I declare that this thesis has been composed by myself and that it is my own.

(Sandra Consuelo Francesconi)
To Giuliano—
for all and everything—
ABSTRACT

The position of the adjective in the nominal, generally regarded as a matter of stylistic variation (Part I), appears to have a considerable theoretical interest as bearing relevance to the distinction of verbs into activities, achievements and accomplishments (Part II), to the problem of tense and aspect (Part III), to the nature of the state denoted by the adjective and to the adjective relation with the noun if refers to (Part IV). After reviewing the most generally held views on the adjective and the relevance of the position in verb distinction, we have analysed attributive structures with adjective in pre- and post-nominal position in conjunction with 'overtly' and 'non-overtly' functional nouns in relation to the conditions the adjective position establishes for the development of discourse (Part IV). As a consequence of this, we reach the conclusion that the meaning of the state denoted by the adjective must be postulated in terms of 'semantic potentials' resulting from past occurrences and basis for future ones; in this view, the position of the adjective is postulated as a process through which the noun determines and is determined by the adjective which, in turn, re-determines itself and re-determines it (noun) according to its being pre- or post-nominally placed (Part V).
I want to thank
Jim Miller as my supervisor for his patience, understanding and useful advices;
C.A. Vogt for the particular stimulation of his "argumentative direction" and for a shared interest in the externally ambiguous 'implicit';
C.T.G. De Lemos for her unshaken intellectual support through years of conversations, discussions and criticisms and for her unfailing help during the writing of this thesis;
J.A. Giannotti for the tension and the relief of an attempt to apply and tentatively prove through a linguistic analysis his philosophical theory without which the last chapters of this thesis would not have reached their present form;
to all of them my deepest gratitude.
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Part I: Review of the literature on the adjective: main points of general interest

The present review of the literature on the adjective is based on:

(1) review of 'traditional' grammars which consider the adjective a part of speech distinct from nouns and verbs (Lyons, 1969: 323 "...since the Medieval period most grammarians have drawn a sharp distinction between the adjective and the verb as they have between the verb and the noun") and take into account both its predicative and attributive use;

(2) review of transformational accounts of attributive adjectives.

I.1. Traditional grammars

In traditional grammars two main trends are recognizable in relation to the adjective position in the NP:

a) that which considers the occurrence of the adjective in pre- or post-nominal position as arbitrary and unsystematic, signalling no difference in meaning: such a view is taken up for ex. by M. Santangelo (1828), Fowler (1851), A. Bain (1877), A. Panzini (1933), Trabdalza e Allodoli (1934), C. O. Curme (1935), G. Gougenheim (1939) among others. They all basically hold that "there is no invariable rule for the position of the adjective" (O. Jespersen, 1924) and that "la place de l'attribut reste toujours très arbitraire" (F. Diez, 1876), pre- or post-nominal position being due to "elegant turn to the phrase", "metrical harmony", "poetical variety", "a work of art", "speaker's in-
tuition", "descriptive force", "nuance stylistique" etc. Only in the case of particular adjectives (considered 'exceptions') such as "great, big" (Santangelo), "poor" (Diez, Jesperson, Gougenheim), "short, low, ripe" (Trabalza e Allodoli), "good, simple, kind" (Battaglia e Periniccone), is the difference of meaning attributed to the adjective position in the NP and connected with "good taste" (Santangelo) "proper meaning" (post-posed adjective) vs. "figurative meaning" (pre-posed adjective) (Diez and Trabalza e Allodoli), "valeur appreciative" (pre-posed) (Gougenheim), "qualité essentielle"/"sense figure"/valeur "subjective" (pre-posed) vs. "valeur plus objective" (post-posed) (Grammaire Larousse du XX siecle);

b) that which considers the occurrence of the adjective in pre- or post-nominal position as signalling a difference of meaning: this is the view taken by such grammarians as Damourette at Pinchon (1911, 1930), Kruisinga (1931), M. Grevisse (1964), P. Tekavcic (1972) among others. It is worth quoting in this respect Kruisinga who holds that "an attributive adjective that precedes its leading N forms a closer unit with it and expresses a quality that is more or less thought of as lasting and characteristic of the N, not an accidental quality or circumstance" (1931: 213).

An attributive adjective preceding its leading N "expresses a permanent quality" vs. the post-posed adjective which expresses "something momentaneous or at least temporary" (1932: 121).

On similar lines Kruisinga and Erades (1953: 183 and 187) who in relation to the structure Adjective + N
(i.e. pre-posed adjective) hold that such an order gives "unity to the group" making "the attributive member a subordinate element" vs. the post-posed adjective which "tends to promote the independence of the members of the group so that its unity is less close than ... with the pre-position of the attributive member".

Summarising the views held in relation to the adjective position in the NP, both in the case of particular adjectives and of adjectives in general, we have the following:

pre-posed adjective: meanings:
- figurative (Diez, Grammaire Larousse)
- generic (Trabalza e Allodoli, Diez)
- essential (Grammaire Larousse)
- affective/subjective (Gr. Larousse, Grevisse)
- permanent/lasting/characteristic/giving unity to the group (Kruisinga)
- proper (Trab/e Allodoli, Diez, Gougenheim)
- individual/distinct (Diez, Tekavcic)
- essential (Damourette et Pinchon)
- appreciative (Gougenheim)
- objective (Gr. Larousse)
- momentaneous/temporary/ind (Krusinga)

post-posed adjective: meanings:
- momentaneous/temporary/independent from the N (Krusinga)

the most obvious remarks for these definitions being:
1. the value of "essential" quality is attributed to the pre-posed adjective by the Grammaire Larousse and to the post-posed adjective by Damourette et Pinchon;

2. the pre-posed adjective and the post-posed adjective are given a plurality of meanings for which there does not seem to be agreement; moreover such definitions as subjective/generic/permanent or essential/objective/temporary/individual etc. refer to different notions;

3. the pre-posed adjective is given different meanings by the same author (both "figurative" and "generic" by Diez and Trabalza e Allodoli; "figurative" and "essential" by the Grammaire Larousse) without any specification as to the relation, whether existing or not, between them;

4. no definition is given as to the meaning of "figurative, generic, individual" etc.

Before dealing with those authors who treat the adjective as a verb, it will be useful to see how such an approach is hinted at in the treatment both of particular adjectives (as for ex. the adjectives with the -able/-ible suffix or the adjectives considered in connection with temporal adverbials) and of the so called present and past participle, though the former is considered as an exception and the latter as a category similar to though different from the adjective. Thus Maetzner (1874), Poutsma (1914), Meyer Lübke (1900) among others admit in the adjective, together with determinations of degree, the presence of "determinations of time" whereby "they approach participles" (Maetzner, 1879), while Weerenback (1927), Cur-
me (1931), Kruisinga, Zandvoort (1950), basically sharing Weerenback's theory that "tout adjective peut participer du rôle du verbe ... La communauté de rôle avec le V s'entendre à la voix, à la réaction casuelle, à l'aspect et au temps", suggest the presence of an aspectual element in the adjective.

The connection between adjectives and verbs is seen even more clearly in the treatment of the "participles" to which by almost general agreement (Fowler, Kruisinga and Erades, Meyer-Lübke, Diez, Poutsma, Weerenback, Jesperson et al.) both an adjectival and a verbal character are assigned - the participle becoming an adjective "when the reference to a determinate sphere of time steps into the background" (Maetzner) "quand l'idée de durée disparaît graduellement et le sens de durée limitée est remplacé par celui de caractère désormais permanent" (Meyer-Lübke) and keeping its verbal function when appearing in the NP in post-posed position. With respect to the participle in the NP, Poutsma states that "the placing of this verbal is to a large extent a matter of indifference": pre-position is said to be used in general when "the actions or states they (the participles) express are not associated with any limitation of time", "when they have stripped off their verbal character and come to denote permanent attributes", while post-position is used when the participle expresses "limitations of time" (Poutsma), i.e. adjectival function and durative aspect are recognised as prerogatives of the pre-posed participle vs. the post-posed participle which "distinctly suggests the time of the action or the occurrence or the agent" (Kruisinga
and Erades on the -ing participle) "marking its verbal force" (Curme).

Summarising the views concerning the attributive participle we have:
1. the participle is considered as having both adjectival and verbal functions: adjectival function: no time association (pre-nominal position); verbal function: time association (post-nominal position);
2. as a consequence of 1) the adjective cannot be considered as having time association: when such a time association seems to be implied, this is to be considered as limited to "exceptions";
3. the participles, though having a time association, do not give "any direct indication of the time of the action they express" (Mulligham, 1852) getting their temporal value from "la signification de la phrase tout entière ... ce qui revient à dire que cette notion temporelle ne tient pas surtout au sens original re... du part. lui-même" (Weerenback).
(For the notion of the temporal value being tied up with all the elements of the sentence cf. also p. 141).
I.2. Transformational Theories on the Adjective in Attributive Structures.

An analysis of the articles that appeared from roughly 1950 up to now shows their basic concern for:
A. derivation of the attributive adjective and
B. its pre/post nominal position.

In relation to A), i.e. to the derivation of the attributive adjective, the most widely held view is that proposed by transformational grammarians for whom attributive adjectives are transformationally derived from underlying predicative adjectives further embedded into underlying relative clauses to which the T-deletion and T-adjective-shift are applied, the assumption being that all adjective/substantive combinations go back to copulative sentences of the form 'N be adjective'.

In this part of the review we shall be concerned with the first two steps of such a transformational analysis, i.e. with the predicative source of the attributive adjective and with the relative clause transformation, as both are relevant for the adjective position in the nominal, the latter being examined in the part dealing specifically with the adjective position.

I.2.1. Predicative Source of Attributive Adjectives

The relation between attributive adjectives and predicative adjectives has been subject to several objections such as: Z. Vendler (1963) who in relation to the structure 'AN--N is A' holds that "no doubt it represents the transformational origin of a great many adjectival NP" but
"it would be a mistake to think that all AN phrases conform to this pattern. Examples like 'beautiful dancer', 'utter fool', 'nuclear scientist' are sufficient to caution us as no fool is utter and a nuclear scientist is not a scientist that is nuclear" while for such a sentence as 'beautiful dancer' "the phrase may mean two things: either that the dancer is beautiful or that she/he dances beautifully";

W. Winter (1965): "no acceptable adjective-N combination matches the string 'T-N-is+adjective' in "'the boy is ill', the Frenchman is last (in a game)' 'the girl is right (in what she says)" (the same examples are found in H. Marchand 1966, too).

To these 'T-N-is-adjective' combinations to which no adjective-N structure corresponds are further added "many adjective-N ones that are not matched by occurring strings of the type T-N-is-adjective ... as: ø: the lower depths; ø: the right side; ø: an old statesman; ø: the late Churchill; ø: the poor guy; ø: a second Chomsky; etc." (where ø corresponds to the non existing predicative structure);

on similar lines Bolinger (1967) objects to the derivation of such sentences as:

"I bought the big table" from:

"'I bought the table' { → 'I bought the table that was big' 'I bought the table big' → 'I bought the big table'" on the basis both that there are many attributive adjectives that are never predicative, adding to Vendler and Winter's examples the following:

'the main reason'; * the reason is main
'a total stranger'; * the stranger is total
'a fond old man'; * the old man is fond,

and that there are adjectives that are predicative but "seldom or never attributive at least in the same sense" as:

'the man is asleep'; * an asleep man
'the girl is sorry'; * a sorry girl etc.
Moreover Bolinger adds as a further reason for refusing the predicative structure as source of the attributive adjective the fact that such a structure (i.e. the predicative) creates ambiguity, this most typically shown by '-able' adjective as in:

'the only river that is navigable is to the North' which "does not tell us whether the temporary states of rivers are referred to ('the only river that happens to be navigable at the moment') or the classes of rivers". 'The only river navigable', instead, "is unambiguously occasion" while 'the only navigable river' is "unambiguously characteristic". Bolinger further objects to the predicative source analysis of attributives on the basis that if such a structure seems acceptable in the case of Ss like:

'I saw a hungry man'
derivable from: 'I saw a man' - 'the man was hungry', it is however less so in the case of:

'I saw a student
   the student was eager!→'I saw an eager student',
"its failing becoming clearer if both predications are with 'be':

'the boy is a student {→'the boy is an eager student'":
in 'the student is eager', 'student' is used in a different sense, "as a designation of an individual and amounts to saying 'the boy is eager" while in 'an eager student'
'student' "suggests someone who is eager qua-student", the first being what Bolinger calls "referent-modification" and the second being "reference-modification".
This analysis leads him to conclude that "predications, sin-
ce they modify the referent rather than the reference of the N, turn out to be unsatisfactory sources for many attributive adjectives.

Similarly for 'a regular policeman' vs. 'the policeman is regular' where "the attributive refers to regularity qua-policeman" and the predicative to "regularity qua-human-being". Thus in Bolinger's analysis the predicative structure of such Ss as:

'the river is navigable'

is ambiguous (vs. its attributive correspondent '(navigable) river (navigable)') unambiguous) while the predicative structure of such Ss as:

'the student is eager'

is unambiguous as much as its attributive correspondent 'eager student', the difference between the latter two being that of referent-modification vs. reference modification. However the non-ambiguity of the predicative structure

'the student is eager'

held on p.15 of Bolinger's article seems contradicted by the same S, ie. 'the student was eager', held to be ambiguous on p.20 on the basis that 'student' "as a human noun... allows of 'eager' in any relevant sense including 'eager-qua-student' but also including 'eager to be off'/'to hear the latest racing news' or whatever", while "'eager student' on the other hand normally means 'eager-qua-student'" (for a similar interpretation of 'functional' nouns used in combination with attributive adjective cf. also Vendler, '63, whose interpretation of such Ss 'he is a good king' as 'he is good as a king', ie. 'AN—N is A as an N' or 'AN—N is A for an N' is basically in agreement with Bolinger's 'A-qua-N' paraphrases of AN structures);
R.L. Politzer (1971) discusses a S similar to Bolinger's 'the student is/was eager', his example being 'the teacher is poor'; and follows Bach's proposal that every noun is accompanied in the deep structure by an indefinite pronoun so that the N 'teacher' for ex. implies 'somebody is a teacher'. On this basis the S 'the teacher is poor' is given the following derivation: 1) somebody is a teacher - somebody is poor; 2) the somebody who is a teacher is poor; 3) the teacher is poor, where the adjective in 3) is said to be "a modification of the underlying concept 'somebody' rather than of the specific semantic content of the word 'teacher'". On the other hand, in 'the poor teacher', 'poor' modifying 'teacher' is said to be "collapsed with the construction in which 'poor' modifies the implied indefinite pronoun", thus yielding an ambiguous structure as "the attributive adjective can modify either a) the underlying indefinite pronoun or b) the semantic content of the N".

"Most attributive adjectives" are thus "ambiguous in the construction adjective + N" (similar to Vendler's 'beautiful dancer' as far as ambiguity is concerned).

If we now compare Politzer's analysis of 'the teacher is poor' and 'the poor teacher' with Bolinger's 'the student is eager' and 'the eager student' respectively, we see that while both analyses agree in attributing non-ambiguity to the predicative structures 'the teacher is poor' and 'the student is eager' (Bolinger's interpretation on p.15), there is no agreement as to the interpretation of the attributive structures 'poor teacher' and 'eager
student', the former being considered ambiguous and the latter non-ambiguous. As in both sentences (ie. 'poor teacher' and 'eager student') we are dealing with the same type of N (‘functional’ Ns in Vendler’s terms), in both Ss the attributive should yield meaning a) and/or b), ie. we would expect that either both Ss are interpreted unambiguously as

'poor qua-teacher'/meaning b)  
eager qua-student'/meaning b)

or as ambiguous between referent and reference modification, between meaning a) and meaning b).

Apart from this difference of interpretation, Politzer's analysis would thus derive an ambiguous structure (the attributive) from a non-ambiguous one (the predicative). That such attributive structures as 'poor teacher' are ambiguous (though in a different sense) is confirmed by Bierwisch's analysis (1971: 129) of such Ss as:

(i) 'the high towers of the town will be reconstructed'

ambiguous according to "a restrictive or a non-restrictive interpretation of the adjective 'high'", ie. between:

(ii.) 'The towers of the town which are high will be reconstructed'

and (iii) 'The towers of the town, which are high, will be reconstructed',

(ii.) and (iii.) implying different norms for comparison as can be seen from these paraphrases:

(iv.) 'The towers of the town which are higher than the average towers of the town will be reconstructed'

(v.) 'The towers of the town, which are higher than average towers, will be reconstructed'
ie. "restrictive modifiers behave like non-generic S4, non-restrictive modifiers like generic ones with respect to the choice of the class for comparison", ie. (ii) is connected with

(63a) These towers are high paraphrased by 63b) 'these towers are high for towers' and (63c) 'these towers are higher than average towers'; (iii) with

(62a) Towers are high paraphrased by (62b) 'towers are high for buildings' and (62c) 'towers are higher than average buildings', ie. S(i) 'the high towers of the town will be reconstructed' is ambiguous between the readings of (62) and of (63). Since (62) and (63) are "close paraphrases", such an analysis "shows that even the positive form of relational adjectives must have a reading similar to that of the comparative, the term for comparison being provided by the average elements of a certain class. This class is that of the subject NP if it is non-generic; it is the next larger class, ie. the genus proximum, if the NP is generic".

Similarly Campbell and Vales (1969) dealing with a structure like

(43a) That painting was expensive hold that such a S is ambiguous as between:

(43b) That painting was an expensive one

(43c) That painting was an expensive item

and (43d) That painting was an expensive purchase

ie. we get for (43a) "the same ambiguity we find in the S 'the elephant was big" "where 'big' is ambiguous as between 'big for an elephant' and 'big for an animal'". S (43a) is said to transform to 'that expensive painting' "only if it can be paraphrased by a structure like (43b)".
The same is held to be true for the 'superlative' structures (35) and (37),

(35) I bought a painting which was very expensive
and
(37) The painting was very expensive
both ambiguous like (43a), vs.

(36) I bought a very expensive painting
which is "unambiguous" and for the comparative structure

(39) I know several lawyers who are more successful
than B.

where "under one reading (where it is success as a lawyer
that is at stake) we can prepose the adjectival group 'more
successful', whereas under the other reading (where it
is success as a person which is at stake) we cannot pre-
pose it".

Thus what is crucial to the interpretation of the above Ss
is the reference of the N; "IDENTITY of reference" (and
not FORMAL identity) between the nominal and the subject
of the embedded relative clause being advocated for the
shifting to prenominal position of the adjective; ie.
while the readings of (39) can be expressed as:

(33) I know a lawyer \# wh-person is more successful
than B \#:

and

(34) I know a lawyer \# wh-person is more successful
than B \#:

it is only in the case of reading (34) that the adjective
can be preposed.

Thus while Campbell and Wales's analysis of such nominals
as 'painting' and 'lawyer' in terms of 'painting/item-pur-
chase' and of 'lawyer/person' respectively is in agree-
ment with Bierwisch's view (and with the others mentioned
above), their analysis of the attributive structure as
represented in the S 'that expensive painting', 'a very
expensive painting', and 'more successful lawyer than ...' as unambiguous as to the reference of their respective Ns, contrasts with Bierwisch's account of such attributive Ss as "the high towers" viewed as referentially ambiguous (and in agreement instead with Bolinger's 'eager student' = 'eager-qua-student').

I.2.2. Comparative Structures

In spite of their disagreement as to the interpretation of the attributive structure, both Bierwisch and Campbell and Wales's analysis bring in the problem of the relation between the so called positive and comparative structures of the adjective (for which cf. also p. 157).

Given the plausibility of such a relation and the fact that in transformational treatments of the adjective the predicative structure of the type N + be + adjective is considered to be the structure underlying both the attributive adjective with the adjective in either its 'positive' or in its 'comparative' form and the predicative adjective with the adjective in its 'comparative' form, it is worth considering also some of the proposals dealing with the 'comparative'; this also relevant as it raises another objection to the predicative source of the attributive and comparative adjective. Transformational grammarians have given to comparative Ss of the type:

'John is taller than Mary'
such structures as:
in which the predicative structures 'John is tall' and 'Mary is tall' appear as constituents of 'John is taller than Mary', i.e. comparative Ss are analysed as derived from two underlying predicative structures with positives as constituents. But as R. Bartsch (1972) points out, logicians and semanticists have emphasised that the Ss (2), (3) and (4):

(2) John is taller than Mary
(3) John is as tall as Mary
(4) John is the tallest of P.'s sons
do not imply (I) and (II), i.e.
(I) John is tall
or (II) Mary is tall
as John may be a very short boy, in which case (I) would be false while (2), (3), (4) could still be true. However
"even though there exists no implicational relation between (2-4) on the one hand and (I) and (II) on the other, there clearly exists a semantic relation". In agreement with Hierwisch and following Sapir (1944), R. Bartsch finds this semantic relation in the fact that Ss containing positives "typically compare a measurement value of an individual to an average or norm presupposed as part of the cultural background of speakers of the language", while Ss containing comparatives "typically compare a measurement value of one individual to that of another which is not part of the listeners' cultural background but has to be generated in his mind for the specific purpose of comparison"; the comparative being considered as "semantically marked" while the positive as "semantically unmarked". The basis of such a view is that comparison underlies both the adjectives superficially realised as 'positives' and as 'comparatives'.

The alternative representation of (1), (2), (3) and of

(5) John is short
(6) John is shorter than Mary
(7) John is as short as Mary

is, in R. Bartsch's view, as follows:

for (I): John is tall
we have Ia) $f^M_T(x) > N_{T,Y}$, where $f^M_T$ is the abbreviation for the measure function as applied to the dimension Height (Tallness) and $N_{T,Y}$ is the abbreviation for the average of the heights of the objects in the reference set $Y$ within which $x$ is compared;

for (2): John is taller than Mary
we have (2a) $f^M_T(x) > f^M_T(y)$;

for (3): John is as tall as Mary

(3a) $f^M_T(x) = f^M_T(y)$ ($\langle f^M_T(y) > N_{T,Y} \rangle$), where the angular brackets indicate presupposition;
for (5): John is short
    (5a) \( f_T^M (x) < N_{T,Y} \);

for (6): John is shorter than Mary
    (6a) \( f_T^M (x) < f_T^M (y) \) \& \( f_T^M (y) \leq N_{T,Y} \);

for (7) John is as short as Mary
    (7a) \( f_T^M (x) = f_T^M (y) \) \& \( f_T^M (y) \leq N_{T,Y} \).

These representations read as follows:

(1a): the height of \( x \) is greater than the height of the average;

(2a): the height of \( x \) is greater than the height of \( y \);

(3a): the height of \( x \) is the same as the height of \( y \) with the presupposition that the height of \( y \) is greater than the average;

(5a): the height of \( x \) is less than the height of the average;

(6a): the height of \( x \) is less than the height of \( y \) with the presupposition that the height of \( y \) is less than the height of the average;

(7a): the height of \( x \) is the same as the height of \( y \) and the presupposition that the height of \( y \) is less than the height of the average.

Leaving aside for the time being (1) and (5), and examining the presupposition of (3a), (6a), and (7a) we see that in (3a) the presupposition 'the height of \( y \) is greater than the average' is the reading given to (I), i.e. to the S 'John is tall', in this case 'Mary is tall'; in (6a) and (7a) the presupposition 'the height of \( y \) is less than the height of the average' is the reading given to (5) 'John is short', in this case 'Mary is short', i.e. the presupposition '\( y \) is tall' and '\( y \) is short' are part of the reading of (3), (6) and (7).
However (3) 'John is as tall as Mary' does not necessarily presuppose 'Mary is tall' as such a $S$ can be uttered also in the context of Mary being short; the same applying to (6) 'John is shorter than Mary' which does not necessarily presuppose 'Mary is short' as it can be uttered also in the context of Mary being tall; the same for (7) 'John is as short as Mary' (for this type of sentences cf. also p. 193). If this is correct, then R. Bartsch's analysis, too, suffers from some of the shortcomings of the transformational approach as the alleged presuppositions do not hold.

Basically the same shortcomings can be found in A. Wierzbicka's (1971) view that only some expressions such as those referring to spatial dimensions like 'large, small, near, far, long, short, wide, narrow, high, low, deep, shallow etc.' "are indeed built on the basis of the corresponding comparative", i.e. '$x_1$ is small $= x_1$ is a small $x = x_1$ is smaller than most $x$'s'; the same applying also to "some other semantic sets like 'loud, heavy (light), for a long (short) time, old (young), dear (cheap), difficult (easy), strong (weak) etc.' "for which the comparative seems to be primary", i.e. 'loud $=$ louder than most', 'heavy $=$ heavier than most' etc. Such comparative forms are given the following interpretation:

ex: 'the voice of $X$ was louder than that of $Y'$ =

"it was impossible (to be able to hear the voice of $Y$ and to be unable to hear the voice of $X$), it was possible (to be able to hear the voice of $X$ and to be unable to hear the voice of $Y$)."

(In footnote 5 referring to this interpretation, Wierzbicka says that "the expression 'one cannot' and 'one can'"
refers to the subsequent pairs of conjuncts, not to either of them individually"), i.e.

impossible (to be able to hear Y and not X),
possible (to be able to hear X and not Y).

In contrast with these, such "evaluations as 'good' and 'bad'" are in her view "absolute", "they do not signify 'better than ...', 'worse than ...'" but "they signify 'we would want it', 'we would not want it': $X_1$ is good $= X_1$ is a good $X = (I$ am thinking of $X_1) — we would want this $X" (where the expression in parenthesis is "the standard representation of the subject of the S").

The comparatives 'better' and 'worse' are explained independently on the basis that "Ss of the '$S_1$ is more P than $S_2$' - type are metatextual and normative" and "indicate what in the speaker's opinion can and what cannot be said". Thus a S like:

'X is better than Y'

is interpreted as:

"(I am thinking of X) — one could not say that (Y is good and that he is not good), one could say that (Y is not good and that he is good)"

i.e. "in the case of the expressions 'good' and 'bad' the comparative is secondary to the positive, not viceversa".

The same relation is held to obtain for a great many pairs like 'similar, intelligent, wise, attractive etc.'

If we now examine the S:

'John is better than Mark'

according to this interpretation we would have:

one could not say (Mark is good and John is not good),
one could say (Mark is not good and John is good),
i.e. if we say that Mark is good we also say that John is good,
ie. to Mark = 'good', there corresponds John = 'good' and to Mark = 'not good' there corresponds John = 'good'. Thus in both cases John is 'good' while Mark is either 'good' or 'not-good'. However the S 'John is better than Mark' with the assumption of Mark = 'not-good' can be uttered also in the context of John also being 'not-good', ie. in the context of both John and Mark being 'not-good', such a S having the reading that John is 'less-not-good' than Mark. If this is correct then Wierzbicka's analysis having 'John is good' as the basis of such Ss is not adequate. In fact the S:

'SJohn is better than Mark'

admits the following possibilities:

if Mark is good, John is 'more-good';
if Mark is 'not-good', John can be either 'good' or 'less not-good'

ie. 'not-good' in a less degree than Mark but nevertheless 'not-good'.

The same happens in the case of the S:

'the voice of X was louder than the voice of Y'

interpreted as:

if one hears Y one hears X,
if one hears X one may not hear Y

where to X = 'audible' there corresponds Y as 'audible' or 'not-audible', this again excluding the reading in which both X and Y are 'not-audible' though X is less 'not-audible' than Y.

To the two groups of adjectives just examined, Wierzbicka adds a third group consisting of adjectives dealing with "sensual qualities" where the positive is said to be pri-
mary whereas the comparative "is based not on the corresponding positive but on some other comparative". 
To this group belong Ss like:

'X is sweet' interpreted as: "(I am thinking of X)—tasting it we would say that there is sugar in it"
and 'X is sweeter than Y' interpreted as: "(I am thinking of X) — tasting it we would say that there is more sugar in it than in Y"

Though here as much as in the interpretation of the 'better'-type of Ss we have such vague proposition as "we/one would/could say", I fail to understand why the above Ss:

(1) 'X is better than Y'
(2) 'the voice of X is louder than the voice of Y'
should have a reading different from the S 'X is sweeter than Y'.

Surely we could have:

for (1) something like: 'observing his behaviour we would say that there is more goodness in X than in Y';

for (2) something like: 'hearing/listening to the voice of X we would say that there is more loudness in X than in Y'.

Moreover the S:

'X is sweeter than Y'
does not necessarily mean that "there is more sugar in X than in Y": this is in fact the case in the context for ex. of a person making a jam with 1 Kg of figs and 1 Kg of sugar and another with 3 Kg of figs and 1 Kg of sugar; in such a situation the result is that "the former jam is sweeter than the latter" but there is not more sugar in the former than in the latter, i.e. the quantity of sugar is the same and yet the former is sweeter.
The fact that Wierzbicka's analysis is expressed through the proposition "we would say" does not alter the criticism that such a S is meaningless, as it can be applied to all sorts of Ss nonsensical or not.

A position similarly based on the notion that the positive degree of the adjective is the result of comparison, is that presented by S.C. Wheeler (1972) who analyses the following Ss:

(1) 'John is a tall man'
and (2) 'John is taller than Mary'
as both based on the "primitive relation" expressed by:

Tall (x, \( y(y) \)),
i.e. (1) Tall \((J, x(x \text{ is a man})\)) and

(2) Tall \((J, x(x = M)\))

the difference between (1) and (2) being that in (1) to the conjunct Tall \((J, x(x \text{ is a man})\)) it is added a membership S saying that the individual belongs to the class to which it is related, thus yielding:

(1) Tall \((J, \hat{x}(x \text{ is a man})\)) and \(J \hat{x}(x \text{ is a man})\).

In this view attributives are considered as having "the form of a two-termed relation between an individual and a class of individuals plus a membership S saying that the individual belongs to the class to which it is related", as "when we say that John is a tall man we are saying both that this relation (between the individual and the class) obtains and that John is a member of the class of men".

The fact that the first conjunct is a relation to a class makes "the truth of the S ('John is a tall man!') depend on the height of the rest of men and how John measures up to the rest of men", i.e. 'John is a tall man' is interpreted
as 'John is tall for a man'.
The importance of Wheeler's conjunctive analysis is that it allows for narrow and wide scope to negation (this being relevant for the position of the adjective in Italian) i.e. the negation of 'John is a tall man' has the form:

(3) NOT (tall (J, \( \hat{x} \) (x is a man)) and J \( \varepsilon \hat{x} \) (x is a man))
"compatible with John's being a man and with John's being neither tall nor a man"; "while in the case where only his tallness is denied '\& J\( \hat{x} \) (x is a man)' is in effect added to the denial:

(4) NOT (tall (J, \( \hat{x} \) (x is a man)))".

Though this analysis seems correct as far as scope of negation is concerned, I wonder whether (4) does not have also the reading in which what is denied is tallness being a relation between John and the class of men while at the same time the second conjunct affirms John's belonging to the class of men, i.e. John would be a man but his 'tallness' would not be a relation between him and the class to which he belongs; in this case however it would yield a contradiction with what has been defined as the "primitive relation" underlying (1).
II.1. Adjective as state Verb.

In agreement with Plato and Aristotle's view of the adjectives as a subclass of Vs, some linguists have considered adjectives as verbs denoting (1) 'states' and as having restrictions different from those of verbs denoting the traditionally called 'events' and 'processes'. This view supported both by the fact that there are languages (as Chinese) where there is no distinction between stative verbs and verbs of action (Lyons, 1968) and by the syntactic evidence for a parallel between the two provided by those languages (as English: cf. Lakoff, 1965, and Russian: cf. Miller, 1970) where such a distinction exists, would seem to point that adjectives and verbs "can correctly be brought together as members of the same underlying category" (Lyons, op. cit.).

The 'restrictions' said to hold for verbs denoting states are basically the following:

From Kenny 1963: restrictions said to hold for 'static' verbs, among which Kenny includes 'be happy, be blue, be able, be taller than':

1. 'A has $\phi d$' implies 'A $\phi s$' (where $\phi = V$): "we use such expressions as 'I have loved her for 7 years' only when 'I still love her'". This is held to be in opposition both to 'activity' Vs as in 'I have acted foolishly' which "does not imply 'I am acting foolishly' nor, of course, excludes it" and to 'performance' V where 'A has $\phi d$' "implies 'A is not $\phi i n g$': 'I have built a house' = 'I am not building it'".

