PLEASURE, PAIN, AND EMOTION

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ABSTRACT

In this dissertation I analyse the concepts of pleasure and unpleasantness and outline an approach whereby the insights gained about pleasure and unpleasantness are applied to the analysis of a number of feeling and emotion concepts. In trying to understand what pleasure is and how it is related to pain and unpleasantness, I tackle various basic questions about the role of pleasure, pain, and unpleasantness in motivation and about the intrinsic goodness of pleasure and the intrinsic badness of pain and unpleasantness. In pleasure's nature of being good, wanted, and sought and pain's nature of being bad, unwanted, and avoided we locate the way in which pleasure and pain are opposites and the central defining properties of the 'pleasant' and the 'unpleasant'.

Within my analysis of pleasure and unpleasantness I reach the conclusion that pleasure and unpleasantness are 'special experiences': I explain what is involved in this claim and defend it against the objections which Ludwig Wittgenstein raised in his Private Language Argument. The view of the emotions which I outline and defend is the view which Aristotle, Spinoza, and many other philosophers have held. According to this view, emotions or 'feelings' such as confidence or fear, delight or misery, and pride or shame, are 'modes' of pleasure or unpleasantness. Given my views on pleasure and unpleasantness, it would follow that a number of emotions are, in part, the 'special experiences' of pleasure and unpleasantness.
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Introduction

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Within my analysis of pleasure and unpleasantness I reach the conclusion that pleasure and unpleasantness are 'special experiences': I explain what is involved in this claim and defend it against the objections which Ludwig Wittgenstein raised in his Private Language Argument. The view of the emotions which I outline and defend is the view which Aristotle, Spinoza, and many other philosophers have held. According to this view, emotions or 'feelings' such as confidence or fear, delight or misery, and pride or shame are 'modes' of pleasure and unpleasantness. Given my views on pleasure and unpleasantness, it would follow that a number of emotions are, in part, the 'special experiences' of pleasure and unpleasantness.
Chapter I: Pleasure as a Form of Attention

In recent years, there has been much interest in the philosophical analysis of pleasure, and this interest was stimulated in large part by some of the early post-war work of Gilbert Ryle. Influenced by Wittgenstein's general denial that psychological words are names of special sensations or experiences, Ryle, with vigour and persuasive power, attacked the widely accepted assumption that pleasure is a kind of sensation or experience comparable to a pain sensation. Ryle reasoned as follows: 'pain' in the sense in which the word names such things as headaches or toothaches is a localized sensation; to walk while having a headache is to walk while experiencing a certain sensation felt at a certain bodily location. Pleasure, however, is a very different sort of thing. When a person walks while enjoying the walk (or, experiencing 'pleasure' from walking) he does not necessarily experience some localized agreeable sensation. Pain consists in the having of a certain localized sensation; pleasure does not. Pain is something that attracts our attention to itself. Pleasure does not attract our attention to itself; when a person enjoys a conversation his attention is on his conversation not on his pleasure. If he experiences pain when engaged in conversation his pain attracts some of his attention; pleasure is not the sort of thing that could do this. The widespread assumption that pleasure and pain are opposites is mistaken, Ryle concluded, for they are not even parallel types of phenomena.

According to Ryle's positive account of pleasure, pleasure is a form of attention or heed, more specifically it is a form of
absorption in some present activity. The child enjoying himself is the child absorbed in doing something. The enjoyment, or absorption, Ryle pictures as follows:

When the blotting-paper absorbs the ink, we picture the ink as unresisting and the blotting-paper as having the power. It thirstily imbibes every drop of the docile ink and will not give it up again. Somewhat similarly, when a child is absorbed in his game, he - every drop of him - is sucked up into the business of manipulating his clock-work trains. All his thoughts, all his talk, all his controllable muscular actions are those of his engine-drivers, signalmen and station-masters. His game is, for the moment, his whole world. He does not coerce or marshal himself into playing, as maybe, his conscripted father does.

Ryle's analysis of pleasure as a form of attention has been very influential. W.B. Gallie\(^2\), E.A.O. Williams\(^3\), Alan White\(^4\), and other philosophers have been convinced that pleasure is in some important sense a form of 'attention'. In this chapter, I examine this view and evaluate the arguments which led Ryle to concentrate on the concept of 'attention', or 'heed', in his analysis of pleasure.

What is important to notice from the outset of our discussion is that a reference to someone 'attending' to something or being 'absorbed' in something does not in itself provide a sufficient condition for pleasure. Ryle himself acknowledges this. For after linking pleasure to attention which is given spontaneously he notes: "This is, of course, not enough. Alarming, disgusting and surprising things can capture my attention without my having to fix my attention on them. So do pains and tickles."\(^5\)

1. Ryle (1954a, p 203)
2. Gallie (1954)
3. Williams (1959)
4. White (1964)
5. Ryle (1954a, p 202)
B.A.O. Williams, who holds that pleasure is, 'one mode or species of attention' also notes that the linking of pleasure to attention fails to provide a sufficient condition for pleasure, for he writes: "This is not to say, of course, that being pleased by something just is attending to it ... attention can just as well be directed to or held by the unpleasant." As someone can 'attend' to the unpleasant as well as the pleasant, so he can be 'absorbed' in the unpleasant as well as in the pleasant. As Alisdair MacIntyre notes, "My attention may be absorbed by the thumbscrew's increasing pressure" without my gaining pleasure from the torture.

Not all of the followers of Ryle have noticed that attention or absorption does not provide a sufficient condition for pleasure. C.C.W. Taylor wrote: "The analysis of pleasure as attention seems substantially correct for pleasure in activities which themselves require the direction of attention; enjoying gardening is just giving one's whole mind to it, being unwilling to be distracted from it and so on." But to say that enjoying gardening 'just is' giving one's whole mind to it, etc., is at least to say that giving one's whole mind to gardening, etc., provides a sufficient condition for 'enjoyment'. J.C. Gosling, like Taylor, thinks that the attention analysis is correct for some pleasures: "But with tragedies and canoeing it looks as though absorption and attention are the relevant constituents" of one's pleasure. By saying that absorption and attention are 'the constituents' of someone's

6. Williams (1959, p 240)  
7. Williams (1959, p 240)  
8. MacIntyre (1965, p 223)  
9. Taylor (1963, p 4)  
10. Gosling (1969, p 135)
pleasure when he enjoys a tragedy or the activity of canoeing, Gosling seems to be committed to holding either that when we say that someone is 'enjoying' or 'taking pleasure in' such events we mean that he is attending and absorbed, or, at least, that attention and absorption provide sufficient conditions for pleasure or enjoyment (in at least one sense of the words 'pleasure' or 'enjoyment'). But Taylor and Gosling are mistaken. Enjoyment in gardening, in watching tragedies, or in canoeing cannot be simply attending to these things or being absorbed in them, because a person can attend to these things or be absorbed without enjoying them. For instance, a person who is canoeing in very dangerous waters might be fully absorbed in his canoeing and be unwilling to be distracted, yet instead of enjoying himself he could be terrified and not enjoying it in the least. There is no established meaning or sense of the word 'pleasure' or 'enjoyment' where 'pleasure' is entailed by attention and absorption. So, there is no occasion when enjoyment 'just is' being absorbed or where attention and absorption are the sole 'constituents' of pleasure.

Are attention and absorption necessary conditions for pleasure? Is pleasure in part attending to things or being absorbed? The remainder of this chapter will be devoted to a discussion of this position.

The view that pleasure is partly attention, or 'a form of attention', is not obvious - it is not as obvious as the view that searching or listening is 'a form of attention' or the view that pain, in one sense of the word, is a sensation. The view may even appear counter-intuitive. The 'attention' involved in enjoying philosophizing seems to be that of thought - thinking about a
philosophical subject. Is it not strange to say that our pleasure is a special way of thinking about the subject? The 'attention' in enjoying music is that of listening. Is it not odd to say that our pleasure here is a special way of listening to the music? Whatever persuasive power people have seen in the Rylian view must be due to the arguments that have been given in its support. Crucial in trying to establish 'attention' as a key concept in the analysis are Rylian arguments like the following:

Sometimes I enjoy a smell; sometimes I dislike it and very often I am quite indifferent to it. But I could not enjoy it, dislike it or be indifferent to it if I were totally oblivious or unaware of it. I cannot say in retrospect that I liked the smell but did not notice it.

To say that a person had enjoyed the music, though too preoccupied to listen to it even as a background noise, would be to say something silly.

Thinking of distress as being parallel to pleasure, Ryle writes:

When a person temporarily forgets his headache or tickle, he must cease, for that period, to be distressed by it. Being distressed by it entails not being oblivious of it.

Unnoticed things, like ozone in the air, may certainly cause us to feel vigorous or cheerful . . . But then we do not enjoy the ozone, but (for instance) the food and the music; and of these we cannot be both oblivious and appreciative.

1.) The form of these arguments is that the enjoyment of such and such entails attention to such and such, therefore enjoyment always requires attention to something and is 'a form of attention' to something. But the idea of 'enjoying something' or 'being pleased by something' is a complex idea - a complex of pleasure and another something. 'Enjoying music' is a complex idea, a complex of the idea of pleasure and the idea of music. And what is entailed by, or

11. All of these passages are from Ryle's paper entitled "Pleasure" (Ryle, 1954a, pp 198 - 199).
required for, a certain complex cannot automatically be attributed to a specific part, the pleasure. The attention requirement of the complex might be due to the thing enjoyed.

Now, in many of the cases Ryle has in mind, the attention requirement of the complex is attributable to the non-pleasure element in the complex. Ryle compares pleasure to distress, noting that a person cannot be distressed by a headache or a tickle which he has 'forgotten'. This is intended to show that distress, like pleasure, is part attention, or 'a form of attention'. But Ryle is here talking about the distress of sensations, and the parallel with pleasure is enjoyment of certain sensations or feelings, e.g. enjoyment of a tickle or a tingle. But sensations and feelings are of such a nature that it is a condition of their very existence that one must be aware of them. A 'forgotten' sensation is a ceased-to-exist sensation; it is not a sensation at all and so not a distressing sensation. 'Attention' to sensations is required independently of their pleasurableness or distressfulness. Therefore, the fact that enjoying or being distressed by a sensation entails 'attention' to the sensation does not permit the inference that pleasure and distress are part attention. Having a strange sensation also entails being aware of the sensation; but it does not follow that strangeness is a species of attention. 12

2.) Apart from the enjoyment in sensations or feeling there are

12. There is perhaps a sense in which we can talk of a person's 'pain existing though forgotten'; here we would mean that the person is disposed to feel pain (sensation). But this does not affect the present point. For it is the sensation, not the disposition, that is distressing; the disposition to feel pain sensation, whether or not we are, or could be aware of it is not itself distressing. And the fact that the sensation is distressing only when we are aware of it cannot be attributed to distress being a form of attention. The fact that the sensation exists or is felt in itself entails that we are aware of it.
other pleasures that seem to require attention. For instance, it hardly seems possible to enjoy playing with one's train, riding one's bike, or having sex without being aware of what we are doing. Indeed, it may look like a contradiction in terms to talk of a person enjoying foreplay though oblivious to what is going on.

But, is the attention requirement due to the pleasure or to the doing of the activity?

Biking and foreplay as normally imagined require attention to what one is doing. Could a person bike though totally oblivious to what he is doing? This is hard to imagine. A lover who succeeded in going through all the right motions while totally oblivious to what was going on would not comfortably be describable as 'engaging in foreplay', though he may win our amazement for his capacity for transcendence. Thus many of the sorts of things a person could be said to be 'doing' we could not imagine him doing without his being aware of doing them; consequently, that his enjoying doing them requires attention tells us nothing about the nature of pleasure. The attention is required by the activity itself. Being a slow bike-rider may require one's giving attention to one's bike-riding, but it does not follow from this that slowness is a form of attention.

Perhaps, with a bit of creative effort, we can conceive of a situation in which we might describe a person as 'biking' though oblivious to what he is doing. It may be logically possible for a person (a 'body') to go through all the right motions while he is in no way aware of what he is doing. Perhaps we might speak of him as 'biking', as we might do of a robot having a similar talent. But assuming that the 'person' is still conscious, it is no longer obvious that he could not be having a good time of things and
enjoying his 'biking'. In short, a claim that enjoying biking, having foreplay, or washing the dishes require attention to what one is doing is only as strong as the claim that biking, foreplay, and washing dishes require one's attention. Whatever doubt we are able to throw on the requirement of attention for these activities on their own throws a proportional doubt on the claim that enjoying this activity requires attention. Thus, for cases such as these where the activities require attention to what one is doing, the fact that enjoying the activity requires attention provides no grounds for linking the attention to the pleasure and treating it as part of the pleasure.  

3.) Different issues are raised by the apparent attention requirement in the cases of the enjoyment of smells, music, stories, and movies. Again, it may seem impossible to take pleasure in such things without being aware of them. But in cases such as these the thing enjoyed could occur or exist without a particular person's attending to them. Though my headaches and sexual activities may require attention whether or not I enjoy them, a smell or a movie can exist without my attending to them. Yet, when I enjoy it, my attention is required, it seems. So cases like these might seem to provide positive reason for attributing the attention required for the complex of enjoying a movie (a story, etc.) to the pleasure.

13. Earlier I quoted a passage where C.C.W. Taylor wrote: "The analysis of pleasure as attention seems substantially correct for pleasure in activities which themselves require the direction of attention." (Taylor, 1973, p 4) Taylor here does not notice that by admitting that an activity requires attention independently of its pleasantness or unpleasantness, he loses his reason for supposing that the attention required for the enjoyment of that activity is due to the enjoyment. No reason has been given for supposing that the enjoyment of the activity is the attention other than the fact that the enjoyment of the activity requires attention.
part of the complex.

But these examples are much trickier than they appear. They seem to rule out what is the most reasonable alternative view of the complex, that of pleasure and its cause. Could the music be the cause of the pleasure when we enjoy music? It may seem not, for if the music were merely the cause, the attention requirement could at most be a contingent requirement for the enjoyment of music. It would at least be conceivable that the music could cause pleasure in us without our being aware of it. The claim that it is not even logically possible to enjoy the music without being aware of it would then seem to rule out the causal model.

But consider similar cases where a certain psychological state clearly is the effect and the music, smell, etc., is the cause. Suppose that a persisting noise causes me to have a headache. Ex hypothesi the noise is the cause of my headache. A noise considered in itself does not require my attention for it to exist (as does my backache or my biking). Nevertheless, is it not a prerequisite of the noise causing me to have a headache that I be aware of the noise? And, is it not just as difficult to conceive of the noise causing me to have a headache without my being aware of the noise as it is to think of the music causing me pleasure without my being aware of it? Yet, here we are dealing with a case where the attention is neither part of the cause (the noise) nor part of the effect (my headache) but a mediator, or causal prerequisite, in this causal interaction. Similarly, if a smell or someone's voice (or some theory or piece of music) is to be the cause of my headache, or is to cause me to go insane, it seems I must be aware of the smell or voice. But my headache or insanity is not a species of attention toward the smell. My attention to the smell is merely a causal
prerequisite of my being driven crazy by the smell. The attention required for someone to be driven insane by a smell is not attributable to the smell on its own nor to the insanity on its own but to the complex of the two being related causally.

Employing our creative intelligences to their fullest we might be able to conceive of a situation in which we would say that 'the music gave him a headache, though he was not aware of the music'. Perhaps we would say this of a deaf man sitting in a concert hall where the music is so loud that the physical vibrations cause him to have a headache. I think we shy away from thinking that the music, qua music, gave him a headache (as we resist saying that Beethoven's Fifth Symphony broke the windows in my house when it was played on my super-stereo with full volume). But still, speaking loosely, I suppose we might be willing to count this as a case where the music caused the headache though the person was unaware of it. But will this example show that since the causal relations in question do not always require attention in the way discussed, the attention requirement in enjoying music is more than a mere causal prerequisite for such pleasure? No. For one is able to think of the same sort of case of 'music causing pleasure though we are unaware of the music' in which, consequently, our enjoyment of the music does not seem to require attention. Insofar as we are willing to count such cases as instances of 'music of which we are oblivious causing us pleasure', we thereby have instances of 'enjoying music' which do not seem to require attention. And so we still lack any important reason for attributing the attention present in some enjoyment of music to the pleasure itself. (The peculiar pleasure: The deaf man sitting in the concert hall is jiggled in such a way by the loud music that the vibrations soothe
and please him. There is as much reason for saying he is enjoying the music though oblivious to it as there was for saying the music gave him a headache though he was unaware of it.\(^1\)

4. Few philosophers would have been persuaded of an important pleasure-attention link were it easy to produce clearly recognizable counter-examples to the view, that is, cases of pleasure unaccompanied by attention to something being found pleasant. However, attention-theorists have, in their discussions, tended to mean different things by 'attention' in different points of their discussions. They have avoided clear-cut counter-examples to their attention-thesis by equivocating upon 'attention', or by shifting in their view of what sort of attention they are linking to pleasure. For the narrower, more useful, attention-concepts there are indeed clear-cut counter-examples to pleasure-theories formulated with these concepts. When 'attention' is thought of in the broadest possible way, the pleasure-thesis is of relatively little interest.

a.) The importance Ryle ascribed to the attention-thesis seems to be due in large part to his wish to link pleasure to a fairly restricted concept of 'attention'. Ryle gives the words 'attention' and 'heed' importance in *The Concept of Mind*. He thinks of 'attention' as a way of behaving or being disposed to

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1. A full explanation of why cases of music causing headaches seem to require awareness, and why deaf-man cases do not seem comfortable counter-examples, would, I think, be interesting, but would be off the track here. Relevant is the fact that music and ideas have a peculiar ontological status: they are not physical events. Thus, their causal effectiveness is not comprehensible in a straightforward way. A second relevant fact is that smells and sounds, though existent independently of a particular individual's awareness of them, are things which need to be analyzed in a relational way by reference to some being's consciousness of them.
behave, namely, as behaving in a careful or attentive way. He contrasts 'attention' with behaving inattentively, carelessly, or absent-mindedly.\textsuperscript{15}

Ryle was thinking of his pleasure-thesis with such a concept of attention when he wrote: "There is a sort of contradiction in describing someone as absent-mindedly enjoying or disliking something."\textsuperscript{16}

If we restrict the thesis to this concept of attention, counter-examples to a pleasure-attention thesis are easily noticed. There is no tight correlation between pleasure and carefulness and no incompatibility between pleasure and absent-mindedness. I do not need to walk with any special carefulness to enjoy walking; no more carefulness is needed for enjoying walking than is needed for walking. There is no contradiction in saying, 'Though Joe is a careless, inattentive driver, he loves (immensely enjoys) driving'. There are many things we enjoy doing which lack a dimension of carefulness-carelessness. Normally, relaxing, sunning yourself, and being massaged are neither careful nor careless, but nevertheless these activities are often greatly enjoyed.

There is indeed an oddness in describing someone as 'absent-mindedly enjoying' himself, but the oddness is not due to a contra-

\textsuperscript{15} Pleasure is one among many psychological concepts which Ryle analyzes in terms of attention or 'heed' in \textit{The Concept of Mind}. The identification of pleasure as a form of attention has an important role within Ryle's overall attack on Dualism in that book. Since Ryle holds that attention is a property of behaviour, by holding that pleasure is a heed-concept Ryle is in effect holding that pleasure is a property of behaviour. By finding fault with his pleasure-attention thesis we are finding fault with his behaviour-istic account of pleasure. And so falls this particular chunk in his attack on Dualism.

\textsuperscript{16} Ryle (1954b, p 59)
diction but to a category mistake. Pleasure like pain can be neither absent-minded nor careful; these terms apply to pleasure and pain no more than do the terms 'fast' and 'slow'. That one cannot enjoy himself speedily is not due to this idea being a contradiction because enjoyment is necessarily sluggish and slow. It is neither. As pleasure lacks a dimension of velocity so it lacks a dimension of carefulness.

b.) In the broadest sense, the word 'attention' can be used to extend to all cases of perceiving something, knowing or believing something, thinking of something, taking care in doing something, and simply being aware or conscious of something. To perceive or think about something, etc., is to give it some 'attention' in this broad sense of the term. But as the words 'attention' or 'heed' are most commonly used, they would contrast with many occasions of barely being aware or conscious of something or merely 'not being totally oblivious' of something. Though vaguely aware of the position of my hands while typing I do not normally 'attend' to them or 'heed' their positions while typing, in the ordinary sense of these terms. My 'attention' is on the ideas, not on my fingers. Ordered to 'attend' to the blackboard, the pupil would not placate the teacher by assuring her that he was not totally oblivious to it. More is required.

Ryle and others at times have wished to analyze pleasure in terms of a more narrow concept of attention, namely, the concept of being absorbed or engrossed. Terence Penelhum linked enjoyment to 'paying close attention' or 'being absorbed'. Being 'absorbed'

17. Ryle (1954a, pp203 - 205)
18. Penelhum (1964, p 245)
or 'engrossed' normally means giving a high degree of attention and thus contrasts with giving average attention or giving only a little attention. While writing this, it is the work which is engrossing me, not the background music. Not all conversations are 'engrossing' ones; to some I give normal attention without finding them taking so much attention as to be 'absorbing'. I am 'engrossed' when actively involved in doing something, not when sitting around and doing nothing in particular.

There are many clear-cut counter-examples to pleasure-attention theses when attention is thought of in either of these ways. There is no contradiction in the idea of my enjoying background music. Ryle said that to say that "a person had enjoyed the music, though too preoccupied to listen to it even as a background noise, would be to say something silly." True, no doubt. But the 'attention' required in listening to music as background music is neither absorption nor 'attention' in the most common sense of the word. The pupil aware of the teacher's voice merely as background noise is not 'attending' to the teacher's voice, in the most commonly used sense of the word.

Background decoration, like background music, does not demand one's attention, in this common sense of the word, yet can indeed add to the pleasantness of a room. I can enjoy relaxing or 'sitting and doing nothing' but I need not heed my relaxation or inactivity, in this sense, though I will no doubt be in some way aware of it. And since these pleasures do not require attention, in this sense, they obviously do not require absorption, i.e., a high degree of attention. Background music or decoration by definition is something one does not normally directly attend to or heed.

It might be responded that even when enjoying relaxing or being
massaged one is absorbed to some degree in what he is doing or thinking about. But with this reply one is merely stretching the meaning of the word 'absorbed' so that it does the work of 'attention' in a broad sense of the word. The normal meaning of the word 'absorption' is such that the word contrasts with low attention or average attention. To use the word for the whole range of 'attention' is either to say something false or merely to stretch its meaning. By arguing in this manner one does not defend the view that pleasure requires a higher than usual degree of attention, but this seemed to be the whole point in saying that pleasure requires 'absorption' or 'fairly close attention'.

c.) Might we avoid some of these problems by adopting a proportionality thesis as, for instance, B.A.O. Williams does? "If I am pleased by something, my attention is, to that extent, drawn to it; and the more I am pleased by it, the more my attention is absorbed in it," Williams wrote. According to this suggestion, great pleasure is necessarily accompanied by a high degree of attention, or a state of being 'absorbed' or 'engrossed'; moderate pleasure with a moderate degree of attention; and mild pleasure with only a low degree of awareness.

The thesis at least has a neatness to it, but unfortunately it is quite false. It is possible for great pleasure to be accompanied by only a low degree of attention; consider, for instance, the pleasure one might gain from relaxing, sunbathing, or being massaged. Moderate pleasure can be accompanied by close attention or 'absorption', as, for instance, in my present response to writing this paper. Most activities that are found pleasant are accompanied by the degree of

19. Williams (1959, p 240)
attention which one normally gives to the activity, and this is so regardless of the degree of pleasure experienced while doing the thing. The difference between the greater enjoyment someone takes in winning a game of chess than in losing it will not necessarily be correlated with a difference in degree of attention given. Though someone may lose a chess game because he gave the game little attention, people will often give just as much attention to the games which they lose as they give to the games they win. Nevertheless, people tend to enjoy the game less when they lose.

A theory of pleasure must be able to explain the nature of the differences between different degrees of pleasure, but apart from the present suggestion which is clearly mistaken, there is no apparent way in which one might do so merely by concentrating on 'attention'.

d.) If the word 'attention' is thought of in the broadest sense, we might include all awareness, including the minimal awareness of 'not being totally oblivious of something', as well as all perceiving, knowing, concentrating, being careful, and thinking. If 'attention' is thought of in this sense, the attention-thesis asserts that when a person is enjoying himself or pleased by something, he at least knows of or is aware of what he is enjoying or pleased by. To this broad statement there do not seem to be clear-cut counter-examples. So, we may admit it as a general truth that a pleased person is at least to some degree aware of what is pleasing him or what he is enjoying. In this generalization, however, we hardly have a developed account of what pleasure is. Furthermore, as I argued earlier, Ryle's arguments do not succeed in showing that the awareness (or 'attention') is actually a part of the pleasure.
Chapter II: Pleasure as 'Pro-attitude'

In this chapter I wish to examine a number of analyses of pleasure according to which pleasure is thought of as a kind of 'favourable attitude' or 'favourable orientation' toward some activity or object of thought. There are differences as well as similarities between the different accounts, and I do not mean to suggest that there is a great deal of homogeneity by speaking of these views as 'pro-attitude' views. I am more interested in the particular accounts of pleasure which are discussed than in categorizing these views in some precise fashion.

The term 'pro-attitude' is used both by Nowell-Smith and David Perry in their discussions of pleasure. In classifying pleasure (also 'enjoyment') as a 'pro-attitude', Nowell-Smith treats pleasure as comparable to other 'pro-attitudes' such as desire and approval. Though Perry holds that it is not possible to provide one account that will be applicable to all pleasures, he holds that each of the two basic types of pleasure (namely, enjoyment and being pleased about something) are species of 'pro-attitude'.

Similar to these views are the descriptions of pleasure whereby pleasure is thought of as an attitude of favourably 'appraising' something, valuing or 'prizing' something, or approving something. Magda Arnold, for instance, defines 'pleasure' as "a welcoming of something senses that is appraised as beneficial and indicates enhanced functioning." Of the relation of the pleasure to the appraisal she writes: "When we reflect upon our experience of

1. Nowell-Smith (1954, pp140 - 144)
2. Perry (1967, pp214 - 216)
3. Arnold (1960, p 74)
pleasantness and unpleasantness, we are aware of appraising this thing as good (pleasant), that as bad (unpleasant); and we often assume that such an evaluation is the result of our feeling experience. But the process of appraisal seems to be inherent in the feeling experience. W.B. Gallie seems to have a similar view in mind when he analyzes pleasure as a form of appraisive attention. John Dewey thought of pleasure ('enjoyment') as much the same thing as 'prizing' or 'valuing' some object. Stephen Pepper treats the expressions 'enjoying something', 'liking something for its own sake', and 'valuing something for its own sake' as interchangeable. J.N. Findlay includes within his definition of 'feelings of pleasure' a kind of approving attitude toward one's circumstances in life. Findlay writes that a feeling of pleasure is "our immediate awareness of the deep fit between wants and circumstances, a consciousness expressible in such phrases as 'Let this be exactly as it is.' This exclamation expresses an approving attitude or favourable appraisal of one's circumstances in life.

Ryle and other philosophers have, when analyzing pleasure,

4. Arnold (1960, p 73). Arnold also provides a definition of 'pain' and 'unpleasantness' which parallels her definition of 'pleasure' (and 'pleasantness'). 'Pain' and 'unpleasantness' are defined as "a resistance to something sensed that is appraised as harmful and indicates impaired functioning" (p 74). The other 'pro-attitude' accounts of pleasure discussed in this chapter also permit a parallel 'con-attitude' analysis of unpleasantness.
5. Gallie (1954)
6. Dewey (1929, Chapter X)
7. Pepper (1949, pp 12 - 13). In a manner similar to Dewey and Pepper, David Perry writes: "If one is enjoying a thing, it follows trivially that he values the thing. The claim here is not that the fact that one is enjoying a thing is a reason for valuing (this would be another matter), but that to enjoy is to like and, hence, to value in a certain manner." (Perry, 1967, p 129)
8. Findlay (1961, p 177)
concentrated on the desires and inclinations of the pleased person. Ryle, for instance, writes: "To enjoy doing something, to want to do it and not want to do anything else are different ways of phrasing the same thing." 9 "Someone who has an inclination to do something that he is doing and no inclination not to do it can be signified indifferently by 'he enjoys doing it' and by 'he is doing what he wants to do'." 10 Ralph Barton Perry has said similar things. When discussing the 'peculiar affinity between pleasure and pursuit, and pain and avoidance', Perry writes that at times 'taking pleasure in' is synonymous with 'inclination' or 'liking', and 'finding painful' is synonymous with 'disinclination' or 'disliking'." 11 (Perry says this of 'taking pleasure in' but resists identifying pleasure with some inclination.) Thinking in a vein similar to Ryle's, J.N. Findlay writes that "to be pleased by a smell is quite, or nearly, insep¬arable from wanting it to continue a little longer." 12 Kurt Baier, too, includes a 'tendency to continue or to repeat the pleasant activity' within his analysis of pleasure. 13 The rest of this chapter will be devoted to examining the above views on Pleasure.

1.) In the analysis of the concept of pleasure as in the analysis of other concepts, it is necessary to be careful to avoid circular definitions. It is not uncommon for philosophers who think of pleasure as some 'favourable orientation' to offer an analysis of

9. Ryle (1949, p 104)
10. Ryle (1949, p 104). Ryle would view the analysis of pleasure in terms of wants and inclinations as an elaboration of the analysis of pleasure as a form of attention and not as a distinct or separate account.
13. Baier (1958, p 272)
pleasure which is circular or in danger of being circular. In such cases, the philosopher uses words which themselves entail, or seem to entail, the experiencing of a degree of pleasure when he is trying to describe or analyze pleasure. If we were to unpack or elucidate the meaning of the definition or description we would need to introduce the very concept we are out to explain, namely, pleasure.

A crude example of an analysis of pleasure that is circular would be an attempt to say what pleasure is by asserting that pleasure is simply enjoying yourself or being pleased with life. Such a statement about pleasure, even if considered true, would not provide a successful analysis of pleasure. 'Enjoying yourself' and 'being pleased with life' themselves entail the experiencing of pleasure. The question of what pleasure is still remains even after describing pleasure in this way.

Within his analysis of pleasure, J.N. Findlay writes that "the varying states of being pleased are all states of relatively unmixed acquiescence or basking dalliance in some activity or in the thought or sight of some object." Though Findlay attempts to explain what pleasure is by referring to a state of 'basking dalliance', an explanation of what the expression 'basking dalliance' means would probably necessitate the re-introduction of the concept of pleasure. A description of someone as 'basking' in the sunshine or in some state of affairs itself entails that he is finding the sunshine or state of affairs a source of pleasure or that he is (passively) being pleased by it. It is nearly a contradiction in terms to say that someone is 'basking in some unpleasant state of affairs'; if we used this description we would be implying that the

14. Findlay (1961, p 177)
person took pleasure in the situation. Furthermore, the description of someone as 'dallying' (or being in a state of 'dalliance') itself seems to entail that the person is amusing himself, or taking pleasure in, some activity which is delaying him. Thus an analysis of pleasure in terms of 'basking dalliance' risks a degree of circularity. An analysis of pleasure in terms of 'a tendency to prolong or continue' captures some of the meaning of 'basking dalliance' but avoids the circularity.

Aristotle and Ryle are sometimes interpreted as having analyzed pleasure in terms of carrying on an activity with zeal or zest. However, the terms 'zest' and 'zeal' are poor for analyzing pleasure since a proper analysis of these terms would itself probably require re-introducing the concept of pleasure. The assertion that someone works 'with zest' (or 'zeal') itself seems to entail that he takes pleasure in his work. Ryle often talks of the person enjoying himself as having a (strong) 'desire' or 'inclination' to do what he is doing, and these terms capture much of what might be meant by speaking of someone as acting with 'zest' but are preferable in the analysis. An analysis of pleasure in terms of 'desires' or 'inclinations' does not itself seem to be in danger of circularity.

J.C.B. Gosling is not so careful as Ryle, and his analysis of pleasure is in danger of circularity at a number of points. Gosling

15. Williams (1959, p 228) Williams writes that Aristotle and possibly Ryle hold that "pleasure in the standard case consists in or accompanies zestful activity."

16. Some philosophers have claimed that a state of desire is necessarily unpleasant, and that desire therefore needs to be analyzed in terms of pain or unpleasantness. If this were so, it would perhaps present problems for one who would analyze pleasure in terms of desire, for this would mean that he was analyzing the pleasant by reference to the unpleasant. And the concept of the unpleasant does not seem any more fundamental than that of the pleasant.
believes that it is not possible to give one account for all cases of pleasure, so he provides different accounts for different species of 'pleasure'. In analyzing the various pleasures he writes that some pleasures are characterized by 'vigour and gusto'\textsuperscript{17}, some are characterized by 'enthusiasm'\textsuperscript{18} and others are characterized by 'eagerness'.\textsuperscript{19} However, these terms are similar to 'zest' and 'zeal' and they, too, introduce some circularity into the analysis. That someone works with 'vigour and gusto' or with 'enthusiasm' entails that he is pleased to work, that he enjoys working or devoting energy to working, or some such pleasure. The claim that someone is 'eager' to golf itself seems to entail that he takes pleasure in the prospect of golfing or that he is pleased to golf.

Gosling also describes some pleasures in terms of being 'cheerful', 'being in a good mood', or being 'lighter of heart'.\textsuperscript{20} Once again, Gosling has chosen expressions which themselves need to be analyzed in terms of pleasure. Being 'cheerful', in a 'good mood', or 'lighter of heart' entails being in a mood where one is pleased with various things.

Ryle was sharp enough to note that one cannot explain what pleasure is by referring to cheerfulness. "On the contrary," Ryle wrote, "the notion of being cheerful has to be explained in terms of the notion of pleasure, since to be cheerful is to be easy to please."\textsuperscript{21} Gosling's description of other pleasures in terms of 'heightened geniality'\textsuperscript{22} is equally troublesome, since being in a

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{17} Gosling (1969, p 133)
\item \textsuperscript{18} Gosling (1969, p 134)
\item \textsuperscript{19} Gosling (1969, p 56)
\item \textsuperscript{20} Gosling (1969, pp134 - 135)
\item \textsuperscript{21} Ryle (1954a, p 197)
\item \textsuperscript{22} Gosling (1969, p 132)
\end{itemize}
'genial mood' itself seems to entail being cheerful or in a good mood, and thus being in a mood where one is easily pleased.

It is not uncommon for philosophers to talk as though they have given a whole or partial elucidation of the nature of pleasure or unpleasantness by explaining pleasure in terms of 'liking' something or unpleasantness in terms of 'disliking' something. C.D. Broad, for instance, wrote: "Is it not possible that the statement 'This experience of mine is pleasant' just means 'I like this experience for its non-hedonic qualities'?" But does 'liking something' explain what pleasure is, or would one need to refer back to pleasure in order to explain what 'liking' is? The claim that Joe 'likes' going to movies seems almost synonymous with the claim that he 'enjoys' or 'takes pleasure in' movies or that he finds it 'pleasant' to go to movies, so one is not justified in assuming that the concept of 'liking' something is either more fundamental or better understood than the concept of 'pleasure'. Gilbert Ryle often uses the word 'liking' in his discussions of pleasure, but he does not take this as an explanation of what pleasure is but merely as a way of delineating the problem being studied. For Ryle, the problem of explaining what pleasure is, just is, at least in part, the problem of explaining what it is to 'like' something. Reference to 'liking' something does not provide the solution but merely a way of posing our problem when our end is to explain the nature of pleasure.

23. Broad (1930, p 237)
25. Sidney Zink makes much the same point about C.D. Broad that I have just made: "There is no ground for regarding the liking as more elementary than the pleasure. Why not describe the liking of the quality as a taking pleasure in it? In fact pleasure seems to be the primary fact." (Zink, 1962, p 91)
Finally, W.B. Gallie, agreeing with Ryle that pleasure is a kind of 'attention', attempts to explain what kind of attention pleasure is by describing it as "the kind of attention that might well be labelled 'appreciative' or 'aesthetic'." To say that someone enjoying a movie is someone who 'appreciates' the movie is similar to saying that the person values or favourably appraises the movie, but the term 'appreciative' is less desirable within an analysis of pleasure. The claim that someone 'appreciates' the music of Mahler itself entails that he enjoys the music. The claim that someone takes an 'aesthetic' interest in his furniture seems to unpack into the claim that he is able to take pleasure in the shapes, colors, and general appearance of his furniture. Thus, an analysis of pleasure in terms of 'appreciative' or 'aesthetic' attention is circular.

I am not saying that the meanings of words such as 'zest' or 'appreciation' are fully exhausted by a reference to 'pleasure'. The word 'zest', for instance, has an additional suggestion of being energetic or active. And it is useful to ask whether pleasure necessarily involves 'heightened activity', since the idea of 'heightened activity' does not itself unpack into the experiencing of pleasure. 'Heightened activity' may be found in the agitated person as well as in the highly pleased. Later in this chapter I ask whether pleasure involves heightened activity.

2.) Most philosophers agree that pleasure is intrinsically good and that it is something which people want and seek. Historically,
much of the interest philosophers have had in pleasure has been in
the discussion of Ethical and Psychological Hedonism, the views
according to which pleasure is the sole intrinsic good and the sole
thing which people want and seek for its own sake. What is contro-
versial in these theories is not the presumption that pleasure is
good and something wanted but the claim that pleasure is the sole
thing that is intrinsically good and the sole thing which people
seek as an end.

A critical test for any proposed analysis of pleasure is whether
the proposal delineates some psychological state with a recognizable
intrinsic value and appeal. When a philosopher identifies 'pleasure'
with something that has no intrinsic value or appeal, or with some-
thing which people in fact are indifferent to, his proposal has missed
the heart of the matter.

There are, admittedly, some philosophers who would say that
pleasure is not always good, and it is sometimes said that Puritans
have held that pleasure is never itself good. Though I will be
discussing these positions later, at present it is sufficient that
it be agreed that pleasure has an appeal or attraction to people.
Even Puritans would admit that pleasure has an attraction to people
- that it is something that 'glitters' and tempts people to seek it.
To provide an adequate account of pleasure a proposal must at least
succeed in isolating some psychological phenomenon which people in
fact care about, even if they are wrong to do so.

Even the simple claim that the word 'pain', in the primary sense
of the word, names a kind of sensation passes this sort of test, for
it succeeds in identifying pain with something with a recognizable
unattractiveness. Within our experience we can confirm the claim
that some sensations are hateful and of a type which we try to avoid or minimize. Those sensations which we feel when we cut or burn ourselves, and those which we call 'headaches', have this characteristic; these sensations are unattractive and of a type which we normally try to avoid or minimize.

The test we must apply to pleasure (and unpleasantness) is one which can be applied to all of the goods and evils which interest philosophers, e.g. beauty and ugliness, or justice and injustice. Happily, the definitions of 'justice' which contemporary philosophers offer do satisfy the appeal test. John Rawls, for instance, includes in his definition of 'justice' the assertion that "institutions are just when no arbitrary distinctions are made between persons in the assigning of basic rights and duties and when the rules determine a proper balance between competing claims to the advantages of social life."\(^{27}\) That duties and rights within institutions should not be assigned 'arbitrarily' and that a 'proper balance' should be struck between competing claims to social goods are principles that at least sound attractive. For one form of justice Von Wright offers the principle that "no man shall have his share in the greater good of a community of which he is a member, without paying his due."\(^{28}\) The principle that someone who takes good from a community should pay back what he owes is at least a somewhat appealing principle and so is not guilty from the start of missing the heart of the matter with respect to justice. (The issue of whether the proposals of Rawls and Von Wright are in danger of circularity is another matter.\(^{29}\))

\(^{27}\) Rawls (1971, p 5)
\(^{28}\) Von Wright (1963, p 208)
\(^{29}\) Can one, for instance, determine what the 'proper balance' is when distributing social 'advantages' or goods without re-introducing the concept of a fair or just distribution?
The greatest fault in the analyses of pleasure which I have mentioned in this chapter and the last one is that the philosophers have identified pleasure with psychological phenomena which have no intrinsic goodness or attraction—phenomena to which people are, for the most part, indifferent.

By concentrating on 'attention' or 'absorption' in defining 'pleasure', as Ryle suggested that we should do, we do not focus upon something with a natural appeal or attraction. Though an 'instinctive' attraction to pleasure seems to be common to all people and animals capable of experiencing pleasure, there is no such universal desire to attend to things or to be absorbed or engrossed in doing something. People sometimes care about their attention, e.g., students sometimes have a desire to listen carefully to the lecturer so as to learn the subject well. But this desiring to attend carefully is rare and by no means so widespread as the desire and attraction for pleasure; furthermore, the student in this case values the attention as a means to an end, the learning of the subject, whereas pleasure is something with intrinsic goodness or appeal—something which people want and seek for what it is in itself. As pain is avoided for what it is in itself, and not merely because it might have undesirable effects such as hindering concentration, so pleasant experiences are wanted and sought for what they are in themselves and not merely for whatever desirable effects they may have.

In his discussion of pleasure, A.R. Manser makes some points related to those I am making, and presents a similar objection to Ryle's analysis of pleasure in terms of 'heed' or 'attention'. The central problem in explaining what pleasure is, he writes, is "how
it is that pleasure can serve as a motive or reason for our activities."

"No adequate description of the 'nature of pleasure can be given unless it is seen that this is the central problem". "It is, I think, a failure to realize this fact which renders so inconclusive the discussion of the subjects by Professor Ryle and Gallie," Manser writes. To concentrate on 'attention' within the analysis of pleasure as Ryle and Gallie do, Manser writes, "is to leave opaque what I have indicated as the core of the problem, why we should want to do things we enjoy or get pleasure from." 30

Nor is there a universal appeal in 'having a desire (an inclination) to do what we are doing and not having a desire (an inclination) to do otherwise'. Of course, if someone has a desire to golf he does care about his golfing (which is the 'object' of his enjoyment). But the point is that he does not care about his state of desire itself, and it is this state of desire which Ryle equates with the enjoyment. Ryle equates our enjoyment with our desire to do that which we enjoy doing (e.g., golfing), but he overlooks the attraction we have to enjoyment itself. People desire to enjoy themselves, and they often do things for the sake of enjoying life more. Enjoyment itself has an intrinsic attractiveness; it is something which people want and seek. There are, perhaps, occasions when a person has a second order desire to have a desire or inclination to do something. For instance, a person might wish that he had a greater desire to get out of bed in the morning, or he might wish that he had a greater inclination to play football with his children.

30. Manser (1960, p 223). Though Manser and I agree on this important point, I find the main body of his paper unclear and confused. Thus he is not at all successful in dealing with what he has rightly labelled 'the central problem' in explaining the nature of pleasure.
But these second order desires are rare and relatively sophisticated, whereas the desire for pleasure is much less rare and is found even in unsophisticated creatures such as dogs and cats. Pleasure is something intrinsically good, but there does not seem to be intrinsic goodness in 'wanting to do what you are doing and not wanting to do otherwise'.

At one point in his writings on pleasure Ryle seemed to be somewhat aware that it was a consequence of his view that pleasure is not something which people want and seek. But he did not notice that this implication of his view might be seen as a fault in his analysis. Of someone enjoying a conversation Ryle wrote: "It is more nearly correct to say that my liking and disliking are not special objects of a possible secondary introspective interest but rather special qualities of my actual interest in the conversation." 31 This, perhaps, is a way of saying that we are mistaken to think of pleasure as something that we want or are interested in; rather, pleasure itself is a form of interest in something. When we enjoy a conversation, we are interested in the conversation, not in our enjoyment, Ryle seems to be saying.

Part of what Ryle is saying in this passage is that when enjoying a conversation our main attention is on the conversation and not on ourselves or on our reactions to the conversation. In the passage preceding the above quotation Ryle wrote that pleasure is not "some collateral activity or experience which might conceivably clamour for a part of my interest or attention in the way in which a tickle might distract my attention from the butterfly." 32

31. Ryle (1954b, p 60)
32. Ryle (1954b, p 59)
The main thrust of this passage is both true and important. When enjoying a conversation, a person normally has most of his attention on the conversation and not on his own enjoyment, nor is his enjoyment something that attracts his attention in the way that a tickling sensation might do so.

But Ryle does not stop at saying this; he also says that pleasure is not the sort of thing in which people normally take an "introspective interest". Under normal circumstances "my liking and disliking are not special objects of a possible secondary introspective interest" he wrote. But this is mistaken. People do take an 'introspective interest' in whether they are liking or enjoying what they are doing or finding it distressing or disliking it. If someone is finding a conversation uncomfortable or distressing, or is 'disliking' it, he may try to lessen the discomfort by changing the subject, disengaging himself from the conversation, or perhaps even avoiding this person in the future. If he is enjoying or liking the conversation, he will often be interested in prolonging or repeating his enjoyment by encouraging his friend to stay longer or to visit again soon.

The 'introspective interest' which people take in their enjoyment or distress is manifested not only in the attention which they give while experiencing the pleasure or discomfort. Their interest in their enjoyment or distress is also shown in the attention or thought that they give to their enjoyments and discomforts when they make decisions and form attitudes about future activities and objects of pursuit. It is mainly because they are interested in enjoying themselves that people devote so much time to movies, music, travelling, and talking with friends. Decisions over careers, friends, hobbies, and coffee brands are strongly influenced by the interest one takes in prospective pleasant experiences. A man's decision to pursue the life of thought
as a career often results partly through the belief that he would enjoy the lifestyle. His interest in enjoyment is not limited to periods in which he is presently enjoying himself; he also shows his 'introspective interest' in pleasure by trying to maximize or increase his future enjoyments.

The view that people take an 'introspective interest' in their enjoyment is not easily detachable from the view that pleasure is intrinsically good. If something is intrinsically good, then we should, in the absence of special circumstances, expect people to want and seek it. Ryle nowhere denies the assumption - one almost universally accepted by moral philosophers - that pleasure is (at least normally) intrinsically good. If Ryle intended to deny that people are interested in their enjoyment he would be placing himself in a philosophically awkward position. If pleasure is indeed something intrinsically good and thus worth having, why is it that people do not take an (introspective) interest in getting it?

