HUSserl AND PHENOmenology

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Ph.D.
University of Edinburgh
1978.
ABSTRACT

This thesis examines the claims that philosophy can provide the foundation for science, that philosophy can show the presuppositions of science to be necessary, and that philosophy itself is presuppositionless.

The investigation begins by considering Husserl's attempt to provide such a foundation - in particular, to show that it is pure logic that grounds science.

It is in the Prolegomena to Pure Logic that Husserl develops this argument, through a sustained attack upon psychologism (the view that psychology grounds logic). By considering this attack in detail we attempt to demonstrate the emergence of certain limitations in the beginnings of Husserl's own views as to the nature of science, logic and truth. It is argued that these limitations entail the failure of the Husserlian project, as presented in the Logical Investigations.

A resolution of these limitations is developed through a consideration of the phenomenology of Hegel, and his arguments concerning the way philosophy should begin if it is to yield truth. In particular, Hegel's arguments for the necessity of phenomenology as preceding all other philosophy and providing the complete justification for science, for his particular conception of science, and for the nature of experience as being dialectical are examined. It is argued that these arguments enable science to be properly grounded.

The final section of this thesis briefly reconsiders the Husserlian position in the light of the Hegelian position adopted.
# CONTENTS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Page No.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>

## PREFACE

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>CONTENTS</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>

## PART I

**HUSSERL'S ARGUMENTS IN THE PROLEGOMENA**

1. Introduction 7
2. The Investigation of Logic 7
3. Psychologism 13
4. The psychologistic interpretation of the laws of logic 22
5. Relativism 25
6. Two proponents of relativism 33
7. Critical observations 35
8. The first psychologistic prejudice 42
9. The second psychologistic prejudice 49
10. The third psychologistic prejudice 53
11. Husserl's critique of the 'thought economists' 62
12. Note 66
13. Science 68
14. Existence, Truth and Science 77

## PART II

**JUSTIFICATION OF CRITIQUE**

| CONTENTS |

1. Introduction 84
2.1 Science 95
2.2 Summary 144
3. Logic 146
3.1 Introduction 146
3.2 How should logic begin? 153
3.3 The Notion of the beginning further considered 181
3.4 Identity, Non-identity and Contradiction 184
3.5 Experience 202
3.6 The dialectic process 208
3.7 The dialectic process and formalization 221
3.8 Truth 226

## PART III

**HUSSERL AND PHENOMENOLOGY**

| CONTENTS |

1. The ideal and the real 238
2. Phenomenology 251
3. Hegel - A concluding note 259

## BIBLIOGRAPHY

| CONTENTS |

263
PREFACE

In philosophy par excellence there is the problem of foundation. This problem can be expressed in the following manner: is it possible to adequately (scientifically) justify one's philosophical beginning, to show that it does not rest on any presuppositions; and, that given this beginning philosophy can realize its task?

The following investigations are concerned to provide an answer to this question. And it is with Husserl's philosophical beginning that the investigations begin. Husserl's power is to take philosophy seriously, he attempts to get to the basis of it and submit it to scrutiny in an attempt to answer the question of foundation. It is Husserl's express aim to situate philosophy on a scientific foundation, and in pursuing this aim he begins by investigating the philosophies of his time. Through a detailed study he finds these philosophies unable to provide such a foundation due to the confusions and ambiguities they contain. It is by working through such philosophies and pointing out their shortcomings that Husserl is able to clear the way for his own philosophical standpoint. It is therefore appropriate to begin by considering Husserl's investigations into the grounding of philosophy and why he finds other philosophies unacceptable.

The question posed above arose through a dissatisfaction with the methods and starting points adopted by some present day philosophies.
In particular, it was philosophies that based themselves on the traditional logic that seemed to be affected by this foundational malaise. And it seemed that the logical analysis of human reality was unable to deal with the subject matter at hand – the process of knowledge, the attainment of truth. By itself, logical analysis is paralysis. It is a failure to provide a rational account of reality, it is unable to reach truth. It is unable to understand the process of knowledge because it is precluded from any knowledge of process. It repudiates the sine qua non of any possible coherent philosophy – the ideal of system. We shall show that the above is the case and that such a logic therefore is unable to be properly scientific.

It will be argued that philosophy is not on a par with empirical science. Particular empirical sciences rest the justification for the truth of their propositions on axioms or presuppositions. To the extent that they remain within the boundary of these axioms to that extent are they internally consistent. But these sciences are not complete as the axioms upon which their procedures are based are not capable of justification by the particular sciences in question. The investigator is thus more a technician – operating with a method that is given. The results obtained by empirical science are therefore conditioned by the presuppositions that initiated the investigations – truth is here conditioned.

Now unless the necessity of these axioms or presuppositions is demonstrated, unless their truth is established, the truths that follow are to that extent dependent (or suspect). It will be
argued that it is philosophy that can give this necessity to empirical science - philosophy will warrant the axioms necessary.

To think that without fulfilling this requirement such methods can be universalized to take into account all aspects of human existence - to claim that empirical science and the logic it presupposes can, by itself, do adequate justice to man, is a grave error, resulting in the reduction of man to that to which such methods can apply together with a translation of other aspects of human existence out of existence. It is the reduction of given being being given to given being. Here it must be pointed out that translation equals loss of meaning. It will be shown that proper science does not provide a method which is then applied to any subject matter at hand, but begins by demonstrating the necessity of its own foundations. Assumptions or presuppositions thus have no place in philosophy. We cannot build a system of philosophy on assumptions anymore than we can build a house on them, for both we require concrete foundations. As Whitehead puts it "If science is not to degenerate into a medley of ad hoc hypotheses, it must become philosophical, and must enter upon a thorough criticism of its own foundations." (1)

It does this through philosophy. By itself empirical (positive) science cannot give its own presuppositions their necessity, not

even a positive science that might call itself philosophy. This is accepted by these sciences when they state that it is logically impossible for any finite science to be both complete and consistent. Philosophy, if it is able to provide the foundation for these sciences (and for itself) must be different in nature from them. It is the claim of phenomenology that it can provide such foundations - that it can give to all other disciplines their intelligibility and truth. Husserl expresses it as follows: "It is the distinctive peculiarity of phenomenology to include all sciences and all forms of knowledge in the scope of its eidetic universality ... The meaning and legitimacy of all the immediate starting points possible and of all immediate steps in possible method come within its jurisdiction". (2) It needs to be shown how it is possible for phenomenology to avoid the limitations of empirical science while being scientific itself. This is provided in Part II of the following investigations:

Within phenomenology itself, there is much variation both in method and content - but there is general agreement to the extent that phenomenology must precede empirical philosophy, that it must provide any philosophy with its foundation. It is phenomenology that guarantees the truth of its presuppositions. It will be argued in this thesis that phenomenology has a precise sense that allows such foundations to be established.

It was in considering the problem of the nature of the self that

I was led to the arguments of the phenomenologists. Empirical investigations, both in psychology and philosophy had yielded little fruit. Here the self was either translated out of existence being replaced by some ontological imposter, or else it was reduced to another object amongst objects - a static symbol of a frozen logic. Phenomenology, on the other hand, seemed to provide access to the self, and to consciousness, without deforming them. It considered consciousness as a being becoming through time, and as always implicated through experience with its object. Phenomenology described consciousness instead of destroying it.

It was through the arguments of the phenomenologists that I saw the problem of the empiricist as an error and their method as the problem. The view they (and especially Husserl) attacked was not a new one. It is the view that destroys the possibility of any true and genuine knowledge, and it is a view that will be reviewed as Husserl's arguments for a phenomenological programme are considered.

The initial investigations in phenomenology were centered on Husserl's Logical Investigations Vol. 1 (i.e. Prolegomena to Pure Logic). But through this investigation certain problems arose that severely limited the positive outcome of Husserl's critical studies. It was through the philosophy of Hegel that a solution was developed. In particular, through Hegel's arguments for foundations or the way in which philosophy must proceed as contained in the Preface and Introduction to The Phenomenology of Mind and The Science of Logic.
It is therefore of value to critically review Husserl's arguments against psychologism, and, more generally to assess the significance of his Prolegomena in that while Husserl's views changed considerably in his subsequent publications (his later work becoming more 'historical') it will enable the writer to substantiate and expand upon the preceding proleptic assertions concerning empiricism and any theory that rests upon presuppositions. It will also enable us to amplify and assess the adequacy of certain Husserlian and Hegelian conceptions - especially their views on Science, Logic and Truth.

The beginning of the investigation is the investigation of the beginning. It is this that is seen as the most important task to be achieved.
PART I

Husserl's Arguments in the Prolegomena

1. Introduction

In the following sections Husserl's arguments in the Prolegomena to Pure Logic will be reviewed as it was through these arguments that Husserl was led to develop his phenomenological system. We shall be concerned to establish the truth and value of these arguments and their implications for philosophy itself. In pursuing this intention certain general criticisms will be developed which, due to the method of presentation of Husserl's arguments, will unavoidably be repeated. This has the merit of constantly reminding the reader of certain perspectives that are held to be central to this thesis.

Secondly, it must be pointed out that while Husserl's views as developed in the Prolegomena are essentially of a preparatory nature, this in no way excuses him from the full force of certain criticisms to be advanced in the body of this thesis; likewise it in no way diminishes the many extremely important insights and truths that he brings to light, concerning the nature of philosophy and the method that its practitioners need to adopt.

2. The investigation of logic

Husserl is led to consider logic through his failure to provide a
satisfactory grounding for arithmetic. He sees in the logic of his
day three confused tendencies - the formal, the psychological and
the metaphysical. Given this amalgam, it then becomes impossible
to separate out that which is solid and true - what Husserl calls
'the universally binding truth' - from that which is mere opinion.
Husserl therefore states his intention as follows:

".... to make plain that all previous logic and our
contemporary psychologically based logic in particular,
is subject, almost without exception, to the above
mentioned dangers: through its misinterpretation of
theoretical principles and the consequent confusion of
fields, progress in logical knowledge has been gravely
hindered." (L.l. 55-6).

The dangers Husserl has in mind here are the employment of methods
which are wrong in principle - that is, not commensurate with the
disciplines' true objects. And the mixing up of different types
of proposition so that logically heterogeneous material is all
run together. With these dangers goes the following one of not
recognising the essential from the inessential - the correct
from the incorrect aim. This is a fundamental criticism which is
discussed at some length in the second part of this work. (cf.
Part II, P.89). It is fundamental in the sense that if one is not
aware of the essential incommensurability of a particular method
with the aim to be pursued the following investigations can only
end up as incoherent either because they fail to follow their
stated method or because the aim is redefined so as to eliminate
the incommensurability, the initial problem and the subject matter as well.

Husserl continues by pointing out that if all the traditionally disputed questions in logic are carefully considered, they can be seen to collapse into two groups:

(a) Those which view logic as a theoretical discipline, being formal and demonstrative and independent of psychology. The paradigm being arithmetic.

(b) Those which view logic as a technology dependent on psychology. Here it is seen as a practical discipline.

Husserl decides to begin with the accepted contemporary treatment of logic - as a technology (group (b) above) and to exactly specify what is meant by, and the justification of, such a treatment. This involves the more basic question of the theoretical foundations of logic itself and its relations to the other sciences - in this case psychology. And, as Husserl points out, this is just the epistemological problem of the objectivity of knowledge. He adds proleptically that his investigations will lead to the specification of a quite separate theoretical science which will provide the foundation for logic as a technology - and for any technology of scientific knowledge. This science will be a priori and demonstrative. We will thus be shown that group (b) rests on the foundations of, and receives its sense from, logic viewed in the manner of group (a).
For Husserl, all the sciences are incomplete, that is, they cannot satisfy us theoretically because they have not demonstrated all their premisses - and they cannot do so. To achieve such a complete demonstration we would require metaphysical investigations. But metaphysical investigations are seen by Husserl as being limited to those sciences that concern themselves with reality. What about those sciences that do not concern themselves with reality - such as pure mathematics, and, more important, what about investigations concerning the nature of science itself?

The answer that Husserl gives is to see logic (as theory of science) as supplying this foundation. Science aims at knowledge in the sense of knowledge (qua judgement) having a certain 'mark' - this being inward evidence.

"Ultimately, therefore, all genuine, and in particular all scientific knowledge rests on inner evidence, as far as such evidence extends, the concept of knowledge extends also." (L.1.61).

Secondly, science aims at giving a systematic coherence to this knowledge. If we did not have this coherence, we would end up with a mere splatter of judgements leading us nowhere. (1)
Validations must be grounded and achieve a systematic unity. There are three requirements necessary for validations to be satisfactorily grounded:

(1) This is just the criticism that S. Koch has recently levelled at psychology viewed as a science: see S. Koch 'Psychology as Science' p.5.
1. They must have a fixed structure in relation to their content.

2. They must be governed by regulative laws - this means that no validating procedure stands in isolation.

3. They may be viewed as free of all essential relation to a limited field of knowledge. For example, the syllogistic forms do not apply to only one science.

Husserl sees validating arguments as having a regularity of form which both gives the possibility of existence of sciences and also of a theory of science; the latter due to the independence of this form of validating arguments from a particular field of knowledge. It is only by validating arguments, which use language, that advance in a science is made. Logic, as theory of science, is thus normative in that it:

1. "... establishes general propositions in which, with an eye to a normative standard .... certain features are mentioned whose possession guarantees conformity to that standard, or sets forth an indispensable condition of the latter." (L.1.71)

2. "... establishes cognate propositions in which the case of non-conformity is considered or the absence of such state of affairs is pronounced." (L.1.71)

If this normative standard is taken as an end the normativity gives rise to technology - and when applied to science itself - a technology of science. At this point there arises a problem. What establishes logic as a scientific discipline? - Is it the
practical standpoint that gives it this form while from the theoretical standpoint all its propositions have been derived from otherwise known theoretical sciences (like psychology)?

That is, to put the matter simply, is logic (or any theoretical doctrine) purely an empirical science, or is there some nucleus or centre that is given a priori - a pure logic. Husserl's answer is that logic as a practical discipline requires a basic norm to give it coherence, and that this norm is not itself normative. Normativity presupposes the knowledge of certain non-normative truths. So, given that there are non-normative truths - or a pure logic - and that they do not come from any practical disciplines, where do they come from? (2)

It is here that we encounter the psychologistic (and the anti-psychologistic) arguments. For one of the answers given by philosophers such as Mill, Lipps, Sigwart, etc., is that psychology provides this essential foundation of logic. Psychology grounds logic.

Before proceeding to examine these arguments it should be noted that when Husserl speaks of scientific knowledge possessing the 'mark' of 'inner evidence' he treads on very dangerous ground. For if this 'mark' is not open to rational discourse it grounds science

(2) S. Rosen takes up this question of the norm or principle of the science of science - and argues that it must be rendered secure by something other than science if we are to avoid an infinite regress. (See p.82 'Hegel - An Introduction of the Science of Wisdom'). The question concerning the nature of science itself is considered in Part II.
in myth. In this state we would not be able to counter any assertion which was claimed to have the mark of inner evidence for there would be no way of rationally doing this. Hence while we agree wholeheartedly with Husserl's demand for a systematic and unified science, we require an explication of the notion of inner evidence that avoids the above danger.

3. **Psychologism**

Husserl proceeds to examine psychologism by adopting its standpoint. He observes that though there may be opposing views on many issues in psychology, it is universally agreed that psychology is a factual and therefore empirical science. It is also universally agreed that it does not possess exact laws. Given these two statements, Husserl makes the following arguments.

(1) If psychological laws lack exactness, and psychology grounds logic, the same must be true of the prescriptions of logic. But logic is a paradigm of exactness with respect to its laws - it does not depend upon inexact empirical fact. Therefore, any position basing logical laws on the empirical would destroy logic as it is presently conceived.

(2) Natural laws are not and cannot be known a priori, nor established by induction from singular facts of experience. Thus, if logical laws are taken as mere natural laws that happen to characterize the state of our minds when we think, they would rank as mere probabilities, and thus nothing
could be certainly judged correct. But logical laws all seem to have a priori validity and are established by 'apodeictic inner evidence'. Therefore, though we have insight into the truth of logical laws, we only have insight into the probability of natural laws.

"Against the truth that is itself grasped with insight, the strongest psychologistic argument cannot avail: probability cannot wrestle with truth, nor surmise with insight" (L.1.100).

Psychology cannot yield the absolutely exact laws which form the core of logic.

(3) If the laws of thought are taken as causal laws, they can only be stated in the form of probabilities. This would condemn us to probabilism, for we can have no insight into causal laws.

Husserl sees two confusions underlying the psychologistic arguments concerning causation. In this argument there are run together logical laws as contents of judgements, with logical laws as those judgements themselves. As the former they are ideal, but as the latter they are real events having causes and effects. (This is the first mention of a distinction that is to play a large part in Husserl's investigations - the ideal and the real. We shall have cause to examine this distinction in greater detail following the exposition of Husserl's position vis a vis psychologism, for it will be maintained that by making the distinction as he does he makes the path to science (Logic) impossible).
The second confusion is run into the first one when law, taken as a term in causation is confused with law taken as the rule of causation - this leads to the rules of causal connection functioning again as causes (i.e. as terms in this connection). Husserl sums up this point as follows:

"The psychologistic logicians ignore the fundamental, essential, never-to-be-bridged gulf between ideal and real laws, between normative and causal regulation, between logical and real necessity, between logical and real grounds." (L.I. 104).

(4) If the psychologistic logician argues that the laws of logic have their epistemological source in psychological matter of fact then they must be laws for mental states and presuppose the existence of such states. But no logical law implies a matter of fact. Therefore logical laws are as little psychologica as they are empirical. They are, for Husserl, pure, and not established by induction (because they have no existential content) but by insight. They exclude all other possibilities of truth.

With these arguments Husserl disposes of the psychologistic arguments that claim that logical laws entail existential assertion of mental fact, and also that logical laws are laws for mental facts - for, with respect to this latter view only factual laws have an empirical range, logical laws are fact free.

An immediate difficulty arises in these arguments in that they are
based upon an empiricistic ground. Husserl is right to take the psychologistic logician to task for relativizing truth (argument (1)) and for destroying the difference between ideal and real laws, and between a priori and aposteriori laws (arguments (2) and (3)). But he overstates his case in that he makes the gap between ideal pure laws and real causal laws unbridgable. And argument (4) can certainly be questioned. For, though it is agreed with Husserl that a logical law does not imply a matter of fact; and, further, that we should not confuse .... "the psychological presuppositions or components of the assertion of a law, with the logical 'moments' of its content" (L.I.106), this does not necessarily imply that the meaning of the content can be given in a manner that is in no way related to other than 'pure' phenomena.

It is clear that Husserl sees psychology as a purely empirical science limited to empirical generalities - it is ..... "the objective science of animal mentality" (L.I. 867). And on this view of psychology it is right to reject it as being able to give any account of the genesis of the logical. But it is necessary to provide an account of the way these laws become constituted for us - of the way these meaningful contents arise. It then depends as to how one analyses the concept of meaning as to how 'pure' the account of such a genesis will be. That is, whether it is possible to give an account of the meaning of a concept without at the same time giving an account of the system of meanings in which that concept is given as a concept.

Husserl did certainly recognize that it was necessary to give an
account of the genesis of such logical contents - this was acknowledged as a major task in the Formal and Transcendental Logic: .... "we must look for the manners in which the objects/take shape as synthetic unities in the mode "they themselves", in those experiences". (p.247).

So far no one has taken "... the ideality of the formations with which logic is concerned as the characteristic of a separate self-contained 'world' of ideal objects and, in so doing, to come face to face with the painful question of how subjectivity can in itself bring forth purely from sources appertaining to its own spontaneity, formations that can be rightly accounted as ideal objects in an ideal world". (260-1).

Phenomenology was then to move from the uncovering of the logical structures to the specification of their subjective constitution. But this constitution or uncovering is achieved by presupposing a given sense to such terms as ideal/real, matter of fact/essence, objectivity/subjectivity, etc. Husserl is already presupposing certain senses to these terms that do not necessarily accord with the way these terms arise or are given in and through experience, - an experience that may extend and be inseparable from the system or structures of meaning present. (This question is further discussed in Part II section 3.6).

Therefore argument 4 is correct in its criticism of the argument of the psychologistic logician, but in saying that logical laws
are as little psychological as they are empirical he is presupposing a sense to these conceptions that needs to be described, i.e. the context of meaning. This is to return to the problem of beginning, and it is here that a phenomenological description is required in that it will warrant necessary a particular law by showing how it emerged from conscious experience.

This is the phenomenological description that is attempted by Hegel in his Phenomenology of Mind where he describes the way the various concepts and laws arise and how they are related to the total conceptual system. Husserl also sees phenomenology as performing the task of clarifying the way (transcendental) subjectivity constitutes such concepts and laws, though in a manner at variance with, and we shall claim (in Part III) inferior to the Hegelian attempt.

We could perhaps put some of Husserl's points in a modified form as follows: no logical law implies a matter of fact, but they do presuppose the having got to the point of being able to assert such a law; of working up to the point of being able to form the notions of the logical and the empirical (or natural). To separate this development off - to ignore it - is to make the possibility of a completely coherent account of science impossible. This criticism does not mean that the a priori-ness of logical as against natural laws has to be abandoned, it means that the notions of ideal law and real law are not separated by a 'never-to-be-bridged gulf'.
To demand such a separation is to make the possibility of any relation between these two notions irrational, and to make the path to idealism (or materialism) unavoidable. This point was picked up by one of Husserl's early critics, P. Natorp. As Farber later expressed it:

"In Natorp's view the problem of the relationship between the formal and the material, the a priori and the empirical, the logical and the psychological is not solved by Husserl; or, in the latter's terminology between the ideal and the real. The material, empirical, psychological, i.e. the "real" seems to remain as an incomprehensible, irrational residue. The author of the drama takes the side of the "ideal" and adheres to idealism, in the Platonic sense; and the 'real' remains standing as a strange, rejected residue which cannot be eliminated. Natorp expressed the belief that Husserl will be forced along Kantian lines (and in fact) Natorp really indicated the course of Husserl's further development." (3)

We shall return to these points.

After stating these four arguments Husserl then introduces the following Kantian proposition:

(3) M. Farber: The Foundation of Phenomenology, p.149 (slightly compressed). See also The Aims of Phenomenology p.6.

(4) Kant, Critique of Pure Reason (MacMillan) B1 - P.41.
"All knowledge 'begins with experience', but it does not therefore 'arise' from experience". (L.I. 109).

For Husserl all laws concerning matters of fact arise from experience hence they must be inductively based on individual experiences. The notion of 'immediate self-evidence' cannot apply here, for these laws are mediated through individual experiences, whereas ideal laws are not - they are timeless hence can be apprehended in this immediate fashion. But again this proposition immediately raises problems.

Kant held that the form of knowledge - the universal and necessary form - was a priori, independent of experience and delimited to the subject as its principle. This a priori knowledge is thus rationalistically held as absolutely independent of experience. (5) The content of knowledge is held by Kant to be derived from an unknown source and is given to us externally, a posteriori and in a completely empirical fashion. Now Husserl in taking over this Kantian position also takes over many of the problems associated with Kant's philosophy. Husserl's distinction between ideal and real seems to be congruent with Kant's distinction between the form and content of experience.

The proposition as Husserl states it is also important, in that while it is most unclear what Husserl understands by the concept of experience, the development of two types of knowledge follows from

(5) Ibid B.2, P.43.
Another consequence of this is that every law is not necessarily empirical, nor temporally bound. And this ties in with Husserl's distinction between real and ideal. Husserl also adds at this point that 'no truth is a fact, i.e. something determined as to time'. (7) It therefore follows that it is senseless to talk of truths arising and passing away. If we take as an example the laws of truth themselves then if these truly arose and passed away we would have a state where laws arose and passed away in accordance with the law - which Husserl sees as being patently absurd.

But what does Husserl mean by experience? And what does he mean by truth? On what basis are we expected to agree with Husserl's (and Kant's) statement concerning the relationship of knowledge to experience? It would seem that this proposition is just asserted and not shown to necessarily follow from the development of experience itself. (8) And if it is claimed that is has the mark of self-evidence, we would require an analysis of self-evidence that made the notion of self-deception absolutely impossible.

A further problem can be mentioned here. When one attempts to express anything, to make a claim to knowledge, it is effected through language. For example, when it is claimed that ".... all knowledge

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(6) E.P. Welch. The Philosophy of Edmund Husserl, p.38. Discusses this point well.
(7) L.I. 109.
(8) Hegel. Science of Logic, p.613, where he attacks empirical logicians who just assert, i.e. there are such and such notions. Where do such propositions come from, where is their necessity?
'begins with experience', but it does not therefore 'arise' from experience" (L.I.109), such a claim presupposes a particular sense of the terms used such that the meaning of the statement can be conveyed. But this 'sense of the terms used' varies depending upon what particular point of view - what particular structures of meaning we embrace. To be adequate to the task of conveying the particular sense intended the statement must be precise and the terms that comprise it clear. That is, to specify the precise sense of terms like 'experience' is to use further terms and statements which further develop the state of affairs first claimed - it is to describe a form of knowledge. To be systematic, it would seem that we need to show how all the different terms arise and how they are related to the points of view possible. This is an immense undertaking. However, in Part II we will enquire into the Hegelian view as to how one should begin such a clarification. This problem is mentioned here in that it is the sense given by Husserl to such terms as experience, truth, fact, etc. that is being questioned. (10)

4. The Psychologistic interpretation of the laws of logic

So far we have seen that psychologism leads us to the view that logical truths are merely vague probabilities resting upon the authority of experience and induction, and concerning matters of fact. Gone is their a priori and exact nature - their pure con-

(9) Merleau-Ponty develops this notion of the structures or forms of meaning in The Structure of Behaviour, showing how this notion helps in solving the problems associated with perception.

(10) See P.89 where examples are given of what happens when there is a lack of such a systematic development of concepts.
ceptuality. Husserl now proceeds to examine the psychological interpretation of the law of contradiction (as espoused by Mill, Spencer, Lange and Sigwart), and syllogistic inference (Heymans). (11)

His argument against the view that the law of contradiction is a generalization from individual facts of experience (Mill) is that the facts that are used to support this contention already presuppose mutual exclusion (i.e. light/dark, sound/silence). This reduces the law of contradiction to a tautology. But it is evident that this law is not a tautology.

Likewise the attempt to construe this law as having a two-fold significance (Lange), both as a natural law, and as a normative law.

Husserl has already expressed himself concerning the divide between natural (real) and ideal law, and this applies to attempts at conceiving syllogistic inference psychologically. The absolute validity of certain inferences cannot be reached in psychology, nor the notion of conformity to an ideal law. In all these cases we find the confusion that conflates self evidence with opinion, exact with empirical generality, logical with psychological incompatibility, impossibility in terms of truth with impossibility in terms of belief.

Husserl then provides a short attack on empiricism, which he sees as intimately linked with psychologism. His argument here is that 'extreme empiricism' cannot provide a rational justification of mediate knowledge and hence is incapable of demonstrating that it is a 'scientifically proven theory'. For in basing itself on 'singular judgements of experience' it is condemned to either a vicious infinite regress or circularity when it attempts to account for the principles governing its procedure. It is involved in the former if the principles governing its procedure themselves require further proof; that is, if these principles rest upon singular judgements. And it is involved in circularity if these principles of proof are justified by more principles of proof - if the principles are of the same form as those which they govern.

Husserl concludes that because extreme empiricism ignores all but singular judgements of experience it is quite unable to rationally justify mediate knowledge. Any attempted justification of its mediate knowledge is performed with more mediate knowledge, the latter being given in psychological terms. This relativizes the whole procedure, for psychological terms are also mediate judgements of fact - from facts alone nothing can be know except facts. (12)

(12) Husserl develops this argument in more detail in Ideas, 8. (We might add here (a) that "facts do not speak for themselves, but always occur in a context of meaning, in which they find their place." (Phenomenology and the Natural Sciences - Ed. Kockelmans and Kisiel, p.23). (b) that 'the fact' as an atom of experience is incoherent. It requires its own history).
Husserl sums up as follows:

"It therefore fails to see that, having no insightful justification for our mediate assumptions, no justification, therefore, for the relevant proof-procedures from the immediately evident general principles that they follow, its whole psychological theory, its whole mediatly known doctrine of empiricism is without rational foundation, is, in fact, a mere assumption, no more than a common prejudice." (L.I. 116).

This is partly what was asserted in the introduction to this thesis - that empiricism repudiates the sine qua non of any possible coherent philosophy, this being the ideal of a system, of comprehending totality. We shall see in Part II that this repudiation is tied up with logic - where we find a similar repudiation of dialectical logic. It will be argued that Husserl while demanding a system where mediate knowledge is fully grounded fails to see any relation between traditional logic (the logic of the understanding) and dialectical logic.

5. Relativism

Husserl has not yet finished with psychologism and empiricism. He presents a more powerful argument against the above - namely, that they violate the conditions for the possibility of a theory as such.
This is by no means a new argument, as was pointed out in the introduction. In fact one writer, J. Wild (13) devotes the majority of his article (which is ostensibly on Husserl's critique of psychologism) to Plato's attack on the above. Again Kojève, (14) in his 'A Note on Eternity, Time and the Concept' points out this argument in relation to science and time. In considering these latter concepts he develops four possibilities of relation, the fourth being that all our knowledge (what he calls the Concept) is temporal. He says of this possibility:

"There is still possibility IV: the Concept is Temporal. But this is no longer a philosophical possibility. For this (skeptical) type of thought makes all philosophy impossible by denying the very idea of truth: being temporal, the concept essentially changes; that is to say that there is no definitive knowledge, hence no true knowledge in the proper sense of the word."

He leaves off considering it further as he considers Plato, Kant and Husserl to have sufficiently demolished this view. So what is Husserl's argument?

If we enquire into the ideal conditions for the possibility of any theory at all, we find two basic groups of conditions - what Husserl...

(13) J. Wild 'Husserl's Critique of Psychologism' in M. Farber (ed) Philosophical Essays in Memory of Edmund Husserl.
(14) A. Kojève. Introduction to the Reading of Hegel, P.102.
calls the subjective (noetic) and the objective (logical). The
noetic conditions are a priori, and the possibility of both
immediate and mediate knowledge depends on them (15) as does the
possibility of rationally justifying any theory. The latter
conditions concern the laws, which if denied, destroy any possible
coherent sense to the terms of a theory — terms such as theory,
truth, object, property, relation, etc. This denial leads to
logical offences, either in the presuppositions of a theory, in
the forms of theoretical connection in a theory, or in the thesis
that the theory sets forth. This provides an informal classifica-
tion of theories as being false, nonsensical, logically and noe-
tically absurd, and sceptical. Husserl also adds that scepticism —
being a consequence of psychologism — involves noetic and logical
absurdity. (16)

Husserl's criticism of psychologism is that it is a sceptical
relativism — so he next investigates the concept of relativism.
Relativism is the view that all truth and knowledge is relative
to the judging subject or to the human species. The former can
be called individual relativism and the latter specific relativism
(or anthropologism). Individual relativism is a nonsensical
doctrine for it destroys the possibility of the sense of its own
assertions. Against specific relativism Husserl marshalls six
arguments which will be briefly summarized below.

(15) See Husserl's 'Formal and Transcendental Logic' and 'Experience
and Judgement'.

(16) § 14 of this work deals at greater length with the notions of
noetic and the logical stated above.
Argument I
Assertion: Specific relativism asserts that 'anything is true for a given species of judging beings that, by their constitution and laws of thought must count as true' (17)  

Refutation: This would mean that truth is only bound to the human species and may not hold for another species. But this would mean that the same judgement could be both true and false - and no judgement can be so. For what is true is absolutely true, whether apprehended by men or Gods. (18)

Argument II
Assertion: There could be beings not bound by the principles that bind us, such as the principles of contradiction and excluded middle. Or, what amounts to the same thing, there could be judgements made by those beings which did not conform to these principles.

Refutation: Either such beings understand the words 'true' and 'false' in our sense, in which case they would be merely being irrational; or else they mean something different when they use such words. This would reduce the dispute to one

(17) L.I. 140.
(18) This, of course, depends on what is meant by truth and judgment. Hegel would say that all judgements are both true and false. In this connection see S.Rosen: Hegel. The Science of Wisdom, P.65.
of words - and with each equivocation we would obtain yet another 'truth'.

Argument III
Assertion: The form or constitution of a species is a fact. From a fact we can only derive more facts. Hence to base truth relativistically on the constitution of a species is to give it a factual character or foundation.

Refutation: Every fact is individual and therefore temporally determinate - truth is not. Facts are causal - truth is not. The above assertion confuses judgement as the content of a judgement - where the notion of truth applies, with judgement as the individual real act of judgement - where the notion of fact applies.

Argument IV
Assertion: All truth has its source in our common human constitution. Therefore if there is no constitution there is no truth.

Refutation: The thesis of this assertion is absurd. For Husserl, "... the proposition 'There is no truth' amounts in sense to the proposition 'There is a truth that there is no truth'. The absurdity of the thesis entails the absurdity of the hypothesis." (L.I. 142).
Argument V

**Assertion:** The constitution of a species might yield the 'truth' for the species, that there was no such constitution.

**Refutation:** To say that the non-existence of a certain constitution could be based on that very constitution is to contradict oneself, i.e. that the existent constitution should condition the truth of its own non-existence.

Argument VI

**Assertion:** That truth is subjective, in that a change in subjectivity would mean a change in the world.

**Refutation:** This view eliminates the world as existing in itself. The relativity of truth entails the relativity of existence. For Husserl the above assertion amounts to the denial of the 'inner evidence of immediately intuited existence', as over against relativism, and in 'self-evident conflict' with it.

These arguments have been reviewed here because it will later be argued that Husserl's view of truth is not an acceptable one. It will also be observed that these arguments against specific relativism are not wholly convincing. For example, the refutation in argument I assumes that truth is forever truth, which assumption implies certain views concerning consciousness, its perspective
and its experience which have not been made explicit. For if consciousness is not a thing - not some static point from which truths are apprehended - but a 'becoming' or a 'negativity' (as we shall argue later), then consciousness' perspective may alter as consciousness itself changes and develops. Hence its standard of self-evidence, its requirement for truth, and its self-evident principles may change. It is not sufficient to adopt the philosophical position of those whom one is investigating unless this position is made explicit.

Similarly, in argument IV, it is not self-evident that there is truth irrespective of the existence of the species. Kojève puts the point nicely as follows:

"Without Man, Being would be mute: it would be there (Dasein) but it would not be true (das Wahre)." (20)

Husserl is presupposing certain conceptions of truth and self-evidence that require demonstration. For example, does self-evidence have degrees? And surely it would never be completely impossible for us to be suffering from some form of self-deception? Again it is not self-evident that the statement 'that all truth has its source in our human constitution' is equivalent to saying that 'there is a truth that there is no truth'. What is being included under the concept of truth as here employed? Is there one concept of truth or two? Is there a truth that applies to

(19) i.e. If consciousness is not given being but being given.
(20) Kojève, op. cit. P.188.
propositions such as $1 + 1 = 2$, that does not apply to propositions of a more philosophical bent? Is it an acceptable methodological procedure to investigate psychologism without the prior explication of the point from which the investigations are being made - without justifying or demonstrating the necessity of the viewpoint that is being employed?

We shall return to the consideration of the questions raised here in relation to the above arguments following the completion of the exigesis of Husserl's arguments against psychologism.

Husserl sees relativism in an extended sense to be the doctrine that somehow derives the pure principles of logic from facts. Against this he argues that the pure truths of logic are all ideal laws having their foundation in the 'sense', 'essence', or 'content' of the concepts of truth, proposition, relation etc. Hence if a theoretical assertion is made which contravenes these laws, it is not merely false, but logically absurd. Husserl's arguments up to this point have been to demonstrate that any theory which deduces logical principles from matters of fact is logically absurd. And, secondly, that psychologism in all its varieties is a relativism that does just that, it tries to ..... "deduce truth from generic human nature, the ideal from the real, or, more precisely, the necessity of laws from the contingency of facts." (L.I. 146).

For Husserl, any doctrine is relativistic (i.e. in a case of
specific relativism) if it treats the pure laws of logic as though they were empirical, psychological laws. This is what the empiricist does. Secondly, it is relativistic if it deduces these pure laws somehow from some particular mode of functioning of our particular human understanding, from some innate quality that precedes all thought and experience.

6. Two proponents of relativism

As proponents of relativism (Anthropologism), Sigwart and Erdman come up for detailed criticism - Husserl applying the arguments already adumbrated. Our interest in these attacks centres on the further statements that Husserl makes with regard to the nature of truth, experience and ideality.

Husserl shows that Sigwart resolves truth into conscious experiences; that for Sigwart it is absurd to speak of truths holding unknown to anyone. Without a thinker there can be no true judgement. But, if experiences, judgements, etc. are real particulars, having a temporal location, and if truth is eternal and beyond time; then the 'experience' in which we apprehend truth will be entirely different from that in which we apprehend phenomena.

For Husserl, truth is a universal, as is, for example, the species Red. Red is not contained, as a part, in a red object - for where the experience of the red of this object (the sensed redness) arises and passes away, the 'experience' of Redness qua ideal unity (or
Therefore we have differing modes of apprehending singular and universal objects. Truth cannot therefore (pace Sigwart) be resolved into conscious experiences. Husserl puts his conclusion succinctly as follows:

"To define truth in terms of a community of nature is to abandon its notion. If truth were essentially related to thinking intelligences, their mental functions and modes of change, it would arise and perish with them, with the species at least, if not with the individual. With the genuine objectivity of truth, the objectivity of being, even the objectivity of subjective being or the being of the subject would be gone".

