BEAUTY, CREATIVITY AND SOCIAL REALITY
IN THE WORKS OF LUDWIG TIECK

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I hereby declare that this Thesis is my own, unaided work.
CONTENTS

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS ii

ABSTRACT vi-vii

I. INTRODUCTION 1
   A. PROBLEMS IN ASSESSING TIECK 1
   B. SURVEY OF THE LITERATURE ON TIECK 4
   C. SOME BASIC ASSUMPTIONS IN THE PRESENT STUDY 30

II. THE WORKS OF THE FIRST PERIOD 33
   A. EARLY WORKS AS FORERUNNERS TO "WILLIAM LOVELL" 33
   B. "WILLIAM LOVELL" 55
   C. TIECK'S PORTRAYAL OF HIS CULTURAL MILIEU 77
      (1) Herr von Fuchs 77
      (2) The "Straußfedern" stories 82
      (3) Peter Lebrecht 85
      (4) Some "Volksmärchen" 92
      (5) The satirical comedies 103
   D. TIECK'S REJECTION OF THE ROMANTIC MIDDLE AGES 130
      (1) Heymonskinder 132
      (2) Genoveva 134
   E. THE INDIVIDUAL AND SOCIETY 142
      (1) Artist-figures 143
      (2) The perceptive non-artist 161
      (3) The pseudo-problem of "Der blonde Eckbert" 178

III. THE MIDDLE YEARS - "PHANTASUS" AND "FORTUNAT" 187
   (1) "Phantasus": the framework 187
   (2) "Phantasus": the poem 198
   (3) The new works 202
   (4) "Phantasus": a postscript 210
   (5) "Fortunat" 213
IV. TIECK'S "GEDANKENWELT": THEMES AND INFLUENCES  

A. THE LATE "AUFKLÄRUNG" AND OTHER CONTEMPORARY IDEAS  

215

B. REACTIONS TO THE "AUFKLÄRUNG"  

216

(1) The Gothic novel  

224

(2) Bühme  

233

(3) Shakespeare  

239

(4) Cervantes  

248

C. LATER INFLUENCES  

258

(1) Solger  

262

(2) Raumer and Tieck's view of history  

270

V. THE THEMES IN THE EARLY WORKS  

276

VI. THE NOVELLAS  

284

A. INTRODUCTION  

284

(1) Method  

284

(2) Themes  

286

(3) Tieck's theory of the novella  

291

B. TIECK'S VIEW OF THE WORLD  

301

(1) A corrupt society  

301

(2) Individuality and madness  

307

C. POWER AND THE FAILURE OF RELIGION  

310

(1) Orthodox religion as a power-structure  

310

(2) The powerlessness of private religious experience  

317

D. POWER AND THE FAILURE OF ART  

324

(1) The powerlessness of the artist  

324

(2) Inspiration is corruption  

330

(i) Shakespeare: "Das Fest zu Kenelworth" and "Dichterleben"  

330

(ii) Camoens: "Tod des Dichters"  

346

(3) Poetry: a national product, a personal experience  

355
ABSTRACT

Three defects of Tieck criticism are: excessive use of biographical-psychological information; excessive use of contemporary cultural evidence to deny Tieck’s originality; and the divorce of characters or motifs from their contexts.

A new interpretation of Lovell shows Tieck’s reaction to his intellectual environment. Many lesser works are shown to have strong connections with Lovell. The works of the 1790s contain both advocacy and fear of the ideals of beauty and of ordinary life; some works show unconvincing attempts to equate these ideals. Tieck’s skill as a psychological writer is demonstrated. A common belief in Tieck’s nostalgia for the Middle Ages is disproved.

It is shown that the extent of several alleged influences on Tieck - Bühme, Solger, Raumer and the Gothic novel - has often been exaggerated. Tieck’s original reaction to the Aufklärung and his comprehensive view of it are emphasised. Shakespeare and Cervantes are revealed as the most important influences.

The value of Phantasus is limited to its indication of Tieck’s increasing socio-economic interests and its adumbration of his novella-theory. The latter is shown to be didactic, superficial and relatively unimportant.

The novellas generally show the same combination of advocacy of beauty as an ideal and suspicion of its distorting
influence if misused. Tieck's dislike of industrial society, of the mass-production of literature, of ideological interference with literature, and of totalitarianism is shown to have a mainly aesthetic basis. His greatest characterisations show that he equated the search for ideological truth with the search for an aesthetic ideal.

The independence of his creative force from his more conscious interests is demonstrated. It is suggested that his politico-social views were more radical than often supposed.

*Vittoria Accorambona* is shown to be the culmination of many of his ideas and of his art.
I. INTRODUCTION

A. PROBLEMS IN ASSESSING TIECK'S WORKS

The interpretation of Tieck's works presents a number of problems. First, there is the sheer bulk of his output: he taxes the memory even at the elementary level of recalling events, remarks, or descriptions. Percy Lubbock has aptly described a critic's difficulty in retaining a single accurate impression of a book—how a passage just read "melts and shifts in the memory" and soon turns into a "cluster of impressions, some clear points emerging from a mist of uncertainty". (1) Perhaps this is by itself sufficient explanation of the strange views promulgated by some Tieck scholars.

A second difficulty exacerbates, in the case of Tieck, the general problem identified by Lubbock. Tieck's works deal with a range of subjects, often interlocking with each other. In consequence he taxes the ordering and classifying part of the mind, and requires of his reader a good general knowledge. Sometimes these subjects appear as subjects in the works—thereby leading us to wonder whether we should consider the subject in and for itself, or Tieck's view of it, or the view Tieck is ascribing to one of his characters. On other occasions we are also required to consider the subjects of the works in relation to a variety of matters upon which definitive statement is virtually impossible. We are confronted with, in
their own right, such comprehensive topics as mediaeval Germany, Cervantes, Shakespeare and Camoens (to mention but a few), and their context as themes in Tieck's works may be religious or artistic. Religion is a prominent theme in its own right, particularly the exotic side of Roman Catholicism and the mystic, sectarian, obsessive aspects of Protestantism. Love, friendship and art are also important themes. Tieck had, moreover, a considerable interest in psychology. Sometimes this was merely his criticism of fashionable fads and fancies, and sometimes it had to do with problems of stress and tension. A later age is tempted to see schizoid and paranoid types, and at least two adumbrations of Freud's Rat-Man. There are occasions when one might think Tieck a Marxist-before-Marx, with his references to uncontrolled industrial capitalism, division of labour, alienated and degraded workers, and the origin of crime in urban poverty.

Even the foregoing list is not exhaustive. It should not, of course, be necessary to fit every point Tieck made into a self-contained system. No human mind is constructed so. However, any claim to have a single view of Tieck, other than the 'mimic' theory, must stand or fall by the integration of the bulk of his important ideas into a scheme. The search for a single view has sometimes taken the form of asserting that a selected aspect of his works has universal significance within his entire output. But our second difficulty is to give to each of Tieck's many interests and aspects its correct status.
The problem resolves itself into finding where Tieck himself stands as author: what is his intention in any given work? As Witkowski points out, Tieck often appears characterless because he attacked the Aufklärung as a Romantic and then, as a bourgeois liberal, attacked the debasement of Romanticism — political reaction, religious orthodoxy, superstition and a class system. It is our task to discern consistency beneath the multiplicity of raw material, to show that the ideals of beauty and justice were seldom absent from his works.

Simple dismemberment of Tieck's works has been a popular method. It arises from the fact, which is the source of our third difficulty, that his creative life, and his contemporary interest, extended over several periods in German literary history, so that he is considered in relation to the Aufklärung, the Trivialroman, Goethe, Classicism, Romanticism, Epigonentum, Realism, Biedermeier and Young Germany. For several reasons this method leads to a distorted view. Each of these movements is itself a complex phenomenon; they are often inter-related; each movement may change its character during its prominence; and each is the subject of disagreement amongst specialists.

A fourth difficulty is that Tieck was a prolific critic and letter-writer, and these additional sources provide us with his statements on a variety of matters, including on his own works. His statements vary between the extremes of perspicacity and inanity, and some critics have concluded that Tieck's views as author and critic were not always compatible, almost as though he carried on these two activities separately. Haym
remarked that Tieck's Vorberichte\(^{(9)}\) of 1828-29 would, if developed, have been comparable to Goethe's Dichtung und Wahrheit in their ambiguous relationship with the facts.

The first difficulty we can merely note; the fourth we must attempt to resolve in the instances in which it seems to need resolution. The second and third — the multiplicity of themes and the complications of contemporary cultural relationships — must be faced throughout if our investigation is to have a plan. The only difficulty which may cause us to miss our way is the third, for it raises the problem of the relationship between Tieck and his cultural environment. This will be considered later in the present chapter.

B. SURVEY OF THE LITERATURE ON TIECK

Segebrecht describes our problems succinctly as, expressing his hope for "eine Gesamtdarstellung des Werkes und der Wirkung Tiecks", he comments adversely on three tendencies in Tieck scholarship: to restrict the scope of assessment to the early works; to extrapolate from them to the later ones; and to take the various facets of Tieck's personality as the key to the works.\(^{(10)}\) These tendencies would certainly obstruct a single view of Tieck, and our task of reviewing previous assessments is made more difficult by the fact that individual scholars' basic assumptions about literature in general have inevitably influenced their writings about him. While bearing Segebrecht's threefold categorisation in mind — for it is the best short statement of the approaches which have been made — it may be
helpful to consider the secondary literature according to the apparent assumptions and intentions of the authors concerned.

Some have, as Segebrecht implies, taken the psychological effects (or the psychological effects they believe to have existed) of Tieck's childhood and family relationships in order to provide an interpretation of his works. Others have relied heavily on the socio-economic or cultural background in the manner of "Geistesgeschichte", and have assumed that he is best regarded as an embodiment of contemporary trends. These are diametrically opposed views of literature. There is a further hybrid category of Tieck-scholarship, which might also be called miscellaneous: he has been considered in relation to a given literary movement, or a particular 'influence', or an aesthetic or other theory or concept (which may or may not have been Tieck's own). Even in the latter case the question of his merit has seldom been considered. This is not surprising, for the attempt to show his conformity, or failure to conform, with a preconception of the critic is hardly conducive to considering his original merit. Unfortunately it seems to have been conducive to misinterpretations, some bearing witness to the distorting power of an idée fixe and others to the pitfalls which await critics who theorise before rather than after having gathered the facts. It is only because of the distorting preconceptions of some critics and the inattentiveness of some others that it is possible to eschew the image of a well-ploughed field, despite monographs and articles by the score,
and still speak of virtually virgin soil. Before proceeding to the exponents of the two main views of literature, we must pause to examine the hybrid and miscellaneous category. Since these works are largely concerned with particular aspects or periods, they will be mentioned in later chapters, where it will be noticed that they share two defects which may be exemplified in general here. Firstly, they tend to assume that Tieck is expressing himself through a character rather than through a whole work. This assumption denies that he had any power of characterisation and objectivity (whereas it will be apparent from the present study that he possessed both, even in his early works). Secondly, there is the error of method, which assumes that any reference to the topic under review is grist to the mill. Steinert, for example, begins with a logical error of stating that Tieck is the chief Romantic and the most typical (11) - so one wonders what, if this were true, Tieck could typify except himself, since his removal from the movement would, in Steinert's implication, leave it without its major figure. Steinert proceeds to compile a dossier of miscellaneous extracts on Tieck's use of colours (his chosen subject). But he makes no attempt to evaluate the works from which his extracts are taken, so the meaning and importance of any particular extract remains unknown. Hellge attempts a thematic analysis of motifs in order to show an interlocking pattern and a relationship between the early and late works. (12) Her two propositions are, in fact, demonstrated, but the demonstration is of little value in the form in which it is presented, for the work soon degenerates into mere unassessed
clusters of topics. We must demur on principle: these motifs are Tieck's means of self-expression; out of context they do not necessarily tell us what he expressed. Furthermore, the works from which her motifs are selected are not a fair sample. Perhaps in Tieck's works, there is no fair sample and one simply has to examine them all. But, as might be expected, Hellge's selection depends heavily on Sternbald, Lovell, Eckart, Runenberg and Eckbert. She ignores Almansur, Ryno, Lebrecht, the Volksbücher, the Straußfedern stories, Genoveva and Rothkäppchen in the early period; and, although examples are culled from the later works, no use is made of Dichterleben, Tod des Dichters, Eigensinn und Laune and Vittoria Accorombona. Thalmann adopts a similar method in, for example, Probleme der Dämonie, and, astoundingly, admits it:

Ich will zunächst aus seinen Schriften jene Momente sondern, die er der dämonischen Wirkung dienstbar gemacht hat. (13)

We have now to consider the two main types of Tieck criticism.

Psychological interpretations tend to concentrate on Der blonde Eckbert and Der Runenberg; some of them are mentioned in the relevant chapters below. For the present we will consider some fallacies inherent in making an approach to Tieck's works which uses psychological evaluation of biographical information. As might be expected, interpretations based on the findings of Freud and Jung are helpful when they fit the work Tieck wrote and unhelpful to the point of absurdity when they do not.
A typical example, more appropriately considered here than in relation to Eckbert, is the article by Hubbe.\(^{(14)}\)

We are informed that Tieck's awareness of the archetypes in the Collective Unconscious were stimulated by an incestuous relationship between him and his sister Sophie, and that the obvious clue to this is the fact that incest-themes appear (in Sternbald, Eckbert, and Lebrecht) in 1795-96 when Sophie and Tieck were living together. There are two objections to this. Firstly, the theme may have had a literary origin. Trainer\(^{(15)}\) speculates that the incest-theme in Tieck's early works arises from his interest in Elizabethan literature, in which the theme often has "dramatic function" but is "void of any personal significance". He suggests that it also came from the English Gothic novelists "searching for unlikely adventures which required confusion of family origins, sudden recognitions and the unexpected discovery of noble lineage to add a modicum of reality to the final explanation of the action", and concludes "that the topic was simply one of unknown potential being submitted to trial". To this we may add the suggestion that Tieck could have first noticed the theme of incest in Lessing's Nathan, which he had apparently read before writing Alla-Moddin.\(^{(16)}\)

The second objection is that, from the correspondence between brother and sister, it was obviously Sophie who maintained the intensity of the relationship against Tieck's wishes. His correspondence with his family certainly reveals tension in the air, but prurient interpretations are unnecessary
when the facts are so simple. The young Tieck feels keenly that he has caused his father unnecessary expense (not the least through improvidence, of which he was never cured); he shows an unusual degree of solicitude for his parents' health and an intense concern that he may have affected this adversely by giving them cause to worry; he seeks to convince them that he would worry and become ill if he thought that they were worrying about him and becoming ill. This mixture of solicitude and the use of one's health as moral blackmail also permeates the entire correspondence between Ludwig and Sophie (presumably they learned it at home), and they even vie with each other in the relative degree of concern each can show. In 1793 - the date is important, since Hubbs cites the joint household of 1795-96 - he suggests obliquely that her illness is caused by her inability to accept life's disappointments, urges her to go out more and find a wider circle of social contacts.

The following year he points out that he cannot turn himself at her behest into the kind of person she wants him to be, and gives her good advice: "sei munter, so viel du kannst, denn Heiterkeit ist die wahre Medicin des Lebens, eine trübe Laune macht unsere Seelenkräfte stumpfer und der Mensch schrumpft darunter wie eine Mumie zusammen". But in the same letter he reverts to passionate declarations of devotion and concern for her health, and guilt at being unable to justify her love ("ich weiß nicht, wie ich dir diese Liebe zu mir vergelten soll").

The impression is of a family in which anything less than
solicitude expressed at great length was taken to be indifference, and in which allegedly delicate health was a means of securing attention or getting one's own way. Sophie was obviously very possessive, and the price of her devotion was his devotion. It is likely that Tieck, to propitiate her, found himself promising more, and speaking and writing more eloquently, than he truly wished to, then resented the trap he had helped to make, and felt guilty at his resentment. Sophie was trapped similarly, for having won reciprocity of concern by her intense and possessive behaviour and threats of illness, she could only redouble her efforts whenever they seemed not to succeed as well as she had hoped. Her possessiveness was no doubt intensified by Ludwig's broken promises to visit her and by her realisation that only in his company could she escape her parental home for the literary life she craved. Their living together might, in fact, have been an example of Freud's Unbehagen in der Kultur (which Rasch uses to interpret Der Runenberg), for they were old enough to live independently of their parents, and Tieck would not have been the first man, or the last, to decide that the balance of advantage lay in letting a female relative ease his domestic arrangements.

As Trainer points out, any attempt to investigate their actual relationship is foredoomed, since the evidence is unobtainable. As for the incest-theme, "At least one may safely assert that Tieck had ample literary precedence for employing it and the question whether personal tensions helped to promote
this interest will be better left to psychologists". (25) Even this seems to overstate the likelihood of their being helpful as interpreters of the meaning of literary works. Their actual attempts have been the reverse of helpful; which is not surprising, since one cannot, logically, consider the effects of his life on his works until one has reached a balanced view of each work in itself.

To return to Hubbs, we are informed that Tieck's connection with the Collective Unconscious was (inadvertently) fostered in childhood by his mother because she told him frightening stories at bedtime in Sophie's company. This apparently created an unusually close bond between brother and sister, and also cast Frau Tieck as the Evil Mother archetype (Isis), whereupon she reappeared twenty years later as the crones in Eckbert and Runenberg. (26) This is one of those occasions when common sense is made to seem not merely irrelevant but an actual handicap. Some tentative observations may be entered at this point. Children can enjoy being frightened by fairy-tales (although it can go too far), and are frightened only because they enjoy it thus. The number of occasions when brothers and sisters have this common experience without incestuous consequences must be innumerable. Children frightened by an imaginary witch usually point to the contrast with their own mother. In fact, though it has no salacious aspects to attract attention, it is far more likely that Ludwig and Sophie sought to escape not their mother but their father, who was less sympathetic to points of view not his own. (27) We are fortunate that those critics who make
inordinate use of biographical and psychiatric material for literary assessment have so far ignored — though to have done so seems inconsistent — those of Tieck's works in which hostility is expressed towards a father.

Of the major works on Tieck, only one — that by Robert Minder — is psychologically based. (28) His assertion of Tieck's individuality is welcome, particularly in view of its denial by others, (29) but his "proof" is unsatisfactory in three respects. Firstly, the book degenerates into a recitation of spurious groups of Tieck's works — spurious because the criteria of classing are taken to be axiomatic without being demonstrated to be valid — and his overall intentions are seldom clear. Secondly, his somewhat disconnected remarks on particular works vary from the stimulating to the fatuous. Thirdly, in so far as he has an avowedly psychological theme, that theme is itself an error. Minder traces Tieck's ideas back to three childhood experiences: being deprived of a kaleidoscope; terror at finding himself alone; and fear when a puppet's unhappiness causes amusement amongst the spectators. (30) He demonstrates Tieck's belief in the influence of childhood experiences on the adult personality (31) and refers to later works in which these three incidents were obviously in Tieck's mind. (32) In consequence, Minder argues (but without showing how the consequence ensues) Tieck's "constitution fondamentale" was "Paradis, Chaos, Jeu: voilà les trois étapes de l'évolution intérieur de Tieck, le triple rythme qui s'est reproduit à toutes les périodes de sa vie". "Paradis" consisted of "pièce filiale, embellissement,
contemplation passive"; "Chaos" consisted of the conflict within his family (his father was a rationalist, his mother pietist, and both were opposed to art) and with his friends and teachers; "Jeu", or Romanticism, was "le "Paradis", récréé par l'art". (33)

As to Minder's selection of the childhood incidents, it is nowhere proved that these were the causes of the three elements in Tieck's adult make-up. The kaleidoscope could equally well have symbolised the cheap gaudiness beloved of crude taste; terror at solitude could have caused his need for friendships; and the laughter of the audience could have represented the vigorous German public and its traditional spectacles. All these alternatives are at least as important in Tieck's works as Minder's interpretations; with a little perverse twisting, any cap can be made to fit. In fact it is legitimate to doubt whether Tieck really remembered them at all, though he may have sincerely believed he did. Vivid trivia which provoke an infant to passion are often repeated in perpetual reminiscence, particularly in self-immersed families such as the Tiecks obviously were. It is not surprising that he used the incidents in his fiction, but that is another matter from saying that they were influential. (34) Indeed, Freud wrote that it is common for people to suppress unpleasant memories, (35) so the really influential experiences of Tieck's childhood may well have remained unremembered.

After introducing his psychological view, Minder largely abandons it, except that he intermittently searches for specific
early experiences which may have prompted Tieck to write as he did. He seldom, however, mentions what the works are about, and this omission seems implicitly to deny the possibility that Tieck's inventive and technical powers produced some works of literary art. Despite his initial assertion of Tieck's individuality, Minder proves only that Tieck's psychological constitution was individual: which was neither doubted nor relevant.

Probably the most unflattering view of all is taken by a number of critics who apply the concept of "Geistesgeschichte" to their consideration of Tieck. This term was first used by Friedrich Schlegel in 1812, and Tieck attached some importance to the concept. (This does not, of course, mean that we should accept the viewpoint uncritically.) Critics holding this view of literature have tended to accuse Tieck of reworking literary ideas culled from his predecessors rather than basing his works on his own experience. While they admit that he is historically important, they tend to deny his originality. These critics usually admire other literary figures, and perhaps find difficulty in abandoning preconceptions derived from them. (Gumbel admits that this is true in his own case.) A striking feature of some of these criticisms is the readiness to censure in Tieck what goes unremarked in a presumably preferred idol. As Kahn points out, Tieck is often regarded as a species of plagiarist, although Goethe's borrowing of the "Turmggesellschaft" in Wilhelm Meisters Lehrjahre from popular literature of the day is not held against him. Kahn suggests
that there are two reasons for this double standard: that critics demand that a German author should be a philosopher, which Tieck was not; and that they object to, and tend not to look beyond, such features as his "predilection for the demonic, his facility in writing, his careless style, his so-called shifty adaptation to new trends". Another feature of the "geistesgeschichtlich" view is, as Segebrecht notes, the tendency to concentrate on the early works and in some cases to extrapolate wrongly from them. It is significant that hostile statements on specific works by Tieck, by which these critics intend to support their general propositions, are either inaccurate to the point of inanity or so vague as to be meaningless.

Possibly the first "geistesgeschichtlich" view was taken, or at least implied, by Grillparzer, whose opinion of Tieck was entirely derogatory. Zeydel suggests that the ideas of Gundolf and others on Tieck may have been influenced by Grillparzer's criticism (which Zeydel dates from 1823).

The tragedian attacked thus:

Die Herausstellung und Verspottung des Abgeschmackten ist sein eigentümliches Feld. Dagegen ist das eigentlich Poetische, d.h. in schöner Steigerung Empfundene, bei ihm fast durchaus nur angebildet ... Wenn er Shakespeare als eine Brille aufgesetzt hat, sieht er die herrlichsten Dinge. Deshalb hat er sich auch in diesen Meister so hineingelebt, der ihm einen Halt, gleichsam die Pappe hergibt, auf die er seine eigenen, umklippenden Papiermännchen aufklebt. In früher Zeit mußten ihm die Minnesänger, der Katholizismus, die Spanier ähnliche Dienste leisten. Am entschiedensten fehlt ihm der Sinn für alle und jede Form. Bei seiner Anlage zum Komischen hätte er ein guter Lustspielsdichter werden müssen, wenn nicht sein haltloser Geist sich in der Formlosigkeit, als seinem eigentlichen Elemente, bewegt hätte. (41)
Grillparzer's view that Tieck admired in Shakespeare what he had grafted on, and did not discern the true Shakespeare at all, will be readily conceded.\(^{(42)}\) There is also no doubt that Tieck had a weaker sense of literary form than one would have wished, though this is not always important in using subjective material or in actual experiment with form as in the comedies. Grillparzer was obviously unaware that Tieck used mediaeval subject-matter and religious themes far more objectively than is often supposed.\(^{(43)}\) It is hardly surprising that such a writer as Grillparzer was repelled by Tieck's idiosyncracies or cavalier attitude to strict form, and was able to compliment him on his sense of comedy - all too rare in German writers - only grudgingly.

Another early "geistessgeschichtlich" view was taken by Rosenkranz in 1838:

Er \[Tieck\] ist der Mittelpunkt der romantischen Schule; seine Geschichte ist ihre Geschichte und umgekehrt. \(^{(44)}\)

He comments that Sternbald was written in a period which lacked religion and was therefore forced to treat art as a substitute for it. He takes his fellow-countrymen to task for ignoring Tieck's comic talent, and adds, as the reason he attributes to them for this attitude,

weil sie \[die Komik\] eine große Feinheit und Beweglichkeit des Geistes fordert, welche uns Deutschen bei\[un\]serer directen, dogmatisierenden Ehrlichkeit nur als eine Gunst des Geschickes, nicht als gemeinses Erbgut zu Theil wird. \(^{(45)}\)

So, he continues, attempts to explain away his comic achievement have led to comparisons with irrelevant foreigners - Aristophanes,
Gozzi and Goldoni - instead of with Goethe and with the Viennese Volkstheater. Rosenkranz also suggests how certain paradoxes in Tieck, and in German Romanticism generally, came about. The Middle Ages were, he points out, regarded by the Aufklärung as synonymous with the Dark Ages, as the epitome of barbarity in Church and State, in art and science: so a reaction led to the Romantics' love for the Middle Ages. This reaction took a specifically bourgeois course: "das Volksthümliche" was used polemically by the bourgeoisie against the predominance of French ways and style amongst the aristocracy. Thus arose the paradox of an obsession by bourgeois Protestants with Catholic feudalism. These ideas are illuminating, but their defect is in their omission of Tieck's contribution in his portrayal of individual characters, or his treatment of such themes as the artist's position in society. 

(Rosenkranz concedes that he himself is a Hegelian and that he therefore writes from an appropriate viewpoint.) As for Tieck's later works, Rosenkranz finds them superficial compared with the early ones, and believes they demonstrate that Tieck valued peace above all else. Since Rosenkranz was so close to the later works we may excuse his misconception. But no such allowance can be made for his "geistesgeschichtlich" successors.

It was Haym, according to E.C. Stopp (who does not mention Grillparzer or Rosenkranz), who was the probable origin of this view of Tieck. Haym believes that at too early a stage Tieck had read too much, acted too much in superficial or extravagant roles, and had been overstimulated by these
experiences, while - because of the Aufklärung - lacking the equilibrium of a religion to control the attraction towards sensual and imaginative activity which the Aufklärung had provoked. Then, Haym continues, his literary talent was corrupted when he worked for Rambach, by simulating emotions superficially as a ghost writer of cheap fiction. (53) (Trainer, following Hemmer, takes a similar view, which is considered in a later chapter.) (54) However, when Haym proceeds to interpret various works in order to substantiate his views, he inadvertently produces only evidence which discredits his basic tenets. He describes Sommernacht as an expression of Tieck's admiration for Shakespeare, (55) and ignores Tieck's implied criticism of the Sturm und Drang and Aufklärung - criticism which was the effect and purpose of Tieck's having written about Shakespeare at all. In recounting the story of Almansur, Haym does not notice that we are supposed to criticise the two hermits (in other words, that the "Idyll" of the sub-title is meant ironically), or that the traumatic loss of a beloved is an important motif. He purports to retell the plot of Lovell (56) without mentioning the following: the loss of Amalie; Lovell's hostility towards his father; his ruination by bad literature; and the function of the group of his friends as a yardstick of normality.

We should also note, as, presumably, Haym's intellectual progeny, the study of German Romanticism by Richard Benz. His survey is based on the belief (57) that all art-forms comprise a total manifestation of intellectual and cultural life at a given
time. Though he does not formally deny Tieck's originality, his contextual approach prevents him from getting to grips with it.

Korff asserts that "Tieck's Dichtertum wurzelt stofflich in der Sturm-und-Drang Literatur", which he particularises as Gütz, Werther, Faust-Fragment and Shakespeare. (58) This is extraordinary: Tieck's view of Shakespeare in Sommernacht is the antithesis of the Sturm und Drang view; (59) the influence of Lessing and of Schiller's Don Carlos on Alla-Moddin is obvious; (60) and Tieck's psychological use of horror may derive superficially from the Gothic novel but owes far more to his own original view of Macbeth and Hamlet. (61) According to Korff, Tieck merely reproduced what he had read: "Seine Dichtungen sind im weiten Maße zunächst nichts anderes als literatenhaft verarbeitete Erinnerungen an Erlebnisse einer frühen, allzu frühen Belesenheit". (62) One searches in vain for evidence cited in support, rather than mere paraphrases of the charge-sheet.

Ritter Blaubart is censured for not dealing with "die Psychologie eines Sexual-Verbrechers oder die Dämonie eines Mädchen-Räubers". (63) This is, in fact, precisely what the work deals with (amongst other things); Korff is entitled to say, if he believes it, that Tieck does not deal with the theme very effectively, but not to deny what is there to read. (64) Korff remarks, by way of interpreting Der Runenberg, that Christian suffers "Wahnsinn"; (65) he does not consider it necessary to state what form this madness takes or why he suffers from it. He ignores the ironic portrayal of the "Klosterbruder", and is apparently under the impression that he has been reading "Die Entdeckungen der guten alten
In considering *Genoveva*, he ignores Tieck's introduction of a sexual motive into the heroine's love for Christ; and, treating the work as "Tieck's Weg zum christlichen Mittelalter", does not mention the author's criticism of military aggression and crude nationalism in the guise of religion. (67) *München* is viewed as a dubious joke achieved by the juxtaposition of incongruous figures. (68) These incredible opinions would sound like dubious jokes themselves, were it not for the portentous erudition of their delivery.

Trainer takes the view that Tieck's works were less important in themselves than his indirect influence on subsequent German literature; (69) indeed, the introduction of his monograph identifies his objective as to demonstrate the truth of a remark of Korff's (71) to the effect that Tieck's works originate in the *Ritter* - and *Schauerroman*. This is an over-simplification by both writers. As shown later, (72) Trainer's interpretations of selected works, while correct within their own context, give an incorrect impression by omitting other important features.

Gundolf takes a view similar to Korff's. Tieck is, he alleges, superficial, (73) a mimic with no individuality, (74) an actor; (75) he makes a number of pejorative comments, such as: "Er fing an als Unterhaltungsschriftsteller niedrigen Niveaus ... er hörte auf als Literaturgreis und Unterhaltungsschriftsteller hohen Niveaus". (76) We are informed that Tieck's rationalist background demonstrates that his Romanticism was artificially acquired (77) (a *non sequitur* which makes comment unnecessary). Gundolf's monograph is, like Ricarda Huch's remarks in her survey
of the period, a plethora of sweeping statements with neither quotations nor footnotes. An entire thesis could be written to examine them. Two specimens may, however, suffice. He disparages Almansur for being a stereotyped "Bazar-Orient". He seeks, therefore, to sustain a charge of superficiality by focussing attention on superficialities; consideration of the work's content would have been welcome. We are also, it would appear, to believe that Lovell is of literary origin - the particular influences being Richardson and Rétfi de la Bretonne - and that this is proved by the fact that William is not a German. Unfortunately it is impossible to assess this point until we can ascertain what Gundolf deduced from the fact that Hamlet was not an Englishman.

Staiger, too, believes that Tieck's inspiration was mainly from other literature. This is, he implies, the result of having worked for Rambach: "Damit verlor er die literarische Unschuld, bevor ihm ein gewichtiges eigenes Werk gelungen war". In consequence the early works - Abdallah, Der Abschied, Almansur and Karl von Berneck - were, likewise, "Kitsch" and without any "festen persönlichen Kern". As Staiger continues it is clear that he seeks an explanation for Tieck's apparently inconsistent and incompatible styles and moods, and for the fact that he was so attuned to, even a pioneer in, all contemporary movements. He refers to Tieck's changes between, for example, the manner of MusMus for the Straußfedern, Wackenroder's devout views of art, and the Märchen, and concludes that this is a form of versatility: "Tieck aber - um es unsanft und paradox zu sagen -
ist eigentlich nichts und eben deshalb ohne heimlichen Vorbehalt zu allem fähig". (84) He is "das schwankende Rohr, das Spiel von jedem Druck der Luft, der keinen Boden und Halt mehr kennt und eben darin eine neue Quelle des Dichterischen entdeckt". (85) "Von allem Anfang an zeigt er sich als der vollkommene Literat. Er lebt und webt in der Literatur und scheint von ihrem gespannten Verhältnis zum Leben ... Überhaupt nichts zu wissen." (86)

Tieck's technical and stylistic virtuosity we may easily concede, for this is essentially a series of changes of standpoint from which he deals with a variety of connected themes. (87) Critics who, like Gundolf and Staiger, regard Tieck as superficial, as a chameleon or mimic of his cultural circumstances, have probably been misled by the fact that he did not develop as much as most major authors do. While there is some change, one's hopes of finding convenient demarcations between juvenilia, works of apprenticeship, works of varying stages of maturity, and final wisdom or self-repetition in old age, are soon dashed. Tieck does seem sometimes to have worried about his apparent failure to develop, and on other occasions to have thought it unimportant. (88) Superficially, his concern, and the criticism referred to, could be shown to be justified. There is hardly a period of his life which does not provide at least one important work whose connections are with earlier or later rather than with contemporary works. However, a synthesis does exist, even though it requires the bulk of his many works to express it properly. The fickleness of his subject-matter - what Stopp calls, rather uncharitably, "das Vielseitige, das
ewig Wechselnde in Tieck, seine fast unheimliche Anpassungsfähigkeit und geistig mimische Gabe" (89) - is more apparent than real. The inter-related elements of his many-sided character as a writer were present from an early stage. There are no important contradictions within his literary output (conceding, therefore, the contradiction and relative inferiority of his critical writings): (90) the world of the later works merely transcends the earlier one by providing a larger horizon, an expanded context of historical awareness, and a consequent decline in the relative importance of themes based on individual psychological disorders. (91) He sees a unity between topics which he had hitherto treated separately, and discovers, for example, that the psychological make-up of individuals is similar to that of society. (92) Even this idea is present in Genoveva, where debased forms of religious fervour have similar effects both in individuals and in nations. (93) The critics mentioned do not realise that Tieck merely responded to a variety of influences which stimulated his pre-existing, mutually consistent interests.

In the light of this argument we can, indeed must, dismiss Staiger's views. But his assessment of some specific works is a final refutation. For example, Staiger states that Lovell suffers from "Langeweile" (94) (comparable to Korff's delphic diagnosis of Christian's problem). (95) Nowhere does he refer to Lovell's loss of Amalia, or his defective education, or the effect of having read too much bad literature. Staiger's diagnosis is supposed to refer to Tieck's feelings about the Berlin Aufklärung which was, he suggests, so weak that rebellion was impossible,
with the result that potential rebels such as Tieck were
driven in on themselves and had only literary stimulus. He
commits thereby a non sequitur. Nothing could be more likely
to induce a budding writer to analyse his own frustration and
its social and personal causes, and then write a great work.
That is what Tieck did in writing Lovell. Still obsessed with
his charge of imitative versatility, Staiger asserts that the
idea of a scripted audience in Kater came from Holberg. It is
difficult to feel confidence in judgments of this kind. They
may be true, but one needs to know, for example, why
A Midsummer Night's Dream or The Knight of the Burning Pestle
were not the origins; and at what stages, if at all, the idea
developed as a satire on the device of the Greek chorus.
Staiger's interpretation of Tieck is based on misunderstandings
of the works, and proceeds by the use of vague allusiveness
instead of facts.

It is difficult to decide whether Thalmann belongs in the
"geistgeschichtlich" or "psychological" category. On the one
hand, she often refers to the urban scene and its alleged
influence, particularly on Lovell. (96) On the other hand, there
are sentences such as the following: "Wackenroder stirbt. Und
Tiecks frühe und andächtige Jugend stirbt mit" (97) (we are not
told how the one event is supposed to have caused the other, in
what way Tieck's youth was "andächtig" or ceased to be so); or -
of Tieck's failed health - "Da war die Romantik des Körpers
dahin; da stellte sich die Behäbigkeit des Bürgers ein, die
Abhängigkeit von Pflege und Badekuren", (98) which, if it means
anything, means that only physically fit authors write romantic literature and - a highly original view of social pathology - that the bourgeois class have the unenviable monopoly of advanced age and ill-health. Unfortunately for this theory of Tieck and the changes in his works, his health was bad for many years before he ceased writing. Yet Thalmann also remarks that the material poverty and the factions which increasingly appeared in German national life in the 1840s prevented him from writing further, (99) which makes us wonder whether a man in his late sixties who had been a prolific writer for over fifty years and had produced several masterpieces was being accused of malingering. Her Probleme der Dämmonie is entirely confused, as Stopp (100) complains, for it is based on Tieck's psychological make-up, but uses examples drawn from the Gothic aspect of his works.

Edwin H. Zeydel's book was the first to set out on a large scale the sequence of events, both biographical and literary, and to demonstrate some relations between them. Indeed, it remains the only treatment of this type, and contains many facts and ideas which now seem self-evident and are taken as axioms. However, his interpretations of the works as they arise in their chronological context sometimes suffers from over-emphasis on biographical or contemporary relevance - for example, his interpretation of Eigensinn und Laune is construed one-sidedly as an attack upon the Young Germans just because Tieck was undoubtedly at odds with them (101) - and although the book's interpretative purpose is to show the importance of Tieck's
bourgeois stance, (102) this idea is obscured by a wealth of
detail. Before proceeding further it is fair to pause to record
that fundamental disagreement with Zeydel is possible for later
writers on Tieck only from a vantage-point won by Zeydel himself,
by his critical biography, his editorial work and his numerous
articles.

A clearer, and more demonstrably mistaken, view is put by
Zeydel in an article relating Tieck to Biedermeier. Zeydel
misunderstands the early Tieck when he writes of the later period:

Er hat jene idealistischen Forderungen seiner Jugend,
die durch Sympathie mit der französischen Revolution
auf dem Gebiete des gesellschaftlichen Lebens und der
Politik und durch Vorliebe für das Mittelalter auf dem
der Religion in ihm erwacht waren, weit hinter sich
gelassen. (103)

This view, while welcome as a corrective to the more common
tendency to undervalue the later works, oversimplifies the young
Tieck's simultaneous dislike of authority, mistrust of popular
taste, belief in genius, and mistrust of those who thought
themselves geniuses. (104) It also assumes that Genoveva is
merely a beautiful poetic evocation of the Romantic Middle
Ages. (105) When Zeydel states

In den Novellen sind Vernunft, Überlieferung und
Konservatismus für Tieck gleichbedeutend geworden mit
moralischer Rechtlichkeit (106)

he also overstates Tieck's alignment with authority in his later
period; there is much in the later works which suggests more
radical views than those which Tieck expressed as a private
individual. (107) His antipathy to the Young Germans may have
been based more upon their view of literature as an instrument
of reform and their concomitant denial of aesthetic values, rather
than indicative of support for their opponents. (108)

From his false premisses Zeydel deduces a view of Tieck which is not in itself unreasonable, but which is merely partial. The basic idea is that Tieck preserved his early ideals in the context of a private citizen's life:

Nur in Bezug auf das Leben des Privatbürgers, auf Literatur, Kunst und Kultur im allgemeinen und in seiner theoretischen Abscheu gegen das Triviale, Niedrige und Gemeine bewahrte er sich seine Ideale nach wie vor. Sein literarisches Schaffen, besonders nach 1820, zeugt davon, daß er sich stets als unabänderlichen Verfechter solcher hohen humanen Werte fühlte ... (109)

So Tieck, according to Zeydel, was in this period "ein Epigone der deutschen idealistischen Bewegung in deutscher Bürgerkleidung. Seine Bestrebungen gelten indessen nur einem einzigen Prinzip: den höchstens und edelsten Zielen des Bürgertums in seinem Kampfe gegen Gemeinheit und Niederträchtigkeit". (110)

This view is unexceptionable within its own limits. It ignores his interest in psychology throughout his career. And his interest in the characterization of women and in the rights of women could, pace Tieck himself, be regarded as showing the influence of Young Germany were it not for its early provenance in, for example, Genoveva. (111) We should also remember that the image of Tieck as the urbane civilised proponent of these ideals - which he was - needs to be modified by an awareness of his quarrelsome nature: certainly he was reviled intolerantly for the offence of not agreeing with the Young Germans, but they did not have a monopoly of intolerance and tactlessness in the exchange. (112) Finally, as to terminology, one may fairly say that Tieck upheld what he regarded as civilised virtues, but it is an unnecessary, if tempting, label to say that these ideas
were "bürgerlich": for they were open to the proletarian and aristocrat also. (113) Zeydel does, however, make it clear that the early and late Tieck are inseparable, and he does so without the construction of artificial patterns (which is Gumbel's error), and without overstating the influence (114) of Solger, Raumer or Shakespeare, or of the allegedly crucial position of Phantasus. (115)

Critics who judge Tieck in relation to a specific literary movement or period form a logical sub-group of those whose view is overtly "geistgeschichtlich"; those who judge him in relation to a particular aspect, genre or alleged influence form another overlapping sub-group. They tend to share two faults: Tieck's versatility, which some have seen as a fault in him, ensures that a view from any particular standpoint is convincing up to a point, because there will be plenty of material relevant to it, but will lead to distortion; and the critics concerned usually make matters worse by misinterpreting the works (a foreseeable fault arising from the pre-determination of a partial view). Lussky, for example, tells the story of Lovell (116) without mentioning the loss of Amalie or the influence of cheap literature, though he correctly notes the disturbing effect of having misunderstood Kant. (117)

We have already noted the "geistgeschichtlich" critics who have tended to ignore the later works, except perhaps to assume that what holds good for the early works is an adequate explanation of the later ones. This defect seems to be as true of those who concentrate on the later ones. If one judges by results, it would appear that nothing is to be hoped from further
consideration of Tieck piecemeal.

Sengle regards the "Biedermeierzeit" as to some extent a late Romanticism, and remarks that the late Romantics, with whom he includes Tieck, were at home in the period. (118) Specifically, he regards the later Tieck as representative of his time in putting current problems into didactic discussion-novellas. (119) When he defines Tieck's position between Romanticism and Biedermeier, he concedes, albeit only by implication, Tieck's unrepresentative quality. He writes that, in Tieck's later works, Romanticism survived in its acceptance of "wonder" in the everyday world and in using rhetoric and allegory, but no longer had the demonic element; whereas, he continues, Tieck did not share the Biedermeier condemnation of sensuality. (120) This judgment ignores the fact that the discussion-novella grew from Tieck's pre-Biedermeier years, and merely implemented a species of objectivity already in his early works. (121) Sengle's view of Tieck as a fairly typical Biedermeier writer is possible only by neglecting the revolutionary and anti-totalitarian elements in his novellas, which is also adumbrated in the early works. (122) It is altogether an example of how a useful view can be distorted by an unconscious determination to fit Tieck, or in this instance part of his output, into a predetermined pattern.

Welcome praise of Tieck, both for what it says and because Tieck is seldom praised by critics, is Roger Paulin's "His early translating and hackwork was to help equip him with the facility, elegance and sensitivity which mark him as a major prose writer
The inner cohesion of Tieck's output and his early growth from hack to genius are the ignored essence of Tieck's claim to consideration. Hienger, too, believes in the importance of establishing continuity between the early and late works, and doubts the usefulness — indeed, asserts the hazards of — using definitions of literary terms as a yardstick.

C. SOME BASIC ASSUMPTIONS IN THE PRESENT STUDY

From the foregoing survey of Tieck criticism it is possible to deduce some ground-rules for the present work. Most of these need be only negative, for a fresh view is possible by merely avoiding bad examples.

Psychological factors allegedly present in Tieck's private life must be discounted when interpreting his literary works. His importance is as a literary figure, not as an illustrative patient; and we have no evidence to use, except some ludicrous misinterpretations which serve as warnings against emulating them. However, it will be obvious that Tieck had considerable insight into human behaviour: therefore, it is legitimate to use later psychoanalytic findings if they seem helpful. Since they will not always be so, the conditional clause is important. As for "Geistesgeschichte", since Tieck often wrote about his contemporary world and cultural milieu we can hardly expect to ignore it when writing about him. But if he is worth reading and writing about, it is as an individual writer with his own powers of selection and presentation of material, not as a mere product of his culture.
One must, however, eschew the agglomeration of incidents, phrases and motifs from different works in order to lend spurious support to a general proposition. This has, unfortunately, been the traditional method when any particular aspect or theme has been considered in relation to his complete output. The extracts are of unknown status and meaning once they are removed from their context: the true laboratory-specimen is the whole work rather than a portion of it. The worthlessness of these assemblages undermines the value of having insisted on the unity of his output.

From these principles follow others. Since one should consider the whole work, one should never assume, unless there is sound evidence to do so, that Tieck speaks through any single character. Since the pulling of thematic threads throughout his whole output and the constant reference to contemporary phases are both discredited by results, the method adopted will be to consider his whole output, and to do so in very broad chronological groupings rather than by motif-systems. This method is a compromise, adopted in the hope of securing the best of both worlds.

Comparison of the early and late works reveals that the predominantly aesthetic stance in the former is given a degree of social orientation in the latter but does not change its fundamental nature. As Tieck explores the antithesis between beauty and delusory versions of it, and considers the thoughts, feelings and actions of people who perceive beauty or mistakenly believe themselves to do so, the early works tend to concentrate
on personal behaviour and the later ones to add a social and historical dimension. But the distinction is not clear-cut. Indeed, Tieck attempts to abolish it by trying to show that the process of creativity is itself the perception of beauty and that the perception of beauty is itself the perception of social reality. In this attempted syllogism lies his desire to equate the aesthetic faculty with understanding of individual and social behaviour, and both with a didactic purpose in art. The sections in which Tieck's literary works are reviewed will show how he tried to establish this syllogism, albeit not in the conscious form articulated here, and how during the first half of his career he examined a variety of possible ideals (rejecting some as delusions or as debased forms) before reaching greater clarity in his second period. It will also be seen that perhaps this equation was itself a delusion.
II. THE WORKS OF THE FIRST PERIOD

A. EARLY WORKS AS FORERUNNERS TO "WILLIAM LOVELL"

Tieck's later interpretations of his early works are important in two respects. First, they imply that he regarded the decade of his early manhood as having already become a historical period with identifiable characteristics and its own Zeitgeist. In many of his early works he consciously satirised contemporary intellectual and social life. Some of his later views reinforce and clarify the judgments he made at the time, but others have to be treated with caution because the impression he gives of his earlier intentions is not always substantiated by the works themselves. Perhaps the chief value of his retrospective self-interpretations is in demonstrating his historical awareness in his later period. Secondly, and arising from the foregoing, we note that his comments omit a great deal; some works he comments on misleadingly, but others he does not comment on at all. He is misleading on Abdallah and Lovell and ignores Sommernacht. Discrepancies of this kind suggest a change in Tieck's outlook.

In 1813— in the period of his life in which many of his earlier works were republished in a new collection, Phantasus— appeared a new edition of Lovell with a new Vorrede. In it he recalls how, as he now puts it, not only Germany but the civilised world generally seemed to have lost "der Sinn für das Schöne, Hohe und Geheimnisvolle", and to have acquired in its place, "Eine seichte Aufklärungssucht" which portrayed "das Heilige als einen leeren Traum". In other words, Tieck is
stating that the Aufklärung, which had begun as the creative antithesis of obscurantism, had become a destructive scepticism refusing to recognise intuition and imagination. (4) This spirit of the age, Tieck holds, took certain forms, some of which had respectable names. Freedom of thought and cosmopolitanism were really indifference towards religion and fatherland; philosophy had degenerated into insipid conversation; and the newly modish psychology was obsessed with sickliness, and was antagonistic towards integration of the personality. "Poesie" was at a low ebb (and so could not remedy these deficiencies), for a soulless misunderstanding of Antiquity produced nothing from the world of scholarship except pedantry and stultifying rules. Attempts at improvement - he mentions Winckelmann, Hamann, Lessing, Jakobi and the young Goethe - were usually ignored, but sometimes caused an unproductive clamour (because, he means, of the behaviour of objectors). Berlin held cultural sway, and other possible centres of culture were regarded as "kleinstädtisch".

Having sketched in this background, Tieck describes the origin of Lovell as an attempt to establish positive values amidst a profusion of influences and counter-influences, without any guidance from his elders (a lack he mentions also in correspondence): (5) to portray, for himself and others,

jene Gegend, die der Verwirrung, dem Geistesluxus, dem Zweifel, der philosophirenden Sinnlichkeit und Leidenschaft als ein helles Elysium gegen Über liegen sollte.

In stating that his objective had been to show the Aufklärer
the deficiency of their position by depicting it, and to present
a constructive alternative, he concedes that his lack of years
may have caused him to fail. Haym accepts at face value Tieck's
later statements of earlier intent, and agrees that he failed. (6)
But the impression of a conscious, deliberate search has little
to do with Lovell as actually written. And the alliance between
a personal need for stability (somewhat understated in the
Vorrede but more apparent in the earlier period) and the alleged
desire to reveal hidden truths to his generation is an uneasy
one. It inadvertently draws attention to the author's real views
at the time when he advances this implausible pretence to a
didactic purpose. In short, the historical awareness and moral
intention are the outcome of Tieck's preoccupations in 1813 (and
foreshadow his later theory of the novella), and bear little
relation to the novel itself. As Trainer points out, the note
of resignation at the end stems from alterations made for the
edition of 1813 to remove the impression of "insistence on
chaos". (7) Since it is not in the original edition we should
disregard it in an interpretation of the Lovell of the early
years and bear it in mind only for assessing Tieck's outlook at
the time of the revision. This view is supported by a letter
from Tieck to Solger indicating that when writing Lovell Tieck
needed to express himself as a form of therapy; there is nothing
of the self-aware didactic in that:

Es [Lovell] ist das Denkmal, das Mausoleum vieler
gehegten und gelösten Leider und Irrtümer; aber als es
gebaut ward, war der Zeichner und Arbeiter schon von
diesen Leiden frei; ich war fast immer sehr heiter, als
ich dieses Buch schrieb, nur gefiel ich mir noch in
der Verwirrung. (8)
Fifteen years later his interpretation of his works and of their period is again different. He abandons the view of his former self as having been historically and in other ways self-aware at the age of twenty, and describes, more convincingly, an ill-informed and unhappy response to the general problems of adolescence and to his unfortunate intellectual environment. He recalls how Schiller's *Die Räuber* annihilated all values for him and how, in the frame of mind engendered by this experience, he wrote *Abdallah*. Presumably this means that the arguments against morality advanced by Franz Moor and Karl's doubts as to whether stability was even desirable were sources of the moral anarchy advocated by Mondal. He is, however, more explicit about his condition when writing *Lovell*. He emphasizes a sense of acute isolation, both from his elders and from his contemporaries. He was, he writes, the kind of youth who makes — who has to make — all his intellectual and emotional discoveries by personal experience, rather than by imbibing a distillation of the experience of others. While in the process of investigating and discovering literature, history, morality and religion, he would be obsessed by his every latest discovery in turn. Most people, he continues, do not understand such compulsions, and an intense youth finds their superficiality and absence of passion oppressive: he is cut off from friends and teachers, because his passions and preoccupations, and his obsessive questioning of basic assumptions, are beyond the range of their experience. There was also a difficulty peculiar to his specific cultural milieu. Among the younger generation, he
recalls, there was a fashion - which we may assume to have been a debased inheritance from the Sturm und Drang (11) - of empty enthusiasm and contrived passion. These people he found vain in their vehemence, and self-righteous in their proclamation of their genius, strength and originality. He recounts how this isolated him still further, by driving him to the other extreme of melancholy and resignation; but he felt at home in neither camp.

Two particular inconsistencies have already been mentioned, and must now be elaborated. Firstly, some important aspects of the works mentioned are omitted. (12) He does not even refer to the theme of an individual who, unbalanced after a misfortune in love, is alienated from society and finds evil attractive; he does not mention the relationship between father and son; and he does not mention the ruination of young minds when they are indoctrinated by meretricious fiction. Secondly, it is not enough to observe that Tieck misinterprets the two works he reviews. His concentration on these to the exclusion of others is itself a misinterpretation of his early years as a writer. Before the time when - according to the Vorrede - he was troubled by bad literature, pretentious self-styled geniuses and religious doubt, he had written works which seemed to solve the problems, namely Die Sommernacht (1789) and Alla-Moddin (1790-91). The exactitude with which the material of these works seems to resolve the doubts which allegedly troubled him afterwards makes us doubt Tieck's chronology or suggests that the intense states he describes were his need rather than his problem. These
possible solutions are not mutually exclusive, but the second will be ignored, since it would require psycho-analysis of the author. An examination of the early works shows that Lovell is properly regarded as a summation of them rather than as a sudden, conscious declaration.

Tieck paid scant attention to these two works in later life. The former was excluded from his collected Schriften, probably not because "Ein dramatisches Fragment" was insufficient to warrant inclusion (for other incomplete works were included) but rather because, being a play and a fantasy, it somewhat contradicted the later novellas on Shakespeare. Some of the characters, and the mood throughout, are reminiscent of A Midsummer Night's Dream ("Sommernachtstraum"), but the story centres on Shakespeare as a boy, thereby foreshadowing Das Fest zu Kenelworth. The boy is lost in the forest and, having fallen asleep, is discovered by the fairies. He is temporarily at risk, for it is their normal practice to punish, as presumptuous, mortals who approach them. Fortunately, Titania takes a liking to him and insists that he should be rewarded instead. She makes him a "Sänger" of unique ability, with an instinctive gift for expressing feelings and describing nature. It is emphasised that this talent is unselfconscious and that it is consistent with modesty and gentleness:

Sei groß, und ahne deine Größe nicht;
Sei milde, nimmer schwelle deine Brust
Verweg'ner Stolz; erfahr' es nimmer, daß
Du seist der Erste aller Sterblichen. (13)

Oberon gives him "Begeisterung", which is also associated with, and to some extent defined by, bold, original, penetrating
thought. The sources of these gifts may suggest that, in emotional terms, they are respectively feminine and masculine traits; later works, particularly Dichterleben (15) and Der junge Tischlermeister, (16) suggest - but without implications as to sexual orientation - that an individual man may have both feminine and masculine traits (and the same implication is found in the portrayal of Vittoria Accorambona). (17) Puck, for his gift, confers upon Shakespeare cheerfulness and the power to banish trouble from the minds of others. Being Puck, he claims a reward, and a puckish one: he will take it on himself to start quarrels about Shakespeare among the small-minded after his death, though the poet's reputation will shine through it all. (18) Such critics and scholars were Tieck's lifelong aversion (as may be seen in, for example, Die Vogelscheuche of 1834, and Puck's reappearance there). (19)

This brief, uncompleted work is important in recording Tieck's view of genius in general and Shakespeare in particular - he did not change this view fundamentally - and also as a refutation of the bombastic arrogance which, Tieck has told us, his contemporaries regarded as a necessary attribute of, and proof of, genius. (Insistence on the personal normality, even ordinariness of Shakespeare was to be a recurring theme in Tieck's works.) (20) There is also an ominous note. It is declared to be dangerous to people of ordinary ability to approach this world of the imagination: the boy Shakespeare is saved only by Titania's whim, albeit a discerning whim. A person of ordinary ability who, either through accident or through arrogance, made
this approach would fare badly. Translation of this fairy-tale into reality brings us to the Lovell-types, for their fate was determined by their faulty self-estimates and selection of false ideals. Not surprisingly (since it is a juvenile work) the "Fragment" contains no material on the tensions of friendship and love which Shakespeare will encounter as an adult and which figure prominently in the novellas.

If Tieck provided anywhere in his works a description of "ein helles Elysium" in contrast to doubt, confusion and egotistic self-indulgence, it was not in Lovell, where he later claimed such an intention, but in Alla-Moddin (1790-91). The chief character, after whom the work is named, is another example of the Aufklärung's stereotype of the non-Christian religious man whose toleration and honourable conduct are contrasted with the vicious, casuistical bigotry of the Christian characters. Comparison with Lessing's Nathan der Weise is unavoidable, particularly since there is even a verbal stimulus to our memory. In both works an outsider appeals on behalf of the central character to a bigoted Christian and receives a mechanical response. The Patriarch rejoins, to the Templar, "Tut nichts! der Jude wird verbrannt!"; (21) and in Tieck, the Stranger (later revealed as Valmont) is similarly met by an unthinking "Er werde Christ" from Alonzo, the Spanish governor. (22)

Rejection of religious bigotry is, of course, an important theme. Tieck's play shows the influence of Nathan in this respect also, particularly in attaching importance to the idea (conveyed in the parable of the rings) (23) that all religions
are equally valid, and to the ideal beneath the rhetorical question

\[ \text{Sind Christ und Jude eher Christ und Jude} \\
\text{Als Mensch? (24)} \]

But in Tieck's presentation the emphasis is different. Valmont's plea to Alonzo is close to an assumption that a religion and a moral code are to some extent the products of an individual's character and to an even greater extent the products of time and place. It also contains the concomitant assumption that religious feeling is a more general and fundamental aspect of the human character.

\[ \text{Es führen mehrere Wege zur Tugend, zum Glück ... Kann Ihre Meinung, oder nennen Sie es Religion, nicht auch irren?} \]

\[ \text{Er [der Allmächtige] erzwingt von keinem Geschöpf Anbetung und Lob, denn jeder Atemzug der Natur ist sein Lobgesang ...} \]

\[ \text{Wie können Sie ein Mitgeschöpf, einen edlen Menschen bloß darum quälen, weil er anders betet als Sie? (25)} \]

Tieck strengthens these points by showing that the pagans ruled by Alla-Moddin also have their bombastic, bloodthirsty, self-righteous characters to compare with the persecuting Jesuits. He distributes his good and bad traits over both the religions concerned, presumably on the assumption that human nature is basically the same, whereas Lessing, less plausibly, seems merely to have inverted the bigoted expectation that Christian is good and non-Christian is wicked. Tieck is much closer in spirit to Kant's \text{Die Religion innerhalb der Grenzen der bloßen Vernunft} which had yet to appear in 1793. The essential point in common was the view that specific religions were merely expressions of religion more widely conceived, so that no specific religion
constituted a compulsive moral framework. (27)

However, the play is on the whole less satisfactory as a work of literature than Nathan, despite the above comparison in its favour on one important point. The reason for this is that Alla-Moddin's moral superiority is merely asserted, whereas Nathan's is proved by actions which the audience either see or hear reported. This foreshadows a weakness in Tieck as a writer which we shall often note: that he embodies ideas in characters to the detriment of characterisation, either because there is insufficient action to demonstrate or summon forth individuality or because the action and ideas part company.

At this point let us rehearse a puzzle we have encountered. Tieck has identified difficulties he faced as a young man, and has misrepresented certain works, particularly Lovell, as having been in some respect the solution, while ignoring in his retrospective view those works which seem more relevant to the problem as he described it. It is within the period of Die Sommernacht and Alla-Moddin, namely 1789-91, that the Tieck of Ryno and Lovell began to appear - after the apparent solutions. The discrepancy shows that the writer and the critic were not at one (we shall return to this point also): for it is clear that the deficiencies of the Lovell-types are caused by their lack of the positive values advocated in Sommernacht and Alla-Moddin, namely a sustaining perception of beauty and of its relationship to individual behaviour and the social environment.

Tieck's own interpretation of Abdallah and Lovell was deficient in another respect also, in that he ignored the most
important motivation of the principal characters (though not the only source of motivation) - namely the mental disturbance caused by unrequited love. (His reasons for the omission remain unknown.) He also ignored two other features of his work at that time: his interest in a certain type of character who revels egotistically in his own brooding; and the effect of literature upon the thoughts and feelings of those who immerse themselves in it.

The love-theme is first encountered in Almansur (1790). Haym ignores the presence of this theme entirely, and accuses Tieck of "die Rousseausche Empfindungsweise, die Werthersche Naturschwärmerei, allein in stumpfem und schwunglosem Abklatsch". (28) Similarly, Trainer, perhaps under Gundolf's influence, dismisses the work as an "oriental idyll". (29) The error in such assessments is that of assuming that Tieck speaks through the characters rather than through the whole work. In fact, the term "Idyll" is probably to be taken disapprovingly.

Two hermits discuss their reasons for having left the world. Abdallah, the old hermit, advises Almansur, a young visitor, to return to society. But he withdraws his advice on learning that, just as he himself had done fifty years before, Almansur seeks solace and peace amidst nature after his beloved has married another for money. Both Abdallah and Almansur are in a state of arrested development because self-fulfilment has been denied them. They tell each other, with obvious sincerity, that their function henceforth will be to refresh travellers who have lost their way, and to give consolation to those who come seeking it.
In view of where they live, their self-imposed duties will hardly prove onerous. This self-deception draws attention to the intellectual and moral flaw in their argument, namely that it is an impracticable idea unless most people refrain from becoming hermits and continue to live in the world. They seek to be happy rather than useful; the world does not conform to their expectations, so they leave it. Their adversity is in no way comparable to the tragedy which inspired Nathan's "Und doch ist Gott!". In Kantian terms they act under a "hypothetical imperative", so that the desire is taken to be a sufficient reason and the action has no moral value. In fact, Tieck's interest is in their motivation rather than their metaphysics, but the comparison is important as the first example of Tieck's use of religious and philosophical material as psychological motivation for literary figures.

They understand, in a purely intellectual way, that the life of a hermit is open to these criticisms, but they are unable to infer that an obligation rests upon them personally. Abdallah advises Almansur to live in the world as it is, and to avoid excessive introspection:

kehre zur Welt zurück, wer weis, wo dein Glück schlummert, gehe hin und erwecke es, du bist zur Gesellschaft geboren, gehe hin und erfülle deine Bestimmung, genieße ohne zu grübeln und du wirst gewiß glücklich sein. (32)

This (which, as will be shown, is precisely what Lovell ought to have done) both reveals their inadequacy and shows that the effect of unrequited love is stronger than their intellectual convictions. This is an irrational matter, in which the mind
obeys the emotions and permits flat contradiction between conviction and behaviour. Neither hermit practises what he preaches. Egotistically, they decide that if they cannot have what they want they will have nothing (much as the "Klosterbruder" decides that since he cannot be a genius he will not be a painter at all). (33) Tieck's implicit disapproval of their motives shows that he rejected the idyll even earlier than Paulin's suggested date of 1792. (34)

Egotism is, similarly, the key to most of the deprived lovers who appear frequently in Tieck's works. In the following year (1791) he wrote the last chapter - now known separately as Ryno after the chief character - to a Gothic horror-novel, *Die eiserne Maske* (1792) by F. E. Rambach. If Almansur may fairly be called a parasite, Ryno is his active counterpart, namely an anarchist, in the sense that instead of merely shunning those who are happy he tries to destroy them. He takes refuge in a fascination with evil, and justifies himself by two sophistical arguments. (35) Firstly, he declares that evil is attractive. It is, he finds, a sphere of activity parallel to the good. It is at its most attractive when practised to a monstrous degree: and the very force of passion means that deeds done under its influence must inevitably be noble, not repellent. Secondly, he asserts that he could not be other than he is, for the forces which have led him to his present position were irresistible. These opinions, supported again by the fallacy of the "hypothetical imperative", are self-indulgent, the outcome of wounded self-esteem; they are comparable to the self-deception
of Almansur. According to Tieck himself, it was some years later that he was troubled by a belief in the independent existence of evil - a view derived, he said, from his reading of Böhme and other mystics (he also mentions Tauler). But evidently the idea was familiar to him at this early stage. Again we note Tieck's transformation of moral and metaphysical considerations into psychological ones: Ryno's driving-force is the loss of a beloved.

When Tieck wrote that Abdallah was conceived while he was in a condition of despair brought on by (in particular) Schiller's Die Räuber, one can only assume, as noted above, that this was the effect of Franz's specious self-justification and of Karl's pseudo-moral assertions. But both of these remind us rather of Ryno than of Abdallah. Furthermore, Tieck introduces the notion of aberrant behaviour caused by frustration in love, whereas Schiller is content with Karl's angry reaction; and Abdallah contains a conflict between father and son which is of no particular importance in Die Räuber. In short, the similarities with Schiller are too tenuous to justify detailed attention: without the spurious authority of Tieck's own comment it would probably not occur to us. Tieck seems to have been determined to explain his development neatly, despite the facts.

His only other admission of literary influence upon the work concerns the Gothic horror-novel:

Dies Buch erschien zu einer Zeit, als Gespenstergeschichten, größliche Schicksale, wilde Leidenschaften das lesende Publikum sehr beschäftigten und interessirten. Dieser Abdallah aber, der auch dergleichen, nur mehr motivirt und mit einem gewissen Tiefsinn vortrug, wurde wenig beachtet. (37)
By this comment he seeks to dismiss (in 1828) both the Gothic mode and the general public. Examination of the Gothic element in Tieck's work(38) and of his attitude to the public(39) must be deferred. However, it is obvious that Abdallah, and the work generally, were "mehr motivirt", and Trainer's view that the "sense of utter futility ... leaves us intellectually unsatisfied"(40) is unjust.

The action of the work is governed by Mondal, the embodiment of evil, who states that his function and delight is destruction. This means the destruction of the order and harmony which human beings create; destruction of their concepts of beauty and virtue, which they believe to inhere in this order:

Die Menschen haben von ihrem Gotte jenen Trieb, alles zu ordnen und in ein ganzes zu bringen, m E E n e Freude ist Zerstörung. Ihrem Triebc genug zu thun, arbeiten sie in einer ewigen Thätigkeit an Ordnung und Harmonie, Sklaven eines Herrn, dem sie dadurch schmeicheln wollen, Schönheit und Tugend nennen sie das Gebäude, das sie aufführen, für mich gibt es keine Tugend als ihre Laster. (41)

The human society with which Mondal has to deal is presumably to his liking. Destructive tyranny masquerades as order: Ali, the tyrant, enjoys tormenting and exploiting his subjects, and Selim claims preposterous rights of interference in his son's life. These powers are challenged: Selim leads a revolt in the name of freedom, and Abdallah arranges Selim's capture and death in order to obtain the hand of Zulma. It is the challenges, not what is challenged, that accord best with Mondal's desires: yet our sympathy is with the challenges. This draws attention to a paradox: the spirit of destruction, in a revolutionary rôle, as justice and self-fulfilment, seeks
to destroy injustice and oppression. But so basic is the urge to maintain order that men quail at the thought of treason even against a tyrant, and Abdallah is driven mad with guilt at a desire which, under the circumstances, was pardonable, namely wishing the death of a parent who obstructs a reasonable sexual ambition.

The work does not fully explore the relationship between good, creative, dynamic destruction (namely the destruction of evil) and the static, oppressive destruction which has the apparent morality of the status quo (though the idea recurs in less melodramatic form in Die Ahnenprobe). The possibility that a particular action which even its own perpetrator regards as evil may nevertheless be good is perhaps an echo of the "guter Mensch in seinem dunklen Drange" from the "Prolog im Himmel" of Faust I, and Mondal's role is similar to that of the "Geist der stets verneint". If one type of destruction is evil and another good, and both stem from Mondal, his rôle is also similar to that of God in the "Prolog im Himmel": the analogy is that even if Faust loses his wager with Mephistopheles, God may nevertheless win his, so the distinction between good and evil as understood in social and legal contexts simply disappears when viewed on a metaphysical level. But the crucial difference between the works is that Mondal is a spirit of chaos rather than a composite of good and evil. It is disappointing that Tieck turned away from his metaphysical interest at this point.

It is tempting to see in the opposition between two sorts
of good and two sorts of evil a reflection of the problems of Europe in Tieck's day. But the dates disprove any connection: by the time Tieck wrote to Wackenroder of his admiration for revolutionary France, \(^{(45)}\) Abdallah had already been written, and the Terror was still six months in the future. The ideas contained in the work are, of course, relevant to political questions in a more general way, because the process of historical change is involved.

Perhaps even more interesting to the modern reader, however, is the psychological condition of Abdallah himself, which is a somewhat separate strand in the work. When we are urged, rightly, to admire in Dostoevsky certain adumbrations of Freud, \(^{(46)}\) it is helpful also to recognise in Abdallah what can only be a precursor of Freud's "Rat Man" case of 1907. \(^{(47)}\) A further element in the work is likewise rather disconnected from the others. Omar, the advocate of hedonism (and therefore the opponent of parental or state authority) has abandoned human society because he is unable either to rise to the level of an angel or to content himself with ordinary humdrum life. He hopes to find self-respect in the enormity of his evil, but also finds himself impelled to do good deeds occasionally. \(^{(48)}\) His significance is rather difficult to estimate, and the difficulty arises from the fact that he is sometimes Mondal's mouthpiece, sometimes himself, and at various times both a willing and unwilling victim of Mondal. But relish in the enormity of evil, and petulant refusal to be ordinary, were themes which Tieck introduced in Ryno and developed in Abdallah and Lovell.
Tieck's accounts of his development also largely ignore another work which is important for its transitional rôle. This is Karl von Berneck, which, subject to the inevitable imprecision of dates for the works of a writer who conceived, began, revised, and republished to such an extent, belongs to the period between Abdallah and Lovell.

Karl is prey to melancholy, and the extent to which this is natural to him is emphasised at the outset by his father, Walther. The family history, Walther says, shows the influence of "ein alter unversöhnlicher Fluch ... Die Trübseligkeit geht mir nach wie mein Schatten, und erbt vom Vater auf den Sohn ...". When, therefore, Karl describes himself as a person destined to experience "nur die schwarzen Tage, die das Schicksal in die Welt fallen läßt", it is only partly self-dramatization: within the work's context we are to assume the existence of a hereditary and environmental predisposition to think along these lines.

The root cause of this family curse is the unexpiated fratricide by an ancestor. Tieck intended this curse to be a rationalisation (within the irrational context of superstition) of Karl's state of mind; he viewed the work as "Dieser deutsche Orestes". He distinguished between it and the Greek work thus:

ich wollte aber vorsätzlich das Gespenstische an die Stelle des Geistigen unterschieben. (51)

In other words, he discarded the metaphysical view of fate and treated character as fate instead, using ghostly elements as a means of conveying it. The shift of emphasis and the ghostly external wrapping to convey a psychological condition were to
become typical of him. (53)

In the play we learn that Karl's inherited disposition has been exacerbated, partly by his upbringing and partly by an associated factor, his position in the family as the younger brother to the valiant extrovert, Reinhard. The latter relationship has made him acutely jealous of his brother's physical and martial prowess, (54) with crippling feelings of inferiority (not entirely justified, it would seem), and he has become obsessed with the legendary story of the Heymons'kinder (55) as a compensating fantasy. (56) This is the behaviour of an adolescent who is as yet unable to meet in reality the adult standard he requires of himself, or to determine a realistic level of self-expectation. So the natural and induced weakness and the compensation-fantasy coincide, and produce vanity in isolation - as Reinhard describes Karl to Adelheid, without quite understanding the true meaning of his diagnosis:

halb aus Eigensinn, halb aus Temperament immer schwer und verdrücklich. (57)

This is the by now familiar objection to being ordinary, as a reaction to having been treated, unsympathetically, as exactly that.

Finally, Karl, recognising that his inborn character and his environment have made him inevitably what he is, decides to kill Leopold to avenge his father (the family situation is in this respect that of Hamlet). He draws the analogy between the sword, an unthinking tool, and the actions of human beings determined by forces beyond their understanding. (58) This is, in different terms, Ryno's argument that uncontrollable forces
have brought him to his present condition and circumstances and that he is not responsible for what he does.

To Ryno's idea are added other elements. There is the germ of an idea which is developed in the motivation of Lovell, namely the predisposition to act in certain ways because of indoctrination by literature. In the present instance it is the literature of a colourful legendary past (it is significant that Tieck translated *Don Quixote* at this time) rather than contemporary cheap fiction. Karl is a preparatory study for William also in his brooding, arrogant, temperamental character. But *Hamlet* was the most important influence.

Karl's father, Walther, has been killed by Leopold, and his mother is now Leopold's wife. Karl describes himself as afraid to expose himself to the risk of death while desiring nonetheless to avenge Walther. He calls himself "einen ... verworfenen, ... nichtswürdigen Sohn", unworthy of knighthood, unresponsive to reported sightings of his father's ghost, and quite unlike his hero, Reinold (of the *Heymanskinder*); so careful of himself that he has not fulfilled the duty of a son to exact vengeance.

This is strikingly similar - too much so to be coincidental - to Tieck's analysis in 1826 of *Hamlet*'s famous monologue "To be or not to be". His interpretation is that *Hamlet*, aware of his own dilatoriness in fulfilling his duties to avenge his father and to assert his own right of inheritance, reflects on the fact that fear of incurring his own death in such an enterprise deters him from making the attempt. It is, Tieck holds, this state of mind, not that of a would-be suicide, which
accounts for Hamlet's vacillation and evasions thereafter. Of
Hamlet generally he thought that the many contradictions in
Hamlet's character, which make him a source of endless
fascination, derive from a specific contradiction which he,
Tieck, regards as a common human characteristic:

Diese Verachtung des Lebens, verbunden mit einer
überreizten Anhänglichkeit an dasselbe, charakterisiert
Hamlet in den meisten Scenen: dies wird auch ein
Kennzeichen aller jener Gemüther sein, die durch
verletzten Stolz und gekränktes Gefühl die Frische des
Daseins, und durch Grübeln die ruhige, sichere Haltung
verloren haben. (63)

This suggests that Tieck's study of Shakespeare, particularly of
Hamlet, was the origin of certain aspects of William Lovell (and
related types), specifically their arrogance and concomitant
fear of ordinariness and their brooding temperament. The themes
of deprivation of self-fulfilment in love and of being
indoctrinated by literature were not, apparently, of
Shakespearian origin.

Karl von Berneck is less like this passionate Hamlet of
1826, and more like the early, passive one. Tieck wrote in his
"Buch über Shakespeare" at about the time of writing Berneck that
Hamlet was an effective tragic figure because of his "leidender
Charakter", incapable of extremes of passion or of sustaining
any passion for long and (an idea similar to Karl's image of the
sword) tending merely to react to fate or to more active people
rather than to take his own initiatives. (64)

We conclude that the characterisation of Karl was influenced
by Tieck's early view of a passive, brooding Hamlet. In a later
chapter (65), it will be shown that Tieck's view of Shakespeare is
also the probable origin of those elements in Karl von Berneck (and William Lovell) normally regarded as Gothic. The similarity between the characters of Karl and Lovell also suggests the influence of his study of Shakespeare, particularly of Hamlet.

From the above consideration of the early works it is apparent that egotistic self-love and the adoption of essentially unreal ideals distilled from literary sources are in Tieck's view the antithesis of a balanced view of beauty and of the real world. These themes, and their ramifications, are considered in Tieck's portrayal of William Lovell.
B. "WILLIAM LOVELL"

This novel is the simultaneous fruition of many of Tieck's previous interests. His dislike of the contemporary "Genie", his fear of the indoctrinating effect of literature on certain people, his obsession with the effect of unrequited love—these and a variety of lesser motifs are fused together in this work, as they are shown to affect a young man who has no ideals and no understanding of society or his place in it. As we have seen, his Vorrede to the 1813 edition represented Lovell as a conscious attempt to define an ideal in contrast to the world he saw as a youth. He referred specifically to a number of factors: the lack of ideals in his environment and in himself, isolation from his elders and his contemporaries, and distaste for the hectoring pseudo-geniuses of his acquaintance. This judgment is of little assistance in considering the character of Lovell himself, whose mental processes are insufficiently clear to him to permit the epithet "conscious", who seeks to abandon love and friendship, and who himself becomes one of the pseudo-geniuses. Tieck's judgment is partly true of the novel as a whole, in that Lovell and Waterloo are shown to have been in error. But since he also shows that their actions were not (or not entirely) within their control, any mention of a quasi-didactic purpose is misleading. It is, indeed, self-contradictory to imply that a moral is drawn if one simultaneously proves that the principals' freedom of action was curtailed. The key to the contradiction is that the two halves of the contradiction were not simultaneous: one half is the
novel and the other half is Tieck looking back at it.

Lovell's character as first revealed precludes the inference of any moral. He is, according to Karl Wilmont, a "Schwärmer", (1) and this term is rapidly clarified as meaning, in this instance, that he is extremely emotional, with a tendency to self-dramatisation, and prone to dwell on the depressing aspects of situations: in short, a latter-day Sturm und Drang type. He is convinced that feeling and analytical reason are mutually antagonistic (and, significantly, he implies that they are associated respectively with youth and age). Therefore, in his view, to align oneself with the one means to eschew the other. Both Karl Wilmont and Eduard Burton express the fear that his excess of feeling will be his undoing; (2) already it is clear to us that he is much preoccupied with himself and that arrogance is seldom far away. These tendencies are to be exacerbated by his subsequent experiences.

The opinions expressed by his friends are important because they - being male, and of the same age, background and general interests - acquire the value of a control-group of normal people in relation to Lovell. The young Wilmont and Burton remind us of Tieck's description of Horatio: he is "Ein gewöhnlicher, guter Mensch, dessen Charakter sich sehr gut nur andeutet" because he would otherwise divert attention from Hamlet. In addition, "seine Handlungen sind ferner so, daß sie nichts auffallendes, nichts sonderbares haben, ohngefähr jeder Mensch würde so handeln wie er". (3) Probably it was in Hamlet
that Tieck noted the technique of establishing a background of normality, against which the "abnormal" hero appeared. Trainer finds Lovell "more sympathetic" than Eduard Burton "because the unconsciouness of his [Lovell's] position makes it more promising, since capable of change, than the unconsciouness of Eduard's apparently superior attitudes". This judgment understatess the fact that Lovell is - as not only Burton, but also Lovell himself and even Waterloo recognise - essentially the same: he is a ruined Burton.

To Lovell's hereditary emotionalism have been added two other characteristics of environmental origin (reminding us that an interest in social and educational reform, and an assumption that the two were connected, were implicit in the Sturm und Drang and explicit in the Aufklärung). Firstly, his experience of people is extremely limited. For example, not content with pronouncing on the relative merits of feeling and reason, he condemns contemporary society as being permeated with artificiality and insincerity - while he fails to recognise these very qualities in Louise Blainville and Rosa. Lovell's callowness is the result of having had little human contact. His knowledge of people is derived from fiction - a disadvantage which Louise notes and exploits by acting out the role which his fiction-moulded behaviour tells her will be appropriate for her purpose. Later, of course, Waterloo finds him an easy prey for the same reason. Lovell's principal experiences of life are, therefore, presented in this novel: a disappointment in love, and its consequences, including subjection to the influence of
warped minds. His inexperience and his indoctrination by cheap literature have left him unable to withstand them.

The second acquired characteristic is that Lovell has himself been warped from childhood. Mortimer, in correspondence with Eduard Burton on their new common experience of fatherhood, comments on a general danger which has afflicted Lovell: his father inculcated self-importance, with the result that Lovell as a boy took his own every whim to be an expression of genius, while no achievement was required as proof of this assumed status. (8) Eduard Burton's letter had contained the germ of that idea, with the comment that many people are called "Bösewichter" who should properly be called "Thoren", (9) meaning that their transgression is an over-estimate of their human worth and general importance. This evidence amounts to a plea to the reader on Lovell's behalf by people from the ordinary world, and prevents us from condemning him without considerable qualification.

To the evidence of hereditary temperament and parental error (to which both Walter Lovell and old Burton had themselves been subject from their respective fathers) must be added an element of mischief. Lovell is the victim of conspiracy; and the conspiracy is first implemented at a time when Mortimer, who was likely to have discovered Rosa's true character and to have protected Lovell, is obliged to return to England.

Lovell also shows that he has the capacity to mature through experience. The first signs of self-knowledge appear when he recognises that at the height of "Begeisterung" he is
often overtaken by "Nüchternheit", even when with Amalia. (10) This recalls his earlier description of the supersession of feeling by reason and his implication that this is an inevitable, if dreaded process. (11) Obviously this process has begun, and the first stage is that he reassesses his "Begeisterung", including that for Amalia, and finds it is not soundly based. His manner of continuing shows that, by experience, he has understood the truth of what his friends told him some months before: that indulgence in an excess of feeling could have an enervating and unbalancing effect. (12) (We note simultaneously Tieck's awareness at an early stage of the dangers of unbridled feeling.) The particularly ominous note is Lovell's fear that the process is irreversible. He describes how a neglect to control the imagination, feelings and obsessions ("Phantasie" and "Begeisterung") will lead one "in ein Gebiet so exzentrischer Gefühle" that exhaustion and confusion result. The former level of intensity seems to him to be preferable to this second condition, but proves unattainable, and the spirit is immobilised by lassitude and a sense of futility. The affected person has, he continues, lost the ability to soar above daily ordinariness but is nonetheless an irreconcilable stranger within it. We deduce a warning from this as Lovell sums up his own error:

Auch bei den poetischen Genüssen scheint mir eine gewisse Häuslichkeit nothwendig; man must nicht verschwenden, um nachher nicht zu darben ... (13)

Similarly he recognises in himself "den seltsamen Hang meiner Seele, bei fröhlichen Gegenständen irgendeinen traurigen,
He is even capable of seeing that Rosa is a source of danger, but by that time he is too firmly enmeshed in his new way of life to regain mastery. These examples of his self-awareness suggest that he is one of the mortals who, without the qualifying ability, approach fairyland (as in Sommernacht) and are therefore endangered. We note in this connection that his mounting despair turns him into a poet, albeit a self-centred one.

But the effect of losing Amalia (a factor almost entirely overlooked by critics, though F. J. Schneider is an honourable exception) is to sweep away this potential maturation and to exacerbate his self-centredness and his immature refusal to be ordinary. The permanency of his love for her, had it been permitted, is questionable: the point is, rather, that its uninterrupted course was necessary to him.

Under this shock, his character - particularly that aspect formed by his father's errors in educating him - and the evil influences at work on him cause him to leave the milieu which has denied him what he desires and to renounce its mores. To some extent this is merely a petulant reaction to spite his father by seeking out his own destruction in depravity, and he takes obvious pleasure in imagining his father grieving at having caused his son's destruction. Lovell is naturally eager to claim that his new way of life, disregarding the welfare of others in pursuit of his own self-gratification, demonstrates his superiority.
stereotyped Sturm und Drang imagery, he states a viewpoint which, much later is put succinctly by Baal: "Was sind sieben Dürfer gegen den Anblick?" Similarly, Lovell tries to kill his love for Amalia by playing the rake while speaking insultingly about her. This is the context of a poem (given in the collected poems as "Rausch und Wahn") in which he describes how, when drunk, he proceeds to realms usually barred to him, namely his own unconscious thoughts. This is made possible because alcohol removes the inhibitions of his sober state and enables him to surrender to impulses which are usually suppressed. The intellect as a mechanism of restraint is rejected along with ideals, art and beauty – inadequate joys to a drunken man – in favour of sexual gratification. As noted, the context of the poem suggests an attempt to convince himself rather than an actual belief. Gradually his reaction against his father and immediate environment becomes a reaction against the world at large, as is shown by his savage feelings towards the jostling crowd which prevents him from approaching Amalia at the theatre.

A more deeply rooted trait which causes him to abandon conventional morality is that for which Mortimer blames Lovell's father. We have seen that Lovell has been brought up to attach undue importance to himself. To observe that whatever he does he will do with extreme emotion is only part of the truth: he will also proclaim that it is the best thing to do and that he does it to perfection. This he will insist on, in the present matter of morality, partly to maintain his
self-esteem and partly to force his conscience into submission. He feels obliged to be not a shabby reprobate but a loathsome monster of evil. Of the many letters which illustrate this, that written to Rosa from the Piedmontese mountains, while the captive of bandits, stands out as containing the interwoven strands of shame, cynicism, arrogance, isolation, and a desperate need to convince himself. (27) His poem, written in the same period, similarly proclaims a reversal of values but fails to ring true because it, too, is an overstatement.