J.N. Findlay is one philosopher who appreciates that an analysis of pleasure needs to isolate something with an appeal or attraction. After identifying a feeling of pleasure with "our immediate awareness of the deep fit between wants and circumstances, a consciousness expressible in such phrases as 'Let this be exactly as it is!'", Findlay raises the following objection: "All this might appear intellectualized or peripheral, it might seem to have missed the heart of the matter, the glow or sweetness or bloom of pleasure, on the one hand, and the sick jars, squirming unease, and parched agonies of the unpleasant."

Findlay shows uncommon insight in sensing that the 'glow',

33. Findlay (1961, p 177)
'sweetness', or 'bloom' of pleasure is 'the heart of the matter' for pleasure and that his previous description of pleasure does not seem to capture this. In identifying pleasure with an awareness or recognition that one's circumstances are as one wants them to be, Findlay is able to explain why one's circumstances in life appear attractive to the pleased person, but he does not thereby account for any attractiveness or 'sweetness' in the experience of pleasure itself. According to Findlay's account, a person pleased with his car will think that his car is as it should be, but where is the attraction in the psychological state of being pleased? What is it about this psychological state that leads people to want to feel pleased and strongly to prefer feeling pleased to feeling distressed? Findlay rightly fears that his account seems 'intellectualized' by focusing upon some cognitive state (an 'awareness') of the pleased person and that it seems 'peripheral' because it concentrates on the attractiveness of one's circumstances without accounting for an attractiveness in the pleasant experience itself. (The same objection applies to views where pleasure is said to be an attitude of 'prizing', 'valuing', or 'favourably appraising' something. On this view, to take pleasure in one's car is to prize or value the car. But where then is the attraction or intrinsic goodness in this psychological state? What is it about the psychological state of favourably appraising something that leads people to want to feel pleased?)

Findlay attempts to deal with this objection in the following way: "The glow or sweetness or bloom which seems the heart of the matter in our states of felt pleasure - can be none other than the condensing power of conscious experience, its ability to hold complex relationships in dissolved suspension." 34 Obviously, this reply to the

34. Findlay (1961, p 177)
objection is unclear and unhelpful. Here Findlay identifies the 'sweetness' of pleasure with a certain power or ability of consciousness, a power of 'condensing' various ideas and an ability of holding complex relationships 'in dissolved suspension'. But, it hardly seems that a 'sweetness' or 'glow' is entailed by the existence of such a power or ability of consciousness, since a person's consciousness would retain the same ability or power even when he is not feeling pleased. A person might feel pleased for twenty minutes after hearing a piece of good news and then cease to feel pleased, but his mental abilities or powers do not themselves undergo some change during this period.

When Findlay identifies the attractiveness of pleasure with this mental ability he may be thinking that the attractiveness is caused by this power—that this power creates or causes the attractiveness or 'sweetness' characteristic of pleasure. (For how could some power itself be attractive? How could a power be intrinsically 'sweet' in the way that pleasure is?) But what then is the thing that is itself attractive? Is it some distinct attractive feeling or experience that is created? (Or, does this power cause our cognitive state or approving attitude to be attractive? What would it be like for some cognitive state to be 'sweet' or 'glowing'? A pleasant experience is intrinsically attractive and intrinsically good, that is, attractive in itself and independently of any effects which it might have; therefore, it would be mistaken to identify the attractiveness of pleasure with some effect of pleasure. Furthermore, if Findlay is thinking that this power of consciousness causes some attractive feeling, it would seem that this attractive feeling itself is the pleasure and the rest of Findlay's account becomes superfluous.

Finally, it seems more than a contingent fact that it is pleasure
rather than unpleasantness that is attractive and wanted. Findlay also agrees with this, for within his discussion of pleasure he writes: "Plainly it is in some sense almost trivially necessary that we should want pleasure (or not want unpleasure)." But given what he says in his definition of 'pleasure' and in his account of its 'sweetness' it would not follow that it is 'trivially necessary' that it is pleasure rather than unpleasantness that is wanted and attractive.

Much of the study of pleasure in recent years has been carried on by philosophers viewing their task primarily as one for Philosophy of Mind rather than as one for Ethics. The belief that the realm of facts is distinct from the realm of values is widespread these days, and I suspect that this belief is partially responsible for the tendency to assume that one can understand the (factual) nature of pleasure without asking questions about the value or appeal of pleasure. Divorcing the concept of pleasure from ethical contexts has made it easier for philosophers to overlook the appeal and value of pleasure when analyzing it.

35. Findlay (1961, p 177)
36. Manser makes a related point. After claiming that 'the central philosophical problem' about pleasure is how it can serve as a motive or reason for action, he writes that "it is as a part of Practical Philosophy that any discussion of the notion should be conducted, not as an aspect of philosophical psychology". (Manser, 1960, p 223). The failure to notice these things is what "renders so inconclusive the discussion of the subjects by Professor Ryle and Gallie," he writes. I agree with Manser that philosophers have tended to divorce the concept of pleasure from ethical contexts and from contexts of 'practical philosophy' and that this may have influenced philosophers in such a way that they miss what Manser and I consider 'the heart of the matter'. However, it is not that the nature of pleasure is not a question for philosophical psychology, but rather that philosophical psychology at times overlaps with moral or practical philosophy. Questions about the way in which pleasure provides a reason for action are of interest to philosophical psychology as well as to moral or practical philosophy.
3.) It is clear that the desires and inclinations which Ryle and other philosophers equate with pleasure are often present when a person experiences pleasure. But are the desires and inclinations one and the same thing as the pleasure, or do they merely accompany the pleasure? A plausible alternative to identifying the pleasure with these desires is the position whereby pleasure, or the expectation of continued pleasure, leads to a person's desiring that thing which is the source of the pleasure. This latter view is the one which I hold and will argue for (though this formulation is slightly oversimplified.)

According to Ryle, to enjoy digging is to want or be inclined to dig and not want or be inclined to do other things. The first limitation of this proposal to note is that it does not provide a sufficient condition for pleasure, for it is possible to have these desires and inclinations without enjoying oneself. For instance, an escaped convict fleeing the bloodhounds and police search-party might be motivated by a strong desire or inclination to flee, and he might not, at that time, be occupied by any desire or inclination to be doing something else. The convict might have these desires and yet be terrified and not be enjoying his flight in the least. The prisoner may be fleeing willingly, so acting willingly is not sufficient for pleasure. Findlay suggested that being pleased by a smell is 'nearly inseparable' from wanting it to continue a little longer. However, this desire is not sufficient for pleasure since one can want a smell to continue without being pleased by it. The police who are chasing the convict might desire that the scent of the man continue

37. Ryle seemed to be suggesting that willingness is a central characteristic of pleasure when he says of the child enjoying his train set that "he does not coerce or marshal himself into playing, as, maybe, his conscripted father does." (Ryle, 1949, p 104).
so they can continue to track him, but they need not be enjoying the scent (and would not even be aware of it). Someone might want a particular unpleasant smell to continue for its own sake simply because it is unusual; he might be motivated by curiosity and not by pleasure taken in the smell.

To be adequate, an account of pleasure needs to be able to account for differences in degree of pleasure. Ryle's analysis in terms of desires and inclinations does not succeed in doing this. A mild pleasure need not be associated with only a mild desire to do or continue doing what one is doing or a greater pleasure with a greater desire to do or continue doing what one is doing. Though one golfer may be enjoying the game much more than his companion, he need not have any greater desire to golf or to continue golfing than his friend has. Normally, both want to finish the game, and, likely, both will want to golf again. (Of course, it is possible that the golfer who enjoys himself little will have little desire to golf again, but this is not necessary. If he thinks that next time he will play better or that the weather will not be so bad, he might have a strong desire to golf again.)

Ryle includes within his analysis of pleasure the claim that a person enjoying himself does not have a desire or inclination to do other than what he is (enjoying) doing. But this part of the proposal will not do. Though someone may be enjoying his afternoon at work he still might want to go home and relax (and thus he has a desire to do other than what he is doing). Though someone has been enjoying the party, he may nevertheless not want to stay but may want to go home (thus, though he has been enjoying himself he nevertheless does have a desire to do something else, namely, to be going home.) Or, imagine a love-impassioned gentleman who is walking to his lady-friend's house.
He is in a state of pleasurable anticipation and very much enjoys the walk. As he approaches her house his desire is not to continue walking but to do something other than that which he has been doing, namely, to see and talk with his girlfriend. Though he has been enjoying his walking, he does not wish to continue walking but now wants to do something else.

The other half of Ryle's proposed analysis is that someone enjoying himself has a desire or inclination to do what he is doing. However, even if such a desire were necessary for enjoyment, the desire on its own is clearly not sufficient. Soldiers in retreat may be motivated by a strong desire or inclination to flee the enemy and save their lives but it does not follow that they enjoy their flight. They might be terrified and might not enjoy it in the least.

Is such a desire or inclination, if not the whole, at least part of what it is to enjoy yourself? Ryle analyzes enjoyment in terms of a desire or inclination to do that which one is presently doing. There are various desires which Ryle might have in mind. For, if we speak precisely, it is only what we believe to be absent or not presently our's that we can desire. As G.E. Moore wrote of the word 'desire': "That name is usually confined to a state of mind in which the idea of some object or event, not yet existing, is present to us." The name is not when we have peace that we desire peace but when we do not have it. It is the poor man, not the rich man, who desires wealth. We

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38. Moore (1903, p 69). Anthony Kenny expresses this point well in a discussion of Aquinas' view of desire: "Aquinas pointed out that it is impossible to want what one already has as it is to remember what is now happening. It follows that one can never want what one always has, e.g. one's own head . . . Following Aquinas we might say that a desire which did not precede its object would not be a desire, just as a memory contemporaneous with its object would not be a memory." (Kenny, 1963, pp 115 - 116).
could, admittedly, speak in a loose fashion of a rich man wanting wealth, but this would be to say that he wants to continue to be wealthy or that he had wanted wealth before he was wealthy. And continued wealth is not something one presently has. Similarly, if we speak of a man who enjoys golfing as desiring to golf we mean that he desires to continue golfing or to golf on future occasions, or that he had desired to golf. We normally say it is 'disposed' to rain before it rains, not while it is raining, and if we did say this while it is raining we would mean that it is disposed to continue raining. The same points apply to talk of someone's having an 'inclination' to do something.

What we must ask, then, when testing the relation of enjoyment to desire (inclination) is whether a person enjoying himself necessarily has either a desire to continue doing what he is enjoying doing or a desire to do this thing again, or whether he previously had a desire to do it. We find that none of these desires (inclinations) are necessary accompaniments of enjoyment. And from this it follows that enjoyment is not analyzable by reference to any of these desires (inclinations).

Does someone who is enjoying himself necessarily desire to continue doing what he is enjoying doing? No. We already have mentioned pleasures that provide counter-examples to this proposal. When the love-impassioned man reaches his friend's house he does not desire to continue walking (on past her house), and this is true even though he is enjoying the walk. Though someone may enjoy reading in bed before going to sleep at night, at a certain point he decides to turn out the light and go to sleep. When he turns out the light he is not necessarily fighting to overcome some desire or inclination to continue reading, and this is so even if he had been enjoying reading. So a desire or an inclination to continue what one
is doing is not necessary for enjoyment. 39

Similarly, though a desire for the smell to continue often accompanies being pleased by a smell, as Findlay suggests, this desire is not necessarily present - i.e., the desire is not part of being pleased. To be pleased by a joke it is not necessary to desire that the telling of the joke be prolonged. A woman hurriedly driving to work might be pleased by the sweet scent of a field of flowers without having a desire that the smelling of the scent be continued. (In this situation, the thought of the smell continuing probably would not even occur to her.)

Nor is the enjoyment of some activity necessarily accompanied by a desire to repeat the activity. A person who enjoys his wedding does not necessarily want to get married again. A man who enjoys killing a rival in a brawl will not desire to kill him again.

Nor is pleasure always accompanied by a previous desire for the object which brings the pleasure. There are unexpected pleasures. A joke, a smell, or a glimpse of a queer cloud may please though it was unanticipated and thus not desired. The sight of a funny face may please even though there was no desire to see a funny face. (The same examples show that 'acting willingly' is not necessary for pleasure. Pleasures which are unexpected and unsought need have no dimension of acting willingly or unwillingly. An unexpected funny remark or pretty sight may bring enjoyment even though the hearing of the remark or seeing of the sight was neither willing nor unwilling.)

39. The same examples show that 'dallying' (or 'dalliance') is not a defining property of pleasure. (Recall Findlay's suggested analysis mentioned earlier in this chapter.) The lover walking to his ladyfriend's house need have no inclination to linger, delay, or 'dally' even though he has been enjoying the walk.
Does pleasure require 'acquiescence', as Findlay suggests? To 'acquiesce' in doing something is to have an inclination to do it and to give-in or submit to the inclination. We 'give-in' or 'submit' to an inclination only when there is internal opposition - some additional desire or inclination not to do it. Some pleasures are indeed accompanied by such submitting or acquiescing. Pleased over her publication, a lady may 'acquiesce' to her inclination to think over and talk over the article. But not all pleasures are accompanied by acquiescence. When sitting through a concert or a meal which I am enjoying, I need not be 'acquiescing' to the listening inclination or the eating urge, for I have no inclination not to do it. Nor is 'acquiescence' involved when one is pleased by a joke. Since being pleased by a joke does not require a previous inclination to hear the joke, it also does not require 'acquiescing' or submitting to an inclination.

Is pleasure necessarily accompanied by energy or a heightened level of activity? (Someone who analyzes pleasure in terms of 'zest' or 'enthusiasm' is suggesting, at least, that heightened activity is involved.) Calm and passive pleasures provide counter-examples to this suggestion. To enjoy relaxing is not to relax energetically (with 'zest'). The pleasant experience in listening to peaceful, somber music does not involve a state of 'heightened activity' ('zest' or 'enthusiasm').

Ryle at one point suggests that acting 'with one's whole heart in

40. In his discussion of pleasure, Aristotle wrote: "How, then, is it that no one is continuously pleased? Is it that we grow weary? Certainly all human things are incapable of continuous activity. Therefore pleasure is not continuous; for it accompanies activity." (Aristotle, 1175a 3 - 6). The discussion in the text above shows that pleasure is not so tightly related to activity. Weariness is not inconsistent with pleasure since one can enjoy relaxing and various other low-activity, undemanding pleasures.
it' is characteristic of pleasure. However, the heightened activity or strong inclination suggested by this expression is neither sufficient nor necessary for pleasure. A person can do things 'with his whole heart in it' when acting out of terror or dread as well as when enjoying himself. And enjoying sunbathing, relaxing, or listening to background music do not require sunbathing, etc., 'with one's whole heart in it'.

To deny that 'pleasure' is definable in terms of desires toward what we are doing is not to say that no philosophically interesting connection between pleasure and desire exists. Pleasure is one common reason or ground for wanting to do something. Secondly, pleasure is itself something that is wanted. Thirdly, the very fact that we desire something may cause us to experience a heightened pleasure upon attaining it. For instance, the fact that the child has a strong desire for a bicycle causes him to feel a heightened pleasure upon receiving it as a gift.

Is pleasure to be identified with valuing or prizing an object? Clearly, we often value things which please us, but is the valuing of the object a consequence of the pleasure or is it the pleasure itself? The claim that pleasure just is the prizing or cherishing of some object may seem plausible when we think of someone who takes pleasure in the paintings of Rembrandt or in his car; he 'prizes' or 'cherishes' the paintings or the car. However, the terms 'prizing' or 'cherishing' are not appropriate for modest pleasures such as mildly enjoying a movie or a painting; 'prizing' and 'cherishing' imply valuing a great deal, whereas someone who mildly enjoys a movie or painting might be expected, at most, to value the object to only a modest degree.

41. Ryle (1949, p 104)
It might be claimed, then, that pleasure is valuing something, and the degree of pleasure is the degree to which the object is valued; the more highly the object is valued, the more intense the pleasure is. But this proportionality view will not hold. People value their lives very dearly even when they are not enjoying life at all; people who enjoy life very little normally value their lives to no less a degree than do those who enjoy life far more. A sick person may greatly value a certain medicine that helps him but he does not normally enjoy it.

The link between pleasure and valuing may be close when pleasure is taken in a car, a painting, or a song: A person comes to prize an object that is a source of a regular recurring pleasure. However, when the pleasure is not tied to some single reliable source, it is less common for 'prizing' or 'valuing' to exist. When someone is enjoying a party he will not normally 'prize' or highly value the party; someone pleased over a joke rarely gains an attitude of 'prizing' or valuing that joke.

Pleasure is something good, and the correlation between pleasure and valuing is largely due to the fact that objects which please us thereby give us reason to value them. Pleasure itself is prized, and in consequence we often prize objects which bring pleasure. But the pleasure is not itself the prizing. There are things other than pleasure which people value as ends; people think of knowledge and life itself as intrinsically good. This is why the degree to which we value an object is not always in proportion to the degree to which it pleases us.

The same situation holds for the relationship of pleasure to favourable appraisals; we often judge to be good those things which please us. But the appraisal is not 'inherent in the feeling experience'
as Arnold suggested; rather, an object's being pleasing provides us with reason for favourably appraising it. The degree of goodness that someone ascribes to an object is not always in proportion to the degree of pleasantness, and this is because people value things other than pleasure. When a form of exercise, a new medicine, or a new law is appraised as good, the appraisal may be based on the fact that the exercise or medicine promotes longevity of life or the fact that the law has a tendency to promote justice. Long life and justice, like pleasure, are valued to some extent as ends in themselves, and a person may appraise them favourably even if they do not please him. A doctor might appraise a new drug favourably without taking pleasure in the drug or being pleased by it.

Findlay suggested that we identify a person's feeling of pleasure with his awareness that his circumstances are as he wants them to be. The view seems most plausible when we think of someone who is in a very good mood and 'pleased with life'. But it does not fit very well the pleasure of feeling pleased to see a friend. Of this case, it might be said that one particular circumstance is 'as one wants it to be': the person wants to see his friend, and he is seeing him.

Shall we say, then, that to feel pleased is to judge something to be as one wants it to be? No, for we have already noted that pleasure is not always correlated with a desire for the pleasing object. A joke or scent may please someone without his having had a desire for the joke or scent to be that way.

Furthermore, it is possible for someone to realize that his circumstances are as he wants them to be to approve of his circumstances being this way, and yet not feel pleased. It is often noted that a person can get what he wants yet not be happy (pleased). But is there not 'something missing' in the life of this person? The only
wanted thing that need be missing would be his being happy or pleased with life. All of his outside circumstances in life might be as he wants them to be, but he also wants to be happy or pleased with his life, and this he is not. But this only shows that being pleased is not the same thing as having your outside circumstances in life as you want them to be. Your being happy or pleased with life is something over and above your having your external circumstances as you want them to be, and it is something which itself is desired.

4.) Central to 'pro-attitude' views of pleasure is that pleasure is identified with a psychological state which can be justified or unjustified, or reasonable or unreasonable. David Perry explicitly mentions that this is part of the significance he attaches to his analyses of the different forms of pleasure as kinds of 'attitudes'.

Nowell-Smith in classing pleasure as a 'pro-attitude' thereby treats it as parallel to the other 'pro-attitudes' of desire and approval. And it clearly is possible for a desire or an attitude of approval to be unjustified or irrational. A desire to act foolish or to injure oneself is, in the absence of special circumstances, irrational. Under normal circumstances there is something irrational in a general's approving a plan of action that he expects to bring a disastrous but avoidable defeat to his forces. To call pleasure a 'pro-attitude', then, seems at least to commit oneself to the view that pleasure is the sort of thing that can be reasonable or unreasonable.

If pleasure were a 'pro-attitude' or a favourable orientation of any of the types discussed in this chapter, it, too, would have this dimension of suitability or reasonableness. Pleasure itself would be

42. Perry (1967, p 213)
irrational, immoral, crazy, or sick whenever the desire, inclination, or approving or prizing attitude with which it is identified is irrational, immoral, etc.

My own view is that pleasure, like an itch, a pain, or a feeling of warmth or of cold is never itself reasonable, unreasonable, immoral, crazy, or improper. Such comments are, I believe, logically inapplicable to pleasure qua pleasure as they are logically inapplicable to itches and feelings of dizziness. However, that pleasure never can have a dimension of suitability may not seem obvious to all philosophers, and I will not press the point at the moment. (Though it will be a consequence of the positive view of pleasure that I develop in Chapters IV and V that pleasure is not itself the sort of thing that has these dimensions of suitability.) But there are at least some cases where it is clear-cut that pleasure has no dimension of aptness or suitability but where the corresponding desire or approving attitude is irrational or inappropriate. And from this it follows that the pleasure in this case is not in whole or in part some 'pro-attitude'.

For all 'purely physical' pleasures, i.e., those not contingent upon cognitive activity, the question of reasonableness or justification in feeling pleasure does not arise. If I know that I will suffer extreme sunburn pain by continuing to lie in the sun, there would be, under normal circumstances, some irrationality in desiring to continue lying in the sun or in approving continued sunbathing. Though there is something irrational in the desire or approval, there is nothing irrational in finding it pleasant to lie in the sun under these circumstances. If my pleasure were a desire to continue doing what I am doing, it would be in some way irrational. Similarly, if I know that I will be sick tonight if I eat more pizza, there would be something irrational in desiring to continue eating pizza in large
amounts, and there would be unreasonableness in 'prizing', highly valuing, or approving each additional piece. However, if I were under the same circumstances enjoying eating each additional piece of pizza, I would not be in any way irrational for doing so. Therefore, my pleasure in eating the pizza is not, in whole or in part, a desire to continue eating or some other 'pro-attitude' toward eating.

Questions about whether or not a particular attitude is reasonable or unreasonable sometimes allow room for dispute, and someone might wish to defend the sunbathing, pizza-eating hedonists mentioned from the charge of being unreasonable in their attitudes. However, no one would deny that it is at least arguable that a desire to continue eating pizza is, after one has eaten a great deal, irrational. And it is at least arguable that the other 'pro-attitudes' would be irrational in these circumstances. But there is no comparable room for argument for claiming that there is irrationality in finding the pizza pleasant or enjoying it under these circumstances. There is nothing irrational in finding pizza pleasant to eat, and this is so even if one has eaten a great deal. The fact that the issue of rationality cannot arise for pleasure in the same way that it can arise for desires and other 'pro-attitudes' is itself enough to show that the pleasure in these cases is not itself the desire or any of the other 'pro-attitudes'.

5.) Desires, inclinations, and attitudes of 'prizing' an object can be reasonable or unreasonable. What then makes a desire or other 'pro-attitude' reasonable or unreasonable? A desire or other 'pro-attitude' is reasonable in proportion to the desirability of the object desired, or, more precisely, it is reasonable to the extent that one has reason or justification for believing the object to be good or desirable. A desire is irrational when the object desired has
no good features, or when there is little or no reason for thinking that it has good features. It is normally reasonable for an intelligent young man to desire an education, since there is some reason for him to see value in an education (e.g., in training his mind, expanding his knowledge, and bettering his job opportunities.) A desire to shave one's head so as to make it totally bald would be, for most women and men in the Western World, irrational. This is so because usually there would be little value in doing so while there would be bad results (e.g., looking foolish, making oneself unhappy as a consequence of looking foolish). Similarly, under normal circumstances it would be irrational to desire to spend the afternoon rolling and unrolling one's tongue or to spend a week sitting in a pool of water. It is possible to think of circumstances in which a desire to shave one's head would be reasonable, e.g., it might help a particular person to get rid of ringworm or help someone in his singing or acting career. But the circumstances which make the desires reasonable are those which bring value or desirability to the state of affairs desired.

For no desire is it inappropriate that it be rated somewhere on a scale of reasonableness, and this is so whatever the object desired or the circumstances under which it comes to be desired.

Other philosophers have said things related to what I am saying about the nature of desire. G.E.M. Anscombe, for instance, writes:

The conceptual connexion between 'wanting'... and 'good' can be compared to the conceptual connexion between 'judgment'... and 'truth'. Truth is the object of judgment, and good the object of wanting.

Supporting a position similar to Anscombe's, J.C. Gosling writes the following about a person who claims to want an apple:

43. Anscombe (1958, p 75)
If we are to be sure that a person really does want the apple, we must be given some answer which characterizes its desirability ... If a desire is to be intelligible, it must be possible to give a final answer to why the subject wants what he does, which gives us the way in which it is desirable. 44

What makes a desire 'intelligible' is what makes it reasonable, and what makes it reasonable is something desirable about the object or the existence of some reason for supposing the object has desirable characteristics. It is possible to desire something which in fact is undesirable, but what makes the desire 'intelligible' - i.e., reasonable and therefore understandable - is some belief of the person's that the object has some desirable characteristic. A person may desire a drink which in fact will kill him (and this effect is undesirable), but his desire becomes 'intelligible' when we learn that, e.g., he thought that it would cure his rheumatism and would not threaten his life. 45

For a desire to be irrational it is not necessary that the desired object be undesirable; a desire can be irrational when the object is merely of indifferent worth. Under normal circumstances, a desire to spend Saturday afternoon crawling around the block would be bizarre and irrational; crawling is not necessarily bad or immoral (and it would not necessarily have the bad consequences of gaining the disapproval of my neighbours, since I could arrange to do it while they are away), but it is irrational simply because it has little positive value.

44. Gosling (1969, p 76)
45. Though Anscombe at one point in her discussion admits that it is possible to desire something that is not good, she at other points talks as though it is not possible. Gosling also at times talks as though it is not possible to desire something not good. Both at times are at the point of assuming that desires which would be 'unintelligible' would be logically impossible to have (whereas, they are merely unreasonable). For instance, in the passage of Gosling's just quoted he is close to assuming that if we cannot find some desirable characteristic in an object (apple), it follows that the object is not really desired.
It might be claimed that there are some desires where the object desired has no value but the desire still is not unreasonable. Trivial everyday desires such as the desire to eat, to sleep, to scratch an itch, to have a cup of coffee, or to see a friend do not need justification, it may be claimed. Though these objects have no special desirable characteristics, the desires are not irrational, it would be claimed. "Suppose I want to go outside for a walk or want to take a bath? Do I need a reason for doing so? I often do such things for no particular reason yet am not irrational for doing so," one might argue.

There are, admittedly, many desires of which we rarely ask whether or not they are reasonable or justifiable, but this lack of inquisitiveness is probably due to our assuming that there is value in each desired object.

There is often value in eating, sleeping, etc., and this is why these desires are not irrational under normal circumstances. Eating and sleeping are necessary biologically and eating may also be a source of pleasure (something desirable). Scratching an itch relieves discomfort, having coffee can provide aesthetic satisfaction, and seeing a friend can be pleasant. These desires are not always rational, and they can become irrational when the object desired loses the value it might otherwise have. If a person has already eaten or has slept more than enough, a continued desire for these things no longer is reasonable. In a world where sleeping was not biologically necessary, a desire to sleep would be as crazy and unreasonable as a desire to crawl around the block is in our world; in such a world, crawling might be as necessary for health as sleeping is in our world, and consequently a desire to crawl would be quite reasonable there.

I conclude that any desire will be reasonable or unreasonable
according to the desirability of the desired object or the available justification for supposing that the object has desirable characteristics. This applies as much to a desire to golf, garden, walk, or lie in a hammock as it does for a desire to sleep or to crawl around the block.46

Let us consider, then, someone who wants to dig in the garden on his free days 'because he enjoys gardening' or someone who wants to lie in a hammock or take a bath 'because he expects to enjoy doing so'. What makes such a common desire 'intelligible' and reasonable? Digging, lying in a hammock, and sitting in a tub of water are not intrinsically worthwhile activities; when moral philosophers list things which have intrinsic value they usually name pleasure, knowledge, and possibly justice, dignity, and a few other things. No one that I know of has claimed that digging, lying in a hammock, or sitting in a tub of water are intrinsically good activities. What value or desirability characteristic do these activities have that would make a desire to do these things intelligible and reasonable?

One way in which activities not themselves intrinsically valuable might come to have value is by being useful as means to some desirable end. It is possible for digging, lying in a hammock, or even sitting in a tub of warm water to gain derivative value through...

46. It may be that the reason why 'pro-attitudes' have this dimension of reasonableness — a dimension tied to the desirability of the object of the 'pro-attitude' — is that each 'pro-attitude' is in part some judgement about the value of the object. For instance, it may be that 'desiring x' entails 'thinking that x is good in some way'. (Certainly, 'approving x' and 'valuing x' entail 'thinking that x is good in some way'.) Such a view of 'pro-attitudes' would be in line with the standard view of emotions among contemporary philosophers. (It is normally supposed that, for instance, being 'proud' of having done x entails thinking x is good in some way.) Given this view of the 'pro-attitudes', the reasonableness of a desire or other 'pro-attitude' will be a function of the reasonableness of the value judgement entailed by that 'attitude'.
being useful as a means to some end. Digging in a garden might be worthwhile for someone who digs for a living to support himself and his family or for someone merely out to save himself money by growing his own vegetables. Lying in a hammock could be useful for a person trying to store up energy for a difficult task or for someone trying to think out a difficult problem under peaceful circumstances. Can we appeal to derivative values such as these to explain the 'intellegibility' and reasonableness of wanting to dig 'because one enjoys digging'? No, for if we claim that someone is doing something 'because he enjoys doing it', part or what we are asserting in saying this is that the person is not viewing his action as a means to some end. As R.S. Peters writes:

If it is said that a man eats because he enjoys eating or gardens because of the pleasure he gets out of gardening, this is a way of denying explanations such as that he is eating out of hunger or gardening for a living . . . The reference to pleasure implies that these things are done for their own sake. They are not done out of necessity, duty, or for any ulterior motive.47

The claim that 'Joe is digging in the garden because he enjoys doing so' is inconsistent with the claim that 'Joe digs mainly as a means to an end, namely, making a living and supporting his family'.

Digging in the garden is not intrinsically worthwhile. In a case when a person is motivated by enjoyment he is not viewing his act as means to an end. What, then, makes such a normal desire as 'wanting to dig in the garden because one enjoys gardening' intelligible and reasonable?

The correct answer, I believe, is as follows: When we say 'Joe wants to dig in the garden because he enjoys digging in the garden' we are giving Joe's main reason (i.e. his grounds or justi-
fication) for wanting to dig. Pleasure is intrinsically good and is therefore what Anscombe calls a 'desirability characteristic'. Because pleasure is desirable, it can give digging a derivative worth, i.e., a value derived from the value of the pleasure. With this derivative worth, digging becomes worthwhile and thus worth wanting. When digging gains this derivative worth, a desire to dig becomes 'intelligible' or reasonable.

Someone like Ryle who holds that our enjoyment in digging is our desire or inclination to dig is not able to interpret the situation in this way. The pleasure cannot be a person's reason for wanting to dig if it is that desire to dig. For Ryle, the claim that 'Joe wants to dig because he enjoys digging' must be an empty tautology of the form 'Joe wants to dig because he wants to dig'.

This provides further grounds for concluding that the pleasure is the reason for the desire and not the desire itself. If we identify the pleasure with the desire, then, in cases when the action is motivated by pleasure, we lose the only desirability characteristic available to account for the intelligibility and reasonableness of the desire. In cases when someone desires to dig, to lie in a hammock, or to sit in a tub of water (i.e., to 'bathe') because he enjoys doing so his desire becomes as unintelligible and unreasonable as a desire to spend the afternoon rolling and unrolling one's tongue or crawling around the block.

A comparable problem arises for someone who identifies pleasure with a prizing attitude. Suppose someone 'prizes' his morning coffee 'because he greatly enjoys it'. By saying that he prizes the coffee 'because he enjoys it' we rule out the possibility that he prizes it mainly as a means to some end. What, then, makes this 'prizing' of coffee intelligible? No one would say that drinking coffee has
intrinsic value; it is not valuable or worth wanting whether or not one enjoys it. The correct view is that pleasure by being good lends value to drinking coffee and thus provides reason for valuing it.

Summary and Conclusion

From the above arguments I conclude that pleasure is not itself the desires, inclinations, valuings, or other 'pro-attitudes' with which it is often identified. In many cases, it is the reason (i.e., the grounds or justification) for the 'pro-attitude'.

Pleasure is something which is appealing, intrinsically good, and something which itself is wanted, valued, and sought; the various desires, inclinations, etc., associated with pleasure do not themselves have this intrinsic appeal or this character of being wanted and sought. The desires and other 'pro-attitudes' can occur without pleasure, and pleasure can occur without the desires and other 'pro-attitudes'. The desires and other 'pro-attitudes' can be irrational in cases where pleasure would not be. Various normal desires are seen to be 'intelligible' and reasonable only by realizing that the pleasure is something distinct from these desires - something which provides reason and justification for them.

The association which pleasure has with our desires, inclinations, and valuings parallels the relationship of pain to various aversions or 'negative attitudes'. Where pleasure is correlated with a desire to prolong or repeat an activity found pleasant, pain is correlated with a desire or inclination to cut short or avoid that which is found painful. A person who is finding walking painful - for instance, someone with a broken toe - may want to cut short his walk and to avoid walking in the near future. What people find painful to do they tend not to want to do again. A pain sensation in the foot is
not itself an inclination to cut-short the walking or a desire to avoid walking in the future, but gives rise to these aversions and 'negative attitudes' by providing reason or justification for them. In a similar manner, a person's desire or inclination to prolong or repeat the activity which he is finding pleasant or 'enjoying', or his valuing or 'prizing' of that activity, is not itself his pleasure; rather, his pleasure gives rise to these desires, inclinations, and 'favourable attitudes' by providing reason or justification for them.
Chapter III: Anti-essentialist Views of Pleasure

A thesis commonly held by contemporary philosophers writing on the subject of pleasure is that the search for a single account of pleasure is misconceived and that it will not be possible to discover one definition or analysis that will be applicable to all 'pleasant' experiences. This anti-essentialist view of pleasure (that is, the view that there is no 'essence' to pleasant experiences) is a central theme in David Perry's book The Concept of Pleasure and in J.C. Gosling's recent book Pleasure and Desire and is a view which R.S. Peters, Georg von Wright, Terence Penelhum, and many other philosophers have endorsed. As well as having some inherent importance for our understanding of the nature of pleasure, the view poses a serious threat to any psychological or moral theory in which the concept of pleasure is given an important role. This is evidenced in Gosling's book where a central claim of his is that the traditional arguments in favour of Psychological Hedonism, the view that pleasure is the sole end or goal that motivates the actions of men, gain whatever plausibility they have in large part through illicit switches in one's arguments from talking and thinking of one kind of pleasure to thinking in terms of another. The word 'pleasure', he writes, "covers a wide range of partly analogous, partly interrelated cases... This complexity, which tells against simple analyses of pleasure as a feeling, tells equally against other

1. Perry (1967)
2. Gosling (1969, Ch. 9)
3. Peters (1958, p 143)
4. Von Wright (1963, Ch. IV)
5. Penelhum (1964, pp243 - 246)
over-all accounts in terms of attention, vigour, relation to desire or whatever it may be. They, like various attempts at hedonism, fail both by ignoring the various forms that an explanation in terms of pleasure must take, and by failing to see the range of variation among 'cases of pleasures'. "The welter of arguments which outside and sometimes inside philosophy are piled up in defence of hedonism emerge not as arguments for a single coherent thesis, but as a set of arguments for a set of theses . . . A very different brand of either thesis will emerge according to the view of pleasure one takes . . . Once the independence of the theses has been recognized they seem individually implausible." In this chapter I will examine the considerations or arguments which have led these philosophers to this view of pleasure.

I Is the Truth to be Decided by Introspective or Empirical Judgement?

Some philosophers offer what is, in effect, their own empirical judgement when supporting the contention that there is no 'essence' to a pleasant experience. William Alston, for instance, writes: "When we reflect on a wide range of cases of getting pleasure . . . we are unable to isolate a felt quality which they all share, in the way in which we can easily isolate a quality of redness which a number of visual sensations share, or a quality of painfulness which a number of different bodily sensations share." Also relying on his own empirical judgement of various pleasant experiences, R.S. Peters writes: "The pleasure of tasting sugar is specific to tasting sugar; the pleasure of sexual activity is specific to sexual

activity; the pleasure of finding out things is specific to finding out things. It is difficult to see what properties the alleged hedonic states have in common if they are thought of as species under a genus." 9

Both Alston and Peters are relying upon their own introspective or empirical judgements when they report that there does not seem to be some single quality or property that is common to all pleasant experiences. Though Alston writes that when we reflect on a wide range of pleasures we are unable to isolate some quality that is common to all, he should really state that he is speaking for himself. For there seems little reason to suppose that all philosophers would arrive at the same judgement if they attempted similar introspective comparisons. There have been many philosophers who have supposed that pleasure is a special experience. David Hume, for instance, wrote: "It is evident that under the term 'pleasure' we comprehend sensations which are very different from each other, and which have only such a distant resemblance as is requisite to make them be expressed by the same abstract term." 10 Though Hume would agree with Peters and Alston that there are great differences between the various experiences we call 'pleasant' he does, nevertheless, see some resemblance or similarity between the experiences and a similarity which gives us sufficient reason to call the experiences by the same name. John Stuart Mill and John Locke also thought of pleasure as a special experience, and it seems likely that if they had been asked whether they notice any quality or property that is common to various pleasant experiences they would have said that they

9. Peters (1958, p 143)
10. Hume (1739, Book III, Part I, Section II.)
did. On this matter, the sort of introspective or empirical judgment a philosopher will make is likely to be influenced by the philosophical theories and presumptions which he holds when judging the matter. Consequently, in cases such as these where philosophers may be expected to disagree in their empirical or introspective judgements, and where their empirical judgements may be expected to be influenced by the philosophical theories or views they already accept, philosophers will need to offer more than personal impressions and introspective reports. They will need to introduce argument. 11

The question of whether there is a single quality or feel common to a certain class of sensations or experiences is not one which we can assume should be simple to answer. Is there a single feel or quality common to all instances of feeling warm, feeling tired, or feeling dizzy? Do all experiences of hearing an oboe include a common (auditory) sensation? Do all of the visual sensations experienced when seeing different shades of green have some sensational quality or feature in common? I suspect that if we asked these questions of different people we would get different answers. In my own case, I simply am not sure what the correct answers are to each of these questions.

There are two different ways in which different sensations and

11. The issue being raised is not whether pleasure is a special localized sensation (e.g., comparable to a headache) but whether it is a special experiential quality. One of Gilbert Ryle's major contributions on the subject of pleasure is the insight that at least many (if not all) pleasures are very different from localized sensations such as headaches or toothaches. Nevertheless, it is important to ask whether one's experience has a special feel or quality or tone to it when enjoying a conversation. William Alston has some helpful things to say about this view when discussing what he calls the Conscious Quality view of pleasure. (Alston, 1967, pp 342 – 344)
experiences can have a quality or property in common: 1.) Two experiences could share a common, unanalyzable quality, or 2.) they could have a common relational property. Even if pleasant experiences did not have some unanalyzable quality in common it remains possible that they have some relational property in common. Whether or not different experiences have some unanalyzable quality in common will not necessarily be obvious, and issues become even more complicated and difficult when we begin to consider various relational properties which different experiences might share. The view I will be defending (in Chapters IV and V) is that pleasant experiences are defined by some relational property. The defense of this view requires considerable reflection, making of distinctions, and argument. Consequently the correctness and usefulness of this definition would not be obvious before one has heard the argument. If we have a particular property in mind we can contemplate various experiences in an introspective or empirical manner, and judge, with some profit, whether or not the experiences have that property in common. However, without knowing what we are looking for, our inability to notice a common relational property among various pleasant experiences is of limited import.

The presence of Wittgenstein is felt in recent anti-essentialist discussions of pleasure as it is in a great number of other contemporary discussions in Philosophy of Mind. Wittgenstein is the father of anti-essentialist views of word-meaning. His attack on the essentialist view of word-meaning was an important part of his Philosophical Investigations. And the presumption that we might view the issue of whether objects called by the same name are called by this name in virtue of common properties as being an empirical issue is itself rooted in Wittgenstein. "Consider for
example the proceedings that we call 'games'," Wittgenstein wrote, "What is common to them all? Don't say: 'There must be something common, or they would not be called 'games'" - but look and see whether there is anything common at all . . . To repeat: don't think, but look!" Wittgenstein is, of course, right to reject the reply that 'there must be something common, or they would not be 'games'" for if the question being raised is whether there is something in common, this reply merely begs the question. However, by employing these observational terms ('look and see') and by contrasting looking and seeing with thinking ("To repeat: don't think, but look!"), Wittgenstein seems to be encouraging us to take the question of the unity of games as one for unargued empirical observation rather than one for detailed, subtle and complex thinking and argument. However, the question of whether or not there is a unity or essence to 'games' is not to be resolved merely by approaching the matter as a straightforward empirical question. Argument, not unsupported empirical judgement, is what is needed.

II The Thesaurus Argument

The widespread sympathy for anti-essentialist views of pleasure among contemporary philosophers has other sources. C.C.W. Taylor, for instance, contemplates a number of sentences about pleasure in supporting his anti-essentialist view of pleasure. I will repeat this list:

1. I take great pleasure in humiliating him.
2. I fish purely for pleasure.
3. I fish for fun.
4. I enjoy fishing.

12. Wittgenstein (1958, paragraph 66)
5. Fishing is pleasant.
6. I shall be very pleased to come fishing.
7. I was very pleased at the result.
8. Your success gives me the greatest possible pleasure.
9. Reading is his only pleasure.
10. He was much given to the pleasures of the table.

Immediately upon presenting this list Taylor writes: "It will surely be obvious that the attempt to isolate the crucial something which is the pleasure in each case and is common to all cases is a hopeless task."¹³

The diversity which Taylor appeals to here is primarily that of linguistic diversity, i.e., a diversity in pleasure-words and pleasure-idioms. One could ask what is common to enjoying a book, enjoying a dinner, and enjoying a sexual romp, and this question would be sufficiently difficult. But Taylor asks what pleasure is common to 'I fish purely for pleasure', 'I enjoy fishing', 'fishing is pleasant', etc., where the most obvious diversity is one of pleasure terminology or linguistic idiom. The pleasure-idioms which Taylor appeals to differ from each other in various ways in their meanings: the word 'enjoy' is not totally synonymous with the words 'pleasant', 'pleased', or 'pleasure', nor is the expression 'taking pleasure in' totally synonymous with 'for pleasure'.

Taylor is trying to prove that there is no common 'pleasure' in each case. Presumably, what makes each sentence relevant to the topic of 'pleasure' is that in each case there is a pleasure-word, i.e., a word which entails the having of a degree of 'pleasure'. (If Taylor is not at least assuming that each of these sentences entails the having of a degree of 'pleasure', it is difficult to

¹³. Taylor (1963, p 3)
see how he could feel entitled to conclude anything about the meaning of 'pleasure' by considering these sentences. He would need to be continually defending himself from the charge that the conclusion he wishes to draw from these sentences have no direct implications for the question at issue, namely, the nature of 'pleasure'. 'Fishing is pleasant' entails 'People experience pleasure while fishing' or a similar sentence containing the term 'pleasure'. Similarly, 'I enjoy fishing' entails 'I experience pleasure when fishing' or something similar. A similar entailment relationship could be presented for the other sentences listed.

Taylor's form of reasoning, then, seems to be as follows: There are a number of words which differ from each other in meaning but which also entail the having of a degree of 'pleasure'. Therefore, the 'pleasure' which is entailed by each of these different words must itself be different in each case.

Taylor's form of argument could be paralleled in the case of a great number of general terms. One might call this the Thesaurus Argument since one could, for any term such as 'pleasure' which appears as a general heading in a thesaurus, invent an anti-essentialist argument for that general term merely by listing sentences containing the words which appear under the general heading. Under the general term 'moisture', for instance, we find the words 'humidity', 'drenching', 'perspire', and many other words which entail the presence of 'moisture' but which clearly differ from each other in meaning in some way. Does it follow from the mere existence of many moisture-words differing in meaning that the word 'moisture' has no single uniform meaning? No. There are many ways of accounting for the differences in meaning of these moisture-words without concluding that the word 'moisture' must have many different meanings.
'Humidity' is a noun which refers to the property which air has of containing a degree of moisture; 'drenching' is an adjective which is used to attribute a high degree of moisture to some object; 'perspire' is a verb which is used to refer to the process of emitting moisture through the skin. It is quite consistent to hold that though moisture-words differ from each other considerably in meaning, the word 'moisture' which appears in the definition of each has the same meaning in each case. The differences in the meanings of the individual moisture-words are well accounted for by the many other differences in the definitions. Thus, it is consistent for one to hold that though there are many pleasure-words differing from each other in meaning, the word 'pleasure' as it enters into the definitions of each of these words, is the same in meaning in each case.

Taylor and a number of other philosophers have given a great deal of attention to one particular distinction between pleasure-idioms, namely, a distinction between enjoying something and being pleased about something. The distinction is given considerable attention in the papers by Taylor and Penelhum and is central in David Perry's book on Pleasure. The authors present this distinction as a critical stumbling block to one who would attempt to give a uniform account for all 'pleasure'.

The philosophers defend their distinction by directing argument at showing that enjoyment is something very different from being pleased about something, or correspondingly, that the idioms of 'enjoying something' and 'being pleased about' something are not the same in meaning. "My being pleased to see that you are well is not the same as my enjoying seeing you are well," Taylor writes.  

14. Taylor (1963, p 9)
Enjoyment and being pleased take different sorts of objects. One can be pleased only with something that is seen to serve his interest, it is argued, whereas no such restriction holds for what one can enjoy.\textsuperscript{15} Being pleased with something but not enjoying something implies thinking of the object as satisfactory.\textsuperscript{16}

In defense of the same distinction Terence Penelhum writes: "Although both have objects, the typical objects differ. Being pleased typically has facts for its objects; enjoyment typically has actions or events."\textsuperscript{17} For instance, we say that we are pleased that the day has ended (the object of the pleasure being a fact) but not that we enjoy that the day has ended. Rather, we enjoy the day, the evening, and in general 'events' or activities and not facts.

Penelhum notes additional differences between the idioms:

\textbf{Although both entail awareness of their objects one has to specify different forms of awareness for each. All that is necessary for me to be pleased by something is . . . that I should know (or think that I know) about it; to enjoy it, however, I have to be actively engaged in it . . . or be paying fairly close attention to it.}

\textbf{The object has put (a pleased person) into a state of mind which may explain his actions over a considerable period after the occurrence of that which pleases him . . . When I enjoy something . . . it affects me by holding my attention and distracting me from other things; and this it cannot do after I am aware that it has ceased, even though it may continue to please me.}\textsuperscript{18}

We can be pleased about things after they occur but can enjoy only what is happening now.\textsuperscript{19}

The two sorts of pleasures, Penelhum says, are independent of

\textsuperscript{15} Taylor (1963, pp 11 - 12)  
\textsuperscript{16} Taylor (1963, p 8)  
\textsuperscript{17} Penelhum (1964, p 244)  
\textsuperscript{18} Penelhum (1964, pp 245 - 246)  
\textsuperscript{19} Penelhum (1964, pp 245 - 246)
each other in that either can occur without the presence of the other.