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(1) I am using 'denote' as interdependent with sense (cf. Lyons, 1981: 152).
2. 'A is ðing not used' (cf. also Lakoff 1965);
3. 'A ðs not frequentative' (cf. also Dowty 1972: 19)
4. 'A ðs if A has ðd':
5. 'States may last for a time ... we may ask how long it took to paint the door blue but not how long it took the door to be blue: ' (cf. also Dowty: Studies in the Logic of V Aspect and Time Reference in English, Ph. D. dissertation 1972, p. 26);
6. 'Static V ... cannot be qualified by these adverbials (= adverbials 'quickly' and 'slowly')! ... As to do something quickly is to take a short time to do it and to do something slowly is to take a long time to do it, only those actions which take time can be done quickly or slowly' and 'only performances take time': 'Mary cannot be beautiful faster than Jane';
7. * I have not finished loving the baby (vs. 'I have not finished drying the baby' = performance V);
8. 'No static V has an imperative' (cf. also Lakoff, 1965);
9. 'States do not have purposes (vs. performances which do have purposes)': * for what purpose did you see this joke?.
   The S'"Why do you love A?' asks for your reasons not for your purpose in loving A ... In this respect some activities are like states";
Taylor 1965:
10. 'If X is becoming ð, X neither is nor has become ð: it holds for changes with a fixed terminus as 'getting to be 6 years old';
11. 'If X is becoming ð, X is ð': it holds for those changes lacking a terminus: 'getting older';
Lakoff 1965:
12. "Stative Vs do not occur in cleft S:
   * what I am doing is being tall vs.
   'what I am doing is being noisy!'"(Lakoff):
the question: "What is he doing?" cannot be answered by a S with a stative V;\[13. "Neither stative Vs (Lakoff and Miller) nor static Vs (Miller) occur with certain kinds of manner adverbials:"

* he \{carefully knew the solution
\}{deliberately

(in Miller, 1970, in relation to Russian, manner adverbs like 'skillfully' and 'carelessly' are said not normally to co-occur with stative Vs but to co-occur with static and active V);\[14. * he is busy \{in understanding the book
\}{engaged
\}{being fat
\}{being poor

(Miller, 1970);

15. 'Adverbs referring to instruments do not normally co-occur with stative Vs' (Miller, 1970);

16. 'Adverbs of place do not normally co-occur with stative Vs' (also Miller, 1970):

* where did he understand the theory?
* he understood the theory in the library (OK. when 'in the library' = reduced form of an adverbial clause of time');

Potts, 1965, in relation to the Aristotelian classification between 'actions without a limit' and 'actions with a limit' gives the following:

17. 'Actions without a limit' (= 'be happy ... be intelligent'):

a) \$ing consistent with having \$ed
b) \$ing does not entail not having \$ed
c) having \$ed does not entail not \$ing;

'Actions with a limit' (= 'be cured... get thin, get well ... ')

('become' and 'undergo a change'):

a) \$ing inconsistent with having \$ed
b) \$ing entails not having \$ed
c) having \$ed entails not \$ing';
Dowty (op. cit.), 1972:

18. \[ \text{'X ceased } V_{st} \text{ at } t > X \quad V_{st} \rightarrow \text{ed} < t \quad \]  
\[ (= \text{state}) \quad (= \text{before}) \]

19. "with 'almost' state predicates have the reading that the state did not exist";

Zydatiss, 1974 (Ph. D. dissertation):

20. "ambiguity of (activity) and state predicates as to inception or cessation in:

'Mary did not work for 5 months/until Xmas';

ie. the implication of 'continuing state of non-occurrence of the event throughout the period' is said not to apply; the same for 'termination at end of specified period' (chart p.153); (d.n.a. for neither 'variable' nor 'non variable');

21. Meaning of modal 'must' in state propositions:

a) obligation for 'variable states' only;

b) logical necessity for both 'variable' and 'non-variable' states.

An examination of the above mentioned 'restrictions' on verbs of 'state' in relations to adjectives in Italian has yielded the following:

II. 1.1. Restrictions 1-21 on State Verbs.

Restriction 1: 'A has Ød', implies 'A Øs': Adj. to which it is said to apply: 'happy, blue, able, taller than'.

If we now consider the Italian S:

(1) John è stato felice (John has been happy)

(2) John è stato capace (John has been able)

(3) Questo vestito è stato blue (This dress has been blue)
(4) Jane è stata più alta di Mary (Jane has been taller than Mary)

we see that the implications are that the states denoted by the adjective in all the four Ss are no longer existent at the time of the utterance. This fact which seems to be a peculiarity of Italian in general not corresponding to the meaning of the English form 'has been' (for which there seems to be general agreement on its implying 'present relevance' both in the sense of 'state-up-to-the-present' and 'present result': Leech, 1971), is proved by the (1), (2), (3), (4) being compatible with 'ma ora non lo è più' (but he/it is no longer so):

(1) J. è stato felice ma ora non lo è più
(J. has been happy but now he is no longer so)
(lit. tr.)

(2) J. è stato capace ma ora non lo è più
(J. has been able but now he is no longer so)

(3) Questo vestito è stato blue ma ora non lo è più
(This dress has been blue but now it is no longer so)

(4) E' stata più alta di Maria ma ora non lo è più
(J. has been taller than Mary but now she/it is no longer so).

Though in all these sentences 'A has $\phi$' does not imply 'A $\phi$s', it is however worth noticing that (3) not only implies that the state denoted by the adjective is no longer in existence, but also that successive changes of states have occurred, ie. (3) implies that the dress referred to has been blue, then white, then ... and now is for ex. green, ie. there seems to be the implication that the dress has passed through at least two different states.
before the actual one. If only one change of state were implied the form 'era' (was) would be preferably used. This implication appears clearly in the following context:

I. "What about wearing that nice blue dress you had on when I last saw you?"

II. "It would be just right for to-night but the point is that it's no longer blue"

I. "What happened to it?"

II. "Well, I dyed it green – Actually the same dress has been blue, then whitish and now it is green".

Though both forms:

'questo vestito era blue' (= this dress was blue) and

'questo vestito è stato blue' (= this dress has been blue)

imply that the state denoted by the adjective 'blue' is non-existent at the time of the utterance, nevertheless while the former refers to a state in the past, its cessation being an implication of the pastness of its reference point, the latter refers to a state which has been entered and left, its pastness being an implication of cessation (cf. De Lemos, 1975). In fact:

* questo vestito era blue per 3 mesi (this dress was blue for 3 months)

'questo vestito è stato blue per 3 mesi'

(= this dress has been blue for 3 months),

this thus explaining the implication for (3) of 'more than one state passed through before the actual one' which is the case for ex. in the following context:

"ma questo vestito non era blue?"
"eh sì, era blue ma ora è verde. Non è una stoffa me
ravigliosa? Pensa che questo vestito è stato blue,
poi bianco, ora è verde e la stoffa sembra sempre
nuova o quasi".
"But wasn't this dress blue?"
"Eh yes, it was blue but now it is green. Isn't
it a marvellous material? Imagine that this dress
has been blue, then white, now it is green and the
material still looks new or almost.

The notions of inception and cessation related to the pre
sent perfect in Italian appear even more clearly with du-
rational adverbials as in:

(2b) J. è stato felice solo per poche ore ieri
(J. has been happy only for a few hours yester-
day)
(2b) J. è stato capace solo per alcuni mesi l'altro
anno
(J. has been able only for a few months last
year)
(3b) Questo vestito è stato blue solo per poco tempo
(this dress has been blue only for a short time)
(4b) J. è stata più alta di M. solo per pochi mesi
(Jane has been taller than Mary only for a few
months)

(1c) J. è stato felice fino a ieri
(J. has been happy till yesterday)
(2c) J. è stato capace fino al 1970
(J. has been able till 1970)
(3c) Questo vestito è stato blue fino a 3 mesi fa
(this dress has been blue till 3 months ago)
(4c) J. è stata più alta di M. fino a pochi mesi fa
(J. has been taller than M. till few months ago)

A temporal adverbial denoting either only the time of the
cessation of the state or both the time of inception and that of cessation are always implied in (1), (2), (3), (4). Consideration of such sentences as:

(1d) J. è stato sempre felice
(J. has been always happy)

(2d) J. è stato sempre capace
(J. has been always able)

(3d) Questo vestito è stato sempre blue
(this dress has been always blue)

(4d) J. è stata sempre più alta di M.
(J. has been always taller than Mary)

however show that both implications, 'but-he/it-is-not longer so' and the 'and-it/he-is-still-so', hold. In fact the above (d) sentences are all compatible with both:

'but he isn't any/nolonger' and
'and he still is'.

(3d): 'this dress has been always blue' being uttered either when it is the intention of the speaker to cause the cessation of the state denoted by the adjective or as a denial of an assertion referring to a different state of the 'dress', i.e. for the former a context like: 'this dress has always been blue and now I am fed up with this colour and I'll change it'; the latter as a denial of: 'I thought you had dyed this dress red' or 'hadn't you dyed this dress red?'.

However if we consider the use of such Ss with temporal adverbials denoting only the time of inception and implying that the state denoted by the adjective is still holding at the time of the utterance as in:

(1e) * J. è stato felice dal 1970
(J. has been happy since 1970)
(2e) * J. è stato capace dal 1970  
(J. has been able since 1970)

(3e) * Questo vestito è stato blue dal 1970  
(this dress has been blue since 1970)

(4e) * J. è stata più alta di M. dal 1970  
(J. has been taller than Mary since 1970)

we see that all of them are ruled out. The reading of state begun at time X in the past and still holding at the time of the utterance requires in fact in Italian the use of the simple present:

(1f) J. è felice dal 1970  
(J. is happy since 1970)

(2f) J. è capace dal 1970  
(J. is able since 1970)

(3f) Questo vestito è blue dal 1970  
(this dress is blue since 1970)

(4f) J. è più alta di M. dal 1970  
(J. is taller than M. since 1970).

(1e), (2e), (3e), (4e), are acceptable only if the time of the cessation of the state denoted by the adjective is implied, i.e. if such adverbials as 'still yesterday/a week ago/today etc.' are implied.

An ambiguity similar to the one in (1d), (2d), (3d), (4d) can be found in:

(1g) J. è stato un'altra volta/già felice  
(J. has been another time/already happy)

(2g) J. è stato un'altra volta/già capace  
(J. has been another time/already able)

(3g) questo vestito è stato un'altra volta/già blue  
(this dress has been another time/already blue)

(4g) J. è stata un'altra volta/già più alta di M.  
(J. has been another time/already taller than M.)
acceptable in the context in which Jane and Mary's whole physical development is taken into consideration. These sentences can be uttered either in connection to a present state 'happy/able/blue' (and 'taller' in the just mentioned context) or in connection to a past state 'happy/able/blue' (and 'taller'), i.e. in such context as:

'Finalmente J. ora è felice, ma è stato un'altra volta/già felice nel 1968/qualche mese fa etc.'
(at last J. now is happy but he has been happy another time/already in 1968/some months ago etc.)

and:

'J. è stato felice nel 1970 ed è stato un'altra volta/già felice nel 1971 ma da allora è sempre stato infelice'.

(J. has been happy in 1970 and he has been happy another time/already in 1971: since then he has always been miserable).

in the latter the cessation of a state in the past is said to have obtained at a time \( t_{n-1} \), where \( t_{n-1} \) is past and posterior to a previous time \( t_{n-2} \) when the other 'istance' in terms of 'beginning and end' of such a state has occurred ('repetitive/frequentative' meaning).

Thus the implication: 'A has \( \tilde{0}d' = 'A \tilde{0}s' applies in Italian only as one of the meanings in the group of Ss (d) and (g). If we now consider other types of states, i.e. the states denoted by such adjective as 'monco, inglese, alto' 'without-a-hand, English, tall' for 'grown up people') we have the following:

(5) * J. è stato monco

(* J. has been without-a-hand)
(6) * J. è stato inglese
(* J. has been English)

(7) * J. è stato alto
(* J. has been tall)

ie. "A has Ød state 'without-a-hand/English/tall'" gives unacceptable Ss: if the present perfect mainly implies inception and cessation of the state denoted by the adjective this explains why (5), (6), (7) are ruled out, ie. such states can be entered but not left, ie. they are not 'cessative states'.

It has to be noticed however that sentences like (7), with states denoted by such adjective as 'tall', are acceptable if the notion of 'tallness' is used with reference to a particular set of entities, ie. John has been tall as long as his 'tallness' has been measured in relation to set of entities A; this implying that when his 'tallness' is measured in relation to set of entities B he may no longer be defined by the state 'tall' as it is the case for ex. in:

(7a) è stato alto dai 3 ai 5 anni
(J. has been tall from 3 to 5 years old)

ie. he was "tall" in relation to children of 3-5 years old, ie. in relation to the set of entities represented by children of that age (for this cf. also p.50).

Restriction 2: 'A is Øing not used' (Kenny 1963, see above). This notion has been taken again by Lakoff as a way for distinguishing between 'stative' and 'non stative' Vs, the former refusing 'be + ing', the latter admitting it: thus
* I am being tall  vs.  'I am being noisy'.

This form, not found in Italian as such, its meaning being expressed through other means, mainly temporal adverbials like 'now' which will be discussed subsequently, has been objected to by Schachter (1973), for which cf. restriction 8, p. 54.

**Restriction 3:** 'A ̊s not frequentative' (Kenny 1963).

The same is held in Dowty (op. cit.) pp. 18/19: "the simple present of activities and performances always has a frequentative (or habitual) meaning ... in a way that the simple present of states does not; 'J. knows the answer' is not frequentative".

If we first start by considering Dowty's sentence (1) 'J. knows the answer' = 'not frequentative' we find that though this seems to be the case in this type of sentence, nevertheless such sentences as:

(2) J. knows the answer whenever the question is not addressed to him

seem to overtly manifest a 'frequentative' meaning, ie. the state of 'knowing-the answer' occurs every time the state of 'question-not-asked-to-J.' occurs. Though this poses the problem of the relation between 'knowing the answer' (in general) and 'not knowing it at a particular time/occasion' as in for ex. 'J. knows the answer but he does not remember it now', however the possibility of such sentences as (2) with a 'frequentative' meaning seems to show that the notion of states as not frequentative is at least not so clearcut as Dowty would suggest.
If we now consider states denoted by adjectives we have the following:

(1) M. è felice la mattina/il 30 di ogni mese etc.  
(M. is happy in the morning/on the 30th of every month etc.)

(2) M. è capace tutte le volte che la circostanza X si verifica  
(M. is able whenever circumstance X occurs)

(3) questo vestito è blue la sera (vestito cangiante)  
(this dress is blue at night) (it is one of those materials which change colour according to the light)

(4) * M. è più alta di J. la mattina  
(* M. is taller than J. in the morning)

where (4) is however acceptable in such contexts as for ex: 'M. is taller than J. in the morning when she wears high heel shoes'.

In such sentences we have the 'frequentative' reading, i.e. whenever it is the case that the time of circumstance X occurs, it is also the case that state Y occurs ('happy/blue/able/taller'). Such a 'frequentative' meaning appears also in such sentences as:

(1a) M. è stata felice 2 volte nella sua vita  
(M. has been happy twice in her life)

(2a) M. è stata capace 3 volte soltanto  
(M. has been able only 3 times (in her life/job etc.))

(3a) questo vestito è stato blue 2 volte  
(this dress has been blue twice) (as a result of dyeing)

(4a) * M. è stata più alta di J. 2 volte  
(M. has been taller than J. twice)

(4a) however becomes acceptable in the context for ex. of M. having been taller at 5-6 years of age and then again
at 12-13 years or in the context of (4) above: in all these contexts the state denoted by the adjective is said to have obtained 'more than once'. Possibly this notion of a 'frequentative' state in the sense of repeated occurrence of state X has to be found also in sentences of the type:

\[(1b) \text{M è sempre} (\text{felice/è sempre stata felice fino a ieri}} \] (capace etc.

ie. with states denoted by such adjectives as 'happy/able/efficient/amusing/ironic/humorous' etc. In these sentences the adverbial 'always' has the sense of 'at/in all relevant moments' thus implying that there are/have been moments when a state does/did not hold or stopped and if such is the case then 'always = in all relevant moments' would seem to have to be traced back to a 'frequentative' meaning.

In relation however to the states denoted by such adjectives as: 'monco/inglese' ('without-a-hand/English', plus 'tall') the frequentative reading does not apply:

\[(5) * \text{M. è inglese alto la mattina/ il 30 di ogni mese etc. monco} \]

(M. is tall/English/without-a-hand in the morning/on the 30th of every month etc.);

the sentence 'Mary is tall in the morning' is again acceptable in the case seen for (4) above. Similarly for

\* M. è stata (inglese 2 volte nella sua vita monco}
\{alto
(M. has been English/without-a-hand/tall twice in his life)

(acceptable only in the sense of "playing the parte of/acting as").

Restriction 4: 'A òs if has òd' (Kenny 1963 and Taylor 1965): applied to the states denoted by the adjectives, this would mean that:

1. M è felice
   (M. is happy)
2. M. è capace
   (M. is able)
3. Il vestito è blue
   (the dress is blue)
4. M. è più alta di J.
   (M. is taller than J.)

imply that 'M. has been happy/able/blue/taller'.

However, all these sentences in Italian are ambiguous as to denoting states holding only at the time of the utterance (t_n), the negation of such a state being implied as holding at t_{n-1} (time previous to the time of the utterance) and as to denoting states holding both at t_n and at t_{n-1}, i.e. these sentences are compatible both with adverbials like 'now/in this moment' only, and with both 'now/in this moment and before' adverbials. In relation to the tense of the copula, the interpretation of the latter as a 'continuative' state up to t_n requires in Italian the use of the 'imperfective form' (Italian: 'era'/was) while its interpretation of a state which ceased at some point in the past and is now again in existence requires the use of the present perfect form as in (1a) and (1b) respectively:
(1a) M è felice ora ed era felice prima
(M. is happy now and was (?) happy before)
able
blue
taller than ...

('continuative' reading from the past up to the t denoted by the adverbial).

(1b) M. è felice ora ed è stato felice prima
(M. is happy now and has been happy before)
able
blue
taller than

(in (1b) the 'iterative' reading applies: the state denoted by the adjective was in existence at some point in the past and is again in existence at the t denoted by the adverbial).

If we now consider the states denoted by such adjectives as 'without-a-hand, English/tall', ie.

(5) M. è monca
(M. is without-a-hand)

(6) M. è inglese
(M. is English)

(7) M. è alta
(M. is tall)

we see that the state denoted by the adjective 'without-a-hand' in (5) refers to a state that may have occurred either at time 'now' (including 'point-of time now' as in the case of an accident or surgery) or at some unspecific time in the past (in the 'before-now').

If we want to specify either we use the expressions:

(5a) M. è diventata/diventò monca/ora/3 mesi fa
(M. has become/became without-a-hand now/3 months ago/in September 1967).

The form 'è stata' (has been) (unless followed by a dura-
tional adverbial of the type "for all her life") is ruled out as the Italian present perfect can be used with adjectives denoting states that can be both entered and left. The form:

'M. has been without-a-hand for 3 months'

is acceptable only if after the t denoted by the adverbial the N died, i.e. in the context for ex. of:

(M. is dead) I: "I didn't know she was without-a-hand How long has she been like that?"

Ii: "3 months".

The imperfective form 'era' (was?) on the other hand, can be used with this type of state either in a 'narrative' sense or again in the case of the entity being no longer alive.

In relation to the state denoted by the adjective 'English' in (6) (such a state being conceived as a state that can neither be entered nor left excluding therefore changes of nationality as involving the problem of whether a person who has acquired 'English' nationality can be defined as 'being English' or not), its occurrence at time 'now' and/or at 'time-X-before-now' does not apply.

In relation to the state denoted by the adjective 'tall' in (7), both readings, referring either only to time-now (though not 'point-of-time-now') or to 'time-now-and-before-now' apply: the former holding both in the context of X being an adult and in the context of X being in a particular condition ('as a child and/or in relation to a set of entities Y'): in the former context meaning that M. has entered the state 'tall' which will be possibly a continuing one; in the latter context meaning that M. has
entered the state 'tall' which will be either a temporary or a continuing one. The reading of 'time-now-and-time-before-now' applies to the sentence

'Mary is tall'
either referring to Mary as an adult or to Mary for ex. as an adolescent with the further reading of a previous stage where the state 'tall' held, ie. 'Mary is tall' as an adult and she was tall as an adolescent in the first case, and 'Mary is tall' as an adolescent and was tall as a child in the second case (different degrees of 'tall-ness' being implied).

Restriction 5: 'States may last for a time ... we may ask how long it took to paint the door blue but not how long it look the door to be blue' (Kenny, 1963, taken up again in Dowty, 1972, who rules out 'take a period of time expressions' with states).

If we now consider the types of states for which this restriction is said to hold in Kenny we have:

(1) (M. non si rese conto della fortuna che le era capitata e) le ci sono volute 3 ore per essere felice

(M. did not realise the luck which had befallen her and she took 3 hours to be happy).

(2) Alla segretaria di J. ci sono voluti mesi per essere capace di maneggiare la situazione

(J.'s secretary took months to be able to handle the situation)

(3) * Alla porta ci sono volute 3 ore per essere blue

(it took the door 3 hours to be blue)
Though (3) is unacceptable as it stands, there are however contexts where the 'take-a-period-of time' expression is admitted with this type of states: in fact if we think for ex. of antique furniture and of the particular colour they acquire after a certain number of years, and imagine that a person X wants that particular colour for the furniture he wants to buy, the sentence

(3a) a questo legno occorrano solo 3 anni per essere/ del marrone/marrone come lei vuole

(this wood takes 3 years only to be brown as you want it)
(lit. tr.)

or even better with the future tense form in the following context:

I: non comprare quel mobile, è troppo caro; compra quest'altro: il modello è lo stesso e (3a) per essere marrone come quello a questo legno occorrano/ ci vogliono per questo legno solo 3 anni di stagionatura

(don't buy that piece of furniture, it is too expensive! Buy this other one, the shape is the same and (3a) to be as brown as that one this wood takes only 3 years seasoning!);

or in the context:

I: questo Chianti non ha quel colore rosso scuro che gli è caratteristico!
(this Chianti wine hasn't got that dark red colour which is its characteristic!)

2: ah, ma (3c) per essere del rosso che tu dici al Chianti ci vogliono X anni di invecchiamento
(ah, but to be that red the Chianti takes X number of years ageing)
(lit. tr.).
In relation to (4) if such a sentence seems to be ruled out, however the sentence:

(4a) ci sono voluti mesi prima che/perché M. fosse più alta di J.

(it took months for M. to be taller than J.)/it took months before M. was taller than J. (lit. transl.)

is acceptable (possibly here (4a) in the impersonal form is acceptable as involving notion of 'inevitable' resultant change-of-state while (4) is ruled out as involving a result brought about 'intentionally' by M.); similarly

(4b) ci sono voluti pochi minuti a M. per essere alta: solo il tempo di mettersi i suoi vertiginosi tacchi a spillo!

(it took Mary only few minutes to be tall: only the time to put on those high heeled shoes of hers!)

is acceptable; though here 'be = become' nevertheless such a sentence with the verb 'be' is possible.

If we now examine the other type of states, those denoted by the adjective 'with-a-hand/English/tall' we have:

(5) * ci sono volute 3 ore a J. per essere monco/inglese

* (J. took 3 hours to be without-a-hand/English)

ie. the states denoted by this type of adjective do not take 'take-a-period-of-time-' adverbials.

In this connection we can also examine the behaviour of the types of adjective considered up to now with 'in-a-period-of-time' adverbials: the use of such adverbials is said to be 'bad' for states in Dowty (1972 : 26), while Miller (1970) distinguishes between:
'in-a-period-of-time be state' (ruled out for Russian) and
'in-a-period-of-time become state' (accepted for Russian).
Though the following sentences with 'be state':

(1) M. è/fu/sarà felice in poco tempo
capace/efficiente/famosa/affascinante
brava/noiosa/etc.
(M. is/was/will be/happy/able/efficient/famous/
charming/good/boring etc. in a short
time)
are acceptable in Italian they have however the notion of
'become', i.e. of change-of-state, presupposed. Similarly
for:

(3) il vestito è/fu/sarà blu in 25 minuti
(the dress is/was/will be in 25 minutes)
(4) M. è/sarà più alta di J. in 3 mesi (fu)
(M. is/will be/was/taller than J. in 3 months)
(5) M. è/fu/sarà/era (narrative) monca in 3 mesi
(M. is/was/?/will be/was? without-a-hand in 3 months)
The fact that we can say neither
(5b) * M. è stata monca'
*(M. has been without-a-hand)

nor
(5c) * M. è stata monca in 3 mesi
(* M. has been without-a-hand in 3 months)
would seem to indicate both that the Italian present per-
fected denotes both inception and cessation of a state and
that the 'in-a-period-of-time' adverbial refers to the
time required for the result state to be in existence:
as the state denoted by the adjective 'monca' (without-
a-hand) satisfies neither as it is a state which can be
entered but not left and it is conceptualised as a 'punc
tual' state, ie. it does not take time to be entered, (5b) and (5c) are not acceptable.

The non-acceptability of (5c) with the adjective of the type represented by 'monca' seems to have a connection with the awkwardness of the following sentences:

(1a) ? M. è stata felice in poco tempo
( ? M. has been happy in a short time)

(2a) ? M. è stata efficiente/capace/famosa/affascinante brava/noiosa/etc. in breve tempo
( ? M. has been efficient/capable/famous/charming/)

(3b) ? il vestito è stato blue in 25 minuti
( ? the dress has been blue in 25 minutes)

(4b) ? M. è stata più alta di J. in 3 mesi)
( ? M. has been taller than J. in 3 months)

etc.

ie. there seems to be an incompatibility between the Italian present perfect and the 'in-a-period-of-time' adverbial (cf. the acceptability of such sentences with other tense forms on p. 436). Such an incompatibility can possibly be connected with the fact that the Italian present perfect entails both inception and cessation of a state (this not being in contradiction with what has been held for sentences 1d-4d on p. 32 as the presence of the adverbial 'always' modifies its reading) while the 'in-a-period-of-time' adverbial entails the time for a state X to change into a state $X_f$.

Thus while the Italian present perfect is compatible with temporal adverbials denoting the time of inception and/or cessation of a result state ('he has been happy since/from
to/till/time \( X' \) ) and the time occurred between the two ('he has been happy for time \( X' \) ), it is not compatible with the 'in-a-period-of-time' adverbial entailing the time required for the change of state to come about. On the other hand all the sentences:

(6) * M. è/è stata/fu/sarà inglese in 2 giorni
(M. is/was/has been/will be English in 2 days)

are not acceptable.

If we now consider these types of states with 'spend-a-period-of-time' adverbials, said to apply to states (Dowty, 1972) we have:

(1) ha passato 3 mesi a essere felice/brava/buona/efficiente/pulita/ordinata/odiosa/obbediente etc.

(X has spent 3 months being happy/good/efficient/tidy/clean/disgusting/obedient etc.)

(1a) ha passato 3 mesi a diventare felice etc.
(X has spent 3 months in becoming/to become happy etc.)

where in (1) we have the state 'happy etc' lasting 3 months, while in (1a) we have the implication that the process of change has lasted 3 months but we do not know whether the result of 'being happy etc.' has been achieved or not. In fact (1a) is compatible with both:

'... but she has failed' and 'and she succeeded'.

(see in this connection also restriction 20).

On the other hand such sentences as:

* ha passato 3 mesi a essere/diventare monca/inglese/blue/alta

(X has spent 3 months to be/become without-a-hand/English/blue/tall)

are ruled out.
Always in connection with the use of temporal adverbials, with states denoted by adjectives, it is worth mentioning Dowty's view relating the occurrence of such adverbials to 'accidental' properties: p. 77: "... not only is the occurrence of an overt time adverbial bad if an essential property is predicated ('the Washington monument was heavy * in 1932')... but the same restriction applies to S-final adjectives which represent reduced when-clauses, in contrast to pre-nominal adjective:

(50) a) J. saw the nude dancers
    b) J. saw the dancers nude
    c) J. saw the nude statue
    d) * J. saw the statue nude"

ie. if an essential property is predicated, S-final adjectives, ie. post-nominal adjectives, are 'bad' as shown by (50 d) being unacceptable. If however Dowty's view can explain the unacceptability of (50 d), it does not however explain the acceptability of (50 a): in fact while 'nude' applied to statue is an essential quality, 'nude' applied to 'dancers' obviously is not because (50 b) is said to be acceptable; thus here (with 'dancers') 'nude' is an 'accidental' property/quality; but if it is so we do not know why (50 a) is acceptable when it should be ruled out as pre-nominal position seems to be a prerogative of 'essential' properties and not of 'accidental' ones.

Dowty goes on to say that "the essential/accidental distinction is dependent purely on the speaker's beliefs about the nature of the world, and in special contexts the restrictions break down": on these grounds, therefore, (50 d) becomes acceptable in the situation of a
speaker who is used to seeing statues representing 'non-nude' entities: in his belief, the state 'non-nude' is an 'essential' property vs. 'nude' which would be an 'accidental' one: in this case then 'J. saw the statue nude' should be acceptable. Moreover if "the restrictions are such that they can break down according to the speaker's beliefs" ultimately such restrictions are non-existent.

However in relation to Italian, if we consider the Ss corresponding to Ss 50(a-d) we have:

(a) J. ha visto i nudi ballerini
(b) J. ha visto i ballerini nudi
(c) J. ha visto la nuda statua
(d) J. ha visto la statua nuda

ie. all sentences are acceptable, the difference being between a/c and b/d, the latter being ambiguous as to the following readings:

(b1) John has seen/saw the dancers when they were nude

(d1) John has seen/saw the statue when it was nude
(afterwards the sculptor carved some sort of dress or hid the 'nudity' in some way or another)

(b2) John has seen/saw the dancers nude but they were not nude (optical illusion)

(d2) John saw the statue nude but it was not nude (optical illusion)

(b3/d3) John saw the dancers/the statue nude and they/it were/was nude

while the former having only reading (3). The difference in these cases has nothing to do with the 'essential/accidental distinction, but with the position pre-or
post-nominal of the adjective.
Moreover Dowty's statement that the occurrence of an overt time adverbial is 'bad' if an 'essential' property is pre
dicated, can be questioned even in relation to the very ex
ample he uses to prove it, ie. the sentence

(7) the Washington monument was heavy* in 1932
said to be non-acceptable, in Dowty's view (p. 77), because
of the presence of the temporal adverbial 'in 1932'.
Taking as an example very similar to Dowty's the follow-
ing:

(8) Il grattacielo Italia (a S. Paolo) era alto\(^{(1)}\)
nel 1960 quando era l'unico grattacielo della
città. Ora con tutti gli altri che sono stati
costuiti è basso!
(The skyscraper Italia in S. Paolo was high in
1960 when it was the only skyscraper of the
town. Now with all the others that have been
built, it is low!)

we see that what a sentence like this means is that what
was considered 'high' in time X ('height' being presuma-
ably an 'essential' quality of skyscrapers) is no longer
considered so, ie. the question of defining N 'high'
(or 'heavy' in Dowty's ex.) or not depends on the frame
of reference used: it is in fact on such a frame of re-
ference remaining the same or being subject to alterat-
ions that the acceptability or non-acceptability of such
sentences relies. In (8) such a frame of reference has

\(^{(1)}\) while English distinguishes between 'tall' and
'high', Italian uses 'alto' for both.
been altered and what was considered in state \( X \) at \( t_x \) is no longer so at \( t_x + i \) (where \( t_{x+i} \) is a \( t \) posterior to \( t_x \)). What is involved here is the idea that the 'positive' form of an adjective is the result of a comparison (for this cf. also p. 197).

**Restriction 6:** "Static \( V \ldots \) cannot be qualified by these adverbials (= 'quickly, slowly') \ldots As to do something quickly is to take a short time to do it and to do something slowly is to take a long time to do it, only those actions which take time can be done quickly or slowly" and "only performances take time \ldots Mary cannot be beautiful faster than Jane" (Kenny, 1963).

This restriction involving the adverbials 'quickly' and 'slowly' applies to Italian, too: in fact:

* è felice/capace velocemente/lentamente
  (\( X \) is happy/able quickly/slowly)

* è monco/inglese/alto velocemente/lentamente
  (\( X \) is without-a-hand/English/tall quickly/slowly).

