AL-JUWAYNI

AND

HIS DOCTRINE OF THE ORIGINATION

OF THE WORLD

by

Fawzia Hussein Mahmoud

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Department of Arabic,

University of Edinburgh

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At a certain period in the history of Islamic thought, dogmatic theology (Kalâm) received the full attention of the most brilliant of Muslim scholars. This happened at a time when purely intellectual sciences had appeared on the Islamic horizon, and opponents of Islām were using these as a weapon against the faith. These factors made Muslim scholars very keen to expound religious truth and support it by rational arguments and proofs, and obliged them to probe into what they called (kalâm).

In this way they hoped to repair the breach caused by the followers of other religious and intellectual sciences. Their work was zealous and thorough. They composed many lengthy volumes. Most of these were intended to refute and silence their opponents.

One of these Mutakallimûn was Imām al-Ḥaramayn, whose fame spread far and wide among his contemporaries and successors, and the perplexed have sought in his works the answers to most of their difficulties.

When we examine the works of Imām al-Ḥaramayn, we find him pointing out, with sound logic, the weaknesses of the views held by the various sects which then existed and brilliantly supporting Islamic beliefs against the opinions of those who
were trying to belittle the tenets of the sunnis. This is why I chose Imam al-ṣanāma'īn as the subject of my thesis, Imam al-ṣanāma'īn who was a guardian of Islamic sciences, zealous in the service of Islam, and encyclopaedic in the range of his interests. I have tried to trace his public and private life and to survey his work in the various religious sciences. I have also tried to study his writings on the origination of the world (Rudāth al-‘Alam) in which he tries to prove that the world has a creator. Further I have added an edition of a work of his, Luma‘ al-Adillah fi Gawa‘id ‘Aqīd ‘Ahl al-Sunnah wa-Jam‘ah, which is still in manuscript form.

My warm thanks are due to Dr. W. Montgomery Watt for having agreed to supervise my study. I am very grateful for his assistance in finding the correct terminology in many parts of my work. I would also record my gratitude for his encouragement at all times.

I wish to thank also Dr. Pierre Cachia, Lecturer in Arabic at Edinburgh University, for helping me to express myself in more fluent English than I should ever have been able to write unaided; and Mr. J.R. Walsh, Lecturer in Turkish at Edinburgh University, for kindly reading the manuscript.

I am much indebted to the librarians in the
National Egyptian Library, the Institute of the Revival of Ancient Manuscripts of the States of the Arab League, Cairo University Library and Edinburgh University Library, Al-Aphar Library, for the trouble which they took in making available to me the works which were used in the preparation of this thesis.

Fawzia Hussein Mahmoud.
### List of Abbreviations

The Qur’an (Egyptian edition). (When Flügel’s numbering of a verse differs, it is put after a stroke.)

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<td>Ibn Taqîrî Barî</td>
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THE TEXT

Introduction

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PART I

AL-JUNAYNİ
PART I

AL-JUWAYNI

Introduction: Sources for the Biography

Of the classical writers who write about al-Juwayni, some were contemporaries, others lived a century or more later. The oldest biography is ‘Abd al-Ghāfir’s. It is to be found in two books. The first is Tabyin Kaḍḥīb al-Muṭafī fī mā Musībā ilā Abī-l-Ḥasan al-Asḥaḡ, by Ibn ‘Asḵir ad-Dīmīṣqī [d. 571 A.H., 1175 A.D.]. The second is Kitāb Tabaqāt ash-Shāfi‘yāh al-Kubra, by as-Subkī [d. 781 A.H., 1379 A.D.]

Ibn ‘Asḵir ascribes this biographical notice to Abu-l-Ḥasan, but that is the Kunyah of ‘Abd al-Ghāfir. This material is of great value, because ‘Abd al-Ghāfir was one of al-Juwayni’s disciples, and lived with him. Thus he records many details about the circumstances of his life and manners.

As-Subkī says about this notice: "It contains most of the details of al-Juwayni’s life."


'Abd-al-Ğafir spoke about al-Juwaynī’s birth, the first period of his life, his manners, character and practical achievements, his love of study and power in debate, his life in Naysābūr and elsewhere, his works, and the high regard in which he was held by his people throughout his life and after his death.

Important as this biography is, the scholar must compare it with other biographies; and as it does not contain any details about the political, religious and cultural circumstances of his age, he must refer to historical works and to those which contain details about sects.

Each of the two books in which this biography is to be found has its value, although the author of the first one, Ibn ʿAsākir, did not add much to what ʿAbd-al-Ğafir had said. Yet he is a valuable source, being one of the oldest writers. The second, as-Subkī, mentions many additional incidents of al-Juwaynī’s life, and this renders his work important. He begins with the praise of al-Juwaynī by his contemporaries, and speaks of the good reputation he had among them; then he gives some details about the first period of his life and about his teachers, which are not in at-TeVīn.

3. Ibid., p. 219.
4. Ibid., p. 251.
He also gathered from different sources, many details about al-Juwayni's father; the veneration al-Juwayni had for some of his teachers; his opinion about "al-Kalām" at the end of his life; and what some great scholars thought of him. He mentions what adh-Dhahabi says of al-Juwayni, which is not complimentary. He speaks about the problem of al-Istirsāl, and two debates between him and al-Shirāzi which took place when the latter came to Naṣībatūr, the first on "al-Ijtihād fi 'l-Qiblah", the second on the marriage of the virgin.

There are other biographies detailed hereunder in their chronological order:

Kitāb Dumyat al-Qaṣr wa 'Aqrat-Ahl-al-'Aqr, written by Abū 'l-Ḥasan 'Alī ibn 'l-Ḥasan al-Bakharzī [d. 549 A.H. 1154 A.D.]

Kitāb al-Muntaqim fi Tārikh al-Mulūk wa'l-Umān, by 'Abd al-Raḥmān ibn 'Alī ibn Muḥammad ibn 'Alī ibn al-Jawzī. [d. 597 A.H., 1200 A.D.]

Kitāb Wafayāt al-A'yān, by Ibn Khallikān [d. 681 A.H., 1282 A.D.]

Kitāb Siyar Aʿlām al-Muballāk, by Al-Ḥaft Shams al-Dīn abd 'Abd Allāh Muḥammad ibn ʿAbdAllāh ibn ʿUthmān ibn Qaymāz al-Turkumānī, ʿAbd-Dimashqī, known by the name of adh-Dhahabi [d. 748 A.H., 1347 A.D.]

2. Ibid. p. 261.
3. Ibid. p. 264.
4. Ibid. p. 275, 278.
Kitāb Masālik al-Abṣār fī Manālik al-Amār, by Shihāb ad-Dīn ibn Ahmad ibn Yahyā ibn Faḍl Allāh al-‘Umārī

[d. 749 A.H., 1351 A.D.]

Kitāb al-Nujum aṭ Zāhirah fi Mulūk Miṣr wa’l-Qahirah, by Abd ‘l-Mahāsin Yusuf ibn Taghri Bardī. [d. 874 A.H., 1469 A.D.]

Kitāb Sha‘bārat adh-Dhahab fi Alshbār an-Nahḥab, by Abū-l-Falāḥ ‘Abd al-Ḥayy ibn al-‘Ammār al-Ḥanbalī

[d. 1089 A.H., 1678 A.D.]

These biographies are of varying importance. In the first one, Kitāb Dumyat al-Qaṣr, the author only mentions the praise of the contemporaries and successors of al-Juwaynī. The second biography is valuable because it is earlier than as-Subki’s by about 200 years. It also contains some details which are not mentioned in other biographies, such as the date of the arrival concerning which Ibn al-Jawzi says: “al-Juwaynī was in Baghdad when al-Juwaynī entered it. In the third one, Wafayāt al-Ayyān, Ibn Khallikān gives rather a condensed biography, but it contains some details about al-Juwaynī’s works and his intellectual life which are not mentioned in other biographies. The fourth, Kitāb Siyar A’lām al-Mubalāh, differs from the other biographies in that it is hostile and indeed abusive in its criticism. The fifth biography, Kitāb Masālik al-Abṣār, gives a clear idea of the high place which al-Juwaynī held in the esteem of his contemporaries and successors.

1. Dum, pp. 196-197.
5. Um., vol. 4, sect. 1, from folio 38 to 42.
The sixth one is extremely short. Ibn Taghri Burni just mentions al-Juwayni's date of birth and some details about his life and death. The seventh is interesting mainly because it enables us to ascertain with greater accuracy the names of some of al-Juwayni's ancestors.

Some of these sources speak mostly of al-Juwayni's intellectual life, others of his everyday concerns, others yet of his influence on his contemporaries or on posterity. From all together, a rounded and reliable picture of al-Juwayni's life emerges.

1. Muj. vol. 5, p. 121
Chapter 1

Al-Juwayni’s Life
Chapter 1.
Al-Juwaynî’s Life

His Name

All biographers say that he is ‘Abd al-Malik b. ‘Abd Allâh ibn Yûsuf. They differ about his further ancestry.


Ibn Khallîkân, as-Subkî and Ibn al-‘Imâd all mention two patronymics (kunyah) by which ‘Abd al-Allâh, and the first Yûsuf were known. They give: ‘Abd al-Malik b. Abû Muḥammad ‘Abd Allâh ibn Abû Ya’qûb Yûsuf . . . . . . ibn Ḥayyûyâh. Ibn al-‘Imâd explicitly tells us how the name Ḥayyûyâh is to be spelt and vocalized.

1. Subk. vol. 3, p. 249
2. Wasf. vol. 1, p. 361
3. Ind. vol. 3, p. 358
4. Munt. vol. 9, p. 18
5. Nuj. vol. 5, p. 121
6. Um. vol. 3, sect. 1, folio 38
7. Ask. p. 278
8. Sam. folio 124
10. Subk. vol. 3, p. 249
11. Wasf. vol. 1, p. 361
12. Ind. vol. 3, p. 358
13. Ibid. p. 361.
As-Subki, Ibn Taghrî, Ibn ‘Iṣâd, Ibn ‘Asîkîr, and Ibn Faql Allâh al‘Umarî, mention that one of the patronymics (kunyah) by which al-Juwaynî was known is "Abd al-Ma‘âlî. Perhaps he was known by this (kunyah) because he dealt all his life with theology, placing it on a higher and more honourable footing among Muslims, and because of the way in which, by his clear and persuasive logic, he raised and dignified Islam.

As to his relative name (Nisbah), biographers all call him "al-Juwaynî. Only as-Subki calls him "an-Naṣṣâbûrî. "Juwayn" or "Kuwayn" is one of the districts (Nâhiyah) or regions of Naṣṣâbûr. Many people are named after it. Yâqût, in Mu‘jam al-Buldân, mentions the father of ‘Abd al-Malik, his uncle al-Ḥasan, and al-‘Abbâs b. Abd ‘Umrân, as of the same

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1. See p. p 113-115
2. Muq, vol. 5, p. 121
   Ḥimâ, vol. 3, p 358
   Waf. vol. 1, p. 361
   Munt. vol. 9, p. 18
   Ask. p. 278
   Um. vol 3, sect. 1, folio 38r
   Sam. folio 144r
   Siv. vol. 11, sect. 2, folio 125. 1st. col.
3. It is between Basta‘m and Naṣṣâbûr, bounded by Baynaq in the east and by Jajirm in the north. (see Yaq. vol 3, Juwayn, p. 181
   See also: Dâ‘irat al-Ma‘ârif al-Islamiyyah, vol 7,
   Juwayn, p. 178, 179.
4. Yaq: vol. 3, Juwayn, p. 182
5. He is also called Shaykh al-Hijjâz. (d. 462 A.H., 1069 A.D.). Yâqût mentions that he was suffî, and knew Ḥadîth. He wrote a book on sâfîm entitled a5-Salâh.
name. It is known that the names associating people with a particular place are given because these people were born in the place, or because they lived a long time there or because they died there. According to the biographies, al-Juwayni was not born in Juwayn, nor did he live or die there. So why was he named al-Juwayni? It is certain that his father was born in Juwayn, where he lived for some time, studying literature, and Islamic law. Then he left it and went away to other places to gain more knowledge, as was the habit of most of the 'Ulamā' at that time. He was called after the place where he was born and lived for a certain space of time. Therefore he was called al-Juwayni. When after his death his son 'Abd-al-Malik took his place as a teacher in his school he inherited the name of al-Juwayni. Al-Juwayni had the name Ab-Naysābūrī because he lived for a long time in Naysābūr, where he taught in an-Nīšāmiyyah school, as will be shown later. Biographers all mention that he was known by the (jaqab) Imām al-Haramayn. Ibn al-‘Imād, Ibn Khallikān, and Ibn

1. Subk. vol 3, p. 249
   Nuj. vol. 5, p. 121
   Idm. vol. 3, p. 353
   Waf. vol. 1, p. 361
   Munt. vol. 9, p. 18
   Ask. p. 278
   Um. vol. 3, sect. 1, folio 38r
   Sam. folio 144v
   Sīy. vol. 11, sect. 2, folio 255, 1st col.
2. In Khurasān, separated from ar-Ray by 16 parasangs, (a parasang is a Persian measure of length, usually reckoned as equal to between 3 and 3-and-a-half English miles. See Murray, vol. 7, p. 463) and
   from Sarkhas 40 parasangs.
   3. See footnote No 1.
Faḍl Allah al-‘Umarī mention that he was also known by another (lāqāb) Diyya’ ad-Dīn. As to the first one, he was known by it, because he lived at Mecca, for four years, during which he was serving the Islamic faith by debating, giving decisions in Islamic law, and trying to spread knowledge everywhere. The second lāqāb was given to him, because he stood as a beacon to the defenders of the faith.

1. Subk. vol. 3, p. 251
   Um. vol. 4, sect. 1, folio 38
   Kath vol. 12, p. 128
   Sīy. vol. 11, sect. 2, folio 38
   İmd. vol. 3, p. 358
   Waf. vol. 1, p. 361.
Place of birth

‘Abd al-Malik was born in the wilāyah of Khurasān. 1

Brockelman in the *Geschichte der Arabischen* literatur mentions that he was born in Bushtingān or Bushtinkān. However none of the sources, mentioned by Brockelman, 2 speaks of al-Juwaynī's birthplace, but they all agree that Bushtingān was the place where he died.

The study of his father's life shows that the father left Juwayn for other places to gain more knowledge and came to Naysābūr in 407 A.H., 1016 A.D. 3 He lived there and taught till the end of his life. 4

If this is true, ‘Abd al-Malik, who was born in

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1. It is in the north-east of Persia, bounded by Khabwā in the north, Afghanistan in the east, and by Karak, Lūkhistān, Iraq, and ‘Ajami in the south, and west. - *Yaq.* vol. 3, Khurasān p. 408.
   - *Da‘irat Ma‘ārif al-Bustānī*, vol. 7, p. 553.
2. Brockelman says that  in ‘Asākir 284 should be  and that al-Juwaynī had returned to his birthplace.
3. Subk. vol. 3, p. 218
   *Ind.* vol. 3, p. 261
   *Siy.* vol. 11, sect. 1, folio 137
419 A.H., 1028 A.D., as will be shown below, was born in Naysâbûr or in its environs. Bushtingân is one of the pleasant little villages near Naysâbûr. It is separated from it by one parasang only, which is about 3 or 3-and-a-half English miles. Therefore it is probable that the father was in Bushtingân, and not in Naysâbûr at that period, which was the period of the birth of his son, especially if we take into consideration that Naysâbûr’s climate was very hot, and the taste of its water was bad, because people had to go to underground canals to get it. If we also take into consideration that ‘Abd al-Malik wanted to be buried in this little village to which he was transferred in his last days, it can be said that Bushtingân is the place of ‘Abd-al-Malik’s birth.

1. See p. 12
2. Yaq. vol. 8, Naysâbûr p. 356
3. See p. 8, footnote no. 2, the word ‘parasang’.
4. See p. 8, footnote No. 2 about Naysâbûr.
Date of his birth

Biographers differ about the date of his birth. Al-Subki, ibn Khillikan, ibn 'Asakir, ibn Kathir, ibn Faqi Allah al-'Umari and al-Samani say that he was born on the 13th of Muharram 419 A.H., 1028 A.D. Only two, ibn al-Jawzi and ibn Taghri Bard, assert that he was born in 417 A.H.

All biographers agree about 'Abd-al-Malik's death. They say that he died in Bushtingan on a Wednesday evening on the 25th of Rabii al-awwal, 478 A.H., 1085 A.D. and that he was 59 years old, which makes his date of birth in the year 419 A.H. Ibn al-Jawzi and ibn Taghri Bard are wrong, therefore, and so is ibn Kathir when he mentions that 'Abd al-Malik was 57 years old when he died. This leads one to affirm that the date of his birth was the 16th of Muharram, 419 A.H. or the 12th of February, 1028.

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2. Waf., vol. 1, p. 362
3. Ask., p. 185
5. Um., vol. 4, sect. 1, folios 38, 40
6. Sam. folio 144r
7. Munt., vol. 9, p. 18
8. Nuj., vol. 5, p. 121
His descent

As he was born in wilāyat Khurasān, we tend to conclude that he is of Persian origin. But some biographers mention his father as being "Tayyib Sunbus" relating him to Tayyi and Sunbus. Sunbus was one of the leaders of a clan of Tayyi, and Tayyi is a well-known Arab tribe, as is said in Taj al-'Arūs. This would indicate that the father, and therefore also the son, were of Arab blood. Of course a Mawlā could also have his nisbah from the tribe. But, if someone was a Mawla, biographers usually mention it in their works. This is not done in the biographies of any of al-Juwaynī's relatives. So the presumption must be that al-Juwaynī was of Arab descent.

1. Subk. vol. 3, p. 208
   Sam. vol. 11, sect. 1, folio 137 col. 2.
His father

His name is 'Abd Allah b. Yusuf b. 'Abd Allah b. Yusuf b. Muḥammad ibn Ḥayyūnāh, and he was called al-Juwaynī. He was born and brought up in Juwayn. He was also called Sunbusī because he was of the clan of Sunbus.

Biographers mention that when he was in Juwayn he received lessons first of all from his father, Yusuf, who was a literary man, and that he learnt Islamic law (tafqqah) from Abī Ya‘qūb al-Abjardī. When he left Juwayn to gain more knowledge, he went first of all to Naysabūr, where he studied with Abū ʿAlī al-Sulṭānī. Later he went to Marw to meet al-Qaffāl al-Marwazi, who taught him the Shāfī‘ite doctrine, al-Madhhab and kalām. He returned to Naysabūr in 407 A.H., 1016 A.D., and opened a school where he taught, discussed and defended the Islamic faith until his death.

1. Siy: vol. 11, sect. 1, folio 137
2. See p. 7
3. Ibid.
4. Subk. vol. 3, p. 208
5. Ibid.
6. Ibid.
7. Ibid.
As-Su'ukl\footnote{1} [d. 387 A.H.] was "Shafi'i". He was a great authority on hadith, a theologian (Mutakallim)\footnote{1} and a cultured man. Al-Qaffal al-Marwazi\footnote{2} [d. 417 A.H.] was also a very important "Shafi'i". He had a large number of pupils. This leads to the fact that the predominant element in his culture was his thorough knowledge of the prophet's traditions (hadith), Muslim Jurisprudence (fiqih) and theology (kalām). On these subjects he has many works.\footnote{3} I have discovered two manuscripts written by him.

The knowledge thus acquired by the father gave a good background to the son, who took a deep interest in Islamic sciences. If we take into consideration that he was well versed in Islamic sciences and was treated with great veneration and respect and that in his school at Naysābūr he was called a "Shaykh", a title bestowed on those who held deep knowledge and were consulted on ex cathedra opinions, then we should recognize that the son began his academic life at the hands of a worthy master.

1. Al-Dhahabī hesitates about the date of death of aš-
   Su'ūkî. He fixed once in the year 387 A.H.,
   \[1997\ A.D.,\] and another time in the year 402 A.H.
   \[1011\ A.D.,\] \footnote{1} See Siī, vol. 11, sect. 1, folio 6 -
   Ibn Faql Allāh al-Umārī mentions that he died in
   404 A.H. \[1013\ A.D.,\] \footnote{1} See Um. vol. 4, sect. 1, folio 21.
What influenced the son also was his father’s love of knowledge. He was always saying in his morning prayers, "O God, put no obstacles or hindrance in my way to knowledge." This quality in the father had its importance in directing the son towards research and inquiry.

Another two characteristics of the father were of great importance. The first was his great anxiety about falling into sin. His extreme conscientiousness is shown by the fact that he used to give his legal alms not once but twice a year, to ensure that he did not fall short of his obligations either by forgetfulness or by allowing some of the money to fall into undeserving hands. Similarly it is related that the money he paid for the woman who became the mother of his son—a slave whom he bought—was entirely lawful, earned by the work of his hand as a copyist, for he wished her to bring blessing and good fortune upon him. When she conceived and bore him a son, he enjoined upon her that in anything concerning her or the child she should avoid any action of dubious lawfulness. On one occasion while the mother was cooking the child cried, and as a wet-nurse

1. Subk. vol. 3, p. 208:
2. Ibid. p. 210
3. Ibid. p. 251.
belonging to the neighbours happened to be in the house she gave suck to him. To this the father objected on the ground that the nurse did not belong to him and had no right so to make free with her milk, so he forced the child to regurgitate it. This shows that he was extremely punctilious in all matters that affected his son. Some biographers, such as as-Subki, declare that the son's good temperament (maqām) was due to his upbringing, which was devoid of all unlawful acts; and surely this is so, for parental care plays a prominent part in developing the physical, moral, intellectual and spiritual qualities of a child.

The second characteristic of the father which is of great importance emerges from what is related about Kitāb al-Mubīt, a book which he set out to write. In this book, which deals with Traditions, we are told that al-Juwayni's father sought to go back to the sources and not to restrict himself to a Shāfi'i interpretation. Part of the work, however, fell into the hands of al-Bayhaqi, who wrote to the author pointing out its errors, criticising its innovations, and vindicating the position taken by ash-Shāfi'i. Al-Juwayni's father thereupon thanked al-Bayhaqi and desisted from completing the work.

1. Subk. vol. 3, p. 251
2. Ibid. p. 251
3. Ibid. p. 209
4. Ibid. pp. 210 - 217

What this incident reveals in al-Juwaynī's father is both a certain independence of thought and a willingness to accept informed criticism. The same independence of thought was prominent in the son from his childhood, for he was prone to gainsay his father, when his father's views did not appeal to him. This characteristic became stronger and stronger, and is very apparent in his books.

Al-Juwaynī's father was in fact the author of many books. He wrote: al-Furūq, as-Silsilah, at-Tabgirah, at-Tadhakkur, Mukhtasar al-Mukhtasar, a commentary on the Risālah, the summary of a treatise Mawqif al-Imām wa l-Maʾmūn, and a Tafsīr containing ten interpretations of each verse of al-Qurʾān.¹

Only two of these works are mentioned in the catalogues of extant libraries: The first as-Silsilah is attributed in the catalogue of the Institute of Ancient Manuscripts of the Arab League to the son and not to the father. Because of the Institute's rules I have not so far been able to examine the manuscript, and have not discovered on what grounds this attribution was made.² The second is Kitāb al-Furūq, which it

¹. Subk. vol. 3, p. 209
². See p. 101
was also impossible for me to see for the same reason. Brockelmann mentions that there is a copy of this book in Istanbul in *Ashir Library Index, I,* that another copy is to be found in *Tarkhân Library No. 146,* and that a third one is a microfilm. This last is to be found in the Arab League's catalogue under no. 171 *Uṣūl fiqh.*

I have also come across another book of the father's entitled: *Risalah fi-l-Istimā' wa 'l-Fawqiyah, fi Tanzih al-Bārī 'azza wa jall 'an al-Ḥaṣr wa 'l-Tanthil wa 'l-Fawqiyah.* This is the second risalah in V.I. of *Majmūʿat al Rasūl al Muniriyah,* printed in the year 1343. Other copies are manuscripts: one is in Berlin collection No. 3903, another in London, in the Landberg collection; a third in al-Mawṣil No. 357 *Majmūʿat.* It is to be noticed that the style of this work is quite different from the style of Imam al-Ḥaramayn's books. That is why I list it among the father's books and not the son's.

This manuscript begins with:
بسم الله الرحمن الرحيم

وصلى الله على سيدنا محمد

الحمد لله الذي كان ولا كان ولا تحسن ولا جاية ولا
طائر ولا حيوان المنفرد بوحدانيته في قد ازليته والدام
في نداءته في قد حضانيته

فصوص الرسالة هي جـ

ص 125 - سبب إنشاء الرسالة الدين النصيحة

172 - عدم تحذير الرسول من الإباء بظاهر الصفات

181 - وصف الله نفسه بهذه الإجابات

182 - التفوقية والاستواء والنزول

183 - ثبوت صفة الوجه

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185 - علوه على مرشح تعالى بلا كيف ولا انحصر

186 - تقرب مسألة التفوقية

187 - ختام الرسالة

ونتهى بـ

" وقال الله تعالى لابن تيمية في مسألة معرفة الرب تعالى

بها والتوجه إليه من يها ؛ وانباهه له بحكافته وعينائه كما يليك بللالةـ

وعظمته بلا تأويل وعطيله وتتكيفه ولا تشيلي ولا جعود ولا وقوفـ

وفي ذلك بلاغ لن تدبر ؛ وكتابية لن استبشر إن شاء الله تعالى ه

والحمد لله بووجه وصلى الله على من لا يتي بعده على آله وصحبه

 وسلم . . أعلم . . . " (صفحة 187 من المجلة).
Date of the father's death

Biographers differ about the date of his death. Some mention that he died in 434 A.H., 1042 A.D.; others say that it was in 438 A.H., 1046 A.D. One biographer, however, tells us that Al-Juwayni was approximately twenty years old when his father died. This information makes it likely that the later date given for the father's death is the correct one.

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1. Subk, vol. 3, p. 251
2. Klopfer asserts that the father died when the son was nineteen. (See Das Dogma des al-Djuwaini und sein Werk Al-\"Acidat an-Nig\'amiya\ p. 7.)
His time

He lived in the fifth century of the Hijrah, from 1009 A.D. to 1106 A.D. In this, as in other periods of Islamic history, there was a close link between religious and political conditions.

Political conditions in the eastern part of the Muslim Empire were in complete chaos. Since the fourth century, the `Abbásid Empire had broken up into small States. Khurasán was a small state that had become independent and had gone on to attack its neighbours, gaining control over them during the reign of Āḥmad al-Buwayhî, approximately in the year 334 A.H., 945 A.D. The Buwayhids went further, and made a puppet of the `Abbásid Khalifah, who through incompetency, particularly in religious affairs, had led his people to disaster. The advocates of the Shi’ā doctrine, who were sent by the Faḍimid caliph, grew in number in the various parts of the `Abbásid domains, and called for the dethronement of the caliph. This led to disorder among the people. The Buwayhids supported the `Abbásid caliph, and by so doing, maintained their influence over him. Nevertheless, they spared no effort in humbling the sunnite caliph and his adherents. This policy led to many crises between the religious sects, and the reign of the Buwayhids was known as the age of persecution of the sunnites.

1. Kath. vol. 12, p. 39
These met various difficulties and dangers which made many of them observe strict silence or emigrate from their homes, resenting acts which compromised their dignity.

The Buwayhids maintained their influence for over a century until the Saljūqs appeared in Khurasān, approximately in the year 426 A.H., 1034 A.D.¹ The state of things became stable in Khurasān about the year 451 A.H., 1059 A.D.² Their influence then extended to neighbouring countries, and their attention was fixed on 'Iraq. The appearance of the Saljūqs and their growing influence did not prevent religious intrigues in Baghdad or Naysābūr, or in other towns, and in Baghdad religious intrigues resulted in sanguinary incidents.

One of these religious slashes occurred in the year 443 A.H., 1051 A.D.³ as a result of a sentence written in golden characters, by some of the inhabitants of al-Karkh on towers flanking the Fishermen's Gate: "Muḥammad and 'Alī are the best of mankind." Some Sunnites said that the inscription added that whoever did not agree with the statement was an unbeliever. The people of Karkh denied this. The caliph sent the heads of the 'Abbāsid and the

2. Kam vol. 9, p. 195. 
3. Ibid. p. 214.
'Allawiyite families (Naqib) to Kafrk to verify this. They found that al-Karkh's people were right. The caliph ordered the fighting which had broken out to stop; but it did not stop. The Hanbalites interfered too, and prevented the sunnites from getting their drinking water from the Tigris. But some people pitied them, and gave them Tigris water mixed with rose water. It happened then that one of the Hashimites was killed, and his people carried him through the city on his bier. This incident made the sunnites angry. They wanted revenge, so they went to the burial-ground of the Buwayhid kings and ministers and desecrated the graves. The state of things became more serious, and the city was in complete disorder.

Another religious clash occurred in the year 444A.H., 1052 A.D. when some sunnite Turkish officers abducted a Shi'ah man, and slew him in front of his women. Violence broke out between the Shi'ahs and the Turkish officers. Houses and bazaars were burnt. The Karkh was extensively damaged. The incident did

1. Kam, vol. 9, p. 221

@ The Hanbalites, who had a large following among common people, were opposed to all theological speculation.
not last long, and the Turkish officers apologised and went away.

Another religious disagreement took place in Baghda6 in the year 447\(^{-1}\) A.H., 1055 A.D. between the Shafi'ite and Hanbalite jurists, when the latter declared it wrong for the name of God the Beneficent and the Merciful to be spoken out loud, or for the profession of faith to be repeated\(^{2}\) with a raised voice in the call to prayer or in the supplication addressed to God when standing \((\text{qunut})\)\(^{3}\) in the course of an act of worship. The Shafi'ites were very angry. But the Hanbalites withdrew their declaration, and conflict ceased.

In Naysibd disorders spread between the year 443 A.H., 1051 A.D. and 447\(^{+1}\) A.H., 1055 A.D. The cause was a report to King Tughril Beg that al-Ash'ari had uttered opinions incompatible with the Faith. The king ordered that al-Ash'ari should be cursed from

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1. Kam: vol. 9, p. 230
2. For "the profession of faith" see Lane's book I, part III, p. 1035; Tahânawi, vol. 1, p. 569, and Qasâ'ali, Al-Irshad as-Sârî li-Sharh Sahih al-Bukhâri. In its margin the text of al Imâm Muslim together with the commentary of the Imâm an-Nawawi, vol 1, from p. 2
As-Sam‘ānī \(^1\) gives other details of what happened to the Ash'arites at that time. He says that they were prohibited from preaching in mosques, as well as being cursed from pulpits. Al-Bistāmī, one of the Ash'arites, went to war with the prince of the city. There was much violence before al-Bistāmī was taken, and put in prison by the prince. Some sources\(^2\) say that this led to the emigration of some Ash'arites from the town, and that among the emigrants was ‘Abd al-Malik al-Juwaynī.

When King Alp Arslān sat on the throne and made Nizām al-Mulk his minister, religious intrigues were quelled, conditions became stable, and the emigrants returned home. Yet such calmness did not put an end to religious sectarianism. Al-Maqdisi mentions in his book entitled Aḥsan at-Taqāsim that in Khurāsān the Shi‘at were strong and the Hashimites were a weak minority.\(^3\) The wāzīr Nizām al-Mulk took an interest in the spread of knowledge, and opened many schools, in which sunnite rites were taught.

As-Subkī mentions nine of these schools, one in

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Baghdad, another in Balkh, a third in Naysabur, a fourth in Haran, a fifth in Ashah, a sixth in al-Bagrah, a seventh in Marw, an eighth in Aml-Tabaristan, and a ninth in al-Mawjil. A sunnite Imam was appointed to each school to teach, preach and give decisions in Islamic law. As-Subk mentions two of them: ash-Shirazi at Baghdad, and Imam al-Jaramayn in Naysabur. It may be said that these schools stabilised the practice of the sunnites, and enhanced their prestige. Thus the power of the sunnites grew greater, and they became of great importance after being a weak minority. Bearing in mind that the Saljuq dynasty was sunnite, it can be seen that it was in the interest of Saljuqs to consolidate the sunnite rites for by doing so they themselves gained in strength. Thus when some people intriguing against Nizam al-Mulk said to Malik Shah that the money he spent on schools could finance a big army which could plant his banner on the walls of

1. As-Subk mentions that this school was not the first in Naysabur. There were four schools before it: al-Bayhaqi school, al-Sadiyyah school built by the prince Naqr Subuktayin, the brother of as-Sulajn Mahmud, another school built by AbU Sa'id b. 'Ali al-Istrabadi, and a fourth one, where the great Imam AbU Ishaq al-Asfara'Infi was teaching - See Subk. vol. 3, p. 137.
3. See Foukast. 5, p. 3.
Constantinople, Niẓām al-Mulk could defend himself by saying: “I have created an army called the army of God. When your armies sleep at night (the soldiers of) this army stand in rows before their Lord shedding their tears, exercising their tongues, and stretching out their arms to God in invocation for you and your armies. You and your armies live under their guardianship, devote yourselves to God’s service by their invocations, and are given rain and sustenance by their blessings.”

The wazir Niẓām al-Mulk, by establishing such schools, and by his lavish expenditure thereon, did not intend to spread knowledge only, he was also trying to foster loyalty to the Saljūq’s princes.

Political intrigues had led to religious disorders, but knowledge on the contrary had flourished and spread; in particular, theological, philosophical and shi'i doctrines had developed. The fifth century abounded in great theologians of Mu’tazalite, Ash’arite, Kharijite, Qadrite, Shi‘ah, Karmatian, and other leanings who subjected religious beliefs to study and discussion.

In Nayṣābūr appeared many Imāms, such as Abū Yūsuf al-Qaswīnī (d. 482 A.H., 1089 A.D.) a Mu’tazilite. He wrote a large Tafsīr in about 700 volumes.

1. Zaki Mubārak: Al-Akhbār P. 16
2. Subk. vol. 3, p. 230
He was fond of collecting books. He was always glorifying Mu'tazilite doctrine, even in front of the wasir Nizām al-Mulk. He presented him with a book entitled "Sharib al-Hadith" in the hand-writing of Abū 'Amir b. Abī Hayyāyah, in ten volumes, and Nizām al-Mulk kept it in his library. Another Imām Abū Turāb al-Maṛāghi was Ashārī. He used to give valuable decisions in the sacred law, and died in the year 492 A.H., 1098 A.D. There were other Ashārites in the city, such as Abū Muḥammad al-Mujārī (d. 486 A.H., 1093 A.D.), 'Alī b. Aḥmad b. Aḥmad b. 'Alī al-Wāḥidī (d. 483 A.H., 1092 A.D.)3, Abu-l-Ḥasan al-Bāḥṣarī4 (d. 467 A.H., 1075 A.D.), Abu Bakr al-Bayhaqī (d. 458 A.H., 1065 A.D.)5 and many others. So that al-Yaraqání, who was one of the most learned men in his epoch advised Abū Ḥāmid al-Bayhaqī to go to Naysábūr saying: "There are many scholars there. If you miss any, you will contact others, and thus benefit by your journey." At that time, therefore, there were many theologians in Naysābūr, and Imām al-Ḥaramayn lived at a time when different opinions and beliefs were known.

1. Subk., vol. 3, p. 219
2. Ibid. p. 237
3. Ibid. p. 289
4. Ibid. p. 298
5. Ibid. p. 3
6. Ibid. p. 13
As to philosophy, we find that the fifth century was distinguished at its beginning by a great philosopher, Ibn-Sinā. None can deny the vast scholarly production of this man, as well as his extensive and diversified research. His influence was great in stimulating his people by his deep philosophical insight. He had many disciples, among whom was Abd Allah al-Ma‘ṣūm. Ibn Sinā said: "He stands in the same relationship to me as did Plato to Aristotle." He wrote many books such as Kitāb al-Mufāraqāt, Kitāb fi A‘dād ‘l-Uqūl, another title fi al-Aflāk, and Kitāb al-Kubā‘īyat. All these are philosophical. Many of his books were in the Niẓāmiyyah Library.

Also in Naysābūr, lived ‘Umar al-Khayyām. Ash-Shahrazūrī says that he comes next to Ibn-Sinā.

He wrote ar-Rubā‘iyyāt, a Mukhtasar fi at-Tabī‘iyāt, a Risālah fi-l-Wujūd, a Risālah fi-l-Kawn wa-t-Taklif, which contains ‘Umar al-Khayyām’s answer to al-Imām an-Nasawi’s question about "Hikmat al Khāfiq fi Khalq al-‘Alam wa-Kalimat at-Taklif."

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2. Ash-Shahrazūrī: Mushat al-Arwāḥ: folio 195. col. 1
Al-Bayhaqī: folio 66, col. 2
It has to be noticed that Ash-Shahrazūrī copies from al-Bayhaqī
It can be seen that there were a great number of philosophical works, especially in Naysabur, and that al-Juwayni could have access to the most important philosophical works of his time. But philosophy was disapproved of by different Muslim sects at that time, and especially by the Hanbalites, who were against philosophers. They attacked his concern with philosophy.

This century abounded also in eminent sufis, among whom mention should be made of Abu 'Ali al-Hasan b. 'Ali ad-DAqqeq (d. 415 A.H., 1024 A.D.), Abu 'Abd ar-Rahman as-Sulami, Abu-l-'Abbás al-Qasîr, Abu Sahl al-Khashshâb, and Abu-l-Qâsim al-Qushayri.

During this time, there appeared also quack sufis, who did much to harm the standing of sufism. Al-Qushayri alluded to them in his Risalah called Ar-Risalah al-Qushayriyyah.

Sufi sciences conform during this period with al-Qur'an and with sunnite rites in their original simplicity.

1. See p. 45
2. See p. 45
5. Ibid. p. 53.
This is a sketch of al-Juwaynî's time in its political, religious and cultural aspects.

The next study is of the different phases of al-Juwaynî's life. The first phase begins with the birth of al-Juwaynî, and ends with the death of his father. The second shows him as a teacher in his father's stead, continuing to acquire knowledge while teaching. The third begins after he left Nāṣībūr and ends with his return. On his return to Nāṣībūr to teach in al-Nisâmiyyah school, the fourth stage of his life begins, and it ends with his death in the year 478 A.H. (1082 A.D.)
First phase

As-Subki gives a clear idea of the early days of al-Juwayni. He says that his father took great care of him from the time of his birth and even before. That began when he bought the slave who was to bear the child with the money which he earned by copying. It was shown again later when he was careful not to have him fed with something which did not belong to him. It happened that once al-Juwayni stammered during one of his debates, a thing which had never happened before. The audience wondered and asked Imām al-Ḥaramayn, "How does that happen?" He replied, "I think that is the result of what I sucked in once." "And what is the story behind that?" they asked. Al-Juwaynî told them how once, when he was a baby, he was suckled by a slave who belonged to their neighbours, and he told the story which has been mentioned above.²

Al-Juwaynî studied Jurisprudence (Fiqh) under his father, and earned his admiration. He also exerted himself in the study of legal rites (al-Madhâbi), especially the Shāfi‘ite one, their differences, (al-Xhilâf), and theology, (al-Ufûl). He learnt

1. Subk., vol. 3, p. 251
   Ind., vol. 3, p. 360
the prophet's traditions (al-Hadith) from several shaykhs, such as Abū Ḥasan, Abū Saʿd b. 'Alī, Abū Saʿd al-Maḍrawī, and Mansūr b. Dāmis. These three teachers were known especially as traditionists (Muhaddithīn). 1

Al-Juwaynī had a very good command of the Arabic language, as al-Fārisī says. 2 He studied the Qurʾān and was noted for his eloquence. Most of those who met him were astonished at his ability in debate and his vast knowledge, so that, when his father died, he was recognized by them, in spite of his youth, as one of the very wise Imāms. He was known as a discriminating and honest critic. Sometimes he criticised his father, and the father was glad of that.

After his father's death he used to repeat this sentence, when he discovered one of his father's errors: "This is an error committed by the Shaykh, God save his soul." 3

We have al-Juwaynī's own testimony that in his quest for truth he has read extensively in the Islamic sciences and, still unsatisfied, turned aside from

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1. Subk. vol. 3, p. 258
2. Siy vol. 10, sect. 1, folio 113
3. Subk. vol. 3, p. 254
4. Subk. vol. 3, p. 254
5. Imd. vol. 3, p. 260
authoritatively transmitted knowledge to works condemned by the [Ahl al-Islam]. Eventually, however, his quest had taken him back to the faith of early Muslims, and it was in that faith that he hoped to die.¹

Some biographers interpret these words as if al-Juwayni had at one time rejected Islamic sciences. But as-Subki² held, - correctly, I believe - that all he did was to subject religious problems to a critical, intellectual examination.

Al-Juwayni was fond of reading, and it is said that he read a hundred books before he began to study theology under al-Isfahānī.³

If we now bear in mind that al-Juwayni's father was fond of knowledge, that he tried at one time to examine things critically, that he always encouraged his son to learn more and that he was glad when his son criticised him, it is clear that it was he who set the pattern for his son's life.

¹. Subk., vol. 3, p. 260
². Subk., vol. 3, p. 260
³. See p. 34, and footnote 1 p. 33.
Second Phase

Al-Juwaynî's experiences during the first stage of his life prepared him to become a great man. He was called an Imâm when he was only twenty. When his father died he took his place in the school and began to teach. While teaching he continued to acquire knowledge. He went to al-Isfara'înî, and to al-Bayhaqi's school, and attended the teaching of al-Khâbbâzî.1

Abû 'l-Qâsim 'Abd al-Jabîr b. 'Alî b. Muḥammad ibn Ḥasan al-Isfara'înî was a great man, and a great Imâm in law (fiqh) and theology (kalâm). He was an Ash'arite. He used to hold debates, he taught Islamic sciences, and he gave decisions on Islamic law. He followed the ascetic practices associated with early Muslims. He died in the year 452 A.H., 1060 A.D.2

Aḥmad ibn al-Ḥusayn ibn 'Alî ibn 'Abd Allâh al-Bayhaqi al-Khîsrâkhârî, was a Ṣâḥîṭe. He studied law (fiqh) under Abû 'l-Fath Nâṣîr ibn Muḥammad al-'Umarî al-Marwâzî. He was known as a Traditionist. To learn Ḥadîth he travelled to Hijâz.

1. Subk., vol. 3, p. 254
and al-‘Irāq. He studied also under some Shaykhs in Khurasān. He wrote, it is said, about a hundred books. He was the first man who collected the texts of ash-Shāfi‘ī. Among his books are: Kitāb As-Sunan al-Kabīr, as-Sunan as-Saghīr, Dalā’il an-Nubuwwah as-Sunan wa l-Āthār, Shu‘ab al Īmān, and Manāqib ash-Shāfi‘ī Ahmad. He followed the practices of the first Muslims (as-Salaf) and was ascetic. He died at Naysābūr in 455 A.H. His body was then taken to Bagdad.¹

Al-Khabbāzi was the chief of the reciters of the Qur′ān (Shaykh al-Qurra‘). His name is Abū ‘Abd allāh ibn ‘Alī ibn Muḥammad ab Naysābūrī al-Khabbāzi.² He taught the Ṣaḥīḥ of al-Bukhārī. He was a good and noble Shaykh. He was well versed in the Qur′ān. Many people went to him for authoritative opinions. He died in 449 A.H., 1057 A.D.

These three teachers of al-Juwaynī were distinguished by being good Muslims, following especially the instructions of the first believers (as-Salaf). Their influence on al-Juwaynī appeared when after examining all sciences he came back to early Muslim beliefs, called by him Dīnāl ‘ajā‘īb.³ This point will be discussed later.⁴

Al-Juwaynî was highly interested in defending the sunnite rites, especially because there were many enemies who attacked and persecuted the sunnite people, as had been shown when surveying al-Juwaynî's time. Some biographers mention that the troubles caused to the sunnites led to the emigration of some of them from Naysâbûr, and among these was al-Juwaynî. But whether these religious clashes were the reason for his leaving the town or not it can be said that this happened in 445 A.H., 1053 A.D. or 446 A.H., 1054 A.D. This incident marks the beginning of the third phase.

1. Subk., vol. 3, p. 252
2. See p. p. 25–28
3. See p. 25
Hopfer in his introduction to Kitâb al-'Aqidah an-Nizâmiyyah asserts that this happened in the year 445/1053. See Das Dogma des al-Djuwaini, p. 7.
Third Phase

This phase begins with his leaving Naysābūr and ends with his return to it. Historians differ as to the reasons which made him leave Naysābūr. Were religious intrigues the cause, or his desire to gain more knowledge by travelling abroad?