I can be pleased by something which it is logically impossible for me to enjoy such as my child’s examination results, or the upsurge in the economy, and I can be pleased about something which I do not in fact enjoy, such as managing to run five miles or refraining from eating dessert. The unpleasantness is a reason for my being pleased at managing them. 20

Clearly there are many differences between enjoying something and being pleased about some state of affairs. Does it follow that no single account of 'pleasure' applicable to both kinds of 'pleasures' is possible? This seems to be what these philosophers think that they have shown. David Perry, for instance, writes of enjoyment and being pleased (which he considers two kinds of 'pro-attitudes'):

"These notions are so radically different . . . that it would appear futile to try to formulate a general definition of pleasure that would cover these ideas yet distinguish them from other pro-attitudes." 21

From the premise that the concepts of enjoyment and being pleased are radically different does it follow that it will not be possible to give an account of 'pleasure' broad enough to cover both concepts yet narrow enough to distinguish the concept of pleasure from other concepts? No. One could as easily argue that the concept of being a man is so radically different from that of being a whale that it would be "futile to try to formulate a general definition of 'mammal' that would cover both these concepts yet distinguish them from other concepts such as being a lizard or reptile." Yet, in spite of the vast differences between men and whales the normal definition of 'mammal' along the lines of an

20. Penelhum (1964, p 246)
'animal with hair and milk-secreting organs in the female' is very able to show what is common to mammals and to say how they are distinguished from non-mammals. Both the species of whales and of man have the characteristics mentioned in this definition, and the fact that lizards do not have these characteristics is what accounts for their not being classifiable as 'mammals'.

Being different is being different in some respects, and being different in some respects does not preclude being the same in other respects. It is not possible to prove that two things are not species of the same genus, or subclasses of the same type of thing, merely by pointing to differences — even great differences — between the things. The account of pleasure which I will be developing in Chapters IV and V cuts across this distinction (of enjoyment and being pleased) with ease yet is well able to distinguish the pleasant from that which is not pleasant. 22

22. I suspect that enjoyment and being pleased about something are not, in fact, two distinct species but are two overlapping classes of pleasures. The authors rightly note that being pleased about something is not the same thing as enjoying that thing, that one can be pleased about something without enjoying that thing (and vice versa), and that enjoyment and being pleased take different sorts of objects. Though this is all true it still does not follow that enjoyment and being pleased are fully distinct or independent of each other. Though my being pleased about having run five miles does not entail that I enjoyed running the five miles, it does entail that something was enjoyed. Someone who is pleased about having run five miles enjoys the thought of his accomplishment. His knowledge of having run five miles may cause him to enjoy in a heightened fashion the walk home after running, the shower afterwards, and the relaxation and conversation afterwards. These enjoyments, it seems to me, are part, or the whole of, one's pleasure in feeling pleased about having run five miles. If all such enjoyments are removed from the situation one necessarily decreases, and possibly totally removes, the person's pleasure in feeling pleased about having run five miles. One who would claim that enjoyment and being pleased are fully distinct must also prove that one's pleasure in being pleased about something is distinct from all such enjoyments as these.
Much of the discussion of Pleasure in the recent literature has been carried on by philosophers trained in, or sympathetic to, the Ordinary Language school of philosophy. Philosophers of this school do not directly contemplate the nature of pleasure (the experience) but of pleasure-words and pleasure-idioms. In particular, it is the 'ordinary' or 'idiomatic' terms and expressions that are given central attention. A danger inherent in this method of philosophizing is that of having secondary or figurative senses of the word being discussed creep into the discussion. Yet philosophers of this school are almost never seen in practice to employ this distinction between primary and secondary senses of the word or expression in question.

The sixth sentence on C.C.W. Taylor's list of pleasure-sentences (the list which I presented on page 60 of this chapter) was 'I shall be very pleased to come fishing'. This sentence, superficially, looks just like the seventh sentence, 'I was very pleased at the result'. The only explicit difference is one of tense; the sixth sentence is in the future tense and the seventh in the past. However, I suspect that Taylor had an additional difference in mind when he included both on the list. A more important difference between the two sentences is that the sixth would normally be used in a figurative, non-literal sense. The sentence 'I was very pleased at the result' would normally be used literally to report or assert that one felt a certain way at sometime in the past. But the sentence 'I shall be very pleased to come fishing' would not normally be used to describe or report an expected future pleasure. (No doubt, it could be used or intended in a literal fashion, but the point is that normally it
Such a sentence would normally be used merely as a polite acceptance of an offer. Someone who accepts an offer with these words would not have said something that would be mistaken or false if he did not in fact feel pleased to fish when the day of the fishing arrived. The use of this sentence is comparable to that of the sentence 'I'll see you later' as it is commonly used by Americans. Americans say 'I'll see you later' in the place of 'good-bye', and when they are using the words in this idiomatic way they would not be insincere or mistaken if they had no intention of seeing the person later. The utterance, in the sense in which it would normally be intended, is what J.L. Austin would call a Performative Utterance.\textsuperscript{23}

Perhaps if the person at the time of accepting an offer with these words were feeling reluctant or distressed at the thought of going fishing we might accuse him of being insincere. But, even so, it would not follow that his words were asserting some fact about his present state of mind. One can be insincere when saying 'welcome to my home' or 'thank you', and yet one is obviously not directly asserting some fact about one's own attitude with these words.

Taylor also includes the sentence 'I fish purely for pleasure' within his list, yet this sentence also is 'idiomatic' and not fully literal. When a sentence of the form 'I fish for x' is used in a fully literal sense it means 'I fish for the sake of getting x'. A fisherman who says 'I fish purely for money' means that the getting of money is his sole reason for fishing and that he views his fishing as a means to an end (money). But someone who says 'I fish purely for pleasure (for fun)' is \textit{not} asserting that the attainment of

\textsuperscript{23} Austin (1962)
pleasure or fun is his sole goal or purpose in fishing. To someone who claimed that he fished 'purely for pleasure (for fun)' it would not be appropriate to reply "But do you in fact get pleasure (fun) from fishing?", for this would be to take his words in a too literal sense. The sentence 'I fish for pleasure' is comparable to 'I fish as a hobby'. These sentences, of course, have some connection with pleasure (the psychological state); someone who fishes 'for pleasure' or as a hobby normally would enjoy fishing. Many philosophers in recent years have given considerable attention to the expression 'for pleasure' in their studies of pleasure, but the conclusions they draw are thrown into doubt by their not having questioned the presumption that the expression is fully literal.

Other sentences on Taylor's list are of a form sometimes used in a literal sense and sometimes used in a figurative sense; because they have these two meanings the sentences are equivocal. 'Your success gives me the greatest possible pleasure' has a formal ring to it. It might be used by someone not attempting to describe his own response but wanting merely to congratulate someone. Indeed, one might even use such an expression of someone whose success does not really please us at all - e.g., of a rival or an acquaintance whose success we are indifferent to or even resent. The sentence in this sense is like 'I'm pleased to meet you' or 'It gives me the greatest pleasure to introduce the renowned ...' where the person using the sentence is normally not attempting to describe his own feelings. The sentence is one which could be used in a literal fashion - indeed, even the sentence 'I'll see you later' could be used by some American in a literal fashion - but the point is that normally, or at least quite frequently, the sentence would not be used in a literal sense.
Similarly, the seventh sentence on Taylor's list, 'I was very pleased at the result' would sometimes be used non-literally. When we see a neighbor and congratulate him on his son's promotion by saying 'I am pleased at your son's good fortune' we might simply be congratulating our neighbor and not describing our own feelings. Our sentence when used in this sense would not be false even if we did not feel pleased upon hearing of the news of our neighbor. 24

In his article Taylor had set out to prove that no single feature is common to pleasant experiences. He probably felt that by including sentences such as these, he was supporting the contention that no special experience was necessary to pleasure. ("For surely no special experience is required for saying 'I shall be very pleased to come fishing', he may have been thinking.) But when we are wondering what, if anything, is common to all pleasant experiences (and this presumably is the question at issue) we are in this instance using the word 'pleasure' or 'pleasant experience' as descriptive of a psychological response, and we are asking what is common to these psychological responses. That there may be sentences which contain the word 'pleasure' or a cognate but which do not refer to psychological states at all does not bear on the issue. 25

24. Not all sentences of the form 'So and so is pleased that ...' are figurative, however. When a son says that he is very pleased at his father's new-found happiness, or that his father's success gives him great pleasure, he would normally be speaking literally and reporting a pleasure which he felt. Nor are we speaking figuratively when we describe the smiling, laughing child as being 'pleased with his new train'.

25. Taylor, in his list, concentrated on first-person pleasure-sentences, that is, sentences where it is oneself who is said to be pleased. And it is the first-person sentences which are most frequently used as performatives and therefore as sentences where one is not literally reporting a pleasure that was felt. I can promise or apologize for myself by saying 'I promise' or 'I apologize' but I cannot promise or apologize for myself or for someone else by saying 'he promises ...' or 'he apologizes'. In How To Do Things With Words, Austin discusses this fact of first-person, present tense sentences being the most common explicit performative sentence (in Austin, 1962, p 56).
Perhaps a philosopher might be inclined to reply, "Yes, the idioms mentioned here differ from the ones which you call 'central' or 'literal'. But rather than dismiss them as 'figurative', we should consider them on a par with the idioms you consider 'literal'. They are closely related to these other idioms. The fact that these uses have a meaning different from that of the other cases merely supports the contention that no unified account of pleasure is possible."

Firstly, this reply fails to say how, e.g., a sentence of the form 'I shall be . . .' when not used to describe or predict a future something can be considered literal. (Does the term 'shall be' have a special, literal sense where it is not used futuristically?)

Furthermore, this reply contains a serious confusion, a confusion found to some extent in many recent discussions of pleasure. In the reply one shifts from talking about words to talking about things. One wishes to draw conclusions about pleasure, a thing, by noting the varieties of usage of pleasure-words. Of course, one often can do this in philosophy with no problem. But in the present shift there is a problem.

Suppose that I say of my boss that he gives me a headache. The word 'headache' here does not refer to a thing, but is merely used figuratively giving the whole sentence a certain, non-literal meaning. There is no headache, a thing, in the situation which I can compare with other headaches - those I take aspirins for. So the question of whether the word 'headache' is always used in the same way does not quite correspond to the question of whether there is something common to all headaches. Those cases in which the word 'headache' is not used to refer to something will not force a decision on whether there is something common to the things referred to or described in those cases when the word does refer to something. It is this latter issue
we are raising when we ask if there is something common to all headaches.

Similarly, the question of whether there is a something common to all pleasures constitutive of the pleasure in each case does not quite correspond to the question of whether pleasure-words are always used with the same sense. When a person says he is pleased to meet another person, or non-descriptively says he is pleased at another's success, there is no pleasure, a thing, to compare to other pleasures, e.g., the enjoyment of a movie. When we ask if there is something common to all pleasures we are using the word 'pleasure' to refer to something and we are asking if there is something common to the things referred to by the word. Considerations of situations in which pleasure-words are not used to describe or refer to things will have no direct bearing on this question.

So, the ordinary language philosopher, if he wishes, could point to the fact that pleasure-words are sometimes used non-descriptively to support a view that pleasure-words are not always used with the same meaning, and he might also argue that there are interrelationships between these different senses. But he cannot point to these uses to support a contention that no unified account of pleasure (the thing) is possible. However, it is the latter view that is philosophically important. 26

26. The tendency to overlook the distinction between literal and non-literal senses of the word in question is also present in the work of Wittgenstein, the founder of recent anti-essentialist thinking. Consider, for instance, Wittgenstein's discussion of 'tools' in his *Philosophical Investigations* (paragraphs 11 - 14). He defends his anti-essentialist position by arguing: "Think of the tools in a tool-box: there is a hammer, pliers, a saw, a screw-driver, a rule, a glue-pot, glue, nails and screws... " Imagine someone's saying: 'All tools serve to modify something. Thus the hammer modifies the position of the nail, the saw, the shape of the board, and so on.'
IV Different Forms of What?

The claim that there are differences, even vast differences, among pleasures is not in itself a new or controversial one. With great notoriety, John Stuart Mill claimed in his *Utilitarianism* that pleasures differ significantly in quality or kind. (His point was that we should consider the quality of the experience as well as the

(26. contd.) -And what is modified by the rule, the glue-pot, the nails?" The argument is that words are like tools, and there is no single definition that can be given for a 'tool' (since counter-examples always arise). For instance, the reasonable suggestion that a 'tool' is an object which 'serves to modify something' meets Wittgenstein's counter-example that a rule, glue-pot, and nails are tools but do not serve to modify something.

But are a rule, glue-pot, and nails 'tools'? (The fact that they might be found in a 'tool-box' does not prove they are tools, for we could find pencils, sandwich, and just about anything in a tool-box.) It seems to me that we would not normally call them 'tools', but if we did so we would mean something different from what we mean when we call a hammer a 'tool'. The *Concise Oxford Dictionary* lists the primary meaning of the word 'tool' a "mechanical implement". As an additional, second meaning or sense - one which is listed as 'figurative' - the dictionary lists a "thing used in an occupation or pursuit". As illustrations of the word in this sense it lists "literary tools; the tools of one's trade; the computer as a research tool". (Sykes, 1976) Now it seems to me that if we would call a rule or glue-pot a 'tool' we would be doing so in the same sense in which we might call a computer a 'tool', and this would be, roughly, a way of saying that the object is useful in the attainment of some practical end or desired result.

Wittgenstein has no argument against this reasonable suggestion that we have two senses of 'tool' here. If the dictionary is right in distinguishing two senses of the word 'tool' here, Wittgenstein is guilty of equivocating on the word 'tool' and of switching from the primary meaning of the word to a secondary, less literal sense.

Now it may be replied that, of course, Wittgenstein is not going to try to prove that the word 'tool' is being used in the same sense, for his whole point is that no single account of 'tools' will be possible. But this reply will not be appropriate to the thesis Wittgenstein presumably is holding, for he is not merely claiming that the word 'tool', and indeed most words, have more than one sense and that these different senses (including literal and non-literal senses) share a family resemblance. This doctrine would not be controversial or important. As Haig Khatchadourian writes, "Wittgenstein is concerned with things which are called by the same name in one and the same sense, and not in different (literal) senses. Obviously, if what Wittgenstein is maintaining is simply that things which are called by the same name, but in different senses, have only 'family resemblances' of one sort or another and not any common determinate characteristics, his view would be of relatively little significance. For hardly anybody would hold the contrary."

(Khatchadourian, 1957).
quantity' or intensity of the pleasure when deciding what intrinsic value it has.) As is apparent from the passage quoted earlier (on page 57 of this chapter), David Hume also recognized that there are differences among pleasures. Indeed, few philosophers would deny this.

Where contemporary philosophers tend to differ from traditional opinion on the subject is not in their claim that there are differences among pleasures but in their further claim that there is no feature or property (or combination of properties) which is common to all pleasant experience which constitutes the pleasantness of the experience in each case. As Taylor wrote (in a passage quoted earlier): "The attempt to isolate the crucial something which is the pleasure in each case and is common to all cases is a hopeless task."

A crucial problem which these philosophers face, but which Mill and Hume did not face, is whether it is a consequence of their view, that the word 'pleasure' is a homonym, i.e., a word with differing meanings. If, for instance, enjoyment and being pleased have little of importance in common, do we not then mean something quite different when we call enjoyment a kind of 'pleasure' from when we call being pleased a kind of 'pleasure'? These philosophers explicitly deny that it is by virtue of some important common characteristic that we call both 'pleasures'; they deny that these things are in some crucial respect 'the same sort of thing'. Perry wrote: "These notions are so radically different . . . that it would appear futile to try to formulate a general definition of pleasure that would cover these ideas yet distinguish them from other pro-attitudes." But if this is so does it not follow that there is no important reason or grounds for grouping these two kinds of things together and calling them by the same name ('pleasure') yet distinguishing them from things we could
not call by that name?

None of the philosophers involved actually adopts the view that the word 'pleasure' is a homonym and all regularly talk as if it is not. Perry entitles his book The Concept of Pleasure as if there were really one concept he was talking about and analyzing all the time. All of the philosophers involved regularly use the word 'pleasure' without quotation marks, apparently as if there were really one kind of thing which they are discussing all the time. However, if one is committed to the view that the word 'pleasure' is a homonym with two very different meanings, one faces a serious problem in justifying this manner of proceeding. For it would seem that the word is seriously ambiguous. Would it not be odd to write an article or book entitled 'Banks' and then to proceed to discuss both banks which one puts money in and banks which form sides to rivers? Could one sensibly say that he was analyzing the concept of being a bank?

J.C. Gosling treats it as a central thesis of his book that no single all-inclusive account of 'pleasure' will be possible and takes the view that the word 'pleasure' "covers a wide range of partly analogous, partly interrelated cases." Some pleasures, he argues, are distinguished by a 'heightened geniality', some by a 'vigour and gusto', others by 'absorption and attention', while still others by different characteristics. Yet, he nowhere views the word

27. Gosling (1969, p 137)
29. Gosling (1969, p 133)
30. Gosling (1969, p 135)
31. Though he uses 'vigour and gusto' as well as 'geniality' in the analysis of kinds of pleasures, it seems, as I suggested earlier, that the former concepts, and maybe the latter one, themselves, need to be analysed in terms of pleasure. That is, one cannot appeal to 'vigour and gusto' to explain what pleasure is since it will be necessary to appeal to pleasure to explain what 'vigour and gusto' are.
'pleasure' as equivocal. He uses the word throughout the book without quotes as though it had a decisive, unmistakable meaning in each case. For instance, he considers ways in which pleasure might be considered a feeling and wonders how pleasure is related to some of the emotions. Given his view that the word can name at least three things which he emphasizes have no common core of 'pleasantness', one wonders whether he takes himself to be talking of a number of very different sorts of things all at once.

Penelhum explicitly argues that we are not dealing with a homonym. "The generic notion of pleasure is no linguistic accident. I would be a strange, inconsistent sort of person if a great many things which I was pleased by I did not in fact enjoy, or if a great many things which displeased me I did in fact enjoy."

Penelhum here wishes to argue that it is no 'linguistic accident' that the word 'pleasure' is used for the two types of things. Though it is not clear what he means by 'linguistic accident' his account does not rescue him from the position that the word 'pleasure' is a homonym with two very different meanings. On his view, we speak of these two very different things by the same word ('pleasure') merely because they normally accompany each other, and because one would be 'a strange, inconsistent sort of person' if he failed to be pleased by what he enjoyed. However, the fact that one thing is normally accompanied by another provides no justification for thinking of them as the same sort of thing. The only common characteristic which such conjunction shows is temporal conjunction.

Penelhum has given what looks more like a causal explanation of how we would come to call two different things by the same word than

32. Penelhum (1964, p 246)
anything that would count as a rational justification for doing so.\footnote{In the quoted passage, Penelhum speaks of the word 'pleasure' as being a 'generic' notion. It would seem that the word 'generic' is being used very carelessly and casually here. For, from his general position I would infer that he is denying that we have anything like a proper genus-species relationship here. If pleasure were a genuine genus of which enjoyment and being pleased were species, the account of why it is not a 'linguistic accident' that we use the same word here would be quite different from the one Penelhum presents.}{33}

After arguing that enjoyment and being pleased are very different with no common essence, Taylor spends considerable effort showing how the two things are interrelated. He argues, in effect, that enjoyment is one possible reason, among many, for being pleased. However, this, too, only shows a contingent correlation and does not provide any justification for thinking of the two as the same sort of thing. Thus, he provides no reason for not supposing that it is a consequence of his view that the word 'pleasure' is a homonym with two very different meanings.

Gosling, does raise the question of how we come to apply the same word to such diverse phenomena. However, the question which he asks is not quite clear enough. Does he want to decide how it happens that the word 'pleasure' came to be used in so many different senses? Or, does he want to decide how things differing so much can be 'pleasures' in the same sense of the term? (Like Wittgenstein in his discussions of 'tools', Gosling shows no awareness of the possibility of distinguishing some of these diverse 'pleasures' according to different, perhaps primary and derivative, senses of the word.)

The word 'pleasure', Gosling explains, "covers a wide range of partly analogous, partly interrelated cases". The pleasure of 'being pleased', he says, is central and the other things we call 'pleasures' are called by this name as a result of their relationship to this central 'pleasure'.\footnote{Gosling (1969, p 136)}{34}
There are three sorts of relationships of other things we call 'pleasures' to cases of 'being pleased' which Gosling mentions:

(a) In some cases this (relationship) may be very obvious: what I enjoy may bring a smile to my face, and it may be indifferent whether I am said to have enjoyed seeing someone win a race or to have been pleased at seeing him ... (b) Sometimes it may be that my manner of engaging in the activity enjoyed bears a relation to my humdrum manner of behavior analogous to that between being pleased and being unaffected or disgruntled ... (c) Even so, it is doubtful what we should make of such cases (those 'pleasures' that are not cases of 'being pleased') if it were not at least usually the case that they leave us refreshed, and relatively pleased with life ... The result of the relevant enjoyment is to restore equilibrium and leave us more pleased with life than we were before.  

The first relationship which he suggests (a) is that in some cases my response may indifferently be described as one of 'enjoyment' or 'being pleased' (and this is why both responses come to be called 'pleasure'). But this seems to be the same as saying that sometimes enjoyment just is being pleased, or that 'enjoyment' in one sense means 'being pleased'. If this were so, then 'enjoyment' in this sense is not a different sort of thing from being pleased. Given this account there is no problem about why we call these 'two things' by the same word, because 'enjoyment' in this sense has the same meaning as 'being pleased'.

The second sort of relationship portrayed (b) is one where certain 'enjoyments' are related to their opposites in a way analogous to the way in which being pleased is related to its opposite. But to say that such things are called 'pleasures' by virtue of some sort of analogy with pleasure in the central case is to say that they are called 'pleasures' in either a metaphorical or some other derivative sense of the word 'pleasure', and this is at least to say that they are 'pleasures' in a different sense of the word from those things to

which they are analogous. If something is not a nose, but is analogous to a nose in some way, then in speaking of it as a 'nose' I am using the word in either a figurative sense or in some other derivative sense (i.e., in a sense derived from the primary sense in some way). When I speak of the 'nose' of an airplane, I am using the word in a sense that is different from the sense in which a person or dog has a 'nose', but the two senses are related, and the former sense is a derivative of the latter.

The third reason Gosling gives for calling some states other than being pleased 'pleasures' is that they 'usually leave us refreshed and relatively pleased with life'. But this is simply to say that some things are called 'pleasures' because they cause pleasure in the central sense of the word. These states are related to pleasures in the central sense as eyestrain is related to the headache which it may cause. But then the sense in which a cause of pleasure (in the central sense of 'pleasure') is called 'pleasant' will be comparable to the sense of 'painful' in which the cause of a headache is itself called 'painful'. We can call eyestrain 'painful' and in doing so we mean that eyestrain causes, e.g., headaches. But we clearly are using the word in a different sense when we call eyestrain 'painful' than when we call a certain sensation 'painful'. So, too, according to this suggestion of Gosling's, these different 'pleasures' are 'pleasures' in different senses of the word.

Thus, according to the relationships which Gosling in fact maps out between the various things we call cases of 'pleasure', these various things are, at least according to the second and third relationships he mentions, 'pleasures' in different (primary and derivative) senses of the word.

Probably a Wittgensteinian view of the relationship between
strains of meanings which a word has lies behind the authors' comfortable acceptance of the apparent inconsistency in presuming some kind of unity in meaning of words while explicitly denying a unity or uniformity among the things being named. With his Family Resemblance view of meaning Wittgenstein provided a model of word meaning which was intended to make it possible for someone consistently to hold both that there is a lack of uniformity among the things called by the same word and that the word is not a homonym with many distinct senses. But Wittgenstein never claimed that a Family Resemblance model would apply to any and every manner of distinguishing strains of meaning of a word. He never claimed that no matter how you distinguish strains of meaning of a word, the word will retain a rough 'unity' in meaning and the various things referred to will always be related to each other in the way in which members of a family are related to each other. Rather, his view was that if you distinguish strains of meaning in a certain way, and interrelate them in a certain way, the word may retain a kind of rough 'unity' in meaning. However, it turns out, that the sort of relationships which the authors we discuss see between the types of things which the word 'pleasure' names do not fit the Family Resemblance model.

The Family Resemblance account of meaning is as follows.\textsuperscript{35} We often think of there being a certain characteristic look to a family, where we think of a rough sort of 'unity' in appearances. In fact the 'unity' is not dependent on there being a number of family traits shared by all the members of the family. Rather, traits will be shared by some members, but not by others; the two brothers will have the eyes of their mother, one brother will have the build of his

\textsuperscript{35} From Wittgenstein (1967, paragraphs 66 - 67)
father, one brother and one sister will have the same sort of ears as the mother, and so on. It may be that no single characteristic is shared by all, or if there are shared features, the overall 'unified' look to the family is not limited to just the properties shared by all. The unified look is due to many features 'overlapping and criss-crossing' and not to features being shared by all.

Wittgenstein argued that in a similar way the different sorts of things which a word such as 'game' names are related to each other in the manner in which members of a family are related to each other. They are not all 'games' by virtue of having some common property or set of properties but they are related to each other in such a fashion that they share a 'family resemblance' to each other. Norman Malcolm, expressing Wittgenstein's view, writes: "The unity of games is like a family resemblance." "What makes all of them games, what gives unity to those activities, is not some feature present in all games but a multitude of relationships."36

According to the Wittgenstein model, the rough appearance of 'unity' which a family may have is due to a network of 'overlapping and criss-crossing' properties. The authors who take the anti-essentialist view of pleasure do not, however, present this picture of a network of 'overlapping' and 'criss-crossing' features. There is little overlapping of features that Gosling mentions when explaining how the different 'pleasures' are related to each other.

For Taylor, Penelhum, and Perry there are primarily two sorts of things which the word 'pleasure' names. These philosophers have not noticed, however, that a Wittgensteinian Family Resemblance view is

36. Malcolm (1967, p 335)
not applicable to a 'family' of things having only two members. Crucial to the model is the presence of certain characteristics in many but not all members. (It is not by having characteristics present in all members that we avoid the essentialist view of word meaning.) However, a characteristic does need to be repeated, or found in more than one member of the family, if it is to be a trait or a part of 'the unified look' to a family. We can speak of a characteristic look to a family because of the five members who have brown eyes, not because of the one who has blue eyes. What is not shared at all is not a family trait but an individual peculiarity.

But if we are talking of a group of two things, then any feature that is not shared by the other member in the 'group' will be peculiar to oneself. If there are only two 'pleasures' in question, namely enjoyment and being pleased, then it is not possible to find a 'rough unity' in this family of 'pleasures' by finding traits in many but not all members. Features that contribute to unity in the family are common to both members; features that are not present in both members are peculiar to one member (if present at all), and features that are peculiar to one member are idiosyncratic and do not contribute to an appearance of unity in the family. The Wittgensteinian Family Resemblance model as it was intended to work does not apply to such small families. Thus, if someone is going to hold that the word 'pleasure' refers to a 'family' of two very different sorts of things and combines this with an anti-essentialist position, he will have to hold that the word 'pleasure' is a homonym, and he will need to handle the word as he handles a word that has two very different meanings and which is therefore ambiguous.

It might be suggested that 'enjoyment' and 'being pleased' are themselves not uniform in nature and that each of these words refers
to a number of different things which share only a family resemblance
to each other. There are a number of individual properties of the
two kinds of 'pleasures' that overlap, it might be suggested, and it
is because of these there are a number of overlapping individual
properties that there is a good deal of 'rough unity' between
enjoyment and being pleased. But this suggestion will not help the
philosophers being discussed. On their view, enjoyment and being
pleased are supposed to be very different, so there cannot be too
many features that overlap and there must be many that do not. Fur¬
thermore, on their view, the 'pleasantness' of enjoyment and being pleased
is not constituted by the features that these states have in common.
So, if their 'pleasantness' is not constituted by what they have in
common, and these two things are for the most part very different,
then it still follows that when calling each of these sorts of
things 'pleasant' we must mean something different in each case.

There are no simple changes or amendments which would enable
these authors to fit their claims about the nature of various
'pleasures' to the Wittgensteinian Family Resemblance model. A major
overhauling of their views on the nature of the different types of
things which the word 'pleasure' names and on the interrelationships
between these things would be needed.
Chapter IV: The Attractiveness of Pleasure and the Repulsiveness of Pain

Pleasure completes the activity not as the corresponding permanent state does, by its immanence, but as an end which supervenes as the bloom of youth does on those in the flower of their age.
(Aristotle)

The love of pleasure is one of the great elementary instincts of human nature.
(Aristotle)

Pain is something which by its very nature disposes men to shun it.
(Eudoxus mentioned by Aristotle)

Introduction

Gilbert Ryle has convinced many philosophers that pleasure and pain are not opposites. When they think of 'pain' they are thinking of localized sensations such as a headache or a stabbing pain in the leg. The word 'pleasure' is normally used to speak of such things as enjoying a football match or delighting in good news, where the word 'pleasure' does not name a special localized sensation. A pain (sensation) is something which attracts our attention to itself; pleasure is not. Within Ryle's thinking, pleasure is itself a form of attention (to something else). To contemporary philosophers, pleasure and pain seem so radically different that they do not have enough in common to be opposites of the same sort of thing. No longer confident of an opposition of pleasure and pain, philosophers have come, as a

1. Aristotle (1174b, 31 – 35)
2. Aristotle - a (Book X, ch. 1)
3. Aristotle - a (Book X, ch. 2). Much of the material in the present chapter is contained in a paper that will be published in Philosophy (during 1980). The paper has the title "Why People Prefer Pleasure to Pain".
matter of course, to discuss the subjects in isolation from each other. Philosophers write books and articles on pleasure while making only incidental references to pain, or they write articles on pain while saying little or nothing about pleasure.

A failure to see the opposition of pleasure to pain is an oversight as serious as a failure to see the opposition of hot to cold or good to bad. Admittedly, if we are thinking solely of localized pains, pleasure is not a perfect opposite to pain. Nevertheless, in essentials, pleasure and pain are opposites. As pain is an unattractive, disagreeable experience, so pleasure is an attractive, agreeable experience. Pain is evil, pleasure is good. Pain is an experience whose nature normally disposes someone to dislike it, to avoid it, or to try to rid himself of it. Pleasure is an experience of such a nature that it disposes one normally to want it, to cherish it, and to seek it. It is this attractiveness Aristotle was thinking of when he compared pleasure to the beauty of a flower in bloom and to the health and handsomeness of youth. It is this attractiveness that philosophers are thinking of when they speak of the 'glow' or 'sweetness' of pleasure. It is because pleasure is attractive and pain repulsive that pleasure and pain concern people in their practical affairs and moral philosophers in their theories. Good is opposite to bad; attractiveness is opposite to unattractiveness; being wanted and sought is opposite to being disliked and avoided. Though a headache is localized in the body in a way that enjoyment of a soccer match is not, the pain is opposite to the pleasure by being a bad rather than a good experience, an unattractive rather than an attractive experience, an experience avoided rather than sought.

It is not a drastic change when we turn from thinking of the 'pain' of a localized ache or a sharp sensation in a limb to the
'pain' of remorse or despair; the shift is not so sharp as the
shift from talking of the 'bark' of a tree to talking of the 'bark'
of a dog. The pain of despair is not localized in the body as is a
headache. However, this 'pain' is also an experience of disagreeable,
unattractive, or bad quality. People are averse to these experiences
as they are to backaches, and they do things to avoid or minimize these
'pains' as they do things to avoid or minimize backaches and stomach-
aches. 'Pain' of this type is also an opposite to pleasure.

The word which seems the most perfect opposite to 'pleasure'
is 'unpleasantness'; as any agreeable or attractive experience is
'pleasant', so any experience of disagreeable or unattractive quality
is 'unpleasant'. Both the 'pain' of headache and the 'pain' of
despair are unpleasant. The word 'pain' has upon occasion been
used by philosophers and psychologists to mean any unpleasant
experience. In everyday, non-scholastic English the word is also at
times used in this broad sense. The words 'pleasant' and 'unpleasant'
may in some contexts have a connotation of pleasure or unpleasantness
mild in degree (e.g., it may seem an understatement to speak of
great art merely as 'pleasant' to look at); however, it is also
established usage to use the words for the whole range of agreeable
and disagreeable experiences including the very intense. That bliss
is pleasant and agony unpleasant is a truism. Though the word 'good'
may not be the best choice of words to apply to the Mona Lisa -
'great' or 'excellent' might be a better choice - this should not
lead one to think the Mona Lisa is not a good work of art. Under-
statements are not false statements.

Of the philosophers in recent years who have analyzed the concept
of pleasure, very few explicitly discuss pleasure's nature of being
attractive, good, wanted, and sought. Yet it hardly can be an ordinary
contingent fact that it is pleasure rather than pain that is attractive, pleasure rather than pain that is good, and pleasure rather than pain that is wanted and accepted as a positive reason for doing something.

In this chapter, my goal is to try to understand pleasure's character of being attractive or agreeable and pain's being disagreeable or unattractive. Attention will center around the value of pleasure and pain and the attitudes toward pleasure and pain which rational beings normally have; that is, I concentrate on pain's being intrinsically bad and its nature of disposing rational beings to shun it and pleasure's character of being intrinsically good and its nature of disposing rational beings to want, value, and seek it. I attempt to understand which is the more fundamental feature of pain, its being bad or its being unwanted; that is, I ask whether pain is bad because we shun it, or whether we shun pain because it is bad. The parallel issue concerning pleasure's being good and its being wanted is discussed.

My central questions are these: Why do we have these attitudes toward pleasure and pain? Why do we dislike and wish to avoid pain and suffering? Why do we want and seek pleasure? Why do we prefer pleasure to pain? There are three answers to be considered: 1.) We have a reason for wanting pleasure and for shunning pain. Our normal attitudes are guided by some rational insight about the nature of pleasurable and painful experiences. 2.) Pleasure and pain do not in themselves provide any reason for wanting the one and shunning the other. It is just a brute contingent fact about our constitution that we are disposed to want and seek pleasure and dislike and avoid pain. 3.) That pleasure is wanted and pain unwanted is a simple tautology. The attitudes toward the experience enter into the
definition of 'pleasure' and 'pain'. A 'pleasant' experience is defined as a wanted experience and a 'painful' experience is defined as an unwanted one. We will be discussing philosophers who have held the second and third positions. I defend the first position.

I Are 'Pleasure' and 'Pain' Definable as Wanted and Unwanted Experiences?

That someone should want and seek pain and not want pleasure is a puzzling idea, and so it is not surprising that philosophers sometimes argue that it is analytic that pleasure is wanted and pain disliked - that it is part or the whole of what is meant by calling an experience 'pleasant' or 'painful' that it is valued or disliked. C.D. Broad suggested:

Is it not possible that what we have called 'hedonic quality' is really a relational property and not a quality at all? Is it not possible that the statement: 'This experience of mine is pleasant' just means: 'I like this experience for its non-hedonic qualities'?

Though Broad formulates his definition in terms of 'liking' an experience, his suggestion is similar to a claim that 'pleasure' is defined by the attitude had toward an experience. On this view, if we are attracted to an experience, value it, or have some welcoming attitude the experience is ipso facto pleasant. In a similar vein, Herbert Spencer equated pleasure with "a feeling which we seek to bring into consciousness and retain there" and pain with "a feeling

4. Broad, Five Types of Ethical Theory, p 238. Having denied that there is a hedonic quality of experiences it seems unnecessary and misleading for Broad to identify a pleasant experience with one liked 'for its non-hedonic qualities'. If there is no hedonic quality then there is no non-hedonic one either. A pleasant experience must simply be one 'liked' for its quality.
which we seek to get out of consciousness and keep out." Many contemporaneous philosophers are suspicious of calling pleasure a 'feeling', but the presence of the word 'feeling' is not crucial in the definition. R. Brandt suggests that we may analyze a 'pleasant' ('unpleasant') experience as "an experience with a subjective element that the person at the time wants to prolong (terminate or avoid) for itself."

It is important to be clear from the outset that proposals whereby pleasure is analyzed according to the attitude had toward it are really very different from those analyses discussed in Chapter III whereby pleasure itself is said to be an attitude. On the present view, pleasure is a feeling or experience (one which we want to prolong). It is one thing to say that a person's pleasure in enjoying golfing is his feeling or experience which he wants to prolong and quite another thing to say that his pleasure is his desire to golf. Notice the comparable difference between two proposed analyses of beauty (or goodness): It would be one thing to say that the beauty (goodness) of an object consists in its possession of qualities that we want and value and quite another thing to say that beauty (goodness) itself is our favourable attitude.

If these proposals are read as offering a sufficient condition,

6. Brandt (1959, p 307). D.M. Armstrong takes a related position: "It is of the essence of pain that we wish it to stop". (Armstrong, 1962, p 92). He does not present this as the full account of pain. His full account is that the concept of pain "involves both the having of a certain sort of bodily impression, and the taking up of a certain attitude toward the impression." (Armstrong, 1962, p 107). The account of pain which I defend in this chapter goes a step further than this in that I argue that pain's being a certain sort of 'bodily impression' is responsible for our taking up a negative attitude toward pain. Pain sensations, I argue, are of a nature that provide us with a reason or justification for, e.g., wanting the sensation to stop.
for pleasure or pain, then the particular 'feel' of the experience becomes incidental to its pleasantness or painfulness. There is no experience which could not be a pleasure or pain provided that we have the mentioned attitude toward it. As Kurt Baier said when defending such a view:

We might have liked and disliked different sorts of sensations from the ones we actually like and dislike, but whatever sorts of sensations we like and dislike, we only call pains those which we dislike. And if there are sensations which we ordinarily dislike but on some occasions like having, then we do not call them pains on those occasions on which we like having them.7

(Baier has since modified his position.)

This consequence of the view some philosophers might find attractive. J.N. Findlay has argued:

Were pleasure and unpleasure peculiar qualities of experience, as loud and sweet are peculiar qualities of what comes before us in sense-experience, it would be a gross, empirical accident that we uniformly sought the one and avoided the other, as it is a gross, empirical accident in the case of the loud or the sweet, and this is of all suppositions the most incredible and absurd. Plainly it is in some sense trivially necessary that we should want pleasure (or not want unpleasure) . . . 8

This argument supports a Broad-type view where pleasure is simply any quality of experience that is wanted or 'valued' and unpleasantness any unwanted or 'disliked' quality.

Findlay emphasizes that the relationship between an experience's being pleasurable or unpleasant and its being wanted or unwanted is an intimate one. Unless this intimate tie is fixed within the very meaning of 'pleasure' and 'unpleasantness' it becomes some gross accident that it is the one rather than the other that we want. Why should such an accident be, as Findlay says, "of all suppositions the

7. Baier (1958, p 273)
8. Findlay (1961, p 177)
most incredible and absurd"? When they are adults, all people, all dogs, all gorillas, and indeed all animals normally shun the painful and welcome the pleasant experience. In other respects there are the greatest variations from one animal to another. The extent of such agreement on tastes over pleasure and pain would constitute an extraordinary coincidence if there were no deeper requirement for such agreement. Secondly, is there not something about pain which makes pain a more suitable or more fitting object to dislike than pleasure? Finally, it must be more than a contingent fact that people prefer what is good to what is bad, and it seems more than a contingent fact that it is pleasure rather than pain or suffering that is good (intrinsically). These are some ways in which the second position outlined at the beginning, that it is simply some brute contingent fact that we want pleasure and do not want pain, is unacceptable.

There are a number of philosophers who have thought that it is more than a contingent fact that it is pleasure rather than pain that is good. William Alston, for instance, writes that "It does not seem merely to be a contingent fact that pleasure is desirable."

H. Sidgwick is proposing an analytic link between pleasure and its desirability (or, more precisely, its perceived desirability) when he defines 'pleasure' as "a feeling which, when experienced by intelligent beings, is at least implicitly apprehended as desirable or - in cases of comparison - preferable." Of intense pain, Brand Blanshard writes:

What sort of assertion is one making in saying that intense

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10. Sidgwick (1967, p 127)
pain is intrinsically evil? It does not seem like an empirical assertion; we do not say that it is only highly probable that an intense pain will be intrinsically evil, as we do that the next swan we see will be white. Such pain is evil by reason of its nature; we can see from what it is that it must be bad... The proposition is, therefore, necessary.\textsuperscript{11}

A. Manser is perhaps reaching towards this necessary evil of pain when he speaks of "the most important quality of pain" as "its to-be-avoidedness". \textsuperscript{12}

The most obvious way to avoid the problems found in a view where the relationship between pleasure and the desire for it and pain and the aversion for it are contingent is to adopt the Spencer-type definitions whereby it becomes true by definition that pleasure is wanted and pain unwanted. Unfortunately, there are also serious problems in this position.

Though Spencer did not realize this, it is an implication of his definition that the particular feel of the experience is incidental to pleasure and pain. What is sufficient is that one have a certain attitude toward the experience. In principle, it must be logically possible for any feeling or experience to be a pain or pleasure. Any sensation or experience would be painful if a desire to be rid of it were introduced.

Findlay, thinking in terms of 'unpleasure' rather than 'pain', argued that pleasure and unpleasantness could not be special experiences. Findlay thought this followed simply from the fact that pleasure and unpleasantness have such a reliable effect on motivation. But there has to be some mistake here. Itches, and even pains, have equally reliable effects on motivation yet there is

\textsuperscript{11} Blanshard (1961, p 230)
\textsuperscript{12} Manser (1960, p 224)
an apriori limit on the sort of sensation that can be an itch or a pain. As pleasure is connected with a desire to seek the experience, so an itch is connected with a desire to scratch. But not just any sensation could be an itch with the mere addition of a desire to scratch the area. Nor could just any sensation be a pain. Brush your cheek lightly with your finger and you feel a light sensation which is neither pleasant nor unpleasant. That sensation would never be an intense pain, nor even a mild pain, whatever desire you might introduce; it is not logically possible for that sensation to be an intense pain.

Nor could just any experience be intrinsically pleasurable. Consider the pain you feel when the dentist is drilling a tooth and unexpectedly catches a raw nerve. A sensation of that quality or feel could not lose its painfulness and become intrinsically pleasant merely by changing the accompanying desires. Masochism does not refute this claim. The sensation in question remains a pain; the person would not be a masochist unless it were pain that he inflicted upon himself. The masochist experiences pleasure along side, and in consequence of, pain. The pain may cause him pleasure or delight, but it cannot be intrinsically pleasant. (More will be said about masochism shortly.)

A definition of 'pleasure' as a wanted experience and 'pain' as an unwanted experience begins to appear unsatisfying. By putting no limits on the kinds of sensations or experiences that can be pleasurable or painful the definitions seem too loose.

II Is It Possible Not To Shun Pain Or Welcome Pleasure?

And Lise, as soon as Alyosha had gone, unlocked the door, opened it a little, put her finger in the crack, and slammed the door
as hard as she could. Ten seconds later she released her hand, went slowly to her chair, sat down, and looked intently at her blackened, swollen finger and the blood that was oozing out from the nail. Her lips quivered. "I am a vile, vile, vile, despicable creature," she whispered.

"I want someone to marry me, tear me to pieces, betray me, and then desert me. I don't want to be happy."

(From Dostoevsky's, The Brothers Karamazov)

There is an oddity in the idea of someone not wanting to enjoy himself or in someone's seeking pain. While suffering the dentist's drill, how can one help but dislike the sensation caused by the grinding, probing instrument? Yet, are there not masochists, people who, at times, want and perhaps enjoy pain? Were there not Puritans who frowned on certain pleasures - those gained from the flesh? Are there not even now puritans or ascetics who show little or no wish to enjoy themselves, and even friends or acquaintances who have moods when they do not want to enjoy themselves?

One common interpretation of the idea of someone wanting pain or not wanting enjoyment is that the person is irrational, perverted, or 'sick'. However, if we are right to think of these cases as instances of irrationality, then it follows that the attitudes in question are logically possible. If it is merely irrational to welcome pain or shun pleasure then it certainly is logically possible to do so. And it is the possibility, not the rationality, of such cases that is presently at issue.

Philosophers who hold that the word 'pleasure' is defined as a wanted experience and the word 'pain' as an unwanted experience probably think that they are accounting for the undeniable oddity in the idea of wanting pain or not wanting pleasure. But these views do not correctly interpret the oddity which we are confronting.

If a philosopher maintains that the word 'pain' entails 'being unwanted' it only follows that if a sensation is not unwanted it could
not be a 'pain'. It would not follow that there will be some sensations which will in fact dispose people normally to wish to be rid of them or to dislike them. But if you think of the sensations we call 'pains' and the way they feel, it is not simply that we would not call them 'pains' if people did not want to be rid of them; these sensations feel awful, and they normally compel us to dislike them. The puzzle in the idea of desiring pain is not located at the linguistic level (being a contradiction in terms), but at the phenomenological level. The perplexity about masochism is not how a masochist can want a sensation and still call it a 'pain' but how he can want these sensations — sensations like those which our dentists create.

Yet it must be logically possible not to want to be rid of even such awful sensations as these. The attitude toward a thing is not part of the thing at which it is directed. Whenever someone wishes to be rid of something it must be logically possible to have the same thing without wishing to be rid of it. So, too, for the sensations we call 'pains'; it must be logically possible to have the same sensation, the one which normally provokes aversion, without the aversion or wish to be rid of it. The compulsion we are dealing with here is a psychological one not a logical one. Sensations of the particular quality of those we get when, e.g., breaking bones or harming organs, by virtue of the way they feel, compel or force us to dislike them.

Similarly, the agreeable experience a person has when enjoying a warm, relaxing bath is logically distinct from the welcoming attitude he would normally have toward the experiences; it must be possible to have an experience of this same tone or quality and yet not receive it with a welcoming attitude. Though we normally want
and value those pleasurable experiences we have when listening to
fine music or eating a juicy, delicious steak, it is not through
some logical necessity that we have these attitudes. Rather, these
experiences are of a nature which inspires us to be attracted to them;
the experiences are 'nice', and they would feel the same (i.e., no
less 'nice') even if we were not attracted to them.