"Truth and being are 'categories' in the same sense, and plainly correlative: truth cannot be relativized while the objectivity of being is maintained. The relativization of truth presupposes the objective point to which things are relative: this is the contradiction in relativism." (L.I.151)

Because Sigwart is unable to make the distinction between the logical (the 'truths of reason') and the factual (the 'truths of fact') - one which Husserl claims presupposes the 'sharp sundering of ideal from real', he is unable to provide this 'objective being' for the relative to hand upon. The doctrine thus collapses.

(21) Husserl also discussed the distinction between sensed red as against the perceived quality of red in the Phenomenology of Internal Time Consciousness § 1, p.25.
In his consideration of Erdmann's anthropologism the same basic criticism is made. Erdmann confuses the real act of judgement with the content of that judgement - thus making the content relative to the possibility of the act, which destroys all absolute truth the content may have had. Relativism is thus the inescapable consequence. For Husserl, propositions that merely explicate the concepts they contain make no assertion about the real - and are to that extent trivial generalities. These propositions govern the form to which our assertions, judgements etc. must conform. Non-conformity entails absurdity, while conformity merely provides formal consistency.


This concludes Husserl's arguments concerning the consequences of psychologism as a sceptical relativism. It is thus appropriate to point out certain problems that are seen to arise from the arguments Husserl has so far produced.

Husserl's introduction of the notions of self or inner evidence, experience, truth, the ideal and the real, and the notion of concept itself is unacceptable. In relation to the notion of inner evidence as the mark that all properly scientific knowledge possesses it has been argued that this 'mark' is not as yet a coherent notion. What is the status of this inner or self-evidence? Is it an ideal addition to an ideal concept and if so in what relation does this self-evidence bare to our more psychological conception where the possibility of error in the self-evidence
cannot completely be ruled out? Again the notion of self-deception seems to have a possible application in any case of inner evidence - even Descartes' cogito seems logically open to this.

Secondly, when Husserl speaks of two types of knowledge arising from experience, what does he mean by the concept 'experience'? Is it a dialectical interplay of a subject separating itself off from an object to which it at the same time relates itself, or is it the mere reception of sensations - for depending on what is understood by this concept any later investigation is determined in a particular fashion.

Thirdly, Husserl speaks of truths as being timeless, it being senseless to speak of a truth ever coming into being or passing away. To do so would be to confuse the content of a judgement with the real act of judging. But the content of a judgement does not stand in isolation from judgement, and judgement itself can be seen to necessarily embody the denial of truth. Here truth is taken as expressing totality - what Hegel calls speculative truth. Now in taking truth in a different sense from this Husserl is presupposing the adequacy of what he should in fact be demonstrating, if truly scientific knowledge is to be attained.

Fourthly, the notions of ideal and real, together with his discussion of universal and particular are not seen as adequate. In his discussion of the universal red and its relation to the sensed red

(22) See Part II where the notion of judgement as incapable of expressing truth is discussed.
object Husserl asserts that these two are completely separate. He speaks of a 'never to be bridged gulf' (23) and a 'sharp sundering' (24) between the ideal (in this case the universal red) and the real (the sensed red object). Given this radical separation, it is then necessary to show how these two sundered 'objects' can be in any way related without destroying the separation first specified. As Findlay has pointed out, this is one point which ... "remains open to criticism in the whole Prolegomena: the great gulf set by Husserl between ideal and real objectivity, and his refusal to believe that the principles of the former can have any connection with the principles of the latter". (25)

How can the ideal 'participate' in reality if it is radically separate? And if there is no unity between these two we seem to collapse into unintelligibility for we then appear to have either a course of ideas inexpressive of reality, or a reality that has no ideal form, and as Bosanquet points out, this destroys the essence of truth. (26) Husserl suggests an answer to this question in a later work - the Formal and Transcendental Logic. There he says that the idealities of significations and of universal essences do have 'manners of possible partici-
participation in reality', while at the same time he maintains that this
in no way alters the 'essential separation' between them. (27)
He then adds that more penetrating investigations are required
here.

Husserl points out here that he was in fact misled at the time of
the Prolegomena about the relation of ideal to real objects. But
the conception of two types of experience, that we pointed out
earlier allows him to develop this 'participation', though it
also throws the question asked onto the previous distinction of
'begin with/arisefrom' experience. In what manner does he advance
beyond the Kantian conception of this relation? In 'Experience and
Judgement' Husserl develops further this problem of the relation
of the real and the ideal. Talking in this section about judi-
cative propositions he states:

'A proposition is not like a real object, individuated in
an objective point of time; rather, it is an irreal
object which, so to speak, is everywhere and nowhere. Real
objectivities are joined together in the unity of an
objective time and have their horizon of connection;
to the consciousness we have of them there belong,
accordingly, horizon-intentions which refer to this unity.

On the other hand, a plurality of irreal objectivities,

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e.g. a number of propositions belonging to the unity of a theory, does not have for consciousness such horizon intentions referring to a temporal connection. The irreality of the proposition as the idea of a synthetic unity of becoming is the idea of something which can appear in individual acts in any temporal position, occurring in each as necessarily temporal and temporally becoming, but which is the same "at all times". It is referred to all times; or correlative to whatever time it may be referred, it is always absolutely the same; it sustains no temporal differentiation, and, what is equivalent to this, no extension, no expansion in time, and this in the proper sense'. (28)

Though we have here moved considerably away from the initial statements in the Prolegomena it can still be seen that Husserl is having trouble relating these two types of objects in a way that does not require some extensive ontological presuppositions. For here the original question of the nature of the relation between ideal and real simply passes to the relation between the temporal and the atemporal - and it is here that Husserl brings in more rarified notions, such as that of 'supertemporality' and 'omnitemporality' in an attempt to explain this. (29) We shall return to this problem presently.

(28) Experience and Judgement, P.259.
Returning to his discussion of Sigwart, Husserl appears to commit another mistake. He argues that if we follow Sigwart, truth would vanish with the human species. This view implies a confusion in the perspective from which the statement is made. Husserl seems to take the subject as separate from the object; truth from fact. But without the prior explication of the notion of experience and truth the position remains obscure. The force of Husserl's arguments can be felt only from the epistemological position of the empiricistic and psychologistic logician, but if their position reduces to absurdity as Husserl often argues, what rescues us from this? He needs to show, and he does not show, how we are able to apprehend this absurdity. That is, he fails to show how he has got to the point of being able to put his distinctions so that they receive a coherent sense, given the absurdity of the above position.

Following Hegel, it will be argued that universal (abstract universal, i.e., red) and particular (the real sensed red object) are in contradiction if taken in isolation - that in some sense the individual red object is both a particularization of the universal and a universalization of the particular. (30) In fact it will be maintained that the bare isolated individual or particular and the abstract universal are unthinkable and hence unreal. But this argument presupposes for its possibility the prior clarification of the relations that hold between epistemology and

(30) Baillie puts it thus: "The science requires generality, the experience requires individuality; the generality of science must be individualized, the individuality of experience must be generalized." Introduction to Phenomenology of Mind. Hegel, P. 46.
phenomenology. Until this has been performed, we ourselves are open to the charge of not having demonstrated the having got to the point where our views achieve a coherent sense - our arguments are made from nowhere without this. In entering into discourse consciousness implicates itself in its own arguments - the arguments developed are related both to the (in this case) psycholgistic logician and to the Husserlian position.

We will also need to look closely at the limitations of an epistemological procedure such as Husserl's, and whether his epistemological view receives a coherent sense. To this end we are in full agreement with Husserl's demands that for an epistemological investigation to be properly scientific it must conform to the principle of 'freedom from presupposition'. And secondly, that any epistemological investigation that is performed must be grounded in - 'have its pure foundation in' - phenomenology; though in what sense this 'presupposition' and 'phenomenology' be taken is another matter to be clarified. (31)

So far we have seen Husserl developing a powerful argument against psychologism - viewed from the perspective of psychologism - namely that it is a sceptical relativism which entails absurd consequences. Husserl puts his point most directly when he says that 'the relativization of truth presupposes the objective being of the point to which things are relative', and in the discussion of truth, especially Hegel's notion of it, we shall see how this 'objective

(31) L.I. P.263.
being of the point is explicated. However, the observations made so far merely indicate in proleptic fashion certain basic problems and the perspective from which Husserl's further arguments concerning the psychologistic arguments will be viewed.

8. The First Psychologistic Prejudice

Husserl turns from the consequences to the arguments of psychologism to show that its supposed truths are in fact delusive prejudices. He puts the psychologistic arguments in the form of three prejudices, which shall be considered briefly.

The first prejudice is stated as follows:

'Prescriptions which regulate what is mental must obviously have a mental basis. It is accordingly self evident that the normative principles of knowledge must be grounded in the psychology of knowledge.' (L.I. 168).

But, Husserl argues, logical laws are not normative, they are not prescriptive. They may be employed in a normative manner, but this requires a 'fundamental transformation' of these logical laws. Husserl emphasises that we must be clear that the logical laws do not contain normativity in their thought content, whereas prescriptions do; though the former can be used as a foundation for a normative statement. If this is not clearly perceived we fall foul of the confusions that sustain both the psychologistic and
the anti-psychologistic positions. The psychologistic view mistakenly collapses these two domains, the logical laws and the rules governing the 'specifically human acquisition of knowledge' into the latter - or better, fails to see the logical laws as being in any way different from the rules for human procedure; while the anti-psychologistic view mistakenly attributes normativity to both and hence is led to overlook the 'purely theoretical nature' of logical laws.

Husserl sees logic, as a methodology (or as a technology) as concerned with providing the general norms for the critical evaluation of our theoretical knowledge. But if logic in this role is aiming at being a scientific discipline, then it, like all other sciences, will presuppose certain theoretical knowledge, such as those truths which cannot be denied on pain of vitiating any possible scientific enterprise. Those truths '... which have their roots in such essential constituents of all science considered as an objective theoretical unity, truths which, accordingly, cannot be thought away without thinking away all that gives science as such its objective purchase and sense, such truths obviously provide the fundamental standards by which we can decide whether anything claiming to be a science, or to belong to one ... really lives up to its intentions, or does not rather stand in an apriori conflict with the ideal conditions of the possibility of theory and science as such.' (L.I. 172)

It is these truths that cannot be grounded in psychology, or any of
the sciences dealing with 'matters of fact'. These truths are ideal, and as such, are completely independent of the particular sciences. Once we recognize this domain, we would according to Husserl, find it impossible to deny the existence of a special science which provides the concepts that constitute the 'idea of System' or the idea of theoretical unity, and whose business it is to investigate the relationships and interconnections of these. This is thus a science absolutely independent of all other sciences. And it necessarily precedes all other sciences. For it provides the forms for any possible science whatever (i.e. the law of contradiction). It must also provide the forms for itself, which is not, according to Husserl, problematic.

Here we may note again the radical separation of form from content, the former being ideal, the latter real. Though Husserl claims that there is no 'inner conflict' in this 'science' that provides the foundations (or possibility) for itself, as well as for all other sciences with respect to their form; it can be argued that it is not a sufficient condition for the possibility or foundation of itself, because of the criterion used to install such 'truths', and the procedure followed in arriving at them. The idea of a 'fundamental standard' as some timeless existent of an ideal realm of concepts, is one that could be called into question, for, as we shall see when the Hegelian conception of science is discussed (Part II), the idea of a standard that exists outside the temporal domain and that guarantees the form of logic is mistaken. The standard is not there to begin with but is only reached after a considerable development of experience - a development which shows
the falsity of any such possible standards that are there in the beginning for consciousness to so organize its content under.

Secondly, and related to the above point, Husserl's notion of the absolute independence of pure logic from logic as a science concerned with matters of fact (and that of the separation of universal and particular - Red, and a sensed red object) is unacceptable. For as Collingwood points out:

"To abstract is to consider separately things that are unseparable: to think of the universal, for instance, without reflecting that it is merely the universal of its particulars, and to assume that one can isolate it in thought and study it in this isolation. This assumption is an error. One cannot abstract without falsifying. To think apart of things that are together, is to think of them as they are not, and to plead that the initial severance makes no essential difference to their inner nature is only to erect falsification into a principle." (32)

Husserl needs to show why we come to make such a separation, not by showing this as the solution to the problems he sees arising from the point of view of the psychologistic logician, but by demonstrating that the judgements he makes concerning the separation of ideal and real truths are based on presuppositions that can themselves be verified. What is asked for here is that Husserl should specify the

(32) R. G. Collingwood: Speculum Mentis P.160
ground that sustains such a set of judgements, for it shall be argued that without such a specification the exact sense of the judgements made cannot be properly grasped. This means that judgements do not stand on their own but are part of a structure or form of knowledge. The particular judgements do not therefore present something as immediate, or immediately evident, but are in part reflective productions. We shall argue that there are no immediate givens - that knowledge is always of a mediated nature.

It will be further argued that it is through the acceptance of certain unexamined presuppositions that Husserl is led to consider only the identity of a particular concept, not its identity and non-identity in unity. This means that the understanding of a concept, such as that of the ideal cannot be adequately accomplished without considering the process of thinking in which such ideality becomes constituted. This does not mean that we need to examine the empirical process of thinking that the naturalistic psychologist is concerned with. Husserl correctly dismisses this approach as being unable to grasp the foundation upon which their own empirical researches are performed, that foundation which gives to this science its scientific form. What is required is that

(33) The claim that Husserl accepts certain presuppositions uncritically, and that these prejudice his investigations has been made by many commentators, i.e.

Th. De Boer Husserl's Idealism, p.326, § 3
J. Derrida Speech and Phenomena, p.81

(Also see J. Kuczynski who claims that Husserl's phenomenology must break down because of his limited view point cf. Homo Creator vrs. Homo Contemplator, p.102.)
Husserl shows how the concept of ideality becomes constituted - i.e. arises as a meaning, in the already existing meaning - content that is thinking. (34)

However, given this separation of form and context, we can develop two perspectives on any science. The first being developed by applying ourselves to the methods that a science uses in acquiring and systematically investigating a particular region of truth.

Here we are concerned with real contingent conditions - with the human constitution and the constitution of other phenomena. This perspective is then concerned with the 'how' of the science, how we acquire the truths etc. of a particular science. It is here that psychology has its particular part to play. The concern with methods appropriate to the acquisitions of truths by human beings is called by Husserl methodological logic. However, this logic, which has its foundations in psychology and in other sciences, still has its first and essential foundations in pure logic.

The second perspective that can be developed on any science focuses on what that particular science teaches us - on the objective theoretical content. This content consists of the particular truths that each of the scientific statements of a science (ideally) state, and also of the theoretical connections that each truth necessarily sustains with the other truths of that science. This perspective

(34) Adorno argues that Husserl could not tolerate such a separation of ideal and real, hence his introduction of the conception of thinking - an ambiguous conception - in which ideal and real could come into relation. Cf. Husserl and the Problem of Idealism. P.10 - 11.
Husserl calls objective in that it is not concerned with the subjectivity of the scientists who make such statements, nor with any particular matter of fact, but with the truths that such statements state and their theoretical interconnection. (35)

Now pure logic is concerned with this second perspective, but only in respect of its form. As Husserl puts it:

"It does not aim at the peculiar material of the various special sciences, or the peculiarity of their truths and forms of combination: it aims at what relates to truths and theoretical combinations of truths as such. For this reason every science must, on its objective, theoretical side, conform to the laws of logic, which are of an entirely ideal character." (L.I. 173-4)

Pure Logic is thus concerned with each science insofar as it exemplifies the essential form of all science. It is the form of the subject matter and the form of its interconnections that is of interest to pure logic.

From these two perspectives there can be obtained by a 'transformation', two classes of norms. Those relating to the objective ideal side of a science, which tell us how we should conduct proof and make theoretical connections; and those relating to the subjective

(35) This conception of objective in an abstract one. We abstract from the materiality of existence - and because empty we claim objectivity for it. (See Part II on the question).
real side, to the general human constitution, telling us how we should proceed in developing a particular domain of knowledge. The former are again ideal, the latter real. It is, according to Husserl, by failing to see these two perspectives and the two classes of norms relating to them, that makes possible both the psychologistic and the anti-psychologistic views.

9. The Second Psychologistic Prejudice

The second psychologistic prejudice runs as follows: If we look at the actual content of logic, we find it is concerned with truth and probability, presentations and judgements, etc. These are mental phenomena. Thus the psychologistic logician argues that because truth, necessity, possibility etc. are expressed in judgements - what the former refer to can only be experienced in judgements, and judgements are real psychological acts, therefore they should be studied by psychology as they are psychological phenomena. This means that the distinction between logical (or pure) and methodological propositions is irrelevant as this argument affects both (both are expressed in judgements).

Husserl has shown the absurdity of the consequences of such a view, now he turns to the actual arguments. He shows, using a mathematical analogy, that the actual thought-process, no matter of what content, is fit material for psychological study; but the content of that thought-process, of that experience, of that judgement etc., is not. Laws concerning the acts of judging or experiencing differ
toto caelo from the laws concerning the content of these judgemental or experiential acts. For example: the law of contradiction is 'a law for the contents of judging, in other words for the ideal meanings which we call propositions', and not for the acts of judging. (36)

This is a very important point, which empirical psychology, for example, is always one to flout. Current research into the higher orders of human life such as the content of thoughts, of dreams, etc. and the nature of understanding, forget that these areas cannot be an object for empirical psychology, for empirical psychology presupposes the taking of the content in a particular way for its own intelligibility. Scheler (37) puts the point as follows:

"Again, the epistemology of understanding is equally a presupposition for empirical psychology, not an object of inquiry. The reports made by the experimental subject as to what he may have found in self-observation, based on experiment, have still got to be understood first of all, and even shared and reproduced by the person conducting the experiment, before the report itself has any claim to establish a 'scientific fact'. It is not for empirical psychology to provide an account of this understanding .... for it is socially and epistemologically presupposed in its own procedure".

(36) L.I. 184
(37) Scheler: The Nature of Sympathy P.222
For Scheler, as for Husserl, there is a divide between the actual occurrence of an experience and the content or meaning of this experience. For Scheler the full significance of cognitive activity (of meaningful experiences) can never be even accessible to the empirical psychologist – because it is entirely beyond the comprehension of empirical psychology due to its ontological status. (38) To the extent that such an ontological difference is ignored – to the extent that empirical psychology forces itself upon the whole range of experience, to that extent will human experience become a monotonic landscape with – as was bluntly stated in the introduction – the translation of all ontologically incompatible existents either out of existence, or into an atrophied form amenable to experimental manipulation. Levinas (39) puts this point succinctly when he says that:

(38) By the ontological status of meaningful experiences we mean to delineate the separate regions that the empirical and the phenomenological occupy. The meaning of an experience is phenomenologically but not empirically available. Likewise the neurological activity of brain cells is empirically but not phenomenologically available.

Husserl puts it as follows: "The relevant analyses are analyses of meaning, and not in any degree psychological ones." (L.I. 183). (Though whether Husserl would claim that the two regions are ontologically separate is a question we will take up shortly). On this point see J. Howie: Metaphysical Elements of Creativity in the Philosophy of W.E. Hocking. Idealistic Studies Vol. III, No.1, 1973. He quotes Hocking as follows: ".... a natural science (strict behaviouristic) psychology is, by necessity of its method, a description of the meaningful in terms of the meaningless." (p.64-5).

"The great mistake of other sciences - psychology for example - is to see, in the ontology of nature the ontology of all regions, or else to reject all ontology".

Once the limitations of such a procedure are grasped, the only reason for the persistent following of such an erroneous method is of a political nature - with which we are not here concerned.

Here we may briefly summarize the difference between the two sciences, between that of the ideal and that of the real, which Husserl continually invokes to destroy the psychologicistic (and anti-psychologicistic) standpoints. These two sciences are again separated - as Husserl points out, there is 'an essential, quite unbridgable difference' between them.

Sciences of the ideal are apriori, and contain ideal general laws - which have no empirical range. Husserl sees these laws as being grounded with intuitive certainty in certain general concepts whose extension is of the lowest specific difference. These sciences deal only with the ideal realm, its objects being 'ideal species' and its terms 'ideal genera'. Only in these sciences do we achieve genuine generalizations.

Sciences of the real are empirical - and their laws relate to the sphere of fact. In these sciences we have insight into the probabilities of the facts to which these laws relate. The extension of the general concepts is one of individual, temporally determinate singulars, and its ultimate objects are empirical facts, and its
terms-empirical classes. These sciences arrive at universal propositions of fact.

Husserl points out here that to fully comprehend the differences involved in these two different sciences, we must have completely abandoned 'the empiricistic theory of abstraction, whose present dominance renders all logical matters unintelligible'. (40) In all knowledge, Husserl sees three distinct patterns of connection, which if not clearly seen, lead to the psychologistic view. For example, if we take physics, it is possible to distinguish three different patterns of connection: those of the thinking subject, i.e. his mental states and their interconnection; the physical world that he confronts; and the 'ideal pattern of connection of the truths in physical theory'. If we reduce this last pattern to any of the others we relativize truth and destroy ideality - as Husserl has already shown.

10. The Third Psychologistic Prejudice.

The third prejudice deals with truth and inner evidence, and is for this reason of more direct concern for the subsequent position to be developed in this thesis. Here, however, we are only concerned with Husserl's attack upon the psychologistic/empiricistic conceptions of the above and Husserl's own conceptions as related to these.

(40) L.I. 185 - Husserl develops the attack against this theory of abstraction in the second half of Investigation II.
Citing Hill, Sigwart, Wundt, Hofler and Meinong, Husserl states what he considers to be their general argument. All truth is related to judgement. A judgement is seen as being true when it is 'inwardly evident'. Now the notion of 'inner evidence' is here a notion of a particular mental character or peculiar feeling which guarantees the truth of the judgement to which it is attached. Therefore logic - if it be concerned with truth - must be concerned with these feelings - and logical laws are ipso facto psychological. Thus we derive the logical from the psychological, and truth from inner evidence.

What is wrong with this argument? In general terms the psychologicist argument fails to correctly understand the relation between the ideal and the real, between the purely logical and the psychological. Husserl begins his criticism of this argument by pointing out that the pure laws of logic make no assertion concerning inner evidence, nor with the conditions for its occurrence, though Husserl does see these pure laws as being related to the psychological in what he calls 'an ideal and indirect way'. That is, it is possible to transform any of the pure laws of logic (in an apriori and inwardly evident way) so that we produce propositions that do speak of inward evidence and its conditions. This transformation is possible due to what Husserl calls a 'general equivalence' between the propositions of the pure laws and the propositions specifying judgements in accordance with such laws - between such propositions as 'A is true' on the one hand, and
'It is possible for anyone to judge A to be true in an inwardly evident manner' on the other. (41) But given this 'general equivalence' between the two propositions (above) it is certainly incorrect to assert that they state the same thing. For 'A is true' says nothing about judgements, nor about anyone's act of judging. And even if we did transform all pure laws of logic into the equivalent propositions concerning judgements we would still be outwith the province of psychology. (42)

Husserl sees psychology as a purely empirical science concerned with mental facts, and the natural conditions of our experience. From within psychology, any talk of possibilities or impossibilities of inner evidence is talk of real possibilities and impossibilities, of real conditions of our experience, of real relationships. (43)

This gives three distinct groups of propositions:

(a) Those propositions stating or embodying the pure (ideal) laws.

(b) Those propositions obtained through a self-evident transformation of the pure laws. These propositions are concerned with mental experiences, with the conditions under

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(41) Cf. L.I.190. Here Husserl says: 'The propositions, therefore, whose sense lies in stating what necessarily is involved in the notion of truth ... can certainly be transformed into equivalent propositions which connect the possible emergence of inner evidence with the forms of our judgement'.

(42) Cf. Hegel, in The Science of Logic (P.761) makes a similar point to this.

(43) Levinas (op.cit. P.97) makes this point - that Husserl is concerned with a purely naturalistic psychology.
which inner evidence is attained. But they are not concerned with the real - they are concerned with consciousness qua every possible consciousness, and are apriori.

(c) Those propositions giving the natural conditions under which inward evidence arises and perishes (i.e. such conditions as mental alertness, practice etc.). These are psychological propositions, they are external to the content of the propositions of the other two groups (i.e. groups (a) and (b)) - and they are empirical.

For Husserl:

"Each truth stands as an ideal unit over against an endless, unbounded possibility of correct statements which have its form and its matter in common. Each actual judgement which belongs to this ideal manifold, will fulfil, either in its mere form, or in its matter, the ideal conditions for its own possible inward evidence. The laws of pure logic are truths rooted in the concept of truth, and in concepts essentially related to this concept'. (L.I. 192).

What then is the relation between the ideal and the real, between truth and inward evidence? Is it, as the psychologistic and empiricistic view maintains, that ideal objects of thought are mere 'verbal abbreviations whose true content merely reduces to individual singular experiences', and is inner evidence a mere feeling that externally attaches to certain judgements - the true
ones? Husserl answers categorically in the negative. Empiricism totally misunderstands both relations. It takes the ideal unities as real singulars, it takes inner evidence as psychological. But before giving precise expression to the correct relation between the ideal and the real, Husserl points out that we need an understanding of the correct relationship between inner evidence and truth.

For Husserl, inner evidence is the 'experience' of truth, 'experienced' in the sense in which something ideal can be an experience in a real act.

"Otherwise put: Truth is an Idea, whose particular case is an actual experience in the inwardly evident judgement. The inwardly evident judgement is, however, an experience of primal givenness: the non-self-evident judgement stands to it much as the arbitrary positing of an object in imagination stands to its adequate perception." (L.I. 194-5).

And further on Husserl states:

"The experience of the agreement between meaning and what is itself present, meant, between the actual sense of an assertion and the self-given state-of-affairs is inward evidence: the Idea of this agreement is truth, whose ideality is also its objectivity." (L.I. 195).

From these statements it logically follows that there can be no inner evidence without truth, for inner evidence is most intimately
related to truth. Secondly, this view eliminates the psychologistic problem of the objectivity of insight, for on this view inner evidence, as a psychological and perforce real phenomenon, may or may not accompany a true proposition in each individual - we may have a conflict between two people, one of whom judges J with insight or inner evidence and the other who also judges J but without the requisite insight. On Husserl's criteria, we have 'insight into the fact that no one's insight can be at variance with our own', therefore the above situation could not occur, both people would either judge J with insight because J was true, or else they would not (though this would not necessarily mean that J was therefore false). This brings up certain problems with Husserl's view that can be stated here. (44)

First of all, Husserl bases a considerable weight of argument on insight and yet nowhere does he systematically describe methodological procedures for obtaining such insights as are necessary for the foundation of his view. (45)

Secondly, his view still requires that we recognize (experience) the meant qua meant before an agreement between this and the meaning can be obtained. The relation presupposes the relata. Hence there is needed some other notion of the presence of the

(44) See the section on Truth in Part II below, where the above are further considered.

(45) E.P. Welch. The Philosophy of Edmund Husserl P.214, and Levin op. cit. P.42 - 48 discuss this.
meant that precludes the generation of an infinite regress of relations, that avoids silence (or non-scientific discourse) and that avoids a vicious circularity in the notion of insight or inner evidence.

Thirdly, Husserl's view is a static or logical one, and hence stands in need of a description of just how we reach the Idea of Truth, how we get to the point of being able to 'produce' ideal objects, of being able to distinguish ideality from reality. All these conceptions require an elucidation, which has been summarily put as follows: that Husserl needs to show how this view is necessary - as Hegel has put it - the form of necessity must get its due. (46) The notion of 'the having got that far' of having got to the point of being able to assert such epistemological distinctions, of being able to assert such relations, is here taken for granted. But the having got this far presupposes for its exact sense the explication of that from which we have come. (47) Husserl must demonstrate the necessity of the view that the relations obtaining between truth and inner evidence (or insight) are such as he claims. It is not sufficient merely to erect an anti-psychologistic scaffolding unless one knows not just what it scaffolds, but


(47) Hegel puts it thus: "Thoroughness seems to require that the beginning, as the foundation on which everything is built, should be examined before anything else, in fact that we should not go any further until it has been firmly established and if, on the other hand, it is not, then we should reject all that follows" Science of Logic P.41.
also upon what foundation it stands. In so far as he takes for
granted 'the having got that far' just so far does he fail to
better the empiricistic and psychologistic logicians. For example,
the view that we 'have insight into the fact that no one's insight
can be at variance with our own', is just asserted, any necessity
it may have is merely a definitional one.

Again as Welch notes, (48) Husserl fails to give any systematic
account of the problem of truth and error. As they are absolutely
pivotal conceptions it is encumbent on him to do so. Such state-
ments as that inner evidence is the 'experience' of truth seem,
without this prior clarification, to be most ambiguous. How can
we experience the ideal (i.e. truth) in an act (the real) if these
are totally separate unbridgeable notions? How can a thing, or an
ideal object be grasped wholly and without residue - what does this
mean? What does the statement that inward evidence is 'the
experience of the agreement between meaning and what is itself
meant, between the actual sense of an assertion and the self-given
state of affairs' mean? How can a state-of-affairs be self-given,
and in what ontological relation does it stand to the sense of the
assertion concerning the former? And surely the experience of an
agreement, any agreement, is open to misinterpretation or error,
for experiences are had by an experiencer? Is this agreement that
of the identity of thought and being?

(48) Welch op. cit. P.44 footnote. See also Q. Lauer's Intro-
duction to Husserl's 'Phenomenology and the Crisis of
Philosophy' P.46.
A further problem concerning Husserl's views in this section is of the notion of 'general equivalence'. Just what does this equivalence consist in? Are both the law and its self-evident transformations ontologically equivalent as against the psychological facts - or is this purely an epistemological point? For it becomes increasingly difficult to see exactly what this equivalence consists in - seeing Husserl explicitly states that they do not state the same thing. This brings up again the general question as to the standpoint from which these criticisms against the empiricistic/psychologistic positions are being made. We shall hold that what is absolutely necessary for a proper understanding of the conceptions that have been referred to above is a system. Indeed without such a system predication itself collapses. (49)

The relating of any predicate to any subject presupposes for its sense a system - a developing system, in which predication can be related to a whole. Without a system it becomes increasingly difficult to understand just what is being asserted, and to decide exactly what sense we attach to such entities as logical objects etc. To provide answers to the above questions, or to rule them out as otiose presupposes a coherent point of view - a system. To understand what Husserl means by experience, ideality, self (or inner) evidence, the objectivity of ideality etc. we first require the system. We shall return to these questions.

(49) See the article by Aquila (Kant-Studien 64, 1973) where he shows the need for a system for predication to even be possible. Hegel of course holds this as a sine qua non of proper science itself.
11. **Husserl's critique of the thought-economists.**

Husserl turns his attention to another empiricistic theory of the basis of logic. This is the view that sees biology as the basis of logic. His prime concern is with the views of Mach and Avenarius (and to a lesser extent Cornelius) - with Mach's principle of the economy of thought, and with Avenarius' principle of least action. Husserl's argument is aimed at demonstrating that the acceptance of a principle of either of the above type entails the corruption of all genuine logic and epistemology, as well as of all psychology. His main argument against the above view again involves the ideal/real distinction.

In general terms, this empiricistic view conceives of science as being the most advantageous form of thought for the continued existence of the human species, because it is the most economical - because it achieves as complete an orientation to, and comprehension of a particular field as is possible. For Husserl, such 'principles' are not so much principles in the sense of rational theory, but in the sense of a 'valuable teleological viewpoint' which presides over both the sphere of natural or blind thinking as well as the sphere of logical and scientific thinking. Husserl does not completely reject this notion - he sees it as having both a legitimate and an illegitimate sense.

It is legitimate to the extent that we are interested in the facts of scientific or economical thinking; in the psychological, physiological, biological - in a word, real - mechanisms that lead to such
facts, and this from the point of view of promoting the survival of homo sapiens. Husserl sees the field of mind as being from this perspective a sub-field of biology and hence capable of pursuing both abstract psychological investigations aimed at producing elementary laws and also concrete researches leading to teleological ones. Husserl so far agrees with the view that notions such as 'the economy of thought' are most valuable in the domain of the real, of facts. They yield an important practical foundation for a technology of knowledge - for the methodology of scientific research.

But Mach and Avenarius root epistemology in this economy of thought, and this is illegitimate. By doing so they are open to the whole gamut of arguments already enunciated against the psychologistic position. For Husserl sees in this attempt to ground epistemology on an economy of thought the attempt to ground it in psychology. From the grouping together of a mass of facts concerning adaptation, thought-economies, least action or facts of a biological nature, nothing is obtained but more facts. From facts alone nothing can be known except facts. But facts presuppose the knowledge of certain non-factual truths. As Husserl expresses it:

".... we must know what science ideally aims at, what law governed connections, what basic laws and derived laws etc. ideally are and do, before we can discuss and assess the thought - economical function of knowing them." (L.I.209).

For Husserl pure logic comes before all such thought-economies - hence
it is absurd to try and reverse such a relationship. The thought-economy view fails to appreciate that the validity of certain norms that underpin it are presupposed by it and cannot therefore be made the outcome of this view. Husserl puts the point nicely when he says, "The possibility of science cannot be shown by the fact of the sciences; since the fact itself is shown only be subsumption under that possibility as an idea." (50)

The primary importance for what follows is again Husserl's separation of the ideal ('objectively ideal') from the real. This leads him to make the following statements:

"The question is not how experience whether naive or scientific arises, but what must be its content if it is to have objective validity: we must ask on what ideal elements and laws such objective validity of knowledge is founded - more generally, on what any knowledge is founded - and how the performance involved in knowledge should be properly understood. We are, in other words, not interested in the origins and changes of our world-presentation, but in the objective right which the world-presentation of science claims against any other world-presentation, which leads it to call its world the objectively true one." (L.I.207).

It is again here that the general question of Husserl's own methodo-

(50) Formal and Transcendental Logic P.267.
logical procedure arises. From what point of view is this separation made and with what justification? Again he presupposes the having got to the point where the particular world views are possibilities for consciousness instead of describing it. In fact he legislates directly against any investigation into the way experience (scientific) arises. This is not acceptable. Without the prior explication of one's own perspective, whether it be that of those he chooses to discuss or not, no clear and complete assessment of the force of his argumentation can be made. This point can perhaps be indicated as follows: the human subject works with a hotch-potch of concepts at many different levels. That is, his language embodies meanings derived from many differing developments of experience - some technically advanced, some poetic, some scientific, some abstract etc. Unless all concepts are developed in the necessary order - and this certainly does require a concern with the 'origins and changes of our world presentation' (51) - then when we assert, judge, etc. we jumble together concepts that all have differing values - they involve many differing 'world presentations'. We thus lack any notion of a world presentation that is the whole or total standpoint. (52) This reflects back on the subject, who, in using these concepts, disintegrates himself in the sense of holding an intelligible position - the subject lacks a unity of self. There thus ensues, through this fog, an endless debate concerning concepts, each subject compounding the confusion by failing to offer the unity of a coherent point of view.

(51) It does of course involve much more, viz. that language can signify proleptically - i.e. that meaning is always in a process of being given. And it also requires a conception of experience that is Hegelian. More on this in Part II.

(52) Hegel: Phenomenology of Mind P.107 makes a similar point.
Husserl is right to criticise the 'thought-economists' for failing to clearly and correctly perceive the relation of the ideal to the real. Yet Husserl then instantiates his own separation of what appears to be only distinguishable aspects of experience, viz. origin and change of world-presentation and content of objectively ideal knowledge. And he does this without providing the grounds. (53)

Slightly re-expressing Kemp Smith (54) we can agree that knowledge starts neither from individual facts nor from general principles, but from the complex situation in which the human race finds itself at the dawn of self-consciousness. It is this that provides the ground for, and the meaning of, such advanced conceptions as 'the objectively valid' etc. It is this process that requires explication.

12. **Note**

Husserl sees his preceding arguments as pointing conclusively to the fact that any form of empiricistic or psychologistic logic is totally untenable. Logic, conceived of as a methodology of science has its foundations outside of psychology.

Here it can be noted that this distinction between psychology seen by Husserl as a factual and empirical science (55) and pure logic,

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(53) See B. Bosanquet. Implication and Linear Inference P.148
is not a distinction that is shown to be a necessary outcome of a fully coherent unitary perspective. That is, it illustrates the relevance of the general criticism made already - the need to demonstrate the having got to the point of being able to make such an epistemological distinction: the need to be properly, not positively, scientific. The process of reaching such a distinction is an integral and indispensable part of any epistemological enterprise. Thus while it is agreed with Husserl that his arguments up to the present lead undeniably to the view "... that a correct grasp of the essence of pure logic, and of its unique position in relation to all other sciences is one of the most important questions in the whole of epistemology" (L.I. 221) - it is not agreed that epistemology precedes all other disciplines. Here it is of especial interest that while Husserl is pointing out his links with philosophers of the past - specifically Kant, Herbart, Leibniz, Bolzano and Lange, he fails to draw his relation of Hegel. He merely dismisses Hegel's philosophical system in contradistinction to Bolzano's as having .... "hindered the progress of scientific philosophy so badly with its unholy blend of discordant intentions" (L.I. 223) - a criticism that is not backed up by any argumentation, (56) thus he fails to consider Hegel's arguments concerning a truly scientific philosophy, in which phenomenology, as preceding epistemology, takes consciousness up to the point where epistemology ceases to be a possibility, but becomes actual - the position where knowledge is grounded and where truth is absolute.

(56) One writer sees Husserl led by these arguments to a view very similar to Hegel's - Kojève Op. Cit. p.195.
What then is Husserl's view of science - that is - what makes science science? Husserl devotes the last chapter of his Prolegomena to answering this question - of giving a provisional sketch of the idea of Pure Logic.

