SOME CONSIDERATIONS OF THE PHILOSOPHICAL

POSITION OF SAMUEL ALEXANDER

WITH

SPECIAL REFERENCE TO HIS THEOLOGY.

Yaqub Masih
In the past, students of theology have rejected the contributions of Professor Samuel Alexander to their subject on the ground of its inconsistency with the teachings of traditional theology. I shall, in this thesis, investigate the philosophical foundations of Alexander's theology. Though it might or might not be true that theology should be based on philosophy, the theology of Alexander rests squarely upon his general philosophical position. In order to understand his theology, therefore, a fairly comprehensive grasp of that position is required.

Again, Alexander's 'whole enterprise' in philosophy consists in the construction of an ontology, which aims at the overthrow of the idealistic contention concerning the Spiritual nature of Reality. Nevertheless, he reached some of the major conclusions of his ontology in the course of his early studies in epistemology. In his theory of knowledge, Alexander argues that objects of knowledge are distinct and independent of the knowing act. Further, he held that no object of cognition can be mental, therefore, mind cannot be an object to itself. It can be 'enjoyed', but cannot be 'contemplated'. However, the view that mind is only a thing amongst other things and that there is a distinction of 'enjoyment' and 'contemplation' in cognition can be made tenable only with reference to the ontological hierarchy of the empirical existents. Hence, the epistemology of Alexander is only a prelude to his ontology.
The latter shows that reality is a progressive motion, which may be called Space-Time. It is self-creative and without any provision it has produced the hierarchy of matter, life and mind. By virtue of a nexus, Space-Time will continue to produce new emergents. The futurist emergent, which is higher than the highest empirical existent at any time is called 'deity'. Deity is always an ideal and never an accomplishment, since it represents the stage not yet reached by even the latest emergent.

The ontology of Alexander is based on the two key-concepts of 'emergence' and the 'mind-body formula'. The theory of emergence points out that the new emergent is different in kind from those on the level, within which it has been generated. As deity is the next higher emergent even to mind, it accordingly differs in kind from it and cannot be called 'spiritual'. Again, the mind-body formula holds that the relation between the emergents in the ontological hierarchy is best exemplified in the relation of the human mind and the body. Further, the mind-body formula shows that the higher can be reduced without remainder to the lower. Therefore, deity, being an ideal emergent, is completely reducible to Space-Time. Thus, on the basis of these two key-concepts, Alexander demonstrates that neither at the beginning nor at the end of the evolutionary process can reality be taken to be mind or spirit. Hence, the theology of Alexander finally completes the anti-idealistic programme of his ontology.

But the theology of Alexander is not only a rounding-off of his ontology, but is also its corollary. Some of the most
important conclusions of his theology follow from his metaphysics. In so far as within the highest empirical existent lies as if prefigured that in whose direction its nisus strains, so may deity be felt as already declaring its reality in advance of its actual coming. Further, the presence of the nisus, carrying the emergents in its onward sweep of Time would give rise to the religious emotion. Hence, being grounded in reality itself, the religious emotion and its ideal deity would never cease for the empirical existents. Nevertheless, this positive teaching of Alexander's theology is overshadowed by its negative conclusions. Being the next emergent to mind, deity is altogether different from mind. Besides, it is also beyond Truth, Beauty and Goodness, for Values are found in the 'body' but not in the 'mind' or deity of God. Hence, the deity of Alexander is beyond mind and values; it is indescribable, because it is unknowable. We can 'contemplate' things below us and in contemplating them we 'enjoy' our own being. But, deity, being a higher emergent, can neither be contemplated nor enjoyed. Therefore, according to Alexander, much positive religious teaching is mythology and 'nonsense'. Further, deity is only a futuristic ideal and an Infinite God with His realised deity does not exist. If so, then such a non-existent and impersonal God cannot be supposed to be responsive to human prayers.

We have not only tendered an account of Alexander's
theology, but have also criticised it. In many respects the shortcomings of Alexander's theology have their root in his philosophy. Therefore, we have given a critical appraisal of Alexander's theology through a prior criticism of his philosophy. We have shown that the key-idea of 'emergence' cannot bear the weight of the massive structure placed upon it, and that the other key notion of the mind-body formula is inapplicable to God.

Alexander believes that he has made an advance over the traditional theology in two respects. Firstly, the 'forward view' is supposed to escape from the difficulty of the problem of evil and suffering, which overwhelms the theistic belief in a Creator God. As the evolving deity is beyond 'good and evil', and is in lineal succession of Goodness, so it is not the author of evil. Secondly, the prevailing theism fails to reconcile the rival claims of the immanence and transcendence of God. This is supposed to be solved, however, by holding that God is immanent in respect of His 'body', and transcendent in respect of His deity.

But I try to show that whatever be the merits of these two contributions of Alexander to theology, his God is too impersonal, irresponsive and pantheistic for the religious needs of man.

In the final analysis, the philosophy of Alexander has failed to support an adequate theology, for it has accepted the prevailing tradition in philosophy, which is not very
sympathetic to religious values. By putting emphasis on the scientific nature of philosophy, Alexander has dealt with Reality in its impersonal aspect. But in religion, Reality appears in personal form. Further, in philosophy we deal with Reality in so far as it can be expressed in literal symbols. However, in religion we deal with Reality in so far as it can be described in non-literal symbols. As Alexander does not attend to this aspect of religious knowledge, he has declared the positive teaching of religions to be 'nonsense'.

In the light of our above-mentioned procedure, in Chapter 1., we have given a short history of the problems which were transmitted to Alexander, and also an account of the idealistic Weltanschauung which shaped his thought. In Chapter II., we have dwelt on the epistemological speculation of Alexander, and, we have shown that the realistic epistemology of Alexander is ultimately based on his naturalistic ontology. The ontology of Alexander remains the very centre of his system, and we have dwelt on it at length in Chapters III and IV. But our purpose is to study the ontology of Alexander with a view to understanding his theology. Therefore, we have given a detailed and critical exposition of those tenets of his ontology which have their direct bearing on his theology. Chapters V, VI and VII., deal with Alexander's theology. Chapter VIII., gives a criticism of Alexander's philosophy, for, as noted earlier, some of the difficulties of Alexander's theology directly follow from the inadequacies of his philosophy. Chapter IX,
(vi)

gives a criticism of the fundamental theories of Alexander's theology. In our concluding Chapter X, we argue that the tradition of philosophy cannot adequately deal with the problems of religion.

To a significant extent Alexander's philosophy and theology can best be understood in their historical contexts and in the light of the historical development of Alexander's thought. We have, therefore, traced the development of Alexander's philosophy and theology. We have been able to do this by referring to his early writings and correspondence, much of which has remained unnoticed and unpublished so far. A list of the unpublished papers and correspondence, which have been consulted in the preparation of the thesis, has been mentioned in sections 11 and 111. of the bibliography. We believe that amongst the unpublished works, 'Fingerposts to Religion' (1886), 'On Taking Time Seriously' (1914), and 'Six Lectures on Values' (n.d.) are important for understanding the theology of Alexander. Further, we find that Alexander's statement in the symposium, 'Is there evidence of Design in Nature?' (1890) and 'Spinoza and Philosophy of Religion: Septimana Spinozana' (1933) have remained unnoticed so far. Laird did not refer to the important conception of an 'evolving deity' which had been explicitly stated by Alexander in the symposium (*). Besides, Laird did not include 'Spinoza and

* See the omission of it from Laird's 'SAMUEL ALEXANDER'S THEISM' - H.J. Vol. 40, 1941-42.
Philosophy of Religion* in the works of Alexander at all.

It might appear as if we have underrated the positive excellence of Alexander's contributions to philosophy and theology. However, we think that the positive excellence of any philosophy consists in provoking us to ask fruitful questions about Reality. This is what Alexander has done in raising the problems of the temporality of God, the nature of deity, the nature limit and function of religious emotion, the problem of evil and suffering, Creation and the future of religion.
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ABBREVIATIONS.

B.F.N.——BEAUTY AND OTHER FORMS OF VALUE
B.J.P.——THE BRITISH JOURNAL OF PSYCHOLOGY
H.J.——THE HIBBERT JOURNAL
J.P.S.——THE JOURNAL OF PHILOSOHICAL STUDIES
M.O.P.——MORAL ORDER AND PROGRESS
P.A.S.——PROCEEDINGS OF THE ARISTOTELIAN SOCIETY
P.B.A.——PROCEEDINGS OF THE BRITISH ACADEMY
P.L.P.——PHILOSOPHICAL AND LITERARY PIECES
S.T.D. 1 & 11 — SPACE, TIME AND DEITY VOLS. 1 & 11
Synopsis of Chapter 1.

We present a short sketch of the philosophical thought which shaped the philosophy of Alexander, and find that his Evolutionary Naturalism is the culmination of that idealism and scientism of the 19th century, which issues in some sort of Spinozistic acosmicism. This is followed by a very brief biography of Alexander, with special reference to his academic achievements. Further, an attempt will be made to reconstruct the historical development of the thought of Alexander as it progressed through the criticism of idealism. Partly for this reason and partly because the naturalism of Alexander developed in the context of idealism, a short account of the philosophy of Green, Bradley and Bosanquet will be given. Then, again, as Alexander’s early protest against idealism assumed the form of anti-apriorism, which is best seen in his MORAL ORDER AND PROGRESS, a brief summary of that work concludes the chapter.
Sec. 1. The Historical Background of Alexander’s Philosophy.

The Rise of Mechanism: Descartes has been considered the father of modern philosophy. He sharply divided the world into the two compartments of mind and matter. Life was included within matter since he took animals for mere automata, supposing their behaviour could be satisfactorily explained in terms of mechanism. This tradition of mechanism has persisted to our own day in the theory of Behaviourism. Behaviourism simply extends the theory of mechanism into the realm of human behaviour, which, according to Descartes belonged to the domain of mind-consciousness. This shows how deeply the philosophy of mechanism has become entrenched in the minds of men. However, our chief concern is with the theory of mechanism which prevailed in the 16th and was handed down to the 19th century. Theology, too, could not remain uninfluenced by this trend of thought. The prevailing 16th century Daemonism which makes four theological assumptions which remained true even for the first half of the 19th century:

1. God is transcendent.
2. The whole material universe is a result of creation.
3. The scripture is an authoritative revelation of truth which cannot be obtained otherwise.
4. Happiness and Salvation are the supreme concern of religion. On the whole, the religious values are to be achieved in the next life rather than in this.

At first the theory of mechanism, initiated by Descartes and greatly extended by the scientific advance of Kepler, Galileo and Newton, only served to strengthen the above-mentioned assumptions. Not till later were its destructive consequences fully realised in the religious circle. Newton had greatly advanced the realm of mechanism and had displayed the universe as a wonderful mathematical machine, but, being a devout Christian, never realised its anti-religious implication, supposing, on the contrary, that the mathematical grandeur of the universe proves the existence of God. (1)

"To be sure, Newton was confident, as we shall see, that certain empirical facts open to anybody's observation, implied unqualifiedly the existence of God of a certain definite nature and function. God was not detached from the world that science seeks to know; indeed, every true step in natural philosophy brings us nearer to a knowledge of the first cause, ..." (2)

Newton believed that God created the masses of body and set them into motion, and that space and time, in which the material objects move, are sustained by His presence. But, it might have been thought that the perfect mechanic God, after having made this perfect world-machine, had retired from it altogether. At least this was the conception of Newton's great contemporary Leibniz.

1. Burtt, E. A. "The metaphysical foundations of modern science" p. 284
2. Ibid. - p. 261
The acceptance of this would have meant the banishment of God from the universe and therefore, Newton reserved two tasks for God in order to show His concern with the universe. According to Newton, God prevents the stars from falling in the middle of space and then, again, He re-forms the mechanism of the world when it gets out of gear. (1)

From the above considerations, it is clear that Newton's solution for keeping the presence of God in the universe was too artificial. Soon after Newton, Laplace showed that the small irregularities in the planetary motion, which had required Newton to posit the existence of God, are self-corrected. Laplace, therefore, looked upon the whole world-machine, having its beginning in a nebula, as a self-creative universe. (2)

Men in general might not have thought of God as an 'unnecessary hypothesis', as Laplace described Him, but the whole contribution of Newton and the sciences of the day showed the remoteness of God in time and space. Even if God created the whole universe, He must have done it a long time ago and now He remains remote from what happens in it. (3) Thus, the transcendence of God came to be further emphasized. But now it began to have an adverse effect on the religious beliefs of the people.

"A God who 'exists' but does nothing in the world, who in no way affects the outcome of events, is simply a God who does not matter" (4)

1 Burtt, E.A. Ibid p.291-2
2 Stace, W.T. 'Religion and the Modern Mind' p.67, 68; Burtt, E.A. Ibid p.275
3 Stace, W.T. Ibid p.63-65
4 Stace, W.T. Ibid p.56
Further, every event must have a cause. But, under the influence of science it meant that this cause should be a 'vera causa'. This meant that the causes can only be natural. The result of this way of thinking was that man's faith in the Divine Providence came to be seriously undermined. God was first banished from the universe and now He was excluded from the daily concern of man. Now, if God does not matter in our lives, what is the use of believing in Him? Further, why need we posit the existence of God? After all, it is the particular events which go to make the universe and if they do not need God for their explanation, then the world as a whole may be looked upon as a self-regulating and self-creative reality without any need of God.

"The key idea of a world-purpose ceases to be operative in an age dominated by the scientific spirit" (1)

Thus, a deistic view of the universe is likely to degenerate into materialism. (2)

**The Theory of Evolution as an Aid to Mechanism:**

Mechanism received powerful support from the theory of evolution. The doctrine of evolution was steadily gaining ground in men's thinking through the works of Kant, Hegel and...

1. Stace, p. 5, *ibid* p. 79
2. Sorley, W. B., 'Moral values and the idea of God', p. 46.

*This has been accepted by Smuts: "The Kingdom of Life, instead of fighting for its own rights and prerogatives, has tamely and blindly surrendered to the claims of physical force and actually joined hands with it and contributed to its supremacy. The acceptance of Darwinism, therefore, so far from stemming the tide of mechanical ideas, has actually furthered and assisted it, and raised it to full flood." (Smuts, J. C., 'Holism and Evolution', p. 12) See also Streeter, B. H., 'Reality', pp. 5–6
Laplace; but it was Darwin's theory of Organic Evolution which put an empirical and scientific seal on it. The theory of Organic Evolution is really opposed to mechanism, for not matter but life grows and life itself is an evidence against mechanism. (1)

However, this anti-mechanistic implication of the theory of Organic Evolution came to be realised much later in the philosophy of Bergson, Haldane, Lloyd Morgan, Alexander, Smuts and Whitehead. At the time Darwin propounded his doctrine of Organic Evolution, the mechanists used it in furthering their theories in two important ways. Darwin's theory showed a continuous transition from the lowest protozoan to the highest creature man. Further, the lowest living cell could hardly be distinguished from dead matter. Could not, therefore, matter, by a slow and gradual process, may be said to have given birth to life? The acceptance of this possibility enabled the mechanists like Tyndall, Haeckel and other materialists, to see in matter 'the promise and potency' of life. If, in some baffling way matter gives birth to life, then the realm of materialistic mechanism receives further extension. Boldly, the mechanist imputed to matter a creative evolutionary process, universally operative, but without forethought or purpose. (2) This assumption was greatly strengthened by a mechanical interpretation of 'natural selection'. (3) Interpreted in a mechanical way, says Prof. Raven, it ruled out all moral and teleological elements and God's providence from the workings of nature. (4)

4. Smuts, J. C. Ibid. p. 121-177
5. Raven, G. B. 'Science and Religion' p. 176
Secondly, the mechanists extended their theory into the domain of human consciousness and values too. Reason became suspect as an independent source of eternal truths and morals. Thinking came to be looked upon merely as an instrument to secure advantages in the struggle for survival. Consequently, moral values came to be treated as mere rules of expediency for adjustment to life-situation. To be sure, species evolved and improved during successive generations but the betterment depended on the fortuitous change in the germ-plasm alone, and according to the mendelian laws of inheritance, only this change was transmitted. Thus, mechanism seemed to reign supreme from the nebula to the creation of man.

Not only the Transcendence of God and His creation of the universe came to be doubted, but quite naturally man came down from Heaven to earth. His earthly abode began to be considered as his only home and religion passed away from worship of God to that of man. With the industrial revolution in England and the establishment of vast trade and commerce, men began to think that at last the lost paradise had been regained.(1).

The 19th century became a peculiar century of hope. The Baconian prophecy seemed to have come true. Values were no longer to be realised in the next world, but to be achieved by man himself. Never before was man's mind infatuated with apocalyptic hopes to the same extent.

1. webb, C.C.J. 'The Historical element in Religion' - p.62 (George Allen and Unwin 1935)
The theory of evolution was fruitful yet in another direction. It led men to seek the origin of things and therefore it led the way to historicism. This historical outlook created the science of anthropology. An indefatigable search was conducted to find out the stages of morality and religion. The Christian religion could not remain an exception to this 'profane' investigation. The textual criticism and the analysis of Christian rites showed their kinship with the pagan and Jewish myths. The sanctity of Biblical revelations became highly suspect and religious authority fell into disrepute.

Thus we find that the four theological assumptions, on which the religious life of the people was based, melted away into thin air. There were of course, exceptions. Devout men continued to explain things in the deistic manner of Newton. Even Darwin believed that God had created a few living cells and endowed them with the promise of all that has elaborated through them. Thus, in the concluding lines of 'The Origin of Species' he wrote:

"There is grandeur in this view of life, with its several powers, having been originally breathed by the Creator in a few forms or into one; and that, whilst this planet has gone cycling on according to the fixed law of gravity, from so simple a beginning, endless forms most beautiful and most wonderful have been, and are being evolved."(1)

This view of Darwin is in keeping with the traditional Christian view of things.

1. The Origin of Species - p.374 (The Modern Library, 1936)
THE RISE OF IMMANENTISM: But it appears from this historical sketch that the days of the conception of a Transcendent God were gone. If religious faith had to be recaptured then the concept of an Immanent God had to be popularised, and, a great many factors helped towards the rise of such a conception. Firstly, the rise of romanticism in literature took men's mind from the outward to the inward deepening of consciousness.\(^1\) Wordsworth, who was not himself a pantheist in his religious belief, popularised the notion of an Immanent Being which pervades all things. \(^2\)

"Getting and spending, we lay waste our powers;

Little we see in Nature that is ours."\(^3\)

Now, what is in the Nature which is ours to soothe and heal us? Well, the answer is contained in the following famous lines of Wordsworth, composed a few miles from Tintern Abbey:

I have felt
A presence that disturbs me with the joy
Of elevated thoughts; a sense sublime
Of Something far more deeply interfused,
whose dwelling is the light of setting suns,
And the round ocean and the living air,
And the blue sky, and in the mind of man;
A motion and a spirit, that impels
All thinking things, all objects of all thought,
And rolls through all things.

\(^1\) That romanticism helped in the growth of immaneitism has been accepted by A. N. Whitehead (Science and the modern world Chap V. A. C. Mc Giffert (Encyclopaedia of religion and Ethics pp. 156-9) J. T. Stace (Religion and the modern mind) and C. J. Webb (Religious thought in England from 1650)

\(^2\) It is now an accepted fact that Wordsworth wrote his famous poem 'Prelude' on the basis of notes which Coleridge had supplied to him. Besides, the influence of Plotinus on Wordsworth was very great, as Dean Inge has shown. Thus, the poetry of Wordsworth had a clear pantheistic background.

\(^3\) The poetical works of Wordsworth, sonnet No. XXXIII - p. 206 (Oxford University Press 1953)
However, more than Romanticism, the theory of evolution paved the way for a belief in an immanent principle. It was Spencer who had extended the doctrine of Organic evolution on a Cosmic scale. The appearance of life and its ascent to man, according to him, is part of the cosmic drama. The universe itself has evolved from a nebula to its present state of complex matter and life, according to the principle of increasing differentiation and integration of different parts. It seemed therefore that there is a principle, implanted in the universe itself, which pervades all things and which impels them to evolve in successive levels. Webb, therefore, is right in pointing out that the theory of evolution helped the rise of immanentism in British thought.

"It is at any rate manifest that the idea of evolution, as the best description of the way in which the world has come to be what we find it, goes along with the conception of an immanent God just as the idea of creation went along with that of a transcendent God." (1+)

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1. Religion and the thought to-day - P.39

*The same observation has been made by McCaffert: "Whatever form the theory of evolution may take, the general conception means the recognition of immanent changing energy by virtue of which the universe is continuously changing and advancing". (Encyclopedia of Religion and Ethics, Vol.7 - p.170) Charles Kingsley, who was an important figure in the religious thought of the day, favoured the theory of evolution for it supported 'a living', immanent ever-working God, which the materialists had precluded. (Raven, C.M. 'Science and Religion' P.176-177. Cambrid
Hence, we can say that the scientific Weltanschauung made the notion of a Transcendent God out of fashion and prepared the ground for an immanent principle which pervades all things. This conception of immanentism of British Scientism paved the way for welcoming German Idealism, which remained the reigning philosophy of Britain for at least twenty five years, till the close of the 19th century. Two things combined together to explain its unchallenged supremacy in its day. The first reason was the utter bankruptcy of the native thought of Britain to help the ordinary man in his religious search for spiritual stability.

The theory of mechanism had left man unfathered, forlorn and helpless in this world. The materialistic mechanism talked of nature as a powerful gigantic machine. To be sure this made nature awesome, but her very powers seemed to make a mockery of human helplessness.

"If you place me face to face, not with an infinite living spirit, but only with what is called 'the Great Necessity', what 'enthusiasm' do you expect the vision to excite? Can there be a more paralysing spectacle? and shall I fling myself with passionate devotion into the arms of that ghastly physical giant? It is impossible:..."(1)

German idealism in the form of Hegelianism of the Caird brothers, the Neo-Kantianism of Green, and the Absolutism of Bradley and Bosanquet, at least showed the supremacy of

spirit over things. At least a man could think that the Supreme Reality is akin to him. An idealist could stand up in proud dignity before the dead powers of Nature, which might knock him down. However inadequate idealism could prove to be later in British thought, for the time being, it could bring man once more to taste 'eternity'. Because of this success of rehabilitating the spiritual life of man, it could boast of possessing a golden key which 'opens the gate of eternity'.

The second reason for the success of idealism was that it tried to include all that the theory of evolution had endeavoured to explain and hoped to have done more. We have already referred to Spencer's attempt to explain the whole universe in his evolutionary way. But he had left a chasm between matter and life, and between life and consciousness. Ward was not slow to detect this and humourously remarked that two volumes of Synthetic Philosophy were missing. (1) Idealism had not to contend with any such chasm, for all was but the Absolute Spirit. Besides, Spencer had failed to discover an intelligible principle which causes the succession of different forms in a really unified development. (2) It was here that Idealism triumphed over the Evolutionary Empiricism of Spencer, showing that there is an Absolute Intelligence which brings forth matter, life and mind out of its inexhaustible store of potentiality and gradually realises itself through their temporal development. Human mind too

is but a manifestation and reproduction of that Infinite Intelligence. Thus, the historical process of evolution was successfully incorporated into the theory of the logical development of the Absolute Mind.

Further, in Green, the religious values, which naturalism had equated with worldly development of material progress, came to be re-assessed and re-affirmed in enlightened humanitarianism. The moral ideal, according to Green, gradually and steadily gains in content and extent through the ages. Though the moral ideal is essentially spiritual, yet, according to Bradley, Bosanquet, Caird and Green, it is being gradually realised as a historical process in social development.

"This description was closely connected with their general tendency to seek the religious and ethical values rather within than without the process of civilization". (1)

For the time being British empiricism was completely eclipsed by the idealistic epistemology; utilitarianism was succeeded by the Ethics of self-realization and the Agnosticism of Spencer and Huxley was superseded by neo-Kantian and neo-Hegelian Pantheism. No doubt Martineau, in theology, did defend the doctrine of a Transcendental God. But he too laid much emphasis on moral will as the vice-regent of God and this insistence on Conscience indirectly supported the thesis that God is to be found inside rather than outside the universe.

INADEQUACIES OF IDEALISM:  At first British philosophers remained content with idealism and the inspired writings of Caird, Green, Bradley and Bosanquet did fill up the vacuum in the religious life which had been caused by the then scientism. But when they recovered from the dazzling effect which the brilliant writings of the idealists had caused, they found that after all the gains of idealism were of uncertain value. Instead of confronting science idealism had ignored it. It treated too lightly the truths of evolutionary theory. By no conjuring up of philosophical magic however, can one identify the historical process with logical development. Besides, it took no note of the gains of mathematics and physics, and therefore, Alexander wrote:

"The purely idealistic philosophy seems to have over-reached itself, and specially in its view of Nature it shocks the scientific habits of the time; ..." (1)

It seems that this criticism of idealism was just, for years afterwards Whitehead too remarked that the German idealistic movement remained out of effective touch with its contemporary science. (2)

Not only had idealism failed to take science and Time seriously, but it came under suspicion in religious and moral matters too. On the whole, its insistence on immanentism led to the conception of a pantheistic Absolute

1. The Oxford magazine, 1894-p.276 Col.2
2. Science and the modern world — p.173
and God. In the philosophy of Bradley and Bosanquet, the individual is merely an appearance and he has to be finally transformed, transmuted and absorbed in the Absolute in order to participate in its full life. In this sense the worshipper loses his individuality; and, the implication of the writings of the 'hideous atheist' Spinoza came to be fully realised. Then, again, the Supreme Reality or the Absolute transcended the God of religion and was beyond personality and will. Of course, the Absolutists did point out that this did not mean that the Absolute is utterly colourless and devoid of attributes. It is simply too rich to be described by the poor categories of human thought. Nonetheless, in the long run, too dazzling light and utter darkness have the same effect on human vision. In order to rectify this defect Pringle-Pattison tried to attribute personality to the Absolute and that way he sought to safeguard the individuality of the worshipper, in the life of the Absolute. (1) He wrote:

"I have a centre of my own——a will of my own——
which no one shares with me or can share——a centre
which I maintain even in my dealings with God Himself"

(2)

Alexander noted this point of dissent in Pringle-Pattison's book 'Hegelianism and Personality' (1887). Alexander headed his review of this book 'A Rebel Philosopher', feeling there was a real rebellion in the camp of the idealists. (3)

1. Hegelianism and Personality—pp.222,223. 2.Ibid.p.217
Pringle-Pattison further elaborated his thesis in his Gifford Lecture of 1912-1913 which was published as 'The Idea of God'. But even the personal idealism of Pringle-Pattison did not satisfy the religious mind because of its pronounced pantheistic tendencies and Dean Inge regarded him as 'not quite theistic' in his thought. (1)

A similar deficiency of idealism was felt in the sphere of morality. It was beginning to be felt that the progress in morals lay in the hands of God, who, in His own good time and place will realise Himself in the noble deeds and the heroic adventures of men. But this makes man a mere tool in God's hands. If it be so, then man is not responsible for his evil acts. Evils then are to be attributed to God in the same way in which we say:

Every virtue we possess,
And every victory won,
And every thought of holiness,
Are His alone.

Then, again, pantheism robs man of his power of freedom, initiative and true choice; and idealism, by emphasizing this immanentism, invited a reaction in the direction of Ameliorism. Alexander came to realise that deity, in which our values will be conserved and transcended, depends in part on human effort.

1. 'God and astronomers'. This was said of Pringle-Pattison for he had maintained that just as the world cannot exist without God, so God as a creator cannot exist without the world. But this prejudice against Pringle-Pattison might have been deepened by his denial of divinity to Jesus. See William Temple's reference to Pringle-Pattison in 'Nature, man and God', pp. 325-327.
In the long run, idealism encouraged Inactionism in morals and sentimentality in religion. It emphasized the reality of ideas over and above the reality of things.

"The essence of idealism whether in its popular or in its philosophical form, lies in the emotional attachment to ideas rather than to things". (1)

But things are the actual facts with which we have to deal in life. By insisting on ideas exclusively it tended to bifurcate our lives into two compartments, namely, a life of ideas and a life of things. A sentimental attachment to ideas stops any fruitful commerce with real life.

Instead of encouraging us to come to grips with life, it tends to substitute a life of imaginary conquest in spiritual realm.

"An idealistic religion is one that is purely spiritual; which rests on the separation of the spiritual from the material, and which finds its function in the spiritual field. It is a religion which has lost its reference to this world". (2)

Naturally, this sentimentality of ideas invited a realistic opposition. Ultimately, 'ideas in our heads' must come into the open world of facts.

"Mankind has lost the radical meaning of such phrases as the logic of events and the logic of passion. Logic became severed from life. .......... Things, events, objective reals must be frankly and consistently

1. Macmurray, J. 'Idealism against religion' p.8
2. Macmurray, J. Ibid. p.17
looked to as the court of last appeal for the validation of our judgments". (1)

Finally, idealism encouraged an escapist religion. It taught that everything should be what it is, for God has brought it about. We are reminded here of Browning's lines: (2)

"The lark's on the wing,
The snail's on the thorn,
God's in his heaven --
All's right with the world!"

Thus, it did not inspire any progress and change. This attitude did not satisfy some hard-hearted realists. Encouraged by a historical view of things, which the theory of evolution had deepened, they sought the real essence of religion by making an empirical survey of it. Naturally, it led to an emphasis on religious experience itself rather than on any religious dogmas. This was first achieved in a grand manner by William James in 'The Varieties of Religious Experience', and Alexander fully agreed with the spirit of it. However, a psychology of religion can explain at most, the psychical motives of worship and its utility in our life as a whole. But it cannot determine the value or worth of religious experience itself. Alexander has followed up this psychologism and historicism in a subtle way. He, following the lead of James, has put more emphasis on the function of deity than on its attributes or being. He has pointed out that religion arises out of the very nature of man as an evolving creature, but certainly

theology should also discuss the nature and being of God as well.

From the above historical retrospect, it is clear that the old materialistic mechanism and the British version of Idealism ceased to be the major tendencies of philosophical speculation towards the beginning of the 20th century, and, Alexander had to discover a new world outlook. In developing his world-view, he had to overcome the struggle between his head and heart. He was brought up in the school of idealism, and his sympathies with science had thrown his lot with the evolutionary naturalists. At every important step of his philosophical journey the ghost of idealism haunted him. Thus, Murphy has shown that the philosophy of Alexander has really succumbed to Absolutism. (1). This interweaving of idealism and naturalism has been thus traced by M. Grace Smith:

"In his scientific and analytic approach to metaphysical problems and his subordination of the theory of mind to the theory of being and his emphasis on the ultimate reality of time, he is in the naturalistic tradition. His emphasis on the 'nisus towards wholeness' and the analogous nature of mind and time reveal his kinship to some idealistic doctrines."(2)

However, we will return to this point a little later. Now,

   specially p. 562
2. Studies in Philosophical Naturalism, p. 34
we are concerned to show Alexander's general solution of philosophical problems as they appeared to him at the time when idealism ceased to be fashionable.

Idealism had failed to take time seriously and yet the scientific outlook could not be ignored. Then, again, though the scientific view had to be accepted, its mechanistic materialism had to be rejected, for life and mind could no longer be treated as machines, nor could they be explained away. Finally, supernatural elements could be eliminated from the universe by making the evolutionary process self-creative. It is for this reason that Alexander had argued against 'the argument for Design in Nature'. Precisely this was the point where idealism appeared to be reasonable and naturalism appeared to be supporting the theory of a blind process. Therefore, Alexander accepted Evolutionary Naturalism and resolutely rejected idealism.

"Alexander's acceptance of the naturalistic fact is unequivocal in the sense that out of it is to be elaborated the entire order of being. His method is that of scientific analysis in its speculative reaches. By it he discovers his first principle, Space-Time, the 'stuff of substances', the source of all reality, all matter and spirit, all fact and aspiration."(1) Though everything, including mind and deity, emerges from Space-Time, this naturalism cannot be called materialism. We will discuss this later on, but the reason of our saying so

1 Bertram Jessup, 'Studies in Philosophical Naturalism', p. 45
is that Alexander did not fully expiate the sins of his youth. In his evolutionary naturalism he found a place for tertiary qualities and values.

"In spite of the glaring instance from Spinoza's philosophy that naturalism could have religion and values not only unimpaired but exalted, the method of naturalism has been regarded with suspicion as if it were incompatible with belief in the things that are most precious to us." (1)

The evolutionary naturalism of Alexander is neither the materialism of the 19th century, nor is it the idealism of that age, but the culmination of both. The materialism of the 19th century had tried to explain all things of our experience on the basis of mechano-morphism, the scope of which was greatly extended by Darwin's theory of evolution and 'natural selection'. (2) However, the materialists were not successful in explaining all our experiences. They could not fill up gaps in their evolutionary account of things. For the time being they tried to give mechanistic account of life, but they could not mechanise consciousness at all. They therefore, taught that mind is simply an effective phenomenon which makes no difference to the behaviour of an organism, but mind or consciousness is a fact and no amount of theory can explain it away.

2. Smuts, J.C. "Holism and Evolution". P. 12, 177
When Alexander's philosophy burst forth in its full blossom the reality of life, mind and value had come to be fully accepted. Life had established itself as an independent category of thought and Bergson had made it the very foundation of his philosophy. This was a great blow to mechanism and materialism. Besides, matter itself had ceased to be regarded in the old naive way, and the new theories of physics were rapidly exploring the structural basis of the atom itself. If, therefore, evolution has to start then it must do so with something which is prior to matter in its mechanistic sense. In determinism, the nature of something which is prior to matter itself, the theory of relativity and its transformation by Minkowski owes to the help of Alexander. By this time the feeling had gained ground that Space and Time cannot exist in separation from each other but they form the inseparable entity called Space-Time. Bauts, who does not refer to Alexander at all, wrote that, according to Minkowski, the inter-penetration of Time and Space could be expressed thus: (1)

"Succession or the time-series, and co-existence or the space-series, are necessary to each other and would not be even intelligible apart from each other. For the succession (time) would perish at each step and would not even form a series, unless it had

1. Holism and Evolution. P. 247
endurance or co-existence (space). And similarly the co-existence (space) would stop at its first step and would not be spread out or extended unless it had also succession (time).

Alexander who wanted to fertilise philosophy with the significant conclusions of sciences hit upon Space-Time as the primordial stuff in the place of matter. But this postulate of empty Space-Time as the absolute reality was indirectly assisted by idealism itself. There is little doubt that British idealism was greatly influenced by Hegel and Alexander himself had studied Hegel (1) and was greatly impressed by him (2). But, in Hegel there are two contrasted tendencies of thought. According to one of these tendencies, the Absolute remains simply an Idea having its own Platonic being.

"There is no passage from this hypostatised conception to the facts of the finite world. The second line of thought starts with these facts, and treats the historical development of humanity as the process in which the Absolute comes to itself." (3)

Consequently, according to left Hegelianism, man becomes the very embodiment of the divine, and his thoughts and aspirations come to be looked upon as the very intimations of the reality at the very heart of things. Interpreted

3. Hegelianism and Personality, p.105
thus, in the concrete realisation of the Absolute, man becomes the very measure of reality. (1). The leftist hegelians would say therefore, that there

"is no goodness, no justice, no tenderness, save that which springs in the human heart," (1)

Of course, this deification of man was not followed by all Hegelians. The right winged Hegelians tended to exalt the Absolute and to belittle the significance of man. At least Bradley (1), who has most influenced Alexander, showed that man is only an appearance of Reality. But what is the nature of this Reality? In many respects the Absolute of Bradley becomes the undifferentiated Substance of Spinoza (1) and Alexander did note this nature of Bradley's Absolute (3). The Absolute of Bradley is neither personal, nor moral, nor beautiful nor true.

"it will be regarded as non-moral and impersonal, in the sense of being below these distinctions; and our Absolute will then remarkably resemble the soul-less matter of the materialists". (4)

2. Fringle-Pattison, A.Seth, 'Two Lectures on Theism'. p.37.
3. Fringle-Pattison, A.Seth 'Two Lectures on Theism'. p.32.
4. Fringle-Pattison, A.Seth 'Two Lectures on Theism'. p.57.
5. Of course, later on; Fringle-Pattison modified his statement about the Absolute of Bradley and recognised that the Absolute of Bradley cannot be less than its appearances. See 'The Idea of God' p.16.
Thus, the rightist Hegelians held man to be an appearance, but made the Absolute nebulous; the leftist Hegelians glorified man, and indirectly tended to regard the Absolute as less than mind. Hence, the immediate conclusion from Hegelianism could be made that the Absolute is inframental and even empty. Thus, even idealism supported the thesis of a blank reality. As pointed out before, science had taught the reality of motion, pure and simple. Alexander, therefore, came to the conclusion that the Supreme Reality is Space-Time. Along with Space-time the other features of emergence, creativity etc., also came to be realised by Alexander in the following way.

Not only Bradley but also Spinoza had influenced Alexander. We find that Spinoza had constructed a naturalistic pantheism and he had taught that all things are mere modes of One single substance. But all modes do not reflect God or Substance equally. An angel manifests God more than a mouse. In all the modes there is an order of perfection. Similarly, Bradley had pointed out that all finite things are but appearances, but there are degrees of reality in all of them. A stone is less harmonious than a person and therefore a person will need less transmutation than a stone in the life of the Absolute. From the viewpoint of the 'order of perfection' or 'degrees of reality', one could introduce a continuity between matter, life and mind, which materialism had left as unsolved riddles. We find
that Alexander has simply transformed the doctrines of 'order of perfection' and 'degrees of reality' into his theory of emergence, but this theory of emergence received its support from yet another source.

The theory of evolution had left a strong impression on Alexander and he was inclined to think that a historical development is the very key towards the understanding of world-riddles. Therefore, he protested against Hegel's logic, for it had taken the place of historical development (1). But even Hegel had shown that nature and spirit have evolved from a common source. Now, in what mode or manner can we think of this evolution and development from the common source? It can be conceived in two ways, namely, as an unfoldment or explication of that which is enfolded, or, as the outgrowth of something which hitherto has not been in being. The theory of unfoldment, either in the form of immanent or external teleology, was shown by Bergson (2) to be the denial of real time and history. Therefore, Alexander, in close sympathy with Bergson, accepted the doctrine of Creative Evolution. Hence, according to him, matter, life and mind are new arrivals in the creative advance and, as such, there is always more in the end than in the beginning. Smuts who shared the same

view of creative evolution expressed it thus:

"we believe in evolution, but it is no more the mechanical evolution of a generation or two ago, but a creative evolution. we believe in the growth which is really such and becomes ever more and more in the process. we believe in Genesis which by its very nature is epigenesis". (1)

If creative evolution, with its emergence, be accepted then we can call in the arrival of the higher from the lower, in the course of history. Mind too, therefore, has evolved, later in time. even Hegel could support the view that the Absolute has come to acquire consciousness at the end of a long process of development. Therefore, Alexander held that the creative evolution need not be explained in terms of mind. (*)

Thus, Alexander came to establish the reality of Space-Time as the universal matrix, from which matter, life and mind have evolved, and further because of the evolutionary nisus implanted in Space-Time, higher emergents will

1. Holism and Evolution. p. 39

it is unfortunate that Smuts did not refer to Alexander and yet his views are similar to that of Alexander and the following statement of Smuts clearly reveals what Alexander accepted in fact: "To view the ideal or spiritual element in the universe as the dominant factor is to ignore the fact that the universe was before even the ideal or spiritual had appeared on the horizon; that the ideal or spiritual is a new and indeed recent creation in the order of the universe, that it was not implicit in the beginnings and has not been reached by a process of unfolding; but that from a real pre-existing order of things it has been creatively evolved as a new factor; and that its importance to-day should not be retrospectively antedated to a time when the world existed without it." (Holism and Evolution, p. 39)
follow in due course. At the very outset, the whole procedure of Alexander appeared so hopeful. It harmonised with the recent gains of physics and mathematics, it included all that was defensible in materialism, and, in keeping with the gospel of the 19th century evolutionism, it glorified man. Man, under this scheme of evolutionary naturalism, became the 'roof and crown of things'. Not only man occupied the very crest of the evolutionary process, but he also now became the determiner of the future. In him lie the mysteries of the past and the key to the future. Man not only became divine, but more, he became god-maker. (1*) The religion of Humanity now gives way to the worship of super-man, whom man himself appeared to be bringing about.

We will find out in the sequel that the whole scheme turns out to be unworkable. If evolution means anything then it means that there is a steady progress and this progress reflects a purpose. A blind process cannot be expected to proceed along a certain spiral advance. 

Development or progress 'is possible, therefore, only to a being who forms a part of a divinely guided process, and

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1. Sheen, F.J. "Religion Without God". P.17

* Armstrongattison seems to have foreshadowed Alexander. He had pointed out that evolution should be interpreted as the working of a completed actuality. Otherwise, there will be the theory of an evolutionary naturalism, according to which man became divine. "The appearance of man becomes then identical with the creation of God; man creates himself, and at the same time brings God to the birth". (Two Lectures on Theism. P.44)
who draws in consequence from a fount of eternal fulness". (1)

In the light of this general setting of the philosophy of Alexander, let us trace the history of the development of his thought, from his early years up to the end. But before we do so, a short biography of Alexander, with reference to his academic career may help us to understand that history all the better.

SECTION TWO.

A SHORT BIOGRAPHY:

Samuel Alexander was an Australian Jew, who came to England in 1877 and till his death in 1936 did not leave his adopted country. For all practical purposes his life is uneventful and remained more or less confined to the academic pursuits common in British universities of the period.

Samuel Alexander was the posthumous son of his father of the same name. He was born on the 6th January 1855 and for the most part of his boyhood he was educated in private schools. He entered Wesley College in 1871 and matriculated in 1873. He entered the university of Melbourne the same year as an under-graduate student in the Arts Course. He remained there for two years and did extraordinarily well, securing all the three exhibitions of the college, a thing which has not been achieved by anyone before him or after. His intellectual powers were easily recognised and he was advised by his teachers to proceed to England for further education. Alexander sailed from Australia for England in 1877 and after a voyage of 100 days reached London. He secured a scholarship by competitive examination at Balliol College, Oxford in 1878. He took his degree in 1881, and he had firsts in Mathematical and Classical Mods, and in Classical Greats. In spite of this Alexander regretted his not having gone to Cambridge for Mathematics.
During his undergraduate days at Oxford, Green was the leading philosopher, and H. Netleship and A. C. Bradley were his official tutors. At that time Cook Wilson too was a lecturer at Lincoln, and it is also certain that Alexander had a close relation with him. On the whole, as Joseph also maintains, the philosophical climate of Oxford at the time of Alexander (that is, 1877-1879) was thoroughly idealistic. Hence it is true that Alexander was bred in the idealistic tradition of Oxford. Carr, in his postcard of the 17th June, 1800, reminded Alexander probably of this phase of his idealistic thought.

After the passing of the Test Act in 1670, it was difficult for a Jew to get a Fellowship, but Alexander was the first Jew to be elected as a fellow after that Act. He was elected to the Fellowship at Lincoln College in 1862 and held it till June 6th, 1873. He spent the first year of his Fellowship in German Universities and after his return lectured during most of the years of his Fellowship. As an experimental measure he had gone to London in 1860, lecturing for a part of the time in Toynbee Hall. His lectures at Oxford dealt with metaphysics and ethics and sometimes with Greek logic. As a tutor he taught all the usual subjects, which included logic, moral philosophy and politics.


We will later discuss the influence of Cook Wilson on the development of Alexander's realism.
From 1865 Alexander widened the sphere of his academic life and joined the Aristotelian Society in the same year and soon became one of its Vice-Residents. In this circle he came in contact with eminent philosophers like Sidgwick and Romances and with such promising thinkers as Ritchie, Huish, and Stout. In the long run his connection with the Aristotelian Society proved very beneficial, for from this platform, in his three successive residential Addresses he elaborated his realistic philosophy.

In 1867 Alexander was awarded the Green Moral Philosophy Prize for a dissertation in Ethics. Later, on the basis of this dissertation he published his first book 'Moral Order and Progress'. Here was an attempt, as he said, to Darwinize the Anglo-Aristotelian-Hegelian tradition which still prevailed in Oxford. The book went through three impressions, but after 1912 Alexander dissatisfied with it, for by that time his more mature reflections had gone far ahead of the simple naturalism of the book. The publication of this book however, brought him into close relationship with Lloyd Morgan, enabling them to develop their philosophy in close collaboration. But, of course, the two differed in some fundamental details. (1)

It was an established opinion of Alexander that philosophy should take more cognizance of scientific conclusions, and at the time this meant that philosophers

1. Morgan L. 'Emergent Evolution', p. 14; also sec the correspondence between Alexander and Lloyd Morgan.
should interest themselves in psychology and biology. From the letters of Stout of this period it is clear that Alexander was very much interested in psychology. That he made a successful case for psychology at Oxford is also asserted by Stout. (1) To acquaint himself with the latest developments in experimental psychology, Alexander spent the winter of 1890-91 with Professor Munsterberg. Later, he also visited the Nancy School. Alexander has left an ms. of a complete book in 15 chapters on General Psychology, which he might have prepared for publication at one time.

Alexander taught psychology along with other philosophical subjects for many years, first at Oxford and later at Manchester. His deep interest in and grasp of psychological principles are clear from his writings, especially in his realistic explanation of the objectivity of 'varying sensa' and the different kinds of appearances.

Finally, it was this psychology which, in conjunction with the realism of Moore, enabled Alexander to develop fully his evolutionary naturalism in "Mind, Life and Deity."

After his return from Germany in 1891 Alexander made several attempts to secure a chair in philosophy. Wallace, Cook, Wilson, R.M. Hettleship, A.O. and F.H. Bradley, Bosanquet and Leslie Stephen all testified to Alexander's powers and promise of philosophical achievement and even the wayfaring professor of Physiology testified to the completeness of

1. MIND. 1/406 p. 127.
Alexander's knowledge of the nervous system. (I) As a result Alexander was elected to the chair of philosophy at Manchester in 1875. He remained in Manchester till his death in 1958.

The merit of Alexander was recognised from the very beginning and honours came to him easily. He was elected to the British Academy in 1913, and was given honorary doctorates by St. Andrews, Birmingham, Oxford, Durham, Liverpool and Cambridge. He was made an honorary Fellow of Lincoln College in 1916 and of Balliol College in 1925. The crowning honour of O.M. was conferred on him in 1930. In 1925 Manchester University presented him with a bust of himself by Epstein and he was very proud of it.

Alexander had a compromising spirit in philosophy, and he did his utmost to harmonise his naturalism with all that was best in the European tradition of 2500 years. His philosophy is a grand system, which seeks to weld together all the main tendencies of thought from Thales to Einstein. The character of his philosophy has been so well described by Metz that we cannot do better than quote him:

1. It is interesting to note the impression of bosanquet of Alexander as compared with Stout. In his letter of 6th May of either 1872 or 1873 he wrote to Alexander that he considered Stout to be a specialist and of Alexander he said 'that you are a mature and thoroughly trained philosopher, learned in all the wisdom of the Egyptians'.

2. Alexander continued to have a deep interest in physiological psychology and this is clear from his correspondence with Lloyd Morgan, Sherrington and Head, almost till the publication of SIMPL TIME AND EAT.
"Alexander takes over Hume's empirical philosophy, but not his scepticism; Spencer's evolutionary philosophy, but not his agnosticism; the theory of knowledge of New Realism, without holding at it, using it only as an organ of a foundation for his metaphysics; and the physical theory of relativity, but not without a speculative evaluation and subordination of it to his own system". (1)

He has been described by Stout as 'perhaps the greatest of his generation'; (2), but as a wave of anti-metaphysical thinking has overtaken European philosophy at the present time, his philosophy has not aroused the interest which it certainly deserves. Speculation has now run dry, but metaphysics will last, as Ward comments, (3), as long as the human race, and with a return of interest in metaphysics his work is sure to exert an important influence on future speculation.

Even if Alexander cannot be regarded as the highest or greatest of his generation of genius, at least he has been a 'master-cartographer of his time', as Boyce Gibson (4) has called him, and, for the nobleness and the simplicity of his character he could be counted as inferior to none, when the end came he was ready to meet it and he passed away on the 13th September 1926.

1. A Hundred Years of British philosophy. P. 64.
2. Personal Reminiscences. P. 126
4. O. Cit. P. 54.
Alexander's philosophical career falls into three periods, namely: (i) the first period in which he formulated his problem and suggested their tentative solutions; (ii) the second period in which he finalised his solution in a complete world-system with boldness, breadth and tenacity; and (iii) the final stage in which his philosophical vision remained confined in the narrow field of 'values'. The first period roughly covers the writings between 1064 and 1081. In this period of apprenticeship there are writings which may be classified under two headings, namely, the writings meant for popular consumption and class lectures, and the writings reserved for philosophical discussion. Till 1092 Alexander supported an idealistic trend in his popular and class lectures. This is clear from his early unpublished works, viz: 'Fingerposts to Religion' (1) 'Elementary Ideas in Philosophy' (2). To this may be added 'The Commonplace Book' which has been mentioned by Laird (3). In these writings Alexander remained satisfied with idealism but he showed no enthusiasm for it. This idealism is clear from the following statements from 'Fingerposts to Religion':

1. Alexander jotted down its date as 'about 1065'. It is a typescript of 43 pages.
2. It is a typescript of 47 pages. It was probably meant for class work. It dates between 1071-1072.
"There are borne in upon me fragments from a world of things, which I believe intelligible because I know it under the forms of intelligence, and which I hold to be continuous and single, because wherever I know it, it enters into the continuous course of my mental history. In the process of acquiring new knowledge lies the first germ of that sense of a great intelligible world, which regarded as a single individual is the barest and most unemotional description of our conception of God." (1) The same idealistic thought was pursued in 'Elementary Ideas in Philosophy'. In 'Elementary Ideas' Alexander adopted Objective Idealism(2) against the Subjective Idealism of Berkeley and called it 'true knowledge'. In 'true knowledge', he said, reality depends on mind, but this mind does not consist of chance experience or knowledge but rational knowledge (2). "The postulate of this (modern) idea is 'the real world is intelligible and all the real world is made up of thought'. Things as they exist are really composed of thought, and they only seem to have solid material existence on account of the particular ways in which these thoughts are connected together. The reality of things depends on true knowledge". (3)

1. Fingerposts. 2. Elementary Ideas. 3. Elementary Ideas. 9, 25
3. Idealism means that the universe is the embodiment of mind. Any theory which seeks the explanation, or the ultimate raison d'être, of the cosmic evolution in the realization of reason, self-consciousness, or spirit, may fairly claim to be included under this designation (Baldwin's Dictionary of Philosophy and Psychology). Subjective Idealism means that things are the ideas of thinking beings. But logically it would lead to idealism, that is, the view that thinker alone is real and all things and other persons are his ideas. But even Berkeley who is considered to be a subjective idealist did not go so far. Hence subjective idealism means that things are ultimately the ideas of an Absolute Mind. Further, according to it, though the world cannot exist without the Absolute Mind, yet the Absolute Mind can exist without the world. Besides, the order of the world depends on the arbitrary will of the Absolute Mind.

Objective Idealism holds that all objects are thoughts of an Absolute mind. Further, as opposed to subjective idealism it holds that the world and the Absolute Mind are organic to each other. If the world cannot exist without the Absolute Mind then the Absolute Mind too cannot exist without the world. Again, the order and connection in the world are logical and as such they do not depend on the arbitrary will of the Absolute Mind.
But Alexander was called an idealist probably less for his writings than for his Oxford education in philosophy, which, as we have said, was predominantly idealistic. Indeed for this reason Shadworth Hodgson called Alexander an idealist in 1867 (1). But in all his writings meant for philosophical discussion he favoured an anti-idealistic trend and did not show any idealistic tendency. Even in his first symposium, 'Is mind synonymous with consciousness?' (loc.cit.) against the idealism of Hitchie and Bosanquet, he maintained an anti-idealistic standpoint about the existence of the Absolute mind and the timeless ego which was supposed to be involved in any piece of knowledge. He called this conception of a mind as something quite different from natural objects of knowledge, an unjustified assumption. (2). The true view of mind, according to Alexander, should be the following: "My own view is that mind is a thing in precisely the same sense as all other things, and that it is a peculiar and unique thing in the same way as other things are peculiar and unique." (3)

This remained a lasting conviction of Alexander and he repeated it in 1936. (4) Thus, in real philosophical discussions Alexander was never a pure idealist. Even Hodgson had to admit after having called him an idealist that Alexander had entirely surrendered Mr. Bosanquet's form of idealism (5). Hence, we find that Alexander as a thinker always displayed an anti-idealistic leaning and this is amply supported from the tone of his reviews of books at this time.

3. Ibid. p. 10.
even in his first review-work he sounded a note of anti-idealism. Reviewing 'Lotze's "System of Philosophy"' in 1864 he pointed out that idealism has shocked the scientific way of thinking in explaining nature. (1). Again, he held that the so-called timeless ego involved in knowledge must be in time and not above it. (2). Continuing the review of it in June 1864, in the same magazine, he pointed out that idealism does not explain the relation between the individual and the Absolute mind, and the relation of the self-reproducing mind with the seemingly unconscious nature. (3). Finally, Alexander closed the first review-work with the following comment on space and time: "The discussion of time and space is peculiarly difficult, and—especially in the case of the former—bristles with debatable points. We cannot help thinking, with some diffidence, that the belief which regards space subjective and time objective is based on the confusion, reprobated by Kant himself..." (4)

Later on, in the review of 'Hegelianism and Personality' by Seth, Alexander gave way almost to an outburst of impatience against neo-Kantianism in England, which he considered to be the result of an enslavement by German thought. "In England the Kantian reaction owes much of its popularity to its being a repudiation of the traditional English philosophy, and in its vehemence seems to overlook the real meaning of the latter." (5)

Now, the central theory of neo-Kantianism is, according to Alexander, the concept of the Transcendental Self or the Timeless Spirit and against this he wrote:

1. The Oxford Magazine, May 40th 1864, p.276. Col.2
2. Ibid. p.276.
3. Ibid. p.276.
4. Ibid. p.276. Col.2
5. The Oxford Magazine, June 6th 1864, p.416

Neo-Kantianism is a form of idealism which is based on the epistemology of Kant. But it rejects the ontological status of 'things-in-themselves'. According to it the phenomenal world is real and it is the realm of ideas. This form of idealism is best represented by Green.
"The real question is, is the fundamental conception a valid one in itself? Because our English psychologists have made the mind a succession of events, are we to go to the other extreme and declare the mind a timeless condition of knowledge? Is there no unity in a tree, which grows and grows in time? Why may not the mind be such a unity? (1)

The same anti-idealistic tendency is shown in his review of "The religious aspect of philosophy" by Royce, (2) and in his first contribution to philosophy, namely: 'Hegel's conception of nature', he wrote this as its conclusion: "The office of the philosophy of nature is to explain how it is that nature, which is penetrated by the spirit, can in the first place, be different in spirit and next be by insensible stages overcome so as to be spirit. The spirit must come forth out of that which is not spirit; it is the mysticism of the reflective understanding to cut the knot by identifying spirit straight away with that which it is not. (3)

But it must be confessed that Alexander deviated from idealism very cautiously and he did so by trying to retain all that was valuable in it. Thus, in his first book "Moral Order and Evolution" (1867), he emphasized evolutionary naturalism and showed an anti-apriori attitude. He was empirical but he did not favour Spencer's evolutional empiricism. He wanted to include all that appeared to him valuable in the idealistic ethics of Green. He therefore wrote that instead of finding any opposition between Aristotelian-Hegelian tradition and Darwinism, he found the fulfilment of the idealistic tradition in Darwinism. (4)

1. Ibid. p.416.
In general, in the first period, Alexander's thought is characterised by its protests against apriorism. Everywhere it sought to substitute an empirical explanation for an apriori theory. In 'Demarcation of Logic and Psychology' (1) he preferred Mill to Bradley and Bosanquet (2) and as an anti-idealist he wrote:

"I will now enquire whether a similar distinction of logical and psychological elements could not settle the whole controversy about all axiomatic knowledge — whether axioms are not derived historically from experience, that is, from a direct experience of certain bodily conditions and changes, and are transferred to the outer world on the evidence of certain outward experiences." (3)

He tried the same empirical explanation of the category of time and in the symposium, 'Has the perception of Time an origin in thought?' he showed that 'time' is derived empirically.

"But also the very perception of a single infinite time which is not regarded as evidence for the perceptual character of time is an extension given to the perception of a concrete time by the abstract of time in general". (4)

In this period however, his anti-apriorism is most pronounced in relation to values in general and to moral values in particular. This is clear from 'The Idea of Value', KIND 1892, but this was already attempted on a larger scale earlier in 'Hegelianism and Personality' by Seth, Alexander.

Naturalistic epistemology: We have already seen that in the review of 'Hegelianism and Personality' by Seth, Alexander

1. It is a typescript of 54 pages, Dated June 12, 1893.
2. Ibid. p.2
3. Ibid. p.34; see also 'Philosophy and Biology', 1894-95, pp.12-20.
wanted to substitute the slogan 'back to the tradition of British empiricism' for the cry 'back to Kant'. He thought that this was quite in keeping with the times, for at this time British empiricism had a powerful ally in Darwinism. The real answer to Humean scepticism, said Alexander, could be made by Darwinised British empiricism and not by Kantianism. (1) As we have said Darwin's theory of organic evolution had very marked influence on Alexander and it accounted for his later theories of the historicity of things, emergence, Deity and naturalism. As a matter of fact his evolutionary naturalism may be looked upon as the philosophical version of the Organic evolution of Darwin. But this Darwinian totalitarianism took possession of his mind gradually. This was first shown in Ethics with the reduction of 'ought' to 'is', and emphasis which we will note also in our later study of him. But from 1894 the extension of Evolutionary Naturalism was made into the realms of epistemology also. Till this time Alexander did not touch epistemology in any marked degree, except in 'Demarcation of Logic and Psychology' (1895). But now he began

I. Ibid. p. 33

- Materialism, challenging the cogency of the cosmological teleological and moral arguments for the existence of an infinite intelligence, holds that the universe requires no supernatural cause and government, but is self-existent, self-explanatory, self-operating and self-directing; that the world-process is purposeless, deterministic and only incidentally productive of man; that human life, physical, mental, moral and spiritual, is an ordinary natural event attributable in all respects to the ordinary operations of nature; and that man's ethical values can be justified on natural grounds, without recourse to any rational faculty and the Absolute Mind.
to explain knowledge empirically, by basing its validity on 'Natural Selection'. This development in Alexander is not only supported by the internal evidence of his writings but also by the testimony of Mrs. Beer (1) who was a student of Alexander between 1673-1676. The Darwinian empiricism was applied to the theory of knowledge by Alexander in 'Philosophy and Biology'. (2) In this paper he pointed out that only those species survive which are adapted to their environment.

"But the higher we rise in the scale of animal existence, and the more consciousness and intelligence enter into the life of the creature, the less does adaptation depend merely on correct physical responses to stimuli and more does it depend upon correct introspection of the surrounding world. Knowledge which is in exact correspondence with the world is an essential portion of the adaptation while a conscious being must perform in order to secure permanent existence; and the more developed the type of animal being, the larger is the part played by the ISTAR interpretation of things in determining success or failure". (3)

On the same basis of 'natural selection' Alexander held that our knowledge of axioms must correctly inform us about the intrinsic nature of things. (4) The same conclusion about the validity of knowledge on the basis of natural selection was paradox in the symposium 'On the Nature and Range of Evolution' (5)

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1. Mrs. Beer sent her reminiscence of her student's days to Alexander and in it she mentioned that a change came over in Alexander's thinking between 1674-5.
3. It is a typescript of 15 pages and is dated about 1674-5.
4. Ibid. p. 5/17.
5. It is a typescript of 13 pages.
"The persistence of true knowledge shows that these modes of apprehension are adapted to the world; because if they had not been adapted they must have perished. This adaptation of truth to the world is called the validity of true knowledge". (1)

This explanation of true knowledge on the basis of 'natural selection' was not pursued by Alexander in his subsequent writings, but he continued to hold it in an attenuated form to the last. He believed that as a result of natural selection the apparatus of knowing had evolved, so as to reveal reality in its appropriate form. (2) Anyway, the important problem of knowledge is not how we come to acquire it but what is the real nature and status of the object of knowledge proper. According to idealism, things are but thoughts, of course, the divine objective thought. But as Alexander questioned the reality of Universal Mind, so he also questioned the validity of regarding objects in this light, while his philosophy tended towards realism, before 1903 he did not seem to have reached it. No doubt he knew the distinction between the knowing act and its object which had been introduced by Robhouse in 'The Theory of Knowledge' (1876). But he had forgotten it, or, "as is more probable", said Alexander, "was not mature enough in my own mind when I read them to understand their importance..." (3) From a letter of Stout to Alexander, dated June 22, 1901, it seems probable that from 1901 Alexander was progressing towards a realistic theory of things. This letter of five pages deals with the

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1. 'On the nature and range of evolution'. p.7.
2. S.T.D. 17. p.73; also see B.F.V. 222-223.
nature of sensation. Stout held that the sensation is an object but it is a psychical in nature and probably Alexander held it to be physical. Stout wrote:

"I feel impelled to write something on the point you raised at our last meeting. You urged that sensations are objects as if this were a fact I had overlooked or denied, as if it made some vital difference to my position. This I cannot admit. The issue between us is, I am inclined to think, mainly verbal."

The issue, of course, was not verbal as the subsequent events proved. But then the subsequent events belong to the second phase of Alexander's philosophical development, and before we pass on now to this phase, let us summarise the philosophical thought of Alexander, following Laird (1).

In the first period Alexander was interested in showing the sufficiency of naturalism in ethics and in preferring Darwinism to Hegelianism in epistemology and in holding a theism based on reverence or religious emotion (2) as he later termed it.

The Second Phase of Alexander's thought:- The second phase covers the years between 1901 and 1923. This was the period of production or execution in marked contrast with the previous phase of much spade-work and long incubation. Without the intensive preparation of this period the full blossoming of the evolutionary naturalism of Alexander could not have taken place. We have already seen that Alexander's thought purported to be a system of Evolutionary Naturalism, at first in ethics and then in epistemology. But before it could be

2. Fingerposts to Religion, pp. 6-7.
applied to all the fields of metaphysics, it needed a reformed epistemology and a revolutionary ontology. A bold programme of this nature required years of speculation and indeed the full philosophical vision unfolded itself for him slowly and gradually in a plodding analysis of the total situation.

How much of realism Alexander acquired by his own independent thinking and how much of it he owed to others, will remain a mystery, unless the full correspondence of his early years be brought to light. The real reason for this is that Alexander preferred to give credit to others for many contributions which he himself had made. But it seems fairly sound to hold that Alexander developed his Realism, at least in epistemology, from Moore's 'Refutation of Idealism' (1903). Most probably Alexander made a start towards a realistic epistemology about August 1, 1904. This guess is based on a letter from Bradley to Alexander. It appears that Alexander had requested Bradley for his opinion of Reid. Bradley wrote:

"You will be amused to hear that I never read a page of Reid. I suppose he puts things frankly. You will, I hope, go on with your proposed essay and finish it." (Dated August 2, 1904)

Alexander seems to have taken some time in finishing his essay and probably sent a draft of it to A. E. Taylor, as is clear from the letter of Taylor to Alexander, dated September 10th, 1905. Taylor wrote:

"I was much pleased to receive the long expected letter from you, and even more to find how much solid material for philosophical reflection it contained. . . . . . But I can see from what I have made out that you are at work on a very
fruitful line of enquiry, and I should not wonder if our ideas in process of time are found to converge increasingly. I remember that Sorely complained to me at St. Louis last year of what he called the 'surrender to Moore,' which he professed to find in my address there on the place of metaphysics among the sciences."

Then again, in another letter of June 15th 1906, Taylor referred to the philosophical writings of Alexander in the following way:

"The shameful time I have kept your MS. ....... As to the anti-Berkeleyan thesis of p. 1 we are both in accord with you..."

Thus, we conclude that the New Realistic thought in Alexander began to take a tangible shape from the year 1844-5.

We have already said that Alexander was inspired by Moore, but unlike Moore he was always interested in the construction of a synoptic philosophy. As matter of fact, he held that a philosophy proper should be a systematic and synoptic. (1) His philosophy developed through his epistemology in the following way.

The realistic epistemology of Alexander was no doubt influenced by Moore, but it was greatly modified by his psychology and this psychology in turn was based on the teachings of Ward and Stout. In his realism he started with a complete dualism of the knowing process and the known object. This was in diametrical opposition to the then prevailing idealistic epistemology. In an idealistic epistemology the self or ego is exalted to the rank of a law-giver

1. "What is Philosophy?" Or, Philosophy and Science, pp. 7, 9.
to things, to be a measure of reality. The anti-idealistic reaction, which was gathering force in Alexander, tended to dethrone mind. If the idealists subjectivised things and the knowledge of them, then Alexander objectivised knowledge to its extreme. Every object of knowledge, according to him, is non-mental. Even images, ideas and thoughts are non-mental. This theory of pan-objectivism brought his face to face with the problems of the past in remembering and of self-knowledge. His theory of the past in remembering brought him in contact with the analogous teaching of Bergson, and, Carr and Alexander had correspondence in regard to it in the first quarter of 1912. Concerning 'self', Alexander held that it could be 'enjoyed', but it could not be known. (1) This let to the denial of introspection in the real sense of the term, and brought him very near to behaviourism, especially that of Holt. However, Alexander never denied the reality of mind or its importance in the vast democracy of things. But he could not fully balance his acceptance and rejection of the pre-eminence of mind and this has vitiated his whole philosophy. In his epistemology, he did not accord any high place to mind, and regarded it as a thing like all other things. But in his axiology mind has been given the place of the creator of values. But, then again, in his ontology and theology mind has been denied its share of importance.

The insistence of Alexander on the objectivity of the varying sense and the reality of the past necessitated a new approach to the problem of Space and Time. Later on, for him, the doctrine of Alexander only verbally resembles the idealistic + the knower cannot be known.
the mathematicians and the physicists had developed the theory
of relativity which made time the fourth dimension of space.
Always on the lookout for contributions from the sciences with
which to fertilize philosophy, he transformed the theory of
the mathematical physics into his metaphysical theory of
Space-Time, with the development of the notion of Space-time,
as the ultimate stuff out of which everything has come, the
Naturalism of Alexander reached its final consummation. His
full philosophical vision was completed by September, 1714.(1)

In the second period Alexander wrote a number of lengthy
viii-xi (1908-11), Mind 1912-13 British Journal of Psychology
1911, The Proceedings of The British Academy 1914 and also
some papers for popular consumption in the Journal of
Education 1909, Glasgow Herald 1910 and Hibbert Journal 1909-10
Apart from these papers he wrote a small book on 'Locke' in
1906, which was very favourably received by the experts. The
thoroughness with which Alexander wrestled with his original
contributions to New Realism made him a prominent thinker, and
as such he was appointed a Gifford lecturer in 1715 in Glasgow.
He delivered his Gifford lectures in the year 1717 and 1718,
and published them in the famous book SPACE, TIME and DEITY in
1920. The book since then has become an object of deep
interest to not a few lovers of philosophy. Laird has called

1. This is clear from the dating of the draft of 'Deity'.
it 'the boldest adventure in detailed speculative metaphysics attempted in so grand a manner by an English writer between 1655............and 1920'. (1). Alexander himself had thought that his philosophy was destined to be the philosophy of the future. (2). In a way certainly, he has gone beyond both Realism and Idealism, and his philosophy has much thought for the future. However, towards the end of his philosophical career, he thought that nobody read him and that he has only prepared the way for Whitehead to come on the stage.

The publication of TIME AND DAILY closed the second phase of Alexander's speculation. There were many comments and adverse criticisms along with deep appreciation of the work. He publicly replied only to Broad and Stout in Mind of 1921 and 1923 respectively. He put forth his position finally in the preface to the second impression of the book in 1927. His work remained an 'ingredient in the philosophical ferment of the day' for at least a decade.

**Alexander and Spinoza:**

Alexander himself pointed out that his doctrine of Enjoyment brought him to Spinoza. (3). But certainly there are many other Spinozistic doctrines which are found in the philosophy of Alexander. The identity of the brain-processes and mind, the conative nature of the mental processes, pleasure-pain as vital processes, the artificialities of values, the

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all-comprehensiveness and adequacy of naturalism, the doctrine of nisus, and so on, can be traced to Spinozism. Even the doctrine of God as the whole universe straining towards deity, has been thought to be Spinozistic by Webb. (1) Of course, the denial of any real reciprocity on the part of God in answer to worship is Spinozistic. Indeed, Alexander did not leave his readers merely guessing, for he wrote five essays on Spinoza, elaborating his philosophy as an emendation of Spinozism. In 'Spinoza and Time' (1921) Alexander tried to show some of the changes which would follow if Spinoza, instead of 'mind' had introduced 'time' in his doctrines of attributes. (2). In many ways this work is important, for it convincingly shows that Alexander's own philosophy is really Spinozistic, if not in actual execution then at least in spirit. The major difference between Spinoza and Alexander is that one is static in his conception of the ultimate and the other is dynamic. (3) But in the end the Space-Time matrix of Alexander is as blank and empty as the Substance of Spinoza. Again, as Spinoza tried to include the things of our daily life under the theory of modes, and yet declared them to be mere appearances, for they have no reality of their own; similarly, Alexander tried to do justice to novelty, creativity and the qualitative entities of our experience under the doctrine of 'emergence', and yet denied them reality by declaring them to be mere accidents in the

2. See the hint of this relationship in S.D.D.1, p. 342.
3. Alexander did note that Spinoza's system was not static, but he thought that 'time has been slipped into extension out of the undefined activity of God'. (F.I.G. p. 225)
circumambient ocean of Space-time. For these points of close resemblance Alexander has been called the Spinoza of the 20th century, as Whitehead has been called the Leibniz. (1). Alexander himself said: if they ascribe on my cinerary urn Erravit cum Spinoza, I am well content'. (2), and thus was proud to be called Spinozistic (3).

In 'Spinoza: An Address' (1927), he pointed out that the naturalism of Spinoza was a blend of science and philosophy, and yet this naturalism had room for values and God. The same theme was re-presented in 'Lessons from Spinoza' (1927). In a very short article called 'Spinoza and Philosophy of Religion' (1933) Alexander gave the clearest account of his theology. Only in 'Spinoza' (1955) Alexander remained content with the exposition of Spinoza alone.

Third Phase:-

After publishing his Space, Time and Deity Alexander felt that his major contributions to philosophy were over. In the third period he busied himself with the problem of 'Value'. No doubt he had devoted some 50 pages to this problem in his SPACE, TIME AND DEITY, but he dwelt almost exclusively to it in the last phase of his philosophical career. 'Art and material' was the first important lecture at Manchester on Aesthetics, and in 1937 he concentrated on the psychology of artistry in 'Art and Instinct'. Many other similar articles followed and finally

1. Hume, A.D. 'Essays in philosophy. 1.16.
he put down his findings about Aesthetics in a book called BEAUTY AND OTHER FORMS OF VALUE in 1933. Even afterwards Alexander continued to contribute to the philosophical thought almost till his end. His last contribution was 'The Objectivity of Value' in the 16th International Congress of Philosophy, Vol. X. 1937.

SECTION FOUR.

ANTI-APRIONISM AND THE EARLY BEGINNINGS OF NATURALISM.

We have already seen that Alexander favoured British Empiricism against the neo-Kantianism of Oxford. The Oxford Idealism, according to him, as we said, was based on the doctrines of a timeless ego, and the eternal categories. Hence, in order to undermine the foundation of the Neo-Kantianism, he tried to oppose its apriorism on the basis of British Empiricism. But he also knew that mere hearkening back to Locke, Berkeley and Hume would not do. At least the history of British philosophy had shown to him that the scepticism of Hume was the logical outcome of the empiricism of Locke and certainly nobody can finally rest in scepticism. No doubt Hume was logically consistent with his empirical premises, but scepticism has to be rejected for it does not do justice to all the demands of life. (1). Alexander did not accept the scepticism of Hume either. He thought, as we saw, that Darwinism was the real

answer to the scepticism of Hum. (1). But did that mean the acceptance of the 
evolutional empiricism of Spencer? No. Alexander considered the latter's 
aposteriori explanation of the categories to be unsatisfactory, (2), for it appeared 
to him to be based on the unproven theory of the transmission of the acquired 
traits (3), and so he preferred to go back to Darwin himself. (4). Alexander argued that if the categories 
cannot be derived from experience of an individual then they cannot be derived from the transmission of the acquired 
knowledge (5). If space, number were not already in reality, 
they could not be explained in terms of subjective experience at all, whether of the individual or the race. He expressed 
it thus: '...how could experiences which were not themselves 
spatial or numerical, no matter from how many generations they were inherited, come to feel or look like space or number?"(6) 
Besides, Alexander did not share the belief of Spencer that 
with the advancement of human society, the sense of moral 'ought' will disappear. No doubt for Alexander, the moral 'ought' was a fact, but it was a fact of higher order and will continue to remain with the existence of the higher order. 
Finally, Alexander rejected Spencer's evolutional empiricism on the theological ground too, considering the worship of the Unknowable a mere deification of ignorance. (1)

Though Alexander rejected the Evolulional Empiricism of Spencer, he accepted the spirit of it. This spirit in philosophy meant the acceptance of Naturalism on a vast scale. It meant for him the weaving together in a system the many scattered conclusions of different sciences. He regarded philosophy as a synoptic science and wrote thus:

"Philosophy combines with those of biological science, of psychology, of ethics, of the science of religion, of art, of politics, and puts them in their connection with one another. It embraces all the world of nature and of human interests..."

Thus, the very early bias of Alexander was for some sort of a naturalistic metaphysics in which all that is valuable in experience could be given a proper place.

Believing in a constructive thought, he found mere polemic irritating and unconstructive. "Of criticism," he wrote, "we have had enough and more than enough. It must end somewhere." (4)

The task of the philosophers, he believed, is to invent contrivances for seeing all things aright, and the argument is to be used for putting the reader into a position from which this vision can be had. (5) As such he preferred an outflanking movement to a frontal attack upon the citadel of idealism—a movement which ultimately assumed the formidable shape of Evolutionary Naturalism in SPACE, TIME, AND DOLL J.

THE POINTS OF EARLY DISAGREEMENT WITH IDEALISM:— Even when Alexander disagreed with idealism, he regarded it as the most

MIND 1921, p. 422-423.
important speculation of the time. For this reason many
elements of Alexander's philosophy can be traced to idealism
and this was noted by his well-known idealist contemporaries
Bradley and Bosanquet. Indeed, Bosanquet in his 'Contemporary
Philosophy' regarded Alexander's philosophy as closer to
idealism than that of the Neo-idealists, (2) and looked upon
his neo-realism as having 'the greatest sympathy with
idealism'. (3). Bradley too, noticed that Alexander's deity
as a quality higher than mind was something like the Absolute
of idealism. (4). Alexander in his 'Basis of Realism' himself
accepted the view that his neo-realism had no truck with
materialism and was in fact nearer to the Objective type of
idealism of Bosanquet (5). But in the end idealism and
Alexander's philosophy remain opposed. Let us see the points
of disagreement as they appeared to Alexander. Alexander did
not write anything directly against idealism, but he came to
voice his disagreement in a few articles and in several reviews
of books to which we have already referred.

Firstly, he questioned the idealistic tenet that Nature
is nothing but a manifestation of an Absolute Mind. How can
Spirit, asked Alexander, divest itself of its own spirituality
so as to appear as nature, a something quite opposed to it? (6)
This question is pertinent, for Alexander pointed out that

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external nature is not all like our states of consciousness (1). Then, again, what is the need for the infinite Thought to reproduce itself in unspiritual things? (2) Unless these questions be answered, he said, idealism would appear as a form of mysticism which blocks the way of true enquiry.

Then, again, closely allied to it is the problem of the nature of the Absolute Mind itself. According to Alexander the concept of an Absolute Mind has been derived from the doctrine of the Transcendental Self of Kant and very early he questioned the validity of so doing. "I know what my self is as a complex of mental states which occur in time, and which form a unity. But what is this transcendental self, upon which the whole Kantian theory depends? What does it explain that the empirical self does not explain?" (3)

As this theory of the Absolute Mind was based on the doctrine of a timeless ego involved in every case of knowledge, so Alexander took the very first opportunity of rejecting the existence of this 'timeless ego' and declared it to be a mere assumption (4).

"A mind which can perform processes independent of things and whose forms are wider than the reality, is, at bottom, a mind which is in time, not above time". (5)

The mind or ego involved in knowledge, then, is no more unique than any other thing of our experience. (6). Of course, self-consciousness is important, but there need be no mystery about it, for there are analogies of this at the lower levels too.

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1. The Oxford Magazine 1884 p.293.
2. MIND 1865 p.64.
5. P.A.S. L.1866 p.10; also The Academy May 4, 1867 p.296. See also his later re-affirmation of it in the HISTORICALITY OF THINGS p.14.
"The mere ability to feel our bodies with our hands, or, what is still more striking, to feel one hand with the other, is an instance in point." (1)

From thoughts like these as his starting points, Alexander was able to construct his Naturalism in which value could be found at all stages and mind could be shown to be as spatio-temporal as a table or chair is.

His second point of criticism against idealism was that it does not take time seriously. In the dialectic, Alexander said, though we talk about change, it is merely ideal change; and we really ignore the real history of evolutionary changes;

"...dialectic is the process by which one idea logically leads on to the higher idea which is implicit in it and is its truth. Evolution is a history of a process in time; dialectic is a history of ideas which form a process not in time. (2) we do not know how much of this criticism Alexander had derived from Seth's 'Hegelianism and Personality' which he had reviewed, for Seth had criticised Hegel for his neglecting time. (3) The thing is that for Alexander philosophy should take account of the scientific development and at that time this meant taking Evolution seriously, which in turn meant taking time seriously and this is clear from what Webb has written:

"The application of the idea of evolution to the social and cultural life of humanity had much to do with the creation in the nineteenth century of a new historical sense." (4) Therefore, not to take history seriously meant for Alexander to be going against the scientific spirit of the time, and he wrote:

1. The Academy May 4.Ibid. p.29b. col.5
2. LIXD 1866 p.51c; also see S.T.D.1 pp.205n,227n; The historicity of things p.11; The Academy Ibid. p.29b.
4. Religion and the Thought of To-day. p.40.
"Philosophy was then, and after Lotze, is still, in a state of anarchy. The purely idealistic philosophy seems to have overreached itself, and especially in its view of nature it shocks the scientific habits of the time; ..." (1)

In the final analysis of things the difference between idealism and Alexander is this, that, according to Alexander time is the feature of reality itself, but, according to idealism, time is a feature in reality as a whole, but it is not true of the Absolute whole.

Further, there is the third point of disagreement, and this lies in Alexander's opposition to the a-priorism of idealism, and he devoted much of his energy to this subject in the early part of his philosophical career. We have already referred to his opposition to the apriori doctrine of time. But, a-priorism was most clearly upheld and argued for by Green in his PROLEGOMENA TO ETHICS and THE PRINCIPLES OF POLITICAL OBLIGATION, that is, in the domain of Ethics and Politics. Alexander, therefore, sought to combat a-priorism by the analysis of 'ought', along the line of his Evolutionary Naturalism, in his book MORAL ORDER AND PROGRESS and also in several papers and symposia. Against Sidgwick, Muirhead and Stout, in the symposium, "is the distinction between 'Is' and 'ought' ultimate or irreducible?", Alexander held that OUGHT can be reduced to IS. He opened the symposium thus:

"I intend to support that reduction of 'ought' to a species of 'is', 'on the lines of scientific thought', which Mr. Luirhead has declared to be naive, and Professor Sidgwick has declared to 'eviscerate ethical thought of its essential importance and interest'.” (1)

There is a distinction between fact and ideas, according to Alexander, but ideal too is a fact though of higher order and is in direct continuity with all other natural facts. Hence the distinction between them is of the same order as the distinction between red and green, or between an apple and a rose. (2) But a fuller idea of Alexander's opposition to a-priorism is found in his Ethics, presented in MORAL ORDER AND PROGRESS. However, this position of a-priorism will be better appreciated if we have a brief sketch of the philosophy of Bradley, Bosanquet and Green. But before we take it up there is one more point which may be briefly mentioned.

Idealism, according to Alexander, does not satisfactorily explain the relation between the individuals and the Absolute Mind. "We want to see how the consciousness of the Supreme Being is reproduced in them", said Alexander, "To this we find no answer: nor is it easy to see how we should". (3) According to Alexander, the all-inclusive whole of idealism absorbs, transforms, transmutes and destroys the relative self-existence of finite parts. But his realism is supposed to retain and safeguard the relative self-existence of individuals. (4). This point of difference assumed a great

1. F.A.S. Vol II. 1892-74, p. 100; see also p. 6 of ‘Summary’ of ‘Six Lectures on Value’.
3. The Oxford Magazine 1864, p. 293, col. 1-2
importance in his subsequent ontology and theology. However, the real opposition between Alexander and idealism is one of temper. For Alexander Time keeps on producing changes *ad infinitum*, and really ends in some sort of voluntaristic metaphysics, very much similar to that of Bergsonism.

But for idealism the changes and histories are mere chapters which reveal the nature of the Absolute reality. (1)

We will find that in the long run the real difference between Alexander and Absolutism lies in the idea of the unity of the universe. For Absolutism the universe is ultimately a unity, an all-inclusive, all-harmonious sentient experience. In Alexander's metaphysics of Space-Time there is no such ultimate whole and the universe is an open universe. According to idealism there is creative advance in Nature from matter to life and mind, but this is possible because of the presence of the Absolute Reality, which is not less but more than mind. However, according to Alexander, Space-Time, the Absolute Reality, is infra-rational. But, being a dynamic reality, it by itself keeps on creating new forms, without any rhyme or reason. Hence, even if there be any unity in the universe it is more of an accident than an essential feature of the universe. This ontological difference is more fundamental than any epistemological difference between Alexander and idealism. Hence, we can no longer postpone a brief exposition of idealism with which Alexander came to be

* By 'Voluntarism' is meant here that 'blind impulse' is the real in nature. This notion has been used in the tradition of thought of Schopenhauer and Hartmann.

1. Bosanquet, B. 'Contemporary Philosophy' p. 170
   Bradley, F.H. 'Essays on Truth and Reality' PP. 468-469.
Intimately connected. We will deal with Green, Bradley and Bosanquet only, for these are the thinkers with whom he had to deal most.

SECTION FIVE.

THE IDEALISM OF GREEN.

Green was above all an ethical thinker, strongly influenced by religious interest. He happened to live at the time when scientific mechanism was gaining a tremendous influence which the traditional British empirical philosophy could not stop. Therefore, seeing the barrenness of native philosophy, Green leaned heavily on German thinkers, specially Kant and Hegel. Armed with Neo-Kantianism, he hoped to combat the destructive influence of a materialistic scientism.

The main contention of Green can be thus summarised. In Ethics we deal with what a man ought to do and what a man ought to do is really based on what he is; and what he is, in the last analysis, is based on his relationship with the total universe around him. But before he can know his relationship with the total universe in its concrete details, he must understand what knowing is. Hence, epistemology is the very foundation of his metaphysical Ethics and he himself accepts this position in the following statement:
"We have to return once more to that analysis of the conditions of knowledge, which forms the basis of all Critical Philosophy, whether called by the name of Kant or no, ..." (1)

The Idealistic Epistemology of Green: Green develops his theory of knowledge very much on Kantian lines in the following way. We are said to know nature, full of objects external to human beings. But nature is of phenomena which are interrelated by laws. What do we mean by a phenomenon or an object of nature? An object, say a table or a chair, is a synthesis or fusion of sensory data and representative images. We may accept this analysis of an object and yet may ask, are not the different sensory data or the representative images quite separate and successive in a series? Well, they are. Therefore, to have an object, 'the series' has to be held together in a unifying consciousness. An object to be an object is, then, a synthesis of the manifold data held together in a unity of consciousness. An object then is an object for a consciousness, for apart from a consciousness there is no 'holding together' and without this 'holding together' there can be no synthesis and without this synthesis there is no object in the proper sense.

At this stage a question may be raised. The percept 'table' has two parts, namely, its esse or being and its other aspect of being known or percipi. We may grant that the object owes its percipi to the mind but does the esse of the object also depend on the mind? Here Green would retort, what do you J. Prolegomena of Ethics, p. 11. On the basis of such statements many realists have taken idealism to be based on epistemology.
mean by the esse of the table apart from its percipit? Do you mean its various sensory data of colour, touch, smell etc., which constitute the table? Well, even colour to be colour has its separate qualities of extensity, intensity etc., and all these successive elements have to be synthesised to get the sensation of colour. Thus, not even a sensation is a sensation without the synthesising consciousness.

We may accept this position and yet may hold that the object as constituted by the relating consciousness is a mere phenomenon and underlying this there is a Ding-an-sich. This was the position of Kant, according to which understanding makes nature out of the materials it does not make ("macht zwar der Verstand die Natur, aber er schafft sie nicht"). But there is no sense, says Green, in retaining the concept of an unknowable and unintelligible something dangling before us, a prospect of ultimate nescience. For Green, then, an object is what an understanding makes it, and behind this object so made by the understanding there is no hidden 'X', no thing-in-itself, which, to use Berkeley's phrase, is a grandeur of an empty name. Thus, for Green, any object, matter and motion,

'just so far as known, consist in, or are determined by, relations between the objects of that connected consciousness which we call experience'.(1)

Let us further analyse what we mean by an object constituted by a relating consciousness. Every object is but a series of events, either in the form of presentative sensat-

ions or presentative sensations supplemented with representative factors. But, as noted earlier, the discrete elements have to be held together in a series by a relating consciousness. This relating consciousness by itself cannot be a passing event for otherwise it will not be able to hold the series of the discrete elements in a unity at all. In this lies the uniqueness of the relating consciousness.