That something is good does not entail that it is wanted under
all circumstances, and that something is bad does not entail that it
is unwanted under all circumstances. This holds for pleasure and pain
as it does for other good and bad things. It is reasonable for
someone not to want a particular diamond, if, for instance, the
diamond was stolen from someone in another country, and this is so
even though the diamond is in itself exactly like other diamonds
and no less beautiful

Though pleasure is in itself good, there may be times when it
is preferable not to be pleased. For instance, it may be improper to
be particularly pleased at funerals, or soon after the death of
someone close. Nor is it desirable to be excessively pleased with
onself for, say, having won an argument with a relative. Thus a
person could, if he were pleased at the time of someone's death, or
highly pleased over having won an argument with his son, desire that
he not continue to feel so pleased, and he could have this desire
at the same time that he is pleased.

Few men desire or seek the pleasure which conceivably could be
gained from rape, and this is so even if they believe that they
could in fact gain pleasure from rape. It is not that they want the
pleasure but disapprove of gaining pleasure from this source: most
men would not want the pleasure. If a father is required to punish
his children, we should desire, and he might do so as well, that he
not take pleasure in doing so. A teacher normally does not want to enjoy failing those students whom he must fail. A father who found himself taking pleasure in punishing a child, or a teacher who found himself enjoying failing a student, might desire that he would cease to feel pleased. Puritans frowned upon pleasure taken in sex, card-playing, the theater, and other activities which they considered frivolous. What distinguished the Puritan from others is not the fact that he disapproves of pleasure from some sources but that he disapproves of pleasure from these sources.13

The puzzle in understanding how someone could want pain is in understanding why he should do so, i.e., what reason he might have for wanting something so bad. Desiring pain has the same oddity as desiring to be castrated or wanting to be torn to bits by lions. One wonders, "What reason could one have for wanting things so bad? What good could one see in them?" Though perplexing, there is obviously no self-contradiction in the ideas of these other desires. The oddity is one of rationality; it seems that one could have no reason for wanting to be eaten by lions and that such a desire would consequently be irrational or perverted. And, a desire which is merely irrational or sick, is one which it is logically possible to have.

In a similar way, the puzzle in not wanting pleasure or happiness is in what reason one could have for not wanting something so good. It feels nice to be pleased and to enjoy oneself; why

13. Though the Puritan is sometimes said to have been against pleasure as such, in practice it was only pleasure from some sources that he shunned. He still probably would have preferred the more pleasant of two breakfast foods, and probably would have wanted and sought pleasant surroundings, pleasant friends. He would have wanted to enjoy such things as great literature or prayer services. No one in practice shuns all pleasure.
would someone not want such good experiences? The oddity in not wanting pleasure or happiness parallels the oddity in not wanting other good things such as health, sound judgement, or sanity. What reason could someone have for not wanting to be healthy or sane?

An action of a rational creature becomes intelligible when we see the good he sees in the act. Masochists often view their pain as deserved punishment, and this is a clue to their thinking. For there is good in being punished when one deserves it. (Parents punish their children and the state its citizens because they see good in just punishment.) His viewing pain as an instrument of something good - a deserved punishment - is a thread of rationality in the masochist.

The same thinking that can lead someone to desire pain might lead him not to desire pleasure or happiness. We sometimes think that certain people do not deserve to have good things; we may do so, for instance, when they have behaved in a nasty or an immoral way. In such cases, we might desire that they not have good things such as wealth, happiness, or long life. As we sometimes think that another person does not deserve to be happy, people sometimes think that they themselves do not deserve to be happy. It was because she thinks of herself as 'vile' that Dostoevsky's Lise does not want to be happy. She thinks that she does not deserve happiness. It is no more a contradiction in terms that one should not desire happiness than it is a contradiction in terms that one should not desire wealth or long life.

14. The masochist would not necessarily enjoy all pain, e.g., he would not so readily appreciate the unexpected pain from a surprise karate-chop in his neck or suffering the unpleasantness of feeling nauseated. Normally, the pain must be viewed as punishment for the masochist to seek it.
Philosophers who think that pain is necessarily unwanted sometimes argue as follows: 'The masochist suffers guilt feelings. He finds that pain and punishment relieve his guilt and bring him satisfaction. Consequently, he seeks pain but does so solely as a means to an end - a quite rational end - namely, satisfaction and relief from the greater pain of guilt feelings. But though he seeks pain he does not want or like pain; while he suffers pain he hates it and desires to be rid of it as much as anyone else does.'

No philosopher that I know of has given any positive argument for supposing that pleasure must be wanted and pain unwanted; those who defend the view that pleasure is always wanted and pain unwanted tend to offer individual explanations of possible counter-examples. However, it is crucial to keep in mind when considering such arguments that, as I previously noted, the attitude we have toward a sensation or an experience is logically distinct from that sensation or experience, so it must be at least logically possible not to dislike the experiences we call 'pains' and not to be attracted to the experiences we call 'pleasures'. Once this logical possibility is noted, and we turn our attention to imagining cases of wanted pains and unwanted pleasures, what clearer, better cases of such phenomena could be conceived of than the ones we have just mentioned? The

15 Armstrong uses this argument: "The neurotic who 'seeks punishment', or who is said to 'seek punishment unconsciously', is a somewhat different case. For him, I think, the pain is endured, perhaps gladly endured, because it represents expiation. The pain is a punishment which assuages guilt. But the whole point about its being punishment is that it is something he has an unfavorable attitude to in itself. In itself it is something that he would rather be without; but it is better than unpunished guilt." (Armstrong, 1962, p 91.)

Armstrong seems to think that something must be unwanted to be punishment. I am arguing that the idea of wanting something as punishment is a perfectly clear, intelligible idea. What is crucial is that an object be bad for it to serve as punishment, and being bad is not the same thing as being unwanted.
felt need to explain away these cases as in some way mis-described thus seems unfounded.

Why insist that a person must be attracted to a pleasant experience and that it would not be pleasure otherwise? A person might say that he is not attracted to such an experience and that he does not want pleasure that comes in this way. He may feel guilty that he is pleased. He may try to think about something else so as to minimize his malicious pleasure. If it is not things such as this one wishes to exclude by claiming we have some favourable attitude toward the pleasure, it is hard to see what meaning is left in saying that the person has a 'favourable attitude' or a 'liking' for this pleasure.

It might be admitted that the masochist is spurred on to punish himself by the hope of relieving an unpleasant guilt feeling, but it does not follow from this that he has no positive desire to punish himself but has only a desire to relieve his discomfort. It would be as natural to conclude that he does want to be punished and that relief from the unpleasant guilt is one of his reasons for doing so.

The satisfaction a person might foresee from punishing himself need have no greater role in motivation than would the satisfaction someone might foresee from punishing someone else. The husband who shoots his wife's lover may be spurred on by his distress over the man's intimacies and may expect satisfaction from seeing the man's potency bleeding out, but few philosophers would conclude from this that he has no positive wish to hurt this intruder but only a desire for his own satisfaction and relief. Rather, most of us would conclude that he does want to punish the man, and that perhaps his own expected satisfaction is one of his reasons for doing so. I see no reason for taking a different position on a person's punishing himself. From the fact that the masochist expects satisfaction from punishing
himself we need not conclude that he does not desire this pain; we should conclude that he does desire it and that the satisfaction he expects is perhaps one of his reasons for doing so.

Admittedly, a Psychological Hedonist might hold that even when punishing another person, it really is only one's own pleasure, and not the other's punishment, which one wants. But few philosophers today accept Psychological Hedonism, and there is no more reason for insisting upon the hedonist account for someone inflicting pain on himself than for someone inflicting pain on someone else. People do not always gain pleasure from causing pain to people. The jealous husband who feels pleased upon beating up or killing his wife's lover would not feel equally satisfied to beat up a man off the street or a neighbour's dog instead. That he thinks the victim deserves punishment is not incidental. The act brings him satisfaction just because he thinks the man deserves punishment and consequently approves and desires punishment. If he did not desire the punishment it would not please him. Similarly, it is just because the masochist wants pain and punishment that it pleases him. If he did not want and approve it, the pain would not please him. I conclude, then, that it is possible for someone not to want pleasure or happiness and not to want to avoid pain or unhappiness.

III The Mill Fallacy

That pleasure is good and that it is desired are obviously interrelated. But which is the more fundamental fact? 1.) Is our desire for pleasure a consequence of pleasure's being good? Is pleasure's being good our reason for wanting it? 2.) Or, is pleasure's being good a consequence of our desiring it? That the former position
is the correct one may be shown by proving the latter to be the incorrect one. There is no sensible third alternative. On any third position pleasure's being good would be neither our reason for wanting it nor a consequence of our desire. From this it would follow that we want pleasure for no reason, or for the wrong reason, and that it is merely through lucky coincidence that what we want is actually good or worth wanting. This proposition would be absurd.

How are we to understand a suggestion that pleasure's being good is a consequence of our desiring it and that pain's being bad is due to pain's being unwanted? One interpretation is that an object's being good is simply entailed by its being desired, or that the word 'good' when applied to pleasure simply means 'desired'.

To see the fault in this position we need only recall a lesson gained from studying Mill's Utilitarianism. While attempting to establish happiness, or pleasure, as the sole standard for what is good Mill referred to the fact that people desire happiness as proof that happiness is desirable. G.E. Moore pounced on Mill for this, calling it a fallacy, so obvious, "that it is quite wonderful how Mill failed to see it." 'Desirable' and 'good' do not mean simply 'desired' but 'worthy or deserving of being desired'. An object can be desired without being worth desiring, or it could be worth desiring without being desired in fact. That people desire to lynch rapists, or enslave their neighbors, does not entail that it is desirable or good that they do so.

Recently, some philosophers have come to Mill's defense, arguing

16. This is slightly oversimplified. An Emotivist or Prescriptivist moral philosophy, would try to account for the relation of pleasure's being 'good' to its being desired in a different fashion. I will discuss the views of these philosophers in Section IV of the present chapter.
17. Moore (1903, p 67)
that we do have some sort of proof of desirability in actual desire, though something short of strict deductive proof. It would seem that they are committed to finding some sort of inductive proof.

The distinction between something's being desired and its being worthy of desire can hardly be denied. In what way, then, might desire be inductive evidence of what is worth desiring or desirable? Defenders of Mill have not been clear. The only sense I can give is as follows: Actual desire is evidence of desirability in the way that actual belief may be evidence of what is true.

That people in a village believe that their postman's name is Jack is some evidence that his name is indeed Jack. That his name is Jack is not contingent upon their having this belief; rather, their belief, if it is correct, is a contingent consequence of his name's being Jack. Because people are rational they are disposed to believe what they have reason to believe. Given this, there is more than a random chance that there is some truth in what people in fact believe.

Similarly, because people are rational they tend to desire objects when they have reason for doing so. In consequence, there is more than random chance that there is good in objects in fact desired. However, people can be mistaken in wanting something as they can be mistaken in believing something. They may desire some food thinking that it is good when in fact it poisons them. They may desire that their country enter into a war with another country without realizing the disaster it will bring.

What is said here holds for intrinsic goods and not just for instrumental goods. There remains a distinction between an object's being desired as an end, and its being worth desiring as an end. That people sometimes come to desire money as an end in itself does not entail that money is intrinsically desirable. One who would desire
money as an end is simply mistaken or misguided. It is conceivable that some species could evolve so constituted that the individual desires as an end in itself to stand in a corner pummelling his head with a rubber mallet. The activity would not thereby be intrinsically worthwhile. Rather, we would have a silly, misdirected creature.

That one should hinge goodness upon people's desires parallels the often ridiculed tying of an action's being good or right to God's commanding it. One asks: Does God command the act because it is right, or is it right because God commands it? If we take the former position, we are admitting that the commanding does not make the act right, and that it must be right on its own account, independently of being commanded. If we take the latter position we are stuck with the implication that if God had commanded us to murder and rape our neighbour rather than to love platonicly, these acts would have been good. But this is preposterous. Given this dilemma, we are forced to conclude that an act's being right or good could not originate with its being commanded. The same dilemma arises for one who would connect goodness to God's desires. And this same dilemma arises for one who would tie goodness to man's desires. We are forced to conclude that an end's being good and desirable could not originate with its being desired and that the thing must be good and desirable on its own account and independently of being desired.

Recently Norman Kretzmann argued in Mill's defense against Moore's charge that Mill committed a fallacy in his attempted proof of the desirability of happiness. Kretzmann writes:

As Pierce was later to say of the truth that it was the 'opinion which is fated to be ultimately agreed to by all who investigate', so Mill might consistently be made to say that the good, or the desirable is the object or set of objects that are fated to be ultimately desired in common by all who have desires.18

18. Kretzmann (1958, p 115)
It makes no sense to say that there can be anything good or beautiful or right that would over the longest conceivable run not come to be desired by the normal desirer. 19

Suppose we agree with Kretzmann that desirable objects are objects 'that are fated to be ultimately desired in common by all who have desires' and that desirable objects would indeed 'over the longest conceivable run' come to be desired by the normal desirer. 20 Shall we say that an object is desirable because it is one which people are destined to desire or that people are destined to desire certain objects because those objects are desirable?

If we take the former position, as Kretzmann seems close to doing, we are stuck with the implication that whatever people might have been destined to desire would ipso facto have been desirable — that, if people had been so constituted as to desire to kill indiscriminately, — rape, or take from their neighbours at their own pleasure these actions would have been desirable. (There are no apriori limitations on the sorts of things which creatures could be destined to desire. There is no logical oddity in the idea of some creature being so constituted that he is, e.g., 'destined to desire' to kill and eat his grandparents.) But this is bizarre. We can no more hold that whatever man would have desired would have been good than we can hold that whatever action God would have commanded would have been desirable.

19. Kretzmann (1958, p 114)
20. This presumption is at best an optimistic hypothesis about people and by no means a truism or analytic truth as Kretzmann seems inclined to suppose. There is no contradiction in the suggestion that there might be certain truths or desirables which people are doomed or 'destined' to remain ignorant of. It is logically possible for there to be objects or properties of objects that will never be known because they are beyond the realm of our five senses. As the deaf man will never know the pleasure of hearing the voice of his beloved, so there may be desirable objects which 'normal' desirers may never sense, never know of, and thus never desire.
desirable. We must conclude, then, that an object's being desirable could no more originate with its being one which we are destined to desire than an action's being desirable could originate with its being commanded. From this it follows that pleasure's being good does not originate from its being desired - that it is not because pleasure is desired that it is good. But if pleasure's being good is not a consequence of its being desired, the most plausible alternative position is that its being desired is a consequence of its being good. And the clearest way of interpreting this position is that pleasure's being good or worth having is our reason for wanting it, or, more precisely, pleasure's being good is one and the same thing with its having a nature which provides reason (i.e., grounds or justification) for wanting it.

An object's being desirable is not contingent upon its being desired. That an object is desired may provide inductive evidence but not deductive proof of desirability. When a philosopher appeals to the fact that people desire an object as 'proof' of the object's desirability, this 'proof' has little use within a philosophical argument. This 'proof' of the desirability of an object has no greater use within philosophy than a 'proof' of the truth of a proposition based on the inductive evidence that a number of people in fact believe the proposition. A philosopher who seriously questioned whether a particular object is desirable or a particular proposition true would be, at the same time, questioning whether people are right to desire that object or right to believe that proposition.
IV. Hume and Epicurus

Happiness requires something in its own nature, or in ours, to give it influence, and to determine our desire of it and approbation of pursuing it.21, 22

(Richard Price, 1787)

An experience is pleasurable or painful not merely by being wanted or unwanted but by being worthy of our desire or aversion. But it is possible for something to be worthy of desire without actually being desired. How then does an object which is worthy of desire come to be desired in fact?

By meriting our desire pleasure provides us with reason to desire and seek it. It is, however, logically possible for there to be creatures which do not desire what they have reason to desire. A creature must have a rational disposition to be disposed to follow reason. Man and the other pleasure seeking animals are creatures of rational disposition. A creature capable of feeling pleasure and pain but having no rational capacity is conceivable. He could be indifferent to pleasure and pain, as he could be indifferent to his own bodily mutilation or death. As it is logically possible for there to be a creature whose beliefs are not influenced by evidence or reason, so it is possible for there to be creatures whose desires are not influenced by good and bad. But such a creature is very different from man. Man is a rational being; indeed, this rationality is

21. Price (1787, Chapter I, Section I)
22. Some of the things that I say in this section and elsewhere in this chapter may appear to commit me to the view that pleasure and pain are special experiences, and this view would raise the problems which Wittgenstein discussed in his Private Language Argument. In Chapter VI, I do directly commit myself to the view that pleasure and pain are special experiences, and at that time I will discuss Wittgenstein's arguments.
entailed by the very concept of being a man. Entailed by being a man is that one's beliefs and desires will not arise randomly but will arise in conjunction with reasons.

Thus, as Price suggested of happiness, there are two parts to the explanation of why we want and approve pleasure. One part lies in the nature of pleasure, and the other part lies in our own make-up. Pleasure is good and thereby provides a reason for desiring it. We are of rational disposition and thus disposed to desire things when we have reason for doing so.

The account of how pleasure and pain influence action is similar to the account of how they influence desire. It is part of a person's rational disposition that his actions are not arbitrary. An animal who seeks or prolongs some experience because he finds it pleasant has a reason for behaving this way, and his reason is the value he recognizes in the pleasure. David Hume argued that moral or value judgements could not be judgements of reason, or factual judgements, by claiming that if they were they could not influence action. However, that one thing influences another cannot be ruled out a priori; indeed, it is entailed by the idea of being a man or any other rational animal that one's actions are influenced by reason. Furthermore, even if it is admitted, as Hume insisted, that all action requires desire or passion, it still must be acknowledged that part of being rational is that one's desires do not arise randomly but that they normally will arise in conjunction with reason. When rational, one's desires do not have a life or will of their own but are guided by what one perceives as worth having or worth avoiding. Thus reason clearly does influence action, either directly, or indirectly by first influencing our desires. In the case of pleasures and pain it is the apprehension, or recognition, that pleasure is worth having and
pain worth avoiding that leads to the seeking behaviour characteristic of pleasure and the avoidance behaviour characteristic of pain and unpleasantness. 23

Some philosophers have denied that reason has a role in our coming to want pleasure or to dislike pain. Indeed, David Hume denied a role to reason in the acceptance of any ultimate end. He argued:

It appears evident that the ultimate ends of human action can never, in any case, be accounted for by reason, but recommend themselves entirely to the sentiments and affections of mankind, without any dependence on the intellectual faculties. Ask a man why he uses exercise; he will answer because he desires to keep his health. If you enquire why he desires health, he will readily reply because sickness is painful. If you push your enquiries further and desire a reason why he hates pain, it is impossible he can ever give any. This is an ultimate end, and is never referred to any other object.

Presenting a parallel argument whereby one thing is desired for the sake of another, and the other is desired as a means to pleasure,

Hume proceeds:

And beyond this it is an absurdity to ask for a reason. It is impossible there can be a progress in infinitum; and that one thing can always be a reason why another is desired. Something must be desirable on its own account, and because of its immediate accord or agreement with human sentiment and affection. 24

Epicurus is also reported as holding that reason does not guide our attitudes toward pleasure and pain. Diogenes Laertius wrote:

23. That there are analytic connections between pleasure, pain, and reason, has been noticed by other philosophers. Kurt Baier writes: "Having a pain is one of the paradigms of (a person's) having a reason for doing something, namely, for doing what promises relief, or what promises avoidance of the possible occurrence." (Baier, 1960, p 15) Of pleasure, William Alston writes: "It does not seem to be merely a contingent fact that . . . the fact that an activity is enjoyable is a reason for doing it." (Alston, 1967, pp 345 - 6).

24. Hume (1751, Appendix 1)
As proof that pleasure is the end he adduces the fact that living creatures, so soon as they are born, are well content with pleasure and are at enmity with pain, by the promptings of nature and apart from reason.  

Though there is sense in both arguments, notice the position into which both philosophers have argued themselves. Both deny that our attitudes toward pleasure and pain are guided by reason. Neither seems to think that the attitudes enter into the definition of 'pleasure' and 'pain'. Consequently, both occupy the position which Findlay calls "incredible and absurd" whereby it is merely an ordinary contingent fact that it is pleasure rather than pain that is wanted and sought.

Secondly, by denying that we have reason for desiring pleasure both philosophers implicitly deny that pleasure is good prior to our wanting or approving it. (If it were good prior to our wanting it, its being good would be a fine reason for wanting it.) Both were thus led to explain pleasure's being desirable as a consequence of our having a favourable attitude toward it or desiring it, and in doing so both commit the Mill Fallacy.

Epicurus referred to our attitude of being "content with" pleasure and "at enmity with" pain as proof that pleasure is desirable and good (indeed, the sole good or "the end"). But as an object to be desirable and good must not merely be desired but be worthy of desire so it must be not merely something we in fact are "content with" but be something worthy of our being "content with" it. Our being "content with" something no more deductively proves its desirability than does our desiring it.

Hume assigned pleasure's being desirable to its being in "accord with human sentiment". He argued: There cannot be a reason for

25. Laertius (Vol II, p 663)
every desire; something must be desirable in itself "and because of its immediate accord or agreement with human sentiment". But what is this but to attribute pleasure's being desirable to its being desired? For what does it mean to say that pleasure "accords with our sentiments" but that it is something we in fact want or approve? In another context the claim that something "accords with our sentiments" might mean that it is not simply desired but worthy of desiring. But Hume can hardly be interpreted as claiming that pleasure is desirable 'because it is worthy of being desired', for this is circular and explains nothing. To explain why pleasure is desirable one must explain why it is worth desiring. Furthermore, if Hume is ready to distinguish our desire for pleasure from pleasure's being worthy of desire, then why is this worthiness not our reason for desiring pleasure? He is here in the middle of arguing that we have no reason for desiring pleasure. Consequently, it seems that by attributing pleasure's desirability to its "accord with human sentiment" Hume is simply attributing pleasure's desirability to its being desired. Thus when his statements are unpacked, we see that Hume has committed a version of the Mill Fallacy.

That there is a clear distinction between an object's being desired and its being worthy of being desired, and that an object is desirable and good only by being worthy of desire, have not always been within the philosopher's store of wisdom. This becomes obvious once it is pointed out, but will not occur to every thinker on his own. Had Epicurus and Hume been clearly aware of the distinction, they would have found it difficult to admit that pleasure merits our desire and then to deny that we have reason for wanting pleasure. What better reason could there be for desiring something than its being worthy of that desire?
The claim that we have no reason for wanting pleasure and
disliking pain is equivalent to the claim that our attitudes toward
pleasure and pain, and our preference of the one over the other,
are arbitrary. It strikes one immediately as absurd to say that
our preference of pleasure to pain is an arbitrary one; the absurdity
lies in the obvious fact that pain does not merit our desire and
approval in the way that pleasure does.

What, then, led Hume and Epicurus to deny a role to reason?
Hume argued as follows: Though health might be your reason for
wanting exercise, and avoiding pain your reason for wanting health,
one cannot give a reason for hating pain. Pain "is an ultimate
end, and is never referred to any other object". One cannot have
a reason for every desire: "It is impossible there can be a progress
in infinitum; and that one thing can always be a reason why another
is desired."

Hume in this passage assumes that the only kind of reason one
could have for desiring something is that object's being a means to
some other object which one desires. Hume rightly claims that it
is not for this sort of reason that we hate pain. He is also
right to conclude that if every desire had this sort of reason, the
existence of a single desire would entail an infinite number of
additional desires. However, Hume's idea of what could be a reason
for desiring something is too narrow. It does not here occur to
Hume that our reason for desiring something could lie in the nature
of the object itself rather than in some connection it has with another
desired object. Our reason for hating pain lies not in some effect
of pain but in the very quality of the experience. No infinite
regress need arise. Health may be our reason for wanting exercise,
and the avoidance of pain, our reason for wanting health. The nature
of the experience is our reason for disliking pain, and that is the end of the matter.

Epicurus' reasoning was quite different. "Living creatures, so soon as they are born, are well content with pleasure and are at enmity with pain, by the promptings of nature and apart from reason", he reportedly held. This suggests that Epicurus reasoned as follows: Since all creatures, including the species of the lowest intelligence, have these attitudes toward pleasure and pain, and since all animals have these attitudes from birth or early in life and thus when their rational capacities are negligible, it cannot be reason or some rational consideration which has determined their attitudes. The desire for pleasure therefore must be instinctive and pre-rational.

However, though the welcoming attitude toward pleasure and the shunning attitude toward pain is common to all animal species which we believe to experience pleasure and pain, it does not follow that reason is not involved. For a rational capacity or intelligence is also common to all such animals. Indeed, it may be an analytic point about 'animals' that such beings have some rational mental capacity. That children and mice as well as adult human beings are "content with" pleasure and "at enmity with" pain does not show that no reason is required in coming to have these attitudes but that no sophisticated reason is required. Creatures of elementary intelligence are still capable of elementary insights.

When we think of Reason, or The Intellect, we often think immediately of the more complex rational processes and overlook the primitive ones. However, some rational capacity is involved simply in recognizing a sound or a face as familiar, i.e., as one which one has experienced previously. And most animals are capable of this sort of recognition. Even an act so basic as seeking or avoiding
something manifests intelligence in many ways. When a mouse avoids a certain turn in a maze after being shocked there earlier, he manifests the rational capacity to distinguish right from left and the recognition that the shock occurred at this spot. In fearing repetition of the shock he manifests inductive reasoning. Seeking or avoiding something entails knowing what one is seeking or avoiding, knowing what one is doing, and recognizing some connection between one's behaviour and the end which is being sought or avoided. An animal who cuts short an activity he finds painful or prolongs an activity because he is finding it pleasant shows a recognition of a connection between the pain or pleasure and his present activity, i.e., he realizes that the present activity affects or is responsible for the pain or pleasure. Even the most primitive animals who want pleasure and shun pain have numerous rational capacities such as these. Thus we cannot conclude from the fact that a creature is unsophisticated that its attitudes toward pleasure and pain are not mediated by reason.

Epicurus almost seemed to be thinking that there are some creatures totally devoid of rational capacity who nevertheless are attracted to pleasure and averse to pain. From this premise it would directly follow that their attitudes toward pleasure and pain were not mediated by reason. But, firstly, there are no such creatures; all creatures who have these attitudes toward pleasure and pain in fact have some intelligence. Furthermore, such a premise could never be established with empirical evidence. Creatures who lack language provide only their behaviour as possible reliable evidence of their attitudes. The best evidence that a being who lacks the use of language wants and approves pleasure is that he seeks objects or prolongs activities which we expect him to find pleasant or avoids
objects or cuts short activities which we expect him to find painful. But, as we have shown, seeking and avoiding require the use of a degree of intelligence. Prolonging an activity because one finds it pleasant or cutting short an activity because it is painful require the additional intelligence of recognizing some relation between the pleasure or pain and the activity. For the creature has, with some reason, come to think of this activity as associated with pleasure or pain. Thus the evidence which best shows us what attitudes a creature has toward pleasure and pain also shows us that he has some rational capacity.26

That we do have reason or justification for our attitudes toward pleasant and unpleasant experiences may be confirmed by directly contemplating some pleasant or unpleasant experiences. Consider, for instance, the pain sensation we feel when having a tooth drilled by a dentist (without anaesthetic) or the kind of sensations someone would normally feel when breaking bones. Would these sensations provide a person with any reason or grounds for wanting to be rid of them?

26. Other philosophers have argued that animals have a degree of rationality. David Hume, for instance, writes: "Next to the ridicule of denying an evident truth, is that of taking much pains to defend it; and no truth appears to me more evident, than that beasts are endowed with thought and reason as well as men." Hume argues: "We are conscious, that we ourselves, in adapting means to ends, are guided by reason and design, and that 'tis not ignorantly nor casually we perform those actions, which tend to self-preservation, to the obtaining pleasure, and avoiding pain. When therefore we see other creatures, in millions of instances, perform like actions, and direct them to like ends, all our principles of reason and probability carry us with an invincible force to believe the existence of a like cause." (Hume, 1739, Book II, Part III, Sect. XVI). Hume is not, of course, here arguing that an animal employs reason in coming to seek pleasure as an end, but rather that the fact that animals seek things that are a means to pleasure shows that they employ a reasoning faculty. And this is my point at present, that animals have a degree of rationality or intelligence. By showing that they have a degree of intelligence I am replying to someone who would argue that 'the attitudes which animals have toward pleasure and pain are unmediated by reason since animals lack rationality.'
Consider, for instance, the very agreeable experience of eating your favourite food in your favourite restaurant with your favourite companions. Would this experience provide any intrinsic reason for wanting or valuing it? Or, try to recall as vividly as possible the nature of the pleasurable experience had when luxuriating in a hot bath when tired. Do these experiences provide any intrinsic reason for preferring them to the sensations which our dentists create?

The suggestion that pain sensations are worth avoiding because of their connection with bodily harm or that eating delicious food is worthwhile for its connection with bodily nourishment is not directly relevant. I am asking whether there is anything about the intrinsic nature of the experiences in question that justifies a particular attitude; that is, consider the sensation we feel when the dentist's drill is gnawing away at a tooth apart from its contingent connection with damaged teeth. Ask whether the sensation simply by virtue of the way it feels provides any reason for wanting to avoid or minimize it. Would an intensely pleasurable experience of eating delicious food provide any intrinsic reason for preferring it to the sensation felt when having a tooth drilled or to the experience had when feeling nauseated? Are our normal preferences here merely arbitrary - i.e., totally devoid of justification? Is it merely some strange prejudice that we have in that we normally cannot help but be averse to the one experience and attracted to the other? The answer is all too obvious: our tastes on this matter are not arbitrary: we do have intrinsic reason for preferring the one experience over the other.

To this it may be replied that since it is our own predilections that are under scrutiny we are not in a position to be the arbitrator of judge; we are not impartial, and given that we do hate certain
sensations we cannot but be expected to think we have reason for our hatred. Who is in a position to say he is prejudiced? But though this argument has some application with many prejudices, it has less application in the present case. Normally, when a person is unable to recognize that an attitude of his is unwarranted he does have some reason for his attitude; the problem normally is that he cannot see that his reasons are bad reasons. However, the person who says, that our aversion for pain is not mediated by reason is not saying that though we do have reasons for disliking pain our reasons are bad reasons. He is not saying that we dislike pain for the wrong reason but that we do so for no reason. The claim is not that to people it seems that the sensation of pain warrants aversion and that people are in this regard confused. (An attitude which is based on bad reasons is still mediated by the faculty of reason.) Though we might admit that a person often is not in a position to see that his reasons are bad reasons, I do not see why he should not be in a position to say that it is not by any reason that he has come to dislike or be attracted to something.

It is not only possible for reflective persons to realize that some of their attitudes may be groundless or unwarranted, it is common for people to do so. A person afraid of walking under ladders or terrified of open spaces, closed spaces, mice, or frogs can, at least at times, tell you that his aversion is unwarranted (and can do so even while feeling fear). Though someone prefers peaches to pears and philosophy to astronomy, he may tell you that there is as much reason for one to hold an opposite preference as to hold his own.

However, a fear of being tortured, of suffering pain at the dentist's, or of suffering the pain from an operation we can recognize as not being arbitrary or unfounded in this way.
That one should have a strong aversion for experiencing sensations of redness and a compulsive attraction for sensations of greenness would be unwarranted or arbitrary in a way that an aversion for the experience of racking pain and an attraction for the experience of eating delicious food is not.

The rational insight about pleasure and pain which guides our attitudes is simple and basic and thus accessible to unsophisticated animals. No complex reasoning or comparing of pros and cons is needed to recognize something intrinsically good and worth having in pleasant experiences and something intrinsically bad and worth avoiding in pain. The good or bad in these experiences is not hidden; it is not merely contingently associated with the experiences waiting to be noticed or discovered. Experiential qualities do not exist undetected; that quality of a sensation or experience which is good or bad we necessarily must be conscious of. That there is something in a pleasant experience worth having and something in a painful experience worth avoiding is obvious.

V Richard Hare

An Emotivist or Prescriptivist moral philosopher would resist my thesis. I hold that pain is bad independently of our attitude toward it and that in being bad pain provides us with reason for disliking it. For these philosophers there is no property or fact of pain which is its being bad or worth disliking. Thus pain could not provide us with reason for disliking it in being bad or worth disliking. For an Emotivist, by calling pain 'bad' one is merely expressing some present emotion or attitude toward pain. For a Prescriptivist, by calling pain 'bad' or pleasure 'good' one is merely performing some speech act of condemning pain or commending pleasure.
These philosophers, however, will stumble upon weaknesses in their theories when they are asked to explain why we should desire, approve, or commend pleasure rather than pain. Without acknowledging some property of merit in the experience, they will be unable to give a sensible and sound answer to this question. The problems they are vulnerable to are well illustrated by Hare's discussion entitled "Pain and Evil".

Why, for Hare, do we have such negative attitudes toward pain?

The constraints we are under are contingent, though they are readily explicable. There are good reasons why very few people get into a state in which they do not mind high intensities of pain. Nearly all causes of pain are also causes of harm to the organism; pain is, therefore, such a good warning device - and has indeed been developed as such - that we have acquired, partly by evolution and partly by learning, a very firm disposition to avoid pain; and this disposition is associated with a subjective feeling of dislike.

Pain is correlated with bodily harm. In consequence, there was a survival advantage to animals who dislike it. By disliking and avoiding pain an animal would, unwittingly, be avoiding bodily harm. Animals who disliked pain were more fit to survive than those who did not, and thus a universal dislike of pain resulted from evolutionary forces. This account, though plausible at first sight, is riddled with problems.

Hare speaks of this connection with bodily harm as a "good reason" for disliking pain, and he may be thinking that this connection provides our justification for disliking pain. But it does not.

27. Hare (1964, p 96)
28. For, are there not 'good' causes for just about everything? Why should it be surprising that there would also be a (good) cause of our dislike of pain? Furthermore, Hare mentions that our avoidance and dislike of pain is acquired partly by learning. Is this not to suggest that we have a reason for disliking pain? In any case, it would be worth asking whether the connection which pain has with bodily harm justifies our aversion for pain - even if this was not what Hare was intending to suggest.
That one thing signals the presence of something bad provides no justification whatsoever for disliking that thing or regarding it as evil. An alarm which is a good warning device of fires or burglars would not be disliked or called 'evil' for being so, and pain's being a reliable sign of bodily harm does not in itself give us reason for disliking pain or calling pain 'evil'. Indeed, when a thing is a good warning device of something bad we have reason for liking and appreciating it rather than disliking it.

Furthermore, pain is an intrinsic evil - something bad on its own account and independently of any connections it may have with other evil things (such as bodily harm). Pain would be bad even if not correlated with bodily harm. The justification for disliking pain and calling it 'bad' is to be found in the intrinsic nature of the experience.

Hare's account may be read as a causal hypothesis, but here too it runs into serious problems. Pain is correlated with harm and thus through evolution nature has ingrained an aversion for pain. A dislike of pain has survival advantage. Within this explanation of the origin of our dislike, it is a primitive, unexplained fact that pain already happened to be correlated with harm. But how is it that pain came to be correlated with harm in the first place?

Within Hare's thinking, that pain has a particular feel to it is incidental to its coming to be disliked and avoided. Dislike is ingrained because the sensations happened to be correlated with harm. A sensation of a different quality would have served quite as well.

29. Baier makes a similar point: "Even if the person did not know what it signalled or if he took it as the sign of a desired event, such as child-birth or a necessary operation, it would still constitute a strong motive for taking alleviating action." (Baier, 1962, p 11)
Had pleasurable or tingling sensations been correlated with harm, nature would have as happily ingrained dislike of them. Had those sensations which we call 'pains' not been correlated with harm, people might have easily been indifferent to, or perhaps even desired them.

An implication of Hare's view is that the uniformity throughout nature in our attitudes to pleasure and pain is an ordinary contingent fact. One sensation could serve a warning function as well as another; all that is needed is for nature to ingrain dislike of it. It could be as natural that some people would have pleasant or tingling sensations correlated with harm, and consequently disliked, as it is for some people to have blue eyes while others have green eyes. Thus, in the end, it remains on Hare's view merely an ordinary contingent fact that our attitudes to pain are uniform and that we prefer pleasant to painful sensations. And this is unacceptable.

Hare did not directly ask what, if anything, justifies our disliking pain and calling it 'bad'. The question is crucial. I have already noted that no justification for considering pain intrinsically bad is found in pain's being a sign of bodily harm. One might, however, suggest that the fact that we dislike pain itself justifies calling pain bad. But it does not. If an object did not warrant our aversion of it, it would not warrant our calling the object 'bad' either. From the fact that someone dislikes Indians it does not follow that he would be justified in calling them 'evil'. Only if one is justified in disliking something is he justified in considering it bad.

A suggestion that desire or dislike might itself justify calling an object 'good' or 'bad' is another version of the Mill Fallacy. As something must be not merely desired but worth desiring to be
desirable and good, so it must be worth desiring and not merely desired to provide complete justification for our calling it 'desirable' and 'good'.

That we are justified in calling pain 'bad' could not seriously be denied. No one would claim that a judgement that pain is normally bad is an arbitrary judgement, and that it is no less appropriate and sensible to commend pain as being universally worth seeking and intrinsically good. Hare nowhere doubts that we are right in calling pain 'bad'. Where then lies our justification for disliking pain and calling it 'evil'? It will be clear by now that our reason for a negative attitude toward pain lies in the intrinsic nature of the experience. In feeling the way it does (i.e., awful and bad) pain justifies our aversion for it. Similarly, our justification for desiring pleasure and calling pleasure 'desirable' and 'good' lies in the intrinsic quality of the experience. By being good and meriting our desire a pleasant experience provides justification for desiring it and for commending it as 'good'.

Meriting our desire must be some fact about pleasure. That pleasure provides reason for desiring it entails that it provides justification or merit for desiring it and that it is worth desiring. And to say that pleasure is worth desiring is equivalent to saying that it is desirable. These concepts - providing reason or justification for desire; meriting desire; being worth or deserving of desire; being desirable and good - are all interconnected. If the first one represents some (abstract) property of pleasure, as it plainly does, then those which it entails also must represent some property.

That pain provides reason or justification for dislike is a factual claim. But this claim entails that pain warrants, merits, or
deserves our dislike. And this entails that pain is undesirable or bad. These propositions are all interconnected. If the first one is factual, as it clearly is, then those which it entails are also factual.

The argument in this paper presses us towards the conclusion that pleasure's being desirable or worthy of desire and pain's being undesirable or worthy of dislike are facts. One who would deny a factual status to such merit would become vulnerable to serious problems. He will be unable to show why the judgement that it is pain rather than pleasure that is 'bad' is not arbitrary, i.e., completely devoid of justification. Yet the judgement clearly is not arbitrary. He will be unable to provide a workable account of why we should dislike and avoid pain rather than love and seek it. Yet there clearly must be some important reason. He will be vulnerable to the numerous objections found with the two accounts which were alternatives to my own in explaining our preference of pleasure to pain.

Am I not committing myself to some Intuitionist view of goodness and thus making myself vulnerable to the objections that are often

30. Other philosophers have noted that Emotivism and Prescriptivism have the unacceptable consequence that moral and value judgements ultimately become arbitrary. Gerge Kerner (in Kemer, 1966) writes: "Since Stevenson rejected the notion that there are such things as moral qualities existing independently of the wills and desires of moral agents, the acceptability of a moral judgement became a purely arbitrary and subjective matter" (pp 97 - 8). "In the theory expounded in The Language of Morals, what reasons can be given for a moral judgement is a matter to be ultimately settled by the decisions we in fact happen to make - for no reason" (p 162). "Hare's new theory (as expressed in Freedom and Reason) was really no improvement over the old: morality is in the end a matter of non-rational decision or commitment" (p 194). Kerner sees this implication of arbitrariness or non-rationality in moral judgement to be a fault or unacceptable consequence of these theories, and presumably this is a fault in the theory because these judgements are not in fact arbitrary, or at least they do not seem to be.
raised against such views? Though I hold that pleasure's being good is some property of pleasure, I am not holding that goodness is some unanalyzable property. Pleasure's being good is, at least in part, its property of providing some reason or justification for wanting and seeking it. To say that pleasant experiences are 'good' or 'desirable' is to say that they are 'worth desiring' or that they 'merit' a being's desiring them, and this is much the same as saying that they provide 'reason' or 'justification' for desiring them. To say that pleasant experiences give us some reason for wanting and seeking them is much the same as saying that they are worth desiring and that they are desirable and good. It seems to me an odd and difficult position if someone should hold that it is a fact that pleasant experiences provide some 'reason' for wanting them but that pleasure's being 'worth desiring' or 'desirable' is not some fact about pleasure. I will be saying more in the next chapter about my rejection of the alleged Fact-Value Distinction.

There are special features of pain sensations not shared by pleasant or tingling sensations which make them particularly well-suited as correlates of bodily harm. To miss this is to miss the heart of the matter. Nature, through evolutionary forces, 'chose' pain over pleasant or tingling sensations to be correlated with harm because pain, being bad and worth avoiding on its own account, is something creatures have reason to avoid on its own merit. The consequences of pain's being associated with harm is that rational creatures tend to minimize harm; but they do so for the wrong reason. An animal favours a hurt leg, not to allow it to heal properly, but because pain is awful or worth disliking and he has reason to avoid it. Had pleasant experiences been correlated with harm we might expect
people and animals to be drawn to physical harm as smokers are to cancer.  

Conclusion

It is sometimes said that the questions 'Why do people want pleasure (or 'happiness')?' or 'Why do people dislike and want to avoid pain?' are senseless or unintelligible. Kurt Baier, for instance, writes: "It is absurd to ask why men hate pain or love pleasure for the same reason as it is absurd to ask why circles are round or why fathers are male." It is because Baier believes that 'pleasure' and 'pain' are defined, at least in part, by reference to the attitudes had toward an experience that he thinks that these questions are absurd. However, according to the position which I have defended these questions are not absurd. The answers to the questions are that we 'hate' pain and 'love' pleasure because pain and pleasure provide us with intrinsic reason or justification for taking up these attitudes. Indeed, even for a philosopher like Richard Hare the question why people hate pain is a sensible one. Hare holds that it is a contingent fact that people dislike or 'hate' pain, and he

31. Many of the arguments which have driven us to these views of pleasure and pain will have equal force in driving us to a comparable position for other ultimate ends. That knowledge, love, justice, or dignity may have intrinsic goodness cannot be a consequence of our desiring them. The attitudes we have to intrinsic goods are not themselves accidental and arbitrary. The value of these ends does not originate with our having favourable attitudes to them. Ignorance and hatred would not become intrinsically desirable merely by a creature's coming to desire them as ends. That knowledge and justice have intrinsic goodness is one of man's reasons for desiring them. As Richard Price wrote: "Why, therefore, reasonable beings love truth, knowledge, and honour, is to be answered in the same manner with the enquiry, why they love and desire happiness." (Price, Chapter III).

32. Baier (1958, p 267)
provides a causal explanation of how people came to dislike pain. Hare argued that a dislike of pain (in one sense of the word 'pain') is a result of evolutionary processes, and this explanation certainly could be considered a straightforward answer to the question "Why do people dislike or 'hate' pain?" The question is absurd neither for Hare nor for myself.

In a recent article Robert Simpson wrote: "If a man explains a wish or an action by referring to happiness, there the chain of reasons comes to an end: it makes no sense to ask a man why he wants happiness." Like Hume, Simpson seems to be assuming that the only sort of reason (ground) one can have for wanting an object is that object's being a means to some end. However, I have argued that pleasure (and happiness) in themselves provide us with intrinsic reason or grounds for wanting them. This is certainly an intelligible account, but it has not occurred to Simpson. Indeed, this explanation of why people want pleasure and happiness is not only intelligible, it is correct.

33. Simpson (1975, p 169)
34. 'Pleasure' is not identical with 'happiness', and one could, of course, take a different position in explaining the desire for pleasure than he takes in explaining the desire for happiness. However, I take the same view for both, and the arguments I used in defending my position on pleasure are, for the most part, applicable to happiness.
Chapter V: The Good in Pleasure and the Evil in Pain

To be a pleasant experience is to be an experience that is 'agreeable' or 'attractive' in quality. An experience that is 'agreeable' or 'attractive' in quality is one which by virtue of being good or worth wanting has a tendency (or 'power') to dispose rational beings to be attracted to it. An unpleasant experience is one which is 'disagreeable' or 'unattractive' in quality, that is, an experience which by being bad or worth avoiding has a tendency (or 'power') to dispose rational beings to be averse to it. Pain sensation is one species of unpleasant experience.

Pleasure's being good or worth having and pain's being bad or worth avoiding are the more fundamental of the characteristics. That we want, value, and seek pleasure is a consequence of pleasure's nature, a result of the fact that pleasant experiences provide some reason for wanting them. It is logically possible not to want and seek pleasure and not to want to avoid pain and unpleasantness. The responses are contingent upon a creature's having a rational disposition. In some cases a person may find more reasons for not avoiding pain than for avoiding it, and in such instances he need not be disposed to avoid pain.

It is not logically possible for pleasant experiences to fail to be good in quality or for unpleasant experiences to fail to be bad in quality. A 'pleasant' experience therefore is to be defined as an experience of good quality, i.e., an experience which provides some reason for wanting and seeking it. An 'unpleasant' experience is to be defined as an experience bad in quality, i.e., an experience with a quality which provides one with some reason for wanting to avoid that experience. (To say that an experience provides 'reason' for seeking or avoiding it is to say
that it provides grounds or justification for doing so.) These definitions provide conditions that are both necessary and sufficient for an experience's being 'pleasant' or 'unpleasant'. In this chapter I defend and elucidate the claim that pleasure is necessarily good and that pain and unpleasantness are necessarily bad.

A. Is Pleasure Always Good?

There is widespread agreement among philosophers that pleasure is good and that pain and unpleasantness are bad. A number of philosophers have thought that it is more than a contingent fact that it is pleasure rather than pain that is good. However, with the notable exception of Henry Sidgwick, few philosophers have directly suggested that the good of the one and the bad of the other actually enter into the definition of 'pleasure' and 'unpleasantness'. But what clearer way is there for establishing that the relationship is more than contingent than by mentioning the goodness and badness within the definition of 'pleasure' and 'unpleasantness'? By defending a definition of pleasure in terms of its value, as I do in the present chapter, I am following out and developing an intuition which many philosophers have had.