It is however worth noticing that if the use of the adverbials 'quickly' and 'slowly' yields unacceptable sentences, nevertheless the use of what in Kenny's quotation above seems to be a paraphrase of these adverbials, ie. 'a long time' and 'a short time' respectively, yields acceptable sentences:

'\( X \) è felice/capace in breve tempo' (fu/sarà/era/è stato)
(\( X \) is happy/able in a short time was/will be/was\(^1\) has been)

\(^{(1)}\) the second 'was' is used in a 'narrative sense'
'questo vestito è blue in breve tempo' (=fu/sarà/era/è stato)  
(this dress is blue in a short time = was/will be/was/has been)  
'M. è più alta di J. in breve tempo' (=fu/sarà/era/è stata)  
(M. is taller than J. in a short time = was/will be/was/has been).

Similarly for:  
'X è monco in breve tempo' (fu/sarà/era)  
(X is without-a-hand in a short time: was/will be/was)  
*'X è inglese in breve tempo' (fu/sarà/era/è stato)  
(X is English in a short time: was/will be/was/has been)  
'X è alto in breve tempo' (fu/sarà/era)  
(X is tall in a short time: was/will be/was)

(versus the 'awkwardness' of such sentences with the present perfect for which cf. p. 45 and p. 46).

The acceptability of these Ss shows that if 'to do something quickly/slowly' is 'to take a short/long time to do it', nevertheless 'to take a short/long time to be in state X' is not the same as 'to be in state X quickly/or slowly'. We are thus faced with the problem of the difference between the two adverbial expressions.

On a very intuitive level we can say that the adverbials 'quickly/slowly' seem to involve both notions of time and space while the adverbials 'in a short/long time' seem to involve only the notion of time. If this were the case, as states denoted by adjectives refuse the former but allow the latter this would imply that they do not have space. But what would time be then and what the relation between states and time and space? Do states have a
location and if they do what is the relation between them and the entities the states refer to?

**Restriction 7:** "* I have not yet finished loving the baby vs I have not yet finished drying the baby = performance V" (Kenny, 1963 and Dowty, 1972)

This restriction would seem to hold for adjective in Italian:

(1) * non ha ancora finito di essere felice/capace
(X has not yet finished being happy/able)

(2) * non ha ancora finito di essere blue/più alta di J.
(X has not yet finished being blue/taller than J.)

(3) * non ha ancora finito di essere alta/monca/inglese
(X has not yet finished being tall/without-a-hand/English).

While the states denoted by the adjective in (3) are always ruled out, ie. they exclude the form 'finish be-state', the states denoted by the adjective in (1), if awkward in the declarative sentence above out of context, become however natural in such contexts as:

A: 'io, nella mia vita, non sarò mai più felice/triste'
(I, in my life, shall never be happy again)

B: 'eh ... non hai ancora finito di essere felice/triste ...
chissà quante volte ancora lo sarai!'
(eh ... you have not yet finished being happy/sad...
who knows how many times you will again be happy/sad)

ie. while speaker A affirms that the state 'happy' is finished, speaker B by denying that such a state is finished affirms that the state has only stopped, ie. it has come only to a temporary end (and it will be in existence again at some point in the future).

The possibility for a state to come to an end (to fi-
nish) is shown also by such S as:

(1) non è più felice/capace/blue etc.
(X is no longer happy/able/blue)

where the adverbial 'no longer' indicates that the state denoted by the adjective has come to an end, the problem of this end being temporary or not being irrelevant. In this sense these sentences are similar to the ones with states denoted by such adjective as 'without-a-hand':

when I say 'J. now is no longer without-a-hand' the implication is that the state of 'being without-a-hand' is finished. The notion of such a state as 'non temporary' in the sense that it is a state which can be entered but not left is relevant only for the implication that if that is true, then 'J. is dead'.


If this holds for Italian adjectives of the type:

(1) * sii alta/blue/monca/inglese
(* be tall/blue/without-a-hand/English)

vs. (2) sii bella/felice/buona/onesta/etc.
(be beautiful/happy/good/honest/etc.)

where the 'imperative' forms in (2) are ambiguous as to 'order' 'request' 'wish' etc. vs the forms in (3) ie.:

(3) e di essere bella!/felice/buona/onesta etc.!
(and to be beautiful/happy/good/honest etc.)
(lit. tr.)

with the structure 'infinitive be + state' which have only the meaning of 'order': 'I order you to', it does not however apply to adjectives of the type 'intelligent/stupid', ie. the sentences:
sii intelligente e non dirgli niente!
(be intelligent and say nothing!)

non essere stupida! fai quello che ti ha detto
(don't be stupid! do what he told you)
(lit. tr.)

are acceptable in spite of the presence of a 'stative' verb. On these lines a strong objection to this restriction has been put forward by Schachter (1973) who holds that sentences like

be here at 6 o'clock
what you'll do is be here at 6 o'clock (for this cf. Restr. 12)
* you are being here at 6 o'clock

Miss the parade
what you'll do is miss the parade (cf. Restr. 12)
you are missing the parade

show that "there can be no single feature such as Lakoff's STATIVE which determines the acceptability of the imperative (the do-something construction and the progressive)", the acceptability or non-acceptability of an imperative depending "upon a semantic property which is not necessarily lexicalised in a single lexical item". This being shown also by such sentences as

Remember to write
* don't remember to write
* forget to write
don't forget to write

"where the acceptability of an imperative whose main verb is 'remember' or 'forget' depends upon whether the sentence is affirmative or negative".
Restriction 9: "States do not have purposes (vs. 'performances which do have purposes'): *for what purpose did you see this joke?; 'why do you love A?' asks for your reasons not for your purpose in loving A" (Kenny, 1963). The notion of 'purpose' here seems to be related to the notion of volition and/or intention formulated by Dowty, 1972 for his semantic predicate DO which is said 'to contribute such a notion on the part of the subject' and 'is exactly what distinguishes activities and most accomplishments from achievements and statives'.

While both "agentive and stative readings can be found in non-stative adjectives like 'polite, noisy, careful etc.' ... as they show a temporary property currently in evidence... and a kind of activity which is under the control of the individual", this does not apply to stative properties like 'tall, erudite' which "cannot immediately be altered by willing them away"; "What DO contributes semantically being volition, temporariness and some notion of 'immediate' controllability" "which cannot be ascribed to the latter type of state" (Dowty). Thus the basic distinction is between:

- **Non-stative adjective:** stative and agentive readings: presence of DO;
- **Stative adjective:** stative reading: absence of DO.

Though the notion of 'volition/intention' contributed by the semantic predicate DO, is relevant to distinguish between states denoted by such adjectives as 'tall/without-a-hand/English' (= stative adjective) and states denoted by such adjectives as 'polite/beautiful/noisy etc.',
it seems however to me to be dependent on some other notion (possibly 'temporariness'). The same definition of a state 'that cannot be altered by willing it away' seems to point to a property of the state as such from which the 'intention/volition' notion derives, or to which it can be applied. Moreover the intention/volition can be applied to any kind of state irrespective of whether such a state will be achieved or not and if it is, it is achieved in certain cases irrespective of one's intentions as in:

'voglio essere alta/vecchia'
(I want (= volition) to be tall/old)

where it is certainly my 'will' to be 'tall/old', but my being 'tall' may occur or not and if it does, it does not have anything to do with my intention; while in relation to my 'will' to be 'old', such a state will occur whether I have wanted it or not. This would seem to point to the necessity of characterizing states according to some other notion than the "intentional" one.

If we now consider Dowty's definition of his semantic predicate DO as "contributing the notion of volition/intention on the part of the subject" and examine the S:

'Maria ha voluto un figlio inglese'
(Mary has wanted (= volition) a son English) (lit.tr.)

we have in the underlying structure 2 (at least) sentences with two different 'subjects', the 'subject' of the first sentence being 'Maria' while the 'subject' of the second sentence being 'son' on the assumption that "inglese" derives from an underlying sentence. Thus while in terms of the superficial structure of the sen-
tence the intention/volition clearly belongs to the 'subject' without any necessity for it to be further specified, in terms of underlying structure the intention/volition belongs to the 'subject' of the matrix sentence (in the case of the second sentence being an embedding) or to the 'subject' of the first conjunct (in the case of the second sentence being a coordinated structure as suggested in Bolinger), in both cases such 'subject' being lexicalised as 'Maria'.

The 'subject' of the second sentence, whether result of an embedding or of a coordination, has no intentional notion attached to it. Thus Dowty's definition as 'intention/volition' on the part of the subject" would need at least some further specification in relation to what he means by 'subject'. The problem of 'intentional' vs. 'non-intentional' also appears in relation to causative sentences and to Lakoff's claim (as quoted in Dowty, 1972) that causative sentences are ambiguous and not vague between volitional and non-volitional causation. Lakoff's basis for this claim being the 'do-so' test for ambiguity vs. vagueness.

Sentences like:

'J. hit the ball' and so did Pete';
'J. knocked the child over and so did Pete';
'J. cut his arm with a knife and so did Pete'

are said to be used to describe situations where the subjects in both conjuncts brought about the result intentionally or both brought it about accidentally and not situations where one subject purposefully produced the result and the other did not. Additional argument for
this claim being noticed by R. Lakoff who holds that a sentence like:

* J. knocked the child over, the clumsy loaf, and so did P., the brute

is odd because of the opposition between 'the clumsy loaf' that can be appropriately added to 'J. knocked the child over' if the result were accidental, and 'the brute' that would be appropriate if the result were intentional.

If we now transfer this claim to causative Ss of the type:

(0) J. ha dipinto la casa rossa, così ha fatto M. (J. painted the door red and so did M.)

(though in my opinion the 'do-so' test does not hold for the above types of verb either) and examine at first the first conjunct only, we are faced with the following implications:

(1) J. wanted to paint the house. He wanted it red and he painted it red.

(2) J. wanted to paint the house; he wanted it to be white but he had some red paint and could not afford to buy white paint

(in this case the difficulty of the notion of 'intention' appears as we could say that if he really wanted the house white instead of red, he could have chosen not to paint the house at all);

(3) J. had to paint the house; he wanted it white but he had some red paint and could not afford to buy the white paint he wanted

(4) J. had to paint the house; he wanted it red and he painted it red;

in (1) the state 'red' is the result of an intention on the part of J. (both of painting and of having it red); in (2) the state 'red' is the result of an intention of painting it but not of having it the colour he wanted; in (3) the state 'red' is not the result of any intention,
neither of the intention of painting the house nor of having it 'red'; it is the result of an obligation/necessity; in (4) the state 'red' is the result of an intention to have the house of such a colour, this however being subordinated to an obligation/necessity (= that of painting it).

The same set of options, as far as the implications of (0) are concerned, applies to 'Mary' in the second conjunct, but if for John for ex. the state 'red' is the result of implication (1), the state 'red' for Mary may be either (1) or (2) or (3) or (4); similarly if the state 'red' is for John the result of implication (2), the state 'red' for Mary may be either the result of (1) or (2) or (3) or (4) and so on. This is proved by the possibility of contexts like:

'J. wanted to paint the house and wanted it to be red, so he bought red paint and painted it red; M. had to paint the house and had to paint it red because her house is in the 'historic' centre of the town and no other colour is allowed'.

The result of such a long context is: 'J. painted the house red and so did M.' What a sentence such as '... and so did M.' implies is only that Mary too painted the house and that the house was red.

Moreover such sentences as:

'J. ha dipinto intenzionalmente la casa rossa e cosí ha fatto M. ma per caso'

(J. painted intentionally the house red and so did M. but by chance: lit. tr.)

are not contradictory, having to do with the scope of the adverbial 'intentionally' or 'by chance' which in
the first part of the conjunct may refer either only to the 'painting of the house' or to the painting and to the state red together so that in the second part of the conjunct the 'but-by-chance'-expression can modify either.

**Restriction 10 and 11:** 'If X is becoming Ø, X neither is nor has become Ø' (said to hold for changes with a 'fixed terminus' as in 'getting to be 6 years old') and 'If X is becoming Ø, X is Ø' (said to hold for those changes lacking a terminus as in 'getting older') (Taylor, 1965).

If we now consider such Ss as:

(1) J. sta diventando buono/efficiente/ordinato/educato etc.
    (J. is becoming good/efficient/tidy/polite etc.)

and (2) J. sta diventando alto/vecchio
    (J. is becoming tall/old)

we see that the implication 'J. neither is nor has become' 'good/efficient/tidy/polite/etc. tall/old' holds, though in neither case can we say that a change with a fixed terminus as the one exemplified by 'getting to be 6 years old' occurs. What we can say is that there is a terminus in the mind of the speaker i.e. to be good/tall/old; but the adjectives involved do not refer to something as definite as the ex. given ('to be 6 years old').

In the case of the states denoted by the adjective 'without-a-hand'/English' the structure 'X is becoming Ø' yields unacceptable Ss:
In relation to the second implication we should have that if

(1a) J. sta diventando più buono/efficiente/ordinato/pulito/alto/etc.

(J. is becoming better/more efficient, tidy/tall, old etc.)

then

'J. is good/efficient/tidy etc.'.

However if such an implication may be the case, it may also be the case that (1a) has as its implication that "X neither is nor has become φ": in fact (1a) as much as (1b)

(1b) J. sta diventando sempre più alto/buono etc.

(J. is getting taller and taller/better and better etc.)

is compatible with 'but he is not tall/good etc.' (for this cf. also p. 137).

Thus for Restr. 10 and 11 it is necessary to point out that:

1) The notion of 'fixed terminus' as exemplified by 'to be 6 years old' is hardly found in relation to states denoted by adjectives;

2) when such a 'fixed terminus' applies as in the case for ex. of 'monco' (without-a-hand) the notion of 'is becoming' does not apply;

3) 'if X is becoming φ' (where φ = comparative form) the implication may be either 'X is φ' (Restr. 11) or 'X neither is nor has become φ' (Restr. 10).
Restriction 12: "Stative V's do not occur in cleft S_r(Lakoff):

* what I am doing is being tall

vs. what I am doing is being noisy.

The question: 'what is he doing? cannot be answered by a S with a stative V'.

In relation to Italian the forms:

(1) * quello che sta facendo è essere alta/vecchia/inglese/monca
    (what she is doing is being tall/old/English/without-a-hand)

are ruled out as predicted by Lakoff's restriction on stative verbs; restriction which, however, seems to apply also to non-stative verbs like 'noisy' as in

(2) quello che sta facendo è essere noiosa/buona etc.
    (what she is doing is being noisy/good/boring etc.)

On the other hand such forms as:

(2a) quello che farai è essere noiosa/buona/rumorosa/gentile/tutta la sera/etc. (for which cf. Schachter on Restr., 8 p. 55)

(3) sta facendo la noiosa/la buona/la chiassosa etc.
    (she is doing the boring/the good/the noisy etc.)

are perfectly acceptable. Similarly the question: 'what is she doing?' can be answered by: 'la buona/la noiosa/l'alta
la vecchia/l'inglese/la monca/l'intelligente/l'a stupid etc.' = 'the good/the boring/the tall/the old/the English/the
without-a-hand/the intelligent/the stupid etc.' where 'she is doing state X' means:

a) 'she is in state X at the moment'; b) 'she is playing the part of being in state X but she is not really in sta
te X'; c) 'she is in state X and the moment she is stressing it'.

Restriction 13/14/15/16:

(13) * he carefully knew the solution deliberately

(14) * he is busy being tall
    * he is busy being poor etc.

(15) * Adverbs referring to instruments

(16) * Adverbs of place:

they are held in general to distinguish between different types of states; however

(13a) * fu attentamente noiosa/buona/efficiente/one sta ecc.
    (X was carefully boring/good/efficient/honest etc.)

but

(13b) fu deliberatamente noiosa/buona/efficiente etc.
    (X was deliberately boring/good/efficient etc.),

ie. they accept 'deliberately' and refuse 'carefully'.

In the case of an adjective of the type 'stupid' we have:

(13c) * fu attentamente stupida
    * (she was carefully stupid)

vs. (13d) fu deliberatamente stupida
    (she was deliberately stupid)

ie. the two adverbials 'carefully' and 'deliberately' are freely interchangeable neither in the case of 'non-stative verbs' nor in the case of 'stative verbs': moreover a 'non-stative' verb of the type represented by 'good/honest etc.' cannot be distinguished from a 'stative verb' of the type represented by 'stupid' on the basis of their occurrence or non occurrence with such adverbials as both show, in this
context, the same behaviour yielding non-acceptable sentences with 'carefully' and acceptable ones with 'deliberately'. Moreover an adjective of the type 'erudite' (clearly defined as 'static' by Dowty for which cf. Restriction 9) shows the same behaviour, i.e.

\[(13e) \ast \text{sarò attentamente erudita su questo soggetto al prossimo congresso.} \quad \text{(* I'll be carefully erudite on this topic at the next congress)}\]

\text{vs. (13ei) sarò deliberatamente erudita su questo soggetto al prossimo congresso} \quad \text{(I'll be deliberately erudite on this topic at the next congress).}

Both adverbials are instead refused by the states denoted by the adjectives of the type 'tall/English/without-a-hand'. In relation to Restriction 15) while we can say

\[(15a) \text{è bella con le ciglia false} \quad \text{(she is beautiful with false eye-lashes)}\]

we can also say

\[(15b) \text{è alta con tacchi di 10 cm} \quad \text{(she is tall with heels 10 cm. high)}\]

\text{vs. (15c) \ast \text{è vecchia/Inglese/monca con ...} \quad (* she is old/English/without-a-hand with...).}

In relation to Restr. 16) we have:

\[(16a) \text{è bella in casa/alle feste etc.} \quad \text{(she is beautiful at home/parties etc.}\]

\text{vs. (16b) \ast \text{è inglese/monca in casa} \quad (* she is English/without-a-hand at home)} \quad \text{(* time and * place)}

\text{vs. (16c) tu vedessi com'è vecchia in casa! senza trucco e mal vestita sembra abbia 70 anni} \quad \text{(you should see how old she is at home! without make up and badly dressed she looks 70)}
(16d) in casa è alta; per forza porta tacchi di 10 cm.
(at home she is tall; it couldn't be otherwise,
she wears heels 10 cm. high!).

Though (16c) and (16d) involve the issue of 'appearing' and 'being' and of their relation, such sentences together with 'sembra vecchia/alta/erudita ma non lo è'
(she seems old/tall/erudite/ but she isn't)
'è vecchia/alta/erudita ma non sembra'
(she is old/tall/erudite but she doesn't look so)
are very well widespread. Similarly for 'tu vedessi com'è stupida/erudita in casa/alle feste etc.'
(you should see how stupid/erudite she is at home/parties etc.).

Restriction 17: 'for actions without a limit: (be happy ...
be intelligent)
a) θing consistent with having θed
b) θing does not entail not having θed
c) having θed does not entail not θing' (Potts).

An analysis of the following $\Sigma$:

(1) essendo felice/buono/interessante etc. ...
   (being happy/good/interesting etc. ...)
shows that they are consistent with 'having been X' but do
not entail it as they do not entail 'not having been X' (a
and b); while

(2) essendo stato felice/buono/interessante etc.
   (having been happy/good/interesting etc.)
entails 'not being X'.

For 'actions with a limit (be cured, get thin, get well etc.)',
Potts holds the following:
a) \( \varnothing \)ing inconsistent with having \( \varnothing \)ed
b) \( \varnothing \)ing entails not having \( \varnothing \)ed
c) having \( \varnothing \)ed entails not \( \varnothing \)ing.

The S

(3) diventando magro ...
    (getting thin ...)

by itself cannot be defined in terms of neither 'consistency' nor entailments as in a) and b) as such a form requires a main clause verb to be defined in either:

thus in:

(3a) diventando magro \( J. \) si rende conto ...
    (getting thin \( J. \) realises that ...)

\( \varnothing \)ing is inconsistent with having \( \varnothing \)ed' and 'entails not having \( \varnothing \)ed', ie. we have an 'ongoing process';
in
(3b) diventando magro \( J. \) si rese conto che ...
    (getting thin \( J. \) realised that ...)

'getting X' is ambiguous as to 'an ongoing process' or to the result of that process: in the former case having restrictions as for (3a), in the latter having the meaning of 'being thin', the only entailment being that the process of change has been accomplished.

In

(3c) diventando magro \( J. \) si renderà conto che ...
    (getting thin \( J. \) will realise that ...)

both ambiguities as to (3b) apply.

In

(4) essendo diventato magro ...
    (having become thin ...)

it is not necessarily the case that the 'not \( \varnothing \)ing' applies:
in fact it is equally possible to say
(4a) essendo diventato magro nel 1975 ed essendo tut	
tora magro ...    
(having become thin in 1975 and still being    
thin...)  
where we have 'Ø ing', and    
(4b) essendo diventato magro nel 1975 ma ora non es_
sendolo più ...    
(having become thin in 1975 but now being no-
longer so...)    
where we have 'non Ø'.    
Thus as neither the entailment c) for 'actions without a 
limit', nor the 'inconsistency principle' a) nor the en-
tailments b) and c) for 'actions with a limit' seem to 
apply, the result is that they cannot distinguish between 
the two types at least in relation to what we have been    
analysing. Moreover if we were to distinguish actions    
'without a limit' and 'with a limit' in terms of 'be state 
X' vs. 'become state X' we'd find that there are states de-
noted by such adjective as 'tall/old' where 'be tall/old' 
presupposes 'become tall/old', while others such as    
'thin/happy' may or may not have such presupposition, and 
finally others such as 'English' where such a presupposi-
tion does not apply (excluding in this case change of/dou-
ble etc. nationalities). Moreover if we consider the adje-
crative type 'monco' (without-a-hand) we have    
(5) being without-a-hand and having been so since    
the age of two/all his life...    
(5a) being without-a-hand but not having been so    
all his life...    
(5b) * having been without-a-hand but being no-longer    
so...    
ie. 'Ø ing' is consistent with both 'having Øed' (5) and
with 'not having \( \text{\textipa{\textoi}} \)ed' (5a); 'having \( \text{\textipa{\textoi}} \)ed' (plus temporal adverbial) entails \( \text{\textipa{\textoi}} \)ing'; ie. in terms of Pott's distinc
tion, the adjective 'monco' can be placed neither in the
'without a limit' nor in the 'with a limit' group.

**Restriction 18:** \( X \) ceased \( V_{\text{st}} \) at \( t > X \) \( V_{\text{st}} \) -ed < t' (Dowty).

This restriction holds for such states as those denoted by the
adjectives: 'boring/honest/cheerful/sad/good/tidy/busy/
stupid etc.' but it does not hold for 'old/English/without-a-
hand' if the entity the state refers to is still in existen
cce:

* ha smesso di essere vecchio/inglese/monco
  (X ceased being old/English/without-a-hand)

(the same implication applies to 'not anymore' adverbials
as in the ex. given for restriction 7). In the case of the
adjective of the type 'tall', it is worth pointing out that
if a. S like

"ho smesso di essere alto"

may seem awkward, nevertheless such an awkwardness disap-
ppears and the S becomes acceptable in the context of

"ha smesso di essere alto verso i 16-18 anni"
(X ceased being tall around 16-18 years old)

meaning that X was tall as a child/adolescent, ie. he was
tall compared to the other children/adolescents; after-
wards as a young man he was no longer tall. It is in fact
perfectly acceptable to say:

"da bambino era alto/per la sua età è alto"
(as a child he was tall/for his age he is tall).
Restriction 19: "ambiguity of (activity and) state predicates as to inception or cessation in the contexts:

'M. did not work for 5 months/until Xmas'",
this further specified as:

"Negation + Durational Adverbial: a) continuing state of non-occurrence of the event throughout the period: it applies neither to 'variable' nor to 'non-variable' states; b) inception at end of specified period applies to both types of states; c) cessation before end of specified period applies to both types of states; d) termination at end of specified period applies to neither" (Zydatiss, 1974).

The following Ss with negation and durational adverbials:

(1) M. non fu felice per 5 mesi (cattivo/disonesto/depresso/etc.)

(M. was not happy for 5 months) (bad/dishonest/depressed/sad/busy/boring.)

have the following implications:
a') state 'happy' ceased before the beginning of 5 months;
b') state 'non-happy' began with the beginning of the 5 months;
c') state 'non-happy' ceased by the end of the 5 months;
d') state 'non-happy' lasted throughout the period of 5 months,

  i.e. 'continuing state of non-occurrence of state 'happy' throughout the 5 months;

e') state 'non-happy' may be finished now or not.

This in the case of NEG negating the state 'happy'. Due in fact to the scope of the negation we have the following possibilities:
1. X was not-happy for 5 months (only the state is negated);
2. X was not-happy not-for-5-months (both the state and the DurAdv. are negated);
3. X not-was happy for 5 months (only the 'copula' is negated);
4. X not-was not-happy for 5 months (both the 'copula' and the states are negated).

[it is the case] [that J. was] [not-happy] [DurAdv.]
[it is the case] [that J. was] [not-happy][but not for 5 months] (for 4/6 months)
[it is the case] [that J. not was (but that he has not been)] [happy DurAdv.]
[it is the case] [that J. not was (but that he has been)] [not-happy DurAdv.],

An implication of the latter 2 being the negation of the Durational Adverbial as well, ie. such a state is still continuing, ie. a), b), c) and d) may or may not apply.

Such durational adverbials are ruled out in the case of states denoted by the adjective of the type: 'old/English/without-a-hand' as states that cannot be suspended for a time. It is in fact the case that an S of the type:

'è stato monco per dieci anni/gli ultimi 10 anni della sua vita'

(he has been without-a-hand for 10 years/the last 10 years of his life)

is acceptable with the implication that he is now dead - ie. the state denoted by "monco" (without-a-hand) cannot be suspended for a time, its suspension being conditioned upon the death of its bearer. In the case of the adjective 'alto' while it is possible to say
'è stato alto per poco tempo - da bambino fra i 3 e i 4 anni' ...
(he has been tall for a short time - when he was a child between 3 and 4 years old ...)

and

'il grattacielo Italia (in S. Paolo) è stato alto per tutto il tempo in cui è stato circondato da case di 2 o 3 piani, poi ...
(the skyscraper Italia (in S. Paolo) has been high for all the time in which it has been surrounded by houses with 2-3 floors, then ...),

it is not possible to say:
* J. è stato alto per due anni
where J. is a grown up man and has never changed environment/country etc.

Restriction 20: "With 'almost', state predicates have the reading that the state did not exist (as opposed to accomplishment predicates which with 'almost' can have the interpretation that the goal was not quite achieved as in 'J. almost built a sandcastle':
a. he did not even begin to build it,
b. he did not quite finish building it)" (Dowty).

If we now consider such S's as:

(1) M. è quasi bella/buona/efficiente/colpevole etc.
(M. is almost beautiful/good/efficient/guilty etc.)

(2) M. è quasi alta
(M. is almost tall)

(3) M. è quasi vecchia
(M. is almost old)

(4) * M. è quasi monca
(M. is almost without-a-hand)

with the simple present tense, we seem to have the meaning of 'state not quite achieved'. The meaning of 'non-existing
state' is dependent on its not having been achieved yet, as the states denoted by such adjective as in (1), (2) and (3) can be still in progress or not, depending on the entity the state refers to, i.e. if Mary is for ex. a fully grown up woman the S in (2) would have the meaning that the state 'tall' has not been quite achieved and that it is not and it will not be in existence: if however Mary is not yet fully grown up, S (2) would mean that as a result of the state 'tall' not yet quite achieved such a state is not in existence at the time of the utterance, i.e. it is non-existing at time 'now' but it may came in existence at some point after now. In S (3) the state denoted by the adjective 'old' is said not to be achieved yet, i.e. it is non-existent at time "now" but it will come into existence at some point after now.

The same applies to Ss like:

(5) M. era quasi bella/alta/vecchia quando J. la vide
(M. was almost beautiful/tall/old/when J. saw her),

while in Ss such as:

(6) M. era quasi bella/alta/vecchia quando morì
(M. was almost beautiful/tall/old/when she died)

means that the state denoted by the adjective was not quite achieved and never came into existence.

Moreover the meaning of state not yet quite achieved emerges from the fact that the structure 'almost state' is compatible with:

(7) M. è quasi ma non ancora brava/alta/vecchia
(M. is almost but not yet (completely) good/tall/old)

(8) M. non è ancora ma è quasi brava/alta/vecchia
(M. is not yet but is almost good/tall/old)
(9) M. non è ancora brava ma quasi (alta/vecchia)
(M. is not yet good/tall/old/but almost)
and not compatible with:
(10) * M. è quasi brava e non ancora brava/alta/vecchia
(M. is almost good/tall/old and not yet good/tall old)
since the result is tautologous because the relation between 'almost' and 'not yet' is an hyponemic one (ie. the scope of 'almost' is restricted to a specific part of the range covered by 'not yet').

Restriction 21: "Modal 'must' in state propositions has the meaning of both 'obligation' and 'logical necessity' for 'variable' states; only the meaning of 'logical necessity' for 'non variable' states" (Zydatiss).
This restriction holds for the states denoted by adjectives as in:

(1) deve essere bella/buona/obbediente etc.
(X must be beautiful/good/obedient etc.)
(2) deve essere alta/vecchia/monca/inglese
(X must be tall/old/without-a-hand/English)
where in (1) both 'obligation' and 'logical necessity' apply while in (2) only 'logical necessity' applies. In particular contexts however, the type of states denoted by the adjective in (2) can have apparently the meaning of 'obligation' as in the case of a film director who, looking for a particular type of person, can say: 'X must be tall/old/without-a-hand/English' with 'must' = obligation: in such cases however the obligation is not on the actual state of X but on finding a person who is in such a state.
II. 1. 2. Conclusions on restrictions 1-21

The above analysis of the restrictions 1-21 (apart from restrictions (6), (13) and (14)), has shown that they are open to a number of objections. The restrictions can apply only to adjectives of the type 'without-a-hand' ('mon co'), which were, however, not taken into consideration in the restrictions. Such states are one of the rare examples of 'invariable' states i.e. states that once entered can no longer be left.

The objections presented to the restrictions 1-21 cast doubt not only on the restrictions themselves but also on the associated theory of meaning as "fixed set of features". This theory of meaning does not take into account the relationship established between a linguistic form and its recurring forms nor the situational context in general. In the above discussion, where the compatibility or non-compatibility of certain adjectives with the restrictions 1-21 is dependent on such factors as the nature of the state, denoted by a given adjective, the frame of reference adopted, the nature of the entity referred to by the noun, the tense of the verb, the interrogative or negative form of the sentence together with the general context where the linguistic segment in question is inserted.

Particularly relevant for the present discussion is a consideration of the state referred to by the adjective 'alto' ('tall/high') as such a state is explicitly recognised as one of the 'static' verbs to which restrictions 1-21 are said to apply. Thus (4g) and (7) in Restriction 1, (4) in Restriction (3), (7) in Restriction 4 and (8) in Restriction 5, i.e.
(4 in R. 1) (1) J. è stata più alta di M  
(J. has been taller than M.)

(7 in R. 1) (2) J. è stata alta  
(J. has been tall)

(4 in Restr. 3) (3) M. è più alta di J. la mattina  
(M. is taller than J. in the morning).

(7 in Restr. 4) (4) M. è alta  
(M. is tall)

(8 in Restr. 5) (5) il grattacielo Italia (a S. Paolo) era alto nel 1960  
(the skyscraper Italia - in S. Paolo - was high in 1960)

(sentence (5) being parallel to (7)* The Washington monument was heavy in 1932, as both are predicating an 'essential' quality: "heaviness" in the case of (7) and 'height' in the case of (5)) have shown:

A) the acceptability of (1) in the following:

(b) J. è stata più alta di M. per poco tempo  
(J. has been taller than M. for a short time)

(c) J. è stata più alta di M. fino a 15 anni  
(J. has been taller than M. till 15 years old)

(d) J. è stata sempre più alta di M.  
(J. has always been taller than M.)