13. Science

In his consideration of the nature of science, Husserl develops his argument around three main questions - which we shall take in turn. The first question is the one previously stated - viz. what makes science science?

Husserl sees science as a unity of acts of thinking, in which a 'certain objective or ideal interconnection' of these acts confers upon these 'a unitary objective relevance', and hence an 'ideal validity'. Now by this objective or ideal interconnection two things can be meant:

(a) "An interconnection of the things to which our thought-experiences (actual or possible) are intentionally directed."

(b) "An interconnection of truths, in which the unity of things comes to count objectively as being what it is." (L.1.225)

These two interconnections are given together apriori in our acts, they are inseparable though not identical for Husserl; whatever exists exists in a determinate manner, and therefore that it is a determinate existence is the truth - the necessary correlate - of
its being. Now although both interconnections or 'sorts of unity' are given together, it is possible to think of them apart. Husserl states that it is by abstraction - the abstraction that occurs in judgement or more precisely in knowledge - that the unity of objectivity and the unity of truth can be thought apart.

He then gives the following specification of his use of the term 'object' and 'thing': "I use the words 'objectivity', 'object', 'thing' etc., always in the widest sense, in accordance, therefore with my preferred sense of the term 'knowledge'. An object of knowledge may as readily be what is real as what is ideal, a thing or an event or a species of a mathematical relation, a case of being or of what ought to be". (57)

What then is the relation between things and truths, for knowledge? Husserl's answer is, that an act is a knowing act if our judgement is inwardly evident. Given this latter, the object of such an act is given in primal fashion.

"Otherwise put, its being thus is a truth actually realized, individualized in the experience of the inwardly evident judgement. If we reflect on this individualization, we perform an ideational abstraction, and the truth itself, instead of our former object, becomes our apprehended object. We hereby apprehend the truth as the ideal correlate of the transient subjective act of knowledge, as standing

(57) L.I. p.226. R. Ingarden takes up the two passages quoted above, and argues that Husserl is here adopting a realist point of view - a view which he later rejects. (Formal and Transcendental Logic). 'On The Motives which led Husserl to Transcendental Idealism'. P. 6-8.
opposed in its unity to the unlimited multitude of possible acts of knowing, and of knowing individuals." (L.l. 226-7).

The process thus has three steps: first we judge X with inward evidence, this individualizes X's being. Second, we reflect upon this judgement, this gives us the truth of the judging. By this reflection, by 'ideational abstraction' truth becomes our object. The third step is achieved when we apprehend the truth as the 'ideal correlate' of our many possible acts of judging X - a unity as against a plurality. Now, given that we achieve such a process, what gives truths a connection to some other truths and not to others; or to put the question in another way as Husserl does in his second question, 'what constitutes the unity of a science and there-with the unity of its field?'

To answer this question we require clarification of the notions of scientific knowledge and truth. If we take scientific knowledge first, we see that it is grounded knowledge. This is to say, we see it as grounded in its necessity of being as it is. And this necessity arises from the fact that this knowledge or state of affairs is law governed.

Secondly, with regard to the notion of truth, we find two types:

(1) **Individual truths**: These are assertions regarding the actual existence of individual things, and are as such, contingent. The necessity of these truths requires
'certain presupposed circumstances'. These truths are concerned with fact.

(2) **General truths:** These are assertions free of the above existential claims. These allow only the possible existence of individuals. Through the process of specialization and deduction, general truths yield propositions to be proved.

Husserl now proceeds to answer his own question concerning the unity of science. If we require a proof of a general truth, we are referred to certain general laws - the proof of these latter leading to a group of laws which are not further provable - which Husserl calls basic laws. Hence .... "the systematic unity of the ideally closed sum total of laws resting on one basic legality, as their final ground, and arising out of it through systematic deduction, is the unity of a systematically complete theory. This basic legality may here either consist of one basic law or a conjunction of homogeneous basic laws." (L.I. 228).

But we still require an answer to the question of what makes truths belong together in a single science. Here Husserl introduces another important distinction - that of essential and extra-essential (i.e. external) belonging. The unity is an essential one if there is a unity of explanation in that science, viz. a theoretical unity. For Husserl, all explanation points to a theory, therefore if we have theoretical unity we eo ipso have unity of explanation and essential unity of the truths in it. This type of unity gives us the so-called abstract or nomological sciences. These sciences are complete in
that all their truths are deducible from the particular basic laws that they embody.

This type of relationship contrasts with the second type of belonging together - the external type. External criteria, such as the proximity of truths to a particular domain - whether this be in relation to an object, or an evaluative interest - give a unity to truths in a science. These sciences are called descriptive or ontological - and the unity evinced by them is not an essential one, not one that is demanded by a unified theoretical perspective.

This immediately raises the question as to the relation between the descriptive and the abstract sciences. Husserl's view here is that the abstract sciences are the basic sciences from which the descriptive derive all their theoretical purchase. Thus the descriptive sciences are really only sciences to the extent that they take from nomological science theoretical elements - they are only sciences by proxy.

In his final question Husserl addresses himself to the problem of specifying "the conditions of the possibility of theory in general". Having argued to the point that the theoretical (or abstract) sciences are of superior importance we now require a specification of the possibility of reaching such knowledge. Here there are two groups of conditions - the subjective and the objective.
The subjective conditions for the possibility of theory in general, as was mentioned earlier (P.27), are of both a real and an ideal kind. Husserl ignores the real conditions, which fall in the province of psychology - here the investigations are concerned with the real conditions and causal relations necessary for the possibility of theoretical knowledge - and focuses on the ideal, or noetic conditions. These have their ground in the form of subjectivity, or, in other words in 'the Idea of knowledge as such'. In this area investigations are made into the process whereby we see the truth of a judgement - into the processes of knowing, judging etc. Knowledge is not something that merely claims to be true, but a judgement that justifies itself in terms of inner evidence. Without such subjective conditions, without inner evidence, knowledge would lack that certainty that distinguishes it from mere opinion. For Husserl it is 'evident apriori' that we as thinking beings must be able to accomplish all the acts required for the production of theoretical knowledge.

The objective conditions are the purely logical - they are grounded purely in the content of our knowledge. Truth is not something that requires for its possibility the insight into it: truths are what they are quite apart from whether we grasp them or not. The laws involved here have a content that is concerned with notions such as truth, law, concept, syllogism etc. - there is no mention of the acts by which subjects grasp such truths. As previously pointed out, these laws can be transformed such that they achieve
a relation with the subject - Husserl claims that the noetic conditions are in fact such modified laws - they relate to the knowledge process. (58)

Husserl's arguments lead to the point where certain abstract laws, which, because they are rooted solely in the content of our knowledge make no mention of the subject act of knowing, function as the most basic conditions for the possibility of theory in general, (in the objectively ideal sense).

Husserl wants to specify the essence of such a content in the most basic or primitive concepts - and these, in the case of theory, are the concepts and laws which are the ideal constituents of theory in general. These control in apriori manner all development of the Idea of Theory in all its possible varieties. Here we are dealing with the theory of theory.

Therefore, given the above argumentation, Husserl lays down the task of a pure logic as follows:

1. First the primitive concepts such as 'concept', 'proposition' etc. which make theory possible, have to be unambiguously and perspicuously laid down. These concepts are the basic categories of meaning and constitute the Idea of unified

(58) This is the crux of the matter - exactly how do they relate to the knowledge process, do they arise out of the knowledge process or are they externally related?
theory. Also involved in such a clarification will be the second-order concepts - (the formal objective categories) such as Object, State of Affairs, Unity, Relation etc., and the concepts of correlative forms will also need to be specified here. Husserl argues that all these concepts are 'independent of the particularity of any material of knowledge', and must be phenomenologically investigated so that we attain insight into their essence. It is, for Husserl, absolutely fundamental that these initial concepts be clear of any equivocation - though as Husserl himself admits, this may be the most difficult task lying before us.

2. Second, in relation to the above categories, we require the laws grounded in them - such that the objective validity of the formal structures is made evident, both in relation to the truth or falsity of meanings per se, and also the being or not being of the objects etc., and both on the basis of categorial form alone. (59)

3. Given the above two tasks as satisfactorily completed we shall have an adequate notion of what Husserl calls 'the Idea of a science of the conditions of the possibility of theory in general'. Accordingly we require the completing science - dealing in apriori fashion with the essential forms of theories and the relevant laws of relation. This

(59) "We are here concerned with the Territory of those laws which in formal universality span all possible meanings and objects, under which every particular theory or science is ranged, which it must obey if it is to be valid". L.I.239.
will give the correct position and relation of any particular theory to any and all other actual or possible theories - which Husserl calls the pure theory of manifolds. This idea of a theory of manifolds is that of a science which clearly and explicitly details the form of the necessary types of 'possible theories or fields of theories' and investigates their relations with one another. This view (60) remains unchanged throughout Husserl's subsequent writings; and, in fact, in his Formal and Transcendental Logic he quotes directly from this section of the Prolegomena - stating that he is unable to improve on its exact characterization of this idea of a theory of manifolds. (61)

These, then are the tasks of a pure logic and they bring to a close Husserl's Prolegomena to Pure Logic. The investigations that follow it in the Logical Investigations are in part phenomenological investigations into the basic or primitive concepts - the carrying out of the first task specified above. We say 'in part' because these investigations often move outwith this narrow province. (62) Husserl justifies this procedure on the grounds that the domain of the logical or the idea of the logical is so cluttered up with obscurities and confusions that such a procedure is inevitable. (63)

(60) L.I. 241-2
(61) Formal and Transcendental Logic 28, p.90-92. Also see Ideas § 71-73, p.184-189
(63) L.I. 260-261.
And secondly, it is also evident that at this point in his philosophical development Husserl had not explicitly stated nor sufficiently justified a phenomenological methodology, though it is in use in these investigations with most significant results.

14. Existence, Truth and Science

Before concluding this review of Husserl's Prolegomena, we must first return to these final arguments of Husserl's concerning existence, truth and science, for it will be in a sense somewhat different from Husserl's that we shall be employing them in the next part.

Husserl argues that being or existence (which I take here to be synonymous) and truth are given together in our acts (64) - they are inseparable. For Husserl existence is determinate existence. It is by the process of abstraction that we are able to apprehend the one without the other - as outlined in the three stage process above. But it is not at once evident that these two are given together apriori in our acts of thinking. This at once necessitates a criterion by which the evident nature of such a state of affairs is to be grasped. And this calls into question the whole notion of evidence and truth - and many commentators on Husserl's phenomenology point out this difficulty - point to the fact that Husserl fails to provide such a criterion. (65) He assumes that

(64) L.I. 151.


we already know what it is – i.e. what self- or inner evidence is instead of providing the necessary criteria.

This criticism is intimately related to the general criticism made at points throughout our consideration of the arguments in the Prolegomena, namely that Husserl fails to show how he has got to the point of being able to assert such distinctions - such a group of concepts. This is of critical importance in that if this is not done, the concepts are not warranted necessary they are merely arbitrary and await contradiction by any other arbitrary set that one might wish to assert. How can Husserl show the necessity of science's possibility when he fails to show the necessity of having got to the point of science itself? Likewise, how can he investigate the primitive concepts of science when he has been and is already using them? Such an account makes a miracle of their arrival. It is not a satisfactory procedure to begin at once at the categorial level, for it makes the beginning, and the necessity of it being the only beginning impossible to reach. Here we return to the procedure adopted by the positive sciences, and this is certainly not a view that Husserl is wont to countenance. Also, the attempt to 'lay down' the primitive concepts presupposes a certain view as to what a concept is - such that it can be 'laid down' like 'stamped coin'. This calls into question the three tasks set for pure logic, for if (as shall be argued in Part II below), concepts are not 'things' that can be just laid down but, in fact, develop (i.e. are 'fluid') - then the possibility of performing Husserl's three tasks becomes an impossibility. It is (pace Husserl) by virtue of the initial concepts being equivocal and ambiguous that progress toward Truth is achieved.
A further difficulty with Husserl's account is as follows: Scientific thought is, as we have seen (p.68), pervaded by a certain objective or ideal interconnection which gives thought a "unitary objective relevance" and thus an "ideal validity". Husserl then points out that two meanings can be given to this objective interconnection, (a) and (b) (66) and that both are "... given together apriori, and are mutually inseparable. Nothing can be without being thus or thus determined, and that it is, and that it is thus and thus determined, is the self-subsistent truth which is the necessary correlate of the self-subsistent being." (L.I. 225-6)

Now what makes science science - the objective or ideal interconnection - seems to be a notion that joins together two quite different ideas. For interconnection in sense (a) would seem to involve more than the strictly ideal, unless 'things' is interpreted in a narrow sense to mean ideal things. But Husserl expressly uses this term in a wide sense, to include both real and ideal being. The interconnection in sense (b) presupposes a higher order level of thought, "ideational abstraction", where truth as an idea is given "in an act of Ideation based upon an intuition (the act of insight)". Here the content is purely ideal. Husserl states that both these senses (both things) 'are given together apriori and are mutually inseparable'. Thus if both are given in such a manner and sense (a) is not purely ideal, how can such totally separate constituents abide in this inseparable relation? That is, from what point of view does Husserl justify this inseparability? It would be consis-

(66) See Page 68 above.
tent for Husserl to claim this if sense (a) referred only to ideal objects, or objects as ideal unities of meaning, for they could be given together with the truth gained through ideational abstraction that they are as they are, but then knowledge would be constrained around the purely ideal and real objects would remain outwith. (We shall reconsider this point when we come to consider Hegel's arguments for science in Part II).

Added to this is Husserl's notion of determinate being. That is, that everything is already determined, is in itself, and that it is so determined is the truth science yields. Yet on what grounds can he possible assert such a statement of the static nature of what is? Husserl would claim that we would destroy the objectivity of both truth and being if either were relativized - truth and being are correlative (L.I. 151). But to deny that the thing is in itself, or self-given, or that it is determinate is not necessarily to deny that truth is possible, it is simply to recognize that the objective point, truth, is not given through an abstractive process of thinking called ideational abstraction - not by abstracting oneself from the real world but by grasping the truth of things through the reality under consideration, a reality that is not separated from a thinking subject. (See Part II).

This is not to confuse Husserl's notion of what makes science science with his distinction between the ideal and the real: the former is a consequence of the latter. It is by questioning the basis on which the latter distinction is made that one is led to question Husserl's notion of the essence of science. As we have seen, the real is the
realm of the natural, empirical, factual, temporal and causal. It implies transcendence, it is think-like, it is outwith the realm of meaning (L.I. 323). As we have said, psychology is seen by Husserl as a natural science concerned with the real insofar as it is mental or 'mentally lined through' (L.I. 192). It seeks the natural conditions of our experience - i.e. the natural conditions of our mathematical and logical activities and is not able to step outside such a point of view. It is precluded from giving an account of the meaning of the content of these activities. Given this conception of psychology Husserl appears to be on unchallengeable ground.

The ideal, on the other hand, is the realm of meaning. Ideal objects exist "..... in a detached ether of pure meanings, or ideal unities, which wholly transcend the acts through which they come before us, or are constituted objects for us." (67) Sciences of the ideal are apriori, normative, and achieve genuine generalizations.

The difficulty with the separation of these two realms is that it is made by thinking. Thinking is the tertium quid that links the two unbridgeable realms. It is thinking that makes the separation and it is thinking that unites them. What is required is then a specification of how thought can achieve such a situation without collapsing one realm into the other'. We shall take this point up again in Part III.

One final point - Husserl seems to place precedence of importance in the pure nomological sciences. Science is only science when it is deductive theory - which thus restricts science to a narrow domain. This restriction appears unjustified and in a later work (68) Husserl realized this narrowness of perspective, but still claims that the problem concerned - "the problem, namely, of what characterizes the form of a province and, correlatively, the form of a theory in the broadest sense", (69) - in some way justifies this narrowness. More important is the problem of the status of a phenomenological procedure such as is adopted in the Logical Investigations. Is it science in the rigorous sense above specified or is it merely a propaedeutic to any future nomological science? And if it is merely such a propaedeutic, what claim does it have to justify its analysis and conceptual clarifications that can seriously be considered by nomological science itself? It is evident that Husserl understands proof of basic laws to be limited to nomological science - but he has in no way justified the exclusion of a 'proof' of such basic laws by a phenomenological procedure that precedes nomological science, and which may perhaps provide the necessity of the points of view and conceptions he holds. What then is this problem of how one has got that far - of having got to the point where particular points of view are seen as necessary, and where concepts do not appear in arbitrary fashion but emerge in the explication of this

(69) Ibid. P.101.
process? And secondly, what is this notion of phenomenology as the justification of the necessity of pure science - and is it science itself? To these questions we now turn.
PART II

JUSTIFICATION OF CRITIQUE

1. Introduction

To criticise a philosophical theory is to adopt a philosophical theory - criticism is not made from nowhere. It is made by one who adopts a particular form of knowledge, either that which is under investigation, or a different though necessarily related form. It is however necessary in either case to know exactly what such knowledge presupposes, or on what foundation it rests if the truth of that knowledge is to be grasped. Any other procedure fails to provide the ground for the possibility of understanding the knowledge in question. It is therefore necessary to show that grounded knowledge is possible and then to assess to what extent Husserl's arguments against psychologism are based on a secure foundation?

It is instructive to consider Hegel's position in relation to the above in that Hegel's arguments in the Preface and Introduction to the Phenomenology of Mind argue for, and the actual body of the text describes the movement of consciousness to the point where it has demonstrated the necessity of its point of view - to the point where a science of logic is possible. Here also we find Hegel's arguments concerning science and truth which will be contrasted with those of Husserl - already reviewed. From this consideration we shall hope to arrive at a position where the adequacy of certain
Husserlian and Hegelian views can be assessed and suggest limitations in Husserl's arguments in the Prolegomena, before he ventured into his full phenomenological investigations.

In an introductory fashion we can view philosophy as being in the unique position of having to expound its method while following it. This makes it impossible to fully understand the method until the completion of its explication. This difficulty is well put by Hegel as follows:

"What is demanded is thus the following: we should know the cognitive faculty before we know. It is like wanting to swim before going in the water. The investigation of the faculty of knowledge is itself knowledge, and cannot arrive at its goal because it is this goal already." (1)

This difficulty has led many philosophers to not bother themselves with the explication of their own method and its presuppositions, but to 'get on with the job' - that is to do philosophy; to provide analyses and results which are not based in a systematical and coherent fashion upon a method that has previously been laid out, but which rests upon assumptions or presuppositions that fail of a discursive elaboration in that system - i.e. they are surds.

Examples of these are common sense, the cogito, God, logic, etc. Common sense is a presupposition that itself requires a ground, for

(1) Hegel: "Lectures in the Philosophy of History" - quoted in Habermas J. Knowledge and Human Interests p.7. Also see Hegel - Encyclopedia Logic P.17.
common sense is a totally relative and mediated concept. We thus require the analysis of the concepts upon which this mediated concept rests. (2) It has been and will be maintained throughout this thesis that the refusal to explicate and justify one's own method and its presuppositions renders the subsequent analyses and philosophies ultimately unintelligible. It is not sufficient to accept certain statements as basic and then to proceed to employ them in the illumination of human experience much as a physicist employs certain axioms in the illumination of sub-atomic particles. This would be to reduce the philosopher to the role of a technician - the ontological to the ontic; Philosophy must enter upon the clarification and justification of its own presuppositions if it is to become scientific in the most solid sense.

Throughout part I repeated criticisms were made of Husserl's procedure in both criticising psychologism and empiricism and in the method of assertion of his own point of view. It was said there that consciousness implicates itself in its own criticism of a point of view - that the criticism or argument did not merely attach to the point of view to which it was directed, but also pointed back to the position of the person who made the criticism. (3) To the extent that Husserl has not (we argued) given his own position a prior clarification, to that extent does the criticism fail in its full force. It was also pointed out that

(2) Kaufman W. Hegel: "Texts and Commentary" makes similar point see Note 24, p.49.
(3) More generally, consciousness implicates itself in any and all its perspectives. For it to be capable of a perspective of something necessitates both that the something be something for consciousness and also that there is consciousness of something. We shall shortly give examples of what happens when this is ignored.
this criticism points back to our own criticisms of Husserl's procedure. How do we justify the criticism of failing to demonstrate the necessity of having got to a particular point of view or criticism unless we ourselves provide such? As Hegel has pointed out, it is necessary to examine one's own foundations first, before anything else. This means examining the foundation without prior structures or assumptions - otherwise this will mean examining the foundation as it is not - for it will be from a point of view in advance of and conditioned by it. And this relates to the points made previously in connection with Husserl's use of notions such as presupposition, experience, truth, science, and consciousness. Only when it has been shown that a point of view is necessary and absolute will it be possible to gain a complete understanding of these notions and following from this of one's being-in-the-world.

However it is unavoidable that use must be made of these conceptions and others in the exposition of the process of arriving at this coherent point of view. This will mean that their full import will not be able to be assessed until the completion of such an exposition - and this seems a most reasonable procedure. Who would expect at the beginning of a philosophical investigation the exact rendering of conceptions to which the investigations were themselves aimed at clarifying. Likewise the full significance of events in a novel cannot be fully appreciated until the novel is complete - they are in part, grasped retrospectively. Here, as in phenomenology, we have a dual perspective in operation - the one immersed in the events as

(4) Hegel: Science of Logic P. 41.
they occur and the other viewing each event in its relation to the evolving whole. Just as a novel is not understood by taking just one of these perspectives just so with phenomenology. Therefore, initially, the conceptions referred to above will be indicated in a proleptic fashion much as a persons character and personality are indicated at the beginning of a novel and become more clear and complete as the narrative proceeds.

But, from what point of view do we begin? Is it a matter of merely propounding a definition that has the accent of common sense, and then holding this as primary, claiming that it is apodictically self-evident to all would-be doubters? Is it possible to escape the charge that any starting point has its necessary presuppositions even experience, to claim that there is but one road to truth, one road to science? And further, what are the presuppositions of even asking such a question? The question itself must be made from a point of view. That is, we are already in mediation.

Implicit in these questions is the belief that those involved in questioning and asserting have a clear and precise conception of what is meant by such terms as science, presupposition, experience, truth, etc. Yet all disputes turn on just this question - a nuance is missed, an ambiguity revealed.

It is here held as a sine qua non for the possibility of coherent and meaningful discourse, that the foundation upon which we, as philosophers, assert any view be made unconditionally and explicitly clear. Though this would appear to be a most reasonable, in fact
obvious demand it is necessary to state it, as much contemporary philosophy seems to have failed to take account of such a demand - and this failure is not confined only to philosophy. Let us cite a few examples to illustrate this point.

In the area of contemporary philosophy called the philosophy of mind there is much discussion concerning such questions as: whether consciousness is a brain process; whether a person who had a brain transplant would still be the same person; whether robots could campaign for civil rights; whether mentality is nothing but a physical property; whether man can be understood purely in terms of his behaviour as observed by another, etc. (5) It is believed that answers to these questions are possible given the correct rendering of the sense of the terms used in the question itself. Yet the correct rendering of the terms requires the prior clarification of the point of view from which we are to understand the terms in the given sense. This is never provided. (6) At best, what is usually offered in place of such a clarification is a hypothetical statement such as - if consciousness is conceived as being (for example) an activity of the brain, or a state of an organism apt for the production of certain sorts of behaviour, certain consequences follow. But then the original question becomes redundant, for attention is now focused upon the new conception - which latter shows itself as being both contradictory and arbitrary; contradictory because


(6) "There exists no coherent theoretical interpretation of the foundations, or justification of the procedures, of ordinary language analysis". S. Rosen Nihilism p.49.
it embodies a duplicity of perspective while at the same time denying it, hence the meaning of the conception falls apart. (We shall examine this contradictory aspect in an example shortly). Secondly, it is an arbitrary conception because the position from which such a conception is to be viewed is just asserted - it is not shown how this conception bares a real relation to the conceiver - it is unscientific.

At worst, nothing is offered. There is a refusal to even consider the foundation of such a point of view or question. We thus collapse into the ambiguity and flux of meaning attendant to any unsystematic point of view. Where do these concepts come from? What do they mean? What does consciousness mean? Are the questions asked in this area of philosophy meaningful, and if they are, are they capable of being answered? The answer one receives to all such questions is silence.

Let us take an even simpler example to drive home this point. It is generally accepted that the statement 'red is a certain wavelength of light' is true.\(^7\) Let us look a little more closely at this truth. For a start one can say that red, the colour that one experiences against a background that is not red - in our day-to-day existence in this world-is not the same thing as a certain wave-length of light. There is a fundamental ontological difference between them for a start! For this latter stands for its intelligibility upon

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\(^7\) Hegel. Phenomenology of Mind P.109, makes similar criticism of such views as that animals are nitrogen.

Also see S. Rosen Nihilism P.70. He attacks the view, "that all psychic or mental phenomena may be reduced to biochemical processes and thereby to mathematically computable energy distinctions".
certain theoretical developments based upon certain axioms applied to the physical world. This is the point of view of the physicist. Here then we have two points of view, that of the person experiencing red, and that of the physicist and his theoretical structures. Yet the statement requires for its truth the unification of these two diverse points of view - points of view that appear to contradict each other, for we can say that for the absolute physicist there is no experience (i.e. red) and for the absolute savage - no wavelength. But if this is a truth, for whom - or from what point of view - is it so? The assertion of such a state of affairs presupposes for its intelligibility the prior unification of two quite different perspectives - that of the experience of red, and that of the possibility of measuring electro-magnetic waves in terms of wavelengths - in one perspective, i.e. as a unity. We seek a unity of meaning. Hence we move from the above statement to a consideration of the basis upon which the two elements in it rest. We require to establish the relationship of physics to experience and all the attendant relationships involved in this concern. (8) This is the point made repeatedly in our consideration of Husserl's arguments against psychologism - we need to demonstrate the possibility of getting to the point where a grounded science is possible and understand in what relation it stands to the other possible and actual human perspectives. Failing this we are left

(8) Whitehead, A.N. "The criticism of principles must chiefly take the form of determining the proper meanings to be assigned to the fundamental notions of the various sciences, when these sciences are considered in respect to their status relatively to each other. The determination of this status requires a generality transcending any special subject matter" Process and Reality P.15. Also see Hegel - Phenomenology of Mind P.109 where he makes the point that we have merely a 'semblance of a conceptual unity' in propositions like the above.
with what Foucault has nicely termed a 'discontinuity of planes'\(^{(9)}\) in assertions such as 'that red is a certain wavelength of light'.

The same applied, mutatis mutandis, to the previous examples; they merely indicate the lack of a system in which meanings held at different levels of experience (or on different planes) can be achieved by one person. From what point of view does the phrase 'brain process' have intelligibility? In the area of philosophy of mind brain process usually engenders its partner mental process - a mental process is usually seen as something that is in contradiction to a brain process. Yet what does the word 'process' convey in each of its uses here? A physical process is something that can be observed, measured, analysed etc., by an observer but a mental process is not. Thus in what sense is it possible to assert a statement equating the two, from the criterion of observation - from what point of view do these two seemingly different processes become the same? It is here that these statements can be seen to rest on very flimsy support. As Hegel says 'In such an exposition, therefore, one does not know how to take either ground or phenomena'.\(^{(10)}\) For the having got to the point of being able to assert the above statement is taken for granted - and taken for granted as intelligible. It is here that, as Hegel says, the form of necessity fails to get

\(^{(9)}\) Foucault. The Archaeology of Knowledge P.54. Foucault sees this discontinuity in the most simple and basic scientific discourse though he denies the notion of unity.

\(^{(10)}\) Hegel: Science of Logic P.460. See also P.775 where he mentions the inadequacy of the method adopted in physics.
its due! Now this procedure may be satisfactory for a technician who merely wants to apply methods, and follow rules, but it is not a satisfactory procedure for a philosopher - it is not a properly scientific procedure. It is, as we have said an indispensable pre-condition for the complete intelligibility of such statements that the having got to the point where they can be made in a significant manner is described. Then, and only then, will it be possible to assess the truth of such. If this is not done the protagonist and antagonist merely involve themselves in a search for truth built upon a permanent vagueness. Such a procedure is philosophically absurd.\(^\text{(11)}\)

Our procedure is therefore as follows: to examine Hegel's arguments for the one road to truth, for a presuppositionless philosophy, and for a philosophy that starts at the clarification of the difficulties above raised and only then proceeds to develop further. In pursuing this intention we shall be concerned for the most part with the Preface and Introduction to Hegel's Phenomenology of Mind - just as we were earlier concerned with Husserl's Prolegomena to his Logical Investigations. It is in the Preface and Introduction that the question of the aim, the method, and the goal of the Phenomenology are first specified.\(^\text{(12)}\) The position adopted by ourselves in the consideration of Hegel's views (since we hold that consciousness

\(^\text{(11)}\) As J. Ferrier says, the present state of philosophy ".... is a war in which none of the combatants understands the grounds either of his own opinion or of that of his adversary; or sees the roots of the side of the question which he is either attacking or defending" Institutes of Metaphysics pp.6-7.

\(^\text{(12)}\) S. Rosen. Hegel P.123 sees the Preface as a Preface to his entire forthcoming system.
implicates itself in its own criticism) must be that of one who is within the Hegelian perspective, for we have specified no other as yet. This means, seeing that both the Preface and the Introduction are written from the point of view of Absolute Knowledge (the position one attains upon reaching the end of the Phenomenology), that, to the extent that we have not traversed the road to Absolute Knowledge, to that extent will the exact meaning of Hegel's argument remain proleptic.

It will be of considerable advantage, instead of offering a commentary on the Preface and Introduction, to consider them in so far as they relate to the topics that have so far provided so much difficulty. This will facilitate the explication of the Hegelian point of view and will also expedite the comparison with the Husserlian views already considered.
Hegel was well aware of the problems that have so far been raised. His Phenomenology of Mind was concerned with describing the process whereby consciousness attains to the perspective of Science - that is - true knowledge. His first edition of this work also carried the title "Science of the Experience of Consciousness" which serves to drive home the point that Hegel considered the description of consciousness' progression from ignorance to truth - a progression that for Hegel occurred in a necessary manner (12) - to be itself scientific. What then does Hegel mean when he says that this progression is itself science, for the Phenomenology certainly differs in major ways from what would normally be considered a scientific treatise? For example, it does not begin with a definition or set of definitions, from which by the application of certain procedures and on the basis of certain presuppositions, further propositions follow. It does not begin with fixed and determinate categories related in particular ways - nor does it lay down to begin with in an unambiguous and perspicuous manner a set of primitive concepts - a demand that Husserl argued to be of primary importance for the possibility of science itself. (13)

It is, finally, not concerned with generating a point of view, theory or system in contrast to other views, theories or systems - nor

(12) Phenomenology of Mind P.137
(13) See p.74-5 Part I above.
with specifying the logical relations that hold in this 'true' theory between all the objects contained.

We can best approach an answer to this question by considering what Hegel has to say in the Preface, which is "On Scientific knowledge in General". To lead into his idea of science he points out what philosophy - as science - is not.

It is not a science like anatomy which latter Hegel sees as being concerned solely with the particular. Secondly, it is not a science that opposes itself to other forms of science - a philosophy that cuts itself off from other philosophies by showing how its particular aims and methods differ from the others. Philosophy ...

"has its being essentially in the element of that universality which encloses the particular within it." This means that philosophy is not concerned with anything less than Totality - and not just the totality of a temporal period, but total totality. As Kojeve has pointed out .... "the principle of all or nothing is valid for knowledge, either one knows everything or one knows nothing." The philosophers concern with truth is then for Hegel the concern with achieving this totality.

Prima facie, this demand for the necessity for comprehending a totality,

(14) Phenomenology of Mind p.57.
(15) The Phenomenology of Mind p.67.
(16) Kojeve op. cit. p.121.
(17) Hegel: Little Logic p.24 "Truth, then is only possible as a universe or totality of thought". (Encyclopedia Logic; Translation W. Wallace - here termed 'Little Logic').
Also See: Phenomenology of Mind P.81.
would appear to be in accordance with our expectations. For, if we take the example previously cited, that of a character in a novel, the exact nature of this character, the 'truth' of this character, is not to be found in any one temporal perspective of this character, but in his development over time. When we attempt to express the nature of this character as present in a particular moment we find that the understanding of this expression or set of expression leads us beyond the de facto presence of the character at a particular moment. The expression or expressions serve to mediate the particular nature of the present characterisation with the context or universe of expression. Expression is itself mediation, or, to use more Hegelian terminology, an expression contains the essential moment of negativity. (18) Any particular temporal aspect of this character would from the perspective of the novel as a whole, if seen in isolation from this whole, be false. The particular is enclosed within, not set in opposition to the universal. (19) A person's character is not an isolated series of particular separate moments related in merely temporal fashion - this would be the death of character - it is the progressive development of what the character has it in him to be, of each moment as it is held in the subject as seen and revealed by the subject.

(18) A.N. Whitehead puts this point nicely as follows: "Whenever we try to express the matter of immediate experience, we find that understanding leads us beyond itself to its contemporaries, to its past, to its future, and to the universe in terms of which its definiteness is exhibited." Process and Reality P.21-2).

(19) Husserl, as we have seen (Part I, p.37) held the complete opposite of this. For him there is a 'never-to-be-bridged gulf' between the ideal (or universal object) and the real (or particular object). Cf. L.I. p.149.
We can also add here that Hegel's philosophy is related to past philosophies in a similar manner; that is, it is not related in an external fashion to previous philosophies, but in a more intimate dialectical fashion. Different philosophies do not drop out of a particular historical situation with no connection to those that went before, they represent progressive realizations of the goal implicit in all philosophizing - namely 'the systematic development of truth in scientific form'. (20) The latest philosophy should therefore be the result of all the systems that have preceded it and must include their contributions, it should be the fullest, most comprehensive and adequate system of all. (21)

For it to be possible for consciousness to reach the level of science, the possibility of consciousness reaching this level must be already implicit in consciousness' prescientific state - for it to be possible for a seed to grow into a plant, the possibility of the plants actuality must be, in some sense, already implicit, immanent, or prefigured in the seed. Therefore Hegel can say that true reality is the process of its own becoming. The true reality of a plant is not the plant by itself, nor the seed from which it developed, but the process of its own development from the seed into the plant - i.e. its life cycle. Likewise for consciousness, the description of the process of its own becoming, elaborated conceptually in its necessary development - necessary both in the sense of a progression to a new perspective as seen by the con-

(20) Phenomenology of Mind P.71
(21) Hegel. Little Logic P.23.
sciousness involved in the particular process (the necessity in experience); and secondly, necessary in the sense of leading to the complete system, of Absolute knowledge (the necessity of experience)—is Science. (22) This development is—'the science of the experience of consciousness' and this includes the positive sciences as a necessary part, albeit a part that is sublated in the complete description. And, finally, if we accept that the whole—the description of the development of consciousness to the level of science—is a process, we can also view this process as a whole, this being the truth of the whole.

But, we have already far outpaced ourselves with the introduction of a host of concepts—such as those of 'becoming', 'process', 'concept' etc., without providing justification for doing so. The difficulty is that from any particular point of view, from any finite form of knowledge, any working out of the concepts will be limited or one sided—that is, provisional, leading through contradiction—the contradiction that is engendered through trying to give a true description or elaboration of a concept while that same concept is still in the process of being given—to the explication of the system.

We might add here a point that Cook (23) develops at some length—


Also J. Hyppolite. Genesis and Structure of Hegel's Phenomenology of Mind P.25 makes the same distinction with regard to the necessity involved here.

H.P. Kainz: Hegel's Phenomenology, Part I: Analysis and Commentary provides a five fold breakdown of the types of necessity present in the Phenomenology—see p.36f.

(23) D. J. Cook: Language in the thought of Hegel.
namely, that language itself is through and through dialectical. It expresses the dialectic of experience itself. The failure of our knowledge to comprehend in a complete fashion, i.e. its incompleteness, is reflected in our failure to say what we mean. We say what we mean then realise that we do not mean what we say.

Hegel argues that it is necessary for science to come on the scene. For, in the detailed working out of consciousness' relation to its object - in its search for truth - it must, through the desire to know, proceed from any state of affairs that is contradictory to a resolution of this contradiction. This resolution can only be carried out in terms of the previous state of affairs, hence each state of affairs has a positive value in terms of the complete science. Hegel thus points out that there is a development, the description of which will of itself be scientific - but it will not be seen as scientific by the consciousness immersed in the particular temporal state of affairs itself.

What, then, does Hegel mean when he argues that the true form of truth is its scientific character and - what is the same - that truth finds the element of its existence in the Concept?

First, he means that the very nature of knowledge (in its true form) consists in its being science. Second, he means that truth is the
Concept. Hence science, for Hegel, is concerned solely with the Concept.

Kojève points out that for Hegel, Concept is ".... the coherent whole of conceptual understanding that lays claim to truth," it is ".... the integration of all concepts, the complete system of concepts." (27) It is the result we reach on completing the journey of experience through the variety of its dialectical stages, and it is the 'element of existence of philosophy'. It is not, then in the generally accepted sense that we are to understand the word 'concept'. It is not to be taken as a purely universal form of thought which we then apply to our sensuous experiences. For Hegel, such a dualist position inevitably runs into contradiction through its inability to grasp reality as it truly is. Philosophy does not operate with any bare sensuous content (an abstraction) nor with some other universal form (also an abstraction); but with their concrete synthesis. The level of analysis Hegel is indicating is one which has transcended the oppositions of such comprehension - that is the oppositions of subject/object, form/content, ideal/real, finite/infinite, abstract/concrete, universal/particular etc. The Phenomenology of Mind is the demonstration that such dualist accounts give of necessity a contradictory account of reality. It is only in the Concept that true reality is achieved. Hegel's philosophy is then, as A Sarlemijn points out a ".... univocal monism: everything exists and lives but in the all-embracing absolute." (28)


(28) A. Sarlemijn: Hegel's Dialectic p.124.
Hegel is quite explicit as to the nature of the concept. For example, in the Preface to the Phenomenology of Mind, Hegel stresses time and again the necessity of thinking in terms of the Concept. When we think in this way we "comprehend and express the true not as substance but just as much as subject". And secondly, the Concept is self-moving and self developing in time - we thus need to abandon ourselves to the Concept once we have reached this particular level of thought.