Since the publication of G.E. Moore's Principia Ethica seventy-five years ago it has become apparent that the nature of the good or the bad is difficult to understand. For this reason a contemporary philosopher might be unenthusiastic over a definition of 'pleasure' and 'unpleasantness' in terms of 'good' and 'bad'. In the preceding chapter I began to sketch my view of these concepts (an experience's being good is, at least in part, its possessing a nature that provides some reason for wanting and seeking that experience); in this chapter my views of these concepts will become clearer. However, I do not pretend to be providing a developed,
detailed account of goodness and badness, nor do I claim to be
dealing with all of the important problems which arise in trying
to understand the nature of the good and the bad.

However, from the fact that the concepts of good and bad
are philosophically puzzling one should not conclude that it is
useless to use them in analyzing other concepts. That the terms
which appear in a definition give rise to their own philosophical
problems is no evidence whatsoever against the correctness of the
definition. If the concept of good were crucial to the under¬
standing of pleasure, as I am suggesting it is, it would be futile
to ignore this and to pursue the analysis in a different direction.
It can hardly be an ordinary contingent fact that it is pleasure
rather than pain that is good, and this cannot be ignored. From
the fact that the concept of goodness is itself puzzling the most
that we can conclude is that a better understanding of pleasure may
hinge in part on our gaining a better understanding of goodness.

It is common, indeed normal, to find within philosophically
useful definitions concepts which themselves are fertile ground for
philosophical study. One useful definition of 'knowledge' has been
that of 'justified true belief', yet the natures of justification,
truth, and belief are very difficult to comprehend and are poorly
understood by philosophers. It is important to see the inter¬
relationships between concepts. When analyzing pleasure in terms of
goodness we see that pleasure cannot be defined directly in terms
of the attitudes toward pleasant experiences for many of the
same reasons that 'goodness' cannot be defined in terms of the
attitudes toward good things. The relations of pleasure to
our desire and seeking of it needs to be understood as being that
of goodness to our wanting and seeking of that which is good.
Since philosophers, along with non-philosophers, almost universally believe that there is, at least normally, something good about pleasure and something bad about pain, a deductive proof that pleasure is good is not of urgent necessity. What does require discussion is the common, and quite reasonable, claim that some pleasures are bad rather than good and that pain is sometimes good and not bad.

Having defined malice as 'thinking of another's undeserved misfortune with pleasure', C.D. Broad wrote: "Is it not perfectly plain that it is an intrinsically bad state of mind, not merely in spite of, but because of, its pleasantness?"¹ There are other pleasures that might seem to be bad. Is there not something bad in sadistic pleasure, i.e., pleasure taken in causing harm to another? The suggestion is not simply that it is wrong to harm another but that it is worse when someone feels pleased over it. Must there be something contradictory in the Puritan claim that pleasure, at least pleasure in frivolous activities, is not desirable?

As pleasure is sometimes said to be bad, so pain is sometimes said to be good. Pain and suffering are sometimes praised for educational, character-strengthening, or soul-purging effects. Severe pain is sometimes valued as a testing ground for will-power or courage. A biologist or a doctor might say that physical pain is generally a good thing, since it serves as a good warning device - a rudder steering people and animals away from harm. Is not pain or suffering a good thing when it is inflicted as just punishment?

¹ Broad (1930, p 234)
That there is bad in a certain state of affairs does not rule out there also being good in the situation. My general view on such suggestions as these is that though there sometimes may be something bad in the occurrence of pleasure and something good in the occurrence of pain, there remains something good about the pleasure and something bad about the pain and unpleasantness. When considering such cases one must ask, 'Even though there is something bad about this pleasure, does there not remain something agreeable or nice – i.e., something good – in the pleasant experience?' For instance, though it is bad to laugh at our friends when they bungle their affairs does there not remain something agreeable or nice, something good, in our experience when we are feeling pleased? Even if there is something desirable in suffering pain as a deserved punishment, does there not remain something disagreeable, something bad, in the sensation?

This mixed account will be accepted readily for instances in which pain is praised for its effects or pleasure condemned because of its consequences. For instance, though pain and suffering may be valued for their effect in strengthening character or in toughening one up it is consistent to say that the pain itself is bad though the strengthened character (or education) is good. Indeed, it is just because the pain itself is bad that it can strengthen character or educate a person. Similarly, should it be held that pleasantness sometimes makes a person lazy or apathetic, we need not say the pleasure itself is bad but only that these effects are bad.

These cases show that 'being good', cannot be equated with 'being something that should always be sought' and that 'being bad' should not be equated with 'being something that in every instance
should be avoided'. In certain instances the beneficial effects of pain might outweigh the bad of the pain so that one should not avoid the pain. (Though the person has some reason for avoiding the pain he has more reason for not avoiding it.) There are many pleasures whose consequences would make the pleasure not worth seeking; though many of us could expect to enjoy a luxurious world cruise, we do not usually choose to throw all our savings into such a venture. The bad consequences would make the venture silly, but this is obviously not to say that the pleasure would not itself be good, but only to say that one is wise not to seek this pleasure.

It is sometimes desirable to inflict pain as a just punishment. It might even be said that such pain is a good thing. But still there remains something bad about the pain. Being 'punished' entails having something bad inflicted. It is because a fine, the loss of freedom, a pain, and death are bad that they are able to serve as punishments. We do not punish people by giving them money, by serving them delicious meals, or by giving them health, precisely because these things are good.

Even if it sometimes is intrinsically good to inflict pain as punishment, there remains something intrinsically bad about that which we are inflicting. What is good in the situation is that we are justly punishing someone. What is bad is the feel or quality of the sensation or experience inflicted. Though we might say that the pain here is good, this would be a way of saying that there is good in inflicting pain here, namely, the good of just punishment. It would be mistaken to overlook the fact that there is still something bad in the feel of the pain.

In a similar way, it is quite consistent to say that though
something is itself good, it is undesirable for it to exist in some circumstances. That the lives of wicked people should be as good or better in length of life, in happiness, or in public esteem than the lives of persons of kindness and virtue is undesirable. For an immoral person there is a point at which his life would be too pleasurable - a point at which any more pleasantness would be undesirable. This is not to say that there is nothing good in additional pleasure. On the contrary, it is just because there would be something good in additional pleasure that its existence would be undesirable. The person does not deserve or merit additional pleasure, and this is to say he does not deserve or merit something good. There is injustice in wicked people experiencing greater personal good than that which good people experience. There is a double-dose of injustice when someone deserves punishment yet not only fails to receive bad things but actually benefits from his wrongdoing. The American public was at times aggravated over the Watergate proceedings, firstly, because the tried or convicted often received little punishment and, secondly, because the guilty parties were often able to benefit from their actions by receiving large amounts of money from their misdoings, e.g., by giving talks on university campuses or on television, or by selling their memoirs.

What is bad in the pleasure of malice, i.e. in pleasure that is taken in some undeserved misfortune of another person? That the person feels pleased indicates that he thinks of the misfortune as a good thing and that he welcomes it. A person who saw no personal advantage in another's misfortunes or who did not want the person to suffer this misfortune would not feel pleased when it happened. It is bad to want misfortune to come to the undeserving,
and it is bad to view other people's troubles primarily from the perspective of how they serve our own interests. These responses are bad whether or not they are accompanied by pleasure. It would be evil for me to desire that my son die an unnatural death, and this is so even if I do not take pleasure in the thought of it.

To feel pleased over the misfortunes of another person is to feel good at the thought of those misfortunes. The person feeling malice feels good, i.e., he has an experience 'nice', 'agreeable', or good in quality.

When a person feels pleased at the thought of another's misfortunes the pleasure shows not only that he has evil thoughts and an undesirable attitude to the other's misfortunes but it also suggests that the person is benefiting (with pleasure) from his wickedness. This sense of offended justice is, I think, one of our reasons for thinking of malicious pleasure as evil. When we are in a heated argument with someone, we hate to have him look at us in a manner that suggests that he is enjoying making us miserable, for this not only suggests that he desires our unhappiness but also that he is benefiting from it. There is a 'double does' of injustice since the person deserves to be punished for his wicked thoughts and desires but instead is actually benefiting. It is quite consistent to say that though the pleasure itself has positive value to the pleased person, it would be desirable for him not to feel pleased over the misfortunes of others.

This explanation of the undesirability of malicious pleasure is not merely consistent with an admission that the pleasure itself is good but actually requires this admission. For the claim that a person is benefiting by receiving pleasure from his actions entails that he is receiving something good from his actions.
It is often thought desirable for someone to suffer remorse or guilt if he has acted immorally. Shall we say that pain or distress felt through remorse or guilt in these circumstances is good (and therefore not bad)? To suffer the pain of remorse or guilt is to be pained by the thought of something one disapproves of having done or wishes that he had not done. That a person suffers remorse after wrongdoing shows that he realizes that his action was wrong and that he has sympathy or concern for his victim. The sympathy for the victim and moral sensitivity to one's own wrong-doing are themselves desirable whether or not the person suffers pain in conjunction with them.

A further way in which it might be desirable for a person to suffer the pain of remorse after wrongdoing is that the pain might be desirable as punishment for the wrongdoing. Pain of guilt might serve as some atonement, expiation, or as an event which purges oneself for wrongdoing. However, it is only because the pain is evil that it can provide compensation or repayment for wrongdoing.2

To be pained over an action is to feel bad or terrible over the act. To say that it is sometimes desirable to feel pained over one's wrongdoings is to say that it is sometimes desirable to feel terrible or bad over having done some act. There remains a disagreeableness and badness to pain even in cases when it is desirable for someone to feel pain. To say that it is sometimes desirable for someone to suffer pain is to say that it is sometimes

2. That people often feel pain through their awareness of having done wrong could almost be interpreted as evidence of the Divine Hand at work, since we have in this psychological phenomenon a built-in mechanism for punishing wrongdoers.
desirable for someone to undergo a bad experience.

B.) Are There Pains that are not Unpleasant?

Though it may be granted that a pleasant experience is necessarily good in quality and that an unpleasant experience is necessarily bad in quality, there are some philosophers who think that it is possible for a sensation of pain not to be unpleasant and thus not to be of a quality that is bad.

Richard Hare, in his article entitled "Pain and Evil"\(^3\), maintains that it is merely a contingent fact whether or not a pain is found unpleasant in the way that it is merely a contingent fact whether or not feeling cold is found unpleasant. It is very common for 'pain' sensations to be found unpleasant, he holds, and for this reason the word 'pain' has come to have a second sense whereby unpleasantness is implied. My concern in the following discussion is with what he has to say about 'pain' in this alleged sense whereby unpleasantness is supposedly not implied.

Hare begins his argument by noting that the word 'pain' as it is most commonly used would not apply to all disliked or unpleasant sensations. Sensations from itches, tickles, electric shocks, or sweltering heat, though unpleasant, are not usually thought of as 'pains'. Rather, pains are, Hare says, distinguished from these others by having a special quality or feel to them. In this observation Hare has a point against Kurt Baier, who at one point said that a pain is simply any disliked sensation.\(^4\) However, this

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3. Hare (1964)
4. Recall the following passage of Baier's which was quoted earlier: "We might have liked and disliked different sorts of sensations from the ones which we actually like and dislike, but whatever sorts of sensations we like and dislike, we only call pains those which we dislike. And if there are sensations which we ordinarily dislike but on some occasions like having, then we do not call them pains on those occasions on which we like having them." (Baier, 1958, p 273).
point gets us no closer to a conclusion that pain need not be unpleasant. From an admission that not all unpleasant sensations are pains it does not follow that not all pains are unpleasant. From the fact that there are coloured objects that are not red we cannot conclude that there are red objects that are not coloured.

While assuming that what he says in terms of 'dislike' of pain applies equally to 'unpleasantness' of pain, Hare argues, "There are, in fact, small degrees of pain which are by no means disliked by everybody. Most people could draw the point of a needle across their skin (as in acupuncture) and say truthfully that they could distinctly feel pain, but that they did not dislike it." Other philosophers have suggested that mild aches are not always unpleasant.

I agree that for some sensations it may not be obvious whether or not they are unpleasant, but is there not as much doubt whether or not these sensations are pain? Admittedly the sensations that Hare mentions are not particularly unpleasant, but ex hypothesi we are considering 'small degrees of pain'. But are these sensations not at least a little unpleasant?

If a friend is drawing a needle lightly across my skin I will soon want him to stop, and this suggests that the sensation is to some extent unpleasant. Admittedly, we may not be much concerned about it. If the music on the radio is slightly too loud, and thus unpleasant, we may not be highly worried about it, yet, if we are in reach of the radio we will turn down the volume. Similarly, though we will not be highly concerned about a mild headache, we still take

5. Hare (1964, p 97)
aspirins for it if it is too slow in going away on its own. Why do we take aspirin? Do we have any reason for doing so? The action is not merely blind instinct. We take the aspirin not merely because the sensation might be distracting us, for we would do so even if it were not. Rather, it is just slightly unpleasant or disagreeable and we think that we would be better off without it.

There are some sensations that seem to be pains which, because they are associated with pleasure, have been interpreted by philosophers as not being unpleasant. One philosopher mentioned that after a good physical work out someone might be happy to have those aches that tell a person that his body is becoming stronger. Von Wright mentions the sensation that a child feels when being pinched by his mother or father in a spirit of love and affection. However, though it may be uncertain whether the sensation is unpleasant, it seems equally uncertain whether the sensation is a pain. Significantly, Von Wright seemed uncertain over how to describe the situation; he not only says that the 'pain' is not unpleasant, but he also says that it is not 'painful', and if this is not a direct contradiction I do not know what is.

The 'pains' which Von Wright and the others mention as pains that are not unpleasant invariably are examples of mild 'pains'. However, if it were a contingent fact that pain is unpleasant it must be logically possible for the most intense of pains to be not the least bit unpleasant. But what would it be like for an intense pain to be not the least disagreeable? One should not be quick to admit that this is a logical possibility.

There is indeed a queerness in the experience of being

6. Von Wright (1963, p 71)
pinched, an oddity which may be misleading Von Wright. There is both a disagreeable element and an agreeable one. Though a child who is being pinched may feel pleased to receive affection, he will at the same time be experiencing unpleasantness in the sensation. It is wrong to reason that since the child enjoys the situation he does not find it unpleasant. With equal oversimplification, one might reason that since the pinch is unpleasant, the child could not be enjoying the attention he receives. It is true that the same thing cannot be both pleasant and unpleasant in exactly the same respect. But it is quite possible for pleasantness and unpleasantness to exist 'side by side' concurrently. One can enjoy a movie while having a headache, while aware of an unpleasant smell, or while feeling uncomfortable in his chair. (There is no need to say that the pleasure and unpleasantness must be alternating in time. A person obviously can be aware of two sensations at the same time. And one sensation could be unpleasant while the other is pleasant; for instance, while someone is feeling unpleasant sensations from being uncomfortable in his chair he may be smelling a pleasant perfume. In a similar way, a person can experience pleasure which is not localized while he is experiencing an unpleasant sensation. While experiencing an unpleasant sensation from a pinch a child may be enjoying the affection and playing. Though the sensation itself has a bad quality, the child's experience in general has a good tone.)

It is possible to be pinched and yet feel nothing or to be pinched and feel a sensation that is not a 'pain'. But if we are considering a case where ex hypothesi the person is feeling pain when pinched by a parent, then, even though the child appreciates
the show of affection, we expect the child to try to squirm out of the grasp of the parent. The squirming is not blind reflex in the way that a leg jerking from a tap on the knee is pure reflex. The squirming movement is not purposeless as is a knee-jerk but is directed at permitting the child to escape the the pinch or lessen its effect. But why would the child have an inclination to escape from the pinching if the sensation were not itself unpleasant or bad, i.e., worth escaping?

The situation here is similar to that of teasing or tickling a person. The context may be one of general fun and amusement. However, at the core of the fun is something itself unpleasant. A person being tickled will normally try to wriggle away; again, the action is not totally involuntary but is partly directed at receiving relief, however temporary, from the discomfort being inflicted. On the other hand, a child may be glad that he is being tickled and may want it to continue, and his ground for this desire is the enjoyment that he is also experiencing. A philosopher who denies that there is unpleasantness will be left unable to account for the attempt, perhaps half-hearted but nonetheless real, to wriggle out of the grasp.

The presence of a mixture of pleasure and unpleasantness is clear in many cases of teasing. Causing a degree of unpleasantness is central to teasing, though the unpleasantness need not be that of pain in particular. Not only do we pinch, poke, or tickle when teasing, we also frighten (shout in a friend's ear unexpectedly),

7. According to the definition offered by The Concise Oxford Dictionary, to 'tease' is to "irritate playfully or maliciously ..." (Sykes, 1976). 'Irritating' a person needs to be analyzed in terms of causing that person some form of discomfort or unpleasantness.
embarrass (as children we would corner a friend and jerk down his trousers), or irritate (cause a friend to sneeze or itch). Like anyone else, the victim finds embarrassment, fright, or irritation unpleasant. He may also find amusement and enjoyment in the humour. Though there may be fun in being teased there remains this core of unpleasantness.8

An important trouble-spot in Hare's discussion is that though he formulates much of his discussion in terms of 'dislike' of pain, he assumes that whatever he finds to be true of dislike of pain will apply to the relationship of unpleasantness, discomfort, and suffering to pain. In Chapter II, I discussed the tendency to think of pleasure in terms of 'liking' something and to view pleasure as a 'pro-attitude', or a valuing or prizing of an object. In a similar way, Hare thinks of suffering and unpleasantness in terms of 'disliking' something, which he equates with some negative attitude, and he thinks of all of these experiences as comparable to thinking of an object as bad. (Hare uses the expression 'affective attitudes', and I suspect that he

8. Philosophers commonly believe that a person's judgements about his own feelings and experiences are incorrigible — that, for instance, a person who sincerely claims that he is or is not enjoying himself or finding something unpleasant cannot be mistaken. However, the above suggestion suggests that it should be possible to err in these enjoyments. Hare and Von Wright hold that certain ('pain') sensations are not unpleasant, and I have argued that these sensations are unpleasant. Though this disagreement took place at the level of philosophical discourse, it seems quite possible that my judgements of the unpleasantness of these sensations might differ in practice from the judgements that Hare and Von Wright would make. If a pin were drawn across the skin of Hare's arm, Hare presumably would be ready to say that he felt a mild 'pain' that was not unpleasant. However, if I were subjected to the same sensation I would say that this mild pain was mildly unpleasant. One of us must be wrong. Hare would judge some mild pains not to be unpleasant, whereas there would be no pains that I would judge not to be unpleasant. So, at least one of us would be mistaken about whether or not certain sensations are unpleasant.
thinks of discomfort, unpleasantness and suffering as well as dislike as fitting into this category.) In Chapter II, I argued at length that the 'pro-attitude' view of pleasure is wrong, and Hare's 'con-attitude' view of unpleasantness is wrong for much the same reason. The unpleasantness of a pain is not itself an attitude had toward the pain but that (bad) quality of the pain which provides us with reason for having a negative attitude toward it.

This misconception of unpleasantness has a crucial role when Hare argues:

I do not see how it can be impossible to understand, though it may be difficult to believe, a man who says that, by practice, he has got into a state in which he does not dislike lying on a bed of nails, although he has exactly the same experiences, apart from the dislike, that I would have if I would lay on a bed of nails. 9

Since dislike is an attitude and not a quality of the experience which we have the negative attitude toward, Hare is right that when we have some negative attitude towards an experience it must be logically possible to have the same experience without having this attitude toward it. However, since the intrinsic unpleasantness of a sensation is not itself an attitude, this argument does not directly apply to it.

If the feel or quality of an experience is crucial to an experience's being pleasant or unpleasant as it is on my view, then Hare's above suggestion if formulated in terms of 'unpleasantness' rather than 'dislike' would not be a logical possibility. On my view of unpleasantness it is logically impossible for two experiences to be exactly alike in quality while one is intrin-

9. Hare (1964, p 98)
sically unpleasant and the other is not. An experience is unpleasant when it is bad in quality and therefore has a quality which provides some reason for avoiding the experience. Pain sensations are intrinsically disagreeable and unpleasant and not merely unpleasant through being a cause of some feeling that is intrinsically unpleasant. It is not logically possible for two experiences to be exactly alike in quality while one is intrinsically bad in quality and the other is not and while one has a quality which provides intrinsic reason for avoiding the experience but the other does not. 10

In another argument Hare tries to establish a separability of pain from its (attendant) unpleasantness by appealing to the effects that a lobotomy has on the way people react to pain. A lobotomy, an operation on the frontal lobes of the brain, is sometimes given by doctors to pacify or calm people with severe emotional disorders, and the operation also can be used to provide relief to patients with severe pain in cases in which other remedies have failed.

There seems to be more than one way in which the operation affects a person's pain. The operation, it seems, can affect someone's condition so that he feels less pain after the operation than he was feeling before it. His pains may be less intense than they had been before the operation and they may become less frequent. Secondly, people will be less anxious about their pains afterwards,

10. As Hare argues that pain is not necessarily unpleasant, so he argues that 'suffering' is not necessary for pain. To 'suffer' is to experience extreme unpleasantness. There are some pains which do not entail suffering because there are some pains that do not entail extreme unpleasantness: mild pains do not entail extreme unpleasantness. However, intense pain does entail suffering since it entails extreme unpleasantness.
and this will happen not just to the extent that their pains are less frequent or less intense. The patients become less concerned or worried about pains of an intensity which have worried them more before the operation. Thirdly, it seems that the persons suffer less because of their pains afterwards and that they find the experience of pain less unpleasant. This, too, seems to be out of proportion to the decrease in the intensity of the pain sensations they feel; pains of a given intensity seem to be less unpleasant after the operation than they had been before it. The descriptions and reports of these pains given by the patients and doctors are not always as clear as would be desirable for philosophers who are concerned about important, but rather subtle, distinctions. There sometimes seem to be inconsistencies between what is said and how the patient actually behaves. (For instance, he may say that he no longer cares about his pains but may still take aspirins for them.) From some things that are said one might think that it is being said that these people have pains which are not at all unpleasant. 11

It is plausible to say that these operations do indeed reduce the suffering and unpleasantness that the patient experiences with pain sensations. With this proposition as premise Hare develops the following argument:

If we can understand what it would be for the suffering to be reduced while the sensation remained the same, we can surely understand also what it would be for the suffering or the distress or dislike to be altogether removed without any diminution in the pain sensation. 12

12. Hare (1964, p 102)
This argument is a non sequitur. Consider the following parallel argument which an American car manufacturer might present: "If we can understand what it would be for the length of our cars to be reduced while the size of the passengers' seating compartment remains the same, we can surely understand also what it would be for the length of our cars to be diminished to zero without any diminution in the size of the seating compartment." A car manufacturer can reduce the length of his cars without affecting the size of the seating compartment if he chops inches off the length of the bonnet and boot. However, if he were to reduce the length of the car to zero this would entail a very substantial reduction in the size of the passenger compartment.

My understanding of the relation of pain to the unpleasantness felt when experiencing it is comparable. On my view, being a sensation of pain entails being a sensation of unpleasant quality. However, it is possible for someone at the time that he is experiencing a pain sensation also to experience additional unpleasantness which is not itself a quality of the sensation. For instance, if one is feeling depressed or gloomy while experiencing pain, the experience as a whole will be more unpleasant than it would be if he were having the pain without also being depressed. Being depressed or gloomy is in itself an unpleasant experience, and when it is added to the experience of pain the resultant experience is all the more unpleasant. Given the possibility of removing the unpleasantness of being depressed without removing the accompanying pain sensation it must be possible to lessen a person's suffering or unpleasantness while he is in pain without affecting the pain. The fact that this is a coherent picture of the situation shows that Hare's argument is a non sequitur.
To be annoyed or aggravated is to be bothered by something one thinks bad or has some negative attitude toward. Pain is something bad. Annoyance and aggravation are feelings which are in themselves unpleasant; it is unpleasant to be aggravated by the cat as well as by a pain. Often a pain causes a person to react to it with a separate, additional unpleasant feeling such as annoyance, aggravation, anxiety, depression or despair, and when a person has a pain and is aggravated or depressed by it the resultant experience is more unpleasant than it would be if he had the pain but was not also aggravated or depressed. For instance, when a headache continues for too long it might become what we describe as a 'nagging headache', which is a headache which is beginning to annoy us. The sensation itself need not have changed, yet by being around so long, we no longer feel fresh to it, and we begin to respond with additional feelings and emotions toward the pain. The pain someone feels at the dentist's or when stubbing his toe would be a source of much additional suffering and distress if, though in itself it remained exactly the same sensation, it were felt under different circumstances. For instance, if our 'dentist' was not someone interested in the well-being of our teeth, but was a man attempting to persuade us to provide him with information, and we were not a volunteering patient but someone taken by force and strapped down to the chair, our mouth clamped open, our resultant experience would be unpleasant.\(^{13}\) Or less dramatically, consider a child's visit to a dentist. Before going, he may be anxious, and after the visit when on the way home he may be in tears and very distressed over the whole business. During the actual drilling he not only suffers the

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13. Such a visit to the dentist was vividly portrayed by Dustin Hoffman and Lawrence Olivier in the recent movie, The Marathon Man.
pain sensations but also suffers this separate emotional response. (A parent or the dentist sensing that it is logically possible to avoid these accompanying, disagreeable emotions may attempt to calm the child. This emotional suffering might actually be worse for the child than was the pain sensation itself.)

How then could a lobotomy decrease the suffering or unpleasantness someone experiences over a pain sensation? When not used for the purpose of easing suffering, the operation is used to calm persons with severe emotional troubles. After having his operation, McMurphey, the central character in Ken Kesey's novel, One Flew Over The Cuckoo's Nest, becomes apathetic and passionless - in this respect more a cabbage than a human being. Hare quotes a son as having said of his father after the poor man has had this operation: "It would make no difference to Dad whether I told him I had won a thousand pounds or that I was going outside to shoot myself." In such a condition of total apathy or lack of emotion over good and evil - a condition difficult to imagine vividly - it is quite intelligible that this residue-of-a-person would now feel little anxiety, aggravation, or emotional upset over his own pain, even

14. From this last example we can also see how people's suffering over pain will vary not just with the intensity of the sensation but also with the subject's personality and character traits, such as maturity and courage. A person of nervous, timid or hypochondriac character might find the experience of pain more disagreeable than would a person of a calmer, braver disposition. Similarly, a person's attitude or emotions toward pain on specific occasions will affect the degree of unpleasantness he experiences in connection with the pain. Someone who feels guilt and a consequent need for punishment (e.g., a masochist) need not feel anxious or depressed over that pain which he seeks voluntarily. Indeed, unlike the child who suffers anxiety at the prospect of pain, the masochist might feel only pleasurable relief at the prospect of pain. But this is not, of course, to say that the pain sensation is not in itself unpleasant for the masochist but only to say that his overall experience when in pain may be less unpleasant than it would be for a non-masochist.
though the pain is something which is in itself bad. 15

There is one final example of what someone might be tempted to think is a sensation of 'pain' which is not unpleasant. The masochist wants pain and may even 'find pain pleasant'. Does this fact show that his pain is not unpleasant or bad?

Already I have argued that it is just because the pain is bad (unpleasant) that the masochist desires and takes satisfaction in pain. Realizing this is crucial to understanding what is peculiar or queer about masochism.

As was decided previously when discussing pinches and tickles, we cannot deduce from the fact that there is pleasantness in an experience the conclusion that there is no unpleasantness. Indeed, it is misleading to describe the masochist's pain as 'pleasant' without qualification, for this seems to suggest that the pain is an unmixed pleasure. But 'enjoying a pain' is not at all like enjoying a meal or a movie, and this is because 'enjoying a pain' is a mixed experience. A pain, though unpleasant in itself, can be a source of a pleasant satisfaction which is experienced simultaneously with the pain.

15. As someone may feel an emotion that is itself unpleasant in responding to an unpleasant sensation, so one can respond to pleasant sensations with emotions that are themselves pleasant. As pain sensations are intrinsically unpleasant so the sensations experienced from eating food that one finds delicious are intrinsically pleasant. It is not uncommon for someone to continue to feel pleased after he has finished a good meal; if the person has eaten such food on previous occasions, he might also, before eating, look forward to the meal with an emotion of pleasurable excitement. If he experiences these or other pleasurable emotions while eating the delicious food, the resultant experience will be more pleasant than it would be if he experienced the agreeable gustatory sensations without responding with these pleasurable emotions. The pleasure in the pleasurable emotions is a pleasure logically distinct from the intrinsic pleasantness of the gustatory sensations themselves.
Though we sometimes describe the masochist as 'enjoying pain' or 'finding pain pleasant', these descriptions should not fool us. With equal justice we could say that the masochist finds his 'suffering' or 'unpleasantness' pleasant or enjoyable, and obviously, we cannot conclude from this that his suffering or unpleasantness is not unpleasant. There is, of course, oddity in talking of someone finding his 'unpleasantness' pleasant, but there also is an oddity in talking of 'pain' being pleasant. A less odd way of talking is to make it clear that the experience being discussed is a mixed experience - one with both unpleasantness and pleasantness.

A pain sensation is **intrinsically** unpleasant as it is intrinsically bad. That is, it is unpleasant and bad because of the

16. That unpleasantness may sometimes be a source of pleasure gives rise to the question whether it is worthwhile for someone to bear the unpleasantness for the sake of the pleasure. Often, the pleasure in being tickled will make the acceptance of the disagreeableness in the sensation worthwhile. There may be times when the pleasure in scratching an itch may lead someone to be glad that he has this itch, even though this means enduring some irritating unpleasantness.

Does the masochist's pleasure compensate for the unpleasantness so as to make masochistic activity, at least sometimes, a worthwhile enterprise (as, for instance, being tickled or having an itch may be)? It would be logically possible for the satisfaction and relief of guilt feeling to compensate in degree for the pain voluntarily inflicted. However, there would remain some irrationality in masochism. You or I do not normally take pleasure in pain. Why does the masochist? A peculiar outlook on pain is, I suspect, entailed by the idea of 'masochism'. (It can never be a compliment to call someone 'masochistic', and I suspect that this is because some irrationality is entailed by 'masochism'.) The masochist is sometimes said to be ridden by an unwarranted sense of guilt; he 'needs' punishment because he has this (irrational) sense of being guilty. It is abnormalities and irrationalities such as these that enable him to take satisfaction in pain. What is strange, then, about the masochist is not that he wants satisfaction and relief from painful guilt feelings but that he has these unwarranted guilt feelings to begin with and that he consequently 'needs' pain. If the masochist's ability to take pleasure in pain is, as I suggest it is, contingent upon his having some irrational or perverted attitude toward pain, then masochism would not be a worthwhile or desirable enterprise even if the pleasure he felt did outweigh the pain.
way it feels in itself and not simply because it may be a means to some feeling that is itself intrinsically unpleasant. A pain sensation cannot cease to be unpleasant because the very quality that is distinctive of pain is a quality that is bad and such as to provide reason for avoiding the sensation. The badness and intrinsic unpleasantness of a sensation cannot be 'peeled off' as Hare seemed to think it could. The intrinsic character of a sensation cannot be affected by purely external changes, such as changes in the person's attitude toward the sensation. The quality of a sensation remains the same through all changes that are purely external. If a sensation provides intrinsic reason for avoiding it, then it will continue to do so whatever changes occur externally. For a pain sensation to cease to be unpleasant it would be necessary for the sensation to lose that quality by virtue of which it is a pain.

C.) The Alleged Fact-Value Distinction

In Chapter IV, I argued that a property of meriting, or providing reason for, our desire or aversion is a fundamental characteristic of pleasant and unpleasant experiences. I argued that this merit in an experience, this goodness or badness, must be a property of the experience, and I gave a rough account of what sort of property this is. In the present chapter, I have argued that this property of meriting desire or aversion, this desirability or undesirability, of an experience is the defining feature of the 'pleasant' and 'unpleasant'.

Many contemporary philosophers are sympathetic to the view that there are no properties of good and bad in objects. The main support which contemporary philosophers explicitly or implicitly
rely on when defending this alleged Fact-Value Distinction is the argument that whereas disputes about facts are always in principle resolvable, judgements of value are always disputable. Though all of the facts in a situation may be stated and known, no indisputable conclusion about issues of value in the situation can be drawn, these philosophers claim. No factual assertion or series of factual assertions entails a value judgement, they say. There are a few things that need to be said about this argument.

When reasoning in this way philosophers usually are thinking specifically of moral judgements, e.g., judgements about whether some action is moral or good. And it is true that with many moral issues there is considerable room for reasonable dispute over the rightness of some particular act, and often there will not be a straightforward, obvious way of resolving the dispute. However, those who hold the Fact-Value Distinction do not in practice limit themselves to claiming that if a value judgement is seriously disputable, the value judgement is not a judgement of fact. Rather, it is assumed that all value judgements provide room for serious dispute and that for any disputes over values there is no possibility of resolving the dispute with a decisive, correct answer.

Philosophers who argue in this fashion have not based their argument on a discussion of the value of pleasure and pain. The premise these philosophers rely on when concluding that value judgements are not judgements of fact does not hold in this case. There is general agreement on the values of pleasure and pain. Most philosophers agree that pleasure is good and that pain is bad, at least normally. Contrary to what the Fact-Value theorist says
is true of value judgements, there is little room for serious
dispute about the values of these experiences. And even though
there may be room for reasonable dispute in some cases, there is,
as I have argued, a correct answer to the dispute. The issue is
by no means irresolvable. (Those who say that some pleasures are
bad are right insofar as it is true that there are some occasions
where it is undesirable for someone to experience pleasure. However,
as I argued, this is simply to say that it is sometimes undesirable
to have a good experience or to feel good. The pleasure remains
intrinsically good in quality even in these cases.)

The Fact-Value theorists claim that no factual judgements
entail value judgements. Yet this does not hold for pleasure and
unpleasantness since, as I have argued, a reference to the value of
the experience is contained within the definition of these terms,
and therefore goodness and badness is entailed by a reference to
these psychological states. Brand Blanshard is one of a number of
philosophers who have noticed this:

What sort of assertion is one making in saying that intense
pain is intrinsically evil? It does not seem like an
empirical assertion... Such pain is evil by reason of its
nature; we can see from what it is that it must be bad... The
proposition is therefore necessary... The implication
is that characteristics commonly taken as factual or
descriptive such as that of intense pain, may entail a
value characteristic such as goodness or badness.''

17. Blanshard (1961, p 230). Max Black also sees that the concept
of pain can be used in bridging the alleged fact-value (is-ought)
gap. He writes: "If I am not mistaken, the following argument from
factual premises to a moral conclusion is valid:
Doing A will produce pain.
Apart from producing the pain resulting from A, doing A
will have the same consequence that not doing A would
have had.
Therefore, A ought not to be done." (Black, 1964, p 180)
What Blanshard says of intense pain can be paralleled with pleasure and goodness. That someone is finding something pleasant or enjoying himself is a fact about the person, yet, as I have argued, that someone is experiencing pleasure entails that he is having an experience 'agreeable' or good in quality. 18

Statements about pleasure and pain entail statements of value. Are assertions about pleasure and pain also factual? Yes. Any assertion that someone is or is not enjoying himself or suffering pain is either true or false. It is possible to lie when saying that you are enjoying yourself, and this is to say that there are some psychological states that would be incompatible with enjoying yourself. From a correct claim that someone, e.g., enjoys movies or enjoys relaxing some inferences can be drawn about what he is or is not feeling and about some sorts of behaviour or physical reactions which might be likely. The claim that someone is in pain might explain why the person is groaning or taking aspirins, and the claim could explain nothing if it were not factual.

18. Even if someone were not convinced that pleasure is always good and that pain is always bad, The Fact-Value Distinction remains challenged by certain pleasures and pains. Suppose someone argued that there is nothing bad in pain when it is inflicted as just punishment or that there is nothing good in the experience of malicious pleasure. To provide trouble for the Fact-Value theorist it is sufficient to introduce just one case where the good of the pleasant experience and the bad in the pain is beyond reasonable dispute. Should one simply admit that it is beyond reasonable dispute that there is something bad in the intense pain that a baby suffers, we have a solid challenge to the theories who rests his case on an alleged disputable character of value judgements. This value judgement is not a subject for serious, indeed irresolvable, dispute.

Indeed, it is not difficult to find particular value judgements that do not allow room for open, irresolvable dispute. Is it not beyond serious, rational dispute that killing a healthy child out of the motive of pure curiosity is bad? Is there room for serious dispute over whether or not a Rolls Royce is a good car? Though one could, no doubt, reasonably claim that the car is bad in some respects, this would not be the same think as holding that it is a bad car (as a whole).
A defender of The Fact-Value Distinction might attempt to escape embarrassment over pleasure and pain by attempting to explain away the near-indisputableness of the values of pleasure and pain in the following manner: "There are two strains of meaning connected with the words 'pleasure' and 'pain', a factual strain and an evaluative strain. By calling an experience a 'pain' we imply both that the experience is of a certain quality and that the quality is bad. The factual ('descriptive') strain of meaning is distinct from the evaluative strain. It is not that the badness of certain states of affairs is indisputable but merely that by calling an experience 'painful' we already are judging that state of affairs to be bad." This is the sort of thing philosophers sometimes say of the badness of 'murder'. Though being an act of 'murder' entails being an act that is bad or wrong, this does not, they argue, show that certain actions are necessarily wrong. To call an action a 'murder', they argue, is to do two things: it is to say that the action is of a certain sort (taking the life of another) and that the action is morally wrong. The action can be described in 'morally neutral' language where its badness is not already implied; by saying that 'Joe has taken the life of another' instead of saying that he has 'murdered' the man we leave open the question of whether or not Joe acted wrongly. So it is argued.

For this defence to be successful, the defender of the distinction needs to hold that once we consider the 'pure facts' of the situation the goodness or badness of the experience will emerge as an open, irresolvable issue. But this position cannot be maintained. Even if we drop the terms 'pleasure' and 'pain' as being loaded terms and consider the experiences themselves - the 'pure facts' of the situation - the goodness or badness of these
experiences does not become any more controversial. Consider the sort of experience which we might call 'excruciating pain'. That there is something bad in the feeling does not become any more debatable if we directly consider the nature of the experience itself while refraining from actually speaking of the sensations as 'pain'. It is not merely that in calling the experience an intense 'pain' that we are judging the value of the experience, but that given the nature of the sensation it is obvious that the sensation is bad. Of any feeling that we could properly call 'excruciating pain' it would simply be mistaken to say that there is nothing bad about it.

Consider an experience which we might properly call 'pleasurable'. Consider, for instance, the experience of someone who is taking great pleasure in eating a meal which he finds, tastes delicious. There is little room for seriously arguing that there is nothing 'agreeable' or 'good' in this experience. Given the nature of the experience it would be unreasonable and mistaken to call it 'intrinsically bad' or 'awful'. It is not only that in calling the experience an intense 'pleasure' that we are (already) judging its value but that given the nature of any experience which we might properly call an intense 'pleasure' it would be mistaken and unreasonable to argue that this experience is intrinsically bad or awful. Thus, even when we consider the 'pure facts' of the experience, the value of the experience does not become a subject for open, irresolvable dispute.

When discussing masochism in Chapter IV, I mentioned that the oddity in the idea of 'wanting pain' is not located at the linguistic level (being a contradiction in terms) but rather that the idea presents a psychological oddity. What is odd is not that
we should speak of a sensation as a 'pain' and then proceed to say that the sensation was wanted but rather that one should have the sort of sensation that we call 'pain' and want that sensation. The sensations that we call 'pains' are sensations that we normally cannot help (as a psychological fact) but dislike or wish to be rid of. (These sensations are of such a nature that aversion is a suitable or fitting reaction.) In a related way, the oddity in the idea of 'pain being intrinsically good' or 'pain not being at all bad' is not located entirely at the linguistic level. It is not simply that someone is being inconsistent in his use of words if he says that a sensation is a 'pain but that it is not at all 'bad'; it is also the case that given the nature of sensations that are called 'pains' it would be unreasonable and mistaken to think that they are not at all bad. These sensations are of such a nature that it is fitting and suitable that we call them 'bad'. Similarly, though it is true that there is a conceptual connection between 'being pleasant' and 'being good in quality' it is also true that the sorts of sensations and experiences that we properly call 'pleasant' are experiences for which it is suitable or fitting that we speak of them as 'good' and unsuitable or unfitting that we should call them (intrinsically) 'bad'.

Richard Hare appreciates that pain poses a problem for a proponent of The Fact-Value Distinction, and in his paper "Pain and Evil" he attempts to argue that the distinction (or a distinction between descriptive and evaluative meaning in words) does not break down over pain sensation. Though there are different dimensions to his argument, Hare commits himself to the dual-strain view of the meaning of the word 'pain', and he consequently is vulnerable to the problems which I have just outlined. Pain is
worrying to proponents of the distinction just because its value seems certain, yet essentially the same problem remains even after one makes this distinction. Even if we consider 'the pure facts' of the situation, i.e., the sensation that we call 'pain', its badness continues to appear no less certain.

Hare sets out to defend the Fact-Value Distinction by trying to show that pain is not necessarily bad. The question of whether or not pain is necessarily bad he views as much the same as the question of whether or not pain is necessarily unpleasant. Consequently, Hare tries to prove that pain is not necessarily unpleasant. I have already dealt with his arguments and have tried to show that pain necessarily is unpleasant. Hare is concerned about the threat posed to the distinction by pain sensation. He does not ask whether the distinction breaks down over unpleasantness and suffering (or pleasure). Indeed, by treating the question of whether pain is necessarily bad as much the same as the question of whether pain is necessarily unpleasant or necessarily involves suffering, Hare seems to be accepting the quite reasonable assumption that unpleasantness and suffering are necessarily bad. However, this quite reasonable assumption gives rise to the same problem for the defender of the Fact-Value Distinction which Hare is trying to protect himself from in the case of pain. For it not only seems obvious that unpleasantness and suffering are necessarily bad, but also seems obvious that whether or not someone is experiencing unpleasantness or is suffering is a straightforward psychological fact about him. On any occasion there is a single correct answer as to whether or not someone is suffering or experiencing unpleasantness, and in cases when he is, it is certain and indisputable that he is experiencing
something bad. Thus even if Hare could do what I say is impossible to do and could establish that is only a contingent fact that pain is intrinsically unpleasant and that intense pain is only contingently associated with suffering, there would remain a serious problem for a proponent of the alleged Fact-Value Distinction in unpleasantness and suffering. The distinction also seems to break down over these experiences.

I mentioned earlier that an important problem in Hare's discussion is his treatment of suffering over something and of finding something unpleasant or uncomfortable as parallel to having an attitude of dislike for that thing or thinking of that thing as bad. The way in which dislike and thinking something bad are related to badness is different from the way in which unpleasantness, discomfort, and suffering are related to badness. With dislike and thinking something bad, it is not the dislike or the thought which is bad but the object that is disliked or thought bad: in our dislike of murder and our thinking it bad, it is the action of murder that is bad and not our attitude of dislike or our thought of it as bad. However, when we suffer over something or find it unpleasant or uncomfortable it is not only the object of the suffering, etc., that is bad but the suffering, unpleasantness, and discomfort itself. The question of whether pain is bad because it is disliked or thought bad is thus quite different from the question of whether it is bad because it entails unpleasantness or suffering.\(^\text{19}\)

\(^{19}\) In his article, Hare is responding to an argument which Kurt Baier produced in his paper "Pains" (Baier, 1962). Baier contends that pains are characterized both by a special quality and by our having a dislike for the sensation. Baier, basing his argument on the claim that pain is always, and necessarily, disliked, goes on to conclude that The Fact-Value Distinction breaks down over pain (pages 5 - 6). The point that Hare makes, that it is possible not to dislike these sensations, is effective against Baier's argument.
the former question we are asking if pain is bad because of our attitude toward it or our thoughts about it; with the latter question we are asking if pain is bad because of a connection it has with something which is itself bad. The concepts of dislike and thinking something bad do not themselves directly give rise to the problems which the concept of pain raises for proponents of The Fact-Value Distinction. But the concepts of unpleasantness, discomfort, and suffering do present the same problems.

The alleged Fact-Value Distinction has been accepted by different philosophers for different reasons, and I have not dealt with the whole range of issues which have been raised in connection with the alleged distinction. I have replied to some of the arguments which have been used by proponents of the distinction and have outlined and defended my own positive view of good and bad. According to this view, to be an experience that is good in quality is, at least in part, to be an experience that provides some reason (i.e., grounds or justification) for wanting and seeking it. However, a philosopher does not need to accept all that I say about the Fact-Value Distinction in order to agree with the main thrust of my analysis of pleasure and unpleasantness. For even if someone were not persuaded by my account of the good in pleasure and the bad in unpleasantness he would still be able to agree that an experience is pleasant or unpleasant if and only if it has a quality that provides some reason for seeking or avoiding that experience. It would be possible

(9. contd.) However, for someone like myself who does not accept the assumption that the question of whether pain is necessarily bad is the same as the question of whether pain is necessarily disliked, much of Hare's discussion will seem ill-focused or misguided.
for this to be the correct analysis of pleasure and unpleasantness even if it were not the correct analysis of the good in pleasure and the bad in unpleasantness.
Chapter VI: Pleasure as a Special Experience

In the foregoing chapters I have argued that a 'pleasant' experience is to be defined as an experience of agreeable or attractive quality, that is, an experience that is good in quality. It can be shown that it follows from this definition of 'pleasure' and a parallel definition of 'unpleasantness' in terms of disagreeableness and badness that pleasure and unpleasantness are special experiences. The view that emerges is important in the following two respects: In the past, led by the philosophers of the Empiricist school, many philosophers have held that, though psychological words such as 'pleasure' and 'unpleasantness' are names for special experiences, these words are, and must be, indefinable. On the other hand, many recent philosophers inspired by Wittgenstein's Private Language Argument have argued that psychological words such as 'pleasure' and 'unpleasantness' are not, and could not be, names for special experiences. In this chapter, after showing how it follows from my definitions that the words 'pleasure' and 'unpleasantness' name kinds of experiences, I discuss the reasoning of these two very different schools of philosophy and show how their resistance to the different parts of my thesis can be met and overcome. That is, I discuss the reasons philosophers have had for thinking that words such as 'pleasure' and 'unpleasantness' are indefinable and try to point out where they made mistakes in coming to this conclusion. I explain how my view can avoid or overcome the problems which Wittgenstein saw in the view that such words are names of special experiences.

