Politics, Administration and Social Science

The case of some area based approaches to urban poverty in Britain and the United States

Angus Erskine

PhD
University of Edinburgh
1981
I declare that this is my own work

Angus Erskine
Acknowledgements

I owe an enormous debt to all those people who have given me support in various ways throughout the writing of this thesis.

I should like to thank the following people for discussing their experience with me and answering my questions: Walter Bor, David Byrne, Joan Cooper, Walter Day, David Donnison, John Edwards, Bernard Frieden, John Greve, A. H. Halsey, Robin Hambleton, Hugh Heclo, Joan Higgins, Edward James, Maurice Kogan, David Lane, Des McConaghy, Marjorie Mayo, S. M. Miller, Charles Morris M.P., Frances Fox Piven, Andrew Rowe, Grahame Room, George Smith, Ken Spencer, Anthony Steen M.P., Peter Townsend, Peter Walker M.P., Gordon Wasserman, Peter Willmott, Ron Young. Some of these people provided me with invaluable documents.

I'd like to thank my supervisors, Ian Dey and Michael Adler for their practical and intellectual assistance, Frances Fox Piven for her guidance in Boston and Donald Mackenzie for his suggestions as to improvements that I could make. I am particularly grateful for the thorough reading of my final draft that Michael Adler did.
Abstract

During the nineteen sixties in Britain and the United States, a series of programmes were developed which had an area focus on poverty. In Britain, this development represented a departure from previous welfare programmes concerned with poverty. Past policies had tended to focus on client groups or on income maintenance programmes. In America, these developments were part of the extension of welfare provision which President Johnson's 'Great Society' achieved. The programmes were concerned with equality of opportunity and the civil rights of blacks.

These programmes appeared to have some key similarities. They both contained an area focus on social problems and they had an experimental aspect. In both countries the programmes were presented as being concerned with trying new approaches to combating poverty. However, when these programmes are examined, it can be seen that in major respects these similarities are not as great as they would seem. The American programmes' experimental focus was overtaken by their development on a nationwide basis.

In Britain, there was little indication of the assessment of previous experiments being used to inform new developments.

This thesis accounts for the development of these programmes and then explores the differences and similarities in the contexts within which they were developed. I focus on the institutional settings of the programmes and their electoral and economic contexts to draw on some of their major differences. The key similarities that there were, were not in the content or the contexts of the programmes but in the way that they have been presented for public consumption. I argue that this presentation was one which was influenced by the language of social science, as social science had become increasingly influential over the period.

In conclusion the ways in which the social science-politics relationship can be viewed is discussed. I conclude that while social science is not an equal influence to political considerations, its role cannot be dismissed as merely, straightforwardly legitimating the policies themselves.
I attempt to assess how this role that social science played influenced the nature of social science and the view of the relationship between social policy and social science that is prevalent. This consideration has an important part to play in considering the relationship between capitalism and welfare.
## Contents

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Acknowledgements</th>
<th>iii</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Abstract</td>
<td>iv</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Contents</td>
<td>vi</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### Chapter One: Introduction

- Methods of investigation
- Explaining, accounting or prescribing?
- Using case studies
- Comparing the United States and Britain
- Policy Analysis, policy development and public learning
- Analysing the policy making process
- Capitalism and welfare
- Legitimation and social policy
- Social science and social policy
- The thesis in outline

### Chapter Two: The American Programmes

- The Community Action Program of the War on Poverty
- Programme direction and structure in the Poverty Programme
- The Model Cities Program
- The Community Development Block Grants

### Chapter Three: The British Projects

- Educational Priority Areas
- The Urban Aid Programme
- The Community Development Projects
- The Inner Area Studies
- Area Management Trials
- Inner City Partnerships

### Chapter Four: The Context in Britain and America

1. The state in Britain and America
   - The electoral system
   - Administrative and institutional arrangements
   - The state apparatus at a local level
2. State services in Britain and the United States
   - Developments in service structure in Britain
   - Poverty and welfare services in the United States
   - Welfare provision in the United States
   - The contrasts
3. Economic Trends
   - The American economy
   - The British economy
   - Restructuring expenditure and 'the crisis'
## Chapter Five: Comparing the United States and Britain

- The presentation of policy ........................................ 204
- The management of public and private debate ................. 214
- Transatlantic social science connections .................... 218
- From service provision to service management .............. 221
- Central control and democratic legitimacy .................. 230

## Chapter Six: Politics, administration and social science

- The social sciences come of age ................................ 239
- The promise of social science .................................... 244
- Rationality-in-practise? ............................................. 249
- External legitimation of policies ................................. 256
- External legitimation of policy making ....................... 263
- Internal mediation .................................................... 267
- Social science as entrepreneur ................................. 270
- Knowledge and expertise ......................................... 271
- Summary .............................................................. 275

## Chapter Seven: Conclusion

................................................................. 277

## References

................................................................. 289
"Pop, would go one of the six-inch guns; a small flame would dart and vanish, a little white smoke would disappear, a tiny projectile would give a feeble screech – and nothing happened. Nothing could happen. There was a touch of insanity in the proceeding, a sense of lugubrious drollery in the sight; and it was not dissipated by somebody on board assuring me earnestly that there was a camp of natives – he called them enemies! – hidden out of sight somewhere."

Joseph Conrad, *Heart of Darkness*
Chapter One

Introduction

This thesis is a comparative study of policy developments in Britain and the United States, using case studies to illustrate some general propositions. This thesis contains three interrelated themes. Firstly, it is an account of area based approaches to poverty in Britain and the United States between about 1965 and 1975, and through this account, an attempt to show how policy has developed and what influence the American experience had on the British programmes. A second theme is the relationship between social science and social policy making. The case studies are used to provide material to examine this relationship. Thirdly, it investigates the connections between capitalism, the state and welfare. All these themes I hope are apparent. In this introduction I shall comment briefly on these three themes and consider some of the main issues which they raise.

Methods of Investigation

I have adopted two different methods of investigation in Britain and the United States. These different methods derive from the different nature of the policy making process in the two countries. In Britain, with its much more closed system of government decision making, it is more difficult to gain access to source documents. The secrecy of British decision making prevents those involved in decisions writing accounts which 'tell the story'.¹ The only way open to the researcher is to interview participants in policy making. This technique has its drawbacks. I interviewed twenty eight people that I had identified as knowing about the decisions that were

¹ There are some exceptions in this period, notably the Crossman Diaries (Crossman (1976)). However the issues which are covered in such accounts tend to be broad and the specific policies in which I am interested receive only superficial consideration. This is even more the case in such books as Wilson's account of the Labour Government 1964-1970 (Wilson (1971)).
made. However, since individuals had to be identified before knowing much about developments, there were clearly misperceptions regarding who would know. One way to overcome this would have been to adopt a snowballing procedure, beginning with the most prominent and obvious individuals and attempting, through them, to discover other important actors. However, this was impossible within the space of a PhD, since by living in Edinburgh, I was isolated from the center of power in London. By the time requests for interviews were replied to and a date fixed for the interview, any interview that lead to another would have taken up a considerable period of time. A snowball search would have been too long an exercise. I requested interviews in clusters, which while giving me some snowballing, didn't aim to exhaust the possibilities of this procedure.

Another problem in using interviews to investigate policy developments is that of the credence which can be given to respondents' accounts. Respondents were not always able to remember events that took place as much as ten years before. Examples arose in my interviews where, because of my own knowledge, which was in part derived from documentary evidence, I would have been better able to recount events than participants. There was an added problem in that respondents seldom admitted straightforwardly to having forgotten events. Only in some cases was I able to check on the validity of respondents' memories, and that largely through good fortune regarding access to documents. Respondents were also conscious, in giving accounts, to present their own actions in the best light which may, with the passage of time, have meant that they adapted their perception.

1 A good example of this is that of a Home Office official who told me that the early Home Office view of deprivation was not associated with a 'personal inadequacy' model of deprivation. I had documentary evidence that this was in fact the model that was being applied.
of what occurred to do this. Most people do not admit that they held opinions which, with hindsight, were untenable. However even if the responses could be seen as being unproblematical in this type of interview, the question is still open regarding the purpose of interviews. I will discuss later the work of Carrier and Kendall (1973, 1977) but it is sufficient to note here that one of their main themes is that it is important to understand the meanings that actors bring to situations. Assessing that meaning is not only made more difficult by the nature of the 'data' that contains such meaning and by the complexity of the structure of meaning. The policy process can be investigated with different levels of interpretation and participants in the process also have different 'meanings' for the same events. Televised meetings, taped meetings, minuted meetings, documented position statements and interviews with participants - one, two or five years after the event, would all produce this complexity.

To overcome what became apparent problems in the use of interviews, in the British context I mainly used the interviews to obtain information which I would have been unable to obtain by any other means. The interviews gave me an insight into some of the issues involved as well as providing me with dates and details of particular events. However this sort of information is not without problems. People do forget and few will admit to forgetting.

I was fortunate in being able to gain access to two sets of personal files which contained a great deal of information about some of the projects. Other respondents sent me documents that were of interest to me. However this itself presented another problem, in that some of the most interesting documents were covered by the Official Secrets Act, and others were of a personal nature making them inappropriate for quotation. I have used some of the papers which I have had access to and quoted from them although they were covered by the Official Secrets Act. For this reason, I cannot always properly
reference my sources, by naming persons to whose files I had access. It is therefore up to the reader to take me in good faith and assume that I have not invented the references I make.

Interviews present a similar problem because respondents are reluctant to be used as a source. Again for this reason I have not always given full references in my thesis to respondents. It is an indication of the ludicrous nature of the Official Secrets Act (and a condemnation of it) that even in an area where there is no conceivable threat to the state in public knowledge of these decisions, there is still secrecy. This is because of the importance of concealing the nature of decision making within the British system to make it appear to be a neutral and rational process. This is an issue I shall explore fully later.

Because of the quality of the American material, my accounts of developments in America are much better informed than those of the British developments. This is a failing which can only be overcome by the opening of the British government process to the public eye. It would be interesting to repeat this study in thirty years, with access to the necessary documents. I feel confident however that my analysis would be basically substantiated.

In America, the programmes, being larger both in their political significance and in the size of their budgets, are covered in greater detail in personal accounts. Johnson's account of his presidency (Johnson (1971)) devotes a chapter to the War on Poverty. However, the American state with its separation of powers does not require secrecy to the same extent. The public nature of the debates over policy, provides legitimacy within the different state structure. In collecting the American material my main sources were publicly available personal accounts of some of those involved in drawing up the proposals for the programmes. The amount of information available, centrally and publicly, in the US is much greater. The Government Documents collection in Boston Public Library
is extensive. Much of my material was found there. I also made use of the Kennedy Archives in the John F. Kennedy Library in Boston. Again the quality of the information is much better than anything to be found in this country. The Kennedy Library contains the President's papers and the papers of some of his senior advisers. Memos, personal letters and drafts of speeches all provided the sort of material through which some assessment of the thinking of the key participants is possible. With more resources this study could have been greatly improved by having done similar work in the Lyndon B. Johnson Library in Austin, Texas and by looking at the papers of the Nixon presidency. Unfortunately this was not possible given either the time or the money involved.