His claim to be the personal arbiter of morality, (28) and his contempt for ordinary people who, unlike himself (as he sees it), are subject to conventional codes, (29) must be considered as aspects of his desire to be a person out of the common run. Early in the novel he was a victim of fate or a hero, depending on his success or otherwise in love. Confronted eventually with his own ordinariness, he despairs at his inability to be evil. (30) The fact that this letter is followed immediately by those in which Eduard Burton and Mortimer refer to people who wrongly think themselves special justifies our attaching importance to this point. Throughout, Lovell is quite ordinary (under the ranting), and in particular with an ordinary conscience. He claims to have abandoned morality because he regards it as a pointless circumvallation which inhibits enjoyment, but he also refers to it as a form of arrogance in aspiring to be god-like, and, as such, doomed to failure:

Ich höre auf, nach Weisheit zu ringen, der sich kein Sterblicher nähern kann. (31)
In other words, the standard is too high, the ideal too remote, he abandons the effort, not the concept.

We must now distinguish between, on the one hand, the trauma which brings about Lovell's aberration and, on the other hand, the ideas he conceives as self-justification. His assertions sometimes show a striking resemblance to Kant's philosophy (which has prompted Wüstling to call the work a "philosophischer Roman"), and also a characteristic divergence from it based on a characteristic misunderstanding of it. Kant's view was that phenomena are intelligible to us only in the form in which our minds understand them, and that therefore the form which reality seems to assume is determined by us as a condition of our knowing it.\(^{(33)}\) We are tempted to the view that Tieck's erroneous views of his own early works, when he reviewed them long after, are examples of this.

Lovell's letter to Rosa reproduces this theory of knowledge and applies it to morality in a way different from Kant. He writes that his senses modify the data they receive, and his mind arranges them and supplies the logical connections to what would otherwise be a random supply of unsorted and unconnected impressions. So the world-view he receives is the product of his own mind. Kant, upholding reason as the means to morality - in a sense its simile - did not concern himself with the conflict that could arise when one person is convinced that he is rational and moral in doing the exact opposite to what his neighbour desires with equal sincerity. In perfect reason there is no conflict.\(^{(34)}\)
It is upon the point which Kant circumvented that Tieck lays emphasis. If morality is a product of personality, what horror may be expected if that personality is warped? Lovell unwittingly confirms that a warped mind inevitably conveys a warped picture of reality while convinced that it is discerning the truth: in short, a delusion.

Meine äußern Sinne modificiren die Erscheinungen, und mein innerer Sinn ordnet sie, und giebt ihnen Zusammenhang. Dieser innere Sinn gleicht einem künstlich geschliffenen Spiegel, der zerstreute und unkenntliche Formen in ein geordnetes Gemälde zusammenzieht. (35)

He does not realise that his "mirror" is a distorting-mirror, not a correcting one; thus the image he chooses is unconsciously ironic.

As his poem (which appears in the collected poems as "Der Egoist") puts it:

Die Wesen sind, weil wir sie dachten. (37)

He does not mean that he creates physical objects by forming conceptions of them—a popular misconception of Kant which Tieck ridicules elsewhere— but that his mind gives them individual and collective meaning. This idea in relation to morality is extremely subversive. He has decided that not only the order of the physical world but also the moral world is the product of his mind. He himself decides what value to place on anything, and he need not supply reasons: what he thinks, is so, because his thoughts are the creator and the law. Therefore morality conceived as an externally imposed duty is an invention of fools, and morality more generally is merely an aspect of his consciousness:
In other words, as the last line of the poem has it:

Die Tugend ists nur, weil ich sie gedacht. (40)

In this way Kant's theory of the knowledge of phenomena has been the source of dangerous moral conclusions. But we must remember Lovell's ordinariness, and consider whether he truly accepts these conclusions or is "protesting too much" again. The poem concludes (on a note which recalls the ambiguity between good and evil in Abdallah):

Was kümtern mich Gestalten, deren matten
Lichtglanz ich selbst hervorgebracht?
Mag Tugend sich und Laster gatten!
Sie sind nur Dunst und Nebelschatten!
Das Licht aus mir fällt in die finstre Nacht,
Die Tugend ists nur, weil ich sie gedacht. (41)

It is virtue which he still needs to discredit, and virtue which he attacks. For someone who does not merely claim an alternative system of morality but asserts that moral judgments have no meaning, he is strangely vehement. And his letter ends with an implied admission of having recoiled from his own conclusions:

Ich verliere mich in eine weite, unendliche
Wüste, - ich breche ab. (42)

As we noticed in discussing Abdallah, in Lovell also Tieck turns philosophical ideas into psychological ones. That we see a world which conforms to our preconceptions is a philosophical proposition. Tieck's emphasis on the trauma which brought Lovell to it, and induced him to develop it, is a psychological addition,
and Tieck conceivably reached it while studying Shakespeare. In analysing the character of Richard II he argues that the way people feel governs the activity of their intellects. With a dominant feeling, they form judgments which relate to the satisfaction of that feeling, and the judgments reached return the influence: they are mutually reinforcing. \(^{(43)}\) Tieck is not disagreeing with Kant, but is explaining why people "think" irrationally: the reason is that they are not thinking at all, but feeling. \(^{(44)}\) Tieck develops this argument in the Buch Über Shakespeare by regarding the true artist as the one who can control and depict this process. \(^{(45)}\) Lovell is, of course, like Richard II, no artist, and his feelings dictate his thoughts.

The path Lovell should have chosen is outlined and made explicit in three letters. First, there is the friendly exhortation of Eduard Burton, who implies that it is never too late to admit one's errors, and who praises the ideal of self-improvement: what he calls "das schönste und interessanteste Kunstwerk ... , mit dem sich die menschliche Seele nur immer beschäftigen kann: die allmäßliche höchstmögliche Vollendung ihrer selbst". \(^{(46)}\) In other words, Lovell should not have abandoned his former life, but should have built on it. Another view of what is substantially the same point is put mockingly by Waterloo:

> Du hast Dich jetzt überhaupt für ein Außerst wunderbares und seltenes Wesen gehalten, und bist doch nichts weniger ... Du hast aus Trägheit, Eitelkeit und Nachahmungssucht manches gethan und gesagt, was Dir nicht aus dem Herzen kam. Deine Philosophie war Eigensinn, alle Deine Gefühle nichts weiter, als ein ewiger Kampf mit Dir selber.
Du hättest ein recht ordentlicher, gewöhnlicher, einfältiger Mensch werden können; auf einem Kupferstich in einer Waldgegend, neben einer jungen Frau sitzend, würdest Du Dich ganz gut ausgenommen haben, aber nun hast Du alles darangewandt, um ein unzusammenhängender philosophischer Narr zu werden. (47)

Lovell himself comes to realise the truth of this, and to regret the wasted years in which he had sought "das Fremdartige, Fernliegende" while failing to develop properly:

Es war nicht meine Bestimmung, die Menschen kennen zu lernen und sie zu meistern, ich ging über ein Studium zu Grunde, das die höheren Geister nur noch mehr erhebt. Ich hatte mich daran gewöhnen sollen, auch in Thorheiten und Albernheiten das Gute zu finden, nicht scharf zu tadeln und zu verachten, sondern mich selbst zu bessern. (48)

This is a true recantation, for he now recognises that there may be "höhere Geister" but that he is not one. The task of self-improvement was foreshadowed in the remarks of Eduard Burton, and Lovell has added the idea of natural development to it. We shall shortly see that this idea is emphasised in the portrayal of Waterloo.

Balder develops differently. If Karl Wilmont and Eduard Burton are the 'control', Balder is, to coin a term, the 'uncontrol'. Where Lovell recoils after his "Egoist" poem with "Ich breche ab", Balder goes on to madness - not in egoism or delusion, but because he has nothing with which to delude himself. In other words, since he recognises the power of egoism he cannot take refuge in it. He compares the world to a puppet-show, and finds it acutely depressing that people should be set in motion without even knowing and even while they proclaim the independence of their thoughts and feelings. (49)
His comparison, particularly his reference to "das verächtliche Spiel der Maschinen", suggests self-disgust at the selfknowledge gained from some earlier experience - probably the real or apparent loss of will before the force of passions - and his advice, frantic in tone, moral in purpose, to Lovell also implies this:

Ich sehe in Deiner neuen Liebe nichts, als Sinnlichkeit ... taufe Deinen Sinnenrausch nicht mit dem Namen Liebe, Du beleidigst diese hohe Gottheit ... (50)

This mood grows into an obsession with decay (possibly induced by an analogy he implies between biological decay and life on the one hand and sexual passion and love on the other). When Lovell, trying to cheer him up, refers to the beauty of nature, Balder replies (in a manner reminiscent of Franz von Moor(51) and the lunatic Leopold(52) in Waldeinsamkeit):

Und alles stirbt und verwes't; - vergissest du, daß wir über Leichen von Millionen mannichfaltiger Geschöpfe gehn, - daß die Pracht der Natur ihren Stoff aus dem Moder nimmt - daß sie nichts als eine verkleidete Verwesung ist? (53)

This "knowledge" (which he seems to equate with "Vernunft") has made him mentally unstable: all basic assumptions have been destroyed, and nothing replaces them. He wonders if he would be happier mad. (54) He eventually ceases to use his reason and becomes a hermit who talks to plants. (55) This particular obsession symbolises his change, for there could be no more apt self-contradiction on the part of a man who had previously regarded all life as composed of decay. From the near-madness caused by uncontrolled reason, he passes, as escape, to harmless irrationality. This artificial idyll is the natural
consequence of his previous unbearable intensity. (56)

The character who most closely resembles Lovell is Andrea Cosima (Waterloo). Tieck's portrayal of him points to the same crucial rôle of love as a catalyst to maturity, and carries a similar implication that a traumatic deprivation of a beloved brings about a state of arrested development and initiates a digressive path through life. From an isolated childhood and youth, during which he comes to know the world through books and is obsessed with an intense and egocentric religiosity, he passes to "Enthusiasmus", an obviously adolescent state of mind consisting of extreme and undiscriminating receptivity to impressions and violent emotional conditions. At that period he overrates his own powers, underrates everybody else's, and regards the world as an exclusive personal field of action. His first love is unrequited, and his initial reaction of melancholy and of envy of others is followed by devotion to abstract ideals. This, unfortunately, brings forth mockery and impatience from his elders, causing him to despise both others and himself. A life of sensual pleasures follows, both as consolation and as antidote. After a period of extreme poverty, caused by profligacy and remedied by a combination of good luck and opportunism, he feels his knowledge of people to be complete. He sees a choice between leaving society and remaining within it: and, if the latter, a further choice between being ruled by others and ruling them. People are, in his view, ruled by discovering and exploiting their character-weaknesses, prominent among which are vanity, insincerity and gullibility. In short,
he regards them as simply material for deceitful manipulation.  

It is possible that Tieck's reading of Richard III suggested certain of Waterloo's chief characteristics. Richard, he writes, recognizes only superior intelligence ("Verstand") as a criterion; he is a schemer without passion or moral standards. Intelligence is a virtue, stupidity a vice. Morals are merely an inhibition to "Verstand". He studies the weaknesses and passions of others in order to exploit them for his own ends. He cannot recognise virtue in others, only weakness or cupidity. Our regard for him is, in Tieck's view, based on recognition that such monstrous villainy is a sign of "Seelengröße" and by the "Illusion" which makes the spectator share his passions and therefore condone his actions. This analysis - the admiration of monstrous villainy and the cynical exploitation of human weaknesses by a dispassionate manipulator - is close to that of Waterloo, except that as a novelist Tieck saw that Waterloo needed a biographical cause of his depravity.

As might be said of Lovell, Waterloo's greatest deceit is of himself. In the final section ("Einige Worte über mich selbst") of his "Testament" is revealed the ambivalence of a man both at the mercy of his temperament and able consciously to exploit it, a man to whom, after a lifetime's immersion in cynicism, even his own individuality evades definition:

Und wer bin ich denn? ... Bin ich denn ein so großer Thor, daß ich alles für wahr halte, was ich gesagt habe? Ich kann es von mir selbst nicht glauben. ... Ich habe mich auch in manchen Stunden für etwas recht Besonderes gehalten - und was bin ich denn wirklich? War es nicht sehr nährisch, mich ununterbrochen mit abenteuerlichen Spielwerken zu beschäftigen, indes ich in guter Ruhe
hätte essen und trinken können? Ich freute mich sehr, das Haupt einer geheimen, unsichtbaren Räuberbande zu sein, ein Gespenst zu spielen, und andre Gespenster herbeizurufen, die ganze Welt zum Narren zu haben, und jetzt fällt mir die Frage ein, ob ich mich bei dieser Bemühung nicht selber zum größten Narren gemacht habe ... Wer ist das seltsame Ich, das sich so mit mir selber herumzankt? (59)

At approximately the same time, his chief disciples see beneath his facade. Adriano and Francesco discern "eine gewisse Unvollendung" in Waterloo; he is "die Skizze zu einer kolossalen Figur, aber die Vollendung, die Vertheilung des Lichtes und Schattens fehlt ihm gänzlich". (60) To this concept of "incompleteness" Francesco adds the idea (which may be the same as Adriano's "light and shade") that Waterloo may be out of equilibrium. Everyone, he writes, has a strange contradictory element in him: "etwas ... , das wahrhaftig nicht im mindesten mit seinem ordinären, sogenannten Verstande zusammenhängt". This dualism he regards as normal - "wir Übrigen stehen am Kreuzwege zwischen einem Heiligen und einem Wahnsinnigen" - and the emphasis of one element at the expense of its opposite as abnormal. (61)

The cause of the state of unbalance noted by Francesco and the "incompleteness" noted by Adriano is early deprivation of self-fulfilment in love. They do not specify this as the cause, for they are unaware of it. It is Waterloo himself, when introducing his section "Melancholie", who provides the explanation. Early love, he writes, is an experience which lasts a lifetime; it is the key to other joys and an anchor-point for the development of virtue. (62) Clearly he feels that his whole
life has taken a wrong turning. He dwells regretfully on the probability of his having enjoyed mundane pleasures in old age, eating and drinking "in guter Ruhe". (63)

William Lovell may be regarded as primarily an examination of the effect upon the personality of unfulfilled love. The deprivation brings about a disturbance of normal development by unleashing the assertive and unbridled side of the character as a means of salving wounded vanity. The condition thereby created is shown to be in one sense a form of unbalance, in another sense a form of incompleteness: destruction of equilibrium causes arrested development. The inference is that the people affected have an alternative character to which they might, given the time and propitious circumstances, revert (an idea not unlike Shakespeare's analysis of his father's character, (64) and the experiences of Leonhard and Elsheim in Der junge Tischlermeister). (65) Contemporary philosophy, often partly misunderstood, exacerbates the condition, and since a defective education and immersion in cheap literature have created fertile conditions for these influences, the loss of a beloved is a spark to a powder-keg. A comparison between these conclusions and Tieck's own view shows that he was unaware in 1823 and 1828 of what he had really written in the mid-1790s.

The foregoing analysis also shows that the work has many roots in Tieck's early writings and concurrent study of Shakespeare.

Both the content of the work and its relations with its predecessors have been generally misunderstood by critics. Haym, looking back to Abdallah, and apparently unaware of the
importance of love, or loss of it, in both works, regards Lovell as merely "ein erweiterter Abdallah", different only in that the supernatural element is partly discarded, partly absorbed in the manipulations by Waterloo.\(^{66}\) Wüstling describes the symptoms, and he, too, fails to identify the causes when he concludes that Lovell "dachte zu viel und fühlte zu stark und war zu wenig tätig".\(^{67}\) Schneider realises the crucial rôle of the loss of Amalie in creating the motive of revenge for wounded self-esteem, but ignores the social and philosophical influences to which the trauma made him vulnerable.\(^{68}\) Trainer does not connect the extremes of feeling and the arrogance in Lovell with his upbringing.\(^{69}\) Weigand regards Mortimer as simply a philistine.\(^{70}\) He rejects Haym's view that he is important as Tieck's mouthpiece\(^ {71}\) and Wüstling's less extreme view to that general effect,\(^ {72}\) and gives as his reason that Tieck would not have given such an important rôle to a subsidiary character. However, while Tieck sometimes did that, as a defect, the real point here is that Tieck was being objective by allowing Lovell to act in his own way while others acted in theirs: the "control-group" theory solves the problem. Weigand also fails to understand Waterloo, labelling him "ein innerlich leerer Machtmensch".\(^ {73}\) He does not realise that Waterloo's origins are similar to Lovell's - the loss of a beloved and a bad upbringing have warped his outlook - and therefore fails to see that Waterloo is what Lovell was set fair to become.

Perhaps the best illustration of Tieck's achievement is
derived from a comparison between his novel and Rééatif de la Bretonne's *Le paysan perverti* upon which it was partly based. Tieck's originality in this matter has also been overlooked. Haym asserts that the French work exerted "allzuviel Einfluß" on Lovell, and that Tieck's contribution was limited, allegedly, to some trivial additions which he defines thus: "ein wenig - in der That sehr wenig - von der edleren Natur Werther's, ziemlich viel von den hypochondrischen Reflexionen und den Phantasie-erinnungen Tieck's: und der Lovell war fertig". However, apart from the curious judgment that Werther was "edel", our reception of Haym's views must inevitably be affected by the fact that he recounts the story of Lovell without mentioning his enforced loss of Amalia, his hostility to his father, his ruination by cheap literature, and the alternative standpoint of the normal characters regarded as a "control-group".

As for the resemblances to Rééatif's work, they seem to show that the influence was merely superficial. Jost notes a number of incidents in common, but finds that they do not constitute proof of plagiarism:

Ces sortes de parallèles, faciles à trouver dans des œuvres traitant de thèmes analogues, conduisent fréquemment à des conclusions douteuses.

On specific resemblances between scenes of seduction he is even more sceptical:

Les diverses tactiques à employer de part et d'autre sont, en effet, décrites des les premières pages du catechisme des corrupteurs...

Even the similarity of the plot is more apparent than real. There is a difference of social class, and (partly the same
point) Edmond's reading and upbringing have had little influence on his development during the action of the novel. Furthermore, Lovell is sent away through his father's whim, not through economic necessity; and Edmond's impulse is towards adultery, whereas Lovell's is, initially at least, to defy and hurt his father.

The closest resemblance is in the evil persuasion which the abbe Gaudet d'Arras (obviously the counterpart of Rosa) exercises on Edmond. He argues that good and evil have no meaning because the reason why people perform good deeds and the reason why other people perform evil deeds are one and the same: they want to. While Edmond's deprivation of his beloved has made him susceptible to this persuasion, there are none of the philosophical or psychological aspects which are crucial in Lovell's portrayal. Wüstling, perhaps making the same point in another way, finds that the French work shows no source for Lovell's imaginative side. Much of Lovell's conflict exists within him, even though there are external influences in the persons of Rosa and Waterloo. Réé is no equivalent of Waterloo, and this means that there is at least as much similarity to Abdallah, where Gaudet would correspond to Omar, the lucid, insidious, external persuader. Lovell is distinguished from Le paysan perverti by its greater intellectual content, as Jost concludes:

le véritable perverti, à la fin des deux romans, c'est Lovell, et non Edmond, si l'on croit que la perversion ne consiste pas simplement dans le goût du péché – ou les délices de la chair, mais dans l'habitude de violer les lois qui conditionnent l'ordre social.
The foregoing comparison of Lovell with its alleged source disproves the charge that Tieck's inspiration was of literary origin: the essentials were added by Tieck from his observation of human behaviour, from his knowledge of the preoccupations of his age, and from his knowledge that those preoccupations filled a void created by the absence of ideals and of the self-understanding those ideals would have brought.
C. **TIECK'S PORTRAYAL OF HIS CULTURAL MILIEU**

(1) **Herr von Fuchs**

In describing the cultural deficiencies of the Germany of his youth, which formed part of the background to the writing of *Lovell*, Tieck commented in 1813 on the weak condition of the art of literature in the early 1790s:

Selbst die Poesie, in welche das Gemüth sich hätten retten mögen, lag erstorben ... (1)

Doubt has already been cast on Tieck's claim, made in the same passage, to have written *Lovell* as a conscious reaction to prevailing conditions. That claim is suspect since it is a retrospective self-diagnosis which is at variance with the work itself. In contrast, Tieck's later assessment of his literary and intellectual environment (rather than his statement of intention with any particular work) is corroborated by the works he wrote at the time.

As noted in an earlier chapter, two of several factors which caused Lovell's tragedy were that he had been ruined by a bad education and indoctrination with trash-literature. The short stories which Tieck wrote in this period (for money, in response to Nicolai's invitation to contribute to the *Straufgedern*) are important, as will be shown in a later chapter, because they substantiate the impression given in *Lovell*. But it is first necessary to demonstrate that it is not an example of hypocrisy on Tieck's part that he wrote cheap fiction while disapproving of similar works by other writers. Tieck had already formulated the view of literature and society found in the stories and had expressed it in a play. That he
wished to commit himself publicly to this view is shown by the fact that he sought to make the play acceptable for performance by his deliberate avoidance of offence to moral convention. (3)

This play, dating from 1793, is an adaptation of Ben Jonson's *Volpone*, and is usually known as *Herr von Fuchs*. (4) Tieck preserved the twin bases of Jonson's play - love of gold and love of deception, fused together as love of power - though he added to them. Gold is Fuchs's substitute for love, and so also is his love of deception. (5) In the latter aspect he has obvious similarities with Waterloo, whose character Tieck was presumably conceiving at this time, and other similarities with Tieck's description in 1793 of Richard III's character. (6)

(There is also an interesting adumbration of Christian of Runenberg and Balthasar of *Der Alte vom Berge*, when Fuchs, asserting that he has done no evil with the money, implies that the evil derives from the gold's inherent dynamic force.) (7)

However, the chief alteration is in the replacement of the subsidiary characters Sir Politic Would-be and Lady Would-be by Murner and Madam Murner. In other words, instead of an English "milord" with absurd schemes and pretensions to knowledge and influence, married to a garrulous pedant, we have a scholarly and literary couple from Germany, who provide Tieck with the opportunity to criticise contemporary ideas.

Murner is collecting information for a travelogue, and notes down, as important, innumerable trivial facts without any descriptions of what he has seen. (8) He implies that his guiding principle is utilitarianism. Most books, he declares,
should be burned, and most libraries closed down, though he
would preserve "die Reisebeschreibungen und andere nutzbare
Werke, die eigentlich praktischen Bücher". \(^{(9)}\) They may, he
concedes, send readers to sleep, but it is more creditable to
fall asleep over a travelogue than over *Werther*, for
travelogues are part of the Aufklärung and of the century's
march of progress. \(^{(10)}\) But Murner is a fraud, even as a
Gradgrind, for he changes his descriptions to make them more
acceptable to his readers. A well-informed tailor he turns into
a Polish aristocrat, and Birnam (a merchant's son who takes the
part assigned to Peregrine in Jonson) into an English lord with
secret commissions from the court. Murner hopes that a reviewer
will accuse him of falsehood so that he will be able to counter¬
attack in a supplementary article. The best entertainment of
all, if it can only be arranged, is to see a usually calm,
urbane, learned man roused to vulgar fury by the exercise of
vituperation, or, as Murner terms it, "Schriftstellerrecht".
Certainly a bad reputation improves circulation and profits. \(^{(11)}\)

Murner as a true Aufklärer (in Tieck's pejorative usage)
has a number of interests and projects connected with education. \(^{(12)}\)
He agrees with Birnam's suggestion (meant as sarcasm, but not
understood by Murner to be such) that wigs should be banned and
short hair made compulsory. But first of all, he believes, all
universities and schools where "die Alten" predominate must be
closed down. Such is his allusive imprecision that it is
impossible to be sure whether he means classical learning itself
or standards derived from analytical study of previous
achievement. Whichever he means he is, at any rate, sure that they are "Worte ohne Sinn", whereas, in his view, "der geistreiche Mensch muß sich befließigen, Sinn ohne Worte zu haben". (13) One might think this an isolated exaggeration, but it is evidently to apply to music, art, and philosophy. Instead, we are to rely on "Ein starkes Gefühl in einer Wissenschaft" and "der grade Menschenverstand, den jeder mit auf die Welt bringt". (14) Tieck's criticism of people who claim to have ability but never feel the need to prove it appears also in the correspondence with Wackenroder, in Lovell, and in the Herzenserregungen, (15) so it is important to note his derogatory reference to it in the present work as an attribute of the Aufklärung. (16)

Murner's intention to ban philosophy need not surprise us: rigorous analytic thought is beyond his comprehension, and may lead to unacceptable conclusions. Poets ("unnütze Müßiggänger") will suffer the same fate. (17) Theatres will be converted into centres for athletics and gymnastics: "Da würd' ich mir ein Volk erziehen!" (18) (Perhaps their strength will come from joy; the supremacy of health and fitness over intelligence, and the compulsory exercising of the young are advocated in Mein Kampf.) (19) Libraries will contain only "das wirklich Nutzbare und Praktische". (20) All art collections will be burned: "Man sehe die Bäume und Berge an, wie sie sind, und nicht wie sie sein könnten; der Mensch muß nicht klüger sein wollen, als sein Schöpfer". (21)

This summing up is a mixture of the repugnant and the ridiculous. In this Aufklärung of his, youth will learn running
and jumping instead of Latin and Greek, and schoolteachers will be ranked according to the height they can leap, instead of having scholars who cannot even stand on one leg. Those with no skill in a practical trade will be sent to the workhouse as vagrants. Priests will not wear distinctive clothing, and will speak not from the pulpit but from the body of the congregation; perhaps, as an alternative, members of the congregation will join him in the pulpit. Women using make-up will be branded.

This nonsensical list of bees in his bonnet shows reformist zeal based on misconceived morality. In one way the nearest equivalent is Muscular Christianity—puritanical, prudish, philistine and obsessed with physical fitness. Added to it is a fierce egalitarianism. In both matters his mind is clouded by ideological bigotry. He is, however, convinced that the fulfilment of his projects would be a great contribution to the enlightenment of the century. That he is not a monarch is, in his view, a misfortune for a large part of Europe. (23) He formerly held republican views, in the belief that reforms are encouraged in a republic. But the example of France changed his mind, for after four years of revolutionary government the old ways still prevail: learned tomes, poems and novels have not yet been cast into the sea; various restricting under-garments, items of headgear, cradles, swaddling-clothes have not yet been burned: "heißt das eine Revolution?" (24) Obviously he would, if permitted, impose his views on the population.

Madam Murner's chief function is to provide more information about contemporary literary taste. Her doctor
prescribed, as a cure for insomnia, the avoidance of reading and of thinking. As a dilettante bore with no critical discrimination she must be allowed to speak for herself:

Kotzebue, Göthe, Schiller, Meißner, Wieland, Klopstock, - welche Namen! (25)

Perhaps one should modify the imputation by observing the lady's epigrammatic assessment:

Klopstock, der erste epische Dichter; Schiller, nur etwas zu gespitzt; Göthe, zu affektirt; Kotzebue ist mein Lieblingsdichter, - da sieht man die reizende nackte Natur, - bisweilen etwas zu shakespeareisch, aber das wird sich noch geben. (26)

Reference was made earlier to Tieck's contributions to the Straußfedern. While few authors will disdain the writing of potboilers if the alternative is a cold pot - Tieck was no exception - the foregoing analysis of Herr von Fuchs shows a degree of self-commitment to an attack on public standards which makes one at least willing to take his short popular works seriously unless there is evidence to the contrary. Closer examination of them shows them to be covert satire.

(2) The "Straußfedern" stories

It has been suggested in the discussion of Herr von Fuchs that these stories are important for their denigration of contemporary trends: as soon as we concede that Tieck's financial motive did not necessarily preclude his adoption of an aesthetic criterion, their serious purpose becomes obvious. He shows in some stories how Man's endeavours are futile either because the result is predestined or because Man is in an unheeding universe. (27) Sometimes the futility is comic (28) and
sometimes tragic\(^{(29)}\) and in either case the crucial factor is Man's delusion that he is the centre of cosmic attention or has the power to influence events. Strong emotion is shown to be destructive, and the only positive force is the squalid and unscrupulous manipulation of others for personal advantage.\(^{(30)}\)

These features are, Tieck insists, found in the specific circumstances of the Aufklärung (in the form in which he knew it).\(^{(31)}\) It is difficult to evade these findings as a general interpretation of the Straupfedern stories because they have such strong links with the major works.

In treating these stories as serious works we should not overlook Tieck's ability to amuse. Many of them provide a rogues'-gallery of a pseudo-Enlightenment and its social context, all of which Tieck interpreted rather broadly to include intellectual arrogance and sentimentality. Of particular merit is the sustained comic description of Ulrich's incompetent attempts through mishap after mishap to arrive at a tryst in what he believes to be a suitable state of stylish elegance.\(^{(32)}\)

However, our present study will be confined to two stories: Die beiden merkwürdigsten Tage aus Siegmunds Leben and Die Freunde.

The first of these describes people who have no ideal except the conviction that the rest of society exists to be manipulated, whether by trickery, by the exploitation of sexual attractiveness, or by the exploitation of a monopoly.\(^{(33)}\) It is this feature which forges a link with the Lovell-types; and a woman's use of beauty as a weapon is a theme found throughout Tieck's works.\(^{(34)}\) But our chief conclusion must be that these
kinds of people hold, or are produced by, negative beliefs, by unawareness of the true ideals. To the extent that this means that beliefs, including negative ones, are produced by their society, which collectively has no ideal, we have a link with, on the one hand, Alla-Moddin's view that religion is a product of time and place, and, on the other hand, the mechanistic concept of society to be revealed in our consideration of Peter Lebrecht.

The story Die Freunde (1797) seems at first sight to be a corrective to the distasteful impression created by Siegmund. But closer examination shows that it supports it: in these supposedly light stories is a statement of unrelieved despair. Ludwig Wandel dreams that he is in a realm of magic beauty, and that he is disappointed by one discovery: he had supposed it to be permeated with the joys of love and friendship, for these are regarded as earthly life's transitory glimpses of the highest ideals, and ought, therefore, to be permanent and outstanding characteristics of the ideal world. But complete truth annihilates them:

es gibt keine Freundschaft, es gibt keine Liebe, hier nicht, wo alle Täuschung niedergült. (36)

So he wishes to return to earthly life:

zu unserer lieben, lieben Erde zurück, wo wir uns unter täuschenden Formen wieder erkennen, wo es den Aberglauben der Freundschaft gibt. (37)

The fairies are merely "Erdichtungen", responsible for unhappiness by making mortals discontented with earthly standards. (38) This is not a reaffirmation of the world of ordinary relationships and acceptance of human nature with all
its imperfections, for it is inspired not by toleration, but by horror at the knowledge of reality. The deception and self-interest of ordinary life are strongly emphasised: in the dream, Ludwig does not recognise his friend, because the man he knew is unlike the real one he now sees. As the friend explains:

weil du mich heut zum erstenmal in meiner wahren Gestalt siehst; bisher fandest du nur Dich selber in mir wieder. (59)

So these ideals, we are being told, are the product of the mind, and have no objective validity. The fact that we want them to exist does not make them exist, but we can accept the delusion and delude ourselves, if we wish, as the quid pro quo of contentment. The basic idea is Kant's theory of perception, already noted in relation to morals in Lovell, and now applied to human relations. Siegmund, Tieck seems to say, was right; odious, but right. So the cynicism which the maturing Lovell condemned in himself had been a recognition of the truth, his return to "normal" life a betrayal: a betrayal made necessary because the beauty perceived by creative insight is unbearable in its difference from familiar beauty. The evasion must be accepted, Ludwig finds, if sanity is to be preserved. Tieck attempted throughout his life to deny this (consider, for example, Peter Lebrecht and Der junge Tischlermeister) and to establish instead the equation of beauty, creativity and social reality, but the outcome was not always convincing.

(3) Peter Lebrecht

As we have seen, the contributions to the Straußfedern consist largely of criticism of cheap literature and of the
society which valued it; and they point to pessimistic conclusions. The stories cover the years 1795-98, during which Tieck, apart from writing Lovell (1795-96), Eckbert (1796) Kater (1797), Bernack (1795), Die verkehrte Welt (1797) and others, not to mention scholarly interests and plans for other works, also wrote a work more obviously related to the short stories, namely Peter Lebrecht (1795-96).

This work seems to have its roots in Tieck's growth of self-confidence as a free-lance writer as he worked on the Straußfedern stories. He began overt criticism of his readership by ironically supplying what was wanted:

Es [das Werkchen] sprach freilich die mittlere Bildung vieler Menschen, die leichte Aufklärung, den mäßigen Spas [sic] und die sanfte Satire aus, die man verstand und billigte. (40)

So the context provided by the Straußfedern is ambiguous. On the one hand, there is the fact that Die Freunde is later (1797), with its reiteration of Lovell's early view, or fear, that ideals have no objective reality, being the products of the beholder's mind. On the other hand, the despair of Die Freunde is followed by the levity of Die Theegesellschaft, Ein Tagebuch and Abraham Tonelli.

As in the short stories, so in Lebrecht, bad literature partly expresses and partly causes social ills. The work continues the good-humoured satire on society and its taste which we have already encountered in the Straußfedern stories. Some of this satire is oblique, in that Lebrecht himself, as narrator, inadvertently supplies evidence which we take to be satire on
him. This technique of allowing a character to portray himself unawares is found throughout Tieck's output; it is implicit in his lifelong interest in drama, in his selection of the epistolary form of Lovell, and in the importance of dialogue in his novella-theory. In the satire on society and on Lebrecht the question of free will is again raised in relation to society and individuals who have been induced to accept society's forms and characteristics as universals. Finally, Tieck suggests alternative ideals to those he denigrates.

The work begins with gentle mockery of the stereotyped horror-novel, a subject to which there are references later in the narrative. Lebrecht points out that, as his sub-title implies, there are no "Abentheuerlichkeiten" in real life, and he finds the literary conventions of horror and perpetual surprise self-defeating. Most literature is, in his view, of poor intellectual quality, and he believes that this is attributable to the low level of attainment found in the reading-public.

An author must, he writes, be humble and submissive to his public: he must supply what is wanted by gratifying their prejudices and levelling down to their intellectual limitations. Readers must not be expected to remember what happened earlier in the work or to collate it with what happens later. The author can describe virtually the same events using virtually identical words and phrases. Indeed, if the public had a memory they would soon become bored. They would then wish to read of events previously unknown to them, described by methods
previously unused, and would prefer books of merit and originality instead of meretricious repetitions of bad books. Knowing his public, Lebrecht promises that Part II will have no connection with Part I. Later he writes that readers lack poetic insight and that their inner boredom causes them to be bored by things around them. (He advocates a different attitude towards the ordinary world, and this constructive idea, which follows from his criticism of deficiencies, is considered below.) They seek interest in what has as little as possible to do with their own lives, and they read of distant places, badly connected incidents, strange beings which are neither original nor plausible, and gruesome crimes. Such phenomena have become the norm, so that the writer who wishes to affect his public must exaggerate still further.

Social injustice in contemporary Germany is mentioned almost casually as a backdrop to life in Peter Lebrecht, and the casualness makes it all the more alarming. The Präsident has the power to appoint the Bürgermeister, and it is only his support which leads to Lebrecht's success in a legal action he raises to recover money due to him from his father's estate. Personal ability and consideration of justice - even consideration of law - were unimportant. Staghunters trample crops which would have fed six peasant families. Poverty and oppression are themselves the cause of much crime; the criminals are punished and the rich oppressors are praised. This society admires the uncouth "deutscher Biedermann" (whom Lebrecht describes in some detail).
Lebrecht holds the view that human life consists chiefly of unthinking ritual, a stereotype in its tastes, customs, manners and ideas. Even its demand for entertainment is, he has maintained, best satisfied by a standardised and mass-produced pseudo-strangeness. Society, being a ritual of "Stand", "Trivialroman", "Komplimente", with little or no intercommunication otherwise, is incapable of self-knowledge. Therefore it sees neither the evils nor the delights which are integral parts of itself. In other words, we are shown a world with both its social structure and its mind nearly in suspension, like a machine incapable of change, ticking over in perpetuity. This gloomy picture is relieved by two potentialities. First, there is - implied by the hero's name, and specified on occasions - instinctive moral goodness (although one could raise the objection that this, too, is no more than blind instinct). Possibly this aspect shows the influence of Kant's solution of a moral insight into the noumenal world; but, as we shall see, Lebrecht's advocacy of anything is undermined by the way Tieck characterises him. Secondly - and subject to the same qualification - there is understanding of what Lebrecht calls the poetry and prose of life. (The use of literary terms reminds us that this is an antithesis to the low-quality literature.)

The correct attitude to life and literature, Lebrecht argues, is to accept the poetry and prose as inseparable, to perceive their essential unity and to avoid emphasising either at the expense of the other. One's immediate
environment should be perceived in that spirit: one should be aware of its ordinariness but also of what is wonderful in it. One should neither shun that which is near, in the mistaken belief that wonder is found only in what is distant, nor become blinkered so as to see and value only what is near. In other words, it does not follow that what is near is automatically 'prose' or what is far is automatically 'poetry'. Therefore, one rejects religious mania, for good is 'near', that is to say in normal conditions of mind, not in strange frenzied states; one rejects ritualised verbiage used for social communication, since straightforward expression is better; superficial quickness of mind is not to be taken as evidence of intellectual power; horror-novels are not 'wonderful', but daily life can be so. In these ways the proper understanding of 'poetry' and 'prose' is a proper understanding of life itself, and is the way out of the mechanistic view of the world into which people are otherwise trapped.

But the vital point is also made, though not developed, that beneath this superficial Germany is the real one which has remained unnoticed. On returning to Germany after foreign travel, Lebrecht finds his country improved, like an old garment taken out again. He means that his view is now better, not that Germany itself has changed. He remarks how we find that what is closest to us seems ordinary and boring, so that we seek delight in what is remote. We try, mistakenly, to become familiar with what is strange, but we should try instead to see what is close to us as though it were remote, to obtain
instruction and delight by looking at it afresh:

Das wunderbare Utopien liegt oft dicht vor unseren Füßen, aber wir seh'n mit unsern Teleskopen darüber hinweg. (56)

This work is, however, less reliable as raw material than is often supposed. Our problem is Lebrecht's character, for he is shown to be a man too full of prejudices (albeit not malicious ones) to be able to think clearly all the time. He has, it is true, redeeming features. If, sometimes, his feelings result in behaviour more sensible than his ratiocination, it is because his instincts are kind and humane. And he is capable of bouts of analytical thinking, even though he lapses into his old unthinking ways in specific relationships with people. To some extent he perceives the true nature of the society which produced him: so, as he portrays it and inadvertently portrays himself, he allows us to build up, partly by inference, a picture of his milieu and of the effect it has on him and on others. But interpretation is made difficult because Lebrecht's simplicity and guilelessness are partly an affectation which is itself the target of Tieck's satire. Despite Lebrecht's strictures against cheap novels, he reflects on how best to base a novel on the arrival of "der Unbekannte", and he is easily deceived by the latter's melodramatic falsehoods. Lebrecht's idea of a balanced attitude shares, in common with what he censures, the same potential danger: it can be carried too far, so that it becomes a form of sentimentality or self-deception. He realises, when theorising, that not everything 'near' is necessarily 'poetry', and that some
'poetry' may lie elsewhere. But he entertains some silly ideas on Nature (59) (often found amongst urban dwellers), has a sentimental view of Shakespeare, (60) and chooses a wife by imputing qualities of mind and character which he romantically believes to be inseparable from her appearance. (61) So while this work can be made to seem important in a scheme of ideas, we cannot take it at face value once we realise how unsystematic Tieck's treatment of him was. Lebrecht is sometimes a mouthpiece and sometimes a target of satire - a confusion of purposes which similarly detracts from the value of Ein Tagebuch (1798).

We must therefore conclude that Lebrecht's advocacy of these ideals is unconvincing, and that Tieck made it so (whether consciously or otherwise): Lebrecht's limitations must inevitably deny him access to the truth. The despair of Lovell and the Straufgedern stories stands unrelied. The view of literature presented in Sommernacht is, to that extent, superseded by the view implicit in the failure of Lebrecht. It will be seen that the theory of poetry presented in Phantasus (with its obvious roots in Lebrecht) is similarly inapplicable because of the failure of the work concerned, and that the Shakespeare novellas (Kenelworth and Dichterleben) tend to substantiate a pessimistic view. (62)

(4) Some "VolksamMrenchen"

Consideration of the works of the late 1790s is made difficult by problems of classification. There is the collection of VolksamMrenchen, which have the apparently unifying characteristic that they were ascribed to the fictive
editorship of Peter Lebrecht. Even though this was a suggestion of the younger Nicolai (64) and may therefore have been to some extent motivated financially, nonetheless, Lebrecht cannot be completely disregarded as a factor in assessing and interpreting the stories, if only for the reason that Tieck can hardly have put the idea out of his mind when writing. Indeed, his exploitation of the constraint imposed by the Straufsfedern suggests that he would have done the same with the Volksmùrchen, namely used them as a covert attack upon current mores, and not least upon the ethos of the business interest which gave him the commission. We should also bear in mind that the works which use the past as a milieu, whether in Volksmùrchen or not, are a feature of these years, and the period is not really long enough for us to expect a clear line of development chronologically or of demarcation between those which are included in the Volksmùrchen and those which are not. This makes it likely that Lebrecht's ideas are a key, if not the key, to the stories.

A sequence of ideas is discernible from a consideration of the position of Lebrecht in relation to other works. Lebrecht's main themes are: that there is real beauty and real tension in the everyday, and a real Germany unnoticed, while people expect beauty and excitement to be found only in geographically or historically remote settings; that society is often unjust; that social convention and various forms of inadvertent indoctrination can reduce life to a mechanical level. These ideas are expressed in the work chiefly by means of criticism of meretricious literature and by a wider criticism of the
society which values it. There is therefore a linear descent: the Straußfedern, with themes from contemporary Germany, gave rise to Lebrecht in which Lebrecht announces his discovery of reality but also demonstrates that his own view is, unknown to him, distorted by his own defects (in Kantian vein, since he cannot apprehend anything otherwise). If his character has any effect on 'his' stories, it must be to ensure that he perceives, and conveys to his readers, only what he is capable of perceiving. If that is true, the Volksmärchen would not be historically accurate, but would deal with present-day subject-matter in a märchenhaft context; they would provide a scope for treatment of themes which would be incongruous in the prosaic present, and so would release the imagination into a new sphere of action.

That, in essence, is their purpose: in a world that never was - because it is a figment of Lebrecht's imagination - we read of things that people think and do in the world that is. The Straußfedern are the present shown by Tieck; Peter Lebrecht is the present seen through the present (that is, through Lebrecht); the Volksmärchen are the present transposed to the past. Tieck neither sought nor achieved historical verisimilitude. If this is to be cited against him it would at least be consistent to reject, say, King Lear as an inaccurate picture of Celtic Britain.

There are, however, two reasons for not preserving the identity and unity of Volksmärchen in our consideration of the works of the period. Firstly, Tieck was apparently so
unconvinced by their unity that he included Karl von Berneck, which was already in existence, redistributed some of them in Phantasus and included the rest separately in the Schriften, even to the extent of including the Sieben Weiber and Schildbürger as two of the four Arabesken in Volume IX. The unity of any group containing both Eckbert and Blaubart is suspect. Secondly, the stories in the collection have connections with other works of Tieck which are at least as strong as any connections within the group. Therefore, a subject-grouping for works of the period is indicated as the most appropriate method of consideration. (This is a classification of the works as wholes, not an extraction of motifs.)

Tieck wrote two introductions to the Volksmärchen, both of which refer to the poor quality of contemporary literature. The Ernsthafte Vorrede criticises its low standard and presents the present compilation to redress the balance. This sounds like a joke because of its immodesty, until one realises that it is perfectly sincere just as it stands. Then the Scherzhafte Vorrede, for people who disliked the serious one, recommends the world of the imagination as a solace from worldly cares. This sounds as though it could be taken seriously except that the works being introduced are not a solace; some are profoundly disturbing, even though the real world is not presented directly. Peter Lebrecht, of course, would be sincerely immodest and would not see the truth in the works he introduces. So these introductions ironise Lebrecht,
the contemporary man, while "he" ironises "his" reading public. The natural division for all subsequent works (in the period) set in the past or in Märchen is into those which deal with contemporary society in veiled form and those which deal with general questions in veiled form; the veil in either case being the past. The latter category, which consists of Genoveva, Eckbert, Runenberg, Melusine, Ritter Blaubart, Heymonskindcr, Magelone, and Eckart will be treated later.

It has been shown that before, during and after the writing of Lovell, Tieck held a consistent view of the environment against which Lovell, and through that novel Tieck himself, reacted. His presentation of this environment has taken two related forms: he has pointed out defects in contemporary literature and defects in society. These two aspects cannot be separated. A defective society admired meretricious literature and rejected the worthwhile sort; the meretricious tended to perpetuate the society which had summoned it into being because it disseminated the errors and affectations which were inseparable from society's defects. As shown previously, one of the causes of Lovell's downfall is his indoctrination by cheap literature; and the Straußfedern stories with their offshoot, Peter Lebrecht, treat this theme in a more lighthearted way. This line of development is continued in the later 1790s - the VolksMärchen period - by Schildbürger and Sieben Weiber, in which the attack on the present is made in the disguises of a chronicle and a mediaeval tale. These two works will be considered below.
Thereafter, attention will be given to the corollary of Tieck's criticisms: good literature, being equated variously with philosophic or religious truth, and these being equated with beauty, therefore became the antithesis of a defective society. The subversive aspect of literature will be seen to be important in, for example, *Hanswurst als Emigrant*, *Kater*, *Zerbino* and *Die verkehrte Welt*. These works naturally include a considerable body of social criticism as background, and therefore are best regarded as developments of the first category. Some subversive ideas will also be noted in *Heymonskinder*.

The position of the poets - the practitioners of this potentially subversive art - is difficult. They are usually regarded as seditious or mad, or both (which, from the viewpoint of authority or the mass public, they may well be). It is shown that their difficulties may have several possible results, usually found in combinations. The gifted individual might over-react to isolation and become hostile and contemptuous towards the masses, or adopt a messianic attitude in the cause of art. This carries the danger of self-righteousness and over-assessment of one's own worth (as with the "Klosterbruder").(66)

There is also the danger of another form of over-reaction, namely that in a world of unrelievably prosaic life, any compromise or balance between the claims of daily life and the claims of beauty is impossible: so there is a temptation to break completely with normal life. This is one aspect of Eckart and Runenberg.(67) We should also note two important factors
which are easily forgotten: firstly, the individual concerned may not be sufficiently talented to warrant the action he takes (that he may not be talented at all is the warning of Sommernacht); and, secondly, Tieck was a writer of fiction, not a theoretician of aesthetics, and whenever he embodied these (and other) ideas in characters, a psychological aspect usually appears and assumes the more important rôle.

We come at this point to a review of the above three groups of works: the lighthearted presentation of present ills by the use of old tales (Schildbürger, Sieben Weiber and Tonelli); the antithesis (in the satirical comedies) between good and bad literature and the opposition between the former and a bad society; and the position of the poet.

Tieck's attack on intolerance and narrow-mindedness in the Denkwürdige Geschichtschronik der Schildbürger (1796) concerns mainly intellectual, cultural and literary questions. In emphasising this aspect, rather than the satire on parochial life to which the traditional tale is largely confined, it is therefore akin to Wieland's Geschichte der Abderiten (1774). This society of Schilda has a general belief in the power of the theatre and other arts to improve society - hence its moralising tendencies and the audience's assumption (though it is a non sequitur) that their own lives and aspirations constitute a definition of virtue. However, no signs of social improvement are discerned. And, despite their moralising, their instincts are quarrelsome, intolerant, and totalitarian.

Those are the aesthetic demands of the Berlin Aufklärung.
their purely intellectual, social and political ideas are of a similar standard. The inhabitants of Schilda deliberately set out to discredit themselves by feigning folly, in order to be relieved of responsibility; they think themselves very clever to have achieved the reputation of fools. Tieck remarks that the story is not an allegory; if one described the present as it is, that would be thought an allegory. He implies, therefore, that the actions of his contemporaries would seem sensible only if one credited them with an ulterior motive. But they really are fools without knowing it, for their long preoccupation with grandiose ideas has made them incompetent to run a parish. They take pleasure in the ease with which they carry out unnecessary tasks; they use sophistical arguments against common sense; they congratulate themselves for having discovered empirical data in support of what is self-evident; they are materialistic, bigoted and platitudinous in their view of the arts; and they are incapable of organised action. The young are indoctrinated into what their teachers understand to be the principles of enlightenment and republicanism, along with a variety of affectations, superficialities and shibboleths on antiquity, love, agnosticism and metaphysics; the pupils learn that the appearance of originality is achieved by expressing contempt for branches of learning one does not understand and for those people who do understand them. The "Schildbürger" eventually occupy influential positions in all public offices, in a variety of official institutions, in education and in the
The moral is that acceptance of current views is tantamount to a conscious decision for folly. The belief that one can choose to do this for a limited period is a delusion: the decision is usually irrevocable. Thus we have the fear presented in this work that Germany's ills are not remediable.

The next work in this group is Die Sieben Weiber des Blaubart. It consists mainly of a satire on the stereotyped techniques and subject-matter of contemporary popular literature. At certain points in the work Tieck mocks the popular "Ritterroman", particularly its conventional wild storms, its condemnation of jollity as vulgar, and the solemn and affected demands of its reading public. He also mocks the readers who discern meanings in fiction which the author did not intend. He now condemns those who demand a moral framework to literature but show no interest in morality in their daily lives.

Tieck's satire is, however, expressed mainly through a complicated network of relationships. Peter Berner and most other characters are in effect controlled by supernatural beings, Bernard and Almida, who are to be regarded as the authors whom Tieck ("L.T.", the fictive editor of the work) satirises. Bernard, a wizard, who attempts to guide Peter's fate and to provide variety and unity, is "der Vorläufer und Aufkündiger aller schlechten Schriftsteller". He finds Peter disappointingly unlike the ideal hero he seeks: he is not intelligent, he is not heroic, his character lacks interest, he has antagonised his protectress and thereby denied himself a
brilliant future, his blue beard is ridiculous, his constant warfare is petty and boring, his story is inconsequential and unedifying, his moral character is thoroughly reprehensible, and he has dabbled in magic of a childish and tasteless kind. (85) Bernard urges Peter to abduct Adelheid, with the intentions of making himself more interestingly romantic and of ingratiating himself with his estranged benefactress (who hates Almida, Adelheid's benefactress). But Peter fails in the attempt and declines to make another; he is not galvanised into action even by Bernard's furious threat that he, Peter, will be badly reviewed and will be loathed by posterity. (86)

Tieck is therefore telling us that people are not what cheap literature shows them to be. Berner will not be what Bernard tries to make him: he persists in being himself. He objects to Bernard's attempt to impose a neat pattern on his life, for he contends that life does not have the purposeful and connected aspect that Bernard tries to establish. (87)

The wives, too, are satires on fictional types, (88) and represent the kind of characters an author such as Bernard would produce; these ironised stereotypes obviously come from the same pen as the Straußfedern stories. Tieck adds a satire on scholarship: the Kobold offers Peter his services, for he can introduce ambiguities and scope for different interpretations, which will generate learned treatises about nothing. (89) Tieck is very intimidating sometimes.

Forthcoming consideration of the satirical comedies will show that they deal with two related themes: a criticism of
society generally by means of a more specific criticism of its taste in literature and intellectual matters is combined with a subsidiary theme of the relationship between the cultural environment and political power. It is therefore interesting to note the first combination of these themes in one of Tieck's invented (that is, non-traditional) fairy-tales, Leben des berühmten Kaisers Abraham Tonelli (1798). (90) In this work Tieck first reveals his ambivalence on the question of political power, which, to the limited extent of his interest in political matters in any case, remained unresolved for the rest of his life. He seems usually to have been immobilised as a political thinker by the fact that his dislike of autocracy and oppression was equal to his fear of what would happen if power resided with the untutored, coarse mass.

As Fink (91) points out, Tieck feigns insistence that his three comic "Märchen" are authentic: the story of Schilda is a "denkwürdige Chronik"; that of Bluebeard (in the Sieben Weiber) is a "wahre Familiengeschichte"; and that of Tonelli a spoof autobiography. Pseudo-realism becomes parody. Tonelli claims to uphold the truth above all else, (92) and with this assurance we disbelieve him. It is, however, difficult to define the general import of the work, because, despite Fink's claim that it has been unjustly neglected, (93) it has an important defect. Tieck falls between two stools in portraying the chief character: sometimes Tonelli is an ignorant, oppressed tailor's apprentice who, raised by chance to power, inadvertently exhibits the prejudices and limitations one should
expect to find; at other times he is far too articulate. This makes us doubt not only his account of his adventures but also whether we are indeed confronted by an ignorant tailor's lad at all. The neglect of the story as a work of literature is probably justified, but it is useful as a further indication of Tieck's beliefs and preoccupations at that time. Tieck's point is twofold: a society which produces such people by the million is defective; and such people are unfit for power. In other words, he censures both the rule of kings and the jacobin alternative. He was to return to this dual attitude in his plays.

5. The satirical comedies

Thus far, in the comic Märchen, Tieck has been content for the most part to continue his satire on society by satirising its taste and its literature. As noted, there is a political element in Tonelli, in which both the ruling class and the untutored mass are censured. We shall see how also in the comedies Tieck assumed a mid-position, often disapproving of oppression and elitism but equally repelled by the opposite extreme. Before proceeding to the main comedies, however, we must digress to consider two minor plays, because the technical devices used in them are used more successfully in the major ones. Thereafter, the central idea in our consideration of the comedies will be Tieck's elaboration of the antithesis between literature of quality and a defective society: which was the second of the three categories into which the works of the period are most appropriately divided. (94)

This antithesis is first stated in the play Hanswurst als
Emigrant, written in 1795 (during the Straußfedern period). Hanswurst represents a comic spirit which Tieck considered to have been absent from recent and contemporary Germany; through this figure he presents serious criticisms of German society and culture. The prologue implies, by its reference to marionettes, that people's individuality is assigned to them by society's expectations of them. The beginning of the play itself shows the contrast between the dull, stereotyped ordinariness of stock figures and creative originality, and shows how the latter can sometimes seem (when judged superficially) foolish by comparison with the received wisdom. In interesting adumbrations of later works, Hanswurst uses the image of leather substances to symbolise mediocrity (this is found much later in Die Vogelscheuche) and the image of a horse to symbolise the exploited lower classes (foreshadowing Heymonskinder and Des Lebens Überfluß). Hanswurst has returned to Germany to find himself supplanted by Gottsched and scholars (a further reminiscence of Die Vogelscheuche). The work as a whole is rather confused, but it is important both as a stage in the development of Tieck's ideas on society and literature and as the first example of his technique of a play-within-the-play, which is an important aspect of the satirical comedies.

The idea that a society gets the theatre it deserves, and that the theatre will reflect the inadequacies of society and its literature, is implicit in the short play Ein Prolog (1796). Scapin, in the prologue to Ein Prolog, comments that the madder one is,
the more original one is acclaimed to be. (103) The audience, who constitute the main cast of Tieck's play, are concerned at the possibility that they are waiting for nothing, but conclude that since they are waiting there must be something to wait for. (104) This conclusion, apart from indicating poor intelligence and a conviction that whatever they do must be reasonable, suggests that if there is a market for rubbish, rubbish will be supplied. Later the intellectual member of their group insists that they might be the products of the imagination of one of them. (105) This somewhat fruitless line of enquiry shows the partial absorption of current philosophical ideas being paraded as a pretence to learning; we should not assume that they wish to consider the nature of perception. The general import which we deduce is that real life as represented by the audience here exhibited is more absurd than the fiction they were waiting to see. There is an analogy with Peter Lebrecht's belief that strangeness is all around if we can but see it; (106) or with the remark in Schildbürger to the effect that a factual description of the present sounds like an allegory. (107) This work shows the satire of the Straußfedern stories brought to the stage. There is no play-within-the-play, so the confusion of Hanswurst als Emigrant is avoided. But the work is, also in consequence, static: in contrast to Kater, in which the technique of a scripted audience is used to provide contrast without confusion.

Der gestiefelte Kater

This is mainly a political satire - for the first time
Tieck explicitly rather than merely implicitly attacks society - but much of the satire (which has political connotations) is still conveyed by his representation of the rôle and status of literature in society. Unfortunately, Tieck's own comments on the play (in Theodor's introduction of it in Phantasmus and in Tieck's Vorbericht to the Schriften) misrepresent it as primarily an attack on the theatre from a literary viewpoint, and this view has persisted.

Gerald Gillespie regards the play as "an attack mainly against the theatre public itself"; but the biting political satire of the "Dichter"'s play and our inevitable inference from the behaviour of the scripted audience make this view inadequate. Later, Gillespie concedes that Tieck may have been disguising revolutionary ideas as harmless jokes in order to avoid incurring the hostility of the censor. This suggestion accords better with the facts. But we should remember that Tieck's strictures are divided between corrupt feudalism and boorish bourgeoisie, with the emphasis on the latter. The bourgeois audience, which ought at least to sympathise with the "Dichter"'s attack on a feudal aristocracy, rejects the play it is offered, preferring instead the trash it is used to. Realising this, the "Dichter" gives up in disgust ("O du undankbares Jahrhundert!")

Tieck's attack is not confined to the theatre-going public, because those we see merely represent society as a whole. A number of ideas are, we learn from the play by the "Dichter", in circulation, and their origin is in cheap literature:
example, the landlord resents not being given a gold piece when
the King speaks to him, for this is supposed to happen every time
according to stories. (112) Criticisms apply, directly or
indirectly, to the gamut of cultural and intellectual activity.
Leander, the court scholar, has no literary discrimination or
intellectual honesty. (113) Hanswurst, the court fool, comments
that his fellow-countrymen have come to abjure jest, and to make
his name into an insult, persecuting not only him but also those
who find him amusing; he is not ashamed of being German, merely
saddened at what German taste has become. (114) The members of
the audience to whom Tieck gives parts in his play (so that they
intervene in the play by the "Dichter") substantiate these
criticisms by their behaviour: they are unimaginative,
suspicious, pretentious, vulgar, intolerant, and stupid. Tieck's
use of a scripted audience therefore joins, as a strand of
development, the method of characterisation used in epistolary
or autobiographical fiction, such as Lovell or the
Herzensergießungen. A review of his audience's comments will
show that their behaviour and the play-within-the-play are
interrelated.

From the outset (in the prologue) they surmise that the
advertisement of a Kindermärchen with a talking, booted cat - all
of which they consider insulting - is either a device to attract
spectators or a symbol for the politically subversive leader of
a secret masonic group which will be overcome by the forces of
good at the end. (115) They fear that their refined taste will
be offended, (116) although their noisy insistence on a prompt
start and their constant interruptions, (117) with the low mentality suggested by them, make one wonder how that were possible. Indeed, they will not accept reality on the stage at all. The cat, ridiculing Gottlieb's hopes and expectations, remarks:

Wer wird denn so aus dem Stegreif glücklich sein wollen! Mein guter Mann, das kommt nur in Büchern vor, in der wirklichen Welt geht das nicht so geschwinde.

At this one of the public rejoins:

Nun hört nur, der Kater untersteht sich von der wirklichen Welt zu sprechen. (118)

This rejoinder perhaps demonstrates also Tieck's fear that the real audience is incapable of drawing the correct inference from an allegory. There are constant interruptions and squabbles of this sort, and peace is re-established only in Act II, Scene 2 (and only temporarily) by the effect of a stereotyped dialogue between two lovers having no connection whatever with the main action. (119) The political sense of such a public is unlikely to be acute, and that pessimistic view pervades the work.

The work as a whole gives an impression of near-hopelessness. The ruling rich indulge their whims and exploit the lower classes. (120) But their greed and bullying dovetail with a number of corresponding attributes in the peasantry. The peasant class is not only superstitious and ignorant - to which one might reasonably add that one could hardly expect it to be otherwise - but also, despite its grumbles, submissive. It is with no intended irony (on his part) that the landlord tells Lorenz that their ruler is a stern man called "Gesetz". (121)
And there is nothing of the smouldering revolutionary about Kunz when, mowing corn, he comments bitterly that "Gesetz" seems to take all their corn away instead of keeping order, and that all hardships imposed by "Gesetz" seem to be accompanied by an unconvincing claim that they are in the public interest.\(^{(122)}\)

The focal point of this bad system is, of course, the court, and even more particularly the King. The latter is an ignoramus who takes pleasure in the sound of large numbers and great distances,\(^{(123)}\) yet commands the obedience of a scholar (Leander) who defers to him even when he is wrong.\(^{(124)}\) Notwithstanding the hardship of the peasants, he gorges himself on rabbit, and justifies this by remarking that it is his duty to his subjects to be in a good mood.\(^{(125)}\) It is not within the range of his intellect that his mood should not affect them. Indeed, the rights of others do not occur to him: he orders a whisker to be torn from Hinze for examination by microscopy, and asks Hinze if he has any worthless relatives who resemble him and who could be dissected.\(^{(126)}\) Much of his deficiency is not brutality as such but isolation from the normal world; he is oblivious rather than cruel. His isolation has not only denied him factual knowledge— he has never seen the threshing of corn and is astounded to learn that bread is made from it\(^{(127)}\) — but has also affected his self-assessment. He is, in his \textit{Weltanschauung}, the centre of all things: the gift of the rabbit has to be recorded by the court historiographer,\(^{(128)}\) and he resents being told of the antipodal concept, since it is others who must be antipodal to him rather than a matter of
where one happens to be. (129) The King is a symbol of the corrupt aristocracy, and their corruption lies in their exemption, and consequent isolation, from the constraints of reality.

The rich, the peasantry, and the court provide circumstances which may readily be manipulated by the enterprising and unscrupulous cat Hinze: the opportunist comes into his own amidst injustice and disorganisation. Hinze despises gullibility and weakness, but takes advantage of them in a manner appropriate to where he finds them; his usual weapons are mock-servility (which his stupid victim takes for the real thing) and brazen effrontery. (130) He is the parvenu, the self-made man without scruple or loyalty to any code. His personality is shot through with independence, and he speaks up for human rights: but mainly when his own are threatened. The "Völkerrecht" he defends against the King is actually his own right not to have his whisker torn out to gratify the King's curiosity about it. (131)

It is probable that Tieck doubted whether his contemporaries would accept this attack in such uncompromising terms, and therefore obscured it by a harmless fairy-tale which goes wrong in performance. The scripted audience represents contemporary unawareness. The Hanswurst emphasises this when he says that people no longer appreciate jest (132) - from which we infer that they are in danger of missing the point of the play by the "Dichter". The latter says he had wished to recall to the audience their childhood feelings, so that they would not regard
the play as more important than it was; he continues by way of explanation (obscurely, as they must find) that he had wanted them to forget their education and to become children again, to feel rather than to think. (133) In other words, the "Dichter" had chosen an innocuous form to get them to look at everything in life afresh; and that was Tieck's hope. They miss the point, and pelt the "Dichter" with rubbish; (134) that represents Tieck's pessimistic fear. Thereby he was playing a joke on the actual audience and hoping that they would censure the scripted audience for bad behaviour to which they might have been tempted, and for ignorance of evil which they might have thought acceptable.

Die verkehrte Welt

The scripted audience in this play is even more badly behaved than that in Kater. A company of actors have gathered to perform a play by the Poet on the subject of Apollo. The actors quarrel about the distribution of parts, and the audience interfere, even to the extent that one of the audience, Grünhelm, takes a part himself. (135) This (and subsequent actions by the scripted audience) indicates, as in Kater, what Tieck thought of them. They wish to be amused and moved, not to be given intellectual or aesthetic fare; otherwise only vulgarity (as they define it) is proscribed. (136) Conflict arises between the Poet and the audience, for his Apollo is rivalled by that appointed by the audience, namely Skaramuz (one of the actors, who usually takes the rôle of the Fool). (137)

The "Direktor" (Wagemann) has no interest in poetic truth
or in the aspirations, legitimate or otherwise, of the actors as long as the play succeeds.\[^{(138)}\] Not surprisingly, the Poet does not want Skaramuz to play Apollo, but has to bow to the audience's demand and the headstrong timidity of the "Direktor"; he regrets that his art is best liked when least understood.\[^{(139)}\] This incident tells us what to expect as an Apollo if these are the audience's standards and expectations. Tieck makes it painfully clear by having his audience admire a parody of the storm from *King Lear*.\[^{(140)}\]

On being given the rôle of Apollo, Skaramuz is not content with his new realm, finding it deficient in riches, wine and food, and he orders improvements which are, he says, in accordance with the Enlightenment.\[^{(141)}\] In other words, as in *Tonelli*, a lifelong fool acquires power and uses it to requisition what he understands to be a better life. He thereby redefines the concept of Apollo to express his own prejudices and limitations and makes material demands upon art. Along with its vulgar ostentation, public opinion (as here portrayed) is censorious of real art. There are newspaper reports of the impersonation of Apollo by a demented tramp. This person's behaviour has offended cultivated society, and is attributed to the practice of belles-lettres without a moral purpose;\[^{(142)}\] practitioners of art for beauty's sake are worthless vagrants.

From such a demand it is but a short step to the control of art by government. Skaramuz-Apollo, as King, claims dominion over poetry, and the sycophantic court poet supports him in his view of poetry's purpose.\[^{(143)}\] He then turns his attention to
the more general question of public taste and education; he decrees that writers must write what readers wish to read, though he is inclined to regard the desire to read as itself unreasonable. (144) The effect is soon apparent. He has refined and cultivated the people by inducing affectations, lowering of standards, loss of respect for parents, and the pretence of cleverness. (145)

The real Apollo dethrones King Admet and Queen Alceste after they have welcomed him in. (146) The welcome and the dethronement mean that poetry is patronized by temporal authority, perhaps in the desire to control it, but is potentially inimical to it. This accords with the desire of Skaramuz-Apollo to control it, and in fact Skaramuz-Apollo is suddenly found in power not long afterwards, (147) which perhaps suggests the view that democratization of art replaces the control by a political élite with an equally unpleasant control by the general public. The revolutionary aspect of poetry is suggested also by the "real" Apollo's incitement of the oppressed shepherds by telling them that submissiveness attracts oppression (148) and that humiliation is rendered acceptable if security accompanies it. (149) He resolves to apply this to himself and sets out to recapture his lost domain. (150)

His is a fiercely egalitarian creed. Apollo rejects the oaths of allegiance and signs of respect his followers wish to pay him, for he is, he says, only a fool underneath. Tieck ironises the real fool by representing the real Apollo as another sort of fool, who sees more clearly and is therefore
deemed eccentric. Ordinary (ungifted) people are, Apollo insists, just as necessary as he is.\(^{(151)}\) The previous scene has provided the explanation for Apollo's rejection of power, for the point is made that while art is egalitarian, it is also apolitical: it does not need mass support or authority's seal of approval. This is the lesson learned from the experience of Seelmann, a soldier marooned after a battle at sea: he finds that the beauty of the sunset both impresses him and reconciles him to his cosmic insignificance. In other words, despite his plight, he is moved, by his experience and feelings, to the creative act of his own monologue.\(^{(152)}\)

Tieck has apparently raised a contradiction: art is seditious because it is egalitarian (which is why temporal authority wished to control it); and it is apolitical because it is personal. The contradiction is, however, more apparent than real: the personal, apolitical aspect seems to be a form of anarchy, of not recognising any authority. This is obviously seditious, but only generally so: whereas in \textit{Kater} the target of attack is a specific form of government. Tieck's general point is settled in the battle which is joined between the two Apollos, resulting in the defeat of poetry.\(^{(153)}\) Skaramuz reveals that he is a fool by shouting "Ein Pferd! ein Pferd! mein Königreich für ein Pferd!", not because he wants a horse but because the cry is "nur eine Hyperbel ..., die ich in der Leidenschaft ausstoße".\(^{(154)}\) By this Tieck satirises bad imitations of great works, and also the unimaginative, literal mind of the audience as Brauer asks, reasonably enough for one
unable to empathise with tragic desperation, what is the point of exchanging the whole kingdom for a horse since nothing would be left to him except the horse. (155) Skaramuz is defeated, but the spectators prefer him and swarm on stage to restore him to power. (156) Thereby, Tieck draws the pessimistic conclusion, as in Kater, that poetry does not improve the taste or behaviour of the general public.

Gerald Gillespie implies that this conclusion represents Tieck's criticism of Goethe: "But, since on another level, Apollo stands for Goethe specifically, as well as genuine culture generally, it is the withdrawal of the living god of poetry into an arcadian idyll - that is, Weimar - which (in the early romantic view) abandons the field to Skaramuz". (157) This judgment ignores two points. Firstly, the real Apollo fights and wins but is then defeated by the public, just as the "Dichter" of Kater was defeated by them. Secondly, Goethe appears in the "Garten der Poesie" in Zerbino as the equal of Dante, Cervantes and Shakespeare. (158) Although Tieck was later to criticise Goethe, having been emboldened to do so under Solger's influence, (159) his views were not so formed at this stage.

Prinz Zerbino, oder die Reise nach dem guten Geschmack

This play is, in the words of its sub-title, "Gewissermaßen eine Fortsetzung des gestiefelten Katers". This is true in the sense that it examines certain aspects in more detail. It is less overtly political (though its political implications should not be under-estimated) in that it is less concerned to attack feudalism as a form of government. And although its greater
emphasis is on aesthetic matters it is no closer to *Die verkehrte Welt*, because it has little of the latter's direct concern with the political subversiveness of art. In *Zerbino*, it is not art which is subversive, but original thought itself, because it does not accept the universal and eternal validity of current ideas.

As a background, the isolation of the court from the bulk of the population, and the brutality which arises inevitably but casually as an unnoticed by-product of the political system, are brought to our attention early, when a soldier is struck by an officer for having his hat on crooked; this action is motivated by the obsession of the regent, Gottlieb, with minutiae of dress, and is permitted by the conviction of the citizenry that without discipline of this kind the State will fall. The peasant's sale of turnips is delayed by this parade, and we are thereby reminded that the section of society which produces goods and supplies essential services is outside that with which the play deals. This juxtaposition, and our noticing its implication of parasitism, provide the context for what follows and make the play into an extended exercise in contempt veiled by wit. There are occasional later reminders of the uselessness of the upper stratum: Simonides and Lysippus, erudite men and plenipotentiaries of the King though they are, are helpless in the forest. And we are also reminded that the problems of the mass of the population are more pressing than those of the court: Stallmeister is obliged to take the rôle of a dog (we take this to represent a servant as construed from the master's
viewpoint) because he did not want to be a peasant; the landlord remarks that he himself once had to be a soldier because there was no alternative, but adds that they are not interested in matters of taste as long as they get enough food. (163) Though Tieck is not making a crude political or economic point, it is equally clear that he does not intend us entirely to forget the context he had provided from the outset. It is this background which relates the play to Kater, rather than the more obvious continuation of some features of the plot.

As in Kater, so in Zerbino Tieck directs attention to the King as focal point and symbol. Through the King of Kater, now an old man in Zerbino, Tieck expresses the idea that forms of organisation of the State are purely fortuitous but that some form or other (no matter which) is necessary. The subversiveness of the play is therefore its revelation about the illusoriness of Order rather than the Kater's attack on a specific Order. The relevant scene in Zerbino contributes, by the medium of the King's characterisation, a line of argument to this effect. (164)

Tieck first implies that government, by which is meant the formulation of policy and the promulgation of decrees to implement it, makes no sense. This is why the old King lapsed into childhood after a period of insisting on reading every document he signed: his fantasy-world seemed rational to him, and the actual world irrational. (165) He simply does not believe that the State exists, although he sees that the belief that it does exist provides a framework and motive for action for most people. (166) In the King's political analysis we come again to
Tieck's awareness of the dangerous aspect of Kant's philosophy. So far the King has merely described how something which does not exist is held nevertheless to exist, and how by appearing to exist it affects people's behaviour. If no form of organisation actually exists, how do we select the apparent form within which to live? His answer is akin to the subversive discovery of William Lovell (that our morals are what we like): the King expresses this idea as he plays with his lead soldiers, which he prefers to the real ones, and insists that the real ones were modelled after them.

So macht es immer unsere Phantasie,  
Sind wir zufrieden, scheint uns alles gut,  
Doch mißvergnügt ist uns das Recht nicht recht;  
Der Schein ist alles, was wir von den Dingen  
Begreifen können ... (167)

Thus he has absorbed Kant's doctrine of the unknown reality of things and their separateness from the things we see; but, instead of taking Kant's way out through moral awareness, the King, like Lovell, draws the conclusion, which perhaps Kant sought to avoid, that if we create and judge the reality we perceive, we are accountable by no external standard and follow our own whims.

Towards the end of the King's exposition there are some remarks which are obscure at first sight. He extends his belief that real people are modelled after imaginary ones by asserting that we should regard all people as "Figuren" made for entertainment and jest, and should be pleased with them, instead of allowing envy and hatred to make us find fault; there is, he adds, no envy or hatred in his lead world. (168) This suggests
that he has retreated into a childhood fantasy because the real
world is too brutal for him, and that his insistence on the
imaginary quality of the real world is a form of self-protection
from the knowledge he would otherwise have of unpleasant
circumstances. The motive of retreat is suggested also by a
specific comment later:

So lange ich diese Gabe [den Verstand] an mir hatte,
war ich eine höchst unglückliche Kreatur, aber
seitdem ich kindisch-bin, befinde ich mich
erstaunlich wohl. (169)

Yet even the fantasy-world must have a structure, and any
structure is better than none. So he kills every fifteenth lead
soldier, acknowledging that fifteen is a random number but
asserting that there must be a rule:

Und Regel muß doch sein, sonst wür’ es Zufall;
Zufall zu glauben ist der höchste Wahnsinn,
Und Wahnsinn streitet gegen die Vernunft. (170)

This leaves us with two unpleasant impressions. Firstly, the
untrammelled imagination seems no more likely than any other
faculty to produce an ideal worthy of implementation. Secondly,
in the real world there are no imperatives except chance and the
whims of those in power, and Reason's only contribution seems to
have been to insist that there must be Order without saying
what it is. This would mean that the world is not arranged at
all, so we arrange it, but badly. Later the King finds that
fashion in ideas (for example, "Humanität", which as an
exaggerated abstraction he finds inhuman) rules even rulers, and
he prophesies for that very reason that there will be more
changes. (171)
As shown, the play is not about a specific society, for the king's analysis applies to any social organisation. What is now long past was once a present which seemed to be a squalid termination to historical processes with few, if any, signs of potential improvement. We must constantly bear in mind the despondency with which a minority must have viewed this; the urgency of their search for methods of escape from apparent impasse; the aggressive and defensive stance forced upon a sensitive and discerning minority by a boorish and dismissive public taste. The theme of taste itself (in the alternative title of the work) is an indication of the inevitable but necessary élitism which underlay the despair, the hectoring self-righteousness, as well as the greatness of the Romantics.

The isolation of a minority whose discernment exceeds that of the majority is introduced in the prologue. The hunter outlines the potential achievement and risk of failure in seeking Beauty: for it is not found on set paths, and there is the danger of losing one's way if one leaves the paths in order to search for it. The point is later emphasized by Hanswurst's parable of how, as a kindness, an angel convinced mankind that wisdom and knowledge, which had brought unhappiness, were really folly; but a minority remain unconvinced (they are the truly wise, therefore) and are, on the angel's advice, discredited as Satan's spies.

Zerbino, in whom this uncomfortable spirit of originality stirs, is regarded by society as ill because he thinks for himself. Hence the diagnosis by Polykomikus (the spirit of
Eventually Zerbino tends to agree with these assumptions and finds his quest ridiculous, since he recognises that he could be at peace enjoying life. (175) With Nestor he then qualifies for citizenship by declaring himself against poetry and by writing dull travelogues. (176) But for most of the play he is "ill". The cure has already been prescribed. The doctor recommends, instead of serious study, journals and almanacs, and the avoidance of exercising the imagination (177) and Hanswurst suggests "Gewohnheit" to dull the awareness. (178) Perhaps with relish Tieck has the first doctor supplanted by another, who countermands the instruction to keep Zerbino unstimulated: instead, a crisis must be induced, so that the madness will rage itself out and equilibrium re-establish itself. (179) The cure for the Romantic is, apparently, either stultification or exhaustion. But we must remember that, although Zerbino has some of the Romantic originality, he also has affinities with the self-styled "Genie": so we should regard him as talented but not a genius, and therefore prone to the bitterness and to the warping effect which the possession of talent, but merely talent, amidst mediocrity can bring about. Zerbino cannot bear the vision of nature as the source of all energy and inspiration (in the "Garten der Poesie"), but Shakespeare does. (180) From this
we deduce that Zerbino - like those under implied threat in Sommernacht, like Sternbald and Lovell - is not a real genius, and is wrongly classifying himself. As Hanswurst remarks, Zerbino's malady would not be dangerous in a private citizen who would be embroiled in business and might even be in a profession where his malady (that is, we infer, his originality) would be an advantage. (181) Hanswurst is commenting on the fact that the upper strata are not only parasites but themselves prisoners; he is also saying that specific work is necessary for mental health and that an unapplied talent may harm its possessor.

Tieck emphasises the contrast between these individuals and their environment. The standards and expectations of educated strata are suggested by the court's Learned Society, which occupies its time with empty smart talk and sententiousness. (182) On a less elevated level, the chorus of journeymen, who represent popular hack writers - "ordinäre große Männer" - such as Veit and Spiess, reflect that their lives, in a world ruined by hatred and envy, are enriched by "mein Schätzlein", namely the public. (183) Through their chorus Tieck attacks the cult of spurious mediaevalism, sentimentality, unoriginality, cynical conformity with profitable fashion, and translations from the English by those with an imperfect knowledge of it. To represent the genre less likely to be dependent on the economic base of a reading public, Tieck provides the uninspired Poet, who with pedantic verisimilitude minutely examines grains of sand to ensure that his description is accurate, and welcomes Zerbino's interruption since he was in danger of thinking up something
unnatural and poetic. (184)

A spirit of superficiality pervades intellectual life. Polykomikus is the patron saint of all mills and smithies, where the manufacture of intellectual goods takes place. (185) The intellectual world has parted company with the reality of meaning and with the practical world, in the same way as the parasitic court has parted company with the economically productive sub-strata. There is now a prevailing assumption that meaning and sense have lost equation. Dorus finds, to his chagrin, that the smith has, as ordered, mended the plough but has not rendered it usable. (Tieck's choice of a plough for an example emphasises the aspect of usefulness, just as more generally the image of mills and smithies makes the analogy between intellectual fare and the means of subsistence clear.) The smith justifies himself:

Ich nahm, was Ihr bei mir bestelltet, dreist
Im allegor'schen Sinn.

[...] der Thor verrät sich eben dadurch,
Wenn er der Menschen Worte wörtlich nimmt.
Es ist nur Einfalt, den Sinn zu begreifen,
Der offenbar in jeder Rede liegt. (186)

In the scene Allegorische Schmiede the master smith explains to his journeymen that they are hammering because they enjoy it: what results is unimportant. (This is not a rejection of utilitarianism; instead, they have rejected purpose.) As he explains to Dorus, the way to become clever is to regard oneself as such, and to pay no heed to anyone else. (187)

In the mill we see what the contemporary world does with its intellectual heritage. (188) The miller tells Zerbino that
the mill is itself the Good Taste he seeks. Erudition is the inheritance of past culture, but is no use without food: by which he means a contemporary product which will become a heritage to the next generation. Therefore the mill of progress supplies nourishment by grinding up the past. Some items are so hard to grind that they nearly wreck the mill (such as Götz and Werther), while others (such as Rathenow) are ground too fine to be much use. Shakespeare is hardly touched, yet still feeds many, and - as Zerbino suggests - there is the view that he is best consumed unground. The miller calls such cases "Antimüller" (by which we understand the immortals of literature), and fortunately for him there are only a few of these. Many different kinds of food (representing different kinds of derivative literature) can be made from the flour: those which do not satisfy, even if consumed in dozens; family dishes which are without taste (but nobody notices); some grains have to be forced into the sack (such as Attila and Themistocles) but thereafter seem so weak that no one could guess their former strength (this is probably either a gibe at poor biographies or an ironic denigration of the transience of temporal power).

The image of the mill is itself an emphasis of the unoriginality and arrogance of the contemporary age, for it is merely processing what is brought to it. The impression is of an age obsessed by itself, seeing only itself as an ideal instead of having ideals as goals, capable of perceiving only itself as culmination when it looks to the best of the past. This is the purpose of the scene in the "Garten der Poesie"
when the Goddess tells Nestor

Ihr [Nestor] vergebt, daß dies die wahren Blumen sind, 
Die Blüth', die in Blühe steht; die Erde 
Kennt nur den schwachen Schatten dieser Herrlichkeit.(189)

But Nestor is a child of his time. (190) He finds that her assertions offend what he regards as good taste and common sense, and he asserts that she lacks taste, classicism and art (although he is unable to explain coherently what these terms mean). He has a scathing attitude towards Dante, whom he has never read but condemns as trivial; he considers Ariosto to be immoral, largely because his own obsessions about social reform and about what is "moving" are absent from the works. Petrarch, Tasso, Cervantes and Shakespeare are similarly disposed of. He looks round for the poets from Germany's Golden Age - Hagedorn, Gellert, Gesner, Kleist and Bodmer - but the Goddess does not know of them (although Hans Sachs is there). Shakespeare, Dante, and Cervantes await Goethe, to greet him as their equal; but Nestor, in a recent review of Hermann und Dorothea, has declared that one would have to be blind to regard Goethe as a poet. He reveres Sophocles, who, however, regards Nestor as an idiot. Thus his admiration of the Classics is implied to be unsoundly based: such judgments of modern literature can come only from a man who misunderstands the Ancients and admires them for the wrong reasons. Nestor is an uncomfortable reminder of Kant's teaching that we see our own minds in the apparent reality.

The concept of unoriginality, of - to develop Tieck's image of the mill - living off the seed-corn of the past by
consuming it but not adding to it is at the root of his implied criticism of education. In the conversation between articles of furniture, the table, chair and cupboard contrast their wild youth with their present usefulness; as a result of this process of manufacture, they now hate the air and sunshine they previously enjoyed. (191) This is a satire on the effect of bad education in eradicating natural strength and inculcating a preference for the unnatural. The satire is not on education as such but on the utilitarianism of bad education which neglected innate individuality. (A similar image - planing away strength from wood - is found in Der junge Tischlermeister, which was conceived in this period.) (192) The development of innate qualities rather than superimposition of alien ones is suggested also by the harp's comments about the violin sonata played by Nestor - that it is an atrocious noise because it is unsuited to the instrument; that the instrument has innate capacities which should be made kinetic. (193) Beauty is to be achieved by self-development, though Zerbino and Tieck's studies of artist-figures show that this can prove to be an unsatisfactory prescription.

In Prinz Zerbino the question of the discerning, sensitive, artistic individual has been raised, and, as will be seen in the novellas, he is defeated. The equation, as society sometimes regards it, between originality and madness is at the root of the attempts to "educate" Zerbino; and it is an important theme in Runenberg and (with political overtones) in some novellas (notably Die Reisenden). Tieck's interest in
this question began as an interest in the relationship between the world of poetry and the ordinary everyday world in *Sommernacht* (1789).

