, The Revival of Learning (London, 1877), p. 187; Ercole Bottari, "Matteo Palmieri", Atti della Reale Accademia Ligure (Turin, 1866), 592, n. 2; Meseri, pp. 264-266; and Scaramella in Palmieri, Vita Acciaioli, p. 113.

(Cont'd.)
as to whether or not Palmieri was therefore a professional humanist, the issue is of importance because it relates to Palmieri's involvement with politics and with the Medici. ¹

As far as any attempts at discussing Palmieri's Weltanschauung are concerned, it seems that they have always been made in reference to Palmieri's two most famous works, his Della vita civile and his Città di vita. Just as is true of the works to which they refer, these comments provide a goodly amount of contrast with one another. It might be remembered that the basic problem left before us by the study of Palmieri's histories is the interpretation to be given to his use of the concept of fortune. ² However, the Della vita civile and the Città di vita, supplemented by other materials, provoke meaningful discussion of other aspects of determinism/nondeterminism to which we ought to address ourselves first.

Looking to Palmieri's directly expressed, general attitudes towards man's ability to shape his own world, one finds a few opinions of a seemingly contradictory nature. This could be the case mostly because Palmieri quite obviously never wrote with the idea of a systematization of his thoughts on such matters. Nevertheless,

Alemanno Rinuccini seems to fall between these two groups: Oratio in funerio Mathei Palmerii, Fondo Magliabechiano, Cl. VIII, cod. 1435, fol. 177v. Incidentally, Meseri's remains the most complete biography of Palmieri, especially for Palmieri's long career of public service; Meseri appears to have failed to meet his promise of discussing Palmieri's writings at a later date: p. 299.


2. In and of themselves the other aspects of possible determinism uncovered there are not of an extensive enough or an extreme enough nature to merit further discussion; refer to pages 92, 104, and 110 of this thesis.
outbursts of despair over the limits to man's powers aside, Palmieri does exhibit a basic consistency in his nonhistorical writings. The following discussion of these works includes all statements Palmieri has made which in any way relate to the powers and "dignity" of man.

In the oration Palmieri delivered the day of the coronation of his teacher, Carlo Marsuppini, as a poet, one encounters what is nothing short of a formalistic expression, even among the humanists, of anguish over the mortality of man. After explaining that Marsuppini lacked nothing in letters and in knowledge, Palmieri remarks, "Sed vana certe est hominum spes et inanes sunt cognitione nostrae quae in medio spatio franguntur et occidunt." To similar thoughts on the fragility of man's nature and attainments, Palmieri appends the belief that all virtue and learning become silent with death unless they are made memorable by such things as coronations.¹ This qualification, so very suited to the event, is no less suspect for that reason than is the pessimism which precedes it - it is possibly a rhetorical device for the dramatization of the sentiments which follow it. Although one cannot be sure to what extent Palmieri was speaking to the occasion, the pessimism is a single instance of a truism of sorts and even at face value does not imply determinism or a break from what has come to be accepted as the humanist tradition on this.

Of greater interest here is the Della vita civile. Beyond the obvious point that to write a didactic tract implies a belief in a degree of malleability to human nature, there is a recurring theme of the importance of the individual's struggle against the adversities of

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¹ In coronatione Caroli Aretini poetae, Biblioteca Riccardiana, 660 (M II 19), fol. 69a.
this world and the taking of his fate into his own hands or, at least, the dignity that is man's alone and which it is his responsibility not to pervert. 1 The following may be taken as representative: "Del virtuoso è proprio non seguitare la vile debolezza delle plebe ignorante, ma conoscersi essere nato huomo sottoposto a qualunque humana adversita, allequali si debbe prevenire col consilio, con ogni diligentia ingegnarsi prudentemente resistere, quando pure schifare non si possano, si richie de temperatamente sopportare, secondo ci admoniscono i savi." 2

A faith in the efficacy of active virtue also appears in Palmieri's Città di vita. 3 Perhaps the appearance of any such thoughts in a religious poem written out of a mystical experience ought to be mildly surprising. Palmieri's friend Leonardo Dati, who emended the work, recorded that "Intentis [Palmieri's] scribentis est, ostendere omnibus hominibus esse libertatem arbitrii, qua duce ire possunt per viam sinistram in perditionem, et per dextram ad salutem

1. On the whole, Palmieri is under debt to classical sources (which he Christianizes) in much of this: William Harrison Woodward, Studies in Education during the Age of the Renaissance 1400-1600 (Cambridge, Eng., 1906), p. 69; aside from aspects of civic humanism, it is difficult to find much in the book that is peculiar to Palmieri but Woodward is a bit too unkind regarding Palmieri's knowledge of classical sources: see Bottari, p. 419 and August Buck, "Matteo Palmieri als Repräsentant des Florentiner Kircherhumanismus", Archiv für Kulturgeschichte XLVII (1965), 38-39, for example.

2. Lib. II, fol. 49a. Variant expressions of the themes discussed in the paragraph above occur in Lib. II, foll. 48a and 49a-b; and Lib. IV, foll. 118b and 123a.

3. Hans Baron, looking more to the Della vita civile, finds this idea of active virtue especially noteworthy in Palmieri; "Das Erwachen des historischen Denkens im Humanismus des Quattrocento", Historische Zeitschrift, CXLVII (1932), 7.
acternam, et tandem inducere omnes per illum viam, quae facit homines esse beatos. Scribendi caussam [sic] Operis Auctor talem mihi fuisse narravit."

> In the poem, one similar to Dante's in conception and format (terza rima) the soul descends and ascends, through the three books, to three regions; the last of these is the favoured realm of eternal light and so on. Of particular import here is the resulting discussion of the "sommo bene." First Palmieri attacks various ideas on the sumnum bonum before he proposes that

> El sommo bene ancor sansa ragione
> haver non puossi & pero sua natura
> a che sol l'huom n acquisti perfectione.
> & perche piu perfecta creatura
> e l'huom che l'corpo o ver l anima sola
> insieme ad questo alen uno mistura.
> El qual composito ad dir una parola
> la scientia con la virtute activa
> conduce al ben che sopra gli altri vola.
> Questa e la vita che si fa piu viva
> questa e la vera al sito de beati
> questa e la via ad vita eterna arriva. 2

> Although the sumnum bonum is not truly Platonic, there is here a certain affinity to what has come to be accepted as a truism of Renaissance Neo-Platonic thought - man, armed with free will, as an

1. Dati in Bandini, coll. 81-83. Palmieri confided to Dati full details on the vision before commencing the poem and they are reproduced by Dati in the same columns.

agent in his soul's fall or elevation.

The degree to which Platonic elements crept into his poem proved a difficulty for Palmieri but it is rather doubtful that we have enough evidence to call him outright an Aristotelean, as has Charles Trinkaus, or a Platonist although elements of both systems appear in his writings. Which label as such is technically more suited to Palmieri does not entirely concern us here even if it were possible to identify him as truly one or the other. The distinction by means of labels themselves would have to be extended to the point of meaninglessness for our discussion of determinism in Palmieri; it would be far better to rely on Palmieri himself in answering this question.

Those aspects of the Platonic view of man which are actually found in his writings are of the greatest relevance and these have already been hinted at. Focusing principally on the Città di vita,

1. In Our Image, I, 282. Although Trinkaus may have spoken too unqualifiedly, one point that might be made in his behalf is Palmieri's mention in the passage quoted of scientia as an instrument to the "sommo bene"; in the Della vita civile Palmieri defines scientia as the knowledge of "cose certe"; fol. 41r. Most identifications with Aristotelean ideas come from scholars examining Della vita civile: see Baron, "Franciscan Poverty", p. 23; Bottari, pp. 408-422 and Buck, pp. 88-89, although Buck goes to some trouble to tone down the idea that Palmieri's debt to Aristotle is great. In fact those who claim Palmieri shows a greater leaning towards Platonism appear to carry the day and here the obvious source is the Città di vita: the text above will consider this shortly. The idea, more explicitly presented in the Della vita civile, that the body or things of the body cannot act on the soul is also a part of the Platonic tradition; see pp. 126-127 of this thesis where it crops up in relation to fortune. Incidentally, the remembrance of Palmieri's teachers would seem no particular help in this problem since, among other things, they themselves - short of Filelfo who is a dubious addition - are too varied in their own outlooks; Dati in Bandini, col. 80, lists Giovanni Sosomeno, Ambrogio Traversari and Carlo Marsuppini. Bottari, p. 400, adds Giovanni Argiropulo as does Mesarzi, p. 269, with Filelfo suggested also for good measure; Tiraboschi, VI, ii, 661, cites Paolo Cortese as the (Contd.)
most scholarship to date has tended to speak of Palmieri more as a Platonist. There are obvious traditional reasons for leaning towards this opinion considering his being an associate of the Medici in fifteenth century Florence. Ficino, looking favourably at the poem, even gave Palmieri the title "Poeta Theologicus." Eugenio Garin entitled the section of his L'umanesimo italiano which dealt with Palmieri, "Matteo Palmieri e il trapasso al Platonismo." Garin is here taking note of the fact that Palmieri views this world as the arena where the spirit does battle and freely decides its fate. This emphasis on the soul or spirit and the course of its life are the elements of the poem which caused Palmieri some trouble but we can definitely say that the Aristotelean conception of the ultimate reality of the world is not there.

Since the sixteenth century, when the first historians relate various details concerning processes and the like taken by the Church against Palmieri, there has been a debate as to what action was actually directed against the author. Whatever did happen to Palmieri himself, there is no evidence for the most extreme report - that he was exhumed and burned as a heretic.

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1. Symonds, II, 188.

2. (Bari, 1952), pp. 87 and 91.

3. The editor of the only modern critical edition of the work, Margaret Rooke, records much of this debate in her preface on pp. viii-ix. In this regard see also Xenon, I, 112. The issue is complicated by the fact that the church in which the supposedly interdicted Palmieri chapel was located, San Pier Maggiore, came to its end in the eighteenth century.
It has long been common knowledge that there was something suspect about the book: Palmieri himself attached to it the request that the work be donated to the guild of notaries on condition that it not be opened until after his death. The other aspect of the debate has accordingly been over the nature of Palmieri's offence once the tradition of there being some sort of heresy was underway. Most writers have named at least one of the following three heresies: that of Arius or Origen and that of too much paganization via Plato. Of the first two groups none of these scholars offers any more concrete evidence for their claims than their own interpretation of the text; however, the evidence that does exist should help a little to resolve the dissension as to what caused the disturbance in Palmieri's own day.

The one historian who makes a direct claim for Platonism in this matter is Giuseppe Boffito in an article suitably titled "L'eresia di Matteo Palmieri." His evidence also mostly comes from his own reading and interpretation of the text of the poem yet he adds mention of a copy of the work which carries a title which, Boffito says, exhibits not an ascetic intent but one of a philosophic sort.

1. In Bandini, V, col. 96. The dates of composition are 1455-1464: Rooke in her preface to Palmieri's Città, p. vii.
2. This list is not exhaustive but includes only a few of the more important scholars. For Arianism we have Zeno, I, 116. For Origen there is Messeri, p. 319; Tiraboschi, VI, ii, 662; D'Ancona and Bacci, II, 93 and Rooke in her preface to her edition of the work, p. ix. Those who speak of the heresy cite as the appropriate lines from the poem, Bk. I, cap. v, p. 24, (40-47).
3. Giornale storico della Letteratura Italiana XXXVII, 1 (1901), 4-7 and 14-17 and 25-27; on p. 27 Boffito damages his argument from textual analysis (rather than more tangible evidence) by claiming Dante made the same mistake (inf. III, 37-39); the question may then be raised as to why Dante got away with it if Bottari has really identified the correct passage.
Somehow overlooked in all this contention is a manuscript in the Laurentian Library, a poem in *terza rima*. The hand, as best I can determine, is Palmieri's and the poem is a first person, general retraction of the Platonism in the *Città di vita*:

Scandalo ho dato all christiana gente,

per quel che da platone io ho ritracta,

hor sia dato perdono al penitente.

Poiche parlar non posso in alchun parto

di quel chi ho errato in qualche caso,

per lingua d'altri al tutto mi ritracto,

Sia del mio libro cancellato et raso

quel che, e, contra la chiesa pura et sancta ....

Until more substantiation comes to light, it will remain unclear as to what happened after Palmieri's death but there can be no doubt that the poem even in its present state is surprisingly permeated by Platonism, that it once may have been more so and that the elements of Platonism caused Palmieri's difficulties while still alive.

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1. *Matheo Palmieri Fiorentino si retracta de sui errori*, Biblioteca Laurenziana, Conventi soppressi 440 (SS. a Annunziata 1677), fol. 264a-b.

2. The spirit having existence before the flesh is "Platonism" enough for heresy, it would seem. The suggestion that the poem has been "cleaned up" leaves open the possibility that there was once in it canonical error with which later generations have not been familiar. No scholar, other than Boffito's claim to have found a variant title, has raised the issue of textual variations in this regard between manuscripts of the poem itself so it is difficult to judge accurately on what basis the posthumous difficulties, if there were any, with the Church arose: Platonism or Origen's heresy. Palmieri, by the way, in his retraction acknowledges the problem with respect to Origen but says that what is actually in the poem is orthodox enough; fol. 264f. In refuting those who claim the book was condemned, Bottari rightly wonders why it never appeared on the Index: pp. 48-49; also that Dati, Vespasiano and one other contemporary, Naldo Naldi (Epigram, "In matheum palmerium", Fond.

(Cont'd.)
It would be easy to transition from Palmieri's philosophic stance in favour of free will and of a world that is not predetermined to its apparent manifestation in the checksheets if it were not for two obstructions — Palmieri's participation in Poggio's dialogue De miseriae humanae conditionis and the recurring topic of fortune, this time in Palmieri's nonhistorical works. The first mentioned is the lesser concern so that will be the first to be examined.

Although the dialogue was not written by Palmieri, although we could not expect Palmieri or Poggio to surpass Cosimo de' Medici in bringing the others to the correct and favoured opinion, there are a great many "althoughs" which could be marshalled to question the wisdom of taking Palmieri's words in such a work as necessarily his own. Even if more research were to be done on the dialogue itself much as Hans Baron has worked on Bruni's dialogues, one wonders if the effort would result in any more certainty in the assignment of actual opinions to speakers than Baron has attained. At any rate one also wonders how great a grain of salt must be taken with a dialogue in which Palmieri is a pessimistic voice who supports Poggio by means of historical examples in helping to establish the miserable lot which is man's by birth.

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1. Poggio outlines the basic (and usual) argument that he who depends on the goods of fickle fortune, fortune which pushes one up and down, will be miserable in this world: De miseriae humanae conditionis in Opera omnis, I (Torino, 1964), Praefatio, fol. Ha, (photofacsimile reprint of 1538 Basle edition). For good examples of Palmieri teaming with Poggio see Bk. I, fol. I3b and Bk. II, foll. L4b-d.
Cosimo’s replies to both Palmieri and Poggio are briefer and more revealing than would be a summary of their own rather long-winded opinions and it thus would be of greater value and interest to present a couple of examples from the mouth of Cosimo. The first is in reply to Palmieri and the second, the concluding statement of the dialogue, is a response to Poggio; in actual fact, both statements are addressed to both Palmieri and Poggio because rebuttals refer to themes each had been helping the other to develop.

To Palmieri’s opinion that man is very much brought into a world of illness, danger and so on, Cosimo answers, “Verum non natura, sed vitio nostro et morum perversitate omnis huiusmodi miseria est contracts, ut non mirum sit, quorumdam male institutam naturam sic miserias causam extitisse. Quare paucorum culpa non videtur mihi ad commune genus hominum referenda.” The second response is in regard to claims for the power of fortune: “Non est tam valida fortunae vis, ut a fortii et constanti viro non superetur.” “Animus a fortunae imperio liber est, si opes asfert, si vires, si valitudinem...” etc. Cosimo adds that we also bear such things by accepting that they are the working of God’s providence.

2. Poggio had claimed, “... intelligis inquam Cosme quantis fortunae incursibus, quam asperae acerbacque conditioni exposita fit mortalium vita, in qua nihil sane tutum, nihil securum, nihil firmum, nihil certum a miseria nobis datur...”; Lib. II, fol. I4e.
3. Lib. II, fol. I4d–e. Poggio’s work contains the strongest statement on the helplessness of man in the face of fortune that we can even attempt to attribute to Palmieri — after one of his lists of historical examples of disasters which have struck mankind: “Videntur sane dedita opera in suum et gentium illarum mutum perniciem consensisse, tam dubia sane, tam insidiae, tum fallex in successionibus fortuna fuit, ut nihil saevius, nihil calamitosius excoigitares;” Lib. VI, fol. X4c.
It would be difficult to accept the dialogue at face value. To whatever extent one does, Palmieri appears as just another voice helping Poggio to extol the wisdom of Cosimo in that very practical manner in which humanists went about doing such things. Whether the opinions are entirely Poggio's or not it is impossible to say. Aside from the dialogue's conflict with what was found in the checksheets, it is counter to that which is found in the *Della vita civile*. What this sort of dilemma does further exhibit is the shakiness of conclusions based on such evidence alone: the checksheets are thus of some value as qualifiers. In any event the pessimism, accepted at its worst and Cosimo's reaction aside, does not condemn the individual men until fortune steps in and this is a sort of determinism which needs further exploration.

It will be remembered from the discussions in regards to individual checksheets that Palmieri used fortune several times to explain events in what could be interpreted as in a determinist fashion. His nonhistorical works do not contain a systematic analysis of the nature of fortune but the idea of fortune does arise often enough for some idea of Palmieri's conscious beliefs on the issue to be gathered.

In the nonhistorical works of Palmieri we encounter two kinds of uses of the concept of fortune. Unfortunately (and my mention of the word just now illustrates the casual sort of colloquialism, the employment of which could lead the scholar to endless hairsplitting),

1. In fact the opinions given by Cosimo are most arguably Poggio's, the author of the dialogue.

2. See pages 127-128 of this thesis.
they are often very restricted in nature and one must be very careful of reading too much into them. The most extreme example of the first of these classes occurs in the Città di vita where we are told that fortune is a reason "che buona fama cade." More commonly within this group fortune is not differentiated from chance (and could be taken as such) but the areas in which it operates are strictly defined: terrestrial things such as "le faculta, le copie l abondantie, et le desiderate richezze," not goods of the spirit or body. We therefore have in such instances a Platonic fortune with a circumscribed role, and one which is still undefined within those limits. In other words we have a "fortune" which is still vague as to the level on which it may cause or affect things mutable but its influence can go no farther than those things and hence it is rather emasculated if it is to be cast as determinism; it is not a fortune as fate, it can be avoided or struggled against. This theme is often repeated in the Della vita civile.


2. Lib. III, foll. 84a-b.


4. For this idea and the variations that operate within it, see Lib. II, foll. 46a-b, 49a and 60b; Lib. III, foll. 61a, 72b, [73a is not really in Palmieri's "voice", it would seem], 74b, 77b, 78a, 93a; and Lib. IV, foll. 96a, 109a and 120b. Christian Bec, at least in including Palmieri in his discussion of this point, almost speaks too unqualifiedly of this merchant group's wholehearted preference not to beat fortune by avoiding the goods over which it has sway but to fight it out accepting the risks, using reason and so on; the statement does seem essentially valid, however: Les marchands écrivains affaires et humanisme à Florence 1375-1424, (Paris, 1967), p. 313.
In these instances, however, we do not usually have a specification of fortune's relation to cause and effect aside from having its domain kept to worldly things. Our formula for interpretation could here easily read worldly things and their variety equals difficulty of control equals inconstancy/mutability equals success/failure equals chance/accident equals fortune/luck/probability or what have you. Such an interpretation could be as justifiably applied to the instance from the Della vita civile as any implication that fortune in some direct form is a force predetermining the course of events.

Only the citation from the Città di vita can be taken as "locked in" cause and effect such that fortune here seemingly places a man's fame out of his control. This one line of poetry is our strongest evidence in favour of an unrestricted manipulative fortune yet even it obviously has alternative readings and is a narrow statement in itself. A Platonic rendering is the strongest possible under the circumstances yet even that leaves man free will. Of greater weight, and thus our only aid in resolving our problem, are those other far more numerous invocations of fortune in his nonhistorical works plus the evidence in the checksheets.

The second series of encounters with fortune in Palmieri's nonhistorical works is usually on a par with the "unfortunately" with which I earlier began a sentence. Nearly all of these occur in his Città di vita and to whatever extent they may be interpreted at all, they can most likely be accepted as fortune as chance. In fact these usages of the word are so casual as to make a senseless enterprise out of any attempts at a definitive judgement on the determinism/indeterminism latent in them. I offer the citations both out of a sense of consistency and out of a desire to make all of the possible
evidence available for consultation.¹

In effect then, the most that can be added to what was said in relation to fortune as it appears in Palmieri's individual histories themselves is that when Palmieri comes closest to a philosophic stance in this regard, his greatest affinity is to the Platonic one yet even there fortune is weak and poorly defined. To this we might append the observation that Palmieri most frequently uses the word in the sense of "blind luck." Therefore when fortune is called upon to explain an event, it is more likely used as an individual case of the workings of fortune as chance than I had originally allowed and there are reasons for making the occurrences nondeterminist.

The quantification of the checksheets, however, does not demonstrate any great belief in the power of fortune were one even to grant that Palmieri abstractly thought highly of its powers. To be assigned to only three of the two hundred and ninety-nine causations is rather unimpressive when it is remembered that nearly all of the events explained lie outside of the spirit or soul and therefore should be under fortune's sway in Platonic terms.