Writing accounts of contemporary events, or events which have happened in the last ten or fifteen years is a difficult process. There is a difference between the sort of account that is produced by a participant and that produced by an outsider like myself. I would argue that in being an outsider I can look more critically at events. However I have obvious gaps in my detailed knowledge of events. In a sense though these events are history for me, as much as they would be if they had occurred fifty years ago. I can only counter any criticism by those with first hand knowledge of these events by arguing that my intention has not been to provide a straightforward 'as it was' account. I cannot do so, nor would it be important for me to do so. I am trying to raise some issues in a critical way which requires a degree of knowledge about events. I hope that this knowledge is sufficient to make my account plausible.

Explaining, accounting or prescribing?

There is an extensive literature which considers some of the different methodological problems which must be overcome in developing a satisfactory account or explanation of the decision making process. Indeed, even thinking about whether an account or explanation is what is sought presents problems.
Clearly, any account or explanation can be confronted with a different account or different explanation. An account does not have to be an explanation, although it may have explanatory value, whereas an explanation might not even include an account. Many of the issues raised in considering this 'explanation/account' problem have their roots in the continuing tension between views of the relationship of the base to the superstructure, the objective to the subjective, the determinate to the accidental. Carrier and Kendall (1973, 1977) try to overcome some of these tensions in developing a phenomenological approach to accounting for policy changes. However, I would argue that rather than overcoming these tensions they avoid them.

They argue that an adequate account has three different aspects. Firstly, it takes account of the meaningful nature of social action. Secondly, it explains developments in terms of the meanings that actors attach to social situations and attempts to explain how these meanings are generated and sustained. Thirdly, it reflects the 'multiple realities' of situations, or takes account of different perceptions of the nature of social problems. Carrier and Kendall's approach falls into the trap of relativism while remaining an effective critique of determinism, whether it takes a 'moral', 'technological', 'political' or 'economic' form. They argue that it is important to study the processes through which a body of knowledge becomes established and sustained in reality. However, I suggest that the differing perceptions and 'meanings' of actors which are sought in a phenomenological approach can be contrasted with the actors' operation within a common ideological frame. This common ideological frame establishes 'meaning' in social situations. An ideological frame creates both the elements of 'meaning' which is generated from the perception of the actual, immediate and specific conditions and a perception whose initiation and structuring is derived from the fundamental forces and relations of production which permeate through consciousness. Therefore, where Carrier and
Kendall have developed a satisfactory critique of positivist approaches to social policy explanations in arguing that
their basic failing is that they are
"based on the assumption that action is determined by external and constraining social and non-social forces, and that a proper understanding of the latter can provide a complete explanation of the former." (Carrier and Kendall, 1973: 211)

The mistake that they make is that by excluding external constraining forces which do not have to be presented in a determinist fashion, they produce a relativism which stands the failings of positivism on its head and is unable to assess the interplay between meaning and structure.

They go on to comment on the role of the social policy analyst

"The social policy analyst is therefore most appropriately described as a 'social pathologist' whose role in the social construction and sustaining of the 'world of welfare' may be very significant, and worthy of study as part of any attempt to understand the development and operation of social policies. One can of course be both 'social pathologist' and 'sociologist of welfare' although they have quite different roles in relation to social policy and social change. The former attempts to engineer social policy changes, the latter attempts to understand changes in social policy." (Carrier and Kendall, 1973: 224)

At this stage it is most important to argue quite forcefully the intimate nature of the connection between the methodological approach and explanation that the student of social policy adopts and the nature of the role the student plays in relation to social policy. The typical social policy analysis in the British and American tradition has a social engineering approach which is contained not only within the assumptions of the social policy analysts, but also within their methodology.

In a Weberian manner, a false dichotomy is constructed between values and science. A scientific approach is however not scientific through the exclusion of values. It is not neutral and adaptable to the value orientation of scientists. A scientific approach is aware of its own values and attempts to critically
integrate these values into understanding the world.

Ham (1980) divides the study of social policy into four different traditions. His classification is worth outlining because it leads to a consideration of different approaches.

The first tradition he sees as the descriptive which has little explanatory value. This is within the established line of empirical work looking at social service provision or 'need' in Britain. One of the underlying assumptions of such descriptive studies is the consensual view of the political process which they reflect. It is only necessary for the political system to be made aware of existing conditions. Politicians can or will then make arrangements upon the basis of this knowledge. Such a view makes an unrealistic assessment of the role of knowledge in the political process.

The second tradition Ham sees as being analytical but not theoretical. It aims at analysing why things are as they are without having a theoretical overview into which these explanations are fitted. However, despite the aim of an atheoretical analysis, such analytical views of policy developments tend to be based on an implicit theoretical perspective, and the failure to articulate such a perspective leads to an inbuilt conservatism in analysis. Again this approach has an action and policy relationship which is not clearly articulated and tends to see developments as being idiosyncratic.

Ham's third approach is the normative approach which has a prescriptive nature. I would suggest that this prescriptive approach has been implicit in almost all of the accounts of social policy and finds its roots in the Fabian tradition of policy analysis. Firstly, a traditional prescriptive approach pays lip service to, and is to an extent influenced by the Weberian distinction between facts and values in social science. Therefore the prescriptive approach seeks to either avoid an interpretation which is 'value laden' or to make explicit the prescriptive content of policy analysis. Secondly, the traditional prescriptive approach, in trying to sustain this fact-value distinction, ignores the normative content of any
Ham calls the fourth approach a theoretical approach and divides it into four different strands where policy is analysed using sociological theory, economic theory, the application of statistical methods and technology and lastly the use of political science and political sociology. What he sees as being distinctive about the theoretical approach is that it brings a body of theory to the examination of social policy. However he does not make it clear how theory relates to the object of study. There are a number of different questions about policy which can be raised. For example, is this the best policy to achieve the ends articulated? An evaluative approach would imply a theoretical understanding both of the nature of the problem and also (and this is often excluded) an understanding of the policy process from input to implementation, in other words, the environment within which policy formulas are translated into action.

Ham's four approaches are worth considering because they add complexity to the problem of explaining, accounting or prescribing. The approach adopted gives substance to the nature of the outcome. It is not sufficient to decide what purpose the study of particular policies has, it is also necessary to consider the relationship between different approaches and different purposes.

Rather than looking at policy from an evaluative point of view, the policy process may be taken as an indicator of other objects of study. This is, in part, my approach and is one form of case study. The particular policy's formulation and implementation can be used to expand our knowledge of, for instance, the administrative process of government. This leads to different methodological concerns than does the evaluative approach, although as I have said the evaluative approach, necessarily should, but usually does not, include some explicit view of the nature of the policy making process.

Using Case Studies

My work has two methodological aspects which need to be
examined, the use of case studies and comparison. This work consists of a series of case studies in the two countries, in a similar policy area. These case studies are not examined in a positivistic manner. The cases have been used to illustrate some general propositions whose validity does not rely solely upon the material presented.

It is hard to define the case study as a particular method since the many uses of case studies in social science seem to be as varied as the uses of other forms of data. In a sense, the case study is more easily seen as a data source rather than a method of enquiry. Having said this, it is clear that the many different uses of case studies complicates attempts to present the problems of case study data or case study methodology.

I will base my discussion of the use of case studies in three main areas of uncertainty.
1) Borrowing Carrier and Kendall's (1977) analysis - problems in the production of plausible accounts.
2) Contrasting conceptions of the purpose of case studies.
3) Contrasting methodologies in policy analysis.

My problem is, though, that attempts to effect this separation cannot be successful since the methodological positions taken by researchers predefine their conception of the purposes of their data and the nature of the account they are trying to produce.

If, in doing a case study, the intention is to develop an account of a sequence of events focusing around particular developments the first major concern is with what Carrier and Kendall (1977) call accounting problems.
1) The fetish of the single cause
2) History as hagiography and biography
3) Periodisation
4) Grand and a priori theorising

The central problem is that of periodisation and the search for turning points. In the construction of a case study, more especially those concerning 'higher level' policy formation, the construction of a description based upon the division of
developments into a number of periods may, rather than
increasing an appreciation of the historical factors influencing
developments, isolate actions in one period from those in another.
Explanations become ahistorical, relying upon contemporaneous
factors. Periodising the development of policy may more
clearly indicate the forces at work within decision making
but the explanation of the role of these forces cannot be
assessed without awareness of historical developments. The
uniqueness of a case study takes on a special importance
if case studies become ahistorical. The relative importance
of different forces cannot be assessed if no historical
development is considered. Without this, a case study may
become unique, allowing neither generalisation nor integration
with theory to occur, but merely speculation.

Periodisation also increases the tendency to search for
causes and viewing prior developments as leading to a single
end. Actions and developments are seen as rational towards
the end occurring. The multiplicity of influences and the compl-
exity of the result cannot be subsumed into a functionalist
and rationalist explanation in terms of end. Policy making is
more haphazard and anarchic than straightforwardly developmental
and the examination of a course of events in the light of the
result overemphasises the role of the result in the determination
of events. This oversimplification ignores other possible
products which could have arisen in similar conditions.

Carrier and Kendall (1977) emphasise the role of comparison
in the avoiding of 'accounting problems'. But this comparative
avoidance of these problems can lead to a return to a positivism
that they begin by rejecting.

These considerations lead to an examination of what sort of
account is desired and what substance is to be given to such an
account. In relation to case studies it would seem that there
are several fairly distinct positions here. Unfortunately,
not articulating the epistemological approach using case studies
allows the language of the investigator in conjunction with
her or his study to conceal the aims of the study. Looking at a variety of authors, some suggest, on the one hand, that the aim of the case is to produce generalisations. The problem of the case study is how to achieve this. Kaufman (1958) confuses his purpose with his use of language. He argues that case studies are the raw data needed to stimulate 'theorising'. He sees case studies as being used to set up propositions and hypotheses which can then be rejected or confirmed on the basis of further case studies. This is a clear example of empiricist generalising. For instance, on the question of the rejection or confirmation of hypotheses he sees a danger in there always being another case which can nullify the conclusion arrived at by the researcher. His answer to this problem is that

"The danger can be kept as small as possible by entrusting the choices (of cases) to a body as diverse in outlook, as varied in experience, and as dedicated to the highest standards of intellectual integrity as the Executive Board of the Inter University Case Program."
(Kaufman, 1958: 58)

An interesting and novel methodology is proposed by Kaufman. Relying upon a committee of the 'sane' and powerful to validate methodological questions would seem to be more appropriate in the resolution of theological debates than scientific ones.

Kaufman, along with others concerned with the Inter University Case Program in the US, sees case studies as basic data for empirical generalising. The problems therefore are concerned with how to isolate variables, how to control variables, how to collect a large enough sample of cases etc etc. In other words how to generalise from a variety of observations, with some certainty, not that the generalisations are 'true', but that they have not been disproved. However, without some theoretical conceptions the data lacks form and substance.

Another approach to case studies would be that taken by Eckstein (1960). He argues in his study of the British Medical Association that the study is a transition from the abstract to the concrete. Eckstein states that the data is
not intended as a 'proof' of generalisations but only as an illustration - evidence of the observed acting as the theory would suggest, not a validation that the theory is correct.