(e) J. è stata un'altra volta/già più alta di M.  
(J. has been another time/ already taller than M.)  
(lit. tr.),

where in (b) and (c) the state "taller than" is no longer in existence while in (d) such a state has been and may or may not be still in existence at the time of utterance and in (e) such a state is in existence for the second time;
B) the acceptability of sentence (2) if the notion of 'tallness' relates to an N denoting a particular set of entities at a particular time as is the case in:

(2a) J. è stata alta dai 3 ai 5 anni/fino a 5 anni/fino a 15 anni

(J. has been tall from 3 to 5 years old/ till 5/15)

(lit. tr.);

C) the acceptability of sentence 3) in such context as

(3a) M. is taller than J. in the morning when she wears high heel shoes;

D) the acceptability of sentence

(4) M. is tall.

both in the context of M. being a child in which case the state denoted by 'tall' may be a 'temporary' one and in the context of M. being an adult in which case the state 'tall' will be possibly (1) a continuing one;

E) the acceptability of sentence (5) vs. the non-acceptability of (7) held by Dowty in the context of

'il grattacielo Italia (a S. Paolo) era alto in un tempo X quando era l'unico grattacielo della città, ora con tutti gli altri che hanno costruito, è basso'

(1) 'possibly' because it is also to be considered the case of M. being 'tall' as long as the frame of reference (such as the people she lives with) remains unaltered. It may very well be the case in fact of M. being 'tall' among Italians but being no longer so if the frame of reference changes and becomes for ex. the Swedish people.
the skyscraper Italia - in S. Paolo - xas high in
time X when it was the only skyscraper in the town,
now with all the others which have been built, it
is low),

ie. while the frame of reference for (7) may have remained
unaltered since 1932 in which case the sentence is not ac-
ceptable, its alteration in the case of (5) accounts for
its acceptability.

As a result of A and B we see that the acceptability or un-
acceptability of the sentences in question ultimately re-
lies on the N: thus in (1 b-e) if the temporal adverbal
shows the possibility of an iterative reading of the state
'taller' and the possibility of its cessation, the accepta-
bility of the whole sentence relies on the N to which the
state 'taller' is attributed; in fact we can say neither
(1 b-e) nor (1) nor (2) if for ex. J's age is such that the
possibility of establishing a state 'taller/tall' previously
to the time of the utterance is precluded (as it would be
the case if at the t of the utterance J. was for ex. 3 - 4
years or something similar) as in this case we would have a
semantically unacceptable sentence.

Let us now assume that in (1 b-e), as they stand, the tₙ of
the utterance coincide with the t of J. being an adult: in
this case the state 'taller', being attributed, in the nor-
mal reading, to J.-non- adult, would be a state susceptible
of possible alteration as it is the case in the (b) and (c)
versions (where the state 'taller' is no longer holding) vs.
the (d) and (e) versions (where such a state is still hol-
ding), ie. in (1 b-e) the state 'taller' was attributed to
J. at a time previous to the t of J. 's adulthood. However Sentences(1b) (1) ('J. has been taller than M') and (2) ('J. has been tall') can also be uttered in the context in which the states 'taller/tall' were attributed to J. when J. was already an adult with no reference to the state J. was in at a time previous to her adulthood. This is the case in:

(1 - 2f) J. è stata più alta di M./ J. è stata alta/fin chè non ha avuto l'incidente che l'ha ridotta in questo stato
(J. has been taller than M./J. has been tall/ untill she had the accident which caused her present condition)
(lit. tr.)

(2g) M. Teresa è stata alta finché non è andata in Svezia
(M. Teresa has been tall untill she went to Sweden)
(lit. tr.)

where the states 'taller/tall' though attributed to J. when she already was an adult are however no longer in existence because of an accident (1 -2f) and because of a change of environment (2g). The possibility of Sentence (2g) brings out another relevant factor to determine the acceptability of Sentences of the type represented by (2) ('J. has been tall'), ie. the frame of reference in relation to which an entity is said to be in a particular state. If we compare Sentence (2g) with Sentence (5) ('the skyscraper Italia in S. Paolo was high in time X') we see that in both cases it is not so much or it is not only the N that determines the acceptability of the Sentences in question as much as the
frame of reference used. In Sentence (5) what we are saying is that the skyscraper A was high in time X because the frame of reference at that time was given by the height of what can be generally defined as the 'non-skyscrapers'. In 1980 the frame of reference has changed, being now constituted by other skyscrapers (both higher and of the same height as the skyscraper in question), so that what was high in time X is no longer so in 1980. The entity referred to by the N is the same ('skyscraper Italia' in (5) and M. Teresa in (2g)), what has changed is the surroundings of the N, i.e. the frame of reference in relation to which the N was said to be in state X. Moreover if we take for granted the non-acceptability of Sentence (7)

(7) * the Washington monument was heavy in 1932 (for the non-acceptability of which we have postulated that the frame of reference used to define the entity in question 'heavy' in 1932 has not been altered, i.e. the notion of heaviness in 1932 is the same as at the time of uttering (7)) and compare it with the acceptability of (5), it seems that in these cases it is not so much the N as the frame of reference used that determines the acceptability of such sentences. In fact the state 'tall' in (2g) and the state 'high' in (5) are no longer in existence because of a change in the value attributed to the states relative to the appropriate N. We are thus faced with the problem of variability in the value of the state denoted by 'tall/high' though such a state has always been considered 'static'. A consideration of Sentences (2a), (2g), (4), vs. (5) shows moreover that this variability applies not only to whether the N is a human being (1), (2), (2a), (2g), (4) or merely anima
(5), but also according to whether the human being is a child or an adolescent or an adult, and according to such other factors as the physical environment, as the acceptability of (2g) proves. It seems clear, in fact, that in:

'X (child) is tall'  'X (girl) is tall'  'X (boy) is tall'
'X (adult) is tall'  'X (Vietnamese) is tall'
'X (British) is tall' etc.

different degrees of 'tallness' are involved, this being proved also by the acceptability of:

'come/per essere/una bambina/un adolescente/una donna/ un' Vietnamita/ etc. è alto'
(as/to be/ a child/an adolescent/a woman/a Vietnamese etc. X is tall) (lit. tr.).

Such a variation points to the 'static' verb 'tall' as to a state which, from a semantic-pragmatic point of view, could hardly be defined in terms of fixed set of features, and even less by Lakoff's STATIVE feature.

Basically the same results are yielded by the 'static' verb 'blue': in fact in relation to the sentences:

( Restr. 3, p. 37) (8) questo vestito è blue * frequentative reading
(this dress is blue)

( Restr. 5, p. 42) (9) *alla porta ci sono volute 3 ore per essere blue
(the door took 3 hours to be blue),

we have seen that (8) becomes acceptable and allows a frequentative reading in the context of N made with a particular material changing colour according to the light as it is the case in:

(8a) This dress is blue in the evening as long as there
is this light, such a frequentative reading being shown also in the context of:

(8b) this dress has been blue twice as a result of dyeing; at the same time (9) as well becomes acceptable if we substitute to the N 'door', for ex. the N 'wood' as in:

(9a) a questo legno occorrano/ occorreranno solo 3 anni di stagionatura per essere del marrone che lei vuole/ per questo legno ci vogliamo/ (this wood takes/will take only 3 years seasoning to be the brown you want) (for the context, cf. p. 43)

or the N 'Chianti' as in:

(9b) per essere di quel rosso che tu dici, al Chianti occorrano/ ci vogliamo per il Chianti/almeno X anni di invecchiamento (to be the red you mean, the Chianti wine takes at least X years ageing) (lit. tr.).

If on the one hand such analysis seems to leave out the possibility to consider the states referred to by the adjectives of the type 'tall/high/blue' (considered 'stative') in terms of 'fixed set of features' showing also the difficulty to hold such notions as 'essential property' (Dowty), on the other hand the fact that restrictions like R9 and R19 put together 'achievements and statives' (Dowty) and 'activities and state predicates' (Zydatiss) shows that the contraposition of 'statives' and verbs of 'achievement, accomplishment and activity' is not very clear cut. Moreover the explicit admission that statives have got something in common with achievements and activities, together with the objections presented above to restrictions
1-21, seems to show that states cannot be determined only as belonging to the category 'adjective', an analysis allowing them to belong to more than one category being necessary.
II.2. Adjective position and subcategorisation of verbs

If the analysis of the adjective in predicative structures has shown the presence of its general categorial indeterminacy, (1) further support to this hypothesis comes from the following analysis of the adjective in nominal structures of the type (Adjective) N (Adjective), which makes it necessary to reexamine the category 'verb' as well.

Examining in fact recent analyses of 'proper verbs' we can see that they are distinguished from the other parts of speech on the basis that they signal tense and aspect and they are divided in 3 main types, i.e. activity, accomplishment, achievement, according to the temporal adverbial they take and to their different entailments. On this basis the aim of the following part is to show the following:

A) activities, accomplishments and achievements cannot be distinguished only in terms of defining their 'direct object' or 'locative of destination' nor in terms of whether the noun-phrase following them contains a definite/indefinite, singular/plural noun. The constituents of the NP and especially their position inside the NP bear on the problem (for this cf. also p. 164);

B) the presence of temporal adverbials considered basic to the distinction between different types of verbs also helps to distinguish the state denoted by the pre-nominal adjective from the state denoted by the post-nominal adjective (for this cf. also pp. 122-140);

(1) I am not saying that the distinction between verbs and adjectives is never valid. I am saying that when we come to meaning the category adjective is not clearly divided from the category verb, i.e. the distinction between adjectives and verbs, from the semantic point of view, is not very determinate.
C) in sentences with activity, accomplishment and achievement verbs and temporal adverbials, the post-nominal adjective implies a change-of-state, while the state denoted by the pre-nominal adjective does not;

D) in such sentences (ie. C) the state denoted by the post-nominal adjective carries tense and aspect as much as verbs, while the state denoted by the pre-nominal adjective does not.

From the analysis of (A-D) we shall be able to get the following consequences:

1. if the adjective presents aspectual elements and thus elements of verbal nature and if such elements depend on the position assumed by the adjective in relation to the N it refers to (pre- or post-posed), this means that the adjective, taking a verbal nature in cases of post-position and not taking it in cases of pre-position, is not clearly determined as a category;

2. if the adjective in post-position presents elements of tense and aspect it follows that the basis of the distinction between the verb and the other parts of speech can no longer be kept, consequently casting doubt also on the categorial status of the verb itself;

3. if moreover the classification of verbs depends on the cooccurrence of the verb with other 'categories' such as the adverb we are presented with the problem of what type of category is the verb and whether it is not the case that it is categorially indeterminate, too.

As a consequence of (1-3) in general we'll have that the existence of such 'categories' as verb and adjective
will be questioned and in particular it will be shown the
difficulty of keeping, in relation to the 'statives', a ca-
tegorisation in terms of [+ adjective] (i.e. 'alto' (tall/high)
for ex. either is adjective or it is not) and the necessity
to substitute it in terms of a continuum in the sense of a
greater or lesser adjectival nature.
II. 2.1. Adjective position and scope of temporal adverbials
with activity verbs

II.2.1 a Activity Verbs + 'in - X - time' Adverbial.

According to Z. Vendler, activity verbs are distinguished from accomplishments on the basis that while the latter allow both adverbial phrases with 'in' and with 'for' ('in an hour' 'for an hour') the former allow only 'for-phrases'. Since the verb 'to walk' is considered an activity verb, let us consider its behaviour in sentences of the type:

(1) J. ha camminato (per)/ nella vallata
    (John walked in the valley)

where 'walk' is followed by a locative phrase exemplified by 'in the valley'. If we introduce in sentence (1) the 'temporal' adverbial represented by 'in an hour' we get, as predicted, the unacceptable sentence:

(2) * J. ha camminato nella vallata in un'ora
    (John walked in the valley in an hour),

such a sentence being acceptable only in the context of John not being able to walk and then eventually succeeding in doing it.

Now if in the NP represented by 'in the valley' we introduce an adjective like 'desert' we get:

Pre-Nominal: (3) *J. ha camminato nella deserta valle
                in un'ora
                (*J. walked in the desert valley in
                 an hour)

Post-Nominal: (4) J. ha camminato nella vallata deserta
                 in un'ora
(John walked in the valley desert in an hour),

ie. sentence (3) with pre-nominal adjective is unacceptable as sentence (2) without adjective, while sentence (4) with post-nominal adjective is acceptable. Thus while the presence of a locative phrase represented either by the structure \((N)\) or by \((\text{adjective} + N)\) does not modify the general statement that the activity verb 'to walk' does not allow 'in-phrases', a locative phrase with the structure \((N + \text{adjective})\) does allow it because of the scope of the temporal adverbial which, in the latter, modifies the adjective. In order to account for these facts it is thus necessary either to modify the above restriction on activity verbs or to specify that such a restriction holds in the cases of:

a) activity verb;
b) activity verb + locative phrase of the form: \(N\);
c) activity verb + locative phrase of the form: \(\text{adjective} + N\).

In the case of sentence (4), which is thus excluded from the restriction on activities, we get the following:

\([\text{John (has) walked in the valley}] \ (\text{desert in an hour})\),

ie. the state denoted by the post-nominal adjective is in the scope of the 'in-phrase' which thus entails a change from a state 'non desert' to a state 'desert', occurring during the time the 'in-adverbial' denotes, ie. it takes an hour for the state 'desert' to be/ become in existence.

If we now try to see the relation between the time in which such a change of state occurs and the time in which the terminative/cessative phase of 'walking' occurs, we can only
say that the two times can or cannot coincide.

In fact all the following interpretations are possible:

(1) John walked in the valley now desert;
(2) John has just walked in the valley a while ago desert;
(3) John walked/has walked for an hour in the valley desert in an hour (where the times denoted by 'an hour' refer to the same stretch of time).

It is moreover worth noticing that while the scope of the temporal adverbial is the state denoted by the adjective when the adjective is in post-nominal position, its scope remains the main verb when the adjective is in pre-nominal position (thus accounting for the fact that the pre-nominal adjective does not affect the meaning of the main verb).

II.2.1b Activity Verb + 'for-x-time' Adverbial

If we now examine the activity verb 'to walk'in the environment of a 'for-phrase', we see that different readings are yielded according to whether the verb is followed by a locative phrase of the form 'in + (adjective) + N' or of the form 'in + N + adjective' (where the adjective in parenthesis means that its presence or its absence does not alter the entailments of the verb), i.e. the sentences

(5) ha camminato nella vallata per un'ora
    (he has walked in the valley for an hour)

and
(6) ha camminato nella deserta vallata per un'ora (he has walked in the desert valley for an hour),

have both the same reading as to the scope of the temporal adverbial 'for an hour', ie. both sentences can be represented as:

[he has walked in the (desert) valley for an hour]
[he has walked for an hour] [in the (desert) valley].

The temporal adverbial 'for an hour' relates to the time in which the 'walking' occurred; in the case of sentence

(7) ha camminato nella vallata deserta per un'ora (he has walked in the valley desert for an hour)

instead, we have the following representation:

[he has walked in the valley] [desert for an hour],

ie. we no longer have the entailment that the 'walking' occurred for the period denoted by the temporal adverbial; instead, the interpretation is that the state denoted by the adjective is in existence during the time referred to by the 'for-phrase', ie. the state was not in existence before and after such a time. But to say that a state (p) is not in existence during time X means that another state, which can be called generically (non-p) is in existence at a time different from the one denoted by the 'for-phrase': in this sense the state (p) entails a change.

Moreover while sentences (5) and (6) can be read as "at any time during time X it is the case that John walked in the desert valley", sentence (7) allows the further
reading of "it is the case that John (has) walked in the valley for an unspecified interval of time; at any time during the interval represented by the 'for-phrase' it is the case that the state of being 'desert' holds". The reading of 'having walked for an unspecified interval of time' is ruled out for both sentences (5) and (6), as shown by the unacceptability of sentence

(6a) *Ha camminato per un tempo indeterminato per la (deserta) valle per un'ora

(*she (has) walked for an indeterminate time in the (desert) valley for an hour)

vs.

(7a) ha camminato per un tempo indeterminato nella valle deserta per un'ora

(he has walked for an indeterminate time in the valley desert for an hour).

Thus while in the environment of a locative phrase of the form 'in - (adjective) - N' Vendler's restriction on the activity verb 'to walk' holds at least for Italian, such a restriction in the environment of 'in + N + adjective' does not hold; this again indicates the necessity of specifying which constituents, and in what position, must be present if the restrictions on the main verb are to hold.

II. 2.1c. Dowty's Analysis

Though basically the same objections can be made to Dowty's criticism of Vendler's treatment of activity verbs, it is worth while giving it some attention, since Dowty's examples provide further evidence for the point
which we are trying to make here.
Dowty objects to Vendler's analysis of activity verbs on the ground that if we take the verb 'to walk' in the context of a locative of destination such as 'to the park' (and of an adverb of extent such as 'a mile', though this construction is omitted here because of a lack of suitable adjectives) we see that it meets all the requirements for accomplishment verbs, i.e. allows 'in-phrases', i.e. the sentence:

(8) John walked to the (dark) park in an hour

(the introduction of the prenominal adjective is mine), is perfectly acceptable as are the sentences:

(9) it took John an hour to walk to the (dark) park
(10) John finished walking to the (dark) park
(11) John stopped walking to the (dark) park

(Dowty p. 27). Now if we consider the Italian equivalent of sentence (8) with pre-nominal adjective, i.e. 'G. ha camminato fino all'oscuro parco in un'ora' we see that such a sentence entails (9) thus agreeing with Dowty's analysis. However, the same sentence, but with post-nominal adjective, has a different entailment (in the reading relevant here), i.e. it took John an unspecified interval of time to walk to the park; it takes an hour for the state 'dark' to be/become in existence, i.e. in this case and in relation to the state denoted by the post-nominal adjective we get the same entailment as for (4) above.

Similarly for (10) which, with prenominal adjective,
entails termination of the single or repetitive activity of 'walking', whereas with post-nominal adjective, ie.
in:

(10) ha finito di camminare fino al parco oscuro
(he (has) finished walking to the park dark)

there is the further information about the 'always/often/sometimes/still/again/now/yesterday' etc. being-in-existence of the state 'dark', ie. a 'timed' existence of the state not present with the prenominal adjective. The correctness of this analysis is shown by the unacceptability of such sentences as:

(10a) *ha finito di camminare fino all'oscuro parco sempre
(*he has finished walking to the dark park always)

(10a') *ha finito di camminare fino all'oscuro parco spesso
(*he has finished walking to the dark park often)

(10a") *ha finito di camminare fino all'oscuro parco a volte
(*he has finished walking to the dark park sometimes)

(10a"') *ha finito di camminare fino all'oscuro parco ancora/di nuovo
(*..........................still/again)

(10a'v) ha finito di camminare fino all'oscuro parco ora
(he has finished walking to the dark park now)

(10a v) ha finito di camminare fino all'oscuro
parco ieri
(he has finished walking to the dark park yesterday),

vs. the acceptability of such sentences but with post-nominal adjective.

The unacceptability of sentences (10a-10a'\") is due to the fact that as the adverbials are in the scope of the verb 'to finish' there is incompatibility between their frequency reading and the terminative reading of 'has finished'.

The sentences (10a'\v) and (10a\v) are, instead, acceptable as the meanings of 'finish' and of the adverbials 'now/yesterday' which refer to the time in which termination occurred, are compatible with each other. (This analysis, which places sentence-final temporal adverbials in the scope of the verb 'to finish' and not in the scope of the verb 'to walk' is confirmed by the acceptability of:

"ha finito di camminare sempre/spesso/a volte/ di nuovo fino al parco"
(he has finished walking always/often/sometimes/again to the park)

where the adverbial is in the scope of the verb 'to walk' and the whole sentence describes the end of a repeated activity. Moreover, it is worth noticing that the unacceptability of sentences (10a - 10a'\") vs. the acceptability of sentences (10b - 10b'\")

(10b) ha finito di camminare fino al parco oscuro sempre/a volte/spesso/di nuovo
(he has finished walking to the park dark always/often/sometimes/again)
significantly shows that the state denoted by the pre-nominal adjective refuses the frequency reading which is however admitted by the post-nominal adjective. In relation, instead, to the temporal adverbials 'now/yesterday' they are both allowed with pre- and post-nominal adjective but they yield different readings, i.e. with the pre-nominal they denote the time in which termination of the activity represented by the verb 'to walk' occurred; with post-nominal they refer to the time in which the state denoted by the adjective occurred.

Thus here again the presence of the post-nominal adjective changes the entailments of the verb 'to walk' in the environment of a 'locative of destination', such as 'to the park', which needs to be further specified as to the position of the elements forming it: at the same time it shows the relevance of the 'in/for-phrases' (and of the frequency adverbials) to its interpretation. The pre-nominal adjective, on the contrary, being outside the scope of these adverbials, is also outside any interpretation connected with them.

II. 2.2 Adjective position and scope of Temporal Adverbials with Accomplishment Verbs.

Taking into consideration the accomplishment verb 'to paint' followed by the 'direct-object' - noun phrase 'a picture', we see that such a structure allows both 'for-X time' and 'in X-time' adverbials irrespective of the presence or absence of an adjective in the NP. It is however noticeable that while both sentences:
(11) ha dipinto un quadro per un'ora
(he has) painted a picture for an hour

and

(11a) ha dipinto un interessante quadro per un'ora
(he has) painted an interesting picture for an hour

have the same entailment as expressed in Dowty (p. 22), ie. "if John painted an interesting picture for an hour, then it is not the case that he painted an interesting picture at any time during that hour" (but that he was painting during that hour), ie. the introduction of an adjective in pre-nominal position does not alter the entailment of the structure main-verb plus 'Direct-Object'; sentence

(11b) ha dipinto un quadro interessante per un'ora
(he has) painted a picture interesting for an hour,

instead, has a further entailment, ie. it is the case that Y painted a picture and that the state denoted by the adjective 'interesting' is in existence for the time denoted by the temporal adverbial. If we compare the entailments of (11/11a) with that of (11b) we see that only in the latter but not in the former sentence the scope of the temporal adverbial is the state denoted by the adjective thus responsible for the different reading of (11b) where the time spent painting the picture is left unspecified.

The English sentence

(12) J. (has- painted a (pleasant) picture in 3 years can be rendered as:

(12) J. ha dipinto un quadro in 3 anni
(12a) J. ha dipinto un piacevole quadro in 3 anni
(12b) J. ha dipinto un quadro piacevole in 3 anni
(J. has painted a picture pleasant in 3 years)
(lit. tr.)
where in relation to (12) and (12a) we have "it took 3 years
to paint a (pleasant) painting" while in relation to (12b)
(in the reading relevant here) the time spent to paint the
picture is left unspecified.
The adverbial refers in this case to the time the state
denoted by the adjective 'pleasant' takes to be/become in
existence, ie. a state generically expressible as 'non - p'
is in existence at the t of the utterance; the state (p)
('pleasant') will be in existence in 3 years, ie. the sta-
te (p) will be the result of a change from a state (non-
p).
Similarly for
(12f) J. dipingerà un quadro piacevole tra 3 anni
(J. will paint a picture pleasant in 3 years)
where the t of painting is left unspecified, the adverbial
referring to the t the state denoted by the adjective will
take to be/become in existence.
Thus while it is true that the treatment of accomplishment
verbs (and of other types of verbs as well) needs to take
into account the nature of the 'direct object' it is also
ture that such a nature cannot be defined only in terms
of "definite/indefinite singular/plural nouns" (as in Dowty,
p. 30) as to such types of nouns the further specification
of the structure of the NP in relation to the presence of
pre-and post-nominal adjective must be added.

Up to now we can draw the conclusion that while the
presence of pre-nominal adjective does not alter the entailments of the main verb, the presence of a post-nominal adjective does alter them; must therefore be specifically ruled out from treatments of verbs such as the ones we are examining.

II. 2. 2a McCawley's Analysis

The relevance of this need for further specification as to the nature of the NP -direct object is also proved by considering McCawley's analysis of Sentences (McCawley, 1971 and Dowty p. 24):

(13 a) The sheriff of Nottingham jailed Robin Hood for 4 years

held to be ambiguous between a repetitive reading and a reading in which '4 years' delimits the duration of the result state which the single act of jailing produced. This ambiguity is considered a criterion for distinguishing accomplishment verbs as 'jail' in the above example, from activity verbs such as 'ride' in the Sentence:

(14a ) The sheriff of Nottingham rode a white horse for 4 years

which have only the repetitive reading. (In the latter case, '4 years' is said to delimit the time over which the act of riding repeatedly took place). Now the fact that in sentence (13a) there is no adjective, while there is in (14a), in itself shows that the presence or absence of adjectives is not considered relevant. Let's see then what happens in Italian where the adjective can be placed either
pre-or post-nominally:

(13a') lo sceriffo di Nottingham imprigionò
il bravo R. Hood per 4 anni
(the sheriff of Nottingham jailed the
good R. Hood for 4 years)

(we consider here only the tense form 'imprigionò' and not
the tense form 'ha imprigionato' as the latter allows a
further reading which can be left out for the time being),

(13a") lo sceriffo di Nottingham imprigionò
R. Hood bravo per 4 anni
(the sheriff of Nottingham jailed R.
Hood good for 4 years).

The first thing to point out is that while (13a') is ambi-
guous between a repetitive reading and a single event rea-
ding in the same terms as (13a), sentence (13a") neither
allows any delimitation of the time over which the act of
jailing took place nor any delimitation of the duration of
the result state produced by the single act of jailing. In
fact, in (13a"), as the adverbial 'for 4 years' has as its
scope the state denoted by the post-nominal adjective (in
the relevant reading), it merely delimits the duration of
the state denoted by 'good'.

Similarly sentence (14a) allows in Italian both versions
with pre-nominal and with post- nominal adjective as in:

(14a') lo sceriffo di N. cavalcò un bianco caval-
lo per 4 anni
(the sheriff of N. rode a white horse for
4 years)

and in

(14a") lo sceriffo di N. cavalcò un cavallo bia-
co per 4 anni
(the sheriff of N. rode a horse white for
4 years).
In (14a') we have only the repetitive reading as in (14a), but in (14a'') both the repetitive and the single event - reading are allowed, the scope of the adverbial '4 years' being here again the state denoted by the post-nominal adjective 'white'. A proof of this analysis can be found in the unacceptability of sentence (14''') and in the acceptability of sentence (14'''): 

(14''') * lo sceriffo di N. solo una/un'unica volta cavalcò un bianco cavallo per 4 anni. 
      (* the sheriff of N. only once rode a white horse for 4 years)

(14''') lo sceriffo di N. cavalcò un'unica volta/ spesso un cavallo bianco per 4 anni 
      (the sheriff of N. only once/often rode a horse white for 4 years).

Again for both (13a'') and (14a'') the post-nominal adjective being in the scope of the adverbial 'for time X' entails a change of state in relation to t x-i and t x+i (where t x-i refers to the time before the one denoted by the 'for phrase' and t x+i refers to the time after the one denoted by the 'for-phrase'), i.e. a change from a state (non-p) at t x-i/ x+i to a state (p) at time x (where x is the time denoted by the adverbial).

II. 2. 2b Accomplishment Verb + Adverbial 'Almost'

Let us turn to achievement verbs in order to see whether it is necessary to specify further the position of the elements inside the NP following the main verb, and to test the hypothesis that the post- nominal adjective
entails a change of state in the context of temporal adverbials. First of all, let us analyse the accomplishment verb 'to paint a picture' with 'almost' and pre/post-nominal adjective:

(15a) ha quasi dipinto un roseo volto
     (he has almost painted a pinkish face)

(15a') ha quasi dipinto un volto roseo
     (he has almost painted a face pinkish).

Sentence (15a) has got the same entailments as:

(15) ha quasi dipinto un volto
     (he has almost painted a face)

ie. i) he did begin to paint a (pinkish) face and he almost but not quite finished it; ii) he wanted to paint a (pinkish) face but then he changed his mind and painted something else.

Sentence (15a') has the following entailments: i) he painted the face; he wanted to paint it pinkish but then he changed his mind and painted it green/yellow/red or generally (nonpinkish); ii) he painted the face; he painted it almost but not quite pinkish. If we compare the entailments of (15a) with those of (15a') we see that in (15a) the scope of 'almost' is the verb 'to paint' while in (15a') it is either the state denoted by adjective or the V 'to paint' and the state denoted by the adjective:

(15a) [he almost painted [pinkish face]]
(15a') [he painted face] [almost pinkish]/[he almost painted pinkish] [face].

In either case the state denoted by the post-nominal adjective entails a change of state either in relation to the
state which actually came in existence (ie. 'green' or 'non-pinkish') or in relation to the state nearest to it in colour (ie. 'pink').

II. 2.3 Adjective position and scope of Temporal Adverbial with Achievement Verbs

They are characterised by being unacceptable with 'for'-adverbials, with the 'spend -an-hour' (to do X) - periphrasis, as complements of 'finish' and 'stop' and, as observed by Ryle, with such adverbials as 'attentively, studiously, vigilantly' etc. They allow instead 'in'-adverbials, the 'take-an-hour' - periphrasis and the adverbial 'almost' which however does not produce the ambiguity found with accomplishment verbs. They are further distinguished by the 'in' - adverbial; ie. the sentence

(16) John noticed the painting in a few minutes

does not entail that John was noticing the painting through-out the period of 'a few minutes' and in this respect the achievement verb 'to notice' distinguishes itself from the accomplishment verb 'to paint'.

Such an analysis is however criticised by Dowty on the basis that if there is an indefinite or Mass noun-direct-object they behave differently. Before dealing with Dowty's criticism, let us examine the behaviour of the achievement verb 'to notice':

(16a) Ha notato il quadro in 5 minuti
(He noticed the painting in 5 minutes)
(16a') Ha notato il bel quadro in 5 minuti
(He (has) noticed the beautiful painting in 5 minutes)

(16b) Ha notato il quadro bello in 5 minuti
(He (has) noticed the painting beautiful in 5 minutes);

(16a-b) show that when the achievement verb 'to notice' is followed by a 'definite' noun phrase represented by the structure Adjective + Noun/Noun + Adjective, it allows 'in'-adverbials;

(17a) *Ha notato il quadro per 5 minuti
(*He (has) noticed the painting for 5 minutes)

(17a') *Ha notato il bel quadro per 5 minuti
(*He (has) noticed the beautiful painting for 5 minutes)

(17b) Ha notato il quadro bello per 5 minuti
(He (has) noticed the painting beautiful for 5 minutes),

show (17a-b)/that, when the achievement verb 'to notice' is followed by a 'definite' noun phrase with the structure: Noun/ (Adjective + Noun), it does not allow 'for-time X' adverbials. When the same verb is followed by a noun phrase of the form 'Noun+ Adjective', 'for - time X' adverbials are allowed; ie. while the presence or absence of pre-nominal adjective is irrelevant as to the acceptability or unacceptability of sentences with the verb in question, the presence or absence of post-nominal adjective is not. Moreover the post-nominal adjective, while yielding an acceptable sentence in (17b) vs. (17a), (17a'), yields different entailments in sentence (16b), vs. (16a) and (16a'), ie. (16a') and (16a) entail that it took Y time X to notice Z (where Z = N/adjective +N)
vs. (16) entailing that Y noticed Z (where Z = N) and that it takes time X for the state denoted by adjective to be/ become in existence. Moreover, while in (16a') no change of state is entailed, a change of state is entailed by (16b), where the 'in-phrase' gives the adjective its 'border-crossing' meaning (for the notion of border-crossing cf. M. Jes- sen, 1973).

If we now consider (17a')(and (17a)) and (17b) we find that the first two are unacceptable because the scope of the durational adverbial 'for 5 minutes' is the main verb 'to no- tice', and there is incompatibility between the 'momentary/ punctual' meaning of such a verb and the durative meaning of the adverbials. This incompatibility is not present in 17b), because the scope of the durational adverbial is no- longer the main verb but the state denoted by the post-no- minal adjective 'beautiful'. In the latter sentence, the du- rational adverbial denotes the time in which the state deno- ted by the adjective is in existence, thus entailing a change of state in relation to the state generically expressed as (non-beautiful) and holding at $t_{x-i}/x+i$.

In this respect sentence (17b) with an achievement verb and post-nominal adjective is not different from sentence (14a") and (11b) with the accomplishment verbs 'to ride' and 'to paint' respectively. This while proving the post-nominal adja- tive as a change-of-state vs. Pre-nominal * change-of state it also proves that in dealing with achievement verbs, too, it is necessary to specify the NP-direct-object not only in terms of definite/indefinite/singular/mass/plural but also in terms of the position of a possibly present adjective.
II. 2. 3a Achievement Verb 'to Notice' plus for-tX adverbial

It is moreover worth considering, in relation to the achievement verb 'to notice', that such sentences as (18) and (18a)

(18) ha notato quel quadro per anni
     (he (has) noticed the painting for years)

(18a) ha notato quell’interessante quadro per anni
     (he (has) noticed that interesting painting for years)

with the structure (Adjective) + Def. N, although unaccepta-
table in the single-event reading, are acceptable in the repetitive reading in the context for example of a partic-
cular interesting painting being shown in many exhibitions and of a person going to these exhibitions and every time finding himself noticing that particular (beautiful) paint-
ing which comes to his attention every time because of its colours/shape/position/topic etc. It is in fact quite normal to utter in Italian in such contexts the sentence:

'in tutte le esposizioni che ho visto ho sempre nota-
to la Pietà'  
(in all the exhibitions I've seen I have always noti-
ced 'La Pietà').

