THE AMERICAN ORIGINS OF NATO:

A Study in Domestic Inhibitions and West European Constraints

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I, Peter Foot, hereby declare that this thesis has been researched and composed by myself.

Edinburgh, 30 March 1984
To the memory of my great-uncle

Ernest Marcus
SUMMARY

This thesis examines why the United States became a founder signatory to the North Atlantic Treaty in April 1949. The enquiry suggests that the perception of a Soviet challenge to Western Europe was a necessary condition for the Americans helping to create the postwar Atlantic Alliance but an historically inadequate explanation of the reasons they did so.

The central conclusion reached in this thesis is that the Truman Administration planned beyond the short-term need to reassure the West Europeans and had its sights set on a longer-term objective. U.S. policy-makers sought to alter the political, economic and military status quo in Western Europe so as virtually to guarantee that the United States would not again be drawn into another world war centred on Europe. Crucial to this American policy objective was the inter-relationship between the temporary purposes of the North Atlantic Treaty and the unformulated but potent idea of West European unity.

Contemporary documents make clear that the American concept of — and enthusiasm for — West European integration a) formed an essential part of security deliberations in Washington, including military planning, during the late 1940s; b) gave coherence to domestic, diplomatic, economic and military aspects of U.S. foreign policy; and c) governed the style, content and tone of transatlantic exchanges, ironically limiting the scope for independent U.S. initiatives while giving the war-weakened states of Western Europe a certain, but never decisive, influence over American policy towards themselves.

By helping create conditions during the late 1940s in which a militarily self-sustaining Western Europe could emerge, the United States hoped eventually — possibly as early as the 1950s — to withdraw from Europe altogether.

From then on containment in that all-important region would not be an American prerogative.
I have become greatly indebted to a number of people during the years of gestation and production of this thesis: to Gerry Wicks who first introduced me to the subject; to Owen Dudley Edwards and Professors John Erickson and Laurence Martin for wise counsels; to David Greenwood for suggestions; to Ted Achilles, Robert Osgood and Francis Wilcox for listening; to Larry Yates for saving valuable time; to Barbara Rae for coping with handwritten drafts with commendable skill and cheerfulness; and to Dr. Rhodri Jeffreys-Jones who performed the difficult feat of being all that one expects of a doctoral candidate's supervisor. To all I am grateful: none is responsible for such errors of fact or blemishes of presentation which may remain. Finally, my wife's support has been a constant inspiration; the results are quite inadequate recompense.
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INTRODUCTION

The North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) has proved to be an alliance of some durability. Formed before the advent of thermonuclear weapons and intercontinental ballistic missiles, it has survived more or less intact in a world different in important respects from that which existed at its birth. The most common explanation for this longevity is that, despite altered circumstances, one overriding factor has remained constant: the perceived need to provide a counterweight to Soviet military power in Eastern Europe. For a generation, continuing uncertainty about Soviet intentions has reinforced that opinion.

But common perceptions can be misleading. The Atlantic Alliance which survives today may conform to the expectations invested in it by its West European members from the outset. It may also serve the purposes for which Americans came to regard it as necessary after the outbreak of the Korean War. What NATO does not resemble in the 1980s - and has never resembled - is the security arrangement that the United States envisaged when the North Atlantic Treaty was signed on 4 April 1949. That set of objectives has been obscured by subsequent developments, NATO's own information programme, debates about who 'caused' the cold war, and the non-availability of the relevant primary sources until the late-1970s. Since then, what had been a trickle of information has turned into a flood and all but swamped historians and political scientists studying one or more aspects of the cold war.¹

It is only just beginning to become apparent that this new material,
available now on both sides of the Atlantic, compels scholars to revise earlier judgements and assumptions.

This thesis is a contribution to that process. In the light of the new documentary evidence as well as the old, it seeks an answer to the question: What led the United States to become a party to the North Atlantic Treaty? As will be demonstrated, the answer has less to do with the Soviet 'threat' than is commonly supposed. The post-war Atlantic Alliance came into being in large part because of the deeply felt American abhorrence of being drawn into another world war centred on Europe. This view would have been held even if no Soviet challenge emerged after 1945. As it was, the West European fear of communist expansion became the focus of traditional American anxieties about what Thomas Jefferson called 'the exterminating havoc of one quarter of the globe'.² It will be argued here, however, that the United States had no intention of becoming permanently 'entangled' in Europe's affairs; that the American prescription for West European security was different from that of the Allies, and that NATO itself was built upon a basic misunderstanding, the possible consequences of which have yet to be seen. For if the Americans have been ambivalent about NATO from the beginning, a major cause has been Washington's constant disappointment that the West Europeans failed and continued to fail - to take the very steps which U.S. policymakers thought imminent in 1949.³
Fundamental to the interpretation contained in this study are the Truman Administration's perceptions of U.S. security interests and the way in which Americans regarded the formation of a united Western Europe as serving those interests. While West Europeans dreaded a Soviet blitzkrieg and feared economic and social chaos, Americans thought the problems were either exaggerated or readily solvable. While the Europeans turned to the United States for long-term assistance, Americans refused to consider themselves as an inexhaustible reservoir of charity. Consequently, the United States insisted that any aid - whether economic, military or diplomatic - should be both short-term and contribute directly to Western Europe's self-reliance and political unity. To Americans, the North Atlantic Treaty and the organisation which it spawned were intended as the devices whereby the European and American positions, as well as the time-scales that separated them, could be reconciled. At no stage prior to April 1949 would the Truman Administration have considered that the steps it took in that month did violence to George Washington's warning about remaining outside 'the toils of European ambition, rivalship, interest, humour and caprice'. On the contrary, the aim was to redeem these acknowledged evils by creating a new Europe, the raison d'etre of which, from an American viewpoint, was to reduce the strain on U.S. economic and other resources brought on by the cold war responsibility of being the leader of the free world. It was an aim for which the Europeans, the intended beneficiaries, had little sympathy.

Historians have been reluctant to concede that internal stress was a feature of NATO from the beginning. In contrast, the argument of this thesis accepts intra-alliance tension as the principal explanation of
why the North Atlantic Treaty took the shape it did. Indeed it might even be said that the Alliance was created because there were differences of view between the Americans and Europeans. If the interests of both had been self-evidently identical there would be little to explain about NATO's origins, though much to describe. A joint recognition of the need to contain Soviet expansionism did not presuppose agreement on how this was to be achieved. In the immediate aftermath of World War II there was an obvious asymmetry of fear among the nations later to form NATO. Americans and Canadians, on the one hand, saw no strategic threat to themselves. The West Europeans, on the other, did feel vulnerable and were conscious that the rejection of isolationism - occasioned by the attack on Pearl Harbor, and confirmed by the American signature on the U.N. Charter - did not mean that Europe was automatically to receive American military largesse. West Europeans thus found that their interests were vested in saying that American interests were vested in Europe. They waged an unremitting campaign from 1947 to extract from the United States that unprecedented guarantee of security, without which, they argued, transatlantic ties of trade, culture, political tradition and common values could have no substance in the postwar world.

From an American perspective, the North Atlantic Treaty - as signed in 1949 - represented only a partial concession to the Europeans' views. Of greater importance to the Truman Administration was the fact that the treaty marked a decisive shift away from the one-ended commitment of the kind enunciated two years earlier, known as the Truman Doctrine. That policy promised U.S. military help to European countries threatened by communist takeover from either within or without. It
amounted to an invitation to the West Europeans to turn to the Americans at the initial sign of trouble. The Marshall Plan was the first departure from that approach. As the U.S. Departments of State and Defense recognised, the United States simply did not have either the diplomatic or military wherewithal to make the Truman Doctrine credible, other than for the two countries on whose behalf it was originally promulgated, Greece and Turkey. To get over the problem, the Marshall Plan was designed to build strength in Western Europe so that by the end of the aid programme American economic assistance would be looked for only as a last resort. For the United States Government, the signing of the North Atlantic Treaty was a continuation of this policy, now couched in military-diplomatic terms. (The process of replacing the Truman Doctrine, and the ideas on which it rested, was completed when Greece and Turkey themselves signed the North Atlantic Treaty in 1951).

The American objective was to create the conditions in which the Europeans could generate the resources with which to defend themselves. In the process, the West Europeans would be relieving the United States of the responsibility of defending its own vital strategic, economic and other interests in their part of the world. This was why the Truman Administration considered that the cause of American self-interest was well served if the West Europeans were helped to help themselves. To be fully successful this required, according to the U.S. view, wholesale systemic and structural change in Western Europe. The extremely modest steps taken during the 1950s in the direction of West European unity suggest the extent to which this view was unrealistic. But in 1949 the problems were made light of: unity, integration, federation -
the words were interchangeable in postwar American parlance - seemed just around the corner. It was an impression assiduously cultivated by some European officials. As a result, the Truman Administration felt confident the United States could meet the two basic but competing requirements of the postwar world: a sound material base and adequate security. For those who made the decisions in Washington, the elusive goal of statecraft was to provide a security framework for the West as a whole but without prejudicing the vitality of the U.S. economy. What Americans did not blush to call 'the United States of Europe' seemed an essential element of that framework.

Unity in Western Europe was supposed to be the ineluctable consequence of the North Atlantic Treaty. The two together would form the basis of American security, not immediately but over the longer run, at the lowest possible cost to the U.S. taxpayer. Paradoxically, although the aim was to maximise American freedom of action, the success of this strategy depended upon West European acquiescence and cooperation, and this reduced considerably the scope for American diplomatic initiatives. The reason for this was the gap between U.S. diplomatic and security commitments on the one hand and political and military resources on the other. The difference between declaratory policy and actual capabilities compelled the Truman Administration to adopt a strategy of containment (of the Soviet Union) which rested on the assumption that the West Europeans could and would bear the lion's share of the security burden on the European land mass and surrounding seas.

Another way of putting this is to say that American policy decisions about Western Europe in the period between 1947 and 1949 were taken
in part because constraints placed upon the Truman Administration by
the West Europeans left it with little choice, and partly because
the United States was inhibited by a variety of American factors
from doing anything substantially different. The Atlantic Alliance
which the U.S. Government thought was created in 1949 was a no cost-
low cost solution to such pressures. Before the intensification of
the cold war with the opening of the Korean hostilities, the formation
of NATO seemed the low-cost answer to a number of specific problems
which had been troubling the United States since 1945. These are
readily summarized: reassuring West Europeans that they would not be
abruptly abandoned; neutralizing European demands for a more definite
military commitment; boosting confidence generally, thus helping ensure
the success of the Marshall Plan; providing a system within which the
British (and, to a lesser extent, the other European colonial powers)
could reconcile their new European role with their older, and waning,
world role; and enabling the 'new' Italy and Germany to join the Free
World family again. Conditioned by the war to think in apocalyptic
terms about the world and its problems, U.S. policy-makers saw nothing
strange in connecting each of these objectives to the idea of West
European unity, once it became clear that the United Nations was not
going to fulfil the function originally envisaged for it.

All of these policy objectives were designed to hasten the day when
the United States could begin to reduce its commitments in Europe.
The date provisionally set for this was 1952, the year Marshall aid
was due to end. By then, U.S. policy-makers hoped an Atlantic security
arrangement would bring specific benefits to the United States. These
too can be summarized: strengthening the U.S. ability to influence the
development and expansion of the Western Union (the European alliance created by the Brussels Treaty of 1948) so that American interests in Europe would be militarily safeguarded by the Europeans; establishing, or renewing, base rights in Western Europe and further afield, notably in North Africa and Southwest Asia, thereby enhancing U.S. worldwide military capabilities; saving American taxpayers' money by minimising the need to allocate more of the national wealth to defence; providing the means by which to exert leverage on the Allies once the European Recovery Programme ceased; and giving the U.S. public a sense that something was being done to give some substance to the anti-communist rhetoric which had passed for public debate on foreign policy since 1947.

Fundamental to the Truman Administration's vision for NATO was the strategic notion of leaving the Allies to provide internal and perimeter security in their region. They were to build on the Marshall Plan so as to lessen the causes of domestic unrest. They were also to provide the first and most important military demonstration to the Soviet Union that the certain costs of an attack would be unacceptably high to the aggressor, thereby deterring him and keeping the eastern borders of Western Europe inviolate. The role which the United States intended to play was quite different. It was to provide a second and subsidiary layer of deterrence. Although partially involved in keeping entry costs high because of the U.S. ground force presence in West Germany, America's real contribution to deterrence was to make the residency costs of an occupying power in Western Europe militarily and politically intolerable. There were few illusions in Washington that the armed forces of the Western Union countries - Britain, France and the Benelux nations - could actually defeat a full-scale Soviet
blitzkrieg, should that level of deterrence fail. What the United States offered was the assurance that the mobilisation of its industrial, technological and manpower resources, together with the opening of an atomic offensive from airfields outside continental Europe, would force a Soviet withdrawal. Because this response was known in advance to be probable, no attack would take place.

The United States was holding itself back from the front line in order to keep its striking power concentrated. At the same time, the refusal of total and immediate commitment would encourage the West Europeans to exploit their own military strength and potential to the utmost. They would integrate their defence efforts, thus helping ensure that the first level of deterrence did not fail. After the outbreak of the war in Korea, and following the increase in U.S. troop numbers in Germany and the appointment of General Dwight D. Eisenhower as NATO's first supreme commander, this double layer of deterrence was fused into one. It was known as the alliance's shield and sword: the Europeans (and Canadians) provided the conventional forces forming the shield, while the Americans' offensive nuclear capability represented the sword. Unlike the original U.S. conception of how deterrence should work, this meant that the threats of conventional and nuclear retaliation were to be carried out simultaneously. It was just this sort of automatic involvement which the Truman Administration had resisted in 1949. That the change was accepted by the same Administration, and its Republican successor, is a measure of how the cold war rivalry with the Soviet Union had come to dominate U.S. foreign policy decisions. The failure to appreciate the importance of this early alteration in NATO's strategy
has confused perceptions of why George C. Marshall, the U.S. Secretary of State, agreed to negotiate an Atlantic Pact and why the North Atlantic Treaty reflected American rather than West European security requirements.

The change in strategic doctrine did not mean abandoning the notion of coercing the Europeans to do more for themselves - and thus more for the Americans - which had characterised U.S. thinking in 1947-1949. John Foster Dulles, for example, threatened the Allies with an 'agonizing reappraisal' of the United States' commitment if they failed to make the European Defence Community (EDC) a going concern. However, as that episode demonstrated, the West Europeans were not prepared to accept U.S. prescriptions. This too was a continuation of attitudes first adopted in the period before the North Atlantic Treaty was signed. For the American design to work a West German army would have to be created. Europeans were not ready for that, especially the French, and would accept the idea only on condition that U.S. force levels were increased on the inner German border. This in turn would involve the United States more than ever in the first layer of deterrence, thus limiting the leverage which could be used to encourage the Allies' movement towards military and economic - and, eventually, political - unity in Western Europe.

In brief, NATO was bedevilled by transatlantic differences from the beginning. The separate geostrategic concerns of the two wings of the Alliance could only be covered over, not eliminated. The treaty represented one stage in the evolution of a complex arrangement between parties who did not share common perceptions about the way mutually
beneficial objectives were to be achieved. Stalinist Russia, if it was expansionist by nature, had clearly to be contained. About this there was no argument. (It was suggested by one of the European drafters of the treaty that the preamble consist of just two words: 'Dear Joe'). But the means by which that desirable end was to be achieved were matters of substantial difference within the Atlantic partnership. It is this conclusion which differentiates the argument of this thesis from the work on NATO's origins by historians on both sides of the Atlantic.

*    *    *

The literature on the founding of NATO is comparatively sparse. There are a number of reasons for this. First, much of the general work on the causes of the cold war has been about East-West (meaning Soviet-American) relations in general and Eastern Europe in particular. NATO's creation was an issue in West-West relations; the Soviet Union did not seek to 'match' it until 1955 when the Warsaw Pact alliance was founded. Consequently, most studies include little material on NATO. Secondly, when references are made, it is in the context of conclusions reached already about American foreign policy in the period 1945-1947. (Some studies, such as D.W. Fleming's two volume *The Cold War and its Origins 1917-1960*, go back to the Bolshevik Revolution). This means that the American involvement in NATO's foundation is usually seen against the background of a series of developments which includes the Yalta and Potsdam conferences, Truman's accession to the Presidency, the communist takeover in Czechoslovakia, the Truman Doctrine, the Marshall Plan, and the Berlin blockade. While this is good historical
practice as a general rule, interpretations have rested on the questionable assumption that U.S. foreign policy displayed a degree of consistency as to both the political objective – containment of Soviet power and influence – and the division of labour within the Atlantic community as to how that objective was to be achieved. Finally, because of the thirty-year rule on the release of government papers in Britain and the United States, most studies of the cold war were prepared without the benefit of access to official archives.\textsuperscript{11}

Since the late-1970s there has been a cautious re-reading of the circumstances and policies which gave rise to NATO’s appearance. (NATO itself has in recent years, shown a greater willingness to foster discussion about its formative period.)\textsuperscript{12} New research has coincided with the move away from the historical debate, conducted throughout the 1960s and into the 1970s, about who 'caused' the cold war. Participants in that debate depicted the United States as either the defender of the free world or meddling interloper. According to the former view the Soviet Union was 'responsible' for the postwar tension in East-West relations; the latter view concedes that the Soviet Union broke promises and proved difficult on many issues but argues that these actions were direct and legitimate responses to American interference in the Russian own sphere of influence.

Strictly speaking, the debate between the holders of both opinions is unhistorical: historians should leave to politicians, political scientists, international jurists and journalists the business of allocating 'blame'. Nevertheless, participation in the argument has been a spur to historical endeavour and has produced some fine studies, even if some of the participants have shown at times a preference for
denigrating their academic opponents rather than re-examining the record.  

The debate has been sustained by the continuing tension between East and West, which had a mesmerising effect on historians.  

The point is confirmed by the historiographical effect of reductions in tension: academic dispute in the subject waned from the mid-1970s, due to the subsidence of the feelings released in the United States by the war in Vietnam, the decline of the New Left, and the continuation – at least for a while – of detente between the two superpowers.

Curiously, the immediate causes of NATO's creation are not subjects for disagreement in that debate. Be they 'traditionalist', 'realist', 'revisionist' or 'post-revisionist', most agree that European fears played a major part in the American decision to sign the North Atlantic Treaty.  

Escott Reid, himself a participant in the negotiations, argues that the last thing NATO represents is the West Europeans being persuaded by the United States to support its cold war policies. Joyce and Gabriel Kolko suggest that the United States was subjected by the Europeans to 'a polite degree of blackmail by exploiting its fear of losing allies'. Daniel Yergin makes the same point: U.S. policy-makers regarded the Atlantic Pact as 'the best way to demonstrate U.S. determination' in the face of European doubts. The most complete expression of this view is seen in the work of the Scandinavian historian, Geir Lunderstad. He contends: 'The United States did not force itself upon Western Europe. More often than not, the Western Europeans wanted Washington to increase its interests in their affairs'. Adding a point which touches the edges of the interpretation given in this study, he suggests that the Truman Administration 'even felt that the Europeans were not doing enough on their own and were relying too much on the Americans'. 
That strand in Lundestad's reading is elevated here to the point where the desire to enable the West Europeans to be self-sufficient in every way is seen as pivotal in the making of U.S. foreign policy between 1947 and early-1949.

The point that the United States saw substantial strategic benefits from the formation of a West European union is largely absent from the historiographical coverage of NATO's formative years. American scholars have tended to be fixated on U.S. - Soviet relations to notice much else. One of the few exceptions is Henry Steele Commager who in 1957 echoed the popular sentiments of the late-1940s by arguing that a 'United States of Europe' was more than a possibility. It had existed, he says, since 1776 in North America, where European immigrants and their descendents have proved the virtues of federalism. This only needed to be recreated in Western Europe for both halves of the Atlantic community to benefit. European scholars, for obvious reasons, have shown more interest but even then those concerned with European integration have concentrated on that theme and not the security element which included the United States. Symbolising this approach is that of Margaret Ball. In her book NATO and the European Union Movement, the evolution of NATO and West European institutions are treated in separate chapters. Only when her analysis reaches the late-1950s is the question raised of whether the European and Atlantic 'communities' can coexist. It is clear from documents now available that this issue influenced the deliberations of U.S. policy-makers ten years before.

One reason why U.S. students of the cold war have given little attention to these matters is that the autobiographies and biographical studies of
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One reason why U.S. students of the cold war have given little attention to these matters is that the autobiographies and biographical studies of
key individuals connected with the Truman Administration show an apparent lack of interest. Truman himself mentions the issue in his memoirs but in connection with Eisenhower's brief as NATO's supreme commander in 1951-1952. Dean Acheson is even less forthcoming, despite the fact that as one of the architects of the Marshall Plan he emerged as one of the foremost advocates of European union in the State Department (as Secretary of State he maintained that interest but, according to a colleague, felt little need to make statements about it because progress toward European integration seemed well underway in 1949). The edited and published diaries of James V. Forrestal are similarly blank. Charles E. Bohlen, Counselor of the Department of State at the time, is reticent in his autobiography, describing NATO as 'simply a necessity', without elaborating on his opposition to the idea in the late-1940s. Only George F. Kennan, Director of the Policy Planning Staff and the intellectual father of 'containment', gives the kind of weight to the European unity issue in his memoirs comparable with that revealed in the contemporary record.

Four reasons for this comparative neglect stand out. The first is that all of these memoirs were written after the Korean War and therefore under the influence of most intense period of the cold war. In the case of Forrestal's diaries, the editor, Walter Millis, seems to have selected entries in part to establish the author's anti-communist bona fides, and in part to reconstruct Forrestal's personal reputation after the former Defense Secretary committed suicide following Truman's decision to dismiss him. Both Truman and Acheson had been hurt by the accusations of Senator Eugene Joseph McCarthy and had particular reason to defend their respective records, the consequence being that
any consideration falling outside the Soviet-American relationship was lightly treated. The second reason is that the written recollections of other individuals have not, or will not, appear in the literature. John Foster Dulles, Robert A. Lovett, Clark Clifford, and above all, George C. Marshall left no memoirs; Dean Rusk, Paul H. Nitze and John D. Hickerson have yet to do so.\textsuperscript{24} Had these been available a different image of American preoccupations in the late 1940s might have emerged.

The other reasons are more speculative. With the exception of Nitze, all those mentioned above expressed themselves during the late 1940s as being in favour of the creation of a united Western Europe. With the collapse of the EDC, the non-inclusion of Britain in the original European Common Market, and the post-Korea emphasis on Atlantic military build-up rather than European economic rehabilitation and integration, such ideas looked over-optimistic. It is thus likely that ambitious U.S. officials and politicians did not wish to identify themselves even retrospectively with what, after a passage of time, seemed more and more obviously to have been a political non-starter, if not an outright failure.\textsuperscript{25} Finally, nearly all U.S. personnel who contributed to the creation of NATO continued to serve in the American foreign service, or remained in contact with it through participation in such bodies as the Atlantic Council of the United States, and the Council on Foreign Relations. This gave them a positive incentive not to discuss the European unity issue as a crucial factor in the making of the Alliance, from an American point of view, because to do so would reveal the extent to which the United States and its Allies differed over NATO's raison d'etre from the beginning.
Given the uncertain State of transatlantic relations since the early-1950s, it would have appeared politically prudent to many to leave such things unsaid. In that setting, the future of the Atlantic Alliance must have seemed more important than its past.

European writing has gone some way towards filling the gaps. Margaret Ball, whose work has been mentioned already, noted the coincidental development of Atlantic and European institutions. It was not part of her purpose to enquire whether American officials saw a causal connection between the temporary need for Atlantic arrangements and the permanent establishment of what George Kennan called 'some real federal authority' in Western Europe. The former Dutch foreign office official, Ernst H. van der Beugel, traced European integration as a concern of U.S. foreign policy from 1947 to 1965. He concludes that the idea of European union, for purposes of defence, was replaced by that of a North Atlantic community; but he does so without having had access to documents of American diplomacy which indicate the extent to which this was not the outcome intended in Washington. Max Beloff, the British historian, published his The United States and the Unity of Europe in 1962. In it he argues that 'from about 1950 it was the State Department itself that became the principal exponent of supporting the movement toward West European unity as conducive to the objectives of American foreign policy itself'. On the basis of what is known now it is clear that this is a conservative estimate. From 1947 on the Truman Administration as a whole took the view expressed by President Kennedy 15 years later: 'we believe that a united Europe will be capable of playing a greater role in the common defence...'. With more confidence than Kennedy's, however, Truman's Administration
felt it could develop the corollary that a United Western Europe would correspondingly reduce the level of American involvement in Europe.

Recent publications by British scholars, concentrating on the transatlantic role of the United Kingdom in the late-1940s, have not yet addressed this strand in U.S. diplomacy. In her book The British Between the Superpowers, 1945-50, Elizabeth Barker notes that reasons of time and space made it impossible for her to conduct a detailed study of American primary sources. Consequently, British and American objectives – and the means to realise them – in Western Europe are presented as near-identical (though Barker does show that less harmony existed over issues in the extra-European world).

Allan Bullock's biography of Ernest Bevin as Foreign Secretary, based in part on U.S. sources, reveals a greater muscularity in the Anglo-American relationship; Bullock never assumes that shared perceptions governed policy-making in London and Washington. He argues that Bevin sought 'the association of the United States with Europe's security, not in the form of a guarantee which would fail to carry conviction but in a joint enterprise, the embryonic North Atlantic Treaty Organization.' He gives much of the credit for that outcome to Bevin but makes the point that the Atlantic Pact 'could never have come into existence if it had not been for American strength and the willingness of the Truman Administration to assume unprecedented obligations in time of peace'. The argument of this thesis is in substantial agreement but suggests that the United States envisaged something much closer to a unilateral guarantee pact, backed by a military assistance programme of limited duration, than a permanent multinational military organisation. For the United States, the obligations
undertaken in the North Atlantic Treaty were 'unprecedented, but they were neither onerous nor intended as permanent.

Only one student of NATO's origins to have published work on the subject has concluded that the United States' long-term aim was a reduced American commitment to West European security. Timothy P. Ireland's *Creating the Entangling Alliance*, published in 1981, argues that the Atlantic Alliance was designed by the Americans to accomplish two goals. The short-term objective was to counter Soviet-sponsored subversion in Western Europe; over the longer run the aim was to recreate a balance of power in Europe as a whole. Once the latter had been achieved the United States could progressively diminish its security activities in one area of the non-communist world. Dr. Ireland uses the German question as the focus for his analysis:

> The impact of an American policy directed at re-creating a European balance against the Soviet Union was this: in order to restore western Europe as a balancing factor against the Soviet Union, the United States had to press for the inclusion of western Germany in programs for European recovery and defence and, at the same time, provide France and other countries of western Europe security against a possible renewal of German aggression. However, the only way the United States could provide adequate safeguards against the fear of Germany revanchism was progressively to involve itself in European affairs.  

In contrast to many American historians, Ireland's work shows a welcome recognition that traditional intra-European politics played a major part in shaping the U.S. commitment embodied in the North Atlantic Treaty and, later, in the bureaucratic arrangements within the (partially) integrated military structure of NATO.
Ireland's book is a major contribution to the literature, and is particularly important in that it concentrates attention on the way in which the North Atlantic Treaty was meant as a solution to the German question, specifically to French fears about a revivified Germany. However, the cost is a focus which is too narrow. U.S. policy-makers were worried by all aspects of the European problem, which included Germany's future but also much besides (such as the Soviet Union's intentions, West European economic recovery and the future role of the United Kingdom). Just as the U.S. 'solution' was to help create a federation out of the Lände (or provinces) which made up the western zones of occupation in Germany, so the U.S. 'solution' for Western Europe was intended to follow the same pattern. To the German and West European problems a single device could be applied: a West European-wide supranational system. This would provide a structure able to prevent German revanchism, create conditions for economic growth and prosperity, eliminate the sources of internal subversion, persuade the British that their future depended primarily upon the European (rather than the Empire and Commonwealth) connection, and offer a credible deterrent when backed by the U.S. atomic arsenal to the standing challenge represented by the Red Army. In American minds, the main difficulty lay in deciding upon the appropriate method of bringing this desirable state of affairs into being.

To notice Dr. Timothy Ireland's relatively narrow field of concern is less to criticise than to acknowledge the amount of work which remains to be done on U.S. foreign policy in the late 1940s. It also helps account for the fact that NATO's origins are still not an issue of major historical dispute. Rather than engage in debate, scholars
have been of late more interested in following their individual areas of interest. Lawrence S. Kaplan relied on personal experience in the Department of Defense (which he left in 1954) and full access to records in the Office of the Secretary of Defense to trace the connections between the North Atlantic Treaty and the subsequent Military Assistance Program. Escott Reid, a retired Canadian civil servant with long service with his country's Department of External Affairs, published his *Time of Fear and Hope* in 1977, which was based on official Canadian sources; it provides a 'functional' analysis of the making of the Atlantic Alliance—concepts, negotiations, treaty terms, geographical scope are each dealt with in detail—and the Canadian contribution to the eventual outcome. Sir Nicholas Henderson, the veteran British diplomat, published unaltered in 1982 a memoir of 'the birth of NATO' which he wrote during two weeks following the treaty signing in the Spring of 1949; based on primary sources, it provides a vivid picture from the perspective of a European official based in Washington at the time. A Scandinavian view is offered in Geir Lundestad's study of Northern Europe as a region of U.S. concern during the cold war. Two Dutch scholars, Cees Wiebes and Bert Zeeman, have pursued their interest in the mechanics of diplomatic exchange by concentrating on the rhythms of the negotiations which formed part of the process which led to the North Atlantic Treaty.

If there is an issue in the historiography of NATO's origins which has given rise to disagreement—or at least to differences of emphasis—it has been identified by the Danish scholar, Nikolaj Petersen. In the context of Anglo-American relations and the making of the Atlantic Alliance, he has asked: 'Who pulled whom and how much?'
His conclusion is that the North Atlantic Treaty should be seen as 'the result of converging and finally coalescing European and North American national security interests.'\(^{39}\) He thus challenges the view which sometimes appears in the work of British scholars, namely that the role of the United Kingdom (and of Ernest Bevin in particular) was of pivotal importance.\(^{40}\) The argument of this thesis is similar to that of Petersen's, in that both agree that 'American policy towards the North Atlantic Pact was mainly generated within the domestic policy set-up and as a result of internal struggles for influence'.\(^{41}\) Where this thesis diverges from Petersen's findings is that it goes out and beyond the issue of whether North American and West European (including British) security interests were the same, to address the more divisive question of how those interests were to be safeguarded in the medium and long term. As Bevin himself came to recognise by August 1949, it was 'not so much a question of America defending us, as of our helping to defend America'.\(^{42}\) This was not the outcome the British had looked for when they first broached the subject of an Atlantic Pact in December 1947. But it was certainly the outcome the Truman Administration had sought.

Despite the recent release of documents covering the period which produced the postwar Atlantic Alliance, much material remains closed to scholars. The most complete documentary record is available in the United States, but even there significant gaps exist, notably in the areas of military planning and intelligence gathering. The British, Canadian and some Scandinavian archives are now open to a greater or lesser extent. The French have yet to follow suit. But the greatest gap is, of course, on the Soviet dimension. Unless and until the Russians allow scholars access to their records, historians -
on both sides of the political divide in Europe - will be unable to
answer the most intriguing of all the questions which NATO's formation
gives rise to: was it all necessary?

* * *

This thesis concerns American perceptions of West European political,
economic and security matters in the late-1940s. Because similar
perceptions exist today in the United States, it is necessary to
eliminate as far as possible the danger of allowing 'presentism'
to control the historical interpretation. To that end, a particular
method has been adopted throughout.

With the exception of the first chapter, each chapter deals with a
relatively short space of time within the period from the beginning
of 1948 to mid-1949. This organisational device has been used for
three reasons. First, the period in question falls naturally into a
number of sections; the thesis structure reflects this. Secondly,
the discipline imposed by these sections helps ensure that component
parts of the main argument can emerge from the analytical narrative,
thus minimising distortion. Finally, the method is well suited to
an enquiry into the evolution of official American attitudes over a
short period crowded with incident; it enables each stage to be
assessed separately and thereby reduces the chances that preconceived
ideas about the North Atlantic Treaty will intrude as anachronisms.
The interpretation is supported by American diplomatic and military
records in the custody of the United States General Services Agency
(at the National Archives, Washington D.C., and the Truman library,
Independence, Missouri). A number of interviews were conducted. Other sources, such as British records held at the Public Record Office, Kew, are used where they give insight into U.S. policy-making and policy-makers not apparent from American sources.

In historiographical terms the outcome is not an interpretation which is at odds with other recent studies but one which is complementary to them. It does not contradict the prevailing view that NATO's formation was the Western response to the fact that World War II made Russia the dominant European power and America the predominant world power. However, it bears out the truth of a sentiment expressed by Charles E. Bohlen after his retirement from the U.S. diplomatic service:

1947 and 1948 were, in my opinion, the years of decision as far as American foreign policy is concerned. They were the years in which we were forced to do things we had never intended to do, and had no thought of doing, and certainly really did not want to do from the point of view of the strict material interest of the United States of America. 43

The challenge to scholarship is to determine the causes of this unwillingness, to identify what was preferred, and to explain how reluctance was overcome in the belief that the preferred solution would be achieved as a result. This thesis is offered as one way to meet that challenge.
CHAPTER 1

WEST EUROPEAN UNITY, U.S. FOREIGN POLICY AND DEFENCE POSTURE DURING 1947

NATO was the consequence of the perceived causes of one war and fear of another. Its formation in 1949 embodied the main lessons learned over the preceding decade: the folly of appeasement and isolationism, the need to control Germany, the importance of collective security, and the dependence on extra-European powers to preserve the peace of Europe (and therefore, many believed, of the world). More immediately, the founding members of the postwar Atlantic Alliance looked with varying degrees of apprehension at the apparently burgeoning challenge of the Soviet Union; all were agreed on the need to contain its expansionist tendencies in Europe. To that extent, NATO was originally conceived as the application of hindsight to the future security arrangements of the Atlantic community of nations.

However, since the cessation of hostilities in 1945, both the interpretation of recent events and its application differed markedly on either side of the Atlantic. On the one hand, the United States was primarily interested in helping to establish a new kind of West European state system which would ensure that Americans were not drawn into yet another costly — and, in their eyes, avoidable — conflict. On the other hand, the states of Western Europe were mainly concerned to safeguard their national sovereignty in the face of the threat posed by the Soviet armies of occupation in Eastern
Europe. This difference of emphasis - a new Europe or the preservation of as much of the old one as possible - suggests the real nature of the transatlantic bargain. The North Atlantic Treaty, signed on 4 April 1949, was a compromise between Western Europe's minimum demands and the maximum commitment that North America felt it necessary to make.

Compromise is obviously the essence of any voluntary international agreement but what is striking about the Atlantic Pact is the extent to which the United States showed itself ready to make some concessions in the short-term in the expectation of achieving its objectives in Western Europe over the longer run. In agreeing to sign the Treaty - the principal American concession - the Truman Administration anticipated further moves in the direction of West European political, economic and military integration and therefore a gradual and general U.S. disentanglement from Europe. That these expectations proved mistaken is obvious in retrospect; that they were unreasonable is less so. But the perceived failure of the Europeans to fulfill their half of the 'bargain' underlay a steady American disenchantment with NATO during the 1950s and thereafter. This sense of disappointment had its origins in the way transatlantic relations developed during 1947. It is thus appropriate to begin a study of NATO's American beginnings with an appreciation of events of that year.

The argument of this chapter has three objectives: to demonstrate the growing recognition in Washington of the gap between U.S. economic resources and military commitments; to establish the strength and consistency of U.S. policy-makers' ideas about West European unity
as part of America's security; and to show that the actual implementation of policy was done with less confidence than might be expected in this year of 'containment'.

* * *

During 1947 Americans began to articulate their hopes and fears for the future of Western Europe. The ground rules for discussion were laid down by John Foster Dulles on 17 January 1947, during a widely reported speech to the National Publishers' Association meeting in New York. Looking forward to the forthcoming meeting of the Council of Foreign Ministers (CFM), to be held in Moscow on the subject of Germany's future, he put the problem into a global context. 'Whoever deals with Germany deals with the central problem of Europe', he said. 'Whoever deals with Europe deals with the world's worst fire hazard'. Statesmanship had to do better than rebuild the European structure substantially as before. That, he reminded his audience, is what had been done after every other 'conflagration', with disastrous consequences. On that reasoning Dulles insisted that the British Prime Minister, Clement Attlee, was only declaring the obvious when he had remarked that 'Europe must federate or perish'. The United States had more experience than any other nation 'in using the federal formula and in developing its manifold possibilities'. He concluded that Americans had no option but to offer inspiration, leadership and guidance to the Europeans in this matter.
Dulles was by no means the first American to expound such views. George Washington himself, writing to the Marquis de Laffayette, declared: 'We have sowed seeds of liberty and union that will spring up everywhere on earth, and one day, taking its pattern from the United States, there will be founded a United States of Europe'. Clarence Streit had gained a certain reputation, from the mid-1930s on, with a variant of this: an Atlantic federal union. But it was Dulles who put the issue of European union on the American political agenda. He was then in legal practice, specialising in international law. He was also the Republican Party's leading spokesman on foreign affairs; he acted as a personal adviser to the Secretary of State, George C. Marshall, and was an official delegate to the United Nations General Assembly from 1946 to 1949. Dulles epitomised the bipartisan consensus which was such a feature of American foreign policy from VE Day to the 'loss' of China to the communists. His public pronouncements were therefore more than personal preferences with a semi-official veneer. According to one scholar, the Republican Secretary of State-in-the-wings was in closer accord with the Truman Administration on foreign policy than many Democrats.

From the flood of press articles on the same subject, which appeared in the next several months, it is clear that Dulles had tapped a rich theme, close to the sentiments of many Americans. Some journalists and commentators were more lyrically enthusiastic than others. But all agreed that, while the future establishment of a federal Germany would not of itself bring about the federation of Europe, the solution to the specific German problem and the wider European one was the same: economic unification leading to political unity.
It all seemed so obvious. As Dulles put it, the nations of Europe had to federate in their own interests, just as the American states had formed a federal union in 1787. If the Soviet Union would not support continental unity 'then a worthwhile start could be made in Western Europe'. Congress took up these ideas on 21 March 1947. A concurrent resolution was submitted in both chambers: 'Resolved by the Senate (the House of Representatives concurring) that the Congress favors the creation of a United States of Europe within the framework of the United Nations'. As with most resolutions this was referred to committee where, in attenuated form, it became part of the Marshall Plan legislation. However, the fact that it was submitted at all, and widely reported, confirmed European integration as a major element in the postwar American Weltanschauung.

There were two main reasons why the idea was to command persistent attention from 1947 onwards. The first was that words and phrases applied to Europe's future - integration, unification, federation, mutual cooperation and customs union - were quickly rinsed of meaning by constant repetition and a lack of definition. This enabled the notion of European unity to change, depending upon the point being made. Resisting Soviet expansionism, creating a large, tariff-free market, preventing future internecine European wars, allowing the United States to return to its own hemispherical concerns, establishing the framework within which to enable Germany, or part of it, to rejoin the European family - all these benefits were identified with the cause of European federalism. In an American context this meant the idea was virtually impervious to challenge. The second reason for its continuing popularity was the
support it evidently had in Europe itself. For so long as substantial figures, the most important being Winston S. Churchill, appeared to promote the prospect of realising this European idea, few in the United States were predisposed to examine the notion afresh. This reinforced what the historian Ernst van der Beugel called the 'deep missionary belief' in the efficacy of applying American federal solutions to Europe's political, economic and security problems.

That this popular conception of a new Europe showed a remarkable resilience is less important to the argument of this chapter than the fact that, beginning in 1947, the Truman Administration did nothing to puncture the prevailing enthusiasm. This is not to say that President Truman and the State Department felt it necessary to follow the lead of public opinion on this matter. For all of the late-1940's the level of interest in foreign affairs, as against other issues in American politics, was very low. 1947 was no exception. A number of studies show that about 30 per cent of the electorate had no interest in international developments; some 45 per cent knew about significant events but not enough to discuss them in any depth. Only 25 per cent had anything like detailed knowledge of foreign affairs. But the overwhelming majority, some 80-85 per cent, consistently placed the state of the economy - particularly inflation - a long way ahead of foreign policy as a source of concern. Provided that the notion of European unity was seen as part of the anti-communist drive, the Truman Administration was relatively free to follow its own instincts on this issue.
While there were few domestic inhibitions, foreign constraints did create problems. The position of George C. Marshall is instructive. Sworn in as Secretary of State on 21 January 1947, he was told by Truman that the wartime Atlantic Charter could serve as the guidelines of policy. From that day to his resignation 24 months later, Marshall acted as though the Charter had included a clause about West European unity. But he did so always with the understanding that Western Europe, including the United Kingdom, could not be bullied just because Americans were worried about that part of the world being a 'fire hazard'.

His first major task after taking office was to prepare for the Council of Foreign Ministers meeting to be held in Moscow during March and April 1947. The question under discussion was the future of Germany but that was obviously inseparable from a wider European settlement. This had been the central thrust of Dulles' speech four days prior to Marshall's arrival at the State Department. From evidence in John Foster Dulles' own papers, and in those of the Department, it is clear that Marshall generally agreed with the Republican foreign affairs spokesman's views on solving the European and German problems by guiding the disparate democracies of Western Europe along the road to federation. In fact, this broad agreement appears to have played a large part in changing the Secretary of States' mind about Republican participation in the team to visit Moscow.

Originally, Marshall intended to restrict membership of his advisory party to appropriate personnel from his new Department. This caused
some consternation in those Republican quarters concerned to maintain the habit of bipartisanship on foreign affairs inaugurated by the bombing of Pearl Harbor and consolidated during the war, especially over the formation of the United Nations. Senator Arthur H. Vandenberg, the mainstay of Republican support for bipartisanship by virtue of his position as chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, was particularly annoyed and suggested to Marshall on 4 February that at least one senior Republican should be included.\textsuperscript{9} This was a powerful appeal, but seems not to have been decisive. Benjamin V. Cohen, Counselor at State, told Dulles on 24 February that the ideas contained in the 17 January speech had struck a responsive chord in the Department. According to Dulles he was told: 'At the highest level there is no basic objection to your views'. Such differences as did exist were dismissed as matters of 'emphasis and wording'. Cohen then informally on Marshall's behalf, invited Dulles to be part of the Moscow-bound team; the offer was gladly accepted. Later that day, Dulles saw Marshall himself and was told that his policy prescriptions on Germany and Western Europe 'had much merit' and would not create any dissension among Marshall's advisors. It was this, Dulles believed, which had made the invitation possible.\textsuperscript{10}

There were no illusions in the Republican Party about what all of this might signify. As Vandenberg pointed out, the inclusion of Dulles meant that the Party with a majority of seats in the Senate would no longer 'be free to criticize what would probably be a failure'.\textsuperscript{11} Nevertheless, it would be wrong to discount the similarities between the views of Marshall and Dulles. They were to become more evident later in the year. But from the very beginning of George Marshall's
two highly eventful years as Secretary of State, it is apparent that he regarded some form of European unity to be the goal towards which the United States must work. Certainly nothing was to be done to discourage the process.  

In effect, Marshall showed himself sympathetic to the four points Dulles had made on the 17 January. First, the federal formula was appropriate to Europe. It would flow from rebuilding the old structure of 'independent, unconnected sovereignties' and from the fusion of 'small economic compartments' into a larger, self-sufficient economic group. Secondly, a united Europe (Dulles did not specify its geographical scope) would be in a better position to withstand the twin Soviet challenge of external aggression and internal subversion. Thirdly, by giving a large measure of autonomy to the individual German states - and including them in the proposed European federal structure as independent entities - there would be less chance that 'vengeful and ambitious' leaders would again rise in Germany to dominate by economic pressures where military conquest had failed. Finally, a federated Europe would create conditions which, in sharp contrast to those following the Treaties of Versailles, would be both 'durable' and 'self-enforcing'.

This last point was of particular importance to the Secretary of State. It dovetailed with his interest in European self-sufficiency through some form of unity. Having held high responsibility during World War I and been made the Army's Chief of Staff on 1 September 1939, he had unrivalled experience of the costs and consequences involved in
mounting and coordinating United States' military efforts to prevent Europe dying of what Americans pardonably regarded as self-inflicted wounds. He did not want the same thing to happen a third time in one century. He had attended all the major wartime military diplomatic conferences and been Truman's special envoy on a doomed mission to unite Chinese nationalists and communists in common cause. It has been rightly said that he 'could pass easily from the role of soldier to that of diplomat'. As subsequent events were to demonstrate, he certainly appreciated the fact that American commitments abroad had become divorced from the economic and military resources which could be allocated to them at home.

Marshall evidently saw in the prospect of some form of united Europe one method - though not the only one - of bridging the gap between resources and commitments. That gap had been apparent to his predecessor, James F. Byrnes, whose failure to find solutions to the United States' foreign policy problems had undermined Truman's confidence in him. He had been an able Secretary of State but had been forced to deal with problems on an ad hoc basis. Neither he, his President nor the United States as a whole had adjusted to the role which Americans were required to play in the world. There was, as a consequence, no unifying set of goals and objectives in the first 18 months following the cessation of hostilities in Europe. It was those which Marshall was largely to supply.

The similarity between both Byrnes' and Marshall's perception of the problem is striking. The United States had demobilized and disarmed
so quickly after VJ Day that Byrnes had little military muscle with which to back up his diplomatic efforts. He could not order a reversal of that process. This put him in a difficult position, as he wrote in 1947:

Some of the people who yelled the loudest for me to adopt a firm attitude toward Russia, yelled even louder for the rapid demobilization of the Army. Theodore Roosevelt once wisely said, 'Uncle Sam should speak softly and carry a big stick'. My critics wanted me to speak loudly and carry a twig.15

Marshall was also caught by the same contradictory pressures. He recalled that after the Moscow CFM he was constantly urged to 'give the Russians hell'. He replied that as a soldier he knew a thing or two about 'giving hell' but that all he had at his disposal then was less than two operational divisions across the whole United States. In contrast, he complained, the Soviet Union mustered some 260 armoured and infantry divisions.16

In the Department of Defense there was also an awareness that foreign policy and military capabilities had got out of joint. As Truman's first Secretary of Defense, James V. Forrestal, wrote to a friend on 24 February 1947, 'General Marshall probably has the hardest job of all'.17 Forrestal was especially conscious of the difficulties because from late 1946 he had been fighting with both the White House and the Bureau of the Budget for the kind of financial appropriations for fiscal year 1947-48 which were commensurate with America's existing international obligations and responsibilities.
The problem was that to give the Navy, Army and Army Air Force what they were asking for risked 'the destruction of everything the military establishment existed to defend'. Truman was adamant: the armed forces could have no more than $11.5 billions and that, according to Forrestal, meant further military reductions, thus weakening Marshall's hand still further.

The reason for President Truman's inflexible adherence to budgetary ceilings for the National Military Establishment was that domestic political and economic considerations allowed him to do no other. He did not intend to undermine America's negotiating strength in international affairs. But, following what had been disastrous mid-term elections in 1946 for the Democratic Party, he had to be keenly aware of the electorate's primary interests if he was to have any chance to be elected President in his own right in 1948. The United States' relations with allies and potential adversaries did not figure prominently in opinion polls; bipartisanship ensured the minimum of debate in the Republican-dominated Congress. From Truman's political perspective, foreign policy was thereby relegated well below the need to arrest the spiral of inflation, balance the budget, manage the reconversion from wartime to peacetime production and put labour relations on a better footing. On these issues he was politically vulnerable. There is no evidence that Truman's attempts to control government spending really did weaken the hand of the United States in its dealings with foreign powers. But from the point of view of officials in the Departments of State and Defense the budgetary bind exacerbated the existing problem of the
United States being unable to fulfill its commitments adequately. And it is the perception of these officials which is important. It was their anxieties which Marshall was to encapsulate in a much-quoted phrase. He told the National Security Council: 'We are playing with fire while we have nothing with which to put it out'.

The problem, latent since the war, became more pressing when the United States acknowledged its wider responsibilities as the world's most powerful nation. This occurred with the promulgation of the Truman Doctrine on 12 March 1947. The President stated his view clearly: 'I believe it must be the policy of the United States to support free peoples who are resisting attempted subjugation by armed minorities or by outside pressures'. However, general though this formulation was, it was promulgated with specific references to aid for Greece and Turkey and to the particular circumstances of the time. What sounded like a universalist declaration of intent amounted, in practice, to short-term assistance to two countries. More generally, from an American standpoint, this new responsibility had to be undertaken only because Western Europe as a whole had been temporarily weakened by war and could no longer be expected to undertake far-flung defence responsibilities. By agreeing to take on some of Europe's 'imperial' burdens, the United States made it plain that Western Europe must concentrate attention on its own security. Put bluntly, the message seemed to be: the United States is able and willing to use its power, wealth and influence to help contain Soviet expansionism on a global scale, but Western Europe would have to be responsible for its own backyard.
To put it another way, the Truman Doctrine was redolent of isolationist sentiment. It was a unilateral promise which, like all other Presidential doctrines, could be fulfilled or withheld according to circumstances. It did not imply abrogation of the Jeffersonian formula: 'peace, commerce and honest friendship with all; entangling alliances with none'. Looked at from Washington, there simply was no need for a thorough-going and open-ended commitment. With its great resources, Western Europe ought to be economically and militarily self-sufficient and would enjoy American aid only so far as such assistance could contribute to long-term rehabilitation. Furthermore, Europe would have to demonstrate what it was capable of doing for itself before the United States considered giving additional help. As with Greece and Turkey, the American aim was to establish economic stability and so make future subsidies unnecessary. If made prosperous once more, Western Europe could afford to defend itself.

In short, the United States was searching for security on the cheap. This was the motivation behind every agreement with, or offer to, Western Europe from 1947 and throughout the formation of NATO. The view was developed and refined in that period; it found numerous forms of expression on various issues, ranging from economic reconstruction to the specific issue of Germany's future. But fundamental to all was the policy-makers' perception of American military weakness, coupled with Truman's refusal to purchase security by borrowing money. Although this clearly caused problems for the Defense Department, James Forrestal was generous. He wrote to a friend in December 1948 in the following terms:
I have the greatest sympathy with Truman because he is determined not to spend more than we take in taxes. He is a hard-money man if ever I saw one, and believing as I do that we can't afford to wreck our economy in the process of trying to fight the 'cold war', there is much to be said for his thesis of holding down spending to the absolute minimum of necessity.\textsuperscript{25}

Marshall's own views on this are not known, but having a 'hard-money man' as President did put a high premium on diplomatic skills, especially where Europe was concerned.

It was Western Europe's economic problems which most exercised the new Secretary of State after the failure of the Moscow CFM to reconcile the position of the Soviet Union and the Western powers. Within days of his President's announcing the new foreign policy doctrine, he gave, in a radio address on 28 April 1947, his interpretation of Europe's malaise. His reading of the situation did not differ radically from that of his President - both recognised the primacy of economic recovery - but his grasp of the complex character of the problems was in marked contrast to Truman's simpler analysis. Instead of assuming that the dollar in combination with an ideological crusade would solve most difficulties, he echoed American disappointment that the process of European recovery had been much slower than had been anticipated, partly because of what he called 'disintegrating forces' which were then well established. In a vivid phrase, he observed of Europe: 'The patient is sinking while the doctors deliberate'.\textsuperscript{26} What was needed, he suggested a few weeks later, was a 'cure rather than a mere palliative'.\textsuperscript{27}
It took some time for the Truman Administration to decide on the medicine's precise ingredients. There was no argument about the fact that considerable sums of money would be involved. The problem was to know how best to prepare 'the patient' for treatment. For American policy-makers that meant creating the conditions in Western Europe which would ensure a progressive diminution in the level of financial assistance to their friends across the Atlantic. The eventual outcome was the Marshall Plan, the subject of long (and often heated) historical controversy.\(^\text{28}\)

However, nowhere in the historiography of the cold war is it sufficiently stressed that the Marshall Plan — more properly, the European Recovery Programme — was intended to last only four years. By 1952, Western Europe was expected to have become self-supporting. This time limit was imposed quite deliberately to induce the Europeans to act decisively in what the United States felt to be their own interests. The supposition was that if they thought that American aid was always going to be available as a crutch, the Europeans would defer the hard domestic decisions which had to be made. Half way through the Marshall aid programme, its American administrator, Paul Hoffman, told a Senate committee that 'what we are supposed to accomplish by June 1952 is to get Europe on her feet and off our backs'.\(^\text{29}\)

That had always been the aim. That was also the American intention throughout the events which led up to the signing of the North Atlantic Treaty. The Marshall Plan established ground rules for both the United States and those countries whose relative poverty left them with no option but to seek help from the United States,
which had emerged from the recent conflict richer than ever. It defined what was expected of all parties. It set a precedent, the direct effect of which - for Americans - was as unlooked for as it was unexpected: a military alliance to which Americans were committed for a minimum of 20 years. The Atlantic Pact was intended by the Truman Administration to be the continuation of the Marshall Plan by other means.

Amid the welter of scholarly debate about the Marshall Plan, there is an element that stands out clearly from the historical record. The State Department was convinced that any recovery programme would founder unless the Europeans committed themselves to self-help. On that condition all else depended, just as it was fundamental to the North Atlantic Treaty two years later. At no stage during the period of the Marshall Plan, nor during NATO's early years, were the Americans persuaded that Western Europe really understood the importance with which they invested in this consideration. As on many occasions previously, U.S. foreign policy comprised a mixture of ideals (or ideology) and clear-eyed self-interest. The problem for the Secretary of State was to fashion this into a diplomatic instrument but without damaging the national sensitivities of the West Europeans. The answer, for him, seemed to lie in relinquishing the initiative in transatlantic relations to the countries of Western Europe.

Whether this was Marshall's own idea may never be finally determined. What is evident is the extent to which his senior officials discussed the idea before Marshall made his speech at Harvard. His newly-
created Policy Planning Staff (PPS) argued the case strongly in its first analysis of long-range policy options. On 23 May 1947, it suggested that the United States

...must insist, for the sake of clarity, for the sake of soundness of concept, and the sake of the self-respect of the European peoples, that the initiative be taken in Europe and that the main burden be borne by the governments of that area. With the best will in the world, the American people cannot really help those who are not willing to help themselves.32

Exactly the same sentiments were to be expressed by American officials throughout the formation of NATO. It was because the Marshall plan — contrary to expectations — had not elicited a satisfactory response by the Europeans that this economic programme was supplemented by the political commitments embodied in the North Atlantic Treaty.

Borrowing ideas and phrases from the PPS report, Marshall outlined his tentative thoughts about economic assistance at Harvard University’s Commencement ceremony on 5 June 1947. He said

It would be neither fitting nor efficacious for this Government to draw up unilaterally, a program designed to place Europe on its feet economically. This is the business of the Europeans. The initiative, I think, must come from Europe.33

The American role was to be restricted to 'friendly aid' in the drafting process and 'of later support of such a program so far as it may be practical for us to do so'.34 This important qualification — 'so far as it may be practical for us to do so' — reflected two things. First, U.S. officials had made a clear distinction between
'a program for the economic revitalisation of Europe on the one hand, and a program of American support for such revitalisation on the other'. In short, the extent of the United States' involvement was not automatic. Secondly, the qualification reflected the fact that no 'plan' existed at the time Marshall made his historic Harvard commencement address. Even by the end of July 1947, George Kennan complained to the Secretary of State: 'We have no plan'. Another senior official commented – almost two months after the speech – that the so-called 'Marshall Plan' was rather like a flying saucer: nobody knew what it looked like, how big it was, in what direction it was moving, or whether it really existed at all.

In terms of NATO's origins, this hesitancy following the publicity which greeted Marshall's proposals is extremely important. For it shows that the United States was satisfied that it could only react to steps taken by the Europeans themselves. However, a few voices protested against this line of reasoning within the State Department. For example, William L. Clayton, Under-Secretary of State for Economic Affairs, stressed that because Europe was 'steadily deteriorating', and because this threatened 'the glorious heritage of a free America', the United States 'must run this show'. Other officials took a somewhat less apocalyptic view but reached the same conclusion. They argued that experience demonstrated the European nations' lack of ability to agree among themselves on economic matters and that this meant that the U.S. Government should take the initiative and full responsibility for the way American money was to be spent. However, there is no evidence to suggest that these views were accepted by either Marshall himself or his Under-Secretary of State, Dean Acheson.
To have taken them on board would have risked the Marshall Plan being characterised as an American diktat. As was made clear to Congress subsequently, this was to be avoided at all costs.

These disagreements within the State Department were less important than the emerging consensus. On two issues there was widespread agreement. The first was that the United States could not define the area - the number of European countries - that would receive American aid. To do this would, again, have the appearance of the United States imposing its will on others and meddling in the internal affairs of Europe. For this reason, no attempt was made to exclude the Soviet bloc countries on ideological or other grounds. The second was what Dean Acheson later called the 'ancient dream' of the United States: the establishment of a politically united and economically integrated Europe. By 1947 this was believed, by all influential opinion in the State Department, to be the vital prerequisite to getting Europe off America's back; united, Western Europe could be left to stand on its own feet. The idea was later incorporated in American thinking about the Atlantic Pact. But it was the experience of formulating the Marshall Plan which established the notion, or goal, of a federal Western Europe in the actual planning - not just thinking - of the Truman Administration and its successors.

Historians have rightly demonstrated that the Administration's preferred approach to European unity differed substantially from that of Congress. The ultimate objective was not in question; the issue was how to arrange American foreign policy so as to enable that objective to be achieved in the shortest space of time. The legislative branch was very much
inclined to put as much pressure as feasible on the Europeans. That had been the point behind the concurrent resolution of March 1947 calling for the formation of a 'United States of Europe'. The young Senator from Arkansas, J. William Fulbright was one of the sponsors of the resolution. He was to remain a key advocate on Capitol Hill of strong Congressional measures to help bring about European unification. (He was to try and maintain pressure on the Allies well into the 1950's). He told the Senate on 13 June 1947, that the approach of the State Department to transatlantic relations was 'unduly timid and cautious'.

Answering a point made by Marshall two weeks earlier at the Harvard Commencement, Senator Fulbright said:

I do not argue that we should as a matter of policy always leave the initiative to other nations. Furthermore, in requesting assistance from us, as virtually every country in Western Europe has done, I think they have taken the initiative. Accordingly it does not seem to me that we shall be dictating to those countries...in any offensive sense if we suggest that under their present chaotic political and economic order they are not good risks either to repay loans or even to survive as democratic states.

He went on to explain that he could not understand the suggestion that American management for some kind of political and economic unity in Europe represented 'dictation or undue influence'. On the contrary, he thought steps such as these were Europe's part of the bargain. To Fulbright and many others this seemed a small and reasonable price to pay for life-giving aid and succour.
Marshall in all probability agreed whole-heartedly but was nervous of exacting such a heavy price. He preferred a down payment in the form of a firm, political commitment from the Europeans now and the establishment of supranational institutions to follow in due course as moves towards unity progressed. The Secretary of State wanted to use Marshall aid as an incentive to federation; Congress wanted to use it as a reward to Western Europe for having subsumed nationalism beneath the workings of a new federal union. It was this difference which underlay Marshall's anxiety about the resolution. On 4 June 1947 - the day before he was due to speak at Harvard - he wrote a letter to Senator Arthur H. Vandenberg which suggests the general trend of State Department thinking on the issue. He began: 'I assume that the resolution has been deliberately phrased in general terms for the purpose of endorsing a principle without raising numerous important questions of detail'. This was distinctly flattering to the drafters of the resolution. They seem to have been mainly interested in a short, punchy sentence which would sum up their views; they had not really thought carefully beyond that. Marshall was mindful not to be critical: 'Of course the United States wants a Europe which is better than [the one] it replaces'. Americans, he implied, could do that by inspiring by example rather than trying to force the pace.

Nevertheless there was also a definite toughness in Marshall's letter. He was keen to blunt the thrust of the resolution.

I am deeply sympathetic toward the general objective of the resolution which is, as I understand it, to encourage the peoples of Europe to cooperate together
more closely for their common good and, in particular, to encourage them to cooperate together to promote the economic recovery of Europe as a whole.  

This was a clear attempt to water down the ambitions of Congress. His characterisation of the purpose of the resolution was altogether too mild to have been accidental. In particular the House of Representatives wanted something much more robust. For that reason Marshall felt it necessary to make the point he would repeat at Harvard: 'The future organization of Europe must be determined by the peoples of Europe'. He therefore asked for a preamble to the resolution embodying these ideas. (It was refused for the reasons given by Senator Fulbright.)  

Marshall's speech at Harvard, in consequence, referred only obliquely to the unity of Europe. However, on 14 July, he had another opportunity to air some thoughts on the subject. In a speech, drafted by George F. Kennan, he reminded his audience of the doubts and difficulties which preceded the final union of the original thirteen colonies. He also spoke of the extent to which the various states had nonetheless succeeded in preserving their individual personalities and institutions. This last point was obviously directed at any European government anxious to safeguard its sovereign powers at all costs. No American, he added, 'can help but feel a keen sympathy for the efforts now being made in Europe to overcome national barriers'.  