'No one and no number of a series of a related event can be the consciousness of the series as related.' (1)

It cannot be simply one item of the series either, for it is one which is present from the first to the last item of the series. Nor can it be the product of the whole series, for it must precede the series as well. It cannot be the product of the immediately earlier series, for at the time of relating the discrete items a, b, c, etc., we have no knowledge of any earlier series from which it might have come. Thus, in all knowledge we have to relate the passing events by a relating consciousness, which is not itself a passing event at all. Hence, the relating consciousness is not a natural process, for every natural phenomenon is a series of change. But within a relating consciousness so far as it is relating a series, there can be no change - there is no lapse of time, however minute, no antecedence or consequence. (3)

Of course, the human consciousness does grow in time. Our knowledge, for example, of various theorems is acquired successively, but our apprehension of them so far as it forms certain knowledge has no succession in it. (4).
"The attainment of the knowledge, again, as an occurrence in the individual's history, a transition from one state of consciousness to another, may properly be called a phenomenon; but not so the consciousness itself of relations or related facts—not so the relations and related facts present to consciousness—in which the knowledge consists." (1)

Thus the human mind participates in two natures, namely, in a natural or phenomenal state so far as it grows and develops and yet, again, it has an eternal nature so far as it shows an a-temporal relating consciousness in the formation of knowledge of nature and objects. Now what can be the ultimate nature of this kind of mind participating in two realms? We have to observe another point before we can answer this. Objects, to be objects, as we have seen, require to be related in a timeless consciousness. Hence, nature, as the scientist presupposes it, also requires to be sustained in an all-embracing, all-relating consciousness. If the scientist is not baffled in his attempt to unravel the mysteries of nature, he is to suppose that nature is bound by unalterable, eternal relations. The objects made by human understanding are not eternally sustained by it. The human mind simply finds them, they do exist before and independent of the human mind. Therefore, the whole of nature, as given to the scientist and as really existing, presupposes an eternal mind in whose relating consciousness nature is permanently sustained. The human mind then in making and understanding nature simply recapitulates and reproduces the eternal mind. (2). Thus, the human mind through its temporal

1. Ibid. sec. 57. p. 61.
2. Prolegomena to Ethics, sec. 50-54.
process is only realising an eternal plan. The logic of the knowledge-situation requires us further to hold that universal consciousness, which is not in time and which has no history, yet carries on a gradual process of self-manifestation which is in time and which has a temporal history. Green, then, concludes thus his religio-metaphysical belief:

"But when that which is being developed is itself a self-conscious subject, the end of its becoming must really exist not merely for, but in or as, a self-conscious subject. There must be eternally such a subject which is all that the self-conscious subject, as developed in time, has the possibility of becoming; in which the idea of the human spirit, or all that it has in itself to become, is completely realised. This consideration may suggest the true notion of the spiritual relation in which we stand to God; that He is not merely a Being who has made us, in the sense that we exist as an object of the divine consciousness in the same way in which we must suppose the system of nature so to exist, but that He is a Being in whom we exist; with whom in principle we are one; with whom the human spirit is identical, in the sense that He is all which the human spirit is capable of becoming". (1)

Though Green argues for the existence of a single, all-embracing divine mind, he is not a pantheist. Just as the human subject unifies the various data of sensation into an object without destroying its separality, so the divine mind expresses itself through the plurality of human subjects.(2)

"It is the very essence of the doctrine above advanced that the divine principle", says Green, "which we suppose to be realising itself in man, should be supposed to realise itself in persons, as such". (3)

THE IDEALISTIC MORAL THEORY OF GREEN.- Just as an analysis of knowledge has shown the reality of an all-embracing, all-

relating mind, so a proper analysis of the moral situation also points out to the same principle at work. Only we have to start here from our inward life as to what happens to us in a concrete moral situation, for:

"it remains the case that self-reflection is the only possible method of learning what is the inner man or mind that our action expresses; in other words, what that action really is. Judgments so arrived at must be the point of departure for all inquiry into processes by which our actual moral nature may have been reached, and into links of connection between it and that of animals—otherwise endowed" (1)

In explaining knowledge, Green argued the presence of an eternal self. In like manner, he says, we have to distinguish between mere want and the consciousness of a wanted object,—between an impulse to satisfy a want and an effort for the realisation of the idea of an object. This distinction implies the presence of the want to a subject which distinguishes itself from it and is constant throughout successive stages of the want." (2) No doubt, at various times there are several desires like a desire of going to a cinema show and another desire for study or a purely natural desire for food and drink. But these various impulses do not become real motives of our voluntary action as long as we do not form an idea of the end in our own self-consciousness. There must be a self which compares various wants in a concrete setting and then chooses one of them. This self then distinguishes itself from a want.

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1. Ibid., sec p4-p7. Alexander too, following Descartes, Green and other Idealists accepts the strategic position of 'self' for revealing the nature of reality, but ultimately uses this knowledge to belittle mind. See S.T.D.1 pp.8;3, 137 and S.T.D.11 pp.5,79; The Historicity of Things pp.22,24.
and is not itself a want, when it chooses one out of the several competing wants. This self or ego or character which raises mere want into a motive by its free or self-choice may contain a history; but at the moment of choosing a want or an object it becomes different from the natural product, that is, a natural want. If it were not so, the act will become as fully determined by the past, as mere animal desires are mechanically conditioned by their past antecedents. The voluntary action, in order to be a free action, must proceed from an ego or character which distinguishes itself from the various competing animal desires of the moment.

"This constitutes an act of will; which is thus always free, not in the sense of being undetermined by a motive, but in the sense that the motive lies in the man himself, that he makes it and is aware of doing so,..."(1)

Now we may trace the origin of this self to the very early history of an individual, but however far we may go, we will always find this ego to be the determining factor in moral action. No doubt this ego becomes fuller through education and development, but it is never absent at any stage of moral life. If the question be put, if the ego does not own its origin to any natural antecedent circumstances, then what is the real origin of it? The answer is that it has no origin.

"It never began, because it never was not. It is the condition of there being such a thing as beginning or end". (2)

Once more, through the analysis of moral actions we have

1. Ibid. sec. 102 p. 106.  2. Ibid. sec. 114 p. 119.
come to the conclusion that there is an eternal self which freely chooses one out of the competing wants of life. This eternal self in man is but a reproduction of an eternal consciousness, not existing in time but is the very condition of there being an order in time — not an object of experience, but is the very condition of there being an intelligent experience. (1)

Now the self chooses a desire for an object because it will lead to the satisfaction of its interests. Hence, the standard of moral judgment lies in the complete satisfaction or fulfilment of the self. This self to be realised includes not only its own interests but also those interests which it has for others in society. Self-fulfilment, then, leads the individual to a full-orbed life in a society, resulting in a harmonious satisfaction of all its competing impulses, allowing others too, to develop themselves in the same way. (2).

"The man cannot contemplate himself as in a better state, or on the way to the best, without contemplating others, not merely as a means to that better state, but as sharing it with him." (3)

Goaded on by this moral ideal, a moral man engages himself in a constant struggle for the betterment of his self, both in intention or depth as well as in extension or breadth. The struggle will never come to an end, for it means the complete development of all faculties in an individual as

1. Prolegomena to Ethics sec. 74. p. 72.
2. Ibid. sec. 254. p. 256.
well as a like development in each member of the human community. The moral good, then, is being conceived as a spiritual activity in which all men as moral beings should participate.

This moral ideal is not a utopian dream, for without the constraining force for betterment of social and individual life no progress can be explained. Ultimately, then, it is the Absolute mind which realises its potentialities through human agents. The moral man is constantly spurred on by being a state in which the capacities of all men are fully realised.

"But the idea as it is in the individual man, however indefinite and unfilled is a communication in germ or principle of the idea as it is in God, and the communication is the medium through which the idea as in God determines the progressive development of human capacities in time".  

SECTION SIX.

THE PHILOSOPHY OF BRADLEY.

The philosophy of Bradley, in general, is of the same nature as that of Green, only in it the metaphysical interest predominates. The extremely critical and subtle analysis of Bradley has brought many points of idealism into clearer relief, and there is little doubt that his acute observations on metaphysical problems influenced Alexander considerably. One can look upon SPACE, TIME AND ENTITY as a rejoinder to Bradley's APPEARANCE AND REALITY. For both there is only

1. Ibid. sec. 122 p. 202. This notion of a constraining spiritual force can be compared with the 'spirit of the whole' of Bosanquet and the straining nius of Alexander.
one Absolute reality, but Bradley believed in a qualitative Absolute, while Alexander believed in a quantitative Absolute. For Bradley, Space and Time are mere appearances, for they are riddled with contradictions, but for Alexander Space-Time is absolutely real and is the very basis of the principle of non-contradiction. In the last analysis the Evolutionary Naturalism of Alexander may be considered as the leftist development of the Absolutism of Bradley.

In the manner of Berkeley and in the spirit of Green, Bradley points out that Reality is given in our immediate sentient experience and nothing which exists can be apart from the sentient experience.

"Find any piece of existence, take up anything that any one could possibly call a fact, or could in any sense assert to have being, and then judge if it does not consist in sentient experience". (1)

Then again he says:

"Sentient experience, in short, is Reality, and what is not this is not real". (2)

But the immediate sentient experience, at the lowest primary stage in our consciousness, is a blur, with incipient diversities, which as yet has not been parted by relations. (3)

However, this initial but foundational experience is not self-contained, but it is a highly unstable equilibrium, ready to break forth into the distinction of 'that' and 'what', subject and predicate. Reality, no doubt, is given in our sentient

1. Appearance and reality p. 145 (2nd edition)
2. Ibid. p. 144
3. Alexander questioned the existence of such a state of undisdifferentiated sentient experience. (S., P., D., l. pp. 22-23.)
experience, but it is only a fragment of the boundless Reality. The ragged edges of this sentient experience extend in all directions, forcing us to transcend it and complete it in yet another wider experience. Under this compelling necessity of transcending immediate experience in a more complete apprehension thought emerges.

Thought at once makes a distinction between the 'that' and 'what' of the incipient diversities contained in the immediate experience. The 'that' becomes a subject of the experience and the 'what' becomes the predicate, or an adjective of the subject. But this predicate, however exhaustive, fails to describe the subject completely. For example, out of a sentient experience thought makes the judgment 'this table is brown'. But 'this table' has many more qualities besides being brown. In order to complete the description we may pile up many more predicates, yet 'this table' has an open texture leading to so many details that no number of predicates or qualifications will exhaust it. Besides, the predicate 'brown' is an ideal content which we have abstracted from the given sensory experience, and this ideal content of 'brown' connects the given sensory experience with all those things to which the concept 'brown' is applicable. Thus, in judgment we no doubt connect the given experience with a wider experience, but at the same time we lose its immediacy. Even the 'thisness' of the table remains an ideal content, and not the feeling of 'this table'. Hence, in order to transcend and yet to complete
the immediate experience thought can work only by parting the
hidden diversities of the immediate experience into subject
and predicate, substance and qualities, terms and relations.
But can thought, working through the machinery of terms and
relations, succeed in giving us the Reality?

Bradley does not question the practical usefulness of
thought, but he does question the ultimate validity of thought-
relations. For example, take the familiar distinction of
substance and attribute which we make in our daily thinking.
we say that a lump of sugar is a substance with the qualities
of sweetness, whiteness, hardness and so on. But obviously,
a lump of sugar is not mere whiteness, mere hardness etc.,
but a unity of them. But where is this unity, where is the
thing apart from the qualities? Of course, like Locke,
we can say that the substance is an 'unknown substratum', but
then, as Berkeley has shown, it does not satisfy us. Can we
say that substance is a mere name and qualities somehow exist
together? But, then, how do whiteness and hardness etc., exist
together? How are they related? Here lies the rub. We cannot
say that sweetness is hardness or even that sweetness has
hardness, for this involves the question of the relation of
the predicate to the subject, and in using this we fall into
the dilemma:

"If you predicate what is different, you ascribe to the subject
what is not; and if you predicate what it not different, you
say nothing at all". (2)

1. Alexander tried to solve it in his own way. See S.T.D.1. pp
276-278.

But if we suppose that the qualities are independent of one another, we then relate them by another relation 'X'. But to relate 'X' with the qualities we need another relation 'X^1', for 'X' is as much different from the qualities as the qualities are found to be different from one another. Therefore, this expedient will lead to the infinite labyrinth of relations without relating the qualities at all.

Hence, the distinction of substance and qualities is only a convenient device, a practical compromise: in daily life most necessary, but in the end is found to be most indefensible. But surely, it will be said that the qualities are related to the mind and the mind also relates the qualities. But, is this possible? Is it consistent enough?

Qualities, such as sweetness or even extension etc., are certainly perceived by the mind and without their relation to consciousness they do not exist. On the other hand, a consciousness in order to be consciousness must be conscious of some qualities. Thus, there can be no qualities without the relation and obviously, there can be no relation without the qualities. Again, qualities in order to be qualities must be different from one another, and this implies distinction, and the distinction implies the presence of a relation between them. But surely the qualities must be there to be related. Hence, the qualities must be and must also be related, and these two demands are discrepant.
Similarly, a relation without terms to relate is unintelligible. The question arises, how are the relations related to the terms? If the relations have nothing to do with the terms, then certainly they cannot relate them; and, if they are connected with the terms, then certainly they have to be related to the terms by a set of new relations. So we are hurried on into an endless process. "The links are united by a link, and this bond of union is a link which also has two ends; and these require each a fresh link to connect them with the old." (1)

Let us apply this observation about terms and relations to Space and Time, for they have been taken to be the fundamental matrix of the world by Alexander. According to Bradley, Space and Time are riddled with contradiction. Let us take Space. Space is a relation and yet it cannot be a relation, for there must be some quality or substance in which a relation inhere. Then, again, it cannot be a substance, for it consists of parts and each part itself must consist of other parts, and so on.

"Space is essentially a relation of what vanishes into relations, which seek in vain for their terms. It is lengths of lengths of长度...nothing that we can find". (2)

Similarly, Time must be a relation and yet it is not a mere relation. If Time is a relation between durationless units, then the whole time has no duration. And, if the whole

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1. Ibid. p.33 Alexander criticised this view of Bradley about terms and relations in S.T.D.I. p.255-257. He retorted: "If it (relation) really relates, it relates by itself and without the interposition of a fresh relation". (S.T.D.I.p.256)  
time is a duration, then its units also must have duration, and as such cease to be units.

Thus, we find that thought can work only through the distinctions of substance and attribute, qualities and relations, space and time, primary and secondary qualities etc. All these forms of distinctions may be conveniently reduced to the distinction of terms and relations. Hence, we find that thought can work only through the machinery of terms and relations, but when we try to understand their inter-relation-ship, then we find them riddled with contradiction. But no self-contradictory experience can yield reality and therefore, thought cannot give us reality, but only appearance. Reality must be such as can satisfy the intellect at least, and so far we have seen thought has not proved to be self-consistent. But what about the certainty of the self, of moral goodness and of religious experience? They are certainly taken to be real, and before they are declared to be appearance we have to examine their claim to reality or self-consistency.

In our unreflective mood we think that we are selves and everyone of us is quite sure of his existence. Descartes, of course, wrongly thought that the self-certainty is found in our serious thinking too. But for all practical purposes self-certainty may be accepted. However, the question is, in what sense is the self to be taken as real?

At the outset we can say that if the self is known by thought according to its own machinery of subject and object, substance and qualities etc., then as such it cannot but be an
appearance, in the light of our earlier conclusion. But let us judge the issue on its own merits. Like Freud, Bradley traces the origin of the distinction between self and non-self to the principle of pleasure and pain. From the early experience of 'one big, buzzing, blooming confusion' every individual learns to carve out the self and the not-self. Even on the developed level of reflection, most of the self seems to consist of organic sensations, but, of course, it contains much else besides, ------'it will contain more or less of whatever in the environment has not been dissociated from itself'.(1)

THE DIFFERENT MEANINGS OF SELF:— Can this be the self which can be found at any one moment of an individual's life? But this momentary self always leads to something beyond it and therefore it cannot be the self with which we identify ourselves. Can we, then, take the average mass of what constitutes the self at different periods of a man's life? Here the average self will be constituted by a man's habits, enduring dispositions and so on. But even this average self is too fluctuating, and so this average self cannot be real.

"And yet, when we look at the facts, and survey the man's self from the cradle to the coffin, we may be able to find no one average".(2)

Is there then an essential self which remains unchanged? But here too, the dilemma is: if the essential self can change

1. kiAD Vol.xii p.370
2: Appearance and Reality p.79 (2nd edition)
then it is not essential, and if it does not change, then it is
not discernible at all. The self cannot be regarded as a window-
less monad, for its unity is sundered by diversities within it.

However, one important conception has been left out so
far, and that is the view of the self as subject in the knowledge
situation. But then the self as subject only cannot be said
to exist independently of the object. To regard the self as a
subject only will be an abstraction. Besides, the self as
subject and not-self as object keep on shifting their position,
and every feature of the self, sooner or later, passes into the
not-self. Hence, the self as subject alone is difficult to
detect. The subject-object distinction emerges only late in
an individual consciousness, and is not a primary datum. As such
no self, as subject, is really to be found.

The Moral Self: But it might be said that so far we have
been dealing with the self apart from its social setting, and
therefore it is only a partial treatment of the subject. Indeed,
our self is a social one, and every fibre of its being is
interpenetrated with social relationship. An individual is
bathed in the life of the whole, and in the language of Hegel
is 'a pulse-beat of the whole system, and himself the whole
system'. But this social self is best seen in moral experience
and so let us see whether the moral self is the one for which
we have been vainly searching so far.

1. Alexander disputed this and pointed out that bodily self
may change its boundaries, but the real enjoyed self or
subject remains distinct from a not-self. (S,D,L, p. 106)
In morality we try to realise the Good and this lies in the realisation of an ever-deepening self, both in content as well as extent. In simple language morality consists in passing from its present state of inharmonious and finite self to a deeper and fuller self—the from what is to what an ideal self should be, and perpetually the healing of the breach between the two is sought through a future, higher self. But as soon as we attain a higher self, a further ideal keeps on looming ahead of it, calling for a fresh effort to heal the breach so created. Morality then aims at an unattainable unity of what a self is, and what it should be. The two discrepant demands are never met and therefore, morality is condemned to its hopeless task of reaching an absolute perfection.

Then again, in morality there is a balancing between the claims of the self and those of others in society, and the two features of self-sacrifice and self-assertion are difficult to reconcile. No doubt, an individual by performing the duties in his station of life seems to be fulfilling the claims of his higher self, harmonising the discrepant claims, in a concrete social setting, without ending up in an abstract notion of the Good Will of Kant which really willeth nothing. But this 'station' always falls into some special, historical social structure, and we can always visualise a better social structure and therefore, the duties in one's special station of life never reaches the ideal of moral demand.
Thus, even the moral self does not reach that intelligible unity which will satisfy the intellect. Every experience so far seems to be beckoning us onward and forward to complete itself. "Every separate aspect of the universe, if you insist on it, goes on to demand something higher than itself. And, like every other appearance, goodness implies that which when carried out, must absorb it". (1)

Now morality, pressing forward for an unattainable unity seeks it naturally in super-morality --- in a form of goodness which will absorb it, namely, the religious experience. (2). But can it do so? No doubt our religious experience is the highest, and we can hardly claim anything higher (3), but is it a unity unbroken by discrepant elements contained in it?

THE RELIGIOUS EXPERIENCE:— In our religious experience we come into communion with God in whom Goodness seems to have been realised; and therefore, the pursuit of moral perfection seems to have come to an end in God. But is this religious communion self-consistent? Even in the religious experience the discrepancy remains between the divine will and finite wills. In religious experience there is an attempt on the part of finite selves to participate in perfection by identifying themselves with the Perfect Self, called God. But here is the old dilemma again, If the union is not complete, the finite self does not become the absolute reality; and, if it is complete, then the need for possibility of devotion also disappears. (4)

1. Appearance and reality p.436. Compare this with the 'spirit of the whole' of bosanquet and the 'thesis' of Alexander.
3. Appearance and Reality p.442.
Than, again, the religious experience always implies a relation between man and God, but this relational mode of thought, is in itself incomplete and seeks for a non-relational whole. Besides, if God, standing in relation to man, has will and intelligence, then he has a personality and being sundered by such relationships from within, becomes a finite being. Such a finite God then will tend to fall into the Absolute as the consummation of his nature.

"If you identify the Absolute with God, that is not the God of religion. If again you separate them, God becomes a finite factor in the whole. And the effort of religion is to put an end to, and break down, this relation—an relation which, none the less, it essentially presupposes. Hence, short of the Absolute, God cannot rest, and, having reached that goal, he is lost and religion with him". (1)

APPEARANCE AND REALITY:— Thus we have searched all types of knowledge given by thought and we find that all of them are infected with contradiction and therefore they can give us only appearance and not reality. Is then, reality unknown and unknowable? This cannot be, for reality is given to us in our immediate experience, though it is only a fragment of the whole of reality that is so given. Then, thought does point to the nature of reality, even when it fails to comprehend the total details of that reality. Thus, reality must be much more than our fragmentary immediate experience, and something more than what relational knowledge can give us. It must be an all-inclusive, non-relational sentient experience, for nothing can be outside experience itself. (2). In this whole of all-

1. Appearance and Reality p.447. Compare this notion with the deity of Alexander who is always to-morrow and who will never be to-day.
2. Ibid. p.144-145.
inclusive experience every appearance must be given an appropriate place, for appearance has its locus in reality, and is not just nothing.

"Every flame of passion, chaste or carnal, would still burn in the Absolute, unquenched and unabridged, a note absorbed in the harmony of its higher bliss". (1)

Now how are we to understand that the Absolute is real? well, reality must be such that it will satisfy the intellect and only that which does not contradict itself will really satisfy the intellect. A thing contradicts itself because it is incomplete and therefore reality must be all-inclusive, self-consistent experience and this is called the Absolute. Because the Absolute is an all-comprehensive experience, therefore it will satisfy all sides of our nature, including thought, feeling and will.

If it is true that the Absolute includes everything, and outside the Absolute nothing can exist, then where do errors exist? Are they also in the Absolute? Yes, they too, are in the Absolute. But though every appearance is in the Absolute, it has not the same degree of reality in it. Every appearance to be in the Absolute Reality will undergo transformation, transmutation and merging at the final stage. The error requires to be more completely transformed and transmuted than the ordinary appearances of scientific and religious knowledge.

"The reality owns the discordance and the discrepancy of false appearance; but it possesses also much else in which this jarring character is swallowed up and is dissolved in fuller harmony". (2)

1. Ibid. p. 172
GREEN AND BRADLEY.- At this stage we must be careful not to exaggerate the difference between Green and Bradley. It is true that Green reduced all knowledge and even sensation to a mode of relational thinking and from the nature of the synthesising ego, found in cognitive and moral experience, argues to the existence of the Absolute. But he also points out that the temporal and relational mode of thinking is only an aspect of the Eternal Mind. Bradley on the other hand has shown that through its machinery of terms and relations, thought is necessary for practical life, but in the end it must be hushed and silenced in the deeper harmony of the Absolute. Besides, Bradley lays a great stress on the immediate experience, full of incipient diversities but not as yet parted by relations. Hence, Bradley seems to have supplemented Green at both the extremes, namely, at the beginning of pre-relational experience and also at the other end of post-relational experience. The reality of the Absolute, according to Bradley, is not proved directly but indirectly, through the criticism of relational thinking. Thus, in the end both are Absolutist and there is difference only in their manner of approach and in their differing emphases.

SECTION SEVEN.

BOSANJUET'S ARGUMENT FROM CONTINGENTIA MUNDI.

Bosanquet has much in common with Bradley, differing from him chiefly in his emphasis on certain aspects of Absolutism.
By his relentless logic Bradley shows that our empirical knowledge is shot through with contradictions and therefore, it can give us only appearances. But these appearances are not non-existent. They, on the contrary, point to the existence of an all-inclusive sentient experience. (1) Bosanquet lays his emphasis on this all-inclusive whole, the presence of which makes every experience transcend itself (2). According to Bosanquet, everywhere, whether it be in the life of logic or politics or moral service or religious devotion, we cannot find rest or self-consistency, for the spirit of the whole is at work and presses each experience towards its transcendence in a higher whole. Hence, if we want to know reality, then this spirit of the whole is a clue to it.

"The logical spirit, the tendency of parts to self-transcendence and absorption in wholes, is the birth-impulse of initiative, as it is the life-blood of stable existence". (3)

Now let us explain and illustrate the effective existence of this spirit of the whole.

In any philosophical reconstruction we have to rely on thought and we have to accept what this thought has to offer. Nothing in the end is real if it does not satisfy thought. But when we examine thought we find that it is a unifying or universalising function of our experience and therefore, it represents the very spirit of the whole. When the reality is given to us in our perceptual experience, thought parts the implicit diversities into its 'that' and 'what', with a view to restoring a richer 'that'. (4)

1. Logic II. pp. 252-254 (2nd edition 1911)
2. Contemporary Philosophy pp. 22-23, 72, 199, 204
3. The Principle of Individuality and Value p. 24
4. Ibid. p. 55
When we say that 'this table is black', we are trying here to go beyond the given 'this table' of our perception by clothing it with a universal concept of 'black'. We never succeed in recapturing the immediacy of the perceptual experience by means of thought-relations; nonetheless, thought aims at giving us a wider and higher whole. (1). At this juncture we should make a distinction between the abstract and the concrete universals.

**ABSTRACT AND CONCRETE UNIVERSALS:** An abstract universal is one in which we attend to the common qualities which a number of things have in common, and we ignore their differences. For example, we form the abstract universal concept of 'triangle' by ignoring the various sizes, colour and positions of different triangles and by selecting their triangularity only, which is common to all particular triangles. But such a procedure leaves the concrete things behind and if we pursue the method of finding out that which is common to all things of our experience, then we will find ourselves left with 'pure being', which is really pure emptiness. (2) A concrete universal, on the other hand, will include the total particularity, and the other rich details of experience. It can do so, not by explaining away the particularity but by including it in a well integrated whole. Thus, a true universal is of the nature of a system.

"To see the escapement wheel lying inside the watch does not 'give' me this wheel as a part of a mechanical arrangement; to know it as a part of such a whole I must understand it, i.e. in my analysis, perform the synthesis of the watch as a definite mechanical contrivance." (3)

2. Ibid. p. 34
Hence, the concrete universal or true thought is always of the nature of a system which includes the different parts in an articulated whole. (1)

Now, thought in this sense of straining towards a whole, as a creative nisus bidding each bit of experience to become a whole, is not confined to intellectual operations alone, but is found at the levels of feeling and will, may, it is operative in nature and life too. (2)

"The universal—the straining towards the whole—is in them as in all experience; and it is idle to deny their constructive and creative nisus the name of thinking, because it does not operate through what we call par excellence logical language, and conceptions attached to words. The rhythm that completes a rhythm, the sound that with other sounds satisfies the educated ear, the colour that is demanded by the colour-scheme, are I take it, as necessary and as rational as the conclusion of a syllogism." (3)

Similarly, in our will we draw into our orbit that which was not there in fact and thus the self widens itself by absorbing the not-self or an alien world.

Now let us further follow thought, the straining of it towards an ever-increasing and progressive whole, as it is found operating on a larger canvas of nature, life and mind.

Nature exists independently of the human mind and here, instead of the human mind constituting nature, it is really nature which becomes a condition for the evolution and sustenance of the human mind. But the important thing is to note that nature and mind are continuous without a break. Nature is, in the last analysis, controlled and guided by the spirit of the whole. This is evident from the nature of the laws which

1. Individuality and Value pp. 34, 35, 40
2. Ibid. pp. 54, 55, 57, 100.
3. Ibid. p. 62. Also see p. 60.
But what is law? It is wrongly understood that a law is a class of similars. Really the plurality and repetition of instances are unimportant features of a universal law. The real view is that a law is 'the expression of a definite connection of contents within a system——an identity pervading a number of distinct determinations whose connection does not lie in resemblance of the elements to one another'.

For example, the law of gravitation is the conception of a systematic relation between the distance and mass. Thus, a law shows a nexus between its parts and as such shows the spirit of the whole towards which all the phenomena of nature seem to be moving. In reality, the truth of the sciences lies in the coherence of all the data of observation and thought-constructions. Hence, nature is pervaded by the vitality of the whole, and the totality of this wholeness is expressed in her laws.

When we come to 'life', then we find that the spirit of the whole is still more articulate here. The nature of the organism depends on the efficient functioning of its parts and the parts as such become significant by promoting the life of the whole organism. But the spirit of active totality is most clear and distinct in the operations of mind. However, we have to note that there is no break in this ever-progressive leaping forth of mind from life, and of life from nature. Life, in order to be carried forward into the new realm of mind, has to undergo complications and elaborations through the laws of natural selection. But we have to recognise that the 'new' has come out of the 'old' because of the effective operation of the spirit of the whole.

1. Individuality and Value p. 100. Alexander criticised this view of the universal as a 'system' in S.T.D. I pp 233-237
2. Ibid. Pp. 101-106
Bosanquet emphasizes the continuity between nature and mind; and gives a new direction to the mind-body problem. We find that in the cosmic evolution of matter, life and mind, the spirit of the whole, is the niusus which carries the stream higher than its source. Here we find that the lower levels are the preconditions of the higher, nay, the higher is the making explicit of the mute history of the earlier processes. In this sense, mind is the meaning of the functioning of the body. Mind is simply the articulation of the hidden striving of nature and life, and is an entity supervenient over these lower forms.

"But in general principle I answer stubbornly that I cannot see why consciousness, being conceived as the determinate working of a world of content, though gifted with a peculiar unity, a niusus towards totality, which can only be noted and not explained, should not be the meaning and true inwardness of a physical process". [1]

Now we have seen that in every finite being, traced from the inorganic level to that of mind through the organic stages, there is the spirit of the whole, which makes every finite thing transcend itself. This spirit of the whole may be called Individuality.

"Individuality is the ultimate completeness of that character of wholeness and non-contradiction which we first generalised under the name of logical stability". [2]

Now, the spirit of the whole working in all things is really the indication of an all-inclusive individuality. Hence, this all-inclusive individual experience is the dynamic principle of the universe. Though it contains countless histories, it

1. Ibid. p.172. Here we find the suggestions for Alexander's notions of mind, niusus, natural piety etc.
2. Individuality and Value. p.68
Itself has no history. All changes and evolutionary phases reveal the presence of individuality. The very purpose of the universe is to make souls. But though the finite spirit is the very focalisation and the extreme articulation of the spirit of the whole, yet it is not the final reality. The very value of the finite spirit lies in its being infected with the spirit of the totality and in thus discharging its mission, it has to carry out an intricate interpenetration with and participation in the processes below and above it. In this task of adjustment the finite spirit has to go out of its insularity and break forth in many directions.

"Thus, the self, in the striving to complete itself, will break in pieces every partial form of its crystallised being, will welcome the chapter of accidents, and clothe itself in conflict and adventure". (i)

Like Bradley, Bosanquet too points out that the moral endeavour cannot be perfected because of the discrepant elements contained in such a life. Therefore, pushed from behind and pulled from above by the force of the nius, exerted by the spirit of the whole, the finite soul seeks its goal in religion. Bosanquet is far more sympathetic to the call of religious devotion than Bradley, but, then again, under the spell of Absolutism, he concludes that the final demand carries the finite soul beyond the religious sphere too. The all-embracing whole, in which every finite being must find its place, is called the Absolute. The Absolute is more than a person endowed with feeling and will.

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1. The Value and the Destiny of the Individual. p. 17
We may not be able to work out in detail the whole process, according to which the Absolute holds all finite things, but in a rough way this process of transforming and transmuting the particular things can be explained by the process of Negativity. From Bradley's 'Appearance and Reality' we learn that every finite thing is riddled with contradiction. But this contradiction cannot be final, for it really implies that every process will have to be transcended and completed in the life of the Absolute. Ultimately, this contradiction will have to be solved, not by crushing one of the members locked up in contradiction but by suitably arranging them in a larger, more harmonious system. For example, it is contradictory to hold that the same flower is both ugly and beautiful. However, if we enlarge the context then the contradiction will be solved. We can say that the flower is beautiful by day and ugly by night. Hence, every contradiction involved in appearance can be solved in an all-inclusive whole. In 'Contemporary Philosophy', Bosanquet lays special emphasis on its all-inclusive unity and points that it itself remains the 'unmoved mover'.

SECTION EIGHT.

ALEXANDER'S INDEBTEDNESS TO IDEALISM:

There is little doubt that Alexander hoped that his Naturalism would be acceptable to all only when it has succeeded in explaining all that idealism has done and, therefore, he tried to include in his system all that appeared to
him valuable in idealism. Hence, he accepted 'self' as the convenient starting point of inquiries, coherence as the criterion of truth, the distinction of Truth and Reality, the importance of Categories, and yet the inapplicability of the categories to the ultimate reality itself and many such idealistic statements, which we will note in the sequel. Even the doctrine of Emergence and Nius has its roots in the idealistic tenet of 'progressive self-realisation' and in Bradley's theory of the 'degrees of reality'. (1) For this reason Murphy and Anderson are of the opinion that Alexander failed to work out his own realistic metaphysics because he remained wedded to idealism. (2).

Finally, any doubt regarding his deep debt to idealism is dispelled by his own admission in SPACE, TIME AND DEITY. Here he pointed out that he had been brought in the idealistic tradition of Bradley and Bosanquet, and continued, that since the writing of the above-mentioned book he has more clearly realised the strength of Bradley's philosophy. (3)

But it is equally certain that he remained committed to Evolutionary Naturalism all through his philosophical career, and this philosophy he had already announced in 'Natural Selection in morals'. (4) In this article he pointed out that Evolution gives precision and comprehensive grasp of world's

1. Bosanquet, B. 'Contemporary philosophy'. pp. 51-52, 53
history, from the inorganic to the highest forms of organic life and human mind. At least, from this point of view he wrote his MORAL ORDER AND PROGRESS and a short summary of this book will show his philosophical temper, which is one of hostility towards the A-PRIORISM of the Oxford idealism of his time.

MORAL ORDER AND PROGRESS:— Here, Alexander pointed out that individuals are born with certain clamorous tendencies which they want to satisfy, and soon on pain of suffering and disappointment they learn to satisfy them harmoniously by balancing their mutual conflicting claims. Soon they also realise that there are other individuals with the same claims as theirs. Consequently, the individuals have to adjust themselves in a balanced social equilibrium in which their respective claims can be met and satisfied. This habitual disposition to submit to the claims of all competing impulses within oneself, with due regard for others, may be called character or will (1). Hence, morality lies in the upholding of the social will, resulting in a social vitality or health. There need not be any conflict between Egoism and Altruism, for each individual is endowed with the impulse of social sympathy and the presence of this social feeling accounts for the balancing of the moral wills in a social equilibrium.

1. The Idea of Value. MIND 1892 PP. 37n, 40, 41; also M. O. F. PP. 1o0, 106. 106.
2. M. O. F. PP. 141; also PP. 127, 131, 139, 140.
How is the moral equilibrium reached? The moral equilibrium is reached through trials, tests and the mutual conflicts of wills and the process may be said to be purely mechanical, not requiring any *a priori* principle at all, nay, not even reason.

"We therefore need no special faculty of whatever sort to teach us morality—-not even do we require a faculty of reason—-our morality is an adjustment which is effected by conflict and compromise among the parts of our nature, or what is the same thing, among ourselves and our fellows" (1)

Then again, every individual has not to establish a social equilibrium afresh. He is born into a society with social equilibrium and from the very beginning he is educated to participate in it. All those individuals who participate in it are said to be good and those who revolt against it are called bad. Moral goodness therefore, is a tyranny of the good. The good men favour a certain ideal or social equilibrium because it appeals to their tastes and impulses, which are perfectly natural. There is nothing non-natural in this preference for the good. (2)

Of course, the social equilibrium does not remain static, for fresh knowledge and other changes in life soon force the existing social equilibrium to change.

"Moreover, every extension of knowledge and the arts, leading as it does to new institutions, must modify morality by the new conditions it creates". (3)

There then ensues a conflict between the old and the new ideals. This struggle between the ideals is of the same

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1. *O.F. p. 141*. also *p. 127, 131, 137, 140*
2. *A. Vol. 2 p. 1892-94 p. 102*
3. *p. 391; see also p. 277; FINGERPOSTS TO RELIGION p. 16*
character as the struggle between the different species of animals for survival. (1) The victorious ideal comes to be recognised as the good. Here again there is nothing a-priori, but there is a perfectly natural process which determines the progress in the moral ideal.

Is there any absolute moral ideal in which all moral struggles will end? No doubt, there is often a progress in social ideal, both in intension and extension, to which Green had pointed. But, according to Alexander, there is no final absolute ideal. Each ideal, so far as it is an equilibrium of competing social wills, is absolutely good under the circumstance. Even thefts and murders are good and quite justifiable under certain socio-political conditions, and low development of individuals.

"A truth which is once true is eternally true; .... In like manner an ideal of good conduct, being a solution of its conditions, is eternally true for them" (2)

Hence, against Green, Alexander held that moral standards are relatively absolute, and they cannot be treated as gradual approximations towards an absolute norm. Similarly, against Spencer, Alexander held that morality is a fact of higher order, and as such with the perfection of this higher order or social organisation, morality will not disappear. Thus, Alexander disagreed both with Green and Spencer regarding the final outcome of morality.

1. International Journal of Ethics 1892 p. 426; also
   * L. O. P. pp. 271, 206
2. Ibid. p. 233. see also pp. 270, 273
If there is nothing special about moral demands, then, why should not the individual violate them? No doubt, the individual does not violate the moral demands for he does feel an 'ought' or sense of moral obligation to perform his duties. But Alexander is simply concerned to show that this moral obligation is quite explicable on the naturalistic line. A mass of sentiments is formed in obeying the calls for maintaining the social health or equilibrium, and any attempt to violate the social vitality gives pain to the individual. (1)

"Goodness", said Alexander, is "equivalent to the approbation which is felt by good men for the action in question; the 'oughtness' of the moral ideal is resolved into a feeling. It is so far from being a unique or transcendental phenomenon, that it is but a psychological fact like others". (2)

That we feel a sense of 'ought' is unquestionable, but what Alexander contended, is that it does not require any non-natural element to account for it. (3) Then, again, besides the presence of moral feeling there is the pressure from the wills of others which makes an individual observe the moral ideal. Hence, the individuals, by virtue of the outer and inner constraints, are forced to be moral. Conscience in each individual is nothing but the internal vice-regent of the outer pressure(*). Hence, Alexander came near the position of Mill in his account of the moral obligation.

From the above account it is clear that Alexander was most thoroughly opposed to a-priorism in morals, and even tried

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1. Mind 1872 p.40
2. Ibid. p.44
3. J.P.S. 1928 p.155
to reduce 'ought' to 'is', to which we have already made reference. Thus, Alexander in his early years tried to carry a naturalistic programme in Ethics. But this naturalistic plan could not be wholly complete, for much as he might have tried to remove Ethics from the domain of Metaphysics, he must have seen that a naturalistic morality cannot be successful without a complete naturalistic metaphysics. Later, Alexander felt dissatisfied with his LOCAL ORDER AND PROGRESS. The reason for this dissatisfaction, says Laird, was that the views expressed in it about progress, about the sufficiency of Natural Selection, and about the moving equilibrium as the arbiter of all values, did not satisfy Alexander in his mature years. The real reason is that he went beyond the domain of Ethics. Epistemology and Ontology monopolised all his interest and his moral theories lagged behind.

* Later in E.F.V. p.253 Alexander wholly accepted the view of Mill regarding the nature of conscience, as is clear from the following: "The conscience which can be verified as operative in our minds is, as Mill described it, nothing but a mass of loyalties which gather round ends which have been found experimentally in the source of time to satisfy the passions of men as adjusted to one another in submission to the social sense, and which is accordingly consulted as occasions arise as a short compendium and convenient vade-mecum of conduct". See also pp.260,266; S.T.D.II. p.260

1. P.L.P. p.21
2. See the letter of Prof. N.A. Smith written to Alexander, dated August 19, 1720
His early naturalism did not satisfy his later years because it lacked the mighty dynamic force which leads to progressive development, upward and forward. The 'progress' of MORAL ORDER AND PROGRESS did not mean the straining of something which leads to the creation of new emergents. It was a name for 'mere change', good enough for a materialistic naturalism, but is wholly inadequate to support a metaphysics in which all the experiences of men at their best, their aspirations for beauty, goodness and truth, could be given a place. Later on, he himself protested against the mechanical explanation of the moral ideal of 'Moral Order and Progress' and supplemented it with the addition of a moral impulse in man which derives him towards moral goodness. (1) Besides, he himself hinted that there should be a plan of moral progress which a metaphysics has to work out systematically.

"From considering this continuity of moral ideals we may form to ourselves the idea of a single law or plan of moral progress, but it is a problem which concerns metaphysics". 2

Then, again, he also envisaged a spiral and not a linear plan of evolutionary development. (3). But at this early stage Alexander had not hit upon the theory of Emergence and he had to wait for the theory of the Space-Time continuum to be fully formed in his own mind. New influences were

1. B.F.V. p.47. Protesting against the conception of the mechanical nature of moral equilibrium Alexander wrote:
   "But what is it which impels us to balance one motive against another? For motives have not hands and do not pull the man divers ways so as to produce a resultant. The balance must be effected by some other passion though it is not reason."
2. B.F.V. p.47. also see J.A.S. 1925, Vol.30 pp.211-212
3. L.O.P. p. 295
4. L.O.P. pp.61, 62 and especially p.384-385
were waiting to transform the mechanistic naturalism into
the dynamic Evolutionary Naturalism of SPACE, TIME AND DEITY.
This new influence came from the new movement of Realism
which began with Moore and Russell.
Synopsis of the Chapter.

Here it is shown that things are independent of mind. Firstly, by an analysis of perception, it is shown that *perception* of a thing does not determine its *esse*. This conclusion of the independence of objects, with regard to perception, is generalised to cover all objects of any cognitive situation. Thus, images, ideas are also to be taken to be independent of the *knowing* process. Further, the hypothesis of the independence of objects of the *knowing* process is tested with reference to varying sensa and illusion. From an analysis of varying sensa and illusions, it is shown that they too are non-mental.

However, the best way of demonstrating the independence of objects of the *knowing* process is to show that mind is also an existent thing by the side of other things. This distinctness of mind is argued here by holding that mind can be 'enjoyed' only and can never be contemplated. If mind, in the *knowing*-situation is so distinct, then, objects and mind are to be taken as quite independent and distinct from one another.

In order to show that mind can be 'enjoyed' only and cannot be contemplated, it is shown that mind is pure conation.
Therefore, it cannot be self-cognised, for cognition is not the essence of it. In holding the conational view of mind, 'feeling' might be an obstacle. Against the conational view of mind, it might be objected that 'feeling' is a modification of the mental process and it is 'known' or 'contemplated'. To remove this objection it is shown that 'feeling' is not a mental process at all. It is a vital process and is of the nature of organic sense. However, there is the possibility of another objection against the conational view of mind. It might be argued that if mind is pure conation which can be enjoyed only, then the past enjoyments cease to be enjoyed at the present time. As such they can be only intellectually remembered. However, Alexander tries to show that the past enjoyments are 'enjoyed', with the mark of pastness about them.

A critical scrutiny of Alexander's epistemology shows that it has not succeeded in explaining the objectivity of all appearances. Further, from the reduction of 'feeling' to vital process and from the doubtful theory of 'enjoyment', it is argued that the realistic epistemology of Alexander forcibly tries to fit facts into its pre-conceptions.
The origin of Alexander's Epistemology:— In the first instance
Alexander was a metaphysician and so a speculative interest
sustained all his thinking. His first work of constructive
philosophy was *Moral Order and Progress* (1889). It was frankly
based on an evolutionary naturalistic bias, but, what is its
foundation? Its method was empirical and being influenced by
Leslie Stephen and Spencer, it could be called an Evolutionary
Ethics. But his empiricism was more allied to that of Mill
than to the *Evolutionary Empiricism* of Spencer. (1). He still
relied on the old British Empirical method and supplemented
it with Darwinism for the construction of his metaphysics.
However, the British empiricism was mercilessly and success¬
fully criticised by Green in his commentary on Hume. But
between 1884 and 1906 Alexander could do nothing to stop the
rising tide of idealism, save protesting against its a-priorism.
both in Ethics and Epistemology. It also appears from the
criticism of Alexander by Carr that Alexander could not
undermine the foundation of idealism in this way. He himself
confessed that during this period he had nothing of importance
to say. (2). Tacitly he assumed that idealism could be refuted
not piecemeal but by a complete system of thought in an oppo¬
site direction. How could this be achieved? No doubt, at Oxford
a revolt against idealism arose under the leadership of Cook
Wilson, but the nature and method of Alexander's ontology and
epistemology did not come from Oxford and this can be shown in

1. *The Oxford Magazine* June 6, 1886 p. 416; Philosophy and
   Biology p. 25; A Metaphysical Sketch p. 9; On the A-priori. p. 3
the following way.

At Oxford the idealistic tradition of Green prevailed for a long time, even after the death of its leader in 1882. Later, Cook Wilson deviated from it and he established some sort of a rationalistic realism. However, he took his decisive step not earlier than 1904 and even then his follower Pritchard points out that his decision was extremely hesitant and when it was taken it was done without any emphasis. (1). In an important letter to Pritchard, dated 6.1.1904 (2), Cook Wilson laid down certain significant conclusions in favour of realism. He pointed out that much which is ultimate in our experience is in itself intelligible though not explicable, and this is true about knowledge itself.

"I felt that if we don't know what knowledge is we know nothing and there can be no help for us. I feel sure many most respectable theories commit the fallacy of supposing that the presupposition of all explanation can be explained". (3)

This assumption concerning epistemology was certainly congenial to the future development of realism.

Then, again, Cook Wilson maintained that the object of apprehension must be recognised to be independent of the act of apprehension. (4). Further, this knowledge of the object is direct, for if the object be known through the representation of an image, then this presence of the image requires to be substantiated by the intermediation of another image and then this substantiating image will require still another image.

1. Mind 1919 p.309
2. Cook Wilson J. 'Statement and Inference' Vol.2. A considerable part of this letter was used by Pritchard in writing 'John Cook Wilson' in Mind 1919. pp.297-316.
Hence, the doctrine of representationism involves a hopeless regress. (1)

These conclusions regarding the independence of objects and their direct apprehension are highly significant for the rise of New Realism. But it is extremely doubtful whether Alexander ever came to know them in the early stage of his revolt against idealism. Firstly, the views of Cook Wilson were too non-committal and, besides, his writings were too few on account of his reluctance to publish his results in a final form. Then, again, his realism was too rationalistic for his theory was based on the analysis of pure thought and not on the direct evidence of experience. Thirdly, the realism of Cook Wilson became a half-hearted affair in his followers Frichard and Joseph. Frichard accepted the subjectivity of secondary qualities and afterwards Joseph accepted a rationalistic interpretation of 'Evolution'. (2)

Finally, Joseph in 1929 accepted the idealistic tradition which is clear from the following statement:

"The empirical conditions of the apprehension of them (real things) by finite minds, and the development in finite minds of that apprehension, may depend together upon a reality of intelligence which shows itself in nature to itself in minds". (3)

2. The Concept of Evolution 1924. in ANCIENT AND MODERN PHILOSOPHY (Clarendon Press 1935) Then Joseph in his letter to Alexander dated Jan. 23, 1912 with reference to 'Conational Psychology' writes: "I disagree with nearly all of it, but you won't be surprised at my saying that". Then, in his letter of Dec. 4, 1920, to Alexander, he says that Alexander's philosophy is as unbelievable as the American New Realism and that the reading of it has shown to him the strength of idealism.
Hence we find that the rationalistic realism (*) of Cook Wilson had not sufficient vigour and therefore the influence of Oxford Realism could not have contributed directly to the realistic development of Alexander. (2) We find that Alexander attacked idealism on the basis of empiricism and for the inspiration of this we have to look into another source. A reflection on Idealism showed Alexander that it was based on the strength of its epistemology. Of course, Bosanquet denied that idealism of his type could be based on the theory of knowledge and he wrote thus:

"What at once amazed me in the polemic before us was the continual collision between its (of New Realism) statements and passages which crowded in my mind in which Green, Wallace, Bradley——to mention no more than these——seemed most sharply and in their whole aim and method to dissociate themselves from what I understand by Epistemology"(3)

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* Realism is a theory, according to which the sense-experience reports a true, if limited, account of objects; that it is possible to have faithful and direct knowledge of the actual world.

Rationalism is the theory, according to which reason is an independent source of knowledge, independently of sense-experience.

Therefore, RATIONALISTIC REALISM means that an analysis of the rational requirement of knowledge shows the independent reality of objects. However, an EMPIRICAL REALISM maintains that the independence of objects is guaranteed by an uncorrupted deliverance of experience itself.

2. However, we have to admit that there must have been some sort of indirect influence of Cook Wilson and Alexander did make use of Cook Wilson’s criticism of Bradley’s theory of ‘terms and relations’. Following Cook Wilson Alexander regarded Bradley’s attack on the relational mode of thinking as based on the abstraction of terms and relations. Thus he wrote: “What Mr. Bradley has done then is to take a fictitious or abstract Space and Time and demonstrate that they are abstractions.”

3. The distinction between mind and its object. pp.54-55; see pp. 51-60.
However, the American Neo Realists insisted on this and Alexander shared the views of his fellow-realists. Besides, being brought up in Oxford idealism, he knew that at least this brand of idealism was based on Kant; and, Kantianism as it was interpreted then, was supposed to be based on epistemology. Hence, the revolt against idealism meant for Alexander a movement against an idealistic epistemology and the signal for action came from Moore. Now Moore published his famous 'Refutation of Idealism' in Mind, Vol. XIll, 1903, followed by 'The Nature and Reality of Objects of Perception' in the PROCEEDINGS OF THE ARISTOTELIAN SOCIETY, 1905-6, and 'The Subject-Matter of Psychology' in the same journal of 1909. It is pointless here to discuss whether Moore did succeed in refuting idealism (4), but he certainly helped Alexander in

2. Alexander shared this view, for in his early criticism of idealism he pointed out that to argue from knowledge to reality is unwarrantable. (P.A.S. Vol.1,1886, p.18). See also his later confirmation of it in 'The Historicity of Things'. (1936 p.20)

3. S.T.D.I, p.6. This is very clearly reflected in his review of 'Hegelianism and Personality' by Seth. There he pointed out that Kant's 'unity of self-consciousness' is at the root of neo-Kantianism. Kant has been taken to be the chief offender by Alexander. As Green did not criticise this notion of 'timeless spirit', so he also became guilty of turning logic into metaphysics. (The Oxford Magazine, June 6,1926, p.416. See also 'Kant', HOLBQn REV. Oct. 1924, pp. 455-6.

4. Moore himself disowned his 'Refutation of Idealism' in his PHILOSOPHICAL STUDIES, Preface p.viii, and Alexander was aware of this.
developing his realistic epistemology (1). From 1908 onward Alexander wrote philosophy as a convinced realist.

But it would be wrong to suppose that Alexander was occupying himself with only realistic epistemology. All the time he was influenced by his underlying metaphysics and this metaphysics was one of Evolutionary Naturalism. In going beyond his realistic epistemology he relied upon his psychology. According to this meta-psychology mind was to be taken as purely conative. In this meta-psychological speculation he was very much aided by Ward and Stout. In the end, his epistemology formed only a chapter which metaphysics, as he said, takes in its stride. (2). However, he came to establish his metaphysics through his epistemology; (3) and therefore in order to understand his metaphysics we have to explain his epistemology.

The background of the realistic epistemology of Alexander.

By taste and temperament Alexander was an empiricist and by taking science and evolution seriously he became an

1. In certain respects the uncritical acceptance of the distinction between mental acts and their objects, drawn by Moore, caused a great deal of trouble for Alexander. See Ducasse, C.J. 'Introspection, Mental Acts and Sensa', MIND 1936 and also Moore's 'Refutation of Idealism' in THE PHILOSOPHY OF G.B.MOORE (The Library of Living Philosophers). We will allude to it again at the end of this chapter.
3. S.T.D.I. p.10. 'A Metaphysical Sketch', p.1. Then, Stout also favours this end and writes: "But it throws light, I think, on his statement that it was by way of epistemology that he first approached ontological problems" (Mind 1946, p.128). However, it will be too exaggerated to hold that a theory of knowledge is the foundation of his philosophy. (See, Dean Inge's remark about this in Guardian, Feb. 16, 1921.)
Evolutionary Naturalist. However, the Oxford idealism was the reigning philosophy of this time, and, therefore, to establish his naturalism, he had to contend against it. This Oxford idealism was supposed to be based on certain premises of epistemology and, therefore, Alexander proceeded to base his realistic epistemology on premises opposed to those of idealism. It appears that he fully realised the strength of the experiential basis of idealism and against it, he could offer no arguments. Therefore, the movement against idealism could be only an indirect one. However, Alexander was not alone in warring against idealism (*).

Percy Nunn and the American New Realists joined issues with idealism. The New Realists argued that idealism was based on epistemology and this epistemology was based on the fallacies of Ego-Centric Predicament, Exclusive Particularity, Definition by Initial Predication and so on (1). The approach of Nunn was more modest. He tried to show that idealism is not based on any self-evident premises, but is at most a postulate. If so, then it allows other postulates to be the alternative solutions of the philosophical problems (2). It seems that Alexander sided with Nunn, for he did regard his own realism as a postulate. In establishing his own realism

* Between 1895-1912, a reaction against idealism had taken place and this had assumed various forms, namely, 'empiricism', 'pragmatism' and 'neo-realism'. Here we are more concerned with neo-realism. The neo-realists were divided amongst themselves with regard to the positive tenets of their theory, but they were all united in their attack against idealism. Neo-realism was a widespread movement in philosophy, and was quite popular both in Great Britain and America. American neo-realism was represented by Holt, Marvin, Montague, Perry, Fitkin and Spaulding. Alexander had a great deal of sympathy with the views of Holt and has made frequent references to him.
he preferred the path which was shown by Moore to the polemics against idealism. It lay in showing that a proper analysis of the knowing process would show the independence of its objects. In 'The Refutation of Idealism', Moore had argued that perceiving is distinct from the perceptum. For example, the existence of blue is quite distinct from its sensation; and, according to Moore, we can conceive that 'blue' might exist and yet the sensation of blue not exist. (1). Further, in 'The nature and reality of objects of perception' (1905-1906) Moore came to this conclusion:

"It would seem, therefore, that if my own observations do give me any reason whatever for believing in the existence either of any perception in any other person or of any material object, it must be true that not only my own perceptions, thoughts and feelings, but also some of the other kinds of things which I directly perceive—colours, sounds, smells, etc.—do really exist: it must be true that some objects of this kind exist or are real in precisely the same simple sense in which my perceptions of them exist or are real." (2)

Then, again, in 'The Subject-Matter of Psychology' (1909) Moore concluded that sense-data cannot be the mental acts themselves. For example, the sensum 'blue' does not seem to belong to mind in the same sense in which an act of consciousness belongs to it. (3)

As mentioned earlier, it is pointless to discuss here whether Moore's arguments were flawless. They served the purpose of establishing epistemological realism as a respectable creed and Alexander accentuated this status of realism. For
him the realistic epistemology was always a POSTULATE and its truth was to be judged from its success in explaining all experiences. (1)

"I make a hypothesis", said Alexander, "and try to show that it explains all the relevant facts. The force of the argument, if it has any, lies in its accumulation of convergent evidence" (2).

As Alexander accepted the coherence theory of truth, so the ultimate test of his realistic epistemology depended on his naturalistic metaphysics which would explain all the variegated experiences on this basis. Once more we conclude that the realistic epistemology of Alexander was only a chapter of his metaphysics, as opposed to an idealistic metaphysics which was supposed by Alexander to be based on an idealistic epistemology. This interpretation of Alexander's epistemology is also supported by the testimony of Stout, who has pointed out that Alexander's theory of knowledge was determined by his revolt against Green. Stout wrote thus:

"He seemed to be in a large measure endeavouring to adjust his analysis of experience to an independently preconceived ontology". (3)

As such the realistic epistemology of Alexander comes to be highly coloured by his metaphysics and therefore, in the final evaluation of Alexander, his ontology and not his epistemology has to be taken into account. This is supported by Metz's view too:

2. MIND. 1923 p.16
3. MIND 1940 p.428. The same point is repeated by A. Boyce-Gibson in AUSTRALASIAN JOURNAL OF PSYCHOLOGY AND PHILOSOPHY, 1938 Vol. 1 p.252.
"But Alexander's theory of knowledge is only the prelude to his metaphysics, and can only be understood through it. Metaphysics is the basis of his whole philosophy; all the lines of his thought converge upon it and are gathered up in it". (2)

The General Problem of Alexander's Epistemology and its Solution:- Idealism teaches the priority of mind over things, and nature. According to it, then, there is one, all-embracing, Absolute Mind which by its self-realising or self-objectifying processes has brought about all things and nature. So in the last analysis Reality is an Absolute Mind. This conclusion is supported by the fact that objects to be objects are made so by the understanding i.e., the understanding makes objects by relating the manifold of sensations through its categories. Further, mind not only creates the truth of sciences but also determines moral goodness by its free activities. Hence, mind by virtue of its regulative and legislative principle gives laws to nature and constitutes values. All these tenets of idealism have already been shown in the philosophy of Green, Bradley and Bosanquet and we need not repeat them here.

The general problem of Alexander was then to refute all these tenets of idealism by proving just the reverse. According to Alexander, mind, instead of being the measure of reality, is only one thing among the vast number of others.(1) Alexander held this view of mind in his epistemology and with this underlying assumption elaborated his metaphysics.

(1) R. K. 'A Hundred Years of British Philosophy' p. 632.
But if mind is only a thing among other things, then we have to explain how this pretension of mind as the law-giver of nature has originated. Alexander came to the conclusion that the exalted position of mind has been reached through a wrong analysis of the knowledge-situation and by an undue emphasis on the role of knowing and by the transformation of metaphysics into epistemology (1). The remedy consists in holding that the knowledge-situation is not unique, but is only an instance of the general relationship of 'compresence or togetherness' between any two things. Therefore, knowing is no more the important than gravitation which is due to/compresence of two material things. Just as the presence of the book on the table does not constitute the essence of the table, so in the same way, the perception of the table does not constitute the 'esse' of the table (2). Besides, the theory of the internality of the knowing process in relation to objects has been based on a wrong analysis of the cognitive fact. In any perceptual situation, if we rely on our untutored deliverance of it, we will find that a perceptum is always distinct from and has an independent status of the perceiving act.

"That these two things, the act of consciousness and the object which it is conscious of, are present together and distinct from one another is not a theory or a philosophical postulate, but a description of the event which is the perception of the tree in its simplest term" (3).

As we said, it is due to a confusion of a perceptum with its

1. Mind, 1912-p.5
3. B.J.F. 1911,p.240; Cf. STD I-p.16; Mind 1912-p.8
perceiving or of a sensum with its sensing, declared Alexander, which has given rise to the erroneous theory of 'esse est percipi'. (1) Hence, really the knowing process remains purely external to its objects.

But further, mind can never be conceived as an object, not because the knower cannot be known, but because cognition is not the essence of mind. Mind is purely conative and can be enjoyed or lived through as it is, but it can never be made an object in the same sense in which a table or a tree can be made an object of knowledge. If mind can never become an object, then the idealistic tenet that mind is the unity of the subject and object is destroyed and thereby the theory of self-manifestating or self-objectifying mind can no longer be maintained. Alexander stated this result in the following way:

"For the hypothesis that mind is one thing amongst other things in the empirical world of finites, though it does not presuppose the actual result that cognition is the concomittance of a knowing enjoyment with a contemplated finite, does presuppose that there is no mind above both empirical mental acts and physical things to which they are both alike objects or, in the Lockeian language, ideas". (2)

Further, as will be seen later, mind no doubt is a gifted member in the vast democracy of things, but it is not a final evolute. The universe is straining towards still higher evolutes, and as such mind has to give up its pretensions as being the 'roof and crown' of things.

2. S.I.I. 11. p. 30; also see p. 332.
But, what about the creation of values -- of Truth, Beauty and Goodness? Do they not own their being to mind? Yes, values do owe their being partially to mind, but, then, they are created by the collective efforts of all mankind and there is nothing to show that they are a-priori determination by the Absolute Mind (*). Besides, values are not specifically mental, for they are found at all levels of existence. In most general terms, we can say that they are but adaptations to specific situations. There is nothing to show that mind by its own special nature of freedom creates Goodness or Beauty, and, even then, freedom in a general sense is found at all levels. Hence freedom too is not the prerogative of mind, for in general it means that feature of things in which cause and effect are both lived through or enjoyed and in this form it is found at all levels of existence. (1).

Finally, mind has been considered by the idealists to be a synthesising activity which by means of its categories makes or determines objects and nature. But these categories are wholly non-mental, and are the empirical though a-priori determinants of all finite existents, including mind. Mind does not create categories but is itself constituted by them, in the same way in which any other thing is constituted by them. No doubt we can detect the presence of categories more clearly in the functioning of mind because it is more perfect.

*In "Six Lectures on Values" Alexander wrote: "Instead of being the foundations of things, they are really the creation of the human mind and ideals, and have no existence apart from these". P.1. Then, values, according to Alexander are no more real than other realities, S.I.D.ll. p.314; The Historicity of things-P.16. P.I. pp.263;265.
than other things in the democracy of facts. Because the categories are seen more clearly in mind than in other objects, therefore, the illusion arises that mind creates them. Mind does not give laws to nature, but simply discovers them, for the categorial features are found in all things.

Thus, the temper of Alexander's realism is to de-anthropomorphise nature and to order man and mind to their proper place in the vast democracy of things. Alexander no doubt stripped mind of its pretensions, but not of its value and greatness. Nevertheless, in the end, instead of the mind constituting things, it is the things which constitute mind. The reason for holding is that mind or consciousness is the functioning of the Nervous System, and, if we speak of dependence, then it is mind which is dependent on its physiological processes (1). Hence, Alexander substituted the Copernican view of mind for the Ptolemaic view which had prevailed in idealism so far (2).

As Alexander's epistemology is based on his metaphysics, therefore, an outline of his ontology will assist us in the understanding of his theory of knowledge. Alexander's ontology takes Time, Evolution and Emergence seriously. Like Bergson, Alexander regards change as the fundamental characteristic of the universe; but this change or movement is evolutionary, for it keeps on producing greater complexities in its vortex.

1. F.R.A. 1914, pp. 280-281; STD II.-p.105
2. The conduct of Understanding, THE JOURNAL OF EDUCATION, March-April, 1909, p. 175. Here Alexander seems to be following Richard who commenting on Kant's 'Theory of knowledge', pointed out that Kant instead of effecting a Copernican revolution really made the Ptolemaic view stand more firmly by making Understanding to be the Law-giver or the Law-maker of Nature.
lead in to progress and the emergence of new qualities. Any evolute is considered as a new emergent. Hence, Alexander's philosophy is a voluntaristic metaphysics or naturalism, but a naturalism which has room for values, or as Alexander called them, 'Tertiary qualities'.

In Alexander's scheme of things, Space-Time, that is, pure motion is the stuff or matrix out of which all things evolve. There is a * Husus in Space-Time by virtue of which it is endowed with universal restlessness which keeps it evolving. In the course of evolution a certain complexity of Space-Time yields matter. This matter, in its further progressive evolution gives way to life, and, life by reaching a further complexity is 'lifted up' into consciousness. Hence, in broad outline, matter, life and mind are the chief new emergents, but each in its turn is a complex of space-time. Life is an organisation of material processes, and mind is but life at a higher complexity of vital processes. But in the final analysis, mind, life and matter are mere space-time in its varying complexities. Mind is not only successive or temporal, but also spatial. By the spatiality of mind is meant that consciousness is an organisation of the processes of the Nervous System, specially of brain. As the neural functions are spatially directed, so mind being neural is also spatial. Mind no doubt is more perfect than life and matter, but is not the final evolute. In the further forward thrust of space-time beings higher than mind are bound to emerge; and, if they have not already emerged, we know not where, then
they are quite certain to arise in future.

Alexander's epistemology can be explained in terms of this hylozoistic hierarchy. In this hierarchical order any two things may be compresent with each other. They may be of the same order of existents or they may belong to different levels. If one of the things is higher than the other with which it is compresent, then the higher is said to contemplate the lower. But the lower cannot contemplate the higher. Further, in contemplating lower objects, the higher enjoys itself, but does not contemplate itself. For example, mind can contemplate its compresent life and matter, but it cannot contemplate itself. Similarly, life can contemplate its compresent matter but it can neither contemplate itself nor the mind above it. However, it enjoys itself in contemplating matter. In the same way mind enjoys itself only in so far as it contemplates its lower objects like life and matter.

Thus, contemplation and enjoyment are found at all levels, when one of the compresent entity is mind then its contemplation is called knowing. For example, when a table becomes compresent with a mind called A, then A is said to know the table and in contemplating the table A enjoys itself. Hence, to have knowledge proper one of the compresent entities should be mind or consciousness.

"...the generic character of knowing is the most elementary of all relations; that it is a relation of knowing in the proper sense only when one member of the relation is a mind."

1. S.T.D. 11, pp. 75-82. It is significant to note that Alexander has so defined 'knowing' that enjoyment is precluded from being knowing proper. 2. S.T.D. I, pp. 82, 86-7, 75.
Here the question may arise about 'and' or 'the togetherness of the two things in a knowing-situation'. Mind and objects are the two component things in this knowing-situation. For example, mind in contemplating a table, enjoys itself. Now, is 'and' or 'the togetherness of mind with the table' enjoyed or contemplated? But there is no relation of 'and' or 'together' over and above the object contemplated, and the enjoying of mind itself, which arises in contemplating the object. So the question of Bradley (1) regarding the nature of the relationship of togetherness as mental or non-mental, does nor arise. The 'togetherness' is enjoyed by A as well as by the table, and is exhausted in enjoyment. (2) But we have to be careful in noting the compresence of mind in a knowing-situation, when the table is behind me then it is really not compresent with me as mind. In such a situation the table is compresent with my living body and can arouse only the physical excitation in me (+) but not the consciousness of its presence. In order that the table be compresent with my mind it should be able to arouse an appropriate sense-excitation, leading to the adequate neural irritation of brain, which may be attended with consciousness.

From the above statement it is clear that in cognition — "it is the one term of the relation (of compresence) which has the unique flavour and not the relation itself" (3).

1. F.I.F. p.56
   S.T.D. II p.21
   * For example, gravitational excitation.
Hence, it would be wrong to regard the knowing process as constitutive of things. In general, then, cognition is simply a revelatory function of cognita. The cognitive act is mental and may be either sensing, perceiving, imagining, or conceiving which always reveals its appropriate objects of sensa, percepts, images, or concepts respectively. Objects are always non-mental in the sense that they are always independent of the mental act. Later on, Alexander showed that they are always physical, for they are complexes of space-time. Hence, in knowing, mind is always aware of the object. But 'of' may be used in two senses, namely, in the sense of reference and apposition. When it is said that mind is aware of the object, then the object does not become a part of mind in the same sense in which the acts of mind belong to it. For example, sensing is really a content or part of mind, for it forms a constituent part of it. But the sensum of which mind is aware is something to which mind refers and reveals it as non-mental. Hence, in other words, the mental act may be called an -ing and that non-mental object which it exhibits may be called an -ed. (1). Hence, in the sensation of blue, sensum is an -ing, and forms a part of mind, but being blue is an -ed and remains independent of mind. Similarly, in the perception of a table, perceiving is a part of mind, but the perceptum 'table' is revealed as an independent entity apart from the perceiving act. No object of contemplation ever forms a part or the constituent

1. S.T.D. 1, p. 12
of mind, and mind in contemplating the object simply finds and reveals it.

If all cognita are but revelation by mind in the contemplation of them, then, what should we say about illusions and hallucinations? Are they also real objects? Well, even illusions and hallucinations are non-mental, but they are not true revelation of the real objects in their proper places. Before we explain illusions and errors, we should clearly state the proper conditions of a cognitive requirement. We have already seen that mind is an organisation of brain-centres 'lifted up' in consciousness and brain-centres themselves are aroused either peripherally or centrally in relation to their adequate stimulation. Now, the evolutionary process through countless generations has made the instrument of knowing appropriate for revealing their objects (1). Hence, without sense-organs and their corresponding brain-centres there can be no cognition, and their normal functioning in normal persons leads to a true revelation of real objects (2). Thus, in general, sensing, perceiving etc., do yield a true view of real objects. If sense-organs and brain-centres be congenitally abnormal, or through acquired circumstances function abnormally, then, we cannot have true appearances of things (3). But in general our instrument of knowing has to be taken as trustworthy in revealing real objects, independent of them.

Thus, the objects of knowledge are always independent of

1. J.A.S. 1A p.26. 2. S.T.D. II, p.164. Mind 1923 p.7. Of course the real question is, how can we determine and standardise this normality? The difficulty of this has been shown by Prof. D.K. Emmet in The Nature of Logical Thinking p.25.
our awareness of them (4) and we know them directly. For example, in perceiving a table we are immediately aware of it and not of the eyes or brain-centres through which we know it. Then the object of which we are aware is always non-mental. Can we say this about images? Do they not depend on mind for their existence? Are not the dream-images wholly dependent on the mind which imagines them? Then again, there is another question, do we perceive the process of knowing itself? And, if we do so, then, at least will not this mental process known as an object be mental? And, if so, then the statement that no object of contemplation is mental is refuted. Now we will take up the first question, but even now we can say that Alexander would at once dismiss the possibility of contemplating mental processes, for mind can only enjoy itself and cannot contemplate itself. Now let us take the question about images.

We have already seen that the 'instrument' of knowing is correlated with and adapted to its non-mental objects. This appropriate act of knowing is initiated by external objects in the case of perception, but in imagination, the mental act is internally initiated to reveal a non-mental object called image (1). The image has been wrongly taken to be subjective, since the image like any other object forces itself on us. This is clear from the testimony of poets and artists who simply find the images as given to them from outside, and as even independent of their will. Their act of imagining simply reveals to them these images. Again, images and sensa must be supposed to stand
on the same level, which is quite clear from an analysis of a perceptual situation. Of course, perception is a unitary experience though it is a complex mental process, in which the presentative and representative factors are welded together in one whole. For example, in the perception of a table from a distance we directly get the colour sensation and supplement this with the past imaginal elements of hardness, smoothness and so on. In our life of daily experience we hardly analyse the perception of a table into its presentative and representative factors, and we think that the percept table with its hardness, smoothness, etc., is directly and immediately sensed. But any plain analysis will show that it cannot be so. But, again, if blind-folded we touch the table, then here the tactual sensation will be supplemented with the past visual and other images of the table. Here what was a sensum in visual perception has become an ideatum or image, and what was an ideatum becomes a sensum in tactual perception. Thus, sensa and ideata very easily 'pass into' each other. This shows that they stand on the same footing, and since one of them is non-mental, hence both are so. (1).

The 'real thing' is a synthesis of many sensa, percepts, images and concepts. They are all non-mental objects which are revealed by the mental act. At times Alexander implied that it would be an inadequate description to say that an object of the mental act is a thing. A thing has many aspects of sensa, images and concepts etc., which our successive cognitions try

red sensation in the past, has been aroused by a real external stimulus. 2.S.T.D.11.p.221-222 specially footnotes.
to complete. (*) Hence, Alexander combined the Kantian doctrine with Platonistic Realism, for according to him, concepts and the very laws of combination are all real and objective, which supplement the sensorial and perceptual aspects of the thing. "Without law sensations or perceptual qualities would be isolated and incoherent. Without sensation law would be without pungency, it would not sting, it would not be realised in the direct action of thing on thing." (1).

Of course, Alexander differed from Kant in granting a non-mental status to concepts and laws, and differed from Plato in attributing an objective status to sensa also.

ENJOYMENT:— Alexander knew that the core of idealism lay in two propositions, namely: 'esse est percipi' and that the self is a unity of subject and object within itself. Hence, he wrote thus:

"When the phraseology of ideas was current in philosophy, the mind was spectator both of ideas of reflection and ideas of sensation. It may be doubted whether this doctrine or that of representative ideas has worked the greater havoc." (2)

Against idealism, realism tried to show that objects and mind are quite distinct. As such objects do not depend on mind for their existence. This independence of objects of the knowing process could be shown in two ways. Firstly, it might be

*The distinction between 'object' and 'thing' cannot be rigid but it means that an object may be a sensum, perceptum, or an image or an ideatum, and a 'thing' is a synthesis of them. (S.T.D.L. pp.15,115n)


2. F.B.A. p.263. Alexander felt that the doctrine of Absolute Mind is simply a transformation of Kant's unity of self-consciousness (The Oxford Magazine June 6.1866 p.416) Then, he had especially emphasised the importance of self-consciousness in idealism and whilst reviewing the works of T.H. Green, edited by Nettleship he wrote that the force of the idealistic contention is derived from the fact that the mind not only feels, but knows that it feels; not only knows but knows that it knows. (THE ACADEMY, May 4.1869 p.296 Col.12).
argued that an analysis of the knowing process shows the distinctness of the subject and its objects. This was achieved by an analysis of 'esse est percipi' by G.E. Moore. But the more important task, according to Alexander, lay in showing that mind is also a thing existent side by side with other objects. To demonstrate this he had to argue that mind is so different from other objects that it can never be made an object to itself. Alexander considered that his chief contribution lay in showing this (3). Alexander came to recognise what Shadworth Hodgson had pointed out, that the fundamental fallacy of idealism lies in identifying knowing with the knower (4). Once grant that any object of consciousness is mental, Alexander thought, and we are compelled to accept the other conclusions of idealism too. Therefore, Alexander pointed out that mind can never be known as an object of contemplation.

ENJOYMENT covers any experience which is lived through or undergone. It certainly does not mean pleasure only, for it may be suffering as well. (1)

"But it is this very peculiarity of mind, that it enjoys and does not contemplate itself, which conceals from us if we do not keep careful guard against prepossessions, the experienced fact that a common world unites us both—the one, the thing contemplated; the other, the thing enjoyed. We still imagine a mind which contemplated both and may be thought to be the source not merely of its knowing of things, but even of their existence". (2)

That mind can only enjoy itself and can never become its own object, according to Alexander, is more vital than the distinction between mental acts and their objects (3). Hence,

2. P.B.A. 1914 p. 254 also see T.D. 1 p. 17.
Alexander's doctrine of enjoyment is very important for understanding his realistic epistemology.

Stout suggests that in the beginning Alexander regarded pleasure and pain as modifications of the mental acts. Certainly, we do live through our feelings of pleasure and pain, and that is why they are regarded as the subjective states of the individual. So Alexander must have got his clue to the doctrine of enjoyment from the experience of feeling. (4)

We have already seen that 'of' may mean reference or apposition. In contemplating an object mind refers to an independent object of which it is aware through its acts. But in knowing itself there is nothing outside of the process to which it may be directed. Therefore, a knowledge of self is the existence of the self itself. Here 'of' becomes an indication of apposition. Hence, Alexander wrote:

"To me therefore, I myself cannot be a cognitum. I can only be a cognitum to a being who stood outside both me and physical things, in the same way as I myself stand outside physical things and life". (1).

Besides, when mind becomes aware of an object it also at the same time becomes aware of its own acts. Thus consciousness is always at the same time self-consciousness, but there is not super-added consciousness of this conscious part of the self.

4. According to Stout, when Alexander selected the term 'enjoyment' Alexander must have thought of pleasure and pain as experiencing things. Otherwise, says Stout, Alexander's use of the term 'enjoyment' would be utterly pointless, perverse and misleading. After justifying himself in relation to pleasure-pain, Alexander extended the term 'enjoyment' to cover all mental acts. (AUSTRALIAN JOURNAL OF PSYCHOLOGY AND PHILOSOPHY, Vol. XLI, 1924, pp. 43-4.)

"There is no difference between these two things as if besides consciousness there is also a consciousness of consciousness. That way madness lies, for there is no reason why you should stop at consciousness of consciousness and not go on to a consciousness of that". (1).

In the above account of 'enjoyment', Alexander wanted to emphasise that enjoyment is a sort of cognition, but then, here cognition is identical with its object. Here the statement of Stout supporting this interpretation is worth quoting:

"The general principle is that enjoyment is not distinct from but simply identical with what is enjoyed; to say that an 'experiencing' is experienced is simply to say that the experiencing exists". (2).

Thus, Alexander could not have helped holding that enjoyment is a sort of cognition, but he wanted to emphasise the identity of the enjoyed states with their enjoyments. But he could not have denied to enjoyment its cognitiveness. This is supported by the fact that he granted the possibility of the science of Psychology. (3) In psychology we are said to know the mental acts through INTROSPECTION. Then, in relation to Alexander's theory of enjoyment one may ask, is there no possibility of introspection? And, if there is introspection, then do we not know the mental process through it?

In the first instance, Alexander did not rule out introspection, as is clear from the following:

1. The Nature of Mental Activity. P.A.S. 1907-8, p.223; also see MIND 1921, pp.420-1.
2. AUSTRALASIAN JOURNAL OF PSYCHOLOGY AND PHILOSOPHY 1944, p.31 also see pp.35,42. Also see Rogers, A.K. English and American Philosophy since 1800, p.423.
3. S.P.D. III, pp.266-270. In relation to 'Truth and Error' Alexander granted that we can judge our enjoyments (S.P.D. III, pp.232, 239-40. This certainly cannot be done without knowing them.
"On the contrary, enjoyments can be understood and analysed, and it is the business of psychology to analyse enjoyments. The description and analysis of enjoyments constitutes what is known as introspection". (1)

But, if this be true that a scientific interest about mind is possible, then this interest cannot be different from cognitive interest, and as such mental processes come to be known. Certainly, the enjoyments without being known can hardly be 'understood and analysed'.

"At first sight it might seem as if there could be no such science, seeing that no other individual can enjoy my enjoyments..." (2)

But Alexander allowed not only an acknowledgement of other's mind, but also a science of psychology based on the knowledge of the functioning of such a mind.

"Not only can we then compare one process in ourselves with another, and arrive at generalisations, like laws of association or the effect of imagination on our feelings, but compare ourselves with others as declared in their statements as to their minds; we are able to verify that their minds work as ours do in some respects, differently in other respects". (3)

Hence, Alexander accepted that enjoyment is both a kind of being as well as knowing. (4)

But once we allow that in introspection we know the mental process, there remains the possibility of the mental acts being known and as such the self-objectifying process of the mind becomes manifest. Alexander would not allow this. He, therefore, laboured to show that what introspection tells us about is no doubt a mental act, but it is not an object. Such mental acts are pure enjoyments. They may be said to be the ing-aspect and

1. B.J.P. 1771 p.24. From such statements Bosanquet held that Alexander's introspection is a somewhat more attentive species of enjoyment (Contemporary Philosophy p.24)
not the ed-aspect of the knowledge-situation.

"Thus my own mind is never an object to myself in the sense in which the tree or table is. Only an -ing or an enjoyment may exist in my mind either in a blurred or subtly dissected form."

(1) But, why has the illusion arisen that in introspection we know mind as an object? The mistake has arisen because ordinarily introspection is really extrospection. We do not really know mental acts, the ing-aspect of mind, but images, sensa etc., are known and these are not mental, but, as we have already said, they are but non-mental objects. (2) Ordinarily, for the purpose of psychology, it is sufficient to know these non-mental objects, for the -ing is found only in relation to the -ed and therefore, the study of -ing is indirectly carried out by pointing to its objects. Hence, extrospection, which is not introspection proper, can give us only the conditions of enjoyment. (3) Properly speaking in introspection we simply 'live through' with a scientific interest.

"And I was contending that you describe the mental act using the object of it as an indirect means, and the object itself is not introspected, no, not even if you are observing an image. (4)

By not granting the possibility of introspection of the mental act Alexander approached the behaviourist position, and in several places he has referred to his temptation of crossing the floor in the camp of the behaviourists. (5)

4. P.A.S. 1907-8 p.277 where 'introspection' has been called delusive. Also see E.A.S. IX. 1908-9 p.31.
4. MIND 1921 p.423. also see S.T.D.11 pp.89-90.
But, of course, Alexander accepted the reality of consciousness and could never join hands with the behaviourists. In denying the possibility of the knowledge of self, he was working strongly under the influence of his anti-idealistic naturalism, with the avowed aim of dethroning mind from its peculiarly strategic position. (1). Similarly, Rogers points out that it is extremely doubtful whether Alexander would have hit upon the doctrine of enjoyment, had not a metaphysical prepossession first pointed the way. (2).

Thus, Alexander held that in enjoyment we are aware only of the enjoyed acts and these enjoyed acts, being of the nature of -ing can never become an object, of the nature of -ed. In order to show that the enjoyed states are of the nature of -ing only, he tried to show in an elaborate manner that mind is purely conative. In a sketch-plan of a conational psychology he wrote:

"The tripartite classification of mental elements, which has been replaced by a bipartite one, it is proposed here to reduce to the proposition that there is but one ultimate mental process namely, conation". (3) *

In addition to his rejecting introspection as a method of knowing consciousness, Alexander also later on identified mind with physiological processes and this is also in line with behaviourism.
2. Rogers, A.A., English and American Philosophy since 1800 p.422.
* Feeling was considered to be a modification of the conative act by Alexander in his previous papers, see A.S. 1907-6. p.222 A.S. 1911 p.116. On p.242-5 of B.J.P. (1911) he pointed out that the description of feeling in terms of sensa does not appear to be successful. Even in Mind 1915 p.15 he continued to regard feeling as the modification of the mental act. But Alexander denied feeling to be the modification of the mental act in S.T.D. I p.124-125. B.J.P. 1911, p.243; STDII. p.118
Even feeling, which till 1913 he had taken to be a modification of the conative act was discarded as mental. In SPACE, TIME AND DEITY pleasure and pain have been taken to be merely vital processes of the nature of organic sensa, (1), and therefore, they can be contemplated but cannot be enjoyed. Thus, the very source from which the doctrine of enjoyment arose came to be denied.

MIND AS PURE CONATION:— Mind has been taken to be cognitive, conative and affective in the contemporary psychology of Alexander, but he regarded mind as purely conative. Therefore, he had to show that cognition and affection are not really mental. (2). His arguments can be summarised in the following way.

Mind is always conative, but conation may be either practical or speculative. According to him we know a thing primarily by reacting to or by doing something in regard to it. We perceive an apple as juicy or sweet in responding or eating it. We do not first cognise a thing and then to something with it afterwards; but we first do something to it and in thus responding towards it we know it. (3). Thus he wrote:

"I have spent days in trying to convince people that knowledge in its primitive form comes to us through practice. That we only know in so far as we act, and wherever we act we know." (4).

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2. This reduction of mental life to mere conation (with the possible exception of feeling) was undertaken in ‘A Conational Psychology’ B.J.1, 1911 pp. 257-267.
4. Six lectures on Value p. 2. also see B.J.1. 1911, p. 250. In this identification of cognition with conation Alexander felt to have been supported by Spinoza and he mentioned it thus: ‘For always in reading Spinoza it must be remembered that however much he speaks in terms of cold speculation, the exercise of intellect is itself
But for various reasons our act or response to the object may be arrested or inhibited, and then we lapse into speculative conation. For example, instead of eating the apple, we may attentively perceive it or image it or carry a train of ideas about. Thus, cognition arises from the conative reference to objects.

"Now, cognition is not a separate kind of action from conation. It is not even a separate element in a mental act which can be distinguished from a conative element in the act. Cognition is nothing but the conation itself, in so far as it is component with and refers to an object:" (1).

Of course, this pragmatic and partly Freudian explanation of cognition is open to grave objections, if conation is not also cognitive from the very start, then it cannot cognise at all, and it cannot become cognitive in relation to objects. An arrested conation is conation and to become cognitive it must be credited either with the emergence of a new quality or else it must be assumed to be endowed with it from the very beginning. It is true that mental striving or an instinctual drive brings us in concourse with objects, but to cognise them we must be cognitive from the start. (2). In this connection the observation of Joseph is very pertinent:

"Knowing does not seem to me a kind of striving. If one likes to call knowing and striving by the common name conation... that does not establish an identity of nature between them." (Letter to Alexander dated Jan. 25, 1912).

1. S.T.D. 11, p. 116; see also pp. 117, 120-121, B.J.P. 1911, specially pages 244-247.
2. See the discussion of Stout in AUSTRALASIAN JOURNAL OF PSYCHOLOGY AND PHILOSOPHY, 1944, p. 15-27, specially pp. 25-6. There are writings of Alexander which do support the interpretation that he regarded mental life as pure conation. This is strongly supported by his reduction of mental life to pure...
Here Alexander committed a metaphysical violence against the accredited psychological facts. In order to show that mind is purely conative, he had to show that feeling is not a mental act but a sensum. And in showing this not only did he go against the findings of the psychologists, but he had to contradict his own statements on the subject. Besides, this is really against the conative nature of mental life itself. This can be shown in the following way.

Ordinarily we know that feeling is purely subjective, and is indicative of the state of mental life in progress. But apart from this general acceptance of the nature of feeling, the subjectivity of feeling follows from the nature of conative psychology itself to which Alexander was heavily committed. From a conational point of view, which Stout had elaborated so well, and which Alexander had accepted whole-heartedly, the feeling of pleasure-pain is simply a consequential reverberation of strivings. According to it a successful striving is followed by pleasure and an unsuccessful striving is followed by pain.

"...conation (p.171 p.243). But in as much as he accepted that conation is both theoretical as well as practical, he thereby accepted the cognitiveness of mental life indirectly. "They (cognition and conation) are not distinguishable elements in every psychosis, but every species of conation assumes two different forms, theoretical or practical, according to the different interest which the conation possesses". (p.171 p.244-245). Then, again, in B.F.V. he clearly laid down that our responses are cognitive as well as conational (p.10, 129). Here, this emphasis on the conative aspect of the mental process has been put to shut out the possibility of self-knowledge. But the fact of mental life cannot be thus distorted."
Therefore, a feeling becomes an inseparable aspect of conation. (1) And as conation is mental, so feeling becomes a modification of the enjoyed conative act. Thus, in Conational Psychology he wrote:

"I am content, as at present advised, to regard it as not independent of conation, but as a qualification of conation. The attempt to treat it sensory does not appear to me successful". (2).