ʿAbd al-Ǧaḥīr al Fārisī, as-Subki and Ibn al-ʿImād 1 mention that al-Juwaynī, al-Qushayrī and some other sunnite Imāms left the city when religious intrigues appeared. Ibn Khallikān 2 just mentions that al-Juwaynī left Naysābūr to meet some (ʿUlamāʾ) in Baghdād, and so does Ibn al-Jawzī 3, and see Ibn Taghīrī Bardī 4 who adds that he went also to Mecca, where he stayed four years teaching, preaching and defending Islamic law. But it is rather more likely that religious intrigues made him abandon Naysābūr, as is confirmed by his disciple ʿAbd al-Ǧaḥīr al Fārisī, and by historical events. The places he went to were probably free from such intrigues because it is not mentioned in any of the sources that there was any movement against the Ashʿarites by that time 5 outside Naysābūr.

2. Ask. 280
3. Imād. vol. 3, p. 359
4. Waf. vol. 1, p. 361
5. Munt. p. 18
6. Hist. vol. 5, p. 121
7. See p. 25
All the same, he gained in knowledge for
in every town he lived in, he studied and dis-
cussed opinions.

From Naysābūr he went to (al-‘Askar) and from
there to Baghdaḍ. Ibn al-Jawzi mentions that
he arrived at Baghdaḍ as the ‘ghuzz entered it.
According to Ibn-al-‘Athīr, these came to the city
in 447 A.H., 1055 A.D. Therefore al-Juwaynī
left Naysābūr about 446-447 A.H. It is said
that he met many great Imāms in Baghdaḍ, discussed
opinions with them, and became famous in the city.

Biographers do not mention how long he stayed
in Baghdaḍ. After leaving Baghdaḍ, al-Juwaynī
went to al-Hijāż, and stayed at Mecca for about
four years debating, giving decisions in Islamic
law, and trying to spread knowledge everywhere.
Therefore, he was called Imām al-Ḥammayn, as
already noted.

   Waf., vol. 1, p. 361
   Tim., vol. 3, p. 358
   Munt., vol. 9, p. 18
   Nuj., vol. 5, p. 121
2. Munt., vol. 9, p. 19
3. Kam., vol. 9, p. 227
4. See p. 57
5. See footnote 1 of this page
6. See footnote 1 of this page
7. See p. 9
During his stay in Mecca, besides defending the sunnite doctrine, al-Juwayni spent his time in pious devotion, between as-ṣafā and al-Marwah, until he had purified his soul. Indeed as-Subki in describing his piety and sensitiveness appears to imply that he was a Sufi. He says, "When in the course of his assemblies he launched into an account of conditions or "Sufi states" (ahwal) and waded into the science of Sufism, he used to reduce those present to tears by his own weeping and to make their eyes bleed by his cries, his recitations and his allusions, for he was ablaze within himself and certain of the subtle mysteries that take place."

Some of al-Juwayni's own words show that he looked for a way other than Kalām, which is based on reasoning, to the reality of God. He says that reason is at a loss to apprehend reality, although it is sure of the existence of an Eternal God.

See Subk. vol. 3, p. 252

1. Subk. vol. 3, p. 257
2. Ind. vol. 3, p. 360
3. Waf. vol. 1, p. 361
4. Aqd., p. 16.
This means that al-Juwayni finds that Kalâm does not lead to the knowledge of the reality of God. This reality can be known by the heart. It is the heart that leads to knowledge of the Reality. This is Sufism.

It has to be said that biographers do not give many details about al-Juwayni's life as a Sûfî, any more than they do about the philosophical element in his knowledge, as will be seen later. This comes from the fact that al-Juwayni was supposed to be mainly a theologian, for he was at the head of an-Nizâmiyyah school at Naysâbûr, which was built, like the other Nizâmiyyah schools, to keep the adherents of the sunnite sect loyal and in good spirit.¹

Al-Juwayni himself seemed to have been careful to keep these two aspects of his life out of the public eye. None of his works known to us is on Sufism, or discusses philosophical problems systematically.² Sufism was not, at that time, the way recognized by all Muslims to the knowledge of God. It seems even that it was not highly esteemed by most of them. Al-Qushayri mentions in his Risâlah³ that there were at that time some bad Sûfis who were

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¹ See p. 26 - 27
² See p. 54
³ Ar-Risâlat al-Qushayriyyah, p. 34
   See p. 31
harmful to Sufism. This means that al-Qushayri was trying to defend Sufism and to prove that it was not what these disreputable Sufis made it out to be. Philosophy was also, as has been shown, attacked by many Muslim sects. This explains why al-Juwayni and his biographers were trying not to give many details about these two aspects of his life.

From Mecca, al-Juwaynî returned to Naysâbur.

As-Subki mentions that this was after religious intrigues had vanished. When Alp-Ârslân was on the throne, Nâzâm al-Mulk became his vizier. The Ashâri'is were recalled. Now Alp-Ârslân succeeded to the throne in 455/1063, and Nâzâm al-Mulk became his minister in 456/1064. Al-Juwaynî therefore is likely to have returned to Naysâbur in 456/1064, or a little later.

1. See p. 31
2. Subk., vol. 3, p. 253
   Waf., vol. 1, p. 362
   Tâd., vol. 2, p. 367
4. Kâm., vol. 9, p. 125

Fourth Phase

This begins with al-Juwayni’s return to Naysabur, and his appointment as teacher at an-Nisamiyyah school in Naysabur. He admired Nizam al-Mulk’s policy. He continued teaching at this school till the end of his life. He became more famous, and many people came to learn from him. Biographers mention that at that period of time, he became the head of the sunnite community, and was responsible for (waqf) affairs. He was also appointed preacher of al-Munif Mosque. His pupils numbered over four hundred. His writings appeared at this stage, and his knowledge became mature. He had a good command of philosophy as well as of Islamic Sciences. This is very clear in his answers to Naturalists (Tabai’iyun) and other philosophers in ash-Shamil, which is one of his most important books. This tallies with what as-Subki says about the philosophical element in his culture. He mentions that al-Juwayni debated the problem of the creation of the Qur’an with a philosopher and refuted all his arguments so convincingly that partisans and opponents alike agreed that he had carried the day. Al-Juwayni’s assertion that he had at one time turned to sciences

2. Ibid. p. 252
3. Ibid. p. 253
other than the traditional ones may be taken to mean that he took to the study of philosophy. Ultimately, however, he came to disapprove of it,¹ as did most of his contemporaries. That is why, when al-Juwayni discusses the opinions of the philosophers, whom he calls "heretics" (al-Mulhidah),² he does not expose them in an organised system. He gives separate answers to separate problems.³

When the Ḥanbalites said that al-Juwayni was an unbeliever because he believed in some of the philosophers' opinions about the knowledge of God, namely that God knows universals and not particulars,⁴ they were alluding in an unfair and abusive way to the fact that al-Juwayni had studied philosophy. Ash-Shahrastānī⁵ also mentions that al-Juwayni shared the philosophers' views about the originated power of man (al-Qudrah al-Hadithah). This statement, discussed later,⁶ proves that ash-Shahrastānī also believed that al-Juwayni had studied philosophy.

As-Subkī and other biographers make slight allusion to this element without giving any details about how, where and when he learnt philosophy. This was through veneration for the Imām, philosophy being a science abhorred by most of the Muslim thinkers.

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1. Subk. vol. 3, p. 260, 31
3. See p. 46 and following
4. See p. 116, 117
6. See p. 176
Some biographers state that philosophy was not studied by the doctors of Islam up till the time of al-Juwayni. Dr. M.A.R. Bişîr, in his thesis entitled "Al-Juwayni and al-Qâzâlî as theologians", submitted to Edinburgh University in May, 1953, discusses the statement of Ibn Khaldûn, in which the latter says that al-Qâzâlî was the first to confuse philosophy and logic with theology. He agrees with him that al-Qâzâlî was the first to introduce logic in theology, and disagrees with him when he says that this great Mutakallim was the first to confuse philosophy with theology. He says: "We in fact find that many leading Mu'tazilites had replied to the philosophers and proffered dialectical and polemical arguments against them, and made frequent use in their own theological discussions of this method of disputation. Amongst these is Ibrâhîm an-Nâqqâm, who put forward arguments against Empedocles and Aristotle and against those who held the view that the movements of the stars were pre-eternal. His demonstration of the falsehood of this proposition is similar to the proof advanced by al-Qâzâlî; and it is probable that the views of Ibrâhîm an-Nâqqâm in this respect formed the basis of al-Qâzâlî's views. (See the Book, al-Intisâr (victory), by al-Khayyât, pp. 35, 36, and the book, Tahâfut al-Tahâfut, (the incoherence of the incoherence) by Ibn Rushd. Beirut edition, pp. 31, 32.)" ¹

¹. See Dr. Bişîr's thesis, pp. 16-19.
It is necessary to discuss here what al-Ghazali says about his predecessors, the doctors of Islam, and philosophy: "So far as I could see, none of the doctors of Islam had devoted thought and attention to philosophy. In their writings, none of the theologians engaged in polemic against the philosophers, apart from obscure and scattered utterances so plainly erroneous and inconsistent that no person of ordinary intelligence would be likely to be deceived, far less one versed in the sciences."¹

By these words al-Ghazali attacked his predecessors. He considers their writings to be of no value. His remarks about his predecessors, the doctors and theologians of Islam are not really true. The fact that none of their writings were a systematic answer to the philosophers is true. The reason was not the incapacity of the Muslim theologians, but the aggressive spirit, which prevailed against philosophy and against those who studied it. The latter were considered unbelievers, and sometimes were put to death. These answers rejected by al-Ghazali as "obscure and scattered utterances" are proofs at any rate that these did study philosophy.

As to the value of their writings, it cannot be denied that they are not organised in a coherent system. They are merely answers to some problems.

¹ Montgomery Watt: The Faith and Practice of al-Ghazali, p. 29
which the theologian mentions either in isolation or in connection with some others. That is the reason for the incoherence of the answers. The obscurity of these answers is rather external than internal. The importance of this is that if the obscurity is external, it means that it comes from the way they were presenting their answers, and not from the way of understanding the philosophical problems. It is very likely that the Muslim writers deliberately refrained from arranging the opinions they were refuting in any logical order or even formulating them correctly, in case the reader might be convinced by these opinions before he read the refutation. One of the Muslim authorities gave his opinion about this practice. His opinion is mentioned by al-Ghazâlî himself, who says: "Ahmad ibn Hanbal, once criticized al-Harith al-Muhâsibi (may God have mercy on them) for his book The Refutation of the Mu'tazilah. "It is a duty to refute heresy," al-Harith replied. "Certainly", said Ahmad, "but you first give an account of their false doctrines and afterwards a refutation of them. How can you be sure what men will do? A man might read the false doctrines and grasp them with his understanding, without turning afterwards to the refutation, or he might peruse the refutation without understanding its full import."  

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1. Montgomery Watt: The Faith and Practice of al-Ghazâlî, pp. 44, 45
This opinion must have been of great influence among the Muslims, because it will be noticed that this was the way they adopted in answering their opponents - the philosophers or the Mu'tazilites.

Al-Juwayni was one of those who followed this practice. His theological works, especially Ash-Shāmil, are full of such examples. They contain answers to separate problems raised by his opponents. Nobody can say that al-Juwayni was unable to arrange his opponents' points of view in logical order, for he did this thoroughly with the opinions of the adherents to his doctrine.

If it can now be accepted that the obscurity of the theologians' writings before al-Ghazālī was due to this fragmentary way of exposing their opponents' arguments, it will be seen that al-Ghazālī's words were unfair to his predecessors. If al-Ghazālī succeeded in changing the way of examining the opponents' arguments, this is due first of all to the fact that he placed himself above suspicion by writing The Incoherence of Philosophers and to the evolution of Muslim intellectuality. Slowly but surely al-Ghazālī managed to realise his aim. His words can thus be considered abusive. He was far from giving expression to the facts. He seems to have ignored the aggressive spirit against philosophy which his predecessors had.

1. Sham vol. 1, folio 39, 40 and 98, 99.
to reckon with, and he discounted the way in which they presented their opponents' opinions by saying: "Ahmad's observation is justified, but it applies to false doctrine, which is not widely and generally known. Where such doctrine is widely known, it ought to be refuted, and refutation presupposes a statement of the doctrine."¹

Al-Ghazālī was very severe in judging Muslim doctors and theologians. Al-Jumaylī and others may have studied philosophy as thoroughly as al-Ghazālī himself. The only difference was that the latter had greater opportunity of expressing his opinions openly. Even he was attacked later by a philosopher Averroes (Ibn Rushd) who said that the doctors of Islam should prevent ordinary Muslims from reading his books.²

1. Montgomery Watt: The Faith and Practice of al-Ghazālī, p. 45
2. Ibn Rushd: Fasl al-Maqāl, texte arabe, Gauthier, p. 21
Al-Juwayni left Naysābūr for Isbahan for a short time about the year 465 A.H., 1072 A.D.

It is noted of him that at the close of his life he wrote on the Shāfi‘ite legal rites, a book entitled Mīhāyat al-Mutah fi Dirayat al-Madhhab, a huge book of about twenty-two volumes.\(^2\)

It has been mentioned that, when Abū-l-Ḥasan 'Alī ibn Faḍlāl ibn ‘Alī al-Jāshī'ī, the linguist, came to Naysābūr in 469 A.H. al-Juwayni was humble enough to study grammar (nahw) under him and to examine his book entitled Ḳaṣṣ al-Hayth fi Sinā‘at al-Adab.

At that period of time al-Ḥāfiz al-Shirāzī\(^4\) came also to Naysābūr in connection with some administrative affairs. Al-Juwayni was also happy to receive this great Imam.

Al-Juwayni then fell seriously ill.\(^5\) He recovered, but a relapse followed. He asked to be transferred to Bushtingān because of its moderate climate, and shortly afterwards died in this village.

\(^1\) Subk. vol. 3, p. 255
\(^2\) See p. 257
\(^3\) Subk. vol. 3, p. 257
\(^4\) Ibid.
\(^5\) Ibid.

Imd. vol. 3, p. 360
The biographers say that he died in 478 A.H., 1085 A.D. Some of them specify the day and the time, the 25th of Rabī' ath-Thānī, 25th of August, 1085 A.D., in the evening at the age of 59.

He left behind him a son called Abū 'l-Qāsim, who died a few years after his father.

The great Imām was buried in his house, in Naysābūr the same evening, and it is said that his remains were later removed to the cemetery of al-Imām Ḫusayn.

My research into other records has brought no confirmation of his having been buried in this cemetery. If his mortal remains ever were removed from his house, it is very probable that they were buried in Karbila', as this city is closer to the place where he died than Cairo, these two cities being mentioned among the places of burial (Mashāhid) of al-Ḥusayn.

1. Imd: p. 358
   Nuğ: vol. 1, p. 12
   Sam: vol. 1, folio 124
   Subk. vol. 3, p. 257
   Munt. vol. 9, p. 20
   Waf. vol. 1, p. 362
   Waf. vol. 4, sect. 1, folio 38, 42
2. Subk. vol. 3, p. 257
   Munt. vol. 9, p. 20
   Waf. vol. 1, p. 362
3. Mikha'il-Dībānī: Al-Taqwīm al-ʿĀm, 1898 Hilal edition
4. Subk. vol. 3, p. 257
5. Ibid.
6. Yaq: Karbila'.
   Ibn Rushīd: Rihlah: The journey of al-Ḥāfīẓ b. Rushīd.- Egyptian Library, photostat no. 2376
7. A place of pilgrimage, west of the Euphrates about 60 miles S. S. W. from Basra, on the edge of the desert (Yağ v. 211 p. 249)
'Ali Pāchā Mubārak in his book, *Al-Khutat at-Tawfiqiyah*, says that there is a mosque called al-Juwaynī’s Mosque in Cairo in a small district called by al-Juwaynī’s name "Darb al-Juwaynī", situated in a bigger district called "ad-Darb al-Aḥmar." Above the door of this mosque a plaque bears the name of Muḥammad ‘Abd Allāh al-Juwaynī, who is the father of Imām al-Ḥaramayn. Beside this plaque, another one bears some details of Imām al-Ḥaramayn’s life, gathered, so it is said, by the servant of the mosque.

This mosque does not, however, appear to be registered among ancient mosques. Perhaps it is the mosque of an al-Juwaynī other than the Imām, or it may be a mausoleum raised as an expression of the admiration of the people of Egypt for Imām al-Ḥaramayn.

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1. 'Ali Bāchā Mubārak: *Al-Khutat al-Tawfiqiyah*, vol. 1, p. 100
2. It is to be noted that 'Ali ibn Yūsuf al-Juwaynī, a ṣūfī who was an uncle of Imām al-Ḥaramayn, visited Egypt. But it is not said that he died there. Subk. vol. 3, p. 215.
Chapter 2

Al-Juwaynî's Works
Chapter 2.

Al-Juwayni's Works

All the biographers of al-Juwayni are agreed that he was a prolific writer. As-Subki mentions twelve books of his, Yaqit three as being the most famous ones, Ibn Khallikân twelve, and Ibn al-Imâm seven. Brockelman in Geschicte der Arabischen Litteratur mentions nineteen, but probably two of these were written by the father. The Index of the Library of the League of Arab States, mentions Kitâb al-Kâfîyah fi-l-Jadal and a summary made by al-Juwayni of a book written by al-Baqillânî. As-Subki mentions two debates between al-Juwayni and ash-Shirâzi. The subject of the first is, the posture in prayer, and of the second, the marriage of the virgin.

In the theological part of one of al-Juwayni's books, entitled an-Nigâmiyyah fi-l-Arkân al-Islâmiyyah, which was separately edited by al-Shaykh Muhammad Zâhid al-Kawtharî in 1367 A.H., 1947 A.D., the Imam mentions another book written by himself. He

1. Subk. vol. 3, p. 253
3. Waf. vol. 1, p. 361
4. Imâm, p. 359
5. Brockelman, p. 368, appendix p. 671
7. Subk. vol 3, p. 275
8. Ibid., p. 278
says: "I wrote a book about the soul (an-Nafs), which contains about 1000 pages."\(^1\) The editor ash-Shaykh al-Kawtharî commented that in the first place a thousand pages was too much to write about the soul, and in the second place al-Juwaynî’s biographers do not mention such a work. He concluded that al-Juwaynî had never written it.\(^2\) This book is not mentioned by biographers, and it is not found in library indexes; but as al-Juwaynî mentions it himself, surely he wrote it. But as the subject of the book, as it appears, deals with philosophy, which many Muslim thinkers abhorred, they deliberately overlooked it, despite their veneration for al-Juwaynî. Al-Juwaynî also mentions in as-Shâmil fi usûl ad-Dîn,\(^3\) another book he wrote himself, Kitâb at-Talkhîs fi 'l-Uṣûl, which may be Kitâb Muhtasîr al-Irshâd | 'l-Ra'îllînî, summarized by al-Juwaynî, as mentioned in the Index of the League of Arab States. But that cannot be settled without examination of the microfilm copy of this manuscript, found in the Institute of the Revival of Ancient Manuscripts.

\(^1\) Add: p. 59. This work is referred by Dr. Farîd Jabre to al-Ghazâlî, which is not true. See La Notion de la Ma’rifat chez al-Ghazâlî, pp. 140, 141, and La Notion de la Certitude chez al-Ghazâlî, p. 11.
\(^2\) Add: p. 59.
\(^3\) Sham, vol. 1, folio 4.
of the League of Arab States, which, for administrative reasons, was not available for scrutiny. It may be that the summary is by al-Baqillānī himself and that al-Juwaynī tried to summarise it again.

Al-Khawansa'rī in his book, Rawdat al-Jannāt, also mentions Kitāb Talkhis at-Tagrib as one of al-Juwaynī's books. Al-Baqillānī's book, mentioned above, is also called by him, al-Irshād wa'l-Tagrib. So Kitab at-Talkhis fi 'l-usul, mentioned by al-Juwaynī in Ṣahih, may be the summary of one of al-Baqillānī's books.

Two biographer mention works of al-Juwaynī's which are missing in all libraries. The first, as-Subkī, mentions three books: al-Irshād fi usul-al-fiqh, which may be the summary of al-Baqillānī's book mentioned above; Diwan Khutab, which may be some recommendations to his son; and Mukhtasar an-Nihāyah.

The second, Ibn Khallikān, mentions Mukhtasar an-Nihāyah too and says that it was not completed by al-Juwaynī. He tells of another book, Madārik al-'Uqāil, and mentions that it also was unfinished, and last of all, Ghunyat al-Mustashfīdīn, which is not to be found in libraries.

2. Subk., vol. 3, p. 253
Another relevant manuscript has been pointed out to me by Dr. Umberto Rizzitano. It is part of a collection and is entitled Masā'il 'Abd al-Haqq as-Siqillī wa Ajwibatuhā li-'Imām al-Haramayn.1

Thus the number of al-Juwaynī's works is twenty-seven. Hereunder is a list of all the books of al-Juwaynī, arranged in Arabic alphabetical order:

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(Prof. Dr. Umberto Rizzitano, Lecturer in Rome and Heliopolis Universities, verified the collection, which is in old maghribī handwriting.)
1. Al-Irshād ilā Qawā'id al-Adillah fi Uṣūl al-I'tiṣād.
2. Al-Irshād fi Uṣūl al-fiqh (which may be Al-Talkhīs).
4. At-Talkhīs fi Uṣūl al-fiqh.
5. Al-Durrah al-Mudā'iyah fi mā waqe'a min Khilāf Bayn ash-Shāfī'iyyah wa 'l-Ḥanāfīyyah.
6. As-Silsilah fi Ma'rīfat al-Qawālīn wa 'l-Wajhān 'Alā Waqáhah ash-Shāfī'i.
7. Ash-Shāmīl fi Uṣūl ad-Dīn.
8. Dimān Khutab.
9. Risālah fi-1-Taqlīd wa 'l-Ijtihād.
10. Risālah fi-1-fiqh
11. Risālah fi Uṣūl ad-Dīn
12. Shīfā' al-Chalīl fi mā waqe'a fi-1-Tawrāt wa 'l-Injīl min at-Tabāl.
16. Qasīdah waqāyah Li-Tunīhil.
18. Kitāb ab-Nafs.
19. Inma' al-Adillah fi Qawā'id Ahl al-Sunnah wa 'l-Jamā'ah.
20. Al-Mujtahīdīn (min al-Taqīfīs fi Uṣūl al-fiqh.)
22. Masā'il 'Abd al-Haq al-Sīqillī wa ajwībatuhā Li Imām al-Haramayn.
25. Munāṣarat fī Zamāj al-Bikr.
27. Al-Waraqāt.

These works are scattered here and there in 'Iraq, India, Syria, Paris, London, Madrid, Berlin, Tubingen, Istanbul and other cities throughout the world. A great number are to be found in Egypt, some in the Egyptian National Library, some in the Institute of the Revival of Ancient Manuscripts of the League of Arab States, and in al-Azhar. Most of these works are manuscripts. Only five have been published. Three books, al-Waraqāt, al-'Aqīda an-Nisāmiyyah, and al Irshād ila Qawā'id al-adillah fi uṣūl al-I'tiqād, and two debates which are to be found in as-Subki’s Tabaqāt.

The works are classified below according to their subject matter. Chronological order was attempted but, as the works bear an approximate, and not an exact, date, this was not satisfactory.

The number put against each title refers to its position on the list above.¹

¹. See p. 57
Classification according to Subject:

I. Works in ('Usūl al-Figh)
   3. Al-Burhān fī Usūl al-Figh.
   27. Al-Waraqāt
   2. Al-Iṣrāḥ fī usūl al-Figh.

II. Works in (Usūl ed-Dīn).
   1. Al-Iṣrāḥ ilā Qawā'it al-Adillah.
   7. aḥ-Shāmil fī Usūl ed-Dīn.
   12. Shiḥād al-Ghalīl fī mā waqa'ā fī-1-Tawrat .......
   19. Luma' al-Adillah fī qawā'id 'aqā'id Ahl aẓ-Sunnah wa '1-Jamā'ah.

III. Works in (al fiqh)
   24. Munāẓarah fī '1-Ijtihād fī '1-Qiblah.
   25. Munāẓarah fī Zawaj al-Bikr.
   6. Aḥ-Silsilah fī Ma'rīfah al-Qaw lays wa 'l-wujhayn.
   10. Risālah fī 'l-fiqh.
   9. Risālah fī '1-Taqlid wa '1-Ijtihād.
IV. Works in (Khilaf)
   5. ad-Durrah al-Mudiyah fi wa Faqa'a Min Khilaf Beyn al-Shari'iyah wa 'l Hanafiyyah.
   15. Shuniat al Mustarshidin ff 'l Khilaf.

V. Works in (Jadal)

VI. Works in other subjects.
   16. Qasidah wagiyah li waladih.
   8. Diwan Khutab.

The description of these works follows in Arabic.
التصنيف بحسب الموضوعات

أن الموضوعات التي يمكن أن تتنوع بينها مصنفات إمام الحريمين
خمسة: اصول فقه، وأصول دين، وفقه، وخلاف، وعدل وصنفات...
أخرى:
أ - مصنفات في اصول الفقه

3 البرهان في اصول الفقه (1)

1 – كتاب البرهان في اصول الفقه لإمام الحريمين مصير فرغانة في
298 لوحة من نسخة مخطوطة بالكتابة البدرية (المدرسة
الモデبية بدمياط) وسطرة كل لوحة 11 سطر وكل سطر به
15 كلمة بخط النسخ الصرح، وهو في قسيم ولتأريخ كتابته
واحدة:

"بسم الله الرحمن الرحيم رب يسر يا كريم
الحمد لله رب العالمين والصلاة على خير خلقه محمد وآله قال
الشيخ الإمام أبو المعالي إمام الحريمين رض الله عنه: حق
على كل من يحاول الخوض في فن من فنون العلم أن يحيط
بالنصوص منه والمواد التي منها يستد الفن حقيقته وحده
ان ابتكر عبارة سديدة على صناعة الحد، وأن عسران يحاول
الدرك بسلك التقسيم، والخوض من ذلك أن يكون الامتداع على
تعلم مع حظ من العلم الجميل بالعلم الذي يحاول الخوض
فيه. فاصول الفقه مستندة من الكلام العربية واللغة والكلام
تعني به معرفة العالم واقامه وحقائق وحديده والعلم بحدهه

1. This work was considered by many Muslims a

     difficult work. (see Subk. p. 274)
ما يجبله من الصفات وما يستحيل عليه وما يجوز في حقه والعلم بالنبوات وتميزها بالمعجزات عن نعوى السبطين وإحكام النبوات والقول فيما يجوز ويسع من كليات الشرع ولا يتسدد المطلوب من الكلام تحت حد وهو يستد من الإحاطة بالسيز بين المعلم وما عداء من الاعتقادات والعلم بالفرق بين البراهين والشبهات ودرك سالك النظر ومن مواج اصول الفقه العربية فأنه يتعلق طرف صالح منه بالكلام على مقتضى الاتفاق.

(لوحة 2 من سطر 1 - 12)

ثم يتم الكلام في اللوحات التي تلي هذه المقدمة ويتخلله لوحات بها بيض من الصل وليست له أبوب ولا فصول ظاهرة يمكن الوقوع بها للامن الا النادر القليل لعدم محاولة كاتبهما اظهار الأبواب او الفصول بالكتابة حتى انتهينا الى السطر الأول منها في نهاية فصل في الفرق بين النسخ والتخصيص.

في السطر السابع منها يقول:

تم الكتاب وقد نجز بهدم الامن وحسن توثيقه الغرض من هذا المجموع في الاصل ونحن نرسم بعد ذلك مستعينين بالله تعالى كتابا جامعا في الاجهاد والتفويق يقع صفا برأسه وتنمية لهذا الموضوع.

وهنا ينتهي الكتاب بدون ذكر التاريخ أو اسم الناشر وهو في قسمين مجلدين الأول في 187 لوحه وثاني من لوهه 188 الى 398 وهو محفظة برم 214 اصول الفقه بدار الكتب.
العصرية بالقاهرة

ب - يوجد منه نسخة بالخط السليم الجيد الحديث في ٢٦٨ ورقة كبيرة مسطرة ٢٣ سطور وละستة كلمات كل سطر ٩ كلمات محفوظة بالكتابة الإزهارية برقم ١٠٤ أصل القلم وهي تختلف عن النسخة المجلوبة في كبر من المبادئ ونسخة الإزهار تمتاز بالشماخ والتقسيم والمغذة الأسرع والخط الثلث الجميل.

آخر نسخة الإزهار كنسخة المكتبة المكية بدبيات ٦ ذكر اسم ناسخها وتاريخ نسخها.

وكان الفرغ من كتابة هذا اليوم الجماعة الرابع والعشرين من شهر جمادي الثاني سنة ثلاثمائة وثمان وثلاثين بعد الالف سنة الهجرة النبوية، وذلك بعلم كتابة الفقيه رهذي الحليه محمد أبو النهرين عليه غفر الله له ووالديه وجميع المسلمين.

وأهم الموضوعات هي:

فصل يجمع التكلف ومصغرة وتقسيم كل ما يجوز التكلف به ورقة ٦ قول في الجملة ومدركة وكتابها وثانيها ٨ طال إلى ٢٠ وقول في الجملة marshal الكلام في هذا الفصل يتعلق بثلاثة فئات ٢٠ - ٤٦ - ٢٣ فظ.

كتاب الابراهيم ٤٦ و ٤٦ طال باب القول في النواحي ٥٥ طال كتاب العلوم والخصوم ٥٥ - ٩٩ و ١ - ٢٨ و ٢٨ والأسئلة الاستثناء ٢٦ و ٢٨ و
القول في الفهم 90-99 و
القول في اعمال الرسول صلى الله عليه وسلم 99-104
القول في التعلق بشائع الماضي 104-106 و
كتاب التأويلات 106 و 148 و
كتاب الأخبار 121 و 148 و
القول في الخبر والمتأثر 121 و 126 و
كتاب الإجماع 126 و 128 و
كتاب القياس 126 و 138 و
كتاب الراجحات 126-138 و
كتاب النسخ 126 و 138
ورد في بروكلين أن نسخة الأزهر هي شرح كتاب البرهان
والواقع أنها نسخة من كتاب البرهان ليست شرحا له، كما
تبين ذلك.

الشرح:

1- يوجد شرح في "ناس" "ثورين" برم 1397 باسم "كتابة
طلب البيان شرح البرهان" ولا يعرف اسم الشاعر.
2- كما توجد نسخة أخرى من هذا الشرح في مكتبة بروكلين،
بهوتسم برم 807 بالفهرس الجديد.
3- وذكر السبک ثلاثة شرح على كتاب البرهان: أولها شرح الإمام
اي عبدالله المازري ولم يقم العمل عليه أيضا مشكلات وورد أن
المازري شرح "ايضاح الحصول مبن مبرهنة الاسول" ولم
نتعرف على هذا النهج في نهارس الكتب (1) وثاني شرح ابي الحسن الامامري من المالكية، وثالث شرح شخص معروف اسمه، الشريف أبو بيجي جمع بين الشرحيين (2) ولم نتعرف على ذكر هذه الشرح في نهارس المخطوطات.

2 - "المجتهدون" (من التلخيص في أصول الفقه).

وهو نقل في 22 لوحة وسطه 41 سطر وكل سطره 21 كلمة بخط النسخ المستند ولا تاريخ لكتابته. وله "اسم الله الرحمن الرحيم" بين بعض كتاب المجتهدين وليس هو من الام ائمة هو من التلخيص في أصول الفقه تأليف الامام ابن المعاذ الجيني رحم الله. كتاب المجتهدين وذكر القول في تصوب المجتهدين علماً وسلم الله ان ما يجوز فيه كلام العلماء ينتمي إلى السائل القطعية والسائل الاجتماعية المرتبة من ادلة القطع قاطع العقلية وهي تنص فيها أملاقطع على الاستقلال. وفضلاً على المطلب من غير انتصار الى تقرر الشرع وذلك معظم مسائل العفائية نحو أثبات محدث (1) وثم يستمر الكلام في اللوحات التي تلي هذه. ولا يوجد لوحات بها بيض ولا يست له أبواب وصول ظاهرة.

(1) انظر هـ 1 من ص 334 من هذا البحث.
(2) السبكي، طبقات الشافعي الكبرى ص 32.
(3) ورد في فهارس جامعة الدول العربية. عن هذا الصنف. يصيغ عام 569 هـ.
وان عدد اوراقه 30 وقمة وقث بيت بالبحث من تاريخ النسخ لم يذكر. وان عدد اللوحات 22 لوحة كما انشأنا ذلك في اعلاه.
وفي لحظة 23 ظ بنتهي الكتاب بفقرة تبدأ: "قيل عن عبدالله بن عمر بن الحاس، قال الناس على النار رجّان تحفظ أبوها وذلك بعد أن يلحن فيها احتفاها وقال الشهبي عن الطبري عن ابن عباس قال بأمر الله وذكر الزهرى 000...

وينتهي اللوحة بعنوان: "صفف آخر من مصنفات أئم الحرمين

وهو "المفهمة النظامية في الأركان الإسلامية"

وينتهي الكتاب بدون ذكر التاريخ أو اسم الناشئ وهو محفوظ برقم 1427/16 فليم 16 بعهد أحياء المخطوطات القديمة

بجامعة الدول العربية 000

الوقتـ 000

هذا الصنف مطبع طبعات عديدة متداخلة وصنف إحدى النسخ الخاطئة التي توجد بدار الكتب المصرية برقم 050 مجمّع.

هذا الصنف يتكون من خمس ورقات حجم كل ورقة 076 اسم ورقة 10 سطر وكل سطر 15 كلمة. والورق قديم ومتأمل ولا يوجد هامش بل تملّع الكتابة الورقة باكلها والخط نسخ محطّة واوله باسم الله الرحمن الرحيم وعلى الله اسم:

سيدنا محمد 000...

هذه ورقات تشمل على معرفة فصول من أصول الفقه ينتفع بها المهتدي فيهر، وذلك من جزئين:

فلاصل ما بني عليه غيره والفرع ما بني على غيره. والفقهـ
معرفة الأحكام الشرعية التي طرحتها الاجتهاد والأحكام سبعة

الخ

ويستقر الكلام في الورقات التي تلي هذه القمزة وليس بالورقات هوأسما أو نراح ففي الورقة الأخيرة ينتهي الصفف بهذه الكلمات "وله صلى الله عليه وسلم من اجتهاد واصابه فله اجر وان اجتد واخطائه فله اجر واحد وخالد ان النبي صلى الله عليه وسلم خطا المجتهد تارة وصية اخرى على الله على الله صلى الله عليه وسلم".

وقد هذا الصفف نسخ عديدة منها نسخة ببرلين ب الرقم 458 و 459 اخرى بها بطري ب رقم 128 و ثالث ببريس رقم 172 الرسالة الخامسة يوجد بالمحف البريطانى نسخة ضمن مجموعة الرسالة الثالثة ب رقم 254 اخرى ضمن مجموعة ايفان الرسالة الثالثة ب رقم 557 كما ان هناك نسخة بالجزائر ب رقم 113 الرسالة الثالثة ونسخة بالاسكويال في اسبانيا بالمرس الجديد رقم 40 و 41 ونسخة بليزي ب رقم 82 ونسخة بأميريكانا ب رقم 115 ان كتاب الرابع ونسخة بالفاتيكان ب رقم 1451 و يوجد نسخة عديدة بالقاهرة بالرقم التالية: 155 مجموعات 108 نسخ

الورقات: 175 - 176 - 761 - 552

شروط كتاب الورقات: 1 - ان شرح هذا الصنف عديدة ولها نسخ كبيرة : نشخ الورقات
لبيد الرحمن بن إبراهيم بن الفركح المخفي عام ٨٨٠ هـ منه نسخ في
برلين برقم ٤٣٣٠ ونسخة بغوتا برقم ١٦٦ ونسخة بونهنج برم ١٠٨
وأيضاً بباريس برقم ١٨٨ السالسة الثانية كما أن بالظافر البريطاني
نسختين: الأولى برقم ١٥٨ السالسة الثالثة وثانية برم ٢٥٦ بالملحق.

٢ - وتن جلال الدين بن محمد بن أحمد الجلي المخفي عام ٨٩٠ هـ
منه نسخة ببرلين برقم ٤٣٦١ ونسخة بغوتا برم ١١٢ والرسالسة الثانية.
ونسخة بالظافر البريطاني ٢٥٧ ونسخة بimas جرخ ١٥٢ ونسخة
بالاسكويلاف الفهري الجديد ١٠٢ السالسة الأولى، الأخرى بنفس الكتابة
برقم ٥٥ السالسة السادسة كما يوجد بكتبة جرخ ١١١ ونسخة برم ١٦٠ السالسة الأولى.
وتنجد بكتبة بلدية الاسكويلاف نسخة برم ١٥٠ ونسخة جزء علم، ونسخة
تحوى مكتبة القاهرة عدة نسخ ذكرت بالجزء الثاني من الفهري القديم.
برقم ١٨٤ السالسة الأولى ونسخة بغوتا برقم ٤٥٧ ونسخة بباريس برقم
١٧٩٨ ونسخة بباريس برقم ١٨٢٩ ونسخة بباريس برقم ١٨٢١ ونسخة
١٨٤ السالسة بالآصفية حيدرabad المكن بالهند من فهري برقم
١٧٢٥ بالجملة ١٤٦٠.

٣ - وتن جرة عين لحمد بن محمد الوعيي الخطاب المالكي برقم
٩٥٢ هـ منه نسخة بغوتا برقم ٢٣٤ ونسخة بالاسكويلاف برقم ٢٠٢ السالسة الخامسة.
ونسخة بالجزائر برقم ٤١٣ السالسة السادسة ونسخة بباريس برقم
١٣٨ السالسة بالجزائر برقم ١٦٣ السالسة السادسة ونسخة بالاسكويلاف برقم
١٣٢ السالسة السادسة ونسخة بالجزائر برقم ٤١٣ السالسة السادسة.
ونسخة بالجزائر برقم ٥٣٤ السالسة السادسة ونسخة بباريس برقم
١٤٩٨ السالسة السادسة ونسخة بالجزائر حيدرabad توين ١٠٠ و٦٦.
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٢ - شرح محمد بن محمد بن عبد الرحمن بن امك الكاملية التفوقي
عام ٨٧٤ هـ. توجد منه نسخة بريلر برقم ٤٣٦٨ ونسخة بالاسكندرية أصل رقم ١٢ ونسخة
الرسالة الثانية ونسخة بالاسكندرية. أصل رقم ١٨ ونسخة
اخرية بنفس المكتبة: فنون رقم ١٦١ الرسالة الثانية ونسخة بالقاهرة
الفهرس القديم جزء ٢ رقم ٢١١ ونسخة بليدزج برقم ٨٥٤ ونسخة
بالموصل برقم ١١٣ - ١٥٩ الرسالة الثانية.

٥ - وشرح أحمد بن محمد الدمياطي الشافعي طبع القاهرة عام
١٣٠٢ هـ

٦ - وشرح أحمد بن محمد بن الناصح الميادى القاهر التفوقي عام
١١٤٤ هـ. توجد منه نسخة باسم الناصح الكبير بريلر برقم ٤٤٧٣ ونسخة
١٣٦٤ بالاسكندرية. أصل رقم ٤٥ ونسخة 
الرسالة الأولى ونسخة باسم الناصح الكبرى بالبيعة دمشق عمومية
١١٦٨ رقم ٥٨ /٥٠ ونسخة بتونس الريتية ج.٤ ص ٢٩ برقم ٢/١٨٦١ ونسخة
اخرية نفس المكتبة برقم ٢٩ - ١٨٦٢ - ونسخة باسم شرح
صغير بريلر برقم ٤٣٩٥ ونسخة بالاسكندرية أصل ص ١٨ - ونسخة
١٠٩ أحمد بن أحمد السماطي التفوقي عام ١٩٩ هـ بريلر برقم ٤٣١٦ ونسخة بالجزائر برقم
١٨٦٨ الرسالة الثانية ونسخة فيها قلخي علي باشا
٦١٠ استامبول و هناك أحمد بن سلامة القليبي التفوقي عام ١٩٧٠ هـ
بريلر نسخة رقم ٤٣٦٧ ونسخة بالاسكندرية أصل برقم ١٨

٧ - وشرح الشواكي ارشاد الفحول طبع عام ١٤٤٦ هـ
ويوجد شرح ارشاد الفحول لسعد الدين الخنازري متوفي
عام ٢٩١ هـ. منه نسخة بباريس رقم ٥٣١١ ونسخة بالجزائر برقم ٥٥٩ الرسالة.
8 - وشرح غاية الأمول لفرز الدين أبو العباس أحمد بن أحمد الرشيد المكتوب عام 557 هـ توجد منه نسخة بباريس رقم 5049.

9 - وشرح عمر بن عبد الرحمن بن الصلاح المكتوب عام 143 هـ توجد منه نسخة باستامبول سليم أغا رقم 119 ونسخة براتغور بالبرتغال رقم 75.

10 - وشرح باسم غاية المرام بشرح مقدمة الأئمة أحمد بن محمد بن زكريا توجد منه نسخة بالقاهرة الفهرس الجديد ج1 ص 39.

11 - وشرح لطيف الإشارة إلى تفسير القرآن في الأصول الفقهية لعبد الحليم بن محمد المصري (1) طبع سنة 1320 هـ وهو نسخة.

12 - نسخ ذي النفد النفوسي محمد مصطفى مكاي يطبع على حجر في قسنطن عام 1241 هـ.

13 - كلمات في أصول الفقه مع شرح في الجريانا برقم 50 وقديم كتب على هذه النسخة مقالة في مجلة 800 م (2) المجلد السابع ص 124 ولماسينيين مقالة عنه في مجلة إسلامية سنة 1445 المجلد الثالث ص 405.

(1) النهج ابن المجيرطي
(2) Rivista Degli Studi Orientali
14 - وضح باسم الدور الصريح في نظم الورقات لحمد بن محمد بن الشريف توجد منه نسخة بالقاهرة القبرس الجديد جزء 1 صفحة 485
15 - وضح باسم الشامل بحقائق الأدلة العقلية وصول المسائل الدينية توجد منه نسخة بالقاهرة القبرس الجديد جزء 1 بالملحق ص 22 تحت عنوان الشامل في أصول الدين.

23 - كتاب مختصر الخلق في اختيار (1) الأحق.

تأليف حجة الإسلام وحبر الأئمة وبحر التحقيق الحافظ الأئمة الكبير ناصر دين الله الأمام أبي العلامة عبدالمالك بن الإمام العلامة أبي محمد عبدالله بن يوسف الجويني الثاني قدم الله تعالى أرواحهم وله أظهرهم في ترجيح مذهب الإمام الإمام الملك لإبداع الحق في الشرع العام أبي عبدالله محمد بن ادريس الثاني رضي الله تعالى عنه وارضوا به محمد رضي الله آمين.

مخططة في ورق حديث بخط نسخ وحجم الورق المتوسط وسörtت
19 ستر وكل سطر 8 كلمات وهو من وقفات مكتبة السيد أحمد الحسيني.
في شهر سبتمبر 1921م وعدد أوراته 33 ورقة وسörtت 19 ستر.
واوله: ورقة 1.

بسم الله الرحمن الرحيم على الله على سيدنا محمد رضي الله عليه وسلم قال الامام الكبير تفر الإسلام سلطان العلم، حبر الامة وحور

(1) قال الجويني في لوحة: من هذا الصف سبته "مختصر الخلق" في اختيار الأحق وهي النسخة التي اتبعت لـ هذا الصف
السيرة امام الحسين ابن المحالبي عبدالمالك بن الامام أبي محمد عبد الله

ابن يوسف الجوهري قبض الله ارحاهم

الحمد لله الذي خص من شاء من الامام بإعلام الأدلة والإسلام

وفيهم لمعرفة قواعد الأحكام وسهل لهم سبيل الأدلة على تناصيل الحلال

والحرام ليهمدى في المشكلات شالهم 

وقد ذلك مقدمه يليها اسئلة واجبيتها في فصول مميتة بالمداد

الاحمر وستمر الكتاب على ذلك حتى ظهر وقعة 230 فتقوم يقول في

آخر سطر من وجهها:

واربد في هذا الكتاب الموجز من العجب العجاب ليباب

الالباب ما تحاربه العقول السليمة والاذهان المستقية مع مراعاة

الانصاف وساحة الامتنان والله اعلم بوجه الصواب واحد لله وآخرا

والصلاة على خير خلقه مجد ظاهرا واطننا الله اغفر للملسنين

والسلمات وافغروا لي وللنا وجميع المؤمنين والمؤمنات.