Some months later, on 18 November, Marshall returned to this theme. In a widely reported speech made on the eve of his departure for
Europe he said: 'The logic of history would appear to dictate the
necessity of this European community drawing closer together, not
only for its own survival, but for the stability, prosperity and peace
of the entire world'.\textsuperscript{51} That was as far as he was prepared to go in
public. Even so, in retrospect and from a European perspective, ideas
such as these seem to have, at best, lacked specificity or, at worst,
been wretchedly naive. But the fact that a Secretary of State took
them seriously - at the very moment when the United States was coming
to terms with power politics - is the strongest of reasons for not
dismissing these statements as casual remarks. Certainly the Europeans
took them seriously enough. The British Ambassador in Washington,
Lord Inverchapel, reported to the Foreign Office in London that the
Marshall Plan had given considerable impetus to the notion of European
unity and had 'fostered too facile a hope that the Western countries
are at last advancing towards the early realisation of a United States
of Europe'. Inverchapel also noted that 'under the careful prompting
of officials and responsible commentators', the Marshall Plan had
become 'the catalyst for welding the various European problems into
a single issue and throwing it... into perspective as part of a global
conflict between Soviet and Western democratic values'.\textsuperscript{52}

Inverchapel also mentioned that 'the United States public, Congress
and some officials' entertained over-high expectations about the
rapid rate of progress towards unity which could be achieved.\textsuperscript{53} Of
this there is no doubt. In 1947 Harry Truman was reported to have
endorsed the concept of European integration; he, like everyone else,
 omitted to explain how a European union could be created or, indeed,
of what it would consist.\textsuperscript{54} Neither the President nor anyone else
mentioned that the American experience of federalism included a civil war. An opinion poll in late 1947 suggested that Truman's uncritical enthusiasm was widely shared: of those questioned, three quarters were in favour of the creation of a United States of Europe. However, it was apparent to members of the British Embassy staff in Washington, that there was a harder edge to this vague idealism. Just as the issue of European unity had been fused with the Marshall Plan - in popular and official sentiment alike - so the question of large-scale economic aid to Europeans became inseparable from the general matter of American security. Inverchapel wrote:

As the American people have willed the end at which they are aiming without being wholly ready to accept the means by which it must be achieved, it has been necessary to enlist their support by relying on a greater extent than might have been the case on the Soviet bogey. In consequence, the self-interest of the United States in connexion with E.R.P. is nearly always counted in military terms.

As an assessment of the methods used to 'sell' both the Truman Doctrine and the Marshall Plan to the American public this supports a number of subsequent historical interpretations. However, the corollary has not been sufficiently noted. As Inverchapel pointed out: 'Much use is now being made of the argument that, for every dollar denied to European rehabilitation, two will have to be spent for defence'.

There was more to this argument than a ploy by Administration officials to persuade a cost-conscious Congress to pass the ERP bill. Almost certainly it was an exaggeration. But the important point is that a primarily economic measure for Europe's rehabilitation was seen to
have direct and beneficial consequences in terms of the military budget. Thus, from a purely parochial view — shared by both Congress and the Bureau of the Budget — the rhetoric of anti-communism which attended the public campaign for Marshall aid had a very down-to-earth function: the saving of American tax payers' money. With a Presidential election to be held in 1948, during which time Republicans would control both the Senate and the House of Representatives, this was a crucial consideration for Truman's team. But it was also the same calculation which was to play an important part, after the election had been won, in framing the American decision to sign the North Atlantic Treaty. As Secretary of State, Marshall was the man charged with the responsibility of reconciling the conflicting pressures and steering the course of foreign policy through the minefield of alternatives. From the moment he took charge at the State Department, Marshall seems to have sensed that much would depend upon American reticence, and upon the readiness of the U.S. Government to resist the temptation to hector the West Europeans into a particular course of action. He told the Senate Foreign Relations Committee:

We must not move in such a way as to awaken hostilities because of national pride, or that we do not offer something in a measure suitable for propaganda distortion by those who are trying to sabotage the European Recovery Program.

Clearly, Marshall's worries were as much about a resurgence of destructive European nationalism as about communist expansionism. Either could involve the United States in renewed conflict; both had to be avoided. It was therefore inappropriate — counterproductive even — to rely on the stiffening of national sinews in Western Europe.
as the sine qua non for halting the spread of communism. Inflamed nationalism, the consequences of which still seared the collective memory, could not be allowed another recrudescence.

It was this perception - more than any other - which led the United States a little over a year later to adhere to a multinational security pact of the North Atlantic area. The precise moment when this perception began to dictate the day-to-day relations with the Europeans is unclear. (Much still awaits the release of Marshall's own papers.) Yet it is evident from a variety of sources that by the end of 1947 Marshall had become convinced that the approach most likely to succeed was one which was both undemonstrative and cautious. It scarcely needs saying that neither Marshall nor any other senior American politician or official was aware that the adoption of this approach would lead directly to the formation of NATO or anything resembling it.

A small but illustrative example of Marshall's chosen path was his response to a journalist's proposal put to him in November 1947. Dorothy Thompson, a columnist with The Washington Star, had decided to finance and edit a magazine, to be sold in Western Europe under the title The Idea of Europe. The plan was to combat communist propaganda by offering the vision of European unity as a potent and exciting alternative. Dorothy Thompson naturally wanted the support of the State Department for her project. Marshall sent the proposal to senior officials in order to get their advice. Their reports were for the most part sympathetic, except in one detail. All expressed doubts about the wisdom of a publication written and
produced in America for sale in Europe. The fear was that the
arrival of the magazine on the newstands would evoke a strong reaction
from nationalists and socialists and might even prove to be embarrassing
for some governments. Marshall's reply to Thompson was therefore
simple: he had no objection to the periodical provided it was only
sold in the United States. As this would do little or nothing to
foster European unity, the magazine was never published. 62

In sum, Marshall's approaches towards Europe were to be oblique.
Perhaps he thought this the only way to navigate between the Scylla
of European nationalism and the Charybdis of Soviet-inspired communism.
Certainly by December Marshall had sailed uncomfortably close to both.
In that month, Congress debated the Interim Aid Programme, itself a
stop-gap measure, before the European Recovery Programme was finalised
and put into effect. But, also in that month, France—a major
recipient of U.S. dollar aid—was severely disrupted by what an
unnamed high French official told the American Ambassador, Jefferson
Caffery, were communist-led strikes inspired by and led from Moscow.
According to the French, part of the motivation for this disruption
was some of the political and economic strings which Congress was
insisting be attached to aid for the French. 63 These conditions
did not, in themselves, amount to a great deal but they did symbolise
an American desire to interfere in French affairs. John Foster Dulles,
who was in France at the time, was greeted as the embodiment of United
States imperialism. 64 On Marshall's arrival, a cable was sent back
to the State Department, with instructions to pass the message to the
Speaker of the House of Representatives, to get the offending conditions
removed from the appropriations bill then being discussed. In
deference to French sensitivities Marshall sought to ensure that he gave no credence to 'the Soviet thesis' that the United States was 'attempting to reduce France to the status of an American colony.'65

In his efforts to avoid giving offence Marshall was well served by American foreign service missions. They provided a steady stream of reports to Washington throughout 1947 on the burgeoning European unity movement.66 Although it is unclear the extent to which Marshall himself read incoming cables, the volume of 'traffic' on this subject was substantial. Moreover, American legations in Western Europe evidently shared the goals of the movement. For example, Dwight P. Griswold, Chief of the American Mission on Aid to Greece and Administrator of the financial assistance granted under the terms of the Truman Doctrine, was especially interested and sympathetic. He urged Marshall that the United States could

...with propriety encourage the union of the free states of Europe as the most effective means of strengthening...economic and political liberties, and of diminishing the traditional dangers in economic and national rivalries on the continent.67

He gave details, too, of Richard Coudenhove-Kalergi's Pan-Europa group and the meetings of the European Parliamentary Congress in Switzerland. The legation in Berne gave further information, together with analyses of Winston Churchill's United Europe organisation, Paul van Zeeland's Independence League, and H. Brugman's European Union of Federations.68
The major embassies were also active. From London, Marshall was sent personal copies of 'Design for Europe', a substantial pamphlet issued jointly by Liberal and Conservative members of parliament. From Paris came details of General Charles de Gaulle's proposed 'Constitution of a Federation of Western Europe' issued in September 1947 to boost his popularity whilst still languishing out of power. In a covering comment the U.S. Ambassador, Jefferson Caffery, noted that de Gaulle's purpose was twofold. First, the plan for federation was designed so that coal from the Ruhr would be sent to the iron and steel mills of Lorraine, thus overcoming a problem which had dogged French industry for decades. Secondly, the plan was intended to convince the U.S. Government that, once Marshall Aid had ceased, a 'Western Federation' would 'ensure that the sacrifices you are asking of the American taxpayers for Germany will not continue for ever'. Caffery was sceptical but not dismissive of either idea.

During 1947 one development within the European unity movement did cause alarm in the Department of State. On 4 December 1947, a cable arrived in Washington from Robert D. Murphy, Political Advisor to General Lucius D. Clay in the office of Military Government for Germany. Intelligence reports about German groups advocating European union suggested that many were infiltrated by communists. Furthermore, of those which were definitely free of communist 'contamination', some were arguing that only in a united Europe could the new Germany regain its national pride and 'again work on equal terms with the world'. This was worrying because it might mean that European unity would become the slogan of German nationalism or the flag of international socialism. These fears proved to be unfounded. Nevertheless, Murphy's
cable was taken by some as indicating that there was a gap between American aspirations and European political realities, and that the gap had to be closed.\(^{72}\) This recognition led to a reappraisal of an idea first broached in the Department of State in 1946. According to one senior official, Walt W. Rostow, then head of the Division of German and Austrian Affairs, suggested that "the unity of Europe could best be approached crabwise through technical cooperation in economic matters rather than bluntly in diplomatic negotiations".\(^{73}\) In other words, the United States hoped that institutional arrangements arising from joint economic cooperation would create the conditions in which European unity could flourish.

This idea was embodied in the mechanics of the European Recovery Programme as it developed. In June 1947, the Department's Committee on Foreign Aid completed an analysis of the problem. The memorandum set out the course to be followed.

To avoid injuring sensitive feelings of nationalism, our appeal should be couched in terms of a European recovery plan which stresses the raising of European production and consumption through the economic and 'functional' unification of Europe. In our propaganda and our diplomacy it will be necessary to stress (even exaggerate) the immediate economic benefits which will flow from the joint making of national economic policies and decisions.\(^{74}\)

This summarised the views expressed during the course of a 'Heads of Offices' meeting two weeks previously. One of the participants, Charles E. Bohlen, the new Counselor, noted that the only way of balancing the dangers of appearing to force 'the American way' on
the Europeans and the dangers of failure if the major responsibility were left to them, was to formalise economic cooperation leading perhaps to an 'economic federation' in three or four years. 75

To advocate 'technical' or 'functional' cooperation as the basis for European unity had a number of benefits. First, the idea was already being discussed in continental Europe; it was at the heart of the Monnet Plan. It therefore could not be represented as forcing 'the American way' on Europe. Secondly, it appeared a useful formula for the initiative which George Marshall wanted to be taken by the Europeans. They would have to get together and decide how much aid was needed and how it was to be apportioned among them. Thirdly, institutional arrangements drawn up to administer the economic assistance had the potential to become a genuine supranational authority with powers wider than its original remit. All three were adapted later in the process leading to the North Atlantic Treaty, when it became clear that the Marshall Plan was not having the desired effect on Europe's national structures. There were disadvantages as well however. It was one thing to require, as part of the European initiative, the establishment of international economic machinery. It was something else to hope that the momentum generated by the new machinery would be either at the right speed or in the desired direction. If coercion was removed - for whatever reason - the chances were that developments would be other than intended. As Murphy remarked of American plans for Germany in 1948: 'The trouble with our good blueprints often seems to be that they get bloody noses bumping into Russians, French, and at times, British stone walls'. 76
Significantly, it was the Soviet Union which first sensed what Marshall could not admit in public. His 'plan' envisaged the Europeans - including the countries of Eastern Europe - collectively conducting thorough studies of their overall requirements. They were to determine what each could contribute and only then approach the United States to make up the difference between demand and supply. The large Russian delegation at the three nations' conference, gathered in Paris during June to consider the appropriate European response to the United States' offer of economic assistance, did not examine the issue for very long. The Soviet Foreign Minister, Vyacheslav N. Molotov, reported to the conference his government's conclusions: that an enquiry into the collective resources of the European nations would violate the sovereignty of the individual countries concerned. Molotov put a counter proposal: that each national aid request should be submitted to the United States' Government separately. When this was refused, he and his team returned to Moscow. The historian, William C. Cromwell, has shown that neither France and Britain nor the United States deliberately excluded the Soviet Union. However, it is clear that the French and British believed it preferable that the Russians did not participate and adjusted their diplomatic efforts accordingly. Bevin in particular welcomed the breakdown of the conference as something he had 'anticipated and even wished for'.

Yet Britain, too, had problems with the Americans over the design of the aid programme. Bevin said in June that if the United States took the line that 'the UK was the same as any other European country' then the British Empire would have to sacrifice what 'little bit of
dignity' it had left. Bevin, quite naturally, wanted special treatment for Britain. This the Truman Administration was not prepared to concede. Special assistance for one country would have violated Marshall's insistence that what he regarded as the unsatisfactory 'piecemeal' approach to aid be abandoned in favour of one which treated all recipients on the same basis. Marshall's staff were worried that singling out, say, the British would have jeopardised the chances of ERP legislation being passed by Congress without being seriously mauled. Indeed, the spectre of Congressional disapproval - conjuring up memories of 1919 - came to be regarded as a most effective sanction by Washington in the attempt to coax the Europeans to make a real unified effort. It was one which was used routinely from 1947 onwards in virtually all subsequent dealings with the West Europeans. As a tactic it had considerable promise. But its effectiveness depended upon a certain consistency in the State Department's own handling of foreign representatives and governments overseas. This was lacking in the latter half of 1947.

Relations with the British were a prime case. They had been told that there could be no special assistance for the United Kingdom, the corollary being that Britain was not treated differently from any other European power. William L. Clayton, during a visit to London during July, made it clear that what the Americans had in mind was a kind of West European-wide customs union (based on the model already established by Belgium, Netherlands and Luxembourg). The British reacted strongly: even in principle they were unprepared to agree to the establishment of such a customs union. The reason they gave was that the proposal would 'involve delay which in present circumstances would be disastrous'. Moreover, the Americans were
reminded that Britain was 'not merely a European country but an international trader' as well. 83

Reactions such as this persuaded the State Department to ease the pressure. Robert A. Lovett, Dean Acheson's replacement as Under-Secretary of State, cabled Clayton: 'We are all in agreement with you on the point that a customs union is a desirable long-run objective but...the attempt to work it out now would bog Europe down in details and distract from the main effort'. 84 This did not mean that the Europeans were to have it all their own way; pressure was to be applied indirectly. In August, Clayton received further instructions from Lovett by wired message:

The main emphasis should be laid on unwillingness of U.S. public and U.S. Congress to aid Europe as a whole unless European countries take effective and cooperative steps to help themselves. Most effective sanction lies, in our judgement, in likelihood of U.S. refusal to support European plan unless there is a real unified effort on their part. 85

This formula allowed the Truman Administration to avoid studiously any action that might be interpreted as attempting to influence the development of the Marshall Plan programme. The United States could not afford to appear to be dictating terms.

The unexpected result of this change in tactics was that it left the United States with very little room for manoeuvre. Kennan remarked in February 1948 that, once the European Recovery Programme was passed by Congress, 'the matter will be out of our hands'. 86 In reality, matters had already begun to slip away from American control
six months before. If the United States followed a 'hands off' policy, then progress would be dependent on decisions taken by the Committee for European Economic Cooperation (CEEC), under the chairmanship of the British diplomat, Sir Oliver Franks. Whereas the Americans saw the CEEC as a regulatory body, the organ of eventual economic integration, the British saw it as a consultative forum with no supranational trappings. Furthermore, because of the tactics adopted by Marshall and Lovett, the State Department could not realistically use the sanction of Congressional refusal. In practice, this meant that the recipients of aid were not without influence over the donors.

This became clear during a visit to Washington by a CEEC delegation, under the leadership of Franks, in October 1947. The Europeans' case was put to Lovett in writing:

The programme is a recovery programme and not a programme of temporary relief. It has therefore to be a large programme and the amounts available under it have to be sufficient to do the job. Otherwise it loses its character, becomes a further instalment of relief, and at its end the people of Western Europe will be on your doorstep again. By then, however, both they and you will be further disillusioned and, more importantly, Europe may have gone so far down the hill that full recovery may have become impossible and the social and political fabric of Western Europe so altered and strained as to force other solutions than those for which we are both working and hoping.87

In effect, Franks was saying that if the United States were to retain Western Europe as a region of allies, the Americans would have to pay handsomely. This was more than a diplomatically-worded statement
about European political realities; it also spoke directly to America's self-image as a global power. Without an economically viable Western European state system, the United States' status in the world would be much reduced. Not for the last time in the development of the Atlantic community since 1945, the Europeans were suggesting that it was in the interests of the United States to look after the interests of the West Europeans. On that basis the recipients of aid could bargain with the providers on virtually equal terms. The problem for the Americans - not yet appreciated by the Truman Administration - was that this arrangement militated against their long-term hopes for a 'new' Europe to emerge from the ashes of World War II.

* * *

The search for NATO's American roots begins in 1947. During that year the three main factors which were to govern United States' attitudes towards an Atlantic security arrangement became evident. These were, first, the fear of Soviet expansionist tendencies worldwide, especially in Europe; secondly, the desire for a gradual disengagement from Europe; and thirdly, the policy of holding down U.S. military spending in the interests of the domestic economy. Linking all three was the American notion of West European unity. It would be unwise to attempt to weigh the relative importance of these. In 1947 each headed the list at one time or another. It was rather the interaction between them which was to be significant in the months ahead. For example, concern over Soviet military strength
caused worries about the wisdom of postwar demobilisation and the descending level of American military expenditure. These in turn suggested that the Europeans should be primarily responsible for their own security once Marshall aid had put them on their feet again, thereby facilitating an eventual American withdrawal. And that would free Washington's hand to deal with the Soviet challenge outside Europe, where the decolonisation process might offer Moscow some considerable temptations.

The State Department, in sum, was not single-mindedly preoccupied with the emergence of the Soviet Union as a superpower rival. The instincts and perception of the policy-makers in 1947 did not conform to Alexis de Tocqueville's famous observation about America and Russia: that 'each of them seems to be marked out by the will of Heaven to sway the destinies of half the globe'. The nature of the Soviet 'threat' was the subject of debate, and U.S. policy towards Western Europe was based on the proposition that unity and strength - and therefore the ability to compete with the United States - were preferrable to continued division and weakness. Nevertheless, in terms of NATO's origins it is significant that during 1947 there was no departmental unanimity of opinion about the American relationship with Western Europe. There were two distinct sets of views; one was radical, the other more moderate. The radicals - led by William Clayton with support in Congress and from John Foster Dulles - advocated exerting maximum pressure on the European democracies to unite. The moderates - led by Dean Acheson and, later, Robert A. Lovett - argued that this approach was bound to be counterproductive because it would drive the Europeans even
deeper into national parochialism. Acheson and Lovett 'won' the argument because their views were closest to those of Marshall.

These divisions of opinion were not only crucial in the subsequent formulation of American security policy towards the Atlantic community. They were also symptomatic of a deeper problem underlying all others. This was the painful adjustment to the realisation of world leadership and the extent to which American policy-makers lacked the confidence to wield the power bequeathed to them by World War II. British Embassy staff in Washington watched that process of adjustment with understanding and an awareness of what was at stake. Lord Inverchapel reported to London:

Whilst an attitude of complacent superiority towards the outside world is still much in evidence, it is now widely appreciated amongst those elements of the community which mould public opinion that it behoves America to assume the responsibilities attendant on her position as the leading world power.\(^89\)

In London, a British official added the comment that the new-found sense of power was very much to the American taste. He thought the United States had learnt a lesson about survival 'beyond forgetting'.\(^90\)

This should not be taken to mean that the United States now perceived that its interests were identical to those of Western Europe. As events in 1948 were to demonstrate, Americans were not ready to inspire and lead the movement towards a formal consolidation of the de facto transatlantic alliance which had existed since 1945. Until the middle of 1948, few in Washington thought that the acceptance of
global responsibilities was synonymous with American membership of
a treaty-based Atlantic alliance.

What helped to change minds in the Truman Administration stemmed in
large part from American thinking which developed in 1947 about the
Marshall Plan. Fundamental to the European Recovery Programme was
the assumption that economic prosperity translated automatically
into political stability. For Americans, political stability in
the Old World meant a measure of real integration and unity. Policy-
makers, acting on this presumption, believed implicitly that the
requirements for West European union were ultimately the same as
for economic recovery. During early-1948, it became clear that the
connection was neither automatic nor self-evident, as a result of
the Europeans' agitation about the Soviet military threat. This led
Marshall and Lovett, in effect, to transfer from economic considerations
to security matters the same process of reasoning they had used about
economic recovery. If the West Europeans could be made to feel 'safe',
economic prosperity, followed by political stability and eventual
unity, would be assured. Then it would be only a matter of time
before the United States could reduce its commitments: by then the
West Europeans would be able to stand on their own. Without that
optimistic perception it is doubtful whether the United States would
have signed the North Atlantic Treaty at all.
AN ASYMMETRY OF FEAR: WEST EUROPEAN-AMERICAN RELATIONS, JANUARY - MARCH 1948

With the formulation of the Marshall Plan, the initiative in transatlantic relations passed temporarily from Washington to the capitals of Western Europe. The most immediate and tangible result of this was the establishment of the postwar Atlantic Alliance and, subsequently, the formation of NATO. Marshall's generalisations on 5 June 1947 were transformed by the British and French into a definite programme for American loans, grants and other economic assistance abroad. The radical U.S. journalist I.F. Stone commented at the time: 'A quick-witted girl moved with alacrity to say "yes" when all the young man did was to express some general views on marriage'. An American suggestion had been converted into a morally binding promise to Western Europe by the West Europeans themselves.

The process which produced the North Atlantic Treaty was different in two important respects. First, the original suggestion was of West European origin. Secondly, the Americans played a much more active role in determining the final shape of the treaty than they had over the Marshall Plan. At the beginning the U.S. Government's contribution to the emergence of a formally constituted Atlantic community was a relatively passive one; later it was to become much more directly interventionist. The principal reasons for the earlier
reluctance to get involved in a multilateral security arrangement are clear from the previous chapter: the mismatch between U.S. foreign policy and available military power, the fear of turning Soviet rhetoric about American imperialism into self-fulfilling prophecy by putting too much strain on West European nations' sovereignty, domestic budgetary constraints, and a pervasive sense of uncertainty - in official circles - about the future role of the United States in world affairs. But there was a further reason which became increasingly important from the end of 1947. This was the conflict within the State Department between a number of Marshall's main advisers on the European question. The effect of this difference of view was to make American diplomacy less assertive than it might have been.

It was also this division of opinion that provided the West Europeans with some opportunity to influence the direction of American foreign policy. This was not to become clear until the formal treaty negotiations began in mid-1948. But because it is an aspect of American diplomacy which has gone largely unremarked in the otherwise voluminous writings on the cold war, it is necessary to consider the appearance of these internal arguments about policy with some care. They appeared immediately the British Foreign Secretary, Ernest Bevin, proposed the 'consolidation of Western Europe' in what was to become the Western Union (composed of Britain and France plus Belgium, Luxembourg and the Netherlands).

* * *
Bevin's proposal was first broached to the Americans on 15 December 1947. During a private dinner between the British Foreign Secretary and his American counterpart at the former's London flat, Bevin reportedly said:

The survival of the West will depend upon the establishment of some form of union, formal or informal in character, in Western Europe, backed by the United States and the Dominions - such a mobilisation of moral and material force as will inspire confidence and energy within and respect elsewhere.²

On the 17th or 18th December 1947, Bevin came to the conclusion that what he had in prospect was 'a sort of spiritual federation of the west'. He acknowledged the American and French preference for formal constitutions but advocated 'the British conception of unwritten and informal understandings'.³ At the meeting of the Council for European Economic Cooperation in Paris during June 1947, Bevin and Georges Bidault, the French foreign minister, had discussed the notion of a West European military alliance which included some American participation. Bevin's proposal of 15 December 1947 seems the first time the matter was put before the Truman Administration in any form.⁴

Marshall's initial reaction was symptomatic of the United States' diplomacy throughout the next two years. It had four elements. First, there was the recognition that future cooperation with the Soviet Union on the postwar shape of Europe was going to be very difficult, if not impossible. Significantly, Bevin's proposal coincided with the breakdown of the Council of Foreign Ministers (CFM) meeting in
London. It was Marshall who moved that the CFM be adjourned indefinitely. 5 Secondly, there was anxiety that no commitments were seen to be - or actually - entered into. The U.S. Secretary of State personally asked that the British government be reminded that during the conversations with Bevin, Marshall 'was not definitely approving at that time any particular course of action'. 6 Thirdly, there was an inclination to take the British into Washington's confidence more than the French: Bidault, was given only an expurgated record of the talks. 7 This was partly because of the Anglo-American supposition that the French government was vulnerable to Soviet spying activities; it was also partly the result of that habit of cooperation, coordination and information exchange embodied in the phrase 'the special relationship'. 8 Finally, there was a recognition of the potential worth of Bevin's proposals but this was coupled with doubts about the real objectives being sought by the Europeans. Marshall believed that what was needed was a clearer understanding all round. 9

Marshall's own uncertainties were revealed in his actions. On the one hand, he appeared to endorse the whole idea; he even authorised the American military delegate at the United Nations, Matthew B. Ridgway, to explore the practical implications with the British and French delegations. 10 On the other hand, he was unwilling to go beyond generalisations about support for the effort to alleviate the sufferings and hardships of the Europeans. In an obvious effort to force a more positive assurance of U.S. backing than Marshall seemed personally able to give, Ernest Bevin sent a cable to Washington on 13 January 1948 in which he laid out his idea formally. The House of Commons was due to debate foreign affairs the following week and
the British foreign secretary was anxious to be able to assure his cabinet colleagues that his proposal for a West European 'union' had the fullest American approval.\footnote{11}

However, from a Washington perspective, Bevin's Memorandum was full of ambiguities. Nor did the accompanying note to George C. Marshall from the British Ambassador, Lord Inverchapel, do anything to clarify matters. The title of the Memorandum referred to 'Mr. Bevin's views on the formation of a Western Union'. It was not clear whether the British Government was thinking about Western Europe or about 'the West' as a whole. Bevin wrote:

\begin{quote}
I believe...that we should seek to form with the backing of the Americans and the Dominions a Western democratic system comprising Scandinavia, the Low Countries, France, Italy, Greece and possibly Portugal.
\end{quote}

This was necessary, he suggested, because it would otherwise be hard to stem what he called 'the further encroachment of the Soviet tide'. 'Essential though it is, progress in the economic field will not in itself suffice to call a halt to the Russian threat'. But Inverchapel supplemented this with the idea that Bevin's 'system' was actually a way to link Western Europe with the Middle East and, through Anglo-French cooperation, provide the basis for 'the development of Africa'. Moreover, while the British appeared to have warmed to the notion of European integration, Bevin suggested that close consultation, rather than a formal alliance, would bring this about. But Inverchapel mentioned that Bevin was considering the Treaty of Dunkirk between France and the United Kingdom as the model upon which to formalise the West European system.\footnote{12}
Despite this lack of clarity the Memorandum did elicit from Marshall a more definite response than had been given in December to Bevin's verbal proposal. Marshall called for policy papers to be prepared promptly in order that his reply could be sent without delay. The redoubtable George F. Kennan, director of the Policy Planning Staff, noted the ambiguities: 'the combination of Bevin's memorandum and Inverchapel's letter leaves some doubt as to what the British really have in mind'. Nevertheless, Kennan was in no doubt about the American response. He advised Marshall:

> The project of a union among the western European nations under combined French-British auspices, is one which we should welcome just as warmly as Mr. Bevin welcomed your Harvard speech. Only such a union holds out any hope of restoring the balance of power in Europe without permitting Germany to become again the dominant power.

The Director of the Office of European Affairs, John Hickerson, called Bevin's objective 'magnificent'. Thus fortified, Marshall sent a message to Lord Inverchapel that 'Mr. Bevin may be assured of our wholehearted sympathy in this undertaking'. On 22 January 1948, the British foreign secretary made a major Parliamentary speech in which was announced moves he had initiated to secure a Five-Power agreement - Britain, France and the Benelux countries - to form the 'nucleus' of postwar Western Europe. The result was the Treaty of Brussels, signed on 17 March 1948.

What Marshall did not communicate to the British Government was any indication of the role which the United States envisaged for itself in the new arrangement. This was more than diplomatic caution.
policy papers by Kennan and Hickerson contained conflicting advice on this. There was a departmental consensus that Bevin's proposal deserved the warmest welcome and merited the closest consideration. There was also agreement that the notion of using the Dunkirk Treaty as the basis of the new design for Western Europe was inadequate. That treaty was a bilateral mutual assistance pact against the possible resurgence of German military power. There was no mention in the text of the possibility that the real threat lay further to the east. (This had been specifically and personally excluded by Bevin because of the hostility which it was likely to evoke in Moscow and elsewhere in the communist fraternity.) But this modest level of agreement could not bridge the wide divergence of views on other aspects of Bevin's ideas.

Two key issues in particular dominated the departmental debate. They were precisely the ones which were to colour the formulation of the American position during the negotiations for the North Atlantic Treaty.

The first concerned the military emphasis in Bevin's proposal. George F. Kennan deplored this. 'Military union should not be the starting point', he wrote. 'It should flow from the political, economic and spiritual union - not vice versa'. Looking some way ahead, he argued that the German role in a future European union would, eventually, be crucial. A mutual assistance pact exclusively based on defence against German aggression had thus little to recommend it. 'If there is to be "union", it must have some reality in economic and technical and administrative arrangements; and there must be some real federal authority'. He was not unmindful of the military requirement however. Kennan said that if the Europeans developed Bevin's concept, 'there
will be no real question as to our long-term relationship to it, even with respect to the military guarantee.¹⁹

But John Hickerson had few such reservations. He saw little need to de-emphasise the military element. He told Marshall that he shared the views of the Belgian Prime Minister, Henri Spaak, who had just been advised of what Bevin was thinking. Hickerson clearly felt that it was necessary to contemplate building sound defences 'against Russia'. Furthermore, he noted that 'any defence arrangements which did not include the United States was without practical value'. The answer, he thought, was a European defence pact. He noted that for such a pact to be really effective, the United States would have no choice but to adhere. 'I believe that this country could and should adhere to such a treaty if it were clearly linked up with the UN'. In opposition to Kennan, therefore, Hickerson advocated American participation in a reciprocal defence arrangement with some or all states in Western Europe.²⁰

The other key issue in dispute arose from the military question: the extent to which the United States should participate directly. Kennan was in no doubt about this. He told Marshall that 'as in the case of the recovery program, the initiative must come from Europe, and the project must be worked out over there'. Nowhere did he suggest the desirability of a formal linkage between American security matters and those of Western Europe. He criticised what he regarded as the tendency in London to see the whole plan as 'just another "framework" of military alliances', this time encompassing the United States. But while Kennan stressed the regional focus of Bevin's ideas, Hickerson took a more global view. To him, there
seemed little choice but to use the Treaty of Rio de Janeiro as the basis of Bevin's plan for a 'Western Union'. That meant a multi-lateral arrangement, rather than a series of bilateral ones, and American involvement as *primus inter pares*. By definition this meant that Hickerson pressed Marshall to take the lead, or at the very least not lag too far behind the British. Kennan had no objection to the Rio Treaty being recreated in Western Europe: he simply did not think the United States should be a signatory.\(^{21}\)

It would be misleading to suggest that a quarrel broke out as a sudden response to Bevin's request for American backing for what became known as the Western Union Defence Organisation (WUDO). It had been brewing for some time, centering on the question of European integration and the American role therein. One of Hickerson's assistants, Theodore C. Achilles - then in charge of the West European desk - later recalled the intellectual background to the disagreement. His recollections are worth quoting at length.\(^{22}\)

> Ever since the end of World War II the State Department has been divided between those who felt that the United States should push the Europeans into unity from the outside and those who believed that the United States should pull the Europeans into unity with us....Everyone was agreed on the importance of tying West Germany securely into Western Europe. So far so good but from there on, opinion divided. The 'Europe first' school felt that all that was necessary was American encouragement for European unity and material assistance. Those of us who favored Atlantic unity felt that much more was needed, i.e., an increasing measure of unity involving the United States and Canada as well as the nations of Western Europe. We maintained that the other school was shortsighted because, although we fully agreed with their arguments as to the importance of European economic unity including Germany, we felt that
the 'Europe first' school had another unspoken and less credible motive, namely, that to urge greater unity in Europe enabled any American official or Member of Congress to sound progressive and alive to the needs of an increasingly independent world but without intimating willingness to assume any U.S. commitments other than material aid.

Given that Achilles was a participant in the argument, his views must be treated with some caution. Nevertheless, there is no doubting the gulf between the two sides, nor the whiff of acrimony which characterised the exchanges.

Achilles' push/pull analysis looks somewhat oversimple when compared to the documentary record. In particular, even during the period 1947-1949, on either side there was nothing like the consistency of view which he suggests. Moreover, although he and his colleagues could claim to have prevailed in the end - a multilateral treaty involving the United States was signed - the case which 'won' lacked the intellectual coherence of Kennan's arguments. Kennan was saying in effect that once a real West European union had been achieved - with 'some real federal authority' - the conditions would have been created in which an explicit American commitment was less necessary, not more so. Hickerson was also in favour of fostering European unity but it was never clear the extent to which that development was to be a precursor to some form of 'Atlantic' union (possibly following the ideas of Clarence Streit, a writer and journalist whose views on this were well-publicised). One thing was clear however, For Hickerson, American involvement was the price the United States would have to pay in order to see moves towards European unity succeed.
He thus thought in terms of a multilateral treaty. For Kennan, American involvement - such as he envisaged any at all - would be Europe's reward for having created a federal European union with the provision for the future membership of Germany. He therefore thought in terms of unilateral gestures of support, following the lines of the Truman Doctrine which he had helped inspire.

George C. Marshall and his Under-Secretary of State, Robert A. Lovett, never succeeded in resolving this conflict. The shifts in the direction of American foreign policy throughout the period which covered the gestation of the Atlantic Alliance are largely due to that. First one view of the United States' national interest appeared to be uppermost, then the other. As the negotiations which led to the formation of NATO were to show, the West Europeans recognised this and put in considerable efforts to support Hickerson's case against Kennan's. For the moment, however, Marshall responded formally to Bevin's ideas by being non-committal. He promised that the United States would 'do all it properly can in assisting the European nations in bringing a project along this line to fruition'. Although he described it as of 'fundamental importance to the future of western civilisation' he left open all of the questions about American political and military policy which the Europeans were seeking to clarify.  

A major reason why the United States seemed to lack a sense of direction on this matter was that Marshall was still not sure how to proceed. This became clear three days after he had received Bevin's request for a formal response. During the course of hearings on the European Recovery Programme, the Secretary of State agreed with Senator Henry
Cabot Lodge, Jr., a strong supporter of the 'United States of Europe' concept, that Americans had to use their 'good offices' to promote the integration of Europe. But he alluded to personal doubts about the best way to ensure that the momentum towards unity could be maintained when the Europeans were 'more or less on their feet'.

On ERP, he said:

The critical time will come [when] the program is not complete but the "heat" is off....Just how we keep the process going towards further cooperation, towards a further consolidation of European states and a general integration, mutual integration in relation to the economic work, is a matter of very great importance.

He likened the problem with that currently exercising his colleagues in the Department of Defense: the unification of high command. All Services concur in the principle, he said, 'but they won't agree with you when you get down to business, unless it is their man that is to command'.

In an effort to clarify Marshall's response to Bevin, Lord Inverchapel called on Hickerson at the State Department on 21 January 1948. His stated purpose was 'to obtain some working level views in the Department' on the proposals looking to the formation of a union of the free countries of Western Europe. His unstated aim emerged during discussions: to discover the role the Americans were considering for themselves. Ironically, just as Inverchapel's covering note to his Secretary of State's original memorandum of 13 January 1948, had confused the State Department somewhat, the British Ambassador
was in his turn treated to two sets of views. In so far as Inverchapel wanted 'working level views' he got both. What this did not enable him to do was satisfy London about the possibility of an American commitment to Western Europe, if any.

The 'Memorandum of Conversation' which chronicled the meeting between Inverchapel and Hickerson encapsulates the problem faced by West European governments. Hickerson opened the meeting by reading out an aide-memoire written by George F. Kennan. Its contents were therefore long on sympathy and encouragement but short on positive proposals. The military aspects were down-played; the positive virtues of the 'political, economic and spiritual union' were stressed approvingly. But then Hickerson went on to make some comments of his own. Picking up a reference in the aide-memoire about the Rio Treaty, he pointed out why it was preferable to the Dunkirk Treaty: it provided 'automatic action against aggression whether from within or without'. This would make the proposed European defence system more attractive to other West European states who were hoped to join later. Moreover, this would not be considered provocative by the Soviet Union. (Hickerson even suggested - no doubt with tongue in cheek - that on this basis, the Soviet Union could itself join without detracting from the protection afforded by the treaty.)

In effect, Hickerson verbally over-rode Kennan's cautionary written remarks about military alliances by stressing ways of maximising the effectiveness of one based in Western Europe. Inverchapel's response is apparently not preserved in the records of the British Foreign Office but he could legitimately claim to some confusion. And this could only have been multiplied as Hickerson continued to air
his views. Inverchapel was told that 'there were arguments on both sides with respect to direct participation by the United States'. Putting his own ideas forward, Hickerson explained that he envisaged

...the creation of a third force which was not merely the extension of US influence but a real European organization strong enough to say "no" both to the Soviet Union and to the United States.

Apparently unaware of the implied contradiction, he went on to say that, if the Europeans decided that no regional defence organisation could be completed without the United States, Washington would be 'sympathetically disposed and would at least give it very careful consideration'. Inverchapel evidently seized on this point and reminded Hickerson that Marshall himself 'did not preclude direct participation' by the Americans; the Secretary of State had given the impression that the only thing in doubt was the question of timing.29 Again, there seems to be no record of Inverchapel's reaction. Whether he noticed that a European 'third force' and the possibility of United States' involvement were potentially and probably mutually exclusive must be a matter of speculation.

The significance of these ambiguities and differing points of view is considerable. They show that, contrary to the impression generated by numerous historians, the transition from the Marshall Plan as the focus of policy makers' attention to an explicit or implicit security commitment to Western Europe was far from easy. In terms of the American origins of NATO this is of the greatest importance. The speed with which the United States could be persuaded to adjust its
various views to a new set of pressures would be crucial.

From the beginning of 1948, the pace of progress towards an Atlantic Pact was largely determined by that process of adjustment. This would have come as some surprise to a number of contemporary observers. One of them, Hanson Baldwin, the military correspondent of the New York Times, wrote in December 1947 of what he regarded as the militarisation of American foreign policy. He pointed to a number of indications: the continuing presence of American troops abroad: the composition of the newly-created Joint Chiefs of Staff, the members of which all had achieved high service rank during the war; the enthusiasm for universal military training by civilians, in and out of Congress; the fact that the National Security Council was made up of Department of Defense staff on secondment; and the appointment of the first military man as Secretary of State. Had these factors actually meant that American foreign policy was becoming militarised, then it would be reasonable to expect rather less drawn-out agonising about the commitment to Western Europe than in fact took place.

What lay at the heart of the American uncertainty and hesitation in the opening months of 1948 was agreement about the ends sought but not about the means to achieve them. No-one in the White House or the Departments of State and Defense seriously questioned the received wisdom that it was vital to American national interests – diplomatic, strategic and economic – to ensure the continued freedom of Western Europe. But there was no consensus about the policy application of that objective. This need not have mattered had foreign policy been under firm control. However, this it was not. From the moment the
London meeting of the Council of Foreign Ministers broke up with no agreement on the future of Germany, American relations with Europe tended to drift. When Dean Acheson was appointed Marshall's successor a year later, he was able to instil a sense of purpose once again. But by then the United States was already committed to the territorial defence of Western Europe.

In the meantime, Marshall and his deputy Lovett retreated into those objectives and concerns which had dominated their long term thinking in 1947: the unification of Western Europe. That this had become their principal preoccupation is revealed in a series of conversation and letters between Lovett and Inverchapel between 27 January and 7 February 1948. These exchanges began with the British Ambassador calling once again on the State Department. It is clear from Lovett's memorandum of the conversation that the British visitor had two aims: first, to determine whether the Americans had developed their thinking about Bevin's proposals beyond the schizoid position demonstrated by Hickerson; and, secondly, to convey to the State Department an important new initiative from London. The response he received marked the beginning of what was to be the United States' attitude and policy preference throughout the negotiations leading to the signing of the North Atlantic Treaty one year later.

The initial meeting was followed by Inverchapel putting his points in writing. Lovett responded by sending the British Ambassador the reflections of George C. Marshall on the new British position. To avoid repetition, the three documents covering these exchanges can be considered together.
Inverchapel told Robert A. Lovett that the extent of the American support for the political and defence organisation of Western Europe was crucial. In order to facilitate the maximum possible, the British now suggested that the United States and Britain, urgently and secretly,

...consider the possibilities of concluding some defence agreement between them to provide against aggression which could reinforce the defence project Mr. Bevin had proposed for Western Europe.

The British Ambassador elaborated in writing on this important suggestion. He advised Lovett that without the assurance of American support the bilateral treaties being discussed could not be fully effective or relied upon in a crisis: 'The plain truth is that Western Europe cannot yet stand on its own feet'. Britain could do only so much on its own. Inverchapel noted that the British government was 'not yet in a position to give firm assurances as to the role Britain intends to play in operations on the continent of Europe'. He therefore asked, on Bevin's instructions, that the United States be ready to 'enter with Great Britain into a general commitment to go to war with an aggressor'. Lest there be any misunderstanding, Inverchapel pressed the point by conjuring painful memories of the recent past. Only with such a development, he wrote, was it probable 'that the potential victims might feel sufficiently reassured to refuse to embark on a fatal policy of appeasement'.

It was a powerful appeal, skilfully made. Lovett immediately observed 'that this proposal raised questions of the highest importance'.
An Anglo-American military alliance in peacetime would require detailed attention by Marshall, the National Security Council and the President; consultation would also have to be opened with Congressional leaders. Those constitutional and political requirements disposed of the British hope for urgency and secrecy and allowed Lovett to concentrate on the issue of European unity. He told the British representative that the extent of American participation would be largely determined by tangible evidence of further progress towards European union. He went further by pointing out that congressional consideration of the ERP - 'intended to bring about economic improvement and thereby lessen dangers and possibilities of war' - might be affected adversely if attention now switched 'toward military arrangements intended for the same purpose'. Inverchapel was advised:

Moreover, the Secretary of State feels that European initiative is of first importance. Therefore, the injection of the United States into the matter, before agreement under the proposal of Mr. Bevin has been developed abroad, would be unwise and would certainly be subjected to serious challenge here as premature on our part.

Marshall wanted to see 'a firm determination to effect an arrangement under which the various European countries are prepared to act in concert to defend themselves'. Only then would the United States consider what support it would offer 'a Western European Union'.

In this connection, it is notable that the Americans virtually ignored an important part of the British submission. Inverchapel had initially told Lovett, and subsequently followed it up in writing, that London envisaged an Anglo-American military understanding about Western Europe which could be achieved in a similar fashion to one reached
between the two countries over the Middle East in 1947. The formula was simple. 'Secret, frank and informal discussions' between representatives of the Foreign Office and State Department, together with representatives of both the British and U.S. Chiefs of Staff, hammered out an agreement in Washington. The outcome was particularly satisfactory to the British Government. It confirmed that despite the promulgation of the Truman Doctrine the United States regarded Britain as an equal in that part of the world. The Prime Minister, Clement R. Attlee, had informed his Commonwealth counterparts that the Americans were to help build British strength in the region so that base facilities in Egypt, Iraq and Cyrenaica could be kept open. The United States also showed enthusiasm that Britain retain its strategically important footholds in Gibraltar, Cyprus, Aden and the Sudan. In December 1947, Attlee summed up the agreements: the Americans and British both recognised that one could not implement its own policies without the assistance of the other.33

None of this was mentioned or referred to by Lovett in his written reply to Inverchapel. And this despite the emphasis placed upon it by the British. Inverchapel reminded Lovett that the Middle East talks had included the suggestion that there might be cooperation on 'other segments of what we then described as the crescent of middle lands encircling the Soviet Union'.34 By avoiding the issue the Americans made their position plain. Containment of what was perceived as Soviet expansionist tendencies had the highest priority in a global setting but when it came to Europe, that 'segment of middle lands' encircling Russia would have to provide for its own salvation and with the minimum of American military assistance. As subsequent events were to demonstrate, the problem with this position
was deciding in what role the United Kingdom should be cast. When Marshall and the State Department thought in a European context Britain was to be part of an integrated West European unit. But when attention focused on a wider geographical area, the Americans were anxious to have the help of the British in regions where the United States had comparatively little experiences and no military bases or intelligence-gathering infrastructure. For the American policy planners the problem was made worse by the fact that the United Kingdom could not discharge both roles. That had been the lesson of Britain's self-enforced withdrawal from Greece and Turkey in 1947. Some compromise would have to be reached. From both a British and American point of view that compromise was embodied in the North Atlantic Treaty.

However, in the early part of 1948, London and Washington were at cross purposes. Bevin argued on 6 February that 'a vicious circle' was developing. Inverchapel wrote to Lovett:

> Without assurance of security, which can only be given with some degree of American participation, the British Government are unlikely to be successful in making the Western Union a going concern. But it appears from your letter that, until this is done, the United States Government for their part, does not feel able to discuss participation.

Bevin suggested that his proposals had not enjoyed the same measure of American support which he had expected in view of his personal championing of the Marshall Plan. Lovett's response was firm and immediate. He replied that the United States had no clear idea of exactly what Bevin's Western Union proposal amounted to. All that
Washington knew were broad ideas, sketched by Bevin in the most general terms. The Charge d'Affaires at the U.S. Embassy in London, Waldemar J. Gallman, had already cabled Washington saying that 'at the technical level' the Foreign Office was stressing the vagueness of current plans. He added that he could discern no change in British thinking or policy as a result of Bevin's House of Commons speech of 22 January 1948. Lovett summed up the attitude of himself and Marshall when he personally told Inverchapel: 'You are in effect asking us to pour concrete before we see the blueprints'.

Bevin could no longer complain, as he had done on 6 February 1948, that he did not know 'how the mind of the United States Government' was moving. He now knew that his general wish for American participation in Western Europe's defence, and his particular desire to reach an Anglo-American military pact, stood no chance of being realised unless and until the Western Union idea was seen to blossom. He knew also that Marshall and Lovett were thinking of the Western Union as 'a Union of the Free States of Western Europe' and not just of a joint military arrangement. That the British had got the message is clear from Lord Gladwyn's memoirs. Gladwyn Jebb (as he then was) had travelled to Washington early in February to sound out how far the Americans would support a European defence pact. He recalled that he was ordered to return to London without speaking with State Department personnel. As he put it carefully, 'the moment was deemed unpropitious'.

The State Department did not leave matters there. Although divided on the issue of American participation, it was united in the conviction that influence had to be used to ensure that the Western Union
corresponded more closely to 'a Union of the Free States of Western Europe' than to what Kennan had dismissed earlier as 'just another "framework" of military alliances'. To that end it made certain that Belgium, at the very least, would reject the Dunkirk Treaty formula, and possibly the Netherlands as well, in favour of what it regarded as a better one.

On 10 January 1948, Marshall sent a copy of the Inter-American Treaty of reciprocal resistance (the Rio Treaty) to Henri Spaak the Belgian Prime Minister. No suggestion was made - or implied - that the United States Government meant to sign a similar treaty with Western Europe. In answer to the Belgian's request for some reassurance concerning American help with the military security of Western Europe, Marshall replied: 'Constitutional, traditional and material factors make reassurance on security difficult'. Alan G. Kirk, the U.S. Ambassador at Brussels, reported that Spaak was studying the Rio Treaty closely, especially the casus foederis contained in Article III.

By 3 February Ambassador Kirk could report that the Department's suggestion 'seems to have borne fruit': Spaak had drawn up a draft treaty for discussion with his Benelux colleagues together with the British and French based largely on the Rio formula of multilateral reciprocity.

Not surprisingly, Bevin complained to the United States Government through Inverchapel that he now faced the rejection by Belgium (and the Netherlands) of the Dunkirk model, coupled with the suggestion that a wider regional instrument should be drawn up. This development was exactly in line with State Department thinking. Article 51 of the U.N. Charter referred to 'individual or collective self-defence'
but Article 52 concerned 'regional arrangements'. Spaak also stressed that for 'defence in depth' U.S. support was necessary but did not allow that to interfere with the European defence pact idea. It was this ordering of priorities which recommended Spaak to the Americans. It was he who had been instrumental in creating the Benelux Union, Western Europe's first multinational grouping. Theodore Achilles suggested to Marshall and Lovett on 20 January that the Benelux represented not only an inspiration to the European unity movements but also 'an example of day-to-day political cooperation more effective than anything achieved between Britain and the United States in wartime'.

Achilles' superiors may have doubted the validity of that hyperbole but they were strongly predisposed to favour Spaak's suggestions rather than those of Bevin on this issue. For Marshall, this may have been partly due to his enduring suspicion of the British Foreign Secretary's personal integrity. This dated from the collapse of the CFM meeting in London during December 1947. Marshall felt that he had been deliberately let down when, at that meeting, Bevin failed to move the adjournment as he had promised to do. (Marshall's successor, Dean Acheson, developed much better personal relations with Bevin and felt that Marshall had rushed to judgement.) However, at most, this personal feeling was a minor contributory factor in governing Marshall's preferences. Spaak's ideas appealed because they spoke directly to American predelictions about a united Western Europe and did not imply the kind of direct participation by the United States that all in the State Department - except the Hickerson faction - instinctively shied away from. British opinions were thus not the
only ones to count. Bevin was not the only source of West European pressure for a transatlantic military arrangement of some kind. The French were if anything, even more interested and never lost the opportunity of saying no. At the end of January 1948, Georges Bidault, the French Minister of Foreign Affairs, made his country’s position very clear to Major General Harold R. Bull, the personal representative of General Eisenhower, then Chief of Staff, U.S. Army. In the report of the meeting sent to Marshall, Bidault ‘expressed the conviction that American strategic planning should be based on a defence of Western Europe’. Unless the West Europeans believed that the United States planned to defend them from the beginning of a conflict, the Americans were told, the idea of Western Union would come to nothing.

This was essentially the same message already conveyed by Bevin, but in the French case Washington was more prepared to listen. Unlike the United Kingdom, France showed every sign of falling apart politically. Robert Schuman’s coalition looked increasingly fragile after the devaluation of the French franc in January with the socialists, led by Leon Blum, threatening to bring the government down. The American Ambassador at Paris, Jefferson Caffery, called on Blum to try to persuade him to behave in what the Americans regarded as a more responsible way. Marshall personally approved this initiative, cabling that he was ‘increasingly concerned by atmosphere of crisis prevailing in Paris’. He told Caffery: ‘Do not hesitate to approach Blum again or other leaders whose parties show signs of bolting whenever you feel this action would be salutary’. It was against this political background that the State Department, and
Marshall in particular, showed sympathy towards those demands which France made upon the United States.

Unlike Bevin, Bidault did not ask for an under-the-table bilateral defence pact with the Americans. He consistently spoke of 'the countries of Western Europe' as an entity in themselves and in which he clearly included Britain. Where he did argue for special treatment from the United States was over the question of military equipment. Marshall was told:

...the French would like to know what we [the United States] can do to furnish them with such heavy equipment on a basis of equipping perhaps somewhere between twenty and forty divisions. If we could help, in addition to equipping themselves they might also eventually be able to assist other Western European countries.

In terms of the origin of NATO, this request is significant. It marks the beginning of what was to become the Military Assistance Programme, without which there might have been no North Atlantic Treaty. It was some time before the United States responded positively but Bidault had succeeded in putting an item on the diplomatic agenda which was to grow in importance as 1948 progressed.45

Again, unlike Bevin, Bidault had discovered the weakness in Marshall's diplomatic position. Ever since the Marshall Plan was first promulgated the Americans had laid great stress on European self-help. It was a feature both of the Vandenberg Resolution later in 1948 and the North Atlantic Treaty the following year. As indicated already, the idea was to ensure that the American commitment - economic or military - would be a declining one. But Bidault argued that even if the United
States refused to be associated with the defence of Western Europe, America's European allies would be incapable of even minimum defence because of shortages in military hardware which domestic production could not make up. He did not advocate that the United States supply everything the French and their continental neighbours needed. Instead he suggested that a division of labour should be tried: the French would concentrate on light arms and equipment while the Americans would specialise in aircraft, tanks and heavy artillery. As with everything else, Marshall acted cautiously; the points were registered, the Policy Planning Staff was asked to investigate but for the moment that was all.46

Later in the year, however, he surprised some of his colleagues, notably James V. Forrestall, by showing more regard for the prospect of giving the French the equipment they needed than for the foreign policy implications of the American forces' reduced capacity - brought about through Truman's budgetary stringency - to support stated objectives.47 This was not because Marshall was unmindful of the relationship between political objectives and military means. Nor was it because he was careless about America's standing in the world. It was simply the result of gradually becoming attuned to the continental European perspective on strategic questions. Bidault pointed out in March 1948: 'We are sitting here under the guns and your people are on the other side of the ocean'.48 As a man who had served with General Pershing in France during World War I and played a key role in the liberation of Europe during World War II, Marshall would have understood the strength of French feeling on this. From late January 1948 onwards, and for the rest of his time as Secretary of State, he
made special efforts to calm France's fears by trying to find spare material for her armed forces. It was an attitude which helped shape the American negotiating position during the talks on the North Atlantic Pact later in 1948.

But Marshall did not agree with everything the French put to him. Two elements in the French analysis of the world situation he could share only partly. The first was on American military priorities and the second was on the danger posed by Germany.

On the United States' strategic concept, Bidault was sure he knew what interests were uppermost in Washington. He told senior American embassy staff in Paris that:

...in the event of war the United States military planners are thinking in terms of three main war theatres: 1) the Far East; 2) the Middle East (with its vital oil fields); 3) Western Europe.

He did not doubt that the Americans could defeat the Russians in a conflict in Europe but 'it would unquestionably be a long, bitter and hideously costly struggle'. He pointed out that the combined effects of Soviet occupation and American atomic warfare would leave Europe 'completely devastated and depopulated'. This would mean, he added, that there would be no West European civilisation to share with the United States the task of reconstruction once again. After its victory, the United States 'would have only Asiatics and African and Colonial natives with whom to cooperate in the task of world construction'.

49
To officials in the State Department Bidault argued from the wrong premise but nevertheless touched a sensitive nerve. He was wrong to suggest that the Far East was seen to be more important to the United States than Western Europe. Until the 'fall' of China and the Korean War virtually the only advocates of this position were identified with the U.S. Navy, often the same people who argued the 'Pacific-first' case during World War II. However, Bidault was correct in thinking that the Middle East had a higher military priority than Western Europe. This was a simple matter of scarce resources but was no less politically embarrassing for that. As the Congress was told in January, the European Recovery Programme was designed, in part, to lessen the burdens on the American defence effort. 'Enlightened cooperative economic endeavor' in Western Europe would go 'a long way toward reducing the necessity for a larger national armament in the future and probably reducing our present armament levels'.

Aid to Europe was thus to the Truman Administration both a substitute for increased military expenditures and the reason the Middle East oil fields could be given a higher military priority than the politically far more important Western Europe. But that was precisely the kind of calculation which, if publicly confirmed, would cause paroxysms among the West Europeans. Consequently, Marshall sent no word to the Embassy in Paris to disabuse Bidault of these ideas.

The French were similarly just off the mark on Germany. They wanted from the Americans what Georges Clemenceau had tried to get from Woodrow Wilson: a territorial guarantee against a possible revival of German aggression. They were thus always nervous at any move which might lead to Germany gaining more power than they could live with
comfortably. On 13 February 1948, the French Government sought American reassurance by reviving an idea first proposed by Marshall's predecessor, James F. Byrnes, eighteen months before. Byrnes had then tabled a Draft Treaty on the Disarmament and Dimilitarization of Germany. It had included provisions prohibiting the reconstitution of German armed forces, paramilitary groups or a general staff. The manufacture and importation of arms and munitions were also debarred. For the French this represented the basis of the American guarantee they wanted: a political and military replacement for the discredited 'Morgenthau Plan' for the economic pastoralisation of Germany.

On the Draft Treaty, the Minister at the French Embassy in Washington, Armand Berard, was told bluntly that it was 'a dead duck'. But this was not because Marshall or his staff had any better ideas. Rather it reflected the growing inclination in the Department of State to leave things to the Europeans. The French were advised that 'the whole question of Western European security should be dealt with primarily by European 'initiative'. The United States did not intend to table any 'startling new proposals'. But this could only reinforce French nervousness about the unreliability of the Americans, thus ensuring that France would continue to put pressure on the United States. The French did, however, concede an important point. They admitted that if Britain could be persuaded to take an active part in continental security arrangements, then this would go some way towards substituting for an American commitment. Should a German army ever be re-established the French reasoned, the combined British, French and Benelux forces would match or even outnumber it.
This reaffirmed the State Department's view that Bevin's Western Union idea had to be steered in the right direction, with a significant leadership role being played by the British. Unfortunately for Marshall, the British seemed unwilling to lead. Lovett pointedly noted to Inverchapel that, as Bevin had admitted, the British were not yet in a position to give firm assurances about Britain's political and military role in continental Europe. Even if Bevin accepted some version of the Rio formula for the Western Union, it did not follow that such assurances would then be forthcoming. Most importantly, the French had shown that the concept of a United Western Europe was unworkable without full British participation: the French would not cooperate because of their fear of Germany and that would make the prospect of an eventual American withdrawal recede into the distant future.

In sum, the net effect of the British and French approaches to Washington on primarily military matters was contrary to what either expected or presumably hoped for. They had consolidated the American belief that the unity of Western Europe would be of considerable benefit to the United States in the medium- and long-term. In the short-term, no senior figure in the State Department disagreed with George Marshall that American forces on the ground in Germany were the key not only to European security but to world peace. He expressed his views to Kennan in a telegram on 25 February 1948:

> French are secure against Germany as long as occupation continues, and as long as European communism threatens our vital interests and national security we could ill-afford to abandon our military position in Germany. Logical
conclusion is that 3 power occupations may be of unforeseeable and indefinite duration, thus offering protracted security guarantees. Our support for West European union is further response to French security requirements.\textsuperscript{57}

He said he agreed with Kennan that the real significance of the Marshall Plan and the American sponsorship of West European unity was that they were ensuring the survival of 'those very concepts of a universal world order' to which Americans were attached.\textsuperscript{58}

The importance of Marshall's message is considerable. It marks a significant moment in the evolution of American transatlantic attitudes. First, it shows that Marshall had decided to take the line of least resistance between the Kennan and Hickerson 'camps'. He conceded to the former the need to get Europe self-sufficient again, and thus in need of less American help. But he also recognised that the latter's belief that the long-term security interests of the United States may dictate a more or less permanent military relationship with Britain and France in Germany. It was this mixture of 'European' and 'Atlantic' approaches which was, eventually, to be the essence of the American negotiating position in the North Atlantic Treaty. Secondly, that mixture had the potential to cause problems in those negotiations. If the Europeans wanted a U.S. commitment against either Russia or Germany or both, the Americans could say that the presence of the U.S. occupation forces already constituted exactly that. Any further commitment was therefore unnecessary, especially as the United States possessed the ultimate retaliatory weapon, the atomic bomb. On the other hand, if the Europeans succeeded in getting an added military commitment from the United States, because of their
apocalyptic fears about the future, then that fact alone would reduce the chances of the Western Union ever becoming what the American foreign service and military establishment wanted: the focus of West European defence efforts.

Marshall's position in late February 1948 was thus a recipe for misunderstanding within his own Department and between the two halves of what was to become the Atlantic Alliance. What it emphatically did not indicate was a weakening of the State Department's ill-defined belief in the notion of some sort of European federal system. Recognition of the need to make some permanent provision for troops in Europe did not imply a growing awareness of a military threat from the Soviet Union. Marshall made his views on this plain to the cabinet. 'The danger of war has been greatly exaggerated', he said. 'The Soviet Government neither wants nor expects war with us in the foreseeable future'. Kennan was more direct in an assessment circulated to his senior colleagues on 25 January 1948. 'The Russians will not allow themselves under any circumstances to become embroiled in war with us as long as we have the atomic bomb and they do not', he wrote.59 The Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) estimated that the Russians would not manage to produce an atomic device until 1953 and would take even longer to develop an appropriate fleet of bombers to carry them. That the Russians produced their first atomic weapon in 1949 demonstrates how little American intelligence gathering had managed to penetrate the Soviet scientific establishment. This was why the announcement of a Russian exploratory explosion in September 1949 came as such a shock. But in early 1948 few questioned the estimate of the mid-1950s.60 The result was that Marshall and his
Department were complacent about the prospect of war in Europe and could therefore be more enthusiastic about promoting European unity than they might otherwise have felt able to be.

Three developments in early 1948 help to define still further the Truman Administration's overall view of Europe. These were, first, the visit of Count Richard Coudenhove-Kalergi to Washington; secondly, the Bulgarian-inspired idea of a Balkan federation; and, thirdly, the communist coup d'état in Prague. Although not of equal importance these episodes help to place American hopes about a united Europe in a wider strategic context than has been possible hitherto.