"Case studies never 'prove' anything, their purpose is to illustrate generalisations which are established otherwise or to direct attention towards such generalisations." (Eckstein, 1960: 15)

An aspect of Eckstein's work which is important to note is that he is not disturbed by the uniqueness or unrepresentativeness of his case. Nor does a committee of the 'sane' and powerful have to validate his conclusions. The essence of his work would be that there is a consistency between explanation and observation.

Hall et al. (1975) also would seem to have such a use for case studies in mind in their analysis of the decision making process. They point to the danger that superficial and misleading generalisations can pass as credible and satisfactory. This leads to the demand for a conceptual orientation within which case studies are used. (Hall, 1975: 17) As they point out, case studies may undermine a hypothesis but they cannot validate it (Hall, 1975: 15).

Their safeguards in the use of case studies seem to relate to Carrier and Kendall's concerns.
1) There must be a conceptual framework with reference to which cases are studied.
2) A prior system of classification of cases is necessary, based upon this framework.
3) Comparison of cases or sets of cases combined with a conceptual framework aids generalising.
4) There is a risk of simplification in delimiting a case temporally up to a decision which may not be seen as a development by actors. Cases must be set in the context of other events and its history (Hall, 1975: 17).

A remaining question to be discussed is that, having suggested that case studies allow for theoretical conceptions to be made more consistent and expanded, how can decision making be studied
using case studies? The nature of the theoretical concerns of the researcher are in a sense dictated by how s/he views his/her method and what status is given to unproblematical observation. I use the case studies as illustrative and analytical examples of developing theoretical concerns, thus overcoming the division between theory and data which is involved in an 'empiricist' or 'theoreticist' methodology.

**Comparing the United States and Britain**

Some similar epistemological questions are raised by the use of comparisons between the different countries. As will be seen the main reason that I chose two countries was not so much because of the methodological advantages associated with having an international comparison. The methodological advantages are associated with a positivism that I am rejecting. Just as it would be a mistake to see case studies as empirical data which allow for the introduction of control and subsequent generalisation, so too it is a mistake to see international comparison in this light. What an international comparison does allow, however, is a richer explanation of the processes which are involved, through the variety of their manifestations as they occur.

Perhaps the key issue in considering methodological approaches to the study of social policy is the question which I have already posed. Why study social policy? The dominant trend is that in some way the study of social policy making can lead to 'better' policy making. This introduces firmly, the criteria of relevance into the study of social policy. Firmly rooted in the tradition of 'relevance', social administration is rarely critical or reflexive beyond the paradigm within which it is set. The intimate connections between methodology, epistemology and political practise are ignored and policy analysis sets forth as a neutral tool, concealing its own domination and dominance.

An example of this would be Rodgers' (1977) discussion of comparative social policy. She exhibits the first sign of the intellectually conservative by emphasising her wariness of theory
building. This wariness of theory conceals theories which are inadequately used.

"Our analyses (not theories) of social policy are only useful so long as they illuminate and in some measure help to 'explain' facts better than any others. So too, any generalisations we draw should be stated as hypotheses to be tested out in further studies." (Rodgers, 1977: 200)

She appeals for constructive descriptions. However the question is answered without being posed. Why analyse social policy? She answers in terms of its utility - a normative concept connected to a consensual model of policy development.1

The method however already determined the result. If policy analysis is to be 'useful', why examine policy making if the nature of the process is already known?

"It is commonly agreed that this collective action (for social welfare) involves the setting of goals, the choice of instruments and the operation of particular programmes. Our studies are therefore potentially concerned with all the social phenomena which influence decisions taken at the level of policy formation and legislation at the middle level of administration and at consumer level where services are 'delivered'." (Rodgers, 1977: 202)

There is an inbuilt assumption of shared values and rationality within the policy making process in such a view. It is in part as a critique of this dominant form of social policy analysis that my work is presented.

I began by considering the question of why, in both Britain and the United States, area based approaches with a common emphasis on 'community' should have occurred in the late sixties and early seventies. I imagined at the time, that what I was studying was a common phenomenon in two advanced capitalist societies. I therefore assumed that in looking at these programmes, some of the common aspects of state welfare provision in advanced capitalist societies could be explained

---

1 I mean here that the model is consensual in the sense that there is no conflict over the nature of policy development, not necessarily that policy making is seen as a consensual process.
through making this comparison. Such an explanation would further our understanding of the nature of the capitalist state and its relationship to welfare provision. However, while I hope that to an extent, I have provided some extension of our understanding, certain features became clear at the beginning of my work which led my study along different lines.

The similarity between the policies in the two countries was soon seen as being apparent rather than real. In emphasising the similarities between the developments in both countries, students of policy making had constructed an implicit view of the policy making process which failed to understand why these policies developed. At the same time an emphasis upon the similarities increased the appearance of similarity and led to the legitimation of policy in a particular manner which I shall explore later on.

Therefore, briefly and crudely, I began to be aware that these policies and programmes were not as similar as at first they appeared. This appearance of similarity was the outcome in part of the relationship of social scientists to these developments and to the government, and also the outcome of the international relationships between social scientists both in personal terms and through the sharing of a body of knowledge or paradigm. For these reasons, the similarities were emphasised and the basic differences ignored. This does tell us, however, something about the relationship between the provision of welfare and the capitalist state on a general and theoretical level. At this point it is sufficient to say that I try and show how 'welfare' or 'social' policy has been conceptualised as separate from the basic relations of capitalism. Not only, is this conceptualisation inadequate, but it also provides a legitimation which aids in the smooth functioning of capitalist relations. Social scientists perpetuate this inadequacy and contribute to this legitimation. The welfare state cannot be seen as an oasis of non-capitalist relations in an otherwise capitalist state. Social policy cannot be separated off as a 'good' part of the state. (London Edinburgh Weekend Return
It is its appearance as a separate part of the state's activity that it seems an extra 'bonus', different from other parts of the state.

Social scientists have played a positive role in constructing and maintaining this appearance. There are important implications for practice here in relation to social research and policy implementation. When I began my work, I was interested in discovering why the state had become involved in area based approaches. This is not merely a question which tells us more about the state, but is of practical relevance to state workers in being able to assess how far they can use state policies to achieve the welfare ends which seem to be the aim of policy. The contradictions and barriers which are confronted in working in different practical ways within the welfare state are time consuming to attempt to circumvent, merely on the basis of practical experience, of trial and error. Therefore it is important to consider whether a policy's lack of 'success' in achieving avowed aims is a failing of the personnel involved, an institutional failing, an organisational failing or indeed a success in itself since the espousal of aims is more important than their achievement.

Moving from seeing the purpose of this study as producing a comparative analysis of policy developments in the two countries, the importance of both the flow of ideas and the place of ideas in the policy making process becomes clear. This was the shift in emphasis which my work initially took.

Policy analysis, policy development and public learning

There are a variety of different traditions in social policy writing which deal in different ways with the problems of accounts and/or explanations. These traditions in part reflect some of the basic trends and purposes of social policy analysis which connect closely to many of the questions which are raised in conclusion by my work. The nature and intentions of an account or explanation and what approach is taken can not be separated from the role that the social policy analyst is playing, is trying to play, or, to enter
another debate, should play.

There is an intimate connection between the role of ideas and their ideological content. I have already commented, above, upon the role of ideas as seen in established studies of social administration. This is of importance because it is an 'idea' itself. Sumner (1979) formulates the concept of ideology

"as elements of consciousness generated within and integral to social practise, reflecting the structure of such practise and the appearance of the practical content." (Sumner, 1979: 6)

It is this ideology that I am interested in and how it relates to the policy making process. A broader view of ideology implicit in such a definition includes not only the everyday commonsense in practise, but also the products of academic investigation. Particulary in social policy analysis such investigation while conforming to certain methodological guidelines, has a basically ideological nature in that it is determined by (and lacks critical self-awareness of) the pragmatic political realities within which it operates. This is instanced in much of the social policy writing and in the concern of social policy writers to have a relevance to policy making, while at the same time conforming to a positivism which is broadly seen as being the scientific method.

Policy making is made to appear, in this connection of ideas, to be an independant process capable of adaptation on the basis of understanding, rather than, as it is, a pragmatic adjustment within a frame of accepted practise.

Heclo (1974) sees learning in a much more adequate manner than any other of the policy analysts who use the term. He recognises its pragmatic nature and does not pretend that it is more than it is. He defines learning as being of two types.

Firstly, classic conditioning

"Much of the time, policy responses have resembled what is known as classic conditioning (or respondent behaviour); the repeated coincidence of conditional and unconditional stimuli has over time led to highly predictable patterns of response." (Heclo, 1974: 315)
This is a trial and error approach to learning, and contains many of the aspects of what has occurred in policy making. His second type of learning is 'instrumental conditioning'.

"If classic conditioning has been most relevant to policy continuity, instrumental conditioning (or operant behaviour) has been most directly applicable to policy change. The distinctive feature of this second type of learning is the addition of environmental consequences (reinforcement) to the basic stimulus-response model, so that reinforcement is not paired with a particular stimulus but is contingent on the response emitted." (Heclo, 1974: 316)

While these two types of learning describe adequately what has been occurring, he fails either to comment upon why learning has been seen as being different, as a rational, linear process, or to understand what a more positive view of human or public learning would entail.

What would be a more appropriate conception of learning than conditioning? That conditioning is occurring not only at an individual level, but also collectively, regarding the institutions of society is clear. However, this cannot be confused with learning. If learning is to be rational, then it must contain more than mere conditioning. It is not only the reflexive aspect of learning which distinguishes it from conditioning, since conditioning is almost totally reflexive. It is the reflection, beyond the immediate and in terms of the abstract, which distinguishes learning from conditioning. The ad hoc pragmatic adjustments which undoubtedly do occur cannot be seen as being learning. Hambleton (1978) in looking at learning as a model of government policies argues for the need for the reorganisation of the state apparatus and institutions to allow for learning beyond this pragmatic adjustment. This approach, I suggest, fails to appreciate why learning does not occur. The appearance of learning, concealing pragmatic adjustment, gives substance to the legitimacy of a particular mode of domination. To substitute the substance of learning for the form is not possible within the present system of political and economic
relations because it is this system of political and economic relations which determine the pragmatic readjustment. The context with its pragmatic constraints within which policy is created is not alternate with another more rational one. It is not a case of one being as effective as another. The context is a creation of a system of relations.

Therefore, when considering in what ways the British and American policies connected, it is necessary to consider how social science ideas are generated and sustained through this system of relations. The argument here is that the connection occurs in preserving and strengthening the appearance of a rational technical system of policy making. It is not a sufficient critique to argue that the system is not rational technical. This is shown by most policy analysts, usually within the context of suggesting ways in which it could be. To understand policy making, it is necessary to go beyond this and consider why it is not, nor can it be, a rational technical process. This requires some understanding of what has influenced the development of policy and the way in which the process has arisen. This returns us to the question of looking at policy developments and the relationship between explanation and account and between these and theory. In my second and third chapters I look at what has occurred in Britain and the United States and implicit in the account is a theoretical position but before putting this position forward in abstract terms I shall return to a discussion of some of the issues relating to how the decision making process can be analysed.