ولا يوجد تاريخ كتابتها ولا اسم ناسبتها وهي مخطوطة برقم

458 اصول الفقه بدار الكتب المصرية بالقاهرة.

وبهذا المخطوطة نسخ عديدة فوجد في بريدين نسخة برقم 4852

وبهار نسخة أخرى ب رقم 5897 كما ان ملحق فيرس المتحف البريطاني

يشير إلى نسخة ثالثة ب رقم 1241 وهي الرسالة الأول - ومكتبة

الاسكندرية توجد نسخة ب رقم اصول 40 - وما دار الكتب المصرية...

858 اصول الفقه الذي وصفناه فان بها ثلاث نسخ أخرى الأول ب رقم

40 م اصول الفقه والثانية 227 م مجموع والثالثة 56 تيمور.

وقد كتب المرحوم الشيخ محمد زاهر الكحلاوي عن هذا التصفيف
كتبه: "احتكاق الحق ببطال البطل في مغيب الخلق" القاهرة 
سنة 1940

21 - مختصر الارشاد للباقلاني اختصره إمام الحريم

ذكر هذا الصف في فهرس جامعة الدول العربية رقم 211
علم كلام وقد حاولت التكرار أن أصل إلى هذا الصف لالحاس
عليه ولكن كانت هناك أسباب خاصة بالمجد حالت دون ذلك
ولاحظ أن الباقلاني كتاب عوانه "الارشاد في اصول الفقه" به كبر اختصره
الباقلاني نفسه (1) ويجوز أن إمام الحريم قد اختصره أيضا خصوصا
وان الخوانسارى يذكر في روايات الجبال من مؤلفات إمام الحريمين
تلميذ التكرب وفي اعتقاداتنا أنه هو والكتاب المعروف "التلخيص في
الاصول" كتاب واحدLAN الباقلاني يسمي كتابه في اصول الفقه الارشاد
والتكرب.

4 - كتاب التلخيص في الأصول

2 - الارشاد في اصول الفقه (ويقال يكون هذا الكتاب هو كتاب
التلخيص ومختصر الارشاد المذكران أعلاه)

____________________________

(1) انظر هامش (2) من صفحة 50 من هذا البحث
1 - الارشاد إلى قواعده الادلة في اصول الاعتقاد

هذا الصفح مطبوع حقق وعليك وقدم له فهله الدكتور محمد يوسف موسى والسيد علي عبد النور عبد الحميد ومن قبلهم
مع ترجمة فرنسية سنة 1938 في باريس

وللهذا الصفح مخطوطات عديدة توجد نسخة بلندن برم 1883
ونسخة بالمتحف البريطاني برم 1748 ونسخة ثانية بالجزائر برم 116
كما تحتوي مكتبة الاستكرال على نسخة برم 1500 ونسخة بنفس الديرين
بكرم 1520 ووجود بقاهره بالفهرس الجديد جزء واحد، وهناك نسخة
بكرم 1519 علم كلام وآخر برم 1529 علم كلام و152 علم كلام ونسخة
بالاحمدية بحلب برم 714 كا توجد نسختان اخرى باستيوال بقهرس
المخطوطات بجامعة الدول العربية في باريس، زوجه 508

شرح الارشاد إلى قواعده الادلة في اصول الاعتقاد

1 - يوجد شرح ابراهيم بن يوسف بن محمد بن المرأة المتوفي علم
116 ه بالقاهره الفهرس القديم ج 3 ص 58 ولفهرس الجديد جزء
1 صفحة 188

وقد عثرنا أثناء البحث على مخطوطة قديمة لم تضاف إلى رصيد
دار الكتب المصرية بعد وتبينا أنها جزء من شرح ابن المرأة على الارشاد
وصف هذه المخطوطة هو:
مخطوطة قديمة مخزنة البداية والنهاية ولا يوجد ترتيبها.
ولا يسبق أن هذه المخطوطة قد جمعت اوراقها وترتيب جزائها ان قد
ورد اول 18 وعبارة تظهرنا على مدى الاضطراب في ترتيب الورقة
تيل: """"... كما تقدم به اوراق حديث العالم """" وبمغى ان
باب حديث العالم متقدم على الورقة التي ذكرت بها هذه الحجة
والحقيقة حسب الترتيب الذي وجدت عليه ورقات المخطوطة ان باب حديث
العالم يقع في لـ 183 او 184 بعد تلك الحجة وليس قبلها ورق
المخطوط قدما وشاكلا بعض الشيء وسماه لونه الى الاحترار وحجم الورقة
27 سم x 40 سم وطول السطر حوالي 15 سم وفي كل سطر 12 كلمة
والخط نسخ ولا يوجد باشا بالمخطوطة وسأرض ابوات وصول هذا
المخطوطة حسب الترتيب الذي وجدت عليه
يبدأ المخطوطة بكلام لا يقع تحت فصل حتى ورقة 10 او 11 ثم تبدأ
الفصل
ورقة 10: "فصل في استحالة كون الرب تعالى جوهرًا والتصيص على
نكت في الرد على الشماري"
ورقة 12: "باب اثبات العلم بالصفات المعنية"
ورقة 57: "فصل قلت رحمه الله البارى سبحانه وتعالى سمعي بصير
عند أهل الحق واختلفت مذاهب: اهل البعد والاهواء".
ورقة 71: قال (رح) باب القول في اثبات العلم بالصفات
ورقة 24: "فصل في اثبات الاحوال والرد على ميكرها
ورقة 109: قال (رح) فاما الفصل الثاني (نبوءة مكرمة على تعليــ
اللوجب)."
ورقة 121: قال أبو المحالي (رح) ذهب جميع اثبات علم حادثة
للرب تعالى عن قول البطنين وهم أن المخلوقات إذا تجددت
حدث الباري تعالصة علامة متجددًا بها يعلم المخلوقات
الثالثة.
ورقة 126 ظ: "فصل في حقيقة الكلام وحده وسنهاء
ورقة 148 و: "ثم قال (رح) شيبة للمخاليفين
ورقة 179 ظ: فصل قوله (رح) العقل علوم ضرورية إلى آخر الفصل
ورقة 182 ظ: باب القول في حديث العالم.
ورقة 205 ظ: باب أئتات حدوث الأعراض وهو الأصل الثاني من حديث العالم
ورقة 214 و: باب بيان استحالة تعرى الجوهر عن الأعراض والأصل
الثالث من حديث العالم
انتهى المخطوطة.

وقد ظهر بالبحث كما أثبتنا ذلك أن هذه المخطوطة هي أول
من شرح ابن المرأة على كتاب الاستعداد لامام الحريمين. فقد قارنت بين
فصل شرح ابن المرأة وهو شرح إبراهيم بن يوسف بن محمد بن المرأة
الثري في عام 111 هـ وهي مخطوطة قديمة يرمى 18 كلم بدار الكتاب
المصرية وهي من خمسة مجلدات، وبين فصول هذا المخطوطة تطابقت
تتقلب بينهما في كثير من المواضيع تذكر على سبيل المثال تطابق النصين
في:
"فصل قوله (رح) العقل علوم ضرورية" وذلك في ل 741 من الجملة
الثاني من شرح ابن المرأة للإرشاد المشار إليه أعلاه والذي يحمل رقم 18
بكل كلمات الكتاب المصرية، ول 171 ظ من المخطوطة، الذي نحن بصدده
نحن، ويستمر تطابق الكلام بين النسختين.

نفق
والامر بالشئ في:

"باب القول في حديث العالم" وذلك في (ل 80) من المجلد
الاول من نحن ابن المراة للارشاد رقم 1 علم كلم ور 180 يمـ
المخطوطة القديمة وکون هذه المخطوطة بناء على ما نقدم جزء من شرح
بن المراة للارشاد.

2 - ونحن آخر باسم "الفتح" لحزين الضفرين في الشافعي
بالمجزائر برم 117

3 - وله مختصر في الجزائر أيضا برم 118

4 - ونحن "الاسلام على الارشاد" والمؤلف غير معروف ووجود بقاس
قرويين برم 1574

5 - وذكر صاحب كشف الظنون ان هناك شرح لتلميذ امام الحرمين
ابي القاسم سلمان ابن ناصر الانصارى المتوفي عام 515 هـ

6 - كما ورد في مرسى جامعة الدول العربية طبعة 1954 ص 130
شرح الارشاد لامام الحرمين تأليف أبي بكر بن ميمون وهي نسخة
كتبت في سنة 782 بخط نسخ واضح فيلم رقم 143 صور على
نسخة في مكتبة أحمد الثالث

7 - ونحن بعنوان "کت الارشاد في الاعتقاد" تأليف ابي اسحق
ابراهم بن يوسف بن محمد بن دهان الاوي المالي التونسي
عام 1116 ه الجزء الأول من نسخة كتب في 739 هد فلا عن
نسخة المؤلف رقم الفيلم 139 ووجود به نسخة بدار الكتب
المصرية 6 علم كلم - 243 ف
11 - رسالة في أصول الدين

لم ييسر لي الاطلاع عليها . فوجد منها نسخة بباريس برمم 122
الرسالة الخامسة ضمن مجموعة

2 - الشامل في أصول الدين

مصروف فتوفياً في 577 لومة شربة غزيرة عن نسخة خطية قديمة
بالاستثناء وكل لومة بحجم 23 سم × 17 سم بكل منها 30 سطر وطول
السطر 13 سم والخط شفاف وتاريخ النسخ عام 1112 ه واره ناقد
بقدار كرامة (1) وبدء الكلام فيه بقول الأم الحميين

... ولا بد من ما وانع الشتاتي المعاني دون الملاحظات
قبل شمل يشرط علم العلم في صحة النظر تبلي عن إضافة اضداده
فكان شرط في وجود النظر عدم دفع والعلم انتقاد محسوس بالانتفاح لا
يجتن شرطاً 12218 الخ.

(1) تبين بتطبيق هذا المصنف بالنسخة الخطية لكتاب "الشامل في اختصار
الدل" لإبن الامير وهو مختصر لكتاب الشامل فيلم رقم 188 بجمعية
الدول العربية "انظر صفحة 89 من هذا الفصل" ان الجزء المخط ناقد
بداية مصدر الأم الحمدين لا يعود إلى بعض صفحات او كراسة كما قلنا إذ
ان ابن الامير يقر في ل أر حيث بدأ اختصاره للشامل "النظر في
اللغة بمعنى الرؤية ومعنى الانتظار ومعنى الورقة والوجهة 2" الى ان
يقول في لوة 37 "فصل إذا تم النظر ولم يحصل فيه آفة تضـلاع
للعلم كان مثبطاً للعلم 123" وهذا الفصل يوجد في ص 3 من كتاب
الشامل لامام الحمدين نسخة رقم 1241232 بدار الكتب المصرية.
ثم يستمر الكلام في اللوحات التي تلي هذه الفقرة وتخلله لوحات بياض وله أبواب وصول ظاهرة حوالي 113 فيما بين أبواب وسائل واجهة وصول. ويتبنى الكلام بالجملة الآتية:

"وقد بقي من رواية الخليل يابان أحدهما في ذكر العجائبات التالية للحدود والثاني في ذكر الحقائق والحدود والله المؤن للصواب."

كل الجزء الأول من شامل ثلاثة خلوا من شوال سنة 202 هـ (610) عشر وستون سنة كتب العبد الفقيم إلى الله تعالى برح بس

محمد بن موسى بن محمود بن محمد بن علي الانصاري الخزازجي يلقوه في الثاني. 

ولاحظ أن الجزء الثاني هذا مفقود والصور محفوظ برمود 1390 علم كلم بدار الكتب المصرية.

وهناك نسخة متصلة عن المصور الفلسفيي السباق الديك الاصورة من نسخة الآستانة نقلت بخط حديث في مجلدين. ويتبنى المجلد الأول الذي يحوى 938 صفحة ببداية الفصل الثالث

"يشتمل على نص الدلالة على شريعة القادر وينطي على مصدر تعليل القدرة القديمة بما لا يتأهث من المقدارات". وفي ذلك ختم دار الكتب المصرية.

اما المجلد الثاني من كتاب الشامل فإنه يبدأ بالفصل الثالث بالفترة التي انتهى منها المجلد الأول ويتبني في صفحة 521. الفترة التالية:

"...ثم نص كتاب الشامل للخزيني وقد نقله بخط من النسخة المشرفة الموجودة بدار الكتب المصرية التي صار بها جمع تأريخسجل في نسبه بن الخطاب. وكان الغراغ منه في بيض الثلاثة عدد 1117 الحجة سنة 1368 هـ"
الموافق 11 أكتوبر سنة 1949 م
والحمد لله رب العالمين

وفي ظهر هذه الصفحة الأخرى من النسخة الصورة أى بصفة
من المجلد الثالث من النسخة المنسوخة حديثا
524/كتاب الآتي :

"وهذا نص ما وجد بشبة الكتاب "

والعبارة مكتوبة داخل مستطيل يشير إلى الكتاب بالاستعانة سـ
خم دار الكتب المصرية. وهذه النسخة النقلة رقمها 4223 ب
وقد اوردنا فهرسا لتحوي كتاب شامل و자rain الصفحات التي في
مقابل الآبواب والقصص والسلسل والاسئلة والاجابة هي ارقام صفحات
النسخة النقلة من مخطوطات الاستناد أى النسخة التي تحمل رقم
4223 ب دار الكتب المصرية.

فصل 300 العلم بالنظر في يناد النظر
فصل: أعلم أن النظر إذا تأخر بشرط من شرائطه فلا يقضى

بالعلم

فصل: يفصلون بين جلي النظر ردقيه
فصل: إذا نصبت دليلًا في حدث العالم فالدليل حدث العالم

فصل: إذا نصمت القول بالاحرال
فصل: النظر يتضمن العلم
فصل: العلوم النظرية تتبع مقدمة مكتسة للعباد
فصل: إضفاء النظر على حكم الصحة
فصل: النظر والاستدلال المؤديان إلى معرفة الله واجبان
فصل: ما الدليل على وجب من جهة الشرع

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1. It is to be noticed that the numbering of the pages
in this Index of Abu-Sha'ban is of the copy written
in the 11th of October 1949. This copy became unrecorded
later. It was in the hands of another scholar.
فصل: ما أول واجب على المكلف
فصل: لما بدأ الحال في أول حالة التكليف إلى النظر
من غير تهيئة في النظر فاقتصره النية قبل انتهاه
النظر كما قرّكم فيه.
فصل: القول في حدث العالم.
فصل: الفضيلة في الشيء وحقيقة.
فصل: فتاوى الدليل على نسب مذهب المحتزلة.
فصل: شبهه للمحتزلة.
فصل: في الرد على التصفيق من معتزلة البصرة.
فصل: في ذكر أن المباهرون معلوم عند أهل الحق.
فصل: القول في ذكر أقسام الموجودات.
فصل: حقائق الجوهر.
فصل: اتفاق الاسلميين على أن الأحياء تناهي في تجدبها.
فصل: مسألة الجوهر عند أهل الحق.
فصل: الجواب ما قاله من اوجه أولى بالأمر.
فصل: نقل ما من ضرب من ضروب الإعراب.
فصل: مسألة: الجوهر متجانسة عند أهل الحق.
فصل: الجوهر عن ذلك.
فصل: في التحزي.
فصل: الجوهر القرب لا شكل له.
فصل: الجوهر غير متقر إلى المكان.
فصل: الجوهر باق غير متعدد.
فصل: الجواهر لا تتداخل
فصل : هل ينقسم كل خط اليه تصفين
فصل: للجواهر صفات واجبة وصفات جائزة
القول في ائثات الاعراض
الجواب
سؤال آخر
الجواب عن ذلك
فصل: هذه الدلالة لا تستقيم على اصول المعتزلة
فصل: من اهم ما يتعلق الاحاطة به ان يعلم ان ضرها
من الاعراض تتضمن دوافعها اضطراراً ومحاولة
الادلة على ائثاتها حيد عن التحقيق
القول في ائثات حديث الاعراض
سؤال
سؤال
فصل: هذا الأصل الذي مبدئاه لا يستقيم على اصول المعتزلة
فصل في ائثات استحالة عدم القدم
فصل في ائثات استحالة قيام الاعراض بالعرض
فصل: فان قيل ما دليلك على استحالة قيام الاعراض بنفسه
القول في الاص للثالث وهو يستقيم على ائثات استحالة
تعرى الجواهر عن الاعراض
فصل يشتمل على الرد على المشتمل الى الاسلام المجوزين
عرو الجواهر عن ائثت الاعراض
فصل مشتمل على ذكر سنة المخالفين
القول في الأصل الرابع، وهو يشمل على أئنات حوارث لا أول لها
فصل: يشمل على ذكر شبه البلدة
فصل: تفصيل أقاويل مختلف الإسلام
فصل: في الرد على الطايمين
فصل: في الرد على التزية الراهين يقدم النور والظلمة
فصل: مشتمل على مظان أهل الزيج على شيخنا في اللحم والانفعال عنها
فصل: مشتمل على ذكر القدام وعناه والحديث وحقيقةه
القول في أئنات العلم بالصانع
سؤال
جواب
فصل التعرض لشرح كلام شيخنا في اللحم
فصل مشتمل على مظان أهل الدلائل ووجوه الانفعال عنها
محصل القول في نفي التشبيه
باب في حقيقة الصلاين والخلافين
فصل مشتمل على إيضاح الرد على الجياعي وشيعته
النفس
فصل: حل يجوز أن يتعادل الشيطان من وجه ويعتقل من وجه
فصل: مشتمل على الرد على من قال الخلاص كل مشترك في
صفات ذات
فصل: مشاركة شيء شيطان في اخس وصفة
فصل: حقيقة المختلفين
فصل: القول في حقيقة الخيرين
فصل: خلاف الخلق
فصل: أسئلة أهل الخزف للشيخ

كتاب التوحيد في حقيقة الواحد ومعناه
فصل: أن قيل أن النبي، واحدهذذا من صفات الفسند المعاني
فصل: الله معدود مع غيره كما تعد بقية الأحاد
فصل: مفاهي التوحيد

الأصل الثالث من أصول الدلالة
الأصل الرابع من أصول الدلالة
الأصل الخامس من أصول الدلالة
الأصل السادس من أصول الدلالة
الأصل السابع من أصول الدلالة
الأصل الثامن من أصول الدلالة

الفصل الأول في المظالم تبدأ بمواقف المعتزلة
الفصل الثاني في ذكر طريق تشتبعها المعتزلة باتباع التوحيد
الفصل الثالث: يشتمل على نصب الدلالة على نفس القدم المدبر

ينطوى على وجود تحلق القدرة القديمة بما لا يتناهى

من القديرات

تم الجملة الأول
الجملة الثانية من كتاب الشامل في أصول الدين

فصل الثالث
الجواب عن ذلك
القول في الجسم ومعناه
فصل مشتمل على ذكر أقل الإجسام
القول في إقامة الدليل على استحالة كون القدم جسما
فصل مشتمل على ذكر حجز المحتلة
فصل مشتمل على ذكر شبه المحسنة والانفصال عنها
فصل مشتمل على الرد على من قال أن الله تعالى جسم وليس مثالا
فصل: الجواب عن ذلك من وجه
فصل مشتمل على فصول من الأكوان
فصل: عن الكون لدى المحتلة
فصل: أقول في اللاتاها للنظام
فصل في توهيمات النظام في غير الأشكال
الجواب عن ذلك
فصل أن الجوهر إن كان متكا على جوهر ثم تحرك منه إلى الجوهر الذي يليه نفس دخله إلى الحيز الثاني
خروج عن الأول
قد ناقضت المحتلة أصولها في الإعراب عن وجبين
فصل المائع في استحالة اجتماع جوهريين في حيز
فصل في المبادأ
فصل 100: تميز الكهنوت المشتالين عن الكهنوت المختلفين
فصل مستقبل على اختلافات في احكام الحركات راجعة إلى الالتفاط والعبارات
فصل: سلك المحترقة في أئب الضغبة
فصل: مثير على اضطرابات الجباثي وانه في احكام التأليف
فصل: مثير على اختلاف المحترقة في احكام الأكواب
فصل: من بقية احكام الأكواب
باب في الاعتدادات وحقائقها وذكر وجه الاختلاف فيها
فصل: مختي الاعتداد
فصل: اختلاف المحترقة في سبب انعكاس الحجر
مسألة الوضاءة واضتكاها
فصل: ما ذكرناه من الآدلة في نفي الجهة لا يستقيم على اصول المحترقة
مسألة استحاله قيام الحوادث بذات القدوم
فصل كلم عن مذاهب الكرامية
فصل لا يقريع على اصول المحترقة اقامة الدلالة على ان التقدم تعالى لا يقبل الحوادث
فصل: الدليل على استئناف اتصال الرحب في الأزل يكون قديم
فصل: بما تذكرن على من يحمل فيه عرضا
باب في ذكر تأويل جمل من ظواهر الكتاب والسنة
الجواب من ذلك
القول في الرد على التصارى
القول في ذكر مذاهبهم في تسمية الله جهوراً
القول في الاقامه – ذكر مذاهبهم فيها مع استقصاء وجود
الرد فيها
القول في ذكر مذاهبهم في الاتحاد وتذرع الاهوة بالناسوت
القول في ذكر مذاهبهم في الجوهر وغايره للانام
فصل في الجوهر
فصل في بعض آراء اليعقوبية والنصطورية
القول في اثبات الالهة والرد عليهم
باب يجمع اسئلة مفتشية من الاباب السابقة
فصل رد على التصارى
فصل رد على التصارى
فصل مشتمل على ذكر القاض ينشيث بها من الانجيل واقترنا عليها
باب في الصفات
القول في الدليل على وجود القديم
باب القول في الصانع لا أول له
اسئلة لاهل الدهر والانفصال عنها
سؤال آخر
القول في ذكر الدلاله على ان الله قادر عالم
القول في الدليل على اثبات العلم والقدرة والحياة
باب الحلل
فصل الاحوال
فصل حقائق الحلل
باب في احكام العمل وشروطها ووجه الاختلاف فيها

سؤال والجواب عنه

الجواب عن ذلك

فصل في احكام العمل

فصل في الحالة العملية وشروطها

فصل في الاطر واالانعكاس

فصل: اختصار حكم العمل بحثها

فصل: اجابة العمل لا يجوز ان يكون معلولا

الجواب عن ذلك من وجهين

فصل العمل يجعل ان تكون دونا قائمة بذاتها

فصل: هل يجوز ان تكون الحالة معلولا والم محلر علة

فصل: الحكم الواحد لا يثبت بجملتين مختلفتين

فصل: هل يجوز ان يثبت حكم العمل بحلة اخرى

الجواب:

القول فيها يشمل ولا لا يشمل

فصل فيها لا يشمل

فصل في تعليق وقوع الفعل

فصل في استحالة تعليق اوصاف الاجناس

فصل الفعل في الحالة المعلقة

فصل الواجب من الاحكام لا يمنع تعليمه لوجود به

فصل في الشرط والصحيح وما يتعلق بهما

فصل في المحل الشرط في وجود الاعراض

فصل الشرط ليس علة في الشروط
فصل في التحليل ونقشه

ويوجد مختصر كتاب الشامل في أصول الدين عنوانه:

"الكامل في اختصار الشامل" لابن الامير. وهي مخطوطة كتب
في القرن الثامن بخط نسج واضح وتوجد بكتبة أحمد الثالث (رقم 1324
ـ 274 ف) وقد اطلحت على الفيلم الصغير الذي اخذ لهذه المخطوطة
ويوجد بقسم المخطوطة بجامعة الدول العربية برقم 188 من الفروص
طبعة 1954 ص 135

ويبدأ المخطوطة في ل اظ يقول ابن الامير:

"بسم الله الرحمن الرحيم. رب سرنا كريم واحمد لله الذى
سبق الحوادث ووجود ومخلوقات كره ووجود، فهو الذي يبدأ
الخلق ثم يعيده..." وستمر الكلام على هذا النحو حتى نهاية ل اظ
وفي ل اظ يشرح حالة بداية احتكاك بالعلم وتقدير وتعظيمه
له... ثم يأتي "ذكر كتاب الشامل" يقول ابن الامير "وكت وقت علمي
الكتاب المؤسس بالشامل في أصول الدين من مصانع الامام العالم جامع
الفضائل". ولما بدأ في اختصار الشامل انتهى نوبة ل اظ يقول:
النظر في اللغة بمعنى الروية ومعنى الانتظار... إلى ان يقول في
ل 3 ظ حيث يرد:

"فصل إذ لم النظر ولم تحصل فيه آفة تضاء العلم كسائر
مثنايا له... وتوالى لوحات المخطوطة دون ظهور بياض حتى يتهيأ
المخطوطة بقوله: "... هذا آخر ما وجد من كلام امام الحريين في
كتابه المعروف بالشامل وقد اختصره وقدما لهما في مكتبة الازهر مختصر
تاريخ تصنيف وكتابه... والخط نسج جميل في مكتبة الازهر مختصر..."
كتاب غياث الام في التباث الظلم

الجاهلي

تصف الشيخ الإمام نظر الإسلام ركن الدين أسلم الحريبي أبي المحالي عبد الملك بن يوسف الجوني رضي الله عنه الكتب سنة ٤٨٧ ه مخطوط قديم ورقا وكتابة. بخط نسخ بره ١٦ كم وصفحاه ٢٧٤ صفحة.

- وآله: ص ٢ بسم الله الرحمن الرحيم.

قال الشيخ الإمام نظر الإسلام أسلم الحريبي ابن المحالي:

"الحمد لله القيم الحي بارادته كل رشد في وحيه كـ
شروطي كـ كل بيان في وصف جلاله عصر في ١٠٠٠ الغ
الى ان يقول آخر صفحة٨

١٠٠٠ طاق هذا الترتيب الى تسمية الكتاب التليل وقد تحقق
للعلماء ان صور الناس وموائل الايميين هو حقا مقول الإسلام يدعى
باسم ببرعلا معانيه وقوق (صفحة ٦) فحواها معانيه نهج غياث

(١) يراجع الفهرس ٣٠٩ ص
الدولة وهذا إذا تم غياث الام في التنيك الام لم يكن بالغياتي
كما شبه الأول بالنظامي والله ولي التأييد والمؤمن وهو باسعات رجيه
حقاً
ناركان الكتاب ثلاثة:

احدها القول في الامام وما يليه بها من الإياب
والركن الثاني في تقدير خلو الزمان عن الامام ولاة الامام
156
والركن الثالث في تقدير انفرار حطة الشهيرة
229
فلتلق البديعة بالامة:

وهي ثمانية اياب:

الباب الأول في (معنى الامام) وجوب نصب الامة وقادة
الامة

(1) ورد في الجزء الخاص بالعقيدة في "النظامية في الأركان الإسلامية"
الذي ساهم المرحوم الشيخ الكحالي "العقيدة النظامية" أنه يفيد ان
الامام كان يرغب في كتابة فصول في الامام يخصها مصنفة "النظامية في
الأركان الإسلامية" ولكن نفلان أن يكون الكتاب منفصلا لطول القول في
هذا الموضوع نوء كتب قال عنه "سمي بالامة الكبرى" وهي معنودة
بالامة مختتمه بالحكم السلطانية وقد عقب الشيخ الكحالي على هذا
القول بأنه هو الكتاب الموجود بالغيات نسبة الى غياث الدولة نظام
الملك لما غياث الام له في الامام. فهو كتاب آخر لابن الجويتي
وهذا غير صحيح بما أن ما صن به الامام نفسه فقيه الام والغيات
كاب واحد.
الباب الثاني - في صفات اهل الحج والعهود
عدد فيهم العبد
الباب الثالث - في الجهات التي تبين الامامة وتوجب
الجماعة
الباب الرابع - في صفات الامامة القدام على اهل الإسلام
الباب الخامس - في الطوارئ التي توجب الخلع والانخلاع
الباب السادس - في امامة الفضول
الباب السابع - في نص امامين
الباب الثامن - في تفضيل ما يلي الامامة والولاة
وجهة آخر:

نجز الكتب بحمد الله ونعمه وحسن توثيقه وذلك في ثالث عشرة
شهر ربيع الأول سنة 1448 هـ وثان والربعين وسبع مئة وخمسمائة الله وحده
월ه على سيدنا محمد وآله وصحبه نعما الله لمن دفع كتبته وقارئه وسن
قال آمين آمين. ويجد بخط آخر ما يلي:
تبت مع مراجعة الالاف فضح بحمد الله ونعمه كتب خليل عبد
الخليل الشافعي ورع منه في تاسع عشر شهر جمادى الأول ت즘ـان
واريخ وسبع مئة وسبع مئة بيت المقدس حواء الله تعالى. ويوجد بدار الكتب
المصرية بترم 8 اجتماع ترم.
والملحوظ أنه يوجد اضطراب في ترتيب ابنا الكتاب يخالف ما
ذكره في تصديره وقد وضعنا الآرائم المكتوبة عن الابواب حسب وضعها
داخل الكتاب غيرنا وجدناها مضربة كما ذكرنا وتوجد ارتدادات عند
كل باب لبعض القرائيين الذين سبق لهم الاطلاع عليها.
ووجد نسخ أخرى لهذا المخطوطة إحداهما مكتبة بلديَّة الاسكندرية رقم (تاريخ 12) والثانية في بنك بور خديaja الفهموس العاشر من 11.

12- شفاء الخليل في بيان ما وقع في التوراة والإنجيل من التبديل:

هذا الكتاب مصور في 27 لحة في فيلم برقم 159 في قسم المخطوطة بجامعة الدول العربية. وكل لحة بها اثنين عشرة سطر وكل سطر به ثمان كلمات وبلغ نسخ واحد و制止: (لا 1 و).

بسم الله الرحمن الرحيم
الحمد لله الذي جرى شيطان الجهالة عن قلوب أوليائه وصرع بجماعتهم إلى معرفة حكمه الصادرة على سام انياها الهاديين والشجاع ود استقليل وبرد شيطان فرادة صلواته على خضر خلقه محمد النبي فيها بحججها فحول البيان وبراس بلغتته. ومقد تطقي بالخبر البيني وصريح القرآن مما أن تصبح التوراة والإنجيل استنعت على ذكر سيد المسلمين طوات الله عليه.

ثم يستمر الكلام في اللوحات التي تلي هذه القدمة ولا يخللها لوحات بها بيضتينتي بـ (لا 16 و) في نهاية ل 25 ورد:

١٠٠٠ رأينا أعروضت من الاكتر من ذلك حين ذكرت منهما ما يقل به الحجة على الخصوم لأن سيد المسلمين (وهنا تبدأ ل 12 و) صلوات الله عليه رأى مرينظفا في التوراة غضب منه وقال لو كان موسى حسبا لما وسعه الا اتباعي. فلماذا السبب لم اكتر من النظر فيهما.
وهنا ينتهي النص ثم نرد بنفس اللحجة:
"وهذا آخر هذا المختصر المسئ بشفاء الخليل في بيان وقوع التبديل نافذة يجعله خالصا لوجهه الكريم وجعل جزاءه الفوز من عذابه الأليم والخلود في جنات نعمته دائم مقام. ثم بلحجة ٢٦ ط.م.
"العبد القدير لله الراجي عند الله محمد بن عيسى بن سعد الجلاد وأبا الفتح شريف. ١٢٩٢ هـ.
"العبد القادر الشافعي فغا الله عنه وذلك في المحتويات من فنه المجردة سنة اثنتين وسبعين وثمانية وذلك بالقاهرة المكرمة وحسنا لله ونعم الوكيل.
"لتوجد بهذا الخطوط نسختان بأيا صوفيا الأولى برم ٢٢٤٢ والثانية برم ٢٤٤٧.

١٣ - المقدمة النظامية

وهذا المصنف ملحوظ وصححه ولق عليه صاحب القضية المرجومن
الشيخ عبد رضوان سنة ١٣٧٢ هـ سنة ١٢٥١ م. وقد نشر هذا المصنف بعد ترجمته إلى اللغة الألمانية الدكتور هرمان كولونر (١)
بعد أن قدم له بقلم أخرى تحدث فيها عن آراء امام الحريسين المقدمة.
وذلك بمظاعب شركة الإعلانات الشرقية بصر المقدمة النظامية قام من أقسام مصنف كبير اسمه المقدمة النظامية في الأركان الإسلامية (٢) وهذا المصنف خاص بالعقيدات وقد صبح

Von Helmut Klopfer: Das Dogma des I mam al-Haramain
al-Djuwaini und sein werk: Al-Aqdaf un Nizatayn
(١) الجنوبي المقدمة النظامية من
(٢) الجزئي المقدمة النظامية من
المرجح الشيخ الكؤرى بآنه حصل على صورة يزخرافية "النسخة
الندلسية فيها قتم المقيد فقط" (1) ثم يقول بلان "قد انردو (يقصد
نسخة المقيدة) قتم المقيدة عن باني الاقسام نسخاً فصوبة المقيدة
التنظيمية كما في الأصل المنقول من خط القاضي أبي بكر بن العربي حيث
قال ناسخ الأصل في آخره: قال الشيخ الإمام أبو بكر محمد بن عبد الله
بن العربي رضي الله عنه (ترك باني الكتاب لأنه على مذهب التنافعي
رضي الله عنه وكان ما ذكر منه مقدار التلقيم لمبدالوهاب المالكى
البغدادي رضي الله عنه (2)

ثم يسترسل الشيخ الكؤرى فيقول:

"وجه تركه لغير قتم المقيدة منه ظاهر لأن ماء الفن والفه
على اختلاف المذاهب في غاية الكرة. وأقا قتم المقيدة منه فعل
نفس لا نظير له في باه ١٠٠ الخ
والنسخ الخطية لبذا المصنف انتقت تراقبة بالاسكربال برم ١٥١٤
وسخة بئشة أحمد الثالث استنال رقم ١٣٧٧ الرسالة الثالثة (3).

- "لم الإدالة في قواعد عقائد أهل السنة"

وقد قام بتحقيق هذا الخطوط والتقديم له في القسم الثالث من هذه المصنف
ويوجد منه نسخة بدار الكتب المصرية برم ١١٨

(1) مقدمة الشيخ محمد الكؤرى للعقيدة التنظيمية ص ٥
(2) انظر تقرير محمد الكؤرى للعقيدة التنظيمية ص ٤
(3) انظر هامش ١ من صفحة ٥٠ من هذا البحث
مجامع ونسخة نسخيةية لنسخة دار الكتب بمكتبة أحمد الثالث بجامعة
الدول العربية، وجدت نسخة أخرى ببرلين برم ۱۰۲۲، وقد حصلت على
صورة نسخيةية لهذا المخطوطة وقد ظهر لنا أن محتويات مكتبة ببرلين قد
نقلت إلى تونس.

شرح لبع الإدالات

شرح لعلي بن محمد السلماني سنة ۱۵۸ هـ، عن نسخة ببرلين
بنفس رقم المخطوطة ای ب ۱۰۲ ونسخة القاهرة بالفهرس القديم ۱۲۱ ص
ونسخة بحلب برم ۱۷ ونسخة الاسكوريال برم ۱۱ (۱)

۱۲۲ مسائل الإمام عبدالحق واجتهادها لعلامي أبي المحمالي:

وهي مخطوطة ظهر انها لعلام الحريم ورد بها بعض اجهزة
مسائل عرضت على الإمام تلك الاجهزة منقلة من نسخة خطية معززة
بآخر كتاب شرح النهج المنتخب إلى اصول المهذب، وليه شرح بستان
فكر النهج ذيله وكمالات النهج والبيان للشيخ محمد مبارس.
عن النسخة المخطوطة بدار الكتب الصرية بالفهرس برم ۱۱ شقته ملك
عووان تلك الاجهزة (مسائل الإمام عبدالحق السليقي واجتهادها لعلامي أبي
المحمالي الجموشي وبدا هذه المخطوطة في أول ورقة ۱۲۲ وثواب
بسم الله الرحمن الرحيم

وصلى الله على سيدنا ووليام Bí، وآله وصحبه وسلم تسليماً

(1) اتخذت من شرح السلماني في نسخة ثالثة ل تحقيق لبع الإدالات.
كتب الشيخ إبراهيم عبد الحق بن محمد بن هارون الصقلي
الإمام أبي المعالي عبد الله بن يوسف الجوهري البصري
في سائل والجواب متعلق على السؤال فلامعنى للتطويل بأباده وذلك
بمئة حرصا الله على خمسين واربعين.
ثم عرض السائل وهي تسع اجوبة.
1 - في حدوث العالم
2 - ذهول بعض العقول عن وجه الدلالة على صدق النبي ﷺ.
3 - في كلام القاضي
4 - في المتنين
5 - في الأعراب
6 - الكلام على النجيين
7 - المعجزات
8 - في جهل صفة من الصفات
9 - في معنى تشت جبريل

وتنقي هذه الأجوبة بنية السؤالة التاسعة وهي الآخيرة حيث
يقول "ثم الأخرى التي يعزز زوالها من شخصه فيجوز أن الله
يعدمها ويفنيها ثم يعيدها كما يعدها بها من جسد البيت فيحمل
(1) هو عبد الحق بن محمد بن هارون الباجي القرشي الكخلي إبراهيم
توفي عام 412 هـ وقد درس على ابن يحيى وتلامذته، خلف ابن إبراهيم وسلمان
بن قرطبة برهان الدحيبي الذهبي فأصبح من سحن في ترتيب المدارك
للناضج عرض وتزويج المسالك لمعرفة إعلام مذهب مالك لافي الفضل في_AG
(2) بن موسى البحتري)
وينف ويجوز ان يزيدها ولا يهدمها بل تبقى غير مصنفة بصفات الملائكة
ثم بوليها الله وجعلها وله القادر على كل ممكن جائز والحد لله
رب العالمين

والخطودة مثابة بعض الشيء وحجم الصفحة 278×20 سم وطول
السطر 15 سم عدد الكلمات في السطر حوالي 40 كلمة والخط مخري.
اما تاريخ النسخ فلا يوجد تاريخ لكتابة هذه المسائل
وأرجوكم اذنا لا يوجد تاريخ شرح النهج ولكن جاء في آخر كتاب
البستان ان ابراهيم بن محمد بن ابراهيم الشهير بالحاج البرنسي كتب
لشيخه اي عبد الله سيدى محمد عبدالله العيني في العشرين شهر
الله الحرم ناجح سنة تسع بعد المائة واللاف سنة 1109 ميلادية ای
حوالي عام 518 هجرية

١٦٦ - مصنفات في الفقه

١٦٥ - نهاية المطلب في دراية المذهب

هذا المصدر ضخم من عدة اجزاء. وله نسخ عديدة كما سماحت
ذلك فيما بعد ولم ينشر لي الاطلاع الى على مجلد يحوى الإجزاء

(١) ١١ شرفه طالع - وقد تم نسخ سائل الامام عبد الحق القطلي
وأجوبته امام ابي الحلي الجونيني برسم حضرة الدكتور ابراهيم
عبيدة الواستاذ بجامعتي رفيما بإيطاليا وبين شمس بصبر وذلك في يوم
السبت آخر شوال سنة ١٣٧٢ هـ ١١ يوليو عام ١٩٥٣ م بيد الشيخ
حميد يزيد نسخ دار الكتب المصرية بالقاهرة
العشر والحادى عشر والثاني عشر وهو مصور نسيجتياني في 272 لوجة
حجم اللوحة 272 سم ويكمل منها 25 سطر وكل سطر يحوى حوالي
50 كلمة والخط نسخ في. وهذا المجلد هو الجزء الرابع من مجموعة
برمود 1209 وهذه المجموعة تحوي أجزاء أخرى أشرت إليها في
معاصيها بعد.
واول هذا المجلد :

"بسم الله الرحمن الرحيم ري سر لا تعسر نور اذ يك كلن الثوب
يماوى عشرة وكان الصيف يماوى عشرة والاثل والصموح يماوى ثلاثين وقد
ذكرنا انهم اذا رضوا بيع الثوب فألحقن موقعم بينهما نصفين فلو كأن
الصيف مكن ازالت فان أراد الناصب فصله فله ذلك ولكن ان ينضب
الثوب بعد فصله يماوى خمسة عشر وأنا نقص الثوب عن خمسة عشرـ
فعلى الناصب ضمان النقصان (ل 2 بعين).

ويستمر الكلام ولا يوجد بهب في النسخة والابواب والفصل ظاهرة

وبنحو :

...باب في المعالي وسائر الأبحاث (لوحة 272)...

وقد وردت عبارة بعد ذلك تفيد أنه يتلوه كتاب الويايا. و
نسخ هذا الصفح عدة منها نسخة بالاسكندرية بقلم 44 فقه
ناعم وآخر بالاسكندرية بقلم 1500 وزائدة بالكتب الظاهرة
بدمشق بقلم 48 وحكموا بها صبو بقلم 3000. كما أنه يوجد بدار
الكتب نسخ متعددة بقلم 4000 و 5389 و 1202 و 4000 و...

ويوجد نسخة أحدث بالكتب ثلاثة نسخة بقلم 1120 (ز) ورد
النام في قسم المخطوطات بجامعة الدول العربية هو:
ف 189 من 1248 ومجوّسات برزم 1130 - وكل مجموعة من هذه المجموعات تحتوي على إجزاء مختلفة فنهاك مجموعات تحتوي على (مجوعة 66 465 865 69 56 19 12 16 15 66 465 865 81 12 15 19 20 21 22). ثم مجموعة أخيرة تحتوي على (مجوعة 75 76 77 78 79)

ويوجد بمعهد إحياء المخطوطات القديمة بجامعة الدول العربية

نسخة مصورة من المكتبة الأحادية بحبل بها جزء من 16 و 22 برزم (761)

واخيراً يوجد نسخة بمكتبة سواحل ورقم الفيلم بها 182

شرح نهاية المطلب في دراية الذهب

الغاية في اختصار النهاية لهصاد المريد بن عبد السلام السليغي طلا

رقم 1449- القاهرة الفهرس الجديد ج2 ص 745 القاهرة الفهرس الجديد ج1 ص 762 صفو الذهب جزء 1 صفحة 104 رقم 1676 - جار الله استمامي "الكرياني في نظم بيت الغايية" محمد نجل فتي الظاهر 1283 - بريت هولندا هليسا 448 الفهرس القديم و 808 الفهرس الجديد

24 - مناظرة في الجهاد في القبلة

هذه المناطكة في سؤال وجه لامع الحريمن من الشيخ أبي

اسحق الشيرازي عن اجتهاد في القبلة صلى ثم تبين الخطأ فاستدل

منها بأنه تعالى له الخطأ في شرط من شروط الصلاة فلزم الاعادة
كما لو تيقن الخطأ في الوقت (1)

25 - مناظره في زواج البكر

هذه المناظرة في أياض البكر البالغة على الزواج بغير اذنها (2)

سلمت في معرفة الفقهين والوجيزين على مذهب الشافعي

ورد في قصيرة الدولة العربية ان هذا الصنف لابن الحرمين
ولم يتوفر لي الاطلاع عليه لاستخدامة نفية وهي نسخة كتب عام 144 هـ
الحمد الثالث 1206 وقية في كتاب الدولة العربية هو 184 فقه
شافعي وقد سبق ان ذكرت اثنا حديثين عن مصنفات والد الإمام ان
هذا الكتاب ربما يكون من تصنيف الوالد لان بعض المتهمين كالسديكي
قد ذكرها انه لوالد الامام وليس للامام نفسه (3)

10 - رسالة في الفقه

لم يتيسر لي الاطلاع على هذه الرسالة ووجد منها نسخة
خطية بالموصل بمدرسة الحفريات رقم 38 الرسالة السابعة وهي ضمن
 مجموعة

(1) السبكي طبقات الشافعية الكبرى جزء 3 صفحة 475
(2) السبكي طبقات الشافعية الكبرى جزء 3 ص 478
(3) انظر ص 18 من هذا البحث
102

6 - رسالة في التقليد والاجتهاد

وهذه الرسالة أيضا لم يتيسر لي الاطلاع عليها والنسخ الخطية الموجودة لهذا الصف نسخة احترام بالكتبة الآثارية بفيض الدين يزيد بن عبيد الله برقم 1720 الرسالة الأولى أو الحادية عشر من مجموعه بها ثمان عشر رسالة - والآخر بكتابة بتّان ببرقم 1916 (1)

5 - مصنفات في الخلاف

5 - الطرة النضية فيما وقع من خلاف بين الشافعية والحنفية

هذه المخطوطة من المصنفات التي لم يتيسر لي الاطلاع عليها وقد ورد في بركلٍ أن نسخة واحدة فقط من هذا المصنف بالتحف البريطاني بالقسم الشرقي برقم 2549

15 - غنية المسترشدين في الخلاف

وهي أحد المصنفات الثلاثة التي ذكرها ابن الخلاصة في تجليه لامام الحرمين ولم يتعسر على ذكره في فهرس الكتب (2)

(1) لقد صورت الجامعة العربية مكتبة الكتب الآثارية بفيض الدين يزيد بن عبيد الله فجيء بحثه حدث لأسباب دقيقة بظروف التصوير له لم يعمر من المجموعه التي تحوي رسالة في التقليد والاجتهاد الا كتاب الورد على ابن عقيل

(2) انظر صفحة ۵۰ من هذا الفصل
17 - كتاب الكافية في الجدل

نسخة خطية بخزائن الأزهر الشريف برقم (84) 1922 ابتداءً.