There are a few other things which the checksheet collation reveals about Palmieri when he actually gets down to putting his thoughts into practice. One is that the comparatively large number of political factors is perhaps not as high as would be expected of the author of the Della vita civile but it is possibly unfair to expect

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1. I, Bk. I, cap. xxvii, p. 134(46-47); Bk. II, cap. xvi, p. 238(23); cap. xv, p. 211(50); II, Bk. II, cap. xxi, p. 27(19), 28(29), and 29(40), cap. xxi, p. 52(15), cap. xxii, p. 84(48); Bk. III; cap. iii, p. 102(22), cap. ix, pp. 132(15 and 17), 133(22 and 31), cap. xi, p. 144(45), cap. xv, p. 164(45); cap. xix, p. 184(45); cap. xxv, p. 212(23) and cap. xxix, p. 231(1). One other one remains that has not been hitherto cited: Annalies, p. 137.
more considering the subject matter of the histories we have utilized. In fact the same explanation would hold for the large number - one hundred and twenty-nine - of strategems and acts that are related to things military. Nevertheless we might note that of those causations which are specified, the psychological ones are the major force Palmieri places in the world by quantitative measurement; in agreement with what was said on page 120 of this thesis, there is no indication of any particular qualitative significance in this matter.

One thing which is most striking is the total absence of the hand of God in even a nondeterminist sense. Religion is there (nine times) as an institutional force; God Himself is absent. The two hundred and ninety-four "(Nonsuper)natural" incidences combine to keep man's feet on the ground and within traditional scholarly ideas on the Renaissance as a trend towards secularization and to keep the Palmieri of the Della vita civile as a part of that trend. Hence, those who comment on Palmieri as an example of the religious minded scholar and statesman and refer to his Città di vita will find evidence to moderate

1. A letter reprinted by Meseri from the collection of Palmieri letters in the Biblioteca Riccardiana contains the following in reference to the birth of a deformed girl: "Credo nihil est miraculum quod facit ipsa natura. Tamen, quia cognovi te postquam annos discretionis ingressus fuisti per totem vitam diligentem inquisitionem rerum novarum fuisses, credo tibi ingratum minime fore cognovisse non dico miraculum, neque audeo affirmare esse prodigium neque portentum, sed monstrum potius raro contingens;" p. 339 (Ricc. 834, fol. 86a).

At times Palmieri is almost cynical in regards to the divine on earth; in his Annales he records the attempt by the Florentine people to gain the upper hand in the war with Pisa by means of supplications to God, and although success did come to the Florentines, Palmieri does not say whether the one caused the other. Although the opportunity was there to connect the two, Palmieri narrates it all in a dry tone and concludes, "Hec ideo annotavi, quia raro a nostro populo et maxime ab hominibus hos suppliciorum concursus efficiuntur, et nunc certo creditur aliquid presagire;" p. 157.
their opinions.\textsuperscript{1}

To whatever extent Palmieri's conscious religious bent moderates the checksheets, we might say that the image which emerges from the checksheets and his nonhistorical writings is one in which Palmieri has construed a material world in which man has the ability to act free of divine interference but this freedom does not seem to result from the nonexistence of an omnipotent being. It is the orthodox Roman Catholic view of free will.

\textsuperscript{1} The question of whether or not Palmieri changed his outlook by the time he wrote the \textit{Città di vita} can be answered with a "no" for the issues which we have been discussing as has been demonstrated but the problem is of interest in other regards which do not concern us here.
CHAPTER IV

BARTOLOMEO FACIO

(ca. 1400/1410-1457)
De bello Veneto: 9557 words [5.5 x 1733 + 25]
Aliud parvi: 1597 words [5.5 x 285 + 29]
Together: 11154 words
43 causes or 1 per 259 words

I. DETERMINIST [2]
A. Supernatural (1)
   2. Nonspirit
   b. Fortune 1
B. (Nonsuper)natural (1)
   1. Social factors (1)
      a. Economic
   4. Historical patterns
      b. Cyclic: recorded under I.F.1.a.

II. NONDETERMINIST [41]
B. (Nonsuper)natural (41)
   2. Social factors (6)
      b. Educational
         1). Rhetoric
            a. Spoken (oratory) 1
            c. Political 5
         3). Psychological, character, intell. factors (5)
            a. Emotions and traits
               4). Envy
                  invidia 1
               5). Fear
                  metus 1
               8). Kindness
                  beneficium (as kindness) 1
               10). Fame
                  gloria 1
               12). Friendship
                  amicus 1
      5. Physical (1)
         b. Inorganic
            2). "Fixed"/Disasters/Wind/Weather, etc. 1
      6. Direct operatives (28)
         b. Stratagems and acts (military) 18
         a. Other overt acts
            1). To an end 8
            3). Causing specified psych. state or response 2
         a. REAL 1
      7. Physical necessities (1)
On the basis of the above titles it would seem that Facio has produced two historical works; for all intents and purposes these titles represent one piece of historical writing and have been treated by me accordingly. *Aliud parvi*... is little more than a continuation of *De bello Veneto*. Proof of this resides both in a corroboratory statement by the author in the *Prooemium* to the edition used and in the manner in which where the *De bello Veneto* leaves off, *Aliud parvi* immediately resumes the thread of the story with its opening words of "Post easm pacem ....."¹ (col. 29). Aside from being Facio's first attempts at the writing of history, these brief works are not mature pieces of history for other reasons and it must be acknowledged that Facio (*Prooemium*) did not consider them as such; the subsequent lack of scholarly interest in them only serves to confirm Facio's opinion.

The historical work which these titles represent is one which Facio admits to be based on the efforts of previous annalists on whose work his Latinity is being imposed for their improvement.² Facio's

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1. The edition used is that which is printed in Joannis Georgius Graevius, *Thesaurus antiquitatum et historiarum Italicae*, V, iv (Leyden, 1722), coll. 1-34. A list of editions appears in Ubaldo Mazzini, "Appunti e notizie per servire alla bio-bibliografia di Bartolomeo Facio", *Giornale storico e letterario della Liguria*, IV (1903), 423-424.

2. Paul Oskar Kristeller, who identifies these works as having been written in Genoa but revised and published while Facio was in Naples, states bluntly: "Facio used some Genoese annals for his source, and probably considered it his main task to present the same facts in elegant Latin. The short works had a limited circulation and are of interest chiefly as his first attempts in a field in which he was to excel;" "Bartolomeo Facio and His Unknown Correspondence" in *From the Renaissance to the Counter-Reformation: Essays in Honor of Garrett Mattingly*, Charles H. Carter ed. (New York, 1965), p. 65.
history still awaits the sort of critical edition that would identify his sources so any comments about differences between him and them must be made with caution. However, in terms of correctness of style within the genre it would be difficult to imagine Genoese annalists of an older tradition surpassing the polish of Facio's style.

On the other hand Facio keeps within the annalistic format which, with wars of no great length, is a great limitation on historical writing especially in the development of themes and causation. Hence one encounters the following sort of stereotyped phrasing and analysis: "Ex anno nihil memorabile gestum est, ex quo existimaverim sub anni exitum bellum inchoatum esse: neque enim Venetorum classem ullam eo anno in Ligusticum sinum trajecisse legimus. Eo, qui secutus est, anno Genuenses cum accepissent, classem a Venetis augeri, triremes decem classi adjiciunt, eique Ludovicum Fliscum praeponunt." 1 Direct but simple in the presentation of his material, there are a number of respects in which Facio fails to rise above the status of the more mediocre sort of chronicler.

One factor that is most obvious is the quantitative lack of explanations for events. A causation factor of one per every two hundred and fifty-nine words gives a clear idea of the extent to which Facio does little more than list information. Comparison with the other historians being studied aside, this would seem to be a low figure by anyone's standards even after one makes the usual allowances for the fact that the majority of causes recorded are from the least

1. Col. 3; see also again col. 3 and col. 9 for similar good instances of this.
analytically intense class, that of "direct operatives".

Facio does not overcome the disappointment occasioned by such a low number of causal explanations when one turns to their qualitative nature. This was hinted at when reference was just made to the high proportion of explanations which come from the class of direct operatives. This of course is to be expected of a military history. However in areas such as the reasons for the origin of war, one might have hoped for better than is offered. Here at least, with the opportunity for some analysis before getting into the blow by blow account of the fighting, Facio could have risen more to the occasion. As it is, he tells us little more than that there was a succession struggle in Byzantium because, for reasons unknown, the emperor preferred the younger of two sons; then "Post mortuo de regni possessione inter fratres exorta contentio est: Andronicus praerogativam aetatis, ac jus successionis: Manuel paternum testamentum praetendebat. Cum diffiderent, controversiam dirimere armis statuent, externa uterque auxilia parare. Manuel cum Venetis, Andronicus cum Genuesibus amicitiam, et foedus junxit." (col. 1). Facio briefly adds that both cities were promised several bits of territory as a further inducement to enter the contest. Facio might have assumed that the reader would be aware of traditional rivalries and interests in the East which would have made the Venetians and Genoese natural allies for disputing claimants to a throne in Byzantium but a discriminating reader would want to know on what basis the brothers chose their allies and, more important, why both Venice and Genoa were particularly disposed to fight at that time beyond the hope of a little more territory. It may be that Facio, in giving the barest outline of the causes of the war, has satisfied most of his readers.
However, reading the opening of the history is more likely to leave one with the impression that the origins of the war are being handled as a stylistic necessity before the relation of the battles, the real meat of his history, can be properly begun. Facio's interest clearly resides in the latter consideration.

This is partly the result of Facio's stated reason for writing, glorification of his patria, Genoa. (Prooemium, p. ii). In excusing the poor performance of Genoa in the second of these wars, Facio provides us with one of his two determinist causations:

"Caeterum quoniam ea calamitas [for Genoa] fortunae magis, quam virtuti Venetorum adscribi potest ...." (p. ii). The active use of virtus seems to place this entirely within the determinist camp and is a contrast of concepts of some significance to Renaissance scholars. For the moment it is important to note that such a contrast leaves the reader in doubt as to whether or not a Venetian victory was inevitable which is why, in accordance with my own established practice, the "Determinist" class was chosen. This is the only instance where Facio directly connects fortune to an event as its reason for happening and it is clearly a sweeping framework within which the individual events of the second war are worked out. There are two further references to fortune: one is again in the Prooemium, p. ii and the other is in the opening paragraph of the De bello Veneto (col. 1). In both cases Facio depicts these wars as exhibiting "varietas fortunae". Although these are not directly tied to any events as explanatory devices, they are further evidence for the suggestion that Facio here takes the concept of fortune with some seriousness. The only alternative that might detract from this opinion is the thought that Facio is excusing the lack of Genoese
"virtus" by putting the outcome of the war in the hands of fortuna. This, on the other hand, is unlikely if one cares to note Facio's continued reliance on the concept of fortune in dissimilar circumstances in his life of Alfonso - this point will be made in the pages that follow concerning that history.

The second cause recorded in the "Determinist" class is more open to misinterpretation. The passage in question reads "Post eam pacem bellum civile apud Genuenses subito exortum est, quod fere omnibus opulentis civitatibus parto domi otio evenire consuetit. Sic Roma post eversam Carthaginem in pernicioses seditiones incidit." (col. 29). The presentation of an example from Roman history aside, the danger is that the reader may take the use of "fere" more seriously than did Facio. Still, it does seem reasonable to read the passage as demonstrating that civil war arose because of what Facio takes to be a general rule; if one accepts "fere" at its strictest, then the causation is "determinist". However, if "fere" is taken to mean not "as a rule" but "usually", then a case can be made for classing the occurrence as "Nondeterminist". Again, since there is doubt, the occurrence was classed as a "I.B.I.a." and provides a good illustration of a cyclic historical pattern. It is true that the cycle is more implied than demonstrated but it is there nonetheless. It is hardly as developed a cycle as those suggested by Renaissance historians such as Bruni or Vasari; then again, as a work of history, the history of the Genoese and Venetian wars is not as highly developed as that of Bruni or Vasari. Cycle theories need not equate with the sort of thoroughgoing determinism that they do with their more extreme advocates such as the Stoics but unless in a particular circumstance there is a specific reason to believe otherwise (evidence
of didacticism, for example), any individual incidence of a cycle theory ought to be treated as determinist.

Within the limits of discussion for this thesis, there is little else that is remarkable about Facio's first efforts at historical writing. There Facio does offer more explanations than has been customary with the other historians studied when it comes to the class of causes tied to man's political institutions; this observation has particular validity relative to the total number of other, especially psychological, causations. Aside from the determinist occurrences already discussed, none of the remaining forty-one causes are worthy of individual comment nor do they show any signs of analytical sophistication. For all these reasons, Facio, fully within the criticism often levelled at humanist historians, does little more than duplicate the efforts of the chroniclers but puts it all in fancier packaging. Then again, when the standard is highly analytical historical scholarship, this criticism damns the chronicler often as much as it damns historians like Facio. As with any historian the expectation is that he will "work the material".
I. Determinist

B. (Nonsuper)natural
   2. Physical
      b. Inorganic
      3. "Human nature"

II. Nondeterminist

A. Supernatural
   2. Nonspirit
      b. Fortune (as "blind luck")

B. (Nonsuper)natural
   2. Social factors
      a. Economic
      b. Educational
         1). Rhetoric
            a). Spoken (oratory)
            2). Other lib. arts and know.
               b). Operative (use/useful)
               c). Lack of
      3. Experience in rebus agendis
         a. Political
            1. Secular
            2. Religious
      b. Custom
      c. Religion
      d. Group fickleness
      3. Psychological, character, intell. factors
         a. Emotions and traits
            1). Anger and outrage
            2). Greed
            3). Hatred
            5). Fear
               metus, terror, timor, vereor
            6). Mercy
               clementia
            7). Pity
               miseratus, pietas
            10). Fame
               gloria, fama
            12). Friend(ship) or lack of
               amicus, inamicus
            13). Memories of old animosities
            16). Insult, affront
               contumelia
            17). Courage, spirit
               fortitudo
26). Arrogance, haughtiness
   superbia
29). Diligentia
32). Fides
43). Dignitas
45). Humanitas
46). Honor
47). Integritas
48). Auctoritas
51). Mores
54). Tedium
55). Suspicio
56). Gravitas
57). Ardor
58). Studium
59). Desiderium
60). Verecundia

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5. Physical

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<td>Weather, etc.</td>
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<td>&quot;Fixed&quot;/Geography, etc.</td>
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<td>Direct operatives</td>
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<td>Trickery, deceit</td>
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<td>(military)</td>
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<td>2). Causing unspec. psych.</td>
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<td>state or response</td>
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<td>3). Causing specified psych.</td>
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7. Physical necessities

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A both pleasurable and frustrating feature of studying quattrocento humanists who did not have a connection with Florence is that far less scholarly attention has been focused on these men than has been true for those within the Florentine tradition. The pleasurable side is the obvious enjoyment any historian gets from working on something his colleagues have neglected. The frustration partly results from the wish that others had worked the field just a little ... doing enough of the more mechanical scholarly spadework like a critical edition so that the job can be finished off and a quick harvest reaped.

Much of this neglect is the product of the "Florentine factor" of quattrocento historiography. This means that the attention a second rate intellect receives will be in direct proportion to the degree of his associations with the city of Florence. Irony aside, it is otherwise difficult to explain how it is that not only has a humanist of Facio’s calibre been relatively ignored but that a piece of historical writing of the magnitude of the Rerum gestarum Alphonsi can have Paul Oskar Kristeller say of it in 1966 (his comment is still valid): "... to my knowledge it has never been carefully studied."¹ The history of critical interest in Facio’s work means that not only have historiographers done little more than read the work (hopefully all of it) and make a casual and brief comment, but that there is not

¹ "Bartolomeo Facio", p. 65. The edition I have used is Rerum gestarum Alphonsi Primi Regis Neapolitani (Basle, 1566); this is a popular edition and is bound together with Giovanni Pontano, De Ferdinando Primo Rege Neapolitano which is pages 146-212.
even a decent, let alone modern, edition of the work.

The *Rerum gestarum Alphonsi Prima* is easily Facio's most impressive work of history. Especially if one's standard is history that gives attention to detail and to thematic development — history that appreciates the complexity of a sequence of events — one might remark that it is the closest Facio comes to modern historical writing. The length of the *Rerum gestarum Alphonsi* exceeds that of Facio's other efforts on any particular topic but beyond this obvious reason for the greater sophistication evidenced by the book, it is fair to say that Facio has applied himself more diligently to the historian's craft.

The obvious reason for the attention that Facio gave the *Rerum gestarum Alphonsi* is that by the time Facio took the work in hand, he was already in the employ of Alfonso I as one of Alfonso's Royal Historiographers. Alfonso was not just a prince who looked to have himself immortalized by court pens. He had a serious interest in history and would certainly have expected a reasonable effort from Facio. Professor Kristeller feels that the clearest evidence we have points to Facio's appointment as Royal Historiographer by at least October 1443 whereas the biography of Alfonso was begun probably soon after that date. Facio's beginning annual stipend was three hundred ducats, a considerable sum for a humanist, and Facio repaid Alfonso in his own way. Alfonso was sufficiently pleased with Facio's work as to have surprised him with an extra payment of fifteen hundred ducats upon the completion (sometime in 1455)¹ of the

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¹. Lorenzo Mehus, Preface to *De viris illustribus*, p. x.
Rerum gestarum Alphonsi and to have made Facio's pension five hundred ducats per year by the time of Facio's death in 1457. 1

Alfonso's tastes are evident in the work. Although the court of Alfonso is most generally renowned in historiographical terms for its public readings from Livy, Alfonso's preferred historical style was that of Caesar. Since Alfonso paid his historian more handsomely than might be expected, it is not surprising that Facio followed his patron's stylistic preference. Facio's main theme, Alfonso's military exploits in Italy, parallels the subject of Caesar's Commentaries and the obvious organizational borrowings are there. However, the most impressive similarity is Facio's approximation of Caesar's terse style. This was the focus of praise of Facio's contemporaries for the Rerum gestarum Alphonsi. 2

1. "Bartolomeo Facio", pp. 60 and 65 and Vespasiano da Bisticci, I, 91-92. Facio records in his biography of Valla that Alfonso paid Valla handsomely for his Latin translation of Herodotus: De viris illustribus (Florence, 1745) p. 23. F. Gabotto documents a date of October of 1446 for Facio's first salary payment as Royal Historiographer; and it is surprising that Kristeller does not account for the discrepancy in dates: "Un nuovo contributo alla storia dell'umanesimo Ligure", Atti di Società Ligure di storia patria, XXIV (1892), 136-137. By way of comparison of salaries, Platina's stipend as Vatican Librarian under the supposedly generous papal patronage of Sixtus IV was, at the later date of 1475, one hundred and twenty ducats a year; Eugene Mints and Paul Fabre, La bibliothèque du Vatican au XVe siècle (Paris, 1887), pp. 135 and 139.

2. Andres Soria, Los humanistas de la corte de Alfonso el Magnánimo (Granada, 1956), pp. 36 and 90 and Kristeller, "Bartolomeo Facio", p. 65. Gabotto, pp. 163 and 164, n. 1, quotes, respectively, Panormita and Pius II: "... confessarei di non aver letto nulla di più soave, di più puro, di più splendido;" and "... non miror imitatum esse in genere dicendi C. Caesarem... "
direct and concise phrasing Facio deserves much credit although he will be faulted in a moment for being at times concise at the expense of detailed explanation.

Having granted Facio qualified praise for brevity of statement, one cannot avoid adverse criticism of his diction. His often limited choice of words makes his explanations seem duller and more tiresome than they really are. Symptomatic of this is the repetitiveness of word suggested by section "II.B.3.a." of the checksheet, "psychological causes." Particularly worthy of mention is "II.B.3.a.5." or "fear." Of the forty-seven incidences there recorded, timor and vereor represent but one each. All the others involve metus or terror (metus, as the word listed first, appears most). Granted that every word can carry a slightly different meaning with each use and granted that the one which best suits the circumstances should be the one employed, it is still possible to find the indiscriminate recurrence of a word. Page one hundred and one gives the most glaring example of what is meant for there the word metus is repeated no less than five times when another word would have served both as well for conveying the meaning and better for entertaining the reader.

Continuing in the same negative vein, especially if the critic is a Ciceronian, Facio's style on the whole lacks the harmony of phrasing achieved by Platina. One illustration should suffice for a

1. Hopefully my fault finding will not exhibit the sort of glee in which Facio indulged as he announced that he had found nearly five hundred errors in Valla's life of Alfonso's father, Ferdinand; Gabotto, p. 146.

2. Only one of these five qualified for being recorded on the checksheet as an explanation for an event.
general indication of what is meant: "Nam inter Genuenses, cum iam
decreta classis esset, pecuniaque in stipendium imperata, de
praefectura inter Ioannem Fregosum, Thomae fratrem, qui per id
temporis Genuensis urbis principatum obtinebat, et Ioannem Antonium
Fliscum nobilitatis principem orta contendit ne classis perficeretur,
impedimento fuit: et a Francisco atque Antonio, aut nulla, aut fero
auxilia venere."\(^1\) Here the failure to better balance clauses
against one another makes Facio's style a bit breathless and awkward.
To present just this one passage is not entirely fair to Facio; it
has been chosen as indicative of something which is more evident in
his style than in that of the most polished of *quattrocento*
historians.

Keeping within the *quattrocento* tradition, Facio does show a
respect for the antique. This means that he prefers the classical
word for the medieval, *templum* for *ecclesia* for example. It also
means that he will often give place names in both their modern and
ancient forms.\(^2\) The opportunity to choose glaring anachronisms
such as *templum* for *ecclesia* did not arise often enough for a critic
to make much of an issue of this if so inclined. In fact all of
the incidences I found are recorded in the note below; Facio does
not stand out from his contemporary humanist historians in his
preference for classical usage.