**Analysing the policy making process**

I have already discussed the methodological questions raised by a case study and comparative approach. One of the most important issues in considering methodology is the way in which the methodological approach cannot be separated from the theoretical approach with which the object of study is examined. This connection is made clear in Lukes's discussion of power and it is worth considering his arguments in explaining my own approach.
Lukes (1974) looks critically at two approaches to the study of power: that of Dahl (1961) in his famous study of New Haven and Bachrach and Baratz's (1970) critique of Dahl in their study of the poverty program in Baltimore. In looking at the policy making process, power is a key concept. The issue raised by Lukes could be rephrased in terms of what is the exercise of power? This is clearly fundamental to much of my discussion of a rational technical mode of domination, since power is an aspect of domination. Crudely the question could be posed – is power only being exercised when it is observable? That the rational technical mode of domination is not an active and observable domination does not deny its existence. An examination of it relates its appearance as not-domination, to its reality as domination. It is through its appearance as not-domination that its reality as domination can be arrived at.

Lukes summarises and criticises Dahl's approach to the study of power as being 'one-dimensional'. It has a behavioural focus which, by looking at decision making on the assumption that this is an observable process centered on conflicts arising within the process, sees the important issues as the subjective interests of the participants in the decision making process. Bachrach and Baratz's approach which Lukes calls 'two-dimensional' goes beyond that of Dahl's by introducing the concept of nondecision making. Nondecision making sees the act of not making a decision as important a factor in the study of power as decision making. As Lukes points out, this is a qualified critique of the behavioural focus of Dahl, in that Bachrach and Baratz are interested in the important aspect of inaction. However, the focus of their approach is still upon the observable conflict even though it may be covert rather than the overt conflict observed by Dahl. Lukes attempts to go further in his 'three-dimensional' view of power, which he sees as being a critique of the behavioural focus of Dahl, and even if modified, of Bachrach and Baratz. The focus of his approach embraces decision making, non-decision making, and control over the political agenda.
This control over the political agenda goes beyond Bachrach and Baratz's nondecisions in that the focus is on why certain decisions should not even be considered. This is different from Bachrach and Baratz's 'non-decisions' since a non-decision is 'a decision that results in suppression or thwarting of a latent or manifest challenge to the values or interests of the decision maker.' (Lukes, 1974: 44)

Lukes considers ways 'in which potential issues are kept out of politics' (Lukes, 1974: 24, original emphasis)

In Bachrach and Baratz's case a non-decision is a decision not to make a decision. Lukes is concerned with potential decisions and non-decisions which do not even arrive upon the agenda. An example from my work, upon which I comment later, would be that whereas the decision not to aim the War on Poverty in the direction which the Department of Labor wished was a non-decision in Bachrach and Baratz's terms, an issue such as guaranteed state employment at prevailing wage rates for the poor was not even a non-decision since it did not appear on the political agenda. Lukes concentrates on both subjective and real interests in considering what issues are at stake even as potential non-mobilised issues. As well as the observable conflict of the other dimensional views of power, the concept of latent conflict is introduced into Lukes's view.

Perhaps the most difficult aspect of Lukes's view of power to maintain is that of the concept of interest. Clearly, Lukes means interest in the Marxist sense of interest, although he does not introduce class, which is essential to sustain the concept. Individual interests are much more difficult to define, especially when considering the relationship between perceived interest and real interest, without reference to a concept of class interest. Lukes defines power by saying 'that A exercises power over B when A affects B in a manner contrary to B's interests.' (Lukes, 1974: 34)

This seems to retain an individualised notion of power even when A may be interpreted as more than 'individual A',
which would leave open some important questions. The class nature of interest for instance is crucial to understanding how real interests may differ from perceived interests.

To avoid becoming involved in a debate upon the nature of power and the best method of studying it, it would seem that the questions raised by Lukes need to be placed more firmly in the context of my work. The problem arises, in particular in looking at policy making, of how far policy outcomes are to be seen both in analysis and practice as the result of a conscious process, in the sense that their determination arises from actors perceptions and motivations or how far the determinants of the outcomes are structural forces which act upon people in a manner which leaves little room for the exercise of genuine free will and choice. This is to present the issue at its crudest and to counterpose two extreme views. Some of the issues involved in such a discussion relate to Carrier and Kendall's concerns and some to the discussion which Lukes has on the debate between Poulantzas (1972) and Miliband (1972). Poulantzas's analysis can be characterised as leading 'straight towards a kind of structural determinism, or rather a structural super-determinism, which makes impossible a truly realistic consideration of the dialectical relationship between the state and 'the system'. (Miliband, 1972: 259)

Whereas Miliband, according to Poulantzas

'sometimes allows himself to be unduly influenced by the methodological principles of the adversary.... Miliband constantly gives the impression that for him social classes or 'groups' are in some way reducible to inter-personal relations, that the State is reducible to inter-personal relations of the members of the diverse 'groups' that constitute the State apparatus, and finally that the relation between social classes and the State is itself reducible to inter-personal relations of 'individuals' composing social groups and 'individuals' composing the State apparatus.' (Poulantzas, 1972: 242)

Holloway and Picciotto (1977) argue that there is a false polarity between Poulantzas and Miliband in this debate in that

'Both authors focus on the political as an autonomous object of study arguing, at least implicitly, that a recognition of the specificity of the political is a
necessary pre-condition for the elaboration of scientific concepts.' (Holloway and Picciotto, 1977: 81-82)

They go on to argue that this attempt to separate the 'political' from the 'economic' fails to understand the nature of the political as a form of relationship which must be understood within the contradiction of the capital relation (Holloway and Picciotto, 1977: 84). It is not that economic relationships determine, in the last instance, relatively autonomous political relationships, but the political and the economic are forms of capitalist relations of production.

However, this does not entirely clarify the important question of how what appear as political relationships in the state apparatus do relate to the capitalist mode of production. When looking in empirical terms at specific policy processes and outcomes, it is insufficient to interpret material in the broad theoretical manner of Holloway and Picciotto. Equally Poulantzas can criticise, safely, Miliband's empiricism and hint at 'abstracted empiricism' through his own avoidance of empirical material in his writing. It may be possible to develop an internally consistent theoretical view, if no attempt is made to relate this to how forms actually appear. The problem which Miliband faces only occurs when looking at the appearances, and it is necessary to relate these actual and specific appearances to a theoretical understanding to advance our analysis.

**Capitalism and Welfare**

A variety of different general and specific accounts of approaches to the study of capitalism and welfare are available eg Gough (1979), Ginsberg (1979), Mishra (1977). It is necessary to outline how my material has been theorised and what relationships are implicitly assumed in my analysis. A failing of traditional social administration is that it does not recognise the importance of an adequately articulated conceptualisation of the context within which policies are developed.

My argument is that in looking at the policies which have
developed in the two countries, the main direction and purpose of social policy is consistent with and to a large extent shaped by the fiscal and economic policies of the state. At the same time, the details of policies are influenced both by the electoral political concerns and the administrative political concerns which they affect. The given institutional structures provide an independent conservative force in allowing policy options to develop. All this occurs within the conditions which private capital 'requires' to continue to accumulate successfully.

Thus the main area of my work is with the relationship that I see between on the one hand electoral politics and on the other state economic and fiscal policies. I agree with Holloway and Picciotto that to separate the economic from the political is to confuse the nature of capitalist relations. However, there is a difference between making this separation in theoretical terms, as Poulantzas does, and making this separation in terms of appearance. Electoral politics and state economic policy are tied into and are part of capitalist relations of production.

Therefore, although I subsequently argue that particular policy developments should be seen as being influenced by electoral concerns, I am not removing these electoral concerns from the system of relations within which they arise. Through the electoral system, the state is seen to reflect societal forces, while actually acting on behalf of a dominant class. Of course, this appearance is not entirely formal. The need for legitimacy produces substantive reactions to electoral pressures that are previously limited through ideological processes. In this way, different parties are not identical and reflect the different electoral demands placed upon them. More importantly, though, the electoral system makes the state seem, merely, to reflect societal forces and allows governments to implement policy on the basis of having been 'fairly' and 'democratically' elected.

Edelman (1977) argues that elections have a symbolic purpose
in making the institutions reinforce beliefs about the reality of democratic participation. This is one aspect of the importance of elections, which is independent from the outcome of the electoral process. The existence of the structures and institutions provide symbolic reassurance and allow the form of government to be seen as reflecting some of the basic ideological requirements of capitalist democracy. While electoral democracy undoubtedly fulfills this function there are also responsive aspects of it which cannot be ignored. Therefore while accepting the main thrust of Edelman's argument it must be added that to achieve this symbolic reassurance, the content of electoral politics does reflect different strategies.

In America, the pursuit of votes is a much more acceptable practice than in Britain. Whereas in both countries, the ideology of 'national interest' is strong, the pluralism of the American political system allows for the pursuit of electoral advantage without disrupting the main structural stability of the system. Therefore, President Johnson in his autobiography can be much more blatant about the electoral calculations in his decisions than for example Wilson in his account of the Labour Government (Johnson (1971) and Wilson (1971)). These electoral calculations are also made in Britain. However the only evidence that I can find for this is circumstantial. In America they are clearly stated and are part and parcel of electoral politics. Philips (1970) provided the electoral bible for the Nixon Administration.

'This book does not represent - or purport to represent - the past or present 'strategy' of the Nixon Administration. Critics who say it does ignore the fact that it makes no strategic or policy recommendations. If its statistics, analyses and projection suggest courses of action, they merely parallel the role of market research ..........' (Philips, 1970: 30)

Philips's book reflects the electoral concerns of American politicians. The fact that he can do this with no reference to policy or strategy, reinforces my view of the American political system as a politically empty attempt to win electoral advantage. The American political system is much
more open than the British to being seen in terms of a Downsian model of governments acting rationally to maximise political support. However, whether policies are selected to win votes or votes are used to choose policies does not affect the analysis of the electoral system that I am putting forward. The electoral system influences policies, but this influence is limited by the relations of production within which policies are developed. The experience of those democracies, such as Chile, which attempted to change the relations of production shows clearly the limits of the electoral system. There is, however, a considerable amount of freedom of choice within the existing relations of production, but the constraints and responses of the electoral system reproduce themselves in the selection of policy options. The search for a consensus in a pluralistic system such as America, or the pursuit of policies on a party basis in Britain have different effects upon how far the electorate is responded to. I examine some of the implications of this later on.

Electoral politics are clearly connected with state economic policies. Furthermore, the relationship between state economic policies and the general maintenance of capitalist relations of production cannot be separated. As de Brunhoff (1978) argues, state economic policy is concerned with the production, circulation and management of a waged labour force and of money as the general equivalent. I would suggest and will show in the following pages that social policy or welfare policy can be related to some of these concerns of state economic policy. In economic policy, the state acts both as capitalist and as provider for capitalists. The state provides the social conditions within which capitals can produce and accumulate.

---

1 'Our model is based on the assumption that every government seeks to maximise political support. We further assume that the government exists in a democratic society where periodic elections are held, that its primary goal is reelection and that election is the goal of those parties now out of power.' (Downs, 1957: 11)
The policies I discuss have developed their form according to some of the overriding 'needs' of state expenditure in relation to the economy in general. These 'needs' are not functionally determined however. There is an element of subjective perception upon the part of policy makers and a variety of different options which can be developed. 'Needs' are not independent determinants but are shaped by the conditions within which they themselves develop.