Comparison between another early work, *Das Reh* (1790), and an obvious descendant of it, *Das Ungeheuer und der verzauberte Wald* (1798), shows the extent to which the *Aufklärung* had come to represent, for Tieck, the specific form of inadequate society: though he was later to regard it as merely the then current form of tendencies having deeper roots. (194) Zeydel (195) refutes suggestions by Hauffen, Regener and Hemmer that *Das Reh* was by Tieck's friend Schmohl and that it had been mistakenly attributed to Tieck. This makes the difference all the more important.

Whereas the later work deals specifically with the *Aufklärung, Das Reh* seems, like *Sommernacht*, to be more concerned with the relationship between poetry and ordinary life in general. It is based on a court in which the enervating burdens of office seem chiefly to consist of protracted meals, attending the theatre, playing cards, hunting, and conversations. (196) Fernando, the Crown Prince, finds, in a Rousseau-esque manner, that spending several days hunting in the forest, eating the game he has killed and cooked, is his chief stimulus. (197) Probably this represents a half-conscious connection between emotional escape into poetry and physical escape into the forest: the general import of *Sommernacht* and the prologue to *Zerbino* suggest this, and the association of hunting with a quasi-poetic release from ordinary life
foreshadows Runenberg. (198) Perhaps symbolically developing Titania's warning in Sommernacht, the poisoned arrow which Fernando is inadvertently using turns the roe into a monster.

In the later work the court is not merely a satire on the futility of bourgeois life but represents a specific philosophy, namely the Aufklärung (in the debased version Tieck knew). Singing is forbidden as being incompatible with "Vernunft" and "gesunder Menschenverstand". (199) This society faces two dangers. First, there is a monster which destroys property and kills people. It perhaps represents the aspect of human behaviour documented in Lovell, Rygo, and other works, namely the misanthropic outcast, for it is oppressed by mental or emotional pain, (200) and shuns human society. (201) Secondly, a wood dedicated to various gods has become enchanted; singing and music are rife there, and those who wander into it lose their reason (202) (much as people who wander on to the "Runenberg"). (203) The wood obviously represents the arts, and a subversive aspect is suggested (as in Zerbino) since Aldrovan, the Crown Prince, who is under the influence of the wood, has fallen in love with a milkmaid, Angelica (he is discriminating, for we learn later that she was stolen in infancy from fairyland), and finds his public position irksome. Comparison between the two works demonstrates that Tieck was interested in the status of magic and poetry in relation to real life before he specifically attacked his environment and that Tieck came to regard the Aufklärung as his specific example of a general theme.

The satirical comedies seem at first sight to tell us
chiefly that the masses cannot recognise beauty and reject it when it is offered. But it has also been shown that two other themes are at least as important. Firstly, only a genius can sustain a vision of beauty without collapsing under the strain of knowing complete truth; this theme leads to our forthcoming consideration of artists and related figures. Secondly, the conflict between temporal authority and poetry has been shown to acquire a political aspect because poetry, being truth, is incompatible with the confused, inefficient and oppressive State which has developed from and embodies the random application of historical forces, acquisitiveness, egotism and power-seeking. This aspect is more prominent in the novellas, but is adumbrated in works of the late 1790s.
D. TIECK'S REJECTION OF THE ROMANTIC MIDDLE AGES

An earlier chapter referred to three categories in which Tieck's works of the late 1790s would be considered: those which satirise the present by using a historical milieu; those in which poetry is shown to be disaffected from a defective society; and those dealing with the position of the poet. We have reached the end of the second category, and have discovered that its underlying idea has political connotations. The subversive rôle taken by, or ascribed to, poetry is a theme to which Tieck returned, also with political connotations, in the novellas. (1) It is, however, less generally appreciated that even in the earlier period Tieck often showed a markedly radical line of thought, even though his political views tended to derive from his aesthetic standpoint. In his attack on feudalism - which may have been the vestigial feudalism of his own day rather than the mediaeval essence - he laid emphasis on the largely unrecognised primary producers. That the aristocracy were oblivious to the realities of peasant life is shown in Peter Lebrecht (in the reference to the trampling of corn)(2) or in royal ignorance as to the origin of bread (in Kater). (3) Society's dependence on a productive peasantry is an important element in the backcloth (and this, too, recurs in the novellas). (4)

Before proceeding to our third category - Tieck's view of the poet's position, which arises naturally from the potential enmity between poetry and the State - we must digress to explore, as a sub-theme arising from his criticism of feudalism, two works in which he is severely critical of the Middle Ages. Heymonskindere(5) shows that, even in a régime of political corruption, the mass of
the population is, at least potentially, the only true base of political power; there is an analogy between this idea and the emphasis on an economic base. And in Genoveva the entire ethos of the Middle Ages is condemned.

If Lebrecht could have been taken as advocacy or representation of the ideals of individual goodness and of today's ordinary life, it would have been possible to construe these two historical works as the other side of the coin - a confirmation of the ideals of Lebrecht by their exemplary embodiment in traditional tales. But we have already noted that Tieck was unable to make Lebrecht convincing. Misunderstanding of that work, as well as of the satirical comedies, Phantasia, Heymonskinder and Genoveva, has led critics to assume that Tieck regarded the Middle Ages with Romantic afterglow. (6) Tieck himself contributed to this misunderstanding of his view by enthuosing about the period, notably in his Vorrede to Minnelieder aus dem schwäbischen Zeitalter (1803). (7) That source, of later date than Genoveva, probably owes much to the temporary influence of the Schlegels, and shows how unrelated were the subjective critic and objective poet in Tieck.

The failure of Lebrecht and the political content of his other works must be viewed in conjunction with each other, and must take precedence over the absurd Vorrede. Tieck could not retreat into a sham mediaevalism because he saw too clearly - but saw only as a poet - that it had been an appalling time for the majority. Rosenkranz is no doubt correct in assuming that Tieck's interest in mediaevalism was a form of revolt created by the disapproval of the Aufklärung.
rather than a genuine attraction in its own right. As an author Tieck could not delude himself in this matter; the despair of Lovell and the Streußledern remains unrelieved.

1 Heymonskinder

The introduction ("Kurze Vororinnerung") expresses the hope that the reader can transport himself into childhood, forgetting what he has learned since, so that he may appreciate a period far removed from his own. He cites the example of old Frankish pictures which, if no allowances are made, often convey little to the modern spectator because they lack perspective and consistency. This is a strong hint that Tieck is presenting more than just an old tale: in other words, in the manner advocated by Lebrecht, we are to look carefully at what is apparently unremarkable. The later Tieck was more concerned at the literary context of the work than its content; he shows respect for the old story and an interest in its stylistic aspect. It is probably this which has misled critics into such judgments as Welsel's: he calls the work an "enächtig treue Wiedergabe". But such judgments are inconsistent with the "Kurze Vororinnerung" and with the real theme of the work itself, which, as we take up Lebrecht's invitation to look beneath the obvious, is revealed as political. This play is, surprisingly, though it may seem, a political work wrapped up as a period-piece; and we should recall that Tieck's later explanation of Kater also directed attention to the literary aspect and ignored its political meaning.

The four sons of Heymon are, against their wishes, involved in the feud between their father and Karl (Charles the Great). At first their antagonist is Karl, but soon they are in conflict with
their father whose feudal obligations outweigh his paternal feelings (as in Eckart). From this situation develops their rôle as opponents of feudal tyranny in defence of freedom. The resentment which Karl (and his son Karlmann) feel towards them arises from their independence: for that reason Karl is more intent on obtaining their symbolic submission than on killing them, and his only condition for ceasing to oppress them is the surrender of their means of resistance, the horse Bayart. Logically this distinction is necessary from any ruler's viewpoint, since the alternative is to kill all vassals, and that is self-defeating. The four brothers are symbolic vassals, both for Karl and for us. As a feudal ruler, Karl cannot tolerate superiority, so his (and Karlmann's) antagonism is particularly directed at the strongest and most able of the brothers, Reinold. (The hostility which superiority attracts was to be a major theme in Vittoria Accorombona.) The antagonism of Karl and Karlmann towards Heymon and his sons arises from the fact that each group has its own type of power. The royal house has the legal power to rule, and the vassals have the greater physical strength (hence the symbol of the trial of strength).

But none of their exploits would be possible without the horse Bayart, who is eventually handed over to the King to be executed by noyade. That Bayart dies only when he can no longer see Reinold suggests that the horse is a symbol for the physical strength of the masses upon whose power depends the success apparently attributable to great leaders, and who are powerless without leadership. According to this interpretation Reinold fails his people by handing them over to feudalism in order to secure his own peace.
In this respect, the work is one of a long series of criticisms directed at selfish hermits, beginning with Almansur and ending with Waldeinsamkeit, and including Eckhart and Des Lebens Überflut. (19) Reinold is a leader born too early, and he compromises. It is a different kind of leader, in a different context, which Tieck was to portray in Dämchen: (20) the rights of man and national self-awareness in the eighteenth century, rather than a challenge to feudalism. The use of a horse as a symbol was noticed in Hanswurst als Emigrant, and recurs in Des Lebens Überflut. (21) The relationship between a leader and the mass of the population which the above interpretation implies is analogous to that which Tieck, writing about Shakespeare at this time, held to exist between a poet and his environment, namely that the relationship is symbiotic. In a more general way, the theme could be regarded as the resentment of the young at being shackled by established institutions; this underlies other works, such as Lovell.

(2) Genoveva

We have by now thoroughly muddled the formal distinction which had seemed to exist prima facie between works based on or related to the Middle Ages and works based on traditional children's tales, and between both and non-traditional Märchen. The erosion of the apparent distinction is not surprising, since it did not arise from the subject-matter and was eroded by Tieck himself when he republished his earlier works. Tieck's only use of any milieu other than that of the contemporary world was as a means of considering contemporary or general problems. It is in this light that we should regard Genoveva.
Tieck's later comments on this work are characteristically misleading. He describes how he had chanced on the 'Volksbuch' in 1798 and has been greatly impressed by its depiction of the solitude and suffering of Genoveva and her meeting with her husband. The theme had also interested him, he records, as a stimulus to technical exploration. He had wished to use dialogue for both narrative and lyrical purposes but without imitating the Ancients; in other words, to combine passion and realism with piety, nature and legend. This (if we could be entirely sure what it means) is an accurate picture of the work, as far as it goes, but the important aspects are not mentioned. Subsequent critical commentary has been apparently based on Tieck's own remarks, and has added a note of adulation. Genoveva is claimed to be humble and saintly; (24) "Typus der reinen Liebe, die durch Demut und Duldung siegt"; (25) triumphant through her acceptance of suffering in order not to break her marriage vow. (26) These judgments ignore three essential factors: Genoveva's motivation; the figure of Golo; and the religious wars. And since these factors have been omitted by critics, it is inevitable that they have discerned no analogy between them. The critical judgments referred to might almost be those of Bonifatius, who, as prologue and occasional commentator (similar to the Greek chorus), presents the story of Genoveva as an illustration of the ideals of piety and morality which he holds formerly to have existed; and his eulogy of her as an example of saintliness closes the work.

Tieck emphasises thereby that the work exemplifies the mediaeval ethos, but this does not necessarily mean that he endorses that ethos. The story has two basic themes - religion (with
nationalism in association with it) and love. Let us consider these two themes against the two ideals identified by Bonifatius. As for piety, its relationship to religion and religious wars is clear. As for morality, Bonifatius' attention to this as an ideal when the real theme is love implies his view that morality is sexual morality and that the scope for being immoral is in sexual relationships rather than in social or economic ones. Tieck's play reveals that he took these to be the mediaeval views and that he believed them to be mistaken. In other words, the crux of the matter is the difference between Bonifatius' words and the work itself.

In the play religion is considered both in a social aspect and in a psychological one. In both aspects religion appears as a disguise or excuse for ignoble behaviour. In its social aspect religion serves as an excuse for violence, provides the delusion of divine support for military or political ventures, and is a cloak for nationalism and racialism in the fight against the Moors. (27) Ritualised warfare, religious disputes and the spiritual exercises of a minority proceed over the head of the common man; he is oblivious of them unless involved perforce, and he is certainly not involved from choice. (28) But the official form of religion, the moral code and the social and economic structure of society have become one. In this system, a nation has a national religion, virtue is an attribute of that nation and is found in no other. The system is closed and fixed: there is no room for a different virtue, a different religion, or - as Martel realises - for absolute ambition. (29) In view of the importance of their religion it is significant that they do not know the Bible very well; this emphasises that their
religion is an attribute of their social mores rather than a set of convictions as such. Their religious ignorance is not confined to the obvious discrepancy between loving one’s neighbour and murdering him by ritual, or regarding him as a servant of Satan because he has different opinions: it also concerns matters of textual fact. (30) 

This historical form of Christianity is the background to the presentation of religion in its relation to love; therein lies the chief interest of the events concerning Genoveva herself. These basic passions are no more controlled and civilised in love than in war, but the context is that of psychology and character-drawing rather than of history. However, religion in this aspect has the same characteristics as in its socio-historical aspect: it is invoked to excuse viciousness, and this is expressed in the sexual relationships portrayed. The characters to consider are, therefore, Genoveva, Siegfried, and Golo.

Genoveva’s religion compensates her for having had no parents — she was brought up in a convent — and for having had to accept Siegfried when he was selected for her as a husband. She had wanted to become a nun instead. To the prospective victim of an arranged marriage Christ was a spiritual husband in the sense that a nun is a Bride of Christ, and she identifies Golo with her Christ-lover. (31) Inevitably she draws close to him, and it is soon he, rather than Christ, who figures in her dreams of release from oppression. When Golo says, self-deprecatingly, that he does not wish to intrude upon her devotion, her reply links the two images:

Warum das nicht? ihr seid so gut und edel,
Der edle Mensch ist nur ein Bild von Gott. (32)
Her attitude to her husband becomes ambivalent. In response to Golo's expression of loyalty to Siegfried, she exclaims: "O jeder müßt ihm [Golo] lieben, der ihn kennt", and, reflecting on the possibility that Siegfried will die in battle, commands her husband to God's care.\(^{(33)}\) This seems to be less a hope for his safety than acceptance of his death, but it is expressed as pious submission to God's will. Just as religion seemed to require soldiers to treat enemies cruelly, it permits Genoveva to wish Siegfried dead. Under Golo's influence she becomes aware of her beauty. This change occurs quickly: Golo believes her to be unaware of her beauty\(^{(34)}\) shortly before we learn that she has her portrait painted so that she can remind herself later of her present appearance.\(^{(35)}\)

Her subconscious wish for Siegfried's death (a slight reminiscence, perhaps, of Abdallah), her attraction to Golo and her awareness of her appearance are mainly unconscious thoughts. In her conscious mind she remains unswervingly pious, and a convinced adherent of feudal society's code. Golo offers her freedom from prison and privation, for herself and her child, if she submits to him, but she will not.\(^{(36)}\) Her rejection of Golo - she tells him that he can take her life but not force her to shame herself - sounds like an assertion of personal rights. This it undoubtedly is, but more important than that is her reference to being a Bride of Christ. Without that constraint, one could imagine a mother either accepting Golo's offer in order to save her child or, less probably, refusing it on the ground that they would both be better dead than enslaved to Golo. It is because she is unbalanced by devotion to an abstraction that she fails to adopt a solution based
on her assessment of the child's best interests (even though, as noted, two opposite views would be possible).

The motive underlying her submission to hardship is her feelings of guilt. We can only infer what she feels guilty about; it has been suggested above that the cause is a desire to commit adultery with Golo and perhaps a desire to have Siegfried dead in order to make it easier. Inevitably, her guilt is given religious expression. On meeting Siegfried again, she tells him that her misfortunes were a punishment.\(^\text{(37)}\) There is nothing in the events of the work to justify her self-condemnation, so the guilt to which she refers must arise from her awareness of her wishes.

Golo is not conventionally religious in the sense that Genoveva is, with her adherence to a rigid code believed to have divine authority. His mental processes are analogous to hers in that his sexual attitudes are expressed religiously, but the ideas themselves are as seen from his masculine viewpoint. To him, Genoveva is like a goddess.\(^\text{(38)}\) He praises her extravagantly as a being who excites the wonder and admiration of all nature.\(^\text{(39)}\) However, his detailed description of her is not of a goddess but of a sexually attractive woman.\(^\text{(40)}\) When Genoveva censures him for having expressed love for her, he defends himself to her by saying it is pure and chaste, even though forbidden by the moral code; but then he loses self-control and embraces her.\(^\text{(41)}\) Rebuffed, he vents his destructive fury on her portrait and, in due course, upon her and her child.

This rejection has two related effects on him. Firstly, his erstwhile kind and tolerant character\(^\text{(42)}\) is warped, and (recalling
the Lovell-types) evil becomes acceptable, even attractive to him. Secondly, he begins to accuse Genoveva of being an evil temptress. This is allied to the hatred he felt for her when she rebuffed him. It reminds us of Blaubart's fulminations, and of the accusation made against Vittoria Accorombona. As noted above, this may be true, or partly true, of Genoveva's subconscious wishes, but certainly not of her conscious ones. Vittoria is similarly accused despite her obvious wish to be left alone. Tieck was interested in men's hostility to women, and in the present work there is a clear instance in Siegfried.

That Siegfried's mind is prejudiced on most subjects is apparent from the beginning, for his unthinking acceptance of society's code is emphasised. He exemplifies the assumption that virtue and nationality are synonyms, that bloodthirstiness is to be encouraged in religious wars. When she attempts to persuade him not to go, he remarks that she is working for the Moors. Beneath the surface are destructive passions: he comments to Otho, as they both lie wounded, that Satan is fought in this life personified as wild lusts and hatreds. Siegfried, too, regards women as inherently evil: he instantly believes Golo's lie to the effect that Genoveva, under the influence of a love-potion allegedly administered by Drago, has welcomed the latter's attentions and has given birth to a child by him. This is in itself improbable, since Genoveva told him she was pregnant before she left and before her alleged transgression with Drago; but Siegfried's reaction is immediate:

In unsern Weibern gab uns Gott den Fluch. He remarks bitterly that he (at the wars) was fighting Satan while
Genoveva yielded to him in another guise.^{49} In his delirium while wounded he associates the names Genoveva and Christ.\(^{50}\) This suggests that he worships Genoveva, only to become vindictively enraged when she acts, or appears to have acted, in a manner less than godlike. The Genoveva loved by Golo incurred Golo's wrath for refusing to do so. Siegfried's importance in the play's scheme of ideas is as a microcosm of his society.
E. THE INDIVIDUAL AND SOCIETY

Tieck's description of his contemporary society, whether he describes it directly or (using an unauthentic historical setting) indirectly, lays emphasis on the antipathy which, he believes, must exist between poetry and any society which - as an outer sign of inner defects - is unable to appreciate it. A moral and intellectual view is thereby implicit in, and is subsumed by, an aesthetic one. It has already been noted that Tieck transmuted philosophical and social material into psychological motivation for characters such as Lovell or Abdallah. He made similar use of his fundamentally aesthetic reaction to his contemporary world by focussing attention on the poet's position in society and, even more, on the poet's state of mind. In so doing, he took as his background the undiscriminating mass of the population to which he attributed a materialist ethos. His consideration of the poet's position had political connotations in Die verkehrte Welt and in the novellas, but in the period currently under review he was concerned mainly with portraying poets as individuals. In fact, from this point onwards, Tieck's "poets" might as easily be painters or musicians (as some are). The erosion of the distinction, which may represent Wackenroder's influence, arises from the fact that he is writing of temperamental rather than artistic matters. His interest in artist-figures also expands beyond a consideration of artists, however broadly defined, to the point where it includes individuals whose vision is different from that of most people but who are not actually artists. This expansion of the theme will be the subject of a later section.\(^1\) Both later and in the present section it will be apparent that Tieck,
far from seeing any solutions in the life of an artist, saw only problems. The psychological inadequacy and social irrelevance of the artist-figures he portrays make it obvious that they could not possibly alleviate the general philistinism.

It is possible to link this pessimistic inference with the despair expressed through Lovell and the Straupfedern stories: the possibility that art may be a means of escape or of social improvement must be discounted when one is confronted by the shortcomings of its practitioners and admirers.

These conclusions are supported by the works which resulted from Tieck's collaboration with Wackenroder - Herzenserzieünsungen eines künstlichenden Klosterbruders and Phantasien über die Kunst - and by Tieck's artist-novel, Franz SternbaldsWanderungen.

(1) Artist-figures

"Herzenserzieünsungen" and "Phantasien"

Wackenroder's "Klosterbruder" overstates his case, either directly or in the characters he creates, and thereby invites us to detect flaws in it; Tieck's "Klosterbruder" is more interested in characters who are themselves aware of the flaws in their case. So while neither Wackenroder nor Tieck accepts the "Klosterbruder"'s case as it stands, Wackenroder merely puts a case and refutes it by his manner of putting it; Tieck directs interest to the man who is himself aware of the flaws but unable to evade them. The shift of emphasis demarcates an enthusiastic writer from a subtle one.

But in either case it is fundamental to our interpretation that the "Klosterbruder" is portrayed by what Wackenroder and Tieck give him
to write: the "Klosterbruder" reveals not art or religion, not Wackenroder or Tieck, but himself.

Wackenroder's "Klosterbruder" expresses contempt for those who lack his ability to appreciate art, and he implies that his function is to interpret art to a philistine world. Few, if any, of his putative contributions are free from this arrogant and elitist attitude, which is probably an over-reaction to his contemporary society's indifference to what he admires in art. A difference between the generations is also implied, and we understand this to mean the difference between the Aufklärung and the Romantics. He looks back to the Renaissance frequently, to make comparisons unfavourable to contemporary culture on two counts. First, there was (he insists) a higher standard of achievement then. Second, Raphael is, in his view, properly thought of not as inspired but as an ordinary man enabled by God's intervention to create great art, and unable to explain his methods to students because he himself does not know; he thinks of the object he paints, not of how he is painting it. The ordinariness of Raphael as a person (he sounds rather like Shakespeare in Tieck's portrayals) is an implied objection to self-styled greatness, which was a characteristic feature of the late Aufklärung in the form in which the Romantics saw it. The overstatements of Wackenroder's "Klosterbruder" are correctly construed as Wackenroder's censure of such arrogance: for his "Klosterbruder" is obviously unaware of the mote in his own eye as, implying that his own age has neither genius nor modesty, he makes fatuous claims on his own behalf. Wackenroder's characterisation consists simply in giving him enough rope with which
to hang himself.

The character of Joseph Berglinger as depicted by Wackenroder (in Das merkwürdige musikalische Leben des Tonkünstlers Joseph Berglinger) is probably the most important example of Wackenroder's portrayal of this type of arrogance. There is the conflict between the young Berglinger, who believes himself to have been chosen as a musician by God, and his father, who, preaching duty and usefulness, wishes him to study medicine (which he despises). (9) Eventually Berglinger becomes an established Kapellmeister, but has found meantime that the mathematical basis of musical theory and the mechanical basis of performance are arid compared with his youthful expectations of the art. (10) Furthermore, he has to cope with a superficial public, professional jealousy and a demanding patron; his soul can be expressed only with the economic support of a hundred people who are at liberty to treat it casually. (11) Despite this implied plea on his own behalf he criticises fellow-composers for petty vanity in their works. He himself regards vanity as inappropriate because the inspiration comes from God (an immodest echo of the "Klosterbruder"'s view of Raphael): one should revere the art, not the artist who is a mere tool. (12) He has led himself into self-contradiction: he resents being unappreciated but censures others who resent that they, too, are unappreciated. He makes the tacit assumption that they deserve it and he does not. Berglinger does not, however, realise that he has condemned himself, and Wackenroder's "Klosterbruder" enters the same trap unawares, for he approves of Berglinger's essentially elitist view and, with no hint of criticism, remarks that since
Berglinger killed himself writing his masterpiece he was probably created to enjoy art rather than to practise it.\(^{(13)}\) In other words, Wackenroder's "Klosterbruder" attributes to Berglinger the delusion that a passionate conviction of ability is proof of that ability. Again, Wackenroder has permitted the "Klosterbruder" to discredit himself and has, by making the "Klosterbruder" describe someone with his own defects, emphasised the superficiality, the lack of discrimination, and the immodesty of such characters.

However, there is little interest in what may underlie these traits in Wackenroder's "Klosterbruder". Wackenroder tells us what the "Klosterbruder" is like; Tieck also tells us how he became so. The difference is demonstrated by the form: this Berglinger item by Wackenroder is a third-person pseudo-biography by Wackenroder of an imaginary Berglinger; Tieck makes Berglinger speak for himself and become an author. This, indeed, is his method of depicting the "Klosterbruder": instead of Wackenroder's scripting of his "Klosterbruder"'s views in order to let him condemn himself by his own words, Tieck's "Klosterbruder" objectivises "his" own ideas in "his" own works. This implies that the "Klosterbruder" has a certain level of self-awareness.

In Tieck's first contribution (An den Leser dieser Blätter),\(^{(14)}\) the "Klosterbruder" refers to the obsession of his formative years, and gives us to understand that an obsessive youthful passion to be an artist is not proof of ability. He then extends this idea to the adult "Klosterbruder", allowing us to infer that the latter arrogantly refuses to be ordinary: since he cannot be Raphael or
Michelangelo, he will not be a painter at all (like Lovell, who could not live up to a moral code, so abandoned it; or Almansur, who could not have the girl of his choice and left society).

In the first important contribution by Tieck’s "Klosterbruder" - *Ein Brief des jungen Florentinischen Malers an seinen Freund Jacobo in Rom* - the young painter, Antonio, writes that his love for Amalia has given him a new, instinctive understanding of both art and religion. But Jacobo replies that love, while valuable as a stimulus to development, can also become a limiting factor: the artist in love runs the risk of discovering only his own identity and feelings in art and of portraying only them, instead of using his experience as raw material. In other words, Jacobo sees love as a short-term benefit to art but also as long-term danger to it: which shows that he, Jacobo, separates art from life and regards art as the ultimate reality. It is Tieck's "Klosterbruder" who makes Jacobo write this: so it is Tieck's "Klosterbruder" who makes Jacobo condemn himself unawares. Here is the difference between Tieck and Wackenroder: Wackenroder’s contributions tilt at the "Klosterbruder"; Tieck portrays him as he describes his own creations - the two correspondents - and thereby Tieck characterises the "Klosterbruder". In the above example the young painter is on the right track by accepting the new experience at face-value; it is the esoteric view of art urged upon him by Jacobo which is insidious. That Tieck’s "Klosterbruder" represents both points of view suggests that he does not identify himself fully with either of them and is, therefore, aware of the merits and pitfalls of each.

From another contribution - *Brief eines jungen deutschen Malers*
in Roman seinen Freund in Nürnberg — we can perhaps infer the state of mind of Antonio, for the unnamed young German painter is apparently in a similar condition. Love for Marie, and her persuasion of him, has turned him to Roman Catholicism, and his motive in visiting the Pantheon, St. Mary Rotunda, was to see Marie "um...mich an ihrer himmlischen Andacht zu bessern". (17) The ceremonial and the music — all of which, we should assume, were heightened by Marie's presence and by her interest in his religious condition — brought about his conversion. (18) It is obviously not an intellectual conviction for which he could give reasons. His conversion in turn heightens his awareness of art, beginning with the works he sees when leaving the church after the service. (19) We have, therefore, a sequence of events: love motivates his religious conversion, which brings him a new awareness of art (as distinct from the technical ability he had acquired as a pupil of Dürer). This awareness is merely a feeling of empathy: it is an emotional condition in relation to art, rather than a philosophical belief about it. He has become incapable of systematic work, for his thoughts and feelings outstrip his concentration. He now perceives the world through art, and finds it "ein gar herrlicher und lieblicher Aufenthalt". (20) One wonders how he will see the world if love fails him in any way: for it is that which supports this emotional structure (and reminds us again of William Lovell).

Similar attitudes persist in Tieck's contributions to Phantasien über die Kunst. Since these items were, in the words of the title, "Herausgegeben von Ludwig Tieck", they do not necessarily represent Tieck's views but rather the views of the
putative narrator. They are therefore to be construed as Tieck's characterisation of the narrator. In Raffaels Bildnis, Raphael receives the devotion normally given to God, and is deemed to have performed an act of undeserved condescension at having lived in the ordinary world. This unconscious blasphemy from so unexpected a source demonstrates that the narrator understands his religion as little as he understands art. (A later contribution - Über die Kinderfiguren auf den Raffaelschen Bildern - contains ideas about children which are equally unsound theologically.) It was noted in reviewing Genoveva that religious faith was not based on knowledge of religion. He takes the view that art is a means of holding aloof from life:

So bewahrt mich deine Gegenwart vor dem irdischen Tun und Treiben (23)
- this being obviously degrading to a person of his fine sensibilities.

At first glance it seems that Tieck finally portrays his author by permitting him to turn "his" character, Joseph Berglinger, into an author of an autobiographical piece and of three essays on music. But the actual circumstances are less intimidating than they seem, for the "author" of the earlier items has by now fallen by the wayside (to appear only for the last item, Der Traum). Ludwig Tieck is the "editor" of them all: which means that the pieces not "by" Berglinger are by an author who is "not" Tieck, whereas those "by" Berglinger assume Berglinger to be real and to be the author of his "own" works. Berglinger's relationship to Tieck is therefore the same as that of the "Klosterbruder", namely there is one remove, with no other fictive person between Berglinger and
Tieck. This relationship differs from the previous appearance of Berglinger in the *Herzenserschütten*, in which Wackenroder's "Klosterbruder" was the fictive author of a biographical piece about Berglinger: the only distorting-mirror through which we now see Berglinger is that of his own self-awareness (as Tieck represents it), and Berglinger's authorship is of equal status to that of the "Klosterbruder" in the hierarchy of wrappings. Berglinger is thereby portrayed through his own words, as, partly consciously and partly unawares, he reveals his character with its strengths and weaknesses. This was Tieck's method in the *Herzenserschütten* (and in many other works): the primitive device of merely allowing him to convict himself by overstating a case, as used by Wackenroder, is now a long way off.

The Berglinger we are now faced with is no longer the executant and composer; at least, these roles are ignored and the contributions concentrate on the by now familiar position of seeking to understand rather than to practise art. In *Ein Brief Joseph Berglingers* he recoils before the arrogance of an esoteric, elitist view of art, but is nevertheless convinced that it is the true view, or at least that it is the only view that he personally can endorse. His argument is as follows: His pride and arrogance at his understanding of art make him feel himself apart from and better than his fellow-men, even though he recognises that people who are oblivious or even hostile to art may lead better lives than he. Even greater self-condemnation follows. He condemns art as inimical to constructive action in the ordinary world, as unproductive and escapist, as self-indulgent, futile and
even blasphemous. Such a view, he realises, mocks life by regarding it as merely raw material for art. But he is driven by his love for art, which judges by criteria different from those used by reason; he is simply at the mercy of his nature.

This self-justification is, to the outsider, defeatist and self-indulgent, but it is interesting in a number of respects. First, there is the view that one's innate, pre-ordained rôle makes a set of constraints or parameters; the influence of Kant (in the misinterpretation used by William Lovell, in which the individual defines his own morality) has already been noticed, and this may be an artist's version. Secondly, this is the assertion of a man who has failed to justify earlier self-expectations: the self-proclaimed genius now seems to have no genius to lose. Thirdly, his unconscious self-condemnation is that, in his own image of the Aeolian harp, he is passive rather than active. Fourthly, we note the invention of a high-sounding pseudo-philosophy to meet the needs of one's self-esteem rather than to reach understanding: for if he himself cannot change, he is logically bound to abandon his arrogance towards those others who are no less trapped than he.

The salient feature of Berglinger, then, is innate distaste for what his vanity demands. This is very close to Lovell. It is on internal evidence of this kind, as well as upon the biographical and documentary evidence adduced by Kohlschmidt and Alewyn, that this item should be ascribed to Tieck. The argument of Zipes that the item is by Wackenroder is implausible.

Berglinger's last contribution - *Symphonien* - contains the by now familiar mixture of sound reasoning and arrant nonsense. He begins
with several generalisations. First, he condemns those who regard simplicity as the greatest characteristic of art and whose objection to complexity stems from their failure to understand it. They are fundamentally similar to certain others, whose admiration of the Classics or the Italians requires them to denigrate the moderns or national schools. We are left with a faint suspicion that Berglinger's own neglected compositions were complex in form and national in spirit. This, if true, would explain his later reference to Goethe, whom he evidently considered pretentious. We may legitimately doubt Berglinger's objectivity, although his advocacy of catholicity of taste is certainly unexceptionable.

He soon begins to grind his personal axe. He asserts that, as in religion so in art (both being divine), faith must precede understanding. This subjectivity is his undoing. If, he continues, one feels the religious or artistic truth, then understanding and the power of judgment are inevitable, for they are merely the external wrappings of one's inner comprehension.

We have yet again the spectator-equivalent of the Kraftmennie who needs neither training nor knowledge, and in this instance not even the implied duty of communication:

Es geschicht hier, dass man Gedanken ohne jenen mühsamen Umweg der Worte denkt ... (32)

"Überzeugung ist die prosaische Demonstration; Glaube der Gemüde, das Verstehn eines erhabenen Kunstwerks: dieses kann nie demonstriert, jene nie auf Kunstweise empfangen werden. (33)

An insufficient humility in many people causes them, he believes, to use their own judgment to decide on the merits or otherwise of works of art, instead of submitting to the judgment of those who know
better, or feel better; perhaps they are merely too kindhearted, and give approval too easily. Berglinger obviously has in mind his own allegedly superior ability. His argument should not be entirely dismissed: discerning and informed tutelage is invaluable and is not found only (if at all) in distinguished and highly individualistic practitioners; and public taste can often be undiscriminating and ignorant. Because of his flawed character, and because he is bitter at being a comparative failure, he is unable to distinguish between general questions and his own career; but he is nonetheless able to see part of the truth.

Franz Sternbalda Wanderungen

Franz, too, is mistaken in deciding to be an artist. From his mistaken decision, and from his contact with the artists and non-artists he meets in attempting to implement it, stem a whole corpus of discussions about art and the artist. Their length and frequency, as well as some of the views expressed, and particularly their use as characterisation, remind us of the Herzenserziehungen and Phantasien; and, as in those works, it is a grave error to assume that any given pronouncement is necessarily Tieck's view of art, and that it can be extracted for convenient use in some other context. The technique of characterisation-by-opinion is ubiquitous in this work. Its method might be summarised as "definition by negatives": just as in Lovell there is the "control-group" which shows what William is not, or in Der Runenberh Christian's depiction rests on the two worlds both of which are denied him, so in Sternbald Tieck presents a series of ideals or ways of living in which Franz finds, variously, attraction, stimulus or repulsion, but
to which he cannot commit himself. Thereby the reader's picture of him is built as his character clarifies and grows. The work is, perhaps more literally so than some more obvious examples, a Bildungsroman: Franz is "gebildet" by encounters with things—he is not. In this sense the work is extremely realistic, for that is generally how people's characters are formed. But, as in Wilhelm Meisters Lehrjahr, the context is artificial: the possibility that harm or unhappiness may be caused to others by the hero's search for self-development is excluded from the work's contrived scheme of things. And, as Butler remarks, (35) "Sternbald wanders quite happily from one place to another; he is never in need, never meets mockery and is never refused hospitality: it hardly ever rains either! ... He neither comes into conflict with society, nor does he deliberately withdraw from it". It is for that reason, which the present study supports, that Butler concludes that "neither as a Bildungsroman nor as a Künstlerroman can this novel be rated very highly".

No interpretation of Sternbald will succeed unless it is based on the incidents which are the most crucial to his life, namely the occasions when he hears, or thinks he hears, the horns. On the first occasion (at the age of six) (36) he gives flowers to a little girl while a horn sounds in the distance. From this meeting grows Franz's concept of beauty:

alles Liebe und Holde entlehnte er von dieser Kindergestalt, alles Schöne was er sah, trug er in das Mädchens Bild hindber: wenn er von Engeln hörte, glaubte er einen zu kennen und sich von ihm gekannt, er war es überzeugt, daß die Feldblumen einst ein Erkennungszeichen zwischen ihnen beiden seyn würden. (37)

This also tells us that his sense of beauty has religious
connotations and is more connected with his capacity to feel love than with an aesthetic sense as such. Despite his training under Dürer, all he has achieved is an intermittent conviction that he wants to be an artist (possibly because Dürer is his father-figure) and another intermittent conviction that the first conviction is proof of ability. Unfortunately he finds himself unable to organise his thoughts and to express them cogently. (38)

Frenz recalls the childhood incident when, having returned briefly to his putative parents' home, he finds himself in the very place where it had occurred ("Es ist hier, gewißlich hier!") (39) and seems to hear the horn for the second time in his life:

Er hörte in der Trunkenheit wieder die Melodie eines Waldhorns, und konnte sich vor Wehmuth, vor Schmerzen der Erinnerung und süßen ungewissen Hoffnungen nicht fassen. (40)

The return to the very spot, and the mixture of recollection and hope, tell us that he has returned to a symbolic pivot round which his life turns. He has, it is implied, latent capacities and feels that unknown forces outside him are evoking them. (41) This need not be regarded as a symbol of manipulation by fate, since it is more convincing as a typically intense description of his awareness of his development to adulthood. In his previous tutelage at Nuremberg, with a strict regimen of instruction and arduous application, there was neither time nor opportunity for growth of this kind. Now it all happens at once. He returns to where he once experienced love, because he is now resuming his progress down a path he has ignored since childhood: the path of life instead of the path of art. (The theme of a return to an earlier and mysterious period of one's life is often found in the Trivialroman, but Tieck
uses this motif here to emphasize the tensions within Franz rather than merely to create a mystery. This transformation of popular literature is reminiscent of his use of terror for psychological characterisation rather than merely to inculcate a vicarious thrill."

The third time he hears the horn occurs when he saves a young woman from injury when her carriage is about to overturn. (He realises after her departure that she was Marie.) Tieck tells us clearly that the horns which Franz hears in adult life are merely auditory illusions:

innerlich erdnte der Gesang des Wal dhorns, den er in der Kindheit gehért hatte. (43)

His artistic direction is changed from religion (in so far as it was on that path) to love:

Du warst es, Bothin des Himmels, für die ich mein erstes Bild aufgestellt habe ... (44)

Tieck as narrator comments that the change wrought in Franz by this incident brings to life what already lay dormant, and also that Franz is no longer capable of formulating objectives because his horizon has widened beyond his capacity to understand it. (45)

Franz has already come to certain conclusions about his compulsion to be an artist. In rejecting (with lamentable tactlessness) Zeuner's kindly-meant offer of employment, on the grounds that he has no respect for business or money and could not reconcile himself to a life cut off from art, he is led to reflect on the isolation this brings him. (46) In an encounter with a peasant family which is shown to be entirely content while ignorant of art, he is so impressed by the rustic domestic idyll that he temporarily thinks of nothing else. (47) Art is hardly a driving force
and all-pervading view if it is displaced so easily. Furthermore, we note that he is preoccupied with the way of life he has witnessed at first hand. In a passage reminiscent of Lebrecht he transfers his ideal from the remote to the everyday, (48) and idealises (being of urban upbringing) the contentment and instinctive wisdom he attributes to the peasantry. (49) He is also assailed by guilt on realising that he has almost forgotten his parents in his own ambitions; (50) this guilt implies that he doubts the value of art and therefore doubts his vocation if it is incompatible with ordinary human feelings. But despite his fear of isolation and his distaste for the amoral position of the artist, he is nonetheless compelled by art: instead of comforting the dying man and his wife, whom he still believes to be his parents, he is obsessed (although reproaching himself for it) with ideas for possible paintings of death-scenes. (51)

Franz has already begun to regard freedom as the chief attraction in an artist's life. In explaining to Brigitte (whom he still believes to be his mother) why he does not want to stay, he does not mention any aesthetic matters, only the free life. (52)

Franz's religious feeling has an equally unsound foundation. He is even warned about this by Mrer in a letter to the effect that religious fervour, if not guided by reason, will take on elements which are not truly pious. (53) The tendency in him which makes this warning so apposite is shown in the church service shortly before he saves Marie from the accident: he enjoys piety as an artistic experience. (54) We recall that the rustic bliss he experienced on the way home was related to art ("mit
diesem seligen Frieden ist die Kunst verwandt". (55) Whatever satisfies a need in him, whether for family relationships, for religion, for love, it is expressed as art: not because he is an artist but because he has no other terms in which to think of reality. In a manner reminiscent of Kant's theory of perception he cannot see life other than as his thoughts shape it: the artistic view is, for the present, his Categorical Imperative, although he grows away from it in due course. His seeing life as though he were an artist is an acquired characteristic which is eroded by his real nature as he falls in love.

The proof of this is in his attempts to produce art. He has the greatest difficulty in settling down to work, not because he lacks motivation or energy, but because he has so little idea what to paint. An excess of feeling hinders purposeful activity, so this "Zagen" (as Dürer calls it) (56) either prevents him from starting work or from sustaining, in implementation, the enthusiasm of his plan. (57) He recognises the insufficiency of a mere ambition. (56)

Even in so far as Franz retains artistic ambitions after meeting Marie again - which is, as will be seen, not very far - he is if anything less certain about what perfect art really is. At Leiden he visits Lukas, and also meets Dürer again. Tieck's Dürer is essentially a Romantic, working in a variety of forms (59) and with the search for inner peace as his underlying motive. (60) His personal emotional and psychological needs are met by his practice of art, so he is oblivious to authenticity, money and fame. (61) He does not hold nationalistic views, but has such connotations in the
minds of others. (62) Despite Franz's veneration for Dürer, Lukas, who is more pragmatic and an inferior artist, influences Franz more.

The strength of Lukas is associated with his place in the tradition of art within which he works. He is a perfector, not an innovator (63) (whereas of Dürer, and to some extent even of Franz, one would say the opposite). As such, he upholds the value of national schools of art and has no understanding of the kind of genius who breaks new ground. (64) He regards Franz's hesitation (his "Zagen") as a weakness:

Nach dem, was Ihr mir gesagt habt, müßt Ihr viele Anlagen zu einem Poeten haben, nur muß ein Dichter auch mit Ruhe arbeiten. (65)

Indeed it is, in a sense, a weakness, but it is no more "unkünstlerisch" than Lukas's unthinking facility. Lukas unwittingly condemns himself when he adds that this fault was found in Leonardo da Vinci and is the explanation for the Italian's small output. As Dürer puts it, there must also be "Kunstgeist... denen der Anblick des Mannigfaltigen ungemein zu Statten kommt"; (66) such a vision could well preclude either virtuosity or prolificity or both.

The weakness of the novel becomes apparent from this point. Franz has received a new impetus to return to more conventional life and to seek Marie rather than artistic achievement, but the two themes in Franz's life - art and love - degenerate, as far as the rest of the novel is concerned, into a support-structure for a further series of encounters which give rise to further discussions about art but add little to Franz's characterisation. At the point where the unfinished work ends he is, we are told, more
confident and mature, but he does not seem to the reader to
be otherwise different. The theme, in so far as there is one by
that time, still rests on the displacement of art by love and on
his temperamental difficulties. His letter to Sebastian contains
the main doubt:

kann ich vielleicht nur dichtend mahlen, bis ich
sie wieder finde? und dann sollte wohl in ihrer
Gegenwart mein Talent erlöschen, weil mein Geist sie
nicht mehr zu suchen brauchte? (68)

He rapidly discounts this possibility by the familiar and
unconvincing assertion that his passionate conviction constitutes
proof. Another letter to Sebastian, from Florence, refers to the
temperamental difficulty:

Mein Geist ist zu unstät, zu wankelmütig, zu schnell von
ejeder Neuheit ergriffen; ich möchte gern alles leisten,
und darüber werde ich am Ende gar nichts thun können. (69)

However, these realisations have no effect on him, since he
continues his travels more or less as he began, and they cannot
impress the reader of the novel who knows more about Franz than
Franz does about himself.

At the root of the weakness in this work - and perhaps the best
explanation of why the novel remained unfinished despite
intermittent intentions of finishing it (70) - is the fact that the
themes of love and art are shown to be related but are not shown to
generate any actual or potential tension beyond the odd troubled
moment. The manuscript fragment of unknown date, continuing the
work, (71) shows that Tieck's later ideas for it had less and less
to do with the story thus far. Other works show that he saw a
dynamic force, fascinating to a novelist, in the deprivation of
self-fulfilment in love. (72) In contrast, actual self-fulfilment
could only be euphoric fantasy, and held no interest for him as a writer. Even in other ways the work shows little sense of real life, as Butler's remarks indicate. Admittedly, there is potential tension between Franz's quest and his temptation to settle down to prosperity and domesticity; it troubles him briefly when he has the opportunity of marrying Vansen's daughter, of going to Italy at Vansen's expense and thereafter of being maintained as a painter. This is not the same as the independence from material wants that he had desired earlier: it is "das wirklich Leben" intruding "um sein inneres poetisches zu verdrängen". He evidently fears not only responsibility but also domesticity and immersion in the settled routines of community life, and is later to fear that his art is the product of his unsatisfied love. His fear of ordinary domestic life is the fear from outside it (and the same could be said of his occasional longing for it). In this essential respect he has strong affinities with Lovell and Christian.

(2) The perceptive non-artist

It has been shown that Tieck's ideas on art and artists (terms we take to include poetry and poets) divide into two main groups. On the one hand, there is the theme of incompatibility and even hostility between art and a defective society; this theme develops (somewhat in this period, and considerably in the novellas) into an examination of the social and political role of art and the artist. On the other hand, there has been extensive discussion of the character and state of mind of artist-figures. The two groups of themes are closely connected. For example, it has been noted that, in the Herzensaehigungen and Phantasien, Tieck censures, albeit
sympathetically, artist-figures who arrogantly deny that they might be ordinary and who exaggerate their abilities and importance. These characters are part of his more general debunking of the self-styled geniuses of the Aufklärung. They also demonstrate that no alleviation of society's philistinism is likely to be forthcoming from an aesthetically aware minority.

But his longer study of an artist in Sternbald - though it has many affinities with the portrayal of Berglinger - is less a debunking of a particular type and more a review of two interrelated general problems. Firstly, Sternbald is confused and hesitant where the genius (a term which is not entirely complimentary in this context) is certain and decisive; he is unable to formulate any precise aim in life because his horizon widens beyond the scope of his experience and analytical powers. Secondly, there is his ambivalence between artistic and mundane objectives. He feels an intermittent longing for a peaceful bourgeois family existence (idealised, of course), even though for much of the time he recoils from it as from an unbearable enslavement to possessions and routine and proclaims the freedom of an artist's life. In Sternbald these two problems are considered theoretically, because the milieu is entirely artificial and the theme of the work as a whole not as well-defined as one would wish. However, in the shorter works of the period, particularly Eckart and Runenberg, which use allegory in preference to a spurious realism, these problems receive clearer treatment.

The confusion as to aims experienced by Sternbald is itself merely a muddled version of a theory propounded in Der Blaubart.
to the effect that there are two types of knowledge - the analytical and the intuitive. The relationship between a free life and a settled one is considered in **Eckart**, where the theme soon acquires social and moral overtones. Our third work in this group - **Runenberg** - considers both themes together.

These three works have an important feature in common: Tieck raises the question not of conformity to an established value (whether moral or aesthetic) but of the definition of value in the first place. "Who discerns truth?" he seems to ask. "Does not every man think himself perceptive and logical?" This question is to some extent present in **Zerbino** (particularly in the characters of the King and Zerbino himself), where it is suggested that people who see the real truth or who doubt that what they are told and what everybody seems to accept is necessarily the truth are conveniently deemed mad. That work, however, is more closely related to the **Aufklärung** and Tieck's reaction to it. The three works mentioned are concerned with these questions more generally.

**Der Blaubart**

Of the three, the weakest is **Der Blaubart**, since it is based on two unrelated elements. On the one hand, there is the psychological portrayal of Peter Berner (in itself a fine accomplishment), whose irrational hatred of women, aggressive nature generally and fear of being thought ugly are interlinked. On the other hand is a pair of original thinkers: Simon (Berner's final brother-in-law) who works by intuition, and Claus the Fool, who subjects unquestioned assumptions to rigorous analysis and finds them wanting (and is therefore a Fool). The thematic connection between these three characters - that each is an outcast in some respect
because of physical or mental abnormality - is too tenuous to gather the work's material together, though reminiscences of other works are interesting in themselves.

In the remaining two works of our group Tieck turns to a specific form of difference. Instead of the general proposition that some people think differently from society, thereby creating enmity, he lays increasing emphasis on conflict within an individual. This inner conflict had been present in Tieck's works before. Lovell-types resolve it by proclaiming their rectitude, Almansur-types by simply not recognising their own motives. Increasingly Tieck wrote of people who try to live harmoniously with their fellows despite contrary instincts. The theme is found in Lebrecht, in the "Komplimmente", or ritualised gestures by means of which people express their desire to live in harmony. (81)

On the one hand, an individual is a member of human society, and shares in some measure its preoccupations, beliefs and compulsions. On the other hand, an occasional individual feels the lure of another world where the norm of behaviour is what ordinary society forbids.

This raises two possibilities: either society is wrong, to the point of perverting or suppressing natural instincts; or the individual's inner conviction is an error, even unto madness.

Hitherto, Tieck has considered this theme mainly in artistic contexts: the "Klosterbruder" prides himself on his superior discernment; Sternbald feels both attracted to and repelled by
ordinary domesticity. Henceforth Tieck removes the complicating factor of art. In the sense that neither the "Klosterbruder", nor even Bergdinger or Sternbald, are, properly speaking, artists, art was not a major element in their sense of being different; it was merely a way of expressing it. It was never presented as an excuse for being different, although Tieck showed how there were people who believed themselves to be non-artistic geniuses entitled to what would be regarded as bad behaviour in an ordinary person.\(^{(82)}\)

In the two stories remaining, the alternative standards discerned by the principal characters will be the products of their own minds. This may represent the influence of Kant, or merely illustrate Tieck's belief, which may have been reached from his study of Shakespeare\(^{(83)}\) or independently, that people think the way they feel, not the other way round.

*Der getreue Eckart und der Tannenhäuser* (1799)

The story is set in two different environments, the feudal mediaeval and the contemporary bourgeois. Tieck demonstrates thereby that certain basic problems of life are the same whatever society's form of organisation. For this he needed two contrasting societies, but he writes of society in general rather than of these two in particular. (The king in *Zerbino* also discounts the possibility that any one form of society is essentially better than any other.\(^{(84)}\)

In the first part of this story, Eckart's feudal loyalty to the Duke of Burgundy overrides his natural instincts, so that he is unable to avenge the murder of his sons by Burgundy, feels
obliged to save their murderer's life a second time, and to accept Burgundy's orphaned children as his wards. These moral constraints (as Eckart believes them to be) have an enemy: the "Venusberg". This force is described by an old man who lost his sons to its call. When Christianity supplanted Heathen idolatry, the devils fled into the 'Venusberg', where Venus holds court with hordes of worldly lusts and forbidden desires. No one knows where the "Venusberg" is, for it does not occur to innocents to seek it - the manifestation of guilt is itself the experience of temptation, as with Bertha - and those who do find it never return.

Rebellion is stimulated by the fact that society's code makes inhuman demands on people, so the young refuse to heed the precepts of their parents and religion: like the sons of Heymon, they want to go their own way, follow their own standards. Perhaps repression is itself responsible for their selection of such an extreme course as that described by the old man or for their willing self-immersion "im holden Wahnsinn". Inhuman constraints and the dangerous extremity of the consequent reaction (in Jungian terms a transfer of libido from one area to another) are the joint themes of the first part. This is neither a eulogy nor a condemnation of an ideal of unthinking true-heartedness: it is simultaneously a rejection of a code of behaviour which represses normal feelings and a warning of the danger of over-reaction which that repression provokes. In other words, deprivation of the gratification of normal impulses results in a distortion of character, as with Abdallah, Lovell, and Emil (of Liebeszauber).
The second part of the story, set four centuries later, confirms the view that the lure of the "Venusberg" symbolises the rebellious force of suppressed instinct, and adds that, when the sensuous life calls, a remoteness from the everyday world in bourgeois comfort is as inadequate a protection as was feudal order's mindless devotion to duty. The title refers to a Tannenhauser, a contemporary "kaiserlicher Rath", who is a descendant of one of the Duke of Burgundy's most faithful servants; his lineage suggests that the conflict between repression and instinct is to be re-enacted. This modern Tannenhauser had felt oppressed and controlled by an evil spirit from the time of his youth, and had feared that this would one day lead him to Hell; every sight and sound in nature had reminded him of the legend of the "Spielmann" and "Venusberg", with Eckart on guard, and had filled him with longing. He had also been oppressed by a recurring dream of taking leave from a grief-stricken father. Thus we have, as in the mediaeval story, the attractiveness of the "Venusberg" to those whom life's code, inculcated by parents, keeps away from it. Love for Emma, unrequited because of her preference for his friend Friedrich, had turned into violent feelings in the fantasy-murder of Friedrich, at the same time as his father had died of grief, caused directly by his mother's death but indirectly by himself, since his mother's death had been caused by grief over his wild life. This is an interesting parallel to Freud's Rat-Man and to Ivan Karamazov, for having evidently entertained the idea of his father's death as a means of removing parental restraint, he had naturally
been shocked when it had happened. In the Tannhäuser's case (as in Dmitri's), he had plunged into a life of sensuality and drunkenness. Soon he had regarded himself as doomed. For a while "Hoffnung und Lebenslust" had held him back, but he had eventually decided that resistance was useless. This implies he made a conscious choice for evil, in order to be rid of the pangs of conscience it caused him. He had entered a life of perpetual gratification, in which the horror and enormity of his deeds had heightened his intoxication with them. (Again we are reminded of the Lovell types and of Dmitri Karamazov, attracted by the very self-abasement of debauchery.) Eventually he had been satisfied, had yearned for the restful, innocent life, with its low-level, short-lived joys and sorrows, and had undertaken a journey to Rome to seek papal forgiveness.

Forgiveness is denied him, whereupon he resolves to return to his old ways. He murders Emma, saying "Diese soll mich nicht in meinem Laufe stören!". This remark is unexplained, but means perhaps that she, by existing, reminds him of the life he might have had, so he wishes her not to exist, to be no longer an impediment to his depravity. The kiss which burns after being given to Friedrich by the Tannhäuser, is also part of the legend: it is supposed to initiate the irresistible enticement of the recipient into the "Venusberg". This means either that Friedrich is now drawn into a similar life because he is deprived of Emma, or that with his comforting insulation from basic passions now destroyed he is at risk. The security of an ordered life is thereby shown to be a fallacy.
In his gradual definition of the question: who sees truth? Tieck finally sheds not only the artist-figure but also the theme of deprivation of self-fulfilment in love as a distorting influence. In the story of Der Runenberg we are left with simply a man: the tension between society and the individual is elaborated without these complications. Furthermore, it becomes clear that the tension is within Christian (as within Sternbald). We are faced not with a man who would go his own way if he had the courage or if society were not restrictive or coercive, but with a man in whom the natural compulsions are mutually inimical: he is attracted both to society and to asocial forces, and is also repelled by both. Lillyman is too harsh in regarding the work as so ambiguous as to be beyond interpretation. The ambiguities do not emanate from the work as a whole, and are best regarded as areas of ambivalence in the principal character.

From the very first, Christian's feelings are divided. On the one hand, he has left his native village "um sich aus dem Kreise der wiederkehrenden Gewöhnlichkeit zu entfernen". He had felt impelled to leave his parents' home "wie mit fremder Gewalt", namely an inner compulsion:

mein Geist war seiner selbst nicht mächtig; wie ein Vogel, der in einem Netz gefangen ist und sich vergeblich sträubt, so verstrickt war meine Seele in seltsamen Vorstellungen und Wünschen.

This implies that the 'trap' against which he struggled was as much the 'strange ideas and desires' as the parental environment. Apart from this ambiguity (which will be considered later), his departure was an assertion of his own identity by the unreflective
implementation of his desire for independence (and has that crucial feature in common with Bertha's departure in Eckbert). Although he makes a passing reference to mines and miners, he is drawn primarily by the wild grandeur of the mountain scenery, by the noisy rough-and-tumble of the chase, in contrast to the life of the plains. It is this which underlies his inadvertent punning mention of "das Ebene" and "die Ebene", and which prompts him, somewhat arrogantly, to pity those plainsdwellers who have not realised the truth:

Es schien mir, als wenn alle Menschen um mich her in der bejammernswürdigsten Unwissenheit lebten, und daß alle eben so denken und empfinden würden, wie ich, wenn ihnen dieses Gefühl ihres Elendes nur ein einziges Mal in ihrer Seele aufginge. (105)

This criticism is directed solely against their meticulously planned routine lives in contrast to his freedom and excitement hunting in the mountains. Rasch, argues that Christian's departure from home is an example of what Freud calls "Unbehagen in der Kultur" caused by the suppression of the "Aggressionsneigung" (a concept related not specifically to violence but to assertion of the will and personal identity). Rasch also believes that Christian's hunting is a substitute or outlet for this aggression, and that it demonstrates Freud's belief in the sublimation of aggression through freely chosen work. These views of Rasch and Freud we take to be supported by Christian's own words and actions and by common sense. Rasch's belief that Christian's love for the mineral world is also a Freudian death-wish (an "ichbezogener Todestrieb") and that his hunting, too, is a death-wish because it leads him to the 'dead' mineral world is, however, unconvincing, because
Christian shows no interest in the minerals until after he has become a huntsman (Rasch’s theory would require him to be drawn to them on their own account) and because his interest in them, when it appears, has, as will be seen, another motive. Hunting as a release and escape from his native village is so natural in a man of his years and circumstances that it does not seem to call for special comment.

The contradiction within Christian is shown by the fact that his happiness in freedom is not constant. He finds the solitude and unfamiliarity of his circumstances burdensome. We have already noted that the urge to leave home was as much a source of anxiety to him as was the restricted environment itself. He is both drawn to and repelled by both environments: a state of mind not uncommon on first leaving home, and again not calling for special comment. It is in his depressed, lonely state of mind that he pulls up the "Alrunenwurzel". This is a legendary root supposed to give out, when uprooted, a cry of pain which sends those who hear it mad; its uprooting is a symbol of figurative rootlessness, of the abandonment of settled communities based on the orderly routines of cultivation. The uprooting is soon followed by Christian’s visit to the Runenberg, where he has an erotic encounter with the strange woman of the mountain. She gives him the "magische steinerne Tafel", which forms "eine wunderliche unverständliche Figur". He is dazzled as much by the jewels as by the woman. She gives him the tablet, telling him "Nimm dieses zu meinem Angedenken".

His first experience of the minerals is therefore the
the consequence of an erotic vision. The concepts of wealth and love are then lost to his conscious mind, but are locked away within him and are associated one with the other. These two concepts have been unrecognized integral parts of him, which are not implanted on the mountain but are rendered active there. As the stranger, giving him directions, puts it:

wer nur zu suchen versteht, wessen Herz recht innerlich hingezogen wird, der findet uralte Freunde dort und Herrlichkeiten, alles, was er am eifrigsten wünscht. (113)

This experience changes him so much that it creates a demarcation of before-and-after in his life, and introduces confusion as to what is strange and what is ordinary. (114)

As a reaction he is drawn irresistibly to a peaceful, neat village, having obviously had a surfeit of solitary freedom.

An important aspect of this impulse is his self-disgust at the desire for sexual gratification and limitless wealth he had felt on the mountain. We may assume these desires to have conflicted sharply with his upbringing, so he was shocked to discover what was within him:

Seine Empfindungen und Wünsche der Nacht erschienen ihm ruchlos und frevelhaft, er wollte sich wieder kindlich, bedümmig und demüthig an die Menschen wie an seine Brüder schließen, und sich von den rötlichen Gefühlen und Vorsätzen entfernen. (115)

He had formerly felt contempt for those whose happiness is made possible only by their unawareness. This is now replaced by compassion for their precarious life. (116)

His marriage to the beautiful village girl, Elisabeth, and his going to work as a gardener for her father are the inevitable expression of his return. Eros leads to marriage, obsession with
wealth to productive work. These are ordinary life's equivalents of the ideals, or its substitutes for them. Whether he considers them real versions or less-acceptable substitutes is concealed in his remark to Elisabeth upon just being married:

Nein, nicht jenes Bild bist du, welches mich einst im Traum entzückte und das ich niemals ganz vergessen kann; aber doch bin ich glücklich in deiner Nähe und seelig in deinen Armen. (117)

This could be either insulting and a presage of eventual disappointment, or a sensible dismissal of fantasy as inappropriate in a responsible member of the community such as he now intends (in his conscious mind, at least) to be. In either case it excludes Vredefeld's belief that the woman in the mountains is "the Great Mother Goddess". (118) Her unmotherly disrobing is regarded by Vredefeld as "not an act of seduction, but a symbol of revelation". (119) But it is hardly likely that Christian would imply erotic comparisons between his new bride and his mother. Furthermore, the woman of the mountains was not, as Hubbs contends, "die absolute Wahrheit", (120) except that Christian regarded her, at that time and intermittently thereafter, as the absolutely true erotic vision. The point which Hubbs overlooks is that Christian has acquisitive as well as sexual motives.

Christian's understanding of, and sympathy with, the world he has rejoined grow with his increasing commitment to it: the birth of their child makes him think of his own parents, and of the pleasure his way of life would give his father if he knew of it. He goes to visit his parents, pained by the separation from his wife and also fearful that it may revive his former conflict. (121)
This fear is realised. His fondness for the village and Elisabeth suddenly strikes him as proof that he has settled down, and he feels a pang of regret for his lost youth. The sight of the Runenberg fills him with the fear of succumbing to temptation:

Ich kenne dich Wahnsinn wohl, rief er aus, und dein gefährliches Locken, aber ich will dir männlich widerstehn! Elisabeth ist kein schnöder Traum, ich weiß, daß sie jetzt an mich denkt, daß sie auf mich wartet und liebevoll die Stunden meiner Abwesenheit zählt. (123)

This temptation is obviously not that of the mineral wealth, but of the 'Waldweib', for only Elisabeth is mentioned (productive work is not) as an 'ordinary' element. This erotic interpretation of his fear is supported by his remark to Elisabeth at the time of their wedding. (124)

Christian's father is an analogue of Christian. Beneath his moral condemnation of his son for restlessness and greed lies a fear of what may be invoked in himself. He is made uneasy by examining the tablet ("mir schaudert recht im Herzen"). (125) And when he has tracked Christian as far as the entrance to the mine, and has good reason to believe him inside, he turns away "in der Ueberzeugung, daß sein Sohn im Wahnsinn hinein gegangen, und in alte gesammelte Wässer und Untiefen versunken sei". (126) Only fear of entering (which is not, presumably, an ordinary physical fear) could explain this non sequitur. This again reminds us that the dualism of Christian is not peculiar to him, though he suffers it in an acute form.

This obsession with gold first afflicts Christian not as miserliness but as a means of achieving security:

Diese Summe könnte uns recht glücklich machen, sagte er einmal zu seinem Vater, wenn der Fremde nicht zurück kommen sollte, für uns und unsere Kinder wäre auf immer gesorgt. (127)
His assiduous work - which causes his father to fear for his health (128) - is probably also motivated by the desire for security, which is part of his new way of life. He may also wish to become independent of the stranger's gold, and thereby to destroy its power. But the gold soon dominates his thoughts, seems to speak a "Liebeswort" to him, to communicate to him its "Liebesdrang". He had controlled his earlier erotic obsession by entering into a conventional marriage. A chain of events had begun with his discontent at home, leading to his freedom and loneliness, his sight of the woman and his acceptance of Elisabeth as an "everyday" substitute. The logical and instinctual next stage is to provide for his wife and children. In his first stage, eroticism is the means, marriage and procreation the ends. In his second, wealth is the means, security the ends. Eroticism and acquisitiveness are different forms of taking the means for the ends. The gold brings wealth without work, just as the woman's erotic aspect implied sexual gratification without responsibility. It was the undeserved aspect of the gold which, to one of Christian's background of work-ethic, suggested licentiousness.

Christian's belief that this is his true nature - "die wahre Gestalt meines Innern" (130) - is merely part of his view at that point. Plainly he was not always so, and his reference to "die magische Figur" as "ein Gift" (131) tells us that his allegiance is still divided, albeit unequally. Just as the stranger on the mountain had implied that latent desires were activated rather than new ones implanted, (132) Christian now explains to his father that pre-existing tendencies in him are being evoked. (133) He can, he
says, live peacefully and contentedly for whole periods, only to find that the conflicting impulse wells up. The interpretation based on "Unbehagen in der Kultur" (in a simple form, without the death-wish) is again shown to be plausible, since Christian's description suggests not only a cumulative effect and consequent collapse of equilibrium but also that there is a recurring pattern.

Soon, however, his system of values is inverted by madness. He regards the mineral world as the true live one, and the plant world as a dead, decayed excrescence of it. He believes that the groan of the "Alrunenwurzel" when torn out shows that the plant world perceives its sorry state. The plants, having unwittingly betrayed themselves, seek his destruction. (134) Clearly, Christian senses his father's hostility, and the more general hostility of his father's world, towards his secret desires, and he reverses his scheme of values in order to remove his sense of guilt. Specifically, he assumes that the groan of the "Alrunenwurzel" indicates its sorrow in self-awareness because this explanation makes the plainsdwellers appear deprived and himself the possessor of a fundamental truth unperceived by them because they are deluded. If he felt himself to be licentious and covetous (he is both) he would feel guilty. Since he knows he is hostile to them he attributes hostility to them. His reversal of values also serves as apparent justification for his disloyal feelings about Elisabeth. She is no longer young and beautiful, and we take him to be thinking longingly of a life of sexual licence when he says

so habe ich muthwillig ein hohes ewiges Glück aus der Acht gelassen, um ein vergängliches und zeitliches zu gewinnen. (135)
Christian's return to the mountain expresses his desire to escape. It is a recurrence of his youthful departure from his parents, but this time he seeks not the freedom and activity dear to a young man, but the erotic freedom and limitless wealth which constitutes the desired contrast to his ageing wife and his enslavement to work. These are his fundamental motives, but since the inner tension has driven him mad, his particular expression of these ambitions is irrational. The form his madness takes is consistent with his means of explaining his father's hostility and of justifying his dissatisfaction with his wife; he regards himself as privy to a truth not perceived by others. This characteristic was present in him from the first, as he revealed his contempt for the toiling plains-dwellers. He now deludes himself that the hideous old crone is the beautiful woman of the mountains and that the worthless stones are jewels. The madness does not consist of error in perception - he sees the same crone and pebbles as anyone else - but of error in evaluation. This poses a logical problem for him: if the pebbles are precious stones, why do they look like pebbles? The madman's answer is that the stones are in disguise; the spark when they are struck shows what is within. (136)

After his departure, his wife and second husband fall on hard times, "als wenn das so wunderbar erworbene Geld auf allen Wegen eine schleunige Flucht suchte". It was not their fault that they had had that windfall, and their misfortunes serve two purposes as far as the reader is concerned: firstly, to demonstrate that their life was indeed precarious; secondly, to provide implicit
condemnation of Christian's obsessions, since they cause misery to others we well as to himself. We cannot be intended to believe that the gold really has a will to escape; if we were, the gold would go to the mine, not to the pockets of swindlers.

Christian's perceptiveness consists of his belief that life can be exciting, fulfilling and beautiful, in contrast to the dull routine, acceptance of hardship and renunciation of ambition which seem to him to characterise the lives of his parents and other plainsdwellers. We are obviously intended to sympathise with his longings, and with the fact that he is drawn to both ways of life. But basically Tieck intends us to censure him. Daemonic nature is symbolised by the gold and jewels and by the unnamed woman - representing, respectively, gratuitous wealth and sexual gratification without responsibility - and Christian's ambitions for these cause his misery and the misery of his dependants. His vision of beauty is wonderful, its implementation in social reality a disaster. It is as though Tieck reproves Sternbald for his attitude to the peasants and to Zeuner, or (138) upholds the Doctor's view of Simon in Blaubart. The story therefore accords with Tieck's criticism of self-indulgent and parasitic behaviour in other works. Far from regarding Christian's vision as in any way poetic, we should associate it rather with the selfishness of Tieck's arrogant hermits, unproductive pseudo-artists and predatory aristocracy.

(3) The pseudo-problem of "Der blonde Eckbert"

To relegate consideration of Eckbert to the status of
postscript may seem illogical, even perverse, since it appeared before those works with which it is often associated and has received much scholarly attention. The defence for this relegation is that Ekkbert is one of Tieck’s worst pieces—certainly his most overrated—and therefore deserves it. It defies any attempt at reason: and in literary interpretation, even guesswork, flights of fancy and wild speculation must accommodate themselves to reason sooner or later, or the primary purpose of communication is defeated. Tieck makes unconvincing attempts to create a supernatural atmosphere by stereotyped images which insult the reader’s intelligence, and the insult has usually been swallowed eagerly as though it were a delicacy. For example, Kimpel remarks that Tieck makes nature an active force because as Bertha tells her story the night looks in and the trees shiver in the cold and wet. (139) Tieck does not say, and Kimpel does not take him to say, that the trees seem to shiver, but that they actually do. This does not deserve to be taken seriously, but even if we do take it seriously it proves only that nature is a passive entity and is therefore not to be feared. And we must demur also that trees which feel warm and dry are, if they are allowed to be sentient in the first place, no longer feeling anything at all, because they are dead. A tree which is capable of feeling cold and wet ought also to feel pleased about it.

However, this work retains a certain position as the first invented Märchen. More importantly still, we should concede that if Tieck had not written it he may not have written Der Runenberg or have developed his awareness of economic and cultural parasitism
in the satirical comedies and later in the novellas: for it will be shown that the subject-matter has significant affiliations with that of other works. Like many an innovation, the writing of Eckbert may be more important for having been done at all, rather than for how well it was done.

The story as a whole depends on Bertha's life-story, and Eckbert's initiative in making it and related circumstances known to outsiders. The former is the more important. The emphasis on Eckbert adds little to it, and must therefore be regarded as a defect if one intends an interpretation of Bertha to rely, as some have relied, on her illegitimacy and on her theft as necessarily requiring the punishment of an incestuous marriage. Such interpretations leave unanswered too many unsatisfactory questions: for they apparently require that Eckbert is similarly punished, even though he is not illegitimate and steals nothing.

Bertha's life falls into several stages. First there is her unhappy childhood. In her despair she dreams of rescuing her parents from poverty by riches which she would acquire in some wonderful manner (a dream which she attempts, but without success, to realise when she returns to her village after leaving the old woman). Evidently this represents a desire for affection. Rippere regards Bertha's daydreaming of riches as selfish and her fear of strangers as indicative of "narcissism". Apparently we are to believe that a girl of eight who wishes she were dead and fears each new day for the unhappiness it will bring is self-willed and idle. But is really a distressingly simple matter:
an unwanted child indulges in compensating fantasy (somewhat similar to Shakespeare in *Kenelworth* and *Hichterleben*), and the romantic daydreaming is a wish to buy the parental love she does not expect to gain otherwise. Perhaps she later buys Eckbert’s love: it is at least probable that he marries her for her money. (146) Certainly it is not surprising that she ran away from home.

The supernatural element begins with the second stage of her life, when at the age of eight she runs away to the mountains. She is taken in by a strange old woman, and stays with her until she is fourteen. She rapidly learns to manage the household, to spin, and to read, despite her former ineptitude; but there is nothing remarkable in this since she is no longer ill-treated. (147) From her reading she forms wonderful impressions of the outside world, and dreams of knights who woo her. (148) Her expectations of the outside world are very unrealistic, and inevitably so. (Later she finds the ordinary world less wonderful than she had hoped, (149) but this point remains undeveloped.) One of her duties while with the old woman is to gather and store the pearls and gemstones obtained from the birds’ eggs. With no obvious context or intention, the old woman warns her that straying from the strait and narrow path will be punished, however long the interval may be. (150) It eventually occurs to Bertha that the jewels may be valuable and that the old woman’s warning refers to them; but she has no concept of good and evil, and none is explained to her. At the age of fourteen it occurs to her that she could take advantage of the old woman’s absence to leave with the jewels and the bird, and that she may thereby find the knight of her dreams. She leaves, torn not between
the pros and cons of theft but between the "Waldesinsamkeit" (which represents innocence in isolation) and "die Vorstellung einer neuen Welt" (151), where her new concepts of love and money direct her (at the price of that innocence). Unknown to her, her "Probeweit" is over before she commits the theft, though what this means is never explained.

There is no doubt that Bertha has been a victim, and this means that if the work has a moral theme, which it often seems to, the moral theme is unacceptable. The old woman implanted the idea of theft in her mind — whether inadvertently or not — and gave her the opportunity to commit it, while providing no moral training and taking no interest in her intellectual and emotional development. Furthermore, the guilt is a mere trick. The old woman cannot be isolated from the real world at all; if the jewels are worth stealing they must have a market-value; therefore they must have a market, which can only be in the real world since jewels in such plenty are useless otherwise.

Secondly, Bertha was not informed that she was on trial and at the edge of a trap; so no guilt can be attached to her. A third objection is that Bertha’s having been induced to steal is not her offence: it is further offence against her, even though she feels guilty. The possibility that Tieck intended the story to uphold the value of absolute morality determined by conscience may also be discounted because Bertha is a tragic victim, not an offender at all. One may legitimately doubt the value of any moral teaching in a work which is so irrational and self-contradictory and which apparently requires the deceit of children. But since so many
aspects of the story cannot be discussed except in moral context, its entitlement to serious attention is undermined, even in any other interpretation.

As an economic act, Bertha's theft is the symbol of her usufruct of literary ideas which form her dreams: she is living on the wealth or imagination of others instead of working to obtain her own wealth or using her own mind. Belgardt believes that this reflects Tieck's own regrets at having commercially exploited his gifts; such views are possibly the indirect influence of Marx's objection to the treatment of literature as a commodity. Stäger writes that Tieck lost his "literarische Unschuld, bevor ihm ein gewichtiges eigenes Werk gelungen war", and before he had any experience of life. However, the errors of judgment Bertha commits are not the errors of a grown man earning his living by his pen; she simply allows her thoughts to be controlled by literary ideas and steals in order to be able to live as she wishes. Certainly the caps offered by Belgardt, Stäger and others can be made to fit, but only by dint of the most perverse twisting. If the story has any symbolic relevance to Tieck's own circumstances, the parasitic nature of living in an idyllic world is more to the point, for it places Eckbert in the same thematic category as Almansur and Des Lebens Überfluß instead of leaving it as an isolated puzzle. This parasitism seems, however, to be a less important theme in the work as it stands than the moral issue. Bertha and Eckbert are impelled by a force greater than their awareness of wrongdoing, namely by a force of self-assertion which defies self-analysis. As Bertha says, puzzled,
of her theft, "es war fast, als wenn mein Vorhaben schon vor mir stande, ohne mich dessen deutlich bewußt zu sein". (156) Eckbert kills Walther "ohne zu wissen, was er that". (157) These are not dream-like states, but the supremacy of inner compulsion over self-awareness: the compulsion to have one's own way, to impose one's desires upon life. Awareness of this process in oneself is a by-product of maturation, and it is this rather than specifically the passage from childhood to adulthood which forms the background to Bertha's story. As Bertha puts it, "es ist ein Unglück für den Menschen, daß er seinen Verstand nur darum bekommt, um die Unschuld seiner Seele zu verlieren". (158) Thus, Bertha (and to some extent Eckbert) is sometimes a moral symbol, sometimes a more general cultural one. The work defies consistent interpretation.

The situation of Eckbert is similar to Bertha's. He had always had a suspicion (though we are not told its basis) that Bertha was his sister, but he suppressed it. (159) Within the story's framework one might therefore infer that this was an intuitive moral sense which should have been binding. But if his incestuous marriage is a punishment, it is unrelated to the murders: the murders occur after the marriage (though before his discovery that it is incestuous). Even this ratiocination leads to an impasse. If one is to attach an intrinsic moral worth to an inner prompting it remains necessary to find external reasons for obeying an inner prompting not to marry a putative sister while disobeying another injunction, of presumably equal validity, to commit murder. The problem is that normal yardsticks are useless but that no others are supplied. While one would normally blame Eckbert for having
murdered either an old woman with the harmless if improbable eccentricity of impersonating middle-aged knights or two knights whose hostility after unwanted confidences was misconstrued, it is difficult to tell right from wrong within the story. If he was fated to commit murder it was no more his fault than the victim's (or victims'). All we can say for certain to Eckbert's discredit is that he is selfish and may have married for money. These failings do not warrant such a destiny.

There is much of the parasite about both Bertha and Eckbert, and the incest-theme symbolises their inability to have any form of constructive relationships with others. The marriage is childless not because of a "curse of nature upon the incestuous marriage"(160) but because there was no sexual motive: Bertha desired a literary romance and Eckbert was probably attracted by her money. This is the reason why Tieck suggests that their relationship was not all it seemed:

beide schienen sich von Herzen zu lieben, nur klagten sie gewöhnlich darüber, dass der Himmel ihre Ehe mit keinen Kindern segnen wolle. (161)

The implication that their love is pretence, and their marriage unconsummated, suggests that their complaint of childlessness may also be for public attention only. Interpreting the story as a stricture upon parasitism also satisfies the objection that Eckbert's "punishment" by condemnation to an incestuous marriage is undeserved: the work becomes an allegory of selfish retreat and exploitation of wealth accumulated by others. Eckbert becomes an analogy to Bertha instead of a source of contradiction. This obviates notions of original sin, (162) levels of reality, (163)
reference to Tieck's relationship with his sister (a highly improbable theory on its own account), or suggestions that Bertha and Eckbert are aspects of a single personality. Eckbert's last words support the interpretation offered here; it is the isolation, or, perhaps more accurately, his realisation of the isolation, which is the real horror for him:

In welcher entsetzlichen Einsamkeit hab' ich dann mein Leben hingebracht! (167)

The general effect of the work is simply to support the criticism of parasitic hermits in Almansur (though they had different reasons), and the aesthetic parasitism censured in the Herzenergiegenen. It is allied to a different, more economically related, parasitism criticised in Heymonskinder, the satirical comedies, and, much later, in Des Lebens Überfluss.

But it should be reiterated that much in the work fails to respond to any single interpretation. It would show an exaggerated respect to pretend that this was because the enigma was beyond us. The work has too many loose ends, so it is difficult to know, for example, whether the dog is, as critics have suggested, a spirit of humour, a symbolic child, or - since it looks and acts like a dog - a dog, which might equally well have been a chamois or nothing at all. The search for a single interpretation which explains everything is an assertion that the story is a perfect work of art with its own internal consistency. The plethora of critical puzzlement in the 180 years since its appearance suggests that it is far from that. If it is not a condemnation of parasitism (though not a very convincing work even then), it is a paranoid nightmare which defies literary criticism and does not warrant it.
III. THE MIDDLE YEARS - "PHANTASUS" AND "FORTUNAT"

After an interval of a decade, during which his literary activity almost ceased (though his scholarly activity proceeded), Tieck resumed writing, and worked on Phantasus. This consists of a reissue of many of his early works, with five new ones (the Phantasus poem, Däumchen, Liebeszauber, Pokal, and Elfen) and much connecting prose. In view of the plethora of themes hitherto found in Tieck's works, an element of summation which might have been expected is unfortunately lacking. The collection as a whole is a prodigious failure, though its position in Tieck's oeuvre gives it perhaps a catalytic importance (a claim similar to that made on behalf of Eckbert). It has certain other incidental merits: it expands some ideas adumbrated in earlier works; it illustrates (particularly in Däumchen and Elfen) a shift of Tieck's interest into economic and political life as desirable fields in which the ideal of beauty should be active and should become reality; and it contains (in Liebeszauber) a new work of particular, and perhaps underrated, intrinsic merit. The following sections will consist of analyses of the framework and of the new works in order to support these judgments.

(1) "Phantasus": the framework

Tieck originally intended that each of seven characters was to read seven stories or dramas, and that the connecting prose would contain relevant cultural discussion. The seven principals would be individually characterised and would represent "verschiedene Stimmungen des Autors selbst". However, the framework story is incredibly prolix and disorganised, and is irrelevant to the stories
it contains. The seven characters are too badly drawn to permit us to test his notion that they represent his moods, and since three of them are women it is unlikely to be entirely true of them. Furthermore, the works they "write" are often irrelevant to their characters, or at least so little relevant that we would not have considered the possibility of a relationship if it had not been put into our minds. Thalmann's apparent view that the stories express the characters of the narrators and that the work as a whole has a single effect(3) must be entirely discounted.

For example, Anton has had a nervous breakdown after a disappointing love-affair, and avoids stimulus whether from literature or from alcohol.(4) He is the "author" of the poem Phantasus, in which the purpose and function of poetry is examined, and of Der blonde Eckbert. He admires Jacobi for his amiability, simple wisdom and lack of sectarianism.(5) One could, if pressed, demonstrate consistency, if not necessary connection, between these points, although the mixture may prove to have a dash of casuistry in it. But this assembly of characteristics does not constitute a character, merely a hotch-potch. This defect typifies all seven.

It is a further defect that the literary works within Phantasus are not always related to the discussion which precedes them. While Manfred's reading of Die verkehrte Welt follows, appropriately, a discussion of Aristophanes' satire,(6) Wilibald's reading of Dümmchen is virtually ordered by Lothar, who wishes thereby to end an undignified squabble between Wilibald and Auguste.(7) Divergences of various types between the principals' characters in
the linking story and their opinions in the discussions, and between both and "their" stories are legion. They constitute a severe defect in Phantasus which prevents us from considering it further as an aesthetic achievement.

Although the structural connection between the Phantasus-framework and the use of dialogue in the novellas is the most obvious one, it is in the exchange of correspondence in Lovell, in the conversations of Sternbald and in the unconscious self-portrayal of the "Klosterbruder" that Tieck first used this technique of allowing a character to express a point of view and thereby to reveal the state of mind which engendered it. Tieck was later to claim for the novella as a genre (probably meaning, without realising it, his own usage) that it could reconcile varying points of view by demonstrating unperceived common ground or by enabling protagonists to see their own views and the views of others with new clarity because of a wider context; this process was intended to be not so much a compromise as a transcending of the previous parameters of dispute.\(^8\) It would, however, be an exaggeration to regard the Phantasus-framework as an early example of a later theory. It was unfinished, so one cannot say what reconciliation might have come about, and one cannot properly appraise any of the characters. The status of the whole work and of any viewpoint and comment in it is in perpetual doubt, although it has unfortunately become commonplace to illustrate interpretations of Tieck by extracting spuriously relevant passages from the Phantasus-framework and treating them as categorical statements by Tieck. Far from the
framework being directly linked to the novella-theory, it is more likely that Tieck's novella-practice evolved from his early works, passing through the Phantasus-framework story and emerging in his "Dresden" period; whereupon his novella-theory merely describes, though not very accurately, Tieck's own practice. It is also probably limited to his conscious intentions, which were less important. In this context the conversations of this framework story are an unconscious experimental model for the later novellas.

The aesthetic failure of the work is a crucial point and must be reiterated because it makes any attempt to infer Tieck's views so unreliable.