Facio does stand out from his peers in making this commissioned

\(^1\) P. 79; another good example occurs on p. 22, the opening to
Book III.

\(^2\) See, respectively, pp. 23, 24, 26, 28, 40, and 43 and 7, 33, 59
and 62. Both tendencies are evident in his other major work of
this sort, his *De viris illustribus*; for a few examples see pages
44, 64, and 65.
biography, one for which he was well paid, less fawning than might be expected. Professor Kristeller, after referring to historians who "... have dismissed Facio's history with a few derogatory remarks about its rhetorical and courtly character;" allows that, "Nobody has ever denied that Alfonso deserved at least a part of the praise he received from Facio and others, and Facio knows very well the difference between a good king and a tyrant. There is no indication that Facio neglected the chief duty of an historian - to present the facts without distortion to the best of his knowledge...." What Kristeller could have added in this regard is that since Facio's subject is less a pure biography of his patron's life and personality and more purely a relation of his truly successful wars in Southern Italy up to his occupation of Naples, Facio was not in the position to have to have done as much fabrication as have some historians in praising their patrons. This is all the more true for Facio since his military history keeps relatively clear of Alfonso's personality and non military activities. It was Panormita who wrote the more anecdotal and character sketch sort of biography, his De dictis et factis Alphonsi Primi.

Two things probably condition a critic to dismiss Facio out of hand. One is the expectation that a patron will be overly complimented by any "kept" humanist. The second is that Facio's name has had the misfortune to have been associated with the sort of Pietro Aretino style incident that has, at least by implication, given humanists that very reputation; that is, Federigo da Montefeltro's

sending of a mule to Facio in return for a favourable mention in the
\textit{Renum gestarum Alphonsoi}.

Naturally Facio, in describing Alphonso's feats in war, did not fail to work in a lengthy passage of prose concerning his patron's character. Both as the only extended depiction that Facio gives of Alfonso and as an example of his one sided praise of Alfonso (here his personality, elsewhere his deeds), it is worth reproducing in its entirety.

\begin{quote}
In quo [taking of Naples] nescias profecto, magis ne eius fortitudinem et constantiam, an clementiam, caeteraque virtutes laudes: an felicitatem admirare. Namque in agredituris rebus impiger, nec labore ullo defatigabatur, nec periculo cedebat ulli: tantamque animi fiduciam in his agendis prae se ferret, ut sese eius milites cum pluribus, ipsi pauciores, dimicare non dubitaverint. In bello gerendo aede constans, ut eum nec calamitas ulla accepta, nec pecuniae inopia, nec beli diuturnitas, nec commenatum pennuria, nec hyemis magnitudo ab incepto revocaverit. In victoria aede clemens, et moderatus, ut de ea laude possit cum quovis antiquorum principum decertare. Clementiae per facilitas, ac liberalitas erat: famis, sitis, frigoris, calorisque inaudita patientia, ad quam per assiduos venandi labores obscuraret, adiuncta erat. Ad haec litterarum amor, (in enim unicus doctorum hominum cultor sua tempestatis fuit) et vini abstinentiam accedebat, quod aqua expungent vix quiquam vini similis referret. Has tantas regias virtutes consili magnitudo, rebus belii, ac pacis pariter peraspecta acqubat. Its porro felix, fortunatusque, ut per raro unquam ulla accepta clade ipse unus omnium regum fortunam in postestate habuisse videatur.
\end{quote}

Although it is difficult to swallow any so glorious a view of an historical figure, even \textit{Il Magnanimo}, there are several reasons for allowing that Facio has not carried himself to extremes. One is that in seizing on virtues such as Alfonso's inclination to be merciful, to a degree Facio does substantiate this quality as a factor in accounting for actual historical events. This would be evident from a correlation of section "II. R. 3.a" of the checksheet with the personality involved in such occurrences. In other words, praising
Alfonso as a kindly type is not entirely a typical innocuous characterization if the praise is also earned in the relation of actual events elsewhere in the history. If Facio got much of his character sketch wrong, then he also got much of his history wrong. Another point to keep in mind is that Facio is not exceeding the sort of praise that other historians have allowed to rulers who are known to have been much less deserving of praise than we know Alfonso to have been. In other words we should not be shocked that Facio appears to be insufficiently disparaging of his subject.

On the other hand he could have said more. One of the reasons it is difficult to evaluate Facio's history as a whole is, as Professor Kristeller notes,¹ that Facio is still a good (and on some things the only) source on the Neapolitan Wars. Although Facio would not have known how much an ignorant posterity would have allowed him to fabricate, he certainly could have expanded on Alfonso's magnanimity to the liberal arts. As the cultivator and participant in one of the more brilliant Renaissance courts, Alfonso's reputation has always been glowing here and Facio, in the passage cited, grants him his singularity but with a brevity that does the writer credit.

All of this could be qualified by a mention of the only other lengthy character sketch in the Rerum gestarum, the portrait of Filippo Maria Visconti. (p. 49). As the by now dead leader of a by now politically submerged family, Filippo was fair game despite having once been allied to Alfonso. Facio is less harsh on the man than he could have been and makes no mention, for instance, of his cruelty. Facio does do a good job of portraying a man of too much energy, "...

¹ "Bartolomeo Facio", p. 65.
in pace bellum, in bello pacem quaerebat ...,”¹ a man capable of
deceit who cared for his soldiers more than for his citizens and one
who loved solitude. Facio's final succinct summing-up is "Et tamen
in tanta solitudine vitam agens omnum Italiam armis territabat,
concitatique, ut non inscite quidam dixerit: Philippus sedendo
vincit." Facio expressed his dislike for Filippo with subtlety but
this does not lessen the impact of his verbal picture.²

Since Facio did not intend such sketches to be a distinctive
feature of his history, it would be best not to dwell too long on
them. Facio is writing the story of Alfonso's taking of the
Neapolitan kingdom and in that sense the title Ferum gestarum Alphonsi
well illustrates the differences from Panormita's De dictis et factis.
Facio's is essentially a military history which delights in the
relation of battle plans or strategies as much as it does in the
story of the battle itself.³ Attention paid to individual battles
creates both a tendency to become more of a chronicler and to fail to
discuss the "wider issues". How Facio is more successful in some
places than in others in rising above the mere chronicling of events
will be discussed shortly. It is something to keep in mind when
assessing Facio's worth as an analytical historian.

1. Facio likes this phrase for he has Alfonso say in a speech to a
peace delegation: "In bello pacem, non in pace bellum quaerere
soleo." (p. 143).

2. Other, though shorter, sketches of personalities appear on pp. 117
and 124. The latter of these refers to Alfonso's son Ferrante
about whose virtues history has taken a very negative view; Facio
mentions only such things as his military skill and desire for
glory leaving out any hint of whether or not he was merciful,
trustworthy or generous; all of which he was not.

3. Page 22 gives probably the best illustration of this.
One factor that weighed heavily against him in terms of any "causation count" such as the seven hundred and eight tallied for the *Rerum gestarum* is the number of speeches he reproduces. The policy on this, as has been often noted, is to discount speeches since it is often impossible to determine the extent to which the historian has put himself into the words of the speaker. Facio has unwittingly attenuated the possibly adverse impact of such a policy by the mere fact that there are very few incidences in his history where the speeches give the sort of cause tied to an effect that would normally be tabulated. Another point to keep in mind is that Facio is aware of trying to keep to the speaker's original words. Finally in this regard it can be said that although Facio is capable of "reproducing" hundreds of words of speechmaking at a time, the number of speeches he includes make up a very small proportion of the entire work.

It is true that any mere count of "causations" misrepresents the analytical abilities of an historian. Naturally the listings that appear on the checksheets are simply additional parameters. Aside from quantification, it is the duty of the historian to consider the quality of that which he quantifies. Still, Facio's *Rerum gestarum* has not a very good ratio of recorded causes when compared to any single work by Platina or Palmieri. The most similar in terms of length and subject matter is Platina's *In historiam urbis Mantuae*. Although cross comparisons of histories and historians are being saved for the concluding sections of this thesis, it is worth noting

1. See pp. 112-113 for an example.
2. The major speeches, as direct and indirect quotations, occur on pp. 4-5, 8, 36, 42-43, 45-47, 112-113 and 141-144.
that not only is Facio barely behind Platina in terms of causation ratios - the two histories are remarkably similar in both the areas and proportions in which those causes distribute themselves.

When the *Berum gestarum* is compared to the other histories studied in terms of the breadth and complexity of causal analysis, we find it comparable to the work of Palmieri but inadequate beside all of Platina's histories excepting the *History of Mantua*. One wonders to what extent the subject matter of each of these particular histories shaped Facio's and Platina's very similar approach. To whatever extent Facio's failing might be due to his subject matter, there is no question that he takes a more limited view of the degree to which events might interrelate. The most obvious instance of this is his inability to give his work overall coherence through any sort of thematic development. This is mentioned not to argue that Platina was correct in his themes but to point out that they were there as organizational tools and explanatory devices. If one's preference is the more chronicle-like historian, then these observations are in Facio's favour. There is little question that Facio is a better recorder of information for the use of later historians than most humanist historians have proved to be. However the only consistent theme in his history is a limited view of fortune, a view which will be discussed shortly.

This is also not to say that Facio need have developed his causal sequences into themes to the point of unjustified generalization. It is to bring out a point for comparison with other historians. The damning evidence against Facio's possible reputation as an analytical historian is his both stereotypical and limited idea of what causes men, for example, to begin or to end
a war. There are four extended and representative causal sequences in his history of the deeds of Alfonso. This means that very few times did he really explain an event with much more than the sort of limited one sentence exposition that tends to be most easily recorded on the check-sheets: "Out of fear, the enemy joined the alliance."

Those more intensely argued explanations occur on pages 1-2, 22, 85 and 103-109. Of these the last is the most sophisticated if only in terms of amount of detail.

The least developed is probably the first listed which covers the opening pages of the history. There Facio narrates a minimum of the background to the succession struggle for Naples which will eventually give rise to Alfonso's Neapolitan involvement before Facio plunges into some res gestae on the field of battle.

Of the four instances cited above, perhaps the most representative is that on page eighty-five. There Facio discusses how it is that Eugenius IV tried to pick up the pieces upon the defeat of René I of Anjou, Alfonso's rival for the throne. ¹

Nanque Eugenius pontifex maximus, de quo superioribus libris mentionem fecimus, aegre ferens Renatum regno pulsam, adhibu num eo [Alfonso] inimicitias gerezat. Cuius opes, quamvis rex parum tinterat, tamen ne contra Romanam ecclesiam, cuius erat maxime observans, bellum gerere videretur, ei reconciliari optabat. Quare data occasione, non destitit, quod dissensio, ac bellum ome sublatum est. Nanque Eugenius quum videret frustra a se suscepta arma retineri, nec iam amplius Renatum, qui postea regni spe abiecta in Galliam abierat, restitui posse, Ludovicum Cardinalem Aquileiensem appellatum, magnno animo, et consilio virum (qui admodum fidebat, cuive rerum suarum summam commiserat) qui cum eo de pace ageret, legatum ad Alphonsum misit.

¹ Joanna II of Naples had to defeat Louis III of Anjou to gain Naples. Alfonso had assisted in this (1420) and for a reward was made her heir. By 1423 they had fallen out and when Joanna died in 1435, she left Naples to René I of Anjou.
Eugenius IV and Alfonso had their disputes immortalized by Valla's fierce attack on Eugenius in Valla's celebrated exposure of the Donation of Constantine as a forgery. By the time of the completion of the *Rerum gestarum Alphonsi* in 1455, things had calmed down quite a bit between the papacy and the Neapolitan court. Nevertheless Facio does Alfonso a favour in playing up Alfonso's concern for the state of the Church, something which did not seem to restrain Alfonso as much at an earlier date. It is a superficial piece of analysis. Also Facio's reasoning is obvious in its point that despite Eugenius' animosity towards Alfonso, Eugenius accepted his own and René's defeat; Facio scarcely probes the depths of human motivation but in his defence it must be conceded that he is not entirely a failure in not surpassing the standards of similar traditional narratives of his time. Leonardo Bruni rose above the restraints imposed on him by the annalistic structure of his history of the Florentine people and created a coherent work of both literary and historiographical merit. Facio's conscious achievement lies more towards the literary side of things.

Facio wrote essentially a record of the military deeds in which one man was involved. Since he is not attempting a subject as broad as that of a Bruni or a Platina, perhaps it might be expected that his history would lack the organizational unity that is expected from the finest humanist historiography. Facio's narrative is more a patchwork of battles that depends upon the chronology of affairs for its progression: one could rearrange the major events without too much of a loss of intelligibility. Alfonso's character, as an example of what is meant, is static; Alfonso at the beginning of the *Rerum gestarum Alphonsi* is no different a personality from Alfonso at
the end. This is not so with the papacy as Platina in the Vitae is so quick to point out. In this sense Facio has not broken from the mold of the classical historian (Livy for example) as described by R. G. Collingwood. Facio does not here show an organic view of the world: an attitude that people, institutions, customs, etc. exhibit change. For many historians this lends extra drama and development to their work. Rightly or wrongly, it increases the feeling for the reader that his reading is taking him somewhere.

Other than chronology, the only devices which seem to thread this patchwork together are the twin concepts of fortune and the uncertainty of human affairs. Facio does not appear to have intentionally used fortune to this end, but at least its incidence helps to keep the reader from getting overwhelmed by the mere march of events. These aspects of chance appear often although the format varies from something as simple as the "fortunes of war" to a more lengthy exposition on the manner in which Divine providence causes surprises for man who is necessarily ignorant of God's plans. The topic of determinism is not alien to Facio since, happily for us, he is an author of two tracts relevant to that theme. Since both of these tracts will be discussed in the collation on Facio, here our only concern will be Facio's ideas on determinism as evidenced in the biography of Alfonso.

1. The Idea of History (Oxford, 1946), pp. 42-45; this does not seem entirely fair to the classical historians despite having a strong element of truth; although Livy may not have demonstrated a feel for the institutional changes that Rome had undergone, Sallust and Tacitus were certainly sensitive to several aspects of change by way of "decline". See Peter Burke on this: The Renaissance Sense of the Past (London, 1970 reprint of 1969 ed.), pp. 131-141.
The word fortune, as has been said, occurs often. Invariably it means little more than chance or "blind luck". Facio does not express a belief in fortune as a goddess but he does say enough to give fortune a singular form to be reckoned with. The word occurs twenty-two times in any significant context and a number of these incidences are independent of one another despite being on the same page. Not all of them are actually explanatory devices tied to an actual event under discussion and hence are not recorded on the checksheet. The most obvious sort of usage both of the simple variety and of the kind that is not recorded on the checksheet would be Facio's description of Pope Nicholas V: "De quo [Nicholas V] ut aliquid dicam, hic me locus admonet. Fuit enim eius viri non virtus modo, sed etiam fortuna nostro seculo admirabilis." (p. 110).

It is interesting that Facio contrasts virtus to fortune - one an active attribute and the other a passive one. The implication here is that fortune can be defeated by active virtues and this is more explicitly stated in two other places. Facio enjoys using the word fortune but it is not employed in any serious way. When he chooses the word, it is synonymous with "blind luck" and he therefore is not presenting it in any determinist sense. It is worth emphasizing again that he remarks twice that active virtues can overcome fortune. In this he is similar to the classical historians for whom fortune, as Professor Denys Hay observes about the "Wheel of Fortune," "... is introduced to account for rapid transformations, but this is a

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1. Pages 15 (twice), 47, 52, 55, 62, 66, 74, 76 (twice), 79, 102, 103, 104 (twice), 107, 109 (twice), 110, 127 and 133.

2. Pages 74 and 117 (in a speech).
literary device, more or less devoid of interpretative significance."¹

A more meaningful brush with determinism, one that is not truly tied to an event if one takes the interpretation suggested, involves a discussion as to how in a situation in which despair was the rational reaction, instead for Alfonso victory followed upon defeat. In a mild fit of philosophising Facio muses: "Sed quia credat eam cladem tantum postea felicitatis Alphonso allaturum fuisse? Angimur miseris mortales, si quid nobis contingat adversi, exitus rerum ignari, quos summae Deus sibi uni praecisos esse voluit, cum omnia quae accidant, in potiorem partem accipienda sint. Si quidem ea clades, qua Alphonse omni spe potiundi regni sibi orbatus esse videbatur, ad postreamum eius victoriae causa extitit." (p. 48). The key sentence begins "Angimur ..." and the clause that matters there is "... quos summae Deus sibi uni praecisos esse voluit ...." Facio does not say that God wills these events but that He wills that they be foreseen by Him alone; hence, man is often surprised by the course of events. This brings us back to the old debate as to whether or not the mere fact of God’s foreseeing an event predetermines it. Facio here does not lend us the slightest clue as to what his position is on this.

If he were to accept that foresight is predestination, then a great schema for his entire history would be worked out and there would be no need to talk of indeterminism. In the face of what was said on the history of this debate, on the orthodox Catholic and fifteenth century view, one would have cause to doubt that Facio would advocate such a full-blown variety of determinism. In fact the Hortus gestarum

Alphonso would be sufficient direct evidence to the contrary in that it gives so many instances where men act in the face of choice to affect their fate. No less significant in this regard is Facio's dependence on fortune as "blind luck".

As it is, then, the seven hundred and three causes cited as being in the nondeterminist category are there because Facio has not presented even sufficient reason to guess that he believes God preordains the choices open to man which they suggest. This sort of taking the problem one step back is the only way in which one could attack the free nature of the very real alternatives open to man which his history brings out. On the other hand, were one to have Facio philosophize that God directly wills all, then it is obvious that Facio does not accept this when explaining actual events.

Of the explanations which were classed as determinist, two deserve singular mention as exhibiting something of the quattrocento mind which is very much out of step with the trends of our day. Both are from the class "I.H.J." or "Human nature". In one of these Facio observes: "Facile vero credit Isama: muliebris nanque sexus, ut natura imbescilli or timidi or, ita ad credendum prondior est." (p. 16). Facio's estimation of women is less striking, however, than a remark he makes about one of René's military successes; Facio attributes it to a cruelty on the part of the French that exceeds anything customary in Italians. (p. 134). It is another example of the particularly Renaissance Italian sense of racial superiority and belief that those from beyond the Alps are still "the barbarians".

1. A similar though more flattering genetic stereotyping of women appears on p. 102.
Turning to the "Nondeterminist" class the preponderance of incidences appear in the two classes of "II. R 3." and "II. R 6.", or "Psychological" and "Direct operatives". On their own the distribution of causations shows nothing remarkable and it might be added that a large number of "Direct operatives", especially "Stratagems" are to be expected in a military history.

When we consider again the seven hundred and three "Nondeterminist" causes as opposed to the five "Determinist" ones, we can see how yet another historian seems to lean heavily towards presenting a world in which man functionally has some kind of choice open to him. Perhaps one of the best exempla Facio gives of this and of a certain Renaissance truism is the following: "Erat is [Blesius Aseretus] quidem humili genere ortus, caeterum vigilans, calidus, lingua celeri, et expedita animoque supra dignitatem, ac praeterquam par erat honores publicos affectante." (p. 45). Here a man is able, through effort, to rise above the dictates of fate - his humble birth. Through application he has succeeded in la vita attiva. It is the kind of endorsement of active virtues which can fly in the face of many humanist tracts where humanists, in their more quiet moments, prefer to put their faith in contemplative virtues.
I. DETERMINIST [7]
A. Supernatural (1)
   2. Nonspirit (1)
      b. Fortune 1
B. (Nonsuper)natural (6)
   1. Social factors (1)
      a. Economic 1
   2. Physical (2)
      b. Inorganic 2
   3. "Human nature" (3)

II. NONDETERMINIST [744]
A. Supernatural (10)
   2. Nonspirit (10)
      b. Fortune (as "blind luck") 10
B. (Nonsuper)natural (734)
   2. Social factors (40)
      a. Economic 4
      b. Educational
         1). Rhetoric
            a). Spoken (oratory) 3
         2). Other lib. arts and know.
            b). Operative (use/useful) 2
            c). Lack of 1
         3). Experience in rebus agendis 2
      c. Political 16
      e. Customs
         1). Secular 3
         2). Religious 1
      f. Religion 5
      h. Group fickleness 2
3. Psychological, character, intell. factors (126)
   a. Emotions and traits
      1). Anger and outrage
         ira, indignitas, laccus
      2). Greed
cupiditas, avaritia
      3). Hatred
odium, inimicitia
      4). Envy
invidia
      5). Fear
metus, terror, timor, vereor
      6). Mercy
clementia
      7). Pity
miseratus, pietas
| 8). Kindness | 1 |
| 9). Beneficium (as kindness) | 1 |
| 10). Fame | 4 |
| 11). Gloria, fama | 4 |
| 12). Friendship or lack of | 5 |
| 13). Amicus, inamicus | 5 |
| 14). Memories of old animosities | 3 |
| 15). Insult, affront | 1 |
| 16). Contumelia | 1 |
| 17). Courage, spirit | 2 |
| 18). Fortitudo | 2 |
| 19). Arrogance, haughtiness | 1 |
| 20). Superbia | 1 |
| 21). Diligentia | 1 |
| 22). Fides | 3 |
| 23). Dignitas | 5 |
| 24). Humanitas | 2 |
| 25). Honor | 1 |
| 26). Integritas | 3 |
| 27). Auctoritas | 5 |
| 28). Mores | 2 |
| 29). Taedium | 1 |
| 30). Suspicio | 3 |
| 31). Gravitas | 1 |
| 32). Ardor | 1 |
| 33). Studium | 1 |
| 34). Desiderium | 1 |
| 35). Verecundia | 1 |
| 36). Ratio | 1 |
| 37). Prudentia | 1 |
| 38). Ingenium | 1 |
| 39). Virtus | 5 |
| 40). Negligentia | 1 |
| 41). Unspecified psych. factor causing reaction | 1 |

5. Physical
| (34) |
| 5 |
| a. Organic | 5 |
| b. Inorganic | 5 |

6. Direct operatives
| (502) |
| 399 |
| a. Trickery, deceit | 1 |
| b. Strategems and acts (military) | 399 |
| c. Other overt acts | 85 |

7. Physical necessities
| (32) |
| 30 |
| a. Real | 30 |
| b. Comfort | 2 |
 Much as with Palmieri, any hopes that Facio had written several histories suited to my purposes were quickly dashed. Once again it became evident both that scholars have often credited an historian with more than he had actually written and that even some of his known works are ultimately of little value to this thesis. Although this became clear before much time had been expended on Facio, the decision was made to study him anyway.