In the Science of Logic, Hegel gives the following elaboration of this term:

"...... a Concept is, first, in its own self the Concept, and this is only one and is the substantial foundation; secondly, a Concept is determinate and it is this determinateness in it which appears as content: but the determinateness of the Concept is a specific form of this substantial oneness, a moment of the form as totality, of the same Concept which is the foundation of the specific Concept. This Concept is not sensuously intuited or represented; it is solely an object (Sache), the logos, the reason of that which is, the truth of what we call things; it is least of all the logos which should be left outside the science of logic." (30)
A concept is for Hegel the determinate presentation of the Concept. The former has both a real spatio-temporal and an ideal-logical existence. The Concept itself is seen as a self-determining and self-realizing movement \(^{(31)}\) - an absolute activity. All reality, all objectivity issues from the self-movement of the Concept. As C. Taylor puts it: "The absolute, as Concept ... must go over into existence. For the Concept, properly understood, is a self-subsistent conceptual necessity and this requires instantiation in reality." \(^{(32)}\) The Concept as Totality or the Whole is that which determines itself. But it does not determine itself as the Concept. The very nature of determination counts against the Concept being able to appear as the Concept - it thus appears in a manner at odds with its essence, it appears as only a moment of the form. \(^{(33)}\)

It is the contradiction in the way the Concept presents itself that is documented in Hegel's Science of Logic; contradiction leading continually to further self-determinations of the Concept(of itself) a process, terminating in the Concept grasping itself through the complete structure of self-generated concepts.

\(^{(31)}\) Science of Logic p.826


\(^{(33)}\) My emphasis. Hegel puts this idea in another way in relation to Spirit. "... the finitude of spirit consists of the failure of knowledge to apprehend its reason as that which is in and for itself, or to the same extent, of its reasons failure to make itself fully manifest in knowledge." Hegel's Philosophy of Subjective Spirit Vol.3, p.85.
A Concept is then determinate in that it is a determination of thought - initially an individuals thought, finally of absolute thought. But it is also an "object in its own self". A concept is also qua object 'instantiated in reality', though always in a contradictory manner. For Hegel sees any determinate finite reality as contradictory, sub-lating itself in the urge to find the adequate or true reality, which is only the Concept. The Concept is the only true self-subsistent object. For Hegel, the real is the rational, the rational is the Concept, hence the real is the conceptual whole - all else, all other 'realities' are illusions.

Now the Concept can only be scientifically developed once we have reached a particular level of thought - a level which has resolved or synthesized the previously mentioned dualities. Hegel puts it as follows:

"Thus pure science presupposes liberation from the opposition of consciousness. It contains thought in so far as this is just as much the object in its own self, or the object in its own self in so far as it is equally pure thought. As science, truth is pure self-consciousness in its self-development and has the shape of the self, so that the absolute truth of being is the known Concept and the Concept as such is the absolute truth of being." (35)

(34) Science of Logic p.49. Hegel also puts it as follows: ".... the determinations of thought equally have objective value and existence." Ibid p.51.

(35) Ibid p.49.
The Concept is then that 'universality that encloses the particular within it'. Hegel means by this that the Concept is that ground within which the Concept determines itself. Hegel later was to put it as follows: "The universality is, so to speak, the foundation, within which the determinations or differences of form gain subsistence." (36) It is not until the conceptual level is reached that such proper scientific comprehension can occur. Prior to this level we see universals as being abstract and separate from particulars; also we tend to regard particulars as given first and universals as arising second. Hegel puts it nicely as follows: "At this juncture (i.e. the level of 'comprehension proper') the universal is cognized as self-particularizing and as gathering itself together out of the particularization into singularity, which is as much as to say that the particular is reduced from the state of independence to being a moment of the Concept. Here, therefore, the universal is no longer a form external to the content, but is the true form which brings the content forth from itself, the self-developing Concept of the matter. At this standpoint therefore, thought has no other content than itself, than its own determinations, which constitute the immanent content of the form." (37)

Each concept is then as a specific form of this universality a unity of substance and subject. Kojève puts it that each concept is "a real

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(37) Ibid p.227. (My addition in brackets) 'Notion' replaced by 'Concept'. See also A. Sarlemijn. Hegels Dialectic. "The Hegelian Universal is not present in things and phenomena; rather, the latter exist as moments in the universal" p.21.
thought of a real entity and a real entity really thought." (38) And truth - what science aims at - is the Concept, the complete development of all the particularizations of the Concept (i.e. as concepts) as the Concept.

Science, as the self-development of the Concept, is what the Science of Logic deals with. The Phenomenology brings consciousness from various inadequate levels of knowledge to the level where this is a possibility for it. No longer can consciousness be content with individual opinion or vague notion. Truth is only possible as the systematic development of concepts. However, this latter does not take place through the agency of a self or subject detached from the concepts it is describing - it describes them truly by its very abandonment to these concepts. We need, then, to understand what is meant by 'subject', and how the latter can 'abandon' itself to concepts.

Hegel says of the subject or 'living substance' that is 'pure simple negativity', that it is ".... actual only insofar as it is the movement of positing itself, or the mediation between a self and its development into something different". (39) It is 'its own becoming, the circle that presupposes its end as its aim and thus has it for its beginning - that which is actual only through its execution and end". (40)

(40) Ibid P.30
The subject is, then, something differing toto caelo from what is understood as an object. An object does not become what it is, it is what it is, or better, it is being in itself. The subject, on the other hand, is the negation of this 'is' of the object. It is the negation of all objects, it is that by which objects can be revealed as objects. The subject, as consciousness, is always outside itself, it is always outside its own time; it is a becoming - something that cannot be captured in the present, because the present receives its meaning simply through the ability of the subject to transcend it. The subject is then always beyond itself - i.e. is infinite, yet is also finite. The 'negativity' that Hegel speaks of is the driving principle behind the whole development to Absolute knowledge as it is the differentiation process itself - the attempt to know the object as it really is which of necessity entails the support of a form of knowledge such that the subject is also 'formed' through this form of knowledge. As the subject is beyond any such temporal instantiation we get the collapse of the particular form of knowledge into a more adequate form and eo ipso the collapse of both the object and the subject as given in it. Thus the differentiation into the subject and object once started or made is a differentiation process due to the nature of this 'living substance' - the 'negativity' or 'moving spirit' which it is. The subject is then not locatable as a thing capable of standing in or subtending various relationships with objects. The subject as a living acting intending negativity is itself no ordinary object!
Kosok (41) develops a two fold point of view on Hegel's Phenomenology of Mind which can be usefully applied to this notion of the subject. His first point of view is that of conceiving of the whole as a process - as a series of temporal events that give the becoming of this whole. The second point of view is that of the process as a whole - the being of becoming or the state of becoming of this whole. Applying this to the notion of the subject we can say that the subject can be viewed both as a subject in the process of revealing objects (and hence also itself) and as a 'being of becoming' an atemporal view of the being that becomes through time. The former focuses on the diversity that is the subject, the latter focuses on the unity of this diversity.

One further point concerning the distinction between subject and object need here be stressed: in Hegel's Phenomenology the notion of a pure subject in separation from a pure object is quite foreign. Subject and object receive their meaning through each other in the sense that for the subject to know the object as its limit is also to understand itself. As Baillie points out in his introduction (42)

"The distinction of subject and object, within which human conscious experience exists, is held to be a distinction within a single unity." The subject can only become what it is by interaction with

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Also A. N. Whitehead in Process and Reality P.34-5 makes similar points viz. "(IX) That how an actual entity becomes constitutes what that actual entity is; so that the two descriptions of an actual entity are not independent. Its 'being' is constituted by its 'becoming'. This is the principle of process."

(42) Phenomenology of Mind. Introduction p.38.
what stands opposed to or what stands over against it and overcoming it. The subject is always a subject revealing objects and objects are always objects for a subject or consciousness - negativity requires this. (43)

The above brief outline should suffice as a provisional statement of Hegel's conception of the subject allowing these further points to be made. The subject reveals its objects through concepts, (it is through the concept that the present survives in memory). (44) The plurality of events, objects, states etc., would be mere unrelated groups of meaningless atomic units without the subjects conceptualization through language. By revealing its objects it of necessity reveals its own 'relation' to its objects and hence reveals itself. This is why Hegel says that "True reality is merely the process of reinstating self-identity, of reflecting into its own self in and from its other." (45)

Hegel's demand that we abandon ourselves to the object, content, or concept is just the demand that we describe the process of experience - the subject (the activity of thinking) revealing objects and hence itself - without adopting an external or detached point of view. As Gadamer says, Hegel's own dialectical procedure ".... is an immanent

(43) Kojève treats of this point, op. cit. pp. 221-3

(44) "The being which negates the given real dialectically also preserves it as negated - that is, as unreal or "ideal": it preserves what is negated as the "meaning" of the discourse by which it reveals. Hence it is "conscious" of what it negates." Kojève op. cit. P.201.

(45) Phenomenology of Mind P.81.
progression from one logical determination to another which, it is
claimed, does not begin with any hypothetical assumptions but rather
which, in following the self-movement of the concepts, presents the
immanent consequences of thought in its progressive unfolding of
itself. Here no transitions are determined externally."(46) Given
the nature of the subject and of the concept, such a procedure is the
only one capable of reaching Truth; for it is only by abandoning
ourselves to the concept that we are able to express the immanent
necessity of development that is 'part' of every concept - an
immanent necessity culminating in complete knowledge of the Absolute
Concept.

The 'immanent necessity' referred to above can perhaps be explained
in the following manner. A concept, as we have seen is determinate.
As such it portrays a particular reality. As Sarlemijn points out:
"Hegel's conceptualism is objective". (47) As issuing from the
Concept they express in a determinate - hence finite - manner a
seemingly necessary property of reality (i.e. the Absolute). But
by being determinate they exhibit a particular finite reality, not
the Concept (the true or objective actuality). Thus in character-
izing reality as determinate they ipso facto characterize it as it
is not. This entails that reality is in contradiction as depicted by
any particular finite concept. Each particular concept will thus
reveal its inadequacy in depicting reality by its mere instantiation.
This contradiction in the concept qua objective is also a contra-
diction in itself, a contradiction which leads to the negation and

transformation of it, in both the thought of reality and the thought of reality, both in the real and the rational. Taylor puts the point as follows: "A given categorial concept is indispensable yet incoherent. This means that the partial reality it designates both must exist and yet destroy itself. But this can only be because a higher reality, designated by the higher category which resolves the contradiction at this level, also exists, and this partial reality is kept in being by its inherence in this higher reality. A partial reality which continually destroys itself can only go on existing if it is continually posited by the larger order of which it is a part." (49)

This 'larger order' is the Concept coming to knowledge of itself through the conceptually developing process. The immanent necessity is then this necessity of the Concept to realize itself, and it is thus the force that drives the conceptual process; this 'force' is the negation that each concept contains within itself and that leads to its transformation.

Science, or system is therefore this completed conceptualization of the becoming of the whole - the whole together with the process of arriving at it. Hegel makes plain his disagreement with philosophers

(48) "The whole development of the Concept of Spirit simply exhibits the manner in which spirit frees itself from all forms of its determinate being which do not correspond to its Concept. The liberation is accomplished in that these forms are transformed into an actuality entirely adequate to the Concept of spirit." Hegel's Philosophy of Subjective Spirit, Vol.1, p.53.

who attempt to start from absolute knowledge, from science, from the result, without providing the process of arriving at it. This bald result must be unintelligible as a result (as must a character's actions at the end of a novel) without the explication of the process that led up to or produced such a result. For we are given no account of how we are to understand or assess such a result. A science of this sort must be unscientific in itself. A proper science is one that leaves nothing, not even its own arrival unexplained.

Again Hegel criticises those who attempt to seek knowledge of objective things in opposition to, or in exclusion from the subject; and likewise, those who attempt the reverse. Either of these attempts must give rise to unintelligibility for in both cases we have to presuppose the opposite of what we attempt in even specifying a separation - we have to presuppose the notion of experience, of a subject revealing objects and revealing itself to even give an account of either subject or object while at the same time maintaining that such a notion is false. Finally, Hegel attacks those who are deceived through familiarity into holding something as known - knowledge comes only from a thought contemplated in a self-conscious way. It is therefore wrong to assume that everyday notions such as subject, object, concept, etc. are, because they are everyday notions, known truly or scientifically. Science, in Hegel's sense, makes no assumptions and rests upon no presuppositions. Presuppositions are the antithesis of science for they make of the foundation
something mysterious - something outside the domain of that science. Any science that bases itself on presuppositions must of necessity fail in its attempt to comprehend totality, for it is unable to grasp itself in a truly scientific manner. And any science that argues for or accepts such a limitation upon its own comprehension merely erects the negation of science into a principle which it cannot justify. (50)

This is a most important argument, and one that we have advanced against Husserl by arguing that he fails to give an account of how he got to the point of being able to assert such epistemological distinctions as he does - and hence fails to warrant them necessary. However, it is not just Husserl who fails to take account of or challenge Hegel's argument at this point. Common is it today for many disciplines to directly assert the presuppositions of their disciplines - and presuppositions often far from 'apodictically self-evident' - as though it were some kind of merit. (51) Grounding a science in non-science, or accepting certain presuppositions as beyond the scope of that science seems to us in accepting Hegel's argument to be the antithesis of any science that would show that its account was true and necessary.

Husserl, while failing to justify his arrival at science in an acceptable manner, also argued vigorously against any science that based

(50) That such an argument can be scientifically challenged - see M. Kosok. The Formalization of Hegel's Dialectical Logic. I.P.Q. Dec. 1966, P.615.  
(Also A. Kojève, op. cit. p.177)

itself upon presuppositions. As we noted earlier, for an epistemological investigation to be scientific, it must ..... "satisfy the principle of freedom from presupposition" (L.I. 263) Phenomenology, in Husserl's view would provide the epistemological investigation with its scientific form. But can phenomenology itself be a science for Husserl? Can it be free from presupposition, for if not we are again caught by the Hegelian arguments?

Hegel obviously claims that phenomenology as the road to science is also itself scientific. We will therefore need to examine just what Husserl and Hegel understood by phenomenology and its relation to science. However, we need to complete the explication of Hegel's notion of science before such questions can be discussed.

Hegel continues his explication of the nature of science by pointing out that what usually occurs in the process of understanding an object is the separation of the aspects or parts of such an object. Physics, for example, takes our familiar object (say) a table, and through its particular mode of analysis (i.e. given its particular form of knowledge), gives us the truth that it is a collection of particles, arranged in a particular conformation, emitting a particular wavelength and qua collection, possessing certain physical characteristics and conforming to certain physical laws. Gone is the table as a stable unit of experience - as a concrete existent. Physics looses the table but gains a set of particular determinations 'of' the table. Hegel calls this process 'the force of the Understanding', (51) which separates out the particulars previously embodied

(51) Phenomenology of Mind P.93.
as one - previously taken as a totality. This process can be seen then as a negative one, a delineation of an object into a plurality of particulars - but negative because this process fails to reveal the table in its 'true' or adequate conceptualization. The table, as the totality we seek to conceptualize has vanished. To put it in a Hegelian way - this 'force of the Understanding' signals the death of the table, we are left with a group of separate particulars. And this second group of particulars is then open to the same 'force' - hence an infinite process leads away from the initial attempt at comprehension.\(^{(52)}\) Therefore a process such as this cannot be 'true' science, in the sense of the completed conceptualization that was spoken of earlier, though Hegel argues, it is a necessary part. To stay at this level of analysis is to remain in contradiction, the more the process is continued the greater the number of contradictions, and the further we move away from the table - the whole we are attempting to grasp.

The problem with this sort of analysis is that it separates consciousness from its object - the position of external reflection. It then proceeds to do damage to the object by splitting it up into a collection of determinations. It thus abstracts from the object in considering the determinations. This entails the result that this sort of analysis can never attain to the true conceptualization of the concrete object - it deals abstractly with an abstraction. The

\(^{(52)}\) Sartre J.P. points out that "Man is a totality not a collection" (Being and Nothingness P.568) - we might add that a table is a totality not a collection of particulars.
presuppositions of the understanding have pre-ordained the result - the mutilation of the object in an attempt to characterise it as it really is. Hegel claims that .... "To see that thought in its very nature is dialectical, and that as understanding, it must fall into contradiction - the negative of itself, will form one of the main lessons of logic." (53)

We might add that any method, being the application of procedures or criteria to an object must of necessity fail in its goal of characterizing such an object as it really is; for a method applied by a subject to the object is the denial of the initial state in which both subject and object existed - it is a refutation of experience. This is why Hegel emphasises the abandonment spoken of earlier. For him "the method is nothing else than the structure of the whole in its pure and essential form." (54) Phenomenology, must therefore make no presuppositions such as the use of methods or procedures in attempting to comprehend the object at hand but must rest content with the pure description of experience. "When all is said and done the "method" of the Hegelian Scientist consists in having no method or way of thinking peculiar to his Science."(55)

But Hegel sees a positive as well as a negative significance in the understanding's analysis. Understanding, in attempting to characterize the object, introduces mediation. It makes of the immediate a set of determinations; it separates what was previously a unity. Hegel

(53) Little Logic P.19
(54) The Phenomenology of Mind P.106
(55) A Kojève op. cit. P.176. See also S. Rosen Hegel P.257.
sees this as being a necessary prelude to the subject being able to grasp reality as it really is. For the determinations made are determinations of consciousness. Consciousness makes the object determinations, therefore these fall within consciousness. And in making such determinations consciousness spells out to a greater extent its concrete relations to its object and it does so in universal terms. Consciousness, as understanding has therefore produced as a result of its analysis a set of universals, albeit abstract universals. These universals are abstract determinations of consciousness because as Heidegger points out ".... they are the result of a scrutiny of consciousness which disregards the full nature and the unity, of the constitution of consciousness." (56)

For Hegel, concrete means interrelatedness, and he sees the process of experience as being one that starts with abstract, unmediated undifferentiatedness and ends with the complete self mediation of the Absolute, with the concrete rational real. So it is a process of making more concrete through the process of experience the initial abstract beginning.

Against this can be contrasted the empiricist and idealist meaning which takes concrete to mean the immediate sense particular. The process of assimilating such immediate 'data' under categories is seen here as being one of abstraction. The empiricist/idealist abstracts from the 'concrete process of experience', and attempts to

(56) M. Heidegger, Hegel's Concept of Experience, P.89. (On the faults of 'the Understanding' see also Gadamer op. cit. P.23-4).
account for a part of the latter through categories derived from other realms. (As Kline has pointed out etymology tends to favour the Hegelian over the empirical conception of concrete "concretum", the result of a process of 'concrescence' or growing together, cannot be anything simple or immediate, but (must be) something mediated, a living unity of what is differentiated." (57)

To return to Hegel's criticism of the understanding, we find that the understanding has produced a set of abstract, because independent (or not interrelated) universals. The problem now ".... consists in actualizing the universal, of giving it spiritual vitality by the process of breaking down and superseding fixed and determinate thoughts." (58) We do not stop at the static negative of the understanding which sees the object collapse into a set of independent universal determinations. Consciousness transcends this inadequate posture. Consciousness .... "is this mighty power not by being a positive which turns away from the negative, as when we say of anything it is nothing or it is false and being then done with it, pass off to something else: on the contrary, mind is this power only by looking the negative in the face, and dwelling with it." (59)

Prior to the process whereby consciousness - (as understanding) - determines the object there is neither determination nor object for a

(57) G. Kline, 'Some Recent Re-interpretations of Hegel' quoted by M. Kosok in The Dialectic of Consciousness in Hegel's Phenomenology of the Spirit. P.209. Kosok goes on to point out how both empiricists and idealists fail to correctly understand Hegel's conception of 'concrete', see pp.209 f.

(58) Phenomenology of Mind 94.

(59) Ibid 93.
subject. It is only by the subject negating the immediacy by attempting to determine it that it becomes - that there is something for consciousness and corollatively consciousness of this something. It is impossible to ask of consciousness before it has progressed what it is, for even to broach the question presupposes having got to a point of view, having become - having implicitly stated the nature of one's own being. Prior to the first determination there is nothing that can be said.

This appears to be a very significant point. One cannot demand of a particular stage or level of development of consciousness answers to questions that are generated from a more advanced level, for each level or stage in the process has its own structure, its own meaning - one for the consciousness immersed in the experience at the particular level, and another for consciousness which has surpassed it. As one does not seek to judge the merit of a painting before the artist has put brush to canvas likewise one cannot expect of consciousness answers to questions which for it cannot be posed. This point again turns on the nature of consciousness, i.e. that it is not a static thing that remains constant through a series of experiences. It does not remain nor ever is an identity, for negativity is just the perpetual cancelling of identity. This whole question demands a clarification of the relation of the logic of identity to the logic of negativity (dialectical logic) which is provided in the following section. Here we can perhaps prefigure this latter by saying - following Kojève that "... its (consciousness') continuation in existence will signify for this I 'not to be
what it is (as static and given being, as natural being, as 'innate character') and to be (that is, to become) what it is not .... it is the act of transcending the given that is given to it and that it is itself." (60) Obviously this assertion as to the nature of consciousness is, from the point of view of traditional logic contradictory.

If (per impossible) consciousness is what it is and not another thing, then it would of necessity conform to, or be governed by the logic of identity, and it would then be merely a matter of expressing the precise relations that hold between itself and the other objects in the world. But it is extremely difficult to envisage how such an 'expressing' could be achieved, for by robbing consciousness of its negativity we would, ipso facto rob it of the possibility of expression - that is, of transcending the given through language. Without language there would be no mediation. We would be reduced to the muteness of the in-itself. There would be total silence.

This point is important for the following reason; if a beginning is made with concepts that are merely taken over as complete, then it will be impossible to comprehend them in a real and adequate manner, for the process whereby these concepts came to be given is not retained - part of their meaning is missing. Hence they will perforce be taken abstractly. A concept is not a fixed and independent entity, it is continually in a process of being given through experience. The meaning of a concept is not separable from the

process of experience, it can only be adequately grasped through the adequate grasp of experience itself.

This criticism of failing to correctly comprehend concepts is made by Hegel when he argues that Modern philosophy fails to grasp the universal as it has arisen "... out of the manifold detail of concrete experience". It takes the universal as already present, as result, through the process of mediation, from sensuous immediacy. It is therefore unable to show the necessity of the universal's existence in the process of understanding the real world. It is unable to be properly scientific.

This is the criticism that was levelled at contemporary philosophy of mind in its attempts to explicate notions such as 'the mental', 'the physical', 'brain process', 'mental process' etc. They were taken over as already substantial concepts without prior explication of the process that resulted in the production of such concepts. Likewise the criticism advanced against Husserl of failing to provide the account of how he got to the point of being able to assert the epistemological categories he uses (i.e. the real, the ideal etc.). Husserl expressly rejects the necessity of providing such an account i.e. "The question is not how experience whether naive or scientific arises, but what must be its content if it is to be objectively valid. We are, in other words, not interested in the origin and changes of our world presentations ...." (62)

(61) Phenomenology of Mind P.94
(62) Logical Investigations P.207.
Now, while Husserl is correct to criticise those who seek to explain the ideal content of our knowledge in a natural psychological manner, he fails to correctly grasp the value of such an erroneous procedure. For Hegel is at one with Husserl in denying that such a psychological account can do justice to what Husserl calls the 'objectively ideal'. In The Phenomenology of Mind Hegel shows the inadequacies that occur in this account while describing the form of knowledge adopted by the scientist (i.e. in the description of Reason as Observation). But Hegel has shown, as against Husserl two fundamental things. He has shown firstly, that the position of the (psychological) scientist arose dialectically out of the failure of an earlier form of knowledge (self-consciousness in its various modes) to adequately grasp reality. It is through the negation of this earlier form that Reason can arise.

Secondly, he has shown that the level of Reason is inadequate as well, resolving itself into Spirit, Spirit into Religion and Religion into Absolute Knowledge. It is only at the level of Absolute knowledge that the 'objectively ideal' can find is adequate - pure - expression. Husserl fails to show how the limitations in the psychological point of view necessarily lead to the position he is adopting. It is this requirement that is referred to when we claim that Husserl fails to adequately account for his own point of view.

Hegel's demand that we 'actualize the universal' is just the demand

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(63) Phenomenology of Mind. P.329 ff.
(64) Ibid p.267
(65) We shall discuss the particular conceptions of psychology held by Hegel and Husserl in Part III.
that we grasp the universal, not as a fixed, abstract and inert thing - not as a result, but as issuing from human sensuous existence. The description (not a psychological one) of the process whereby this sensuous existence yields up a universal will enable the proper meaning of this universal to be grasped and hence contribute to the understanding of this human world. This is a sine qua non of philosophical science.

Hegel sees concepts as being "... in truth, self-moving functions, circles", (66) because the process that the subject passes through on its way from sensuous certainty to the Concept requires of concepts that they be fluid, that they develop - it is a conceptual process. Understanding, which holds these concepts apart from what is being conceptualized (i.e. being), apart from each other, and as fixed does violence to the very nature of the concepts - again a reason why Hegel demands an abandonment to the concept - and does violence to the nature of consciousness and object. Hegel states that if we break down, or better transcend the limitations of such a point of view, and see concepts as self moving, as "spiritual entities", then we are on the road to science. Hegel puts it as follows:

"This movement of the spiritual entities constitutes the nature of scientific procedure in general. Looked at as the concatenation of their content, this movement is the necessitated development and

(66) Phenomenology of Mind p.95.
expansion of that content into an organic systematic whole. By this movement, too, the road, which leads to the concept of knowledge, becomes itself a necessary and completely evolving process ... The road to science, by the very movement of the concept itself, will compass the entire objective world of conscious life in its rational necessity."(67)

We have then, in the proper science a self-developing process, and one which continually returns upon itself. This is why Hegel terms the concepts as being circular. We are continually returning to an ever enriched (because more differentiated and interrelated), and ever developing Whole - Spirit - Absolute - Concept. We return again and again because of the contradictions engendered by our initial, (and all subsequent), attempts at knowing (in the Phenomenology of Mind). We try to say what we mean and immediately introduce more meaning than we were aware of - hence the need again to say what more we mean, etc. etc. We get no nearer to saying what we mean unless the mode of expression changes and ipso facto the component of this mode - the knowledge and the object known. (68)

(67) Ibid P.95. Here we can note the mistaken critique of Habermas (Knowledge and Human Interests P.24) where he states that Hegel does not proceed logically, nor if it is science can it do anything except confuse the legitimacy of the positive sciences. Here, Habermas seems to be taking both 'science' and 'logical' from the point of view of the Understanding - without demonstrating how this position can provide an intelligible account of itself. Naturally from the point of view of positive science (or understanding) Hegel's views would appear to be the antithesis of science. But Hegel shows that the Understanding's position collapses under scrutiny.

(68) For an explication of Hegel's notion of circulatity see Gadamer op. cit. pp. 5-35.
To further spell out the Hegelian notion of the development of concepts we can perhaps gain in perspicuity by considering the example previously considered - that of a character in a novel. Suppose we say of X that he is an angry man. We do not mean that he is exhausted by such a characterization. For in further consideration of X we may also make many more such pronouncement concerning his character, motives, actions etc. These further characterizations are not made in a merely additional manner but condition or modify the initial typification, i.e. we are evolving a picture of X. The concept 'angry' thus ceases in itself to be an adequate concept in its application to X - the essence of X is not exhausted by such a characterization but seeks a more adequate and complete typification. In this latter endeavour we find that concepts applied to X at various times take on a differing meaning depending upon the completeness of the characterization; depending upon what point in the adequate typification of X has been reached - and this depends both upon our own developing point of view and how this 'makes' us see X. Concepts - even in this example - are not separate isolated labels that we variously apply to other separate isolated existents in a fixed and atemporal universe. They are the way we grasp the significance of our experience. To make concepts separate, static existents would be to make experience unintelligible - for we would be continually asserting the negation of each preceding assertion, we would be continually producing a "new" X as against the "old" X by making each assertion - there would be no development of X. If we view the character X in Hegelian fashion then X would appear as
a whole whose content was given through the gradual evolving of a coherent system of concepts - a being becoming what it is.

Now, given the briefly stated nature of subjectivity to be that of negativity or negative activity it follows that the Concept must be expressive in part of such a state. It must therefore reflect in some fashion the principle underlying its production, the attempt by the subject to grasp (through rational discourse) the truth. Hegel calls it the mediation of thought and being - which because thought is activity and being is being determined through this activity, the concept (as mediation) will of necessity embody not just the 'being' side of experience but also the 'life pulse' of the thinking. It will express the dissimilarity which obtains between these two in its very nature, in its unity. This dissimilarity is just the factor of negativity. Hegel says that such thoughts are .... 'charged with the difference of a soul and a body,' (69) so such thoughts or concepts are not a differenceless unity, nor a mere conglomerate of two aspects they are unities of opposites, they are 'charged'.

Hegel thus typifies concepts as self-moving functions, which lead through their own development to the discursive elaboration of ...... "an organic systematic whole." (70) They develop through their own inadequacy in revealing being, just as the typification of X as angry immediately leads to a further typification in an attempt to

(69) Science of Logic P.37 (Also see Baillie's Introduction to the Phenomenology of Mind P.34).

(70) Phenomenology of Mind P.95.
typify X in a less inadequate manner. And because X is not just a thing but negativity the typification has, as it were, to try and 'keep up' with X, to typify X both as X is now and as X will become - that is as finite and infinite at the same time. Hegel makes the point that mathematics or mathematical methods degrade this process, for they are unable to cope with the 'sheer restlessness of life and its absolute and inherent process of differentiation'. (71) It is not possible within the ambit of traditional logic to typify this process as it is, for the presuppositions of this logic have preordained the result, this understanding must destroy negativity. (72) (Recourse to any introduction to traditional logic will validate this point. For example, Copi (73) in his introduction to Logic is concerned .... "only with the correctness of the completed process", and not with the process itself.) Again, in this passage, Hegel shows the inadequacy of staying within this domain, an inadequacy we observe as still rampantly evident in such areas as psychology today. The experimental method followed by psychology does just this, it degrades what is 'self-moving' to the level of matter (given being), and is then surprised that it arrives at contradictions. This method merely repeats endlessly the process of reducing the subject to an object and hence obliterating the essence it was attempting to know. We find a lack of any internal necessity, in the development of this process, because we find a lack of any 'abandonment' to the process itself -

(71) Ibid P.104.

(72) Rosen puts it as follows: "That is, the real obstacle to self-knowledge lies rather in the definitions of knowledge and form, or as Hegel would put it, in limiting oneself to the "logic of the understanding"". Self-consciousness and self-knowledge Hegel-Studien 1974, Vol.9, P.112.

(73) I. Copi. Introduction to Logic P.6.
the abandonment is rather to the methodological procedures that produce such a result. (74) This method is applied by psychology to a subject matter wholly detached from it, instead of arising through the discursive elaboration of the subject itself. The urgency to 'get on with the job', to generate results that justify the methodology is a self-stultifying procedure, for the method is already taken as an absolute which itself 'fashions' the subject matter, and produces the results. This is just an extended tautology - and a tautology that fails to comprehend itself. Hegel sees this sort of procedure as unreal and unscientific, and therefore giving rise to only unreal truth.

Hegel contrasts these 'pseudo-philosophical' (75) methods with the scientific (properly scientific) method in an effort to spell out in greater detail the differences between them. The first of these pseudo-philosophical methods is the process of raisonnement (rationci-nation). This is the view from outside, the view briefly mentioned above. The self stands apart from the content it apprehends, and seeks the essence of this content. But by so detaching itself from the content it makes of itself an inessential moment. Hence it is unable to progress, it merely makes negative determinations of the content without seeing its own negativity in the process. It makes of itself the opposite pole in this process - what Hegel calls 'the ideally presented subject', to which such content is related in a merely accidental or fortuitous manner - it is an alien. Conceptual

(74) B. Bosanquet puts it as follows: "What has happened here is that a very limited but apparently self-contained system has been erected ad hoc by a practical interest or an arbitrary intellectual objective." Implication and Linear Inference P.159.

(75) Kojève's term - op. cit. p.264.
thinking, on the other hand is concerned both with the content as apprehended and the subject as apprehender, in their unity. It is not the view from outside. As we have already pointed out, the concept is just this recognition of being and negativity in unity. Hegel expresses this in the form 'Being is Thought' and 'substance is implicitly and in itself subject'. (76) Experience is not the internal registering of an external impression but the continual reinstating of the unity of subject and object through their mutual determination. Raisonnement therefore in its elaboration of the content is forced to adopt an inadequate means of expression because it adopts an inadequate form of knowledge - the meaning as expressed here will be one-sided.

We can express the difficulty that Hegel sees here through the doctrine of relations. The debate over whether relations were internal or external is a way of expressing the problem Hegel was trying to show as the essence of ratiocination. If the terms and their relations are taken as mutually exclusive then the proposition collapses for want of a relation. If this is not the case the propositions collapses into identity - either position entails the collapse of discursive elaboration. But this way of conceiving the problem is not the only one. Earlier, the nature of the self or subject was seen as a becoming, not as static. Likewise the predicate is not a merely abstract determination attached in a particular way to this subject. The difference is nicely put by Hegel when he says by way of an analogy that "Rhythm is the result of what hovers

(76) Phenomenology of Mind P.113.
between and unites both". (accent and metre). The doctrine of relations as being the view that relations were either internal or external to their terms, or the view of ratiocination are both wedded to the form of propositional truth, in the sense that the proposition can serve to express the truth.

In our consideration of the examples mentioned earlier (red is a certain wavelength of light; a table is a particular structure of atoms; a mental process is a brain process; X is angry) we repeatedly emphasised the point Hegel makes. The unity required for such assertions to even be made is absent, hence the meaning of its content falls apart into bare subject and abstract universal (predicate) - we are back to accent and metre.

Secondly, because the conceiver of such a point of view (or proposition) is an external agent the proposition itself must reveal mere external elements. A unity of meaning is thus impossible to obtain. With each further statement concerning the subject we get a continual negation of each preceding one - both in the sense we attribute to the subject and the sense we attribute to the predicate. From this point of view any notion of the whole, or the Concept is impossible to

(77) Ibid. P.120.

(78) R. Musil puts the point generally as follows ...."in mathematics is the source of a wicked intellect that while making man the lord of the earth, also makes him the slave of the machine. The inner drought, the monstrous mixture of acuity in matters of detail and indifference as regards the whole, man's immense loneliness in a desert of detail, his restlessness, malice, incomparable collousness, his greed for money, his coldness and violence, which are characteristic of our time, are according to such surveys, simply and solely the result of the losses that logical and accurate thinking has inflicted on the soul" The Man without Qualities P.40-41.
obtain. In each of the examples, the predicate has substantive significance, and thus absorbs the meaning of the subject within it - being invades the subject. Hence the subject ceases to stand as a fixed and objective self, and the predicate ceases to be a discrete and separate item, it throws itself into the subject - X is angry. Hegel sees this view as leading to speculative thought where the contradictory character of the proposition - and the process of ratiocination itself- is sublated. The proposition attempts to express the truth (the substance), but the truth is, in its essence subject - finding its content in itself and itself in its content. Hegel concludes: "There is to be found, therefore, no sort of content standing in a relation, as it were, to an underlying subject, and getting its significance by being attached to this as a predicate. The proposition as it appears is a mere empty form. (79)

To be science, philosophical exposition must eschew the ratiocinative procedure in and through its knowledge of this procedure, and grasp its content only in pure concepts, which because they embody negativity, will lead to the systematic elaboration of the whole - they will provide the rhythm of the whole. In ratiocination, the concepts are not pure, are not taken as they really are, but as this view requires - as static, formal and still embodying sense elements.

The second pseudo philosophical method is that of common sense. Hegel attacks those who think that philosophizing 'by the light of nature'
by common-sense, and by 'intuition is sufficient to lead us to truth'. This point is important in that if appeal is made to any of these in the case of a dispute there is no way of knowing what is meant by such an appeal - it of necessity fails of a discursive elaboration, it lacks a criterion. Science cannot rest content on a foundation supported by an intuition, or feeling of the rightness of the procedure and support. And this means that the positive sciences are not sciences in the Hegelian sense, unless philosophy has 'had a hand in their production', unless philosophy has shown the necessity of the presuppositions and axioms that form the foundation of these sciences (i.e. how physics arose from and is related to experience). The same applies to logic itself. We cannot start at the purely conceptual level and elaborate a logic unless we have demonstrated the necessity of the concepts we adopt, that is, how they came about - what they mean. Or, in other words, until we have reached a point where the truth has been grasped as absolute, we are in no position to assert the necessity of particular concepts nor their interrelationships. As Hegel says, the form of necessity must get its due. To show certain positions as necessary to the comprehension of the whole is to show that they are not presuppositions. The true (because Hegelian) scientist must demonstrate the necessity of every position adopted.

Therefore given the Hegelian notion of the truth as the whole, and secondly the nature of the proposition, it is only possible to grasp the truth of a process of explication at the end of that explication. The ascription of a predicate to a subject collapses into nonsense unless we see this process as being within a whole. (The subject,
we might say, is the process as a whole, and the predicate the whole in process). The understanding of having got to a particular point of view, of being able to assert certain propositions can only be adequately assessed on completion of the point of view, that is, the understanding of the whole. Therefore we must begin by showing how science comes about, how it 'comes on the scene', and why it needs to come on the scene - how it is an improvement on that which went before.