بحث 15: وكل لوحية بها عشرون سطر وكل سطر يحتوي على 16 كلمة.

وقد اظهرت على الفيلم الموجود بقسم المخطوطات بجامعة الدول العربية وهو فيلم رقم 187 والرقم الأول منه عليها "خليفة جامعة الدول العربية" الأولى ورقم من المخطوط وهي ل أخرى اشارة إلى الملكين واسماء قبائلهم ورقم المخطوطة في مكتبة الأزهر الشريف.

وفي لوحية 18 يوجد سطران في الركن الأعللي على يمين الصفحة وفي الجزء الخالي الباقى منها فيشة جامعة الدول العربية في لوحية أو عَشْوايَن الكتاب كتب بخط كبير (هذا الكتاب لعلهم اللقيه) وكلمات السطر بعد ذلك متحركة، ويلي هذا السطر ستة استمر تذكرة ودعوات للخلق.

ول 22 خطياً فيها فيشة جامعة الدول العربية للمرة الثالثة.

12 أو: كتب عليها بخط كبير كتاب الكافية في الجدل تصنيف عبدالملك بن عبد الله بن يوسف الجوهري أمام الخريجين ثم أسلا الملكين وخميم الخزانة الأزهرية.

ويبدأ الكلام في لوحية 26 حيث قال: (وهذه اللوحة مكررة في الفيلم):

"بسم الله الرحمن الرحيم وعلى الله وعلى محمد وآله الطيبين الطاهرين وسلم تسليماً الحمد لله على الله يسلم وصافته على خبر البريد وحمد وآله وسألت وفق الله لطلب الجنت وآذان الله على سبيل الخيرات أن اجمع طرقاً للكلم في النظر وستغني عنه في مناظره أن أنزل النزوان طمعاً
في جزء من نص كتاب الله سبحانه وتعالى إلا أنه
لا يمكن تحقيق النظر لمن لا يكون مستفيلاً لمعاني ما يجري من أحكام
النظر في معاني الألفاظ وحققها على التفصيل والتحقيقات معرفة على
التحقيقات فتكون البداية إذن بما ذكرها احق وأوصي فاقد ما يجب البداية
به بيان الحد ومنه لتحقق حقائق الألفاظ وحدودها فالحد
والحقيقة والمفهوم على عرف علامة الأصول واستعماله واحد، أين كان
كل واحد من هذه الامكانيات البسيطة المشهورة في لسان العرب ووالاهم
بالاستعمال عند اهل الأصول لفظ الحد فكان لفظ
الحد لا تجري مستحيلة في الكشف عن بيان كل شيء وصفاته فإنه لا
يمكن أن يقال ما حد الله وما حد علمه وعده، ولكن يقال ما حقائق
الله وصفاته، كذلك يحسن أن يقال ما معنى الله وصدره وظناته
الحد في اللغة بمعنى من الأحكام والنهائية وذلك سلالة في الاله وصفاته
وأصحاب الألفاظ في معنى الحد والحقيقة هو اختصاص المحدود يصف
يخلص له وقد قيل فيه إنه الجامع الناجح 9999 وقيل هو الفـضـظ
الوـفـيـر 9999

ويشبي الكتاب في ل 65 كيف قال الامام: 

9999 هذه ضروب من الامثال تستعين بنا على وضع الخصم
فيا بعين وضعه برسن النظر أولاً تمتد بالنظر طلب الحق وابتغا
الرشد أو يقصد به التلبس والسياحة
9999 ثم الكتاب بحمد الله ونبره وقاله قلد الله الحمد وكان
الفراغ من كتابه في شهر رجب لثمان خلت منه من شهر ستة خمسين
وستياء وعلى الله على محمد وآلله وصحبه اجتمعين.
قد نقل الكتاب عن النسخة الموردة من العراق وقد تحدثت القابلة في ذي القعدة من سنة اربيع وستمائة بحمد الله توجيه منه "ويوجد بناء المخطوطة إربع لوحات بخط مختلف في رواج النبرات وقد ورد في فهرس جامعة الدول العربية بصفة 145 أنه يوجد آخر كتاب الكائنة في الجدل رسالة في الحدود المستحيلة في أصول الفقه. فيما تكون هذه اللوحات الإربع هي رسالة في الحدود

و - مصنفات في موالا أخرى

16 - قصيدة من نظام الإمام الحسين في كعية ولده

وططلع هذه القصيدة:

إلى كمم تعداد في غضرة وفitra 1000 دم هذا النوع إلى غير النقطة (1)

وتوجد نسخة من هذه القصيدة ببرلين برقم 2161 والرسالة الثالثة بثقل اسماعيل بن أبي بكر القرئي اليمني المتوفي عام 827

18 - كتاب النفس

وهو الحصن الذي ذكره الإمام الحسين في سياق أقواله في كتاب القاعدة النظامية (2)

8 - ديوان الخطاب

وهو الحصن الذي ذكره السبكي أثناء ترجمته لأمام الحسين (3)

هذة هي مصنفات إمام الحسين مصنفة بحسب الموضوعات (1) ولاحظ أن البيت ماكس الوذا (2) انظر صفحة 65 من هذا البحث (3) انظر صفحة 66 من هذا البحث
Chronological classification:

It is quite difficult to classify chronologically al-Juwayni's works. The reason is that one work only has an exact date, thirteen have an approximate date, and the others cannot be dated.

22. The only work which bears an exact date is Masā’il al-Imām ‘Abd al-‘Haqq as-Siqilli wa Ajwibatuhā 11-l-Imām Abī-l-Ma‘ālī al-Juwaynī. It is mentioned at the beginning of this work that it was written at Mecca in the year 450 A.H., 1058 A.D.¹

The works which bear an approximate date are:

13. Al-‘Aqidah an-Nigāmiyyah. This work, as mentioned in Cairo edition, is attributed by al-Ghazālī.² This leads to the fact that it was written quite late, after the arrival of al-Ghazālī in Naysābūr. This might be about the year 479 A.H., 1080 A.D., when al-Ghazālī was learning in an-Nigāmiyyah school. This tallies with what was said by two biographers, that al-Juwaynī spent his last days in writing in al-Madhhab. This work, apart from the part published under the name of al-‘Aqidah.
is in Fiqh. Its original title is *an-Nizāmiyyah fī-l-Arkān al-Islāmiyyah*.  

19. *Risālat Juna' al-Adillah fi Qawā'id 'Aqīd Ahl as Sunnah wa'l Jama'ah:* There are differences between the two MSS available in the chapter entitled "Imāmat al-Muslimin," which helped in finding the approximate date of each. It is said in **MS Q** that the prophet did not appoint anyone to be his successor. In **MS B**, it is said that the prophet did not indicate 'A1ī to be his successor. This means that version Q, where the name of 'A1ī is not mentioned, was composed under the Shi'ah, or Buwayhid's government, and that the other copy, in which 'A1ī is mentioned by name as not having been appointed to succeed the prophet, was composed under the sunnite or Saljūq government. The first version is the earlier, and was composed before the Saljūq came, probably when al-Juwaynī was teaching in his father's school; therefore it was composed between 438 A.H., 1046 A.D. and 447 A.H., 1055 A.D.

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1. See p. p. 94, 95  
2. See p. p. 95, 96  
3. See p. vii, viii of the Introduction (part III)  
4. See p. viii  
5. See p. x from the introduction to the manuscript (part III)  
6. See pp. viii, viii from the introduction to the manuscript (part III)
7. **Kitāb ash-Shāmil fī Usūl ad-Dīn**: This was written by al-Juwaynī to defend the orthodox Muslim faith. It seems likely that this was during his first years at an-Nizāmiyyah school, where he was engaged in the teaching of the sunnite rights. Therefore this book might be written between the years 456 A.H., 1060 A.D. and 459 A.H., 1063 A.D.

1. **Kitāb al-Irghad ilā Qawātī al-Adillah fl Iʿtīqād**: This is a summary of ash-Shāmil as Ibn Khaldūn says in his book. This book was therefore written after ash-Shāmil.

2. **Kitāb Ghiyāth al-Umm fī-l-Iltiyāth as-Zulam**: This was written after al-ʿAqidah an-Nizāmiyyah, because it is said in the preface that the book would be known as al-Ghiyāth, even as the other book was known as an-Nizāmi; therefore it was written in the year 473 A.H., 1070 A.D. or a little later.

4. **Kitāb at-Talkhīs fī Usūl** was mentioned by al-Imām in Ash-Shāmil. This means that it was written before ash-Shāmil, but not necessarily immediately before. Probably it was written when al-Juwaynī was learning Kalam, because it might be a summary of one of

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2. al-Juwaynī: *Ghiyāth al-Umm fī-l-Iltiyāth*
   
   az-Zulam, p. 9, under no. 8 Ijtimaʿ Taymūr.
al-Baqillānī’s books, which al-Juwaynī studied when he was learning theology. Therefore this book was written early in the second phase of his life, probably about the year 440 A.H., 1048 A.D.

21. Mukhtāṣar al-Irshad fī-l-Usūl, which may be Kitāb at-Talkhis fī-l-Usūl.

18. Kitāb an-Nafs, which is mentioned by al-Juwaynī in al-'Aqīdah an-Nisā'miyyah. The likelihood is that he wrote it before he was named at an-Nisā'miyyah school. This is because, during this period of his life, he was undertaking the full responsibilities of a sunnite Imām. This should prevent him from writing a book dealing rather with philosophical ideas, as has been stated above, than pure theological subjects. This book was written in the second phase of his life. It seemed likely that during the first years of this phase he was engaged in the writing of Kitāb at-Talkhis, and Luma‘ al-Adillah. The likelihood therefore is that Kitāb an-Nafs was written about the year 444 A.H., 1052 A.D.

24, 25. The two debates mentioned in as-Subkī’s book, between al-Juwaynī and ash-Shirāzī. They were composed when the latter visited Naysābūr. This was before the year 465 A.H., 1072 A.D.

26. Kitāb Nihāyat al-Mālāb ff Dirāyat al-Madhab was written after 465 A.H., 1072 A.D., because two biographers mention that al-Juwaynī spent the last

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1. See p. p. 54, 105
2. Subk. vol. 3, p. 256
   Ind. Vol. 5, p. 395
years of his life writing this book.

3. *Kitāb al-Burhān fī Usūl al-fiqh* was probably written when al-Juwaynī was teaching in Naysābūr, because the book proves that it was written when the author was really mature. It might be after *Ash-Shāmil*, about the year 460 A.H., 1067 A.D.

20. *Al-Mujtahidīn* was written after *Al-Burhān*, because, as Brockelmen says, it is the summary of it.

Thus the chronological order of such of al-Juwaynī’s works as can be dated is:

2. *At-Talḥīq fī-l-Uṣūl* (which may be *Mukhtasar al-Irshād*) — about 438
3. *Luma‘ al-Adillah fī Qawā'id Ahl as-Sunnah wa-l-Jam‘ah* — between 438 and 447
4. *Kitāb an-Nafa‘* — about 444
5. *Masa’il ‘Abd al-Haqq as-Sillance* — in 450
6. *Ash-Shāmil fī Usūl ad-Dīn* — between 456 and 459
8. *Al-Burhān fī Usūl al-fiqh* — about 460
9. *al-Mujtahidīn* — after 460
10. *Munāẓarah fī-l-Qiblah* — before 465
11. *Munāẓarah fī-l-Zawaj al-Bikr* — before 465
12. *al-‘Aqidah an-Nizāmiyyah* — about 471
13. *Chiyath al-Umm fī-l-Iltiyāth as-Zulam* — about 471

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1. al-Juwaynī says at the end of his book *Al-Burhān*:

> “وَخَلَفَ نَسْبَةً نَزِيلَ ذُكِّيَةِ مَعْتَبِيَّ رَبِّيَّ نِعْمَةَ نَزَلَتْ لَهُ مَعْتَبِيَّ رَبِّيَّ نِعْمَةَ” (See p. 622)

This sentence might confirm Brockelmen’s statement (p. 371, Appendix 1).
The works of which the date cannot be fixed are:

- *Ad-Durrāh al-Mudīyyah* fī mā waqa‘a min Khilāf Bayn ʿa-Shāfiʿiyah wa-ʾl Hanīfiyyah, Risālah fī ʿt-Taqālid wa ʾl-Ijtihād, Risālah fī ʾl-Fiqh,
- Risālah fī ʾl-ʿAqīdah, Risālah fī ʾl-Wadā, Risālah fī ʾl-Waḥy wa ’l-Humaydīth,
- Risālah fī ʾl-ʿIlmi, Risālah fī ʾl-ʿIlm wa ʾl-Wadā, Risālah fī ʾl-ʿIlm wa ʾl-Humaydīth,
- Risālah fī ʾl-ʿIlmi, Risālah fī ʾl-ʿIlm wa ʾl-Wadā, Risālah fī ʾl-ʿIlm wa ʾl-Humaydīth,
- Risālah fī ʾl-ʿIlmi, Risālah fī ʾl-ʿIlm wa ʾl-Wadā, Risālah fī ʾl-ʿIlm wa ʾl-Humaydīth,
- Risālah fī ʾl-ʿIlmi, Risālah fī ʾl-ʿIlm wa ʾl-Wadā, Risālah fī ʾl-ʿIlm wa ʾl-Humaydīth,
- Risālah fī ʾl-ʿIlmi, Risālah fī ʾl-ʿIlm wa ʾl-Wadā, Risālah fī ʾl-ʿIlm wa ʾl-Humaydīth,
- Risālah fī ʾl-ʿIlmi, Risālah fī ʾl-ʿIlm wa ʾl-Wadā, Risālah fī ʾl-ʿIlm wa ʾl-Humaydīth,
- Risālah fī ʾl-ʿIlmi, Risālah fī ʾl-ʿIlm wa ʾl-Wadā, Risālah fī ʾl-ʿIlm wa ʾl-Humaydīth,
- Risālah fī ʾl-ʿIlmi, Risālah fī ʾl-ʿIlm wa ʾl-Wadā, Risālah fī ʾl-ʿIlm wa ʾl-Humaydīth.

These books must be left out of any chronological list until new information is found.

Muslim commentators took a deep interest in al-Juwaynī’s works, and in their notes helped to clarify obscurities in his works, so that now ordinary readers are able to understand the aims of al-Juwaynī. In other words, these commentators completed the work which the Imam had begun in his childhood for the spread of truth and the exaltation of the faith. Thus his contemporaries and succeeding generations benefited by his knowledge.
The commentaries written on the works of al-Imám also reflect the culture of different epochs. In interpreting him they committed many errors; but despite these, their efforts point to the great trust they placed in al-Juwaynî.

Four European scholars were interested in al-Juwaynî's works: Luciani, who edited *al-Irshād*; Rev. Louis Gardet and M. M. Anawati, who speak about some of al-Juwaynî's works, specially *al-Irshād* and *ash-Shamil*; and Klopfer, who edited *al-‘Aqidah an Nizāmiyyah* in German.
Conclusion to Part I
Conclusion to Part I.

From the study of Al-Juwayni's biographies, it can be concluded that he was a man of sound judgement and keen intelligence, who spared no effort in serving the Muslim faith. His father had instilled into al-Juwayni as a boy his love of the Muslim faith; and in manhood his sincerity and knowledge impressed his contemporaries. His deep love of the faith made him defend his religious standpoint with all his power, and thus he earned the veneration of his fellow-men.

Abū Isḥaq ash-Shirāzī, the Imam and director of an-Nūfūd institute of Baghdad, says of al-Juwayni: "How fortunate you people of Naysibūr are, with such an Imam."2 On another occasion the Imam of Baghdad says to al-Juwayni, "The people of the East and the people of the West have greatly benefited by your knowledge."3 He also hailed al-Juwayni as "Greatest of Imams."4 Yet this man in his own right was also a great leader of his people; therefore such a tribute paid by such a man served to show to contemporary thinkers al-Juwayni's true worth.

1. See p. 3. Subk. vol. 5.
4. Ibid.
Another great Imam, Abū 'Uthmān Ismā'īl ibn 'Abd al-Raḥmān as-Ṣābūnī, heard al-Juwaynī speaking and exclaimed: "O God, spare al-Juwaynī all adversity. He is today the comfort of Islam, and by his eloquence its defender." 2

By such declarations, these two great Imams acknowledged that al-Juwaynī had made extensive contributions to the understanding of the faith.

A third great Imam, Al-Jurjānī, 3 also placed al-Juwaynī on a high and honourable footing. He said about him: "He is the Imam of his time, sui generis, the prodigy of his age without parallel in knowledge and prestige and eloquence. 4 People from Khurasān, 'Irāq, and Hijjās go to him to acquire knowledge." 5

Al-Qushayrī maintained of al-Juwaynī that his power of convincing people placed him in such a position that "if Imām al-Ḥaramayn were today to claim to be a prophet, his words would take the place of a miracle," 6 which meant that al-Juwaynī's words had the same effect on souls as the prophet's miracles had on their bodies. This also serves to show how well he understood the psychology of his people.

1. His name is Ismā'īl ibn 'Abd al-Raḥmān ibn Ahmad ibn Ismā'īl ibn Ṭabarī ibn 'Abī Da'ī, Shayh al-Islām, Abū 'Uthmān as-Ṣābūnī. He was a jurisconsult and a man of Hadith. (d. 449 A.H., 1057 A.D.)
2. Subk. vol. 3, p. 253
3. Ibid.
4. Ibid.
5. Ibid.
6. Ibid.
Many succeeding generations honoured Imām al-Ḥaramayn. As-Ṣubki is one of them. Some of his words are very significant. "His answer is ever on the tip of his tongue; It is as if it (i.e. his argument) were a hail of iron." "His contender approaches with the dignity of a scrutiniser; and departs acknowledging the abasement of a culprit." 1

As-Ṣubki thought so highly of al-Juwaynī that he considers al-Juwaynī's treatises better than any of either al-Qaffāl's or Abū Hāmid's, 2 who were two great Imāms of Islam. According to as-Ṣubki, nobody is to be compared to al-Juwaynī.

There are biographies which censure him, and his foremost opponents are adh-Dhahabi 3 and the Ḥanbalites. As-Ṣubki mentions this 4 in At-Tabaqāt. There is also reference to this in adh-Dhahabi's books, 5 which make four accusations: 6 the first is that al-Juwaynī was ignorant about Ḥadīth; the second that he held that God knows universals and not particulars; the third, that he was once unable to give the meaning of a particular verse of the Qur'ān "al-Rahmān 'Alā al-'Arsh istawā"); the fourth that he gave up the study of theology.

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1. Subk. vol. 3, p. 250
2. See p. 15
3. His name is Al-Imām al-Ḥāfiẓ Shams ad-Dīn Abū Abd Allah Muḥammad ibn Abī Naṣr Muḥammad ibn 'Uthmān ibn Qaymāz al-Turkumānī, known by the name of Ād-Dhahabi (d. 748 A.H., 1347 A.D.)
4. Subk. vol. 3, p. 261
5. The first volume of Tarikh al-Islām wa Tabaqāt al-Mashāhir wa 'l-'Ulamā, which contains the names of people who died between 437 A.H. and 500 A.H., 1106 A.D. is missing from the Egyptian National Lib., Cairo. Syr. contains the accusations.
On consideration of the first accusation, how could al-Imām use Ḥadīth in debate and give decisions in Muslim law, without some deep knowledge of the prophet’s traditions?

If adh-Dhahābi had discovered that al-Juwaynī was really wrong, why did he not give examples to prove it? This point does not stand up to examination. Adh-Dhahābi did not study al-Juwaynī’s works before decrying them. He may have heard this accusation from some ignorant Ḥanbalīs and reproduced it in his book. He may, in fact, have been quoting al-Māzīrī, who wrote a commentary on al-Burhān; but as Subki says that both adh-Dhahābi and al-Māzīrī were ignorant of Kālām and affirms that al-Juwaynī’s view of God’s knowledge is very clear in his book Ash-Shāmīl. He gives examples of al-Juwaynī’s own words.

3. Ibid, p. 265
If we try to ascertain from al-Juwayni's own writings in another of his works what his view was of God's knowledge, we find that al-Juwayni linked God's will with His knowledge.  

Now al-Juwayni asserts that God wills all that is to be. The world, according to him and the Ash'arites, is in permanent creation (Khalq Mustamir). As His will is concerned with the particulars of creation, it follows that knowledge also must comprehend the particulars and not be restricted to generalities.

The third accusation deals with al-Juwayni's hesitation when asked the meaning of "Al-Rahman 'Ala al-'Arsh Istawa," and why a person looks up to pray. The accuser felt that such a great Imam should have known where God, but he, the accuser, failed to understand that al-Juwayni knew that God is everywhere.

The last accusation is that he gave up the study of Kalam. Defending the Imam, as-Subki comments on a statement attributed to al-Juwayni. "Do not study Kalam, because if I had realised where that knowledge was to lead me, I would never have concerned myself with it." As-Subki denies that such words could have been said by such a great Imam, but adds that even if al-Juwayni said them they would give no ground for criticism.

1. *Aqīd.* p. 17
2. Ibid. p. 14
3. See p. 176
5. Ibid.
6. Ibid. p. 260
7. Ibid. p. 261
As-Subki's words mean that if al-Juwayni deserted the
study of Kalam, this does not mean that he rejected
Kalam. That is why he says that there is no ground
for criticism.

Taking into account al-Juwayni's environment,
his works, and his spiritual and mental qualities, it
can be understood why he studied Kalam and why he
deserted it.

The great influence of his family in guiding
him to the study of Islamic sciences has already
been pointed out. Political intrigues led to
disorder in religious affairs to such an extent that
people were at a loss which doctrine to follow.
Thus it was that one so well versed in Islamic
doctrines was a most suitable person to help people
to acknowledge the existence of God. Al-Juwayni seems
to have realised deeply the role he had to play in
appeasing souls. That is what he declares in his
introduction to his work *al-Ishâd.* He says
that theological proofs are the means of conviction
and methods of corroboration. When he perused
exhaustive treatises containing conclusive de-
monstrations and convincing proofs which the people
of his age were incapable of conceiving, and when
he found that beliefs were unsupported by con-
vincing proofs, he was disposed to pursue a course that

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1. *Ishâd* (Luciani) P. 1, 2.
would contain conclusive proofs and propositions based on reason. He even considers the study of theology as a revealed command. (Wajib bi-ash-Sharī').

His work, an-Mizāmiyyah fi-l-Arkān al-Islāmiyyah, which was composed late in his life, has an introduction in Kalām, which was called later, when separately published, al-'Aqidah an-Mizāmiyyah.

This proves that if he has deserted Kalām, this must be quite late, after he had written Al-'Aqidh, this theological introduction to an-Mizāmiyyah fi al-Arkān al-Islāmiyyah. In this work he gives his true opinion about Kalām. He declares that Kalām is a good way to prove the existence of God, but not to knowledge of God Himself. This may be the reason for which some of his contemporaries and successors thought that he rejected Kalām. This opinion of al-Juwaynī gives a great importance to Kalām, because he considers it as a science leading to the knowledge of the existence of God. Later on, if he deserted Kalām the reason must be that he felt the groundwork was done. He may also have come to the realisation that though Kalām could be a way to appease other people’s souls, it could not satisfy him any more. He wanted his faith to be strong and solid, and he may have found that the way

1. Irsh., p.
2. See p. 106
3. Aqḍ., p. 16
to it is through the heart (al-Qalb) and not the intellect (al-‘Aql). That is why he says that Kalām does not lead to the knowledge of God Himself. Therefore he did not reject Kalām, but just deserted it. Kalām was for him simply a means of consolidating beliefs. The fact that he deserted Kalām lies in words of his, already referred to, to the effect that he had ultimately returned to the faith of early Muslims. As-Subki says that this means that al-Juwayni abandoned (at-Tawfiq) "controversial interpretation of scriptures" and came back to at-Tawfiq) "reliance on the obvious meaning of revealed texts". He may have been a theologian in doctrine, and a ūlī in his own devotional life.

It may be that although al-Juwayni studied philosophy and perhaps wrote on the subject, as mentioned above; although he occupied himself with theology and found that it confirmed his religious beliefs; yet his thirst for the true knowledge of God was still not quenched, so he found satisfaction in ūlīsm. It is very likely that his disciple, al-Ghazālī, who went through these three stages, was influenced by his master, and it can be said that the renaissance of Islamic sciences brought about by al-Ghazālī is really due to al-Juwayni.

1. Subk. vol. 3, p. 263
PART II

AL-JUWAYNI’S DOCTRINE OF THE ORIGINATION OF THE WORLD
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AL-JUWAYNI’S DOCTRINE OF THE ORIGINATION OF THE WORLD

Introduction

Before examining the doctrine of al-Juwayni on the origination of the world, the general and specialised meanings of the two words "al-Hudūth" and "al-‘Ālam" should be understood, to ascertain the attitude of al-Juwayni with regard to these two meanings.

The general meaning\(^1\) of the verb "Hadatha" is "happened" or "was found". It means also "came into existence, began to be, had a beginning, began or originated, existed newly for the first time, not having been before." The infinitive noun is "Hudūth". "Hadath" is a term applied by Sibawayh\(^2\) to the infinitive noun. "al-Hudūth" is an event, an accident, which is likely to happen from nothingness.

The opposite of the verb "Hadatha" is "Qaduma". The opposite of "al-Hudūth" is "al-Qudmah" or "al-Qidam", and of "al-Hudūth" is "Qadim".

The specialised\(^3\) meaning of Hudūth is threefold.

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   Lane’s Arabic-English Lexicon, Bk. I, p. 2, 528, col. 3
   Ash-Shahrāstānī: al-Mīlāl wa-l-Nībah in the margin of
Continuation of Footnote 3 on P. 121

 Lalande - Vocabulaire technique et critique de la philosophie, Tome I, supp. p. 131.
 Frank - Dictionnaire des sciences philosophiques, p. 308, from p. 1141 to 1181.
 Sweetman - Islam and Christian Theology, 3 vols.
1. One represents the opinions of philosophers, most of whom looked upon the world as being eternal. Existents do not spring from nothing; matter and time preceded them. Philosophers believe that there is an eternal matter which existed with God. It has no form, and bears within itself the potentiality of being. There are causes which lie in the world itself. They determined its existence at the moment it was created, for otherwise it would have remained in the state of pure potentiality in which it was before. But if there was something determining its existence, this determinant must have been determined by another determinant and so on. There is a series of causes. But there cannot be an infinite series of causes. There is a Prime Agent, a Prime Mover, which is God. According to Aristotle, the efficient cause lies in the souls of the stars. God is not an Ultimate Agent. God is the Ultimate Aim of desire which inspires the Heavens to action.

2. The second represents the opinion of theologians, who believe that existence sprang from nothingness. The Mutakallimûn divided the existent (al-Mawjûd) into substance (al-Jawhar) and accident (al-‘Araq), which are according to them created by God from nothing, and do not spring from a pre-existent matter.
They then state four basic principles: The first one is the existence of the accident (Thubūt al-‘Arad); the second the originated character of accidents (Rudūd al-‘Arad); the third the impossibility of substances being without accidents (Istibālat Ta‘arīf al-Jawahir ‘an-al-‘Arad); and the fourth, which is the impossibility of events without a beginning (Istibālat Huwwādith al-Awwal-Lahā) or a chain of events without a first link.¹

According to them, origination is one of God’s acts. This is in general their method of proving that the world is originated. But there are some differences between two of the most important sects of Mutakallimīn, the Mu’tazilītes and Ashʿarītes, in what concerns the existent, the non-existent, substance, and accident. These differences are mentioned, not by the Mu’tazilītes but by their opponents, the Ashʿarītes. Most of the Mu’tazilītes’ books are lost, except a few such as Kitāb al-Intiṣār by al-Khayyāt.²

The existent, according to Ashʿarītes, is the thing,³ (ashghay’), as will be explained later, the thing existing in the external world, which is the

¹. Tam. Cairo, 1360, p. 44
². Al-Khayyāt: Al-Intiṣār.
³. Al-Baqillānī: At-Tamhid, Cairo, p. 40.
creation of God, the result of His will. The Ash'arites hold that this is different from the Mu'tazilites' point of view. According to the latter, the thing is not what exists, but what is known (al-Ma'ālim). This leads to the view that the existent and the non-existent are both things, because what is known may be existent or non-existent. If the thing is a thing both in non-existence and existence, there would not be anything for God to do. His power will have no effect because existence is already one characteristic of the non-existent thing. In this way the thing has existence without the interference of God's will. And this is contrary to the sunnites' principles.

The Ash'arites mention also that the substance, according to the Mu'tazilites, is a combination of accidents (A'raj Mujtama'ah). Therefore, if accidents perish, the substance perishes too. The Ash'arites find that the Mu'tazilites have confused two species (Jins); the substance must be of a quite different species from the accident. This is one of the most important principles of the doctrine of the origination of the world.

   As the copy of this Sham written in the 11th of October 1919, was not available, I referred in the following pages to the folios of the protestant copy (see p. 20).
But Ibn al-Amir, who was a sunnite, understands the Mu'tazilites' point of view about substance in a different way. He says, as a commentary upon the Ash'arites' explanation of the Mu'tazilites' opinion on substance, that if the Mu'tazilites say that substance perishes when the accidents perish, they do not mean that substances are not different from accidents; they simply mean that it is impossible to separate substances from accidents. Thus their opinion is not contrary to that of the Ash'arites.

This leads to the fact that the Mu'tazilites' rivals may have misunderstood them, and what is said about the Mu'tazilites in their opponents' books may give a wrong idea about their doctrines. So it can be asserted that the Mu'tazilites' doctrines are still unknown to us.

The Ash'arites have another way of proving the origination of the universe. It is given by al-Ash'ari. He said: "The proof of that is that the completely mature man was originally semen, then a clot, then a small lump, then flesh and bone and blood. Now we know very well that he did not translate himself from state to state. For we see that at the peak of his physical and mental maturity he is unable to produce hearing and sight for himself,
or to create a bodily member for himself. That proves that he is even more incapable of doing that when he is weak and imperfect. For if he can do a thing, when he is imperfect, a fortiori he can do it when he is mature; and if he cannot do a thing when he is mature, a fortiori he is incapable of it when he is imperfect.¹

Al-Ash'ari then gives examples which prove the existence of God. He says: "From seeing him a baby, then a youth, then a man in the prime of life, then an old man, we know very well that he does not translate himself from youth to old age and decrepitude. For even though a man strain to rid himself of old age and decrepitude, and to restore himself to his youthful condition, he cannot do it. So what we have said proves that he has a translator who translates him from state to state and governs his every condition; for his translation from state to state without a translator and governor is impossible.²

He mentions another example; he says that "cotton cannot change into spun thread and woven cloth, without weaver or craftsman or supervisor."³

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2. Ibid.
3. Ibid.
This method differs from the other in that the existence of God is proved without dividing the originated world into substances and accidents. It proves the existence of God by pointing out the fact that creatures are unable to create themselves, which leads to another fact: that there must be a Creator.

3. The third represents the opinion of the Sufis, who believe in the creation of things. They think that there is a relation between the knowledge of God and the appearance of the universe. To them, the world is eternal according to God's knowledge, and originated in its concrete existence. The universe is neither eternal nor originated, and there is a relation between God and mankind which represents the need of the created for the creator. If this relation did not exist, then the universe must exist by itself. According to the sufis, this relation is the basis for the proof that the world is originated.¹

The word "al-Álam" in its ordinary sense, means "all the creatures" or "what the cavity of the celestial sphere comprises" ² and according to theologians, it means "everything that exists besides God". This is the early Muslims' definition (al-Salaf). ³

   Lane's Arabic-English Lexicon Book V, p. 214, col. 1

3. Irsh. p. 17 and (Lucimic) p. 10.
   Lum. p. 2 x "العالم حسب موجبة وسوى لله تعالى"
later Muslims' definition (al-khalaf) is: "The universe is substances and accidents."

These two definitions are not contrary: everything that exists besides God is what implies a prior non-existence. It has a beginning. It is originated. Substances and accidents imply also a prior non-existence and are originated. Al-Juwaynî mentions them in his books as indicating the same originated existent.

According to the Mu'tazilites (as their views are represented to us by the Ash'arites), these two definitions would be contrary, because they defined the thing as being the comprehensible and not the existent.

Al-Juwaynî in his books uses the word "judâth" in its ordinary meaning. Sometimes he uses "hadath" as a cognate noun. He says, for example: "Bâb al-Gawl fî hadath al-'alam." ¹ and "al-aql al-Thânî: Ithbât hadath al-'alam." ² and "Wa tahrîrî fî Rawm Ithbât Hadath al-'alam yattadibu bi Thubût al-Akwân." ³ At other times he uses the word "jûdâth." He says:

1. Shâm. Vol. I, folio Irsh. p. 17 (تعدادی) p. 120.
3. Ibid. p. 24 (ولع شموئيل) p. 110.

Lum. p. 12 x
"fa idhā tathabatt bi ma Dhabānā al A'rād wa
Hudūthā"  
and "Thumma Lam Yubbītāh Qabla al-Hudūth
Bal Atībatāh lāzimatas Ba'da al-Hudūth."  

Al-Juwaynī uses the word 'Ālam and Hudūth in its ordinary meaning, which is "what the cavity of the celestial sphere comprises".  

Technically al-Juwaynī uses the words Hudūth and 'Ālam according to the Mutakallimūn point of view, as will be demonstrated later. He usually mentions the definitions of the world given by the early and later sunnites.  

1. *Irsh.* p. 27  
2. *Shām.* vol. I, folio 30  
3. See p. 124  
4. *Irsh.* p. 17  
5. *Lum.* p. 2 x
Al-Juwaynī's works which contain his opinions on the origination of the world are four: Lūmā' al-Adillah li Qawā'id 'Aqīdah Ahl as-Sunnah wa -l-Jamā'ah, Kitāb al-Ibrāh ilā Qawā'id al-Adillah li Usūl al-Ī'tiqād, Kitāb āsh-Shāmil fi Usūl ad-Dīn, and Kitāb al-'Aqīdah an Nīṣāniyyah.

In the first three books, al-Juwaynī studies the opinions of Ahl-al-Hagg on the origination of the universe. He analyses these opinions, criticises them, and links them with intellectual proofs and arguments. It appears that he tries to analyse and criticise these opinions in order to make a doctrine of his own, according to the opinions of Ahl-al-Hagg, on the origination of the world. He chooses the best definitions. He also tries to introduce new definitions, and to examine the different problems in a more orderly way. He says: "It is logical to begin with the study of the originated existents, because the Eternal Existent is not known necessarily, but by reflection. Reflection

2. Ibid., folio 38
3. See, p. 200 - 229
is based on necessary or immediate knowledge. Thus it is necessary to start by it." Then he continues: "You have to know that the originated existents are essentially divided into two divisions...etc." ¹

These words prove that al-Juwayni has his own opinion about the treatment of theological problems. He is trying to apply his doctrine of knowledge (al-‘Ilm). One of his most important principles is that necessary knowledge is known immediately without the mediacy of reflection. Reflective knowledge comes after.²

Al-Juwayni has another doctrine on the origination of the universe. It is to be found in the fourth book, mentioned previously, Al-‘Aqīdah an Nizāmiyyah. He declares that he is the first to expound this doctrine.

Thus al-Juwayni has two doctrines. The study of his opinions on Ḥudūth includes the study of these two doctrines. The first chapter of this second part will be on al-Juwayni’s doctrine of knowledge and its links with his doctrine of the origination of the world. The second chapter

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1. Sham, folio. 36.

2. See p. 135 and following.
will have for subject matter the doctrine of al-Juwaynī on the origination of the universe according to Ahl-al-Haqq. His other doctrine, which is entitled "al-Juwaynī's doctrine on the origination of the world according to his own opinion" will be the subject of the third chapter. Then in the conclusion a comparison will be made between al-Juwaynī and two of his predecessors, al-Baqillānī and al-Baghdādī.
Chapter 1

Al-Juwaynî's Doctrine of Knowledge
Chapter 1.

Al-Juwaynī's Doctrine of Knowledge

Al-Juwaynī believes that those who want to acquire knowledge should have and follow a doctrine of knowledge. Opinions on knowledge are given in some of his books, although, as he himself said, they do not constitute a complete doctrine of knowledge; he has just given the principles he need to acquire theological knowledge.

The Imam talks of the sources of knowledge, its degrees, subjects, the method used for each subject, and the aim he seeks from knowledge in all its forms. All this shows how he studies the world, and how he considers its problems. He distinguishes between studying the world according to theology and studying it to know its different phenomena.

The sources are reason (al-'Aql), the senses (al-Hawsā), and the self (an-Nafs).

1. Reason: Al-Juwaynī speaks about immediate knowledge (al-Badihiyyah) which he defines as a faculty of the mind, either to reject or accept some considerations, He looks upon rejected considerations...
as impossibilities, and accepted considerations as possibilities. 1 Man conceives impossibilities naturally. Al-Juwayni calls that "knowledge of the impossibility of combining contraries" 2 or immediate knowledge. 3 This primary knowledge is not extraneous, but is innate in man's mind, and man cannot acquire it. The reason is of a kind that is called by al-Juwayni "necessary knowledge". 4

2. The Senses. Sounds, colours, smell, tastes, heat and cold: 5 all these are considered by al-Juwayni as sources of knowledge. They also cannot be acquired.

3. The Self. Feelings of pleasure, of pain, and all other feelings are considered by al-Juwayni as non-acquired knowledge, and thus they are also another kind of immediate knowledge. One of the examples

3. Shām. vol. 1, folio 68.
5. Irsh. p. 12, 13 and (Luciani) p. 8.
he gives to explain this is: "When a man changes his direction, he knows that he is able to do so, immediately."  

These three sources give necessary knowledge, but (Badāhiyyah) differs from what is known by the senses and the self by the fact that it is not affected by physical deficiencies (Darar) or bodily needs (Hajah).  

All that has been written of the origination of the world by al-Juwayni can be based on these three sources: reason, the senses, and the self. The difference in sources leads to different doctrines.  

As to the degrees of knowledge, al-Juwayni believes that man’s mind can understand some facts immediately and easily, but not others; the former are understood naturally, without reasoning, but the latter, to be understood by the mind, require time. He calls the first "necessary knowledge" (al ‘ulûm al-Darâriyyah) and the second "reflective knowledge", (al ‘ulûm an-Nagariyyah). The reflective knowledge is called also by al-Juwayni "the acquired knowledge" (kasbi) in his book al-Irsâd. This reflective knowledge

1. Burh. folio 17  
2. Irsh. (Luciani) p. 8  
3. See p. 134  
4. Burh. folio 19  
5. Irsh. (Luciani) p. 8

"Ibn al-Abbas al-Qurashi". (See also p. 20) "A great part of the book is the commentary on the meanings of the words, and the derivation of their meanings from the words of the Prophet and the Sahaba, and the interpretation of the verses of the Qur’an and the Hadith."

Shams, vol. 5, p. 12. (See also p. 20) "A great part of the book is the commentary on the meanings of the words, and the derivation of their meanings from the words of the Prophet and the Sahaba, and the interpretation of the verses of the Qur’an and the Hadith."
knowledge is so called by al-Juwaynī as it is the result of the originated power of man (al-Qudrah al-Māḍithah).

He explains what he means by necessary and reflective knowledge as follows: "Some geometrical facts are conceived immediately, such as: the part is less than the whole, and the whole is more than the part, and the straight lines from the centre of the circle to the circumference are equal. These are called axioms. If on these premises the mathematician builds a geometric form, he makes an hypothesis, and proves it, according to the facts. He may find it quickly or he may spend some time searching for it. It depends upon his intelligence. ¹

This means that immediate knowledge is innate. It is not in the power of man to acquire it. It is called by him, as has been previously said, "necessary knowledge". Acquired knowledge is based on it. The mental operation which has to be accomplished to realise the acquired knowledge is reasoning.

¹ Burhān, folio 20
by questioning. He expresses this as being a transition from affirmation to negation. To explain this he says: A man studies an immobile body; if this body moves, a new thing happens. This is conceived immediately, without reasoning. Then if his mind considers the incident, he will wonder if it is logically possible. He will suppose two things: affirmation or negation; and according to the state of his mental alertness, will come the result. He will discover through this mental operation that to affirm the necessity of the movement is logically absurd. Therefore he knows that it is possible. This is accomplished by the acceptance or determination of one of the two supposed divisions. This is wandering among necessities.  

Reason, during this mental operation, does not adopt a special method, 2 such as (qiyās) 3 or argument

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1. Shām. vol. I, folio 68. See below... 2. Burh. folio 17. 3. In general, the verb (qāsa) means "He measured the thing by another thing like it," both in the proper sense and mentally often meaning "He compared the thing with another thing" [Lane's Book I, Part VII, p. 2577. (Al-qiyās) means the act of measuring.]...
Continuation of Footnote 3 on P. 137:

way of using words (al-Qiyās ǧī-J-lughah). The specialised sense of the word (al-Qiyās) includes five kinds: (Al-Qiyās as-Sufst tj or al-Muchāliti, al-Qiyās al-Khatabī, al-Qiyās al-Jadali, al-Qiyās al-Mantiqi, and al-Qiyās Ash-Shari’ī), which is called by logicians and theologians, (at-Tarāthīl). (Dictionary of technical terms by at-Tahānawi, Calcutta, 1854, vol. II, pp. 1189-1195). Ibn Rushd mentions four kinds of (Qiyās); Al-Burhanī, al-Jadali, al-Khatabī, and al-Muchāliti (Fasl al-:') al ma’na Bayna Ash-Shari’ah wa-l-takmih Min al-Ittiṣāl, p. 2.) Ibn Rushd, in his book, does not explain what he means by each of these, but at-Tahānawi does. He says that the three first kinds which are al-Sufst tj, al-Khatabī, and al-Jadali, are not based on real or true premises (Huqaddimat Sadīqat) (Tahānawi, vol. II, p. 1190). The fourth (see Qazwīh. Risālat Shamsiyah, appendix to Tahānawi) is used by logicians, and he seems to say that it is also used by theologians. The fifth is only used in jurisprudence and is completely different from the (Qiyās) used by logicians. It is based on four points (al-Asl, al-Farš, Hukma-al-Asl, and al-Wasf al-Jāmi’ or al-illah. (Tahānawi, vol. II, p. 1193).

Al-Juwaynī really does not accept any other mental operation than what he calls: transition between affirmation and negation. So it is better to keep the word (Qiyās) in this context and understand by it any kind of Qiyās known by the Arabs.
from present things to absent; or the unification of things by (‘Illah) or the demonstration of the different compared with the identical. All these methods are rejected by al-Juwaynī during the mental operation. As to the method called (as-Sabré wa-t-Taqsim), al-Juwaynī finds that most of it is false; only the transition between affirmation and negation is accepted by him. It is to be noticed that these proofs are rejected by reason only during a purely mental operation; they are adopted when reason relies upon revelation, in what al-Juwaynī calls "What is known by reason and hearing" (San’a). To acquire this kind of knowledge, one must use these proofs, the (Qiyṣa), the argument from present to absent, the unification of things by (‘Illah), etc. These proofs are used by al-Juwaynī in the study of the attributes of God, because the study of this subject belongs to what is known by reason and hearing. Therefore al-Juwaynī is not contradicting himself in using these proofs in Irshād and refuting them in al-Burkān. Al-Juwaynī distinguishes between the methods used to acquire "what is known by reason alone" and "what is known by reason and ‘hearing’". (San’).

1. Ash-Shahrastānī mentions that al-Juwaynī rejects the argument from present to absent. (Continued on p. 138A)
Continuation of Footnotes for P. 138:


2. In its specialised sense, the word ("Ilâh) means ("Ilâh Qâlqâliyyah, wa Shar'iyyah, wa wasfaa, wa "Ilâh Ismaâ, wa ma'naa, wa Huflmaa). (Tahânawi, Vol. II, p. 1036). See also Ibn Hazm, al TIKAM fi Usul al-Ahkâm, vol. 8, pp. 99-101.) It is said that (al- Ilâh, ash-Shar'iyyah) have no influence on things, like (al-"Ilâh al-"aqilyyah) which bring things into existence. According to logicians the latter might be (Sâriyyah or Mâdiyyah or Ghâ'iyyah) (Ibid.) Al-Juwayni rejects (al-"Ilâh al-"aqilyyah).