Coudenhove-Kalergi arrived in Washington in mid-February 1948. He was the founder and leader of the Pan-Europa movement based in Switzerland. His purpose, Marshall was advised by the U.S. legation in Berne, was to coordinate the Marshall Plan with a recently-launched 'Parliamentary Initiative for a United States of Europe'. He had visited the United States on a similar mission during the war when he tried to persuade Franklin D. Roosevelt to include a united Europe as an Allied war aim. In this the Count was unsuccessful. With the rhetoric of European union louder than ever since Winston Churchill's case for unity, Coudenhove-Kalergi no doubt rated the chances of success much greater in 1948. His Pan-Europa group was dedicated to the idea of persuading parliamentary assemblies to agree to federation and force the decision on the various governments. As an Austrian aristocrat, he probably had more instinctive sympathy for the principle of supranational cooperation than most. Marshall was told by the Berne Legation that as the Count embarked for the
transatlantic sea voyage he announced dramatically: '1948 is the birth year of the United States of Europe'.

Coudenhove-Kalergi had no official status. He was a self-financed individual who had espoused the European unity idea since the 1920s. Nevertheless, his visit was taken sufficiently seriously in Washington for arrangements to be made for a brief meeting with George Marshall. As Hickerson advised Charles E. Bohlen, the Counselor at the State Department, 'If he does not see the Secretary for a few minutes it might indicate that we have less interest in sponsoring a European federation than is the case'. The meeting duly took place and the Austrian recalled in his memoirs that his 'proposals fell everywhere on fertile ground'. He reported that Truman and Marshall personally assured him of their support. He took these assurances seriously, not considering that perhaps they were merely being diplomatically polite. As a consequence he placed far more importance on the meetings than they did. It is evident from the State Department records that a number of senior officials were not impressed with him.

The obvious discrepancy between Coudenhove-Kalergi's recollection and the contemporary records can be overstated, however. It led one historian, Lawrence S. Kaplan, to suggest that European unity was an issue which did not animate policy-makers in Washington during this period. There are four reasons for challenging this interpretation. First, the flood of incoming work and visiting dignitaries at the Department inevitably meant that an individual with no national accreditation would only be spared a short time. No particular importance should be given to that as a result. Secondly, the pressure of events
made the concept of European unity something of an intellectual retreat, an objective to be striven for but not at the forefront of day-to-day discussion with every visitor. Thirdly, Marshall's chosen diplomatic approach was to avoid giving the impression of America seeming to meddle in the internal affairs of the West Europeans. As he told the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, to do otherwise would be counterproductive. Finally, Coudenhove-Kalergi represented parliamentarians, who for the most part were in opposition to the party in power, and not governments. Marshall had thus a variety of reasons for being polite and leaving it at that. Kaplan is certainly correct to suggest that the Austrian was regarded as something of a crank. So was Clarence K. Streit, the apostle of Atlantic federalism. But the ideas of both were no more than extensions of the views of Kennan and Hickerson respectively.

Marshall noted that Coudenhove-Kalergi's ideas 'have always been in advance of governmental thinking' and that his efforts had aroused 'considerable interest'. He also noted that Pan-Europa were 'unquestionably furthering in Europe a popular psychology favorable to such steps as may be practical for the close association of the free nations of Europe'. Hickerson added that Pan-Europa had gained a new significance following Bevin's Western Union speech. Bohlen advised Marshall that by receiving the Count the United States would be seen to do more than give lip service to the whole idea'. Nevertheless, Marshall's self-imposed constraints meant that he could not go as far as Governor Thomas Dewey did during a Lincoln's Day Dinner, at which he was joint guest of honour with Coudenhove-Kalergi. Dewey welcomed the Austrian's 'inspiring message urging
European unity' and suggested that 'the Marshall Plan should become a powerful instrument in the formation of a United States of Europe'.\(^{68}\) Dewey, the runaway favourite for the Republican presidential nomination later in 1948, had the freedom to articulate what the Democrats could only speak about in private. Moreover, he served notice that in the coming presidential election the unity of Europe would be one issue – the only one on foreign affairs – where Republicans felt confident to attack Truman's record. This was subsequently to cause problems in the North Atlantic Treaty negotiations.

There was another strand in Count Coudenhove-Kalergi's proposals which were of more than passing interest to some in the State Department. This was the question of Eastern Europe. The essence of his Pan-Europa movement's argument was that a federal Europe should stretch from Portugal to Poland. John Hickerson said in March 1948: 'The United States hopes to see the eventual development of a United States of Western Europe (possibly later of all Europe) and the Brussels Pact offers the hard core for such a development.\(^{69}\) On this Hickerson found agreement in George Kennan. Believing that any West European union should be drawn up so as to allow the countries of Central and Eastern Europe to join, Kennan argued the case forcibly. 'Any concept which did not offer a place for Eastern European states', he wrote, 'meant leaving them...no theoretical alternative other than a continued association with Russia or some highly implausible neutralization and isolation'.\(^{70}\)

Unlikely though these ideas seem with hindsight, there were activities in January and February 1948 in the Eastern bloc which gave them a
certain - if transitory-substance. State Department interest in these dates from June 1947 when the idea of a Balkan Federation began to be examined. Kennan advised Lovett then that the establishment of such a federation would be greatly to America's advantage in that it would challenge the hegemony of the Soviet Union in that region. He pointed out that this objective was in keeping with overall objectives: 'The US has consistently believed in the free association of states for the solution of common problems'. He suggested the Rio Treaty and Article 52 of the UN Charter as useful precedents. 71

Thereafter, the State Department monitored developments closely. On 27 November 1947, Yugoslavia and Bulgaria signed a Treaty of Friendship, Cooperation and Mutual Assistance. The leaders of both countries, Marshall Tito and Prime Minister Gheorghi Dimitrov, indicated that this was the forerunner to a federation. On 17 January 1948, Dimitrov went further by announcing that he envisaged a federation encompassing Albania, Bulgaria, Romania, Hungary, Poland, Czechoslovakia, Greece and Yugoslavia. The American ambassador in Moscow, Walter Bedell Smith, advised Marshall that this was communist heresy and amounted to direct defiance of the Kremlin. Smith advised Marshall that he doubted whether Stalin 'would ever trust even the most subservient henchman to organize a Baltic to Algean Federation' as proposed by Bulgaria. On 28 January 1948, Pravda issued a strongly-worded editorial rebuke, and Dimitrov publicly and immediately recanted. 72

In itself the Dimitrov initiative was not important but it did have the effect of confirming the anti-communist element in the idea of a
united Western Europe. It therefore encouraged Marshall to accept the division of Europe as a fact. He told the Cabinet that, for example, Czechoslovakia had achieved 'the outer appearances of freedom' and 'developed a political movement proceeding in the opposite direction to that laid down by Moscow. He was certain that these semblances of freedom would disappear very quickly. His Cabinet colleagues were advised that the Kremlin considered Czechoslovakia as the point of entry 'of really democratic forces into Eastern Europe'. For that reason the Russians would oppose a federation among their East European satrapies even more energetically than they had communist involvement in the Marshall Plan. The U.S. Secretary of State was only weeks early in his prediction but he made it clear that he regarded any Soviet move against the Czechs as 'purely defensive'.

Marshall had, in effect, accepted the argument implicit in Winston Churchill's 'Iron Curtain' speech at Fulton, Missouri almost exactly two years before. When Churchill drew a line 'from Stettin on the Baltic to Trieste on the Adriatic' he acknowledged that countries which lay to the east, Czechoslovakia among them, were subject to 'a very high and increasing measure of control from Moscow'.

Marshall acted on the presumption that, as Churchill had argued, the Soviet Union had legitimate security interests in Eastern Europe, to tamper with which would be profoundly destabilising. Thus before the coup d'etat in Prague he had developed a set of attitudes which would lead him to do nothing about events in Czechoslovakia, other than to complain loudly. He certainly did not think in terms of military intervention. Naturally there were those who did but they
had no influence on the higher management of foreign policy. For example, David Lilienthal of the Atomic Energy Commission told his friend Dean Acheson that he thought the fate of Czechoslovakia 'would be like the sinking of the Maine' in 1898. It would arouse the country to action, 'particularly since our people thought we had enough atomic bombs to win a war very cheaply and quickly'.

That was not the mood of the Truman Administration on the eve of the coup in Prague. It was more concerned about what might happen in Eastern Europe if plans went ahead for the consolidation of Western Europe as a political entity. Marshall asked the Chief of the Division of Eastern European Affairs, Francis B. Stevens, to assess the significance of the Dimitrov's proposal and the Pravda rebuke in the light of the Western Union idea. He was advised:

> If decisive steps toward significant integration in Western Europe are taken, this Government should be prepared for sudden and perhaps surprising developments in Eastern Europe...'

It is clear therefore, that the Department not only recognised that something like the Prague coup was imminent but also understood that the establishment of a West European union as a potential 'third force' would hasten such a development. Whether or not the Kremlin was much exercised by the prospect of union in Western Europe can only be guessed at. But the fact that the State Department considered the future in these terms underlines once again the centrality of West European unity in Departmental deliberations.
What does not seem to have been realised by those proponents of eventually extending a West European federation eastwards, was that their ideas were internally inconsistent. George Kennan pointed to the problems in his autobiography. For example it was difficult to see how Hickerson could advise Marshall that a West European federation would accentuate the east-west divide, and might even 'speed up the timetable...for the absorption of the satellites' in Eastern Europe, while at the same time suggesting that such a federation would one day include the Soviet satellites. However, that view was conditioned by hindsight. At the time, Kennan seized upon the idea of a Balkan Federation, recanted by Dimitrov but not by Tito, as the means to promote a communist but anti-Stalin and anti-Russian revolt in Eastern Europe.

Kennan summed up the views of one half of the U.S. foreign service establishment about Europe's future in February 1948. In a major survey of American foreign policy he wrote:

If there is no real European federation and if Germany is restored as a strong and independent country, we must expect another attempt at German domination. If there is no real European federation and if Germany is not restored as a strong and independent country, we invite Russian domination, for an unorganized Western Europe cannot indefinitely oppose an organized Eastern Europe. The only reasonably hopeful possibility is some form of federation in Western and central Europe.

This is probably the purest expression of latent neo-isolationist attitudes in the State Department at the time. He rejected as of no further use the 'old fashioned concepts of collective security'
which arose out of 'multilateral defensive alliances between complete sovereign nations'. Because Stalin did not threaten a military take-over anywhere in Western Europe, Kennan felt sure that the Soviet leader was ready to offer a straightforward spheres-of-influence agreement. When this came, Kennan argued, it would be a great test of American statesmanship.

In the light of developments leading to the formation of NATO, Kennan's views are of considerable interest. They mark the distance which some at least in the State Department had to cover if they were to accept the notion of a multinational transatlantic collective security arrangement. Kennan was to be proved wrong about Stalin: the offer of a spheres-of-influence agreement never came. And, in company with almost everyone else, he failed to realise that only a divided Germany held the seeds of lasting stability of a kind acceptable to the two superpowers. However, while his influence was not in the event to prove decisive, his voice still carried considerable weight. His arguments were the ones with which both Hickerson's Division and the West Europeans seeking a transatlantic pact had to deal in the coming months. He set the standard against which his opponents were measured. Writing the day before the communist takeover in Czechoslovakia, Kennan urged Marshall to refuse a spheres-of-influence arrangement with the Soviet Union. But, he went on, the United States could demonstrate to Stalin that two developments were in the Russian interest. The first was the reduction of communist pressures in Europe and the Middle East 'to a point where we can withdraw all our armed forces from the Continent and the Mediterranean'. The second was 'to acquiesce thereafter in a prolonged period of stability'.
Kennan gave eloquent expression to the instincts of many U.S. foreign policy makers that the United States should shed responsibilities, not take on new ones. That had been the substance of Hickerson's point, too, when he said the United States wished to see the emergence of a new Europe able to say 'no' to both America and Russia. The problem with this otherwise intellectually coherent point of view was that it did not take account of political realities. Throughout January and February, Britain, France and the Benelux countries had demonstrated time and again that they did not wish to be in a position to say 'no' to Washington. They wanted — and actually pursued — a policy of entangling the United States in their security affairs. As was to become clear later a major reason for this was the fear that the arguments of Kennan might become the basis for American foreign policy. To the Europeans, his ideas were the beginnings of a world condominium between the Soviet Union and the United States. In such circumstances the views and interests of the once-great Europeans would be largely ignored. From a European perspective that fear was as important as that of Soviet hegemony in creating conditions in which the Atlantic Pact could be fashioned.

Events in Prague on 25 February 1948 provided the opportunity for the West Europeans to redouble their efforts. Having accepted that the Soviets were due to make a move of this sort, the reaction of Marshall was much more mild than that of his European counterparts. However, he did issue jointly with Bevin and Bidault a declaration condemning 'the establishment of a disguised dictatorship'. 82
Bevin was evidently determined that matters should not rest there, with the United States apparently shrugging its shoulders at the inevitable. On 26 February 1948 he called the American Ambassador, Lewis Douglas, to the Foreign office. Bevin suggested — on a personal basis and without cabinet approval — that

...there should be held, very privately, either in Washington or at some point in Europe, conversations between the U.K., France, Italy and the Benelux countries for the purpose of exploring what steps all may take collectively, or in groups, to prevent the extension of the area of dictatorship.

Bevin said he preferred Washington as the site for the talks. Douglas commented to Marshall, in a cable recording the substance of the meeting, that he 'could not determine whether Bevin made this suggestion as a slanting effort to entangle us at the moment in European quasi-military agreements'. Ironically, Douglas said he doubted that this was the case when it is evident that this was precisely what Bevin had in mind. The historian John Baylis has rightly called into question the notion that Bevin 'charted a deliberate, consistent and foresighted cause from the end of the war to the signing of the North Atlantic Pact'. But from late February 1948 onward Bevin's behaviour, as documented by the State Department, shows just what kind of consistency. Having been refused an Anglo-American military alliance, he now changed his approach to one which included Western Europe as a whole in the hope that this would secure Marshall's backing where previous initiatives had failed. In addition, he began much more noticeably to bang the anti-communist drum, thereby hoping to capitalise on the fears aroused by the Czech crisis in the United States.
In the event, Marshall did nothing but revert to his 'wait and see' policy. On 27 February, he instructed the Embassy in Paris to inform Bidault: 'We should not be asked to consider associating ourselves with [the Western Union] until the picture of what Western European Gvts themselves are going to do about it is much clearer'. He added, 'Recovery and security are obviously related'. These observations were in answer to remarks made by the French Foreign Minister to Ambassador Caffery. France was reportedly

...more than willing to sign a secret military alliance with concrete promises on all sides for immediate action in any eventuality with Great Britain and the Benelux countries if the United States is associated in some form with them.

What France did not want was a high-rounding treaty 'with nothing affective behind it'. On 2 March, when the Czech crisis had eased somewhat, Bidault followed this up when he told the Americans that more than anything else, he wanted 'a concrete military alliance (against Soviet attack) with definite promises to do definite things under certain circumstances'. Two days later, perhaps sensing that Marshall would be of little help, he asked that a message be conveyed to President Truman personally. In it he referred to the beneficial effects of economic aid from the United States and said that the time had come 'to apply similar efforts in the political and military fields as well'. He called for an immediate, top secret meeting of French, British and American officials to discuss the matter further.
Despite these pleas, and those like them from the British, Marshall remained aloof, refusing to commit the United States to the military security of Western Europe other than in maintaining occupation forces in Germany. In the context of NATO's origins he was clearly unsuccessful. But in the context of American hopes about a united Western Europe, his policy at least appeared to pay off almost immediately. By refusing to give any form of American guarantee, Marshall ensured that the West Europeans would take definite steps to turn Bevin's Western Union idea into reality. On 29 February, representatives from the Benelux nations met in Brussels: on 4 March they were joined by the British and French — after Marshall had formally rejected Bidault's first request. They discussed a draft treaty, prepared by Henri Spaak of Belgium. It was based, as Marshall and his Department had hoped, on Articles 51 and 52 and the Rio Treaty. Spaak thanked the U.S. Charge d'Affairs in Brussels, Hugh Millard, saying that American influence had 'done the trick' in persuading the British and French to abandon the Dunkirk Treaty formula. In response, Millard told Spaak that the Department was well pleased with the direction the talks were taking.  

However, there were those in the State Department who knew already that what was to become the Brussels Treaty would be insufficient. On 8 March 1947, a week before the treaty was signed and published, Hickerson advised Marshall: 'A general stiffening of morale in free Europe is needed, and it can only come from action by this country'. Hickerson, as he was to do many times in the coming months, was faithfully reflecting European anxieties. Reasonably or otherwise those worries were, at bottom, military ones. The Dutch Ambassador to Washington, Eelco van Kleffens, made the point for all when he
saw frankly that 'the military features of the draft treaty did not mean a great deal unless backed, in some form or another, by the United States'. Hickerson argued that the Czechs collapsed easily because they had no assurance of external support against fifth columnists or outside forces. The Czech model might be followed in France or Italy if the United States continued to do nothing. He recognised that 'the state of United States defences severely limits our immediate military capabilities'. But he urged Marshall that at the very least the Americans ought to examine seriously 'the magnitude and nature of the military commitments this Government is in a position to assume with respect to Europe'. For Hickerson, this meant active participation in what he called a 'North Atlantic-Mediterranean regional defence arrangement based on Articles 51 and 52 of the United Nations Charter'.

Significantly, at the very moment these points were being fed to Marshall, Kennan was absent from the Department on a special assignment to Tokyo. Up until then Hickerson's views had always been balanced by those of the Policy Planning Staff. Marshall had incorporated the views of both as a result. For the next few weeks he was given an unrelieved diet of advice from the Division of European Affairs advocating a formal transatlantic partnership. At the same time the Secretary of State was being informed by the Department's monitors of public opinion and the press and radio that support was growing in the United States for a more active and committed foreign policy. This, Marshall was told, followed directly the recent events in Czechoslovakia. On 11 March, he advised the Embassy in Rome:

'We believe US public opinion now prepared to support strong measures'
and even hinted that Western Union would get American backing if the results of the Brussels talks were seen to be satisfactory.\textsuperscript{92}

It is no exaggeration to say that the combined effect of Kennan's temporary absence and the movement in American public opinion was the North Atlantic Treaty. Both developments increased the receptiveness of the State Department to the West European arguments. These proliferated in the days after the communist takeover in Prague. On 11 March, Inverchapel handed to Marshall an \emph{aide-mémoire} by Bevin in which was the news that Norway was about to be approached by the Soviet Union with a demand to conclude a treaty of mutual assistance. Bevin wrote strongly of the need to prevent 'the collapse of the whole Scandinavian system and the chance of calling any halt to the relentless advances of Russia into Western Europe'. He identified two serious and imminent threats: first, 'the strategic threat involving the extension of the Russian influence to the Atlantic'; and, secondly, 'the political threat to destroy all efforts to build up a Western Union'.\textsuperscript{93}

Marshall's response was immediate. He wrote to Inverchapel: 'Please inform Mr. Bevin that in accordance with your \emph{aide-mémoire} of March 11, 1948, we are prepared to proceed at once in the joint discussions on the establishment of an Atlantic security system'. The Defense Secretary, James Forrestal was advised the same day. President Truman personally approved Marshall's reply.\textsuperscript{94} It must have seemed that an Atlantic Pact was just around the corner but, as events unfolded, almost everyone was to be disappointed in the immediate outcome.
The promptness of Marshall's response suggests the conclusions to be drawn from the events - and the varying official reactions to them - of January and February 1948. Marshall's reply to Bevin did not constitute an American commitment to anything other than diplomatic discussion in secret. But it does mark an important moment in the evolution of U.S. attitudes toward closer political and military ties with Western Europe.

The most significant feature of those two months for this interpretation of NATO's origins is that the American belief in the efficacy of a united Western Europe, which dated from 1947, was now fused with the European apprehension about Soviet expansionism, overt or covert, in Europe. The anti-communist strand in the European integration idea was always present in American thinking but only as one among many. Now the two factors were given equal weight. Bevin's success in getting Marshall's agreement in principle to help create an Atlantic security system stems directly from this. Wittingly or otherwise, he had managed to balance American hopes and fears perfectly. This he did by pointing out that the Soviet threat posed a direct challenge to his Western Union proposal. Given the American hopes which were invested in that proposal - 'the hard core' of a United States of Western Europe - it is not surprising that Marshall acted with alacrity on 11 March whereas for the previous three months he had done practically nothing in that direction.

This was no knee-jerk reaction to the communist threat. Rather it was a reluctant agreement to participate in transatlantic discussions
primarily with a view to calming European fears which Marshall felt were greatly exaggerated. However, having agreed to talk, the most basic American instinct was to limit the damage which such discussions might do to the United States' freedom of manoeuvre and already overstretched military commitments. In contrast, the West Europeans wanted to restrict that freedom and to try and get changes in America's military priorities. Thus as the talks were about to begin, there was no 'community of interests', acknowledged and acted upon by all. It was a curious beginning to an alliance whose most salient characteristic in retrospect is its longevity.

The argument of this chapter has three elements. The first is that the West Europeans collectively had considerable influence on the deliberations of the State Department, following the collapse of the London CFM and Bevin's Western Union announcement. This, in conjunction with the West European response to events in Czechoslovakia, impelled Marshall to make some gesture indicating the United States' continuing concern for Western Europe. The gesture he chose was a non-committal agreement to dismiss the idea of an 'Atlantic security system'.

The second element is the internal debate within the State Department about where American interests lay over the long-term. While no senior official dissented from the need to foster unity in Europe, the issue in dispute was the method of going about this. Those concerned with the daily management of relations with the Europeans saw no contradiction between West European integration, or unity, and the formation of a
specifically-designed, Atlantic security system. Those charged with the development of a unified and coherent foreign policy - principally the Policy Planning Staff - wanted the establishment of a Western Europe that was economically, politically and militarily self-reliant.

The final element in the chapter is Marshall's diplomatic style. He had determined - certainly by January 1948 - that any attempt to browbeat the West Europeans would be counterproductive. He settled on a method of executing policy by what amounted to a system of rewards: the United States would only help those who helped themselves. He could have decided to offer inducements or incentives; but such a policy would, in his phrase, have taken the heat off, thus reducing the chances of the West Europeans overcoming what Americans regarded as a myopic dependence on the preservation of sovereignty. In the case of the Prague coup, he waited for the West European reaction. When that took the form of the Brussels Treaty, he 'rewarded' them by agreeing to talk about their security in a wider setting. It was a diplomatic style which acknowledged that the West Europeans had influence in Washington, but which nonetheless avoided the pitfalls of following the prescriptions of either Hickerson or Kennan, both of which involved the foreclosing of options. It was a policy created by the need to bring internal American inhibitions into balance with West European constraints on policy.
DOMESTIC INHIBITIONS AND WEST EUROPEAN PROBLEMS:
CONSTRAINTS ON POLICY

George C. Marshall's acceptance on 12 March 1948 of the idea of 'an Atlantic security system' marks an undeniably important moment in the history of NATO's formation. Without it there could be no formally constituted Atlantic Alliance of the kind which emerged in the 1950s. However, the significance of Marshall's acceptance - and all that it might imply for American foreign policy - should not be overstressed. No policy decision had been taken other than to concede to the West Europeans that the United States was prepared to talk about holding talks. No extra commitments were undertaken. To suggest that something like the North Atlantic Treaty was just around the corner would be to disregard the gist of the now-available documentary evidence. It would also be to fall into the post hoc, ergo propter hoc trap. The question of 'when' an Atlantic Pact could be created was not yet on the American diplomatic agenda, and certainly not in Marshall's eyes. For him it was still a question of 'whether' such a pact was necessary.

Although Marshall had spent January and February telling West Europeans generally, and Ernest Bevin in particular, that the United States was unclear about what was being asked of it, he could not have failed to grasp the essence of the Europeans' demands. His message of 12 March 1948 implicitly acknowledged their substance. But, even with President
Truman's limited backing, Marshall knew that his room for manoeuvre was largely determined by both Congressional opinion and U.S. public opinion. The Senate debate on the Marshall Plan opened in the first week of March. Few doubted that the Senators would approve and that Congressmen would vote the money but there was concern that the decision should not be seen as a grudging one. Had the votes been close then the Europeans would not have been given that injection of confidence that virtually everyone said was necessary. The State Department had already used the fear of a Congressional rejection of ERP as a weapon with which to blunt European requests for military assistance in addition to economic aid. But that same fear was also a constraint on the makers of U.S. foreign policy: their professional perceptions of what might be necessary or desirable were not the sole or decisive determinants of what the United States could or should do in the international arena.

The aim of this chapter is to add to the points made in the previous one and so establish the full range of pressures on U.S. foreign policy-makers during March and April 1948. As there were both internal inhibitions and external constraints, the argument has two parts. The first concerns the domestic setting: trends in public opinion as monitored by the State Department and the way in which Congress impinged on Departmental thinking and vice versa. The second concerns the way in which developments in France, Britain, Italy and Germany made it increasingly difficult for Marshall and Lovett to leave unexamined the policy which they had decided upon during January and February.

* * *
Marshall had good reason to assert on 11 March 1948 that U.S. public opinion was prepared 'to support strong measures' vis-à-vis the West Europeans. On the same day, the Division of Public Studies produced a review of popular opinion on current European developments. The author of the report concluded: 'The feeling has grown that US economic assistance, exemplified in the Marshall Plan, is not enough to contain expanding Communism and that further political and military measures are essential'.

The report was prepared, like all others which succeeded it until the mid-1950s, under the supervision of S. Shepard Jones, Director of the Division of Public Studies within the Office of Public Affairs at the State Department. It was his responsibility to monitor shifts of popular attitudes and the essential elements of arguments deployed for or against a particular policy by newspapermen and radio journalists. Beginning in March he inaugurated a series of studies of reaction to events in Western (as well as Eastern) Europe which went beyond the previous rather rudimentary and less detailed analyses which had characterised the output of his Division during 1947. The reviews were circulated widely throughout the State Department. All of them were based on what Jones described as 'a large amount of articulate discussion including representative and influential newspapers, radio commentators and Congressional spokesmen'.

Taken together they constitute a useful digest of shades of opinion, informed or otherwise, and therefore help to define the domestic context in which the policy-makers had to operate. That is the way they will be used in this thesis: circumstantial evidence apart, their widespread and regular distribution makes it impossible to say whether, at a given moment, a particular report was influential in swinging a policy
decision one way or another. What they do permit is a convenient guide to the strength of feeling on those issues which are relevant to the American contribution to the formation of the Atlantic Alliance.

Jones noted that a series of events had combined in the first two weeks in March 1948 'to produce significant trends among American opinion'. These included the coup in Czechoslovakia, the signing of the Soviet-Finnish mutual assistance treaty, reports of substantial communist strength in Italy prior to the general election to be held there in April, and the opening of the Senate debate on the Marshall Plan. All had served, argued Jones, 'to intensify the conviction that aggressive communism will expand in Europe unless confronted by superior force, material and political'. However, he also wrote: 'much of the discussion on the European situation, while somber and urgent in tone, does not focus sharply on specific policies or measures which might be taken by the United States.' 3 This lack of specificity may have reflected the Truman Administration's lack of public leadership on the issue in other than rhetorical terms. But it was reinforced by the way in which editorial writers, columnists and Congressmen concentrated on the question of West European unity. For them it was not the United States which was required to take remedial action: that was the business of the Europeans.

This was the reason, Jones explained in his analysis, why 'the strongest note' emerging from the public discussion was that speedy enactment of ERP was the most valuable step the United States could take to strengthen Western Europe. 4 George F. Kennan's account of the same two weeks includes references to 'a real war scare' and his accusation that the Washington community over-reacted 'in the most deplorable way'
to events in Eastern Europe. This may have been true in certain military circles but there is little evidence of such behaviour in the State Department.

The central thrust of Marshall's policy towards Western Europe was scarcely altered by what had happened in Prague. This is clear from a telegram sent by Robert A. Lovett to Robert D. Murphy, political advisor to U.S. Military Governor in Germany. On 6 March Lovett cabled:

> Purpose and scope ERP and CEEC are far beyond trade relationships. Economic cooperation sought under ERP, and of which CEEC is vehicle, has as ultimate objective closer integration of Western Europe. In this way it is a correlative of and parallel to the political and security arrangements sought under Bevin's proposal for Western Union.

Summarising public discussion on these themes, Jones noticed that in the press and the Senate there was the same presumption that the Marshall Plan and the Western Union were designed for similar ends. What he called 'an impressive array' of newspapers, commentators and Congressmen, revealed 'very wide approval of the efforts by the West European powers to plan greater political and military unity'. Reporting the Senate debate on the ERP, he observed that 'strong support for indicating, in some way, U.S. support of European political unity was evident'.

On the issue of European integration the Truman Administration was thus close to popular sentiment. The consensus which had developed during 1947 continued to hold. Nobody, it seems, questioned whether a united Western Europe was as self-evidently in America's interest as generally implied. But on the particular issue of West European
defence there was less agreement. Jones reviewed the variety of opinion among press commentators and it is apparent from his summary that there were three distinct positions.8

The first was opposed to the idea of any American involvement on a variety of grounds. The Portland Oregonian encapsulated the views of this group in an editorial which declared that no West European alliance could be effective without a guarantee of U.S. support, which it believed was 'improbable to the point of being fantastic'. Nor was this view confined to the far north west: it was shared by, for example, the Des Moines Register, the Baltimore Sun and the Wall Street Journal. The Chicago Daily News put a particularly bleak construction on events. American efforts to stop communism, they warned, were only 'weakening ourselves'; 'we can't go on for ever pouring billions into a cold war that is not costing the Soviet Union a kopek'. The second set of views was rather more optimistic but less precise. Newspapers such as the Milwaukee Journal and the Toledo Blade declared that only a determined union of all democratic forces could effectively contain Soviet expansionism. They therefore left the matter of American participation - of what kind and to what degree - unexplored. However, of this group the Charlottesville Observer conceded that if it were known that any aggression in Europe would encounter direct resistance by the United States, 'it is very likely that the aggression will never be launched'.

The first and second groups were overshadowed by the third. This comprised substantial numbers of newspapers and columnists who urged prompt and vigorous action by the U.S. Government. Furthermore, this group advocated that an explicitly military commitment be undertaken. Some urged that the United States make a binding military guarantee to
a West European union along the lines apparently proposed by Bevin. Others called for a collective commitment under the Charter of the United Nations as the only viable and effective way of halting the 'red menace'. And others made less sweeping suggestions: for example, to make a public declaration, agreed by both Republicans and Democrats, that the United States will defend France and Italy. All, in short, agreed that Americans had no choice but to use their political and military potential to prevent further Soviet encroachments. Those holding these views represented the majority of American 'quality' newspapers and journalists: the New York Times, the Washington Post, the Washington Star, the Christian Science Monitor, the St. Louis Post-Dispatch, the San Francisco Chronicle, Time, Life, Sumner Welles, Marquis Childs, James Reston, Elmer Davis, Edgar Ansel Mowrer, Hanson Baldwin, Joseph and Stewart Alsop, to name only the most prominent.

The composition of informed opinion across the United States had three implications which were not immediately apparent but which, with hindsight, can be seen to have been an important element in the development of transatlantic relations during 1948. The first is that U.S. policy-makers were getting the same message from the most important segments of American journalism and from West European Governments. Dissenting views were expressed in the United States during early March but these did not represent a serious political or intellectual challenge to the case being put by the majority of commentators. There was, for example, no public counterpart to the kinds of view expressed by the Policy Planning Staff within the confines of State Department counsels. There was thus no serious debate about the appropriate course to follow. The second implication of the structure of opinion is that the majority view represented a convenient
platform on which to build future support for such action as the Administration might decide to take. Informed opinion — and, by extension, U.S. public opinion generally — was both a potential constraint on policy and something which the Hickerson faction could draw on during the months ahead. That this would be an important factor was recognised by the British: the Embassy in Washington reported in April that State and Defense Department personnel thought that careful leaks of information to the American press were valuable in preparing American public opinion for future developments. Finally, although the largest body of opinion appeared to endorse with varying degrees of enthusiasm the idea that the United States make a clear commitment to the West Europeans' security, that endorsement depended on the absence of discussion about the precise kind of commitment. There was therefore, plenty of scope for a debate to break out in the newspapers of a sort which might be prejudicial to arrangements made in secret between diplomats and other national representatives.

This last point was particularly relevant to the matter of European integration in an Atlantic context. That some form of West European unity should be the objective of American foreign policy was conceded by everyone from unreconstructed isolationists to the new internationalists. All lamented with Edgar Ansell Mowrer that 'no United States of Europe was yet in being'. Much less clear from the commentators was how the notion of an Atlantic security system could be reconciled with that objective. It was not until 1950 that Americans came to recognise that the formation of an Atlantic arrangement actually reduced the chances of changing what they regarded as the West Europeans' intractable desire to preserve an outworn system of sovereign states.
If West European security required an Atlantic framework then that was one more reason for the Europeans relegating Western Union in their priorities. Conversely, should the United States refuse to endorse an Atlantic system adequately then the Europeans would feel even more disheartened and thus retreat into parochial, national considerations, irrespective of what this might mean for their long-term peace and prosperity. But the United States did not notice this policy trap until the 1950s.

No such complications entered into the discussion on Capitol Hill about Western Europe's future economic, political and military structure. The opening days of the Senate debate on the Marshall Plan brought forth demands that the recovery programme be supplemented by political and military action by the United States to further West European security. In addition, some Senators demonstrated their determination to link the granting of aid to progress towards West European unity. Although this was a common feature of public discussion, and had already been incorporated into the Republican Party's political stock-in-trade for the coming Presidential election, this undermined the essence of Marshall's conception about the way to deal with the matter. In the event Congressional attempts to make West European unification an explicit objective of Marshall aid were defeated. But it needed some effort to do so and the episode served to remind senior State Department officials that the Congressional contribution to the formulation and operation of foreign policy could be either constructive or destructive. What events showed, from March to the passage of the Vandenberg Resolution, was that the usefulness of the Congress to the State Department was directly proportional to the extent to which elected representatives were taken into the
Department's confidence.

On 3 March 1948 Senator William Fulbright addressed his colleagues on the subject of European unity in precisely those terms which Marshall had warned against in January. The Secretary of State had told the Senate Foreign Relation Committee that the United States could not afford to risk the collapse of the economic aid programme by insisting that the recipients coalesced into a single unit. This, he suggested, would awaken hostility because of national pride and thereby jeopardise the very goal towards which he and his Department were working.\(^\text{11}\)

However, Fulbright proposed an amendment to the Foreign Relief Assistance Act, then being debated in the Senate as the first of four bills (covering each of the four years from 1948 to 1952) authorizing the Marshall Plan expenditures. He urged the Senate to write into the bill an unambiguous statement that the objective was the political unification of Western Europe. He quoted John Foster Dulles' testimony before the Committee that Europe must unite herself if she were to thrive and prosper.\(^\text{12}\) By doing this Fulbright underscored the point that there was a bipartisan agreement on foreign policy and that this extended to the question of West European unity. Despite this he eventually withdrew his amendment.

The significance of Fulbright's decision against pressing for a vote on his amendment is that it reveals the way in which Marshall managed to ensure that nothing in the legislative programme supporting Marshall aid would damage the operation of policy towards Western Europe, notwithstanding strong Congressional enthusiasm for pushing the Europeans in the direction of federal union.
Fulbright knew before he stood up to move the amendment that the State Department had already persuaded most of the Foreign Relations Committee members that moves of this kind would be counter-productive. During February, the Committee had wrestled with the problem of how to compel the West Europeans to honour the promises made in the Paris Report of 22 September 1947. In that report, European powers recognised that economic rehabilitation was not enough. As Fulbright said:

It is therefore implicit in the programme that at its end lies not only economic cooperation in the form of customs unions and the elimination of trade and economic barriers... but also closer political and cultural bonds. This need has already been stressed by British, French and other leaders.13

During hearings held in closed session, the Committee's chairman, Senator Arthur H. Vandenberg, made his views clear: 'They said they would try to do something. I don't see why we should not say to them, "Listen, Bud, this is what you promised to do".' He told the press afterwards that he 'shared all these hopes for European unification. I see little long-range hope except as there can be a consolidation which is substantially more than economic'. He expressed a nagging worry of others on the Committee when he observed: 'Suppose all of this interest in what Bevin calls the Western Union promptly subsides just as soon as they get their checks. Do we just ignore that?'.14

It was sentiments like this which the State Department wanted to exclude from ERP legislation. To that end the U.S. Ambassador in London, Lewis W. Douglas, was brought to Washington as the Department's principal witness during the executive sessions devoted to drafting the bill in mid-February. Although Committee members all had a
preference for what one of them described as giving 'a tremendous push to the idea of an integrated Europe', there were clear differences when it came to deciding upon method. It was these which Douglas was able to exploit and so limit the language to the line taken by Marshall and Lovett during January and February.

One side of the argument was put by Vandenberg, the Republican chairman, supported by two Democrats, Carl H. Hatch and Elbert D. Thomas. Vandenberg summarised their view:

Marshall said to them [the Europeans], 'You have to do something for yourselves'. They said, 'we are willing to try to do the following things'. Marshall said, 'All right, then we will help you'. All in the world we are saying is, 'In response to our invitation you said you would try to do the following things. We are just reminding you as a condition precedent to the first check you get that you said you would try'.

The other side of the argument was put by Henry Cabot Lodge Jr., a Republican, and Walter F. George, a Democrat. They dismissed the notion of inserting words to that effect as being two-edged. One of the points under discussion was the free movement of peoples in Western Europe should be permitted reflecting the supranational character of ERP. It was suggested that there was a distinct possibility that were the United States to insist on this as part of the evidence for integrationist moves, the Americans would find themselves vulnerable to European demands for the free movement of peoples across the Atlantic. Lodge said the United States could not take the attitude: 'You are not going to get a dollar until you get a certain amount of integration'. He also said: 'All we can hope to do...is to make them realize that we hope to God they are going to integrate.'
This internal disagreement in the Committee meant that Douglas had the opportunity of appearing to play the honest broker, and then determine the final form of words to be used. He succeeded in heading off Vandenberg's intention to see moves toward unity precede the granting of aid. At the same time he was able to persuade the others that this did not mean leaving everything to chance. The trick was to include both points. The final version of the bill read, in part:

The provision of assistance under this Act results from the multilateral pledges of the participating countries to use all their efforts to accomplish a joint recovery program based upon self-help and mutual cooperation...and is contingent upon continuous effort of the participating countries to accomplish a joint recovery program through multi-lateral undertakings and the establishment of a continuing organization for this purpose.\(^8\)

Put in this way the implicit threat to refuse the next tranche of aid if progress was not satisfactory became muted. The State Department accepted that this was the minimum which the Senators would agree to; and it was sufficient for the members of the Committee to recommend the legislation to Congress unanimously.

Fulbright's attempt to shape policy was thus not completely doomed from the start. His amendment called specifically for a statement to the effect that the United States was interested in not only sustained economic cooperation among the recipients of aid but also their 'political unification'. But that was merely to rehearse the arguments about imposing a 'condition precedent' which had been settled already in committee. He had no choice but to withdraw his amendment. Nevertheless, his intervention in the debate was important because he, like Vandenberg, was close to Congressional
instincts on this matter. He had followed through on his earlier co-sponsorship in 1947 of the joint resolution calling for the creation of a 'United States of Europe', which had been widely applauded. His arguments in debate were well made and relevant. He pointed out what the CEEC countries had apparently promised to do was the least that Americans could reasonably expect. Adding an historical argument, he reminded his audience that before 1914, Europe had been prosperous. This had not prevented war then and would not do so again: 'I do not believe that the relatively small, independent political sovereignties of Europe, as they now exist, can, under modern political and economic conditions, maintain their independence for long.'

From the perspective of the policy managers in the State Department the outcome was satisfactory. Although Fulbright was not apparently in collusion with officials, his remarks in the Senate served as a useful reminder to West European Governments yet did not constitute direct pressure. And Ambassador Douglas had succeeded in putting into the language of an American statute the phrase 'self-help and mutual cooperation'. It was a formula that was subsequently to be regarded by Washington as the heart of the Vandenberg Resolution and the North Atlantic Treaty. It represented the standard by which Americans would judge European contributions to the defence of the Atlantic area once NATO had taken shape.

The 'self-help and mutual aid' formula had two main virtues for the executive and legislative branches of the government. The first was that it neatly expressed that strong current of opinion which had been running in the country ever since John Foster Dulles made
his seminal speech on West European unity in January 1943. The free
nations of Europe were not to be allowed to lean on Uncle Sam and the
best way for them to become self-reliant was to persuade them to
cooperate as closely as possible. In the short-term Americans under-
stood that to mean economic integration: over the longer run it meant
political unity as well. The second advantage was that the phrase
'self-help and mutual aid' did not go beyond the guidelines for
policy towards the Europeans, set by Marshall during February and
March. It did not refer directly to the general U.S. desire to see
unity in Western Europe so as to restrict America's peacetime commit-
ments to a few years only. But it did imply all of that. Incorporated
into the North Atlantic Treaty it carried the same connotation - for
Americans - but with the admixture of military considerations. As
became apparent later, Marshall and Lovett had no thought of subsuming
the Western Union beneath a larger 'Atlantic security system' when
they agreed to talk about additional U.S. military assistance to
Europe. The Western Union was not to be neglected. Rather, it was
seen as the embodiment of 'self-help and mutual aid': it was to be the
permanent feature, an Atlantic security system a temporary expedient.

However, contributions by Congress to the formation of U.S. policy
position during March regarding Western Europe did not end with the
'self-help' formula. It went some way towards resolving a disagreement
which had broken out within the State Department and which spread to
the Bureau of the Budget and the President's Committee on Foreign Aid.

The row first broke out between Marshall and Lovett on the one hand,
and Hickerson and Kennan on the other. The issue was the role of the
American foreign service. Marshall's 'hands off' policy towards the
Europeans effectively meant that he intended to de-emphasise the usual reliance on diplomatic exchange and entrust American interests to the administrative body to be set up by the CEEC, the Organisation for European Economic Cooperation (OEEC). Consciously or otherwise, he had accepted the method of bringing about West European unity espoused by Jean Monnet, the French civil servant often described as 'the father of Europe'. (Marshall may in fact have absorbed Monnet's ideas through John Foster Dulles, who was a long-standing personal friend of both Marshall and the Frenchman). It was Monnet's idea that European integration would never come about by appealing to elected national assemblies. Governments would be persuaded to move in that direction when it was proved to them that it was in their interests to do so. That proof, Monnet thought, could only be provided by the successful operation of supranational administrative arrangements. This was the essence of the future Schuman Plan, which Monnet inspired, and the proposal to establish a European Defence Community in the early 1950s. Every action which Marshall took in 1948 suggests that he broadly accepted Monnet's methods as the ones most likely to succeed.

Hickerson and Kennan did not agree with this. In his memoirs, Kennan made the distinction on which their joint opposition was based. 'It is axiomatic in the world of diplomacy,' he wrote, 'that methodology and tactics assume an importance by no means inferior to concept and strategy'. All shared the same concept and strategy: American security was best served if Europe became self-reliant. The differences arose over method and tactics. Hickerson's Division of European Affairs made its position clear in January 1948. West Europeans could be helped in three ways: by attending conferences
specially arranged for the purpose; by participating in the work of such bodies as the CEEC; and through the normal diplomatic channels. Conferences were dismissed as rarely productive, standing bodies as unpredictable. That left diplomacy as the best chance of encouraging political cooperation, minimising friction and securing 'a common front on a maximum of issues'.

Kennan took the same line but expressed it differently. He complained that Marshall's method meant that the recovery programme was being managed as 'a technical business operation and not as a political matter'. This would 'reduce drastically' the programme's potential political effect. He was particularly critical of leaving things to outside agencies:

> Our experience with ad hoc wartime and post-hostilities agencies operating in the foreign field has demonstrated that not only are new agencies of little value in executing policies which go beyond the vision and educational horizon of their own personnel, but that they actually develop a momentum of their own which, in the final analysis, tends to shape - rather than serve - the national policy.

He added that once the ERP bill was passed 'the matter will be largely out of our hands'. The planned operation of the Marshall Plan would make it difficult for the Department of State to conduct 'any incisive and vigorous policy with relation to Europe'. This, he warned, 'thrusts this Department back - with respect to one great area of the world's surface - into the position it occupied in many instances during the recent war:- the position of an advisory, rather than an executive agency.'
As career diplomats, Kennan and Hickerson had a vested interest in protecting the institution of the foreign service. They therefore opposed Marshall's proposal to establish a separate agency outside the Department, headed by an Administrator responsible directly to the President, to liaise with the OEEC. This could only 'cut deeply into the operations of the Department of State in European affairs' and 'reduce the prestige, competence, and the effectiveness of its mission in Europe'.

This view was supported by the influential Director of the Bureau of the Budget, James W. Webb (who on Lovett's retirement was to become Under-Secretary of State). He believed that no new executive agency was needed, partly because the requisite machinery already existed, and partly because the Department was seen to have done a good job on the Interim Aid Programme and the special assistance to Greece and Turkey. Because the Secretary of State was responsible for foreign policy he should have overall charge. Moreover, the cost-conscious Bureau Director pointed out that a new organisation would mean establishing staffs which would tend to duplicate the work done already by sections of the Departments of State, Treasury, Agriculture and Commerce. But some wanted to go even further than Marshall, notably the President's Committee on Foreign Aid, popularly known as the Harriman Committee after its Chairman Averell Harriman (then Secretary of Commerce). Whereas Marshall wanted a new agency responsible to the President direct, he did advocate that it operate in accordance with policy guidance of the State Department. Harriman's Committee wanted a Presidential appointee, confirmed by the Senate, whose guidance would come from a Board made up of the heads of the Departments involved.
It was left to the Senate to sort out this array of sectional arguments. This it did in drafting the final form of the Economic Cooperation Act of 1948. As had happened over the issue of pushing the West Europeans towards unity, a compromise was reached, again with the help of Ambassador Lewis Douglas, by including elements of all sides of the argument. The finished text stipulated that a separate organisation be set up with its own Administrator:

1) the Administrator and the Secretary of State shall keep each other fully and currently informed on matters, including prospective action, arising within the scope of their respective duties which are pertinent to the duties of the other;

2) whenever the Secretary of State believes that any action, proposed action, or failure to act on the part of the Administrator is inconsistent with the foreign policy objectives of the United States, he shall consult with the Administrator and, if differences of view are not adjusted by consultation, the matters shall be referred to the President for final decision.26

On the issue of a potential conflict of interest between the Secretary and the Administrator, Vandenberg had the clinching argument. He pointed out that on atomic energy there was a similar formula for reconciling the 'violent clash of rival interests' of the civilian and military authorities. There had been no appeal to the President: the 'whole thing has just worked right out in good shape'.27

By taking the view that the same formula would work as well for the administration of ERP, the Senators ensured that Marshall prevailed over his critics, inside and outside the State Department. There was a bonus too. The Administrator appointed by Truman was Paul G. Hoffman who left his job as president of the Studebaker Corporation specifically for this purpose. On his own admission during the
Senate confirmation hearings on 7 April 1948, he had 'no knowledge of government'. What he did have was experience on the Harriman Committee where he established himself as a strong supporter of European integration and political unity. He, like Dulles, knew Monnet well. He summed up in a sentence Marshall's whole approach when he told the Foreign Relations Committee later:

> Fundamentally what we are supposed to accomplish by June 1952, is to get Europe on her feet and off our backs, and one must never forget that, because we cannot go on indefinitely supporting these foreign countries... I do not think our economy can stand that.

Harriman, who was of the same opinion, left his post as Secretary of Commerce to become Truman's (and Hoffman's) Special Representative in Europe. The Marshall Plan legislation which created these new jobs passed the Senate by a large bipartisan majority (69 to 17) on 13 March 1948. Two days later, the OEEC was formed in Paris; and two days after that the Treaty of Economic, Social and Cultural Collaboration and Collective Self-Defence - the Brussels Treaty setting up the Western Union - was signed.

Marshall and Lovett could take considerable satisfaction from all this activity. Indeed, thereafter Marshall left the day-to-day running of relations with Western Europe to Lovett, while he became closely involved with inter-American affairs. In the immediate aftermath of the crisis over Czechoslovakia things must have appeared to be going well. On 15 March, the U.S. Ambassador in Paris, Jefferson Caffery, was approached by the former Premier, Paul Reynaud, to offer a view said to be widely held in the French foreign office. No doubt to the satisfaction of his superiors in Washington, Caffery...
was told: 'No federation can possibly come into being unless a state can assume the role of "federating state"'. Reynaud said that only the United States would play that part and asked that 'the US shed its fine scruples of non-intervention in the internal affairs of Europe' and participate actively in the elaboration of the West European union. He would have understood Marshall's diplomacy better had he remembered Talleyrand's observation: 'Non-intervention is a term of political metaphysics signifying almost the same thing as intervention'.

Lovett's first major initiative in transatlantic relations was to discuss the proposed North American-West European security relationship with the Senate Foreign Relations Committee. This time the objective was not to resolve internal arguments within the Truman Administration on the issue, but to deflect West European pressures for a cast iron military guarantee against the Soviet Union and (for some) Germany. The vehicle for doing this was what came to be called the Vandenberg Resolution, passed in June 1948. In the historiography of the Atlantic Alliance that resolution is invariably sited as a precursor to the North Atlantic Treaty. This interpretation takes a different view and argues that in mid-1948, the Truman Administration hoped that the passage of the resolution would reduce European anxieties, thus making more formal and binding arrangements unnecessary. These anxieties were especially strong in France, Britain, Italy and Germany. In answer to these, the Vandenberg Resolution was intended as a substitute, not a preparation, for an Atlantic Alliance.

Lovett was impelled to take this step largely because the West European interpretation of recent events was more alarmist than that of Marshall
and himself. Cabinet had been told in November to expect trouble in Prague; when this occurred there was outrage but not surprise. Marshall's reaction went no further than to lodge a diplomatic protest. When Jan Masaryk, the Czech Foreign Minister, fell to his death on 10 March — in circumstances regarded by many in the West as suspicious and symptomatic of Russian ruthlessness — Marshall was informed by the U.S. Embassy in Prague that Masaryk had almost certainly committed suicide.³⁴ Regretfully though he may have done so, Marshall simply accepted that, since Czechoslovakia had been prevented from participating in ERP, Soviet influence predominated in that part of Europe. Western Europe wanted greater reassurance than attitudes of this sort could generate. The fact that such reassurance might not be forthcoming was an added anxiety to half a continent already overburdened with worries.

The French were the most nervous and vociferous. On 4 March 1948, Bidault had a long meeting with Caffery in Paris and demonstrated the profound effect which the coup in Prague had on French thinking. Caffery was told that the French Government was ready to shoot if necessary to avoid a similar coup in Paris. Moreover, Washington was informed, there was now a real danger of a direct Soviet attack, which would be enhanced further if the Italian communists won power in April. Bidault's views on this were characterised by Caffery as follows:

> From everything we have been able to find out, Russian thinking is about like this: "If we do not take over Western Europe in the relatively near future, the Americans may wake up and then we shall be up against it. Of course there is a little risk that the Americans will wake up sooner than we think and knock us out with some of their famous atomic bombs. However, we believe that the Americans are still des naïfs and will wait too long".
Bidault was reported as having concluded: 'I know that this may sound extravagant, but we are sitting here under the guns and your people are on the other side of the ocean'.

In effect, Bidault was asking for a more specific version of the assurances that had been given to Greece and Turkey under the Truman Doctrine one year earlier: that it should be the policy of the United States to support free peoples who were resisting attempted subjugation by armed minorities and by outside pressures. Here was clear confirmation that the West Europeans recognised the difference between Truman's declaratory policy and the policy actually pursued. As suggested in Chapter 1, the President may have combined the struggle between right and left in Greece with the Russian ambitions in the Dardanelles - both impulses dating from the early 19th century at the earliest - and made them appear a universalistic conflict between democracy and totalitarianism. But in practice the pledge to Greece and Turkey was non-transferable. Events in Prague, together with those in Paris during December 1947, made the French extra sensitive to this.

American diplomats were aware of the French domestic ramifications. The Schuman government rested on a shifting and uncertain parliamentary coalition. Washington tended to the view that Schuman and his foreign minister Bidault were politically reliable, if only because they were - from an American viewpoint - more acceptable than the two alternatives. General Charles de Gaulle the wartime leader, was making a strong bid for a return to power. Caffery noted that de Gaulle had said, and done, nothing to assist when Schuman had been under siege in November and December by the communist trade unions. This
inaction did not endear him to the State Department and his strident nationalism sounded uncomfortable echoes of Nazi Germany in the 1930s. The other alternative was the communists. They were reported as jubilant at the prospect of a de Gaulle victory: they thought this would bring the 'class war', and thus their ultimate triumph, that much closer. Given the choice between a continuation of Schuman's government on the one hand and the possibility of either a Gaullist or Communist victory on the other, the State Department naturally opted for the former.

By taking this view, the United States could not deny to Schuman and Bidault any reasonable request for additional assistance. This became especially apparent during the North Atlantic Treaty negotiations. Nevertheless, the Americans were far from sure of which horse to back. Tentative soundings were made with de Gaulle: if he were to come to power it made no sense for contact with him being limited to a short, secret meeting with John Foster Dulles in December 1947. At the same time, the Truman Administration apparently sanctioned the American Federation of Labor and the Congress of Industrial Organisations to assist in the attempt to bolster the non-communist left as the best means of combating Soviet influence. In the case of France, this meant channelling funds - promised by the Treasurer of the American Federation of Labor, David Dubinsky, on a visit to Paris - to the socialists who had so irritated the State Department in February by weakening the Schuman government by refusing to support the devolution of the franc. American diplomats resolved the inherent inconsistency here by taking the view that any government in Paris, the communists excepted, would be forced by geostrategic realities to look to the United States for assistance.
The State Department was also ambiguous about the United Kingdom, although in different ways and for different reasons. On a personal level, Marshall's mixed impressions of Bevin were confirmed in March. Following the Prague coup, the British Foreign Secretary told Henri Spaak - who then told the American Ambassador in Brussels - that he thought the Soviet Union was neither ready nor willing to launch an attack on Western Europe. Moreover, he gave it as his opinion that the Soviet leader, Josef Stalin, was 'a strong stabilising influence against war'. Shortly afterwards, however, Bevin suggested that, unless the Marshall Plan was backed up by a Western military pact, this might provoke an armed attack. He wrote:

[I]f we proceed with half measures which are purely economic and financial and do not carry them to their logical conclusion, the Soviet Government might think that that is all we are likely to do. This would consequently weaken our position and so might precipitate the conflict which we desire to avoid.40

This could only be interpreted in Washington that Bevin said one thing to his European colleagues and something else to the Americans. Suspicions in the State Department were raised even further when it was learned that at least part of the British Foreign Office wanted American support for the Western Union because this would 'eliminate the necessity of Britain's military guarantee to Europe'.41 This was in obvious contrast to what the State Department had supposed lay behind the Western Union proposal.

But the State Department's uncertainty over Britain went much further and deeper than noticing such apparent inconsistencies. The basic problem was how the United States should comport itself towards the United Kingdom. George F. Kennan described this dilemma in a Policy
Planning Staff memorandum (PPS/23), submitted to Marshall and Lovett in late-February. If the Americans took the British into the U.S.-Canadian orbit, Kennan wrote, this would solve Britain's long term economic problem but at the cost of casting off Britain 'from the close political association she is seeking with continental powers' and therefore make those countries more vulnerable to Soviet pressure. On the other hand, if the United States urged the British 'to seek salvation' in closer association with her continental neighbours, this would ensure that the economic problems of both Britain and Germany would remain unsolved in 1952, when Marshall aid ended, and thus invite 'another crises of demand' on the United States for still further amounts of economic assistance. 'The scope of this problem'. Kennan suggested, 'is so immense and its complexities so numerous that there can be no simple and easy answer'.

Kennan saw only two ways to find a real cure for Western Europe's 'abnormal dependence' on U.S. governmental aid. The first was to create a close economic association between North America and the Western Union, including Britain. Perhaps because this proposal was similar to the 'Atlanticist' line propounded by John Hickerson, he was careful to point out that for this to work properly there would need to be a substantial degree of currency and customs union, plus relative freedom of migration between Europe and America. The second cure was a recommendation that Britain, France and the Benelux countries take full advantage of the twin facts that Africa was comparatively free from communist subversion or influence and that it was no longer an area of great power rivalries. This meant that Western Europe's flagging economic fortunes could be revived by the economic and commercial exploitation of the African continent. It
would, said Kennan, absorb large numbers of people, including Europe's 'surplus technical and administrative energy'. It would also 'lend to the idea of Western European union that tangible objective for which everyone has been rather unsuccessfully groping in recent months'.

Although the Policy Planning Staff paper contained the idea that these two solutions were not mutually exclusive and might complement each other, there is no doubt that Kennan himself favoured the African option. Ironically, his ideas on this were shared by Ernest Bevin, whose 'Atlanticist' preferences Kennan strenuously argued against. The British Foreign Secretary was reported as having said later in 1948: 'If only we had pushed on and developed Africa, we could have had the U.S. dependent on us and eating out of our hands in four or five years'. Similarly, Gladwyn Jebb, a rising star in the Foreign Office, confided in his diary during January 1948 that he hoped it was possible to construct a 'Middle Power', consisting of Western Europe and the bulk of Africa, which would be friendly to the United States but not dependent on her, thus being able to pursue independent foreign policies where necessary. In the light of this congruence of view between Kennan and some sections of the British foreign service, it is not surprising that similar ideas were developed about France. Commenting on the French plan to incorporate French North Africa into metropolitan France, the Policy Planning Staff advised Marshall to accept French imperial policies in that region, despite the fact that those reflected the French refusal to consider independence for subject peoples there 'even as a distant goal'.

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While France and Britain continued to exercise U.S. policy-makers in their deliberations, the most pressing problems in early March were associated with the defeated Axis powers, Italy and Germany.

On 11 March the Division of Public Studies in the State Department identified Italy as the subject of special concern to the American public. The press regarded it 'as the most crucial point in the present Western European situation'. A survey of press opinion suggested that many observers regarded it as 'the place to draw the line'. Particularly prominent, according to Departmental analysts, were the opinions of those advocating a United States commitment of some sort. Most were agreed that prompt action prior to the election due on 18 April was essential. A radio journalist made a common point: communist efforts in Italy (and France) would be successful 'in inverse ratio to the assurance of aid from the U.S.'. Very few took a different line; among these were the Rochester Times-Union which denounced as immoral any attempt to bribe the Italian electorate. 45 Tens of thousands of Italian-Americans did not agree. An unprecedented letter-writing campaign — supplemented by propaganda broadcasts by U.S. citizens with Italian connections, such as the popular singer Frank Sinatra — urged friends and relatives in Italy to vote for the parties most likely to cooperate with the United States. Behind all this lay the implicit threat that if the communists won power Italy would receive no Marshall aid. 46

President Truman took a personal interest. His advisor, Clark Clifford, recalled that the President had been 'very practical and approved [the] use of every means to influence the election'. 47 For domestic political reasons he had little choice. The large Italian-American vote could
not be risked by the prospect of a 'loss' of Italy to the communists, especially in a year when Truman had to face the American electorate in a contest almost everyone thought would be won by the Republican, Thomas Dewey. But Truman also recognised that the crisis in Czecho-slovakia necessitated U.S. action regardless of American political considerations. On 10 March he told the Secretary of Defense, James V. Forrestal, that circumstances in Italy constituted 'a real menace to our troops and a threat to the primary security interests of the United States'. Forrestal was instructed to send the Italians a variety of munitions and matériel, the purpose of which was

...to increase in so far as practicable the potential ability of Italian security forces to maintain the internal security of Italy and so suppress anticipated attempts by subversive elements to seize power by force. 48

Even here Truman kept one eye on his own electorate. In order to ensure he was not accused of allowing the U.S. military establishment to profit from Italy's misfortunes, he ordered that any reimbursements paid by the Rome government be lodged with the U.S. Treasury. 49

Background papers on special military aid to Italy had been circulating within the executive branch for some weeks prior to Truman's authorisation on 10 March. They reveal the different ways in which the diplomats and the military men regarded the problem, at a moment just before the United States began to talk to the Canadians and British about an Atlantic Pact. The two approaches were symptomatic of much discussion within the Truman Administration in the months ahead. Interestingly, both were predicated on the fear of a communist takeover, despite the fact that the Director of the Central Intelligence Agency felt confident that Italy would not succumb. 50
It is indicative of the salience of the Italian issue that the National Security Council (NSC), formally constituted in September 1947, should chose Italy as its first subject for study. It recommended that the United States should make full use of its political, economic and military power in order to prevent an invasion of Italy from Yugoslavia or a communist coup in Rome or elsewhere on the Italian mainland. The joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) were quick to respond. Admiral William D. Leahy, Chief of Staff to the Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces and Truman's main military advisor, put the JCS position to Forrestal. It had three parts. First, all of the equipment approved by Truman could not be in Italian hands by the date of the election on 18 April. Moreover, even such supplies as would arrive on time could only retard the military aid programmes to Greece and Turkey. The JCS wanted Truman to decide which was to have priority: resources were scarce. Secondly, if the U.S. strengthened its ground, naval and air forces in the Mediterranean area as a signal of American intent, this could only bite deeply into available reserves. This, as Leahy explained, was the result of the 'extended military position' of the United States: new commitments could not be undertaken without something having to give elsewhere. Finally, the NSC had suggested that, at the request of the 'legal Italian government', the Americans and British might deploy forces in Italy. The JCS judged this to be militarily unsound because it 'would entail serious risks of global warfare' and could only be contemplated after full mobilisation had taken place.  