Hegel's phenomenology is just this description of the development of knowledge from untruth to truth, the education of consciousness from the natural to the scientific standpoint. Now another important point made by Hegel in these (still) introductory remarks, is that true knowledge does not come on the scene merely in opposition to untrue knowledge. It arises dialectically, out of the untruth of that untrue knowledge. Therefore each account of knowledge, whether untrue or not, has its value in the phenomenology - each account or stage has a positive value in that through it the whole is reached.

Now, in seeking to know, consciousness negates the untruth of its knowledge, but it does not stop at this point. Hegel argues that to stop at this point - to take this negation as leaving us with nothing (scepticism) - is to see only the negative side of negation. The positive significance of the process is that it is determinate negation, giving rise to a new form - the content negated but retained as negated. (We might add here that memory is a good example of the positive side of negation. A memory is the present negated as present yet retained in the present as a memory or
'negative presence.') To stop at scepticism is to make discursive knowledge impossible - we end only in silence. But given the negative and positive significance of this process, a transition is made from each form of knowledge that is inadequate, culminating in the form that is complete - the point where knowledge no longer finds contradiction in its form (and ipso facto in its language), and where the 'concept corresponds to the object and the object to the concept'. At this point consciousness has attained to science - Absolute Knowledge. Only at this point is it possible to elaborate a logic that is scientific - that is, not tainted by relativity of truth nor inadequacies of content.

A problem, previously thought insuperable, now makes its appearance. How is it possible for us to perform such a description of this process, for if we are seeking to describe the process as it is, surely our own knowledge, our own language will make it impossible in principle to do just this? This seems to be one of the lessons of Kant's philosophy. How it is possible to know the untruth of our phenomenal knowledge except phenomenally, that is unscientifically? Hegel puts the difficulty as follows:

"This exposition, viewed as a process of relating science to phenomenal knowledge, and as an inquiry and critical examination into the reality of knowing, does not seem able to be effected without some presupposition which is laid down as an ultimate criterion .... But, here, where science first appears on the scene, neither science nor any sort of standard has justified itself as the essence or ultimate reality; and without this no examination seems able to be
We have already considered the problem of presupposition both in Husserl and Hegel. It has been said that a science built on presuppositions is not properly scientific unless the necessity or truth of these presuppositions is made evident in discursive fashion. Plainly we have an infinite regress here. Hegel attempts to avoid the force of this argument as follows. We seek truth. Truth is the knowledge of what a thing is in itself. Our knowledge of this thing is through concepts; that is, as the thing is in itself, for us. It would seem that for knowledge to gain truth it would have to jump from one side of the relation to the other, it would need to be this thing in itself. This is evidently impossible. But consciousness is not a thing, it is essentially negativity. Consciousness is both consciousness of the object, and consciousness of itself — "consciousness of what to it is true, and consciousness of its knowledge of that truth." (81) The problem of knowing before we know is a problem only when consciousness is conceived in isolation — in separation — from its object, and in conceiving this relation of consciousness to its object abstractly. Consciousness does not suddenly decide to characterize or know an object. Consciousness is essentially consciousness only through its object. It is both a distinguishing from and a relating to. It is the process of this dual movement that we call knowledge. (82) Hence any consideration of knowledge

(80) Phenomenology of Mind P.139.
(81) Ibid P.141
is ipso facto a consideration of both the distinguishing and the relating aspects. Both these aspects are for the same consciousness, hence Hegel can say that 'it is itself their comparison.' Heidegger puts it aptly thus: "The decisive point of this explanation is this; every time we represent phenomena in their appearance, both the thing we measure, and that with which we measure fall within consciousness itself." (83) When both the object as it is in itself for consciousness, and our knowledge of this object do not correspond, consciousness attempts to rectify this state of affairs by claiming for itself a 'new' object and then proceeding to examine it in more detail, but there is also a second movement involved here. Consciousness comes to see that in fact the 'new' object that appeared was due to the negation of the preceding experience - a negation both of the object of consciousness and of consciousness knowledge of it. Consciousness is from this perspective in the process of continually examining itself - both its knowledge and its object - because both are wholly implicated in consciousness experience. This latter perspective is that of the philosopher or reflecting consciousness that is able to see more than the object at hand. The object here is more the previous experience and how it offers up a new experience - a new consciousness of an object and a new object of consciousness - for consciousness. Again we need to remember that consciousness is not a thing but negativity - it is always 'outside' itself such that it can subtend the peculiar 'relationship' to its experience that has been spelt out above. The criterion by which we decide on the truth or falsity of our knowledge is consciousness itself. And consciousness, being (as we have said) a being of becoming, entails a

(83) M. Heidegger, Hegel's Concept of Experience P.97.
dialectical interplay between these two aspects of its experience, an interplay that resolves through the process of negation and the negation of this negation the inadequacies in both respects. By developing its own content consciousness resolves the inadequacies that if finds in itself. This investigation or examination is thus internal to consciousness itself, the development of the immanent content contained therein. So while consciousness can be typified as always outside itself it is not outside itself in an external fashion. There are no transcendentals guiding the experential process itself - no thing in itself.

The object is then not object simpliciter and the subject is not subject simpliciter. If the object is in the process of being determined by consciousness, and consciousness is at the same time being determined through its object, either of these typifications would fail to account for the dual process involved. It would be merely an attempt to reinstate the notion of separation, and the inseparable problem of foundation associated with it.

Now prior to an exposition of the dialectic (which is provided in the next section) we can say proleptically that this dialectical procedure - where "consciousness tests and examines itself" - is not the merely subjective determining the objective. This would be to view the matter abstractly. Hegel's point is that the determinations themselves - subjective and objective - are determinations that have arisen from a particular attempt to characterize the object of consciousness and eo ipso the relationship between consciousness and its object - an attempt which in its attempt, loses its own truth. Subjective
idealism is the outcome of the view that consciousness, being subjective, determines its objects or the world (as the objective), an outcome which entails the negation of the distinction itself. For Hegel, the object, has as much agency in the process of knowledge as has consciousness; there is a mutual reciprocal determining, not a one way process. (84) Hence our way of conceiving the situation is not just the active meeting the passive, the subjective meeting the objective, the agency meeting the agent. We have a dynamic meta-stability of consciousness and its object, of both the object of knowledge and the knowledge of the object.

On completion of the process, consciousness can see that each mode of the relationship between consciousness and its object and their sublation give rise to what Hegel calls a "scientifically constituted sequence". Each mode thus has a positive value in its expression of what it takes the truth to be - and is necessary in providing its accent to the 'rhythm' of the Whole. Hegel is able to delineate the entire blueprint for the education of consciousness to the point of science only because he has already reached such a point. And as we have already mentioned, the Preface and Introduction to the Phenomenology of Mind are written from the point of view Absolute Knowledge - from the Scientific point of view.

(84) Baillie in his Introduction to the Phenomenology of Mind P.39 makes this point as follows: "We cannot say that the subject dominates the object any more than that the object directs the activity of the subject: they are inseparable elements and develop pari passu."

Merleau Ponty in his discussion of Hegel's Introduction to the Phenomenology also emphasises this point Cf. "Philosophy and Non-Philosophy. Since Hegel". Telos No.29 1976, p.58. (This point is further generalized in a footnote by H.J. Silverman (Trans. p.58 No.31).
In saying this Hegel does not mean to place Absolute Knowledge on a scale with all the other forms of knowledge. For in reaching Absolute Knowledge we have transcended experience (as the subject - object complex) itself. This means that we, qua finite subjects, cease to exist as such, and become moments of the absolute. As Sarlemijn puts it: "While the process of human knowledge partly overcomes the subject-object opposition by resolving what is given into pure determinations; while the human individual attempts to realize in his own way the good known to him; his freedom can never influence absolute freedom, because it is finite like its subject and cannot escape the negative dialectic of the finite. This is why the human individual cannot offer resistance to what is historically necessary. Here, as in every dialectical analysis, the subject of determinations passes from the finite to the absolute individual. It is for this reason that the human conquest of the object is that of the absolute, that human freedom is that of the logos, not because the latter restricts the former, but because the former is lowered and raised to a moment'\(^5\). Absolute knowledge is thus not a point of view because there is no 'we' (in the usual sense) to be subject of it.\(^6\)

To criticise such a procedure, to argue that Hegel has not attained to such a 'grand conception' is of necessity to have shown that

\(^5\) A. Sarlemijn op. cit. p.152-3.

\(^6\) This raises the problem as to what sense Hegel is giving to the "we" in the Phenomenology of Mind generally. On this see K. R. Dove: Hegel's Phenomenological Method p.45-56. Dove discusses the various explanations offered by commentators on Hegel's Phenomenology on Hegel use of the term "we", as well as suggesting his own solution.
Hegel's description is in itself subsumable within a more comprehensive system - the one from which the criticism is made! There is no other way philosophically - scientifically - to perform such a critique. (87) (One can, of course, argue that the whole philosophical enterprise is absurd - but this is still an argument and hence based upon a particular form of knowledge or point of view which itself needs to be explicated so that the argument can be grasped in its full significance - and this would transform the argument into a scientific (and also self-contradictory) one).

This is why the emphasis upon the implication of consciousness in its own procedure has been continually expressed throughout our argument. Without a systematic grasp of the whole, any criticism will lack complete truth and intelligibility for we will be unable to fully comprehend the sense of the concepts used in such a critique, because we fail to fully comprehend both our own consciousness and its object - we lapse of necessity into the mere haphazard and arbitrary. This is just the point of view Hegel demonstrates as being continually sublated in his phenomenological description. Each mode of experience (and the consciousness that is immersed in it) by itself cannot know that it is part of a "scientifically constituted sequence". Thus a criticism from such a point of view - from any of these intermediary modes of experience - of the whole discourse would be both impossible, because it would have to know that there was such a 'whole' discourse of Science to be able to criticise it; and,

(87) "To refute a philosophy is to exhibit the dialectical movement in its principle, and thus reduce it to a constituent member of a higher concrete form of the Idea". Hegel, Little Logic P.168.
secondly, it would be irrelevant because it would only be able to view the system, as it is not, it would not be able to understand what was being expressed in full. This is the reason why criticism was made by us from the Hegelian perspective, of statements from the philosophy of mind, and the example from physics. They fail to show how they are fully intelligible - they fail to show the necessity of their foundations - and then, upon the mere presumption that they are, assert with indignation the inadequacy or fallacious nature of views falling outwith their domain. Rosen puts the point nicely as follows: "It is therefore nonsense to judge philosophy in terms of art, science, political ideology, or any other secondary (because detached) form of speech, which itself implies prior philosophical decisions, whether known to the speaker or not. Philosophy can submit to no judge but itself ...." (88)

For Hegel, any empirical science is defective because its general principle is indeterminate and vague, hence not connected to the cases for which it is the principle; and, secondly, that the point from which these sciences begin, their axioms and assumptions are neither able to be accounted for nor deduced in that science. "In both these points the form of necessity fails to get its due." (89)

This is, of course, not to say that these sciences are unnecessary or contain nothing of value - on the contrary, they are a necessary part of philosophical science (or speculative science), providing

(89) Hegel. Little Logic, P.15 (my emphases).
this latter with concepts obtained in their respective analytic procedures. But these sciences, what Hegel called positive sciences have the following three features:

"1. Their commencement, though rational at bottom yields to the influence of fortuitousness, when they have to bring their universal truth into contact with actual facts and the single phenomena of experience".

2. "These sciences are positive also in failing to recognize the finite nature of what they predicate, and to point out how these categories and their whole sphere pass into a higher. They assume their statements to possess an authority beyond appeal"

3. They are positive ".... in consequence of the inadequate grounds on which their conclusions rest."

These three features make it impossible for positive science to satisfy reason, to be properly scientific. And, finally because of the mode of investigation adopted by such sciences - analysis - they are only able to produce abstract results. In the example of the table we found the concrete object of our experience being replaced by a set of abstract attributes - attributes, which it should be pointed out, are agreed to be what the table really is, and attributes

that form no part of our normal experience - but no way of returning to the concrete object was then possible. There eventuated the contradiction of taking the table as a unity, as well as taking it as a collection of attributes.

"All this ...... was the well-known incoherency of ideas, with their way of spreading out without a central point, an incoherency that is characteristic of the present era and constitutes its peculiar arithmetic, rambling about in a multitude of things, from a hundred possibilities to yet a thousand others, and always without a basic unity." (91)

(91) R. Musil. The Man Without Qualities P.17 (My emphaisis).
SUMMARY

2.2

Briefly, we can say that science must first be arrived at. It is not sufficient to start at the purely scientific level unless it has been demonstrated how we are able to reach such a standpoint. Therefore it is requisite for a complete understanding of science that the description of the process from the prescientific to the scientific standpoint be completed. This is the role of phenomenology. As Hegel has pointed out, "the form of necessity must get its due", it is phenomenology that provides this form of necessity.

Now, because of the nature of experience - its being dialectical - the description will take the form of a discursive elaboration of experience - the process of consciousness attempting to grasp and express the Whole. And because experience embodies the negativity of consciousness, the concepts themselves will not be mere separate atoms available for analysis - they will not be just static nor abstract being but will be in their essential nature becoming. They will not be given being but being given.

Science, for Hegel, is then the completed description of the being of becoming in purely conceptual terms. Science is thus concerned not with abstractions but with the concrete, with completeness and consistency. It always deals with a unity which while given in an incomplete fashion is always in the process of coming to terms with and transcending its incompleteness.

Finally, science is presuppositionless. It does not bring in
from outside axioms or assumptions with which to begin. It remains within its own content, returning upon itself with each discursive elaboration. Science in its completion is circular; it is the truth of the Whole and the unity of thought and being in its entirety. It is "Absolute or completely coherent knowledge". (92)
Introduction

3.1

It has been argued that science is not something that can be straightway plunged into, that it must first be shown how it is possible to attain to such a scientific perspective, and of how such scientific concepts are formed.

Logic itself has as science, to be reached. It is not a satisfactory procedure to begin one's logical studies with a definition or set of definitions that have the accent of common sense, and to then proceed at the whim of individual inclination to the elaboration of various rules and logical procedures. Yet logic today, as much as when Hegel made his criticisms of its unscientific method, still exhibits this unscientific aspect. To take just a few examples by way of illustration.

Copi, in his Introduction to Logic, lays down the following definition of logic: "The study of logic is the study of the methods and principles used in distinguishing correct from incorrect reasoning". (1) Now, because there are other definitions of logic available, Copi is obliged to counter them. He takes only two other specimens:

(1) 1. Copi: Introduction to Logic P. 3.
1. Logic is the science of the laws of thought.
2. Logic is the science of reasoning.

The first specimen is rejected, for two reasons. These are, that, psychology studies thinking and hence is the science of the laws of thought. Because logic is not a part of psychology it cannot be this science as well. Secondly, this definition is rejected because it is too inclusive - not all thought is the object of study for the logician.

The second definition is rejected for similar reasons. Reasoning is still thought and is therefore still part of the psychologists subject matter. Thus we are left with the initial definition. But Copi does not consider whether the process of actually propounding a definition of logic is itself a satisfactory procedure for logic. Nowhere is there a development from the ordinary to the logical point of view; and, in fact, Copi expressly repudiates the whole idea of providing such a development. Thus his introductory remarks have an ambiguous ring about them - take for example the following:

"But the logician is not concerned in the least with the dark ways by which the mind arrives at its conclusions during the actual process of reasoning. He is concerned only with the correctness of the completed process".
"The logician is not concerned with the process of inference but with the propositions which constitute the initial and end point of that process and the relationship between them". (2)

It is with the argument that results from the process of inference that the logician is chiefly concerned. Yet the notion of argument is itself used in an ambiguous manner. It is taken as 'any group of propositions of which one is claimed to follow from the others which are regarded as providing evidence for the truth of that one'; and it is also taken to refer to the process itself. Logic must therefore study the completed product - the argument as completed - with a view to determining its correctness while recognizing that this is, in effect to study the process as it is not. One is thus tempted to ask: how can the relationship between propositions be fully grasped if the process of inference is ignored?

In terms of the notion of science previously outlined, we can list the following basic mistakes in this professedly introductory text:

1. There is an arbitrariness both in the conception of logic itself and in the procedure of developing its subject matter. That is, from the initial definition that is merely asserted, to the nature of the process to be considered (or not to be considered). This act of

(2) Ibid P.6.
definition merely instantiates identity by fiat and entails the complete denial of reflection as a conditioning process. (We shall argue that identity is not something given - but that the proposition already embodies both identity and difference. And, that it is not intelligible if it is taken as a result or identity).

2. It presupposes the intelligibility of its initial categories, i.e. the separation of certainty from truth; the separation of process from result; the separation of method from content; and the separation of identity from difference.

3. It begins with the result - the completed process - without any justification for doing so.

4. There is a complete lack of system (3) (in the Hegelian sense).

To take another example, from a viewpoint more in sympathy with the Hegelian perspective, Bradley in his Principles of Logic(4) begins immediately with judgement, baldly stating that it is impossible

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(3) What Hegel said about this logic still remains true. "In the present state of logic, one can scarcely recognise even a trace of scientific method. It has roughly the form of an empirical science". Science of Logic P.52.

(4) F.H. Bradley: The Principles of Logic.
before we begin logic to know where to begin. Secondly, he admits that his arrangement is arbitrary. Yet, if it has been shown how it is possible to delineate the logical sphere, the difficulty of the beginning will at least have a possibility of solution instead of being ruled out by fiat. And we can certainly question a science that points out its own arbitrariness as though it were some kind of merit.

Again, Bosanquet in his Logic, shows a basically confused point of view. On the one hand he argues "... that there is no more reason in asking what evolution of thought we are studying than in asking what laws of motion are studied by mechanical science .... It is no more necessary to specify in what particular cases you find knowledge than to specify in what particular cases you find motion". (5)

This view fails to recognize that while the laws of motion are not themselves motions, the laws of thought are themselves thought, that is - they are thoughts for a form of knowledge. Thus we see the reduction of speculative science to empirical science. The reduction of logic to just another science that is in need of a principle which it itself cannot provide. Again this view fails to offer a point of view from which the reader can judge or assess (or even understand) the meaning and truth of what is being said. A host of concepts are brought in (from where?) and then it is asserted (by what right, and from what point of view?) that 'such and such' is the case or 'that so and so obtains'. One bare

assertion is as good as another. Bosanquet repudiates the notion of requiring the necessity of the determinations he makes - he sees this as being superfluous. (6) But to merely claim that this demand is superfluous is not to refute the argument for its need.

On the other hand, Bosanquet does recognize the notion of development as being vital to his whole logic. His logic is based on the conception that "... judgement develops in accordance with its proper interests and purpose", (7) giving the idea of a germ unfolding differences as a way of indicating what he means by development. But the notion of development would seem to contain the notion of necessity which, it is claimed, is irrelevant. This seems to be a major difficulty for Bosanquet.

We may also note here that Husserl is not concerned with how naive or scientific experience arises, but with the completed product itself, with the result. His concern is over what content it must have to be objectively valid. (8)

It is evident from this very brief consideration, that these philosophers are not particularly concerned with meeting the demands set down for logic to be properly scientific, hence it is not surprising

(6) On this point see Hegel: Science of Logic P.613. (Also see Preface to second edition of this work).
(7) B. Bosanquet: op. cit. P.22.
(8) Husserl: Logical Investigations P.207.
that such ambiguities are revealed at their point of embarking into the domain of the logical. Secondly, it is clear that logic is not considered by everyone to be a homogeneous domain. For example, it appears that there is one logic for the science of the process of reasoning, while there is another for the science of reasoning. Is there a beginning to logic which is not arbitrary, but which is of necessity the only beginning, and if so why is it that so few philosophers appear to agree with it? Is there one logic or many logics, and if the latter, what is their relation?
HOW SHOULD LOGIC BEGIN?

3.2

Hegel's arguments concerning science aimed at establishing the necessity of providing a description of the process whereby consciousness moves from its initial naive state to the level of science (or logic), as a prerequisite to any further investigations. It was only in this way that the philosopher could avoid irrationality. If this procedure is not followed, certain consequences follow.

First, given any proffered starting point, presupposition or definition of the science, there will be no undeniable reason why we should begin with it, contained in it. If an attempt is made to provide a definition of logic, such as Copi's, there is no way we can provide a proof of it, other than by showing "... the necessity of its emergence in consciousness" (9) a procedure Copi, (as well as the other philosophers we have considered here) rejects. Secondly, the definition will never be completely acceptable to everyone, hence there will be revisions, qualifications, even alternative starting points suggested. Any decision on which definition is to be accepted can only be made in an arbitrary manner. As Hegel remarks, "In this method of beginning a science with its definition, no mention is made of the need to demonstrate the necessity of its subject-matter and therefore of the science itself". (10) And

(9) Hegel: Science of Logic P. 49.
(10) Ibid. P. 49.
such a definition - through the act of definition - would merely attempt to fix concepts, notions, substances, etc. in an arbitrary manner without the possibility of comprehending its own act being open to it.

How then does Hegel begin his Logic? The beginning is made with pure being a beginning which presupposes pure knowledge, (11) which latter has its justification in the Phenomenology of Mind. It is knowledge that no longer contains the opposition of the subjective and objective standpoints - no longer deals with a thinking about something which exists independently as a base for our thinking, nor apart from it, nor with forms that merely offer themselves as distinguishing marks for truth. This, as we have seen, would not be a truly scientific procedure.

Hegel claims that the Phenomenology of Mind has demonstrated that pure knowing is the "... Ultimate absolute truth of consciousness". (12) In logic we deal only with pure knowing, in the total extent of its development - we operate at the level of the Concept, and in a sense recapitulate on the development in the Phenomenology, except

(11) A point that is often ignored by those discussing Hegel. A good example of this is provided by J Veitch in the dithyrambic essay included in his Method, Meditations and Selections from the Principles of Descartes. In effect he reiterates the criticisms of Trendelenburg - failing totally to see the point of view of the Hegelian Logic; and the criticisms that Hegel makes of the logic that Veitch subscribes to. (Esp. see PP.CXV - CXXIII).

(12) Science of Logic P. 68.
that now the development is comprehended in purely conceptual terms. (13)

What then is this Concept that has reconciled Being and Thought - that has transcended the limitations of experience?

Hegel says of the Concept that it is charged with negativity, which, as has previously been mentioned, means that the Concept is the unity of Being and Thought - or, to say the same, is the unity of identity and difference. Being such a unity, it is self-developing. It is 'the simple life pulse'. (14)

Secondly, Hegel sees the Concept as bringing content back into logic. Traditional logic is seen to rest its forms of correct reasoning on the laws of identity and contradiction. But this is just the difference, it is not correctness of the knowledge of the fact that is required in logic - but truth. That is, traditional logic ("dogmatic logic" (15)) is seen by Hegel as being concerned with the correctness of our judgements - i.e. with the rationality and consistency of our knowledge. But it is not concerned with truth in the sense of the subject and predicate of a judgement standing "... to each other in the relation of reality and concept". (16) Sarlemijn highlights the significance of Hegel's distinction between correctness and truth as follows: "An inference can well be correct without having any correspondence to reality; in this case, the premises do not agree with reality. It is precisely in this opposition between correctness

(13) The Logic presupposes the Phenomenology "... which contains and demonstrates the necessity, and so the truth of the standpoint occupied by pure knowing and of its mediations" Science of Logic P.69.

(14) Ibid P.37
(15) Encyclopedia 'Logic' P.304
(16) Ibid, P.305.
and truth that formal logic differs from dialectical. An argument is 'correct' when it obeys the rules of formal logic, and thus complies with the requirement of non-contradiction. Thoughts are 'true, when they correspond to their object .... The requirements which hold for the knowledge of non-contradictory, motionless, and ideal laws and determinations are not necessarily the principles of reality in motion. Dialectical logic, therefore, will not have violated the formal-logical principle of non-contradiction when it shows that ideal being is not in accordance with its content and is present in real, limited objects in a limited and contradictory way - ideal being as such being unlimited and universal." ".... it is formal logic alone which provides the rules of correct knowledge. Yet it analyzes merely rules, and not ontological laws .... Formal logic makes possible a correct argument .... the form of movement inherent in reality belongs to ontology."(17) Thus formal logic is limited, it does not discuss the question of ontological truth, it is therefore unable to relate its ideal determinations to the reality it inadequately presents. (It is the concept as uniting the opposition of subjective and objective that constitutes truth.) (18) We shall consider this question further when discussing the relation of formal logic to dialectical logic. See below, also see part II, § 3.4).

Now, on the Hegelian view, the concept of a thing is not a form of an actuality separated from it - it is not the mind's reception of sensations. It is not the being of essence nor the essence of being. It is the coincidence of both. (19) To lay down that identity is the

(17) A. Sarlemijn, op. cit. p. 92-3. (Also see C. Taylor, op. cit. p. 317-8)
(18) Hegel also elaborates on this distinction in Hegel's Philosophy of Subjective Spirit Vol. III, p. 75-77 (and P. 225-7).
(19) On this point see Phenomenology of Mind p. 115.
form in which thought is to be rendered is to erect into a law a point
of view which Hegel amongst others has shown to be basically inadequate
to its content. For identity only expresses one half of the truth,
of the Concept - it makes process impossible. So it might be added,
does difference express only half the truth, and it by itself would
make unity impossible. Hegel puts the point thus: "Identity, there¬
fore .... is also the determination of identity as against non¬
identity". (20) To express identity is already to express more than
identity, for in the process of stating such an identity (i.e. A = A),
the immediacy of A has become mediated by the reflective process
involved here. The determination of identity is only possible (as
we shall show) within a temporal context and as against its negation. (21)

The Concept cannot, thirdly, be treated as the predicate of a subject,
for this would reduce it to a form attached to a content; it would
simply re-introduce the opposition of subjective and objective, without
allowing any solution to such an opposition. (22) The Concept is not
then a separate, static, finite being, nor a vague indefinable dia¬
phanous vapour. It is the concrete, the actual, in the sense that it
is the objective, the true and the active. All concepts issue out of
the Concept through the activity of the Concept. The negativity each
concept embodies - its necessary interrelation with and sublation in
other concepts - leads to the elaboration of a self-contained structure
of concepts, this being Totality conceptually comprehended - the
Absolutes' self-comprehension. Each concept necessarily implicates

(20) Science of Logic P.413. (On this point see also PP.409 - 416).
(21) See the discussion of this point by M. Kosok: The formaliza¬
tion of Hegel's Dialectical Logic. P.610.
(22) Cf. Part II. § 2.1 above, for explication of Hegel's term
'Concept'.
others. As Baillie points out in his introduction, "... any one category involves all the others, and can be clearly interpreted only in the light of the entire system. Each mirrors the whole system in itself, and the whole system can be said to be the unfolding of "the concept" par excellence". (23)

It must be emphasised that Hegel's view of logic is that of a science concerned with the (absolute) objectivity of knowledge. His logic is objective in that it presents the self-development of concepts, that is, it is solely a conceptual comprehension. And for Hegel, objective existence is concrete existence, that is - logical existence. Hegel puts it as follows:

"The concrete shape of the content is resolved by its own inherent process into a simple determinate quality. Thereby it is raised to logical form, and its being and essence coincide; its concrete existence is merely this process that takes place, and is eo ipso logical existence." (24)

Hegel's disagreement with 'the logic of the understanding' and with Kant's transcendental logic can be developed as follows. In so far as the understanding has not reached a speculative point of view it is infected by various inadequacies that make it impossible for it to comprehend the absolute or the Concept. It separates the infinite from the finite, the real from the ideal, the universal from the particular, and the abstract from the concrete. "Logic is usually said to

(23) Phenomenology of Mind. Introduction p.35.
be concerned with forms only and to derive the material for them from elsewhere. But this 'only', which assumes that the logical thoughts are nothing in comparison with the rest of the contents, is not the word to use about forms which are the absolutely-real ground or everything. Everything else rather is an 'only' compared with these thoughts.\(\text{(25)}\) What logic should be doing is examining "... the forms of thought touching their capability to hold truth."\(\text{(26)}\)

The logic of the understanding is concerned with the formal content of our thought and not with the whole content. Secondly, its sole concern is with the finite, and the relationship of finite to finite.\(\text{(27)}\)

Thirdly such a logic is concerned with the correctness of the rules governing this content, and not with the adequate knowledge of the whole (i.e. with truth). Again, this logic cannot be properly scientific, in that it is unable to demonstrate the necessity of the concepts contained in its basic statements and laws. (We shall return to these points shortly).

On Kant's transcendental logic Hegel expressed himself as follows:

"What has here been called objective logic would correspond in part to what with him (Kant) is transcendental logic. He distinguishes it from what he calls general logic in this way, (a) that it treats of the notions which refer \textit{apriori} to objects, and consequently does not abstract from the whole \textit{content} of objective cognition, or, in other

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\(\text{(26)}\) Hegel. Little Logic p.52.

\(\text{(27)}\) "Aristotle is thus the originator of the logic of the understanding; its forms only concern the relationship of finite finite, and in them the truth cannot be grasped." Hegel (quoted by Sarlemijn op. cit. p.94).
words, it contains the rules of the pure thinking of an object, and (b) at the same time it treats of the origin of our cognition so far as this cognition cannot be ascribed to the objects .... His chief thought is to vindicate the categories for self-consciousness as the subjective ego." (28)

Now Hegel's disagreements with this procedure are as follows. First, it is not the subjective ego, but the absolute subject (i.e. Spirit) that is the true vindicator of form. Thus Hegel says that Kant's form of cognition (the subjective ego) ".... has still to be relieved of the finite determinateness in which it is ego, or consciousness." (29) Kant was unable to resolve the opposition between subject and object, he was a subjective idealist. Unable to resolve this opposition entailed that he was unable to achieve the objective rationality of all encompassing Spirit. Hegel claims to have achieved this latter point of view.

Secondly, Hegel says that the result of the Kantian philosophy was ".... that Reason cannot acquire knowledge of any true content or subject matter and in regard to absolute truth must be directed by faith." (30) That is, Kant held that knowledge could not be gained of the unconditioned (noumena), of things as they are in themselves. Hegel, on the contrary held to no such transcendent. For Hegel, all reality is scientifically knowable, all concepts are distinguishable

but inseparable developments of the absolute. It is the absolute that resolves the opposition of subject and object. "The subject whose moments of thought constitute things is the absolute whole and not the human cognitive faculty." (31)

How then does Hegel develop his Logic? The beginning is made with pure being. Why? Hegel's analysis of the beginning, given in the Introduction to his Science of Logic explains why. He presupposes pure knowing - that is - purely conceptual knowledge. Now given the level of thought, the Concept, the beginning must be made with that which is first in the process of thought - (of the all-encompassing activity of the absolute thought). What is first for thought is thought itself without distinction, and as this absolute thinking is the only real object for Hegel it must, prior to its self-becoming be but pure being. Thought, as pure knowing is a self-developing, self-forming negativity. For Hegel, any other beginning for logic would involve more determinate concepts which would presuppose (at least) pure knowing as their ground. As in the Phenomenology, we have just simple immediacy present, but this time we are at the scientific level, having resolved the one-sided and contradictory standpoint intrinsic to spatio-temporal experience. We are in the domain of the Concept, whose first form is pure being. Let us consider this beginning in more detail.

The beginning must be an absolute and it must be without presupposing anything, hence it must also be groundless and free from mediation -

(31) A. Sarlemijn op. cit. p.108. He continues: "It is the endeavour to synthesize and sublate rationalism and Kantianism which causes Hegel to call his metaphysics a logic. It is the science which 'sublates' both traditional metaphysics and transcendental logic."
it must be pure and simple immediacy. It must be undeveloped in the sense that it possesses no determinations with respect to anything else, nor within itself; it is the undifferentiated whole. The beginning then can only be pure being and the Science of Logic will reveal the reason why such an abstract beginning is the only true beginning.

But any consideration at all of this beginning reveals that though there must be pure being and nothing else, "Yet there is nothing and there is to become something. The beginning is not pure nothing, but a nothing from which something is to proceed .... The beginning, therefore, contains both, being and nothing, is the unity of being and nothing, or is non-being which is at the same time being, and being which is at the same time non-being". (32)

Hegel, in asserting that the beginning is made with pure being is in fact saying that such pure being is without determination, it is free of determination, free of being a being - it is then no different from not-being. But it is also at the same time absolutely different from not being for it is pure thought. Hence it is not not-being nor yet pure being - for it is just the beginning, i.e. becoming. Consistent with this Hegel says that one can in fact omit this consideration of being and not-being, and consider only the notion of beginning as such, that is, the beginning of pure thought. Such a procedure would reveal two subordinate aspects - the two that Hegel has delineated, for the beginning is a beginning. It is not nothing nor yet something.

(32) Science of Logic P.73.
This notion of beginning is not that where we begin with some already determinate brute given that is then imbued with motion, or is capable of being further developed. Hegel is really trying to show that his system has no beginning in this sense. For a beginning is only an attempt by a form of knowledge to specify the substance of reality that is due to be grasped. But truly understood, i.e. from no finite form of knowledge but from absolute knowledge, the beginning is a false notion. Hegel repeatedly claims that his science is circular, and a circle has neither beginning nor end.

"The essential requirement for the science of logic is not so much that the beginning be a pure immediacy but rather that the whole of the science be within itself a circle in which the first is also the last and the last the first". (33)

The Science of Logic will reveal the completeness and circularity of knowledge when it has completed its description. But prior to this development - where pure knowing is present in its nakedness, such a revelation is impossible. Therefore Hegel attempts to present for thought the conceptual presuppositions of concepts themselves, beginning with the first concept, that of beginning - with pure thought itself. Pure thought is then, a beginning or becoming, and as such is a unity of pure being and nothing.

From the standpoint of Absolute knowledge we could say that this analysis of the beginning of the Science of Logic, which reveals the

(33) Science of Logic P.71. On this point see A. Sarlemijn Hegel's Dialectic P.42.
notion of the unity of being and nothing, again expresses the char-
acter of all concepts (the unity of thought and being) and hence a
restlessness - one can conceptually comprehend this restlessness,
this negativity in the beginning. It points to something else, it
is a 'non-being' on the way to being; it drives pure knowing on and
the more it seeks to comprehend these concepts the more the structure
develops. It is, as McGilvary has pointed out - begreifendes Denken -
that is '.... grasping clutching thought, thought that grips its
object as its own inalienable possession'. (34)

Hegel gives as the first, purest, most abstract definition of the
beginning, the identity of identity and non-identity. This definition
is obviously in radical disharmony with the law of identity held by
traditional logic.

However, before considering the relation between the law of identity
and what might be termed the law of non-identity (i.e. the identity
of identity and non-identity), it is appropriate to give precise
expression to Hegel's particular dissatisfaction with the proposition,
for on this viewpoint turns much of the misunderstanding concerning
such things as the nature of the beginning in Hegel's Logic. Hegel
himself says that the proposition "the unity of being and nothing"
is, taken by itself, a false expression of the whole true result.
For unity tends to suggest that we compare two different things and,
finding them the same pronounce upon their unity. The unity is then
seemingly completely unrelated to the two objects being compared -

(34) McGilvary 'The Presupposition Question in Hegel's Logic',
Philosophical Review 1897 Vol. 6, P.502.
it is something that we supply. The "unrest of incompatibles", the "movement" involved in this union is not given expression in this proposition. The unity seems conferred by an external reflection.

Earlier, Hegel expressed his dissatisfaction with the propositional form by saying that it was contradictory in itself, that it was "a mere empty form". Here again he says the following:

"..... the proposition in the form of judgement is not suited to express speculative truths." (37)

In judgement only the identical aspect is taken into account. For example, when we say 'the crow is black' we consider the subject in abstraction from the other determinations that are possible, and from the fact that the predicate - a universal - does not apply solely to crows. But speculative thought demands comprehension; that is, both the identical and the non-identical aspects. In a word it demands that the manifold relationships that the subject sustains be included as essential in the consideration of the subject. Without this latter, the nature of the subject could not be known, and we would be left with the mere form of a subject, that is, a subject without determination, a 'subjectless' subject - an inconceivable. But the fact that the subject is a crow already means that the subject has

(36) Phenomenology of Mind. P.124. (Also see the previous section on Science above).
(37) Hegel: Science of Logic, P.90.
been determined and is also in the process of being further determined. The subject is then nothing more than the unity of past predicates - and a developing unity. As Gadamer points out, "We do not take up something new or different in the predicate, for in thinking the predicate, we are actually penetrating into that which the subject is. The subjectum taken as a firm foundation is abandoned, since thought does not think something else in the predicate but rather rediscovers the subject itself." (38)

If we consider this judgement as it is usually conceived, the subject is separated from the predicate which latter is just one of many possible determinations one can attribute - in external fashion - to a form of a subject which lies beyond it. As we have noted earlier, in such a conception 'the form of necessity fails to get its due'.