Considering the 'New Economics' of the Kennedy and Johnson eras and the attempts at economic stimulation through Keynesian policies of demand management, it is not merely the intrusion of the political (the War on Vietnam) into the economic affairs of the state which led to the overheating of the American economy. The political and the economic cannot be separated in this way. Again, the attempts at continual balancing and fine tuning during the Wilson Government 1964-70 indicate how the political pressures under which the government operated (international, national and party) react with a chosen economic strategy.

To see welfare policy as being only a political pay off to stabilise class conflict, therefore ignores the connection between the economic and the political. The one acts upon the other. The unrest in the ghettoes which some argue was responsible for the development of the Model Cities program in the USA was a product of the existing social relations as concretely manifested in existing political and economic policies. It is a fine distinction to make between a deterministic view of political and economic relations and the view that I am putting forward. It would be insufficient to argue against an economic determinism merely on the grounds that it is not solely the economic which provides this determination but that political-economic relationships do. This is not my position. These relationships are both constructed by subjective choices of policy makers and limit and construct their perceptions of the choices that exist. The two elements of structure and meaning cannot be separated.
Much of the existing examination, from a Marxist perspective, of the development of welfare policy centers around two questions. 'What is the role of class conflict in explaining the emergence of welfare policies? And how are the 'functional requirements' of the capitalist system mediated by the state?' (Gough, 1979: 56)

Gough argues that the major determinants of the modern welfare state are working class struggle, the centralisation of the state and the influence of the former over the latter, but as he says these factors are not exhaustive. This comes back to my earlier discussion of the aim of this inquiry - to examine the relationship between factors in the development of social policy, but not in a deterministic fashion. Welfare policies cannot be isolated from state economic policies in that they are means to the ends themselves.

Another important Marxist approach to looking at welfare policies can be derived from O'Connor's book on the fiscal crisis. O'Connor (1973) can be criticised for focusing exclusively upon the fiscal aspects of the crisis while ignoring other aspects of capitalist contradictions contained within the state's expenditure. He argues that contradictions arise within the size of the state budget and the role that it performs. Certainly the material which I have collected here points out some of these contradictions. What needs to be related, however, is the relationship between fiscal policy and economic policy. The former concerned with the state's financial viability, the second the means by which the state encourages continued accumulation by private capitalists.

O'Connor begins his thesis by arguing that the capitalist state tries to fulfill two basic and contradictory functions. The state tries to create and maintain the conditions for private accumulation while trying to maintain conditions of social harmony. In other words, the state provides both for the private accumulation of a socially produced surplus and provides the conditions under which this can be seen to occur legitimately.
'The state must involve itself in the accumulation process, but it must either mystify its policies by calling them something that they are not, or it must try to conceal them (eg by making them into administrative, not political, issues).'

(O'Connor, 1973: 6)

O'Connor goes on to argue that state expenditure can be classified in the two fold manner which reflects the two fold nature of the state's role.

'social capital is expenditures required for profitable private accumulation; it is indirectly productive.'

(O'Connor, 1973: 6)

'social expenses consist of projects and services which are required to maintain social harmony - to fulfill the state's 'legitimation' function. They are not even indirectly productive.' (O'Connor, 1973: 7)

He further divides social capital into social investment and social consumption. The former increases the productivity of a given amount of labour power, the latter lowers the reproduction costs of labour.

He goes on to argue that nearly every state agency is involved in both the main functions of the state, of accumulation and legitimization. These two purposes can be served simultaneously, making the classification of any state outlays ambiguous. The accumulation of social capital and social expenses is a contributory process which generates crisis tendencies. Because the social surplus is appropriated privately, the socialisation of costs produces what O'Connor calls a 'structural gap' between state expenditure and state revenues.

'The result is a tendency for state expenditures to increase more rapidly than the means of financing them.' (O'Connor, 1973: 9)

Secondly, he argues that the fiscal crisis is exacerbated by the 'private appropriation of state power for particularistic ends'. By this he means that 'specific interests' have a disproportionate call on state power. These contradictory processes within the state budget are generating a fiscal crisis.

Friedland, Piven and Alford (1977) provide an expansion of O'Connor's view of the fiscal crisis. They argue
'On the one hand, urban governments must be responsive to the infrastructural and service requirements of capital accumulation, and to changes generated by economic growth. On the other hand, they must also manage political participation among the masses of the urban population who do not control capital accumulation and may not benefit from it either.' (Friedland et al., 1977: 449)

They argue that the functions of accumulation and legitimation are not inherently and continuously contradictory. Stability and prosperity of the economy is a precondition to legitimacy and it is when the accumulation process begins to break down that legitimacy is called into question. This is an important point when considering the nature of the state's crises. These crises whether of legitimation (Habermas (1976)) or fiscal cannot be separated from the process of capital accumulation itself. These contradictions of accumulation and legitimacy arise from the place of the state in capitalist society.

State economic policies are closely tied with state fiscal policies, since through fiscal policies the state provides not only the material conditions of capital accumulation, as O'Connor outlines, but also the general monetary framework and regulation of waged labour which de Brunhoff describes. The management of overall demand, the stabilisation of the currency on the world markets, the level of interest rates, and the supply of labour power are all regulated through state fiscal policies while providing a general economic setting for capitalist production.

The links that must be made theoretically are between these aspects of the position of the state and the arguments that I am putting forward in relation to the place of legitimacy, electoral politics, administrative structures, state economic and fiscal policies and the development of welfare policies in a capitalist state. These are the essential ingredients which require integration into a consistent frame.

A key concept that I use is that of 'mode of domination'. I see state policies as being part of a 'rational-technical mode of domination'. While the concept of domination has its roots in Weber, it has more recently been used by Habermas
Weber's concept of domination relates to his views of the exercise of power, domination being the expression of power. Since for Weber such exercise of power is not seen within a system of power relations which is derived from and built upon a system of class relations (specifically the capital-labour relation), his use of domination differs from mine. Habermas and Marcuse expand upon the Weberian concept of domination in discussing the rational and technical nature of domination. However these discussions are not directly relevant to my use of rational-technical mode of domination. They enter into a debate upon the nature of technology and science which would represent a side track from my main concern.

The importance within this work of the concept of mode of domination is at a more immediate level. Beginning with the basis of an assumption about the class nature of capitalism, I am arguing that capital maintains and adapts its domination. It uses different modes to achieve this domination. Looking at the ways in which capital dominates over labour gives rise to tautological constructions of the capital-labour relationship in terms of an a priori assumption of a static dominance of capital over labour. It is not only that capital oppresses and exploits labour that is important, it is how it maintains that oppression and exploitation that is of interest.

A more recent use of the term 'mode of domination' is that of the London Edinburgh Weekend Return Group (1980). They refer to a keynesian mode of domination and a monetarist mode of domination. Their use of the concept is more akin to mine. By mode of domination they refer to the way in which capital regulates the capital-labour relationship. While my period falls within the keynesian mode of domination, I do not use the term 'keynesian' because it has many facets which cannot

1 'Like the political institutions historically preceding it, the state is a relation of men dominating men, a relation supported by means of legitimate (i.e. considered to be legitimate) violence.' (Gerth and Mills, 1970: 78)
be covered or separated analytically. The rational-technical is one aspect of this mode of domination and I do not mean to imply that the totality of the mode of domination is expressed through its rational form. The keynesian mode of domination is characterised by the use of keynesian management of the economy, accompanied by a series of social policies whose direction attempts to build a consensus around the prevailing balance of class forces. Resolution of conflict occurs through negotiation and accommodation rather than overt conflict. However this resolution and attempt at consensus masks the inherent inequality of the relationship of class domination. In this way, keynesianism is not merely a set of economic policies with which are associated a set of conciliatory social policies, the social and economic policies are interdependent aspects of a keynesian mode of domination.

The conciliatory nature of social policies developed during the keynesian mode of domination, both in their search for social peace and consensus, and in congruence with keynesian 'economics'. Social policies while attempting within this mode, to regulate and control potential and actual conflict, were constructed within a process that attempted to avoid the generation of conflict over means and ends. It was in attempting to remove this conflict over means (means for preventing other potential and actual conflict) that the importance of a rational-technical approach to policy making lay. A rational-technical approach masks class conflict in a fundamental manner. Not only does it mask class conflict but also provides a formalised bureaucracy in the Weberian sense, with seemingly external rules of operating which allow for the resolution of institutional and interest conflict within the state apparatus to occur without recourse to obvious power, thus reinforcing the state apparatus's legitimacy.

Legitimation and Social Policy

The primary and most fundamental place of legitimation in capitalist electoral democracies is the legitimation of the private accumulation of a socially produced surplus. This
legitimation has not always been, nor is now entirely, a function of the state. The state, though, supports directly and indirectly the ideologies which provide for this legitimation. While state policies, in general, are consistent with this appropriation, there are other problems of legitimation that are concerned with the existence of the state itself.

The very existence of the state requires legitimation. The increase in the intervention of the state into a multitude of social relations, which according to the basic rationale of capitalism are self-regulating relations, creates for the state a legitimation problem in a sphere where the maintenance of class relations and forces, having been self-legitimating through concealed regulation (e.g., the family, the church, etc.) becomes visibly regulated by the state and so makes visible the contradiction between the state's role and the supposed 'natural' forces which maintain capitalism. However, this legitimation of the existence of the state is not a new problem. There has not been a 'non-statist' capitalism, which has been replaced by a growth in state functions. What has happened, is that the state has increasingly intervened in more areas of life to regulate relationships which had previously been regulated more discretely, i.e., the church or the ideology of 'economic realities'. The family is a good example of an area in which the state has increased this form of intervention.

While the intervention of the state in principle may be seen as legitimate, particular acts may still require a more specific legitimation that relates to the act itself. It is difficult to separate analytically the legitimation of the state itself and the legitimation of particular state functions, since the existence of the state is not independent from the relationships and functions in which it is involved. Rather these relationships and functions constitute the state. The political system and its processes legitimate both the state and the system of private accumulation which underpins it. Acts of the state that change and adapt the social structure of private accumulation are often presented as being neutral or technical decisions
meeting the objective demands of the economy or polity. Not all acts of the state are legitimated through the portrayal of policies as being rational or neutral. However, I argue that the state achieves legitimation through the process of policy making in a broad sense - the structures and institutions of the state apparatus and their relations to one another and through building this system of relations entrances for external validation of particular policies as being rational and technical.

**Social Science and Social Policy**

This raises the second approach which I argue to begin with that my thesis is concerned with - the connection between social science and social policy making. While there are many methodological questions that are raised in making the argument that I subsequently develop, I argue that social science can be seen to have been used to legitimate social policies in both countries, policies that have been developed to meet different ends. That the focus of social science has been consistent with the more generally perceived fiscal and economic policies of the state, I argue is conclusive evidence that my argument is correct. It is not however 'proof'. The consistency of social policies with the general economic and fiscal policies being pursued is not surprising. It would be assumed, in many models of the policy making process that this connection would occur. What does require explanation is how 'knowledge' is also consistent with these economic and fiscal policies. Most models would assume some independance one from the other. The only conclusion which I think can be drawn is that this synchronisation is occurring because of the nature of the relationship between the production of knowledge in capitalist societies and the political economic 'realities' facing the state. However this argument cannot be continued and sustained on too specific a level. Clearly the production of all knowledge at all times does not show this consistency. The growth in such fields within social science as ethnomethodology, phenomenology and Marxist political economy go against this trend. It is in those branches of social science which are seen as being directly applicable that this
synchronisation occurs. Even then, there is a limitation to this. Certain applied sciences have a time span in research which cannot be adapted so directly to the economic requirements of particular years and cannot adapt to economic changes. This also occurs in spending on large social programmes. The Beveridgean welfare state was much more consistent with the public expenditure requirements of the fifties and the sixties than the seventies, and seemingly, the eighties. However, there are political and institutional barriers to its dismantling. Applies science programmes such as the space program in the US are subject to similar barriers to their adaptability.