The JCS concluded that the only way to avoid these difficulties was to enhance the overall strength of the United States armed forces. In other words, the Pentagon seized on the Italian situation as an
illustration of its claim that Truman's budgetary stringency was seriously damaging the American position in the world. Admiral Leahy wrote:

The Joint Chiefs of Staff believe that the over-all world situation, of which Italy is only a part, dictates the necessity for strengthening immediately the potential of our National Military Establishment. Some form of compulsory military service is essential if timely and effective strengthening of our potential is to be achieved, since this is the only method short of mobilization which can produce desired results without delay.52

The point was driven home by the observation that neither limited nor general mobilisation would result in 'appreciable augmentation of our combat strength' for at least one year after the order to mobilise had been given. The kind of objective being cited by the NSC in Italy was identical to that pursued elsewhere in the Mediterranean, the Middle East and further afield. The United States' limited forces could not carry out all the obligations given them by their civilian masters, the JCS argued.53

Truman was sceptical of such claims: he approved the NSC working paper without accommodating the views of the JCS, except to specify that any additional deployments of force to the Mediterranean would require partial mobilisation. Thus on the specific issue of Italy the Pentagon had very little impact on policy. (However, selective service was reinstated on 24 June 1948, as a way of overcoming the Services' chronic manpower shortages but not in such a way as to breach their budgetary limits).54 A 'secondary priority' for Italy was decided upon by the Department of State, but this did not affect the programme of aid: Hickerson suggested that the Pentagon's estimates
of what was possible usually 'proved overly pessimistic'. And so it turned out. On 8 March 1948, it was established for Marshall that 'substantial deliveries' could be made to Italy in time to be effective in connection with the 'control of disturbances anticipated during and immediately after the election'. On that basis, Truman instructed Forrestal to press ahead, regardless of the complaints put forward by the armed forces. 55

By taking that decision the President seemingly settled the policy of the United States towards Italy. Military aid would be sent, partly to strengthen the Italian armed forces but mainly as clear evidence of the American desire to help. This would be augmented by a range of measures, from the encouragement of the letter-writing campaign to the relaxation of unduly onerous terms in the Italian Peace Treaty, and from the hastening of economic aid to putting pressure on Britain and France to admit Italy to the Western Union. 56 But almost immediately the Rome Government complicated matters considerably. The Prime Minister, Alcide de Gasperi, told the American Ambassador that, although grateful for the offer of equipment, he did not want it shipped until later. In his judgement the arrival of such a shipment would have an adverse effect on his electoral campaign. 57 It was a timely reminder that Marshall's fears about inflaming national sentiments by Americans acting too vigorously were entirely justified. It was comparatively easy to offer economic aid, support Italian membership of the United Nations, send aircraft carriers and station them below the horizon, and use American celebrities and politicians with Italian connections to broadcast Western propaganda. But it was much more dangerous to appear to keep de Gasperi in power by providing him with American arms with
which to turn on the Italian population, should the election result go the 'wrong' way. The U.S. Ambassador in Rome, James Clement Dunn, advised Marshall that reports from Washington in the Italian press about the shipment of arms had caused de Gasperi to go on to the defensive against the political attacks of the communists. He therefore asked that every precaution will be taken to keep the matter completely secret. On the understanding that supplies arrived after the election, de Gasperi agreed to a formula whereby shipments did not come direct to Italian ports but were off-loaded at Bremenhaven in Germany and then transhipped by rail through Europe, entering Italy in comparative safety from observation. 58

The election result came as a great relief to Washington (although, presumably, not as a surprise to the CIA): de Gasperi won convincingly. No-one could be sure whether the extraordinary effort put in by the Americans helped the parties dedicated to parliamentary government to victory. The irony was that, although the result meant to Washington that Italy was no longer of critical concern, the Italian government almost immediately joined the queue composed of the other West Europeans demanding a security guarantee from the United States. Americans may have helped defeat the communists but that only increased the Italian appetite for further assistance. It was not to be reduced until the signing of the North Atlantic Treaty and the passage of the Military Assistance Programme in the following year, the measures which also did much to satisfy France and the United Kingdom.

No such easy remedies were at hand for the largest problem faced by the United States in Western Europe, namely Germany. Although it had been accepted by the United States that the industrial resources of
Western Germany could and should be used to encourage and sustain the economic recovery of Western Europe, the similar calculation was not made on military matters until 1949. Politically, the re-armament of Germany was as yet utterly unacceptable to the West Europeans. It was also anathema to the Russians. On 6 September 1946, the U.S. Secretary of State, James F. Byrnes, announced in Stuttgart: 'It is the view of the American Government that the German people throughout Germany, under proper safeguards, should now be given the primary responsibility for the running of their own affairs.' He went on to indicate the terms under which this might happen. Among them was the statement that U.S. occupation forces would stay 'for a long period'. This was a substantial shift of policy; originally the occupation was due to end sometime in late 1947 or early 1948. As the historian John Backer has demonstrated, this change was of great importance to the whole tenor of East-West relations and to the United States' relations with its friends in Western Europe. 'The barrier of the Atlantic...seemed removed', he wrote, 'and the future of the United States effectively tied to that of Western Europe'. Byrnes was still thinking in terms of a possible re-unification of Germany. By the time Marshall replaced him at the State Department, the de facto and temporary partition of Germany had begun to take on a de jure and permanent character. No-one willed this; it simply emerged as an arrangement which satisfied the different interests of the Americans, the Russians and their respective allies.

Unfortunately, in early 1948, the arrangement was not popular with Germans. It was an issue with which American policy makers were closely concerned. George Kennan took a special interest, perhaps because he was a fluent German speaker, had spent some time in Germany
as a boy and seen wartime service there as well. Writing in late February 1948, he produced a striking analysis of the German situation for Marshall:

In any planning we do for the future of Germany, we will have to take account of the unpleasant fact that our occupation up to this time has been unfortunate from the standpoint of the psychology of the German people. They are emerging from this phase of the post-hostilities period in a state of mind which can only be described as sullen, bitter, unregenerate and pathologically attached to the old chimera of Germany unity. Our moral and political influence over them has not made headway since the surrender. They have been impressed by neither our precepts nor by our example. They are not going to look to us for leadership.

He added that German political life would polarise around the extreme right and the revolutionary left, both of which from an American standpoint were 'unfriendly, ugly to deal with' and contemptuous of the things valued by the United States.

Kennan was to be proved wrong by events on all these counts. However, when he turned to the issue of West European unity, and West Germany's place in it, he was more correct. Virtually all important personnel in the State Department assumed that the long-term interests of the United States and Western Europe were best served by the creation of a real European federation. Kennan noted that, as yet, the Germans themselves had been poorly prepared for the idea; this would have to change. Furthermore, he argued that there were only three possible outcomes for Western and Central Europe. The first two were, respectively, Russian domination and German domination. To accept either would be to throw away the fruits of victory from the last war. This left the third possibility: 'a federated Europe, into which the parts of Germany are absorbed but in which the influence of the other countries
is sufficient to hold Germany in her place'. Kennan argued that this was the optimum solution but that it would depend on a more or less permanently partitioned Germany. A unified Germany within a West European federation would unbalance the other components. Therefore to Kennan there was no alternative but to prepare the Germany population to accept an artificial - but nonetheless real - division of their country.63

In the event, the Germans did accept partition: those in the East had no choice; those in the West conceded the necessity on the understanding that the Western half of the country receive its full share of American economic largesse. In early 1948, few if any foreign service personnel in Washington realised that the transition would be as comparatively trouble free as it turned out to be. Most thought that there was no option but to support German unification: the Germans wanted nothing else and the Russians made promises to that end. The U.S. Political Advisor for Germany, Robert D. Murphy, cabled Hickerson from Frankfurt in January:

Our object is to see a unified Germany under a German government with sufficient powers to govern. During coming months we will do nothing to defeat that purpose. It would be wrong to say that a division of Germany is a fact we must recognize. Neither we nor the Germans recognize it.64

What is significant about Kennan's memorandum to Marshall in late February is that it represents the first departure from the consensus view expressed by Murphy.

It is notable that Kennan's rationale for moving towards an acceptance of partition rested on the objective, shared by Murphy among many others, of a federated Western Europe. As with the Marshall Plan and
the U.S. reaction to Bevin's Western Union proposal, the ill-defined but powerful concept of a united Western Europe was the yardstick against which all other political and economic goals in Western Europe were judged. From early on in 1948, and throughout the rest of that year, there was an increasing propensity among policy-makers to see a divided Germany less as an unfortunate necessity in the short-term than as a positive benefit over the longer run. On a day-to-day basis the Americans had to deal with more mundane matters - the problem of the Ruhr, the integration of the West German economy into that of Western Europe as a whole, the impact on the German population of the de-nazification and re-education programmes and, above all else, the Nuremberg Trials and relations with the Soviet Union - but the long-term objective was always in view. In Kennan's words: 'With these tasks and problems before us it is important that we should do nothing in this intervening period which would prejudice our later policies'.

What made the application of this policy difficult was that, unlike the concurrent situation in Japan, the United States did not wield unquestioned authority in Germany. Americans could not unilaterally impose their wishes on, or coordinate measures with, the Germans. Account had also to be taken of Russian actions. Even though the London CFM had broken up in disarray, leaving any hope of four-power agreement over Germany in tatters, the fact remained that Soviet forces controlled a sizeable proportion of German territory and had full occupational rights in Berlin. Moscow's opinion could thus not be ignored. Similarly, the British and French had also to be consulted for the same reasons. There was also the question of the Benelux countries: no successful ordering of Western Europe could be
achieved if Germany's northwestern neighbours were not fully committed to whatever final settlement was to be decided upon. The Policy Planning Staff's advice was to concede that it was in the United States' interests to temper policies in order to win support and minimise opposition from friends in the West and potential adversaries in the East; this was preferable to acting unilaterally in defiance of the feelings and interests of those also directly concerned. It was the adoption of this attitude, applied to the wider context of Western Europe, which helps explain why the United States eventually became a founder member of the Atlantic Alliance.

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The argument of this chapter contains three strands. The first of these is the growing importance of public opinion in the United States about what was happening in Europe. From early-1948, additional efforts were made in the Department of State to monitor views expressed in newspapers and on the radio networks across the country and to analyse opinion surveys closely. No serious opposition to the idea of aiding the West Europeans - in addition to economic assistance - was apparent. By late March, of those Americans with opinions on the subject a ratio of 5 to 3 expressed themselves in favour of some U.S. military help being given to Western Europe should war break out. (A similar proportion was not opposed to supporting West European countries threatened by internal communist activity.) At this point therefore, it can be seen that public opinion did not inhibit policy makers from taking decisions to help. Nevertheless, the importance of popular attitudes had been acknowledged: in an election year, with the chances seemingly running against Truman, it would loom even larger.
The chapter's second theme is the role of Congress, especially the Senate Foreign Relations Committee. Policy could not be divorced from the political community: diplomatic objectives could be pursued only as fast as Congress could be persuaded to go. During March the relations between the executive and legislative branches on the issue of transatlantic diplomacy became a major preoccupation of the State Department as a whole, and of Marshall and Lovett in particular. They sought to use the relationship, first, to raise the spectre of Congressional refusal as a useful lever vis-a-vis the West Europeans; and secondly, to consolidate their policies against challenges from within the Department of State or elsewhere in the executive branch.

The final strand of this chapter is a continuation of the consideration given in Chapter 2 to the impact the West Europeans were having on policy choices. However, this time the focus is not the pressures on Washington. Rather it is the recognition that American objectives were complicated by particular problems associated with individual countries, notably France, Britain, Italy and Germany. Of these, the French presented the fewest difficulties: the United States simply had to decide whether to give them some form of security guarantee against the Russians and, more importantly, the Germans. The choice was less straightforward in the case of the British. The Americans found themselves in a dilemma of wanting on the one hand to see the dismantlement of the British Empire coupled with British membership of a united Europe; and on the other to preserve Britain's global position as an adjunct to the strategy of containment. Italy proved troublesome because the prospect of the communists winning powers by legitimate means was an embarrassing one. Furthermore, the imperatives which drove Truman to encourage intervention in Italian domestic politics
ran counter to Marshall's 'hands-off' policy. Finally, the German problem continued unresolved. Above all the miriad daily details of occupation duties, two considerations predominated: the need to incorporate the western half into a European federation, and the understanding that this would largely depend on the cooperation of the British and French.

When those three themes are taken together with those developed already in the previous chapter - West European influence in Washington, internal debate within the State Department and Marshall's diplomatic style - one conclusion suggests itself. It is that at the very moment when Marshall agreed to talk about an Atlantic security system with his West European counterparts, the State Department was being pushed and pulled from a variety of directions. The picture which emerges from the documents is not of a Department single-mindedly concerned with the ideological, political and military challenge represented by the Soviet Union. On the contrary, Marshall's pointed lack of action in response to the coup in Czechoslovakia suggests that he wished to reassure the Russians that the United States had no intention of disrupting Soviet influence in Eastern Europe. His was not the policy of 'brinkmanship' and 'rollback' later associated with John Foster Dulles. Marshall put his faith in politically moderate governments and opposition parties in Western Europe. Following this lead, the State Department concentrated on that region where a continuation of the status quo was unsatisfactory but where, unlike Eastern Europe, constructive change was possible and capable of being influenced by the United States. In March 1948, that process of change appeared to be underway with the signing of the Brussels Treaty.
TOWARDS THE VANDENBERG RESOLUTION: POLITICAL AND DIPLOMATIC CONSIDERATIONS

On 17 March 1948, the day the Brussels Treaty was signed, President Truman made two speeches; one to a joint session of Congress, the other to an Irish-American jamboree in New York. The speeches marked the U.S. response to the creation of the five-power Western Union. The subject of both addresses was the same: what the President termed the 'communist menace' to the free world, the West European response to it and the supplementary action to be taken by the United States. As in the case of the Truman Doctrine, while the rhetoric was explicitly anti-communist the practical application remained unclear. Like George C. Marshall's Harvard speech, Truman's remarks amounted to a declaration of intent; they were scrutinized by journalists, Congressmen and Administration officials for policy implications. This lack of specificity reflected, first, Marshall's chosen diplomatic method in transatlantic relations and, secondly, Truman's own reading of the lessons of Woodrow Wilson's failure in 1920 to mobilise enough political support at home for his diplomatic objectives. Truman recalled: 'Our European friends apparently remembered the League of Nations too; they were most anxious to have not only a presidential declaration but also a congressional expression confirming it.' This was an apt formulation of the problem faced by the U.S. Administration over a year before the North Atlantic Treaty was signed.
Truman's dilemma can be characterised by the question: how could the things being demanded by the Europeans be made identical to America's national interest and couched in language which would not be rejected by either the Congress or the people of the United States? This chapter contains an interpretative account of the way in which the Truman Administration began to discover its own answer to that question. The chapter has four subjects. The first is the speeches themselves and the U.S. press reaction to them. The second is the array of responses from within the Administration about ways of filling out the President's policy framework. The third is the way this internal debate had an impact on the comparatively low-level discussions on Atlantic security which opened in March between the Americans, Canadians and British. The final theme is the Vandenberg Resolution, intended as the 'congressional expression' confirming the presidential declaration but which became something rather different. Connecting all four are two parallel strands - the continuing support for West European unity and a growing apprehension about the economic and military implications of current declaratory policy.

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In his speeches on 17 March, Truman expressed grave concern about the situation in Europe. He referred to the Soviet Union's 'constant abuse of the veto' in the U.N. and communist action which had 'destroyed the independence and democratic character of a whole series of nations in Eastern and Central Europe'. This, together with pressure on Scandinavia, Greece and Italy, had established a pattern which was unacceptable to the United States. He welcomed the fact that 'this growing menace' had persuaded the free nations of Europe 'to draw close
together for their economic well-being and for the common defence of their liberties'. In this respect his choice of words was indicative of the trend in U.S. foreign policy deliberations. In welcoming the Brussels Treaty he stressed that its significance went 'far beyond the actual terms of the agreement itself'. He said:

It is a notable step in the direction of unity in Europe for protection and preservation of its civilization. This development deserves our full support. I am confident that the United States will, by appropriate means, extend to the free nations the support which the situation requires.

Echoing the help-for-self-help formula of the ERP, he added that the determination of the free countries to protect themselves would be matched by an equal determination on the part of Americans to help them do so. A similar analysis was offered in New York later the same day. The British Ambassador reported to London that Americans generally regarded Western Union 'as a step towards the ultimate establishment of a fully-fledged United States of Europe'.

Taken together, these two speeches represent Truman's first major public foray into foreign policy since the promulgation of his eponymous Doctrine. His remarks had some striking features, the most obvious being the picture of West European unity as an obstacle to Moscow's burgeoning ambitions. The point was not laboured; as Marshall would have wished, European national sensitivities were left only slightly ruffled. But the link between the policy of containment and the American conviction about the efficacy of European union was manifest. Moreover, Truman offered nothing dramatic, despite the vivid image of ruthless, expansionary communism which he had conjured up. When he promised 'full support' this was qualified by two phrases,
'by appropriate means' and 'the support which the situation requires'. The implication was clear: it would be for the Americans, not the beleaguered Europeans to deem what was appropriate or necessary. Like the Truman Doctrine, these two speeches were long on rhetoric and short on substance. The President was certainly not offering, as John F. Kennedy was later to do, 'to pay any price, bear any burden, meet any hardship or support any friend' in order to ensure the survival and success of liberty.\(^4\)

This was neither reluctance nor parsimony. For some time it had been apparent that there was a danger that, unless the West Europeans made greater efforts, the burden on the United States might become politically and economically untenable. In November 1947, the Policy Planning Staff in the State Department produced a report, written by the intellectual godfather of containment, George F. Kennan, which made the case. Kennan noted that since World War II the United States had 'borne almost single handed the burden of the international effort to stop the Kremlin's political advance'. This had stretched American resources 'dangerously far'. He therefore urged:

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\text{In these circumstances it is clearly unwise for us to continue the attempt to carry alone, or largely single-handed, the opposition to Soviet expansion. It is urgently necessary for us to restore something of the balance of power in Europe and Asia by strengthening local forces of independence and by getting them to assume part of our burden.}\text{\(^5\)}
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The historian Timothy P. Ireland rightly links this with the position of Germany. The presence of American troops there was becoming a dis-incentive for the Europeans to safeguard themselves.\(^6\) But this line of thinking has a wider significance. In the longer historical context, Kennan's memorandum may be taken as the first draft of what,
two decades later, would be called the Nixon Doctrine: the idea that American (and Western) security was most efficiently safeguarded when regional powers took on the task of defending their area, the role of the United States being that of arms supplier, political supporter and little else. In the immediate context of Truman's 17 March speeches, Kennan's reasoning provided, from the perspective of United States' national interests, the strategic rationale for the creation of a West European union with a military dimension.

That this kind of consideration was fundamental to Truman's own appreciation of developments can be inferred from his recommendations to Congress. He did not call for an increase in military appropriations. Nor did he suggest that all available military aid be sent across the Atlantic. He showed no inclination to reverse the postwar 'reconversion' programme by turning American industry from peacetime to wartime production. What he asked for was much more modest. The first request was an economic one: the speedy enactment of the Marshall Plan, currently being debated by both Houses. As virtually everyone agreed in Washington, the ERP was the single most important measure which Americans could take to put Europe permanently back on its feet, foster a spirit of unity and thus reduce the United States' involvement over time. Using the technique which had worked for the Truman Doctrine, the President used somewhat extravagant anti-communist language in order to minimise potential opposition. The second request was a military one: the reintroduction of selective service and the establishment of universal military training (UMT) for all able-bodied Americans. In the event, selective service was reintroduced (it was only abandoned in 1972 after the Vietnam War); UMT was rejected.
Truman regretted the rejection of UMT. He considered the measure of 'paramount importance' to American security, and had been considering it since 1946, when he established a commission to report on the idea. The commissioners argued that UMT was necessary because it was the only method by which military manpower levels could be raised 'without overburdening the country’s economy through the maintenance of a huge standing Army, Navy, Air Force and Marine Corps'. This theme was taken up by a number of Administration officials. According to Forrestal, on 30 January 1948, Marshall 'spoke with great vigour as to the necessity of the U.M.T. Programme'. It would, the Secretary of State argued, convince the world that the United States was ready to back up its policies abroad 'and thereby would in the long run result in the saving of very large sums'. On 12 February, he told the National Security Council that the United States was 'playing with fire while having nothing with which to put it out'. The answer was UMT, he suggested. The retiring Army Chief of Staff, General Dwight D. Eisenhower told Forrestal, the Defense Secretary, that unless the Army got more men, Germany and the Far East 'would have to be abandoned to chaos and Communism'. The Secretary of the Army, Kenneth C. Royall, told Congress that without UMT and the Marshall Plan 'the Army budget and the Army itself should be increased.  

However, Truman did not have wholehearted backing for his UMT proposal, even from within his Administration. The Joint Chiefs of Staff were not opposed but felt that the initiation of such training would take too long to improve the numbers of men under arms. Their preference was thus for selective service, the effect of which on combat strength would be more immediate. In the Policy Planning Staff there was a different concern. Marshall was told that his personal advocacy of
UMT held certain risks:

The best information available to the Policy Planning Staff is that the prospects are poor for enactment of the UMT legislation this year, even with the weight of your prestige behind it. This being the case, failure to enact the legislation after your strong testimony in its favour would have a very bad psychological effect abroad, both in discouraging our friends and encouraging further aggressive moves by the USSR.\(^\text{11}\)

On this Hickerson disagreed. He advised Marshall that it was possible 'to crystallize public opinion in support of UMT'. Marshall evidently believed this too. On 17 March, following Truman's message to Congress, the Secretary of State told the Armed Services Committee in the Senate that he saw no possible way financially to maintain a reasonable military posture except on the basis of universal military training. 'Diplomatic action, without the backing of military strength, in the present world', he argued, 'can lead only to appeasement'.\(^\text{12}\)

Truman and Marshall over-rode the doubters among their policy advisers. The State Department's Office of Public Affairs produced a special quantitative study of the press reactions to Truman's two speeches including their military content. According to this, some three-quarters of the leading newspapers received Truman's message favourably. Most supported the economic and military elements, special support being for the immediate enactment of ERP. 'Approximately three out of five of the papers generally approved enactment of the draft, and over half were also convinced of the need for UMT'. Editorial support was particularly strong 'with no measurable geographical differences apparent'.\(^\text{13}\) Some front-page headlines on the 18 March give a flavour of the coverage:
Truman asks draft, universal training, West Europe signs military pact: quick passage of ERP urged to stop Reds—The Denver Post.

Draft and military training urged by President in anti-red message: Soviet obstructionism and desire to subjugate Europe bluntly assailed—The Cincinnati Times-Star.


In nearly three-quarters of the papers reviewed—and in almost all headlines—selective service received the greatest emphasis. This was natural: of Truman's proposals, conscription touched the American citizen most immediately. 14

Although Truman could take some comfort from this support he had also to take account of his critics in the press. Opposition came mainly from sources which were normally against the policies of Truman's Administration. There were conservative papers like the Wall Street Journal and Chicago Tribune, which argued that Truman was being forced into desperate measures because of what they regarded as his previous policy of appeasing the Russians. His speeches on 17 March were thus an opportunity to call for the election of a Republican to replace him. There was criticism from the left as well, mostly from newspapers like the New York Sun and the Miami Herald which had identified themselves as mouthpieces of the Wallace wing of the Democratic Party. They therefore bombasted Truman's 'war-at-any-price programme'; complained that no alternative was offered to the 'militarization of America'; and asked for 'better evidence that an atomic war' was the 'only solution' before they would accept Truman's philosophy. More sober comments came from the San Francisco Chronicle which called for further
information and wanted to know 'the dimensions of the crisis'; on the basis of information about the situation in Europe, the paper asked whether there were sufficient grounds for 'sounding the tocsin'.\(^{15}\)

These criticisms and doubts were not, however, the real causes of the Truman Administration's failure to establish universal military training. Instant demobilisation after a war is part of the American ethos, backed by a Constitutional proscription of standing armies. UMT did not conflict with the constitution but there were worries on Capitol Hill about the trend towards something which might be a nascent standing army. Congress was doubtful, therefore, irrespective of the initially positive response in the U.S. press. There were more specific objections as well. First, the Senate Armed Services Committee was nervous about the financial cost of UMT and its 'relation to other components of the military budget'. The Department of Defense was never able to allay those fears. Secondly, Congress had become enthusiastic about the potential of air power allied to the atomic bomb. Opinion was running in favour of the long-range bomber as a substitute for unattractive measures for enhancing military strength like UMT. The newly autonomous U.S. Air Force did everything it could to encourage this view. Finally, Congress had already passed the bill designed to unify the armed forces within a single government department. The Senate Armed Services Committee, aware of the problems which inter-Service rivalry had created for the unification programme, was not disposed to recommend UMT which was endorsed by the Army but opposed by the Air Force.\(^{16}\)

The congressional rejection of UMT - correctly anticipated in the State Department - emphasised again the problem of growing commitments and
shrinking, or at best stable, military resources. During the weeks after Truman's speeches on 17 March, much attention was paid to this problem, as it applied to Western Europe. The focus of deliberations was the President's declaration to Western Union that the United States would extend to the free nations 'the support which the situation requires'. Pressmen evidently thought this constituted a policy, the details of which had already been worked out. In fact, Truman's remarks marked merely the beginning of that working-out process.

The Policy Planning Staff, under the temporary directorship of George H. Butler (due to the absence of George F. Kennan in the Far East), now grappled with the problem. On 19 March, Butler produced a discussion paper setting out three alternative ways of giving effect to Truman's words. Each of these had powerful sponsors within the Administration. What emerged a year later in the form of the North Atlantic Treaty contained elements of all three. The first was for a treaty of reciprocal military assistance, based on Article 51 of the U.N. Charter, but not restricting membership to a particular geographical region. The second was for a regional treaty of mutual military assistance which would be an amalgam of the Rio and Brussels Treaties. Both of these options involved the United States directly and formally in the defence arrangements of Western Europe. The third was different. It was based on the idea of giving a unilateral assurance to the Western Union that an attack on the Brussels Treaty signatories would be interpreted as a direct assault on the United States. The objective behind all three was the same: to deter an aggressor by assuring him in advance that any aggression would meet the countervailing force of the United States.17
Superficially the proponents of the unilateralist position - led by George Kennan and Charles E. Bohlen, Counselor at the State Department - lost the argument: an 'entangling alliance' was created. However, their views were powerful influences when the detailed text of the treaty was drafted months later. It was only when the organisation spawned by the treaty began to operate in the 1950s that their views were rejected as irrelevant. On historical and intellectual grounds they certainly cannot be lightly dismissed. They were, after all, close in spirit to the U.S. diplomatic tradition of avoiding foreign entanglements. They represented what can be called the postwar version of isolationism made respectable. Also, the United States had only ever been 'isolationist' vis-a-vis the Europeans. Given that the postwar world had thrust greater global responsibilities on the Americans, there was a strong case for keeping commitments to a minimum in any one area. This argument appealed to those critical of the West Europeans. As Kennan wrote:

The suggestion...that an alliance was needed to assure the participation of the United States in the cause of Western Europe's defense only filled me with impatience. What in the world did they think we had been doing in Europe these last four or five years?19

The essential point here, as Kennan made plain, was not anti-Europeanism but rather a consciousness that resources were finite and that the United States was acting already 'as generously and effectively' as it could to confront the challenges faced by the West Europeans.

On political grounds, however, the unilateralist argument had scant chance of wide acceptance within the Administration. Kennan and Bohlen said, in effect, 'We are not as strong as we need to be; therefore we must
steer clear of any entanglement'. But most of their colleagues did not agree. They preferred to say, 'We are not as strong as we need to be; therefore a way must be found to augment our strength by building up friendly powers to share the job of world policeman with us'. Moreover, the Truman Administration had established a habit of responding to West European weakness. The Truman Doctrine and the Marshall Plan were the two most conspicuous examples of this. The outright opponents of Kennan and Bohlen, and those who had different views, were therefore predisposed to listen to the West Europeans. And not a single government in Western Europe saw the world as a safer place if the United States did not make a whole-hearted security guarantee to themselves. The thought uppermost in the minds of Marshall, Lovett, Butler, Hickerson and Achilles was not, as Kennan alleged, 'the ostentatious stimulation of a military rivalry' between East and West. Rather it was how to reassure European opinion that the United States was not going to follow its own example in 1920 and assume the role of perfidious America.

Those of such opinions had their views reinforced almost daily by the influx of cabled messages from U.S. missions and embassies in Western Europe. Expectations had been aroused in Europe by U.S. aid and could not now be disappointed without serious consequences. What these consequences might be was dramatically illustrated by a despatch from the Embassy in London, dated 30 January 1948. The cable read, in part:

It is because British gratitude to US today is not unlike what it was in the days when lend-lease bill was being debated in 1940 that Bevin could take a calculated risk in standing up to Soviet Union. But it was a risk based on assumption that US aid would be forthcoming in acceptable form. If that expectation should
be disappointed, no one can say what the outcome will be. So great are the stakes that British may have no alternative except seek rapprochement with Soviet Union, no matter what government might be in power. 1

For American officials this was geostrategic reality in its starkest form. It was repeated in one way or another throughout 1948. No single despatch was as influential as, for example, Kennan's 'Long Telegram' from Moscow in February 1946, in which he first put the case for 'containment'. Nevertheless, the cumulative effect of a whole series of messages helped to undermine the unilateralists' case still further. Put another way, many American representatives in Europe had, in the diplomatists' parlance, 'gone native'.

A convert to the view that something further had to be done to reassure the West Europeans was Kennan's deputy, George H. Butler. Perhaps taking advantage of his superior's absence in Japan, Butler produced a report which took a different line from Kennan's. It was titled 'The Position of the United States with respect to Western Union and related problems', known as PPS 27, and circulated on 23 March 1948. Butler argued that, although the United States had to help 'resist the aggression of Soviet-directed world Communism', fear of the Soviet Union did have a constructive side: 'Fear of Soviet-Communist aggression is sufficiently strong that many of the free nations of Europe are willing to cooperate in close association, provided they are assured of military support by the United States'. That assurance, Butler thought, 'could be predicated upon resolute action by them and should take the form of a firm commitment to extend military and other support'. Here again was the self-help theme: the precise method giving meaning to the President's 17 March speech to Congress should 'leave maximum freedom of method compatible with effective assurance.
of reciprocal support from them'. Butler envisaged a three-stage process. First, Western Union should be expanded to include Norway, Sweden, Denmark and Poland and Portugal. Later, Italy, Eire, Switzerland, Germany, Spain and Austria would also join. Western Union members were to be encouraged to deepen their cooperation, in economic and cultural fields in addition to military ones. Second, the United States should give an immediate but unilateral assurance that an attack on any member of Western Union would be regarded as an attack on the United States. Finally, Butler recommended that the United States conclude a mutual defence agreement with these countries.²²

Kennan was furious about the content of PPS 27. Some of the recommendations contained in it were the very ones which he had argued were not only inappropriate but also unnecessary. Yet because it had been produced by his departmental section, he felt at least partially bound by it, as he admitted.²³ Nevertheless he continued, with his colleague Charles E. Bohlen, to oppose the very idea of a treaty on the grounds that it would divert attention from economic matters - where the United States was strong - to military issues - where the United States (and the Western world) was weak. He recalled his attitude at this time vividly in his autobiography.

Time and time again, in the ensuing weeks, I said to my colleagues: 'All right, the Russians are well armed and we are poorly armed. So what? We are like a man who has let himself into a walled garden and finds himself alone with a dog with very big teeth. The dog, for the moment, shows no signs of aggressiveness. The best thing for us to do is surely to try to establish, as between the two of us, the assumption that teeth have nothing whatsoever to do with our mutual relationship...If the dog shows no disposition to assume that it is otherwise, why should we raise the subject and invite attention to the disparity?'²⁴
Kennan also opposed the treaty idea per se: he had little confidence in treaties of alliance, perceiving that they could be readily distorted for ulterior purposes. He did not abandon his efforts against an Atlantic pact until after the re-election of President Truman later in the year.

Apart from Kennan's continuing opposition, there are three additional considerations to be taken into account before assessing the possible impact of PPS 27 on the formation of policy. First, Marshall himself never approved the report. He regarded it as having 'the status of a working paper', and had 'not taken any position with respect to it'.

The National Security Council received the report in a different form and produced its own version only after the Vandenberg Resolution had been passed. By then a number of things had changed. Secondly, Kennan was in agreement with his staff, and the State Department generally, on the question about expanding the membership of Western Union, to include most, if not all, of Western Europe. No senior official in the Department envisaged a mutual defence pact as in any way as acceptable replacement for the notion of a truly united Western Europe, or for the conviction that the West Europeans had to do more to help themselves militarily. Finally, Butler's memorandum was issued the day after talks began - in a Pentagon basement amidst great secrecy between American, British and Canadian representatives - on the subject of an Atlantic Pact. Thus PPS 27 followed a trend already established rather than initiating a new departure.

The tripartite discussions on the subject of an Atlantic security system began in Washington on 22 March 1948. What had prompted the talks was the Anglo-French request, discussed in Chapter 2, for such
exchanges; but only representatives from the United States, Britain and Canada were present. The ostensible reason for excluding France was that country's apparent vulnerability to Soviet intelligence penetration. However, it is reasonable to speculate that, when it came to talking about transatlantic military matters, the habits of tripartite wartime cooperation simply took over. The discussions lasted for a little more than a week. On 1 April, the representatives produced a report on their deliberations - known as the Pentagon Paper - which recommended 'a course of action adequate to give effect to the declaration of March 17 by the President of support to the free nations of Europe'. The essence of the Pentagon Paper was described in the minutes of the final meeting of the representatives.

It was generally agreed that a treaty should be accomplished and as soon as possible, the optimum possibility being that it might be accomplished prior to the end of the current session of Congress. This would have much greater political affect than a mere declaration of intent, no matter how strongly worded for Presidential delivery.

London and - almost certainly - Moscow were the only European capitals to which the news of this conclusion was passed. The Foreign Office knew of the Pentagon Paper because British representatives took part in the drafting of it. The Kremlin was probably told of its existence by a member of the British delegation, Donald Maclean, later to be exposed as a Soviet agent. Again almost certainly, the relief in both capitals would have been similar. The British could feel that Bevin's concept of an Atlantic Pact had moved a large step forward. The Russians could take comfort in the news - if Maclean so reported the proceedings - that despite events in Czechoslovakia in neither West European nor American minds was there any intention of embarking on a strategy of destabilisation in Eastern Europe, much less an actual armed attack.
Both could feel safer.

However, crucial to the understanding of the Pentagon Paper's real significance is the fact that the document was much more important to the British than to the Americans. Marshall himself took no part in the talks other than to approve of their taking place; he left Washington on 29 March to attend the ninth International Conference of American States at Bogotá, Columbia. Lovett was also otherwise engaged. There was no representative from Truman's staff present either. No participant was of higher than ambassador rank. The U.S. team was led by Lewis W. Douglas, who had already represented Marshall's views on aspects of transatlantic relations to the Senate Foreign Relations Committee. Douglas was supported by Hickerson and Achilles, whose views on closer Atlantic ties were well known; and by George Butler, who a British diplomat described as 'representing George Kennan' but who had come to share Hickerson's opinion. Also in the American team was Major-General Alfred M. Gruenther, representing the U.S. military establishment. Absent were Charles Bohlen and others in the Department of State opposed on grounds of principle or practicality to an Atlantic Pact.

The U.S. delegation, in sum, was of high calibre but of relatively low status, and not representative of all shades of opinion in the Administration. It is therefore premature to describe the Pentagon talks as 'the launching of the North Atlantic Treaty'. Throughout the negotiations the Americans repeated that no commitments were being entered into; the results of the talks would not be binding on the three governments concerned. From the American point of view this was partly because Congressional support could not be guaranteed,
and partly because the U.S. representatives were not empowered to define the position of the Administration. Even Hickerson was being careful, according to the minutes of the last meeting, to impress the British with the idea that the Pentagon Paper represented 'only a concept of what is desired at the working level' and that British expectations should be based on nothing more than this. Half way through the talks, the British Ambassador, Inverchapel, indicated that Bevin was being kept abreast of developments; Hickerson commented that the talks were 'too tentative to merit official reaction at Mr. Bevin's level'.

In an account of the creation of the North Atlantic Treaty written in the weeks following the signing ceremony on 4 April 1949, J. Nicholas Henderson, then a Secretary in the British Embassy, noted he had regarded the progress towards an Atlantic Pact as inevitable, once the next stage in the negotiations got under way during the summer of 1948. Three decades later he was more sceptical and referred to other apparently inevitable international arguments which never came about because of 'excessive focus on immediate national rather than common long term interests'. That same scepticism is appropriate to the Pentagon negotiations of March 1948 as well. Nothing was decided upon other than the text of what amounted to an international working paper and no more. Even the agreement in principle to conclude some form of arrangement at a later stage meant very little. As Dean Rusk - then Director of the Office of United Nations Affairs - recalled, George Marshall during his time as Secretary of State was always against agreements in principle because such agreements meant nothing until all of the fine print, qualifications and modifications were known. Given the 'excessive focus on immediate national interests'
in an election year, with what many regarded as an already 'lame duck' President, the West Europeans were as far from formalising a greater American commitment to themselves as they ever had been.

The Pentagon talks are important but not for the reason that they represent the 'launch' of the North Atlantic Treaty. The Pentagon Paper, and the talks which produced it, are of interest to historians because of what is revealed in them about the complexity of the American attitude towards Western Europe. In comparison, the position of the Canadians and British was straightforward. The Canadians had been on record for some time as wishing to strengthen the U.N. Charter by the creation of an Atlantic security arrangement under Article 51. They would not have opposed a collective pact open to all, including the Soviet Union. The British position was summarised by Henderson as 'an attempt to obtain an early American commitment to support the Brussels Treaty, and to join an Atlantic Pact'.

Two European scholars, Wiebes and Zeeman, have argued that PPS 27 'laid down future policy' and that the State Department had decided upon an Atlanticist policy as early as March 1948. Both contentions are correct as far as they go. PPS 27, Butler's memorandum of 23 March, did resemble the Pentagon Paper, while in turn bore a strong similarity in outline to the North Atlantic Treaty. On the basis of the Pentagon Paper, it is clear that the Atlanticists - Hickerson, Achilles and Butler - were beginning to dominate policy formulation regarding Europe in the State Department. But their 'success' was due, in part, to the temporary absence of two key 'unilateralists' or 'Europeanists', Kennan and Bohlen, from the deliberations. Even if that had not been the case, the steps towards a collective defence pact suggested in
the Pentagon Paper had still to be approved at the levels which mattered: by Lovett and Marshall; the NSC, Forrestal and the Joint Chiefs of Staff; and finally by the President and a Republican-dominated Congress in an election year. It is therefore not surprising that Hickerson should have warned the British and Canadian delegations that they had to realise that 'some Presidential declaration might in practice be all that the Americans could offer'. Adding that a great deal would depend on whether there were fresh outbreaks of potentially hostile Soviet activity, he reportedly said that 'if complete calm prevailed it would be so much more difficult to sell the idea of a pact to the Senatorial leaders'.

The Soviet Union was soon to oblige by beginning the blockade of Berlin in late June. But in early April the U.S. Government had still to define its own position with respect to West European demands. Two issues in particular caused difficulties later for American policy makers: the question of which regional groupings were appropriate to what purposes; and the extent to which any Administration could commit a successor to take military action or qualify the right of Congress, enshrined in Article 1 of the Constitution, to declare war.

On the regional issue the Americans drew a distinction between a European and an Atlantic group not drawn by the British. Had all three sets of representatives shared the twin objectives of the British – U.S. backing for Western Union, and the creation of an Atlantic Pact – then this could have been readily achieved by extending the Brussels Treaty to cover the United States and Canada. The assession clause of that treaty, Article IX, provided for just such a development. However, this was specifically ruled out by the Americans, whose position was
set out in the minutes of the second tripartite meeting on 23 March.

Extension of the Brussels Pact should not involve adherence by the US (or Canada), in Hickerson's view, since the US hopes to see the eventual development of a United States of Western Europe (possibly later of all Europe) and the Brussels pact offers the hard core for such a development. It would lose its utility for this purpose were the US to join.40

Coming from a convinced Atlanticist like Hickerson, these remarks are important. They show, first, that despite the international atmosphere surrounding the events in Prague, American enthusiasm for West European unity was undimmed. Secondly, although the tripartite talks had been convened, there was no sense in which the U.S. Government saw an Atlantic arrangement replacing the Brussels Treaty system. Finally, following the Marshall Plan experience, the Truman Administration was clearly banking on Western Union as a military organisation with a function similar to that of the O.E.E.C.: an institution the workings of which would help inculcate the habits of international cooperation, leading to a degree of supranational authority.

However, there were problems with this design, largely because of the position of France and the United Kingdom. As Kennan had recognised in February, there could be no viable European union or federation without the full support of both countries.41 The French would take no action unless the British did as well; but if Britain did look towards Europe it would not solve its long term economic problems and therefore retard European recovery, rehabilitation and reconstruction, the sine qua non of the Marshall Plan. The Americans could not decide whether an Atlantic security arrangement or a European political and economic union ought to have over-riding priority.
This indecisiveness reflected a lack of clarity about where United States' national interests really lay, an indecisiveness which was the product of a combination of differences of opinion within the State Department, Marshall's diplomatic style and doubt about what Congress would approve. In contrast, the British and Canadians knew much more precisely what they wanted. It was they who were instrumental in eliminating a world-wide pact under Article 51 or a straightforward Presidential declaration as possible options for the United States. 42

But deciding which nations should join which group, and whether an Atlantic or a European arrangement ought to be the first order of business, did not help the United States to solve its other problem: the exact wording of the *casus foederis* in the suggested treaty. Even at this stage defining the circumstances under which the signatories would go to war was of paramount importance to the Americans. It was not so significant for the United Kingdom, as was made clear by Gladwyn Jebb, a member of the British delegation. He told his colleagues in the Foreign Office that the United States would only agree to a treaty if the *casus foederis* was to be determined by the individual signatory nations themselves, not by some majority or collective decision. He went on to note:

> All this is of course important, but nowhere near so important as the main question, namely whether after making their enquiries the United States Administration feel able to support the idea of a Pact at all. 43

For its part the Truman Administration could not decide whether to support the idea of a pact until the *casus foederis* had been agreed.
Two main options presented themselves, neither of which was satisfactory. The Rio Treaty of 1947 offered one possibility. The operational clause to which the United States had agreed as a signatory stipulated that an attack on one American state would be regarded as an attack against all and that each of the signatories undertook 'to assist in meeting the attack in the exercise of the inherent right of individual or collective self-defence' recognised in Article 51 of the U.N. Charter. Even though from a United States viewpoint the Rio Treaty was backed by the tradition of the Monroe Doctrine - and many U.S. military interventions in Latin America - no mention was made of the use of armed force. The same formula applied to West Europeans might have been accepted by the Americans but would not have achieved the main purpose of restoring confidence in Europe. The West Europeans may well have accepted in the end, had the United States insisted. But matters never reached that stage because Washington did not lose sight of the need to reassure its friends. The other option derived from the Brussels Treaty itself. Article IV automatically committed the signatories to military action if the *casus foederis* occurred. The members of Western Union agreed to afford the country under attack 'all the military and other aid and assistance in their power'. They would have been wholly content had the Americans been prepared to agree to that 'hair trigger' clause. In practice, constitutional considerations made this impossible for Americans. (The Brussels Treaty would have been modified had the United States sought to become a signatory). Under the U.S. Constitution, the President and the Executive may negotiate and ratify treaties but this can only be done 'with the Advice and Consent of the Senate'. The Senate would not approve any measure which reduced Congressional influence on foreign policy, especially the right to determine when the United States was at war.
The difference between the two options was thus much more than a technical distinction. Apart from the political and constitutional considerations, there was a military dimension to this as well. The availability of American forces to augment the troops in central Europe was much in doubt. Shortfalls in manpower levels had persuaded both Truman and Marshall to support the reintroduction of selective service and the inauguration of universal military training. However, there was no guarantee that these measures would be passed. As Inverchapel noted, the American public was 'well ahead of Congress' in its willingness to accept both. Congressional refusal to deliver more men would be certain to undermine any feasible, additional commitment to Western Europe.

Major-General Alfred Gruenther, representing the Department of Defense and the Joint Chiefs of Staff at the Pentagon discussions, was understandably cautious in his contributions to the talks. Although James Forrestal was reported to be the 'foremost advocate' of an Atlantic Pact, the JCS were more wary. Inter-Service rivalry and fierce arguments about roles and missions made it impossible for the JCS to agree on anything other than the desirability of minimising commitments. Asked by Ambassador Douglas whether the United States was biting off more than it could chew if an Atlantic Pact was formed, Gruenther was non-committal. All he would say was that any undertaking to go to the aid of another country should not stipulate that such aid be delivered locally. He argued that the United States should retain the freedom to carry out action against an aggressor in accordance with existing American strategic concepts. As will become evident in the next chapter, this could scarcely reassure the West Europeans.
However, the most striking evidence of the inconclusiveness of the Pentagon negotiations comes from Bevin’s reactions. On 9 April 1948, the British Foreign Secretary cabled Inverchapel in Washington with a message for Robert Lovett. From the shortened version handed in at the State Department it is obvious that Bevin was not working on the assumption that a treaty was imminent or even a more distant probability. The message had three aims. The first was to acquaint the Americans with the fact that Bevin had cleared the idea of an Atlantic pact, as discussed in the Pentagon Paper, with the Prime Minister and Cabinet colleagues. Should the United States invite participation in a conference to discuss defence arrangements for the North Atlantic area, then Washington could be assured in advance that the British were eager to attend. The second objective was to argue the case for a multilateral, collective security system. If Bevin had confidence in the Pentagon Paper as embodying American foreign policy, this would not have been necessary. He argued for going beyond the 'half measure' of ERP; for creating confidence in Western Europe; and for American support of Western Union and membership of an Atlantic security system as ways of solving 'the age-old trouble between Germany and France'. Bevin’s third purpose was to destroy the case for American support being conveyed in a Presidential declaration. Again, a modicum of faith in the Pentagon proposals would have rendered this effort unnecessary. He concluded: 'To sum up, we do not believe that there is any substitute for a Treaty if something effective is to be done'.

The argument used against a Presidential declaration was well designed to stimulate the desired response from the Truman Administration. Bevin wrote:
Again, any such declaration not having the backing of the Senate would make people here very doubtful as to whether they had incurred any reciprocal obligation. We should certainly be under a moral obligation not to leave the United States in the lurch. We should be constantly challenged as to whether we were in any way bound by a presidential declaration, and we should have to say that there was no commitment. That would leave us in a very unsatisfactory position and might arouse resentment in America.  

This diplomatic understatement was effectively suggestive. Sensitive nerves were touched with precision: the acknowledgement of the Senate as a power in international relations; the legally worthless promise of a European 'moral obligation' to American security; and the implicit suggestion that resentment in the United States of Europe's response to the President's initiative would redound on Truman's hopes of re-election.

Unwittingly, Bevin somewhat spoiled the effect. He expressed the anxiety that, in an emergency, the British would be left waiting 'as in 1940 in a state of uncertainty'. He went on to suggest, albeit indirectly, that without a collective security arrangement which included the United States, Britain would find it difficult to resist aggression and may have to resort to appeasement policies again. It was one thing for the U.S. Embassy in London to express almost identical sentiments, but quite another for Bevin to question the integrity of the United States in having irresponsibly left the United Kingdom standing alone in 1940. The effect was immediate. Lovett cabled Douglas in London with instructions to tell Bevin that the United States Government considered his wording as 'highly unfortunate'. Bevin's response was to the effect that Britain was relatively much weaker than in 1940 and so could not hope 'for a successful stand against the Soviet hordes for a protracted period'.

Bevin's apologetic explanation was accepted but the net effect of this slight cooling of the temperature in Anglo-American relations was to confirm U.S. officials in the view that European self-help was a theme to be stressed again and again. Bevin was told by Douglas that the tendency on the part of Western Union members to hold back from developing their joint venture, pending an American assurance of prompt military support, represented precisely the attitude which might deter the United States from making any commitment. (Bevin blamed the French for dragging their feet; in the months ahead the same accusation was directed at the British). Douglas, now back in London after leading the U.S. team in the Pentagon talks, restated the policy laid down by Marshall and Lovett in January. The Europeans were to attach considerable importance to the President's 17 March speech in which the United States pledged to keep troops in Germany until the peace of Europe was secure. Against that background, if the Brussels Pact members revealed a resolute determination to integrate and coordinate their defences, the United States would be prepared to discuss how best to provide support by the coordination of the production and supply of military matériel.\(^53\)

Here was clear evidence that the 'anti-Treaty Party' – as Henderson called Kennan, Bohlen and other opponents of the Atlantic Pact – had begun to reassert itself after having been excluded, deliberately or otherwise, from the Pentagon talks.\(^54\) While the British had come to see the issue in black-and-white terms of a choice between an Atlantic Pact or chaos, the American officials not in the pro-Treaty Party saw matters in less simplistic terms. Douglas was saying that such a choice did not exist; that there were other ways of making Western Europe secure, which did not necessary require a fully-fledged
treaty. Western Union was militarily weak but it had the manpower. The United States could use its productive potential to help provide European forces with the equipment they needed. By avoiding wasteful duplication through consultation across the Atlantic, and between the members of Western Union, strength would be built to the extent that the Western Europeans could deter an aggressor. This was very much the line taken by Kennan and Bohlen. They were not gambling with European security; they simply believed that the presence on the ground in Germany of American troops was the foundation of peace in Europe, and that therefore talk about a treaty was largely irrelevant. At most what Western Union needed was to expand its membership and be supported politically by a unilateralist declaration and militarily by a 'military ERP'.

The growing influence of these views became apparent to the British. The Foreign Office was informed that 'Hickerson had been encountering resistance to his idea of a Pact' during discussions with State Department colleagues. Bevin told Attlee at the beginning of April that he calculated the chances of the U.S. Government agreeing to treaty proposals were 'little better than fifty-fifty'. Lovett was particularly anxious to disabuse the British of the notion that the outcome was foregone. Henderson recalled a meeting between the U.S. Under-Secretary of State and Lord Inverchapel, which took place on 10 April when the British Ambassador told the Americans of Cabinet approval of the Pentagon Paper.

Alas, Lovett could report no such progress on the American side. His mood that day was pessimistic, even for him. More than the usual number of bogies were besetting him from all sides. There really were terrible difficulties with Congress, he feared.
He mentioned potential problems in Congress about the appropriations vote on ERP and that in an election year some general declaration of support was all that the President could give. He also pointed out that, as yet, the United States had not seen any serious efforts at military collaboration among Western Union countries.\textsuperscript{57}

All of this was in marked contrast to the timetable established in the final Pentagon meeting. It had been decided then that the need for quick results over-rote all other considerations. Full scale negotiations were to begin in May at the latest. So strong was this conviction that the series of talks was brought to a premature close in order to make preparations for the substantive talks, despite unresolved disagreements on a number of items.\textsuperscript{58} In fact the serious negotiations did not begin until after the Berlin blockade had begun. It was not until this fresh evidence of apparent Soviet intransigence that the Americans felt obliged to sit down with their Canadian and West European colleagues. Even so, negotiations on Atlantic security lasted from July until the very eve of the North Atlantic Treaty signing ceremony.

Commenting on the lull between the end of the Pentagon talks and the opening of proper negotiations, two historians have suggested that the most important reasons for the delay were 'the internal differences of opinion within the State Department and the efforts to unite Congress behind the plans'.\textsuperscript{59} Measured against much of the historiography of the North Atlantic Treaty and NATO, this explanation is perceptive. However, it does proceed from what might be termed the 'Whig interpretation' of NATO's origins. The unspoken assumption is that the
North Atlantic Treaty was somehow inevitable and that NATO was the natural, beneficial and automatic product. The delay is thus seen as no more than a break in continuous progress towards those goals. From the perspective of the State Department in April 1948 matters looked rather different. There was no certainty that the Hickerson group would succeed in convincing the higher echelons in the State Department of the desirability of their proposals. Despite what Lovett told Inverchapel, relations with Congress were productive because Senator Vandenberg was not asked to back the 'plan' outlined in the Pentagon Paper. Above all, there is no room in the interpretation for the strong possibility that the Americans deliberately exaggerated the internal difficulties and problems with Congress as a method of forcing the British - and through them West Europeans as a whole - to do more for themselves.

This was the strategy that Marshall adopted in the immediate aftermath of the Czech crisis. It was foreshadowed in the Secretary of State's remarks to the Senate Foreign Relations Committee in January. Referring to the long-term effects of ERP, he said that the problems would occur when the 'heat' was no longer on the West Europeans to consolidate their joint efforts into collective action. If there was a single sentence of Bevin's initial written enquiry about U.S. backing for the proposed Western Union which impressed Washington it was: 'We in Britain can no longer stand outside Europe and insist that our problems and position are quite separate from those of our European neighbours'. It was just that kind of remark which convinced State Department officials that their Utopian ideas about a 'United States of Europe' were capable of being brought to fruition, to the benefit of the United States of America. When Lovett personally learned from the
Belgian Prime Minister, Paul-Henri Spaak, that the British and French were reluctant to proceed with a tight implementation of the Brussels Treaty he acted promptly. Cables were sent to the Embassies in London and Paris to convey the message that the more tightly the Treaty was implemented, the better the United States would like it. As with the Marshall Plan, the key to success in the American scheme was the emphasis given to the self-help condition: U.S. assistance was to be an offer only to the extent of providing what the Europeans could not produce themselves.

Senator Vandenberg, Chairman of the Foreign Relations Committee, entirely agreed with that approach. Because of the central role he played in gaining wide, tripartisan acceptance of ERP, he was fully conversant with the assumptions underlying foreign policy. Lovett showed him the proposals contained in the Pentagon Papers, during the first in a number of meetings designed to explore the limits of tolerance of Senators and State Department officials on transatlantic security policy matters. Vandenberg's initial reaction to the idea of a pact suggested in the paper was characteristic. Lovett, reporting their conversation of 11 April, wrote: 'He said that the Congress was anxious to help but that the proposal here was in the nature of an unlimited, open-ended offer of aid to anyone who might reach for it...'. It was the Senator's view that such an offer would encourage America's friends 'to fold their hands and let Uncle Sam carry them', or, alternatively, to foster an unwarranted sense of security which might actually lead to provocative action by the recipients of aid. He told Lovett that the need for some sort of assurance of assistance was recognised, but felt that 'its form must in all events leave the determination to this country' as to the
circumstances under which the United States extended aid. Vandenberg was 'cool on the formal guarantee of a pact' but prepared to cooperate in the search for a short-term procedure to back up the countries of Western Europe.  

Given the currents of opinion running in the State Department there was no significant difference between the views of the two men. The product of their meetings was Senate Resolution 239, known as the Vandenberg Resolution, passed on a vote of 64 to 6. The two most important clauses entitled the U.S. Government to pursue:

- Progressive development of regional and other collective arrangements for individual and collective self-defence in accordance with the purposes, principles and provisions of the [U.N.] Charter;
- and Association of the United States, by constitutional process, with such regional and other collective arrangements as are based on continuous and effective self-help and mutual aid, and as affect its national security.

Dean Acheson, Marshall's successor, later called this resolution 'the forerunner of NATO'. John Foster Dulles linked it to the Monroe Doctrine as a landmark in U.S. diplomacy. NATO's first Secretary-General, Lord Ismay, said it marked a striking evolution in American foreign and defence policies in peacetime and made possible American membership of the Atlantic Alliance.

Historians have tended to confirm those opinions. In its own publications, NATO describes the resolution as having cleared the constitutional road to the North Atlantic Treaty. There is no doubt that some in the State Department did see in this way, notably the pro-Treaty Party. But others did not. Certainly no-one at the time thought that the
resolution would lead to a permanent international bureaucracy such as NATO became. There is therefore a need to distinguish between cause and effect. Certainly the effect of the Senate vote was to make the North Atlantic Treaty a constitutional possibility. However, that is not an argument supporting the assumption that such was the intention. This is an equally strong case for saying that the framers of the resolution thought in terms of precluding the development of an Atlantic Pact.

The problem faced by Vandenberg and Lovett was to define the extent to which the United States could go towards membership of a regional defence arrangement, yet at the same time reserve to the Senate the final decision about how far the United States would in fact go. Vandenberg, the former isolationist converted by the attack on Pearl Harbour, made his own position plain: 'The whole purpose is to avoid any direct alliance, or the whole purpose is to retain complete freedom of action on our own part with respect to the evolution of events.' Lovett made a similar point when explaining the resolution to representatives of Western Union and Canada. He pointed out that it was an 'extraordinary paper in America history' in that it was a statement of policy in advance. He stressed that it represented no guarantee and ought not to be over-emphasised, 'except as representing the absolute maximum to which the United States might go'. He insisted that the resolution 'carried no assurance that the U.S. would go that far'. It was an act of one element of the American government and he warned that 'the final result might differ markedly from the concept contained in the Vandenberg Resolution'.

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On that basis, Resolution 239 can be interpreted as a recognition of what might be necessary or possible, rather than as an expression of what was desirable or probable. Similarly, the lack of specificity in the language reflected not only Senatorial caution but the division within the State Department. The actual wording gave no encouragement to either the 'Atlanticists' or the 'Europeanists'. Both could accommodate their policy proposals within it. However, on the Senate side, there was interest in the relationship between the resolution and the general inclination towards the idea of European unity. Lovett was therefore careful to make the connection in his talks with Senators. He told the Foreign Relations Committee, for example, that passage of the resolution was necessary before the end of the legislative session. Prompt action by the Senate would help the nations comprising Western Union 'to firm up their union and fusion movement in three areas: political, economic and military'.

This was more than merely a grace note sounded for the benefit of Senators whose preferences were well known. Lovett linked the issue of unity in Western Europe directly with American national security. The Senators were told:

The military situation is one of particular concern because the union of Europe, which is one of our cardinal purposes in connection with the national security aspect of this country as well as the hopes of rehabilitation in Europe, depends a great deal on what the countries involved feel the attitude of this country is toward such a union.

With West European unity in mind, the resolution was based on the same principles as Marshall Aid. Any action by the United States would depend upon the Europeans recognising the 'fundamental necessity' of helping themselves and helping each other 'long before they come
Lovett denied, without qualification, that the United States would join the Brussels Treaty. The West Europeans, he said, 'must not take the attitude, "I'm tired, Daddy. Carry me"'.

Vandenberg supported this overall approach when speaking for the adoption of the resolution in the Senate debate. He spoke of a federation of the European peoples as 'one of the most helpful evolutions that could be contemplated'. He thought that the emphasis on the development of regional and collective arrangements 'specifically includes the great idea of a United States of Europe'.

Vandenberg's support for European unity of some sort may have been the vestiges of his earlier isolationism but his obvious enthusiasm was nourished by his close working relationship with John Foster Dulles. Vandenberg was the acknowledged Republican spokesman on foreign affairs in the Senate and he relied on Dulles as his principal adviser. Dulles in turn was one of Marshall's confidants, and the man recognised as Marshall's successor at the State Department in the event of a Republican victory in November. Lovett had given his blessing to Vandenberg's continuing consultation with Dulles on the issue of the resolution. Even before the Vandenberg-Lovett conversation began, Lovett approached Dulles to get his general views. Both men agreed on 8 April that political and economic guarantees should be given to Europeans only on a provisional basis. This would 'give some protection during the dangerous period of transition from division to unity'. Dulles added that he felt it would be a 'catastrophe' if the United States were to guarantee 'the existing status of disunity'.

Echoing Marshall's earlier remarks about how to keep the 'heat' on the Europeans, Dulles wrote to Vandenberg: 'Unity requires hard political decisions which are only taken under the pressure of necessity,
and if we take that pressure off, little will happen'. Confirmation that this attitude was justified came when Dulles met Paul-Henri Spaak, the Belgian leader currently in Washington. Spaak told Dulles that he was ready to lead moves towards European unity but was not hopeful of any major developments unless the United States kept the pressure on. Two weeks later, Lovett told Dulles that in drafting the resolution, care would be taken to ensure that the United States was not underpinning the status quo in Western Europe.71

Dulles himself was confident that his ideas were shared by both Lovett and Marshall. Their views on European unity were less public than his but there can be no doubt that Dulles made his own contribution to the Vandenberg Resolution. An American historian, Daryl J. Hudson, has suggested that the resolution illustrates the influence of Vandenberg on foreign policy, rather than evidence of State Department dominance, as suggested by Acheson and others.72 This conclusion might well be extended to cover Dulles's contribution also. His intervention ensured that the resolution determined not so much that the United States was willing to enter a regional defence arrangement but that it would consider doing so only once the West Europeans took firm and irrevocable steps to unite. This was a straightforward application of the principles Marshall had already decided upon. The implication of the two paragraphs from the resolution quoted above, was that Europeans were to create a regional grouping before Americans would consider any 'association' with it. As Senator Hickenlooper remarked, the United States had to avoid being trapped into supporting something where 'we give all the quid and there just is not any quo'.73
The four people most closely concerned with the drafting of the resolution—Marshall, Lovett, Vandenberg and Dulles—were meticulous about the wording. Nuances of meaning were explored in order that the eventual text went no further than Truman's speech of 17 March. The clause dealing with the 'association' by the United States with regional security arrangements was obviously crucial and it went through a number of textual revisions. Lovett rejected the words 'participation' and 'support' on the grounds that both implied a degree of commitment greater than was envisaged by the State Department. In all cases, the acid test was U.S. national interests. 'If a regional group was set up in such a form as to advance the national security of the United States', Lovett said, 'then U.S. was ready to consider association with it'. The ranking Democrat on the Foreign Relations Committee, Senator Tom Connally, asked whether this meant 'membership'. Lovett replied that it did not and defined 'association' as meaning the opening of military conversations; the exchange of strategic plans and their harmonisation; and included the idea of standardising equipment. (This was the same line as that pushed by Douglas in his conversation with Bevin in mid-April). Lovett said that the resolution would have the effect of restricting talks with Western Union countries to conversations about 'the basic principle of self-help and mutual aid...in their military activities as well as their economic activities'.