3. In general, بحث means "he probed the wound, measured its depth with the جناح, with an iron or other instrument, tried, or examined, or endeavoured to learn its depth; examined its extent. He determined, or computed by conjecture or by the eye, its measure, quality, size or bulk. He tried, proved, or tested it; proved it by experiment or experience; He elicited its true, or real, condition. لانف躬 I observed the people attentively, with investigation, one after another, that I might know their number. شبير means the source, or origin. It also means form, appearance, figure, condition. داية means also a characteristic or likeness. (See Lane's Book, part IV, p. 1295, col. 2, 3.) In its specialised sense, the word (As-Sabre) or (As-Sibre) means (al-Taqsim) which is to limit (Ilâq) the characteristics (Awâf) the source or origin (al-Agl). (Tahânawi, vol. I, p. 661). Al-Tahanawi mentions that this is the explanation of al-Jurjani.

4. The word (Taqsim) means: division (al-Qismah) or (Tarkib al-Qayâd) or according to theologians, the transition between two things, one is prohibited, the other must be accepted. Sometimes the word is used by them for (as-Sabre). (Tahânawi, vol. II, p. 1222). Al-Juwayni rejects (al-Taqsim) during the mental operations in its first two meanings and accepts it as being the transition between what he calls affirmation and negation.

5. Irsh, p. 38, 44, 48, 49.
According to al-Juwayni, there is only one mental proof which points out the truth.\(^\text{1}\)

Al-Juwayni found how difficult the transition between affirmation and negation could be. He showed that man has to deal with the subject of his study directly.

It can happen during this operation that he has to believe in something which is not right, and he falls into error, or as time elapses, into doubt. Al-Juwayni calls these two cases (al-'uqūd)\(^\text{2}\), that is, wrong beliefs. The right thing or the truth is to be found in man's mind. Thus acquired knowledge is innate in men's minds as well as necessary knowledge or immediate knowledge, but it takes time to appear. That is why he calls it necessary as the immediate knowledge.\(^\text{3}\)

It is to be noticed that al-Juwayni means by the word (Darrī) at the beginning "What is innate and immediately known without reasoning." He means by it at this place, "What is innate ", only. This is a wider meaning because it includes both the immediate and reflective knowledge. Therefore if al-Juwayni calls the reflective knowledge once acquired (kasbī)\(^\text{4}\) and another time necessary (Darrī)\(^\text{5}\) he does not contradict himself, because

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1. Irsh. p. 8, and (Iwadi) p. 7.
2. Burh. folio 15, 14. "عند تعلُّم إعتقَد إلى حقيقة ما هو بإظهار باء" (continued on p. 103 A)
3. Irsh. (Iwadi) p. 7
4. Irsh. (Iwadi) p. 7
5. Irsh. (Iwadi) p. 7
Continuation of footnote 3 on p. 139:

3 - Al-Baydawi in interpreting the word (hidayat) in the Qur'an finds that it has many meanings. These meanings can be classified in four categories.

a) God gives (hidayat) to the person the faculties by which he can manage in life such as: the intellect, the senses, and internal feelings.

b) He gives also the proofs which differentiate between the truth (al-jaag) and wrong (al-Bittil), the goodness (as-Salih) and badness (asb-Sharr).

c) God guides also by sending the prophets and the Holy Books.

d) God guides His people also by making their hearts cognizant with fine subtilities, by revelation, inspiration or true dreams. This is what happens to prophets and the (awliya').

That is what Tahānwī says of al-Baydawi's interpretation of the word (hidayat) in the Qur'an (Tahānwī, vol. II, pp. 1540-1541).

One might see easily how these four categories can be the different sources of knowledge mentioned by al-Juwaynī- the reason, the senses and the self. All that the person learns is due to these three sources, given by God. That is why al-Juwaynī calls the reflective knowledge necessary. It is innate as well as the immediate knowledge, because God gives it. The person does not bring anything more than what God gave him. When he acquires knowledge, he feels that he brings something new, but in reality he is just discovering by the faculties given by God something which God wanted him to know. This tallies well with al-Juwaynī's view about the originated power of man. Man acts freely within the limit of what God wills for him (see part III, p. xii)

(See: Tahānwī, vol. II, pp. 1540-1541)

4 - Tāhānwī (Luciani), p. 3

5 - Burh: folio 15, 16.
he asserts what he means by the word (Darafa) each time.  

The reflective knowledge is acquired, because it is the result of the originated power of man, as has been stated above. As acquired, it relies upon the immediate knowledge (Badhiyyat), which is known by the senses, and which is known by the self. This reflective knowledge is necessary, as it is innate and emerges from the reason (‘Aql). The word (‘Aql) here has another meaning than the one al-Juwayni bestows on it at the beginning of his doctrine and at some places in Irshad when he represents it as a source of knowledge. At this place it means more than an immediate knowledge. It seems to be the faculty which includes all kinds of knowledge. According to al-Juwayni, the word (‘Aql) might have different meanings.

Al-Juwayni thinks that what is to be done, when somebody wants to acquire knowledge, is to go through a sort of contemplation, but he has to be very careful not to believe in the wrong thing, or to fall into doubt. Experience is necessary to make such discrimination between what is right and what is wrong. Al-Juwayni says: "Knowledge never comes about without experience."

1. He does not seem to make the sense clear later, when it means "self-evident." (see p. 141), but one can deduce this meaning from what he says.
2. Irsh. (Luciani) p. 9
3. Ibid. راراما تضامن الاعل من اللغة والمشتركة المنتسبية إلى معاني
4. Ibid. folio 20
5. Ibid. folio 16
The Imam gives a criterion for recognizing the truth. It is when the problem has given the person interested in it a feeling of appeasement and confidence. Then he will have no doubt. But if this never happens, it means that somebody has tried to make him doubt, and he feels that he is unable to defend his point of view. This is not doubting, it is only inattention (buhul), because the feeling of appeasement and confidence is never wrong. When this feeling is present, wrong beliefs disappear. This leads to the fact that, according to al-Juwayni, knowledge is self-evident.

This tallies with what he asserts about reflective knowledge, which he calls necessary knowledge as has been stated above. As the reflective knowledge is necessary, which means innate, it is self-evident as the immediate knowledge. This is what the (parūrī) might also mean.

This is extremely important. Al-Juwayni wants the results of his demonstration in proving the origination of the world to be absolutely true.

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1. Irsh. folio
2. This idea of reason as necessary knowledge might be taken by al-Juwayni from the Qur'ān
There are three subjects of knowledge:

1. What is conceived by the reason alone (bi-l-‘Aql Wahdahu) such as the reality of things, the impossibility of the impossible, the possibility of the possible and the necessity of what is necessary.

2. What is conceived by "hearing" (or receiving information) (bi-as-Sam') is the happening of possible things, and their disappearance. The possibilities which are created by God, if declared by a truthful person, can be believed.

3. What is conceived by reason and "hearing" simultaneously, comes from "hearing" and does not appeal to the reason, and the reason has to ascertain its validity. Theological opinions, according to al-Juwayni, come in this category. He says: 'The existence of God, His life, that He has true speech, are affirmed by hearing. But if somebody who knows this by "hearing" then reflects about the possibility of seeing God, about the creation of acts, the rules of the Power, or any other question which belongs to theology, he tries to conceive them by reason and "hearing".'

2. Ibid. folio 19
Each subject has its own method. Al-Juwayni tells us that what is known by hearing happens through the director (al-Murshid), and proofs, al-Adillah as-Sam'iyah. The director speaks truth, and his ways of appealing to mankind to accept his speech are miracles. The mind does not intervene. The Qur'ān and the prophets' traditions are proofs based on "hearing". To accept religious "hearings" man must believe that the director, who pronounces God's words, has learned such words through the speech of his soul.

As to miracles, man must believe in those through whom they have been performed. Miracles are unnatural, and the prophet who performs the unnatural makes one feel deeply that he has a power within him which is not found in others, and that he has acted under the guidance of a higher power. People believe in him. Al-Juwayni says that this deep feeling, which is felt directly after the performance of miracles resembles immediate knowledge. It is a sort of intuition.

As to what is known by reason alone, the Imām says of it that he would not enter into details as he believes it is unnecessary in his book on theology. Nevertheless his method in this kind of knowledge can be indicated.

1. Burh. folio 19
2. Ibid. folio 22
3. Ibid. folio 23
Al-Juwayni distinguishes between the study of the world as a natural scientist and its study as a theological problem. Speaking about the first study, he declares that the knowledge of things is acquired by induction (al-Istitiṣā'), that is, by observing nature, and by determining rules which are compatible with reality. Al-Juwayni also points out that what cannot be conceived by the mind now, such as the nature of magnetic attraction, will be known hereafter, and that such problems require a certain aptitude of mind.

The Imam means by such declaration that there is a certain dealing between reason and nature which prepares the intelligence to go deeply into the facts of nature.\(^1\) The only proof used by al-Juwayni in that kind of knowledge is the transition between affirmation and negation, as has been previously stated.

The method of acquiring knowledge by reason and "hearing" is deductive. This is supported by his saying: "Everyone who attempts to grapple with a subject should know its definitions."\(^2\) To acquire knowledge by reason and "hearing" (Sam'), the transition between affirmation and negation, the (Qiyās), the argument from present to absent, the unification of things by (Ijihād) etc. are used.\(^3\)

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1. Burh, folio 21
2. Ibid, folio 2.
3. See p. 138
We should bear in mind that the results obtained through the deductive method should not be dependent upon facts, but should be dependent upon first principles. Al-Juwaynī in the study of the origination of the world gives definitions, before beginning his studies.

If the subjects of knowledge differ in their methods, likewise they are different in their aims.

Belief in things learned by "hearing" comes from the heart and not from reason. The aim of theology is to consolidate faith in the heart. Al-Juwaynī thinks that what is known by hearing, even if it is said by the truthful man, is yet open to doubt. This may lead to an uncertain knowledge. Yet it does not mean that he suspects hearsay, but his aim is to render it as what is known by the mind. The mind, according to al-Juwaynī, has its value with regard to theology. It endows this science with a degree of certainty which appeases the soul.

1. Dr. Zaki Najīb Mahmūd: Positive logic. Dr. Zaki calls it: al-Istīnbaṭī

2. Aqd. Bāb al Sam'‘iyāt. p. 57

3. Ibid.
Yet Ibn-Imam's confidence in reason with regard to theology is not absolute;\(^1\) for he believes that the reason alone is sometimes unable to urge man to think of God, and his bounties and mercy. That must come from a religious command, for man is not always attentive.\(^2\) According to the Mu'tazilites, there are ideas in man's head, and there is inclination more to one idea than the other. One idea, for example, is that there is a Creator who gave him life. If he knows God, and thanks Him, he deserves no punishment, and will receive his reward; but if he does not know and thank Him, he will receive punishment. Man will prefer the first idea, to escape suffering, and, if we observe what happens in his "self", we find that this happens, when he is in a state of attention. If he forgets to pay attention to these problems, he will never discover that he has to prove the existence of God by reasoning, which is a religious command. Thus al-Juwayni does not deny that reason is able to find religious truth. He just points out that those who say that it is necessary to study religious beliefs forget that the thinker is not always paying attention to such problems, and that souls need an external stimulus. This stimulus

1. **Shām**, vol. 1, folio 16
is the religious command. Therefore the power of reason is limited, when it deals with religion. That is why the study of religious problems, according to al-Juwayni, is always based on revelation (al-Shar').

The aim of knowledge by reason alone is to study the facts of the outer world. Al-Juwayni is very clear about that when he says that the phenomena which cannot be known now can be known later, when the proper methods will be discovered. 1

Therefore, the world, according to al-Juwayni, is either to be studied as a subject of theology, and the method followed should be deductive, and the aim to prove its origination, to consolidate religious beliefs; or it is to be studied for knowing the world itself.

Al-Juwayni as a theologian applying the deductive method is free to make suppositions before studying. Thus he holds more than one doctrine in proving the origination of the world. At one time he adopts the technicalities of the sunnite predecessors, called (Ahl-al-Haqq); at another he lays down other suppositions and founds another doctrine.

The results of his suppositions are self-evident, because, according to him, knowledge is self-evident. Thus, all his sayings about the origination of the world are self-evident. This leads to prove the existence of God.

1. Durk. Folia 13. 20
As to the fact that he was applying the deductive method, and was conscious of its value, it can be said that he did not hold some ideas at the beginning of his life from which he turned back fully later, as stated by Klopfer, but he had a method, and, according to this method, he could lay down the definitions he likes, and build the systems he wishes. This leads to the fact that he might have wishes to expound, from the beginning of his career as a theologian, his own doctrine of the origination of the world, but his contemporaries' need of a right way to follow decided him to examine, criticise, and organise first (Ahl-al-Kinay's) opinions.

1. See Add. (German translation) introduction p. 25
2. See pp. 26, 27, 28.
Chapter 2
The Origination of the World according to Ahl-al-Haqq
as expounded by al-Jumayyf
Chapter 2

The Origination of the World according to (Ahl-al-Haqq) as expounded by al-Juwayni

It has been stated above that al-Juwayni held two doctrines.

a) In the first he examines his predecessors' opinions, accepts what seems to him right, and rejects the others. This is the doctrine of al-Juwayni on the origination of the world according to (Ahl-al-Haqq).

b) In the second he proves the origination of the world following a new method. Therefore it can be called: The doctrine of al-Juwayni according to his own way of thinking.

Al-Juwayni, together with (Ahl-al-Haqq), bases the first doctrine on definitions. He declares this when he says: "You have to know that the study of the origination of the universe is based on first principles, technical words, and sentences, which should be explained clearly. The aim of such study cannot be comprehended, unless its method is understood." ¹

(Ahl-al-Haqq) give two definitions of the universe. The first, which is: "The world is everything that exists, except God" is given by the early Muslims (as-Salaf). The second, which

1. Lum. p. 2 x
2. Shams, vol. 1, folio 23
is: "The world is substances and accidents."¹ is given by the later Muslims (al-Khalaf). (Ahl-al-Haqq) define also the thing (ash-Shay' ), the substance (af-Jawhar), and the accident (al-'Arad).

The two definitions of the world are both accepted by al-Juwayni. He shows, as has been previously asserted,² that there is no conflict between them, for he divides existents into two parts: "Him, who has no beginning", that is, God; and those who have a beginning, and an end, the originated (al-Hadith).

This originated existent (al-Mawjūd al-Hadith) is divided necessarily into substance and accident. The existents, which have a beginning and an end, are called by the early Muslims: "Every thing that exists, except God," and by later "substances and accidents". Al-Juwayni asserts that the world, in the eyes of both early and later Muslims, is created from nothingness. It can be said that the difference between the two definitions is due to the evolution of Islamic culture. The method of the early Muslims is the contemplation of the universe, according to what is said in the Qur'an. The method of the later Muslim is the division of the real and concrete existent (al-Mawjūd al-'aynī) into two abstract entities: substance and accident.

1. Lum. p. 2 x
2. See p. 128
Al-Juwayni says that this division is to facilitate the realisation of the Mutakallimin's aim. This aim is to prove the origination of the universe, as has been previously said, when his views on knowledge were mentioned. The division of real existents into substances and accidents is just a supposition, which leads to what the Mutakallimin wanted to prove.

Al-Juwayni speaks about each of the three terms: the thing, the substance, and the accident.

The thing, according to al-Juwayni's definition, is "what exists". He says: "Everything is an existent, and every existent is a thing; what cannot be a thing, cannot be in existence, and what cannot be in existence, cannot be a thing." This is one of the definitions of (Ahl-al-Haqq), as al-Juwayni himself declares.

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1. Shâm, folio 23.

2. Ibid.
One of (Ahl-al-Haqqa), al-Baqillani, gives, in his book, At-Tamhid, the same definition, "Every existent is a thing, and every thing is an existent."

Al-Juwayni shows that this definition means that only the existent is a thing, and not the non-existent, because non-existence in his doctrine means absolute nothingness. A thing exists after it has been nothing, that it, from nothingness.

Thus al-Juwayni proves the power of God, who creates things from nothingness. According to al-Juwayni, God is powerful. His power is not hidden. It appears in the act of creating things from nothingness. If things were things in nothingness - be means if they were existent in nothingness - what would the effect of God's power be? Things should be defined only as existents, to show and prove the power of God in all His magnificence; because if the thing is defined as "the comprehensible" (al-Ma‘lum), then, since the comprehensible can be non-existent, so the thing can be in nothingness. Thus the effect of the power of God will be just to bring the existents from one state to another, and not to create the things from nothingness.

In other words, if the thing, according to the definition of the Mu'tazilites, is the "comprehensible", it will not prove the existence of God's power of creation, for the comprehensible may exist or not exist, and thus the thing becomes existent or non-existent. If the thing is non-existent, where is the tangible proof of the creative power of God?

Al-Juwaynî gives some contrary ideas resulting from the definition of the thing as the "comprehensible". He mentions two examples:

The first one is: "God has no partner," and the second is: "Contraries are never combined."

If the thing is the comprehensible, the first statement, "God has no partner" will be not an immutable truth but a contingent thing, which is blasphemy. The second statement, "Contraries are never combined", will also be a thing, which is nonsense.

Some thinkers, commenting on these two statements, say that this kind of knowledge might be considered as having no (Ma'îm). Al-Juwaynî rejects such nonsense, because according to him, if there is a knowledge without something known (Ma'îm), there will be a Will and a Power, without result, which is not acceptable. Thus knowledge

must entail something known.

It should be noticed that al-Juwaynī means by a thing, the originated existent; created, and not the Creator; because if not, he would also fall into non-sense, and God would mean a thing.

Thus, according to al-Juwaynī and all the Ash'arites, a thing exists after it has been nothing. Its existence is in the concrete. They differ completely in this point from the philosophers who speak about an eternal matter, previous to existence. According to them, the world is eternal. The Ash'arites differ also from the Mu’tazilites, as has been said.

Al-Juwaynī gives some linguistic arguments in answer to the Mu’tazilites. He says names are given after an intellectual effort (Ta’aqul al-Maqgūd), or by taking them from others, who have already given a sense to them (Naql). Names are determined by agreement (Istilah), or by arbitrary choice (Ta’wīq), if the word has already a sense. The author has only to combine the different meanings derived from diverse uses of the word. Naming may be either literal or metaphorical. If it is literal (Tasmiyah Maqṣūyyah), one has to prove

2. See p.p. 125-127
it by giving examples of the well-known and usual use of the words. If not, it is metaphorical (Ta'awiyah Na'aziyyah), and one has to show the sense to which the term is transferred from the one which is properly applicable.

Al-Juwayni then speaks about "the thing." He says that the word (Ash-Shay') is not applied by the Arabs to what is known or to what has not yet happened and can happen. Nobody can affirm that the Arabs used it except to express real existent things. This is well known.

The Arabs used the word (Ash-Shay') both in the affirmative and the negative, but negation is not the same thing as non-existence. The Arabs used it

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1. Sham. vol. 1, folio 32.
2. Ibid.
3. Ibid.
4. Ibid.
not to indicate a kind of thing, or a thing which does not now exist but will exist, but to name a existent thing. Al-Juwaynī refutes his opponents' opinions about (Ash-Shay') by discussing two verses from the Qur'ān. The first one is cited by the Mu'tazilites, to prove that they were right in calling the non-existent a thing, the word (Ash-Shay') being applicable in the Qur'ānic verse they give, to the earthquake, which has not yet happened. "Verily the Quake Hour is a mighty thing."\(^2\)

Al-Juwaynī replies that the word "thing" in this verse is applied to the movement which is noticed in the act of quaking or trembling, and not to things which will exist one day. If the world, for the Mu'tazilites, were only movement, and not composed of real existents, the Quranic verse cited by them would be the right one to prove what they are trying to assert. But, according to their doctrine, the world is not equal to movement,\(^3\) but is composed of things having an external existence. Therefore, they are wrong in attempting to support their view by this Quranic verse. Al-Juwaynī then cites another verse: "I have created thee formerly, when thou wert nothing."\(^4\) to prove that, in the Qur'ān, the word

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1. Shām vol. 1, folio 33
2. Dār al-Fikr, vol. 4, Synt. 2
3. Shām vol. 1, folio 33
4. Dār al-Fikr, vol. 4, Synt. 9}
(Shay') is only applied to what exists. If the existent is not created yet, it is used in the negative case, as it is in this verse. So al-Juwayni with (Ahl-al-Haq), uses the word in its ordinary meaning.

Al-Juwayni and the Ash'arites consider that the non-existent is known, because they know that it does not exist. This means that the non-existent is only an idea. Al-Juwayni explains the non-existent in relation to the existent. In this he seems to agree with Ibn Sinâ', when he says: "Existence is more known than non-existence, because the existent is known by itself, and the non-existent is known by some aspect of the existent." 2

Al-Juwayni gives some examples to explain what he means by knowing the non-existent. He says that if somebody knows that he has no dress (Thawb), his knowledge is sure. What is in his mind could not be an idea of having a dress, but the idea of having no dress. 3 Al-Juwayni also says to his opponents: "Do you believe that God knew eternally that the universe is going to be? If you say no, you are pagans; if not, then you recognize that God knew the existence of the universe, before it came into being.

1. Shâhî vol. I, folio 34
2. Ibn Sinâ': Ash-Šifâ': Maqâlit I, Ch. V, p. 298
3. Shâhî vol. I, folio 35
He knew it in its possibility when it was a non-existent.  

Here al-Juwayni and (Ahl-al-Haqq), in disagreement with the Sufis, do not believe in any relation between the eternal knowledge of God that the universe is going to be existent, and the existence of the concrete universe. He says that the possibility of existence is not existence, and that the object of knowledge is non-existent.

Substance was defined by several men of (Ahl-al-Haqq). Al-Juwayni discusses three of their definitions.

The first: "Substance is that which accepts the accident." Al-Juwayni refutes this, because it defines substance by one of its characteristics. The second: "Substance is everything that occupies space, or has location." Al-Juwayni does not refute this. He just replies to those who thought that occupying a place (at-Tafrayyuz) is unintelligible. According to him, it is intelligible. The third definition: "Substance is every (Jirm) is accepted by al-Juwayni as being the best. It does not differ from the second definition, but it is clearer. In Irshād, he just states that "the substance is what has a location (Mutakahayyiz).

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1. Shām.  
2. Ibid.  
3. Ibid. vol. I, folio 37.
Continuation of Footnotes on p. 157:

5. Ibid. 
   Irsh. p. 10
7. Ibid. 
   Irsh. p. 10

In general, (Jirm) means body (See Lane’s Book, Part II, p. 413.) But al-Juwaynī does not really mean by it "body". According to him, the substance is different from the body (al-Jirm), the latter being defined by him as "the combined" (al-Mu’talif). The term (Jirm) used by al-Juwaynī in this definition is equivalent to "every thing that occupies space or has location" which is something mental, as will be shown later. Therefore it cannot be a "body". Yet al-Juwaynī does not use the term (Jirm) in a new and completely different way from its meaning in language. Lane mentions a meaning for this term, which is: "It has no colour" (لا لون). (See Lane’s Book I, Part II, p. 413.) This meaning is very near the one intended by al-Juwaynī in his definition of the substance. "What has no colour" cannot be seen, therefore it is mental.
Al-Juwaynī mentions eight qualities of substance. He divides these qualities into "essential, or individual qualities" (Ag-Sifāt an-Nafsiyyah), and "abstract or relational qualities" (Ag-Sifāt al-Ma‘nawiyyah).

By "essential qualities", al-Juwaynī means those without which substance cannot be conceived. He defines them as being necessary to the substance for its existence. They have no cause ('illah) to be in the substance. They constitute its self.  

The "relational qualities" differ from the "essential" ones. They do not constitute the self of the substance. They are in it by cause ('illah), which is a (Ma’nā). 2

The "essential qualities" are: "The occupation of space" and "the acceptance of accidents."

As these two qualities are essential, they are necessary. Al-Juwaynī believes that anything that occupies space is a substance, and the occupation of the space is the space itself. To understand this, it should be borne in mind what he means by

1. Irsh. p. 30 and (Lusayn) p. 172.  
2. It is to be noticed that some Mutakallimin call (Ag-Sifāt al-Nafsiyyah) (Ag-Sifāt ath-Thubutiyyah). This is to distinguish them from as-Sifāt as-Salbiyyah. Al-Ijī defined these qualities as being those which point out the essence (بُدْلًا على الأشياء) without additional meanings, and the (سِناء مُعْثِر) as being those which point out an additional meaning to the essence. See al-Ijī al-Mawqīfī, Cairo, 1907, vol. 5, al Mawqīf ath-thālith - the introduction. (Footnote continued on p. 158A)
Continuation of Footnote 2 on p. 158:

It is to be noticed also that al-Iji considers (As-Sifat al-Ma'na'iyah) as being the location (الصفات المتنبيعة) as being what cannot be separated from the essence, and (الصفات المتهيئة) as being its contrary. Al-Juwaini says that the latter divided the (Sifat Ma'na'iyah) into "caused" (معاني) such as (الصائب والغائب) and "non-caused", such as the knowledge (العلوم) and the power (القدرة).

Then he says those who deny the (الصوات المحلة) deny the (الصوات المحلة). He finds that being powerful means having the power. Al-Iji mentions that according to Mu'tazilites (الصبة الفضيلة) is divided into four divisions (الصبة الفضيلة) (صبة المحلة) (صبة المحلة) (صبة المحلة).


وَلاَ يَسْتَثْنَىْ عَنْ هَذَا الْفَنْ (يَنْمِدُ السَّمَاءُ) عَنْ التَّعْرُضِ لَلْحَوْالِ إِلَّا بِتَسْبيْهَ أَحْوَالِهَا أَوْ وُجُوهَهَا (سَيْقُطُّ لْحَوْالِ) (لْحَوْالِ) (لْحَوْالِ) (لْحَوْالِ)
"essential qualities". Relying on this meaning, space cannot be conceived without that which occupies space, and that which occupies space cannot possibly be conceived without space.

The acceptance of accidents, which is the second essential quality, means that substance cannot be conceived without accidents. This leads to the question: Is it possible for the substance and the accident to exist alone, or not?

It is really difficult to answer this question, since al-Juwayni has mentioned the acceptance of accidents as an essential quality of substance.

But there are two kinds of existence: real existence, in external reality, and mental existence.

Which kind of existence does al-Juwayni bestow on substance and accident, when they are separated, and which kind, when linked together?

To answer this question, the remaining qualities of substance, mentioned by al-Juwayni, must be studies. These qualities are not "essential". They are what he calls "relational" (Sifāt Ma'na'iyah).

1. One of these qualities is "substance is different from accident." This quality is conceived by the mind, after the division of the existent,
by al-Juwayni, into substance and accident. According to him, only the substance occupies a place, and never the accident. That is why he refutes one of the Mu‘tazilites’ definitions, which is: "Substance is a collection of accidents" because, if substance is the result of a group of accidents, and nothing else, this means that every accident occupies a place, which is contrary to his principles.

Al-Juwayni tries always to remind his opponents of the definitions given by them as the basis of their doctrines, the method applied being the deductive method.¹

To show how substance is different from the accident, he says that, if life comes to the substance, the substance becomes alive and feels pain, joy, and other feelings. These accidents, which were not in the substance, did not require a place in the substance.² Thus they do not occupy a place, and are different from the substance.

2. The second is that substance is indivisible (al-Jawhar fard). That is the atom. These atoms have no beginning, no middle, and no end.³ According to mathematicians, this is the geometric point.⁴

¹ See p.p. 143–145
² Shām, vol. 1, folio 43
³ Ibid. folio 38
⁴ Ibid.
Philosophers and some theologians who followed philosophers such as an-Nagšām, denied the existence of atoms.

To confirm this quality al-Juwaynl gives an example in which he makes an insect, "the ant", move from one place to another. If the space in which it moves is divided into infinitesimal parts, it cannot go further. He thinks, like those who preceded him, and who believed in the existence of atoms, that, if the ant is advancing on its way, the space must be divided into a finite number of parts. Al-Juwaynl asserts that the ant's movement implies the finite division of space because whatever is not finite cannot be conceived as being completed.

Al-Juwaynl denies the infinite division of bodies into atoms. He finds that completion is a natural phenomenon, which occurs and is a natural characteristic of existents. All thing existing come to completion, and none of them can be conceived as divisible into an infinite number of atoms. For him, it is absolutely impossible for infinite bodies to be completed. Thus, he concludes that bodies

1. Shām, folio 39
2. Shām, vol. 1, folio 39
3. Ibid.
must be divided into a finite number of atoms.

Al-Juwayni asserts the necessity of a contact (at-Tamāa) or parallelism (al-Muhādah), between the mover and the space. He also asserts that all this must be completed during a certain lapse of time. Accordingly, he rejects the idea of leaping (at-Tafrah), which is suggested by An-Naẓẓām.

To refute the (Tafrah), al-Juwayni asks:

"What is accomplished by leaping; is it finite or infinite?

If it is finite, that is what he wants to prove, i.e. that it is not infinitely divisible. If it is infinite, and if the mover traverses the distance by leaping, that leads to the same conclusion, namely, the completion of the traversing of what is infinite. According to al-Juwayni, this completion shows that there is no infinite divisibility.

He then explains by some examples the idea that a relation is necessary between the mover and space. He says: "Supposing, that the mover just leaps in its path." As it goes from one end to another, so there is always a sort of relation between the ant and its path, and there is no real hiatus or gap. This is what al-Juwayni wants to prove.

2. Ibid.
3. Ibid. folio 40.
He rejects the idea of leaping from the point of view of space. He also rejects it from the point of view of time. He says: Suppose that there is a deep well, and there is a wooden plank across it, with two ropes, one of which goes to the bottom, through the water which is only half-way up, and the other goes half-way down the well, to the water's surface. There is a bucket at the end of the long one, and at the end of the short one. If both ropes are pulled up, the bucket and might arrive at the same time at the top of the well. This could mean that the end with the bucket has leaped, but that is not so, it only means that it has been quicker than the other.

Therefore, according to al-Juwayni, movement should always happen in space and time, and means that there is no completion without finitude, i.e. a limit to divisibility.

Al-Juwayni gives another example; the one of the mill-stone which turns. The points near the centre turn more slowly than those on the circumference. The latter must be faster, because

2. Ibid, folio 41.
they have to traverse, in the same lapse of time, a bigger circle than the ones near the centre. They only move faster and never leap.¹

After refuting the idea of "leaping", al-Juwayni tries to affirm the existence of atoms by examples taken from practical life. He says that the difference between two bodies in size is not due to the difference of size of particles but to their number. If two unequal bodies are divided into equal parts (which cannot, in this example, be atoms, because atoms are not found in the natural world but are geometric points)², the difference between the unequal bodies is due to the number of parts and not to their size.

As has been previously stated, Al-Juwayni, in drawing examples from practical life, does not believe that the atom is actually found in the real world. The examples he gives are to simplify the understanding of his doctrine.

¹. Shāh, vol. 1, folio 41
². Ibid., folio 53
It is important to notice that, according to al-Juwayni, atoms are in the mind, and not in external reality. Most of the Mutakallimun divide the \( \text{ٍ١} \) (al-Jism) into a finite number of real particles. An-Nassem speaks of the infinite division which ends in real particles. Philosophers assert an infinite division which ends in unreal particles. Al-Juwayni agrees with Ash-Shahristani that the particles do not exist as real objects, but they are finite in number.\(^1\)

3. Another quality of substance is that all substances are of the same genus (\( \text{ٍ١} \text{-Jawahir, Mutajanjisah} \)), or are similar.

According to him (Tajmus) means similarity (Tamathil). He explains what he means by similarity. He says that it is possible for two similars to be different from one another in one quality and for two dissimilars to have a common quality, provided it is not an "essential quality" in both cases.\(^2\)

In this way similarity lies in the resemblance in essential qualities.\(^3\) In the case of substances the similarity, as has been previously said, lies in two essential qualities, location in space (Tahayyuz).

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1. al-Iji: al-Mawqif, Cairo, 1907. al-Mawqif ar-Rabi', al-Maggid al-Talith, "the body".
2. Irshad(Luciani), p. 21
3. Ibid. p. 36 (Luciani) p. 2.
4. See p. 157?
and the acceptance of accidents (Qubul-′Arad).

Some theologians who do not accept the similarity, as an essential quality, of substances notice that the Ash′arites and most of the Mu′tazilites who assert that all substances are similar have to introduce accidents in the structure of things to explain the differences between things. In other words, they say that they have to assert the acceptance of accidents as an essential quality of substance, and to affirm the impossibility of separating of substance from accident. Accident makes the differences noticed in esixtents, for only accident and not substances are visible.

4. A further quality, is that the substance has no form or shape (Shikl).

Al-Juwayni criticises the views of those who are inherently contradictory in saying that substance has no shape, and then considering it as similar to a quadrilateral or circle or any such form. Al-Juwayni says that "If it has been stated that substance has no form, it is nonsense to consider it as being like a form; what resembles a form is a form. That is the reality of likeness." He thinks that this is possibly rather

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1. al-Iji: al-Mawqil: vol. 5.
difficult for ignorant people who try to conceive (Tagawwur), the essence of substance. Only material forms can be conceived.\(^1\) Therefore it can now be asserted that substance, having such characteristics, cannot be found in external actuality.

5. Another quality given by al-Juwayni is that substance undergoes no change,\(^2\) (al-Jawhar Bāqīn Ghayru Muta'addid).

From this quality, al-Juwayni wants to show that there is something unchangeable in individuals. This quality of being unchangeable or invariable does not mean a material invariability, but something conceived by the mind. Al-Juwayni wants to make substance stable and accidents un¬stable. This quality brings to mind what is said by the modern philosophers about the "Ego"; namely, that each person has the same attributes as others, yet differs from others, because he is not the result of these attributes. There is the "him", the individual man, the "I" felt by the everybody.

Al-Juwayni and the Ash'arites mean by the "ego" the affirmation of a religious aim, which is the existence of individuals in the Day of Judgement, to receive reward or punishment.

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1. *Shām*, vol. 1, folio 337
2. Ibid, folio 51, 52.
The problem of the stability of the substance or atom is very important in Islam. The Ash‘arites and Mu‘tazilites discuss it. Ibn-Sīnā speaks about it with his disciple Bahmanīr. Ibn Maymūn mentions it in Dalālāt al-Ḥi‘rīn. Nuṣir ad-Dīn at-Tusī and Jalāl ad-Dīn ad-Dīwānī studied it too.

6. The last quality al-Juwaynī mentions is that substances cannot penetrate one another. (Al-Jawḥir li Tatadākhah), although they can be beside one another.

If substances were interpenetrable, they would enter into a small space. In this way, the world would emerge from a small space, without God’s interference, interpenetrability being a quality of substances. According to al-Juwaynī, as will be stated later, every existent, every event in the world, every change is due to God’s will.

Further, the interpenetrability of substances leads to the interpenetrability of accidents, with the result that one accident is to be found in more than one substance. This is contrary to the qualities of accidents.

   Dr. Mahmūd al-Khuṣṣārī’s article, p. 55.
   See also Dr. Abū al-Rahmān Badawī: Aristi
   Liṇā al-Araž, p. 495, 496
2. Ibn Maymūn, Dalālāt al-Ḥi‘rīn, Munk’s tr., v. I, pp. 419-440
4. Smash, vol. 1, folio 52
5. See p. 186
Al-Juwaynī asks: If the substances are penetrable, which one will penetrate, and which one will be penetrated, substances being spaces? How will they be one into another? How will the accidents, which are contrary, be together, like black and white, for example? Thus al-Juwaynī rejects the idea of interpenetrability of substances.

These are the qualities of the substance as given by al-Juwaynī. It can be concluded that substance has not real existence. Thus it is a thought, of which it can be said that it is the occupation of space, or space itself. But al-Juwaynī, by the second essential quality, which is the substances' acceptance of the accidents, gives to substance a real existence. It is not strange that substance seems to have two existences, an intellectual, unreal one, and a real one according to its state, separated from the accident or linked to it. But according to al-Juwaynī's doctrine, it is only a supposition, an idea, it can never exist in reality by itself.

The accident (al 'Arāḍ) is defined by al-Juwaynī. First of all, he gives the ordinary
definitions as being variable. The mentions two verses from the Qurʾān to confirm the definitions of accident as being the variable.

The first is “Ye intend the chance gains of this world” \(\text{Turidān 'Arad ad-Dunyā}.\) The second is: “They said: this is a cloud (‘Arid) which is going to give us rain.”

In the first verse “the chance gains are accidents \(\text{('Arad ad-Dunyā)}.\) In the second, the word (‘Arid) means the cloud, which has passed off the light of the sun.

For the specialised sense of the word, al-Juwaynī gives some of the Mutakallimīn’s definitions, such as “The accident is that which is not stable.” This definition is near to the ordinary one, and has the same meaning mentioned in the Qurʾān. The Ashʿarītes also say that the accident is that which does not stay more than one instant of time. Other Mutakallimīn define it as being “that which subsists in other than itself.”

Al-Juwaynī says that this is the definition of the philosophers. He prefers the one he gives, which is:

1. Shām, vol. I, folio 52
2. Surat 8, Ayat 67 Q.viii/4/88
3. Surat 46, Ayat 14 Q.xvi/2/23
5. Ibid.

In Qurʾan, some other definitions of the accident are mentioned without any discussion. See p. 3 x and footnote 1, 1
"The accident is a happening which has no position and is to be found in the space of a substance." 1 This definition affirms clearly the difference between substance and accident.

In his book Al-Irshād, he just defines the accident as being "What is relational in the substance." 2 This definition does not differ from the other one given by him. It just seems to summarize what has been detailed in the first: the (Ma‘nā) mentioned in the short definition is "the happening which has no space" (al-Jādīth alladhi lā Hayyīzā Lahu) and (al-Qā‘im bi-l-Jawhar) is equal to (Wa Nawa‘jād bi Dhāt Mutaḥayyizāh.)

It is to be noticed that al-Ijjī in his book, Al-Mawaqif, 3 preferred the definition of al-Juwaynī. He says: "It is the best, because there is no negation, no annulment in it." He means that the definition of accident as "What is a quality of another thing" is not good, because some qualities are negative, and some others are of God. It is not good also, because it does not define the accident as one of the two divisions of the real existent. Al-Ijjī also agrees with al-Juwaynī about the opinions of the Mu‘tazilites on the accident, which is, according to them, to be found in nothingness. 4 This

1.  Shām. vol. 1, folio 72
2.  Irsh. (Luciani) p. 10
4.  Ibid. p. 7.
is completely contrary to the Ash'arites' doctrine.

I. Al-Juwaynī attempts to prove the existence of the accident in three ways: the first based on intellectual principles, the second on the power of the senses, and the third on internal feelings. In each way, he tries to point out what is changeable in existents.

a) As to the first one, al-Juwaynī asserts that substance can be conceived in other directions (Jihāt) than it is. So he asserts the possibility of the substance to be anywhere. He then asks: "What is the reason for such a change?" He calls the reason (al-Mustādjī) or (al-Wājīb) which produces such change to the substance. ¹

Is it the substance itself, he means its essence, which produces that, or some abstract property (ma'īnā) over and above the essence?

Al-Juwaynī rejects the first supposition, because it is impossible for substance itself to produce such change, according to its qualities. Thus the (Mustādjī) should be other than the substance. It is the accident.

¹. Şām, vol. 1, folio 61, 62.
Irsh. (Luciani) pp. 10, 11.
Lum. p. 4 x and footnote 2,2.
b) The second way to prove the existence of the accident is based on sense perception.

Al-Juwaynî asserts that many accidents are perceived by the senses.¹ This knowledge is necessary. It does not need any arguments. Al-Juwaynî has already stated that knowledge supplied by sense perception is necessary or immediate knowledge, which comes without any need for reflection. ²

This knowledge is such as colours, tastes and other feelings of sense.³ These sense perceptions are not stable. Therefore they are different from substance which is stable. Thus accidents exist.

Al-Juwaynî proves also the existence of accidents by internal feelings⁴ as a sort of personal experience. He speaks of the internal feelings of pleasure, followed by a feeling of pain. The succession of such feelings proves the existence of something other than the "I" which is substance. Thus the accidents exist.

Al-Juwaynî, by the study of substance, then of accident, introduces us into his principles, by which he proves the origination of the universe.

1. See p. 134
3. Ibid, folio 18
4. Ibid.
It has already been pointed out that he first divides real existents into substances and accidents, defines substance, and studies it. Then he defines the accident and proves its existence.

Proving the existence of the accident is the first principle (al-Aql-al-Awwal) in the doctrine on the origination of the world.

Some accidents are called by al-Juwaynī "external relations" or states (akwān). They assign a special position to the substance.

These accidents are: Movement (harakah), rest (sukūn), assembly (ijtimā’), separation (iftirāq), and touch (mumassah).

Al-Juwaynī explains that the external relation (al-kawn) is verbal noun of (kān) (Yaǔm) which means "to be". He says that the Arabs used to say: (Zayd kān) was in the house, to affirm that he was in that place. When he says "He was (kān) with him" this is to affirm that

1. The problem of "external relations" (akwān) with the problem of "colours" (self) are of great importance too, for the theologians preceding al-Juwaynī (See McCarthy, Theology of al-Ash’ari, pp. xxix, 120.
3. Al-Juwaynī does not mention any definition for (al-kawn) see p. 3 x
4. Shām, vol. 1, folio 281
he was in the place indicated. If they say that he was not, this means that they deny that he was there, but do not deny his existence.¹

Al-Juwayni, by this linguistic argument, justifies the term *(Kawn)* which was used by the Arabs to assign a place to somebody. He uses it in its ordinary meaning, his technical definition of "external relation" being "what assigns a special position to substance."

Al-Juwayni agrees with some of the Mutakallimīn² about the qualities of accidents. They cannot be located. They are always found in substances, and do not remain for more than one instant of time. They are always changing, and one accident cannot be in two substances. Opposite accidents are not to be found in one space, that is, one substance. Accidents occupy times, as has been mentioned in discussing substance. It is impossible that two accidents exist at the same time. This means that each action has its time. Al-Juwayni explains this by supposing a substance moving from one direction to another. It moves continuously, without stopping. According to al-Juwayni, it cannot be accepted that the substance traverses a distance without touching every part of it, or being parallel to it. The accomplishment of the movement cannot happen in no time. It is

¹ Shām, vol. 1, folio 281
² al-Iṣḥāq al-Mawāqif, vol. 5, Muqaddimah 5, 6, 7, 8.
impossible also that two movements happen in one instant of time. If this can happen, the substance can jump from east to west in no time. This leads to the idea of leaping rejected by al-Juwaynī.¹

Al-Juwaynī considers that the existence of the accident is the first basis for the doctrine of the origination of the world.

II. The second basis is the origination of accidents.

To confirm this, al-Juwaynī, with (Ahl-al-Haqq) ² depends on three points.

a) The impossibility of the non-existence of the eternal, because if it did not exist, it would not have been eternal.

b) The impossibility of the existence of the accident by itself.

c) The impossibility of the existence of an accident through another accident.³

Al-Juwaynī gives an example. He says "If it is possible to conceive a substance at rest, then to conceive it in movement, this movement is new (Thar'ah) and the rest has disappeared." Thus rest

¹ Shām, vol. 1, folio 287
² See p. 123
³ Shām, vol. 1, folio 71
Irsh, p. 20 (Luciani) p. 12.
Lum, p. 5x see footnote 1,1.
is not eternal. Before going further, he answers those who explain the succession from movement to rest by affirming the idea of latency (kumfn). They assert that accidents are not new (Fari'ah). They were latent. The movement, for example, was latent in the substance. Then it appears, and the rest becomes latent.

According to al-Juwaynî, this is impossible, because the rest, and the movement are two contrary accidents. They cannot be at the same time in one substance. If rest and movement were in the substance and then appeared, this means that movement has an accident, which is appearance, and this is contrary to the qualities of accidents.

a) As to the three points on which the second principle is based, al-Juwaynî, commenting on the first point, says that the eternal never disappears, and that this is immediate knowledge. Supposing that the Eternal was nothingness, who can then bring Him into existence?

Nothingness is absolute non-existence. It is also immediately known, that the Eternal can take away nothingness.