Social science, however, does not necessarily have the same time span and can be adapted (perhaps 'chosen') to suit more rapidly changing economic demands. In particular, the acceptance uncritically of one methodological approach, a positivist empiricism, ignores some of the founding methodological and epistemological questions which need to be explored in generating new developments. The social engineering approach of social science as applied in government gives it an adaptability which other sciences may not have. Social science then enters into the policy making process as a technical politics since its techniques and methods, when applied in political decision making does not result in a scientisation of politics. I explore this more fully in Chapter Six.

Considering then how this relates to the question of legitimacy, it can be seen that I am arguing that social science (positivist social science) as a technique conceals some of the more fundamental forces that influence policy development. I have already stated what I see these as being and in my study follow this through using some examples in the field of policy making in the two countries.

What remains to be put forward is some explanation concerning the role that legitimation plays. The resolution of conflict in terms of power cannot be seen to occur within a supposedly democratic system of government. Such a democratic system is based upon the twin aspects of rationality, in that the process
results in a rational resolution of conflict, and of participation, in that we all have equal power in the choice of objectives. However, power is exercised by a dominant class in its own interest and this interest is not rationally compatible with such concepts as 'national interest', especially in times of economic crisis. It is this aspect of the state that legitimation seeks to conceal.

The Thesis in Outline

This thesis begins by looking at the history of the development of the policies and programmes in the United States and then in Britain. I examine the experience in the two countries, separately and chronologically. This examination concentrates on issues which give me material which I develop in later chapters. In particular the aim is to present some of the major differences, not only in the settings of the programmes and projects, but also in their organisational features.

Chapter Four looks at the background to these policies. The important features which I identify are the structure of the political institutions, the differences in the provision of welfare services in the two countries and the changing economic settings. These provide the context within which these developments can be understood and analysed. These contexts are important in shaping the direction of policy. They must be considered to understand the role of administrative and institutional factors. It is important not to construct an account of policy development which is straightforwardly derived from 'economic' influences. Equally the political influences on policy development include the politics of the administrative structure of the state and these issues go some way towards explaining differences in the two countries.

Chapter Five focuses on some of the similar issues in policy development in the two countries. In attempting to recognise the importance of the meaning that policy makers give to policy developments, the way that they construct the debate around policy should be considered. I argue that the language of this debate is one which gives an appearance of similarity to the projects and programmes, being derived from a common transatlantic social science language. I however draw a distinction between this language
and the operational or theoretical definition of this language which is the crucial element of transferring language into concepts. This chapter also considers some of the similar tensions which the two countries faced that led to a shift from a service delivery focus to a service management focus in policy. The last issue discussed is that of the common tension between central control and democratic legitimacy which influenced the development of participation and decentralised management strategies in the two countries.

Chapter Six discusses the relationship between social science, administration and politics. I focus upon this relationship because, while politics and administration provided the key determinants of the nature of the projects, social science provided a language for the presentation of the policies. A language which lead to an appearance of continuity and similarity, an appearance which concealed the reality.

I consider how social science 'came of age' in the nineteen sixties and discuss what role social science played in government. I reject a view of social science as being an equal partner in its relationship with politics, the two developing in a pragmatic manner policies which accomodated the 'facts' of both. However, I do not see social science as merely a legitimator for specific policy developments but argue that social science's legitimation role is that of legitimating the policy process as a whole. Social science also plays an important part in mediating conflicts within the state bureaucracy, which cannot appear to be resolved on the basis of power. Social scientists have also acted as information gatherers and as entrepreneurs.

In conclusion, I discuss how more traditional views of the nature of social science and policy developments have lead to accounts of policy developments which cannot explain their complexity. I also consider how these traditional views are part of the construction of social science that the state has been involved in these programmes.
'Facts are not the only, nor the most important, consideration... Social history, like history itself, is a combination of taste, imagination, science and scholarship; it reconciles incompatibles, it balances probabilities; and at last it attains the reality of fiction, which is the highest reality of all.' (Dangerfield, 1966: 315)
Chapter Two
The American Programmes

The Community Action Program of the War on Poverty

'... ... the Great Society programs were promulgated by federal leaders in order to deal with the political problems created by a new and unstable electoral constituency, namely blacks - and to deal with this new constituency not simply by responding to its expressed interest, but by shaping and directing its political future.' (Piven and Cloward, 1971: 249n)

The Economic Opportunity Act, the legislative instrument setting up the War on Poverty and containing the Community Action Program was subtitled

'An Act to mobilize the human and financial resources of the Nation to combat poverty in the United States.'
(US Congress, 1964)

President Johnson signed the Act on 20th August 1964, a surprisingly short time after he had proposed a 'Nationwide War on the Sources of Poverty' in a special message to Congress on March 16th 1964 (Johnson, 1964e).

The manner in which the legislation was passed through Congress serves as an indication of its political importance to the Johnson Administration. The short time between the assassination of President Kennedy on November 22nd 1963 and the beginning of the Administration's plans to go ahead with a war on poverty is significant. Walter Heller, the Chairman of Kennedy's Council of Economic Advisers (who were responsible for the initial investigations into the extent of poverty in the US and for drawing up preliminary proposals for an anti-poverty program) reports that in a meeting with President Johnson two days after the assassination, the new President encouraged the development of the programme with all possible speed before the approaching Presidential elections in November 1964 (Heller, 1963c). Richard Blumenthal (1967) quotes a speech by Heller in which he reports that in conversation with Johnson at this meeting, Johnson said to him 'That's my kind of program. It will help people. I want you to move full speed ahead.'
Johnson in his account of the meeting with Heller gives his reaction to the idea of a poverty program.

'Before me now was a call for action, a call for a revolutionary new program to attack one of the most stubbornly entrenched social ills in America. Like most social change, such a revolution would not come without a struggle. My perceptions of America persuaded me that three separate conditions were required before social change could take root and flourish in our national life - a recognition of need, a willingness to act, and someone to lead the effort. In 1963 I saw these three conditions coming together in historical harmony.' (Johnson, 1971: 70)

He goes on to report his response to Heller

'The poverty program Heller described was my kind of undertaking.
"I'm interested", I responded. "I'm sympathetic. Go ahead. Give it the highest priority. Push ahead full tilt."' (Johnson, 1971: 71)

At Heller's previous meeting with President Kennedy three days before the assassination, Heller reports in his notes from that meeting that Kennedy was modifying his support for a poverty programme and considering delaying its implementation until after the election (Heller, 1963d). At a meeting with Kennedy in October 1963, the notes report Kennedy's clear commitment to a poverty programme.

'It's perfectly clear that he is aroused about this (poverty) and if we could produce a program to fill the bill, he would be inclined to run with it.' (Heller, 1963c)

At the meeting the following month, the notes show the political calculations involved in such a programme for Kennedy's Administration.

'I (Heller) wondered just what his current feelings about it was. His (Kennedy) attitude was "No, I'm still very much in favour of doing something on the poverty theme if we can get a good program, but I also think its important to make clear that we're doing something for the middle-income man in the suburbs etc...."' (Heller, 1963d)

1 Levitan (1969: 16) reports that the antipoverty proposals received a set-back in the fall of 1963 because of fear of a 'white-backlash'.

---

Note: The document contains a paragraph broken off mid-sentence. The last clause indicates that the antipoverty proposals received a setback in the fall of 1963 due to fear of a 'white-backlash'. This is referenced in Levitan (1969: 16).
Kennedy was concerned about the electoral ramifications in the suburbs of such an inner-city focused approach. Kennedy's electoral alliance was already strong in the cities of the north and east and it was the more conservative suburbs and the Mid-West and South towards which he had to look for an added margin considering the extremely narrow electoral victory that he achieved over Nixon in 1960. Johnson, on the other hand, had to emphasise more liberal policies since his position on the Kennedy ticket as Vice President had added a conservative element to allay the fears of southern Democrats. The lack of progress in Congress which Kennedy's domestic policies met during his Presidency can be attributed to a coalition of conservative Democrats and Republicans. Johnson, to maintain his own, and to inherit Kennedy's constituencies, emphasised his liberal leanings. In the same first meeting with Heller, he stressed his liberal record, which, reflecting the division between the image and the substance of American politics was more consistently liberal on major issues than Kennedy's had been. Johnson had Presidential ambitions as Senate Majority Leader (attempts to nominate him had been made in 1956 and 1960) and with a long record of political involvement in Washington was in a position without power. Once President, reelection was as important to him as the stability and continuity between Administrations that he frequently stressed. Indeed, the lack of continuity is noticeable. The achievement of many of Kennedy's aims by Johnson indicated the success which he achieved in combining some of Kennedy's aims with his own considerable legislative experience and political power. For Kennedy, therefore, the poverty program was a desirable end in terms of an overall political strategy and direction for his Administration to pursue. The assassination converted the proposed programme into an important goal which bore a distinctive Johnson stamp (and so gave him credit which could have electoral benefits) and was identified with the overall liberal compassion emphasised by Kennedy.

What evidence is there that Johnson pursued the war on
poverty for electoral gain? Three separate types of evidence can be used. Firstly, the clear account from Heller's notes show Kennedy's enthusiasm being tempered by political expediency and Johnson's total commitment to the idea when presented with an outline of the poverty programme. At the time of Heller's first meeting with Johnson the content of a poverty programme had not yet been decided but was still being negotiated between government agencies by the ad hoc Task Force of the Council of Economic Advisers and the Bureau of the Budget. The Justice Department under Robert Kennedy was emphasising a largely experimental 'brains trust' approach.

'A series of task forces should be assigned the responsibility of keeping the problems of the poor before the government....Thus we are proposing that this study concentrate on developing strategies of self-help...' (Robert Kennedy, 1963)

On the other hand, the proposal for the poverty programme eventually put forward by Heller in a memorandum to Sorensen on 20th December 1963 recommended a Coordinated Community Action Program which would aim at 'specific local areas of poverty' and rely on local initiative, action and self-help (Heller, 1963f). These are two different approaches and their common theme is a poverty programme without details. President Johnson's initial support can therefore be seen in terms of support for a non-specific liberal measure to investigate ways of combating poverty.

The second sort of evidence is circumstantial in nature. With Johnson's approval for the idea of such a programme, the development of a firm proposal occurred rapidly. Johnson recounts

'I told him (Shriver) he would have to work fast. Not only did I want to propel a program through Congress immediately but I wanted the plan to produce visible results...' (Johnson, 1971: 76)

Johnson, 1964a) publicly announced his intentions to set up a poverty programme. This announcement was expanded in his Annual Message to Congress: The Economic Report of the President (Johnson, 1964b) on 20th January 1964. This message was accompanied by the Annual Report of the Council of Economic Advisers (1964a) in which the costs of poverty and its incidence were emphasised.