In this case the difference between pre- and post-nominal adjective is that the latter but not the former allows (in the reading relevant here) the single event reading, i.e. repetitive and single event reading of V 'to notice' in:

post-nominal

(18b) Ho notato quel quadro bello per anni
     (I (have) noticed that painting beautiful for years)
vs. only a repetitive reading of the verb 'to notice' for (18a).

In such contexts as the one just described the unacceptability of the achievement verb 'to notice' as complement of "finish/stop" fails. Thus in:

(19/19a) ha finito di notare quel (piacevole/in\niteressante) dipinto \n(he (has finished noticing that (beautiful/interesting) painting)

we have termination of the repetitive act of noticing while in

(19b) ha finito di notare quel quadro piacevole/\ninteressante \n(he (has) finished noticing that painting\nbeautiful/interesting),

we have similarly termination of the repetitive act of noticing the painting plus the possible reading of a temporalised existence of the state 'beautiful/interesting' in terms of 'now/then'. This is made clearer if we allow the durational adverbial 'for years' in (19)/(19a) and in (19b):

(19a') ha finito di notare quel piacevole/\ninteressante dipinto per anni \n(he (has) finished noticing that beautiful/\ninteresting painting for years)

(19b') ha finito di notare quel dipinto piacevole/\ninteressante per anni \n(he (has) finished noticing that painting\nbeautiful/interesting for years).

In (19a') we have termination of the repetitive act of noticing the (beautiful/interesting) painting: the 'for'-adverbial denotes the time in which such a repetitive act
took place. In (19b') we have termination of the repetitive act of noticing the painting: the "for-phrase" denotes the time in which the state denoted by the post-nominal adjective is/was in existence, i.e. in (19b') the time of the termination of the repetitive act of 'noticing' is left unspecified.

The same applies to the verb 'to notice' as complement of 'stop'.

We can thus conclude this analysis of the restrictions said to hold for achievement verbs with the remark that the verb 'to notice' in the above contents takes neither the 'spend-an-hour' - periphrasis nor the 'attentively/studiously/vigilantly' etc. - adverbials, irrespective of whether the NP-direct object has the form N or (adjective) N (adjective) as proved by the unacceptability of:

(20/20a) *Ha passato un'ora a notare il (bel) quadro
       (*He (has) spent an hour noticing the (beautiful) painting)

(20b) * Ha passato un'ora a notare il quadro bello
       (*He (has) spent an hour noticing the painting beautiful)

(21/21a) * Ha notato attentamente il (bel) quadro
        (*He (has) noticed attentively the (beautiful) painting)

(21b) * Ha notato attentamente il quadro bello
       (*He (has) noticed attentively the painting beautiful).

'Notice' does, however, take 'in'-adverbials. In this case, the position of the adjective must be taken into consider-
ration as yielding different entailments; it also takes 'for' adverbials and can be a complement of 'finish' and 'stop' in particular contexts but in both cases the position of the adjective yields different entailments.

II. 2. 3b Dowty's View on Achievements

Having pointed out this, let us now consider Dowty's treatment of achievement verbs. Dowty (pp. 30-31) says that while the achievement verbs 'discover' and 'meet' disallow the durational adverbials 'for 6 weeks' and 'all summer' in sentences like:

(22) * J. discovered the buried treasure in his backyard for 6 weeks

(23) * J. met an interesting blond on the beach all summer

they allow such adverbials with "indefinite plural or mass noun" as in:

(24) John discovered \{ fleas on his dog for 6 weeks \\
\{ crabgrass in his yard

(25) John met interesting blondes on the beach all summer.

Sentences (22), (25) are particularly relevant in this context as they show the presence of adjective and/ or, in Italian, the so-called participle: in Italian sentence (22) can be rendered as:

Pre-Nominal:(22a) Giovanni ha scoperto il sepolto tesoro nel suo giardino per 6 settimane

which is however acceptable in the context of '6 weeks' having as its scope the locative phrase 'in his backyard' but
unacceptable if 'for 6 weeks' has as its scope the Main Verb 'discovered', and also as:

Post-Nominal: (22b) Giovanni ha scoperto il tesoro sepolto nel suo giardino per 6 settimane
(John (has) discovered the treasure buried in his backyard for weeks)

where the scope of the adverbial 'for 6 weeks' is the state denoted by the so-called post participle. That is, to the English sentence (22) there correspond two versions, one with pre-nominal adjective acceptable in the above mentioned reading and the other with post-nominal adjective, where the durational adverbial refers to the time in which the state 'buried' has been in existence.

Similarly for (23) rendered in Italian by:

Pre-Nominal: (23a) John ha incontrato un'interessante bionda sulla spiaggia tutta l'estate
and acceptable in the context of 'all summer' having as its scope the locative phrase 'on the beach', and by

Post-Nominal: (23b) ha incontrato una bionda interessante sulla spiaggia tutta l'estate.

In order to avoid the acceptable reading for both (22) and (23) with pre-nominal adjective, consider these sentences without the locative phrase 'in his yard/on the beach': such sentences exemplified by:

Pre-Nominal: (22a') *ha scoperto il sepolto tesoro per 6 settimane
(*John (has) discovered the bu
and by

(23a')
ha incontrato un'interessante bionda tutta l'estate
(John (has) met an interesting blond all summer).

Without locative phrases, (22a') is unacceptable while
(23a') is acceptable only in the repetitive reading;

vs. Post-Nominal: (22b')
ha scoperto il tesoro sepolto per 6 settimane
(John (has) discovered the treasure buried for 6 weeks)

and Post-Nominal: (23b')
ha incontrato una bionda interessante tutta l'estate
(John (has) met a blond interesting all summer),

ie. (22b') contrasts with the unacceptability of (22a') while (23b') which can have both single and repetitive reading contrasts with the only repetitive reading of (23a').

Thus again in the case of the achievement verbs 'discover' and 'meet' followed by a definite/indefinite singular noun phrase (as direct object) the structure of the NP as (adjective) N or as N + adjective has to be taken into account, the crucial elements being the position of the adjective and the scope of the adverbials.

The same holds for sentence (25) which rendered in Italian as:

Pre - Nominal: (25a) ha incontrato interessanti bionde tutta l'estate

entails a repetitive reading of the verb 'meet' vs.

Post - Nominal: (25b) ha incontrato bionde interessanti tutta l'estate
entailing both repetitive and single event reading. This is shown by the unacceptability of:

Pre - Nominal:  (25a')  *ha appena incontrato interessant- ti bionde tutta l'estate  
* John has just met interesting blonds all summer)

vs. the acceptability of

Post - Nominal:  (25b')  ha appena incontrato bionde interessanti tutta l'estate  
(John has just met blonds interesting all summer).

In relation to sentence (24) if we introduce an adjective such as 'small' we have:

(24a)  ha scoperto piccole mosche per 6 settimane  
(John (has) discovered small fleas for 6 weeks)

and

(24 b)  ha scoperto mosche piccole per 6 settimane  
(John (has) discovered fleas small for 6 weeks),

(24a) having only a repetitive reading  but(24b) having both a repetitive and a single-event reading, as shown by the following:

(24a')  *ha appena scoperto piccole mosche per 6 settimane  
(*John has just discovered small fleas for 6 weeks)
(24 a") ha ripetutamente scoperto piccole mosche per 6 settimane
(John has repeatedly discovered small fleas for 6 weeks)

(24 b') ha appena scoperto mosche piccole per 6 settimane
(John has just discovered fleas small for 6 weeks)

(24 b") ha ripetutamente scoperto mosche piccole per 6 settimane
(John has repeatedly discovered fleas small for 6 weeks),

ie. in (24a) the scope of the adverbial is the main verb 'discover' while in (24b) is the state denoted by the post-nominal adjective 'small'.

On a similar basis we can argue that if

(25) John discovered that quaint little village for years

is unacceptable and

(26) Tourists discovered that quaint little village for years

is acceptable (as in Dowty p.31), (25) becomes acceptable in its Italian version with post-nominal adjective

(25b) ha scoperto quel paesino strano/irragiungibile/inaccessibile/stupendo/isolato/per anni
(X has discovered that village quaint/unreachable/inaccessible/marvellous/isolated etc. for years)

and (26) yields different readings according to whether it is rendered by:

Pre - Nominal: (26a) i turisti hanno scoperto quello strano paesino per anni
or by Post-Nominal:

(26 b) i turisti hanno scoperto quel paesino stranoper anni

ie. in (26) and (26a) the repetitive reading of the verb 'discover' ranges over the period denoted by the durational adverbial 'for years'; in (26b) both the repetitive and the single event reading of 'discover' are allowed: the repetitive reading ranges over an unspecified period of time, as the durational adverbial 'for years', with the adjective 'quaint' in its scope, refers to the time in which such a state has been in existence.

II.2.4 Conclusion

From what we have said above it seems that verbs have been distinguished into verbs of activity, accomplishment and achievement on the basis of their coocurrence with some types of temporal adverbials in the sense that while activities would allow only temporal adverbials of the type 'for t X', accomplishments (plus direct object) would allow both 'for t X' and 'in t X' being further distinguished from activities in so far as with 'for t X' they would present an ambiguity of the verb between the repetitive reading and the reading of single event (while activity verbs would present only the repetitive reading) and from achievements which would allow only 'in t X'.

Dowty's objection that activity verbs with a locative of destination (of the type 'to the park') present the characteristics of accomplishments cooccurring also with 'in t X' and that achievements, if followed by a plural
indefinite or mass noun, allow also 'for t x', finds support in the analysis here discussed in the sense that:

I. activity verbs allow the temporal adverbial 'in t X' when the locative of destination ('to the park') has the structure N+adjective, i.e. adjective following the noun;

2. achievement verbs allow the temporal adverbial 'for t x' if the structure of the nominal direct object (indefinite plural or mass) is of the type N + adjective.

Moreover the presence of an adjective post-posed to N, while causing the distinction suggested by McCawley to be inadequate, shows also that achievement verbs allow 'for t x' not only if followed by an indefinite plural or mass noun but also if followed by a definite noun (as is the case for 'that quaint little village' in the Italian version with post-posed adjective). Beside this, it is worth noticing that in the case of the temporal adverbials 'for t X' and 'in t X' with activity, accomplishment and achievement verbs, the reading we get, with the adjective pre-posed to the noun, is different from the reading we get with post-posed adjective, thus showing the relevance of the adjective position.

The distinction suggested by the above mentioned authors must take into consideration not only the presence of temporal adverbials and of nominals direct object and locative of destination but also the structure of such nominals in terms of presence or absence of adjective post-posed to the noun. It is true (as the present analysis shows) that the post-position of the adjective is the reason why the distinction of verbs into activities, accomplishments
and achievements becomes questionable; it is also true that this is caused by the fact that the post-posed adjectival (and not its pre-position) in the direct object or in the locative of destination followed by a temporal adverbial, falls within the scope of the adverbial. That is, the state referred to by the adjective presents an aspectual element in terms of beginning ('in t X') or of duration ('for t X'), thus reducing the distance between the meaning of adjectives and verbs and thus giving further support to the hypothesis of a categorial indeterminacy of the adjective — categorial indeterminacy shown also by the fact that the aspectual elements, if present when the adjective is post-posed, are however absent when the adjective is in pre-posed position.

From what has been just said it seems, moreover, that the categories of verbs examined, correlating with adverbs and adjectives (the latter of controversial status), turn out to be questionable.

In short the problem arises as to whether we should postulate a categorial indeterminacy for the verb as well. From this, it follows on the one hand that in the semantic part of the description there are not such clear cut categories as adjective and verb but intersecting processes; on the other hand, we have to consider the position of the adjective (and the problem of word order) not as a category but as the product of a process leading to a categorisation no longer in terms of (+ Adjective) but in terms of a continuum in the sense of a greater or lesser adjectival nature: thus for ex. 'alto' can no longer be categorised in terms of (+ Adjective) in the sense that either it is adjec
tive or it is not as it is (+ Adjective) in pre-position
and (- Adjective) in post-position (as the presence vs.
absence of aspectual elements respectively shows), but in
terms of continuum Adjective – Verb, i.e. in terms of a
greater or lesser adjectival/verbal nature.
If this thus leads to postulate the possibility for a
single element to belong to different categories, the fact
that the post- position of the adjective shows aspectual-
temporal elements vs. their absence in pre- position, thus
causing different readings according to the position, takes
us to see in the adjective a semantic indeterminacy beside
a sintactic one. In short in pre-nominal position the mea-
ning of adjectives is further removed from the meaning of
verbs -i.e. no aspectual elements - whereas in post-nominal
position the meaning of adjectives moves towards the mea-
ning of verbs, in that it acquires aspectual elements.
Part III Aspect and Tense

The presence of aspectual elements in the adjective post-posed to N, considered sporadically in the analysis of the restrictions 1–21 and more exhaustively in the part on verbs subcategorisation, will now be examined in greater detail in relation to causation, to the temporal adverbial 'every-day-a-bit-more' and to temporal adverbials in general.

III. 1 Adjective position and causation

In connection with the notion of the post-nominal adjective entailing a change of state it is particularly relevant to see that causative sentences of the type: 'X causes Y' yield acceptable sentences if $Y = 'N + adjective'$ while they yield unacceptable sentences if $Y = 'adjec
tive + N'$ as in:

Pre-Nominal: (27) * Maria ha reso l'interessante articolo (*Mary (has) caused the interesting article)

(28) * La febbre ha reso la pallida donna (*The fever (has) caused/made the pale woman)

(29) * Il vento ha reso gli orribili fogli (*the wind (has) caused/made the orrible papers)

(30) * quello che è successo ha reso l'ar
rabbiato Giovanni
(* What happened (has) caused/made the angry John)

(31) * La morte del marito ha reso la ricca donna
     (* the death of the husband (has) caused/made the rich woman)

(32) * vedere Giovanni ha reso la felice donna
     (* to see John (has) caused/made the happy woman)

(33) * udire il rumore ha reso il nervoso scrittore
     (* to hear the noise (has) caused/made the nervous writer)

(34) * l'essere alto rende l'odioso scrittore
     (* to be tall causes/makes the hateful writer)

(Sentences (27), (29) are acceptable if the context of 'ha reso' = 'ha restituito' = (has) given back)

Post-Nominal:  (27b) Maria ha reso l'articolo interessante
                 (Mary caused/made the article interesting)
                 (lit. tr.)

(28b) la febbre ha reso la donna pallida
     (the fever (has) caused/made the woman pale)

(29b) il vento ha reso i fogli orribili
     (the wind (has) caused/made the papers horrible)

(30b) quello che è successo ha reso Giovanni arrabbiato
     (what happened (has) caused/made John angry)

(31b) la morte del marito ha reso la donna ricca
     (the death of her husband (has) caused/made the woman rich)
(32b) vedere Giovanni ha reso la donna felice
(to see John (has) caused/made the woman happy)

(33b) udire il rumore ha reso lo scrittore nervoso
(to hear the noise (has) caused/made the writer nervous)

(34b) l'essere alto rende lo scrittore odioso
(to be tall causes/makes the writer hateful).

For the b) versions of sentences (27-34), the structures formulated by Dowty on p. 103/104 and based on Intentional vs. Non-Intentional causation are shown in:

Intentional Causation

```
a) S_{a}
   \_V\_ NP    NP
     \_DO\_  x   Si
       \_V\_ NP    NP
         CAUSE Sii  SIII
          \_V\_ NP    NP    \_V\_ NP
            DO\_ x   Sv
                  x   \_COME\_ ABOUT
                  \_Sv\_ y
```
(Agentive) Non-Intentional Causation

b)

\[
\text{\begin{align*}
\text{Si} & \quad \text{y} \quad \text{NP} \quad \text{NP} \\
\text{CAUSE} & \quad \text{Si} \quad \text{S} \quad \text{Si} \\
\text{V} & \quad \text{NP} \quad \text{NP} \quad \text{V} \quad \text{NP} \\
\text{DO} & \quad \text{x} \quad \text{S} \quad \text{iv} \quad \text{COME} \quad \text{ABOUT} \\
\text{x} & \quad \text{S} \quad \text{v} \\
\end{align*}}
\]

These structures can explain sentences (27b) and (30b) as intentional causation and possibly sentence (29b) as non-intentional causation, but they cannot explain (28b), (31b), (32b), (33b), (34b), from which both the Intentional structure a) and the DO-structure as subject of Cause in b) are excluded. In order to account for such sentences, something other than a DO Sentence must be the subject complement of CAUSE in b). Realising this possibility, Dowty gives an alternative structure with the semantic predicate COME ABOUT, i.e. he formulates causation for non-agentive accomplishment verbs as

c)

\[
\text{\begin{align*}
\text{S} & \quad \text{V} \quad \text{NP} \quad \text{NP} \\
\text{CAUSE} & \quad \text{S} \quad \text{S} \quad \text{S} \\
\text{V} & \quad \text{NP} \quad \text{V} \quad \text{NP} \\
\text{COME} \quad \text{ABOUT} & \quad \text{S} \quad \text{COME} \quad \text{ABOUT} \\
\text{x} & \quad \text{y} \\
\end{align*}}
\]
and causation for stative verbs as

d)

\[ \text{V} \quad \text{NP} \quad \text{CAUSE} \quad \text{S}_1 \quad \text{NP} \quad \text{V stat} \times \quad \text{V stat} \ y \]

(where COME ABOUT Vx = achievement).

If under this formulation we examine sentences (27-31) in their b) versions, we find that structure c) can account for (28b), (29b), (30b), (31b) but not for (32b) and (33b) and (34b).

The latter sentences in fact do not seem to be accounted for by any structure proposed here: structure d) in fact cannot account for it either, as the abject-complement of CAUSE entails a change of state, in Dowty's terms, a COME ABOUT Sentence.

If we analyse the state denoted by the post-nominal adjective in the b) versions of the above sentences, we see that Von Wright's formal system (as in Dowty p. 121/122) which "makes no formal reference to the agent's action which brought about the result" is just what we need to account for the post-nominal adjective in the object complement of CAUSE, i.e.

i. the state X was not in existence before cause - Y
ii. the state X was in existence after cause - Y
iii. the state X would not have come into existence if there hadn't been cause-Y and all else had been the same.
Such notion of causation is expressed by Von Wright through the formula \((\neg p \land \neg p)\) which applied to the state denoted by the post-nominal adjective in the above sentences reads as follows:

state \((\neg p)\) and next state \((p)\) instead of state \((\neg p)\):

* e.g. the states denoted by the post-nominal adjectives 'interesting, pale, horrible, rich, angry, happy, nervous, hateful' result from previous states generically expressible as 'non-interesting, non-pale, non-horrible, non-rich, non-angry, non-happy, non-nervous, non-hateful'.

That is, the state \((\neg p)\), instead of remaining \((\neg p)\), has changed into \((p)\).

III.2 Adjective position and Temporal Adverbials

In relation to a such a notion of change of state with the post-nominal adjective it is worth considering the following sentences with the adverbial "every-day-a-bit-more":

Pre-Nominal: (34) * E' un utile dizionario ogni giorno un po' di più
(* It is a useful dictionary every day a bit more)

(35) * E' una bella donna ogni giorno un po' di più
(* she is a beautiful woman every day a bit more)

(36) * E' una famosa attrice ogni giorno un po' di più
(* she is a famous actress every day a bit more)

(37) * E' un prossimo risultato ogni giorno un
pò di più
(* it is a near result every day a bit more)

(38) * E' un futile comportamento ogni giorno un pò di più
(* it is a futile behaviour every day a bit more)
(lit. tr.)

Post-Nominal:

(34b) E' un dizionario utile ogni giorno un pò di più
(it is a dictionary useful every day a bit more)

(35b) E' una donna bella ogni giorno un pò di più
(she is a woman beautiful every day a bit more)

(36b) E' un'attrice famosa ogni giorno un pò di più
(she is an actress famous every day a bit more)

(37b) E' un risultato prossimo ogni giorno un pò di più
(it is a result near every day a bit more)

(38b) E' un comportamento futile ogni giorno un pò di più
(it is a behaviour futile every day a bit more)

etc.

ie. in the b) versions of sentences (34–38) the adverbial 'every day a bit more' is referred to the state denoted by the post-nominal adjective and "it implies movement along a line in the direction of a terminal point which has not yet been reached" (Verkuyl, 1972: 92); at every time t in the interval of time represented by \( t_1 \ldots t_n \) there corresponds a particular state which is different from a previous one at a previous time, ie. at time \( t_{iii} \) for ex. there cor-
responds a state \( \text{pii} \) which is different from state \( \text{piii} \) at time \( t_{\text{ii}} \); i.e. state \( \text{piii} \) at time \( t_{\text{iii}} \) represents a change of state in respect to state \( \text{pii} \) at time \( t_{\text{ii}} \).

In non-predicative structures without the verb 'to be', the adverbial 'every day a bit more' does not yield unacceptable sentences when the adjective is in pre-nominal position, but the scope of the adverbial is not the state denoted by the adjective but the main verb as in:

Pre-Nominal: (39) Ho conosciuto quella bella donna ogni giorno un po' di più
(I have Known that beautiful woman every day a bit more)

(40) Guardava lo stupendo fiore ogni giorno un po' di più
(he looked at the marvellous flower every day a bit more)

(41) Parlano del tremendo caos ogni giorno un po' di più
(they talk about the terrible chaos every day a bit more)

(lit. tr.)
etc.

In sentences (39), (40), (41), the adverbial 'every-day-a-bit-more' gives to the main verb the reading of 'Know a bit better' for (39), and of 'look at/talk a bit longer' to (40) and (41) respectively together with a repetitive reading, as shown by the unacceptability of:

(39a) *Ho appena conosciuto quella bella donna ogni giorno un po' di più
(* I have just Known that beautiful woman every day a bit more)

(40a) *Stava guardando lo stupendo fiore ogni giorno un po' di più
(* he was looking at the marvellous flower every day a bit more)

(41a) * Stanno parlando del tremendo caos ogni giorno un pò di più
(* they are talking about the terrible chaos every day a bit more)

(lit. tr.)
e tc.

If we consider such sentences with post-nominal adjective as in:

(39b) Ho conosciuto quella donna bella ogni giorno un pò di più
(I have Known that woman beautiful every day a bit more)

(40b) Guardava il fiore stupendo ogni giorno un pò di più
(he looked at the flower marvellous every day a bit more)

(41b) Parlano del caos tremendo ogni giorno un pò di più
(they talk about the chaos terrible every day a bit more)

(lit. tr.)

the adverbial 'every day a bit more' refers to the state denoted by the post-nominal adjective and keeps the same meaning in all 3 sentences, while the main verb of (39b) has the single-event reading and that of (40b) can have both repetitive and single event reading, as proved by the acceptability of:

(39bi) Ho appena conosciuto quella donna bella ogni giorno un pò di più
(I have just Known that woman beautiful every day a bit more)

(40bi) Stava guardando/era solito guardare il fiore stupendo ogni giorno un pò di più
Apart from the different meanings of the main verb in
the above sentences (39-41) (which however point to the ne-
cessity of analysing the adjective position also in relation
to the verb tenses), it is relevant that the structures (34-
38) are unacceptable while (34b - 38b) are acceptable; that
is, the adverbial 'every day a bit more' entailing a change
of state yields unacceptable sentences with pre-nominal adjec-
tive but yields acceptable ones with post-nominal adjecti-
ve.

Such a notion of change of state in relation to the abo-
ve Sentences seems to find its correct formulation in: (¬pTp)
where T = 'and Next' (Von Wright).

Let's now see if such a notion of change of state as re-
presented in Von Wright's formula can account for structures
with temporal adverbials as in:

(42) E' una bella donna oggi
    (she is a beautiful woman today)

(42b) E' una donna bella oggi
    (she is a woman beautiful today)

In (42) the scope of the temporal adverbial is the 'copula'
while in (42b) it is the state denoted by the adjective.
Accordingly, the meaning can be represented thus:

(42)[E' oggi il caso] [bella donna]
[it is today the case] [beautiful woman]

(42b) [E' il caso [donna] [bella oggi]]

[it is the case [woman] [beautiful today]]

ie. (42b) entails that state p (=beautiful) holds during the time denoted by the adverbial 'today' and that a state (~p) holds during the time $t_{x-i}$ (previous to $t_x$ where $t_x$ = 'today' or that state (~p) does not hold during the time $t_x'$, ie. in relation to $t_{x-i}$ and to the state (~p), the state (p) (beautiful) represents a change of state. The notion of change of state yielded by the post-nominal adjective in the above examples with temporal adverbials (1) points on the one hand to a temporal existence of states (tense and aspect being present in case of adjectives in post-position), and, on the other hand, to the state (p) at $t_x$ (where $t_x$ = denoted by the temporal adverbial) as the negation of whatever state $N$ was in at $t_{x-i}$ (2). Thus in saying (42b) we assert that $N$ is at $t_x$ 'beautiful' and not 'famous' or 'clever' or 'nice' or whatever - it is that particular state which is in existence and not other possible ones.

(1) for the use of attributive adjectives and temporal adverbials cf. also p. 128 and following.

(2) for a development of such a notion of negation cf. p. 183.
III. 2a Present and Present Perfect plus Temporal Adverbials (1)

Consider the following sentences with temporal adverbials of duration, inception, and cessation:

Pre-Nominal:

(23) è stata una famosa attrice per 3 anni/per anni/per molto tempo (she has been a famous actress for 3 years/for years/ a long time)

(25) è una famosa attrice dal 1968 (she is a famous actress since 1968)

(27) non è più una famosa attrice (she is no longer a famous actress)

etc.

vs. Post-Nominal:

(24) è stata un'attrice famosa per 3 anni/per anni (she has been an actress famous for 3 years)

(26) è un'attrice famosa dal 1968 (she is an actress famous since 1968)

(28) non è più un'attrice famosa (she is no longer an actress famous)

(lit.tr.)

etc.

Consider further:

Pre-Nominal:

(23a) *è stata una famosa attrice per 3 anni ma è stata un'attrice per tutta la vita (* she has been a famous actress for 3 years

(1) for the use of temporal adverbials see also p. 132 and following.
but she has been an actress all her life)

(25a) * è una famosa attrice dal 1968 ma è una attrice dal 1960
(* she is a famous actress since 1968 but she is an actress since 1960)

(27a) * non è più una famosa attrice ma è sempre una attrice
(* she is no longer a famous actress but she is always/still an actress)

etc.

(from which is excluded the reading of 'actress' as not professional, ie. the reading 'to behave like an actress')

vs. Post-Nominal:

(24a) è stata un'attrice famosa per 3 anni ma è stata un'attrice tutta la vita
(she has been an actress famous for 3 years but she has been an actress all her life)

(26a) è un'attrice famosa dal 1968 ma è un'attrice dal 1960
(she is an actress famous since 1968 but she is an actress since 1960)

(28a) non è più un'attrice famosa ma è sempre un'attrice
(she is no longer an actress famous but she is always/still an actress)

(lit.tr.)

etc.

ie. with pre-nominal adjective the scope of the temporal adverbial is the main verb the time reference of the main verb is the time reference of the N - time reference of N which the adjective does not modify; with post-nominal adjective, instead, the scope of the temporal adverbial is the state denoted by the adjective and not the N,ie.
(23) [has been for 3 years [famous actress]]
(25) [is since 1968 [famous actress]]
(27) [is no longer [famous actress]]
(24) [has been actress [famous for 3 years]]
(26) [is actress [famous since 1968]]
(28) [is actress [no longer famous]]

(24) allows the reading that the condition of 'actress' and of 'famous' are both over, and also allows the further reading

(24) [is actress] [been famous for 3 years]


Thus the pre-nominal adjective takes the time reference of the N while the postposed adjective remains free, having a time reference which can be same as or different from the time reference of the N. Thus an analysis of (23) appears to allow basically the following:

(23b) [has been for \(t^x\) [famous actress]]

(she is no longer actress)

vs. (24) 'she has been an actress famous for 3 years'

which allows, in the part relevant here, the following:

(24b) [Present actress \(t^x\)] [past famous for \(t^x - i\)]
(24c) [Past actress for \(t^x\)] [past famous for \(t^x - i\)]

(where (24b) = she is actress but she is no longer famous and (24c) = she is no longer either actress or famous):

the b-version implies that the \(t^x\) of 'actress' has a span superior to the span of 'famous', i.e. \(t^x\) of 'actress' and \(t^x - i\) of 'famous' where \(t^x - i\) is a \(t\) inferior to \(t^x\), i.e. in (24b) the \(t\) of 'actress' is still in existence while the \(t\) of 'famous' is over; in (24c) the \(t\) of 'actress' is over
and t of 'famous' is over but the t of N is different from the t of the adjective. In all these cases the t of the state denoted by the post-nominal adjective is different from the t of the N.

Similarly for

(25) è una famosa attrice dal 1968

(she is a famous actress since 1968)

where we have

(25b) [Present from t_x [famous actress]]

vs. (26) she is an actress famous since 1968
giving in the reading relevant here

(26b) [Present actress] [famous since t_x];

being the t of 'actress' different from the t of 'famous', (26b) can be formulated as

(26 bi) [since t_x actress] [famous since t_{x-1}].

Similarly for (27) 'she is no longer a famous actress' giving

(27b) [Past t_x [famous actress]]

vs. (28) she is no longer an actress famous

yielding in the reading relevant here

(28b) [Present t_x actress] [Past t_{x-1} famous].

We find the same in sentences with pre-nominal adjectives:

(29) * è una famosa attrice anni fa

(* she is a famous actress years ago)

(31) * è una bella donna anni fa

(* she is a beautiful woman years ago)

(33) * è un eccentrico personaggio qualche anno fa

(* he is an eccentric character some years ago)

etc.

vs. Post-nominal:

(30) è un'attrice famosa anni fa
(she is an actress famous years ago)

(32) è una donna bella anni fa
(she is a woman beautiful years ago)

(34) è un personaggio eccentrico qualche anno fa
(he is a character eccentric some years ago)

etc.

where in (30), (32), (34), the notion of presentness is predicated of the N while the notion of pastness conveyed by the adverbial is predicated of the state denoted by the adjective; and in (29), (31), (33) both the notion of presentness conveyed by the main verb and the notion of pastness conveyed by the adverbial are both predicated of the N causing a semantic contradiction.

III. 2b Imperfect tense plus Temporal Adverbials

We have the same as in III.2a if the main verb is in the imperfect tense, as in (35) – (43) with pre-nominal adjectives:

(35) * era un regolare funzionario solo ora
(* he was a regular official only now)

(37) * era un interessante commediante solo oggi
(* he was an interesting comedian only today)

(39) * era un normale abbigliamento solo oggi
(* it was a normal attire/way of dressing only today)

(41) * era un buon stile solo oggi
(* it was a good style only today)

(43) * era un ubriaco poliziotto solo oggi
(* he was a drunken policeman only today)

vs. the acceptability of (35), (37), (39), (41), (43) in
the versions with temporal adverbials conveying the same notion of pastness as the one conveyed by the main verb as in:

(35a) era un regolare funzionario allora
(he was a regular officer then)

(37a) era un interessante commediante allora/anni fa
(he was an interesting commedian then/years ago)

(39a) era un normale abbigliamento allora/anni fa
(it was a normal attire/way of dressing then/years ago)

(41a) era un buon stile allora/anni fa
(it was a good style then/years ago)

(43a) era un ubriaco poliziotto allora/anni fa
(he was a drunken policeman then/years ago)

etc.

Consider, further, the acceptability of (36), (38), (40), (42), (44), with post-nominal adjectives:

(36) era un funzionario regolare solo oggi
(he was an officer regular only today)

(38) era un commediante interessante solo oggi
(he was a commedian interesting only today)

(40) era un abbigliamento normale solo oggi
(it was a way of dressing normal only today)

(42) era uno stile buono solo oggi
(it was a style good only today)

(44) era un poliziotto ubriaco solo oggi
(he was a policeman drunken only today)

etc.