Facio is similar to Palmieri in having written a seemingly more meagre output of historical literature than some other humanists yet having produced more works than they have on a greater variety of other topics of relevance to this thesis. He is a very good example of the humanist as both historian and philosopher. Facio’s two tracts De vitae felicitate and De excellentis ac praestantiais hominibus make him a preferred candidate for study here. Beyond this, to the degree that Facio is so often criticised for being mediocre and undistinguished, he is being merely “average”. In this it is possible to agree with P. O. Kristeller that Facio is “... a characteristic representative of Italian humanism ....” (“B. Facio”, p. 58).

One should be careful of leaving the erroneous impression that Facio is at all unique in having an imposing array of titles for apparently historical works which, upon closer examination, amount to something else. The perusal of Appendix II should give a good indication of how few humanists wrote much history at all. The figures noted there certainly surprised me. It is obvious that a closer look at those lesser known humanists with several histories
to their credit would probably, as with Palmieri and Facio, disqualify those works from this thesis on such grounds as not being histories at all or as being of too few words. This is mostly the result of the need for a comprehensive and scholarly book on Italian Renaissance historiography, something more up-to-date and specialized than Eduard Fueter's *Geschichte der neueren Historiographie*; medievalists, admittedly harvesting smaller fields, have been more successful. 1 An intense survey of Italian Renaissance historiography would entail so much labour that it is not difficult to see why scholars have shrunk from the task. At any rate enough information is at hand to evaluate Facio, Palmieri and Platina as the only humanists of any import both as historians and as theorists on man's place in the universe.

As has been already been stated, the degree to which Facio has been ignored makes him all the more desirable a candidate for study. 2 The major rival for his place in this thesis, Gianozzo Manetti, produced no history so elaborate or important as Facio's *Rerum gestarum Alphonsi Primi*. The neglect this work has received is also reflected in the confusion over exactly what Facio had written. 3

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1. Munich 1911. A recent detailed study such as Antonia Gransden, *Historical Writing in England, c. 550 to c. 1307* (London, 1974) is a good example.

2. Even his name has been mishandled; as Kristeller notes, it is more likely spelled Faccio but incorrect usage has now conventionalized it to Facio; "Bartolomeo Facio", p. 59.

3. Aside from those works of various kinds that I shall be mentioning, Facio has three grammatical tracts to his credit; they are the *De differentiis verborum*, the *Synonyma* and the *De verborum priscorum significatione* - the last of these is now lost. Also still extant are about one hundred and thirty letters: on the confusion even these have caused, see for example, Remigio Sabbadini, "Bartolomeo Facio, scolaro a Verona, maestro a Venezia", in *Scritti* (Contd.)
There is no decent general book to which the scholar may turn to sort this out: he must search out articles in obscure journals from the turn of this century. Such a situation is no great bother for the scholar working on one historian but it is difficult indeed for anyone planning to survey the entire field.

At first glance Facio has written seven histories. They are the Commentarioli or De bello Veneto/Aluuius perit temporis, the Rerum gestarum Alphonsi Primi, De viris illustribus, a work entitled De origine bellii inter Gallos et Britannos, another known as De rebus Siculis, another named Historiarum et chronicorum mundi and a Historia suorum temporum. Facio also has to his credit a translation of Arrian's Life of Alexander from Greek to Latin; this is an effort which obviously is of no immediate import to this thesis. The first two historical works have already received some attention in this thesis. The next, the De viris illustribus, will be discussed shortly, especially by way of explanation of why it was not analyzed by means of a checksheet. Of the remainder they are either not histories at all or they never existed. The eighteenth century bibliophiles, usually so helpful, have made a few enduring errors with Facio.

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storici in memoria di Giovanni Monticolo, Carlo Cipolla ed. (Venice, 1922), p. 29; and Kristeller, "Bartolomeo Facio", pp. 56-74. See Mazzini, pp. 419-443 for the best bibliography of Facio's works and pp. 443-451 for the best list of works wrongly attributed to him. There is a recent "biography" of Facio but it is fairly insubstantial and says nothing new; particularly irritating is the author's habit of not citing his sources: Claudio Marchiori, Bartolomeo Facio, tra letteratura e vita (Milano, 1971), esp. p. 71.

1. Zeno, I, 67 mistakenly took these separate titles to mean separate works.
The De origine belli inter Gallos et Britannos is straightforwardly not a piece of historical writing nor did Facio ever represent it as such. It is the title which misleads. Basically it is a short story or novella based on popular legend which explains the origins of the Hundred Years War.¹ To what extent Facio embellished on this popular tale has provided scholars with a source of debate although it is generally conceded that Facio does not at all claim the work for his own: "Subduxi me tantisper negociis meis, dum tibi [Count Carlo di Ventimiglia] latinam historiam illam redderem, quae ab indocto homine, nescio quo, inepte atque incondite litteris tradita fuerat ...." (col. 893). There is an element of humour in all this in that although Facio's source is not known, his translation, another instance of his ability "to improve" a work by rendering it into polished Latin, appears more often in manuscript catalogues than any of his other works; if this is an indication of popularity, the joke is truly on Facio because Jacopo Poggio Bracciolini's translation of Facio's version back into the vernacular appears in the catalogues with even greater frequency.²

¹. This novella was published by Chacon, Bibliotheca, coll. 693-902. While at Alfonso's court Facio also did a translation into Latin of Tale X.1 of Boccaccio's Decameron; Carlo Braggio, "Una novella del Boccaccio tradotta da R. Facio", Giornale Ligustico di Archeologia, Storia e Letteratura, XI (1881), 365-387.

². The best general analyses of this tale and its likely sources appear in Carlo Braggio, "Una novella", and, by the same author, "Giacomo Bracelli e l'umanesimo dei Ligure", Atti di Società Ligure di Storia Patria, XXII (1890), 231-257. Letterio Di Francia, Novellistica, I, Storia dei generi letterari italiani (Milan, 1924), p. 320 describes well the overall impression Facio leaves: "Lo scrittore narra, è vero, con larghezza i fatti, sviluppa con chiarezza le situazioni; ma tuttavia non riesce a dar vita ai suoi personaggi ed a rappresentarne gli intimi moti dell'animo, in tanto avvicendarli di strani eventi;" the translation as a whole is discussed on pages 317-322. As Braggio and Di Francia show, the tale is not taken from Boccaccio.
The next item on the list of works attributed to Facio is a history entitled *De rebus Siculis*. Eighteenth century scholars claim to have seen this history under Facio's name in the "French Royal Library" in Paris. Some have gone so far as to ascribe it catalogue numbers of either 221 or 8378. No modern scholar has discovered this work. Ubaldo Mazzini, in the early twentieth century, was unsuccessful in locating such a history by means of a correspondence with Henry Omont of the Bibliothèque Nationale. My own searches in recent manuscript catalogues, including those for Italian libraries, were also to no avail. On the basis of Omont's reply, Mazzini (pp. 444-445) felt that rather than representing a lost work by Facio, it is merely a case of someone making a "mistake" in the title of the *Rerum gestarum Alphonsi* (a copy has been in the possession of the Bibliothèque Nationale for some time). Additionally Mazzini (pp. 446-448) convincingly argues that the *Historiarum et chronicorum mundi* refers not at all to an historical work. This only leaves us with the *Historiarum suorum temporum* and the simple explanation would seem to be that this work, noted by Zeno (I, 67) is also nothing more than Facio's *Rerum gestarum Alphonsi*. Facio's life of Alfonso was often bound with Pontano's *History of Naples* under the joint title of either *Rerum suo tempore gestarum* (Basle, 1566) or *Historia suorum temporum* (Basle, 1577) for examples; the making of these titles into

2. See also Fabricius, II, 548 and Mazzini, p. 420.
a "new" work by Facio alone would be an understandable mistake. There is also the possibility that Facio composed a history of the wars between the Genoese and the Catalans but not a trace of this history remains. 1

The corpus of historical works by Facio then has been reduced to three titles: the De bello Veneto/Alivid parvi, the Rerum gestarum Alphonsi Primi and the De viris illustribus. As has already been pointed out, the last of these was not subjected to the close reading and study of the checksheet technique since to have done so would have served no purpose. The checksheet was designed for use on a certain kind of history and although the De viris illustribus meets most qualifications, it fails on those that are most important. It is far in excess of two thousand words and it is written in as clear and flowing a classical Latin as might be imagined for such a work. It is true that it is historical biography but it is that only in a restricted sense. Facio's collection of lives of illustrious men of his time is an encyclopedic compilation of information in which each of the rather brief biographies exists unto itself. By not exhibiting any sort of sustained analysis, by not attempting to cover any specific problems in any particular depth, the work basically represents a chronicle of information. The information is useful but it is, on the whole, too much in the form of a mere list. For this reason the checksheet sort of approach would have given a highly distorted picture of the book; there is much in the De viris illustribus for the historian of culture but a bit less than might be expected for the student of analytic history or the history of

determinism. It would be prejudicial to a balanced look at Facio the historian to ignore the book entirely but any such scrutiny of its contents will have to be brief.

Having said all this, it must be admitted that the scope and contents of the work make it enjoyable reading for anyone interested in quattrocento culture. In a book that is well within the ancient and medieval precedent of the "on illustrious men" genre, Facio gives us a non Florentine look at whom he felt were the important people of mostly the first half of the quattrocento. (The work was written 1456-1457, after the life of Alfonso and obviously before Facio's death in 1457). 1 Facio presents these biographies in groups of very roughly six to a category under the following headings: poets, orators, jurists, physicians, painters, sculptors, private citizens, generals and princes. Facio gives a good humanist justification for his sequencing of these headings: "A Poetis vero, quoniam ii antiquissimi, et ante Oratores suisse traduntur, scribere ordian. Deinceps ad Oratores, ac caeteros ordines veniam." (p. 3). Each series of biographies is preceded by an explanation of the importance that group serves to mankind.

The choice of men worthy of remembrance is most remarkable to the modern reader in Facio's choice of painters. The degree to which Florentine art is ignored is striking. Facio's attention to Flemish artists should be a reminder for the art historian of the tastes of at least the non Florentine critic before the internationalization of the Tuscan style; certainly Vasari's Lives of the Artists is nearly a century away. In fact the now

universally acclaimed genius of Massaccio figures not at all in Facio's account of the worthy. Pride of place in terms of the longest biography goes to Gentile da Fabriano. In his own time Gentile was more favourably compared to the great early Tuscan artists than he tends to be today yet he did not paint in the growing tradition of Giotto but more in that of the North of Italy. Whether Facio, as a Northern Italian, is following his tastes or Gentile's acknowledged renown is not our concern here. It is, though, worth remarking that Gentile's is among the six longest biographies of the entire De viris illustribus. Why the remainder of these six names received such attention would be more obvious to the modern reader; they are Francesco Spinola, a long-time friend of Facio, Cosimo de' Medici, Niccolò Piccinino, Pope Nicholas V and King Alfonso. Facio fails to highlight so enthusiastically his fellow humanists but he does well by two favoured patrons, Nicholas V and Alfonso I of Naples in gracing them with the two longest biographies in the whole collection.

By way of comment on Facio's style and the general contents of the De viris illustribus, two of the biographies of humanists will be presented, the shortest or that of Lodrisio Crivelli and the longest of the humanist biographies, that of Leonardo Bruni. "Leodrisius Cribellus Mediolanensis non parvum etiam in eloquentia nomen obtinet. Epistolas multis notus Francisci Sforiae res gestas prosa oratione perscripsit, quas in libros digestit." (p. 15). Among other things Facio fails to include Crivelli's De expeditione Pii papae Secundi in Turcae in this very brief notice (see Appendix II of this thesis). Taking the opportunity to say more, Facio's life of Bruni gives a good indication of why the decision was made to abandon the checksheets:

There is little room for sustained analysis of causation in such a compendium of information.

Still as a compendium of information, it has some use and it was on this basis that Facio received praise from Lynn Thorndike. Thorndike could not be accused of any undue bias in favour of Renaissance humanists but Thorndike did appreciate Facio and the information he preserved relating to the history of science. The De viris illustribus preserves a trend now well established for Facio

in that his writings are still well regarded only in so far as they provide factual source material for the modern scholar. Within this vein the *Rerum gestarum Alphonse* and the *De viris illustribus* are the most information packed of his works and as a result they are the two for which Facio is best remembered. More will be said shortly about the not very innovatory nature of Facio's historical methodology.

In the field of tracts on the active vs the contemplative life or the dignity of man, the latter a field in which Facio was one of the first authors of his century, his conservative nature again dominated his writing and has thereby caused scholarly attention to focus instead on the more original and more stimulating efforts in this genre by those, apart from Valla, with a Florentine connection. Facio's general reputation has been clouded by his quarrel with the greater genius of Valla. Although Facio's name has received some publicity from the polemics in which they engaged, some of this has been a disservice in that scholars often took Valla's words too seriously. For instance as late as 1892 a reputable scholar, Ferdinando Gabotto, claimed that Facio was of humble birth, the son of a shoemaker who specialized in making clogs for fishermen; admittedly Gabotto's footnote expresses some doubts over accepting Valla's *Recriminationes* as a source but this piece of Valla slander, taken from a work of pure revenge for Facio's similar attacks, still received more notice than it should have in Gabotto's text. It took another generation of scholars before the first guess was made, correctly, that Facio and his father both, like so many humanists, were notaries. For now the dispute is

of importance because it ostensibly arose over differences of historiographical technique: Facio, in his *Invectivae contra Laurentiam Vallam*, goes to some lengths to explain what is wrong with Valla's views on historiography and what is correct about his own. He, incidentally, also takes a little time to defend his tract *De vitae felicitate*.

At first Facio, Panormita and Valla were at Alfonso's court together and were fairly friendly. Valla's possibly overly aggressive bearing in the disputation for which Alfonso's court was famous started a rift between him and Panormita: Valla, for example, must have been aware of the embarrassment he caused Panormita in purposely quizzing him in Latin knowing that Panormita's weaker command of Latin did not enable him to do otherwise than reply in Italian. Things got worse when Valla's *De voluptate* was published for there it is Panormita who defends, rather well in fact, Epicureanism (Later Facio wrote his *De vitae felicitate* where Panormita defends the contemplative life). Facio followed Panormita and their chance for revenge came when Valla submitted his *Historiarum Ferdinandi Regis Aragoniae* to Alfonso for criticism. The book, in an unfinished state, was confided to the court librarian unread since Alfonso was suddenly called from Naples. Facio and Panormita schemed successfully to get the manuscript for their own purposes. Facio declared open war on Valla and Valla's history with his *Invectivae*. Valla's return salvo was his *Recriminationes*.

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dissertation (Columbia University, 1975), p. 3. Marchiori, p. 6, chides Garin for stating in 1941 that Facio was born "... di assai umile famiglia."

Facio was abetted by Poggio in this feud which for a time gave Facio more renown than his more honest intellectual efforts. Although the quarrel had died down before Valla's death, Facio, at the end of his own life, could not resist remarking a bit unfairly in his biography of Valla in De viris illustribus that Valla wrote "... de summo bono, quod in voluptate constituit...." (p. 23).

It is to be wondered if Facio did himself any justice at all in expounding his historiographical theories in the *Invectivae*. The opinions expressed there provoked from Remigio Sabbadini the remark that Facio, more than other humanist historians, placed too much emphasis on the literary side of the writing of history, the rhetorical flourishes, thereby exhibiting the worst defect of the age, "sacrificing substance to form." In the light of what has already been said about Facio's actual historical work it would not be fair to adapt Valla's taunt about Facio's diminutive stature, "inter minutissimos, minutissimis," and to characterize him as an historian as "inter pessimos, pessimus." There is rhetoric, it is true, but there is also some substance; otherwise, he would not be such a source, for example, for the Neapolitan Wars. Sticking to the *Invectivae* (as Sabbadini apparently did) it is possible to extract Facio's general theory of historiography.

1. Kristeller, "Bartolomeo Facio", p. 60. Gabotto, pp. 178-179, gives two examples of phrases resulting from this conflict which have become part of the folklore of humanism: Valla's reference to Facio's stature as mentioned in my text and Paolo Giovio's verse which has confused scholars by wrongly implying that Facio died soon after Valla: "Ne in Elysii sine vindice Valla susurret/Facius haud multos post obit ipse dies."

2. *Il metodo degli umanisti* (Florence, 1922), p. 82.
In doing this certain dangers must be kept in mind. Constantly this dissertation has warned of the difficulties of taking anyone's, particularly a humanist's, "free standing theories" at face value. This is all the more dangerous when the work is a form of polemic: the author is likely to take a firmer grasp than he might on issues where he has possibly caught his opponent in error if only to make his opponent's case the worse. Despite these reservations the broad outline of what Facio feels is wrong with Valla's history says something of what history should be: those parts of these invectives which deserve greatest caution are the personal attacks on Valla. The Invectivae are consistent in explaining the theory and then showing how and where Valla specifically erred; to lend them further weight as representing Facio's credo, it can be said that they are consonant with Facio's efforts in the De bello Veneto/Alid parvi, the Rerum gestarum Alphonsi and the De viris illustribus. Sabbadini's disparagement of Facio has not been forgotten nor has my contention that Facio has meat on the bones of his history. It is just that Sabbadini has taken Facio's literary stricture more exclusively to heart than he has taken Facio's words for example on the need to be objective and truthful in the writing of history.

At the outset of the Invectivae Facio claims easily to have found around five hundred errors in Book One of Valla's life of Ferdinand. Facio apologizes that he has not the time nor the space to list them all but that he will give a representative sampling and it is true that the majority of his examples are literary, errors of Latin usage and the like. It is particularly in the first part of the first invective that Facio discourses on the "elegance" of style proper to history. The modern reader, if he accepts Facio's
assessment of Valla's work at all, probably would have sided with Valla: the most striking and offensive passages are those on such things as choosing words to suit the social rank of the mouth from which they issue or not mentioning someone's lust for a queen because such forthright portrayals of man's sexuality are unseemly to history and are more appropriate to satire.¹

However this is not the only sort of historical fault Facio has found. He himself divides the errors "... alios circa latinitatem, alios circa explanationem, in quibus te principem facis, alios circa historie dignitatem, atque artem" (p. 500). Facio is not just concerned with the "dignity" of history and it is easy to seize upon that as his meaning for elegance. He takes some pains, within the literary side of the historian's task, to argue for a proper ordering of events as an aid to understanding — information should be presented in such a way that it can be comprehended. (p. 547). The proper ordering of events is bringing us away from the "dignity" of history to the "art" of history. Before we fully abandon "dignity" to the scrapheap of quattrocento conceits, it must be borne in mind

¹ Invectivae in Roberto Valentini, "Le invettive di Bartolomeo Facio contro Lorenzo Valla", Rendiconti della R. Accademia dei Lincei, Classe di Scienze, Morali e Storie, XV (1906); for example pp. 527 and 535. On a more purely grammatical level: "'Ferdinandum enim infanatem esse castelle.' Vulgari nomine uti nihil te puduit: cum ea quae propria non sunt, liceat nobis iudicio arbitrioque nostro per circuitiornem proferre elegantius. Quis autem est tam imperitus rerum scriptor, aut tam illiteratus homo qui neogiat infantes regios filios appellari?" (p. 507) or see pages 505 and 515 where Valla, the author of the Elegantiae linguae latinae, is shown clearly to have erred in classical usage. For a final illustration of Facio's attitude on this sort of thing, "'Profetare tamen audere.' Semper, ut video, in summa copia laborabis verborum inopia, die queso, ubinam apud livium, aut cesarem, aut Salustium hoc verbum reperisti? cum historiam scribas, historiograhos imitar, debuisti, qui id tum divinare, tum presagire, tum augurari, tum vaticinari, [sic] tum ariolari, dixerunt: ut unum ex tam multis tibi inmentem [sic] venire debuerit. sed aliquid ecclesiasticum scribere te putasti." (p. 528).
that teachers of history today continue to show care for the formal writing style of their students for reasons similar to those chosen by Facio: it is only some of his ideas on "dignity" that seem most out of place to us.