But later, under the influence of his metaphysics he wrote that he had been mistaken in treating feeling as a modification of conation (3). Now, this change of view was not based on any psychological ground, but it became necessary for him on metaphysical ground. It must have been greatly influenced by the statement of Bosanquet which he made in 1913:

"If you reserve anything for a mind stripped of objective contents, you must, as realism admits, reserve pleasure and pain. But if so, all qualities involving pleasure and pain are mind-dependent, and no physical realism can recognise them as real." (4)

Further, Bosanquet continued that pleasure-pain cannot be separated from sense-contents.

"You must either assign sense-contents to the mind, or aesthetic contents to physical reality". (5)

Alexander had to revise his views about feeling in the light of this idealistic contention. His line of argument is that the sensa are non-mental objects, and feeling is of the nature of sensa. It is known but, then, it is not a mental act.

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1. Even in S.T.D. he could not deny this. See pp.122-123.
4. The distinction between mind and its objects. p.36.
5. Ibid. p.37.
Thus, Alexander dismissed the claim of feeling from being regarded as mental and noted that it is attended with insuperable difficulties. (1) for it is not very easy to support his contention on the basis of naive experience. In some of these pronouncements he radically departed from his empirical programme. In his final judgement he took feeling to be purely vital and of the order of organic sensa. Contradicting his former statements he declared that pleasure and pain are not mental modifications, "but characters of life of which the mind has awareness, as it has of everything which it contemplates, and that the mind does not enjoy them, however strained the technical expression may seem in this connection". (2)

The proof of this doctrine could be only indirect. According to him feeling has to be studied in its simplest instance, and that is to be found in relation to sense-feeling. Now, this sense-feeling is very much like a sensation in having the attributes of duration, intensity, etc., and appears to be localised (*) and therefore it is in general a form of organic sensa, even if it does not seem to have any specific organs. Most probably Alexander knew that he was standing on an uncertain ground, but he held it because his metaphysics needed it. Like Spinoza, Alexander held that pleasure arises from bodily well-being, and pain arises from the diminution of vitality. (3). But to regard pleasure and pain as the characteristic features of life is too speculative and too subjective.

* It is significant to note that Alexander did not accept the doctrine of 'tickle points', and so he could not have accepted feeling as sensation, for having of a sense-organ is an essential mark of a sensation. 
a criterion for the biologists to accept, and hardly any biologist has accepted it. Thus, the proof of the non-mental character of feeling is obscure and very indirect and betrays the fact that Alexander was working under the pressure of his metaphysical prepossessions, (1), and that was to show that no object of awareness can ever be mental, and so mind cannot be a self-objectifying entity.

The premises and conclusions of Alexander's epistemology:

Prof. Broad complains (2) that it is difficult to distinguish between the premises and conclusions in Alexander's theory of knowledge and so let us try to state them as clearly as possible. Alexander's method is empirical and he used the term 'experience' in a wide sense. In this wide sense 'a concept' or 'thought' is as much direct and immediate as a sensum is.

"By experience I mean always experience in general and for me it is always immediate. For me sensa, percepts, images, and concepts and judgments are alike apparitions, and I think it unhappy to call sensa specially immediate." (3)

Alexander saw that to a great extent the idealists too were empirical but he maintained that they were not empirical enough. Their thinking did not harmonise with scientific 'habits of the time' (4), and, further, their conclusions did not accord with religious beliefs and experience. (5).

Alexander agreed with Bosanquet that to analyse any experience is not enough for the purpose of epistemology. The experience must be significant. Therefore, Alexander pointed out that if we start our enquiries with images, dreams and illusions, then we will come to the conclusion that the objects of knowledge are mind-dependent. The reason is plain, for it is easy to regard images as mind-dependent, and then we can apply this conclusion to perception also, for images and percepts stand on the same footing (4). But, why should we not begin with the simpler cases of cognition, like sensation or perception? Let us begin with perception of a table or an apple. Here we find that the perceiving act is distinct from its perceptum 'table' and, as the naive deliverance of perception will hold, the table is independent of the perceiving act. (1). We can apply this conclusion of the independence of the object of its knowing process to images and concepts also, for they stand on the same footing as sensa or percepts.

But, even if we begin with the perceptual situation, the position of realism does not seem to stand on a firm footing. Along with Berkeley and Green, Bradley would retort that the perceiving act and its object may be distinct but they may not be separate. What right have the realists to separate the

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4. This position is best seen in 'Knowledge and Reality', Scottish Herald March 12, 1910 p. 12. See also Wolf, A. 'Natural Realism and Recent Tendencies in Philosophy', A.S. 1908-9 p. 163; Gregory, J.C. 'Realism and Imagination', Mind 1921 pp. 303-4


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perceptum from its perceiving act, seeing that they always go together? (2). The so-called fallacies of Ego-Centric Predication and Definition by Initial Predication etc., at most show that the idealistic conclusion of *esse est percipi* is not proven, but certainly they do not refute it.

All that can be said with safety is that the idealistic contention is at most a postulate. But if only this could be proved it will not be an unimportant conclusion, for it will entitle the realists to go on with their theory as another alternative postulate. (1). At this stage Alexander felt intent to treat the independence of objects as a postulate. But, this is a postulate, said Alexander, which is based on the uncorrupted deliverance of naive commonsense (2), and its truth is to be judged from its capacity in explaining all the relevant data of experience (3). Besides, this realistic postulate harmonises with the temper and results of scientific thinking.

Thus, Alexander postulates that in a perceptual situation the perceptum is distinct and independent of the perceiving act. Further, if we analyse the cases of veridical perception, according to Alexander, then we will find that sense-organs,

2. According to Bosanquet this separation of an object from its mental act is simply an untenable fiction—a pure abstraction in which the mental character of presentations has been fraudulently attacked (Ibid** pp.31-52, 48-49**.
1. Bradley maintained that his philosophy was not based on any postulation but on observation. Then he maintained that Alexander's realism was not a case of postulation but one of abstraction (P.L.P. p.55)
brain centres etc., as the instruments of knowing are compresent with the perceptum and appropriately reveal them. Through the evolutionary processes of ages, on pain of extinction, our sense-organs have become so adapted to the real objects that they reveal them as they really are. We then conclude, on the basis of numerous instances of veridical perception, that the sense-organs are the instruments of revealing their objects and are not the means of distorting them. This conclusion can now be extended to images also. Images too are quite distinct and separate from their imagining processes. Besides, images and percepts stand on the same footing, to which we have already made reference and therefore what is true of percepts is also true of images. Thus, from the cases of many instances of veridical perception and true imagination we can generalise that the cognitive acts are designed to reveal their appropriate objects. Of course, these objects may be sensa, percepts, concepts and so on; and a thing is a synthesis of all of them. Thus, a thing is gradually revealed to us through the selective responses of mind. Mind responds selectively in the same way in which a plant selectively responds to light, air etc., or as an animal, under some instinctual drive, selectively responds to his instinctual object of his environment (1). Thus, the selectivity of mind is based on natural endowment for the appropriate knowing of objects. Now this selectivity of parts of a complex

1. This is in harmony with the view of McDougall. According to it the instinct determines the perception of its appropriate object in the environment. See his SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY 15th edition p. 26.
thing does not mean distortion or suppression of the true nature of a thing.

"But selection, while it creates the limitation of the mind to what is selected, does not or need not alter the object selected". (2)

Alexander emphasised the fact that the selectivity of the mental act is highly appropriate to reveal the object. Hence, the mental act does not distort the features which it reveals partially: (3). Sensa, percepts, images etc., are all different perspectives of a thing and they all belong to it. But though the thing is revealed to us partially, in the form of sensa, percepts etc., we do not experience them as parts of the thing. In reply to Stout's criticism (1), Alexander stated his views in the following way:

"Now I do not mean that when I select I am aware that I select; that knowledge is the theory of the outside philosopher. To apprehend what is a part is not to apprehend it as a part". (2)

With these premises and conclusions of Alexander's epistemology we can deal with the more complex knowledge-situation.

THE REALITY OF APPEARANCES:— If the mental act is so adapted that it appropriately reveals the object compresent with mind, then it seems that there is no possibility of illusions or errors. Then, again, there is the difficulty about the varying sensa. Even if the thing apparently continues to be the same, we may have the varying sensa of it. For example, the sound of

2. MIND 1922 pp. 4-5.
a running car varies to an observer at a fixed place; or, a round plate appears to be varying in size and shape as we recede from it. Hence, the trustworthiness of sensa has to be defended or explained in such cases.

Before dealing with the weighty objections we should once more repeat the theory of Alexander. If the perceptual situation is normal, that is, if the intra-organic or the extra-organic conditions in which we perceive an object be normal or standardised, then the object is revealed as it really is, in its own right. But there may be aberrations of the external and internal conditions and in that case the revelatory act will not be able to reveal the proper object. Suppose that the conditions of revealing an object Y be X, then any aberration of X into X1 will not reveal Y, but it will reveal Y. Hence, even in wrong perception something is revealed, only that thing is not the required thing in the context of the required moment. The objects of even illusory perceptions are non-mental and we have no reason to suppose that any sensa are mind-dependent, for the function of any mental act is revelatory, and not constitutive of the thing (1).

This theory is to be sharply distinguished from that of Stout for, according to Stout sensa are dependent on the sense-organs even when they are objective and non-mental. According to Alexander the variations in the functioning of sense-organs simply bring us to different objects and the sense-organs,

brain-centres etc., continue to be the instrument of revealing their appropriate objects. All sensa whether of the veridical or of the illusory perception are equally non-mental and objective.

Alexander explained all kinds of appearances of things in accordance with his realism and in doing so has given us a very deep and penetrating understanding of the psychological conditions of perception and illusion. On this ground the remark of Bosanquet appears to be amply justified that what Prof. Alexander did not know about metaphysics, logic and psychology is not worth knowing. (1).

Alexander classified appearances into Real, mere and illusory appearances. The objects truly revealed as they are may be called real appearance. Mere appearances arise when the thing is not perceived analytically or separately from the contextual factors. For example, when a straight stick is not perceived as straight in water then it is mere appearance of the stick. Here, instead of seeing the stick alone we perceive the whole compound situation. However, when the perceiving mind intrudes itself into the object of perception, then an illusory appearance arises. For example, when a patch of grey in contrast with red appears as green then it is due to the internal organ that the grey appears as green. Now mere and illusory appearances do not belong to the referent things even when they are non-mental, for they belong to other things and contexts. However, the varying sensa are all real appearances and do belong to the referent

1. The Distinction between mind and its Objects. p. 11
thing, and therefore they require special explanation.

**THE OBJECTIVITY OF VARYING SENA:**

From the relativity of sensa in the past and even at the present time it has been concluded that they are subjective. But the varying sensa, according to Alexander, are the real features of the thing selected by the subject. The same light appears dimmer as we recede from it. But the brightness of light contains all the degrees of brightness which are lower than itself on the scale. Similarly, the sound of the moving car has all the degrees of pitch which are lower than what it has at its highest. Mind simply selects a portion of the real brightness or sound through the varying distances. Similarly, a round plate contains all sizes smaller than what it is, and mind, as being situated at varying distances simply keeps on selecting them as it recedes gradually from it. Here, as noted before, Alexander diverged from the accepted explanation of the varying sensa and so Stout took objection to this theory of Alexander. According to Stout, a round plate appears smaller because through the varying distances the retinal image of the plate gets successively smaller and this accounts for the varying sizes of the plate. Similarly, the brightness of light diminishes with distance because there is a corresponding diminishing retinal excitation. Stout therefore concludes that

"sensa have no existence apart from the percipient's organism, and that what occurs outside the nervous system makes no difference to them, except in so far as it makes a difference to this". (1).

Hence, he draws a close relationship between the functioning of sense-organs and the variations of the sense. Therefore, according to Stout sense are all non-mental or objective, but they are dependent directly on the conditions of the body of the percipient (2).

In this controversy between Alexander and Stout one can easily see that Alexander was not right. 'Brightness' being an intensive quality can hardly be said to have parts which the mind can select. Besides, even in the case of the plate having quantitative size, the explanation in terms of retinal image is far simpler and verifiable. Further, in holding that the plate contains all the smaller sizes and the mind simply selects them as it recedes from the plate, Alexander departed radically from the deliverance of naive experience. Even with this odd explanation Alexander does not appear to be out of the wood. We may grant that the varying sensa do belong to the object which contains all of them, but the question is, that we attribute the varying sensa to the same objects at the standard distance and this seemingness is as much the part of the perception of the varying sensa, and this has not been explained by the theory and that is the real crux of the question.

2-2-A-S. LX p.247,251-256. Of course, Stout regarded sensa to be non-mental and even material: "...in the antithesis of matter and mind they (sensa) fall on the side of matter and not of mind" (Mind, 1922 p.306). Again, he continued: "I admit and maintain that if they were not material but mental we could know nothing about a material world (ibid p.309). But Stout emphasized the dependence of sensa on sense-organs (see his letter of 1900 to Alexander). Then about the secondary qualities he wrote: "Hence, though we may know them as existing independently of the variations of our sense experience, we cannot, or can only, in a very inadequate way, fix what they are apart from these variations." (Mind 1923 p.398. See also Mind, 1940 pp.140-141)
But we have to look into the motive of Alexander in denying to the retinal excitation or sense-organs the part which they play in the formation of sensa. Clearly, the motive is one of safeguarding his realistic epistemology. If the sensa be the product of sense-organs and their corresponding brain-centres, then, what guarantee is there that any sensum is not produced by the underlying neural excitation alone, irrespective of an outside object? Hence, Alexander put the question to Stout by way of explaining his reason for excluding the constitutive role of sense-organs and for referring the varying sensa to the objects themselves:

"Still, I cannot resist asking him (Stout) how, if the size and shape of the sensum depend on the retinal excitation, can sensa be as he declares them to be on the side of the material object and not on the side of mind?" (1).

Of course, for Stout sensa are non-mental but, according to him, they are conditioned by an extra-mental objective condition. Hence, the sensa represent directly through thought an objective reality:

"Thus, in so far as knowledge is conditioned by a presentation, this presupposes (a) that there is a special relation between the presentation and the presented object, and (b) that this relation is itself part of what is known." (2).

1. Mind, 1923-p.8. See the discussion about it in STD I-II-139-142, in which he denied the dependence of sensa on the working of sense-organs. See also STD II-157.
* It is interesting to note that Alexander in 'Philosophy and Biology' (1894-5) held that the information of the secondary qualities of colour, taste, etc., depended on the organs of sense and varied with them. But this information so depending on the sense-organs cannot be said to be certain concerning the real nature of objects.
But Alexander had no patience with this kind of representationism (*). He thought that this kind of reference to the non-mental condition of sensa, through thought, is an assumption which is incapable of any verification, and he wrote thus:

"How can experience warrant a reference to this something conditioning presentation which we never have experienced and which is only a symbol for the non-mental? But the supposed condition of presentation cannot be further known for it is not known at all".(1).

It was here that Stout and Alexander join issue about the meaning of the term 'experience' referred to before. Then, Alexander added that once we grant the subjectivity of sensa, we cannot get back to the real world, even through the 'thought' of Stout (2). Thus, the difference between Stout and Alexander is not verbal, as Prof. Broad has hinted (3), but is based on real epistemological differences between them.

Hence, according to Alexander, the varying sensa do belong to the thing, and they are simply selected by mind as parts of the thing, for the lesser intensities are contained in the larger intensity. But he himself realised that it is rather inaccurate to speak of 'parts' of intensity.(4) Stout, therefore, easily detected these logical and psychological difficulties in Alexander's description of the varying sensa.

MERE AND ILLUSORY SENA:- By holding the objectivity of sense Alexander had to face insuperable difficulties in explaining mere and illusory appearances. He did not pretend

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*Stout stated his position thus: "But though I accept a representative theory of sense-perception I reject any representative theory of knowledge" (Mind, 1940 p.16 also sec p.15n)

to explain mere and illusory appearances, but, he owned that like Locke he only hoped to record and describe them and also admitted that there were errors in the elaboration of the doctrine. (1). In the face of these admissions we will be content to give only a short account of mere and illusory appearances. However, the very adequacy of the explanation of illusions and errors would have served the test of the truth of realism and by its failure to satisfy this test the postulate of the realistic theory comes to be greatly weakened.

In mere appearance we do not sense the object singly and analytically, but we perceive it conjointly with the other contextual factors which modify it. For example, in the contextual factor of water a straight stick appears as bent. What we succeed in perceiving is only a compound situation of which the object in question is only a part (2). This is in harmony with the Gestalt theory of perception, according to which we tend to perceive things as wholes. But the question is, is the stick really modified, that is, is it really bent in water? Of course, Alexander would say 'no'. Then, what is modified? Obviously its sensum. But then it would mean that the sensum is not an object but an apparition of the object, and this goes against Alexander's theory that the sensa are objective. For Stout and others the sensible apparition, which is subjective, is modified. Alexander was not prepared to accept the subjectivity of sensa and therefore, he could not explain the objectivity of mere appearance. (3)

The difficulty of explaining illusory appearances realistically is very great. The illusory appearance, according to Alexander, arises from the intrusion of mind into an object. He rightly maintained that the same mental processes are involved both in illusion and in perception. In both of them we supplement the sensorial data with interpretative factors and we can grant also to Alexander that these interpretative or personal features, as he called them in his early papers, are non-mental. The only difference between them is that the interpretative features fit into the sensorial data in perception and in illusory perception they do not. (1). But, the question is, how in the presence of illusions, can we consistently hold the objectivity of sense? How can we decide that at the time of occurrence a certain interpretative feature fits into the real situation or not? The grey in contrast with red does appear as green, but is not so in reality. It is hard to maintain that this appearance of green is objective and yet that has to be maintained on the basis of Alexander's pan-objectivism. At times Alexander seemed to take refuge in the well known dictum of the time that sensora do not err and an error is due to judgment. (2). But consistently with his premises this escape was not possible for him, for, in spite of some distinction between judging and sensing, both equally reveal their objects directly. At most, Alexander could maintain that the elements of illusions and their laws of combination are real for green is a real feature of the world somewhere, and a certain patch could be green. Thus he held that:

"all the materials of illusory percepts are real, and, if the world of reality is taken wide enough, the percept itself is a perspective of the real world, and is just as objective and non-mental as any other percept." (1)

The important thing, for him, is that in illusions we squint at reality; but the serious matter is that we have no means of distinguishing between the squinting and the real perception of it. Alexander frankly admitted his failure in explaining them:

"Hence I am not concerned to ask why the appearances should be what they are but only to record them and describe the conditions under which they originate". (2)

But this simply means to substitute psychology for epistemology.

The main question remains unanswered and that is, how the illusory perceptions are going to be explained on the basis of the objectivity of all sensa. The question does not refer to the reality of the elements and not even of the laws of the connection between the elements but precisely about the illusory combinations of the elements of the object. This question remains unanswered, but if we cannot explain illusory appearance then this also tacitly applies to the objectivity of mere appearances also. After all, there is not a very great difference between the varying sensa and mere sensa and illusory appearance. (3). This was hinted at by Bradley in his letter to Alexander, dated Feb. 19, 1709:

"The course you take lands you (so far as I see) in this difficulty that the explanation you give of your unreal world as subjective, applies also just as well to your real world".

2. Mind 1923 p. 7
Therefore, the failure of explaining illusory appearances extends to all cases of appearances. Hence, the central point of the objectivity of sensa has not been explained in Alexander's epistemology. Alexander was really right when he held that if we begin our epistemological enquiry with images, illusions and dreams, then we will end up with the mentality of sensa. But then he has not succeeded in showing the objectivity of sensa when he postulated his realism on the basis of the perceptual situation. The fact is that it might have been indefensible to hold that all things are ideas, but it is equally indefensible to hold that all ideas are things. We will meet with the same observation when we come to Alexander's deduction of the categories from Space-Time. There is greater likelihood of reaching the truth if we follow the path of the Golden Mean between these two extremes.

**THE INTUITION OF SPACE-TIME IN THE EXPLANATION OF GEOMETRICAL ILLUSIONS:**

According to Alexander Space-time is known through intuition, which is simpler than and prior to sensation. In sensation a certain neural pattern is lifted up into consciousness. If so, then the space-time complex of brain is compatible with all point-instants and thus should be able to intuite them correctly. However, human beings are creatures of sense and as such they cannot intuite space-time in its purity. In ourselves 'consciousness is evoked in the first instance through sensation, though intuition pure and simple is more elementary than sensation.' (1).

\*T.B.11.p.201; see also S.T.D.1.p.153.*
Thus, senses are not well adapted for perceiving space and time, but are meant to reveal their respective secondary qualities. For example, the eye is adapted to perceive colour and the ear is attuned to sound. However, we can intuite space and time only through our senses and therefore, our intuition of space suffers from the deceptiveness of senses. "Our senses only cheat us by their weakness and partiality of selection, but our intuitions cheat us because our senses are cheats". (1)

In connection with the varying sensa of the shape and size of objects Alexander threw an important suggestion. According to him, everything is a complex of space-time. A round plate is also a complex of space-time of various dates. Now, in receding from a round plate or approaching it from a distance, the space continues to be the same but its dates vary. If we look at a disc straight down then the centre of it meets the eye earlier than its periphery. But when we recede from it then the difference in time which the light takes in travelling from the centre and periphery is narrowed down and due to this narrowing down of time interval the size of the disc looks smaller. (2). If Alexander could have extended this kind of explanation for the various appearances in terms of space and time, then he might have substituted a realistic interpretation of the varying sensa. In that case he could have become independent of the sense-excitation in terms of which we ordinarily explain our sense-experience. Broad

1. S.T.D. pp. 207-8; also see pp. 148-9. Here unwarily Alexander lapsed into the popular view of the deceptivity and consequent subjectivity of sensa.
accepts its importance (1) and Alexander too recognised its value, but he expressed his lack of ability in fully elaborating it (2). On this basis Alexander thought that touch being less influenced by time-factor, being a direct informant, is less liable to error than vision (3).

**THE LIMITATION OF ALEXANDER'S EPISTEMOLOGY:**

We think that the fundamental error of Alexander lies in two things. Firstly, he subordinated epistemology to metaphysics to such an extent that it was distorted. This is quite clear from his doctrine of enjoyment...Secondly, it lies in the uncritical acceptance of the analysis of the knowledge situation given by Moore. Alexander accepted without reserve, the independence of the objects of the knowing process. Had he subjected this analysis of the knowledge situation to his searching scrutiny then he would have found out that some objects are certainly distinct from the knowing process, but they depend on it, for example, tooth-ache cannot be said to exist independently of feeling it. It was to such instances that Stout pointed 'Are presentations mental or physical?' (4). Later on, Ducasse (5) more clearly pointed out that the objects of the knowing process may be of two kinds, namely, connate and

1. Mind 1721 p.143  
2. S.T.D.II.p.177n  
3. S.T.D.II pp.222-3  
alien. He, then, showed that some of the instances of connate objects do depend on the knowing process. For example, the sensible quality blue cannot be said to exist independently of being experienced blue (1). Had Alexander been critical enough he would have realised this himself and then he would have completely revised his doctrine of the complete objectivity of sensa and that of 'enjoyment'. But, certainly then, his theory of extreme realism would have been given up and in that case his metaphysics would have been truer and more consistent with common sense.

Under the influence of his anti-idealistic metaphysics, the programme of which he had announced in his earlier papers (2), he divided the world as if with a hatchet into the knowing act and the known object. He took very great care in showing that no known object is ever mental. This committed him to the extreme theory of the objectivity of sensa, which finally brought him against insuperable difficulties in relation to various appearances. This difficulty of panobjectivism is best seen in relation to images. But before we take up the question of the objectivity of images and the enjoyment of the enjoyed remembering, let us see whether knowledge is what Alexander took it to be. According to Alexander, knowledge is simply a compresence between two terms, one of which is conscious. If mere compresence between two things were knowledge then we would be omniscient. There-

1. This is what Moore accepts too, The PHILOSOPHY OF G.E.MOORE- p.656.
2. For this see the following: 'Knowledge and Reality' GLASGOW
fore, Alexander had to admit that one of the compresent terms must be conscious and to be conscious meant peripherally and centrally aroused in an adequate manner. But if so, can we really deny the uniqueness of the knowing process? Can we say that knowing is only an instance of the universal phenomenon of compresence? Even Alexander had to admit that the uniqueness of the knowing process is due to the fact that one of the compresent terms is conscious; but, this is what the idealists also say, for according to them, knowledge is due to the presence of a unique 'subject'. However, Alexander somehow refused to accept that the knowing subject is an essential factor in the knowing process. But, we can define knowledge either as mere togetherness or togetherness with a conscious term. The former cannot explain knowledge and the latter alone can. If so, then the knowing process becomes unique and cannot be an instance of the universal phenomenon of compresence. Thus, Alexander's account of knowledge in terms of compresence only is mere abstraction and an indefensible hypothesis (i).

Then, again, can we really explain the knowledge-situation in terms of the knower and the known? Is knowledge itself nothing but a relationship or togetherness of two terms in which one of them is conscious? According to an old Indian tradition, a knowledge situation is explained in terms of

subject, object and knowledge. This knowledge cannot be
drowned up in 'mere relation' between the knower and the
known, and this is what Bradley (1) had referred in his protest
against the bipolar division of the knowledge-situation by
Alexander. Knowledge itself, says Stout, is distinct from
the relation of what is known and the knower. The cognitum
itself has two aspects:

"One of the terms in what is known, the other is the knowledge
of it...its being known. This relation of cognition and
cognitum is presupposed in the relation of knower and known.
The knower knows in as much as he has or possesses knowledge..." 

In other words, knowledge is an independent though a joint
product of the knower and the known. Here 'esse' and 'percipl'
are inseparably blended. Alexander regarded this as truth in
which reality is possessed by mind. But can knowledge be
divorced from Truth and can knowledge be something different
from an object being possessed by mind? But once we grant
that knowledge is surcharged by mind and the realistic explaina-
tion of knowledge as mere relation between two component
terms breaks down. When we talk of knowledge then the knower
and the known are its two termini from which it arises, but it
itself is the very core and centre of the knowledge-situation.
Alexander unfortunately attended to the two terminal relata and
ignored the relationship itself. But the relationship is as
important as the terminal relata and cannot be swallowed up

1. P.L.P. p.46. 2. AUSTRALASIAN JOURNAL OF PSYCHOLOGY AND
PHILOSOPHY, 1944 p.20. see also pp.19-20.
in them. But if we accept that 'knowledge' subsists as something surcharged or vitalized by mind, and we will have to accept the idealistic contention that Alexander has simply gratuitously abstracted knowledge from the mind (1).

We have already seen the great difficulty which Alexander experienced in explaining the objectivity of sensa, but this becomes most apparent in relation to the objectivity of images. From the instances of veridical perception and true imagination one can generalize that the mental act is appropriate to reveal its object, but this generalisation is based on 'induction by simple enumeration', and therefore, at most it is only probable in character. Hence, at most is can serve as a working hypothesis and it cannot serve the purpose of eliciting any certain conclusions from it. This precaution is necessary in relation to the appropriateness of the imaginal act in revealing its objective image. Now in the perception there is a causal antecedent which arouses a neural excitation, and this neural excitation lifted up in consciousness reveals an appropriate object. In imagination, however, the image has no external causal agent in liberating an appropriate neural excitation. The neural excitation, in such cases, is due to an internal stimulation. If, therefore, every neural excitation, as a result of internal stimulation be attended with consciousness, then will it always lead to a revelation of its appropriate object? If this be accepted, then we are committed to

extreme subjectivism from which Alexander's realism is considered to be a way of escape; and, if every mental act is not considered appropriate to reveal its object, then the objectivity of sensa has to be given up. There seems to be no escape from this (1).

Then, again, the difficulty of remembered enjoyment becomes very great and Alexander was beset with doubts about the statement that the mental act cannot be known (2). When Alexander was not particularly interested in elaborating his theory of 'enjoyment' he assumed that the mental act is known, for it can be described and even the errors of enjoyment can be detected and removed. (3). But theoretically he denied the possibility of the knowableness of enjoyed states. When pressed by Broad (4) as to the nature of enjoyment as a mode of being or knowledge, he stated ambiguously that enjoyment is a mode of being as well as a kind of knowledge:

"I sum up my answer by saying: It (enjoyment) is undoubtedly a mode of being, but not only a mode of being, for it is that kind of being which is a knowing, and is at once a knowing of objects (in virtue of which relation it is called contemplation), and of itself" (5).

This is simply a repetition of what he had stated in an earlier paper (6). But once we grant that 'enjoyment' is

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both knowing and being and are inseparable, we at once come back to the ghost of idealism, namely, the inseparability of knowing and being.

The ambiguity and inconsistency of the doctrine of 'enjoyment' are clearer still in relation to the cases of 'remembered enjoyments' (1). But before we thus focalise his difficulty of enjoyment, let us critically examine this theory of 'enjoyment'.

We have already seen that by 'enjoyment' Alexander wanted to show that it is a kind of knowledge in which knowing is identical with the known. Hence, as noted before, enjoyment is both knowledge and being. But because it can be both, therefore, from this it does not follow that enjoyment as knowing is identical with being in the same sense. When there is an enjoyment 'I am aware that I am aware of a tree', then 'of' is not simply an 'of' of apposition. As Hallett (1) has pointed out, the 'of' is both of apposition as well as of reference. The proposition refers to a cognitive context.

It has been clearly expressed by Stout thus:

"It is perhaps true that we are always aware of what we enjoy. But the enjoyment is other than the awareness of it; the of in aware of is not an of of apposition, as it is in the dancing of a dance" (2).

The subject and object, matter and form are as distinct in enjoyment as they are in contemplation (3).

Then, again, if the cognitiveness of enjoyment be denied,

as Alexander seemed to do in BEAUTY AND OTHER FORMS OF VALUE (4), then it becomes simply a vital process of merely living through. This will lead to the denial of the emergence of mind as something supervening over life. Besides, if it is mere being, then it cannot be known, certainly not even as a state of enjoyment. Thus, Prof. Broad put it:

"Surely, Prof. Alexander’s sound principle that no object gains its existence or its qualities from the fact of being known ought to be supplemented by the equally sound principle that no existence—not even an enjoyment—gets known from the mere fact of existing and having such and such qualities" (5)

If enjoyment be both cognition and being, then, it will be quite an unintelligible entity, and even then, it will be quite different in kind from cognition in general. Most probably Alexander wanted to show the identity of cognition and being in enjoyment, but in that case we cannot deny the nature and function of cognition to enjoyment. It is a common experience that we not only live through our mental acts inarticulately, but we also talk about them (7). But as Alexander tried to show that no objects can be mental, therefore, he refused to accept that we know our enjoyed states. But to maintain the identity of cognition and being is very difficult.


Indeed Alexander himself recognised this in granting the possibility of the science of psychology. This is clear from the following: 'Intelligible speech is the chief means of such an enlargement, and while it is directed in the first instance to explaining to one another the nature of the external objects we contemplate, it comes to be used to make clear to others the nature of our enjoyments.' (S, E, D, 11.

p. 269.
in relation to the remembering of past enjoyments. (1)

To enjoy means to experience that which is present and, therefore, the past experiencing cannot be enjoyed, nor can it be, according to Alexander, contemplated. What then is a memory of a past state, asks Prof. Broad, according to Alexander's theory? (2) Alexander maintained the Bergsonian theory that the past is preserved and therefore mental life swells as it advances through the accretions of the past. For example, according to Alexander, we do remember our past anger or shame. But, though the past anger or shame is revived, it is not revived as the mind's present, but it forms a part of the whole of which another part is the mind's present (2).

"I remember the feeling of shame felt at a social blunder; and the more vividly I represent the circumstances the more intense the emotional excitement becomes, and the more completely it includes the bodily expression proper to the emotion and invades me. Still, all this personal experience is detained in attachment to the past object, and despite the urgency of the feelings I am lost in the past, and the whole experience, object-side and subject-side alike, has the mark of the past." (3).

Hence, he held that the past enjoyment is revived and becomes and actual state but, being component with a past object it ceases to be a present enjoyment. Therefore, Alexander maintained two contradictory statements, that is, the past

1. Alexander had wrestled with the difficulty of remembering the past mental states in The CONSCIOUSNESS AND EXISTENCE and was conscious of the difficulty of his exposition of this difficult subject (B.J.F.1711 pp.151-262) and wrote: "...to enjoy a renewed state and to drag it into intimacy with my present enjoyed self is to enjoy it as mind and past, and that means as belonging to me in the past." (B.F.1911, p.262). 2. MIND 1921 p.133.

1. A.S.Vol.IX (1908-9) p.36. In 1908 Alexander was far more Bergsonian for he tended to think that the past is also in the present as present. But he later changed the view as outlined above. See S.T.I.p.140-2. Also see the correspondence of Carr with Alexander in 1912.

enjoyment is re-lived and enjoyed, and, also that it remains past. The whole thing is not only logically indefensible but it goes against the testimony of common experience. If the past anger be really revived then we would feel angry in remembering it. But the past feeling of shame may be remembered even with mirth. And, if somehow, the same sort of emotional state be aroused, then it is never the same identical enjoyment.

Here the view of Stout is worth quoting:

"It (the past enjoyed state) was different in kind from my present emotional excitement. It cannot therefore be now enjoyed. It cannot be so because it has ceased to exist and the existence of an experience is identical with the enjoyment of that experience". (1)

Obviously, we cannot have two enjoyments simultaneously, namely, of the past enjoyed state and the other of remembering that past enjoyment.

Thus, from the above consideration, it is clear that in remembering the past enjoyment, the act of remembering cannot be identical with the past enjoyed state. We can have only a cognition of the past enjoyed state. Therefore, we see that in the enjoyment of the past enjoyed state cognition and being cannot be identical.

Further, if the past enjoyed state did really exist in the present enjoyment as actual, then the past and present will coalesce and the historicity or temporality of the mental process will be undermined. Alexander was quite conscious of this and therefore he maintained that the past enjoyment remains in the broad present as a part of one continuous mental

as is clear from the following:

"Its (of the past shame) actuality no more makes it a present emotion than the sensory character of the beginning of the meteor's path in the sky makes it present, when the real present is the end of the path". (2)

Therefore, the remembering of the past enjoyment never remains identical with the past enjoyed state, and once more, the identity of the knowing and being of enjoyment breaks down. In the end the enjoyment of the past enjoyed state simply becomes a cognition of it. Here then, there is an object of cognition which is mental and therefore it contradicts the thesis of Alexander that no object of knowing is mental (1). This thesis seems to be vulnerable from another point of view too. Alexander did maintain that we know others' mind, and he called this knowing assurance. He did not explicitly say whether this knowing is contemplation of enjoyment or both or neither. So let us see whether the 'assurance' of 'others' mind' supports Alexander's contention that no object of knowledge can be mental.

The above-mentioned possibility of knowing a mental object would have been brought home to Alexander had he fully developed his doctrine about the assurance of others' mind. He held that we know others' mind directly (2), and that we do not invent the concept of foreign consciousness (3). No doubt, he said, this assurance of others' mind grows in content through reflection and sympathetic imagination (4). But is this not a kind of knowledge of mind? Alexander is vague and only said that 'it is an act of faith forced on us by a peculiar sort of experience' (5). However, what we know about others' mind

is simply an inference from their behaviour, which is an object of contemplation. Consistently speaking, really there is no bridge here from the contemplated behaviour of others to their mind (1). But, if we do experience others' mind, then obviously such objects of assurance are mental. Had Alexander elaborated his views about the 'assurance of others' mind', then he would have experienced the same sort of difficulty which Berkeley felt about the term 'notion' in distinction from the term 'ideas' (2).

It might be indefensible to turn metaphysics into epistemology as the idealists are supposed to do. But, then, it is equally indefensible to distort epistemology under the influence of some preconceived ontology. This is specially pertinent here, for Alexander regarded metaphysics as a descriptive science and therefore he should have tried to describe the epistemological situation as faithfully as possible (3). To make epistemology servile to metaphysics is after all a dictatorial metaphysics, and a bad epistemology. (4). To keep epistemology as an incident to one's metaphysics is defensible, but to make it only a corollary of one's metaphysics is to betray a temper of metaphysical totalitarianism.

3. We are reminded here of Alexander's warning which he had stated in 'Elementary Ideas in Philosophy' (1891-2). Love of truth, said Alexander, is essential in philosophy. 'Philosophy does not consist in taking up a certain attitude towards facts. This habit of taking up attitudes is a fault to be guarded against''. (p. 1)
4. It is here that Stout's disappointment is justified: "I had expected that Alexander's philosophical construction would be founded on and keep in close touch with the analysis of experience. What I found or seemed to find was largely
SUMMARY OF CHAPTER TWO. The real aim of Alexander was to show that all things in nature have evolved of themselves and there is no Absolute Mind or the spirit of totality anywhere in the workings of nature. This view was disputed by the idealists. According to them there is an Absolute Mind which makes the emergents emerge and which explains every case of progressiveness in nature. This idealism, according to Alexander, is based on a theory of knowledge, and, again, this theory of knowledge is based on the theory that the object of knowledge is mental. Hence, to refute idealism he had to refute this theory of knowledge. He had to show that no object of knowledge is mental. The most obvious case of an object of knowledge being mental is self-knowledge. Therefore, he had to refute this. In order to show that mind cannot be known, Alexander advanced the theory of ENJOYMENT. This also further required that mind should be proved to be purely conational, and feeling be declared to be a non-mental sensum.

Then, again, it is not sufficient to show that there can be no self-knowledge, but it should also be shown that every object of knowledge is real in its own right. To show this Alexander had to demonstrate that every object of knowledge is objective, and therefore he propounded the theory of the pan-objectivity of all sensa.

the reverse of this relation. He seemed to be in a large measure endeavouring to adjust his analysis of experience to an independently preconceived ontology". Mind 1940 P.126.
Meanwhile the following chief results have been achieved:

1. A knowing-situation can be analysed into mental act and its appropriate object. The object depends on mind for its *percipi* but not for its *esse*.

2. This deliverance of experience was confused due to several reasons noted below:

   a. It was thought that the 'independence of objects' would mean that they are not related to the knowing act.

   b. A knowing act always selects and therefore it was interpreted that mind in doing so creates the object. But selectiveness does not mean any distortion; it means its partial revelation to consciousness.

   c. Again, it was supposed that mind can be an object to itself. However, no object of knowing can be mental. This source of confusion has been destroyed by the doctrine of 'enjoyment'.

   d. Further, the presence of varying sensa of the same object led to the belief in the subjectivity of sensa. But now it has been shown that sensa are the partial revelations of a thing, and a thing is a synthesis of all its varying sensa, images and so on.

   e. Besides, an illusion was supposed to be peculiarly mental. But it has been shown that they too are non-mental and they are simply mis-placements of an object.

However, the realistic epistemology of Alexander is based on metaphysics, for its truth is based on its ability in harmonising all the relevant facts of our total experience.
Hence, if it can be shown that in the order of esse or existence, things precede mind, then it would be clear that objects cannot be said to depend on mind at all. On the contrary, it will show that mind depends on things for its emergence and sustenance. Thus we find that Alexander's epistemology is only a prelude to his metaphysics, to which we now turn.
Here we want to show that, according to Alexander, not mind but Space-time is the Absolute Reality. This Space-time is given in our Intuition and therefore, it should not be taken to be an abstraction. By Space-Time is meant 'progressive motion'. Therefore, by itself Space-Time creates the order of varying complexities of point-instants, corresponding to which there is the hierarchy of matter, life and mind.

The creation of novelties is known as the process of Emergence, which is based on the presence of a Nisus in Space-time. The nisus refers to the creativity of Space-Time. This theory of nisus is an empirical generalisation from the de facto advance observed in the course of nature. The presence of this nisus not only maintains the hierarchy of matter, life and mind, but this will also lead to the emergence of higher creations in future.

Though 'emergence' means the noting of new departures in the goings-on of the universe, yet each emergent is said to be completely reducible to the lower level from which it emerges. This shows that with discontinuities of quality in emergence, there is also throughout a spatio-temporal continuity in the hierarchy of matter, life and mind. Again, this continuity in the hierarchy is further made clear by the fact that all entities, from Space-Time to mind, are patterned
on the same universal formula of the mind-body relationship. This universal formula is most clearly seen in the union of mind with body in human persons. But, even in Space-time, there is the same pattern, and, we can say that Time is the mind of Space.

The mind-body formula is based on the view that human mind and body are identical and indissoluble. Thus, according to this view, mind is a complex of neural processes and as such it is as spatio-temporal as anything else in the vast democracy of facts. If mind is as spatio-temporal as anything else, then it is a thing existing side by side with all other things. As such it cannot claim to be the measure of all reality. Hence, the thesis is proved that Space-Time is the sole reality, from which everything emerges and to which it returns.

In this chapter we will also note that if there is the emergence of a new quality, then it is not quite correct to say that it is completely reducible to the lower level from which it emerges. Further, the applicability of the mind-body formula to a great extent nullifies the emphasis on the emergence of the new in the goings-on of the universe. Then, again, the spatiality of mind is based on the identity of mind with the neural processes. But this is a very doubtful proposition. Finally, if mind is reducible to vital processes, and life is reducible to matter, and matter to space-time; then everything ends in the empty reality of Space-Time. Hence, the metaphysics of Alexander ends in a-cosmianism.
NATURALISM AND IDEALISM. 

We have already seen that Alexander's epistemology was based on a preconceived ontology and he accepted this interpretation of his system:

"My whole enterprise is a study in ontology, and have I not said more than once that the theory of knowledge is not prior to metaphysics but an incidental chapter of it?" (1)

This was his firm conviction from the very beginning, and even in the first of his reviews he referred to it thus:

"If we treat logic independently of metaphysics, we are for even in danger of dropping into psychology..." (2)

This metaphysics is one of Evolutionary Naturalism and is opposed to idealism in temper in general. But, it is not opposed to all the tenets of Absolute Idealism. It accepts the doctrine that Truth is one whole, but does not hold with idealism that the parts of this one whole are unreal and false. (1). The real difference between Alexander's naturalism and Absolute Idealism lies in the starting-point and in the method of inquiry and this has been stated by Alexander himself:

"For the one, in some form or other, however much disguised, mind is the measure of things and the starting-point of inquiry. The sting of absolute idealism lies in its assertion that the parts of the world are not ultimately real or true but only the whole is true" (2).

   S.T.D.11 pp.75, 86.
2. The Oxford magazine 1924 May 28 p.276.
3. S.T.D. p.7. "But certainy idealism does not hold that the parts are not empirically real. It is doubtful whether Alexander has established the ultimate reality of the parts or the emergents of Space-time.

2. S.T.D. p.6. "Perhaps Alexander referred to the following passage of Bosanquet: "Call us idealists or what you will, we who follow the watchword! Das Wahre ist das Ganze! might prima facie find in it much of what we demand..." (The Distinction between Mind and its Objects, p.24). Then, again, there is another statement of Bosanquet which has been echoed by Alexander: "They
Now Alexander has not unambiguously stated the difference. That mind is a fruitful source of starting an inquiry has been accepted by him in many places (3). But he challenged the other assertion that not only Truth but Reality also is one, all-harmonious, significant whole. For Alexander the universe is always a growing universe, and being full of time can never be a complete universe. (1). For idealism, on the other hand, the universe is a complete unity and its one function is 'to make souls'. For Alexander, the universe has no such function but there is something analogous to it, namely, the whole world of Space-Time has a nisus towards deity. In terms of absolutism, perhaps it is difficult to draw any sharp distinction for in Alexander's system there is a strain of Spinozistic absolutism. Perhaps the difference can be best stated by saying that for idealism there is one principle which is best illustrated in the doctrine of concrete universal. For Alexander, on the other hand, a universal is only a 'plan' or 'habit' of Space-Time.

"The insistence on a 'principle' instead of a 'plan' marks the whole difference between idealism and Realism. There is nothing absolute in a plan; in a principle, properly understood, there is". (2)

There is yet another difference between idealism and Alexander and this has been quite clearly stated by him. According to

(the objects) are parts of wholes or of a whole, which can only be ultimately self-existent through the full-grown nature of mind". (Ibid p.43)

him, mind is not the measure of reality, for it is only one thing among other things. We have already seen this earlier and later in SPACE, TIME AND DENSITY he took special delight in 'dressing down' and 'telling off' the exaggerated claims of mind (4). From the very beginning Alexander denied the reality of the Absolute Mind. He stated two things, namely, there is no necessity of retaining the concept of a Transcendental Self, for knowledge can be explained purely on an empirical basis. Secondly, he held that any categories required for explaining knowledge must be given in experience. He tried to justify the first part of his contention in his epistemology and the second part will be seen in his 'Deduction of the Categories' from Space-Time.

No doubt the exaggerated claim of mind as a measure of reality followed from the uniqueness of the cognitive situation and Alexander showed that a cognitive situation is only an instance of the universal compossance between two things. Further, as we have seen now, mind only determines the percipio of a thing but not its esse. The force of this realistic assumption, of course, depends on its success in explaining all the problems of knowledge (1). But Alexander was primarily a metaphysician. He felt, therefore, that a realistic epistemology can ultimately be based only on a proper metaphysics (2). The aim of his epistemology was to

show that mind is not constitutive of things and he wanted to establish the same point in his metaphysics.

"My principal object is to ask whether minds do not fall into their appropriate place in the scale of empirical existence, and to establish that they do". (3).

THE DEVALUATION OF MIND: To demonstrate the non-uniqueness of mind Alexander took several measures. Firstly, he endeavoured to show that every mind is constituted by the same stuff of which everything else is composed. Hence, in esse or being, mind is just what other things are. Secondly, mind is supposed to be the source of the categories. But Alexander showed that the real source of the categories is not mind but space-time from which everything, including mind, has emerged. Thus, no doubt the categories explain knowledge, but they owe nothing to mind for their reality. Besides, Alexander tacitly implied that mind cannot be the measure of reality for things have existed long before mind. (1). We have alluded to space-time as the fundamental stuff of the world and now let us see how Alexander was led to it.

Mind cannot be the ultimate stuff for things existed before any finite mind appeared. But, certainly this argument cannot be applied to the Absolute Mind. We have seen that the Absolute Mind was rejected by Alexander for, according to him, reality must be given in experience and absolute mind is not given in experience. Hence, we have to find out an absolute

3. S.T.D.11.p.3.also p.73.
1. This argument does not seem to be important for it was already taken up and answered by Bradley (Ethical Studies p.61) as Bosanquet reminds us (Contemporary Philosophy p.4).
stuff which is given in our experience. Experience gives us a world of an hierarchical order of matter, life and mind. In this hierarchy mind depends on life and life in its turn depends on matter. All these objects are studied by their special respective sciences. It is clear, however, that the science of matter is more fundamental than others for both life and mind depend on matter. Now sciences are the expressions of human experience at their best. Therefore, to find out empirically the fundamental stuff out of which everything has proceeded we have to consult the sciences. (1). As matter appeared to us to be more fundamental than life and mind, so the science of Physics is more fundamental than other sciences. (2). But, of course, we cannot accept in philosophy what is considered by physics and mathematics as most fundamental. The reason is that we have to rest our case on the most concrete though elementary experience, (3), and the science, even the science of physics does not deal with the simplest experience, but it deals with its reality in terms of concepts. By helping ourselves to what physics and mathematics give us we find that space-time or motion is the most elementary reality given to us in our experience. This doctrine of space-time, Alexander held, was philosophical and not scientific. Throughout SPACE, TIME AND DEITY, Alexander showed that his doctrine of space-time is in harmony with the teachings of mathematics and physics. (4).

According to Alexander, space-time is the simplest stuff from which the whole universe, with all its rich qualities, has emerged. The nature of this space-time can partly be determined by the manner in which it is supposed to be reached. If we follow the suggestion given by Alexander, then it will confirm our suspicion that he has followed a process of abstraction to reach the most elementary stuff involved in matter. At the outset, the inquiry has been confined to physics. Therefore, the claims of life and mind to yield the ultimate stuff has been ignored from the very nature of the inquiry. Alexander suggested that the simplest feature of the sensible world can be found out through a successive omission of the qualities of matter. Happily for him, Kant had pointed out that we can think away all the qualities of a thing but not its space and time. Of course, Berkeley and Bradley had pointed out that space and time cannot be thought apart from the secondary qualities. (*). However, Alexander determined to find out the simplest stuff, held that space and time can be real by themselves:

"Difficult indeed the process is, and in practice I am accustomed in thinking of space and time by themselves to keep constantly pictures of material things and events before my mind and then forget their richness of colours and smells and other

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* Alexander accepted that in general it is true that we cannot sense space and time for we can sense only the secondary qualities. But we can intuit space-time. Only this intuition is possible through the kindly offices of our sense-organs. (S.T.D. II, p. 61, 143)
qualities; and I recommend this practice to my readers". (1).

Later on Alexander gave this image of space and time:

"It (pure space-time) is for me an aether of pure motions, chaotic at first, and without differences of quality (the one quality is that being of motion), but of intensity and direction..." (2).

Thus Space-Time is abstract but is not an abstraction. (3).

"S-T and the categories are excessively abstract, as compared with life and mind or material existences; but they are overpoweringly actual". (4).

Let us try to explain the statement that Space-Time is abstract but is not an abstraction.

Philosophy of a great thinker begins with a significant world-vision. He analyses it and tries to find out the significance of his key-vision which can be generalised to cover all experiences. Alexander had the world-vision of the universe in the form of its progressive motion. But this motion was considered anterior to all things. Either this motion, pure and simple, is an abstraction which thought

1. S.T.D.1. p.39. Bradley remained unconvinced of this procedure and wrote in his letter of April 26 1922 p.2, "As to the start...Space, Time and Motion are to my mind abstractions, quite unthinkable as real apart from quality". This process of intuitive abstraction, through which we come to know the space-time of Alexander, has been vividly described by Prof. J.A. Smith. But in the end, he also regarded Space-Time as an untenable fiction. "For to him (Alexander) what he calls 'Motion' is ens reale or realissimum, and to me it is an appearance, and unreality, a fiction or figment". (P.A.S.XXV 1924-5. p.60. see also p.45 where S-T has been called 'such stuff as dreams are made of'). In this connection see also Le Morgan, EMEMGEPIT EVOLUTION p.9.
creates or it is something concrete. Many would say that this motion, without the thing which moves, is an abstraction of thought. However, such an abstraction or concept cannot be the matrix of all things. Hence, this motion must be itself concrete to explain the creation of all concrete things by it. If it is concrete then it must be given in experience. If motion were not given in experience then even thought would not be able to create it. Hence, according to Alexander's dictum, every object of cognition must be traced to some impression. Thus we have to find out the kind of experience which reveals the objective reality of motion. The experience which reveals motion cannot be sense-experience, for sense-experience can acquaint us with a thing which moves. Hence we have to appeal to an experience which is prior to sense-experience, and this is known as Intuition. Hence pure Motion is intuited.

Motion, then, is the same thing as Space-Time. Here Space-Time is abstract, for we are gradually transporting ourselves successively to a reality which is anterior to secondary qualities and even matter. But it is not a concept, since, according to Alexander, it is given in intuitive experience. Thus, Space-Time is abstract but is not an abstraction.

Thus, for Alexander Space-Time is a concrete event which is given to us through intuition. Unfortunately, an intuition works in us only through the kindly offices of senses, (1),

and therefore we have to supplement our intuition of space and time with imagination and reflection (\textsuperscript{5}). Of course, sense has no monopoly of reality and reality is equally knowable through conception (\textsuperscript{5}). Now, being abstract, space and time become more of the nature of concepts or ideal realities. But, being intuited realities they are also actual. Thus, the point-instants 'are real and actual just because they are ideal'.(\textsuperscript{4}). Alexander was aware of the difficulty of saying so and he wrote:

"I quite realise the difficulty in maintaining, as I do, the point-instant to be actual, in the sense that we can reach it only through concepts, and yet real, we can never hold it, for we are creatures of sense. If I am right with the notion of an 'intuition' prior to sense, conception (whether in my form or in the highly elaborate constructions of the mathematicians, still conceptual though using sensible experience) is our human circuitous way of making good the deficiencies of sense" (\textsuperscript{5}).

The fact is that Space-Time ceased to be a scientific abstraction for Alexander and it became an evolving matrix for him. Science is interested in the measurable aspect of time and does not trouble itself about its nature. Alexander has speculated about the nature of this Space-Time and has made it an absolute of his metaphysics. This is clear from what Gunn says about it:

"He (Alexander) is fully aware that physical doctrines and formulae in so far as they concern themselves with Time, are limited to an interest in its measurement, leaving its nature a problem for the metaphysician to discuss. While the Newtonian

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{2} Ibid p.41.
\item \textsuperscript{3} Ibid. pp.41-42,151,153.
\item \textsuperscript{5} S.T.D.l. p.xi.
\end{itemize}
concept of Absolute Time is modified by a doctrine of relativity of measurement, Alexander considers that Space and Time, or rather, Space-Time, retains an absolute dignity and meaning of its own which is independent of all measurement” (1).

Now, what is the nature of this intuition which is supposed to give us the reality of space and time? Alexander defined intuition as:

"not in the sense that something is given to us by some unexplained faculty, nor assuredly that it is reached without effort, but in the sense that it describes a fact which we are brought face to face with and accept, as we accept a colour or a sound. Whether the fact is truly seen depends on its agreement with all relevant data."(2).

THEORIES OF SPACE AND TIME:— Space-Time as the fundamental reality came to be firmly fixed in the speculation of Alexander because a similar notion had gained ground in mathematical physics, specially in the four-dimensional theory of Minkowski (3), which was in conformity with the theory of Relativity of Einstein (4). But Alexander regarded his theory of Space-Time as metaphysical (1). It was of course, not opposed to the mathematical theory, but it was the more comprehensive of the two. Besides, this was based on a plodding analysis of our direct experience, and not on mere conception. Considered as such he had to defend his view of space-time against the theories of Descartes, Leibniz, Newton, Kant, Bergson and Bradley. He regarded the relational view of space-time,

2. The Basis of Realism, P. 1914 P. 295. It seems that Alexander used the term 'intuition' in the sense in which Bergson and Whitehead have used it. This is suggested by his statement about the use of description in pointing to reality, see S.T.D. 1. P. 56-57.
3. J. C. Smuts who seemed to be unaware of Alexander’s work, summarised the teaching of Minkowski in the same way. ‘Holism and Evolution’ P. 29. 4. S.T.D. I. pp. 36, 58-60; P. 1, P. 394-350
favoured by the mathematicians like Descartes, Leibniz and Russell as a mere postulate. This postulate was workable, he said, but it did not make his assumptions unnecessary (2). On the contrary, by his comprehensive survey of space-time he tried to show that his view of space-time as the fundamental stuff of the universe, successfully included all that was valuable in a relational account of it (3). He brushed aside Kant's theory of space and time on the ground that it was too subjective and on the whole a mere figment of imagination. If space and time were not real, no amount of mental creativeness could have manufactured them (4). He directly dealt with the theory of Bradley only. According to Bradley space and time are mere appearance and are not ultimately real. Alexander's reply to Bradley brings us to the very heart of his theory of space and time.

In essence, the theory of Bradley points out that space and time each taken by itself must be continuous and yet at the same time must admit of infinite divisibility. These two demands of continuity and divisibility are contradictory and so, space and time of their very nature are riddled with contradiction and therefore they cannot be real. According to Alexander, these two features of continuity and divisibility are supposed to be contradictory because space and time are separated from each other (1). The intuited reality is Spatio-temporal in which space and time are inseparably related and this absolute reality is the very ground of the

2. S.T.D.1. p.38. 3. Ibid. chap. V.
of the law of non-contradiction itself. Besides, the argument of Bradley is based on taking 'relation' and 'terms' in abstraction, with the result that 'relation' failed to relate. Hence, we must not take space and time separately, for the fundamental stuff is always space-time, forever hyphenated. In this light let us see how one rescues the other from contradiction.

The Spatio-Temporality of Space and Time: When we appeal to our experience of space and time, we find them to be continuous with distinguishable parts. Space is given to us as an infinite extension, which admits of division into points or lengths, but these lengths are not felt as separate from one another. Similarly, Time is experienced as a duration of successive events. It is felt as continuous but divisible into moments or instants. However, these instants interpenetrate into each other. Apart from any theoretical construction, like the mathematical theory of continuum, the 'continuity and infinitude of space and time thus spoken of as presented in experience are crude, original characters of them' (1). Being hard empirical facts they cannot be explained away by any theoretical device. We are left only to analyse them to death in order to understand them.

No doubt space and time are apprehended by intuition through sense, but we have to use imagination and reflection to make them intelligible to us. The intellectual divisions

of space apprehended as continuous may be called points and those of time may be called instants. Then by continuity of space or time is meant 'that between any two points or instants another can be found' (2). Similarly, by the infinitude of space and time, given by intuition and extended by thought, is meant their single wholeness or self-containedness. The term 'infinite' is of purely empirical import and can easily be seen in mathematical series. Here infinite is given first in our experiences, as Descartes pointed out, and the finite simply follows from it (3).

The question arises, can Time or Space, taken by itself, explain its two characteristics of continuity and divisibility? Now, Time taken by itself is a pure succession of ever-perishing 'nows', without any past or present (4). Similarly, Space taken by itself is a pure continuum without any distinguishable elements. It is a pure plank without any distinctness of parts (5). Thus, Time by itself simply becomes an ever-perishing 'now' and only with difficulty can it be called a succession at all. Space too, by itself, will cease to be space and will become a mere blank. The cure lies in the harmonious marriage of the two. Space supplies its non-successiveness to Time and saves the 'nows' from perishing; Time, in its turn, supplies its successiveness to space and introduces distinctness to its elements:

2. Ibid. pp. 42-44, 147.
4. Ibid. p. 45.
5. Ibid. p. 47.
"Without space there would be no connection in Time. Without time there would be no points to connect. It is the two different aspects of continuity which compels us in turn to see that each of the two, Space and Time, is vital to the existence of the other". (1).

In the light of such intimacy of space and time, we can reply thus to Bradley. Space and Time are not infected with contradiction. Space by itself is a continuum and the other characteristic of divisibility is not its inherent feature, but is derived from its being filled up with Time. Time by itself is pure succession and in itself it does not contain the feature of continuum, which really it derives from Space. Now Time and Space is each supposed to be riddled with contradiction because each is taken falsely in separation from the other. Space is always temporal and Time is always spatial and thus reality is spatio-temporal. Treat Spatio-temporality as one concrete fact and the supposed contradictory features become two distinguishable aspects of the same reality. In this way Alexander replied to Bradley (*) and he finalised his answer in the following:

"What seems contradictory is not the empirical T, and the empirical S is not contradictory. For it is not mere T, but is spatial, being the T side of S-T; and this S-T is not a mere concept but it is the empirical reality, reduced to its simplest terms, in which we live. Further, though S and T by themselves are abstractions, they are real in so far as they are discoverable elements of the reality S-T; the abstractions are not mere inventions of the mind but well founded" (1*).


(*) Bradley remained unconvinced. See his letter of 26.4.22. p.3.

(*) Mr. C.D. Tenney reminds us that Locke had anticipated Alexander's Space-Time relationship and he quotes from 'Essays Concerning Human Understanding' Bk.11. Chap.15. This is the passage quoted: "Expansion and duration have this farther agreement, that though they are both considered by us as having parts yet their parts are not separated one from another, no, not even in thought... Expansion and duration do mutually embrace and
At this stage we should record the objection of Prof. Broad. According to him, Alexander need not have referred to Space to explain the continuity of Time. Prof. Broad thinks that the moments of time may not endure but time as a relation of succession does endure. According to Prof. Broad, the argument of Alexander rests on:

"the fallacy that a complex of related terms cannot have a property not possessed by any of the terms. No instant endures; the terms of duration are instants; but it does not follow that a complex whose terms are instants related by the relation of succession is not just what we mean by a stretch of duration..." (2)

According to Alexander, an 'instant' actually endures because it is the instant side of point-instant, and point-instant is an actual fact (1). But Prof. Broad has not questioned this concreteness of point-instant and unless he does his objection will not hold. If we grant that it is empirically given then his account is not as vulnerable as his critics have thought. Therefore, Alexander could reply to Prof. Broad by pointing out that his duration as 'related by the relation of succession' is not metaphysical enough, for this 'relation' too has to be empirically explained. According to Alexander instead of the relation of 'relation' explaining the continuity of space-time, it is the continuity of space-time which explains the category of 'relation'. (2). Alexander was the empiricist, but instead of taking recourse to psychology, which was followed by the

2. Mind 1921 p.35.
past British empiricist, he took recourse to the ontological reality of space-time.

**POINTS AND INSTANTS:** we have to show the interpenetration of points and instants in a more detailed way. The relation between a point and its instant is not of one to one correspondence. It is a relation of one to many correspondence. One point occupies many instants, and an instant is repeated in many points. Roughly speaking, physical events may occur at different places at the same time; and events at different times may occur at the same place. (1) If there were one to one correspondence between a point and its instant, then the point would fail to give permanence to its instant. In the same way, the instant will fail to discriminate its point.

"If the point corresponded uniquely to the instant it would share the character of the instant, and Space would cease to be the Space we know". (2).

In order that Time should linger Space must recur, and, in order that Space may have distinct points Time must be repeated.

To the above statement Joseph objects bluntly:

"That a point occurs at an instant, and that an instant occupies a point, seem to me statements really unintelligible. I do not see how Space secures the continuity of time". (4).

This remark of Joseph is justifiable if we abstract space and time from each other, then their intimacy becomes a mystery. But if we accept the absolute givenness of Space-Time, i.e. motion, then we do not see how the intimacy of points and instants can be called unintelligible. Space and Time.

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according to Alexander, simply are two analysed elements and we make this analysis to make the intuitively apprehended Motion conceptually intelligible to ourselves. Joseph wrongly thinks that Alexander was explaining the continuity of successive nows. He was simply describing and analysing Motion, which he considered to be an apprehended, empirical fact.

In this connection, like Joseph, Prof. Broad too ignores the fundamental concreteness of point-instant. According to him, the explanation of enduring points through instants and of the continuity of instants through the enduring points is wholly circular (1). But, if duration be taken as a fact and if that has to be analysed, then how else can it be analysed? Once we grant that a point-instant is a fact of experience, then the following reply of Alexander to Prof. Broad appears to be quite satisfactory:

"I say (i) that an instant could not be a part of a duration if there were no element with it which was not non-successive: (ii) but that is not enough: in order that a point should endure it must occur at many instants, and in order that instants should be successive, each must occupy many points" (2).

Once we grant that Space-Time is the ultimate concrete stuff, given to us in our experience, it is not difficult to follow what Alexander held about points and instants. He might have been somewhat careless in his expression, as he admitted, but the charge of inconsistency or circularity is not so well founded as he has thought. But probably Alexander went much farther than he should have done in proving the intimacy of Space and Time and this is seen in his attempt of connecting the three dimensions of Space with the three characters of Time.

The experienced physical space has three dimensions. But, according to Alexander, Time too has three dimensions, namely, succession, irreversibility of direction and betweenness. An instant 'A' which is before another instant 'B' cannot be after it. This is known as the asymmetrical or irreversible direction of time. Then, again, each instant is between two instants. Now, there subsists a close interdependence of each new feature in Time on the corresponding new dimensions of space. The irreversible direction of time is possible only if Space is more than one-dimensional (1). Similarly, the transitiveness or betweenness of Time is possible only if Space is tri-dimensional and also vice-versa (2).

"If we could imagine a Creator who had determined to make Time an asymmetrical transitive succession, he would to carry out his purpose, have made a Space of three dimensions; vice-versa if he had determined to make a three-dimensional Space he would, to carry out his purpose, have made Time a transitive asymmetrical succession" (3).

The above attempt of Alexander to relate the three dimensions of Space with the three features of time, has been considered by all his critics to be very obscure (4). Alexander himself admitted that this undertaking is hazardous and even presumptuous (5), but his one object was to bring out the fact that the separation of Space and Time from each other is artificial (6). In reply to Prof. Broad he wrote:

"In other words I wanted to deepen our sense of obligation of S and T to one another, that each was a part of the other's being" (7).

But, there is another way in which Alexander has shown the intimacy of Space and Time and this known as the doctrine of Perspectives and sections.

**PERSPECTIVES AND SECTIONS:** When we say that reality is spatio-temporal we mean that it is historical and growing. Now, in what way can we think of a growing universe? There are two ways in which we can think of a growing universe, namely, in terms of perspectives and sections. When we look at a mountain from different angles, then their different views, following Russell, may be called its perspectives.

The mountain is nothing but a totality of all such perspectives. The important thing about a perspective is that it does not distort its object. Again, what could be a perspective of a palpably changing object like an organism? An organism, at any moment of its existence, is composed of cells of various dates, that is, of immature, mature, and senescent cells.

Take now a perspective of a mind. In it some thoughts have just passed, some are present and some are expected. In a mind the past, present and future mental events are all found. Thus, mind in any one of its moments is full of past, present and future, and this is what is called historical. Here we have to note that the past and future of mind are real. Of course, the past does not exist as now, but why should existence be confined to the present only?

"But if we avoid this error and take time seriously, the past possesses such reality as belongs to the past, that is, to what is earlier than the point of reference; it does not exist now, but it did exist then, and its reality is to have existed then" (1).

1. S.T.D.I.p.71
In the same way the future exists as future.

If we take a perspective of Space-Time from an instant aspect, we will find that the various points of space are filled with dates. Thus, a perspective gives a true picture of a growing universe, which a section does not. But, what is a section? In the spatio-temporal reality Space is regarded as the trail of Time. The trail or generation of space by Time, simply means that the points of space keep on changing their time coefficients, that is, the point which was present becomes past or future with different perspectives. Of course, it would be wrong to suppose that the sum total of points increases in this growth or movement introduced by Time in the Space-Time stuff. Now, by a section is meant Space, as the assemblage of events which occur at the same moment of time: or, the Time, as the assemblage of events which occur at the same point. This section of the spatio-temporal universe, either as the whole of Space of one date or the whole of Time at one point is unreal. Its unreality is best seen in an organism whose cells are never of one date. Besides, the whole of Space at one instant will be a perishing 'now', just as the one instant is without an enduring point. The whole of space must be enduring and in order to endure its points must be of various dates (1).

For Alexander, the universe is a growing universe in which the past and the future are real besides the present. Therefore he called the universe historical through and through (2). If it is so, then the perspectives are the

2. Ibid. pp. 61, 65, 66.
historical realities of the spatio-temporal universe, but obviously a section is not (1). Hence, it will be wrong to hold with Prof. Broad that sections are as real as the perspectives (2). We can quote Alexander's reply to Prof. Broad thus:

"...if you wish to do this and see the world as a history which it essentially is, you must take it by perspectives which give you historical reality and not by sections which are but useful artifices" (3).

THE THEORY OF EMERGENCE: We have discussed the nature of Space-Time and now we have to make the hypothesis that all empirical things, from matter to mind, are constituted by the fundamental stuff of Space-Time. (4). Space-Time is but motion and is anterior to matter. We will find that Matter is simply a complex of point-instants or event-particles. The point-instants are but bits of Space-Time, which have been taken out of the continuous whirlpool of motion. Empirical existents are mere 'complexes of motion differentiated within the one all-containing and all-encompassing system of motion. The emphasis is on the continuity of motion, in which particular motions are mere fragments. These complexes of motion are correlated with various qualities of materiality, vitality, and consciousness. But in the end all existents have evolved from motion, which is the fundamental stuff of the world. However, it is difficult to picture motion without something which moves. But we have to note that the

3. Ibid. p.417.
* See the note at the end of the chapter.
fundamental stuff which is motion is anterior to any material thing (1). It is the pure movement which constitutes the thing (2). This is also supported by the physicists themselves who regard matter as a complex of motion. Hence, the hypothesis that motion is the fundamental stuff is not a pure speculation. It is no doubt terribly abstract, but it is an actual event. It can be imagined as a form of a flash of red light by thinking away its redness (3).

Alexander was committed to a scientific view of the world and therefore, in his metaphysical search for the fundamental stuff he constantly fell back on the teachings of Physics and Mathematics (4). In harmony with them he came to the conclusion that Space-Time is the ultimate stuff. In the long run, according to Physics, matter is nothing but a system of energies.

"Thus, to say nothing of matter proper, it does not seem very far-fetched to suggest that the electron itself may be a complex of motion, with which its electrical quality is correlated or rather identical" (5).

In Space-Time, Time is the principle of movement and so the universe, composed of the fundamental stuff of Space-Time, is caught up in the eternal unrest. As point-instants or event-particles come to be organised into a complex, a certain empirical existent emerges with its quality in correlation with that complex. A higher empirical quality will emerge if the complex of pure events reaches a more enriched crystallisation. Under 'the guidance of Time', Space-Time

of its very nature breaks forth into progressive complexes of event-particles, which lead to the emergence of Matter, Life and Mind (1). It would be wrong to suppose that the universe has any beginning. It is 'beginningless Motion', which spins out fresh emergents as it advances in certain directions. Then, again, this cosmic creation is without any purpose, though it may create creatures who may have purpose (2).

Any evolitional account of things has to meet certain gaps between matter, life and mind. We do not know how life has come out of matter, and how mind has evolved out of life. Mechanistic Materialism assumes that everything has come out of matter and it tries to explain away all that is distinctive of life and mind. (1). However, Alexander was committed to an Evolutionary Naturalism in which everything emerges from a matrix simpler than matter itself. In this scheme of things the distinctive features of life and mind are accepted. In this sense emergent evolution is a protest against a mechanistic scheme of things (2). In the emergent evolution matter, life and mind are new arrivals in the course of evolution, and they have to be accepted as brute facts. Here we find that a certain crystallisation of point-instants is correlated with a certain quality. But, the question is, why should a certain crystallisation be correlated with a certain specific quality? Well, For Alexander, philosophy is but a science, and a science is a faithful description of empirical facts. Philosophy, then, being a description of facts can do

2. F.E.P. p.267
no more than watch and note the facts, bow down before them and acknowledge them with gratitude (3). Here Alexander pointed out that we should accept with loyalty the fact of "critical turning points", "creative synthesis" or "new departures" in the goings-on of the world. This loyal acceptance of the fact he called "natural piety" (1). This natural piety, according to him, is simply a scientific temper of a scientist "by which he accepts with loyalty the mysteries which he cannot explain in nature and has no right to try to explain" (2).

**NISUS:** Why should the emergents emerge as they do? The emergents arise from the presence of a nusus which pulls all existents towards greater complexities. This nusus is not the mere turning of a squirrel in its cage, but is an impetus in things for a progressive advance along a pyramid (1). Thus, stated the doctrine of nusus is vague, as Alexander himself admitted (2). It seems that it is a generalisation from the observation of advance noted in nature. This is clear from his reply of 2.6.1921 to Lloyd Morgan:

"At the end with nusus which (as at present advised) seems to me just the de facto advance of what I now call 'emergent evolution'" (3).

Matter was the first to emerge from a certain complex of point-instants. For our convenience we can call the first quality, supervening over pure point-instants, materality.

3: Here we are reminded of Bosanquet's nisus, which can be noted but not explained (Individuality and Value p.192). This similarity has been also noted by Loughnan in The Monist 1936 p.211.
This materiality is novel but it is the 'crystallisation' of these point-instants. It is the business of the scientists to point out the specific correlation between matter and a particular complex of point-instants. However, matter with its materiality does not remain quiescent in a state of equilibrium. If we take Time seriously, then we have to suppose that every creation will keep on straining towards fresh emergents. Matter, then, also kept on piling up fresh complications and in course of its process underwent a richer complexity, which came to be correlated with life. The vital processes are something new but they can be expressed without residue in terms of the lower physico-chemical processes from which they have emerged (1). Once more we have to note that the vital processes are but a certain form of physico-chemical processes. Over and above the specific complex correlated with life there is nothing like an independent psychoid or vital entelechy of Driesch (2), which guides the physico-chemical processes in an organism ab extra. But the 'spinning process' of Time 'pushes on' and the vital processes undergo new elaboration into the form of cerebral processes and come to be correlated with consciousness. Mind or consciousness no doubt is a novel quality, supervenient over the purely physiological processes, but it can be expressed without residue in terms of the lower neural processes from which it has emerged. Mind is the highest quality which has emerged, so far as human knowledge can take note of, but there seems to be no reason why the universe should not produce higher

emergents. Later on, we will find that Alexander said that the whole universe is in travail with a higher quality or emergent called Diety. Though mind is not going to be the highest emergent in an hierarchical order of spiral creativity, yet it is the entity best known to us. As it is an exemplar of a universal pattern of things therefore an understanding of mind in relation to its physiological correlate will throw light on the nature of emergents themselves.

THE FOUR CHARACTERISTICS OF THE NEW EMERGENTS: In order to appreciate the nature of emergents, it would be better if we, following Van Hall, stress the four characteristics of the emergents at each successive level:

1. Each emergent is new and different in kind from the level it emerges from, but then it is expressible without residue in terms of the lower level. For example, 'Mind' can be expressed without residue in physiological terms; and life, in turn, can be expressed without remainder into the physico-chemical processes and so on. This has been mentioned before, but, along with this, another peculiarity of the situation has to be noted. The specific character of the lower level is carried into the 'body', but not into the 'mind' or the emergent quality, though the categorial features are carried up (1). For example, life emerges from matter but the vital processes are not coloured. However, the categorial features of substantiality and causality are found there. Of course, Alexander did not prove the spatiality of Life, for he thought that it follows a fortiori from the substantiality of mind, which

1. S.T.D.11.p.70-71
he undertook to prove. This observation shows that, according to Alexander, Spatio-Temporality is the very being and essence of everything; and the emergent qualities, though novel, are but accidental features of Spatio-Temporal Reality.

2. The emergent quality or the higher level, though it is expressible without residue in the lower level, is not co-extensive with the whole of the lower level. The higher level is co-ordinate with only to a portion of the lower level. For example, the neural processes which carry consciousness are localised in the brain, which is only a portion of the body. It is quite a different thing to hold that these neural processes are sustained by the activities of the whole body. This observation will be of special interest to us in connection with the pictorial representation of Deity.

3. Alexander was not very clear but probably he regarded the emergent as the special characteristic of the wholeness, which is not found in parts taken separately. This is supported by the fact that he called the emergent quality 'mind' and this 'mind' has the universal characteristic of 'holism'. (2). The new emergents evolve through the successive complexity of Space-Time.

"But at each change of quality the complexity as it were gathers itself together and is expressed in a new simplicity. The emergent quality is the summing together into a new totality of the component materials" (3).

Now, if the emergent quality is this fact of 'summing up' or

'holism' of Smuts or the 'Gestalt' of the Gestaltists, then it cannot be reduced to the parts without surrendering its uniqueness. Only when this whole is an additive whole, can it be reduced to its parts. But though the additive whole can be reduced to its parts, it cannot have any novelty. The whole as 'summing up' as distinguished from mere 'sum' alone can have something new which its components have not. In other words, the 'whole' as sum of the parts is expressible without residue in its components, but as the 'summing up' it cannot be so reduced. Alexander has simply confused the notions of 'sum' and 'summing up', or of the integrative whole and the additive whole. Hence, the emergents as additive wholes are quantitatively continuous but qualitatively, or as summing up, are discontinuous with their lower levels.

4. Again, the course of evolution, according to Alexander is not divergent, as it is in Bergson's philosophy. It has been pictured as a pyramidal advance. This is due to the fact that there is a nisus which sweeps all things towards greater complexities or higher emergents.

Matter, life and mind are simply examples of emergence. It is possible the physicists may discover several emergents between Space-Time and matter. Similarly, the bio-physicists may discover several emergents between matter and life. It is the business of the scientists, therefore, to enumerate the various emergents. All that an Evolutionary Philosophy can state is that an emergent is said to arise when a new quality
comes to characterise a certain crystallisation of Space-Time. Here the important thing to note is that there is a steady progress, with resultants and emergents (*). Resultants mark the continuity between space-time and its emergents; and the emergents mark the new departures or critical points along the path of the progressive creativity of Space-Time. In the words of Lloyd Morgan 'though resultants there is continuity in progress; through emergence there is progress in continuity' (1). Montague has described emergent evolution as 'the temporally continuous development of qualitatively discontinuous levels of being (2). This creativity of discontinuous levels of emergence follows from the presence of a nusus which pulls all existents towards greater complexities.

*A complex whole may have two kinds of characteristics. That characteristic of the whole which is additive and subtractive only, and which can be predicted from the nature of its components is called resultant. However, that characteristic of the whole which is new and which cannot be predicted from the nature of its components is called emergent. For example, water is composed of hydrogen and oxygen. The weight of the water is a resultant feature of it, but its fluidity is its emergent quality.

1. Emergent Evolution p.5.

2. 'A materialistic theory of emergent evolution' - ESSAYS IN HONOUR OF JOHN DOWBY - p.257. Alexander himself described it as temporal continuity in which there is emergence of qualities (STD II. P.49).
It may be accepted that new qualities emerge in Space-Time. But, if it is so, then we have to relate the emergents with Space-Time in an intelligible way. If Space-Time can give birth to these emergents, then it must be credited with the potentialities of containing them (*); and, if it does not contain them, then the emergents simply become so many accidents. Alexander seems to favour the latter alternative. He was careful in pointing out that Space-Time does not contain anything over and above its own features and in a subtle way denied that matter, life and mind have anything distinctive about them. The relation between the different levels is one of perfection, but the term 'Perfection' has nothing to do with values.

* This point has been raised by Carr in his letter to Alexander, dated 23.12.1920: "The simple elements could only be in appearance simple if they contained this enormous potentiality, and though you seem to insist so much on the simplicity, it cannot really be the simplicity of abstractions, but rather the simplicity of germs out of which complex or forms develop".

The same criticism has been levelled against Alexander by Hoernle: "If 'Life' and 'Mind' have evolved from 'Matter', the only possible inference is that the universe was, and is, more than 'Matter'." (Idealism and Evolutionary Naturalism, The Monist, 1926 XXXVI p.566)

This noteworthy that Alexander himself used this kind of argument against materialism: "Materialism can only become reasonable by allowing an element to exist in matter which has affinity with the latest outgrowth from matter which is mind. But matter ceases to be sheer matter and acquires life". (Naturalism and Value P.B.P. p.261)
"Perfection is an awkward name; I might have said 'difference of kind', but I mean it in the sense in which one says that one man is bigger than another but not better". (1)

The emergents, including mind, are mere complexities of Space-Time (2). Miss Liddell puts it thus:

"If we examine carefully Alexander's definitions of Space, does it not appear that the underlying notion is always that of identity? How else can we interpret the statement that every existent is so much space with its appropriate time?" (3).

Thus, a quantitative view of life prevails in Alexander's philosophy and this was influenced in it because of its tacit acceptance of scientism. (4). But, if everything about matter, life and mind is accidental, then why should we take the trouble of explaining them? Again, Alexander would retort that he is simply describing the brute empirical fact with natural piety (4). This is very clear from his reply to Lloyd Morgan's letter of 22.7.1918. Lloyd Morgan had pointed out that for him the business of a science is to describe the world as a going concern and to ascertain how it goes. But the question for metaphysics, according to Lloyd Morgan, is: what makes it go as it does go? (1). In his reply to Lloyd Morgan, dated 14.6.1918, Alexander wrote:

1. Letter to Miss Oakeley P.1.
2. STD I. p.327. 3. Ibid p.43. 4. STD II. p.46-7, 74, 138.
* Scientism is the philosophy in which the methodology and the conclusions of sciences are taken to be final (Arnold Lunn, Revolt against Reason, pp.17, 67).
* Carr also protested against this descriptiveness of Alexander's philosophy and in his letter of 24.12.1917 he wrote to Alexander thus: "Your argument in each case seems to be, 'it is so, and there's an end to it', but it leaves one wondering 'how the thence it can be so". The same observation has been made by Romanes against Alexander for taking the scientific explanation as final, see P.A.S.1.1880 p.66-9 also p.
"What makes the world go is its going; and the special sciences deal with the 'particular go' of particular things".

But can we rest content with the going-on of the world? We have to co-ordinate the various goings-on of the world, in accordance with the same master-plan. In this 'reflection' on things, we have to include not only what is, and what should be, but also what is going to be. For human beings, with their impulse of disinterested curiosity, visions and prophecies about the goings-on of the world are as much experiential facts as their notings are. If we do not accept this then we will be left with pure empiricism. We will be left with mere facts without any reason to argue about. This has been well noted by Collingwood:

"This strain of empiricism is the weakness of Alexander's philosophy. If the method of philosophy is purely empirical, if the universal means the pervasive, the necessary merely the actual, thought merely observation, a system built on this method can have in it no driving force or continuity: there is an element of arbitrariness in every transition". (2). But even Alexander had to pass from what is to what is going to be. He had to argue that the upward march of Space-Time will continue and Deity will emerge from Mind. Now, no doubt, by taking Time seriously he could have stated that the transitions will continue in nature but he could not have postulated this PROGRESSIVE goings-on of the universe. Here is the subtle criticism of Bradley:

"And, further, Reality (as Space-Time) contains a 'nisus', and seems essentially to be a progress...though you hardly attempt to justify this. A 'forward movement' of Time is one thing, and a progressive 'nisus' is surely another" (1).

Alexander simply generalised the idea of progress as could be seen in the theory of evolution and as such went beyond

a historical order of things. Hence, it is not enough to confine oneself to facts alone. The facts by themselves are dumb and they speak volumes only when they are clothed with larger meanings which they themselves prompt.

By ignoring a spiritual principle which makes the emergents emerge, as Lloyd Morgan postulated, Alexander's metaphysics seems to suffer from the fallacy of genetic explanation, that is, it tends to explain the later in terms of the earlier. Matter is nothing but an organisation of point-instants, with its emergence of the new quality of materiality. Then, again, life is nothing but a complex of physico-chemical excitements and can be expressed without residue into them. In the same way mind is nothing but a neural organisation in the cerebrum:

"If the study of life is not one with a peculiar subject-matter, though that subject-matter is resolved without residue into physico-chemical processes, then we should be compelled ultimately to declare not only psychology to be a department of physiology, and physiology of physics and chemistry, but, if we are consistent, to be a chapter, like all sciences, of mathematics, which deals with motion and Space and Time" (1).

Hence, it is clear from the above statement that Alexander tried to reduce all existents to Space-Time, and in a subtle way tried to explain away the distinctiveness of life and mind. Prof. M.K. Smith just missed this strain of naturalistic reductionism when he proposed to substitute for 'nothing but', 'and also'. He proposed that Alexander should have used the words 'mind is vital and also conscious' (2). This proposal was made by Prof. M.K. Smith because Alexander had used the

1. S.T.D. 11.5.62. Also see pp. 65, 67.
2. See the letter of Alexander, dated August 19, 1920.
words 'not merely and also' to characterise each emergent. Thus, mind is not only physiological but also conscious; not only is it expressible completely in terms of the neural processes but it is something new, quite different in kind from the neural processes. But, if there is a difference in kind and not only degree, between life and mind (3), then how can mind be expressed in terms of life, without any residue? If mind is different in kind from life, then it cannot be expressed completely in terms of life; and, if mind can be expressed completely in terms of life, then it is contradictory to hold that the emergents are entirely new and yet completely expressible in terms of the lower levels from which they have emerged (4). This has been well expressed by Mr. Bateman thus:

"To say 'each new type of existence when it emerges is expressible completely or without residue in terms of the lower stage and therefore indirectly in terms of all lower stages', is surely a departure from the theory of emergence, and I might add, a fallacy of genetic explanation" (1).

The rigid adherence to the spatio-temporal nature of reality has made the emergents merely miracles of nature, which can only be hailed with glad surprise (2), and Alexander quite clearly accepted that the emergents are miracles of nature which we have to acknowledge as such (3). Most probably Alexander was quite conscious of the accidental nature of the emergents in the life of space-time, but he

accepted this under the formula of 'natural piety' (4). The observation of Prof. N.K. Smith to this 'natural piety' is very apt:

"Can the 'way of the world' be brought in, as an opus operatum, at every point at which your 'realities' give out? You almost seem to me, at times, to appeal to 'experience' as Bacon and Descartes were wont to appeal to 'Revelation'... Do not the successive empirically verified emergences thus become so many supplementary hypotheses to make good the defects of your main hypothesis?

**THE MIND-BODY FORMULA:**

We have to explain the relation between mind and body for this relation is a clue to the understanding of emergents (5). We have already seen that life has emerged from physico-chemical processes, and that life itself has then undergone further elaboration in the form of neural organisation in man. Though the whole of human body with its nervous system is important in carrying consciousness or mentality, yet the neural processes of the brain are more particularly concerned in carrying consciousness. Alexander repeatedly pointed out that mind and the cerebral processes are not two but one; (1)

"The separation of the mental process from the neural one is therefore superfluous, for it is the same process features which are in the one case enjoyed and in the other contemplated" (2).

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4."I have chosen as illustrating the attitude of natural piety our acceptance of the emergence of these qualities," (P.L.P. p.315). Then, again, on the top of the same page he wrote: "...the recognition of emergent qualities which can be truly accepted but cannot be accounted for".

2. S.T.D.11. p. 12; also cf. PP. 5, 9, 11.
Hence, he said that it is inadequate and misleading to say that consciousness is correlated with cerebral processes (3). The relation is not one of correlation but one of identity between the cerebral processes and mentality. Here Alexander thought himself to be supported by Spinoza and in 'Spinoza and Time' he wrote:

"This is the way Spinoza would answer the question whether brain-processes and their corresponding thought-processes accompany each other or act upon each other. For him they are the same thing twice over; there is neither correspondence nor interaction between them, but identity of essence" (1) Mind is nothing but a certain neural organisation, but it is not merely neural, for the cerebral processes carrying consciousness are not the same as the neural processes not awakened into consciousness. Of course, Alexander did not specify the distinctive features of those neural processes which carry consciousness, but he believed that there were some (1). The neural organisation lived through and enjoyed its mental; and seen from outside and contemplated is neural. Therefore, it appears that the distinction between mind and body depends on the way in which a certain complex of vital processes is cognised or looked at.