'Poverty......has many faces. It is found in the North and in the South; in the East and in the West, in the farm and in the city, among the employed and the unemployed. Its roots are many and its causes complex. To defeat it requires a coordinated and comprehensive attack.' (Council of Economic Advisers, 1964b: 77)

The ease with which it could be defeated is also stressed but rejected as a course of action.

'Conquest of poverty is well within our power. About eleven billion dollars a year would bring all poor families up to the three thousand dollar income level we have taken to be the minimum for a decent life. The majority of the Nation would simply tax themselves enough to provide the necessary income supplements to their less fortunate citizens. The burden - one fifth of the annual defense budget, less than 2% of GNP - would certainly not be intolerable. But this 'solution' would leave untouched most of the roots of poverty. Americans want to earn the American standard of living by their own efforts and contributions.' (Council of Economic Advisers, 1964b: 77)

Johnson's third major annual message again emphasised the War on Poverty. In his Budget Message to Congress, he said

'I propose to establish a means of bringing together these separate programs - Federal, State and Local - in an effort to achieve a unified and intensified approach to this complex problem, in which each element reinforces the other.' (Johnson, 1964c)

A one billion dollar programme is a major federal initiative and it is not remarkable that Johnson should have continually highlighted the importance of the programme. What is indicative of its political importance is how much speed went into the production of legislation so that Johnson could present the Bill to Congress in March. He also made clear, while emphasising that the aims of the Bill were consensual and non-partisan, that it was a Johnson bill, a Democratic bill, and an Administr-
The appointment of Sargent Shriver, already full-time Director of the Peace Corps, to direct the new programme was again a politically adroit move considering his identification, not only as a member of the Kennedy family, but with the Kennedy liberal-intellectual section of the Democratic Party. It could be argued that in addition to Shriver's proven administrative talent and ability to launch a major programme like the Peace Corps, the appointment of Shriver allowed Johnson more flexibility in emphasising both the continuity of his Administration from Kennedy's while retaining personal credit for an initiative which was his own Administration's distinct from any of Kennedy's initiatives. Of course, this is not an entirely accurate portrayal since, as Sundquist points out,

"The bill was thus a composite of new ideas like community action and long discussed ideas like Youth Conservation Corps." (Sundquist, 1969: 77)

It was however as a Johnson Administration bill that the Economic Opportunity Bill was introduced to Congress and while the administrative structures of Presidential government made the placing of the Office of Economic Opportunity in the Executive Office of the President (rather than in an existing agency like Health, Education and Welfare (HEW)) a most suitable place for an activist and coordinating agency, its recognition as such an agency reflected the prominence which the President was keen on giving to his antipoverty strategy. In a memorandum from a presidential aide (Lee White) in the White House to the Secretaries of major departments involved, different administrative structures were outlined. The alternative that was adopted had as its main benefit, according to the memorandum that it would dramatise the President's and the Administration's commitment (White, 1964).

The Administration nature of the bill is even clearer when considering the way the Act was put through Congress. Despite Sargent Shriver's publicising at the Congressional Hearings of his consultations with one hundred and thirty seven experts
during January 1964, the proposal put forward earlier in a memorandum from Heller in December 1963 (Heller, 1963f) was substantially unchanged as far as the Community Action proposal was concerned. The bill presented to Congress was put through the Committees in the House and in the Senate on the basis of it being a Democratic Administration's proposal which required little debate since it had the support of the Democratic Party in Congress and was not open to modification by interested Republicans. In the House Committee on Education and Labor, the final bill was drafted by the Democratic caucus under the leadership of Adam Clayton Powell (Democrat - New York), thus preventing the Republicans from working on the final bill and the bill was presented to the Republicans as a fait accompli. Having Representative Phil Landrum (Democrat - Georgia) sponsor the bill in the House, also strengthened the Democratic coalition in Congress. He was a conservative southern Democrat who might have taken part in any Democratic opposition to the bill. As Johnson remarks

'his sponsorship would render the bill considerably more palatable to Southerners.' (Johnson, 1971: 78)

Donovan expands this

'Landrum was to help line up a sufficient number of Southern votes to make this a Democratic program. If ambitious young Republicans wanted to oppose a war on poverty in a presidential election year so be it.' (Donovan, 1967: 34)

Johnson thus, in mobilising a Democratic majority in Congress behind a clearly partisan and presidential bill placed the Republicans in a difficult position. By supporting the bill they strengthened the President in an election year, by opposing the bill they faced the accusation that they supported the existence of poverty. Such a strategy left the Republicans in a position where their arguments against the bill had to rest upon the administrative and fiscal arrangements of the bill, leaving Johnson the credit for a concern with poverty. Sundquist reports

'Whatever history may judge to have been its legislative merits, the political merits of the War on Poverty in
1964 cannot be denied. It gave the new President whose legislative agenda consisted otherwise of left-over Kennedy proposals, a bold and attention-getting proposal on which he could put his personal stamp.' (Sundquist, 1969: 26)

Having shown that Johnson wanted the poverty programme implemented with speed as a Democratic measure identified with his own Presidency, the argument that the war on poverty was intended to have particular electoral benefits needs more support. Moynihan (1966) adds evidence for Piven and Cloward's position in arguing that the Task Force under Shriver which drew up the final Act which was sent to Congress wanted a programme that would

'pass Congress, help win the Presidential election and eliminate poverty, perhaps in that order.'

(Moynihan, 1966: 6)

How could, though, the war on poverty be seen as helping Johnson to win the Presidential election?

I have already indicated the more general liberal intellectual appeal of the War on Poverty and this, although not of primary importance is significant. The extent to which the poverty programme provided employment and research funds both at a national level and a local level, for a large number of professionals and academics will be explored later. Much of this constituency will have been found in the liberal establishment of the Democratic Party.

Piven and Cloward argue that the distribution of community action funds reflects electoral pressures within the national political system.

'Local agencies were established, frequently in storefront centers. Professional staffs were hired which offered residents help in finding jobs, or in dealing with public welfare, or in securing access to a host of other public services. A neighborhood leadership was cultivated called 'community workers' (close kin to the old ward workers) to receive program patronage. The neighborhood leadership, in turn, became the vehicle for involving larger numbers of people in the new programs, for spreading the federal spoils.... Through both neighborhood and city-wide structures, in other words, the national administration revived the traditional processes of urban politics: offering jobs and services to build
party loyalty.' (Piven and Cloward, 1971: 261)

In other words the institution of community action programs, while distributing federal monies to an identifiable part of the electorate, also constructed the party machine among a black population which had never previously been integrated into the electoral system. Friedland (1977), though, takes this analysis further and argues that the distribution of funds reflects both the political system and also class needs. Friedland argues that

'... local poverty funding levels are a response by locally situated, but nationally powerful corporations and labor unions to local political challenge. Local political challenge is likely to be a singularly ineffective determinant of poverty funding where a central city's power structure fails to provide sufficient interest or power to secure War on Poverty funds. In cities where corporations and labor unions are powerful, the extent of political challenge posed by the poor and non-white populations will be an important determinant of poverty funding levels. In cities where corporations and labor unions are not powerful, only national electoral factors will make a difference. Thus the inter-city distribution of War on Poverty funds reflects both political system needs and class needs.' (Friedland, 1977: 419-420)

There are methodological problems in this argument. Friedland does not succeed in disentangling theoretically the balance between local and national determinants of War on Poverty funding. His empirical hypothesis testing cannot produce a satisfactory theoretical distinction, leaving doubt as to the validity of his empirical conclusion. Local pressures may affect the distribution of funds, but so too could an intended distributional balance at national level according to criteria based on 'national' class needs and 'national' political system needs.

The case therefore cannot rest merely on an empirical examination of the electoral distribution of funds. Piven and Cloward and Friedland show how the rising numbers of blacks in the northern cities presented social and electoral pressures to both the national and local power structures. In 1965 about 33% of all blacks lived in America's twenty largest cities
compared with only 13% of whites and even by 1960, half of the blacks in each of the six cities with the largest black populations (New York, Chicago, Philadelphia, Detroit, Los Angeles and Washington D.C.) had been born elsewhere, mainly in the South (Piven and Cloward, 1971: 223).

Undoubtedly the level of poverty in the Northern cities was high, but the main centres of poverty in 1959 were in the Southern rural states (Congressional Quarterly, 1970), such states as Alabama, Arkansas, Georgia, Kentucky, Louisiana, Mississippi, North and South Carolina and Tennessee. Paradoxically this group of states while containing the only states that the liberal Stevenson carried against Eisenhower in 1956 except Missouri (he carried Missouri, Arkansas, Mississippi, Alabama, Georgia, North and South Carolina) were the focus of the greatest concern for the Democratic Party as a national party. Whether the Presidential candidate could be elected ignoring the southern Democrats and appealing to northern blacks with a strong civil rights plank was something that both Stevenson and Kennedy avoided testing. As the Democratic Party's monopoly of the South was eroded, the Party turned towards the Northern cities, relying on the black vote to win key marginal states which carried a large number of votes in the Electoral College. The states with the largest number of votes in the Electoral College were amongst the closest fought in the Nixon-Kennedy race in 1960. Although Kennedy won the election by 332 votes in the Electoral College to Nixon's 191\(^1\), Nixon had 49.9% of the vote in Illinois with 27 Electoral College votes, 49% in Michigan with 20 votes, 47.5% in New York with 45 votes, 48.7% in Pennsylvania with 32 votes (U.S. Department of Commerce, 1962). At the same time 90% of all northern blacks were concentrated in ten of the most populous northern states with the largest number of electors (Piven

---

1 Presidential elections are fought on the basis of states. The winner of the most popular votes in any state, wins all the Electoral College votes of that state. The Electoral College then (nominally) elects the President.
and Cloward, 1971: 251). With Kennedy's fairly convincing margin over Nixon in the southern states with their small number of electoral college votes - (the total of electoral college votes in the states that Stevenson carried in 1956 was 73) - the potential benefits of a programme focusing on urban poverty and civil rights can be seen for Johnson in a Presidential race. These calculations are however not entirely clear, since an active Presidency requires not only election of a President, but also a sufficient number of amenable Congressmen to support a programme, a situation which involves a less clear-cut set of calculations.

Analysis of the distribution of Community Action Program (CAP) funds by the Office of Economic Opportunity (OEO) carried out by the Advisory Commission on Intergovernmental Relations (ACIR) (1966) in their study of the poverty programme, shows that in the 200 selected counties studied the poor and especially rural counties lagged behind the urban and rich counties in implementation of programmes and in the receipt of OEO dollars per person (ACIR, 1966: 146).

How much this distribution can be attributed to local initiative resulting from the political forces examined by Friedland and how far to the OEO at a national level is impossible to disentangle. The allocation of funds may reflect a federal government preference, or the ability of local areas to 'play the game'. It is difficult to assess the importance of this 'grantsmanship' as opposed to federal preference. Greater initiative on the part of local areas may result in more funding than equivalent areas without the initiative. But it is clear that despite the 'nationwide' rhetoric of Johnson, the community action programme was largely conceived of as an urban strategy, and it was the urban areas and states which received the bulk of the funds.