Beyond this concern for the proper packaging of history lies the recognition that the main task of the historian is to present his material clearly, without contradiction (p. 514), without senseless digressions (pp. 518-519) and, most importantly, to present the truth. On this last point Facio, therefore, berates Valla rather severely for errors in historical detail. The greatest number of these relate to Valla's poor knowledge of the geography of Spain and Facio delights in mocking Valla's mistakes here. 1 No less significant is Facio's complaint that Valla has too cumbersome and tedious a view of the historical process. Therefore in assessing Valla's views on causation Facio, having just warned Valla there are places where he does not explain enough, admonishes: "Sed in scilicet occupatus es, ut doceas bellum aut odio, aut similitate, aut invidia, aut metu, aut avaritia nasci solere. Quasi vero non alijs de causis bellum oriri possit. An ignoras interdum suspicione injuriae, interdum feminarum raptu, vel alia huiusmodi gravi causa atrociissima bella suscitari." (pp. 519-520). Facio realizes that there are times when it is best to be brief and times when this is not so. Facio could be making too much of a virtue of brevity of style but the passage cited at least proves that he is aware of the complexity of events however tersely he

1. P. 510, for example. Facio's manner brings to mind his complaints about Decembrio's translation of Arrian's De gestis Alexandri, the ineptitude of which Facio tells us necessitated his own translation: in Chacon, Bibliothec, col. 891.
himself may present them on paper.

It is one of history's ironies that Facio's life of Alfonso has proved a greater source for the modern scholar than has Valla's life of Ferdinand (unless he is interested in anecdotes about the worthies of the fifteenth century). This does not mean that Facio fails to remain in essence a humanist historian. Symptomatic of this attitude is a letter to the teacher of his son where he asks that greater emphasis in his son's education be put on morals than on learning. With such an attitude, it is not surprising that so much of what the humanists wrote seemed to be without substance. Especially their forays into philosophy have been much maligned for this reason. In this regard Facio's tracts *De vitae felicitate* and *De excellentia ac praestantia hominis* have been subjected to some of the severest criticism Facio has received.

Before we examine these tracts, one of which is a dialogue, it might be well to keep in mind a doctoral dissertation on the Renaissance dialogue by Giovanna Wyss Morigi. There the tradition of the dialogue (and related forms) is shown to be more varied than most would have imagined. Particularly in the Latin world, the dialogue did not just mean a disciplined argument or dialectic to the resolution of an objective problem in some sort of "scientific" fashion. No less reputable a design was the dialogue as a teaching forum - a literary tool for conventional moralizing. In the eyes of their contemporaries, the humanists were not so thoroughly


unsuccessful with the dialogue as they appear to have been to us today.

The first of Facio's two tracts to be written, the De vitae felicitate, demonstrates another seeming duplication of a work by Valla, his De voluntate. Both represent dialogues in three parts which try to resolve the question of how is man to achieve true happiness. In most comparisons of the two pieces, Facio tends to come off the worse at least in repute. Valla's work is known in some measure even by casual students of the Renaissance if only, wrongly, as a successful attack of Epicureanism or paganism upon traditional Christian values. Valla's historical writing, on the other hand, has been relatively ignored by serious students of humanism. For Facio the reverse is true because the balance of his fame shifts in the direction of historiography.

There is one immediate reason for the disappointing nature of Facio's De vitae felicitate. It is the too facile and too direct a manner in which traditional Christianity triumphs over other philosophies and value systems. The conclusions have a predictability which strips the dialogue of the sense of development and of drama which is one of the great merits of the dialogue form. Of course it is to be expected that Christianity would win out in the end - it does in all of the quattrocento dialogues of this sort, even that of the most religiously suspect of authors of such a

1. When the Spanish humanist Juan de Lucena attempted a dialogue on this theme, supposedly he chose Facio as a model to keep as far from Epicureanism and unorthodoxy as possible: Margherita Morreale, "El tratado de Juan de Lucena sobre la felicidad", Rivista de Filología Hispánica, IX, 1 (1955), 1.
tract, Platina. It is the manner in which Facio arrives at his foregone conclusions that makes the book stylistically and historically uninteresting to any reader without a special interest in Facio himself. Valla at least gives Christianity a chance to defeat a serious challenge. Perhaps it is Facio's failure in this regard that prompted Lynn Thorndike twice to characterize the contents of the De vitae felicitate as "rather insipid." If one falls into line with nineteenth century scholars and looks for a clear triumph of paganism, then all such tracts will seem insipid starting with Petrarch's De remediis utriusque fortunae.

This fault is so obvious that almost as soon as he had finished writing the dialogue, Facio was defending himself for allowing certain disputants to bow too easily. In a letter to Roberto Strozzi which is often appended to manuscripts of the dialogue, Facio explains that the case for the winner was so superior that it would have been senseless to drag things out once an example had been made of the losers. To Valla Facio makes the sharp explanation that Giovanni Lamonela, the disputant who offered the least resistance, did

1. "Some Unpublished Renaissance Moralists", p. 119 and Science and Thought, p. 186. Facio would probably not have found much consolation in the two following slightly more favourable assessments of the De vitae felicitate: "Scritti in un latino chiaro ed elegante possono sembrare esercitazioni letterarie, ma sono, invece, indici, pur nella loro umiltà, d'una orientazione nuova nella impostazione del problem della felicità e della eccellenza e dignità dell'uomo;" Giuseppe Saitta, Il pensiero italiano nell'umanesimo e nel Rinascimento: vol. I, L'umanesimo (Bologna, 1949), pp. 465-466; and "The dialogue has little originality..." this "... does not detract from the dialogue's intrinsic value, which lies in the crispness and elegance with which Facio reviews the arguments of older philosophies, especially Cicero, Augustine and Lactantius;" Rao, p. 8.

2. In De viris illustribus, p. xxxv.
not hold out more fiercely because Lamola, "Unlike you Valla," is not contentious by nature.¹

Facio had been a pupil of Guarino da Verona as had been Giovanni Lamola. The disputants are Guarino, Lamola and Facio's old friend Panormita (Antonio Beccadelli). It was around 1434 that Facio was in Ferrarra with the circle depicted in the dialogue.² The dialogue itself dates to the years 1445-1447 while Facio was in Naples and it is dedicated to Alfonso I.³

In playing down the importance of such things as the active life, Facio's dialogue treads directly upon topics dear to this dissertation. Since Facio argues little beyond the idea that ultimate human happiness resides in the afterlife, there is no reason to expect him to be making any sort of argument for supernatural determinism. In fact in advancing the well worn notion that true happiness is not to be found in the active life, even Facio is aware that he can retain a belief in the "good things" of this world and still keep intact his thesis that the ultimate test is the afterlife. For this reason Facio later bothered to defend himself to Valla for his own attack on the worldly "goods" of Aristotle with the explanation that they are fine so far as they go, in this life, but they fall short when one thinks of any "later" life.⁴ It would have been better had this

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¹ Invectivae, p. 538.
² Gabotto, pp. 131-132.
³ Gabotto, pp. 138-139 and Rao, p. 7. Facio apologized for attempting such a popular topic but claimed he had read nothing on it that had satisfied him: De vitae felicitate, Fondo Chigi S IV 115, fol. 1b. Trinkaus, In Our Image, I, 176 thinks that Facio wrote his dialogue as an answer to Valla's De voluptate.
⁴ Invectivae, p. 557.
dialogue become known by one of its alternative and more illuminating
titles, De vita beata. With that in mind one would be more prepared
to put in their proper context Guarino's proofs that the "beata vita"
does not reside in such things as riches (fol. 6b), in the military
life (fol. 14a), in the literary life (fol. 27b) or even, and this is
significant, in the clerical life per se (fol. 20a). Lamola relied
heavily on examples drawn from ancient history in making these points.
Panormita, in Book II, defends the contemplative life and mostly
finds support for his arguments from philosophers and the Church
Fathers. With Guarino to correct him, Panormita eventually arrives
at a definition of the contemplative life that means contemplation of
God. Book III is occupied by Guarino's description of the joys of
this future life, for instance, freedom from cares (foll. 46b-47a).

Giuseppe Saitta is one of the few scholars to view Facio's De
vitae felicitate as representative of humanism; to that opinion he
adds, "... il bene sommo che è la stessa immortalità dello spirito
... Nè soltanto di Lattanzio, ma anche d'Isidoro e di Agostino
egli si serve per chiarire il concetto d'immortalità come la metà che
all'uomo si addice. Ma va al di là di questi autori e si ricollega
ad un platonismo cristianizzato quando cerca di provare che solo
l'uomo è capace d'immortalità, perché solo l'uomo è partecipe della
divinità." It is the deification of man. (p. 466). To this
reader Saitta is overemphasizing the degree to which Facio "deifies"
man: Facio does do it but no more than St. Augustine makes man
divine or Christianity platonico. The significant feature of this
tract is that it effects a neat dichotomy between this life and the
Christian afterlife such that a Christian can indulge successfully in
both with the understanding that the latter is ultimately the more
important.

As was true for Facio's histories, the most dangerous brush this dialogue has with determinism is the use of the concept of fortune. In the dialogue itself, fortune is employed in a definite sense of "blind luck," a fortune which can be actively overcome or adapted to. [foll. 10ª, 15ª, 23ª, 25ª(twice), and 40ª]. It is in the Prohemium to the dialogue that fortune receives its greatest credibility. There Facio asks Alfonso to whom the work is dedicated, "Quis unite vel prudentia vel magnitudine vel equitate, vel moderatione, (vel)¹ clementia vel facilitate vel liberalitate praestantior? (Quis satis illustrior? Quis praeeret in gerendis rebus felicior?) Cum omni cogito quantopere tibi fortuna favorunt in amplificando paterno regno. You seem to me to be one not only favoured by fortune but one with whom fortune complies." (fol. 2ª). Facio may be waxing eloquent for his patron but here fortune seems a little more than "mere luck." Luck it still is but that sort of juxtaposition to a series of active virtues suggests a slightly greater reliance upon the efficacy of fortune than is present in the dialogue proper or in Facio's histories.

Soon after finishing De vita felicitate Facio began his near companion piece De excellentis ac praestantia hominis. It was dedicated to Pope Nicholaus V in 1447 or 1448 and Professor Kristeller has referred to it as the "... earliest humanist work entirely concerned with the dignity of man." Kristeller thinks the most interesting feature of the work is often overlooked, that man's

1. Manuscript variations found in Ottob. Lat. 1651, fol. 3ª.
dignity resides most especially in the immortality of the soul which gives him a future life.\(^1\) Not only does the conclusion to the tract parallel *De vitae felicitate*, but also the statement by Kristeller follows the tradition of Saitta. Rather than establishing a secular, worldly humanism, Facio keeps within the bounds set by the Church Fathers. Still if one is a Christian, what other conclusion is possible?

Facio, and most other humanists writing on this theme, are remarkable for the emphasis they place on man's special, God-like nature and the optimism with which they view man's potentials within the realities of this admittedly lesser world. In a letter to Giovanni Spinola Facio summarized his tract for us: "Nec minus jocundus erit tibi, ut puto, libellus alter de Hominis excellentia, cum videris, quam magna, quam varia, quamque admirabilia homini a Deo et a Natura data esse demonstrare; ex quibus eius dignitas summa appareat, ac prope divina. Quae res, partim ex philosophia, partim ex ipsa theologia vitae nostrae ducet, depromptae sunt."\(^2\)

Facio gives as a reason for writing this *opusculum* the expected allusion to a desire to complement Innocent III's dissertation on the misery of the human condition. Facio fully understood Innocent had also planned a work on man's dignity. (fol. 1a). Whether Innocent or any other medieval figure could have chosen to argue quite like

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2. In Mitarelli, col. 376.
Facio is a matter for debate, however the degree to which nothing similar was actually written can most quickly be illustrated by an analogy to the fact that no medieval statue exudes quite the force, the *virtù* of Michelangelo's *David*. Facio gives man a position of power and achievement on this earth only superseded by the possibilities open to him in the spiritual life. (foll. 22\(b\) - 24\(a\)). In either case these prospects derive from God by granting man his own special nature in his own divinity. (for example, foll. 6\(b\) and 15\(b\) - 16\(a\)). Man's beauty of form, achievements in arts and sciences, his advances in government, his reason and his free will all come from his God-like nature. Just as it is a property of God's divinity to be free of necessity, (fol. 6\(a\)), so men in sharing that divinity shares freedom (foll. 6\(b\) - 7\(a\) and 12\(a\)-b). Choice belongs to men whether it means effective action in this world - man's talents, his arts - or opting for "platonic" elevation and participation in the celestial life. (foll. 7\(a\)-b, 19\(b\), 5\(a\) and 39\(a\)). Although all this comes from God's special gift to man, it is man himself who takes responsibility for his deeds on earth. (fol. 4\(b\)). The Platonic elements of this dignity are obvious enough but Saitta deserves credit for recognizing the degree to which Facio declares worldly men "... il dominatore di tutta la realtà ...."¹ This is the fruition, in a more spiritualized "Platonic" sense, of the Scholastic attempt at taking God "out" of man's immediate reality such that men functions in a rational intelligible world with his own

¹ P. 468: Saitta also recognizes the degree to which Facio is building upon Lactantius' *De spifice Dei*. 
choices and responsibilities. (fol. 4b). It is not the secular humanism identified by scholars such as Ludwig Pastor but it is a humanism just the same. The comparison with Michelangelo’s David was seriously intended.

The operative separation of man’s world and God’s world set forth in Facio’s theoretical opuscula is confirmed in his historical works. The checksheet for the collation of his histories at the head of this chapter records seven "determinist" causations as opposed to seven hundred and forty-four nondeterminist ones. Within that determinist class only one is given as "supernatural" and there the interfering agent is not God but fortune. This one incidence comes from the De bello Veneto/Alius parvi and was discussed at length there. For now it is sufficient to recall that it was not so direct an intercession by a supernatural agency, let alone God, as to worry us much in contrast to Facio’s overwhelming sense of man’s conducting his own affairs on earth completely free of supernatural and, as the other six "determinist" causations show, relatively free of natural determinist agents.

Of the natural determinist agents Facio leans most heavily on the idea of "human nature" as determined by national traits. The actual historical situations have already been mentioned in the Rerum gestarum Alphonsi but it is possible to add that in Facio’s other


2. Facio does not find much use for even casual, conventional invocations of God in his more relaxed, nonhistorical writings such as letters: Mittarelli publishes letters to Giovanni Spinola with two such applications, for example "... cuius fruendi [Spinola’s company] si mihi potestas a Diis immortalibus data esset ...." (coll. 373-374 and 376).
writings he makes a few more references to a concept of national traits that shape behaviour. Again Facio seems to be projecting a sense of Italian cultural superiority.  

The "nondeterminist" class shows a heavy reliance (five hundred and two) on "direct operatives" but this is not surprising keeping in mind that the works studied were basically military histories. Despite this the remaining two hundred and forty-two occurrences in that category evidence a wide variety of alternate causation with the greatest single number falling under the heading of "psychological, character and intellectual factors." Within that latter category one might be taken aback upon noting how limited Facio was in his choice of words. This habit has already been mentioned in regard to metus and the Rerum gestarum Allobonai. Adding the De bello Veneto/Alius pars to the sample has not helped the situation by much. 

Limited though his diction may be (the price of a clear and direct style?) Facio in his historical and nonhistorical writing is an author fully within the tradition both of a Renaissance faith in free will and a humanism with Christian roots. The collation shows ten incidences of his major stumbling block in this regard, fortune, within the nondeterminist class. There we see fortune as something which, much like windy conditions during a naval battle, affects the

1. These are not particularly strong characterizations and their derogatory nature depends on subtleties of diction. For instance in a letter to Giovanni Spinola Facio declares, "Sed de his hactenus; Manfredus noster ad nos pervenit, et Lonchinis valet, ubi per aliquid spatium mortem contrahet existima. Barbari enim illi Britanni, qui arma contra regiam ceperrant malestatem, pacati sunt ...." (col. 374). Facio is not calling all Britons "Barbari" but those who took up arms he labels as such; the point is that he never chose any such word for any remotely similar circumstance involving Italians; see also De origine belii, col. 893 and De viris illustribus, p. 70.
strategies to be used but does not necessitate a particular sequence of events. Facio's nonhistorical works, especially the De vitae felicitate, continue this theme. Here it is fortune that can be overcome by active virtue. The distribution of causations in the collation demonstrates that the active choices open to man are those that shape his world.

1. See also a letter to Jacobo Lavagnola in Sabbadini, "Bartolomeo Facio", p. 35 and letters to Spinola in Mitarelli, coll. 373 and 376 and in De viris illustribus, pp. 52 and 73.
Chapter V

Comparisons Between Platina, Palmieri and Facio:

Historiography and Determinism

The preceding chapters have tried to limit their subject matter in two important and obvious respects. The first of these has been a tendency to discuss the three historians with little reference to the others. The second of these has been to treat of their histories and other writings only in so far as both refer to the issues of causation and determinism. It would have been possible in this second regard to have spent more time on those other aspects of a more purely historiographical nature such as style, the use of speeches, the handling of sources, borrowings from classical historians and so on.

Other scholars, addressing themselves to Platina and Palmieri, have covered this ground well enough; this is not the case with Facio and he has accordingly received the most attention in this thesis. At any rate having examined all three individually, it is now possible to make comparisons between the three of them. In this chapter Platina, Palmieri and Facio will be considered for some summary conclusions.

1. Something has been or will be said of all of these except the critical use of sources. For our purposes it will suffice to say that by writing mostly contemporary history, Palmieri and Facio do not provide much that is useful for discussion; for Platina, see Palermino, pp. 46-66. None of our three historians rises to the sort of critical use of, especially documentary, sources of Bruni: Emilio Santini, "Leonardo Bruni Aretino e i suoi Historiarum Florentini populi Libri XII", Annali della R. Scuola Normale Superiore di Pisa, Filosofia e filologia XII (1910), 60-61, 80-81 and 90-92; Blackman, p. 274, defends Bruni against the adverse criticisms of Felix Gilbert on his use of sources.
about their general historiographical technique, particularly their philosophies of history, before they are scrutinized together on the issue of determinism.

The most obvious point of departure for a discussion of anyone's technique for the writing of history is that of the choice of subject matter. True to a Renaissance commonplace, borrowed from the ancients, history for Platina, Palmieri and Facio is essentially about biography, politics and war. Our three historians differ on the attention they give to social, economic, psychological or cultural factors for instance but all three subsume these issues into the overall framework of history as biography, politics and war. Within these categories Platina receives pride of place as the best biographer and Facio as the best military historian. It is difficult to offer any honours to Palmieri as the best political historian. Although he is the best known of the three for a book on a political theme, his Della vita civile, and although he was the only politician of the three, he does not exhibit a sophistication in his history writing that materially exceeds that of Platina or Facio. On the other hand the subject matter of Palmieri's histories is more exclusively political and this is reflected in his vastly higher proportion of political causations to other causations over Platina and Facio. Looking to

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1. Ferguson, p. 3, is justified in observing on the humanists' major formal histories: "Taking the classical historians as models, the humanists restricted the scope of history to a literary narrative of political and military events."

2. See particularly my comments about the Vita Acciaiolii and the De captivitate in Chapter III.
those figures Platina shows one political for every four thousand
one hundred and thirty-one words, Facto has one for every six
thousand three hundred and sixty words while Palmieri has one for
every twelve hundred words. Palmieri is a quantitative though not
a qualitative victor. Taking it another way, roughly three per
cent of Platina's total causations are political in nature as are
two per cent of Facto's and seven per cent of Palmieri's causations. 1

Facto's title to best military historian rests more on the
liveliness and coherence with which he narrated the Neapolitan Wars.
In quantitative terms he usually did better than the others.
Taking his histories as a whole, "stratagems and acts" of a military
nature or "II R 6 b's" comprise fifty-three per cent of all
causations while for Platina and Palmieri they form thirty-eight per
cent and forty-three per cent respectively. Narrowing the sample
for each down to their most military of historical works in terms of
subject matter, the result for Palmieri's De captivitate Pidarum is
forty-two percent, for Platina's In historiam urbis Mantuae it is
fifty-four percent and for Facto's Rerum gestarum Alphonsi Primi it
is also fifty-four percent. These statistics do not vary enough
to be significant nor do they provide much of a measure of
historical talent in this regard. They do give an indication of
the degree to which warfare intrudes into these humanists' analyses.

1. All of these proportions and percentages have the same relative
value whether or not the class "II R 6. " or "Direct operatives"
is included. In the figures given above that class is included
but it is worth noting that all three historians happened to
have used this category in roughly the same ratio to the other
categories. For our purposes, purposes which involve
comparisons, whether or not that class is included is therefore
immaterial and for the sake of convenience, all figures will
encompass that class.
Better measures for military historiographical skill are such things as details of strategies, explanations of the causes of war and so on. Facio has the longest and best focused historical effort along these lines; the degree to which his *Rerum gestarum AlphonsiPrim* ignores the personality of Alfonso and keeps to the complicated tale of the Neapolitan Wars displays a thematic single-mindedness often lacking in *quattrocento* historical writing.

In praising Platina for being the best biographer of the three the compliment does not result from a biographical single-mindedness of purpose in his *Vitae*, his *Vita Victorini* or his *Vita Millini* equivalent to that Facio displays for deeds in his military history. These biographies, particularly those of the *Vitae* where Platina often seems to be writing also a universal history of papal and imperial politics, provide a broken biographical narrative by today's standards for this genre. Nevertheless, in the biographies of the *Vitae* Platina rises to the highest standards of biography as character sketch in demonstrating what Burckhardt called the Italian "... search for the characteristic features of remarkable men...." (p. 200). This is most particularly true for the lives of popes with whom Platina was contemporary or nearly contemporary and Platina, beyond relating the events of a man's life, matches Suetonius in his ability to paint a striking verbal portrait of a man by using physical description, anecdotes, by recalling the man's favourite sayings and his personal habits. One quotation should illustrate not only Platina's talents in this regard but also his

1. For more on Platina's talents as a biographer and stylist, see Palermino, pp. 51-60.
much praised concise yet neatly balanced style of writing, something
for which my chapters on Palmieri and Facio offer no such praise.