1. P.L.X. p.356. *Spinoza would not maintain this identity of brain and thought processes. For him, they run parallel and the order and system of one correspond to the order and system of the other. Hence, Alexander departs from the doctrine of Spinoza.
2. S.T.D.II. p.6-7.* in the light of the above view of Alexander, it would not be quite correct to say, as Prof. Emmet commented that Alexander did not note the distinctive feature of the whole body which it undergoes at the time of thinking. (Philosophy, 1750 p.229). Then, there may be levels of consciousness, as Prof. Emmet points out (ibid.p.228) or, as Rumm had pointed out (F.A. S.Lxxi.15y-15z), but the important thing is that all of them have their neural correlates, and as long as they have neural correlates he could have held his view.
As Mind and Body are one and the same therefore the question of interactionism does not arise. Consider a certain neural process - say 'a' 'carries' thought 'A', and, the neural process 'b' carries the thought 'B'. In this case 'a' can cause 'B' for 'a' can cause 'b'. But 'b' is nothing but 'B'. Similarly 'A' can cause 'b' for 'A' can cause 'B', but 'B' is nothing but 'b' in its contemplated and neural nature. Hence, the intimacy of mind and body is very well explained on the basis of an identity of mind and brain. There is nothing in the mental process, according to Alexander, which cannot be explained in terms of the identity of mind and brain.

"There is enough and to spare somewhere in the neural structure, to provide for everything in the mental life". (1).

By holding that mind can be explained in terms of the neural processes, Alexander once more approached Behaviourism. But against behaviourism he held that mind is not an epiphenomenon or an ineffective determinant of behaviour (2). Mind, as a higher neural organisation does make a difference to our behaviour and is enjoyed as consciousness (3).

Strangely enough Alexander considered this relation of mind and body to be simple (4) and therefore hoped that it would serve as the 'readiest solution' (5), towards our understanding the relation of the new emergents with reference to that inferior basis from which they have emerged. In other words, the relation between life and matter, matter and

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point-instants, and between Time and Space is the same nature as of mind with its body (6). Time then is the 'mind' of Space, materiality is the mind of space-time, life is the mind of physico-chemical processes. It is possible then, wrote Alexander:

"that the union of the body and mind which we find in the human person may turn out in the end to be typical of every form of existence from the lowest to the highest, and perhaps of the universe itself as a whole" (1).

Of course, when Time is said to be the mind of space, then Time is not any sort of consciousness; nor can materiality be said to be dim form of human mentality, nor can life be said to be nascent mind. It simply means that Time performs the function of mind in Space analogously; or, that life performs a function in relation to physico-chemical processes akin to which mind performs in relation to the human brain. But from this importance of the mind-body relationship, it does not follow that the human mind is the pattern or measure of Reality. It simply means that the union of the body and mind is simply an exemplar of a universal pattern, which runs through all things in the Space-Time matrix (2). May, instead of saying that Time is the mind of space, the truer statement will be that mind is the time of body, life is the time of the physico-chemical processes and so on (3). It therefore implies that there is something simpler than mind from which it has

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6. F.L.P. p.272
2; S.T.D.11. p.59
emerged. The mind-body relationship is only an instance of the universal pattern which runs in all things and as such mind has no prerogative over other things. Later on, in 'The Historicity of Things', Alexander pointed out that by saying that Time is the 'mind' of space, he meant that everything has a tendency to enter 'wholes', or the holism of Smuts (1). The other aspect of the formula is that everything has a 'subjective pole' or 'ing-feature' or 'enjoyment' (2). But, as Prof. Emmet has suggested, the mind aspect of the mind-body formula simply means that it is the 'spear-head of novelty' (3).

THE PURPOSE OF THE MIND-BODY FORMULA:— Now, what is the place of the mind-body formula in the Emergentism of Alexander? It serves two important purposes. First, it tries to introduce an element of continuity in the otherwise discontinuous series of emergents and, further, it proposes to solve the problem of the relation between mind and body, by avoiding the Scylla and Charybdis of vitalism and mechanism.

If mind be nothing but neural processes enjoyed by the experienc, and the body be nothing but the processes contemplat ed from outside, then there are really no distinct and separate entities between which a relationship has to be established. And, if there is no dualism between mind and body, then the question of vitalism and mechanism does not arise. Again, if this mind-body formula be applicable to all

1. The historicity of things, p.20.
2. Ibid. p.21. Also see Lessons from Spinoza pp.16,17; B.F.W. p.21.
empirical existents, then there can be no sharp distinction between life and matter. As pointed out before, life is nothing but an organisation of the physico-chemical processes. Of course, it is not merely material, but is also vital (1). Thus, there is not antithesis between life and matter, for they are one and the same process. Besides, there is something in matter which is akin to life and mind (2).

"For though matter has no life, it has something which plays in it the part which life plays in the living organism and mind plays in the person...Thus, matter is not merely dead as if there was nothing in it akin to life" (3).

Hence, we find that there is no opposition between life and matter, for they can be indifferently expressed in terms of each other. (4). Negatively, the mind-body formula denies that there is any independent Entelechy or Elan Vital apart from the constellation of the physico-chemical processes themselves, and as such prepared the way for NATURALISM.

However, from the history of materialism of the 19th century, Alexander must have known that the greatest obstacle to the acceptance of Evolutionary Naturalism lay in the existence of gulfs between life and matter, and also between mind and life. Without establishing some continuity between them, even the doctrine of 'natural piety' would be unavailing. Through this mind-body formula Alexander hoped to secure some continuity between the emergents.

"My motive in anticipating the discussion of empirical qualities by the hypothesis that Time performed towards Space the office of mind, was, that by suggesting that something corresponding to mind was present from the beginning at the lowest finite level of mere motion, I might remove the prejudice against any attempt to exhibit all the forms of existence as a continuous series from Space-Time upwards through matter to mind". (6).

Thus, the mind-body formula establishes a continuity between the emergents in two ways. Firstly, it points out that ultimately there is only one stuff, that is, Space-Time from which the emergents have emerged, and in the final analysis they are but complexes of space-time. Mind is but life, and life is but matter, and matter is but space-time. Hence, there is reductionism, but it is that reductionism in which materialism does not hold good. And, further, on the basis of the mind-body formula we can say that Space-Time to which everything has been reduced has something which is akin to mind. (1).

Then, again, the applicability of the mind-body formula to all the levels of empirical existents shows that there is only one universal formula, anterior to mind itself. Hence, the emergence of mind is not uniquely unique and it cannot be said to be the measure of reality. Then, though mind is a new creative synthesis or critical departure in the evolutionary goings-on of the universe, it is not altogether without some parallel, for life and matter are also similar departures. Hence, there is only one universal pattern in all the emergents, and, therefore, the cleft between matter and life, and life and mind, is not altogether impassable. All the emergents, showing the same universal pattern, at least betray a common unity.

According to this hypothesis, said Alexander, the mystery will

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remain deep, but not completely unintelligible (1).

If the theory of emergence emphasizes the discontinuity between the different levels, then the mind-body formula stresses the continuity between them. If, therefore, there is continuity between the different levels, then the discontinuity between them gets blurred. As such the doctrine of emergence gets weakened. This is probably what Metz meant in the following statement:

"Although this speculation too is evidently inspired by upward-looking ideas, it is plain that it inflicts a mortal wound upon the emergence-doctrine. For now the boundary between the two levels is to a large extent obliterated and the fruitful thought of the emergent as the creatively new loses all its importance" (2).

But the universality of the mind-body formula serves a third purpose and that is to prepare the way for proving the spatiality of mind. Once the spatiality of mind is proved, the thesis that mind is an object like all other objects will become intelligible. This will consequently show that the ultimate stuff or the supreme Reality is Space-Time.

THE SPATIO-TEMPORALITY OF MIND: That mind is nothing but the neural processes 'enjoyed' is not a theory according to Alexander, but is a deliverance of experience (3). Ordinarily we locate our mind where our body is, and with the help of reflection and acquired knowledge we feel our mind in the head.

2. A hundred years of British Philosophy, p. 646; see also p. 645.
3. S.T.D.1, p. 103.
"That experience teaches that the mind is somewhere within the body and is felt in particular within the head; and it answers roughly the question, "where is the enjoyed space of mind in the whole space which is contemplated?" (1)

This conclusion can be reached in this general way. The union of mind and body is known as a person and in a person sometimes the bodily and sometimes the mental aspect dominates. When we say that we have a headache, then the bodily aspect dominates; and, when we say that in a state of intoxication we are not our proper selves, then the mental aspect dominates. But one aspect cannot exist without the other. Even thinking has to be sustained by its underlying organic, kinaesthetic and motor sensations. The relation between mind and body is so intimate that any distinction which we draw between them is mainly one of emphasis (2). On the basis of this general observation we can identify the enjoyed space of the mental processes with the contemplated space of the neural processes.

"Mind and body are experientially one thing, not two altogether separate things, because they occupy the same extension and places as a part of the body" (3).

If mind is nothing but a part of the body or the neural processes in the head, then mind is the same thing as the neural processes, and like them is spatio-temporal.

The general argument outlined above to show the spatio-temporality of mind is really based on the dogmatic acceptance of identity in the place of empirical correlativity between neural and mental processes. (4). Therefore, to prove the spatio-

4. Lloyd Morgan, 'EMERGENT EVOLUTION', pp.25, 29, where he differs from Alexander in not confusing correlation with identification.
temporality of mind Alexander added a metaphysical and an empirical proof of it.

Whilst it is accepted, said Alexander, that mind is temporal, the view that mind is spatial is met with ridicule. (1) But, he thought that this rejection of the spatiality of mind was based on the non-acceptance of materialism. But, now we see that the Space of Space-Time has affinity with mind and the fear of materialism is groundless (2). If we turn to experience, then, according to Alexander, mind appears to be spread out or voluminous in its enjoyments (3).

"Within this vague extension or volume of the separate and salient mental acts or processes stand out as having position, and 'direction'" (4).

This is best seen in a shoot of painful consciousness. But this voluminousness of the enjoyed space should not be confused with contemplated space. In a turn of thought, in the solution of a problem, some 'direction' is felt; but this 'direction' does not refer to the organic kinaesthetic strains at all. For example, one may be in the habit of turning one's head whenever a new turn has taken place in one's thought. But this bodily strain is not the 'enjoyed direction'. The direction of a mental process is literally the enjoyed anatomical or physiological path in the head (5). About the neural character of the

3. "It (consciousness) has a spread-out character, exactly the same as that we are familiar with in external objects. And that voluminosness is located vaguely within the contemplated body". (P.A.S.XI.1911.p.12)
4. S.T.D.x.p.97; cf. also P.A.S.1X (1906-9) pp.7,8,16.
5. S.T.D.x.p.110; ibid. also P.A.S.VIII (1907-80) pp.220,249,250
   P.A.S. XI. p.13,14,16.
   B.S.P.2 (1911) p. 252.
mental direction, which varies with the physical object of contemplation Alexander wrote:

"What the precise spatial direction is, is something as to which we only become clear when later knowledge shows that the locality of the mind is the brain itself. Anyone who carefully analyses a complex mental activity will verify for himself this experience, which, whether he takes it literally as I plead that we should, or only metaphorically, can best be described as a complex and highly differentiated system of directions, here beginning, there inhibited, here pressing on and changing to a different topic; there taking on thoughts that have emerged from another direction". (1).

This intuitive apprehension of the neural direction involved in thought is at the basis of the more refined localisation of brain functions.

"It is indeed difficult, if not impossible, to understand how we could ever correlate a particular mental process as we do with a particular neural process possessing its contemplated or physical character, had not mind already its own spatial enjoyment". (2).

THE CRITICISM OF THE SPATIALITY OF THE ENJOYED PROCESSES:

In the very beginning Bradley (3) had objected to the presence of this 'direction', which is supposed to be felt in thinking and willing in particular. Mr. Bateman (4) called the 'enjoyed direction' fictitious and Miss Calkins (5) observed that mind can be said to be extended, spread out or voluminous in a purely metaphorical sense. Let us try to understand once more what this spatiality of mind means.

Suppose that there is a line of colour ab. It excites through the eyes a brain affection AB. Of course, this neural excitation in the brain need not be a line but it is spatial.

3. T.I.P. 1505
This neural AB involved in the contemplation of the non-mental ab is 'lifted up' in conscious enjoyment.

"To put the matter shortly, a space which enjoys itself consciously or mentally as space contemplates the space of the object..." (1)

If the mental process is spatial, then the space of the neural tract AB will apprehend the space of ab, because space intuits all other points of space. But, how do we become conscious of the AB tract as spatial? When AB contemplates the space of ab, then it enjoys its contemplating the space of ab. But it does not enjoy the enjoyment of the space of AB itself. This is clear from Alexander's statement that in seeing a tree we know nothing of the occipital excitation, and when we think of the occipital excitement we do not see the tree (2).

Of course, the neural tract AB can be contemplated by others, but it ceases to be enjoyment. (3).

We can of course, appeal to experience to attest the truth of the spatiality of the mental act. Ordinarily to appeal to experience of mind means taking recourse to introspection. But, as we have already seen, according to Alexander, introspection furnishes us with the conditions of mental life but it does not directly deal with the mental life itself.

"I do not in introspection turn my mind upon itself and convert a part of myself into an object. I do but report more distinctly my condition of enjoyment". (4).

Hence, the only other method of attesting the truth of the spatiality of mind is enjoyment. But enjoyment is too elusive a method for knowing mind. It is at most a kind of knowledge which is exhausted in its being, and for all practical purpose, it is incommunicable. Therefore, it cannot enlighten us about the nature of the mental process at all.

Thus, neither intuition, nor introspection nor enjoyment can attest the truth of the spatiality of mind. Finally, Alexander had to fall on the dogmatic identification of the mental processes with their neural correlates.

"Enjoyment for me was always identical with the brain-processes and its connections". (1)

This appeared to him as a piece of philosophical intuition and he really accepted it without any criticism. Thus, we find that the mind-body formula is based on the sheer dogmatic assertion that the mental and neural processes are identical. (2)

Yet, without proving the spatiality of mind the mind-body formula cannot be maintained. And, then, without the validity of this mind-body formula it cannot be proved that all the emergents can be reduced to the Space-Time matrix.

Anyhow, Alexander accepted the spatiality of mind and sought to show that the enjoyed space is the same as the physical space. This follows from the temporality of mind.

2. Calkins; m.w. Ibid p.283; also Van Hall, Gé Ibid. p.58.
It is easily accepted that mind is temporal and also that the enjoyed time is the same as physical time. We really date the present event from our enjoyed time of the moment. As time and space cannot exist apart from each other, so the mental time cannot exist apart from the enjoyed space, and vice versa. From the nature of the past enjoyments we can say that the enjoyed time is spatial and the enjoyed space is full of various dates.

As we have already dealt with the theory of past enjoyment, we will refer to it now very briefly. We have already pointed out that to enjoy means to experience and therefore if the past anger is enjoyed then it means that it becomes a present reality. But, according to Alexander, the past anger is really past, for the past incident with which it was connected drags it to the past. But, Alexander now tried to explain the basis of confusing the past anger as present at the moment of its revival. The past anger during its state of revival appears as present. This is due to the fact that we experience the revived past anger with the same quality of the mental experience. But, how do we experience the same quality? This sameness of the quality of the experience depends on the sameness of the neural correlate (1). Thus, the same neural correlate has now two time co-efficient. The remembering act is the same neural act with the present time co-efficient, but the enjoyed memory is the same neural tract with a past time co-efficient.

Thus, to an experient himself the remembering and the memory are quite distinct and the past enjoyment is really felt as past. Now suppose that there is an angel who can contemplate our mental processes.

"For him my mental process is exposed to his contemplation as well as neural process, which to me or you it is not. The angel would see the neural process physically synchronous with my present. But the mental event would be seen by him to have the mark of the past, because he could see into my mind as I enjoy it. He would distinguish the past enjoyment from the present enjoyment at the same place, and would see that two events by way of enjoyment might share the same neural process" (1).

But does this admission of the neural process with different time co-efficients explain the present enjoyment of the past state? The crux of the matter is that the neural tract with the past time has to be filled with the present time, if it is going to be enjoyed at all, at the present time. The result would be that the past and the present time would coalesce and would not be distinct. This point has been well made by Van Hall thus:

"I have a present enjoyment which is aware of the remembered object together with its act; there should however be but one mental act, which contemplates the past, enjoys itself as present and also as past; for I can only enjoy an enjoyment by being this enjoyment". (2).

Just as Alexander tried to prove the spatiality of mind by coalescing wrongly the enjoying neural tract AB with the intuited tract ab, so here the present enjoyment of the past enjoyed state is sought to be proved by coalescing the two times, past and present, into one.

Thus, the spatio-temporality of mind follows only from

a dogmatic identification of the mental processes with the neural processes. But in that case the enjoyed space really becomes the same thing as the contemplated space and the so-called proof of the spatio-temporality of mind becomes wholly irrelevant or a fallacious ignoratio Elenchi (1).

Hence, we find that the theory of the spatio-temporality of mind is the weakest spot in Alexander's system. But this failure is also very significant, for, by not being able to prove the spatiality of mind he has failed to show that mind is a thing amongst all other things, and this was the avowed aim of his metaphysics. But more: if mind is not spatial then it cannot be reduced to the body or the vital processes, and finally, it cannot be reduced to the Space-Time matrix. Thus, mind will become an irreducible co-eval reality along with the space-time matrix and therefore, the doctrine that Space-Time is the absolute matrix or the fundamental stuff will remain unproven.

Now, we conclude that in its general outline Alexander has failed to dislodge mind from its strategic point of importance, and now we have to see whether Alexander has succeeded in de-mentalising all that has been considered to be particularly mental.

NOTE: THE THEORY OF EMERGENCE AND ALEXANDER'S PHILOSOPHY.

After the publication of SPACE, TIME AND DEITY the theory of EMERGENCE enjoyed a good deal of popularity in various philosophical systems, but, as Hoernle well says, none of them took emergent evolution as seriously as Alexander did, in the sense that Alexander's universe is still evolving (1). Alexander, however, with his habit of attributing all novelities to others, himself (2) pointed out that he had owed his doctrine of emergence to a suggestion which was given in Lloyd Morgan's INSTINCT AND EXPERIENCE (1912). Lloyd Morgan, however, in order to be more precise, pointed out that it was not his book 'Instinct and Experience', but it was a paper in SCIENTIA (1915) which had clearly laid down the key idea of emergent evolution (3). We think however, that Alexander was right in referring to 'Instinct and Experience', because he had really completed his system by September 1914. He has referred to the paper in SCIENTIA (1), but did not attribute to it the source of his key-idea of 'Emergent Evolution'. In NATURAL PLENTY' (1922) he referred again to 'Instinct and Experience' as the source of his key-idea of 'Emergence'. The fact appears to be that Alexander did not borrow the concept of Emergent Evolution from Lloyd Morgan; he simply shared it with him and

he has said so in another place:
"They (creative syntheses) are, therefore, after the usage
of the late George Henry Lewes, described as emergents by
Mr. Lloyd Morgan, with whom I have for many years shared this
conception of things, which he has expounded with a simplicity
and lucidity beyond my powers in a chapter of his book, INSTINCT
AND EXPERIENCE .......

Alexander's though was always full of the inchoate concept of
'emergent evolution' and in the beginning he was simply
fumbling for the appropriate terminology. Even in MORAL ORDER
AND PROGRESS (1889), Alexander had pointed out that progress
is not linear but spiral.

"The new type resembles the old, but it stands at a higher
level; and it runs its course parallel to the line of develop¬
ment of the former type, yet always preserving the
essential differences". (4).

Then, again, very early, Alexander was impressed by the
'hierarchy of ministrations' (5) or 'the gradations' between
the different kinds of things (6).

Thus, we find that the doctrine of emergence was quite
natural to Alexander's way of thinking and it was wrong to
hold with Anderson(1) that the doctrine of emergence was a mere
concession to idealism on the part of Alexander and that this
concept did not originate with him. The doctrine of emergence
formed the very core of Alexander's philosophy and its main
purpose was to show that matter, life and mind can be brought
under a coherent scheme of evolution. Further, this evolution

2. r.l.f. p.307. 3. m.o.f. pp.342,355. 4. m.o.f. p.364-365.
5. F.A.S. 1890. p.56.
is not simply an explication of the implicit levels already contained in the primordial stuff; it is a real creative process in which new creations arise in due course.

CHAPTER FOUR.

THE METAPHYSICS OF ALEXANDER (Part II)

The Dethronement of Mind

SYNOPSIS

We have seen in Chapter III, that Space-Time is the Absolute Reality and 'mind' is a thing amongst all other things. Here we will confirm the same conclusion by showing the falsity of the special claims of mind for being regarded as the measure of reality. The special claims of mind are that it is the source of the Categories and Values, and that it is free. A scrutiny of these claims, however, will show that mind is no more free than a stone and that the categories are ontologically prior to and independent of mind. But mind may be said to be the source of values. This, however, need not make mind pre-eminent in the democracy of facts. Firstly, values are not unique for mind, for they are found at all levels. Secondly, it is not the Absolute Mind, but the 'standard mind' which determines values. Thirdly, values make reality richer but not more real. In the final analysis they are mere incidents in the Absolute Reality of Space-Time. Finally, human values are going to be superseded by the next emergent 'deity'; and, as such they cannot be said to outline the essence of Reality.

Thus, the Metaphysics of Alexander shows that mind cannot be the measure of Reality. It is a mere incident in the
THE SPECIAL CLAIMS OF MIND:— We have already seen that the Emergent Evolutionalism of Alexander, under the guidance of the Mind-Body formula, has shown that mind is no more uniquely unique than Life and Matter. Alexander is supposed to have shown that mind is spatio-temporal, and so, instead of being the measure of reality, it is itself constituted by the things below it, and ultimately by the S-T stuff. But so far, this 'dressing down' of mind and 'telling off' its exaggerated claims follow from a general metaphysical consideration of things. For the final dethronement of mind from its being the measure and arbiter of the reality of all things, its own pretended claims of uniqueness have to be shown as false. The special claims of mind for its uniqueness are really three.

Firstly, as shown in the idealistic theory of knowledge in chapter 1, mind is supposed to be the source of the categories by virtue of which it relates the series of passing manifold of experience into connected objects of knowledge (*). The idealists hold that this synthesising activity of mind distinguishes it from all other phenomenal objects. Secondly, in morality there is a non-natural ego or self which chooses freely between the competing desires. The successive desires are natural but the free self which chooses any one of them and elevates it into a voluntary action is quite different from the competing desires themselves. Hence, the nature of self as a free agent is another claim for the uniqueness of mind. Finally,
in 'The Distinction Between Mind and its Objects', Bosanquet pointed out that the domain of values is the special and unique sanctuary of mind.

"...I cannot see how the tertiary qualities, say, for example, those which we call aesthetic, can have justice done them on this principle" (1), that is, on the principle of Alexander's realism.

Alexander therefore sought to show that all these special claims of mind are false, for in general, the categorial features, freedom and values are found at all levels of the empirical existents. As such they are found in things which are prior to the emergence of mind, and, therefore, they are independent of it, and are not peculiar to mind at all. Hence, Alexander gave an empirical explanation of the Categories, Freedom and Values, which is of special significance for understanding his system.

Sec.1. THE CATEGORIES:- In SPACE, TIME AND DEITY, Alexander has devoted the largest number of pages to the empirical explanation of the categories. But he himself noticed that it was the least regarded of his contributions. (1). He himself in a letter wrote to C.C.J.Webb (2) that he was most interested in the topic of categories and it was natural enough for him to be so interested. As he believed that idealism was based on epistemology and the centre of this epistemology lay in showing the importance of the a-priori categories, he had no option but

*About the mental characters of universals or categories, Bosanquet wrote: "The reality of the universal is a sufficient proof that the objects of mind may be alive with its vitality". (The distinction between mind and its Objects p.36; also see pp.35-36.
to combat this claim on the basis of his empiricism.

We have already seen that from the very beginning Alexander occupied himself with anti-apriorism (3). As noted earlier he tried to explain the nature of categories empirically. Only at the early stages of 'Demarcation of Logic and Psychology' (June 12, 1893) and 'Philosophy and Biology' (1894-95), Alexander tried to account for the categories on the basis of psychological experience, and later, in SPACE, TIME AND REALITY he tried to deduce them empirically on the ontological basis of Space-Time. Even at the early stage, his 'Demarcation of Logic and Psychology' had aroused a great deal of interest(1), but his account of the categories in SPACE, TIME AND REALITY is very thorough and is full of illumination. However, a fuller account of them comes under Logic proper and we will make only a brief reference to them for understanding the system of Alexander.

As the subject of the categories has been taken up by Plato, Aristotle, Kant and the British idealists Bradley and Bosanquet, so Alexander referred to all of them. In this account of the categories he was most indebted to Plato and Kant and in developing his empirical explanation of them he had to criticise Bradley and Bosanquet, with reference to them. In this criticism, the theory of 'terms and relations' held by Bradley and the theory of 'concrete universal' expounded by Bosanquet are of special note.

Instead of holding that mind is the special source of the categories, Alexander showed that all categories are spatio-

1. See the letter of Bosanquet of this time to Alexander.
temporal and they arise from the nature of Space-Time itself. Probably this is his boldest speculation, for he showed here that the categories are themselves existent entities, and are but the all-pervasive features of Space-Time. This means therefore, that things are thoughts. Certainly, Pan-Objectivism could go no further.

The empirical existents have two kinds of characters, namely, variable and pervasive. For example, Life, Mind or Consciousness are variable characters for they are not found in all empirical existents. But there are certain features like existence, number, universality, relation etc., which are found in all things. As noted earlier, the empirical qualities of the lower level are carried into the 'body' of a new emergent, but they are not 'carried up' into its 'mind' or the new, supervenient quality (1).

The pervasive characters of all existents are called categories (2). It is true that even the pervasive characters undergo some variations, according to the empirical circumstances. For example, a triangle may be small or big but it must have some size or area. Such variations of the pervasive characters are called the Primary qualities. Corresponding to the different complexities of the primary qualities there are the correlated Secondary qualities of matter, life and mind etc., Hence, the categories are found in all things and are to be distinguished from the qualities which emerge from the complexes of point-instants.

The categorial characters have been called by Kant **a-priori** in the sense that they are independent of and prior to every experience. But, Alexander called them **a-priori**, in the sense that they are 'at the root of' every experience or that they are metaphysically prior to empirical existents. No matter how far we go in our knowledge, even in the simplest cognitive situation of Intuition we will find them in the simplest existent entity. Hence, though they are **a-priori**, they are also empirical, in a wider sense, for they are also experiences (1). Thus, Alexander taught that his **a-priori** categories are to be contrasted with the non-empirical **a-priori** categories of Kant and the idealists. Here lies the empiricism of Alexander. The categories are traced to actual entities which in this case are the point-instants or the Space-Time itself (2). Further, though the categories are **a-priori** they are not separated from the empirical characters by hard and fast distinction (1). The reason that empirical things are complexes of that very Space-Time of which the categories are the pervasive features. This observation is best seen in motion. When motion is a particular sort of motion then it is an empirical existence. However, in so far as it is has the character of motion, that character is categorial. Thus, motion is the border-line between the categorial and the empirical. However, in a narrower sense, strictly speaking, an empirical

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existent is that which has some quality or some non-pervasive features also (2). Probably Alexander meant that the categories are the ground-plan or the basal patterns in Space-Time for they are found even when we divest things of their qualitative colourings. One has to discover the categories through the method of abstraction,---a method which was used by Descartes for finding out the indubitable truth:

"He (reader) needs only, in order to help himself in the abstract (that is, elementary) inquiry to think of empirical things, divest them of their qualitative colouring, and single out the categorial foundations of what the colouring is correlated with". (3).

**MIND AND THE CATEGORIES:** Being the pervasive features of all things, the categories are common to mind as well as to all non-mental things. Then, again, mind being the most perfect thing displays its categorial features most clearly. But because it can see these features quite clearly in itself, therefore, it comes to believe that the categories which are found in all other things are but imputed to them by mind (4). From this, the erroneous claim is made that mind is the law-giver to all things.

"But now, if there is something in the things which gives colour to the imputation, if, for instance, there is something in external things which is identical with the causal or substantial continuity which we find in mind, when we do not take that experience to be more than it really is, the imputation is unnecessary" (i).

**THE THREE GRADES OF THE CATEGORIES:** Alexander seems to have classified the categories into three grades probably in

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4. MIND p.12. 2.12.
accordance with their generality. In the first grade are found the categories of existence, universality, relation and order. In the next group are substance, quantity, number, causality etc., in the last group is motion which is most complex of all and presupposes all of them. The major categories intercommunicate with one another, that is, they are predicatable of each other. For example, 'relation' exists and has universality. But the major categories do not 'communicate' with the minor categories, that is, the minor categories need not be the predicate of them. Nevertheless, the minor categories communicate with the major categories. For example, 'relation' need not be causal, but causality must be a form of relation. Thus, the major category 'relation' does not communicate with the minor category 'causality', but the minor category of causality does communicate with the major category of relation.

With this classification of categories, let us deal with a few important categories like Relation, universality, Substance etc.

**RELATION:** We find that the categories are not abstract concepts, and they all 'communicate' with the basic category of relation. Of course, all categories derive their nature from the structure of space-time and this spatio-temporal nature of the category of relation is the clearest of all.

We have not to appeal to any favoured region of experience to trace the origin of categories. The nature of Space-Time is sufficient to explain the nature of every

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category. The same thing is true of the category of relation. Space-Time has been held by Alexander to be continuous and the category of relation has been derived from this raw continuity of space-time.

Idealism explains the relation of things through the kindly office of mind (2); it was William James however, who pointed out that relations are of the same stuff as the terms they relate; and Alexander accepted this suggestion wholeheartedly. Thus, the empirical relations of space and time are themselves spaces and times. The terms and their relations are of the same stuff (3). Since all empirical existents are but complex of point-instants, the relation between them is spatio-temporal. No doubt a complex relation, for instance, paternity, is complex, but it is reducible without remainder to S-T (4).

The category of relation being simple is hard to define, but it can be described. It may be described 'as the whole situation in which its terms enter, in virtue of that relation' (1). For example, in virtue of the relation of paternity a person X is a father and another person Y is a son. Of course, outside this relationship, the person X may be a farmer or an author or a dictator. Hence, a term may have many more characters objectively, independently of any one relationship. Here one is reminded of the so-called fallacies of 'exclusive particularity' and 'Definition by initial predication' which were

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1. S.T.D. 1. p. 240
pointed by the American neo-realists. Therefore, really terms are found in a relation and a relation is always found in terms. Hence, there are terms in relation, but there is nothing like terms and relation (2). This distinction takes us to the controversy about the externality and internality of a relation.

EXTERNAL AND INTERNAL RELATION:— Relations are the spatio-temporal connections of things. Hence, a relation must relate and the things, being vortices in the spatio-temporal continuity, cannot remain without being related. If so, then there cannot be any external relation, for a relation cannot exist in separation from its terms or things.

The fact is that Alexander endowed Space-Time with its continuity and also with its diversities. Space and time apart from sustaining each other's continuity also break each other into diversities:

"Time disintegrates Space directly by distinguishing it into successive spaces; Space disintegrates Time indirectly by making it a whole of times, without which whole there would be no separate Times either". (1).

Now, the relation relates because being spatio-temporal it cannot but be continuous. But the terms can exist apart from any particular relationship, for space-time is also diverse. Thus, to prove the connectedness of terms, Alexander emphasised their spatio-temporal continuity and to show their separate individual existences he emphasised their diversities.

Alexander suggested that instead of classifying the relations into external and internal, it is better to classify

2. Ibid. pp.244,251.
them into (i) Absolutely intrinsic, (ii) Essentially intrinsic, and (iii) extrinsic. The categorial relations are absolutely intrinsic for no matter what happens to an existent being, as long as it is an existent it comes to be characterized by them. The typical characters of a thing are the essentially intrinsic relations of a thing. For example, the manhood of a man is his essential relation and relatively it remains unaltered. But misfortune may turn a man into a beast and death may alter him into a piece of matter. Hence, the empirically essential relation is only relatively unalterable. The extrinsic relations are what are called 'separable accidents' in Logic. For example, to have a coat or a house is an extrinsic relation.

Finite things have absolute reality so far as their categorial characters are concerned. But the empirical characters of a thing may be altered.

"But it will already be apparent that subject though they are to change, to conversion into things of different nature, this does not destroy their claim to be real so far as they are what they are".(1)

Thus, all things are but complexes of Space-Time, but they are not swallowed up by it (2). However, at this stage we cannot ignore the view of Bradley regarding the self-contradictoriness of terms and their relations (3). As a matter of fact, the externality and internality of relation was discussed to solve the difficulty of infinite regress, which seems to

infect qualities, terms and relations. This necessity of
infinite regress disappears as soon as we find that terms are
always in relation and there is nothing like terms and
relations. Whenever we need a relation \( R \) to relate the terms
and their relation \( R \), we are treating relations so that they
do not relate. But there can be no relation which does not
relate. Hence, the infinite regress about the 'terms and
their relation' is based on the erroneous view of the pure
externality of relation (4).

The real difficulty of Bradley, according to Alexander,
lies in the fact that Bradley did not take up the case of a
concrete relation which connects concrete terms. According
to Alexander, real relations are based on S-T and S-T is an
actual fact. Here the terms are always related and a
relation always relates. Bradley abstracted Space and Time
from each other and found that each of them so abstracted is
infected with self-contradiction. The two contradictory
demands of continuity and diversity cannot be found in Space
and Time taken separately, but when they are taken together as
Space-Time, then there is no contradiction (1). Not only is
Space-Time not self-contradictory, but it is an Absolute
Reality. It is the very foundational or a-priori experience
on which all other experience must be based. Instead of the
thought guaranteeing the reality of Space-Time, it is the
reality of Space-Time itself which guarantees the validity of
thought. Understood thus, Space-Time is the very foundation

1: S.T.D. I pp. 46, 207, 257, 260
of the principle of non-contradiction itself (2), and therefore space-time itself cannot be self-contradictory. Hence, the difficulty of an infinite regress of terms and relations follows from the abstract nature of the terms and relations which have been taken up by Bradley. Besides, the views of Bradley are based on the false notion of an external relation which does not relate, despite his protests to the contrary (3).

**UNIVERSALITY AND PARTICULARITY:** Existence is an identity of space and time and a universal therefore is an identity of kind. For example, a man continues to be human in spite of his variations in height, colour, intelligence etc. A universal has no separate existence from its particulars. As a matter of fact there is nothing like a particular and a universal, but there is an intimate union of the two called an individual. All things, then, are individual (1). A universal may be looked upon as a plan of organisation and this plan may be an individualistic plan or a generic one. The persistence of John in accordance with a certain plan is an example of a singular universal; but the persistence of a plan in all different kinds of dogs is an example of a generic universal. Hence, a universal is a certain plan and within limits allows variations in that plan. The universals are of the same stuff as the particulars. As all empirical existents are bits of space-time, so a universal is itself spatio-temporal. Ultimately, the universals can be derived from the

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constancy of the 'curvature' of space (2), and this constant curvature of space is due to its temporality,

"It is the conformity of Space to the one-dimensional Time, which is uniform—flows uniformly as Newton says—that involves with it the uniformity of Space". (3)

Universality, then, is a name of the constancy of any existent in Space-Time (4).

What is true of empirical universals, for instance 'cows' and 'dogs', is true still about the categories themselves. They are all fundamental determinations of space-time. They are the key-plans of all empirical existents, that is, any existent must be a substance, existence etc.,

THE NATURE OF UNIVERSALS: The age-long controversy about universals concerns their relationship to their particulars. In this context the central contribution of Alexander is that the universals are no less actual than the particulars. As such the categories should be described and identified in concrete experience (1). They are all concrete and so are the universals. But, how do we explain their concreteness? Either we can say with Plato that they have a separate existence in an ideal world or else that they have a neutral existence (*).

However, the traditional interpretation of the Platonic theory


* By 'neutral-existence' is meant a category which is wider than the category of existence itself. For example, the idea of a 'squared circle' cannot be actual, but then it is an object of thought. So it must be, and therefore, it is assumed that it must be in a region which is beyond any actual existence. Alexander, being an empiricist denied the theory of neutral being. For him, any being must be an actual being and there cannot be anything like neutral being.
of the reality of universals makes them separate from the particulars, and in order to connect them there occurs the fallacy of 'the third man', involving infinite regress. (**)

Then, again, the notion of the neutral existence of the universals will contradict Alexander's theory that every existent must be traced to its corresponding impression (1). But, an existent universal becomes an individual and can no more be in two places at once than a particular cow or table can be. Hence, for Alexander the problem of the relation between a universal and its particulars takes the following form. The universals must be concrete, traceable to Space-Time determinations and yet they must be applicable to all particulars coming under them; and, how can this be?

In order to solve this hopeless problem about the relation of the universals with their particulars, Alexander took the help of metaphors. The universals are called the plans or patterns in space-time. They are not copied by the particulars, but they are modified into them to suit the special circumstances of time and place (1). Then they are called the formulae. Now, the formula of a series is in the series, though, of course, it is not a particular member of the series (2). But the most used metaphor is of 'habit'.

*** The fallacy of the 'third man' was discussed by Aristotle in his criticism of Plato's doctrine of ideas. It runs like this: wherever there is a common element in many things, we have an idea of that thing. Hence, the common element in all men constitutes the idea of man. But there is also a common element between this idea of man and an individual man, and, therefore, there is a further idea or a 'third man' to connect them. Then, again, between this 'further idea' and the individual man, there must be yet another idea to connect them. Hence, any attempt to connect the ideas or the Universals with their particulars leads to an infinite regress.

1. STD I. p.viii
The universals have been described as the 'habits' of Space-Time (5). Just as a habit responds to various situations with suitable modifications and yet continues to be the same, so the universals are the habits of Space-Time according to which it is found in various situations (4). However, the mental habits, being localized in neutral regions only, are extremely limited. On the contrary, the habits of Space-Time, being in an infinite region, are ready to break forth in any space and time when the empirical conditions demand them. In this sense of being free from the limitation of any specific space and time, the universals may be said to be subsistent (5). As such the universals are the potential plans.

"It is only in this sense that the plan of a universal is potential; its potentiality is a reality consisting in the readiness of Space-Time to adopt it, because Space-Time is built up of point-instants whose place and time are perpetually changing their distribution" (5).

From the use of the metaphors of plans, formulae and habits, one can surmise that Alexander meant that all existents come out of the machine of Space-Time with the stamps of the categories (1). The categories are the moulds but instead of being empty they are always full of space-time. It is in this sense that we can say with Murphy (2) that Alexander has taken both the form and matter inextricably confused into one. In spite of his efforts Alexander has not succeeded in showing

that the universals are concrete actualities. In simple language Alexander pointed out that all things are not given at first in the form of unrelated manifold of experience, but they are always ordered and arranged in Space-Time itself from which they all proceed. Hence, there are as many universals as there are the different kinds of existents on their various levels.

"...extreme as the statement may sound, the universals are spatio-temporal, physical, biological, mental, according to the level of existence to which their individuals belong... and that the universal man though it is not a man is man or human". (3)

The Concrete Universal of Bosanquet and Alexander's Universal:

Being the constitutive plans of things, the universals are concrete. But they should be distinguished from the theory of 'concrete universal' of Bosanquet (4). A concrete universal, according to Bosanquet is of the nature of a system. But Alexander criticised this notion of universal and pointed out that such a 'concrete universal' of Bosanquet is not a universal but a universe. It is based on a combination of two distinct notions. The one notion is that a universal is a union of different features into a plan or law which is realised with modifications in individual instances and this is the real notion of a universal. The other notion which it includes is that a universal is a union of different individuals into a system. In this sense it is really a universe but not a universal (1). The real point of difference is purely metaphysical. The concrete universal of Bosanquet is a universe

in which all finites are but parts of the one significant whole and to be real they have to be merged, lost and transmuted in the whole. Alexander could not but protest against this view of the universal (2).

**SUBSTANCE:** A substance is a piece of space which is the scene of succession, or more simply, it is the persistence of a piece of space in time (3). It is so easily detected in us who endure. We are substance and as such we are a contour or a configuration of space enduring or persisting in time.

A complex empirical existent as a substance is:

"then a contour of space (i.e. a volume with a contour) within which take place the motions correlated to the qualities of the thing; and the complex substance or thing is the persistence in time of this spatial contour with its defining motions". (4).

Of course, the category of Substance like all other categories is actualised|only in empirical existents. A substance with its qualities endures within limits as a unity. But, how are the qualities unified in a substance? This was the question of Bradley and he came to the conclusion that the distinction of substance and qualities is ultimately self-contradictory (1). On the contrary, according to Alexander the unity is supplied by space-time itself. A complex of point-instants is correlated with a certain quality of sweetness and another complex of these event-particles is whiteness and so on. The various motions correlated with

their corresponding qualities are differently located in the spatial contour called sugar. These different motions interpenetrate into each other.

"The motions of white are spread over the volume like stippled points in an engraving and the sweetness motions among them" (2) Hence, these qualities are really juxtaposed, nonetheless Space-Time is continuous and therefore these qualities, that is, their corresponding motions are ultimately connected in Space-Time (3).

"Thus at least a whiteness and a sweetness condition of the substance may co-exist, not in virtue of a direct connection between whiteness and sweetness but as the joint outcome of the processes beginning with the primordial connection" (4).

**QUALITY IS NOT A CATEGORY:** Alexander held two things which are peculiar to his discussion of the categories. Firstly, quality, which has been considered to be a category is not recognised by him as such. Secondly, he held that Space-Time is that absolute reality to which the categories are not applicable. Let us explain his viewpoint on these matters.

A category is a pervasive feature of all empirical existents. But a quality is simply correlated with a specific complexity of point-instants. A certain complex of point-instants is matter, and another spatio-temporal complex is life and still another complex is correlated with mind. These qualities vary.

"But experience does not acquaint us with quality as such; as it does make us acquainted with quantity or substance as such". (1).

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Hence, quality, being a non-pervasive feature is not a category, but it is simply a collective name for a number of qualities. (3) 

To the above observation of Alexander one may object that everything must have some quality. Alexander would accept this but he will retort that there is nothing like one quality of which colour, life, matter, consciousness etc., are mere modifications. On the other hand, according to his showing there is a quantitative complexity, the modification of which is correlated with all kinds of qualities, and therefore, quantitative complexity or number is a category (3). This is in keeping with the nature of scientism in which a quantitative view of things subordinates any qualitative evaluation of them.

SPACE-TIME AND THE CATEGORIES:— As there is no beginning of the world (4), so there is no beginning of the categories. But though Space-time is the source of all things, it itself is not subject to them (1). This can be shown by trying to apply some of the categories to Space-Time itself. Now, Space-Time is not universal, for a universal, being a plan is executed and repeated; and Space-Time as a whole cannot be repeated (2). Again, it cannot be a substance, for a substance is always related to another substance and there is no such thing with which Space-Time as a whole can be related (3).

The thing is that the categories are applicable to existent things and Space-Time is not an existent entity, and therefore, it is not subject to the categories (4). But,

4. Otherwise we will not be taking Time seriously S.T.D.I. p.338.
because Space-Time is beyond all categories, therefore it is not negative. Of course, it is quality-less, but, then, being a matrix and an ultimate stuff of all things, it is extremely positive (5).

Are the categories actualities? Alexander, strongly believing in the truth of British Empiricism sought to derive the categories from actual experience of them. He tried to show that the actual is prior to the possible and the universals follow from the actual, homoloidal structure of Space-Time (1). But, the question arises, has he succeeded in doing so? Now, the most important category is Relation, and as noted earlier, according to Alexander, a relation is itself spatio-temporal. It is the driving force of Time which connects the various points of space. But, if a relation is itself a point-instant, then it needs another point-instant to connect it with other point-instants. The difficulty of the 'third man' arises again and the infinite regress cannot be avoided. Further, he also pointed out that a bit of space-time is diverse from other bits of space-time (2), and therefore they need to be related by fresh relations. The thing is, that once a relation is made a stuff, then it ceases to relate, for it becomes too much self-contained (3). Hence, unless one is prepared to accept regressus ad infinitum about terms and relations, relation cannot be a bit of space-time stuff.

What is true of relation, is also true of the universals. Every category, according to Alexander, has the concreteness of Space-Time and is as actual as the perceived redness of an actual rose (4). A universal, then, has an actual feature of space-time, and is a quasi-individual existents (5). But, once the universal is substantialized it fails to be a plan, and, when it is a plan or a potentiality to break into an actual execution it is not an actual feature of space-time.

Hence Murphy wrote:

"The appeal to 'possibility' will not help, for there is no vestige of possibility in actual occurrences and to such the world is limited. Nor will relations or laws help to make the distinction, for in pure Space-Time the relation is of the same stuff as its terms and the plan is not distinct from its execution". (1).

The fact is that Alexander tried to be loyal to the old British tradition of empiricism. But its shortcomings are too patent. An experience can tell us what is, but it cannot tell us what must be. Alexander knew this and he quite frankly held that factual necessity is all that we need, and there is nothing like logical necessity.

"As there is no 'must' for science or philosophy,... science has to deal with what is". (2)

Again he added:

"But there is no necessity in things except fact. Nothing is added by the adjective necessary. Every fact carries with it necessity, the necessity at least for the human mind of accepting it." (3).

But, logical necessity is also a fact; and, a fact with a mustness or implication about it. It is a fact but not a natural fact and this is what the idealists like Green and

Bosanquet wanted to emphasise. The so-called continuity of Space-Time can offer only juxtaposition, but not any real connection (4).

From the above observation it follows that Alexander did not explain the categories, but he gave us what Kant called the schemata of the categories (1). As a matter of fact Alexander casually came to this distinction of schema and categories, but he brushed aside the distinction as unnecessary. Alexander's categories resemble Kant's schematism for the schematism of Kant is intellectual and yet sensible (3). It is a sensible concept (4), and that is what Alexander's category is.

The upshot of the criticism is that Alexander has not been able to trace the form to its matter, for it is illogical to do so. Thoughts and things are quite distinct and thoughts cannot be reduced to static-temporality. If idealism cannot explain how things flow from thought (5), then, certainly Alexander has not succeeded any better in showing how thoughts flow from things.

SECTION II.

FREEDOM (*)

As mentioned earlier, according to the idealists, freedom of will has been considered as a special case for showing the uniqueness of mind or self (6). But according to Alexander,

all human actions, including 'voluntary' acts, are strictly determined causally and there is no free ego to determine 'the voluntary' acts. Following the distinction of contemplation and enjoyment, Alexander has classified causal determinations into three types, namely: (i) when the cause and effect are both enjoyed, (ii) when the cause and effect are both contemplated, and (iii) when the cause and effect are of mixed determination. The so-called free action is one in which the cause and effect are both enjoyed. This sounds very much like the idealist's statement that the free act is a self-determined act. But, we will find that this verbal similarity does not hide the fact that Alexander's account robs free action of its freedom.

According to Alexander, from an analysis of actions which/recognised to be wholly free acts, it is clear that they are simply determination in enjoyment. A voluntary act is taken to be free and a voluntary act is one which proceeds from our whole organised self. The keener the conflict of desires, and the keener is the consciousness of free choice between them. Here obviously the determiner of the act is the self which we enjoy and the desires themselves are the enjoyed states. Hence, a free act is determination in enjoyment. The greater the extent and content of the organised self the freer is the action. Therefore, a free act is one which is free from an external determination (1).

Then again, a free act is wholly determined. This might not appear evident for life and mind seem to show unpredictable and variable behaviour. But this is due to a
great plasticity of responses in them. This plasticity follows from the greater complexity in their constitution (2). However, from this variability of responses to the differing situations we cannot infer the presence of any unique freedom in them. By the determinism of free act is meant that it is determined by its antecedent in the character and the circumstances of the agent. (1).

Further, according to Alexander, a free act may be wholly determined and yet it may not be predictable. Predictability is a consequence and not the essence of determinism (2). Determinism therefore, is comparable with novelty and that is why an action may be determined and yet not be predicted (3). Roughly there are three occasions on which the future of a fully determined action may not be predicted. Firstly, an action may be theoretically predictable, but in actual practice it may offer very great difficulty in calculating its future. For example, it is very difficult to predict the future course of the behaviour of an individual, even when theoretically it is possible to do so. Usually in such cases our practical powers are too feeble for the task. But, there is another reason why a wholly determined action may not be predicted. This follows from the reality of time.

"Human nature is a growing thing, and with the lapse of real time may throw up new characters which can only be known to him who experiences them". (4)

5. F.A.S. 1914.344.
6. S.T.D. II. 524; also see p.329; also F.A.S. 1914,344,345.
Again, connected with the reality of Time, there is a third reason why a prediction of a determined action may not be possible. In a hierarchical scheme of various levels of existence there is the distinction of contemplation and enjoyment. Now, from its own level a being may predict a contemplated event but it cannot predict an event about an existent of a higher order. But, can a creature of a higher order, for example, a god or an angel, predict human actions? No, he may not.

"All known forms of action could be predicted in their measurable characters, but never in their emergent ones. Not even God, if we suppose a God presiding over the birth of the world....." (1)

Hence, determinism and prediction are distinct ideas and determinism is compatible with unpredictability and therefore with freedom (2).

Hence, we find that a determined action may be unpredictable, but this does not prevent it from being a wholly necessary act. Of course, this compulsion may not be of external determination.

"But the necessity which the will obeys is the 'necessity' of causation, the determinate sequence of events upon its conditions". (3)

We may feel ourselves free and we do feel our freedom in choice, but there is no power behind the choice and there is no freedom of choice (4). To an angel or a god who can

1. P.E. p.313; see also S.T.D.iii. pp.73,327.
3. S.T.D. 11. p.329. Then Alexander held that in voluntary act we act upon the line of least resistance and thus held that the voluntary choice is purely a mechanical selection. S.T.D.11.322.
contemplate our enjoyments, the human free act will appear to him as wholly determined. Hence, according to Alexander, looked at from a higher point of view, the free act is not really free. Could Spinoza desire anything more in this connection? (1)

"At the same time the angel or God who sees our action as determined may know also that for us it is enjoyment and free, though he cannot enjoy our freedom but only knows that we feel it". (2)

Alexander's theory of the illusoriness of freedom is connected by the deceptive term 'self-determinism' of the idealists. But the 'self' of the idealists is always a free, non-natural self, which has no antecedent and no origin. 'It never began, because it never was not'. (3). This illusoriness of freedom was not a new thought for Alexander, for even in **Moral Order and Progress**, he had called this notion of a 'free self' to be a 'sheer delusion'. (4).

Whatever be the explanation of free act, it is not distinctive of mind. If a free act is simply determination in enjoyment, then, even a plant or a stone enjoys its own acts and to that extent is free. Thus, freedom is not an exceptional privilege of man, but is found at all levels (5).

With the above account of freedom Alexander has shown that there is nothing unique about mind.

"In each case we have been able to verify the proposition that the distinctive features of mind belong to it in virtue of its character as a conscious being, not in virtue of anything which separates it from other finites". (6)

Thus, a cognitive situation is only an instance of the universal feature of consciousness; the categories, instead of being constituted by mind, really constitute the mind, as they do all other things, and freedom is found at all levels. But, there is only one other favoured region of mind which has not been discussed as yet. This is the region of values. Here mind does seem to constitute them, at least as one of the constituent factors.

"Only in the case of value was the conclusion imperfect, because of our inadequate knowledge of the history of material things". (1).

But, here the aim of Alexander is to show that value is found at all levels and there are minds but there is no Absolute Mind (2), and this is our next task in explaining the attempt of Alexander in dethroning mind.

SECTION III

(VALUE)

THE ARTIFICIALITY OF VALUES:— Values are not the distinctive features of human experience, for, according to Alexander, they are found at the sub-human levels too. From this it must not be concluded that they are the qualities of reality itself. The term 'tertiary qualities', ascribed to the human values of Truth, Beauty and Goodness may further create this confusion. Values are those features which make reality richer and fuller but not more real than it is.

Values are not qualities (3), for they do not belong to objects apart from the appreciating or valuing minds. Values are not objective entities like qualities. Secondary qualities, viz., colour, heat, etc., are known, but they exist independently of mind. Primary qualities, on the other hand, constitute mind itself; and, as such cannot be said to be dependent on mind. But values are the blendings of the subject and object. Not only the perceiving but also the essence of values depend on mind (1). For example, beauty does not belong to a rose itself, but to the rose as seen by an aesthetic mind. Similarly, Truth is not the same as reality (3), but it is the reality as 'possessed by a standard mind, which has been moved by an impulse of disinterested curiosity (2). Thus, value may appropriately be called an amalgam of subject and object, of mental and non-mental entities. (3). For example, by itself a piece of marble is dead, but the sculptor, by chipping off, imputes into it the form of Hermes or a goddess and through a form creates a meaning of divinity.

"The function them of a sculptor is to impart into the form of a foreign material characters or ideas, alien to that material and supplied by the mind, which the artist desires to express. In this sense the bust is a physical material into which the mind enters in the only way possible for it to enter, by moulding the form of the material so as to mean, so long as the mind is there to interpret, certain qualities.(1).

2. T. Eliott Alexander regarded Truth and Reality to be the same thing, as he confessed it in S.T.D.11.p.237a.
No doubt it is mind which creates values out of materials, but it is not an individual mind which creates values. The mind which gives rise to Truth, Goodness and Beauty is a 'standard mind' or an 'impartial mind' and this standard mind is a collective mind. But the term 'collective mind' does not mean 'Group mind' literally; it is the stable mind which has emerged out of the conflict and shock of competing minds in their search of Truth, Beauty and Goodness (2). The standard mind is not an Absolute mind of the idealists. However, it is a mind which has come to accept a stable standard of truth, beauty and goodness, arising from the conflict of competing minds at a certain epoch, in a defining environmental situation. For example, in Europe, before Galileo, it was the recognised truth that the earth does not move round the sun. All those people who believed in it then were considered standard minds or the experts or the qualified judges. All those who disagreed with this proposition were called heretic. Here we have to note that an individual does not exist without his being socialised and standardised in a society. A Jesus may arise and protest against the prevailing morals of the day, but he protests as a standard mind of an ideal society (1). Thus, a standard valuer possesses the stability as well as the modifiability of a norm, but the important thing is to note that standard mind is necessary factor in the determination of Truth, Beauty and Goodness.

B.H.V. pp.175-176.
1. Morality as an art J.P.S. 1926 pp.154,156.
The question naturally arises, how do we set up a standard mind? The standard mind arises out of trial and conflict in the actual process of finding out truth, beauty and goodness. As soon as some particular truth or some beautiful object comes to be established so as to be acceptable to valuers, then all those who accept them as such become the 'impartial spectators' or 'expert judges'.

"The judges are discovered at the same time as the rule by which they judge. From one point of view the standard is set up by a piece of tyranny, but the tyranny is established in the effort to secure goodness and truth and beauty". (2)

Though Alexander has called Truth and Goodness as the tyranny or the conspiracy of the standard minds, he did not mean that the standard minds are reached in a purely mechanical manner. He insisted that through the struggle truth, beauty and goodness emerge in their proper colour.

"Competition is the means to the supremacy of the adapted over the unadapted types, and brings value into being by the rejection of unvalue". (1).

That right is likely to prevail in the long run is aided by another factor. This lies in the inherent tendencies in each man to reach truth, beauty and goodness.

"There are three elementary tendencies of which tertiary qualities are the satisfactions and dissatisfactions; the tendency or desire to learn which is curiosity, the desire to do, and the desire to produce or give expression to ourselves in outward form". (2)
It is the presence of these impulses of curiosity, constructiveness and sociality which impel us to find out the values through tests, trials and the conflict of warring opinions.

**THE OBJECTIVITY OF VALUES:**

Hence, following Alexander we can conclude that values are man-made and artificial, but they are not unreal on that account (3).

"The mind is the highest finite empirical reality we know. Strange that its touch should be thought to de-realise its creations". (4).

By saying that values are objective, Alexander meant that they are not private, personal and incommunicable or unsharable (4). As in the case of beauty, value is always found with reference to some objects (2). Values are not personal, for they are impersonal or disinterested. In other words, Truth, Beauty and Goodness are due to a disinterested satisfaction of the three impulses of curiosity, constructiveness and sociality (3). These impulses become disinterested for they are satisfied in an impersonal way, that is, the way in which a number of men will be satisfied in a standard way. Values are created when they satisfy a standard mind, as opposed to an individual mind (4). Thus he wrote:

"Finally the mind which enters into the relation with an object in virtue of which the object is valuable and the mind is satisfied in respect of a certain capacity, is a standard or objective mind; and these values are objective, and nothing is good, or true or beautiful, for a particular mind, or has subjective value, except in a derivative fashion, only intelligible as a claim to objective value". (5)

3. STD II. P. 244. 4. STD II. P. 245.

1. B.F.V. Pp. 35, 72. 2. B.F.V. P. 172


5. B.F.V. P. 265 see also 'The Objectivity of Value p. 27.
Hence,

"Objectivity means something more than being an object: it means in any object the coerciveness or compulsion of the experience of the object" (6)

Therefore, the objectivity of the coerciveness of values lies in the compulsion exercised by the consentient minds upon the individual minds (1). Thus, values come to be established as the tyranny of the impartial spectators.

In a general sense values are found at all levels and the analogues of the tertiary qualities are found on the lower levels too. (2). On the level of animals and plants, values are what satisfy those needs which lead to the preservation of types. Thus food is a value for the preservation of the species. At this level then, value has reference to the type and it relates to the individual in so far as he represents a type (1).

The essential features of value, according to Alexander, continue to be the same at all levels. What makes tertiary qualities distinctive is the presence in them of a conscious subject. Values at the lower organic level are also developed through struggle and this has been well illustrated by the Darwinian theory of 'Natural Selection' (*).

1: Ibid. P.27.
*: This was an old conviction of Alexander to which he had given expression in H.O.: "The course of morality will be found to represent the struggle between moral ideals, and the phenomena of the maintenance and growth of morality offer parallels to the history of natural forms. The analogy, however, is not so much a key to the interpretation of moral facts, as it is a result of an inquiry into these facts, conducted independently". (H.O.P.262)
The species which survive represent the valuable types which are well adjusted to their environment. The struggle 'red in tooth and claw' is not inimical to the survival or emergence of values. The surviving species are valuable, not because they are permanent; they are permanent because they are worthy. The doctrine of natural selection is:

"so far from being indifferent to value that it is wholly concerned with value; its very meaning is that values emerge through the trial of various types under certain external conditions, which trial determines whether in virtue of its gifts or constitution a type is worthy". (2)

In other words, value is what is suited to prevail through trial and test. Hence, the struggle helps the emergence and expression of the gifts of the species (1). Thus, according to Alexander, Darwinism give us a history of values as they arise in the organic world. Alexander also conjectured that the relatively permanent elements of the physical world have emerged in the same way of natural selection, that is, through test, trial and struggle (2). At this stage we should note that, according to Alexander, in the inorganic world, by value is meant that by virtue of which one thing matters to another. There is then, as Laird held, a 'natural election' in the inorganic world (*).

2. STD 11.pp.54-55, 310-511; B.F.V. pp.286-289; Lessons from Spinoza * p.24

The extension of values to the inorganic world was credited to Laird (B.F.V. pp.1, 286; T.L.P. pp.286) but as Laird himself admitted (T.L.P. p.286n) that this was done by Alexander himself before Laird reached this notion.
The magnet has natural election for iron and in this sense may be said to satisfy the magnet. However, here there is no room for subjective value.

"At the same time we note that at this level the possibility of subjective value disappears; all value is objective because the nature of the two parties to natural election is fixed or at least is supposed to be fixed" (3).

Therefore, we conclude that value is not uniquely unique of human minds, but may be said to be empirically universal. Thus, the universal features of value are those elements which pertain to the satisfaction and preservation of the interests of the type.

"The difference which seem to separate the tertiary qualities so completely, and are thought to make human life unique, arise merely from this difference in the subjects". (1)

The subjects of minds

"which judge truly, or behave rightly, or produce or recognise beauty, are the successful types developed on the level of mind, when to consciousness are added reflection or judgment and with it intrinsic sociality". (2)

At this stage we cannot help asking, is there no distinction between the values reached consciously and contemplatively and the general values which are reached blindly at the inorganic level without any subjectivity? The special nature of the tertiary qualities become quite patent in human beings who have also in addition organic and inorganic values. At this stage at least, the organic and inorganic values are not regarded as values at all. Even the way in which the law of

3. B.F.V. p.266.  
1. STD 11. p.309; also see p.308.  
2. STD 11. p.306-7
natural selection works in human beings is different from the way in which it does in sub-human beings. At the organic level the individuals who fail to get adjusted are destroyed. However, in the case of human beings, not the individuals but their ideals are destroyed. Hence, we have to accept, against Alexander, that human minds do make a radical difference to values, and they constitute tertiary qualities in a way in which the values at the organic and inorganic levels are not constituted. At the organic level might is right; but at the human level right is might. And, we believe that there is a radical difference between these levels of values. Alexander failed to see the distinctiveness of the tertiary qualities because of his preconceived metaphysics, the avowed aim of which was the dethronement of mind. Just as in epistemology we noted that not mere co-presence but conscious co-presence constitutes knowledge; so here we note that without a contemplative mind there can be analogues of value but not real value.

Then, again, what is the status of value? We will find that Alexander is very vague on this point. He could not help attributing quasi-reality to Truth, Beauty and Goodness.

"They (the values) take their proper place in the scheme of empirical things, and they do exhibit to us a fundamental feature of reality as a whole". (1).

But, he added in the same paragraph, they are mere Incidents
in the reality which is purely spatio-temporal. These two
strains of recognising value and then negating them are found
in relation to each one of the tertiary qualities, to which
we turn now.

BEAUTY AND UGLINESS:—The redness of a rose exists
in its own objective right, but its beauty consists in its
being appreciated as such by an aesthetic mind. Even a
natural landscape is not beautiful without an aesthetic
appreciation (1). Now, how does mind blend itself into the
material? Well, in the presence of certain materials, namely,
stone, marble, pigments, words, even pure tones etc., the
artist is thrown into an excitement which he is compelled to
satisfy as his inner need. In order to satisfy his aesthetic
impulse he forms or fashions the materials in such a way that
they begin to express a meaning or significance which other-
wise they did not possess. For example, in the presence of
a suitable piece of marble, the sculptor is thrown into an
aesthetic excitement and he fashions the marble in such a
way that the figure of Hermes or Venus is carved out. In
itself the piece of marble was dead and cold, but moulded
under an aesthetic impulse the marble is fashioned in such a
form that it begins to show a divine and living figure of
Hermes. This imputing of the meaning of a divine, living god
into the marble is the blending of the artist with the
material (2)

J.R.S. '1930 p.51; Form and Subject-matter of Art, T.A.S.
Vol. 37. 1936-7. 2.119.
Then there is an element of illusoriness in an artistic creation. The marble statue appears to be divine and living, and the flat canvas appears to be solid (1). Greater the success of the art and greater is the element of illusoriness in it. As opposed to the illusoriness of an illusory perception, the illusoriness of an art constitutes its truth or artistry (2). Hence, in art there are two important elements, namely, the presence of an aesthetic impulse and the necessity of the material in it, and, let us explain them.

Though mind is essential in the creation of any beauty, it is not the mental element alone which constitutes it. The materials are necessary to throw the mind into a constructive activity. In the case of poets there must be words to be surcharged, bewitched and enchanted with meaning. Similarly, the sculptors, painters and musicians have their own appropriate materials. Thus he wrote:

"The artist then worked upon his clay or words or pigments under the compulsion of this impulse, but with his eye directed upon the subject-matter..." (3).

Then he further added:

"We may safely, then, conclude that the material of the work of art is no mere technical ingredient but vital..." (4)

   H.J. XXIII, 1924-5, p. 29b.
Thus, beauty results from mental imputation but it is not due to mind alone, for the material is necessary to the creation of beauty. Therefore, from the nature of art one cannot argue to the supremacy of mind.

Secondly, in the production of an art the artist is driven by his aesthetic impulse. This aesthetic impulse is the constructive impulse gone contemplative. Birds build their nests, but they do so for the practical purpose of hatching eggs and rearing up their young ones there. Similarly, the nightingale sings in the service of the sexual impulse. But, in an aesthetic construction, it is enjoyed for its own sake. For example, a painting being diverted from practical utility is contemplated for its own sake. Similarly, the musician sings unbidden for the mere delight of music itself. Ordinarily words are used for practical adjustment, but in a poem the words, being enchanted with the bewitchery of its peculiar form, are enjoyed for their own sake. (1). For example, 'paint the meadows with delight' has no practical meaning. Most probably the last lines of Kubla Khan best illustrate it:

Beware! beware!
His flashing eyes, his floating hair!
Weave a circle round him thrice,
And close your eyes with holy dread,
For he on honey-dew hath fed,
And drunk the milk of paradise.

Seized by the constructive impulse gone contemplative, the artist fashions his materials in such a way that the formed materials satisfy his aesthetic impulse. However, he does not have any complete notion as to what the final shape of his artistic creation would take. For this reason the artist is said to discover his creation, and very often he is surprised at what he himself comes to create. With his specific talents the artist, in the presence of his appropriate materials of his art, is thrown into an aesthetic excitement and as a result of that he discovers his creation in the materials (1).

"The work of art, being the expression contemplated for its own sake and not merely as a sign, however much it owes its form to the artist, reveals to him his own meaning, and the artistic experience is not so much invention as discovery" (2). Thus, according to Alexander, Shakespeare discovered Hamlet in the English language, in the same way as Newton discovered the law of Gravitation in the physical realm (3). This emphasis on discovery in the artistic creation has been introduced to show the non-supremacy of mind in the creation of artistic values.

The presence of mind is necessary in the appreciation of beauty. In the case of natural beauty the technical construction is not needed for it is done by nature itself.

But even here we piece and re-piece nature ideally. This is clear from the fact that the same landscape changes its beauty with the change in our appreciating moods (4). But the mind which creates beauty is not my mind or your mind and certainly not the Absolute mind; it is a standard mind. Here the 'standard mind' of Alexander takes the place of the Absolute Mind of the idealist. In relation to this Bosanquet wrote:

"The general will, for instance, seems nonsense to Professor Alexander, who still rejects a general mind totidem verbis from his realistic point of view, though finding room for a collective mind, and attaching indeed fundamental importance to it". (1)

In addition to the presence of an aesthetic impulse and the collective mind, there is a third important element of 'coherence'. Firstly, there is the coherence of the parts in relation to the whole, which gives unity in variety to any work of art. Then again, the judgments of beauty by the aesthetic judges must also cohere with one another.(2)

"Coherence in the internal constitution of beauty is also coherence among the minds which appreciate it, and exclusion of other minds". (3)

We will find that the same theory of coherence is used to guarantee the objectivity of Truth. However, this coherence theory of Alexander is different from that of the idealists. The coherence-theory of the idealists leads to the existence of an all-inclusive, consistent Whole. But, Alexander, being opposed to the doctrine of an all-inclusive whole, held the

doctrine of the Relative absoluteness of the coherence of the agreeing judges. This difference is clear from another statement of Alexander that beauty does not admit of degrees. This can be explained thus.

Ordinarily, an artistic creation can be said to be a blend of the materials and the aesthetic minds. The materials may be pure or they may have their own theme or subject-matter or story. Pure music has its materials in the form of pure tones, without any theme or subject-matter. A poem has some theme or subject-matter. The passions aroused by a theme may be called material passions, as distinguished from the formal passion which is the aesthetic impulse itself (1). Summarising his observation about the artistic creation Alexander has mentioned five elements, the three of which are contained in the following sentence:

"The impulse to creation is based upon the material passions provoked by the subjects, but is distinguishable from them and is formal." (2)

Further, the aesthetic impulse is liberated by the subject-matter and the materials of art. For example, clay or words or stones are vital parts of an artistic creation. Again, an artistic creation is not only beautiful, but it is also great or small. According to Alexander, the greatness of art depends upon the subject-matter (3).

1. B.F.V. pp. 20-1, 45, 54, 72, 77, 117-118.
2. Ibid. p. 172.
3. B.F.V. pp. 139, 142, 143, 146, 179.
"What I plead is that it is the material as of a certain form which is judged aesthetically and is strictly beautiful, but the subject matter which is signified by form is not as such beautiful but only important or trivial, great or small, big or little—it belongs to what I should like to call the order of 'perfection' as I said about morals; but the word is too ambiguous and I must say only 'greatness'." (1)

Now, one may be successful in achieving an artistic creation or else he may be unsuccessful. Once an artistic creation has become successful, it is beautiful and does not admit of degrees.

"Though there are no degrees of beauty there are approximations to beauty or ugliness; to be accurate, there are degrees of failure or ugliness". (2)

However, a work of art differs in greatness according to the range, penetration into the subject-matter and subtlety of expression. Hence, every beautiful work of art is relatively absolute. If so, then there can be no progression towards better or higher beauty. A similar consideration about truth and goodness would show that, according to Alexander, there is no Absolute standard of the idealists, the presence of which permeates the things with the spirit of totality and ultimately guides us to an all-inclusive Reality called the Absolute.

**Moral Goodness and Evil:** Alexander did not depart in any significant manner from his early theory of morals. But he tried to bring it in harmony with his views about Beauty and Truth. In the light of this observation we can briefly

outline his views of Moral Goodness in the following way:

Morality consists in a harmonious character and will, which is simply a coherent system of desires with reference to other wills and the material objects. Thus, goodness is an amalgam of mind and its objects (1). Wills are always directed to objects and in harmony with other wills come to be regarded as good.

"In the case of good there is no antecedent coherence or structure in the non-mental reality, for the good non-mental reality is brought about by persons themselves through their wills, always in obedience to the conditions imposed by the nature of things". (2)

But the non-mental object stands in the background and remains secondary and moral goodness consists primarily in the good directions of will (3). Thus, Alexander was nearer to Green and Kant in his moral theory than in his epistemology or ontology. Like Green he recognised the non-mental world as the occasion for the exercise of the moral wills. In this way the non-mental world cannot be ignored in any moral life. But, primarily, it is the character which is good or bad.

"Our acts are judged for their own sakes, for their bearing upon character and irrespectively of their results, though not independently of them" (1).

Hence, in the amalgam, called the moral good, the non-mental nature does enter, but the control is in the hands of mind. (2)

2. STD 11. p.276; also see pp.276, 279; B.F.V. pp.262, 267.

1. B.F.V. p.237. See also Mind 1913 p.26, where 'good and willing' is said to be goodness actually.
Though it is the mind which determines the moral good, it is not an individual mind. Firstly, even the individual mind always works under impulse of sociality or gregariousness, by virtue of which each individual sympathises with his fellow-beings. It is the presence of this sociality which leads to a harmony of passions and wills, in oneself and with others.

"For motives do not pull the man divers ways so as to produce a resultant. It must be that the balance of motive is effected by some other passion or sentiment, and may, I believe, be identified with the social impulse". (3*)

Thus, an individual mind is never a solitary mind, it always remains socialised and collectivised. Then again, there are the moral judges or the standard minds, who discover and maintain the standardised directions of wills to non-mental objects. Hence, the moral good is a coherent will, coherent with regard to the competing impulses within an individual himself and coherent in relation to other wills. Thus, a moral act is a universal good, that is, it is good for an individual under standardised conditions, in which any individual can act in like manner. (1) Hence, a moral act, being determined by a standard mind, is a law universal.

So there is truth in Kant's 'categorical imperative'. But

2. B.F.V. p.262.
* Here again, Alexander felt that he was supported by Spinoza. Thus, with reference to him Alexander wrote: "The mere knowledge of good and evil is no corrective or controller of the passion. A passion, he says, in a principle of the last moment for understanding the moral life, can only be controlled by another passion". (P.L.P. p.347)
there are exceptions in special cases; only these exceptions should not be made to serve an individual interest, as opposed to an impersonal or standardised interest. According to Alexander, Kant did not allow any exception in special cases, for Kant thought that any such exceptions would serve an individual interest. Thus, according to Alexander, by not allowing any exception in special cases Kant has made the moral law purely formal (2).

Thus, the moral good, being non-individualistic and non-private; and, being impersonal and sharable, is always objective. But because the moral good is objective, therefore from this we cannot conclude that there are unalterable moral laws. All moral maxims are absolute, relative to certain conditions. In this sense, there are no degrees of goodness. (1) An action, once good, is always good, under those conditions. We have already seen that in MORAL ORDER AND PROGRESS, Alexander maintained that even thefts and murders are good in their peculiar conditions (2). But, though goodness does not admit of degrees, it does admit of degrees of 'perfection', that is, in range or largeness. Hence, the gift of a widow's

2. "If what we now call bad conduct, murder, adultery, theft, could be conceived to become predominant, under greatly changed and of course impossible conditions, it would cease to be bad, and would be the ideal of life". (M.O.P. p. 317; also Cf. p. 307.)
mite is as good as the endowment of a hospital. Only the latter is more magnificent or meritorious (3). Thus, Alexander observed:

"To be good is to be good, and though the goodness of one age may be inferior to that of another age, and some part of goodness may lapse into evil, what is good once, like what is truth, remains good or true of the circumstances under which it was good or true. Values require a fuller reality but no greater reality"; (1)

Once, again, the non-admittance of degrees in goodness was aimed at showing the untenability of the Absolute Good of the idealists. There is no Absolute Good of Green towards which the whole of human history is progressing and approximating. No doubt there is coherence in goodness, but that coherence is of the impartial spectators; and the coherence keeps on changing with the standards of the impartial spectators from age to age. Hence, there are standards, but there is no one Absolute standard in morals or beauty or goodness (?). Then, again, goodness depends on minds, and even on 'standard minds', but not on an Absolute Mind. Even when the standard minds determine the good, they do not invent or create it; they discover it (2). Hence, mind is not all in all in the creation of moral good, for it has to be given to it by the objective circumstances. Thus, Alexander has tried to show that minds are gifted members in a democracy of things, but they are not the arbiter or the measure of reality.

1. STD II. P. 263. This is the original reference in the text.
2. B.F.V. P. 246, 251, 256.
TRUTH AND ERROR:

We have seen in chapter 11, that the pan-objectivism of sensa almost made it impossible for Alexander to explain 'illusions'. He tried to escape from the situations by holding that senses do not err and the problem of errors belongs to judgments and not to perception. However, if knowledge is a revelation of reality, then even errors will have to be given a place in reality. This was the realistic position of Alexander till 1913, in which for him Truth and Reality meant one and the same thing (1). However, it seems that the problem of error became too insistent and therefore he was forced to make a distinction between Truth and Reality. He came to recognise that error cannot belong to reality and truth is reached in the same way in which error is reached. If therefore, error does not belong to reality, truth also cannot belong to it. Truth and error arise from reality as possessed by minds (2).

Then, again, truth deals with judgments and in a judgment we make explicit what is already implicit in a percept. In doing so we dissect and reconstruct the given percept. Though this piecing and repiecing is done at the guidance of reality, yet it is different from reality. Thus, Truth consisting in judgments is different from Reality (3). Further, in the truth of science there is an elaborate use of inference.

"An inference is sheer artistry, for nature acts and does not infer. It is for us to find by inference the reasons for her acts". (4)

So Truth, being artistic, is different from reality. Truth is the reality as possessed by mind and therefore it is an amalgam of mind and reality (5). In truth, we piece and repiece reality in our efforts to know it. Thus, sciences are full of artifices, though they are not artificial, for these artifices are the means for taking possession of reality.

"Hence, since knowledge and science are generally understood with the implied emphasis on their truth, they are not reality itself, but that reality as possessed by minds" (1).

In this amalgam, however, reality dominates, for mind humbles itself before the lordship of facts. Once again, it is not an individual mind but a standard mind, working under the impulse of disinterested curiosity, which determines truth, at the bidding of reality. The standard mind, as in Beauty and Goodness, arises from a clash, trial, test and struggle between the curious minds, judging the reality. According to Alexander, values emerge only through the struggle with the unvalues.

"The so-called tertiary 'qualities' of things, truth, goodness and beauty, are values (and for us are the most important of the values), and imply and are unintelligible without a contrast with their unvalues of error, evil, and ugliness" (2)

Without the clash of differing judgments, according to Alexander, one would not discover his errors (3), nor would

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he reach truth. Thus, truth is established at the guidance of reality, through the clash of minds.

The presence of the collective mind is necessary to insure objective truth for various reasons. Firstly, any individual, however, gifted he may be can know only a part of reality; but with the co-operation of many minds knowledge becomes fuller and complete (4). Then again, a clash of many minds makes us aware of our mistakes as well as truth. Further, the clash leads to the rubbing out of our individual idiosyncracies so much so that our approach to reality not only becomes impersonal but de-personalised. The de-personalised mind reveals reality as it is (1).

"The difference between fine art and science is in the main this, that the man of science keeps his personality out of the subject which he is examining, while the artist introduces into his materials characters which come from his personality, and are his vision of the subject of his art". (2).

Then, again, in sciences minds are not only de-personalised but they have to evolve symbols and other artifices for discovering reality (3). Hence, sciences are arts but not fine arts, for reality is not fashioned and moulded by the scientist to express his own mental significance; but the mind itself is moulded as to be a flawless mirror to reflect reality (4).

Though Truth is an art (for it is the reality possessed by mind and reached through the artefacts) still it is reality which dominates here. The symbols and the artefacts

seem to take a scientist away from reality. But they are all captive balloons with their moorings held fast to reality (5).

"The physicist flies off into the empyrean, but he is always accessible to signals from the world and sends them in turn to it". (6)

Mind no doubt is a factor in the determination of truth, but it enters into it as an instrument for discovering it and not as constitutive (7). Then, again, there is an impulse of curiosity for its own sake, which fashions the materials in such a way as to satisfy that impulse. This leads to the formation of a coherent system in the establishment of truth; but this coherence does correspond with reality (1). However, this point requires some further elaboration.

Alexander took cognizance of two extant theories of truth, namely, the correspondence-theory and harmony-theory of truth. As a matter of fact the coherence-theory of truth is intimately related with idealism and his realistic metaphysics demanded the correspondence-theory of truth. But having distinguished Truth from Reality, there was no point in emphasising the correspondence-theory, and, we have seen that Alexander, having interpreted coherence-theory in his own way, preferred it. Alexander gave two reasons for accepting the coherence-theory of truth. The correspondence-theory points out that a proposition is true when it agrees with reality, and false when it does not. However, in case of any doubt about

7. B.F.V. p.252.
the truth claim of a proposition, how can we test it?

Obviously we do so with the help of other propositions. Clearly, then, in such cases truth does not consist in correspondence, but in coherence with other propositions (2). Further, there is another deeper reason. In truth, the standard minds are impelled by their disinterested curiosity to know reality. This impulse makes knowledge systematic and this means that all judgments are made to cohere with one another (1). Hence, truth consists in the coherence of the standard judgments of the qualified judges or experts. But this systematisation of all elements of knowledge, which satisfies the disinterested curiosity of the standard minds is based upon reality or is guaranteed by the internal coherence of objects themselves (2).

"The method of science at once obeys the material and rearranges it, using such help of its own invention as it needs for the purpose of co-ordination. The mind, as in fine art, supplies the form, but the form does not alter the material, but renders it intelligible". (3).

But Alexander knew that correspondence-theory could not be omitted, for he all along had insisted on the necessity of experimentation. Therefore, he held that rightly understood the two tests of correspondence and coherence are identical.

"For coherence within the science involves correspondence with fact, and correspondence with fact involves coherence within the science". (4)

However, facts enter into the science in the form of judgments and that means that they are possessed by mind. Hence, really

2. STD 11. p.252
the artistic side of science demands that truth should consist in the coherence of judgments of standard minds, at the bidding of reality. But this coherence-theory of truth is different from the coherence-theory of the idealists and this is clear from Alexander's rejection of the degrees of truth.

Alexander accepted the view that true propositions depend on reality, but reality is so rich that we do not possess it in its entire fulness at any one time. Hence with progress in knowledge more parts of reality are disclosed to us and therefore true propositions also keep on getting fuller. Hence, it might be that propositions once regarded true within their range of revealed facts, later on may turn out to be erroneous in the light of larger range of facts.

"Truth is thus the ever-increasing adaptation of minds to the reality which they know, which is the same as to say it is progressive revelation of reality to the minds which know it". (1).

Hence, the natural conclusion from the above observation would be that truth grows and there are degrees of truth. But Alexander did not draw this conclusion. On the contrary, he held that there are no degrees of truth.

"What is true is true. But while there are no degrees in the truth of knowledge, there are all manner of degrees in the perfection or range of knowledge". (2).

In other words, he pointed out that there are degrees in the greatness but not in the truth of knowledge. What is once true is always true and remains so within its range. For

example, the law of gravitation remains true within its own range of facts. Of course, in a wider context of other facts it may not remain true. But this is due to a progress in the range and greatness of knowledge and not due to any truer truth. "But one piece of truth or knowledge may be greater than another, from the largeness or importance of its topic, its greater comprehensiveness (like the theory of gravitation in its time), or its profundity or its subtlety and complexity"(1).

What could be the motive in not accepting the obvious conclusion as to the degree of truth? Well, the motive was to reject the idealistic thesis that there is one all-inclusive reality towards which our progressive truths are ever-increasing approximations. This idealistic doctrine, according to Alexander, leads to the annihilation of the finite individuals. "The doctrine of degrees of truth or reality rests on the belief that finites lose their value or at least alter it by being taken along with others. If all finites are spatio-temporal complexes this belief cannot be well founded"(2).

However, it does not appear that Alexander has been able to safeguard the reality and value of individuals. Firstly, the individuals as individuals have no value (3). Only that has value which pertains to the preservation of the type at the organic level, and of the social or collective mind at the level of tertiary qualities. Then again, reality does not belong to any qualified entities at all by virtue of their qualities. But they are real in so far as they are spatio-temporal.

2. STD 11: 2265.
3. STD 11: 2425.
"Whereas when values are analysed or described, they are seen to fall into their places as incidents...in the empirical growth of things, within what is really the primary reality of space-time". (4)

Thus, the statement that values and finites are preserved as merely spatio-temporal is no better than the doctrine which holds that they are absorbed, transformed and transmuted in the Absolute Reality.

**THE NATURE AND PLACE OF THE STANDARD MIND:** Alexander knew that without an absolute mind, it would be difficult to guarantee the objectivity of values. He, therefore, sought to show that there is a common mind involved in Truth, Beauty and Goodness. But this common mind is not non-natural. It emerges through trial, test and struggle, and therefore, there is no need to appeal to an Absolute Mind. However, he wanted to do justice to the objectivity of truth, beauty and goodness.

Alexander knew that there is agreement in sciences, in Aesthetics and even Ethics. But he also knew that the agreed propositions keep on changing. The idealists explained these two elements by holding that there is an absolute norm towards which our progressive experiences are ever-increasing approximations. The agreement is due to a common mind in which the finite minds participate and the change is due to the progress in our ever-deepening and widening experience of it. But the absolute mind itself does not change, though it is the ground of all changes in nature and man's knowledge.

4. STD II. p. 314.
Alexander, having rejected the notion of a transcendental mind and its non-historicity, could not accept the solution of the idealists. He held therefore, that there is a standard in Truth, Beauty and Goodness, but it is reached only through a temporal order of trial and test. But, being a solution of its problem of each epoch, it is reliable and absolute; but this absoluteness is relative to its own context (1). Naturally, a standard relative to a certain context cannot be said to be absolute.

As noted earlier, the standard mind is absolute only in its own limited context. The standard mind for the Greeks is not the same as that of the British thinkers to-day, and there is hardly any standard which can be said to be true for all times and climes. Hence, the theory of the standard mind of Alexander can explain a general or working agreement about values at a certain time. Even this is doubtful for there is no such agreement in the whole world to-day, even in sciences, the home of objective truth. One often hears of Russian and German sciences; and certainly there is much less agreement in morals and art. Once we discard that there is an absolute standard, we do not see any continuity between the changing standards from age to age. In order to explain this continuity and progressiveness of standards, Alexander introduced the theory of the degrees of 'perfection' or 'greatness' in different values. But has he succeeded in transferring change from the

norm to the greatness of value? Greatness itself implies an Absolute standard as value. Once we accept that values are progressing towards greater perfection, we will have to accept that there is an all-embracing reality in which perfection will find its completion.

Then, again, can we really make a sharp distinction between Truth and its greatness or between beauty and its perfection? Alexander himself pointed out that the distinction between beauty and greatness should not be exaggerated, for they are not independent of each other (1). Further, he held that virtue and 'greatness' are almost inseparable, "for if an action has not the greatness necessary to its circumstances it is also wanting in virtue" (2)

Again, it is common knowledge that a consilience of induction or the convergent facts in support of a law pertains to its truth. A law which includes a large number and variety of cases coming under it has not only more range but also a better or higher claim to truth. Therefore, really the distinction of values and perfection cannot be pushed indefinitely. As 'perfection' itself requires an absolute standard, so values too require an absolute standard. Most probably Alexander did not regard values as arbitrary. But if the theory of the standard mind were to guarantee the objectivity of values, this standard mind, being itself an expedient compromise, can never

establish any objective values. Besides, on this basis, it will be hard to maintain their progressiveness towards an ever-increasing perfection. According to Mr. Atkinson Lee, this want of an objective standard follows from the very nature of the space-time constitution of the universe as an ultimate fact.

"Such a universe has no fixed internal standard wherewith to estimate measures and values. Since it has no fixed centre nor boundaries, it has no frame of reference, and is so far arbitrary". (1)

Hence, if we reject the notion of an absolute standard there is nothing to guarantee the idea of progress. But Alexander had an inveterate faith in progress. This is clear from the following statement of his:

"Might is not right;...But right is might;...the right is what is suited to prevail in the judgments of men. And if we have faith that the world work out its salvation and not its destruction, we shall be apt to believe that what so prevails is rooted in the nature of things, including men." (1)

On this faith in the progressiveness of the world-process his whole theology is based, to which we now pass on. But before we do this, let us summarise the result of Alexander's axiology.