In his presentation to the Senate Foreign Relations Committee in closed session, Lovett was at pains to convince his audience that self-interest was the dominant consideration governing the United States' attitude towards Western Union. He told the Senators that:
Bevin's suggestion of a Western Union, which was to deal with political, economic and military union, arose to a certain extent from the continued discussions that we had had with them about self-help and mutual aid.

He emphasised this point, he said, because he believed it to be 'the common denominator' of all problems besetting the West Europeans. The resolution was intended by State Department officials 'to keep those people firm in their desire to pull together and to act as a unit'. Time was also important: Lovett wanted to take advantage of the Europeans' apparent present willingness to lower national prejudices. As Lovett had said, there was to be no possibility of the West Europeans being allowed to let Uncle Sam carry them. He summed up his views in the phrase: 'We are not the guarantors of anything'.

These arguments were not used by the State Department merely to persuade a potentially still-isolationist Congress to accept a new departure in American foreign policy. They undoubtedly had that effect but the same arguments were used by the Department in its dealings with West European governments as well. During the same period as appearing before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee in executive session, Lovett saw the French Ambassador, Henri Bonnet, to advise him of the impending resolution. The Frenchman, who was to become something of a thorn in Lovett's side during the substantive negotiations leading to the North Atlantic Treaty, asked whether the measure represented any kind of guarantee. The U.S. Under-Secretary of State informed him that the United States had 'never considered any form of guarantee' and was thinking instead of 'practical measures' and policy coordination to improve West European security. Earlier the French had been advised that they, like their European colleagues, ought not to decide to do nothing pending an American decision to
increase the commitment. Caffery told them in mid-April that it was only when the Brussels Treaty powers had made progress towards collective self-defence, mutual aid and coordinated military planning that the United States would make its move. 77

Recognising that this was more than rhetoric, the Brussels Pact signatories met on 17 April 1948 to decide how best to coordinate their defence planning without prior American assistance. The previous day, Douglas had outlined for Bevin the framework of American policy: U.S. troops to stay in Berlin and to the West of the inner German border for as long as necessary, coupled with consideration of further military assistance once the West Europeans had determined for themselves what was still needed. Douglas made plain his belief that such measures, together with the American monopoly on atomic weapons and delivery systems, were all that was necessary for the peace of Europe to be sustained. 78 He could have added - but apparently did not - that this formula was also held by some in Washington to be sufficient to deter indirect as well as direct aggression. In a careful analysis of Soviet takeovers in Eastern and Central Europe since 1940, Hickerson advised Lovett on 12 April that no communist coups d'etat could or would occur without the physical presence of Russian soldiers to lend 'prompt and compelling support to the pressure tactics of local Communist parties'. 79

This attitude may have struck the Europeans as myopic complacency. Certainly they did not share it. This is particularly clear from a telegram which Douglas sent to Lovett, reporting a conversation with Winston Churchill, on 17 April. The contrast in views symbolises transatlantic differences, despite the fact that neither Douglas nor
Churchill was formally representing the attitudes of their respective national governments. Churchill's idea was that the Soviet Union would one day acquire its own atomic capability. When it did so, war would be inevitable. He therefore suggested that atomic diplomacy, as it came to be called by historians, be applied: tell the Soviet leaders to withdraw from Berlin and East Germany to the Polish border or the West would raze Russian cities. Douglas agreed with Churchill that the only vocabulary understood by Moscow was that of force. But he disagreed on every other point. The American thought that with the formation of Western Union, backed with U.S. matériel constituted 'a demonstration of solidity and irresistible force' to deter the Soviets from adventurism. Furthermore, he considered that such a demonstration would deter the Soviets, even though they 'may ultimately develop - if they have not already developed - the atomic bomb'.

This then, was the shape of American thinking behind the Vandenberg Resolution. It would help the re-establishment of Western Europe as a centre of power but at a minimal cost to the United States. As Lovett and Marshall told Dulles and Vandenberg, any formal agreement made 'would be short, possibly as long as five years, with a right to withdraw on a year's notice'. It was necessary not because the United States had fallen victim to 'Pactomania' but because it could not go on giving what Vandenberg called 'the negative answer' to European pleas for assistance and support. Senator Alexander H. Smith, a member of the Foreign Relations Committee, remarked: 'It seems to me this [resolution] is framed as an answer to the pressure brought to bear on us by the British-French-Benelux crowd'. His colleague, Walter F. George, was more prescient: 'We will be far more bound by this resolution than I fear we are willing to admit at the
moment’. Vandenberg’s son remarked after his father’s death that ‘rarely in American history had such a small egg hatched so quickly into such a large chicken’. ²³

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Alexis de Tocqueville observed that in America sooner or later every domestic political question becomes a judicial one. The same change can be seen taking place in U.S. foreign policy toward Western Europe in the three-month period covered in this chapter.

The chapter opens with President Truman’s vague commitment to West European security contained in his speech to a special joint session of Congress on 17 March 1948. It ends with Truman’s sentiments being given congressional confirmation in the carefully considered language of an insurance policy. The validity of any claims was to be determined by the United States in the light of prevailing national interests. The premiums were to be paid by the Europeans in the form of an obligation to do more to help themselves militarily through mutual aid. Ironically, the phrase ‘self-help and mutual aid’ in the Vandenberg Resolution became the kernel of American commitments undertaken later in the North Atlantic Treaty. However, between April and June 1948, this was not the intention of Marshall and Lovett or Vandenberg and Dulles, who all thought in terms of Western Europe becoming self-sufficient and thus obviating the need for such a commitment. This view was reinforced by Paul-Henri Spaak who articulated the ideas the Americans most wanted to hear: that an Atlantic Treaty was not necessary and that he was ready to become the first European leader in a position of power to advocate the cause of West European union as an active policy.²⁴
The inter-relationship between, on the one hand, the general American desire for long-term disengagement from Western Europe and the European unity issue, on the other, is central to the understanding of where U.S. foreign policy stood on the eve of both the Berlin blockade and the opening of formal negotiations about a treaty. The assumptions which lay behind the Vandenberg Resolution epitomise the effect of that inter-relationship in the formulation of policy in 1948. The resolution was an acknowledgement that a treaty might be necessary but not as a matter of urgency, nor as a commitment which went beyond the loose obligation contained in the Rio Treaty. It was to be the Europeans' task to impress on the United States that this did not accord with military realities in Europe. For their part, officials in the State Department had yet to realise that military imperatives had already pushed the United States well beyond the point where a treaty could be refused. In sum, Thomas Jefferson's proscription of 'entangling alliances' had been slightly compromised; instead, in Vandenberg's Resolution, Americans had accepted George Washington's earlier formula of trusting 'to temporary alliances for extraordinary emergencies.'
CHAPTER 5

TOWARDS THE VANDENBERG RESOLUTION: MILITARY CALCULATIONS

During the drafting stage of the Vandenberg Resolution, the Senate Foreign Relations Committee asked the State Department for details of U.S. public opinion on the American military relationship with Western Europe. This was supplied on 18 May 1948 and took the form of two unpublished surveys of national opinion, commissioned by the State Department, one conducted in late March, the other a month later. Taken together they reveal that - despite Czechoslovakia, Truman's St. Patrick's Day speeches, and the emergence of the McCarthyite sentiment embodied in the Federal Employee Loyalty Program - the American public found certain aspects of anti-communism unpalatable when translated into actual policies. That feeling undoubtedly pervaded the Vandenberg Resolution and accounts in large part for its vagueness.

Historians are generally wary of the value to be attached to opinion polls.¹ Politicians and officials tend to be much less critical; their reactions to surveys of opinion can be illuminating. The first survey, referred to above, contained the question: 'Would you approve or disapprove of the United States sending military supplies to countries of Western Europe now, in order to strengthen them against future attack?' Of those asked, 52 per cent approved, 39 per cent disapproved and 9 per cent were of no opinion. In the second survey a different question was posed: 'Do you think we should promise to go to war on their side if Western European countries are attacked by some other country?' This time, of those asked, 40 per cent said such
a promise should be made, but 48 per cent disagreed; 18 per cent were undecided or had no opinion. The difference in the two questions means that no conclusions about trends can be drawn but that very difference is notable. When the question included the phrase 'sending military supplies' a comfortable majority appeared to approve. However, when the question suggested a possible need to 'go to war' a significant majority were opposed to the idea.

The American public's capacity to make distinctions of this kind in matters of foreign policy was of obvious importance to the Lovett-Vandenberg conversations. The Foreign Relations Committee was advised of the State Department's interpretation:

The disparity in the response to these two questions suggests that popular attitudes on any proposition as to the use of U.S. troops to aid other countries may depend a great deal upon the language in which it is presented.

The views concurrently expressed in press and magazine articles supported that conclusion. There was a perception that the Brussels Treaty had increased Western Europe's potential to defend itself. This could be increased still further by the United States authorising a limited, military version of 'lend-lease'. A typical view was that of Joseph Alsop who advocated 'a closer, more formal relationship between this country and the Western European union' but who saw this not as a 'military alliance'. The front-runner for the Republican presidential nomination, Governor Thomas E. Dewey was also reported to be against a military alliance.
All of this information was passed to the Senate Foreign Relations Committee. It is therefore difficult to avoid the conclusion that the resulting Vandenberg Resolution was worded, in part, to accommodate the preferences and antipathies of the American public. These coincided with the views of Marshall, Lovett and Vandenberg and go a long way towards explaining why Senate Resolution 239 stopped well short of an unambiguous commitment. But there were military reasons for this hesitancy too. It is these which are the subject of this chapter.

* * *

Commenting on the Vandenberg Resolution, the Chairman of the U.S. Atomic Energy Commission, David E. Lilienthal, remarked that it was 'virtually an extension of the Monroe Doctrine to Europe'. There is considerable irony in the remark; as the custodian of America's stockpile of atomic weapons, Lilienthal was in a better position than most to appreciate it. Like the Monroe Doctrine when originally promulgated, the resolution was in essence a unilateral declaration of intent which conveniently ignored the inability of the United States to support its diplomatic position with armed force. Both were exercises of political bluff in international politics. The intention behind both was to prevent potentially hostile states from taking steps which might lead to conflict with the United States. Yet at the very moment when deterrence began to be accepted as the basis of both foreign policy and defence posture, the military strength (especially ground force capability) necessary to make deterrence credible was ebbing away. In retrospect it is
easy to assume that the American monopoly on atomic bombs constituted a substitute for weakness in what are now termed conventional forces. That was certainly the view of the fledgling U.S. Air Force (USAF), which provided the delivery vehicle, but the same confidence was not apparent elsewhere in the Pentagon. Nor - Winston Churchill apart - was it very evident in Western Europe. To U.S. policy-makers, the atomic bomb represented military strength of a kind but not of the dependable sort upon which to base American and Western security.

In 1948, there was no nuclear bias such as developed under the Eisenhower Administration during the 1950s.

Given U.S. military weakness - or, more properly, American policy-makers' belief that the United States was militarily weak - there could be no fully satisfactory response to the West Europeans' reiterated demand for a military guarantee. These demands were based on a twin European assumption that such guarantees could be given and that they would be respected by putative adversaries.

In mid-1948, senior U.S. officials disagreed with the first assumption and had not yet begun to consider the second. The Vandenberg Resolution was, in effect, an attempt to reconcile the views held on either side of the Atlantic. It did not succeed: the Europeans pressed for clarification of what was meant and, having discovered that this was less than satisfactory to themselves, took steps designed to ensure that when U.S. policy was clarified it would be along lines closer to their own perspective. (The process by which this happened is the subject of the next chapter.)

From a European point of view in 1948, the most encouraging aspect of the Vandenberg Resolution was that a transatlantic treaty had
not been excluded as a possibility. As shown in the previous chapter, American policy-makers did not regard this as a concession. Agreeing to the idea of a treaty, whether directly or indirectly, meant little to them until the actual terms of the contract were known. The Europeans saw symbolic, political significance in an Atlantic treaty, almost irrespective of its content. The Americans did not share that perception, preferring to interpret a treaty as an enforceable contractual obligation which could not be undertaken for any reason other than it being in their national interest to do so. A treaty could be worded as loosely or tightly as circumstances demanded. Whereas the foreign policies of the West European powers towards the United States were reminiscent of gentlemen's agreements, U.S. foreign policy was defined by lawyers. A mixture of realism and naivety is apparent in the approach of both. An Atlantic treaty did have symbolic significance but treaties — as Europeans knew to their cost — were frequently torn up and the territorial guarantees contained in them disregarded. On the other hand, although a treaty did commit the signatories, Americans tended to transpose the Anglo-Saxon concept of individual law into the chaotic field of international relations, where a gentleman's agreement might be quite as good as any other.

The one thing that the United States felt it could not offer militarily in mid-1948 was to supply what Georges Bidault had asked for on behalf of his French countrymen: 'a concrete military alliance with definite promises to do definite things under certain circumstances'. Ernest Bevin had tried to achieve much the same when he proposed an Anglo-American military agreement in February 1948. As has been demonstrated in previous chapters, George C. Marshall had
deliberately withheld just such an American military commitment in a calculated effort to impress upon the West Europeans the need for them to cooperate amongst themselves – politically and economically as well as militarily. However, the formation of Western Union had done little or nothing to bring about any real measure of military integration or to rebuild Western Europe’s confidence and fighting spirit. For their part, the Europeans were understandably suspicious when they noticed the gap between the rhetorical flourishes of the President’s speech of 17 March and the evident subsequent aversion to back up the ringing declarations with armed strength. Contrary to Marshall’s hopes, the withholding of American backing for – or membership of – Western Union only undermined the potential of the enterprise to succeed in fostering a spirit of self-reliance. Not for the first or last time, this apparent obduracy merely made the Europeans question the reliability of the declaratory policy emanating from Washington.

What the Europeans failed to understand was that Marshall saw no option but to steer clear of tighter military ties. His decision reflected more than the general view expressed by John D. Hickerson that Western Union was regarded as 'the hard core of a future United States of Western Europe' and which had to be encouraged on that basis. Marshall’s outlook was coloured by the problems left by the rapid demobilisation of American armed forces after V-J Day, 1945, and by Truman’s determination to ensure that defence expenditures did not take resources away from more deserving (and politically rewarding) sectors of the economy. One of Marshall’s biographers noted that the Secretary of State was always concerned with the 'necessary connection between diplomacy and military power'. It can be added that Marshall – and all other senior policy makers in the area of foreign and defence
policy - had to live downwind of the 1946 mid-term elections which had brought Republican control of both Houses of Congress, largely on a ticket of cutting the expenditure of central government, reducing inflation and lowering personal income tax levels. This necessarily weighed more heavily with Truman than the pleas of the West Europeans.

The military and diplomatic corollary was spelt out by Marshall to the National Security Council in February 1948. In a famous phrase he said: 'We are playing with fire while we have nothing with which to put it out'. Much would therefore depend on appearances. Regarding the possible deployment of troops to Europe, Palestine or any other potential trouble-spot, Marshall pointed out that no such action would be possible without at least partial mobilisation. Robust policies needed financial and manpower resources. Neither was available in sufficient quantity even though, he argued, it was vital that the United States' resolve be not perceived abroad as weakening. If that happened, he suggested, the United States would 'lose the game' and prejudice its national position, especially since the Marshall Plan had involved the Americans in Europe's future well-being.

However, as Marshall knew, there were compensating factors. The ERP had been initiated as a method of preventing the 'fire' spreading westwards. In Kennan's phrase, the objective was 'to create strength in the West rather than destroy strength in Russia'. That idea was welded in the American mind with the notion of West European unity, political and economic integration, and military self-sufficiency, all to be achieved in the medium- to long-term. This meant that, from Washington's point of view, building strength in the West did not require a large and expensive American force-in-being. A strong
Western Europe would militate against the need for a powerful standing force of the sort which offended some of the oldest of American sensitivities. The Defence Secretary, James V. Forrestal, put the case in its strategic context to the Chairman of the Senate Committee on Armed Services, Chandler Gurney. He wrote in December 1947:

> At the present time we are keeping our military expenditures below the levels which our military leaders must in good conscience estimate as the minimum which would in themselves ensure national security. By doing so we are able to increase our expenditure to assist in European recovery.

This he argued was a calculated but acceptable risk in order to follow a course which offered 'a prospect of eventually achieving national security and also long-term world stability'.

That risk was still the linchpin of American 'grand strategy' in mid-1948. The main problem was that it did not satisfy its principal beneficiaries, the West Europeans. Living next door to the huge and battle-hardened forces of the Red Army, they took the view that rather more was necessary. Truman and Marshall agreed. As indicated in the previous chapter, their answer was universal military training (UMT) for all American males for one year between the ages of 18 and 21, coupled with the reintroduction of selective service. In strategic terms, the objective was to provide the kind of reserve force, capable of being swiftly mobilised, which had been so conspicuously lacking in both 1917 and 1941. In economic terms, UMT was designed as a way of getting security on the cheap. In transatlantic terms, UMT represented, in Marshall's opinion, 'the best manifestation to Europe - both as to the Western friendly countries and the Iron
Curtain - of the continuity of our policy and our determination to continue our position in European matters'.

Marshall and Truman's concern for Western Europe was undoubted but, despite their vigorous advocacy, UMT in reality was the U.S. Army's proposal for the survival of ground forces as a major component in the American armed forces. The atomic bomb threatened to turn the Army into a minor service along with the Marine Corps: prestigious, with a long history but little political muscle on Capitol Hill or in the counsels of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Marshall was naturally predisposed to identify with the Army's cause - his long and distinguished service in its ranks made his sympathy virtually automatic. President Truman was similarly inclined, being immensely proud of his service on European battlefields during World War I. Behind the arguments of both was the assumption that in a future war, regardless of whether atomic munitions were used, the final result would be determined by the success of failure of infantry and mechanised divisions winning and holding territory. Vast areas would have to be occupied and that required a mass army based on conscription. The Army added its own arguments, pointing out that there could be no guarantee that atomic strikes would be decisive; if they were not, even greater troop numbers would be necessary to deal with the unconstrained Soviet army. Moreover, the United States had neither aircraft nor missiles of intercontinental range; the Army would thus be responsible for establishing bases within operational range of available aircraft.

Of the four U.S. armed services, the Army was the most Eurocentric. As in World War II, the U.S. Navy and Marine Corps tended to look
towards the Pacific, and considered its organic air capability—embarked on even larger aircraft carriers—as a candidate for atomic weapons delivery. The U.S. Air Force had few self-doubts either. In his first annual report, published on 30 June 1948, its Chief of Staff, General Carl A. Spaatz, argued that 'air power will inevitably be the primary instrument' through which a decision would be reached in wartime. A combination of the pre-war assumption that 'the bomber will always get through'; the 'successes' of the Hiroshima and Nagasaki demonstrations of superior air power; the arrival of new ballistic technology; and the relationship between an expanding air force on the one hand, and job opportunities and export sales from airframe manufacture on the other, made the USAF's case appear very strong. Both the Navy and Air Force could envisage for themselves a major global role whatever may happen on the ground in Europe. In contrast the Army needed Western Europe to defend if it was to survive with its roles and missions intact.

However, it was the Army which disposed of the forces most suitable for what Forrestal called 'various potentially explosive areas over the world'. A large fleet assembled off Seoul in South Korea, or Greece and Palestine in the Eastern Mediterranean, could do little to influence the activities of indigenous nationalists or communists. A group of B-29 bombers with an atomic weapon carrying capability could do even less. Such responsibilities fell on the Army which was already, on its own estimates, badly overstretched in Germany, Austria, Trieste and Japan. So serious had the situation become that a formal review was made at a White House briefing on 18 February 1948, attended by the President, the Secretaries of State, Defence and the Army, together with the four Joint Chiefs of Staff. Judging
from Forrestal's report, General Alfred Gruenther made the most of the occasion. Central to his presentation was the disparity between available strength and present (and potential) commitments. Manpower levels were presented as representative of the problem.

Available U.S. Military Manpower Strength as on 1 February 1948
(in thousands)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Service</th>
<th>Actual</th>
<th>Budget Authorisation</th>
<th>Congressional Authorisation</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Army</td>
<td>552</td>
<td>560</td>
<td>669</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Navy</td>
<td>476</td>
<td>526</td>
<td>664</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Marine Corps</td>
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<td>346</td>
<td>362</td>
<td>382</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTALS</td>
<td>1453</td>
<td>1535</td>
<td>1823</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Millis (ed.) The Forrestal Diaries, adapted.

The real point to be taken from these figures was not that overall U.S. armed forces were 20 per cent under strength, although that gave the military grounds enough for worry. It was that the ratio between combat capability and administrative, logistic, planning and other support functions had become unfavourable. U.S. national security required relatively more 'teeth' and less 'tail'.

Gruenther concluded that the deployment of anything larger than a division outside continental United States 'would make partial mobilisation a necessity'. Marshall subsequently showed himself
specially anxious that alarmist forecasts of that sort should not
be discussed publically because of the potentially adverse affect
on West Europeans. He told the Senate Armed Services Committee that
UMT was the way not only to make substantial cash savings but also
to show the world that 'the United States intends to be strong and
to hold that strength ready to keep the European world both at peace
and free'. He therefore did not want 'stark comparisons' made by
Defense Department personnel 'between the forces disposed of by the
Soviet Union and those of the free world'. Forrestal had planned
to make exactly such a comparison in a written and unclassified sub-
mission to Congress. On 23 March 1948 Marshall wrote to Forrestal:
'The political effect of this comparison would be very serious in
Europe, especially the number of weeks it would take Russia to reach
the Atlantic and the Pyrenees'. He added that France would be par-
ticularly disheartened and that much of the good abroad done by
Truman's 17 March speech would be undone.21

Forrestal, apparently taking Marshall's advice, omitted the contentious
comparison from his text. From his diary it is not clear what made the
Defense Secretary change his mind. Marshall made four basic points,
any one of which, or some combination, may have been decisive. First,
anything tending to reduce West Europeans' will to resist aggression
would be a loss to the United States and a gain for the Soviet Union.
Secondly, the failure to sound a note of confidence in the ability of
'free Europe', backed by America, to give pause to the Russians would
have 'a direct effect on ERP'. Thirdly, estimates of Soviet military
strength were dismissed as a combination of U.S. guesswork and Soviet
propaganda. Finally, Marshall suggested that Forrestal's statement,
as originally drafted was 'more a preliminary to war than a proposal
for preparation to avoid war'. Whatever the reason, Forrestal's actual statement to the Armed Services Committee contained no material of which Marshall would have disapproved. Forrestal presented a straightforward request for an augmentation of some 30 per cent to manpower levels (comprising 350,000 regulars and 220,000 selective service draftees) together with the beginnings of the proposed UMT programme, 850,000 men between 18 and 19 for one year's training. In the event, Congress accepted only the need for the re-introduction of selective service.

Marshall told Forrestal that while the United States could not afford to bluff, the tension between East and West was still 'in its political phase'. Every effort must therefore be made not to make any suggestion that there was substance to the Soviet charge that 'imperialist America' was attempting world domination. Equally, nothing was to be said or done to give credence to West European suspicions that, in the event of a war, United States forces would vacate Europe immediately. The President could recommend UMT and selective service as 'unmistakeable evidence to all the world that our determination is to back up the will to peace with the strength for peace'. But as he, Marshall and Forrestal knew, that scarcely squared with existing military plans. Although the reality could not be kept from West European governments, those same authorities had a vested interest in maintaining the belief that the United States would defend Western Europe, if the moment ever came to do so. However, West Europeans would have been stunned by a public declaration that there was little that American military planners felt could be done in the event of hostilities, initially at least, pending the full mobilisation of the United States' vast industrial and human reserves.
Bernard Brodie, the first academic to consider the problems of strategy in the nuclear age, wrote in 1946 that U.S. military decision-makers 'continued to think in terms of peacetime military establishments, which are simply cadres and which are expected to undergo an enormous but slow expansion after the outbreak of hostilities'. The comment applies equally well to 1948 and remained true until the opening of the Korean War. That event forced Truman to authorise the massive rearmament programme recommended by the National Security Council in its report, known as NSC 68 and completed in 1950. Until that moment there was a serious gap between military posture and the foreign policy objectives it was presumably designed to support. America's capabilities simply did not match its declared intentions. There was nothing to be gained, and much to lose, from advertising military realities to the publics of Western Europe.

During the first half of 1948, only the British and Canadian governments were aware of the full extent of the gap. The Department of Defense could not avoid taking these two into its confidence: Canada, because of the joint responsibilities to defend the Western Hemisphere, a prime consideration in any war plan; Britain, because the U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff continued to consider the British Isles as the only available launching pad for an eventual re-run of the Normandy landings should Western Europe ever fall. In the British case, the old wartime Combined Chiefs of Staff committee (CCS), officially dormant but still unofficially active through the British military attaches in Washington, provided a precedent for joint planning which continued to operate with a degree of cooperation that was probably not officially sanctioned.

The American journalist, Joseph Alsop, was nearer the truth than
hyperbole when he wrote in this period that if the Anglo-American alliance were ever to be disbanded, 'every military plan in the Pentagon would have to be torn up'. 28 Documentary evidence gives some support to this proposition. General Stephen J. Chamberlain, Director of Army Intelligence, was told that an emergency war plan, drawn up in April 1948 after a meeting between American, Canadian and British planners, was a fully combined plan involving the three armed forces of all three countries, but that it did not appear to be so:

The US planners would take their plan and use the British and Canadian forces all the way through. The British would take the same plan and the same concept and with the same forces write a British plan around it. It amounts to exactly the same as a combined plan. However, should one pick up a US or a British paper he would not be able to tell that the US had planned with the British.

Earlier, in January, an instruction to American planners said:

'There should be no US paper in the CCS files indicating concerted action in preparation for World War III', despite large-scale planning and such detailed preparations as joint American and British biological warfare trials in the Pacific. 29

Although Anglo-American military collaboration appeared to be close, certain differences did exist. The British placed comparatively greater emphasis on controlling the oil-rich territories of Southwest Asia and were most interested in the period 1950-55 and beyond. For their part, the Americans concentrated on continental Europe and were preoccupied with the need for contingency planning for meeting a surprise attack. General Hollis, a member of the British delegation
at the Pentagon talks in March, remarked in London that U.S. military thought was 'a blowback from Pearl Harbour'.

The basic problem facing American military planners in 1948 was that they had insufficient money, equipment and manpower to fulfill the requirements of an emergency war plan for Europe. Thus, just two weeks after the distribution of the Pentagon Paper – which meant almost nothing if the United States did not have the physical resources to back up a political commitment – the Joint Chiefs of Staff approved a war plan based on the premise that Europe could not be defended to the extent of deterring aggression. There would have to be a reinvasion. It was just this which worried West Europeans, especially the French. The Truman Administration was mindful of their worries but felt unable and unwilling to do a great deal more. The President was determined to cut defence expenditure. In fiscal year 1947 it was held to $14.4 billion; in fiscal 1948 it dropped to $11.7 billion and for fiscal 1949 the budget was proposed at $11 billion. Marshall told Bevin that, rather than increase the military budget, Truman was prepared to cut it in order to safeguard ERP. Lovett told the French Ambassador in Washington that the only way to get more money for the Pentagon was deficit financing, and that the President would not countenance. He added that from Europe's point of view the two worst things which could happen in 1948 would be a return to deficit financing: it would cause 'the immediate abandonment of ERP' and might fuel Congressional exasperation that West Europeans were not carrying their share of the security burden that Americans 'would revert to isolationism'.

The discrepancy between resources and commitments, and the priority given to the Marshall Plan, meant that - in military terms - it was not possible for the conclusions of the Pentagon Paper, and the assumptions which underpinned them, to be explicitly stated in the Vandenberg Resolution. Nowhere is this more clearly evident than in the emergency war plan approved in the wake of the Pentagon talks. It was code-named HALFWOON. 32

As originally drafted, HALFWOON was approved by American, British and Canadian military personnel during talks in Washington from 12 to 21 April 1948. They agreed that it would serve as the basis of 'unilateral but accordant' planning in each country. 33 Had the French known about the plan's precise contents it would have confirmed all their suspicions - dating from de Gaulle's wartime difficulties with Churchill and Roosevelt - about an Anglo-Saxon condominium. Simply stated, the plan was predicated on a number of assumptions.
The occupation troops of the three countries would withdraw from continental Europe virtually the moment hostilities occurred. The Western hemisphere was to be insulated against attack. The United Kingdom was to be made secure, initially by the British alone, subsequently assisted by U.S. and Commonwealth forces. And, lines of communication to and from Middle East oil terminals through the Mediterranean Sea were held to be of overriding importance in the later stages of World War III. It was assumed that the British Commonwealth, the continental Western Union nations and countries in Latin America would be allies of the three powers. In addition, Turkey, Spain, Norway, Iraq, Iran, Pakistan, Afghanistan, Saudi Arabia, Egypt, Palestine, Trans-Jordan, Syria, Lebanon and the Yemen would become allies if attacked by Soviet forces.
From a purely American standpoint HALFMOON was the basis of all military judgements which had to be made in 1948. It was the yardstick against which demands for greater U.S. commitments were measured by the Pentagon. However, the plan was not definitive. First, it had to be put together without any political guidance from the Truman Administration. The following war objectives were therefore not sanctioned: to compel a Soviet retreat to pre-1939 boundaries and to ensure that the Soviet Union abandoned policies of political and military aggression. The plan was thus not Truman's military version of John Foster Dulles' policy in the 1950s of 'rollback' and liberation in Eastern Europe. Secondly, while the plan was significant because it represented the first time U.S. military officers from all Services found themselves in agreement on basic principles, there were fierce arguments about roles and missions currently taking place. HALFMOON was an outline emergency plan. It had yet to be filled out by subsidiary plans from each of the armed services; there was no guarantee that these could be integrated into the overall concept. Thirdly, HALFMOON was the basis for major procurement programmes: new bombers for the Air Force; larger carriers for the Navy. If budgetary stringency forced the abandonment of, or serious modification to, such programmes the plan itself would be effected. Finally, there was no room in the plan for those smaller-scale contingencies - in Greece, Palestine or Korea - which many military men regarded as the most likely to threaten the non-communist world.

Nevertheless, HALFMOON had a considerable bearing on the immediate future shape of transatlantic relations. If the Pentagon Paper represented what some State Department considered to be desirable HALFMOON was what the Defense Department as a whole presented as the
optimum. The absence of any undertaking to defend Western Europe on the River Rhine meant that the French and the Benelux nations were being abandoned for the time being. Their cooperation – assumed in the Pentagon Paper – in such arrangements was thus most unlikely. They believed that World War III would be like World War II only worse. No plan so redolent of the previous war and their experience of military occupation could hope to gain their acceptance. However, they could not know that in participating in HALFMOON the Americans had conceded that, notwithstanding the atomic bomb, the United States could not go it alone. If they could convince the United States to deal with them on the equal basis apparently accorded to the Canadians and British, their security could be assured. This they succeeded in doing when the North Atlantic Treaty was signed. But before that war plans had to be modified.

The American planners were well aware that HALFMOON had some major flaws. The first of these was a consciousness of the expected failure to bring another general war centred on Europe to a rapid and successful conclusion. The plan covered only the first year of fighting but rested on the presumption of a long war. Ironically although this could scarcely reassure the West Europeans, the Russians – if they knew of HALFMOON through British or other sources – could take some comfort from this. Had they confronted a United States that was confident of a quick victory, that believed as everyone had done in 1914 of the 'short war', their grounds for fear would have been multiplied many times. It is axiomatic in the study of international relations that wars are usually not begun by a state unless a swift and satisfactory result is believed possible by its leaders. HALFMOON carried no offensive threat, nor did it connote an American willingness to
defend Western Europe. It stood instead as a promise that at some point after the vast U.S. war-making potential had been mobilised, American forces would cross the Atlantic for the third time in the twentieth century to rescue the Europeans from the consequences of their internecine rivalries. It was probably with regret and conviction that the U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff approved the sentence in HALFMOON which stipulated 'occupation troops will be withdrawn from Europe as expeditiously as possible' when an invasion from the East was deemed to have begun. 34

The second of the flaws was related to the period of conflict and concerned the atomic bomb. With the limited forces available there seemed no way to avoid a costly and lengthy war. UMT was designed to shorten the period in which U.S. reserves could reach combat readiness. Particularly striking, in the light of the subsequent heavy bias towards nuclear weapons in NATO's strategy of defence and deterrence, is the way in which American planners had no confidence in 1948 that the atomic bomb provided a potential solution to their problem. Nor did the planners equate military effectiveness with the destructive power offered by the American monopoly over atomic bombs:

It is difficult to forecast the duration of...the war since there is no yardstick or formula known whereby the over-all effect of the atomic bomb can be calculated, this being particularly applicable to the psychological effect [on the Soviet Union]. 35

HALFMOON assumed that permission to use the weapon would be obtained and that the stockpile available on the day of mobilisation would be delivered as quickly as possible to selected targets in the Soviet
Union. But the planners did not assume this air offensive would stop
the Soviet Armies' advance. They agreed with the American planners'
earlier assessment that 'a successful treatment of the USSR with
atomic and conventional bombs would materially reduce Allied
requirements'. In short, the atomic bomb would allow the Allies to
inflict upon Soviet cities the kind of destruction visited upon
Tokyo, Hamburg and Coventry during the last war but at a lower cost
in men, equipment and time. They took the view later popularised
by the British scientist, P.M.S. Blackett, that the atomic bomb was
just another weapon: it was not the single or sufficient condition
of military success.36

Nevertheless the atomic bomb's importance was not discounted entirely.
Henry Kissinger recalled: 'We added the atomic bomb to our arsenal
without integrating its implications into our thinking, because we
saw it merely as another tool in a concept of warfare which knew no
goal save total victory, and no mode of war except all-out war'.37
But American planners still wanted to use bases in Britain, India,
the Middle East and the Japanese archipelago to launch 'an air
offensive in strength, exploiting to the utmost the destructive power
and psychological effects of the atomic bombs'. The Secretary of
Defense, James V. Forrestal, deplored later what he called 'a mistaken
idea of the value of atomic bombs' and he poured scorn on the notion,
prevalent amongst officers of the U.S. Air Force, that a plane leaving
Maine, loaded with atomic bombs, aiming to fly over the Kremlin, would
make Stalin 'roll over and quit'. But he also recognised that the
atomic bomb was the only weapon the United States had which could be
used quickly.38
Although atomic weapons were only a part of HALFMOON's overall concept, their importance can be gauged from the fact that Truman vetoed the entire contingency plan precisely because of the atomic weapon component. For some time, the Armed forces had been trying to gain control over the custody of the weapon, but as Truman told David Lilienthal, 'As long as I am in the White House I will be opposed to taking atomic bombs away' from the Atomic Energy Commission. He told Forrestal that he did not propose 'to have some dashing Lieutenant Colonel decide when would be the proper time to drop one'. On 6 May 1948, Truman rejected HALFMOON and asked that an identical plan be prepared but without the assumption that atomic weapons would be used. He would not sanction the bomb even for planning purposes because, as his chief military adviser, Admiral William D. Leahy, recorded in his diary, firstly, a way might be found to outlaw atomic weapons through the United Nations and, secondly, Truman felt that American public opinion 'would not permit the use of the bombs for aggressive purposes'.

It was not until 13 September 1948, that Truman would agree to the planning of the use of atomic weapons as an integral part of U.S. preparations for war. According to Forrestal, he told a White House meeting of the JCS and Service Secretaries that he prayed he would not have to make a decision to use them again 'but that if it became necessary, no-one need have any misgivings but that he would do so...'. But by then the Soviet blockade of Berlin had greatly intensified the Cold War. By September, even George Marshall, who earlier had been against the inclusion of atomic weapons as part of planning, had changed his mind. He quoted John Foster Dulles with evident approval as having said that the use of atomic weapons in
the event of war was a foregone conclusion because 'the American people would execute you if you did not use the bomb'. He wrote that he had told the Norwegian Foreign Minister on 20 November 1948 that in his judgement:

[The main deterrent to Soviet aggression has been the possession by the United States of the atomic bomb. I added that until recently I thought the Soviet leaders probably had felt that the American people would never permit the use of the bomb but that in the light of developments of recent months, including Berlin, and of developments here that I felt the Soviet leaders must now realise that the use of this instrument would be possible and hence the deterrent influence now was perhaps greater than heretofor.]42

Such views, however, were not being generally expressed by Truman, Marshall or the State Department in April.

Their actions and statements in mid-1948 seem to have been conditioned by the cautiously optimistic assessments of the intentions of the Soviet Union then being made by American intelligence agencies. Contrary to Kennan's later claim that the 'war scare' of March 1948 - in the wake of the coup in Czechoslovakia - had been irresponsibly engineered by the military and intelligence establishments, the Central Intelligence Agency told President Truman on 30 March: 'The preponderance of available evidence and of considerations derived from the "logic of the situation", supports the conclusion that the USSR will not resort to direct military action during 1948'. The CIA suggested that the Soviet Politburo did not want war because the politicians involved were 'always suspicious of the military. War would again bring the military to the fore and might constitute a real or imagined threat to the Party leaders'.43 The Joint Intelligence
Committee based at the American Embassy in Moscow felt that war was not probable in 1948 but 'far more likely to develop between one and two years' later. However, even this conclusion was heavily qualified:

[The] inability of the Soviet Union to defeat the United States within a period of a few years and to prevent widespread devastation of Soviet territory would jeopardize the life of the Communist regime....In any case, it would appear, at the present time, as though the eventual outcome of a long war would be a gamble and therefore to be undertaken by the Kremlin only as a last resort.

The Joint Intelligence Committee felt the Soviet Union would risk war only if it felt that the combined United States and Western European military strength were slowly being built up, putting the Soviet Union to increasingly greater disadvantage. If, however, the Soviet Union was confronted with 'a rapid and positive growth of United States and Western European strength', then the Kremlin would 'defer military action'. It would concentrate instead upon the consolidation of its hold over its satellites while putting pressure on the West's colonial and dependent areas in the Middle and Far East and awaiting 'the natural weakening of the capitalist system'.

The essence of this interpretation was that time was on the side of the United States. This contrasted with the gloomier forecasts of military and intelligence personnel based in Washington. On 16 March, the CIA advised Truman that war 'was not probable within sixty days'. Two weeks later this tenuous forecast was extended, though the USAF was reportedly unwilling to associate itself even with that slight extension. The Moscow-based analysts took a longer view. With the
pessimism of all military men, the Joint Intelligence Committee felt bound to say that war was always a possibility but, equally, felt that the Kremlin, 'with the usual patient historical perspective of Communists', would await a more favourable moment in the future before initiating the 'inevitable' collision between communism and capitalism. This, in turn, would give the United States time to institute 'compulsory military training, expeditious implementation of the Marshall Plan and the extension of military guarantees to Western Union'.

Although not instigated solely because of the Moscow Embassy's recommendations, these three proposals became the main supports of American foreign policy. Selective Service was extended, but, as some had predicted, UMT failed to get through Congress; ERP legislation was hurried through after the communist coup in Prague. However, the extension of military guarantees to Western Union was not accomplished until the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation was fully developed. Military guarantees required a much closer degree of joint planning than that represented by HALFWON. Nevertheless, during April 1948 there was the beginnings of an awareness within the Pentagon that the strategic concept of HALFWON - retreat from Europe followed sometime later by liberation - was completely at variance with U.S. foreign policy and national objectives. When every effort ought to have been made to preserve Western Europe, in line with every public statement on foreign policy made by the President and his two Secretaries of State since the war, James Byrne and George Marshall, HALFWON abandoned Western Europe to the oncoming Soviets without more than a token struggle.
This inconsistency between foreign policy objectives and military planning was noted by one of the most independent thinkers in the U.S. military establishment, Admiral Louis Denfeld, the Chief of Naval Operations. He argued that a strategy to retain at least part of Western Europe was not only necessary but also feasible because of the creation of Western Union. He therefore urged that a realistic and appropriate strategy would be to assist, as far as resources allowed, Western Union to establish a defensive line on the Rhine. He pointed out that any other strategy meant that the manpower, economic resources and industrial capacity, together with the benefits of ERP, would be handed over to the Russians. The concept of operations on which HALFMOON was based could only spread despair and defeatism in Western Europe. It would also do virtually nothing to protect oil supplies. However, Denfeld reserved his strongest arguments for the reliance on the atomic bomb to diminish Soviet war-making and war-fighting capabilities. He doubted that defeat could be imposed in this way: 'We shall have lost so much territory, so many allies, strategic positions and vital resources, and so much time as seriously to jeopardize the possibilities for ultimate victory'. He added that Soviet capabilities had been unnecessarily overestimated and the opportunity for sabotage and subversion in the United States itself was unduly pessimistic.

At first, Denfeld's ideas fell on stony ground. Military posture was seen to be so weak as to preclude any such ambitious plan, no matter how desirable. In a Presidential Directive of 13 May 1948, Truman reviewed his 17 March speech. He explained that because of the shortage in trained Army personnel there would soon have to be a
withdrawal of American troops from Korea while the occupation forces in Japan and Germany were at a 'minimum'. The Army was losing its strength at the rate of about 5,000 men per month and Truman observed 'our mobile forces available for movement abroad or for home defence were only 30,000'. It was pointed out that the British could barely keep the peace in Palestine with more than 90,000 men, most of whom had seen some action during the Second World War. James Forrestal told a group of Congressmen in April that the Army situation was 'alarming', particularly its inability to supply trained and usable troops 'to seize or hold bases overseas'.49

Nevertheless, as time went on, Denfeld's point became more respectable within the Pentagon. Even HALFWOON planners had acknowledged that the shortcomings of the plan were the inadequate provision of assistance to the countries of Western Europe. Consideration was even given to holding the Rhine or a large foothold on the continent, but the weight of the plan fell behind the evacuation of American troops from Germany and Austria through France and Italy and the evacuation of British troops through Dunkirk. A start had been made, however, and from late April American planners began to think in terms of involving themselves in the Western Union planning activities. General Gruenther was told on April 26:

We cannot under any circumstances permit Britain, France and Benelux to go forward with military plans in which we do not participate. They will be allies in war and it would be military folly to let them plan in such a way as not to complement US plans. They might actually peril our own plans.50
No doubt put this way, the idea of substituting Western Union-American planning for the Anglo-Canadian-American version was attractive to the JCS. But the implications worried them. They advised Forrestal if such planning with Western Union resulted in 'action in advance of adequate military readiness on our part should lead unavoidably to major military commitments', the consequences would be 'very grave indeed'. They wanted no agreement which 'might unduly influence or jeopardize our optimum over-all global strategy in favor of either direct military assistance or distribution of equipment'. More than anything else, the JCS wanted to ensure that the United States was precluded from 'being drawn into any command arrangements capable of being expanded prematurely into an allied control council for global strategy....It is essential that we retain maximum freedom in strategic matters'.

The U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff had foreseen what no-one else had, namely that joint planning with European Allies would result in Europeans having a considerable voice in American military policy as a whole, not merely with respect to the defence of Western Europe. They agreed that Western Union needed arms aid from the United States and recognised this as being a desirable aim for future accomplishment but they opposed any large-scale shipments because they would interfere seriously with the already depleted supplies available to American armed forces. Nothing was to be allowed to meddle with the primary task of satisfying American arms needs. There should be no distortion of strategy just because arms aid was needed to meet foreign needs without regard to existing strategic plans.
Within the military wing of Truman's Administration two clear positions had been taken regarding America's possible response to the perceived threat from the Soviet Union. By April 1948, the military planners had taken the rather hopeless view that, at least in the short term, there was nothing the United States could do in the event of a Soviet attack into Western Europe or anywhere else. At the same time, responsible elements in the intelligence community considered such views to be alarmist and inappropriate because the implementation of the proper steps soon would preclude such an attack from taking place at all. But these two schools of thought did not embrace all official opinion relating to U.S. military policy. As David Lilienthal remarked of policy-making within the National Military Establishment (NME), the Pentagon was an area of 'chaos and conflict and carnage confounded', a remark which applied equally well to matters of defence and national security generally. 52

This became especially apparent when the National Security Council (NSC) entered the debate on 30 March 1948. Under the National Security Act of 1947, the NSC had been given the responsibility of reporting to the President on 'the integration of domestic, foreign and military policies' in order that all branches of the Executive concerned with defence and national security could cooperate together effectively. The NSC's job was to reconcile for Truman the debates within the State Department about policy towards Western Europe with the debates within the Department of Defense and NME, while at the same time recognising the constraints on military policy which Truman's budgetary limits had necessarily imposed on both Departments. Not surprisingly, it failed to do this. In fact, it aggravated the problem. 53
During March, the NSC had considered the whole question of 'The Position of the United States with Respect to Soviet-Directed World Communism' and its report bearing this title, was circulated to State and Defense on 30 March, known by its reference number NSC 7. The opening sentence of the report set the tone: 'The ultimate objective of Soviet-directed world communism is the domination of the world'. Outside the rumblings from the U.S. Air Force about the need to launch a preemptive atomic strike against the Soviet Union, NSC 7 was the purest expression of militant anti-communism voiced at a high level within the Truman Administration in the first half of 1948:

The United States is the only source of power capable of mobilizing successful opposition to the communist goal of world conquest. Between the United States and the USSR there are in Europe and Asia areas of great potential power which if added to the existing strength of the Soviet world would enable the latter to become as superior in manpower, resources and territory that the prospect for the survival of the United States as a free nation would be slight. In these circumstances the USSR has engaged the United States in a struggle for power, or 'cold war', in which our national security is at stake and from which we cannot withdraw short of eventual national suicide.54

The NSC felt that frustration of the Soviet Union's global goals could not be achieved by a 'defensive policy'. In an argument which prefigured John Foster Dulles' opposition to containment in the early 1950s when he espoused the 'New Look policies', the NSC said: 'A defensive policy by attempting to be strong everywhere runs the risk of being weak everywhere. It leaves the initiative to the Kremlin...' Instead, the United States had to organise 'a world-wide counter offensive against Soviet-directed world communism'. This, it was envisaged, involved 'mobilizing and strengthening our own and anti-
communist forces in the non-Soviet world' and also undermining the
strength of the communist forces in the Soviet world by supporting
underground resistance movements behind the Iron Curtain. 55

The NSC recommended three broad areas in which Western strength could
be built up, all of which involved domestic and foreign considerations.
Firstly, there had to be a 'strengthening of the military potential of
the United States', above all by the maintenance of 'US superiority in
atomic weapons'. Steps were to be taken promptly to establish some form
of compulsory military service and the armaments industry was to be
reconstituted. Machine tools and technical information were to be
sent abroad to facilitate the reconstitution of the arms industries
of 'selected non-communist nations' and to provide for the standard¬
isation of armaments. Secondly, the 'counter-offensive' required the
immediate adoption and implementation by Congress of the Marshall Plan.
Western Union was to be endorsed strongly and its development and
expansion actively encouraged 'as an anti-communist association of
states'. An 'appropriate formula' was to be worked out to use U.S.
military action in the event of an unprovoked attack on Western Union
and to provide for the opening of formal military conversations with
these countries. Thirdly, there was to be a large-scale propaganda
campaign; a 'vigorous and effective ideological campaign', both at
home and abroad. This was to include a programme to suppress the
communist 'menace' within the United States. 56

The significance of NSC 7 was not that it represented the distilled
essence of American hysteria about the Soviet threat but that it was
almost immediately rejected, on the grounds that it had no bearing on
American diplomatic goals and ignored the reality of American military
weakness. Attacks by the State Department and Defense Department, were perhaps inevitable: the very existence of the NSC represented a threat to the primacy each department claimed over its own affairs. Nevertheless, their objections were substantial and cannot be regarded as institutional wounded pride. Lovett, acting in Marshall's absence, thought the paper 'inadequate' and wanted changes to be made to avoid giving the 'false impression' that NSC 7 represented the definitive statement of American foreign policy aims. He agreed with George Kennan and the Policy Planning Staff that Kennan and Marshall should redraft the paper before it was submitted for final approval. Most of all, the PPS was concerned with the wide-ranging nature of the NSC report: its conclusions were 'too general' and its recommendations 'not clear and specific enough'. Despite this appearance of partial approval, it quickly became apparent that Bohlen, Kennan, Hickerson, Henderson and Dean Rusk were opposed to virtually every part of the report.

On 7 April 1948, Lovett received the first of a number of objections to NSC 7. Written by Assistant Secretary of State for Economic Affairs, Willard L. Thorp, William C. Clayton's successor, it was also the most damaging. Thorp was distressed by the wholly negative approach of the NSC. He cited as a special example the idea that Western Union ought not to be regarded as 'an anti-communist association of states' but rather as a 'Pro-Democratic' group which demonstrated a welcome 'reduction in nationalism' in Western Europe and which would help greatly in the development of 'an integrated Europe'. Thorp condemned the notion of supporting only those individuals and parties 'who seem to represent most exactly the political and economic ideology that has been successful in America'. He added, with obvious reference to Bevin and Spaak, that this meant giving support to the moderate Socialist...
parties of Europe'. 'It is not enough', wrote Thorp, 'simply to cut off the heads of communists wherever they appear'. Instead, satisfactory conditions had to be created which would counteract the strong appeal that Communism would naturally exert in the conditions of post-war Western Europe.  

Thorp attacked NSC 7 for not being in line with the twin aims of American policy towards Western Europe embodied in the Marshall Plan: building a strong, single economy and a strong, unified political unit. The opposition of the Joint Chiefs of Staff was based on different arguments. While expressing general agreement with NSC 7's aim of organising a world-wide counter-offensive, the JCS distanced itself from any implications literally involving military action of any consequence at this time, since appropriate readiness was an essential prerequisite to such action: 'From a military viewpoint the JCS must point out the extreme importance to our national security of keeping our military capabilities abreast of our military commitments.' The JCS attacked the NSC plan to rebuild Western Union's armaments industry by sending machine tools and know-how on the grounds that, firstly, this would interfere with American rearmament and, secondly, such machinery would be readily captured by an advancing Soviet Army. The JCS did not object to the theoretical problem of adopting NSC policy as being inappropriate to military strength but protested on practical grounds. Whether from fear or conviction, the Joint Chiefs felt that the difference between America's declaratory policy, as perceived by the NSC, and actual military strength was so great as to invite an attack upon Western Europe or elsewhere. They felt that a 'counter-offensive', unaccompanied by appropriate readiness, would cause the Soviet Union to consider as mandatory an 'immediate initiation of open warfare'.  

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A major reason for the NSC coming under such attack for failing to recognize the goals of American diplomacy, or to account for the military limits to American power, was that the NSC prepared its report without reference to the two Departments principally involved. With its next major venture, NSC 9, a study of how the United States could support Western Union, the national Security Council took a less controversial option and adopted a Policy Planning Paper (PPS 27) on the same subject, making only minor amendments of its own. NSC 9 was circulated on 13 April, only two weeks after NSC 7 had been distributed. Basing its conclusions on PPS 27, the NSC adopted a new, much milder tone and instead of insisting upon a world-wide counter-offensive, of which aid to Western Union was to be but a part, now spoke in terms of some kind of transatlantic treaty. Instead of seeing only the negative side to the Soviet threat, it now emphasised the positive side, saying that fear of 'Soviet-Communist aggression' would notionally help to persuade Western European countries 'to cooperate in close association provided military aid was forthcoming from the United States'.

Although NSC 9 was to be the subject of a spirited attack from George F. Kennan when he returned to the Department after his absence in the Far East and subsequent illness, on the grounds that it was too far-reaching and altogether misguided, it was broadly in keeping with Marshall's diplomacy. The drafters of NSC 9 had concentrated upon what the United States could do realistically 'to give effect to the declaration of 17 March by the President', rather than give vent to an emotive, all-embracing anti-communism. Its conclusions were consequently more cautious and placed stress upon what Europe could do for itself and not merely upon what the United States could do for Europe and everyone
else. It recommended that Western Union be enlarged to include Norway, Sweden, Denmark, Iceland and, if the elections in Italy were 'favourable', Italy. Following Truman's promise to nourish 'unity in Europe' with the support which the situation required, the NSC felt that the United States should not become a member of Western Union. Support was to be offered in two ways: by exploring the possibility of a 'North Atlantic Collective Defence Agreement' between the United States and an enlarged Western Union, plus the addition of Canada, Eire and Portugal as purely 'North Atlantic' states; and by initiating immediately military conversations with Western Union in order to strengthen collective security through the co-ordination of military production and supply'.

In contrast to the lack of consultation with, and subsequent attacks from, other departments which had characterised NSC 7, NSC 9 seems an assiduous attempt to appease all concerned. NSC 9 represented the path of least resistance. The Atlantic lobby within the State Department was acknowledged by the recognition that Western European weakness compelled a military response from the United States in the form of a treaty. This was immediately qualified by the reservation that the United States would be the final arbiter on American actions in the event of an attack. Those within the State Department who wished to build Western Union into something greater, and not see it submerged by an Atlantic agreement, were mollified by the recommendation that Western Union be enlarged and remain a separate entity within a still larger Atlantic group. The military establishment were told that the purpose of giving military aid was not just to encourage unity in Western Europe. Military help, the NSC made clear, was to be given on a reciprocal basis, thus forcing 'resolute action' on Western Union's part and so, by implication, reducing the demands upon American resources.
And the JCS had already come to the conclusion that American military planners ought to be present at Western Union's planning councils.
NSC 9 also included recognition of the special importance and larger global reach of the Anglo-American relationship: there was to be an announcement by the President that the non-inclusion of Greece, Turkey or Iran in the arrangements ought not to be interpreted as a neglect by the British or American governments of these three states' political independence or territorial integrity. The deep concern of James Forrestal and the JCS for the strategic importance of the Middle East was embodied in the suggestion for some general Middle East security system. 63

NSC 9 contained no alarmist assessments of the speed with which the Soviet Armies could reach the Pyrenees. The NSC now felt that a North Atlantic Collective Defence Treaty would be 'the instrument... to preserve Western Civilisation'. It relied greatly on the promise of American military help being sufficient to deter a Soviet invasion and to build on the work of the Marshall Plan to restore confidence in Western Europe generally while doing nothing to upset the progress towards unity within Western Europe as a whole. In short, bearing in mind the depressing reality behind U.S. military plans, the NSC managed to make it appear that American diplomacy and military policy were moving in the same direction. It did this by resorting to a large measure of bluff, a bluff which could work only if both the Kremlin and Western Europe were taken in and accepted Washington's promises at face value.

On 20 April 1948, the Acting Secretary of State, Lovett, cabled Marshall in riot-torn Bogotá with the news of NSC 9 and of the early talks with
Vandenberg about a Senate resolution. The cable makes it clear that opinion within the State Department was beginning to harden in favour of a transatlantic treaty, a suggestion first made by the Policy Planning Staff (in the absence of George Kennan), picked up in the Pentagon Paper and subsequently enshrined in NSC 9. Marshall was told of a statement Truman could make to begin developments along this line: invitations would be issued to Western Union's five countries, the four Scandinavian nations (other than Finland), Eire, Italy and Portugal to attend a conference to examine the general idea of a multilateral treaty based on U.N. Charter Article 51 and following the basic lines of the Rio Treaty. The President would also make some reference to the desirability of enlarging Western Union and expressing American willingness to discuss military aid and to participate in military conversations. 64

Before replying three days later, Marshall consulted his military advisor in Bogotá, Lt. General Matthew B. Ridgeway. He accepted Ridgeway's view that it was undesirable to express publicly a willingness to participate in military talks. Marshall also cautioned against giving anything which could be interpreted as a military guarantee to Greece, Turkey or Iran. It would be unwise, he cabled, 'to involve the danger and the invitation for a dispersal of our forces when concentration appears to be the wisest course especially in view of our present limitations.' He did not want to 'spread our activity over far too widespread an area'. 65 During the Second World War, he had been the greatest exponent of the Clausewitzian doctrine of concentrated forces in battle and it is worth noting that if Marshall ever did accept the implications of 'Mr. X' George Kennan's
strategy of 'the adroit and vigilant application of counter-force at a series of constantly shifting geographical and political points, corresponding to the shifts and manoeuvres of Soviet policy' then he did so against his deepest military instincts. 66

Marshall arrived back in Washington on 24 April and immediately involved himself in the conversations with Vandenberg and Dulles. He told them he was anxious that the planned resolution could be justified in terms of the Monroe Doctrine and he cited arrangements during the two world wars which might be used as precedents. He now firmly rejected the idea of a separate arrangement for the Eastern Mediterranean and the Middle East, saying that Greece and Turkey already enjoyed American protection - the Truman Doctrine still applied - but that anything more would be 'an empty gesture on which we might be called and thereafter disclose our inability to make good'. 67

From this point, the end of April, it may have seemed that the path towards a North Atlantic treaty would be straightforward. The State Department as a whole regarded a treaty as the least that could be done; the NME felt it was the most that could be offered; and the NSC had endorsed both positions. Marshall was not opposed to the general idea and the Western Europeans were only too happy to see their wishes granted. But now Kennan returned to his desk and, on bringing his considerable influence and intellect to bear on the proposal, attitudes changed rapidly within the State Department. It was this change which Hickerson communicated to the British at the close of the Pentagon talks when he indicated that the idea of a treaty was meeting serious opposition in the Department. 68
On 29 April, Kennan addressed a memorandum to both Marshall and Lovett, giving his and Charles E. Bohlen's thoughts on the work done so far regarding Western Union:

I believe that the appeals from Bevin and Bidault spring primarily not from a worry about whether we would be on their side in the event they are attacked by Russia, but from this feeling that we do not have any agreed concept between ourselves and themselves as to what we would do in the event of a Russian attack, and particularly what steps, if any, could be taken to save the continental members of the Brussels Union from the dual catastrophe of Russian invasion and subsequent military liberation. I suspect that their fears on this account have been heightened by reports of the attitude prevailing in some parts of our military establishment and of the U.S. press to the effect that there would be absolutely no point in our considering plans for stopping or delaying a Russian advance anywhere in Western Europe, since the Russians "have the capability of overrunning all of Europe and the Middle East".

Kennan felt that there was no need for 'a public political and military alliance' because the very presence of American troops between Western Europe and the Russians was an adequate guarantee that the United States would be at war the moment a Soviet attack took place. What was needed were 'realistic staff talks to see what can be done about their defence'. He opposed 'the sort of thing which has been under discussion this week with Senator Vandenberg and Mr. Dulles', at least for the moment:

I fear that to advance along these lines before we have gone into the military realities may not only fail to achieve our main purpose of giving the Western Europeans an adequate sense of security but may even open up rifts among the Western Europeans which would be highly undesirable at this moment.
Kennan wanted the Western European-American 'exploratory staff talks' to determine what could be done to co-ordinate military measures in the event of war with Russia. He wanted 'further exploratory soundings on the political level', to establish precisely the nature of the Western European outlook. 70

Kennan felt that if the staff talks proved satisfactory, there would be an end to the pleadings of Bevin and Bidault for American guarantees in the form of a treaty. To this end, Kennan urged that the U.S. military establishment be persuaded of

the desirability, from the immediate political and psychological standpoint, of convincing the Western Europeans that we have not made up our minds to complete defeatism with respect to Western Europe and are willing to explore with them all serious suggestions as to how a Russian advance could be at least delayed and impeded in the early stages and possibly eventually halted at some point or another. 71

In effect, Kennan counter-proposal to the NSC's reliance upon bluff was to change American war plans so as to provide U.S. help to stop a Soviet advance into Western Europe. By giving the peoples of free Europe the assurance of American military support, their governments would stop making impossible military demands on Washington. Although Kennan subsequently claimed that his 'Mr. X' article had been misunderstood because he never intended to preach the value of military confrontation with the Soviet Union as he saw the Soviet threat in political terms, manifesting itself mainly in fermenting unrest generally and by subversion, the memorandum quoted above suggests still another dimension to the story. The reason Kennan felt compelled to advocate a greater American military commitment to Europe was not
that he saw an immediate and present danger of a Soviet demarche but rather that European fears and expectations were so high, and so centred on military matters, that the United States was left with no option in the matter.

If either Marshall or Lovett formally replied to Kennan's memorandum then copies of their replies seem to be missing from the State Department archives. However, the records do show that from early May, Kennan's views began to be translated directly into action. There was no attempt to stop the Senate resolution from being presented but Lovett began to emphasise the importance of military aid and the co-ordination of military production and supply, rather than holding out prospects of an Atlantic Pact. This was the line taken by Ambassador Lewis Douglas in London in conversations with Bevin. Lovett continually told the Senate Foreign Relations Committee that the United States did not intend to join any new regional arrangement but would only be 'associated' with it. This point emerged strongly from the eventual debate on the Senate floor on Resolution 239, it being generally agreed that whatever might occur in the future, any arrangement with Western Europe was 'not to go as far as the Rio Treaty'.

As Marshall said, American policy would be limited to helping Western Union's inalienable right to self defence, recognised by the U.N. Charter, but only promised American 'encouragement and support to such arrangements'. Despite a well-reported speech by Louis St. Laurent, the Canadian Minister for External Affairs, strongly supporting the creation of an 'Atlantic Pact' on 28 April, Marshall and Lovett continued to hope that the passage of the Senate Resolution, coupled with Staff talks in Europe, would be all that would be required
to give effect to Truman's speech on 17 March.\textsuperscript{74}

The opportunity to open 'realistic staff talks' was greatly helped by developments in London. On 5 May, Marshall was informed of the planned formation of the Western Union Defence Organisation, designed to be like a four-storey building:

On the top floor are the National Defense Ministers: the third floor has the Chiefs of Staff; the second floor the ambassador's Committee of London with a permanent Secretariat...; the first floor, committee of special military representatives...