Tieck's failure to conceive the framework story as an internally consistent work is so extreme, and so generally ignored, that we must pause to emphasize it. Consider his description of Friedrich's happiness on being united with Adelheid as "das Märchen [...], in welches sich sein Leben plötzlich verwandelte". If this is an objective statement by Tieck about Friedrich's circumstances, it implies that the "Märchen" is a realm of idyllic happiness—a judgment which Tieck's own works, and not least those in Phantasus, contradict. If Tieck is describing Friedrich's feelings we might conclude that Friedrich is simply uninformed about the genre or takes a different view of it. This would, however, be surprising in a man who has evidently given considerable thought to the symbiosis between imagination and dreams on the one hand and daily reality on the other. In fact, the ideas and the characters in Phantasus part company quite early. Manfred has been married to Rosalie "seit mehr als zwel Jahren", (11)
which we take to mean more than two years but less than three. There is nothing remarkable in the fact that they have two children by now, but the children can hardly be old enough to occasion the conversation about their education so that Lothar can approve of their having remained unspoilt by modern methods of education. If the elder was legitimate, which we assume it was, he or she must be less than two years old, and the younger probably still unweaned. Mainly Tieck cared little about his plot. (He fell into a similar self-contradiction about Sternbald's age.)

The chief danger in interpreting Phantasus is, as noted above, the temptation to undiscriminating bibliomancy. There are so many generalisations that an apposite quotation can usually be found to lend spurious support to almost any view. For example, Ernst's comments on the Märchen and its relationship to everyday life are the epitome of oracular obscurity. He contrives to suggest, without actually saying, that there is unsuspected horror in beauty or ordinariness, that "Gedichte und Märchen" have their origin therein, and that the works concerned are related to the character of their inventor. These remarks alone could be helpful if they had been explained, but unfortunately the more he talks the more delphic he becomes. He adds that the spontaneous generation of these works has the consequence (which we can only find curious) that it "verwirrt unsere Phantasie bis zum poetischen Wahnsinn, um diesen selbst nur in unserm Innern zu lösen und frei zu machen". The portentous air of definition leaves the crux of the matter unmentioned. How does he intend us to assess the works? If their
value is purely therapy for the author, what is the reader to make of them without knowing the author's state of mind? How is the "poetischer Wahnsinn" changed, and what does it do when "frei"? The temptation to treat the Phantasus framework as an open-cast mine from which pithy comments can be picked up at will must be resisted at all costs: Ernst's dicta, even when granted immunity from analysis, have no obvious connection with his views on mediaeval Germany and add nothing to our interpretation of the Märchen in Phantasus. Furthermore, they are irrelevant to his character; it is true that he "writes" Eckart, but the other Märchen are "written" by his friends.

The work is nonetheless important for a review of some of Tieck's interests. Apart from its technical position between Sternbald and Lovell and the dialogue-novellas, there are two categories of ideas which require consideration. A new interest in psychology is shown, particularly in the idea that extremes of behaviour can provoke each other: this is noted by Ernst(16) and is implicit in Liebeszauber (which is, improbably, "by" Lothar, the admirer of Shakespeare).(17) And there is a range of ideas on history and literature. These ideas, as a revelation of Tieck's preoccupations at the time (though not necessarily a statement of his views), constitute the chief value of the framework. But their irrelevancy to the works included suggests that a more immediate motive was Tieck's preoccupation with himself as a character of sevenfold fascination and his apparent willingness to construct a spurious raisin d'être for publication. While length and merit should not necessarily be equated, particularly since length in
some of Tieck's discussions is a cause for reasonable complaint by
readers, some of the link-passages between contributions are trivial
in length as well as content: a few lines introduce or comment on
the Phantasus poem, Eckbert, Eckart, Runenberg, Liebeszauber, Eileen
and Polak, stringing them crudely together.\(^{(18)}\) Despite the work's
ambiguities and inadequacies, and despite these unflattering
aspersions on Tieck's motives, we must, however, attempt to codify
some of the ideas.

Much of the material is related to the Romantics' sense of
German cultural identity, which often expressed itself as a new-
found admiration of an earlier Germany. As Lothar remarks, an
uncritical obsession with the Ancients demonstrates failure to
understand them, and it is no surprise that such people should
suddenly conceive an admiration for Kotzebue as an allegedly
representative modern German\(^{(19)}\) - a delusion also harboured by
Mme Murner in Herr von Fuchs\(^{(20)}\) and the old pedant Terneheim in
Eine Sommerreise.\(^{(21)}\)

Perhaps the ill-thought-out obsessions of many of their
contemporaries have provoked an over-reaction, for Ernst, the
chief advocate of the ideal of old Germany, also overstates his case.
He begins reasonably (though it must be observed that he adds little
to Lebrecht's argument). He contends that one learns to understand
"das Nahe und Einheimische" only after understanding "das Fremde"
(by the latter he means, according to the context, the relics of
Antiquity) so that it is no longer "fremd"; this is the reason
for sending young noblemen on the Grand Tour.\(^{(22)}\) He implies that
two dangers arise from this interest. On the one hand, there is
a misguided obsession with Antiquity, and, on the other hand, there seems to be no will to object - though he himself does object - to the growth of utilitarian mass-production factories such as those at Fürth:

Dieses Nord-Amerika von Fürth konnte mir freilich wohl neben dem altbürgerlichen, germanischen, kunstvollen Nürnberg nicht gefallen. (24)

Ernst probably means, but does not demonstrate very clearly, that the two dangers are linked: lack of respect for Germany, particularly old Germany, is caused by the obsession with the Classics, and this fails to prevent industrialisation from destroying Germany's heritage. But he is an elegist, not a campaigner. Indeed, the concept and value-system of old Germany has become, to him, an idyll against which he judges the contemporary world and finds it wanting, and which he desires to see restored. His very terminology reveals an aesthetic concern.

The essential unreality of his views is shown by his account of mediaeval festivals:

doch hatte jener freimütige frohe Sinn nichts von der Zerstreutheit unserer Zeit [...] (25)

He cannot know this, though plainly he believes it. Furthermore, he has, without realising, not one obsession but two, namely the mediaeval romance (as he sees it) and the artist-craftsman period of Dürer which came later and was historically incompatible with the feudal order of "romance". An aristocratic ideal ("Tausende vom Adel als Gäste") cannot coexist with a Nuremberg which is, he says, great because "altbürgerlich": (27) except by misunderstanding
at least one and probably both. That Tieck was aware of the
distinction is apparent from a comparison of Genoveva or
Heymonskinder with Sternbald; we assume, therefore, that he
imputes ignorance to Ernst.

Ernst sees in early German literature an educational
corrective to the contemporary trash available to "der gemeine
Mann", who should be enabled to obtain proper editions of popular
old tales; if the educated classes studied the people ("Volk")
they would themselves, he believes, become educated and capable of
educating others, and would not then seek to impose a "falsche,
schwächliche Bildung". This, however, sounds less like his
former aristocratic ideal and more like a city romantic's image of
lost peasant vigour: an image which has no truck with the realities
of squalor, hunger and disease. Again, references in earlier works
suggest that Tieck criticises Ernst for this ignorance.

His interest in gardens is another example of his creation of
an imaginary ideal as the antithesis to contemporary taste. He
describes lovingly the old-style gardens, with fruit and
vegetables in abundance, and occasional flowers. Their beauty
was the concomitant of their usefulness, because they were shaped
by "das Bedürfnis". Their lack of sophistication made them
"die wahren Idylle, die kleinen Naturgedichte". Relentless toil,
blisters, slipped discs, late frosts, blight and greenfly were
presumably unknown.

Mediaeval Germany, by which he means variously, according to
the convenience of his argument at any one time, the troubadours,
the feudal aristocracy, the peasantry or the middle classes, is
simply a slogan which disparages contemporary cosmopolitan and aristocratic views. A range of disparate concepts are given a collective label. The presentation of his views may therefore be regarded as a reintroduction of the technique Tieck used in Lovell and in the Herzensergiefungen and Phantasien, namely permitting a character to elaborate opinions which characterise him for the reader. It may fairly be said that Ernst, in his self-contradictions, in his aesthetic and aristocratic view of old Germany, shows a subjective and irrational mind and obliviousness to the social (as distinct from the aesthetic) evils of industrialisation. (Tieck himself was not particularly interested in the social evils, but was certainly aware of them.)^34 We are again led to observe that the Phantasus-framework is fiction, not a set of statements by Tieck: he stated views, to be sure, but they are not necessarily his own. Ernst as a character is not unlike Ferdinand of Waldinsamkeit,^35 and this resemblance certainly precludes our acceptance of him as an authority.

The other important theme in the framework is that of literature itself; it is a further defect that this theme is not directly connected with the historical discussion other than by Ernst's belief that early German literature had been unjustly neglected, would benefit those who studied it, and deserved to replace contemporary trash. The inadequacy of contemporary fiction is emphasized by Manfred. When Clara and Auguste express their horror and nervousness at the recent stories (Rinnenberg and Liebeszauber), he refers to recent real-life examples of brutality and injustice as "die ächten Gespenstergeschichten". ^36 They are not in his view
made acceptable by being given artistic expression, and he points out that the facts are horrifying by themselves in any case. (37) But he admits that he is greatly moved by melodramas in which writers and actors cynically stimulate meretricious emotions, and he notes that women withstand this influence better than men. (38) (The contradiction between this analysis and Manfred's puerile boorishness in pretending to be mad or drunk in order to distress his wife (39) demonstrates the diremption of characterization from ideas.)

There is another tenuous connection between the historical and literary themes. Mediaeval Germany is Ernst's Utopia; poetry serves the same function for Anton. (40) The whole work is noteworthy for its absence of political content at a time of unprecedented turmoil. The underlying attitude is one of reaction against the arrogance and sterility of contemporary thought, with its disastrous combination of unimaginatively remorseless logic and pedantic scholarship. They gather to discuss these things and their preferred alternatives (while Napoleon goes to Moscow and back). They are a Romantic bourgeois version of a religious order, in that a group of like-minded people devoid of interest in society have convened to express a joint conviction. But from his earliest years (in Almansur) Tieck suspected that the recluse was vain and self-indulgent, no humble striver after goodness. Such people may practise their religion or art of poetry with the sincerity of delusion, and they cut themselves off from society thereby. (41)
(2) "Phantasus": the poem

The poem which Anton "writes" in the Erleuchtung (1811) seems to provide confirmation of the importance attached to the general availability of beauty: elitism is apparently at a discount. The idea that beauty and ordinariness are akin has been found in many previous works. Lebrecht saw beauty in the "real", undiscovered Germany, just as Ernst does; ordinary domesticity has a certain attraction for Christian, Sternbald and Lovell. Not all of these are specially gifted people, and the general impression is that the beauty of life ought to be for ordinary people as well as for artists; just as the artist is inseparable from his environment, beauty is not the monopoly of art. These ideas underlie Der junge Tischlermeister, which was conceived in the 1790s. (42)

If the Phantasus poem is taken to be a straightforward statement of Tieck's views it is somewhat at variance with the contempt for mass taste implicit in the earlier satirical comedies and Lebrecht. But when we seek Tieck's views we should consider whole works, not characters extracted from them. Reference has already been made to the Phantasus characters' remoteness from political and social events. Anton's view (to be explained shortly) of the power of the imagination as an all-comprehending and totally comprehensive instrument aptly symbolises Tieck's ambivalence: an aversion to popular taste, coupled with dislike of elitism. The stumbling-block is that while anyone with the requisite ability is a member of this elite, the ability is rare. Presumably Tieck was aware of this, at least unconsciously, for he speaks through Anton, the "writer" of the Phantasus poem and of Der blonde Eckbert:
therefore possessor of no ordinary imagination. Whether he meant to or not, Tieck conveys the essential ambivalence of "democratic" reliance on "Poesie", partly by these facts about Anton and partly by the fact that Anton uses "Poesie" as a form of psychological therapy.

First we should note the more general aspects of "Poesie". Anton as he describes himself in "his" poem begins as a Faust-like figure who, under the influence of "Ernst", "Vernunft" and "Verstand", has studied all knowledge recorded in books of philosophy and history and has found it inadequate:

Um endlich wieder zu gelangen  
Noch dummer wo ich ausgegangen (43)

- reminding us of Faust's impasse, as well as his style, in similar circumstances:

Da steh' ich nun, ich armer Tor!  
Und bin so klug als wie zuvor. (44)

But Faust's need, and eventual quest, is for all experience known to man. In contrast with Faust, Anton's study of the past has merely brought him to a standstill of passive disillusionment. He does not need experience in the external world, but a change of attitude towards it. At the beginning of the poem we learn that he is troubled by the miseries of the world and can see only suspicion, mistrust and anxiety in human relationships (45). The child Phantasus appears to him in a dream and points to the contrast between, on the one hand, his condition and, on the other hand, the beauty of nature outside and everybody else's enjoyment of it. If he will permit himself to be ruled by Phantasus, he, too, will be led into this "Frühlings-Reich". (46) In other words, the world is not as he sees it: he misinterprets it because his faculty of
"fantasy" has atrophied. His view that the "Frühlings-Reich" is childish, games a useless pastime, those who do not solemnly and reflectively pursue high aims fools, has been characteristic of him only since youth. At that time, study had banished his feeling for beauty, optimism, and the transcendental, and had replaced them with a sense of human want and misery, a mechanistic and materialistic interpretation of life. But Phantasus had formerly been his constant companion and guide. Clearly, an erroneous path should be abandoned, (as is also the case with the Professor in Der Gelehrte) in order to return to a lost way of living and thinking. When Anton, reviewing his own scholarly endeavours, accuses Phantasus

Du aber, Knäblein, bist inmitten
Der Bildung nicht mit fortgeschritten,

the inference we are intended to draw is that the fault is in the word - or slogan - "Bildung". From Phantasus' point of view Anton unwittingly gives his case away by this accusation.

Anton changes his attitude to life. This is achieved by the development of imaginative powers latent within him. He learns that Phantasus is not the all-encompassing entity. He is more a divining-instrument, a faculty by means of which Anton perceives first the constituents of Pan (Märchen, Jest and Love, all of equal status) and finally Pan, the whole. The point is made that each constituent by itself leads nowhere: "liebe Albernheit" is more and more drawn to Märchen's terror; Jest, incorrigible, is either unproductive or destructive; Love by itself leads to a blinkered Wertherism, unable to perceive Pan the whole, except in fright (and
at this point Phantasus ironically addresses him as "Werther").

But Phantasus can, at will (as he does in inducting Anton), lead to any constituent or to Pan. Phantasus refers to Pan thus:

\[
\text{Das ist der Vater, unter Alter, Heist Pan, von allem der Erhalter.} \quad (51)
\]

This familiar mode both emphasizes the accessibility of Pan -

\[
\text{Still lchelt er [Pan], da seine Kind!}
\]

\[
\text{In Spielen glücklich vor ihm sind}
\]

- and is also a reminder of the contrast with the Prolog im Himmel of Faust i, where Mephistopheles - the analogue of Phantasus in the moral sphere - refers to God impudently as "der Alte". \((52)\)

Neither Phantasus nor any of the entities accessible through him has any connection with morality (instinctive or otherwise).

They can, of course, remain unconnected, for development of the imagination differs from the search for external experience in that it does not introduce conflict between one's own desires and others' welfare: so the moral question does not arise. Thereby Anton solves his own problems and ignores life's realities.

Interesting though it is, the poem adds little to Almansur, for it merely substitutes a life of personal poetic experience for the life of a hermit and then points to the same conclusion, namely a condemnation of selfish retreat into an idyll; the poetry is as unproductive and, ultimately, as parasitic as the solitude. The poem's call to re-enter the real world was already implicit in Lebrecht and eventually receives clearer statement in Der Gelehrte and Waldesinsamkeit. \((54)\) An unrelated strand in the poem is the insistence on the diagnostic function of poetry; but this was, again, implicit in Lebrecht and is not properly stated until the
The poem is an important transition in Tieck's development, and deserves attention for that reason rather than in its own right.

(3) The new works

Däumchen

This work is unusual in being based, albeit by the concealment in allegory, on a contemporary situation: it deals with the invasion of Germany by the French, though it purports to deal with the invasion of Celtic Britain by the Saxons. Tieck's comment on the contemporary condition of Germany is expressed by Thorns (Däumchen), who points out that victory can be achieved only if the Celtic groups (that is the Germans) cease quarrelling and co-operate. He offers the rapid collection and dissemination of information about the battlefield, and for this he uses the magic boots (the symbolic meaning of which will be considered below). In other words, national unity and reliance upon the common man are essential. When victory is achieved, Thorns turns up in the food at the celebration banquet - symbolising again the predatory role of the rich and powerful guests - and makes an impassioned speech about peace, human rights, the duties of rulers, and freedom from oppressive taxation.

The implied predatorship of the rich is condemned also by its analogy to the cannibalism of Leidgast. His attraction towards evil, the belief that others are inferior and may be enslaved or exterminated, the sexual associations of torture, with assertion masquerading as reasoned argument, with inter-racial connotations - did Tieck's "Poesie" see 130 years into the future? However,
Leidgast as a characterization is too fully developed and absorbs too much attention for his function in the plot, which (since he is an invader of foreign origin, but not one of the main band) is to carry a socio-economic analogy to the aristocrats and to serve as a symbol of foreign domination.

For the invader in the play takes two forms. The military enemy can be, and is, repelled by the uniting of the factions and classes; but the cultural invasion is less easy to resist, since it has already taken place. A digression is necessary to consider the Seven League Boots as a symbol which explains this point.

The boots, as the cobbler Zahn explains, represent the relationship between Classical Antiquity and modern times. They were originally made in Ancient Greece, and no modern worker could reproduce their uncontrived simplicity. When first made, they enabled their wearer to travel fifty or sixty miles at each step, but they have lost their power progressively with each successive repair. Zahn has been guided by them as models in making his own modern pair, which can go to Syracuse (around 1,500 miles) in one stride.

This fable, which is possibly based on Herder's earlier advocacy of taking classical ideals as an inspiration rather than slavishly imitating them, may be interpreted thus. The ideals and values of Antiquity are still valid, but have inevitably lost some of their force, partly because they were the product of a specific culture which no longer exists and partly because they have been transmitted indirectly through intervening cultures.
However, until Zahn's modern boots are made they are the only magic ones. It is with their aid that Leidgast is able to impose his will. Significantly, he, too, is a Saxon (meaning a Frenchman) who left his fellows while on a raiding-party, established himself with the magic boots, and enslaved Semmelziege.\(^{(62)}\) In other words, the cultural invader monopolises classical learning and makes a plaything of the indigenous intellectual. Leidgast is French classicism conquering Semmelziege, the German mind, and his use of the boots represents arrogant pedantry. Thoms shows that classicism can be a lingua franca because it can serve everybody, but Zahn represents the power of modern thought.

The poor showing of the German intellectual is a familiar theme in Tieck\(^{(63)}\) and is important in the present work. Reference may be made to Persiwein, the trivial-minded poet,\(^{(64)}\) and Alfred, the pedantic, slow-witted philosopher-scientist.\(^{(65)}\) But Semmelziege is the most important example. He laments that he is forced to labour as a slave, for his ability is exclusively intellectual, and only by using that could he serve his country in its present difficulty.\(^{(66)}\) But, as noted, he is the helpless plaything of the foreign invader, and by the time he frees himself military success based on a new national mood has solved the more immediate problem. It is also significant that Semmelziege is by no means an admirable figure. Apart from being useless, his most memorable characteristic is crudity. His wife, Ida, is repelled by his coarse language, which he uses all the more when he discovers that it distresses her.\(^{(67)}\) The crude impractical bore (Smmelziege the German intellectual) is captured by Leidgast (French classicism),
and is, (in the image of the see-saw) sent flying aloft with each blow from the club of alien culture, only to return painfully to earth with nothing achieved.

In other words, Tieck seems to imply that the German intellectuals permitted a successful cultural invasion which long preceded the military one and, by having eroded the sense of nationhood, made military conquest all the easier.

The view that the Phantasus framework is of negligible literary merit is substantiated by the fact that the chief thematic link between Dümchen and the connecting narrative is with Ernst’s desire to have early German literature republished to counteract foreign influences; but Dümchen is "written" by Wilibald.

Liebeszauber

The other work of 1811 mentioned above is Liebeszauber, which has, as its main events, an apparently supernatural manifestation and a sexually motivated stabbing.

Bail’s character is the key to the interpretation of the work, and is the source of all the important action. His ideals are those of abstinence and assiduousness - chastity is evidently a passion in his case - and he demands that the world should have the ideals he wants it to have. But none of this is translated into action: he merely feels distress when the world pleases itself. He is solemn and studious, and incapable of spontaneous enjoyment, which, as manifested in the unremarkable Roderich, he finds indicative of a state of unbalance. Obviously he is afflicted with ultra-sensitivity, an over-development of views and feelings which would be normal if present to a lesser degree (rather like
many phobias and allergies). Roderich ascribes this to over-indulgence by Emil's parents and to self-indulgence.\(^{(73)}\)

A state of perpetually being-moved has become his natural condition,\(^{(74)}\) and we observe that it is accompanied by self-protective reversal of values. Naturally, Emil in love is equally abnormal. His first poem shows that he regards love as both a joy and an affliction.\(^{(75)}\) He greatly regrets that his unconquerable shyness prevents him from approaching his beloved,\(^{(76)}\) and instead he observes her for hours through the curtain at night in a way which suggests voyeurism.\(^{(77)}\)

The old woman, Alexia, indulges in a harmless spell on behalf of her mistress in order to make the solitary and apparently indifferent Emil love her; but to Emil it follows logically from her appearance and manner that she is practising the black arts.\(^{(78)}\) His extremes, exacerbated by isolation and, we infer, sexual frustration, distort his perception of the world. This is the background to a sadistic murder, the events of which must now be unravelled.

Roderich's dagger accidentally comes into Emil's possession, and he wonders what must be the feelings of a person who kills a rival or hurts a beloved with it.\(^{(79)}\) He then sees a half-erotic half-gruesome vision. Looking into his beloved's room across the street at night, he sees her with bare breasts (for no apparent reason, since she is assisting at the ritual throat-cutting of a child while a monster drinks the blood);\(^{(80)}\) but neither is she completely naked. From this we infer a breast-fixation. Let us
consider this vision in relation to specific facts about the murder which Emil commits immediately after the wedding-service. Emil goes to his bride's bedroom to surprise her while she is changing. This initiative is inconsistent with much in his previous character, but it has affinities with his secret observation of her. He goes to her room immediately after she has announced her intention of dancing (which he dislikes), and he is toying with the dagger which gave rise to his sinister thought some time before. We later learn that his bride was nearly changed when he arrived; this is supported by inference, for between the time when Emil leaves the assembled company to go to her room and the time of the murder, the other guests have donned complicated garments for a masquerade organised by Roderich. After what must, therefore, be several minutes, if not longer, his bride runs out. But she is wearing only a short (otherwise undescribed) garment - from which fact we presume that they had begun to make love - and with bare breasts at which he stabs before cutting her throat. This incident (referring particularly to the erotic imagery and the throat-cutting) can be explained only as the re-enactment of fantasy.

That Tieck introduced the fact of Emil's wealth - it exempts him from ordinary work and thereby stimulates his abnormality, which is based on his abnormal view of beauty - is a most significant fact in his transition to the stronger interest in socio-economic matters in the novellas. This work is therefore connected with those novellas in which Tieck condemns the parasitic idyll (as shown in Chapter VIG, below).
Of the new works in *Phantasus*, this is the least satisfactory; its content is largely self-repetition of earlier works. The story will therefore be omitted from the present survey.

*Die Elfen*

The commercial value of jewels in *Eckbert* and *Runenberga*, as well as their symbolic representation of beauty, is even more strongly emphasized in *Die Elfen*, and this shift of interest is accompanied by further implications about society's economic basis. The story is - though in a somewhat unlikely setting - an analysis of the relationship between rich and poor. Tieck was, from at least the time of *Kater* and *Zerbino*, aware of the reliance of the middle class and aristocracy upon an often unrecognised sub-stratum of primary producers. Though he made the point chiefly in relation to the peasantry, he was familiar with Heinrich von Ofterdingen (1802) in which there is specific reference to society's reliance on the gold-miners. However, although *Die Elfen* is the first of his literary works to show direct evidence of his serious interest in questions of economics and industrial urban society, there is no doubt that this interest actually began much earlier. The deleterious effect on the workers in a labour-divided system is mentioned by Schiller in his *Briefe über die Ästhetische Erziehung der Menschen* (1797), with which we may reasonably assume Tieck to have been acquainted. Tieck, however, may have received the idea from Wackenroder, who refers in a letter to pin-makers in Fürth as an example of alienated
labour.\textsuperscript{(88)} Ernst in Phantasus refers to "dieses Nord-Amerika von Fürth".\textsuperscript{(89)}

The possibility that the theme of Die Elfen has to do with the contrast between art and materialism has \textit{prima facie} attraction, and was, indeed, fostered by Tieck's unfavourable comparison of the castle's splendours with those underground.\textsuperscript{(90)} That comparison, and the pseudo-theme which is deduced from it, are, however, examples of Tieck's failure to discipline himself to keep to one theme: here, as often elsewhere, he puts in too much. The key fact is that the elves leave when they are discovered, and in consequence the prosperity around them vanishes.\textsuperscript{(91)} This sequence of events shows that their purpose in the story is not to be an aesthetic symbol, for an understanding of beauty by the materialistic world would not necessarily have caused this decline.

The playground scene is related to the theme of the production and distribution of wealth. The child Marie, who has wandered into Elfinland, and is being shown round by an elf-child Zerina, visits several important areas. There is a subterranean chamber where grotesque and clumsy dwarfs produce precious metals and jewels under the command of the "Metallfürst"; these workers are harassed and short-tempered, and the "Metallfürst" resents the children's visit as "Kindereien" and "Müßigkeiten".\textsuperscript{(92)} Then they visit the source of all water, which supplies the fertile areas above,\textsuperscript{(93)} and a hall of fire which supplies the energy for plant growth and fermentation.\textsuperscript{(94)} These visits are obviously reminders that the prosperity of Marie's village depends on subterranean toil and natural forces, and that the beneficiaries do not know the provenance of the benefits they
enjoy. It is significant that the elves are twice described as "Wohlthätler" to the village. (95)

Ignorance of the true nature of Elfinland is essential if the benefits are to continue. Marie is warned about the dire results of revealing the secret, both when she leaves (96) and years later when her daughter Elfriede plays with Zerina. (97) This ignorance is general in the village. The area which Marie comes to know as Elfinland is regarded locally as repellent and forbidding in appearance, its inhabitants as worthless vagrants and tricksters, (98) who inspire "kalte Angst und wundersames Fürchten" in those who approach. (99) Materially prosperous classes are shown to require, firstly, that toilers elsewhere should exist, and, secondly, that the prosperous classes should not be aware of their own dependence on those others. It is implied that the existence of poverty-stricken toilers is inevitable, for when the rich landowners leave the area as it declines, the formerly prosperous peasantry sink to the level of those whom they formerly despised. (100) The significance of the childhood experiences of Marie and Elfriede suggest that only the innocent irresponsibility of childhood could accept as a visible setting for personal enjoyment the existence of underground toilers and natural energy without enquiring into the truth of the matter. The implied advocacy of productive work from Eckbert and the satirical comedies is applied to the socio-economic structure of Germany.

(4) "Phantasus; a postscript

The importance of Phantasus in Tieck's development has been over-rated. The framework-story of an elopement is annihilated by
the discourse which is unrelated to it, and by the literary contributions, which are unrelated to either, except by coincidence. With the reservation that the views of the characters are not necessarily Tieck's views, it is possible to codify the main ideas.

Rediscovery of the "real" Germany - the former Germany - by Ernst, and an objection (in Daumchen) to the control of German intellectual life by the French version of classical learning merely extend, but do not essentially change, similar advocacy by Lebrecht. The role of what we would now call a proletarian in creating wealth enjoyed by others (in Die Elfen) and a populist theory of power (in Daumchen) merely develop, respectively, the identification of the peasantry as primary producers in the satirical comedies, and the political implications of Heymonskinden. The sadistic aspects of Leidgast and Emil are new (and do not recur except in the murder of Vittoria Accorombatena), but the eroticism of these works and of Pokal is easily traced to Eckart, Sternbald and Runenberg. The harm done to Emil by solitary brooding and obsession with his own moods is foreshadowed by the Lovell-types. It is in the role assigned to imagination in the Phantase poem that one finds some connection between the various literary contributions. The power of the imagination is shown to develop the capacity for enjoyment by allowing full self-knowledge. Its therapeutic value is contrasted with the harmful effects of abstract intellectual activity. This would obviously have aided Emil as it aids Anton, and would certainly have improved Semmelziege. But there is no connection between this idea and the earlier works included, such as Eckhart or Runenberg. One could, of course, argue
that the power of Phantasus would have helped Eckbert and Christian, but this would be the retrospective association of ideas which one would not have associated were it not for their unconvincing juxtaposition when republished.

In these contexts what appear to be new themes - gardens, invasions, sadistic attacks - often merely illustrate more familiar basic propositions. The "neue Manier" (claimed by Tieck) is often less apparent on closer examination than at first sight. The creative function of the imagination, formerly (for example, in Runenbergs, Blaubart and Zerbinos) a seeming handicap or at least a mixed blessing, is the most important addition, and becomes a vital theme in Tieck's novellas: creativity is the path to beauty, which is upheld as the desirable alternative to personal and social imperfections. This is not to say that it invariably takes the form, or has the effect, indicated in the poem. Later discussion of Dichterleben and Hexen-Sabbath demonstrates that the poem is merely a stage in development.

Unfortunately, the framework has no total effect. Phantasus is a record of some of Tieck's interests, though it is unsatisfactory as a record of all of them. The collection as a whole - taking the framework discussions and the new items, for the earlier works do not really belong here - is, however, an interesting adumbration of the novellas. The importance of socio-economic ideas, hitherto found only embryonically, and the use of discussion justify us in regarding this compilation as the root of the novellas. Lieske detects a change towards such interests in the poems between 1804 and 1806; as far as major works are concerned, it is clear that, to
the extent that Tieck has an identifiable "second period", it begins with Phantasus.

(5) "Fortunat"

As an epilogue to Phantasus and, simultaneously, as a further transition to the socio-economic world of the novellas, we must consider Tieck's last allegorical drama: his final approach to realism. Its chief merit - amongst many demerits - is in its development of an idea implied in Liebeszauber and forming the basis of Die Elfen. The reliance of the wealthy on the many producers of wealth is by now a familiar idea in Tieck's works. In Fortunat he first makes explicit the view that the possession of wealth imposes a duty to use it responsibly. As will be seen later, Tieck's novella-theory asserted not only the realism of the genre but also its didactic potential. (103)

Tieck's own comments on this play concentrate on its form. (104) The work is, in fact, important chiefly for its content, as an assertion of man's responsibility for his own destiny and as an insistence that material good fortune should be used responsibly and creatively for the general good, instead of selfishly. It is a defect that these two themes do not logically belong together; indeed, one could object that if each individual is able to make his own fate by will and effort, some at least of those whose fate is unpleasant through poverty would deserve it. So once more we have a work which is more valuable as an indication of Tieck's thought than for its intrinsic merit.

Individual responsibility is asserted in the Prolog. Fortuna, the goddess of fortune is arraigned by six plaintiffs for having
allegedly caused their misfortunes. She demonstrates that each has only himself to blame: the crucial rôle was played not by their original gift or good luck but by their response to it. (105)

This view is more optimistic than the Straufffedern stories in which fate is hostile or indifferent while human endeavour is futile; and it also contradicts the contemporary fate-dramas, which Tieck despised (106) (conveniently forgetting his own Karl von Berneck). Its didactic, even sententious, effect is irrelevant to people who do not have power, wealth, talent, courage or charm and who are thereby denied the opportunity of misusing them. Unfortunately Tieck was sometimes inclined (as also in the Phantasus poem and in Der junge Tischlermeister) (107) to build didactic recommendations on the implied possession of unusual qualities.

Towards the end of Part II a new note of responsibility is sounded. Andalosia, imprisoned by enemies who seek his gold, reflects on the uselessness of his life spent, as it has been thus far, in vainglory, (108) and soon thereafter he condemns himself for having neglected the obligation to others which he now recognises that his fortune imposed. (109) This speech abandons the tendentiousness of previous sections, and states the outcome of the ideas of socio-economic justice implied in Die Elfen and in Emil's embarrassment at being wealthy. The privilege of power is to be regarded as an obligation to others.
IV. TIECK'S "GEDANKENWELT": THEMES AND INFLUENCES

In the introduction, reference was made to the existence of a number of critical works which, in effect, dismember Tieck's output and distort our view of it by considering him in relation to specific influences. It was remarked that the methodological fault of such works is that they degenerate into lists of places in his works where an undigested, and often unimportant, piece of evidence is to be found. If, however, Tieck's works are considered as wholes, as in the present study, a pattern emerges. In summary, it becomes apparent that Tieck applied his findings from his study of meritorious literature (particularly Cervantes and Shakespeare) in a constructive manner to his view of his own intellectual environment; he was influenced by them in his reaction against his environment and in his own achievement of maturity as a writer. The preceding survey of most of his works in the first half of his life will now be used as a background to an attempted definition of Tieck's world-view; in other words, only now that we have established what Tieck's misunderstood works are about is it possible to infer his standpoint.

When Tieck began writing, the major works of the Sturm und Drang and the Aufklärung were in the past, with much of Classicism and the entire Romantic movement still to come. His formative "Gedankenwelt" was the Sturm und Drang and the Aufklärung - both, it must be stressed, in debased forms after their maturity - together with his own omnivorous and indiscriminate reading of both cheap and meritorious literature. We will consider each influence in turn.
A. THE LATE "AUFKLÄRUNG AND OTHER CONTEMPORARY IDEAS

Of these influences, the Aufklärung, the Sturm und Drang and the cheap literature form a group; literature of quality will be considered later. Tieck's works show that the Aufklärung he saw in Berlin in his youth was no longer the civilising force we associate with Wieland, Lessing and Moses Mendelssohn. Belief in human progress through the exercise of Reason had stylised itself into rejection of whatever could not be analysed or stated as verified and verifiable fact. A scientific age saw nature as the expression of causation, a system of natural law in which there was no place for creative initiative, intuition, feeling, or inexplicable events; these could not be explained by Reason, and were therefore held to be errors. This attitude was thought to be a cause for criticism by Herder as early as 1774\(^{(1)}\) and by Schiller in his Die Göter Griechenlands of 1787,\(^{(2)}\) and is a recurring feature of Tieck's works. But it is also clear that Tieck included in the term Aufklärung virtually everything he disliked in contemporary ideas: arid rationalism, intellectual arrogance, some manifestations of Pietism, sentimentality, and a variety of affectations. The Aufklärung he saw was a self-contradictory confusion; and he reacted to a variety of conflicting ideas, as he himself notes in introducing the second edition of Lovell in 1813.\(^{(3)}\)

His works suggest that he believed that there was a link between the misuse of Reason (to deny feeling and intuition) and intellectual arrogance. He often shows how people who lack perceptiveness and imagination think that their scepticism denotes
a superior mind. As a result they lose the capacity for constructive self-criticism, become vain and boorish, and assume that their ideas — being ipso facto sound and beneficial — ought to be imposed on society. Such people seem to be the Aufklärung's version of the Sturm und Drang "Genie", untaught and unteachable. They are criticised in Sommernacht, Herr von Fuchs and in the Streusfelderm stories (particularly Ulrich, Farmer and Siegmund).

A slightly different version of them is presented in the character of Berglinger who — echoing Murner of Herr von Fuchs — asserts that the strength of his conviction is proof of ability. Reason, as a corrective to superstition and obscurantism, and the intuitions of gifted people, are, of course, ideals to which Tieck subscribed; it is against their misuse or debasement that he inveighed.

In addition, he censured certain forms of over-reaction to Reason. The Pietists opposed to it an ideal of instinctive goodness, relying on feeling rather than analysis; and Lebrecht shows that Tieck not only had a high regard for instinctive goodness but also lampooned the sentimentality into which it could easily degenerate. He called Rambach's circle in Berlin a place where "so viel von Empfindung gesprochen und nirgends weniger empfunden wird", and no doubt embodied his strictures in Lebrecht and Ulrich. Another strand in Pietism was the belief that literature and art were justified primarily as a means of edification, and would normally require a moral or religious purpose. This opinion was perhaps a debasement of a less specific attitude to literature to which Gellert and Jacobi had responded and which they themselves had disseminated: the expectation that literature would deal with
important problems in contemporary life. Tieck's works, particularly his novellas and novella-theory, show that he agreed. But in the form in which he seems to have encountered the view, it amounted to a denial of the freedom of art to choose its own subject and treatment, and to dictation of these by the power of the most stridently expressed utilitarian or didactic prejudices. (5) Tieck resisted the subordination of art to dogma, and wrote scathingly of the prejudices of the literate mob in his *Struwwelpeter* stories and in his satirical comedies. A specific form of this interference with didactic intent was an obsession with education, and in *Fuchs, Ulrich, Zerhino* and *Phantasus* Tieck ridiculed a variety of educational fads which the faddists sought to impose on the general population. Nonetheless, Tieck's own writings were didactic: satire is, after all, implicitly didactic since its attack upon what the satirist dislikes is invariably sustained by a vision, however dimly perceived, of a better state of things to which he thinks people should aspire. Tieck's novella-theory contains a didactic element dating from at least the time of *Phantasus* and, less consciously, from the time of the comedies.

An extreme view, again probably connected with Pietism in its fanatical manifestations, is the belief that beauty is sinful because contrived. This is expressed by the Puritan Ellis in *Dichterleben* (6) and to some extent by Dietrich in *Die Gemälde*; (7) the obvious origin within Tieck's works is Christian's father in *Der Runenberg*. While the general tenor of Tieck's works upholds the value of beauty in itself, *Sternbald* and *Runenberg* show his
quasi-Pietist mistrust of it if it is not controlled. He sought to overcome this mistrust, by his attempt to demonstrate that beauty could be useful socially, economically and psychologically, in such works as Lebrecht, the Phantasus framework and Der junge Tischlermeister, as well as by the adoption of a didactic novella-theory. But it will be observed that these works mentioned are artistic failures, and the novella-theory little related to his best works in the genre. Tieck's artistry had its own dynamic, which he even feared.\(^8\) It will be observed, too, that Tieck's artistry also led him to describe the world he saw and knew to exist, and to fail to describe convincingly a world he wanted to exist but knew to be an illusion.\(^9\)

Logically connected with this theme of beauty and its dangers is Tieck's view of another method of opposing Reason, namely by the exercise of individual feeling without the framework of a religion; Werther is the obvious prototype. Many early works show his awareness of the dangers of unbridled feeling, and particularly of the dangers to individuals who sever connections with their ordinary environments. Such individuals may be pursuing a personal vision of beauty, but they may also be over-rating themselves. The analogy between the artist and the arrogant "Aufgeklärte" becomes self-evident.

The arrogance of the Aufklärung in the period of its degeneracy was perhaps inevitable. The very name Aufklärung proclaims its possession of something worthy which has been denied to its predecessors and opponents, as though it is in the van of progress with history's force at its side, whereas all others are
barbarian, obscurantist, crude, reactionary and superstitious.
The necessary and praiseworthy self-confidence of the movement in
its early years had changed into an ignoble variant, which
inevitably provoked a reaction. So the Aufklärung particularly
rejected the Middle Ages and Roman Catholicism, whereupon the
Romantics found them beautiful and mysterious. Tieck rejected the
arrogance. But he became interested in the Middle Ages on two
distinct levels, loving their poetic quality while condemning this
as an illusion. His true view of the Middle Ages inclined to that
of the Aufklärung rather than of Romanticism. (10)

The Aufklärung contained a potential contradiction as to the
relative importance of German nationhood and the Classics. Klopstock
furthered patriotic sentiment; Lessing hoped that a German drama
would develop from his selection of English rather than French models.
In the late Aufklärung this even degenerated into antipathy to the
Classics on principle because they were not modern, and Tieck
ridiculed this in portraying Murner. But, on the other hand, there
was also renewed interest in the Classics, which developed from
Winckelmann's study of ancient art. Soon Greek culture was being
advocated (by Herder and Schiller) (11) as a model of harmony (both
within the individual and between man and his environment) worthy
of imitation in the modern world. Tieck ignored both sides of this
potential dispute for several years, although he was aware, from
the time of his friendship with Wackenroder, (12) that a potential
alternative ideal may have been available in the neglected
traditional culture of Germany. These ideas are found, though not
always clearly, in the Volksmärchen, in which he uses (not for the
first time) settings taken from the past in order to express ideas about the present. Just as he was attracted to mysticism partly because the Aufklärung reviled it, so he was strongly aware that his view of the older German literature placed him out-of-step with contemporary taste; his liking for it incurred the opposition of those who did not, while those who were uncritically obsessed by it objected to his balanced view of its faults and virtues. Plainly, his antipathy to the Aufklärung, which found such literature crude and unformed, was a motive here also, for he continued to admire Aristophanes, who was quite unlike the early German writers, for his social satire and was probably influenced by him in his own satirical comedies.

He was also influenced by the contemporary view of Greece as an era in which language and literature were held to be common property, fully integrated with each other and with popular culture. This view of Greece had been current since Herder, and Tieck's virulent attack on the reading public of his own time in 1800 (unpublished in his lifetime and, according to Köpke, written in a hand that suggests blind rage) is in an identical spirit. These criticisms of the general public are similar to those in the less acrimonious Briefe über Shakespeare (1800) from the Poetisches Journal. This article is ostensibly about Shakespeare, but is really about contemporary Germany's view of him; it is therefore to be taken as a critique of contemporary intellectual attitudes. His charges may be summarised as follows: prissiness, born of loss of vigour; intellectual arrogance, born of smug ignorance; suppression of or indifference to originality, born of
mediocrity; and the loss of ideals, or the perpetuation of ideals in debased forms.

It is therefore no surprise that Tieck, believing this, continued alternately to attack contemporary taste and to despair of the artist's or perceptive non-artist's position in society throughout his first period. He seems, however, to have taken a more optimistic view in 1803 in writing *Die altdeutschen Minnelieder*. Referring to the change in status and in the degree of understanding accorded to these works, he remarks that a few years previously there had been general philistinism, coupled with a derogatory view of earlier art and a parochial view of Spanish, Italian and English culture. This new optimism may have been derived from his relations with the Schlegels. His progress towards a new view of poetry dates from this period, and may have contributed to his sense of purpose and stability. However, in his second main period in Dresden he was again to criticise similar characteristics in Germany's intellectual life, though they then took different forms.

Tieck's changing view of Goethe is a microcosm of the larger corpus of his opinions. Goethe's œuvre was originally Tieck's ideal of poetic beauty. But it was Goethe's abandonment of both German identity and of the close relationship with the people (as Tieck saw it) in favour of classical, cosmopolitan and aristocratic ideals that led Tieck to abandon his idealisation of Goethe (though it was some time before he could accept consciously his own change of view). Goethe and Tieck merely exemplify a bifurcation in the Aufklärung itself.

A further self-contradiction in the Aufklärung to which Tieck
reacted was presented by the Gothic novel. The arid intellectualism of the movement had provoked in the general reader a desire for secrets and mystery in defiance of the laws of causation; but the genre had a rational, and often moral, solution (that is, a solution which was not supernatural, even though we find it far-fetched) and was therefore acceptable to the Aufklärung. The genre introduced an element of stereotyped, and therefore predictable and tedious, pseudo-strangeness into literature, which Tieck satirised in Lebrecht. While he remained to some extent under its spell for the rest of his life, the extent and importance of this has been exaggerated. Tieck was also interested in the reasons why people were attracted by mystification, or by the prospect of mystifying others, and also in the technique of mystification as a means of suspending a theatrical audience's disbelief. It is suggested elsewhere that his study of Shakespeare was the basic influence in this respect, although the Gothic novel tended to determine the forms in which that Shakespearean influence expressed itself.

It was in his psychological understanding that he transcended the Aufklärung. This capacity presented him, however, with the problems of instability which plagued him throughout his life, and which his belief in "Poesie" and his theory of the novella were intended to solve. The manifestations of sentimentality and Pietism he effectively discounted. But the problems of the "Genie" and the fanatic - both of Sturm und Drang origin and fostered by the refusal of the Aufklärung to tolerate talent and feeling or mysticism - remained. His "Poesie", formulated in the Phantasus poem, was intended to solve them by reconciling extremes of views
and of character traits, and by permitting intuition the status of an investigative function; but his assertions on this point are unconvincing.\(^{(26)}\)

**B. REACTIONS TO THE "AUFKLÄRUNG"**

(1) *The Gothic novel*

Much has been made of the Gothic novel as a literary environment for Tieck, and as an alleged influence upon him. For example, Trainer\(^{(27)}\), following Hemmer\(^{(28)}\), argues that Tieck's interest in Gothic fiction ante-dated his acquaintance with Rambach and that this was "another aspect of his incorrigible glib fluency, the product of a talent dominated by an undisciplined imagination". Hemmer\(^{(29)}\) agrees that Tieck's Gothic and "Trivial" writing was an opportunity for experiment and self-discovery which aided the budding writer. The flow of cause and effect, in the sense that motifs were adopted by Tieck, has been thoroughly documented by Trainer and Thalmann, and the frequency with which various components from the Gothic assembly-kit may be found in his works is not in dispute. The importance of the subject has been exaggerated, however, as examination of the more important alleged evidence shows. Trainer and Thalmann interpret a number of works in the light of their investigations into Tieck's literary predecessors, but we will note that they do not come to grips with the real themes of those works. Tieck was interested less in the effect of vicarious fear on the reader and more in the psychological condition of the characters; and less in the fear itself than in the characters' compulsion towards inspiring or
experiencing it. Therefore, it can hardly be true - even as a matter of logic, apart from the evidence of the works themselves - that Tieck progressed "from Gothic to Romantic": he was not, except superficially, Gothic to start with. The influence of his Shakespeare studies as the origin of his interest in portraying characters by the horrors they see, and the probable origin of his passive, brooding heroes in his reading of Hamlet, has already been demonstrated. Faced with divergent views, let us examine some examples.

Abdallah (1792) includes a number of supernatural events and settings, but their resemblance to a Gothic stereotype is not sufficiently strong to have made us assume a close connection if we had not been predisposed to think that one existed. There are, it is true, gruesome scenes in an imaginary underworld; but these serve as a literary device for the presentation of ideas about destruction, freedom, tyranny and guilt. The work is far removed from a terror-mystery in which all is explained at the end. The Gothic relies on plot and the Romantic relies on character: and there can be no doubt that Tieck was a Romantic in Abdallah.

That was already the case with Ryno (1791). There are few events, but we learn much about Ryno's state of mind: the person, not the plot. There are shadows, visions, outbursts of maniacal laughter, wild storms, eerie rooms - little is left out. But these are the setting for a portrayal of an alienated individual who is an obvious precursor of William Lovell, Andrea Cosima (Waterloo) and others.

The importance of Gothic elements, as distinct from their undisputed mere presence, is even more questionable in
William Lovell (1795-96). Since all apparently supernatural events are reported in letters, there can be no question of expecting the reader to accept them as reality. There is certainly no evidence to think that Tieck wished to produce in the reader the vicarious thrill which a Gothic novel is supposed to produce. This is an important point, because it shows that Tieck had applied and developed his view of Shakespeare's use of terror to affect the audience. We (Tieck's readers) are not supposed to be affected: we are supposed to learn to understand William and his behaviour. The deceptions practised upon William are little more than external wrappings to the story, although viewed psychologically they are instructive. William's outlook has been so fashioned by his reading-matter that he is vulnerable to deception based on it. To that extent the inclusion of Gothic elements is a criticism of society, of its tastes in literature and of its defective education; Tieck included these deficiencies in the satirical comedies, and satirised society by satirising its literary taste. In that William's vulnerability is also the outcome of his desire to be different from ordinary people, his susceptibility to deceit is the Achilles heel of his arrogance.

In the portrayal of Andrea one finds the same factors at work, for he is a similar type. His contempt for others, and his pleasure in deceiving them and thereby controlling them, have increased over the years. But the Gothic mode is merely his instrument of deceit, chosen for its effectiveness, just as Louise Blainville chooses her sentimental protestations of love with the same purpose in view. The Gothic element in the work as a whole
is merely one of several methods whereby Tieck portrays the aberrations which result from deprivation of self-fulfilment in love. These aberrations are the true theme, upon which several social, psychological and philosophical sub-themes depend, but this is not mentioned either by Trainer or by Thalmann. An influence which is not essential to the true theme is not very important.

Thalmann devotes a complete chapter in Die Romantik des Triviale to interpreting William Lovell (30) (and Riha later takes a similar view to hers) (31). Her chapter is worth examining in itself, since it illustrates the risks of interpretation by preconception. She recounts the action, and Lovell's life, chiefly by drawing a distinction between the country (Bondly and certain other places) and the town (London, Paris and Rome). The country is, we are told, simple, innocent, idyllic, dull and intolerant of the town; the town is labyrinthine, insidiously attractive, evil and destructive. This false antithesis is the result of insistence on the divining-rod of the Trivialroman. Combined with this view is an inexplicable and irrelevant contempt for the young fathers in their country homes, who are supposed to be deficient in some ill-defined manner because they are temporarily preoccupied with their newly-born children to the comparative exclusion of other interests. This is a particularly facile criticism because it is precisely the lack of this supposedly dull life and an inability to see its merits which causes Lovell to go to his destruction, or self-destruction, in the town. Thalmann's account is followed by her attempt to
interpret the character of Waterloo chiefly by reference to secret societies and the "Genie" figures of the Trivialroman. This view takes no heed of the fact that Waterloo is both an evil and a pitiable man, warped by unrequited love and the defects of his elders years before. Finally, Thalmann's attempt to associate Waterloo's last writings with an undefined concept of irony obscures the fact that his self-discovery and autobiographical testament emphasise for us the marked similarity between Waterloo and Lovell. The crux of the novel, namely that a trauma prevented their natural development, is found nowhere in the critical works mentioned.

7 The failure of Eokbert has been demonstrated earlier. Otherwise, we should note that the various Gothic elements occur spasmodically throughout the rest of Tieck's works, but invariably as servants of more important points; perhaps the most important reference is Lebrecht's mockery of it. Der Fremde is ostensibly a ghost story, but since only the characters disturbed by unusually forceful passion (Lowenstein and Amalie) actually see the apparition, a more sensible view of the story is that it represents passion as an aspect of a general chaos, using horror-methods. In Der Blaubart the Gothic horror is confined to a single room, which symbolises the aberrant trait (hatred of women) in Berner, and to a single object, the key, which he uses to provide a specious cause for aggression. In Liebeszauber all imaginative horror is absorbed in Emil's vision, by means of which his sexual fantasies are conveyed to us; and the actual horror is a real-life murder. As Tieck approached a more socially-orientated view of
literature with his novellas(32), the element of horror is externalised and is related to specific and plausible situations in real life. In Die Reisenden the horror is again real, in the society of the insane and in the allegation that society at large equates dissidence with lunacy.(33)

In Pietro von Abano(34) the main themes are the opposition of orthodoxy towards experimental or empirical knowledge, and tricksters' exploitation of people dissatisfied with or antagonised by orthodoxy's bigotry. (Tieck's criticisms of both extremes in this matter, rather than partisanship, mirrors his criticism of political extremism in Eigensinn und Laune.) (35)

In illustrating these themes and their background of superstition, Tieck uses the idea - first introduced by means of Waterloo's mis-shapen nose and Berner's disfiguring beard(36) - that evil is wrongly equated with ugliness. This false equation was, of course, a favourite amongst Gothic writers and, indeed, Romantic ones; it is deeply rooted in our general attitudes, for what childhood nightmare has ever featured a handsome bogeyman? In Pietro von Abano, as in Elaubert, Tieck shows how ugliness may become evil through the force of misattribution. (37)

The forms of deceit used by Pietro are a lesser matter; they do not require our belief in the supernatural, although they strain our modern credulity somewhat.

Die Wundersuchigen shares with Pietro the use of Gothic elements by some characters to deceive others. Here also the Gothic is a stimulus to the introduction of other themes - in
this instance a study of the mentality of those who are "wundersichtig". As we have seen in earlier works, the religious or artistic personality was of greater interest to Tieck than was theology or aesthetic theory: so in this novella the seeker of wonder was more interesting than the wonders themselves,

Die Klauseenburg and Abendgespräche are reversions which break the pattern, in that the ghostly elements seem to have objective reality in the narrative. Even here, however, the works have more important purposes than the inculcation of suspense. In the former there is an investigation of the relationship between deformity and genius and into the social position of women. And in the latter work, the most important theme is Eduard's abandonment of a flirtatious silliness and fondness for duels, in favour of true love, and his analogous abandonment of the Grand Tour in favour of real life; in pursuit of love for Cécilie he lives with ordinary people and sees real life for the first time. An accompanying theme of a ghost righting a wrong done in life is, unfortunately, made to seem fatuous - and makes the work as a whole seem fatuous - by the ghost's unnecessary appearance in real life, when it could have remained as a dream. This makes us realise how strong was the hold of the "Trivialroman" upon the superficial part of Tieck's imagination, even while his important works place it in a proper perspective.

It is possible also to discern the Gothic influence in Vittoria Accorombona's vision of evil and in the rather melodramatic deaths of Julie and Ottavio. However, this may also be too stringent a judgment, for Vittoria's imagination,
Julie's grief, and Ottavio's remorse are adequate explanations on the realistic level.

It is hardly possible that the commonplace views of a society, the traditional symbols and stereotypes of its literature, its routine modes of thought and expression, would not permeate any author. An artist, whatever his field, cannot but take up his inheritance and either reject it and develop something of his own, or accept it as his bricks and mortar and invest it with new meaning. In fact, all artists do both in some degree. The foregoing consideration of the Gothic and "Trivialroman" elements in Tieck refers to works in which he used these elements consciously as a means of self-expression: he was not at their mercy, for he made them serve psychological ends. So while he was certainly a child of his time in some of those works, the important examples do not support the view that they were a major influence except in so far as he consciously rejected them.

As suggested elsewhere, the real "Gothic" influence on Tieck was Shakespeare. (41)

This suggestion is supported by evidence from his critical essay of 1795, *Shakespeare's Behandlung des Wunderbaren*. The second section of this (entitled *Ueber die Behandlung des Wunderbaren in der Tragödie*) analyses three methods whereby, as Tieck saw it, Shakespeare ensured that "das Wunderbare" should direct our attention to the essential tragedy of the events on the stage.

First, "Die Geisterwelt scheint uns hier entfernter, und ist uns unbegreiflicher". Terror is kept in the background, ominously,
whereas if clearly present it might be explained away; effective use of terror will dull the spectator's analytical faculty while riveting his attention. Ghost figures, such as Hamlet's father or Banquo, are present but unexplained; we see them through the eyes of other characters, but never learn to know them directly in the way that we know Ariel or Caliban. In other words, there is effect without explanation.

While it is obvious that his interpretation of Shakespeare could have been reached only by a man steeped in the contemporary Gothic horror-novel, the reverse is equally obvious: that this interpretation of the function of terror and its use in literature could come only from a man steeped in Hamlet and Macbeth. The balance of emphasis favours the importance of Shakespeare, for the Gothic novel required a normal explanation of its terror: which is precisely what Tieck discounts. And the obsessive re-focussing upon terror, which is implicit in Tieck's description of it, underlines the attraction which Tieck plainly believed people felt for it: which, in turn, implies a psychological interest in those who are terrorised. This judgment is further supported by Tieck's third point (the second is an essentially technical reminder that terror for which the reader or spectator has not been prepared by previous suggestion will seem vulgar or childish). Tieck summarises his third point ambiguously in a section-heading as "Der Dichter läßt für das Wunderbare fast immer eine natürliche Erklärung übrig",(43) - ambiguously, because the crux is the kind of explanation provided. He then deals with the psychology of characters, and points out that Shakespeare does not permit his
ghosts to be seen by more than one person. This, he says, gives
them an allegorical significance - not the kind of allegory in
which an abstraction appears as a person, but an allegory of the
 beholder's state of mind. So we conclude that Tieck's "Gothic"
works are the product of this study of Shakespeare's
characterisations.

(2) Böhme

Tieck ceased writing when the instability which was
associated with his peculiar gifts mellowed with the years. The
evidence suggests that for reasons of self-esteem he sought a
respectable reason to explain the atrophy of his literary gifts.
It may, however, have had another cause.

He had been led by his "Liebe zur Poesie, zum Sonderbaren
und Alten" to the mystics, particularly to Böhme, and gives as his
reason that he had failed to find "einen dialogischen Philosophen".
By this he meant one prepared to investigate rather than assert
dogmatically. Some years later he gives a clearer explanation.

At first, he writes, he had been a freethinker unaware of his need
for religion because poetry had satisfied it; but, since poetry
for him also dealt with mysticism and holy things, it had
fostered religious and mystic aspirations in him. The Aufklärung
(Tieck refers to the form in which he knew it in his youth) had
seemed to discount everything he had needed. Its condemnation of
Catholicism as stupid, superstitious, and priest-ridden and its
emphasis on modernity (or what it regarded as such) had provoked
the Romantics to interest themselves in Catholicism and old
Germany. (and these two reactions were mutually reinforcing).
Protestantism had seemed to them to be a mere destructive, negative hostility towards intuition and beauty, by people who regarded themselves as "vorgeschrittene, höher stehende Luther" and who purveyed "die völlige Unwahrheit der verfolgenden Verneiner". The Pietist movement, associated with this, had spurned art and poetry and (he continues) substituted a mean, anxious life for a pious one. So he had been drawn - and there is a rebellious connotation - to Jakob Böhme, who was persona non grata amongst the Aufklärte, and he expressed his admiration for him in Fastnachtspiel. This exemplifies a general trend: Ederheimer points out that the Romantics in general were attracted to Böhme because his intuitive personal beliefs isolated him from an age which preferred more tangible and prosaic forms of knowledge; the Romantics felt that this was, in essence, the same as their own position. 

Before proceeding further we should note that none of the other works written at that time, not even Genoveva (and Fastnachtspiel is insignificant in comparison) require any reference to Böhme for an understanding of them. They may certainly have sprung from Tieck's personal problems, which may have been exacerbated by his lack of religious belief. But it is obvious that his writing persona went its own way. His religious problem may have stopped him writing in 1802, although this does not explain why it did not affect what he wrote before that date. It is more likely that his religious problem was connected, but as a mere aspect, with other problems he experienced as an individual and as a writer, and that Tieck, looking for an explanation, wrongly chose a
religious one. Whatever the explanation, it is obvious that Tieck's revolt against the Aufklärung was aesthetic, because of its denial of instinct and beauty, and the specific forms of his revolt were to idealise aspects of "Poesie", of beauty (as he saw it). In the present context, therefore, we note that his desire for mysticism was, as he later recognised, fundamentally aesthetic.

His account of his cessation of writing sounds as though he had felt an ethical doubt about poetry. Having been led, he writes, to mysticism by aesthetic interests (he concedes the point without realising its importance), two years' self-immersion in Böhme and Tauler brought about a crisis which he describes in the following ambiguous terms:

so kam es da, daß mein jugendlich leichter Sinn, meine Lust zur Poesie und der Bilden mir als etwas Verwerfliches, Verfehltes erschien, daß ich nun glaubte, Spekulation und das innere Leben gefunden zu haben, daß es sich für mich aber nicht mit den sonstigen weltlichen Bemühungen vertrüge ... (47)

This is obscure. There is the element of disgust, which presumably refers to the amoral tendencies of beauty in Runenberg, Die verkehrte Welt and Zerbino. Tieck himself adds that this mood affected Zerbino, Genoveva and Oktavian. It is difficult to know what he means, since these works seem to be about other (different) things. Porterfield and others have remarked on this:

And in letter 61 [of Matenko's Tieck-Solger correspondence] Matenko, following Johannes Raitf, contends, clearly with right, that Tieck's own assertions regarding the great influence on Zerbino of Böhme, Tauler, and other mystics must be denied even in the face of Tieck's own remark. (48)

Tieck also implies in the above quotation that those works were disgusting because they dealt with worldly matters: which in
turn suggests the desire for retreat into a pseudo-cloister. The combination "jugendlich leicht" is perhaps the key: having, in a continuous outpouring for over a decade, written numerous works based on his own first-hand and second-hand experiences, he was emotionally and intellectually vitiated. Possibly thereafter the absence of the safety-valve of writing was another source of difficulty. Religious problems were merely the external symptom of this, and scholarly interests a partial cure, for they gave him "im Verzweifeln neuer Leichtsinn". (49)

Therein lies the most likely explanation for the long fallow-period of his middle years. This also explains what would otherwise sound like self-contradiction when he states that the chief cause of his recovery was "vorzüglich wohl mein sich regendes ungeduldiges Talent". (50)

While Tieck mentions philosophy, religion and certain other important cultural factors in this connection, (51) his only truly metaphysical comment is obscure. In referring to the liberation from a particular obsession allegedly caused by his having read Solger's *Philosophische Gespräche* he writes:

> nun seh ich aber, wie Höhm [sic] und die meisten Mystiker, dem Bösen eine zu große Realität zuschrieben, so daß sich der fürchterlichste Dualismus entwickeln muß, der mich oft genug geängstet hatte. (52)

He might easily have learned from a re-reading of his own *Abdallah* the idea that destructiveness could have a constructive effect, and that, conversely, progress can be bound up with evil; or from Lovell that evil is attractive to warped characters. The above quotation is a remarkable instance of Tieck's intuition
as a writer preceding and being vastly superior to his more obviously intellectual activity.

In short, Tieck's interest in Böhme is an excellent illustration of his own self-diagnosis as one in whom influences merely stimulate pre-existing tendencies. His obsession with evil dates from at least the time of Abdallah, and his love for beauty as an escape from the rigidly rational utilitarian world of the Aufklärung dates from Sommernacht. Witkowski is incorrect, therefore, in asserting that Tieck turned from the Aufklärung because he was influenced by Böhme for the sequence of events is wrong; it is a different problem connected with, if anything in particular, his turning to the Schlegels. Similarly Witkowski discerns the influence of Böhme in Genoveva, but seeks to sustain his argument only by assuming that Genoveva's views represent the import of the play as a whole. Thalmann regards Watelet of Der Aufruhr in den Cevennen (conceived in 1806) as representing the influence of Böhme. This is unlikely, since Watelet sees no independent evil at all, merely misguided people; Watelet is more likely to be a fictionalised Solger. Probably the most important subsequent appearance of the idea that progress and uniquely new thoughts are associated with evil is in Der Hexen-Sabbath; but since the idea is found embryonically before Tieck's acquaintance with Böhme no causal relationship is possible. Some scholars will go to any lengths to avoid having to admit that sometimes Tieck had an idea of his own.

The most detailed assertion of Böhme's influence on Tieck is made by Ederheimer. His entire section on this subject is
is permeated with the two main deficiencies of critical works in which Tieck is seen from one standpoint only. The first deficiency is that of seeing everything through the distorting-spectacles thereby assumed: so, for example, Abdallah is supposed to show Böhme's influence because Omar teaches Abdallah that the distinction between good and evil does not exist, and this destroys Abdallah's faith. But this example merely shows that Tieck was concerned about a metaphysical problem which seems to concern adolescents the world over; it does not follow that he took it from Böhme. Secondly, the entire section consists chiefly of a series of extracts or references to specific points in various works; at no time does Ederheimer consider what each work as a whole means. Astoundingly, he convicts himself (though, being unaware of what he has done, he continues undeterred):

Einzeln versplitterte Boehmsismen, die ganz systemlos angebracht sind, finden sich in Tieck's Schriften in ungeheurer Anzahl. (60)

The numbers we dispute; but the dispute is unimportant, since we concede their irrelevancy.

Obviously Tieck felt a superficial attraction to Böhme's thought, just as he did towards the Romantics' Middle Ages (61) and to Gothic horror. (62) In each case he was in rebellion against the Aufklärung (in the form in which he knew it), and these spurious alternatives rapidly proved unsatisfactory for him. But beneath this reaction and counter-reaction was the familiar doubt about the ethical connotations of beauty; this theme recurs in the novellas (particularly Dichterleben) and remains unresolved even then.
Shakespeare

Our review of Tieck's mainsprings has hitherto been somewhat negative: we have seen him reacting against what he disliked, and we have discounted the alleged influence of Böhme. It is now necessary to consider a positive side. Tieck rejected the Aufklärung (in its contemporary form) because he knew Shakespeare and because this knowledge assisted him in formulating ideals; he assimilated the Gothic novel to his own purposes also under Shakespeare's influence. And we shall see later that he owes to the influence of Cervantes his susceptibility to Shakespeare's benign influence.

Tieck's view of Shakespeare was, contrary to common belief, not one of uncritical adulation: on the contrary, he was often sharply critical (on entirely idiosyncratic grounds). While he sometimes displayed critical acumen (suggesting, for example, that Titus Andronicus was merely a revision by Shakespeare of a work of unknown authorship), he was equally capable of ascribing inferior plays to Shakespeare and of preferring them to real Shakespeare plays.

His extreme subjectivity as a critic (in contrast to his objectivity as a poet) is readily apparent from the instances referred to. His specific comments often show that he held a fixed and rather limited idea of what a play sui generis should be and was bewildered when confronted with a playwright obviously great yet not conforming to his preconceptions. His irrelevant comparisons of Romeo and Juliet with Die Räuber and Kabale und Liebe, and of Shakespeare with Diderot and Iffland,
reveal that he had not yet learned to appraise literature by standards other than those implicit in works he already knew. He even remarked that the nuances of Shakespeare's thought were beyond the capacity of the unphilosophical English language. Plainly the Shakespeare whom Tieck saw was a late eighteenth-century German.

But we must also note that at this time, and to some extent for his whole life, Tieck the critic and Tieck the writer were often virtually disconnected. Apart from his remark to Wackenroder in 1792 that Shakespeare was for him a recent overwhelming discovery — plainly a nonsensical opinion, since he wrote *Sommernacht* three years earlier — let us consider his idiosyncratic view of Hamlet's famous speech "To be or not to be". His interpretation was published in 1826, but bears a striking resemblance to the state of mind of Karl von Berneck: yet the critical notes, which date from not later than 1795, do not mention this interpretation. Tieck states in the *Buch* that Hamlet's character is cast in a contemptible light because he stabs the King only when, having heard that he himself will soon die, he concludes that he has nothing to lose. If Tieck had realised consciously, when compiling his critical notes, that he regarded Hamlet's vacillation as fear of death, he would have pointed to the death-scene as proof of his view and would have drawn the connection with the famous earlier speech. It is highly unlikely that such an original view would have been omitted from these notes, for, though unorganised, they are certainly copious. Plainly the
Shakespeare of the *Buch* has little to do with the Shakespeare of *Die Sommernacht* or the quasi-Hamlet of Karl von Berneck: Tieck the writer seems independent of, and more clear-sighted than, Tieck the critic.

The form of the Shakespeare notes suggests Tieck's desire to reach an understanding of Shakespeare rather than to set down and elaborate an understanding already reached. Technical matters, suggested interpretations, points of dramatic theory follow each other without sequential connection, just as his line-by-line reading stimulated his thought. His more deliberate attempts at analysis of the works as a whole are concerned chiefly with categorising the plays and with assessing Shakespeare's place in history.

His view of Shakespeare's position in history has something of the quality of a tug-of-war between his apparent belief that the theatre was a product of historical and social forces and his equally strong belief in Shakespeare's uniqueness. On the one hand there is the origin of the theatre in the forces of religion (though he does not say that the theatre is a religious analogue) modified by that of nationality. Accordingly, Tieck continues, Shakespeare inherited a theatre founded on Christian mythology (with specific virtues and vices personified in the Morality plays), traditions of the Devil and Harlequin, and the early Italian theatre. This primitive inheritance makes Shakespeare's greatness and modernity all the more remarkable in Tieck's view. Shakespeare's contemporaries were hardly ready for him, and after his death they relapsed into masques, allegories and childish taste.
Comments such as these, taken with our knowledge of Tieck's familiarity with Ben Jonson by 1793 - the year of Herr von Puchs - suggest that this part of the commentary is earlier still than Lüdeke's estimate of 1794. Obsession with his idol would have needed an accompanying ignorance of Shakespeare's contemporaries in order to lead him so dangerously close, as a critic, to the Sturm und Drang concept of Shakespeare, in such flagrant contradiction of his poet's view in Die Sommernacht.

Tieck is later at some pains to deny this concept. He has the best of both arguments: Shakespeare cannot be judged by the criteria implicit in Classical tragedy, partly because he is unique and partly because previous practice is the product of different circumstances and is therefore irrelevant; yet for the same reason his art is closely connected with his own circumstances, and he is not the pretentious hectoring "Genie" figure. As Tieck put it in the introduction to Shakespeare's Behandlung des Wunderbaren (1793), Shakespeare wrote for the nation, not for the mob; he ennobled and refined the beliefs of the people, neither cutting himself off from them nor accepting them uncritically.

The extent to which Tieck equated greatness in a poet, and the qualities he deemed implicit in greatness, with the closeness of the poet's relationship with his own nation is suggested by this, and is made even clearer in a comment the The Merry Wives of Windsor. He describes this play (in a manner reminiscent of Lebrecht) as being
unter Sh. Lustspielen das merkwürdigste ..., weil es das Einzigste ist, das national ist ..., ohne Abenteuerlichkeiten und Wunder, ..., völlig aus der Natur herausgehoben ... (79).

The national aspect is emphasised also in Die Kupferstiche nach der Shakespeare-Galerie in London of 1793. He states that Shakespeare is a national poet, expressing the national character for all sectors of society, and replacing Greek mythology in England. (80) He evidently held this view consistently, for it is found in his correspondence with Solger twenty-two years later. (81)

Perhaps most important of all, Tieck’s study of Shakespeare led him to reflect on the role of the poet as such. In discussing Richard II, he remarks how feeling preconditions thought, in the sense that vice and evil are often a form of one-sidedness, or incorrect inference dictated by passion. Tieck believes that the poet has a useful function in counteracting this, although he seems to waver between two concepts - a poet who demonstrates the weakness (and therefore, presumably, serves as a terrible warning) and a poet who inculcates feelings which lead to the right thoughts. In these comments and in the following it is clear that he takes a didactic purpose to be axiomatic: the dramatic poet is

Lehrer der Menschheit, er kann hier mehr wirken, als der moralisierende Philosoph, denn es ist den meisten Menschen unendlich leichter, aus Gefühlen Gedanken zu abstrahiren, als Prinzipien sich zu eigen zu machen und nach diesen ihre Gefühle zu verfeinern. (82)

The true genius is the one who is not dominated by a single, limiting or distorting passion, but in whom the one feeling or idea will inevitably evoke many others. The genius has a comprehensive view, and expresses it in works of equal magnitude
and comprehensiveness. This is strikingly similar to his definition of sublimity in his uncompleted essay of 1792, Über das Erhabene. Sublimity, he held, was distinguishable from mere beauty by the fact that the sublime is a "Hauptgedanke" which inspires many lesser thoughts. His implied view of the nature of Shakespeare's genius is apparently an analogue, and in view of Tieck's extreme youth and the consequent probability of rapid change in his ideas this similarity also suggests that the date of the "Erster Entwurf" should be the earliest consistent with the facts.

The fact that Tieck's own creative work shows interpretations of Shakespeare which are absent from the critical notes tells us that Shakespeare appealed to his imagination, always more perceptive than his intellect. Previous chapters show the Shakespearean influence on Karl von Berneck and William Lovell. We have also seen that Shakespeare stimulated Tieck's thoughts on the problem of perception posed by Kant, and was an important example to Tieck of the relationship between poetry and national identity, to which he was to attach more weight later. We have also seen that Tieck's study of Shakespeare was the origin of elements usually attributed to the influence of the Gothic novel, and that it was from Shakespeare that Tieck learned to use terror as a means of characterising the terrorised.

Perhaps the most important aspect of Shakespeare to Tieck, however, was as an ideal. From the first - in Sommernacht (1789) he regarded Shakespeare as the antithesis of the hectoring self-styled genius, because he was modest, even ordinary in private life.
By implication, the boy Shakespeare in that early play is a
warning to such types: the world of imagination is perilous for
them. In a letter to Wackenroder Tieck writes of the personal
ordinariness of the real genius, in whom greatness is an
unconscious attribute, readily distinguishable from the extraordinary
and eccentric behaviour to which their friends Schmohl and Moritz
are impelled. \(^{(85)}\) Such views are found throughout his works. \(^{(86)}\)

However, Tieck’s own behaviour in early manhood was perhaps
less exemplary than his strictures on others might seem to imply.
Obviously his admiration of Shakespeare in an environment which
paid him less heed makes him feel superior. From another letter to
Wackenroder we may infer that from this feeling grew Tieck’s
awareness of the elitist arrogance with which he was later to
characterise the "Klosterbruder" who cites his own emotional
intensity as alleged proof of discriminatory power. Tieck states
in that letter that a great and sublime soul is necessary not only
to create great art but also to appreciate it, whereas the
ignorant mass is moved only by sentimentality. \(^{(87)}\) In yet another
letter to Wackenroder he refers to his detailed studies of
Shakespeare, and advocates their retreat to the ivory tower:

\[
\text{wir werden ... immer ... ihre [referring to "die Welt"]
Wichtigsten unwichtig finden, und sie wird uns für
exzentrische Schwarmer halten, - ... \(^{(86)}\)}
\]

It is conceivable that Tieck drew immodest comparisons. He
expressed to Wackenroder his fear that pretence of madness in a
writer describing mad thoughts - and he seems to mean himself and
Shakespeare - can, as with Hamlet or actors, lead to real madness.
Like the elitist feeling, this must have been a most gratifying
fear - that of being a potentially mad genius along with Shakespeare. It suggests that the fear of ordinariness and the pretensions of greatness, which he criticises in William Lovell and related types, were derived not only from his own observation of others but also from his personal feelings of an earlier period, which he learned to portray objectively when a few years older. The contradiction in these examples from 1792 between his criticism of his contemporaries and his similar offence shows that the balance between uncontrolled emotion and objective assessment, including self-assessment, was an unstable one, and it may be thought that he never entirely resolved it.

Shakespeare as an ideal was the more enduring obsession. The description in Peter Lebrecht (1795-96) is a gentle mockery of the sentimental view of genius: Lebrecht, visiting Stratford, imagines Shakespeare at work, unaware of his own greatness as works pour from his pen. This is a view of art devoid of passion, a debased view of the normality of Shakespeare, and it is therefore a comment on Lebrecht and on false impressions of genius. Finally in this period Shakespeare appears in Prinz Zerbino (1796-1799). In the mill-scene in Zerbino, an allegory of the contemporary world's treatment of its literary heritage, Shakespeare is hardly touched by the grinding, although he still feeds many; Zerbino suggests he is best taken unground. Zerbino, however, being of ordinary ability, cannot bear the vision of nature as the source of all energy and inspiration in the "Garten der Poesie", but Shakespeare can; this recalls Shakespeare's reception by Oberon and Titania in Sommernacht, and
the warning of peril to ordinary mortals who approach. In the "Garten der Poesie" the flowers are the real ones, of which the earth knows only imitations. (93) Tieck's point is that poetry, particularly in the works of Shakespeare (and Dante, Cervantes and Goethe; he places these four above others), discerns and portrays real beauty; life is less perfect. It is as if Kant's noumenal world were expressed in aesthetic rather than philosophical terms.

As Tieck approaches the end of his first intensively creative period it is clearly his view that poetry, represented for him by Shakespeare, has a comprehensive and clear vision, a permanent value, and a value in relation to which daily life is a lesser substitute. The relationship between the world of the imagination and the ordinary world became a major preoccupation at this time, as shown in Runenberg and the Phantasus poem.

Tieck's final view of Shakespeare, which seems to portray him as the complete answer to the late Aufklärung's debased Reason and the neo-Sturm und Drang genius, is contained in his novella Dichterleben. Even there, as will be seen, Tieck is still in doubt as to the psychological and moral status of beauty. His true views in this and related matters may never be fully established, since they seem to have deep roots in his individual character. It is also possible that Shakespeare represented to Tieck a kind of lifeline without which he was unable to reject Goethe. It will be apparent from the foregoing, and from later consideration of Dichterleben, that Tieck laid emphasis on the relationship between Shakespeare and his cultural milieu and sense of nationhood.
Goethe's alleged lack of a corresponding empathy was Tieck's chief criticism of him. Perhaps Tieck could not find the resolve to reject one hero without putting another in his place. These suggestions are substantiated in our later review of the rôle played in Tieck's life by Solger.

As a postscript, lest there be any lingering doubt as to the subjective and fundamentally irrational view which Tieck held of Shakespeare, let us note that, while he objected to others' alterations of Shakespeare, he himself wrote to Raumer that it was desirable, both for artistic and practical reasons, to divide As You Like It into three acts:

Um dies ganz möglich zu machen, müssen natürlich Kleinigkeiten weggelassen und Worte hinzugefügt worden.

This remark reveals his unquestioned assumption that his own alterations (unlike anybody else's) could not possibly violate the original because of his unique understanding. This is characteristic of the Romantics' refashioning of material while expressing veneration for its integrity in the original form; the alterations introduced by Arnim and Brentano into Des Knaben Wunderhorn are another example. The practice, and its unselfconscious double-standard, is similar to the Romantics' alteration of history in the belief that their historical works were thereby rendered more accurate in essence.

(4) Cervantes

Tieck was enabled to utilise what he had learned from Shakespeare about the Aufklärung and about the Gothic novel from his study of Don Quixote. In the latter is a striking example of a character whose thoughts have been formed by literature and whose
independent judgment has been destroyed: in other words, an example of the very opposite of what Shakespeare meant to Tieck.

It therefore provided a logical connection between the concepts represented by the Aufklärung and by Shakespeare. The Spanish work seems also to have provided Tieck with an analogy between uncreative literary parasitism and unproductive socio-economic parasitism - an analogy reinforced by the fact that the parasites in both situations entertain delusions of their perfection and rectitude.

We have noted, in considering Tieck's works thus far, that he stressed the effect of literature as a determinant of thought in two contexts. Firstly, his motivation of Karl von Bernack and of Bertha (of Ekkbert) relies on their obsession with traditional chivalric tales. They are simple parallels to Quixote, and perhaps owe much to the fact that Tieck was familiar with the Spanish work from boyhood. (98) Even as late as Kenelworth there is a reference to the delusion inculcated by "Poesie": the boy Shakespeare believes certain chivalric stories because they are beautiful and inspiring and because they sound true; (99) Quixote believes similar stories for precisely the same reasons. (100) But there are important additions, and perhaps Tieck's indebtedness to Cervantes for these is largely unconscious. Tieck criticised the social order of chivalry as parasitic: the analogy between the economic parasitism or brutality of the feudal upper classes and the aesthetic parasitism of those who dwell in a world of Romance has been mentioned in our analysis of Ekkbert, Zerbino and Genoveva (and is important in such later works as Waldeinsamkeit). This analogy will be seen to be implicit in Don Quixote. The idea of parasitism
is also linked with the quality of amorality which, as an
attribute of beauty, gave Tieck considerable anxiety in, for
eexample, Sternbald and Dichterleben. Secondly, it is difficult to
escape a sense of analogy between Quixote's indoctrination by
literature (with obvious similarities in Tieck's spuriously
mediaeval works) and the deplorable effect of cheap literature in
Tieck's contemporary debased Aufklärung. This theme is at the root
of much in Lovell and of Tieck's many attacks on contemporary taste
in the Strapfedern stories and in the satirical comedies. We
shall see that Tieck achieved an ingenious analogy between this
effect of literature and his application of Kant's theory of
perception (which has been noted in relation to Lovell). In the
light of this evidence, Lussky is probably incorrect in stating
that the Volksmärchen of 1795-96 mark Tieck's discovery of a
"deeper meaning" in Don Quixote, which Tieck had previously (in
Lussky's view) regarded as "merely an entertaining tale". (101)
That Tieck discovered a deep meaning and that the discovery was
influential is not in doubt; but these events must have occurred
much earlier, for their effect is discernible as early as Berneck.

The most striking feature of the Spanish work is that
Quixote is so imbued with the fiction he reads that he takes it to
be a description of real life, and consequently suffers delusions
about situations confronting him. From this we have his misconception
of the past and his misguided interventions in the present. There
is therefore a close analogy with his interest in the fact that
literature was for many readers a distorting-mirror through which
they saw life and which affected their thoughts and actions. The
key to this is escapism: "The appeal [of stories of chivalry] was the romantic susceptibilities of people leading dull lives". (102) Spain of the sixteenth century wanted chivalry as its entertainment just as the eighteenth century wanted non-materialist horror to escape from Reason. Quixote cannot understand the world except in terms of his delusion, which supplies the apparently logical connections between phenomena. This is very similar to Kant's view that objects conform to knowledge. Tieck's view of Don Quixote is a psychological version, in a literary context, of Kant's theory of perception.

It is also superficially tempting to regard Quixote as related to the fools who see more clearly than many normal people. While Tieck was somewhat interested in this view, as might be inferred from Claudius and Simon in Der Blaubart and perhaps Christian in Der Runenherge, it is not an interpretation of Don Quixote and cannot therefore have come from there. Mostly Quixote is gentle and wise; his obsession is a single distorting mania, not an extra ability or further dimension to his mind, and when it comes upon him he is a dangerous lunatic who can discern only what his lunacy supplies. Quixote sees about him only indolence, finery, elegance and sophistication, courtiers with stereotyped ritual. He contrasts these with the chivalrous valour, frugality, austerity and natural spontaneity of knights-errant. So his life is acted out in accordance with a pattern of values which, in effect, proscribe freedom of choice by prescribing which choices will be made. Even though Quixote clashes with society, he is not an individualist, since he is acting a role meticulously studied. He is more pedant
than hero. He does not think; he quotes. Murner's bigotry and paranoid conviction of his sole rectitude are in the same spirit; a self-contained set of prejudices cover all situations. The hardships of the chivalrous code are similar to the inhuman demands upon Eckert and Seestern. (103) Obviously the old stories Quixote believes to be literally true are an insult to the intelligence of a sane person. Quixote is mad; he is also dangerous and parasitic.

He is dangerous because he does not enquire into the rights and wrongs of situations before he intervenes violently; he is as guilty of "Faustrecht" as those whom he attacks. (104) This is the most obvious form of his delusion: he equates Christianity with martial valour, like Camoens in Tod des Dichters, Römer and the Baron in Die Gesellschaft auf dem Lande, and both sides of the religious war in Genoveva, and like them he is sustained by the paranoid conviction that he knows best. The practical consequences for society are appalling, or would be if he were more effective. But his actions are those of a lunatic, not a scoundrel; he is not a do-gooder, merely a catastrophic well-meaner. Quixote, not Götz, is the probable origin of Tieck's objection to "Faustrecht".

Secondly, Quixote is a parasite. He would have been a useful and productive gentleman-farmer but for his lunacy. And it is noteworthy that an important part of his obsession is that he is not plain Quixote, but Don Quixote, and that his ladies all have the title of Doña. Ennoblement is an integral part of the process by which he becomes a lunatic, parasite and criminal. A knight-errant is not expected to pay for board and lodging at an inn, and
is entitled to devoted service from his squire with neither the reality nor the expectation of payment, unless one counts his largesse with land that does not belong to him. He is nothing more than a mad vagrant. The parasitic economic position of the upper classes is an important theme in Tonelli, in the description of the royal courts in Kater, Zerbino, and Die Elfen. In a more general way, self-indulgence is shown to be parasitic in Almansur, Eckbert, Dämchen, Des Lebens Überflut, and Welsdinsamkeit.