The aim of Alexander was to show that values are due to minds, but not due to an Absolute Mind, and since they are found at all levels, they are not as such distinctive of human minds. But the theory of Alexander makes values subjective, though not individualistic. Further, if we take the view that a norm is reached through trial and test, from generation to generation, then values based on such norms become arbitrary. Alexander himself called the standard 'the conspiracy' or 'the tyranny' of the standard minds. Again, the
ubiquitous feature of values at all levels can be maintained only by explaining away the distinctiveness of the tertiary qualities. In the organic world there is constructiveness or utilitarian craftsmanship, but there is really no beauty; there is gregariousness or expediency for the preservation of the species, but there is no disinterested sociality; and, there is curiosity in the service of instinctual gratification, but there is no disinterested curiosity for the accumulation of knowledge. It is not the consciousness of the human subjects which makes the tertiary qualities unique, but their pursuit for their own sake; and this distinctive feature of values is utterly absent at lower levels. Alexander was honest enough to attribute due share to minds in the creation of values, but his preconceived anti-idealistic reaction prevented him from recognising their distinctiveness and supremacy in the world of facts.

1. Groundwork of the Philosophy of Religion p.158.
   (Duckworth 1946)
CHAPTER FIVE.

A HISTORY OF ALEXANDER’S EARLY RELIGIOUS THOUGHT.

SYNOPSIS.

Here we will try to reconstruct the early thought of Alexander concerning religious experience. We will find that all the essentials of his theology were already present in his early religious thought, but he needed sufficient metaphysics to feel sure of them. From the very beginning he felt that God is known through ‘religious emotion’, and that He is beyond values and that He is to be conceived as a Being in the process of Time. He also realised that a philosophy of religion should successfully reconcile the rival claims of Immanence and Transcendence. Thus, the theology of Alexander is the result of the serious thinking of his whole lifetime and as such should not be lightly brushed aside.
REASONS FOR THE NEGLECT OF ALEXANDER'S THEOLOGY:

Whilst reviewing the Gifford Lectures of Samuel Alexander, Prof. C.C.J. Webb observed:

"Critics of Professor Alexander's book have so far tended to concentrate their attention on his discussion of Space and Time, to the neglect of his account of Deity; and the latter has even been...though, I am persuaded, quite mistakenly...treated as something not to be taken too seriously,..."(1)

Most probably Prof. Webb was referring to Prof. Broad and Stout who had submitted a searching criticism of Alexander's epistemology and ontology, but they said little of importance about Alexander's theology. Prof. Broad even poked fun at it. Of course, Prof. Webb's observation is no longer applicable, for through Whitehead, Alexander's theology is being attended to indirectly. However, there must have been some reasons for the early neglect of Alexander's theology. For this we submit the following reasons.

Firstly, Alexander's philosophy is highly original, and McTaggart, in a short and hurried review of SPACE, TIME AND DEITY remarked:

"In every chapter we come across some view which no philosopher, except Professor Alexander, has ever maintained". (2)

But, this remark of McTaggart is specially true concerning Alexander's theology. It is something completely new, so new that it could not be easily assimilated in the current teachings of the subject. For example, Prof. Broad hinted that Alexander has used the term 'deity' in a sense in which no one else has used it (3). Similarly, Sheen has pointed out that Alexander's

2. The Cambridge Review Nov. 19, 1920 p. 17
3. MIND 1921 p. 148
theology has nothing in common with the past theology. The current theology, especially about 1920 disparaged time, and Alexander's theology was based on 'taking time seriously'.

God, in traditional theology, is an immutable Being, but for Alexander, He is for even 'Becoming' (1). This daring originality of Alexander's theology estranged the feelings of his critics. Even such a sympathetic expositor of Alexander's system as Hettz observes that we might admire and highly appreciate the speculative qualities of Alexander's world-scheme, but he adds:

"We must reject as ill-judged its attempt to explore a region which is unexplorable. Spencer, whose greatest successor Alexander is in our own time, halted before the Absolute in silent humility and reverence; this behaviour seems to us to be more honest, pious and honourable than the impetuosity and violence with which Alexander tries to overcome it". (2)

Others, like Wickham, became simply sarcastic. According to him the view that Deity is always in the future and will never be actual is sheer madness and then he sarcastically remarked:

"But Professor Alexander is not mad.... The most we can say of him is that his mind has become too complicated and refined in its eternal gropings. He worships Time, but not the present time, nor the past. God is the future". (3)

Even his friends thought his conception of God funny (4). Well, James has remarked that every progress in knowledge is a marriage of the old with the new. Here the theology of Alexander was so new that a successful marriage between his theology and the traditional theology could not take place.

2. A Hundred Years of British Philosophy P.651.
This startling newness was the reason of the early neglect of his theology.

Secondly, the theology of Alexander is too abstract and metaphysical. It does not seem to arise from the data of religious experience. Predominantly it tries to do justice to the current theological concepts of immanence, transcendence, theism, pantheism and so on. Thus it deals with the ideas about God, and hardly seems to deal directly with the God of the religious devotees. He seemed to think that out of all religious experiences only one thing can be accepted - that there is a real craving for a God. But anything apart from this which the mystics have said of God, has been branded by him as mythological and 'nonsense', as he wrote to Laird (x). Granted that much of the mystic experience is couched in mythological expression, but will it not be considered as an imperfect communication of some genuine experience? In any case, the contemporary theology of Alexander included the religious myths of the Fatherhood of God, the Redemption of sins, Creation, Incarnation etc., Alexander's theology did not accept their truth. Therefore, it appeared to the then theologians as a mere appendage to a preconceived philosophy of Evolutionary Naturalism. It is a fact that Prof. Broad did not take Alexander's theology seriously, but he has made one very serious comment, in the following statement:

"Frankly it seems to me that the doctrine of what Prof. Alexander calls 'deity' is an integral and important part of

* In his letter of 31.6.31.
his system, but I suspect it is not what anyone else means by deity, and that it has been somewhat strained to make it fit in verbally with the concepts of religion and theology". (1)

Then again the historicity of Alexander has not touched the problems of the Jesus of History or even the Jehovah of Abraham, Isaac and Jacob, as the guide and Lord of History. He has become unhistorical in the sense that he has ignored the divine purpose as an historical event. Thus, Alexander's theology is not in keeping with the history of religious consciousness. This is another reason why it came to be neglected.

Lastly, the critics of his theology like Harvey Wickham and Prof. Broad were not aware of the historical continuity of Alexander's thought on the subject. Therefore, they did not believe that such a strange and novel theology could be the serious effort of years of speculation to systematise religious experiences. Had Prof. Broad known this, he could not have made the following remarks:

"I suppose it is a point of honour with Gifford Lecturers to introduce at least the name of God somewhere into the two volumes, and we may congratulate Prof. Alexander on the ingenuity which discovered a place in his system for something to which this name might be not too ludicrously applied." (1)

The Deity of Alexander may or may not be too ludicrous, but that it was born of his deep conviction can no longer be doubted. Not only did Alexander, in his reply to Prof. Broad

1. Mind 1914 p. 140. *Of course, Prof. Broad did not know that Alexander's theory of Deity was completed in September 1914. The invitation for Gifford Lectures came to him in 1915 (P.L.P, p. 60). So his doctrine of deity was not simply a matter of ceremony. Probably Alexander was preparing his book for publication, at the invitation of Prof. J. L. Jacks. This is clear from the letter of Prof. J. L. Jacks to Alexander of April 1912.
maintain that he was quite serious about his theology (1),
but much later (31.8.31) he wrote to Laird in a very personal
way about his religious conviction.
"I never was negative in respect of that subject and never
was even agnostic. I date from the agnostic time, but never
subscribed to the prevailing belief (or want of belief)."*
I dare say I may have expressed myself coldly (or, being
younger, even scornfully) towards what I now call the elements
of 'nonsense' in positive religion.....But I think I have
always been firm on the central point". (2)

For this reason he never forgave Prof. Broad and wrote thus
to Prof. C.C.J.Webb, in his letter of Jan. 1922:

"Of course you are right in saying that BK.1V is not intended
to be perfunctory (imagining my giving 100 pages to a matter
of ceremony!) I think that after the categories, it was
Deity which interested me most, and at any rate I felt a good
deal surer of that than of much of the rest". (3)

But apart from these pieces of evidence, the sincerity and
seriousness of Alexander are clear from the skilful way in
which his theology has been developed in his philosophy. So
much consistency, sought with so much subtle and serious
arguments, could not be mere matter of ceremony of a Gifford
Lecturer. Then, again, he continued his 'funny ideas' till
the end. Alexander maintained his theology consistently in
his following subsequent writings: 'Spinoza and Time' (1921),
'Artistic Creation and Cosmic Creation' (1927), 'Science and
Religion' (1930) 'Spinoza and Philosophy of Religion' (1933),
'Six Lectures on Value, The Summary' (n.d.), and the
'Historicity of Things' (1936). But in the end no evidence

* Alexander was opposed to Spencer's Agnosticism, see the
is stronger than the evidence of the presence of this kind of religious conviction in Alexander's early speculation, which was certainly free from the ceremony of a Clifford Lecturer. Let us therefore try to reconstruct the early religious thought of Alexander, from his early writings.

**SOME ESSENTIAL FEATURES OF ALEXANDER'S THEOLOGY**: Before we can show that there is a continuity of religious thought in Alexander's speculation, from the beginning to its end, we should be able to determine its essential features. The following features may fairly be considered as essentials of his theology:

1. **The primacy of religious emotion**: According to Alexander, there are various ways of apprehension which are suited to their specific objects, in cognising them. Religion also is based on a distinctive way of experiencing its object. This may be called 'religious emotion', through which we become aware of God. Only when we have experienced and found God through religious emotion, can we attempt to have some theoretical understanding of Him. The conceptual attempts to make God intelligible to us may be faulty, but their failure does not show the illusoriness of the religious object.

2. **The need for a better reconciliation between Immanence and Transcendence**.

Reflecting on the religious experience, the theologians have sought to understand the relationship between God and man in terms of Theism and Pantheism. According to Theism, there is an eternal Transcendent Creator who has produced a temporal universe. But, according to Alexander, if this
Omniscient Creator has produced this universe, with its evils and sufferings, then He is responsible for them. But, if He is also the author of evils, then He ceases to be a Loving Father, and as such He forfeits our claim to worship Him. Pantheism, on the other hand, points out that everything is in God and the whole universe is maintained in its being by His indwelling Presence in it. If so, then the finite individual loses his reality in Him and there is no room for worship, for the worshipper and Deity becomes identical. Then, again, such an immanent God is as much responsible for the sufferings in the universe, as He is for its beauty and goodness. But, if God be responsible for the sufferings in the universe, then He once again forfeits our affection for Him. According to Alexander, the traditional theology is hopelessly involved in logical difficulty and therefore, there should be an intellectual effort afresh to solve the contradictory demands of our religious life. This he tried to do by advancing the theory of an evolving God.

3. Deity as a creature in time:— In order to remove the difficulties of Theism and Pantheism we have to suppose that Deity is not a creator, but He is a creature which Time elaborates in its restless movements. The whole universe itself is in travail for the birth of Deity and Deity therefore is in a process of Time.

4. Deity is beyond value:— Deity is higher than the highest evolute in the evolutionary hierarchy. He is to supervene over mind, which is the highest evolute known to human
consciousness. This mind, in the pursuit of the tertiary qualities of Truth, Beauty and Goodness, may be said to be the highest manifestation of Space-Time, the 'Absolute Reality' of Alexander. In the birth of Deity, these values will be conserved in a certain sense, but really they will be transcended. Following the universal formula of mind-body relationship, we can say that mind, with its tertiary qualities, in a certain complexity, will become the body and Deity will become the 'mind' of this body. Just as the body or brain carries the quality of consciousness, similarly, mind with its values will carry 'deity'. But, then, Deity will be an emergent quality, supervening over and transcending values. Therefore, Deity can be said to be Truthful or Good in a metaphorical sense only. The important thing to note is that Deity transcends Truth or Goodness, for Deity is different in kind from mind, from which it will emerge.

5. God is the whole universe with its nisus towards Deity.

Values are created before Deity. Therefore they are not the product of an intelligent Creator. Just as Design in Nature has come about by purely natural selection, so values too have emerged through trial, test and struggle. But natural selection explains only the retention of the valuable types out of a number of competing species, but these numberless species are produced by the Creative Nature herself. Similarly, the emergents have been thrown into existence by the restless process of Space-Time itself. This restlessness of Time in a
certain orderly direction, may be called NISUS. Thus, we can say that the whole universe with its nisus towards Deity is called God. By 'Deity' is meant that quality in the universe which is worshipped by religious persons. This deity, according to Alexander, is not an actual Being, but is simply a tendency of the universe to be higher than the highest emergent in the evolutionary hierarchy. Hence, the religious consciousness is aroused by the whole universe with its deity-ward nisus. This nisus impinges on the whole man and appeals to his total personality.

For our purpose, these essential features are sufficient and if they can be traced in the early speculation of Alexander, then we can say that he had a fairly continuous development in his religious thought. We trust that in SPACE, TIME AND DEITY, Alexander has simply made explicit what was already implicit in his early thought.

THE RELIGIOUS CONVICTION OF ALEXANDER IN HIS EARLY YEARS

We have already pointed out in Chapter I, that Alexander had an idealistic philosophy for popular consumption. It appears that at this stage, he was attached to Green more in his theology than in his epistemology or ontology. However, we will find that he was disposed to rebel in this sphere of his thought as much as in others. This rebellion in theology was less noticed then, for Alexander's thought was not sufficiently ripe for him to give full expression to it. After all, theology is the ripest fruit of the philosophical speculation and can be
reached in one's evening of philosophical toil. But Alexander had his religious conviction and was opposed to the agnosticism of Spencer, which he expressed in the following way:

"There is the gospel of the Unknowable, which seems to satisfy so many minds, because it is a deification of ignorance or rather suspense of judgment. It reflects credit upon people's modesty and patience that they can be content with so tiresome and uninteresting a God as the Unknowable" (1).

At this early stage, Alexander was not only opposed to agnosticism, but he had positive religious belief, which is clear from his following writings of this period.

THEISM IN ALEXANDER'S COMMONPLACE BOOK: Laird tells us that Alexander maintained a sort of Commonplace Book in which he wrote down his thoughts, and Laird has quoted a long passage from this diary, which deals with Alexander's early thought (Nov. 1, 1885) concerning theism (2). In this passage, contained in the 'Commonplace Book', Alexander tried to reach God through Moral Law given in One's conscience.

"I might say conscience implies the existence in me of the Moral Law which is divine" (3).

But obviously the moral laws have been found to be changing in human history, and then, how can they reveal God who is unalterable? It is here that Alexander came to the conclusion that each moral act so far as it is moral is absolutely right, of course relatively to its circumstances. Thus, he wrote:

"In every moral act we do right absolutely ... are pleasing in the sight of God ... are so far recognised by Him as one with Himself" (1*).

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1. The Oxford Magazine, June 6, 1888-p.415
2. H.J. 1941-42-p.147
3. Ibid.-p.147
But, then, how do we explain the change in moral law inconsistency with the perfection of God? God has implanted Himself in man and nature and through them gradually unfolds Himself.

"It is the latent process of the human mind and the undiscovered invitations which Nature is yet to offer to him which determines a change of the moral law; but in God this moral law is already absorbed in the completed whole of processless activity which, as conditioned by bodily and mental powers, is to reappear as the never-ending struggle after higher and higher law". (2)

Thus the growth of moral law does not mean that God goes through a process in time; 'for, as we have seen, God is never imperfect, and even in imperfect morality is still absolutely God. It is only when God is regarded as the actual recovery of Himself from the Nature in which He was lost, that we can speak of Him as gradually self-revealed'. (3)

**FINGERPOSTS TO RELIGION:** But this unqualified acceptance of Neo-Kantianism undergoes some significant changes in 'Fingerposts to Religion'. This work was dated in pencil 'about 1885', but it has been corrected by someone as '16th November 1886', probably by Laird, after some evidence. This latter date appears to be correct because it marks an advance in his thought over that of 'Commonplace Book'. In 'Fingerposts to Religion', Alexander pointed out that there is a high road to religion and there are also bypaths. In moments of depression and exaltation our emotions may reveal to us a larger presence than our own and this may be called the high road to religion. But by following the course of knowledge and conduct we may come to religion as well. This

1. Ibid p.147. - This early passage is echoed in STD 11, in the following passage: "...and in its higher moods the religious mind conceives itself as doing God's work in doing his best the work of man...and conceives God as speaking to man in his conscience or in his passion for truth or beauty"(p.365).
2. Ibid. p.148. 3. Ibid p.147
course may be called by-paths or fingerposts to religion (1).
In our progress of scientific knowledge we discover that
the whole universe is intelligible,
"because I know it under the forms of intelligence, and which
I hold to be continuous and simple, because wherever I know
it, it enters into the continuous course of my mental history.
In the process of acquiring new knowledge lies the first germ
of that sense of a great intelligible world, which regarded as
a single individual is the barest and most unemotional
description of our conception of God". (2)

This 'rational order' postulated by science may be spoken of
as 'the omniscience of God' (3).

What is true of the progress of knowledge is also true
of our progress in morals. There seems to be a progress in
morals as a result of a progress in our sensible knowledge
and relations with fellowmen. The past moral good keeps on
turning out to be inopportune, under a higher necessity (4).

From this progress we can conclude the following:
"That our conduct is by the stress of circumstances and the
resulting needs of moral life turned to purposes larger than
we dreamed, is made by the religious sense the basis by its
belief that the world is under the moral government by God"(1).

Hence, from the above statements it can be concluded
that God is the very ideal of knowledge and conduct and
in finding out truth and goodness we really discover God to
be very near to each one of us (2).

So far the religious thought of Alexander may be said
to be quite orthodox, but in his 'Fingerposts to Religion',
he added the following significant observations. Firstly,
he pointed out that he had not enough metaphysics to pass
from 'the intelligible order of the universe' to 'the com-

1. Fingerposts to religion p.2. 2.Ibid p.6. 3.Ibid p.10.
4. Ibid p.16
pletely intelligent universe' (3), and, again, he pointed out that Goodness, in strict sense, is applicable only to human beings and not to God (4). In thinking of God as Omniscient, he said, we seem to make God a man (5). Alexander, therefore, his commended Aristotle in not attributing moral excellence to God. However, he pointed out that a purely metaphysician God of Aristotle cannot explain His personal relationship with His worshippers. He, therefore, became aware of some important difficulties in his religious thought and emphasized his need for a great deal of philosophising before he would be able to put his thoughts clearly about God (1). But, then, he clearly laid down that religion is quite different from morality and the pursuit of truth. It is improper to say, according to Alexander, that religion really means doing what is right, and further, it cannot be said that the knowing of science is the knowing of God (2). Religious consciousness is quite unique, and as he later held, that it is quite different from the appreciation of values. "You may be good without having religion, or possess truth without rendering praise to God for it, and the reason is that the emotion which is peculiar to religion is absent from you; but you cannot know or act without being made aware of something which may prepare you by knowledge and conduct for reception of the idea of God " (3).

Thus, Alexander probably held that there are some promptings

1. Fingerposts to Religion-p.15
3. Ibid.-p.19
2. Ibid.-p.18
4. Ibid.-p.21
5. Ibid.-p.3
1. Ibid.-p.16
3. Ibid.-p.6-7
from God prior to the explicit awareness of morality and knowledge, leading to Him. In other words, morality and knowledge assure the reality of God apprehended quite independently of them through the peculiar way of religious emotion. In any case, in "Fingerposts to Religion", Alexander quite clearly laid down that God transcends values and is known in His own distinctive way and that the central problem of theology is the relation of God to man. The same conclusion that Goodness is human and not divine has also been hinted in the last page of MORAL ORDER AND PROGRESS (1889), and here too he pointed out that religion and morality satisfy quite different sentiments. He expressed this thought in the form of a question:

"Whether the difficulties in which Christianity as a religion is placed at the present day do not arise from the absorption of its highest idea into the conceptions and the practice of morality? When what was once the inspiring idea of a religion becomes part and parcel of the moral ideal, the religious sentiment proper is starved". (1)

THE ARGUMENT FROM DESIGN AND THE CONCEPTION OF AN EVOLVING GOD:

A little later in 1890 Alexander made a very significant advance in his religious thought, and that lay in passing from 'a God who is a completed whole of processless activity' to 'a God who participates in the process in which all things are involved'. This most distinctive teaching of Alexander, along with his criticism of theism and pantheism, was elaborated in a symposium: 'Is there evidence of design in nature?' (2). Now let us summarise the main elements of his contention in that symposium.

1. m.o.r. p.415 2.f.a.s. cfr, vol.1, pp.47-76
Alexander was very early occupied with the orders or levels of finite existences in an hierarchical system (3). He pointed out that the argument from design in nature could forcibly be presented in relation to a 'hierarchy of ministrations' (4).

"Not only are individual forms of life adapted to their ends, but there is a hierarchy amongst the different orders of existence and the lower serve the purposes of the higher and all serve the purposes of the highest, man. And I fancy that it is this 'hierarchy of ministrations' which impresses the minds of men more than the perfect adaptation of individual forms" (5).

Hence, Alexander contended that there is adaptation of living forms, but from this one cannot legitimately infer the existence of a Designing Mind.

"The appearance of design is so far from being a proof of an original intelligent design that it is itself the result of a process which is not design". (1)

The process which is not design is one of Natural Selection. Nature produces a number of individuals and species and only those species survive which can adapt themselves to the requirements of their environment. Naturally, the surviving species, being adapted to their complex environmental conditions will appear as designed to fit into them. But this fitness or design is simply a precondition of their existence. The adaptation of a species and its existence are but one and the same thing. (2)


1. Itid. p.5b. For this reason Romanes regarded Alexander to be mechanical and he wrote thus to him: "I send you a book that I published some 12 years ago on 'Theism'. If you will glance through it before we meet, we may be in a better position to start from, as you will see that in those days I was even more severely 'mechanical' in my thinking than you are now". (Dated Jan 1, 1890.)
Let us take the hierarchical system of A1, A2, A3, etc., in such a way that A3 depends on A2, and A2 depends on A1. This hierarchy of ministration will not survive if it were not adapted to A2, and the same thing is true of A2 in relation to A1. In this arrangement the lower things in the series will appear as ministering to the needs of the higher. But this appearance of design is the result of natural selection which is not design.

According to Alexander, not only the argument for the prior existence of a Designing Intelligence is inconclusive, but even if it were conclusive it will not serve any theistic purpose at all. God, the Creator is supposed to have implanted the laws of evolution in a few living cells in the beginning, and as a result of that man in the long series of continuous evolution has emerged. However, this Designing Intelligence will not only be responsible for the triumph of man, but also for the waste of unsuccessful lives too. Whatever view we may take of this subject,

"the intelligence which designed this original collocation designed therefore not only the adaptation and successes which resulted from it, but also the failures and hideous ruin and wreck which accompanied the process". (1)

2. P.A.S. 1890 p. 59. — The argument is very much like that of Hume, who through the mouth of Philo expressed the theory that matter without being purposive can bring out order without previous design. "It is in vain, therefore, to insist upon the uses of the parts in animals or vegetables, and their curious adjustment to each other. I would fain know, how an animal could subsist, unless its parts were so adjusted? Do we not find that it immediately perishes whenever this adjustment ceases, and that its matter corrupting tries some new forms?" (Dialogues concerning Natural Religion, Part VIII, p. 153). Or, R. Kemp Smith 'Hume's Dialogues' pp. 227-228. I. A.S. 1890 p. 63. Cf. This with Hume's 'Dialogues concerning Natural Religion' pp. 104-7.
To doubt the theologians, in order to evade this difficulty, which is involved in the conception of a transcendent, personal God, have elaborated the conception of an Immanent Intelligence which works itself out in all things. But this conception of an Immanent Intelligence is really another name for the totality of all things. According to Alexander, it is "but a comprehensive name representing the fact that all the forces of the world result in the production of the order we see and know out of chaos in which order is mingled with disorder; and if so, what right have we to call it intelligence, or beneficence, or attribute to it a personality? At any rate if this intelligence is immanent, it is immanent in the failures as well as in the successes, and the God who is identified with this immanent intelligence appears as the union of the most contradictory attributes, at once the object of worship and the object of execration, at once a merciful and long-suffering ruler, and the most bloodthirsty and reckless of tyrants" (1).

Thus, from the above statements one would get the impression that Alexander neither favoured a transcendent God nor an Immanent God, and, therefore, he did not favour theism at all. But the conclusion is false, for Alexander had a theism and he gave a sketch of it, according to which God is in a process of Time.

"I could only say that in accordance with the theory I have sketched I should think of God as growing along with the growth of the world, and only becoming intelligent and capable of design with the emergence of humanity. There is an old Greek idea of a power called Noira, or Fate, which rules everything, to which the Gods themselves are subject. And I do not know but that we are taught by the facts to accept a view resembling this, and to regard God as participating in the process in which all things are involved" (2).

From this, it is clear that the conception of an evolving God was in the mind of Alexander, and this Noira or Fate (3)

of evolving in time was simply more systematically and fully
developed in SPACE, TIME AND DELITY. Alexander did not allude
to this conception of an evolving or growing God in Time
before 1914, for he had not philosophised enough to give it
a definite shape in his whole scheme of things. Alexander
wrote about his religious conviction after a long time in
1909, in an article in the HIBBERT JOURNAL with the heading
"PTOLEMAIC AND COPERNICAN VIEWS OF THE PLACE OF MIND IN THE
UNIVERSE". In this article Alexander was too much pre-
occupied with the refutation of idealism, but then he was
equally jealous of safe-guarding the interest of his religious
convictions. Here he vaguely referred to the conception of
an evolving God, but he dwelt on the other aspects of his
theism, with greater clearness. This can be thus summarised.

THE PLACE OF GOD IN THE PTOLEMAIC AND THE COPERNICAN VIEWS
OF THE WORLD:

According to Alexander, the Ptolemaic view of the
Universe, emphasizing mind as the centre and measure of
Reality, leads to Idealism. This idealism finally leads to
mysticism and pantheism. But pantheism and mysticism lead
to the denial of the individuality of the worshippers. Then,
again, pantheism no doubt by identifying God with the whole
Universe makes Him awesome, but by doing so also removes His
claims on human affection (1). This follows from the fact
that God as the whole universe contains not only what is
good but also what is evil. Thus, being the author of evil

He ceases to be the object of human affection. How, a Copernican view of the universe may have some difficulty in explaining the reality of God, but we must note that God is not primarily an object of human understanding.

"One thing seems clear: that no intellectual demonstration of God's nature, taken by itself, without reference to man's emotional needs, is sufficient to explain the object of religion". (1).

God is felt in religious experience and this is caused by the whole universe in its total impact on us. The whole universe, impinging on our total personality is not primarily revealed to intellect, in the first instance. But it excites in us:

"that vague endeavour and desire, akin to so many other feelings, which we call religious craving or emotion".(2)

However, if religious experience be a mere craving for an object, created by the impact of the whole universe upon us then it becomes subjective, without any guarantee of its corresponding with a real object. In order to remove this difficulty Alexander took the help of his realistic assumption. According to this assumption, every mental activity is geared to its own appropriate object,---a result which has been achieved by natural selection in getting man adjusted to his environmental needs.

"But no mental activity operates in the void. Wherever the mind works it finds its object, and, with the guidance of all its past experience, it shadows forth an object as the correlate of its own conditions. The religious idea of the correlated world as a whole is the response which the mind sets up when the actual world as a whole operates on us through feeling, revealing itself in this indirect way".(3)

1. H.J. 1909-10 p.64. 2. Ibid. p.64. also p.64-5. 3. H.J. 1909-10 p.65. also pp.65-6.
Alexander here held that the religious craving is for a real object, but he did not outline the nature of this object. He, however, laid down that the object of religious emotion emerges, when the good conquers the evil; truth triumphs over error, and beauty vanquishes ugliness. Thus, in the spinning of Time the true, the good and the beautiful get sorted out.

"The developed sentiment of religion finds its object in this continuously growing part of the universe which represents in a now famous phrase, the conservation of values. That line of growth, manifested in human progress but also in the subhuman world, and not necessarily concluded by human progress, the beings which make it up, from that infinite part of the infinite universe which is God". (1)

Thus, the object of religious emotion is the continuously growing part of the universe. This statement must have been incomprehensible to his readers at that time. But in the light of his theology of 'Space, Time and Deity', this is quite intelligible. It seems therefore, that by 1909 Alexander had worked out a conception of a God as a process in time, which however, he did not elaborate fully. But even here he pointed out that man is a contributor to values which go to make the object of his religious emotion and concluded his article thus: The consequence of assigning mind its proper place amongst things is:

"that the abasement of man's claims to the level of what he truly is leaves him at the same time with the assurance of his affinity and his trust in this chain of things which have value, to which he himself is a contributor, which he calls God". (2)

Thus, Deity is in line of development of values, in an hierarchical scheme of things, and may be said to be at the

From the above statements about religious conviction of Alexander at his early years of speculation, it is clear that he took his theology seriously. But it must be conceded that Alexander was not as explicit about his theology, as he was about his epistemology. For this reason Hoernle wrote about Alexander in 1918 in the following way:

"But though this Realism is without any explicit philosophy of religion, it is clearly in temper religious". (1)

Hence, it is not true that Alexander was not serious about his theology, as Prof. Broad had hinted. Then again, in the light of this historical continuity of Alexander's religious thought, we have no reason to agree with Laird's remark that Alexander had to make in theology 'an immense stride between 1889 and 1920' (2). In all spheres of his thought Alexander's vision deepened and widened with his years and there was no leap or sudden break in his thoughts throughout his different phases of development. Therefore, from the above observation we can conclude that we should take his theology seriously. Here is an attempt of an unusually gifted and sensitive mind to think of God consistently in relation to his experience as a whole. With this historical introduction, we can now enter into his theology proper.

CHAPTER SIX.

THE THEOLOGY OF SAMUEL ALEXANDER.

SYNOPSIS.

Here is the key-ideas of Emergence and the mind-body formula are applied. On the basis of the mind-body formula it is shown that the whole of Space-Time, inclusive of all finite existents, is the 'body' of God and the nisus towards a hitherto unattained higher emergent is deity. This deity is the 'mind' of God. Deity, being sustained by all the finite existents and more especially by mind, goes ahead of them and transcends them. Deity therefore is different in kind from mind and supersedes mind and value, but is essentially in lineal succession and continuity with them. However, deity is only an ideal, looming ahead of the highest emergent in a hierarchical order. God forever strives to attain His deity but never succeeds in achieving it. Hence God with actual deity does not exist.

The above view of deity as evolving in Time is considered by Alexander as superior to the prevailing view of deity, for, according to him, it alone reconciles the merits of theism and pantheism, transcendence and immanence. Besides, according to Alexander, this theory not only accepts the reality of religious craving, but it further supports the doctrine of Ameliorism. In a way it does away with the traditional doctrines of Creation, the Eternity of God, Incarnation,
Immortality etc., But it is held by Alexander that the gain is greater than the loss, for by following Alexander's theology one loses only the mythology, but one gets assured of an immense realm of continued progress, which man as an architect of his own fate, can alone bring about.

Finally, Alexander with the help of the doctrine of deity succeeds in showing that mind is not the measure of reality for it is only a phase in the evolving universe. If its values are not going to be destroyed by an impending doom, as Russell believes, then, at least they are going to be superseded. The Absolute Mind being not given by experience does not exist. But Space-Time alone is Absolute and of itself, without any purpose, it keeps on producing fresh emergents.
CHAPTER SIX.

THE THEOLOGY OF SAMUEL ALEXANDER.

RELIGION AND PHILOSOPHY ARE COMPLEMENTARY: Most theologians will agree with Alexander that God cannot be intellectually proved. Thus Galloway wrote:

"The Christian experience, of which theology is the explication, ultimately rests on truths which are held on the assurance of faith, not on logical demonstration. No rational deduction, for instance, can give for its conclusion the Christian idea of God; faith makes it real, not logical proof." (1)

Similarly, De Burgh points out that no man can be argued into the presence of the living God (2). The so-called proofs of the existence of God do not create faith where it is wanting, but they are most strengthen one's belief in one's God (3).

Hence, Alexander stated:

"If you have ever found anyone who has been rationally convinced by proof of the existence of God, I should like to meet him. I feel that you cannot demonstrate the existence of God." (4)

But, from this it does not follow that God is not felt. Religion is not a sentiment only, but God is that upon which the religious sentiment is directed (5). Hence, that is God which we worship and adore and of whose presence receive assurance in our prayers. Therefore, God is apprehended through our religious emotion, as a tremendous mystery, which is more than we are and yet is felt as a real presence. (6)

2. Towards a religious philosophy pp. 15-16; also see Webb, C. C. J. 'Religion and the thought of to-day' p. 37-46. James, W. J. 'The varieties of Religious Experience' pp. 444; Stace, W. T. 'Religion and the Modern Mind', where he says that instructed religious persons regard these proofs as fallacious and outmoded.
But, can the uniqueness of this religious experience guarantee the objectivity of God? At most a psychology of religious experience can show that such a response contributed to the health and happiness of the worshippers, and attest that religion so far has proved efficacious in human development(1). However, psychology cannot determine the reality of the object of religious experience.

"The Psychologist is no more necessarily concerned with the question of whether religious experience is caused by anything outside the subject than is the physicist with the question of the reality of matter". (2)

All that we can be sure on the basis of psychology is that our craving for God is deeply rooted and arises from our very human nature, but the object of this religious experience can be said to be real only when it has been shown to be demanded by the facts of our total experience (3)

4. Six lectures on Values; Summary p.6. Cf. also STD II.p.343;
   K.S. Vili 1909-19 p.64. 5. STD II. P.343;
6. STD II. p.346.
1. STD II. pp.34,362. See Sigmund Freud who held that religion is only a "mass delusion", yet granted its partial utility in human progress so far. See his "Future of an Illusion" pp.32-33;
   Moses and Monotheism p.109; Collected papers Vol.11.p.35. Also
   Reik,T. 'From Thirty Years with Freud'. p.126. See also James's view about the utility of religion in 'The varieties of Religious experience'. Pp.237,246-248.

Thus, at the outset Alexander did not allow that religion by itself can give any knowledge of its object. This assumption on the part of Alexander enabled him to put his own interpretations regarding the object of religious worship. This central contention is expressed by the following statement:

"Always indeed, the religious emotion believes in the reality of its object, as something greater than man and independent of him, in whom the finite creature may even in some phases of feeling be submerged; and it would reject as preposterous the suggestion that God may be a fancy with which it plays, like a lover with a dream of perfection. But the religious sentiment itself can supply us with no such theoretical assurance of reality, and it needs to be supplemented with a metaphysical enquiry, what place, if any, the object of worship occupies in the general scheme of things". (1)

But, it is equally certain that few will accept this view that religion leans on metaphysics. Thus, Alexander held that philosophy comes to complete our religious experience by showing the reality of God. But philosophy by itself cannot create faith. As Alexander himself pointed out, the function of philosophy is to satisfy human curiosity for its own sake. No doubt philosophers do talk of God, as Descartes and Spinoza did. But their Gods are not worshipful. Similarly Aristotle, following his metaphysical train of thought arrived at the notion of a Prime Mover.

"It did not lead him very far towards the production of a God available for religious purposes. It may be doubted whether any proper general metaphysics can ever, without the illicit introduction of other considerations, get much further than Aristotle" (1).

1. STD 11. P. 342. Also see THE LISTENER Dec. 3. 1930.
No doubt Spinoza did try to found a religion of his own on his philosophy, but his intellectual love of God is pseudo-religious in its appeal. The God of Spinoza, the Infinite Substance really does not support any religious warmth about Him. The Substance comes to be invested with religious zeal which has been imported into it from another source. (2).

"Unless the religious passion were already lit, it is hard to see how the intellectual love would rise above a supreme intellectual satisfaction, and this is not the religious but the scientific sentiment". (3)

Thus, we conclude that philosophy cannot have the reality of God, but at most can it show the validity of the idea of God. The reality of God is given in our religious experience and if it cannot be had there, it cannot be found anywhere. As such, philosophy can give us an intellectual satisfaction in relation to the idea of God but it cannot satisfy a religious need.

1. Whitehead 'Science and the Modern world', P.242-3. Again Bergson pointed out that philosophers God is incomunicable. But the God of the religious devotees is always one with whom they hold communion. "This is precisely what occurs in most cases when the philosopher speaks of God. So remote is this conception from the God most men have in mind that if, by some miracle, and contrary to the opinion of philosophers, God as thus defined should step down into the field of experience, none would recognise Him". (Morality and Religion, P.206-207); see also p.206).

3. 'Spinoza and Time', P.L.P. P.376; see also 'Spinoza and Philosophy of Religion' 1932, P.126; and also 'Theism and Pantheism' P.L.P. P.325. See also the 'Journal of Theological Studies' 1940 P.348, where Prof. Webb puts both Spinoza and Alexander under the same charge of pseudo-religiousness with reference to an object which does not support any religious sentiment at all.
However, it is not only religion which needs philosophy for justifying faith, but philosophy too needs religion for its data. Philosophy deals with our whole experience, but religious experience too is a fact of human nature and as such it has to be included in it (1). We will find that according to Alexander, the hierarchical scheme of things demands the necessity and reality of Deity (2). But demanded by its hierarchical scheme of things, philosophy may give us a God who may be imperfectly worshipful. For example, the Absolute of the idealists or the Brahman of the Vedantists is the ultimate philosophical reality but neither can be said to be the object of religious worship. Hence, there should be a fruitful combination of philosophy and religion.

"Philosophy then may clarify and illuminate and purify the conception of the object of religious worship, whether that object be conceived pantheistically or theistically, but it does not itself supply an object of worship; that is the goal of religious striving which it may or may not find in the world of experience. Philosophy supplies no religion but at most can help the religious mind to find contact with the world of science" (1).

Let us illustrate this contention. The most convincing though not the most valid (*) proof of the existence of God is 'the argument from Design'. At the time of Alexander, this ‘argument’ had become important, for Darwin's theory of Organic Evolution with Natural Selection had put thinkers

1. STD II p.353; also Naturalism and Value, P.E.P. p.280;
in two camps. According to one group of thinkers, Darwin's theory had strengthened the argument from design, and, according to others, it had made it obsolete (2). Alexander belonged to the latter group. So let us see how he dealt with this argument.

THE ARGUMENT FROM DESIGN:— In our finite life we find that a complicated machinery with its adjustment of parts with one another cannot exist without a mind. Therefore, we infer that any such fine adaptation of living forms to their surroundings could not have come about without a Master Mind or Designing Intelligence. This adaptation in the organic world is best seen in 'the hierarchy of ministrations'. However, as we have already seen, according to Alexander, the whole adaptation, even of the most complicated type, has been brought about by a process which is not design (\textsuperscript{a}). It has been achieved purely by a process of 'Natural Selection'. Any external teleology, where the purpose is imputed into the pre-existing materials ab extra is indefensible; but, the same thing is true of 'immanent teleology' where the purpose works itself through the materials created by the Designing Intelligence from Himself. In both

2. Henz C. E. 'Natural Religion and Christian Theology' p. 163-4. This has been elaborated by W. T. Stace in 'Religion and the Modern Mind' Chap. V.
cases the Designing Intelligence becomes responsible for extreme wastefulness, evils and sufferings of the universe (1). This point has been recognised by some theologians too. Thus Prof. Webb wrote:

"...for it is at least no less hard to reconcile with a belief in God's wisdom, than was the view that God had created all at once in its main features the universe as it is now". (2)

THE GENERAL PROBLEM OF ALEXANDER'S THEOLOGY: Alexander did not consider the other proofs of the existence of God, for he believed that God could not be demonstrated to be existing. But, he thought, that the Being of God could be indirectly proved. This would be done by showing that God's existence is consistent with a scientific view of things. As the philosophy of Alexander gives a scientific view of things, so our task now is to find out as to what place has been assigned to God in this scheme of things. Further, we will have to see whether the nature and place of God, elaborated by Alexander's philosophy, can call forth the religious feeling of the 'numinous'.

Hence, the complementary nature of philosophy and religion can be thus stated:

"The contact between religion and philosophy described is established, if philosophy can indicate in its scheme of things a place which may be filled with the object of religious worship; if, in other words, it can show that

2. Religion and the Thoughts of To-day p.37.
the God of religion is demanded, or at least suggested by the world as conceived by philosophy". (1)

The problem thus stated by Alexander, is very fair. Therefore, our first aim is to find out what face and nature Alexander's system assigned to God. Next, we have to determine the nature of Deity required by the religious consciousness. Finally, we will have to examine whether Alexander's God does satisfy our religious needs. We will find in the sequel that the first task was the primary problem of Alexander. But if so, then there lies the major defect of his theology, for it has been made to conform to the conditions of a pre-conceived metaphysics. But a theology, in the first instance, must be true to the facts of religious life itself, and Alexander himself admitted this (2).

However, Alexander has not carried out this requirement in his theology. We shall try to show that Alexander has watered down the facts of religious life to fit them in his metaphysics. According to his own admission, he cared for his philosophy more than for his theology (3), and the nature of his philosophy is such that it cannot adequately deal with the facts of religious life.

**THE PLACE OF GOD IN ALEXANDER'S PHILOSOPHY:** Here we have to be careful about the terms 'God' and 'Deity' which cannot be

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1. Septimana Spinozana 1933 p.129; also see STD 11. p.345
interchangeably used in Alexander's theology. 'Deity is the next empirical quality to the highest we know' (1), and God means 'the infinite universe with its nisus towards deity' (2). The term 'deity' is perfectly general for it means the prophetic tendency, at any level, for the next higher empirical quality. At the stage of Space-Time materiality is deity, at the stage of matter life is deity, and at the stage of life mind is deity. But from the cosmic point of view, though not for matter itself, life has ceased to be deity, as soon as life became incarnate in a few living cells. Similarly, from the cosmic point of view matter and mind have ceased to be deity because they have become facts. Only at the level of mind we can talk of deity even from the cosmic point of view, for the next empirical quality higher than mind is yet to be produced from mind or spirit. Thus deity always looms ahead of the highest empirical existence in the hierarchical order of things. Therefore, it always is an ideal, — a becoming, and once it becomes an actual reality it ceases to be deity. Thus the whole universe strains eternally towards deity.

However, God as the whole universe with its nisus towards deity is actual; deity nevertheless is never actual but always remains an ideal.

If this be the nature of God and His Deity, then it is certainly demanded by the hierarchical order of things (1). But these definitions of God and Deity are based on the

1. STD II p. 345. 2. STD II. p. 353.
characteristics of an emergent naturalism and therefore their fate depends on the ultimate truth of Evolutionary Naturalism. According to this system, Time is real, and progress will continue, and a higher emergent is bound to arise. This restlessness of Time to throw out newer and higher emergents is, according to Alexander, rooted in Space-Time itself, the matrix from which all finite existents have emerged. Let us explain, therefore, this restlessness of time or Nisus.

**THE NATURE OF NISUS:**

The nature of nisus or the restlessness of Time has been specially elaborated by Alexander in 'Spinoza and Time', and so let us follow this account of nisus.

The nisus of Alexander is the emended version of the 'conatus' of Spinoza. By 'conatus', according to Spinoza, is meant the universal tendency to self-preservation. This is clearly seen in organic beings who preserve themselves in the face of opposition from their environment (1). Alexander pointed out that this conatus of Spinoza may be called by a simpler though vague term 'nisus'. (2). Everything, then, has a nisus or conatus in as much as it strives to be what it is. But the same nisus is seen in the transformation of types 'which takes place, as attested by observation and theory, out of lower to higher levels' (3). Further, this nisus is most palpable is those things from which a new level,

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not yet attained, has to proceed. However, the nisus continues to exist at the lower levels for preserving their beings and in sustaining the higher levels which have been attained already. For example, matter and life have their nisus which not only is seen in their self-preservation but also in their sustaining the higher level of mind. But, as noted earlier, the nisus is most palpable in the dim striving towards an unattained level (4).

This nisus is a progressive process of Space-Time, for if it were like the turning of a squirrel in a cage, a mere repetition (5), then it would mean a mere preservation in its own being which is possible only in the case of individual beings. But Space-Time is not a Substance and its individuality is incompatible with its essentially temporal nature. The nisus therefore,

"is the impulse of the world towards new levels of existence (as well as towards new kinds of being within any one level), and the guarantee that the particular distribution of motion attained shall not be permanent as a whole, but only admit those relative permanences within it which do exhibit the Spinozistic conatus" (1).

We may grant that Space-Time being essentially temporal cannot be mere cyclic turning in a cage. All that we can hold is that it will keep on throwing new complexes in its incessant movement, but this incessant movement need not be directed towards any specific ladder. Hereafter

"There is a nisus in Space-Time which, as it has borne its creatures forward through matter and life to mind, will bear them forward to some higher level of existence" (2).

2. STD II. p.346
The hierarchical order of empirical existents has reached mind, as the highest level attained so far. But there is nothing in mind, according to Alexander, which requires us to think that the nisus will stop there. Mind too, therefore, is filled with nisus,—with restlessness to be lifted up into still higher emergent. This impetus in mind fills it with a craving for deity. This presence of deity is felt in our religious experience and is assured of its validity by the empirical evidence of the progressiveness which is found in the hierarchical order of things. Naturally, then, human mind wants to give some shape to this ideal deity, in the form of some imaginary or pictorial image. But all such attempts are mere concession to our weakness, for our intellect does not remain content with feeling the impact or impetus of the nisus. From the very nature of the case the knowledge of God or deity is barred from us. How can we know a higher quality which has not come into being? Further, how can we know the higher which we can neither contemplate or enjoy? (*) Our human altars still therefore are raised to the Unknown Deity (1). But though the form which deity will assume in future is unknown, it is not unexperienced. Deity is felt as a tremendous mystery,—an uncanny thing, a vague foretaste of things. It continues to be an object of religious faith and speculation (2). Therefore, Alexander did not profess agnosticism, though he came quite close to it. Thus, Mr. Atkinson Lee writes about

(*) For we can contemplate that which is at the lower level, and we can 'enjoy' only our own being and cannot enjoy the
this in the following way:

"It is furthermore, an interesting fact that a recent writer in the naturalistic tradition, Samuel Alexander, whilst avowing ignorance of God's character as deity yet repudiates the charge of agnosticism". (3)

Though the future form of deity is precluded from our knowledge of it, we can yet say it is not of the nature of mind or spirit. The reason is that the new emergent, supervening over mind, must be different in kind and not merely in degree from mind. But just as mind is also life and is sustained by the lower level, so deity too will be sustained by all things lower than itself.

"God, the being which possesses deity, must be also spirit, for according to analogy, deity presupposes spirit, just as spirit or mind presupposes in its possessor life, and life physico-chemical material processes". (1)

Just as life forms the 'body' of mind, so mind will form the 'body' of deity. (*) Thus, God possessing deity has both mind and body, according to the universal formula of mind-body relationship. The 'body' of God will be psychic brain or mind and the 'mind' of God will be His 'Deity'.

Only we have to note that the psychic brain or mind, which will be so further refined and complicated as to carry deity will not necessarily be human mind. Hence, God cannot be described in human terms. This is another reason why God,

being of higher levels. 1. STD 11. pp. 347, 348, 349, 356, 377,
2. STD 11. pp. 348, 354, 378;
1. STD 11. p. 349.
(*) As 'mind' is nothing but a part of brain carrying consciousness, so we can also say that mind is psychic brain and to avoid confusion we will use the term 'psychic brain' for mind, wherever convenient.
that is, His deity cannot be known or expressed in human terms viz., spirit, omniscient being or love etc. Thus, the God of Alexander, that is, His quality of divinity or deity, becomes wholly indescribable and literally can be expressed with the help of negatives only, like the Substance of Spinoza.

Again, we find that God as possessing deity does not exist, for once deity becomes actual, it ceases to be deity. Thus God as possessing actual deity is only an ideal, but God as the infinite world with its niasus towards deity does exist (1). However, the whole conception of God is likely to be confusingly vague and therefore Alexander tried to illustrate his notion in two pictorial forms, namely: (1) as a finite god or an angel, and (ii) Infinite God. So let us follow his illustrations, for many important observations are based on these pictorial images.

GODS OR ANGELS: We have already seen that the whole universe with its niasus towards deity is God. Such a God is infinite and is actual. But of course, we do not know and it is idle to guess what form the next deity will assume as a finite existent. However, with a view to understanding the forecast of its nature we can draw a picture on the analogical basis of mind-body formula. Deity, as an ideal, is infinite. But once it becomes an actuality as in matter, life and mind, it becomes finite. Now we can

Mind 1921 p. 426.
2. STD 11. p. 355
draw a picture of deity becoming actual in finite gods or angels. According to the mind-body formula, mind or the psychic brain will undergo such a refinement and complication that it will carry the higher quality of deity (2). In this case, mind or the psychic brain itself will form the 'body' of deity and its deity will become its 'mind'. To call such a finite deity 'superman' is not strictly correct, for the psychic brain, corresponding to mind, will become the 'body' of deity and his deity will be different in kind from mind, in the same way in which mind is quite different from life. But this finite god will be continuous with mind, in the same way in which mind is in lineal succession of life. Hence, there will be spatio-temporal continuity between mind and the finite gods, but there will be qualitative discontinuity between them.

Human beings contemplate objects and enjoy their own mental processes. However, gods or angels would be able to contemplate mental process too. The distinctive processes through which gods or angels contemplate mind, life and matter may be called 'deisings'. Angels or gods then would not be able to contemplate their own 'deisings', but they will 'enjoy' them only.

Similarly, we can picture an infinite God having actual deity. Of course, this pictorial representation is only an aid towards understanding an actual infinite

1. STD 11, pp. 356, 361.
God, Who, as such does not exist. (1). Here, again, according to our mind-body formula, the whole of Space-Time will be His 'body', and His 'mind' which is His Deity, will be lodged in a portion of the universe. This mind of course, though lodged in only a portion of the universe, will be infinite. The infinity of God's mind and body requires some explanation. As the whole of Space-Time, inclusive of all emergents, is God's body, therefore, everything in it, including our minds, will be felt internally. But there will be still the distinction of contemplation and enjoyment. Mind, Life etc., will be the objects of contemplation and His desirings will be enjoyed.

Deity of an Infinite God, though lodged in a refined portion of Space-Time, will be an infinite Mind. Of course, 'mind' here does not mean mind as a qualified emergent, but it is the universal counterpart of the universal mind-body formula. This infinity of the supposed empirical quality of Deity distinguishes Him from all other finite beings. However, Deity, though lodged in a portion of the universe, is infinite. Human mind too is infinite, though finitely. It is finite because it is limited to the sensations derived from senses in contact with the world. It is infinite, for the space-time of our limited body is connected with the infinite world. In other words, our perception, remembering, expectation etc., deal with only those things which are relatively distinct, but these things themselves have their
fringes opening to an infinite circumambient ocean around them. Then, again, our mind is finite in relation to the external things, for all of them do not affect us cognitively through the senses. Thus, it is finite externally. But, in itself internally, mind may be considered to be infinite in the same way in which a finite line, being infinitely divisible, may be said to be infinite internally. In brain

"there is room for multitudinous combinations initiated from within and enjoyed as imaginations and thoughts, and, for all I know, these are infinitely numerous in their possibilities of combinations". (1).

According to Alexander, in human beings, only a part of the body, namely, brain is fitted to bear the quality of mind. But the brain receives sensory excitations from every part of the body and in this sense the brain represents the whole body physiologically. In the same way, the Deity of God would receive sensory excitations from every part of God's body, that is, the whole of Space-Time and thus would represent the whole of Space-Time physiologically. Then, again, just as a human mind contemplates the organic and visceral sensations from its body, so God's Deity would receive the sensory excitations from every part of God's body. Thus, though Deity is lodged in only a part of Space-Time yet it receives an infinite number of sensations and has infinite memory, expectations etc.,

From the above consideration it might be inferred that the distinction of 'enjoyment' and 'contemplation' would

1. STD II. P. 359
disappear in the Infinite God. But, according to Alexander, there is still the distinction of enjoyment and contemplation for the Infinite God (1). So far as Deity contemplates the body, it enjoys its 'deisings', but its own deisings cannot be contemplated. Hence, it would seem that even God cannot know His deisings. As Alexander did not elaborate this part, so he did not see the difficulty of 'enjoyment'. Consistently with his theory, even the Infinite God would cease to be omniscient. This would have led him to revise his doctrine of 'enjoyment'. But Alexander did not elaborate this topic for he did not believe that an Infinite God with actual Deity exists. He argued for the non-existence of an Infinite God with actual Deity in the following way.

THE INFINITE GOD WITH ACTUAL DEITY:—

The picture of an infinite God, as actually possessing Deity, has been drawn only as a concession or aid to our understanding. At each level, deity has been felt to be actually infinite, but as soon as it becomes actual, it has been found to be finite. Thus, we find that material objects, living organisms and conscious beings are all finite, though as ideal deity they were infinite. Hence, purely on empirical evidence, it has been found that the possessor of deity is always a finite and not an infinite being (1).

"Thus there is no actual infinite being with the quality of deity; but there is an actual infinite, the whole universe, with a minus to deity; and this is the God of

the religious consciousness, though that consciousness habitually forecasts the divinity of its object as actually realised in an individual form". (2)

If the infinite God with actual deity does not exist, then the question arises, why should an Infinite God with actual deity be imagined to be an existing being? The reason is that there are actual infinites, *viz*: Space-Time itself which is a-priori. Then, there are infinite lines in space and infinite numbers. Analogically, therefore, the religious minds imagine that an Infinite God with Deity does actually exist. But they do not see that the analogy is false. The infinite lines and numbers deal with primary qualities and these are no real qualities at all, and God with actual Deity is a real qualified entity. Hence, what is true of unqualified entities need not be true of a qualified entity. So far as our empirical evidence goes we find that the qualified infinite is purely ideal without the possibility of its ever being actual (1).

But it is not enough to discard the possibility of an Infinite God with actual Deity on the basis of empirical evidence alone. In accordance with the system of Alexander, the existence of an infinite God with actual deity is equally impossible on theoretical grounds. We know that the categories, being the pervasive features of all things, must apply to an infinite God with actual Deity. If they cannot be applied, then deity cannot be imagined to be actual.

Now, the body of God is the whole of Space-Time itself, and we have already seen that Space-Time itself is beyond the categories. But, it may be conjectured that the deity of an Infinite God, being limited to a portion of the universe, will be a limited individuality. However, deity is not an individual, for an individual is the union of particular and universal. But, the actual deity, representing the whole of Space-Time, does not admit of being repeated and without repetition there can be no universal. Similarly, the actual deity cannot be said to be a substance, for representing the whole of Space-Time physiologically, there is no other substance to which it can be related. So the actual deity of an Infinite God is as much beyond the categories, as is the body of the Infinite God. Therefore, an infinite God with an actual deity is merely ideal, without the possibility of its being actual. Hence, it is an idle dream to think of an infinite existing God. Deity is a nisus and not an accomplishment (1). Now we can end the whole argument with a statement of Alexander, which has an echo of the conclusion of Kant's Transcendental Dialectic:

"God as an actual existent is always becoming deity but never attains it. He is the ideal God in embryo. The ideal when fulfilled ceases to be God, and yet it gives shape and character to our conception of the actual God, and always tends to usurp its place in our fancy". (2)

Thus, an infinite God with actual deity is always an ideal, ——— a transcendental illusion of Kant if we try to (know

1. STD II. p. 364. 2. STD II. p. 365; also p. 410
Him to be actually existing. Of course, Kant does not question the being of God, but only our possibility of knowing Him. Alexander went farther. He removed not only the possibility of knowing Him, but also the very possibility of 'conceiving' (**) Him. Hence, the Infinite God with actual Deity is neither a constitutive nor a regulative idea of the scientific world, but a figment of the imagination.

**SUCCESSIVE PHASES OF DEITY:**

Deity has been defined as the higher than the highest emergent so far and in the evolutionary hierarchy the different emergents have come into being successively. With the successive evolution of matter, life and mind, deity too has been varying; and, as the world grows in time, so deity changes with it (1).

"What makes the world divine is not the same quality for the animal as it is for the man, not the same for the man as it is for the merely material body. But at each stage of the world's history as it strives out towards the production of the next stage, and it must do so if time is real, there is in front of it a culmination analogous to that which we call God". (2)

If deity is different for matter, life and mind, and varies with the lapse of time, then, does not God too change with it? We will find that it is the same question as that which deals with the creation of the world in relation to a theistic God. Does the world make a difference

**In Kant's sense of 'conceiving'.**

1. Deity p.10 (Draft of September 1914, of about 32 pages); also Abstract of Gifford Lectures for 1917-18, Lecture IX. p. 22; STD 11. p. 346
2. On Taking Time Seriously p. 16.
to the Creator or not? Now Alexander pointed out that the body of God includes all empirical and a-priori existences and the successive growth adds only to the quality but not to the quantity of Space-Time. Alexander has expressed this better in his Draft of 'DEITY' than in SPACE, TIME AND DEITY. In his draft he wrote thus:

"The universe grows not by extension but in time that is by refinement within space. Thus it is true that God grows in time, but no matter what empirical quality may be deity, the whole of the world including its deity is still expressible without remainder as Space-Time" (1).

Thus there is growth only in the complexity of the internal arrangements within Space-Time, but Space-Time as a whole does not grow (2). Here we find the touch of Absolutism in the philosophy of Alexander, to which we will refer later.

Then, again, we have defined deity as the next higher empirical quality to the highest we know (3), and now we see that 'the highest quality' keeps on shifting in the evolutionary emergence. From this, does it follow that there is no deity at the levels which have ceased to be the highest? In other words, does it follow that matter and life now have no deity and mind too will cease to have any, as soon as angels or gods emerge in God's good time and place? Alexander was so much occupied with deity as ahead of mind and was so much convinced that there were no angels or gods that he did not pay sufficient attention to this

1. Draft of 'Deity' p.10.(b) 2. STD II. p. 366.
3. STD II. p. 345.
question. He meant that matter still worships life, and life even now divines or tries to bring about mind. It is this effort on the part of the lower levels which sustains the existence of the highest level. Only the highest emergent will know that the deity of the lower levels has ceased to be deity, but the lower levels will continue to have the nisus for their deity. In his draft of Deity, Alexander has dealt with this problem in the following way:

"Thus it is inherent in the notion of deity that as soon as the divine quality is realised it ceases to be divine for the beings of that level. It does not cease to be divine for the creatures for which it represents the next stage of evolution of empirical qualities". (1).

The same point with greater clearness has been stated in 'Spinoza and Time':

"And within the 'minds' of these material or living things themselves the nisus is felt as a nisus towards something unattained, and they have the analogue of what religion is for me. The 'mind' of the stone is a dim striving towards life, which for the stone is an unattained level of existence; although we who come later know that life has taken the realised form of finite living things". (2)

Again, he wrote the same thing to Miss H. Oakeley in a letter of 4.4.1921.

"But even now matter finds its 'deity' in life and is unaware of living beings as such;..." (3)

The above question has a great deal of relevance in connection with angels or gods. We have already seen that an Infinite God with His realised Deity is not an actual Being. The same cannot be said about finite gods or angels.

There might be gods or angels in whom psychic brain or mind is the 'body' and godship or angelness is mind, according to the universal formula of mind-body relationship.

"If Time has by now actually brought them forth, they do exist; if not, their existence belongs to the future. If they do exist ('millions of spirits walk the earth') they are not recognisable in any form of material existence known to us; and material existence they must have; though conceivably there may be such material bodies, containing also life and mind as the basis of deity, in regions of the universe beyond our ken". (1)

Thus, Laird too grants that, according to the premises of Alexander, there is nothing to forbid the belief that there may be angels, and also plenty of Jovian gods above angels, and there may be also plenty of Promethean gods above Jovian gods (2). Because they must have matter, life and mind, therefore from this it does not follow that they must be knowable. They may be in a universe beyond our ken.

Besides, we cannot know them as such, for we can neither contemplate them nor enjoy them.

The existence of gods or angels may be scholastic and trivial (3), but human beings would continue to pray to gods and the gods may be responding to them all the time and yet according to Alexander, as we will see later, such responsiveness has been denied. Who knows, the angels might be worshipping the Jovian gods, and the Jovian gods in their turn might be worshipping the Promethean gods, all unaware. If deity does not cease to be deity for the creatures for which

3. STD II. p. 565
it represents the next stage, after it has become empirically existent, then polytheism becomes a credible creed. If, however, deity ceases to be so, after it has become empirically concrete, then there will come a time when a man will cease to worship as soon as deity has become incarnate in concrete forms. Deity-blindness in that case will become an inevitable stage of progress. In this sense, Freud, Russell and the Marxists will be the real prophets of the New Age. Further, if deity ceases to be deity as soon as it has become concrete, then, even Space-Time, Matter and Life now will have no birth-pang for deity and therefore, it will not be proper to say that the whole world is in travail to bring forth deity. Thus, if we take the definition of deity as 'the next higher empirical quality to the highest we know', then the question about gods and angels is not really trivial or scholastic.

The existence of gods or angels may be scholastic, but the question of the relation of values with gods or deity cannot be said to be so trivial, for in God our values are said to be objectively enshrined. Let us therefore take up this problem.

**GOD AND VALUE.**

We have already seen that, according to Alexander, the whole universe in its creative advance towards a new emergent is God. It is also certain that minds are the spring-board from which a higher jump will be made. When the creative
nus in man towards deity becomes actual, then mind will form its 'body'. But what will happen to the Tertiary qualities of Truth, Beauty and Goodness? No doubt Alexander would say that they will also form the 'body' of the next emergent quality. But this question requires a detailed treatment, for God is considered to be the very embodiment of these values for which human beings seem to be painfully limping. In this spirit, therefore, Hoffding has defined religion as faith in the conservation of values. However, according to Alexander, deity is altogether different in kind from mind and therefore will be sustained by values but it will be quite different in nature from them.

MORALITY AND RELIGION:— In religion man is said to be responding to God with his whole personality, and, therefore, in his religious experience every fibre of his being is likely to be aroused. Hence, the impulses of disinterested curiosity, constructiveness and sociality are likely to be used in the service of religion. As such there is no wonder that art, science and goodness have been hallowed by religion.

But of all values morality or goodness has been considered to be very closely related to religion. The reason is not far to seek. Religion, as its etymology implies (†), is a communal response (1), and, therefore, Durkheim has specially

* Perhaps the term 'religion' has come out from the root 'religare', which means 'bind.'
†. STD II. p. 404.
emphasised the social role of religion. Again, we have seen that morality is also a social response. Therefore, it is no wonder that morality and religion have come to be intimately related. Very often a religion is judged by its moral conduct which it inspires in its followers, and a good moral standard, in its turn, leads to a high and developed religion. From the earliest time morality and religion have been found to be intimately connected. For instance, the observance of religious rituals and taboos was considered to be moral duties, and the moral laws, in turn, were considered to be divine ordinances (2).

From the above observation, said Alexander, it must not be considered that religion is a natural outgrowth of morality. This view of Alexander is opposed to what Bradley had held. According to Bradley, religion is the termination of morality. 'It is a moral duty not to be moral' (3), and this is 'the duty to be religious' (4). As such we have to make an appeal to facts for deciding the issues so raised. "Since experience then shows that there may be religion without virtue, and virtue without religion, we conclude that, however closely related the two sentiments, that for deity and that for goodness, are distinct" (1).

The reason is that morality is based on the instinct of sociality and religion is based on the brute sentiment for deity. In the Biblical language, we attain to God not by works but by faith. But in religion, being a response of

2. This is most clear from the Jewish commandments. See Exodus chapters 20-23.
3. Appearance and Reality p. 436. 4. Ibid. p. 441.
1. STD 11. p. 405; also Cf. 'Fingerposts to Religion'. pp. 6, 6-7.
the whole personality, we are shaken in every fibre of our being and the religious emotion seizes upon the moral and other values, and treats them as conditions for its sustenance and enjoyment (2). The same view has been held by Whitehead:

"Conduct is a by-product of religion——an inevitable by-product, but not the main point. Every great religious teacher has revolted against the presentation of religion as a mere sanction of rules of conduct. Saint Paul denounced the Law, and Puritan divines spoke of the filthy rags of righteousness. The insistence upon rules of conduct marks the ebb of religious fervour" (3).

However, the independence of morality and religion of each other can be best judged in the context of the relation between Goodness and Deity.

GOODNESS AND DEITY:—We have already seen that from the practical viewpoint Goodness is the highest manifestation of finite existence (4), but deity is beyond even goodness. Value is a human invention and not a quality. However, deity is a quality or at least a tendency towards a quality higher than mind. In this sense, deity is ultra-human (1). This is supported from various points of view. Firstly, we have already drawn a distinction between 'perfection' and 'value'. There is difference of 'perfection' between matter, life, mind and deity, in the order of hierarchical development.

1. STD II. p. 405; also Cf. 'Fingerposts to Religion' pp. 6, 6-7
5. STD II. p. 409.
But value does not admit of any distinction of degrees. Value is either fitting or unfitting in a certain context absolutely. Thus, there is a radical distinction between a thing which is of the order of perfection and of the order of value. Now, deity is of the order of 'perfection', and therefore, it is not value. Then, again, Alexander pointed out that value implies a subject-object relationship. But neither God nor His Deity can be of the nature of this subject-object relationship. Therefore, they cannot be called value (2).

Further, value is found at all levels in contrast with what is not value, and, therefore, it is a feature in all finite existences. But deity is still future—a becoming and so has not to contrast itself with anything existent. Therefore, the question of value does not arise in relation to deity.

"There is a good speculative meaning in this fancy, for value breaks out wherever there is finite existence of however high a level. But if deity is realised, we have passed beyond the conception of actual God, the infinite world tending to deity; and God for the angels is an infinite being still transcending them in quality" (3).

If deity is not value, then even goodness cannot be ascribed to it. To call deity good is to make it human (1), which it cannot be. We have seen that value is that which is permanent, defeating the impermanent, and deity is founded on all that is permanent and therefore valuable in finite existents so far. Therefore, all values, including

2. B.F.V. P. 292
3. STD 11. P. 419.
1. Fingerposts to Religion PP. 3-4, 21.
goodness, form the material on which deity is founded (2).

"Deity, therefore, ensuing upon a level of existence like man, would absorb into itself all goodness and beauty and truth which are man-created values, and man's goodness might be regarded as a feeder of God's deity, used up in bringing that deity to birth". (3)

Hence, God's deity, though not good, is on the side of goodness, and if we take God's body into account then we find that, being the whole of Space-Time, it includes good as well as bad (4). The reason is that an evil will is as much an actual something as a good will is. Therefore, being an actuality, both good and bad will must be in Space-Time, for nothing can be outside it (5). Then, again, as the body of God sustains His deity, and as deity exists on what is permanent and good, so the evil, ugly and false have to be 'unmade to be made' to be suitable for sustaining deity. Hence, there is the redemption of the purgation of evils (6).

From the above consideration it is clear that in a sense deity conserves values, for they are the materials on which deity is founded. This point has been well expressed by Leighton:

"All values are conserved in Deity and it is an outgrowth of them. Deity is not a value in itself but it is of the essence of value. All unvalues are left in the substructure below Deity". (1)

Values form the proximate body and unvalues are pushed in the remote body of deity. Thus, deity is beyond values and quite different in kind from them. Hence, deity transcends them (2).

"Deity is a quality distinct from and superior to goodness or beauty or truth. I can be enthusiastic for beauty or truth, but I have no worship for them. They excite in me no religious feeling, though in many persons they may supply the place of religion, where no religion is felt. The mystics are right; we worship or live in God, not His goodness, but His godship or deity". (3).*

Alexander called histeology a forward view in contrast with the traditional theology, which he regarded as founded on a 'backward view' of things. In other words, God, according to Alexander, evolves in time. Therefore, the notion of deity which we have discussed so far is a created being and therefore not a creator. Hence, God is not eternal, according to Alexander, but He is essentially involved in the process of time. We have therefore to discuss the creativity and temporality of God.

**IS GOD A CREATOR?**

God is the whole universe with a nusus towards deity. In this form no doubt it is a creative impulse. But the distinctive feature of God is His deity, created at each stage of the empirical ladder, in the onward sweep of time. Thus, deity is created (1), and because it is

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1. B.F.V. P. 294.
3. This conviction of Alexander that religion is distinct from morality, science and art and that it is unique, is also supported by Clement Webb: "... I will in the same dogmatic fashion remark that any attempt to identify religion with some other form of human experience---with knowledge, with aesthetic appreciation, with the consciousness of moral obligation---it will be found impossible to carry through" (Religion and the thought of To-day P. 12). 2. On Taking Time Seriously 1. STD 11. P. 397; P.L.E. P. 270 P. 13. The historicity of things, P.15-16.
as yet an unattained goal of the creatures, therefore, it belongs to the future (2). Hence, in the ordinary sense of the term God, so far as deity is distinctive of Him, is not a Creator at all. Hence, according to Alexander, the conception of a personal Creator, who preceded the universe, cannot be accepted. But the body of God is the whole of Space-Time itself and this body being swept on by Time in its onward march is certainly self-creative.

"If, indeed, we take God to mean no more than the creative impulse by which the world goes its restless way in time, in this sense there is indeed a Creator God" (1).

However, the distinctive feature of God is His deity and this deity is really a creature. Not only is it created at each higher level before breaking forth into empirical existents, but it is also sustained and supported by the lower levels and specially by the just approximate level from which a new emergent will shoot forth.

"Now in so far as God owes his being to preceding history he is himself dependent on finite beings and in particular man" (2).

THE FATHERHOOD OF GOD: In a real sense, man as all other finite existents comes from Space-Time which is therefore our real father. But Space-Time by itself arouses our mathematical or speculative intuition in relation to it and not our religious emotion (3), and therefore, we do not worship Space-Time and we do not call it our father. But

1. The Historicity of Things p. 15.
2. On taking Time Seriously p. 55; also see P.I.P. p. 330.
3. STD II. p. 353.
God in His nisus towards deity touches every fibre of our being and we turn to Him and we find Him. This responsiveness of God, this gathering or drawing up of ourselves to Him, makes us dependent on Him. It is this sense of dependence on Him which gives us the feeling of being enlarged, enhanced, uplifted and transformed. In this mysterious largeness of sustenance God is felt as a Father (1).

The same thing has been put by Alexander in a different way:

"If the nature of deity, its feel and colour, are unknown, the ideal which we help to realise is nearer to us when a realised being who commands us or even one of whom we are a part. The idea of fatherhood applies to this changed relation, for the ideal which we create is itself as in us the cause of our own action" (2).

However, this fatherhood is merely a figurative or pictorial representation of a real experience. But, then, again, ordinarily, instead of a 'forward view' we take a 'backward view' of things. According to the forward view, Deity to whom we raise our hands in prayers, is not at the beginning of time, but is the last in the order of generation (3).

God, so far as He is worshipful, according to Alexander, always belongs to the future.

"If conceived theistically he is projected in time in front of the universe at any stage of its history, as a being which the universe is seeking to produce, with whom the heavens and the earth are in travail. If he is still conceived not theistically as some individual existence, but pantheistically as co-extensive with the whole he is still beyond the level of present attainment, for his distinctive quality, what makes him divine is as yet unattained but only prepared for and belongs to the future" (4).

1. STD II. p.579. 2. Septimana Spinozana 1933 p.133.
3. STD II. p. 579.
4. On Taking Time Seriously p.15; also p.16; The Historicity of Things p.15-6; Septimana Spinozana 1933 p.131.
THE DIFFICULTIES OF CONCEIVING GOD AS A CREATOR:

Thus, according to Alexander, Godship or Divinity always belongs to the future and therefore God cannot be conceived as a creator (1). This of course, sounds very odd, and, therefore, Alexander tried to fortify his position by showing the weakness and inconsistency in thinking of God as a Creator who precedes the universe. Firstly, when we think of God as a Creator, we also conceive Him as foreseeing what will happen to the universe in time. If God has created the universe, how can He be supposed to be ignorant of the laws of its on-going? But if so, then it involves contradiction. By accepting the reality of time, we have to further grant that it is always spinning out new creations and, if it means that it has been determined in advance, newness has no meaning. It seems that Alexander without elaborating this argument took for granted Bergson's criticism of teleology. Hence, following Alexander, we can put his view in this manner: If time is real, then the events cannot be foreseen even by God; and, if they are foreseen by God, then the world is not in real but faked time. However, time is real and there can be no Creator to foresee its elaborations.

"We are involved otherwise in all the mystery of a God who can foresee the history of the world, and this, if history is history, is self-contradictory". (2).

1. Septimana Spinozana 1933 p.131
2. The Historicity of Things p.15.
But there is another difficulty too. We will later elaborate the relationship between God and His worshippers. We find that it has been philosophically expressed in the conceptions of theism and pantheism. According to Theism, God has created the world at a certain point of time. Of course, there are such pertinent questions in relation to this theory: Why did he create the world, when he could exist without it? Does the world so created limit Him or not? But now we may ignore such difficulties and we may ask this question: Does He create the world out of a pre-existent material or does He create the world out of Himself? If God creates the world out of a pre-existent material, then He becomes an artificer only and ceases to be an infinite Creator. Again, if we say that God creates the material too out of Himself, then it means that God is the indwelling Spirit in the materials, shaping themselves, according to His own laws. God ceases then to be a Transcendent Creator and theism becomes inconsistent with itself (1). The notion of a Creator God becomes still more indefensible in relation to pantheism. In pantheism all things follow from God and they are in God. Here things and God are inseparable and the notion of Creation implies that there should be some independence of the creatures of their Creator. But, according to Pantheism, things are mere appearance of the ultimate

reality. They may be said to emanate from the ultimate reality. As such they coincide with it.

Of course, we can combine theism and pantheism, but we will find later on, that this is an artificial blending and in the long run is indefensible. Thus, we can think of God either theistically or pantheistically, but in either case the notion of a Creator God becomes superfluous and self-contradictory. Therefore, we have to abandon the notion of a Creator God (1). Ultimately then, for Alexander, the doctrine of Creation forms a part of religious mythology and as such has to be given up in his own philosophy.

CREATOR GOD AND THE PROBLEM OF EVIL: There is another weighty reason why the conception of a Creator God has to be given up and this is to be seen in relation to the problem of 'evil and suffering'. If God has created the universe then He must be responsible for everything in it. We also know that a theist can approach this problem of evil with a great deal of diffidence. The old dilemma is always before him: if God is Omniscient, then He must have deliberately allowed evil in the universe; and if He is Omnipotent, then He should have prevented it;

1. Septimana Spinozana 1935 p.131. 2. P.P.P. 326
"Epicurus' old questions are still unanswered. Is deity willing to prevent evil, but not able? Then he is impotent. Is he able but not willing? Then he is malvolent. Is he both able and willing? Whence then is evil?" (Quoted by W.R.Sorely from Hume's Dialogues Concerning Natural Religion, in his 'Moral Values and the idea of God' p.453 (Cambridge University Press 1918). In this dilemma everything depends on the interpretation of 'omnipotence' (Bergson, H. 'Morality and Religion' p.224). If God has the purpose of creating souls then the choice of 'free will' has to be allowed. But once this free will is given, the possib-
But, either He has not deliberately allowed evil or else He cannot prevent it; therefore, either He is not Omniscient or else He is not omnipotent. (*)

Of course, in the history of theological speculation subtle and deep explanations have been offered, but Alexander did not accept them. He did not even consider them on their own merits. In one sentence he brushed them aside, because they did not fit into his scheme of a purposeless universe (1).

"There is no over-ruling and pre-existing purpose in the world upon which we should throw the blame for what we cannot help, or which we need thank for its subtle device of helping us by pain, still less of selecting a few who should profit by the pain of others and feel their own happiness enlarged thereby, as the blessed are said to feel in Augustine's heaven". (2)

We find that Alexander temperamentally preferred the doctrine of Ameliorism, which had found favour with J.S. Mill, William James and the followers of Comte's 'Religion of Humanity'. But the story of Crucifixion throws light on the problem of suffering in a profound manner. Of course, the Christian view of suffering does not remove the veil of mystery, but certainly does not leave one completely baffled and stupefied in the face of it. In the words of Streeter, in the historical 'myth' of crucifixion we are initiated in:

*Of the suffering, evil and sin cannot be totally laid aside. After all the 'sorrowing Son of man' had to be made perfect through the vale of suffering.

2. STD 11. p. 422.
"A new mastery of the fact of pain—an apprehension that there is a kind and quality of pain that is creative, curative, redemptive, and that this is a kind of pain which man is privileged to share with God. Evil is neither explained nor denied; it is defeated." (1)

It is difficult to say that this view of suffering is inferior and masochistic in comparison with Alexander's doctrine of Ameliorism. But instead of halting here, let us proceed with Alexander's account concerning the difficulty of a Creator in respect of the problem of suffering.

If a theistic Creator, according to Alexander, cannot explain the problem of suffering, the pantheistic Creator fares worse. Of course, in the strict sense, as we have already seen, there is no room for a Creator in a pantheistic system. But, according to pantheism, everything is in God, both good as well as bad. For this reason the God of pantheism forfeits our affection for Him.

**Evolving God and Suffering:** Thus, according to Alexander, the problem of evil and suffering becomes insoluble for the theory in which there is a Creator God (2). But this problem becomes easier of solution for a theory in which there is an evolving Deity. Such a deity is not responsible for any evil in the world. As a matter of fact, God's deity is the outcome of the struggle between good and bad, and ultimately it is founded on the triumph of the good. Any prayer to such a God does not mean that His presence is already there to

help the issue, but it is simply a call to the ideal, in conformity with the world-nisus, to sustain such efforts to help the birth of deity. Because deity depends on our own successful effort in defeating the evil, therefore it makes human effort more serious(1). We are left on our own resources to combat evil and an intellectual acquiescence in the doctrine of an evolving God allows an incentive to the practical and virile effort for amelioration.

"Instead of the vague notion which misinterprets the analogy of artistic creation of a theistic creator which works from behind with intelligence and purpose, it substitutes the notion of a higher being or phase of being, itself a cosmic product, the idea of which impels the possessors of that idea forwards, and in that sense draws them on from on front" (2).

Of course, such a theory teaches that the springs of pain will never be dried up, but it also teaches that the impulse for betterment is also implanted in us by Space-Time itself (3), and we have therefore no other option but to work in that direction.

From the above statement it is clear that the doctrine of Ameliorism of Alexander is based on deep-seated pessimism. According to him, evil will not vanish from the earth (4), and what is worse, it has hardly any meaning. Evil is a perpetual feature at each stage in the hierarchical order of empirical existence, and is a condition of the ascent of

life. But, this ascent does not mean any worthier life, but is means a more 'perfect' life. Hence, the theory of Alexander is essentially a non-valuational view of life. Does this view of life make our pain less painful? Besides, the general doctrine of Determinism to which Alexander's theory is committed leaves no free choice even for this kind of Ameliorism. Even the effort at ameliorism is not due to any free and deliberate choice of the individual, but this

"attempt at betterment is at once implanted in us by the Space-Time out of which we are precipitated and secures the deity to which the world is tending" (1).

Hence, human efforts are but the perpetual drive of Space-Time in its ceaseless wanderings, without any purpose, rhyme or reason. The tone of Alexander may be hopeful, but other students of human nature and of the larger Nature beyond us have not found any ground of optimism. Nature 'red in tooth and claw' cares little for human suffering. Therefore, Alexander has simply contributed to the course of despair which Freud (2) and Russell (3) have taught so frankly and without disguise.

Dean Inge did not pay sufficient attention to Alexander's strong inclination to Spinozistic Reductionism and therefore he thought that Alexander was too full of apocalyptic hopes. After all emergents are seeming, mere incidents, and Space-

1. STD II p. 423. 2. The Future of an Illusion p. 56.  
Ibid p. 65; also see p. 66; Totem and Taboo p. 141 (Pelican Books)  
Time alone is Reality. Naturalism and Humanism, as Mr. Atkinson Lee has shown in his 'Groundwork of the Philosophy of Religion', cannot but end in despair.

**THE NATURE OF RELIGIOUS SENTIMENT:** We have to see whether this God of Alexander satisfies the religious need or not. But before we do so we have to determine the nature of the religious sentiment which Alexander's theology proposes to satisfy.

The theology of Alexander has shown so far that God is the whole universe with its niusus towards deity (1). If this be the nature of God, then the whole push of the total world in its onward drive is felt as divine. This is exactly what happens, according to Alexander, in our religious experience. It

"is the feeling of our going out towards something not ourselves and greater and higher than ourselves, with which we are in communion;..." (2)

Religious sentiment no doubt is a complex experience but it is centred round its own nuclear emotion. This nuclear emotion may be called a religious appetite, which when aroused would lead to the discovery of its appropriate object in the same way in which hunger impels the organism towards the discovery of food (3). Thus, religion is based on a real impulse towards the divine. Like any other appetite, it may be either directly provoked by the presence of its appropriate

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2. STD II. p. 373; also see p. 346.
3. STD II. p. 374. 4. STD II. p. 376.
object or else it may be aroused from the internal working of its own nature. When the religious emotion will be thus aroused in an individual, then he would find his God (4). This religious emotion is found in various degrees of development. It may be found in a very rudimentary form, as when it is aroused by a thunderstorm; or, it may be in a refined form, as when it is aroused by beauty, truth of goodness. But primarily we feel God and then by acting towards Him come to have some reflexive knowledge of Him. To feel religiously then is to be caught up in the mighty whirl of the universe in its creative advance towards a new emergent.

"In that forward movement due to the onward sweep of Time our minds with their substructure of body are caught, and our religious response is at once the mark that we are involved in that nius, and that our minds contribute in their part towards it" (1).

This sensitiveness to the world-nius is not confined to any specific sense-organs or understanding, but it is due to the arousal of the whole personality responding to the whole of reality, it is the deep which responds to the Deep. In this religious response the intellect is not silenced or stifled for it does not work here in any significant manner. Our whole personality, being caught up in the world-nius, becomes surcharged with it and the nius enters into our total constitution.

"and as impregnated with this tendency it affects the mind by other ways than cognition, though interpretable in the ways of cognition" (2).

When the religious craving has discovered its object, then the intellect imparts to it some definiteness and form.

Few will object to the above description of the religious experience itself. Of course, one will object to the nature of the supposed object from which, according to Alexander, the "saving experience comes". As oft repeated this object which provokes the religious experience is the whole of the universe with its niusus towards deity. But does the uniqueness of the religious experience bestow any objectivity on it? The feeling of being enhanced, elevated and raised up by an external object may be wholly a paranoiac delusion. Unfortunately, Alexander did not pay sufficient attention to the question. Following William James (*) he assumed that nothing so effective could be unreal. Believing that no mental process can work in void, he wrote:

"Worship is co-operation; and if our sentiment proceeds from a conation adapted to the universe in its forward tendency, God in his turn is adapted to that conation and satisfies it, and it is as satisfying it that we discover his deity". (1).

God, for Alexander, is as much an appropriate object of religious emotion as food is for hunger.

"Perhaps in the same way the impulse to worship implies a God, in searching for whom we get to know him". (2)

From the above statements it is clear that Alexander did not regard our religious experience as illusory, and dismissed

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* Alexander has written an address of 33 pages on "Prof. James's Gifford Lectures". Some of the materials of this address have been utilised in SPACE, TIME AND DEITY.
the objection of those without such experience on the ground that they may be deity-blind (3). But he insisted that deity is felt and experienced and its reality "is forced upon us both in philosophical conception and in the feeling it evokes in us of itself". (1)

The same thing he said in his 'Six Lectures on Values, Summary' "What I would suggest for your reflection, is that the existence of deity is not something which depends upon us like beauty, but which forces itself upon us, and we cannot get away from it. It is something that becomes the basis of the religious creeds, but is felt, as the wind is felt, and all our creeds are super-structures based upon this fact. what sort of fact it is, it is hard to discover" (2).

Following Rudolph Otto, Alexander later emphasized the eeriness or the uncanniness of the religious experience of a tremendous mystery (3).

"There is a character in the world, call it by what name you will; Mr. Otto calls it numinous, I prefer to call it deity, to which we respond in this fashion, ourselves acting as a whole in response to the play upon us of this whole of which we are a part". (4)

Finally, since the nisus is always forward-looking and deity is always a quality in the future, how can it be effective in the present? No doubt, the present feeling can be aroused only by something actual, but the actual world contains the seed or the pull for the future. what acts upon us, according to Alexander, is that which is going to make deity actual. Hence the futurity of deity does not prevent it from its exerting its present pull on us (5).

1, STD 11. p. 37b. 2, Summary p. 9; see also P.L.P. p. 36-7, where he pointed out that religious feeling and its object are given in the one and the same experience.
Hence, we can say that we know God in His nisus towards deity through the religious emotion, which is assured by our religious faith (6). But at this stage we remember that, according to Alexander, we know other minds directly through assurance. The question arises, therefore, is there any difference between our knowledge of God and of other minds?

**The Assurance of God:** According to Berkeley, we know both God and other minds in the same way, by their gestures. Since God speaks to us through the whole of nature, which is divine language, therefore, our knowledge of God, according to Berkeley, is surer than that of other minds (+). According to Alexander, we know God and other minds directly, but our apprehension in the two cases is different. We know other minds through social emotion and we know God through religious emotion. Our social instinct brings us to other minds and the existence of them is revealed to us by their reciprocal actions upon us. But, according to Alexander, there is no reciprocal action from God and the so-called response from God, in our religious communion, is merely metaphorical (1).

"The universe does not answer to our prayers by overt external actions as our fellows respond to our social approaches to them, but in strength and sustainment which in its tendency to deity it gives to our minds" (2).