1. Shâm. vol. 1, folio 24
   Irsh. p. 21 (Luciani) 12
2. Shâm. vol. 1, folio 25
If the eternal disappears, this means that one of the conditions (shurūḥ) of its existence has disappeared, and this leads to nothingness, which is absolute non-existence, and for which there can be no Creator. Thus it is impossible for the Eternal to be in nothingness.

b) As to the second point, which is the impossibility of the existence of the accident by itself, al-Juwaynī says that the accident needs a place, because it does not exist by itself, but exists in another existent. It produces in this existent the change noticed in it. It never stays more than one instant in the substance. It is not transferred from one substance to another. It is the movement itself, because if it is said that it is transferred, it will need another accident to move it, and it becomes a place for the new accident, which is not acceptable, each place being substance. Thus the accident is never a place. It can never exist by itself.

c) The third point is the impossibility of the existence of an accident through another accident. Al-Juwaynī already mentions that if an accident

1. Irsh. p. 22 (Luciani) p. 13
Shām., vol. 1, folio 87
Dum. p. 5 x
exists in another accident, the latter becomes
a substance, because the acceptance of accidents is
an essential quality of the substance (Sifah
Nafsiyyah).

Now if these three points are affirmed, this
helps to determine that what is not eternal is
originated.

III. The third basis or principle (al-Asl-ath-
Thalith) of al-Juwayni's doctrine of the origination
of the world is the impossibility of separating
substance and accident from one another.¹

This principle is to be deduced from the
essential quality given by al-Juwayni to substance,
which is its acceptance of the accidents. It has
been previously stated that this quality gives a
real and concrete existence to substance. It is
impossible for substance, without this quality, to
be found in the external world, in other words, to
be perceived. The third principle affirms this
quality. Accidents are in substance. Each of
them does not exist more than one moment and never
exists with its contrary.

IV. The fourth principle (al-Agl-ar-Rābi') is
the impossibility of a chain of events without a
beginning,² because the existents have a beginning.

1. Irsh. (Luciani) p. 13,14.
   Luma. p. 5 x see footnote 2,2.
2. Irsh. p. 23 (Luciani) 14,15.
   Shām. vol. 1, folio 97
   Luma. p. 6 x see footnote 1,1.
Al-Juwayni says that, if anyone believes that there are events without a beginning, as being in continuous creation, since eternity, such as the movements in the firmament, each of these movements has a completion. So each has an end. If each has an end, the next must have a beginning. Thus there are no events without a beginning.

Al-Juwayni, by dividing the real existent into substance and accident, and by giving the four principles or bases to his doctrine on the origination of the universe, presents to us two parts of the real existent; one is stable, the other does not last more than one moment. But as the separation of these two parts is impossible, if one part is originated, the other should also be so, and existents or things are not eternal. They are originated.¹

In this way, al-Juwayni proves the origination of the world according to the opinions of (Ahl-al-Haq).

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¹ Irsh. (Luciani) p. 45  
Lum. p. 4 x
Chapter 3

The Origination of the World

according to

al-Juwaynī's own view
Chapter 3.

The Origination of the World according to Al-Juwayni's own view

In this doctrine, al-Juwayni defines the universe (al-*ilm) as being "everything that exists besides God."¹ This definition has been given by early Muslims (as-Salaf) as already mentioned.

It is known that according to al-Juwayni existents are of two sorts: God and the universe. In this doctrine he does not divide the existent into substances and accidents. According to his views in this second doctrine, the universe is composed of finite bodies, with various forms, having accidents which are distinguishing characteristics, such as colours, shape and other qualities.²

This is a realistic definition contrary³ to

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1. *Aqd.* p. 13

This definition is given also by al-Juwayni in his other works:
*Shām.* vol. 1, folio 173
*Ishr.* p.
*Lum.* p.

Of the early Muslim (as-Salaf) see p.

2. *Aqd.* p. 14

العالم أحكم مُوضوعة متناهية المنتظمات وعُرَض في ترتيبها دقة دقة. وهَوُيَّة، نعمًا في مساحة لا نهاية.

3. If al-Juwayni gives views in his work *Aqd.* which are different from the ones given by him in his other works, this does not mean that he denies the latter or turns fully on many questions, as has been stated by Klopfer. (*See* *Aqd.* *German translation*, p. 25. See also *Ishr.* p. 117-120.)
that given by him and (Ahl-al-Haqq) in the first\(^1\) doctrine, which has been entitled "The origination of the world according to (Ahl-al-Haqq) as expounded by al-Juwayni." The word accident used by him in this second doctrine does not have a special technical sense, as in the first one. He uses it here in its ordinary meaning of what is conceived by the senses.

Knowledge acquired by the senses is necessary, as has been previously explained.

Al-Juwayni then tries to ascertain their variability, and from this deduces the meaning of the possibility of things. He finds that things have unstable characteristics, these characteristics being perceptible by the senses or conceivable by the mind. One can perceive the sequence of the (A'raḍ) and can assert that things might always be of another shape (Shikl) than they are. Thus all existents are unstable. This leads to the conclusion that they are possible. Al-Juwayni says: "It can be conceived by the reason that what is at rest (Sukūn) might be in movement, and what is in movement might be at rest. What by chance

\(^1\) The first here does not mean the first given by al-Juwayni, but the first expounded in the thesis, (see p. 195).

\(^2\) See p. 134, 135.
is located in the highest position of the atmosphere can possibly be in the lowest, and what turns in a certain orbit can turn out of it." 

He concludes by such reasoning that things are possible. If things are possible, they are not necessary, and if they are not necessary, they are not eternal. For him the universe, with the existents it contains, is possible, and can assume another shape and order than it has. Thus if the universe is necessarily possible, it is impossible for it to be eternal. Al-Juwayni says that if existents are possible, so they need a Maker, for variability and instability of things cannot occur by themselves. They are originated.

These are the two doctrines of al-Juwayni on the origination of the universe. The first is his doctrine according to (Ahl-al-Haqq); the second his doctrine according to his own way of thinking. Al-Juwayni then speaks about the relationship between the Maker and his creatures, and the made of creation.
According to al-Imām, God, as the Creator of the World, has known of the existence of the world since eternity. This knowledge is eternal, like his other attributes. Al-Juwaynī shows that the Maker is eternal, because if He was originated, He would need a Maker, so He would not be necessary and this is contrary to what He is. He is necessary and is the Maker and Creator of all the originated existents.

God brings about in the world His will and His choice, because according to al-Juwaynī God is (Murīd, Mukhtār). If God could not exercise His will, and his power of choice, He would not have been able to create the universe in this particular place in the void of space, and in that time.¹ He says that the determinable principle (al-Mājib) which cannot choose cannot determine one thing rather than another. This idea is explained by the following example: "If there is a medicine, having the characteristic of attracting bile, it will always attract bile and all of it. It will never attract some of it, and leave some, because this medicine does not act capriciously, but according to its fixed properties."²

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¹ Aqd. p. 12
² Ibid.
As to the world, all spaces are similar, and all the instants of time are similar. The Creator created it in a special space and time. This proves His will; because if God was like the medicine, which acts according to a fixed property, without any choice, He would never be able to create the world in this place rather than another, and to determine it in this point of time rather than another. Al-Juwayni shows that the determination of the world in a special space and time leads to the fact that the Determinative Principle (al-\(\text{Mukhassi}\)\(\text{s}\)) has a will and acts according to His power of choice. Thus the eternal Creator, God, created the universe, according to His own will, at the point of time He wanted, and in the way and shape he desired.

According to al-Juwayni, God always knew the existence of the Universe. This means that God knew the universe was going to exist. It has already been said that al-Juwayni, along with the Ash‘arites, thinks there is no causal relation between God’s eternal knowledge of the existence of the universe and the universe’s originated existence. According to them, there is no
relation of necessity between the universe and God before its creation. The universe, according to them, comes from absolute nothingness. Nothing was there before the creation, absolutely nothing. If the universe is eternal, it is only eternal as known by God.

Once the Universe exists, there is a relationship between it and God. The creation, according to them, is continuous. In other words, after the creation of the universe, God does not leave His creatures. All changes happen according to His will. Man's power has its effects, according to God's will. Al-Juwaynî calls it "the originated power." (al-Qudrah al-Hadithah). All creatures are the result of God's will. They are the proofs of His existence. It is very important for al-Juwaynî and (Ahl-al-Haqq) to assert that God's power has a result (Mandûr li Qudrat Allah). It has been previously stated that their definition of the "thing" (ash-Shay') "What is existent" goes to prove the existence of the power of God; because if the things were not existents, in other words, if they had no real existence in the external world,

1. See p. p i22, i23, i24.
2. Irsh. (Luciani) p. 2
what would be the result of God’s power and will?¹

Ash-Shahrastānī mentions that al-Juwaynī’s opinion about the originated power of man is similar to the philosophers’ opinions. He thinks that al-Juwaynī states the result of this power of man as being the existence (al Wujūd) and that there is a chain of causes up to God.² Ash-Shahrastānī does not give any of al-Juwaynī’s quotations to prove what he says of him. Al-Juwaynī says that there are results from man’s power, but that result is not existence. Existence is the result of God’s power.³

If al-Juwaynī speaks about the relation between the Creator and the created, he also speaks about this relation between God and the two mental existents, substance and accident. According to him, accident is originated. Therefore it is created. Substance, which can never be separated from accident, is originated too.

Al-Juwaynī says that the first accident, which is

1. See p. 151
2. Ash-Shahrastānī: Nihāyat al-Iqdam, p. 78
3. See p. 186
to be found in substance is rest (ṣukūn). But as accidents never remain more than one instant of time, so other accidents follow on in the substance, and real things exist.

The sequence of accidents happens by the will of God, which is continuous.¹

These are the two doctrines of al-Juwaynī on the origination of the universe. Both lead to prove the existence of an Eternal Maker of the Universe, who acts according to His own will. Before the creation, there is no relation between Him and the universe. After the creation, He governs the universe, and is the author of each of its changes.

These two doctrines are completely different, as has been previously stated. The difference between them is fundamental. The first doctrine is based on the division of the existent into substance and accident, the second is based on the idea of the possibility of existents, which is immediately known without the division into substance and accident.

Al-Juwaynī follows the deductive method. His doctrines must be examined to see whether he says anything contrary to what he has already laid down as definitions and principles.

¹. See p. 176
In the first doctrine, he defines the universe as being of "substances and accidents". He defines substance, saying that it is "every jirm" (Kullu Jirm). The accident according to him is "a happening which has no position and is to be found in the space of a substance."; and the thing is "what is existent."

He first studies the thing, which is, according to him, a real existent, and asserts the power of God, from the fact that He creates things from nothingness. He then divides this real existent into two other existents, which are intellectual or mental. One of these mental existents represents what is unstable in the real existent. This is the accident (‘Arād). The other represents what is stable. This is the substance (al-Jawhar). But he says that these two mental existents cannot be separated from one another. Thus, if one, the (‘Arād), is continuously unstable, it is possible, and the other mental existent (al-Jawhar), which is inseparable from the (‘Arād) must be unstable or possible too. What is possible is originated.

1. See p. 15
The first objection to make to al-Juwayni is: was it really necessary to divide the real existent into two mental ones to prove that the universe is originated?

It can be asserted that the qualities al-Juwayni gives to the substance and accident seem to be coherent, and realise the aim of his research, which is to prove the origination of the world.

He described substance as being space. It differs from accident. It is indivisible. It has no shape (šikl). All substances are similar (mutajānisah). They are at rest, and impenetrable by each other.

Being space, and having no shape, it can be asserted that substance is extension (al-Imtidād). These two qualities are stated by al-Juwayni to give the idea that substance is an abstract. Then its indivisibility is said by al-Juwayni to prove the existence of the power of God; because if the existent is infinitely divided, it is impossible to start the creation of existents while the division of the particles of the existents is infinite. This quality of substance leads directly to the aim of al-Juwayni, which is to prove the origination of the world. The similarity of substances also proves this because the indivisible parts are similar. The
difference between things is caused by accidents, which do not last more than one instant. The change is due to God's will and power. Impenetrability is also a quality which proves the power of God; because if the indivisible parts were penetrable, the whole world could emerge from one atom, which is contrary to the power of God.

Rest is a quality which, according to al-Juwaynī, distinguishes the substance from the unstable accident, and he supposes it to be the stable, intellectual existent.

All these qualities combine with each other to give a clear and detailed idea of substance. Having no place, not staying more than one instant, never existing in two substances — all these qualities make the accident quite unstable. This affirms the idea of the origination of accidents.

Therefore, it can be asserted that the different qualities given by al-Juwaynī to both substance and accident are not contrary. They all assist in leading to the demonstration of the origination of the universe.

But al-Juwaynī is to be blamed for putting the definition of the thing beside the two definitions of substance and accident, as the basis of his first doctrine.
The demonstration of the origination of the universe by dividing the real existent into two intellectual ones - substance and accident - is sufficient in itself and does not require the definition of the thing, to prove the possibility of the universe. In this doctrine, the possibility of the universe is plainly proved by the qualities of the accident, the substance, and the four principles given by (Ahl-al-Haqq) and al-Juwayni. The idea of the thing in the system of this doctrine really has no place. It is extraneous. The definition of the thing as given by (Ahl-al-Haqq) leads to the proof of the power of God. God is powerful when He creates things. Thus the creation of things or existents is proved and the world is originated.

This leads to the conclusion that al-Juwayni with (Ahl-al-Haqq) had put two different systems one beside the other. Each proves the origination of existence, without the help of the other.
It can always be said that there is no contradiction between the definition of the thing on one hand, and the definition of substance and accidents on the other; for the thing, being the existent, is accepted as created by God. Thus it is originated, and the origination is His attribute, and as the attribute is an accident, therefore there is no contradiction between the definitions given by the authors of this doctrine. But this does not rule out what had been said previously, that there is no real relationship, or a sort of necessity, between the definition of the thing and those of substance and accident, in the system built by al-Juwaynī with (Ahl-al-Haqq).

If there is any reason for putting them together, perhaps al-Juwaynī with (Ahl-al-Haqq) wanted to lay down a real and concrete basis, before giving an intellectual basis to the doctrine. It should also be borne in mind that, if al-Juwaynī, with (Ahl-al-Haqq), had to build their doctrine on these three definitions, it was because these meanings always had been in the people's mind, even before the Mu'tasilites and sunnites had to do with them. They were trying by such means to take away every doubt about this doctrine.

The other doctrine of al-Juwaynī does not contain any contradiction, and is not complicated.¹ He

¹ Dr. Hemut Klopfer in his introduction to al-'Aqidah an-Nigāmiyyah. (German edition) mentions that this work of al-Juwaynī's is really coherent. (See Das Dogma Des Imām al-Ḥaramayn al-Djuwainī, und sein werk al-'Aqidat an-Nigāmiyyah, p. 25.)
goes easily from one point to another. He conceives first the possibility of existents by direct perception. Then he asserts that continuous change in existents needs a supervisor or a governor. Thus there is a Creator, who is God.

This second doctrine is easier than the first one, and contains, as well as the first, a philosophical thought, which is the distinction between necessity and possibility in existence.

This philosophical idea is to be found in al-Farabi's books. He says: "There are two kinds of existents. One of them, if its essence is considered, is not necessary, and is called the possible. The second, if its essence is considered also, is necessary and is called the Necessary Existent. If the possible is supposed non-existent, this is not logically absurd. But it needs a cause. If it happens, it happens as a result of something. Possibilities should never have an infinite chain of causes. They should never happen regularly (Bi-d-Dawr). They should always need a necessary Existent, which is the First Existent.

As to the Necessary Existent, it is absolutely absurd to suppose that it is non-existent. It has no cause. It never happens as a result of something other than itself. It is the first cause of all things. Its existence should be previous to all
other existents. It is the most perfect of all existents, and above causes.\(^1\)

Ibn-Sinâ' also defines the Necessary and the possible. He says that the necessary does not need a cause; the possible needs a cause.\(^2\)

The idea of necessary and possible existents is in both doctrines of al-Juwayni, as has been mentioned. It is important to notice that, if the idea of necessary and possible is in both doctrines and if the definition of the world used in the second doctrine is put by al-Juwayni beside the one which divides the concrete existent into substance and accidents, and which is used in his doctrine according to the views of (Ahl-al-Haqq),\(^3\) it can be said that he got the idea of his own doctrine expounded in al-Aş'âdah an-Mizâmiyyah since the beginning of his career as a theologian. His study of (Ahl-al-Haqq)'s views was firstly done by him because, as has been previously shown,\(^4\) many people were perplexed. He had to show them first which way to follow, his main task being the appeasement of souls.

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3. Shâmî, vol. 1, folio 20\(^6\)
4. Trst., p. 1\(^4\) (Luciani) p. 10
5. Lûn, p. 2\(\times\) sâ al-r. 1\(\times\) q.
An interesting explanation of the universe can be deduced from al-Juwayni’s views about substance.

Al-Juwayni himself does not seem, as a theologian, to be interested in giving an explanation of the universe in itself. His views about substance and accident are aimed only at supplying a coherent and clear system of proof for the origination of the universe. But some of his words reveal that he has the idea of what his views could lead to: it is when he gives an example to explain the changeable existents, saying that they can change one into another. The explanation which can be deduced from his views is the following:

The division of the real existent, made by him, into substance and accident is mental. It can never be realised in the concrete, because of the impossibility of separating substance from accident. Thus substance and accident are two mental elements of the real existent. As the substance is space, its reality is extension. This extension is not real extension, but an intellectual one, like geometrical extension.

Another idea springs from the impenetrability of substances; that is, there is no void (Khālṣ’) in the universe, because substances are one beside the other. The world is compact (Māṣ’), Al-Juwaynī
says: "Every space can be thought of as being occupied by a substance."¹ and "There is not other meaning for the contiguity of two substances than that it is impossible to place a third substance between them."² If there is no void (Khalā'), space is continuous extension, which cannot be smaller than it is, because of the impenetrability of substances. But as substances are the indivisible parts, thus the continuous extension is to be considered as being formed of atoms, these intellectual parts, without form, impenetrable, similar and different from accidents.

If al-Juwaynī does not consider the separation of substance from accident as impossible, the explanation of the universe could be metaphysical. But as he returns quickly from the intellectual field to concrete existence, it can be said that the mental extension, which is the reality of substance, when it is separated from accident, is also the reality of substance linked with accident. In other words, it is the reality of things, which al-Juwaynī presents as concrete bodies, with defined and different forms, always changing. The atoms get more real existence. As they are similar, the existents are similar in essence. The differentiation

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1. Shām, vol. 1, folio 336
2. Ibid.
of creatures is due to accidents. Al-Juwaynî gives an example to explain this idea. He says that air is not different from fire in substance. The difference between them is due to accidents.\textsuperscript{1} Air can have the attributes of fire. It can be heated so that it becomes as hot as fire. It can also have the colour of fire.\textsuperscript{2} Every existent can change into another existent, if it happens that it gets the same accidents. Stones can be transformed into liquids.\textsuperscript{3}

This explanation of the universe is really interesting. It resembles the modern scientific idea of the universe.

The second doctrine of al-Juwaynî on the origin-ation of the universe does not contain any explanation of existents. In this doctrine he considers the existents in the external world without giving any mental basis to the doctrine.

But al-Juwaynî does not really intend to give an explanation of the universe. Yet he gives a method for it, to realise the study of the world's phenomena. The method to be followed is the induction (\textit{al-Istiqra'\textsuperscript{'}}, as has been previously stated.

\textsuperscript{1} Shām. vol. 1, folio 47.
\textsuperscript{2} Ibid. 681.
\textsuperscript{3} Ibid. folio 46.
According to al-Juwaynî, man can study the universe as a theologian and follow the deductive method. That is what al-Juwaynî has really done. Man can also study the universe as a scientist and have another method. In the inductive method, he gives the main place to experience (at-Tajribah). Definitions are not the basic principle of this method. He affirms to those who study the universe in this way, that if they meet a difficulty this does not mean that this difficulty will always stand there, without any solution. What cannot be known now, will be discovered later, when man finds the proper method to apply. There is also a sort of internal preparation in the man himself (Tahayyu' an-Nafs) to know better the secrets of nature. Al-Juwaynî believes that man's mind, and his "self" play a great role in the study of nature.

This idea resembles the outlook of modern scientists, who base their researches both on external observation and personal experience.
Conclusion to Part II

Comparison between al-Juwayni and two of his predecessors, al-Ba'illâni and al-Baghdâdi.
Conclusion to Part II

Comparison between al-Juwayni and two of his predecessors, al-Baqillani and al-Baghdadi

After expounding al-Juwayni’s views about knowledge and the origination of the world, a comparison will be made of these views with those of two of his predecessors: firstly, al-Imam Abu Bakr Muhammad ibn at-Tayyib ibn al-Baqillani (d. 402 A.H., 1011 A.D.); and secondly, al-Imam Abu Mansur ‘Abd al-Qadir ibn Tahir at-Tamimi al-Baghdadi (d. 429 A.H., 1037 A.D.) The comparison is to show how far al-Juwayni was successful in presenting Ahl-al-Haqq’s opinions in a better and a neater way. The comparison will be based on what is contained in Kitab at-Tahhid fi ar-Radd ‘Ala al-Mulhidah al-Mu’attalah wa-l-Qardîshah, wa-l-Khawarij, wa-l-Mu’tazilah, by al-Baqillani about knowledge and the origination of the world, on what was said about these two problems in al-Baghdadi’s book entitled Usul ad-Din, and on the result of the studies concerning the doctrines of al-Juwayni of knowledge and origination.

It is to be noticed that these three sources are not equal, because two of them are based on one book of each of the authors al-Baqillani and al-Baghdadi, the third on the result of the most important books of al-Juwayni. So the fact that the
books of al-Bāqillānī and al-Baghdādī might not express their views clearly enough should always be kept in mind.

In at-Tahrīd, al-Bāqillānī expounds his views about knowledge and origination in a few short sections (Abwāb). He speaks about (al-‘Ilm) and its reality, the divisions of the sciences, the sources of knowledge and argumentation (Istīdāl). What is known (al-Ma‘lūm) is studied with regard to the existent (al-Mawjūd). That is how he introduces the study of the origination of the world, which he treats in a few other sections.

In these sections he treats some of the main points of these two problems and leaves the others.

He defines first of all (al-‘Ilm) which is "the knowledge of what is known (al-Ma‘lūm), as it is."¹ He shows the importance of this definition, saying that it indicates the existent and the non-existent, because according to him the non-existent (al-Ma‘lūm) is known as well as the existent.

This is asserted clearly by al-Juwaynī too, and is the basis of one of his criticisms of the Mu’tazilites.

As to the sources of knowledge, al-Bāqillānī

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¹. Tam., p. 9
mentions six sources. Five of these are the five senses, the sixth is the source of all other kinds of knowledge produced in the self, such as:

a) The knowledge which man has of his own existence, his feeling of health, pleasure, pain, sadness, happiness, power and impotence, etc.

b) The knowledge of what the man wants to do, and to whom he wants to speak.

c) The knowledge that bodies, when they are existent, must be either gathered together (Mujtami'ah), in contact, or separated from each other.

d) The knowledge of the fact that information received is true or not true, and other facts, which must be in accordance with one of the two divisions, affirmation and negation.

e) The knowledge of the shyness of the shy, the fear of the frightened.

f) The knowledge produced by (al-Khabar al Mutawātar).

The last two kinds of knowledge differ from the others by the fact that they presuppose the existence of the senses. The others, according to him, do not rely on the senses.

1. Tam., p. 9
2. Ibid. p. 10
3. Ibid. p. 11
Al-Bāqillānī, by this classification of the sources of knowledge, gives great importance to the senses. Nevertheless, his arguments given later about the origination of accidents are based mainly on mental necessary knowledge, rather than the knowledge coming from the senses.1

It should also be noted that by putting all the kinds of knowledge, other than those coming from the senses, in one category, or division, he proves that he does not distinguish between what comes from the self (an-Nafs), and what has for source the mind (al-`Aql), such as the knowledge of affirmation and negation.

This confusion between the different kinds of sources is also noticed when he asserts that the last two divisions have the senses for source as well as the self. He should have put these two in a special category. The happening of (al-Khabar al-Mutawātār) by an unusual act of God is another important reason for putting this kind of knowledge in a special category.

Al-Juwaynī, in giving three clear sources of knowledge - the mind, the senses, and the self - distinguishes better than al-Bāqillānī between the different sources of knowledge. He is more sure of what he says about (al-khabar al-Mutawātār). Yet it can be said that the idea of affirmation and negation expressed in this book of al-Bāqillānī

might have inspired al-Juwayni in his argument about mental knowledge, the transition between affirmation and negation.

As to the degrees of originated knowledge, (al-‘Ilm al-Muhdath) al-Bāqillānī mentions two necessary (‘Ilm Darūrah) and reflective, which he calls (‘Ilm Istidlāl wa Nigar). 1 At this point al-Bāqillānī’s inconsistent way of expressing himself must be stressed. After mentioning two degrees or two divisions of knowledge, he speaks in the same paragraph about three kinds of knowledge, the second being introduced by him as the knowledge which comes from speculation and argumentation. 2 A little further on he considers this same knowledge as one kind of knowledge, saying (ad-Dirb-al-Akhar). 3 His views about the meaning of necessary knowledge give a clear idea of it, which is in perfect accordance with what al-Juwayni says about this degree of knowledge. It can even be said that what al-Bāqillānī says about it is simpler to understand than al-Juwayni’s assertions.

Al-Bāqillānī’s views on reflective knowledge are too summary. He just mentions that it comes after necessary knowledge and requires contemplation or speculation. He calls it later acquired knowledge (kasbi), as being the result of the originated power of man (al-Qudrah al-Yādith). This

1. Tam, p. 7
2. Ibid.
3. Ibid, p. 8
4. Ibid, p. 7
is also what al-Juwaynî means by (kasbi).

Al-Bâqillânî does not explain how speculation, the difficulties of speculation, and the criteria of true knowledge happen.

All these points are discussed in detail by al-Juwaynî, as has been shown. But if al-Bâqillânî neglects these points, or is unable to discover their importance, he speaks about the arguments used in acquiring speculative knowledge. There are six:

a) The argument based on the idea of affirmation and negation.

b) The argument based on the idea that what the thing which is present (fi ash-Shâhid) has because of a (‘Illah), the thing which is absent (fi-l-Ghâ’ib) must have also, if the same (‘Illah) is present.

c) The argument based on the idea of similarity: if a thing is right, its similar must be right too.

d) The argument based on the meaning of words: the fire always gives the idea of heat.

e) The argument based on the belief in miracles.
f) The argument based on what is known by "hearing" (as-Samā') such as: the Qur'ān, the Sunnah, the consensus and the (qiyās Shar'i), based on the principles given by Revelation. ¹

These are the arguments of al-Bāqillānī. He does not distinguish between a mental argument (Dalil 'Aqlī) and a traditional (Sam'ī) argument as al-Juwaynī does. The first of these six arguments is the only one accepted by al-Juwaynī as mental argument. The two last are mentioned by al-Juwaynī as one, which he calls (Dalil Sam'ī).

It is based on the belief in miracles. The other arguments of al-Bāqillānī are rejected by al-Juwaynī, as what happens in the mind during speculation is, according to al-Juwaynī, a transition between affirmation and negation.

Al-Bāqillānī gives a definition of argument:

"It is the guide (al-Murahid) to the knowledge of what is absent, from the senses, and to what is not known necessarily." ²

This definition places the senses in a different category from what is necessary knowledge, and is contrary to what al-Bāqillānī asserts before.

Again al-Bāqillānī does not seem to realise the

1. Tam., p. 13
2. Ibid.
importance and the value of his divisions. Al-Juwaynī gives a clearer and more valuable definition of argument, which includes his two kinds of argument, the mental and the traditional (al-'Aqlī wa-s-Samī).

Al-Bāqillānī does not speak about the subjects of knowledge as there is only one subject for him, which is the study of the world from the theologian's viewpoint. He does not mention the possibility of studying the world as a man of science, as al-Baghdādī and al-Juwaynī do. This comes from his narrow outlook on knowledge in this book. Also he does not speak about the aim of knowledge in theology.

As to the evidence of knowledge, he does not speak about it, but one can deduce it from his definition of knowledge, by which he affirms the validity of what is known.

As has been previously stated, Al-Bāqillānī does not treat the origination of the world as a separate problem. What he says about "what is known" (al-Na'ilūm) and its two divisions, the existent and the non-existent, is an introduction to the study of the originated existent. The existent is, according to him, eternal or originated.\footnote{1} This is the thing.\footnote{2} The originated existents are, according to what he affirms in this book, classified into three divisions: the combined body (jism Mu'allaf), substance and accident.\footnote{3} Al-Juwaynī follows the same way.

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1. Tam., p. 16
2. Ibid., p. 15
3. Ibid., p. 17
of thinking in speaking first of all about \(\text{(al-Ma‘lūm)}\) in his doctrine of knowledge, but he gives the problem of origination more importance, as he studies it in a special part in all his works.

He also states that there are two kinds of \(\text{(Ma‘lūm)}\): an existent and a non-existent. He speaks of the kinds of existents: the eternal and originated.

Al-Juwaynī differs from al-Bāqillānī in putting the originated existent into two divisions: substance and accident. This has its importance, because al-Juwaynī, in putting aside the combined body, gives a clear idea of the two divisions of the existent, each of them being just an idea, a supposition, when separated from each other.

For the seeker of theological knowledge, al-Bāqillānī does not explain clearly enough whether he means a real division or a mental division of the originated existent. As he presents this idea, it is the originated existents (in the plural) which are divided into three categories— the combined body, the substance and the accident. This presentation gives the impression that substance and accident, being divisions of existents as bodies are, are of the same value, or on the same
level as bodies. They would be all different kinds rather than different divisions or categories of existents, which is not in accordance with the definition of substance and accident given by al-Juwayni, as will be shown later.

Here again al-Baghili seems to be confused about what all these divisions can mean. But he seems to have realised that substance and accident are mental. He does not speak in this book about the qualities of each, but their definitions show it. The definition of substance is "that which accepts one accident from each genus of accidents."¹ This means that substance cannot be perceived without accident; in other words, it cannot exist in the external world by itself. Therefore it is mental. The definition of accident, which is, "what does not last",² shows that it is a mental existent also, which is the reason why he uses the word "division" rather than "kind", and why also he puts the body, which has a real and concrete existence, beside these two mental ones, to be in accordance with what all his predecessors did. Al-Juwayni does the same, but in a more clear and precise way, when he puts the definition of the thing, which has a real existence, beside the definition of accident and substance as basis of the doctrine of the origination

¹ Taw. p. 17
² Ibid. p. 18
of the world. This is not really very successful, because the definition of the thing has really no place in the system built by al-Juwayni, as has been shown. The same can be said of the definition of the body in al-Baqillani's doctrine, which has now two defects, namely that body is considered as a division of the originated existents, and that it is put beside the mental existents, as the basis of the doctrine.

Al-Baqillani speaks about the thing (ash-Shay') as one of the two divisions of the (Ha'il) without showing its role in the doctrine of origination at all. He does not mention that it is a real and concrete existent, beside the two mental ones, substance and accident. He also forgets that the "thing", by its definition, and what this definition includes, is an originated existent, and is sufficient by itself to prove the origination of the world. All this has been previously stated in discussing al-Juwayni's views about the thing.  

Al-Baqillani does not expound four principles in his demonstration of the origination of the world as al-Juwayni does. He just speaks about the accident and its instability, which he proves by two verses of the Qur'an, mentioned also by al-Juwayni. "Ye intend the chance gains of this world." and "They said: This is a cloud which is going to give us rain." But

1. Tam. p. 115
2. See p. 151, 152.
3. Tam. p. 18
4. Q.Surat. 8, verse 67 - in Bell, verse 68
5. Q.Surat. 2, verse 23 - in Bell, verse 22.
he gives mental proofs relying on the mind and the self as sources rather than the senses, as has been mentioned previously, to prove the origination of accidents (Ithbāt Ḥadīth al-ʿrād). He does not mention the impossibility of substance and accident being separated from each other. He does not speak about the impossibility of a chain of events without a beginning. All that he asserts to prove that the existents are originated is that bodies do not come before what is originated - the originated being the accident. Thus bodies are originated. His proof that the bodies do not exist before the originated existent, which is the accident, is that it is known by immediate knowledge that the bodies cannot exist without being gathered together, separated, or in contact with each other. He mentions this at the beginning of his doctrine of knowledge, as a kind of knowledge produced in the self. It can be said that he has not enough order in his ideas, and he does not realise the importance of some of his assertions, such as: these accidents, which he does not call (Akwān), and the importance of which he does not show. Yet these three accidents are the basis of his demonstration of the origination of the world.

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1. Tam., pp. 18-20.
2. Ibid., p. 22
Al-Baghdādī expounds his views in his book, Ugūl ad-dīn, with more detail than al-Bāqillānī. But he also treats some points and leaves others.

His definition of knowledge is "an attribute by which the alive becomes the knower."¹ This definition is not appreciated by al-Juwaynī, who follows the definition of al-Bāqillānī, as has been stated. Al-Baghdādī does not show the importance of this definition, as al-Bāqillānī does. He just presents it with others of his predecessors, without any comment. He affirms later that it is the one he prefers; when he speaks about what is known by mind, and what is known by revelation.²

As sources for knowledge, he mentions two (al-Badīhah) and the senses (al-Hiss).³ According to him, (Badīhah) is divided into two divisions: affirmative immediate knowledge (‘Ilm Badīhī fi-l-Ithbāt) and negative immediate knowledge (‘Ilm Badīhī fi-l-Nafy).⁴ The first is such as the knowledge which man has of his own existence, the feelings of pain, pleasure, hunger, thirst, the feeling of heat, cold, sadness, happiness, etc.⁵ The second is our knowledge of the impossibility of the absurd.⁶

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¹. Ugūl, p. 5
². Ibid, p. 25
³. Ibid, p. 8
⁴. Ibid.
⁵. Ibid.
⁶. Ibid.
Al-Juwaynī asserts three sources, as has been mentioned: the mind, the senses, and the self. Two of these sources, the mind and the self, are included, as can be noticed, in what al-Baghdādi calls (Badīhah) because the knowledge of our existence, and all these feelings of pleasure, pain, heat and cold, etc. have, according to al-Juwaynī, the self for source. The impossibility of the absurd comes, according to al-Juwaynī, from what he calls the mind (Badīhiyyāt). Therefore (Badīh) has not the same meaning for the two Imāms. Al-Juwaynī gives it a limited and precise meaning; al-Baghdādi assigns to it more than one kind of knowledge. A curious thing is that al-Bāqillāni does not mention the mind as a source of knowledge, and al-Baghdādi does not realise that the self can be a source of knowledge. They do not clearly distinguish between the different sources of knowledge, as al-Juwaynī does. It can be said that al-Juwaynī, in doing that, proves that he has a very fine sense of differentiation and understanding. But if al-Baghdādi does not distinguish between what is known by the self and what is known by the mind, he is more sure of what he says than al-Bāqillāni about the sources of knowledge. He distinguishes sharply between what he has to include in the affirmative immediate
knowledge and the negative immediate knowledge. Al-Baghdādi in his book gives all kinds of feelings and conceptions in one division without any order.\(^1\) Another advantage in what al-Baghdādi says about sources of knowledge can be found in his clear division between affirmative and negative, which can be considered as being the source of the idea of "transition between affirmation and negation" presented by al-Juwaynī as his only process of mental knowledge.

As to the degrees of knowledge, al-Baghdādi gives two: necessary knowledge (ʿIlm Darūfī) and acquired knowledge (ʿIlm Muktasab).\(^2\) He asserts that the difference between these two degrees is caused by the power of the knower in getting his acquired knowledge and his power in argumentation.\(^3\) He then asserts that necessary knowledge happens without argumentation or reflection, and it is not in the power of the knower to produce it.\(^4\) The acquired or reflective knowledge includes two kinds of knowledge: mental (ʿAqlī) and revelative (Sharīʿī). Both happen by speculation or reflection. Some of this acquired knowledge can be clearer (ʿAjlā) than others.\(^5\) He also declares that

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1. Tām, pp. 10,11.
2. Uṣūl, p. 8
3. Ibid.
4. Ibid.
5. Ibid. p. 9
speculative or reflective knowledge might be necessary by God’s will and could happen as an unusual thing. So it is possible.¹ He does not give any explanation about the operation of speculation, the difficulties which the knower can meet during this operation, the arguments used, the evidence of this speculative knowledge, and the criteria for its truth. That is why one can have doubts about his meaning of "clearer" (Ajlā), if he means that some kinds of speculative knowledge are easier to acquire than others, or that speculative knowledge acquired is not always in the same degree of clearness in the mind. This leads to a doubt about the evidence of acquired knowledge, and whether acquired knowledge, once it has occurred, is necessary, like immediate knowledge, as has been asserted by al-Juwayni.

This point really needed more attention from al-Baghdādi. It can be said that he means by (Ajlā) that the speculative process is clearer; he is not referring to the certainty of the result. This comes first of all from the fact that, as a theologian, the evidence of knowledge is really important for his results, which must be self-evident. Secondly, his statement that speculative knowledge can, in an unusual case, be necessary²

¹. Ugul. p. 15.
². Ibid.
gives the impression that he has the idea of the necessity of this knowledge. Thirdly, a close examination of his views can be helpful in clarifying this statement. When he divides originated knowledge into necessary and acquired knowledge, he says that the difference between them is in the power of the knower in having them. This means that what makes the difference is the power of man. This does not deny that acquired knowledge happens in the mind and by the mind. Therefore it can be necessary like immediate knowledge. This is what can be said about al-Baghdādi's views concerning the degrees of knowledge, but his meanings here are uncertain.

Al-Juwayni's views are much clearer and more detailed. They do not rely on any unnatural or unusual act of God. They rely more on reasoning and usual facts. This makes al-Juwayni more intellectual. But still it can be said that he got many of his ideas from his predecessors, one of whom was al-Baghdādi.

Another point about which al-Baghdādi appears perplexed is in what he calls (al-Khabar al-Mutawātar). He considers it as a source of knowledge. He asserts that what is known by this source is as necessary as what is known by the senses. This makes his sources three, and he only mentions two.

1. Uṣūl. p. 12
2. Ibid.
He adds that the proof of its necessity is that nobody can doubt it.

What is to be said to al-Baghdādi is: this proof of which he speaks, is it mental or traditional, "by hearing" (Sam'i)? Or does he want to say that this knowledge is just self-evident? If it is self-evident and is like the immediate knowledge of the senses, why do some people doubt it?

The answer is that, if the knowledge which comes by the (Khabar al-Mutawātar) seems to be necessary, it is because people believe in it. Its evidence comes from the heart, not from the mind. That is what al-Juwaynī asserts when he puts as a basic principle to all that is known by hearing (as-Sam'i) the belief in the director (al-Murshid). This belief resembles a sort of intuition. What is known by hearing becomes a proof for him (ad-Dalil as-Sam'i), because it becomes self-evident. It is a proof beside his mental proof. These two proofs are the ones used by al-Juwaynī in "What is known by hearing and mind together." Al-Juwaynī was very wise to put this sort of knowledge based on (as-Sam'iyāt) in a special division, apart from what is known by mind alone, or hearing alone.

In a way, this idea came to him from al-Baghdādi, the latter having said, when he was speaking about

1. Uṣūl, p. 12
2. See p. 143
the subjects of knowledge, that he rather adds (ash-Shar') to speculative knowledge, because (Shar') is based on the evidence of prophecy, and the evidence of prophecy comes by speculation.¹

Here again al-Baghdādi seems to be unsure about what he asserts; at one time (ash-Shar') is necessary; another time it is speculative.

As to the subjects of knowledge, he mentions four: what is known by speculation; what is known by experience and custom; what is known by Revelation; and what is known by inspiration.²

The first division includes: the origination of the world, the eternity of its Maker, His one-ness, His attributes, His justice, His wisdom, the evidence of the prophecy of His missionary by miracles.³ These points are the subject of what is known by the mind. He does not include in this division any speculative knowledge other than the religious kind. What is known by experience is like medical sciences and the different crafts. What is known by (ash-Shar'), as mentioned by him in that place, is the sinful act (Harām), the virtuous act (Halāl), the unbecoming act (Makrūh), and the morally indifferent act (Mundūh). Then he adds, as has been mentioned, the (Shar') to what is known by speculation. That is what al-Juwaynī calls "What is known by mind and hearing". What is known

¹. Usuli, pp. 14, 5.
². Ibid. p. 14
³. Ibid.
by inspiration is, for example, poetry. The
ability to write poetry is an uncommon attribute,
and is a special gift from God. This is not
mentioned by al-Juwaynī, but it must have for source
the self.

As to the method followed by al-Baghdādī in
these four subjects, nothing is said about it.
The method differs, according to the subjects,
but nothing is mentioned by him about this point.
Yet it can be deduced from his way of treating
the problem of the origination of the world that
in what is known by speculation, he follows the
deductive method. None of the mental proofs are
mentioned by him. But he mentions the Qur'ān,
the Sunnah, the consensus, and the Qiyās, as
proofs, which are traditional proofs.

For what is known by experience, nothing is
said by him about its method. He makes some
superficial observations1 about animals, insects,
etc., which are now considered absolutely wrong.
That is a thing which is not found in al-Juwaynī's
views of the world's phenomena. On the contrary, al-
Juwaynī got the right idea about research, when he
declared that what cannot be known now can be known
later when the proper way to find it will be dis-
covered.2 Another of his ideas, reflected in
modern research, is when he asserts that there is

2. See p. 199.
a sort of relationship between man and nature, which interferes with the result of the researches.

Al-Baghāḍī says about inspiration that this sort of knowledge is not acquired, therefore there is no method for it. And here again al-Baghāḍī does not seem to be methodical in the exposition of his ideas.

As to the aim of each of these subjects, al-Baghāḍī speaks about only one, which is the aim of what is called by him speculative knowledge. This aim is that the right speculative knowledge leads to the consolidation of religions. The aim of what is known by experience can be deduced from what he says about the creatures. It is the knowledge of nature in itself. But he does not assert it.

His doctrine of the origination of the world is based on definitions. He first defines the world (al-ʿAlam) as "Everthing other than God." Then he mentions that the world is of two kinds (al-ʿAlam Nawʻūn). He does not say two divisions. This fact has its importance in al-Baghāḍī's doctrine, as will be shown. It makes clear from the beginning the fact that al-Baghāḍī does not want to divide the real existent into two other existents. The main question now is: What does

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1. Ibid. p. 11
2. Ibid. p. 33
he say about these two kinds? Are they in perfect accordance with the basic idea of his doctrine, which is not to divide the real existent into two other existents? An examination of the definition of each of these two kinds, the qualities of each, and the principle of the origination of the world will show whether or not al-Baghdādī maintained consistency with his basic idea, and whether this basic idea was the right one to have for his doctrine or not.

The two kinds mentioned by him are: substances and accidents. He does not speak about things (ash-Shay') as al-Juwaynī and al-Baqillānī do. This comes from the fact that al-Juwaynī and al-Baqillānī divide the real existent into two existents. Al-Baghdādī does not. For him substances and accidents are only two kinds.

It has been previously said that one of the facts which might be a reason for al-Juwaynī to put the thing beside the substance and accident was the need to have a real and concrete basis to his doctrine after dividing the real existent into two mental existents. Al-Baghdādī does not need this
basis, "the thing", because he does not divide the real existent, but sees in it two kinds. He defines substance as "every thing having a colour,"¹ and accidents as "the qualities which are in substances." ²

His definition of substance presents the substance as a real existent, because it includes an accident, which is colour. He chooses colour as the kind of accident to be mentioned in the definition of substance, because he asserts that sight is the most important sense (al-Afdal). The deduction is that colour is the most attractive of that which is seen (al-Mar'iyat).

Al-Juwayni defines substance as being "space or what occupies space." Space is an essential quality of substance. Al-Juwayni's definition presents substance as quite different from accident, but both are mental. The basic idea of al-Juwayni's doctrine is different from al-Baghḍādi's.

Al-Baghḍādi does not want to divide the real existent; hence his definition of substance.

The definition of accident presents it as a meaning. It is "a quality", he says. This is in accordance with what he wants to ascertain, which is the real existence of the substance.

1. Usūl, p. 33
2. Ibid.
At this point it can be said that what al-Juwaynī tries to do finally in developing the qualities of substance and accident, is to restore a real existence to the supposed mental substance. Al-Baghādī has done this since the beginning. If al-Baghādī’s way of thinking is helpful in putting aside the definition of the “thing”, it is at a disadvantage in keeping the idea of a mental existent, which is the accident, right to the end of the development of his ideas. There is one mental existent and one concrete existent at the beginning and we still have one mental and one real at the end.

With al-Juwaynī, there are two mental existents at the beginning, which disappear completely into one real existent after he has developed his ideas.