Hegel argues that an individual in abstraction from the whole which individuates it is unintelligible - unreal. We operate within a unity of discourse - a developing unity. Yet taking an individual in abstraction is just what the judgement taken in its non-speculative sense does - a subject or individual is determined through a predicate (a universal), but only the identical aspect (in our example, the blackness) is taken into account in the judgement simpliciter. 'The crow' and 'black' are co-extensive as expressed, yet at the same time they cannot be so, for black is a universal and the crow a particular. (39)

(38) H.G. Gadamer. Hegel's Dialectic P.18. The subject is just another example of the class of concepts, viz. that they are "... the unity of the state of being differentiated and of being undifferentiated". Science of Logic P.74.
(39) On this point see Hegel: Science of Logic P.627.
It might be argued here that the distinction between the 'is' of predication and the 'is' of existence is blurred by Hegel, allowing the above point to be made. But this is to miss the point that at the conceptual level, the level of comprehension, the copula does not conjoin the two moments (subject and predicate) in either an existential or a predicative manner. For the conceptual level has transcended such a distinction - a concept, any concept is at this level spirit in a particular determination. It is the unity of identity and non-identity which is expressed through the speculative content of the judgement. As Gadamer puts it,

"Properly speaking the philosophical statement is no longer a statement at all. Nothing is posited in it which is supposed to remain, for the "is" or copula of the statement has an entirely different function here. It does not state the being of something using something else, but rather describes the movement in which thought passes over from the subject into the predicate in order to find there the firm ground which it has lost". (40)

The bare judgement by itself, unless it represents a development of a unity - the subject - fails to make sense. (41) Hegel would thus say that each successive judgement sublates the preceding one in the sense that the form of each judgement is negated yet retained as a further expansion of the Whole. If we remain exclusively

(40) H.G. Gadamer, Op. Cit. P.18. We would argue that what Gadamer holds to be the nature of the philosophical statement applies in fact to all statements properly considered, due to the nature of the reflective process itself. Cf. note 96 Page 201.

within the domain of identity, nothing can be said, for it is just the difference that judgement expresses - i.e. 'the crow is black', and likewise the sublation of this difference in a unity, a more determinate unity. Similarly if we remain within pure difference nothing can be said, for no point of contact, no judgement can be formed. The judgement thus has to express both identity and difference in its unity, that is, both the relating to and distinguishing from aspects of an identity. What is expressed by the collapse of the judgement is the unrest of the Whole (of pure being and nothing) - the judgement itself does not express this. Hence the unity of being and nothing is likewise a disunity, a becoming.

Becoming is the Whole true result of the consideration of the beginning; it is a movement, an unrest. The difference between pure being and nothing leads to a development in which both being and nothing become other than they are, they receive a more adequate expression, they become more determined - they become more concrete.

This beginning is for Hegel abstract for it is undetermined and immediate. Nothing more can be said about it, as any further statement determines it. This point of view is again in complete opposition to the empiricists 'immediates' which are seen as the concrete from which we abstract. The empiricists immediate is similarly something about which nothing can be said - but this

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(42) We can say that becoming is both being and nothing (negatively) yet neither positively, at the same time - they are inseparable yet distinct. And all philosophical concepts are examples of this unity. On this see M. Kosok. The Formalization of Hegel's Dialectical Logic P.609.
is because it is unknowable. The concrete is here the in-itself, transcendent of experience - unreachable. Hegel, on the contrary has no such transcendent. (43)

But before giving a more precise expression to the notion of dialectic, we can perhaps pause to take account of criticism made in connection with this mode of beginning logic. We shall concern ourselves solely with the criticisms advanced by Trendelenburg as it was he who was largely responsible for the reaction against the Hegelian Logic. (44)

In his article "On The Logical Question in Hegel's System" (45) Trendelenburg advances the following three basic criticisms of Hegel's beginning of his Logic. Firstly, the logic presupposes more than pure thought. It also presupposes the concept of local motion. Thus Hegel assumes movement. Secondly, pure being and nothing are not mutually "intus-suscepted" or interpenetrating. There is a complete levelling of both. And, thirdly, it is

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(43) This important point is often missed even by commentators on Hegel. As M. Kosok has pointed out: "Findlay makes the mistake of treating the universal ("this") as an abstraction from a "concrete" sense experience which he regards as "... already well defined and definite to begin with, and that the process of universalization dilutes as it were, the original concreteness of the given. However, from Hegel's perspective, the sensuous material, as well as the subject sensing the sensuous material are both abstractions of the one concrete process of experience". The Dialectic of Consciousness in Hegel's Phenomenology of The Spirit, P.208.

(44) As G.S. Morris writes: .... "it is notorious that Trendelenburg did more to weaken the credit of the Hegelian Logic both in its "general and fundamental point of view", and in its "form", than any one among his contemporaries". Vera on Trendelenburg, Journal of Speculative Philosophy Vol. VIII, P.93.

impossible to think the identity of pure being and nothing, for nothing appears to be less than pure being.

Trendelenburg's first criticism is developed along the following lines. Hegel's logic claims to presuppose nothing but pure thought, a pure thought that is completely free from the taint of the sensuous or external element. It is by the creating from itself that the logical is developed, not by the including of sensuous intuition. Yet Trendelenburg argues that it is impossible to make one move from pure thought without covertly presupposing some sort of imaginative conception or intuition. Pure thought is thought purged of its impurities it "... lives apart from imaginative impure thought. If it does not receive from the latter its daily bread, it dies irretievably". (46) Thus what Hegel really does in the beginning is to introduce motion - not the pure activity of pure thought, which is a movement, but the "... movement of intuition, a geometrical movement which designs forms in the space of the imagination. This local motion appeared as the presupposition of the presuppositionless logic". (47) Pure activity need not necessarily lead anywhere. It could be the mere static expression of pure thought. But why should it lead to the categories elaborated in Hegel's logic - in particular to Becoming? It is according to Trendelenburg, because Hegel drags in the image of the intuitive, of movement leading somewhere that he can seemingly show that pure thought creates through itself the logical system. But, it is argued, this is an illegitimate move on Hegel's

(46) Ibid P.358.
(47) Ibid P.359. This criticism is still being made viz, F.Lombardi, "After Hegel" in New Studies in Hegel's Philosophy Ed. W.E. Steinkraus. P.224-5 (though here the criticism is merely asserted dogmatically!)
own view of science. The self-development of pure thought would no longer be a self-development. The system would be under the guidance of some other agency.

How valid is this criticism? It would appear that Trendelenburg's criticism is made from the position or point of view of a being who has not yet reached or accepted the position of Absolute Knowledge - the thinking in the form of the pure Concept. Hence he takes the conception of pure thought to be separated from any relation to experience instead of being its culmination. This point has been made by various philosophers such as G.S. Morris, A. Bullinger and H.G. Gadamer. (48) Bullinger puts the point nicely as follows:

"... Trendelenburg entirely misconceived the "freedom from presuppositions" which Hegel required in the derivation of the categories from the Immanence of pure thought. Thought which does not comprehend the absolute notion, which goes outside of all experience is aimlessly looking into mere vacancy cannot develop the categories of logic". (49) But the Concept is not outside of all experience, it is nothing else but experience fully comprehended. If we reject the Hegelian notion of identity of thought and being, then it is only self-evident that if we make a beginning with pure thought we will need to import some notions of being from foreign lands.

However, we find a difficulty with Hegel's beginning akin to the one Trendelenburg points out above, and this concerns the movement

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(49) A. Bullinger, op. cit. P.128.
from being to nothing and to becoming. It consists in this, that Hegel points out that pure being passes over into non-being or nothing, and nothing passes over into pure being. Now in what does this 'passing-over' consist? Why, for instance should there not be a perpetual passing over of pure being into nothing and vice versa without the concept of becoming even arising?

Hegel points out that when we think pure being or pure nothing we find that each 'immediately vanishes in its opposite'. There is not therefore a 'passing-over', it has already occurred. Being has passed over into nothing and vice versa. Further to this Hegel adds that we do not have a relation present. Being and Nothing do not stand in any relation, the transition from one to the other is non-relational. Secondly, being and nothing are not concepts; the first concept would appear to be becoming, a unity "... whose moments, being and nothing, are inseparable". These 'moments' are abstract, and are not self-subsistent. And thirdly, Hegel states that the distinction between pure being and nothing does not lie in either but in a third thing, namely in 'subjective opinion', though this conception does not belong in this exposition of the beginning.

The answer to the above questions would then seem to be that the result of the analysis of the beginning yields the first concept - becoming - which contains two 'moments', being and nothing as negatively present - i.e. present as negated. The transition

(50) Science of Logic. P.103 (See also pages 73 and 74)
(51) Science of Logic. P.93.
has always already taken place between being and nothing; it is the state of immediacy, the immediacy of becoming which is expressed through the immediate transition or vanishing of its two moments. But, the result qua result must be mediated (for it to be a result) - it is thus a mediated immediate. Likewise being and nothing are mediated immediates. For as expressions of reflection they are immediate in relation to mediation. (52) Now this brings up the problematic introduction of the notion of subjective opinion. It is this latter which serves as the basis for the distinction between the moment of being and the moment of nothing. The introduction of subjective opinion (or belief) (53) at this point does give an answer to the question of why thought passes from the non-relational 'vanishing' of being into nothing and nothing into being - but, it seems, at the expense of pure thought. Pure thought ceases to be a totally adequate standpoint, another (external) agency is involved.

Gadamer offers clarity on this point as follows:

"Thus if there is recourse to belief at the beginning of the Logic that is only because we are still at the level of incipient thought, or, put another way, because as long as we stay at the level of Being and Nothing as what is indeterminate, determination, i.e. thought, has not yet begun. For that reason the difference between Being and Nothing is limited to belief.

(52) The phrase 'expression of reflection' is Hegel's cf. Science of Logic P.69.
(53) The German Meinung has been rendered as subjective opinion (Miller), intention (Johnstone and Struthers) and belief (Gadamer) we have followed Miller's translation here.
Implied in this, however, is that the progression to Becoming cannot be taken as a development in dialectical determination". (54)

Gadamer argues that Hegel considers the question of how becoming arises out of these two moments to be senseless. For being and nothing are not self-subsistent, they exist solely as vanishing or as their opposite; which is becoming. This is why they are not conceptual. They are pre-conceptual and do not stand in any relation, for they are not determinations of thought. They are the emptiness that is to be filled much as light and darkness are two emptinesses which allow for visual determination. Here, "... pure seeing is a seeing of nothing. Pure light and pure darkness are two voids which are the same thing". (55) Any thing is always seen in terms of these two 'voids' much as any determination of becoming is a determination in terms of being and nothing, that is, becoming.

This answers the question of why there is not a mere static passing-over without development. Pure thought, in attempting to think pure thought i.e. pure being in its immediacy, thinks nothing. But there is thinking - the emptiness - which is these two moments.

Again Gadamer puts it succinctly as follows: "Whoever asks how movement starts in Being should admit that in raising that question he has abstracted from the movement of thought within which he finds himself raising it. But instead, he leaves this reflection aside.

(54) H.G. Gadamer op. cit. P.88
(55) Ibid P.91. (This is also what McGilvary is struggling to say in his article on "The Dialectical Method". Mind 1898 Vol. VIII, P.237).
thinking it "external reflection". Certainly in Being just as in Nothing, nothing determinate is thought .... But even if nothing other than empty intuiting or thinking is present, the movement of self-determination, that is, of Becoming, is there. (56)

Trendelenburg's first criticism and our own difficulty in conceiving of the nature of the movement in Hegel's Logic both arise when thought separates itself from being and nothing and contemplates them in this separation - i.e. thinks of them as standing in some relation. Here thought is about being and nothing, and this signals a failure in reaching the speculative level of thought. Implicit in the above criticisms is the reassertion of the propositional form as the expression of logic and of a logic of mere propositions. Hegel continually reasserts the radical difference between the point of view that takes being to be exclusive of nothing (and vice versa), and the point of view that sees being not as being but as in transition into nothing. (57) These are two fundamentally different points of view.

This brings us to Trendelenburg's second criticism. If being and nothing are constantly passing over into each other (- or have already done so) why do they not get levelled - annihilated - instead of being mutually "intus-suscepted"? If becoming is the identity of being and nothing as thought, why should these two aspects continue to move or be active? Where is the real penetration?

(56) Ibid P.91.
(57) Science of Logic, P.56, P.90.
Trendelenburg argues that in all of Hegel's most essential concepts, such as finite/infinite, freedom/necessity etc., the real inter-penetration is forced in from outside the purely logical domain. Again Hegel would reply that Trendelenburg is arguing from the logic of the understanding, where thought and being are separated. Hence being and nothing require some agent to catalyse the penetration, and of course Hegel could not logically provide such an agent given this separation. This is why it is vitally important to grasp the perspective of the Hegelian logician. The view that being and nothing cease to be active in the identity that becoming is, states only one half of the truth. For while it is true to say that in becoming being and nothing are one, it is also equally true to say that they are not identical. The statement of inactivity merely seizes on the first identity statement and forgets the statement of their non-identity - the negativity in the concept of becoming. (58)

Thirdly, Trendelenburg argues that it is impossible to think the identity of pure being and nothing, for nothing appears to be less than pure being - viz. empty being. How can two such empty abstractions complement each other so as to form the concept of becoming? Here it might be argued that it is just impossible to think of being without thinking of a being, hence the nothing would be less in terms of reality. This would, of course, again reassert the separation of thought from being, that is, the attempt to think about something (for Hegel this would be to move from the consideration of pure being to the consideration of determinate being). For Hegel thought is inclusive of its object, for Trendelenburg

(58) K. Löwith attacks this onesidedness in Trendelenburg, see From Hegel to Nietzsche, P.55.
thought is exclusive of its object. (59) All of Trendelenburg's criticisms presuppose the point of view of one who has not transcended the limitations of this inadequate posture. Hegel would say that if there is a difference between pure being and nothing, in what does it consist? For the attempt to specify any difference would be to give further determination to what is undetermined - it would be to attempt the impossible.

This criticism of Trendelenburg's is also made by other philosophers. J. Veitch (60) states, "Nothing must always be less than Being". And J-P. Sartre argues that Hegel overlooks the fact that when he says that being and nothing "are empty abstractions, and the one is as empty as the other", he forgets that emptiness is emptiness of something. Being is empty of all other determination than identity with itself, but non-being is empty of being. In a word we must recall here against Hegel that being is and that nothingness is not". (61)

It can again be argued against Sartre that he takes only one side of the transition to make his point. For when he says that being is and nothingness is not, it can equally be said that pure being is not, and nothingness is, for each is the state of transition into the other. The attempt to think pure being is the attempt to think nothing - the one passes over into the other.

(60) J Veitch op. cit. P. CXVII.
But how acceptable is the criticism that Hegel could (we claim) advance against Trendelenburg's three points? Does the argument that Trendelenburg has failed to achieve the appropriate level of thought refute the substance of his arguments - for this type of criticism is a familiar one made by Hegel against such attacks?

It would appear that Hegel is justified in making the above type of general criticism of those points of view that fail to reach the speculative level of thought. Hegel has demonstrated that his system rests on secure foundations which have been explicated in their necessity. In doing this Hegel was required through the nature of the subject matter itself to take account of all the forms of experience possible, just as, if he was interested in the phenomena of colour he would be concerned to lay bare the full spectrum. This means that all philosophical points of view are in a sense included in his explication and shown in what relation they stand to the system as a whole. The sense in which they are included is that Hegel provides the particular form or structure of knowledge which subtends the philosophical point of view under consideration. Had he not provided such an explication, then the criticism of Trendelenburg would be untouched by the Hegelian reply, and we would then require a perspective from which to view the adequacy or inadequacy of such a criticism. Science, as we have already pointed out, would demand this procedure. But Hegel does provide such an explication or description - hence he throws the onus back onto those who would wish to refute him. That is, Hegel demands that it must first be shown upon what foundations Trendelenburg's criticisms
rest and how they avoid the philosophically prior criticisms already advanced by Hegel against such foundations. (62)

This latter could be achieved in a number of ways. Firstly, by showing that the Hegelian system was incomplete and hence subsumable within a more complete system. (Thus the Marxist criticism of Hegel is that he provides the truth for self-consciousness but not for man. A complete description of Totality (or the 'Absolute') is the phenomenology of the historical process itself. It is not sufficient to confine such a description to consciousness alone - it is the whole concrete actually existing man with whom we are dealing. Marx could thus claim to have completed the one-sidedness of the Hegelian system. Hegel has given the view from the inside - how dialectical thought attempts to provide an understanding of the way in which one's own specific thought processes and the perspectives from which they operate, limit the results of one's thinking. Marx, on the other hand, could claim to have given the complete view by adding the historical perspective in showing how dialectical thought, while presupposing the Hegelian view in some ways, enables the thinker to understand his own position in society and in history - and the limits imposed on him by his own perspective, that is, his class position.) (63)

(62) As Hegel says: "But the liberation from the opposition of consciousness which the science of logic must be able to presuppose lifts the determinations of thought above this timid, incomplete standpoint and demands that they be considered not with any such limitation and reference but as they are in their own proper character, as logic, as pure reason". Science of Logic P. 51.

Secondly, one might show the shortcomings of adopting the Hegelian system by demonstrating the lack of coherence in certain Hegelian conceptions. This could be achieved by developing an alternative phenomenology - this would indicate that in Hegel the "form of necessity had failed to get its due". But unless a refutation of the Hegelian arguments already advanced is provided, these same arguments will be continually reiterated - each time the same basic mistakes are made. From this standpoint - the scientific standpoint - piecemeal criticism has no place. Criticisms must be made from a scientific perspective with all that this requires.
THE NOTION OF THE BEGINNING - FURTHER CONSIDERED

3.3

Hegel gives as the first, purest most abstract definition of the beginning of logic that it is the identity of identity and non-identity. (64) What does this mean?

Earlier on it was pointed out that pure being and nothing are not concepts, they are not therefore related in the way any conceptual determination would be to any other. They are pre-conceptual, and are what the first most basic concept - becoming presupposes. Now this situation can be viewed from two points of view. The first is the point of view of the process of transition of pure being into nothing and nothing into pure being. Neither moment can withstand the other for there is a complete lack of determination. Yet they are not the same. Hegel points out that ".... they are not the same, that they are absolutely distinct, and yet that they are unseparated and inseparable and that each immediately vanishes in its opposite." (65)

Pure being (identity) passes over into nothing (non-identity) or more correctly pure being is nothing. Now from the point of view of the process, we can express this state of affairs by saying that there exists the non-identity of identity and non-identity, meaning by this that the 'passing-over' or vanishing process requires that

(64) Science of Logic P.74
(65) Science of Logic P.83.
there should be a non-identity between pure being and nothing, (otherwise there would be no 'passing over'). But from a second point of view, the process as a whole (i.e. becoming) we regain the unity (identity) by viewing the state of transition of pure being into nothing and vice versa as the unity into which both collapse. Becoming is neither being or nothing but the "movement of the immediate vanishing of the one in the other". The Logic is the continual expansion or determination of unity (identity) - it is one process of development. From this perspective we can say that the beginning - becoming - which is a unity - is the identity of pure being (identity) and nothing (non-identity).

Both these ways of expressing the situation are the same, they merely emphasize one aspect more than another. In the first perspective, diversity or difference is emphasised - hence non-identity. In the second, unity is emphasised (the process as a whole) hence the identity of identity and non-identity. All levels in both the Phenomenology and the Encyclopedia are examples of this dual perspective. And the tension can be seen here, right in the first concept - that negativity that is embodied in all concepts in this process of development. Each unity achieved immediately expands into a diversity through the factor of negativity, which is then held in its diversity but unified at a higher - Hegel would say a more concrete - level.

This logic is not concerned only with given being - with elaborating the static separate forms of a being that has already been determined or given. It is concerned to describe the process of the
becoming of being in its completeness. At its center is the opposite of the law of identity - because it is the opposite of given being. We are dealing with something (the Concept) being given - not with given being, with process not stasis. Becoming is the being of experience, experience - the being of becoming. (66)

(66) "... experience contains identity in unity with difference" Science of Logic p.415.
IDENTITY, NON-IDENTITY AND CONTRADICTION

3.4

In the introduction it was stated that the knowledge of process is just the process of knowledge. The attempt to provide the logos of that which is being given is the attempt to grasp that which is both what it is and not what it is. That which is being given embodies both identity and non-identity - therefore it would seem to follow that the discourse that reveals this process will be in-itself affected by such a nature; it will be a perpetual transition to a more adequate (concrete) account of this process. Temporality destroys the adequacy (and therefore the satisfaction) of the present account, for knowledge is essentially process.

Hegel's point is that the Concept (the complete system of knowledge) is Time. (67) "As to Time .... this is the concept itself in the form of existence". (68)

Thus any account that holds solely to the identity of being will be an account that negates such process - negates the temporal nature of knowledge as such - it will be an atemporal account. It will be an account that takes no notice of the having got to the point of being able to provide a discourse of being in its identity. It will have to presuppose the coherence of its presupposed foundations. But to focus on given being is to focus on only one side of being - for


(68) Phenomenology of Mind, p.104.
given being is merely one aspect of the totality we seek to comprehend; the other side being the being given nature of totality itself of being in its relation to its other.

This two sidedness can be seen in the comprehension of any concept. For example the boundary or limit of a concept is at the same time both the limit for the concept and the limit for what it is not. Understanding, in holding to identity must perforce fix on the inside of the limit - the in-itself - it must stay within the limit of each concept. This is the paralysis of the process. Equally to concentrate solely upon the outside of the limit - the for itself - would be to make being totally unintelligible - discourse would be impossible. The unity of both these positions or sides gives the concept both in its being (identity) and in its nothing (non-identity) - it gives the concept in its becoming (in itself - for itself).

Perhaps a more striking example of this dual process is that of human being itself. We do not say of a living person that he is what he is up to the present and no more - this would annihilate the future for him. This would signal his death ("... identity is merely the determination of the simple immediate, of dead being; ... "). But nor do we say that this person is some ineffable substance of which we can only catch temporal glimpses. We take the person as that which develops and becomes what he has it in him to be. Thus at any temporal instant we would say that this person is of such and such a character knowing full well that this typification is being

transcended as we speak. We have the complete person when the person is no more! Thus human being is both identity (that is given being), and non-identity (the negation of this given being) in their unity. And experience is - as we have said - just the being of becoming. However we must further clarify these notions of identity and non-identity.

It has been said that Hegel's logic has the opposite of the law of identity at its core, that from the first concept onwards we find both identity and non-identity in unity in each and every concept. Prior to the first concept we have merely the state of indeterminacy - whether at the level of the Phenomenology where there is no distinction between self and other (hence no experience), or at the level of pure logic (science) where there is no difference between pure being and nothing.

However, once the attempt is made (at either level) to determine one or the other - as soon as the first reflection or determination is made (once we have an expression) we have immediately two determinations - one the negation of the other. Each needs the other (they are correlative) yet each is the negation of the other. At the phenomenological level experience begins with a first reflection - it is a process of "separation from" to "relate to" something - any relation separates and at the same time relates. Here we have Spirit manifesting itself as a subject - object process. Both subject and object have their being through the other and presuppose the ground from which they appeared. Yet both have their negation in the other.
At the level of science the first determination (concept) is immediately two sided and presupposes the ground (pure thought) from which it arises. Becoming is the identity of pure being that has passed over into nothing and vice versa. It embodies both identity and non-identity (negatively) in their unity. Thus at both levels we begin with the identity of identity and non-identity - with the unity of being and thought.

We can perhaps further develop this nature of all concepts by returning to our previous examples of memory, and to the notions of "negative presence" and "positive presence" developed by Kosok. (70) His analysis brings out the nature of this relationship - a double relationship - of identity and non-identity in their identity most clearly.

Consider a present experience. It has a particular content or meaning and a particular form - that of being the present experience. Yet no sooner is it so than it is not. It ceases to be present, it is past. Yet it is retained by us in memory. It is retained in the present as past. It is a past present, present as past - that is, it is negatively present. The positively present, i.e. the present experience requires this negative presence of the previous experience; for the present would be nothing (would have no meaning) without the past or the future. We can say that the present is the future grasped through the agency of the past. Memory is just this negative

presence which gives unity and meaning to the present - it provides
the ground. Likewise becoming is both the negative presence of pure
being and nothing but the positive presence of neither. There is
here a retention of both pure being and nothing as negated and this
is just the concept of becoming - the identity of identity and non-
identity. Now this retention of positive presence as negatively
present is no simple linear progression. We have here a continual
expansion of a unity at ever advanced levels. Hegel, in discussing
what he calls the absolute method (of the Concept) puts it as
follows: ".... at each stage of its further determination it raises
the entire mass of its preceding content, and by its dialectical
advance it not only does not lose anything or leave anything behind,
but carries along with it all it has gained, and inwardly enriches
and consolidates itself". (71)

Likewise a person's character or personality does not develop in a
mere collective fashion - it is the continual expansion of the sub-
jects perspective and the enrichment of its content through the
negation and retention of past experiences. These latter give the
meaning to the present. We thus do not have a 'set' of 'characters'
which collectively express a person's character through time - such
discreteness would be laughable. There is but a continually develop-
ing person. (As Kosok puts it: "The subject stands as the ever-
present past or "essence" ..... or field of negative presence to

(71) Science of Logic p.840. Also P.841. "The highest most concen-
trated point is the pure personality which, solely through the
absolute dialectic which is its nature, no less embraces and holds
everything within itself, because it makes itself the supremely
free - the simplicity which is the first immediacy and
universality."
which the objects appear as the ever present present of activity, and
their joint process is the ever-present future of subject-object
activity." (72)

For there to be knowledge, there must be Time. Knowledge expresses
the temporal nature of its aspects through the negativity that drives
it on. Without negativity, without the negative presence of pure
being and nothing there could be no becoming, no time and hence no
knowledge. Time then can only be "the concept itself in the form
of existence." But, if we take the Hegelian proposition of the
identity of identity and non-identity logically, how is it possible
to avoid the charge of contradiction? If identity is the same as
non-identity (or difference) then it is not different from it - so
surely we have only one conception. This point raises the general
problem of the relation between traditional logic - which is based
on the laws of identity, excluded middle and contradiction - and dia-
lectical logic, which latter is based on the 'law' of non-identity
and the development through contradiction. This point also bears
directly on the notion of foundation - of having justified one's own
point of view - both with respect to Husserl, and to any non-Hegelian
logician. It is therefore necessary to examine these notions (i.e.
of identity, difference and contradiction) in some detail.

Traditional logic rests on the law of identity, and following from
this the laws of excluded middle (or difference) and of contradiction.
The law of identity can be expressed in the following manner: that

(72) M. Kosok: The Dialectic of Consciousness in Hegel's Phenomenology
of the Spirit, p.223.
if A is anything at all, then A = A, and this relation is held to be both transitive and symmetrical. Now the problem arises of how we are to show that this law is a properly scientific production and that it does not rest on mere presupposition. For it is generally held by traditional logicians that no deductive proof of such a law can be given that does not already presuppose this law.

There are various answers to this problem, such as, that it is plain common sense that a thing is what it is and not another thing. Or again it is stated that this law is intuitively obvious - it is apodictically self-evident; it is the minimum presupposition of rational thought itself. Yet these answers fail to satisfy the Hegelian demand for a truly scientific beginning to logic. They either presuppose identity in their arguments or else ground identity in the non-discursive 'beyond'. It can immediately be replied to the above answers that experience manifests just the opposite of the law of identity (i.e. the being given nature of given being); and, if this is the case, on what basis, or from what perspective do we decide which point of view is correct? For the law would have to be placed in suspension while under investigation. Thus we look for the explication of the process of arriving at a logical point of view, of arriving at the enunciation of the law of identity. It then appears that an explication of such a type is the last thing such logicians could provide. For upon closer consideration, these three laws show themselves to be contradictory, and, from the point of view of traditional logic, unrelated. Hegel puts the point succinctly as follows:
"The several propositions which are set up as absolute laws of thought, are, therefore, more closely considered, opposed to one another, they contradict one another and mutually sublate themselves. If everything is identical with itself, then it is not different, not opposed, has no ground. Or, if it is assumed that no two things are the same, that is, everything is different from everything else, then A is not equal to A, nor is A opposed to A, and so on. The assumption of any of these propositions rules out the assumption of the others. The thoughtless consideration of them enumerates them one after the other so that there does not appear to be any relation between them." (73)

Further to this Hegel claims that there is no good reason why these "single determinations of reflection" - that is, identity, difference, and contradiction should alone be held as the absolute laws of thought. We could with equal right include all the other categories so far developed in Hegel's logic - that is, all the "determinatenesses of the sphere of being." There is thus a lack of necessity in the way such laws are developed.

Further to this, Hegel, in the above quoted passage is drawing attention to the central weakness of such determinations of reflection. (74) For when it is said that if no two things are the same then A is not equal to A, Hegel is arguing that there can be no relation between these two things at all. For there to be a relation of any sort, the two

(73) Science of Logic, P.411.

(74) In the Little Logic, Hegel points out that the weakness of such a consideration - i.e., taking identity as a category of reflection and hence abstractly - "... is the touchstone for distinguishing all bad philosophy from what alone deserves the name of philosophy." P.214.
things must differ in some respect, yet this is just what is being
denied. There can be no such relation as, for example, identity
simpliciter. For such 'pure' relations are not determinations at
all but "the absence of determination." Let us consider this weakness
in more detail.

The law of identity states the truth for mere abstract identity-
because it separates the object from the subject, and then separates
the object from its ground (or manner of existing in this world).
We are left with a formal monad. This sort of consideration
separates the object from the subject in that the reflection on
A which gives rise to the expression of identity, plays no part in
the determination of A as self-identical. As Hegel has pointed out
".... the law of identity already contains the movement of reflec-
tion ... ", (75) it is a product of reflection. Unless this reflection
is grasped as an essential moment or aspect of identity, the
latter collapses into the abstract - and we get the violation of the
law whenever it is asserted. (This latter point will be considered
in more detail shortly).

Secondly, if focuses on A in its being as abstracted from all relation
to the Whole (or world). It thus becomes a static timeless being -
It is A merely "in-itself" in exclusion from A "for itself". But by
such an abstraction it fails to determine A at all. A as self-
identical is still indeterminate. (76) It cannot be said of A in

(75) Science of Logic p.416.
(76) Ibid. p.413.
what its identity consists because identity here excludes difference. This is why Hegel says that this sort of identity can have no ground - for it is not opposed to anything. Identity, as determinate is the opposite of this because it has negated its own identity. The process of being determined is just the process of cancelling abstract identity - indeterminate identity - through difference. \( A = A \), as the expression of identity is held to be a tautology, and to be contentless - yet it has difference at its center. For the proposition sets out to determine \( A \), and determination is difference. Hence in attempting to determine \( A \) as self-identical, \( A \) must stand out against itself to be so related. Hegel says that "Such identical talk therefore contradicts itself. Identity, instead of being in its own self truth and absolute truth, is consequently the very opposite; instead of being the unmoved simple, it is the passage beyond itself into the dissolution of itself." (77) Therefore what the assertion of identity states is much more than, and wholly different from the abstract identity - the "In-itselfness" in exclusion from relation - as held by the traditional view of this law. The propositional form itself destroys the simple \( A \) in its passage beyond \( A \) to determine \( A \) as self-identical - reflection has entered, there is negativity in the content. The law of identity then, goes much further than the assertion of abstract identity, it asserts in fact the exact opposite. Identity is " .... the determination of identity as against non-identity" (78) - or else it is an indeterminate. We note here that McTaggart in his commentary on Hegel's Logic, completely ignores this point that Hegel stresses, viz. that

(77) Ibid p.415.
(78) Ibid p.413. We give an elaboration of this process in Section 6. The Dialectic Process).
The law of identity is contradictory in that it leads one to expect a further determination which it does not give, i.e. "A is ...." then "A is A". This is a negation of determination, a contradiction. (79)

The law of excluded middle states that anything must be either A or not A (-A). This means that A and not A are separate and can be written A ≠ -A. Now two problems immediately arise. The first is, how do we reach negation from the identity which was purely affirmative? The law of identity gave us the indeterminate A - the self-identical monad. Now this law is asserting opposition - no two things are the same - but not giving any basis upon which such an opposition or difference could be reached. The law of identity provides no basis, for, as was shown above, there is no relation - no for-itself-ness - hence difference now turns out to be a lack of difference. As Hegel points out, if everything is different then A is not equal to A, nor is A opposed to A. This can be put in another way. Negation cannot be derived from affirmation alone without collapsing the distinction between these two concepts. Difference is difference of something - negation is negation of something. The law of identity by excluding the reflective process, failed to provide such a determinate being. It provided merely indeterminate being - ultimately

(79) J. McTaggart: Commentary on Hegel's Logic, S.110, P.105. McTaggart says here that the law of Identity is a complete tautology, " .... its truth rests, not on identity in difference, but on the absence of all difference". Hegel would argue that an identity without difference is not an identity at all, it is an indeterminate. It is just this point that McTaggart fails to grasp. He goes on to say, "That A is A would surely be quite consistent with the facts that A is not B, that A and C are polar opposites, and that A and D have a Ground E". (P.106). If A = A simpliciter, then it is groundless because indeterminate.
reducible to one formal monad. Thus to be consistent the logician must posit difference as another fundamental axiom to complement the law of identity - but cannot show in a properly logical (i.e. scientific) manner the connection between the two. There is a separation between identity and difference, which because the ground of such a separation is excluded, is not seen as an opposition.

Secondly, the law of excluded middle, taken by itself, also turns out upon further consideration to be internally contradictory. In order to specify difference it is necessary to affirm the identity of the determination in which the two differ. Without providing this affirmation it is impossible to obtain determinate being. As Rosen puts it, ".... if we assert separately -A ≠ A, then no two things are the same, in which case there is no basis for them to be compared or related.

A universe of radically disjunct monads, however, provides no basis for distinguishing one from the other." (80) Again difference cannot coherently be taken in separation from identity anymore than identity can be taken in separation from difference. One of necessity involves the other, they are opposed and therefore related moments. This is why Hegel says that the assumptions of any of the propositions involved in either of the two laws rules out the assumptions of the other. Because the separation of identity from difference is laid down (together with the exclusion of the reflective process) at the beginning, we get a series of contradictions both in the laws themselves and in their relation to each other.

Hegel sees this situation collapsing through opposition into a more thoughtful consideration, where contradiction is seen as the unity of the diverse moments of identity and difference. However, we need to consider the law of contradiction as traditionally expounded before further specifying the Hegelian viewpoint.

The law of contradiction states that nothing can be both A and not A. Contradiction is impossible in the sense of something existing that has both of two contradictory qualities - or is typified by two contradictory predicates. This poses many problems.

First, how is one to conceive of this law of contradiction, for the traditional statement of it fails to show this? If one is dealing with given being in separation from reflection and from the concrete process of experience (ignoring for the minute whether this is, or is not possible), then the law of contradiction asserts correctly, but how small is its truth; that a something is characterised as being of a particular determination, or not of a particular determination, but not of both determinations. The difficulty with this "small" truth is that it reduces to nullity - for the law of contradiction merely expresses the result of the two previous laws. The laws of identity and of excluded middle were shown to stand in contradictory relation if conceived in traditional terms. The assertion of identity without difference reduced to a lack of determination as did the assertion of difference without an underlying identity. Therefore how can a law that embodies these two aspects fare any better?
Secondly, by dealing with given being, with a well formed and atemporal universe, contradiction must result in nullity - in a return to ground as Hegel says, for the only recourse upon arriving at a contradiction is to return to the pre-contradictory state of affairs in the hope of being able to provide a better account that avoids such a contradiction. This is an impossible task. To recognise the true significance of a contradiction is to move from the consideration of given being in itself to the perspective of given being being given through the reflective process itself. Hegel says in his Early Theological Writings that ".... what is a contradiction in the realm of the dead is not one in the realm of life", (81) meaning by this that contradiction is not nullity but the expression of life itself. Life is itself the refutation of such a law. Thus when Hegel says that life is "an infinitely finite, an unrestricted restrictedness" he means that life is just the process of developing through contradiction, because life grasps the contradictory moments of itself in their unity. We shall have more to say on this score in the following section on reflection. But, in proleptic fashion we can add the following. When Hegel says that everything is inherently contradictory he means that the act of positing itself reveals contradiction. Indeed ".... every determination, every concrete thing, every Concept, is essentially a unity of distinguished and distinguishable moments, which by virtue of the determinate essential difference, pass over into contradictory moments." (82)

(81) Early Theological Writings, p.261.
(82) Science of Logic, p.442.
It must here be remembered that with the unity of thought and being (the absolute point of view) every concept contains opposites in unity — each is an identity of identity and non-identity. Now, the expression of a contradiction, qua expression, is a reflection. Even simple immediacy itself is an expression of reflection. As such, every expression propounded of necessity excludes another expression that is not propounded. Reflection is driven on in an attempt to rectify this situation. (83) It seeks the adequate discourse — the Concept — which is the Whole fully conscious of itself as the Whole: it is Time. Each reflection is a temporal act seeking to grasp Totality itself — Time itself. This does not mean that reflection is involved in an impossible task (because it is a contradictory task). It is not an impossible task because reflection is not an abstract identity. Rather it is a questioning process, which by determining something in opposition to itself leads to "higher order" comment on both the determinations made and the thought position or point of view from which these were made. This is what the traditional logician fails to cognize. Unconvinced of the point of view of absolute knowledge — of the unity of being and thought — he fails to see the transition of one determination into its opposite, and hence the need for consciousness to reconcile any of its categories. Movement lies totally outwith his domain. Hegel thus reviews the antinomies and contradictory formulations these logicians provide of such categories as finite/infinite; part/whole; universal/particular; immediacy/mediacy; identity/non-identity; concrete/abstract; etc. They fail to see that the negativity in each concept or category (that is, the

(83) See Early Theological Writings, p. 312.
reflective process itself) leads any determination as a negation (or
difference) into opposition and into contradiction. Language itself
gives expression to contradiction because experience is in itself
contradictory (as was pointed out earlier). It is when contradiction
is expressed that progress is made. "Only when the manifold terms
have been driven to the point of contradiction do they become active
and lively towards one another, receiving in contradiction the
negativity which is the indwelling pulsation of self-movement and
spontaneous activity."(84) The expression of contradiction effects
the transition to a point of view that is able to reconcile such
contradiction, through a more adequate (i.e. complete) discourse.
Bosanquet puts the point nicely when he says that contradiction is
".... an unsuccessful or obstructed Notion: Notion a successful or
frictionless contradiction."(85) Contradiction does not reduce
to nullity because the negation of a determination is itself part
of the totality we seek to comprehend. Contradiction is 'aufgehoben',
that is, negated yet retained as negated - it is negatively present.
There is then no abiding contradiction in the Hegelian Science - due
to this notion of negative presence.