In other words, the strength of our belief in God is based

"Hence, it is evident that God is known as certainly and immediately as any other mind or spirit whatsoever distinct from ourselves. We may even assert that the existence of God is far more evidently perceived than the existence of men;..." (FRASER'S 'Selections from Berkeley', sec. 147, p. 110)

1. STD 11. p. 360. 2. STD 11. p. 361
on the intensity, frequency and continuity of our life of devotion alone. Though it is true that one knows one's God through faith (*), and does not see Him through his eyes, still it is not true that there is no reciprocity on the part of God. If the devotees had not felt constant guidance in their lives, they would not have attributed miracles to God. Constant prayers no doubt are powerful source of keeping one's faith alive, but it does not mean that they are not answered (1). At least one feels the presence of God in one's communion. Thus Prof. Webb wrote that devout persons:

"would certainly repudiate this doctrine.....and would claim that their prayers and their devotion were not left without a genuine answer from Him to Whom they were directed". (2)

Though Alexander is not quite specific in his denunciation of this 'feel' of God, yet from what he said it can be conjectured that he would regard it as purely illusory. If we declare the object of religious emotion to be illusory or 'myth' or nonsense, then, the reality of the religious experience, on which he has placed so much emphasis, also gets negated thereby. However, if we keep close to the testimony of religious experience, then we would have to accept that God is felt as a Guide, Comforter, Friend and

* We are reminded here of the famous lines of Tennyson, taken from his In Memoriam:

  Strong Son of God, immortal Love,
  Whom we, that have not seen Thy face,
  By faith, and faith alone, embrace,
  Believing where we cannot prove;

1. Webb, C. C. J. 'Religion and the Thought of To-day' p. 11.
2. Church Quarterly Review, 1922, Vol. 93, p. 352
Saviour. Alexander has simply tried to admit only that much of attenuated experience of God which would fit into his scheme of things. He put emphasis on the fact that God is felt, even as lifting a man above his lowly self, but he would not like to admit that this feeling is of a Personal Being. Once again we come to the conclusion that, according to Alexander, we know that there is a Being, but we do not know what that being is. Alexander could escape from the difficulty of Kant's Ding-an-sich by a verbal solution of it. He called that Being the whole universe with a nisus towards deity. But really such a description of God means nothing at all. According to Alexander, God cannot be described even in terms of values. He simply pointed out that a religious experience is a craving for something we know not what. He is felt as wind is felt, but what sort of thing he is, is hard to describe. In many respects Alexander comes very near to Schleiermacher and we can perhaps say of him what Mackintosh said of Schleiermacher: "Deity is active in the world; and Schleiermacher, if we put it so, saw the movement of God's finger, but His face as yet he had not seen. He felt for the hem of His garment, as it swept through the immensities of time and space; but regarding the infinite Holiness and Love......he had thus far maintained a nearly complete silence".

We can only add that Alexander regarded 'Holiness and Love' either a metaphor or a beautiful mythology or, as he said in his more intimate circle, 'nonsense'. Stripped of all its

3. Six Lectures on Values; Summary P. 7.
philosophical flavour for Alexander God is the creative Universe, an *Elan Vital* of Bergson, and to feel this impulse of creativity is to be religious.

However, for Alexander, the existence of God is not only supported by our religious instinct, but is also assured speculatively. We know that there is an hierarchical scheme of empirical existents, as a result of an historical process, and therefore, analogically we can argue that a higher type is bound to be unfolded by the onward sweep of time. In other words, the reality of deity follows from the general plan on which Space-Time works (1).

"The belief reposes on this double basis; or at least when emotion assures us of God, we can look for speculative evidence of him in experience, and the direct experience and the speculative one support and supplement each other"(2)

But, ultimately everything will depend on the adequacy of Alexander's theology in satisfying our religious need.

DOES THE THEOLOGY OF ALEXANDER SATISFY THE RELIGIOUS SENTIMENT?

We have already seen the description of the nature of religious sentiment, according to Alexander. Alexander accepted four rough criteria by which the sufficiency of a philosophical conception of God may be tested. They require that God:

"should be greater than man, a 'universal' or all-inclusive being, different in quality from man, and finally, responsive to man, ...."(3)

Alexander held that in relation to these four criteria
"the religious consciousness attests the philosophical
conception that God's deity is the issue in Time of a
tendency or nisus in the world, an issue which
is dependent on the nature of things lower than itself" (4).
Now therefore, let us see how Alexander's theology satisfies
these criteria.

It needs no comment that God should be greater than man.
If He is not at least that, He need not be worshipped at all.
But if He is, then the deity of Alexander, being in the order
of higher development of 'perfection' is certainly greater
than man. Further, though gods have been regarded as merely
tribal or national, even in the early history of Judaism,
we can accept the second criterion that God, in principle,
should be universal. As the nisus towards deity is sustain¬
ed by all finite creatures, deity may be conceded to be
universal. Even if there be gods or angels already existent,
the fate of deity remains unchanged, for even gods and angels
are under the Nix, impending over them, -- 'the menace which
Prometheus levels against Zeus of supersession by a higher
God' (1).

God as different in nature from man: The third criterion,
namely, God should be different in quality from man, deserves
more than a passing reference. According to Alexander, God's
divinity is not merely higher humanity but is different in
kind from mind. We have already seen that deity is founded

on values but is different in kind from being Truth, Beauty and Goodness. Deity, being raised above willing, said Alexander, is not goodness at all (2).

"Deity does not know, but only the minds know which are included in the body of God" (3).

Therefore, the so-called attributes of God, viz., Omnipotence, Infinite Goodness etc., are 'the figurative disguises of a faith in something of a different order from man'. (1) In such cases, where of its very nature precise knowledge is wanting, we are said to indulge in lyrical poetry.

"But since we cannot picture this higher quality to ourselves but only have faith that there is such, we satisfy our pictorial and mythologising instinct by imagining a man or personality of vaster power, intelligence, wisdom and goodness than ours" (2).

If the deity of Alexander is so unapproachable, then any prayer to Him is in vain. Prayers, according to Alexander, simply consist in strengthening oneself in one's effort to make deity incarnate. It has subjective reality, but it cannot have any objective response from a Heavenly Father. We have already touched this point, but prayers are such an important feature of religious life that unless theologians satisfactorily explain them, he cannot hope to win approval from the religious devotees (4). Alexander's approach is negative and this is clear from the following statement:

"What indeed prayer always is, the fortifying of a man by himself to help in making something better than himself; in a word instead of a religion of admiration we should have one of aspiration. The ideal God whom man brings into being in man's measure (for all things contribute to that end, though

1. STD II.-p. 383  2. STD II.-p. 384
man is nearest) by his offer of the things upon which he sets value, by his virtue or his creation of beauty or truth, draws man to him by the impulse contained in man's own nature, which strives to create the very being which it adores." (1)

In simple language, if a life of prayer is addressed to a personal God, then it is simply illusory. Thus, Alexander has brought together two things, which are inconsistent with each other. Firstly, he pointed out that religion arises from an impulse to worship and this is engendered by the impact upon us of the whole world with its tendency to deity (2). Now he tells us that a real religious life consists in creating the very God whom he worships. But the creative act is very different from the adoring act. It is really the adoring act which is worship and if this is illusory, then it means that religious emotion itself is illusory. The world-nisus may help us to create, but as a creator we can create only values but not divinity. If man's god is the creation of his fingers, then he will be the idolater of Truth, Beauty and Goodness. This contradicts his own statement that impelled by the religious appetite we discover or find God but we do not invent Him (3). By denying the existence of actual deity Alexander has made religious worship purely subjective, and in a way illusory. This negative idea of the nature of deity can hardly do justice to the fourth criterion, namely, the responsiveness of God to man.

* Thus Prof. Webb has written that the religion of the ordinary man is overlooked when the investigator neglects the testimony of common prayers, public worship etc. (Religion and the Thought of To-day p.7)
THE RESPONSIVENESS OF GOD: Alexander granted that the responsiveness of God to man is the most vital and distinctive feature in the religious experience (1). From the very dawn of religious consciousness man seems to be dependent on God. It was first felt in the awe and fear in the presence of God. At a more advanced stage it was clearly observed in the pantheistic development of thought, in which man and God were taken to be identical. In the 19th century, in the neo-Kantianism of Green, the human mind was supposed to be in organic dependence on God. However, Alexander pointed out that in the more pantheistic tradition of thought this responsiveness culminates in the Fatherhood of God. We have already seen that Alexander regarded this Fatherhood as merely a 'pictorial representation' (2), and a mere projection (3) of a real religious situation. Alexander wrote about it thus:

"In this conception may be traced the primaeval mystery which is the root of religion; for to the child the father is the mysterious something which he discovers to be like himself, a person by whom he is sustained but who issues arbitrary commands which the child must obey" (4).
No doubt this relation is moralised and refined, and God is considered to be not only an inscrutable Power, but He is also taken to be One who is moved by Love and Mercy.

God is said to be responsive, according to Alexander, only in this sense: that deity as an ideal liberates forces in man, which enhance him and give him 'large sustenance'.

Again, man is said to matter to deity, because it is man who sustains it and will ultimately make it incarnate through his efforts.

"And it is, I believe, felt (though perhaps I am misled by philosophical prepossessions) as the sense that we also help to maintain and sustain the nature of God and are not merely his subjects; that God himself is involved in our acts and their issues, or, as it was put above, not only does he matter to us, but we matter to him" (1)

Alexander was aware of his difficult conception of a deified God and he was conscious of the unworshipful nature of his God, at least in the eyes of the religious people. This fact should have made him revise his theology. But he did not do so for he regarded the current theology as mythology and Christology as a beautiful mythology only (1). Alexander confessed that it is hard to say whether his God is worshipful, and he added:

"It seems to me more reasonable (and helpful) to worship a being whose love draws us to him from in front, and whom we thus help into existence, rather than a being independent of our efforts, who pushes us from behind..." (2).

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1. STD 11, p. 366

*In this connection Sheen has observed:
"Either such a God is greater or less than man. If He is greater than man then the greater comes from the less, which is absurd; if He is less than man, then He is not a God but a puppet and a travesty of the name". (Religion without God p. 266). This criticism has been also accepted by Dean Inge.

See 'God and the astronomers' p. 115-6.)
But if this be the nature of deity, which is a mere ideal and can never be a concrete individuality, then, can we 'love' it? Can we labour to bring into being a creature whose fsee we can never see? It is true that deity is not a creature of wholly human efforts, but is sustained by the whole universe, but it also, according to Alexander, depends on us. If so, then does it continue to be higher than its creator 'man'? (3). Of course, according to Alexander, whether we like or dislike the world with its nisus will implant in us an impulse to bring about deity in God's own good time and place (1). If so, then there is no room, on our part, to choose freely the course of action. A religion, based on mere instinct, is wholly mechanical and largely unconscious. Alexander has dwelt on the reality of worship, but he has placed it in a sphere where there is no room for free worship. A Spinozistic Alexander cannot escape from the paradox of Spinoza. Spinoza himself wrote his Ethics for the improvement of moral life, but his doctrine of determinism denied any room for improvement. Similarly, Alexander asserted the reality of religion, but he also denied it in the sense that he declared it to be a mere 'necessity' of one's nature.

As we do not know the nature of deity, and it is idle to guess it, it becomes only a vague ideal. Can such a vague ideal infuse one with devotion for bettering his world, 

yet unborn? Alexander thought that it can:

"Such worship and obedience to God is like their devotion to their nation or country or state which again they call their father or mother, from the thought of whose future they derive their inspiration to good citizenship, so that they in a manner owe their being to it, and at the same time are aware that its future is in their hands" (1).

Here the analogy limps, for the ideal nature into which one tries to shape the future of one's country is never so vague, and the country too with its concrete life, is never a mere ideal in the abstract.

In 'Spinoza and Time' (1921), Alexander took Spinoza to task for denying the responsiveness of God to man.

"The healthy religious mind shares Spinoza's mysticism to the point of its feeling of our oneness with God; but it asks for the fathering response, and holds that God's need of us is no less than our need of him" (2).

But later, Alexander forgot this demand of the healthy mind. Deity ceased to be a concrete fact and it could be said to 'love' only in a metaphorical sense. Now, if Spinoza's God lacks the 'human note', then Alexander's God lacks it no less, for his God too has no responsiveness to love which we enjoy in our fellows (3).

Alexander did not accept the responsiveness of God in prayers and, therefore, he came to treat this responsiveness in an unintelligibly abstract way. Bradley noticed this and he wrote to Alexander in his letter of April 28, 1922, in the following way:

"And now, in the religious experience of so many devout persons, the presence and action in prayer of a responsive Power may, I think, be taken as an experienced fact. And I think that this 'proof' of God's existence is good — as far as it goes" (1).

But the more Alexander emphasised the historicity of temporality of things, the more he came to look upon Space-Time with a nias towards deity in the form of Unconscious Will (2). We will find later that he tried to escape from pure Voluntarism by his doctrine of progressive nias, but in the end the conception of a 'progressive nias' cannot bear the weight of argumentative stress against it.

However, Alexander was less concerned to satisfy the religious sentiment directly, and he was more concerned in justifying himself in relation to the philosophical theories (3) about the religious experience. We find that in the course of theological speculation, the doctrines of theism and pantheism have arisen to explain the relation of God to man. But theism on pantheism

"in itself it is a philosophical and not in the first instance a religious conception. .... He (God) still asks aid from the pictorial imagination in order to be realised for our reflective weakness; but requires no pictures that depend on violent hypotheses" (4).

Alexander, in his discussion of theism and pantheism tried to avoid 'violent hypotheses' and considered his own contribution to be superior to the traditional account of them and so let us deal with them.

THEISM AND PANTHEISM. Alexander accorded a great deal of importance to these two theories in connection with his theology. He even considered their successful blending as a mark of the reasonableness of his theology. Theism and pantheism, according to Alexander, arise from a blending of the data of the religious experience with philosophy. Their merits as philosophical theories depend on their capacities for satisfying religious needs, and their demerits mean therefore, failure in doing so (1).

We will define theism and pantheism shortly, but now we can say that theism refers to a *transcendent* and pantheism refers to an *immanent* God. Therefore, before we discuss the merits and defects of these theories, we should settle the meaning of the terms 'transcendence' and 'immanence'. A transcendent being is one which exists outside the world. This world, of course, includes both material as well as spiritual beings (2). This is best illustrated in the God of Aristotle, who, having created the world retired from it. On the other hand, according to Alexander, an immanent being is one who pervades the whole universe and has no existence outside this universe (3). This is best illustrated in the Substance of Spinoza which is *natura naturans* as well as *natura naturata* and is fully exhausted in the world of which it is the indwelling spirit.

The above characteristics of an immanent being should

be carefully noted, for it cannot be said to be immanent in a limited portion only. Immanence is not the same thing, said Alexander, as omnipresence. To be present at a thing is not to exist in it (1). The God of theism is said to sustain the life of the creatures but He cannot be said to be in them. Obviously, a theistic God has His life separate from those of His creatures. This point is of sufficient importance, for theism also maintains that God became immanent in His incarnations, as in Hinduism and Christianity. Jesus has been regarded as God and man alike—a perfect God and a perfect man. But Alexander dismissed this conception as illogical, for God cannot be said to be immanent in an integral individual only, because an immanent God is either in all things alike or in none of them. However, we can note here one point. Alexander regarded Bradley and Spinoza as on the same line of pantheistic speculation (2). But both of them have maintained that though Reality is in all things, it is not found in the same degree in all of them. There is more of Reality in a saint than in a sinner, and more of it in man than in a stone (3). If Alexander's own observation and interpretation be correct, then, we can say that the greater degree of perfection is transcendent to the things of lower degrees. Only in this sense, Jesus and God are said to be fuller and higher than other creatures.

As a matter of fact his own solution in terms of God and deity is based on this observation. Anyway, Alexander regarded the conception of God-man as an artificial solution of the religious problem.

"Supposing that the highest religious consciousness demands a historical personage, who is a man but really God........ that experience is not to be described in rational terms as a synthesis of immanence and transcendence or pantheism and theism; but if it can be rationalised at all, demands different conceptions". (1=)

From the above argument, Alexander came to the conclusion that immanence and transcendence are exclusive terms and they cannot be reconciled rationally as Ward tried to do in his definition of theism. If God is co-extensive with the world, as immanence must maintain, then He cannot transcend it; and, if he transcends it, then He cannot be immanent in it (2). Of course, a theistic God may be at once transcendent and immanent in the sense that He is immanent in the minds of men who recognise Him consciously. But such an immanence, according to Alexander, is not the 'immanence' of philosophy (1).

1. F.E.P. p. 328. *In the same strain Alexander wrote a few pages ahead: "It appears to me vain to support our belief in any revelation of God in man, and still less in any particular man, no matter how perfect and beautiful exemplar he may have been of what man has it in him to become by justifying it as the realised union of transcendence and immanence. (F.E.P. p. 328)
2. F.E.P. p. 325 f.
Yet the reconciliation of the two is of supreme importance, for the religious sentiment demands it. In general, we have seen that, according to Alexander, transcendence and immanence being exclusive terms, cannot be reconciled and yet the mature religious sentiment requires in its object of worship elements which are characteristic of both (2). So passing from general considerations, let us come to details in which theism and pantheism try to do justice to the various elements of religious needs.

**MERITS AND DEFECTS OF THEISM AND PANTHEISM:**

Theism maintains that there is a personal, transcendent Being who has created the universe and enters into communion with man and maintains the course of natural events (2). According to this view the individual worshipper does not lose his independence (4). On the other hand, God becomes a real object of love and adoration (5). But it has an inherent defect of its own. By virtue of His transcendence, God remains detached from His creatures (6). If God can remain apart from man and if He chooses to create him when He likes, then the connection between man and his Creator remains weak and arbitrary.

"God does indeed need man, but not as man needs man. The unification of God and man remains artificial." (7)

Again, we have seen that, according to Alexander, it is difficult to maintain the conception of a Creator God.

Pantheism maintains that there is a being which pervades the whole of nature, and, therefore, it is the very breath and life of each individual. The Pauline utterance about God that 'in Him we live and move and have our being' is strictly speaking, true of a pantheistic God. But such a God is more impersonal than personal, as we find in Spinoza and the non-dualistic Vedanta of Shankar. Such a doctrine, according to Alexander, supplies an unlaboured connection and natural intimacy of the worshipper with his God (1). Here, all finite things and individuals follow from God, out of the very nature of God, or, as Spinoza put it, they follow necessarily from Him. If man cannot be without God then, according to this theory, God also cannot be without man. Both are organic to one another.

However, the defect of the theory is that the independence and the individuality of the worshipper are lost in the nebulous whole (2). The individual becomes a mere appearance, and ultimately he is transmuted, transformed, hushed and silenced, beyond recognition, in this whole. In this sense, Spinoza's Substance has been likened by Hegel to a lion's den, to which all footprints point but from which none returns. Then, the impersonal nature of the pantheistic God does not reciprocate the love and affection of His devotees. This love of God is not unselfish but selfless (3). Again, such a God

1. *EB* II. p. 375; *E. E.* 244.
2. *STD* II. PP. 392, 373; *E. L.* PP. 324, 325, 376.
remains beyond praise and blame, good and evil. He remains awesome but in the end He becomes imperfectly worshipful(1). Finally, the all-pervading God of pantheism indwells in evil things in the same way in which He exists in the round ocean, blue sky, murmuring rivers etc. Hence, the relation between morality and God is broken (2). Therefore, a pantheistic God, lacking human note, is hardly worshipful (3).

Hence, theism and pantheism, each taken by itself, is insufficient to do full justice to religious needs. They need to be blended, but so far no blending has been successful in philosophy, according to Alexander. No doubt in Christian theism an attempt has been made to reconcile the merits of both immanence and transcendence in the following way.

We have already seen that theism posits the transcendence of God and this logically makes God incommunicable. To bridge the gulf, therefore, between man and God the conception of intermediaries has been introduced. In Christian theism, finally, God-man becomes the point of reconciliation between man and God. But this attempt, according to Alexander, is simply 'purchasing consistency at the cost of a miraculous person without parallel in the world' (4). Thus, theism fails in reconciling the merits of both transcendence and immanence and indulges in mere mythologising imagination (1).

4. STD II, p. 419; also see p. 392; P.L.P, pp. 319, 323, 328.
Yet theism and pantheism have to be reconciled in a rational way and this is what Alexander's theology proposed to do.

**ALEXANDER'S RECONCILIATION OF THEISM AND PANTHEISM**

The solution which Alexander proposed to give us is frankly called to be philosophical, and in its essence it consists in the following observation:

"If God is to satisfy philosophy, he must at once be continuous with the rest of man's life and continuous with the world of things. He must on the one hand attract the affection of man, which pantheism however exalted fails to do; and, strange as it may seem to say so, his relation to the world must not be miraculous, but he must live in the world which is said to be his creation. He must not leave mankind cold but respond to the impulse to adoration; and he must not leave his own creation unintelligible" (2).

These are the conditions which Alexander's God is going to fulfil in his theology.

Deity is beyond all finite creatures and therefore transcends them. Yet this deity is in the same universe in which all finite things are. As such, deity transcends all finite things, but is also the lineal successor of all that is permanent and valuable. Therefore, there is continuity between finite things and deity. We have already seen that, according to Alexander, this deity is capable of exercising our love and affection towards it. (1). Again, the body of God is the whole universe, and therefore, all finite things are in God's body and they are not lost in it but are fully retained (2). Thus, Alexander's conception of God and deity

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1. STD II. p. 397 f.
2. Spinoza and Philosophy of Religion, SEPTIMANA SPINOZANA 1933 p. 131
includes the elements of both theism and pantheism.

"For his (God's) deity is the outgrowth in Time of the preceding qualities of existence as contained within Space-Time, and while his deity is fed by lower finite, he himself not only transcends them on quality but, including them all within his body and representing in his deity the goal of their efforts, releases them from their isolation as individuals and sustains them and gives them a significance which as mere individuals they do not possess" (3).

Hence, God is immanent in respect of His body, but transcendent in respect of His deity (4).

From the above discussion it is clear that Alexander must have felt a sense of triumph in reconciling the rival merits of pantheism and theism. We will find that this solution is not real and cannot be said to be better than the so-called arbitrary and mythological solution of Christian theism. It is even doubtful whether his reconciliation between immanence and transcendence is consistent with his own definitions of these terms. However, we will refer to them after.

After all, Alexander's theology is a part of anti-idealistic metaphysics and if it fares better than idealism in explaining all facts then it will be said to have succeeded in its objective of supplanting it. Therefore, let us compare the theology of Alexander with that of the Absolutists.

GOD IN ABSOLUTISM AND IN ALEXANDER'S THEOLOGY: — Philosophy, according to Alexander, is an all-comprehensive science, and

1. STD 11. p. 555; Septimana Spinozana p. 135 infra.
4. STD 11. p. 396; P.L.E. pp. 331, 383; Septimana Spinozana p. 132
therefore, its truth is to be tested by its success in explaining all the varied experiences of life. Hence, the hypothesis of Space-Time as the sole reality has to be tested by its success in explaining our religious experience as well (1). We have already seen that Alexander's account does not do full justice to our religious needs, but we have to see now whether it fares better as a purely philosophical discipline or thought. As such we have to compare his solution with that of the absolutists, for after all, it was absolutism in reference to which Alexander wanted his system to be judged.

According to the Absolutists, as Alexander maintained, the finites, though empirically real, are not real in their own right. They are mere appearances of the One all-inclusive reality called the Absolute. The God of religion, as we have already seen in the Philosophy of Bradley in chapter 1, is but an appearance and is not the absolute reality (1). But Alexander pointed that his philosophy does not lead to the absorption and transmutation of the finites. The finites, though partial, are real in their own right. This follows from the fact that every finite is a piece or complex of space-time and whatever may happen to it, its spatio-temporal nature will be preserved. No doubt a finite being may lose its empirical character, for life

1. STD 11, p. 345-346
by death may become a piece of dead matter, but its real feature of space-time will be fully retained.

"The finite things may through their interactions change be destroyed or modify each other; but in this process it is their empirical characters which vary. Their reality is not affected at any moment" (2).

Now, Space-Time in Alexander's system is the Absolute Reality (3), and therefore, we can say that, according to Alexander, the finite beings, so far they are in the Absolute Reality, they are reserved, retained and not transformed or transmuted (4).

But there is such a phenomenon as transmutation. A piece of living matter may become so refined and complicated that it ceases to be merely vital and becomes conscious. However, even here the brain does not cease to be living or vital. Even when spatio-temporal forms are gradually lifted up into matter, life and mind, they are used up as they are. They are not essentially altered or superseded but they subserve and sustain the life of the higher levels (1). Regarding the retention and preservation of the finites in the ultimate reality of Space-Time Alexander wrote thus:

"The doctrine of degrees of truth or reality rests on the belief that finites lose their value or at least alter it by being taken along with others. If all finites are spatio-temporal complexes this belief cannot be well founded. One finite may be more complete or more highly organised than another, but the second occupies its space-time as much as the first, and is equally real; and the propositions about it equally true" (2)

The same thought was repeated by him later on:

"For in the end all finites are pieces of Space-Time with that distinctive complexity of spatio-temporal structure which makes them the bearers of their distinctive empirical qualities. The finites are not lost in the whole but constitute it, and all the whole are (if only as spatio-temporal complexes) in continuous connection with the whole..............Their reality is not affected at any moment. They are what they are" (3).

Hence, Alexander maintained that his solution was better than that of idealism because it accorded reality to finite things, which Absolutism did not allow.

However, the preservation of finite beings as spatio-temporal complexes is merely lip-service to a phrase. Space-Time by itself is purely empty, without any proper quality. It is even beyond the categories and cannot be said to be an individual or substance or being. To say that a finite being is preserved as a spatio-temporal complex is really to deny his existence altogether. Anyway, let us see whether deity fares any better in Alexander's system.

We have already seen that the deity of Alexander is located in only a portion of the infinite Whole of Space-Time. Now this deity cannot be said to be Absolute, for it is not the whole of Space-Time. Therefore, it can be maintained with idealism that the Absolute is not God. But then again, the Absolute is not spirit or mind either, for mind or spirit is an empirical quality and the Absolute, though it contains spirit, is not an empirical quality at all. Again, deity too, is not spirit, for deity is subserved and
sustained by mind but it is higher than and different in kind from mind. Thus, reality neither in its a-priori level nor in its empirical character can be wholly described as mental. Hence, the Absolute Idealism which teaches the primacy of mind, comes to be finally disproved. But deity, though it is higher than mind, shares its fate with all empirical finite things.

"Thus it is true, as absolute idealism contends, that God is (at least in respect of his deity) on the same footing as finites, and if they are appearances so is he, though an infinite appearance" (1)

Thus, deity becomes an incident if it ever becomes a fact, but even its reality is only ideal.

Thus, Alexander has finally shown that mind is not absolutely real, for its value and being are going to be superseded in the course of evolution. Then further, even deity is only empirically ideal and all finite beings as well as deity are mere incidents in Space-Time. Therefore, only Space-Time is the One and Absolute Reality. Therefore, the metaphysical programme of establishing the absolute reality of an entity different from mind has been completed in his theology. As such the theology of Alexander is an integral part of his Evolutionary Naturalism and on its success depends the final overthrow of mind, as the absolute reality.

1 STD 11 p. 371
CHAPTER SEVEN.

SOME MISAPPREHENSIONS AND EMENDATIONS OF THE THEOLOGY
OF ALEXANDER.

SYNOPSIS.

Here we take up some of the misapprehensions and
emendations of the theology of Alexander by Dr. Stiernotte,
Laird and Dawes Hicks. These misapprehensions have gathered
round Alexander's doctrine of Deity and Nisus and his theory
of the 'body' of God. However, a scrutiny of their
objections shows that they are groundless.
As mind is the highest emergent so far as known to us, therefore, deity is felt to be most palpable in human minds. The human minds cannot but divine deity because they are caught up in the world-nisus. Hence, deity is felt due to the effect of nisus on us and this nisus may be said to be the sole creative impulse of the universe. We can also say that the nisus gathers up its force in a focus and deity is the point of concentration in the highest emergent as a result of that activity. The nisus causes in us a religious emotion and endeavour, and deity is the object of this religious emotion and endeavour (1).

But deity is not the nisus itself, for it is the product of it and due to it. However, Alexander has used the expression 'Deity is a nisus and not an accomplishment' (2). Here he wanted to say, not that deity is the world-nisus, but that deity is a mere futuristic ideal. He himself pointed out that the nisus is creative and deity is a creature, though of course not of one's imagination (1). But, as a futuristic ideal, deity may energise our efforts to bring it forth. In this sense, it becomes a creative ideal, awakening us to realise it. The love for it "draws us to him from in front" (2).

However, from the creative role of deity we cannot infer that it is the world-nisus. Hence it would be quite out of keeping with Alexander’s philosophy to replace the conception of deity by nisus and this is what Dr. Stiernotte advises us to do. He says that in the long run, it is the nisus and not deity which is real. Of course, the nisus is the sole creative impulse of the universe, as is clear from the following:

"This impulse of creativeness I call the nisus of the universe, borrowing an idea from Spinoza and agreeing, as I think, with the spirit though not all the details of Mr. Bergson’s vital. This nisus not only leads to the formation of things and to the sustenance of them, but impels the world forward towards new creations, bringing forth the new out of the bosom of the old. It creates chemical bodies and keeps their form by the stability of their functions; but also, this is perhaps more striking, drives on ‘the chemic lump’, in Emerson’s words, to ‘ascend to man’" (1).

As the nisus is not exhausted in the creations of all empirical existents so far, therefore, the possibility of future existents cannot be brushed aside. The shadowing forth of the future existent from its immediate and proximate rung of the ladder is felt as deity. However, Dr. Stiernotte points out that the ‘infinite lake of deity’ is a useless metaphysical postulate in Alexander’s system (2), for the following reason:

"There cannot be two creative principles in Alexander’s system, the nisus of Space-Time, and the deity of Space-Time, or else we have indeed a very strange pantheism with two divine principles with their respective functions not clearly determined" (3).

1. STD II. p. 376. See also W.R. Inge ‘God and Astronomers’ p. 79, where he says that Alexander’s nisus is the begetter of Deity.
2. THE LISTENER Dec. 3, 1930 p. 272
3. Artistic Creation and Cosmic Creation P.L.P. p. 273
4. God and Space-Time P. 278. 3. Ibid. P. 278
On the basis of this strange interpretation of Alexander's deity and on the doubtful cogency of his arguments he comes to this conclusion:

"The vindication of the reality of the flow of Time into a future which cannot be constituted of any existents, of any infinite localization of Space-Time as deity, signifies that we have discarded entirely the conception of deity as future --- and have replaced it by the conception of deity as nisus, as creative impulse --- on which he places so little stress" (1).

Is it correct to say that Alexander did not place stress on 'nisus', --- on 'the reality of the flow of Time'? Here we totally agree with Hoernle's estimate of the situation:

"Indeed, it seems to me that, of all the evolutionists whose writings I have read, Alexander is the only one whose universe is still evolving, and who is prepared from indications in its present condition to forecast what the next stage is going to be, viz., the emergence of the new quality of 'deity' in the birth of which the world is now travelling" (2).

Then, again, how in the face of 'The Historicity of Things' and 'On Taking Time Seriously', can one deny that Alexander did not stress the flow of Time? This strange statement of Dr. Stiernotte arises from his misinterpretation of Alexander's theory of Time and his advice concerning the rejection of the conception of deity arises from an equally peculiar interpretation of Alexander's theory of deity.

**DR. STIERNOTTE'S INTERPRETATION OF ALEXANDER'S TIME:**

Dr. Stiernotte thinks that Alexander has given an ambiguous answer about the 'historicity of things' (3).

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2. This Monest; XXXVI 1926 pp. 562-3.
He thinks that, according to a certain interpretation of certain passages, it can be held that Alexander obliterated the distinction of past, present and future (1). In order to prove his case Dr. Stiernotte has quoted a number of passages, but we will refer to those passages on which this possibility of interpretation seems to be strongly grounded.

Alexander did hold the reality of time and therefore he also held the reality of past and future. Dr. Stiernotte has quoted the following statement of Alexander:

"The past event, it is true, does not exist now, and if existence is taken to be present existence, the past clearly does not exist. But if we avoid this error and take time seriously, the past possesses such reality as belongs to the past, that is, to what is earlier than the point of reference.... As to the later or future, there is at bottom no greater difficulty in speaking of the future as being real and existing really than there is in respect of the real existence of the past. A future or later point does not occur now, and therefore, it is now not-yet, just as the past is now no longer. It has what reality belongs to it in the real time" (2)

Then again, he also granted the possibility of clairvoyance of certain future events (3). From this possibility one would only infer that the future event is not real but also actual. Alexander also held that future events have some 'place where they occur' (1). From this one would infer that the future events are also actual. Naturally, then Dr. Stiernotte concludes:

"The question at issue is: Do the events exist ready-made in the future, and are we coming upon them gradually

3. STD 11. p. 319
through our experience of the succession of Time?
If the events exist throughout all Time, past, present and future, then Alexander has taken Time so seriously that the present is obliterated, and there is no real future for us since it lies ready-made" (2).

But did Alexander ever hold that future events exist ready-made? From the quotation, taken from STD i. p. 71-72, it is clear that events are not ready-made and future has reality as future. Further, the statement that the future event must occupy space is based on the reality of the Spatio-temporality of events and does not support the interpretation that future events are ready-made. In certain cases, it must be conceded that the events which have been clairvoyanced do exist as ready-made, but such events will come under the heading of 'broad present'. However, by clairvoyance, Alexander meant the foreseeing of the future on the basis of the present causes, determining the future. Here the clairvoyant, instead of being a calculator, simply becomes sensitised by the present causal agents leading to the future.

"The future will be what it will. But since it will be the causal outcome of what is present actually, there may be minds so sensitive to the influences at work in the world, that they may divine certain future events" (1). Then he further added:

"What seems to me open to the gravest question is that any character of the future which transcends our hitherto experienced orders of fact should be foreseen" (2).

1. STD 1. p. 75. 2. God and Space-Time p. 266.
Now, the divining of the future events does not mean that they are ready-made. One can divine the static-temporality of the future events and all those qualities of the future events of which he has become familiar. But of the quality of the hitherto non-existing higher emergent even God cannot predict and know (3).

From the above argument it is clear that Alexander did take time seriously and the interpretation that the future events are ready-made is alien to his system. So serious was he about Time that he pointed out that even mathematical infinites cannot be completed for it will require an infinite time for doing so.

"To suppose that the infinitely great must be completed is to eliminate Time from its nature; just as to suppose that the infinitely small is an indivisible self-subsistet entity or infinitesimal is to eliminate Time from its nature" (4).

With far less justification we can hold that Alexander ever meant that the would-be future higher emergents are ready-made. Thus, Mr. Tenney correctly wrote that:

"Alexander maintains that the future does not exist, but will exist only in the future. Future history has been and is real, present history is just now real, future history is not real at all until time brings it forth" (4).

Only here Alexander would say that the future is real as future but it is not actual. Thus, against Dr. Stierotte we conclude that Alexander was never ambiguous about the

1. The Romance of Emergence, in STUDIES IN PHILOSOPHICAL NATURALISM p. 24. * The same thing has been stated by Mr. Grace Smith: "The reality of the future is likewise continuous with the present; but its existence is 'not yet' just as that of the past is 'no longer' (Studies in Philosophical Naturalism p. 39)

3. STD. 11. P. 364. 4. STD. 11. P. 363
Historicity of events.

Dr. Stiernotte's Interpretation of Alexander's Deity:

There is little doubt that Alexander's theology is full of ticklish points of its own, but they must not be multiplied by arbitrary interpretation. According to Dr. Stiernotte, deity and nius are two creative agencies in the theology of Alexander. All qualitative emergents are fragmentations of deity. He calls deity a 'lake' or 'reservoir of yet higher phases in the future'. His full statement on this point runs as follows:

"As higher qualities than mind are fragmented from deity, these qualities cease to be 'deity' but belong to finite empiricals, and deity remains a reservoir of yet higher phases in the future, ......... We have, however, in Alexander's system an irreconcilable dualism of creative agencies.' On the one hand, he has asserted that the nius drives the finites forward to higher levels of existence, a role we have constantly emphasized. On the other hand, these higher levels are higher qualities which are presumably fragmented or detached from deity. This dualism gives rise to embarrassing questions which Alexander has nowhere clarified in his exposition. Is deity to be envisaged as a being which gives fragments of itself for the elevation of existents into higher 'mental' qualities?" (1).

It is difficult to determine the sources from which Dr. Stiernotte has drawn the conclusion that 'deity' is a creative agency. Deity, as we have seen is neither a creator nor creative but is a creature. If Dr. Stiernotte could prove his thesis then it would show that Alexander's system is wholly idealistic, for it is tantamount to holding that it is the higher which determines the lower.

1. God and Space-Time p. 277
As a matter of fact the difficulty of Alexander's system is that he nowhere made the higher react on the lower. This has made the responsiveness of God so difficult in his system. Hence, Bradley, commenting on the reality of religious experience, put this question:

"Am I wrong in thinking that your general doctrine as to the non-reaction of the higher stage of development upon the lower is what stands in your way here?" (1)

Further, it is not deity but Space-Time alone which is the reservoir of yet higher phases in the future. As a result of the nisus deity is a shadowing forth of the future in the highest emergent so far. Hence, there can be no question about the fragmentation of deity.

**DEITY AND NISUS, ACCORDING TO DR. STIERNOTTE:**

That higher emergents are mere fragmentations of infinite deity arises from the interpretation of the term 'infinite deity'. Dr. Stiernotte thinks that infinite deity means that the successive phases of deity are infinite.

"Alexander does not discuss this point, but on the basis of his statements that deity is infinite, we may postulate that the number of these successive phases is infinite. A phase of deity is realized in the next empirical quality, and ceases to be deity. A phase is then finite. The next phase is then realized; again finite, and the process apparently goes on ceaselessly". (2)

There is no harm in thinking of an infinite number of future emergents. Indeed, this follows from the infinity of the spatio-temporal nature of reality itself. In infinite

time, an infinite number of emergents is bound to occur. Then, again, as deity varies with changes in time, so there will be an infinite phases of deity. But from the extrapolation of Alexander’s doctrine one cannot show that the doctrine of infinite deity is highly speculative.

"It appears that the nius of the world is factual, the creative impulse is actual, while deity in its successive phases is based on analogy, and the analogy becomes highly hypothetical when the successive phases are multiplied indefinitely in order to do justice to Alexander’s assertion that deity is infinite" (1).

Firstly, if we take time seriously and grant that it is infinite, then there is nothing too speculative in accepting the infinite phases of deity. But, then, why should we interpret ‘infinite deity’ as ‘an infinity of successive phases of existents higher than man’? Dr. Stiernotte does not give any reasons for his interpretation, but the passage to which he gives his interpretation can be thus quoted here.

"We should only have to remember that the world-soul so conceived is a variable quality, according to the level for which it is the next in the hierarchy of qualities" (2).

No doubt, as we have already seen that deity varies with the changes in time and the different levels of emergence. But, how does this fact throw any light on the interpretation of the concept of ‘infinite deity’? The term ‘infinite deity’ quoted by Dr. Stiernotte in his work on page 28, means that it is felt as infinite in its ideal condition, before it is realised. This is clear from the following statement:

"Infinite deity then embodies the conception of the infinite world in its straining after deity, .......
Before there was mind the universe was straining towards infinite mind" (1).

God is forever straining to realise the infinite deity but never attains it, for the ideal when realised ceases to be infinite deity (2).

Hence, we conclude that 'infinite deity' need not be explained in terms of an infinite series of successive phases of existents higher than man. And if we do not interpret the concept of infinite deity in terms of infinite series, then the view that the qualitative emergents are fragmentations of deity becomes unnecessary. Then, again, if deity is not explained as a 'series', then it ceases to be a creative agency or a reservoir of successive emergents higher than man. Further, the supposed difficulty of two creative agencies or principles also disappears. Hence, the difficulties, to which Dr. Stiernotte refers, are not the difficulties of Alexander's theology. They arise from the arbitrary interpretation of Dr. Stiernotte himself.

Then, again, Dr. Stiernotte advises us to discard entirely the conception of deity as future and to replace it by the conception of nisus, as creative impulse (1). The result would be that the whole world will be considered as merely creative and the 'process-philosophy' of Alexander would coincide with the elan vital of Bergson. But this is

quite unnecessary for Alexander does endow Space-Time with self-creative impulse (2). Hence, the doctrine of 'infra-pantheism' to which Dr. Stiernotte refers (3) is not a necessary emendation. In this connection Dr. Stiernotte writes:

"Not only is God creative of deity, but if our interpretation of the identity of the body of God and the Space-Time matrix inclusive of the finites is correct, then God is creator and not merely creature. God as identical with Space-Time and its emergents is a substantive concept of God, while deity as identified with a portion of Space-Time and as a quality would appear to be an adjectival conception of God" (4).

This emendation has been brought to replace the 'forward view' of God by the traditional 'backward view' of Him. It may be a legitimate point of view but this cannot be supported by the system of Alexander. That system is based on 'forward view' and does not admit of any compromise on this point. Then, again, deity is an ideal quality in embryo, but to call it 'adjectival' is not quite correct, for it would tend to be interpreted as an appearance of an Absolute reality. Of course, Space-Time is absolute, but its divinity lies in its deity. Deity therefore, cannot be discarded. If we discard deity, then it would mean that there is nothing worshipful in the whole of Space-Time matrix. This leads to the next consequence of discarding deity.

If we discard the concept of deity, then human beings will be left with the impulse of religious emotion alone and their religious sentiment will have no object. Thus, religion will be based on a subjective impulse only and any object of worship will be merely a fancy or a figment of imagination. Besides, this would lead to the modification of the fundamental theory of Alexander that corresponding to every mental act there is an appropriate object. But, perhaps Dr. Stiernotte would suggest that the object of religious consciousness will remain and that would be the Space-Time matrix inclusive of all finites. But would that be sufficient for religious purpose? The discarding of deity is tantamount to the rejection of the whole of Alexander's theology, and this goes beyond the mere emendation of Alexander's theology. Again, if Space-Time matrix inclusive of all finites be the Creator God, then, how does Dr. Stiernotte escape from the charge of anthropomorphism which he levels against the God of Alexander? But, first of all, we have to explain this alleged blemish in the theology of Alexander.

IS ALEXANDER'S THEOLOGY ANTHROPOMORPHIC?

Alexander regarded the relationship of Mind-body as the universal pattern of all empirical and a-priori existents. Space-Time shows this pattern in its being as much as does God. If there are gods then they are also patterned on the
same universal formula. Even if infinite, God, if He be actual, must be spatio-temporal and at the same time will be grounded on the universal formula of mind-body relationship. Thus, the universe with all its finites is said to form the 'body' of God and deity is His 'mind'. As a matter of fact, Alexander could not believe in the immortality of souls, for he could not accept the theory of souls without a body (1). This is very similar to the predominantly accepted belief of the Indian thinkers that even the gods have subtle bodies. The famous Indian theist Ramanuja even believes that in God there are both the elements of matter and consciousness. Now because of this element of 'body' in God, Dr. Stiernotte thinks that the theology of Alexander suffers from the fallacy of anthropomorphism (2). He therefore, approves the following statement of Bertocci's criticism:

"Here we see a good example of the kind of anthropomorphism to be avoided. To say that a human person could not exist without his nervous system, muscles, bone, and skin is in no way proof that God too has a body. Indeed, the historic contention is that absence of bodily form constitutes a major difference between the divine Person and the human" (1).

Dr. Stiernotte himself comes to the following conclusion:

"Our conclusion of the whole question of the 'body' and the 'mind' of God, is first, that the expression 'body of God' is too anthropomorphic for any system of metaphysics, such as Alexander's, which claims to be enlightened, and secondly, that the 'mind of God' as deity is not sufficiently

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1. STD 11. PP. 369, 425. 2. Op. Cit. PP. 235, 239, 244
1: quoted on PP. 236 of 'God and Space-Time'.
clarified. When clarified we find that knowledge is not possessed 'as by deity, but by the minds which are assumed to emerge in Time' (2). But the above charge of anthropomorphism does not seem to be justified. Firstly, the term 'anthropomorphism' is really a term of abuse and does not mean anything quite definite. Further, to go beyond everything human is impossible. As a matter of fact Alexander tried to go beyond mind or spirit and values, and as a result of this effort on his part his deity became unknowable. Instead of becoming anthropomorphic he tried to de-anthropomorphise his theology. His deity transcends all that is best in human mind and thus he dedicated his altar to the unknown God (3). But Dr. Stierotte has ignored this de-anthropomorphism in the theology of Alexander, by saying that 'the mind of God' or deity is not clarified. But the distinctive feature of God is His deity or 'mind' and not His 'body' and if we have to prove the charge of anthropomorphism, then we should show that deity is anthropomorphic. This has not been proved and therefore the charge is not valid and as a matter of fact cannot be substantiated.

However, God with an actual deity is not infinite but merely finite, that is, there can be actual gods but there cannot be actually infinite God with realised deity. In relation to gods there can be no real charge of anthropo-

3. STB li. pp. 344, 348, 349, 356, 377
morphism for they cannot be anything else besides being supermen. But when Bertocci brings the charge of anthropomorphism, he must be referring to the conception of an Infinite God, for the historic conception regards the Infinite God as spiritual. However, the infinite God with unrealised deity is not actual but is only an ideal. If so, then, how can we say that a Being who is always becoming and is never is to be human at all?

At this stage it might be contended that whatever be the conclusion about the 'infinite God with deity', at least the argument does invest Him with a 'body' and therefore, in principle at least, Alexander's God is anthropomorphic. Here we are reminded of the famous saying about Plotinus that he blushed because he had a body, and similarly, the objectors think that God will blush because He has a body. By 'body' of God we understand that it is the body-aspect of the mind-body formula and it does not mean any specific body at all, whether human or animal. The 'body' of God corresponds to the conception of Natura naturata of Spinoza and nobody has claimed Spinoza's conception to be anthropomorphic. Dr. Stiernotte himself has pointed out quite correctly that the 'body' of Alexander's God includes the whole of Space-Time, inclusive of all finites, and this is driven by niusus towards deity. Considered thus, the conception is wholly pantheistic. Dr. Stiernotte himself
thinks it so and approves the statement of Metz in this connection:

"His (Alexander's) theology is thoroughly pantheistic and his concept of God is so completely involved in the texture of the world that all his efforts to save the transcendence of God and to justify theism against pantheism are in vain" (1).

Now, if the God of Alexander is pantheistic then He is all impersonal and this impersonality of Alexander's God is also accepted by Dr. Stiernotte (2). If Alexander's God is impersonal, then to call his theology anthropomorphic is wholly unjustified. Thus, we conclude that the theology of Alexander may be very unsatisfactory, but then, it does not suffer from the fallacy of anthropomorphism.

**LAIRD'S CRITICISM OF ALEXANDER'S THEISM:**

Alexander's philosophy is a system and a criticism of it, therefore, should consist either in showing that philosophy proper cannot be systematic or that certain vital experiences which should be included in a complete system have been left out of it. If there are theories included in it which are inconsistent with its other theories or that the principles of the system are inadequate and so on. One cannot legitimately criticise the theology of Alexander from the viewpoint of another system without showing at the same time its superiority over the system of Alexander. If one does so then

1. Quoted from Metz's 'A Hundred Years of British Philosophy' on p. 247-248 of 'God and Space-Time'.
his criticisms will be external and not internal. The external criticisms will have only suggestive value, for it will point out the necessity of probing deeper into the philosophy of Alexander itself. Most probably the system of Alexander is vulnerable from all these points of view, but the worst attack on it will consist in showing that it is inconsistent. Personally, we do not think that Alexander's system is free from the charge of inconsistency, but this charge has to be shown in relation to certain basic tenets of Alexander's philosophy. Without going into the details of Alexander's philosophy we can sum up the main tenets of it in a sentence. We can say that the philosophy of Alexander is based on the empiricity of knowledge, the historicity of events arranged in a hierarchical order in which each level is patterned on the universal formula of mind-body relationship. Now any criticism of Alexander's philosophy which ignores any of these tenets will be called external and not internal criticism of the system. Now Laird (1) has levelled certain criticisms of Alexander's theism which may appear to be internal criticisms but are really external objections. As Laird was a close associate of Alexander, his criticisms have great weight and are thus likely to greatly influence the critics of Alexander's

theology. No doubt in the exposition of Alexander's theism Laird has put his fingers on certain very important features of it, but in his criticisms of Alexander's theism he has been misled by extraneous considerations. He wrote:

'Alexander's doctrine seems to be crammed, if not even to be choked, with several serious difficulties' (1). The difficulties to which Laird has pointed may be thus explained and answered.

1. NOT DEITY BUT NISUS IS MORE WORSHIPFUL.

'Most theologians would say that God, whatever else he be, must at any rate be ultimate if he exists at all. According to Alexander the progressive historicity of things would be ultimate, the last word in any metaphysics, but God or deity, that is, the achievement of the next stage above 'mind' in the ladder of emergence would not be ultimate at all. ..... On the whole the conclusion here would seem to be that the nisus was more worshipful in the long run than the particular emergent stage that we call deity, but, no doubt, there may be a certain ingratitude in complaining of a 'deity' that ex hypothesi is incommensurably higher than the best that is human" (2).

This criticism may be summed up by saying that deity, being not ultimate, is not worshipful; and nisus, being ultimate, is worshipful. However, this criticism will be valid only when we grant that the 'ultimacy' of the object of worship

is a raw datum of religious demand. This is what the theologians cannot maintain and Alexander would not accept either. Further, if we have to worship something ultimate in the system of Alexander, then it is certainly Space-Time itself. But Space-Time is not deity because it calls forth mathematical intuition and not the religious emotion in us (1). Deity, according to Alexander, is the divine element (2), the numinous feature of the universe (3), and we cannot but worship it. Anything that is worshipful is deity. The pregnant sentence of Alexander is:

"Religion is not the sentiment which is directed upon God; but God is that upon which the religious sentiment is directed" (4).

If so, then the 'nisus' is not worshipful, for the religious sentiment is not directed upon it. But probably Laird would say that we 'ought' to worship, even if we do not worship the nisus. However, according to Alexander, the religious sentiment is quite simple like an appetite or instinct (5) and thus it is the nature of 'is' and not of the nature of 'ought'. We do worship and cannot but help worship and the question of 'ought' does not arise. We will refer to this point again in connection with the fifth criticism of Laird.

Then, again, is deity as ephemeral or transient as Laird supposes it to be? In general deity as an ideal, looming ahead of the highest emergent at any time is as ultimate as the nisus is ultimate. If we accept the progress-

iveness of the process inherent in Space-Time, then the shadowing forth of the next emergent higher than the highest is also there. But certainly there are varying phases of deity, corresponding to the successive levels of existents. Deity has been different for plants, animals, men and angels and it varies with the lapse of time (1).

Theoretically, then, deity as a general ideal is certainly ultimate, but the specific content of this ideal has been varying.

However, Laird would emphasize the fact that deity ceases to be deity as soon as it becomes an accomplishment. In this sense deity becomes a transient feature. However, we have already discussed this question of 'the successive phases of deity' in chapter VI. There we have seen that a specific deity ceases to be deity as soon as it has become an empirical existent, from the cosmic point of view. From the viewpoint of the creature, however, for which deity represents the next stage, it continues to be deity. Thus, from the practical point of view the deity of man will always remain deity for him, and it will always usurp his fancy.

Hence, if the ultimacy of deity be a point of advantage, then the theology of Alexander does not lack it.

† STD II p.366
11. INSUFFICIENT EVIDENCE FOR EMERGENT LADDER AND THE
   POSSIBILITY OF CO-ETERNAL DEITY.

Let us come to the second difficulty with which, according
to Laird, the theology of Alexander is crammed and choked.
Here we have to quote in full the objection of Laird for it
is not easy to interpret his meaning:

"Alexander's metaphysics of the historicity of things is
constructed on the principle that we do know that Space-
Time came first in a non-material condition, that
materiality supervened upon it universally, that sporadic
vitality, and, later, a still more circumscribed mentality
supervened in the same way, and that the cosmos could have
no room for 'angels' or for 'gods' until it had evolved
through all the stages. I would suggest that we don't
know anything of the kind, and have quite insufficient
reasons for inferring it from the highly conjectural evidence
that we may have concerning the origin of human minds on this
planet. Let there be hierarchy of levels of existence with
the angelic or divine incommensurably above the human and
mental. Let it also be granted that in a small corner of
the universe, viz., in this planet, minds turned up rather
late. What right have we to infer that superhuman levels
may not have been established aeons before life appeared on
this planet? Since Alexander's conception of the historicity
of things implies progress as well as process, we should have
"to say, I suppose, that deity could not be co-eternal with the world, or at any rate that some high level of existence (perhaps a level much higher than mere deity) could not come first. But if process and not progress is all that Alexander has proved (and I do not think he proved more), then divine process, or a process still higher, might very well be co-eternal with the universe. That is what many people believe who believe in God's 'eternity' and also in the 'redemption' of the human race. Credible or not, the conception implies no inconsistency" (1).

The exact interpretation of this long passage is rather difficult, but this is connected with the earlier passages of pages 149-150. Now Laird rightly pointed out that the progressiveness of the process 'is essential, indeed quintessential', for Alexander (2). But he has also told us that the emergent evolution of Alexander is based on 'quite insufficient reasons' and 'highly conjectural evidence'. The ground for saying so is that the emergent evolution is based on the acceptance of spatio-temporal continuity and qualitative discontinuities in the various emergents, namely, matter, life and mind. But the question is, are matter, life and mind really different in kind from one another? Now, Laird, following the arguments and conclusions of Sir Charles Sherrington (in MAN ON HIS NATURE) came to the conclusion that it is doubtful whether we can hold that life differs in

1. H.J. Vol. 40, 1941-42. PP. 151-152
2. Ibid. P. 149.
kind from matter and that mind differs in kind from life. Thus, because there are no qualitative discontinuities between matter, life and mind, the theory of emergence which is based on such discontinuities is also doubtful.

We do not know whether many biologists would agree with what Laird and Sherrington state about the absence of any qualitative difference between matter and life. This is a question for the experts to decide. Any philosophy which is wedded too much to specific conclusions of particular sciences has to face the difficulty consequent on the changes in those conclusions. Alexander's philosophy being based on the specific conclusions of particular sciences will always remain exposed to such dangers. But we feel that the difference between matter, life and mind is not only one of degree but is really one of kind. This view is shared by Lloyd Morgan, Smuts and others. We have no reason to doubt that a new kind of relatedness does supervene over physico-chemical processes when they are found in a living being. Again, if there is any truth in the psycho-analytic cure of neurotic disorders, then we have to accept the fact that the physiological processes in human beings are directed by processes which are not merely vital. But after all, what Laird and Sherrington have said about the absence of any qualitative difference between matter, life and mind might be correct. Nevertheless, Alexander's emergent ladder was based on the evidence of the biological researches of his
time, specially those of Driesch and Haldane. Therefore, his acceptance of the emergent ladder cannot be called conjectural or too speculative.

We do not know whether we are correctly interpreting the second part of the objection raised by Laird. Probably he meant that there might be several processes or ladders. The hierarchy of matter-life-mind-gods forms one process and there might be several processes of this type. For example, there might be quite a different process with the hierarchy of angels-Jovian gods-Promethean gods. Now this latter process might have been there aeons before Alexander's ladder started on this planet. May, in this process instead of Space-Time being the base, the angels or the gods may be the matrix. Then, again, by 'deity' is meant for Laird 'the rung in the ladder immediately above mind' (1). If so, then a higher process or deity might be very well co-eternal with the universe, for deity becomes the very starting-point of the universe in this supposed process. Thus, instead of believing with Alexander that deity is ahead of us, it will, according to Laird's emendation, really be co-eternal with our universe. Now, if this be the interpretation of the second part of the objection of Laird, then we have reason to believe that the emendation proposed by Laird does not cram Alexander's theology at all. We are not quite sure what Laird meant by 'co-eternal', but probably he means

that God, being present from the very beginning of the universe, is co-eternal and pervasive with it. If it is so, then, according to Laird, it "is what many people believe who believe in God's 'eternity'". We will now try to ascertain whether the proposed difficulty, pointed out by Laird, is a real difficulty in Alexander's theology.

Laird, at the end of the above quotation, points out that his 'conception implies no inconsistency'. But inconsistency with what? It is certainly not inconsistent with the view that there may be various processes having different matrices or ladders in the cosmic drama. But such a view is not supported by any empirical evidence and the empiricity of knowledge is a fundamental tenet of Alexander's philosophy, and so it is inconsistent with Alexander's view of things.

Further, Laird has pointed out that Alexander has proved 'process and not progress'. We think that Alexander has tried to prove 'progressive process' and not simply 'process'. Laird himself wrote:

"'The restlessness of Time' is one of Alexander's descriptive phrases, but he was careful, indeed sedulous, to repeat that 'restlessness' was not enough for historicity, i.e. for cosmic metaphysical evolution. The restlessness assumed a determined direction".(1)

Personally, we agree that Alexander has not succeeded in proving the progressiveness of the process of the universe. But that is quite a different thing. What is important to note is that Alexander's theology is based on the doctrine of a nius and this is . . . process as well as progress.

Hence, we cannot propose any ladder in the name of process and say that it is consistent with Alexander's view.

Laird proposed his emendation of a different ladder for, according to him, Alexander proved 'process and not progress'. We do not agree with Laird's conclusion. Alexander observed matter, life and mind, emerging from Space-Time and from this observation came to the conclusion that there is a ladder-like process in the universe. Laird regarded this conclusion of the ladder-like process in the universe as an extremely hazardous and unnecessary. (2)

But, Laird himself has gone beyond 'process' in his emendation. He proposed:

"Let there be a hierarchy of levels of existence with the angelic or divine incommensurably above the human and mental" (1).

Thus, he supposed a progressive process with different specific levels, which, according to his own admission, is a hazardous conjecture. Besides, his type of ladder has no empirical basis and is certainly inconsistent with Alexander's specific ladder, the matrix of which is Space-Time.

However, even this emendation will not help the matter much. The important question remains, do we know such a deity who is co-eternal with the universe, or do we not? This will require a different kind of the theory of knowledge.

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and therefore, with this emendation it will require also a corresponding emended epistemology. Hence, we conclude that Alexander's theology precludes the possibility of any 'co-eternal deity' and therefore the supposed difficulty of 'co-eternal deity' is artificial and does not choke the theology of Alexander.

Of course, there is a difficulty, with reference to the doctrine of the 'successive phases of deity', to which we have already made reference. According to one interpretation which we have followed, Alexander's view of deity allows greater probability for polytheism than for monotheism. And yet any system of theology should prove the reality of monotheism and not of polytheism. Hence, according to this interpretation, Alexander's theology does not do full justice to the consciousness of higher religions. But, this objection is quite a different thing and this does not lend any support to the doctrine of 'co-eternal deity' of Laird.

111. THE FINITUDE OF ACTUAL DEITY: From the nature of Laird's second objection to Alexander's theology, it is clear that Laird did not favour the doctrine of 'finite deity'. He wanted to have an eternal and infinite deity, and therefore, he criticised Alexander's view of finite deity:
"Alexander's repeated statements that actual 'deity' would have to be finite may be rather too confident. In a way it was a consequence of his system, .......

Here, however, one may wonder whether, as so often, the system may not have manufactured difficulties which, without it, would not exist" (1).

We think that it is unnecessary to discuss the nature of 'actual deity', for according to Alexander, it can never be actual and always remains an ideal. As soon as it becomes actual a higher phase of deity looms ahead of it. God is always straining towards the realising of ideal deity but never succeeds in doing so. This meaning of deity is quite plain to Alexander's theology and the statement about the 'finite deity' really refers to the higher emergent which has become actual (1). Unfortunately, Alexander was not very careful in the use of terms like 'deity' and 'God'. Sometimes he used the term 'God' where the real reference is to 'deity', and at times used the term 'deity' when he meant angels or gods (2). Laird, therefore, interpreted 'deity' as 'the name for the rung in the ladder immediately above mind' (3), and failed to see that an actual deity, from the viewpoint of cosmic development, ceases to be deity. Then, again, Alexander did not maintain the finitude of gods or angels or 'actualised deity' without giving reasons for it. We have already outlined the reasons on the basis of which Alexander concluded that 'infinite deity' cannot be actual. Therefore, it cannot be said that Alexander's view of the finitude of actual 'deity' is rather too confident.

2. See std.11. p. 365,364. The supersession is not by a higher 'God' but a higher 'deity'. 3. Op.Cit. p.180
But most probably our quarrel is purely verbal, for Laird is pointing out the possibility of infinite gods or angels. However, this cannot be maintained, for a plurality of 'infinite' gods is not a self-consistent notion. If there be more than one infinite being then they will limit each other and as such will cease to be infinite. The statement of Laird appears to us very obscure. Probably Laird means that the rung of the ladder, immediately above man, may be infinite and he gives the following reasons for holding this:

"So far as I can see the proof of the finitude of (actual) 'deity' rests upon the finitude of the theatre (i.e. of the human body) in which the mental rung of the ladder of historicity invariably emerges from the merely vital rung. If bodily contours be held to be irrelevant, anything in the world may be supposed". (1)

Of course, if one takes away the very premises on which a certain conclusion is based, then any other conclusion or statement can be made. But can we declare the bodily contours to be irrelevant from the viewpoint of Alexander's philosophy? We think that we cannot do so without rejecting it wholesale. However, even if we discard the bodily contour as irrelevant, the emendation of Laird becomes highly phantastic. His emendation is this:

".......if we thought of deity as 'carried' not by a part of a mind that is 'carried' by a brain (let us say, in some rapport between minds) what sort of life-line or what sort of mind-line would be left to cling to? Such a rapport might be between our minds (or the minds of the elect among us) and the minds of Martians and Saturnians. It might be a rapport between our minds and their stars, or more generally, a cosmic rapport that had nothing to do with the finite boundaries of living bodies and of living body-minds" (2)

To begin with Alexander has quite definitely ruled out the possibility of God 'as a society of minds', for he said, that nothing can be gained from the current metaphors of the mind of a state or crown (1). Therefore, this emendation of Laird is quite inconsistent with the theology of Alexander. Here we agree with Dr. Stiernotte's criticism of Laird's suggestion:

"We do not see what Laird gains through these extravagant suppositions of the nature of finite gods and angels, which suppositions become increasingly grotesque rather than philosophically enlightening" (2).

Hence, we conclude that on the basis of Alexander's philosophy, there is no possibility of an actually infinite deity and the possibility of an infinite mind as a rapport between human, martian and Saturnian minds and their 'stars' is too speculative to serve as a difficulty for Alexander's theology.

IV. THE WHOLE WORLD AS THE 'BODY' OF DEITY:— With reference to the universal formula of mind-body relationship, the whole of Space-Time inclusive of all finites is the body of God and deity is His 'mind'. Now Laird objects to the use of the term 'the whole world' which tends towards deity. For him not the whole world but only a portion of the universe really will be straining towards deity. Dr. Stiernotte thinks that this objection of Laird is cogent (3).

In order that we may not be accused of misinterpretation

1. STD II. p. 351. 2. God and Space-Time p. 260
3. Ibid. p. 261
we are quoting in full the relevant portion of Laird's criticism:

"Accordingly we have to say that even if there is a legitimate sense in which 'the whole world' is 'the body' of the minds that exist, it is not the usual sense. In the usual sense of language the body of my mind is a watery colloid substance of small dimensions and of very moderate powers. In terms of Alexandrian canons 'the whole world' with its universal nisus is only the Urleib and not the Leib of any mind, its remote and not the proximate body. Similarly, 'the whole world' could only be the remote and not the proximate body of emergent deity. "...

We do not see the point of criticism. In a way, Alexander would accept the whole statement. 'The world' is said to strain towards deity in its ideal form and not towards 'the emergent or actual deity'. As soon as the ideal deity has become actual it ceases to be infinite and ceases to have the whole world for its 'body'. Certainly, the gods or angels are not going to have the whole world as their 'body'. Laird did not carefully distinguish the two notions of deity as actual and deity as ideal. In his criticism number 111, he took the actual deity to be finite and now here he takes it to be infinite. But he must have known that the emergent deity is an actual deity, which is really no deity at all, and such a deity has not the whole world for its Leib.

But even in the case of deity in its ideal form, there is some implicit distinction of proximate and remote bodies.

The deity of man depends more on him than on other lower levels and Alexander did recognise this:

"Now in so far as God owes his being to preceding history he is himself dependent on finite beings and in particular man" (1).

But, probably the objection is that 'the whole world' is the body of ideal deity. When it becomes actual, then we have to suppose that this body becomes scattered into bits, as Dr. Stiernotte tries to point out. This difficulty of the 'shrinkage theory' is attributed to Alexander's theology. Dr. Stiernotte therefore quotes this criticism of Dawes Hicks:

"Why should God be conceived as the whole world possessing deity? If deity be an empirical quality, as is mind or life or colour, is there more reason why the world should be the body of God than that it should be the body of any one of these qualities? Are we, indeed, to suppose that the whole world is the body (say) of mind prior to mind's emergence, but that when it does emerge its body shrinks into a very insignificant portion of that world? (2)

Alexander has made a distinction between God and gods. By God he understood the Infinite God and if such a God has body then it cannot but be infinite, that is, the whole world. Hence, it is not a valid objection to maintain that God cannot have the whole world for His body. Further, we fear that Dawes Hicks has not correctly interpreted the term 'empirical'. In the sense of Alexander's use 'empirical' does not mean 'actual or existent'. This term has been used

1. On taking time seriously p. 15 (Italics ours)
2. H. J. LXX, 1920-1921 p. 530-531
by Alexander to distinguish the 'empirical' from the 'a-priori' or all-pervasive feature of the world. Certainly for being a non-pervasive or non-categorial quality, deity has no reason to have the whole world as its body. But deity proper is an ideal and as an ideal it remains infinite, and as an infinite 'mind' of God it presupposes an 'infinite body' or the whole world. Thus, the first part of Dawes Hicks's criticism is pointless, and let us therefore turn to the other difficulty which is supposed to arise from the 'shrinkage theory'. But before we reply to it, let us explain Alexander's meaning of the sentence that 'the whole world tends to deity'.

By 'the whole universe or world' is meant the whole of Space-Time with its hierarchy of finite levels. In this hierarchy, the higher level is sustained by all the lower levels. The deity of man is sustained by mind, life and matter; and mind, in turn, is sustained by life and matter. The same thing holds of life and matter. In this broad sense, even mind is sustained by the whole world. And, if there are gods, then they are sustained by all the lower levels, but the lower levels are not sustained by the higher. This is the complaint of Bradley. If it be so, then deity, being higher than the highest emergent so far, is sustained by the whole world. This interpretation is based on the following statement of Alexander:
Moreover the nisus of the whole is shared at any moment by everything with it. Life has been evolved and has been embodied in finite living things; and mind in sentient things. The nisus would seem to have done its work so far as the attainment of life or mind is concerned. Yet still material and living things are caught in the nisus, in virtue of which they sustain the level above them, and without which that level would disappear, and things would shrink back to a lower stage" (1).

If this is so, then the highest emergent is supported and sustained by all the lower levels and this is the meaning of the statement that the whole world strains or tends towards deity. When mind has become an emergent existent, even then this straining of the whole world, inclusive of levels lower than mind, will continue, but its body will become finite. It is to this we trust that Laird, in the previous criticism was objecting. He was arguing for an infinite emergent deity. Thus, we find that there is nothing by way of Laird's distinction between Urleib and Leib which really choke the system of Alexander. There is no difficulty in holding that the whole world strains towards deity in embryo. But as soon as it becomes actual, then in a general way, even this highest emergent will be sustained by the whole world. However, as a particular instance of any empirical existent it will have only a limited 'body', as is the case with our individual minds. However, at this stage Dawes Hicks has raised the following objection:

1. Spinoza and Time P.L.P. P. 381
"Are we, indeed, to suppose that the whole world is the body (say) of mind prior to mind’s emergence, but that when it does emerge its body shrinks into a very insignificant portion of that world? And if so, why does the fact of emergence make so tremendous a difference? Assuming that the whole world had at one time a niusus towards the birth of mind, it is surely arbitrary to assert that it loses such niusus as soon as a certain number of mental lives appear upon the scene" (1).

When mind was an ideal deity of ‘life’ then Alexander would hold, that not only life but the whole world was struggling and straining to bring it about. Even now the niusus, to bring forth mind, continues in life. When mind became actual, then there was certainly a shrinkage, but the better term would be ‘scatter’, which Laird has used. But what does ‘shrinkage’ mean? It does not mean that the whole infinite world at once becomes an infinitesimal ‘body’. There is ‘shrinkage’ due to a spiral rise in the evolutionary hierarchy. The broad base of Space-Time narrows and shrinks as the ladder tapers high.

Not the whole of Space-Time has become matter and not the whole of matter has become life, and not the whole of life has become mind. Similarly, the whole of mind will not be gods or angels. There is shrinkage only in this sense, but when the ideal deity becomes actual, then it becomes scattered into the multiplicity of finite beings. Now that an emergent deity scatters into a multiplicity of finite beings is a fact, and therefore, Alexander would advise us to accept this with ‘natural piety’. However, in addition to

1. H.J. 1920-21 p. 561
this, Alexander has also given his reason as to why a qualified being cannot be infinite and we have already referred to it. Thus there is nothing in the argument of Dawes Hicks either, which crams or chokes the theology of Alexander.

Lastly, the nisus does not cease to sustain the emergent deity when it becomes actual. Hence, it is incorrect to hold with Dawes Hicks that at one time the whole world had a nisus towards mind and this nisus has ceased as soon as a certain number of mental lives appear on the scene.

V. There is one more criticism raised by Laird. We consider that in substance this is a real difficulty of Alexander and we will make use of it in our own criticism of Alexander’s theology. But there is one element of it which we consider to be a misapprehension, which Laird shares with Prof. Broad.

We find that Alexander has not really explained to us the terms ‘higher’ and ‘lower’ and yet he has made frequent use of them. In his letter to Miss Hilda Oakeley, he implied that the ‘higher and lower’ should be explained in terms of the emergent ladder. Following the order of the emergent ladder we can say that mind is higher than life, and life is higher than matter. Further, we find that the difference between matter, life and mind is one of increasing complexity. Deity, then, is simply more complex than mind. In this context Laird has put the following question:
"If so, one can surely ask whether mind is higher than mere vegetative life solely or principally because of its more efficient complexity, and more generally why we should worship efficient complexity if it excels mind and mental values in kind? As it seems to me one might decline to worship efficient complexity with at least as good reason as Alexander had for declining to worship truth or beauty or righteousness, ———(1).

We agree with Laird in holding that the distinction of higher and lower cannot be one of mere complexity. If it were so, it would amount to the reduction of quality to quantity and Alexander's own assertion that matter, life and mind differ in kind will become meaningless. But we object to the second part of the question put by Laird. If we keep close to the theology of Alexander, then, can we say that we can decline to worship deity? The same kind of question was raised by Prof. Broad in the following sentence:

"He (Alexander) seems to hold (a) that S-T will always go on producing higher and higher complexes with new and more wonderful qualities, and (b) that we ought to regard these new qualities with something of the love and reverence which religious persons feel for their God" (1).

But the fact is that according to Alexander, the religious sentiment is of the nature of an appetite and therefore, it is a natural process of the nature of 'is'. It is what we do. We can neither refrain from worshipping what we do worship, nor can we ask such question, 'Ought we worship this higher complexity or not?' We have already referred to this question in connection with the first criticism of Laird. It is not up

to men to decide whether he should worship the higher complexity or not. We have here only to observe what he does and what he cannot help doing. Alexander replied to Prof. Broad in the following way:

"A much more important point: I do not say as Mr. Broad thinks that we 'ought' to regard the new qualities produced by S-T with religious reverence; but that religious reverence is the way we do regard such a next higher quality—no ought but a fact, if rightly described" (1).

Thus, Alexander did not say that we ought not to worship Truth, Beauty and Goodness, but he said that the values do not arouse religious emotion. It is once more a question of fact and he wrote thus in reference to it:

"I can be enthusiastic for beauty or truth, but I have no worship for them. They excite in me no religious feeling," (2) the

Thus, following hierarchical ladder of Alexander, we cannot help worshipping deity, even though it be no more than merely greater complexity than that of mind.

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1. Mind 1921 p. 149
2. The Listener Dec 3, 1930 p. 922 col. 2
CHAPTER EIGHT.

A CRITICISM OF THE PHILOSOPHY OF ALEXANDER.

SYNOPSIS.

According to Alexander, philosophy is a comprehensive science and its method is wholly empirical and even analytic to death. We shall discuss whether philosophy can be called scientific and whether Alexander has clearly explained the connotation of 'experience'. However, from these assumptions, Alexander has deduced his epistemology and metaphysics. He, following the empirical method, came to the conclusion that Space-Time is the simplest reality on which everything must be based. We shall discuss whether Space-Time is really concrete, and if so, whether it can be called the simplest element.

In Alexander's Naturalism, Space-Time becomes the matrix of all empirical existents, and, by virtue of the nisus, it generates the hierarchy of empirical existents. In due course we shall discuss the nature of this nisus and emergence which form the main pillar of Alexander's theology. Further, we shall discuss whether this hylozoistic account is a subtle form of materialism. Again, the empirical existents have not only emerged in a hierarchical order but they are also patterned on the universal formula of the mind-body relationship. We will see that if the mind-body formula be true, then emergence
loses its importance, and, if emergence be true, then the mind-body formula becomes misleading.

Thus, we summarise here the criticisms of the fundamental premises and assumptions of Alexander's philosophy, and come to the conclusion that it ends in a-cosmicism.

**PHILOSOPHY AS A COMPREHENSIVE SCIENCE:**

Alexander was not simply content to fertilise philosophy with the conclusions of science, but he wanted to make philosophy a scientific study in every respect. Therefore, he took philosophy to be a science (1), which differs from all other sciences, not in method but only in having a comprehensive subject-matter (2). As philosophy, according to Alexander, is a science, therefore, its method is one of faithful description of observed or experienced facts (3); or, as he himself expressed:

"The method of naturalism is the method of impartial description and analysis, as practised with appropriate means in the natural sciences" (4)

But, is it right and proper to say that philosophy is a science and that its method is purely empirical description?

Firstly, a science is a body of laws and principles of phenomena of a distinct department of the universe, for the sake of knowing them for its own sake. In other words, a science is a dispassionate understanding of facts. So far

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2. Elementary ideas in philosophy pr. 2; The Listener Jan. 21, 1893 p. 78; The Listener, Dec. 3 1930 P. 921.
as 'ethical neutrality' is concerned, philosophy proposes to be an impartial study of facts, but surely in philosophy, we not only try to understand facts, but we also attempt to appraise and evaluate them. Facts and values have to be given equal status in a philosophical account of them. However, properly speaking science deals with facts and disregards values (5). Further, a science is compartmental, for it deals only with a cross-section of reality. Thus, philosophy being comprehensive, ceases to be a science. Then, again, in order to be comprehensive, philosophy has to offer a synoptic world-view and this requires a vision on the part of the philosopher and Alexander accepts this necessity of vision in philosophy:

"The great fundamental notions of philosophers are not proved, their truth is seen. Proofs are nothing but machinery, which helps others to secure the philosopher's vision" (1).

This is what Bosanquet would call 'penetrative imagination' (2), and therefore, according to Alexander, the philosopher uses certain 'contrivances for putting his readers into the right position for seeing' (3). But, if vision is necessary for a world-view, then philosophy needs an artist's vision, and then it ceases to be an impartial description of facts. No doubt in a scientific discovery, an intuitive grasp of things is a necessary factor. But to the extent that a

3. A Metaphysical Sketch p.1; Mind 1921 p.409-10.
1. P.R.P. p. 373
science depends on an intuitive, lightning-like grasp of the situation, it ceases to be purely scientific.

Thus, from the above considerations, it is clear that philosophy is not a science, though indirectly it is penetrated with the scientific data and conclusions. When philosophy accepts certain conclusions of one or more sciences then it does so by weighing their importance and relevance in the wider context of our total experience. This has been thus expressed by Prof. Macmurray:

"------ (Philosophy) can undertake the task of estimating the weight that should be attributed to the conclusions of science in the formation of our general views about the nature of the world" (1).

As a matter of fact, philosophy includes sciences (2) and in doing so it goes beyond them. In the words of Kulpe, the task of philosophy consists in the systematisation of the separate sciences (3), and as such it is:

"a supplement and completion of the special sciences; and that its great task is to move between theory and practice, experience and hope, reason and feeling,—weighing probabilities, balancing arguments, reconciling differences" (4).

Not only philosophy, going beyond sciences, assumes the character of an artistic vision, but sciences themselves are not purely scientific. They themselves rest on beliefs which are not proved scientifically. For example, science presupposes the value of truth, but, does not deal with 'value'. It gives only a quantitative view of things and as such deals with that which can be weighed and

1 The Boundaries of Science p. 27.
2 Macmurray, J. Ibid. p. 11.
4 Kulpe O. Ibid. p. 194
measured and can be quantitatively expressed. But, philosophy, in its comprehensive sweep, includes everything, quality as well as quantity, value as well as facts, and thus cannot remain entirely within science.

"--------(philosophy) is concerned with the business of relating science as a whole to the other parts and aspects of common human experience. It has to attempt to integrate science with aspects of experience which are not scientific, remembering that science itself depends for its very existence upon natural beliefs which are not and cannot be reached by scientific methods, however much they may be modified or clarified by the results of scientific investigation" (2)

Alexander’s own philosophy is far from being a science. It is a synoptic world-view, which has been inspired by the vision of a rising spiral, 'a revolving escalator or band', 'the mind-body relationship' etc.

If philosophy be not a science, then we cannot accept the further contention of Alexander that its methodology should be one of analysis and description only. We also need that synthesis, which rests on a creative insight into things conceived in their entirety. Since philosophy deals with experience as a whole, evidence for a thing cannot be based on the specialised observations peculiar to some limited field of scientific enquiry (1). For this reason some thinkers like Dean Inge (2) and Sheen (3) point out that even the theory of evolution cannot be used on a cosmic scale. Now, the spirit of this contention is admirable.

yet we may find that some scientific conclusions serve as clues to the whole reality. This is a question which refers to the value of 'metaphor' and 'analogy' in philosophical thinking. But, on the whole the methodology and assumptions of science cannot be simply generalised to become the touchstone of philosophical enquiry. Nevertheless, this is what Alexander has done, partly as a result of his theory of philosophical method. However, to surrender to this demand of Alexander is for philosophy to capitulate to science. 

Alexander's realistic theory of knowledge is based on the generalisation of the revelatory function of knowledge in science (1). The empirical method of a science demands that we should not trouble ourselves as to how things are related to our minds (1).

But this contention of Alexander, presupposes that the method of science is the only possible method of knowledge (2). However, this is simply the dogmatism of scientific totalitarianism. We agree with Prof. Macmurray when he says:

"Science can cover the whole range of phenomena but not the whole of the possible knowledge about any of it.

-----In other words, there is nothing that science cannot give us some knowledge about, and there is nothing that science can give us complete knowledge about" (3).

*Alexander was fond of comparing his age with that of the 17th century (P.L.P. pp. 34-347, 346, 351). Well, in the 17th century, the philosophical method was identified with mathematics and so, Alexander thought that he could, in his time, identify philosophy with science.
1. STD 1. p. 11.
2. Van Hall, G. 'The Theory of Knowledge of Samuel Alexander'- p. 49.
3. The Boundaries of science p. 72
Thus, the incomplete and partial knowledge of science cannot
be expected to yield the exclusive method of knowledge in
metaphysics. In other words, philosophy is a critique of
scientific methodology, so far as its general implication is
concerned, and therefore, this function of the criticism of
scientific knowledge cannot be justified if we use the
presupposition of science all the while in doing so (1).
The justification and evaluation of the scientific procedure
and knowledge must be based on considerations other than their
own presuppositions, or else, it must be shown that every form
of knowledge can be of the nature of scientific methodology
only. This latter task has not been carried out by Alexander.
As the former contention, his position comes to this tautology:
"scientific procedure is valid universally for it is scientific".

Now we have to raise the question concerning the meaning
and nature of 'experience' itself, on which the empirical
foundation of the realistic metaphysics has been based. The
term 'experience' is really very vague and loose for philoso-
phical discourse, and therefore the logical positivists have
defined it in terms of their doctrine of 'verification'.

Jacks and Alexander exchanged five letters during April 6, 1912
and April 25, 1912, concerning the analysis and meaning of the
term 'experience', and yet neither remained satisfied with its
meaning. Alexander himself was aware of the vagueness of the
term and wrote about it thus:

T. Hoernle, R.F.A.'Idealism and Evolutionary Naturalism', The
Monist, 1926 pp. 570, 572; Philosophy To-day p. 9.
"Art is sometimes described as an experience, but since everything is in a certain sense an experience, this description is too vague, for we need to know what kind of an experience". (1)

The last part of the statement is important, for Alexander has used it in answering the charge of loose and ambiguous use of the term 'experience'. In reply to Stout's objection (2), Alexander pointed out that for him 'experience' meant always 'experience in general' and for him it was always 'immediate' (3), and he laid down that the sound principle in its use is 'be sure that what you say you experience is there in the very form in which you describe it' (4).

Alexander has referred to experience in many places for vouchsafing the reality of various kinds of objects of knowledge (5). For this reason, Prof. Kemp Smith, in his letter of August 19, 1920, wrote thus to Alexander:

"You almost seem to me, at times, to appeal to 'experience' as Bacon and Descartes were wont to appeal to 'Revelation'."

The list of the different kinds of objects and their corresponding specific experiences can be thus summarised:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Kinds of Objects</th>
<th>Kinds of Experience</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. Space-Time and</td>
<td>--- By intuition through sensation (STD 11 pp.158,159)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Primary Qualities</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Secondary Qualities</td>
<td>--- By special senses</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. Life</td>
<td>--- By organic and kinaesthetic sensations (STD 11 pp.4,170,176)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. Own self</td>
<td>--- By 'enjoyment'</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6. Other selves</td>
<td>--- By 'assurance'</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7. Values</td>
<td>--- By 'appreciation' (STD 11 p.242)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8. God</td>
<td>--- By 'religious emotion'</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Over and above these objects we are said to experience ourselves as substance, feel the identity of mind with its underlying neural processes, experience the reality of the past and future of contemplated objects, and 'enjoy' the past mental processes as past and so on. Alexander himself has summarised the objects and their corresponding experience in the following way:

"Thus, in the widest sense of the phrase 'cognition of', in which it may include the last-named cognition of other minds, we have cognition of Space-Time and the primary 'qualities' of matter by intuition, of matter by the sense of resistance, of secondary qualities by the special senses of life by the organic and kinaesthetic senses, of other minds by assurance which is supplemented by sympathetic imagination" (1).

But is it enough to name the different kinds of experience which are involved in the cognitions of various kinds of objects? After all, they may be mere names. They have to be analysed and their significance has to be determined with precision. In several instances viz., the identity of mind with its neural correlates and the spatiality of mind are not given in the ordinary experience, and yet they are said to be given in experience, according to Alexander. It is the defect not only of his epistemology but of his whole philosophy. Sometimes he included certain objects as given in experience which ordinarily will not be so accepted and at other times he would not accept things which are actually attested by experience. For example, the responsiveness of

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1. P.A.S. Vol. 37, 1926-7, p. 117; see also Mind 1923 p. 3.
1. STD 11. p. 176-177.
God will be said to be attested by religious experience and yet Alexander would not accept it.

Thus we come to the conclusion that philosophy is not a science and its method is not purely empirical and descriptive. Alexander himself does not adhere to the empirical method and very often goes far beyond the testimony of uncorrupted 'experience'.

**SPACE - TIME MATRIX.** Being empirical and analytic Alexander's philosophy has to find out that from which all empirical existences can be constructed or rather into which they can be analysed. In his day two kinds of substances were advanced to explain all things, namely 'matter' by the materialists, and 'mind' by the idealists. But 'matter' failed to explain life and mind, and 'mind' failed to explain how matter can be the product of 'spirit'. To be sure, physics had penetrated farther into matter, and Whitehead had constructed the theory of 'extensive abstraction' from the conclusion of physics. But Alexander, though advised by Prof. Broad to adopt this theory (1), rejected it on the ground that it presupposed and did not explain the major category of 'relation' (2). He, therefore, wanted to penetrate to something still more ultimate (3) and this he found in Space-Time entity. Of course it would have been much easier for Alexander, as Prof. Emmet suggests (4), and as he himself knew (5), if he had been prepared to describe Space-Time as the structure of a

continuum of events rather than as an absolute stuff from which all things are derived. His theory of 'perspectives' might have been then less exposed to the criticism of Prof. Broad and Dawes Hicks (1). But then, Alexander could not have made Space-Time the absolute reality, and his realistic analysis of the categories and consequently of epistemology could not have been carried out. In the long run it would have meant an overthrow of his whole system, for in a subtle way the other doctrines of mind-body relationship, emergence and God are inter-related with Space-Time as the ultimate matrix.

However, it is one thing to say that Space-Time is fundamental for Alexander (2), and quite a different thing to say that it is a defensible portulate of the system. Alexander was quite conscious of the difficulty of maintaining that there are pure motions without something which moves, and this has been seized upon by a number of his critics (3). He himself wrote about it thus:

"I know that to speak of pure Space-Time is puzzling; and it is of course a theory to suppose, as I do, that material and all qualified events are as it were nodosities in Space-Time" (4).

1. Broad C.D. 'Minds' 1921 p.31-32; Dawes Hicks H.J. 1920-21 p.577
2. Mind 1921 p.419.
3. Dawes Hicks H.J. 1920-21 p.577; Morgan L. 'Emergent Evolution' p.23f; Watson J. 'The Philosophical Review XXXIII 1924 p.241; Stout G.F. 'Mind' 1940 p.145. Sheen F.J. 'Religion without God' p.266; also 'God and Intelligence' p.223. Dean Inge approves of Sheen's objection in 'God and the Astronomers' p.415. Similar criticisms of Prof. J.A.Smith and Bradley have already been noted earlier.
4. Mind 1921 p.414
Further, concerning point-instants, he wrote:

"When I attempt to call it the limit of a motion, I am really fumbling with mathematical notions, leaving my last like an undutiful cobbler. I know that the position is difficult and perhaps it may be thought to be wanting in concreteness" (1).