Don Quixote cannot logically be interpreted as portraying a search for the restoration of lost ideals, or as a criticism of a society which has lost them and has failed to value them when they reappeared. Cervantes cannot have intended to convey the impression that mediaeval chivalry was accurately represented in the works of literature which formed Quixote's thoughts, or that the Golden Age had once been reality. Quixote does not attempt — and in this he differs from Camoens — to elevate himself arrogantly above society by demonstrating that he is unaffected by its degeneration; Quixote is simply mad, because he has been robbed of the power of independent thought by his indoctrination with mediaeval romance. He has therefore ceased to function except as an automaton: a point made mutatis mutandis about Ulrich, Balder (in Lovell) and by Lebrecht in his reference to the mechanistic aspect of "Komplimente". His misguided attempt to establish in reality a fictitious world is not the same thing as Tieck's interest in the vanishing socio-economic order of mediaeval Germany. There is a difference between nostalgia and
lunacy: although Romer certainly approaches Quixote, in that his nostalgia is for the social stratification and militarism, not for mediaeval craftmanship. The connection is the implication by both authors that ideals are errors of perception: Quixote and his Tieckian equivalents think, wrongly, that they can relive previous heroism. The errors of Camoens and of the whole of Portugal in Tod des Dichters (showing, again, Tieck's view that personal and collective behaviour have close similarities) provide another example. It is also tempting to analyse Don Quixote in terms of the "near and far", "prose and poetry" of Tieck's writings, with particular reference to Lebrecht. But Cervantes does not give us any clear indication that there were wrongs to be righted in Quixote's own village, or that contemporary society was especially evil.

It is likely that, in addition to these important themes, a minor character in Don Quixote exercised a strong direct influence on Tieck. Marcela, a beautiful shepherdess, is accused by the general population of having, by her cruel disdain, caused the death of her distracted admirer, Grisostomo. She defends herself as follows. She is not obliged to love those who love her, and has given them no encouragement. She was born beautiful, and is neither responsible for nor obligated by her inadvertent effect on others. They simply refuse to leave her alone. She is Cervantes' everyday counterpart to Dulcinea. The latter represents a certain aspect of chivalry, namely the appointment of a beautiful lady to worship as inspiration. The cruel hardships the knight-errant undergoes - and, with the prospect of a delicately unspecified
reward, seeks - are intended to earn her favour. In Marcela's case the favour was supposed to be an extreme one, and she resented this supposition. Galatea (1585) is in a similar position. Beautiful and accomplished, she is inevitably loved; or at least admired. She is entrapped into an appearance of slight favour by gratitude for Elicio's services: gratitude which she cannot withhold without seeming churlish. But he, encouraged by it, feels rebuffed when she then withdraws a little, and reproaches her for indifference to his suffering. Whether Tieck used these models is difficult to tell, but it is interesting to find Vittoria Accorambona and her predecessors here, with their beauty, intelligence, independence, and resentment of their admirers' insulting suppositions. Perhaps in these relationships lies also the origin of Tieck's interest in the distortion of the character brought about by the loss of a beloved, although Quixote's deprivation is masochistically self-imposed in order to create the external inspiration.

From this Tieck-centric view of Don Quixote it is possible to infer what Tieck saw in it. Unfortunately, he did not supply any convenient statement about this, although he is known to have read it first in his teens and to have admired it throughout his life. We are therefore obliged to establish Tieck's view of it by inference.

We have already noted that, by at least 1793, when working on Karl von Berneck, Tieck was aware of the effect which literature could have in implanting ideals of behaviour (that is to say, previously practised modes of behaviour described in literature
and found attractive and compulsive by the individual subsequently reading of them) and thereby effectively denying the affected individual any freedom of will. This idea recurs from time to time throughout Tieck's output. In approximately the same period, when working on William Lovell, he applied this idea to the effect of contemporary cheap literature, but in that work the theme is related to the psychology of terror. The specific forms of these ideas in Don Quixote are that fiction could inculcate a delusion, either about the allegedly ideal past or about the allegedly degenerate present, or both, and that this delusion determines subsequent behaviour. There is an interesting analogy to Kant's teaching that the mind's preconceptions create the (apparent) reality which is perceived. Both Kant and Tieck were consistent in also suggesting that religion and morality are the creation of time and place; the common feature is early (deliberate or inadvertent) indoctrination by the force of habit and custom, whether in the sphere of religion, morals, more general norms of behaviour, or processes of thought. Cervantes may be as important as Kant in his influence on Tieck, for it seems to have been from Cervantes that Tieck noted the insidious implanting of ideas in obsessed readers: the quasi-Kantian predisposition of the mind to think in certain ways may have reached Tieck in the literary form it takes in Don Quixote.

This probable effect of the novel shows itself more clearly in the specific forms in which Quixote's delusion expresses itself, for it is in relation to those that the resemblance to Tieck's works are noticed. Firstly, there is Quixote's paranoid
and bigoted conviction that he is the sole repository of lost virtues and is entitled to impose his views on others by "Faustrecht". This reminds one of Tieck's distaste for the quarrels between Aufklärung and Romanticism, and between religious factions, and his hope for reconciliation by "Poesie".

But, more importantly, it is obvious from Don Quixote that the mediaeval romance was not being advocated by Cervantes as worthy of perpetuation or realisation in the modern world. This point is directly relevant to Tieck's severe criticism of the mediaeval world in Genoveva and Heymonskinder, or more generally of feudalism in the satirical comedies. Whatever his romantic enthusiasms in correspondence or critical writings, his literary works condemn the mediaeval past without modification.

Secondly, there is the parasitism of a self-indulgent mania for implementing ideals without objective assessment of them and their consequences.

Two more general qualities of the work may also have attracted Tieck. Advocacy of the vernacular, of nationhood as the background to literature, which was a development characteristic of the later European Renaissance (Europe discovered first its classical past, then its vernacular and national past) is a major aspect of this novel, and is also found in Tieck's critical writings, where it is apparent that he was aware of the long-term historical process.

Don Quixote, with its Castilian prose, and dicta such as Quixote's view that a translation is at best only like the reverse side of a tapestry, can only have appealed strongly to him.

Finally, there is a technical matter. The novel Don Quixote
consists of Don Quixote portraying himself, unconsciously, by his own words and actions, with the author sympathetic but distant and sometimes mocking. This was the stance of Wackenroder and Tieck in the *Herzenserfahrungen*.

Although much of the present section necessarily relies on inference, it is likely that Don Quixote was an important influence on Tieck - possibly the most important of all, because it gave cohesion to the influence upon him of the Aufklärung and Shakespeare. It probably gave him an early understanding of the possibility that a person who selects an ideal destined to isolate him from an indifferent or hostile society may have egotistic motives and may be a cultural or economic parasite. The work probably showed him also that an uncritical surrender to fiction was a form of self-indoctrination leading to atrophy of the individuality. Quixote takes a ready-made view of beauty from an imaginary world created by others, instead of creating his own in real life. He is the exact opposite of Tieck's Shakespeare.

C. LATER INFLUENCES

Since Tieck has often been considered merely in relation to the alleged influences upon him, as though his works were largely derivative, it is interesting to note that Tieck was at some pains to defend himself against the charge of unoriginality. He comments that his study of Solger's *Erwin* (1815) brought to his conscious mind what had hitherto lain dormant and unorganised:

Denn das scheint mir eben das rechte Lernen, daß uns deutlich und zusammenhängend wird, was wir schon selbst gesehen oder geahndet haben, was uns bald deutlich, bald dunkel vorschwebte, was doch wieder andern Gedanken und Vorstellungen zu
widersprechen schien, die wir auch lieben mussten, und nun plötzlich in allem Licht, notwendige Folgen sehn, und die Widersprüche gerade, die uns ängstigten, uns und unsere Lehre bestätigen. (117)

Though his remark is occasioned by Erwin, he phrases it generally and implies his view that he was stimulated and developed by his reading but did not merely copy it; that he worked through influences, absorbed them, made them his own by his ability to respond to them with an inner supply of originality. Certainly he was attracted to influences, or we might more accurately call them stimuli, such as Shakespeare, Cervantes, Solger and Raumer, which expressed (or which he wrongly thought expressed) his own embryonic ideas; and he was attracted to other interests, such as the Gothic novel, which expressed a certain part of his personality. What he saw in these stimuli, or what he made of them, often reveals more about himself than about the objects of his critical attention.

Tieck merely went through processes of increasing self-awareness rather than developed in the more usual sense. His nature was many-sided, and could supply inspirations for a life's work under a succession or concatenation of influences or stimuli. It is this that explains why his works are so varied yet have such frequent links, and why the thematic links are traceable over his whole career as well as forming more obvious chronological groups.

As Matenko suggests:

This lack of change may be due to the fact that Tieck's inner nature was already formed from the first, and hence his development was not an evolution but a deepening of what had already existed before. (118)

Tieck's attitude, even in this middle period, to his lack of "development" is not entirely clear. The tone of a letter to
G. A. Reiner in 1817 suggests that he sees nothing to worry about (and this seems to have been the impression he conveyed to his nephew Felix Theodor von Bernhardi in 1851). On the other hand, referring in 1817 to the fact that he conceived Fortunat (completed in 1816) in 1800, he makes the following rather self-deprecatory general comment:

Es kann mich oft wahrhaft ängstigen, daß meine alten und ältesten Pläne im Fortgange meines Lebens so wenige Revolutionen erleiden, wie ich doch bei allen Dichtern sehe. Dies ist meine Individualität, die mich nur scheinbar in gewissen Jahren auf kurze Zeit verließ.

And in 1848, somewhat anticipating Matenko, he was at some pains to represent this characteristic as a form of early maturity and lifelong consistency; he does not disclaim the experience of violent emotion, merely the experience of violent change of objective.

We must remember that Tieck's writing career seemed virtually to have ended after Fortunat. The fact that he was still completing early plans, with no significant developments in them, must inevitably have caused him anxiety and have made him wish to regard it as indicating strength rather than weakness. It was in this period of his life that he misrepresented his earlier works (in the preface to Lovell when reissued in 1813) as having shown an extraordinary degree of historical perspective and self-awareness as well as a mature intellectual purpose. He also the misrepresented satirical comedies so as to mitigate their subversive effect, and it has been suggested that his intention, particularly in revising the comedies, was a desire to avoid possible offence to authority. This may have been a partial
motive, but there may have been others: deep insecurity, doubt of his ability to continue original writing, and a desire to appear mature and guided by orderly purposes. This theory is supported by his retreat into scholarship; by the fact that his scholarly work is idiosyncratic, seeing what he wished to see rather than what was there; and by the fact that he continued to write works which attacked authority.

The key is his apparent desire to be balanced, mature and invulnerable to influences. Nothing refutes his pretences more clearly than his unconvincingly dismissive references to his youth. Of "Gedanken, die mir ganz neu sind" he remarks:


This conveys the impression that in a brief period of youthful folly he revelled in passionate self-abandonment to new ideas because they were new and exciting, while his inner convictions were unchanged. He grossly understates the genuine intensity and the time it lasted, and indeed contradicts himself in the same letter by saying that the disturbed mood in which he wrote the work is still a part of him, even if less burdensome, and is associated with his creativity.

But perhaps what worried him most was that he no longer seemed to be prey to the obsessiveness which he (no doubt
correctly) regarded as the concomitant of his creativity. He was (at least by comparison with his former self) stable, mature and unproductive. His defence-mechanism was to explain it away, firstly by contending that his failure to evolve - and to evolve through "Revolutionen" - was a sign of his many-sided originality and, secondly, that his failure to be mentally and emotionally unstable was a welcome sign of maturity. Therefore he also tried to contend that the period in which he had done great work - which perhaps he could never surpass - was not the turmoil it had actually been but was a calm progression through his many-sidedness. And consequently he misrepresented his earlier period when he came to assess it critically, and continued to misrepresent it.

(1) Solger

Tieck's general comment that influences merely developed what was latent within him rather than implanted anything new he also makes specifically in relation to Solger. Of the latter's Philosophische Gespräche and Erwin he remarks:

ich ... sah und fühlte mit freudigem Erschrecken, daß dies mein eigenes Innerstes sey, das, was ich immer gesucht, und immer nur scheinbar gefunden hatte. (129)

Likewise, he calls Solger "der Dilemmer [sic] meiner Ansichten und Ahndungen mir selber"(130) - intending to show his indebtedness to Solger, and in a sense doing so, but also revealing his view that Solger merely developed ideas already present in him. And he finds "mein eigenes Gemüth" in Erwin's last words. (131)

The more usual view is that Solger influenced Tieck. (132)

Tieck himself is largely responsible for this error, for his letters and certain of his critical writings assert the benefit he derived
from their friendship. These assertions may have been sincere, but probably arose from a personal esteem for Solger, coupled with Tieck's unawareness (noted elsewhere) of the nature of his own works.

This possible explanation certainly applies to the main point of alleged influence. Tieck asks us to believe that his life was changed by his having learned of Solger's idea of "jene Realität des Nichts" (as Tieck phrases it); this had become a "Hauptwendepunkt meiner Gedanken", with the result that he had been "von der Realität des Göttlichen, der wahren Wirklichkeit durchdrungen". The idea which so impressed Tieck was that Man's self-awareness and awareness of the world can both develop to the point where they become a unity; in this unity Man ceases (in his perception) to have empirical existence and has, in effect, ceased to be an empirical phenomenon to himself. This is "reales Nichts", a positive nothingness achieved by revelation (by which term is meant an intuitive understanding rather than a religious gift). Tieck's fear of the amoral dynamic quality of poetic creativity would, it is presumed, have been assuaged by such a belief. Furthermore, the intellectual justification it contains for the closest possible relationship between the individual and his environment must have been extremely welcome to Tieck in his struggle to reconcile Goethe's greatness with his former idol's having fallen into error of a type which Tieck found heinous. Comfort in being able to regard as creative something formerly thought dangerous, and confidence in being able to admit to holding a critical view of a former idol - these were
valuable influences. But although we may be grateful to Solger for these catalytic effects, which hastened, but did not cause, Tieck's resumption of work, it remains a matter of fact that the basic ideas he attributed to Solger were his own. The problem of the individual ego and its relationship with society was a pressing one in Tieck long before his acquaintance with Solger, and the acceptance of daily reality is implicit in Lebrecht. For Tieck, Solger's "reales Nichts" was a useful leg-up over an obstacle, but it solved no problems and introduced no new themes.

Tieck's own protestations of indebtedness to Solger also concern the change allegedly wrought in his own attitude to beauty and with the change in his attitude to Goethe. After having read the manuscript of the first draft of Erwin, he remarks that he had previously given himself up uncritically to beauty, ignoring the problem of subjecting it to moral and philosophical criteria, and failing to distinguish between its nature and its effect on him. We should recall, however, that the moral implications of beauty were in Tieck's mind years before, and so was its effect, or at least one of its effects, on the beholder. Tieck's implication that beauty may have effects inconsistent with its nature is obscure. Presumably he intended to refer to the possibility, which he found disturbing, that the nature of beauty may not be what a moralist or philosopher would wish it to be. But in his present mood of protestation to Solger he declares that the "Kunstdialoge" of the Philosophische Gespräche enabled him to perceive more clearly the true presence of God in all beauty, how reality is transfigured, and how religion, art and
philosophy are essentially one and the same. These ideas are also found early in Tieck's works. They are given unity and dogmatic assertion - whether real or spurious is outwith the scope of this study - in the Philosophsiche Gespräche: the common principle of the self-destroying revelation of the Divine ("die Tat der Selbstvernichtung und Selbstaufoepfung des göttlichen Wesens") unites art, religion and philosophy. This revelation, if in the individual, is religion; in external form it is art; revealed by self-contemplation it is philosophy. No doubt this specificity gave Tieck a measure of stability. But it is mere assertion (and by a philosopher whose subsequent influence on philosophy is negligible); Tieck's own concept of "Poesie" was far more productive of ideas. Indeed, when one compares Phantasus (the poem) with Solger's view that "Phantasie" is the entry of the Divine creativity into reality and particularity, and that it proceeds by expressing the unity of antitheses and thereby advancing our cognition, it is legitimate to enquire, somewhat rhetorically, who influenced whom.

The change in Tieck's attitude to Goethe was an aspect of his changing aesthetic views. On writing to Solger of the effect of learning of "jene Realität des Nichts", he does not - a significant omission for our present purpose - explain what he means, but instead suddenly begins to criticise Goethe's reverence for Antiquity, which, although admittedly sincere, contains

... ein gantz nichtiger, willkürlicher und leerer Aberglaube [...], der niemals, am wenigsten in der Nachahmung, zum Leben kann erweckt werden, warum sie auf diesem gebannten Standpunkt die Kunstwelt, die unerläßlich mit dem Christentum, mit dem wahrhaft Nationalen zusammenhängt, verkennt müssen, und wie jenes Ideal, das ihnen vorschwebt, ein nichtsches Gespenst der Leblosigkeit ist. (149)
This view of the importance of national identity goes back to at least Lebrecht; and the view of reverence for Antiquity as being (if pedantic) arid and useless is pilloried in Murner (and by implication criticised even as early as Sommernacht).

Furthermore, Tieck, perhaps again intending a compliment, writes that Solger served him as "klarer Vermittler" in this changed view of Goethe, without seeming to perceive the flat self-contradiction, for he has just before stated that the change was initiated by his own reading of Goethe's recent *Italienische Reise* (1816-17). (150)

Tieck seems, as with the more religious matters, to be eager to assure Solger of what he himself knew to be only partly true. Solger gave him help and courage to face up to the implications of his inner knowledge, to accept a delayed realisation of his own unsuspected views; but he did not inculcate those views.

Tieck's religiosity, too, had an aesthetic basis. For example, he remarks that he had sought in mysticism what he had formerly sought in art, and that he had been right the first time. He does not say what he had been seeking: a self-indulgent state of seeking seems to have led, in due course, to a euphoric state of having-found, as his mental or emotional unbalance corrected itself. It is a reasonable inference that his moral suspicion of beauty (revealed in the satirical comedies and in *Der Runenberg*) would have induced him to seek aesthetic satisfaction elsewhere while not admitting to himself at the time what he sought. Tieck's letters convey the impression that his ideas on this matter, too, were influenced by Solger, but the evidence of his earlier works disproves this.
He has now returned to an earlier state, accepting his own earlier works:

meine allegorischen Entwürfe sind mir von neuem lieb geworden; nur das Willkürli, must vermieden werden, echte Geistigkeit vermeidet es von selbst: ... Jetzt 1818 am Schluss des Jahres, bin ich im Cirkel wieder herumgekommen, wo ich 1798 war, nur hoffentlich doch mit etwas Gewinn, und traurig macht mich dies Gefühl auf keine Weise ... (152)

This has been possible because he has regained a lost perspective. It is therefore not surprising that when Tieck resumed writing he showed great interest in his early works (hence Phantasus) and tried to place them in a setting of mature judgment (the framework) and to represent them as intuitive poetry as advocated in the introductory poem. This was "mein sich regendes ungeduldiges Talent". (154)

In a third respect also it is probable that Solger assisted him: namely, by expressing certain ideas latent in Tieck and by doing this in quasi-philosophical terms (which were a form Tieck apparently grasped more readily than his own myriad thoughts). These ideas concerned the need for a correct balance between emotion and detachment by means of art or mysticism. (155) As Mörtl points out, (156) Tieck apparently adopted Solger's assertions and overestimated Solger's influence on him. (157) Unfortunately, Mörtl then proceeds to make the same mistake. He regards Kronenberg's outburst about evil as the result of Solger's influence, whereas it is obviously the self-awareness of a reformed confidence-trickster; (158) Tieck's finding the poetic in the everyday is, we are told, likewise Solger's influence (as though Lebrecht had never existed); Tieck's historical authenticity is supposed to come from Solger, (160) although nothing he wrote
earlier could compare with the inauthenticity of Dichterleben, Tod des Dichters and others; Tieck's use of dialogues is supposed to come from Erwin, which implies that Tieck had not read Plato or the Decameron, or written Sternbald or the Phantasus framework. 

The coincidence between the friendship of Tieck and Solger and the changes which overcame Tieck during those years has misled critics into grossly overstating the case, or merely stating opinions without offering proof. Thalmann states that Tieck's warm friendship with Solger ended with the latter's death in 1819 (which is not surprising), but also relies heavily on less obvious coincidences: "Und mit ihnen allen [Solger, Runge and Kleist] ist Tieck's romantische Dichtung in den Phantasus-Bänden zur Ruhe gegangen". It is open to question whether Tieck was at that time entirely a romantic, or whether he ceased entirely to be one, and whether the deaths referred to were in any way instrumental. Schönebeck believes that the novellas are expressions of Solger's ideas (but obvious links with the early works disprove this). He also states that there are "einige Stellen" in the Phantasus framework which show Solger's influence. But if Tieck left such instances so isolated it would show their lack of integration with his main ideas; if integrated they could equally convincingly illustrate that his previous awareness of them was merely stimulated. Schönebeck makes similar assertions about Fortunat in particular; but one cannot infer the existence of an important influence from the adsorption of ideas in an easily discredited work. Minor states that Tieck's novellas show irony (which he does not define; he seems to mean objectivity or
detachment from the characters) and that this was Solger's influence.\footnote{166} It is, however, easy to see that Tieck was detached, even in such a passionate work as \textit{Lovell}, long before meeting Solger. Minder believes that \textit{Phantasus} shows Solger's influence on a Romantic base,\footnote{167} but this judgment ignores the connection with earlier works (even as early as \textit{Sommernacht}). Of Minder's view that Solger's point of revelation when the individual perceives the divine became the \textit{Wendepunkt} of Tieck's novella-theory more will be said later.\footnote{168} Here we merely observe that one cannot have any form of interesting narrative without some form of turning-point: something, somewhere and somewhen, has to cause something to happen within the work, and this innate demand of narrative has no more to do with Solger than with anybody or anything else. Schönebeck also believes that it was from Solger that Tieck learned to seek "Poesie" in present-day reality.\footnote{169} As Lüdeke points out, Tieck wrote that he learned this from Shakespeare.\footnote{170} We may not wish to believe Tieck, but since the idea is present in \textit{Lebrecht} we must certainly disbelieve Schönebeck. Lüdeke attributes Tieck's insistence on Shakespeare's acceptance of conventional morality to the influence of Solger's "reales Nichts";\footnote{171} but the idea is merely a development of Shakespeare's personal ordinariness in \textit{Sommernacht} and \textit{Zerbino}.

We are therefore driven to the conclusion that Solger had no important influence on Tieck's works or their content, except that, as implied by Stamm,\footnote{172} he gave moral and intellectual support as a friend; this may have been invaluable. But since the only scientifically valid test of the theory that Solger was helpful
would be to run the experiment again without the ingredient under review (namely, Solger), the case must go by default. Except on a personal level it is contradicted by the evidence.

(2) Raumer and Tieck's View of History

Tieck was acquainted with Raumer from 1810, and they were close friends from around 1815. Tieck's interest in history was, however, an important element in his work long before either date, and seems to have been based on three beliefs. Firstly, an awareness of the popular base necessary for historical change is implicit in *Heymonsakinder* (as much as in *Die Ahnenprobe*): that is to say, his concept of history was not the Romantic stereotype, in which history is made by great individuals who act alone and succeed or fail alone, but had a socio-economic basis which was stimulated by, or expressed itself through, leaders. This was his view of literature also: that there was a symbiosis between the genius and his circumstances. Secondly, it will be shown that before meeting Raumer Tieck believed in the continuity between past and present. Thirdly, he believed in the deep affinity between history and poetry. As he wrote to Friedrich Schlegel in 1801:

> Ich kann es dir nicht ausdrücken, wie mir alles in der Welt immer mehr Eins wird, wie ich gar keine Unterschiede von Räumen oder Zeiten mehr statuiren kann, es wird mir Alles bedeutend, alles was Geschichte giebt und Poesie, so wie alle Natur, und alles in mir, sieht mich aus einem einzigen tiefen Auge an, voller Liebe, aber schreckvoller Bedeutung. (177)

On the first-mentioned point we come immediately to a contradiction between Tieck's works and letters. In asserting the unity of history and poetry Tieck seems, despite his own works, to entertain the concept of history as made by great individuals:
When in doubt, we should prefer Tieck's works to his extraneous views: for it is a truism that he tended to be objective in his literary writings and subjective in his scholarly and critical work. As Lüdeke remarks, the changes in Tieck's view of history are found "mehr in meinen Reflexionen und brieflichen Aussprache als in eigenen Leistungen". His belief in the symbiosis between artist and environment, between historian and environment, belies this "great events" concept.

The second belief referred to above - that past and present were not separable - is implicit in his early use of historical settings for contemporary problems (in the Volksbücher). The idea is found in his later works, though no more so than in the early ones. But in his correspondence and critical writings it is certainly found more clearly in the later period. The point is illustrated by comparing the letter to Friedrich Schlegel already quoted with one to Reaumer in 1829. He remarks to Reaumer that the majority admire both the greatness of the past and modern trash (a point he made as early as 1799 and also in later years), and do so because they lack a universal sense, namely they are unable to comprehend the continuity of past and present. He believes this problem underlies the inadequacy of contemporary cultural and intellectual life.

The third belief - the affinity between history and poetry - reveals that Tieck treated history as a species of poetry. This is shown by the letter to Friedrich Schlegel and by a further
letter from those fellow years to Johann Georg Zimmer. He implies that both poetry and history are intuitive forms of understanding:

Die Einsicht in die Poesie ist Einsicht in alle Kräfte der Welt, in Natur und Geschichte, die psychologia vera. (183)

In other words, poetry has the capacity of a visionary divining-instrument for truth, and this act of perception of the world is simultaneously an act of self-knowledge. That Tieck should have linked historical understanding with self-knowledge shows how subjective his view of history was. Here, if not earlier, are Phantasus and Dichterleben in embryo. That the poet's state of mind is a determinant of what he sees is implicit in the passages quoted from the letters to Friedrich Schlegel and Zimmer. It seems to be a case of historical objects conforming to poetic knowledge.

Not surprisingly, Tieck wrote to Raumer of the unity of history and poetry. It was an old idea for Tieck, but a new admission, that in scholarly pursuits he was guided by poetic rather than scholarly considerations ("aus der Poesie heraus die Dinge anzusehen"). (184) He remarks in another letter that the writing of history and poetry are, however original they may be, determined by the age in which they are produced: and that both are subject to the limitation that there is no absolute historical truth or artistic beauty if all is relative to time and place. (185) (It is as though the "Einsicht" to which he had referred when writing to Zimmer is destined to fall short of the ideal). To Raumer he continues that, while the individuality and originality
of historians and artists may overcome the obstacles presented by culturally acquired practices, received forms of self-expression, and various petty prejudices and passions of contemporary life, their individuality is nonetheless inseparable from its setting. He objects to "das alte leblose Geist des Ideal", meaning an absolute ideal by which a work is judged.

He has by now in this letter passed, characteristically, to the subject of poetry and has assumed that what is true of it is true of history also. He has implied that there can be no model work of art, to which all others would be compared and judged in accordance with their conformity to it. This is no doubt true. But while we would also agree that there can be no single exemplary work of art with similar status, a work of history cannot be considered only in relation to the time and place of its composition. It must aid our understanding of the period, place or process treated; it may do this well or badly, and the historian's success or failure may or may not be affected by the influence of his own historical position. No doubt historians are so affected, but that does not necessarily produce good (or bad) history. Tieck imposes an aesthetic view on history, and we must bear constantly in mind, when considering his "historical" works of literature, that this led him to treat historical raw material as he would treat any other.

It has been alleged that under Raumer's influence Tieck wrote historical novellas, and did so with a new emphasis on historical authenticity. Tieck's interest in history antedates his acquaintance with Raumer - so, indeed, does the conception of
many of his later "historical" works - and his writing of novellas is unconnected with the relationship. The question of influence therefore rests on proving that Tieck's use of history was authentic and that (if proved) it was Raumer's doing. There is also the larger question of how important historical authenticity in "historical" fiction is, and how important it was in Tieck's works.

Certainly of Tieck's letters would appear to uphold its importance. He implies that historical truth is above partisanship and is therefore likely to enrage partisans. The difficulty of establishing historical truth amidst myth, allegory, religion, human passions and fate, was being made, in Tieck's view, more difficult by philosophers' attempts to impose preconceptions upon historical enquiry. This accusation is a reappearance of Tieck's objection to rigid systems restricting feeling - an objection he had voiced since his earliest years. It also shows a characteristic unawareness in Tieck the scholar - a deficiency more characteristically absent from Tieck the writer - of the possibility that feelings are just as much preconceptions.

But Tieck contradicted himself. To Raumer in 1818 he objects to the artificial introduction of subjective emotion into historical writing. This view is entirely consistent with his theoretical writings, but we must enter two caveats. Firstly, there is a letter of 1832 to an unknown theatrical director. Commenting on a drama Jacob II of unknown authorship, he conveys the impression that alteration of history is in certain circumstances permissible; while not abandoning his view that
irrelevant display of beauty should not be artificially introduced into historical plays, he did not actually object to the alteration of history for artistic reasons. Tieck's air of reasoned concession on this point, takes insufficient account of the fact that several decades earlier, his use of history - in Alle-Hoddin, Schildburger, Sternbald, Heymonskinden - was, if not symbolic, certainly shot through with poetic licence.

Our second caveat is that Tieck's "Raumer" works are not plays but prose fiction, and make precisely those free uses of history which we might have expected from the earlier works. The person of Labitte (in Aufruhr), the characterisations of Camoens, of Vittoria, of Eduard Beuchamp (in Aufruhr), are patently unhistorical. It has never been suggested that Dichterleben is authentic; indeed, its origin in Sommernacht and Phantasus, and the possibility that the relationship between Tieck and Wackenroder inspired that between Shakespeare and Southampton, make it a most unhistorical novella.

In these and in some other works there is a certain framework of historical events, but what is actually authentic need not have been so for all the difference it makes.

We must therefore disagree with Zeydel's view that "Raumer aroused Tieck's dominant interest in history, politics and current events and aided him in developing into a historical novelist." Tieck's interest was not previously dormant, and though it expressed itself somewhat differently in the later period, there is no evidence to suggest that Raumer affected this process. Perhaps, as was probably also true of Solger, Raumer gave Tieck valuable support as a friend. This likelihood ought to be recorded, at least.
V: THE THEMES IN THE EARLY WORKS

Behind Tieck's ridicule of the stereotypes of the debased Aufklärung and vestigial Sturm und Drang (the arrogant pedants and the self-proclaimed geniuses) and the stereotypes of reaction to them (the affected sentimentalists and bigoted Pietists) is a conviction, clearly expressed in the underrated Straußfedern stories, of the futility of man's endeavor. In those stories it is shown that either the outcome of individual efforts is predestined or the universe is oblivious to them. In either case, therefore, the endeavor is futile, though it may be tragic or comic. Ideals are shown to be either illusions invented by ourselves to fill the void (a point found in Abdallah, Lovell, Die Freunde and Zerbino) or (consolidated as beauty in Sommernacht, Die Freunde and Zerbino) unbearable.

Metaphysical despair is more characteristic of Tieck's first period than of the novellas. Even in the early works, however, his aesthetic standpoint, which was later to become relatively more important, is clearly seen beneath the metaphysical. A form of predestination, in the sense that the individual may think he makes a free choice but does not do so, is brought about when indoctrination by literature (whether good or bad literature) predetermines an individual's thoughts and responses to stimuli (as shown in, for example, Karl von Berneck, Lovell, several of the Straußfedern stories and the satirical comedies). In our attempt to codify Tieck's ideas, it is apparent even at this early stage that there is a discrepancy between the theoretical and actual status of this theme. Theoretically it is a mere variant of
predestination; but it is much more important in the works
themselves. He was not, in the main, a metaphysician. We have
noted in Abdallah and Lovell how his early interest in metaphysical
ideas was transmuted into material for psychological
characterization. This process, being part of literary creation,
shows an aesthetic rather than speculative or purely realistic
motive. Similarly, an aesthetic standpoint is indicated by the
fact that when he wrote of futility as a metaphysical concept
it was not generalized, but particularised into an attack in
literary form on the mainly literary ideals of his intellectual
environment: an attack which began with his first important work
(Sommermacht, 1789) and remained a consistent theme thereafter.
Apart from the unflattering view which vulgar taste and stupidity
stimulated in Tieck as beholder of them, the bond of mutual
reinforcement of subject and object seemed indissoluble: bad
literature inculcated bad ideas and created an unsatisfactory public,
which demanded bad literature and was further indoctrinated by it.
So claims to be geniuses, or wallowing in affected sentimentality
or in contrived pseudo-horror, became the norm, and were copied by
people whose knowledge of life was from this cheap reading-matter
and who had no sustaining ideal of beauty to pursue instead. The
discerning minority were thereby placed in a desperate and
dangerous isolation, for (again citing the Garten der Foesie in
Zerbino) only outstanding geniuses could hold beauty in view without
suffering.

Tieck's despair was, it is presumed, confirmed by looking
closely at the structure of the society which valued the cheap
literature he despised. Society seemed heedlessly unjust (Tonelli, Kater, Zerbino). Its injustice was, however, a form of callousness, of unawareness, rather than conscious, deliberate cruelty: for society seemed unselfconscious and immutable (Hanswurst als Emigrant, Lebrecht), people's ideas - whether on literature, morality or etiquette (the "Komplimente") - cast from a mould, ready-formed, and appearing on cue in response to the relevant stimuli, devoid of natural individual feeling, and with no sense of beauty in and for itself.

Some of those who realise this exploit the knowledge, and manipulate others for personal advantage. Others turn away from the knowledge: to love, religion, or art. Love and religion are also seen as being aesthetically motivated (Sternbald, Herzensergieβungen). In so far as they are sought for their own sakes, they are shown to be illusions. Idyllic love is not achieved in real life - only in parasitism (Almansur), romance (Melusine) or literary contrivance (Sternbald). And religion is of socio-historical and psychological origin (Alia-Moddin), an excuse for national aggrandisement and personal gratification (Genoveva). Even art has its dangers. Being inimical to bad literature, and bad literature being admired by a bad society, good literature is potentially subversive, or at least is assumed by society to be so (as in the satirical comedies) and is therefore its potential victim. Furthermore, the artist is isolated from his fellow-men and encapsulated in a tiny élite, and thereby becomes vulnerable to psychological dangers (for example, the arrogance shown by Berglinger). These dangers may also afflict
non-artists if they are perceptive enough otherwise to see what their fellows cannot - a warning given clearly and repeatedly in Sommernacht, Maubert, Eckart, Runenberg and Zerbo. Tieck’s ambivalence towards beauty as a concept - his love for it as an antidote to the Aufklärung but his recognition of its dangers - dates from his earliest works; it was fostered by his study of, and intermittent obsession with, Shakespeare and Cervantes; and it is found in his major novellas (such as Hexen-Sabbath and Mächerleben).

But Tieck’s works generally show that real genius transcends both the social limitations and the psychological danger: a genius is of his environment, but not submerged in it; he discerns his environment, but is not in antithesis to it. Such are the essential features of Tieck’s portrayals of Dürer and Shakespeare, and they are clarified by the contrast of Quixote’s error. The link between a genius and his environment may be regarded as analogous (though the analogy is ours: Tieck does not draw it specifically) to the belief expressed in Lebrecht that poetry and ordinary life should be part-and-parcel of each other. Beauty and wonder are to be found not (as cheap literature and in the view of those who admire it) in remote places and times, but here and now; but the distorted vision of the modern age cannot see it. From this it would appear that Tieck’s belief in German nationhood and his love for the traditions destroyed by industrialisation and capitalism and by a bigoted and pedantic preference for the Classics (in misunderstood form) were essentially an aesthetic rather than political opinion.

Tieck’s belief in German nationhood and his affection for an earlier Germany were probably no more than a belief that Germany
had somehow taken a wrong turning in its adoption of external criteria rather than indigenous ones. His interest in the development of the German Renaissance (he does not use this term, but plainly regarded Düren's Germany as this) is consistent with his later, more explicit awareness of the economic, political and cultural damage which Germany sustained during the Thirty Years' War, particularly by the growth of foreign cultural influence.  

His interest in the development of the Herman Renaissance (he does not use this term, but plainly regarded it as this) is consistent with his later, more explicit awareness of the economic, political and cultural damage which Germany sustained during the Thirty Years' War, particularly by the growth of foreign cultural influence. His use of the German past as a setting was, like his use of non-European locales in Abdallah, Alla-Moddin and Düren, merely a device for achieving distance to facilitate the treatment of themes: he neither sought nor pretended to authenticity. This characteristic, with the implication that motives and situations from one historico-geographical setting may legitimately be transferred to another, foreshadows his later, more explicit belief that history is a continuous process, with unbroken links between ancient and modern. But even without explicit statement, Tieck denied that any one age was ideal. The mediaeval or "Renaissance" romances have charm, but only in them is life idyllic: elsewhere it is full of problems. Genoveva demonstrates that the mediaeval ethos, so admired in the prologue by Bonifatius, is unworthy of a civilised State. The "Klosterbruder" of the Hergerser-Dichte- und Phantasien is a contemporary who harks back nostalgically in elitist arrogance: but Tieck and Wackenroder, far from using him as a mouthpiece, portray him by 'his' writings. The same may be said, mutatis mutandis, of nostalgia for old Germany in the Phantasus conversations.

Tieck's political views, to the limited extent to which they
are separable from his views on other matters, seem to have
begun with a short-lived admiration for Revolutionary France.\(^3\)
Thereafter, but also earlier, he obviously disliked ill-informed
individuals and ill-informed mobs; but since these dislikes are
found in \textit{Alla-Hoddin} (written before the Terror), the influence of
contemporary events is questionable. \textit{Sommernacht} shows that Tieck's
early interests were aesthetic rather than political - even at a
time of life when inflammatory opinions are often a natural
condition. Along with his dislike of mass taste we have heard a
seditionous note in his implication that aristocrats were parasitic
and unaware of their economic reliance on primary producers whom
they despise and despoil (\textit{Lebraucht, Zerbino, Die Elfen,} and
\textit{Fortunat}). His interpretation of political leadership as an
expression of popular will (\textit{Heymonskinder, Däumchen}) is in the
same vein, and is analogous to his view of genius. The radical
tendencies persist into his Dresden period, although they are to
some extent obscured by his aesthetic liking for the aristocracy
and monarchy.\(^4\)

A review of the first half of Tieck's writing-career - the
ideas of which are confirmed in \textit{Phantasus} and \textit{Fortunat} -
reveals an underlying antithesis between, on the one hand, an
aesthetic standpoint by means of which individuals and society may
obtain a clear view of beauty and morals, and, on the other hand,
the mutually reinforcing ignorance and prejudice of a haphazard
but ossified society incapable of recognising or responding to
beauty. It is implicit in the early works, but explicit in the
novellas, that beauty is concomitant with a recognition of reality, with justice, self-fulfilment, and psychological or emotional equilibrium in individuals and societies. It also becomes clearer in the novellas that there is a prevailing pseudo-beauty which is analogously composed of delusion, injustice, and perversion of self-fulfilment by means of arrogance, mental unbalance or obsession. As this antithesis is increasingly expressed in the socio-political context of the novellas, the polarisations between justice and injustice, between the individual and power-cliques, between traditions viewed nostalgically and modern industrial growth, inevitably sharpen. But the aesthetic basis remains the sole unifying factor.

This shift of emphasis was, as seen in an earlier chapter, discernible in Phantasus. That collection shows how Tieck was abandoning his obsessive fight against the late Aufklärung - reasonably enough, since it was vanishing - and thinking more deeply about society and history and about the forces beneath it. In the light of what we learn about Emil of Liebeszauber it becomes more obvious, in retrospect, that it was exemption from the necessity of performing regular productive work in normal life which contributed to the downfall of Almansur and Lovell. Their free time permitted self-obession and helped to turn them into Titania's mortals (as in Sommernacht) who approach the realm of unbridled imagination and suffer the penalty. As an example of how the socio-economic element in the second period is added to the mainly psychological element of the first, we may cite the hermits: who are self-indulgent recluses in the first period and economic parasites in
the second. Another example is the transformation of a personal desire to control others by mystification (Waterloo) into a quasi-political order (Die wundersüchtigen).

For these reasons, Tieck's "second" period, in so far as his works are thus divisible, may be said to begin with Phantasmus rather than with the novellas: in the framework, and in the new works therein, his nascent social interests come to the fore, as the primary means of upholding the ideal of poetry and of denigrating its antithesis. Lieske believes that there is a change in the poetry which Tieck wrote earlier: he finds the Sonette aus dem ungedruckten Roman Alma, ein Buch der Liebe of 1803 romantic and the Reisegedichte eines Kranken of 1805 more realistic and objective. However, Lieske does not discern in later works the potentially subversive element in Tieck's writings, to which attention will be drawn later. Lieske's emphasis on "Resignation" as a crucial change in Tieck in the first decade of the new century is an exaggeration of a temporary phenomenon.
VI. THE NOVELLAS

A. INTRODUCTION

(1) Method

The interpretation of Tieck's later works has usually been regarded as an exercise in thematic classification rather than in tracing chronological development. Even Witkowski's attempt at a chronological division - the Revolution of 1830 as the dividing-line - with the intention of showing that the first section reveals opposition to reaction and the second opposition to the Young Germans, is a form of crude subject-classification; it fails, however, because it does not take account of the middle ground which Tieck occupied throughout. (The use of the year 1830 for this purpose was suggested, without acknowledgement to Witkowski, by Zeydel and Gneuss.) A thematic rather than chronological approach to interpreting the later works is not surprising: whereas development is to be expected in a young writer, consolidation is more common in an older one.

It is presumably for such reasons that Tieck's later works have been considered thematically or (what amounts to the same thing) in relation to specific themes such as Biedermeier or Young Germany. The underlying assumption is that what Tieck wrote on one topic in 1820 is fundamentally compatible with what he wrote on another in 1841. This is broadly true. One does not even have to make allowance for the fact that Tieck could not have written about the Young Germans until they existed, for he seems to have regarded them as merely the current manifestation of a permanent characteristic in German intellectual life. Novellas which
belong together thematically do not form any obvious chronological clusters. However, as in the first period one must consider the works themselves, and resist the temptation to take characters and quotations out of context in order to prove (but only apparently) a theoretical case. The difficulty has arisen, as it arose in relation to earlier works, because of Tieck's inventiveness and prolificity, combined with his failure to exercise self-discipline. Many novellas have a profusion of sub-themes; this is Tieck's by now familiar defect of including too much because he had not formed a sufficiently clear intention for a given work. It is not always easy to decide whether recurring motifs are properly called themes or mere illustrations of themes. This has led many critics to quote Tieck's characters as though they necessarily spoke for the author.

A thematic approach to the novellas as a whole raises the question of the relationship between the first and second main periods in Tieck's writing career. Obviously he was not the same author as before; but the division between the two has been exaggerated, perhaps inevitably to cope with the sheer bulk. Of all the differences between the early and late works, none could equal that between Eckbert and Schildbürger or between Der wiederkehrende griechische Kaiser and Die Vogelscheuche. If we wish to sub-divide Tieck, as we must in some way in order to comprehend him, the chronological hiatus of his middle years is helpful in the sense that there was some development before it and during it, but little afterwards. Tieck emerged in Dresden with, if not stasis, then at least a stable viewpoint.

The allegedly new Tieck is frequently ascribed to the influence
of Solger and Raumer. These ascriptions are disproved above. The use of historical settings, upon which the alleged influence of Solger and Raumer is usually thought to depend, is only incidentally history. In both instances the category of "Historical" works is formed fortuitously: just as those of his early works which describe his environment directly are not thematically separable from those of the same period which deal with it in veiled form, so the later historical works come together by chance. They are not "historical" works; they deal with the position of the poet and poetry in society and belong together for that reason. Lest this historical aspect be given more weight than is due, the truism that King Lear is a bad study of Celtic Britain (and is not intended to be one at all) bears repeating.

Of all Tieck's Dresden works, only one - Vittoria Accorombona - is a novel; the rest are novellas. As shown in a later section of this chapter, Tieck had a theoretical belief in a turning-point of surprise in the novella as a genre, and an unrelated belief in the function of the novella as a vehicle for discussing and resolving apparently irreconcilable viewpoints. Despite these structural interests and didactic protestations, it remains clear that his chief interest was in content rather than form: and since discussion about varying points of view must have social connotations, we look primarily not for structural features but for evidence of social thought.

(2) Themes

The underlying idea in the novellas as a group was adumbrated in the conclusions inferred from the survey of Tieck's
earlier works in the previous chapter. An antithesis between the ideal of beauty (whether art or poetry is immaterial) and a defective society which pursued a delusory version of it was the common thread with which all other thematic strands were connected. This is generally true of the second main period also, and the remaining chapters of this thesis explore Tieck's treatment of this polarization. However, the context in which this theme now appears has changed: Tieck's former obsession with the Berlin late Aufklärung and related phenomena is now replaced by a more comprehensive view of historical change. This has two consequences: the Aufklärung, in the sense in which Tieck denigrated it, is now seen to be the formerly current manifestation of a deeply rooted and pervasive aspect of German intellectual life; and Tieck has developed a stronger interest in social and economic ideas. These differences give the second period an inner cohesion which, though present in the earlier period, had been obscured by a multiplicity of obsessions and influences. This cohesion is enhanced by such works as Der junge Tischlermeister, Tod des Dichters and Dichterleben, which emphasize similarities between the psycho-social needs and behaviour of individuals and of society at large.

At the beginning of the Dresden period, Tieck reiterates - but in the direct description of Der Geheimnisvolle instead of in the allegory of München - his view that contemporary Germany was economically and politically corrupt and was therefore unable to resist foreign invasion; again, his point is that a degeneration of cultural nationhood had preceded the military failure and had
made it inevitable. (Der Geheimnsvolle was first intended as a play,\(^9\) and therefore invites closer comparison with Däumchen than might be thought appropriate at first sight.) From this point onwards specific references to Germany are more readily construable as examples of historical trends rather than as contemporary comment.

Society, being corrupt but unable to change (one is reminded of Lebrecht), regards individual dissent as madness (Die Reisenden). Already the theme of power is discernible, and casts new light on Omar's corruption of Abdallah (as an early Lovell-type) and Fliege's achievement of power by combining skill at deception with the possession of gold. A number of novellas consider alternatives or antidotes to the exercise of power, but none is adopted and proposed. Orthodox religion is seen to be motivated by a desire for power (Die Verlobung, Pietro von Abano), religious dissent tends to form power-agglomerations from dissenting individuals (Aufruhr), and private religious experience is powerless or irrelevant (Der 15. November, Aufruhr, Der Schutzgeist). The artist-poet and art-poetry are ineffectual against the heedless dynamic of society (Hexen-Sabbath, Tod des Dichters), or irrelevant, since poetry is a purely personal experience (Dichterleben, Das alte Buch). The psychological problems of the artist-poet in the isolation which this produces can be obviated only by the diremption of values from an aesthetic élite: this seems to be Tieck's attempted solution of the difficulty posed by his identification of poetry as a refuge. He attempts to replace the élitist concept of nobility (in other
words, an ideal of aristocracy) by nobility of character and conduct (in *Die Gesellschaft auf dem Lande* and *Die Ahnenprobe*) and to democratise beauty by insisting that it may be found in ordinary life (in *Der junge Tischlermeister*). His attempts are unconvincing; the attempt shows what he desired, the failure what he saw. In those works he was a realist despite himself, unable to show convincingly that evil was being replaced by good, and providing hints (in *Der Alte vom Berge* and *Tod des Dichters*) that wealth in the form of free capital has the evil demonism formerly ascribed to natural phenomena. In other works he was a realist more consciously, describing how poetry could be the victim of sectarianism and power-structures (*Der Jahrmarkt*, *Der Mondsüchtige*, *Der Wassermensch*, *Die Glocke von Arragon*, *Die Vogelscheuche*, *Eigensinn und Laune*). These works show an interest in the Young German movement - his dislike of its quarrelsomeness and its attempt to subordinate literature to polemical purposes, but his equal dislike of the reactionary authority it opposed.

Tieck’s equidistance from extremes is often overlooked - by, for example, Grillparzer, Zeydel and Lüdeke, who tended to associate him with the traditional and reactionary camp. Even Hienger, who insists on the continuity between the early and late works, implies that there is a diminution in Tieck’s strictures when he states that Tieck takes the bourgeois world more seriously in his later works because he no longer satirises it to the same extent. The impression Hienger gives is mistaken; and if Tieck showed a more serious side (though that could hardly be said of, for example, *Die Vogelscheuche*), it is merely because he draws attention to the
dangers beneath the surface of authoritarian systems.

His attitude to the Young Germans was, in fact, similar to his early attitude to the Berlin Aufklärung; but he now saw the Young German movement as the current manifestation of a long-lived aspect of German intellectual life, and he was not obsessed with it as a movement. His increased interest in the social position of women is sometimes taken to be an example of his response to contemporary thought, since the theme was a favourite of the Young Germans. This would, however, tend to prove a measure of agreement with the Young Germans, rather than opposition to them. In any case, the theme is not new in Tieck's works, though it certainly receives more emphasis in the relevant period.

The sensitive and perceptive non-artist, a prominent figure in Tieck's consideration of the Berlin Aufklärung, appears in the novellas also. The only course of action open to such a character is, apparently, retreat into an idyll. But Tieck, being now more socially aware, shows that this solution is parasitic, intellectually dishonest, and ineffectual (in Des Lebens Überfluss and Waldeinsamkeit).

Finally (though, because of Waldeinsamkeit and the fragment Der Huttenmeister, slightly out of chronology) comes Vittoria Accoramboni. This is a work of genius in its own right, despite certain flaws, but its importance here is that it exemplifies the main themes. In this novel (it is the only one of Tieck's Dresden works not formally designated a novella) society is seen to be unjust because it is a power-structure, and despite the fact that
it is a fixed, closed system. It has not been systematically constructed. Religion offers no release for individuals because it, too, is a power-structure which is, in the specific instance shown, an integral part of the State. Poetry likewise offers no release: although it is the quarry of State forces, it is unable to improve an evil system; and since it is the quarry, an individual life of beauty (a retreat into idyll) is unacceptable to authority. Authority is not content with an individual's retreat: like the King persecuting the children of Heymon to secure their symbolic submission, authority pursues the poet into his privacy and accepts only conformity as proof of allegiance. The novel also shows Tieck's interest in the position of women in society, but it has been suggested earlier that the origin of the idea for Tieck was in his study of Don Quixote.

(3) Tieck's Theory of the Novella

This theory has received considerable critical attention. For this, and for its irrelevancy to his works, it rivals the alleged influence of Solger.

Tieck's chief disquisition on the novella is in his Vorbericht zur dritten Lieferung of 1829. He precedes his definition by some comments on misunderstandings of the genre. He finds that the term is used for all stories, especially short ones, as though excusing a story of insufficient importance. Tieck believes that, like the greatest writers of novellas (Boccaccio, Cervantes and Goethe), one should not confuse the term with others, such as "Begebenheit, Geschichte, Erzählung, Vorfall, oder gar Anecdote".
From his remarks and comparisons it is plain that Tieck meant that the term novella should be used with precision, to convey a particular method of treating the subject-matter; that the genre was important as a form, not a mere statement of shortness; that it should have a serious, possibly moral purpose. He states several characteristics which he obviously regards as essential to the definition of the novella. He is, however, allusive rather than exact, and the extent to which these characteristics would be interrelated must sometimes be inferred.

The chief difference, he believes, between other prose genres and the novella is in its reliance upon and treatment of a single significant event:

... daß sie [the novella] einen großen oder kleineren Vorfall in's hellste Licht stelle, der, so leicht er sich ereigen kann, doch wunderbar, vielleicht einzig ist. Diese Wendung der Geschichte, dieser Punkt, von welchem aus sie sich unerwartet völlig umkehrt, und doch natürlich, dem Charakter und den Umständen angemessen, die Folge entwickelt, wird sich der Phantasie des Lesers um so fester einprägen, als die Sache, selbst im Wunderbaren, unter andern Umständen wieder alltäglich sein könnte. (18)

In other words, the novella focuses attention on an event which would otherwise, presumably, remain unremarked, and shows that this event, however commonplace or plausible, is wonderful, even unique (because, we must infer, of the hitherto unsuspected effects it is now, in the novella, seen to have). The novella is therefore as concerned with hidden causes as with the portrayal of events, and has a diagnostic, explicatory rôle in relation to ordinary life. The "wonder" is merely an enhanced understanding of the everyday, rather than acceptance of the improbable: "wonder"
seems wonderful only to a mind denied knowledge of hidden causes. This interpretation is supported by Tieck's reference to the "Wendepunkt" (which he also calls a "Mittelpunkt"), "der sie [the novella] von allen andern Gattungen der Erzählung unterscheidet". Even though he calls it "jenen sonderbaren auffallenden Wendepunkt", we need not construe this turning-point as a climax in the events themselves (though it usually is so construed), but merely as the moment when the reader has the vital piece of information with which he is enabled to follow the writer's explication and see that it is logical. A mere event or story, in Tieck's view, lacks this characteristic.

Secondly, Tieck insists that the contemporary world is no less suitable a subject than were the times and environment of Cervantes: the past may have romantic interest, but we know the present better. This insistence seems to us consistent with (as Tieck believes) the explication nature of the genre's reliance on a specific event drawn from ordinary life. Obviously we are not to admire and enjoy (or at least not only to admire and enjoy) but also to learn and understand.

In this didactic undertone lies the third characteristic of the novella-form advocated by Tieck. We should bear in mind that Tieck's contemporary reading-public expected its reading-matter to have a didactic purpose. Hewett-Thayer summarises contemporary reviews as having been "by an overwhelming majority written on the assumption that a work of literature must have a moral message." Tieck was a child of his time in regarding
the genre as particularly suited to the presentation of ideas: in his view, ideas might be advocated by the principal characters, or embodied by them, or presented by the action itself; he held that the restriction of the genre concentrates and clarifies ideas which would otherwise remain diffuse and unformed, and by this it gains the power to convince. (22) Tieck's earlier reference to imprinting an understanding of the "Wendung der Geschichte" on the reader's "Phantasie" implied a directness of appeal, by-passing analytical judgment. It is now clear that the analytical judgment is to be made by the author of the novella: whereas tragedy (Tieck continues), using the concept of fate to reconcile the demands of art with those of intellect, morality and the state, views human life from the god's-eye-view of Olympus, the novella (he cites Die Wahlverwandtschaften) leads through the labyrinth of personal emotions and modern life:

> daß der lichter gewordene Blick auch hier im Lachen
> oder in Wehmuth, das Menschliche, und im Verwerflichen
> eine höhere ausgleichende Wahrheit erkennt. (23)

By his later references (in conversation with Köpke) (24) to "eine Spitze, in der man sich wiederfindet" he probably meant something of this sort. From his written rather than from his reported remarks we may perhaps infer that the understanding of an otherwise insignificant event, which at first sight appears to be a quasi-structural device, also confers a knowledge transcending partisan feelings or one-sided passions. (25) Again, we have the ascription of a diagnostic capability to literature, achieving its purpose by appealing round the ego-fortifications of intellect, which Tieck always mistrusted, to an intuitive faculty of understanding.
Finally, we note that in view of its didactic purpose the novella, in Tieck's view of it, is permitted to cross boundaries of propriety which may continue to apply to other genres:

This implies that a novella containing subject-matter which might be considered improper in another literary form may have beneficial effects because of the manner of treatment which the novella-form makes possible.

Tieck believed that the foregoing description explains why, in contrast to his earlier practice, he called his later prose works novellas. In this he was plainly in error, as may be seen by considering each of the four characteristics in turn.

Critics have generally taken the view that his later works do not have a clear "Wendepunkt". There are many instances in which the events of a novella and its meaning as a whole have little connection with each other; this arises from Tieck's didactic use of dialogue and the consequent overshadowing of events to the point of their virtual irrelevancy. When Pongs remarks that Tieck discovered only at a late stage the "Charakternovelle als Wendepunktnovelle" and ascribes this to the strong influence of "das Wunderbare als das Unheimliche", he neglects the intrusion of didactic dialogue as well as the fact that Tieck early achieved control of the use of terror for psychological purposes. Minor emphasises the realistic authenticity of the novellas, but shows no connection between this and the "Wendepunkt" or "das Wunderbare".
Tieck's sincerity about the role and status of "wonder" is not in doubt. As he wrote to his brother in 1822:

Ich bilde mir ein, eigentlich unter uns diese Dichtart erst aufzubringen, indem ich das Wunderbare immer in die sonst alltäglichen Umstände und Verhältnisse lege.

The commentators Zeydel, Matenko and Fife say:

Interesting is Tieck's statement that he thinks he has made an innovation in literature by introducing the marvelous [sic] into the affairs of everyday life in the Novelle. (30)

Ralf Stamm treats Tieck's statement in that letter as a programme rather than as speculation as to the effect of his recent works. (31)

Both Tieck and these commentators miss the point. Either a surprise is shown, on examination later when the reader has more information, to have had normal causes (and in a realistic work there is no other possibility), or it is not. If it is not, then the work is fantasy, which may be acceptable in some other way. Pongs, Minor (32) and Arnold (34) ignore this distinction when they assert that Tieck found the origin of the novella in the Märchen. The works of the period of this letter - Der Geheimnissvolle, Die Reisenden, Musikalische Leiden und Freuden, Die Verlobung - obviously accord with the theory, but we must remember that this talk of "wonder" and "everyday" is merely a verbose theoretical sledgehammer used to crack a walnut. For nobody would read a narrative (would it even be a narrative?) in which nothing happened to cause something else which was not entirely predictable, even if it appeared so with the advantage of hindsight. "Das Wunderbare" is merely another name for a previously overlooked "Wendepunkt". The difficulty, in anyone's life, of finding the original event from which a total chain of cause and effect proceeds makes it unlikely that a novella
will solve the problem except by the contrivances of artistry; which Tieck leaves out of his theory of the novella and sometimes out of his practice of it. It is simply in the nature of continuous works of literature to have climactic moments, unless the works concerned are shapeless impressions.

But of "wonder" in the sense in which Tieck used the term in his essay Über Shakespeare's Behandlung des Wunderbaren (1793) there is no mention in his theory, and virtually none in his practice. It is more akin to what he saw in Cervantes in 1834 — "wie das Alltägliche und Geringe den Schimmer und die Farbe des Wunderbaren annehmen könne" (35) — though even that recalls Lebrecht. Again, it is obvious how Tieck's critical and creative work were disconnected, and how when his critical faculty was on the right track it often lagged behind his creative intuition.

Tieck emphasises the contemporary world as a suitable subject for novellas defensively, against those who deny its suitability, rather than as an actual prescription. It is true that his novellas tend to deal more with contemporary life than do his early works. But so does William Lovell; so do many early works given spurious historical contexts; so do many later novellas which are historical in milieu and deal with modern problems obliquely.

The didactic purpose of many of Tieck's novellas, the embodiment of ideas in characters or in the total effect, and the frequent use of dialogue have been noted. None of these characteristics is absent from the early works; examples are legion, but perhaps further mention of Abdallah and Lovell will suffice. It has also been noted that the failure of the discussion and the events to
correspond sufficiently closely is a defect to which Tieck's didactic purpose apparently blinded him. This defect was first apparent in Phantasus and persisted in a number of works written during the rest of his life. It may represent the influence of his study of Shakespeare and Calderon; if so, it may have resulted from an attempt to turn dramatic situations into prose narrative, for dramatic situations rest on confrontation whereas narrative requires events. Turning from the dialogue-structure to the author's objectivity, this again is not new. In his early works - Abdallah, Lovell, the Berglinger pieces, Sternbald - Tieck allowed characters to speak for themselves, against each other.

Zeydel interprets Tieck's theory of the reconciliation of differences by their discussion in a novella as evidence of "biedermeierlich" views. In making this assumption, he ignores the origin of the method in Tieck's early works, and the deep concern with contemporary and historical questions of freedom, authoritarianism and self-fulfilment which the novellas show. Zeydel's strictures of some novellas are justified, but he is able to be generally disparaging only by ignoring the better ones. The idea of reconciling opposing points of view is found much earlier. Tieck believed in 1800 that his association with the Schlegels would replace the destructive, quarrelsome, negative spirit of the Berlin Aufklärung with a new spirit based on a worthy literature, itself based on a generous recognition by contending parties that their differences were superficial.

Tieck himself remarked that some of his works fulfil his own criteria and others do not. Consideration of works by this
method is likely to obscure their real meaning, since the criteria are artificial. For example, the accident which Fiorettine ("Die wilde Engländerin") contrives to undergo is more instructive to her than to the reader; (39) though unusual, it is not the "wonder" or mishap which Arnold (40) and Stamm (41) believe it to be, but an unconscious act of great psychological importance in a character-portrayal. This is contrasted with "wonder" in the sense of a piece of good fortune in Die Gemälde: in which, after Eduard's moral regeneration by hard work is about to become necessary, we are asked to take the thought for the deed, as the lost treasures suddenly turn up and make the sacrifice unnecessary, while throwing in a reward for good intentions (42) - all in the worst Hollywood manner.

The fact that Tieck felt impelled to construct an elaborate theory which, where it fits his works, merely justifies clumsily what he had always done, suggests that his earlier fear of unbridled creativity was still present in him and provoked the desire for a sense of purpose. As a conscious theory it is quite unoriginal. From Plato's use of dialogue as a didactic method, from Alain Chartier's Quadrilogue Invectif, from the dialogues of Froissart, from the Colloquies of Erasmus, from Boccaccio's Decameron comes in varying measure the idea of friends discussing important general subjects, not infrequently in idyllic gardens - another reminder of the probable origin of the novella-theory in Tieck's own practice in Phantasus.

One of the novellas which conforms closely to Tieck's theory is Musikalische Leiden und Freuden (1822), and it is one of his worst. There is a "wonderful" element, in that the beautiful
singing which mystifies and entrances all who hear it is revealed to be Julie's voice; and Julie has been hitherto represented to be untalented. But this is irrelevant to the main part of the work, which consists of long discussions about music; the discussants exchange their views and recount their experiences. They do not reach any notable agreement, but pontificate at tedious length while neither exerting nor deriving any mutual influence. There is no relation between their views on music and their characters more generally. With appropriate changes of characters' names, this novella could have been a continuation of *Phantasus*. Like *Phantasus*, it raises the suspicion that Tieck's novella-theory was an unconscious attempt on his part to lend intellectual respectability to a literary fault. Subsequent review of the novellas will be concerned with their content. Those which conform to a reasonable degree to the novella-theory are usually unimportant works.

The irrelevance of the theory to Tieck's major works is a more than sufficient comment in itself, and serves also to explain why consideration of the possible relationships between Tieck's theory and those of, for example, Goethe (43) and Friedrich Schlegel will be excluded from the present study.
B. TIECK'S VIEW OF THE WORLD

(1) A corrupt society

In Daumchen Tieck had implied that the French military conquest of Germany had merely given outer form to a cultural conquest which had already taken place; the ruling class, which he had even earlier satirised in the comedies, had proved inept as leaders. In Der Geheimnissvolle (1821) we do not need to infer a contemporary context, since the work is a direct portrayal of the period of occupation by French troops. The story concerns a young scapegrace, Kronenberg, whose chief defect is vanity; this prompts him to tell lies, and in particular to pretend to be the author of a well-known seditious book, in order to be considered a desperate character. (1) His portrayal is integrated with the wider theme of the political and cultural condition of Germany, though discussion of the latter is rather intrusive at times.

The milieu is Germany's system of "Stände". This allows such as Kronenberg to impress and impose upon the servant class by adopting an appropriate manner (2) (reminding us of that more successful upstart, Hinze). The upper "Stände", upon whom the duty of leadership lay, are immobilised, being unable to agree on the relative merits of German and French culture. This division expresses itself on two levels—occasionally as an intellectual encounter, but usually as an undignified squabble between, on the one hand, bombast proclaiming itself to be patriotism and, on the other hand, affectation dressed up as foreign refinement. (3) There is some optimism about the potential of German culture, but as presented it has neither cohesion nor vigour, and is
convincingly, if unflatteringly symbolised by Kronenberg. One feels its eclipse by the French to have been inevitable.

The cultural identity of Germany was a subject to which Tieck returned only later when he wrote about the Young Germans,\textsuperscript{(4)} and in other works his socio-political comments do not actually compare Germany with another country. Some of the works set in contemporary Germany do not seem to be specifically German in content: they seem to refer to society more generally.

Much of his comment is made by continuing his earlier practice of characterising a society through its attitude to art and literature. In \textit{Die Gemälde} (1821) he implies that Germany, and similar societies, lack not only a sense of cultural identity but also - perhaps the root cause - an appreciation of art in itself. He upbraids false attitudes to art: devotion to works of art as property (this reminds us of the merchants in \textit{Sternbald}) makes both Walther\textsuperscript{(5)} and old Essen\textsuperscript{(6)} (the father of Eduard, the hero) forget their paternal duties, allows the Prince to be swindled,\textsuperscript{(7)} and blinds the cultivated rich to the plight of the poor;\textsuperscript{(8)} while Dietrich (a "Nazarener") would subordinate art to the service of religion and patriotism.\textsuperscript{(9)} There is no prevalent aesthetic sense: the art-connoisseurs eagerly buy forgeries which Eulenböck, the virtuoso master of all styles with no style of his own, passes off as genuine.\textsuperscript{(10)} Tieck's purpose is to show that in the society portrayed, property eclipses art, love and duty, and that people may become so incapable of discerning reality that they even judge it by its conformity to imitations.\textsuperscript{(11)} But while Eulenböck deceives
them by fostering their self-deception, he, like Andrea and all the other tricksters, deceives himself. Where are the pictures of his own which he should have been painting all these years?

The theme of wealth, and of the social status and moral worthiness attributed to it, appears in various forms throughout the novellas. In Die Verlobung (1822) we are reminded that it is easier to be good when rich.\(^{(12)}\) In Der Jahrmarkt (1831) and Der Schutzgeist (1839) we are reminded of the origin of some crime in poverty, which is represented in those works as being so powerful an influence on behaviour that the enforcement of law and order against criminals affected by it amounts to persecution.\(^{(13)}\)

The most striking example, however, is that part of Der Alte vom Berge (1828) which deals with capitalism and its responsibility for the social (and aesthetic) effects of industrialisation. Tieck had already expressed, in Phantasus, a distaste for the physical ugliness of industrialisation and for the alienation of the worker from his work which had been brought about by the division of labour;\(^{(14)}\) he was to return to these matters in Der junge Tischlermeister (1836).\(^{(15)}\) It is probable that his view of urban poverty as a contributory cause of crime which provided a moral excuse was connected with those views. In his "Dresden" period, his views of industrialisation and capitalism were still aesthetic, as they always had been, but have acquired social aspects. It is possible also that his fear (revealed in certain works) of the loss of individual freedom under pressure from environmental or cultural factors\(^{(16)}\) was a yet deeper root of his socio-economic interests.
In Der Alte vom Berge, in an environment of machinery, smoke, steam and slag-heaps, Balthasar, the factory-owner whose epithet forms the title, regards capitalism as a monster feeding on misery by causing, inevitably as he believes, extremes of wealth and poverty. (17) Perhaps less striking but more familiar is the dictum that capital follows cheap labour because it obtains the maximum return by so doing. (18) (This was why the Count in Die Heiden left when the despised outcasts left.) (19) Balthasar and his manager, Eduard, though both good men otherwise by conventional yardsticks, (20) are corrupted by their obsession with property, even to the extent of preparing a murder in retaliation for theft of the firm’s property: they set a booby-trap to shoot a persistent burglar. (21) Whether the law (this is obviously a place where there is law, though we are not told what forms it takes) prescribes the death-penalty for burglary is beside the point: they are not a court. But they act as a court, in the sense that they arrange an extreme penalty, because they have come to regard property and its defence as the highest good. Balthasar’s generous philanthropy and desire to mitigate suffering are also of interest in Tieck’s portrayal of him as an individual, for they conflict not only with his defence of property by murder but also with his dislike of pleasure (for which his poverty-stricken childhood is responsible) and his conviction that misery in life is inescapable. (22) To this sordid, joyless life of capitalised industrialism Tieck often opposed the figure of the artist-craftsman in Der junge Tischlermeister (1836). (23) Balthasar’s unawareness of beauty also links him with those who
make art a business: the merchants of Sternhald, Eulenböck of Die Gemälde, and Henslowe of Dichterleben. (24)

There are numerous examples in the novellas in which Tieck demonstrated contemporary society to be corrupt in its ordinary administration, quite apart from the economic aspect. For example, in Glück sieht Verstand (1826) there is, throughout, an unspoken assumption that advancement does not depend upon winning the good opinion of official superiors (to which, in a fair context, he does not imply any objection), but that it is won or lost because superiors do not make a dispassionate assessment of merit; they merely favour subordinates whose prejudices and limitations match their own. That Simon is honourable and thereby wins his superiors over should not bring him promotion, for he is grotesquely incompetent. Tieck satirises thereby (and in the title) a society that imposes upon itself the need to choose between a ninnyhammer and a crook for its public officials.

The topic of the present section - the widespread presence, both in society generally and in Tieck's contemporary Germany - of social, political and administrative corruption was found in Tieck's works from an early stage. Examples may be found in Siegmund, Ulrich, Lebrecht, Sieben Weiber, Kater, and Eckart, and will be discovered in our further consideration of the novellas. However, works which contain evidence of this sort are often more appropriately considered in relation to other themes. Tieck attributes Germany's political backwardness, socio-economic injustice and industrial ugliness to the intellectual and moral
bankruptcy of its own mass culture. This in turn he attributes to the lack of awareness of beauty, from which national individuality and a free and beautiful society would develop. He shows that, instead, Germany fails to develop as a nation, and is prey to foreign domination and to the social and aesthetic evils of uncontrolled industrial growth.
(2) Individuality and Madness

Merely to amass examples of crass materialism and social or economic justice is, however, to ignore what Tieck saw beneath them. Many works are concerned with the relationship between authority and freedom - not in a political sense, but more broadly interpreted as the right to be different. Authority as Tieck portrays it is not always the State as an organisation; it consists sometimes of other people's expectations (which may sometimes, of course, be enforced by temporal authority). As shown earlier, Lovell is rejected by his father because he has different personal opinions on a matter which his father does not regard as falling within the realm of opinion; and Apollo of Die verkehrte Welt is subversive only because he thinks differently. The concept of "correct" and "incorrect" thinking is inevitably connected with the definition of sanity.

The ambiguity surrounding this question is considered in Die Reisenden (1822). Adlerfels, known throughout as Wolfsberg, is confined for a while in a lunatic asylum. He has been mistaken for Birken, whose abduction and confinement in the asylum has been arranged by the father of a girl whom Birken has seduced. Morally, "Wolfsberg" is not an inappropriate substitute, since, regarding himself, genius-like, as needing and able to sustain more experience of life than ordinary people, he has seduced a servant-girl, Franziska. His unpleasant stay in the lunatic asylum brings about a most unconvincing moral regeneration.

More importantly, it demonstrates two points. Firstly, society is inefficient at protecting young girls from philanderers, and
equally inefficient at preventing wrongful arrest; and beneath this criticism lies another, that injustice stimulates people to take the law into their own hands, but they do not act very creditably in the process. Secondly, there is the sinister treatment of delinquency as though it were proof of lunacy: this happens to "Wolfsberg", and is threatened against Görge. (31)

Clearly some of the inmates are detained because previous ill-treatment has caused mental illness, while others have broken down under the strain of society's dictates as to reason and logic. It is chiefly upon the position of the latter category that the "Direktor" bases his valedictory address. (33) He asserts that madness is not determined by any objective test but upon the opinion, even the whim, of those in power, and upon society's current values, which are not constants. The "mad" must learn to practise the majority's dishonest pretence of reason (by which he means that they should refrain from questioning basic assumptions), for most people are mad but lack the courage to be so without dissembling. These arguments by the "Direktor" seem to equate madness with originality, and it is through the "Direktor" (in an earlier speech) (34) that Tieck relates this point to the artist-figure: there is common ground, comments the "Direktor", because the dramatist and actor must enter into the rôles they create, even though this places their originality and stability at risk. The "Direktor" adds that these dangers exist also for those who need empathy with the insane in order to treat them.

Unfortunately for the clarity of the argument, the "Direktor"
also likens himself to a reluctant despot, to a ruler taking on the characteristics of those he rules, or to a religious leader taking his flock’s errors upon himself (like Dostoevsky’s Grand Inquisitor). These ideas are interesting, but in their undeveloped state they constitute a typical overloading of a character, just as the work as a whole is typically overloaded with characters, its ideas obscured by (and not closely connected with) a complex and implausible plot concerning a conspiracy against another inmate, Raimund. Even more unfortunately, Tieck does not distinguish between two concepts: on the one hand, the danger to artists and (as we would now call them) psychiatrists if they lose objectivity, and, on the other hand, his view that society’s so-called rationality is often nothing more than codified and unquestioned whim.

But for our survey two themes may be extracted: that dissent is labelled as madness; and that originality may (in its own right, even apart from the possible enmity of authority) constitute a threat to sanity. In our later consideration of artist-figures we will return to the second point. For the present, we must consider the authoritarian implication of the first: that society is a power-structure which will not tolerate those who are different. Tieck considers two particular contexts for this idea: these are the spheres of art and religion, in both of which individuals may have thoughts and feelings which authority may find unacceptable. The origins of the idea, confining our search to Tieck’s works, are in the perceptive non-artists Simon and Claus (of Ritter Blaubart) and Zerbino (and perhaps the King) of Zerbino: seeing the truth, or doubting what they are told, they are deemed ill or mad.
C. POWER AND THE FAILURE OF RELIGION

(1) Orthodox religion as a power-structure

The interest in power in Tieck's early works referred mainly to personal power, which expressed itself as the desire to dominate and manipulate others, partly for financial gain but more for the pleasure in power itself. The obvious examples are Mondal and Omar in Abdallah, Fuchs in Herr von Fuchs, Waterloo and Rose in Lovell and Leidgast in München. It is hardly surprising that after the Napoleonic period Tieck should have become more interested in power within the State. However, a striking aspect of this new interest is that religion appears as a cloak for power as well as for ignoble personal ambition. (In both respects there is thematic connection with Genoveva.) In other words, Tieck's interest in power has to do with private thoughts and feelings rather than with politics and constitutions, and is concerned with these public aspects only in so far as they reflect the private characters of the individuals concerned and the refusal of authority to leave them alone.

Die Verlobung (1822) shows religious bigotry being used to stifle the original thoughts and feelings of a young woman, Dorothea. Her family has become, in effect, a secret society controlled by her mother, and it is suggested that religion is often misused in social relations generally to supply spurious justification for prejudice. Dorothea's will is progressively sapped, as she is ostracised within her family for not wishing to be married to a rich man she dislikes to pay off family debts. For this, and for regarding good deeds as preferable to the outer
forms of belief, she is treated as unfeeling and as though she had no rights to considerate treatment. Her mother has, beneath the religious layer, the habit of using love as a weapon. Every issue is adroitly converted into whether her daughter loves her or not: if she does, it is implied, she will share her mother's religious convictions and will accept her mother's judgment in all matters. The union of temporal and spiritual authority is (in the minds of those who wish to wield them) absolute.

This family is a microcosm of the formal institutions of religion: to think differently is to be regarded as a threat. Pietro von Abano (1823) is the "Zaubergeschichte" its sub-title proclaims it to be only in a superficial sense, for the black arts which are practised by certain of the characters are merely tricks carried out with great skill or are coincidences: all apparently supernatural events in this novella have the one explanation or the other. Pietro's tricks and his practice of illusions are best explained as his reaction to Church bigotry and popular superstition.

The Church, represented in the work by the old priest Theodor, objects to two current trends. Firstly, there is a spirit of rationalism which has been inculcated by Averroists. These were intellectuals influenced by Averroes, an Arabic philosopher whose teaching, based on Aristotle and to some extent on Plato, advocated the supremacy of reason over faith in the task of proving the existence of God. Rather like Aristotle, he denied that the
soul was immortal. While he held that the intellect was immortal, he did not think that this proved personal immortality: intellect ("nous") was an attribute of the race. He held that the beliefs of the vast majority of people and of the theologians - the latter having the same beliefs as the majority but desiring reasons for them - were merely philosophical truths adapted to inferior minds. He attracted contemporary and posthumous hostility from the Church, but he was a major figure, posthumously, in Scholasticism, and his influence survived longest in Padua (8) where the novella is set.

It is as an (apparent) Averroëst that Pietro seems to Antonio to deserve defence against the priest's strictures. Pietro, Antonio implies, follows "den neuen Geist ... der ewigen Wahrheit ... Der nicht wieder, trotz eurer Künste, untertauchen wird, um gläubig euren Legenden zu gehorchen ". (9) Again there is the idea that improvement is obtainable by shedding a misleading complexity and reverting to a lost simplicity. We should not interpret Pietro as a quasi-Romantic driven into mystery by an aridly intellectual quasi-Aufklärung: the Averroan influence is here thought by Antonio to be an enlightened one in contrast to obscurantism and authoritarianism by the Church. However, this is Antonio's misunderstanding of the current state of Averroanism and of Pietro's character. Averroanism, if correctly represented in Pietro, is no simple rationality but a mystification all its own. Tieck's portrayal of the blind hero-worship of Antonio for Pietro is combined with an accurate historical impression. As Ernest Renan, taking the historical Pietro d'Abano as an example, remarked:
Médecine, arabisme, averroïsme, astrologie, incrédulité, devinrent des termes presque synonymes. (10)

But Theodor's attack on Pietro is more personal than his mention of the Averroists suggests. The priest has unthinkingly associated the sceptical aspect of Averroism with the magic of Pietro, and has thereby correctly identified the mixture of unrelated ingredients in that part of contemporary thought opposed to orthodoxy. The Church's tendency to regard heresy (a different belief) and witchcraft (a different power) as a single phenomenon arises from its authoritarian dislike of challenge: a point mentioned by Alfons (11) and Antonio (12) while convinced of the goodness of "Castalio" (Pietro's alias) and noting the Church's opposition to him. (The Church's assumption that a link exists between heresy and witchcraft is an important motif in Hexen-Sabbath (13). This gives Tieck's view of the confrontation between the medieval Church and the Renaissance, with the mutual misunderstandings and antagonisms, and with a network of human relations which precludes moral judgments on the reader's part.

Nothing could be more obvious in these novellas than Tieck's dislike of the Middle Ages, (familiar from Genoveva) and fear of the modern alternative (a newer element in his works); nothing could be more conspicuously absent from his critical writings and correspondence.

But clashes between ideologies are, in Tieck's works, clashes also between individuals. Theodor's hostility towards Pietro has much to do with his resentment of Pietro's imposing presence, gift of communication, and popularity with the student body. (14) Pietro is, of course, a fraud and an evil man, but Theodor regards
him as a challenge to the Church's authority rather than as a man in error. As Alfons remarks, it is "Munft" which lies behind Theodor's antagonism, a form of vested interest being threatened; Beresynth makes a similar criticism of Theodor. With such attitudes from authority, obscurantism is inevitable.

Moreover, rejection creates retaliatory hostility; as in Ryne, in Lovell, and the wolf in Rothkäppchen, so in Pietro and his dwarf Beresynth. Pietro is rejected because of an intellectual difference, Beresynth for a physical one. Popular superstition, in failure to repudiate which the Church fails intellectually and morally, attributes evil to ugliness. This causes the rejected person to take pride in the characteristic which gave rise to rejection, whether this be his individual desires (Lovell), the desire for independent power (Pietro), or ugliness (Pankrazia and Beresynth). The cumulative effects of such incidents as being attacked for sport by a mob gathered to worship their Redeemer is to reverse Beresynth's moral values; the reversal, obviously the ego's self-defence, is addictive like alcohol. And Pankrazia, being completely outwith normal relationships, concludes that immortality is taught merely to keep the young under control; those who discard the idea are free.

Rejecting, because rejected, she takes the Averroist's view; but, while claiming merely freedom, she is positively evil. These physical accidents of birth are analogues of Pietro's different mind: which is another accident of birth.

This novella shows that the cause of rejection and persecution is mere difference itself; but also that the difference is
capable of leading to evil. Again, Tieck recoils from both alternatives.

_Der Aufruhr in den Cevennen_ likewise shows a power-struggle between, in this instance, rival forms of orthodoxy (though one of these forms, being anti-Catholic, would no doubt contest the definition). The Catholic orthodoxy has provoked the Camisards to rebellion, and although each party has its good men there is nothing to choose between the vicious blood-lust of either side (a form of impartiality in these matters which Tieck first showed in _Alla-Moddin_). The Camisards begin with a desire for a religious life outwith orthodoxy, and for the development of personal spirituality. But, to be effective, they need to function as a power-bloc, with policy-decisions taken and adhered to, and the problems of internal dissent solved. (Only a power-bloc can recognise the existence of internal dissent.) To this internecine struggle, Tieck opposes a view which transcends sectarianism. The hero, Edmund, sickened by reciprocal savagery, falls under the influence of Watelet, who preaches an ideal of love for one's fellow-man, based on the view that specific forms of religion are (as also suggested in _Alla-Moddin_) mere products of time and place. This view is supported by the unintelligent but good-hearted Gottfried and Barbe. Watelet represents an attempt to reconcile extremes by transcending them and by providing them with a wider context which reduces seemingly vital differences to unimportance. The reconciliation of differences was a function which Tieck more often claimed for art and poetry than for religious impulses, and claimed specifically for the novella. He particularly emphasised
This (alleged) function of poetry in *Dichterleben*, where he also attributed the ability to Shakespeare.\(^{(30)}\)

Many critics have regarded Watelet as an example of the influence of Böhme.\(^{(31)}\) However, in addition to the points made in earlier discussion of Böhme, the fact that the environmental origin of religious dogma is mentioned in an early work and the analogy between Watelet's religion and Tieck's "Poesie" makes this unlikely.

The purpose of this chapter has been to demonstrate Tieck's view of organised religion as a power-structure; this view also appears in *Vittoria Accorombona*.\(^{(32)}\) We must now consider some of the alternatives which Tieck offered. It will be seen that love, individual religious feeling and art are real values, not illusions; that they oppose obsessive passion, bigotry or uncontrolled enthusiasm. However, it is also apparent from the novellas that in Tieck's view these values were to no avail.
(2) The powerlessness of private religious experience

Tieck's representation of the orthodox church (of any denomination) as an authoritarian structure raises the logical possibility that an alternative exists in personal religious feeling. His treatment of this aspect shows that the alternative occurred to him, that he desired to find it effective, and was obliged to admit that it was not.

In Der fünfzehnte November (1827) Tieck seems to present a solution. But it is a solution unworthy of the name, since it defies common sense; furthermore, the action and the most important theme diverge.

Much of the work concerns Elsbeth and her relationships with three men and with her brother. Thomas, a retired sea-captain, hopes to marry her in order to gratify vicariously an earlier passion for her mother. Elsbeth's uncle and foster-father, van der Winden, supports Thomas (his old friend) in order to gratify even more vicariously his own equally sexual ambition towards her. The youngest suitor is Sommer, a bombastic hypocrite, plainly a satire on a generation of young men modelling themselves on their misunderstood Werther; he is egotistic, self-dramatising, selfish, stupid and boring. To these unpleasant forms of passion Elsbeth opposes a love based on service and self-dedication to her deranged brother Fritz Wilhelm. Her beliefs are in sharp contrast also to the religious bigotry of the Domine, and may be summarised as a form of pantheism in which Fritz Wilhelm is one of God's creatures. Fritz Wilhelm's religion is more markedly pantheistic, but as a portrayal he is
ludicrous. Having learned, as a brilliant child, all he wanted from existing intellectual knowledge he became an idiot with an intuitive genius, and returned to normality only after predicting, preparing for and accomplishing (all during his idiocy) a complicated and dangerous act of devoted service to the community. These ideas can be correlated by contrasting feigned with real love, or artificial posturing with natural feeling, but this process would require us to take Fritzwilhelm seriously.