(The above are even more clearly acceptable in the enlarged version with 'already' as for ex. 'he already was an officer regular nevertheless only today'). In (36), (38), (40), (42), (44) the notion of pastness conveyed by the main verb is predicated only of the N, while the notion of presentness
conveyed by the temporal adverbial is predicated only of the state denoted by the adjective. Thus if the adjective pre-position, cancelling the state semantic potentials, also cancels the t of the state denoted by the adjective which takes the t of the N, the adjective post-position, actualising the state semantic potentials, also actualises the t which may or may not coincide with the t of the N. If this accounts for the different interpretation of (23), (25), (27) in relation to (24), (26), (28), it also accounts for the interpretation of the following ones:

(45) usciva con una brava ragazza da quando aveva 18 anni
(she went (?) out with a good girl since she was 18)

(47) mangiava acidi wurstel da 3 giorni
(he ate (?) sour wurstel since 3 days/he had been eating sour wurstel for 3 days)

(49) usciva con belle donne la sera
(he went (?) out with beautiful women at night)

etc.

(examples taken from Dowty, 1972) where the temporal adverbial, being in the scope of the main verb, gives to the main verb an iterative reading, i.e. the temporal adverbial gives the main verb temporal interpretation. With post-nominal adjective as in:

(46) usciva con una ragazza brava da quando aveva 18 anni
(he went (?) out with a girl good since she was 18)

(48) mangiava wurstel acidi da 3 giorni
(he ate (?) wurstel sour for/since 3 days)

(50) usciva con belle donne la sera
(he went (?) out with women beautiful at night) etc.

the adverbial having as its scope the adjective causes the main verb to have the further reading of 'was going out/was eating', ie. we have, in this case, both the iterative and the momentary reading, ie. the adjective and the adverbial modify the main verb temporal reading as it is shown by the non-acceptability of:

(45a) * stava uscendo in quel momento con una brava ragazza da quando aveva 18 anni
(*he was going out in that moment with a good girl since she was 18)

(47a)*stava mangiando in quel momento acidi wurstel da 3 giorni
(* he was eating in that moment sour wurstel for 3 days)

(49a) * stava uscendo in quel momento con belle donne la sera
(*she was going out in that moment with beautiful women at night)

etc.

vs. the acceptability of:

(46a) stava uscendo in quel momento con una ragazza brava da quando aveva 18 anni
(he was going out in that moment with a girl good since she was 18)

(48a) stava mangiando in quel momento wurstel acidi da 3 giorni
(he was eating in that moment wurstels sour for/since 3 days)

(50a) stava uscendo in quel momento con donne belle la sera
(he was going out in that moment with women beautiful at night)

etc.
III.2c  Other Tense Forms

It is again through a consideration of the scope of the adverbial that we can account for the non-acceptability of (51 - 67), with pre-nominal adjectives and the acceptability of (52), (54) and (56), with post-nominal adjectives:

(51) * sto per incontrare un ottimo professore in tutte le sue lezioni
(* I am about to meet an excellent professor in all his lectures)

(53) * ho appena ascoltato un famoso concerto fino a 2 anni fa
(* I have just listened to a famous concert till 2 years ago)

(55) * sta leggendo un valido articolo fino a 3 anni fa
(* he is reading a valuable article till 3 years ago)

(57) * usciva con una piacevole ragazza con sua madre
(* he went (?) out with a pleasant girl with his mother)

(59) * notò la famosa ballerina da mesi
(* he noticed the famous dancer "for" months)

(61) * perse importanti documenti da alcune settimane
(* he lost important documents "for" some weeks)

(63) * prese inutili libri ormai da tempo
(* he took useless books "ormai" "for" a while)

(65) * raggiunse la sublime vetta da anni
(* he reached the sublime top "for" years)

(67) * cominciò a dipingere un noto personaggio da anni
(* he began to paint a famous/notorius character "for" years)
(52) sto per incontrare un professore ottimo in tutte le sue lezioni
   (I am about to meet a professor excellent in all his lectures)
(54) ho appena ascoltato un concerto famoso fino a 2 anni fa
   (I have just listened to a concert famous till 2 years ago)
(56) sta leggendo un articolo valido fino a 3 anni fa
   (he is reading an article valuable till 3 years ago)
   etc.

The presence of the state temporal meaning actualised by the post-position (as already hinted at in Bolinger 1967, though in a different approach) appears clearly also in Post-nominal:

(71) ricordo quella ballerina bella
(73) ho conosciuto giovane famosa eccentrica
(73a) ho visto grassa ottusa interessante piccola
   etc.

(I remember that dancer beautiful/young/famous/eccentric/fat/silly/interesting/little/etc.)

(73) (I have met...................
(73a) (I have seen................

where the post-position causing the scope of the main verb to be the adjective gives to the adjective the reading of 'when she was adjective ' vs.

(72) ricordo quella bella giovane/famosa/eccentrica/ etc. ballerina
   (I remember that beautiful/young/famous/eccentric/etc. dancer)
(74) (I have met......)
(74a) (I have seen......)

where the scope of the main verb is the whole structure 'adjective + N'.

(72a), (74b), (74c):

(72a) ricordo quella ballerina bella e ora è diven

tata orribile

(I remember that dancer beautiful and now she has become horrible)

(74b) ho conosciuto quella ballerina giovane e ora

ha più di 60 anni

(I have met that dancer young and now she is over 60)

(74c) ho conosciuto quella ballerina grassa e ora

guarda com'è magra

(I have met that dancer fat and now look how thin she is).

In the above examples the present perfect of the main verb refers to a time which is both past and present in relation to the N, while it refers only to a time past in relation to the adjective. In (72a), the present tense 'remember' activates the N time span as past and present, while it activates the post-posed adjective time span as past: if from this it derives that the tN is different from the t adjective when the adjective is post-posed, it also derives that the t of the state denoted by the adjective and activated in the post-position specifies the temporal interpretation of the main verb tense which in the case of the present perfect includes the present and the past.

From this point of view, consider further sentences such as (75) and (77) with pre-nominal adjective and (76) and (78) with post-nominal adjective:

(75) era una famosa attrice nel 1950

(she was a famous actress in 1950)
While in (75) and (77) the adverbial gives the temporal reference of the main verb placing the state in the time specified by it (adverbial), in (76) and in (78) the adverbial gives the temporal reference only of the state denoted by the adjective placing it in the time which it (adverbial) specifies. Thus the time-reference of the whole sentence (76) and (78) with post-posed adjective and adverbial is greater than that of (75) and (77) with pre-posed adjective. With pre-posed adjective the \( t \) of the whole sentence is the \( t \) of the main verb determined by the adverbial: with post-posed adjective the \( t \) of the main verb interacts with the \( t \) of the adjective determined by the adverbial — an interaction which determines in turn the time-reference of the whole sentence (in relation to this see also p. 143 and following).
III. 3 Conclusions

The analysis of the structures 'copula verb + (Adjective) N (Adjective) + Temporal Adverbial' has shown that, in the case of preposed adjectives, the temporal adverbial modifies the verb and the time-reference of the adverbial must agree with the time-reference of the verb (Cf. the non-acceptability of (29) (* is a famous actress years ago), (31), (33), of (35) (* was a regular officer only today), (39), (41), (43), of (45a) (* was going out with a good girl years ago), (47a), (49a), etc.). Where the adjective is post-nominal the temporal adverbial modifies only the adjective. But this means that the adjective is detachable from the noun and it, is 'temporizable', ie. it is detached from N and it has got a time-reference which is independent not only from the time-reference of the N but also from the time-reference of the V, as is shown by the acceptability of (24a) ('she has been an actress famous for 3 years but she has been an actress all her life'), (26a), (28a) and by (30), (32), (34), (36) etc. (46a), (48a), (50) etc.

Thus if the adjective has got its own time-reference, the latter is separate from the time reference of the N when the adjective is post-nominal, but is identical with the time-reference of the N when the adjective is pre-nominal (Cf. the analysis of (23), (25), (27) and the non-acceptability of (23a), (25a), (27a) vs. the acceptability of (24a), (26a) etc). The analysis of (23-65) shows that the notion of time-reference relates not just to verb, and that, as argued by Crystal (1966) "it is no longer the case
of studying tense forms in isolation from the rest of the sentence. The presence of a tense element in the adjective (which we have already seen in our analysis of verbs subcategorisation, part II.2), shows that "different grammatical environments may produce different possibilities of co-occurrence" and that "verbal features are distributed over a good deal of the sentence", and also shows that the adjective-verb relationship cannot be formulated in terms of opposition between two categories but it must be formulated in terms of what we have defined "continuum" of greater or lesser adjectival/verbal nature. If from this it follows an hypothesis of indeterminacy of the adjective as a syntactic category (and of the verb as well), from the fact that, inside the adjective analysis, the pre- or post-posed position shows the absence (pre-position) vs. the presence (post-position) of tense / aspect — being tense / aspect semantic categories — it follows its indeterminacy as a semantic category, too (for this cf. also part II.2).

In this view postulating for the adjective a semantic indeterminacy we need a theory of meaning different from the general one which, formulated in terms of fixed set of features, cannot account for the change in meaning corresponding to the change from pre-nominal to post-nominal position.

This discussion of adjectives rests on the idea that linguistic description must take account not just of the language system but of the fact that speakers draw both on the system and on the context, linguistic and extra-linguistic, when using the language. Existing models of generative grammar
do not allow for this view, whereas systemic grammar as developed by Halliday does allow for it. His model incorporates the notion of a series of choices, each 'chunk' of syntax resulting from a particular set of choices at different points in the system.

We should also take into account the view of language as an interrelation of 'sentences' where every 'sentence' is part of a larger chunk of speech - interrelation of utterances which define themselves in relation to other utterances in an interlocutory duality - language in this case being no longer considered as something static and given but as a dynamic process where meaning participates of this dynamicity in the sense that it is the result of a crossing of all the elements constituting the single utterance and of the crossing of the single utterance with the utterances preceding and following it.
Part IV. An Argumentative-semantic Hypothesis

Given the conclusions reached at the end of the preceding chapter, it is interesting to relate O. Ducrot's (1972 and 1980) theory to my analysis of the adjective, particularly with respect to presupposition. Ducrot starts from the idea that most sentences uttered are part of a larger discourse, continuing a preceding interchange and requiring a further debate, i.e. are utterances which define themselves in relation to other utterances, examines the presupposition which, present "à peu près partout dans le lexique et dans la syntaxe", has particular importance for linguistic theory. According to Ducrot, to choose an utterance is to choose a certain presupposition and thus actually define a category susceptible of continuing it thereby establishing the limits offered to the "allocuteur" in the sense that continuation of the dialogue depends on acceptance of the presupposed content. The choice of the presupposed elements thus appears as an "acte de parole particulier" "acte à valeur juridique, et donc illocutoire, au sens que nous avons donné à ce terme: en l'accomplissant on transforme du même coup les possibilités de parole de l'interlocuteur" (Ducrot, 1980 : 91); "c'est pourquoi leur choix limite la liberté de l'auditeur en l'obligeant - s'il veut poursuivre le discours amorcé - à les prendre pour cadre de sa propre parole. Lorsqu'on introduit des presupposés dans un énoncé, on fixe, pour ainsi dire, le prix à payer pour que la conversation puisse continuer" (Ducrot, 1980 : 91). That is, the reply is based on the very act
of presupposition, on the fact that this or that has been presupposed and not on the truth of what has been presupposed. If Ducrot believes that the presupposed elements of an utterance cannot be defined do as conditions with truth value and that the presupposition cannot have properly logical status ("la présupposition n'a un statut logique que si on donne à ce mot un sens plus large, et si on appelle 'logique du langage' une étude d'ensemble des relations entre énoncés, relations dont les rapports inférentiels sont seulement un cas particulier"; Ducrot, 1980: 100), he also outlines a view of discourse as utterances which define themselves in relation to the argumentative possibilities opened by them. By this he means that utterances orient the discourse in one or in another direction: "on conçoit les significations de phrases comme des instructions pour décoder leurs énoncés en exploitant les indications fournies par la situation de discours", "comme un ensemble de directives sur la façon dont la situation doit être prise en compte" (Ducrot, 1972: 32-33).

IV.1 Utterances 1-8

If we now examine the structure 'copula + (Adj) N (Adj)' according to Ducrot's hypothesis, i.e. as utterances which in a sequence of discourse are analysed on the basis of the argumentative possibilities that such a structure opens up, we see that it is relevant to consider such a structure both in utterances with overtly 'functional'
nouns and with non-overtly 'functional' ones\(^{(1)}\), ie.

\textbf{Pre-nominal:}

\begin{itemize}
\item (1) è un povero scrittore \\
    (is a poor writer)
\item (3) è una brutta Fiat \\
    (is an ugly Fiat)
\item (5) è un grande scrittore \\
    (is a great writer)
\item (7) è un grande edificio \\
    (is a great building)
\end{itemize}

(where (1) and (5) have an overtly 'functional' N and (3) and (7) a non-overtly 'functional' one)

\textbf{vs.}

\textbf{Post-nominal:}

\begin{itemize}
\item (2) è uno scrittore povero \\
    (is a writer poor)
\end{itemize}

\(^{(1)}\) the distinction between 'functional' and non-'functional' nouns seems to be definable in terms of a distinction between already existing entities to which man has attributed a function (as for ex. nouns of the type 'moon, earth') and entities built by man for a specific function. In the latter nevertheless we must distinguish between entities the function of which is not lexicalised in the noun as for ex. in the case of 'building' (where the function is indirect) and entities like 'writer' where the function is directly lexicalised in the noun. According to Vendler (1967) there are nouns which "explicitly denote certain functions (appropriate V class) so when they are used with an adjective we expect one qualifying them with respect to that function...In this view functional nouns point out a set of activities with respect to which somebody can be qualified" "the subject being rated according to what it does and not according to what can be done with it" (pp. 179-195)
(4) è una Fiat brutta
(is an ugly Fiat)

(6) è uno scrittore grande
(is a writer great)

(8) è un edificio grande
(is a building big)

etc.

When we examine how these utterances can be incorporated in discourse, we find that the same speaker A (or another speaker in the dialogue) can utter (1), followed by:

(1) (ia) non vale la pena leggere le sue opere
(it is not worth reading his works)

(iiia) le sue opere non hanno nessun valore letterario
(his works have no literary value)

(iiiia) non sa scrivere
(his cannot write)

(iva) non ha capacità compositive
(his does not have the capacity to write essays)

(va) scrive confusamente
(hies writes chaotically)

(via) non mostra alcuna capacità logica
(hes does not show any logic capacity)

(viia) non sa niente di politica/economia/legge/etc.
(hes knows nothing of politics/economics/law etc.)

(viiia) il suo sentimentalismo è nauseante
(his sentimentalism is disgusting)

(ixa) non è più valido oggi
(hes is no longer worth today)

(xa) oggi non si legge più
(nowadays nobody reads it)

(xia) oggi è completamente superato
(nowadays he is completely out-of-date)

(xiia) segna la fine della tematica del Romanticismo
(it marks the end of Romantic themes)
(xiiia) segna la fine della tragedia di vendetta
(it marks the end of the vengeance tragedy)

(xiva) segna la fine del periodo elisabettiano (cronologicamente)
(it marks the end of the Elisabethan period)
(chronologically)

(xva) nessuno compra quello che scrive
(nobody buys what he writes)

etc.

ie. (i-xv) show how the adjective 'poor' in pre-position modifies the overtly functional N 'writer' in relation to:
a) written works (i), (ii): b) writing capacities in general or in terms of capacities as an essayist or in terms of organisation of material etc. (iii), (iv), (v); c) general knowledge (vii); d) literary style (viii); e) validity in the present time (ix); f) number of readers at the present time (x); g) particular topic of his works (xii), (xiii); h) period in which he lived (xiv); i) way his works sell (xv) etc.

To the Post-nominal: B: (2) è uno scrittore povero
(he is a writer poor),

without any particular intonation, the same speaker B or another speaker can go on with the following:

(2) (ia) ? (ixa) */?
(iiia) ? (xa) */?
(iiiia) ? (xia) */?
(iva) ? (xiiia) */?
(va) ? (xiiia) */?
(via) ? (xiva) */?
(viia) ? (xva)
(viiia) ?
The only fully acceptable sentence with post-nominal adjective is represented by (xva), where the state denoted by the post-posed adjective has got a semantic relation with 'nobody buys what he writes', i.e. (xva) is explanatory of the 'poverty'. The sentences (i-xv) have been marked with an interrogation mark because they become acceptable if it is implied that they describe the reason why the works do not sell, i.e. (i-xv) become acceptable when:

(i) .............................................................. che rimangono invendute (which are not sold)
(ii),(viii),(ix),(x),(xi).......................... e nessuno le compra (and nobody buys them)
(iii),(iv),(v),(vi).............................. la lettura è difficile e nessuno le compra. (to read them is difficult and nobody buys them)
(vii).............................................................. e questo oggi è basico per vendere (and this nowadays is basic to sell)
(xii).............................................................. tematica che ha stancato e nessuno più compra opere che trattano questo soggetto (topic which nowadays has tired people and nobody anymore buys works dealing with it)
(xiii).............................................................. tragedia di cui non si può più sentire parlare e nessuno compra più opere su questo tema (tragedy people can no longer hear of and thus nobody buys works on this topic)
(xiv).............................................................. come periodo economicamente ricco (as an economically rich period)
The essential point is that the adjective 'poor' in post-position needs contexts where the lack/scarcity of money must appear either implicitly or explicitly. It should be noted that (ix), (x), (xi), are acceptable when it is implied that the sentence subject is still alive or in existence. Given (3), with pre-nominal adjective,

(3) è una brutta Fiat
    (it is an ugly Fiat)

the same speaker A or another speaker can provide the following continuations:

(3) (ia) la parte davanti è troppo corta rispetto al resto
        (the front is too short in relation to the other parts)
(iiia) non funziona bene
        (it does not work well)
(iiiia) lo sterzo non ha manovrabilità
        (the driving wheel does not have good manoeuvrability)
(iva) il cambio è basso
        (the gear is low)
(va) i sedili sono scomodi
    (the seats are uncomfortable)
(via) il freno è duro
        (the brake is stiff)
(viia) l'acceleratore a volte si incanta
        (the accelerator sometimes gets stuck)
(viia) l'interno del portabagagli ha poca capacità
        (the inside of the boot has got very little capacity)
(ix) non ci sono portaceneri
    (there are no ashtrays)
(xa) non c'è posto per la radio
    (there is no place for the radio)
(xia) si arrugginisce con facilità
(it gets rusty easily)
(xia) è pesante da guidare
(it is heavy to drive)
(xiia) ha poca accelerazione
(it has got poor acceleration)
(xiva) non supera i 100 Km.
(it can only do 110 Km an hour)

etc.

ie. (i-xiva) show how the adjective 'ugly' in pre-position modifies the non-overtly functional N 'Fiat' in relation to: a) aesthetic view point; b) general functioning; c) manoeuvrability of the steering wheel; d) gear height; e) seats comfortability; f) brake stiffness; g) boot capacity; h) lack of fitting; i) resistance to the rust; l) general manoeuvrability; m) acceleration; n) speed; etc.; with the adjective in post-nominal position, ie. with

(4) 'è una Fiat brutta'
((it) is a Fiat ugly)

we have:

(4) (ia)
   (iia) *
   (iiiia) *

(iva) (acceptable in the sense that the lowness of the gear can be something breaking the aesthetics of the N in discussion)

(va) *

(via) *

(viia) *

(viia) *

(ixia) *

(xia) *

(xia) *

(xia) *

(xia) *

(xia) *

etc.
ie. only (i) and (iv) are acceptable, as only (i) and (iv) are related to aesthetical considerations; (ix) and (x) can be considered acceptable only in the context where they get the further specification or the presupposition that such elements as 'ashtrays' and 'radio' are thought of as essential or at least important to determine an evaluation of the N in aesthetical terms; (i-xiv) are acceptable only if connected to (4) through connectives such as 'and' - in this case being used to determine further aspects of the N, aspects not included in the state denoted by the adjective which because of its position postposed to the N has as its reference the aesthetic side of the N;

to the Pre-nominal:

(5) è un grande scrittore
(he is a big/great writer)

the same speaker A or another speaker can go on with the following:

(5) (ia) i suoi romanzi/tragedie/commedie etc. sono famosi
(his novels/tragedies/comedies etc. are famous)

(iiia) le sue teorie sulla fisica sono basiche
(his theories on physics are of fundamental importance)

(iii) nel suo secolo scrivere bene era difficile
((it) was difficult to write well in his century)

(iva) ignorare le sue opere significa ignorare la matematica
(to ignore his works means to ignore mathematics)
(va) ha segnato l'inizio di una nuova era
((he) marked the beginning of a new era)
(via) tutti lo hanno imitato
(everybody imitated him)
(viia) la sua umanità è ineguagliabile
(his humanity is unequalled)
(viia) scrivere per lui era un divertimento
(writing was to him an enjoyment)
(ixa) lavora 18 ore al giorno
((he) works 18 hours a day)
(xa) scrive solo la mattina
((he) writes only in the morning)
(xia) dorme pochissimo
(he sleeps very little)
(xiia)* la sua altezza è incredibile
(his height is unbelievable)

etc.

ie. (i-xii) show how the adjective 'grande' ('big/great')
in preposition modifies the 'overtly' functional N 'writer'
in relation to:
a) works (genre) (i); b) fame (i); c) importance (ii); d) relation with the century he lived in (iii); e) meaning of his work (iv); f) popularity (vi); g) humanity (vii); h) meaning of writing for him (viii); i) working time (x); l) sleeping time (xi); m) physical dimensions (xii); etc.

With the post-nominal: (6) è uno scrittore grande
(he is a writer big/great)

we have:
ie. (iia), (viiiia), (ixa), (x), (xi), are ruled out while (i), (ii), (iv), (v), (vi), (vii), are acceptable in the case of the post-nominal adjective receiving a heavy stress. It appears here interesting to examine the cases of non-acceptability: we have, on the one hand, the non-acceptability of (ixa), (x), (xi), and, on the other hand, the non-acceptability of (iii), and of (viii). In the former case the non-acceptability appears determined by the fact that the adjective 'grande' ('big/great') in post-position essentially modifies the N in its aspect of physical dimension (as it appears from the acceptability for ex. of 'è uno scrittore grande': 'è alto m. 1.90/pesa kg 98' 'he is a writer big/great: he is m. 1.90 tall' (?)/'his weight is kg 98' etc.) and only contextually, in the case of heavy stress, in its aspect of 'importance': (ixa), (x), (xi) do not modify the N in relation to any of these two aspects, from which follows their non-acceptability. In the latter case, ie. in the case of (iii) and of (viii), the non-acceptability appears determined from the

(1) A certain prosodic feature can function as alternative to the process of pre/post-nominalisation. Intonation is considered another realisation of the difference between pre- and post-nominalisation— which does not constitute a counterevidence as the same result can be obtained either prosodically or sintactically.
fact that the time of (iii) and of (viii) refers to a time past. In fact if we examine (vi), (ii), (iv), (v), (vi), (vii), we see that all of them become non-acceptable if, instead of the present tense or of the present perfect (the Italian present perfect does not necessarily imply the end of a state/event etc.), we have the past perfect, ie.

(6) (ib) * i suoi romanzi/tragedie/commedie/furono famosi
       (*his novels/tragedies/comedies/were famous)
(iib) * le sue teorie sulla fisica furono basiche
       (*his theories on physics were basic)
(ivb) * ignorare le sue opere significò ignorare la matematica.
       (*to ignore his works meant to ignore mathematics)
(vb) * segnò l'inizio di una nuova era
       (*he marked the beginning of a new era)
(vib) * tutti lo imitarono
       (*everybody imitated him)
(viib) * la sua umanità fu ineguagliabile
       (*his humanity was unequalled).

If we analyse, instead, the same structures with past perfect in the case of (5) with pre-nominal adjective, we see that they do not present modifications with respect to their acceptability, ie. to

(5) 'è un grande scrittore'
       (he is a big/great writer)

can follow:

(5) (ib) i suoi romanzi/tragedie/commedie/furono famosi
       (his novels/tragedies/comedies/were famous)
We are thus faced with a problem of time, clearly appearing in the above analysis of the structures (5) and (6); a consideration of time appears relevant also in relation to (1), (2), and to (3), (4): in fact with (1) 'è un povero scrittore' (he is a poor writer)

ie. with pre-nominal adjective of the type represented by 'poor', we have:

(1) (ib) non valse la pena leggere le sue opere (it was not worth reading his works)

(iiib) le sue opere non ebbero nessun valore letterario (his works did not have literary value)

(iiiib) non seppe scrivere (he did not know how to write)

(ivb) non ebbe capacità compositive (he did not have the capacity to write essays)

(vb) scrisse confusamente (he wrote chaotically)

(vib) non mostrò alcuna capacità logica (he did not show any logic capacity)
non seppe niente di politica
(he knew nothing of politics)

il suo sentimentalismo fu nauseante
(his sentimentalism was disgusting)

segnò la fine della tematica del Romanticismo
(he marked the end of Romantic themes)

segnò la fine della tragedia di vendetta (nel periodo Elisabettiano)
(he marked the end of the tragedy of vengeance) (in the Elisabethan period)

segnò la fine del periodo Elisabettiano
(he marked the end of the Elisabethan period)

nessuno compro quello che scrisse
(nobody bought what he wrote);

while with

'(2) 'è uno scrittore povero' (he is a writer poor)

with post-nominal adjective we find that none of the structures (ib-xivb) is acceptable not even in the implication of 'works not being able to sell' and thus not even in the resulting implication of 'lack/scarcity of money'.

(xvb) is acceptable if the subject of (2) is still alive and in this case (xvb) refers to a situation in the past the present result of which is (2); in fact (xvbi) 'nessuno comprot nel 1700 quello che scrisse' ('in 1700 nobody bought what he wrote') is not acceptable; thus also (xva), the only acceptable sentence in the a-versions of (2) becomes non-acceptable in (bi), i.e. in its past time version.

With pre-nominal (3) 'è una brutta Fiat' (it is an ugly Fiat)

and post-nominal (4) 'è una Fiat brutta' (it is a Fiat ugly)
we have:

(3) (ib) * la parte davanti era troppo corta
(*the front was too short)

(iib) * non funzionava bene
(*it did not work well)

(iiib) * lo sterzo non aveva manovrabilità
(*the steering wheel did not have good mano-
euvrability)

(ivb) * il cambio era basso
(*the gear was low)

(vb) * i sedili erano scomodi
(*the seats were uncomfortable)

(vib) * il freno era duro
(*the brake was stiff)

(viib) * l'acceleratore a volte si incantava
(*the accelerator sometimes got stuck)

(viib) * l'interno del portabagagli aveva poca capacità
(*the inside of the booth had very little capa-

city)

(ixb) * non c'erano portaceneri
(*there were no ashtrays)

(xb) * non c'era posto per la radio
(*there was no room for the radio)

(xib) * si arrugginiva con facilità
(*it got rusty easily)

(xiib) * era pesante da guidare
(*it was heavy to drive)

(xiiiib) * aveva poca accelerazione
(*it had poor acceleration)

(xivb) * non superava i 100 km
(*it could not do 100 km)

etc.

(the tense here used is the imperfect); ie. with the N of
the type represented by 'Fiat', the tense of the (b) struc-
tures must be the same as the tense of (3). We thus have
a difference between the type of N denoted by 'writer' and the type of N denoted by 'Fiat', i.e. the time of the two Ns is conceptualised in different terms (1).

Analysing now pre-nominal: (7) è un grande edificio
(it is a big/great building)

we have:

(7) (ia) non si può non visitare
(we cannot not visit it)

(iiia) si deve conoscere
(it is necessary to know it)

(iiiia) è essenziale per chi studia architettura
(it is essential for people who study architecture)

(iv) essendoci vissuto il padre della letteratura moderna
(having lived here the father of modern literature)

(va) essendo un esempio di barocco romano
(being an example of Roman baroque)

(via) essendoci morta Mary Stuart
(as Mary Stuart died there)

(viia) in quanto appartiene ai Borghese
(as it belongs to the Borgheses)

(viia) avendoci creato Strauss il valtzer
(as Strauss' waltzer was created here)

---

(1) In relation to this I can only suggest that nouns of the type represented by 'writer' seem to be conceptualised in the language as 'a-temporal' - without time limits in the sense that the chronological life time of the entity denoted by the N in question is not taken into consideration. What is relevant is thus not the entity but the function, the existence of which does not seem to have time limits.
(ixa) essendoci stata decisa l'invasione dell'Afghanistan
   (as the Afghanistan invasion was decided here/there)

(xa) supera in altezza tutti gli altri
   (it exceeds in height all the others)

etc.

ie. the adjective 'grande' ('big/great') in pre-position modifies the 'non-overtly functional' N 'building' in terms of: a) general culture (i), (ii); b) specific culture (iii); c) inhabitants (iv); d) type of architecture (v); e) events (vi); f) ownership (vii); g) activities/decisions (viii), (ix); h) dimensions (x); etc.

With post-nominal adjective: (8) è un edificio grande
   (it is a building big/great)

we have:

(8) (ia) * ? (viiiia) * ?
    (iia) * ? (ixa) * ?
    (iiiia) ? (xa)
    (iva) * ?
    (va) * ?
    (via) * ?
    (viia) * ?

ie. with post-nominal adjective (ia) and (iia) are not acceptable: there is no relation between post-nominal 'grande' ('big/great') denoting 'physical dimension' and the obligatoryness to 'visit/know' the entity demoted by the N it modifies; it is however acceptable, as (iiiia) and (va), only in the context of the entity's physical dimensions being
considered important in relation to general culture or to a specific study; (iva), (via), (viia), (viiia), (ixa), are acceptable only if the subject would require the presence of the physical dimension represented by 'grande' (big/great) in relation to the events/activities attributed to them; (xa) is acceptable as it refers to the physical dimension. Thus the adjective of the type represented by 'grande', in post-position and in conjunction with a N of the type 'building', denotes physical dimension. The (ia) in their b-versions, ie. with time in the past (where possible) yield the same results for (7) with pre-nominal adjective, ie. acceptability, and for (8) with post-nominal adjective, ie. non-acceptability, in (ib-ixb). This shows that the nature of the N in relation to time must be taken into consideration in this case, too (as in the case of the N 'Fiat'), while the acceptability of (8xa) contrasts with the non-acceptability of (8xb), ie. with 'superò in altezza tutti gli altri' ('it exceeded in height all the others').

IV.1a **Summary**

Thus, in relation to time the examples (1-8) in connection with the argumentative possibilities opened up by them in a discourse situation show that with pre-nominal adjective, (1), (3), (5), (7), ie.

(1) è un povero scrittore
(he is a poor writer)

(3) è una brutta Fiat
(it is an ugly Fiat)
(5) è un grande scrittore  
(he is a big/great writer)

(7) è un grande edificio  
(it is a big/great building)

open up both the argumentative possibilities represented by the utterances (a) with tense in the present and those represented by the utterances (b) with tense in the 'passato remoto'. The exception is (3), where only the utterances exemplified by (a) are possible - the nature of the N being responsible for their non acceptability; in the case instead of:

(2) è uno scrittore povero  
(he is a writer poor)

(4) è una Fiat brutta  
(it is a Fiat ugly)

(6) è uno scrittore grande  
(he is a writer big/great)

(8) è un edificio grande  
(it is a building big/great)

with post-nominal adjective, only the a-version, with the same tense as (2), (4), (6), (8) (present tense) are acceptable; the b-versions with tense past in relation to the tense of (2), (4), (6), (8), are not acceptable.

Thus in the case of a N of the 'overtly functional' type represented by 'writer' and of the 'non-overtly functional' type represented by 'building' with pre-nominal adjective, the present tense of the sentence where the structure 'Adj + N' appears can be followed by a sentence with tense in the present and/or in the past; in the case of the same types of N but with post-nominalised adjective, to the present tense of the sentence where the structu
re 'N + Adj.' appears must correspond a present tense in the sentence following it. It is significant that where an adjective precedes a non-overtly functional N of the type represented by 'Fiat', the present tense of the sentence with the pre-nominal adjective demands a present tense in the following sentences. This shows not only that the N has its own tense but also that the tense of the N determines the argumentative possibilities of the utterance in question, i.e. which utterances can follow.

In the case of pre-nominal adjective the time becomes the time of N which determines the time of the adjective and the tense of the verb in the utterances following them. In case of post-nominal adjectives, instead, the time of the N remains detached from the time of the state denoted by the adjective which gets activated as time separated from N and as time 'now': as such it determines the tense of the verb in the utterances which follow the utterance in question.

It is in this view that it seems to us we must place the explanation of the fact that the utterances (1), (5), (7), with pre-nominal adjective, can be followed both by the utterances exemplified by the versions (a) with the verb in the present tense and those exemplified by the versions (b) with the verb in the past tense (and in the case of (3) only versions (a)), while the utterances (2), (4), (6), (8) with post-posed adjective, can be followed only by the utterances of the type represented by (a), i.e. by utterances with the verb in the present tense.
The post-position thus gives prominence to the time of the state denoted by the adjective, whereas the pre-position causes the state denoted by the adjective to get the time of N.