Finally, in his letter of August 4, 1920, to Prof. Broad, he wrote:

"The fact is I have an obstinate belief that the proposition is true, but I also think it more than possible I have slipped in the proof. I might have imitated Gauss and other mathematical swells, and stated the theorem and left it unproved. But not being swell enough to be taken on trust I thought it cowardly not to give reasons, so far as I could".

THE AMBIGUITY OF HISTORICITY AND ABSOLUTISM IN THE DOCTRINE OF SPACE-TIME:

From the above confession of Alexander it is clear that Space-Time is not really given in experience and it is only a philosophical 'simple' of the philosophers like the various 'elements' of the Greek hylozoists. This is the reason why Alexander regarded Space-Time as a 'theory' (2), 'ideal' or 'conceptual' (3), but, then again, as 'real' and 'given in experience'. Thus Prof. Emmet points out that a good deal of confusion is found concerning point-instants. Sometimes they are treated as real and at other times they are regarded as ideal (1). The same ambiguity is found about Space-Time as a whole. It is regarded either as 'stuff' of which things are composed or as 'pure motions'. Hence, in the following

1. Philosophy 1930 p. 250.
statement, Prof. Emmet points out that Alexander oscillated between two views:

"In one view S-T is something absolute and complete (a kind of substance), an infinite whole, distinguishable, it is true, into point-instants, but in which motion simply means the redistribution of the temporal co-efficients of spatial outlines within the whole S-T. In the other view Time stands for what Whitehead calls 'the advance into novelty'. On the former view S-T is an absolute stuff of which things are made; and we can ask whether, like the materialist's matter, this is not an abstracted concept treated as if it were a substance. On the latter view we could say that nature is focused in lines of advance with a history, and at each level of the process where there is a new emergent quality, this quality is, as it were, the spearhead of creative advance at that stage."

But whichever view we take of Space-Time we fall into trouble. Can Space-Time be the real 'stuff' of which things are constituted? This has been answered by Miss Liddell in the following way:

"He (Alexander) has posited a primal stuff. But no genuine infinite can be stuff. Stuff is a definite notion. It is substance, reduced to its lowest term, but still substance; and infinite in itself is not substance nor even stuff" (1).

At most it is a mere metaphor (2). If it is 'stuff', then really it ceases to be temporal or historical. Although Space-Time is full of Time, in itself it is timeless, says Hallett, for it has neither a momentary existence nor a single duration. It 'comprehends them all' (3).

But, again, can Space-Time as a 'historical' notion be absolutely real? No, since at any moment it is 'gnawing

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1. Alexander' Space, Time and Deity p.47; see also p.42.
into the future', and so can never be complete (4). Alexander himself pointed out that 'infinite Space has no contour, and is thus no substance' (5). 'Space-Time exists only in the loose usage of words' (6). It is an infinite becoming. If the universe is timeful, how should it not always be occurring? True, time may have neither beginning nor end, may be an endless string, but the string goes on in endless motion, like a revolving band or an escalator' (1).

'The world which is Space-Time never and nowhere came into existence, for the infinite becoming cannot begin to become' (2). Hence, Space-Time is of the nature of Bergson's Elan Vital and then it becomes a creative entity, creating without any end or purpose, so that all emergents, from matter to deity, are mere accidents. But, according to Alexander, the empirical existents are preserved in Space-Time, and this cannot be if Space-Time be like 'a shoreless river without any source or end'. If space-time be mere Elan Vital, then such an entity cannot guarantee the emergence of deity, nor can it conserve the emergents once they have been thrown out of its womb.

If Space-Time is not an Elan-Vital or a mere revolving escalator, then can it be a mere 'abstract postulate of Mathematics' as Boedin understood it to be? (3). Well, abstract entities can never explain concrete realities. But, Alexander himself regarded Space-Time as 'the lowest expression'...
of the universe (4). Certainly, as Hawes (5) has pointed out, the Space-Time of Alexander is an ultimate reality without any qualities of matter, life, mind, value, purpose or teleological principle, and therefore comes to be a blank entity — 'the dark night of Spinoza'. In this sense, we empty Space-Time of everything and equate it with the 'thinnest, most vacuous and formal aspects' of reality (1).

Thus we conclude that Space-Time can be regarded either as 'infinite becoming' or as 'the absolute stuff'. If it is an 'absolute becoming', then it cannot guarantee the conservation of the new emergents, much less the emergence of deity. Further, this will lead to the absence of any systematic character in reality, without which no rational thinking is possible about it. However, if Space-Time be not an infinite 'becoming' but be interpreted as an 'infinite stuff', then it becomes too thin, abstract and empty to explain the rich variety of the universe. Hence, we find that Space-Time of Alexander, has two contradictory strains of Absolutism and Historicity. Each taken by itself is insufficient to explain the whole experience and taken together they lack the necessary harmony. Murphy (2) points out that in the end absolutism triumphs, but this absolutism is like that of Spinoza. In the history of philosophy, it has been observed that philosophy always breaks down in relation to the dipolar dialectic of world-events. There is

4. STB II. p. 341
1. Leighton J.A. 'Man and Cosmos' p. 230; see also p. 237
the permanent and the transitory, substantial and accidental, Being and becoming and so forth. Alexander always emphasized the becoming and the temporal, but he knew that it was onesided view of things. Therefore, he tried to give the form of Substance, Being and permanence to 'Becoming' and this has made him doubly inconsistent. In itself no purely temporalistic account can solve the problem but it is much worse, if it is going to be clothed in the borrowed garments of the absolutists. Alexander regarded Space-Time as the Absolute Reality (1), and called it 'the One' (2). As such it is self-contained, infinite and all-embracing, "Within this matrix there may then be progressive types not so much of reality as of merit or perfection, as a rose may be more perfect thing than a stone" (3). Even in relation to point-instants, he at times treated points as the unchanging 'eternals'. Points do not of course move in the system of points, but they change their time-coefficient" (4). But if it be so, then, says Dawes Hicks:

"one vainly seeks to learn how point-instants, whose points do not move in the system of points, are conserved to guarantee, when in some way they cohere together in groups, existents (electrons, atoms, things etc.,) whose points do move in the system of points, and which successively 'occupy' different space-times" (5).

This brings us to another fundamental feature of Space-Time,

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1. STD I. P. 346; STD II. P. 369. 2. STD I. PP. 359, 345
3. STD I. P. 347. 4. STD I. P. 61; also P. 65.
5. Dawes-Hicks O. H. J. XIX, 1, 20-21 P. 576; also Inge W.R. 'God and Astronomers' P. 111.
This feature is nisus and emergence which is possessed by Space-Time as a whole. Once Space-Time is taken to be an evolving matrix it ceases to be a scientific doctrine and becomes synonymous with the Plan Vital of Bergson of the natura naturans of Spinoza (1). This is the predominant notion of Space-Time and we have to see how far Space-Time as Natura naturans can solve the riddles of our total experience.

For Alexander, Space-Time is progressive notion. This progressiveness of the process is called 'nisus' (\*). He never seriously questioned the reality of the progressiveness of the nisus. It remained with him an article of faith which he shared with the men of the 19th century, a century which has been called 'a peculiar period of hope' (2). In MORAL ORDER AND PROGRESS (1889), he thought that the general progress in morals will continue and this will not be linear but spiral (1). Even in BEAUTY AND OTHER FORMS OF VALUE (1933), he maintained that goodness will count in the end (2). For this reason the 'gloomy Dean' wrote:

"For consider how the doctrine of Progress, the supposed law of Progress, inevitable, endless, continually increasing and advancing Progress, was the lay creed of men of science, philosophers, sociologists and historians, during the whole of the last century" (3).

But the Dean added that this law of progress, in the face of the Second Law of Thermodynamics, is illusory and unfounded (4).

However, Alexander did not think that this unending progress is an illusion of an apocalyptic hope. He maintained on the other hand, that this doctrine of nisus or the progressive process is guaranteed by the nature of events (5), and so it is verifiable fact. (6) No doubt he confessed that he was simply applying an analogy in holding that deity will emerge in God's own good time and place, but this, he said, is no more than extension of what can be traced in actual facts (1).

Any criticism of Alexander's doctrine of nisus depends on the meaning of the term 'progress'. This term 'progress' naturally means that the spiral will continue to throw out higher emergents in the infinite spinning of time. But we will soon see that 'progress' or 'higher or lower' is not an axiological term for Alexander, but a mere descriptive formula. But then it must also be conceded that Alexander's doctrine of deity is based on the ordinary notion of 'progressiveness'. Deity is the divine element in the universe which man worships and it is supposed to be higher than man, and this deity is created by the nisus in its onward sweep

7. STD II. p. 367; also cf. STD II. p. 361
of time. Thus 'nisus' means the 'progressiveness of the process' or else, as he maintained, the 'de facto advance'.

But can this notion stand the stress of argument?

**NISUS AND TIME:** Firstly, we have to observe that nisus is not mere restlessness of time, for the restlessness of time by itself can yield only movement or change in empirical existents. But it means that Space-Time is more than mere motion, for it is a directed motion for the creation of emergents along a certain spiral advance. This has been well pointed out by Gunn:

"Space-Time is more than Space plus Time, for it possesses a mystic generative quality which Space and Time as such cannot possess. In this case the formal name Space-Time is perhaps unfortunate, for the restlessness of Space-Time surely implies that the additional mystical element in the conception which is more than Space plus Time is something akin to the creative force which lies included in Bergson's Time---" (1).

The only weakness in this criticism is that it implies that Space and Time are separate, but, according to Alexander, they are indivisible entity. But the fact remains that Alexander assumed much more than he explicitly stated about Space-Time. Space-Time by itself is supposed to act intelligently, though Alexander would like to treat it as a blind Will. But, if the possibility of an 'alien influx into nature' be barred (2) and if Space-Time be caus a sui or self-creative, as he maintained (3), then, by virtue of its acting

1. Letter of 2.6.1921 to Lloyd Morgan. 2. STD 11. p.367
2. The Problem of Time p.262. The same sort of criticism has been given by J.E. Bodin 'Cosmic Evolution' p.89, in the following words: 'why should ensembles of space-points and time-instants have such fertility when wedged to each other and taken in perspective?'
in an orderly manner, it is an intelligent principle:

"Space-Time itself, by virtue of its own nisus, elaborates without forethought a 'hierarchy of ministration' which if it were produced by mind would imply a vast and all-wise forethought or providence" (4).

To be sure, Alexander tried to explain the whole progressiveness of the world in a purely naturalistic way. He pointed out that the very condition of the emergence of deity and higher emergents is that they should be adapted to the lower levels in the most delicate way and this intricate adaptiveness will come about in the same way in which organic adaptation has come about, through the process of natural selection. However, natural selection is at most a negative principle, for it explains the survival, but not the arrival of new emergents. The nisus, on the other hand, and, therefore, cannot be exhausted or completely is a positive principle of creativity/identified with the functioning of the negative principle of natural selection. Besides, we will soon quote Alexander to show that the cosmic creative principle is 'purposeless' (1), and if so, then it will undo its creation with the same indifference with which it builds it up (2). As such it cannot guarantee even its preservation, much less its upward progress. Alexander apparently did not think so:

"It (Space-Time) is itself uncreated but is merely there. In it, as in a matrix, are formed the finite things which are said to be created and to have a beginning. --------- It is, in the old phrase, cause of itself, causa sui, self-created. But though uncreated, it is creative, in

2. Boodin '», 'Three Interpretations of the Universe' p.94-5.
the sense that these crystals or embryos grow within its womb; and it must contain in itself some principle or character which is manifested in this growth. It has no purpose, but its creativeness comes to fruition in certain finites which possess true purpose (3).

**SPACE - TIME AND ORDERLY EVOLUTION: -** But can Space-Time by itself explain growth? In itself Space-Time is no more than a series of events and to call the events 'embryos in growth' is mere metaphor.

Space-Time by itself cannot perform that function which belongs to mind alone. The systematic emergence of novelties, their sustenance and their upward striving require an intelligent principle.

"If we could say this, it would be more plausible to say that the *nexus* which makes for 'advance into novelty', which is not Time but is measured in terms of Time, is the 'mind' factor in the events whose extended patterns (measured in terms of Space) are the 'body' factor" (1).

Seeing the necessity of an intelligent principle, Alexander called Time the 'mind' of Space. Instead of treating Time as the 'form' of mind, as Kant taught, Alexander treated mind as the form of Time. (2). But by itself, it is a mere analogy and it simply means that Time-Factor of Space-Time introduces restlessness in it. But Time by itself is a series of discrete moments, cherishing of 'nows'. In order to consider Time as the 'mind' of Space, it has to be divorced from its indissoluble partnership with Space (3).

3. I. H. F. p. 267-70. Cf. 'Dialogues Concerning Natural Religion' in which Hume makes the hypothesis of a material world, containing the principle of order within itself pp. 24-577.


This has been well observed by Miss Liddell:

"Only by attributing to Time a greater significance than Alexander's original definition could permit, and by tacitly leaving Space out of account in so far as it is identified with Time, can the static-temporal universe be made to coincide with the actual, historical process of reality" (4).

But, if Time be thus separated from Space, then it becomes hopelessly discrete and unreal. But, again, if it remains in loyal partnership with Space, then it remains confined to the production of movement and not of growth (5). Thus, we can conclude with Watson:

"In short, I can see nothing in all this but a futile attempt to make Time do the work which only mind or universal intelligence is fitted to perform" (6).

Now let us come to the emergence which the nisus creates.

It is the nisus which makes the emergents emerge. Here we find that the nisus makes 'qualitied' events emerge from Space-Time which is 'unqualitied', creatures having purpose emerge from that which is purposeless. The whole principle seems to be based on contradiction. But, if the world-order of qualitied events is a fact, then, why should we think that it is merely static-temporal only?

"To the degree in which a world character is different from motion, it is not motion—--On the other hand, as attempt to identify new qualities with new laws of motion merely, is to seek to evade plain facts"(1).

Thus, the whole doctrine is based on the violation of the well-known principle ex nihilo nihil fit (2), or that the higher cannot come from the lower (3).

4. Liddell A.F. op. Cit. p.59
5. Watson J. 'The Philosophical Review' 1924 p.240,244.
Then again the theory of emergence is based on the orderly evolution of matter, life and mind and they are mere accidents in the Absolute Reality—Space-Time.

"It must be owned that if we take a local point of view, the history of our earth, the theory looks plausible, but it is not possible, I think, to account for the order of emergence on the basis of accident" (1).

This theory of the progressiveness of the process is not only based on a 'local point of view', but on a 'localised' point of view. One must not ignore the second law of Thermodynamics (1). Hence, the progressiveness of Space-Time is not a valid generalisation of observed facts known to us and is based at most on accidents, confined to a narrow range of cosmic history.

IS EMERGENCE A DESCRIPTION OR FACTS OR A PRINCIPLE OF EXPLANATION?

We may accept that the world is in process but 'we might boggle at the further premiss that the process must be progress, and again at the gloss that such progress is quite clearly and specifically along the emergent ladder of the nisus' (2). But even if all these difficulties concerning the doctrine or the progressive nisus be ignored and the

1. Rogers A.A. 'English and American Philosophy since 1800' p. 427
4. Leighton J.A. 'Man and the Cosmos' pp. 230, 236.
theory of emergent evolution be conceded, can we then say that this theory explains the cosmic drama? Alexander pointed out that he simply observed the fact of emergence and as an empiricist he simply noted and gratefully accepted it (1). But, as De Burgh pointed out, the task of mere noting down brute facts belongs to science. Philosophy has to explain them as well (2). Taken in itself, the theory of Emergence simply states facts without offering an explanation of them (3). But really Alexander cannot be said to have accepted Emergence as a mere descriptive term. He transformed it into a key-concept of his philosophy. Unless the theory of Emergence be so treated, the further theory of a futuristic deity cannot be established. However, a critical scrutiny of the theory of Emergence will show that it is neither a satisfactory scientific theory nor is it a valid philosophical principle of explanation.

The theory of Emergence, as a scientific description of novelties, as they arise in the course of evolution, demands that we should rest satisfied with the ultimate pluralism of matter, life and mind. To be sure, the theory of Emergence, by accepting the novelties as they arise in the course of evolution, goes beyond the inadequacies of mechanism, but it errs, on the other hand, from too much conservatism.

   Also see Russell Be 'Mysticism and Logic' p.51 (A pelican book 1953).
2. H.J. Vol 40 1941-2. P.149. Once more we are reminded here of the acute observation of Bradley, which he made in his letter of 26.4.1922; 'A forward movement of Time is one thing and a progressive nusus is surely another' (P.J.F, P.67).
A scientific theory should not rest satisfied with the doctrine of the irreducible emergents (1). Further, as a scientific explanation of facts, it is simply a theorising of an observation which is based on too narrow a field (3), and as such it does not appear to be justified as an explanation of all facts on a cosmic scale. Purely from the empirical point of view, emergence cannot be said to be a fact. The emergence of matter from Space-Time is a mere conjecture (4), and similarly, the emergence of life from matter is another conjecture. Thus, the process of emergence is not an empirical fact (5).

Besides, as a philosophical explanation of facts, it should state the 'whence' and 'wither' of emergence (6). Of course, it is not quite correct to say that Alexander has not given the explanation of emergence. But Space-Time, being an unintelligent entity, is incapable of accounting for it. As hinted before, the fact of emergence requires an Intelligent Principle to sustain, conserve and push it forward. "The faith in a progressive nisus, for which non-religious knowledge —pace Professor Alexander——affords no warrant, commends itself to reason as the corollary to faith in God" (1).
TIME AND SPACE: 

Even if we grant that there is emergence and that the universe is historical through and through, are we justified in saying that Space-Time as a whole is historical? Here there is a great controversy between the idealist and the realist. The idealist maintains that Time belongs to finite things, but it is not true or Reality as a whole. The idealist holds that there is an all-inclusive and a completed Whole which is the ground of changes in the world, but it itself does not admit of any change.

"It (The Infinite Reality) has not a history or its own history could not represent it. But it contains histories without number" (2)

Similarly, Dean Inge wrote that it is contradictory to hold that there is process within the whole, though there is no process of the whole (3). Then he continued:

"Evolution presupposes the interaction of the environment and the environed; but there can be no environment of the whole of what is. We cannot think of the whole of reality moving in a unilinear direction, whether of space or time or space-time" (1).

It would seem that the idealist is in a peculiarly difficult position to harmonise the fact of change with the

1. De Burgh "Towards a religious philosophy" p.129, also see p.167. Similarly, webb has also suggested that the theory of emergence really requires God to make it intelligible (Church quarterly Review 1922 p.355) See also Inge W.R. Op.Cit. p.141
1. Ibid. p.159.
Absolute. But the same difficulty is found in a temporalistic philosophy of Alexander. If Space-Time grows through Time, it ceases to be the whole at any one time. But Alexander discounted such a possibility.

"For we are not to think of the matrix, Space-Time, as something which grows bigger in extent with the lapse of Time; -----" (2).

Then, again, he further held that there may be progressive types within the matrix, but the matrix continues to be the same ultimate stuff. Space-Time remains 'the One' reality. (3). We have already noted that Alexander had a strain of Absolutism. Though he was willing to accept Space-Time as Absolute (4), he refused to accept God as Absolute, for His deity is always variable. Hence, Alexander rejected the doctrine of a qualitative Absolute, but he retained the notion of a quantitative Absolute. Thus he would attribute change to qualitative reality, but not to quantitative Space-Time as a whole. Had Alexander taken Time seriously, he would have accepted that Space-Time is always more than Space-Time for there will be always quality in it. On the empirical evidence we cannot say that Space-Time is reality, for in experience it is never given without quality. But Alexander rejected quality as the constituent of reality and yet it is this which makes the reality of Time, for without quality we cannot say that Time is the spearhead

2. STD 11. p. 566
3. STD 11. p. 547
4. STD 11. p. 546
of novelty. Hence, we find that Alexander too maintains that Time does not make a difference to Space-Time as a whole. He could do this for he did not accord reality to the emergents as emergents. They are mere accidents in Space-Time. From the viewpoint of spatio-temporality, they are mere appearances and have only relative reality. This will become clear from our consideration of the relation between the emergents and Space-Time.

**EMERGENTS AND SPACE-TIME:** We have already discussed this topic in chapter III, and we can be brief. Space-Time by itself is empty, but somehow qualified emergents arise. They are 'mysteries' which the attitude of scientific loyalty to note facts forces us to accept with 'natural piety' (1). The emergents are contingent, for they arise from complications which are not the fundamental features of Space-Time (1). The fundamental features of Space-Time are the categories, and qualities are its non-pervasive, accidental features.

This rejection of the reality of the emergents also follows from Alexander's admission that the higher can be reduced to the lower without residue, and ultimately to

1. P.L.F. pp.472,506; STD II. pp.47-7,74,156; Kind 1921 p.410
2. Hawes; Raymond Pe Op.Cit. p.179; Tenney CD. 'Studies in Philosophical Naturalism' p.24. The qualities, according to Alexander are miraculous and as miracles they pervade the whole universe. The same view has also been taken by Miss Liddell. The qualities, according to her interpretation of Alexander's theory, are accidental though inevitable features in the Space-Time matrix. (Alexander 's Space, Time and Deity pp.23,44,54,61)
Space-Time. Thus either we have to say that only Space-Time is real and all qualitative emergents are accidental events or else we have to admit that Space-Time is much more than merely spatio-temporal entity (3).

Carr (1) and Hoernle (2) therefore, argued that Space-time is not really simple (*), and Stout showed that qualities cannot be reduced to spatio-temporality (3). However, the dominant note of Space-Time absolutism is that qualities are mere incidents and they do not outline the essence of Reality. After all, the evolutionary Naturalism of Alexander, ends in the blankness of Spinozism. This tendency towards Spinozistic Reductionism was also noted by Mr. J.V. Bateman and he expressed it thus:

"Notwithstanding protests to the contrary (4), pure primordial S-T which allows no relational or categorial determination, appears to be as much of a philosophical jacket as the ancient Parmenidean One" (5).

This note of 'blankness' of Space-Time is further made quite clear from his refusal to give any precise and definite meaning to terms 'higher' and 'lower'. We have already seen that Laird thought that this question is very important in ascertaining the reality of emergents and progress. He also added in this connection that he found no

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3. A. Wolf too, pointed out that Space-Time is unwittingly made to include much more than mere space and time. (Chronici Spinozani 1921 p. 323). See also his similar remark in the 'Jewish Guardian' September 9, 1921 p. 86.
satisfactory answer in Alexander's pages (1). This question about 'progress' was raised by Alexander in MORAL ORDER AND PROGRESS (1889), but there too he remained non-committal. Following Spencer, he pointed out that ordinarily 'progress' meant higher organisation with increasing differentiation of parts with the corresponding specialisation of functions (2). But he did not consider it to be satisfactory.

"The definition of progress by increasing differentiation, even with the necessary corrections (of integration), is obvious and formal to be of much service" (3).

From this we might conjecture that Alexander would have accepted the meaning of 'higher' in terms of greater complexities. We are left only to guess here for he has completely evaded the issue. This is quite clear from his reply to Miss Hilda Oakeley, in his letter of 4.4.1921. In view of the importance of the subject, let us quote the whole of the relevant part:

"You are not alone in your criticism. But 'higher' and 'lower' do not mean for me what can be judged beforehand to be higher and lower. My position rather is that the scale of levels is not intrinsically one of value but of empirical differences which I call 'greater or less perfection' but without having an ideal of perfection which is, I think, what you suppose. Perfection is an awkward name; I might have said 'difference of kind', but I mean it in the sense in which one says that one man is a bigger man than another but not better. Now what I am trying to say is that value cannot be judged a priori but is discovered experimentally, and that within each level the types which have value are those which can establish themselves".

AN analysis of the contents of this reply to Miss Oakeley,

3. M.O.F.  p.388
reveals that the hierarchy of emergents is not based on any axiological standard. The difference between them is one of mere complexity. But even here the difference of 'perfection' has no standard at all. The reason is that a stone and a rose differ in perfection, but one is not more real than the other (1). Both of them are real equally so far they are spatio-temporal complex. In the matrix of Space-Time it is pointless whether anything is more complex than others. Hence, progress and perfection and consequently the qualities dependent on them, do not really matter in the Reality of Space-Time.

**IS THE EVOLUTIONARY NATURALISM OF ALEXANDER A FORM OF MATERIALISM?**

Whilst reviewing SPACE TIME AND DEITY, Dean Inge pointed out that Alexander has not an independent spiritual world and in consequence his philosophy seems to be still entangled in a subtle materialism (1). Later on, his attitude hardened and referring to Alexander's description of mind as a complex of space-time stuff, he called this view 'downright materialism' (2). Similarly, Metz points out that Alexander did not hesitate to naturalise and materialise mind. Further, he points out that in Alexander, there is a tendency to explain the higher in terms of the lower (3).

1. STD I. p. 347
"Alexander's thought is here completely involved in the materialistic ideas of the older evolutionary movement" (4).

But, a few pages earlier Metz has shown a more cautious evaluation. He thinks that Alexander's metaphysics is most appropriately called naturalistic, because it is based on the categories of natural science. But, he also adds that it is materialistic in a refined or disguised fashion (1).

However, Alexander himself regarded his system as naturalistic but not materialistic. He pointed out that materialism is a perversion of naturalism (2) and then he took 'materialism' to be a word of abuse for, according to him, no reputable philosophy has ever been materialism (3). Then, again, in a subtle way he pointed out that matter has ceased to be matter by producing minds.

"Materialism can only become reasonable by allowing an element to exist in matter which has affinity with the latest outgrowth from matter which is mind. But then matter ceases to be sheer matter and acquires life" (4).

His reasons for not calling his system materialistic are as follows:

1. Matter itself is not the primary stuff, for it itself has emerged from Space-Time. Therefore, it is not a-priori, categorical framework of the universe as Space-Time is.

11. Then, again, as Metz (5) points out, Time takes the lead and the Spatial aspect of the Space-Time matrix is ignored. After all, it is Time which becomes the 'spearhead of novelty', and Space becomes a mere trail of Time. Thus, the system becomes Voluntaristic as Bradley called it (1).

111. Besides, Alexander regarded the mind-body formula as universal and therefore even matter has something in it akin to mind. Later, following Whitehead, he held that everything has a 'subjective pole' or mind. Therefore, there is nothing dead or inanimate in his system. Even Space-Time itself is animated (2).

"But even now it is plain that if mind is spatial like matter, Space is as much in affinity with mind as it is with matter and the fear of materialism is groundless" (3). Hence, considering the ubiquity of mind-body relationship, we can say that the dualistic correlativity is too strong to make the system of Alexander degenerate into monistic materialism.

However, the denial of materialism by Alexander, for reason outlined above, is considered by Leighton to be purely technical if not verbal.

"If life emerges from a physical order in which there was no life, and mind from that particular complication of the physical order which is vitality, then we have a new materialism. In view of the historical meaning of terms..."
why cheat ourselves with words? In spite of his protestations, Dr. Alexander's imposing and ingenious attempt to deduce all the empirical qualities in existence from pure space-time is materialism " (4).

But against this view Prof. Emmet points out that Alexander may be called a naturalist, but certainly not a materialist. Her ground of saying so is that for Alexander matter is simply a description of the quality of one level only (1).

We agree with Prof. Emmet in treating Alexander's system as naturalism and not as materialism. The reasons are quite obvious. Materialism levels down all differences between matter, life and mind; for Alexander, these emergent qualities are quite distinctive of their novel features. Mind or consciousness, for him, is an effective determinant of behaviour and for this reason he did not accept materialistic behaviourism. Besides, Alexander did assign a place to morality, values and religion and did not discard them as illusory, as materialism does. Further, he did not think that mechanism is quite adequate to explain all phenomena. Alexander believed in the creation of the new and something which could not be predicted in advance by a Laplacean calculator.

Therefore, we conclude that Alexander cannot be called a materialist, and this conclusion is not based on purely technical or verbal grounds at all. As a matter of fact his Space-Time, to which everything, in the end is reduced, is quality-less, therefore, the term

1. Philosophy, 1950-p.229
Materialism is as much inappropriate to reply to his system as it is to Spinozism. And, Alexander's system is but the modern version of Spinozism. Just as the finite things are mere modes of Spinoza's Substance, so the empirical entities are unreal for Alexander. Time, matter is nearer to Space-Time than life or mind, but it is as much an accident as life or mind is. But, though it is not materialism, the system of Alexander is cosmicism and this is strengthened by our consideration of the mind-body formula, to which we turn now.

**THE MIND-BODY FORMULA:** We have already explained the nature of the mind-body formula in chapter 111. Further, we have already pointed out there that the purpose of the formula is to show a continuity between all the emergents. The mind-body formula itself, however, is inconsistent with the theory of emergence. The theory of emergence demands that there should be something new which was not at the stage of the lower level and therefore to which it cannot be reduced completely. However, the mind-body formula asserts that there is a complete identity and indissolubility between the new emergent and the lower level (1). If the mind-body formula be true, then really nothing emerges; and, if emergence be true, then the mind-body formula becomes invalid.

The real conflict is between the theory of emergence and Reductionism. The reality of emergence leads to the possibility of deity and of a qualitative absolute. But reductionism leads to the reality of Space-Time as the Absolute. Undoubtedly, Alexander wanted to preserve both, but if he were pressed hard, he would prefer reductionism. Certainly Alexander has not left us guessing here. He has maintained that the emergent can be reduced completely into the lower level, ultimately to Space-Time (3). Thus, the emergents become mere accidents and Space-Time the only 'substance'.

Our naive experience brings us in contact with a world of plurality and our reflection demands it should be reduced to some order and system. Alexander tried to do justice to both aspects of our experience. He recognised the existence of the reality of matter, life and mind, and so far he did justice to the plurality of our experience. But they have to be reduced to some unity. Alexander showed that their unity lies in the unity of the Space-Time matrix. Now, is the unity abstract or concrete? Certainly, he wanted to preserve the reality of emergents, but he also declared them to be mere 'accidents' in Space-Time. When they arise, they have to be accepted with 'glad surprise' as mysteries. If it be so, then there is no reason why they should be and as

3. See specially STB II, pp. 63, 69, 69
such the rational nexus between the empirical things of
the universe is destroyed. Therefore, Bosanquet observed
that Alexander's universe is without any real unity (1).
Further, he propounded this paradox of the progressist:

"He will not understand that the infinite whole, in its
wholeness, is a life and self-enrichment; and to get the
novelty and irrational freedom he craves, he demands that
the whole, the all-inclusive universe, shall depart from
what is is, and assume new characters, different indeed,
but not necessary, thus omitting one-half the nature
of a rational nexus" (1).

Hence, in Alexander's system there is the unity of Space-
Time continuum, which is the lowest expression of the
universe (2). Thus looked at, the unity of Alexander's
system is a blank unity from which plurality has dis-
appeared.

THE REALITY OF MIND IN THE DETERMINATION OF VALUE.

It might be objected that our interpretation of
Alexander's philosophy in terms of Spinozistic reductionism
is onesided, for the reality of mind is recognised by
Alexander, so far as the creation of value is concerned. On
the face of it this may appear to be a good objection to
our interpretation. We find however, that this defence in
favour of mind is not quite sound. Though the theory of
Emergence has been adopted by Alexander, for him the

1. Contemporary Philosophy p. 159
2. Ibid. p. 114. 2. Ibid. p. 171.
Absolutism of Space-Time is the greater truth. Before we decide this question, we have to ascertain the reality of mind in its creation of value.

Miss Calkins (1) points out that Alexander has used 'mind' in two incompatible roles, namely, as an 'experiencer' and, again, as a spatio-temporal complex (1). She thinks that in relation to the mind-body formula 'mind' has been taken to be a spatio-temporal entity, but in connection with value, it has been used as an independent experiencing subject, outside the series of appreciated objects (2).

"In a word, the tertiary quality doctrine, even in its most realistic aspect, presupposes the uniqueness of mind: it contrasts goodness, truth and beauty precisely as creations and inventions of mind from the primary and secondary qualities which constitute external objects"(3).

Though Alexander accepted the view that value owes its character to mind, his admission does not entitle Miss Calkins to conclude that his philosophy will result in a dualism of Space-Time and mind (4). In the context of value, the reality of mind will depend on the reality of value, and what is the locus standi of value itself?

Firstly, value is not a quality at all, and therefore, it does not owe its being to Space-Time. Hence, it has no place in the world of reality. Alexander has found value even at the level of matter, but he did not point out that it belongs to Space-Time. From what he stated about Deity

1. The dual role of mind in the philosophy of S. Alexander, Mind, 1925.
and God, it may be inferred that value belongs to the emergents only. Value implies a relation of a valuer and valued, and, in Space-Time there can be no such relation. Therefore, value does not belong to the ultimate reality. Value emerges only as a result of a struggle, trial and test, and apart from such struggles does not exist (1). Thus, value lies rooted in the emergents, and the emergents are mere incidents. Can value be more? as "Where/when values are analysed or described, they are seen to fall into their places as incidents (though of the highest interest for us, outside the religious interest) in the empirical growth of things within what is really the primary reality of Space-Time" (2).

Value not only does not belong to Space-Time, it does not belong to God or Deity either (3). Hence, value has no place in a world of either quantitative or qualitative Absolute. Besides, we have already seen that the relation between different levels is not axiological (1). Value has meaning in its own level of emergence, and what does it mean to the human mind?

The tertiary qualities of Truth, Beauty and Goodness are values at the human level. But they are man-made, and as such are purely subjective, though certainly not individualistic.

"Their subjectivization is not annulled by the fact that Alexander makes them dependent not upon the individual but upon the collective consciousness" (2).

Alexander called them objective, but their objectivity follows from their trans-subjective appreciation. But from the viewpoint of ontological being they are just human and they have no real objective status. This becomes clear from the following consideration.

That truths of science and the standards in morals and arts have been changing will be accepted by all. But we feel that in spite of many aberrations they are gradually approximating their absolute standard. This view can be best illustrated in relation to scientific progress. We know that the Ptolemaic view has given place to the Copernican theory, and the theory of Gravitation has been supplemented by that of Relativity. Progress in scientific theories, therefore, means 'progressive revelations of reality', as Alexander put it (1). But Alexander added that the earlier theory of Gravitation or the Ptolemaic theory of the universe, remains true for its respective range of experience (2).

We believe that this view of Alexander's is not quite correct. We will say that older theories may be successful in explaining the facts under them, but they were not true even within their limited range of facts. They were taken to be true because their falsity could not be detected within that range of facts. Similarly, we believe that there is an absolute standard of morality and art. Once we find that

1. STD II. p. 264. 2. STD II. p. 264; B.F.V. p. 231
certain acts are wrong, then they will not be called right even at the low stage of culture and civilization. According to Alexander, an axiological standard is objective for an individual, but it is not so on the broader canvas of human history. Hence, it is variable from age to age, from collective minds of one age to the collective minds of another age. In this sense, we find that Metz is right when he says that the collectivization of minds in determining tertiary qualities does not make value objective on that account.

Thus, value does not remain objectively real at the human level: the subjective and ephemeral product of mind cannot confer reality on mind itself. Thus, mind creates values but both remain mere incidents in Space-Time. Moreover, if value be subjective then so is truth, and therefore, the theory of knowledge. But this would appear to render the realistic standpoint of Alexander untenable. Thus, Dr. Stiermotte, following Konvitz, writes:

"It is here that Alexander's epistemological and metaphysical realism breaks down for a view of value which contains large elements of subjectivism" (1).

The reason is that if truth or falsity is subjective, so is knowledge. Of course, Alexander would never accept this; he pointed out that truth is reached by subordination to

2. STD II.-p.237
facts, and through the clash of minds, That the rose is red is a fact, but its truth depends on the agreement of expert minds (2). Thus, Alexander separated facts from truth, as if there could be facts without their being related to truth. This strange position of Alexander is clear from the fact that for him metaphysics is independent of epistemology, and consequently, there is reality independent of truth or falsity. "Reality is not true nor false; it is Reality" (3). Hence, Truth and Reality are not the same thing and therefore from the subjectivity of Truth, one cannot deduce the subjectivity of facts. Alexander might have remained satisfied with this separation of metaphysics, and epistemology, Reality and Truth, but we think this artificial. After all the metaphysics of Alexander is also a kind of knowledge, even of scientific knowledge. If knowledge be subjective then his metaphysics too is subjective. Ultimately no reductionism can remain thoroughly self-consistent. Alexander elevated Space-Time to the status of the sole Reality; and that it may not be displaced or doubted, he made it beyond all subjective conditionality. The zeal for keeping Space-Time inviolable could go no further. But a reality, beyond truth and falsity is also one which is beyond human knowledge and then it becomes the blankness of Spinozistic Substance.

Therefore, we conclude that Alexander always had two conflicting strains of Space-Time Absolutism and Temporal Emergentism or Historicity. To do justice to the manyness

3. STD 11. p. 237; also p. 247; also J.F.S.I. No.1 p. 9
of experience, — to the rich variety of life, he took the help of Temporalistic Emergentism. But, Temporalism must have something permanent and therefore, he based his temporalism on the Absoluteness of Space-Time. The conflicting strains of Absolutism and Emergentism, Emergence and the Mind-Body formula, Reality and Truth, Absoluteness and Relativity of standards in tertiary qualities, God and Deity, all remain irreconcilable to the end in the philosophy of Alexander. If the Space-Time Absolutism remains dominant in Metaphysics, then certainly Emergentism remains dominant in his Theology, to the critical survey of which we turn now.
CHAPTER NINE

A CRITICAL EVALUATION OF ALEXANDER’S THEOLOGY

INTRODUCTION: We have seen that any great philosophy is based on a world-vision and the idea of God is the expression of the deepest and most significant of all visions. Though one need not accord the highest place to theology, it is not proper to subordinate it to philosophy. Theology, with its unique subject-field, is an independent subject. Alexander, however, does not accord it an independent status but that of a corollary of his system. This has been rightly noted by Metz:

"This (theology) is a termination and rounding-off of the metaphysical system much more than it is a knowledge or vision of God. It is much less a question of what God is than a question of what place and function remains for Him in a universe so constructed" (1).

But when we make our theology a corollary of a definite system of thought, then God becomes a mere idea and we lose touch with God as a Person. Of course, when we say that God is a ‘Person’, then the term ‘Person’ is a metaphor or a non-literal symbol or an ideogram to express an experience which cannot be otherwise expressed. However, Alexander has tried to describe religious experience in literal symbols and in doing so, he has missed the essence of it. Superficially he appears to be fully empirical. He has defined God in a purely empirical way: ‘what we worship, that is God’ (2).

Again,

"God is that upon which the religious sentiment is directed. The datum of experience is that sentiment, and what God is is known only by examining its deliverances" (1).

Further, he has pointed out that philosophy may call an entity God, but 'philosophy leans on religion to justify it in calling the possessor of deity by the religious name of God' (2). But unfortunately, Alexander has not acted according to this requirement of theology which he himself recognised to be essential. This will become clear from his treatment of the notion of deity. Deity is obviously an object of religious worship, and he has defined it in the following way: 'Deity is the next empirical quality to the highest we know' (3). But what is the basis of defining deity as the next emergent quality at any one level?

**IS THE NEXT EMERGENT DEITY?** If the worshipfulness of the next emergent be not a corollary of Alexander's Evolutionary Naturalism, then it should be based on the observation of facts. And this is what is demanded by Alexander's Empiricism. Again, if it is based on observation, then we should be able to verify this both at the sub-human and human levels. So let us deal with this question at each stage.

Alexander has pointed out that deity is found at all stages of empirical existents.

1. STD 11. p. 343  
2. STD 11. p. 342f  
3. STD 11. p. 345
"So far as matter may be said to feel religion, it feels religion towards life, if we take life to be the next emergent" (4).

With reference to this view, Brightman has pointed out that Alexander has deserted his empiricism:

"There is no empirical ground for suggesting that inorganic matter ever had a 'religious' attitude towards the next higher emergent, life; nor is it true to say that the present worship of the religious consciousness is directed towards 'deity' - the unknown and unknowable next emergent of the evolutionary process" (1).

Though the above observation of Brightman is substantially correct, yet the term 'empirical' requires some clarification. Of course, the type of empirical ground which Brightman demands is on the very face of it impossible, and Alexander was quite aware of this, as is clear from the following:

"How its being would be 'experienced' in the material 'soul' may need for its description a greater capacity to strip off human privileges and sympathise with lower experience than most persons, and certainly I possess" (2).

Now, if we cannot know that matter 'worships' life, then, what is the empirical basis of holding this view? In other words, what is the analogue of 'religious emotion' at that level? Alexander answered it thus:

"And within the 'minds' of these material or living things themselves the nius is felt as a nius towards something unattained, and they have the analogue of what religion is for us" (3).

Similarly, in his draft on 'Deity', Alexander wrote:

"For each level of creatures deity is some unknown quality which they divine (Significant word)" (4).

Thus, to have the nisusial striving is to be religious. As Alexander regarded his theory of emergence and nisus as empirical, so he would treat this nisusial striving to be also empirical. So understood, Alexander's theory is an important way in which the significance of religion can be found. Even if Emergence and Nisus be regarded as a localised affair of a narrow sphere of the universe, it would not refute his theory. He would hold that the sphere of religion is co-existent with that of Emergence, and if emergence disappears then religion also will disappear. Religion, then, would indicate the presence of an upward striving of the universe, and this is an important contribution towards the understanding of the significance of religion. However, the explanation of religious experience in terms of nisusial striving is simply the restatement of the theory of Emergence and Nisus. If Alexander had proved independently of his theory of emergence and nisus that matter worships life, then he would have shown that religious emotion is not the unique characteristic of man. This would have also established his naturalism, but as far as his view concerning the presence of religious feeling at the sub-human level is a mere corollary of his system.

Let us now see whether at the human level, it can be shown that what man worships is just the next emergent quality. Following Otto, Alexander regarded religious experience as a 'numinous' feeling or non-rational apprehension
of something mysterious or the Holy. But the 'Holy' is a very vague Something, and, according to Alexander, the numinous element in the universe is not deity, but is an adumbration of it. In other words, Alexander pointed out that deity is not directly known in religious experience.

"The belief that in religious experience we have direct experience of God goes entirely beyond the record. But what the religious experience is an experience of is a matter of interpretation. In the end the interpretation may be correct. But it is not direct and it is reached only after much other experience which we have learned to trust. In itself it is a craving for something we know not what---"(1).

If it is so, then no appeal to religious experience can show that its object is the next emergent quality. Thus Alexander removes the very possibility of the empirical evidence for his theory. But at this stage, it might be pointed out that the view that religious experience is a numinous feeling of mysterium tremendum is an empirical conclusion for it has been based on a comparative study of the various religions by Otto. As the object of religious experience has been shown to be vague and mysterious, so this finding of Otto harmonises very well with the conception of a futuristic deity. Here Alexander points out that the belief in God reposes on the double basis of philosophical speculation and religious experience. Religious experience by itself is dumb and silent and therefore, it informs us of a vague and mysterious being only as its object. But the philosophical speculation steps in and

1. B.F.V. p. 290
imparts some definite shape and form to this religious object.

"But the religious sentiment itself can supply us with no such theoretical assurance of reality, and it needs to be supplemented with a metaphysical enquiry, what place if any the object of worship occupies in the general scheme of things" (2).

If this contention were valid, then Alexander's view of deity, being based on the conclusion of a comparative study of religions, would be regarded as empirical. But we find that Alexander has made use of the findings of Otto in a questionable way.

Firstly, the idea of *mysterium tremendum* has been explicitly stated by Otto to be a non-literal symbol or an ideogram.

"The truly 'mysterious object is beyond our apprehension and comprehension, not only because our knowledge has certain irremovable limits, but because in it we come upon something inherently 'wholly other', whose kind and character are incommensurable with our own, and before which we therefore recoil in a wonder that strikes us chill and numb" (1).

As such it cannot be used as a literal symbol. But Alexander has used the term 'mysterious' as a literal symbol in as much as he believed that this mysterious entity can be clarified by philosophy (2).

"For to have the religious experience is one thing, to describe it and make it a matter of discourse is another and different thing, which can only be achieved by the use of appropriate rational and unmysterious means of bringing home to other men the mysterious" (3).

2. STD 11. p. 542
2. The Listener Dec. 3. 1930. pp. 921, 922
3. P.L.P. p. 317
Secondly, the mysterium tremendum of Otto, in spite of its elusiveness, refers to a Person. The 'holiness' of Yahweh is expressed in His 'fury', 'jealousy', His 'wrath' etc., (4) and these certainly refer to a being having quasi-personality. Then, again, this Being of 'marvel and mystery and awe' is the eternal, benignant, gracious Will (5). Hence, 'mysterium tremendum' is conceptually not as unknown as Alexander has taken it to be. Alexander himself noted this, but in order to justify himself he wrote:

"Mr. Otto thinks that this numinous element is rationalised in the various religions in their creeds, and, naturally enough, he, being a theologian in a Christian University, thinks that it is best, or uniquely, rationalised in Christianity. That is a secondary matter; but in recognising the existence in real fact of this numinous element in the world, I follow him, ——" (1).

Thus, Alexander retained only that much of Otto's empirical conclusion which fitted into his metaphysics and the rest he ignored. Hence he has taken a part for the whole of religious experience. Even the non-rational element of the numinous is only a component of the concrete religious experience. Otto always had the concrete religious expressions of the various religions before him, and therefore, he did not take the numinous element as the only element in religious life. However, Alexander took the numinous element as the whole of religious experience, and thereby he accepted an abstraction for the concrete religious experience. Thus the

double basis of speculation and religious experience is really one. His underlying thought may be reconstructed thus:

"If deity is a futuristic quality, something vague and unknown, then the religious feeling can be only indefinite. Hence, only that much of religious experience should be regarded as genuine which harmonises with it".

Hence, for Alexander, religious experience is a craving for something 'we know not what'. But this is simply a vicious abstraction. Hence, Alexander's contention that deity is the next emergent quality does not appear to be an empirical conclusion, but is a corollary of his metaphysics.

There may be another ground on the basis of which we can say that Alexander's view that deity is the next emergent quality is empirical. He appealed to religious consciousness in which the raw data of religious experience are interspersed with intellectual interpretations. Therefore, to support his views empirically he tried to refer to four criteria of religious consciousness, namely, (i) God is greater than man, (ii) He is all-embracing, (iii) He is different in kind from man, and (iv) God is responsive to man. The next emergent has been shown by Alexander to satisfy all these four criteria.

"Some of these tests by which the sufficiency of a philosophical conception of God for the religious sentiment itself are judged have been already included more or less explicitly in this exposition" (1).

1. STD 11, p. 362
Then, again, in the light of these four criteria, Alexander concluded his discussion thus:

"So far as this is the case, the religious consciousness attests the philosophical conception that God's deity is the issue in Time of a tendency or nisus in the world, ———"(2).

But, even here, as has been noted earlier, Alexander has given his own arbitrary interpretation of the criteria (iii) and (iv) to harmonise with his theory. Further, if we take the verdict of religious history, then we find that it is just the reverse of what Alexander has called deity. This has been forcefully expressed by Sheen in what he calls the fallacy of 'Inverted Relations' (1). God has been regarded by the worshipers as a Creator of the whole universe and as the most real of all objects (2). Even Otto points out that an analysis of numinous feeling shows the presence of 'creature-consciousness' in it (3). But the deity of Alexander is a creature. Then being an 'unattainable Omega of Space-Time' (4) deity becomes, if not unreal, at least a shadowy figure. Thus on the basis of actual religious consciousness one cannot say that we worship the next emergent quality.

However, there are real facts of religious experience to which the doctrine of deity might have referred.

Alexander was right in holding that human beings, in their life of religious devotion, do feel that they are being lifted

2. STB 11. p. 560 (Italics ours)
1: Religion without God. Pp. 259
2: Collingwood R.G. 'The Idea of Nature' P. 164
4: Sheen F.J. 'God and Intelligence' P. 55
up and even that they are being transformed to partake of
divine nature. They do feel a nisus towards becoming
something higher. St. Paul noted this by saying that in
Christ we are all new creatures. However, this idea of
self-improvement and progress towards divinity has been
perverted into the so-called 'forward view' of God. Man
has been made in the image of God and he is going to be
divine with the help of God who draws him into his own
nature.  

"The old teaching, which is an integral part of Neo-Plato-
ism, is that all things come from God, and are drawn by
a natural longing, conscious or unconscious, to return to
God. In this universal upward striving the world has its
life." (i).

Hence, the next emergent is not the object of our real
worship. It is an object of our aspiration and not of our
devotion.

Let us once more appeal to our religious experience.
In our religious consciousness we actually find a 'pull'
which lifts us up or gives us the sense of being enhanced,
enlarged and elevated. The 'saving experience' does turn
a broken reed into a pipe of eternal music. Then, again, as
Bergson has pointed out, the real religious mystic gets a
vision which serves as a nisus in him and in others who
are infected with his fire and they are all transformed and
elevated. Thus, there is a real nisus which is actually
felt in the moment of religious vision, ecstasy and
inspiration. If this fact be rightly grasped then we can

1. Inge w.R. 'God and the astronomers' p. 130, also see
   PP. 136, 209.
say that the nisus of the emergent evolution is unexplained mystery, so long as we confine our observation to the emergents as they arise in the objective world. But there seems no reason why we should not observe the presence of the nisus in our religious experience and accept it with natural piety. But the acceptance of the nisus in our religious experience will transform the dumb mystery of natural emergence into an intelligible activity of God. Here we find that religious experience will fructify the observation of a naturalistic evolution and will transform the 'accidents' of emergence into a meaningful scheme of a divine creative process. Though Prof. Raven does not explicitly refer to Alexander, yet the following statement fittingly applies to the nisus of Alexander's Evolutionary Naturalism:

"What it suggests is that the ineffable whose presence we encounter in our moments of rapture is also discoverable in the texture of the universe as the nisus of its causality, the principle not only of its continuity but of its emergent novelty; and if so, that ultimately process and reality, the time-space world and the eternal, express one and the same being" (1).

This 'saving experience' of religious mysticism is the same thing as the 'spirit of totality' of Bosanquet, which drives all things towards greater comprehensiveness and wholeness. (2). This is again, what Smuts called the holistic

---”It would be, I think, on all hands acknowledged that a capacity in the human soul to become in some measure a partaker of the divine nature --- the phrase occurs in the New Testament ---in implied in its susceptibility to religious experience; ---"(Webb C.C.J. 'Our Knowledge of One Another'. I.B.A. Vol. AVI. 1930 P. 296)

2. Individuality and Value pp. 60, 62
tendency, which is present in all things, from atoms to 
saints. Prof. Raven goes further and thinks that this 
nisus which is found in the course of evolution is but the 
Holy Spirit itself (1). It is the same Holy Spirit which 
is 'inherent in the stuff of the universe, a creativity 
or nisus manifested in the whole and in every particular, 
a concreteness and holistic principle whose effect can be 
seen throughout the process of causation' (2). Thus, Prof. 
Raven proposes a fruitful contact between the scientists, 
philosophers and theologians (3). Therefore, we find that 
Alexander's doctrine of nisus and emergence is based on 
real facts of religious and scientific process. But he has 
simply stopped at the naturalistic level and did not proceed 
to supplement and complete his doctrine with the fact of 
nisus in religious expression.

Further, though the nisus is felt and we are lifted 
Heaven-ward, new horizons of greater perfection loom ahead 
of us. As soon as we have entered into a higher self, a 
still higher ideal supervenes into which we are going to be 
further transformed and transmuted. But this also tells 
us that the sea of perfection looms yonder, pointing and 
beckoning us towards it. This is very well expressed by 
the following lines of Rossetti, which have been quoted

1. *Natural Religion and Christian Theology* - Second Series 
P. 154
2. Ibid. p. 155. 3. Ibid. p. 153
by Fringle-Pattison:

May come up hither. From this wave-washed mound
Unto the farthest flood-brim look with me;
Then reach on with thy thought till it be drowned,
Miles and miles distant though the grey line be,
And though thy soul sail leagues and leagues beyond—
Still, leagues beyond those leagues, there is more sea.

On the basis of such facts of religious life, the doctrine
of the infinite series of deity can be based. We can also
concede that this deity is simply a new series in a hierarchy
of emergent levels. So far as human beings are concerned,
they do not seem to worship the next emergent. They worship
'the completed fount of fulness'. Thus, the deity of
Alexander is a purely speculative product of Emergent
Evolutionism, and apart from this speculation it cannot be
maintained that the next emergent is the real object of
worship. To take the next emergent to be deity is to mistake
a philosophical construction for a religious creed. The
fruitful idea of Emergence so intoxicated him with the joy
of creativity that he invested his speculative deity with
religious fervour. But this is simply a fallacy of dis-
placed religious emotion on an object which does not support it.

Thus, Alexander has not been able to give an empirical
evidence for his theory that deity is the next emergent
quality. But now let us see whether he has presented any
clear and definite notion of 'religious emotion', through

the evocation of which we discover God.

Some critics think that Alexander's doctrine is helpful towards guaranteeing religious experience, for, according to Alexander, when the religious emotion is aroused in us then we discover God through it. Therefore, Dr. McCarthy thinks that in Alexander's theology there is a solid foundation for discovering God:

"Alexander's metaphysical description of God rests on the solid foundation of an impulse or urge within man to discover deity" (1).

If one reads the six pages of SPACE, TIME AND DEITY, Vol.11. (PP.373-378), then he will agree with Dr. McCarthy.

But later he will find that this solid foundation has been built but on sands. The reason is that this 'religious emotion' is very vague.

Alexander has pointed out that he has followed McDougall in the description of religious sentiment (2). But, according to McDougall, a sentiment is an organization of emotional tendencies round an object. However, as noted before, Alexander considered the object of religious sentiment to be a matter of interpretation. As he did not straightaway start with the object of religious sentiment, he could not be said to have followed McDougall. Besides, he referred to it as emotion, appetite, or impulse. However, a sentiment

is quite different from an appetite or an impulse. A sentiment is an organisation of impulses about an object. Hence, it is an enduring state or structure of the mind, but an impulse is a momentary fact of our mental life. Then, again, he did not precisely define the nature of religious impulse. He described it as a 'religious appetite' (1), 'brute instinct' (2), 'nearer to simple sensation' (3), and then he said that God is apprehended through religious emotion by the assurance we call religious faith (4). Therefore, against the view of McCarthy (5), we hold that Alexander did not hold any clear-cut idea of religious impulse which can be compared with those which are involved in tertiary qualities. If religious emotion has any meaning for Alexander then it means simply a blind, visceral impulse—an impulse which man shares in the creative current of the world—nusus. The religious emotion or appetite is the response of the whole make-up of man to the whole of reality in its nusus towards a new quality.

"In that forward movement due to the onward sweep of Time our minds with their sub-structure of body are caught, and our religious response is at once the mark that we are involved in that nusus" (6).

Further, Alexander pointed out that this religious emotion has its own distinct object and its apprehension is also distinct from other kinds of apprehension (7). Therefore, let us determine the nature of the distinct object to which this emotion refers. According to Alexander, The world

Itself provokes in us the religious emotion which makes us aware of God (1). According to him:

"...There is an actual infinite, the whole universe, with a nisus to deity; and this is the God of the religious consciousness, though that consciousness habitually forecasts the divinity of its object as actually realised in an individual form" (1).

But the numinous aspect of God is His deity and this deity is a nisus towards a new quality (2), which is higher than anything we know (3). At this stage, the description of the object of the religious emotion becomes confused, because Alexander did not maintain strictly the distinction of God and deity. But his theory of emergence strictly applies to deity, for it is always varying with the change of emergent quality. If the fate of God be inseparable from the destiny of deity, then God continues to be an evolving God and as such He is always becoming and can never be.

If there can be no infinite deity in actuality, then God does not exist (4). But Alexander pointed out that it is not quite exact to say that there is no God but gods (5).

"What I say is that God as actually possessing deity does not exist, but is an ideal, is always becoming; but God as the whole universe tending towards deity does exist" (6).

But because God is not actually existent, therefore, does it follow that he is unreal or purely conceptual?

4. STD 11. p. 361. 5. An Interpretation by Prof. Broad
6. Mind 1921 p. 428. STD 11. p. 365; also THE LISTENER,
**THE REALITY OF GOD:** Here the position of Alexander may be contrasted with that of Kant. Kant in his "Critique of Pure Reason" could not obtain a scientific knowledge of God, for the very supposition of "pure reason" excluded the possibility of religious knowledge. But if the God of Kant was beyond knowledge, he was also beyond any scepticism. Alexander's God, on the other hand, cannot exist, because he cannot be equated with the bare and empty reality of Space-Time. But, if God be unreal, then Alexander's theory of knowledge will have to be modified. According to Alexander, corresponding to every conative trend there must be a real object and he wrote thus:

"The God who is the object of religious feeling is not a fancy embodied in some mood of excitement, but has its basis in solid fact and in the general nature of things (1). Then, he clearly laid down that religious emotion is of the nature of an appetite, which once aroused does not invent but discovers its object (2).

Thus, whatever Alexander might have said about the non-existence of God, he is a real object of worship and is as such a real object. All that he could have said that we cannot have a definite knowledge of God and that our best knowledge of Him is mythological. Probably this is what he meant in the following statement:

2. STD 11. p. 374, 374n
"Hence it is that religion, partly because it needs images of that which is not imaginable, and partly because it craves fixity of its ideas, is the prey of mythologies and of creeds—"(1).

Then he added that there is hardly any religion which avoids mythology and even the future religion will need its own mythology (2). However, our knowledge may be very poor and may be likened to the lisping of babes, but the object of such religious knowledge does not become fanciful on that account.

If God be real, as Alexander did accept, then it is improper to call Him purely ideal or merely conceptual. The deity of God may be forever becoming in the same way in which our mind is always a conative process (according to Alexander). But, does that mean that our mind is unreal? Deity may be an ideal, but does that mean that it is unreal? A similar distinction has been made in relation to point-instants and the future. In relation to point-instants, Alexander said that they 'are real and actual just because they are ideal' (3). Similarly, the past and the future are not actual, and yet they are real. Can we not say the same thing about God whose body is actual, but whose deity is ideal? We can thus conclude this point with Hartshorne and Reese:

But other bits of evidence are present in Space, Time and Deity itself which leads one to believe that, whatever his words, Alexander sometimes held, or at least could have

1. The Listener Dec. 3. 1930 p. 922 col.2.
2. Ibid pp. 922, 923.
3. STD 11. P. 363; see also STD 1. pp. 325,526
held, to the reality of deity. Thus, he has within
his system the needed contrast between the notion of the
actual and the real and the needed equation of the ideal
with the real which would make of his absolute deity a
necessary element in space-time process (i).

Alexander's insistence on the nature of deity has
contributed to the belief that he held the notion of an
unreal God. This deity, according to him, is always
futuristic and can never be actual. But this futuristic
nature of deity need not make it unreal, for the future,
according to Alexander, though not actual is real.

Alexander wanted to emphasise the historicity of deity
and this made him say that deity is always becoming, — it
is something which always looms ahead. Now there is a sense
in which deity looms ahead and this is what the idealists
have been holding. According to idealism, the Supreme
Reality is forever realising itself progressively through the
whole hierarchy of things. There is Bosanquet's 'spirit of
totality' which leads every finite thing to complete itself
in an ever-increasing whole (x). The same thing is clear
from the doctrine of 'degrees of reality' in Bradley.
Alexander did not make his position of deity clear in
relation to the doctrines of 'degrees of reality' and 'the
progressive spirit of totality' of Bradley and Bosanquet
respectively. As a matter of fact, Alexander never
 completely outgrew Absolutism.

'*' Pringle-Pattison interprets 'the spirit of totality' as
that the power which carries us forward and contributes
to advance. (The Idea of God p. 251)
Thus according to Alexander, the infinite God has as His body the whole of Space-Time, with all those engendered qualities which were once deity. Hence God is both actual and ideal, with his conserved history and prophecy. In other words, God is not simply what He has been, but also what He is going to be. This is what the Hebrew God Yahweh means. He described Himself as 'I AM THAT I AM'. This phrase really means that He is what was, what is and what is going to be (†). Thus interpreted the God of Alexander appears to be a Hebrew God who has been expressed in a modern way.

† This name of God occurs in Exodus 3:14. YHWH or YAHWEH is very difficult to translate. It is supposed to be derived either from the verb 'to be' or 'to become'. Hence, it means a 'being', 'who is or will be' or, 'the Eternal'. It may be translated even in a causative form, 'He causes to be', which is an abbreviated form of the longer litany, 'He causes to be what comes into existence' (The Interpreter's Bible, pp. 677-678, 674-675, N.Y. 1952). We have interpreted the phrase in the sense that God is eternal. This interpretation is in keeping with the verse 3-15, where the historical continuity of Yahweh has been emphasised. This is also supported by Davidson who has given his theological interpretation thus: "'I will be that I will be', expresses the sameness of Jehovah, His constancy—His being ever Like Himself. It does not express what other attributes He had,——it rather expresses what all His attributes make Him,——the same yesterday and to-day and for ever, the true in covenant relation, the unchanging; hence it is said 'I am Jehovah, I change not' " (Davidson, A.B. 'The Theology of the Old Testament p. 47, also see p. 56-7; T & T. Clark, 1904). Martin Buber also takes the phrase to mean that God is ever-present (Moises pp. 46-54 East and West Library, London 1946). Most probably Alexander took the phrase to mean 'I will be what I will be'. It is etymologically correct, but in itself it does not support the thesis that God is futuristic only.
Therefore, God being both actual and ideal is forever becoming or evolving and as such He is real. Indeed, Alexander emphasized that God as the whole universe, with its misus towards deity is actual. Deity, however, is an ideal and can never be existent. With this distinction of the ideal and the actual elements in God, the views of Alexander come very near to those of the idealist.

God is not actus purus for Alexander, but being an evolving entity, He is real. If this be so, then it is very similar to the doctrine of the idealist. According to him, the whole world is a progressive realisation of the infinite potentiality of God. Alexander kept the two elements of actuality and ideality apart by his separation of God and deity. However, God without deity (that is, His Divinity) cannot exist, and deity too without its base in God (that is the whole of Space-Time with its engendered qualities) is unthinkable. Hence, the two are inseparable. If we use the term 'Infinite God' for that concrete notion in which God's actuality is progressively realised in the infinite series of deity, then the whole doctrine comes to be a form of idealism. However, Alexander never reached this conclusion and gave rise to much confusion by his reiterated emphasis on deity. However, even this emphasis on deity in certain respects i.e. an echo of an idealistic utterance that
it is the end which gives meaning to all that has been. Thus Pringle-Tattison wrote:

"--- every evolutionary process must be read in the light of its last term. This is the true meaning of the profound Aristotelian doctrine of Telos or End as the ultimate principle of explanation" (1).

The same point was raised by Edward Caird who held that prophecy is truer than history, at least in throwing light on man. The following passage from 'The idea of God' is very relevant here:

"Man's ideals are, in a sense, the creative forces that shape his life from within. They have brought him thus far, and they confer upon him the possibility of an endless advance. As Edward Caird puts it: 'Their prophecies may be truer than history, because they contain something more of the divine than history has expressed as yet, or perhaps than it ever can fully express" (1).

Hence, the deity of Alexander, is the progressive Telos or End through which God is realising Himself. But in this sense, 'deity' is only one aspect of the whole. The other aspect of the whole is 'what is actual'. Thus, God in the concrete is real and its reality consists in what is both actual and ideal. The prophetic deity may be more important than the actual history of Space-Time. Nevertheless, it is not this which we worship. The real object of our worship is the infinite God, Who contains both history and prophecy. This neglect of the notion of an Infinite God, with onesided emphasis on a futuristic deity and an inaccurate explanation

1. The Idea of God P. 106
of religious life have contributed much to the dissatisfaction with Alexander's theology. Hence we agree with Webb when he wrote about Alexander thus:

"In him, as in Spinoza, we recognise a profound instinct for religion, natural to sons of the people which, as Athanasius said, has been a school of the knowledge of God to all nations, and powerful enough to inform with genuine religious passion a doctrine of God which itself affords it no adequate basis" (2).

Thus, from the doctrine of the non-existence of God with actual deity or of actual infinite deity, we can generalise the conclusion that no elaboration of Space-Time can exhaust the richness of God or can really be identified with God. The whole of Space-Time, with its emergents keeps on straining towards the actualisation of God and this straining itself depends on the pull from God. But every actualisation will fall short of Him, for God always remains beyond it. Further, it is true that the infinite God cannot be brought fully under the categories, for we can only apprehend Him and cannot comprehend Him. Our knowledge of Him can be imparted only through symbols and myths. Such knowledge is not less than scientific knowledge in depth and significance, though it has not scientific clearness and definiteness. Religious experience deals with the whole of human personality, as Alexander expressed it, and what type of intellectual knowledge can do full justice to it?

2. Journal of Philosophical Studies XXI 1946 p. 346; also see Church Quarterly Review Vol. 93 1922 p. 347
Even for expressing ordinary vision we take the help of metaphors and similes. Naturally for describing great visions, welling up from the very depth of the soul, we will have to use more 'enchanted and enchanting' symbols. Thus, the definition of deity is a priori in the bad sense of the term. Because deity must be a priori higher and different in kind from man, therefore, Alexander concluded that it must be worshipful. But this does not hold good in actual religious life and therefore, the whole theology of Alexander is based on this wrong supposition. Now the whole doctrine of deity is based on the theory of emergence and let us examine its validity in relation to the doctrine of deity.

**EMERGENCE AND DEITY:** A God who is said to be emerging in this chain of this evolving universe has a precarious existence and cannot be said to be the God of religious consciousness. Dean Inge truly said that a God under sentence of death is no God at all (1). But, why has Alexander posited God in the future?

We have already seen that the left Hegelians had made man the very incarnation of the divine process. Alexander simply extended this thought by pointing out that this process will continue beyond man. In Alexander's evolutionary process of Space-Time, there is no qualitative

1. God and Astronomers p. 10
being higher than man. But he also saw that
man recognizes that there is a Being higher than himself
and he worships such a Being. This worshipful
Being is deity. As this deity cannot be identified with
Space-Time, ----- the Ultimate Absolute of
Alexander, therefore, this deity must be
somewhere in it. As Space-Time is Absolute,
therefore, there can be no being over and
apart from it. Then, again, deity, being per
definition higher than man, cannot be below
him, and as there is nothing higher than man
that can be said to be existing, so deity can be
only the next higher emergent from him.
Besides, this process of emergence is without
any final end, therefore, deity cannot be
identified with any one culminating emergent.
As such deity can never be, it is always
becoming.
From the above considerations, it is clear that Alexander's theory of God with ideal deity depends on the acceptance of the theory of emergence. But we have already seen that the theory of emergence is true from a local and localised point of view only. It can be at most true of the series of matter-life-mind alone. However, this objection concerning the limited validity of the theory of emergence may be conceded and yet it would not refute the doctrine of deity. It might still be held that human beings belong to this particular series and as such they will continue to worship the next emergent of this ladder. But, of course, if the doctrine of emergence and deity be valid for this series only, then we cannot properly say with Alexander that the whole universe with its niusus to deity is God. At this stage, the critic of Alexander's theology can point out that this series is only a part of the universe and in itself it is regulated by other parts of the universe. The world of this series might be, therefore, conceived to be imitating a process already completed somewhere. Hence, Faito's theory of 'eternal forms' and the traditional doctrine of a Transcendent God can be held to supplement the theology of Alexander. If so, then his 'forward view' has not been able to supplant the 'backward view' in theology.
Thus, the theology of Alexander is of limited validity only.

However, the fundamental contention of the theory of emergence is that the universe itself produces the hierarchy of emergents. But if Space-Time by itself works without any end or purpose, then the emergents become the product of a blind process. Therefore they become mere accidents, since there appears to be no reason why they should arise at all. If they are accidental products, then we cannot infer any intelligible or rational conclusion from them. As such the theory of emergence becomes insecure and the doctrine of deity, being based on the theory of emergence, depends on the precarious expectation. Further, the reality of God with His ideal deity depends on the reality of the emergents themselves. After all, deity itself is a futuristic emergent. If, therefore, the emergents are accidental, then deity (and with it God) also becomes an accidental entity in the Absoluteness of Space-Time. Most probably this is what Alexander meant to say when he held that God is not the Absolute (1). Here we can compare the theology of Alexander with that of the idealists. According to the idealists, God is not the Absolute, for in content and value the Absolute is richer than the God of religion. But Alexander's God, so far as His deity is concerned, is not the Absolute, for the Absolute is quality-less Space-Time. Thus, the God of religion is not transcended but is denied a

1. STD II. p 371
place in the reality of Space-Time. However, this theory of Alexander puts God on the same ontological level as that of the emergents. In the final analysis, God is of the same nature as of matter, life and mind, for He is equally an appearance. If it is so, then ontologically God ceases to be higher than the emergents or the worshippers, and, again, He ceases to be ontologically different in quality from the worshippers. Whatever difference there may be between deity and man, according to Alexander, it is within the sphere of accidents only. If it is so, then God, in respect of his deity, ceases to be worshipful, for He is brought into the sphere of de-deified accidents.

Finally, we have to decide whether the theory of emergence can explain the reality of God, or whether the reality of God can explain the theory of emergence. We have already seen that Space-Time by itself can explain the reality of the world-process but not its progressiveness. However, the progressiveness of the process is also a fact. Hence, either it is an accidental feature of the world-process or else it is regulated by an intelligent principle. The very fact that Alexander ascribed the presence of a nius to Space-Time indicates that he was not prepared to regard it as an accidental feature of reality. And yet this progressiveness cannot belong to Space-Time as its essential
feature. Hence, this has to be attributed to the presence of an Intelligent entity which regulates Space-Time itself. Thus, instead of explaining the reality of God with the help of the theory of emergence, we are logically compelled to explain the theory of emergence through the reality of God. In the last analysis, the world-process by itself is unintelligible and this was therefore called Maya or Illusion in Indian thought. Of course, neither idealism nor any religious theology can completely clear away all the mysteries of our experience. But if philosophy has to explain our experience and if explanation means an elaboration of a meaningful scheme of things, then the acceptance of the reality of Divine Intelligence has more to commend itself than the assumption of an unintelligent entity of Space-Time which works without any rhyme or reason (1).

Then, again, by putting too much weight on the theory of emergence to account for deity, Alexander makes God a shadowy figure. The theory of emergence points out that the higher comes into being due to the past activity. As such it stresses the 'push' of the world-process and ignores the 'pull'. But the 'push' and 'pull' are equally important in the explanation of the emergents. With Alexander we can say that reality consists of distinguishable grades whose nature is such that the higher require the lower for their existence.

But to this observation we can add that the lower require to be possessed by the higher in order that their whole potentiality may be realised. By denying the action of the higher on the lower, Alexander has denied the existence of any organic connection between them. On the whole, the lower can exist without the higher, according to Alexander, but the higher depend on the lower. Consequently, the lower seem to have more reality than the higher. Similarly, deity becomes dependent on the lower in a way in which the lower do not seem to depend on deity. This denial of the greater reality to the higher and consequently to deity makes God ineffective concerning the goings-on of the world. But a God who makes no difference to the world below Him is no God at all. This gives an unnatural air to the theology of Alexander. Sheen calls it the fallacy of 'inverted Relations'.

"By this is meant that obtuse mental tendency to invert and turn upside down the natural relation existing between knowledge and reality on the one hand, and God and man on the other" (1).

Thus, the deity of Alexander comes to be a creature of a later part of the process instead of being the creator of the process. Instead of creating man, God in respect of His deity comes to be created at least partially by the efforts of man (2).

Undoubtedly, Alexander tried to make his deity effective and responsive to the lower in some way. Deity as an ideal, according to him, does exert an influence on the lower and thus helps them to participate in the activity of actualising deity. But this effectiveness of deity follows from its
subjective status in the minds of the lower emergents, and it forfeits its objective status. Besides, we have already seen that deity as a subjective ideal is incapable of sustaining the religious endeavour of the worshippers. Thus, the deity of Alexander has no real religious function to fulfil. As such we agree with the evaluation of Alexander’s deity by Webb:

"As reached therefore, by the road of metaphysical speculation, the object which our author (Alexander) propounds for our religious veneration may seem to be as unsatisfactory in this regard as that which was offered us by the evolutionary agnosticism of the last century" (1).

Besides, the theory of Emergence makes God entangled in the world-process. But once we do so, the numinousness of God is lost. This is clear from the past history of philosophy. The idealists made the world and God organic to each other and thereby they ended in some sort of pantheism. And this pantheism, as Alexander himself saw, made religious worship impossible. But Alexander did not realise that the same difficulty would arise in a different way if he would make God dependent on the world-process. He made deity a consequence of the world-process. In other words, the universe is taken by Alexander to be without deity, if we take Space-Time to be the Absolute Reality. Thus, deity cannot be without the world, but the world of

3. Church Quarterly Review 1922 p. 547
Space-Time, according to Alexander, can be without deity. This de-deification of reality takes away the meaningfulness of the universe, for God is the very meaning of the universe. If we have to avoid this de-deification of reality, then we have to appeal to religious consciousness itself which believes in the meaningfulness of the universe. In order that religious experience be possible, we have to accept God both as Transcendent and Immanent, as Alexander himself has pointed out. God is immanent in the world so far as His principles are concerned, and He is transcendent of the world so far as His being is concerned. God as He is known to religious consciousness is known as a personality, and therefore, the world is the manifestation of that Supreme Personality. But the very nature of personality is that it maintains its own separateness and exclusiveness. So if God is a person then He has to be taken as separate from the world-process through which He manifests Himself. Therefore, in His personality there are many thoughts and experiences which are enjoyed by Him but which remain quite independent of this world and human thought. The world, then, does not exhaust the fulness of God. This transcendence of the immanent God has been thus expressed by Pringle-Pattison:

"But just as the man has a centre of his own, which we cannot occupy, and from which he looks, as it were, upon
the inner side of his acts and words (as well as upon a private world of thoughts and feelings, many of which do not take shape in the common or general world at all), so, if we speak of God at all, there must be a divine centre of thought, activity and enjoyment, to which no mortal can penetrate" (1).

This solution of the Absolute Reality in terms of the transcendence of the immanent is as old as the Vedas. The Absolute Reality of the Vedas is said to pervade the whole world and is yet held to transcend it. This is clear from the following lines, taken from the Hymn to Purusha:

Whatever is, is Purusha;
Both what has been and what shall be;
As great as this is Purusha,
Yet greater still his greatness is;
All creatures are one-fourth of him;
Three-fourths th' immortal in the heaven. (2)

The other consequence of the application of the theory of Emergence has been the shutting out of all knowledge of God. We know, that according to Alexander, we can neither 'enjoy' nor 'contemplate' any entity higher than man.

Naturally, the deity of Alexander remains an unknown (X) (1). It is difficult not to express our surprise at this statement, specially when we know that he had derided the gospel of the 'unknowable God' (2). Then, even in 1931 he wrote to Laidl:

"I never was negative in respect of that subject and never was agnostic. I date from the agnostic time, but never subscribed to the prevailing belief (or want of belief)" (3).

But probably Alexander meant that he believed in the

2. Rig-Veda X 96; Griswold’s translation.
4. H.C. Vol. 40 1741-42 9 146
existence of God, but he disclaimed any knowledge of Him. However, this will be called agnosticism (*). But if we do not know and if it is idle to guess the nature of deity, then the best thing is to maintain silence. But Alexander has not done this. On the contrary, he pointed out that we apprehend God through our religious faith (1) as something numinous or mysterious (2), and that He is partly seen and partly thought (3). Besides, we are said to be assured of God's reality on the ground of both specific experience and speculative evidence (4). Then, again, he maintained the difficult statement that deity is 'unknown' and that it is not 'unexperienced' (5). If we experience God, then we must be knowing Him, though we must confess that we know much less than we should like to know and very much less than popular religion fancies (6). Of course, religion has always included an element of mystery but men have never worshipped pure mystery (7). Besides, the mysteriousness of God is different from our nescience of Him.

God is said to be mysterious for He transcends the

* Agnosticism may be defined as that theory of religious knowledge which asserts that it is impossible for man to attain the knowledge of God (Runes D.D. 'The Dictionary of Philosophy' George Routledge 1944, London).

subject-object relationship of our cognitive experience and thus can be properly expressed in terms of myths or symbols only. He remains most mysterious to them specially to whom He is revealed.

"It is just this seeming paradox which is asserted by religion and theology, wherever the two propositions are maintained, that God has revealed himself and that God is an infinite mystery for those to whom he has revealed himself, the paradox is stated implicitly" (i).

Alexander did not make any distinction between religion and scientific knowledge. As a matter of fact he tacitly accepted that knowledge to be religious knowledge proper must be scientific. Hence, by the unknowability of God, Alexander meant the absence of any definite knowledge of God. As such any positive teaching of any religion became for him 'nonsense' (2).

At this stage it might be contended that Alexander himself has given us some knowledge about his deity. However, the kind of knowledge which he has given us about his deity is not the religious knowledge of God through acquaintance. It is that knowledge of God which his system has provided for Him. This will not be called a religious knowledge of God, but in fact is a fabrication or a system. Hence, Netz rightly observes here:

1. Paul Tillich 'Systematic Theology' Vol. 1. p. 121
2. Letter of 31.6.31 to Laird H.J. Vol. 40 1941-42 p. 146
"We must reject as ill-judged its attempt to explore a region which is unexplorable. Spencer, whose greatest successor Alexander is in our own time, halted before the Absolute in silent humility and reverence; this behaviour seems to us to be more honest, pious, and honourable than the impetuosity and violence with which Alexander tries to overcome it" (1).

This is clear from the fact that Alexander regarded all kinds of religious knowledge as mythology or nonsense (2). But is religious myth nonsense?

**Religious Knowledge and Myth**: Alexander held that God cannot be known, for His deity is beyond our 'enjoyment' and 'contemplation'. However, religious persons are insistent on the deliverances of their consciousness of God. Their religious knowledge has been expressed in a traditional garment of language. Now Alexander regarded all such teachings of a positive religion as mythology and 'non-sense'. Of course Alexander has not stated his meaning of the term 'mythology' in his writings, but in his private circle he would treat it as 'nonsense'. Nonetheless, even in his writings he called the teachings of Trinity as 'not of itself rational' (3), and the ascription of personality to God, he called 'our weakness of imagination' (4). So let us enumerate the concepts of religion which he called myths.

Firstly, according to Alexander, the insistent claims of clarified religious consciousness are expressed in

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3. P.L.P. p. 319
4. P.L.P. p. 379
pictorial embodiments.

"Thus the intimate harmonising of God and man, their communion in the relation of child to father, is embodied in the idea of a God-made man, which is found in other religions, but none with such grace and winningness as in Christianity" (1).

But this embodiment is but a beautiful mythology (2).

Then, again, the God of theism which the religious sentiment naturally and inevitably employs is a consequence of 'the mythologising imagination' (3). Afterwards, Alexander maintained that the doctrine of creation forms a part of religious mythology (4) and the notion of a Creator God is a metaphor (5). Finally, he pointed out that the 'reconciliation of man with God through Jesus is artificial (6).

"The ordinary theism, therefore, when it postulates a human intermediary between us and a God who is conceived as endowed with deity actually attained, acts consistently in believing the intermediator to be more than man, human and divine at once —--—purchasing consistency at the cost of interposing the conception of a miraculous person without parallel in the world" (7).

All these teachings of Christianity have become mythology because they are based on a backward-view in theology.

The forward-view, however, points out that deity is yet to be and will never be actual. Nevertheless, the ordinary religious consciousness habitually forecasts deity as actually realised in an individual form (1).

The remedy of this mythologising consists of course in de-mythologising, and Alexander did this with reference to

7. STD II. p. 418-419
8. STD II. p. 362
the 'pictorial presentation' of the Fatherhood of God and Redemption or the forgiveness of sins in the following way:

"Our dependence of God, which partly, makes us think of him under the figure of a father, is our sense of how God gathers up for us in his person the whole infinite world to which we belong, so that in trusting ourselves to his divinity we are aware of our continuity with the whole in its divine quality" (2).

Then, again, the idea of fatherhood applies to deity, for the ideal which we create is itself, as in us, the cause of our action (3). Similarly, the myth of Redemption can be de-mythologised. Redemption means our being resolved into this infinite deity; and the forgiveness of sins is the feeling of mysterious largeness as a result of being carried up by the nisus (4).

But, Alexander also held that the process of mythologising is natural and inevitable (5), and, therefore, hardly any religion is free from it (6). Religion partly because it needs images of that which is not imaginable, and partly because it craves fixity of its ideas, is the prey of mythology (1). Then, he also hoped that a new religion will be born, ----- a Messianic hope ----- from some simple-minded, but profound religious genius sensitive to future needs. Even it will have its mythology in order to be humanly accessible, but its mythology will be credible to the men of to-day (2). But, if mythology is so essential

2. STD 11. p. 376
3. Septimana-Simozana p. 133. 4. STD 11. p. 399
2. Ibid p. 923.
to religion, then why should we call it 'nonsense'? We guess that Alexander thought it nonsense, for according to him, God is essentially unknown and unknowable and therefore no myth can penetrate into His nature or can be adequate to represent Him. Hence, any description of God will be what Prof. Emmet calls 'projective analogy!', that is, that analogy which we construct from intra-experiential ideas for applying it to what is intrinsically unknowable (3). Further, he thought that deity is always in the future and mythology puts Him as pre-existing the world. Besides, mythology runs the risk of making people worship human perfection in the place of divinity. We think that in the following lines, Laird has correctly given Alexander's reason for regarding religious teaching as mythological:

"But he (Alexander) was also saying that he repudiated the nonsense of traditional philosophical theology, the nonsense of looking for deity in the wrong place and of attempting to adore the mere perfection of human attributes like moral goodness or intellectual insight when these, however much they might be 'perfected', remained and had to remain wholly and definitely sub-divine" (1).

It is quite true that Alexander would never allow tertiary qualities to be attributed to God (2) and then he regarded Jesus as a perfection of man but not as actualised deity (3). The whole viewpoint of Alexander can be made clear by our attempting to answer these two questions: (a) Is myth

3. The Nature of Metaphysical Thinking p.11.
3. STD 11. p. 418; P.L.P. p. 328
irrational, that is, is it only due to the weakness of human imagination which cannot remain satisfied with the 'unimaginable'? Or, is it due to the presence of a higher truth which is inexpressible through our ordinary subject-object relationship? (b) Then, again, if God and His attributes are going to be expressed, then should we do so through mere negations or through the lowest category or through the highest reality known to us? Let us deal with the first question first.

The theologians like Streeter, Tillich and Niebuhr have held that there is no way of speaking about God except in mythological terms (4). Thus, Streeter wrote:

"It follows that to test the element of truth in any religion we must direct our attention first of all, not to the intellectual constructions of the theologian, but to myth and rite, to hymn and prayer, to parable and proverb, to the mystic's meditation and the prophet's trumpet call" (1).

Similarly, Stewart pointed out that logical and scientific thinking remains opposed to the religious consciousness of God (2) and, therefore, he contended that Plato had to take recourse to myth to bring home to us the reality of God.

The myth-thinking of Plato consists

"in showing that the 'whole', or all-embracing Good, cannot be grasped scientifically, but must be seen imperfectly in a similitude" (3).

When the theologians may that religious thinking is mythological, they mean that there is a different kind of knowledge of God and this knowledge should neither be judged

1. Reality P. 47 see also p. 67.
2. The myths of Plato pp. 52, 53, 57. 3. Ibid. p. 59; also Emmet D.M. 'Whitehead's Philosophy of Organism' p. 123.
by logical reasoning nor should be confused with nescience.
There is a positive knowledge of God, which can be satisfactorily communicated with the help of myths and parables, but it cannot be expressed in the context of subject-object relationship. The reality of religious myth is judged by its power of energising and elevating the receiver of them.
Hence, Jesus spoke in parables
"that it may be fulfilled
that it may be fulfilled — which was spoken by the prophet, saying, I will open my mouth in parables; I will utter things which have been kept secret from the foundation of the world" (4).

At least forty-three parables have been recorded in the gospels. They were spoken as an evidence of the fact that the Kingdom of God had come in the midst of men. Because of these parables the hearers marvelled and they said of Jesus that He taught them with authority.(*)

"Myth is not primitive science, nor is cult primitive morality. Their content as well as the attitude of people toward them, discloses elements which transcend science as well as morality elements of infinity which express ultimate concern" (1).

We will say something more about religious myth, but we can safely conclude now that myth does not mean any concession to our weakness of imagination. The reason for mystic thinking in religion is not due to the fact that 'we do not in general proceed rationally or think in abstract forms, but are creatures of imagination' (2). Myths arise due to the very nature of the religious object itself, and are the product

4. St. Mt. ch. 15 v.55.
5."If Jesus' parables are to be regarded as literature at all, they belong to the literature of power". (Robinson W.H. 'The Parables of Jesus' P. 193)
of rational thinking. It is too narrow and one-sided a view to confine reason to logical thinking only and to brush aside art, religion and morality on the ground of their irrational character. Of course, one can define 'rational' in any way he likes, but any such arbitrary definition will yield tautology but not an empirical truth.

The second question which we have raised pertains to the nature of our expressing or symbolising or mythologising God. Of course, if we do not accept the reality of God and if we consider Him to be a mere philosophical concept, then our question becomes meaningless. Somehow Alexander did not accept the reality of God and took Him to be a creature of philosophical thinking. He granted that religious feeling is a fact but he also tacitly held that this feeling may be concerned with a fanciful object. Religious feeling or the light of nature, according to Alexander:

"Cannot be its own guarantee. It needs confirmation from the accordance of its deliverances with the whole of our experience" (1).