In Chapter III, I discussed the anti-essentialist philosophers who maintain that there is no single account of the concept of pleasure that will apply to all 'pleasures'. They come to their conclusion through stressing that different pleasure-idioms have
different semantic nuances and through appealing to the great differences that exist among various pleasant experiences. It is possible to experience 'pleasure' when eating delicious ice-cream, drinking fine champagne, watching a movie, or indulging in sexual fantasies, yet the nature of one's feelings and experiences are very different in each instance. What property of experience is common to these diverse pleasures? In each case the experience is agreeable or attractive in quality, i.e., the experience is good in quality. In each case the experience is of a type which provides one with reason for wanting and seeking it. When 'taking pleasure in' fine company one finds the experience of being with these people agreeable, i.e., one's experience is good in quality, one 'feels good', one's experience is 'nice'. Similarly, when 'pleased over' receiving good news, one 'feels good' about the news, and this is to say that one has an experience agreeable or good in quality. When enjoying nice ice-cream one's gustatory sensations are (intrinsically) nice or good. When enjoying watching a movie one's experience is good in quality.

Does it follow from my definitions of 'pleasure' and 'unpleasantness' that pleasure and unpleasantness are special experiences?

1. R.S. Peters comes curiously close to saying what I say in this paragraph. When speaking of a sweet taste he writes: "Surely to describe it as pleasant or to say that it causes pleasure is to class it with a whole lot of other things that seem worth experiencing or doing for their own sakes. The pleasure of tasting sugar is specific to tasting sugar; the pleasure of sexual activity is specific to sexual activity; the pleasure of finding out things is specific to finding out things. It is difficult to see what properties the alleged hedonic states have in common if they are thought of as species under a genus." (Peters, 1958, p 143). When writing the latter half of this passage Peters seems to be not fully appreciative of the implications of what he wrote in the first half of the passage. At the beginning of the passage he confidently asserts that pleasant experiences form a single class by virtue of their intrinsic value yet he goes on to say that 'it is difficult to see what properties the alleged hedonic states have in common if they are thought of as species under a genus'. Their intrinsic value is the property that pleasant experiences share.
Yes. Earlier, in Chapter IV, when discussing the views whereby 'pleasure' and 'unpleasantness' are defined solely by the attitudes had toward experiences, I criticised these views for putting no limits on the sorts of experiences that could, in principle, be 'pleasant' or 'unpleasant'. That sensation which we call an 'intense pain', I said, could not lose its painfulness or unpleasantness if one could do what is logically possible to do and change one's attitude to the sensation. That is, if the sensation were to remain exactly the same in the way it feels, and we could cause a creature to welcome rather than shun the sensation, it would not thereby cease being unpleasant and become intrinsically pleasant. These points do not in themselves prove that pleasure and unpleasantness are special experiences; but by putting limits on the experiences that can be pleasant we edge ourselves closer to the view.

The class of experiences, or features of experience, that are intrinsically pleasant is distinct from the class of features of experience that are intrinsically unpleasant. That is, no experience or feature of experience is, or can be, both intrinsically pleasant and intrinsically unpleasant in the same respect. If this does not seem apparent in its own right, it can also be deduced from the fact that pleasure is intrinsically good and pain and unpleasantness intrinsically bad. Nothing can be both good and bad in the same respect; good and bad are contraries. The truth of this proposition could perhaps be doubted by someone who denied that pleasure's being good or unpleasantness' being bad are properties of pleasure and unpleasantness; but I have argued for the position that these values are properties of pleasure and unpleasantness and thus take myself to have shown that they are. That something is intrinsically good (in some respect) entails that it is not intrinsically bad (in the same respect). There must be some difference between an object that is
good and one which is bad, and this applies to experiences no less than it does to other objects. Thus, given my definitions of 'pleasure' and 'unpleasantness' it follows that no experience or feature of experience can be both pleasant and unpleasant in the same respect.

An object can contain some good features and other bad features. Similarly, an experience can be intrinsically good in some respect and intrinsically bad in another, that is, it is possible to have 'bitter-sweet' experiences - experiences that are pleasant in some respect but unpleasant in another. Someone could experience pleasure and unpleasantness at the same time if he were, for instance, enjoying a concert while feeling uncomfortable in his chair or feeling too warm. His experience in listening to the music would be somewhat good in quality, but he would also be experiencing a discomfort localized in the back area or the vaguely localized unpleasant sensations that one speaks of as 'feeling too warm'. If I enjoy a meal on the whole while finding it slightly too salty and thus slightly unpleasant in this respect, the experience in eating the meal is for the most part attractive or good but is unattractive or bad in one respect - in the taste of saltiness. In all 'bitter-sweet' experiences, experiences containing both pleasantness and unpleasantness, the pleasantness and unpleasantness are properties of different aspects or features of the experience.

Thus, pleasant experiences must differ in some way from unpleasant ones, yet all pleasant experiences have some property in common, namely, their being good in quality, and all unpleasant experiences have their being bad in quality as a shared property. From these truths it follows that pleasure is 'a single class of experience' and that unpleasant experiences form a second, distinct
'class of experience'. To say this is the same as to say that pleasure is 'a kind of experience' or 'a special experience' and that unpleasantness is a different 'kind of experience' or a different 'special experience'. 

But is pleasure a 'special experience' on my view? Some philosophers might object to my saying that it is. Have I not admitted that on my view there are a number of very different experiences that can be intrinsically pleasant? On my view any experience would be intrinsically pleasant if it were intrinsically good in quality, and there are great differences among experiences that are good. The agreeable gustatory sensations experienced when enjoying eating good chocolate are very different from the sensations experienced when one enjoys drinking fine champagne, yet both are intrinsically pleasant since they are intrinsically good in quality. Should we not say that on this view pleasure is not a 'special experience' or 'a single kind of experience' but simply any experience that is intrinsically good in quality or 'tone'?

To deal properly with this objection it is necessary to introduce a distinction between two types of properties which an object can have, namely, relational and non-relational properties. C.D. Broad introduced this distinction in his discussion of pleasure:

Is it not possible that what we have called 'hedonic quality' is really a relational property and not a quality at all? Is it not possible that the statement: 'This experience of mine is pleasant' just means: 'I like this experience for its non-hedonic qualities'?

Though the word 'like' is not the best choice within the definition, Broad is suggesting that an experience is pleasant if we have a favourable attitude toward it. On this view, an experience's being

2. Broad (1930, p 237)
pleasant is not a direct function of the feel or intrinsic quality of the experience but of some relation which the experience has to something else, namely, the person's attitudes.

A similar distinction is implicit in Sidgwick's analysis of pleasure, a view that is much the same as my own:

Shall we say that there is a measurable quality of feeling expressed by the word 'pleasure', which is independent of its relation to volition, and strictly indefinable from its simplicity? ... This seems to be the view of some writers: but, for my own part, when I reflect on the notion of pleasure - using the term in the comprehensive sense ... to include the most refined and subtle intellectual emotional gratification no less than the coarser and more definite sensual enjoyments - the only common quality that I can find in the feelings so designated seems to be that relation to desire and volition expressed by the general term 'desirable', in the sense previously expressed.

Like myself Sidgwick reaches the conclusion that it is their being desirable (or good) which is the property that the variety of pleasant experiences share. He speaks of the property of being desirable as a certain relation to desire and volition, and he denies that pleasure is 'simple' in some fundamental way or that the word 'pleasure' in indefinable. For Sidgwick, as for Broad, an experience is pleasant not by having some special unanalyzable quality or non-relational, 'simple', property, but by existing in a certain relation to one's attitudes, desires, or volition.

Like Sidgwick I hold that the presence of some quality that is desirable or good is what unites the various experiences which are pleasant into a single class, and, like Sidgwick, I think that desirability is a relational property. Desirability is not a 'simple', unanalyzable property but some relational property. As I argued in Chapters IV and V, and experience's being desirable or good in quality is, at least in part, its property of having a quality which provides one with reason for wanting or seeking that

3. Sidgwick (1967, p 127)
kind of experience. On this view, an experience is good in quality by existing in a certain relation to desire and action, namely, that relation of being such as to provide reason (grounds) for wanting and seeking that kind of experience. Experiences are pleasant on this view not by sharing some unanalyzable quality, or some non-relational property, but by sharing some relation to desire and action. In respect to their intrinsic properties, i.e., their unanalyzable qualities or non-relational properties, pleasant experiences are not necessarily the same but are very different. It is in respect to some shared relational property that pleasant experiences are the same. Similarly, the experience of intense pain and feeling nausea differ in their intrinsic quality or feel but they are the same in their intrinsic value. Both experiences are disagreeable and bad in quality, i.e., both have the relational property of being such as to provide some reason for avoiding the experience, and it is in their sharing this relational property that both experiences are unpleasant.

With this distinction we have a reasonably clear reply to the objection that pleasure is not, on my view, a special experience but any of a great variety of good experiences. Pleasant experiences are a 'special kind of experience' or a 'single kind of experience' in one respect but are 'different kinds of experiences' in another respect. They are the same kind of experience in respect to a certain relational property though not the same kind of experience in respect to their intrinsic, unanalyzable qualities.

Stephan Darwall, when discussing Sidgwick's view of pleasure, writes:

Sidgwick does not hold a 'one feeling' theory of pleasure. That is, he does not hold that pleasure is a particular kind of feeling which may be produced by the feeling one has lying on a waterbed or the experience of poring over a
gripping tale of intrigue. Insofar as one experiences pleasure in these cases one has different experiences. What makes these different experiences or feelings pleasures is the relation that they have to desire, viz., that they are apprehended (explicitly or implicitly) as desirable. And this apprehension need not involve a recognition of the presence of a common, particular kind of experience (called pleasure).... 

What Darwall should have said is that with respect to intrinsic, unanalyzable qualities Sidgwick does not hold that pleasure is a particular kind of experience but that he does hold that with respect to a certain relational property pleasure is a particular kind of experience. To share a certain relation to desire is not to have nothing in common. To judge that every pleasant experience is desirable is to judge that every pleasant experience has a certain relation to desire.

When philosophers say that some psychological word does or does not name 'a special experience' or 'a single kind of experience' they often seem to assume a classification of experiences according to intrinsic, unanalyzable qualities. The assumption is not universal though. Sidgwick thought that pleasures shared a 'common quality' yet he analyzed this common character in terms of a relational property. (Herbert Spencer thought of pleasure as a kind of feeling yet also analyzed pleasure by means of some relational property.) However, if a philosopher were to assume, or

4. Darwall (1974, p 477). Though, as I mentioned previously, Sidgwick does claim that what pleasant experiences have in common is their being desirable, when he explicitly defines 'pleasure' he does so in terms of experiences that are apprehended as desirable. But to define 'pleasure' in terms of this apprehension of desirability is just to take one step back from the heart of the matter. Sidgwick acknowledges that pleasant experiences are desirable; that they are also 'apprehended as desirable' would seem to be simply a consequence of their being desirable. Their being desirable is the more fundamental characteristic and the one that therefore should appear in the definition.
to claim, that the only proper way of classifying or distinguishing experiences into different 'special kinds' is by appealing to intrinsic, qualities or unanalyzable features his position would rest on some confusion.

I see no greater impropriety in classifying experiences into different kinds by appealing to relational properties than there is in classifying physical objects into different kinds on the basis of certain relational properties. Most of the classifications we use for physical objects are based on an appeal to some relational property(ies). For instance, the members within the group of household objects which we call 'ashtrays' are no less diverse in intrinsic nature than are the experiences which we call 'pleasant'. The objects come in widely differing materials (e.g., stone, glass, clay . . .), shapes (round, square, oblong, irregular . . .), colours (black, blue, magenta . . .), weights, sizes, and proportions. What unites this assortment of objects and provides us with reason for calling them by the same name - 'ashtrays' - is their having a particular relational property, namely, that of being suitable for holding hot tobacco ashes. Few philosophers would say that because it is only some relational property which these objects have in common that they are not really 'a single kind of domestic object'. One who would take this view on 'ashtrays' would be forced to take a similar view on most words. The items which we call forms of 'money' are no less diverse in intrinsic nature: some are small and round, others large and rectangular; some are made of gold, others of silver, copper, paper, nickel - even stone; they come in all different colours; etc. What gives us reason to call such diverse objects by the same word - 'money' - is their having a certain relational property, namely, that of having a
certain use in the commercial life of a society. Few philosophers would insist that because these objects are grouped by a relational property they are not in any important sense 'the same sort of thing'. There is no additional reason for insisting that sensations or experiences which are grouped according to relational properties are not in any important sense 'the same kind of experience'.

Perhaps someone might assume that if we group experiences or objects according to relational properties then the intrinsic nature of an experience or an object will be incidental to the classification, and distinct accompaniments of the experience or object will be the sole determinative of the classification. Though this might be so for some relational properties it is not so in the present case, that of the goodness or badness of an experience. C.D. Broad suggested that we define a 'pleasant' experience as one which is liked for its quality: on this view the intrinsic nature of an experience is incidental to whether or not the experience is pleasant, since whatever intrinsic quality an experience has the experience would be 'pleasant' if we had the right attitude toward it. It is a consequence of this view that even the sensations which we presently speak of as 'intense pains' would cease to be unpleasant and would become intrinsically pleasant in a particular case if we merely did what is logically possible to do and changed someone's attitude toward the sensation. With C.D. Broad's suggested definition of pleasure it is exclusively 'outside factors' which determine whether a particular experience is pleasant. But this is not so on my proposed definition.

Not always are the intrinsic features of something incidental to its having some relational property. Though there are great differences among objects that are 'ashtrays' not just any object could be
an 'ashtray'. The lamp in front of me could not be an ashtray (though, perhaps, one could 'use it as an ashtray' by putting out lit cigarettes on its stem). Nor could a ball-bearing be an ashtray.

Nor could just any experience be intrinsically good in quality. Those experiences which we call 'intense pains' or 'feeling nausea' could not (logically) be intrinsically good in quality. When we define an 'unpleasant' or a 'pleasant' experience by the intrinsic goodness or badness of an experience we are saying something about the intrinsic nature of pleasant or unpleasant experiences. With these definitions the intrinsic nature of an experience is not incidental to its being pleasant or unpleasant; indeed, the intrinsic nature is crucial. Though it perhaps could be said that according to Broad's (or Spencer's) proposed definition there is an important sense in which pleasure would not be 'a special experience' (since the intrinsic quality is incidental), this is not so of my definition of 'pleasure'.

The View that the Word 'Pleasure' is Indefinable

I hold that it follows from my definitions of 'pleasure' and 'unpleasantness' that these words refer to special experiences. But there have been many philosophers who have thought it odd that words which name special experiences might also be defined. Of pleasure and pain John Locke wrote: "These, like other simple ideas, cannot be described, nor their names defined; the way of knowing them is, as of the simple ideas of the senses, only by experience." David Hume took a similar position when discussing

5. Locke (1690, Bk. II, Ch. XX)
pride and humility and the 'passions' or emotions in general:

"The Passions of pride and humility, being simple and uniform impressions, it is impossible we can ever, by a multitude of words, give a just definition of them, or indeed of any of the passions." 6

It is possible to distinguish the following different strains of thinking in these passages. Firstly, an experience such as pleasure or pain is simple and basic, it has no parts into which it can be broken. There are no kinds of experiences more simple or basic into whose terms it can be analyzed. Therefore pleasure and pain are unanalyzable and the words 'pleasure' and 'pain' are indefinable.

Secondly, to know what pleasure and pain are, and to understand the meanings of the words 'pleasure' and 'pain', one must experience pleasure and pain. No mere verbal description can teach one what a pleasant or painful experience is like. Of my definitions of 'pleasure' and 'unpleasantness' in particular, Locke might have responded that merely by saying that a pleasant experience is good in quality one does not capture the special feel or lusciousness of pleasure or the immediate texture of great distress. These definitions are 'hollow', providing 'form without content', he might have objected. Locke had a similar point in mind when he wrote the following about the word 'scarlet':

A studious blind man, who had mightily beat his head about visible objects, and made use of the explication of his books and friends, to understand those names of light and colours which often came in his way, bragged one day, that he now understood what scarlet signified. Upon which,

6. Hume (1739, II, 1, 2)
his friend demanding what scarlet was? The blind man answered, It was like the sound of a trumpet. Just such an understanding of the name of any other simple idea will he have, who hopes to get it only from a definition, or other words made use of to explain it.\(^7\)

Thirdly, Locke says that pleasure and pain cannot be 'described'. I will look at this third claim first.

Why does Locke think that pleasure and pain cannot be 'described'? He seems at least to be thinking that there are no psychological concepts more fundamental than those of pleasure and pain with which one might 'describe' pleasure and pain, that is, that among the various concepts that refer to kinds of experiences there are none more fundamental or basic than the concepts of pleasure and pain.

But is it possible to 'describe' pleasure and pain by employing concepts that do not themselves refer to kinds of experiences? I suspect that the possibility of doing this has not occurred to Locke. On the analysis of pleasure which I have given an experience is pleasant by being good in quality. On this view 'pleasure' is defined not by appealing to psychological concepts that are more fundamental than that of pleasure, but by employing a concept that is not itself psychological to distinguish pleasant experiences from other experiences.

The suggestion that one might use non-psychological concepts to describe one's experiences might at first seem very odd. Suppose someone were to claim that it is not possible (logically) to predicate some non-psychological term literally of some experience. This claim would rest on the assumption that it is not logically possible for an experience to have any of the properties that an object that is not an experience (e.g., a tree) might have. For

7. Locke (1690, Book III, Ch IV, Sect II)
if an experience could have a property which a tree might also have, why should it not be possible to say that one’s experience has this property, and in doing so to ‘describe’ one’s experience?

The proposition that it is not possible to say anything informative about one’s experiences is not only false but necessarily false. The claim that something is an object which it is not possible to say anything informative about is a claim that would be, if true, very informative; to know that it is not possible to use non-psychological words to convey information about our experiences would be to know something important. But this claim itself is made up of one’s predicating non-psychological words of experience, and one is doing so in a literal and informative way. (The word ‘non-psychological’ is not itself a psychological word, since it does not itself name some experience.) By being a literal and informative sentence about experiences it provides a counterexample to the proposition it advocates. Thus the sentence is necessarily false, since its being true would entail its being false. Thus it must be at least logically possible to say informative things about experiences by predicating words of an experience that do not themselves name kinds of experiences.

What properties might experiences share with objects that are not experiences? Experiences, like physical objects, can have spatial and temporal properties, and one can refer to these properties with normal spatial or temporal words. Thus, I can describe my pain as being located in my back, as having begun ten minutes ago, as being located in a small, well-defined area or as covering a rather large area. We say that we have a sensation in our left leg or that we are experiencing pain in two different places (or that we are experiencing two pains). We obviously are speaking literally
when assigning the temporal properties. Some philosophers say that when saying that a pain is in the left leg we are not speaking fully literally since a pain is not 'in' our leg in the same sense in which a bone or blood vessel is 'in' our leg. (The sensation is not really where it seems to be.) However, even if this is true, it is at least true that the sensation (literally) seems to be in a certain place. If it is not true that what distinguishes backaches from headaches is the actual location of the sensation, then it at least is true that what distinguishes headaches from backaches is that the former are aches that seem to be in the head while the latter are aches that seem to be in the back. Thus if sensations do not literally have spatial properties they at least literally seem to have certain spatial properties, and to say that they seem to have certain spatial properties is to speak literally and informatively.

"But," one might reply, "can one say anything about the way he feels by predicating non-psychological concepts of his sensations or feelings? Can one use non-psychological concepts to describe or refer to some property of the very quality or feel that an experience has?" Perhaps the best examples of concepts that can be used in this way are the two which I am concentrating on throughout this chapter, namely, 'good' and 'bad'. A person is speaking no less literally and informatively if he is describing some sensation or experience as 'good' or 'bad' than when he is speaking of some physical object such as a car or crop as 'good' or 'bad'. The following sentences are clearly informative: "I feel terrible (great, bad . . .)"); "The pain has become worse (better)"); "I feel good all over".

To say that a sensation or an experience is 'bad' in quality is, at least in part, to say that it provides reason for avoiding it.
To say that a sensation or experience has this property is certainly to convey some information; indeed, the information conveyed is quite important. By talking in this way of one’s sensations one is 'describing' them. Yet the words 'good' and 'bad' do not name experiences of some sort. The words are non-psychological words since they can be literally predicated of physical objects.

There are other examples of non-psychological words which can be used to convey information about the feel or quality of an experience. A sensation, like a light or sound, can be faint or indistinct. A sensation, like a season of the year, can fade and then reappear: like the sound of a chugging locomotive, a sensation can fade and then reappear in a rhythmic fashion (we say it 'throbs', but the slightly metaphorical term could be replaced by non-metaphorical talk of rhythmic fading and reappearance of a sensation). A sensation can be different from other sensations and it can be strange or uncommon. (Of course, if I tell someone I have just felt a strange sensation he may not know exactly what it is like, but I am still telling him something about the way it feels, namely, that I do not have a sensation like this frequently.) If a man tells his doctor that the sensation in his stomach area which he has been feeling all day is now fading, the doctor might not be able to imagine exactly what the sensation feels like, for there are different sorts of sensations that could fade. But the doctor knows something about the way that the man is feeling, namely, that his sensation is changing and changing in a certain way.

For any non-psychological concept that can be used to refer to a property of a sensation or an experience it is possible for there to be a psychological term which distinguishes sensations or
experiences according to the property in question. As it is possible to assign a certain location to a sensation, so there are numerous sensation-words for which it is part of their meaning that they assign a certain location to the sensations which they name. Thus, the words 'headache', 'backache', 'toothache', 'earache' are words which distinguish pain-sensations according to their location (apparent location). No one can have a toothache in his shoulders.

Sensations, like physical states of affairs, are sometimes classified, in part, according to their causal origin. A reference to the causal origin of a skin condition is contained within the concept of sunburn; when one has sunburn his skin is in a certain damaged state that is caused by exposure to sun-rays. Similarly, to have 'angina' is to have pain located in the chest that is caused by a diseased heart.

Experiences, like physical objects, have temporal properties, and, consequently, there are some psychological words whose meaning is such that an experience's having a certain temporal duration is implied by the use of the word. By speaking of a sensation as an 'ache' we not only are calling it a pain but are also attributing a certain temporal duration. A pain in the head or back that lasted only a moment would not be a 'headache' or 'backache', though it would still be a 'pain'. Wittgenstein is noticing that a certain temporal duration is implied by the use of the words 'deep grief' when he writes: "Why does it sound queer to say: 'For a second he felt deep grief'? Only because it so seldom happens?"8 A

8. Wittgenstein (1967, p 174). Wittgenstein may be thinking that the fact that grief has this temporal duration shows that grief is not a sensation or special experience. For, after noting that deep grief cannot be had for only a second he goes on to write: "But don't you feel grief now? (But aren't you playing chess now?) The answer may be affirmative, but that does not make the concept of grief any more like the concept of a sensation." But sensation concepts sometimes do
psychological state must have a certain duration before it can be 'deep grief' or 'sorrow'.

The concept of 'being on one side' of an object can apply both to physical objects and sensations. As there can be a dent 'on one side' of a car so a person can feel a sensation 'on one side' of his body. The concept of something recurring is not specifically psychological. As sounds and number patterns can be recurring, so a certain sensation or feeling can be recurring. To say that someone 'has migraine' is not only to say that he suffers a head-ache (a pain located in the head) but is also to suggest that the sensation is felt on one side of the head or that it is a recurring pain.

As a sensation or an experience can be described as being good or bad in quality or feel, so it is possible to have words that refer to experiences in virtue of their good or bad quality. My contention is merely that we do have words that do this, and the words are 'pleasant' and 'unpleasant'. To say that a person is experiencing 'pleasure' is to say that he is having an experience good in quality, i.e., an experience which has a quality which provides reason for seeking such an experience.

Whenever the meaning of a psychological term is such that the word refers to an experience by distinguishing that experience from others solely according to properties that are not peculiarly psychological (e.g., bodily location, temporal duration, value, etc.)
that word will be definable, and the concept which it represents will
be analyzable. If I am right and an experience is distinguished as
pleasant or unpleasant according to the goodness or badness of the
quality of the experience, then the words 'pleasure' and 'un-
pleasantness' will be definable and along the lines that I have
prescribed.

Locke believed that the words 'pleasure' and 'pain' are
indefinable, and he based his view, in part, on the claim that
pleasure and pain are simple. In a similar way, Hume appealed to an
alleged simplicity of pride, humility, and the other passions to
support a claim that the names of the passions are indefinable.
In what way, then, might pleasure and pain be simple, and why should
this simplicity be a reason for supposing that the words 'pleasure'
and 'unpleasantness' are indefinable and the corresponding concepts
unanalyzable?

There perhaps is one respect in which pleasure and pain are
'simple', for there seems to be a sense in which each does not
'have parts'. A pleasant experience is not 'complex' in the way
that 'mixed feelings' is a complex psychological state; 'having
mixed feelings' entails having two or more distinguishable feelings,
whereas 'having a pleasant experience' does not. A state of
'mixed feelings' is composed (in a logical sense) of two or more
feelings in a way in which pleasure and pain are not; a reference to
more than one feeling enters into the definition of 'mixed feelings'.
According to Aristotle's definition of 'fear', a definition which I
will be looking at more closely in a later chapter, 'fear' is to be
defined as 'a pain due to a mental picture of some destructive evil
in the future'. According to this definition, fear is 'complex' in
that it contains two mental phenomena, pain and a certain mental
picture (i.e., a cognition) of a future evil. Pleasure and pain are not themselves complex in this manner, and thus seem to be 'simple' in this respect. If 'analysis' is understood as breaking down an object into its parts in the way that Aristotle breaks down fear into part cognition and part pain, then pleasure is 'unanalyzable' or 'simple' in this sense.

However, defining a word is not the same thing as examining the objects named by the word, 'breaking them down into their parts' and then constructing a definition from the names of the parts in the way that Aristotle breaks down fear into its parts and then defines 'fear' by reference to the names for these parts. That is, defining the word 'pleasure' is not the same thing as examining the experience of pleasure and breaking down the experience into parts or different feelings. Some definitions, but not all, are like Aristotle's definition of 'fear'. The word 'bachelor' is definable as 'unmarried man', but to say this is not to do what would normally be understood as breaking down a bachelor (the man) into 'his parts'. A bachelor is not part man and part unmarried creature.

A thing does not have to 'have parts' in this sense for it to be possible to give the word which names that thing a definition. The geometer's 'point' is something that is certainly 'simple' in this sense, since it 'lacks parts' if anything does, yet one can give a non-circular, informative definition of the word 'point' as "that which has position but lacks magnitude" (The Concise Oxford Dictionary). The words 'particle' and 'atom' in one of their senses mean 'that portion of matter which is smallest and indivisible'. What these words in this sense of the words would refer to would be something that is necessarily 'simple' or
'lacking parts', yet, nevertheless, the words clearly are definable (I have just defined them), and the corresponding concepts are analyzable.  

Perhaps philosophers have, at times, assumed that when they were giving what they called a philosophical 'analysis' of something they have been 'breaking that thing down into its parts'. But what in practice is presented under the title of philosophical 'analysis' is simply any sort of definition of words or any study of the basic features of some type of thing. That a type of thing is 'simple' or 'lacking parts' in the way in which a point is simple does not entail that there are no fundamental, distinctive features of that type of thing; that a word (e.g. 'point') refers to something 'simple' or 'lacking parts' does not entail that it is indefinable. Suppose I were right in saying that an experience is 'pleasant' or 'unpleasant' solely by virtue of being good or bad in quality. The words 'pleasant' and 'unpleasant' would then be definable or analyzable yet they would also refer to something which is in one sense 'simple' or 'without parts'. For, on this definition, 'pleasure' and 'unpleasantness' are not defined by reference to two or more distinguishable feelings or experiences that are 'ingredients' necessary for pleasure. 

There is a second way to interpret the claim that pleasure is 'simple' and therefore unanalyzable. By saying that pleasure is

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9. The word 'atom' as it is most commonly understood today refers to some small portion of matter which was once thought indivisible but which has been found to be divisible and thus not 'simple'. The word 'atom' when used in this way is being used in a second (derivative) sense since in these contexts it does not connote indivisibility or simplicity.
'simple' one might mean that there are no concepts more fundamental than the concept of pleasure in terms of which one might describe a pleasant experience or analyze the concept of 'pleasure'. From the premise that pleasure is 'simple' in this way it follows immediately that the concept of 'pleasure' is unanalyzable (in a non-circular way) and that the pleasantness of an experience cannot be 'described' in any useful way. But if one appeals to such 'simplicity' in order to prove that the concept of 'pleasure' is unanalyzable the 'argument' is circular. If by saying that pleasure is 'simple' we mean that there are no concepts more basic than the concept of 'pleasure' into which terms one might analyze the concept of 'pleasure', then our conclusion that the concept of pleasure is unanalyzable is little more than a restatement of the premise. If this is what the word 'simple' in the premise means then the real question becomes whether or not the concept of 'pleasure' is 'simple' in this way. The assertion that pleasure is 'simple' only seems obvious if we think that one is claiming that the experience of pleasure is something very 'simple' or 'having no parts' in the sense previously elucidated. But, as we have shown, it does not follow from the fact that a pleasant experience is 'simple' in this way that the word 'pleasant' ('pleasure') is indefinable or that the concept of 'pleasure' is unanalyzable.

Locke claimed that a person must experience pleasure and pain to know what they are, and he seemed to think that this claim supported the contention that the words 'pleasure' and 'pain' are indefinable. Perhaps, of my claim that a 'pleasant' or 'unpleasant' experience can be defined as an experience of good or bad quality, he might have objected that even with these 'definitions' one does not know what pleasure and unpleasantness feel like and
that my 'definition' supplies at best 'form without content'. This would be a way of objecting that my account fails as a definition or at least that the definition is therefore shown to be incomplete and necessarily so. Locke would have contended that any attempt at defining 'pleasure' must fail because in the end it will be necessary to experience pleasure to know what it is and to know what the word 'pleasure' means.

A philosopher who would object that my definition does not tell one 'what pleasure feels like' would seem to be assuming that there is, in addition to the characteristic of having a good quality, some other respect in which all pleasures have a feel or experiential quality in common. But is there such an additional respect in which all pleasures are alike? I do not think there is.

When we think of a particular pleasant experience it may be correct to say that a person would not know what is peculiar to that particular kind of experience unless he had felt that sort of experience. It might be true that a person cannot know what is distinctive of the pleasant experience in eating fine chocolate candy unless he has experienced the agreeable gustatory sensations of eating good chocolate. But someone who has tasted and enjoyed fine chocolate does not thereby know what is distinctive of the agreeable sensations experienced when drinking fine champagne. Someone who has experienced the agreeable gustatory sensations had when eating various good foods does not thereby know what is distinctive of the peculiar agreeable sensations one has when enjoying sexual intercourse. Similarly, one who has felt the disagreeableness of a sharp headache does not thereby know what is distinctive of the unpleasant experience of nausea, nor does he know precisely what the unpleasantness of smelling a rotten chicken
is like. There is no single pleasant experience that can teach one what is distinctive of each pleasant experience nor a single unpleasant experience that can teach one what is distinctive of each of various unpleasant experiences. I have concluded that the only thing which is common to all pleasures is the intrinsic goodness of the experience. It is not necessary to experience the pleasure of drinking champagne, having sex, or any other pleasure in order to know what the word 'pleasure' means. To know what the word 'pleasure' means is to know that an experience is pleasant when it is good in quality, and once one knows this one can recognize those experiences which are pleasant by recognizing those which are good in quality. 10

10. Possibly Locke would have objected to defining 'pleasure' and 'pain' in terms of good and bad by replying that 'good' and 'bad' themselves need to be analyzed in terms of pleasure and pain. For he does write: "Things then are good or evil, only in reference to pleasure or pain." But he goes on to write: "That we call good, which is apt to cause or increase pleasure, or diminish pain is us; or else to procure or preserve us the possession of any other good or absence of any evil." (1690, Bk II, Ch XX). In this latter passage he seems to acknowledge that there are things other than pleasure and pain that are good and bad, while in the preceding sentence he says that things are good or evil 'only in reference to pleasure or pain.'

To someone who would claim that good and evil themselves need to be analyzed in terms of pleasure and pain we find a reply in the work of Aristotle. In arguing that pleasure is not the sole good Aristotle writes: "And no one would choose to live with the intellect of a child throughout his life, however much he were to be pleased at the things children are pleased at, nor to get enjoyment by some most disgraceful deed, though he were never to feel any pain in consequence. And there are many other things we should be keen about even if they brought no pleasure, e.g. seeing, remembering, knowing, possessing the virtues. . . . We should choose them even if no pleasure resulted . . ." (Aristotle, 1174a 0 – 10). Knowledge has intrinsic value, and it is good independently of its tendency to please. Therefore, its being good or having intrinsic value is not to be analyzed in terms of whatever tendency to please which it may have. Thus the character of 'being good' is not to be equated with 'having a tendency to please'.

The claim that pleasure is good is not empty, though it would be if 'good' meant 'pleasant'. To say that pleasure is (intrinsically) good is, at least in part, to say that pleasant experiences provide us with some (intrinsic) reason for wanting and seeking them. And this statement is clearly more informative than the statement 'pleasure is pleasant'. 
The Private Language Argument

Partly because of Wittgenstein's style of writing in the Philosophical Investigations his discussion in what is called The Private Language Argument gives rise to different interpretations of what position he is taking at a particular point. The following reading of Wittgenstein is not a particularly esoteric one, and it includes most of the points that philosophers have thought to be damaging to someone claiming that certain words are names of special experiences.

Wittgenstein introduces his discussion as follows:

How do words refer to sensations? -- There doesn't seem to be any problem here; don't we talk about sensations every day, and give them names? But how is the connexion between the name and the thing named set up? This question is the same as: how does a human being learn the meaning of the names of sensations? -- of the word 'pain' for example.

(paragraph 244)

If words such as 'pleasure' and 'pain' were names for special experiences problems would arise over how people could teach or learn these words. The words 'pleasure' and 'pain' are part of the English language. They are not intelligible to me alone but have a meaning which is shared by different people. I can understand other people when they talk of 'pleasure' and 'pain', and they can understand me when I use these words. How then does one teach these words to other people? When trying to teach the words, we cannot point to another person's sensations or experiences as we can point to something physical such as his leg. When we teach the word 'leg' it is possible to point to the object the word 'leg' names, but we are not able directly to point to someone's sensations or experiences when we teach the words 'pain' and 'pleasure'. If the words 'pleasure' and 'pain' name special experiences, how
could one be sure, when teaching the word, that the person being taught the words hooks-up the words with the right sensations or experiences? How could one be sure that another person applies the word to the same sensations or experiences that I apply it to and that he therefore has given it the same meaning that I give it?

Certainly the Empiricist philosophers were not sensitive to the problems which arise in accounting for how it is possible to teach and learn psychological words. David Hume, for instance, introduces his discussion of pride, humility, and the passions in general, in the following way:

The passions of pride and humility, being simple and uniform impressions, it is impossible we can ever, by a multitude of words, give a just definition of them, or indeed of any of the passions. The utmost we can pretend to is a description of them, by an enumeration of such circumstances as attend them: but as these words, pride and humility, are of general use, and the impressions they represent the most common of any, every one, of himself, will be able to form a just idea of them, without any danger of mistake. 11

Here, after arguing that the names of passions are indefinable, Hume tries to explain how he can comfortably assume that he and his readers nevertheless correctly understand the meaning of 'pride' and 'humility' and therefore how they in practice mean the same thing by these words. Though Hume is not here directly trying to produce a general thesis about how the names of the passions are taught or how we all come to mean the same thing by the words 'pride' and 'humility', one may, nevertheless, ask whether Hume succeeds in explaining how everyone is able to form a 'just idea' of the meanings of 'pride' and 'humility' and to do so 'without any danger of mistake'. Here Hume seems to be arguing that it is

11. Hume (1739, Bk II, Part 1, Sect II)
because the words 'pride' and 'humility' are of general use and because the feelings of pride and humility are very common, that we are all able correctly to understand the words 'pride' and 'humility' and to be safe from erring on this matter. But one needs to say more than this.

The fact that the words 'pride' and 'humility' are in general use at most tells us that they have a meaning, but this fact does not help us to learn what that meaning is. The fact that the feelings of pride and humility are very common would not in itself provide us with any clue to which feeling the word 'pride' is supposed to refer. Indeed, for Hume, pride and humility are merely two among many passions. How then does one know which of the many passions which he is subject to is the one which he is supposed to call 'pride'? Is there not a danger that different persons might come to use the word 'pride' to refer to different passions? What would prevent the emerging of a linguistic chaos in our language of the passions - a chaos where the names of passions are in practice hooked-up with individual passions in a random fashion?

Hume holds that we cannot define the words 'pride' and 'humility' or directly describe the feelings named and that "the utmost we can pretend to is a description of them, by an enumeration of such circumstances as attend them". This statement hints at a position to which Wittgenstein gives much attention: for Wittgenstein, the words 'pride' or 'pain' are understood and taught in relation to 'such circumstances as attend' someone's 'feeling pride' or 'feeling pain'. Wittgenstein argues that the words 'pride' and 'pain' have a conceptual connection to the circumstances in which these feelings are said to arise, and for
Wittgenstein, the 'circumstances' are the **behaviour and physical surroundings** of the person said to be 'proud' or 'in pain'. This view of Wittgenstein's I will return to shortly.

In his discussion of the view that psychological words name special experiences, Wittgenstein does not ask whether the words might be given verbal definitions and thus be taught or learned in this way. He does not ask whether one might distinguish some types of experiences from others by employing concepts which are not themselves psychological concepts; he does not ask, for instance, whether 'pleasant' experiences might be distinguished from 'unpleasant' experiences by employing the non-psychological concepts of good and bad. Perhaps the reason for this is that in the history of philosophy the view that psychological words name special experiences has often in fact been conjoined to the further claim that these words are, and must be, indefinable.  

Perhaps, Wittgenstein was sufficiently persuaded by the Empiricist way of thinking to be convinced that if a word named a special ('simple') experience it would not be possible to define that word. In any case, Wittgenstein did not in fact think of separating the view that psychological words name special experiences from the view that these words were indefinable. In consequence, the only way of teaching psychological words to which Wittgenstein gives serious

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12. As I mentioned, Sidgwick is a significant exception to this general rule, since Sidgwick explicitly rejects the view that 'pleasure' is simple and unanalyzable; instead he provides a definition of 'pleasure' and does so in terms of a property that he explicitly says is relational.
attention is that of ostensive definition, that is, teaching the word by pointing to someone who can correctly be said to be 'feeling pleasure' or 'feeling pain'.

Given his assumption that we teach a child the words 'pain' and 'pleasure' by pointing to someone in the appropriate state, the visible, physical behaviour 'expressive of' a particular psychological state comes to have, for Wittgenstein, a crucial role in the analysis of psychological concepts. The words 'pain' and 'pleasure' are taught in connection with the behaviour associated with states of 'being in pain' or 'feeling pleasure'. For instance, we see a child fall to the ground landing on his knee. The child begins to cry, rubs his leg, moans, or behaves in any of the various ways that people in pain behave. We tell him that he is suffering 'pain', and the child thus learns the word. The meaning of the word becomes tied to such behaviour.

The major role which Wittgenstein gives to behaviour in the identification of psychological states is evidenced in the following passages:

What would it be like if human beings shewed no outward signs of pain (did not groan, grimace, etc.)? Then it would be impossible to teach a child the use of the word 'tooth-ache'. (paragraph 257)

Only of what behaves like a human being can one say that it has pains. (paragraph 283)

'But doesn't what you say come to this: that there is no pain, for example, without pain-behaviour? -- It come to this: only of a living human being and what resembles (behaves like) a living human can one say: It has sensations. . . (paragraph 281)

These remarks taken on their own are probably consistent with an interpretation whereby Wittgenstein is making an epistemological point, namely, that unless we had behaviour as evidence of pain or
of any sensation we would not be able to know that someone else was in pain and therefore would not be able to say with confidence that another person is in pain. But this epistemological thesis would not be particularly controversial, and there are many remarks, which I will be quoting in the following pages, which suggest that Wittgenstein's thesis is not the epistemological one but the thesis that a part of, or the whole of, being in pain is behaving, or being disposed to behave, in a certain fashion.

In one of the foregoing quotations Wittgenstein speaks of the behaviour as an 'outward sign' of the pain, and at other points he speaks of the behaviour as 'expressive' of one's sensation. One way of interpreting the relation of the sensation to the behaviour which is 'expressive of it' or its 'outward sign' is the one which Kurt Baier takes where the sensation is the cause of the behaviour. Thus, Baier takes the view that "'X has a pain' means 'X has a sensation which causes him to have a disposition to manifest pain behaviour'."\(^{13}\)

If we accept the Wittgenstein or Baier view where pain is identified by pain behaviour does it follow that 'being in pain' entails having a special sensation? Baier, I think, believes it does follow from his account.\(^{14}\) Wittgenstein, it will be shown, resists accepting such a conclusion, and he is right to do so. For, if pain is tied analytically to pain behaviour in Baier's way it does not follow that pain is a special sensation. There are no apriori limits on the sorts of sensations which might be correlated with, or the cause of, some particular type of behaviour.

\(^{13}\) Baier (1962, p 18)
\(^{14}\) At one point in his paper, Baier writes: "'I have a pain', in other words, says two things: 'I have a sensation of a certain sort' and 'I dislike this sort of sensation'." (1962, p 5)
It is logically possible for any sort of sensation to cause someone to wince, groan, or rub his knee. There is no logical necessity for a sensation to have a particular feel to it in order for it to cause someone to behave in these ways. It is logically possible that the sensations that would cause me to groan feel different from the sensations that would cause you to groan. It is logically possible that the sensations that cause me to groan and therefore are 'pains' to me are sensations that would cause you to smile and 'look pleased'.

In the case of other physical reactions there is often a broad range of things that can cause a certain reaction. There is, for instance, a broad range of substances that can cause people to sneeze. The presence of cats causes some people to sneeze (and to manifest other allergy symptoms) but leaves others unaffected; for another person the presence of pollen and not cats causes him to sneeze; for others it is dust, but not cats or pollen; etc. It is logically possible for there to be as much variation in the sorts of sensations which cause people to grimace, groan, or cry. Thus, since it is logically possible for any sensation to cause subjects to wince or behave in any of the ways that people in pain behave then, on the view that a sensation is a 'pain' if it causes one to wince, etc., it follows that a sensation does not have to have a special feel to it to be a 'pain'.

The following passage shows Wittgenstein coming to much the same view, namely, that crucial to being in pain is behaving in a certain fashion and not having a special sensation:

15. Norman Malcolm makes much the same point in Malcolm (1963, pp 98 - 99)
16. & 17. footnotes: see next page.
16. There have been other philosophers who have taken the route which Baier takes. They attempt to reach the conclusion that the psychological term refers both to something public (i.e., behavioural) and to something private (i.e., a special experience) but do so while putting the stress solely on the public (behaviour) in their definition of the psychological term. They will fail for the same reason that Baier failed. In his paper "Feeling and Expression," Stuart Hampshire takes the following position: "We must first have distinguished certain patterns of behaviour in certain standard circumstances, actual or notional; and then, on the basis of this kind of classification, we can distinguish the various inner sentiments as controlled inclinations to behave in these ways in these standard circumstances. We arrive at the distinctions between the different feelings and sentiments by abstracting from the manifesting behaviour. In our classification we move, as it were, inwards from the expressive behaviour to inner feeling." (Hampshire, 1960, p 81). Taking a particular case - the emotion of anger - he writes: "In explaining what anger is, as opposed to some other emotion, I would refer to a disposition to attack when the subject has been, or believes that he has been, in some way harmed or hurt." (p 73). Now, I suspect that in the way that Baier wanted to say that pain is a special kind of sensation, namely, that one which causes us to display pain-behaviour, so Hampshire wants to say that anger is a special kind of feeling, namely, the one which one feels when disposed to attack. However, if only a particular behavioural disposition is mentioned as the distinctive feature of the psychological state, then being in the psychological state will not necessitate having some special feeling or experience. If 'feeling angry' is defined as 'feeling as one feels who is disposed to attack' then it is in principle possible for any kind of feeling or experience to be one of anger, for there are no logical limitations on the sort of feelings and experiences one can have when disposed to attack as there are no logical limitations on the sorts of sensations which could cause one to groan. Thus the lesson to be learned is that if someone wishes to hold that some special sensation, feeling, or experience is a part of, or the whole of, being in the psychological state named by a particular term, one will not be able to define that psychological state by making the behavioural disposition the sole distinctive feature of that psychological state.

17. At other points in his paper Baier says things that put him in a position similar to the one which I am defending. In elucidating the nature of pain behaviour, Baier writes: "Pains are by nature feelings of a kind which incline us, urge us, prompt us to do what promises relief. . . A person's having a pain, or his expecting that some possible occurrence would cause him pain, is one of the paradigms of his having a reason for doing something, namely, for doing what promises relief, or what promises avoidance of the possible occurrence." (1962, p 15). Though Baier actually defines 'pain' by reference to a sensation's being such as to cause someone to manifest pain behaviour, he does, in the passage just quoted, probe one level below that of pain behaviour. In this passage he shows that pain behaviour is merely a consequence of a more fundamental feature of pain, namely, that pain is the sort of sensation which provides us with reason for trying to avoid or be rid of it or seek relief. The correct way to define 'pain', then, is not by appealing to the consequences of pain's having the nature which it has but by referring to that feature of pain which leads to pain's having such (behavioural)
"Imagine a person whose memory could not retain what the word 'pain' meant — so that he constantly called different things by that name — but nevertheless used the word in a way fitting in with the usual symptoms and presuppositions of pain" — in short he uses it as we all do. Here I should like to say: a wheel that can be turned though nothing else moves with it, is not part of the mechanism. (paragraph 271)

Here Wittgenstein seems to be saying that if someone speaks of himself as being in pain when he is in the right physical setting, that is, when he is behaving in the right way in the right physical surroundings (e.g., he has fallen and has begun to cry, etc.) then he is using the word 'pain' correctly and therefore is in pain, and this is true independently of what sensation he might happen to be experiencing.