Al-Baghādī does not study the qualities of substance and accident in a special chapter, as does al-Juwaynī, but he speaks about these qualities here and there, through the development of the fifteen questions (Mas'alah) of his second (Aql) in which he treats the problem of the origin of the world.

For him substance is the indivisible part. He does not call it atom, and he does not present it as similar to the geometrical point. He just says that it is the indivisible part. It might
be a real and not an unreal indivisible part.
He proves its existence by saying that, if the
division was infinite, it would never be possible to
say that the mountain is bigger than a grain of
corn, because what is infinite is never bigger
than another infinite.  

Another quality is that substances are similar
or of the same genus. He also describes bodies as
being similar. This comes from the basic idea of
his doctrine. Accidents cause all the differences
between bodies.

Al-Juwayni also asserts that accidents cause
all the differences between existents, that is
why he gives accidents an equal place with substance.
Both are, when thought of in separation, of mental
existence. Linked together, they form a real
existent, which is one, without division.

The idea of the similarity of substance or
bodies gives al-Baghdâdi the idea of how existents
can change one into another; the solid becomes
liquid, and liquid becomes vapour. Al-Juwayni,
who asserts the same idea, must have got it from
him. But in al-Juwayni’s doctrine it has a better
place in the explanation of the universe, al-Juwayni
having stated that the world can be conceived in
another way than that of a theologian.

Another quality of substances is that they do
not penetrate into one another, but are beside one

1. Uqul. p. 36
2. Ibid. p. 35
3. Ibid. p. 54
4. Ibid. p. 55
5. Ibid. p. 46
another. This quality is also mentioned by al-Juwayni. He might have got it from al-Baghdādī. It asserts that there is no void in the world. Substances can also be combined.¹

These are the qualities of substance, as stated by al-Baghdādī. They do not differentiate substance from bodies; accidents, on the other hand are in a different category from substances.

Accidents, according to al-Baghdādī, are not divided.² Each is a unit. It needs a place.³ Accidents are not similar,⁴ (Jins Maḥrusa). Some of them include several accidents, for example, the accident "colour" includes the accidents "red", "blue", etc. Accidents cannot be combined (Tarkhīh) or be in contact with each other (Mumassah) or be transferred from one place to another (Intigāl)⁵ or last (lā Tabqā)⁶ or be repeated,⁷ which means that they cannot last more than one instant of time.⁸

These qualities are also mentioned by al-Juwayni. Al-Baghdādī speaks in detail about the divisions or categories of accidents. He mentions thirty categories. The first and important one is

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¹. Uṣūl. p. 38
². Ibid. p. 35
³. Ibid.
⁴. Ibid.
⁵. Ibid. pp. 38–56
⁶. Ibid. p. 42
⁷. Ibid. p. 45
⁸. Ibid.
the accident called (Kawn). The second is colour.
He does not give a definition of "external relations" (Kawn) but one can see that external relations for him are what gives the substance a place, and that they have the same meaning and importance as in al-Juwayni's doctrine.

Al-Baghdadi does not expound the demonstration of the origination of the world in four principles as al-Juwayni does in his works where he treats this problem according to Ahl-al-Uqqa's views. Yet three of these principles - the first three mentioned by al-Juwayni - are treated by him in separate questions, but not presented as principles. He then states the origination of the world, then speaks about the finitude of the world.

One can ask why he treats such a point after the assertion of the origination of the world. Is it to complete his views about the origination of the world or just to treat some questions put by the seeker after truth? It might have, in his mind, a relation with the problem of the origination of the world. But he does not know how to show it clearly.

Those are the views of al-Baqillani and al-Baghdadi about the two problems of knowledge and origination, as expounded each in his book mentioned above, in comparison with al-Juwayni's views, as presented in his most important books about theology.

It has been stated at the beginning of this
comparison that the sources on which it is based are unequal. It can be asserted now that this fact was always taken into consideration, and that the results of this comparison might be of some value.

The first thing to assert after this comparison is that the three Imāms differ as to the degree of precision and capacity of comprehension of the meaning of substance, accident and thing.

Al-Bāqillānī deals with "the thing" to which he does not give as much importance as it should have. He deals with substance and accidents, conceiving them as mental existents. That can be deduced from their definition, but he does not make his conception quite clear, when he puts them on the same level with bodies as divisions of the originated existents. His conception of origination is based mainly on the origination of accidents, which he develops clearly enough. He does not seem to have realised the importance of the other principles of the proof of origination. These principles link together again the two divisions of the existent and prove that they have a beginning in time. This is because he does not realise the importance of accident and substance, or the importance of the role they play in proving
the origination of the world. His views about knowledge are more mature although they are incomplete.

Al-Baghdâdi neglects some points in treating the problem of knowledge. But he seems to have realised the importance of all its questions as al-Idâqillânî does, because his doctrine of knowledge does not contain any contradictory assertions. His doctrine of the origination of the world is in a way original, being based only on two definitions — of accident and of substance. The thing, which is one of the important definitions used by Muslim theologians, as al-Juwayni asserts, is put aside by him. He may have realised that its presence is unnecessary, and he was right. But he did not show it. Three of the four principles of the demonstration are well conceived by him. The fourth is put aside, as if it is not important.

Al-Juwayni, on the contrary, presents a developed doctrine of knowledge. His views about origination prove that he understands perfectly the importance of each definition of his predecessors. He could give to each meaning used by them its own value. What was not in accordance with the right way he conceives, was refuted and rejected by him.
What was not represented in a right way was re-organized by him, such as the sources of knowledge, which were not well conceived either by al-Baqillānī or by al-Baghdādi. The conception of substance and accident is perfectly developed by al-Juwaynī, as well as his conception of the thing. The four principles, which can be considered as the most complete of all that has been said, are clearly expounded. Al-Juwaynī was not really successful in putting the thing beside substance and accident in one system, as has been said. But it can be said that he realised this fact because his views about the thing do not interfere at all in this system of demonstration of the origination of the world. It has been rather stated by him, as has been said, to be a concrete basis to his assertions about the two mental existents.
PART III
Edition of
LUMA' AL-ADILLAH FI QAWA'ID
'AQĀ'ID AHL AS-SUNNAH
WA-L-JAMA‘AH
PART III

Introduction

Reklbat: Luma’ al-Adillah fi Qawa'id ‘Aqā'id

Ahl as-Sunnah wa-l-Jam‘ah is one of Al-Juwayni’s works. This manuscript has been chosen, edited, and an introduction is written to it. It contains most of Al-Juwayni’s theological opinions. It naturally deals with his doctrine on the origination of the world, which is the subject of this thesis.

Two copies of this manuscript have been used, and a commentary. As to the two copies:

(a) The first is a manuscript in the Egyptian National Library, in a collection No. 618, Majalm. This collection contains twelve manuscripts in 178 folios.

Reklbat Luma’ al-Adillah... begins at folio 117, up till half of the folio 122v (25 x 20 cm). Each folio has 31 lines. Each line has 12 words. The handwriting is (Naskh).

It is quite possible that this collection had all been written by the same man, because the handwriting is the same. The name of the writer is:

1. The twelve manuscripts are: 1) Ma‘ālim fi Uṣūl ad-Dīn, Li‘l-Imām Fakhr ad-Dīn, ar-Rāzī. It is missing. Only its title is there. 2) Al-Ashkāl al-Arkha‘ah fi al-Mantiq. 3) Qawa'id al-‘Irtibā’. 4) Al-‘Aqā'id al-Nasā‘īyyah. 5) Ma‘lumat al-‘Irtibā’. 6) Sharh al-Malhāmat. 7) Unmāḥaf al-Zamā‘īshārī. 8) Al-Luma’-li Imām al-Haravayn. 9) Al-Hudd. 10) Ajnās al-Mawjūdāt. 11) Mānṣūr al-Qamar and 12) Sharh al-‘Aqā'id al-Nasā‘īyyah. The collection contains many additional notes. It seems to be that its writer wanted to fill the empty places. The handwriting of these additional notes is not the same of the original writer of the collection. Some titles are written by another writer different from the original, as in the case of al-Luma’.
Muḥammad ibn Sulaymān ibn Yūsuf ash-Shāfiʿi. The Rāsāʾil in this collection has no date. It ends by the name of the writer only. But other two Rāsāʾil in the Majālīyah are dated; the first is Al-ʿAḥḍār as-Saḥābiyyah, the second its commentary.

The first, which is the fourth Rāsālat in the Collection, ends at the beginning of folio 26v with the name of the writer, who is the same as the writer of al-Lumāʿi, and the date, which is the 17th of Rajab, 508 A.H.

The commentary on the ʿAḥḍār as-Saḥābiyyah, which is the last Rāsāl in the collection, ends by the date which is the 11th of Dhu-l-Qaʿdah, 509 A.H.

Rāsālat Lumāʿ al-ʿAdillah is between these two Rāsālīn. Thus it is more likely that it had been written between these two dates, 508 A.H., 1114 A.D. and 509 A.H., 1115 A.D.

b) The second is a photostat of a copy which is actually in Tübingen Library. It was in Berlin Librarianshafstlibra. With the assistance of the General Library of Cairo University, this photostat copy was made, the library number in Cairo being 26393. This copy (Majālīyah) contains folios of which are bound out of order, is in a collection, It starts at folio 49v and ends at 63v. The folios of this collection are being completed by ff. 19v, 11v, 10v and 11v.

1. See p. 46 x
The handwriting is (Naskh). It is dated. The writer ended it on the 23rd of Rabī‘ al-Awwal, 547 A.H., 1152 A.D.¹ The name of the writer is Ibn al-Faraj al-Chuzzi.²

o) The third copy is in the commentary, written by Abd Muhammad 'Abd Allāh Sharaf ad-Dīn ibn Muhammad ibn 'Alī al-Qāhirī, known as at-Tilmisī. It is entitled: Sharḥ Luma‘ al-Adillah fi at-Tawḥīd. There are two copies of this commentary:

1) The first was written in 804 A.H., 1402 A.D. It is to be found in Aḥmad ath Thālith Library under No. 9869. A photostat of this copy is in the Institute of the Revival of Ancient Manuscripts of the States of the Arab League, under the number 1240 f.

2) The second, a microfilm copy, which is to be found in the Escorial Library, in Spain, under no. 1606. The microfilm used belongs to Dr. Muḥammad 'Abd al-Ḥāfīṣ abī Rīdah. This copy is better than the other, because the text of the Luma‘ is generally clearly presented in red ink. Some places are not clear, such as: from folio 2, col. I, till half of folio 3, col. II, the folio 5, col. I, when the author is speaking about the accident (al-‘Arad) and its fitness (Muḥdyyah), and in folio 45, col. II, in ch. "God

¹ See p. 45 x
² See p. 1 x
is superior to the acceptance of accidents." All these points are pointed out in the edition. This copy contains 132 folios, each with two columns. The writing is (Naskh.)

These are the three copies used in establishing the text of Risālat al-Luna. As the first copy belongs to the Egyptian National Library in Cairo, the letter Q is used as the abbreviation. The second copy got B, because it is in Berlin Library. The third got the letter Sh as it is a (Sharh).
The style in Q differs completely in some places from the style in B and Sh, in which differences are only in words or some short sentences. The complete change in Q is especially noticeable in the texts dealing with the origination of the world. This is not in the opinions, but in al-Juwayni's way of expressing himself. Thus it can be said that, in some places, there are two styles - Q style and B and Sh. style, which are exposed both, one beside the other, in the edited copy, and all additional words in brackets.

The comparison between B and Q (the copy Sh., as it is a commentary, is put aside for a while) leads to the fact that the handwriting in B is better than in Q. This last copy also contains many spelling errors, which have been corrected, sometimes with no reference in the footnotes.

Some grammatical mistakes are also to be found in Q. Nevertheless, in spite of all these imperfections, Q is to be preferred to B, because

1. See pp. 3x - 6x
it is the earliest, being written, as has been mentioned, between the two years 508 A.H., 1114 A.D. and 509 A.H., 1115 A.D., and B in the year 547 A.H., 1152 A.D.

It is very important to point out that differences are in the style, as has been mentioned before. Occasionally these differences have been expounded in more than one footnote, referring to one passage in accordance with the ideas, which are the same in both styles, but expressed in different ways. Only one sentence contains a different idea or statement. It is when al-Juwaynī speaks about the prophet's successors. In Q the sentence is: "The Prophet did not mention his successor." In B it is: "The Prophet did not mention 'Ali as his successor." This is very important. It is to be explained as follows: The copy B containing the name of 'Ali, as not being the successor of the Prophet, has been produced after the Sunnis were away from the government, when the Sunnites got the upper hand, under the

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1. See p. 42 x
2. See p. 42 x
reign of Alp-Arsalan. The other copy, Q, was earlier produced under the Buwayhides. This fact explains the difference of style between the two copies, as each of them had been written in a different period of time during al-Juwayni's life. It is very likely that Q had been written during the second phase of his life, when he was teaching in his father's school before he left Naysabur. At that time he was just starting his career as a teacher. That is why the style in Q is more pedantic. The spelling and grammatical errors are probably due to the Shafi'ite writer, who was one of al-Juwayni's pupils. The second had been written in the fourth phase of his life, after he came back to Naysabur, to teach in an-Nigamiyyah school. At that time he was more mature, and had got more knowledge about most of the sciences he was interested in, Islamic and non-Islamic sciences. That is why his style in B is nearer to his style in his other theological books produced at that period of his life.\(^1\)

As the Risalah contains some Qur'anic verses, they have been mentioned with their Sura in the footnotes, without Flügel's numbering.

1. See \textit{p.p.} 3 \times - 6 \times

\textit{See also} \textit{Ish} and \textit{Sham}.
"Luma* fl Qawa'id 'Agā'id Ahl as-Sunnah wa-l-Jamā'ah" or "Luma* men al-Adillah fl Qawa'id 'Agā'id Ahl as-Sunnah wa-l-Jamā'ah" or "Luma* al-Adillah fl at-Tawḥīd" are titles for this work of al-Juwayni, in which he attempted to explain the Ash'arites' beliefs.

The first title is to be found in Q, the second in B, and the third in Sh. These titles express the subject of the Risālat well. The Risālat contains the summary of Ahl-as-Sunnah, wa-l-Jamā'ah's beliefs, proved by intellectual arguments. The summary did not alter the aim of the work, which is to invalidate the sunnite beliefs. Thus, what this work contains is really quite clear and strong. It is the salient features of the sunnite beliefs.

Al-Juwayni mentions that he wrote this work, because some of his contemporaries asked him to do it.

1. This title is mentioned by al-Juwayni in the introduction. The writer of the manuscript gives: Kitāb Al-Luma' men Taqānīf Imam al-Haramayn. (See footnote 1 p. 18)
2. Egyptian National Library, manuscript No. 618 Majāmī'.
3. A photostat under No. 16393, Cairo University.
4. Microfilm No. 1606
5. See p. 19 from line 10 till 10
For clearer understanding, the Luma* has been divided into seven parts (Abwāb).

The first: The world and its origination.
The second: God and His attributes.
The third: The will of God and the will of Man.
The fourth: The visibility of God.
The fifth: God and the creation.
The sixth: The prophet’s mission and miracles.
The seventh: The Imāmate.

It is easy to see, according to these divisions, that al-Juwayni has studied theological problems, which seemed to him to be more important than others, and which were strongly discussed by his contemporaries. He started by discussing the origination of the world, which was the basis for the discussion of God’s attributes. Then he discussed the prophet’s mission, the miracles, and the Imāmate. It is to be noticed that he did not discuss the reckoning day (al-Ma’ad) and people’s states in the other world. Some of these parts contain only one chapter.

1. Part one contains al-Juwayni’s opinions about the origination of the world. He begins with the definitions of the world, the substance and the accident. He then speaks about the meaning of the Eternity and origination. The arguments of the origination of the world are produced in four chapters (Fasl). This word is not used by al-Juwayni himself. He uses two other words: (Asl) in B
and (Mas'alat) in Q. In these chapters he studies first the (‘Arad), then its origination, the impossibility of the separation of the substance and accident from one another, then the impossibility of the infinity of originated existents. He concludes that the substance, which is never separated from the accident, is originated because what is not previous to the originated is originated. According to al-Juwaynī, the origination of the world means the possibility of the world. Thus the world needs a Maker, which al-Juwaynī calls the differentiating Principle. This principle is not similar to the nature (Tabi'ah) or cause (‘Ilah) because, according to him, the Maker is powerful, and determinates without the motive being known. He determinates according to His will.

2. In the second part, al-Juwaynī studies the attributes of God. He speaks about the necessary attributes of God, saying that God is Necessary Existent. His knowledge is eternal. His power and His life are eternal too. Al-Juwaynī refutes his opponents’ opinions. They affirm that the power of God is originated. Al-Juwaynī’s argument is based on the fact that, if His power is originated, it would need another power to create it, and this leads to an infinity of powers, which is absurd. Thus His power is eternal. God is above mankind’s
attributes, because these attributes are imperfect. To prove the Unity of God, he speaks about the contradiction between the wills of gods, if they were more than one. He also speaks about the attributes with which God cannot be qualified, such as to be placed, and to have determined form like the bodies, and other qualities.

He then explains the verse "God seated Himself on the throne."⁷ telling that (al-Istiyā') means here superiority of God, who cannot be subject to the characteristics of temporal production. God, according to al-Juwaynī, is above change, because if He could change, He would be originated. Those who pretend that there is change in God disagree with the consensus of Muslim opinion. They are called Kappanmites.

3. Part three deals with God's will and Man's will. What is originated, the good and the harmful, happens by the will of God. God is the Creator of every event. This means that He wanted what He created. God's will is never imperfect. This means that God always does what He wants, He is never unable to do it, and nothing happens without His will. The Mu'tazilites find that the necessary and commendable acts are always wanted by God, whether they happen
or not. The unbecoming acts are accomplished in spite of God's will. The morally indifferent acts happen, and God does not care if they happen or not. Al-Juwaynī believes that creatures are not forced to obey God. God wills them to obey, by their own will, to be free and not determined.

Every adherent to Islam believes in these words: "What God willed was, what He did not will, was not." God willed man to feel free in his acts, and he feels free. Thus his acts happen according to God's will. God's will is above all wills.

The Qur'ān is full of verses expressing this meaning. Al-Juwaynī mentions some of them, such as: "But if Allah had so willed, He would have gathered them to the guidance." and "If Allah will to guide anyone, He enlargeth his breast for Islam, but if He will to send him astray, He maketh his breast narrow and contracted." The verse: "He does not approve of unthankfulness in His servants" means that God meant by the word ('Ibād) those who already obeyed Him. The verse "If Allah had so willed, we should not have associated neither we, nor our fathers, nor should we have made anything forbidden ... until they tasted our violence".

1. Qur'an vi/35
2. Qur'an vi/135
3. Qur'an x/xix/xi/9/9
4. Qur'an vi/147/149
God just wanted to answer the pagans. The proof is what He said at the end of the verse: "Say: Have ye any (revealed) knowledge? Bring it forth for us then; ye follow nothing but opinion, and ye are only conjecturing. Say: To Allah belongs the convincing arguments. If He had so willed, He would have guided you all in a body." 1

4. Part four deals with the visibility of God. Al-Juwayni, with Ahl-al-Yaqq, believes that God is visible to men. The intellectual proof they give for the possibility of the visibility of God is that God is existent, and every existent is visible. The proof of the visibility of God in Paradise is the verse: "Faces that day shall be beaming." 2 The visibility is by eye and not by mind. The verse: "Sight reaches not to Him" 3 does not mean that He is invisible, because conceiving is not seeing. Conceiving means that God is determined and God is not determined. The verse: "Thou wilt not see me" 4 proves that there is a visibility of God, because the verb to see is used. It is used in the negative form because of the circumstances in which the verse was said. Al-Juwayni believes that if a prophet affirms an attribute to God, it is absurd to think that he is ignorant about it. The prophet can ignore the future, which is unknown to mankind, but never a detail concerning the beliefs, such as the attributes of God.

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1. Q/C/148, 149/149, 150.
2. Q/C/148, 149/22, 23.
Thus the verse of Mūsā contains the idea of the visibility of God.

5. In part five, al-Juwaynî studies the relation between the Creator and the creatures. He affirms that God is the Creator and is quite different from the created. Many verses from the Qur'ān affirm the same idea such as: "To Allah do obeisance, all who are in the heavens, and the earth willingly or of constraint, their shadows too in morning and in the evenings."¹

Al-Juwaynî gives some arguments. He says that acts are proofs of the knowledge of the actor. Most of the people act without knowing what they are doing and why they are doing it. If they were the creator of their acts, they would have known what they were doing. Al-Juwaynî affirms that men still are not determined in their acts. They are free to do what they want to do - they feel it. Thus acts are not necessary. Man should always accomplish the commands of God, which are necessary. Those who accomplish the necessary commands should not be recompensed, because it is a duty to do it.

6. Part six deals with the apostleship, the prophethood and the miracles. Al-Juwaynî believes that God sends the prophets. In answer to those who deny the prophecy, al-Juwaynî says that the

¹ Q. xiii/15/16
commands should be external to the "self" because
man is usually inattentive. Sometimes he is unable
to see what he has to do. And prophecy is not
absurd; it is possible. Thus the reason can
accept the idea of prophecy.

Miracles, which are unnatural acts, are proofs of
the truth of the prophets. Al-Juwaynî explains
this by an example: "If a king presents a missioner
to the people, he expects the people to believe the
missioner. In order to establish proof of his power,
the missioner commands the king to get up. If the
king gets up, people will believe the missioner, and
will obey him as a representative of the king."

The prophet Muhammad has miracles. The
Qur'ân is one of them.

The Qur'ân is a miracle because of its style,
which is unique. Al-Juwaynî asserts that the
Qur'ân is a miracle also because it contains the
history of every early people. The prophet was not
cultured; in fact, he was an illiterate man. It is
also a miracle because it contains some prophecies
about the future, which, in fact, did happen later.
Other miracles are also recorded.

7. The seventh part deals with the Imamate.
Al-Juwaynî speaks about the Khulafâ'-ar-Rashîdîn,
that the prophet did not mention anyone to be his
successor, and that the Imam was elected according to
the consensus of Muslims. Al-Juwaynî mentions
the conditions of the Imamate.
لسع الأدلـة
في قواعد عقائد أهل السنة والجماعة
لإمام الحبـين
(1) فع في قواعد اهل السنة والجماعة لأعمال الحرسين
(2) بسم الله الرحمن الرحيم
(3) وهم نحن وهو حسب فإن (4)
الحمد لله العلم القاهر الحكيم الذي وجب له القسم والاستحلال في تأويله (5) تجويز المدٌم
(6) والصلاة على النبي (7) ميبد الباطل وضح الحق بواقعات الدلالات
هذا وقد استدعي إرشديك (8) الله (عز وجل) (9) ذكر بع (10) من الأدلة (11) في قواعد اهل السنة والجماعة
نستخرج الله تعالى في سماك بناكم واللله
الستمان وعليه التكبير

161 - ب: "بسم الله الرحمن الرحيم رب يسر ومن يا كريم. كتاب
الله من مصانع الامام الكبير الشافعي في المحال والقياس
الله روحه العزيز للمعبد المذبح يا زين اسال ين
اى راهم من الفرج الغنوى اللهم نفعه في الدين برحمته يا
عزيز يا غفور برحمة يا أرحم الرحيمين "

262 - ساقط من: 

464 - ساقط من: 

5 - ق: "اشدكم" وهو تحريف والتصحيح من: ب 6 ش.

266 - زيادة من: ب 7 ش.
١ - العالم وحدوده

(١) الاصل في حدث العالم ووجود الصانع
ابنهم وعُلِّم الله (٢) أن الأول تقدم (٣) عبارات
اصحل الموجودين عليها ابتداء (٤) منهم لجميع المعاني الكبيرة
في الإلفاظ الوحيزة (٥)
فضة اطلقوا (٦) العالم
فان قيل: ما العالم وما سي العالم؟ علماً
قلنا: العالم عند سلفنا لامعة: عبارة عن (٦) كل
وجود سوى الله تعالى (٧)
(٨) وعند خلف الامة: عبارة عن الجواهر والاعراض
(١) فاطط قوله: "لهم سي العالم: علماً؟"
فاما: "العالم" اسم من العلم والعلامة.
وانما سي "العالم": علماً علماً امارة منصبة على وجود صاحب
العالم تكذب "العالم" بجواهره واعراضه واجتماعه
دلالة دالة على وجود الرس سباقه تعالى (٨)

١٦١ - ب: "ما لا غالب في حديث العالم" وفي ش: "القول في حدث
العالم".
١٦٢ - سأط من: ش. يبدل في: ب: "ثم ن".
١٦٣ - ش: "ال]() بالتفسيـر".
١٦٤ - ب: "روا".
١٦٥ - ش: (اللفظ وعزة).
١٦٦ - ب: "في العالم هوائه" وفي ش: "وهو"
١٦٧ - سأط من B " تعالى ".
١٦٨ - ب: "ثم العالم ينقم إلى الجواهر والأعراض".
كان قيل: ما حد الجوهر وما حقيقة العرض؟
قلنا: قد ذكرت له حدودًا شتى - غيرنا نقتصر
على ثلاثة منها - فنقول:
الجوهر (1): المتجيز
وقيل: الجوهر - ماله حجم
وقيل: الجوهر - ما يقبل العرض
فاما العرض فقد تقبل: ما يقوم بالجوهر (1)
وقيل (2): ما ينظر على الجوهر (3): (كالانوان والظلاموم
والرياح والعلوم والقدرة، والأرادات الحاديثة وإصداؤها والحياة
والموت) (3)
وقيل (3):Args: من السؤال المتعارض
وقيل: العرض: ما يستحيل عليه الدبقاء.
فلما ذكر أن الموجود ينقسم الى قدم وحدث.
فالقدم: هو الموجود الذي لا أول له يوجد.
والحدث: هو (الوجود) الذي له أول (4)
بأن قيل: ما الدليل على حدوث العالم؟
قلنا: الدليل عليه - ان اجترام العالم واجناسها

(1) 21 - ب: ذكرت بتقدير وتأخير وشيء من انتصرف اللطفي ما لا يخل
بالمعنى: "فالجوهر كل ماله حجم - وقيل هو الشمتيز -
وقيل هو المستغني عن المجل - وقيل هو القابل للضرر -
وقيل ما له حظ من السماحة
(2) 25 - ب: سقط
(3) 26 - زيادة من: ب
(4) 45 - سقط من: ب في الش: مخطوطة بالشذ
(5) 55 - ب: "ثم حدث الجوهر بياني على أصول، ش: "ثم حدوث
الجوهر بياني على أصول".
لا تخلو عن الأعراض الحادثة ولا لا يخلو عن الحادث حادث
السؤال على هذا الكلام من اربعة أوجه: (5)

(1) الأول لا نسلم بثبت الأعراض
ولكن سلمنا ثبوت الأعراض فلا نسلم حدوثها
ولكن سلمنا حدوثها فلا نسلم استحالة خلو الجوهور عن هذه
الأعراض الحادثة
والربع - لم تلت: إن ما لا يخلو عن الحادث حادث (1)?
(2) ما السؤال الأول: اثبات ثبوت الأعراض
الدليل على ثبوت الأعراض - إن لم تتعلق إذا رأى جوهرا
سلاكا ثم رأى متحركا فقد ادرك التفرقة الضرورية (18 و)
بين هاتين الحالتين.

وذلك التفرقة لا تخلو:
اما أن ترجع إلى ذات الجوهور
أو إلى معنى زائد على الجوهور؟

دستحال أن يقال: ترجع التفرقة إلى ذات الجوهور

(18) - ه و ش: "100 منها - أثبات الأعراض - ومنها أثبات
حدث الأعراض - ومنها أثبات استحالة تمرى الجواهر عن
الأعراض ومنها استحالة حوادث لا أول لها ومنها - إن ما
لا يسبق الحوادث حادث "
وفي ش: "منها أثبات الأعراض ومنها أثبات حدث الأعراض
ومنها أثبات استحالة تمرى الجواهر عن الأعراض - وينهـا
استحالة حوادث لا أول لها - فإذا ثبت هذا نقول ما لا يخلو
عن الحوادث لا يسبقها ولا لا يسبق الحوادث فهو حادث"
نقد

(٢٥٤) - ب: "فلا الإحل الأول - (في أئتيات وجود الإعراض) فقد

انكرت طائفة من الطلعة: الإعراض، ونرى أن لا يوجد إلا

الجوهر: والدليل على أئتيات الإعراض: لنا، رأينا الجوهر

ساكا ثم نراه متحركا ندرك (فنا ندرك (في ش) تفرقة

ضرورة (ساقط من ش) بين الحالتين - ولا يقع الاقتراع الا

بين ذاتين - إذ هي لا يخالف نفسه - ففي ذلك أن

الشروط آيلة إلى الإعراض الزائدة (ش: زائدة) على الجوهر

- لم معظم الإعراض مدرك على الضرورة - فان العاقل إذا

طرأ عليه الألم وعترته الاسم (الاسم) أو نئاءه لذاته.

أو أعهله شهوة أو ادرك عليها - فانت يستيقن طرور هذه

المحاني على البديهة; - يلاحظ أن الفروقات بين ب: و ش

طقية وقد اثبتها.
لان الجوهر (في الحلائل) موحد وثبي. لا يختلف نفسه.
فلان يقع الافتراق إلا بين ذاتين وصنع وبذلك ان التفرقة
راجعة الى معنى زائد على الجوهر، وذلك هو العرض الذي
ابيناه.

1) السؤال الثاني: منح حدوث الأعراض.
والدليل على حدوث الأعراض - إذا نرى الأعراض المشابهة
تتماثل على حالتها فنستعين حدوث الطارئ منها من حيث
وجبت، ونعلم حدوث السابق منها من حيث كبدت
اذ لو كانت قديمة لاستحال عدهم فإن القدم نأتي العدم.
فإن كان ط. الجاه.
وانما ثبت له القدم داستحال عليه العدم (1).
(2) والدليل على استحالة تعرى الجوهر عن الأعراض:
إن الجوهر شائعة للاحياز والجواهر الشائعة للاحياز: غير
مجتمعة ولا مشترقة محل.
بل باخاصط يعلم أنه لا تخلو عن كونها مجتمعة أو
مشترقة؟ وذلك يقضي باستحالة خلوها عن الاجتماع والافتراق.

---
15
ب: "أما الأصل الثاني - حدوث الأعراض.
والدليل عليه: إذا نرى الأعراض المشابهة متناثبة على
حالتها وعشيق حدوث الطارئ منها، ونعلم أيضا حدوث
السابق من حيث عمتة، فإن لا ثبوت قدمها لاستحال عدهم.

25
ب: "أما الأصل الثالث فهو تبين استحالة تعرى
الجوهر عن الأعراض؛ والدليل عليه: إن الجوهر الشائعة
لللاحياز لا تقبل إلا مجتمعة أو مشترقة، بل باخاصط يعلم
(تعتم بالاختيار) أنها لا تخلو من كونها مجتمعة أو مشترقة،
ولذلك يقضي باستحالة خروج من الاجتماع والاجتماع وكذلك
نعلم ببدية المقول استحالة تعرى الاجرام عن الأنصاف
بالتحرك والسكن والتأثير (شي واللثا) في الحال والزلال
والانتقال وكل ذلك يوضح استحالة تعريها من الأمراض
٧- بلاحظ أن الفروقات بين ب، ب، ب طفيفة وقد أثبتها
(٨٩) وإنما إنا إنا ق
وكذلك نعلم ببداية العقول: استحالة تمرى الإجرام عن الاتصاف بالتحرك والسكن والبلد في الحال والزوال والانتقال.
وكل ذلك يوجب استحالة تمرى الجواهر عن الأعراض
(1) والدليل على استحالة حوارث لا أول لها:

ان حقيقة الحادث: ماله أول، وإذا كان حقيقة كل حادث
ان يكون له أول، فإن كرية الحوادث لا تخرج عن حقيقتها،
فإن تكون لكل أول

وهذا كأول جوهر - فإن حقيقة الجوهر كنبة مشيدة، فالكر.
لا تخرج من حقيقتها، سيكون كل متحيزا، فكل ذلك هينا.
اذا ثبت الأعراض، ثبت حديثا، ثبت تمرى الجوهر
عنها: فإنه تول الدهرى: بأن الحوادث لا أول لها،
ثبت على ذلك أن الجوهر لا يسبق الأعراض الحادثة، ولا
يسبق الحادث حادث على الاضطرار من غير حاجة إلى
نظر وتفكير (1)

(2) والدليل على أن العالم له حج، و

15 - ب هش: "وأما الصلب الرابع - وهو إيضاح استحالة حوادث
لا أول لها، والدليل عليها (على ذلك): أن دورات الاتصال
تتملخ (وتحمل) وتُقل كل دورة (منها) على مراراتهم التي
قبلها، فلم تقتضى (كانت) قبل الدورة التي قبلها (تحت فيها)
دورات لا نهاية لعددها، ولا غاية لأعدادها، لأن ذلك
مؤدياً لما لا نهاية لهما (لما كان مؤذناً بتناهيهما) إذ لا
يمصر عدد ولا يضبطه، إنه لا يتفرق في العقول.Aنضواء، ولا
لا يتحقق انشهاءه - فلم انتظى الدورات قبل الحجدة
لا تناهت انتهت إلى أول وفروض هذا الليل وفق هذا السبيل في جيئة محاكمات كلاً لا ووالدين والابن والزروع وحوله.

وإذا ثبت هذه القدرات ثبت عليها (تُرَبُّس) استحالة خلو الجواب عن الحوادث المثبتة إلى أول وفروض من الحوادث حادث على الشتر - من غير حاجة إلى نظر اعتبار.

تلاحظ الفروق بين ب، فكما نلاحظ التشابه بين هذا الكلام وبين ما يقوله: أنام الحريبي في كتاب الإرشاد ص ٢٥٢.

كانت في الأصل هكذا "....."......"ب، ص ٢٥٢ - "فصل في أثبات العلم بالصحيح".
(1) إنه قد صن حديث العالم بالدلالة التي ذكرناها 
(2) والحادث جائز الوجود (2) . فإذا يجوز تقدير وجوده (2) بدل (2) 
عن نفسه (2) ، ويجز تقدير (استمرار) (1) عدهم بدل (8) عـن 
وجوده (8) (9) بلا اختصار (4) بالوجود الممكن (10) بدل عن 
الحدث الجائز (10) انتقت (11) إلى مخصوص (12) وهو الصانع 
ثم (13).

(13) يستحيل ان يكون (14) مخصوص العالم (14) طبيعة: كـ 
صارت نه الطالعين.

(15) يستحيل ان يكون علة موجبة - كما صارت نه الآلال 
لان تلك الطبيعة لا تخلو: إما ان تكون قديمة او نادرة؟ (15)
(16) فإن كانت تقنية، انتم قد اثارها فإن الطبيعة ضد
مبيتها لا اختيار لها، وهي موجبة آثارها عند أرجاع 
المواضع (وانقطاع الدواعي) وقد صن عدة (16)
وان كانت الطبيعة (16) حادثة، انتقرت إلى طبيعة 
أخرى (16) ثم الكلام (16) في تلك الطبيعة، ككلم في تلك 
الطبيعة، ككلم في هذه الطبيعة (16).
(17) ونساء هذا القول (20) إلى أثبات حركان لا أول لها.
(18) وتنين يبطل ذلك.
(19) فوجب بذلك (19) أن مخصوص العالم: صانع مختار

مصول بالاستدلال والاختيار.

16 — ب و س: "إذا ثبت الحوادث".
۲۴۵ - ب و ش: "وهذا من وق.
۲۴۶ - ساقط من ب و ش.
۲۴۷ - ساقط من ش.
۲۴۸ - ساقط من ب و ش.
۲۴۹ - ساقط من ب و ش: "من الوجود.
۲۵۰ - ب: "قاذافاختص.
۲۵۱ - ب: "من الوجود.
۲۵۲ - ساقط من ب و ش.
۲۵۳ - ب: "انقرت.
۲۵۴ - ساقط من ب و ش.
۲۵۵ - في ب: ساقط.
۲۵۶ - ساقط من ب و ش.
۲۵۷ - ذكر في ب و ش: "لا اختيار لها وهم آثارها عند ارتفاع المنواج وانقاص.
۲۵۸ - الدوائر، فإن كانت الطبيعة قديمة لزم تقدم آثارها وقد وضح
۲۵۹ - حديث العالم: "كانت في (ق) زيادة من (ب).
۲۶۰ - ساقط من ب.
۲۶۱ - "ب محدث.
۲۶۲ - "كالكلام فيها.
۲۶۳ - في ب: "يؤدي الفعل.
۲۶۴ - "وضح.
٢- الله وصفاته
صانع العالم: ازلي الوجود، قدم الذات (١) مفتوح
لوجوده لولا مبدأ لثبوته (١).
والدليل عليه (٢): أنه تعالى (٣) لون حادثنا لمشارك
الحوادث في الانتصار إلى حدث (٤) كلمته في محدث
(٥) ينزل منزلة الكلام فيه (٤) و述べ
القول (٩) يؤدى ذلك (٠) إلى اثبات (٨) حوادث لا أول لها.
وقد سبق (١) بطنان ذلك (١).

١٤١٥- ب: وردت هذه العبارة بتقدم الجملة الأولى على الثانية
و استبدال لفظ لثبوته بلفظ لازليته في ش: وردت العبارة
كما هي مع استبدال لفظ "مفتوح" بلفظ "مبتدا" ولفظ "مبتدا" 
بلفظ "مفتتح".
٢- ساقط من ش
٣- ساقط من ب وش
٤- ب وش "ثم يلزم في محدثه ما يلزم فيه"
٥- زاد من ب
٦- ب وش "ويفض "
٧- ساقط من ب وش
٨- ساقط من ب
١٤١٦- ب: "وقد سبق الفعل والدليل على استحالة ذلك" في ش.
استحالة ذلك.
فصل

1. صانع العالم: حيّ عالم بجميع المعلومات، قادر على جميع القدرات.

كذلك يستقمن كل لبيب: ان الانفعال الحكمة (3) المتقدمة، الوارقة على احسن ترتيب ونظام (ولغة واحكام) لا تصدر إلا من (1) عالم بها،

وهي جزء صدر (4) خط منظم على ترتيب معلوم - من غير عالم بالخط: كان من (3) العقول (6) خارجاً وتيه الجهل والجاهل.

وإذا ثبت (10) كون صانع العالم، (11) عالمه، تأدياً، يبالخطار يعلم كونه حياً إذا يتحيل ان يصف بالعلم،

والقدرة: ميّت واجد (12) ويجوز ذلك: مراقبة وتنادى.

---

10 - ب: "الباري تعالى "
7 - ب: "عن "
6 - ساق من ب: "ش: "المعنى المعنى "
5 - زيادة من ب: "ش: " عن "
7 - "تريد "
9 - "سمو المقول "
3 - "ون "
2 - "استبان "
۱۱- ب و ش: "قادرا مالا"
۱۲- ب "تفجویز"
فصل
صحيح العالم: مريد (1) على الحقيقة (2) عند أهل الحق
وأيضاً الكعبة: كونه مريدًا على الحقيقة - وزم (3): إنه
تعالى (عن قوله) (4) لو (5) ووصف بكونه مريدًا لاقاعال
 نفسه فالكبير بذلك: إنه خالقها - ورد في
لوق وصف بكونه مريدًا لبعض أعمال العبادة فالكبير بذلك
إنه أمر بها (6).
وزم: إن كون الله عالما بوقع الحوالات في ذاته أعل
خصائص ذاتها - يغنى (7) عن تعلق الإرادة (8) بها.
وهذا باطل - إذ لو أنف القوة عالما عن كونه مبتداء
لاغنى كونه عالما (9) عن كونه قادرًا (10) وليس كذلك (11).
وإذ (11): قد وافقنا (12) على انتقال أعمال المهديين
إلى الإرادة (13).

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<td>151</td>
<td>161</td>
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<td>2</td>
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<td>ساقط من ب</td>
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<td>3</td>
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<td>ساقط من ش</td>
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<td>&quot;وزم&quot;</td>
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<td>5</td>
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<td>زيادة من ب</td>
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<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td></td>
<td>&quot;إذا&quot;</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

156 - وردت هذه العبارة في بِه: "بِه" وسقطت "بعض" من بِه وش

| 7  |   | "مغن"   |
| 8  |   | "الإرادات"   |
| 961 | 161 | ساقط من ش   |
۱۰۶۱ - ساقط من ب و ش
۱۱۱۱ - ساقط من ش
۱۲۱۴ - ب: "وَقَدْ وَافِقَتْ" وَبِهَا: "وَقَدْ اعْقِلْتَ"
۱۳ - ب: اردادها.
فصل (1)
ذهب (2) مسلطة البصرة الى ابن الباري تعلى مريد بارادة (3)
حادثة (ثامنة) (4) لا في محلها،
والذي قاله باطل: لان (5) الحوادث انا (6) انقرت
الارادة لحدودها (7).
ولو (8) كانت (1) الارادة حادثة لانقرت أيضا الى ارادة أخرى
لحدودها (9).
ثم يؤدى اثبات (10) ذلك الى اثبات ارادات لا نهاية لها.
هذا بطلت هذه الدعاوى: لم يبق (11)-بعد ذلك (11)
لا القطيع بما صار إليه اهل الحق ومن ونف الباري (12)
سخدامه وتعال (13) يكون مريد بارادة قديدة ازليا.

1 - هذا الفصل جاء في ب بعد قوله: "فصل صاح العالم-
مريد عند اهل الحق واحد..." الذي جاء ذكره في ت في
صفحة 15 من نسخنا هذه. وهذا يراجع إلى عمارة التل الذي بقيت
عليه أوراق الجريدة التي يهاجمها الشيخ
(الذي) حصل أن أشرت إلى ذلك في موضعه
من المقمته (أثر) رفقة (11) عند المقدم.
(في) الب. "andelier".
2 - ب: "ذهب".
3 - ب: "بارادات".
4 - زيادة من ب و ش.
5 - ب: "فان".
6 - ب: "إذا".
7 - ساقط من ب ودلبه في ش. "اخر".
8 - ساقط من ب.
9 - وردت في ب هذا: "... كنت الارادة حادثة في ابهاء
مقررة لحدودها الى ارادة التي ش: "... تم تلك الارادة الى
ارادة".
فصل
صاحب العالم: سبعة (١) بصير متكلم
إنه قد ثبت كنه حياة والحي لا يخلو من الاتصال
بالسمع والبصر والكلام وصدادها (١)
والنذر هذه الصفات نتائج
والرب (٢) سبحانه وتعالى (٢) يقصد عن سمات النفس

1 ـ "ساقط من ب"
2 ـ "ساقط من ش"
3 ـ ب: "عز وجل"
نص
الرب (1) سبحانه وتعالى (1) - بات واجب الوجود.
اذ قد ثبت - بما قدمته - قدمه.
القدم يسحيل عده - يلتفاق من العقول. وذلك
يضيع بكبته باقيا (114و) مستر الوجود.

16 - ب: عز وجل
2 - ب "قدمته" وفي ش: "تقدمه"
3 - ش: "يضيع"
فصل (1)
صاحب العالم: (2) واحد - عند أهل الحق (1)
(3) والواحد الحقيقي: هو النبي الذي لا ينقسم (1)
والدليل على وحدانية الآلهة: أنا أو هم نوقدنا الذين أتينا (4)
وفرضنا (5) عرضاً ضدين (1) وقدرنا ارادة احدهما لاحسب
الذين (1) (7) وارادة الثاني للثاني (8) - فلا يخلو من
امور ثلاثة:
اما أن تنفذ ارادةهما
أو لا تنفذ ارادةهما
(8) ارادة احدهما دون الآخر (9)
(10) وأستحال أن ينفذ ارادةهما لاستحالة اجتماع الفدين.
وأستحال أيضاً لا تنفذ ارادةهما لتباغت الالهيين، وخلو
الحل عن كلا الخدين (11).
(9) فإذا أبطل النفسان تعين الثالث (10):
(11) وهو أن تنفذ ارادة احدهما دون الآخر.
والذي لا تنفذ ارادةه فهو الغلوب المستكره.
والذي نفذت ارادته فهو الآله القادر على تحصيل ما يشاء.

1. تقدم ذكر هذا الفصل في ب: قبل "فصل: ذهبت معتزلة
البصيرة..." في ش: فصل في الوحدانية.
2. ب: "عند أهل الحق واحد..."
3. ب وش: "حقيقة الواحد الذي لا ينقسم"
4. ساقط من ب وش
5. ب: "وقدرنا"
۶۵۱ - ب و ش: "فان جوزیتا ارادةànhده احدهم لاحد اولین".