But, surely philosophy can only clarify but cannot guarantee the reality of God. If God can be known as real, then it can be done by religious consciousness alone and only the conceptual clearness of this reality needs the help of philosophy. The wisdom of God may be revealed to babes, and may be concealed from the wise. Thus, the reality of God does not

1. The Listener Dec. 3, 1920, p. 922 col. 16
depend on philosophy at all, nor even on religious consciousness but on His Being alone. But God’s reality impinges on us and we can respond to Him only by transforming the nature of this reality through our rational process. Of course, ‘rational’ includes both scientific and non-scientific thinking. This impingement of God is felt by us as a thing of great value and a priceless mystery. God is expressed by us in ‘value-judgments’ or rather ‘value-feelings’ (2).

"In the history of religion revelatory events always have been described as shaking, transforming, demanding, significant in an ultimate way" (3). The events of the burning bush, Mt. Sinai, Calvary have all the same characteristics. The elemental expression is mythopoeic like Isaiah’s utterance of being an ‘unclean’ person standing before the Holy Being or of Peter’s recognition of himself as a sinner who could not confront the sinless Son of God. The expression is wrung out involuntarily and it is always recognised to be non-literal and yet true. Such experiences work out vast changes in the world, in the lives of saints and sinners, in the contributions of poets and artists, and scientists and philosophers. A thing of this nature we want to understand intellectually. But we can understand the magic of myths only by conceptualising them. This conceptualisation makes them clear and intelligible to us, but their magic evaporates. Hence, we delude ourselves by thinking

that we understand myths in terms of ordinary concepts. A myth when conceptualised becomes an allegory.

Religious experience then arises from the impingement of the infinite on the finite, and the conceptual thinking arises in our commerce with finite things. Conceptual thinking about God therefore, aims at bringing the infinite in the category of the finite. At this stage we should also note that religious myths have the task of elevating the finite into the sphere of the holy and the infinite.

"If a segment of reality is used as a symbol for God, the realm of reality from which it is taken is, so to speak, elevated into the realm of the holy" (1).

For example, God is described as 'Father', but this has the effect of making physical fatherhood theonomous and of surrounding it with sacramental depth. Even Flugel and also Pfister had to concede that God as father has been a great help in freeing man from father as god (1). If this is a correct distinction between philosophical and religious thinking, then we have to guard ourselves against the allegorising of the religious object by conceptual thinking.

If we do make use of philosophical thinking to clarify our religious notions, then with what sort of conceptual thinking should we explain the nature of God? We can explain the nature of God either in terms of the lowest or the highest reality known to us or in terms of nescience. Of course, there is also another expedient of doing so and that

1. Paul Tillich op. cit. p. 267
2. Flugel J.C. 'The Psycho-Analytic Study of the Family' p. 154
   Pfister G. 'Some applications of Psycho-Analysis' p. 345
consists in explaining Divine Reality in terms of super-personality. However, in practice, the super-personal God has come to be understood as an impersonal God. We need not deceive ourselves by thinking of God beyond the highest reality known to us, for our grasp cannot transcend our reach. Then, again, if we cannot think of God beyond personality and values, then certainly we cannot rest content with the gospel of the Unknowable. The history of philosophy and theology has shown that we can hold no significant negation without a nucleus of some positive assertion. Alexander could hold the unknowability of God only on the basis of his positive doctrine of deity and the theory of knowledge. Besides, he himself did not explicitly hold the doctrine of nessience. Thus, we find that God cannot be thought in pure negative terms. Can we then know or express God in terms of the lowest category known to us? The older materialists had thought of the Supreme Reality in terms of matter. But obviously, the simplicity of matter cannot explain the growing complexity and richness of life and mind. The higher cannot be fully explained in terms of the lower. If matter cannot explain the nature of the Supreme Reality, then even 'life' cannot be said to explain the nature of it. If we explain the nature of the highest reality in terms of life, then we will be simply repeating the fallacy of materialism, though on a
reduced scale (1). If matter and life cannot explain the nature of Reality, then certainly Space-Time, being the emptiest of all reality known to us, cannot do full justice to Reality. Alexander himself saw that God cannot be Space-Time, for Space-Time has not the feature of numinousness. He also had the vague feeling that his God lacks the note of divinity and this is clear from the following statement:

"Yet it remains true that speculatively, even without the practical revelation of God, we can arrive at the postulate of a world tending to deity, though we could not discover it to be worshipful" (1).

Thus God becomes a postulate and its worshipfulness remains open to doubt. Thus we are left with the last alternative only, namely, we can know God in terms of the highest reality known to us and this is the reality of 'being a person'. So far as religious history is known to us the best exemplar of human personality is found in the life of Jesus. Now 'no man hath seen God at any time; the only begotten Son, which is in the bosom of the Father, he hath declared him' (2). Jesus becomes the Son of God, for He has rent the veil and revealed the 'hidden' God. Christ Crucified as a spotless lamb of God is a myth, but this myth is a power, for it has made a difference to human history.

"For the Jews require a sign, and the Greek seek after wisdom; but we preach Christ crucified, unto the Jews a stumbling block, and unto the Greeks foolishness; But unto them which are called, both Jews and Greeks, Christ (is) the power of God, and the wisdom of God" (3).

1. Streeter B.H. 'Reality' P. 123  
We come back to myth again, for myth and symbol express a higher truth which, psychologically speaking, cannot become articulate in any other way. In philosophy, poetry and politics and all spheres where power-thinking has been a fact, myth comes to surround their concepts with its halo and penumbra of magic. Edward Strong shows the importance of myth in philosophy, in which, he says, the poetic vision is undying, though this poetry is intellectual......

"The source of analogical metaphysics is metaphor and myth; the power of the myth is evocative and demonstrative, and the truth of the metaphor in metaphysics is poetic truth-------- enhanced, vivified and perpetual meanings" (1).

In another article called 'The leading myths of our Time' (2), Swaby points out that no revolutionary idea in history has been backed without its stirring fables. The fables may appear to be phantastic, she says, but each one of them incubates some profound meaning and value. She illustrates the truth of this observation in relation to Communism, Fascism and Democracy, one by one.

"Like art, myths clothe life with fresh enchantment, reveal an unsuspected plot and pattern in it, lift men to higher regions above the tedium vitae. Their magic confers a chrism of self-importance on those deemed unimportant, sounding a trumpet of hope, a call to a larger destiny" (3).

From the above observation it is clear that myth is not nonsense and the worship of God through Christ is not the

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worship of human perfection. Jesus is a historical and yet a living myth of mankind. The truth of myth consists in its power of adding meaning to all those who participate in it. According to Jung, religion brings mental health and adds meaning to the life of the individual (1). The religious symbols, according to him:

"make it possible for man to erect a spiritual counter-pole to primitive instinctive nature; a cultural attitude, as opposed to mere instinctiveness" (2).

Even the Freudians, who are negatively predisposed to religious value, admit that the image of God draws its sustenance from the experiences of countless generations. Every human child so develops that he cannot avoid the God-image, for the family-situation at once becomes the ephorising force or stimulus for the activation of phylogenetic memory-traces. That the source of God-thinking is as deep as humanity itself has been well emphasized by Jung. The ages, according to him,

"assumed without question that this system was a being with a will and consciousness ——- was even a person—— and they called this being God, the quintessence of reality... There is a psychological justification for this supposition for it is only appropriate to call divine an almost immortal being whose experience, compared to that of man, is nearly eternal" (3).

Whether a religious myth is nonsense or not is to be judged not from its roots but from its fruits. The truth appears

1. Psychology of the Unconscious. pp. 15-16, 224; also Contributions to Analytical Psychology pp. 53, 66.
2. Contributions to Analytical Psychology p. 68.
3. Modern man in search of a Soul. P. 217
to be this that religious knowledge arises not in union but in communion with the Supreme Reality as a Person and philosophy can deal with Reality only as a concept. Naturally the world of religion becomes an unintelligible mystery to philosophy and this has been well expressed by Brunner:

"A philosophically reasoned faith in a personal God is a contradiction in terms, however hard thinkers may have laboured to square the circle" (1).

When we look upon the Supreme Reality as a Person, then alone we find the numinous element in Nature. Alexander called himself an Otto-man. But had he been one, he would have seen that the argument from Design fails when it is expressed conceptually. However, rightly understood the fact to which the argument from design refers is an indicator of the presence of the Other Self and is thus understood numinously. When the Psalmist beheld the glory of God in the starry heavens, then the starry heaven was felt numinously. Only in this spirit of experiencing Nature numinously we can say:

"The heavens declare the glory of God/ and the firmament sheweth his handywork. Day unto day uttereth speech, and night unto night sheweth knowledge. There is no speech nor language, where their voice is not heard" (2).

For the sake of this numinousness, Kant felt that the argument from design was 'deserving of respect'. Thus

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1. God and man p. 46 (S.C.M. Press 1936)
2. Is. xix- v. 1-3
De Burgh observes:

"In the Critique of Judgment he (Kant) remarks that the purposive phenomena in nature evokes, prior to any explicit reasoning, a feeling akin to the religious, a sense of an unknown power behind phenomena, that is awesome, or, in Otto's familiar term 'numinour'" (1).

Similarly, De Burgh points out that Cook Wilson in the face of general adaptation and harmony of nature could not help feeling admiration and wonder. He quotes the following words of Cook Wilson:

"Whether it be an illusion or not, the idea of plan or design and choice of means comes on us with irresistible force; we cannot shut it out" (2).

Thus the knowledge of God is possible to us only when in our moment of spiritual excitement we confront the Supreme Reality as a Holy Person. This note of personality is lacking in Alexander's account of deity. Consequently, he could not enter into the spirit of religious knowledge and therefore he declared the teachings of the positive religion a mythology in a depreciatory sense.

Alexander wanted to have some sort of theism. Therefore, he had to find out a way of maintaining the transcendence of deity. In order to do so he took the help of the mind-body formula. It is curious to note that this distinction of mind and body was made by Pope to illustrate the pantheistic conception of God.

"All are but parts of one Stupendous Whole
Whose body Nature is, and God is soul." (1)

We will see later that Alexander's system is too pantheistic to allow any room for a Transcendent God. But now we are raising a more fundamental issue. We doubt the very applicability of the mind-body formula to God. Not because its applicability leads to pantheism, as William Temple thought (2), but because the conditions which justify the application of the formula to emergent existents do not apply to God.

No doubt the mind-body formula is only an analogy to throw light on the nature of empirical existents, but the analogy itself must be more clear than the experiences to which it is going to apply.

"Meanwhile, we must own that until we understand more than we do at the present about this question of the relation of mind and body, we are not in a very good position to say whether it is a relation which can be generalised to interpret anything else".(1)

Therefore, according to Prof. Emmet, the whole effort on the part of Alexander, to explain our experiences in terms of the mind-body formula is really a fallacy of Obscurum per obscurius (2).

There is much in this objection of Prof. Emmet which can be accepted, but we do not think that there is any fallacy of obscure explanation, so far as the formula of mind-body itself is concerned. Alexander is quite clear as to what he means by the mind-body formula. Mind here means the neural processes themselves which have been

1. Emmet D.M. *PHILOSOPHY* Vol. XXV. 1950 p. 227
'lifted up' into consciousness. Thus, mind and body are indissoluble and identical. The same entity when 'enjoyed' is mind and when 'contemplated' is neural. This relationship between mind and body may be inadequate and even indefensible, but there is no obscurity in Alexander's meaning of the formula itself. Again, the formula was advanced as a hypothesis and therefore, its validity rests on its capacity to explain all facts and we fear that the formula cannot bear the weight which has been placed upon it. In a way the mind-body formula is even more pervasive than the categories themselves, for the categories do not apply to the Infinite God and Space-Time, but this formula does apply to them, according to Alexander. But we think that this formula, strictly speaking, cannot be applicable either to Space-Time or God. This inapplicability does not arise from the fallacy of Illicit Generalisation or Anthropomorphism, as Dr. Stiernotte thinks (1). But it is inapplicable because the conditions of the mind-body formula cannot be satisfied in Space-Time and the 'Infinite God'.

Let us take Space-Time. Can we legitimately say that Time is the 'mind' of Space? Now mind is an emergent quality from life, but Time does not 'emerge' from Space, and therefore, it cannot be called the 'mind' of Space. Alexander himself noted this (2) and therefore, he explained

the statement 'Time is the mind of Space' in the sense that Time performs the same function in relation to Space as mind performs in relation to neural processes (3). Further, he held that Time is the mind of Space, for from the Time-element of Space-Time, mind and all other qualities have emerged (4). In itself the explanation is obscure, for in the hierarchy of Space-Time, matter, life and mind, mind is not only Time but is static-temporal and so is life and all other emergent qualities. Then, again, the most generalised meaning of 'mind', according to Alexander, is that everything has a tendency to enter into whole or 'holism', and that everything has the aspect of 'ing' or 'enjoyment' (1). But Space-Time, being always restless, cannot be a whole. Time, instead of making Space-Time a whole, keeps it always expanding. Therefore, in the first meaning of 'mind', Time cannot be said to be the 'mind' of Space. Then, can we maintain the distinction of mind and body in terms of 'enjoyment' and 'contemplation'? Can we say that Space when 'enjoyed' is Time? Quite obviously, it is not true, for Space by itself does not exist. The relation between Space and Time is not one of identity as is the case with mind and body.

"The relation of Time to Space is therefore something closer than that of being merely analogous to the relation of mind and its neural basis, and something less than that of being identical with it" (2).

1. The Historicity of Things. pp. 20, 21
Hence, Time is not the 'ing' aspect of Space, for the two are not identical, and in it there is no distinction of contemplation and enjoyment, for as yet there are no levels of emergence. It is a stage earlier than and prior to the later differentiation of it into contemplation and enjoyment (3). As such, Time cannot be said to be the 'ing' or 'enjoyment' of Space, and therefore, it cannot be said to be the 'mind' of Space. Thus, the mind-body formula does not apply to Space-Time. Alexander did not care to examine this, for he wanted a formula of universal applicability to unify all experiences. Of course, he had also other functions for the mind-body formula to which we have already referred in Chapter III.

Again, Alexander wanted to attribute all progress, new departures and creative syntheses to the 'restlessness of time', and in this sense he regarded Time as an analogue of mind.

"Alexander in fact admits this, when he speaks of a nusus, or creative tendency in S-T. But can you get this out of his notion of S-T as an infinite four-dimensional continuum? I do not think so, unless you implicitly assume that the mere fact of succession necessarily means creative advance" (1).

Thus, from the above consideration it is clear that Time cannot be called the 'mind' of Space and as such the mind-body formula breaks down at the initial level of Space-Time. Now let us see whether we can apply this formula.

3. STD II. p 40-41
to an Infinite God.

If the mind-body formula cannot be legitimately applied to Space-Time, then we have no reason to regard it as a universal formula. Consequently, it cannot be extended to the Infinite God without an independent empirical enquiry in relation to it. But as the nature of God, according to Alexander, is beyond our contemplation and enjoyment, therefore, we cannot empirically determine the applicability of the mind-body formula. Therefore, the mind-body formula can be applied to God, only as an extension of a generalisation, which has been based on the observation of existent emergents. But before we apply the formula to the Infinite God, we should see that precisely those conditions are found in Him which are found in empirical existents which justify the applicability of the formula to Him.

First of all, the mind and body of the mind-body formula, have not been considered to be human mind and body. Mind in man is a particular emergent quality; but at the lower levels, life and matter are mere analogues of mind. At the lower levels of emergence, the mind-body formula is a justifiable and in a way a fruitful analogy. As a matter of fact, in 'The Historicity of Things', Alexander has made clear the sense in which 'mind' has to be used as a correlate of 'body' at all levels. Mind, in this
extended sense, as we have already seen, means a holistic tendency and an 'ing' aspect of a thing. But in applying this formula to the Infinite God, Alexander has literally used the human frame of reference. This is a form of Anthropomorphism (*). To be sure, he also said that this way of describing God is purely figurative and mythological. (1) But this necessity on the part of Alexander to describe God in terms of metaphors indicated that God cannot be usefully described except in terms of human personality (*). Further, if the application of the mind-body formula to God is mere metaphor, then from the nature of this metaphorical thinking about God, one cannot be very sure of the conclusions one draws about Him. But Alexander has taken the mind-body formula too seriously and literally in his theology where

*Our charge of anthropomorphism in Alexander's application of mind-body formula to God is different from Dr. Stiernotte's similar objection to Alexander's theology. According to us, the 'body' and 'mind' of God have been used by Alexander in human terms. Hence, according to us, Alexander has anthropomorphised God. But, according to Dr. Stiernotte, an attributing of any kind of 'body' to God is gross anthropomorphism. We think that the position of Dr. Stiernotte is too extreme. Then again, Dr. Stiernotte also maintains that Alexander should not have applied the term 'mind' to God, as he did not allow 'knowing in human meaning'. We think that this is too extreme a view to take about divine 'knowing'. Dr. Stiernotte deals with this problem at great length (God and Space-Time pp. 235-244), but the following quotation from him will suffice for our purpose: "---the expression 'body of God' is too anthropomorphic for any system of metaphysics---The 'mind of God' as deity is not sufficiently clarified". We have already seen that Dr. Stiernotte's objection of anthropomorphism is invalid.


*On other occasions, Alexander did not allow the applicability of the best of human attributes to God for even descriptive purposes.
its applicability is extremely doubtful. God is supposed to have a 'body' with all its visceral and organic sensations and then He is supposed to have a brain-structure like ours. Thus God comes to be represented by the image of a superman. But God may have a 'body' and 'mind' which may be quite different from ours, in the same way in which Space-Time is supposed to have 'mind' and 'body' which are only analogous to ours. This humanising of God with the too literal application of the human mind-body relationship is indefensible.

Further, is deity of an Infinite God an 'ing' aspect of Him? There are grave doubts for thinking it so. The body of God includes the whole of Space-Time with all its engendered qualities and as such it is an actual reality. But deity is only ideal. In order that deity be an 'ing' aspect of God, at least this deity should be as real as the body. After all, mind and body in the mind-body formula are identical and indissoluble. As deity is not as actual as the body of God is, so it cannot be the 'ing' aspect of God, and as such it ceases to be the 'mind' of God. Hence, the mind-body formula does not apply to God.

The same thing may be put in a slightly different way. So far, the entities which have the mind-body pattern, have been shown to have deity also. Even Space-Time has its deity of materiality towards which the Time-arrow is pointed. But in the actual infinite God with the realised deity, there
can be no arrow forward to anything beyond Himself. In His case 'mind' and 'deity' coincide. This would mean that the restlessness of Time cannot apply to God. This is what the idealist means by saying that Time-process is within the world or the whole, but the whole as a whole is beyond history and time. But this Time-element of Space-Time is mind and this becomes wanting in the Infinite God with the realised deity. Therefore, He cannot be said to have mind as the analogue of the Mind-body relationship.

Further, we have seen that the mind-body formula is based on the identity of mind and body. But, when we come to the conception of Alexander's God, Who is straining towards deity, we find contrasts instead of identity between mind and body. The body of God is creative, contains good and evil alike and is all-inclusive; but, deity, the 'mind' of God, is created, contains only that which is in line of Goodness and is transcendent. If they be contrasted, they cannot be treated as mind and body. As such the mind-body formula cannot be applied to God.

If the mind-body formula cannot be applied to God, then the conclusion based upon it is also invalid.

**TRANSCENDENCE AND IMMANENCE:** If the mind-body formula be not applicable to God, then Alexander's solution of Transcendence and Immanence, on the basis of this formula
is also unacceptable. But this is a central problem of theism, and therefore, it requires a more detailed treatment. At the outset we can say that, according to theism, God is both transcendent and immanent. This is a direct postulation which arises from religious experience itself. In other words, theism arises out of direct experience of God and is not a logical solution which deals with the concept of God. "It maintains both conceptions, led to do so not by stress of logic, but by the claims of spiritual value" (1).

Thus, in a way Alexander is right when he said that in theism, the transcendence and immanence of God are postulated together without reconciliation (2). Both factors are present in religious experience and certainly there is the need of reconciliation of them (3). Religious experience, in the life of communion, shows that God is a Person with Love and Compassion, and as such He has a personality.

"Theistic religion is profoundly concerned to maintain that God is a being with whom personal relations are possible; if that be abandoned we shall be compelled to dismiss that religious experience, which Theists take to be the highest and most significant, as illusion" (4).

Similarly, Pringle-Pattison pointed out that the term 'God' loses its meaning without some sort of personality ascribed to Him (5). Now the very nature of the personality is such that it transcends its processor activity (6). Then, again,

5. Hegelianism and Personality p. 222.
in order to grant the possibility of worship, the worshipper must be distinct and independent of his deity. Thus a life of religious devotion cannot help postulating a transcendent God. Again, this religious experience also shows that we are creatures and God is our Creator (*); we are finite and He is infinite (**). This infinite Creator must be able to create the world out of Himself, for there can be nothing outside of Him. This, according to Alexander, is but immanence (1). If so, then religious faith lays down that God is immanent in His creation and is yet transcendent—-the source and goal of all finite beings (2). Thus, immanence as well as transcendence are implicated in religious life. They appear to be irreconcilable in the same way in which the wave and corpuscular theories of light appeared to be irreconcilable and yet both may be true. The important thing is to note that they are the articulation of religious experience itself. They need reconciliation, but they cannot be made to subservce any philosophical speculation.

"The fact, then, that we cannot reconcile the partial independence and freedom of the finite self with its acknowledged dependence upon God in other respects, need not force us to abandon our primary moral conviction, in deference to a speculative theory which may be applying a finite plumb-line to measure the resources of the infinite" (3).

Of course, any solution which does justice to the primary facts of religious life is highly welcome. But

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* Our sense of dependence on God and our feeling of creatureliness are raw data of religious experience.
* Alexander himself would accept that the experience of the 'infinite' is prior to that of the finite.
3. Pringle-Pattison A.Seth, "Two Lectures on Theism" p.48.
Alexander's solution is purely philosophical (1), and we will see further that it is also artificial. Alexander's system can be only pantheistic, for all emergents are engendered by Space-Time itself by virtue of its nisus. There is nothing outside of it, therefore, according to his own definition, Space-Time with its nisus remains the matrix of the whole universe. Besides, we have already seen, that in Alexander's philosophy, all emergents are mere incidents and deity too shares the same risk, and, therefore, Space-Time alone remains the only blank reality. Space-Time is the One. Though the finites are said to be preserved, they are preserved not with their empirical qualities, but only as spatio-temporal entities. Further, we have already seen, that Alexander's theory is too deterministic, like that of Spinoza. As such there is no room for free choice. Thus, for all purposes, the system of Alexander, is fully pantheistic. But to this point we will return a little later.

At this stage Alexander has introduced the distinction of God and Deity, which are related to each other in the form of mind and body. Now, if we take a generalised view of deity which has been looming ahead of every emergent, then we find that this deity always goes beyond the highest emergent in order of empirical existence; and in this sense transcends it. Therefore, Alexander pointed out that his theology successfully reconciles the rival claims of immanence.

T. P.L.P. pp. 328, 331
and transcendence. God's body includes everything and therefore, He is immanent in respect of His body. Again, deity transcends or goes beyond all the emergents, and, therefore, in respect of His 'mind', He is transcendent. "His transcendence and his immanence are united through their different functions in God's total being" (1).

This ingenious solution seems to have some relevance at the human level. At this level we find that deity transcends man and becomes as remote from him as the Deistic God was supposed to be. Thus, Mrs. Le Boutillier writes in this connection:

"In order to satisfy his temporal pattern with deity, or the completion of God, as a future level, Alexander has divorced nature from Him, has made it impossible for man to strive towards Him as towards a present actuality, to gain knowledge of Him, to have community with Him, or to increase in His wisdom" (2).

Thus the deity of Alexander appears as incommunicable as the Deistic God had been. From this characteristic of deity, Mrs. Le Boutillier thinks that it is really a transcendent entity (3).

However, a closer examination of Alexander's theology will reveal that it is pantheistic to the core. As a matter of fact it is infra-pantheistic rather than pantheistic, for a pantheistic God pervades the whole of nature and His immanent Being is co-extensive with the world which he indwells (1). But the deity of Alexander, though it is sustained by

1. P.L.F. p. 331, also see p. 363; Septimana Spinozana p. 132.
2. 'Religious Values in the Philosophy of Emergent Evolution' P. 52
3. Ibid. p. 87
the whole world, can hardly be said to be co-extensive with it. This is due to the fact that deity is only a chapter in the history of Space-Time, and therefore, his pantheism also becomes a part of his more inclusive naturalism. Being even less than pantheism, his theology can hardly claim to be theistic. Nevertheless, if the distinction of theism and pantheism may be maintained in the theology of Alexander, then we can say that his theology is pantheistic. The reason is that really the mind and body are identical and deity cannot be said to be beyond Space-Time. After all, the distinction of God and deity is intra-cosmic distinction. He himself pointed out that deity transcends us, though it still remains within nature (2). But a transcendent God should be outside of Nature; and, He is transcendent because He is the Creator of the universe (3). On the other hand, the deity of Alexander is a creature, and, being entangled in the fate of the universe, remains dependent on it. As such we agree with Dr. Stiernotte (4), against Mrs. Le Boutillier that the reconciliation of transcendence and immanence of God cannot be effected through the distinction of 'mind' and 'body' of God (1).

Though Hartshorne and Reese will not agree in regarding Alexander's theology as pantheistic, yet they hesitate in calling it fully pantheistic (*). They write thus in this

4. God and Space-Time pp. 246-250
* In panentheism, however, transcendence and immanence are not as explicitly stated as in theism.
connection:

"...pantheism seems to be implicit in the logical and conceptual framework of his thought, although it never quite became explicit in his writings" (2).

Lastly, the distinction of immanence and transcendence in Alexander's theology depends on the distinction of deity and God, and this distinction, again, is based on the applicability of the universal formula of mind-body relationship, and this, finally rests on the doctrine of emergence. But, this emergence itself is due to the functioning of an immanent nisus, by virtue of which Space-Time gives birth to new emergents. But can we interpret emergent evolution except on the basis of some sort of inner teleology which is implanted in Space-Time itself? Prof. Raven answers this question thus:

"We shall have realized the truth of Dean Matthew's wise words that 'the phrase 'emergent evolution' is a transparent disguise for the idea of immanent teleology" (1). If this is so, then really the theology of Alexander is so pantheistic that it leaves no room for transcendence at all.

Is Alexander's Doctrine of Deity Theistic? Pantheism is an unsatisfactory doctrine from the viewpoint of religious consciousness. But in all fairness it must be conceded that immanence in some form has been held by the religious mystics. However, they did so in a spirit of protest against the mechanical and external relation in which a deistic God was

2. Philosophers speak of God p. 372. Probably this is the most charitable view which can be taken of Alexander's theology in relation to theism.
1. Natural Religion and Christian Theology, p. 144.
placed. They did not hold it as an explicit theological theory (2). Logically, however, pantheism cannot be said to explain the relation of God with man which is found in religious experience. A religious consciousness demands transcendence as well as immanence. Alexander was right in as much as he recognised their presence in theism, but he was not right in holding them together in the manner in which he did in his theology. We have already shown above that the transcendence of deity, as held by Alexander, is purely artificial. On the contrary, however, Alexander held that his conception is theistic (3) and explained it thus:

"But in respect of his deity the conception of God is theistic, and since his deity is distinctive of him, this notion of God remains predominantly theistic" (4).

What Alexander ignored is the fact that the transcendence of God in theism is not a purely logical idea. It is a descriptive notion, which arises from religious experience. God appears to be transcendent to us because He confronts us in the hour of choice. He is felt to be transcendent to us when He appears to be responsive to us in our prayers and pleadings to Him. But Alexander rejected this notion of the responsiveness of God in our prayers to Him. For Alexander, Deity is an ideal and not an existent entity, but for a theist, He is more real than anything He knows and experiences. God can only be glorified and praised, because His richness of

Being has so much of boundless value that He cannot be analytically described. However, this praise of God is also a description of Him, so far as He is seen to be affecting us in making our own lives richer ‘in His ocean flow’. The nature of God, in whom all values are concretely embodied, cannot be described except in terms of symbols and myths. For Alexander God is impersonal, but whatever may be the difficulty in ascribing personality to God, a theist cannot picture Him except in terms of personality.

Alexander pointed out that deity is not value, but it is in line with value. In ‘Septimana Spinozana’, he maintained that man’s values serve as a feeder of God’s deity, and are used up in bringing that deity to birth (1). From this it might appear that deity is really worshipful in a theistic sense. But, deity, which is always to-morrow, cannot be an actual embodiment of values. Then, we doubt whether man-made values can ever form the elements of deity, for, according to Alexander, value is not a quality and is not an objective feature of things. But deity is a quality and therefore, human values cannot go to make deity. Thus, deity really transcends values and is not worshipful because of its having them in its ‘body’.

Therefore, we conclude that Alexander’s doctrine of deity is not theistic.

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1. p. 132
CHAPTER TEN

CONCLUSION

Philosophy tries to understand and evaluate our experiences as a whole. This attempt to reduce our tangled web of life to some order and system seems to be rooted in human mentality itself.

If we ignore the anti-metaphysicians for the time being, then we can say that a number of metaphysicians would grant that there is a holistic tendency in things as well as in human thinking. Something like this was also supposed by Alexander, when he wrote the following:

"Ascent takes place, it would seem, through complexity. But at each change of quality the complexity as it were gathers itself together and is expressed in a new simplicity. The emergent quality is the summing together into a new totality of the component materials" (1).

But it was Smuts who laid special emphasis on the holistic tendency in all things, from atoms up to the mentality of man. The same view is found in the organismic philosophy of Whitehead. According to him, the planetary model of even an atom betrays its organismic nature.

We may grant that there is an organismic or holistic tendency in all things and yet we may not grant that the interpretative form of human mentality corresponds to its objective order. In order to justify a realistic

1. STD 11. p. 70
interpretation of human form or gestalten, Kohler has advanced
the theory of 'isomorphism'. According to him, not only in
every perceptual activity is there a gestalt, but this gestalt
corresponds to some objective gestalt. It is true that the
perceptual activity is mediated through physiological
processes, but they too run into patterns or gestalt and some¬
how they too faithfully reproduce the objective gestalt. In
other words, according to Kohler, there is some identity of
form or gestalt in the objective physical, physiological and
psychological fields.

That the human mentality cannot but work by creating
'wholes' has been impressively demonstrated by the Gestalt
psychologists and if somehow it could also be shown that the
'wholes' or 'forms' of mind are also found in the objective
field then there will be a great advance in the realistic
theory of thinking. It will certainly be an advance over
the idealistic solution, which is more speculative than
empirical. However, Prof. Emmet has shown that the
physiological realism of Gestalt is as yet unproven. It seems
to rest on the doubtful 'copy theory' of truth. Further, its
explanation of conceptual thinking in terms of physiological
gestalt breaks down (1).

"Does 'isomorphism' ask me to believe that when I
formulate an equation $2x + 4 = x + 2$, the variable $x$
is correlated with an indefiniteness in the distribution
of forces in the cerebral field, which indefiniteness
then passes into an equilibrium having the same structure
as that of the force correlative to 2?" (1)

1. The Nature of Metaphysical Thinking pp. 52-55
From the above considerations all that we can say is that human mentality cannot but create forms; and, in creating forms to clarify its nexus of interrelations with the world, it does not reproduce reality. Just as an organism 'transmutes' the food it digests, so human mind transmutes what it receives from the world. Does this mean that there is an unknowable world in itself? That there is a transcendent world, that is, some reality over and above our mind must be conceded. This world floats into us, as we also float into it, and the very condition of its being known is that we have to transmute it. The world so transmuted is a real world and there is no Ding-an-sich behind our knowing it. So we know the transcendent reality in terms of 'forms' or 'symbols', which we project into the world in order to have a successful commerce with it. Even our perception requires a symbol, for it also involves 'meaning' (2). We translate the world through our projective symbols.

"This means that the relation of our perceptual experience to nature should be thought of neither in terms of direct apprehension nor of likeness, but as a highly simplified and abstract 'projection' which nevertheless bears some relation of systematic concomitant variation to the things projected" (3).

Here we are going a long way off the track of Alexander's realistic epistemology, but our concern is not with his epistemology, so much as with the nature of his philosophical construction.

If perception involves meaning and symbols, then a fortiori scientific and metaphysical construction cannot be without them. In sciences we make indirect analogical models to understand the world in rapport with which we find ourselves. The pictorial models were helpful in the past and the mathematical models are popular at the present time, because we have to think of the world in some intelligible models. No doubt the scientific models which we construct are checked by the carefully collected and validated data. Then, again, the model to be scientifically valid, must be helpful in our experimental attack in our field of enquiry. This is another check on the formulation of 'models' in science. 'Mechanism' was a helpful model of the 19th century scientific thinking, as the imagery of a planetary system of an atom is another model of scientific thinking in Physics at the present time.

"But when we turn to other types of interpretative activity expressed through symbolic forms, such as art, religion and the creation of metaphysical theories, the scope for the form-creating powers of thought and imagination is far greater, and the ways in which they may be guided by actual realities to what is other than ourselves are more difficult to discern" (1).

Philosophy takes the whole world for its subject-matter, and yet the whole world can never swim into our experience. However, we have to make an intelligible world-model for ourselves in order to find some relief out of the 'big, blooming, buzzing confusion' in which we are

placed. Reality is not only too large but also too rich for our understanding.

"What we can do, is to isolate some definite part and frame a mental picture of that; or we can try to get a kind of bird's-eye view of the whole as seen from some particular aspect" (1).

Being a 'perspective', any world-picture is but partial, but it cannot be helped. We use a metaphor, a myth, a symbol, a picturesque analogy which has impressed us most and we give a wide generality to it. For example, Darwin found his picture of 'natural selection' from the selective process performed by breeders and he extended it to the whole animal world. Similarly, Newton was struck by the fall of apples and he widened his analogy to the whole realm of the inanimate in the form of the theory of Gravitation.

"Although the likeness of metaphor is drawn from the actual, the pervasive meaning or essence transcends the actual" (2)

The group of facts, from the analysis of which the metaphor or analogy is drawn is described by Pepper, as a root-metaphor.

"What I call the root metaphor theory is the theory that a world hypothesis to cover all facts is framed in the first instance on the basis of a rather small set of facts and then expanded in reference so as to cover all facts. The set of facts which inspired the hypothesis is the original root metaphor" (1).

This is the way, according to Pepper, in which the philosophers have been building their systems, all these years (2). Of course, the length to which a metaphor or

1. Streeter B.H. 'Reality' p. 44; also see p. 56.
2. Ibid. p. 374.
analogy will go depends on the driving power of the original experience, its capacity for inclusiveness and the metaphysician's power of elaborating it in a sustained constructive thought (3).

What the metaphysician does, therefore, is to construct a theoretic model drawn from analogy from some form of intellectual or spiritual relationship which he judges to be especially significant or important” (4).

The truth of the philosophical system, then, depends on its comprehensiveness and natural facility with which it can illuminate certain aspects of reality. By 'comprehensiveness' we mean the largeness of scope or the greater range of consistent description within it. By its 'natural facility' we mean the 'fittingness' or 'appropriateness' with which the metaphor or analogy succeeds in harmonising its data (5). Thus, in this way Plato discovered his metaphysical key in the beauty of 'form', Aristotle in the doctrine of 'horme' drawn from 'the drive to completion found in physiological desire', Descartes found the key idea in co-ordinate geometry and Leibnitz in an algebraic model and Kant in Practical Reason. In the same way Alexander found his key idea in the restlessness of Time of his Space-Time matrix (1).

If the above view of philosophy has some truth, then Alexander was justified in extending and generalising the key ideas of Evolution, Emergence, Nisus and Space-Time. Therefore, the objections of Dean Inge and Sheen, relating to Alexander's use of evolution are not valid. Sheen points out that the extension of scientific procedure to philosophy

contains the fallacy of 'Uniform Method of Science' (2).

He elaborates this objection in the following way:

"Because Time and Space are found to be physical ultimates, does it follow that God is Space-Time, or that Space is His body and Time is His Soul as Professor Alexander would have us believe?" (3).

In the same vein Dean Inge has written:

"The theory of evolution is legitimate when applied to certain parts of the universe, such as the recent history of the species to which we happen to belong. To assume that this local and temporary phenomenon is the primary law of macrocosm is the extreme provincialism" (4).

Prima facie there is nothing wrong in extending a root-metaphor or analogy, for this is what philosophers have been doing until now. But from the validity of the analogical method we cannot also conclude the validity of the actual result which has been achieved by way of extending an analogy to a wide range of facts. The world is too rich and varied to be exhausted by any one metaphor or analogy.

Though an analogy illuminates a certain group of facts, it leaves many other facts in comparative darkness. Prof. Emmet has compared a metaphysical analogy to a Fougasse cartoon.

"Fougasse can convey certain important characteristics of a subject through a very few lines—the tilt of an eyelid, perhaps, or the curve of a neck. There is distortion; there is a high degree of selectivity; there is certainly the artist's personal way of seeing; yet the result conveys an important character of the situation" (1).

In his own personal way then Alexander has shown the significance of creative advance which is found at all levels, and, so far he has illuminated a dark tract of our experience.


But it is quite another question whether this analogy of 'growth' or 'historicity' can be fittingly applied to God. God is certainly found to be working through history, but it is doubtful whether we can think of Him as a process in history. Therefore, we agree with De Burgh when he said the following:

"But it is clear that theology can never join hands with any philosophical system that denies the dependence of temporal happenings on a reality above and beyond time" (2).

To be sure, this extension of Time, Progress and Evolution to the very nature of God is inadequate. However, from this inadequacy it does not follow that it is illegitimate to extend an analogy from its own group of facts to all possible facts. Alexander's analogical reasoning has become inadequate because the analogies are not fitting or appropriate to the religious object. The analogy was quite fitting to bridge the gaps between matter, life and mind, and it did make mechanism obsolete. Like a Fougasse cartoon, the insight of Alexander illuminated this aspect of the total situation. However, no one metaphor or analogy can exhaust the total situation and in many respects the analogical metaphysics of Alexander completely fails to throw light on religious issues. This failure of Alexander's philosophy arises from the fact that it takes its root-metaphor from science. The reason is that philosophy of its very nature is all-comprehensive, for

2. Towards a religious philosophy p. 131
it has to interpret our experiences as a whole. But the Key-concept, with the help of which it co-ordinates all experiences, arises from a favoured perspective of reality. Hence, the interpretative significance of a philosophy is partial, even when it says something about the whole reality. However, philosophers have taken their partial-world-view for the whole. This philosophical despotism has done violence to many aspects of life, but none of them have been more distorted under this faulty Weltanschauung than the experience of religious life. The materialists and the naturalists have thrown doubts on the validity of religious life itself. But even this philosophical tradition would not have become intolerant of religious claims if philosophy of recent years had not been associated with science, and this association with science is the real reason why philosophical analogy of the period concerned fails to illuminate our religious experience.

Metaphysics is poetry but it is an intellectual poetry. This will be maintained by the Logical Positivists too, but in a derogatory sense. We maintain it on the ground that metaphysics gives us an intellectual vision of the transcendent world about us. Metaphysics elaborating different but complementary metaphors, gives us an insight into the world part by part.

"The philosophic vision of one cosmic myth does not destroy that of another. Although the light is not literally of God, it does not fail to be the light of man. Our cosmic faith may be far from the Platonists,
but their cosmic metaphor tells us something not to be forgotten about the poetic philosopher" (1).

But this metaphysical poetry is intellectual in the sense that it includes within it the spirit and conclusions of science, and science has become divorced from that which concerns us most. In other words science deals with impersonal forces which can be understood by intellect and in its one-sided emphasis on this aspect of experience exclusively, it has become negatively oriented to human feelings and emotions. At the present time Logical Positivism, which is permeated with the spirit of science, points out that God and value deal with feelings and emotions and, therefore, they are meaningless problems for the intellect. A philosophy, in the proper sense, according to it, deals with either tautology or empirical propositions. But God positions about God are neither, and therefore all utterances about God are nonsensical (1). Similarly, Prof. Ayer holds that axiological propositions express (and arouse) feeling but as such they do not come within significant propositions (2), and they too, therefore, must be consigned to the class of meaningless propositions. How has this estrangement of philosophy from moral and religious values come about?

A perfect science which is fully aware of its non-scientific basis, and a perfect religion which has learnt to

make full use of scientific application for the edification of human spirit and glory of God, cannot conflict (3). But the scientific world-view has developed its own onesided exclusiveness, and theology too has put forth its exclusiveness as a defensive measure, and, as a result the two streams of thought have come into conflict.

"The scientific spirit and the religious spirit in us are subtly antagonistic and tend to negate one another, so that our capacity for decision and action is paralysed. We cannot surrender either, and the effort to believe in both at once results in our believing effectively in neither" (1).

The fact is that science has been maintained and supported by forces which are not scientific. Human society which has promoted science, for helping to make life tolerable; Science by itself gives us the means for the use of man, and the use of it ultimately depends on the goodness of human nature. Again, science not only is maintained by society, but, further, its chief foundation of disinterested truth and enquiry is not something which can be established by the method of science. However, without its being based on the principle of Truth, science cannot go on. But, ordinarily, philosophers who have made use of scientific conclusions, have ignored the non-scientific basis of science. They have too exclusively concentrated on the results of science. But science has most effectively

1. Laeomurray J. Ibid. p. 32
dealt with non-human materials and therefore, the results of Physics, Chemistry, Astronomy etc., are impersonal. If we erect our philosophy based on the insight of the material world, then this philosophy cannot but give weight to impersonal and non-human considerations. At first the dangers of scientism were not quite apparent. Only in very recent times we are visualising its dangers. Science gives us the means and the powers which can be used well or ill (1). The scientists now are realising the immensely destructive power of hydrogen and atom bombs. If they are not wisely used, they are likely to put an end to the whole civilization which has given birth to science itself. An exclusive attention to scientific development, apart from human values which keep it going, at last has shown its own inner contradiction.

As with the help of his intellect man had built up science, so with the whole weight of his feelings and emotions, he has established his art, literature and religion. Religion is as old as human consciousness. So far man has never been found without some religious belief and practice, that is, he has always been in communion with some supernatural powers around him. Even the cave man had some belief in divine powers and human immortality. It is difficult to ascertain the exact nature of primitive beliefs. Manaism, Totemism and Animism appear to be the early forms of religion and each of these forms has its advocate for maintaining it to

1. Macmurray, J. -Ibid.- pp. 36, 37
be really primitive. Whatever be the most primitive belief, it seems certain that an experience of something felt as mysterious has been at the root of the primitive religious consciousness.

"Religion is verily a universal feature of human culture, not because all societies foster a belief in spirits, but because all recognise in some form or other awe-inspiring, extraordinary manifestations of reality" (1).

Later, the mysterious manifestations become more articulate and gods with distinct personalities came to be worshipped. But in the fully developed religions we find that there is only One Power or Being whom man worships. This awe-inspiring Being is felt to be a Person. Man has found Him helping him in his life's task and calling him to higher destiny.

But, even with the advance of our knowledge of God, His mysteriousness has not decreased. He remains a 'hidden' God and can be described only in telling metaphors. These metaphors are mere symbols which describe Him non-literally. They too are mere representations which are mere 'projections' of human mentality, but they serve to illumine the Transcendent Other as Person. God is described in non-literal symbols as King, Saviour, Father, Friend, Guide and thus forth. When we approach the Other, the Transcendent Reality, with the depth of our whole being, pulsating with emotions and feelings,

1. Lowie R.H. 'Primitive Religion' p. xvi; also see James E.O. "The Concept of Deity" p. 21; Murphy J. 'The Origins and History of Religions' pp. 63, 64.
we find Him expressible only in these and like symbols. There seems to be no reason why these symbols should not be regarded as trustworthy. They do help and guide seekers after the Transcendent Reality. Why should an intellectual approach be raised to the status of our only approach to the Other? The scientists and the philosophers can give us no satisfactory answer to it, seeing that science itself is sustained by faith which is the crystallisation of human feelings and emotions. It is no good logic to accept one product of feelings and emotions as true and reject the other for no reason at all.

With the deepening of religious consciousness man has found not only that he seeks after God, but God too is in search of him. For this reason if man stretches his hands towards God, God too is ready to clasp them. God is then desperately anxious to redeem man, raise him to His Glory so that He may have fellowship with man. A God who is on the look-out for redeeming a soul cannot help revealing Himself to man and declare His ways to him. Through the firmament of His Heavens He has been declaring Himself; through the inspired words of His prophets He has made His ways known to all. But the Earth will pass away and the words will lose their meaning. They are not the perfect mediat. for His expressing Himself to man, but they are progressive in God's revelation of Himself. In the fulness of Time, therefore, in the Person of Jesus, a living manifestation of God became incarnate. There could be no higher medium
of manifestation.

What we want to emphasize is that God has been found to be anxious to reveal Himself and the best medium of His revelation is human personality. Rama.Krishna, Buddha and such persons have been claimed to be the manifestation of God, and therefore, we have to accept in principle that a holy man is the best symbol for revealing God. It is up to the religious consciousness of the world to see whether in the Person of Jesus we have not a very meaningful symbol of God. Jesus, therefore, is a myth, a Symbol, a living 'projection' of man, an abstract notion which has appeared in a concrete medium, a Logos which has become incarnate in the form of a Person.

Thus seen through a history of two thousand years, the historical Jesus, like a perfect work of art, has radiated a significance for man which goes beyond any history. Under the shadows of the Cross, His humble servants have got a glimpse of the long-suffering Love of God. They have passed on their experiences from generations to generations and now they have become codified in the form of religious tradition. Many errors have become corrected through mutual interchange of experiences. This religious tradition might have hardened some prejudices too, but no account of religious life is complete which totally ignores the testimony of this tradition. But we find that Alexander's theology
throws to the wind all the fundamentals of this traditional belief in God. His ground for doing so is not derived from any fresh inspiration drawn from the spring of divine spirit, but is based on the assumptions of philosophy. How has this philosophy become intolerant to this religious tradition?

We have already seen that philosophy arising from science could be onesided only and therefore the philosophical analogy could not illumine the dark tracts of religious experience. Philosophy cannot but be analogical but the spirit of its analogy is that it serves to include everything within it. Any intellectual effort to do full justice to values and religion can be but halting, for it cannot do full justice to that which springs from feelings and emotions. But philosophers at least had the courtesy to recognise that God is also meaningful, even though they could pay only lip service to Him. Thus Aristotle concluded with the notion of God as the Prime Mover of the world. Similarly, Descartes brought in God as a *deus ex machina* to guarantee his criterion of truth and consequently of his ontology. In the same way the God of Spinoza comes to be invested with 'intellectual love' which He is incapable of inspiring. Hence, the God of philosophers is really not worshipful, for He is not invested with personality. But even this grudging lip-service to God was dispensed with in the naturalistic and materialistic philosophy of the 19th century.
The 19th century philosophers saw that God of philosophers is simply a Concept which can be retained or omitted, according to the exigency of a system. A Laplace therefore had no need of that concept. What these philosophers failed to see is the fact that they had not dispensed with the Living and Loving God of religion, but they had rejected only a ghostly concept of God. Anyway the materialists were drunk with the new wine of mechanism. Anything which could not be seen in the form of a machine was discarded as illusory. God certainly could not be fitted into this Procrustean bed of thought and so He was taken to be non-existent. Later, the materialists were successfully opposed by the idealists, but in their zeal they misjudged the real error of the materialists. This error lay in holding that whatever could not be intellectually conceived, could not be held to be real. For the idealists the real is rational and therefore they assumed that the Supreme Reality is an Absolute Mind. However, the idealists like Bradley and Bosanquet frankly saw that their Absolute is not the God of religious worship. From this Alexander should have concluded that philosophy cannot yield the God of religious worship. But in him the totalitarianism of philosophy which he had inherited from the idealists and the materialists persisted in his acceptance of Evolutionary Naturalism. In fact philosophy for him was an all-comprehensive science and so nothing could be omitted from it. According to
the Evolutionary Naturalism of Alexander, Reality is essentially a Growing Movement. If therefore there is a God, then He must be an evolving God, for anything which is not evolving, according to Alexander, is unreal (1). But if there is any reality in religious experience and its tradition then God cannot be an evolving God, for an evolving God is farthest away from a Living and Loving God, Who is also the Creator and Sustainer of the world and of everything in it.

A study of Alexander's theology becomes instructive for it shows that unless a philosophy develop its root-metaphor from religious experience, it cannot do full justice to it. The more a philosophy tries to accommodate itself to science, the farther away it is likely to go from the truth of religious consciousness. Now it is not contended that philosophy should not arise from science, but it is contended that such a philosophy should recognize its limitation and as such should give up its pretensions of explaining religious experience. In modern times, the theory of Evolution has thrown a flood of light on many dark factors of biology, history, anthropology and even on the origin of religion. Further, the development in Physics has led to the view of the world as the organisation of fluent events. If these two findings of Physics and Biology be combined

1. Laird J. H.J. XL 1941-42. P. 148
together, then a world-view will emerge in the form of
process-philosophy, as we find in Alexander, Bergson, Smuts,
Lloyd Morgan and Whitehead. There is little doubt that the
process-philosophy has thrown a great deal of light on facts
which have arisen from the scientific investigation of the
world. At least the crudities of mechano-morphism,
Associationism, Vitalism have been given up. But can it do
full justice to the facts of religious experience? We need
not discuss this question with reference to Lloyd Morgan
for he has frankly 'acknowledged' God in his scheme of
Emergent Evolution. But let us see whether other process-
philosophers have thrown any more light on religious value
than Alexander has done.

The world-view of Smuts starts from the holistic tendency
which is found in all things. He extends this root-metaphor
to the whole universe and with the help of this co-ordinating
analogy tries to refute mechanism and to establish a
harmonious relation between matter, life, mind and personality.
Looked at from this point of view his analogy is illuminating,
but in the last analysis it proves inadequate for religious
values. We can briefly follow the arguments of Smuts in the
following way.

Probably the view of Smuts is nearest to that of
Alexander whom he never mentions. According to Smuts, Activity
in Space-Time is the real ultimate stuff of the world (1).

1. Holism and Evolution p. 336
"The Space-Time continuum, instead of being a vague, homogeneous, formless, metaphysical concept, becomes a part of physical reality, becomes the 'field' of the material world, with a definite structure of its own. Structure, real differentiated structure, becomes the inmost form of the real Space-Time world" (1).

Of course, Smuts had derived this notion from Minkowski (2).

In this Space-Time framework, 'Time integrated with Space is active and creative, and productive of reality' (3). Then, again, the creative evolution is carried on all by itself through its holistic nius (4). Every entity is holistic, from atoms to mind and personality. The only difference between them is one of degree with which 'wholeness' has been achieved. In matter there is much diffusion, and in life or organism, holism becomes quite definite. But in mind and personality, it becomes an independent directive principle.

"It is through a continuous and universal process of whole-making that reality rises step by step, until from the poor, empty, worthless stuff of its humble beginnings it builds the spiritual world beyond our greatest dreams" (5).

If all things are holistic, then there can be no real novelties, for there will be only a difference of degree and not of kind. This is what Smuts does not see, but he had the honesty to confess that matter which gives birth to life and mind cannot be mere matter (1). If it be so, then all things have to be seen in the light of that in which

1. Holism and Evolution p.35. 2. Ibid. p. 29.
3. Ibid. p. 114. 4. Ibid. p. 355. 5. Ibid. p. 110
holism is best manifested and that is mind and personality. Hence, all things become spiritual, differing from another only in degree. But this is what Smuts most emphatically denies.

"To view the ideal or spiritual element in the universe as the dominant factor is to ignore the fact that the universe was before even the ideal or spiritual had appeared on the horizon; that the ideal or spiritual is a new and indeed recent creation in the order of the universe, that it was not implicit in the beginnings and has not been reached by a process of unfolding; but that from a real pre-existing order of things it has been creatively evolved as a new factor; and that its importance to-day should not be retrospectively antedated to a time when the world existed without it" (2).

Not only does Smuts deny the presence of mind at the beginning of the world-process, but he also rules out its possibility at the end of it. He points out that many people believe that there is 'a grand inner Purpose' in the evolutionary 'goings-on' of the world-process; and, if there is a purpose then there must be a Mind behind that purpose (3). Now, the above reasoning by which a supra-mundane Mind or Personality is reached, says Smuts, ignores one important fact:

"Such a 'Personality' would be creatively new and unlike the wholes which we know and which would constitute its parts. It would be as different at least from human Personality as this again is from mere organism. To call such a new Transcendent Whole by the same name as human Personality is to abuse language and violate thought alike" (1)

The existence of God, then, according to Smuts, has to be
proved on another basis (2). Here Prof. Raven comments (3) that Smuts had associated religion with a supernatural and Biblical cosmology. Further, Prof. Raven adds that Smuts was looking forward to rewriting the last chapter of Holism so as to demonstrate that the holistic process had its proper culmination in the integrative energy of the deity (4). We can hardly guess as to what the result could have been. But had deity been made to emerge from the world-process itself, then he would be simply repeating the difficulties of Alexander. God to be properly intelligible must be credited with a separate and distinct individuality of His own, over and above what is revealed of Him through the world-process.

But whatever the conclusion of Smuts might have been, one thing is clear that he wanted to make his Creative Evolution causa sui.

"Behind the evolutionary movement and the holistic field of nature is the inner shaping, directive activity of Holism itself, working through the wholes and in the variations which creatively arise from them" (1).

Finally, at the end of his book, he points out that the holistic nius is the guarantee that Truth, Goodness and Well-Being will not fail.

"The rise and self-perfection of wholes in the Whole is the slow but unerring process and goal of this Holistic universe" (2).

1. Ibid. P. 351; also see pp. 101, 102, 109, 110.
2. Ibid. P. 353nf
Smuts has not been very clear about the nature of this Holistic nexus. Is it intelligent or is it not? If it is an intelligent nexus, then surely it is mind. If it is mind, then there is the Supreme Personality, both at the end and at the beginning of the world-process. But Smuts denies this. Hence, the holistic nexus is blind and unintelligent. If it is blind, then there seems to be no guarantee that the higher whole will continue to emerge and will be sustained. Thus, we find that Smuts simply repeats the fallacy of Alexander. If the holistic nexus be the ground of movement and change, then it alone cannot also be that which makes the emergents emerge. Indeed, in one place Smuts seems to have come to it:

"Real Evolution requires other concepts besides those of action and structure; and these concepts can only be derived from experience. Thus the actual creativeness of Evolution is a conclusion not so much from theory as from empirical facts. And the exact nature of this creativeness is unknown in some respects and remains a problem for the future to solve" (1).

Once again, we come to the conclusion that if we take the categories and conclusion of science as final, then we will get illuminating analogies. However, their scope, adequacy and fittingness will be of limited value. In itself it is not a mean gain. But it must not be allowed to overreach itself. We find that the same observation is applicable to Bergson and therefore let us turn to him.

Bergson and Alexander have a great deal in common. Both of them lay special emphasis on unceasing creativity. If this creativity be conceived in terms of 'matter' and 'form'.

1. Holism and Evolution p. 337.
2. Bergson H. 'Creative Evolution' p. 262
or principle, then we can say that Alexander put special stress on the space-time matrix and his creative principle of 'the restlessness of time' or 'nisus' is vague. This nisus is more assumed than proved. Whereas in Bergson, the principle of creativity comes into the foreground and his 'matter' or 'hyle' is vague.

According to Bergson, the ultimate reality is pure, unceasing activity, creating things for ends which cannot be foreseen in advance. This creative reality called Elan Vital is the source and centre of every creativity in the universe and it may be called God.

"God, thus defined, has nothing of the already made; He is unceasing life, action, freedom. Creation, so conceived, is not mystery; we experience it in ourselves when we act freely" (2).

This God or Elan Vital has been creating along divergent lines of evolution of matter and mind, intellect and intuition, instinct and intelligence. In this creativity Elan Vital has given birth to two kinds of society. For one type of society man was created, and for another kind of society hymenopterous insects were created. The culminating points of divergent lines of evolution of sociability are found in:

"two perfect types of association represented by a society of insects and a human society, the one immutable, the other subject to change; the one instinctive, the other intelligent; the first similar to an organism whose elements only exist in the interest of the whole, the second leaving so wide a margin to the individual that we cannot tell whether the organism was made for them or they for the organism" (1).

1. Morality and Religion p. 96-97
The human society is maintained by intelligent individuals, but by intelligence alone, according to Bergson, society is more likely to be dissolved than maintained. If an individual takes the help of his intelligence then he would tend to be egoistic and not altruistic (2). This observation of Bergson is also supported by the fact that on the basis of rational arguments alone Mill, Bentham and Sidgwick have not been able to make a successful transition from 'each to himself' to 'each for everyone else'.

Then, again, by his intelligence the individual becomes conscious of his death and this idea of the certainty of death is likely to weaken his efforts to maintain his social activities (1). Moreover, mere intellectual calculations can never give him the certainty of his future result. But the social life demands that the individual should not delay and that the activity should be followed up at once. Purely intellectual life then is likely to threaten the building of society. But the continuance of society is the aim of Nature and therefore she has taken precaution to counterpoise the dissolvent tendency of intelligence. At the fringe of intelligence there still lurks a residue of instinct and this residue works indirectly to counterpoise the dissolvent work of intelligence. Since 'intelligence works on representations, "it will call up 'imaginary' ones, which will hold their own against the representation of reality and will succeed through the agency of intelligence itself, in counteracting the work of intelligence" (2).

This calling up of images through the indirect working of the residue of lurking instinct at the fringe of intelligence is called Myth-making. Religion arises from this myth-making. As soon as an individual attempts to work for his egoistic pleasure only, the myth of deity springs up, who is going to prohibit, prevent and punish it (3) and thus the egoistic activity is thwarted. Similarly, when the vision of inevitable death springs up to weaken social effort, there arises the image of immortality after death and this strengthens the individual in his social efforts (4). Again, when the uncertainty of a calculated result is likely to thwart the individual in his social activity, the image of benign powers, who are represented to help him in giving him success, arise in him, and as such he is emboldened in his social effort (1). Looked at from these points of view we can say that religious myths are defensive reactions against the representation, by the intelligence, of a depressive margin of the unexpected between the initiative taken and the effect desired, of the inevitability of death and similar dissolvent tendencies of intelligence.

For Bergson myth-making is not a nonsensical process. It is essentially a creative and constructive process, which is found in art, literature and science as well (2). But it works with exceptional force in religion (3). However, a religion of myth-making can hold a society intact, but in order to make it progressive and creative, it will have to
pass on to mystic religion. Mysticism consists in at least partial coincidence with the cosmic creative force, the Elan Vital or God Himself (4). Diving deep into the very current of life, the mystic is filled up with vast force and he radiates an extra-ordinary energy, daring and power of conception and realisation (5).

"Creation will appear to him as God undertaking to create creators, that he may have, besides himself, beings worthy of his love" (6)

The mystic, filled with immense creative vitality, tries to carry humanity to its higher goal. The direction of the mystic's activity

"is exactly that of the vital impetus; it is this impetus itself, communicated in its entirety to exceptional men, who, in their turn would fain impart it to all humanity, and by a living contradiction change into creative effort that created thing which is a species, and turn into movement what was, by definition, a stop" (1).

This Elan Vital which communicates its energy and direction to the mystic is love and it aims at creating beings worthy of being loved (2). This divine love is not simply a thing of God, but it is God Himself (3).

"It is upon this point that the philosopher must fasten who holds God to be a person, and yet wishes to avoid anything like a gross assimilation with man" (4).

Thus, Bergson, the mystic metaphysician, ends his speculative career in religious mysticism. But does he succeed in doing so? Is there a passage from Elan Vital as creative energy to creative Love which is God Himself?

If God is Love, then He has a personality and will. As such He cannot be equated with Elan Vital which is simply a blind, creative energy. Then, again, if God is a person then there cannot be complete immanence of His Being in the world. But if God is Elan Vital then He cannot but be an immanent God only. Bergson somehow does not raise such problems. Mysticism will have a place in any genuine religious life, but the absorption into the creative current is only half the story. Bergson does not fully develop the logic of his mysticism and dwells only on the creativity of the religious mystic. This, again, makes him inconsistent with the major assumption of his 'Creative Evolution'. After all, practical activity marks the life of Intellect and not of Intuition. Delving deep, through intuition, into eternal Duration one becomes a limpid flowing current, and feeling one's unison with Elan Vital one cannot enter into the social activity of a reformer.

The inner contradiction between Bergson's philosophy and theology conclusively shows that religion can deal with the Supreme Reality only as a Personality. But the philosophy of Bergson, drawing its inspiration from Biology, could not help becoming impersonal. The philosophy of Bergson has illumined an important tract of experience and shown a true way through its criticism of mechanical evolution. But consistently with the main spirit of his philosophy he could not throw light on our religious
experience. Probably he himself realised this, and therefore he could not help conceiving God as Love, in order to do full justice to the nature of religious object. But if God is Love then He cannot be identified with impersonal Plan Vital. After all, the thinking of a truly great philosopher is always instructive, perhaps, more in its errors than in its success. We see the way which his thinking has illuminated and we also begin to have some faint glimpse into the darkness which it has left unilluminated. If the philosophy of Bergson is true, then his theology is faulty; and, if his theology is true then his philosophy is inconsistent with it.

In recent time, most probably, the highest synthesis of matter and form, metaphysics and religion, has been reached by Whitehead. His system no doubt arises from metaphysical description and he extends the descriptive analogy to other fields of experience.

"A metaphysical description takes its origin from one select field of interest. It receives its confirmation by establishing itself as adequate and as exemplified in other fields of interest" (1).

Like Alexander, Whitehead accepts a fluent world, which however, is experienced by us as extension both in time and space. But by an analysis of this experienced extension, we come to actual entities or occasions, as the limiting instance of it (2). An actual entity is spatially and temporally atomic. Its reality lies in its becoming and

2. Whitehead A. N. 'Process and Reality' p. 24
perishing. It 'cannot have any external adventures, but only the internal adventure of becoming. Its birth is its end' (3). But these actual entities interpenetrate one another and therefore the world is one continuum. So far, the actual entities are the analogues of Alexander's point-instants.

These actual entities, interpenetrating one another, keep on creating new events and in the creation of even one event the whole participates. It should be admitted of course that every entity is not equally important in the birth of an event in the same way, for if it were so, then there would be mere repetition and there would be no novelty, variety and real creation. Hence, some actual entities are more directly related than others in the production of an event. But here Whitehead diverges from Alexander. Alexander tried to deduce the categories or forms too, from the Space-Time matrix, and even considered it as a point of superiority to the construction of whitehead. Whitehead, on the other hand, believes that there are 'eternal object' or 'potentials' or 'forms' or 'possibles' (1), which are prior to the actual events. In this supposition, whitehead accepts the tradition of Plato. The actual entities can be formed variously, but there are a few possible forms in which they can be realised. Here he comes to the conception of Leibniz, with whose thinking he has a great deal in common. The actual entities,

3. Ibid. p. 111.
with the help of eternal objects can be actualised in a concrete event. This is called by Whitehead 'Ingression'.

"The term ingress here refers to the particular mode in which the potentiality of an eternal object is realised in a particular actual entity contributing to the definiteness of that actual entity" (2).

With the help of actual entities and eternal objects, we can explain the movement and even new creations in the world. But Whitehead saw that without God, the order and hierarchy of new emergents cannot be explained. He therefore points out that it is God who ultimately determines in what manner actual entities are going to be moulded into new events. He therefore is the final 'principle of concretion' (1).

"There remain the inexhaustible realm of abstract forms, and creativity, and God, upon whose wisdom all forms of order depend" (2).

Hence, we have to find out the nature of God who is the real author of concrescence. The God of Whitehead can be looked at from two viewpoints, namely, as 'the Primordial non-temporal entity' or as He is in His 'consequent nature'.

So far we have seen that there is Creativity in the world and the actual entities are the first creatures. Then there are ideal forms, which are real but not actual. They are actualised on the epochal occasions of concrescence, when they ingress into actual entities. However, the eternal objects before they are actualised, form a logically inter-related harmonious system of potentials. Then, again, according to Whitehead, nothing can be real without its

2. Ibid. p. 31
subjective pole. Therefore, the totality of eternal objects implies some real experience in which it is felt, grasped and synthesized.

"This ideal world of conceptual harmonization is merely a description of God himself. Thus the nature of God is the complete conceptual realization of the realm of ideal forms" (3).

As the eternal objects are prior to the actual events, so God, the realization of eternal forms is the Primordial non-temporal reality (1). In this non-temporal primordial form, God is the antecedent ground Who conditions every creative act (2).

But God is not only prior to but is also the companion of the world. When eternal objects descend or ingress into actual entities, leading to conoresence, they give rise to conscious experience in God. This conscious experience is complete for each actual entity is seen in the light of all eternal objects in their harmony, for it is what God is. God, in this aspect, is a concrete realization of all possibilities in which any actual event takes place. This aspect of God is the 'consequent nature' of God. In the consequent nature of God not only eternal objects are realized in all possible forms through all actual events, but the flux of actual events is also eternalised through ideal forms. In this sense God saves the world from its utter destruction.

2. Ibid. P. 154.
If we keep in view the two aspects of God, as the Primordial non-temporal reality and the 'consequent nature' of God, then the following paradoxical statements can be made about God. These paradoxes have been regarded by Stebbing (3) as the result of careless and unclear thinking on the part of Whitehead. But they seem to harmonise the conflicting ideas of God which have never been so harmonised before. Whitehead has expressed his paradoxical statements about God in the following way:

"It is as true to say that God is permanent, and the world fluent, as that the world is permanent and God is fluent. It is as true to say that God is one and the world many, as that the world is one and God many. It is as true to say that in comparison with the world, God is actual eminently, as that in comparison with God, the world is actual eminently. It is as true to say that God transcends the World, as that the World transcends God. It is as true to say that God creates the World, as that the World creates" (1).

From many points of view the philosophy of Whitehead has been considered to be the final intellectual achievement in the first quarter of the 20th century concerning the main currents of thought and it is hoped that many centuries to come will profit from it (2). It has thrown new illumination on the theory of knowledge, ontology and even theology. But it is doubtful whether this philosophy of Whitehead can deal with the God of religion satisfactorily. His two aspects of God may be the ultimate philosophical vision, but they do not articulate the significance of the God of religion.

3. Mind 1930. P. 475
2. The Philosophy of A.N. Whitehead. P. 14
God, as the Primordial non-temporal actuality is just an abstraction, at most 'the Good' of Plato; and, God in His 'consequent nature' is nothing but the self-realised Absolute of Hegel. The fact is that the Transcendent Reality may have a nexus of relation with us either in the form of I-It or I-Thou, as Buber has pointed out. Science and philosophy based on science, as the process-philosophy is, deal with Reality in I-It aspect and as such they cannot illumine the dark spots of religious experience. In our religious encounter with Reality we discover a Person and Reality appears to us in the inter-relationship of I-Thou.

"In religion it is the mutuality between self and another self which is the object of reflection. The universal, therefore, must be a universal person to whom the self stands in universal relation" (1).

It seems, therefore, (quite contrary to what Alexander supposed) that there is a complete break between philosophy and theology. As a defensive measure against the excess of contemporary philosophy there is a Barthian theology of the Transcendent Word of God. According to this theology, God is given in revelation and this revelation is made possible through faith. But this faith again is but a gift of Grace from God. Stated thus faith has nothing in common with the rational process of philosophy. But can human mind keep religion and philosophy in water-tight compartments? We have to accept that both of them are partial insights into

1. Macmurray J. 'The Structure of Religions Experience' pp. 53-54, also pp. 52, 32.
reality from their different perspectives. Both of them are analogical penetration into the transcendent world. We need therefore a grand analogy to do justice to both aspects of the situation. At present there is a great deal of emphasis on science, but the scientific thinking has reached its logical crisis in relation to the nature of laws of the microscopic world.

"Nor has the real scope and contribution of psycho-analysis yet been determined; nor that of the new border-line sciences of life, such as biochemistry and biophysics; nor is it clear what are the dominant ideas which are to express man's life in society" (1).

Therefore at this time of thought-crisis, Prof. Toynbee looks forward to religion to give the lead. In his extensive survey of the world history, in the end, religion stands in the centre. He writes:

"I have come back to a belief that Religion holds the key to the mystery of existence;——" (2)

But this religion should be as catholic in spirit as that of the Indians, and he adds,

"that this catholic minded Indian spirit is the way of salvation for human beings of all religions in an age in which we have to learn to live as a single family if we are not to destroy ourselves" (3).

1. Emmet D.M. 'The Nature of metaphysical Thinking' p. 219
3. Ibidé p. 6. col. 5.
3. Ibidé p. 6. col. 5.

Of course, the Transcendent Reality is the One which all religious mystics experience and try to describe. Here lies the catholicity of Religion. But one can see Him only from his perspective and in doing so he cannot but be partial. Hence, there is a great room for sharing one's experience with others, and no one can claim an exclusive perspective for himself. After all, our religious experience is of a Person who contains the supreme meaning of our lives. Any perspective which gives us a glimpse of this has to be respected. However, in the vast democracy of religious
We have seen that in general philosophy of nearly the past one hundred years has tended to be totalitarian and as such it has ignored religious values. The philosophy of Alexander too shares the limitation of his philosophical climate. It was a common belief that philosophy determines the nature of religious thinking and Carr wrote in the following manner:

"The problem of religion and ethics in modern thought is not, as I conceive it, to harmonize natural science with the old religious concepts, but to reform our concept of God in accordance with our progress in interpreting our knowledge of the physical world" (1)

When Alexander wanted to determine the reality of God on the basis of his philosophy, then he was simply unconsciously doing what others were doing for so many years. Now we realize that the god of philosophers can only be a concept, but not a Person and as such He ceases to be a religious reality (2). Archbishop Temple says the same thing when he points out that Natural Theology:

perspectives some are more important than others. It has also to be realised as such and should not be lost sight of in the interest for excessive zeal for catholicity.
2. Thus stated, it appears as an illegitimate dichotomy, for it might be contended that there may be a philosophy which uses its key-concept from a religious perspective and as such it can yield a God as a Person. However, philosophy as philosophy can deal only with literal symbols and literal symbols cannot describe the God of religion. Neti, neti (not this, not this) is the only way in which philosophy can describe God. However, a philosophy with its key-concept drawn from religious perspective cannot prove wholly negative to religious values.
"May assure him (the natural theologian) that there is a God who both claims and deserves his worship; it may bid him to seek that God and the way to worship Him; but it cannot confront him with the God whom it describes. It can only discuss God; it cannot reveal Him" (1).

Further, we have to realise that God cannot be equated with the world-process, neither in the idealistic nor in the naturalistic way. The world depends on God and may even be conceived to be realising some divine plan, but God exists over and above, though also within the world (1). Thus, giving the modern version of the orthodox Christian doctrine of Trinity Prof. Raven writes:

"This threefold hypothesis is plainly consonant with the belief that there are three modes of being in the deity, God experiences as the source and ground of all existence, God manifested in the creation and development of the universe, the educative Logos of the Greek Fathers, and God immanent in His creatures as 'life-giver' and inspiration" (2).

Alexander pointed out that in God there are many histories and that He is not exhausted in any history, but he did not point out that He is also beyond history. This raises the ticklish problem of time in relation to the eternal order in God.

Whether we agree with Alexander or not, we have to accept the reality of Time. Science, with its emphasis on the principle of growth and general dynamism, has taught us to treat Time as the supreme category of our experience.

"Not only the realm of human agency, individual and social, but that of organic life, and even of inanimate nature, is historical" (3).

1: Raven C.E. Natural Religion and Christian Theology p.144
3: De-Burgh G: 'Towards a Religious Philosophy' p.103
Then, again, we acquire knowledge in time and perform our duties as a temporal creature, and, therefore, from our practical point of view, the reality of time cannot be ignored. But above all in religion the reality of time has to be accepted. All great historical religions of the world are interested in the historical events which gave birth to them. Lord Buddha, the prophet Mohammed and Jesus Christ were all historical figures. But Christianity is uniquely interested in the historicity of Jesus, for He happened as a culmination of the historical process of revelation through the prophets, and lives as such in His believers. We further, believe that Life and Death of Crucifixion of Jesus did matter to God (1). Therefore Dr. Burgh rightly points out the following truth:

"The religious consciousness, whether taken in its primary form of intuition or in that of the conceptual interpretations of theology, holds firmly, for all its assurance of eternity, to the reality of the temporal process. If Time be an illusory appearance, religion is robbed of its incarnational principle, and the gulf between God and man remains unbridged" (2)

Similarly, Prof. Webb whilst discarding the notion of an evolving God as religiously unsatisfactory, remarked that the doctrine of an eternally perfect God "has notoriously been found hard to reconcile with such essential features, not indeed of all religions, but certainly of Christianity, as the assignment of a high spiritual significance to an historical process of revelation, the recognition of a discriminating providence in the lives of nations and of individuals, and the determination of the eventual position of individuals

in the universe by their moral conduct during their lives" (1).

As such Webb advises the theologians to revise their conception of God's eternity and His relation to Time: in view of the creative evolution advanced by Alexander (2).

Alexander shared with Bergson the vision of Reality as Temporal. With the reality of Time, the older notion of a mechanical evolution of the universe has been shown to be untenable and the concept of 'life' has come to the forefront. In this sense, materialism has shown to be false. Then, again, the feature of novelty and creativity has been given due share. Further, it is in harmony with the developments in physics. By taking Time seriously Alexander has thrown a flood of light on many problems of philosophy. But the historicity of things, not only gnaws into the future but it also swells with the accretions of the past. In his zeal for the 'historicity of things', Alexander has ignored the conservation of the past, especially of religious history and tradition. He has proposed a view of God which is not one of evolution, but of revolution. It arises no doubt from the past, but 'it breaks, in effect, with every great historical religion' (3). God cannot be conceived as 'becoming' only, apart from His nature of 'being'.

"However, to speak of a 'becoming' God disrupts the balance between dynamics and form and subjects God to a process which

has the character of a fate or which is completely open to the future and has the character of an absolute accident. In both cases the divinity of God is undermined. The basic error of these doctrines is their metaphysical-constructive character. They apply the ontological elements to God in a non-symbolic manner and are driven to religiously offensive and theologically untenable consequences" (1).

If God is eternal and yet history does make a difference to Him, then how are the two going to be reconciled? De Burgh points out that their relation baffles our understanding (2). Concerning this baffling problem, a great deal of light has been thrown by Archbishop William Temple, even when he does not regard his solution as more than being suggestive. He points out that the life and Crucifixion of Jesus did make a significant change in the manner and content of God's revelation to man (3). But this change in Him is in His action and Self-manifestation but not in His essence or being. His Personality is qualitatively unchanged, for His love for the redemption of man remains unchanged. In this sense, we can say that the 'eternal is the ground of the historical, and not vice versa; but the relation is necessary, not contingent----------essential, not incidental' (4).

It is essential so far as the self-communicativeness of God to man is concerned. But once we try to press the point of essentiality and necessity of self-communicativeness of God through Historical Revelation, we come to the idealistic view of the Hegelians. But we have seen that God cannot be

wholly entangled in the world process. How, then, can the temporal and eternal be reconciled in God, for God is immutable and yet purposive, self-sufficient and yet loving and is being touched by response to His love? (1)

The fact is that in religious experience time is left behind and we are left with a beatific vision of a timeless reality. The bumpings of life cease, journeys end, tears are washed away and the weary are at rest. Then, Time puts on the garment of eternity. The pearl of great price is possessed and who cares for the labours and uncertainties which led up to it. Thus eternity is won in this very life, for the Nirvana of the Buddhist or Jivanmukti (i.e. deliverance in this life) of the Vedantins, are realities in this very earthly frame. Quoting the famous saying of Schleiermacher, Dean Inge wrote thus:

"In the midst of finitude to be one with the infinite, and every moment to be eternal, this is the immortality of religion" (2).

Hence, eternity is a concept of value, meaning and significance. In this sense, a lily of a day is fairer far in May than an oak standing for three hundred years, and being 'fair' it packs years in its moments. Similarly, the intellectual love of God is felt sub specie aeternitatis, for this love is a thing of great value and to feel it is to be liberated from the thraldom of Time. In this beatific

2. God and Astronomers p. 298
vision of God, all passions are subdued and all harsher voices are hushed in the harmony of God-consciousness. Even the self is left behind, as the Indian sages taught, or as St. Paul said:

"I am crucified with Christ; nevertheless I live; yet not I, but Christ liveth in me: " (1).

But is this view of eternity peculiar to religious experience alone? No, as Green pointed out, knowledge and morality, both have an element of timelessness.

"The pursuit of knowledge and the moral life are temporal processes; truth is discovered, duty done, in a succession of historical acts. But both imply what is above and beyond Time. Take the judgments; its content involves universals, " (2).

Of course, Alexander explained the universal in terms of actual point-instants. But we have already seen that he could do so only by ending up in metaphors (-), which evade rather than solve the problem. Besides, he explained the value of Truth, Beauty and Goodness, by discarding every absolute standard. However, if we begin with the de-valuing of value, then nothing remains. No, not even the philosophy of no-value, for ultimately it also rests on the value of Truth. If salt loses its savour then with what can it be salted? But if we grant that there is value, then we have to accept that the contemplation of value is of something which is timeless. Now the creation of value involves time, it continues in time, and even the psychological process i


x. Where 'literal' thinking is required.
involved in its enjoyment is a real duration, but the content of value which is contemplated is timeless.

If religious experience is of value and if the contemplation of value is timeless, then the baffling relation of Time and Eternity at least becomes partially intelligible. God is felt in our religious experience as a thing of great value, and therefore, the religious tradition represents Him as Timeless and eternal, and it does ignore Time and history (1).

Nevertheless, God cannot be a static reality and the worship of Him cannot be a tiresome hymn of praise. If Jesus be taken to have revealed Him, then God is to be pictured as one who is working out His plans.

"My Father worketh hitherto, and I work" (2).

Jesus, before He went out in His ministry, toiled with His horny hands and His ministry, as St. Mark saw, consisted in doing good to the people. If God works, then Time is the very condition in which higher values take shape (3). For this reason Plato in his TIMAEUS, as Dean Inge reminds us, and St. Augustine, regarded Time and the world to have been created together. If the world is a creation and a work of art, then like all other works of human artistic creation it requires time. This also answers the puzzling question as to why God did not make human beings perfect. Well, this violates the law of the creation of Goodness. A good and religious life require time in which our wills have to be

voluntarily surrendered in His 'ocean flow', so that they may 'fuller and richer be'. For this reason, the idea of Creation and Judgment has been symbolically introduced to give to our life a dramatic colouring. Therefore, even the life of God, which we can hardly know, cannot be without some act and act requires time.

"On a higher level is the doubt whether any sempiternal existence, apart from creative activity, can possess any value or fulfill any purpose" (1).

Then, again, if man is caught up in the current of spiritual flow, then he ceases to be a mere passive vessel. As Bergson pointed out, the great mystic because of his Heavenly vision becomes a great social reformer. A Buddha comes out of his life of meditation and preaches to the people; a Shankar travels all over India in order to re-establish Hinduism; The Galilean fishermen are transformed into the catchers of men; a faint-hearted Peter is made to bear witness before kings and princes, and a Saul is changed into Paul. A vision of God liberates the hidden energies in all of us for great deeds. How much more dynamism must be in Him whose vision makes a lame walk and a dumb speak.

As noted earlier a work of art is planned and executed in time, but when we contemplate it in terms of its value, we forget this time-factor. God is also a Creator, whose works of beauty are in the starry heavens, round ocean, rosy-fingered dawn and gorgeous sunset; whose music we hear in the quiet murmurs of rivers, chirping of birds and the silent harmony of spheres; whose great drama is enacted

1. Inge w.k. Op. Cit. p. 294
in the lives of men who are gradually elevated from their animal existence into the stature of gods and angels. God, therefore, has to be pictured 'in act' and so pictured He executes His plans in Time. Thus Dean Inge put it:

"Plotinus says plainly that without the world of becoming the spiritual world would not be 'in act' — it would not be actualised" (I).

Thus, a life of religion does not ignore Time, but God as a thing of quality and supreme value is pictured as Timeless. We think of Him as Love and love triumphs over the accidents of death and as such He comes to be described as Eternal Now, the silent ocean without the ripples, the same to-day, to-morrow and always. If it is so, then the analogy drawn from religious experience will be one of eternity. 'A thing of beauty is a joy for ever and it will never pass into nothingness'. Can God be described in terms less than this? But time also exists in God, not as an accident but as an essential medium in which His plans take shape and fruition. However, this medium cannot outline the nature of Him in which it exists. The concept of a God who is in the process of Time, takes away the very meaning of Time itself and history becomes a mere accident, for then it will have no end to subserve.

It is true that if we extend the analogy of scientific Time into God, then it fails to throw any light on our religious experience and here lies the inadequacy of Alexander's analogy. But certainly Time can be taken

\[1, \text{Op. Cit. p. 266}\]
seriously in religion and that means that as religious men we have to transform this world into a habitation of men who will love one another. This vision of the religious seers has been dimmed by the rise of industrial revolution and consequent consciousness of nationalism. Communism in its own perverted vision tries to establish a common brotherhood of men by means of forced political regimentation. It is doubtful whether men can be forced to love one another, but the triumph of communism means the failure of religious men who have not risen up to give a concrete shape to the vision of a 'kingdom of ends', where men will be respected as brothers on equal footing. To take time seriously in religion means to complete the plan of God as we see it through our religious tradition. For a Christian it means the seeing the plans of God through the events of Calvary and not proving disobedient 'unto the heavenly vision'.

CONCLUSION: We have come to the end of our study of Alexander's philosophy and theology. There is hardly any significant detail of his epistemology, ontology and theology with which we have not shown our disagreement, but there is hardly any element in his thought which can be totally discarded. His neo-realism is not acceptable to us because it ignores the creative and constructive role of sense-organs and mental processes; but no epistemological theory is credible to us which does not include an empirical truth in it.
We rejected the Space-Time matrix, for it accounts for the movement but it does not explain the progressiveness and hierarchical order of the universe. But surely no world system can be erected at the present time which ignores the historicity and creativity in the universe. Negatively, the creative and dynamic nature of the Space-Time matrix has made mechanism and materialism false and they can never raise their heads again, at least in their older forms. Then, again, we have protested vehemently against the conception of an evolving God. But there can be no theology which can afford to neglect the task of self-improvement of individuals and to fulfil in history the great task of transforming the world into a fit habitation for men to live in. These are some of the great lessons which we learn from a study of Alexander and we can say of him what he said of Spinoza, that 'a great man does not exist to be followed slavishly, and may be more honoured by divergence than by obedience' (1).

Indirectly, the study of Alexander has shown to us the drawback of the great philosophical tradition of the 19th century, both as Evolutionary Naturalism and Objective Idealism: A philosophy is simply a synoptic vision, but it is an intellectual poetry and cannot be treated as a science. As a synoptic vision it has its focus as well as its fringe. As such it illuminates a certain aspect and relatively ignores the rest. In its joy of creativity, in its ecstasy of vision, it ignores those other aspects which have been illuminated by other visionaries. Here lies the danger of dogmatism.

1. F.L.L. p. 364-5
partiality and philosophical idolatry. Of late, the synoptic vision of philosophers has its locus in science and it has done much to illuminate our experiences which have their appropriate home in science. But comparatively it has ignored the religious vision of value and of Holiness and of Reality as a Personality. On the other hand, the theologians, as a defensive measure against the corrosive influence of anti-religious philosophy, have erected a Transcendental Theology. This has nothing in common with the process philosophy with which we have dealt. We need a vision which will do much to balance the onesidedness of both claims. Ultimately, it is the common field of social life in which the two visions have to intermingle. The vision of a scientific philosophy will help men to make increasing use of science, and a vision of a Loving God will help men to transform this vale of tears and sorrows into a heaven of bliss and joy.

Further, Alexander has endeavoured to show that reality is a progressive process. Therefore, new emergents will keep on arising in it. But there can be no emergent without its deity. So deity is implicated in empirical existence itself. Of course, Alexander could not establish the progressiveness of reality, but there can be no doubt that by stressing the progressiveness of Space-Time, he wanted to show that deity is rooted in reality itself. And no religious thought can afford to ignore this contribution of Alexander to theology.
Again, Alexander showed that human beings belong to a progressive series and as long as there is progressiveness in it, they will continue to think of and worship God. This craving for God, according to Alexander, is most helpful and necessary for creating higher entities in the universe, and cannot be brushed aside as useless. In a way the craving for God, being caused by the world-nisus, lies at the root of maintaining all that is valuable for the past, present and future of human beings. If it is so, then Alexander's theory supports the importance and urgency of religious craving. However, he maintained that we feel God as we feel air, but we do not know anything of Him. Here Alexander has remained satisfied with an under-statement of the religious situation to avoid the pitfalls of 'over-beliefs'. However, even if this much be accepted by all, then at least the mutual exclusiveness and intolerance of different faiths will be avoided. Nevertheless, this agnosticism cannot be sustained in our religious practice. We do have some knowledge of God as a living Person. At least we can say that we can see the face of God darkly, but we cannot declare Him to be an object of pure nescience. We learn once more that philosophy, however sympathetic may be to religion, can give us only a concept of God, but not a living and loving God.

Then, again, Alexander saw that religious knowledge, enshrined in the holy texts, consists of non-literal symbols and myths, but he failed to see that these myths are the only
way in which we can say something about God. In science we
do no more. In science the representative symbols help us to
have a successful attack on the problem in the field of
enquiry and they help us to formulate a law with which we
can have a practical commerce with the world. In religion
too, with the help of myths, our heart and soul are
elevated and hidden energy is released. The reality of
myths depends on the power of evoking all that is best in
us. Without this power a myth loses its usefulness; and,
any lip-service to it is mere idolatry.

If, therefore, Alexander has not given us the right
answers, at least he has put the right questions and as
such he has pointed the directions in which our search has
to be made. In this respect he will be regarded as a leader
in our world of thought. His system of thought, with its
boldness, breadth and tenacity has shown the adventure of
human spirit in its quest of the unknown depth. Even when
we cannot go to the whole length of his thought, we cannot
fail to be struck by its vigour and by plunging in it we feel
ourselves refreshed.
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