This passage is from the life of Pius II which appears in the Vitae:  

Vivendi autem rationem ita patiebatur ut oculi et 
desidia accusari nullo modo posset. Surgebat mene aurora 
illusive, et habita ratione valetudinis, ac re divina 
caste et pie facta, ad negotia publica statim egrediebatur. 
Fundus officio, ac per Hortos recreandi animi gratia 
delatus, prandebat. Mediocri cibo utebatur non exquisito 
et lauto. Cibos raro aibi apparari iussit, quod 
apponebatur, hoc edebat. Vini parcissimae, dilutique ac 
lenis magis quam austeri amator. Sumpto cibo, dimidio 
horae cum domesticis aut fabulabatur, aut disputabat. 
Cubiculum deinade ingressus, cum paululum quievisset, horis 
cannonici de more repetitis, tandem legebat aut scribecbat, 
donec ei per manera publica licuisset. Ideam faciebat 
noctu, quod die post cenan; nam et legebat et dictabat 
usque ad multam noctem in lecto incens: nec amplius quam 
horis quinque aut sex quiescebat. Homo fuit staturas 
brevis, caput habuit ante annos canum, faciem ante dies 
senectam prae se ferentem. Aspectu severitatem faciebat 
conditus ostenebatur. Circa cultum corporis neque morosus, 
neque negligens, laboris paticens habebat. Sitim sequo 
amino et famen toleravit. Robustum et corpus natura 
dedebat, quod tamen longae peregrinationes, et cerebri 
labores, et frequentes vigilae attriverant. Ascendebant 
morbi eius familiarissimi, tussis, calculus et podagra; 
quibus ita persaepe cruciabatur, ut praeter uniam vocem 
nil ei, quare vivus dici posset, relictum videretur. (p. 358)

My chapters on Palmieri and Facio make the failings of each of these 
historians as biographers clear enough. Facio is the less to be 
blamed since he did not aim for true biography in any of his 
historical writings.

From the preceding chapters it should also be clear that all of 
these historians do not engage in many consistent technical 
borrowings from the classical historians. All show a general

1. This is essentially an abridgement of a separate life of Pius II 
which Platina wrote ca. 1465, Vita Pii II Pontificis Maximi, ed. 
attentiveness to classical precedent but none of the three exhibit the sort of slavishness to the classics for which so many humanists are popularly faulted. Platina does use the format of the classical (Suetonian) character sketch but he does not employ it in the formulaic manner of an Einhard: Platina has, in his unmistakable way, given a biography of Pius II which presents the man as a unique individual. Similarly in his Latinity Platina shows a flexibility and willingness to adapt and neither he nor Palmieri nor Facio demonstrate the later petrification of Ciceronianism marked by Pietro Bembo.

One classical borrowing that is used extensively by these three historians is the speech as a narrative device; speeches are most evident in their civic/military history. Palmieri and Facio use them well in their major historical works, the De captivitate Pisarum and the Rerum gestarum Alphonsi Prim. Here, much as with the great Roman historians like Tacitus, the speech is not only used as a purely stylistic device but to crystallize a series of events, to expose a person's character, and so on. Platina is the most interesting in that he is not very effective in his handling of the speech, but then again, he does not rely on them as much as do Palmieri and Facio. The In historiam urbis Mantuæ, one third of

1. This attitude is best illustrated in Platina's Prohemium to his Vitæ: "Non negaverim tamen huic generi scribendi difficultatem quandam inesse, cum nudis verbis interdum, ac minus latinis quaedam exprimenda sunt, quae in nostra Theologia continentur. Hae autem ad latinitatem qui referat, magnas perturbationes ingenii nostrorum temporum hac consuetudine imbutis afferat necesse est, mutatis præsertim terminis, unde omnis disputandi ac rationandi series colligitur. Sed habeat hanc quoque auctoritatem aetas nostra, vel Christiana Theologia potius. Fingat nova vocesula, latina faciat, ne veteribus tantummodo id licuisse videatur." (p. 4).
Platina’s historical output in terms of number of words, shows a widespread reliance on speeches which only contribute to a dramatic effect and make no other historiographical contribution. This history has already been faulted for this and other weaknesses in the section following its checksheet. On the other hand, Platina’s major historical effort, the *Vitae*, demonstrates a discreet and limited use of speeches and a dependence on other devices to lend the work coherence such as didactic themes. In this Platina is the most matured of the three.

Platina has a number of themes which act as threads to tie together this otherwise often unrelated cluster of biographies. These themes have all been discussed in my Litt. thesis; they are the need to wage war on the Turks, the behaviour suited to secular princes and the need for a reform of the clergy including the papacy (allied to this is a patchy picture of the general institutional changes the papacy has undergone).\(^1\) Without straying too far from the concerns of this thesis, it is possible to say that Palmieri also gives some evidence of this sort of thematic development. The Renaissance historian, certainly Platina and Leonardo Bruni, could be accused of a direct borrowing of the cycle theory from the pagans, especially as it relates to explaining success followed by decline. This is of importance to determinism so it will receive some notice here.

The ancient philosophers whether Stoic or Epicurean or whether Plato or Aristotle advance a cyclical theory of history.\(^2\) The basic

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1. See particularly pp. 72-73, 76-77 and 107-134. See also pp. 63 and 61-62 of this thesis.

2. A good summary of these views appears in Grace E. Cairns,
schema employed by the Renaissance historians can be found most explicitly in the philosophy of history of the ancient historians popular in the Renaissance such as Livy, Tacitus, Polybius and Sallust. Sallust gives a neatly packaged version of this historical framework which serves as an overall explanatory device for so many Renaissance thinkers. His 

Cataline puts this ambitious, self-seeking individual forward as an example of the decline of 

virtus Romana within the following context of Rome's general decline: "At first the lust of money increased, then that of power, and these, it may be said, were the sources of every evil. Avarice subverted loyalty, uprightness, and every other good quality, and in their stead taught men to be proud and cruel, to neglect the gods, and to hold all things venal." Augustine fought against the cycle implicit in this sort of progression and this pattern's resurfacing in the Renaissance suggests the rejection of the Christian linear theory of history. The 

trecento Paduan "proto-humanist" Albertino Mussato uses an adaptation of the cycle theory to explain Padua's decline after 1311; Bruni has republican civic virtue and liberty rise and fall; Machiavelli sees such a rhythm for, among other things, virtus bellica; Vasari for the history of art and Platina for the history of the Church. In some respects preempting

Philosophies of History: Meeting of East and West in Cycle Pattern Theories of History (Westport, Conn., 1962), pp. 204-224. For the ancient background, see also Frank F. Hamilton, Shapes of Philosophical History (Stanford, Calif., 1965), pp. 7-13.

1. 


2. Mussato's ideas especially appear in both his De traditione Patavii and his De lite inter naturam et fortunam; J. K. Hyde, (Cont'd.)
Reformation publicists, Platina invokes materialism as the operative agent for the decline of the pure and simple Apostolic Church to the corrupt institution of his own day. Neither Facio nor Palmieri, though Palmieri comes closer, so flirt with so sweeping a possible foundation for determinism.¹

This is a possible determinism of natural causes, the potential determinism of Aristotle and the natural philosophers as mentioned in Chapter I: if "p", then "q" - having "p" necessitates "q". When dealing with limited, individual events, this need put no overall necessity into human affairs but when such a generalization is writ large, it gives finality to what was a mere possibility for the outcome of events. The key point is whether the writer believes success corrupts virtue with the inevitability of the chain of events in a natural phenomenon such as the stages in a chemical reaction or the changing of the seasons. Assuming he so believes, although success corrupts virtue, does not virtue lead to success? And if that is so, then virtue must inevitably lead to corruption and decline;

Bruni is the least obvious here; Hans Baron observed the pattern both in Bruni’s Laudatio and his History of the Florentine People: both have "... two strands of interest: to establish the center of the history of the ancient world in the rise and fall of civic freedom and energy; and to understand the freedom of the Florentine city-republic as a resumption of the work accomplished in ancient city-states." Further than this, the History of the Florentine People shows: "A realization that Italy and in particular ancient Etruria, had been covered with independent city-states, and that much of this flowering life was subdued by Rome’s ascendancy but rose again after the destruction of the Imperium Romanum - this wider vista was needed before a ripe dynamic concept of history could emerge, and before the idea of a God-willed universal Empire, transcending history, could be overthrown by a realistic vision of historical growth and decay." Crisis of the Early Italian Renaissance (Princeton, N.J., 1955), I, 52-53; see also Joseph A. Blackman, "Leonardo Bruni and the Renaissance of History in Italian Humanism", Unpub. Ph.D. thesis (North Texas State, 1977), pp. 304-305.

¹ Pp. 82 and 90-91 of this thesis.
and if virtue precedes (and hence proceeds from) success, does it not arise from failure and decline... otherwise how can one account for its presence? A cycle is born. Should an historian admit to the inflexibility of such a sequence, to whatever extent he accepts it as a valid generalization he has conceded it to be so, then any didactic intent he may have is in vain. Human affairs are part of an unchangeable cycle: the chain of causation binds those who arrive once the process has begun.

Platina, however, has a serious didactic intent. His exhortations for the end of the process of decline in the Church presumes a belief that the pattern can be actively altered by man. In fact he, like so many who think in terms of the lessons of history, fails to address head on in any of his writings the dilemma his attitude poses. The more one sees patterns, generalizations or lessons in history of a naturalistic or a scientific sort, the more man is bound to that past; the more encompassing the view, the stronger the chains that bind. The extreme in this regard would be Stoicism. Beyond what was said in Chapter II about Platina and determinism, it must be taken for granted that his answer to the dilemma just posed is simply his belief in didactic history. He argues for the active reform of the Church — the pattern can be broken — rather than passively waiting for the depths of corruption and decline so that virtue can inevitably arise from that state of decadence.

Of our three historians, as already mentioned, Platina gives the only real attention to a form of cycle theory or any similar interpretive device. Aside from the obvious avenue of influence represented by the classical historians and philosophers, for
Platina one might particularly pinpoint the poet Virgil. Platina was a Virgil scholar and must have been conversant with Virgil's "messianic" Eclogue which advances a rather Stoic sort of cycle based upon the return of a "Golden Age."

The pagan classics could be, in fact, a source of heresy. The Christian, predominantly Augustinian, linear view of history presumes a uniqueness to historical events along a path from one Creation to one Final Judgement. Renaissance historians of the quattrocento did not write methodi as did say a Jean Bodin so the threat was not then so obvious. The basic technique of the Renaissance for avoiding heresy while retaining the cycle and its tendency towards generalizations in history was to separate profane and sacred history. Frank E. Manuel presents Giambattista Vico as a post-Renaissance example of a "Renaissance subterfuge": "Since prudence dictated that the history of the Jews and the Christian Church be elevated to a separate plane, reasonable men were reluctant to meddle with them ... Vico carefully refrained from relating the history of the Jews to the law of nations and the Jews were not made subject to the vicarii." By exposing the Church to a form of cycle, Platina ventured more than most. This is not only symptomatic of the freer climate of the period before the Counter Reformation, it is a facet of his intellect which, as his troubles with Pope Paul II demonstrated, could appear to be a bit daring in its expressions of paganism. Although the cycle as a fully

1. Eclogue IV, especially 5-9 and 41-46. See Cairns, pp. 201-203. For Platina as a serious student of Virgil, see Lusio-Renier, p. 432.

2. P. 49; see also pp. 24-41 for the opposition of Christianity to the cycle and its heretical tendencies.
developed interpretative device finds its fullest expression in the Renaissance in the sixteenth century, particularly Bruni and Platina in the historiography of the quattrocento make the first significant moves towards the employment of this device.

The more obvious didactic intent underlying Platina's historical works over those of Palmieri and Facio is evidence for the degree to which he is a traditionalist; namely, he is one of those historians who are Ciceronian in that, beyond imitating Cicero's writing style, he looks upon history as "magistra vitae." In a similar vein Quintilian, that other cornerstone of quattrocento humanist education, defined history's purpose as "... laudare claros viros et vituperare improbos." Platina's interest in biography and his historical goals as presented in the Prohemium to In historiam urbis Mantuae and the Vitae show him to be most firmly in this camp. As the student of Vittorino da Feltre, Platina lives up to the truism that Vittorino gave the more moralistic education while Guarino did more towards producing scholars. Facio's historical works, even the De viris illustribus, are more consciously information packed than are Platina's while being less heavy handed in their moralizing or the degree to which the author imposes himself upon the material.

Platina's Prohemium to the Vitae covers all the ground of his earlier Prohemium to his Mantuan history so only the Prohemium to the Vitae will be examined. Whereas Facio's Insectivae are a manifesto of historical technique, Platina's Prohemium is a declaration on the

1. De institutione oratoria (Bk. II, ch. iv); the edition used is The institutio Oratoria of Quintilianus, English summary and concordance by Charles Edgar Little (Nashville, Tenn., 1951), I, 78.
goals of his history. In this specific regard all history is the mistress of life and

... ad prudentiam, ad fortituidinem, ad modestiam, ad omnes denique virtutem animi hominum ita consitantur, ut laude ipsa nil antiquius, turpitudini autem nil detestabilius existiment. Quod si vetere illi, apud quos virtus in precio fuit, celebrari maiorum suorum statuas in Foro collocatas, pro templis ac aliis in locis publicis volabant, ad utilitatem hominum respicientes: quanti a nobis facienda est historia, quae non sua, ut statuae, non vana, ut pictures, veras praeclarorum virorum imagines nobis exprimit, quibusquam loqui, quos consulere et imitari ut vivos fas est. (Hence, Sixtus IV) hac hominum utilitate motus, simulque dignitate ecclesiasticae consulem, non frustra mandasti, ut res gestas pontificum scriberem, ne illorum benefacta persirent negligentia scriptorem, qui suo audore et sanguine hanc republicam Christianam tam amplam nobis, tamque praecaram reliqueris: utque deinceps haberent posteri nostri, quo ad bene beataque vivendum incitarent, cum legendo perdiscent quid imitari, quidve fugere opportinet. (p. 5).

This is an unblushing statement for moralizing history most particularly within the biographical format. The lion's share of Platina's historical output is along these lines: the commemoration of the deeds of worthy men for the utility of posterity. This is truly a sense of history as the equivalent of the statues in the Forum.

Pacio, as has been claimed, does not write with so personally involved an idea of the value of history; Palmieri's historical output is, in terms of sheer volume, more oriented to biography but the Florentine politician Palmieri, both with little stated intent and with any self-seeking aside, seems to be writing more with a second Renaissance classical borrowing in mind: commemoration of great men more purely as a patriotic act and a glorification of la vita attiva. Looking to the classical precedent, Sallust again gives the most striking instance of this position. Combining complementary statements from Catiline and Jugurtha: "To me, indeed,
the only man who really seems to live and enjoy his vital powers is he who, in devotion to some task, seeks the fame of a brilliant exploit or virtuous accomplishment. Where the field is so wide, nature points out different paths to different persons." (pp. 2-3).

"Every man who is anxious to show his superiority over the lower animals may well strive with his utmost power to escape passing his life in obscurity like the cattle whom nature has made to gase on the ground and serve their belly." (p. 1). The Renaissance delight in biography upholds such a belief in the validity of the pursuit of fame and unique achievement. The classical historian can help to provide a basis for this facet of the dignity of man just as did the classical philosopher. Unlike the medieval philosopher, the medieval historian is rather deficient in this regard. It is implied in such an attitude to history that man is a controller of his fate and his life is the expression of his ability to reason and to act upon that reason.¹ It is an indirect argument against determinism.

¹. Yet again Sallust gives to the Renaissance the best summary statement of this issue: "It is the unfounded complaint of mankind that they are naturally weak and shortlived, and that it is chance, not merit, that rules their destiny. So far is this from the truth, that consideration will show that nothing surpasses or excels our nature, and that it is rather energy that is lacking to it than power or length of days. It is mind that is the commander of life in mortal men. Where this advances to glory along the path of virtue its powers, resources, and renown are ample without the help of fortune, for uprightness, activity and other good qualities, fortune can neither give nor take away. Where, on the other hand, it has become the slave of low passions and has succumbed to sloth and bodily pleasures, a short submission to the fatal influence of lust suffices to fritter away strength, opportunities, and intellect, in idleness and then the weakness of our nature receives the blame, and the doers charge circumstances with the defect that lies in themselves." ( Jugurtha, p. 122).
This position is premised upon a world open to manipulation, a world which is rational and which therefore allows for measured calculation. It is a field within which the active man of affairs, the man of moral energy, can express his powers freely, without restraint. In this Burckhardt was justified both in emphasizing Alberti's famous dictum "Men can do all things if they will" and in capturing the spirit of Cellini, "He is a man who can do all and dares do all, and who carries his measure in himself." (pp. 107 and 219 respectively).

The attitude of our historians, particularly Platina and Palmieri, to history is reflected in the degree to which determinism does not surface in their historiography - more will be said about this shortly. It is of interest that all three humanists testify to the general Renaissance belief in free will. As was suggested in Chapter I, the Renaissance truly offered nothing new on the subject but it is fair to say that the Renaissance, much as Facio demonstrated, can be credited with a new emphasis on a traditional issue. For instance, a comparison of St. Thomas or even St. Augustine on God's foreknowledge as to whether or not it predestines events with Valla's discussion of the same issue in his *De libertate arbitrii* makes a mockery of Valla as a disciplined

1. Alfred von Martin, symptomizing a trend of modern historical scholarship, thought this the result of the "bourgeois revolution"; Peter Burke, *Tradition and Innovation in Renaissance Italy* (first published under the title *Culture and Society in Renaissance Italy*, 1972), Fontana ed. (London, 1974), p. 27. This cannot be more than a partial explanation; otherwise, it would be difficult to account for these ideas in the classical world.

philosopher even though Valla's more superficial but more entertaining analysis is an easier pill to swallow. At any rate Valla is symptomatic of a watered down traditionalism.

The two main currents of interest to determinism in the theoretical tracts of the quattrocento are that second aspect of Aristotelianism discussed on p. 44 of this thesis, that is, the individual will and its primacy or ability to self-motivate and that aspect of the Platonic tradition which looks to man as a free agent not so much due to his freedom within a natural world of causally interlocked events and the like but his place as a spiritualised being above the structure of the natural world. Late trecento and early quattrocento authors tend to emphasise the force of the individual will, men such as Coluccio Salutati, Poggio Bracciolini and most particularly Leon Battista Alberti. With the first tracts on the dignity of man, those of Facio and Gianozzo Manetti, the focus is more heavily placed upon man's spiritual nature. The earlier humanists, possibly for some reason connected with the immaturity in their time of the sort of Neoplatonism necessary to this position, discussed the issue more often than not in terms of problems posed for man's freedom by fate or fortune. All early authors recognized that a Christian was in danger when using these terms too loosely and that free will must ultimately be defended. Still, it is interesting that fate and fortune formed a significant part of their discussion.

Salutati's De fato et fortuna, for example, clearly establishes a belief in fate - just as with Dante, fate as God's Providence -

1. This idea of fate as "necessitas a Dei providentia fluens" goes back to Boethius; see p. 40 of this thesis.
and fortune, a belief which seems to go beyond anything exhibited by our historians. Still Salutati argues in his *De nobilitate legum et medicinae* for the will as self-moving and beyond necessity. With an attitude that Machiavelli will echo, Alberti stresses in works such as his *Della tranqulità dell’ animo* or his short dialogues (*Intercocenales*), particularly the one on fate and fortune, that forces such as fate and fortune do obstruct man's path but with effort, man can overcome these obstacles. It is a theme that he presents with boring repetition.

Facio brings us to the second approach, the increasing emphasis on man's spiritual nature which is so characteristic of the tracts on the dignity of man. It cannot be too often restated that especially for Facio and Manetti, the first entrants on this scene, there is no individual idea which they present that is new; that which was not expressed already by the Bible, the Church Fathers or the Platonic tradition as outlined in Chapter I was at least implicit in that Platonic tradition. Facio's *De excellentia ac praestantia*


hominis has already been examined in the collation for that author. Suffice it to say that Manetti's *De dignitate hominis*, written soon after Facio's *De excellentia* and certainly with the approval of Alfonso I to whom it was dedicated, encompasses the same basic material as Facio's tract except that issues are dealt with at greater length, there is less attention to the afterlife per se despite an emphasis on man's unique spiritual nature, and lastly Manetti is more explicit about naming his sources. What was said earlier about Facio holds true for Manetti. Whether it was intentional or not, Pico kept alive this Platonic feature of the fight against determinism and gave it further impact through the force with which he argued for the liberty of the now clearly independent soul. In this he is truly a fruition of the Platonic tradition as described on p. 38 of this thesis. Although it would be difficult, unless one subscribed to some sort of idealist philosophy oneself, to make this trend the essence of Renaissance thought, its importance at least as a *credo* for our generation of humanists cannot easily be denied.

1. For Manetti's confessed knowledge of Facio's tract and Manetti's dedication to Alfonso, see *De dignitate hominis*, pp. 1-2. For example, both discuss the glories of the human figure but while Facio quickly praises man for walking erect, and so on, Manetti covers each part of the body in great detail in Book I. Book II is where Manetti places his important discussion of man's spiritual nature; see especially the concluding statement on p. 64.