Identity and non-identity are thus negatively present (but positively
absent) in every concept - they are distinguishable but inseparable
moments. And any particular concept is insufficient to the task of
comprehending Totality or the Whole due to this negative presence.
This insufficiency generates for thought the movement to completion -
to the complete discourse. Negativity in contradistinction to

(84) Science of Logic, P.442.
(85) B. Bosanquet. The Principle of Individuality and Value, P.232.
nothing provides this vitality, this activity leading somewhere. Nothing - nullity - terminates discourse. But contradiction properly understood does not lead to nullity because reflection is embodied in, not excluded from the result. This is to say that contradiction is not final. Kojève puts this point as follows: "Negativity differs from Nothingness in that it is inserted into Totality." (86)

In the consideration of these three laws of thought it is evident that there is at least one fundamental fault. They presuppose a point of view that has not transcended the opposition of thought and thing. The laws thus bare contradictory relations to each other, they are unscientifically developed, and they are contradictory in themselves. There is a collapse of identity into non-identity and vice versa; there is a collapse of negativity into nothingness; there is a collapse of determination into indeterminacy. There is a failure to show in scientific fashion the necessity of such 'laws'. Hegel rightly stresses this point time and again. No vital study of logic can be made until one is convinced of the point of view of absolute knowledge. The Hegelian logician does not take thought as exclusive of thing - as being a merely mediating activity taking place between the self in separation from the world of things - he sees thought as inclusive of thing, and thing as inclusive of thought. Thought is this 'begreifendes Denken' that 'grips its object as its own inalienable possession", and it does so through the process of experience. (87)

(86) A. Kojève. Op. Cit. p.234. In terms of the earlier example concerning memory the same point can be made. Negation giving nothingness would be equivalent to a total loss of memory! On this see M. Kosok. The Formalization of Hegel's Dialectical Logic, p.605.

It is thus possible to provide the following contrast. Traditional logic is dualistic, Hegel’s logic is monistic (though not a monism by reducing one aspect to the other - difference does not vanish here). Traditional logic is concerned with given being in abstraction from the thought process, of being in exclusion from negativity - Hegel’s logic is concerned with the being given nature of Totality. From the former perspective it is not surprising that such propositions as "the identity of identity and non-identity" appear incomprehensible.

We need to now return to experience and clarify the process whereby thought is able to grasp its object in its truth. It is therefore necessary to examine the dialectical process that is experience.
EXPERIENCE

3.5

"Consciousness knows and comprehends nothing but what falls within its experience". (88) All knowledge is a product of experience - to be known is to be experienced. Against Husserl (and Kant) all knowledge begins with experience and also arises from experience. (89)

There are no transcendent forms waiting outside experience, to make it intelligible when it comes on the scene. There are not for Hegel two types of experience; real experience - where, the subject receives sensations, and an ideal experience of the apriori ideal forms or logical forms separate from this real experience, by which such real experience is to be moulded. Before experience, there is for Spirit as consciousness nothing, for no determination has yet been made. There is then no subject, no object, no consciousness, no knowledge, no ideas, no discourse, no form, no content, no meaning, no reflection and no language for consciousness. There is but indeterminacy or lack of any form of relationship. Hegel later typifies this stage of spirit prior to experience as that of "soul or natural spirit", as immediate or implicit spirit. (90)

Still experience does begin and there are things known. How? Experience begins with this immediacy becoming mediated. It is an act in which a subject - consciousness - "... distinguishes from itself something, to which at the same time it relates itself ...

(88) Phenomenology of Mind p.96

(89) See Baillie "everything falls within experience and experience contains all reality and even the appearance of reality" Phenomenology of Mind p.44.

(90) Hegel's Philosophy of Subjective Spirit. Vol.1 p.79.
there is something for consciousness". (91) Just as in perception it is not until one looks at something that there is a "looker" and a "looked at" - that there is perception, likewise it is not until this distinguishing from and relating to activity that there is a subject and an object - that there is experience. But why does this act occur, why does experience begin?

The act occurs due to the nature of the Whole, Spirit, or the Absolute. It is this nature that is set forth in the phenomenological description of experience. It is therefore impossible to provide an account of this discourse without eo ipso providing the complete discourse. The description of the nature of the Whole cannot be anticipated nor intuitively presupposed. Temporality cannot be collapsed into the present so that the question concerning the nature of the Whole can be answered. To do so would be to make process incomprehensible.

The question itself presupposes the completion of certain experiences so that the meaning of the question is conveyed, i.e. that the question is taken as a question. It also presupposes the completion of the discursive elaboration of the Whole for its answer.

We could, in proleptic fashion say that it is the factor of negativity that generates the Whole, but then the question would again recur, only this time it would turn on the nature of negativity. It would be a process of attempting to ground conceptions, and show their meanings, a process which would in the end result in the elaboration

(91) *Phenomenology of Mind* P.139.
of the complete discourse. Knowledge must be patient - there are no quick and easy-roads to truth. It must first be shown what is involved in each and all possible forms of experience before such questions can be answered. We need to know what is meant by such terms as truth, knowledge, consciousness, experience etc. These terms presupposes a significance which has yet to be achieved.

In Part I it was argued that Husserl fails to provide an adequate account of the meaning of such terms because he fails to show how they arose in the first place. It is unclear what Husserl meant by the term experience both because he failed to provide a systematic elaboration of this concept before he employed it; and, also, because he changed his view as to what constituted experience as his philosophy developed. That is - from a somewhat Kantian conception in his early works to the conception of pre-predicative experience (given expression in such works as Experience and Judgement) later on. Science demands that the necessity of the conceptions be demonstrated, that the understanding of the nature of the above terms is shown to be based on a coherent, true and necessary point of view.

To return to Hegel's account of experience - it is when the immediacy becomes mediated by consciousness distinguishing from itself, its 'other', that experience begins. So from this immediacy or 'feeling soul' or 'pure ego' which is a unity we get division - the subject - object complex. We could perhaps express the same thing by saying that Spirit, (the Absolute, or Time) becomes other to itself by presenting itself in time, as appearing - as a series of shapes of itself. Hegel says that consciousness is the immediate existence
of Spirit - immediate in that it does not know itself but is also presented with the necessity of coming to know itself as Spirit as its end. Thus Spirit (a unity) presents itself in a subject (consciousness) - object complex (in difference); that is, as experience which culminates in Spirit knowing itself through its experience, (as a unity in difference - a difference in unity). This is a self-generating process.

The moment of consciousness appears as the moment of separation into the distinction between consciousness and object. This separation is effected by Spirit as consciousness. "In consciousness there is one element for an other." (92) Consciousness distinguishes itself by distinguishing the other and this other is for consciousness an immediate. Now consciousness is, according to Hegel "... on the one hand, consciousness of the object, on the other, consciousness of itself; consciousness of what to it is true; and consciousness of its knowledge of that truth. Since both are for the same consciousness it is itself their comparison." (93)

It is through the nature of consciousness that both truth and knowledge are compared. Previously when it was said that "consciousness distinguishes from itself something to which at the same time it relates itself" Hegel was showing that through this activity both truth and knowledge of truth are present and related. When consciousness distinguishes from itself, it posits an object as over

(92) Ibid p.140 Hegel calls this mode of Spirit "Spirit in relationship or particularization" Hegel's Philosophy of Subjective Spirit Vol.1 p.79.

This is contrasted with spirit as immediate or natural. In this work this anthropological development comes before and is the presupposition for the phenomenological development. This raises the question as to the relationship of the Phenomenology of Spirit to the entire system, a question which seems to have no definite answer.

(93) Phenomenology of Mind p.141.
against itself, i.e. as external to it, as in itself. But to distinguish from is ipso facto to relate to, otherwise there could not be any basis for distinction. Hence consciousness also posits an object as for it, as related to it. Consciousness is thus complex. Consciousness is always consciousness of an object but this consciousness has the above two sides. And consciousness compares itself in its distinguishing activity with itself in its relating activity. Consciousness examines itself, 'it is itself their comparison'.

Hegel says with perfect consistency that consciousness compares its consciousness of what for it is true, i.e. the object in itself, with its consciousness of its knowledge of that truth, i.e. as related to it. It compares its truth with its certainty. It is this comparison that characterises experience. And if the knowledge of the object does not correspond with what consciousness takes the object to be in itself, consciousness "... seems bound to alter its knowledge in order to make it fit the object. But in the alteration of the knowledge the object itself also, in point of fact is altered; .... with change in the knowledge the object also becomes different since it belonged essentially to this knowledge." Any change in the 'distinguishing from' aspect is a change in the 'relating to' aspect. Consciousness is always a consciousness of something and something is always something for consciousness. Analyzing one brings the other into view - they are mutually mediating. Thus as Hyppolite points out "The theory of knowledge is at the same time a theory of the object of knowledge." (94)

Experience is then the process - the dialectical process - of consciousness examining itself; examining both its knowledge of the object and the object of this knowledge by the standard or criterion of the consciousness in question. The standard - immanent in consciousness - implies conditions that both moments of the experience of consciousness need to fulfil. Each successive collapse of the form of knowledge due to the contradiction between the object as consciousness knows it, and the object as it is in itself, gives rise to a new form of knowledge in which the previous experience is now the object - the experience of the object becomes the object of experience. There is a continual attempt made by consciousness to construe the object as providing the objectivity of knowledge. This however transposes itself in the activity of consciousness - objectivity moves from the side of the object to the side of the subject. Or to put the matter differently, consciousness finds itself in its object and its object in itself. Consciousness thus finds the situation as follows: "What at first appeared as object is reduced, when it passes into consciousness, to what knowledge takes it to be, and the implicit nature, the real in itself becomes what this entity, per se is for consciousness: this latter is the new object, whereupon there appears also a new mode or embodiment of consciousness of which the essence is something other than that of the preceding mode. It is this circumstance which carries forward the whole succession of the modes or attitudes of consciousness in their own necessity". (95)

Experience has its necessity, it is Spirit or the Whole on the way to the knowledge of itself through its various necessarily interconnected appearances. The description of this process is the phenomenology of Spirit.

(95) Phenomenology of Mind p.144.
Hegel's Phenomenology is the description of consciousness's transformation from naive to scientific consciousness (Reason). As such it is the description of a dialectic process. This description is presented in two ways. Firstly, it is presented to us, to the philosophical consciousness observing the experience that consciousness is immersed in. Here Hegel specifies the contradiction lying in the object of consciousness as well as the contradiction lying in the consciousness of this object. We are here able to see the contradictory knowledge that emerges from this mode of experience and see its resolution into a more adequate mode. Secondly, Hegel describes the dialectic from the point of view of the consciousness under consideration - that is how it is able to grasp the experience it is involved in so that it is led to change its understanding of its object.

These two presentations differ since the significance of each particular form of knowledge can only be adequately grasped, i.e. grasped in its necessity - grasped scientifically - from the point of view of the Whole or Absolute Knowledge. So the full significance of the contradictory state of affairs that consciousness is involved in at any particular level of knowledge, will not be known to that consciousness. We see the development of the object of consciousness and correlatively the consciousness of the object as arising out of the preceding relationship through the negation of
that mode of knowledge whereas the consciousness immersed in the experience claims to have discovered a new object. This 'new' object is for us the experience of the previous experience, such that the knowledge of the first object becomes our second object. The new object is in truth .... "the experience concerning that first object." (96) We seek now to elaborate on the way this new object arises (- the "dialectic process which consciousness executes on itself.").

To make a start we need remind ourselves that throughout the description of naive consciousness'education to the level of science there is only one content involved - that is, the Whole, Spirit, in its various presentations. The process is a continual determination of this content, which by determining it, develops it. As we have said consciousness is the immediate existence of Spirit (or the Whole) and is as such the beginning of such a determination, because consciousness is not merely separated off from a reality (or object) but both consciousness of an object and consciousness of itself. It is Spirit that is " .... the self-supporting absolutely real ultimate being. All the previous modes of consciousness are abstractions from it. They are constituted by the fact that Spirit analyses itself, distinguishes its moments, and halts at each individual mode in turn. The isolation of such moments presupposes spirit itself, and requires spirit for its subsistence, in other words, this isolation of modes only exists within spirit, which is existence." (97)

(96) Ibid P.143
(97) Ibid P.459
Spirit is then the ground out of which experience arises and to which it returns. It is the one content of the whole phenomenology. We thus find the criticisms of Hegel, (98) to the effect that he has merely reduced being to the thought about being, as being unfounded. Spirit is not mind. Spirit is the all of which at a particular level of experience mind becomes present as an integral aspect. Hegel's Spirit is monistic - a unity, but a unity of opposites. Idealism and realism equally miss this point. Spirit is the ground out of which these distinctions arise it is not the particular philosophical expression of one form of experience. And, because it is negativity - an unrest - it develops its content (through the development of experience). It is the going beyond itself through expansion to recover itself.

Now Hegel says of consciousness that it "... is to itself its own concept". (99) That is, consciousness is to itself its own appearance or posit. Consciousness is then both itself and also outside itself, attempting to comprehend itself - to examine itself. To do this consciousness must be other than merely self-identical. It must be the unity of identity and difference and it is this through experience. (100) Consciousness is thus complex - ontologically complex.

Consciousness examines itself in the sense that each experience it has

(98) This is the general Marxist argument against Hegel.
(100) Hegel Science of Logic P.415, "... experience contains identity in unity with difference". (See also our previous section on Identity and Non-identity).
becomes an object for consciousness' next experience. As has been said, the new object that consciousness considers is "the experience concerning that first object". And that experience - any experience - is but the process of consciousness examining both the object of its knowledge and the knowledge of its object. Hegel's point is that this examining is an expansion of a unity but which continues to be a unity none the less. We can perhaps consider Kosok's attempt to clarify this point as his description of the process of experience brings out this peculiar character of the type of relation that occurs in experience, and also highlights how this illustrates the difference between the dialectical and traditional logics.

We said earlier that reflection is embodied in every expression, even in the expression of immediacy itself. What does this mean?

It means that there is no such thing as an immediacy that stands apart from consciousness and which is capable of affecting it. For to reflect on anything is to mediate it. Reflection is the setting of an object for a subject, in which the object is an object for a subject and the subject is a subject through its process of revealing or reflecting on its object. This is to say that in any reflective process there is a mutual mediation of each through the other. To say that there is an immediate - some kind of brute given or simple - is also to say that it is a mediated immediate, that it is only a given for a subject. And it is also to say that such a state of affairs is contradictory - for either it is immediate and thus not mediated or it is mediate. So what can such a mediate immediate be?
Suppose we call such a postulated immediacy A. Then to determine it as A is to go beyond the initial state of affairs. It is to assert that A is present in the field of consciousness, or that A is not present. "Thus the very act of affirming an immediacy, asserting or announcing a given, or recognizing what is present, is to set up the condition for its negation, since to affirm is to reflect, and allow for the possibility of negation. That which is initially given can be referred to positively as that which is present (called "positive presence") and negatively as that which is lacking (called "negative presence" since the given makes itself evident as a lack)". (101)

The immediacy as such, cannot be comprehended. For to be so would be to presuppose an already existent universe of discourse (i.e. an accepted set of ideas etc.), it would be to already have had some experience. (102) Reflection thus introduces through its own activity a development of the initial unity. Kosok puts the point succinctly as follows:

"Thus reflection on an original indeterminate element A quantifies this element into two determinate modes: itself (its-self) and its-other functioning as alternatives and in this state defines a reflected universe of discourse/A/. Assertion and negation (i.e. (A) and (-A)) are hence functions of reflection. It should be mentioned however, that both A and -A, pure immediacy of the given, and pure negation, are pre-reflected in nature even though -A

(101) M. Kosok: The Formalization of Hegel's Dialectical Logic p.598.
(102) See M. Kosok: The Dialectic of Consciousness in Hegel's Phenomenology of the Spirit, p. 252-3.
appears as the gap in the process of reflection. This means that the first reflected state reveals two component elements prior to itself: the given and the transition from the given (A and -A). Thus the state of immediacy in its prereflected mode cannot be looked upon as a static state void of negation, for this would not allow for the process of reflection to arise and yield the reflected state as its result." (103)

Reflection therefore transforms A into the assertion of A, (A), which then implies the assertion of the negation of A, (-A). Reflection transforms a pre-formal, pre-reflected, pre-positive or negative content A into a determined A. The act of reflection is that which transforms A, producing the assertive or determinate quality of A. Kosok sees such an act as issuing in a new unity A' as determined by consciousness (i.e. within a context of mediation). This new unity is expressed as (A) \(\leftrightarrow\) (-A), and this new unity can then be taken as the object of a further reflection (as we have previously stated, the experience of the object becomes the object of experience). But this further reflection transforms the new object through the act of reflection itself and resets it within a further context of mediation - a new universe of discourse. The process is thus ontological as well as dialectical. We have a meta level transformation - and this is the nature of reflection, to always involve higher order comment on an experiential form previously existing. (104)

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(103) Ibid p.120-121.
(104) Ibid p.120-121.
(the original immediacy (unity)) in an ever expanding universe of discourse such that the one content is continually re-establishing its own unity through the distinguishing action of reflection.

Let us further explicate this process. Reflection begins with an unreflected content, the initial immediacy A. To reflect on A is to reset A in a context, i.e. in relation to consciousness. The assertion of A is accomplished through a context which is the negation of A. A is determined as A over against or as limited by what it is not.

Therefore both the assertion of A and the negation of A are required - they are correlative, they are mutually mediating. This process then has the following characteristics: it has one content A; it has two forms, assertion (A) and negation (-A); it has three phases; the reflection on A produces the assertion of what is, i.e. (A), the assertion of A implies negation (-A), and this negation implies assertion such that both are correlative - what Kosok calls self-negation (A) ↔ (-A), \(^{(105)}\) or A'. In this result both (A) and (-A) have been negated, yet retained as negated, as moments in a more determined unity. Both are negatively present in A'.

This expression (A) ↔ (-A) is called the principle of Non-Identity. It expressed the fact that the result contains both (A) and (-A) as negatively present but positively absent. If A is presented both as (A) and (-A) than a contradiction exists. But if A is presented as A' where both (A) and (-A) are not present as such but are in the

state of passing over into their opposite then no violation of the law of contradiction occurs. (106) A then expresses the immediate A mediating itself into two contrary moments, neither of which can stand in separation from its other.

It is in this formulation of the principle of Non-identity that the difference between traditional logic and dialectical logic can be precisely delineated. In traditional logic the determination of A as self-identical does not involve any context of mediation, there is thus no transformation of the content A. It is essentially an atemporal account. A has been already fixed by definition and is not influenced by any contextual modification or reflective process. But as has been shown in the earlier consideration of the law of identity, it is not possible to understand such a law. For any attempt to do so is ipso facto to reflect on A in its identity, and this transforms the law of identity into its opposite. As Kosok remarks, "The law of identity is not false: it is simply empty since "A is A" is not definable within a temporal context .... it operates within a system in which the ambiguity of definition is eliminated by fiat. Thus every element is well-formed in-itself, and is not influenced by contextual relatedness." (107)

Non-identity expressed the other side of the question. To specify A as self-identical is, we have seen, to have specified A as A


(107) Ibid, p.611.
insofar as it is not not A. That is, A cannot be defined as self-identical in a temporal logic without at the same time defining it as non-identical. Identity could only be expressed through a complete and consistent discourse where all content had been given. But if this has not been achieved then we have the process of the content being determined through the reflective process, a process which of necessity produces continually higher order unities through meta-level analysis. The expression \((A) \iff (-A)\) indicates the incompleteness of the determination of A, and is then capable of being further reflected upon such that this specification of A is transformed and expressed in a more adequate manner - more adequate because more of the content has been determined or made explicit. This development is, further, a one way temporal process. It follows that if reflection transforms the content of the object reflected upon, then it is impossible to ever return to the position prior to reflection. This "non-conservative" nature of the temporal development in dialectical logic is due to the inseparability of content from its context of mediation. "Thus negations are "non-conservative", since an attempted return or repetition from the initial A to not A and back to the initial A by means of a double negation retains within its representing structure the activity of movement that has generated the A which appears as a result of negation: one cannot return unmodified to the original state." \(^{(108)}\)

In traditional logic, \(-A\) can be replaced by A, because A is abstract

\(^{(108)}\) Ibid p.605.
and separate from the reflective process. Dialectical logic is unable to treat double negation as affirmation because (A) and (-A) are not logical contradictions due to the way (A) and (-A) are related, i.e. \((A) \leftrightarrow (-A)\). Thus by negating the result of the first reflection on the immediacy A we obtain -(A) and -(A). In traditional logic this would amount to holding -(A) and (A) - a contradiction. But dialectical logic holds that neither -(A) nor -(A) can be positively present - they are negatively present in the one result \((A) \leftrightarrow (-A)\), i.e. A'. And -(A) cannot be replaced by A due to the transformative quality of the reflective process and the inseparability of -(A) from -(A). That is, to express such a negation is to take the result of the first reflection and proceed to make a second reflection. Hence the impossibility of referring to -(A) in the original universe of discourse. In a temporal and irreversible dialectical logic -(A) cannot be replaced by (A). (109) This later move could only be made in a completed system where all had been given, in a finite universe of discourse where all had been determined. But the essence of the reflective process is just the opposite of this - there is an expanding and developing universe of discourse - a temporal and ontological development. We are thus never in the position of being able to apply the logic of any atemporal non-ontological symmetrical system.

Memory presents a good example of the negative presence of a content.

(109) See Kosok: The Dialectic of Consciousness in Hegel's Phenomenology of the Spirit p.108 f. (Also on this point see A. Sarlemijn, Hegels Dialectic p.84f).
Suppose we negated the memory by reconsidering or attempting to experience that experience as if for the first time. Such a procedure would never amount to the positive presence of the experience itself. It would instead be a transformation or development of the original content (or experience). For the context - the memory structure - is that through which immediate experiences are given meaning. One could perhaps argue that a loss of memory would allow for previous experiences to be had again "as for the first time", but one could then query as to whether the person was the same person; and, secondly, even if we accepted that he was the same person one could still maintain that the loss itself would be such as to condition the experience - it could never be relived in its originality. (110) Repetition must always involve a transformation of what is experienced. The experienced is not isolable from the context - the structures of meaning - that subtend it. Consciousness implicates itself in its experience - it cannot stand apart from its object.

Hegel's notion of aufheben is the expression of this negative presence. In terms of the above example it could be said that the memory is the past experience that has been overcome in the sense of being one-sided or separate from the abiding context. It is overcome or annulled but it is retained as incorporated into the context or frame of reference of the individual concerned such that it together

(110) As G. Mure puts it: "The least reflection on human experience at once develops it and at the same time reveals that its inherent nature is to develop actively from level to level. And this reflection resolutely pursued is philosophy." A Study of Hegels Logic, p.355.
with the other memories that it is now in a unity with serve to mediate the current experience. By such an incorporation the memory is preserved at a superior level of knowledge.

In Hegel's Phenomenology, the process that consciousness undergoes is this continual expansion and development of its reality through the sublation of each form of experience as incapable of achieving the truth, it is cancelled but also preserved as a dialectical moment at a higher level.

Again in the explication of the beginning of logic previously considered, pure being and nothing were seen as having already passed over into the other such that they were sublated in the concept of becoming. Becoming is a more adequate way of expressing the identity of identity and non-identity at this particular level, i.e. the level of pure being and nothing. Kosok puts the point as follows: "Thus the "synthesis" concept of Becoming for Hegel is that "which is not either Being (affirmation) or Nothing (negation)"; but rather the indeterminate state of transition between that which is and is not: becoming is defined in terms of that which it is not". Becoming is both Being and Nothing negatively but neither positively - it is dialectical.

Traditional logic is then unable to cope with this "restlessness" in each and any concept - it is therefore unable to know the truth.

It specifies the correctness of inferences not the truth of the whole. As Sarlemijn puts it: "The requirements which hold for the knowledge of non-contradictory, motionless and ideal laws and determinations are not necessarily the principle of reality in motion." (112) Because traditional logic is based upon the laws previously adumbrated it is not able to elucidate the true knowledge of the Whole. It is also unable to give a scientific account of these laws. Dialectical logic is able to provide a scientific account of our knowledge of the Whole as it is not confined by the same laws. (113)

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(113) "Aristotle is thus the originator of the logic of the understanding; its forms only concern the relationship of finite to finite, and in them the truth cannot be grasped." Hegel (as quoted in Sarlemijn Op. Cit. p.94).
THE DIALECT PROCESS AND FORMALIZATION

3.7

We have developed the notion of a dialectic process in part through a consideration of Kosok's formalization of Hegel's dialectical logic. However there are certain difficulties associated with the attempt at formalization that need to be clearly stated.

Hegel would see formalization as an operation of the understanding, the latter adopting a form of knowledge that is essentially inadequate to the task of comprehending the true (i.e. the Absolute). (114) To formalize is to abstract from the process of self-externalization of the Absolute - to attempt to render the form of this process according to the static formal elements of the intellect (understanding). As Hegel puts it: "This whole analytic approach lacks the basic consciousness that the purely formal appearance of the Absolute is contradiction. Such consciousness can only come into being where speculation takes its point of departure in Reason..." (115) The 'purely formal appearance' is a subjective appearance that lacks unity (synthesis). (116) The terms of this appearance stand in an external relation to each other. Now, given this characterization of the limitations of formalizing thought, how far or to what extent does

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(114) On this see Hegel. The Difference between Fichte's and Schelling's System of Philosophy p.103 footnote 25. The difference between the way the Intellect and Reason understand such formulas as A = A.


(116) Ibid p.177 "Since the analytical way of philosophying rests on absolute opposition, it is bound to overlook the philosophical (i.e. speculative) aspect of philosophy precisely because the latter aims at absolute synthesis."
Kosok's attempt at formalization fail to these criticisms?

Kosok gives the following characterizations of the Absolute. He claims that "... the Absolute is the very process of this continual transformation and redefinition, and does not appear at any particular stage as such, expressing rather the principle of Non-Identity that to be is to become, and becoming is the foundation of being." (117) He also puts it as follows: "... the Absolute is the very process of meta-level transition." (118) The principle of Non-Identity is, as we have seen, (A)⇔(-A). This formula is the Absolute, which generates a dialectical matrix (according to the recursive formula (R) A = A^n + 1), this being the self-externalization of the Absolute.

Now the following problems arise. On Hegel's view above, we would expect the Absolute as formalized to be presented as a set of formal items standing in external relations. It would seem that the synthesis itself (the Absolute as unity) is not given expression in this formula. The synthesis is 'invisible'. This is not surprising if we are attempting to represent the Absolute through finite formal structures. This is the source of the difficulty that has led some philosophers to argue that it is not possible to formalize the non-formalizable, and that it is useless to try. (119)

(117) Kosok M. Formalization of Hegel's Dialectical Logic, p.625
(119) H. P. Kainz argues the former, op. cit. p.52 Also Rosen S. Hegel p.88 'There is no form which corresponds to the synthetic act itself'. H. S. Harris argues the latter, Philosophy and Phenomenological Research Vol.XXVIII Jan. 1978 No.4 p.578.
Further to this, one can argue that the formal presentation leaves out the intuitive synthesis of the formal items (A) and (-A) and the formal relation between them (↔). Thus the Absolute is not presented through the formal presentation but through the intuitive aspect that Kosok provides through his non-formal presentation. Kosok does indeed claim that his formalization is special in the sense that it does not leave out content (120), and that it is useful in that it reveals levels of structural relationship generated by the activity of conscious reflection. (121) But it is difficult to accept such arguments solely in terms of the formal structure he develops.

The "expanding matrix of terms" generated by the reflective activity inherent in the principle of non-identity is seen by Kosok as culminating in the return to the pure subject (spirit). That is, he argues that the seemingly open and infinitely developing expansion through reflection - which process would appear to be linear - returns to the pure subject - at the limit stage. But is not this latter a merely external arbitrary and inadequate conception, for it is hard to see how such a mathematical notion could determine the complete self-externalization of Spirit (or the Absolute)?

(120) Kosok M. The Dialectic of Consciousness in Hesel's Phenomenology of Spirit p.83.


(122) Kosok M. The Dialectic of Consciousness in Hegel's Phenomenology of Spirit p.364 (my emphasis)
The notion of a limit makes sense for mathematical cases but it seems hard to grasp what meaning such a term could have in relation to a process that Hegel claims is logical and ontological.

Two further difficulties arise in this connection. Firstly, how can a formal procedure capture the ontological and transformative nature of the dialectic process when formalizing thought by its very nature excludes the ontological aspect? Secondly, and following from the above, in what way can such formal presentation include what Rosen calls "the pulsation-process" (123) of the Absolute?

In considering Kosok's account of the dialectic process, it was seen that he saw reflection as being a reflection on an unreflected immediacy A, setting A in a context of mediation that is given in the form outlined in the previous section. Now what is it that effects such a reflection - what generates the development from A to A' On Kosok's formal account it seems difficult to answer this for the unity of Spirit which presents itself to itself through self-externalization does not seem to be capable of formalization. Kosok does say that the initial state of immediacy cannot be viewed as 'a static state void of negation' for this would not allow for the process to begin. But the positive nature of such a state - the dynamic element - seems conferred upon this process by an external agent viz. Kosok's own intuitive presentation of this process. This point can also be put in the following manner. For Hegel, the dialectic process of experience is the temporal externalization of Spirit, which qua finite and therefore contradictory, becomes negated as the true

(123) S. Rosen, G. W. F. Hegel p.132. It is the "moving spirit", which is (as Hegel expresses it in the Preface to the Phenomenology p.96-7) "... the dissimilarity which obtains in consciousness between the ego and the substance constituting its object," that we claim Kosok does not (and cannot) include in his formal presentation.
presentation of Spirit but retained as a moment of a more determinate self-presentation of Spirit. The unity is Spirit - the negativity of the process.

Kosok's formulation insofar as it splits the unity of Spirit into the content (A) and the form of its presentation (i.e. assertion () ) seems to loose this dynamism of Spirit as negativity, for to formalize it is to present it, i.e. it is to externalize and hence negate the pure negative activity per se. (124)

But Kosok's attempt at formalization is useful in that given the above limitations, we claim it does present an alternative possible structure to the formal items of assertion, negation and double negation that allows for a structure - an expanding formal matrix - to be developed. This formal presentation attempts to show how an ever expanding richness of determination can arise. That it does in fact arise is due to the non-formal elements of Kosok's presentation. We claim that it is only because Kosok attempts to fuse his intuitive presentation of the formal matrix with the formal presentation of the matrix that such formalization can be seen as a process - and that it can be intelligible. To the extent that Kosok fails to see this dual nature of his procedure to that extent does he fail to present the structure as alive - as a self-movement. The purely formal presentation fails to include the "pulsation-process" that is the sine qua non of the dialectic process itself. (125)

(124) As Hegel says, it would be but "a paralysed form" of the "essentially negative activity" Phenomenology of Mind p.104.
To complete this justification of an acceptable point of view we need to specify in what sense we use the term truth. Following this we will be in a position to reconsider Husserl's point of view.

In the discussion of Science, we made the following points concerning truth. Firstly, truth is the known Concept. Truth is only possible as the self-development of concepts (culminating in the complete system of concepts - the Concept). This truth is then the Absolute Truth. Secondly, each particular level or form of knowledge has its own truth, but a truth that is one-sided and is transformed into a more adequate truth. Does this mean that the earlier truth was in fact a falsity masquerading as such? This question assumes that the universe of discourse for both levels remains the same such that a Yes/no answer can be given to the question. But as has been shown above, the transformation from a form of knowledge to a more adequate one is a transformation of experience - an ontological transformation. Thus the negativity embodied in the prior form of knowledge - in the expression of what for consciousness was the truth leads to the sublation of that form of knowledge. And due to the nature of consciousness truth does not reside in either the object external to consciousness, nor in a consciousness external to the object, but in the complete conceptual comprehension of experience.
As consciousness is always consciousness of an object and objects are always objects for consciousness, and as consciousness is not an identity - a yes/no answer fails to provide a true answer to this question. As experience is the dialectic process of consciousness attempting to grasp the truth, experience will illustrate the change in the criterion of truth along with the transformation of the form of knowledge itself.

Thirdly, because each concept embodies negativity, it also must be inadequate to express truth because negativity is what drives consciousness on - it is the immanent truth seeking its expression through a more adequate, integrated and interrelated reflection. Negativity thus signals incompleteness and hence untruth, though this negativity and this untruth are continually providing the system - are bringing the truth into existence. The sublation of a particular form of knowledge is both a denial (i.e. negation) of that form of knowledge but a negation the elements of which are held as negatively present in the higher level achieved. This is why Hegel says that "true reality is merely the process of reinstating self-identity," .... we reachieve a unity of experience by developing the previous experience.

We can note here that this view of truth contrasts sharply with other philosophical theories of truth. On the above view, any separation of subject and object, of thought and being makes the achievement of truth an impossibility. For example the correspondence theory of truth asserts that a proposition is true if it corresponds to a fact or state of affairs, that is, if there is an identity between
reality and the proposition that gives it expression. (126)

Here reality is something that we attempt to express - it is external to us, separated from us. Thus comes the paradox that to know that the state of affairs or reality, stand in a relation of identity to the proposition that gives it expression is to know what cannot be known for we merely produce another proposition which seeks to achieve what a proposition by its very nature cannot achieve. If reality is external to us it is external to us and notions such as correspondence and reflection loose their meaning. Again we have previously commented upon the proposition as being an inadequate means of expressing the truth.

In Part I Husserl's view of the nature of truth as presented in the Prolegomena was examined. It was seen that Husserl made a complete separation between the real and the ideal - science that concerned themselves with the former could not also investigate the latter - that is, the realm of pure law, of general truths.

But together with this separation Husserl also claimed that there was a relationship between the two realms. Truth, as "... an experience of primal givenness" was the way something ideal could be experienced in a real act. (127) Further to this he states that "One must clearly

(126) This is a very general specification of the correspondence theory, which does not do justice to the variety of manners in which it has been presented. My purpose in making the general point against this theory hopefully makes the specification of each variety of its expression unnecessary.

(127) See Part I Section 10
grasp what the ideal is, both intrinsically and in its relation to
the real, how this ideal stands to the real, how it can be immanent
in it and so come to knowledge." (128) To be able to clearly grasp
this Husserl states that we must first clarify what is understood
by the concepts of inner evidence and truth. (129)

In following this intention we will begin by looking at the way
Husserl develops his concept of truth (in the Prolegomena) in relation
to the things such truths express, and also in relation to the con-
cept of inner evidence. (130)

Husserl makes a distinction between two interconnections that are
intrinsic to scientific thought. There is on the one hand ... "an
interconnection of the things to which our thought experiences are
intentionally directed", and on the other "... an interconnection of
truths, in which this unity of things comes to count objectively as
being what it is." (131) Now both these interconnections are given
to us in an apriori and inseparable manner, and further to this
Husserl adds that the interconnection of things is "truly in" the
interconnection of truths. (132)

(128) L. I. p.193 (my emphasis)
(129) Ibid p.194
(130) We recognise that Husserl developed his views concerning truth
and evidence in L.I.VI, and in all his latter works i.e., Ideas
Cartesian Meditations and Formal and Transcendental Logic. We
are here only concerned with the Prolegomena.
(131) Ibid p.225
(132) Ibid p.226
This creates the following problem. How can the realm of truth qua ideal unity be separate from the realm of things and at the same time be immanent in the latter, while the latter is "truly in" the former? This would appear to be the source of the ambiguity that A. De Waelhens accuses Husserl of being guilty. (133)

This ambiguity can be spelled out as follows. On the one hand it would appear that the realm of truth is independent of the realm of things. Truth is a purely ideal object, it is not temporally conditioned. (134) A thing however is a real empirical phenomenon, and is temporally conditioned. A thing becomes truly present insofar as it is grasped in a scientific manner; it becomes objective by being presented in an evident judgement. Science, as an "ideal interconnection of truths" is composed of self-evident judgements. Each such judgement has a truth as its content.

It would seem to follow that a thing is objectively known only insofar as it is the content of an evident judgement qua evident, that is, insofar as it is ideal. L. Dupré puts this point neatly as follows: "The eternal kingdom of truths is made up of pure logical relations. It seems to be autonomous, and its sole criterion is the internal coherence of logical relations. The order of things receives its entire objective value from the order of truth" .... "It would seem, then, that one might


(134) L.I. p.110
summarize Husserl's position by asserting that the world of truths rules the world of things, without being ruled by it."

(135)

The "world of truth" - of pure laws - does admit of a transformation (a "mode of use" (136)), and it is in such a transformation that truth becomes related to evidence. Husserl puts it as follows: "The pure laws of logic say absolutely nothing about inner evidence or its conditions. We can show, we hold, that they only achieve this relation through a process of application or transformation, the same sort of process, in fact, through which every purely conceptual law permits application to a generally conceived realm of empirical cases. The propositions about inner evidence which arise in this manner keep their apriori character, and the conditions of inner evidence that they assert bear no trace of the psychological or the real. They are purely conceptual propositions, transformable, as in every like case, into statements about ideal incompatibilities or possibilities." (137)

All the propositions of pure logic are for Husserl, insofar as they are true, also capable of being grasped with inner evidence. Truth and inner evidence are for Husserl equivalent, but they do not state the same thing.