Wittgenstein finds further problems in the view that the words 'pain' or 'pleasure' name special experiences. If the word 'pleasure' were used to name a special experience, what guarantee could there be that a person would continue to apply the word to the same experience each time he used the word? How could someone be sure on some occasion that he was using the word for the same experience which he used it for on previous occasions? No one else can verify for him that he is being consistent, since no one else is directly aware of his experiences. The person might try to imagine the sort of sensation or experience he called 'pleasant' on previous occasions, and he might compare his present experience to his recollection of the previous experience. But what guarantee

(17, contd.) consequences, namely, the fact that pain is something evil, something which provides one with reason for avoiding it. That people in fact try to avoid or minimize pain is, so I have argued in Chapter IV, also a consequence of the fact that they are rational. It is, I argued, logically possible for there to be creatures not disposed to avoid pain; creatures devoid of reason might have this characteristic.
would there be that the person's present experience correctly represents the previous sensation? There is no objective, independent 'criterion' of being correct, Wittgenstein argues. If there can be no objective or independent criterion of being right in applying the word 'pleasant' to the same kind of experience, there can be little sense in saying that someone is 'right' or 'wrong' in applying the word 'pleasant' to a certain experience, Wittgenstein would reason. Wittgenstein writes:

In the present case I have no criterion of correctness. One would like to say: whatever is going to seem right to me is right. And that only means that here we can't talk about 'right'.

(Paragraph 258)

If this is so, then the correct use of the word 'pleasant' does not depend on someone's applying the word to a special sort of experience, Wittgenstein would conclude.

Thus the view which emerges from Wittgenstein's argument is that the correct use of psychological terms is not contingent upon one's referring to special experiences, and this is to say that psychological words are not names of special experiences. This view also appears as the central theme of Wittgenstein's famous "Beetle in the Box" argument:

Suppose everyone had a box with something in it: we call it a "beetle". No one can look into anyone else's box, and everyone says he knows what a beetle is only by looking at his beetle. - Here it would be quite possible for everyone to have something different in his box. One might even imagine such a thing constantly changing. - But suppose the word 'beetle' had a use in these people's language? - If so it would not be used as the name of a thing. The thing in the box has no place in the language-game at all; not even as a something: for the box might even be empty. - No one can 'divide through' by the thing in the box; it cancels out, whatever it is.

(Paragraph 293)

The 'thing in the box' represents people's experiences and sensations. The word 'beetle' represents psychological words such as 'pleasure'
and 'pain'. The conclusion is that though the words 'pleasure' and 'pain' have a use in our language it is not as names of special sensations or experiences.

Earlier I quoted passages where Wittgenstein is assigning special behaviour a central part in the identification of particular psychological states. He wrote, for instance, "What would it be like if human beings shewed no outward signs of pain (did not groan, grimace, etc.)? Then it would be impossible to teach a child the use of the word 'tooth-ache'." Taken on its own this claim could be interpreted as an epistemological claim, I mentioned earlier. However, given that there are many other passages where it seems clear that Wittgenstein wants to deny that words such as 'pain' and 'pleasure' name special experiences, it seems that these claims are not epistemological ones. He is not merely saying that groaning and grimacing are evidence of pain and that pain is a special sensation, for he goes on to deny that pain requires having a special sensation. If pain behaviour is only evidence of pain, and pain itself is not a special sensation, then what is pain? It seems that for Wittgenstein to talk of pain is to talk of special behaviour and that a reference to someone's pain is a reference to his behaviour. 18

I have taken the view that pleasure and unpleasantness are special experiences. How then do I avoid or overcome the problems that Wittgenstein finds in this view? As I mentioned earlier, when

18. Wittgenstein treats first-person psychological sentences as different from third-person sentences. The claim 'he is in pain' would be, it seems, directly about someone's behaviour or behav-ioural dispositions for Wittgenstein. (The sentence 'I am in pain' Wittgenstein would say is not a factual assertion about one's pain but merely a non-fact-asserting exclamation 'expressive' of pain.)
Wittgenstein attacks the view that psychological terms are names of special experiences, he is assuming that the terms, if they would name kinds of experiences, are indefinable. The problems he finds in the view are problems for someone like Locke who also believes that the words are indefinable. As Wittgenstein writes:

'And yet you again and again reach the conclusion that the sensation itself is a nothing.' - Not at all. It is not a something, but not a nothing either! The conclusion was only that a nothing would serve just as well as a something about which nothing could be said. (paragraph 304)

The Private Language problems arise not simply if one holds that psychological words name sensations but if one holds this and holds that nothing can be said about them. Having the above passage of Wittgenstein's in mind, George Pitcher writes:

The point is not that private sensations are nothing, or do not exist, or are not important, or anything of the sort; the point is rather that nothing can be said about them and hence they play no part in our language game.

The claim that 'nothing can be said about sensations' has a crucial role in the view Wittgenstein attacks. (Interestingly, Pitcher is not merely speaking for the Empiricist but speaking for himself when he writes, of sensations, "the point is rather that nothing can be said about them". Pitcher offers us a fine example of a sentence which the Logic teacher knows is rarely found in actual usage, a necessarily false sentence. If the sentence were true it would be very informative about sensations and thus would provide a counter-example to the proposition being asserted.)

The situation changes dramatically when one shifts away

19. Pitcher (1964, p 291)
from Locke and holds that the words are definable. The problems Wittgenstein sees become avoidable. Though a great number of philosophers have discussed and tried to refute Wittgenstein's argument, none that I know of have tried to overcome the problems by adopting this shift from the classical Empiricist position.

If one holds that the words 'pleasure' and 'unpleasantness' are definable the situation with respect to teaching and learning the words changes considerably. If a word is indefinable it would seem that the main way of teaching the word is by ostensive definition, i.e., displaying or pointing to the object named by the word. The assumption that psychological words are taught by ostensive definition holds much of the responsibility for Wittgenstein's concentrating on the behaviour of the person in a certain psychological state as the defining feature of that state. What we see when we point to someone in pain is his physical reaction and not his sensations.

The importance of the assumption that psychological words are taught by ostensive definition is seen in the following passage of Wittgenstein's:

"What would it be like if human beings shewed no outward signs of pain (did not groan, grimace, etc.)? Then it would be impossible to teach a child the use of the word 'tooth-ache'."

(paragraph 257)

Why does Wittgenstein feel so certain that to teach the meaning of a psychological term such as 'tooth-ache' it is necessary for there to be behavioural 'outward signs' of pains? Wittgenstein is assuming that a word such as 'pain' is taught by ostensive definition. If we were going to teach the word 'pain' or 'pleasure' by pointing to someone experiencing pain or pleasure there would be nothing relevant for the learner of the word to see
unless there were some 'outward sign', some behaviour, associated with the psychological state.

Pitcher, in defending Wittgenstein's discussion of pain, writes:

One thing, to begin with, seems perfectly certain: if there were no overt manifestations or expressions of pain — i.e., if people just inwardly had pains, but did not cry or groan or grimace or plead for help — then there is no conceivable way that anyone could learn the use of the word 'pain'. But then 'pain' could not be a word in any language. And so it must be granted by anyone that there is at least this connection between pain and pain behaviour: pain behaviour plays an indispensable part in the teaching and learning of the word 'pain'.

That Pitcher is assuming that psychological words are taught by ostensive definition is explicit in what he says a few sentences later:

When a word is the name of something, I learn what it means by having other people point out examples of it to me or by observing what they apply it to . . .

In this passage Pitcher not only assumes that psychological words are taught by ostensive definition but asserts that all names are taught in this way. (This assumption would be more sensible if Pitcher were using the word 'name' in a way that 'being a name' entails being a word that is indefinable. Pitcher does not say that he is doing so however.)

Not all words are taught or learned by giving or receiving an ostensive definition. If a word is definable one way of teaching it is by giving a (verbal) definition. An ostensive definition is not necessary. If my definition of 'pleasure' were correct one could teach the word 'pleasure' simply by explicitly defining it as an experience of good quality. Speaking with less

20. Pitcher (1964, p 291)
precision, one could define 'pleasure' as 'feeling good' or 'experiencing good sensations'. (Loose definitions often have a helpful role in teaching people words. It is rare to receive a definition in everyday life that would stand up to philosophical scrutiny in such a way that it would be non-circular, 100% accurate, and totally sufficient for teaching someone the word. Indeed few dictionary definitions fail to be to some degree loose or circular.) One could teach the words 'pleasant' and 'unpleasant' by telling someone that pleasant experiences are distinguished from unpleasant ones by the intrinsic good or bad of the experience. Coming to understand the words 'good' and 'bad' does not itself raise special private language problems since these words are not themselves psychological ones, that is, the words are not themselves names of special experiences.

Though people could learn the words 'pleasant' and 'unpleasant' by receiving explicit verbal definitions, I expect that people do not often in fact learn the meaning of these words in this way. It is a relatively small percentage of one's words that a person learns by receiving verbal definitions, and even when one does receive definitions, the verbal accounts given of the words in question will often be at best approximate and loose. In such cases a supplementary method for fully learning the word would be relied upon.

Nor is ostensive definition the only alternative. Adult human beings in the Western World normally know a great deal more than ten thousand words, and it is a minority of these that one learns by receiving a verbal or an ostensive definition. Most of the words we come to understand are words which no one intentionally attempted to teach us. Most of an adult's vocabulary is
gained through what might be called 'Linguistic Inference', that is, by his making conceptual inferences—often 'unconsciously'—about the meaning of a word through having heard or seen the word used in various linguistic contexts. When being spoken to, when overhearing the conversations of others as a child, when hearing television or radio, and when reading books, magazines, or signs, one is able to draw inferences about the meaning that a word has.

There are many words that could not be taught exclusively by ostensive definition. One could not teach the words 'afternoon', 'yesterday', 'time', 'billion', or 'philosophy' exclusively by pointing; there are a great number of words that would be so difficult to teach by ostensive definition that doing so could be ruled out on practical grounds. Though someone might be able to teach a child the word 'apple' by handing the child apples on various occasions and calling the object an 'apple' on each occasion, he would be much less successful if he tried to teach the child the word 'bachelor' by pointing to unmarried men in various settings. The child might not notice anything peculiar about these people. Maybe he will think that being a bachelor is not wearing a ring. Nor could one hope to be successful in trying to teach the words 'married' and 'unmarried' by pointing to married and unmarried people. One needs to tie the use of these words to the concept of a legal institution, and one cannot hope to succeed in doing so merely by pointing to various people. Nor would the word 'university' easily be taught by pointing to a series of buildings with teachers in them. Merely by seeing the group of buildings one could take any number of features to be the distinctive features. What if one did not even know what a 'teacher' is or what 'learning' and 'education' are?; what would lead one to make the proper distinction
between a 'university' and a 'primary school'?

Nor will such words always be learned by one's receiving a direct verbal definition. Probably, the most common way in which people learn the word 'university' is by their hearing, perhaps on various occasions scattered over a period of time, such claims as the following: "John is planning on going to university after high-school"; "Johnson is a student at the University; he is studying to be a doctor". From claims such as these one can infer a connection between the meaning of the word 'university' and a concept of advanced education. One can learn the meaning of the word 'bachelor' by hearing sentences like the following: "He's not yet married; I'm beginning to suspect he will be a bachelor his whole life," or "The party tonight is for bachelors; no married men will be admitted."

Similarly, one can learn the connection of 'pleasantness' and 'unpleasantness' to good and bad experiences by making inferences about the meanings of these words when hearing them used in various linguistic contexts. (Normally, such inferences about meaning will be 'unconscious', and there would be a cumulative effect upon hearing the words used in different contexts.) Pleasure is spoken of as something good and unpleasantness is spoken of as something in itself bad. That unpleasantness is bad is apparent, and thus inferable, from the following sentences: "I find their company very unpleasant, and that is why I do not visit them anymore" or "This has been an unpleasant day; tomorrow will be better". From the following sentences one could infer that 'pleasantness' is thought of as good: "It was good to see him; I found the occasion very pleasant", or "I find the atmosphere here very pleasant; so I will return when I have time."
When learning the meaning of a word through Linguistic Inference one will need to hear the word in more than one context in order to gain an accurate understanding of its meaning. From hearing the following remark one would gain some idea of the meaning of 'bachelor': "He is no longer a bachelor. He got married today." One could infer a connection between being a 'bachelor' and being unmarried. However, from just these sentences and no other ones, one would not know, for instance, that females cannot be 'bachelors' in the ordinary sense of the word. Similarly, it would be necessary to hear the words 'pleasant' and 'unpleasant' on various occasions in order to gain an accurate understanding of their meaning.

Learning words by Linguistic Inference requires, of course, already knowing the meaning of other words. If one is to learn the meanings of the words 'university', 'bachelor', and 'pleasant' from hearing them used in various contexts, one must already be able to understand the general meaning of the sentences in which they appear. Not all words could be learned in this manner.

A comprehensive account of what is involved in coming to learn words by inferring their meaning through hearing them used would be very complicated as would be a comprehensive account of what is required in order to learn words accurately and fully through ostensive definition. However, it is clear that we can learn words in this way. Some words could not be learned exclusively from ostensive definition. Clearly, we do not learn all words by either ostensive or verbal definition.

If the words 'pleasure' and 'unpleasantness' name special experiences, how can we be sure that someone who is trying to learn
the meaning of the word has learned to apply the word to the right experience, i.e., to the same kind of experience to which other people apply the word? An implicit claim within the Private Language Argument is that one problem in the view that psychological words name kinds of experiences is that there would be no way to be sure, when teaching the word, that a person learning the meaning of the word is applying it to the same kind of experience. The problem arises because we have no 'direct access' to, or direct awareness or knowledge of, other people's experiences. Part of the process in learning the meaning of a word, Pitcher writes in his elucidation of Wittgenstein's argument, is that one applies the word to the sorts of things he thinks it refers to. Pitcher continues:

In this latter process, what determines whether I have gotten it right or not is whether I apply the word to appropriate or to inappropriate things, and the only possible way of telling which is the case is for other people to confirm my application when it is correct and to rebut it when it is not correct. But nothing of this sort can happen in the case of private sensations: I might continually apply the word 'pain' to the wrong sensations and no one would ever be able to tell me that I was doing so.21

I hold that the word 'pleasure' names a special experience. How do I overcome these problems? How can someone teaching the word 'pleasure' know that the person to whom he is teaching the word has come to apply the word to the same sorts of experiences to which the teacher is applying it?

It is necessary to distinguish two questions here: 1) How do we know when someone has correctly understood the meaning of the word 'pleasure' and that he therefore has given it the same meaning which others give to it?, and 2) Assuming that someone does under-

21. Pitcher (1964, p 291)
stand the meaning of the word 'pleasure' (he knows that it means 'experience good in quality'), how do we know that the experiences of his which he calls pleasant are in fact pleasant (good in quality)?

To gain evidence that someone correctly understands the meaning of a word it is not necessary to check his use of the word against those objects to which it refers. To gain evidence of whether someone correctly understands the word 'university', for instance, it is not necessary to visit a university campus and observe whether he calls this a 'university'. (Such evidence would be inconclusive, in any case. For it is possible for someone to call a set of buildings a 'university' when it is not and for him still to know the meaning of the word. He simply could make a mistake.) The assumptions which people hold about the meaning of words are manifested in the things they say when using the word. Someone's uttering the following sentences give good evidence that he does not correctly understand the meaning of the word 'university': "Joe has bought a new university and is about to drive it to work", or "The university is made up of many stars and planets and is millions of light years across". There are other sentences which would provide evidence that someone does correctly understand the meaning of the word 'university': A person's statement that "Joe is going to university to study to become a doctor" provides good evidence that the speaker has connected 'university' with advanced study of some subject.

Similarly, to gain evidence of whether a child correctly understands the words 'pleasant' and 'unpleasant' it would not be necessary to do the impossible and directly check his words against his experiences. Since the words are definable we could if we wish
to check someone's understanding of the words simply ask him what the words mean. (The answer would be helpful though inconclusive since he would likely give a vague reply as most people do when asked to define words.) We also can observe the assumptions a person has about the meanings of the words he uses when he forms sentences with these words. A child's saying "I'm not going to school anymore, I find school unpleasant" provides some confirmation that he understands the word 'unpleasant' since this shows that he thinks of unpleasantness as bad. "This food is too pleasant; take it away," would provide evidence that someone does not understand 'pleasant'. "The car has a new pleasure joint" or "He dropped the bottle and spilled pleasure all over the floor" provides strong evidence that someone does not understand the word 'pleasure'. (A person's saying these things would not entail that he does not understand the word 'pleasure'. It is conceivable that the mechanics at the corner have taken up calling a certain part a 'pleasure joint', and there are other possible events that would make the evidence logically consistent with someone's correctly understanding the word 'pleasure'.)

If the words 'pleasure' and 'unpleasantness' are names of special experiences, how does someone know that other people are applying these words to the same sorts of experiences which he is applying them to? How can we know that other people mean the same things as we mean by these words? What makes this problem worrying for Wittgenstein is the presumption that the words are indefinable. Given the view that the words can be defined, and the further claim that the concept which is
central in distinguishing the 'pleasant' from the 'unpleasant' is the concept 'good' - a concept which is not itself a psychological one - the questions have straightforward answers. As the word 'bachelor' has the same meaning and definition for you as it does for me, so the words 'pleasure' and 'unpleasantness' have the same meaning and definition for you as they do for me. The distinguishing feature of the class of experiences we call 'pleasant' is their being of good quality, and this link of the word 'pleasant' to the concept of goodness can be established 'publicly' because the concept of goodness is a 'public' one, that is, the concept of goodness is not a psychological one. That pleasant experiences are distinguished by their (intrinsic) worth can be conveyed in public discourse. How this is in fact done has already been outlined in the preceding discussion of how people are able to learn the meanings of 'pleasure' and 'unpleasantness' from hearing the sentences in which other people use these words.

I have already discussed the sort of verbal evidence we can gain that other people have correctly understood the words 'pleasure' and 'unpleasantness'. That evidence which confirms that another person correctly understands these words also confirms that he has given them the same meaning which I have given them. If we both understand the words correctly, then we both have given them the same meaning.

One might ask the further question: Given that we have, in a particular case, evidence that another person correctly understands the meanings of the words 'pleasure' and 'unpleasantness', how do we know that those experiences of his which he calls 'pleasurable' or 'unpleasant' are in fact pleasant or unpleasant, i.e. good or bad in quality? Though this question is of some interest in its own
right, it is not necessary to deal with this question in order to handle the central concerns of The Private Language Argument. The central concerns in Wittgenstein's argument are with how psychological words could both have a public, communicable meaning yet also name special experiences. This I have already explained. It is not necessary to know whether the experiences which Joe calls pleasant are in fact pleasant to know if Joe correctly understands the word 'pleasant'.

Given that someone's understanding of the meaning of a word can be checked at the linguistic level, the above question seems to reduce to the following question: How do we know in a case where someone says that his experiences is pleasant that he is not mistaken or lying? To attempt to answer this question by holding that we always know when someone is mistaken or lying when talking about his pleasures would be to prove too much, for we do not always know about another's mistakes or lies about his experience any more than we always know about his mistakes or lies concerning public states of affairs. (Even if someone maintained that in some or all occasions it is logically impossible to know with complete certainty whether a person is mistaken or lying when calling an experience of his 'pleasant', this would not affect my claim that we can have good evidence of whether or not someone understands the meaning of the word 'pleasant'.) When someone finds value in doing something he has some reason to do it; thus if someone finds some activity pleasant (his experience is good in quality) then he has some reason for engaging in that activity. If someone's behaviour suggests that he is avoiding some activity which he claims to find pleasant this would be some evidence - though inconclusive evidence - that he does not find it pleasant. For instance, if someone claims
to find opera pleasant, but in fact never goes to operas even when he has the chance, this would provide some evidence that he is perhaps trying to deceive us when he says that he enjoys it.

Central to Wittgenstein's Private Language Argument was the following problem: If a word such as 'pleasure' were the name of a special sort of experience, how could a person be sure that he is applying the word to the same kind of experience each time he uses the word? ("In the present case I have no criterion of correctness. One would like to say: whatever is going to seem right to me is right. And that only means that here we can't talk about 'right'.")

On my view there is a 'criterion of correctness' when one calls an experience 'pleasant', namely, that experience's being good in quality. On my view what makes one pleasant experience 'the same' as the last one is its being good in quality. To apply the word 'pleasant' correctly to the present experience it is not necessary for me to try to recall whether this experience is just like the other ones which I have considered 'pleasant'. All that is needed is that I now think that this experience is a good one (intrinsically). If it is a good one then it necessarily is like other pleasant experiences in the relevant respect.

In this respect, the situation when judging an experience 'pleasant' is like the situation when judging on non-psychological matters. When judging that the set of buildings in front of me is a 'university' it is not necessary for me to attempt to remember the set of buildings which I last called a 'university' and then to compare the present set to them. Merely by judging this set of buildings to be the site of an institution of higher learning of the proper sort I will be able to judge whether or not this is a 'university'. If I am right in judging this to be a 'university'
then it will follow that this set of buildings is, in the relevant respects, like previous sites of buildings which I have correctly judged to be 'universities'.

One can, of course, go on to ask, "What evidence do people have that a person has correctly remembered the meaning of the word 'pleasant'?" (It might be supposed that for psychological words to have a reliable role within our language it must be in principle possible to check on forgetfulness in meaning.) A person's erring in his remembering the meaning of the word 'pleasant' is checkable or noticable in the same way in which his erring when learning the word 'pleasant' would be checkable. The sentences in which he uses the word would provide evidence of his forgetting the meaning of the word. Sentences which would suggest that he does not think of pleasure as intrinsically good or that he does not think of pleasure as a feature of experience would provide evidence that he is not correctly remembering the meaning of the word 'pleasure'. Sentences which suggest that he thinks of pleasure as good and as a feature of experience (and not, say, of a box) provide evidence that he correctly remembers the meaning of 'pleasure'. Needless to say, forgetfulness in the meaning of words is not a common occurrence.

Earlier I mentioned, in passing, that Wittgenstein, in arguing against the view that psychological words name special experiences, does not distinguish the view whereby 'special experiences' are classified according to relational properties from a view where they are distinguished exclusively by non-relational, inherent features of an experience. Someone might suggest that in attacking the view that psychological words name 'special experiences', Wittgenstein is thinking of 'special experiences' in the latter way. If we interpret Wittgenstein this way it might appear that there is a
certain compatibility between my views and Wittgenstein's arguments, since I am thinking of 'special experiences' in a different way when I argue that pleasure is a special experience. Given this interpretation of Wittgenstein, precisely where am I in disagreement with him?

Even on this interpretation of Wittgenstein there remain very important and fundamental ways in which I am disagreeing with him. Wittgenstein does not distinguish the two ways of classifying 'special experiences', and in attacking the view that psychological words are names of special experiences he does not restrict his attack to one particular way of classifying special experiences. The conclusion he arrives at is a much more dramatic one, namely, that we are misconstruing the meaning of psychological words if we think that their meaning is such that they are used to convey information about the nature of our experiences. Wittgenstein does not see any way in which psychological words could be names of special experiences, so his conclusion is that their meaning is such that they do not refer to experiences at all. When psychological words are used for fact stating they are not used to refer to 'the inner life' of man but refer to something public, and the only public meaning or reference Wittgenstein recognizes as possible is that the words refer to certain kinds of behaviour, perhaps in certain physical surroundings. Earlier in this chapter I quoted a passage where Wittgenstein seemed to be saying that even if someone applied the word 'pain' randomly to sensations, he would nevertheless be using the word correctly and therefore would be 'in pain' if he used the word "in a way fitting in with the usual symptoms and presuppositions of pain". This I took to mean that if someone is behaving in the appropriate manner, perhaps in appropriate
surroundings, then he is in pain, and this is so independently of whatever he might be feeling. This striking position is also the one which Wittgenstein is taking in his Beetle in the Box Argument: here his conclusion is that "the thing in the box has no place in the language-game at all; not even as a something . . ."

Applied to pleasure and pain, this would be to say that one's correct ascription of pleasure or pain to someone is completely independent of whatever experiences that person might be having.

The only manner of teaching psychological words which Wittgenstein considers is that of ostensive definition, that is, displaying or pointing to someone in the psychological state in question. The only way of giving a psychological word a publicly communicable meaning which Wittgenstein considers is that of tying the meaning of the word to the physical behaviour or physical circumstances associated with some psychological state. This tendency to concentrate on the behaviour and circumstances associated with psychological states is perhaps partly reinforced by the assumption that we teach these words by ostensive definition. (If I were going to teach a child the word 'misery' by pointing to someone who is miserable, I would have to rely on the person's behaviour or physical circumstances to indicate whether or not he was miserable.) Wittgenstein does not limit himself to saying that it might be behaviour which is the public defining property of psychological states. He does not see any other way of a psychological word gaining a public meaning, so consequently he holds that the behaviour is the defining property of individual psychological states. As George Pitcher writes when presenting Wittgenstein's view: "What does play a part in pain language-games is pain behaviour (e.g., groaning, crying, clutching the
affected part) and pain-comforting behaviour (e.g., saying soothing words, administering sedatives, applying bandages, fixing pillows) - in short, the external circumstances in which the word 'pain' is used. The private sensations, whatever they may be, play no part at all."

Thus, central in Wittgenstein's account of what is involved in 'feeling pain' or 'feeling pleasure' is behaving in certain ways in certain circumstances; what someone is experiencing is incidental. On my account of pleasantness and unpleasantness the reverse holds. The words 'pleasure' and 'unpleasantness', on my view, name special experiences, those intrinsically good and intrinsically bad in quality respectively; they do not name special kinds of behaviour in certain physical surroundings. What makes someone's life pleasant or unpleasant is what he feels, not what he does.

I have not given a complete account of pain in the sense in which the word names a special sensation. However, I did argue, in Chapter V, that it is analytic that pain is unpleasant (intrinsically). If this is so, pain is a special kind of sensation for it is one which is bad in quality. (I have not said how pain sensations differ from other unpleasant sensations, e.g., itches.) Even Wittgenstein at times comes close to recognizing that the value of pain - its badness - is a fundamental feature of pain, but he does not notice that this badness is analytically tied to 'pain' and that it thereby places apriori limits and guidelines on the sorts of sensations that need to be felt by people in pain. He presents an objector as saying to himself: "Yes, but there

22. Pitcher (1964, p 299)
is something there all the same accompanying my cry of pain. And it is on account of that that I utter it. And this something is what is important - and frightful." Wittgenstein's reply to this useful point is merely: "Only whom are we informing of this? And on what occasion?" (paragraph 296). This character of being important and 'frightful' is what I am focusing upon in calling pain 'bad' or 'evil'. Pitcher writes:

One possible misunderstanding must be avoided at all costs. Wittgenstein is not denying that when a person is in pain, he very often and perhaps always feels something frightful, nor even that this something is terribly important to the person himself and to others. 23

In this argument on Wittgenstein's behalf, Pitcher acknowledges that someone in pain 'often and perhaps always' feels something frightful, and Pitcher thinks that it is extremely important not to think that Wittgenstein denies this. But is it not more than a contingent fact that people feel this way when in pain? And, are there not apriori limits on the sorts of sensations that could be properly called 'frightful' (or bad)? How then can one hold that 'the private sensations, whatever they may be, play no part at all'?

Who then are we informing by calling pain 'frightful' (or bad)? With this statement - one which Wittgenstein senses is a truism - we are replying to someone who says that the sorts of sensations one has are incidental to being in pain. Not just any sensation could be 'frightful' or bad.

23. Pitcher (1964, p 298)
Chapter VII: Cognitive Pleasure and Distress

His mein and his language were so noble and fearless in the hour of his death that to me he appeared blessed. I was pleased and I was also pained because I knew that he was soon to die. We were laughing and weeping in turns.

(Plato, writing about Socrates)

In this passage from the Phaedo, Plato is describing his feelings at the time of Socrates' death. The pleasure and pain that Plato felt might be called 'cognitive' since they were tied to certain states of belief or knowledge of Plato's. Plato reports that he was pleased over Socrates' courage in facing death. In order for Plato to be pleased over Socrates' courage it was necessary for him to be aware of that courage. A person cannot be pleased about some state of affairs that he does not know exists. Plato's pleasure was in some way tied to his knowledge. Plato said that he was pained 'because he knew that Socrates was soon to die', and this is to say that his pain was somehow related to his knowledge that Socrates was about to die.

Being pleased (distressed) about some state of affairs is something complex. Two phenomena are involved, pleasure (distress) and cognition. The relationship between the two phenomena is causal. To be pleased or distressed about some state of affairs is to be pleased or distressed in consequence of knowing of, or believing in that state of affairs. When Plato was pained 'because he knew that Socrates would soon die', Plato's knowing this fact was a cause of his pain. It was not simply that Plato felt distressed while knowing that Socrates would die soon, since being distressed while knowing something is not a sufficient

1. Plato (58e - 59a)
condition for being distressed about that thing. There are many things that Plato knew while he was distressed, yet he was distressed about Socrates' approaching death and not necessarily about the other things. What accounts for Plato's being distressed about this thing is that it was his knowledge and thinking of this thing that was causing him to be distressed.²

This view of the relationship between the pleasure (distress) and the mentioned cognitions also provides the basis for an account of the relationship of the pleasure (distress) to the object of the pleasure (distress). The object of Plato's pleasure - that thing that he was pleased about - was the noble and fearless bearing of Socrates. The noble and fearless bearing of Socrates was the object of the thought or knowledge which caused Plato to feel pleased. To be distressed by Socrates' approaching death is to be distressed by the thought or knowledge that Socrates was about to die. The object of the pleasure (distress) is the object of the thought or knowledge which causes the pleasure (distress).

One could, of course, ask the further question, 'What is the

2. The distinction that is commonly drawn between 'mental' and 'physical' pleasures and pains closely parallels the distinction between cognitive and non-cognitive pleasures and pains. (Non-cognitive pleasures and pains are pleasures and pains that are not contingent upon some thought or belief.) Roger Trigg, for instance, writes: "When we suffer mental pain or distress, we do not just feel something. We must be thinking of some situation we dislike. When we feel physical pain, however, we do not have to be aware of anything besides the sensation. If we forget what is distressing us, our distress will go. Apart from the sensation, there is nothing which we can try to forget when we are in physical pain. A sensation does not require the thought of anything else. As a result, argument cannot affect the sensations I feel." Thinking of 'mental pain' as an emotion, Trigg continues, "Unlike emotion (sensations) do not depend on beliefs which can be changed." (Trigg, 1970, p 19). The emotion of 'mental pain' is tied to some thought and is contingent upon that thought Trigg notes. The 'mental pain' depends on certain beliefs, and if the thought or belief that it depends on changes the distress will end. 'Physical pain' or 'non-cognitive pain' is not directly dependent on some belief for its existence.
relation of a belief or thought to the object of the belief or thought? However, I am not presently concerned about this question. My point is that it is through its connection with some cognition that the pleasure or distress being discussed can be said to 'have an object'.

Some recent philosophers have denied that the person's cognition is the cause of his pleasure in a case such as this. I will devote the rest of this chapter to examining their arguments.

Thinking of a person who is 'pleased because' he believes that he has won the Irish Sweepstakes, Irving Thalberg produced the following argument to support his view that the belief in question is not the cause of the pleasure:

It always makes sense to ask how soon after the causal event (believing) the effect (pleasure) occurred and how the events stood to each other in space; however, could Jones honestly say whether he was pleased right away or only after thinking about his triumph? And how near to the pleasure was the belief that allegedly caused the pleasure? The etiological (i.e., causal) analysis of 'pleased because' breaks down in the face of these queries.

What is the temporal relation between someone's feeling pleased over a piece of news and his hearing or thinking of that news? When someone feels pleased over a piece of news there may be no perceptible time lapse between his hearing or thinking of the news and his feeling pleased; he may hear the news and 'immediately' feel pleased. However, that a gap in time is not always perceptible cannot be taken to rule out a causal relation. It might have been that upon first hearing of the news that Socrates was to die Plato 'immediately' felt a terrible (very disagreeable) sinking sensation in the stomach. Yet it is clear

3. Thalberg (1962, p 67)
that the hearing of the news would have been the cause of his feeling this sensation. The sensation was not about to occur even without his hearing the news. When a man kicks me in the shin I may not notice a gap in time between his foot's contacting my leg and the onset of pain, yet clearly the kick nevertheless was the cause of the pain. Anyone who believes that there must be a time lapse between the occurrence of a cause and the occurrence of its effect can simply say that in these cases the lapse is so small that it normally is not, and perhaps could not be, noticed by the person in question.

Thalberg seemed to think that the temporal duration of the person's pleasure is not distinguishable from the temporal duration of his thoughts and that the thoughts could not be the cause of the pleasure for this reason. However, when someone is pleased about something the duration of his pleasure will normally differ from the duration of his thoughts, and the duration of the pleasure can be distinguished from that of the thoughts. The pleasure in being pleased about some event will be felt even at times when one is not thinking about the subject he is pleased about. J.C.B. Gosling makes this point:

Take the case of someone who is so pleased at having pulled off a deal that he throws a party. The pleasure he feels is shown in his interest in amusing his guests and his generosity with the champagne bottle. It is not a necessary part of being pleased about the deal that he should contemporaneously be aware of the deal even to the one removed extent of thinking about it.

When someone is 'pleased at having pulled off a deal' his experience is more agreeable for a period after he learns of his success, and it is more agreeable even at times when he is

not thinking about his achievement. Yet this pleasure is a constituent of his being pleased about the good news.

Within the passage of Thalberg's which was quoted, Thalberg argued that in the case of pleasure and belief it does not make sense to ask 'how near to the pleasure the belief was which allegedly caused the pleasure', and Thalberg interpreted this as supporting his claim that the belief could not be the cause of the pleasure. When arguing in this manner Thalberg is assuming that for two things to be related as cause and effect they must have positions in space. The argument raises difficult questions. Must a mental occurrence have a precise location in (physical) space in order to be either a cause or an effect? If so, how do we go about locating a mental occurrence in space? (For instance, is the experience of a pain in the leg itself in one's leg or in the brain, and if it is in the brain could one say precisely where?) Do thoughts and beliefs have locations in the head? These questions are very difficult and profound, and I will not directly try to deal with them.

Rather, my reply to Thalberg here is that if his argument were sound it would prove too much. If Thalberg is suggesting, as he seems to be doing, that a belief cannot be a cause of pleasure because it lacks physical location, he is committed to holding that it cannot, for the same reason, be a cause of anything. If he is holding that pleasure cannot be an effect of a belief because it lacks physical location, he is committed to holding that it cannot be an effect of anything. Thus, if Thalberg is suggesting both that causes and effects must have physical locations and that pleasure and beliefs lack spatial location, it would follow from his position that pleasure and beliefs can
never be either a cause or an effect. But this is a position that cannot seriously be maintained.

There are many instances in which it seems undeniable that beliefs and pleasure enter into causal relations. A man's belief that his boss will fire him can be a cause of his getting ulcers. A person's belief that he is being watched can cause him to stutter or stumble. A drug or a good meal may be a cause of someone's feeling pleased. Lack of food or sleep can cause someone to take less pleasure than he usually does in his normal activities. Admittedly, the Epiphenomenalist holds that pleasure, beliefs, and mental phenomena in general are never causes of anything, but he still holds that they are effects (of physical processes). Furthermore, his view that beliefs, emotions, and other mental events never have the least causal influence on physical events or other mental events will be one of the main problems in his view, and this is precisely because it makes him deny many propositions that seem obviously true (that a man's believing something may be a cause of his getting ulcers, that his being in pain may be the cause of his behaving in certain ways, etc.). Even the Identity Theorist would not deny that mental events can be causes and effects. Since a mental event for him is a physical event, it can enter into any of the causal relationships into which the corresponding physical event could enter.

Thus the position that Thalberg is committing himself to in his argument, that pleasure and belief by their very nature can never enter into any causal relations whatsoever, is unacceptable. It has much to be said against it and little to be said in favour of it. I conclude then that pleasure and belief are at least the sorts of things that can and do enter into causal relationships.
And given this general view, I see no special problems in holding that they can enter into causal relationships with each other.

Bernard Williams has provided additional argument against the causal analysis which I am proposing. One of his arguments he bases on an alleged incorrigibility of someone's judgements about the object of his pleasure and the belief to which the pleasure is connected. If the belief were the cause of the pleasure in these cases it would be possible for someone to be mistaken in judging that he is pleased because he believes such and such or pleased about such and such. If the belief were the cause, Williams argues, "it would make sense to say that I had just been mistaken in thinking that it was a certain belief that caused my pleasure; but in general no sense can be attached to this." If the object of one's pleasure in these cases were the object of the thought or belief causing the pleasure it would be possible to err in judging what one is pleased about, for it would be possible to err in judging which thought or belief is causing the pleasure. "But," Williams argues, "I cannot be mistaken in saying 'I am pleased because I have inherited a fortune' in the same way as I can in saying, for instance, 'I have a stomach-ache because I ate some bad fruit'." Ryle was arguing for a similar conclusion when he wrote: "When I have been amused by a particular joke, the question 'What gave me that pleasure?' does not await an answer. For of course I already know that it was that joke, if it was that joke that had amused me." Ryle is arguing that the joke or the hearing of the joke is not the cause of the pleasure,
for if it were one could not know incorribibly what 'gave him' the pleasure.

But are these judgements incorrigible? Suppose a person is already feeling pleased or in a good mood when he hears good news or hears various jokes. In this situation it would not necessarily be obvious to him what was giving him pleasure. Someone at a party might be unsure whether it is the good news, the jokes, the music, or the wine that has been pleasing him. It is not uncommon for people not to know why they are 'happy' or what they are 'happy about'. So, too, it would not be odd for someone to say 'I feel great, though I do not know what I'm so pleased about'. If it is possible for someone to be unsure what is pleasing him, then it also must be possible for him to judge and be mistaken. The person might, for instance, assume that the jokes were pleasing him but realize later, after reflection, that the jokes were bad and that he had not really enjoyed them but that it was really the warmth of friendship, the good news, the music, and the sense of occasion which had caused him to feel so pleased. (It would also be possible for these circumstances to cause someone to be pleased by jokes that are bad. But my point is that even if the person were not pleased by the jokes he might, in such a situation, falsely believe that he had been pleased by them. This would be a natural mistake, since people do not often carefully analyze the sources of their pleasures.) Similarly, a person at a concert might think that he is being pleased by the music when it is really his companion, the elegant plush theater, the stimulation of being out of the house, and the anticipation of the coming meal that is pleasing him.

There are some cases where a person would be in little doubt
what is pleasing him, and it may be such cases that Ryle and Williams have in mind. If a person is not already in a particular pleased mood and he feels more pleased immediately upon hearing a piece of good news (or a good joke), he would have convincing evidence that the hearing of the news (or the joke) caused the pleasure. But the fact that sometimes the question 'What gave me the pleasure?' does not 'await an answer' does not prove that the claim is not causal. For causal claims are not always difficult, and it is not always easy for a rational creature to err when making a causal judgement. When I see a man kick me in the leg and immediately feel pain in that leg, there is little chance that I would be wrong if I judged that the kick was the cause of the pain.

Williams provides other reasons for denying that the belief is the cause of the pleasure in the case he discusses. If the statement 'I am pleased because I have inherited a fortune' means 'I am pleased because I believe I have inherited a fortune' then "it is impossible to see what evidence I could have for the (causal) hypothesis, or how I could set about collecting evidence," Williams argues.7

What evidence might someone have for thinking that his belief in an inheritance, or even his hearing of a joke, is the cause of his pleasure? The direct evidence is the temporal conjunction of the hearing or thinking of the inheritance, or the hearing of the joke, and one's feeling pleasure. That a person feels more pleased immediately upon hearing or thinking of the inheritance, or hearing the joke, provides good evidence that the cognition is a cause of the pleasure. He has the same kind of evidence for

7. Williams (1959, p 227)
connecting his pleasure to his thought as a child has for connecting the pain in his knee with his just having fallen on it. The child's evidence is the fact that the onset of the pain begins with his falling on the knee.

Probably, additional indirect evidence of the presence of a causal relation in a particular case is contained in background knowledge which the person has of similar conjunctions in the past, and this knowledge aids him in making a reliable judgement in a particular case. The child is aided in making an intelligent causal inference in a particular case by already knowing that pains do not often arise randomly and by knowing that physical injuries are often followed by pain. (Indeed, he will probably learn from his parents the general causal law that pain may be caused by physical injury.) Similarly, someone will gain from experience the background information that pleasure and distress do not often suddenly come and go at random, but that the hearing of good news or of good jokes is often immediately followed by the experiencing of pleasure and that the hearing of bad news is often followed by increased unpleasantness and distress. (We also gain evidence of a regular conjunction when we see or hear of another person's coming to feel miserable when he hears bad news.) This knowledge aids one in judging causal connections in specific cases by providing evidence of a general causal law.

What evidence might someone have for thinking that some belief or hearing of a joke was not the cause of his pleasure in a particular instance? That the two events are not conjoined in time in the proper manner would indicate that they are not related causally. If someone realizes that he was already pleased before hearing of his inheritance, or hearing the joke, he
has solid evidence that it is not the inheritance or the joke that he is pleased about. If I feel good but do not feel more pleased upon thinking of the inheritance, and did not feel more pleased when I learned of the inheritance, I have strong evidence that I am not pleased specifically about the inheritance. Another kind of evidence would be gained if the removal of the circumstance believed to be the cause were not followed by a change in the state of affairs believed to be its effect. We then would have good evidence that the presence of the former circumstance was not the cause of the latter's being the way it was. For instance, suppose the person finds out that there has been a mistake and that it is not he who is to receive the inheritance but someone else. Suppose he feels no less good after learning of this fact. He would then have evidence that though he felt generally good he had not been pleased about the inheritance in particular. (That a person would be genuinely unconcerned about an inheritance would not be odd if, for instance, the inheritance is a small one or the person is already quite wealthy and thus expecting to have little use for an inheritance.) The person might conclude that he had not been pleased about any specific thing but that he simply had been in a good mood. He might realize that the cause of his feeling pleased was not his believing in the inheritance but simply his having had a good sleep the previous night and his being greeted in the morning with a beautiful, sunny day.

When Williams says that it is impossible to see how someone could 'go about collecting evidence' for the 'hypothesis' that a particular belief has caused him to feel pleased, Williams is in danger of assuming that in order to recognize causal connections it is necessary to be a trained scientist with a laboratory where one
might make a 'hypothesis' and then 'go about collecting evidence'. But a man does not need to be a trained scientist to be able to conclude, with good probability of being right, that the headache he is presently suffering was caused by the clout in the head which he received earlier in the day from his wife. No greater scientific training is needed for one to be able to conclude, with good probability of being right, that the pleasure or distress which he has just begun to feel was caused by his recent hearing of good or bad news.

Making sound and reliable causal inferences is a normal part of the life of adult human beings and is frequent among children and even animals. No great intellectual sophistication is necessary. A man learns that the presence of cats causes him to sneeze or that twisting his back in a certain way causes him to feel a sharp pain; a young child learns that turning a certain knob causes a picture to appear on the television screen; a pigeon learns that tapping a certain bar produces a food pellet (i.e., causes a food pellet to appear). The pigeon, of course, does not have a sophisticated theoretical understanding of the nature of causality, but the same is true of most adult human beings. Apart from philosophers and some scientists few people give any thought whatsoever to what a causal relation is. That the pigeon lacks formal training in philosophy should not lead us to conclude that he cannot recognize one thing's being a cause of another.

I conclude, then, that when a person is pleased or distressed over some state of affairs, his thoughts or belief in that state of affairs is the cause of his pleasure or distress. The object of his pleasure or distress is the object of the thought or belief which is pleasing or distressing him.
Chapter VIII: Emotion

I. There is a tradition in Philosophy and Psychology within which a number of psychological concepts are analyzed by reference to particular kinds of pleasure or distress. Aristotle, for instance, wrote:

By passions I mean appetite, anger, confidence, envy, joy, friendly feeling, hatred, longing, emulation, pity, and in general the feelings that are accompanied by pleasure or pain.¹

Among the definitions which Aristotle offers for the names of individual emotions are the following:

Shame: A pain or disturbance in regard to bad things, whether present, past, or future, which seem likely to involve us in discredit.²

Pity: A feeling of pain caused by the sight of some evil destructive or painful, which befalls one who does not deserve it...³

Fear: A pain or disturbance due to a mental picture of some destructive or painful evil in the future.⁴

Locke also presents a number of analyses. Among them are the following:

Sorrow: Uneasiness in the mind, upon the thought of a good lost...

Anger: Uneasiness or discomposure of the mind, upon the receipt of any injury, with a present purpose of revenge.

Envy: Uneasiness of the mind, caused by the consideration of a good we desire obtained by one we think should not have had it before us.

Joy: A delight of the mind, from the consideration of the present or assured approaching possession of a good.

1. Aristotle (1105b 20)
2. Aristotle-b (1385b 14)
3. Aristotle-b (1385b)
4. Aristotle-b (1382a 21)
Hope: That pleasure in the mind, which everyone finds in himself, upon the thought of a probable future enjoyment.\(^5\)

David Hume spoke of the 'sensations' of pleasure and pain as the 'very being and essence' of the passions. Of pride and humility, in particular, he wrote: "Thus pride is a pleasant sensation and humility a painful; and upon the removal of the pleasure and pain, there is in reality no pride nor humility."\(^6\) Spinoza and other philosophers as well as many psychologists have given similar hedonic analyses for various emotions.

The definitions mentioned here are for terms that are within the vocabulary of the 'emotions'. Many definitions in terms of pleasure or distress have also been given for psychological words outside the category of emotion (e.g., for names of sensations, moods, and character traits). However, in this chapter my interest will be primarily with what has been said about names for emotions.

The emotion-names mentioned in the opening paragraph were defined not just by reference to pleasure and unpleasantness but by reference to cognitive pleasure and cognitive distress. Though there were minor terminological variations within the different definitions, some reference to the cognitive and the hedonic was central in each case. Where these philosophers speak of 'pain', 'disturbance', 'discomposure', or 'uneasiness', I speak of 'distress' or 'unpleasantness'. Disagreeableness or unpleasantness seems fundamental to the description which they offer, and it is in this way that I will be interpreting these definitions. In most of the

\(^{5}\) Locke (1690, Vol I, Ek II, Ch XX)  
\(^{6}\) Hume (1739, Ek II, pt. I)
cases some cognition was explicitly mentioned within the definition. However, in defining 'anger' Locke said that it was unpleasantness 'upon the receipt of injury'. It would be more precise to define 'anger' in terms of the cognition of a received injury. It is not logically possible for someone to be angry over receiving an injury unless he knows of his ill-treatment. Indeed, to be angry it is not necessary actually to be treated badly but only to think that one is being treated badly. Even when people treat me well I can be angry at them; it is only necessary that I perceive them as treating me badly or unfairly.