۷۰۵ - ساقط من ش

۸۵۸ - ساقط من ب و ش
فإن قيل:
لم لا يجوز أن يترانث انبدأ ولا يختلف قط؟
قلنا:
إن لم نجز اختيارهما في الارادة كان حالا (1):
ان (الإم) (1) وجود احدهما ووجود صفاته ليستحيث إن
ينفع الثاني من أن يبد ما يمج ارادته (2) عند تقييد-
الافراد والعاجز من خط (3) عن رتبة اللهية (4) بذلك مضمن
توله تعالى (4) "لو كان فيما ألمه إلا الله فصدقنا (5)." أ
اي (6): لتناقش احكامهما عند تقدير القادرين على الكمال.

169 - ب: "استحلاح نفوذ ارادتها واستحال ان لا تتمكن
ارادتها جيماً لامتاع وجود ضدين والخلو عنهما".
168 - ساقط من ب و ش.
167 - ب و ش: "وان تفت ارادة احدهما كان الثاني مخلوساً
مستكروا. وإن لم نجز اختيارهما في الارادة كان حالا.
1 - زيادة من ب.
2 - كانت في ق: "ارادته".
3 - ب و ش: والعلاج عن رتبه الالهية منخط.
4 - ب: "عنعلاء".
5 - (آية 24 سورة 21).
6 - ب: "مخناه".
فصل

(1) القدام (البارى سبحانه و) (2) تعالى:
عالم بعلم قدم قادر بقدرة قديمة، حي بحياة قديمة.
وذهب (3) المعتزلة إلى أن (4) البارى (5) تعالى عن قولهم:
حي (6) العالم قادر (7) بنفسه (8). وليس له قدرة ولا علم ولا حياة (9).

(1) دلائلا في السألة إن تقول (10):
قد كثير (11) في الحقول — إنما يعلم به المعلوم علم
فلو علم البارى تعالى (11) المعلوم بنفسه، لكان نفسه
علياً فإن كل (12) متعلق بعمل تعلق احاطة به (13) علم
ثم (14) قد تحكى المعتزلة في صفات البارى (5) تعالى —
تريث (15) : أنه (16) عالم حي (17) قادر بنفسه (18)، مريد
بإدارة حادثة
(11) لطوفكس عاكسما قالو: لو زعم: إنما عالم بعلم حادثه
مريد بنفسه (20) — لم يجدوا بين ما اعتقدوا (20) وبين ما
الزومهم (21) فصل.

فصل
فإن قالوا:
لو كان البارى تعالى (12) مريدًا بنفسه (20) لكان مريدًا لكل مراد

1 - ش "البارى"
2 - ب و ش: "سبحانه"
ب : "نهب"  
4 - ساقط في ش  
5 - ساقط في ب  
6 - ورد في ب بقدر وتأخير "قادره عالم حي"  
7 - ش : "نفسه"  
8 - ش : "حياة حلم وقدرة"  
9 - ب و ش : "و"  
10 - ش : "تحقق"  
11 - ب و ش : "سبحاته"  
12 - ش : "و"  
13 - ب : في ب وردت بعد "علم"  
14 - كانت في ق : "و"  
15 - ب : "الرب"  
16 - ش : "برنت"  
17 - ب : "حية علم"  
18 - ش : (نفسه)  
19 - ش : "لو"  
20 - ب و ش : "نفسه"  
21 - ش : "سبحاته" "قدره"  
22 - ب و ش : "المروه"  
23 - ش : "سبحاته"  
24 - ب و ش : "نفسه"
كما أنه تعالى (4) لما كان عالماً بنفسه (3) إلا حسب كتاب (2)
(3) معلوم (4) والمعنى كله مخلوق له (5)

قلنا:

(1) هو باطل على نظام مذهبهم ومقدمهم يكون الباري تعالى
(2) قادراً (7) فإن ذلك من صفات الله تعالى بعضاً الندوات.
(3) ثم يختص كون الباري تعالى بعضاً الندوات (8)
(4) ولا يصف الرب (عزجل) (1) بالاقتدار على مقدرات العباد.
(5) وقد صرحت نصوص من كتاب الله تعالى بابيات (11) معرفة و
(6) شبه: (12) قوله (سبحانه و) (13) تعالى: "و لا تحمل من
(7) فحا ولا تضع إلا بعلمه " (14)
(8) وقال عز من تأول (15): "انزله بعلمه " (16)
(9) وقال سبحانه (17) متداولاً (18) شيا على نفسه:
(10) ان الله هو الزكزا ذو القوة المبين " (19)
(11) أيت لنفسه القوة (20) وهي القدرة باتفاق الفسرين

1 - ساقط من ش: ب و ش: " لنفسه "
2 - غ: ب " بكل "
3 - غ: " المعلوم "
4 - ه: زادة من ب
5 - ح: 6 - كان في ق: " هذا ما باطل على ناس " مقدمكم يكون
6 - الباري تعالى
7 - زادة من ب
8 - ب و ش: " على زعم "
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>رقم</th>
<th>معنى</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>9</td>
<td>زيادة من ب. وفي ش تعالي</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10</td>
<td>زيادة من ب.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
| 11  | ب: "على اثبات."
| 12  | ب و ش: "فضها."
| 13  | زيادة من ب |
| 14  | سورة 35 (فاطر): 11 |
| 465  | ب: "قال تعالى" وهذه العبارة ساقط في ش |
| 11  | (4/111-النساء) |
| 16  | ش: "تعالي"
| 17  | ب: "مضحى."
| 18  | ن من (15/48 الذاريات) |
| 520  | ساقط من ب - وفي ش: "تأثير لنفسه القوة."

("الآيات القرآنية")
فصل

وقد ذكرنا إن الباري تعالى: متكلم فاعل (الآن) (ان كلامه (قدم الأزلي (لا يبدو

(3) لوجوده) وذهب (4) الممتلئة، والتجارية، والزيادية، والإمامية، والمختلفة

(5) إن كلام الله (6) تعالى: حادث.

(11) ظل وامتنع (7) طرابف - من هؤلاءـ من (8) اطلق القول يكون مخلوقًا (1) قسمه: حادثا (و) محدثا.

(9) وإطلاق المتأخرين من الممتلئة قولي: يكون مخلوقًا.

(10) والدليل على قدم كلام الله تعالى (الاعتقاد على أنه متكلم كلام) إنه لوكاين (كلامه) (11) حادثا: لم يخل من أمر (ثلاثة) (12):

اما (ان) (13) يقوم بنذة الباري تعالى.

أو يقوم (14) بجسم من الأجسام.

أو يقوم (15) لا بحل.

ببطل (16) تجاهل (17) إن يستعمل قيام الحوادث بنذة الباري (18) تعالى (18) فان الحوادث لا تقوم إلا بحادث (18).

زائدة من ب
ب "كلامه: الأزلي يقدم" وفي شيء "كلام الله تعالى: قدم الأزلي."
زيادة من ب
ب "وهمه" ساقط من ب
ب "الباري" في شيء "الله سبحانه وتعالى..."
بـ: "نفيه" 8
بـ: "عن" 7
169 - ساقط من ش.
زيادة من بـ: "و"
كثرة من كـ: "ور"
بـ: "بأنه" 10
زيادة من بـ 11
بـ: "نفي كان كله حادث.

12 - زيادة من ش.
13 - زيادة من بـ.
14 - ساقط من بـ و ش.
15 - ساقط من ش.
16 - بـ، شـ: "بطل"
17 - بـ: "اذ يستحلل قيام الحوادث بذاته"، وفي شـ: "فان الحوادث يستحلل قيامها بذاته سبحاً
18 - بـ: "ولا تقوم الحوادث الا بحادث"، وفي شـ: "فانه لا تقوم الحوادث الا بحادث".
(1) وبطل قيل علم كتابة بجسم 619، يلزم ان يكون المتحك ذلك
الجسم (1)

وبطل قيل (2) الكتاب بكل حال 620، كان الكتاب الحديث (3)
عذب من الاعراض، وس/Desktop/Trash/75896.pngتقل الاعراض بانفسها 619، لو جاز
ذلك في ضرب منها لزم (4)، في نافذتها

---

16 - ب: "لو قام كتابة لكان المتحك الهم الك." 
في ش: "لو قام بجسم 6، كان المتحك به "

2 - ش: "وجود "

3 - ب، ش: "لاه" 

4 - ب: "لجازذلك"
فصل
الكلام الحقيقي: شاهدًا (1) حديث الله (2)
وهو الذي تدل عليه السواقي المتواضع عليها.
وقد تدل عليه: الخطوط والرسوم والإشارات.
وكل ذلك صناديق الكلام القائم بالنفس، لذلك قال الخليل (3)
(3) أن الكلام في الفؤاد ومنا جعل اللسان على الفؤاد (4).

دليل
ومن الشواهد على ذلك (5):
كتاب الله (7) عز وجل (6) في الاخبار عن المنافقين (7) قوله تعالى:
"أذا جاء المنافقين (7) قلنا: بكسر الرجل الله (8) الآية (9) ونحن نعلم أن الله تعالى لم (9) يكذبهم في اثباتهم،
وإنا يكذبهم فيما تجنه سُراهم (7) تكه ضائرهم (7).

وقوله سبحانه: "ولقولون في أنفسهم "الائية" (10)
وأذا تثبت أن القائم بالنفس: كلام وليس هو حرفنا (11)
منتظمة ولا (12) أصوات مققحة (13) من مخارج الحروف فليثبت (12) المقابل: أن (14) الكلام القديم (14) ليس
بحرف ولا (15) أصواته.

---
1 - 2
2 - 3
3 - 4
5 - 6
6 - 7
7 - 8
8 - 9
9 - 10
10 - 11
11 - 12
12 - 13
13 - 14
14 - 15

هو ابن فอين بن الصلة أحد بني جس بن بكر ثم احد بني
تغلب بكسره ابوباكك، ولد حوالي سنة 141 2م وهو شاكر وعظم
من شعراء الدولة الأموية وكان تصرفاً (عن شر شعور الشهابين
هفتم سنة 211 هم بتحقيق الشيخ محمد محي الدين عبد الحميد-
الطبعة الخامسة سنة 1371 هـ 1951 م بصفة 28 من)
3 - قال الاختل: لا يعجبنك من خطيب خطة، حتى يكون
مع الكلام أصيلاً أن الكلام لفي القدام وانما في جمل النسا على
القدام، دلالة
(انظر شعر الاختل ص. ٥٠٨ بيرين)
4 - ب: "الكلام"
5 - ش: "من كتاب الله"
6 - ش: "التحالي قوله"
7 - ش: "ساقط من ش"
8 - ب: "بقوله"
8 - ب: (١/١ المنافقون)
9 - ب: "قالوا تشهد انك لرسول الله"
10 - زيدة من ب و ش:
11 - ش: "حرف"
12 - ب و ش: "فانما تثبت أن القالم بنفسه هو الكلام، وليس
هو حرف منتظم ولا أصول منقطة".
13 - ب و ش: "فسباقن"
14 - ش: "كلام البارى سبحانه تعالى قديم"
15 - ساقط من ب
ولا الحان ولا نغمات (1) 
فان الحروف (2) تتوالى وتتكرر (3) ويقع (4) بعضها
مسبقا ببعض (5) وكل مسبوق حداث.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>ساقط من ب</th>
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<tbody>
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<td>1</td>
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<td>2</td>
<td>&quot;الحروف تتبعًا وتتوالى&quot;</td>
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<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>ساقط من ش</td>
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<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>&quot;وقال&quot;</td>
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<td>5</td>
<td>&quot;لبعض&quot;</td>
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</tbody>
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平板

كلام الله تعالى (1) مقرر بالسنة الغزرة، حفظه بحفظ (2)
الحفظة، كتب (3) في المصاحف على الحقيقة (4)
والقراءات:

الصادقات والقراءات،
وهي من (5) الأعمال، التي يمر بها وينهي عنها، ويتاب
الكلف عليها، وقد يعاقب على تركها.

Wilam الله تعالى: هو المعلوم الفهم منها
والحفظ: صفة الحافظ
والحفظ: كلم الله (7) عز وجل (6)
والكتابة: احرف منظمة وأشكال مزجية،
وهي: حوادث.
والغموض منها: كلم الله تعالى
(وهو (1)) أي أن الله تعالى (10): كتب (11) معلوم،
مذكور (11)، وهو غير ذكر الداقيق وله تعالى ذلك
الكتابين.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>رقم</th>
<th>ب</th>
<th>&quot;البارة عز وجل&quot;</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
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<td>1</td>
<td>ب</td>
<td>&quot;البارة عز وجل&quot;</td>
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<tr>
<td>11</td>
<td>ب</td>
<td>&quot;البارة عز وجل&quot;</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
8 - ساقط من ب
9 - زيادة من ب
10 - ورد في ب حسب تقديم وتاريخ "مذكور" معلوم مكتوب في و
11 - ب: "كتاب"
(ذكر ما يستحيل في أجواف الباري تعالى)
(1) يشمل على نصوص (1)
(2) وحالة القول فيه:
(3)
ان كل ما يدل على الحدوث، وعلى سنة (8) النفس (5)
فالرب (7) تعالى وينصب عنه (7)
(4) هذه الجملة (12): تتير في فصول تشتمل على تفاصيل (8)
(5) منها (9):
(10) إن الرب (10) تعالى متقدس (10) عن الاختصاص
بالجهازات والاتصال بالمحاذاة (11) ولا (12) يحيط به
الافظ (12) ولا يكتنف الانتصار (13) وحجل من قبول الحد
والقدر.
(11) والدليل على ذلك:
ان كل مختص بجبهة (14) شاغل لها: (وهو) (15) متحيز.
(12) وكيل متحيز (16) غالب للياقة الجواهر وفرقتها.
(13) وكل ما يقبل الاجتماع والاجتياز لا (17) يخلو عنها
(14) ولا يخلو (8) عن الاجتماع والانتصار (18): حادثه
(15) كالجواهر (19). (20) فإذا تبت تقدس الباري عن التحيز
(16) والاختصاص بالجهازات نتيرب على ذلك تحليلاً عن الاختصاص
بسائر مثنا أجرهم واجسام (20)

١ - زيادة من بـ وش "انا انه في ش لفظ" الباري يقابله "والله".
لا تصدق الاقطار، في ش: "لا تحدث الإكراه لا تحية الاقطار، "الاقطار: (تستلم بها) 14 14

زيادة من ب، في ش "وجوه شجرة" ساقطة، 15 16 16 - ساقط من ب

"ثلا" 17 16 18 18 - ب "ولا لا يخلو عنهما"

سابق من ب 19 18 - "وذا" 20 17 - ساقط من ش

"فترب"
فان سلنا عن قوله تعالى: الرحمن على العرش (1) تلتها:

المراد ب "الاستواء" القهر والغلبة والعلو (2) (3) منه قوله العرب:

(4) استوى فلان على الملكة - (5) استعلع عليه(6) واطردت له.

ومنه قوله الشاعر:

قد استوى بشر على العراق 500 من غير سيف ودم العراق.

---

1 - (5/6 الفرآن)  
2 - سالف من ش  
3 - زيادة من ب  
4 - ش: "القليل"  
5 - آي: إذا ب  
6 - ش: استوى
فصّل

الرب (1) سبحانه وتعالى (1) يتقدّس (2) عن تبول الحوادث.
واقع (3) على ذلك: أهل الهم والتحل (4).
وخلف إجماع الأمة: طاغية بنى نيب سجستان تلقب ب "الكرامية".
(4) فهموا: أن الحوادث تطرأ على ذات الباري تعالى (5).
عن قولهم (6) وهذا (7) مذهب المجوس.
والدليل على استحالة قيام الحوادث ذات الباري تعالى (8):
انها (9) لوقت به - لم (10) يخل عنها. ويا لم يخل عن
الحوادث: حادثه.

1 1 - ب "نزل وجل" 2 - ش: "تقدّس" 3 - وردت في ب بثدим وتأخير "أهل الهم والتحل" على ذلك.
4 - ب: "و" 5 - ساقط من ب وفي ش: الشر مخلوق.
6 - ب "وهو" 7 - ش: "تذكر" 8 - ساقط من ب وفي ش: "الباري سبحانه وتعالى.
9 - ب "انه" 10 - "لم"
الحواض (كلها) 1) تقع مرادة لله تعالى 2) تفعها ونشرها 3) خبرها ونشرها.
وذهبت المفروضة من تبعهم من أهل الآباء.
إلى أن الوافيات والمشروبات من الظلال، مرادة لله تعالى.
و若您 لم تقع.
والمشروع والفيضان تقع - واله تعالى (3) كاره ليا (4).
غير مريد لوجبها (5) وهو (6) في تقع على كره (6).
والمحابات، وما لا يدخل تحت التكليف من أعمال البهائم.
والمحانيان - تقع (7) - وهو (8) لا يريدنا ولا يكرهنا.
وإذا دلنا على ان الرب (9) سبحة وتعالى - خلق لجميع الحواض 10) ينتحب (10) على ذلك (11) أنه مريد لما خلقه.
تأصد إلى ابداع ما اخترع.
ثم نقول:
قد قضى المقول بأن قصور الإرادة، بعد نفوذ الشهية من
إصداق الإمارة (11) على سما النقص والإعفاء (12) بالمجزه.
والقصر (12).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>رقم</th>
<th>مادة من ب</th>
<th>ساقط في ش</th>
<th>ساقط من ب</th>
<th>ساقط في ش</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
<td>4</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
7  ساقط نب ب
8  ب: "نهو"
9  ساقط في ب 6
10  604 ب 6: "عليه"
11  ب: "الامارات" وفي غ: "الامارات الدالة"
12  1041 ب 6، في غ يتقدم وتأخير "بالقصر والعجز"
(1) ومن ترشح (2) للملك (3) كان لا ينفذ مراده في أهل ملكه - عد من ضعيف المنية (4) وضاع الفرصة (5). 
فإذا كان ذلك يزري على من ترشح (6) للملك (7) كفيف (8)
يجزى ذلك في صفة ملك الملك، ورب الأرباب.
فإن قالوا:
الرب - سبحانه (9) وتعالى - قادر على أن يرد الخلق (10) إلى طاعته قبل رسرا، ويظهر (11) آية تظل رقاب الجبارة لها (12) خاضعة؟ (13)
قلنا:
من فاسد أعلم: إنه لا يجوز (11) في حكمة (14) اجبار الخلق (15) على الطاعات، وضاعرها إلى الخيرات، ولا يريد منهم (16) إلا الإيمان اجبارا، وإنما يريد منهم اختيارا. 
فما يريده لا يقدر عليه هوا لا يقدر عليه لا يريده (17)
وقد اجتمع سلف الإمة وخلفها على كلمة لا يجدها معتز إلى الإسلام، وهي (18) قولهم:
"ما شاء الله كان، وما لم يشأ لم يكن".

1 - ب: "فنم"
2 - ب: "ترشح" وفي ش "ترشم"
3 - ب: "و".
4 - ب: "وضاعا للفرصة" وفي ش: "وضاعا للرفعة"
5 - ب: "بترشح".
6 - ب: "كيف"
7 - ساقطة في ب، ولكن ذكرت في ب بعد "رب الأرباب".
8 - ساقط من ب، ش.
69 - ب: "العباد إلى النطاعة تقرأ" وفي ش: "الخلائق إلى النطاعة تقرأ".

ب: 1000 - كانت في ق: "ولها خاصة".

ب: 11 - ساقطة من ب.

ب: 12 - "الحكم" وفي ش "حكم الله".

ب: 13 - ش: الخلق.

ب: 14514 - ب: "ذلك وانما يريد منهم الاياض على الاختيار، وما يريد الا يقدر عليه، وما يقدر عليه لا يريد".

يتأقلم في ش: "ذلك وانما يريد منهم الاختيار".

15 - ساقطة من ب.
ورى التيّة (1) لا يرى الكفر
ونها: (2)
قوله تعالى: "ولو شاء الله لجعلهم على البديه" (3)
(4) ونها قوله تعالى:
"من يرس الله أن يهديه ينحى صدره لله ورس الله
أن يظلد يجعل صدره ضيفا حرجا".
ونها قوله تعالى: (4)
"لو أننا ننزلنا اليوم الملائكة (5) إلى آخر الليللاة.
فان احتزوا بقوله تعالى: "ولا يرضى لعباده الكفر
(6) فالجواب - إن نقول (7)
(8) أراد الله تعالى ب"العباد" المؤمنين لطاعته المخلصين
لعبادته (8) وهو ( مثل) (4) قوله تعالى: "عينا يشرب بها عباد الله "(10)
(وانا) (11) أراد الأولية الانتقاء عن العباد الذين لم يرد
(12) نم الراب الكفر - لم يكرروا

__________________________________________
1 - ب: "شاهد"  
2 - ب: "سافط في ب - في ش: "ونها"  
3 - (3/16الانعام)  
4 - (4/16الانعام)  
5- (11/16الانعام)  
6 - (7/31 الزمر)  
7 - (6/6ش: "قنا "  
8 - ب: "أراد أن الله تعالى لا يرضي لعباده المؤمنين لطاعته
المخلصين لعبادته - الكفر" في ش: "أراد الله بعباده
المؤمنين المخلصين العبادة"  

10 - زيادة من ب
11 - زيادة من ب
12 - "يُرفَن"
وريت يا شاه الله ما اشتركا

"فقول الذين اشتركون: لو (1) شاء الله اشتركا، ولا آباؤنا،
ولا حورا من شيء إلى قوله - حتى ذاختا بِسناء (1)
(2) ووجه الدليل (2) من الآية: أن الله (3) رد على الكفار
قولهم:
(4) "لو شاء الله ما اشتركا "(4)

(5) الجواب - إن تقول:
الله تعالى (5) أنما رد عليهم (6) لانهم قالوا ما قالوه
مستهزيئين سارة (8) في الحق (6) وردا لحجة الله (7) و تعالى (11)
والدليل (11) على ذلك - قوله تعالى (11) في آخر الآية:
"قل: هل يندكم من علم (12) فتخرجوا لنا إنا نتبعون إلا
الظن هو أنتم الأتاغرون.
قل: فلله الحجة البالغة، فلو شاء لبدكم اجمعين (12)"

| 161 | مكتف في ب: وهي الآية (12/148) | 162 | 62 | 3 | 364 | 4 | 44 | 65 | 1 | 2 | 8 | 9 | 10 | زادة من ب: |
11 ـ بِهدٍ: "عليه"
12 ـ بِ"الآية": وما آية (15/149/2 الانعلم)
وفي ش: "١٠٠٠ عليه قوله تعالى: "
4 - رؤية الله
فصل
مذهب اهل الحق - إن البارى (7) تعالى: (12) مري دلوا (13):
يجوز أن يراه الزائرين بالابصار.
وذهب (4) المعتزلة (5) إلى أنه سماح له تعالى: يشجع أن
يرى، وصار الآخرون منهم إلى أن البارى تعالى (6): لا
يرى نفسه (14) والدليل على جواز (2) الرؤية عقل: أن الرب- (8)
(8) سماح له تعالى (9) موجود (10) وكل موجود (10): مري (11):
وبين ذلك (11):
(14) إنما نرى الجواهر والالوان (شامهدا) (15)
فإن رؤى (14) الجوهر، لكزنة جوهر (1) فيلزم ان اليرى اللون، وإن
رؤى اللون، لكزنة لونا (2) لزم (16) اليرى الجوهر.
وان رؤيا لموجودها: لزم ان يرى كل موجود (17)
(17) والبارى - سماح له تعالى: موجود، فصح ان يرى (17).
فإن قالوا:
ابن يري مست قراء (18) : لفظت له والرب تعالى (11):
ابزي (20) تدعي (20) والذات (21) فلا يري (22)؟

__________________________
1 - ب و س: "الله "
2 - ساقط في ش
3 - زاده من ب
4 - ب: "ودهيت"
(1) فالجواب من وجهين:

- احدهما: أن تقول:

كلكم هذا نقص عظيم (1) من جوانب رؤية (2) من المعلوم والروائع، والعلوم، والثواب، (3) فانها حواءث (4)

وقدكم يسحل ان ترى (5)

(4) تم الجواب الحقيقى — ان تقول (6):

(6) (7) الحدوت (8) ينبىء عن موجود (9) مسبق بحدمه (10) والحدم السابق لا (11) يصح (12) الرؤية، فانحصر التصحيح في الموجود (13).

فدل (14): (على ان كل موجود صحيح ان يرى). (15)

(16) يستدل على جوانب الرؤية (17) فانها (18) ستكون في (19) الجنة (20) وعندما صدقنا ونقول منه (21)

(22) بقوله تعالى (23):

"وجهه يمتد ناضرة إلى ربي ناظرة "(24)

والنظر انذا عدى ب (25) " إلى " اقتضى (26) رؤية البصر (27).

(28) فان عرضنا بقوله تعالى: " لا تدرك الإبصار "(29)

قلنا:

(30) من قال (31): (20) أصحابنا (32) من قال:

(33) الإدرار بيني "

1 - 1 ب: "قيل" وش "قلنا: هذا نقص عظيم "
2 - 2 ب: "الرؤية"
26 - ب: وهي حوادث غير مرئية في ش: "وهي حادثة غير مرئية عندكم"  
46 - ساقط في ب 6ش  
5 - زيادة من ب  
61 - ب: "الحوادث تنبى عن وجود"  
7 - ساقط في ش  
8 - ساقط في ش  
109 - ب: "يرفع عليه الرؤية مما يحصل التصحح على الموجود"  
140 - ب: "ولا يرفع رؤية الحاضرة ناحصر الصحيح في الموجود"  
110 - ب: "على ش: "فأنا كل موجود يرفع ان يرى"  
111 - ب: "يبدل على وجب الرؤية"  
112 - ساقط في ب 6ش  
113 - ساقط في ب 6ش  
1515 - ساقط في ب 6ش - في ش: "قوله"  
16 - (23 - 40/290 القياس)  
17 - ش: "بحرف"  
1818 - ب: "الرؤية نما" في ش: "رؤية نما لا يحتفل غير ذلك"  
19 - (13/118 القياسات)  
20 - كانت في و ش: "فمن اصحابنا"  
21 - ش: "فان مارضونا بقوله: (لا تدرك الابصار وهو)  

يدرك الإبصار  
سورة 6 آية 104  
22 - ساقط في ش  
23 - "كأن"
۲۷

باتبیع عن (۱) الاحاطة ووضرک الغایة ووالرب (تعالى) نطق (۲) المقام (۳) الغایة والنهیة.
فان عارضنا بقبول تعالی فی جواب موسی عليه السلام:
"لن تزای (۴) فؤّدا (۵) ان (لن) يقتضي النفي على التأیید؟
قلنا:

هذه الآیة (۶) من اوضح الادلة على جواز الرؤیة فناءا لـ
کان مستحیلة لکان (۷) معتقد جوازها غالبا و (۸) كافرا.
وکیف (۹) معتقد (۱۰ و (۱۱) لا يجوز على الله تعالی مسئ
امتناع الله تعالی (۱۲) لرسالته (۱۳) واجتیاه لنبرة ه
وخصص (۱۴) بتکریم وشرفه بتکلیم (۱۵) وجعله افضل اهل
زمانه وآیة ايده بهرهانه.
(۱۶) من جواز الامراء الربی فی امر يتعلق بعلم الغیب.
اما يتعلق بوصف الباری عزیزا لا يجوز الربی عليهم
فی يجب حل المیا على ان ما (۱۵) اعتقد موسی عليه السلام
جواز (۱۶) لامان (۱۷) لا ان ما (۱۸) اعتقد جوازه (ی점سه
الیه) (۱۹) تبناج (۲۰) نبرع (۱۹) النفي (۲۱) في (۲۰) الجواب
السؤول (۲۲).
یما سأل موسی (۲۲) علیه السلام (۲۲ و (۲۳) رؤیة
ین الدنيا لینصرب (۲۴) النفي الیها (۲۴) والجواب نزل (۲۵)
على قضیة الخطاب.

۱ - كانت في ق: "ینی".)
زيادة من ب
3 ب: "مقدس"
4 (143/12 الاعراف)
5 ب: "يرمو" 
6 ب: "بني"
7 ب: "معتقدا" وفي ش: "معتقد جواز الرؤية"
8 ساقط من ب
9 ب: "تكوين"
10 ساقط في ش
11 ب: "نبيته وامتنع لرسالته"
12 ب: "نبراته ورشته بتكريمه" وفي ش: "شرفه بتكليمه"
13 ب: "تكوين"
14 ساقط في ب
15 ب: "اعتقده موسى عليه السلام"
16 ب: "وكله"
17 زادة من ب
18 ب: "نافزا"
19 ب: "ترفع المنع"
20 ش: "الإجاب"
21 ساقط من ب
22 زادة من ب
23 ب: "رؤيته في الفئال فيصرف..."
24 ش: "اليه"
25 ب: "يجب" ش: "يدل"
5 - الرب والخلق

نص

الرب (1) سبحانه (2) متفرد بخلق الخلقات (3) فلا خلق سواء
ولاء ميدع فيه 6 وكل حادث ءفالة تعالى (4) محدثه

وقالت المحترمة :

السنجابان يختون (5) اعمالهم بقدرهم (6) ويخلقوها (7)
والرب سبحانه تعالى (8) غير موضوع بالانتدار على اعمال العباد
والدليل على تفرد الرب (1) تعالى بالخلق : قوله (10) تعالى :
"إنه خلقكم كن (11) لا يخلق أفلا تذكرون " (11)

(12) وجه الاستدلال باللائحة :

إن الله تعالى (12) تعالى (13) بالخلق وأثنا على نفسه (بذلك)
ولو شاركه فيه غيره (15) لبطلت فائدة التدح (16)
وذلك يستدل بقوله تعالى : (17)
"خلق كل شيء فاعبدوه " (18)
ولو (19) تعالى :

"قل : الله خلق كل شيء وهو الواحد القبار "

ثم الدليل - من حيث العقل - على أن الرب تعالى متفرد
بالإيجاد والاختراع (19)

أن (20) اعمال دالة (21) على علم أفعاله واعمال الصادرة
من (22) العباد لا يحيظون ببعض صفاتها ولا كانوا خالقين لها
لكيوا محيطين بجعلة صفاتها

1 - ب: "البار"
1. كانت في ق: "منفرد "
2. ب: "لا" وش: "ولأ"
3. ساقط في ب: في ش: "فانه "
4. ش: "مخترعون "
5. ب: "بقدرهم "
6. ش: "いただける "
7. ب: "مزوجة " في ش: "تعالى "
8. ش: "الرب سمحه "
9. ساقط في ش: "تعالى "
10. ب: "مما " في ش: "تعالى "
11. ساقط في ب: وش: "وهي الآية (12/12 النمل)"
12. ب: "يقصد تعالى " في ش ساقط
13. ش: "يقصد تعالى "
14. ب: "زيادة من ب "
15. ش: "نجد في الخلق "
16. ب: "المحج "
17. ب: "والله خالق كل شيء " وهي (12/12 النمل)
18. ب: "نجد في ب وش: الآية (12/12 النمل)"
19. ب: "حتم " ش: "و "
20. ب: "دليله "
21. ب: "وش: "عن "
فصل
العبد (1) (غير) مجرّب (1) على انعاله،
كل هو قادر عليها مكسب لها،
والدليل (2) على اثبات القدرة للعبد (2)
ان الحالل يفرق بين ان (3) تتردد يده (3) وبين ان يحركها
قصداً.

ومعنى كنه مكسباً - انه قادر على فعله - وان لم تكسر
قدرة مؤثرة في (4) اتباع المقدر (4).
وذلك (5) بطاعة الفريق (بين ما يقع مراد و) (6) بين ما يقع غير مراد
وان كانت الاوردة لا تؤثر في المراد.

١٥١ - كانت في ق: "منثر" ما بين القرسين زيادة عن الأصل
ليستقيم النص
١٥٢ - ب: "عليه" وش: "عليها"
١٥٣ - ش: "يحرك يده ضرورة"
١٥٤ - ش: "ابتعاه"
لا يجب على الله تعالى شيء، ومما انعم به فهو فضل منه، ومما عاقب به فهو عدل منه، (1)

وبهيج على العبد ما يجعله الله تعالى عليه، (2)

ولا يستفاد ب مجرد الحقول وجهب شيء، بل جميع الاحكام المتعلقة بالتكليف متفقة من قضية الضرر، ويجب السمع، والدليل على أنه لا يجب على الله شيء، أن حقيقة الواجب ما يستوجب اللوم يترك بالقرآن (3)، والرب (4) سبحانه وتعالى (5) يتعالى (6) عن ذلك، والى الذي يوضح ذلك:

فان طاعة المكلفين يجب عند المعتزلة شكر الله، (7)

أما الآية (8) من الآيات.

______________________________
1 - ساقت في شيء، 3 - ساقت في شيء، 4 - ساقت في شيء، 5 - بمعنى المفعول، 6 - بمعنى المفعول، 7 - قيل: "المعنى المبتدأ"، 8 - قيل: "المعنى المبتدأ"، 9 - سوق "الله تعالى"، 10 - قيل: "أولى".
فان كانت (1) الاطاعات واجبة (2) عوضاً من النعم (3):
فيستحق أن يستحق مؤدي الواجب: ثواباً (4)
وإلاً جاز أن يستحق العبد على إداة الواجب عوضاً إلجاز ان
يستحق الرب على الثواب: شكر (5) والان كان مستحقاً (6).

1. لا يقع فيه.

٢٦١ - ش: "وعي للنعم" 
٢٥٢ - ب: "ثواباً" 
٢٥٣ - قطفي في ش: "ثواباً عليه" 
٢٥٥ - ش: "وعي للنعم"
فصل (1)

له تعالى ـ أن يرسل الرسول ويعيد الانتباه

مبشرين ونذرين.

وإنها الراهمة: البداية.

ومنجا جوان انبوات الرسول.

قالوا:

أن جاء الرسول بما يدرك عقلاً لمن يكون في ارتداءه قاعدة، وكان في قضية العقل (13) منعها عدن (14) غيرها.

(15) وإن جاء الرسول بما لا يدرك عقلاً: فلما يقبل ما يخالف العقل.

(16) فلنا:

الشرع يرشد إلى ما (19) لا يستدرك بحجب العقول ـ (17) ولا يرد بما يبقى العقل بخلاضه (18).

وأنا لم يكن في أرسل الرسول استحالة ـ (19) خرج عن الحقيقة ـ تجب (20) الحكم بجوازه.

النحو والأبيات البينات

1 - شرب: "القول في أقنعة النبات" ـ 3
2 - شرب: "القول" ـ 4
3 - شرب: "محرم" ـ 5
4 - شرب: "نعم" ـ 6
5 - شرب: "وإن كان ما جاء به الرسول غير مدرك بالمخلص" ـ 7
6 - شرب: "قال أن الأرب اننا نرسل لنا" ـ 8
7 - شرب: "فإن ينفع للمخلص بجوازه" ـ 9
8 - شرب: "ب حقيقة" ـ 10
۳۸

۶ - الرسالة والنبية والمعجزة

فصل

أما بثبت صدق مذاعي النبيـ بل المعجزات:
(1) وهي انعال الله تعالى خارقة للعادة (۱۲۱ ظ ظ) الاستهارة
(۴) ظاهرها (۴) على حسب نحو النبيـ (۴) هو تخيذه
ويعجز عن الاليان باشمالاء الذين يتحداهم النبيـ.
وجه دلالها على صدق النبيـ:
(۲) أنها تنزل منزلة التصديق بالقول
(۴) ظاهرها في (۶) الشاهد:
ان يصدى ملك الناس، وأذن لهم بالولايـ عليه فلا (۶) احتفا
به، وأخذ كل حله (۷)، قام لاهل الجمع قائم (۸) وقال:
(۷) يا بابا الملا (۷)، أي رسول الملك اليم، وقد ادعى الرسالة
بمرأى منه يسمع
وأن الرسالة (۷) أن الملك يخالـ عادته وقومه، وقعد، و
اذ استدعـ (۳).
ثم يقول:
(۱۳) يا بابا الملك: صدقي قره واقتعد؟
(۱۴) فإذا فعل الملك ما استدعـه، كان ذلك تصديقا
(۱۵) نازلا منزلة (۱۸) ثوله: صدقت.

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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>۱</td>
<td>ساقط في شا</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>&quot;ظلمه&quot; ب &quot;المتلاح&quot;</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>۴</td>
<td>&quot;مثله&quot;</td>
<td>۵</td>
<td>&quot;مثله&quot;</td>
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<td>&quot;مثله&quot; من &quot;ب&quot; &quot;و نظرها&quot;</td>
<td>۸</td>
<td>&quot;ب&quot; &quot;في الولج&quot;</td>
<td>۹</td>
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</table>
الفصل
الدليل على نبوته (1) نبأناً عند عليه الصلاة والسلام: المعجزات. ومن (٣) آياته: القرآن - وفيه وجوه من الاعجاز منها: ما اختلفه من الجزالة، ونظم الخليج عن جميع المعاني كلام العرب.

وتحدى العرب ب بالنارواهم سورة (٢) وذكر: إنهم لو عارضوا (٣) لبالتيل نعراه، ولن تفس نظره لهم ؟ (٤) نحاولوا معارضته - (٥) لهم اللع البلغاء، والسنة الفصحاء (٦) - نيف (٧) وثاني سنة: فلم (٨) يأت لهم معارضه.

ومن وجه الااعجاز (٨)

(٩) استمال القرآن (١٠) على قصص الأولين، مع القطع بان النبي عليه السلام كان اما - (٢) لا يقرأ ولا يكتب (١١) ولم يعهد في جميع زمانه: محتاجاً لدراسة كتب الأولين وتعلمها.

ولم يسبق (١٢) له نهضة يتوقع في شبلها دراسة الكتاب (١٣).

ثم اشتمل القرآن على غيوب متعلقة (١٥) بالمستقبل وأغفي انباء القرآن عنها (١٦).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>ش.</th>
<th>۱ ۴ ۲ ۳ ۴ ۵ ۶ ۷ ٨ ٩ ۱۰ ۱۱ ۱۲ ۱۳ ۱۴ ۱۵ ۱۶</th>
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<tr>
<td>&quot;بالله عليه&quot;</td>
<td>&quot;ب: &quot;حما رز&quot; &quot;ب: &quot;حما رز&quot;</td>
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<td>&quot;لو لاحهم عارضوا&quot; &quot;و ق: &quot;إيهم لحارضوها&quot;</td>
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<td>&quot;وحاولوا&quot;</td>
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<td>&quot;المبارة في شتى بعد &quot;فلم يأت لهم معارضة&quot;</td>
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<tr>
<td>&quot;في&quot;</td>
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<tr>
<td>&quot;أجاز القرآن وفي ب: &quot;الاعجاز في القرآن&quot;&quot;</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
1361 - ش: إشتهال
1362 - ش: لا يكتب ولا يعرض
1363 - ش: يفقه
1364 - ش: يفتقر

10 - ش: محلة - مختلفة
19 - في ب: واتفقت كما أنهما عن القرآن
ورسل الله (1) عليه السلام (2) (آيات و) (3) معجزات سوّى القرآن:
كانلاف القرع،
وتبسيج الحص،
وانتظار المحطا،
وذبح بالاة من بين الأصابع (4)
و نحوها (6)

1 ـ زيادة من ش.
2 ـ با: "على الله عليه وسلم".
3 ـ زيادة من ب.
4 ـ ب: "نبي".
5 ـ ب: "ابوابه".
6 ـ ب: "نبيها".
نص
كل ما جوزه العقل، ورد ب الشرع (1)
وجب القضاء بشبهه
فس (2) ورد الشرع به:
عداب القبر.
و سؤال منكر ونكير
ورد الروح الى الميت في قبره.
ونبها:
الضراط
والميزان
والحون
والشفاعة للمذنبين
كل ذلك: حق
والجنة، والثاني مخلوقتان - (3) في وقتي (2)
قال الله تعالى (4):
و (5) وقية (6) عرضها السماوات ولا رض أعدت للمذنبين (7)

1 - (16) ب: "الشرع به".
2 - ب: "و ما ".
3 - ساقط في ش.
4 - ش: "عز رجل".
5 - ساقط في ش.
6 - (132/132 آل عمران)
42
7 - العامل
فصل
(1) امامه المسلمين
(2) أمير المؤمنين - من (2) بعد رسول الله (ص) عليه السلام
السلام:
(3) أبو بكر الصديق (رضي الله عنه) (4)
(5) ثم الفاروق - بعده
(6) عثمان
(7) علي
(8) رضي الله عنه
ومن نص (1) النبي عليه السلام (9) على امامه (10) أحد بعده 6 وتوليته (11) إذ لو تولى ذلك (11) لظهر وانتشار (12)
اشتهرت تولية رسول الله صلى الله عليه وسلم سائر ولاته و
كما اشتهر كل أمر خطير (13).
(14) وإذا ثبت (15) ان الاامة لم تثبت نصًا لاحق (16):
دلال (17) انها ثبتت اختيارا
(18) ثم المسلمون (18) اجمعوا على امام أي بكر (رضي الله عنه)
واقادوا - بجمعهم - له (من غير مخالف) (19)

1 ـ ساقط في بـ. ونفى عن "امام المسلمين".
2 ـ ساقط في بـ 6 ش.
3 ـ بـ "صلى الله عليه "
4 ـ زيادة من بـ.
وكذلك (1) جرى الأمر في زمن عمر، وتمكنه أولى رضى الله عنهم
وبعدها - ون قاتل عليا - فأنه كان لا ينكر إمامته، ولا يدعها
لنفسه - وإننا كان يطلب قتله عثمان (رضي الله عنه) (2) - حافظ أن
مصيب وكان مخططاً وعلي رضي الله عنهم (3) - ونه (21) و
(4) متسک بالحق (5)  

1 - ش: "كذا"  
2 - زيادة من ب  
3 - ساقط في ب و ش  
4 - 443 - ب: "بالحق متسک"
فصول
الخلفاء (1) (الراشدون (2) كما (3) ترتيبه في الامة (4) ففاظه.
ترتيبهم في الفضيلة:
فخير (5) الناس - بعد رسول الله ( صلى الله عليه ) (6):
ابوكر
ثم عمر
ثم عثمان
ثم علي
رضي الله عنهم اجمعين (1).

إذا السلمون كانوا لا يقدمون للامة (2) أحمد تشبيه منهم
وإنما (8) قدومهم قدومه (8) لاعتقادهم كنه (1) أفضل واصلح
للامة من غيره.

| رقم | نسخة من ب | ص: "لما" | ش: "الخلفاء" | ش: "و" | زيادة من ب | سالفه في ش | سالفه في ب | 868 | ب: "قدومه" | و: "أين" |
لا يصل للامامة الا من يجمع فيه شرائط:

ًئدا: ان يكون: فرضاً

فان رسول الله (4) عليه السلام، قال: "الائمة من قريش"،

والاخر - ان يكون معتبداً من اهل الفتوى (7).

و (4) ان يكون: ذا نجدة، وكباية، وشهد (5) لسياسة (6) الامير

واياتها (مهدية الى رئاسة الامير) (5).

وان (7) يكون حراً ووا في دينه.

(4) وكل هذه الشرائط كانت موجودة في خليفة رسول الله (8).

عليه السلام (8).

وقد قال (8) عليه السلام (8).

"الخليفة بعدى (9) ثلاثين سنة ثم يصير ملكاً عضواً.

و كانت الامام الخلفاء هذا القدر.

(10) والله البادي (10).

* 16 - ب: صلى الله عليه
  2 - زيادة من ب
  3 - ش: "هاتلي"
  4 - ب: "الي سياسة"
  5 - زيادة من ب
  6 - زيادة من ب
  7 -سقط في ب

* 86 - ب: صلى الله عليه
  1 -سقط في ش
  610 -سقط في ب 6 ش
۲۹

(۱) تم كتاب اللبع في الكلام بحمد الله وحسن توقفه على (بد)
العبد البديع الفقيه على هغب الله تعالى محمد بن سليمان بن
يوف السامي فخر الله له ولي قرأ فيه ودع له بالخنفرة
والضوان.

نقلت هذه النسخة من النسخة المخطوطة المحفوظة بدار
الكتب المصرية بالقاهرة رقم ۱۱۸ مجمع.

۱ - جاء بنهاية نسخة ب الآية:
"نبي هذا الكتاب وهو اللبع من تصنيف الإمام إمام الحسين
اي العلي عبدالله بن عبدالله الجوئي طيب الله ترضيه
فرغ من نسخة ليلة الدهان الثالث والعشرين من شهر ربيع الأول
من سنة سبع واربعين وخمسة والحمد لله على إلاإلا والصلاة على
محمد خام انبائه - حسبنا ونعم الوكيل."
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