2. Giovanni Gentile gives the best example of a once current tendency, particularly among Italian historians, to inflate a bit unreasonably the overall importance of the view discussed above; a good example is "La concezione humanistico del mondo", *Nuova antologia*, CCXCVII (1931), 308-309 and 315; these ideas are also printed, although at much greater length, in *Il pensiero italiano del Rinascimento*, vol. II in *Opere complete* (Florence, 1940), pp. 47-113. Also see di Napoli, p. 9.
The philosophic base for a belief in free will by both our historians and the fifteenth century as a whole should be clear. This thesis has argued that the historiography of Platina, Palmieri and Facio does not in any meaningful way contest this credo.

Neither God, nor the gods, nor nature effectively eliminate choice from man's world. There is only one broad determinist concept that all these historians exhibit and that is fortune. In the pages describing each historian my tendency was to attenuate the seriousness of fortune for these historians as an explanatory device.¹ Beyond what has already been advanced specific to each historian, it is worth mentioning that fortune was not a serious issue for the quattrocento despite the frequent employment of this word at that time. Of course this word can have a philosophic or literary meaning. Howard Rollins Patch points to the difficulties in separating the two when he claimed: "Whether the goddess was even actually believed in as something more than a symbolic creature, at least after the Roman period, it is really impossible to say. But we do know that there were people in the Middle Ages who could in terms of a deity conceive of what we call a force ...." (p. 34). Patch argues that Petrarch and Boccaccio denied fortune other than as a "poetic fiction" thereby keeping within the orthodox Christian view; by the late Renaissance there was a swing back to the full pagan deity with an emphasis that could contest that of the Romans.²

¹ Especially useful is the discussion at the end of the collation for Palmieri.

² Pp. 21-22 and 24. Certainly Castiglione's manner of invoking fortune earned his book the distinction of having to have all references to fortune removed in order to get the book off the Index.
In effect the quattrocento is part of the middle ground between Rome and the late Renaissance. Humanists such as Salutati and Bracciolini kept fortune as a serious concept but made it an expression of God's providence; this is not at all the pagan view. Leonardo Bruni used the actual term fortune more often in his Historiarum Florentini populi than did Platina, Palmieri or Facio in their historical works but invariably his meanings are those which have been identified as "blind luck." It was Alberti who left, in his Della famiglia, the clearest description of the limits within which fortune, here again as chance or "blind luck," can affect humanity. Nearly the entire Prologue is dedicated to a theme which can be summed up by the single remark, "It is not in fortune's power, it is not as easy as some foolish people believe, to conquer one who does not want to be conquered. Fortune has in her hand only the man who submits to her." This particular look at fortune returns us to an issue broached earlier in this chapter, the primacy of will, as self-initiated and forceful action, as a factor in establishing the freedom of the will. The Della famiglia represents a large part of that already mentioned "boring repetition" Alberti exhibits on this theme. Platina, Palmieri and Facio concur with Alberti's ideas on

1. Beyond what was said on pp. 203-204 of this thesis, see Bec, particularly p. 313.

2. Blackman, pp. 316-323; for a last few examples from Platina see De tuae valutudine (or De honesta voventato) in Caelii Apiti, De re culinaria (Basle, 1541), pp. 233-234.

3. The Family in Renaissance Florence: A Translation By Renée Neu Watkins of I libri della famiglia (Columbia, S.C., 1969), p. 28; also in this regard see pp. 57 and 89-90; that fortune for Alberti is truly nothing more than "blind luck" pay particular attention to pp. 145-146.
fortune: for Platina and Fazio this is most evident in their histories as the checksheets demonstrate; for Palmieri, consensus is less evident but still there (see especially pp. 126-129 of this thesis). All three of our historians keep fortune firmly in its place as essentially a literary device for describing what most moderns would prefer to identify in terms of luck, chance or accident none of which need defeat la vita attiva. If the late Renaissance did truly return to a pagan concept of fortune, the shift from the late medieval or early Renaissance idea of fortune is not to be noticed in the works of these three humanists.
CONCLUSION

Neal Gilbert has claimed that during the late Renaissance humanism went through a phase of revising school curricula such that a very large number of subjects were "brought to order" or "reduced to art." The outcome of this insistence on order and method was the oversimplification of knowledge. (pp. 69-73). This, of course, is the danger of any attempt at the organization of learning. Since my enterprise has meant a methodizing that has again posed time worn questions for scholars but at the same time has increased the data brought to bear on those questions, my procedure, rather than tending to oversimplify, would seem to create a reverse threat: by increasing the data, the issues appear more complex.

Since, as has been argued in the Introduction, this thesis will be doing little more than what other scholars have done short of being more thorough and systematic in doing it, the complications should not worry any students of historiography who prefer to have evidence, the more the better, before forming an opinion. Beyond the doubts raised in my Introduction about such a technique, the major difficulty inherent in this strategy remains the false sense of security statistics tend to give to those who employ them. It cannot be overemphasized that they always represent but one dimension of a problem; the scholar must keep clearly in mind the relative importance of that dimension whether relying upon or ignoring such data.

For this and other reasons it was easy for me to find fault with Donald Wilcox in the Introduction and in the section of this thesis addressed to Palmieri's De captivitate Piaarum liber. Again, it is
not necessarily a case of Wilcox being wrong, just that it would have been simpler for us had he given scholars both more of the data on which he based his conclusions and a clearer idea of the meaning of the terms employed in those conclusions. Having subjected the *De captivitate* and other works by Palmieri to the checksheets, it is now possible for me to admit that something which I have labelled "psychological" causations do form an important element in not just Palmieri's but also Platina's and Facio's historical writing. In fact (barring the class of "direct operatives") for each historian they are the most important element: for Platina they account for eighteen percent of total causations, for Palmieri seventeen percent and for Facio seventeen percent. In this I am therefore in agreement with Wilcox, assuming we are talking about the same thing; as was concluded in the section on the *De captivitate Pisarum liber*, it is difficult to determine just what Wilcox understood by the adjective "psychological".\(^1\) Besides, although there is a statistical importance for psychological causations as defined by my sheets, this did not prove to be an issue of any great qualitative significance for any of the historians. It is a case of the statistics speaking for themselves in that any weight the psychological element carries is due to its numerical superiority over other causations.

Whether or not there is any significance to the remarkable uniformity of those just named percentages, it is difficult to judge.

\(^1\) Blackman, pp. 307-311, is better on the psychological dimension of the history writing of Leonardo Bruni in that he is more specific as to what he means by "psychological".
If percentages for what have been identified as social causations are taken into account, the results are nine percent for Platina, ten percent for Palmieri and five percent for Facio. Aside from a hint again of the greater devotion of Facio to military history, there is still a surprising degree of consistency to these figures. The similarity of these proportions again suggests some sort of uniformity for mid quattrocento culture. The only point at which there is an at all surprisingly wide variation of figures after taking into account differences of subject matter is within that same group of psychological causations. There "fear" is seen to constitute a wildly disproportionate number of the possible causative agents: for Platina ten percent of total psychological causations, for Palmieri twenty percent and for Facio thirty-eight percent. In fact Platina shows a more even distribution of incidences throughout that class such that no one emotion or trait so dominates his "psychological causations" as does "fear" those of Palmieri and Facio. For Platina, "greed" manifests a greater relative presence, namely eleven percent. (Cynics will be disappointed to learn that it was Platina's Mantuan history, not his papal history, which made the major contribution to the tally for "greed"). For Platina, as it happens, "anger" is hardly less of a motive force and it accounts for a rounded off percentage of ten percent of the total number of psychological causations. On the basis of these figures the summary conclusion seems to be that for our historians politics is the single most important social fact. On the other hand such social or collective issues count for much less than do the more

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1. This agrees with Burke, Tradition and Innovation, p. 221.
individualized factors that have been referred to as psychological. Furthermore, within that last grouping of factors, "fear" tends to be a favourite choice as a motivator of men. Whether these findings are at all unique to our historians or to the quattrocento, remains an open issue until similar sharply focused enquiry has been addressed to other historians of that and other periods.

There are two conclusions which seem to be in some measure unique to the historians of our period. One is that all three exhibit a strong element of Platonism as part of their philosophic base for a belief in the freedom of man. This has been discussed more in reference to their general thought than their histories so the reader is referred again to Chapters I and V and to the collations to the checksheets for each author. The issue is raised once more here mostly as a reaffirmation of an element of consistency for mid quattrocento culture. The second issue is that of secularization, something that has often been remarked upon in discussions of the checksheets and something which is readily noticeable in them. God hardly intrudes at all in the historical world of our humanists, even for Platina in his writing of papal history. Scholars, usually taking Bruni as a starting point, have long identified this as a characteristic of humanist historiography. It is reassuring to find this point so graphically confirmed by the checksheets.

In the only scholarly effort to date exclusively devoted to the

sort of issue of major concern to this thesis, Myron R. Gilmore’s brief article entitled "Freedom and Determinism in Renaissance Historians", the beginnings of a case are inadvertently made for the secular nature of most specifically Italian Renaissance culture. Restricting himself mostly to Commines and Guicciardini, Gilmore demonstrates parallel developments between the two historians. Gilmore’s conclusion is that both look upon the course of history as beyond the eyes of man: "The outcome is beyond all human calculation of hope or fear. They believe in historical miracles in the conventional sense." Gilmore does argue that both have a system which allows human freedom but for us it is interesting that the structure behind this "inscrutable world" was for Guicciardini a kind of secular, accidental fortune; for Commines, it was God. For Commines the following was a common historical judgement: "Thus we must conclude that this expedition was conducted by God from its departure to its return because the wisdom of its leaders counted for nothing." The pessimistic attitude of Guicciardini is supposedly due to his being of the disillusioned generation of Italians that experienced the evils of the foreign invasions of Italy which date from 1494. Nevertheless he keeps to the secular tradition of Italian culture. An issue worthy of further study would be to see to what extent northern Renaissance historians other than Commines truly did fail to break from this feature of the world of the medieval historian.

1. Studies in the Renaissance, III (1956); the passages just quoted appear on pages 55 and 52 respectively.
2. Obviously the Reformation’s impact would be interesting to chart; for example, see Herschel Baker, The Race of Time (Ann Arbor, Mich., 1967), pp. 38-41 and 64-70.
It is an ability to establish these sorts of common points for comparison which is one of the major benefits to be gained by the use of the checksheet sort of approach; this would be especially true for broad issues such as determinism because that kind of topic stands farthest from the difficulty that arises of comparing "like with like": obviously the checksheets cannot reflect subdivisions which the historian could not have brought out due to the subject matter of the narrative. Hopefully the historian is dealing with "what happened" rather than what he "wished had happened." Despite any tendency some historians will have to enter into the narrative more than others, the more general the category on the checksheet, the more useful that category will be as a common point of comparison.

Until further such checksheets are attempted for a greater number of historians of the Renaissance, of the Middle Ages and of the Reformation, the subcategories of the checksheets will remain for general students of the Renaissance the most difficult to assess and to use. Still the sheets should at least be helpful for students of the individual historians involved if only as a finding list for key words like *virtus* employed in a meaningful context. Subjecting a wider sampling of historians to this technique will open up the possibilities for comparative analyses of Italian humanists suggested by my Introduction. For the moment the generalizations will have to address themselves to very broad issues such as determinism. Even within that limited yet important sphere, however, it would seem that some measure of exactitude has already been achieved.
APPENDIX I

Page References for Causation Occurrences:

Notations are organized according to each history's checksheet. For ease of location of the reference, the page number is preceded by a "code" which consists of the first word of the sentence or clause in which the causation is found followed by two letters which are the first letters of each of the two words which immediately follow that first word in the text. At times it is necessary to identify more than one sentence or clause in making a reference; in such circumstances there will be more than one "code" listed separated by commas. Textual punctuation has been eliminated in the interest of saving space.
Vita Victorini

IIB3: Verum ue 13.

IIB2b2)a): A st 8; mercedem en 10; Adeo ed 21; FedericuUc 30.
IIB2b2)b): Romana el 6; Mox v6 6-7; Non ae 8-9; His am 10;
eruditionis ed 27.
IIB2f: Verum cu 9; Neminem ar 16.
IIB2g: Adeo ed 21.
IIB3a2): ut tn 7.
IIB3a23): verum im 16.
IIB3a28): praeterea vs 9.
IIB3a29): Tantae df 28.
IIB3a33): Tantae ea 27.
IIB3a34): ut tn 7.
IIB3a38): pertaeusus vs 9.
IIB3a48): Tantae ea 27.
IIB3a49): Tantae me 9.
IIB3g: Adolescens Vs 7.
IIB3j: Princeps ia 12.
IIB5a: Dum qa 8; natu ma 12; Quem gft, Urgente pm 37.
IIB5c1): a bl 6; tantum le 7; Saltu ec 8; nullo np 9; quosdam eq
9; Motus ip 10; Confluebant uq 10; Verum cv 11; ad qe 11;
Quare vs 12; De ma 12; Neminem ig 12-13; Dicebat ea 13; Pexos
ea 13; A ce 14; A ni 14; Ab im 14; Ipse vs 14-15; Simplicibus
en 15; Humanitatem fb 15; Pedagogos oe 15; Tempus ip 16;
Cogebat pF 17; Ad ha 18; Latinam pe 19; Carmina op 19;
Qulbusdam el 19-20; Ut pe 20; Si qv 20; Dabat er 20;
Objurgatione fp 20; Laetabatur as 21; Siccos ea 22; Audire pa
22; Varia se 22; Legebat el 2h; De SP 2h; Legebat et 2h; In hg
2h; Valerii MI 25; hominem tc 25; Ad pd 25; A Cu 25; Ciceronem
eP 25-6; In Sg 26; Aristophanem dl 26; Urbanitate tp 27-8;
Altercantes sd 28; Si qv 28; mordentem lv 28-9; illos eq 29; Si
qv 29; Optima qa 29; Aestate eq 32; Parentes eq 32; Phaisium pr 33;
Erat at 34; Recognitius qh 35-36; His qa 36; Mundus ef 37.
In historiam urbis Mantuae

IA1a2): Verum Di 779.1
IA2b: Terrae mp 752; Verum nh 752-3.
IB1a: Quieta aa 720.
IB1b: Sub qM 642.
IB3: Verum hu 856.

IIA1a1): Deo ae 647; Futurum be 734.
IIA1a2/b): Sanguis ic 727.
IIA1a3): Agebantur uD 706; Dii ea 647.
IIA2b: Hac ef 778; Mira fc 785; Nec Fm 814; fortuna qp 847.
IIB1a2): Pugnae es 758.

IIA1b): Ferunt en 747; Hoc ea 752.
IIA2: ut it 653; Villis ea 655; De po 657; ut ao, Foederibus he 666; Mantuani Qc 667; Veniebat in 668; Omissa ip 699; Veritus Sn 701; Tandiu ea 709; Bellum do 719.
IIB2a1): Pugnae es 758.
IIB2b: Effugere no 764.

IIA1b): Ferunt en 747; Hoc ea 752.
IIA2: Optimates ae 696; interfector aS 712; Ex qp 713; His ta 713; Innovata df; At Ce 721; Triennis pq 722; discurrentes pD 725; reservata Ai 750; Chortta ti 793; Quibus er 793-4; Ex rp 848; Et nD 722.
IIB1a2): Incensus ip 670; Additur os 693; adeo ei 694; ira ia 700; Funduntur td 705-6; Hoc nt 709; Steterat ai 717; Hac rt 736; eo pd 744; qua er 759; Irritatus ha 768; quam or 782; Provocare eu 825; At BP 841; Veneti pq 846; Renatus vr 856.
IIB3a2): ob ch 653; His ta 713; Dum ha 715; Quiescente ic 724; Edem ab 725; Vir eu 726; Ex uf 741; tollendos ed 743; Antonius ei 752; In hs 762; Eres ab 771; Turn vr 794; apec ot 798; Urgebat to 800; Quodsi ep 802; Pace up 812-3; Is FM 833; Missus de 847; Interim vr 856; qui ae 852.
IIB3a3): Funduntur td 705-6; tantum no 707; quodque sq 794; Quos eo 796; Turn vr 844.
IIB3a4): Belli ce 655; Motus ia 688; Placuit ic 748; qui ae 862.
IIB3a5): Instabant td 672; Moti mn 695; Instant to 698; Abstimuitta 699; Periculo fp 700; porta qf 707; Sequenti ac 710; At ic 733-9; Videiessae 739; rapinis ia 743; Quare ib 744; tantum to 755; Effugere no 764; eos ce 779; Interim vr 808; At VR 810; Is PM 833; Pincennius Co 856; Piscenites of 860.
IIB3a6): Hinc ce 676; Vir eu 726.
IIB3a7): Turn Mu 675; Qa ro 721; Veneti mm 715.
IIB3a8): Villis ea 655; urgebat te 672; Venientem pm 689; Moti mn 695; Abstinuit ta 698; Moti pm 704; Rosinus mi 721; Hac rt 736; quam or 792; Moti pb 793; Veneti pi 846.

1. Arabic numerals refer to pages unless noted otherwise; in this case they refer to columns. Punctuation and spacing have been minimized in the interest of space.
IIB3a9): aemulatione gm 655; Sordelli fe 688; Vedentem pm 689; Mantuani Ca 691; Idem fe 708; Quieta pa 733; In hs 762; Tum CU 774; Is ec 795; Picennini va 839; pulchritudine ga 85a.

IIB3a10): Solicitus id 692; Non od 693; Ro ce 699; Injectus tp 706; adeo qp 715; Movit tq 722; His ar 765; At Bq 821.

IIB3a11): Tum vE 637; Motae ao 859.

IIB3a12): Hac rc 707.

IIB3a13): Temperatum ea 707; Is qa 792.

IIB3a14): caverantque ni 713; Mittere il 714; Instabant ao 715.

IIB3a16): Tum Mc 715; Stomachari tc 749; accusata tL 763;
Indignatus ot 861-2.

IIB3a17): nemine me 718; Sequenti id 720; Hunc va 729; Qua rp 754;
Hinc Fr 793.

IIB3a18): Tum Uf 774.

IIB3a19): Is lv 666; quique pi 846.

IIB3a20): Ipse pm 860.

IIB3a21): Ludovicus id 849.

IIB3a22): Hinc od 727; Huius bh 733; Accidit tL 734.

IIB3a23): Ceterum Ba 864-5.

IIB3a24): At NP 883.

IIB3a25): Tum Ih 751.

IIB3e: qua qL 688; Quo ib 733; Et qP 822; Picennini va 839.

IIB3a: captum da 811; mota ce 834.

IIB3e: quo ib 733.

IIB3f: Et qP 822.

IIB3g: Prefectus ec 789.

IIB3h: Prefectus ec 789.

IIB5a: Vidisses ia, Quem qP 739; Diffugerant mp 743; tanta pa 753; Franciscus sa 796; Consederat ad 823; nisi es 826; dolore sm 840; Verum st 856; ubi vL 862.

IIB5b1): Insignis ha 696; quae qa 703; Qua er 726; Reversus da 726; ita qa 752; Dii ph 777; Superveniente dh 787; Sequenti so 797; para ng 814; Tum vP 821; Verumus pa 831; Ibi da 832; Abeunte dm 837; Bo de 844; Verum ha 856.

IIB5b2): equestri Va 671; ad on 704; Mantuanis ma 718; quorum pd 814; Trajecris ao 824; Montanum rn 825.

IIB6a: Dolo ep 674; Valebat tp 699; id am 711; fraudae fo 724;
Ugolinunque sh 748; quod hu 792; Badem qF 794; Tum BC 840.

IIB6b: Castra ac 660; Datur sd 660; Tum df 664; Mittertur pi 664-5;
Mantuam im 665; Conscripita ha 665; Qua rp 679-80; Accepto tr 693;
debus pf 695; ne qf 698; darent ms 698; Il ia 699; Aucto on 700; Scribit da 700; Qua rp 704; Is ae 704; Hunc Re 704; Post tb 706; Tunc vu 708; Manire es 709; Ultimos ie 709; Struxere IC 710; Efficere tu 709; cum ie 713; quod fU 713; Hac ef 713;
Omissa ia 714; quas ea 714; Rescindere ep 715; Oppidami im 715;
Mantuani ao 715; erecto dv 715; extractis ep 715; ad pf 715;
Mantuani di 716; Vulnerabuntur eI 717; Convenere am 717;
Veronenses vt 717; Praetermittere ei 717; Sensit vD 717; vi td 719; Struxere ie 720; Sumpta de 720; Erectae iv 721; Badem ar 724; Hac ov 726; cognito pe 726; Mantuano mc 727; At Gt 728;
Philippino de 728; Initio is 729; Felinus to 731; arbitratio
iQ 735; Comperata dt 737; cum ih 757; Mantuanum pt 757;
Tumultus ii 758; Naturandum ir 758; Ad ci 758; qui tu 758;
Magnus ti 741; Deligit ie 743; rapienis in 743; Comperio da 753;
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IIB6c2): Hanc or 1286.
IIB6d: adeo ea 1289.
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IA2b: In qr 22.
IB4b: Verum mr 26.

IIB1a1): Prenarrata fv 30.
IIB2a: Hec ic 5.
IIB2c: Publicas el 6; Nam qr 7; Interim ei 8; Ad hr 8; Nicolaus ip 9; unum tp 22; Ludovicus ra 23; Hac dc 26; Interim pd 26; Hinc nq-26-27.
IIB2f: qui es 28; Barri pi 28; Monasterium qa 28; Basilica pd 29; Tum hi 29; Ornamenta ia 29; Provisiqa 29; Nec ci 29.