Within most of the definitions an explicit reference is made to the pleasure or distress being caused by the mentioned cognition. When Locke writes that sorrow is distress (uneasiness) upon the thought of a good lost, the word 'upon' could be replaced by 'caused by'. A person feeling sorrow or grief over the death of a relative feels distressed when he learns or thinks of that death, but the distress must be caused by this knowledge in order for him to be feeling sorrow over the death. Suppose a son feels distressed upon learning that his father has killed himself by smashing the son's new car into a tree. If it is the thought of the car being smashed and not the thought of his father being killed that is causing the son to feel distressed, then the son feels sorrow for the loss of the car and not for the death of his father. Feeling distress while thinking of the father's death is not sufficient for feeling sorrow over his death. The distress must be caused by that knowledge or thought for the emotion to be sorrow over the death.

The claim that some cognition is a constituent of the various 'feelings' and emotions discussed will not meet much resistance from
contemporary philosophers. That individual emotions entail specific thoughts or beliefs is commonly asserted by philosophers these days, and no one has seriously disputed the claim. Irving Thalberg explicitly argues that cognition is a component or 'constituent' of an emotion.\textsuperscript{7} Kenny writes that "only something thought to be good can be envied. . . only something thought to be bad can be regretted."\textsuperscript{8} Echoing Aristotle's account of pity and Locke's of sorrow O.H. Green writes: "If a man does not believe that another has suffered some undeserved misfortune, he cannot feel pity for him. . . and if a man does not believe that he has suffered some loss, he cannot feel grief.\textsuperscript{9}

The descriptions which the earlier philosophers offer of the cognition involved in a particular emotion are usually similar to, or compatible with, those which present-day philosophers offer. One could argue a bit about the precise details of a correct account of the cognition, but this will not be my concern here. The accounts which have been offered seem at least roughly correct.

Where the hedonic accounts differ importantly from contemporary views is in giving pleasure and unpleasantness a central role in the analysis of the emotions in question. As has been the case in the discussion of pleasure and pain, Wittgenstein's Private Language Argument has had considerable influence on the discussion of emotion concepts. In recent years, philosophers have tended to shy away from or reject the view that some special experience is central to an emotion. In relation to the contemporary outlook, a

\textsuperscript{7} Thalberg (1973) \\
\textsuperscript{8} Kenny (1963, p 193) \\
\textsuperscript{9} Green (1972, p 36)
defense of the hedonic approach takes on a heightened importance. For I have argued that pleasure and unpleasantness are special experiences, and I have devoted considerable attention to clarifying and understanding what is involved in this claim. Given this view, it follows that any emotion which has pleasure or unpleasantness as a component thereby has a special experience of the sort discussed as a component. For instance, if Aristotle was basically correct in saying that the word 'shame' is to be defined as 'a pain or disturbance in regard to bad things, whether present, past, or future, which seem likely to involve us in discredit', it follows that shame is, in part, a special experience, namely an unpleasant one.

In recent years, when philosophers have raised the question whether emotions are special experiences they have tended to have a view other than Aristotle's in mind. Errol Bedford, for instance, writes:

What evidence is there for the existence of a multitude of feelings corresponding to the extensive and subtle linguistic differentiation of our vocabulary for discussing emotions? The assumption gains no support from experience. Indignation and annoyance are two different emotions; but, to judge from my own case, the feelings that accompany indignation appear to differ little, if at all, from those that accompany annoyance. I certainly find no feeling, or class of feelings, that marks off indignation from annoyance, and enables me to distinguish them from one another. 10

Bedford goes on to quote a psychologist who has come to the same opinion as his. The psychologist writes that "there is little evidence that a peculiar, unique type of consciousness accompanies and identifies the different emotions." 11

The view that Bedford has in mind is that each emotion has a

11. Boring, Langfeld, and Weld (1948, p 100)
unique experiential feel or quality to it and that each emotion is distinguished from the others by its peculiar, individual intrinsic quality. Bedford is right that the emotions are not distinguished from each other in this fashion, and it is important to recognize this. Hume at times seemed to slip into this 'colour spectrum' view of emotions, and William James, C.D. Broad, and other philosophers also seem to have held the view that Bedford rightly criticizes.

George Pitcher also has this 'colour spectrum' view of emotions in mind when he sets out to criticize what he calls 'the traditional view' of emotions. The view he attacks is that "to have an emotion is just to have a certain unique feeling or group of inner feelings, to undergo a special inner experience." Pitcher does not mention the views of Aristotle, Descartes,

12. Hume writes: "The passions of pride and humility, being simple and uniform impressions, it is impossible we can ever, by a multitude of words, give a just definition of them, or indeed of any of the passions." (Hume, 1939, Bk II, Part I, Sect. 2. See also Part II, Sect. I and Part III, Sect. 9 of Bk II.) Here, Hume seems to think that there is some unique feel to each emotion. However, Hume also says that pleasure and unpleasantness are 'the very essence' of the passions and, in the case of pride and humility, 'upon the removal of the pleasure and pain, there is in reality no pride nor humility'. And Hume also notes that pride has a special connection with the idea of oneself. Yet, at least when writing the above passage, Hume fails to recognize that these other claims do provide the basis for 'a just and useful' definition of the words 'pride' and 'humility'. With observations such as Hume's, the authors of The Concise Oxford Dictionary define 'pride', in one sense, as a "feeling of elation and pleasure due to (an) action or circumstance that does one credit".

Hume does not need to hold that there is some unique feel to the experience of pride or that the word 'pride' is indefinable. The experience of pride does not necessarily feel different from other pleasant experiences. Being pleased with some circumstance which one thinks of as being to his credit does not necessarily feel different from being pleased to see the home team win, being pleased when hearing from the doctor that one's heart is sound, or taking pleasure in a movie. Locke does not share this inconsistency or near-inconsistency of Hume's. Locke thinks of the passions as 'modes' of pleasure and pain and does not also say that the names of the passions are indefinable or that each passion is a 'simple' impression.

13. Pitcher (1965, p 326)
Spinoza, or Locke. He nowhere directly mentions the view of the emotions whereby the different names for the emotions are defined in terms of different forms of cognitive pleasure or cognitive distress, and most of what he says has little relevance to these theories.

The view of the emotions which has predominated in the history of philosophy is not the 'colour spectrum' view where each emotion is distinguished from the others by having some special unique feel or experiential quality but one such as Aristotle's where the emotions are identified as particular kinds of cognitive pleasure or cognitive distress. For Aristotle, the emotions of fear and pity are, at least in part, special experiences, namely, disagreeable ones. What distinguishes fear from pity is the cognitive component of the emotion. When someone's distress is due to the sight of some evil coming to a person not deserving it his emotion is pity, but when his distress is due to the thought of a future evil his emotion is fear. (A more detailed and precise account of the necessary cognition could be sought.) The experiences of pity and fear do not necessarily differ from each other in intrinsic feel. What differs in the two cases is the cognition that produces the disagreeable tone of the experience.

Few contemporary philosophers show any interest in the hedonic theories of the emotions; indeed, few even seem to be aware of the existence of this tradition. The approach is rarely defended, attacked, or even mentioned by contemporary philosophers. In his book *Action, Emotion, and Will*, Anthony Kenny does discuss the views of Locke and Hume and the way in which these philosophers give pleasure and pain a central role in the analyses of the emotions. 14

14. Kenny (1963, Chapter I)
However, without arguing that Locke and Hume are wrong in concentrating on pleasure and pain in the analysis, Kenny proceeds to develop his own account of the emotions in a direction in which pleasure and pain are given no role in the analysis. In his own account, the stress is put on the behaviour, involuntary physiological changes, and physical environment associated with particular emotions. (Kenny shows a degree of sympathy with Wittgenstein's Private Language Argument, and this probably influenced him into shying away from special experiences and concentrating on physical factors in his analysis of the emotions.) Perhaps, Kenny saw no plausibility or importance in the hedonic analyses.

Stuart Hampshire, in his book *Freedom of the Individual*, in passing, shows a degree of sympathy for Spinoza's hedonic analyses of the emotions. Of someone afraid of the dark, Hampshire writes that "the fear is the thought of the danger, together with the perturbation, the disagreeable affect, associated with it." Anger, Hampshire writes, "is the thought of the wrong or bad thing done, together with the perturbation, the disagreeable affect, associated with the thought." (Though Hampshire thinks of the unpleasantness as part of fear and anger in normal cases, he thinks it is possible for fear and anger not to be unpleasant in some cases. I will discuss this view in the coming pages.) However, the sympathy Hampshire has for Spinoza's view is limited to remarks he makes in passing, whereas, when Hampshire does discuss the emotions at greater length in another essay he does not mention Spinoza's view.

15. Kenny (1963, pp 13-14)
16. Hampshire (1975, p 97)
and develops his account along distinct, semi-behaviouristic lines. In this paper, a sympathy with Wittgenstein's Private Language Argument influences Hampshire, as it influenced Kenny, into giving behavioural dispositions a central role in the analysis.

Gosling, in his book *Pleasure and Desire*, gives some attention to Aristotle's view of the emotions and acknowledges that there is some truth in the theory. He writes:

Feeling angry is very different from feeling sorry or feeling jealous - yet each may be called a case of feeling distressed about something... An angry person is displeased with something conceived as an injury to himself; a person who feels sorry is displeased at some misdemeanor of his own as a cause of displeasure to someone else; a jealous person is displeased at someone else's success as putting himself in a relatively poor light.

My pleasure on one occasion may be pleasure at someone's doing me a kindness, and so be a part of my gratitude.

A person in love, or who feels grateful or triumphant may be said to feel pleased.

Though Gosling admits that there is some truth in Aristotle's theory, he does not seem to think there is much importance it it. He writes:

There is no harm in considering various passions as forms of pleasure and its opposite so long as one does not expect too much consequent homogeneity. The analysis of various emotions in terms of 'pleasure' and 'distress' would decline in importance if one were to admit that there is no homogeneity entailed by the claim that, e.g., both anger and jealousy are 'unpleasant' experiences and that both joy

and pride are 'pleasant' experiences. However, I have criticized in detail the thinking which lies behind the anti-essentialist view of pleasure which Gosling and other philosophers have, and I have provided my own positive, homogeneous account of pleasure. To say that both anger and jealousy are 'unpleasant' is to assign them the common characteristic of being disagreeable or unattractive experiences, i.e., experiences that are bad in quality and which provide reason for shunning them. To say that anger and jealousy are 'unpleasant' is to say that both are, in part, the same kind of (special) experience.

The resiliency and importance of the hedonic approach to analyzing psychological concepts is evidenced in a number of scattered remarks found in the writings of recent philosophers. Gilbert Ryle, we noted earlier, warned that pleasure could not be analyzed by reference to a mood such as cheerfulness. "On the contrary," he wrote, "the notion of being cheerful has to be explained in terms of the notion of pleasure, since to be cheerful is to be easy to please." As cheerfulness seems to entail pleasure, so moods that are opposites to cheerfulness - e.g., gloom, despair, and depression - seem to entail unpleasantness. As the cheerful person is easily pleased so the depressed or despairing person tends to find his thoughts and normal activities unpleasant or distressing. Ryle also speaks of a tickle as a "certain sort of distressing feeling or sensation". A tickle's being unpleasant is, as I argued in Chapter V, what explains the squirming or fleeing behaviour characteristic of someone being tickled. The hedonic approach is useful for analyzing a mood such as cheerfulness or a

sensation such as a tickle (or pain) as it is for analyzing an emotion such as anger.

William Alston writes: "What is it like to feel homesick? Well, nothing seems very enjoyable, one often has a sinking sensation in one's stomach, and one often thinks of home with pangs of regret."(The Concise Oxford Dictionary provides a similar hedonic analysis: to be homesick is to be "depressed by longing for home during absence from it"). A reference to the unpleasantness of being homesick accounts for the 'sickness' in feeling homesick. There is something wrong, some problem, something which we need to do something about, when homesick.

In the recent discussion of pleasure, many philosophers have tended to concentrate on 'enjoyment' and 'being pleased'. It is, however, somewhat arbitrary to concentrate on these terms. No philosopher would claim that these are the only terms which entail pleasure. Irving Thalberg, introduces a broader range of words in his discussion of pleasure, and he confidently assumes that he is referring to a kind of pleasure when he speaks of someone being 'thrilled', 'overjoyed', 'satisfied', 'delighted', or 'content'. The phrases in which these words appear he speaks of as a "family of phrases about pleasure". In a similar manner, words that are opposites to these, e.g., 'dejected', 'dissatisfied', and related terms, seem to be names for kinds of unpleasant conditions.

It is not only philosophers who think that various psychological concepts need to be analyzed hedonically. Titchener, Wundt, and other psychologists have thought of pleasure and unpleasantness.

21. Thalberg (1962)
as the sole or primary dimension of feeling and emotion. The authors of *The Concise Oxford Dictionary* define 'fear' as "a painful emotion caused by impending danger or alarm", being 'glad' as being "pleased", an 'itch' as a special "irritation", 'amusement' as a "pleasant diversion", and 'hunger' as an "uneasy or painful sensation, exhausted condition, caused by lack of food."

Though contemporary philosophers have offered interesting and illuminating hedonic proposals, what is lacking in contemporary philosophy is the recognition of a trend here. It is not recognized that it is not simply this or that concept that may be analyzed by reference to pleasure or unpleasantness, but that a great number and wide range of concepts may be analyzed by reference to the agreeable or disagreeable in experience.

II. Not all of the hedonic proposals mentioned in the previous section will seem obviously true to all philosophers. To some philosophers some of these proposals may seem obviously false. David Hume, we may recall, wrote the following about pride and humility:

Pride is a pleasant sensation and humility a painful; and upon the removal of the pleasure and pain, there is in reality no pride nor humility. Of this our very feeling convinces us; and beyond our feeling, 'tis here in vain to reason or dispute.

To Hume it seemed obvious that pride is pleasant and humility unpleasant, and he seemed to think that this would also seem obvious to anyone else who introspectively examines these feelings. However, these judgements will not in fact seem obvious to all philosophers. In a recent paper Donald Davidson discussed Hume's view of pride, and he gave considerable attention to certain cognitions which Hume linked to pride. However, Hume's suggestion
that pride was always and necessarily pleasant Davidson thought obviously false. Indeed, Davidson thought it so obvious that pride is not always pleasant that he dismissed Hume's suggestion without argument. "Though there are sometimes characteristic frissons of pleasure that accompany prideful thoughts, such experiences are not necessary or typical," was about all that Davidson says on the matter. Since a hedonic analysis of pride will not appear obvious to all philosophers, one who would define 'pride' by reference to pleasure will be obliged to provide some argument to support this definition.

Hume seemed to think that the pleasantness of pride was to be established by introspection rather than by argument. That pride is pleasant and humility unpleasant "our very feeling convinces us; and beyond our feeling, 'tis here in vain to reason or dispute," he wrote. Argument is not merely unnecessary but useless Hume thought.

However, Hume believed not merely that pride is in fact pleasant but that it is necessarily pleasant. "Upon the removal of the pleasure and pain, there is in reality no pride nor humility," he wrote. But if someone were to confirm by introspective, empirical judgement that a feeling of pride is always pleasant, it would not thereby be shown that pride is necessarily pleasant but merely that it in fact always is. From someone's introspective judgement that pride is always pleasant for him it would not follow that pride will always be pleasant for everyone, that pride must be pleasant in all possible worlds, or that pride is in part feeling 22. Davidson (1976, p 745)
pleased. To show that pride is necessarily pleasant one will need more than empirical observation. To prove that the concepts of pride and pleasure are interlocked, some sort of argument will be both appropriate and necessary.

Though there have been, since the time of Aristotle, many proponents of hedonic analyses for emotions, what has been missing is argument to support the proposals. Those philosophers who presented hedonic definitions provided no argument to support their views. Like Hume the other proponents seem to have thought that their analyses were obvious. No doubt this complacency was encouraged by the fact that little serious criticism of the view has appeared in print; the complacency was perhaps also partly due to the fact that throughout the periods during which hedonic theories were common there were no developed alternative positions to compete with their own views. I will now take a closer look at some hedonic proposals. I will elucidate and argue for these proposals and defend them from possible objections.

There are some emotions for which it will appear obvious to most or all philosophers that the emotions have an analytic connection to pleasure or unpleasantness. That jubilation ('joy'), blissfulness, and delight are necessarily pleasant, and extremely so, and that despair, grief ('sorrow'), misery, and distress ('suffering', 'agony') are necessarily unpleasant few philosophers would seriously dispute. More likely, a philosopher would claim that these statements are trite and are truisms. He might object that being joyous or jubilant just is being highly pleased and that the problem in explaining what agony or grief is just is the problem of explaining what extreme unpleasantness is.
The claim that these statements are truisms is one with which I agree. Indeed, this is just what I am claiming (though some cognitive content needs to be added to 'grief' and 'jubilation', e.g., the thought or belief that one has lost or gained something good). However, in the context of having given a detailed account of pleasure and unpleasantness these truisms are not empty or uninformative. If one applies to grief, jubilation, and the other mentioned emotions the accounts of pleasure and unpleasantness which I have given it would follow that these emotions are, in part, special experiences, i.e., experiences of good or bad quality.

Furthermore, the discussion of Cognitive Pleasure and Cognitive Distress in Chapter VII supplies us with an account of the relation of these emotions to their 'objects'. How is a person's grief related to the object of his grief, e.g., the person whose death he is grieving over? According to Locke's analysis, grief ('sorrow') is distress at the thought of a good lost. The object of the grief is the object of the thought which is causing one distress, i.e., the person or thing which is considered good and believed to be no longer present. When someone is grieving over the death of a friend, the friend is the object of the thought which is distressing the grieving person. How is someone's jubilation related to the object of his emotion, e.g., the signing of a peace treaty between his country and its main enemy? According to Locke's definition the object of the jubilation ('joy'), the peace treaty, is the object of the thought which is causing one pleasure. The object of the jubilation is that state of affairs which is considered good and whose existence is believed to be present or assured.

But are there not people who enjoy suffering or grieving, or
find these emotions satisfying, and does this not show that these emotions are not necessarily fully unpleasant? When we describe something as 'pleasant' or 'unpleasant' we often mean that it brings or causes pleasure or unpleasantness. Even things that are themselves unpleasant can be 'pleasant' in this sense, since even unpleasantness can be a means to pleasure. For instance, someone who suffers unpleasantness might feel pleased when recognizing that his suffering is coming to an end. A student who suffers stress when studying for exams may feel highly pleased upon finishing his last exam, and the suffering may actually be a stimulant or cause of the pleasure. We might even describe the situation as one in which there was a certain pleasure to his suffering. More paradoxically, we might say that his suffering was not wholly unpleasant or that it was to some extent pleasant. However, it is only in the sense of being a means to pleasure that suffering can be 'pleasant'. It can never be intrinsically pleasant. Similarly, if we talk of someone (e.g., a masochist) enjoying his suffering or grief our meaning is that he is enjoying something unpleasant. (It is just because his suffering is unpleasant and therefore bad that the masochist views it as punishment and thereby gains satisfaction from it.) Suffering cannot be intrinsically pleasant.23

Moritz Schlick once wrote the following passage:

The word 'suffering' in its significant sense, is always

23. There may be times when we speak of someone as enjoying 'suffering' when we are not thinking that he is really suffering but that he is pretending that he is suffering or that he is still suffering. In these cases, we are, so to speak, talking in inverted commas, since we do not think that he is 'suffering' in the literal sense of the word.
used only for mixed states, for complicated experiences whose feeling tones are never wholly and purely pain... Emotions of wholly unmixed pain are rare... Most forms of disagreeable things tend to have a hidden pleasure component, as it were, and this holds even of anger, fear, care, and of mourning. Even the profound grief with which we stand at the deathbed of a loved one is permeated by a peculiar remote sweetness. Experiences of 'suffering' are not wholly disagreeable, not altogether painful.  

Part of what Schlick is saying here is that people rarely experience unpleasantness without experiencing pleasure at the same time. Even when experiencing great unpleasantness there may still be some pleasure being felt at the time. I doubt that this is as common as Schlick thinks it is, but it is possible for people to feel this way.

It would be, however, misleading to say, as Schlick is close to doing, that the word 'suffering' may refer to elements within experience that are not fully unpleasant. To say that someone is 'suffering' is to say that he is experiencing extreme unpleasantness. A person could experience pleasure while he is experiencing unpleasantness, but we are not referring to that pleasure when we speak of the person as 'suffering'. When we say that someone is 'suffering', the word 'suffering' in itself is being used to refer only to unpleasantness. No pleasure is entailed by the claim that someone is 'suffering' or experiencing 'grief'; however, unpleasantness is entailed by the claim that someone is 'suffering' or experiencing 'grief'. Schlick wrote that a disagreeable experience can have a pleasure 'component'. However, pleasure cannot be a 'component' of suffering or grief in the sense in which unpleasantness is a 'component' of suffering or grief. When Schlick says that pleasure may be a 'component' of suffering, this is merely a mis-

24. Schlick (1939, pp 137-138)
leading way of saying that someone may experience pleasure while suffering and that the suffering may actually be a cause or a source of the pleasure. Schlick worded his claim by saying that "most forms of disagreeable things tend to have a hidden pleasure component, as it were, and this holds even of anger, fear..." The 'as it were' indicates that Schlick senses that he is not speaking fully literally. He refers to suffering, grief, etc., as 'disagreeable things' and in doing so he seems to be acknowledging that these states are disagreeable - not 'partly disagreeable', not 'agreeable' - in some fundamental way.

That suffering and grief are related analytically to unpleasantness and jubilation and delight to pleasantness will appear obvious to most philosophers. However, the suggestion that fear is always unpleasant or that pride is always pleasant may seem less obvious.

George Pitcher writes that "part of being afraid that something will happen is that one considers that thing bad or unfortunate."25 Pitcher says that this cognition is part of fear; it is not all of fear and is not a sufficient condition for fear. Any thought or belief can be had dispassionately or unemotionally. A soldier might realize that he is in danger and that his life is threatened, yet he might feel brave and unafraid. Two people might go to the dentist each knowing that they are about to experience something bad and extremely distasteful, yet only one might feel frightened at the prospect. A prisoner sentenced to be hung might, after being afraid for weeks, resign himself to his fate and cease to be frightened. His cognitive outlook need not have changed, since he might continue to view death as extremely undesirable.

25. Pitcher (1965, p 343)
Religious martyrs are often portrayed as facing pain or death without being afraid, and there does not seem to be any logical impossibility in this idea. Any evil could be faced with despair or courage instead of fear.

A person could believe that he is about to die and think of death as a bad thing yet not be afraid. What more is necessary? The person must also be disturbed or bothered by the prospect of his death. He must find the prospect of his death unsettling; the thought of death must be the source of an uneasy, uncomfortable feeling. To say these things is to say that he must find the prospect of his death distressing and unpleasant. The more distressing the thought of death is the more frightened the person is. The unpleasantness a frightened person experiences might be limited to his feeling an unpleasant 'sinking sensation' in the stomach region upon the thought of himself dangling in the air with the rope tied tightly round his neck. Or the unpleasantness might be more vaguely located and associated with a general physical tenseness throughout the chest region of his body. This unpleasantness is the non-cognitive, feeling, 'affect', or 'special experience' needed for fear. This is the analysis Aristotle is giving when he defines 'fear' as a 'pain or disturbance due to a mental picture of some future evil'.

The claim that fear is at least normally unpleasant few philosophers would doubt. Nor would many philosophers query a claim that terror, or intense fear, is always unpleasant. Philosophers sometimes mention cases of fear which they say are not unpleasant, but it is usually cases of mild fear or 'nervousness' that they have in mind. However, one who would hold that there is no analytic tie between fear and unpleasantness
must hold that it is at least logically possible to have the most intense of fears ('terror') without feeling any unpleasantness whatsoever. Yet, this does not seem to be a logical possibility. Ryle at one point mentions that the fact that people voluntarily do things that frighten them, such as rock-climbing, shows that fear is not always unpleasant. Does not the fact that people go to horror movies show that they sometimes enjoy being frightened?

To go to 'horror movies' is not necessarily to feel horror, nor do all people who do 'frightening' things such as rock-climbing feel frightened. Probably, many people do not feel at all nervous or frightened by many of the movies that are called 'horror movies'. To me, Frankenstein movies are more charming or quaint than frightening. And, as there will be some people who go climbing who feel nervous and do not enjoy themselves, so there will be some people who enjoy themselves without feeling frightened. These cases do not threaten the thesis presently being examined.

Still, there are people who enjoy watching movies that genuinely frighten them and people who enjoy rock-climbing yet do feel frightened while they are climbing. Indeed, it might even be claimed that the fear might even be a source of stimulant of the pleasure. However, the admission that people might enjoy themselves while frightened, or that they might even find fear 'pleasant' in the sense of being a stimulant or cause of pleasure is not inconsistent with the claim that the fear is in itself unpleasant. As will be clear by now, it is quite possible to experience pleasure and unpleasantness at the same time.

26. Ryle (1949, p 95)
There is, I think, a tendency to exaggerate the degree of fear that people feel in some activities which they do for pleasure. Someone who enjoys rock-climbing or horror movies while 'frightened' is likely to be nervous or mildly frightened and not extremely frightened or literally 'terrified'. (A better example of someone likely to be literally 'terrified' is the father in the doctor's reception room who is waiting to hear if his daughter is going to live.) Though some movies make us genuinely nervous or frightened, it is only in rare moments that one feels extreme fear (e.g., when shocked by the sudden, unexpected sight of the grey, contorted corpse). And one will not find these moments intrinsically pleasant, though perhaps they may generate or lead to a feeling of pleasurable relief afterwards.

The fact that people voluntarily do these things and that they take pleasure in doing them does not show that the fear is not itself unpleasant. If people found these activities for the most part pleasurable, this would give them sufficient reason for engaging in the pastimes even if the fear or nervousness were itself unpleasant. People are often keen to be tickled, yet as Ryle himself notes, a tickle in itself is an unpleasant sensation. The fact that a young lady takes delight in being tickled by her boyfriend does not show that she thinks of the sensation of being tickled as intrinsically nice but that she finds the occasion to be for the most part amusing and pleasant. The sensation a person feels when being tickled is not intrinsically attractive but merely, in the context, is a source of pleasure. It is quite consistent to say that fear, under certain conditions, stimulates or causes pleasurable excitement but that it is nevertheless in itself unpleasant.
The question for us is not whether the frightened rock-climber or movie-goer finds the occasion as a whole unpleasant but whether he finds a certain aspect of the situation unpleasant. The answer is that the rock-climber who is nervous about falling has thoughts of falling, and these thoughts cause him some distress. He finds the thought of falling to some degree upsetting or unpleasant. The greater the distress at the thought of falling, the greater is the nervousness or fear. The movie-viewer who is frightened by the threat of the 'murderer's' presence is, to that extent, bothered, uncomfortable, or distressed by his presence.

Why, then, if fear is intrinsically unpleasant are people often eager to do things that make them nervous or frightened? Their experiences are mixtures of unpleasantness and pleasure, and the pleasure is the greater part in the mixture.

Stuart Hampshire produces another example of a case of fear which, he says, need not be accompanied by unpleasantness. Though Hampshire felt a sympathy for Spinoza's hedonic analysis of the emotions he felt obliged to admit that it is possible to have an emotion without the hedonic element that would 'normally' be present. He writes:

When I truthfully say that I am sad about something, or that I am frightened of something (e.g., of German nationalism), I am not always reporting an inner perturbation, an affect, in addition to the thought of the object as an appropriate object of sadness or fear.

Just because the thought is in the normal case an element in the state of mind, together with the affect, one can intelligibly speak of being frightened of German nationalism, when the thought of danger is present, without the associated disagreeable affect.

Hampshire is right that someone can truthfully say that he is
afraid of German nationalism without feeling discomfort at the moment in which he is uttering the words. What a person feels when he is reporting that he is afraid of German nationalism - i.e., what he feels while uttering the words - is not crucial to the fear being reported. But this is not because fear is not necessarily unpleasant but because someone who is reporting a fear of German nationalism is not necessarily reporting a present, momentary emotion but is reporting a long-standing emotional disposition. He is saying that he tends, at times, to feel nervous or frightened of German nationalism.

A person who says that he is a clumsy person can be speaking truthfully without behaving clumsily at the time he is uttering these words, but it does not follow that one can be a clumsy person without ever behaving in a certain (clumsy) manner. Similarly, when someone truthfully says that he is afraid of mice, what he feels at the time of saying this is not necessarily crucial to the fear he is reporting. He might tell me of his fear while driving down the road when there is no danger of mice and when he does not feel the least bit nervous. He is reporting a tendency to feel nervous or frightened on certain occasions, e.g., when he sees a mouse, when he walks near the place where he last saw the mouse, or when he walks through the house at night in the dark. At times such as these the thought of mice appearing occurs to him, and he finds the thought disturbing and unpleasant.

In a like manner, if someone is afraid of German nationalism, he at times feels nervous or perturbed at the thought, e.g., when he reads some newspaper heading about Germany, sees a German car on the road, or falls into conversation about Germany. If there
were no such discomforts felt, it would follow that the man is not bothered or disturbed by the thought of German nationalism, and if he is not disturbed by the thought, he is not frightened of German nationalism.

Fear comes in different degrees. Both extreme fright (terror) and mild fright (nervousness) are cases of 'fear'. A person extremely afraid and a person only mildly afraid can both correctly be described as 'being afraid'. One 'frightened' person might be far less distressed by the thought of the feared object than is another 'frightened' person, but this does not show that the discomfort felt is incidental to fear. The less distressed a person is by the thought of approaching danger, the less frightened he is. It is possible to be afraid even when one is experiencing only minor discomfort, but then the fear is mild or low in intensity.

Both a Belgian in 1938 and an American in 1970 might have correctly said that they were 'afraid of German nationalism', yet we might expect that the former would have been far more frightened than the latter. When Hampshire writes that a fear of German nationalism is not necessarily accompanied by a 'disagreeable affect' he probably is thinking of someone like the contemporary American rather than of someone like the pre-war Belgian. That is, he is thinking of someone who is only mildly frightened by the thought of German nationalism. However, even to be mildly afraid it is necessary to be at least mildly 'unsettled' or bothered by the thought, that is, one must find the thought at least mildly unpleasant or disagreeable.

Some people exaggerate with their words for rhetorical purposes. They say that they 'hate' when they dislike, that they
'love' when they like, that they are 'terrified' when they are afraid; they say that they think something is 'fantastic' when they think it is good or 'horrible' when they think it is bad. Some people try to contribute to an impression of their being worldly, informed, and sensitive by exaggerating with their words when describing their thoughts and feelings on international affairs. When such a person says that he is 'frightened' of some situation in another country (e.g., German nationalism) he may in fact be little or not at all distressed or bothered by the situation, but this is not because fear need not be unpleasant but because the person does not feel what his words, taken literally, imply that he feels.

Hampshire said that a person might say that he was afraid of German nationalism when in fact he is not distressed by the thought of it but merely thinks of German nationalism as 'an appropriate object of fear'. This is to say that a person might say that he is afraid of something when he is not afraid but merely thinking that it would be appropriate to be afraid of this. Suppose a man told us 'I'm afraid that dad is going to die soon' but we knew that the speaker was not in fact the least distressed at the prospect of his father's death. In this case the speaker is not genuinely afraid of his father's dying but is either insincere or speaking figuratively rather than literally. Similarly, if someone said that he is afraid of German nationalism but he was not in fact the least bit bothered or distressed by the thought of it but only thought that this was 'an appropriate object of fear', then he is speaking either insincerely or figuratively.

When he denied that unpleasantness is necessary for fear
Hampshire in effect adopted the position that thinking that something is dangerous is in itself a **sufficient condition** for 'fear'. Hampshire, we may recall, explained the semantic situation as follows:

Just because the thought is in the normal case an element in the state of mind, together with the affect, one can intelligibly speak of being frightened of German nationalism, when the thought of danger is present, without the associated disagreeable affect.

This seems to be a way of saying that sometimes when I claim that I am (literally) frightened of something I am not claiming that I am bothered by the thought of that thing but only that I think that this thing is dangerous. By holding this Hampshire seems to be committing himself to the view that to think of something as dangerous is 'being afraid' of that thing in some (literal) sense of the phrase. This seems to imply that *any time* someone thinks that something is dangerous he is 'afraid' of that thing in some literal sense of the word 'afraid'. (How could fear sometimes be the thought of danger if there were times when the thought of danger was not fear?)

However, I have already provided solid argument against this position to which Hampshire seems to commit himself. Earlier I argued that the thought or belief that one is in danger is not a sufficient condition for fear. To say that the thought of danger is not a sufficient condition for 'fear' is to say that there is no literal sense for which 'being afraid' is simply having the thought that something is dangerous. When someone believes that he is in danger it is possible for him to be brave, apathetic, or despairing, and in such cases he would not necessarily be afraid in *any* literal sense of the term. It is possible for someone to believe that German nationalism is dangerous yet be totally apathetic
and unconcerned about it, and in such a case he would not be 'afraid' in any literal sense of the word. Consequently, when someone claims that he is (literally) afraid of German nationalism he would never be claiming only that he thinks it is dangerous. It may in fact be that the person thinks it is dangerous but is not bothered by the thought, but in claiming that he is literally afraid he would be claiming that he is bothered by the thought of it.

Some philosophers think that there is an important distinction between 'being afraid' and 'feeling afraid', and such a philosopher might object that unpleasantness is part of 'feeling afraid' but not necessarily of 'being afraid'. However, the preceding argument applies as much to the latter expression as to the former. The thought or belief that one is in danger is not sufficient for being afraid. To 'be afraid' as well as 'feel afraid' it is necessary to be bothered, unsettled, and thus distressed by the thought of the danger. A man could not be afraid of mice or of heights without at times being disturbed and distressed when seeing or thinking of mice or when gazing from heights.

There is no sharp distinction in meaning of the sort these philosophers suppose between 'being afraid' and 'feeling afraid'. Perhaps the former expression more often than the latter is used to refer to an emotional disposition, i.e., a disposition to feel the emotion on various occasions. Philosophers have, I suspect, been misled by the fact that the distinction echoes a distinction between, e.g., being intelligent or strong and feeling intelligent or strong. Someone can be intelligent without feeling intelligent and can feel intelligent without being intelligent.

However, one could also formulate a distinction between 'being in
pain' and 'feeling pain', yet this latter distinction comes to nothing. The fact that we can make this linguistic distinction does not show that one can 'be in pain' without ever 'feeling pain' or that 'being in pain' is not having a kind of unpleasant sensation.

Is pride intrinsically pleasant and necessarily so? The Concise Oxford Dictionary defines 'pride' in one sense as a "feeling of elation and pleasure due to action or circumstance that does one credit". More precisely, we may say that pride is pleasure due to the cognition of some action or state of affairs which is thought of as being to one's credit. We can take pride in what we think does us credit even if the thing does not in fact do us credit.

Is pleasure necessary for pride? Donald Davidson in a recent discussion of Hume's view of pride took the position that a certain cognition, without pleasure, is sufficient for pride:

What is needed to account for pride is the attitude of approval, or thinking well of, rather than being pleased.28

On Davidson's view, a person's being proud that he has won the long distance competition in the Olympic Games would be his approving of himself because of his win, and this would be the same as his judging himself to be praiseworthy because of his achievement.29

Though the approval or cognition which Davidson mentions is necessary for pride it is not sufficient. This attempted reduc-

28. Davidson (1976, p 748)
29. Davidson (1976, p 753)
tion of emotion or 'feeling' to cognition will not succeed. As was mentioned earlier, any thought or cognition can be had unemotionally or dispassionately. There is no thought towards which it is not in principle possible for someone to be indifferent; any thought could, in principle, leave a person 'unmoved'. Consider, for instance, a man very bothered by some personal problem. He plays his weekly tennis game with an old friend of his, and he plays very well. On other occasions he would have taken greater 'self-satisfaction' in playing so well but today, because he is feeling miserable, he does not take pride in his agility. On this day the thought of his having played very skillfully leaves him totally 'unmoved'. The cognition that he has played very well on its own is not sufficient for his being proud of his performance.

If pride or any other emotion were simply some thought it would be possible for people to feel pride or any other emotion at will. Most people could sit down at any time of day and think of things which they have done very well or circumstances which they believe are to their credit. Most of us think that we have done at least some praiseworthy things in our lives, and we could recall these events if we wanted to do so. However, people cannot feel pride or any other emotion at will. (Historically, the word 'passion' is connected with the idea of 'passivity'. 'Passions' overcome us and are not taken on voluntarily whereas 'actions' are voluntary and for the most part under an agent's control.) The reason for this is that feeling proud is not simply thinking of something which does one credit but is also feeling pleased by this thought, and though one can think about some subject at will, normally a person cannot at will be pleased by
thinking of some subject.

Normally it is recent actions or achievements and not actions of the distant past in which people take pride. Consider, for instance, a man who has just won a competition at the Olympic Games. His chest 'swells with pride' as he steps up to receive his award. Likely, for many hours after the event, he will, as the thought of his achievement occurs to him at various times, feel great pride in his victory. However, as the event recedes further and further into the past, the thought of his victory will leave him less 'moved' and so he is less overcome with pride. After a number of years have passed the thought of his earlier success might be associated with no pride at all. However, there need not be, during this passage of time, some corresponding change in the person's opinion or evaluation of his achievement. The person has little reason to think less of an achievement a few days or a few weeks after the achievement. The decrease in pride felt is not attributable to some cognitive change. Ten years after the event he might continue to believe and might readily acknowledge that he had run a very praiseworthy race on the earlier occasion, and yet might nevertheless have long since ceased to be proud of himself for that achievement.

What has changed in these cases is not the person's evaluation of his accomplishment but the degree to which the man is able to feel pleased over his earlier accomplishment. In the first hours and days after the event he felt pleased (delighted) at his success, and it is this pleasure which is the 'feeling' component in his being proud of his success. As the event recedes further into the past, the thought of his success loses its impact, i.e., it loses its power to please. (As a psychological fact,
thoughts which please or pain us at one time lose their power to do so as time passes. This fact about painful emotions underlies the saying 'Time heals all wounds'. The idea is not simply that people's thoughts or beliefs about a situation change over time but that thoughts which pain us at one time lose their power to do so as time passes.) As the thought of his success comes to be a less potent source of pleasure so he comes, in proportion, to feel less pride over his achievement. (It is not logically impossible to take pride in events of the distant past. It is logically possible for one's chest to 'swell with pride' when he thinks of an achievement of twenty years ago.)

That a person is proud of his looks entails that he is pleased with his looks. A man's being proud of his skill in playing the banjo entails his being pleased with his skill. A mother's being proud of her family entails her being pleased with it; she thinks that the qualities in her family reflect an achievement on her part, and she takes pleasure in the thought that they do so.

Descriptions of pride, like descriptions of other emotions, sometimes refer to specific occurrences of the emotion and at other times refer to a disposition to feel the emotion on various occasions. When saying 'Ann is proud of her looks' we may be thinking that at the present moment, now that she has finished dressing for the dance, she feels proud. Alternatively, in saying this we may be claiming that it is a trait of her personality or character that she is proud of her looks. Pride as a character trait is simply a disposition to feel pride on various occasions. That 'Ann was proud of her looks for most of her youth' entails that 'Joan was pleased with her looks for most of her youth'.

This latter statement entails that 'at various times in her youth the thought of her looks being good occurred to Ann and brought her pleasure'. (Perhaps the phrase 'being proud' would more frequently be used for emotional dispositions than would the phrase 'feeling proud'. However, 'being proud' like 'feeling proud' entails 'being pleased'.)

There are various pride-idioms which deserve some mention and explanation. That a carpenter 'takes pride in' his carpentry entails that he is proud of the work he does, i.e., that when working on or completing a piece he, at various times, tends to feel proud of his work. That a man takes pride in his mind but not in his looks entails that he is proud of his mind but not of his looks. The description of someone as 'taking pride in' his carpentry or his mind has the additional connotation that he devotes special attention or carefulness to his work or mental activity. To say that a carpenter 'takes pride in' his work is to suggest that his manner of working is motivated, at least in part, by a desire to produce a piece that he can be proud of, i.e., a piece that would warrant his feeling proud of it.

What is it to suffer 'hurt pride' or 'loss of pride'? A person who normally is proud of himself suffers hurt pride or loss of pride when an event occurs which he perceives as discreditable to himself and which causes him to be less proud for a period. To feel 'hurt pride' is not in itself to feel pride at all but is to feel, e.g., shame or anger at the event or circumstance perceived to be discrediting.

To say that someone has 'regained his pride' is to say that after suffering a period of hurt pride or loss of pride - i.e., a period in which he felt little pride in himself - he has come to
be proud of himself to the degree that he previously had been. A young man whose girlfriend has dropped him in favour of someone better looking normally suffers, among other emotions, hurt pride. The event, for a time, 'destroys his self-confidence and pride': his thoughts become dominated with an event that seems to indicate that he is a comparatively unattractive person. As time passes, his opinion of his own merits rises as his perspective on events changes and becomes less distorted; he again becomes able to take pride in his good qualities and merits.

A man who is proud of his skill in tennis would often be more distressed by playing badly than would someone less proud of his skill in tennis. A man who takes pride in his self-sufficiency and in his ability to provide for his family may be more distressed than would someone who did not pride himself in this ability if he became unemployed and were forced to request public aid. These facts show that pride is sometimes a source of pain and that it can be 'painful' in the sense of being a cause of pain. Should we conclude from this that pain is as closely connected to pride or as much 'a part of' pride as is pleasure? No. The pain mentioned here is an effect of pride whereas the pleasure is a constituent. That a man takes pride in his ability to provide for his family entails that he takes pleasure in this achievement; that he is distressed by being forced to request public assistance is at most an effect of his previously having been proud of his ability to support his family. It is logically possible for someone to take pride in his ability to support his family without being distressed when he loses the ability. If, for instance, a number of good things happen to the person at the time he loses his job his thoughts might become occupied with his gains rather
than his losses. In this situation a person who had been proud of his ability to support his family might not be distressed when losing the ability. However, it is not logically possible for someone to be proud of an ability without being pleased that he has it.

We sometimes describe a person as being proud, simpliciter, without explicitly claiming that he is proud of some particular achievement or ability. To say this is at least to say that he has a high opinion of his merits and attributes and that he is pleased with them. It may be possible to be proud of oneself without being proud of some particular merits or accomplishments, but normally a proud disposition will be composed of pride in various personal achievements and qualities. Normally, when someone is correctly described as being 'a proud person', simpliciter, he will be a person who is proud of various particular circumstances, e.g., his being a self-made man, his having raised healthy and happy children, his having been successful in his career, etc.

Vanity is excessive or unwarranted pride. A person who is vain is excessively pleased with himself — he is pleased with himself for attainments or qualities that do not warrant the degree of enthusiasm he feels. In judging that someone is vain we not only are saying that he is pleased with himself but are also making a moral or value judgement that his feelings are excessive or unwarranted to the extent that his feeling this way is a fault in him. It is this moral or value judgement implicit in judgements of vanity that Errol Bedford is thinking of when he writes:
There are certain cases in which a third-person statement gives the speaker's verdict on that person; a factor which certainly complicates discussions of character. Such terms as 'vain', 'envious', and 'resentful' are terms of censure.  

Gilbert Ryle, when defending the claim that vanity is not a special experience, argued as follows:

There is no special thrill or pang which we call a 'feeling of vanity'. Indeed, if there were such a recognizable specific feeling, and the vain man was constantly experiencing it, he would be the first instead of the last person to recognize how vain he was.

There are two points that need to be made in replying to this argument. Firstly, by speaking of someone as 'a vain man' we often would be attributing not merely a present emotion but some character-trait to him. To have a vain character-trait or disposition is to be disposed to feel vain on various occasions. The vain man is not 'constantly experiencing vanity' any more than the clumsy man is constantly being clumsy, i.e., being clumsy every moment of the day. But, nevertheless, the vain man does have special feelings on various occasions. Secondly, recognizing vanity in ourselves is not simply recognizing that we

30. Bedford (1956, pp 89-90). Vanity is always and necessarily a fault and thus is a 'term of censure'. The terms 'envious' and 'resentful' are in a slightly different category. Unlike vanity, envy and resentment are not always faults. That a philosopher should envy the brain-power of Aristotle seems no fault, nor is it a fault for a mistreated person to be resentful of his treatment.

When thought of as a character-trait and not merely as a particular emotional occurrence, being an 'envious' or a 'resentful' person would normally be undesirable. However, these traits would, I think, differ from vanity in that it is at least possible to have these character-traitst without some fault or undesirability being involved. If a person lived among far more talented people or among people who regularly mistreated him, it is doubtful whether his having a character-trait of being an envious or a resentful person would be a fault. (This is so especially if he were otherwise a happy, congenial person.)

31. Ryle (1949, pp 84-85)
are pleased with ourselves but recognizing that we are not warranted in being pleased in some instance. A person's slowness in recognizing his own vanity therefore is but a single instance of the general human trait of being slow to recognize one's own faults and excesses. (Most of us are much quicker to see faults in others than we are to see them in ourselves.) That people are slow or unable to recognize vanity in themselves is not due to vanity's not being a special experience (or a disposition to have special experiences) but is due largely to a low capacity in people for recognizing one's own excesses and faults.

Conclusion

The hedonic approach to the analysis of psychological concepts is important for various reasons. For emotions a hedonic analysis provides, firstly, a clear description of the components of an emotion and of their relationships to each other and, secondly, it provides an explanation of the relation of an emotion to its 'object'. The hedonic approach counters the tendency in recent Philosophical Psychology for philosophers to avoid assigning a role to special experiences in the analysis of psychological concepts. To show that a psychological concept entails pleasure or unpleasantness is to show that it entails a kind of experience of the sort outlined in earlier chapters. Hedonic analyses explain what the emotion or sensation feels like; they describe the 'subjective character' of the emotion or sensation.

I have defended hedonic analyses for little more than a handful of psychological concepts. As is suggested by the number and variety of hedonic proposals mentioned in the early part of
this chapter, there are probably a number of additional psychological concepts which would be susceptible to hedonic analyses. The various proposals would benefit from closer examination and from argument offered in defense. I rest content to point in the direction of a type of philosophical analysis which appears promising and important. In this direction will be found a useful application for the insights gained in the foregoing detailed examination of the pleasant and the unpleasant.
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