For a similar reason we must dismiss Der Schutzgeist (1839). The work's main theme - assuming that this is found in the protracted discussion before the main events of the story - upholds the value of private intuitive religious feeling. It is asserted that this feeling, if externalised, leads to charlatanry, or to over-emphasis of externals (prayer-books and cathedrals), or (as in the story about Tauler) to vanity about one's skill in effective preaching. Humility and piety so displayed can become forms of arrogance and viciousness. However, it is also shown that attempts to subject this intuition to analysis constitute a bigotry all its own.

This theme, which is in itself unexceptionable, has nothing to do with another of apparently equal importance: a trenchant denunciation of inequality of wealth and of urban poverty as likely to create crime. Since these aspects of society are also prominent in the opening discussions, it may have been unconsciously - we have already noted the superior operation of Tieck's imagination
compared with his analytical side - that Tieck inserts a splendidly ironic touch. The mother, seeking her injured son, guided by intuition as she does so, and given unexpected stamina by her commitment to the undertaking, manages very well. But she still needs money in large quantities to get across the river, for she encounters unwilling ferrymen who need a large bribe.\(^{(42)}\)

The work demonstrates, probably unconsciously on Tieck's part, the fallacy of assuming that religious conviction will overcome practical difficulties.

The two novellas considered above show that Tieck found difficulty in providing a convincing portrayal of instinctive goodness as a worthy opponent to authoritarian orthodoxy or other forms of evil, and show that he wanted to do so. Where he did succeed in portraying individual goodness - in Gertrude of Hexen-Sabbath\(^{(43)}\) or Pepoli of Vittoria Accorombona,\(^{(44)}\) for example - it had only a minor role and demonstrated the hostility and power of orthodoxy.

A more important example, which must be taken seriously, is Die Wundersuchtigung (1831). In this novella it is shown that, although instinctive goodness does exist, it is (in Tieck's estimation) probably weaker than another instinct, namely the urge towards mystification as a means of obtaining power over others. The implication is that there is a polarisation between goodness as mysticism and evil power-seeking as mystification, and that much of man's difficulty arises from the fact that this polarisation is easier to recognise in the abstract than to live up to in real life; in other words, that in real life they tend to intermingle.
Seebach advocates the irrationality of love for one's fellow-man in the form of philanthropy, which in his conception of it may create groups of people with ideals in common but does not create secret societies. The freethinkers, he says, entered "in einen geheim öffentlichen Bund" in order to protect their individual inner goodness: "um ... das Geistigste, das, was unantastbar seyn sollte, und was doch immerdar verletzt werden muß, still und behutsam zu schützen". So their reason for banding together was merely that they could do more in union than individually, by strengthening each others' resolve. There were no secrets, he insists, there was no formal society: a person of like mind was, by definition, a member; a member was, by definition, of like mind. They were the "Aufgeklärte" (the context implies "the true Aufgeklärte"): "denn jeder wahre Mensch ist dieses Salz der Erde, und ist ohne Gesellschaft, Eid und Verbindung dieser ächte Freimaurer". As in Die Ahnenprobe and Der junge Tischlermeister, nobility is a personal quality, not the exclusive and automatic attribute of lineage, and is thereby implicitly democratized. But the action of the present work shows something else: the antithesis between individual goodness and group error or evil, based on the urge to elitism, mystification and love of power. And as this antithesis is explored, there is no evidence of a rational basis, or of wider support, for moral goodness. The good is seen to be irrational, and therein lies its weakness and vulnerability. But Seebach himself is also drawn towards irrationality in the form of mystification. This had been an early obsession, which had vanished with his youth, and which
now, stimulated by Sangerheim (a charlatan and dupe of a bigger charlatan, Feliciano), bursts forth again.\(^{(51)}\)

There is an implicitly political aspect to the idea that anyone may be individually good whereas a formal Order requires admittance: for the matter becomes one of acceptability to authority within the Order. In Sangerheim's characterisation, obscurantism in a mysterious Order is a form of power-seeking. He argues sophistically that the confinement of secrets to an Order, as distinct from their wide dissemination, is a safeguard against their misuse by the ignorant.\(^{(52)}\) It is in the belief that there were indeed supernatural secrets being used philanthropically that he sacrifices his integrity, engaging in sharp practice for the profit of the Order.\(^{(53)}\)

Feliciano is the successful, cynical exploiter of others' gullibility and fascination with mystery; he is similar to Waterloo in Lovell (Sangerheim is akin to Rosa and Balder), but less complex and with no early misfortune to mitigate his offence and to lend interest to the delineation. Elitism and contempt for others are the mainspring of his temperament: "das Heilige" must be kept from "die blöde, rohe Welt, die unwissende Menge", which would misunderstand and defile it.\(^{(54)}\) This satisfies fellow-members, but his real motive is the acquisition of wealth and power.\(^{(55)}\) He works on the principles that the bigger and more fanciful the lie, the more likely it is to be believed, and that it is a tactical error to allow the impression that there are rival factors to be evaluated.\(^{(56)}\) These points were put no more specifically by Hitler.\(^{(57)}\) The general impression in both sources
is that ordinary people, with ordinary minds and consciences, can, by these tactics, be induced to entertain ideas which do not match their previous limited intellectual experience; their usual inhibitions and restraints are thereby set aside and they are easily manipulated. This is what happened to William Lovell. Feliciano analyses the evolution of the main churches, contending that they are debased versions of older mysteries, that they prove the existence of a suppressed desire for them, for a secret Order and for superiors initiated into the unknown.\(^{58}\) That he finds it possible to deceive and control people suggests Tieck's belief that the religious impulse, particularly the Roman Catholic impulse in the form in which he saw it,\(^{59}\) can often appear in this perverted form.

In summary, the theme of *Die Wundersuchten* is that goodness and religious impulses are aspects - which may exist independently of each other - of innate personal irrationality, and that this irrationality can easily degenerate into superstition and mystification, ripe for exploitation by the unscrupulous.

In another novella of this period, *Eine Sommerreise* (1834), Tieck confirmed his implication that religious feeling is the expression of an individual's psychology. He developed this idea by suggesting that the irrational and atavistic passions incline to Roman Catholicism and the control of these to Protestantism, with the attendant danger that excessive rationality may lead to aridity and to suppression of natural feelings.\(^{60}\)

The work has other important features for our survey,
however, so its main review is deferred.

The present section has shown that, in Tieck's works, private religious experience, far from being an antidote to State power, may even - however innocently - be a microcosm of the bigotry and authoritarianism behind it.
D. POWER AND THE FAILURE OF ART

(1) The powerlessness of the artist

A State in which being different is forbidden: this, the fear of the "Direktor" in Die Reisenden, is shown at work in Der Hexen-Sabbath (1831). This novella is set in Burgundy and France in 1459, in a late feudal order in which the rich and powerful please themselves and, in power-cliques, manipulate the monarchy and oppress the lower "Stände". They use the Church as an instrument of oppression: Etampes, the representative of the ruling Duke of Burgundy, has turned it into an effective means of extortion. Since his arrival some mad (or apparently mad) old women have formed the habit of denouncing rich men whose property passes, after their arrest, to Etampes in response for his persuading Bishop Athenas that they were merely misguided rather than evil. We are to assume that he has arranged all this.

The Church, however, believes itself to be unfailingly right, even when defying common sense and common humanity. It is incapable of perceiving its errors of logic and the nature of its atrocities because it is concerned with dominance. This is explicable by considering, as the work's earlier passages invite us to do, the historical context of decline in Church power, both financial and intellectual: it thinks in power terms because it is in decline and on the defensive. So its definitive judgments are for sale, its hierarchy a career-structure. It rules the mob by conforming to the meanest popular prejudices. It assumes an equation (as in Pietro von Abano) between heresy, which is a disagreement with the Church on a matter which the Church
regards as factual and fundamental (though the Church was usually wrong and the matter often trivial), and witchcraft, which is the exercise of an alleged power not available to the Church.\(^{(9)}\) In other words, the Church insists that its specific forms of religious experience, of belief, and of worship, are the only ones.

These conditions of depredation and manipulation by the rich, and defensive animosity by the Church, are as a powder-keg ready for a spark. An over-zealous minor official whose sanity is questionable makes accusations of witchcraft.\(^{(10)}\) There is a surge of hysteria, and reason is to no avail. An accusation is tantamount to proof, and anyone who denies that witchcraft exists thereby proves his own guilt, since only a witch would wish people to discount the danger.\(^{(11)}\) Athanas acquires unchallengeable powers of definition, claiming to discern a suspect's guilt or innocence by looking into his eyes and using his unique God-given diagnostic powers.\(^{(12)}\) A sane society would declare him a dangerous lunatic and lock him up for compulsory treatment, which would be directed not only at his obvious paranoia\(^{(13)}\) but also at the possibility that a partial cause lies in his alleged sexual inadequacy.\(^{(14)}\) Meantime, however, the profiteers move in and keep everything in lucrative turmoil.

The arts provide no challenge to this state of affairs, although Labitte is occasionally imprudently outspoken (for example in the above suggestion about Athanas). Culture has flourished in the fifty years of peace since Joan of Arc expelled the English;\(^{(15)}\) its function, however, is not to lead a revolt but to provide a retreat from the world.\(^{(16)}\) Labitte's opposition
to authority is the largely inadvertent outcome of the kind of artist and the kind of person he is - introspective and impish - rather than of his being an artist as such. (17)

Since art's conscious initiative against authority is limited to the occasional impertinence from an eccentric old man in an apparent citadel of refuge, we must consider in what way the refuge itself was unacceptable to authority. At first sight, Labitte's view that ordinary life is wonderful in its potential beauty (18) might be thought inimical to the Church's reliance on mystery and miracle, for this would be a conflict as to dogma. But the conflict comes, instead, from his view that beauty and imagination are an individual experience, and that all aspects of thought, feeling, religion and art are vehicles for it. (19) Labitte transcends the Church (as Camoens does) (20) by taking the whole of human experience as his sphere of interest. This is form of free inquiry, as well as of relegation of the Church to a less-than-universal status. Authority reacts with force, as a threatened authority must.

Labitte's position is set out in his allegory in which he suggests that the angels who fell from grace were not lesser ones, but, on the contrary, were the strongest and most glorious; they were seeking other forms of activity and creativeness in preference to those which continued to satisfy the orthodox, passive angels. (21) The chief of these fallen angels is known to legend as Lucifer - "Lichtträger" - and it is he who is the motive-force in every hero, thinker, "Begeisterte(r)", artist and poet. (22) So artists do not, we conclude, have to decide to be subversive; it is in their
nature to be so. It is therefore irrelevant for Catharina to speak of his goodness, childlike simplicity and harmlessness.\(^{23}\) For he paints a picture of a witches' sabbath, depicting people who are incapable of understanding God or beauty but who, needing to worship something, worship "das Abgeschmackte, Aberwitzige".\(^{24}\) It is merely a realistic painting of such people (not advocacy of their views) but is so powerful a representation of evil and of reverence for evil that it brings him into disrepute.\(^{25}\) (This recalls Ellis's unanswered criticism of Shakespeare\(^{26}\) and Tieck's own fears\(^{27}\) on this subject.) The same verisimilitude prevents Labitte from being impressed by ceremonial: it is as an artist, not as a political cartoonist, that he remarks how the colours in which the great like to dress up are those of an ape's rump.\(^{28}\)

Art is not compromised by its defeat, for Catharina and Labitte are unrepentant at execution; it is shown to be ineffectual against orthodoxy in power, and beyond the understanding of the mob. But there are hints that it brings about a change for the better in a historical time-scale far beyond an individual life-time. Labitte is presented as a representative of a minority who, by being victimised for originality, bring about a shift in the boundary between the usual and the unusual (Hebbel's story of the sleeping giant\(^{29}\) is similar). Labitte says, referring to his own allegedly wicked painting:

\begin{quote}
Jeder Erfinder ist der Märtyrer seiner Originalität. Viel schlechtere Sachen werden nach meinem Tode Aufsehen und Verwunderung erregen, und, wenn es geschieht, so wird kein Mensch dann mehr von dem armen Peter Labitte mehr reden.\(^{30}\)
\end{quote}

Tieck's artist figures conflict with authority partly because
they create aesthetic beauty which opposes the banality of evil, but more because their perceived world is different. It is the difference which makes them inadvertently subversive, and therefore victims.

In many works the concept of the artist broadens to include anyone whose view is original and who is regarded as dangerous or mad in consequence. Obvious examples would include Zerbino, Christian, Claudius (in Maubert) and some of the patients in Die Reisenden. An example of the non-artistic but clear sighted "fool" exists in the period of Hexen-Sabbath also, namely in Der wiederkehrende griechische Kaiser (1831).

This is a love-story (with a contrived happy ending) interwoven with the story of a rebellion. From it may be deduced a number of points, chiefly concerned with demonstrating Tieck's dislike of the feudal order. These points have, however, been deduced from other novellas, so the present study will be confined to the character of Ingeram, the Court Fool in the service of Johanna.

Ingeram is the only character in the work who sees himself and the world without delusions. He recognises escapism as an important motive in many people's self-deception. He believes they hanker after an earlier world (presumably imaginary; Ingeram is obscure) in which harsh reality was unknown; but this world was smashed by Lucifer. The present world was reassembled from the broken pieces, so something of the former order remains in the innocent, simple, sentimental pleasures which are still possible. But the reason for this persisting escapism is that human nature
is so uninspiring in his estimation: for the most part, one should not expect people to behave well, and one will avoid disappointment if one's expectations of people are low. Mankind is "ein Hackenack von Erbarmlichkeit, Hunger, Neid, Bosheit und schuftischen Wesen aller Art". (31) In other words, Ingeram asserts mankind's animal nature, its limitation to the most primitive emotions, and its incapacity for selflessness and idealism. The events of the novella up to the contrived ending, and the fact that the ending is contrived, suggest that Tieck did not know how to refute the view but wished to refute it. Ingeram's analysis has the tone of despair but of impeccable pragmatism: recognise the unpalatable truth but do not collapse under it.

So only Ingeram sees oppression, self-seeking, the delusions, self-delusions and posing of love, and animal viciousness beneath the pretence of duty, for what they are. It is his originality, not his malformation, which makes him a "fool", and he belongs in this respect with that other fool, Claudius, and the neurotic Simon (both of Der Blaubart), and also with the subversive intellectual enquirer Zerbino and with Labitte. He sees mankind between the poles of rationality and irrationality, each having its own debased form at the extreme. (32)

But Ingeram exercises a beneficial influence on Johanna's reign only because he is permitted to do so. (33) It is not shown in the novella that his rise to the power-behind-the-throne was inevitable, or even probable. The "happy ending" does not carry conviction: the earlier Ingeram who was mistreated is the more convincing portrayal. We shall note also in considering Dichterleben
and Der junge Tischlermeister that Tieck seems to have wanted to portray one set of circumstances but was led inexorably to portray a more realistic but less pleasant alternative.

(2) Inspiration is corruption

When the artist expresses the will of the nation, rather than standing, "fool"-like, in opposition to it, the question of his annihilation by the power of the State does not arise. Labitte is vulnerable because he has no power-base of popular support; he is esoteric, not a national figure. He thereby exemplifies the first of the two points made by the "Direktor" of the lunatic asylum in Die Reinsendan — that an authoritarian society labels dissent as madness (or, in Labitte's case, heresy). There is, however, still the second point made by the "Direktor", namely the danger of inspiration to the inspired person. The relationship between art and its "parent" society has also arisen in, for example, Sternbald and Hexen-Sabbath: art in relation to nationhood, to society's values, and to business. These issues are examined in two novellas, each based on the life of a great poet: Shakespeare in his success, and Camoens in penury and neglect. In both works Tieck considers the symbiosis between artist and society, and shows how the emotional disorders of a society and an individual are related: how they both have the same need for equilibrium, how they are both prone to the error and danger of excessive "Begeisterung". (This point is also made strongly in Der junge Tischlermeister.) (34)

(1) Shakespeare: "Das Fest zu Kenelworth" and "Dichterleben"

The concept of "Begeisterung", which permeates the whole of Dichterleben, is explained, in summary, as follows. In any aspect
of behaviour, but particularly in the arts or religion, it is a form of one-sidedness, of limitation of view. It is therefore potentially dangerous, whether in a person or in a State. Equilibrium is necessary, in a context of ordinariness, and is achieved by poetic insight which, by revealing the truth, corrects one-sidedness or extremism. In this lies its value to society and to individuals. The weakness of this argument is that it is essentially subjective, and is therefore itself potentially one-sided. It can easily become separated from reality if it has no base in the culture of a specific environment, and if this happens it can cause one to see in other people and their behaviour, and in oneself, what one wishes to see. Genius must not be restricted by ordinary life, but in Tieck's view comes from it, from a nation and from literary antecedents. In a more practical sense he shows that it comes from the commercial basis of a paying public to which it communicates (though he saw at least as early as the satirical comedies that this tended to lower the standard of taste). Art, he believed, should be not a universal but a part of everyday life. However, the end of Dichterleben II implies that "Begleisterung" is insidious, for it leads even Shakespeare into error.

The action of the novella has as its backdrop several decades during which the English theatre develops rapidly. (35) Purpose-built theatres are opened, cadres of experienced actors appear, low-quality plays flood the market in response to public and commercial demand, and England is in a vigorous and patriotic phase of national life. So the public, the infrastructure and the state-of-the-art are all simultaneously propitious for the
emergence of a Shakespeare and for him to begin with his historical plays. In other words there are two pairs of relationships, themselves related: between the theatre and its economic and social environment; and between all of these and Shakespeare. This network of relationships is referred to at various times in the work.

As noted above, the theatre has suddenly become a business, exploiting public taste. Henslowe, the theatre-owner who employs Shakespeare, is a businessman (and a descendant, in Tieckian terms, of the "Direktor" of the theatre in Die verkehrte Welt). The plays, the authors, and the actors mean nothing to him except instruments of profit. He does not correctly remember Shakespeare's name or the names of his plays because the details are unimportant. His fear that Puritans in influential positions may impose censorship, and his belief in giving the audience what it wants, have nothing to do with advocacy of free speech or democratic principles: he is alarmed at the possible harm to his business.

The conflict between Puritanism and the theatre is the most important aspect of interaction. Public taste may be improved, bourgeois prejudice, (represented by Shakespeare's father, John) softened; but the Puritans argue from principle, and they are no less "begeistert" than the poets. Much of this conflict is little more than mutual denunciation, as exemplified by Arthington and Marlowe. The protagonists seldom meet, and even then seldom answer each other point-for-point: which emphasises the magnitude of the problem.

Shakespeare does not regard these matters in the same light:
he is critical of both viewpoints and regard them as a false antithesis. Instead of merely upholding the freedom of the theatre against Puritan censorship, he refutes Marlowe's argument which rested on the alleged importance of sensuality - the latter is, Shakespeare says, "eine Aufgabe für die Poesie" rather than "die Krone derselben" - and objects to Henslowe's pandering to the lowest elements in the audience. But he also objects to the Puritans. His charge is that their concept of the divine excludes "das Menschliche selbst" and that they therefore exclude the arts on the false principle that "das Schöne könne niemals gut sein". He believes that neither an individual nor a State can retain equilibrium if constantly and intensely committed to the arts or religion; ordinariness is necessary as a context for these activities. Therefore he wishes to resist (but not to persecute) the Puritans. It is important to note that the problem he sees is much larger than the conflict presented to him. He regards all obsessions, all departures from the ordinary world, as dangerous. His belief in taking a comprehensive, balanced view is demonstrated in his argument with the Puritan, Ellis.

Ellis regards the theatre as a frivolous and immoral entertainment, and believes that people should concern themselves with religious matters instead. Shakespeare may believe he is ennobling these instincts, but his audience sees only coarseness. Playwrights who deliberately exploit their audiences' low tastes are innocent compared with him: he, with his greater skill, makes vice more attractive (the criticism is similar to that levelled at
Labitte); and the theatre, with its spectacle, has greater impact than the printed book.

Shakespeare replies that the Puritans are wrong to believe that a serious view of life requires one to eschew cheerful arts and innocent pleasures. Every ability should be cultivated to the full ("ausgebildet"). Poetry, he continues, encompasses and ennobles all aspects of life, places them in a proper relationship to each other, and thereby achieves a moral end which is beyond the capacity of the moral sense. A talent cannot, he concludes, choose its sphere: that is determined by the nature of the talent, which is not general but for a specific activity.

Shakespeare's reply can certainly be said to put Puritanism in its place. But his alternative, which rests on "Begeisterung", is not without dangers of its own, and is not a true alternative at all. Every talent is, apparently, to be "ausgebildet" in a sphere to be determined by the nature of the talent. He does not say what is to happen if a man should possess a talent the exercise of which is incompatible with others' welfare (which is essentially Ellis's criticism of him), for he assumes that with proper "Begeisterung" this cannot happen; the possibility does not even enter his head. And Shakespeare leaves unanswered Ellis's criticism (as Labitte did not answer a similar charge) that his audience may see only crudity even if he has actually presented something more worthy.

In his bitterness and grief at the discovery that Southampton and Rosaline are lovers - so he has lost them both - Shakespeare doubts himself and his ideals, and fears that Ellis was right after
But this fear is only a moment of weakness, derived from his regretful realisation that he cannot have an ordinary life because he is not an ordinary person. In its context, this fear has no antecedent and no outcome (though Tieck's projected sequels may have clarified the matter). More importantly, we note that Southampton learned from Shakespeare's plays certain tricks which he used in seducing Emmy. This tends to substantiate Ellis's criticism; obviously the potential moral flaw is not to be overlooked.

As we have seen, Shakespeare's view of poetry, its purpose, and its inspiration, is more comprehensive than the partisanship of his lesser contemporaries. There is a conflict between him and the university-educated poets in particular. These are at least partly dependent on aristocratic patronage, and write of universal concepts, derived partly from feudalism and partly from their Classical education; and they eschew national self-awareness. Shakespeare, in contrast, is completely free-lance, and writes of and for nationhood. The universal values of Marlowe and the others are probably the literary descendants of the morality-values in morality plays. In a way this is a difference between generations compressed into fewer years than usual. The breach with the past forms of theatre has only now, with Shakespeare, found its literary concomitant, namely a drama rooted in matters of national concern. But Marlowe's views are important in two respects: he is the crucial figure in the background of Shakespeare, who admires him; and he is both a literary-historical and psychological phenomenon who clarifies our view of Shakespeare by providing a contrast.
The following is a summary of Marlowe's opinions (which are expressed in several places in Dichterlehen I). The poet is a being separate from all nature and society, unaffected by its laws, joys or sorrows. He makes his own world, which has no connection with that inhabited by ordinary people and is inaccessible to them. Therefore he deliberately excludes any sense of belonging to any specific country: the place where one chances to be born and to spend one's childhood should not be allowed to obscure and limit one's imagination. University education (here he intends to put Shakespeare, whom he knows only as the "Schreiber", in his place) teaches one to live in a wider world and to base one's outlook upon that of the Ancients. The poet makes his own world by deliberately choosing the other-worldly. In so doing he benefits mankind and society: he gives them visions of beauty to give meaning to life. But he thereby breaks the code by which ordinary people live, so he arouses the hostility of those whom he benefits. There is the charge of immorality allegedly in his works and in his personal life. But to the reader of this novella it is amorality:

Diejenigen, die mich auch hierüber [for immorality] tadeln, schelten nur die Begeisterung selbst, jene Lebenskraft ...

If, he continues, the poet tries to live as an ordinary person, the other-worldly powers turn on him and ruin his attempt at ordinary happiness.

Shakespeare is a complete contrast: self-educated, patriotic, morally responsible, synthesizing rather than one-sided; and as a person he is in many ways even ordinary, pedestrian. Indeed, his ambivalent relationship with ordinary, everyday life - represented
by Stratford, by his early years there, by the characters of his father and of Johanna Hathaway - is particularly important. After his marriage, he runs his father's business as efficiently as his father's antagonism permits, (16) and becomes prosperous in his chosen work later.

His father's hostility towards him has two causes: William is apparently indifferent to commerce, and is disobedient in indulging poetic propensities; later the disreputable company he keeps adds fuel to the fire. But the two men were on a collision-course from the first. His complaint, even in boyhood, about his father's sternness is that he is not permitted self-development ("Aber man läßt mir nicht Freiheit, auf meine Art klug zu werden"). This was caused by mutual incomprehension: the boy could not understand, the father would not. ("Der ist oft ohne alle Ursach böse, erwiderte der Kleine, und ich muß es auch aushalten.") (47)

In this world of Stratford and his father, the "Fest" becomes a symbol of freedom. Its importance is that William's visit contains incidents which are symbols of major aspects of the main work; this relationship has been neglected by previous writers on Tieck. In the first of these incidents, William persists in believing the Day and Dekker story of Guy of Warwick on the grounds that it is beautiful and sounds true. (48) This conviction which is reminiscent of Don Quixote, (49) adumbrates his adult belief in poetry and "Begeisterung" and his unawareness of their potential dangers. Secondly, there are the incidents arising from his first involvement with poetry and the theatre. (50) He acts the part of an echo in a recitation; he is more moved by a real echo of hunting
horns; a martial noise causes him, in error, to speak the echo ('Konigin") before Gascoign instead of after him; he loses the paper on which his lines are written; and, in a fit of enthusiasm, he acknowledges Johanna as his wife. In these events we have an embryonic version of his progress from echoing reality to leading it, and from echoing other literature to being inspired by real models. Patriotism, and love of a worshipping kind, are the twin spheres of his poetry. He is called into real life by a hunting horn, and as in Sternbald, this is incompatible with art. With his acknowledgement of Johanna a propinquity-trap is closed on him, and he is ensnared in ordinariness.

In adult life Shakespeare finds himself in a "Zwiespalt aller Empfindungen". (51) The set pattern of psychological and emotional relationships in his family at Stratford is (in a reminiscence of Sternbald and of Christian) stultifying to his creativity as a poet, but it is necessary to him as an ordinary person: Shakespeare is both drawn to and repelled by both his milieu (whereas Greene's intermittent antipathy to family life is merely part of his unstable character). The cultural and emotional restriction in Shakespeare's family, which is inimical to his poetic work, contends with family love, while the unknown potential of his talent in London both entices him and makes him apprehensive. He is between his immutable past in Stratford and his future "Fest" in London, and he is not really at home in either. From his "Momente der Begeisterung" or "Diese Ausbeugung vom gewöhnlichen Leben und dessen Geschäften" comes everything he values in his life: the opportunity of
restoring his father's lost happiness and prosperity; friendship with Southampton; love with Rosaline; and the delights of poetry. But it is implied that for much of the time - since "Momente" cannot presumably take more than a small proportion of it - he is an ordinary person.

This "Begeisterung" is crucial to the concepts of religion, patriotism, love and poetry which, expressed in various characters, make up the work itself. It is the driving force, these other activities merely its external shape or its context. In many instances it appears as a specific all-consuming obsession (such as religious mania). But Shakespeare also makes claims for it as a synthesizer and as an instrument for perceiving truth. These two aspects will be considered in turn; first, the obsessive aspect.

Certain poets of the pre-Shakespearean group provide examples of the poetic effects. Marlowe's views have already been noted on the separation of the poet from ordinary life, on the rôle of "Begeisterung" and its dangers. Robert Greene's life is a series of pendulum-swings from virtue and sobriety to debauchery and drunkenness, and back again: alternating repentance and recidivism. This unbridled element is an evil to which he was once attracted by the thrill of physical danger. It is also (he believes, perhaps as a means of preserving his self-esteem) the concomitant of his talent. When he has lost everything - house and home, wife and child - he rhetorically greets the loss as the attainment of poetic freedom. One is reminded of Lovell proclaiming his independence when unable to have a conventional life, and joining a different society of different misfits. In the
present work, Henry Cuffé adopts similar attitudes in political activity. (53)

Throughout, we find that Shakespeare's pronouncements and objections (but not necessarily his actions) provide an antidote to extremism. His typical mental processes are synthesis and the search for comprehensiveness, transcending the false antitheses of narrower views. (54) He rejects Marlowe's claim that the expression of sensual passion is the highest achievement of poetry. He advocates, instead, a fusion of corporeal with spiritual, eternal with mortal, rejecting the idea of opposed categories:

so gibt es auch vielleicht eine Poesie, die Alles verbinden mag.

He opposes Marlowe's rejection of patriotic feeling. Indeed, he points out that Marlowe's position is self-contradictory. On the one hand, Marlowe identifies sensual experience as the basis of literature, and on the other hand rejects any limitation by place and time. But the latter are equally an integral part of the individual, and to sever one's roots is to arrest one's development. The glories of recent English history are particularly inspiring for a poet. Shakespeare also objects to the bigotry of the religious "Schwärmer" because they are so one-sided.

Nevertheless, Shakespeare is himself led into error by "Begeisterung". We have already seen how he does not deal effectively with the potential moral-philosophical weakness of "Begeisterung" when he advocates this in his argument with Ellis. And there are certain aspects of his life in which his passions are not controlled by his conscious thoughts. In particular, it
is probable that his love for Rosaline and his friendship for Southampton were the products of his poetic imagination, for their characters as he sees them differ sharply from the reader's view. At the very end he recognises that this has been the case:

war es nicht eine himmlisch süße, eine zauberhaft lockende Empfindung, die mich in diese Liebe, in diese Freundschaft führte? Und in welche Hölle haben mich diese täuschenden Engel [love and friendship] gestürzt, die den Schein [i.e. not the reality] des Lichtes an sich nahmen!

A vision of the ghost of Marlowe - whose destruction was caused by uncontrolled "Begeisterung" - has just saved him from rushing into destructive jealousy.

Shakespeare bases his portrayal of Venus on Rosaline. Southampton states that it was the poet in Shakespeare which makes him see her as a unique beauty. Beautiful she undoubtedly is, but her petty behaviour to Franz confirms Southampton's opinion.

Southampton is, to Shakespeare, Adonis. Apart from a hint from Tieck that a homosexual attraction is felt by Shakespeare, there are two quasi-ideological reasons for his view of him. Firstly, there is a bourgeois adulation of the aristocrat and of his freedom and ease. Secondly, Southampton may be a projection of his younger self pursued by Johanna, so that Johanna and himself suggest to him real life ideals in Rosaline and Southampton and poetic ideals in Venus and Adonis. Shakespeare wishes he had resisted Johanna's advances; he comments that a mature young woman is dangerously attractive to a youth just as a young girl is to an older man, and he refers almost immediately thereafter to
Dido and Aeneas (62) (in which story Dido, an older woman, distracts Aeneas, the younger man, from his destiny). Therefore Shakespeare admires Southampton's indifference to Rosaline and Adonis's to Venus. (63) Of his own Venus and Adonis he says this: the classical Adonis has the complete happiness of a fulfilled love, but he thought it more elegiac and poetically productive if Venus were the active partner and Adonis the passive, inexperienced, reserved, even cold one. Southampton, as the basis of this Adonis, excels in all sports and is still a boy in his indifference, even hostility to women. The power of love is unknown to him; even Rosaline - Venus - cannot prevail. His actual character is less pleasant even than this stereotype, but Shakespeare sees in him what he wants or needs to see.

The theoretical basis of Shakespeare's view of Southampton is indicated in a disagreement he has with Marlowe about the relationship between poets and aristocrats. (64) Marlowe, typically, compares a superiority which is innate with that which is an accidental by-product of social status, and concludes that if humility is to enter into the relationship it is appropriate from the aristocrat, not from the poet. Shakespeare, also typically, looks beyond potential rivalry. In his view, a combination of admirable personal qualities with aristocratic birth and power (he does not say that the one guarantees the other) transcends this potential conflict. It is natural, he believes, to worship perfection. He insists that this is not the self-abnegation of one party in order to glorify the other, but merely the recognition of admirable qualities inherent in an individual person. The poet's
interpretative gifts include transmuting servility into reverence and love, arrogance into tenderness. An aristocratic background is one of several admirable characteristics or achievements, each of which is merely a focus of personal qualities rather than an object of reverence in itself. The poet, in Shakespeare's view of the relationship, transforms and deifies perfection, and this is to the advantage of both parties: the perfect individual can know his perfection only when the poet portrays it, and the poet can perceive it only when the revered one embodies it.

This argument loses its force because the Southampton whom we, the readers, see is not the same person at all. Indeed, Shakespeare tends after his unfortunate marriage to place friendship higher than love, and he admires in Southampton some commonplace and not very worthy traits. He even fears that Southampton will turn from him later (this is a curious reminiscence of fears expressed by Tieck to Wackenroder), although we must demur that the sense of privilege and insecurity ought more appropriately to flow in the opposite direction; even Marlowe's advocacy of this principle cannot discredit it. "Begeisterung" proves treacherous, for it leads to a false synthesis as well as false antithesis. Southampton, far from being admirable, is mean and egotistic. He states openly that no duty can outweigh his duty to himself; he seduces Emmy only to defy Rosaline; there is a latent streak of crude violence in him. In short, he is an unremarkable youth of eighteen, whose chief interests are, in this order of preference, freedom, horses, hunting, books and girls. Girls find him attractive, but he has no particular interest in them. Shakespeare's poem about him as Adonis
is accurate, his real-life view of him inaccurate. (66)

With Southampton and Rosaline Shakespeare allows "Begeisterung" to take over his ordinary life, and he controls it in the nick of time. Meanwhile his poetry goes - but unknown to him - closer to the real truth. That it does not lead to the outright condemnation that Southampton and Rosaline plainly deserve shows that Tieck did not intend us to accept fully Shakespeare's claims about the diagnostic power of poetry.

This work represents the view that poetry must be founded upon a national spirit, which is expressed by an inspired poet. It may be, therefore, that part of this novella is Tieck's most explicit condemnation of two features in his early intellectual environment - the love of classical ideals and the self-styled geniuses. These concepts are embodied in Marlowe and refuted in Shakespeare. It has been suggested earlier that Shakespeare represented to Tieck a means of strengthening his resolve to reject Goethe as an idol; Goethe would otherwise have been the only available counter-ideal but was not entirely to Tieck's liking. (67)

However, Tieck shows that many aspects of the ideals Shakespeare embodied for him can also appear in a debased form: the environmental base of poetry can become its conversion into a commodity, giving the public what it wants; and inspiration can become unbridled imagination and obsession. Despite Shakespeare's claim that true poetry will serve a moral end, it is demonstrated (for example, in Southampton's conduct) that it can have a corrupting effect. Furthermore, Shakespeare's Venus and Adonis proves that the poet's aesthetically pleasing versions of his
experiences may be only partially accurate. Poetry may be rooted in the real world, but the real world merely supplies raw material which is often reworked into ideals of beauty. It does not improve the real world: Henslowe continues to make money, Ellis remains an implacable and bigoted opponent, John Shakespeare accepts that poetry is worthwhile only because he sees it can bring wealth and status, (66) Cuffe ends on the scaffold, and Southampton and Rosaline remain morally unworthy. (Small wonder that a hostile regime crushed Labitte.) While poetry in this work continues to attract the hostility of authority, it is not actually subversive: so there is a retreat from the more aggressive and confident position of Die verkehrte Welt.

If the world that the poet sees is not the true one, he may see the world he wishes to see. Kant's influence, as expressed in Tieck's early story Die Freunde, is still strong. Shakespeare does not find real friendship or real love (he only believes he does), and the England of which he writes is, like Camoens' Portugal, Romer's Germany, or Quixote's chivalry, long past; but he extols friendship, love and patriotism as though they are of the present. His poetry is self-delusion, the rôle he claims for it specious. No doubt Tieck wanted to believe what Shakespeare says: but he is obliged to show that his Shakespeare is wrong, and this refutes the naïve claims in Sommernacht. Just as Tieck's religious characters fail, so do his artists. These facts have been ignored by critics, some of whom have assumed that the chief character speaks for Tieck. (69) No doubt he does in part; but it is whole works - as the introduction to the present study insists - that
speak for Tieck more completely. Nowhere is Tieck's novella-theory more clearly refuted.

Many of the foregoing conclusions are also implicit in the other novella based on the life of a great poet, Tod des Dichters (1833).

(ii) Camoens: "Tod des Dichters"

This work develops an important idea in Dichterleben by showing how people can believe themselves - how a whole society can believe itself - to be sustained by patriotic, religious and other ideals which are, in fact, forms of self-deception.

The society portrayed is Portugal and its colonial empire in the middle decades (to 1580) of the sixteenth century. We are told that the early Portuguese who had established the empire in India and the Far East had had entirely altruistic motives, namely the furtherance of their country's glory and the extension of Christendom, with no thought of personal gain or pleasure. They were, it is claimed by their descendants, virtuous, bold, self-sacrificing, and indifferent to worldly goods. Whether this is historically true or not is irrelevant; Tieck's point is that Camoens and his contemporaries believe it.

The Portuguese in Camoens's lifetime have a strong sense of their glorious, idealistic past. But this awareness has become a trap. Material success has been the incidental, inadvertent outcome of their successful pursuit of non-materialist ideals. Materialist standards now obtain: valour, patriotism, and religion are pressed into service to legitimise exploitation; otherwise the former austerity is a laughing-stock. Furthermore - and perhaps most
importantly - material success has destroyed itself because the uncontrolled acquisition of wealth has benefited only certain sections of society (others are worse off) and has caused serious inflation. (73) There is no general understanding that anything is wrong; that Portugal should not be glorious is beyond the range of anyone's experience. Yet its decline was inevitable: having begun, by natural process, it succeeded and failed by the same natural process. None of it was planned; and none of it was permanent. The Portuguese of Camoes's time are different people from their pioneering, proselytising forebears. They must be, for they live in a world of consequences, not of incipience. But they do not see the difference, and therein lies their tragedy.

Three salient features may be discerned in this society. (74) Firstly, demoralisation and socio-economic evil result from uncontrolled materialism. (The fabric of society is endangered by severe inflation when gold from the colonies increases the money-supply without correspondingly increasing primary production.) Secondly, ancient ideals are proclaimed by those who deceive themselves into believing that the erstwhile characteristics of society are immutable. But the entities upon which these ideals are focused - such as the nation, the national religion, and the economy - are not static but dynamic: the force inherent in them produces, by organic growth, a situation which differs radically from that in which the idealists think themselves to be. Thirdly, owing to this evolutionary process, evil is as likely an outcome as good, and those adhering to ideals (as they believe them to be) may become anachronisms. The analogy of Don Quixote or Homer suggests itself.
In many ways Camoens is a microcosm of this society; and in this respect it is plain that here, as in few other works (Dichterleben and Der junge Tischlermeister are the chief examples), the social background is a vitally important aspect, and has essential features in common with the central character. Camoens proclaims the ideals of the early Portuguese: self-sacrifice and valour on behalf of Portugal, and religious faith. He is regarded in that light by several other characters: by Ferdinand (76) Catharina, (77) Castro, (78) Amerigo Castelvatro, (79) and (in his conscious mind, at least) by Christoforo. (80) But the ideals which he proclaims, and with which his admirers in the novella associate him, are not those which closer examination of the work suggests to us as his real views. There are, therefore, two discrepancies: Camoens's view of himself is incorrect; and society's view of him is incorrect. The two would be mere paraphrases of each other, except that the latter raises other issues such as whether a society sees itself mirrored in its great men without necessarily seeing the great men in essence at all. But for the present we are concerned with Camoens's mistaken view of himself as a basis for his conflict with society.

His religious fervour is self-delusion. Despite his enthusiastic declaration of Christian faith, his poetry (specifically Os Lusíadas: "The Portuguese", dealing with Vasco da Gama's discovery of the sea-route to India) relies heavily on Greek mythology, particularly Bacchus and Venus; the context implies parity between them, and many of his readers have felt offended by this. (81) His protestations of religious orthodoxy are not what they seem: they are part-
parcel of his equally spurious patriotism. Obviously Christianity was just grist to his poetic mill, equal - but no more than equal - to the other elements. Christoforo unconsciously reveals this when, thinking he is emphasising Camoens's religious faith, he says:

Dafür war er Dichter, der alles, auch seine christliche Religion, die herrliche, liebevolle liebte und anbetete. (82)

To this one should add Camoens's defiance of society's morality in his illicit love with Catharine, (83) and the fact that it is followed by a lifetime not of repentance but of defiance.

Doubts may also be cast on his patriotism. Firstly, one suspects his motivation. He is denied fulfilment in love because he is poor and without rank. (84) He then - and only then—enters his country's service abroad (in Africa), recklessly exposing himself to danger, partly in desperation, but chiefly to win personal fame: "in der Meinung sich auszeichnen und um Portugal verdient zu machen". (85) His efforts fail because he does not also adopt the only ambition which his contemporaries regard as worth achieving, namely the acquisition of a private fortune by fair means or foul. (86)

Secondly, Camoens's judgment is defective and inconsistent. In India he idealises Portugal as a place where honesty, innocence, virtue and talent are honoured; he believes at this time that graft and corruption are confined to the colonies, that Portugal will welcome him home and will rally to his call to emulate their great ancestors. (87) Back in Portugal, however, he accepts Sebastian's estimate of motives for the North African campaign, and is convinced that it will lead to the establishment of a great Christian empire to match that in Asia. (88) Furthermore, he
expresses admiration for Sebastian's leadership, even though the King is obviously a military ignoramus (and must clearly be such to one of Camoens's experience of battle) and has, in tune with the general official indifference to Camoens, given him a minimal pension.

Camoens has trapped himself into self-contradiction. Society is corrupt; but his method of revenge upon corruption has been the glorification of that same society. He therefore creates a problem of logic for himself: he has to explain, in a way consistent with his self-esteem, why this glorious society treats him shabbily.

It is not entirely true that he has been treated shabbily. Although the court has given him scant recognition, his poems have appeared in two editions, and he is widely, if not universally, admired as a poet. Obviously the reading-public has not expanded to the point where it supports free-lance writers, and if he will neither practise graft nor accept patronage and persists in saying exactly what he thinks, it is no one else's fault if he is poor. Like Marlowe unable to co-operate with aristocrats, he sets up a false antithesis between veneration and riches on the one hand and neglect and poverty on the other. Elsewhere he attempts to defend Sebastian's niggardly treatment of him. It is again significant that he ignores the possibility that merit might reasonably have a measured reward: he is instead trying to justify the absence of that wealth and worship he had sought in the first place.

The pride which leads him into these paradoxes is not soundly based. In his renunciation of material goods he is maintained
by Yao’s begging. He refuses to consort with the nobility in fear of further humiliation rather than from indifference to their neglect of him. He declines all favours and services except from Yao, whom he saved from death by torture, at some risk to himself and who obviously cannot repay this even by a lifetime’s devotion.

The key to Camoens’s character (as distinct from the experiences which formed it and the paths its development took) is, simply, hubris. A vainglorious man is defeated by society because his exacting ideals, uncompromisingly pursued, are inappropriate to a corrupt mercantilism and because his personal arrogance provokes antagonism. He takes refuge in false explanations for his defeat, requiring him to regard himself as religious, patriotic, and faithful to his true love. But his profession of faith and patriotism are nothing more than a counter-attack upon the socio-economic order which spurned him, and his lifelong devotion to Catharina is mere wallowing in grief. This hubris was created when he was denied Catharina, and the connection with the Lovell-types is obvious. Shortly before his love-affair is forcibly ended, he writes in the Seelen zu künftigen Gedichten:

So von Seligkeit und Wonne ummauert, im Hernisch dieses Gefühls, in dieser Götterrüstung trotz ich den Menschen und allen Dämonen! Und sie fühlt und lebt eben so! Wer bist du [zürnende Gottheit], daß du nur drohen darfst? (96)

There are striking differences between Camoens as we see him in the novella and the young man who wrote the Seelen before being denied Catharina. The early work shows no interest in martial fame or in formal Christianity. A soldier’s life is shown as a free one,
but has little to do with patriotic glory. "Schmerz" and "Eros" absorb all philosophical and religious concepts. (98)

These ideas change after the loss of Catharina. The soldier's freedom becomes blind patriotism, and "Schmerz" and "Eros" become deprivation of self-fulfilment in love. Tieck seems to regard Camoens's lost eye as a symbol of this deprivation. He says that the eyes indicate the character, and adds that the loss of one eye deprives one of part of the ability to communicate with others. (99)

And Christoforo also describes the loss as symbolising a visual restriction in a sense other than literal:

die Kraft, den Geist des Auges einzubüssen, ist weit mehr, es ist, als wenn mit diesem nicht bloß der Körper, sondern selbst der Geist verstummelt würde. (100)

But the remaining eye gives "ein seliger, seelenvoller, unsterblicher Blick" — qualities suggestive of immortality based on remoteness from reality — whereas his lost eye is "ein Grabmahl seiner Größe" — a symbol of obsessive, because defective, vision. (101) As with his vision, so with his love, intensification of the part is the result of having only the part: "Nur diese Erinnerung an sie [Catharina] ist die Wahrheit meines Lebens, alles andre nur wie "Märchen und Lüge". (102) The inspiration which corrupts Camoens's vision of the ideals of religion and patriotism is, therefore, personally motivated; he uses these ideals as a means of retaliation "im Zorne gegen sein Vaterland". (103) He is tempted into attack not only because he is wilful and aggressive by nature but also because, being a poet, he has the means of self-expression at his command. (104) Like Labitte or the real Apollo of Die verkehrte Welt, his artistry predestines him for collision.
Catharina is in many ways analogous to Camoens; her conflict with society, the nature of that conflict, and its effect on her, provide many points of similarity. In old age her mood is one of resignation, with a love of solitude; she is satisfied with her life as it then is because she wants little from it.

She is an orthodox Roman Catholic and is blindly patriotic. She was different as a young woman, but she has been defeated.

She had rebelled on two counts. First, there was the parental prohibition, with the force of law and of received morality behind it. To this her response was the emphatic statement that love is "doch immer nur Unschuld und auch die innigste Vereinigung Weihe und Tugend!" Her implication here is that a moral code which prohibits love is wrong and does not deserve obedience. Secondly, there is the metaphysical aspect. She regards love as a means of rising above the level of common experience. It is therefore a form of overweening which will be punished, in her view; but she also holds that the value of the experience outweighs this. She implies that not only is the impulse to ignore ordinary restrictions uncontrollable - which in turn implies a guiltless amorality of the type claimed by Lyno - but also that to refrain from yielding is in some way reprehensible as a lost opportunity:

Und kann der Mensch, der nur in einem einzigen Augenblick das Unsterbliche erschaut hat, kann er denn jene im Dunkel Kriechenden beneiden, kann er sich nur als ihres Gleichen wünschen? - d a r f e r es? (111)

Camoens writes in the Seelen that she feels the same hubris as he.

In short it seems that Catharina set herself apart from or above society and was defeated. She now upholds its ancient virtues
with all the zeal of a reformed alcoholic for teetotalism.

In the relation of Camoens to Portugal there is an underlying assumption on the part of many characters that a poet is the product of his environment: that, whatever his original contribution, it is the society around him which determines the kind of poet he is, the subjects he chooses, and the treatment he gives them. The point is put with some force by the Florentine mercenary, Amerigo Castelvatro, who contrasts Italy with Portugal. The latter, he points out, is a political and cultural entity, with a glorious history and a single present purpose. These factors, Amerigo continues, inspire its chief poet, Camoens, just as the glories of Rome inspired Virgil:

... und alles ist Wahrheit, nicht Fabel; Geschichte, nicht Erfindung, das Erlebte...

Camoens's *magnus opus* is, he says, a second *Divine Comedy*, but in heroic mould. Furthermore, his character has the firmness and resilience which Tasso lacks.

But the novella as a whole shows that an age sees itself, or what it wants to see of itself, in its poets. To such as Castro and Ferdinand (and to the admiring foreigner, Amerigo) Camoens embodies the best in their country; they believe that people will appreciate him more when their country declines, when they will have greater need of him to inspire them with freedom and patriotism and to renew Portugal's strength. This is a misconception on their part, and the body of the novella shows Tieck's intention of revealing it to be such. The Camoens they see is not the real one. Even if they should not be expected to delve into the true motives
for his religious and patriotic feelings, they certainly ignore in their eulogy the wider aspects of his religious views, which have offended them hitherto. His world-historical view of religions, coupled with the fact that the events of his great poem took place several generations earlier, are poor evidence upon which to base a claim that he will inspire them to regain their glory. As for the glory, they misinterpret their country, for its glory was lost in all but the pretensions some time before. As for Camoens's real effect, it must have been obvious to Tieck, as it is to us, that metropolitan Portugal did not recover from the disaster of its imperial success, despite Camoens's posthumous reputation. Contemporaries see what they need to see; if this is a distortion, or if more is to be seen, others may see more clearly later. The corrupting effect of "Begeisterung" is at the root of both personal and collective misconceptions.

(3) Poetry: a national product, a personal experience

Our present concern is with art and poetry. We have noted that in his two chief specific examples Tieck shows these to have no effect on historical processes but to be effectively determined by them. That this no doubt subconscious realisation was unwelcome to him may be inferred from his objection to the subordination of poetry to mercantile or dogmatic interests, whether by way of trade, political censorship, or the ideology of the Young Germans. The point is that Tieck's conception of poetry was as an essentially personal experience. Try as he might to write of nationhood and society, of the role of poetry in divining truth beyond the scope of dogma or reason, he returns constantly to the personal
experience of an aesthetic sense and to the poet's temperament. To these topics the whole of *Dichterleben* and *Tod des Dichters* eventually return, with emphasis on the danger brought to the poet by his gifts or - as in *Der Hexen-Sabbath* - by authority against which the poet is powerless.

Of the way in which Tieck's focus of attention on the poet erodes a more conscious attempt to convey a broad historical process, there is no clearer example than *Das alte Buch und die Reise ins Blaue hinein* (1834). This work is a microcosm of much of Tieck's output, both good and bad. The framework satirises the trivial squabbles of contemporary life, by allowing us to infer the contrast between them and the story of Athelstan (symbolising the spirit of poetry). The symbolic squabble concerns rival claims to have the best butter, which represents petty ideological arguments about meaningless differences (we may interpret this religiously, politically, or both). The luckless Beeskow, who brings peace by impressing upon the rivals that the topic of argument is unworthy, dies of a surfeit after being obliged to sample them all as the only means of maintaining the hardly-won peace. (This tells us nothing further, and symbolises Tieck's habit of overloading his characters when his imagination runs away with him.) The protagonists are prosaic, and intolerant of speculative thought. They cannot understand Beeskow's love of *Märchen*, which he defends as a region beyond the reach of reason and as being often the best method of communication. (114)

In the "Dinnenerzählung", Athelstan, the spirit of poetry, brings beauty to certain civilizations in turn; (115) mediaeval Germany,
Italy, Spain, modern Germany. Great individuals - the Italian poets, Chaucer, Shakespeare, the Spaniards, Goethe - learn beauty and themselves teach it. Thus we have the two basic ideas: continuity of European culture while the ascendancy passes amongst the various countries in turn; and the origin of great individuals in a beneficial environment. Then, characteristically for Tieck, Athelstan seems to be no longer the dynamic of European culture but an individual poet. In this regard the reader receives another group of assertions. Wonder is intelligible only to receptive individuals, affected by it as a harp by a player; and no connection is drawn in the elaboration of this point between wonder and the cultural and environmental view of poetry noted above. These great and receptive individuals unite the noblest in mankind with the divine in nature. Moments of "Begeisterung" are, however, rare, because they would otherwise destroy the individual concerned. Commercial misuse of this gift leads to despair. Love is important in maturation as a poet: so only after having presumptuously kissed Gloriana-Titania does Athelstan become Oberon and begin his task. From her he derives self-knowledge, which is a prerequisite to his having any impact on others; and only by identifying himself with, and experiencing, fairyland can he transmit Märchen to others. There are dangers: this realm includes intellectual error in the form of unbidden and disordered ideas in the person of Filbert, and evil in the dwarfs, led by Hannes, the "Arsenikprinz". (Hannes can likewise inspire: he lives on in the recent French writers, and E.T.A. Hoffmann, Börne and Heine.) Disorder and ugliness must exist since otherwise beauty and order
cannot. Beauty freely chosen can purify ugliness: in other words, there is no unfit subject for art. But ugliness can also be chosen, if passion is allowed to dominate inspiration, and in this error men may attack beauty as though it is ugliness. Aesthetic values in this scheme evidently absorb and transcend moral ones, so ugliness is treated as evil would be treated in a religious system based on a concept of free will.

In the essential features of this work - the emphasis on the individual poet and his temperament, the quickening power of love, the dangers of an inverted value-system based on greatly feared passion, the use of aesthetic concepts in a quasi-religious way, the dislike and mockery of bigoted faction - Tieck is still identifiably the author of Sommernacht, of Lovell, the Herzensergiebungen, Sternbald, and Die verkehrte Welt. This present work, and those devoted to the poets Shakespeare and Camoens, make it obvious that Tieck's first and second main periods must often be considered together.
Aesthetic values prove inadequate against mercantilism, totalitarianism, and the physical and temperamental dangers to the poet himself: that is the pessimistic conclusion deducible from the works considered so far. Certain works show Tieck's desire to present a more positive view, by suggesting that aesthetic values are not the prerogative of a minority but are, on the contrary, generally available and entirely compatible with ordinary life. This, if true, would point to an optimistic conclusion, for the failure of aesthetic values has hitherto been attributable to the vulnerability of isolated individuals. That Tieck desired to believe that ideals could be widely disseminated may be inferred from his oft-repeated assertion of the personal ordinariness of true geniuses such as Shakespeare and their symbiosis with their environments; Dichterleben strikes a reasonable balance between the contribution of the environment and the contribution of the individual genius. But the theme of the appreciation of beauty by large sections of the population is by no means new in his works, and it should be emphasised that at each previous appearance his argument has been unconvincing. The essential unity of beauty and ordinary life was asserted in Lebrecht: but by a narrator who, because of Tieck's characterisation, wins our amused toleration and liking, not our regard for his intellect or acumen. Then, in Kater and Die verkehrte Welt, it is obvious that art cannot be effectively democratised because the masses neither recognise nor want it and the rulers want to control it. Later, Ernst's discourse in the Phantasus framework and Anton's poem Phantasus are
unconvincing because, while Tieck succeeds in showing that "Poesie" is independent of birth or lineage and requires only personal ability, he fails to take account of the obvious objection that a high degree of aesthetic sensibility, let alone genius, is itself extremely rare. If it is only by this form of democratisation that art can affect society, then plainly it must remain ineffective.

Tieck's chief example - Leonhard of Der junge Tischlermeister - is a man of unusual intelligence and ability and a commoner involved in ordinary life. He proves Tieck's point, but simultaneously proves that point to be of little value. Although Tieck implies that aesthetic beauty should arise from ordinary life, rather than be achieved by the implementation of theoretical rules, he does not show this happening. He implies that it happened in Germany's pre-industrial period, but this view arises from his uncharacteristic and disappointing use of rose-coloured spectacles. That he makes the attempt is important for our survey.

In Der junge Tischlermeister is found the related theme of the democratisation of the quality of nobility in personal behaviour. On this point, too, Tieck disappointing departs from his earlier realism and attempts to prove a case by contrivance; and again the fact that the attempt was made is important. Tieck's low estimate of the quality and behaviour of hereditary rulers is found in the satirical comedies, in Daumchen, Der Geheimnissvolle, and Der wiederkehrende griechische Kaiser. And we have already noted in his covert criticism of Southampton his implication that Shakespeare's admiration for the young aristocrat was the poet's idealising vision rather than a description of reality. In that implication
Tieck shows himself a realist. In Der junge Tischlermeister his portrayal of the aristocrat Elsheim has affinities with that of Southampton: noble birth, with its connotations of cultural advantage and unrestricted scope for personal development, is assumed to be likely to produce a civilised person. Southampton is anything but that, and Elsheim's achievement of a civilised condition is touch-and-go but is finally asserted to have been the result of his having been allowed unrestricted freedom. While this is psychologically sound as far as it goes, it does not make Tieck's case very strong. He refrains from telling us what Elsheim does to discharge these basic impulses or what sort of impulses they are.

The context is contrived, like that of Sternbald; indeed, the two works were conceived in the same period. The contrivance ensures that nobody suffers while Elsheim is off the leash; alternatively, we have to assume that there was no contrivance and that Elsheim was satisfied for life by a few trifling improprieties. Tieck's attempt to show how Leonhard is Elsheim's equal in human terms even though not of noble lineage becomes ludicrous, since a self-respecting and prosperous carpenter who can read Greek and act in Shakespeare has no need for the comparison. Tieck seems to realise this, for he slips into inverted snobbery at the end and has Elsheim admire bourgeois family life as superior to the aristocratic equivalent.

Der junge Tischlermeister is an overrated failure which derives its value from having been attempted rather than for its intrinsic merit. In that respect it is properly categorised with Sternbald, Eckbert and the Phantasus framework. Its
importance is that, as an attempt, it shows what Tieck wanted to be true; and that, being a failure, it shows what his innate ability unerringly saw.

We must now consider two works with a more obvious politico-social content, in which Tieck describes the inevitability and desirability of the passing away of aristocratic ideals: Die Gesellschaft auf dem Lande and Die Ahnenprobe. His description is tinged with regret, for both works show his reluctance to accept contemporary intellectual and environmental changes, despite his clear disapproval of much in the old system.

The first of these two works - Die Gesellschaft auf dem Lande - suffers from Tieck's habitual dichotomy between the main plot and the important ideas. The plot is a love-story involving Franz von Walterhausen and Adelheid. But there are several people on or near the estate who are more important than the lovers. They divide into advocates of the old order and representatives of various aspects of change. Tieck does not favour either party; indeed, both sides are implicitly accused of bigotry. In the achievement of objectivity this novella shows Tieck's particular form of realism at its best, in sharp contrast to the pretence of Der junge Tischlermeister.

Binder represents the worst of modernity. He blindly and uncritically accepts and implements every new idea; this means that, since some new ideas are sensible and others the very reverse, he is both successful and silly. Tieck's portrayal of the old order is equally trenchant. The Baron is an old-style
Prussian landowner, a benevolent despot to his family and estate, and unable to realise that there may be better methods and opinions than his own.\(^6\) He is so devoted to the old ways that he is, perhaps unwittingly, dishonest in his attempts to uphold them.\(^9\)

The Baron believes what he finds comforting to believe.\(^10\)

The pigtail represents, to him, German vigour and honour. Frederick the Great's preference for French culture, the idea that Prussian vigour was brute force, the possibility that "honour" is sometimes dishonesty - these thoughts are either painful and incomprehensible or simply do not occur to him. He longs at one point for the mediseeval "Faustrecht".\(^11\) It is reasonable that a man of his age and background should experience this difficulty of adjustment, particularly when the contemporary ideas may be no better or even worse than the admittedly inadequate ones being eroded. It is to his credit that he becomes capable of a broader view, recognising that extreme enthusiasms for the old and new simply exacerbate the confrontation, and that he had over-reacted against the more tendentious and strident advocates of change.\(^12\)

Unfortunately, this moment of historical awareness is shown to be fragile under the impact of Franz's proof that Romer was never in the Hussars; the Baron angrily tears up the marriage-contract between Franz and Adelheid. He calls the information "eine unverschämt Lüge"; this means he finds it unbearable.\(^13\) The Baron's moment of percipience is rather out of character; his rapid loss of it is more typical. Perhaps Tieck wished to show that the old order was capable of development and could therefore
be preserved in the reasonable expectation that, given time, it would improve of itself; this view would obviate the need for radical attacks on it. Perhaps he also wished to show that such attacks would merely provoke the old order into petulant reaction.

Römer, the Baron's bailiff, lives a lie (that he was a gallant Hussar), convinces others of it, and becomes convinced of it himself; whereafter, whatever the original moral overtones, it becomes more correct to speak of self-delusion. This symbolises a more deep-rooted form of deception concerning his position in and attitude to society, and in this he resembles the Baron. Römer asserts that their militaristic, rigidly stratified society now vanishing is perfect; he proclaims the efficiency of the estate he manages; and he refers proudly to the respect and love the peasantry feel for their betters. Each of these claims is shown in the work to be spurious.

The pigtail, representing to him the "Unterschied der Stände" upon which his idealised system is based, is to us the symbol of his delusion, of the general belief in that delusion, and of the disrespect with which the self-styled progressives viewed the traditional past. But it is as genuine a conviction as his religion. He concedes that the pastor may be right in saying that compared with the greatness of his religion the pigtail is a mere custom and prejudice from which he should seek liberation; that there have been, are, and will be millions of people who neither know nor care about it. But to him it was the outer sign of his religion and patriotism, and as important to him as the Aufklärung and Zeitgeist to the pastor. It is fundamental to his identity.
certainly the central symbol of the work.

His is an ideal of sorts, in support of which he cites a no doubt imaginary piece of advice allegedly given to him by Gellert with the apparent intention of turning Prussian soldiers into knights-errant by means of books of an improving nature. (19) But the ideal, like Römer's story, is also a lie. What is thus represented as good in Römer's beloved Germany is an invention - an invention which is the mask of a brutal reality, and of which its mendacious exponent has a profound need. This pretense belongs in the context of Tieck's social criticism in Kater, Der Geheimnisvolle and Hexen-Sabbath, and the ideological failure of Der junge Tischlermeister: corruption-by-loyalty in a patriot is analogous to corruption-by-"Begeisterung" in a poet. The authoritarian feudal system can seem benevolent - indeed many of its protagonists have been just men according to their lights - but Tieck is clear that it was simply not good enough, its proclaimed virtues a comforting myth.

The role played by protagonists' subjective impressions is implicit in the irony which surrounds Tieck's presentation of the theme of change. At an early stage in the work, we read that there had been a dispute between Römer and the pastor as to when the new century began. (20) Römer had asserted that the beginning was not in 1801 as the pastor had said, but in 1800. He did not use the usual argument in support of that opinion, namely that the years 0 to 9 make one decade, so that the years 0 to 99 make a century (neither does the pastor use his most compelling case, namely that there was no Year Nought). Instead, Römer lays emphasis on the replacement
of a seven by an eight. He refers to "das neue Wesen, die Acht", and insists "In der Acht liegt es". This is doubly ironic, since, as the work develops, there are connotations of outlawry (of "Faustrecht") as well as of esteem or "paying heed", and this emphasises the subjectivity of it all, for such reflections beg the question as to what is esteemed. In a period of transition, in which the old had not yet crumbled and the new had not yet formed, this muddle is to be expected, and it is a mark of Tieck's realism and moderation in their best forms that he described the muddle rather than tried to resolve it or pretend that resolution was immediately evident. The work thereby refutes the more obviously didactic portions of his novella-theory, but upholds the claim that literature may have a diagnostic function.

The second of the two works in which Tieck rejects elitism and traditionalism in the social structure, while simultaneously recoiling from advocacy of the democratic change which is the logical alternative, is Die Ahnenprobe (1833). This novella is unusual in Tieck's works in that the ideas and the action are embodied in the same character, without the imbalance between intellectual importance and importance in the plot which mars so many of his novellas. On technical grounds, therefore, Die Ahnenprobe is superior to many others.

The work's sequence of events (as distinct from their order of presentation: for reminiscence is used with good effect) begins with an act by the aristocrat Seestern, who in his passionate youth proposed a love-match with his "bürgerlich" beloved, Jakoba. (21) To this she reacted by persuading him that he should respect his
own social position. His proposal, which had included the expectation of immediate cohabitation, had represented to her a breach of the moral law of society, prompted by egotism. Seestern under the influence of Werther had insisted (like Camoens and Catharina) upon their right to unbridled freedom despite the absolute prohibitions of their environmental code. But, as a result of her argumentation and refusal to comply, he had come to accept her view (and to uphold it as a stern "Oberkämmerer" in the period of the novella's main action) that the social order and its mores are immutable and sacred, requiring the sacrifice of personal desire to the private and public obligations imposed by one's "Stand". (This conflict is first encountered in Abdallah.) Thereafter Seestern holds this view with all the zeal of a convert; he and Jakoba change their minds - as shown by their eventual encouragement of Elisabeth and Edmund - only in late middle age. Until then, marriage between the "Stände" is in their view not only impossible from a practical viewpoint, but also profane since the social order is sacrosanct. The alternative course for those of the Werther-period is taken by a contemporary of his, Werden, who, refusing to adapt himself to the established order, becomes cynical, and is a failure both materially and as a person. (22)

The order of society and the unmitigated wilfulness of individuals at that time were in collision. Where society won, as with Seestern and Jakoba, the individuals who, in effect, surrendered were denied self-fulfilment and happiness within the order, even though they had embraced it. Those who challenged the order, such
as Werden, became warped by being placed in a perpetual mood of self-contradiction. This attitude causes Werden to be always on the attack against Seestern (who, in Werden's interpretation, abandoned all ideals inimical to the order of society in order to seek gain within it).\(^{23}\) In this spirit also, Werden adheres to a rival "Societät" composed of inactive and uncreative dissidents who have in some respects been defeated by the power of order and require some channel through which to express their resentment of and hostility towards it.\(^{24}\)

But society is in transition. The old order, with its mutually exclusive "Stände", is breaking up under the impact chiefly of the occupation and restructuring of Germany by Napoleon (the main action occurs in 1810).\(^{25}\) Social change, even that of the most traumatic type, is, however, not accomplished overnight: Tieck's works dealing with change always include a variety of old and new elements. The impression he creates is that, at any one time, the elements which are coming into being and those which are passing away jostle each other and live cheek-by-jowl in varying degrees of confusion and tension. The rival "Societät" of this novella consists of a mixture of these elements. The prominent individuals are Wendelbein, an unscrupulous confidence-trickster, who dupes all "Stände" possible; and Werden, the defeated Werther grown old, revelling in acrimony against what had defeated him while representing himself as wise and mature. There are also many otherwise solid middle-class men to whom the "Societät" is a safety-valve. Through it they amuse themselves with harmless mockery of learned societies, for they are not learned themselves, have no prospect of being so, have no
ideals, and are not provided with any by the truly learned. They also express resentment both of the aristocracy, which despises them, and of the liberal and radical element which they are too old to understand. Although this club contains a small number of evil men, most members are respectable citizens useful to society most of the time, albeit of limited abilities. The club as a whole contains the casualties of both the old order and of the new (and is far from the attack on the Young Germans which Lüdeke believes it to be).\(^{(26)}\)

In the main action of the work a generation has elapsed since the established order of society gathered one defeated Werther (Seestern) into itself and saw another (Vierden) sink. Nobility in the sense of noble behaviour is no longer regarded as characteristic only of the class of nobility. Seestern as an elderly man is won over by Edmund's honourable conduct and sees that Edmund's "Bürgerlich" forebears were similarly capable of a degree of self-sacrifice and public spirit seldom to be found in the aristocracy. In the new century, Tieck implies, it is not necessary to the reader for the hero to achieve aristocratic rank (the contrast with Wilhelm Meister suggests itself) since the criterion now is the quality of behaviour. A similar point is made in the relationship between Elsheim and Leonhard in Der junge Tischlermeister.

Tieck is, however, cautious in describing not only what he thinks desirable but what he thinks prudent. Neither Seestern nor Edmund desire Edmund's titular ennoblement, but the King - perhaps
unable to contemplate either that a "Bürger" should be noble or should marry into the aristocracy - insists on ennobling him nonetheless.\(^{(27)}\) This (we must infer, since no royal motive is recorded) ensures that Elisabeth and Edmund will not have to contend with opposition from the forces of tradition which would oppose an inter-class marriage. The behaviour of the mob shows that this is a reasonable precaution, for it has all along been impressed by the mention of aristocrats and royal connections on the part of people who are not impressive otherwise.\(^{(28)}\) The apparently unnecessary ennoblement resembles Tieck's implication in Die Gesellschaft auf dem Lande that ultimate progress would be quicker and easier if the spirit of change avoided giving provocation to the spirit of reaction. It is also reminiscent of the action of Elsheim in Der junge Tischlermeister, who wishes to pass Leonhard off as a professional man chiefly to obviate useless discord.\(^{(29)}\)

The novella Die Ahnenprobe therefore illustrates a change in society towards a democratisation of values - it is open to anyone to be honourable - and Tieck's belief in the desirability of making this change in an orderly way. But again we must demur that he has contrived a context which will show this gradualism having the desired result. Edmund is unusually fortunate not only in possessing his qualities of intellect and character but also in having the opportunity to show them and in being judged by unusually enlightened people. No doubt these opportunities occur in real life from time to time, but they can hardly be relied upon as major agents of necessary change.
The two novellas just considered depict the change from an aristocratic to a bourgeois value-system, and it is inescapable that the most effective portrayals, and the ones which excite the reader's sympathy as individuals, are Römer and Seestern, who face the greatest stress of self-adaptation. This indicates again that Tieck's creative intuition worked independently of his conscious intentions: ideologically he evidently preferred Franz and Edmund, whereas they are overshadowed in the works. We previously noted that Tieck's view of poetry was, despite his obvious wish to see it affect society, that it was a personal experience only; yet he recoiled from the elitist view of it which might have been a logical alternative. There is also his distaste for the physical ugliness and human distress brought about by uncontrolled capitalised industry. He seems to have desired, in its place, a bourgeois (in the sense of non-feudal) system free from materialism and social stratification, guided by an ideal of beauty which could permeate ordinary life in all its aspects and which would prevent both industrial ugliness and the personal risks of inspiration in the gifted individual. These ideas he sought to promulgate in Der junge Tischlermeister (1836). That this work is a failure demonstrates that his ideological desires were not sustained by any inner conviction of their practicability. The failure makes Tieck a realist despite himself.

The ideas of this work show a thematic bifurcation into the socio-economic and the psychological aspects.

As to the former, Tieck advocates the democratisation of beauty when Leonhard insists that it is found not in financially
valuable and rare works of art but in common objects. (Modern social scientists are familiar with the point from Thorstein Veblen's *Theory of the Leisure Class* (1899), where it is referred to as the "pecuniary canons of taste".) Tieck extends this idea of beauty in two ways: first, he implies that the pre-industrial socio-economic order which produces and values these beautiful common objects is a good one in the sense that its members are happy and self-fulfilled; and, second, he implies that this appreciation of real value is an inherent characteristic of the specific society of pre-industrial urban Germany. But by this extension his desired democratisation of beauty is negated, for it is obviously based on a nostalgia for the guilds. The guilds system is inevitably opposed to the aristocracy as well as to capitalised industry: its pride and work-ethic abhors the overweening and self-indulgent aristocrat, its craftsmanship abhors mass-production, and its extended family-unit abhors division of labour and alienation from work. Though Tieck was not without human sympathy for the urban proletariat, much of it seems to have been *ex hypothesi* - in other words, his socio-economic views were specific versions of his aesthetic views, and his objection to proletarian misery was an objection to ugly lives. We have already noted that the aesthetic basis of socio-economic views may have antecedents in Schiller; such ideas are also found in the writings of Marx, whose *Das Kapital* refers to the alienating effect of the division of labour and whose *Manifesto of the Communist Party* shows a degree of un-Marxist nostalgia for the guilds. But since the guilds cannot be reintroduced, Tieck's exaggerated nostalgia for them is social *Epigonentum*. 
The essential unreality of Tieck’s advocacy of these values is emphasised by the fact that Leonhard is no ordinary craftsman. Perhaps intending to show that innate worth made environment and social origin irrelevant, Tieck succeeded instead in showing how only innate worth could triumph over environment. Tieck’s advocacy therefore tends towards the concept of a cultural élite rather than the concept of an everyman-aesthete; his achievement is the opposite of his purpose. Yet again he described reality while trying to describe an ideal.

The psychological aspect of the work is summarised in his belief that by giving rein to impulse a person or a society achieves and maintains stability. The link between this and the socio-economic aspect of Leonard’s aesthetics is that giving rein to impulse is obviously antipathetic to the soul-destroying division of labour and alienation from work in capitalised industry and is equally obviously compatible with his idealised guilds-system. However, it is in the psychological applications of his theory about free impulse that Tieck is led into further difficulties. The work raises as subjects for discussion between certain characters some questions of propriety and morality, and the only important question — namely, what might happen if an individual’s self-fulfilment conflicts with others’ welfare — is disregarded. From a moral point of view the entire work is contrived.

Probably the most important single feature is the identification of certain characteristics and needs which Tieck held to be applicable to society and individuals. This idea is found
in *Dichterleben* and *Tod des Dichters*, where it had closer connections with religious questions and with the theme of the poet's relationship with society. In *Der junge Tischlermeister* the similarity between an individual and society has to do with the need for a balance between work and freedom, duty and self-development. These desirable attributes he sees in the life of a craftsman, in whom the social evils of industrialisation and the psychological dangers of an artist's life are solved in equal measure. But the solution is at the expense of realism. Tieck looked back because he did not like what he saw around him; his democratic ideals were sincere but based on bourgeois nostalgia.
F. POETRY AS VICTIM

Inequality of wealth, and corrupt administration, are themes which permeate the novellas. Of the need to improve society Tieck seems to have had no doubt; but he seems to have seen no way of doing it. Religion and literature were his usual instruments. But religion is shown in many novellas to be the subject of sectarian feud as a medium for the expression of power, yet to have no external significance except that, as initially a personal experience, it is prone to be perverted into mystification for the sake of power. Art (construed in the wider sense) is likewise shown to be a personal experience without external effect, though it attracts hostility from authority since it is a form of independence which authority cannot tolerate. It is also believed - both by political rebels and by reactionary opponents - to be a form of rebellion, and is therefore vulnerable to exploitation by radicals and suppression by reactionaries. Tieck's belief that poetry is not actually subversive but merely a personal experience, and his realisation that both political extremes believe it has political potential and therefore wish to control it, is probably the root cause of his abstention from and dislike of the partisanship (of both sides) in the Young German period.

Although the method of this study precludes chronological groupings as such in considering the novellas, the theme of poetry as a victim of society emerges from the preceding review of certain novellas, and produces a group which is related to Tieck's contemporary intellectual environment in the 1830s. The chronological cohesion of this group is entirely fortuitous,
being the by-product of thematic classification. It exists because, as noted earlier, Tieck tended to regard the various elements in German intellectual life at that time as merely the latest examples of deep-rooted trends which had appeared in other guises before, and which he had considered in earlier works. As far as the novellas are concerned, it is a common error to think that Tieck's criticism of the world of the 1830s was largely a criticism of the Young Germans, and it is another to think that he criticised only the Young Germans. (1) Indeed, on some points he was inclined to be tolerant of their ideas to the extent of entertaining them himself.

(1) Tieck as contemporary observer

Of the novellas with which this section is concerned, only one - Eine Sommerreise - is set entirely in the past. Throughout his output Tieck uses the past, or a geographically remote location, as a setting for ideas which are relevant to his own time - either directly or indirectly in that they have general applicability. This novella was written in 1833, but was based on a journey undertaken with Burgsdorff in the summer of 1803. (2) Tieck's love of the art and culture of old Germany loomed large in his recollection the following winter, (3) and discussions of these topics are prominent in the novella. Doubts about the motive and status of Ferdinand's religious enthusiasm provide psychological interest, but the work's importance for us is more general and historical. Matenko remarks that "the resemblance between the novella and the diary fragment is only a question of subject-matter. The raw material has passed through the alembic of the poet's imagination and has been transformed in consequence." (4) Topics which were in
1803 of contemporary interest are prominent in the work, and there is also some consideration of German intellectual history from a much earlier time. The whole work, however, represents Tieck's view at the time when it was written, and it therefore provides a useful background for a consideration of the novellas which are set in the 1830s.

The impression given is extremely pessimistic. Those who, in dialogue, uphold positive values fail to live up to them. Wachtel believes that art, the theatre and literature have been debased and misconstrued because of their subordination to dogmatic prejudice; he maintains that society is unjust; he asserts that one's duty lies not to a remote ideal as in Don Quixote but to one's own immediate environment, and that many of the contemporary young fail to realise this. But he is as much a windbag as the "Schwärmere" he denigrates, for he does nothing but lead his own private life and address a posterity personified in his drunken imagination. Walther advocates common sense and toleration while involving himself in moralistic interference in others' lives and succumbing to his intermittent addiction to gambling. Ferdinand's religious and social ideals arise from his emotional condition and are therefore entirely unstable. These characters illustrate the views which Tieck seems to have held in the 1830s of the historical foundations of contemporary intellectual life. That he was well aware of the historical origins of contemporary trends is apparent from Liebeswerben which, though set in the present, looks back to certain forces at work during the
previous few decades. The latter work therefore complements \textit{Eine Sommerreise}.

In \textit{Liebeswerben}, three minor characters fulfill the function of diagnosticians of the various social and intellectual symptoms manifested in the principal characters. The three are Rath Witte (husband of Elisa), his father-in-law, the Präsident Adlerfeld, and Geheimerath Walther. As noted in reviewing \textit{Eine Sommerreise}, these diagnoses concern the historical origin of contemporary trends: Tieck does not treat the 1830s as a unique and isolated phenomenon, but as the product of history.

Witte begins his discourse by saying that the government should root out dissident elements. The philanthropy of an earlier generation has, he believes, now resulted in the adulation of the young, who, in consequence, grow up undisciplined and disrespectful and object to work, study or restraint of any kind as unreasonable and tyrannical.\(^{(13)}\) He finds their literature coarse and rebellious.\(^{(14)}\) Adlerfeld - perhaps because he is older and has seen changes in his own lifetime - takes a more tolerant, gradualist view.\(^{(15)}\) The rigid mutual exclusiveness of the "Stände" had, he points out, formerly confined the bourgeois and lower classes, so that order and peace had been achieved only at the price of freedom. Removal of these impediments to their advancement had been an improvement, but the speed with which the removal had become effective had caused a surge of energy: "Stände" with no apparent desire hitherto to express themselves or to influence society now, he notes, seek political power, and the plethora of books and
journals on quasi-political topics is part of this. It is unfortunate, he continues, that mindless rebellion masquerades as well-thought-out idealism, and that well-meaning people are induced by their understanding of the historical forces to give it greater respect than it deserves. He is, however, generally optimistic in a way which suggests a dialectical view of the historical process:

Die Jugend, sagte der Alte, quillt immer wieder nach, und oft hat sie auf ihre Weise eben so recht, wie das Alter in seinem anscheinenden Eigensinn. (16)

Walther identifies three stages within his own lifetime; (17) he believes that they show that ideas spread like contagion (an interpretation which is perhaps natural from a man in his position), whereas in fact his description of them shows how one extreme provokes another. First, in his analysis, there was the **Aufklärung**: the age of Reason, which did not understand the vivifying powers of faith, and regarded it as negative, as symptomatic of an inability to think. Then came the ascendancy of the imagination (he refers, presumably, to Romanticism), with its ideals of beauty, art, holiness, and love, and with attempts to reconcile philosophies based on them with religion. Finally, in what Walther sees as the modern age, came fanaticism and superstition, a spirit of irrationality which insisted that doubt and reason were negative and were themselves symptomatic of an inability to think; such people, he remarks, use scripture selectively to support their prejudices. The hectoring claims and muddled thinking of the principal characters (Amoul, Lindhorst and Wallross) substantiate
these charges.

In such an intellectual environment the art of literature is, not surprisingly, at a low ebb. Several forms of its debasement are represented in the work. Firstly, Amsel has written some mild and ineffectual poems on freedom, and some plays which no theatre will accept, and is now engaged upon a worthless novel which is to illustrate a perfect government and to show that a great state can also be a republic.\(^\text{18}\) However, this ambition, and his exclamation "Ich kann nicht Fürstendiener seyn"\(^\text{19}\) (a quotation from Schiller's Don Carlos; he copies the words but forgets the ideal) do not inhibit him from hoping for a royal patron.\(^\text{20}\)

Secondly, just as Amsel's modernity induces him to abandon all political and social institutions, Lindhorst rejects past literature. He regards Goethe and Schiller as mere products of their time, who knew nothing of great ideas yet to be conceived; they will, he allows, retain a certain value as curiosities, as the best of the period before true literature and the modern world began.\(^\text{21}\)

Despite this derogatory view, he takes Werther as a model in writing a love-letter for Wallross to send to Elisa (his Dulcinea). He acknowledges Werther as a genuine expression of passion; he and Amsel often crib from it, and from Rousseau's Héloïse, and are well-thought-of in consequence by people to whom the originals are unknown.\(^\text{22}\) In other words, literature is merely copied to express feelings which are themselves of literary origin. Thirdly, as implicit in the foregoing, literature has become a commodity. Amsel and Lindhorst produce it, in the form in which others will buy it. Wallross represents the customers. Wolfram is the
wholesaler, and publishes what is safe: while vaguely liberal, he is more concerned to stay in business than to propagate ideals—and radical publishing is commercially hazardous. (23)

From the above analysis of this novella, it is obviously not the attack on the Young Germans it is sometimes thought to be. (24) Tieck's objection to the Young Germans was based on their desire to subordinate literature to polemical purposes. The target of attack here is what it was in Kater: second-rate, prejudiced reading matter for second-rate prejudiced readers en masse. Real literature is conspicuous by its absence, victimised by being ignored.

_Der Jahrmarkt_ is probably Tieck's most trenchant criticism of contemporary society, for he implies that, in essentials, no progress has been made since the Middle Ages. Again, the description of the modern world directs attention to its historical origins.

The journey and sojourn in the town provide a framework for a comedy of manners and errors which has an "innocents-abroad" quality, such as the incident of bowing to life-like waxworks. (25) But the humour has sinister foundations, for this comic background is used by Tieck to draw attention to two particular evils: the need for social reform (a consistent theme in Tieck's works); and the poor condition of contemporary intellectual life. Accusations against Lindwurm, Fritz (his son) and Titus are the result of an irrational hue-and-cry by the mob; (26) and this lends support to the view expressed by several characters that the administration of justice in a socially unfair State is a form of persecution.
This diagnosis by Graf Rehbahn and the "Polizeipräsident"(27) is plainly intended to reflect the experiences of men who know the realities of urban life. They are presented in a different form by Titus.(28) Criminal society, he says, mirrors bourgeois society, for the latter suppresses freedom and decent values while enriching ne'er-do-wells who are already rich. A nobly-minded robber-leader can, he believes, restore justice. David, in the Old Testament, was one such; if the story had come to us from a supporter of Saul we would think differently of him. Cartouche was another; they usually occur in cities, he remarks. (The modern term for an ancient phenomenon is urban guerrilla.)

That Titus' views, influenced obviously by Schiller's die räuber and jean paul's siebenkäs (Titus virtually admits that he sees the world only through jean paul),29 are not entirely sound demonstrates Tieck's belief that one cannot learn life from literature. That Titus makes a moral judgment of the problem which is, despite his practical inexperience, entirely sound demonstrates Tieck's belief in an instinctive judgment of what is right. But Titus, in his admiration of the originality, amounting to a professional skill, shown by city-bred beggars in their approach to potential alms-givers,(30) passes typically from morality into aesthetics. Thereby, incidentally, Tieck foreshadows Brecht's dreigroschenoper, where Peachum addresses the audience and explains that beggars need a succession of disabilities, since people become accustomed to the same ones;31 the idea is, however, found in Justus Möser's patriotische phantasien (1774).32
The hue-and-cry, and the persecution implicit in the socio-economic structure and the administration of justice, are mirrored in Titus's discoveries about the current state of literature.\(^{(33)}\)

He tells Zinnober, a publisher, that his love for literature overrides his interest in his social position; he wishes not to make money but to be useful by publishing books in the manner of Jean Paul which will proclaim virtue and nobility of behaviour.