(136) L.I. p.157 (Also see L.I. p.174 where Husserl explains how ideal laws can, by a normative transformation acquire a methodological significance.)

(137) Ibid p.189.
A proposition of the form 'A is true' makes no reference to any individual's subjectivity or real natural condition - it is the logical objective aspect that is being expressed. To say that it is possible to judge A to be true in an inwardly evident manner is to focus on the subjective (noetic) aspect. This latter subjective aspect is not (as we have seen in Part I) a psychological natural feeling of the truth of the proposition A, it is the "... ideal conditions whose roots lie in the form of subjectivity itself." (138)

It is difficult to see what the exact difference is between the truth of a proposition A and the evidential nature of the same proposition. For though evident is often used as a synonym for true, Husserl is not using evident in this sense. Rather evidence is the experience of the idea of truth. Patzig puts this point clearly as follows: "Rather we have here a sort of cross-connection between truth and evidence, namely through the assertion that an evident judgement as such is the actual experience of the idea of truth and qua such an experience it is a particular case of that which is experienced in it, therefore of the idea of 'truth'." (139)

The difficulty with this relationship is that if truth is an ideal unity, the experience of this ideal unity as the object of a self-evident judgement does not give as the reality that is being truly

(138) L.I. p.136.
presented. This point can be developed if we return to the inter-relationship of things, truths and evidence. If truth gives us the objective unity of things, and evidence gives us the *experience* of the objective unity of things, then the latter must be subjective in that the experience of the objective unity of things need not necessarily be congruent with the *actual* unity of things. Truth, if it is used in the sense of the agreement between the sense of a judgement and the existing state of affairs, and not as a synonym for correctness *(140)*, would seem to entail the exclusion of the real from the realm of truth, it being the *phenomenal* that is under consideration. We are here in agreement with both Dupre' and Patzig. Dupre' puts it as follows, "It would seem to me that both the logical relations (the kingdom of truth) and the 'things' (in the Husserlian sense) are ideal elements of pure consciousness." *(141)*

*(140)* L.I. p.184 footnote: "The concept of correctness is correlative with that of truth"...

"The logical predicates True and False, taken in their proper sense, only concern propositions in the sense of the ideal meanings of assertions."

*(141)* L. Dupre' op. cit. p.348-9. G. Patzig puts it as follows: Husserl and his followers "...did not see that evidence presupposes experienced truth, that experienced truth as little guarantees actual truth as experienced movement is the same as actual movement." op. cit. p.194 On this point also see Levin D. M. Reason and Evidence in Husserl's Phenomenology p.47.
It would appear that if Husserl is to render his conception of truth and evidence in a consistent and systematic fashion he will have to adopt an idealist position. However this latter would have the demerit of failing to provide a satisfactory ground for the understanding of the relationship between the ideal and the real. For the real would cease to denote the independent world and would instead stand for the world as constituted by us in our acts of consciousness. We shall have more to say on this point in part III.

Husserl's attempt at relating truth to self-evidence, and his explication of the notion of truth (as specified in the prolegomena, do not appear to be satisfactory. If this is correct it implies that the relation of real to ideal will not be satisfactorily explained. For it seems that on Husserl's account truth remains on the ideal side unable to unify with the reality it is in fact 'giving'. It would seem that if self-evidence and truth are separate, there is needed some tertium quid that will facilitate the connection, and this would seem to involve insuperable problems. One could argue that there is no real difference between truth and self-evidence but then the problem of the

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(142) D. Hemmendinger claims that it is striking that Husserl in fact "... never gave a systematic treatment of evidence, considering its importance to him." Husserl's Concepts of Evidence and Truth. Monist Vol.59 No.1 1975 p.85. But as against this, it would certainly appear to be the case that in the Formal and Transcendental Logic Husserl explicitly studies systematically the different forms of evidence that give the different types of objectivities. On this latter question see S. Bachelard, A Study of Husserl's Formal and Transcendental Logic p.101 f.

(143) In this connection we note the peculiar way in which Husserl characterizes "the formations with which logic is concerned." He says that "... they float obscurely between subjectivity and Objectivity." Formal and Transcendental Logic p.81-2.
relation of ideal to real would remain unresolved. Certainly in that Husserl places the real outside the ideal and outside the experience of the real he must reduce the real to the phenomenally real. That is, truth remains within the subject and experience provides the evidence of its ideality. The object or thing then seems to remain as an unknown (and unknowable) residue - reality becomes logically incomprehensible. Husserl would appear to be assuming the Kantian point of view.

For Hegel, there is always but one content - Spirit - which is on the way to a scientific knowledge of itself - of reality - through the dialectic process previously described. As each concept contains negativity it leads to further development of this content through conceptual development. Absolute knowledge - the domain of truth - is for Hegel the rhythm of the Whole (structure of concepts). Each concept presents Spirit as consciousness with the accent and meter of its existence. And because it is the unification of thought and being, the Concept expresses the truth of both - it is logical and ontological.

Husserl's 'concept' arises out of "an ideational intuition founded on certain experiences" (L.I.252) but they are "independent of the particularity of any material of knowledge" (L.I.237). Hence truth must here be delimited to the logical and not the ontological. Also Husserl's first main objective for pure logic is to lay down the basic concepts of science in an unequivocal and unambiguous manner. An objective that destroys any development of these concepts such that truth can find a progressively more adequate expression. For the relations that hold
between such concepts are external - a relation conferred upon these concepts purely by virtue of their having the mark of inner evidence. And given that in the Logical Investigations truth is timeless for Husserl it becomes difficult to see how these truths can have any manner of participation in the here and now.

This is the problem with Husserl's critique of relativism - it is a purely logical one. When he says that relativism presupposes "the objective point to which things are relative" (L.I. 151), he fails to conceive of the possibility of the criterion of truth itself changing because consciousness and its object have developed. Truth by being timeless must lie outwith the subject as a real being. The experience of the real seems to differ toto caelo from the 'experience' of idealities. There are thus two subjects.

The point that Husserl misses is that relativism is unacceptable as he rightly insists against Sigwart (et al) from a logical point of view as no specification of 'the objective point' can be given. However, on the dialectical account 'the objective point' is immanent in experience and it is this that gains more adequate expression as experience proceeds through meta level transitions to Absolute Knowledge. It is expressly through this transformative process that the conceptual truths of various forms of knowledge can be united as the rhythm or truth of the Whole. (144) On Husserl's account any such unity is achieved by purely definitional means, and the 'unity' so achieved is

(144) "To be in its concept that which reveals and is revealed - this is, then the true shape of spirit; and moreover, this shape, its concept, is alone its very essence and its substance". Phenomenology of Mind. P.759.
not of the whole but of the ideal in separation from the real.

We need now to return to a consideration of the criticism advanced in Part I and show briefly how the justification of these has been achieved, by the development of a scientific (Hegelian) standpoint.
In Part I the following criticisms were advanced against Husserl. First, that the real was not separated from the ideal by a "never to be bridged gulf". By making such a separation Husserl makes the real external to knowledge - makes it incomprehensible. As he puts it: "No conceivable gradation could mediate between the ideal and the real". (L.I. 104). Yet on what basis does Husserl make such a separation? We argued there that Husserl merely asserts that such a point of view is the correct one without showing how it arose in the first place. He develops this point of view through a critique of psychologism which he sees as destroying the possibility of any distinction between the ideal and the real, but he makes the opposite mistake by asserting the complete separation of what are only distinguishable aspects of experience. The psychologistic view Husserl rightly criticises for relativizing truth, but his view seems to eliminate truth altogether - we are left with correctness. Let us then, develop this first criticism advanced against Husserl and see to what extent Hegel avoids it through his description of the real and the ideal.

1. The ideal and the real

It is difficult to be precise as to what Husserl actually meant by real. He does say that real refers to what is "in" consciousness
as well as to what is outside it - its distinguishing mark being that it is temporal being. "What is real (real) is the individual with all its constituents: it is something here-and-now." (L.I.351) But this can apply both to the phenomenally real and to the independently existing real. And it is on these two different concepts of real that the difficulty turns. For Husserl is a realist in the Logical Investigations to the extent that he holds there to be real independently existing things, but he also denies that these things are able to be phenomenologically investigated - this latter would be a metaphysical task. What he is concerned to investigate is the "immanent" object (or intentional object) and how it is constituted in consciousness.

There is then a sort of bracketing being performed by Husserl in the Logical Investigation, a bracketing which we claim denies just that aspect of the object that needs to be developed - the ontological or transcendent aspect. We are therefore in agreement with Th. De Boer, when he argues that "..... there is in the Logical Investigations an epoche and a disconnection of the existence of the extra-mental object. And here 'reduction' has the meaning which it is so often wrongly said to have in the first volume of the Ideas: putting within brackets the real existence of the object. Here one does indeed lose something". (1)

Indeed, in his Psychological Studies in the Elements of Logic

(published six years before the Logical Investigations) we find Husserl distinguishing between the phenomenal and the transcendent thing and arguing that it is the former that is meant when we refer to things in the world.

"First we must distinguish between the **phenomenal** thing and the **transcendent** thing. To the concept of an objective unity of parts and properties, articulated in such and such a manner and co-existing independently of our consciousness, there of course corresponds no intuition. To suppose so would be a contradiction. But this concept also has no currency in the domain of common thought .... To natural thought, that very sequence of reciprocally cohering contents (accompanied and encompassed by certain psychical acts) which we live through in the "observation of the thing from all viewpoints", under normal conditions of perception, just is the thing itself. And it alone is what is meant whenever a thing, a house, a tree or the like, is spoken of .... We can also express our view in this way: Talk of an intuition always involves a reference to some sort of representative. The question of whether intuition of **things** is possible therefore leads us back to the question about the nature of the intention of the correlative representative. If we take 'thing' in the sense of a transcendental unity, then eo ipso we rule out talk of intuition. But if we take the word in the sense of the representatives of natural consciousness - as, for example, that sense adheres to the words 'house', 'tree', and the like - then the ultimate fulfillment of those representatives lies in the continuous course of intuited contents, which is **encompassed**
by an undivided act enduring continuously the same throughout the successional variety of the contents, and which, thus is immanent in the undivided act." (2)

Thing then is reduced to phenomenal thing. Real is reduced to Reel. There are two responses that can be made to this. First, from what perspective is the distinction between phenomenal and transcendental thing made? That is, is it possible for Husserl to even make such a distinction without involving himself in contradiction? For if the phenomenal object is the real thing there seems to be no way in which we can gain access to the transcendental object, we have here an 'epistemological impasse'. This is of course the criticism that Hegel would direct at Husserl (and does direct at Kant.) (3)

Secondly, it would appear that the concern with what is immanent in our acts - the content of our acts - and the intuition of this content would lead Husserl to the idealist position. Husserl in fact clearly recognized this. He says that idealism ".... alone


(3) "The Ding an sich is still concealed behind the phenomenal object. The problem of transcendence, formulated in the question, "How can I gain access to an external world?" is evaded rather than solved." Th.D. Boer op. cit. p.326.

D.M. Levin argues that Husserl's epoche fails to engulf the perceptual object, it "... maintains its transcendental irreducibility; it stubbornly resists the Husserlian Method." Husserl's notion of self-evidence. In Pivčević (ed) Phenomenology and Philosophical Understanding p.59. (On this point in relation to Kant see J. Maier, On Hegel's critique of Kant P.75).
represents the possibility of a self-consistent theory of knowledge." (4) It would appear then that Husserl is giving expression to the ideality of reality but not to the reality of ideality.

How does Hegel employ these two concepts? For Hegel the only true reality is the Absolute, which as the Absolute is the process of presenting itself through its various "particularizations". "The Absolute Idea alone is being, imperishable life, self-knowing truth, and is all truth. It is the sole subject matter and content of philosophy. Since it contains all determinateness within it, and its essential nature is to return to itself through its self-determination or particularization, it has various shapes, and the business of philosophy is to cognize it in these." (5) Insofar as it cognizes itself in its various shapes it "embraces those shapes of real and ideal finitude ...." (6) Hegel's Science of Logic was concerned to describe the way the Absolute presented itself, in pure thoughts - in concepts. This logic is claimed to be objective, all determinations or shapes or concepts exist only in the Absolute (the concrete universal). We are not here concerned with something only in principle or as something ideal in abstraction from the real. Hegel is concerned with the content of such characterizations insofar as they are aspects of the real ideal - the Absolute. Hegel puts his point nicely when he attacks the view that the ego as intellectual intuition is the beginning of logic, ".... although the ego could

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(5) Hegel, Science of Logic p.825. Also see p.28.

(6) Ibid p.825.
in itself or in principle (an sich) be characterized as pure knowing or as intellectual intuition and asserted as the beginning, we are not concerned in the science of logic with what is present only in principle or as something inner, but rather with the determinate reality in thought of what is inner and with the determinateness possessed by such an inner in this reality." (7) The thought referred to here is pure thought - thought not burdened by the oppositions of consciousness (thanks to the Phenomenology of Mind) hence not burdened by the opposition of ideal and real. Here, in pure knowing the ideal (qua universal) subsists in reality, it is then not detached from the real particularizations of itself. It is by "abandoning" ourselves to the concepts (in this case the particular and the determinate) that we shall discover the abiding presence of the universal and the illusory presence of the universal qua the particular. Sarlemijn puts this point clearly as follows: "The content of reality is universal and ideal; what is real merely represents an accidental combination of ideal structures." (8) The "shapes of ideal and real finitude" show through their contradictory natures, the reality of the Absolute. They show this through their negation as independently existing things and their retention as moments in the process of the Absolute's externalization. (9) 

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(7) Ibid P.77.
(8) A. Sarlemijn, op. cit. p.21.
(9) "According to common conviction and practice, all determinations exist separate from one another and 'for themselves'. The Logic refutes this belief, and grinds off finitude and 'separateness from our concepts.'" Ibid P.85 (my emphases).
they are 'negatively present' in the Absolute.

Hegel's logic is therefore metaphysical and ontological as well as formal and logical. (10) It sees the finite forms of the understanding as essentially related to that understanding, an understanding that is contradictory. Hegel shows through his logic how all reality is rational, there is no (irrational) residue that lies outwith the domain of knowledge, and how such a logic is objective. He claims to have shown the objective nature of his logic through the detailed presentation of the world of experience in the Phenomenology of Mind. This presentation shows the unreality of the various forms of knowledge and their correlative subject and object. We get a continual return to ground - to the Absolute as the actuality which is expressing itself. The real as finite and temporal is shown by Hegel to be illusory, - what is real is the ideal - the concrete universal - the actual.

Hegel provides a solution to the relationship between ideal and real being based upon his demonstration in the Phenomenology of Mind that Spirit is the only true actuality and that it is Spirit that sets forth ".... its process of becoming Spirit." (11) The whole development is but the continual activity of Spirit collapsing each of its particular externalizations of itself, the transcending

(10) Hegel, Science of Logic p.63: "The objective logic, then takes the place rather of former metaphysics which was intended to be the scientific construction of the world in terms of thoughts alone. If we have regard to the final shape in the elaboration of this science, then it is first and immediately ontology whose place is taken by objective logic."

(11) Phenomenology of Mind, P.806.
through negation of all real-izations of itself (qua ideal-Spirit). The logic then depends for its truth on the achievement of the Phenomenology. To the extent that Hegel has shown the reality of the ideal through the dissolution of the real as specified in the dialectic process that is experience he has provided the necessity for the proposition that the Absolute alone is actual.

This leads to the second criticism advanced against Husserl, which was directed to the manner in which Husserl introduced the notions of inner evidence, experience, truth, concept and consciousness. He introduces these notions without showing their necessity, that is, how they arose in the first place. By so introducing these notions he presupposes their intelligibility, and that they can be employed to distinguish the particular spheres of knowledge that he describes. For example, Husserl uses the notion of inner evidence to separate true from false judgements yet nowhere does he satisfactorily elucidate what he means by inner evidence nor does he show how such a concept emerges for consciousness as the latter is given in a particular form of knowledge. He fails to warrant this concept necessary.

By saying that inner evidence is a 'mark' that true judgements possess - that it is a 'luminous certainly', an 'insight in the pointed sense' of the truth of a judgement - we are in no way advanced in our understanding of this concept. Husserl does indeed specify that there are two different types of conditions
that need to be fulfilled for inner evidence to occur. The first type comprises the real or natural conditions which pertain to human beings in so far as they are natural empirically existing beings. Such conditions are discovered by the empirical sciences and especially by psychology. But the most important conditions are the ideal ones, and the phenomenologist has to demonstrate the necessary relations that exist between the pure laws of logic (i.e. the ideal truths) and the ideal conditions for possible inner evidence. Husserl then points out that "The understanding of our distinction between the real and the ideal 'theory of inner evidence' presupposes, on the other hand, correct concepts of inner evidence and truth" (L.I. 193-4), and as we have shown (section 3.8 above) Husserl fails to clarify these two concepts in a satisfactory manner. For the claim that (say) the law of contradiction is inwardly evident would seem to assume the laws of logic as the ground for finding this law of logic as inwardly evident. (12) Husserl's claim that to deny the ideal conditions of inner evidence that attach to this law is to be irrational is just such an assumption. This is not a properly scientific procedure.

Again, in his discussion of the nature of pure concepts he points out that they are ".... independent of the particularity of any material

(12) In the Logical Investigation (P.191) Husserl claims that he stresses ".... the ideality of the possibility of evident judgement which can be derived from logical principles, and which we see to reveal their apriori validity in cases of apodeictic self-evidence ...." As we have already seen, there is considerable difficulty in clearly grasping what Husserl understands by evidence and truth. But here validity would seem to presuppose the logical laws that are supposed to be being judged.
of knowledge" (L.1. 237), and that the first task of pure logic is to fix the meaning of these pure concepts in an unambiguous and precise manner. The independence of these concepts from the domain of the real is logically implied by Husserl's prior separation of real from ideal. This latter separation has been found to be unacceptable. To the extent that a concept fails to express the unity of these two aspects (the real and the ideal) just so will it fail to elucidate the Whole we seek to comprehend - being in itself will remain external to thought as some irrational residue. (13) And secondly we have argued that concepts cannot be simply laid down due to the very nature of the reality to which they give expression. A concept is on the Hegelian view a revealed reality - but a reality that is still being given - it is the Concept which "brings forth its form from within itself."

The reality that is presented by a concept contains both reality and consciousness in process. A concept is then on the Hegelian view part and parcel of an ontological as well as a logical process. Husserl's pure concept is a logical entity in exclusion from the ontological.

The third criticism was directed to Husserl's view of science. Proper science was for Husserl nomological science, the other sciences (called descriptive or ontological) taking their theoretical elements

(13) Hegel would claim that Husserl is here (in the specification of what he holds to be the nature of pure concepts) operating at the level of the understanding, where the general object "... falls apart into form and content, universal and particular, into an empty implicitness and the determinateness which comes to this from without, - that in the thought of the understanding the content is different to its form, whereas in rational or notional cognition it brings forth its form from within itself." Hegel's Philosophy of Subjective Spirit Vol.3, p.225.
from nomological or abstract science. Scientific knowledge is grounded knowledge, in that it is based upon certain general laws and the proof of these latter rests ultimately on basic laws. The basic laws themselves are not further provable. Now while it is agreed that scientific knowledge is grounded knowledge it is not grounded in the sense that Husserl gives to this word. On the view of science elaborated in Part II, grounded knowledge is knowledge that contributes to the complete conceptualization of reality - of the absolute subject. Hegel's own summary of the import of his Phenomenology serves to substantiate this point."

It (the Phenomenology) includes the various shapes of spirit within itself as stages in the progress through which spirit becomes pure knowledge or absolute spirit.... The apparent chaos of the wealth of appearances in which spirit presents itself when first considered, is brought into a scientific order, which is exhibited in its necessity, in which the imperfect appearances resolve themselves and pass over into the higher ones constituting their proximate truth. They find their final truth .... in science, as the result of the whole." (14)

Knowledge is grounded (that is, not presupposed), when it is shown as issuing out of, and as being a contradictory presentation of Spirit. This grounding is for Hegel not of a purely formal nature. Hegel criticises the formalism that attempts to ground ideal laws

(14) Hegel, as quoted by M.J. Petry in his Introduction to Hegel's Philosophy of Subjective Spirit, Vol. 1, p.lxvii
in exclusion from any materiality of existence. For example, in criticising Reinhold (though his criticism would apply in many ways to Husserl) he says, ".... from what is formal in an absolute sense one cannot reach anything material; the formal and the material are absolutely opposed .... The alternative to all this is to connect cognition with the Absolute, so that it becomes an identity of subject and object, of thinking and its stuff, but then cognition is no longer formal ...." (15)

Husserl's nomological science is not seen as being capable of even attempting to conceptualize reality as it is totally separated from it. We are reminded of Wittgenstein's phrase that problem and method pass one another by. (16) On the Hegelian view, the basic laws of nomological science could not be shown to be a satisfactory position from which to erect science as they exclude negativity, and they presuppose conceptions which are antinomical i.e. the separation of form and matter, of ideal and real, of finite and infinite etc. Without the objectivity of the absolute we shall argue that Husserl's point of view reduces to that of the subjective idealist.

We have shown in the earlier section dealing with logic that the traditional logic itself fails to be properly scientific - hence we can say that nomological science requires for its possibility


(16) L. Wittgenstein. Philosophical Investigations p.232e. Wittgenstein was of course not referring to Husserl - but to psychology, and the inability of the experimental method to even deal with the philosophical problems it attempts to solve.
the prior phenomenological description of the way consciousness comes to such a form of knowledge, and see to what extent it can answer the problems that this form of knowledge sets itself.

This leads into the fourth area of criticism which deals with Husserl's lack of system. By failing to transcend the dualities of being and thought, of real and ideal, there is the tendency to eliminate being (the metaphysical) or at least to claim that it lies outwith the domain of pure (i.e. proper) science. But such a tendency also removes truth, that is, ontological truth (the knowledge of objective reality) from the domain, we are left with the correctness of a given form of argument, with logical truth but not with truth as the rational depiction of reality itself. We do not get the systematic development of experience to the point where the existence of the essence given by a form of knowledge, is the same as that essence itself. Rather we get a formal severance of existence as real existence from the ideal correlate - the intentional object. This severance was in Husserl's later works to become explicit in the phenomenological reduction, where questions concerning the actual nature of what was being phenomenologically investigated were bracketed or suspended. This raises the question as to just what was understood by Husserl when he talked of phenomenology, for it does seem that he is using this term to denote a different activity from that of Hegel. Let us pause to give expression to phenomenology as presented in Husserl's Logical Investigations and to see in what sense this conception differs from the one developed in Part II above.
2. Phenomenology

Husserl, in the first edition of the above work had described phenomenology as descriptive psychology, though a psychology that was carefully distinguished from any theoretical psychology (of which psychologism is an example). He was concerned to specify a special class of descriptions, those that ".... describe the empirical objects whose genetic connections the science wishes to pursue, (and) also form the substrate for those fundamental abstractions in which logic seizes the essence of its ideal objects and connections with inward evidence." (L.I. 263). But Husserl was quick to point out his own error in this conception of phenomenology. In the second edition of that work, phenomenology is now seen as providing the necessary basis for psychology as well. For any psychology, even if it deals with the general must still be concerned with the empirical. Phenomenology however, excludes the empirical or natural order. (17) It is concerned to establish the "self-evident truths of essence" that concern the foundation of any theory at all. Existence is, therefore, not of concern to the phenomenological investigator. The tasks of pure logic are phenomenological. "Our great task is now to bring the ideas of logic, the logical concepts and laws, to epistemological clarity and definiteness. Here phenomenological analysis must begin." (L.I.251).

Husserl, later on in the Investigations, gives the following precise description of the phenomenological standpoint.

(17) See over
Note (17)

Husserl, writing in 1925 on the Logical Investigations says the following: "There is still another, and perhaps the most important and essential novelty of the psychological-phenomenological method which I have not yet indicated and which for the first time appeared in the Logical Investigations and thoroughly determined their mode of enquiry. It became clear very soon that a descriptive investigation having the sort of goal as the Logical Investigations had, could not by any means have the character of a merely empirical psychological enquiry, it could not be descriptive in the sense of a psycho-physical psychology or in the sense of a naturalistic psychology. The exclusive theme of the Logical Investigations was the psychical modes which are correlative to the objectivities (and especially the logical-ideal ones) which are intended, psychical modes in whom, purely in the immanence of psychical life, concepts, judgements and theories form themselves as ideal, identical unities of sense together with the modes of being merely supposed or of being evidently true, as the case may be."

"Let us now shift from our natural-scientific, psychological standpoint to an ideal-scientific, phenomenological one. We must exclude all empirical interpretations and existential affirmations, we must take what is inwardly experienced or otherwise inwardly intuited (e.g. in pure fancy) as pure experiences, as our exemplary basis for acts of ideation. We must ideate universal essences and essential connections in such experiences - ideal species of experiencing of differing levels of generality, and ideally valid truths of essence which apply a priori, and with unlimited generality, to possible experiences of these species. We thus achieve insights in a pure phenomenology which is here oriented to real (reellen) constituents, whose descriptions are in every way "ideal" and free from 'experience', i.e. from presupposition of real existence." (L.I. 577) (18)

As here specified, phenomenology constitutes a turn inward, an abstracting from the physical-natural (real) standpoint. Yet it seems that this turn inward is still based upon the natural-psychological conception of man. We just exclude the real physical aspect and concentrate exclusively upon what is inwardly present - the 'psychical modes' of the psycho-physical subject. Later this 'naturalistic prejudice' of the independent physical realm is rejected by Husserl as he develops his transcendental

(18) "In fact, what the Investigations had in view, and necessarily so, was the laying bare of a revealing inner intuition of the acts of thinking hidden for the thinker himself, an essential description moving itself within pure inner intuition and relating to the pure givenness of experience." Ibid P.202-3.
idealism. As Husserl explicitly states in the Preface to his Ideas: "If we now perform this transcendental-phenomenological reduction, this transformation of the natural and psychologically inward standpoint whereby it is transcendentalized, the psychological subjectivity loses just that which makes it something real in the world that lies before us; it loses the meaning of the soul as belonging to a body that exists in an objective; spatio-temporal Nature."\(^{(19)}\) On this latter view objectivity, the real, will be developed from out of the transcendental subject-consciousness thus becomes the foundation for being. The early informal bracketing of the real existence of the object is no longer necessary as the view that there is such an object is an illusion.

Let us now draw out some further details from the above specification that will be able to be directly compared with the Hegelian view of phenomenology to be specified shortly.

Husserl's essences are logical items, that is they are self-identical and conform to traditional logic. Each essence as such is what it is for eternity. Further to this there is no 'pulse-beat' or negativity in these essences such that they develop into a particular dynamic structure. There is no notion here of a dialectical development of essences as the self-presentation of the Absolute.

Husserl's Phenomenology is concerned with epistemological questions. He is concerned with the "Exhibition of the necessity of an epistemo-

logical foundation for the apriori sciences through transcendental phenomenology - the science of transcendental subjectivity." (20)

This latter is termed science in that it is governed by formal logic and mathematics, and is apriori. (21) Hegel would see such an epistemological concern - such a science - as being limited and dogmatic, it being the standpoint of the understanding.

For Hegel, phenomenology as presented in the Phenomenology of Mind is the science of Spirit as appearing (as experienced); it is also at the same time an introduction to science, taking us from the most undeveloped level of experience to the transcending of experience itself. The culmination of the phenomenological development is the point at which Spirit or the Absolute can grasp the necessity of the process itself. It is the level of conceptual comprehension - a comprehension not flawed by any separations. Phenomenology therefore can be seen as an introduction to the level of science - the scientific system of Absolute Spirit, and having reached this level we (qua Spirit) are then able to grasp the necessity of the phenomenological presentation of Spirit as one part of the system. (22) (We recognise that there is much discussion concerning the exact role that the Phenomenology of Mind plays in Hegel's system given that in the Philosophy of Spirit Hegel presents a truncated version of phenomenology which latter

(21) Ibid. P.214-5.
(22) For a more extensive discussion of this point, and the question of how Hegel's view of the relationship of the Phenomenology of Mind to his system changes see W. Kaufmann, Hegel's Conception of Phenomenology. In Pivčević (Ed) P.212 f.
Also see M. J. Petry, Hegel's Philosophy of Subjective Spirit, Introduction P.XIII (also P.XIVI note 21) and S. Rosen, G.W.F. Hegel, Chapter 6.
is seen to be the outcome of anthropology and the presupposition of psychology. (23)

As we have seen, for Hegel the only concrete actuality is Spirit or the Absolute. This is the concrete universal. If this is not understood Hegel's system becomes unintelligible. Given this Absolute, we as finite consciousness'es are able to realize our 'truth' (that we are moments of the Absolute) through the description of the process of experience itself. For this latter must be able to demonstrate the completeness of its process if it is to be able to claim Absolute knowledge. Hegel's requirement that we demonstrate the necessity of a point of view or form of knowledge is the demand that we show how such a point of view can provide us with knowledge of the Whole.

Hegel is not then concerned with a purely epistemological development. Epistemological questions arise with a particular level of experience - with a particular externalization of the Absolute. Hegel's phenomenology is therefore fundamentally different from Husserl's. As Rosen succinctly expresses it: "There is in Husserl no sense of dialectic, no over-coming of the paradoxes of finite logic, no idea of completeness, no account of Spirit as Absolute no explanation of consciousness or self-consciousness, and therefore no account of the relation between subjectivity and the constituted content of subjectivity. Or so it would be claimed by Hegel." (24)

(23) M.J. Petry provides a good description of the way Hegel, and his commentators saw the relation of the Phenomenology to his system. Hegel's Philosophy of Subjective Spirit, Vol. 1.
(24) S. Rosen, G.W.F. Hegel, p.28.
Hegel's phenomenology represents the justification for the pure development of logic. It represents a solution to the relation between knowledge of an object and the (self-conscious) knowledge that we do know such an object (that is, truth). Experience, as we have shown, is the link between these two domains. (25) Hegel sees but one subject (Spirit) as the ground that is being determined. Thus the subject - Spirit - is neither a pure essence nor a pure object. It is neither a real physical object nor a pure ideal object - it is given through the process that includes itself as consciousness attempting to know an object and attempting to state what this known object is (truth).

But is this Absolute or Spirit but a presupposition that Hegel adopts to resolve the dualist problem? Hegel would claim that the Phenomenology of Mind demonstrates the necessity for such a conception simply by showing how the process of experience can in no other way avoid absurdity. Hegel thus claims to provide the necessity for such a subject by showing the inability of all previous attempts to demonstrate the truth of their knowledge. Husserl as we have seen

(25) R. B. Pippin gives a clear presentation of how Hegel demonstrates that consciousness must become self-consciousness.

"Put it into its broadest Hegelian terms, the issue is the relation between consciousness of an object (knowledge) and self-consciousness (truth, or knowledge or knowledge, or finally, transcendental knowledge). As is infamous, Kant thought he could "deduce" the move from the latter to the former, but as has already been shown, Hegel rejects such a methodological relation. His move is to argue instead for what he calls the "experience" of consciousness as the middle term, occasionally speaking of the "history" of this experience as the only way for consciousness itself to become self-conscious ..." Hegel's Phenomenological Criticism, Man World 8 Aug. 1975, P.301-2.
does not satisfactorily demonstrate the truth of our knowledge because he fails to provide an adequate account of the relationship between the experience of the object and the experience of the truth of that experience. The separation of real from ideal is not adequately grounded, it is not shown to be necessary. The criticism, repeated throughout this thesis, that Husserl fails to demonstrate how he reached such a standpoint, is this Hegelian argument.

This failure was spelled out by focusing on Husserl's lack of justification for his own point of view. Because consciousness implicates itself in its own criticism (in its own knowledge) - because all consciousness is consciousness of something - we need to provide a justification of this point of view, of our own particular consciousness of something so that the significance of what is asserted vis a vis the knowledge under investigation (i.e. psychologism) can be truly grasped. This requires a phenomenological description of consciousness' development up to this point - a description that does not presuppose any method but merely "gives itself" to the development in question and describes the forms that consciousness takes in its consciousness of things (being). It is by such a procedure that Hegel can claim to have substantiated his claim that Absolute knowledge - Spirit knowing itself as Spirit - is necessary, scientific, complete and presuppositionless. (26) Here no external agents are involved and

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(26) Harris, E.E. puts the point thus: "So far as the phenomenologist fails to make good his claim to transcend the antithesis of idealism and realism, Hegel has already advanced beyond him; so far as phenomenology succeeds it has been anticipated by Hegel." Hegel's Theory of Feeling. In Steinkraus (Ed) P.91.
no assumptions are made. It is, as we have argued, but the one content which is being given and which finally arrives at the complete scientific presentation of itself. It is at this moment that the spatio-temporal development is transcended. There is but the complete circle - but Time itself. (27)

Husserl, as we have seen, repudiates any such idea of providing consciousness' prehistory up to the present - of providing the description that will show the necessity of the foundations upon which his own view rests. Husserl's sense of presuppositionlessness is but the logical exclusion of the metaphysical from the domain of the purely ideal. Pure logic does not for Husserl make any ontological presuppositions - it does not presuppose any relation to the here and now of determinate material existence - hence such a procedure as Hegel demands would be seen by Husserl as otiose. (28) But Husserl's procedure has been called into question in that he presupposes the laws of (traditional) logic

(27) Hegel's view here, of the process as a Whole could be seen to be exactly what some modern theories in physics are approaching - that there is a certain universe for the astro-physicist such that Time is circular and closed and, as Time, has no Temporal succession. For a discussion of this view and the paradoxes it entails for traditional logic see the interesting discussion by B. Williams and D. Sciama, on Time. (Open University 3rd level Arts Course on Problems of Philosophy. Televised discussion chaired by S. Wilson).

(28) It is the elimination of the ontological difference between the ideal and the real that separates Husserl (in the Logical Investigations) from Hegel. We would argue that Husserl never developed a dialectical phenomenology because the ontological aspect was formally excluded from consideration. Thus his conception of intentionality is equally non-dialectical. But a thorough examination of Husserl's philosophy in its entirety would be required to substantiate this argument.
without showing the necessity (and hence extension) of such laws. This method grounds pure logic in non-science (whether it be in the form of silence, non-discursive presence, intuition or myth). Logic cannot be grasped scientifically without the phenomenological description of the way this form of knowledge arises, and how the laws it holds are developed and interrelated, and how they contribute to the knowledge of the Whole. Part II was concerned to indicate the way logic should be developed - but we have been only concerned in the main with the way it should begin. The investigations throughout this thesis have concentrated on beginning - with the way philosophy should begin if it is to attain its goal - the conceptual comprehension of reality.

3. Hegel - A concluding note

In this thesis it has been argued that philosophy, if it is to be properly scientific, must begin with the phenomenological description of the process that gives rise to such a philosophy. It is only by such a procedure that the necessity for, and the truth of such a philosophy can be established. This argument was developed through a critical examination of Husserl's arguments concerning the grounding of logic as developed in the Logical Investigations (Part I).

In developing the Hegelian arguments for how philosophy should begin we passed over many problematic areas in Hegel's philosophical
system. We would like to now indicate very briefly three of these areas, as being in need of investigation.

In the first place we merely noted that Hegel's use of the term 'we' has been seen by Hegel scholars as problematic. (29) In what sense are 'we' who are guided through the 'shapes of Spirit' able to find this development intelligible? Especially in the transition to Absolute Knowledge, do we cease to be 'we' in being able to grasp such knowledge? And if this final transition is not intelligible this has important ramifications for the system as a whole, for the logic would then not be able to presuppose the level of conceptual thought as being demonstrated by the phenomenology, or its claims to have performed such a demonstration would be severely curtailed (i.e. we could claim that it is only intelligible by Spirit itself and not by us, which would introduce a separation into what Hegel would see as an inseparable union).

Secondly, we noted that there has been much discussion as to the exact role Hegel saw phenomenology as fulfilling. For in the Philosophy of Spirit Hegel presents phenomenology with a much reduced subject matter. It is here presented as being the result of the anthropology and itself (in concluding with the resolution of the subject-object antithesis), as being the immediate

M. Heidegger, Hegel's Concept of Experience, P.149
S. Rosen, G.W.F. Hegel, p.278 f.
presupposition of psychology. That is, it is psychology that deals with the development of Spirit. How then, does the anthropology, phenomenology, psychology and logic interrelate, and can the notion of circularity - a necessary conception if Hegel is to claim completeness and consistency - still be maintained?

Thirdly, there is the need to investigate the precise nature of each transition as expressed in the Phenomenology - each step in the dialectic process of experience. Only after such a detailed and complete investigation of each form of knowledge and its transitions into a more adequate one, could it be established without a shadow of a doubt that Hegel had in fact 'delivered the goods'. This would be an investigation that does not judge Hegel's depiction of the forms of knowledge from some other finite form of knowledge (as we argued, for example, that Trendelenburg does) but merely attempts to present in its clarity the detail of the process itself. Such an investigation would be valuable in that in being carried out, either all the other philosophical positions would be unmasked as inadequate, or else Hegel's own system would be revealed as being inadequate, leading through sublation to a more adequate one.

Therefore while we have agreed with Hegel in the need for adopting a phenomenological description of experience as leading to scien-

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See also W. Kaufmann, Hegel's Conception of Phenomenology. In Pivčević (Ed.)
scientific knowledge, in experience being a dialectic process, and in that subject and object are but two distinguishable aspects of a dynamic totality Hegel calls Spirit, there is still much that needs investigating before the Hegelian system can be adequately evaluated. The rallying cry is then "back to a clarification of the Hegelian philosophy!"
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