Western Union had invited 'an American observer' and the special military committee was to draw up reports 'using similar methods to those employed for the Marshall Plan (seeking out what they have and what they need)'.\textsuperscript{75} Lovett had told the Ambassadors of the Western European countries that American aid would have to be limited to the co-ordination of military production and supply together with a general commitment along the lines of the Truman Doctrine but now strengthened by a Senate Resolution and covering all Western Europe. Senator Vandenberg proved helpful over the need to restrict the resolution to approving 'associate' status and Western Union had finally begun the difficult task of integrating Western Europe's disparate military forces. The newly-formed defence organisation in London not only would serve as the focus for the projected military talks but Western Union members had already accepted the need to determine first of all, as with the Marshall Plan, what Western Europe could do for itself before asking for specific military aid and matérielle.
There was also a significant reduction of tension within the State Department. The long-running disagreement between George Kennan and John Hickerson appeared to be over at last, with Hickerson seeming to capitulate entirely to Kennan's views. Hickerson now abandoned his earlier belief in the primacy of an Atlantic Alliance as outlined in the Pentagon Paper and NSC 9. In a major review of NSC 9, later coded NSC 9/3, Hickerson and Kennan considered the idea of such an Alliance as a last resort, to be contemplated only if all other efforts 'to bolster public confidence in Western Europe' failed. Instead, all efforts to strengthen Europe's confidence and 'to reduce the risk of war' by deterring possible aggressors, were to be augmented by U.S. military representatives observing the London Five Power military talks; their task was to help draw up combined war plans and the necessary logistical supply arrangements. The Americans were not to participate; merely to observe and give advice. 76

Central to the joint Kennan/Hickerson proposal was the idea that the United States should

...seek to convince [Western Union] of the wisdom of proceeding with military talks during the next several months without seeking any U.S. commitment more formal than that given in the President's March 17 message and the Senate Resolution at least until there has been more time for the development and practical implementation of the Brussels Treaty system. 77

Lovett used the same words when communicating this policy to the American embassies in Western Europe. It was a restatement of Marshall's earlier ideas about holding back on American commitment pending closer integration in Western Europe. A more formal commitment,
possibly but not necessarily in the form of a treaty, would be a reward for progress towards Western European unity. As such, it was entirely in keeping with the Truman Administration's constant search since the end of hostilities for the minimum military effort required to prevent communist aggression. The Marshall Plan precedent had again been followed: the United States would screen estimates only when Western Union had determined what it could do to help itself.

In keeping with the precedent of ERP, there now appeared another reason why the arguments of the Atlantic lobby lost some of their former force. Ambassador Lewis W. Douglas reported from London at the end of April that the British Government was apparently playing exactly the same game in the Western Union military talks as it had played in Paris the previous year during the preliminary talks on the organisation and distribution methods of Marshall Aid. Douglas reported that:

> Benelux representatives felt they were disposed to go faster and further than the British in endowing Western Union with effective power and cited as example British tendency to limit role of permanent organ and secretariat....Western Union had taken shape remarkably quick and intimated it would be a pity to slow down or lose momentum because of British reluctance to have adequate authority granted to the organisation.78

This was unwelcome news to Marshall. He replied that while he wished to see 'any concrete progress toward greater unity of thought and action between the nations of Western Europe', he felt, as he had done earlier, that any public statement to that effect was 'not appropriate'. To make such a statement would be to appear to meddle with the internal affairs of Western Union and to interfere with British policy, a
Nevertheless, Marshall did not want to see Britain pull out of, or even weaken, Western Union. If the United States now came out strongly in favour of the Atlantic approach, the British would inevitably see this as an excuse to downgrade the importance of the Brussels Pact. The Pentagon Paper embodied the kind of Atlantic co-operation - albeit without the participation of the continental Europeans - which provided exactly that opportunity. Existing military plans were also a considerable embarrassment in this connection: Britain could not be expected to play the leading role in Western Union if the Anglo-Canadian-American intention to evacuate troops from Europe became known publicly. The British had an even longer tradition of aloofness from European affairs than the Americans. If the United States demonstrated that an arms-length relationship with Western Europe suited its purposes best, then the United Kingdom - occupying its self-determined, mid-Atlantic position - would be compelled to do likewise. As Kennan pointed out, rumours about HALFMOON were both accurate in their essentials and most destructive of European confidence and morale. As a first step towards a political repudiation of that plan, Douglas told Marshall on 4 May 1948 that he had arranged an early meeting with military planners in London to discuss a commitment to establish a clear defensive line on either the Elbe or Rhine rivers.

Neither Douglas' cable containing this news, nor Marshall's acknowledgement, gives any hint of the momentous importance of this step. It was not until after the Korean War that actual American plans were to change.
Nevertheless, the importance of the new policy in the State Department can scarcely be overrated. Prior to this, American policy towards Europe had been in chaos. Truman may have promised 'the support which the situation deserves' but he left considerable scope for American action or inaction and, of course, omitted any reference to U.S. strategic plans. Bevin may have been promised that 'good progress' at the Five Power Military talks would be rewarded with an American willingness to join, at an early date, discussions on military production and supply. But there was no scheme to increase American military output except to build a 70-group airforce and, even then, Bevin was told specifically that 'no consideration was being given to make heavy bombers available' to Britain or Western Union. The Senate might have been preparing the Vandenberg Resolution but the French, in reply to a question as to whether the United States was 'contemplating guaranteeing the frontiers of Western Europe, were told by Theodore C. Achilles that the United States was 'very definitely not thinking of any such thing'. Marshall might have told Kennan that the French 'are secure....as long as the three power occupation of Germany was of unforseeable and indefinite duration, thus offering protracted security guarantees', but this did not take into consideration Truman's deep concern about the declining numbers in the U.S. Army and the effect this reduction was having on the occupation forces' effectiveness.

Western Europe's safety might, ultimately, have depended upon the American monopoly over atomic weapons but, in May 1948, the President refused to consider even the possibility of their use as outlined in HALFWOON. NSC 9, originally planned to provide the blueprint for an Atlantic Alliance, became NSC 9/3 under Kennan's influence which
proposed little more than the promise of military equipment and joint war planning with the Western Union's newly-established defence organisation. In that this might have left Western Europe reliant solely upon the atomic bomb, the French were sceptical. Bidault felt that the Russians would discount the bombs ever being used by the American 'naifs' who would 'wait too long'. Even the limited proposals of NSC 9/3 came under attack from the JCS:

We should not be committed to any military plans that might unduly influence or even jeopardize optimum overall global strategy in favor of either direct military assistance or distribution of equipment.

NSC 9/3 eventually became the basis on which the American military delegation was sent to London in late June to participate as observers in the development of Western Union's military planning.

But it was from the moment that Douglas announced the change in Anglo-American plans that the American commitment to the defence of Western Europe really began. The rejection by the State Department of a full-scale withdrawal followed by a replay of the Normandy landings, and the subsequent decision to compel the NME to alter its own plans in line with American diplomatic goals, marked the decisive moment in the development of the North Atlantic Treaty. The United States was committed by deeds, not merely promises. This crucial change had been brought about not by fear of an imminent Soviet attack but by the clear-eyed recognition that if the United States did not plan to defend a line at the Rhine, Western Union would not long survive as a unit. Given, in Lewis Douglas's words, 'our interest in Western European unity', the British tendency to stand aloof from Western
Europe would have to be undermined. This could only be done by giving a military commitment to the defence of Western Europe as a whole. For good or ill, the United States of America had become entangled in the affairs of Europe.

* * *

In tracing the developments which preceded the Senate's acceptance of the Vandenberg Resolution, two apparently contradictory impulses can be seen to have come together. On the one hand, there is the tendency on the part of the United States to stand back and thereby compel the West Europeans to do more for themselves, and ultimately create a politically lasting, economically self-sufficient and militarily secure coalition. The phrase 'self help and mutual aid' sums up the American attitude described in the previous chapter and it is consistent with the views already noted of Marshall and Lovett from the beginning of 1948. On the other hand, in this chapter, it is clear that military considerations muddied the seeming clarity of those American objectives. The putative allies of the United States took little or no comfort from their superpower patron's atomic monopoly. They remained, quite simply, frightened. The Brussels Pact, as its founders had known from the beginning, could not defend Western Europe without direct U.S. assistance. Yet at that moment existing military plans promised only chaos if hostilities broke out. Western Union forces would be moving eastwards to meet the challenge, including the British, who over and above their undertakings in HALFMOON would probably have honoured their continental commitment. At the same time U.S. forces were to be withdrawn westwards because logistically they could not be sustained. There was thus no choice but to harmonise the
respective plans of the Anglo-Canadian-American group with those of the Anglo-French-Benelux group.

The result of the two impulses fusing was paradoxical: if the United States was ever to succeed in convincing the West Europeans to stand on their own feet, it would have to be seen by them to do more on their behalf. That paradox was fundamental to a succession of developments, beginning with the Vandenberg Resolution. It lay at the heart of the North Atlantic Treaty, the emergent structure of NATO, and the decision to increase U.S. force levels in Europe in the early 1950s. It also served as the basis for the long list of complaints emanating from Washington that the NATO allies were taking a 'free ride' at the expense of the American taxpayers. In the context of this thesis, the paradox also explains why European pressure on the United States did not relent during the negotiations which led to the North Atlantic Treaty. It is to those that attention must now turn.
Four distinct sets of negotiations preceded the publication of the North Atlantic Treaty text on 18 March 1949. From July to September 1948 there were exploratory talks on Atlantic security in Washington. In London, U.S. observers contributed to intra-Western Union discussion about military measures. From the end of 1948 to March 1949, substantial negotiations took place to finalise the text of the treaty. Finally, discussions running in parallel with all three were held about a military version of the Marshall Plan, sometimes on a bilateral basis, at others a multinational setting.

The American part in the first two of these four diplomatic exchanges, forms the subject discussed in this chapter. The focus is rather different from that of most recent writers on NATO's origins, specifically Sir Nicholas Henderson, Lawrence S. Kaplan and Escott Reid. In their respective studies, the predominant assumption is that the Atlantic community of nations was seeking a more formal, permanent expression in the postwar period. According to this view, the North Atlantic Treaty was the natural, if not automatic, result. From this it follows that, once agreement has been reached, all parties to the treaty shared the same view of what had been decided upon. In order to bring this satisfactory state of affairs to fruition, diplomats and the governments they represented, did not pursue national interests where these were seen to conflict with the general good. Thus the French -
who threatened to sabotage the whole enterprise if the treaty did not recognize Algeria as an integral part of Metropolitan France - are revealed in the Kaplan school as the exception, not the rule. It cannot go unremarked that each of the writers mentioned was either directly concerned with the negotiations or in government service at the time. Each has remained a staunch supporter of the Atlantic idea ever since. Whether unconsciously or by design, this background seems to have fostered a tendency to minimise transatlantic differences.

The argument in this chapter proceeds from another assumption: that the United States pursued its own national interests - frequently different from those of the Atlantic colleagues - with a singlemindedness equal to that of the French. What separated the two was that the Americans showed more finesse than the battle-shocked French in doing so. However, the argument of this chapter is not propounded as superior, or more 'true', than the one more usually made. Both have their contemporary function. The 'Atlantic community' view helps explain the longevity of NATO and can be cited as the essential underpinning to numerous decisions taken by NATO nations since 1949. The alternative view helps one to disentangle the reasons why NATO's history has been dogged by argument, suspicion, bad faith and disappointed expectations. In historical terms, both interpretations are valid. To date, however, one has had rather more attention than the other.
The blockade of Berlin by the Soviet Union and its Allies began on 24 June 1948. Twelve days later talks started in Washington about the formation of an Atlantic Pact. The two events were not consequential. It is true that, had there been no perception of a challenge from Eastern Europe, such talks would never have taken place. However, the decision to hold them was made after the passage of the Vandenberg Resolution and before the sudden interruption of road and rail links with the old German capital. The talks ended on 9 September with the completion not of a draft agreement - as the European participants would have wished - but of an 'agreed statement' on the nature of the North Atlantic security problem and 'the steps which might be practical to meet them'. Despite the facts that the Berlin blockade persisted, and that tension between East and West remained high, for Marshall and Lovett the agreed statement - known as the Washington Paper - followed the pattern of the Pentagon Paper and the Vandenberg Resolution: it was essentially non-committal.

The start of the negotiations coincided with the end of the Congressional session and the beginning of the presidential campaign in earnest. The immediate consequence of this was that no treaty could be laid before the Senate until January 1949 at the earliest. Technically, Congress could be recalled but, from an American viewpoint, there was no hurry. Given that a new president was expected to replace Truman, political prudence suggested that no new major departures be agreed to in the interim. Furthermore, foreign policy was a bipartisan issue. The November elections were expected to produce a Republican President and a Republican Congress. Thus far, neither John Foster Dulles nor Governor Dewey, respectively the Secretary of State - and White House incumbent-in-waiting, had shown enthusiasm for the idea of a Pact.
Vandenberg was known to be wary. In fact during the campaign in his major address on foreign policy, Dewey carefully avoided all mention of military alliances and instead concentrated on the need to create a 'United States of Europe'. As George Kennan remarked to Marshall and Lovett: it was important 'not to encourage the [Pact ]project to a point where we arouse false hopes'.

In an election year, public opinion was clearly of transcendent importance to the Democratic Party leadership. According to the opinion polls, the American people were satisfied that the West Europeans required U.S. military assistance. Nevertheless, as shown in the previous chapter, many - if not most - tended to back away from a commitment to 'go to war'. Moreover, as the campaign progressed, polls began to show resistance to anything which might lead to higher taxes, such as a 'military ERP'. The West Europeans wanted not only a cast-iron American commitment. They wanted arms as well, and just at the time when Truman had reason to think he had military spending almost under control.

When the Republicans regained dominance in Congress during the midterm elections, they did so in part through their straightforward appeal to traditional Republican virtues of a balanced budget, low personal taxes and reduced expenditure by central government. Whether or not he disagreed with some of the implications of that approach, Truman was in no electoral position to argue. These clothes he had to steal and wear himself. As the Defense Secretary, James Forrestal, was aware, Truman had decided on ruthless control of military spending as part of his national economic programme. It was the natural target: in postwar America, defence outlays have consistently been the largest item on the federal budget.
The table below shows that in the financial year (FY) 1948, ending on 30 June, coincidentally just days before transatlantic talks began, Truman had cut total expenditure from the previous year by some $493 millions but had less success in cutting military spending. That was taking in real terms, a greater percentage share of the total federal bill. (The next largest item on the account in 1948 was Veterans' benefits and services, which represented almost 18 per cent of the total.) There was more to this than the tinkering of accountants in the U.S. Bureau of the Budget. There were votes to be lost if control of expenditure was demonstrably absent. In any case, Truman himself did believe in balancing the budget, 'New Dealer' though he may have been. As Forrestal said, the President was 'a hard money man' at heart. Thus, for so long as the Europeans linked an American

### U.S. Defence Expenditures as a Percentage of the Federal Budget 1946 - 1950 in $ millions (all for FY ending 30 June)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Total Federal Budget</th>
<th>Defence Expenditures</th>
<th>as % of Fed. Budget</th>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Total</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>1946</td>
<td>61738</td>
<td>44731</td>
<td>72.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1947</td>
<td>39631</td>
<td>13059</td>
<td>35.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1948</td>
<td>36493</td>
<td>13015</td>
<td>35.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1949</td>
<td>40570</td>
<td>13097</td>
<td>32.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1950</td>
<td>43147</td>
<td>13119</td>
<td>30.4</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

commitment to arms supplies and other military help, and until the financial cost of that assistance was known, the U.S. negotiators had no choice but to play for time.

The uncertainty within the Truman Administration about the desirability or otherwise of a treaty added to the instinct for caution. Marshall and Lovett had been beset by conflicting advice in the early part of 1948, not just on matters of emphasis but on issues directly germane to U.S. security. Now an uneasy compromise had been reached, based on a National Security Council document (NSC 9/3) which appeared to reconcile the pro- and anti-treaty factions as well as the departmental 'don't knows' and the doubters in the Pentagon. In fact the compromise could not stand too much close examination; differences remained. Marshall had become unwell with the kidney problem which was to force his early retirement. He was thus not able to give the kind of leadership which would resolve such disputes. As for Truman, he was otherwise engaged on the hustings. His Administration was hobbled by indecision on those foreign policy matters which were not pressing. Where urgency was required, as over Berlin or the recognition of Israel, things moved swiftly. But the Atlantic Treaty was not such an issue. If it was to appear at all much would depend on the drafting skills of the negotiators.

The text of the Washington Paper was hammered out during the course of some 20 meetings between early July and early September. These were of two kinds. First, setting the framework for discussion was the Ambassadors' Committee, comprising the senior representatives of the Brussels Treaty powers (the United Kingdom, France, Belgium, the Netherlands and Luxumbourg). Canada was represented by Lester B.
Pearson, the civil servant in charge of the Canadian Department of External Affairs. The American delegation - the target - was led by Robert A. Lovett, supported by Bohlen, Kennan, Butler, Hickerson and Achilles. This meant that unlike the March discussions in the Pentagon, the U.S. representatives reflected the spectrum of views about an Atlantic Pact which had emerged since the beginning of the year. Bohlen and Kennan were the sceptics; Lovett was an unmovable 'don't know'; while the other three were enthusiastic Atlanticists. Secondly, a smaller gathering known as the Working Group was given the all-important task of drafting the agreed text and amending it in the light of the Ambassadors' comments. Members of this group were officials below ambassador rank: at various times all of the Americans except Lovett participated.

From the recollections of participants, and the minutes and transcripts of the seven-power negotiations, it is clear that the role of Lovett was pivotal. Sir Nicholas Henderson, then a Secretary at the British Embassy, recalled the American Under-Secretary's style of chairmanship.

Lovett was always friendly and courteous, but he was also consistently cautious. He would talk urbanely and without notes, illustrating his remarks with anecdote and metaphor. He would dilate upon U.S. policy in general, the American constitution, the strained U.S. economy, and the need to avoid building a 'fire trap' in Europe. But it was a Herculean task trying to squeeze from him any positive statement of what the U.S. were prepared to do towards the security of Western Europe.

He was 'a past master at circumlocation' and was unwilling to lead the discussions, preferring to let them ramble. As Henderson observed,
all of this was probably deliberate, partly for the political reasons already discussed in this chapter, and partly because of Lovett's conviction - shared by Marshall - that withholding support was a useful lever vis-a-vis the Europeans. It is particularly striking that Henderson should recall Lovett's use of the phrase 'avoid building a fire trap in Europe'. This was the exact form of words used by John Foster Dulles in his seminal speech on 9 January 1947, in which he put the American case for European federation as the precondition of long-term disengagement from the Old World.

The first Ambassadors' Committee meeting consisted largely of Lovett informing the 20-odd career diplomats present of the conditions under which the United States was participating in the inter-governmental discussions. He reminded his listeners that the purpose of the exercise was to give substance to what Bevin had suggested in January: United States' backing for an arrangement whereby the political, military, economic and spiritual forces of Western Europe were integrated into 'some form of union, formal or informal'. To that end, Lovett explained that two principal inhibitions dominated State Department thinking; one was political, the other constitutional.

It was politically essential, Lovett said, to ensure that any agreement had 'the backing of the vast majority of the American people'. A brief statement to the press would be made about the talks being held - itself a departure from the March discussion in the Pentagon. But no further details would be given. The minutes record his remarks.

He emphasized the need for absolute security. A leak, particularly during the political campaign in the United States, might throw the whole enterprise
into jeopardy. Political heat in this country will increase up to election day, and scars will be left afterwards. Any leak as to the subjects of discussion in these meetings, therefore, might cast a cloud over the whole plan.

What had to be avoided was the kind of situation which had surrounded the negotiations leading to the Bretton Woods agreement in 1944, when the journalist James Reston published a daily and accurate account of the supposedly secret proceedings.

On the constitutional question, Lovett explained that two options had been considered. An agreement could be reached and sent to the Senate to approve before the Presidential ratification, or the whole Congress could be asked for advice on policy through consultation prior to an agreement. The latter option had been chosen and the result was the Vandenberg Resolution. (The House of Representatives' Foreign Affairs Committee unanimously supported the resolution but legislative problems made it impossible to put it before the full House prior to the end of the legislative session). Lovett described this 'as an extraordinary paper in American history, as a statement of policy in advance'. The basic condition of U.S. association with regional and other collective arrangements were that the beneficiaries of that association had to show determined and continuous efforts at self-help; equally they must be prepared to participate in central aid arrangements involving the United States. This last point represented a significant shift in Lovett's thinking since he had helped draft the resolution six weeks before. Then 'self-help and mutual aid' had referred exclusively to the West Europeans' expected progress towards the quintessential American virtue of self-reliance. Now mutual aid included the United States: transatlantic assistance
was to be a two-way street. Any other formula risked the Senate's rejection especially as the Republican majority was reputed to be increased in November.

For obvious reasons, the U.S. Under-Secretary of State did not include in his address the point that all of these political and constitutional inhibitions suited his Department's interests very well. Given that the Truman Administration as a whole had yet to make up its mind about an Atlantic Pact, it was clearly prudent to keep anything which might be construed as an American commitment from the press and public; if details of proceedings leaked out, the Europeans could use that as a lever against the United States. Moreover, Vandenberg was still widely tipped as the Republican presidential hopeful who would defeat Dewey for the nomination in the coming convention of the Grand Old Party. Lovett knew Vandenberg well as a working colleague and was aware of his reservations about a formal pact. It was not part of the State Department's job to bequeath to an incoming Administration a contentious commitment to Western Europe, known in advance to sit uncomfortably with the neo-isolationism of John Foster Dulles (the likely future Secretary of State) and the wariness of Vandenberg.

In one important respect Lovett was not a supporter of the Status quo. He did wish to see permanent, constructive change occur in Europe. He could not know - few in government did in 1948 - that the creative, armed stalemate in Europe, built on the division of Germany by East and West, would be the method by which world peace was assured. What he sought was change in that part of the continent still open to American influence. He therefore told the Ambassadors' Committees' "The United States would endeavour in these talks to develop thoughts
of closer military, political, economic and spiritual union between
the countries of Western Europe'. European security based on the
Brussels Pact as the hard core, would have to be rebuilt on a much
sounder basis than in the past. He had yet to discover that 'a much
sounder basis' meant in practice precisely the long-term commitment
which the existence of a united Western Europe was supposed to obviate.

There were four further meetings of the Ambassadors' Committee before
the Working Group got down to the job of drafting. The Americans
suggested an agenda, to which all agreed, the four items of which
served as the subjects for the four discussions. These were:
(1) the situation in Europe as it affected security, including estimates
of Soviet intentions; (2) security measures taken or to be taken in
Europe by the Western Union powers; (3) security relation with other
West European countries; and (4) the nature of the U.S. association
under the Vandenberg Resolution with European security arrangements.
As Henderson observed, discussions did tend to ramble and the agenda
was not rigidly kept. Hence, for the sake of clarity, the four talks
are best taken as a whole, basing discussion and analysis on the agenda
but keeping the themes discrete regardless of which meeting in which
they appeared. To give just one example of why this is necessary: the
most interesting interventions about Soviet intentions were not made
during the meeting devoted to that subject. There was some argument
about the structure of the agenda: the French wanted to discuss first
of all how the United States was going to end the feeling of insecurity
in Europe. Lovett disagreed: the agenda reflected very much an
American perspective. Perhaps sensing this, no other European
representative supported the French call for a new agenda.
Lovett had excluded 'military problems' from the discussions at the outset. These were to be dealt with by Western Union countries in London. However, the nature of the Soviet threat could not be avoided as a subject of debate on those grounds. The new British Ambassador, Sir Oliver Franks, opened the discussion with a succinct statement of the European view. The internal logic of the Soviet system, he argued, demanded an attempt at world domination, beginning with the countries on the eastern shores of the North Atlantic. The countries on the western seaboard would be immediately threatened and it was this which created a 'community of interest' in the North Atlantic area. The Russians had two techniques: aggression and subversion. The threat was real, he said, and suggested that if the talks failed to create an adequate demonstration of a collective will to deter overt aggression the threat would grow.13

Lovett confined himself to a general acknowledgement of the threat's impact on western democracies' policies. He left Bohlen and Kennan to discuss Soviet intentions more thoroughly. This was natural; they were the two senior State Department experts on the subject. Both were fluent in Russian. Kennan had served with distinction in the U.S. diplomatic mission in Riga in the 1930s and subsequently in the Moscow embassy during the war. Bohlen had served as Roosevelt's personal interpreter at Yalta and had replaced Kennan in Moscow when the latter was recalled to become the Department's first permanent incumbent of the new Russian desk.14 As became apparent during the exchanges, the scepticism of both men about the need for an Atlantic Pact reflected their educated belief that the Soviet threat was less than their colleagues imagined.
Bohlen expressed the opinion that the Russians were now alarmed that they were losing ground. Their hopes for getting control of Germany were diminishing; the blockade of Berlin was cited as evidence of this. He also said that the Soviet Politburo did not have separate military, political and economic policies; all were integrated. This meant that the West had to guard against 'undue apprehension' about a Soviet invasion. The Kremlin would not easily expose more troops in the Red Army to the comparative pleasures of Western life. This had been the cause of substantial desertions during the Great Patriotic War. The Soviet Government, Bohlen said, 'was more preoccupied with the maintenance of the regime in Russia than with any other problem and was aware of potential dangers at home'.

Kennan supported that contention and gave further reasons. The Soviet leaders had not yet repaired these parts of Russia so lately devastated by the German invaders. The people were weary of war. The Kremlin knew only too well that the lesson of both world wars was that no attempt to dominate the continent of Europe could succeed unless the North American industrial potential was knocked out or neutralized first. Kennan argued that nothing justified the belief that the Russians were ready, willing and able to conquer the world by armed force. They were not operating to a fixed timetable; parallels between fascism and communism, or Hitlerism and Stalinism, were dangerous. However, Kennan did point to the danger that the Soviet Union might resort to war:

'The greatest danger would be in an abrupt weakening of their power in Eastern Europe'. Barring that the real 'war' was political and currently in progress. It was the cold war and could be won by the West. The task facing the United States was how to give the maximum encouragement to the West Europeans and discouragement to Moscow.
Kennan concluded by drawing a distinction between the readiness of the United States to go to war if forced to do so and the long-term trends of the Western democracies winning the political and ideological confrontation between East and West.  

The Canadian representative, Lester Pearson, tried to shift the discussion away from Soviet intentions. He suggested that an Atlantic Pact should not be closely tied to what the Russians were supposedly trying to do. The worry was that if the Soviets embarked on a 'peace offensive' the rationale for the Pact would be weakened. He suggested that the Atlantic idea was based on wider considerations of shared values, interdependent economies, common heritage, political systems and social concern. Kennan responded by saying that he agreed with the notion that a community of interests existed which had a wider base than military necessity. The problem there, he suggested, was that traditional, historical and other links between the two sides of the Atlantic were no argument for a military alliance. Such an argument had to be grounded on realistic perceptions of the Soviet threat. If the threat was palpable and immediate, then military staff talks were the solution, not another military alliance. Lovett later added the observation that too much weight ought not to be placed on the Vandenberg Resolution. That, he said, represented the 'absolute maximum' to which the United States might go: 'the final result might differ markedly from the concept contained in the Vandenberg Resolution'.

If the Europeans failed to get a satisfactory response from the Americans on the question of the Soviet challenge, the tables were turned on the issue of what security steps were being taken by the five members
of Western Union. Lovett's own response was vividly described by Sir Nicholas Henderson. The French Ambassador, Henri Bonnet, made one of his frequent and vociferous requests for an early U.S. commitment to the Brussels Treaty powers. According to Henderson, Lovett replied with a rhetorical question.

'How could the U.S. deal with the maintenance of peace and the prevention of war with a group whose capabilities were unknown?' A little cold water spilled suddenly in this way after the usual warmth of his words and manner had the effect of ice.\textsuperscript{18}

In effect, Lovett was carrying on the American search for the actual meaning and purpose of the Western Union. State Department officials from Marshall downwards had complained that Bevin had never explained what he meant ever since late January when the subject was first publicly broached. During the Pentagon talks in March, Hickerson had made the American position plain: Western Union was expected to become the 'United States of Western Europe', possibly of all Europe eventually.\textsuperscript{19} This expectation remained and the U.S. representatives wanted evidence of progress in that direction.

Hickerson asked the question which most interested the Americans: what was the extent of the Europeans' progress on the pooling of their military resources and the conclusion of financial arrangements to that end? Sir Oliver Franks told the meeting that little had been achieved to date because 'no yardstick for such arrangements had yet been made'. He did, however, run through the steps taken to modify or create various bodies designed to carry out the objective of military integration foreshadowed in the Brussels Treaty. He mentioned the establishment of the Permanent Consultative Council which included
a permanent Military Committee, a Standardisation Committee and various subsidiary advisory bodies. He also revealed that inventories were being compiled of current military readiness and potential military strength. This last task was likely to take some time, said Franks, because it involved working out a balance between manpower, industrial capacity and economic resources available for defence and for the normal economy'. He noted that war production resources on the continent had been either destroyed or reconverted to civilian purposes and reminded all that 'military potential depended on a healthy economy'.

The U.S. response was in two parts. First, Lovett pointed out that industrial production in the United States was running at full speed with shortages in materials and manpower. The American reconversion programme had also been implemented for 'world needs'. The largest U.S. manufacturer of explosive for shells during World War II was now making fertilizer for Europe as well as for domestic consumption; some aircraft fabricators had turned to agricultural machinery production, again for Europe as well as the United States. The point was made that if the Europeans were to be supplied with war production, their economic recovery would suffer. Secondly, Lovett indicated again the salience of the phrase in the Vandenberg Resolution, 'continuous and effective self-help and mutual aid'. He recognized that U.S. 'association' meant more than military land-lease. Some sort of regional pact 'similar to the Rio Treaty' would be desirable from the American standpoint. He might have added - but did not - that such an arrangement would place much of the burden on the Western Union while not committing the United States to the use of armed force against aggression in Europe. At no stage did he give the Europeans
any suggestion that the Brussels Treaty, with its much stricter *casus foederis*, could be equally acceptable as the blueprint for an Atlantic Pact.  

However, the U.S. clearly did see the Brussels Treaty as directly applicable to other West European countries. That was why Lovett had wished to discuss the security relationship between Western Union and its neighbouring countries before discussing the nature of the American commitment. The Europeans took issue with this. The French Ambassador, Bonnet, pointed out that politically unstable countries, such as Italy, would be liabilities; he urged the discussion turn to ways of strengthening the Brussels Pact through transatlantic links. The Belgian Ambassador, Baron Silvercruys, said that the key to the third agenda item currently being addressed was the fourth item, the American commitment. For the British, Sir Oliver Franks put a more sophisticated case. He suggested that there were two levels to the problem:

> [T]here were certain countries with a vital interest in, and of vital interest to, the security of the North Atlantic area; this was the bigger plane. The other plane was European: there were countries which might be associated with the Brussels Pact, for instance Norway, Sweden, Denmark, Iceland and Italy.

This was not an exhaustive list, he said, but 'the readiness of the Brussels Powers to enlarge and of the others to join was conditioned by the attitude of the U.S. and Canada' toward the last item on the Ambassadors' agenda, the nature of North American associations with Western Europe under the Vandenberg Resolution.
Lovett was not moved. Following U.S. policy, he insisted that Western Union's relationship with other West European countries and this security could be discussed independently of what the United States and Canada might eventually decide. As far as the United States was concerned the 'ultimate criterion' of U.S. association was whether or not 'its national security was enhanced by such an arrangement. He pointed out that Greenland and Iceland were of greater significance to the United States (and Canada) than some nations in continental Europe. The minutes record his view:

Mr. Lovett said that unless the Western European nations showed a high order of determination to solve their problems through some form of union based on self-help and mutual aid, the enterprise would not possess the degree of assurance for the future which the U.S. expected. He reiterated that the U.S. could not "rebuild a fire-trap", that wars in this area had twice involved it, and that now the people of the United States desired to avoid mistakes of the past and make a constructive contribution to world security.

The Europeans could not have failed to receive the message: the ending of isolationism was not, in Lovett's mind, synonymous with the kind of Atlantic arrangement being sought by the West Europeans. Picking up a proposal made earlier by Kennan, he suggested different levels of membership. There might, for example, be three groups of nations: North American, Western Union and 'others', the last of which would include Greenland, Iceland and Portugal (because of the Azores), the so-called 'stepping stones' across the Atlantic. Implicit in such a system was the notion that obligations would be less onerous depending on geographical and other factors. In the later drafting stages of the actual treaty the Europeans finally succeeded in persuading the Americans to abandon this idea of graduated membership.
The division of opinion between the North Americans and the Europeans was even wider on the fourth agenda item. Lovett stated that the present need was 'for some fairly precise indication of the type of organization with which the U.S. might be dealing in the future'. Bonnet replied the Europeans were waiting to hear what kind of association was contemplated by the United States under the Vandenberg Resolution. Lovett thought that it would be 'unprofitable at this time to try to be too precise as to details' of the American position. He emphasized that under the U.S. constitutional system there could be no event such as aggression against an ally which could automatically bring the United States into war. The constitutional prerogative of Congress to declare war was non-negotiable. The Vandenberg Resolution did not alter this; nor could there be any unilateral guarantee to the Western Union.

At this point Lester Pearson mediated. He suggested that the Rio Treaty formula was appropriate. Under it, an attack against one was to be considered an attack against all but this did not mean that each party was obligated automatically to go to war if one of the others was attacked. The obligation called for 'assistance', not a declaration of war. Similarly, each country would decide for itself whether an attack - as the occasion for 'assistance' - had occurred. All of this should satisfy the Americans. However, he added that when the Rio Treaty was being formulated, the United States had not considered that the other signatories were to supply in advance details of the military assistance they could render to the Americans and the other signatory nations. Different rules should thus not now apply. Lovett demurred, saying that while the Rio Treaty was 'a take-off point' for discussion it did not meet the specific requirements of a North Atlantic Pact.
The inter-American relationship had a long history and while the assistance to the United States was minimal in some cases, at least the Latin American states could supply raw materials. The West Europeans in contrast, would require such raw materials. But he did concede that the expansion of the Brussels Pact might take place simultaneously with the creation of an Atlantic arrangement for collective security.\textsuperscript{24}

Without that concession it is difficult to see how further progress could have been made. It overcame the problem noted by Hickerson that from an American perspective the Brussels Pact was not broad enough in membership yet too broad as to obligation. It also avoided the difficulty discussed by the Canadians of political factors excluding certain countries while strategic factors made their inclusion imperative. Moreover, it enabled the Europeans to concentrate on Atlantic arrangements as a priority and the Americans to continue with their preoccupation of a lasting settlement in Europe.

Kennan emphasized this point, supported by Hickerson. He said that in the long term the United States looked to changes in Europe which would permit a general unification of the whole continent, including the countries behind the Iron Curtain.

It was necessary that when the Marshall Plan period came to an end, or even earlier, there should emerge an economically self-supporting Europe which was on the road to greater political unity and which was militarily capable of taking care of itself.

The United States did not wish to see a return to prewar conditions in Central and Eastern Europe. What Kennan called 'petty nationalisms', or
very small alliances, which could not survive once push came to shove, were of no use by virtue of their impermanence. It followed, he argued, that discussions should not concentrate solely on the issue of a military guarantee against a military danger which would be mitigated in the course of time.  

At the end of the discussion of the American commitment, the Ambassadors' Committee agreed that the next stage was the examination of the issues which discussion on the four agenda items had raised. For this the Working Group was formed, comprising the Ambassadors' seconds-in-command. The Americans were mostly Atlanticist in outlook: Hickerson and Achilles, plus two of their staff members, Samuel Reber and W.J. Galloway; Kennan was a regular attender, Bohlen less so. Differences in the U.S. camp were therefore inevitable although this did have a constructive effect:

By washing their dirty linen in front of the Working Party, the Americans concealed nothing. The other representatives always knew exactly what the troubles were on the American sides and who was in favour of this or that.  

The consequence was that the Americans avoided any possibility of arousing suspicions. British and Canadian participants later credited the success of the Working Party's efforts to Hickerson and Achilles. However, it is clear from the record that Bohlen and Kennan made a major contribution, without which the results would have probably been more to the liking of the Europeans.  

The product of the joint labours was the Washington Paper, approved by the Ambassadors on 9 September, for distribution as an international
discussion document. It took some 15 meetings of the Working Group to agree on a draft. In most of these there was a tendency for debate to ramble around the issues, and arguments were frequently repeated. Comment and historical analysis can therefore most usefully focus on the end product, elucidating it by back reference to the discussions on the sticking points.

The Washington Paper was a three-way compromise. It showed the influence of the West Europeans (who were represented in the actual drafting by the British diplomat, Sir Frederic Hoyer-Millar), the Hickerson-Canadian vision of an Atlantic community, and the Bohlen-Kennan view that the threat was neither as immediate nor as military as others suggested. But there was a fourth, disembodied presence in the discussions: the U.S. Senate. During a meeting of the Working Group on 12 August, 1948, Hickerson made what a Canadian described as 'a solemn and serious statement'. Hickerson reminded the group that the fact talks were taking place was indicative of 'the most radical change in United States foreign policy that have ever taken place'. He therefore explained:

[I]n so far as the State Department was concerned, its officials were unwilling to risk failure in implementing this new United States foreign policy. It would be disastrous if they were to put forward to the Senate an unacceptable pact or treaty. It would be almost equally disastrous if a pact or treaty were to be ratified with a series of hampering reservations after protracted debate.28

Kennan, who chaired most of the meetings of the Working Group, expressed some bitterness at this attitude in his autobiography. He recalled an occasion when Lovett crushed a European suggestion on the grounds that
Senators would not accept it. The objection was apparently final but Kennan rather wished that 'one of our European friends had stood up at this point and said, "Mr. Lovett, if you and your colleagues in the State Department cannot speak responsibly for American foreign policy in this matter, will you kindly introduce us to the people who can?'" 29

These sentiments were probably shared by Lester B. Pearson, an avowed advocate of 'quiet diplomacy' and the separation of domestic and foreign policy issues. However, in political terms such attitudes were a luxury. The Senate had to be considered a power in international relations in its own right. As Truman himself recognized, the Europeans remembered the Senate's rejection of the League of Nations and wanted the United States to deliver after this second world war what Senator Henry Cabot Lodge Sr. and colleagues had denied them after the first. 31 All seven countries represented at the talks had a vested interest in ensuring that the eventual outcome was fully acceptable to the Senate.

The three-way compromise was engineered in a way familiar to the American contingent. Rather than make hard choices between competing priorities and points of view, all were found a place in the finished document. (This is what happened when Lewis Douglas ensured Marshall got his way on the administration of ERP and the formula adapted in the preparation of both NSC 9 and the Pentagon Paper.) 32 The outcome was that the Washington Paper was satisfactory to all parties because no final decisions were taken. This led to a certain awkwardness in the presentation of the arguments. Three examples make the point. On whether a treaty was needed, the document included the statement: 'No alternative to a treaty appears to meet the essential requirements'. But this was heavily qualified by the observation: 'As will be clear
this paper represents no firm conclusions'. On the question of the Soviet threat, the Soviet Union was identified as 'statistically capable of dominating Europe by force' and that this, combined with a 'self-admittedly expansionist' ideology, made the current situation 'extremely insecure'. However, the likelihood of war was said mainly to depend on the Soviet leaders miscalculating Western intentions and on the undermining of their influence in Eastern Europe. Finally, on the issue of the American commitment, the West Europeans were said to be anxious that the assistance given should be immediate, and military as well as economic and political. Yet all agreed that constitutional consideration had to be observed and that it would be up to individual countries to decide how and whether to give assistance. At the same time it was acknowledged that the presence of U.S. troops in Germany made the United States effectively a European power, thus involving the Americans in most contingencies, including armed conflict, from the outset. 33

There was no necessary inconsistency among these and other points in the argument but no attempt was made to resolve them either. This was especially evident in the first section which outlined 'the provisions which might be suitable for inclusion in a North Atlantic security pact'. Instead of drafting the actual provisions, the Working Group was content to note the main headings - membership, geographical area, obligation clause, relation to the U.N. Charter, and the like - and make reference to the relevant parts of the Vandenberg Resolution, the Rio Treaty and the Brussels Treaty. At least two of these sources was cited for each heading. As the discussion on the resolution and the Pentagon Paper in Chapter 4 already makes clear, this meant that the division between the Americans and the Europeans was still wide. 34
The United States had moved towards the European position but not past the terms of the Rio Treaty which obliged signatories to 'assist' in meeting the attack. The Europeans on the other hand preferred the tighter obligation of the Brussels Treaty to 'afford the party so attacked all the military and other aid and assistance in their power'. They had not moved despite the knowledge that the Senate could not endorse an Atlantic Pact based on the Brussels formula.35

This fundamental difference of view, already apparent during the March talks, was not finally resolved until the following March. It is one reason why the North Atlantic Treaty took so long to draft and why its operational clause - as read by a strict constructionist - was heavily qualified. The difference is also the major reason why the search for NATO's origins ought not lead to the discovery of antecedents where there are none. Two European scholars have argued:

At the end of June 1948 the situation was as follows: the resistance within the State Department to an Atlantic alliance had almost vanished, the NSC was unanimously in favour and the Vandenberg Resolution meant that the American administration could safely start negotiations on an Atlantic Alliance.36

It is the case that resistance to the idea of an alliance had crumbled. But that still left the substantial issue of the kind of alliance - and its raison d'être - undecided. To a West European that may matter little: the principle had been agreed. To the legally-minded American negotiators at the time, however, the meaning of 'alliance' had not yet been determined.

The division of opinion within the State Department about the need to concede to European requests for an American security commitment
focussed on that problem of definition. Bohlen and Kennan had not been swamped by the views of Hickerson and his colleagues; they merely shifted to higher, legal ground and continued their efforts from there. In his autobiography, Bohlen does not mention his role as a dissenter; he simply states that NATO was a necessity. Kennan was more frank, describing his opposition in general terms. It is therefore ironic that in his own memoirs he castigated 'that mixture of arid legalism and semantic pretentiousness that so often passes, in the halls of our domestic-political life, for statesmanship'. Writing shortly after his premature departure from the State Department in 1950, he made an attack on 'the legalistic approach to international affairs', which he regarded as the besetting sin of 20th century American diplomacy. During the North Atlantic Treaty negotiations, however, the only way he could tackle his departmental opponents and rivals was to adopt their methods.

For much of the early meetings of the Working Party, Kennan and Bohlen worked hard to change the views of their European colleagues. Hoyer-Millar, for the British, put the standard line: that 'one of the ultimate intentions of the Russians was domination of the United States, having first obtained control over the European nations lying in its path'. Bohlen's response as chairman of the gathering was comprehensive. He argued that events in Yugoslavia - Tito's communist revisionism - showed the Soviet Union as 'dangerously over-extended'. While the U.S. military establishment was disintegrating between 1945 and 1947 - under the impact of the demobilisation programme - the danger to Western Europe had been great. Now the American public was alert to the Soviet challenge and, he reminded the group, the Russian Army had not moved beyond the line referred to as the iron curtain. At a
later meeting, he said that 'the U.S. Government considers that our position vis-a-vis the Soviet Union is better now than at any time since the end of the war'. Asking for confirmation from Lovett that the talks were exploratory and that 'even indirect commitments' were not on the table, the Under-Secretary replied with a characteristically cryptic comment: 'OK'.

Lovett also agreed that from an American point of view, the Washington talks were really to find out 'how far the Europeans themselves had gone in the direction of mutual self-help for the protection of the entire free European community'. However, at these meetings of the Working Group not attended by either Kennan or Bohlen, such matters were pushed to one side. At such times, Hickerson led for the Americans. His preference was to urge national representatives to discuss subjects freely without feeling that they were committing their governments. By doing this he freed himself to explore areas which would otherwise have had to be avoided. However, when the discussion turned to the central issue of the nature of an American association with the Western European countries and Canada, Hickerson requested a postponement until Bohlen could be present to outline his views. This was partly because Bohlen was senior to Hickerson, and partly because the absence of Bohlen and Kennan from the Pentagon talks had enabled them to disown the results. The price to be paid was that the views of the dissenters had to be respected in the final text of the Washington Paper.

With the distribution on 9 September of that paper, there was an hiatus in the formal progress towards some sort of Atlantic Pact. The 'very tentative proposals' of the Ambassadors' Committee, as Sir Nicholas
Henderson called them in retrospect, 'spent the next three months in the Brussels Treaty machine'. The Committee was reconvened, with its Working Party, on 10 December when it became clear that American attitudes had changed considerably. The Europeans immediately noted that Lovett now wanted to make rapid progress with a view to concluding a treaty by February 1949. What caused that change was more than the result of the Presidential election in November, although that was a factor. To a greater extent it emerged from the second of these clusters of considerations mentioned at the beginning of this chapter, namely the London military conversations together with the continuing interest in European unity. Although both issues were handled outside the formal discussions about an Atlantic Pact, they constituted the essence of U.S. interest in Europe during late 1948.

The problem confronting the United States (and Canada) in the London talks was characterized by Averell Harriman, formerly Truman's Commerce Secretary, now his Special Representative in Europe to monitor the Marshall Plan operation. In a cable to the Secretary of State on 14 July 1948, he wrote from Paris:

There is general acceptance in Europe that the U.S. will fight if Western Europe is attacked, but the almost universal comment is that "Western Europe will be over-run by the Russians, eventually the U.S. will defeat Russia and liberate Western Europe, but in the meantime most of the better people, and therefore, their civilization will have been destroyed". Appeasement psychology, like isolationism in the U.S., is not deeply buried. Harriman argued that shipments of token military supplies were necessary. He reminded Marshall of the disproportionate effect on British morale in 1940 when a million rifles were sent to the beleagured United Kingdom.
Economic support like ERP helped to meet the threat of internal subversion and aggression but it was military support which strengthened the will to meet external aggression. And it was this which the West Europeans needed. He added that secrecy was not helping and that to wait for Congress to reconvene in the new year would be to invite a weakening of such resolve as currently existed.46

The short-term answer was the kind of harmonization of military planning that Douglas had been instructed to get under way. During one of the early Ambassadors' Committee meetings, Sir Oliver Franks announced that the British, American and French commanders-in-chief in Germany had already begun 'to make concerted plans for emergencies'.47 The U.S. Commander in Germany, General Lucius I. Clay, was informed on 16 July 1948 by the Army Chief of Staff, General Omar Bradley, of the objective:

You are authorized to set up a joint planning staff to begin the coordinated planning necessary for operations involving initial withdrawal to, and occupation of, positions on or near the Rhine.48

Clay was warned however, the plans were tentative only; discussions with the British and French were to be conducted with the clear understanding that such tentative planning for emergencies 'may later require extensive revision by reason of decisions taken at a higher level'.49 This kind of qualification was shortly to be formalised with reference to the distinction between peacetime planning and wartime operations. In practice, the plans Clay was asked to help draw up were a political necessity because of West European fears. In military terms, they were in no way replacements for the emergency
warplan, HALFWOON. To the Americans it was always clear that actual control would, in the event of hostilities, be removed from the Western Union chiefs-of-staff and passed to the Combined Chiefs of Staff. The only question then was whether the French should be admitted to the counsels of the CCS.

The medium-term answer was to send a small military delegation to London in order that the U.S. Government could monitor developments within Western Union. The delegation was led by Major-General Lyman L. Lemnitzer, hitherto involved in planning for the U.S. Army and subsequently NATO's Supreme Allied Commander Europe (SACEUR) in the 1960s. He left for London on 17 July 1948 having received the previous day, detailed instructions and terms of reference drawn up jointly by the Departments of Defense and State. Because of the importance invested in the Western Union's own deliberations, these instructions can be taken as embodying official American views on the subject in mid-1948.

Lemnitzer's team was composed of representatives of U.S. air, maritime and ground forces but, as befitted such a mission, it was the Army which was in overall charge. (The U.S. Army Chief of Staff in Washington acted as the executive agent of the U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff). The general terms of reference were given as the Vandenberg Resolution and the European Recovery Programme. All political matters were to be referred back to Washington but Lemnitzer was not authorized to make military commitments of any kind. His team's participation in the London military talks was undertaken with a view to contributing to 'conversation on military plans' and on the coordination of military supplies. Drawing directly from the compromise text of NSC 9/3
Lemnitzer was informed that with respect to the Western Union nations:

(1) they must first plan their coordinated defense with the means presently available; (2) they must then determine how their collective military potential can be increased by coordinated production and supply, including standardization of equipment; (3) we would then be prepared to consider and screen their estimates of what supplementary assistance from U.S. was necessary; (4) we would expect reciprocal assistance...; (5) and legislation would be necessary to provide significant amounts of military equipment but the President would not be prepared to recommend it unless the foregoing conditions had been met.51

In short, the Marshall Plan formula for maximizing European self-sufficiency through self-help was the fundamental basis of Lemnitzer's mission, but this time with a military rather than an economic emphasis.

On the specific issue of defence planning the U.S. delegation were given two instructions. The first was to avoid all mention of the policy or plans of the United States about the use, or threatened use, of atomic weapons in wartime. No reasons for this were given but clearly the security of such information was a consideration, as was the fact that the Pentagon were not yet authorized by Truman to make such plans. The second was that the delegation were not to disclose any U.S. strategic concept to the West Europeans but were to give the impression that the U.S. JCS had fixed on no rigid course and would welcome suggestions about developing strategic concepts which could be acceptable to all. This involved a certain amount of sleight of hand by Lemnitzer. He could not disclose the reality of American military planning to the continental Europeans because that would destroy the point of the exercise by worrying them still further. He also, in company with the British and Canadians, could not reveal the fact that talks had taken place in March from which the French in
particular had been specifically excluded. The conclusion of the Pentagon Paper - that a treaty-based pact was desirable - would have pleased France and the Benelux countries, but not the way in which they were reached.

Lemnitzer was not told to lie to the Europeans by saying that the United States was fully committed to the forward defence of Western Europe on German soil. Rather, he took his cue from the Western Union nations themselves when they stated in May that this strategic concept was to fight as far to the east in Germany as possible, to buy as much time as was available, thus giving a breathing space for American military power to intervene decisively. He was told to give a liberal interpretation to this: American forces for the defence of Europe would initially consist of the U.S. occupation forces and nothing else but that over the longer-run Western Europe would be defended, even though forces for that purpose might be deployed to other areas. The U.S. delegation were reminded that the United States had global responsibilities, which in wartime would involve, at a minimum: securing sea lines of communication; conversion of American industry once again to build another arsenal for democracy; and the prosecution of the war in extra-European theatres. Lemnitzer thus could not acquiesce in any plans which might 'jeopardize or even unduly influence optimum overall global strategy' or any command arrangement for an allied military council for global strategy.

This was the military aspect of the 'self help' theme. As suggested in Chapter 1, during the discussion of the Truman Doctrine, the United States was apparently ready to use its power to help contain Soviet expansionism on a world scale, but Western Europe would have to be responsible for its own backyard. The corollary was that
the Americans were anxious to do what they could in the way of supplying arms and other forms of military assistance to the Western Union powers in order to enhance the worldwide flexibility of the U.S. armed forces. In this connection, Lemnitzer's main task was therefore to help coordinate a mutually beneficial supply plan. The 'paucity of currently available supplies' did not help and threw even greater stress, in American minds, on the Western Union members' announced promise to pool their resources, establish combined commands and the achievement of maximum standardization of equipment. Standardization would also involve commonality with U.S. equipment, although Lemnitzer was informed that a 'somewhat closer standardization relationship may be expected to develop between the United States, Britain and Canada than with the continental powers'. He was also told to guard against the possibility that standardization by Western Union on U.S. equipment types ought not to place the United States in a position where it became dependent on Western Union sources for the supply of major items. In other words, the Europeans were to be helped but not to the extent to which they could dictate terms to the Americans.

One of the first things done by the Lemnitzer team was to receive a visit from Lt. Col. Charles H. Bonesteel, a special assistant to Averell Harriman. The purpose of the meeting was to ascertain the nature of Lemnitzer's mission and its objectives. Bonesteel indicated to Lemnitzer that the presence of U.S. services personnel at the Western Union military talks 'harmonized fully with objectives toward which Mr. Harriman is working' in the administration of Marshall aid. While Lemnitzer was not formally a participant but an 'observer', he found that in practice he became more closely involved than was perhaps compatible with the ultimate objective of a self reliant Western Europe.
From his reports back to the Pentagon, it is clear that he regarded the European military representatives as less than competent. During a lengthy discussion on supply problems he evidently intervened by reminding all present that this could not be properly discussed unless logistics were recognized as a factor: little thought had been given to the function of bases, port facilities, air fields, transportation and communication, he argued. This was probably an unduly harsh judgement, for the European military men had seemingly received no unequivocal instructions from their parent governments to initiate genuine collective measures for their common defence.

On 31 July the Pentagon received the first full report of the London talks. Written by Lemnitzer, it revealed the extent to which the United States was being involved, despite every determination to the contrary. His cable read, in part:

As result of experience and observation here to date I consider US participation in Western Union Military Committee discussions could not be withdrawn without serious damage to Western Union structure....In addition, and without attempting to forecast what US attitude or alignment towards Brussels Treaty Powers might eventually take, I believe it would be unwise even to abandon or neglect taking full advantage of opportunity to observe and influence their military planning.

He even suggested that when the time came to replace him, a two-star general be appointed because to do otherwise would be interpreted as a 'waning of US interest in Western Union with consequent harmful effect on activities of the Military Committee'. (This was done in late August when it was announced that Major-General A. Franklin Kibler would lead the U.S. delegation.)
Crucial to both military planning and cooperation on supply was the Western Union's defence effort-in-being. The U.S. delegation reported to Washington the degree of integration that had been achieved or planned by the end of July. On ground forces, the armies of the 'Brussels Five' had agreed in principle that standardization of equipment was to be achieved as rapidly as possible. The first priority was improving combat capability by the adoption of common tactical and training doctrines. This had not progressed much beyond the occasional exchange of officers. Communications - techniques, codes and procedures - were to be adapted to a common format. In the meantime the inventories of military strength were being compiled. On naval and maritime air forces, undertakings were made about the harmonization of communications, the pooling of naval intelligence, the common use of ports and refit facilities, and the standardization of new ship construction. On Western Union's air forces, Lemnitzer said: 'It is currently evident that continental powers, including France, intend restriction of their air forces to air defence and tactical air purposes. They are sufficiently realistic at this point to accept the necessity for relying upon U.S. and British strategic air [power]'\(^59\).

All of this was described by the U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff as 'generally in accord with U.S. strategic concepts'. They believed that the denial of Western Europe to Soviet occupation was 'well within the capabilities of the West European nations to fill the military vacuum in Western Europe within a very few years'.\(^60\) For this reason the JCS, on the advice of the State Department, refused permission to the U.S. delegation to agree to a French proposal that an American general be appointed to command the combined forces of
the Western Union. All that they would agree to was the appointment of General Clarence R. Huebner to sit as an observer on the newly-created Western Union Chiefs of Staff Committee. The chairman of this was British, Field Marshall, the Viscount Montgomery of Alamein, supported by a British Air Marshall, together with a French General and Admiral. This also accorded with the prevailing official American view that Western Union should be led by the British. Ironically, the French idea of an overall U.S. commander-in-chief was adapted once NATO was formed with General Dwight D. Eisenhower becoming the first Supreme Commander Allied Forces Europe (SACEUR) in 1950. But during 1948, the Truman administration did what it could to remain aloof from such a public demonstration of American involvement.

From the Truman Administration's point of view there were two flaws in these Western Union developments. The first was that members of Western Union showed a disturbing propensity not to take their task seriously enough. Given the shortage of equipment, the Pentagon was annoyed to learn that Denmark (not a Brussels Treaty signatory) needed some 60,000 rifles urgently. Britain and France claimed they could not help but it emerged that they intended exporting 100,000 rifles to the United States 'for sporting purposes'. The JCS acknowledged that there were balance of payments benefits in this but felt that it hardly represented earnest endeavours on the part of the two leading West European nations to build military strength in their part of the world. In this case the sale was stopped. One that went ahead was just as aggravating to the Pentagon: Britain sold some scarce jet engines to Sweden on the grounds that the contract could not be broken despite the admitted shortage of military aircraft in Europe.
The second flaw was that the Anglo-American military relationship was beginning to cause problems for the coherence of U.S. defence planning. On the one hand, the British were expected to take the lead in Europe, which meant in effect a contraction of the United Kingdom's defence responsibilities worldwide and an enhancement of the continental commitment. On the other hand, the coordination of U.S. and British troop activities in Germany had been organised on a bilateral basis as part of the global regulation of the two countries' joint efforts. If the British made their European interests proportionately more important, there was a distinct risk that the United Kingdom would not be able to carry out its obligations agreed to in the emergency war plan HALFMOON. This was especially relevant to security interests in the Middle East where Britain's continuing role as custodian of the Persian Gulf, and its oil-rich littoral, was held to be vulnerable to Soviet attack in wartime.63

This mismatch between resources and commitments was recognized but nothing was done about it immediately. It was not until December that the State Department decided on Britain's place in the global scheme. Lovett wrote to Harriman on 3 December to clarify matters somewhat by putting the problem in a wider perspective:

It is essential for the British to take the lead in working towards closer European integration. However, at least at the present time it would be unwise both for them and for us were a position of strong European leadership to require a lessening in British ties with this country and the Dominions. By a series of overlapping but not necessarily co-extensive groupings, e.g. Brussels Pact, North Atlantic Pact, it should be possible to provide assurances to the British that real steps towards closer union with Europe can be taken without prejudice to their commonwealth relationships or their particular ties with this country.64
In retrospect it is clear that this view was a mistaken one: the British were not prepared to take the lead in European integration, whether military or otherwise.

However, different messages were being received in Washington. During the final stages of the Washington Paper text preparation, Gladwyn Jebb, the British official most closely associated with the Western Union Permanent Commission, told the Working Group that Bevin wanted nothing to slow the progress of the European nations 'toward that union which all believed is so essential'. In November, Jebb said that the British Government was actively pursuing the idea of European unity and so resisted the notion of merging Western European countries into a wider political entity which included the United States and Canada. What is interesting about Jebb's remarks is not that they were less than frank, but that he felt it necessary to make them. It is yet another indication that the West Europeans - and certainly the British - were aware that the way to impress the State Department was to use the language of European integration. That had been Bevin's purpose in Western Union from the beginning: it created a good impression, pending the conclusion of an Atlantic security arrangement. It was an acknowledgement that such an arrangement was less likely to emerge if the Europeans showed themselves hostile to American prescriptions for European unity.

To a large extent, therefore, the American 'error' in investing the European union ideal with more military and political reality than it warranted was the result of taking the Europeans at their word. The State Department had monitored the meeting held during May at the Hague, under the joint chairmanship of Paul-Henri Spaak and Winston S.
Churchill, to coordinate the activities of the various pro-European union movements. Despite Spaak's presence, the Hague Congress was an unofficial gathering, which for reasons of protocol limited the American response to Marshall's comment that the United States welcomed 'any concrete progress toward greater unity of thought and action between the nations of Western Europe'. Two months later another meeting in The Hague received greater U.S. interest. This time the gathering was composed of the five Western Union foreign ministers, supported by their respective staffs. Ambassador Lewis Douglas was sent from London to report on progress. He identified for Marshall the two themes which touched American interests. The first was a double recognition in Europe that the United States could not promise to act in any way which might contravene the U.S. Constitution, but that the Rio Pact was an inadequate basis for a North Atlantic Alliance. The second was that Georges Bidault formally tabled a proposal — the first by a serving minister — for a European federation based, in the first instance, on economic integration. Bevin opposed this along with the Benelux representatives on the grounds that such a union would contain 'a large block of Communists' belonging to the national communist parties of Western Europe. In what Douglas recognized as an effort to undermine the case for some kind of supranational European authority, Bevin's counterproposal was for what became known as the Council of Europe, a forum for inter-governmental exchange at ministerial level.

No senior U.S. official seems to have drawn the conclusion from this that the British might sabotage any attempt to unite Western Europe if they were allowed to 'lead in working towards closer European integration', as Lovett put it. However, American efforts were
redoubled. In a press release of 27 August 1948, the State Department announced that it favoured the taking by the Europeans themselves of any steps which promoted the idea of European unity or which promoted the study of practical measures to that end. Explaining this to the Embassies and Legations in Western Europe, Lovett cabled:

While avoiding premature endorsement of French or any other specific proposal looking unification of Europe we intend to encourage publicly and privately the progressively closer integration first of free Europe and eventually of as much of Europe as possible. There is danger that unless progress can be made rapidly American efforts to help free Europe get back on its feet will have been wasted. There is also danger that partial recovery will produce complacency and reduce European willingness to take bold measures essential to establish real and continuing prosperity. Annual ECA debates in Congress will bring strong pressure since Congressional willingness to appropriate funds will be materially influenced by extent of progress towards integration. We wish our missions in free Europe to press in all appropriate ways for encouragement of the idea of European unity and for formulation and implementation of practicable proposals to bring about its integration. We would naturally welcome bold leadership from any free European quarter.70

It is notable that this cable was the product of the Division of European Affairs. Achilles-and Hickerson, its two principal members, already saw European unity as the indispensable complement to Atlantic security arrangements, of which they were the State Department's strongest advocates. Europeans separated the issues of integration and security; Americans saw them as mutually supporting.