Zinnober replies that, apart from the fact that few imitations of Jean Paul have succeeded, such works do not supply what is now required. The reading-public, he explains, currently demands political satire, or any polemical work which attacks authorities; attacks on named individuals are particularly welcome, and find favour as evidence of patriotism. Sincerity is at a discount: the present trend is not for an author to be inspired and then offer his work for publication, but for the publisher to decide, using his knowledge of the trade, what is wanted and will sell, and to commission it. A scholar or poet cannot possibly know this; and for the writer to set himself up as arbiter of justice or morality (namely, to write what he believes) is undemocratic and arrogant.

A destructive, scandalous journal is the ideal, but (perhaps as a practical businessman, choosing a project closest to Titus's interests) he suggests that he should commission a pseudo-biography of Cartouche. As Schweikert remarks, "In dieser kritik ... treffen sich Romantiker und Jungen Deutschland";\(^{(34)}\) but we must remember that Tieck does not take sides.

The social and literary themes might seem at first sight to be unrelated. The clue, however, lies in the choice of setting:
a traditional annual fair, having its roots in the Middle Ages, is the milieu for the display of aspects of modern life which are similar to those currently regarded as uncivilized. The theme is, therefore, concealed by advertisement on the title-page. The persecution of poverty, outbreaks of ochlocracy, and the religious intolerance recall mediaeval times, and are reflected in the fact that literature is also in bondage to the mob. Tieck seems to make the point that little has changed except outer forms.

(2) The spirit of quarrelsomeness

Two minor works of the period suggest Tieck's view that the bedrock upon which much of the political bigotry and discord rests is that German intellectual life showed, over a long period, an innate tendency to quarrelsomeness, to the pleasures of mounting high horses. This attribute is emphasised as early as 1793, when Murner discourses in Herr von Fuchs. Uebereilung (1835) contains two inserted stories in which many people are embroiled in mutual recrimination because of, in one case, a mistake in reading "sagacité" for "stupidité", (35) and, in the other, a quotation misconstrued when its context is ignored. (36) Until the disputants learn the facts they exchange insults about various national cultures and denigrate Shakespeare. (37) The old scholar who tells these anecdotes believes it possible for whole periods of history to be possessed by a prevalent notion, and adds that this explains how even otherwise intelligent persons can share a common and widespread folly. (38) He intends, it would appear, to show that the substance of such disputes is often trivial, and this intention is furthered by the contrast between his important introductory
generalisations and the absurd acrimony he then depicts.

*Der Mondsüchtige* (1832) has a related theme. The obsession of the hero (Ludwig Licht) with the moon as a romantic image (though his second-rate mind prevents him from investing it with any actual meaning) correctly conveys the quality of his two other obsessions, namely with Goethe's poetry and with his beloved Emilie.

Apart from the fact that Ferdinand (Ludwig's uncle) shows characteristics which are not surprising in an elderly man whose youthful passions were cut short by tragedy - namely, passivity and (until Ludwig's adventures spark off some reminiscences) reticence - there are no important differences between uncle and nephew. Both are admirers of Goethe (chiefly the Goethe of the *Sesenheim* lyrics and *Werther*), and are sharply critical of, often embroiled in argument with, those of their contemporaries who demand politically didactic literature and judge it by non-literary criteria, by its socio-political purposes. These contemporaries therefore denigrate Goethe, regarding *Inbirenz* in particular as immoral, and admire Schiller, but only by dint of distorting his works to fit their opinions. (This is Willig's complaint in *Die Vogelscheuche*.) It is, however, important to remember that unthinking reverence and unthinking rejection of Goethe and Schiller, and deliberate misrepresentations of them, are Tieck's methods of characterising the people and the period. This work is by no means a defence of Goethe and Schiller against the Young Germans (Lüdeke believes it is), and there is external evidence to show that
Tieck's admiration of them was by no means absolute. (45) Tieck portrays a generation in which beauty arouses the acrimony of misunderstanding rather than any proper appreciation of it.

Further remarks by Ferdinand and Ludwig also criticise the current state of literature. (46) They regret that much contemporary literature is vapid entertainment, imitating great works of art. Ferdinand explains this. The function of the writer ("Dichter") may be compared to "verdichten": what, in the world which the writer sees, is nebulous, unremarkable, dispersed, is condensed and concentrated by him; the ability to do this is his creativity and vision. In contrast to these "Dichter" and "Verdichter", current writers are mere "Dünner" and "Verdümmer", who dissipate the essence of truth with their superfluity of words. Whole libraries, for example, have been "verdünnt" from Werther, and seem to be more liked and respected than the progenitor; people accustomed to the works of the "Dünner" become incapable of recognising the merit of the original, let alone responding to it. Along with the "Dünner", Ferdinand concludes, one finds the "Dehner" (who presumably writes at inordinate length) and the "Verdicker", who cheapens and coarsens everything. Ferdinand's argument is not unlike that found in the mill-scene in Zerbino.

The point of the plot of Der Mondsüchtige as a whole, if it has a single point, is that both Ludwig and Ferdinand are ludicrously ineffectual when action is demanded: Ludwig cannot remember Emilie's surname or Swiss home-address and makes no plan to track her down; (47) Ferdinand allows Rosa's old father to keep him out of the house where
Rosa, his own wife, is a prisoner. (48) Like the disputants of Uebereilung, who prefer the exchange of vituperation to reasoned argument, both uncle and nephew fall into raving incapacity when the obvious solutions are, respectively, concentrated thought and a boot applied unaesthetically to the front door. These are weaknesses of temperament, not conventional cowardice, for both become involved in acrimony, over matters far less important, with men who criticise Goethe and Shakespeare, and Ludwig acquires himself well in a dagger-fight with Firmin about Goethe. (49) But these undoubted qualities are not available to them for solving important problems; indeed, Ferdinand admits that his wisdom is really helplessness. (50)

Revealing as the events are, however, our attention should be focussed on the background, which is the prevalent tendency towards discord.

(3) Allegorical portrayals

When describing the intellectual life of Germany in the 1830s Tieck often (as indeed he had done much earlier) used an allegorical method. His most effective description of it is probably in the Märchen-Novelle of 1834, Die Vogelscheuche. The work is based on the conflict between the free creative imagination - the "Poesie" of Phantasus - and the restrictive, quarrelsome and intolerant spirit of bourgeois philistinism. This spirit, and Tieck's preference for its antithesis, have been consistent themes, connected with all major aspects of his work: his dislike of the Aufklärung (in its late Berlin version) and of sentimental affectations; his love of Shakespeare; his catalytic friendships with Solger and Raumer; his opposition to the control of literature by political or religious
activists or by social prejudice; and his awareness of the dangers of this conflict when it occurs within one individual. These themes are expressed allegorically - and comically, this time - in the disturbance within Ledebrinna and in the argument which he stimulates amongst others. The work therefore has a superficially improbable connection with Sternbald and Runenberg, and this connection draws attention to the fact that although Tieck writes here mainly of the 1830s he shows that the current trends of which he disapproves have roots in the eighteenth century, and particularly in the activities of Gottsched and Nicolai.

The action is initiated by Ambrosius, a Senator of Wegebergen, who makes a scarecrow ("aus gebranntem Leder," to withstand the elements). In so doing he has two motives. Firstly, he believes that art should be of and for the people, as in Greek and mediaeval times. All publicly visible objects - art, architecture, furniture - should, he holds, be works of art, and in this context he regards the design and construction of scarecrows as a neglected art-form. Secondly, he assumes that, as a cultured leader of the community, he has a duty to show what can be done (and thereby to improve people). He constitutes a satire on people who, over-reacting against elitist concepts of art, insist that all trivial objects ought to have, in some way or other, an artistic value; characteristically he does not distinguish between the implication that it necessarily has such a value and the ideal that beauty and practical usefulness need not be mutually exclusive. Indeed, he forgets that artefacts must often be practically useful, and chides his fellow-citizens for erecting scarecrows which offend culture and
art rather than the birds. (55) Inordinately proud of his creation, he compares it to Apollo, Adonis and Robin Hood; but adds that, since it is "die "achtte Symbolik" it could be anything. (56) He is like the smith in Zerbino, who ruins a plough by improving its appearance; but perhaps he is best summarised as a brainless Leonhard.

The scarecrow becomes, therefore, a symbol of ordinariness masquerading as something special. Thalmann ascribes Tieck's use of the term "ledern" to a psychological work by J. Chr. Reil of 1823, showing how madmen may believe themselves to be made of various materials. (57) So they may, but Tieck used the term to symbolise prosaic mediocrity not only in Die Vogelscheuche but also in Hanswurst als Emigrant (thirty years before Reil's publication), where he also—again, as in Die Vogelscheuche—expressed disapproval of Gottsched's influence. (58) The fact that the scarecrow is of leather gives rise to many punning references to "ledern" in the sense of "philistine". This "leather" world is in conflict with the "elfin" world of the imagination, for the main plot depends on the activation of the scarecrow by the elf Heimchen, who takes refuge in it, bringing as she does so the energy from a shooting-star. The scarecrow becomes the chief character, Ledebrinna. (59)

At a later stage Ledebrinna is in a state of distress because of the conflict between his philistine nature and the imaginative spirit within him. (60) But until this conflict develops, its effect is merely to make him—a scarecrow—seem to be a cultured member of society. He founds a learned society called "die Ledernen". (61) The name will, he says, symbolise their main intention—opposition
to "Genies" - by adopting an adjective their adversaries use as an expression of contempt. They, for their part, regard geniuses as like birds of prey, or crows and ravens, who consume without producing; whereas only domesticated or flightless birds are useful. It is their job, as members of "die Ledernen", to be scarecrows, frightening these wild birds away from cultivated vegetables and fruit. If their chosen name were not the best, they could, he remarks, have called themselves "das Bürger-Bündnis der Vogelscheuchen, die vogelscheuchende Gesellschaft der Humanität". Earlier, Ledebrunna has expressed extreme dislike of flowers as being useless, comparable to a refined social stratum within a state, which does not work but, while being protected from all vicissitudes, despises those who do work. This, taken with his use of the term "Bürger" in the alternative society names, indicates yet another defect in him: for he and his kind are equally parasitic. In their view, they are practically useful when compared with the aristocracy, and educated compared with the lower strata. This comparison tells us much, for it suggests that they can proclaim their own merit only by directing sneers at others. Obviously Tieck was not proclaiming bourgeois virtues. Indeed there is a reminder of his intermittent criticism of the parasitic aspect of wealth, as seen in, for example, Die Elfen. The description of Elfinland in both works includes dwarfs and cobolds who supply riches; in other words, an outcast population of proletarians is still necessary to provide the economic foundation.

The eighteenth century, Ledebrunna believes, came close to their views of "die Ledernen", particularly with Gottsched, who is
their idol and patron spirit. Unfortunately, as they see it, there were those who in various ways opposed Gottsched's influence. He instances Klopstock, who allegedly ruined language and verse, and literature more generally, by breadth and depth of thought and by care in his means of expression; Schiller, Fichte, Hegel and Schleiermacher were all their enemies. He refers with particular venom to Goethe, as being immoral and vulgar (like his advocate, Wilhelm, and deserving similar ostracism), not to mention obscurantist, weak, prolix and worthless. He has previously stated that Shakespeare is boring, that he admires Hugo's Hernani, that Goethe is a weakling, morally subversive, a superficial flatterer of women, a wordmonger without thought, a superficial cosmopolitan opposed to maturity, profundity, freedom, morals and rational religion. (65) Present-day journalists, he now continues, carry on this great eighteenth-century tradition; the Young Hegelians keep the spirit of old Nicolai alive. They in their society will produce, as their contribution, rubbishy poems, boring criticism, and interminable stories about the Seven Years' and Thirty Years' Wars; they will praise extravagantly the works of their own members, and will deal with those of the opposition (particularly Alexander) either by ignoring them or by deliberately misrepresenting them; when obliged to praise rivals, they will demonstrate how these rivals were fortunate for reasons unconnected with merit, and will point out the superior intrinsic worth of their own members. To publicise their views, they establish a daily paper, the success of which emphasises to us the poor intellectual climate and the prevailing parochialism.

In other words, Tieck is renewing his attack upon the pedantic,
prosaic, quarrelsome spirit which formerly manifested itself in
the Aufklärung, and now appears in a different form. As Ledebrinna
remarks later: "Jedes Sakulum hat seine eirenthümliche Ledergrösse.
It is not the Young German movement itself to which his criticism
is directed, but to the spirit behind its worst aspects.

As noted earlier, Ledebrinna was made by Ambrosius in the
mistaken belief - which may have been a debasement of the ideal
that art should be for everyone - that everyday objects must
necessarily be art. Perhaps in the desire to disseminate, which
was a reaction against elitism, has come the error of failing to
discriminate. His unsuccessful attempt to recover possession of
Ledebrinna's(67) therefore becomes a symbol of the fact that this
spirit, this debasement of an ideal, is now out of control, like a
Frankenstein's monster. Ledebrinna's temporary affliction with the
imaginative power of Heinchen(68) makes him, after his cure, worse
still. He becomes acquisitive and materialistic, obsessed with
wealth and French Romanticism. (69) While in a trance he translates
(at the instigation of Pankratius, who is Puck-turnèd-troublesaker)
a French play without reading the original; he regards errors and
bad style as unimportant, compared with the speed of the
accomplishment, and adds that he could write laws and constitutions
with equal facility. (71) They now, he proudly notes, outdo
Gottsched. (72) Ledebrinna finds contact with Shakespeare (particularly
Hamlet), Manzoni, von Clausen and Immermann unbearable; Shakespeare
has (Pankraz explains) caused untold misery in the world by
exemplifying the antithesis of what Ledebrinna loves and the modern
world desires, so the patient must be pacified with books to his
liking (Van der Velde or Clauren). (73)

It is conceivable that Ledebrinna's view is an over-reaction against over-refinement, and is therefore also to be regarded as a debased version of a more worthy view. In his delirium, as his philistine nature wrestles with Heimchen, he exclaims:

O sehr, sehr bin ich für das Häßliche eingenommen. Das Häßliche ist, wenn man es im Grunde des Tiefsinns betrachtet, eigentlich das Schöne. Denn das Schöne entsteht nur, wenn alles was von der Figur weggenommen wird, was das Häßliche ausmacht, so ist denn die wahre Schönheit weit mehr ein Negatives als ein Positives. (74)

Those who equate beauty with the loss of individuality bear the grievous responsibility for having created "die Ledernen". (A related image of planing away strength is found in Der junge Tischlermeister; it has antecedents in Zerbino.) (75)

In the lawsuit begun by Ambrosius, who claims Ledebrinna as his legal property, Alexander, his lawyer, contends that the charge is inherently probable. In support of this view he cites contemporary literary and political hacks, who obviously have no souls but who equally obviously are able to function nonetheless; these, he says, are the "Schein-Lebendigen", of which his friend Tieck wrote in Sommerreise. (76) Ubique, for the defence, contends that the charge is preposterous. The theory of pseudo-people does, he agrees, stem from Tieck, an author notorious for his scurrilous kater and for using children's fairy-tales as an excuse for political lampooning. (77)

The characters from the ordinary mortal world (other than those who hold a literary conversation, to be considered later) serve to substantiate and amplify the portrayal of "die Ledernen".
Prominent among these, for being normal, is Wilhelm Linden,\(^{(78)}\) a lieutenant in love with Elisa. His language is unrefined (Elisa, too, is unusually forthright);\(^{(79)}\) Tieck thereby mocks the priggishness of the philistines and their unawareness that standards of acceptability are dictated purely by custom and affectation. Dümpfelde\(^{p}\) (Elisa's father) and Spener are politically ignorant and hypocritical; for all their professed republicanism they fawn on minor royalty.\(^{(80)}\) Ophelia (Ambrosius's daughter) constitutes a pessimistic view on Tieck's part that great art and literature have no effect on those incapable of responding to them, because they see only their own reflections. She falls in love with the animated scarecrow, calls it her Adonis, and compares herself (inaccurately, but, in her own estimation, convincingly and satisfyingly) with her namesake in Hamlet; she also compares the statues of Antiquity unfavourably with it. Her letter to her father, in which she recounts these experiences, is full of literary allusions, taken out of context and misconstrued. Heinzemann (Orla's "Bürgermeister") and his brother-in-law, Peterling, represent the imaginative opposite of the prosaic philistines. Each has a number of crackpot theories which show the effect of having wondered intuitively at scientific problems with essentially unscientific minds.\(^{(81)}\)

The portrayal of this provincial society is developed by the portrayal of a fantasy one in Elfinland (a technique similar to Tieck's early use of historical, geographically remote or fanciful settings in order to write about ordinary society). Elfinland as here described is no conventional idyll. It has much in common
with human society; for example, Alfieri-Kuckuck says that in both worlds adversity forms the character, and individuality is inevitably associated with character flaws. This Elfinland is mainly an allegory for the kind of human society which would exist if the more natural ways and instincts were liberated instead of suppressed. A particular difference is in the elves' sexual attitudes. They have no embarrassment at nudity, and no interest in fashion; their self-adornment is at will. They take their views from the plant world they inhabit: reversing human opinions, flowers display their sexual and reproductive organs as their beauty itself, instead of concealing them. Humans are aware of this only symbolically, he continues, for they equate innocence and childhood with flowers and blossoms, and speak of losing childhood and innocence when sexual impulses come. And humans eat and drink publicly, whereas flowers and plants hide their ugly roots and feed on what is repulsive to humans. But, we observe, the sources of dissension in human society are also found in Elfinland. There are arguments between husband and wife, and between the generations; there are young lovers whose elders disapprove. When the young — who live only for the moment — break the laws, the authority-figures speak much of religion, but are not understood. There are periodic rituals and festivals, and no one seems to understand them. There are destructive passions. Language sometimes becomes indelicate in moments of stress (Heimchen, for example, is in trouble for calling a priest a rude name). This elfin world is perhaps also an allegory for a maturer stage. In a possibly unintended piece of sarcasm, Alfieri-Kuckuck offers to
leave Heinzemann his glove as a pledge for his return; this device for giving confidence to children who have to be left is of unknown origin, but almost certainly of long standing.

Much is made also of the contrast between this world and human society. Indeed, this contrast initiates the main action, for Heimchen, fleeing from the forces of elfin law and order, who have taken umbrage at her rebelliousness and impertinence, takes refuge in the scarecrow and thereby animates it as Ledebrinna; she had mistaken him for an orator mouthing fashionable ideals. We are to note that contemporary intellectual passions, especially those for public display, are lifeless. In due course Ledebrinna becomes a battleground between his innate crass philistinism and the lively spirit trapped within. In consequence, he succumbs to a nervous collapse, believing that there is an enemy spirit within him which pretends to be his soul and to be better than he; it is, he feels, not an integral part of him, and has independent cognition. Its removal will, he believes, save his health; external forces, or the guidance of stars or will-o’-the-wisps are better than this spirit.

The persistence of genuine literature is indicated by the fact that Ledebrinna and his society seek to supplant it with rubbish. This is substantiated by the chapter entitled "Billige Rechtsprüche", in which a conversation about literature is held between people already known to be opposed to Ledebrinna: Alexander; Amalie von Weilern; her aunt, Frau von Edelmuth; and Senator Willig. They are agreed in their opposition to French Romanticism. Bearing in mind Ledebrinna’s admiration
of Victor Hugo's *Hernani*, and his denigration of Goethe, Shakespeare and others, we should note at this point that discussion of Romanticism means French Romanticism and its influence in Germany. The discussants do not have a collective term for the German contemporaries they prefer, but they mention several authors and works from the period of 1827 to 1833 who in their view have upheld former ideals: Immermann (*Alexis* *Merlin*, and *Tulifantchen*), Raupach, Uechtritz (*Alexander und Darius* and *Rosamunde*). They regard these writers as upholding a tradition first found, in their view, in Oehlenschläger. In the course of their discussion they identify several errors into which they believe that German literature, under the influence of French Romanticism, has fallen. If some of these errors strike us as possibly rooted in earlier low-quality German literature, this may have been true, at least in Tieck's opinion. Willig ascribes the French Romantics' attributes to their having translated and copied Hoffmann - to whom, he believes, "Willkür" and "Schrankenlosigkeit" were the Muse.\(^{(89)}\) Tieck wrote elsewhere that many a self-styled new French play which was imitated, for reasons of literary fashion, in Germany might well be a French imitation of a German one.\(^{(90)}\)

Alexander objects particularly to what we now recognise as fate-tragedies.\(^{(91)}\) (Tieck's critical writings include several objections to these,\(^{(92)}\) and his concomitant belief that it is character that causes fate;\(^{(93)}\) though it has been pointed out that he himself stimulated the genre with his own *Karl von Bernneck*.\(^{(94)}\) Alexander cites Adolf Müllner's *Die Schuld* (1816), Zacharias Werner's *Der vierundzwanzigste Februar* (1809) and Grillparzer's *Die Ahnfrau*.\(^{(95)}\)
(1817). These, he says, have long been wrongly accepted in Germany, and their ugliness and supernatural irrationality misconstrued as great drama. Their defect is that they present the impossible or absurd not as a poetic means of expression (as in *Märchen* or in parts of Shakespeare) but as authentic fact. The former method, he continues, indicates "Begeisterung", which elevates the reader; the latter method shows "Fanatismus", which arouses passions not to purify them but to debase them. This "falsche Tragödie" is the very opposite of Sophocles, even though these modern writers have neo-classical pretensions.

The domination of poetry and art criticism by political factions is Willis's particular aversion. He regrets that it seems impossible sometimes to have a writer's literary ability assessed impartially. Praise of Goethe is condemned in some quarters as sycophancy merely because he reached aristocratic rank and government office. Such critics tend to turn Schiller into a liberal spokesman, but praise of Schiller can incur the accusation of having attacked Goethe. (This in itself suggests that the Young Germans were, in Tieck's view, not the only ones to subordinate artistic judgments to doctrinaire political ones.)

Amalie is reading Hugo's *Notre Dame de Paris.* Fascination with what is unnatural, weak, even repulsive, and the delusion that these things are beautiful, may be induced by the artist's skill, she believes; but she also finds that this fascination and delusion are a known phenomenon in human behaviour, and are a symptom of the sickness which the French call Romanticism. As she
reads the work in question, she herself experiences this interest, as she recognises, despite her strictures. She regards such books as particularly unsuitable for women (in whom she presumably, therefore, hopes to see higher standards), and regrets that women are prominent amongst the writers and readers of the new French Romanticism, for this prominence shows that their penchant for what is cruel, repugnant or improper exceeds that of men.

From a discussion of propriety in literature develops a discussion of man's attitudes to women. Willig remarks that these are stereotypes. Women are restricted, he says, by a false ideal of beautiful inactivity and passivity, which causes them to over-react and desire the turmoil of Romanticism (thereby, we presume, explaining the preponderance of women which Amalie discerns in the ranks of its adherents). Women who have a genuine urge to knowledge and purposeful activity, he continues, find themselves encased in this stereotype, with no opportunity to fulfil themselves, and they are condemned as unwomanly if they act otherwise. Jean Paul has, in Willig's view, a particular responsibility for this state of affairs, construing femininity as tantamount to sickness.

The discussants generally see some grounds for optimism over the future of literature. Alexander and Frau von Edelmuth both regard the French Romantic period as temporary and transitional. Alexander believes that its extremes are working themselves out, and that, even if the old values are not restored, the present forces will be exhausted. Germany has in his view virtually completed its passage through this stage. Frau von Edelmuth finds that there are some talented people amongst the French Romantics who
may improve with time (though she does not name them).

Die Vogelscheuche and two minor works - Der Wassermensch and Die Glocke von Arragon - are obviously related to Tieck's disagreement with the Young Germans. But it has been shown, particularly by Ledeburina's eulogy of Gottsched, that Tieck saw in his contemporary world of the 1830s the same fundamental opposition between cheap and meritorious literature as in his earliest years. His own view was consistent: he adopted an aesthetic criterion which he defended both negatively against the desire of ideologically-motivated factions to control literature and positively by insisting on literature's capacity to perceive and expound the truth. It is his positive side that deserves greater emphasis, but we should distinguish between his own proselytising protestations in the novella-theory (and in such minor works as Die Glocke von Arragon) and his intuition as a writer. It is a truism that his theories were subjective and his creative work objective. But his objectivity - his "irony", in the sense of detachment - was not the deliberate, conscious adoption of impartiality which his theories suggest: it was his aesthetic desire to describe reality, including people's behaviour, truthfully which led him not only to the failure of Der junge Tischlermeister, but also to the controlled detachment he achieved in even such works as Lovell, Genoveva, and Vittoria Accorombona. Artistic beauty, irrespective of subject-matter, was a synonym for the establishment of true statements (in artistic form) about that subject-matter, regardless of what the artist may, as a separate
question, desire to be true. Therefore, when Tieck was confronted with obsessions, arrogance, brutality and quarrelsome ness we find not only works in which he takes issue with the particular form of one-sidedness under consideration, but also works in which he shows understanding of, even sympathy with, the error, and explains the background and its antithesis, and points to the truth. This, in essentials, is his practice in Lovell and Dichterleben, for example; absolutes of right and wrong may be advanced strenuously by certain characters, but Tieck sets them aside in favour of presenting symptoms of behaviour, diagnosing its causes, and describing its course. In other words, much as Tieck tried to graft an alien theory of the novella on to his own output, his best works show his artistry proceeding elsewhere under its own dynamic.

The self-assertion of his artistry even while his conscious mind was engaged with the specific phenomenon of the Young Germans is particularly obvious in Eissensinn und Laune. Its two salient features are that the characters develop beyond any ideological need, and that Tieck does not take sides politically. His abstention from partisan involvement in this work emphasises the fact that his only real quarrel with the Young Germans was also his only real quarrel with their opponents: namely, that apart from his more general objection to brutality and oppression, whatever their provenance, he had a specific objection to their attempts to suborn literature. A consideration of Eissensinn und Laune will establish his political neutrality and the inner force of his own literary intuition; for these purposes the work's defects are as important as its strengths.
(4) The quarry resists

Eigensinn und Laune demonstrates that Tieck's interest in the contemporary world gave place to his deeper instincts as a psychological writer, for the most interesting part of the work from a literary point of view, namely the portrayal of Emmeline, is logically merely an aspect of the body of subject-matter concerning the Young Germans and their opponents which forms the thematic basis. This lack of symbiosis between ideological and literary interest is common in Tieck. It demonstrates that, while a polemical position can produce great, if flawed, works, an attempt to represent all sides from the standpoint of reason may be too detached. The point is best illustrated by comparing Der Wassermensch with the present novella. The former has nothing wrong with it but is not a major work. In contrast, the successful part of Eigensinn und Laune (without which the work has little literary interest) has an emotional content, and it is that very part which, by transcending Tieck's didactic purpose, makes possible an aesthetic assessment of the work as a whole. This novella, perhaps more than any other, demonstrates that Tieck's theory of the novella was a harmful misconception. Tieck thought, correctly, that the Young Germans, incorrectly, tried to make literature a victim. He himself tried to make it a kind of mediator instead. This novella shows that Tieck's inner literary instincts rejected not only the Young Germans' type-casting, but Tieck's as well.

In his conscious attitudes, Tieck was obsessed by polemicists' attempts to direct poetry by non-aesthetic criteria. Writing in
1835 to Heinrich Brockhaus, he refers scathingly to people who claim a monopoly of patriotism and freedom, and who insist that literature should be a political medium judged by extra-literary criteria. He regards them as bombastic philistines. He complains that previously (in 1819 and 1820) the "Ultra-Deutschen" had made him their idol, and had turned on him when they had learned that he rejected their sectarian views. This letter was his reaction to a review of Eigensinn und Laune in Blätter für literarische Unterhaltung (28 October 1835, No. 1), which had censured Tieck for allegedly unsympathetic attitudes towards the younger liberal element. There was also a vituperative article about him, Tieck in Dresden und die literarischen und sittlichen Zustände in Deutschland, by Theodor Mundt. Mundt wrote a letter on 5 February 1836 to Heinrich Koenig, justifying his attack by accusing Tieck of having, in Eigensinn und Laune, declared war on German youth and of having committed sundry other intellectual crimes.

But even though Tieck's conscious mind seems to have been concerned chiefly to attack the Young Germans, we should not jump to conclusions. He was being attacked only by them, therefore had no need to defend himself in other directions to the same extent. More importantly, the work itself contains targets of criticism other than the Young Germans. The socio-political elements in the work are: the half-hidden power-cliques, the mob, the political rebels, and the rebels against society's sexual ethics. From these is derived a list of attributes of an unfair society, which are sharply condemned: women, not men, arouse enmity for promiscuity;
men introduce sexual innuendo into social and intellectual relationships with women; law-enforcement is governed by prejudice; there is political chicanery; witless fashion and insipid foppery; the young radicals, although sincere in many cases, use mere denunciation instead of providing reasonable and reasoned arguments for their preferred alternatives.

So both sides - the established orders and those who rebel - come under the lash: on the one hand, a mindless perpetuation of a ridiculous and evil system; on the other, equally mindless and irrelevant attacks on it. Tieck deplored the conditions which provoked protest and deplored the manner of protest. Between these extremes the ideological hero is Ferdinand Ambach, the erstwhile distracted lover who, in maturity, discharges his duty as Chief of Police sternly but with scrupulous fairness and legality; but his is a relatively minor persona in the work. Zeydel is incorrect in regarding this novella as primarily an attack on the Young Germans, even though Tieck's spurious authority supports him.

The reason for Tieck's impartiality as author of this work, which leads him to castigate both sides equally and other elements as well, is probably that his real target is the unnaturalness of urban society itself. After the earlier sections, introducing Emmeline and her environment, we read of her journey to Switzerland with her father and the newly-hired coachman Martin Sendling. The splendour, the majestic solitude of the Alps liberates their thoughts from the tasteless etiquette and petty vanities of urban life. The form this takes is an awareness that human worth
is based on innate qualities, and is not correctly measured by the incidental externalities of polite society. Under the influence of this journey, Emmeline's father, the rich banker Runde, has already recognised that education, as generally conceived (by which he means in non-aristocratic circles), develops human qualities, whereas the upper "Stand" is often cruder than the lower. Models worthy of imitation are, he decides, often found amongst the peasantry and bourgeoisie, particularly amongst craftsmen fulfilled in their work. He distinguishes between "gesunder Menschenverstand", which is often ruined by inculcation with trivial etiquette and which - though it often needs education to be fully effective, much as a waterfall must be harnessed to produce power - can often scythe through over-refined inanity; and "kranker Menschenverstand", which has much to do with "neumodige Philanthropie, ...

Menschenrechte, Psychologie, Erbarmen und sentimentales Winseln über das Elend der Welt". (113) It is as though Rousseau's noble savage had become, first, an untutored Sturm und Drang genius, and then an untutored intellectual with civilised manners. Less fancifully, Sendling is Leonhard without the education; manners democratised. It is as an expression of her own naturalness, that is to say of her spontaneous assertion of her rights, that Emmeline wishes to marry Sendling, the epitome of "gesunder Menschenverstand", and it is in similar spirit that she rejects him when he has been ruined by having been taught to be a gentleman. (114)

The defect of the Young Germans, as represented in this novella, is that their view of nature is the product of urban minds. This is suggested in the characterisation of Wilhelm Bichler
(the foster son of Ferdinand Ambach, later known to be the son of Sameline and Friedheim). His wild enthusiasm which he calls "Genie" is, as Charlotte remarks, a weakness or illness. From his own protestations we see more clearly his own error of perception. He contends that the gradualist approach from within the State system, which Ambach urges upon him, stultifies the intelligence and imagination. Nature (by which he seems to mean his own unanalysed feelings) demands that he rejects and smashes the machinery of the State, the superstitions of bourgeois institutions.

It is in criticising the whole of urban society and its more, rather than in merely attacking the Young Germans, that the novella demonstrates how Tieck's attempts to construct an ideological work resulted, despite himself, in a demonstration of his own unconsciously more comprehensive gifts. The work's other merit as literature is in the portrayal of Emmeline. The choice of a heroine whose self-fulfilment is connected with sexual freedom is a Young German theme. But while the frequency of this theme in Tieck's later works is no doubt a response to contemporary interests, it is not new to him. Its appearance now is less a concession to modernity than the self-assertion of his imaginative response to contemporary life: poetry refusing to be a victim. However, a detailed survey of Emmeline's character will be omitted as being superfluous in view of the later chapters on Female Characters and on Vittoria Accorombone.
G. THE PARASITIC IDYLL

It would appear inevitable that if society was so unpleasant and nothing could avail against it, the only solution would be to retreat from it. Poets, and similar people with inner resources, might achieve this, even though society may find their individuality unacceptable and seek it out in order to destroy it; this is shown in Hexen-Sabbath and Vittoria Accorombona. But what of those who are without genius but in some way sensitive or weak and unable to accept society's norms? Tieck discerned contradictory factors which seem to have prevented him from taking too rigorous a view. He does not censure too harshly those individuals in the later novellas who retreat from the world, for he sees that their environment is inadequate; the sarcasm directed at Almansur is lacking in the novellas. But he condemns their over-estimate of themselves and their blinkered vision. He seems to say, therefore, that there is some excuse for such as Labitte and Vittoria, but less for the moderately gifted or ungifted people who merely exaggerate their own importance and sensibilities. The portrayal of Bergliger, Grimoald (of Genoveva) and Reinold (of Heymonskinder) are probably the earliest important examples of this. Three novellas treat the theme of withdrawal from the world by people of ordinary abilities; in summary, Tieck's view is that their retreat is a sign of inadequacy of character, is an attempt to disguise that inadequacy, and serves to perpetuate it. In other words, Tieck upholds the value of ordinary life, such as he had done in Lebrecht.

The unnamed Professor of Der Gelehrte (1827) is a recluse
because he commits the error of regarding scholarship and ordinary life as incompatible; his error arises from an egocentric misconception of scholarly dignity.\(^1\)

_Des Lebens Überfluss,_ like _Der Gelehrte_, analyses and evaluates a choice for isolation. Two lovers, Heinrich and Clara, have eloped because Clara's father - the family is aristocratic - objects to her marrying a Bürger. They have been cheated of some of their possessions and have lost the rest through misfortune; they have only their love left. Their plight initially arouses the reader's sympathy, and this is emphasised by Heinrich's condemnation of the outside world as hypocritical, oppressive, and socially and economically corrupt.\(^2\) But Tieck soon shifts our attention from this to his condemnation of their reaction to it.

This reaction is conveyed to us by symbols: a diary, a horse and a staircase. Heinrich's diary is his sole reading-matter; so his intellectual and emotional life is entirely self-consuming, like the criminal to whom his diary refers, condemned to death by starvation and eating himself.\(^3\) The destitute lovers are maintained by the devoted work and care of Clara's old servant, Christine. Clara is aware that they are in a false position (von Wiese misses the significance of this because he wrongly ascribes Clara's remarks to Heinrich);\(^4\) she makes an attempt to explain this obliquely to Heinrich when she recounts the story of her father's prowess at horsemanship, made possible only because a servant trained the horse.\(^5\) The horse is therefore a symbol of the productive strength of the lower "Stände" (similar to the use of a horse in _Heymonskindere_ and to symbolise the political strength
of the masses and their role as a power-base and as primary producers); so she and Heinrich are parasites. The staircase, which Heinrich burns for fuel, symbolises another form of parasitism: the consumption of the accumulated wealth of the past ("Sieh nur, geliebte Clara, welche soliden, trefflichen Menschen unsere Vorfahren waren"). Clara again points out that they are consuming without producing, for she asks the specific question (and receives no proper answer) about what will happen when the staircase has gone. Heinrich later tries to justify his having burned the staircase by saying it was a device between "oben" and "unten", and that these are merely relative concepts. He implies thereby that these concepts have no moral force: that only the inheritance of the past demarcates them. This pseudo-revolutionary talk (with half-digested ideas, reminiscent of the asseverations of Wallross and Amsel in Liebeswerben and Ferdinand in Waldschaft) from a parasite who soon compromises is a further condemnation by Tieck of Heinrich's original decision to become a recluse.

Of these three symbols the most important is the diary (not, as von Wiese states, the staircase), for it tells of his self-preoccupation which, in effect, explains the two other symbols. He is so oblivious to anything except his own feelings that he is unable to conceive that the world should not share his self-assessment; so he battens on Christine and burns the staircase. It is, he declares, "Fur unmöglich" that they should freeze "bei so heiser Liebe" and he refuses to seek work because that would constitute an admission that their love was insufficient.
his dream, in which he is being auctioned but only Clara will bid above an insultingly low level, he comes to the truth: that the world regards him as virtually worthless, as "einen Lumpen". (14)

This is why he accepts, without apparently considering it, Clara's view that it is better not to probe for the truth, and he concludes (echoing Die Freunde):

> Alles, was unser Leben schon machen soll, beruht auf einer Schonung, daß wir die liebliche Dämmerung, vermöge welcher alles Edle in sanfter Befriedigung schwelt, nicht zu grell erleuchten. (15)

From the perspective of the narrator this criticism is confirmed:

> Um in diesem Zustande fortzuleben, war aber der sonderbare Leichtsinn dieser beiden Menschen nothwendig, die Alles über der Gegenwart und dem Augenblick vergessen konnten. (16)

In contrast to the voluntary isolation of Heinrich and Clara, Waldesinsamkeit depicts a period of enforced solitude. Ferdinand von Linden is abducted and confined by an apparent friend, Helmfried, who wishes to marry Ferdinand's beloved, Sidonie (for her money). (17)

Before his imprisonment in a house far in the forest, Ferdinand is a passionate advocate of "Waldesinsamkeit", and ecstatically repeats the poem of that title from Eckhart. (18)

At this time he is best thought of as a lesser William Lovell. He regrets that he cannot communicate with Sidonie except in words and looks which are "alltäglich" and "allerordnärst", (19) and he cannot understand how people who are moved by beauty in art, nature and music can revert to daily triviality. (20) He is, he asserts, overpowered by his feelings and by his apparently unreturned love. (21) He evidently intends people to believe, and believes himself, that he has a unique experience - unique also in
its sadness and intensity. He longs to be alone with Sidonie, away from the idle chatter and "die faden Komplimente dieser sich verliebt stellenden Narren". A friend (Hath Eilen) and Sidonie both try, unsuccessfully, to convince him that he is wasting the best part of his life on this nonsense. But, like Lovell, he prefers to be a desperate character, and melodramatically drowns his sorrows.

His drunken raving (at the party from which Helmfried arranged the abduction) reveals to us that his desire for romantic seclusion is motivated not only by an arrogant belief in his superior sensibilities but also by apprehension at the new view of the world created by discoveries in exploration and science. The general impression is of a second-rate but immodest mind grappling with disturbing ideas which reduce his significance and the significance of his environment; this disturbance may be the root cause of his desire for retreat into "Waldeinsamkeit". Thus is William Lovell, perhaps with a dash of Almansur, brought up to date. Tieck is objecting to the widespread currency of a poetic idea of "Waldeinsamkeit" not because he deprecates the dissemination of poetic ideas (it has been shown that he desired this in principle but thought it unlikely) but because he deprecates this particular idea, as he had done consistently for nearly fifty years. Lüdeke fails to appreciate this point.

After displaying his sorrowful debauchery, Ferdinand disappears. He wakes up, incarcerated in the forest, where he soon has his fill of "Waldeinsamkeit". For a while he reconciles himself to his inexplicable position. But increasingly he finds that, though all
his material wants are met (excellent food and wine are available in abundance), though he has health, entertaining books and his desired solitude, he cannot enjoy these while deprived of freedom of movement and human society. However, even in his intermittent chafing at his detention, he shows a depth of practical ineptitude matched only by his namesake in Der Mondsüchtige.

Under the continued stress of confinement he comes to realise that the freedom he had hoped for in "Wald Einsamkeit" is itself a form of deprivation: to think perpetually of the eternal and infinite leads to madness. (28) We are reminded of earlier remarks by Sidonie. (29) She points out that a life of constant intensity of feeling, such as that then advocated by Ferdinand, would be unbearable. Vice, vulgarity, stupidity, boredom are certainly a part of ordinary everyday life, she continues; but ordinary everyday life is not itself to be despised, for it is necessary as a distraction and source of recovery from the heights of emotion, in order that one may bear the intensity again.

Ferdinand's progress to a more normal condition is also due partly to his having read a manuscript by a madman, Leopold, who was once confined in the same house. (30) Leopold's uncontrolled thoughts (we are told that he had studied to excess in early life and became unbalanced) have given him a morbid horror of death and decay (like Balder and Franz von Moor), and an obsession with excreta. In order to allay his fear of becoming manure after he dies, he has developed a conviction of a personal relationship with God, which will give him immortality. There are subsidiary elements in his mental disorder: he has an obsession, which itself has
religious overtones in his case, with coprophagy; and he also has an infantile desire to shock people by flouting sanitary conventions. To a layman he seems to have suffered paranoid schizophrenia. The function of the character of Leopold in the novella is to serve as an example of the dangers of untrammelled thought: dangers which Ferdinand escapes, but which his disgust and fascination with debauchery and his love of retreating into abstractions show him to have been potentially vulnerable.

The present section has - in common with most sections devoted to the novellas - involved us in reminiscences of Tieck's early works. The hermit-figures in both periods of his output are unable to meet life's rigours and disappointments, and conceal their weakness either by feigning a higher degree of sensitivity and ideals which are supposed to require solitude or by proclaiming their preference for less exacting standards of wickedness. Hence comes the Almansur-Lovell link round which many of Tieck's works revolve. The parasitic aspect of these characters is developed with economic and cultural connotations in Tieck's study of artists and perceptive non-artists, all of whom are found also in the novellas. The link between this aspect and Tieck's lifelong study of Don Quixote has been demonstrated earlier, and this, too, is found in the novellas. The psychological dangers of solitude and parasitism are expounded in Waldseinsamkeit. But it is Das Lebens Überfluss which re-establishes the link - so obvious in Don Quixote - between economic and cultural parasitism, and thereby emphasises its close affinities with economic ideas implicit in Honswurst als Emigrant, Heymonskind, Eckbert, Runenberg, Die Elfen and Fortunat.
From these works it is easy to infer that Tieck desired to see a working (if bourgeois) democracy of cultural and social equals.

But from the contrived happy ending of *Die Lebens Uberfluss* we infer also Tieck's view that this utopian ideal would not be realised. The contrivance is to be taken in conjunction with a similar contrivance in *Die Ahnenprobe*, and with his failure to show the realisation of ideals in *Sternbald*, *Melusine* and *Tischlermeister*. Art, love and an ideal society are seen only in artificially created milieus. Tieck's unconscious denial of his ideals in this way is tantamount to a reaffirmation of his equation between aesthetic beauty and true descriptions of reality: an equation which forced itself out of his contemporary political concerns into a work of flawed genius, *Eisenstein und Laune*.

Tieck's statements about reality are statements about human thoughts, feelings and behaviour. We have often noted the elements of his art upon which his greatest achievements rest: his psychological understanding, and his unromantic detachment from and control over his romantic material. Our consideration of his novellas has thus far tended to emphasise their socio-economic context. It remains now to demonstrate that his psychological realism is as important in his late works as it was in his early ones. The point could be made by detailed character-analysis of, for example, Shakespeare and the pre-Shakespearean poets of *Dichterleben*, or the contending figures of *Hexen-Sabbath*. However, certain female characters will be considered for this purpose instead, partly because female characters constitute an important
strand in Tieck's thought and partly because we are enabled thereby to approach a major work which sums up many of his lifelong ideas, namely *Vittoria Accorambona*.
VII. VITTORIA ACCORAMBONA

A. FEMALE CHARACTERS IN TIECK'S WORKS

Two novellas in particular - Die Klausenburg and Das Zauberzeug - are of interest as a thematic bridge between Eigensinn und Lache and Vittoria Accorambona, for they focus attention (in the story-within-the-story) on portrayals of unusually gifted women. Tieck's consideration of this theme has two aspects - the gift and the woman. Of these, the latter aspect is the more important, and this emphasis itself indicates how much Tieck had turned from his obsession with the position of the artist in society to the more comprehensive concept of the individual. His interest now seems to be in forms of superiority, of which a talent is one sub-form and beauty another. In conjunction with this, he also considers the difficulties caused by men's attitudes to women.

In Die Klausenburg, Ernestine's physical deformities are of incalculable benefit to her in realising her pianistic gifts, for one feature of them is that she has enormous hands. This point is closely connected with Franz's curse on all gifts and talents - not merely intellectual or artistic ones, but also social gifts, gifts of personality, or the gift of beauty - as species of deformity:

Ja Fluch, Fluch! rief er aus, allem Talent, der Rede, der Anmut und allen Gaben, die uns ein schadensfreies Schicksal mittheilt, um uns und andere zu verderben! (1)

The idea that talent, construed comprehensively, may be a disadvantage because it attracts misfortune, is developed, and is related to the problems of women in Vittoria Accorambona. The
story of Ernestine also, however, introduces another aspect of
that novel, and is itself foreshadowed as early as Senoveva, namely
the right of women to have sexual feelings, and to be known to have
them, without connotations of impropriety. We are told that
Ernestine has a normal feminine temperament (as there is no reason
why it should be otherwise) despite her intellectual and musical
gifts and physical malformation. She wishes to love and to be
loved by a man, and cannot accept a masculine or sexless rôle or
regard her accomplishments as a substitute. She therefore
becomes an example of Tieck’s deprived lovers of the type who
conceive a hatred of the unattainable beloved (Solo in Senoveva
and Emil in Liebeszauber are earlier examples). It is Franz’s
(seeming) perfect normality which is the object of her desire:

Und Du Ausladen, Schelmischer, Mitler, Lebenswürdiger,
Talentreicher, Du Tugendknope, Du Schönheits-Häcker, -
daß ich Dich so innigst, innigst habe lieben müssen,
müssen, trotz dem innersten Kern meiner Seele, der mir sagte,
daß Du es nicht verdientest, - Dir glattbüttigen, gerade
gewachsenen Menschenthaler werde ich immer, das kannst Du
mir glauben, ganz nahe seyn. (3)

She comes to resent men who admire in women only the temporary
beauty of their youth, and also to resent girls who are exclusively
corresponded with their appearance. (4) But it is, we see plainly,
resentment and envy, and is based on her attraction to
unattainable normality. It is analogous to the longing for, and
antagonism towards, ordinary domesticity felt by Sternbald,
Christian and the Professor in Der Gelehrte. In those works the
context of their longing was temperamental rather than artistic,
and it may be that the qualities of mind and imagination that
motivated those characters are best construed as a form of handicap.
The other story-within-a-story - that of Florentine, in Das Zauberschloß - deals more frankly with a young woman’s sexual feelings. She had learned the nature of sexual relationships from a book which she discovered by chance when a girl. In reporting this the narrator criticizes the neglect of some parents to instruct their children about the details of sexual intercourse, and the crudity with which others do so. Florentine is unusually gifted in mathematics and astronomy, and these studies become "eine fortwährende Zerstreunung, um sich vor sich selbst zu verbergen". She loves Falmouth but, feeling horrified by her own impulses, behaves in a hostile manner towards him ("Das Gefühl ängstigte mich eben, und ich wollte ihn dafür bestrafen, daß er mich mir selbst entwendet, daß er mich den Gefühlen untreu gemacht hatte, die ich für meine besten hielt").

After a heated argument, in which she reproaches him for his constant attempts to bring the conversation to his love for her, and in which she expresses antagonism in the knowledge that it will hurt him, occurs the incident in which he sees the lower half of her body. This was obviously her intention, for it cannot be explained away as accidental (though it is a moot point whether she would have consciously recognised it as such even afterwards). As Falmouth remarked earlier, natural feelings are inevitably strong ones and eventually outweigh "die finstern Stimmungen".

The character of Vittoria Accorombona has obvious affinities with these and other earlier female characters. Genoveva, Emmeline, Charlotte (of Der junge Tischlermeister), and Florentine are in
some ways preparatory sketches. It is interesting to note, as a contrast to the generally sympathetic attitude to women revealed in his works, and with particular reference in this instance to his recognition that they may be intellectually distinguished, that his private utterances may have been less civilized. In a letter to Johanna Steffens in 1848 he states his wish to terminate their relationship because of the irreconcilable political differences made manifest by her support of the National Assembly. His remarks include the following: "Was verstehn Weiber von Staatssachen? Stricken, Näh'en, Haushalten ist ihr Beruf, darin sind sie ehrwürdig". (11) Again, we note that the poet and the man were not always at one, and the former was more praiseworthy.
B. **VITTORIA ACCORONBONA**

The importance of *Vittoria Accorombona* lies ultimately in its intrinsic merit as a work of literature. It is salutary to remember that Tieck's ideas are worth studying because he was a major writer, although it is with his ideas that this study is chiefly concerned. Since many of Tieck's works are, despite their merits, flawed in some respect or other, the point has seldom been insisted on before in the present study. It is mentioned here because, in the present state of Tieck scholarship, an assertion of the literary value of *Vittoria Accorombona* may still be necessary. For the present purpose it must suffice to point out firstly, that the novel lacks the two chief defects of much of Tieck's work, namely incompatibility between the characterisation, the conversations on literary and intellectual matters, and the plot. This puts negatively the positive virtue that these three elements are in harmony in the work, and that the conversations, although extensive, further that harmony rather than disrupt it. This is achieved despite the fact that, by using a real and realistic milieu, Tieck denied himself the freedom of fantasy of *Märchen*, or of (as in *Sternbald* and *Tischlermeister*) a contrived false immunity from the constraints of the real world. In this, the work is ranked with *William Lovell*, with which it shares the further challenge - successfully met in both instances - of differentiating and interrelating a large number of characters.

Looking beyond Tieck's works, a comparative study of *Vittoria Accorombona*, *Effi Briest*, *Madame Bovary* and *Anna Karenina* would not be entirely to Tieck's disadvantage, even if he were placed fourth.
in a final judgment. Within Tieck's output, the present work is helpfully collated in various technical and thematic respects with lesser (but still important) works such as Hexen-Sabbath, Tod des Dichters, and Einsieden und Laune; and therefore indirectly with all the works to which they themselves are linked. The present chapter will be largely confined to the themes of Vittoria Accorombona, and it will be apparent that it is a valuable summation of much which has gone before. Its comparative neglect by scholars is all the more surprising; no tenable interpretation has hitherto been provided.

Tieck's novellas have revealed a web of themes. Society is unjust because it is economically, socially and politically corrupt, and is a power-structure intent on maintaining and increasing its power. Religion in its organised forms offers no way out because it, too, is concerned with power. Personal goodness has no impact on society at large, and may generate conflict between a moral individual and an immoral state. Art offers no way out because, although it may be a corrupting influence when it prostituted itself to satisfy the lowest tastes or when it is wrongly believed to have done so, it cannot improve socio-economic morals or (though the point is omitted from Vittoria Accorombona, for obvious reasons) the ugliness of industrialisation. Art is, in other words, a personal experience. Society's defects are discerned in its attitude to art. The products of art are regarded as a form of property, the control of its practitioners as a means of self-glorification; society therefore takes a view of art which the artist cannot accept. The power-structure also believes (but wrongly) that art can be an
effective instrument of propaganda; the artist is therefore claimed jealously by all contenders. In fact, the artist (in Tieck's view) expresses his environment, warts and all, but does not lead it.

Beneath this persecution of artists lies the power-structure's inability to tolerate individuation: whether as an artist, as a beautiful woman, as an unusually ugly person, or as a person of exceptional (but not necessarily artistic) ability. The defensive isolation which this provokes can produce elitism and arrogance in the individuals concerned; personal religious or aesthetic experience is therefore a form of limitation or hazard. Vittoria will be seen as an example of this "excellence", for her beauty and for her poetic and intellectual gifts.

One aspect of her characterisation in particular - as a woman in difficulty because of men's attitudes - may be traced back to Louise Blainville in Lovell, the "männliche Mutter", the Countess (sister of Marie) in Sternbald, Genoveva, and the unnamed prostitute in Siegmund. As suggested earlier, the origin of the idea may be a character in Don Quixote. As an artist under attack, Vittoria has antecedents in Die verkehrte Welt. No doubt Tieck's interest in the social position of women developed in this period, since the theme was judged important by the Young Germans; it has been noted in Hexen-Sabbath (Catharina), Tod des Dichters (Catharina), Eigensinn und Laune (Emmeline), Die Klausenburg (Ernestine) and Das Zauberschloß (Florentine). The theme that individuals who attempt to be ignored but are sought out by a persecuting society is found in Niedermeyer works; but it is also found in Heymonschilder. It bears repeating that these themes in Tieck's late works also
have antecedents in his early period.

The novel is set chiefly in Rome in the period 1575-1585. The rule of Pope Gregory (who died in 1585) is ineffectual: political power rests with a number of factions composed of high-ranking churchmen and aristocrats, and these factions, whether clerical or secular, are based on the most powerful aristocratic families (mainly, therefore, the Orsini and Medici).\(^{(14)}\) There is no effective means of law-enforcement: the official militia is under Papal authority, but the latter is exercised not as an instrument of impartial government but in response to political pressure by the factions. Physical power is wielded by the bandits based outside the city, and the faction-leaders openly employ them to achieve their sectional ambitions by the use of terror, violence and deceit. For those not born to a position of power and privilege, adventure is available in the bandits' forces. Alternatively, the patronage of a powerful person may be obtained: and this, in a society riddled with nepotism, requires total surrender of personal standards in the patron's service. Honest and hard-working use of personal talents is not the way to self-advancement.

The bandits are an "estate" within society, with a strict code of loyalty to each other and to their aristocratic employers (who do not show reciprocal loyalty). These outlaws are not all evil men: many have been driven to their present life by the injustice of the state, or by famine, or are attracted (as Marcello is) by a romantic view of the bandits' way of life as one of freedom and adventure. The latter point is put by Vittoria
after her closer acquaintance with the ways of the factions, whereas previously her attitude had been merely tolerance towards a young man's indiscipline. To Vittoria the bandits represent a counter-force to the power of the ruling classes, and ideal of vigorous freedom in contrast to the corrupt and moribund state; as such they constitute a promise that a better nation will emerge. On the last point she is concerned less they dissipate their energies fighting each other, or become mere tools of the rulers, rather than acting together to overthrow the state. This is a romantic fantasy which she does not reiterate (she concerns herself with her own life, not with politics). It is, moreover, not borne out by the facts, for while it is true that order is eventually established, this comes not as a just society developing from the freedom of the bandits but as a dictatorship by a vengeful and savage new Pope (Sixtus V, formerly Cardinal Montalto). Furthermore, the ways of Rome, whether under Gregory or Sixtus, contrast sharply with the efficient, restrained and legal means with which the Venetian Republic defeats, tries and executes Luigi Orsini. (It is often overlooked, in the face of Tieck's romantic enthusiasm for aristocrats, that his more important works show them in a bad light) The factions remind us of those in Hexen-Sabbath in their self-seeking conspiracies, but perhaps there is a deeper root: they may be compared with Waterloo raised to political power.

In this society poets and women occupy an ambiguous status: worshipped, yet of lesser status than their worshippers, and always the focal point of rivalry as objects of possession. However, one
should not infer that the work takes as its theme poets or women in relation to society. This is an element in it (which in fact illustrates the theme), but the overall effect is that behind a psychological novel dealing with poets and women is a larger context of a conflict between outstanding individuals and society. It is at this point that we must reiterate that Tieck was a novelist rather than an abstract thinker. His creative ability, when confronted with a theme which can be given abstract statement, often transcends it. Vittoria is too well delineated to be "a woman", and Roman society too bad to be "society". However, the extremes provoke the sharpest definition of topics, and it is probably this, rather than a "conception of cultural decline" (in Keck's sub-title), which drew Tieck to late Renaissance Rome. Our thematic study must perforce classify its raw material, but the imaginative dynamic of literature often leads elsewhere. There is some temptation, then, to interpret the work as dealing with the poet or with women in relation to society, indeed with both. Vittoria is a poetess (Tieck exaggerates the historical Vittoria's ability), she is often in the company of poets, and there is much literary discussion. In addition, since Tasso appears as a character in the novel, the reader cannot fail to recall Goethe's Tasso. An examination of the characters of Tieck's Tasso and of Vittoria shows, however, that neither is intended to stand for "the poet", even though other characters in the novel may regard them so.

Throughout, emphasis is laid on Tasso's misery at the court of Ferrara. He has become a plaything of power-rivalry between Ferrara and Florence, each of whose rulers wishes him to be his
court poet and thereby to add lustre to his court; but neither of these understands or appreciates his work. His difficulties are increased by the fact that as a genius he has inevitably aroused the enmity of accomplished mediocrities. Pepoli and Vittoria attribute his downfall to this; indeed, it is self-evident. But he is "the poet" to them, not to the reader. On Tasso's first appearance, incognito, he expresses his envy of the aristocrat's life, surrounded by artistic beauty. When Vittoria finds the beauty of the house and gardens at the Villa d'Este artificial and contrived, he defends them by saying that Nature has been brought under the control of art and thereby to a higher (because poetic) freedom. To him, the layout of the gardens is analogous to the structure of a poem, and performs the same sweetening and ennobling function in relation to Nature as does the poem, with its rules which have been tested and approved by the past, in relation to everyday language. Inevitably the man who holds these views on art admires the vigorous, domineering Margaret of Parma; improvises a poem in which the muse tells him that he can compose poetry only when in pain; and seeks out the Inquisition in order to demonstrate his Orthodoxy to the Duke of Ferrara. Tieck's Tasso is subservient by nature; he can exist as a poet only by mastering and implementing established poetic practices, and as a person only in the service of, indeed in bondage to, the powerful rulers. His importance in the novel is that Vittoria's view of him, and society's view of him, illuminates her character and fate for the reader. She condemns society's treatment of the poet in Tasso, rejects society's notion of a poet's necessary subordination to society, draws analogies between Tasso's
position and her own, and finds Tasso inadequate as a person. (24)

It is ultimately the latter point which weighs with her and with the reader: her criterion is related to character, not to art.

A proper understanding of Vittoria will be aided by considering her family (particularly her mother, Julie), whose role in the novel gives her greater prominence. A partially correct view of the work as a whole is that it is a family novel, about a widow who (like Dorothea's mother in Die Verlobung) cannot cope with her children, one of whom develops far beyond her and predominates in the action. (25) An analysis of Julie's character will be followed by consideration of her effect on her children, and the gulf between mother and daughter.

Julie is a composite of conflicting elements. While she is ambitious for her children and is willing to engage in selfless labour for their advancement, (26) she also desires to bask in the reflected glory of their success. (27) And while she is proud of her aristocratic lineage, (28) she also has "Bürgerlich" traits; (29) these take the form chiefly of condemning immorality and amorality (implicitly aristocratic behaviour) and upholding the false antithesis of an ordered and purposeful life ("bürgerlich", in her estimation), (30) and may have been implanted in her by her overreaction to a youthful indiscretion. (31) These pairs of contradictions are cross-connected: her pride in and ambition for her children are linked with her pride of ancestry and resentment at her family's decline; and her "bürgerlich" element makes her feel aggrieved and fearful at the paths taken by her children (except Flaminio) who cannot reconcile themselves to "bürgerliches,
gewöhnliches Leben". Her life and end follow an inevitable course: with such a pride, the failure of her children destroys her, for she has no other interests; and she is incapable of amoral conspiracy in a society in which corruption alone will secure advancement. Julie's effect on her three sons is disastrous: on Flaminio, atrophy; on Marcello, stimulus to over-reaction; on Ottavio, warping.

To Vittoria she represents bürgerlich constraints, much as John Shakespeare does to William. Julie has always encouraged Vittoria's intellectual development and literary work, and taken great pride in her, but she still thinks of marriage and motherhood as her daughter's proper means of self-fulfilment. Vittoria's ambitions for herself, however, are the result of development beyond limits acceptable to, or comprehensible to, Julie, who has as little understanding of her daughter as of her sons. Only Vittoria is able to escape her influence, being neither moulded, nor suppressed, nor provoked into reaction. Both Marcello and Ottavio exemplify the behaviour-pattern which is more prominent in Der junge Tischlermeister, namely the inevitable emergence in distorted form of an suppressed characteristic. It is chiefly in portraying Vittoria that Tieck ceases to confine himself to repressed or distorted characters while simultaneously renouncing the temptation to invent a Märchen or contrived reality in order to avoid the problems of writing realistically. Many of his works achieve one of these objectives; only this achieves both.

Vittoria is, then, different from the majority and is placed in a
real world, and Tieck shows that she pays dearly for it.

Before examining Vittoria's character, it is necessary to consider the concept of "excellence". Reference is made to this at several points in the novel and in this chapter, and the importance Tieck attached to it is shown by the way he ends the work:

Nur zu oft wird das Edle und Große von den kleinen Geistern so verkannt und geschmäht. (36)

This is a quotation from the work itself, not a remarks made some years after. Even so, it requires some modification as a statement of what actually happens to Vittoria. The contradiction between Tieck's theoretical statements and his intuition as a writer has been noted before, sometimes in an extreme form, and it is found to a limited extent even here.

"Excellence" is mentioned in relation to Vittoria, Bracciano and Tasso. These three are, variously, "Personen ... , die über der Linie der gewöhnlichen Menschen stehen"; (37) "Die edlen Naturen" (38) or "sterke Gemüter" (39) in contrast to those who are not "edel" or "stark"; they are "jene ausgezeichneten Menschen"; (40) they may proclaim that "unser Gefühl, unser Mut hat uns ihre [the gods'] Gunst gewonnen". (41) This "excellence" has two inter-locking attributes. Firstly, there are suggestions that such people (though, with a certain untidiness of argument, since probably Tasso is not one) are entitled to disregard conventional morality to obtain personal fulfilment. (This idea is found in more developed form in Nietzsche; but its immediate ancestry, which is more important, is in Goethe's Faust and in Tieck's own works, particularly William Lovell.) However, Tieck's description of the milieu of the novel ensures that we note the similarity between
this claim and the disregard of the law claimed by the aristocrats as the right of their "Stand". Indeed, Tieck provides some ambiguity about Bracciano on this point, and extends it to Vittoria herself. Bracciano murders his wife, Isabella, and the underlying reason is to free himself to marry Vittoria. Vittoria, commenting on the rumour of Bracciano's guilt, virtually defends his right to have done so, by implying that Isabella was a person of little consequence whose life obstructed more important matters. The more superficial reason given by Bracciano is Isabella's infidelity, which worthless people are not apparently allowed. It is obvious that her behaviour was a forgivable reaction to her husband's prolonged absences and general neglect of her; she would have been entirely reasonable in regarding them as separated de facto. Almost immediately after having defended Bracciano, Vittoria takes a far more censorious view of her husband's carousing and peccadilloes, which are provoked by her aloofness; but he, too, is inferior.

By introducing evidence of this kind, Tieck does not let the claims of "excellence" to override morality go unchallenged. No doubt he was fascinated as a novelist by these principal characters and saw more than one side of the claim. However, he somewhat contradicted thereby what he seems to have regarded (in his conscious mind, at any rate) as the main theme, namely the hostility which is aroused by "excellence" in itself. In view of the murders and associated evidence of the attitudes taken by Vittoria and Bracciano, they cannot be said to have been entirely inadvertent in incurring enmity.
The principal theme is the second of the two consequences of "excellence" mentioned above, namely the danger to which these people are exposed from the ordinary masses. Tieck's specific analytical comments (rather than his novelist's development of characters and situations) imply that the chief danger arises from the petty hostility and vindictiveness directed at "excellence" itself as a condition, rather than by anything actively done. This is borne out by events. While Eracciano and Vittoria may be said to have provoked society by their actions, their inadvertent provocation is more important; after all, the odd murder or two in sixteenth century Rome was not very conspicuous. The fate of Vittoria and Eracciano has a number of antecedents in Tieck's works. The hostility directed at the physical superiority of Reinold in Nymonskinder and the persecution of Beresynth in Pietro von Abano for the accident of a physical difference are as important in this regard as the lives of the women characters considered in the previous section. These examples, if considered together with Dichterleben and, to some extent, with Tod des Dichters and Hexen-Sabbath, suggest that the genius who expresses the thoughts and aspirations of his environment, and is merely a microcosm of it, is safe; is even lauded. In contrast, he is at risk if he stands apart from it and seems to disapprove of it. It is individuation which is not tolerated, in whatever form it may appear; and "excellence", if that is the form, is like a red rag to the bull.

This does not mean that Vittoria Accorombona may be regarded as a fate-novel. There are a number of references in the dialogue to fate, particularly (as is usually the case) at moments of crisis.
They consist of observations that happiness is denied, or that freedom of action is diminished or destroyed by force of circumstances. In retrospect, the action of the novel seems to have a certain inevitability, but if it did not we would say it was unconvincing. The chief context of fate when mentioned in this work is the fate, so called, of "excellent" people. But this "fate" is not presented as a metaphysical idea: it amounts merely to pessimistic expectations as to what happens in the view of Tieck and his characters. The idea of fate will therefore be ignored.

Vittoria is "excellent" within Tieck's scheme of ideas because of her beauty, physical presence, and intellectual and poetic gifts. But the novelist ousts the analyst, for the form of "excellence" which plays the most significant part in her life is her beauty and attractiveness to men. Her abilities and her appearance are placed in juxtaposition in two ways. Firstly, an analogy is drawn between her and Tasso, both being regarded, mutatis mutandis, as desirable acquisitions by people who do not understand or value them properly but who wish to enhance their own standing by possessing them. This analogy is drawn by Vittoria herself in her extemporised poem.\(^{(44)}\)

Secondly, state authority reacts with displeasure to Vittoria's establishment of a literary salon, and cites it as spurious evidence in support of a charge of immorality;\(^{(45)}\) this happens also to Catharina in Hexen-Sabbath.\(^{(46)}\) Tieck's implication is that an individual life of beauty is unacceptable to authority because it adopts criteria which cannot be subsumed within a system based on power. In this victimisation there is another reference to Tasso.
Tasso's position at the court of Ferrara, in which a domestic pet's intimacy with a tiger proves pleasant at first but fatal in due course. (47) In other words, people who must maintain their individuality, yet are involved with the ruling authorities, are endangered even by the mere proximity of these powerful individuals, for conflict is inevitable. The idea is a mixture of the "Schulze"'s remark in Glück gibt Verstand that the rich and great will turn on distinguished individuals of lower "Stand" after having apparently accepted them, (48) and Franz's curse on talent in Die Klausenburg as a form of handicap. In the present work an individual life of moral goodness, as exemplified by Pepoli, is equally regarded by state authority as provocation. (Pepoli is the individually good opponent of collective evil, a figure whom Tieck failed to portray convincingly in Der Schutzeist and Der Fünfzehnte November. He is murdered at the behest of a maniacal dictator, Montalto, who, like Sangerheim or Athanas, takes an abstraction to be more valid than individual goodness and whose personal character-deficiencies may explain his public actions.) (49)

But Vittoria's real adversary is less the state power than public opinion (public opinion, that is, within the ruling strata) which lies beneath the exercise of formal power. In this respect her appearance certainly takes precedence over her abilities, which serve only to make her into a more desirable mistress in their estimation. She expresses her opinions as a person - therefore, inevitably, as a female person, though her opinions are not in themselves sexual in topic or innuendo - but she tends to be regarded only sexually. It is in this aspect of her characterisation
that Tieck somewhat abandons his theme of "excellence" in order to expand the portrayal of Vittoria as a woman. Keck\(^{(50)}\) ignores this aspect entirely—perhaps unavoidably, in an avowedly cultural study.

Vittoria inspires, variously, worship and importunity in men; the chief examples are Flaminio, Camillo Mattei, Luigi Orsini, Cardinal Farnese, Peretti and Bracciano.\(^{(51)}\) Her fundamental criticism of men is that they express reverence for women in order to disguise their lust:

$$\begin{align*}
&\text{Diese klägliche Lüsternheit, die aus allen Zügen spricht,} \\
&\text{wenn das Wort Liebe oder Schönheit nur genannt wird ... diese} \\
&\text{Dienstbeflissenheit und das Kriechen vor den Weibern, die sie} \\
&\text{doch in ihrem Herzen verachten ...} \quad (52)
\end{align*}$$

A similar objection is expressed by Emmeline in *Eigensinn und Laune*.

The theme was of contemporary interest: but not of contemporary origin, for it appears in *Don Quixote*, with which Tieck was familiar from his youth, and is obviously connected with some of Tieck's own earlier works.

Vittoria's criticism requires, however, some comment. It is true that she encounters some crude and insulting attitudes which society at large seems to countenance, and her dislike of this is entirely reasonable. She seems almost to object to being found sexually desirable, and this is unreasonable. She does not, of course, object when the man is Bracciano, for she regards him as her equal.\(^{(54)}\) Her objection is therefore directed at men who are not her equal rather than to the behaviour itself. Her rejection of insulting propositions (from, amongst others, Cardinal Farnese) creates a groundswell of resentment against her, which is increased
by her choice of Bracciano and her consequent involvement in his family's internal discord. But the immediate cause of her downfall, as distinct from the climate of opinion which makes it possible before it occurs and acceptable in Rome afterwards, is that her rejection of Farnese and Luigi Orsini caused her to incur their hatred (Ryno and Golo are therefore prototypes), in gratification of which they cause her misery and death. (55)

Despite a slight imbalance between the theme of the work and its most effective aspects, there is a strong link between her beauty and her other forms of "excellence", in that both are likely to attract hostility without any positive act to justify it. In portraying her as a woman, Tieck lays great emphasis on her passivity. Her lifelong nightmare of being murdered becomes a reality, and is accompanied by a description of her beauty and repeated mention of her compliance towards her murderers. (56)

This description is strongly reminiscent of an earlier passage after Camillo Mattei rescues her from drowning. (57) Only on these two occasions, which are unique in the work, is she described thus, conveying the impression of a goddess worshipped and simultaneously desired as a possession. Both scenes also emphasise her comparative lack of initiative in the progress of the events concerned, and lead to the deduction that, although in a chain of cause-and-effect, Camillo and her murderers were responding to her attractiveness, this effect on them was mainly inadvertent on her part. This inadvertency is not confined to her sexual effect, but is a more general part of her character. She is simply herself; for example her courage is inadvertent when she ignores the likelihood of
danger from an escaping steer (Peretti is terrified); she refuses to fear death; she defies the authority of church and state by tending to withdraw from it rather than by issuing a challenge; and she accepts death when it comes, with only pangs of fear for the unknown. Her inadvertency emphasises the extent to which she is sought out.

At the root of her avoidance of involvement with men is a dislike of the idea of sexual intercourse and childbirth, which she finds repugnant and degrading: it is probably this attitude which causes her to object, with a strenuousness inappropriate to the circumstances, to being thought attractive. Not surprisingly, for she is only seventeen when the novel begins, her (probably unthinking) actions somewhat contradict her pronouncements. She is not averse to an innocent flirtation with Camillo Mattei, but has no understanding of her effect on him. She also responds to being kissed by Tasso. These incidents, though inconsistent with her expressed views, should not be allowed to obscure the more important points. She unthinkingly, but nonetheless deliberately, responds to Tasso and Camillo Mattei because she chooses to, and these incidents are properly interpreted as the forerunners of her later relationship with Bracciano, when she asserts her right to sexuality without having to accept connotations of immorality.

It is as an aspect of that right that she would cease to feel degraded in a sexual relationship only if the man were "excellent" like herself. (This is the significance of her poem Gewalt der Liebe, Bracciano is her equal ("So habe ich doch wirklich einen wahren,
wirklichen Mann gesehen"),(67) and is therefore acceptable. Keck is mistaken - and exaggerates the "salon" idea in the process - in believing that Vittoria "becomes an educative influence upon the Duke of Bracciano", or anyone else.(68)

The men she has met otherwise have been her inferiors in some essential matter, yet neither her nature nor her circumstances will tolerate chastity. She finds even Tasso unimpressive as a person (we recall references to him in Tod des Dichters), probably because his insistence on working within established rules is, to her, a denial of individuality;(69) she therefore condemns him for having desired her ("das dieser göttliche Tasso auch nur ein Mann, ein schwacher Mann war? - Nicht stärker als Camillo").(70) Peretti, another ordinary person, remarks bitterly after their marriage on the appropriateness of her alternative forename, Virginia.(71)

Nonetheless, Vittoria entertains the idea of encouraging Camillo, and does, in fact, marry Peretti. There are two reasons for this seeming paradox. Firstly, Camillo would be so far beneath her that she would not be disappointed: he would be a man "den ich eigentlich ohne alle Bitterkeit unter mir fühle".(72) This attitude is reminiscent of that taken by the "Klosterbruder" towards his desired career as an artist; he cannot be Raphael or Michelangelo, and therefore declines to be a painter at all. Secondly, Vittoria believes (wrongly, as it turns out) that marriage to such a man would protect her from harassment (she means Luigi Orsini in particular) while leaving her free to pursue her intellectual and poetic interest.(73)

She does not at that time know Bracciano.

While she does not feel that a union with Bracciano would
degrade her since he is her equal, she does not wish to become his mistress. Tieck hints that she still dislikes intercourse (Peretti's remark suggests that she may still be a virgin, even in marriage) until she experiences it in her marriage with Bracciano. (74) This is probably why, despite her previous insistence that the ceremony of marriage is meaningless and that the affinity of the lovers is the only salient fact, (75) she still insists on waiting until their marriage. This suggestion is borne out by her reasons for waiting, (76) which would be powerful to a girl of different character but seem unconvincing from Vittoria. Her fear that Bracciano would lose respect for her contradicts her previous utterances in advocacy of free love, and implies mistrust of him; she protests an obligation of loyalty to her mother, which has not troubled her before, and loyalty to Montalto, though she knows that Montalto's loyalty is to Peretti, not to her. She also expresses fear that society would take reprisals against her rather than against Bracciano, and cites the "double standard" by which sexual licence is permitted in a man and censured in a woman; although she must realise that high-ranking and powerful mistresses were not unknown and that Bracciano's position would be an adequate protection. She makes no objection on moral grounds and she is shown to be a courageous person, so we infer that an element of reluctance underlies her ratiocination. Her inexplicable advice to Peretti to avoid danger (77) may, like Genoveva's advice to Siegfried, indicate fear of the consequences of her freedom as a widow rather than solicitude for her husband. It is significant that, when in ostensibly protective custody after the murder of
Peretti and her trial, and denied contact with Bracciano, she is more happy and at peace engaged in solitary poetic activity than at any time previously. Her enjoyment of the pleasures of the idyll is not parasitic; therein she differs from Almansur, Eckbert, Heinrich of Des Lebens Überfluß or Ferdinand of Waldeinsamkeit. But she is equally naive in thinking it possible. Only her brief marriage to Bracciano produces greater happiness (thereby illustrating Falmouth's remark about Florentine in Die Klausenburg), and when she is fulfilled, it is as a woman, not as an intellectual or poetess. To that extent Tieck overstepped the bounds of this theme of "excellence".

He was, indeed, obliged to do so to make the kind of novel to which his previous interests impelled him. To have done otherwise would have required a focus of attention on Bracciano, with consequent overshadowing of Vittoria, or expansion of the work beyond a reasonable size. But Bracciano must, if we are to accept the validity of the general proposition about "excellence", be taken on trust, for although he has qualities of presence and leadership and a fine intellect (there are affinities with the characterisation of Faust, even to the involvement with alchemy), these are not shown in action, and the reader is left with the impression that his chief merit is in winning Vittoria's respect. While this is obviously a rare feat, one feels that he should be able to make more solid claims before being taken at her valuation. He seems more like a superior Pietro von Abano: and that is not enough, for in Tieck's scheme of ideas he is supposed to have another importance, by showing that the quality of "excellence";
which he has and Tasso lacks, is a quality of the character quite
distinct from poetic ability, which Bracciano seems to lack
entirely.

Our lasting impression of this work recalls Lubbock's
identification of the critic's difficulty in retaining an accurate
impression of any work. (79) Regardless of the interesting ideas
this novel contains, and despite their close integration with the
events and characterisations, the reader remembers Vittoria. In
portraying her Tieck succeeded, as nowhere else, in making beauty —
whether physical or artistic — convincingly beautiful in itself.
So often in other works we are required to take it on trust (or,
as in the case of Southampton, cannot avoid seeing that not all is
what it seems). Of all Tieck's works, this and Lovell are works
of art, absorbing on their own terms rather than giving us
intellectual food to take away and digest. This achievement results
from the unity of ideas and characters — the diremption of which
detracts from many of his works. From this we might amend Lubbock's
observation by adding that our impression of a work tends to
stabilise when this unity is established.

The present section on Vittoria Accorombona began by recounting
the themes of the novellas and by observing that this novel sums
them up. The themes of the novellas show a constant tendency to
polarise between beauty and ugliness, poetry and materialism or
power, original thought and the imposition of received values, to show
talent as therefore a liberation or a handicap. These may best be
thought of as "ideas", however, rather than as "themes", since
we have seen that the contexts in which they appear are as varied
as Tieck's undisciplined subject-interests dictated.

_Vittoria Accorombona_ reduces these polarised ideas to a single
question: Is excellence tolerable in society generally? Tieck
suggests that it is not. With the background of Simon (in
_Blaubart_), Beresynth (Pietro von Abano) and Ernestine (Die
Klausenburg), he construes beauty, poetry and individuation as forms
of excellence destined to attract hostility. Excellence is, he
implies, in itself a handicap.

Here, perhaps, is the key to his constant political ambivalence -
with his democratic and elitist ideas never fully reconciled - and
to his lifelong despair about the artistic preferences of the
majority. In Vittoria's fate (as in Labitte's) much of Tieck's
erlier pessimism is confirmed. His Shakespeare is revealed by
comparison as a fortunate exception; opportunists (Hinze, Fuchs,
Waterloo, Farnese) rule the roost; Sternbald and Leonhard
represent Tieck's wishful thinking; Christian is a warning;
Zerbino's journey in search of good taste is fruitless; the paths
taken by Bulenbock and Gottsched bring comfort and prestige;
Ledebrinna is real.
The problems of organising the vast corpus of material in Tieck's works have been considered in earlier sections, particularly I, IV and VI A(1), and the main strands of Tieck's thought have been reviewed in sections V and VI A(2). The multiplicity of themes and motifs makes it difficult to distil them into a statement which is both brief and true.

If there is one main strand with which all others are interwoven - albeit with a little judicious twisting and stretching here and there - it is the theme of beauty: its relations as an ideal with the ordinary world and with the artist; its translation into reality, whether that reality be moral, social, economic or political, whether it be concerned with private life or the life of communities and nations. A properly developed aesthetic sense is represented to be, if in the individual, a means of correcting or escaping from the thought-control insidiously exercised by the force of tradition and custom, or by literature; if in society - in so far as Tieck drew the distinction, especially in his later works - an awareness of beauty would prevent the ugliness of oppression, of industrialisation, and of attendant social evils. Tieck's attempts to show this desirable application of beauty were, however, far less convincing than his descriptions of its defeat (or its perversion, through the misapplication of creativity). The comparative prominence of socio-economic interests in the later works has also been noted, together with the reservation that these interests are rooted in
his early works.

The profusion of themes and motifs means that thematic classification, while necessary, may nonetheless be a little misleading if it is carried to excess. As an example of the difficulty, let us consider the unfortunate influence which, in Tieck's works, is often exercised by older friends or fathers (such as Selim and Omar on Abdallah; Lovell senior, Rosa and Waterloo on Lovell; or John Shakespear on William). In an abstract hierarchic arrangement of themes, this is merely an illustration of the younger person's encapsulation in the world of his interfering or oppressive elders, from which independent understanding (connected with an aesthetic sense) would have liberated both parties. But in the works, these relationships become important, each in its own right, as is shown by the relevant sections of the present study. The extent to which each develops under its own dynamic substantiates the method of this study in taking works as wholes rather than extracting elements from them for comparison out-of-context. It also shows how Tieck's imagination as a writer, his presentation of situations, and his ascription of motives, progressed beyond theoretical and easily classifiable structures. There is, in other words, a divergence between abstractions and actual cases (which is probably connected with the frequent contradictions between what Tieck seemed to think he had written and what he had actually written). It therefore becomes too simplistic to say that those older people and their younger quasi-victims would have been improved by an
awareness of beauty. To the extent that by the concept of beauty (as shown in Sommernacht, Lebrecht, the Phantasus poem and Dichterleben) Tieck meant a clear and balanced view of life and what was worthy in it, the simplistic statement is, of course, correct. But Tieck's use of the idea in different contexts gives rise to a variety of sub-themes, which depict the characters and their relationships: therefore, a number of disparate sub-themes may be traced back to the main one. Intermittent images of people as puppets or tools (for example, Balder, Hanswurst als Emigrant, and Bernneck) refer, therefore, to the lack of independence in thought and feelings which Tieck's "Poesie" would supply; social evils arise because an ugly environment is accepted; and much of the deficiency in Tieck's contemporary intellectual environment, which he includes in a somewhat individual understanding of the term Aufklärung, would be remedied by an understanding of beauty. It is important to distinguish between Tieck's underlying themes and his illustrative sub-themes or motifs. The bulk of critical writing about Tieck, as well as the virtual worthlessness of much of it, has arisen from the practice of "dismembering" his works (the term used in the Introduction), and the root cause has been a general failure to draw this distinction.

Even if only in the sheer variety of thematic material which Tieck used in the service of his aesthetic ideal, his place in literary history is assured. For good or for ill, many ideas subsequently important in world history are found in his works. His status as a possible source or intermediary for these ideas has probably attracted less attention than is deserved.
Zeydel(1) builds his advocacy of Tieck's importance chiefly on his historical position: that he exercised a considerable influence upon German and foreign authors by his own literary works and by his critical writings; that he influenced the development of the German theatre (including particularly the Munich "Bühnenreform" of 1889); that he furthered the reputations in Germany of certain foreign authors, notably Shakespeare and Cervantes; that he fostered interest in early German literature and in the works of some of his contemporaries; and that he popularised Romanticism. Zeydel also ascribes to Tieck the position of the first poet of a bourgeois metropolis, and shows how his historical importance was enhanced by his role as a transitional figure in a period of social and intellectual change. Some of Zeydel's views have been contested in this study; but in putting the case for Tieck's historical importance and literary merit he is alone amongst major writers on Tieck in treating him both sympathetically and without unwarranted indulgence.

Zeydel's assessment is valuable in drawing attention to the bourgeois aspect, but obviously requires amplification, which reinforces Tieck's claim to be regarded as a major precursor of modern thought. Specifically his works contain many ideas which a later age associates with Freud, Jung, Marx and Hitler. We have already noted how, in Abdallah and possibly in Eckart and in Der Alte von Berge, Tieck adumbrated Freud's Rat-Man case, and, in Sternbald and Runenberg, Freud's "Unbehagen in der Kultur". Two ideas subsequently found in Jung's theories are also present. The existence of intuitive thought, and a possible connection with the
idea of the Collective Unconscious, is found in Tieck's correspondence with Friedrich Schlegel (2) and in, for example, the character of Simon in Blaubert. (3) There is also a strong possibility that the Tieckian deprived lovers who so frequently appear as hermits, would-be artists who retain a warped relation to art, or a variety of characters who are denied normality and frivolity but eventually seek it either normally (Der Gelehrte), to excess (Greene of Dichterleben, and Lovell), or in a perverted form (Liebeszauber) - that these are obvious examples of Jung's view that if libido is withdrawn from its chosen object it will reassert itself in some other way. (4) Adumbrations of the racialism, propaganda-methods (associated with a low estimate of the propaganda-audience) and fitness-cults advocated in Mein Kampf are found in Tieck's works. (5) Last, but not least, Marx's views as to the dynamic of money, of its intrusion into human relationships, of the pursuit of cheap labour by free capital, of the aesthetic superiority of the world of the guilds, and the conversion of literature into a commodity, are also present in Tieck's works. (6) If the formulation of ideas is at least partly a cultural accumulation, as we take it to be, Tieck's place in the process of catalysis and transmission is worthy of attention, and the fact that his works are a rich open-cast mine of information about the thoughts of his time gives them a permanent value for later generations.