Moreover considering the utterances (1-8) from the point of view of the argumentative possibilities represented only by the utterances of type (a), we see that with pre-nominal adjectives all the examples (a), i.e. (i-xv), are possible while in case of post-nominal adjectives only (2xva), (4ia), (6xiia) and (8xa) are possible: this leads us to infer that the pre-posed adjective modifies N in a whole series of states/events connected with it (noun) while the post-posed adjective modifies N only in the component specifically determined by it (adjective).

While this further supports the hypothesis that the adjective is semantically indeterminate it also hypothesizes its pragmatic indeterminacy caused by the adjective's ability to occur in two positions.
IV.2 Adjective- noun Interrelation with the Operators 'but' and 'and'

In the preceding chapter I examined utterances (1-8) with respect to the argumentative possibilities opened up by them, in terms of which type of utterances can follow them, and argued that such argumentative possibilities are determined by the interrelation of adjective and noun. It is important now to analyse this interrelation in greater detail.

It has been maintained that "in pre-position the lexical meaning of the noun... is crucial to the specific interpretation of the adjective" so that "the criteria for establishing the sense of the adjective are those specific lexical attributes of the N to which the adjective refers" in the sense that (in case of pre-position) "they seem to be less objective because they depend in much larger measure on the specific lexical content" so that for ex. "the recognition of the particular referential attributes of 'furieux' in 'furieux menteur' is accomplished specifically through the recognition of those qualities which distinguish a 'liar' from other nouns and these referential attributes will be necessarily different for every noun" (Waugh, 1976).

The post-posed adjective, instead, "modifies any preceding N just as it would modify any N in the language" so that for ex. the adjective 'old' in post-position "takes the meaning of 'old-in-years/aged'...independently of one's status", ie. "independently of being a 'friend' or a 'garçon' or a 'soldat' etc." as "in post-position ... only part of the lexical features of the N are involved, not all of them as in pre-position" (Waugh, 1976).

IV.2a 'But/And' with Functional Nouns

Let us now examine the following structures with 'overtly functional' nouns and adjectives of the type repre
sented by 'ugly':

Pre-nominal:  vs. Post-nominal:

(1)  è una brutta Fiat  (it is an ugly Fiat)
    (a)  è una brutta mano  (it is an ugly hand)
    (b)  è un brutto serpente  (it is an ugly snake)
    (c)  è una brutta pianta  (it is an ugly plant)

(2)  è una Fiat brutta  (it is a Fiat ugly)
    (a)  è una mano brutta  (it is a hand ugly)
    (b)  è un serpente brutto  (it is a snake ugly)
    (c)  è una pianta brutta  (it is a plant ugly)

etc.  etc.

The hypothesis that the pre-nominal position of the adjective "attributes a quality to the individual/entity specifically in his capacity as defined by the N" can explain the pre-nominalisation in (1), but cannot explain (1a), (1b), (1c). On the other hand, the hypothesis that post-nominal position attributes, "a quality to the specific N present in the structure 'Adj + N' as to any N" accounts for only one of the readings of (2), (2a), (2b), (2c). In fact if it appears difficult in (1), ie. in structures with not 'overly functional' N, to interpret them, ie. (1a), (1b), (1c), as 'ugly-qua-hand/snake/plant etc.', (2), (2a), (2b), (2c) have the further reading in which the adjective specifies, inside the set determined by the N present in the structure 'N + Adj', a subset X defined by the adjective and by implication the presence of a further subset defined in terms of non-X1. Inside the set represented by 'Fiat/snake/plant/etc.' there is a subset defined in terms of 'ugly' (X) including in the subset 'not-ugly' all the possible varia-
tions allowed by 'non-X'.
The importance of this reading, (already noticed by Bierwisch, 1971, in the case of plural structures) together with the explicative inadequacy of the analysis of the adjective position with respect only to the features of N, leads us to analyse the type of utterance represented by (1) and (2) from the argumentative point of view with the operators 'but' and 'and'. In this view 'but' and 'and' are considered operators whose presence establishes certain conditions for the development of the discourse and gives to the utterance a certain argumentative direction consequent to the speaker's intentions (Vogt, 1977 and 1981). Thus 'but' in the type of utterance 'A but B' is seen as an operator which originates in B an argumentative direction opposite to that of A; and 'and' is seen as an operator which originates in B an argumentative direction which is the same as the one present in A. The following part will try to show the validity of an analysis in argumentative terms and will show that the B in the structure 'A but/and B' depends on the interrelation adjective-noun and on the utterances/presuppositions preceding it.

IV. 2b 'But/And' with non-Functional Nouns

'A and B': Pre-nominal:

(1i) * è una brutta Fiat e comoda
    (*it is an ugly Fiat and comfortable)
(a) * è una brutta mano e morbida
    (*it is an ugly hand and soft)
(b) * è un brutto serpente e innocuo
(*it is an ugly snake and harmless)
(c) * è una brutta pianta e utile
(*it is an ugly plant and useful)

etc.

where the adjective in 'B' has an argumentative direction opposed to that of A;

(1ii) * è una brutta Fiat e scomoda
(*it is an ugly Fiat and uncomfortable)
(a) * è una brutta mano e ispida
(*it is an ugly hand and rough)
(b) * è un brutto serpente e pericoloso
(*it is an ugly snake and dangerous)
(c) * è una brutta pianta e inutile
(*it is an ugly plant and useless)

etc.

where the adjective in 'B' has an argumentative direction which is the same as that of the adjective in A;

(1iii) è una brutta Fiat ed è scomoda
(it is an ugly Fiat and it is uncomfortable)
(a) è una brutta mano ed è ispida
(it is an ugly hand and it is rough)
(b) è un brutto serpente ed è pericoloso
(it is an ugly snake and it is dangerous)
(c) è una brutta pianta ed è inutile
(it is an ugly plant and it is useless)

etc.

(1iv) * è una brutta Fiat ed è comoda
(*it is an ugly Fiat and it is comfortable)
(a) * è una brutta mano ed è morbida
(*it is an ugly hand and it is soft)
(b) * è un brutto serpente ed è innocuo
(*it is an ugly snake and it is harmless)
(c) * è una brutta pianta ed è utile
(*it is an ugly plant and it is useful)

where in the (1iii) we have the same problem as in the type of utterance represented by (1ii) and in (1iv) the type (1i) with the difference that the (1iii) are acceptable while the (1ii) are not and neither the (1iv) nor the (1i) are acceptable.

We can explain the non-acceptability of the (1iv) by the fact that the adjective in B has got an argumentative direction opposite to the direction of the adjective in A (while the presence of the operator 'and' requires the same argumentative directions in both A and B - cf. the acceptability of the (1iii) where the directions are the same).

However the non-acceptability of the (1ii) is not explainable in terms of argumentative direction, as the direction of both adjectives is both negative as required by the operator 'and'. The non-acceptability of these utterances has in fact to be sought in the fact that the pre-nominal adjective cannot be detached and thus cannot be coordinated with another adjective. That is, the presence of the only adjective in B and the non-acceptability of the whole utterance 'A and B' shows that 'Adj + N' is a single indivisible unit (see further part III on tense/aspect).

This non-detachability of the pre-nominal adjective together with the opposed argumentative directions is responsible on the other hand for the non-acceptability of the (1i).

If the (1i) and the (1ii) are thus to be excluded for main
ly syntactic–semantic reasons, the exclusion of the (1iv) is due to semantic–argumentative reasons (and not to syntactic ones) based on a 'canonic' view of language according to which their acceptability on the basis of a presupposition or preceding utterance of the type

'le Fiat sono brutte ma comode'
(Fiats are ugly but comfortable)

would be presumably considered an exception. Instead, with respect to the use of language and to the interrelation between utterances, the acceptability of (1iv) is no longer considered an "exception". From this point of view the operator 'and' must be further defined as coordinating equal argumentative directions not just inside a single utterance but inside more than one utterance or inside an utterance and its presupposition, i.e. in the utterances (1i) the 'and' carries out a coordination with the negative argumentative direction ('ugly') modified ('but comfortable') of the presupposition/preceding utterance.

It is interesting to see how the (1iii), too, can present this type of coordination as for ex. in the case of

I: le Fiat sono brutte ma comode
(Fiats are ugly but comfortable)

2: concordo che le Fiat siano brutte ma non che siano comode; questa per es. (1iii) è una brutta Fiat ed è scomoda.
(I agree that Fiats are ugly but not that they are comfortable; this for ex. (1iii) is an ugly Fiat and it is uncomfortable)

where speakerI with 'but' produces a contrast between the negative direction of the adjective X ('ugly') and the positive direction of the adjective Y 'comfortable'. Such
a contrast of argumentative direction established by 'but' has the scope of mitigating basically the negative argumentative direction of X: it depends on speaker (2) to assume as fundamental the negative direction of A ('ugly') or the positive direction mitigating it with 'but' in 'B' ('comfortable'). Speaker (2), uttering (1iii), shows that the assumes the negative direction of A in the utterance of I as predominant. It thus follows the presence of the 'and' coordinating the negative argumentative direction of B in (1iii) with the negative argumentative direction, assumed as predominant, in the A of I. In this case, therefore, the coordination operates in relation to sentences in context.

Moreover if we compare the acceptability of the (1iii) with the non-acceptability of the (1i) and (1ii) (*è una brutta Fiat e comoda/scomoda), we see that the pre-nominal position of the adjective, making it undetachable from the N, (cf. p.168) would seem to make impossible the coordination with a 'B', the structure of which is represented only by an adjective.

'A but B': Pre-nominal:

What has been said for (1i) and (1ii) also explains the non-acceptability of:

(1v) * è una brutta Fiat ma comoda/scomoda
(*it is an ugly Fiat but comfortable/uncomfortable)

(a) * è una brutta mano ma morbida/ispida
(*it is an ugly hand but soft/rough)

(b) * è un brutto serpente ma innocuo/pericoloso
(*it is an ugly snake but harmless/dangerous)
(c) * è una brutta pianta ma utile/inutile
(*it is an ugly plant but useful/useless),
(1)

while what has been said on the acceptability of (1iii) can be said also for the acceptability of:

(1vi) è una brutta Fiat ma è comoda
(it is an ugly Fiat but it is comfortable)
(a) è una brutta mano ma è morbida
(it is an ugly hand but it is soft)
(b) è un brutto serpente ma è innocuo
(it is an ugly snake but it is harmless)
(c) è una brutta pianta ma è utile
(it is an ugly plant but it is useful). 

The same applies to:

(1vii) è una brutta Fiat ma è scomoda
(it is an ugly Fiat but it is uncomfortable)
(a) è una brutta mano ma è ispida
(it is an ugly hand but it is rough)
(b) è un brutto serpente ma è pericoloso
(it is an ugly snake but it is dangerous)
(c) è una brutta pianta ma è utile
(it is an ugly plant but it is useless),

which are acceptable if associated with a presupposition or preceding utterance of the type

I. le Fiat sono brutte ma comode
(Fiats are ugly but comfortable)

(1) Though mainly syntax is involved in the non-acceptability of these sentences, both syntax and semantics are involved when the second adjective occurs.
Ia. concordo che le Fiat siano brutte ma non che siano comode; questa per es. (1vii) è una brutta Fiat ma è scomoda
(I agree that Fiats are ugly but not that they are comfortable; this for ex. (1vii) is an ugly Fiat but it is uncomfortable)

where with (1vii) the speaker shows his disagreement with the mitigation of the negative argumentative direction of the utterance of I by using 'but'.

'A and B': Post-nominal:

(2i) * è una Fiat brutta e comoda
    (*it is a Fiat ugly and comfortable)
    (a) * è una mano brutta e morbida
        (*it is a hand ugly and soft)
    (b) * è un serpente brutto e innocuo
        (*it is a snake ugly and harmless)
    (c) * è una pianta brutta ed utile
        (*it is a plant ugly and useful)
    etc.

(2ii) è una Fiat brutta e scomoda
    (it is a Fiat ugly and uncomfortable)
    (a) è una mano brutta e ispida
        (it is a hand ugly and rough)
    (b) è un serpente brutto e pericoloso
        (it is a snake ugly and dangerous)
    (c) è una pianta brutta ed inutile
        (it is a plant ugly and useless)
    etc.

(2iii) * è una Fiat brutta ed è scomoda
    (*it is a Fiat ugly and it is uncomfortable)
    (a) * è una mano brutta ed è ispida
        (*it is a hand ugly and it is rough)
etc.

(2iv) * è una Fiat brutta ed è comoda
 (*it is a Fiat ugly and it is comfortable)

(a) * è una mano brutta ed è morbida
 (*it is a hand ugly and it is soft)

(b) * è un serpente brutto ed è innocuo
 (*it is a snake ugly and it is harmless)

(c) * è una pianta brutta ed è utile
 (*it is a plant ugly and it is useful)

(lit. tr.)

etc.

In these examples if (2ii) are acceptable coordinating the 'and' two equal argumentative directions inside the utterance in question, (2i) are acceptable if we consider the interrelation with other utterances, ie.

1. le macchine sono creazioni brutte ma comode
 (cars are creations ugly but comfortable)

2. è vero, la mia per es. (2i) è una Fiat brutta e comoda
 (it is true, mine for ex. (2i) is a Fiat ugly but comfortable)

where the operator 'and' in (2i) shows the coordination with the negative argumentative direction mitigated of I; both in (2i) and (2ii) the B introduced by 'and' has the result of attributing a further specification to the subset of the Fiats already determined as such (ie. as subset) by the post-posed adjective, ie. the adjective '(un)comfortable' further specifies the subset of the 'Fiat ugly'.
If from this point of view we compare (2ii) with (2iii) we see that whereas in (2ii) the N is defined as belonging to one subset, in (2iii) it is defined as belonging to two distinct subsets – the subset of the 'Fiat-ugly' and the subset of the 'Fiat-uncomfortable'.

Considering now (2iii) we see that in the interrelation with utterances/presuppositions of the type

I. le macchine sono creazioni brutte ma comode
(cars are creations ugly but comfortable)

2. non è vero, la mia per es. (2iii) è una Fiat brutta ed è scomoda
(it is not true, mine for ex. (2iii) is a Fiat ugly and it is uncomfortable)

the speaker (2), uttering 'and B' in (2iii), shows his agreement with the negative argumentative direction of the utterance of I.

(2i) and (2ii) and (2iii) and (2iv) are all possible in interrelational processes of the just quoted type, ie. to:

I. Le macchine sono creazioni brutte ma comode
(cars are things ugly but comfortable)

the following answers are possible:

(a) (è vero) la mia per es. (2i) è una Fiat brutta e comoda
   (it is true - mine for ex. (2i) is a Fiat ugly and comfortable)

(b) (non è vero) la mia per es. (2ii) è una Fiat brutta e scomoda
   (it isn’t true - mine for ex. (2ii) is a Fiat ugly and uncomfortable)

(c) (non è vero) la mia per es. (2iii) è una Fiat brutta ed è scomoda
   (it isn’t true - mine for ex. (2iii) is a Fiat ugly and it is uncomfortable)
(d) (è vero) la mia per es. (2iv) è una Fiat brutta ed è comoda
(it is true - mine for ex. (2iv) is a Fiat ugly and it is comfortable)

ie. (2i), (2ii), (2iii), (2iv), are all possible answers to speaker I, the difference between uttering one or the other depending on the interpretation given to the utterance of speaker I. In terms of argumentative direction I's utterance shows a negative argumentative direction (determined by 'ugly') mitigated by the positive argumentative direction of 'comfortable' introduced by the operator 'but'; (a) answering with (2i) simply grants his agreement with both the negative argumentative direction and its mitigation produced by I's utterance; (b) answering with (2ii) only shows to have taken as predominant the negative argumentative direction of speaker I which he further specifies adding another adjective with negative argumentative direction; (c) answering with (2iii) shows to have taken as predominant I's negative argumentative direction with which he agrees; (d) answering with (2iv) shows his agreement with speaker I emphasising the mitigation of the negative direction operated by 'but' in the I's utterance; in this case we no longer have only one negative argumentative direction mitigated (2i) and specified (2ii) but two argumentative directions having the same strength.

'A but b/B': Post-nominal:

(2v) è una Fiat brutta ma comoda
(it is a Fiat ugly but comfortable)
(a) è una mano brutta ma morbida  
(it is a hand ugly but soft)
(b) è un serpente brutto ma innocuo  
(it is a snake ugly but harmless)
(c) è una pianta brutta ma utile  
(it is a plant ugly but useful)

etc.

(2vi)  
* è una Fiat brutta ma scomoda  
(*it is a Fiat ugly but uncomfortable)
(a) * è una mano brutta ma ispida  
(*it is a hand ugly but rough)
(b) * è un serpente brutto ma pericoloso  
(*it is a snake ugly but dangerous)
(c) * è una pianta brutta ma inutile  
(*it is a plant ugly but useless)

etc.

(2vii)  
è una Fiat brutta ma è comoda  
(it is a Fiat ugly but it is comfortable)
(a) è una mano brutta ma è morbida  
(it is a hand ugly but it is soft)
(b) è un serpente brutto ma è innocuo  
(it is a snake ugly but it is harmless)
(c) è una pianta brutta ma è utile  
(it is a plant ugly but it is useful)

etc.

(2viii)  
* è una Fiat brutta ma è scomoda  
(*it is a Fiat ugly but it is uncomfortable)
(a) * è una mano brutta ma è ispida  
(*it is a hand ugly but it is rough)
(b) * è un serpente brutto ma è pericoloso  
(*it is a snake ugly but it is dangerous)
(c) * è una pianta brutta ma è inutile  
(*it is a plant ugly but it is useless)
(lit. tr.)

etc.
In relation to the (2vii) and to the (2viii) we are faced with the type of problem already seen for the (2iii), ie. structures which are not acceptable in isolation but which are acceptable in context. Their conditions of acceptability, however, vary. Taking again the same example uttered by speaker I, ie.

**Ii. Le macchine sono aggetti brutta ma comodi**
(cars are things/objects ugly but comfortable)

we have the two possibilities:

(b) non sono d'accordo; questa per es. (2vi) è una Fiat brutta ma scomoda
(I don't agree; this for ex. (2vi) is a Fiat ugly but uncomfortable)

and

(d) non sono d'accordo; questa per es. (2viii) è una Fiat brutta ma è scomoda
(I don't agree; this for ex. (2viii) is a Fiat ugly but it is uncomfortable)

ie. (b) answering with (2vi) shows his opposition to the mitigation of the negative argumentative direction given by 'but comfortable' in the sentence of speaker Ii; ie. the operator 'but' of (2vi) contrasts the adjective in the 'B' of (2vi) with the adjective in the 'B' of the preceding utterance. Speaker (b) through the use of the operator 'but', opposes himself to the mitigation of the negative argumentative direction operated by Ii in his utterance. The same happens for speaker (d) uttering 2viii) - he opposes himself to speaker Ii but in this case through an utterance - (2viii) - having two argumentative directions of the same strength: (2vi) is an utterance with only one argumentative direction (negative), while (2viii) is an utterance with two argumentative directions.
(2v) and (2vii), as answers to speaker II, agree in turn with the contrast, established by the utterance of II, between the argumentative direction of the adjective in A and the direction of the adjective in B.

IV.3 Conclusions
From the point of view of the interrelation between adjective and noun the utterances of the type 'A but/and B' examined here show the following results:

(a) with pre-posed adjective:
('è una brutta Fiat e/ma è(s)comoda' (it is an ugly Fiat but/and it is (un)comfortable ). The structure Adj-N constitutes a single unit in which the adjective is not detachable from the noun. The result is that the subject of the utterance is defined as belonging to the set of entities referred to by the N negatively oriented ('ugly Fiat') to which a further determination is added ('and/but B', i.e. 'and/but (un)comfortable');

(b) with post-posed adjective: the structure Adj-N makes two determinations with the adjective detachable from the N: in the case of structures where the 'and/but B' is of the form 'copula + adjective' the 'subject' of the utterance is defined as belonging to the set of entities referred to by N, to the subset determined by the post-posed adjective ('ugly') and to the subset determined by the adjective present in B: the two subsets are distinct. In the case, instead, where in the 'and/but B' we have only the adjective, the set of en
tities referred to by N is determined to be the sub-
set defined by the post-posed adjective and further 
spiced by the adjective present in 'and/but B', 
le. we have in this case only one subset which is a 
specification of the specification;

(c) from (a) and (b) it follows that the interrelation 
Adj-N, because of the distribution of the adjective, 
shows that it is impossible to analyse the state de-
noted by the adjective without taking account of its 
'semantic mobility'.

We get practically the same results, in terms of (a), (b), 
(c), if we examine the utterances of the type 'A but/and B' 
where we substitute to the N non-overtly 'functional' of 
the type 'Fiat' and to the adjective negatively oriented 
'ugly', a noun overtly 'functional' like 'writer' and an 
adjective the argumentative orientation of which depends 
on the elements preceding or following it, like 'great/big'; 
this type of utterance is significant because if we ana-
lyse

(3) è un grande scrittore/attore/presidente/paese etc. 
(is a great writer/actor/president/country etc.)

vs.

(4) è uno scrittore/attore/presidente/paese grande 
(is a writer/actor/president/country big)

with pre-nominal adjective vs. post-nominal adjective, we 
see that the former modifies the N in a whole series of 
states/events connected with it (N) (for which cf. utte-
rances 1-8 in part. IV.1) and also gives it a positive 
argumentative direction. For instance it is possible to
say

(3a) è un grande scrittore e scrive cose meravigliose
great writer and writes marvellous things

vs.

(3b) *è un grande scrittore e scrive idiozie
*is a great writer and writes rubbish

and

(4a) è uno scrittore grande e scrive cose meravigliose
is a writer big and writes marvelous things

(4b) è uno scrittore grande ma scrive idiozie
is a writer big but writes rubbish

where in (4a) and (4b) the post-position shows the indeterminacy of 'big' in terms of positive or negative argumentative direction. Moreover

(3c) è un grande scrittore e grosso/imponente/mae=stoso etc.
is a great writer and big/imposing etc.

shows that the pre-nominal adjective, undetachable from N, modifies N in the whole series of states/events connected with N, while the post-nominal adjective, detachable from N, modifies N (in the reading relevant here), in general specifying it, in this example, in the physical dimension which has no particular argumentative direction. It is in fact equally possible to say

'è uno scrittore grande e/ma bello'
is a writer big and/but handsome

and to say

'è uno scrittore grande e/ma brutto'
is a writer big and/but ugly.

Thus the pre-nominal position gives to the state denoted by the adjective a relative variability of meaning, making
the adjective undetachable from N, while the post-nominal position gives it a relatively invariability of meaning, making the adjective detachable from N - this variability and invariability leads us to postulate a semantic-argumentative indeterminacy.
Part. V. Meaning in terms of 'Semantic Potentials'

It was argued in the preceding chapter that the meaning of the state denoted by the adjective in the structure (Adjective) N (Adjective) depends on the interrelation of the adjective with N (and on the other elements present in the utterance), and with the utterance following and/or preceding it. This interrelation, in turn, depends on the pre- or post-nominal position of the adjective.

This interdependence points to the syntactic-semantic-pragmatic indeterminacy of the adjective, which takes us to a notion of meaning no longer in terms of some 'fixed set of features' but in terms of 'semantic potentials' "across variant presuppositions and premises for intersubjectivity" (Rommetveit, 1978). It is only by postulating a "general graft of meaning potentials" that we can account both for the presence or absence of aspectual/temporal elements (Part II and III) and for the different types of utterances which can follow or precede the structure (Adjective) N (Adjective) (Part IV.1 and IV.3) according to the position of the adjective.

If thus for the state referred to by the adjective in general we can formulate an hypothesis on the meaning in terms of semantic potentials, in relation in particular to the attributive structure, on the basis that "words specify an intended referent relative to the set of alternatives from which it must be differentiated" (Olson in Rommetveit, 1978: 131), we can postulate a process of identification and differentiation every time the state is reset in the attributive structure so that "different elaborations" may re-
sult from it "depending upon experience... in a matrix of social interaction" (Rommetveit).

In this view, thus, the state denoted by the adjective in the process of 'resetting' operated by the attributive structure, identifies itself as the result of its past occurrences and the basis for its future ones (J.A. Giannotti, 1983). In this 're-setting' the adjective position in the nominal comes into operation. The pre-nominal position cancels the meaning potentials of the state and activates only its orientation towards a (positive or negative) (1) polarity. The post-nominal position activates the semantic potentials of the state denoted by the adjective. Thus, in pre-nominal position the adjective takes up the semantic potentials of the N (seen as "coisa ... sintoma de multiplas ações"/ 'thing... symptom of multiple actions/ acts', J.A. Giannotti, 1974), with which it co-occurs and to which it gives only the orientation towards a (positive or negative) polarity, while in post-nominal position the state denoted by the adjective keeps its semantic potentials, triggering off only one of the semantic potentials of the N with which it co-occurs. This accounts for the pre-nominal adjective de

Note: (1) 'positive and negative' are used in parenthesis as while all the positionally variant adjectives show an orientation towards a certain polarity it is not always the case that such a polarity is positively or negatively directed. Thus 'beautiful' has a positively oriented polarity while 'grande' (big/great) has a polarity but neither positively nor negatively oriented.
noting a state semantically undetachable from the specific N with which it co-occurs, in contrast with the post-nominal adjective denoting a state semantically detachable from the specific N with which it co-occurs.

This hypothesis finds support in the a- and b- versions of (1-8) (Part IV) in relation to the time-reference of the adjective, which only in pre-nominal position takes the time-reference of the specific N it co-occurs with. The acceptability of utterances of the type 'A and/but b/B', however can be explained only by appealing to a notion of "semantic flexibility" and "openness". That is, the state denoted by the adjective is considered from a semantic point of view as a general draft of meaning potentials which the position 're-sets', cancelling or activating them.

On the other hand, it seems that only in this view is it possible to account both for the acceptability of:

Post-nominal:

(1) Giovanni è un ragazzo alto/intelligente/uomo/bravo/povero/buono/scrittore/studente/interessante/brutto/onesto/piacevole/etc. come Mario

(John is a boy/man/writer/student/etc. like Mario)

(1a) è un ragazzo/uomo/scrittore/studente etc. alto/intelligente/ buono/bravo/povero/interessante/brutto/onesto/piacevole etc. come Maria

(John is a boy/man/writer/student etc. like Maria)

as much as for the acceptability of

(1b) Anna è una ragazza alta come Mario
(Anna is a girl (as) tall (as)/like Mario)

(1c) è una casa alta come quel campanile
     (it is a house(as) high (as)/like that bell-tower)

(1d) è una stanza grande come un (intero) appartamento
     (it is a room (as) big (as) like a (whole) flat)

(1e) è un viso bello come una rosa
     (it is a face (as) beautiful (as)/like a rose)

etc.

where the post-position, activating the semantic potentials of the state denoted by the adjective and making it relatively detachable from the specific N with which it co-occurs, gives the compatibility of 'boy/man/writer/student' (where 'writer' and 'student' are masculine) with 'Maria' relatively to tallness, vs. the non-acceptability of:

Pre-Nominal:

(2a) *Giovanni è un alto/intelligente/buono/bravo/povero/interessante/brutto/onesto/piacevole etc. ragazzo/uomo/scrittore/studente/come Maria
     (* John is a tall/intelligent/good/poor/intelligent/ugly/honest/pleasant etc. boy/man writer/student etc. like Maria)

(2b) *Anna è un'alta ragazza come Giovanni
     (* Anna is a tall girl like John)

(2c) *è un'alta casa come quel campanile
     (* it is a high house like that bell-tower)

(2d) *è una grande stanza come un (intero) appartamento
     (* it is a big room like a (whole) flat)

(2e) *è un bel viso come una rosa
     (* it is a beautiful face like a rose)
(2f) * è una vecchia donna come mio padre
   (* it is an old woman like my father)
(2g) * è un alto edificio come il cipresso
   (* it is a high building like the cypress)
   etc.

and the acceptability of:

Post-Nominal:

(2i) è un uomo bello e così è Maria
    (he is a man handsome and so is Maria)
(2ii) è un'attrice vecchia e così è mio padre
    (she is an actress old and so is my father)
(2iii) è un edificio alto e così è il cipresso
    (it is a building high and so is the cypress)
    etc.

vs. the non acceptability of:

Pre-Nominal:

(2iv) * è un bell'uomo e così è Maria
      (* he is a handsome man and so is Maria)
(2v) * è una vecchia attrice e così è mio padre
      (* she is an old actress and so is my father)
(2vi) * è un alto edificio e così è il cipresso
      (* it is a high building and so is the cypress)
      etc.

(the non-acceptability of (2iv), (2v), (2vi) with pre-nominal adjective coinciding with the non-acceptability of:

* è un uomo e così è Maria
  (* he is a man and so is Maria)
* è un'attrice e così è mio padre
  (* she is an actress and so is my father)
*è un edificio e così è il cipresso
(* it is a building and so is the cypress)
etc.

vs. the acceptability of:

Pre-nominal: 'Giovanni è un alto ragazzo come Mario'
(John is a tall boy like Mario)
etc.

and of

'Giovanni è un alto ragazzo e così Mario'
(John is a tall boy and so is Mario)
etc.

where the pre-nominal position cancels the semantic potentials of the state denoted by the adjective. The latter takes up, in their place, the semantic potentials of the N and a semantic incompatibility arises between 'boy/man/writer/student/etc.' (where 'writer' and 'student' do not include the femmine) and 'Maria'.

The non-acceptability of the following examples

(3) *è un povero scrittore e ricco
(* he is a poor writer and rich)

(3i) *è una brutta Fiat e bella
(* it is an ugly Fiat and beautiful)

(3ii) *è un grande edificio e piccolo
(* it is a big/great building and small)

(3iii) *è un onesto scrittore e disonesto
(* he is a honest writer and dishonest)

(3iv) *è una grassa ragazza e magra
(* she is a fat girl and thin)

Ignoring the possibility of an anaphoric reading for repetition, we can say that in (3-3iv) the pre-nominal position, cancelling the semantic potentials of the adjective
except the orientation towards a positive (3iii) or negative (3, 3i) direction and thus reducing the structure 'Adjective + N' to a negatively or positively determined N (ie. negatively or positively determined in all the N semantic potentials), is the reason for their non-acceptability.

In contrast, the following sentences, with post-nominal adjective, are acceptable:

(4)  è uno scrittore povero e ricco  
     (he is a writer poor and rich)
(4i) è una Fiat brutta e bella  
     (it is a Fiat ugly and beautiful)
(4ii) è un edificio grande e piccolo  
     (it is a building big/great and small)
(4iii) è un ragazzo onesto e disonesto  
     (he is a boy honest and dishonest)

The two post-posed adjectives activate the semantic potentials in a double polarity: they denote a state that being itself the result of certain 'behaviours' ie. previous uses, becomes here presupposed and that, acquiring one or other polarity depending on the frames of reference adopted, can be thought of only in terms of general draft of meaning potentials.

The dependence on the frames of reference adopted makes it necessary to postulate the presence of a 'variation fulcrum' (J.A. Giannotti, 1983) which, alone, can account for the apparent contradictoriness of such examples, as it appears in the explicitation of (4) as

'è uno scrittore povero se lo paragoni agli altri scrittori/ per i miei standards/ e ricco se lo paragoni per es. agli insegnanti/ per i suoi standards
(he is a writer poor if you compare him to other writers/according to my standards/and rich if you compare him for ex. to teachers/ according to X's standard.)

or of (4i) as

'è una Fiat brutta se la paragoni alla Ferrari/ per i miei standards/ e bella se la paragoni alla Wolksvagen/ per i suoi standards'.

(it is a Fiat ugly if you compare it to the Ferrari/ according to my standards/ and beautiful if you compare it to the Volkswagen/ according to X's standards)

or of (4ii) as

'è un edificio grande se lo paragoni agli altri/ per i miei standards/ e piccolo se lo paragoni agli grattacieli/ per i suoi standards'

(it is a building big/great if you compare it to the others/ according to my standards/ and small if you compare it to the skyscrapers/ according to X's standards)

(cf. also p. 48).