IIB3a1): Quare ee 12; et ia 12.
IIB3a5): quo mp 18; At ar 20.
IIB3a6): Domi ip 6; omnia fq 6.
IIB3a10): eo ci 28.
IIB3a11): Nicolaus PC 20; Liberalissima pl 28.
IIB3a13): Accedebat pa 19; Interim pd 26.
IIB3a15): Ostendunt so 9.
IIB3a17): Postremo od 23.
IIB3a32): Ille qa 8; Cui ta 9.
IIB3a33): Nicolaus Ai 16.

IIB3c: Ludovicus bi 8; Hic ae 24.
IIB3e: prudentia re 6; At iv 7.
IIB3f: Multi PI 15; maximus pm 24; pecunia ca 25.
IIB3j: At iv 7.
IIB5a: Que ci 11-12; Permanente am 26; Hec ip 27; Ad up 29; Ex at 29.
IIB5b2): Quod pv 19.

IIB6b): Nec mp 8; cui qa 8; Acciaiulus ic 8; Ludovicus el 9; Ludovicus iT 9; De ci 9; Hicn sa 9; Ludovicus ve 9-10; Inde eq 10; Ludovicus ill 10; Neapolitani ar 10; Ioanna ir 10; Tum Ra 10; Nulla ph 11; Ille sc 15; Custodes cs 13; Que pf 13; Ludovicus tv 13; Ludovicus qa 13-14; Dum ac 14; Ludovicus na 14; Proximis id 14; Qui da 15; Non mp 15; Causa hp 15-16; His id 16; preter hm 16; et cp 16-17; Corradum dc 17; Morialen ph 17; Morialis ia 17; qui ie 17; Nam qv 18; Hanc is 18; Ludovicus is 18; Nicolaus eq 18; Victor ii 18; Tantumque vd 18; Corradus el 19; At Rm 19; Sed po 19; His ra 19; Hostes in 19; Lindo iq 19; Ipse vi 20; Tripartito hr 20; arma re 20; Postquam sf 20; Certe et 20; Factio iq 21; Principes vf 21; Acciaiulus in 21; Custodum aa 21; Tunc As 21; Luce pa 21; Acciátel ce 21-22; Delecto is 22; Primo aa 22; Etiam As 22; Regie nn 22; At ci 23; Ceterum nn 23; Primo ea 24; Quitus ai 24; ipsi vp 24; Inde mm 24; His el 24; Anichimus pm 25; Nicolaus ie 25; Validiori ic 25; Eq qa 25; Nicolaus Aa 25; Angelus ca 25; Primo ic 25; Instant ia 26; Hic pa 26; Ludovicus aa 26; Nichilo ir 26.

IIB6c1): Florentini ni 5; cum oe 5; prudentia re 6; Interim tp 6; Sed qa 7; Illa ev 7; Quod cp 7; Accitip 6; Non mp 6; Ludovicus iT 10; Ibi ah 10; Reliquos or 10; Nicolaus ie 11; Inde Aa 11; Pecuniam pq 12; Missio ic 12; Nicolaus sa 13; Nam ah 15; Hinc ec 17; Per ar 17; Preter et 17; Terra ei 18; Paulo pq 19; donec Ai 20; Nicolaus ia 20; Ad ri 21; Ludovicus rd 22;
Post ad 22; Iubente sR 23; Hac tc 23; Ad ci 23; Qui rP 24; Quod on 27; Intus es 28-29; Ecclesiis qi 30; In ee 30; Pro as 30; In rp 30; Inter qi 31; Adiecit es 31.

IIB7a: Quibus mv 13; Cui rp 18; sed up 19; Famescenti pf 21;
Anichinus ip 26.
IIB2c: statim ti; Cum ii 5; Quibus ic 5; Prima it 5; Lunge Ip 5-6; Nec dL 6; Pisanis dG 7; In qr 15; Per hi, Preparatiis ip 15; Ab ii 17; continue ep 25.

IIB2f: Salutis ca, Primum qd 6.

IIB3a1): tamquam ie 6.

IIB3a2): statim ti 5; Sed de 15.

IIB3a3): tamquam ie 6.

IIB3a4): timore pt 11; reliquos pt 11; ex ii 14; Inter Hg 19; In fm 21; Post ha 21; Tartaliss tu 22; Hi pi 27.

IIB3a7): Nostrorum pm 29.

IIB3a8): Qva bm 7; Sic ia 24.


IIB3a14): Tartaliss tu 22.

IIB3a15): Erant qo 11; et ts 13.

IIB3a26): statim ti 5; Inerat fs 6.

IIB3a30): qua pd 20.

IIB3a52): Hec df 18.

IIB3a53): cuius dG 22.

IIB3f: virtute dc, Nam bm 4-5; cupiditate pa 21.

IIB5a: In fm 21; Febres ph 23; Indes aq 29.

IIB5b1): In en 19; Cum ch 20; Arbitrantes it 20.

IIB6a: qui pd 6.

IIB6b: In Ch 6-7; Qua bm 7; Quamobrem vn 9; Verum cr 9; Pisanis su 11; Murus us 11; In ii 11; Patefacto pt 11; Decem ps 13; Quibus ca 13; Per it 14; Adversus ef 14; Sforia vg 15; Accelerantes ip 16; Dum hF 16; Deinde re 16; Adveniense 1h 17; Et nV 18; Qui ia 18; Vistores ii 19; Idem Fu 19; Duo ip 19; Dum ep 19; Inter Hg 19; Intentis ao 19; quasi cv 19; Verum sv 20; Inter hq 20; Cola np 20-21; Ceterum de 21; Exercitus nq 21; Pisanis et 21; Nocte io 21; Custodes ia 21; Ferocia am 22; Mutatis ic 22; Commissitae ea 23; Pluribus il 23; Hoc re 23; ceteros fc 23-24; eorum do 24; proinde sp 24; Magistatissim 1m 24; Quasar Vs 24; In en 24; Hac an 25; Quapropter ie 28; In de 23; Procedentes de 23-29; Luca da 29; Nicolaum ph 29.

IIB6c1): In CG 6; Gratam if 7; Alderottus ph 7; Dum ht 8; qua ip 9; Mandatum ie 10; Florentini ce 10; quem Pm 10; Preparatiis ip 15; ut sa 21; Recepto lV 24; Pauclis re 25; Ceterum Fv 25; Gimus sp 26; His rr 26-27; Inter hv 27; Dubio ia 27; His dn 28; Postquam hp 29; Ad si 30; Vigintique de 34.

IIB6c2): Florentini te 23.

IIB7a: Imminente iP 15-16; Primo ea, Hac in 18; Videntes ep 24.
IB3: Post hd 132.
IB5a: Per ht 137.

IIIB1a2): Verum mf 135.
IIIB2c: Voluterrani aF 131; et qd 132; Iis am, Fuerunt id 134;
    quod Is 136; Dum hi, to Dubius ic 136; Tandem Pf, Igitur lv 138;
    Priores id 139.
IIIB3a3): et dp 132.
IIIB3a5): Voluterrani sd 132; deinde ch 134; Exinde na 136; quare
    aP 139; Dicentur ac 139; Quare tp 140.
IIIB3a15): Post hd 132; cum Ft 136.
IIIB3a17): Ramundus Mc 134.
IIIB3j: vi ev 135.
IIIB5b2): deinde ia 134.
IIIB6a: et ds 133; per fe 137.
IIIB6b: statim ci 132; Accipitur tb 132; Lucensis ic 132; Visa tL
    132; Interum mD 132-133; Adventu ep 133; Deinde sc 133; Post
    ha 133; Non mp 133; Et MP 133; Itaque cn 133; Deinde ce 134;
    et aF 134; Inter hg 134; decemviri pd 134; castellum de 134;
    Senenses aG 134; Sevilia ph 134; vi ev 135; Heo mo 135; Sed ca
    135; Ipse va 135; Hostes qa 135; Deinde aT 135; Ipse eq 135;
    Talentinus lo 135; Hostes vp 136; Talentinus uh 136; Ilii na
    136; Post hp 137; Ceterum il 137; Florentini ve 137; Postea vm
    137; Hinc is 137; Nostri ic 137; Inter hi 138; Quod Fe 138;
    Pontifex ue 138; Sic ar 138; Ac df 138; Per ei 138; Priores ie
    139; Dum hg 139.
IIIB6c1): Post hd 132; Interim lt 132; scripsit ns 132; Per ht 137;
    Dum hg 137; Verum pn 138; Castellanorum fp 138; Legatus ep 139;
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IB2b: Et ia 32; Quod ca 53.
IB3: Facile ve 16; Miserabilia hf 44; Cum qe 134.

IIA2b: Tot f 15; Iataque cp 15; Dum hp 62; Sed ci 66; Post ha 76;
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IB2b1a): Militum ah 11; At om 140.

IB2b2): Erat ha 30; Cuius p, q 33.

IB2b2c): Sed dp 33.

IB2b3): Haec ai 54; Ea Ca 83.

IB2c: externa ai 2; Iam hi, Iataque cB 22; Praegetatu iu 37; Copias
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IB2e1): Erat ha 30; coronamque ap 122; Hiaque da 129.

IB2e2): Se it 110.

IB2f: Quae re 23; Finito bi 32; Nanque Ep 85; quam pr 91; Per ef
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IB2h: sed qa 26; praelio ap 51.

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IB3a2): omnia as 1; Stultum av 26; Iataque cp 40; Inter ho 58.

IB3a3): Nam em n; Nanque AI 31; Nasquam tc 32; Hic ve 36; Erat
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IB3a5): Id mc 4; Post ha 6; quod ie 7; qui cp 24; Ii tp 26; His
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IB3b10): Eam ve 3; Erat io 87; Perfecto T, i, Malti ev 87.

IB3b12): Erat ap 39; Excesserat pe 38; Alphonsus ca 55-56; Quo ce
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IB3a13): ipsae qo 14; Eugenius qp 108; Inter Hs 113.

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IIIB3a(54): Initio ea 2.
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IIIB3a(56): namque Fr 31.
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IIIB3a(60): Quibus pm 109-110.
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IIIB3k: sive n, s 80.
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Erat eu 96; Sed ee 98; Deinde aK 101; Posthaec Io 105;
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IIIB6a: Post hr 57.
IIIB6b: Ea v3 1; quem ap 1-2; Paraturum so 2; Simul ci 2; Quibus oo 12; Ibi dn 2; Tum it 2; cum hs 2; Illa qi 2; Itaque qi 2;
convehendae ua 2; Ioanna dc 2; Hae so 2; Post hF 2; Erat ef 2;
Praegressus ip 2; Interea NA 2; Et IL 2; Sfortiam q1 3; Cum hd 3; Sibi vh 3; Qui cu 3; Quae ca 3; Id mc l; Ludovicus aa l4;
Iactisque au l; Non to l; Alij ta 4; rostratae au l; Dum hN l4;
Rostratae hq l; Deinde Ra 5; Inter hB 5; Nec mp 5; Inde q1 5;
Per ho 5; quo do 5; quod oc 5-6; Mutuis is 6; hunc [sic] un 6;
Ignari pu 6; Primus oc 6; Simul do 6; Quorum ID 6; Qui IB 7;
In pc 7; Misset ia 7; altera qn 7; Is el 7; Interim Ao 7;
Cunque ca 7; Nam cp 7; Quos CB 7; Post hB 7; Capuan xn 7-8;
Ludovicum eu 8; At Lp 8; Cum hs 8-9; Ioannem Pm 9; Itaque eB 9;
Cuius ia 9; Cuius CB 10; Itaque sn 10; Postridie po 10; Quo sa 11;
Itaque ce 11; Bracius us 11; At Su 11; Bracium ec 11;
Namque iv 11; Constitut B, u 11; At Su 11; Quorum aa 12; Is ve 12;
Preparatis io 12; Quod ca 12; Qui ed 12; Quibus ci 12;
Quod pa 12; Quibus Ar 12-13; At Su 13; Quod ca 13; Quod co 13;
Legatus ce 14; receptui ci 14; Itaque ca 14; Proin qn 15;
Interea M, q 15; Quod ca 15; Recepto mp 15; Quo aa 16; His pa 16;
Itaque ha 16; Is el 16; Cognito Sa 17; quia 17; Quod ce 17; Post hd 17; Municiae ai 17; IIta ta 18; Deinde ns 19;
Namque re 19; Cognito ed 19; Sfortia ua 19; Quod pa 19; His rd 20; Alphonsus ho 20; Prefectus na 20; Itaque et 20; Oppidi
uv 21; Inter hs 21; Cum aA 21; Stationibusce ic 21; Post st 22;
Namque se 22; Ibi co 22; Cunctis os 22-3; Haeo In 23; Quod uA 23;
iussit Au 23; Itaque ot 23; Quibus aa 23; Lembi ep 23; Id es 23; Ingens vo 23; Suadebat Io 23; Quod ca 24; Interea Io 25;
In eo 25; Mare ac 26; Quod pp 26; Erant ei 27; Holliendum ip 27;
Et mc 28; Quod ci 28; Ligures ce 28; Qua ra 28; Ea re 28-9; Et
IIB6c1): Quod uin 3; Præcataturum sq, Ludovicum vs 3; Nec vs 3; Sed t̄̄, Reginae ca 9; De ha 11; Cumque Cv 16; Magna pd 17; Postridie dr 17; ultioni ad 19; Post ha 22; Et un 22; Itaque ca 24; Nec mc 25; Cumque sl 25; Quod cc 25; Et qe 26; Non pP 27; Quidam ee 30; Atque ue 37; Nec df 37; Quibus ac 38; Itaque pa 40; Mistitetur [sic] Ca 42; His ah 43; Quibus pa; Maluit ep 48; universa ct 69; Deinde Pc 49; Nec ma 50; Caeterum Is 52; Atque ue 65; Forte pi 83; Quum ap 73; Quumque ia 73; Multi ha 76; Fuere aq 77; Fueratque ha 81; Eoque id 89; Legatus up 85; Atque on 86; Qui ou 87; Hique pa 87; Turpe ep 88; Cumque io 89; Inter hp 88; Et qr 88; Misset ie 91; Dum ha 92; Frant ac 92; Quem fe 92; Quod ca 95; Quae ca 95; Per hm 98; Quibus io 99; Is vp 100; Inter ha 100; Cum ar 101; Qui pi 102; Philippus M, d 108; Cuius pa 108; Itaque mp 109; Cumque Rr 109; Caeterum Ai 109; Deinde pr 109; Post h, c 110; Ad el 111; Quibus cA 111; Florentini ve 115; Post cp 122; Eoque Cd 122; Quae pp 123; Supra vg 123; Et qm 124; Inter hp 137; Eodem es 139; Turpe er 139; Itaque qa, Taurinis np 140; Rex vs 141.

IIB6c2): Cum di, Et Ip 52; Castra ca 71; Cuius iv, Quorum pp 90; an sa 96; Quibus gm 100.

IIB6c3): His sa 18; Multis ee 52; Ingens ad 61-2; Dederat eu, Postquam ve 87; Nec it 96; Quin ed 100; Posthaec ue 102; At Fl 128; Quo cc 131; Per it 141.

IIB7a: Multos qe 8; Interess 5, q 15; Cum aa 21; Quem pi 21; Qua rc 21; Ibi co 22; Difficilem to 23; Itaque o, d 24; quo oc 28; Sed po 41; quae Gp 45; Sed pe 54; Postquam ae 63; Quin ci 70; Contractisque im 71; Iosiasac Rl 75; Postquam ve 76; tantum If 77; Nanque Afs 79; sub ac 81; Demum ht, Dum ha 83; Constituerat ar 89; Nec mi, Francisci is 91; Eo da 92; Alphonsus eu 94; Caeterum sh 96; Per ed 110; Soluta io 128; Illi iv 133.

IIB7b: Itaque ci 11; At cv 144.
This list makes no pretence at being the result of exhaustive research. As mentioned in the Introduction, it is the product of my early efforts at defining the limits of any possible sampling of historians: useful as such a list may be, one should keep this in mind when consulting it. There is need for the refinement of the information presented here; it does, however, provide a point from which one may make a start.

The name of each historian is followed by his dates of birth and death, if these were readily available, and the name of the city with which his name tends to be associated. The source for the attribution of a history immediately follows the title of that history. In keeping with the reasons for which this list was compiled, no history is included if it seems certain that it was not originally written in Latin.
Acciaiuoli, Donato (1428-1476) Florence
*Life of Charlemagne* Fueter, p. 103.
*Vita Hannibalis e Scipionis*

Accolti, Benedetto (Maio) (1415-1466) Florence
*De bello a Christiania contra barbaros pro Christi septichro et Judaeas recuperandis*
*De praestantia virorum sui sevi*

Giacomo Albini (1445-1496) Naples
*De gestis regum Neapolitanorum ab Aragonia qui extant, lib. IV*

Amerini, Antonio Geraldini
*Life of Bishop Angelo Geraldini and the Geraldini Family* (ca. 1470)
*Vat. lat. 6940, foll. 1a-58a.*

Ariosto, Francesco (Peregrino) (-ca. 1484)
*Francisci Gonzaga novi ducalis...historiola*
Cosenza, V, 310-311.

Beccadelli, Antonio (Panormita) (1394-1471) Naples
*De dictis et factis Alphonsi regis Aragonum*

Benedetti, Paolo de
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Biglia, Andrea (Billius) (d. 1435) Milan
*Historiam Mediolanensem*
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Biondo, Flavio da Forlì (1388-1465) Rome
*De origine et gestis Venetorum*
*Historiarum ab inclinatione Romanorum imperii decades*
*Populi Veneti historiarum, liber I*

Bolani, Domenico (ca. 1445-1496) Venice
*Venetarum rerum historia* (lost)
Pertusi, p. 304.

Bonfini, Antonio (1427-1502)
Rerum Ungaricarum Decades
Thompson, I, 509.
History of Ascoli
Cosenza, V, 63.

Bonincontri, Lorenzo (1410-?) Naples
History of Naples
Thompson, I, 505.

Bracciolini, Johannes Baptista Poggius
Vita Dominici Cardinalis Capranicae
Florence
Kristeller, Iter, I, 243.
Life of Piccinino
Kristeller, Iter, II, 135.

Bracciolini, Poggio (1380-1459) Florence
Historia Florentina (to 1455)
Thompson, I, 479.

Bracelli, Giacomo (1441-1466) Genoa
De bello, quod inter Hispanos et
Cosenza, V, 53.
Genuenses saeculo suo gestum
101.
(1420-1444)

De claris Genuensibus libellus
Fueter, p. 49.

Bruni, Leonardo (1368-1444) Florence
Commentarius rerum sub tempore in
Thompson, I, 478.
Italia gestarum
Blackman, p. 102.
Historiarum Florentini populi
Fueter, p. 104.
Vita di Aristotle

Buonacorsi, Philippo (Callimachus Experiens)
Thompson, I, 482.
De vita et moribus Gregorii Sanocensis
Life of Attila
Calchi, Tristano (1462-1505) Milan
Life of King Vladislaus IV (1440-1444)
Thompson, I, 478.
Vita et mortis Sbignei Cardinalis
Blackman, p. 102.

Campano, Giannantonio (ca. 1427-1477)
Life of Pius II
Fueter, p. 103.
De vita et gestis Bracci
CMH, VIII, 863.
Life of Federigo de Montefetreo
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1. All (but possibly the History of Ascoli for Bonfini and the Life of Attila for Callimachus) were written out of Italy.
Canensi, Michele  Rome  De vita et pontificatu Pauli Secundi  KR II SS. III, xxvi.

Cannisio, Egidio da Viterbo  Rome  Historia viginti saeculorum  Cod. Angelico 351.

Caracciolo, Tristano (1439-1517)  Naples  Opuscula historica  Cosenza, I, 856.


Coccio, Marcantonio (Sabellico) (1436-1506)  History of Friuli  Thompson, I, 483.
Decesses rerum Venetarum  Thompson, I, 483.
Ennesades sive Rhapsodia historiarum  Fueter, p. 30.
De vetustate Aquileiae  Fueter, p. 31.
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excidium

Collenuccio, Pandolfo (1444-1504)  Conpendio [sic] delle storie del regno di Napoli  Thompson, I, 505.
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Contarini, Francesco (ca. 1421-1460)  Historiae Heturiae sive Commentariorum de rebus in Heturiae a Senensibus gestis  Fueter, p. 37.

Corio, Bernadino (1459-1519)  Milan  History of Milan  Thompson, I, 482.

Crivelli, Lodrisio (ca. 1413-1465)  De vita et gestis Francisci Sforiae  Fueter, p. 42.
De expeditione Pii papae Secundi in Turcas  Fueter, p. 42.

Cyrnaeus, Petrus (1447-1506)  Ferrara  Commentarius de bello Ferraresi  Fueter, p. 50.
De rebus Corsicis  Fueter, p. 50.

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Decembrio, Pier Candido (1399-1477)  Milan  Life of Francesco Sforza  Thompson, I, 481.
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Vita Nicolai Piccinini  CMH, VIII, 863.
Compendium of Roman History  Cosenza, V, 159.
Vita Homerii  Kristeller, Iter, I, 108.

Donato, Antonio (d. 1481)  Venice  Vite dei duci  Pertusini, p. 304.
Facio, Bartolomeo (1400-1457) Naples
De bello Veneto/Aliud parvi
Rerum gestarum Alphonsii
De viris illustribus

Ferni, Michele (d. 1513)
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Historia nova Alexandri VI ab
Innocentii VII obitu

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Gallo, Antonio
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antea oceanum

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Jacopi Ammannati ... brevis vita

Giustiniani, Bernabo (1408-1489) Venice
De origine urbis rebusque ab ipse gestis
historia
In Beati Laurentii Justiniani vitam
ad monachos Cathusienses
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