Two aspects of Lovett's message were continuations of past themes in U.S. diplomacy since 1947: the general interest in European unity and the more specific threat that Congress would stop, or severely curtail, ERP operations if evidence of integration was unforthcoming. Three
aspects were novel however. First, the State Department had decided to mount a Western Europe-wide campaign through diplomatic channels with a view to promoting the idea of European unity. (The cable was sent to London, Paris, The Hague, Brussels, Luxembourg, Rome, Oslo, Copenhagen, Stockholm, Lisbon and Bern.) This represented a small but significant deviation from Marshall's previous policy of being seen to interfere as little as possible. Secondly, the campaign was largely inspired by the fear that the West Europeans were in danger of becoming complacent through the partial success of the Marshall Plan to date. Given that Lovett and Marshall had always intended to see a reduced U.S. involvement from 1952 onwards, this was an incentive to adopt more robust attitudes towards the Europeans. Finally, because this cable was prepared and sent at the same time as the Washington Paper was almost complete, it is strongly suggestive that the United States had indeed come to accept that there was no necessary contradiction between the promotion of European unity and membership of an Atlantic Pact. The former was the ultimate objective towards which the United States was prepared to accept the latter as a temporary expediency. All that had to be done was to ensure that the operational clause of an Atlantic Pact was not binding on the United States.

Lovett's cable of 27 August is of interest for a further reason. It shows that the rhetoric of the Presidential election was having its effect on the State Department. In the midst of the most notable period of postwar bipartisanship, there were very few differences of view on foreign policy issues between Truman and Dewey. In only one respect was there any deviation. The Republicans advocated a hard line approach to European unity. The Democrats, in contrast, said
virtually nothing on the subject. (As suggested in Chapter 1, this was almost certainly because the cause of European unity was widely associated with Senator J. William Fulbright, who was on record as having called for Truman's resignation. In a difficult campaign the issue was best left undisturbed.)

On 30 September, Dewey summed up the points he had made thus far in his campaign about American hopes for Europe. Referring to the ERP he said that this programme of European aid must not be just relief:

> We shall use it as a means for pushing, prodding and encouraging the nations of Western Europe towards the goal of European union...we have waged two wars and now three years after the second war, we are having to pour out our resources to reinforce a Europe once more threatened by aggression.

He proposed that 'a third great peaceful power', strong enough to deter an aggressor, should stand between the United States and the Soviet Union, thereby introducing an element of stability in a devastated and divided Europe. What was needed, he argued, was 'a United States of Europe'. This was to be the major objective of his foreign policy. ERP would be 'used creatively for this great permanent good'. To do otherwise would be to fritter away the billions already spent on European rehabilitation, he said.

Judging from the reaction of the British Embassy in Washington, these remarks and others like them were interpreted by West Europeans close to the State Department as more than merely incidents in the election campaign. In a long despatch to Ernest Bevin, Sir Oliver Franks wrote,
on 23 October 1948, that Dewey was determined after the election 'to make a lasting name for himself as President', to go down in history as one of the great Republican leaders, rivalling perhaps even the memory of Franklin D. Roosevelt. He could not hope to emulate the latter in domestic affairs, argued Franks, so he was intent on building a place for himself in history by his foreign policy. The crusade for European unity was his chosen route to that objective.73 Plenty of presidential hopefuls had wanted to make their mark one way or another in the past. What made Dewey's aspirations more significant was that he was universally expected to win. Writing as though the Republican contender had already moved into the White House, Franks suggested that 'Mr. Dewey will naturally be more cautious in his approach to foreign problems than were Presidents Roosevelt and Truman'. Anxious to preserve the 'American way of life', and conscious that nothing jeopardized this more than the possibility of a third world war, Dewey had determined to 'build up a strong "third force" in the shape of a federated Europe'.74

So firmly did Franks believe that this would be the future shape of American policy that he suggested, with due deference, that Bevin alter the direction of British policy. Franks assumed that European federation was neither immediately attainable nor desirable as the ultimate objective. Nevertheless, he did think that constructive counterproposals should be made rather than the kind of negative approach adopted by the British Foreign Secretary during a speech to the House of Commons on 15 September. In that, Bevin had been at some pains to demonstrate the near-insuperable problems that lay in the path to federation. At a minimum, Franks suggested, the United Kingdom should
talk in terms of a periodic gathering of European political leaders on the model used by the British Commonwealth countries. Even so, he added, it would 'not be easy to persuade American opinion to accept such a plan in preference to their own ideas of federation'. The Americans were, after all, 'convinced of the merits of their own system' and - rightly or wrongly - believed that postwar democratic Europe faced a similar situation to that confronted by the thirteen American states between 1776 and 1787.\textsuperscript{75}

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In considering the drafting of the North Atlantic Treaty the Danish political scientist, Nikolaj Petersen, concludes that it is difficult to uphold the common European view that the United States were 'gulled, dragged or lured' into the Atlantic Pact by anxious Europeans. He argues that U.S. policy was primarily determined by State Department decision-makers' perceptions of the national interest. The North Atlantic Treaty, he suggests, was the creation of an initial coalition based on perceived shared interests in Atlantic security.\textsuperscript{76} The argument of this chapter supports this interpretation to a certain extent: the idea that the West Europeans exercised decisive influence is vulnerable on a number of grounds, not least because Europeans had access only to particular sections of the State Department. As shown in the previous chapter, the U.S. military had begun to consider changes in strategy and concepts of operations in ways which found favour in Western Union circles, but that had less to do with European pressure than with the acceptance by the JCS of some over-riding military imperatives. For their part, Congress, the White House and the American
public were not at all susceptible and were in many cases suspicious of, even hostile to, the Europeans.

However, in other respects this chapter points to a different conclusion. The Washington Paper, a non-binding discussion document, certainly signalled that a treaty was now widely regarded by the Truman Administration as both necessary and desirable, and probably inevitable. What it definitely did not do was to determine the nature of such a treaty. The United States may have moved from a willingness to discuss an Atlantic security pact to an obligation to negotiate a formal document. But no attempt was made to resolve disputes about the nature and immediacy of the Soviet threat, number of members and geographical scope, non-military aspects and the all-important operational clause. These disputes reflected not a confluence of interests but a divergence. Again and again, Lovett emphasized during the Washington Exploratory Talks the United States' interest in the development of West European self-sufficiency. For their part, America's putative allies had a vested interest in minimizing progress towards that end because to reach it would obviate the need for a U.S. commitment without which they felt strategically naked.

This difference of view was reflected in the fact that, while European hopes were centred on the Washington talks, the Americans were more interested in developments on the other side of the Atlantic, notably the London meetings of the military representatives of the Western Union. European (and Canadian) scholars have thus naturally tended to concentrate on formal negotiation when considering NATO's origins. American scholars in turn have largely ignored both the negotiations
and the U.S. interest in Western Union, mainly because of their equally natural concentration on U.S.-Soviet relations. As a result both groups of scholars have missed the point that, by September, the State Department had been manoeuvred by Lovett into a position which was fully prepared for the expected Republican take-over in November. Lovett's cable to European capitals on 27 August - which called for the Europeans 'taking steps which before the war would have seemed beyond the range of practical politics', was very much the line pushed by Dewey in the campaign. As Pearson remembered, the U.S. contingent on the Ambassadors' Committee and attendant Working Party expected a Dewey victory and consequently indicated resistance to a broadly-based Atlantic treaty. Consequently, nothing in the Washington Paper precluded the emergence of a security pact described by Pearson as having three parties, the United States, Canada, and the United States of Western Europe. But neither was there anything which compromised the caution already demonstrated by the Truman Administration from the beginning of 1948.

On the eve of the election it is fair to say that European unity - an important element of which in the American mind was inextricably bound up with the hoped-for success of the Western Union - was the ultimate goal towards which the United States was working. The conclusion of an Atlantic Pact was now regarded as a way of assisting this by removing the West Europeans' most acute fears. On that basis, Americans were prepared to pursue an Atlantic treaty energetically. But they would do so for reasons which were essentially different from those of the Canadians and Europeans. A 'community of interests' there might have been on the general question of containing Soviet expansionism; the more specific issue of how containment was to operate in Europe had yet to be 'resolved.
Chapter 7

The Negotiations and Military Assistance: Making the Alliance, Minimising the Commitment

The Brussels Treaty powers informed the U.S. Government on 29 October, four days before the Presidential election, that they had agreed in principle to negotiate a North Atlantic Pact with the two North American nations. They cited the Washington Paper, produced during the earlier exploratory talks and circulated on 9 September 1948, as the basis for discussions; they suggested the U.S. capital as the most suitable place for these to take place.¹

The American response was immediate and consistent with the conduct of U.S. foreign policy since the beginning of the year. Speaking for the Truman Administration on receipt of the message, John D. Hickerson pointed out that representatives of the U.S. Government had not been from the start, and were not now, in a position to commit the United States, either in principle or in some other way. Before making any recommendation to the President, the State Department needed to know two things. The first was 'the detailed results' of the Western Union foreign ministers' meeting which had, among other things, produced the agreement in principle. As it had done many times before, the U.S. Government thus signalled its abiding interest in European self-help: any steps which could reduce the level of U.S. involvement would not be pre-empted by the United States acting precipitantly. The second thing the State Department and Hickerson wanted to know was the reaction of political and Congressional leaders to 'this whole matter'.²
The State Department was already aware that the American public drew a distinction between helping the Europeans defend themselves and promising to go to war on their behalf. A treaty in which that distinction was not respected stood little chance of ratification, especially if - as expected - the Republicans captured both the Presidency and the two Houses of Congress in a few days' time. ³

Four days after the election, in which Truman triumphed and the Democrats regained control of the Senate and the Houses of Representatives, some of this hesitancy disappeared. On 6 November, the President approved 'the general principles' of the Washington Paper; he took it with him to study during his post-campaign holiday in Florida. ⁴ This was interpreted in the State Department as indicating that any revisions or firm proposals produced during the resumed exploratory talks would have to be cleared by him. In practical terms, this meant that when the time came to resolve the problem left open in the Washington Paper - whether the Rio or Brussels Treaties should be the model - Truman wielded decisive influence. This did not obviate the need to court Congress. Lovett briefly renewed his contacts with Senator Arthur H. Vandenberg but realised that a similar relationship was now needed with the new Chairman of the Foreign Relations Committee, Senator John Connally, if anything was to find expression as a treaty.

Talks started again on 10 December when it was decided to stop calling the talks 'exploratory'. ⁵ Their subject was not whether there would be an alliance but what kind of arrangement could be devised to meet the differing requirements of the countries participating in the talks, and any who might subsequently join. Negotiations between governments were finally underway.
This chapter concerns the American side in the last two sets of diplomatic exchanges which preceded the formation of the postwar Atlantic Alliance. These are the formal, inter-governmental negotiations which produced the final draft treaty, and the less structured, but equally important, discussions on military assistance. To the U.S. Government the joint outcome - the North Atlantic Treaty and the Military Assistance Programme - was designed to bridge the gap between American security commitments and responsibilities on the one hand, and the resources which could be devoted to them on the other. Foreign policy and defence posture would be mutually supporting, serving the desired objective of security without extravagant outlay. This was also the Europeans' aim for themselves; they saw in an American commitment the opportunity to avoid making the kind of extra military effort commensurate with their fears of the Soviet Union. To the Americans, almost everything depended on the Allies doing more for themselves; to the West Europeans, virtually nothing depended on that. Therein lay the difference. It was thus appropriately ironic that the U.S. Marine band, which played softly throughout the signing ceremony on 4 April 1949, should have included the Gershwin numbers 'I got plenty of nothing' and 'It ain't necessarily so'.

On his last trip to Europe as Secretary of State, George C. Marshall explained his belief that the United States' possession of the atomic bomb, coupled with the ability to deliver it, constituted the basis of West European security. His remarks, to Halvard Lange, the Norwegian Foreign Minister, during November, appear in Chapter 5 in another
context; they are worth paraphrasing to bring out the different effect the American nuclear monopoly had upon the U.S. negotiators on the one hand, and the West Europeans on the other. Marshall said that the main deterrent to Soviet aggression was the American atomic capability. He admitted that in the past the Soviet leaders may have thought there to be little risk of the weapon being used against their country but that now, following the events of 1948, such calculations were less likely to be made in the Kremlin. In the language of the 1950’s, nuclear deterrence had become credible. Although Halvard Lange did not apparently make the point, the West Europeans had much less confidence in these new weapons of mass destruction. Their anxiety to conclude an Atlantic security arrangement was evidence of this: American weapons might be used too late, to prevent a Soviet blitzkrieg, or they might not be politically effective. Even Japan – well on the way to defeat by 1945 – was not persuaded to desist from war after the attack on Hiroshima; it took a second bomb to do that. Thus for the Europeans, the American nuclear monopoly was an added incentive to get a binding treaty. But for the Americans the incentive worked the other way.

It was against this background that the State Department prepared the most illuminating report on American-West European relations to appear in 1948. It took the form of an answer to a series of questions addressed to Marshall by W. Averell Harriman, the President’s Special Representative in Europe charged with overseeing the European Recovery Programme. The reply was ready on 3 December 1948, signed by Lovett (due to Marshall's absence in hospital for a kidney operation) and endorsed by both Kennan and Achilles, of the Policy Planning Staff and Office of European Affairs respectively. It provided Harriman with a useful guide to the views held by senior State Department officials.
responsible for arguing the American case in the North Atlantic Pact negotiations due to begin the following week. It is therefore directly germane to the interpretation contained in this study. Harriman had asked for details about the form of organization of Western Europe the U.S. Government was hoping to see developed; how the Atlantic Pact fitted into or around that; and what was policy regarding the rearmament of Western Europe. He also asked about the development of policies towards France and Germany. In the reply, Lovett pointed out that 'the uncertain and fluid state of world conditions' made it impractical to have 'fixed and rigid policies'. He also said that final determinations of policy might require further consultation within the State Department and with other Departments. In fact, the points put to Harriman could have been written any time between the promulgation of the Marshall Plan and the ratification of the North Atlantic Treaty.9

On the desired organization of Western Europe, Lovett said that the United States did not yet know 'what form of permanent over-all organization will best meet the needs of free Europe'. He explained the delicacy of the United States' position:

Integration must be developed voluntarily by the free European countries; it should not be imposed from without. However, the European governments are unlikely to take the bold and difficult measures essential to accomplish effective integration in the absence of continuing pressure, and assistance, from us.10

The Organization for European Economic Cooperation (OEEC) was ideal: it was of European origin but dependent on the flow of U.S. dollars under the Marshall Plan. It provided opportunities for leverage. The OEEC existed in order to ensure the success of the Plan but, to the Truman Administration, its long-term purpose was to foster the habit
of economic cooperation, pending the closer political integration of the participating countries. However, the OEEC was not enough; it needed augmentation by a North Atlantic security pact. Harriman was told that such a pact 'should be considered a supplement to and in no sense a replacement for the efforts toward European unity...'. While the OEEC was to encourage economic integration, the Brussels Treaty system was, said Lovett, regarded as Bevin originally described it, 'as the nucleus of a Western European union'.

Lovett thought the role of the United Kingdom to be crucial. Britain had special difficulties. India had achieved independence yet the British worldwide responsibilities remained vast; at the same time, Western Europe could not be secure unless and until Britain played a full part in Europe's defence. For the State Department, an Atlantic Pact appeared the answer to these conflicting pressures. As already shown in Chapter 6, Lovett told Harriman that it was 'essential for the British to take the lead in working towards closer European integration'. However, Lovett acknowledged that for the present Anglo-American and Dominion ties should not be weakened. It was suggested that instead 'a series of overlapping but not necessarily co-extensive groupings', such as Western Union and an Atlantic Pact, could make it possible for the British to lead the movement towards integration without prejudicing Anglo-American or Commonwealth relationships. Apart from any other factor, Britain held the key to the solution of the German problem in the West European context. The United States recognized that any long-range plan of integration which was vague about the future of Germany, or which implied admission of the Germans as 'second rate members', was unrealistic. And France, 'the keystone of Continental Western Europe', could not be persuaded to
take a healthy and constructive attitude towards Germany's rehabilitation unless the British did likewise. The difficulty, beyond the reach of the United States, was that the French wanted a 'European Assembly' with a measure of supranationality, while the British advocated a 'Council of Europe' as a forum for intergovernmental exchanges.\textsuperscript{13}

The British had certainly received the message. Reporting to London on 18 November, Sir Oliver Franks, speculated about the effect on U.S. policy preferences about European 'federation' following Truman's re-election. Franks argued that just because Dewey had departed the political scene it would be wrong to conclude that the United States' enthusiasm for West European unity would disappear. Pressure might decrease but not go away. Congressional deliberations on annual ERP appropriations, and on 'military lend-lease', would almost inevitably include discussion of the European unity theme. He repeated his earlier suggestion that the British Government put forward 'some constructive proposals...directed towards closer political cooperation between the countries of Western Europe'.\textsuperscript{14} A more robust response was that of the Foreign Secretary, Ernest Bevin. Addressing the subject of a 'United States of Europe' as popularly recommended in America, he told the House of Commons in September:

\begin{quote}
A written constitution is suggested now and we are told in America and elsewhere that we are fools because we do not run after them. I am not being unkind even to the United States, but it is well to remind them that it took 11 years to deal with their constitution.\textsuperscript{15}
\end{quote}

That he had little intention of going any further was disappointingly evident, to the United States, from his Council of Europe proposal. However, the real point is that his speech was a tacit acceptance,
after the distribution of the Washington Paper, that good Anglo-American relations were largely dependent on Britain's declaratory and perceived policy on European integration. It must have seemed a long way from earlier in 1948 when the British Ambassador in Washington proposed a military treaty between the United States and Britain, reviving the wartime cooperation of the Combined Chiefs of Staff.16

That proposal had been refused, leaving Bevin to develop the Western Union as a way of winning confidence in Washington. The signing of the North Atlantic Treaty and the Military Assistance Programme were evidence of his success. But while these measures brought the United States two steps closer to 'entanglement', American objectives remained — on the eve of the final negotiations — what they had been on VE Day. As George Kennan put it, and as approved by George Marshall, on 24 November 1948: U.S. foreign policy was still directed toward 'the eventual peaceful withdrawal of both the United States and the U.S.S.R. from the heart of Europe, and accordingly toward the management of the growth of a third force which can absorb and take over the territory between the two'.17 This was central to U.S. thinking and amounted to the post-World War II version of 'normalcy'. The fact that matters turned out very differently is indicative of how — superpower status and atomic monopoly notwithstanding — the United States was constrained by European realities to the point where basic policy was abandoned.

All this did not occur until the early-1950s. In November 1948, the European situation still seemed quite straightforward: Russian intentions were directed towards a political conquest of Western Europe, which could be avoided if the West Europeans maintained the struggle for
economic recovery and internal political stability. A North Atlantic Security Pact, wrote Kennan, would 'affect the political war only insofar as it operates to stiffen the self-confidence of the Western Europeans in the face of Soviet pressures'. While such stiffening was desirable and necessary, it did encourage 'a general preoccupation with military affairs to the detriment of economic recovery...'. This was regrettable, argued Kennan (again with no disagreement from Marshall), because it was addressed to what was not the main danger:

We have to deal with [this military preoccupation] as a reality; and to a certain extent we have to indulge it, for to neglect it would be to encourage panic and uncertainty in western Europe and to play into the hands of the communists. But in doing so, we should have clearly in mind that the need for military alliances and rearmament on the part of the western Europeans is primarily a subjective one, arising in their own minds as a result of their failure to understand correctly their own position.\textsuperscript{18}

This was another way of expressing Lovett's point to Harriman that an Atlantic Alliance amounted to a supplement to the Marshall Plan, not a replacement for it. According to this view, a North Atlantic Treaty if built on the American concept, would be no more, and no less, than 'a formalization, by international agreement of the natural defence relationship among the countries of the North Atlantic community'. Long-term justification for this was not dependent on a particular interpretation of Soviet intentions and capabilities.\textsuperscript{19}

Recalling this memorandum in his memoirs, Kennan cultivates the impression that his was a lone voice, that he could 'no longer effect the movement toward a treaty'. He is dismissive of 'the gentlemen of the Office of European Affairs', who, he said, wanted to extend an Atlantic alliance 'as far as possible to jam it, so to speak, as close as possible to
the Soviet Borders. This is obviously a continuation of the earlier disagreements between himself and Hickerson, which are discussed in Chapter 2. However, it is also clear that Kennan's own objections to a treaty were weak, essentially for the kind of domestic political reasons which he felt should not influence foreign policy.

Marshall and Lovett understood the domestic context. The Secretary of State appreciated the arguments put by Kennan – the latter omits mention of this in his memoirs – but simply did not regard them as decisive. Kennan thought it wrong that Senators constituted 'the final and unchallengeable arbiters' in treaty proceedings, his view being that the State Department should not be put in a position of a lobbyist before Congress. For Marshall, whatever kind of treaty eventually emerged, the Senate had the power to prevent ratification, and Congress had been fed on a diet of anti-communist rhetoric since the Truman Doctrine was announced. The Administration was now having to ride that tiger. Furthermore, public opinion could not be ignored. One opinion poll, taken after the election and circulated in the State Department, showed popular attitudes as more or less equally divided on the issue of going to war in support of the West Europeans. But a clear majority (54 per cent to 39 per cent) were in favour of sending military supplies. This majority turned into a minority of 39 per cent when the question was asked as to whether the respondents still favoured military assistance if it meant an increase in U.S. personal taxation. These results suggested that popular opposition would attend any policy designed to supply matériel commensurate with Western Europe's reasonable requests. As Kennan acknowledged, the Joint Chiefs of Staff were already exercised by the widening discrepancy between resources and commitments; it followed that there was little 'spare' capacity to offer.
The net effect of these three factors - the Senate's role; popular resistance to spending money on West European defence requirements; and shortfalls in U.S. military capabilities - strengthened the Europeans' case. Now, only one way of boosting confidence in Western Europe seemed available: to conclude a treaty embodying a political commitment, backed by the retaliatory power of the atomic bomb, to the security of Western Europe.

By November 1948, the U.S. public expected a treaty but not an expensive one. There was nothing accidental about this expectation. Although Kennan argued that the American people, and not the Congress, should be the object of the Department's domestic attention, it was his opponents, not he, who cultivated popular preferences. From the summer of 1948, Theodore C. Achilles began a series of briefings with journalists representing Associated Press and United Press International. As Achilles recalled, the newspapermen were discreet: they

never pried on controversies in the discussions and such points as they did raise I would answer by referring to a provision of the Rio or Brussels treaties or the Vandenberg resolution. It sounds banal but well before the treaty was made public its general nature was fully known to anyone who read the daily press carefully and many who read it only occasionally.

This kind of briefing led journalists to anticipate a pact almost before it was drafted. Walter Lippmann, for example, commented on the announcement that transatlantic negotiations were about to begin: 'After many months, the project of a pact among the nations on both sides of the Atlantic is ready for formal negotiations. It is a great event'. Perhaps remembering his days as a young assistant to President Woodrow Wilson, when he helped draft the Fourteen Points he added: 'This is a
recognition at long last, that the government and people are ready to apply the lesson of this bloody and tragic century'.

The State Department reached four conclusions from its extensive reading of published opinion in the week prior to the opening of negotiations. First, a cross section of the total population strongly favoured strengthening American security. Secondly, the public likewise favoured 'continued firmness' in dealings with the Soviet Union. Thirdly, there was no serious opposition to a collective security arrangement in the North Atlantic area. Finally, while Americans overwhelmingly wanted the build up of U.S. armaments and strongly supported the Marshall Plan, there was clear disquiet about the value of sending military supplies to Europe (or China), with only one third of the population showing outright support. This was very much what Marshall and Lovett wanted to hear, and the activities of Achilles in particular made sure that the most influential columnists had the 'right' things to say. It left the U.S. negotiators with a virtually free hand. What was acceptable to the West Europeans would be approved by the American public - provided the commitments given did not violate constitutional imperatives. The American treaty makers were well aware that the right of Congress to declare war had to be respected. They also knew that this could be exploited in the effort to achieve the ultimate objective: the emergence of a united Western Europe militarily strong enough to deter an aggressor without the assistance of U.S. conventional forces. In late-1948, with defence expenditures under tight Presidential control, this seemed the only viable option left open to the U.S. negotiators. It was part of what one historian, Robert H. Ferrell, describes as the embarrassment of trying to manage foreign policy 'during the nadir of America's military power'.

The U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff were seriously perturbed by the prospect of a treaty being concluded. It was their view that 'every effort should be made to avoid actual United States commitment, in the sense of committing any of our armed forces to military action, unless and until *preceeded* by adequate preparedness'. 30 This argument went on:

As the Joint Chiefs of Staff have previously stated, the great importance to our national security of keeping our military commitments abreast of our foreign commitments...cannot be overemphasized. This is to be construed not as non-concurrence with any phase of United States foreign or international policy but simply as recognition of the responsibility of the Joint Chiefs of Staff for national security... [and] that current United States commitments involving the use or distinctly possible use of armed forces are very greatly in excess of our present ability to fulfill them either promptly or effectively.31

This was the first time the JCS had an opportunity to make a formal contribution to the Administration's deliberations on Atlantic security since April 1948. As senior military men - whose peacetime job was primarily to protect their respective Services and budgets - they naturally lost no chance to make the case for more money being allocated to defence. But on the prospect of an Atlantic Pact, their arguments reflected undeniable military realities. 'Prudent insurance against disaster' was best taken, they said, in the form of improvements to the U.S. armed forces' state of readiness.32

No other group within the higher ranks of the Truman Administration took this view. It was obvious that Truman would not abandon his method of providing for the military discussion of national security by residual financing - giving to the military what was left after other expenses of central government had been met. The way forward for the Administration - including the military - was therefore to
place reliance on the one potential growth area of defence spending, that of Western Europe as a whole, once the immediate objectives of the Marshall Plan had been achieved. Because priority had to be given to economic recovery, and because West Europeans insisted that the military danger would become pressing without an unequivocal American commitment to themselves, the United States opted to gain time by becoming the indispensable founder member of the Atlantic Alliance.

This implied no abrogation of the former interest in the progress of Western Union. On 24 November, the JCS reported to James V. Forrestal, the National Security Council and the Department of State that the institutional structure of the Western Union was at last taking shape. A Defence Committee, Military Supply Board and a Permanent Commission (based in London under the chairmanship of Gladwyn Jebb, the British Foreign Office representative) had been established. A Western Union Chiefs of Staff Committee had also been formed, under the chairmanship of the British Field Marshall, Viscount Montgomery. Studies were well in hand to determine the level of assistance required. Reviews of six relevant subjects were promised for delivery in Washington by December. These were (1) the steps taken to deter an aggressor with the means currently available; (2) the progress made towards standardization of equipment coordination of production and pooling of resources; (3) estimates of forces to be maintained and of reserve levels; (4) the extent to which these could be equipped, without jeopardizing the ERP, from present stocks, new production with or without external economic aid; (5) the extent of outside assistance needed; and (6) the extent to which this might be obtained from other than the United States. It was this evidence of movement in Western Union - and movement in the right direction - which was welcomed in Washington. That the movement
was more apparent than real emerged only later and was not suspected at the time. Consequently, the United States Government felt more confident about continuing the policy of offering rewards for progress towards the consolidation of Western Europe. This could be done by making a commitment to West European security of a kind which represented the least cost to the United States and the minimum which would be accepted by the Allies-to-be.

It was for all of these reasons that the West European representatives were pleasantly surprised, on 10 December when the Washington talks resumed, by the changes in the attitudes of their American counterparts. There was now a determination to arrive at the actual text of a treaty as quickly as possible: the meetings were no longer designated 'exploratory'. Robert A. Lovett again took the chair, stipulating the procedure to be followed. After the text had been prepared in draft form, the President would be asked for his opinion and judgement, followed by consultation with Congressional leaders. In practice this became a two-stage process. A draft text was sent to participating governments (seven at that time) on 24 December; this was amended and the finished version published on 18 March 1949.

Most of the drafting was done outside the Ambassadors' Committee; once more, the smaller group of the Working Party were asked to prepare texts on the basis of policy points raised at the higher level. This gave John D. Hickerson the most consistent advocate of an Atlantic Alliance in the State Department, considerable influence. Dean Acheson, Marshall's successor, acknowledged this obliquely after the signing ceremony in April 1949. According to Hickerson he said:
Well Jack, I think this treaty is going to work. If it works there will be arguments in the United States as to who more than anybody else is responsible for it, but if it doesn't work, there will be no damn doubt, you did it.37

Although the crucial role has elsewhere and variously credited to Georges Bidault, Ernest Bevin, Robert A. Lovett and Eelco van Kleffens, Acheson's judgement as to the individual chiefly responsible is by no means implausible.38 Although Hickerson did not have the intellectual stature of a George Kennan, he did have persistence. During the course of 1948, the Truman Administration – though for reasons wider and deeper than those articulated by Hickerson – came to accept his policy prescriptions. His influence was also practical: from the beginning of the final drafting stage, he insisted that simple and straightforward language should be used throughout the text. The test to be applied was whether an 'Omaha milkman' could readily understand the treaty when it was published.39 The aim was to minimise popular controversy and this was certainly achieved. In the long-term this approach had a price: the treaty document was clear for immediate purposes but unhelpful over the longer run. In the interests of clarity, contentious issues which could not be resolved were, in effect, left to the North Atlantic Council to be established under the treaty's auspices.40

Some issues raised few difficulties for the U.S. negotiators. North American and West European participants all agreed that the United Nations had to be acknowledged in the treaty as having the 'primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security'.41 There was no serious dispute over the length of the period to be covered by the treaty. The Europeans would have preferred a 50 year term (following the Brussels Treaty president) or at least 'a generation';
the Americans and Canadians wanted a shorter period. The United States accepted a compromise that the treaty included reference to a 20-year term with provision for a half-way revision. On the question of whether there should be non-military aspects to the new alliance - an idea enthusiastically backed only by Canada - the United States agreed to a form of words which referred generally, but without commitment, to the strengthening of democratic institutions and the encouragement of economic collaboration. Regarding the matter of the North Atlantic Council, the 24 December draft said that the task of the new body would be 'to deal with matters concerning the implementation of this Treaty'; on U.S. insistence, 'to deal with' was replaced by 'to consider'. This was more than a minor word change: it deprived the Treaty Organization of any coercive powers. To the United States, supranationality had its uses in a European setting but not in an Atlantic one.

The question of membership was less easy to resolve. The earlier draft had stipulated that, after agreement, any other country in the North Atlantic or West European regions could be invited to join. The Americans insisted on the removal of the phrase 'North Atlantic', thus restricting new members to Western Europe, and on the insertion of the words 'unanimous agreement', thus stressing each signatory's power of veto on new accessions. Agreement on this had been reached largely in order to protect the decisions taken already after long arguments about which countries - in addition to those negotiating - should be invited to join the new Atlantic Alliance from the outset. As Lovett made clear, 'if the treaty were to appeal to American opinion, membership should not be confined to the seven countries now represented at the talks'. The American preference was to invite only those
countries 'whose homeland or insular territories are washed by the waters of the North Atlantic, or which form part of a close union of states which meets this description'.\textsuperscript{46} This last criterion for membership was designed to enable Luxembourg, integral member of the Benelux and Western Union, to be part of the wider arrangement. It was a formula by which all the strategic transatlantic 'stepping stones' would be encompassed: Portugal's Azores, Denmark's Greenland, Norway's Spitzbergen, as well as Iceland and Eire.

What the formula did not do was enable countries having only a Mediterranean seaboard to claim membership. To the American negotiators there were five considerations to be taken into account on this issue. These were the problems of presentation to the U.S. people and Congress, the Latin American dimension, the drawing of what was called the 'hold line', the place of Italy in the new security scheme (given that, unlike Luxembourg, Italy was not part of Western Union and thus not belonging to an alliance with an outlook on the Atlantic approaches), and what to do about the Algerian departments of France.

The State Department was well aware that, whatever the final shape of the military pledge undertaken by the United States under the Atlantic Pact, the U.S. isolationist tradition, like appeasement psychology in Europe, was 'not deeply buried'.\textsuperscript{47} A commitment had to be made, and seen to be made, but prudence counselled that wherever possible the European connection had to appear as of less importance than the Atlantic one. This could most easily be achieved if the only signatories to the treaty were those rimming the North Atlantic. For this purpose, Portugal could more readily be included than Italy, even though the former was a dictatorship and the latter a renewed democracy of the
kind the Atlantic Alliance was supposed to protect. It was also necessary to be clear about the treaty area in view of the reaction of various countries in South America. At first the United States showed some inclination to link the Rio Treaty with the new pact by including Brazil in the North Atlantic area. The Europeans objected on the grounds that an invitation to that effect was 'likely to cause undesirable complications'. By December most members of the Inter-American Alliance had become 'apprehensive lest, through the formation of the North Atlantic Pact, they might more easily be involved in conflict'. The American calculation was that a specifically North Atlantic arrangement, rather than a looser, wider system, would lessen such fears. It also had the virtue of keeping the Rio Treaty, the latest expression of the Monroe Doctrine, untouched by European involvement.

More troublesome was the general question of where on the European map to draw the line. This had been recognized as a problem from the beginning. In March 1948, George H. Butler of the Policy Planning Staff put the point:

> Since concentration of U.S. effort is essential in order that our strength will not be wasted by dispersing it too widely, the problem is to phrase a statement about U.S. military assistance in such a way as to cover these countries whose continued freedom is most essential to U.S. security, and at the same time to avoid a statement that might invite Communist aggression against countries not included in such a first priority list.

By April 1948, it had already been decided that Greece and Turkey were adequately provided for by the Truman Doctrine. To re-emphasise this, a declaration by the President, coinciding with an Atlantic Treaty, would stipulate continuing interest in these countries (and Iran) even though they were to be outside the formally defined treaty area. The
Washington Paper had included the same recommendation on 9 September 1948. It seemed the best way to devise an arrangement which would meet the security needs of the signatory nations, plus those in geographically contiguous regions, while not over-extending U.S. military capabilities. This formed the basis of the area definition of the finished treaty and its accompanying declaration on Greece and Southwest Asia. On what was to become known as NATO's northern flank there were fewer problems: Sweden wanted no part in the new arrangement, while Finland was debarred because of the terms of the recently-concluded Soviet-Finnish treaty of friendship. The Irish Republic excluded itself by insisting that the price of Irish accession was American pressure on the British Government to relinquish control in Northern Ireland.

The real difficulties in defining the 'hold line' concerned Italy and North Africa. During the negotiations Italy had been the subject of a wide variety of views. In the case of the French this had meant a change from passionate opposition to Italian membership to staunch advocacy of inclusion. The United States was steadier in its approach. It opposed Italy's membership but eventually bowed to French pressure. Lovett said in December that his Government had no firm position. On the one hand it recognized, with the British, that Italy could not contribute much to military strength as a result of the peace treaty limits on the Italian armed forces. On the other, the Truman Administration had already taken on security responsibilities in the Eastern Mediterranean, and had occupation forces in Trieste, and would have to make some reference to an American interest in Italy's territorial integrity. To do anything else would weaken the pro-Western political parties which had won so convincingly in April 1948. Lovett favoured a two-stage solution. First, Italy would be included in the
declaration on Greece and Turkey, perhaps even suggesting a Mediterranean Pact later. Secondly, Italy would become a member of Western Union, thus overcoming the country's seeming isolation. This idea was particularly appealing to U.S. policy-makers. Concurrently under discussion was a proposal for a French-Italian customs union; were this to be realised it would supplement the Benelux union and go some way towards satisfying the wider American aspirations for Western Union. The Italian Government let it be known in Washington that it was prepared not only to join the Brussels Treaty Powers but also 'to enter into an organization for [the political] integration of Western Europe'.

Curiously, although the Italian membership question was ostensibly a matter for dispute, the real issue was North Africa. As the Dutch negotiator Eelco van Kleffens pointed out, the inclusion of any territory on the southern shores of the Mediterranean would necessarily entail Italian membership. And the French insisted that the Algerian departments were to be included as part of metropolitan France. The United States objected on a number of grounds; as Lovett remarked, 'To get into Africa would open up a limitless field'. Neither Greece nor Turkey felt entirely safe and wanted to join. They could hardly be left out, Lovett thought, if Algeria was included. If Algeria came in, it would be hard to refuse Belgium's inclination to have the Belgian Congo - with its important reserves of weapons-grade uranium - included as well. Even the Dominion of South Africa had shown an interest in membership on the same basis as Canada. A momentum could easily develop which would expand the boundaries of the new Alliance beyond the point of which the American public would support it, and at which the strain on U.S. military resources would be so great as to be obvious to all, thereby destroying the purpose of the exercise.
As Lovett told the Ambassadors’ Committee in December 1948, 'the basic concept in the State Department had been that of a relationship with the signatories of the Brussels Pact'; and North Africa had not been included in the Brussels Treaty. 56

Behind these points of detail lay a principle which could not be disregarded by the Americans. This was the issue of European colonialism. By late 1948, the United Kingdom had impressed the United States of its commitment to decolonisation, following the granting of independence to India. Marshall remarked in November that the British had given 'abundant evidence' of this good faith in leading dependent peoples towards self-government and independence. They were therefore sponsored by the Americans at the United Nations to assume the trusteeship for the former Italian colony in Libya. 57 Other European nations did not enjoy this measure of U.S. support. The Dutch desire to restore the prewar relationship with its colonies found no favour in Washington, in spite of American recognition that the continuing ability of the Netherlands to service its debts was almost entirely dependent on the dollar-earning capacity of the Dutch East Indies. 58 This was to create particular problems on the eve of the signing of the North Atlantic Treaty. Regarding Belgium’s African possession, Lovett cabled Brussels: 'We do not consider North Atlantic Pact could possibly cover Congo...' despite the fact that uranium made the security of that colony 'of utmost importance in US strategic thinking'. The United States recognized that the Belgian Prime Minister, Paul-Henri Spaak, would have difficulty defending the Pact in his Parliament if the Congo was excluded, but felt this could be overcome if all Africa was left outside the treaty area. 59 The question of Spanish Morocco did not arise because Spain, although having an Atlantic coastline, could not
be considered until the particularly unacceptable nature of the Franco regime had altered sufficiently to remove the stain of fascism. 60

Much of the agonising over the geographical extent of the projected alliance reflected American uncertainties about the United States' willingness and ability to undertake new security obligations. President Truman's budgetary stringency meant that adequate forces did not exist - and could not be generated - for current mission requirements, embodied in the emergency war plan HALFWOON. 61 Strategy had thus to conform to capabilities, not vice versa, and this meant that commitments could not be extended. This was why the Americans insisted on a casus foederis in the North Atlantic Treaty which was unspecific on whether and when U.S. military assistance or reinforcements would be available to Western Europe.

For the U.S. Government, the fundamental issue was the financial ordering of domestic priorities. President Truman presented his budget recommendations for fiscal year 1950 to the Congress on 10 January 1949. 'I am convinced', he said, 'that we should plan our military structures at this time so as to insure a balanced military program in the foreseeable future at approximately the level recommended in this budget'. 62 He had already determined that $14.4 billion was the maximum that the National Military Establishment could be allocated. He reportedly brushed off the collective demands of the Pentagon and military chiefs, for a minimum of $16.9 billion, with the remark that what they had said was 'all very interesting'. 63 James V. Forrestal, the Secretary of Defence, persuaded Robert A. Lovett, Acting Secretary of State in Marshall's temporary absence due to ill health, to state formally that 'forces supportable by $16.9 billion would provide a
military posture and state of readiness better calculated...to instil the necessary confidence in democratic nations everywhere, than would the reduced forces in a more limited budget'. 64 Truman was unmoved. Instead, he followed his instincts and the advice of George C. Marshall, who pointed out in October 1948 that, so far as Western Europe was concerned, care had to be taken to conserve U.S. manpower and that full advantage had to be derived from Western Europe’s 'military potential'. 65

Marshall’s remarks were indicative of the American approach to the division of labour in the proposed Atlantic Pact. They might be interpreted as confirming what an eminent and experienced U.S. Ambassador, Charles Yost, later defined as the three objectives of American diplomats: to presume national security; to avoid a major war; and to win domestic approval, thus assisting the Government to succeed in its over-riding aims – that of staying in power. 66 Truman, strengthened by electoral success in November, won this round of budgetary wrangling, largely as a result of the fact that his policy of imposing rigid upper limits on military expenditure enjoyed widespread approval. 67 He received full support from Marshall in pursuing this policy, before and after the election. Congress endorsed the policy by authorising military appropriation for fiscal 1950 at slightly lower overall levels than Truman had asked for (although an attempt was made to put proportionately greater resources at the disposal of the U.S. Air Force). 68 Had the Pentagon’s demands been met, the Federal budget would have become adversely unbalanced, forcing the Administration to resort to deficit financing or to higher taxation. Although strong enough now politically to try either option, Truman saw no international trend, emerging from the events of 1948, which led him to follow his
military advisers' prescriptions. It was a calculated risk but, again, Marshall spoke for the President: 'We must expect for the current fiscal year a situation which is neither better nor worse than that which we have faced in 1948 insofar as it affects the ceiling of our military establishment'.

At the moment when the North Atlantic Treaty negotiations entered the final phase, General Dwight D. Eisenhower was recalled to government service, as he put it later, 'to relate the strengths of our forces to the probable situation we might encounter in war'. His main job was to ensure for Truman that the budget bidding process for fiscal year 1951 did not include submissions by the Joint Chiefs of Staff which were based purely on military requirements and which took no account of what the Administration as a whole, and the Bureau of the Budget especially, took to be the nation's capacity to pay. This is what had happened in 1948 with the preparation of the 1950 budget. Eisenhower therefore decided to change the military plan which served as the basis for the Pentagon's financial requests. In January 1949 he authorised the preparation of a new emergency war plan to replace HALFM00N. Its code name was OFFTACKLE and the JCS was instructed to base calculations on the forces expected to be available under the President's budget estimates for fiscal year 1950.

OFFTACKLE thus embodied the reality of U.S. military planning, based on capabilities, as against the intentions supposedly being incorporated in the North Atlantic Treaty during the negotiations concurrently in progress. As soon as the planners began work on OFFTACKLE disagreements arose about how much reliance should be placed on the American nuclear monopoly, whether the United Kingdom was an appropriate base for
offensive operations and the extent to which carrier-based aircraft should be used in strategic bombing missions. Eisenhower moved quickly, in February 1949, to lay down policy guidelines - approved by Truman - which would over-ride these disagreements and inter-Service rivalries. The Joint Strategic Plans Group were told:

The security of the United States requires the pursuance of a definite policy to insure, at the earliest possible moment, the holding of a line containing the Western Europe complex preferably no farther to the west than the Rhine. The logical extension of this line involves the United Kingdom on the left flank and...Cairo-Suez on the right flank.

However, Eisenhower pointed out that this desirable military objective could not be achieved with the forces available, and not even when selective service measures had begun to swell military manpower resources appreciably. He therefore set two less ambitious objectives. The first was to establish 'a substantial bridgehead', probably in south-west France and north-east Spain, to be held in Western Europe. The second followed from the likely difficulties of achieving the first: to evacuate continental Western Europe with the intention to 'return, at the earliest possible moment...in order to prevent the communization of that area with long term disastrous effects on U.S. national interests'. Eisenhower then added a list of what he termed 'musts', namely the primary tasks of the American military in war: to secure the United States, Iceland, and Greenland; and to protect the lines of communication to the United Kingdom, Straits of Gibraltar, Alaska, South America, Okinawa and Japan. This was less a matter of what John Erickson has called 'that tired joke about generals preparing to fight the last war all over again',

This was less a matter of what John Erickson has called 'that tired joke about generals preparing to fight the last war all over again',
than a realistic assessment of what United States military power could accomplish in the late-1940s. Furthermore, although OFFTACKLE was not completed until late-1949, the judgements and assumptions on which it was based were largely shared by British and Canadian planners. As with HALFMOON, the same strategic concept for the defence of continental Western Europe served as the basis for the national military plans of the three countries. Differences of emphasis there were - notably over the strategic importance of the Middle East - but the degree of cooperation between the nations which had made up the tripartite, wartime Atlantic Alliance continued to be stronger and more effective than anything achieved by NATO in its formative years. Recognising the unfavourable east-west balance of what soon came to be called conventional forces, the three extra-continental defenders of Western Europe opted for greater reliance on nuclear retaliation. For the Americans, OFFTACKLE included a new targeting plan, prepared by the U.S. Air Force, intended not merely to be used 'against' the Soviet war making capacity (as in HALFMOON) but to 'destroy' it. The number of atomic bombs and targets involved remains a classified secret but it is clear from the stated military objectives that the proposed atomic retribution was to be awesome and terrible. Although planned outside the arrangements mentioned in the North Atlantic Treaty, this stress on atomic weapons was later taken up by NATO itself and marked the beginnings of the Alliance's nuclear bias.

In the context of the American origins of NATO, the direction of U.S. strategic thought and planning, represented by OFFTACKLE, was influential. Assessments of present and projected force capabilities were as much of interest to diplomats as to the military policy-makers at a time when a security alliance - of unprecedented characteristics for all concerned -
was under construction. OFFTACKLE confirmed that the kind of deterrence offered by the United States on behalf of Western Europe was different to that to be presented by the West Europeans to the Soviet Union. The Pentagon's strategic assumption was that the Europeans would have to acquire, develop and maintain a credible capacity for barrier defence (keeping their borders inviolate). This was the first layer of deterrence. The second was to be provided by the Americans in the form of atomic weapons, coupled with long-range air power, and unmatched industrial resources, which would be mobilised to inflict unacceptable costs on the occupying power in Western Europe.\(^\text{75}\) The crucial difference between the two levels of deterrence was one of time. Americans hoped to establish a defence line on the Rhine but had much stronger expectations of an immediate withdrawal and a subsequent return in approximately two years after the opening of hostilities. The condition of 'self-help and mutual aid' mentioned in the Vandenberg Resolution meant that barrier defence was a European responsibility but that the United States would assist with the supply of military equipment.

Growing out of the London conversations of July and August 1948, attended by the U.S. Lt. General Lyman Lemmitzer, this help became the Military Assistance Programme of 1949.\(^\text{76}\) Agreed in outline form on the very eve of the signing of the North Atlantic Treaty, it was designed to assuage West European fears about the practical strength of the obligations undertaken by the Americans in the treaty. From an American standpoint the supply of 'military ERP' was also designed to reduce the Pentagon's demands on the federal budget.

During the last stages of the treaty negotiations there was a tendency for the Europeans to talk about the 'guarantee clause' while Americans preferred the term 'the pledge'. The difference is instructive: a
guarantee has legal connotations of contract; a pledge, especially in international relations, is an assurance or solemn promise with no legal implications (though there may be strong moral obligation). For the British, Ernest Bevin seems to have discounted the distinction. He told the Cabinet in February 1949 that 'in the end, I suppose, it is the existence of prepared common plans, rather than paper commitments which usually prove effective in determining a government to go to war in aid of an ally'.

There was obvious truth here but little comfort to Western Europe as a whole: as shown in the previous chapter, U.S. military planning was of two sorts. First, there was peacetime planning of the variety which General Lucius I. Clay pursued with his fellow commanders-in-chief in Germany, for the preparation of positions on or near the Rhine. This was largely for political consumption by West Europeans and bore little relation to the calculations being made in Washington. Secondly, there was the more serious planning for wartime operations (of the kind discussed above) which, despite relatively sophisticated concepts of operations, in reality would have borne out the truth of the remark by the French president, Henri Queuille that America would be 'liberating a corpse'.

Applying theories of deterrence - the pledge - was one thing; reassuring West Europeans about their immediate future - a guarantee - was another.

The obligation clause contained in the North Atlantic Treaty was an attempt to do both. The precise wording emerged in two stages, some three months after the treaty negotiations were reconvened on 10 December 1948. The first stage was completed on 24 December with distribution of a draft treaty text to the seven participating governments (United States, Canada and the Western Union countries). The second stage ended on 8 March 1949 when a new draft was circulated to
the same countries and to Norway.79

The fortnight of talks which preceded the despatch of the draft treaty on Christmas Eve 1948, marked the high point of the influence wielded thus far by the West Europeans themselves and John D. Hickerson's 'Atlanticist' Division of European Affairs within the State Department. The Pentagon Paper of 1 April 1948 included a pledge that was substantially weaker than the one contained in the Rio Treaty (under which a majority decision of the parties could impel all signatories to take diplomatic and economic action - but not military action - against an aggressor). The Pentagon Paper included the following draft clause:

...each party shall regard any action in the area covered by the agreement, which it considers an armed attack against itself and that each party accordingly undertakes to assist in meeting the attack....80

The phrases in italics represented to the West Europeans the kind of loopholes which had to be closed; too much scope existed for unilateral action on the part of the United States. Accordingly, in the Washington Paper of 9 September 1948, a compromise between the 'hair trigger' clause of the Brussels Treaty - which the Europeans would have liked duplicated in the Atlantic Pact - and the looser formula of the Pentagon Paper. The September draft stated that an armed attack would be considered an attack on all; each of the signatories 'should consequently, in accordance with its constitutional processes, assist in repelling the attack by all military, economic and other means in its power...'81

With the drafting of the version circulated on 24 December (the Ambassadors' draft treaty) the effect of the Atlanticists' argument was even more prominent. If an armed attack occurred, the signatory
nations 'will assist the party or parties so attacked by taking forthwith such military or other action, individually and in concert with the other Parties, as may be necessary to restore and assure the security of the North Atlantic area'. As written the clause was as watertight as the West Europeans could have hoped for. The Americans had apparently conceded that the pledge need not include the notion of each signatory having the right to determine whether an armed attack had occurred. They had also included explicit mention of military assistance. However, the Ambassadors' draft made a major concession to the views of the U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff: during the drafting of the Pentagon Paper in March 1948, General Gruenther had insisted that the American military 'retain freedom to carry out action against [an ] aggressor in accordance with [U.S.] strategic concepts'. In effect, nine months later the Ambassadors' Committee agreed that a European country under attack by the Russians only had the right to expect its allies (including the United States) to launch retributive assaults on the Soviet Union, and not to provide direct assistance to itself.

Like the previous versions, the Ambassadors' draft had the status of an international discussion document. For matters to proceed further on the American side copies had to be sent for comment to military policy-makers and to key Senators. The despatch of these copies marked the beginning of the second stage in the development of the obligation clause.

Admiral Louis Denfeld, that incisive critic of U.S. defence planning, presented the views of the Joint Chiefs of Staff to the State Department on 5 January 1949. Their general response was warm: the idea of
collective Atlantic defence would be 'an essential feature of a United States policy directed toward preservation of our national security'. What concerned the JCS was that the scope of the treaty 'should not be such as to result in undue disparity between our commitments and our present and prospective strengths'. This was a familiar theme but they were pleased that the weight of the obligation clause fell on the phrase 'as may be necessary to restore and assure the security of the North Atlantic area', Denfeld commented:

> Wording less general in nature might tend dangerously to affect our freedom of planning and action with respect to global strategy, it being manifest that direct assistance alone might well be neither practicable nor so effective as steps taken in consonance with over-all strategic concepts.

The JCS were opposed to any Mediterranean or North African territories being included. But their real objections were two telling points of detail. The first was their criticism of any wording in the final treaty which might give the impression that a commitment to consult other signatories about taking action amounted to a commitment to take such action. The second concerned the phrase 'armed attack'. Because this could be taken to mean internal or external aggression, the JCS wanted further refinement in the definition. From a military point of view, in Denfeld's words, 'the limitation of mandatory commitment, where reasonably practical, is good business in terms of future military contingencies'.

Arthur H. Vandenberg and Tom Connally reacted to the Ambassadors' draft. The treaty negotiators were given the substance of their views on 8 February 1949. Like the JCS they wanted a minimal commitment but were not prepared to rely on a particular interpretation of the relevant clauses.
Rather than taking the view that the draft pledge was really about the restoration and maintenance of 'the security of the North Atlantic area', the Senators wanted specific changes made so that the resulting pledge would be weaker than that of the Rio Treaty. They recommended that the drafted pledge should read: the signatories 'will assist the party or parties so attacked by taking action, individually and in concert with other Parties, as may be necessary to restore and assure the security of the North Atlantic area'. There was, in short, to be no mention of 'such military and other' action, nor that it should be taken 'forthwith'. The State Department minutes recording the response to this announcement to the negotiators make clear how perturbed the West Europeans now were. In a private conversation with his Canadian colleague, Sir Oliver Franks, the British Ambassador, reportedly said that this new development was 'disastrous'. During the Ambassadors' discussions with the U.S. Secretary of State he was more circumspect and analytical. Reflecting the gentlemanly, European approach to diplomacy, he suggested that the substance of the Treaty was what mattered, the words being of secondary importance only. However, because a certain degree of public discussion had already occurred, expectations had been raised about the Atlantic Pact in Western Europe. Public opinion there, he implied, would require something much stronger than that being now proposed.  

Vandenberg and Connally had become unofficial members of the U.S. negotiating team. Although this was regretted by some European participants, and by some on the American side (such as George Kennan), this was natural and inevitable. The U.S. Constitution stipulates that the President may only ratify treaties on the advice and consent of the Senate; in practice consent is most readily given if advice has been
asked for beforehand. Marshall and Lovett had respected this in 1948; their successors, Dean Acheson and James E. Webb (from the Bureau of the Budget), followed suit after they took office with the new Administration in January 1949. It was largely this which led Escott Reid to recall that while Acheson was not 'present at the creation' of the Atlantic Pact, the new Secretary of State came in on the sixth - and last - day of creation, that day being a particularly busy one.86

Acheson reported to his first meeting with the Ambassadors' Committee on 8 February that little preparatory work had been done to acquaint leading Senators with details of developments in the second half of 1948. This allowed him to buy time, thus reducing West European pressure for an early completion of the text; he explained that 'regulating progress depended more upon the Senators than upon himself'.87

This was a useful device for the State Department. It allowed the Department's own reservations to be presented as the Senators' own objections, against which the West Europeans could not argue as negotiating equals. The stratagem had a certain disadvantage in that it suggested criticism of Lovett: the inference being that he should have sought close contacts with Tom Connally on the subject. In fact there had been little or no occasion to do so, following the passage of the Vandenberg Resolution in June 1948. No copy of the Washington Paper treaty draft of September 1948 was supplied to the Foreign Relations Committee, partly because the document had no official status, and partly because it included the State Department's clear preference for a Rio Treaty-type pledge, which fell well short of what the Vandenberg Resolution could, if liberally interpreted, be said to permit. Negotiations had not been reconvened until early December when Senators were out of Washington during the Congressional
Christmas break. When Acheson finally did meet the two Senators, on 3 and 5 January 1948, it was for all practical purposes the earliest that this could have been done.

The reaction of Vandenberg and Connally, respectively the former and present chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, to the Ambassador's draft was consistent with their earlier involvement in transatlantic diplomacy in mid-1948. Although political rivals, both had been in agreement over the purpose of the Vandenberg Resolution: it was to help create an environment in which the West Europeans would begin to act, in security terms, according to the dual principle of 'self-help and mutual aid'. If the United States ever were to avail itself of the opportunity created by Resolution 239 to associate with regional, collective arrangements in Western Europe, then it would do so on a quid pro quo basis, as a response to the kinds of political, economic and especially military development that senators had been looking for in Western Europe for some two years. Acheson's biographer, David McLellan, has argued that the new Secretary of State and some senators 'sensed the utility' of a North Atlantic Treaty which would persuade the Europeans, especially the French and Germans, 'to bury their quarrels and collaborate in producing a stronger, more unified front to the Russians'. All of this is demonstrably true (although McLellan does not extend the point to cover the European unity issue) and in the context of the guarantee clause or pledge it reinforces the point that the Senate and Acheson both had an interest in a weak commitment. A strong, unambiguous guarantee would have lessened the pressure on the Europeans to take such action. In the earlier words of George C. Marshall, it would have 'taken the heat off' Western Europe, thereby lessening the chances of radical change.
The problem with this approach was that it presented the temptation to reduce the commitment below the level acceptable to the West Europeans. An impromptu and intemperate debate on the Senate floor on 14 February 1949 epitomised this; Acheson recalled that it 'set off a land mine under our feet'.

The isolationist Republican from Missouri, Forrest Donnel, read into the Congressional Record an article published two days previously in the Kansas City Times, which reported the Secretary of State to have said that the treaty would be a moral commitment to fight, even if the sole right of Congress to declare war would still be respected. In a speech which would have been unexceptional in the 1930s, Donnel complained bitterly against this. He challenged Connally and Vandenberg to disassociate themselves with the thrust of Acheson's reported remarks. Connally caught the mood and asserted in reply that he did not believe in giving carte blanche assurances to anyone, least of all the West Europeans. Americans would not be blindfolded, he said 'and make a commitment now to enter every war that may occur in the next 10 years, and send our boys and resources to Europe to fight'. Americans were not Sir Galahads, he concluded. It was left to Vandenberg to put the case for the proposed treaty. The Atlantic Pact would prevent a third world war, he argued, and be written 'within the four corners' of the U.N. Charter. He added the historically dubious but politically expedient remark that the Pact would be 'the outcome and implementation' of the Resolution which bore his name and which fellow senators had approved so convincingly the previous June.

On hearing of the unscheduled debate Acheson, together with Charles E. Bohlen, the State Department Counselor, went up to Capitol Hill to talk to Connally and Vandenberg. Their discussion centred on various drafts of the obligation clause, now known as Article 5. Acheson's
minute of the meeting states: 'Both Senators were even more strongly than heretofore of the opinion that it must be made clear in Article 5 that there was no obligation, moral or otherwise, to go to war'. Connally even suggested that the formula first used in the Rio Treaty — that an attack on one would be considered an attack against all — was inappropriate. Vandenberg was less insistent but did stress the need to omit the word 'military'. His colleague strengthened the point by proposing the phrase 'as it may deem necessary' to be inserted to qualify any obligation undertaken and reserve final judgement to the national governments. Acheson pointed out the virtues of the planned pact as a deterrent to an aggressor but did not apparently seek to change minds. It was agreed that he appear before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee later the same week.91

Developments now unfolded swiftly. A group of high level officials in the State Department — led by Bohlen and Hickerson — produced a draft of Article 5 which represented 'in substance the minimum commitment which could be embodied in this Article and achieve from the point of view of foreign policy the purposes of the North Atlantic Pact'. It included the Rio Treaty idea of an attack on one being an attack on all, but it also incorporated Connally's phrase about the signatories taking the measures they deem necessary.92 Sir Oliver Franks was shown the draft informally to get his views on the likelihood of the acceptance by the West Europeans, including the British. Apparently on his advice a crucial phrase — 'including the use of military force' — was included.93 The text now read:

The Parties agree that an armed attack against one or more of them in Europe or North America shall be considered an attack against them all; and consequently
that, if such an armed attack occurs, each of them, in exercise of the right of individual or collective self-defense recognized by Article 51 of the Charter of the United Nations, will take, forthwith, individually and in concert with the other Parties, the measures it deems necessary, including the use of armed force, to restore and maintain the security of the North Atlantic area.

President Truman read and approved this and, following Acheson's suggestion, agreed to put pressure on Tom Connally, Truman's fellow Democrat, to accept this Article as drafted. With slight - and insubstantial - amendments, this draft was discussed by Acheson with the Foreign Relations Committee meeting in executive session on 18 February 1949. The Secretary of State skilfully defended the wording of this (and all the other Articles) but it was Vandenberg who made the really telling point in answer to suggestions for changes: 'the worst thing that could happen to us is to take this treaty on the floor of the Senate in a form where it is not eloquently adopted, and I would rather have an overwhelming approval of this sort of statement than a grudging approval of something stronger, because I think it would be weaker in the end.'

This did not conclude discussions on the final text of the treaty - there were a number of minor issues, and the major ones of Italy and Algeria, to be settled - but an Atlantic Alliance was now clearly about to be established. Prior to this, there was a real doubt, particularly in American minds, about whether the idea of such an alliance - mooted in 1947 by St. Laurent and Ernest Bevin - could be given political substance. As it was the West Europeans and Canadians could congratulate themselves on what Escott Reid termed 'a partial victory'. The North Atlantic Treaty would not include a guarantee
but it would have a pledge stronger than the one in the Rio Treaty. This was reason enough for celebration but real achievement had been an American one. Article 5 was a masterpiece of diplomatic draughtsmanship (to which Europeans made an indispensable contribution). It reconciled domestic U.S. inhibitions and West European constraints by the simple yet hard-to-achieve method of being virtually all things to virtually all Americans. Like the U.S. Constitution, it could be interpreted either strictly according to the letter, which appeased the latent but real isolationist impulse; or more loosely by addressing the ill-defined but potential usefulness of the Atlantic community to the United States. 97

The Alliance had been made but the actual commitments - political, military and moral - had been minimised. In this form, the Truman Administration could claim legitimately that - as Lovett had insisted in mid-1948 - the treaty 'had the backing of the vast majority of the American people'. 98 In December 1948, the National Opinion Research Center reported that some 75 per cent of the U.S. public approved some form of Atlantic Pact. Opinion was evenly divided on whether an explicit commitment to go to war could or should be made. The figures changed very little in the period up to and beyond the signing of the treaty. 99 There were many Americans - in government as well as outside - who would have liked to leave matters there. But just as the Marshall Plan had to be supplemented by an Atlantic security arrangement, so the North Atlantic Treaty had to be bolstered by yet more evidence of American goodwill and largesse, this time in the form of a military assistance programme.