V. 1 Identification and Double Differentiation

This general draft of meaning potentials represents therefore a configuration which is the result of previous determinations around which the meanings realised by every actual occurrence turn. Hence while it is result of different determinations - given the possibilities of its cooccurrences as it appears for ex. in an adjective of the type represented by 'grande' ('big/great') cooccurring with Ns of the type represented by 'building/house/flat/room/man/boy/child/baby/table/tree/dog/cat/mouse/worm/etc.'- at the same time it is also susceptible of different determi
nations according to its cooccurrences. It is, thus, a result combining different determinations and susceptible of different determinations every time it re-sets itself bringing back, through this combining process, 'past experiences' together with "the tendency to penetrate anew into the flow... of its dynamic development" (Vigotsky, Thought and Language, 1962). It is on this general draft of meaning potentials - seen as a configuration combining past occurrences and every time re-set in the attributive structure - that the adjective position operates, thus transforming the relation N-Adjective - a binary relation into a ternary one and thus becoming the process through which we have the determination of the state through the adjective and the N. Thus we have a circular process which joins the N to the state via the determination which it (state) finds in the position of the adjective: in the attributive structure the N determines and is determined by the adjective which in turn re-determines itself and re-determines it (N) through the pre and/or post-position. In pre-position the state denoted by the adjective determines itself as orientating towards a polarity (negative or positive) which takes all the semantic potentials of the N; in post-position the state denoted by the adjective determines itself both as orientating towards one polarity or another and as activating the semantic potentials which identify and differentiate it from its 'other'. In such a process of identification and differentiation, the differentiation is twofold in the sense that the state, in the process of re-setting, identifies and differentiates itself both from the other occurrences of itself and from the
other states from whose negation it is determined, i.e. 'alto' ('tall/high') for ex. every time it re-sets itself, does so as a 'alto' different from the other occurrences of itself and at the same time different from all that is included in 'non- alto', i.e. it is a negation of the negation which could be formalised as follows: if for ex. we consider the adjective 'alto', such an adjective can be represented as 'non-X', but, as X is all the states which are non- 'alto', we thus have 'alto' = Neg (non-X); the fact however of 'alto' cooccurring, in the attributive structure, with a particular Ni causes 'alto' to get differentiated from itself in another occurrence with a N different from Ni: i.e. 'alto' (tall/high) cooccurring for ex. with the N 'skyscraper' is different from 'alto' cooccurring with the N 'house' or with the N 'man' or 'woman' or 'child' or 'baby' (for this, see also examples p. 48 and p. 199) while at the same time 'alto' cooccurring with 'skyscraper' may be different from 'alto' cooccurring with 'skyscraper' (for this see also our criticism of Dowty on p. 77). If we get from this a N formalisation similar to the adjective formalisation, i.e. Ni = Non -N where N is all that is non-Ni and thus Ni' = Neg (non-N), we also get a general formalisation of the attributive structure in terms of

Neg (non-X) Neg (non-N).

The adjective can thus be considered only in relation to a 'compositional' view in the sense that not only the state denoted by it but also both the entity denoted by the N and the position taken by the adjective in the nominal, to
gether with their argumentative possibilities, must be taken into account.

V. 1.1 Bierwisch and Chafe's approach

If we now examine the examples analysed by Bierwisch (in *Semantics*, 1971) of the type:

Pre-nominal:

(13) le altre torri saranno ricostruite
    (the high towers will be built)

and by Chafe (*Meaning and the Structure of Language*, 1970: 195), and in relation to the latter we change the predicative structure into an attributive one, i.e.

(14) è una grossa Cadillac/elefante
    (it is a big Cadillac/elephant)

(15) è un grosso topo/ratto
    (it is a big mouse/rat)

vs. Post-nominal:

(13a) le torri alte saranno ricostruite
    (the towers high will be rebuilt)

(14a) è una Cadillac/elefante grosso
    (it is a Cadillac/elephant big)

(15a) è un topo/ratto grosso
    (it is a mouse/rat big)

we find that in (13), (14), (15), the pre-nominal position cancels or neutralises the semantic potentials of the adjective. The latter remains determined only in relation to the polarity taking up the N's semantic potentials, and triggers a process of identification and differentiation (twofold)
affecting the N alone. It is in fact through the process by which 'tower' is identified and differentiated from its 'other', and through the pre-nominal position cancelling the adjective's semantic potentials to take those of the N, that 'alto' takes up the meaning of 'verticality'. That particular meaning is a result of the determination of the N. Thus, if, in the process of identification and differentiation of the N from its 'other', verticality is taken into consideration, verticality is taken by the pre-nominal adjective. Because it is pre-nominal, this adjective keeps only the polarity orienting it towards one direction ('alto') or another ('basso'/low). Thus in the cases of

'è un'alta/bassa torre'; 'è un'alta/bassa casa';
'è un'alto/basso palazzo'; 'è un'alta/bassa montagna' etc.
(it is a high/low tower/house/palace mountain)

it is the noun-determination process itself that the pre-nominal adjective triggers off - a process of identification and (twofold) differentiation which is not fixed, as it can take most different parameters. Depending from sociocultural/idiosyncratic variables, these range from the physical to the aesthetical and behavioural etc. dimensions ("the question 'how big is it? .... brings into the discussion a scale recognised by the participants as relevant and asks that the object be measured, as it were, along this scale" J. Lyons, 1969: 466).

On the other hand in (13a), (14a), (15a), the post-nominal position determines the actualisation of the state denoted by the adjective both in its polarity and in its semantic
potentials and triggers a process of identification and (twofold) differentiation applying to the adjective. While with the pre-nominal adjective we have the actualisation of the process itself of the adjective dermination through the N (and of the N through the adjective), with the post-nominal adjective such a determination becomes presupposed and undergoes a process of 're-setting' through which the adjective becomes relatively detached from the N. Thus in (13), (14), (15), the process of identification and (twofold) differentiation operates, because of the cancellation of the adjective semantic potentials, respectively on 'tower/Cadillac/elephant/mouse-rat', i.e. on the N, while in (13a), (14a), (15a), it operates respectively on 'alto/grosso' ('high/tall-bog'), i.e. on the adjective. This is shown by the acceptability of:

(13b) le alte torri saranno ricostruite, non le case/palazzi etc.
     (the high towers will be rebuilt/ not the houses/palaces etc.)

vs. the non acceptability of:

(13c) * le alte torri saranno ricostruite, non quelle basse
     (* the high towers will be rebuilt, not those low)

and from the acceptability of

(14b) è una grossa Cadillac, non una Fiat etc.
     (it is a big Cadillac, not a Fiat etc.)

vs. the non-acceptability of

(14c) * è una grossa Cadillac, non piccola
     (* it is a big Cadillac, not small)

and the acceptability of

(15b) è un grosso ratto, non un gatto
     (it is a big rat, not a cat)
vs. the non acceptability of

(15c) * è un grosso ratto, non piccolo
(* it is a big rat, not small)

ie. in (13), (14), (15), the Ns 'tower-Cadillac/elephant-rat' identify and differentiate themselves from all that is 'non-tower, non-Cadillac, non-rat' while in (13a), (14a), (15a), the adjectives 'tall/high-big' identify and differentiate themselves from all that is 'non-tall/high', 'non-big' including but not being limited to 'low-small' (for this see our criticism of R. Bartsch on p. 177), ie. to antonymous terms (in both cases the differentiation is two-fold). In pre-nominal position it is Ni (specific occurrence of N) that identifies itself as Ni and at the same time differentiates itself from all that is represented by Non-Ni, becoming, in this way, the negation of the Non-Ni. In post-position it is the adjective Xi (specific occurrence of X) that becomes the negation of the Non-Xi. Given the positional variability of this type of adjective, to postulate the existence of a 'higher semantic unit' such as 'automobile' for 'Cadillac' or 'animal' for 'elephant' (Chafe, op. cit.) or 'mouselike animal' for 'rat' "which determine the norms for big", if it can be acceptable, in Chafe's view, in relation to the predicative structure (which is the subject of his analysis), it is not in the case of the attributive structure because of the positional variability of the adjective. Different "higher semantic units" should in fact be postulated according to whether the adjective is in pre-and/or post-nominal-position. Moreover, if this constitutes a further proof against the formulation of a predicative structure as basis of the attr
butive structure (for which see p. 7) (more than one predicative structure should in fact be postulated to account for the different meanings due to the adjective positional variability), from the very fact of having to postulate every time a 'higher semantic unit' to determinate the norms for the state denoted by the adjective ( 'Cadillac-automobile'; 'elephant - animal'; 'rat - mouselike animal' in the above ex., etc.) it derives a multiplicity of 'norms' which, because of their very nature, cannot be reduced to a 'fixed' norm. From this arises the need to formulate a 'general draft of meaning potentials' also for the N which is always actualised re-setting itself as result of a process of identification and (twofold) differentiation from its 'other'; process on which the adjective and its position operate giving predominance to such a process in relation to the N in one case (pre-nominal position) and to such a process in relation to the adjective in another (post-nominal position).

(This analysis of pre-nominal adjectives taking the noun's semantic potentials, thus actualising the very process of the adjective determination through the N, could plausibly account also for the fact that adjectives can occur in pre-nominal position as a result of anaphora. (1) In such cases, the pre-nominal position of the adjective is a consequence of a previous predication which, having already determined the adjective in relation to the N,

(1) The cases of anaphora are not analysed here.
re-sets it as 'given' element that becomes a secondary predication. The semantic potentials of this secondary predication can be neutralised so that the adjective takes the potentials of the N that has determined it.

V. 1. 2 **Comparative Structures** (see also p.15)

So far we have considered the post-nominal position as the position that, actualising the very re-setting of the determination of the state through the identification and twofold differentiation process (both from itself in other occurrences and from all that is the negation of itself), gives the adjective a relative detachability from the specific N it cooccurs with. From this it derives not only that the state is determined as result of a process of comparison (ie. identification and differentiation on the basis of the past occurrences) so that "even the positive form of relational adjective must have a reading similar to that of the comparative" (Bierwsch, 1970: 43), but also that in case of 'explicit' comparison such a comparison must be obligatorily post-nominal.

This is in fact the case as it appears from:

**Pre-nominal:**

(10) *Giovanni è un più/meno povero scrittore di Mario
(*John is a poorer/less poor writer than Mario)

(12) *e una più/meno brutta Fiat di quella
(*it is a more/less ugly Fiat than that one)
(14) * è un più/meno grande scrittore di Mario  
(* he is a more/less big/great writer than Mario)

(16) * è un più/meno grande edificio di quello  
(* it is a more/less big/great building than that one)

etc.

(where acceptable reading of these sentences can be obtained in cases of anaphora or where a particular intonation pattern is used)

vs. Post-nominal:

(11) G. è uno scrittore più/meno povero di M.  
(J. is a writer more/less poor than M.)

(13) A. è una Fiat più/meno brutta di quella/B.  
(A. is a Fiat more/less ugly than that one/B)

(15) A. è uno scrittore più/meno grande di quello/B.  
(A. is a writer more/less big/great than that one/B)

(17) A. è un edificio più/meno grande di quello/B.  
(A. is a building more/less big/great than that one/B)

etc.

where 'J' and 'M', 'A' and 'B' make explicit the specific frame of reference relative to which the quantified re-setting of the adjective (in terms of 'poverty/ugliness/largeness' etc.) is actualised.

For post-nominal 'positive' adjective the state is actualised as the result, which re-sets itself, of a process of identification and (twofold) differentiation, i.e. of a process of comparison having as frame of reference past occurrences; for post-nominal 'comparative' adjectives, instead, the frame of reference constituted by the past occurrences becomes a presupposed element which gets re-set in the
specific frame of reference defined in the utterance (ie. the 'positive' adjective 'poor' for ex. occurs in 'J. is a writer poor' on the basis of the adjective past occurrences which get re-set in the utterance in question; in the case, instead, of the same type of adjective in the 'comparative' form, the past occurrences of 'poor' become presupposed and get re-set in the frame of reference specified in the utterance, ie. in the specific frame of reference defined by 'J' and 'M' 'A' and 'B' in 'J. is a writer poorer than M.' or in the type of utterance represented by (11), (13), (15), (17), etc.). In this re-setting in a different frame of reference the state can keep the determination obtained from its past occurrences but not necessarily so as every time it re-sets itself, it becomes also the basis for further determinations. This explains the acceptability of (18) and of (19-21a)

(18) Kempe è un ragazzo alto come Anna e Kempe è alto
(Kempe is a boy as tall as Anna and Kempe is tall)

(19) Zè Miguel è un ragazzo alto come Maria ma non è alto/è basso
(Zè Miguel is a boy as tall as Maria but he is not tall/he is short)

(20) Kempe è un ragazzo piú alto di Anna e Kempe è alto
(Kempe is a boy taller than Anna and Kempe is tall)

(21) Zè è un ragazzo piú alto di Raquel ma Zè è basso/ non è alto
(Zè is a boy taller than Raquel but Zè is short/is not tall)
(21a) Kempe è un ragazzo più alto di Anna ma Anna è alta
(Kempe is a boy taller than Anna but Anna is tall)

(where in (19) and (21) 'not tall' is not to be considered synonymous with 'short'). In (18-21a) from the B (where B = 'is adjective', adjective in its 'positive' form) of (18) and of (20) which derives its determination value from past occurrences and is reset as result of them, thus becoming a presupposed element which gets reset as such in the A ('J. is N + Adjective') of (18) and (20) and as different in the A of (19) and (21) we get the determination of the state as result of past occurrences and basis for future ones.

If on the one hand, the acceptability of (19) and of (21) constitutes a counter-argument to the postulation for the A of (18), (19), (20), (21), of structure B as 'presupposition' (in R. Bartsch) and as 'derivation' (in Wierzbicka) (thus (18) 'J. is a boy taller than/as tall as/M'. would 'presuppose'/'derive', in their views, from 'J. is tall' for which of p. 15), on the other hand their acceptability together with the acceptability of:

(22) Titita è una ragazza alta come Zè Miguel ma Titita è alta e Zè Miguel è basso
(Titita is a girl tall as Zè Miguel but Titita is tall and Zè Miguel is short)

further shows the presence of a 'variation fulcrum' for the determination of the state denoted by the adjective from which its formulation as general draft of meaning potentials.
V. 2 Lakoff on 'but': Argumentative Direction and Semantic Potentials

As the acceptability of (19), (21), (22), is a counter-argument to R. Bartsch and Wierzbicka's analysis and since the significant feature of such examples is the presence of 'but', it is worthwhile having a look at R. Lakoff's analysis (1971: 115 - 149). Lakoff maintains that the acceptability or non-acceptability of:

(54) John is a Republican but you can trust Bill
"does not stem from necessarily inherent properties of Republicans but rather from the speaker's feelings about Republicans, based on personal prejudice" while

(56) * John is a Republican but Bill will take the garbage out for you

is rejected on the basis that "it is hard to find an appropriate interpretation due to difficulty of assuming any logical connection between the two members of the conjunct: while it is possible and perhaps normal to associate certain traits of character with membership in one or another political party, it is not natural to assume an association between the latter and the willingness to take the garbage out".

Note that in the analysis of (54) the acceptability or unacceptability is seen as depending on the 'speaker's feelings' and on 'personal prejudice' while the rejection is said to be based on the absence of 'any logical connection' between the two members of the conjunct. That is, for the former we have the application of variable pragmatic criteria while for the latter we have logical criteria appealing to a supposed 'normality' or 'non-normality'. Furthermore, (56) becomes perfectly acceptable for ex. in a discussion context
where a speaker A considers being Republican as positive and not being Republican as negative. Image that in such a discussion it has come out that B is not Republican, which is for A a negative evaluation element, and that A hates to take the garbage out, so much so that he considers as highly positive in others the willingness to take the garbage out. Suppose that at this point C says: "well, John ia a Republican but Bill will take the garbage out for you" meaning in this way to establish, in the evaluation of A, something in favour of B (whose evaluation is negative in the eyes of A because of Bill not being Republican); ie. we thus have a situation where being Republican is an element in favour of John but the taking out of the garbage is an element in favour of Bill, ie. Bill is not Republican - which is negative - but he will take the garbage out which is positive. In this case, thus, the operator 'but' combines in 'p but q' two argumentative movements: one in 'q' in relation to 'p' with the effect of establishing a sort of balance between John and Bill and one internal to 'q' and in relation to B (not being Republican is negative and the garbage problem is positive). In relation to the movement internal to 'q', the operator 'but' establishes a movement in 'q' opposed to an implicitly accepted idea that to take the garbage out is positive, while the fact of 'Bill' not being Republican is negative. Thus, in this case, the operator 'but' would have the function of introducing in 'q' a movement opposed to that of 'p' as a result of another intermediate movement acting inside 'q'. In this view therefore
(71) B. murdered A., but he was caught
(72) B. murdered A., but he got away
do no longer constitute "odd uses of 'but'" (R. Lakoff, op. cit: 136): the 'q' introduced by the operator 'but', analysed as establishing an argumentative movement contrary to that of 'p', determines the speaker's attitude towards 'p', ie. towards 'B. murdered A.' and thus determines the interpretation of (71) and of (72). This is further shown by the acceptability of (71a) and (71b), ie.

(71a) B. murdered A. but he was caught (fortunately)
(71b) B. murdered A. but he was caught (unfortunately)
(the same for (72).
If now, from these examples by Lakoff, we turn to examine (19-22), we have more explicitly:

(19) Anna è una ragazza alta come Kempe ma Anna/Kempe non è alta
(Anna is a girl as tall as/like Kempe but Anna/Kempe is not tall)

(19a) Anna è una ragazza alta come Kempe ma Anna/Kempe è bassa/o
(Anna is a girl as tall as/like Kempe but Anna/Kempe is short)

(21) Kempe è un ragazzo più alto di Anna ma Anna è alta
(Kempe is a boy taller than Anna but Anna is tall)

(21a) Zè è un ragazzo più alto di Raquel ma Zè/Raquel è basso/a
(Zè is a boy taller than Raquel but Zè/Raquel is short)

(21b) Raquel è una ragazza più bassa di Zè ma Raquel è bassa
(Raquel is a girl shorter than Zè but Raquel is short)

(22) Titita è una ragazza alta come Zè ma Titita è alta e Zè è basso
(Titita is a girl tall as Zè but Titita is tall and Zè is short)

where the operator 'but' introduces in 'q' a pole opposed to that of 'p' in terms of 'short' in (19a) and (21a); and in terms of negation of the pole in 'p' (ie. 'not tall') in (19). It introduces a repetition of the pole 'tall' and 'short' in the 'q' of (21) and of (21b). In all these cases the 'q' introduced by 'but' establishes the measure in relation to which 'p' is determined, ie. the measure of the determination of the height of Anna/kempe in (19) (19a), and of Kempe in (21) and of Zè/Raquel in (21b).

These structures (19), (19a), (21), (21a), (21b), (22) show it is necessary to postulate the state denoted by the adjective as a general draft of meaning potentials (the determination of which depends on the occurrences and on the frame of reference established in every occurrence). They also show that the comparison orientates the state denoted by the adjective towards one or another direction without necessarily including the poles ('tall' for ex. and 'short') as is the case for (19). Moreover, it is worth noticing that while the 'q' introduced by 'but' has a movement contrary to the one present in 'p' in (19), (19a); (21a), ('alto'/'tall/high' of 'p' vs. 'non alto-basso'/'not-tall/high/short' of 'q') the 'but q' repeats the movement of 'p' in (21) and in (21b) where 'but Anna is tall' and 'but Raquel is short' respectively repeat the orientation of 'Kempe is a boy taller than Anna' oriented toward 'tall', and of 'Raquel is a girl shorter than Zè' oriented towards 'short'. 
The result in this case is the orientation of \textquoteleft p\textquoteright beyond the pole established by \textquoteleft q\textquoteright, i.e. beyond the 'tall/short' pole of \textquoteleft q\textquoteright; so that in (21) and in (21b) the 'height' of Kempe and the 'shortness' of Raquel, respectively, have to be placed beyond the pole represented by 'tall' and by 'short', i.e. we have an increase of 'height' and an increase of 'shortness'. In this negation and affirmation the argumentative force of the \textquoteleft q\textquoteright introduced by the operator 'but' turns out predominant, as it establishes the measure for the determination of \textquoteleft p\textquoteright (1): i.e. the Nin \textquoteleft p\textquoteright can be determined as 'short' or 'tall' (and as 'shorter' or 'taller') on the basis of \textquoteleft q\textquoteright introduced by 'but' — it is only through the 'but q' that we can establish the 'tallness' or 'shortness' of the N in \textquoteleft p\textquoteright.

The B, in the structure 'A and/but B' (where B = adjective), seen as element which "quantifies" the determination itself of the state denoted by the post-posed adjective in A, and from which its determination itself is quantified, explains the interpretation of (4) i.e. of:

(4) è uno scrittore povero e ricco
(is a writer poor and rich)

(4i) è una Fiat brutta e bella
(is a Fiat ugly and beautiful)

(4ii) è un edificio grande e piccolo
(is a building big and small)

(4iii) è un ragazzo onesto e disonesto
(is a boy honest and dishonest)

etc.

where the "and" operates a coordination with two different

(1) in this analysis of the operator 'but' we continue using the view put forward by C.A. Vogt (op.cit.)
frames of reference which result from past occurrences and are actualised through adjectives expressing opposed polarities. Both utterances show a general argumentative force which is balanced in the sense that neither of the two polarities prevails; they are utterances where the determination in "quantitative" terms of the states denoted by the adjectives "poor ugly/big/honest" in A depends not only on the specific N but also on the presence of the adjective 'rich/beautiful/small/dishonest' in B; in the same way the 'quantitative' determination of the states denoted by the adjectives in B depends, in turn, on the determination of the states denoted by the adjectives in A. Thus if in (19-22) the meaning of B (introduced by 'but') is relevant for the determination of the meaning of the state denoted by the adjective in A, in the utterances (4-4iii) the meaning of B determines and is determined by the meaning of the state present in A in a circular process involving the 'and/but B', to.

If, thus, in the attributive structure the N determines and is determined by the adjective which, in turn, re-determines its self and re-determines the N through the pre- and/or post- position, this process of determination and re-determination is in turn re-determined on the basis of further possible elements following the structure in question in an "openly endless unity" - never being a finished datum-. 
Part VI Conclusions

Summarising what we have been analysing up to this point we can say that while occurrence in pre-or post-nominal position has been considered in the literature on the attributive adjective as basically a simple stylistic variation, in the standard transformational analysis both pre- and post-nominal adjectives have been derived from a predicative structure through a relative clause. To the objections already put forward by Z. Vendler, Bolinger, Politzer, among others, to this hypothesis, further objections have been presented here both in relation to such a predicative structure formulated as presupposition in R. Bartsch and as ' derivation' in Wierzbicka in their analyses of comparative structures. If thus the attributive structure has been little considered in generative grammar, the contribution to our understanding of the occurrence of the adjective in different positions is nil. Greater attention has been given to adjectives defined as verbs of state and differentiated from verbs referring to events and processes on the basis of a certain number of restrictions (R1-R21) postulated by Kenny, Taylor and others. The examen of these restrictions, showing their inadequacy, also shows the doubtful nature of the theory of meaning as a "fixed set of features". The meaning of a linguistic element has proved to be the result of the relationship established not only inside the utterance where it appears but also in relation to the preceding or following utterance. Beside the fact that many of the restrictions can be objec
ted to, questions arise concerning the validity of the distinc-
tion between verbs of state and verbs referring to events and processes and the assignment of such states to the category Verb or to the category Adjective. Their supposed syntactic determinacy can be questioned also on the basis of an analysis of verbs which, examined with temporal adverbials, show the presence in the adjective of elements of tense and aspect when the adjective is post-po-
sed to the noun vs. absence of tense and aspect in case of the adjective pre-position.
The fact that the position of the adjective in relation to the noun determines the presence or the absence of aspectual-temporal elements - tense and aspect being semantic categories - leads us to postulate a semantic continuum ranging from adjective-like to verb-like, with intermediate positions that are more or less verbal or adjectival.
If this opens up the possibility of considering states, events and processes as belonging to more than one 'category', it also opens up the possibility/necessity of a theory of meaning that excludes sets of fixed features and analyses the inter-relation of the constituents of an utterance on the basis that language is an interrelation of utterances which define themselves in relation to other utterances in a dynamic process. On this basis, the argumentative hypothesis of Ducrot (according to which utterances are defined in relation to the argumentative possibilities opened up by them in "orienting" the discourse in one direction or in another) leads us to an analysis of attributive structures with pre-posed or post-posed adjectives in terms of the argumentative possibilities opened
up according to the position of the adjective. The pre-nominal position opens up argumentative possibilities different from those displayed by the post-nominal position, causing the adjective modification of the noun in all the series of states/events connected with it (N) while the post-position causes the modification of N only in the component specifically determined by it (adjective). For these reasons I consider the adjective indeterminate also from the semantic-pragmatic point of view.

As a consequence of this indeterminacy it has been here proposed that the meaning of the adjective—handled in terms of "potentials" (which the argumentative hypothesis of Ducrot seems to us to be based on, "relative to the set of alternatives from which it must be differentiated")—this treatment is in general opposed to an analysis of meaning in terms of fixed sets of features.

In particular, there takes place a process of identification and (double) differentiation every time the state gets reposed in the attributive structure in the sense that different elaborations may be the result. In this view, thus, the state becomes a result of past experiences and a basis of future ones in the process of re-position operated by the attributive structure.

This "general draft of semantic potentials"—"a blend area in which qualities graded in opposite directions meet" (Sa—pir in Lyons, 1968)—is thus seen as a configuration which, resulting from preceding determinations, agglutinates different determinations and it is susceptible of different determinations every time it re-poses itself in a particular occurrence so that through this process it becomes the re—
result of past experiences with "the tendency to penetrate anew into the flow of its dynamic formation/development". The position, acting on this configuration, is thus the element which transforms the relation noun-adjective from a binary relation into a ternary relation becoming the process through which we have the determination of the state through the adjective and the noun. We thus have a process uniting the noun to the state via the determination which it (state) takes in the position of the adjective: in the attributive structure the noun determines and is determined by the adjective which in turn re-determines itself and re-determines it (noun) as pre- and/or post-position (determination in turn susceptible to be further re-determined by possible following ups of the structure in question): in pre-position the state is determined as orienting itself towards a polarity which takes up the semantic potentials of the noun; in post-position the state is determined as orientation towards a polarity and as actualisation of the semantic potentials which identify and differentiate it from its 'other'.

This identification and differentiation which is double in the sense that the state differentiates itself both from other occurrences of itself and from all that is itself negated, gives the effectivisation of the propriety and at the same time specifies it.

The position is thus seen as the element modifying the process of "objectivation" of the noun and the object appears in the crossing of the two positions (pre- and post- posed) which actualise the process of determination of the N (and
from which they - positions - are determined) so that, through the position, the "object" shows itself as carrier "not just of one single trait" but of a "draft" of semantic potentials in terms of all the states/events/processes connected with it - "a complex, mobile, protean phenomenon" as "it changes in different minds and situations", "almost unlimited", "a dynamic, fluid...whole which has several zones of unequal stability" (Vigotsky).

Thus if the position on the one hand does not allow to consider the "object" as "an isolated, ossified, changeless formation", on the other it does not allow to consider the state denoted by the adjective - as determined by and determining N - as static, fixed immutable, finished datum.
Appendix. Some Remarks on obligatorily Post-nominal Adjectives

We want here to examine briefly a group of 'complementary' adjectives of the type represented by "communist, penal, rectangular, English". This type of adjective shows the behaviour exemplified in (1)-(4) and (1a) - (4a):

(1) è un partito comunista  
(it is a party communist)

(2) è una stanza rettangolare  
(it is a room rectangular)

(3) è un codice penale  
(it is a law penal)

(4) è un ragazzo inglese  
(he is a boy English)  
(lit. tr.)

etc.

vs.

(1a) * è un comunista partito  
(* it is a communist party)

(2a) * è una rettangolare stanza  
(* it is a rectangular room)

(3a) * è un penale codice  
(* it is a penal law)

(4a) * è un inglese ragazzo  
(* he is an English boy)

etc.

They do not normally occur in pre-nominal position unless in cases of anaphora—for repetition of the type 'this communist party...', 'this rectangular room...' etc.

Consider this type of adjective in comparative structures like (1b - 4b):
(1b) è un partito più comunista di quello  
( _it is a party more communist than that one_ )

(2b) è una stanza più rettangolare di quella  
( _it is a room more rectangular than that one_ )

(3b) è un codice più penale di quello  
( _it is a law more penal than that one_ )

(4b) è un ragazzo più inglese di quello  
( _he is a boy more English than that one_ )

eetc.

Although awkward in isolation, they are less so in contexts like (1c) – (4c):

(1c) quello di Marchais è un partito più comunista di quello di Berlinguer  
( _that of Marchais is a party more communist than that of Berlinguer_ )

(2c) la stanza di Maria è più rettangolare di quella di Marco  
( _Mary's room is more rectangular than Marco's_ )

(3c) quello inglese è un codice più penale di quello italiano  
( _the English is a law more penal than the Italian one_ )

(4c) John è un ragazzo più inglese di Mary  
( _John is a boy more English than Mary_ )  
( _lit.tr._)

eetc.

where the acceptability of (2c) contrasts however with the non-acceptability of (2d):

(2d) * la stanza di Maria è più quadrata di quella di Marco  
(* _Mary's room is more square than Marco's_ ).

The type of adjective represented by 'square' seems particularly reluctant to occur in the kind of comparative con-
struction in (1c – 4c), which have the meaning of 'typically (or similar) plus adjective'.
In relation to (1c – 4c), it is worth noticing that while 'canonically' the type of adjective we are dealing with in this section is not gradable, it is possible to qualify it "'abnormally' with 'more' or 'less'. This is perhaps unusual but it is a possibility which semantic theory should allow for" (J. Lyons, 1969: 469).
The difference between 'complementaries' of the type 'communist/English etc.' and 'antonyms' of the type 'good/honest etc.' is "not always clear cut in the 'logic' of everyday discourse" (J. Lyons: 469).
However the unacceptability of (2d) tends to show that there is a difference "in the degree of semantic specialisation in terms of location along a continuum of transparency... closer to the 'transparent' pole of the continuum... or to the 'opaque' pole" (Levi, 1978).
That is, thinking of the states denoted by all the adjectives examined up to now as a continuum, we see that while the states denoted by the adjective of the type 'good' are closer to the 'opaque' pole, the adjective of the type 'communist' are closer to the 'transparent' pole and, inside this latter group, adjectives like 'quadrato' (square) are closer than others, the degree of 'transparency' (and/or 'opacity') being subject to variation.
This greater or lesser degree of 'transparency', typical of the adjectives we are examining in this part, is due to their possible readings, which, in turn, depend on the number of the adjective occurrences. In these cases the limited number of occurrences is responsible for both the limited set of readings and the greater degree of semantic specialisation. From this it follows also a restriction of the sta-
te semantic potentials, i.e. to a minimum of occurrences it corresponds a minimum of semantic potentials and a maximum of semantic specialisation with the consequent difficulty for such semantic potentials to undergo cancellation and thus to be pre-nominalised (pre-nominalisation in fact occurs only, as we have said, in cases of anaphora for repetition).

Moreover the view of the meaning of the state denoted by the adjective in terms of semantic potentials as the result of 'past occurrences' and 'the basis for future ones' in the process of 're-setting' operated by the attributive structure, accounts for both Levi's admitted "regular ambiguity ... over a predictable and relatively limited set of possible readings" (p.50) of Complex Nominals (CN) of the type 'solar generator', and for her analysis of such nominals as follows:

"in ordinary discourse we would most likely use the CN 'solar generator' to mean 'generator using (the energy of) the Sun'; it is this reading which makes the most sense in view of our Knowledge of what the 'institutionalised' referent of this particular CN is. However it is equally true that the same CN could be used given the appropriate extra linguistic context to mean 'generator which produces Suns', 'generator on/for the Sun' etc." (p.54).

Thus, all the different types of states denoted by the adjectives here considered can be seen as a continuum ranging from a maximum of semantic potentials ('good/beautiful' etc.) to a minimum ('communist/English/square 'etc. ), the latter yielding through their relatively limited number of semantic potentials actualised in the post-position a saturation of the N 'object' nature.
ABBREVIATIONS

Adj. = adjective
N = noun
Ns = nouns
NP = noun phrase
S = sentence(s)
Ss = sentences
t = time
V = verb
Vs = verbs
Vst = state verb
Øing = gerundive form/progressive
Øed = past form/past participle
Ø = state verb
Øs = present tense third person singular
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