In conclusion, there are two ways in which Tieck made a unique contribution to German literature - a contribution which seems to vindicate his adoption of an aesthetic stance.

Firstly, he gave literary expression to a number of contemporary
ideas which would otherwise have lacked it. His transformation of
Kant's theory of perception was a vital starting-point, for he
seems to have realised that without a psychological or emotional
disturbance to make the obsession plausible it would have remained
merely an interesting idea (except to professional philosophers).
In turn, the disturbance itself had to be made plausible, by showing
how environmental influences had brought Lovell, a person of
ordinary abilities, to a state of readiness for trauma; and its
course had to be made plausible by establishing a tension between
the obsessed person fashioned by this philosophy and his
undistinguished basic character. This in turn required that a
further tension were established between the rather mediocre real
Lovell and the overweening and sentimental Lovell created by his
environment. The union of philosophy and realistic characterisation
and the integration of both with the influence of environment are
the bases of Lovell's entitlement to be called a masterpiece. In
more purely psychological vein, Tieck's use of the themes of
unrequited love and of fascination with terror and deceit show an
insight into and objective control over his material which might
more accurately be called realistic. It is consistent with his own
view of genius that some of his best works - for example, Lovell,
Liebeszauber and Vittoria Accombona - transform popular material
and reveal his mastery in the process.

Secondly, and arising from the foregoing, Tieck was highly
original, extremely effective and uniquely early in providing
successful psychological characterisations. He is usually regarded
as a Romantic, because his subject-matter could often be so
described. That, however, does not make him a Romantic.

Unfortunately, Tieck himself confused the issue in such works as Abdallah by his stylistic failure to distinguish between what we should accept as true and what we should take to be Abdallah's visions. Then there are some equally unfortunate atavistic ghosts in a few lesser novellas, (7) and some unimportant but memorable views of the past through rose-coloured spectacles such as Melusine. But even by the time of Lovell, Tieck's objectivity was an integral part of his art. The mere fact that the work is epistolary means that we, the readers, need believe nothing of Lovell's strange imaginings, but may take them to indicate his state of mind. There is no fundamental difference of approach, of Tieck's stance as author, between Lovell and, say, the more obviously realistic Die Ahnenprobe. There is merely a difference of subject-matter, which necessitates a difference of style and vocabulary.

Critics have written much about Tieck's "irony", in the sense of an author's detachment from and consequent objective control over his material, and have applied this concept particularly to his later works. They have therefore sought an explanation from his middle years, such as the alleged influence of Solger. But far from acquiring his "irony" from Solger in middle age (as in Mortl's view) or from literary sources earlier (as in Lusky's view), (8) Tieck was, with few exceptions, objective by nature from the beginning (as a writer, not as a person), allowing characters to depict themselves by their own words and actions. His treatment of avowedly Romantic themes of love, art, and religion is the treatment of a psychological realist, not of a Romantic; he treats of preoccupations with those
subjects, not with the subjects themselves. But because his raw material was imaginative, sometimes extremely so, and because, from a technical viewpoint, both his subject-matter and his style were sometimes ill-controlled, he is often termed a Romantic. His own critical pronouncements, assessing either his own works or the works of others, were subjective; it was his literary works which were realistic. Even his ideals, in the sense of standards for an ideal society, were realistic: Martin Sendling of Eigensinn und Leune, and Leonhard of Der junge Tischlermeister, show what can be achieved by developing, rather than ruining, innate qualities. The nearest Tieck came to describing a Utopia is the elfinland of Die Vogelscheuche, and it has human failings of an entirely acceptable kind.

It is Tieck's realism as an author that makes him seem startlingly modern. When one reads of such matters as the organic growth of an economy, and its eventual deterioration because of the uncontrolled injection of a money-supply; of political dissent being treated as lunacy; of totalitarian states; of the need to preserve old buildings and traditional crafts from destruction in the path of industrial development; of the need to recognise the importance of intuition - it is with only a small stretch of the imagination that Tieck could be seen as a mid-twentieth century writer, and it becomes clear that claims on Tieck's behalf to have been a progenitor of contemporary ideas must have some substance.

As a consequence of his realism, Tieck placed great value on a specific relationship with a real environment and on a positive
attitude towards it. To some extent (as shown by Paulin)\(^{(15)}\) this was a love of, even nostalgia for, his native country in an earlier time; but it was also an understanding that an individual's environment was self-evidently important to him, be he ordinary or a genius. In his insistence on this, at a time when it was not self-evident to many, he was a realist. In his aesthetic stance, which is crucial to an understanding of his ideas, he was realistically motivated. We have seen earlier how his aesthetic love for the Middle Ages did not blind him, except superficially, to the historical and psychological truth and how, most important of all, he did not, in the final analysis, convince himself or us that beauty must, in the face of opposition, necessarily prevail and have the effects on individuals and societies he, and we, would wish it to have. In these matters also his use of aesthetic means led inexorably to realistic (and pessimistic) conclusions. If we seek a brief definition of Tieck, he may be called the Aesthetic Realist.
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This is in the following sections:

I. PRIMARY LITERATURE
   A. TIECK'S WORKS AND CORRESPONDENCE
      Literary works by Tieck
      Critical works by Tieck
      Correspondence
   B. MISCELLANEOUS PRIMARY LITERATURE

II. SECONDARY LITERATURE
   A. WORKS ON TIECK
      [Works entirely on Tieck or comparing or contrasting Tieck with other named authors or movements. This section includes monographs, periodical articles, and articles in Festschriften or other compendia which contain articles by individual authors. Works on German literature containing references to or chapters on Tieck are listed separately.]
   B. WORKS ON GERMAN LITERATURE
   C. MISCELLANEOUS SECONDARY LITERATURE
I. PRIMARY LITERATURE

A. TIECK'S WORKS AND CORRESPONDENCE

Footnotes have normally been given in an abbreviated form in order to avoid the repetition of details in subsequent references or reference to an earlier footnote. The code-letters shown below and used in footnotes have been copied (if available) from Uwe Schweikert's Ludwig Tieck, München, 1971 (Dichter über ihre Dichtungen, Bd. 9 I/III): III, 309-314.

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Veblen, Thorstein

NOTES

I. INTRODUCTION

A. PROBLEMS IN ASSESSING TIECK


2. cf. Ellis, *Narration in the German Novelle*. Ellis argues (pp.77-99, especially pp.86-88) that *Der blonde Eckbert* recounts Eckbert's paranoid fantasy of a conspiracy against him. Psychological interpretations of this variety are obviously possible if attempting to explain the behaviour of such characters as Lovell, the King in *Zerbino* and Leopold of Waldsinsamkeit; though such elucidation should not be allowed to detract from considering the works more broadly.

3. See Freud's "Rat-Man" case, *Notes upon a case of obsessional neurosis* (1909), *Standard Edition of the Complete Psychological Works of Sigmund Freud*, Vol. 10, pp. 179-183, 200-201, 263-264, 279: the patient desires his father's death in order to remove parental opposition to a desired marriage. This is, in essence, the construction placed in the present study on the behaviour of Abdallah (see Chapter II A) and the Tannenhauser in *Eckart* (see Chapter II B(1)). The otherwise inexplicable desire felt by Balthasar (S XXIV, 172) to comply with his dead father's unreasonable wishes as to his marriage may be similarly motivated.

4. See the *Phantasus* framework (S IV, 12, 13-16, 56), *Die Elfen* (see above, Chapter III(3)), *Der Alte von Berge* (S XXIV, 175 ff.), *Der junge Tischlermeister* (S XXVIII, 78-82), *Der Jahrmarkt* (S XX, 13-16, 173-178), *Der Schutzgeist* (S XXV, 25).

5. This view is encountered, in various guises, in the locations shown in the following notes from Chapter II B: 53 (Haym), 54 (Hemmer and Trainer), 58 (Korff), 69 (Trainer), 73-76 (Gundolf), 78 (Huch), 81-83 (Staiger), 90 (Stopp).


9. These are listed in the Bibliography under *TIECK'S WORKS AND CORRESPONDENCE*.

B. SURVEY OF THE LITERATURE ON TIECK


15. Trainer, "The incest-theme in the works of Tieck". See particularly pp. 822, 824.

16. See below, Chapter II A.

17. Letters, Tieck to his father: 15 May 1792 and 12 November 1792 (LT, 4-6).

18. Cf. Letters, Tieck to Sophie: end of April 1792 (LTG, 286); June or July 1792 (LTG, 294-295); 20 November 1792 (LTG, 313-315); 23 December 1792 (LTG, 321-321); 24 September 1792 (LTG, 336-338).

19. See note 18; also letter, Sophie to Tieck, 1 May 1792 (LTG, 286).


22. Cf. Letters, Sophie to Tieck: 23 December 1792 (LTG, 319); 12 and 21 July 1793 (LTG, 329-331); 5 October 1793 (SK, 319-321).

23. Letter, Sophie to Tieck: 6 May 1792 (LTG, 290).


29. Such denial is implicit in many of the works listed in Note 5, above.


32. Minder, op. cit., pp. 11-12.

34. In *Der Gelehrte* the Professor finds himself repelled and oppressed by magnificent vistas of cliff and forest because he feels reduced in cosmic importance by the comparison, and he compares this feeling with that of a child abandoned by its nurse (S XXII, 16). However, it is not the feeling of being alone as much which terrifies the Professor, but the feeling of insignificance. This is an example of Tieck's use of autobiographical information as raw material—he uses it to characterise the arrogant and insecure old scholar—and does not prove that the childhood incident affected Tieck's own outlook.


36. The Grimm brothers' *Deutsches Wörterbuch* cites "in dem Stufengange der indischen Geistesgeschichte" from F. Schlegel's *Geschichte der alten und neuen Literatur. Fünfte Vorlesung in Sammtliche Werke* (I, 133). Tieck's familiarity with Schlegel's researches into oriental literature may be inferred from the correspondence between them, particularly his letter of March 1801 (Sch, 57ff.) and Schlegel's letters of 10 November 1802 (Sch, 124) and 15 September 1803 (Sch, 135-136).

37. Cf. the discussion below of Ali-Akoddin (Chapter II A), Shakespeare (Chapter IV B3), *Dichterleben* (Chapter VI 2(i), and Tieck's relations with Raumer (Chapter IV C2).


42. See below, Chapter IV D(3).

43. For Tieck's objective treatment of mediaeval and religious subject-matter, see, for example, discussion below of Genoveva (Chapter II D(2)), *Der Aufruhr in den Cevennen* (Chapter VI C(1)) and *Der 15. November* (Chapter VI C(2)).

44. Rosenkranz, "Ludwig Tieck und die romantische Schule", p. 4.


49. Rosenkranz, op. cit., p. 15.
54. Trainer, "Tieck, Rambach and the Corruption of Young Genius", p. 29.
   Hemmer, Die Anfänge Ludwig Tiecks und seiner dämonisch-
   scheuerlichen Dichtung, p. 305.
   See also below, Chapter IV B(1).
55. Haym, op. cit., p. 25. See also below, Chapter II A.
56. Haym, op. cit., pp. 43-45. See also below, Chapter II B.
57. Fenz, Die deutsche Romantik, p. 4.
58. Korff, Geist der Goethezeit, III, 480.
59. See below, Chapter II A.
60. See below, Chapter II A.
61. See below, Chapter IV B(1).
64. See below, Chapter II E(2).
68. Korff, op. cit., III, 515-516. Cf. below, Chapter II (3)
69. Trainer, "Ludwig Tieck". (German Men of Letters, I.)
   Trainer, "William Lovell: Tieck's world of Chaos". See
   particularly p. 192.
70. Trainer, Ludwig Tieck: From Gothic to Romantic, p. 10.
71. Korff, op. cit., IV, 125.
72. See below, Chapters II A, II B, IV B(1).

73. Gundolf, Romantiker. Neue Folge, p. 5.


75. Gundolf, op. cit., p. 9.


78. Huch, Die Romantik.

79. Gundolf, op. cit., p. 22.

80. Gundolf, op. cit., p. 33.


82. Staiger, op. cit., p. 326.

83. Staiger, op. cit., p. 351.

84. Staiger, op. cit., p. 334.

85. Staiger, op. cit., p. 341.

86. Staiger, op. cit., pp. 350-351.

87. The thematic connections between Lovell, Lebrecht, the Straußledern stories and the Volksbücher, despite wide stylistic similarities, are shown in the relevant chapters below (II B; II C(2)-(4)).

88. See below, Chapter IV C.


90. Compare the portrayal of Shakespeare as an idealised poet with necessarily mundane characteristics (see Chapter II A, Sommernacht; Chapter II C(5), Zerbino; Chapter VI D(2)(1), Dichterleben) with the idiosyncratic view revealed in Tieck's correspondence and critical writings (for which, see Chapter IV B(3)). Compare also his sympathetic and perceptive portrayals of women characters (see Chapter II D(2), Genoveva; and Chapter VII) with the bigotry revealed in correspondence (see Chapter VII A, Note 11).

91. This point is amplified below in discussing the influence of Raumer (Chapter IV C(2)) and Tieck's novella-theory.
(Chapter VI A(2)). See also Chapters VI E (for Die Ahnenprobe; Die Gesellschaft auf dem Lande and Der Junge Tischlermeister); VI D(2)(1) (for Dichterleben); and VI D(2)(11) (for Tod des Dichters).

In the last three works mentioned in Note 91, Tieck states that psychological factors which apply to individuals can apply also to whole societies.

See below, Chapter II D(2).

Staiger, op. cit., p. 326.

Korff, op. cit., III, 499. (See above, at Note 65.)

Thalmann, Die Romantik des Trivialen, pp. 93-113; see also below, Chapter IV B(1), Note 30. Cf. also Thalmann's Romantiker entdecken die Stadt, p.14.

Thalmann, Der romantische Weltmann aus Berlin, p.19.

Thalmann, Der romantische Weltmann aus Berlin, p.28.

Thalmann, Der Heilige von Dresden, p. 122.

Stopp, "Wandlungen des Tieckbildes", p.256. See also above, Note 13.

Zeydel, Ludwig Tieck, the German Romanticist, pp.309-310. See also below, Chapter VI F(4).

Zeydel, op. cit., pp. xvi, 359.

Zeydel, "Ludwig Tieck und das Biedermeier", p. 357.

See the following chapters below: II A (for Sommernacht); II O(1) (for Herr von Fuchs); II O(2) (for the Streusalzfedern stories); II E(1) (for the Herzenserlebnisse); IV A and IV B (for Tieck's reaction to the Aufklärung).

See below, Chapter II D(2).

Zeydel, "Ludwig Tieck und das Biedermeier", p. 357.

On the one hand are Tieck's denunciation of social and political oppression in Die Reisenden, Der Jahrmarkt and Hexen-Sabbath (see below, Chapters VI B(2), VI F(2) and VI D(1) respectively) and his portrayal in Der Alte vom Berge (see below, Chapter VI B(1)) of capital's evil dynamic. On the other hand, in private life he seems to have had reactionary outbursts chiefly in old age: see his letter to Johanna Steffens, 21 December 1848 (see below, Chapter VII A, Note 11);
letter to Ludwig Count Yorck von Wartenburg, 13 November 1852 (LT, 553-554); letter to Raumer, 21 December 1817 (UL, 153-155). These outbursts were probably distortions of his love of traditional mores - a love which was usually modified by a humane outlook. His more common views centre on advocacy of an enlightened conservatism in the social structure rather than an endorsement of reaction: see his letter to Raumer, November 1821 (LBI, 131-136). This is consistent with his emotional praise for the institution of monarchy (see KS IV, 376); there his argumentation has obvious aesthetic motives, containing such assertions as "Die Republik ist der Prosaismus". No doubt such views, taken in conjunction with Shakespeare's misguided praise of Southampton in Dichterleben (see below Chapter VI D(2)(i)), were readily misconstrued by the republican radicals in whose eyes Tieck seemed to have aligned himself with the forces of reaction; see Tieck's letter to Heinrich Brockhaus, 14 November 1835 (TN, 100).

108. See below, Chapter VI F(4). Cf. also Tieck's moderate view and dislike of political extremes revealed in letters to Raumer, 21 December 1817 (UL, 153-155) and "probably 1832" (UL, 148-150). Obviously Tieck was simply repelled by the crudity of some radical attacks on tradition: see also his letter to Raumer, 19 November 1824 (LBI, 169-175, particularly 172).


110. Zeydel, loc. cit.

111. See below, Chapter II D(2).

112. That Tieck's manner of avoiding involvement with radical circles was not always well-chosen is implicit in a letter to Heinrich Brockhaus, 14 November 1835 (TN, 100).

113. See below, Chapters VI F(4) (for the character of Martin Sendling in Eigensinn und Laune) and VI E (for the character of Elsheim in Der junge Tischlermeister).

114. See below, Chapters IV C(1), IV C(2), IV B(3).

115. See below, Chapters III(1), III(4).


118. Seidle, Biedermeierzeit, I, 222.

119. Seidle, op. cit., I, 245. See also below, Chapters VI A(2), VI A(3) (particularly VI A, at Note 21) for further consideration of Tieck's didacticism.
II. THE WORKS OF THE FIRST PERIOD

A. EARLY WORKS AS FORERUNNERS TO "WILLIAM LOWELL"

The chief of these are included in the Schriften: for details and for mode of citation, see the Bibliography under TIECK'S WORKS AND CORRESPONDENCE

A change in Tieck's conscious outlook may be inferred from his alterations to the satirical comedies (for their republication in Phantasus) and to Lovell. Pestalozzi (in his edition Ludwig Tieck, Die verkehrte Welt, pp. 96-97) notes that the Phantasus version omits some criticisms of religion, monarchy and patriotism but that the Schriften version restores them. These first alterations, with those to Lovell for the edition of 1813, have usually been held to indicate a mood of "Resignation" (see also Trainer's "William Lowell: Tieck's World of Chaos", pp. 199f.; and Lieske's Tiecks Abwendung von der Romanik, pp. 23-26). A similar inference may be drawn from the fact that Tieck's method of introducing the politically subversive Kater in Phantasus is to have Theodor concentrate on its formal aspects (see F, 159-160; also Chapter II C(5), below, at Notes 106-110). This attitude is also implicit in Tieck's introduction of the work in the Vorbericht zur ersten Lieferung of 1828 (see SI, pp. VIII-XXI). It is possible that Tieck wished to avoid a confrontation with the censor. Certainly, however, the mood of "Resignation" was superficial and temporary, for novelettes such as Die Keisenden and Der Hexen-Sabbath (see below, Chapters VI E(2) and VI D(1), respectively) are at least as subversive as the satirical comedies. It would appear, therefore, that Tieck's political views had little bearing on the alterations. It is suggested below (see below, Chapter IV(C), that Tieck feared intermittently the amoral dynamic of his creativity. This would explain his persistent misunderstanding of such works as Abdallah and Lovell as the perpetual tinkering by his conscious mind with the products of his unconscious creativity.
3. See above, Note 1.
4. See below, Chapter IV A.
8. Tieck, letter to Solger, 31 March 1815 (TS, 166-170, particularly 167).
9. Vorbericht zur zweiten Lieferung, S VI, pp. V-XVIII.
10. Schiller, Die Räuber, Act I, Scene 1; Act II, Scene 2.
11. See below, Chapter IV A.
12. These aspects are considered particularly in Chapter II B, below.
13. NS I, 15.
14. NS, 15-16.
15. S XVIII, 120, 161ff. (Referring to Southampton).
17. Masculine qualities of character are implied in Vittoria’s physical courage and by the analogy of Tasso’s admiration for Margaret of Parma. (Tieck, Werke, Ed. M. Thalmann, IV, 582, 593-594).… Cf. also the anonymous central character of the story Die männliche Mutter. (S XIV, 53-70).
18. NS I, 18.
19. S XXVII, 331. Cf. also the character of Termheim in Eine Sommerreise (SXXIII, 52-56) and the central character of Der Gelehrte (see below, Chapter VI C).
20. See below, Chapters IV B(3) and VI D(2i).
28. Haym, Die romantische Schule, p. 34.
32. S VIII, 275.
33. See below, Chapter II E(1).
35. NS II, 4,6.
36. Vorbericht zur dritten Lieferung, S XI, pp.LXV-LXXVII, particularly LXXII-LXXVII. Tieck's reference to Böhme in this Vorbericht arises from his discussion of his Der Autor (formerly called Der neue Herkules am Scheidewege) of 1800. In a letter to Solger, 24 March 1817 (TS, 359-364, particularly 361-362), Tieck writes that his self-immersion in Böhme and Tauler brought about a crisis which influenced the writing of Zerbino, Senovasa, and Octavian. (Cf. also: Köpke's Ludwig Tieck, II, 174 and Chapter IV C(1), below). These examples show that Tieck's conscious awareness of these religious and metaphysical matters dated from the late 1790s, lagging behind his poetic intuition.
37. Vorbericht zur zweiten Lieferung, S VI, p. VIII.
38. See below, Chapter IV E(1).
39. See below, Chapter II C(2), II C(3), II C(5).
42. S VIII, 34-35, 113, 117, 123.
44. See below, Chapter VI E.
45. Tieck, letter to Weckenroder, 28 December 1792 (TW,405).

47. See above, Chapter I, Note 3.


49. S XI, 7.

50. S XI, 15.

51. *Vorbericht zur dritten Lieferung*, S XI, p. XXXVII.

52. *Vorbericht zur dritten Lieferung*, S XI, p. XXXIX.

53. See below, Chapter IV B(1).


55. For variant spellings, see below, Chapter II D, Note 5.

56. See his wearing of heavy armour and manipulation of weapons, and his obsession with the legend (S XI, 15-19, 82).

57. S XI, 66.

58. S XI, 88.


60. S XI, 71.


63. KS III, 290.

64. *Buch über Shakespeare*, 60-61.

65. See below, Chapter IV B(1).
B. "WILLIAM LOVELL"

1. S VI, 5.
7. S VI, 76-80.
8. S VII, 281-282. This is the fault found also in Berglinger; see below, Chapter II B(1).
10. S VI, 128-130.
13. S VI, 129.
15. S VI, 188.
18. S VI, 128-130.
22. S VI, 250.
26. S VII, 281-282
27. S VII, 243-244.
29. S VI, 200, 201; S VII, 167.
30. S VII, 279.
31. S VI, 164.
32. Wüstling, TIECKS WILLIAM LOVELL, p. 72.
34. Kant, Grundlegung zur Metaphysik der Sitten. (See Kant's gesammelte Schriften, IV, 434.)
35. S VI, 177.
36. TIECKS GEDICHTE, III, 230-231.
37. S VI, 178.
40. Ibid.
41. Ibid.
42. S VI, 179.
44. Buch über Shakespeare, p. 115.
45. Buch über Shakespeare, p. 117.
46. S VI, 255.
47. S VII, 322-323.
50. S VI, 83-84.
51. Schiller, Die Räuber, Act IV, Scene 2. (Nationalausgabe, Vol. 3, p. 95.)
52. See below, Chapter VI G, Note 30.

53. S VI, 146.


56. It is possible that Christian’s father in Der Runenberg similarly takes refuge in the cultivation of plants, including the belief in communing with them, in order to combat an instability in himself (and obviously more apparent in Christian). See below, Chapter II E(2).

57. S VII, 287-324, particularly 312-315.

58. Buch über Shakespeare, pp.131-133.


60. S VII, 175. This is similar to the implication that Leonhard in Der junge Tischlermeister (S XXVIII,110,416ff., 442ff.) is “incomplete” because of an unfulfilled love-affair with Kunigunde. This is an interpretation of the symbol of the “Baugeist” in an uncompleted house: the “Baugeist” was restless until Leopold’s return after having resumed and completed his relationship with Kunigunde (S XXVIII, 9-10,466).

61. S VII, 176.


63. S VII, 324.

64. S XVIII, 285-284.

65. See above, Note 60; and below, Chapter VI E.


70. Weigand, Tiecks „William Lovell”, p.100.

71. Haym, op.cit., p.49.


73. Weigand, op.cit., p.103.
C. TIECK'S PORTRAYAL OF HIS CULTURAL MILIEU


3. Ibid., S XI, pp. XXV-XXVI.

4. This is the title in the Schriften. It was first published as Ein Schurke über den andern, oder die Fuchsprelle.

5. S XII, 5, 6.


7. S XII, 7, 9-10. Cf. Chapters II B(2) and VI B(1) below.

8. S XII, 43.

9. S XII, 38.

10. S XII, 44.

11. S XII, 40-43.

12. S XII, 80-88.

13. S XII, 82.

14. S XII, 82ff.

15. This is implicit in Tieck's claims of the greatness required to appreciate Shakespeare (letter to Wackenroder, 10 May 1792, TW 292), and his criticism of their friends Schmohl and Moritze (letter to Wackenroder, 28 December 1792, TW 396-397). Cf.
examples in Lovell (see above, Chapter II B, Note 6; in the 
Hersenserröllungen (see below, Chapter II B(1), Notes 13,24, 
31-33).

16. Cf. also S XII, 57.
17. S XII, 84.
18. S XII, 85.
20. S XII, 85-86.
21. S XII, 86.
22. S XII, 86-88.
23. S XII, 80.
24. S XII, 81.
25. S XII, 61.
26. S XII, 62.

27. This is generally true of Schicksal (S XIV), Die mäinnliche 
Mutter (S XIV), Die Brüder (S VIII), as well as of those 
stories listed below in Notes 28 and 29. See Zeydel's 
Ludwig Tieck, the German Romanticist, pp.57-58.

28. This is generally true of Die beiden merkwürdigsten Tage aus 
Siegmunds Leben (S XV), Fiufer der Geniale (S XV) and Ulrich, 
der Empfindsame (S XV). These stories are mentioned in this 
section.

29. As in Der Fremde (S XIV).

30. See discussion below of Die beiden merkwürdigsten Tage aus 
Siegmunds Leben.

31. See below, Chapter IV A. Cf. also specific references to the 
Aufklärung in Herr von Fuchs (see above, Notes 10,12) and in 
Ulrich, der Empfindsame (S XV, 125).

32. S XV, 142-147.

34. Cf. examples of general accusations against women by Berner in 
Blaubart (S V, 141-142) and Ernestine, (see below Chapter VII A, 
Note 4); and examples of provocative behaviour by women.
Florentine in Das Zauberseel (see below, Chapter VII A, Note 9), Catharina Otaz in Tod des Dichters (S XIX, 406ff.) and Vittoria Accorombona (see below, Chapter VII B, Notes 63, 64).

35. Its marked dissimilarity from the other Straußfedern stories is noted by Zeydel (Ludwig Tieck, the German Romanticist, pp. 58-59, 73-74); Zeydel does not, however, note its complementary relationship to them, regarding it rather as a form of escapism.

36. S XIV, 158.
37. S XIV, 158.
38. S XIV, 160.
39. S XIV, 158.

40. Vorbericht zur dritten Lieferung, S XI, p. XXXIV.

41. See below, Chapter VI A(3).
42. S XIV, 163-165.
43. S XIV, 164, 166, 248.
44. S XIV, 248-250; SXV, 20.
45. S XV, 1-8; 44-47.

46. Unfortunately, Tieck's criticism of the mass reading-public still has some force. The several categories of light fiction in today's public libraries - the western, the crime-novel, and the romance (with its sub-category, the hospital romance), often produced in large numbers by relatively few authors each using several pseudonyms - provide an interesting analogy. Avid readers of these sometimes develop the habit of encircling the page-number which is the same number as their own houses. They need this mnemonic because, when reading at home, they are unable to remember what they have read until part-way through. They have been known to object to the alleged deletion of these marks by the library staff, although the real explanations are either that they had previously borrowed and marked duplicate copies, or that the volume has been rebound and has therefore lost its memorably-illustrated dust-jacket, or that another unknown page-ringer lives at the same number in another street.

47. S XV, 20-21.
48. S XIV, 203.
49. S XIV, 231.
50. S XIV, 214.
52. S XV, 52-55. Possibly Tieck intended also an oblique criticism of Gottsched, whose moralising periodical Der Biedermann was published in 1727. Cf. Tieck's dislike of Gottsched's literary values, as revealed by Hanswurst als Emigrant (see below, Chapter II C(5), Note 101) and Die Vogelscheuche (see below, Chapter VI F(3), Notes 64, 72.)
53. S XIV, 180-182, 213, 215; S XV, 8-12, 14, 25-27.
56. S XIV, 239.
57. S XV, 62.
58. S XV, 62, 63-64.
60. S XIV, 238.
62. See below, Chapters III(2) and VI(D)(1).
64. Vorbericht zur dritten Lieferung, S XI, p. XXXV.
65. In Volksmärchen, I: Erste Vorrede, pp. vff.; Scherzhafte Vorrede, pp. xiii ff. These introductions are not included in the Schriften, but are reproduced in Schweikerts Ludwig Tieck (Dichter über ihre Dichtungen), I, 155-158.
66. See below, Chapter II E(1).
67. See below, Chapter II E(2).
68. These groups are discussed, respectively, in the remainder of the present section and in Chapters II C(5) and II E.
70. S IX, 27.
72. S IX, 23.
73. S IX, 31.
76. S IX, 53-58.
77. S IX, 68-70, 78-79.
78. S IX, 77-78.
79. S IX, 81.
80. S IX, 81-82.
81. S IX, 97-99, 184ff., 175ff., 199.
82. S IX, 176-177.
83. S IX, 91ff.
84. S IX, 105-107.
86. S IX, 199-200, 217-219.
87. S IX, 193. Cf. also S IX, 220.
89. S IX, 222.
90. This is the title given in the Schriften. The original title in the Straußeadern was Merkwürdige Lebensgeschichte seiner Majestät Abraham Tonelli.
92. S IX, 273.
94. See above, Note 66.
95. NSI, 125, Cf. a similar point in Kater. S V 217-219.
96. NSI, 77.
97. NSI, 125.
98. S XXVII, 162-181, 344. See below Chapter VI F.
99. NSI, 95-96.
100. See below Chapters II D(1), and VI G.
101. NSI, 125.
102. See below, Chapter VI F(3).
104. S XIII, 245-246.
105. S XIII, 261-263.
106. See above, Chapter II C(3).
108. S V, 159-160; SI, p. VIII-XX.
110. Gillespie, op. cit., p.27.
111. S V, 280.
112. S V, 259.
113. S V, 190-192, 220ff.
115. S V, 166-167.
117. Cf. also S V, 177-178, 186, 169,195,199-202; similarly throughout.
118. S V, 203.
119. S V, 207-211.
120. S V, 182-183, 196-197, 211-212.
121. S V, 196.
122. S V, 260-261.
124. S V, 223.
125. S V, 211-212.
126. S V, 226.
129. S V, 222-223.
130. S V, 296-207.
131. S V, 224.
133. S V, 277-278.
134. S V, 279.
135. S V, 290-299.
136. S V, 297-299.
137. S V, 294ff.
139. S V, 297.
140. S V, 315ff. See also Fraking's "Zwei Shakespeareparodien in Tiecks 'Verkehrter Welt'", pp. 355-356.
141. S V, 302-304.
142. S V, 324-325.
144. S V, 376-377.
146. S V, 343-344.
147. S V, 375ff.
148. S V, 400.
149. S V, 401.
150. S V, 401.
152. S V, 401-404.
154. S V, 430.
155. S V, 430.
156. S V, 430-431.
158. S X, 293-297.
159. See below, Chapter IV C(1)
162. S X, 98ff.
163. S X, 189-190.
164. S X, 50-51, 53-54.
165. S X, 46ff.
166. S X, 50.
167. S X, 52.
168. S X, 52.
169. S X, 358.
170. S X, 53-54.
171. S X, 173.
172. S X, 4-5.
173. S X, 32-34.
174. S X, 141.
177. S X, 10-11.
179. S X, 36-37.
182. S X, 54-70.
183. S X, 236.
184. S X, 320.
185. S X, 178.
186. S X, 132.
188. S X, 176-187.
189. S X, 268.
190. S X, 272-274.
192. S XXVIII, 157. Cf. the analogy of this idea in art (S XXVIII, 270) and in language and decorum (S XXVIII, 212f., 281). Tieck's Vorwort of 1836 (quoted by Schweikert in his compilation Ludwig Tieck (Dichter über ihre Dichtungen), I, 277) states that Der junge Tischlermeister was conceived in 1795; though Schweikert believes that Tieck amended the true date from 1796 in order not to substantiate the belief that he had been influenced by Goethe's Wilhelm Meister, which appeared in 1796.
194. See below, Chapter V (end), VI A(2), VI F(1)-(3).
195. Zeydel, "Das Reh - ein Jugendwerk Ludwig Tiecks". Zeydel refers (pp. 93-96) to the following: Hauffen's Zu Ludwig Tiecks Nachlaß; Regener's Tieck-Studien. Drei Kapitel an dem Thema: Der junge Tieck; Hemmer's Die Anfänge Ludwig Tiecks.
196. NSI, 26-28.
197. NSI, 30.
198. S X, 3-7; S IV, 214-215, 220.
199. S XI, 155ff.
201. S XI, 231.

D. TIECK'S REJECTION OF THE ROMANTIC MIDDLE AGES

1. See below, Chapter VI D.

2. S XIV, 214.


4. See below, Chapter VI D(2)(i).

5. The full title in the Schriften is Die Geschichte von den Heymons Kindern in zwanzig altfränkischen Bildern (S XIII, 1). The work and the original story are usually referred to (by Tieck, as well as others) using a shortened form variously spelled as Haïmonskinder, Heymons kinder, Heimonskinder or Heymons kinder. The latter spelling, which appears in the abbreviated title in the contents-list to volume XIII of the Schriften, is used in this thesis unless quotation requires a variant.


7. KSI, 187ff., 195f. (This introduction is entitled Die altdeutschen Minnelieder in KSI.)


10. Vorbericht zur dritten Lieferung, S XI, p. XLII.


14. See below, Chapter II E(2).
17. See below, Chapter VII B.
19. See above, Chapter II A; below, Chapter VI G.
20. See below, Chapter III(3).
21. See above Chapter II C(5); below, Chapter VI G.
22. See below, Chapters IV E(3), VI D(2)(1).
23. Vorbericht zur ersten Lieferung, SI, p. XVIII.
27. S II, 31: Karl Martell believes that the Spaniards were conquered by the Moors because their Christianity was defective; he believes also that Germany's Christianity is the true one and that the Moors will therefore be defeated.

S II, 58: Otteb claims that his religious belief helps him to kill infidel enemies.

S II, 65: Karl Martell rebukes Aquitanien for having attempted to rape the Moorish woman Zultoa; his objection is not to the violation but to the potential defilement of the Christian Aquitanien.

S II, 79: Wolf comments, concerning the beauty and excellent workmanship of a Moorish sabre, that only their religion prevents him from regarding the Moors as a worthy people. Cf. also S II, 15-16.
30. S II, 133-137: Drago lauds the Crucifixion as an example of willingness to be martyred; but he does so merely to enjoin submissiveness upon Genoveva, and is apparently unaware of the interpretation of the Crucifixion as an atonement for the sins of others.
S II, 188. Genoveva, in the forest with her infant son Scluaeraenreich, compares herself to Abraham. The analogy is nonsense, for she herself is the intended victim, whereas the intended victim in the Bible was Abraham's son, Isaac. Similarly, her reference to slaughtering the lamb (meaning her son) is inaccurate, for Abraham killed a lamb as a preferable victim; he did not plead for the lamb (as she for her son) as being more worthy of preservation.

31. S II, 84-88.
32. S II, 41.
33. S II, 44.
34. S II, 96.
35. S II, 103.
36. S II, 148-149.
37. S II, 246.
38. S II, 41, 149-150.
40. S II, 96-98.
41. S II, 105-106.
42. S II, 12, 14, 142ff., 157.
43. S II, 146-147.
44. S II, 150.
45. S V, 141-142; Tieck. Werke (ed. by Thalmann), IV, 741ff., 764.
46. S II, 16.
47. S II, 131.
48. S II, 163.
49. S II, 165.
50. S II, 165.
E. **THE INDIVIDUAL AND SOCIETY**

1. See below, Chapter II B(2).


7. See below, Chapters IV B(3) and VI D(2)(i).


17. *TW*, 92-93.


26. Kohlschmidt, "Bemerkungen zu Wackenroders und Tiecks Anteil...". Kohlschmidt, "Der junge Tieck und Wackenroder".

28. Zipes, "W. H. Wackenroder: in Defence of his Romanticism". See particularly pp.257-258. Zipes bases his view on the strong biographical similarities between Berglinger and Wackenroder. But Wackenroder's dislike of the prospect of a career in law at his father's behest is recorded in a letter to Tieck in 1792 (TW,387); and it is hardly conceivable that they had not discussed it even before then. Tieck's early familiarity with Wackenroder's circumstances means that Zipes's conclusion does not necessarily follow from the evidence.

29. TW, 249.

30. TW, 249.

31. TW, 249-250.

32. TW, 250.

33. TW, 251.

34. TW, 251.

35. Butler, "Wozu Dichter in dürftiger Zeit?", p.27.

36. According to S XVI, 38, where the incident is described, he was six at the time. However, there is some doubt as to Franz's age. Elsewhere (S XVI, 69), the incident is stated to have taken place fourteen years before, so Franz should be twenty when the main action of the novel begins. But Tieck also gives his age as twenty-three (S XVI,62).

37. S XVI, 39.

38. S XVI, 40.


41. S XVI, 40.

42. S XVI, 67-69.

43. S XVI, 69.

44. S XVI, 69.

45. S XVI, 69-70.

46. S XVI, 32-33
47.  S XVI, 22-23. Cf. also S XVI, 13.
48.  S XVI, 24-25.
49.  S XVI, 25ff.
50.  S XVI, 37.
51.  S XVI, 42-43.
52.  S XVI, 48-49.
53.  S XVI, 54.
55.  S XVI, 24-25.
56.  S XVI, 53.
57.  S XVI, 60.
58.  S XVI, 62.
59.  S XVI, 114.
60.  S XVI, 128.
63.  S XVI, 90.
64.  S XVI, 94-96.
65.  S XVI, 94.
68.  S XVI, 204.
69.  S XVI, 386.
70.  Tieck, letter to Friedrich Schlegel, 4 September 1806 (Sch, 160-161); letter to G.A. Reimer, 28 February 1817 (LT, 68-69).
71.  Alewyn, "Ein Fragment der Fortsetzung...".
72.  This is true of, for example, Lovell and Waterloo (Lovell), Golo (Renovva), Camoens (Tod des dichters).
(Hexen-Sabbath), Luigi Orsini (Vittoria Accorombone) and others.

73. S XVI, 183-185.
74. S XVI, 185.
75. S XVI, 204.
76. See below, Chapter IVA.
77. Der Blaubart is the title used in the Schriften, Bd. V. It was published in the Volksmärchen, Bd. I, as Ritter Blaubart. Both titles are in common use.
78. S V, 65-66, 82, 141-142.
79. S V, 46ff.
80. S V, 14-15, 17, 18, 24-25, 26-27, 32-34.
81. S XV, 8ff.
83. See below, Chapter II B, Notes 43-44.
84. See above, Chapter II C(5), Notes 164-166.
85. S IV, 177, 185, 188, 193.
86. S IV, 181-183.
87. See below, Chapter II E(3).
88. S IV, 195.
89. Cf. Jung's On Psychic Energy (see Collected Works, Vol. 8, pp. 39-40). The point is also similar to Jung's belief that an attitude taken to one extreme may change into its opposite: cf. his On the Psychology of the Unconscious (see Collected Works, Vol. 7, p. 72.)
90. See below, Chapter III(3).
91. S IV, 199.
93. S IV, 205.
94. S IV, 203ff.
95. See above, Chapter I A, Note 3. Cf. Dostoevsky's
The Brothers Karamazov: Ivan's guilt at having desired his father's death is brought to the surface when his father is murdered by Smerdyakov, though Ivan believes Dmitry is the murderer (The Brothers Karamazov, pp.706-7, 716, 718, 721, 725, 726. Cf. also Dmitry's reaction on believing he has killed Grigory (p.516).

96. S IV, 208-209.
97. S IV, 211.
98. S IV, 211.
100. S IV, 213.
102. S IV, 214.
103. S IV, 217.
104. See below, Chapter II B(3).
110. S IV, 216, 217.
111. S IV, 216.
112. S IV, 222-224. See also below, Notes 118-120. For Ewton's interpretation of this event, see below, Chapter IV B(2), Note 60.
113. S IV, 221.
115. S IV, 226.

117. S IV, 229.


119. Vredsfeld, op. cit., p. 204.


121. S IV, 229-230.

122. S IV, 230.

123. S IV, 230.

124. S IV, 229.

125. S IV, 239-240.


129. S IV, 234.

130. S IV, 236.

131. S IV, 236.

132. S IV, 221.

133. SIV, 236.

134. S IV, 237.

135. S IV, 238.

136. S IV, 239, 243-244.


141. S IV, 146-147, 160.


143. Rippere, op. cit., p.477. See also S IV, 148-150.

144. S IV, 147.

145. S XVIII, 11.

146. S IV, 162.

147. S IV, 151ff. Rippere (op. cit., p.478) finds this "paradoxical"!

148. S IV, 155-156.

149. S IV, 160.

150. S IV, 156f.

151. S IV, 158.

152. S IV, 169.


159. S IV, 169.


In fact, incestuous intercourse is not infertile. If Tieck believed it to be so, and if one bases an interpretation of the story on his postulated belief in this, our modern knowledge can only reduce the symbolic value of the work.

161. S IV, 144.


163. Northcott, "A Note on the Levels of Reality in Tieck's Der blonde Eckbert".

165. See above, Chapter I B


170. Ellis in his *Narration in the German Novelle* (pp. 77-93; Tieck: 'Der blonde Eckbert') gives the interesting view (which he summarises on pp. 86-88) that the story is Eckbert's paranoid fantasy of a conspiracy against him. But we are not told how Walther knows of Strohmian and why Eckbert and Bertha entered upon an incestuous marriage. Walther's knowledge of Strohmian also puzzles the following:

Hillmann, "Ludwig Tieck", p. 119.

III. THE MIDDLE YEARS - "PHANTASUS" AND "FORTUNAT"


2. *Vorbericht zur ersten Lieferung*, S I, p. XLII.

3. Thalmann, *Das Märchen und die Moderne*, p. 35.
Thalmann, *Der romantische Weltsmann aus Berlin*, pp. 40-41, 74.


8. See below, Chapter VI A(3).
10. S IV, 95.
13. See above, Chapter II E(1), Note 36.
15. S IV, 129.
18. S IV, 143, 213, 244-245, 365.
19. S IV, 64.
20. See above, Chapter II C(1), Note 25.
21. S XXIII, 52-56.
25. S IV, 72.
27. S IV, 12.
29. S IV, 364.
30. The insular ignorance of social and economic reality on the part of the royal court is criticised in Kater and Zerbino (see above, Chapter II C(5)). This ignorance is possibly linked with Lebrecht's urban idealisation of the country (see above, Chapter II C(3)).
31. S IV, 77-84.
32. S IV, 80.
33. S IV, 80.
34. His awareness is implicit also in *Die Elfen* (see below, Chapter III(3)) and in *Der junge Tischlermeister* (see below, Chapter VI E).

35. See below, Chapter VI E.


37. S IV, 286-287.

38. S IV, 289.


40. See discussion of the *Phantasmus* poem, below.

41. Tieck expressed regret that his poor health did not permit him to undertake any patriotic work against the French invaders (see letter, 5 April 1813, to Barthold Georg Niebuhr, quoted as Tie 40 in Schweikert's *Ludwig Tieck* (Dichter über ihre Dichtungen), III, 169.

Perhaps more plausibly and more sensibly, he referred elsewhere (letter to Solger, 1 February 1812, TS 94) to his early interest in Mediaeval Germany, which he regarded as evidence of patriotism; he also commented ironically on the criticism which he feared he would incur for not showing more political interest at such a time. In Tieck's defence one may cite the strongly political aspects of the satirical comedies and *Däumchen*, which are discussed in relevant chapters; these aspects, it could be argued, concern more important matters than the ebb-and-flow of military fortunes.

42. See below, Chapter VI E. See also above, Chapter II C, Note 192.

43. S IV, 134.


45. S IV, 130-133.

46. S IV, 132.

47. S IV, 134-135.

48. See below, Chapter VI G.

49. S IV, 133.

50. S IV, 138-140, 142.

51. S IV, 143.

53. See below, Chapter VI F.

54. See below, Chapter VI F.

55. See below, Chapter VI A(3).

56. See below, Chapter VI D(2)(a).

57. S V, 570.

58. S V, 579.

59. Hitler, Mein Kampf, pp. 316, 323, 421. Cf. S V, 549, 551, 553. The common features are the enslavement and exploitation of subjected races and the unquestioned assumption of rights attaching to physical supremacy.

60. S V, 581-585.


62. S V, 505.

63. Cf. Leander in Kater and Zerbino (see above, Chapter II C(5)); Termheim in Eine Sommerreise (S XXIII, 52-56); the remarks of Puck in Sommernacht (see above, Chapter II A) and of the "Kobold" in Die sieben Weiber des Blaubart (see above, Chapter II C(4)).

64. S V, 589-594.


66. S V, 540.

67. S V, 574.

68. S V, 506-507.


70. Examples may be found in SIV, 251-252, 262, 275-276.

71. S IV, 246-247.

72. S IV, 250.

73. S IV, 261.
74. S IV, 261.
75. S IV, 249.
76. S IV, 254.
77. S IV, 254.
78. S IV, 255ff.
80. S IV, 266.
81. S IV, 280.
82. S IV, 282.
83. S IV, 282.
84. S IV, 280-282.
85. S IV, 282.
86. Novalis, Heinrich von Ofterdingen, Schriften, I, 244-245. (Tieck and Friedrich Schlegel edited Novalis's Schriften in 1802.)
88. Wackenroder, Reisebericht, Reise nach Nürnberg und Fürth, 24 August, 1793 (Tw, 579ff.); Reise nach Ansbach und Nürnberg, 4 October 1793 (Tw, 592). Wackenroder may have received the idea directly or indirectly from Adam Smith's Wealth of Nations of 1776 (see Smith's Wealth of Nations, I 14-19); Smith regarded the division of labour as tending to promote efficiency and did not raise Tieck's or Marx's objections. Marx's reference in Das Kapital to the needle-makers as examples of alienated, because divided, labour (Capital, I, 338; cf. also Capital, I, 359, 363, 422) may have a curious and confused bibliographic ancestry. Cf. also Marx and Engels: Manifesto of the Communist Party, p. 60. Cf. also S XXVIII, where Leonhard refers to the manufacture of nails and needles as the antithesis of traditional craftsmanship.
89. S IV, 12.
90. S IV, 382.
92. S IV, 373-374.
IV. TIECK'S "GEDANKENWELT": THEMES AND INFLUENCES

A. THE LATE "AUFLÄRUNG" AND OTHER CONTEMPORARY IDEAS


3. Vorrede zur zweiten Auflage, S VI, 5.
Vorbericht zur zweiten Lieferung, S VI, p. XVI.
4. Tieck, letter to Wackenroder, 10 May 1792 (TW, 293).


6. See below, Chapter VI D(2)(1) (S XVIII, 323-330).

7. See below, Chapter VI E(1).

8. See below, Chapter IV C.

9. See below, Chapter VI E.

10. This may be inferred from his portrayal of the period in Genoveva, Haymonskinder and Eckart, and of its surviving economic and political forms in the satirical comedies.


14. Letters, Wackenroder to Tieck, December 1792 (TW, 382f.) and January 1793 (TW, 411, 418).


16. See below, Chapter IV B(2).


21. KS I, see particularly pp. 143ff., 149-150, 152ff.


23. Cf. Tieck's letter to P. Schlegel, March 1801 (Sch, 57ff.).

24. See below, Chapter VI B(2); Chapter VI F(1).

25. Vorbericht zur zweiten Lieferung, S VI, pp. XXXIII-XXXIV.
23. See below, Chapters IV B(3), IV C(1).
24. See below, Chapter IV B(1).
25. See below, Chapter IV D(1).
26. See above, Chapter III(1); below, Chapters VI A(3), VI D.

B. REACTIONS TO THE "AUFKLÄRUNG"

27. Trainer, Ludwig Tieck: From Gothic to Romantic, p.29.
28. Hemmer, Die Anfänge Ludwig Tiecks und seiner dämonisch-
schauerlichen Dichtung, pp.306f.
30. Thalmann, Die Romantik des Trivialen.
32. See below, Chapter VI A(2).
33. See below, Chapter VI B(2).
34. See below, Chapter VI C(1).
35. See below, Chapter VI D(4).
37. See below, Chapter VI C(1).
38. See below, Chapter VI C(2).
40. Tieck, Werke (ed. by Thalmann), IV, 764-768, 770-774, 792-793f.
41. See below; also Chapter IV B(3).
42. KSI, 62ff.
43. KSI, 70.
44. Tieck letter to Solger, 24 March 1817 (TS, 361).
45. Vorbericht zur dritten Lieferung, S XI, pp.LXXII-LXXV.
46. Ederheimer, Jakob Boehme und die Romantiker, pp.4, 10-11.
47. Tieck, letter to Solger, 24 March 1817 (TS, 362).

Porterfield refers to Tieck's letter to Solger, 24 March 1817 (TS, 359-364).

49. Tieck, letter to Solger, 24 March 1817 (TS, 363).


52. Tieck, letter to Solger, 24 March 1817 (TS, 363).

53. See below, Chapter IV C.

54. Witkowski, "Tiecks Leben und Werke", p. XLIII.

55. Witkowski, op. cit., p. LXVII.

56. Thalmann, Der Heilige von Dresden, pp.33f.

57. See below, Chapter VI C(l).


60. Ederheimer, op. cit., p.52.

Eton's article on Der Runenberg (cf. its pp. 22-23, 25) may be similarly described. Eton assumes that the eclectic Tieck was imbued with Böhme's thoughts merely because he used some reminiscent images. Eton reaches thereby the absurd conclusion that Christian's experience in the mountain is his own physical rebirth.

61. See below, Chapter II D.

62. See above, Chapter IV B(l).

63. Buch über Shakespeare, p.2. In the entry under this play in the Oxford Companion to English Literature the extent of Shakespeare's authorship is stated to be doubtful.

64. Tieck, letters to A.W. Schlegel, 29 December 1797 (Sch,28) and 9 January 1798 (Sch, 29).

65. Cf. also Bertrand, L. Tieck et le théâtre espagnol, p.161.


Tieck's tactless impatience towards his contemporaries in Shakespeare criticism is shown in KSI, 159.
67. Ibid., pp.76, 98.
68. Ibid., p.70.
69. Tieck, letter to Wackenroder, 30 November 1792 (Tw, 366)
70. K3 III, 278ff.
73. Ibid., pp.174-175.
74. Ibid., pp.177-178.
75. Lüdeke in his edition of the Buch über Shakespeare (p.1) gives the date of the first draft, which he entitles Erster Entwurf: Kommentar zu Shakespeare, as "etwa 1794", and thinks Kopke's assessment at 1795 too late.
76. Buch über Shakespeare, pp.299-300.
77. Loc. cit.
78. KSI, 38-40.
79. Buch über Shakespeare, pp.343-344.
80. KSI, pp.3-4.
81. Tieck, letter to Solger, 27 April 1616 (Ts, 429). This was by then part of Tieck's more general view of the relationship between nation and poet. Cf.: Paulin, "Ohne Vaterland kein Dichter": Bemerkungen über historisches Bewußtsein und Dichtergestalt beim späten Tieck".
82. Buch über Shakespeare, pp.115ff.
83. Ibid., p.117.
85. Tieck, letter to Wackenroder, 28 December 1792 (Tw, 396-397).
86. This view of Shakespeare, and Tieck's associated criticism of pseudo-geniuses, are found in Sommernacht, Lebrecht, Zerbino and Dichterleben; Buch über Shakespeare, pp.299-300; Ks III, 206; Ks IV, 213; Tieck, letter to Wackenroder, 10 May 1792 (Tw, 292).
87. Tieck, letter to Wackenroder, 10 May 1792 (Tw, 292-293).
88. Tieck, letter to Wackenroder, 30 November 1792 (TW, 367).
89. Tieck, letter to Wackenroder, 12 June 1792 (TW, 324).
90. S XIV, 236.
91. S X, 183.
93. S X, 266.
95. See below, Chapter IV C(1).
96. KS III, 171ff.; KS IV, 34ff., 353ff.
97. Tieck, letter to Raumer, May 1832 (LN, 142).
98. Köpke, Ludwig Tieck, I, 44f.

102. Entwistle, Cervantes, p. 151.
103. See above, Chapters II C(1), II E(2); below, Chapter VI E.
106. S XV, 8ff.
107. See below, Chapter VI E.
108. See below, Chapter VI D(2)(ii).
110. See below, Chapter VII.
111. KSI, 205; KS II, 361; Cf. also: Zeydel, Ludwig Tieck, the German Romanticist, pp. 114, 151, 308.
112. See above, Chapter II A (the discussion of Alla-Moddin).

113. See: Vorbericht zur ersten Lieferung, SI, pp. IX-XII; Vorbericht zur zweiten Lieferung, S VI, pp. XVIII, XXXIII; Vorbericht zur dritten Lieferung, S XI, pp. LIX, LXXV; KS I, 109ff.; KS II, 155ff., 325ff. See also the following letters from Tieck: to Heinrich Brockhaus, 14 November 1835 (TN, 102); to Winkler (estimated date 1824) (LT, 246-247); to Raumer, July 1829 (LE, 297-298), "probably 1832" (UL, 149), 21 December 1817 (UL, 154); to Solger, 24 March 1817 (TS, 361), 5 May 1818 (TS, 434), 15 February 1819 (TS, 521). Cf. in Phantasus (STV, 130), Anton before the visit by Phantasus shares general susceptibility to "Argwohn" and "Miftraun".

114. KSI, 187ff. See also the following letters from Tieck: to F. Schlegel, 16 December 1803 (Sch, 138); to A.W. Schlegel, 15 November 1828 (Sch, 187); to Solger, 1 April 1816 (TS, 206), 16 December 1816 (TS, 316).

115. KSI, 323ff.; KS II, 121, 147-148, 315ff. See also the following letters by Tieck: to F. Schlegel, March 1801 (Sch, 57-58), 16 December 1803 (Sch, 144); to Solger, 1 February 1812 (TS, 95). Similar assumptions underlie F. Schlegel's letters to Tieck, 10 November 1802 (Sch, 124), 15 September 1803 (Sch, 136, 143).


117. CATER INFLUENCES

118. Cervantes, Don Quixote, II, ch. LXII, p. 923.

119. Tieck, letter to Solger, 31 March 1815 (TS, 166-167).


121. Tieck, letter to Solger, 24 March 1817 (TS, 360).

122. KSI, p. VII.


124. See above, Chapter II C(5).

125. See above, chapter IV D(3), Note 65.

See above Chapter I B, Note 41.
126. Compare *München* and *Die Elfen* with *Die Reisenden*, *Der Hexen-Sabbath* and (particularly because of its implications for modern society) *Der Jahrmarkt*; see below, particularly Chapters VI B, VI D(1).

127. Tieck, letter to Solger, 31 March 1815 (TS 167-168).

128. See above, Chapter II A, where this feature is first noted.

129. Tieck, letter to Solger, 31 March, 1819 (TS 166-167).

130. Tieck, letter to Solger, 24 March, 1817 (TS, 361).

131. Tieck, letter to Solger, 7 May, 1816 (TS, 229).


133. The following allege that Solger influenced Tieck's works:
   - Heinichen, *Das späte Novellenwerk Ludwig Tiecks*, p. 31. (However, Heinichen modifies this view: ibid., p. 42.)
   - Schunicht, "Der Falke am Wendepunkt", p.51.

The following hold this belief only in modified form:

The following do not accept that Solger had important influence on Tieck:
   - Ludeke's chief ground is that many allegedly Solgerian features were present earlier.
   - Thalmann, "Der unwissend Glaubige", p.130. Thalmann finds Schönebeck's conclusions "absurd".

134. In addition to the letters cited above in Notes 129-132, see:
   - Tieck, letter to Solger, 10 November 1818 (TS, 477).

135. Tieck, letter to Solger, 18 December 1817 (TS, 402-404).

137. This fear is suggested by the incipient poetic ability of Lovell (S VI, 178); Sternbald's amoral attitudes (S XVI, 37, 42-43), the Garten der Poesie scene of Zerbino (S X, 293-297). See also Tieck's letter to Solger, 24 March 1817 (TS,361).

138. For Tieck's changed view of Goethe, see above, Note 94.

139. This theme is found throughout Tieck's works of the 1790s; examples are Sommeracht, Lovell and those thematically connected with it, and Der Eunenberg. Schönebeck (in his Tieck und Solger, p. 9) records that Tieck met Solger in 1808 and again in 1810, but that they were not truly friends until 1811.

140. See above, Chapters II C(4).

141. Tieck, letter to Solger, 27 June 1814 (TS, 132).

142. See above, Note 137. See also Tieck's letter to F. Schlegel, 16 December, 1803 (Sch, 144ff.).


144. Tieck, letter to Solger, 16 December 1816 (TS, 313-314).

145. This idea is found in Sternbald and the Herzerausserungen (see above, Chapter II E(1)).

146. Solger, Philosophische Gespräche, pp.319-321.

147. Solger, Erwin, p.199.


149. Tieck, letter to Solger, 18 December 1817 (TS, 403-404).

150. Tieck, letter to Solger, 16 December 1816 (TS, 315-316).

151. Tieck, letter to Solger, 10 November 1818 (TS, 477).

152. Tieck, letter to Solger, 10 November 1818 (TS,477-478).


157. See earlier paragraphs of the present section.
159. Mörtl, op. cit., p.151.
160. Loc. cit.
161. Mörtl, op.cit., p.165-166.
162. Thalmann, Der romantische Weltmann aus Berlin, p.27.
163. Schönebeck, Tieck und Solger, pp.41-44, 53ff., 64ff.
164. Schönebeck, op.cit., p.41.
168. Minder, op.cit., p.128. See also below, Chapter VI A(3).
169. Schönebeck, op. cit., pp.50f.
170. Lüdeke, Ludwig Tieck und das alte englische Theater, pp.126-127. 
See also KS II, 251; KS IV, 18.
171. Lüdeke, op. cit., p.128. See also KS II, 351; KS III, 206; 
KS IV, 215.
172. Stamm, Ludwig Tiecks späte Novellen, p.32.
174. See above, Chapter II C(4).
175. See below, Chapter VI E.
176. See above, Chapter IV B(3); below, Chapter VI D(2).
177. Tieck, letter to F. Schlegel, March 1801 (Sch, 57f.).
179. Lieske, Tiecks Abwendung von der Romantik, p.84.
180. See above, note 176.
182. S X, 272-274 (Nestor in Zerbin). Cf. the scholar Termheim 
in Eine Sommerreise (S XXIII,52-56).


185. Tieck, letter to Raumer, 2 February 1818 (LB, 82-83).


187. Tieck, letters to Raumer, 27 November 1823 (LB, 151) and 30 March 1815 (LB, 280).


189. Tieck, letter to Raumer, 2 February 1818 (LB, 84).

190. This view is implicit in Tieck's criticism of Schiller's *Die Jungfrau von Orleans* and *Die Braut von Messina* (KS IV, 149-151) and of *Don Carlos* (KS IV, 204-205).

191. Tieck, letter to an unnamed theatrical director, 1832 (LT, 366-367).

192. See above, Chapter VI D(2)(i), Note 65.


V. **THE THEMES IN THE EARLY WORKS**


2. See above, Chapter IV B, Note 115.

3. Tieck, letter to Wackenroder, 28 December 1792 (Tw, 405).

4. This is revealed in Shakespeare's defence of aristocrats against Marlowe's strictures in *Dichterleben* (S XVIII, 119-123), though it is suggested in Chapters VI D(2)(i) below that Tieck ultimately rejected this view. There is a contrast between the greater discernment of Tieck's poetry and his more naive advocacy in his critical writings (KS IV, 378); cf. also above, Chapter I B, Note 107.


VI: THE NOVELLAS

A. INTRODUCTION


   Hienger, *Romantik und Realismus im Spätwerk Ludwig Tiecks*. (Much of this work consists of a classification of character-types.)


   Minor, *"Tieck als Novellendichter"*, pp.60ff.

   Thalmann, *Der Heilige von Dresden.* (Much of this work consists of a classification of character-types.)

2. Witkowski, *"Tiecks Leben und Werk"*, p. LXXXI.


5. See below, Chapters VI F(1), (3), (4).

6. See above, Chapter IV C.

7. See Chapter VI D, below, for discussion of Tod des Dichters, *Dichterleben* and *Der Hexen-Sabbath*.

8. See below, Chapters VI F(1), (3), (4).

9. Vorbericht zur dritten Lieferung, S XI, p. LXXXIV.

10. See: Müller, *"Tiecks Novelle, 'Der Alte vom Berge'"*, pp.318-320.


   Zeydel, *"Ludwig Tieck und das Miedermeier"*, p.357.

13. TN, 42, 81, 84, 87, 96-98.


15. Vorbericht zur dritten Lieferung, S XI, pp. LXXXIV-XC.

16. Ibid. S XI, pp.LXXXIV-LXXXV.

17. Ibid. S XI, p. LXXXV.

18. Ibid. S XI, p. LXXXVI.
19. Ibid S XI, p. LXXXVII.
20. Ibid. S XI, p. LXXXVII-LXXXVIII.
22. Vorbericht zur dritten Lieferung, S XI, p. LXXXVIII.
23. Ibid. S XI, pp. LXXXIX-XC.
25. Vorbericht zur dritten Lieferung, S XI, p. XC.
27. Tieck himself remarked (see Köpke's Ludwig Tieck, II, 234) that some of his novellas fulfil the criterion of a "Spitze" and others do not. Doubts, or at least serious reservations, are also expressed by the following:

Heinichen, Das späte Novellenwerk Ludwig Tiecks, pp. 33, 42.
Hienger, op. cit., p. 40.
Minor, op. cit., pp. 54ff.
30. Tieck, undated letter to Friedrich Tieck received on 24 October, 1822 (LT, 189).
32. Pongs, op. cit., p. 159.
33. Minor, op. cit., p. 47.
35. K8 II, 381.
37. NS II, 45.
38. See above, Note 27.
39. See below, Chapter VII A.
42. S XVII, 96-97, 99-100.

B. TIECK'S VIEW OF THE WORLD
2. S XIV, 255ff.
4. See below, Chapter VI F(3).
10. S XVII, 12.
15. See below, Chapter VI E; S XXVIII, 78ff.
16. This fear is implicit in Tieck's portrayal of the indoctrination which affects people who immerse themselves uncritically in literature, always of an imaginative type and often inferior. The importance of this view is shown in an earlier chapter (IV B4) to underlie his interest in Don Quixote, which itself
which itself clarified for Tieck the effects of the late Aufklärung and the Gothic novel on his contemporary world. It is also shown in that chapter that Tieck discovered an analogy between cultural and socio-economic parasitism.

18. Marx, Capital, III, 256.
19. See above, Chapter III(3).
20. S XXIV, 156, 174-175, 176, 194, 224-225.
22. S XXIV, 168.
23. See below, Chapter VI E.
24. See above, Chapters II E(1); below, Chapter VI D(2)(1).
27. S XVII, 256.
32. S XVII, 192-207.
33. S XVII, 259-262.
34. S XVII, 233.
35. S XVII, 165.
36. S XVII, 259.

C. POWER AND THE FAILURE OF RELIGION
1. S XVII, 133.
2. S XVII, 126-127.
3. S XVII, 125, 165.
4. S XVII, 148-149.
5. S XVII, 159.
9. S XXIII, 304.
11. S XXIII, 358.
13. See below, Chapter IV D(1).
14. S XXIII, 304.
15. S XXIII, 305.
16. S XXIII, 351.
17. Cf. the wolf in Rothkäppchen: "Ich will sie fressen, da sie mich nicht lieben" (S II, 351).
22. S XXIII, 370.
25. S XXVI, 84-85.
27. S XXVI, 286-287.
29. S XXVI, 263 ff.
30. See below, Chapter VI D(2)(i).

Lebede, Tiecks Novelle "Der Aufruhr in den Cevennen", p. 163. (Lebede bases his view largely on Tieck's own assertions in the following: Köpke's Ludwig Tieck, I, 238ff. and II, 253; Tieck's letter to Solger, 24 March 1817 (TS, 362); Tieck's Vorbericht zur dritten Lieferung (S XI, pp. LXXII-LXXV). None of these references gives clear support to such a view.)

Mörtl, "Ironie und Resignation in den Alterswerken Ludwig Tiecks", pp.146-147.

Walzel, Deutsche Romantik, I, 51.

Zeydel, Ludwig Tieck, the German Romanticist, p. 293.

In contrast, Minder's Un poète romantique allemand lists influences on the novel but does not mention Böhme.

In Chapter IV B 2, above, doubt is cast on the importance of Böhme's influence.

32. See below, Chapter VII B.
33. S XIX, 134, 171ff.
34. S XIX, 130ff.
35. S XIX, 147ff., 160ff.
36. S XIX, 164.
37. S XIX, 156ff.
38. S XIX, 185.
40. S XXV, 19ff., 30ff.
41. S XXV, 25.
42. S XXV, 60.
43. S XX, 246ff.
44. See below, Chapter VII B.
45. S XXIII, 171-175.
46. S XXIII, 173.
47. S XXIII, 174.
48. S XXIII, 175.
49. See below, Chapter VI E.
50. See below, Chapter VI E.
51. S XXIII, 159, 185, 198, 233, 275.
52. S XXIII, 172.
53. S XXIII, 275-278.
54. S XXIII, 247.
55. S XXIII, 256.
56. S XXIII, 255-256.
57. Hitler, Mein Kampf, p. 252.
58. S XXIII, 245-249.
60. See below, Chapter VI F(1), Note 12.

D. POWER AND THE FAILURE OF ART
1. S XX, 457.
5. S XX, 234.
7. S XX, 333.
8. S XX, 241-244.
10. S XX, 331-333.
12. S XX, 360.
14. S XX, 400.
17. See remarks by Wundrich (S XX, 436-437) and Catharina (S XX, 198).
18. S XX, 205.
19. S XX, 316.
20. See below, Chapter VI D(2)(ii).
23. S XX, 198.
24. S XX, 221.
25. S XX, 222.
26. See below, Chapter VI D(2)(i).
27. See above, Chapter IV C.
28. S XX, 402.
30. S XX, 222. Cf. Catharina's mistaken assumption that the mediaeval persecutions are over (S XX, 231-232) and Tieck's reminder that similar outbreaks occurred in 1700. (S XX, 458).
32. S XXII, 170-172, 355-356.
33. S XXII, 386.
34. See below, Chapter VI E; cf. S XXVIII, 64ff., 78-79, 81-85.
37. S XVIII, 3-4, 6-8, 37, 43.
38. S XVIII, 58-60, 62.
39. S XVIII, 61, 198-201, 331.
40. S XVIII, 323-330.
41. S XVIII, 343.
42. S XVIII, 347.
43. S XVIII, 66, 110, 120-121.
44. S XVIII, 67-69.
46. S XVIII, 227-228.
47. S XVIII, 19-20.
49. S XVIII, 28ff., 32, 34, 36.
51. S XVIII, 50, 65, 148-149.
52. S XVIII, 195, 297.
54. S XVIII, 345-346.
55. S XVIII, 315.
56. S XVIII, 335.
57. S XVIII, 309-310.
58. S XVIII, 257f., 289, 299.
59. S XVIII, 121-122.
60. S XVIII, 229.
61. S XVIII, 224-225.
63. S XVIII, 315, 316-317.
64. S XVIII, 119-123.
65. For Shakespeare's fear about Southampton, see S XVIII, 299; for Tieck's fear about Wackenroder see his letters of 29 May 1792 (TW, 302) and 28 December 1792 (TW, 390).
66. S XVIII, 235-236, 298, 351.
67. See above, Chapters IV B(3), IV C(1).
68. S XVIII, 262-263, 265-267, 279.
69. Lüdeke's Chapter X in his Ludwig Tieck und das alte englische Theater is generally based on this assumption; see particularly pp. 361ff.
See also Zeydel's Ludwig Tieck, the German Romanticist, p. 291.
70. S XIX, 310.
71. S XIX, 316.
72. S XIX, 310-311.
73. S XIX, 397.
74. These are inferred from Tieck's interventions as author and from information supplied by his characters: see S XIX, 208, 310-311, 316-320, 334-337, 356-357, 386, 397, 403-406, 431-432, 431-432, 481-486, 494-495.
75. S XIX, 445.
76. S XIX, 391-392.
77. S XIX, 313, 415.
78. S XIX, 505-506.
79. S XIX, 391.
81. S XIX, 398.
82. S XIX, 341.
83. S XIX, 289-290.
84. S XIX, 416.
85. S XIX, 348.
86. S XIX, 350.
87. S XIX, 370.
89. S XIX, 445.
90. S XIX, 381, 391, 402.
91. S XIX, 468–470.
92. S XIX, 255.
93. S XIX, 254.
95. S XIX, 354.
100. S XIX, 350.
101. S XIX, 376.
102. S XIX, 253.
103. S XIX, 370.
104. S XIX, 361.
105. S XIX, 209.
106. S XIX, 204.
110. S XIX, 417.
111. S XIX, 416.
113. S XIX, 379, 505-506.

114. S XXIV, 11-27, 89-103.

115. S XXIV, 121, 132-133.


117. S XXIV, 50-51.

118. S XXIV, 54.


121. S XXIV, 109-117.

122. S XXIV, 112-117.

123. S XXIV, 139-142.

E. THE DEMOCRATISATION OF IDEALS: AN ILLUSION


4. S XXVIII, 31, 85, 93-97, 429. Cf. some related points about Leonhard (S XXVIII, 94-95) and about society in general (S XXVIII, 78-79, 81-85).

5. S XXVIII, 28, 261.


7. For examples to Binder’s credit, see SXXIV, 426, 445-446, 455, 472; for examples to his discredit, see S XXIV, 426, 429, 431, 472-473, 490-491.

8. S XXIV, 420.

10. S XXIV, 433.
11. S XXIV, 497.
12. S XXIV, 504.
15. S XXIV, 403.
17. S XXIV, 431.
18. S XXIV, 490-482.
19. S XXIV, 444.
20. S XXIV, 401-402.
24. S XXII, 87-110, 137.
26. TN, 84.
27. S XXII, 166.
28. S XXII, 139.
29. S XXVIII, 75-76.
32. While the Manifesto of the Communist Party contains many criticisms of the bourgeoisie and of capitalism, there are some nostalgic words and phrases which seem to contradict the main theme, viz:

p.52 "The bourgeoisie, wherever it has got the upper hand, has put an end to all feudal, patriarchal, idyllic relations."

p.54 "All that is solid melts into air, all that is holy is profaned" [when the bourgeoisie dominates].
pp.62-63 "...their [referring to the "lower strata of the middle class"] specialised skill is rendered worthless by new methods of production.

See also above, Chapter III, Note 87.

33. S XXVIII, 64ff., 78-79, 81-85.

F. POETRY AS VICTIM

1. Important examples of these errors are:
   Minor, "Tieck als Novellendichter", pp.100ff.
   Wilkowski, "Ludwig Tiecks Leben und Werke", p. LXXXI.
   Zeydel, "Ludwig Tieck und das Biedermeier", p.357.


3. Tieck, letter to F. Schlegel, 16 December 1803 (Sch 143).


5. His comments (S XXIII, 22-23, 34, 41-42) should be construed ironically.


10. S XXIII, 7ff., 117ff.

11. S XXIII, 134.

12. S XXIII, 39-40, 51, 67, 93, 156.


15. S XXVI, 426-429.


17. S XXVI, 464-466.

18. S XXVI, 357.
20. S XXVI, 351.
22. S XXVI, 396-397.
24. Gneuss, Der späte Tieck als Zeitkritiker (Chapter III: Tiecks Stellung zum Jungen Deutschland, pp.66ff.). Liebeswerben is one of several novellas which Gneuss holds to show only Tieck's disagreement with Young Germany.
   Minor, op. cit., p. 100.
   Witkowski, op. cit., pp. LXXXI ff.
   Seydel, Ludwig Tieck, the German Romanticist, p. 315.
25. S XX, 68.
27. S XX, 173-178. Cf. Marx and Engels: Manifesto of the Communist Party, pp. 79-80 where law is represented to be the expression of the will of the bourgeoisie.
28. S XX, 13-16.
29. S XX, 13.
30. S XX, 17.
33. S XX, 151-158. Cf. Murner's description of his "literary" art: see above, Chapter II C(1).
35. S XXI, 298ff., 303.
37. S XXI, 302, 310-311.
38. S XXI, 290-291.
40. S XXI, 68-69
41. S XXI, 81, 109.
42. S XXI, 75, 81, 83-84.
43. See below, S XXVII, 258-261.
44. TiJ, 81.
45. This is implicit in the views of Goethe which Tieck explores in *Goethe und seine Zeit* (KS II); it is, indeed, implicit in the fact that he explores these views at all. Cf. Tieck's qualified criticism of Schiller (KS III, 50-55; KS IV, 152-154); and of both Goethe and Schiller (KS IV, 167-168).
46. S XXI, 73ff., 81-83.
47. S XXI, 70ff.
49. S XXI, 127ff.
50. S XXI, 81.
51. S XXVII, 24.
52. S XXVII, 20.
53. S XXVII, 20, 22-23.
54. S XXVII, 20.
55. S XXVII, 22.
56. S XXVII, 24-25.
58. NSI, 125. See above, Chapter II C(5).
60. See below, Notes 68-74.
61. S XXVII, 162-181.
62. S XXVII, 75-77.
63. S XXVII, 190-191. Cf. above, Chapter III(3); S IV, 373-374.
64. S XXVII, 172 ff.
66. S XXVII, 344.
67. See below.
68. S XXVII, 321 ff.
70. S XXVII, 331.
71. S XXVII, 336-338.
72. S XXVII, 344.
74. S XXVII, 329.
76. S XXVII, 272-279.
77. S XXVII, 293-312 (particularly 300).
78. S XXVII, 44-46.
79. S XXVII, 41-42, 46ff.
82. S XXVII, 159.
83. S XXVII, 160-161.
86. S XXVII, 246.
87. S XXVII, 321-323.
88. S XXVII, 249-263.
89. S XXVII, 252.
90. KS IV, 138-139.
91. S XXVII, 251-252.
92. KS IV, 211.
93. See above, Chapter III, Note 106.

Zeydel (Ludwig Tieck, the German Romanticist, p. 52) comments: "Karl von Berneck ... became one of the forerunners of the German "fate tragedy" of Zacharias Werner and Adolf Müllner, though we have no evidence that it influenced them".

95. S XXVII, 258-261.
96. S XXVII, 249-250, 261, 263.
97. S XXVII, 261-263.
98. S XXVII, 250-251, 252, 253-254.
99. Tieck, letter to Heinrich Brockhaus, 14 November, 1835. (TN100ff.).
100. TN, 99.
Mundt's article appeared in Literarischer Zodiakus, 1836, No. 1.
102. S XXIV, 377ff.
103. S XXIV, 279.
104. S XXIV, 380.
105. S XXIV, 380-381.
106. S XXIV, 315ff.
108. S XXIV, 270.
109. S XXIV, 347.
110. Zeydel, Ludwig Tieck, the German Romanticist, pp. 309-310.
111. S XXIV, 289ff.
113. S XXIV, 299-301.
114. S XXIV, 311, 319-320.
115. S XXIV, 355.
116. S XXIV, 361-368.
117. See the comments on the character of Genoveva, above, Chapter IID(2).
6. THE PARASITIC IDYLL

1. S XXII, 17, 20-21, 39, 45-46. Evidence on those pages also shows the Professor's conflicting attraction and hostility towards domesticity and ordinary life in general.

2. S XXVI, 7, 16-17, 23-25.


7. S XXVI, 35.


9. See above, Chapter VI F(1); below, in the present chapter.


12. S XXVI, 8.


17. S XXVI, 565.


20. S XXVI, 486-487.


22. S XXVI, 486.

23. S XXVI, 482-487.

26. TN, 139.

VII. VITTORIA ACCOROBONA

A. FEMALE CHARACTERS IN TIECK'S WORKS
2. S XXV, 128-129.
3. S XXV, 141.
4. S XXV, 130.
7. S XXI, 233.
10. S XXI, 234.

B. VITTORIA ACCOROBONA

12. Lillyman ("Ludwig Tieck's Vittoria Accorombona") is concerned chiefly to refute other critics' errors. He also reviews representative examples of two opposing critical views: "Critical debate has centred on the question whether Vittoria Accorombona is a faithful portrait of the Italian Renaissance or a belated exploitation of the themes and motifs of Tieck's early works" (pp. 468-469). In favour of the former (cited by Lillyman) are: Rehm's Das Werden des Renaissancebildes in der deutschen Dichtung ... pp. 159, 170);
Koskenmäki's John Webster's The White Devil and Ludwig Tieck's Vittoria Accorombona (pp. 28-29); and Boklund's The Sources of the White Devil (p. 194). To these may be added Keck's Renaissance and Romanticism: Tieck's conception of Cultural Decline ... in his "Vittoria Accorombona" (p. 43). In contrast, Minder's view is psychological (Un poète romantique allemand, pp. 150-151, 155f.). and Mörtl ("Die Renaissance in Tieck's Vittoria Accorombona") concludes (pp. 104ff.) that the work illuminates Romanticism, not the Renaissance. The latter view is also taken by Landau in his "Vittoria Accorombona [sic] in der Dichtung im Verhältnis zu ihrer wahren Geschichte" (particularly pp. 315-316). Lillyman (op.cit., pp. 471ff.) and Zeydel (Ludwig Tieck, the German Romanticist, pp. 320ff.) take a "non-Renaissance" view, as does the present study. Taraba's "Ludwig Tieck. Vittoria Accorombona", while examining interesting viewpoints, does not state a firm view.

13. These are expounded above in Chapter VI A(2).

14. Tieck, Werke (ed. by Thalmann), IV, 570-571, 697-700, 748ff. Cf. also the actions of Bracciano, 672-682.

15. Ibid., 697-700. Cf. 546.

16. Ibid., 779.

17. Ibid., 807-813.


20. Ibid., 579-582.

21. Ibid., 582.

22. Ibid., 584. Cf. also Vittoria's poems about the rose-bud and the pearl (ibid., 703-704). These, however, although similar in mood to Tasso's improvisation, are only a part of Vittoria's generally stronger and more varied character.

23. Ibid., 649f., 687.

24. See below, in the discussion of "excellence".

25. This is one of the several views considered by Taraba (see above, Note 12).


27. Ibid., 543-544, 577, 588.

28. Ibid., 543.
29. Ibid., 643-662.
30. Ibid., 643.
31. Ibid., 608, 727-730.
32. Ibid., 643.
33. Ibid., 544, 643 (Flaminio); 544, 546 (Marcello); 605-606, 769-770, 772-773 (Ottavio).
34. Ibid., 556-557.
35. Cf. Leonhard's seduction of Kunigunde (S XXVIII, 442; Cf. Mishein, S XXVIII, 429), Magister Fületrou's advances to Friederike (S XXVIII, 449ff.), the character-changes which overtake Mannlich and Charlotte (S XXVIII, 437-438). Cf. also Walder (Lovell), Ferdinand (Eine Sommerreise), Kronenberg (Der Geheimnisvolle), Catharina (Tod des Dichters) Grease in Dichterleben. Many such instances are more convincingly explained as swings of the pendulum rather than as permanent attainment of objectively verified truth. Cf. also Chapter II E(2), Note 89, where a connection with the ideas of C.G. Jung is suggested.
36. Tieck, Werke (ed. by Thalmann), IV, 814.
37. Ibid., 665.
38. Ibid., 662.
39. Ibid., 679.
40. Ibid., 603.
41. Ibid., 710.
42. Ibid., 688.
43. Ibid., 692, 741-742.
44. Ibid., 704. Cf. 640-649.
45. Ibid., 741.
46. S XX, 425ff.
47. Tieck, Werke (ed. by Thalmann), IV, 600-604.
49. Tieck, Werke (ed. by Thalmann), IV, 595-598, 783-787.
50. Keck, op. cit.

51. Tieck, Werke (ed. by Thalmann), IV, 544 (Flaminio); 547-552, 763 (Camillo Mattei); 611 (Luigi Orsini); 604ff. (Farnese); 615, 621ff., 722 (Peretti); 678, 709ff., 715ff. (Bracciano).

52. Ibid., 556.

53. S XXIV, 278-280. Cf. also a similar objection by Albertine in Der jüng'e Tischlermeister (S XXVIII, 181ff.)

54. Tieck, Werke (ed. by Thalmann), IV, 556, 693.

55. Ibid., 722 (Farnese), 804 (Luigi Orsini).

56. Ibid., 572, 805-806.

57. Ibid., 549-550.

58. Ibid., 593-594.

59. Ibid., 589, 611-613.

60. Ibid., 611, 693, 710-711, 752ff., 803.

61. Ibid., 805-806.

62. Ibid., 556, 588.

63. Ibid., 547, 549-550, 564-565.

64. Ibid., 587.

65. Ibid., 664-665, 694.

66. Ibid., 584-585.

67. Ibid., 664.


69. Tieck, Werke (ed. by Thalmann), IV, 580-581.

70. Ibid., 589.

71. Ibid., 721.

72. Ibid., 557 (Camillo). Cf. her attitude to Peretti as reported on p. 616.

73. Ibid., 623. Cf. 641.
74. Contrast the evasiveness of her replies to Bracciano (see below Note 76) with her attitude later (ibid., 788ff.).

75. Ibid., 664.

76. Ibid., 693-694, 710, 717-718.

77. Ibid., 731.

78. Ibid., 753-754, 758.

79. See above, Chapter I, Note 1.

VIII. POSTSCRIPT

1. Zeydel, Ludwig Tieck, the German Romanticist, pp.247ff., 337ff.

   Cf. Tieck's letters to F. Schlegel, March 1801 (Sch,57), 16 December 1803 (Sch, 140). These letters imply a unity between the ancient and modern worlds as though all were part of one and each part intuitively accessible.

3. SV, 44ff.

4. See above, Chapter VI E, Note 89.

5. See above: Chapter II C(1), Notes 18, 19, 22; Chapter III(3), Note 59; Chapter VI C, Notes 54, 56, 57.

   Cf. Marx and Engels, Manifesto of the Communist Party, pp.52, 53, 58, 62ff. See above, Chapter III(3), Note 66; Chapter VI E, Note 18; Chapter VI E, Note 32.

7. This is true of the Rahmenzählungen of Abendgespräche, and Das Zaubersehloß.


10. S XIX, 386, 397, 403-406.

11. See above, Chapter VI E(2), Note 33; cf. also SXI, 294-295.
12. See above, Chapter VI D(1).

13. S XXVIII, 78ff. Cf. above, Chapter III (1), for the character and ideas of Ernst


15. Paulin. "'Ohne Vaterland kein Dichter'".