The notion of supplying Western Europe with matériel was far from new
when the treaty neared completion. The National Security Council had reported to Truman as far back as July 1948 on the detailed pros and cons of providing military assistance to the non-Soviet world, especially Western Union. It was therefore developed in parallel with the North Atlantic Treaty, following the progress of the Western Union military organisation based in London and monitored by the Americans, and it reflected the same U.S. concerns which have been the theme of this thesis. The young historian Arthur M. Schlesinger Jr., writing in November 1948, made the relevant points:

We are confronted with a situation in which European governments are bound willy-nilly to build up their defenses...The only solution is for the United States to assume part, at least, of the burden of rearmament and this can be done best by resuming lend-lease.

The second main reason forcing us into a policy of military aid is that the American objective of a European federation cannot be achieved without an American decision to underwrite such a federation strategically...A European federation can make military sense only if it is backed in principle and in fact by American military might and unless it makes military sense it will have overall appeal for European governments changed with the problem of protecting their people in an epoch of insecurity.

He added that military staff talks were needed to relieve the Europeans of their 'profound fear of American isolationism'. Another historian, Lawrence S. Kaplan, with the hindsight of a quarter century looking back on his own personal involvement in the military aid programme, embellished Schlesinger's observations. Acknowledging that there was a strong strain of self-interest in the Marshall Plan and military version of ERP, Kaplan also noted the altruism: the United States still felt it had a mission to help others achieve the Americans' state of happiness and prosperity. This mission could be realised not only in
granting economic and military aid, it could also be achieved 'by
conferring the advantages of America's unified economy and society
upon divided allies. To many Americans this was an imperative under-
lying American effort to persuade Europeans to cooperate among them-
selves on behalf of a future United States of Europe'.

Because the final form of the Mutual Defense Assistance Program - as
passed by Congress - began to take shape in the latter end of 1949,
a full description and analysis falls outside the scope of this thesis.
Furthermore, Kaplan has provided a major study of the detailed work
which went into the U.S. military assistance plan for Western Europe
and elsewhere. Still, in spite of such prior attention, the supply
of matériel was considered by Americans and Europeans from mid-1948
onwards as an indispensable element in any future Atlantic security
arrangement. The reasons which led the United States to make military
supplies available were the same as those which animated and conditioned
U.S. responses to West European proposals for a multi-national, trans-
oceanic security alliance. Some comment here is therefore necessary,
especially as the American input to the earliest stages of the military
aid programme's formulation serves to confirm the interpretation of
NATO's American origins contained in this thesis.

On 10 July 1948, Truman approved the National Security Council's report
on giving military help to the non-Soviet world (NSC14/1). It
stipulated that any assistance given must not jeopardise the matériel
needs of U.S. armed forces and should be consistent with existing
strategic concepts. Replacements, spare parts and ammunition would be
provided for as long as U.S. security requirements dictated. And the
programme had to be in accordance with the aims, purposes and adminis-
tration of Marshall aid. If there had to be some partial rehabilitation of the American arms industry, this was not to unbalance the effort to return the United States to full peacetime economy. NSC 14/1 spelt out what this meant for the West Europeans: they had to integrate their armaments industries so as to become rapidly self-supporting. Where this was not possible standardisation of equipment should be achieved with U.S. models. The recipients of aid should provide strategic raw materials in return for supplies and that compensation should be forthcoming to the United States 'whenever and to what extent feasible'.

By December 1948, the Joint Chiefs of Staff had built these ideas into their calculations. Initial doubts that the economic burden of trying to rearm the United States and Western Europe simultaneously would be insuperable had been overcome. In September, Air Force General Hoyt S. Vandenberg suggested that America's security interests might be best served if the United States curtailed its own requirements in order to make larger contributions to the revitalisation of the military power disposed of by the Western Union countries. Army General Omar Bradley agreed, saying that it 'would seem a great mistake to concentrate our entire resources on a United States rearmament program in the belief that such action alone will contribute most to our security'. By December, the Joint Chiefs of Staff reached a consensus: they recognised that to pile military assistance on top of the requirements of the old emergency war plan HALFWOON, including its expensive mobilisation and logistical elements, would risk the economic, and therefore the military, security of the United States. They were thus thrown back on the irreducible minimum for the nation's defences later to be incorporated in OFFTACKLE at Eisenhower's insistence.
The minimum requirement was, in the words of the historian of the JCS, 'to acquire and support forces for an atomic offensive, to meet occupation commitments, to provide a "platform" for mobilization, to maintain lines of communications, and to provide initial air defence of the United States'.\textsuperscript{106}

This established the criteria by which 'spare' capacity could be devoted to the West European rearmament effort. No-one concerned with developing the aid programme in late-1948 and early-1949 underestimated the difficulties involved, particularly the fact that such help as could be supplied was small in relation to what the Europeans themselves had to supply. Officials in the State and Defense Departments, as well as Congressmen, were evidently clear – and satisfied – that on the basis of 1948 figures the United States would supply only one-seventh of the total Western Union military build-up.\textsuperscript{107} Testifying before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee in 1949 on the programme before Congress, General Lemnitzer stated: 'The hard core of ground power will come from Europe'. Politically this was acceptable to the U.S. Government and public opinion; militarily, as General Vandenberg pointed out, the aid proposed was 'a very minute drop in the bucket' compared to what was required and to what would have to be forthcoming from European economies and resources. General Bradley summed up: 'No one of us has any idea that the arms furnished in this program would be enough to arm enough forces to stop [a Soviet] aggression'.\textsuperscript{108}

On the American side this caused little anxiety. As Bradley put it, what the United States was to supply was 'a very small part' of the West Europeans' needs:
We think that in general they should furnish most of those needs themselves to build up their security, and that this is a small part which we think will help start them toward building up their security by increasing the morale of the troops who receive this. Remember, these are forces which are already in being and are provided for in this year's budgets by the nations. We feel it will increase the morale of the nations with the will to resist and a desire to build up their security to a point where they can really defend themselves.\textsuperscript{109}

As with the North Atlantic Treaty, this was a primary purpose of the exercise. Neither the administrative nor legislative branches of the U.S. Government felt that more needed to be done by the Americans. Considerable comfort was taken in the fact that this 'aid-for-self-help' formula had forced Western Union to embark upon a programme of military integration, with a commonly-agreed strategic plan and properly-assigned wartime roles and missions. According to Lemnitzer, the requests for aid would have been much greater than they turned out to be had it not been for the degree of integration already achieved at the military level in Western Union. Without that, the United States 'would have been confronted with each nation attempting to have a complete army, navy and air force to carry out all roles'.\textsuperscript{110}

There was a double benefit for the United States in this state of affairs, which coincided precisely with the motives which had led the Truman Administration into the talks on Atlantic security from the outset. The first was that a degree of military collectivisation had been forced on the West Europeans which materially reduced the relatively unproductive burden of defence expenditure on economies on both sides of the Atlantic. Following the processes established under the Marshall aid programme, American officials had been able to ensure that requests
for assistance were, in Robert Lovett's words, 'authentic and realistic'. The requests did not sacrifice economic recovery in Western Europe; nor did they strain Truman's spending limits. The presence of U.S. observers at Western Union conferences had paid handsome political dividends. As Lovett pointed out to Averell Harriman in December, 'The psychological effect on the West Europeans of the knowledge that a program agreed by their military leaders could not be met might be disastrous'. He added that such knowledge would be 'a boon to the USSR'. The second advantage for the United States was that in helping to create conditions in which West Europeans could themselves begin to operate a set of defence arrangements, that were truly collective in origins and practice, the Americans could limit their involvement to joint activities with a unified West European effort. This minimised 'entanglement' and provided the basis for a diminishing participation as the Allies proceeded on the path towards robust economic health and political unity.

As ever the West Europeans did little to point out that progress towards political and military unity was more apparent than real. In a major address in New York in mid-November 1948, Eelco van Kleffens, the Ambassador of the Netherlands to the United States, said that if such 'massive realists as Churchill advocate the idea [of European federation], it must be not only desirable but also capable of execution'. He suggested that Western Union already contained the notion of integration 'already a single Western European general staff is in operation' and in daily contact with its political steering group, the Consultative Council established by the Brussels Treaty. He emphasised that federation had not yet arrived but was on the way. He asked for American tolerance: the argument that Western Europe's failure to take
rapid steps amounted to a refusal 'to pull its weight' was strongly rejected: even the original thirteen American colonies had taken time to develop their federal arrangements. He asked for patience. Americans, he said, should 'give those who labor there your trust and a real chance to accomplish what cannot be accomplished overnight'.

The Dutch Ambassador remarked that 1948 was in any case not 1776: Alexander Hamilton's difficulties were comparatively minor when compared with the contemporary problems in Western Europe. Although the American popular press and some Congressmen did not always recognise this, senior U.S. policy-makers were well aware that military assistance would not eliminate all the problems which confronted European federalists. If Marshall aid and an Atlantic Pact failed to create confidence then yet more would have to be done, in the phrase quoted earlier of the Marshall Plan Administrator, Paul Hoffman, to get Europe back on its feet and off America's back. Furnishing military equipment was the obvious next - and possibly last - source of influence the Americans could tap.

It was not only the West Europeans, however, who asked for military grants-in-aid. By the end of 1948, over 50 countries had asked for varying degrees of help. American resources could not satisfy all and so the Joint Chiefs of Staff were asked in November to prepare a list of priority countries. European countries - neutral and non-neutral - together with Canada headed the list, while China and countries in Southwest Asia, Latin America and Africa appeared further down. While this reflected Western Europe's strategic importance to the United States it did not solve matters. Within Western Europe there were significant differences in what was required. These
differences in part reflected some European countries' continuing colonial responsibilities and the United States, as it had indicated over the Atlantic treaty, would not allow itself to be seen to underwrite European imperialism. The natural sensitivity was reinforced by the need to match the Soviet Union as the champion of decolonisation. The issue could be contained in an Atlantic context simply by defining the treaty area accordingly. With the military assistance programme things were more problematical. They came to a head two days before the North Atlantic Treaty was signed, in a heated session during which the European Foreign Ministers, gathered in Washington for the ceremony, defended themselves against charges brought by Dean Acheson against the Netherlands in particular but which had a wider application.

The problem arose over anti-Dutch rebellions in Indonesia. The United States, while not itself involved, supported in general terms the Indonesian ambition to re-establish an independent republic. The U.S. Special Representative in Europe, Averell Harriman, advised Acheson in March that any Dutch Government which agreed to restore the republic in the East Indies would almost certainly fall. He had been told by Dirk Stikker, the Dutch Foreign Minister, that the Netherlands wished to remind the United States of a pledge given to Western Union: 'that Dutch soldiers who will be drafted in April will be devoted to Western Europe and defense'. Harriman wrote that Stikker added that 'arms and supplies would be urgently needed if these troops were to play any useful part'. Acheson found this unacceptable. If Western Europe needed defending then Dutch soldiers and their equipment should be brought home for that purpose. To that end, he announced on 2 April 1949 to his West European counterparts that no military assistance
could go to the Netherlands. The United States wished, wherever possible, to adhere to the principle of equality of treatment as to whether supplies were to be forthcoming for all Western Europe. But, Acheson insisted, the United States 'must have the legal right to say no' to a particular nation, though it hoped that such a situation would never arise. 115

The European response was fierce. Acheson's linkage of Western Europe's security and colonialism touched a raw nerve. Appropriately Ernest Bevin led the counter-attack. It is worth quoting his reply in full from the verbatim report of the meeting.

Bevin: Suppose we have plans to hold at the Elbe, with troops and armies from Holland, Belgium, France and Great Britain. Then there is a dispute going on - leave Ireland out of it for the moment - say with Great Britain and on Malaya, or some part of Africa - we have great territories overseas - and the U.S. Government on quite other grounds didn't like what we were doing in Africa or somewhere else, yet we are faced with planning, the drilling, the inculcation of the spirit among our people to defend this line. Then they are left in uncertainty whether America will give us the arms on quite another issue. Well I suggest to you: how would you feel if on other grounds arms were withheld? Now I admit your troubles with Congress; I admit all you feel about imperialism, and about insurrection and rebellion against the dear old powers in Europe. Well, I don't mind you feeling like that. It may be a grand idea to have quite the missionary zeal to free everybody in the world, but it's not a very good answer when the Russians are coming down with a tank corps. We shall have a Russian tank [attack] because we have trouble on the Gold Coast. That is the sort of fundamental thing we are worried about and can you give us the answer to that? 116

He added later the same meeting: 'It leaves you the authority under your suggestion as I see it to take absolute unilateral action because you are supplying money....We on the other hand have got to persuade our parliaments virtually to go right in without reservations and
questions'. The issue was eventually shelved at a West European suggestion that results be awaited from a high level Dutch mission which was due to visit Indonesia.

Bevin's outburst indirectly reveals much about American foreign policy — and by extension transatlantic relations in general — at the end of a thirteen month period during which appeared the treaty which created NATO. On a personal level, the British Foreign Secretary showed, on the one hand, how desperate the Old World had become for the security now within the gift of the New; on the other, he demonstrated what has been called 'the common English resentment of American power', in fact shared by many Europeans. On a military level, Bevin's remarks exposed yet again the European fixation about the Soviet Union's unreliable intentions and vast military capabilities. On a diplomatic and political level, Bevin demonstrated that the North Atlantic Pact did not solve the basic European security problem over which he had striven for the past year. His recognition that neither the treaty nor the associated military assistance programme, nor yet the defence planning exercises which accompanied both, had really dented the American freedom to act unilaterally meant that he could not claim, with Canning, that he had called in the New World to redress the balance of the Old. All that the United States had done was to put on paper what had been obvious in two world wars: Americans had a vested interest in ensuring that no single power dominated all Europe, but that the United States reserved to itself the right to determine when and how that objective would be achieved. Managing the foreign policy of a superpower with global responsibilities, the American diplomats felt they could do no other.

* * *
The five Western Union countries, the United States and Canada, together with Norway, Denmark, Iceland, Portugal and Italy, signed the North Atlantic Treaty on 4 April 1949. They also issued the same day a declaration reaffirming support for Greece, Turkey and Iran. Thus was NATO born.

American policy-makers liked to remind the West Europeans that this step was unprecedented for the United States. (It was, of course, an equally novel development for Western Europe.) Historians have picked up this theme, including the formation of the postwar Atlantic Alliance in the process begun with wartime doubts about Soviet intentions and brought to fruition with the Truman Doctrine and Marshall Plan. That process is often called 'the American diplomatic revolution'.\(^{119}\) From the evidence presented in this thesis it is clear that such a view is inappropriate, or at best relevant only in the context of Soviet-American rivalry. As regards Western Europe, it would be more accurate to say that the Truman Administration as a whole intended the North Atlantic Treaty to prevent a diplomatic revolution of a kind which would jeopardise America's freedom of manoeuvre. The treaty per se did not entangle the United States in the affairs of Europe: in 1949 all American diplomatic options remained open. To Washington, the new Alliance was a set of political arrangements which had a military expression. Nothing in the treaty compromised the traditional U.S. preferences for minimal standing forces, rapid mobilisation at the eleventh hour, and thorough demobilisation the moment hostilities ceased. Possession of an atomic monopoly reinforced those preferences.

The difficulty with America's otherwise uncomplicated approach - and the source of future changes in U.S. policy - was that almost everything
depended on a positive reaction in Western Europe. It was the West Europeans who had to become the self-sustaining counterforce to communism. For Americans in the late-1940s this meant some form of economic, military and political unity in Western Europe, to be brought about probably in that order and sooner rather than later. As encouragement, Marshall aid was forthcoming; military assistance was on its way; and the fact that a security pact had been concluded - which was of greater value to the recipients of aid than the donor - helped improve the political climate. Lovett's instructions to Harriman, quoted earlier in this chapter, bear repetition in this context. The Atlantic Pact, he wrote, 'should be considered a supplement to and in no sense a replacement for the efforts towards European unity'. The Brussels Treaty system would continue to operate as 'the nucleus of a Western European union' which had not been imposed on its members from without. That was Europe's first and best hope; the American pledge was the last.

This was the application to Western Europe of the strategy of containment, as revealed in the documentary record covering U.S. relations with Western Europe - between 1947 and 1949. In domestic American setting it was a policy with much to recommend it: nobody in the United States was required to do very much to make it a success. Additional demands were not to be made on the U.S. Treasury or taxpayer. Industry could continue the increasingly profitable production and export of non-military goods to the growing markets in Europe. The military establishment was left free to develop war plans and procurement programmes which conceded little in practice to the security needs (as interpreted by West Europeans) of the new Allies. Additionally, popular support was forthcoming - according to opinion polls in April 1949, almost 80 per cent approved the Atlantic Pact - because
something was being seen to be done about communism but not by the United States alone. Congress looked to the day when much of the economic and military burden would be carried by the rejuvenated West Europeans. The unformulated ideal of a West European union pervaded, strengthened and seemingly justified this optimism.

Events external to the United States - principally, the advent of the Soviet bomb and the Korean War - soon exposed the fragility of this concept of containment. The emphasis on a new Western Europe shifted to military integration across the Atlantic area. What had been designed to facilitate withdrawal became the device which ensnared.

It is this change which has obscured from contemporary historians the original American motives for signing the North Atlantic Treaty. As this thesis has shown, the United States had satisfied itself by the end of 1948 that an Atlantic Alliance would be an inexpensive way of bridging the gap between America's global commitments, thrust upon it at the close of World War II, and the economic, military and political resources which could be devoted to them. The world's most strategically important region, Western Europe, was the main focus for concern but the founding of Western Union encouraged the United States that the West Europeans were beginning to control their own destiny with minimal reliance upon transatlantic friends. As the State Department put it in an explanatory statement for the American public: 'The North Atlantic Pact is made possible by the strides the Western nations of Europe have taken toward economic recovery and toward economic, political and military cooperation....Lines of action to increase cooperation through 1952 have been prepared'. The Pact and West European integration were interdependent elements of the one
concept: the treaty improved the chances of integration in the short-term; full West European unity would render the Atlantic Pact unnecessary in the long-run. In the American grand strategy of the late-1940s, NATO was seen as a holding measure. That is why the United States signed the North Atlantic Treaty. What happened thereafter does not call that conclusion into question.
NOTES AND REFERENCES

The following conventions are used throughout. First, published works are cited in full initially; thereafter the author and a shortened title only are used. Secondly, following the practice with unpublished sources, page number references to individual documents reproduced in printed collections indicate the whole document, not the page on which a quotation or particular point is made.
INTRODUCTION : Notes and References


3. This is evident from the endless arguments about burden sharing in NATO. See P. Foot, Defence Burden Sharing in the Atlantic Community 1945-1954 (Aberdeen: University of Aberdeen Centre for Defence Studies, 1981).


12. Short essays covering each of the 12 original signatory nations' reasons for joining the Atlantic Alliance began appearing regularly in the official publication NATO Review from 1979. See volumes 27, 28, 29, 30 and 31.


16. The use of such apparently neat catagorisations is convenient but misleading. There is a degree of overlap between groups and within one catagory there can be wide differences of sources, methods and conclusions. However, some rough definition is possible. 'Traditionalists' see U.S. policy primarily as a reaction to a series of potentially hostile Soviet initiatives (example: H. Feis, From Trust to Terror (New York: Norton, 1970)). 'Realists' take the cold war as a period of natural - even inevitable - competition between the two leading powers of the day (example: N.A. Graebner, Cold War Diplomacy: American Foreign Policy, 1945-1960 (Princeton: University of Princeton Press, 1962)). 'Revisionists' regard the United States as interventionist in tendency and practice; American policy thus forced the Soviet Union to behave more aggressively than it would otherwise have done (example: W.A. Williams, The Tragedy of American Diplomacy (New York: Delta, 1962)). 'Post-Revisionists' mark a return to the more neutral position taken by the 'realists' (example: D. Yergin, Shattered Peace).


24. Theodore C. Achilles has written, but not published, his memoirs. His published version of NATO's origins is part of the semi-official series issued by NATO: see NATO Review, 27:4, pp.11-14; and 27:5, pp.16-19.

25. There may also have been a desire on the part of those Democratic Party members or supporters to distance themselves from the policies of the Eisenhower Administration. As John Foster Dulles was the foremost advocate of a federalised Western Europe - and had been since 1947 - there would have been a natural inclination to emphasise the issues on which there were differences rather than similarities.

26. See text below, pp.

27. E.H. van der Beugel, From Marshall Aid to Atlantic Partnership: European Integration as a Concern of American Foreign Policy (Amsterdam: Elsevier, 1966), especially p.258. See also the Preface by Henry A. Kissinger, extolling van der Beugel's avoidance of the 'parochialism' which Kissinger suggests is usual in transatlantic exchanges (pp.ix-xi). It is a moot point whether he took this view because van der Beugel does little to differentiate the interests of North America from those of Western Europe.

29. Kennedy quoted, ibid., p.v.


39. Ibid., p.93.


CHAPTER 1 : Notes and References


7. Van der Beugel, From Marshall Aid to Atlantic Partnership, p.100.


10. 'Council of Foreign Ministers Meeting in Moscow', 26 February 1947, Personal Memoranda File 1947, Supplement of 1971, JFD Papers. See also 'Memorandum for File' (by Cohen), 24 February 1947, CFM Files (Lot H-88), Box 14, Record Group 59, National Archives and Record Service, Washington D.C. (hereafter, Record Group will be cited RG, and the National Archives and Record Service as NA).


12. A fuller judgement on Marshall at the State Department awaits the release to scholars of access to his papers. At the time of writing (1984) this has not been granted, pending completion by Forrest C. Pogue of the last volume of the authorised biography.


18. Ibid., (editor's comment).

19. Ibid., pp.234-235.


46. Ibid., pp.604-605.

47. Ibid., p.605.


49. Documents on American Foreign Policy, IX, p.605.

50. 'GFK draft: GCM Speech for July 14th' (endorsed 'used GFK'), Chronological Files 1947. Records of the Policy Planning Staff (hereafter cited PPS Papers), RG50, NA.

51. State Department Press Release, 17 November 1947, Miscellaneous 1946-1949, Box 7, Bohlen Papers, RG59, NA.

52. 'Annual Survey for 1947', Inverchapel to Foreign Office, London, 14 February 1948, 15496, 68013 F0371, PRO.

53. Ibid.

54. Truman's views on European unity are referred to in The Washington Post, 8 April 1947. This is one of the few references to the President's opinions on the matter. Senator Fulbright's biographer suggested that one reason for the comparative dirth of White House comment may well be the desire to avoid identification with Fulbright. Truman and Fulbright had fallen out over domestic policy - the Senator called for the President's resignation. The suggestion is therefore that Truman was reluctant to commit himself publicly to European unity because to do so would inevitably link him to his Democratic opponent. See T. Coffin, Senator Fulbright, pp.94-96, and H.F. Gosnell, Truman's Crises, pp.316-318.

55. 'Annual Survey for 1947', Inverchapel to Foreign Office, London, 14 February 1958, 15496, 68013 F0371, PRO.

56. Ibid.


58. 'Annual Survey for 1947', Inverchapel to Foreign Office, London, 14 February 1947, 15496, 68013 F0371, PRO.


60. See Note 12 (Chapter 1) above.

30. The historian Alfred Grosser puts the general point: 'The countries of Western Europe found themselves in situations which varied considerably and were yet quite similar. Common to all was poverty but it was experienced differently by each, and all expected help from the one victor that had become richer'. See A. Grosser, The Western Alliance (London: Macmillan, 1980), p.34.


34. Ibid.


40. This did not mean that all U.S. officials hoped that the Soviet Union would refuse to participate. Many simply had not thought through the implications of Soviet participation.

41. Acheson quoted in Beloff, The United States and the Unity of Europe, p.79.


43. Congressional Record, 80th Congress, 1st Session (1947), pp.6957-6958.

44. Ibid., p.6959.

61. Documents covering Dorothy Thompson's proposals are held in the General Files of the Department of State, Office of European Affairs, 840.00/11-2247, RG59, NA. (hereafter citations from the General Files will be given by the numerical classification only.)

62. The notion of a united Western Europe being an ideological competitor with communism was discussed in a report by the Department of State's Committee on Foreign Aid: 'We cannot forget that [European unity] formed an essential part of the two most successful and dynamic recent European ideologies: German pan-European fascism and Communism itself'. Text quoted in M. Beloff, The United States and the Unity of Europe, p.16.


64. Dulles' own account is J.F. Dulles, War or Peace (New York: Macmillan, 1950), pp.105-106. Dulles overstated his role in getting the Interim Aid conditions rescinded.


66. None of these cables are reproduced in FRUS 1947, III. The corresponding volume for 1948 opens with a long section entitled 'Western European Unity and Defense' and thus gives a more accurate picture of State Department's interest in West European unity. The basis of that interest, however, was developed in 1947.

67. Griswold to Marshall, 13 November 1947, 840.00/11-1347, RG59, NA.

68. U.S. Consulate, Berne to Marshall, 25 July (A-345), 840.00/7-2547, RG59, NA.

69. Coe to Marshall (Report on London Freedom Committee) 16 September 1947, 840.00/9-1647, RG59, NA; Caffery to Marshall, 18 July 1947 (A-1268), 840.00/7-1847, RG59, NA.

70. Caffery to Marshall, 5 August 1947 (435), 840.00/7-2647, RG59, NA.

71. Murphy to Marshall (Report on Various German Federalist Movements) 4 December 1947, 840.00/12-447, RG59, NA. In the same document, Murphy noted that Marshall's 18 November 1947 speech had encouraged European federalists and added that the Department of State supported the general objectives of such groups.

72. Achilles to Lovett, 7 December 1947, 740.0019 Control (Germany)/12-747, RG59, NA.


74. Text quoted in ibid., p.16.

76. Murphy to Beam, 7 December 1948, 740.00119 Control (Germany)/12-748, RG59, NA.

77. For American reports of Molotov's team at the Paris Conference, see the documents reproduced in FRUS 1947, III, pp.296-308.


84. Lovett to Clayton, 10 July 1947, ibid., pp.324-326.


87. Franks to Lovett (Unofficial Aide-Mémoire), 22 October 1947, ibid., pp.446-450 (emphasis in original).


89. 'Annual Survey for 1947', Inverchapel to Foreign Office, London, 14 February 1948, 15496, 68013 F0371, PRO.

90. See covering minute by Rundall, ibid.
CHAPTER 2: Notes and References


12. 'Summary of a Memorandum Representing Mr. Bevin's Views on the Formation of a Western Union', enclosure to Inverchapel to Marshall, 13 January 1948, FRUS 1948, III, pp.3-6.


14. Ibid.


17. The full text of Bevin's speech is House of Commons, Parliamentary Debates (Hansard) 5th Series, 446 (1948), cols. 383ff.


21. The views of Kennan and Hickerson are cited, respectively, at Notes 19 and 20.


27. Ibid.

28. Inverchapel's communication to London could not be traced in the relevant files at the PRO.

29. Memorandum of Conversation (by Hickerson), 21 January 1948, FRUS 1948, III, pp.9-12.


32. The American response is contained in Memorandum of Conversation (by Lovett) 27 January 1948, ibid., pp.12-14; and Lovett to Inverchapel, 2 February 1948, ibid., pp.17-18.


36. Gallman to Marshall, 6 February 1948, 840.00/2.648, RG59, NA; Memorandum of Conversation (by Lovett), 7 February 1948, *FRUS 1948*, III, pp.21-23. *The Economist* noted in its 31 January 1948 issue that unless Bevin spelt out the jobs to be done in laying the foundation of the Western Union, 'the Bevin offer will not become the Bevin Plan'.


39. Full text can be found in Royal Institute of International Affairs, *Documents on Regional Organisations Outside Western Europe, 1940-1949* (London: Oxford University Press, 1950), pp.52-58. A copy was passed to Spaak by the American Ambassador to Belgium, Alan G. Kirk. See Kirk to Marshall, Embtel 92, 11 January 1948, 840.00/1-1148 and Millard to Marshall, Embtel 107, 16 January 1948, 840.50 Recovery/1-1648, RG59, NA.


45. Memorandum of Conversation (by MacArthur), 29 January 1948, ibid., pp.617-622.

46. Ibid.; Marshall to Kennan, 3 February 1948, Chronological Files 1948, PPS Papers, RG59, NA.


49. Memorandum of Conversation (by MacArthur), 29 January 1948, ibid., pp.617-622.


52. Full text is given in FRUS 1946, II, pp.190-193.


56. Hickerson to Marshall, 16 February 1948, and Achilles to Hickerson, 'Thoughts on Western European Security', both 840.00/1-2048, RG59, NA.

57. Marshall to Kennan, Cablegram 387, 840.00/2-2548, RG59, NA.

58. Kennan to Marshall and Lovett, 24 February 1948, Chronological Files 1948, PPS Papers, RG59, NA.

59. 'Resume of World Situation' (Bohlen to Marshall - 'Notes for Cabinet', marked 'G.C.M.'by Marshall), 12 November 1947, Subject File Miscellaneous 1946-1949, Box 7, Bohlen Papers, RG59, NA; Kennan to Heads of Division, 25 January 1948, Chronological Files 1948, PPS Papers, RG59, NA.

60. An important exception was David E. Lilienthal, Director of the U.S. Atomic Energy Commission. In his diary he criticised the CIA strongly for its 'lack of integrity' in dealing with the 'meagre stuff' it managed to obtain on Soviet atomic research. But few were in Lilienthal's position to reach a similar judgment. See The Journals of David E. Lilienthal, III, The Atomic Energy Years 1945-1950 (New York: Harper and Row, 1964), p.376.


62. Hickerson to Bohlen, 20 February 1948, 840.00/2-1648, RG59, NA.

63. Bohlen to Hickerson 18 February 1948, ibid.

64. See the discussion above, pp.50-56.

66. For Kaplan's interpretation in full see his 'Toward the Brussels Pact', pp.78-80.

67. Memorandum of Conversation (by Hickerson), 16 February 1948, Chronological Files 1948, PPS Papers, RG59, NA.

68. 'Review of Press Coverage, International Affairs, Feb-March 1948' Office of Public Affairs Files 1948, RG59, NA.


70. Kennan's views are argued in G.F. Kennan Memoirs 1925-1950 (Boston: Little, Brown, 1967), p.454. For a longer treatment see PPS 23, PPS Subject Files 1948, Box 2, RG58, NA, in which Kennan argues for American support for a 'communist reformation' along Titoist lines.

71. Kennan to Lovett, 'Balkan Federation', 23 June 1947, Chronological Files 1947, PPS Papers, RG59, NA.


73. Humelsine to Department of Agriculture, 12 November 1947, 711.61/11-1247, RG59, NA. For a fuller account, see D. Yergin, Shattered Peace, pp.346-349.


76. Stevens to Divisional Chiefs, 18 February 1948, FRUS 1948, IV, pp.298-300.


78. Memorandum for File (by Kennan) 14 March 1948, Chronological files 1948, PPS Papers, RG59, NA. The ideas were later included in PPS 59, 'U.S. Policy Toward the Soviet Satellite States in Eastern Europe', 25 August 1948, PPS Records Book, PPS Papers, RG59, NA. See also NSC 58, FRUS 1949, V, pp.42-54.


80. Kennan was dismissive about his own influence, suggesting that it was odd that he had been listened to at all. See G.F. Kennan, Memoirs 1925-1950, pp.426-427.

82. Text of the declaration, *FRUS 1948*, IV, p.738. For the analysis of the coup in Prague by the U.S. Embassy, see ibid., pp.747-754.


85. Caffery to Marshall, Telegram 615, 27 February 1948, 840.00/2-2748, RG59, NA.


89. Memorandum of Conversation (by Nolting), 11 March 1948, ibid., pp.43-44.


95. The phrase comes from the title of the semi-official study of NATO's origins, L.S. Kaplan, *A Community of Interests*. 

2. Ibid.

3. Ibid.

4. Ibid.


7. 'Summary of Press Coverage of ERP Debate', 11 March 1948, Office of Public Affairs Files 1948, RG59, NA.

8. The material for the following two paragraphs is taken from ibid; and 'US Opinion on Current European Developments', 11 March 1948, same file.

9. Washington Embassy to FO, 27 April 1948, Z235841, 73069 F0371, PRO.


11. For details see above, pp.50-51.


13. Ibid., p.2030.


16. Ibid., p.145.

17. Ibid., pp.144-145. The full committee debate on this is reported in ibid., pp.109-172.


20. Monnet was in Washington in mid-February. For documentation, see FRUS 1948, III, pp.626-627 and 631-632.


22. Achilles to Hickerson, 'Thoughts on Western European Security', 20 January 1948, 840.00/1-2048, RG59, NA.


24. Ibid.

25. For summaries of the positions taken by the Bureau of the Budget and the Harriman Committee, see 'Memorandum from Wilcox to Connally', 4 November 1947, reprinted in U.S. Senate, Executive Hearings, Foreign Relief Assistance Act of 1948, pp.518-520.


28. Ibid., p.512.


30. Towards the end of 1948, Lovett continued his involvement as Acting Secretary of State (Marshall was unwell).

31. Caffery to Marshall, 15 March 1948, 840.00/3-1548, RG59, NA.


33. One example is Daniel Yergin. He wrote: 'The Senate approved the so-called Vandenberg Resolution as "the sense of the Senate" on June 11, 1948. The way was clear for NATO'. See his Shattered Peace, p.364.

34. The U.S. mission reports from Prague during and after the coup are in FRUS 1948, IV, pp.747-754.


37. For the American soundings in the de Gaulle camp see Caffery to Marshall, 14 January 1948; Hickerson to Caffery, 3 February 1948; Caffery to Marshall, 4 March 1948; all FRUS 1948, III, pp.594-596, 622-623, 624-625 and 628-630.

39. Caffery to Marshall, Tel.516, 30 January 1948, 840.00/1-3048, RG59, NA.


41. Marvel to Marshall, 22 March 1948, 840.00/3-2248, RG59, NA.


43. Ibid.


45. 'US Opinion on Current European Developments', 11 March 1948, Office of Public Affairs Files 1948, RG59, NA.

46. See H. Feis, *From Trust to Terror*, p.311.

47. Clifford, cited ibid.


49. Truman to Forrestal, [10 March 1948], ibid., p.781.


52. JCS to Forrestal, 10 March 1948, ibid., pp.782-783.

53. Ibid.

54. For Truman's approval, see *FRUS 1948*, III, p.781, (n.1.).


56. See NSC1/2 and NSC1/3, ibid., pp.765-769 and 775-779 respectively.

57. Dunn to Marshall, 12 March 1938, ibid., p.784.


63. Ibid.

64. Murphy to Marshall, 7 January 1948, FRUS 1948, II, pp.8-10.


66. Ibid.

67. 'American public opinion and support for the Brussels Pact allies', Jones to Bohlen, 12 April 1948, Office of Public Affairs Files 1948, RG59, NA.
CHAPTER 4: Notes and References


3. The Public Papers of...Harry S. Truman, 1948, pp.182-183; Inverchapel to FO 11 March 1948, Z2448/273/72/G, 73054 FO 371, PRO.


6. T.P. Ireland, Creating the Entangling Alliance, pp.54-55.


8. H.S. Truman, Memoirs, II, p.71. He saw UMT as more than a military training programme. He was also concerned with the beneficial effect it would have on young Americans (see ibid., pp.71-72); he was also proud of his own army career in World War I.


10. JCS to Forrestal, 10 March 1948, FRUS 1948, III, pp.782-783.


13. 'Press Treatment of President Truman's March 17 message to Congress', 31 March 1948, Office of Public Affairs Files 1948, RG59, NA.

14. Ibid.

15. All quotations taken from the State Department's own analysis, ibid.


18. See the remarks of Theodore C. Achilles, quoted in Chapter 2, pp.73-74 above.

20. Ibid., p.409.


24. Ibid., p.408.

25. Butler to Lovett, 23 March 1948, PPS Studies (Box 3), PPS Papers, RG59, NA.


27. 'Sixth Meeting: Pentagon Talks, 1 April 1948, ibid., pp.71-77.


29. See text pp.125-128 above.


31. Henderson remarked that this was a tactical error by Hickerson, ibid. The full list of participants – and of which of them actually attended meetings – is in the Minutes of the six meetings held in the Pentagon, *FRUS 1948*, III, pp.59-64, 66, 69, 70 and 71.


35. Dean Rusk's remarks came during a television programme, 'The Twentieth Century Remembered', 6 August 1923, BBC 2.


39. Jebb to Bevin, 1 April 1948, AN 1431/1195/45G, 68068A F0371, PRO.

41. See text, pp.104 – 105 above.

42. Pentagon Paper 'Final Draft', FRUS 1948, III, pp.72-75.

43. Foreign Office minute (by Jebb), 30 April 1948, Z3650/2307/72/G, 73069 F0371, PRO.

44. Texts of the Rio and Brussels Treaties in, respectively, Royal Institute for International Affairs, Documents on Regional Organisations Outside Western Europe 1940-1949, pp.52-58; and NATO Basic Documents (Brussels: NATO Information Service, n.d.), pp.8-10.


46. Inverchapel to Bevin, 19 March 1948, Z2448/293/72/G, 73054 F0371, PRO.

47. Foreign Office minute (by Jebb), 30 April 1948, Z3650/2307/72/G, 73069 F0371, PRO.


49. 'Paraphrase of a Telegram From the British Secretary of State... of April 9th Regarding Recent Talks on North Atlantic Security Arrangements', ibid., pp.79-80.

50. Ibid.

51. For Gallman's remarks, see text pp.166 – 167 above.

52. Lovett to Douglas, telegram 1307, 14 April 1948, 840.00/4-1648, RG59, NA; Douglas to Lovett, 16 April 1948, FRUS 1948, III, pp.88-89.

53. Ibid.


55. Inverchapel to Bevin, 31 March 1948, AN1412/1195/45G, 68068A F0371, PRO; Bevin to Attlee, 6 April 1948, PM/48/38, PREM 8/788, PRO.


57. No record of this meeting exists in the 840.00 series of State Department documents held at the National Archives, Washington.

58. C. Wiebes and B. Zeeman, 'The Pentagon Negotiations March 1948', p.361. (There is no record of this 'timetable' in U.S. records; Wiebes and Zeeman have relied on Canadian documents for this.)
59. Ibid.

60. 'Summary of a Memorandum Representing Mr. Bevin's Views on the Formation of a Western Union', 13 January 1948, FRUS 1948, III, pp.4-6.

61. Memorandum of Conversation (by Achilles), 5 April 1948, ibid., pp.76-78; Lovett to Caffery, telegram 1112, and Lovett to Douglas, telegram 111; both 6 April 1948, 840.00/4-648, RG59, NA.

62. Memorandum of Conversation (by Lovett), 11 April 1948, FRUS 1948, III, pp.82-84.


68. Ibid., pp.39 and 20.


70. Memorandum of Conversation (by Lovett), 11 April 1948, FRUS 1948, III, pp.82-84.

71. Dulles to Vandenberg, 8 April 1948, Correspondence File 1948, Supplement of 1971; and Memorandum of Conversation (by Dulles), 27 April 1948, Memoranda and Correspondence File 1948, both JFD Papers.


73. Dulles to Vandenberg, 8 April 1948, Correspondence File 1948, Supplement of 1971, JFD Papers; U.S. Senate, The Vandenberg Resolution and the North Atlantic Treaty, p.47.

74. Ibid., pp.19, 55, 20 and 40.

75. Ibid., pp.4, 40 and 20.
76. Lovett to Caffery, 14 May 1948, *FRUS 1948*, III, p.121.
77. Caffery to Marshall, 13 April 1948, ibid., pp.84-85.
81. Memorandum of Conversation (by Dulles), 27 April 1948, Memoranda and Correspondence File 1948, JFD Papers. Interestingly, this specification of a maximum five-year period does not appear in Lovett's own summary of the same meeting, c.f., Memorandum of Conversation (by Lovett), *FRUS 1948*, III, pp.104-108.
82. Vandenberg to Dulles, 2 July 1948, Correspondence File 1948, Supplement of 1971, JFD Papers.
85. This last point was emphasised in the Senate debate and noted by Lovett. See 'Resume of Senate Debate on the Vandenberg Resolution', 15 June 1948, FW840.20/6-1548, RG59, NA.
CHAPTER 5: Notes and References


2. Jones to Lovett, 'Materials Requested by Mr. Wilcox', 18 May 1948, Office of Public Affairs Files 1948, RG59, NA.

3. Ibid. (The file copy has sending instructions to Dr. Francis O. Wilcox, Chief of Staff to the Senate Foreign Relations Committee).


6. The author is grateful to Owen Dudley Edwards for this observation.


8. See text above, pp.75-76.

9. See text above, pp.174-175.


13. Ibid., p.335.


17. This case was put fully by The President's Air Policy Commission (Finletter Commission), Survival in the Air Age (Washington: USGPO, 1948).

19. Ibid., p.358.


22. Ibid.

23. For Forrestal's testimony, see U.S. Senate, Committee on Armed Services, Hearings on Universal Military Training, 80th Congress, 2nd Session (1948), (Washington: USGPO, 1948), pp.3ff.


28. See attachment to DELWU 48, 17 September 1948, Europe-Western Union FMe, July-October 1948, Leahy Files, RG218, NA.

29. JIC 169th Meeting:16 July 1948, CCS 092 Western Europe (3-12-48) See 4; 'Biological Warfare Trials', CCS 578/17, 14 January 1948 (underwood to Price), ABC 385 (Sea) 9 December 1947; both RG218, NA.

30. COSC 215, volume 3, 20 April 1948, DEFE5-10, PRO.

31. Minutes 18th Meeting, 4 February 1948, CO 5(48), DEFE4-10, PRO; Memorandum of Conversation (by Lovett), 21 May 1948, 840.20/5-2148, RG59, NA.

32. The title of HALFMOON was changed a number of times. As these changes did not themselves indicate alterations to the plan, the original title is used throughout.

33. JSPG 496/1, same file, Sec.8.


47. JCS 1844/2, 6 April 1948, CCS 381 USSR (3-2-46), Sec.13, RG218, NA.

48. Ibid. The section of HALFMOON in which the domestic American aspect of the Soviet threat was discussed remains classified by the U.S. Department of Defense.


50. JCS 1844/4, CCS 381 USSR (3-2-46), Sec.13, RG218, NA.

51. Forrestal to NSC, 28 April 1948, CCS 092 Western Europe (3-12-48), Sec.12; Douglas to Marshall, 28 April 1948, Telegram 1798 (Pentagon copy), ibid; K. Condit, 'History of the JCS', II, pp.360-361.

53. The NSC was established by statute, National Security Act, P.L.80-253, on 26 July 1947. However, the NSC of the period 1949-1950 had not yet emerged as a major influence on foreign policy, as it was later to do. A brief assessment in H.H. Lowenthal, The National Security Council: Organizational History (Washington: Congressional Research Service for the Library of Congress, 1978).


55. Ibid.

56. Ibid.


59. Forrestal to NSC, ibid., pp.56-563. The only point on which the JCS were reported ready to support NSC 7 was the call for large-scale rearmament: by increasing defence expenditure, inter-service rivalries would lose their sharpness.

60. See text above pp.167-169.


62. Ibid.

63. Ibid.

64. Lovett to Marshall, 20 April 1948, ibid., pp.96-97.

65. Marshall to Lovett, 23 April 1948, ibid., p.103.


68. The British certainly noticed the cooling of enthusiasm. See N. Henderson, The Birth of NATO, pp.18 and 21. See also J. Eayrs, Growing Up Allied, p.80.


70. Ibid.

71. Ibid.

72. See the State Department report on the debate 'Resume of Senate Debate on the Vandenberg Resolution', 15 June 1948, FW 840.20/6-1548, RG59, NA.
73. Ibid.; for Marshall statement, 5 May 1948, see extract FRUS 1948, III, p.111.

74. L.B. Pearson, Mike, II, pp.37-60; E. Reid, Time of Fear and Hope, p.271.

75. Caffery to Marshall, 5 May, FRUS 1948, III, p.112.

76. Kennan to Lovett, 7 May 1948, ibid., pp.116-118.

77. Ibid.

78. Douglas to Marshall, 28 April 1948, telegram 1798, Pentagon copy, CCS 092 Western Europe (3-12-46), Sec.2, RG218, NA.

79. Marshall to Douglas, 30 April 1948, 840.00/3-3048, RG59, NA.

80. Douglas to Marshall, 4 May 1948, 840.20/5-448 LONCON, RG59, NA.

81. Achilles to Douglas, 13 April 1948, 840.00/4-1348, RG59, NA.

82. Memorandum of Conversation (by Achilles), 15 April 1948, 840.00/4-1548, RG59, NA.

83. JCS 1844/2, Denfeld Minute, 6 April 1948, CCS 381 USSR (3-2-46) Sec.13, RG218, NA.


85. Forrestal to NSC, enclosure to JCS 1868/6, CCS 092 Western Europe (3-12-46) Sec.2, RG218, NA.
CHAPTER 6 : Notes and References

1. For a discussion of the historiography, see text pp.11-23 above.

2. There is now a substantial literature - especially in the United States - on NATO's troubles. A succinct statement of this approach in S. Serfati, Fading Partnership: America and Europe After 30 Years (New York: Praeger, 1979).

3. 'Memorandum by the Participants in the Washington Security Talks, July 6 to September 9, Submitted to their Respective Governments for Study and Comment', 9 September 1948, FRUS 1948, III, pp.237-248. (Hereafter, this memorandum will be cited as the 'Washington Paper').


5. See the discussion pp. 197 - 199 above.


8. Minutes of the First Meeting of the Washington Exploratory Talks on Security (hereafter cited First Meeting: WETS), 6 July 1948, FRUS 1948, III, pp.148-151. (Meetings of the drafting committee will be cited: Working Group, WETS.)

9. Reston was again the target in 1948: see E. Reid, Time of Fear and Hope, p.73. Reston did have some success however. In his column for the New York Times, 10 February 1949, he published an accurate account of the differences of view about the wording of the pledge. It led to an unscheduled debate in the U.S. Senate and some embarrassment for the negotiating governments. See below, pp. 327 - 328 .


11. Dulles' neo-isolationist tendencies are the theme of E.R. Platig, 'John Foster Dulles: A Study of his Political and Moral Thought Prior to 1953'.


13. Ibid.


16. Ibid.

19. See text above, pp.174 - 175 above.
21. Ibid.
23. Ibid.
25. Ibid.
27. Ibid., p.58; E. Reid, Time of Fear and Hope, p.63.
28. Stone to Pearson, 13 August 1948 (NASP, file 283(s), part 2), cited in ibid., p.88. See also Tenth Meeting: WETS, 12 August 1948, FRUS 1948, III, pp.212-213, for the U.S. version of the same speech.
30. L.B. Pearson's thoughts on the proper conduct of diplomacy, together with his account of NATO's origins, are contained in Mike II, pp.37-63. Further discussion is aired in E. Reid, Time of Fear and Hope, pp.70-86.
32. See text pp.133 - 134 and 231 - 232 above.
34. See text, pp.182 - 183 above.

42. Sixth Meeting: Working Group, WETS, 26 July 1948, ibid., pp. 200-204.

43. 'Memorandum of the Eighth Meeting, Working Group', 6 August 1948, 840.20/8-648, RG59, NA.

44. N. Henderson, The Birth of NATO, p.65.


46. Ibid.

47. Third Meeting: WETS, 7 July 1948, ibid., pp.155-160.

48. Bradley to Clay, 16 July 1948, WAR 85967, JCS 1868/18, CCS 092 Western Europe (3-12-48) Sec.4, RG218, NA.

49. Ibid.

50. Caffery to Marshall, 29 July 1948 (3436), 840.00/6-2948, RG59, NA.

51. 'Instructions for the U.S. Representatives Attending the London Western Union Talks', enclosure to Gruenther to Hickerson, 16 July 1948, FRUS 1948, III, pp.188-193.

52. Ibid.

53. Ibid.

54. See text pp. 37 - 38 above.

55. 'Instructions for the U.S. Representatives Attending the London Western Union Talks', enclosure to Gruenther to Hickerson, 16 July 1948, FRUS 1948, III, pp.188-193.

56. DELWU 6, 27 July 1948, Europe-WU (July-Oct. 1948) file, folders 20-25, Box 5, Leahy Files, RG218, NA.

57. Ibid.

58. DELWU 9, 31 July 1948, same file.

59. DELWU 11, 'Summary of WU Activities 25-31 July', 1 August 1948, same file.

60. SM-10447, 'US Representatives Attending London Five-Power Military Talks on the Western Union of Nations', 9 August 1948, JCS 1868/11 CCS 092 Western Europe (3-12-48) Sec.4, RG218, NA.

61. DELWU 11, 'Summary of WU Activities 25-31 July', 1 August 1948, Europe-WU (July-Oct.1948) file, folders 20-25, Box 5, Leahy Files, RG218, NA.

63. Wedemeyer to Lemnitzer, 7 August 1948, attachment to DELWU 14, 6 August 1948, Europe-WU (July-Oct.1948) file, folders 20-25, Box 5, Leahy Files, RG218, NA.

64. Lovett to Harriman, 3 December 1948, FRUS 1948, III, pp.300-310.

65. Jebb cited (from memorandum of conversation (by Ritchie) 23 November 1948, NASP, file 283(s) part 4) by E. Reid, Time of Fear and Hope, p.69.

66. Marshall to Douglas, 30 April 1948, 840.00/4-3048, RG59, NA.

67. Douglas to Marshall, 22 July 1948, 840.00/7-2248, RG59, NA.

68. Douglas to Marshall, 27 July 1948, 840.00/7-2748, RG59, NA.


71. See Note 54 (Chapter 1) above.

72. Full text of Dewey's Salt Lake City speech is reproduced in 'Public Comment on Military Assistance for Western Europe' (17 September – 8 October, 1948), 8 October 1948, Office of Public Affairs Files 1948, RG59, NA. The speech was reported in New York Times, 1 October 1948.

73. Franks to Bevin, 23 October 1948, Z9560/273/72, 73065 F0371, PRO.

74. Ibid.

75. The full text of Bevin's speech is House of Commons, Parliamentary Debates (Hansard), Fifth Series, Volume 456 (1948), cols.89-107.


77. Lovett to Caffery, 27 August 1948, FRUS 1948, III, pp.222-223.

78. Pearson, Mike, II, p.50.
CHAPTER 7: Notes and References

1. Memorandum by the Belgian, French, British, Luxembourg and the Netherlands Ambassadors, 29 October 1948, FRUS 1948, III, p.270. (A representative from Luxembourg had not participated in the Washington Exploratory Conversations but from then on the Benelux countries fielded three, not two, representatives).

2. Memorandum of Conversation (by Achilles), 840.00/10-2948, RG59, NA. (A paraphrase is reproduced in FRUS 1948, III, p.270, n.l.).

3. Substantially the same message was conveyed to Canada. See E. Reid, Time of Fear and Hope, pp.48 and 271.


5. E. Reid, Time of Fear and Hope, p.49. See also the press release by the State Department, reprinted in the New York Times, 11 December 1948.

6. L.B. Pearson, Mike, II, p.37. Henderson recalls the incident as well but not those songs; see N. Henderson, The Birth of NATO, p.112.


9. Lovett to Harriman, 3 December 1948, ibid., pp.300-310 (see especially n.2., p.301).

10. Ibid.

11. Ibid.

12. Ibid.

13. Ibid. See Lovett's full explanation of U.S. policy on Germany, ibid., pp.308-310.

14. Franks to Bevin, 18 November 1948, Z 9560/273/72, 73065 F0 371, PRO.


16. See text pp.81-82 above.

17. 'Considerations Affecting the Conclusion of a North Atlantic Security Pact', 24 November 1948, FRUS 1948, III, pp.284-289. Marshall's approval is indicated on a cover page to the document. The printed version is accompanied by an editorial remark on an unidentified handwritten note of Marshall's approval. The handwriting is clearly that of Kennan himself. See Memorandum by Kennan (and enclosure), 24 November 1948, 840.20/11-2448, RG59, NA.
18. Ibid. (Emphasis in original).
19. Ibid.
21. See text pp.70 - 75 above.
23. The poll, conducted by the National Opinion Research Council for the State Department (and not published), is analysed in 'Current Public Attitudes on Resisting Communist Expansion in Europe', 15 November 1948, Office of Public Affairs Files 1948, RG59, NA.
25. Interview with Theodore C. Achilles, 31 October 1978, conducted by the author.
30. JCS to Forrestal, 2 November 1948, NSC 35, NSC Reports File, NA.
31. Ibid.
32. Ibid. It is notable that the JCS were consistent in their views. They argued that Soviet capabilities rather than intentions were the surest guides; equally, they argued that deterrence would work only if U.S. capabilities were sufficient to match those of the Soviet Union.

39. Interview with Theodore C. Achilles, 31 October 1978, conducted by the author.

40. During the ratification process, senators worried about the role of the Council, and its associated military committee, wanting assurance that these did not mean American participation in a binding and automatic military alliance. See the chapter on ratification in T.P. Ireland, Creating the Entangling Alliance, pp.117-148. New research, by Phil Williams of Southampton University, on this aspect of NATO's origins will be published in late-1984.

41. See Article 6 of the 24 December 1948 draft, FRUS 1948, III, pp.333-337; and Article 7 of the actual treaty, FRUS 1949, IV, pp.281-285.

42. Eleventh Meeting: WETS, 14 January 1949, ibid., pp.27-34.

43. Compare Article 8, 24 December 1948 draft, FRUS 1948, III, pp.333-337; and Article 9 of the actual treaty, FRUS 1949, IV, pp.281-285.


48. See Hickerson' reported remarks in Sixth Meeting: Working Group, WETS, 26 July 1948, ibid., pp.201-204. The European response is Seventh Meeting: Working Group, WETS, 28 July 1948, 840.20/7-2848, RG59, NA.

49. Eighth Meeting: WETS, 10 December 1948, FRUS 1948, III, pp.310-314. This distinction was useful when Truman made his Inaugural Address in January 1949, in which he outlined the Point Four programme. For further details and documentation, see FRUS 1949, I, pp.757-783.


51. The declaration was included in Truman's speech at the signing ceremony. See Acheson to Certain Diplomatic Offices, 2 April 1949 FRUS 1949, IV, pp.270-271.

52. For the Swedish dimension, see G. Lundestad. America, Scandinavia and the Cold War, pp.353-357.

53. Hickerson to Lovett, 1 December 1948, FRUS 1948, III, pp.812-813. Hickerson was strongly in favour of Italian membership but was not confident that this would be the outcome: Hickerson to Maddocks, 3 December 1948, ibid., pp.813-814.

55. 'Italy and West European Integration Movements', 28 December 1948, 840.20/12-2848, RG59, NA.


58. Memorandum by the Financial Policy Sub-committee to the Correlation Committee on ERP, 7 December 1948, ibid., pp.495-499.


60. For a representative European view of Spanish membership, see Spaak's reported remarks, Kirk to Marshall, 29 November 1948, ibid., pp.298-299.

61. HALFMoon is discussed pp.213-218 above.

62. Public Papers of...Harry S. Truman 1949, p.56.

63. W. Millis (ed.), The Forrestal Diaries, p.499 (editor's comment).

64. Forrestal to Truman, 1 December 1948, FRUS 1949, I, p.226.


68. Congress approved $13,912 million,of which $735.7 million was intended to give the USAF 70 groups. However, Truman put this sum 'in reserve', thus preserving the balance between the armed forces. This largely explains why the outturn figure, given on p.250 above, for FY1950 was $13,119 million.


71. JSPC 877/1, 16 February 1949, CCS 381 USSR (3-2-46) Sec.28, RG218, NA.

72. DJS to Generals Wedemeyer, Norstad and Admiral Struble (Memorandum and attachments) 25 February 1949, same file, Sec.30.

74. The final version of OFFTACKLE is JCS 1844/46, 8 November 1949, CCS 381 USSR (3-2-46) Sec.41, RG218, NA. For disagreements within the U.S. military establishment on the plan, see CJCS to Johnson, 'Split Views on New Emergency War Plan', 3 September 1949, same file, Sec.38. For disagreements between the Americans, British and Canadians, see ABC 109, 3 October 1949, same file, Sec.39. In his recently declassified, in-house study Condit summarises the targeting policy of the new plan:

"disruption of Soviet industry; elimination of the political and administrative controls of the Soviet Government over its people; undermining the will of the Soviet Government and people to continue the war; and disarming of the Soviet armed forces. These objectives were to be achieved with atomic weapons and some quarter million tons of conventional bombs during the first two years by inflicting critical damage on petroleum refineries, electric power plants submarine construction facilities, high octane aviation gasoline production facilities and other war-supporting industries.

For all of the future war's supposed ferocity, there was no obligation placed on American planners to be able to bring about unconditional surrender, nor to prepare for military occupation and administration of Soviet territory. See K. Condit, 'History of the JCS', II, pp.298-299.

75. See the discussion pp.213-218 above.

76. For details of the Lemnitzer mission, see pp.275-280 above.


79. The following paragraphs on 'the pledge' are based in part on Escott Reid's excellent analysis: see his *Time of Fear and Hope*, pp.143-156.


83. See the discussion pp.177-178 above.

84. JCS (by Denfeld) to Forrestal, 5 January 1949, enclosure to Ohly to Marshall, 6 January 1949, *FRUS 1949*, IV, pp.9-13. See also JCS to Forrestal, 'North Atlantic Pact', 5 January 1949, JCS 1868/40, CCS 092 Western Europe (3-12-46) Sec.14, RG218, NA.
85. Twelfth Meeting: WETS, 8 February 1949, FRUS 1949, IV, pp.73-88. See also E. Reid, *Time of Fear and Hope*, pp.148-149.

86. Ibid., p.63.

87. Twelfth Meeting: WETS, 8 February 1949, FRUS 1949, IV, pp.73-88.


93. Bohlen to Acheson and Webb, 16 February 1949, ibid., pp.115-116. This memorandum included three other draft texts for Article 5 drawn up in the light of Franks's comments. The differences between them hinged on whether the word 'military' appeared, and on whether the parties were committed 'to assist' or 'to take action'.

94. Memorandum of Conversation (with Truman by Acheson), 17 February 1949, ibid., p.117.


100. NSC 14/1, NSC Report Files, NA.

101. Schlesinger was writing for the *New Republic*, 22 November 1948.


103. NSC 14/1, NSC Report Files, NA.

104. A full discussion of this is K. Condit, 'History of the JCS', II, pp.409-430.
105. See Vandenberg's report JCS 1868/13, 12 July 1948; and Bradley's reply JCS 1868/20; 17 September 1948 CCS 092 Western Europe (3-12-48), Sec.6, RG 218, NA.


108. Ibid., pp.158 and 85.

109. Ibid., p.85.

110. Ibid., p.159.

111. Lovett to Harriman, 3 December 1948, FRUS 1948, III, pp.300-310.


113. See the account given in K. Condit, 'History of the JCS', II, pp.412-414.

114. Harriman to Lovett, 5 March 1949, FRUS 1949, IV, p.165.

115. 'Verbatim Report - NAP Discussions (Military Assistance Program) April 2/4 1949', (p.A13). Records of Interdepartmental and Intradepartmental Committees, NATO Box 1, RG353, NA.

116. Ibid., (p.A16), (Hyphens added for sake of clarity).

117. Ibid. (p.C4)


120. 'Current Public Attitudes on the 'Atlantic Pact', 25 March 1949, Office of Public Affairs Files 1948, RG59, NA.

The literature on the Cold War is vast. That fact governs the organisation of the bibliography. By way of explanation, three points can be made. First, cited published works are those which have been either cited in the body of the thesis or directly influential in its preparation. Secondly, the published works are thematically grouped under headings (e.g. Biographies, Studies of NATO's origins, etc.). Thirdly, in order to maintain the 'theme' of each section, articles are included where appropriate rather than putting them in a final miscellaneous section.

A. Unpublished Sources: Papers and Records

Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Washington, D.C.

Tom Connally papers
Robert Patterson papers
Carl Spaatz papers
Robert A. Taft papers
Hoyt Vandenberg papers

National Archives, Washington, D.C.

Modern Military records (RG 218)
State Department, general records, decimal file (RG58 and 59)
State Department: Charles Bohlen and John Hickerson files
State Department: Records of the Policy Planning Staff.

Harry S. Truman Library, Independence, Missouri

Dean Acheson papers
American Committee on a United Europe papers
Atlantic Union Committee papers
William Clayton papers
Clark Clifford files and papers
George Elsey papers
Paul Hoffman papers
Joseph M. Jones papers
National Security Committee papers
President's Advisory Commission on Universal Training papers
President's Air Policy Commission papers
Sidney Souers papers
Harry S. Truman papers: Central and Confidential files
Harry S. Truman papers: President's secretary's files
James Webb papers
Public Record Office, Kew, London

Foreign Office, general political files (FO371)

B. Unpublished Sources: Diaries

Library of Congress

William Leahy

U.S. Navy, Historical Office, Washington, D.C.

James V. Forrestal (microfilm)

C. Unpublished Sources: In-House Studies


D. Unpublished Sources: Oral History Collections

Truman Library Oral History Collection

Theodore Achilles
Charles Bohlen
Thomas Finletter
Loy Henderson
Halvard Lange
George C. Marshall
H. Freeman Matthews
James Reston

U.S. Navy, Historical Office, Washington, D.C.

Hanson Baldwin

E. Published Documents: U.S. Congress

U.S. Congress, Congressional Record. 80th and 81st Congresses.


F. Published Documents: U.S. Department of State


———. Foreign Relations of the United States 1946.


———. Foreign Relations of the United States 1948.
Volume I part 2. General; The United Nations
Volume II. Germany; Austria.
Volume III. Western Europe

———. Foreign Relations of the United States 1949.
Volume I. National Security Affairs; Foreign Economic Policy.
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