In summary, the evidence that Johnson instituted the war when he did and in the manner that he did to help his Presidential election bid in 1964 rests upon three different sorts of evidence.
1) When and how the President gave the go ahead for the poverty programme.

2) The speed and manner in which the Administration put the bill through Congress.

3) An assessment of the electoral problems facing the Democratic Party at the time.

This is however not a sufficient explanation of the founding of the CAP. Other forms of rewards could have been distributed or indeed other electoral alliances formed by Johnson. It is necessary to extend this overview into a wider consideration of the political economy to see why the CAP was an integral part of this election strategy.

Indicated above is Piven and Cloward's argument that the CAP funds were used in cities to build what, in retrospect, is extremely close in form to a party machine. The accepted version reviewing the CAPs is that they created major political problems within the cities, but such a view ignores important aspects of community politics. Undeniably, the CAPs created problems in many areas for the local power structures by demanding in a vociferous and organised manner improvements in services and benefits for the residents of 'poverty neighbourhoods', but such a course also channels political protest into existing political structures, removing in many cases the more disruptive extra-system protest. The national power structure, in the American political system, is more strongly threatened by extra system protest at the local level than the inclusion of disruptive groups into the local bargaining structure.¹

There were other benefits which the CAPs gave which went beyond the immediate electoral benefits which might be gained. The inclusion of protest in an organised manner was structured to coincide with economic and budgetary pressure upon the federal government from other sources. The ideas behind the CAP were consistent with some of the developing themes of social scientists, leading to the creation not only of a programme to

¹ See Powledge (1970)
deal with poverty, but a programme, whose main focus was upon self-help, community development and the provision of services to the poor.

The major serious problem of the economy facing President Kennedy, throughout his time in office, was its stagnation. An important measure that Kennedy was unable to have Congress pass was a tax cut which, according to the advice of his CEA, would have stimulated demand and hence stimulated output. In the last year of the Eisenhower Administration (FY 1960) tax receipts exceeded budget outlays by three hundred million dollars. In Kennedy's budget message for fiscal year 1964, he said

"Our economy has been falling short of its productive potential for more than five years because total demand for goods and services by consumers and business firms has been insufficient to keep the economy operating at capacity. Yet, in the face of this persistent inadequacy of overall demand, the purchases of consumers and business firms have been restrained by tax and other collections - Federal, State and Local - which now total over one hundred and fifty billion dollars a year."

(John Kennedy, 1963)

The 1964 Budget was designed to include a tax cut to speed up the economy and encourage growth. These calculations were part of the calculations made in introducing the poverty and civil rights legislation. In a memorandum to the President (JFK) from Walter Heller, Heller (1963a) argued that the updated poverty data originally collected by Robert Lampman in 1957

"offer one more demonstration of the costs of economic slack. And they, therefore, also provide another dimension of what's at stake in the proposed tax cut."

(Heller, 1963a)

In another memorandum the next month to the President, Heller argues that structural unemployment is not a problem in the United States but that high unemployment rates are created by lack of demand.

"This then is simply to say that it would be tragic if renewed talk of structural unemployment were to divert us from our main choice - demand-stimulus - at the very time that the combined output and employment figures are proving how correct you have been in your insistence on expanding demand through tax cuts coupled with rising budget outlays."

(Heller, 1963b)
A last example of the perceived connection between the stagnation in the economy, the demands of minority groups and the problem of poverty is provided by Heller in another memorandum on the implementation of the Civil Rights Act. This time to President Johnson, he writes

'Removing discrimination will raise potential GNP in the US significantly - the study we made in 1962 shows that

A GNP rise of 2-2/3% (about fifteen billion dollars today) could be expected from the removal of discrimination in employment.

If non-whites were able to attain equal education with whites the GNP rise would be 3.2% or about twenty billion dollars.' (Heller, 1964a)

These excerpts show how, in this case, policies, which while being portrayed as serving compassionate goals, may clearly be explained as producing direct economic benefits and serving certain economic interests directly. There is an ambiguity in the CEA's position on the relationship between unemployment and stagnation. This arises from their view of the two as interconnected, both acting causally one upon the other. In the past, the pressure from the unemployed had to be much greater than it was to solicit government action. The plight of business in a stagnant economy is more usually a source of government action and concern.

The CAP of the War on Poverty were consistent with the views held by the CEA of the needs of the economy. Although other programmes could, undoubtably, have been introduced and developed, the CAP contained within it the demand stimulus that the CEA and the President felt that the economy needed. The total expenditure on the War on Poverty in its first year being planned at one billion dollars represented a considerable commitment in public expenditure. The 1964 Budget estimated federal expenditure for FY1964 at 300 million dollars for housing and community development, 5,000 million dollars for health, labor and welfare and 1,500 million dollars for education (U.S. Budget, 1964). One billion dollars represented 15% of the existing expenditure on these major social welfare
sectors of the budget. This increase in budget outlays supported
the first prong of Heller's proposed tax-cut/increased outlays
strategy, while providing both the electoral benefits for Johnson
and also, through the nature of the expenditure, providing a
programme which both had social control functions (channelling
political protest) and also a more effective economic role
than other types of expenditure might provide. The emphasis
upon self-help and community development implied the expendi-
ture of a large part of the money in areas where, owing to
poverty, effective demand was at its lowest. Increasing
effective demand should, in the economic reasoning followed
by Heller, stimulate domestic production at a greater rate
than the more expensive attempts to increase demand among
higher income groups. The benefits of a service oriented
approach as opposed to a direct cash transfer can also be
seen to be consistent with this overall economic logic.
One of Johnson's emphases in his attempts to publicise the
programme and gain wider support for it, was on how the intention
of the programme was to turn the 'taxeater' into the 'taxpayer'.
This is a position that would not necessarily have occurred
with straight cash transfers. In remarks to members of the
U.S. Chamber of Commerce, Johnson said

'Unless you attack the causes of poverty itself, you
are going to be shovelling it out to the taxeaters
instead of producing and training taxpayers.'
(Johnson, 1964f)

Perhaps even more clearly in a Special Message to Congress
on Area and Regional Economic Development, he had this to say

'A growing nation cannot afford to waste those resources,
human and natural, which are now too often neglected
and unused in distressed areas. We cannot afford the
loss of buying power and of national growth which flow
from widespread poverty.' (Johnson, 1965c)

As a final example, in his Special Message to Congress Proposing
a Nationwide War on the Sources of Poverty, he put forward the
CEA's calculations

'Our fight against poverty will be an investment in the
most valuable of our resources - the skills and strengths
of our people.
And in the future, as in the past, this investment will return its cost many fold to our entire economy.

If we can raise the annual earnings of ten million among the poor by a thousand dollars we will have added fourteen billion dollars a year to our national output. In addition we can make important reductions in public assistance payments, which now cost us four billion dollars a year and in the large costs of fighting crime and delinquency, disease and hunger.' (Johnson, 1964e)

This concentration on demand stimulus explains the opposition of the Department of Labor Secretary Wirz to the form that the War on Poverty took. In a memorandum to Sorensen, he argued for a greater employment emphasis in the programme and the advantage of private employment stimulation rather than public action (Wirz, 1964). Such an approach was not followed and would not have presented the advantages of the service focused approach the 'war' took.

A last thread in this construction of the more general conditions influencing the specific form the poverty programme took lies in developing social science themes at the time. This is something that will be explored in depth later, but it is sufficient to say here that the CAPs followed in the footsteps of the established projects like those of the President's Committee on Juvenile Delinquency and Youth Crime and the Ford Foundation and could be justified in terms of some of the ideas about the existence and cause of poverty which were in currency both within and outside government at the time.

This overview of the reasons for the founding of the War on Poverty should at least indicate the trap into which analysts of the founding of the war have fallen. Because of the non-existence of an observable political interest in Washington for a poverty programme at the time, they assume that the measures arose within the government on the basis of compassion or the assessment of past policies by professionals who set up the program. In this view, Johnson is seen as having created support for the programme to provide the necessary

---

1 See Piven and Cloward, 1971: 248n
lobby. This argument is however almost the opposite from mine. The war's origins lay in structural aspects of the American economy and polity and Johnson justified the war in terms of compassion to protect himself, not the war.

**Programme direction and structure in the Poverty Programme**

The formal administrative structure for the Poverty Programme represented a departure from established practise. Partly this can be attributed to the fact that much of the poverty legislation was composed of other programmes which had been mooted during Kennedy's Administration by federal departments and agencies. Rather than locating the programme within existing government departments like HEW, with a coordinating committee chaired by the Secretary of the Department and consisting of relevant departments and agencies, the emphasis on coordination was heightened by establishing the Office of Economic Opportunity within the Executive Office of the President. OEO retained operating responsibility for a number of the programmes under the Economic Opportunity Act while other programmes were delegated to other departments or agencies of the federal government, i.e. Neighborhood Youth Corps in the Department of Labor and adult basic education and work experience in the Department of HEW. OEO was also given a 'vague mandate' for coordinating other programmes not part of the EOA which were designed to deal with poverty (Levitan, 1969: 50).

As Levitan points out

'It is apparent from the legislative history of the EOA that no overall rational plan dictated either the selection of programs to be included in the Act or their distribution between the new OEO and federal agencies already in the poverty business. The distribution was essentially pragmatic, involving two sets of factors; existing agencies' expectations that they would get their share of the new program and the preference of Shriver and his associates, backed by the President.' (Levitan, 1969: 50)

OEO when fully developed, became a large government agency, reflecting the level of finance for the programme and the diversity of approaches which were under its direction.

In 1968 OEO had eleven functional offices ranging from the
Office of Health Affairs to the Office of Congressional Relations. OEO also established seven regional offices to deal with matters more directly at the local level. These regional offices, by mid-1968 accounted for 49% of the 3,100 persons on the OEO's permanent payroll (Levitan, 1969: 59).

The main section of the OEO to which this study refers was under Title II of the Act - Urban and Rural Community Action Programs. The local agencies of the OEO, the Community Action Agencies (CAAs) were responsible for conducting, administering or coordinating the CAP grants made to them.

In the words of the Act

'Such component programs shall be focused upon the needs of low income individuals and families and shall provide expanded and improved services, assistance, and other activities, and facilities necessary in connection therewith. Such programs shall be conducted in those fields which fall within the purposes of this part including employment, job training and counselling, health, vocational rehabilitation, housing, home management, welfare and special remedial and other noncurricular educational assistance for the benefit of low income families and individuals.' (U.S. Congress, 1964: Sec 205(a))

The Community Action Agencies which conducted the CAPs were the focus of the now much publicised 'maximum feasible participation' clause of the Economic Opportunity Act. Under Sec 202(a) the CAP was defined as a program

1) which mobilizes and utilizes resources, public or private, of any urban or rural, or combined urban and rural, geographical area (referred to in this part as a 'community') including but not limited to a State, metropolitan area, county, city, town, multicounty unit, or multicounty unit in an attack on poverty;
2) which provides services, assistance, and other activities of sufficient scope and size to give promise of progress towards the elimination of poverty or a cause or causes of poverty through developing employment opportunities, improving human performance, motivation, and productivity, or bettering the conditions under which people live, learn and work;
3) which is developed, conducted and administered with the maximum feasible participation of residents of the areas and members of the groups served; and
4) which is conducted, administered or coordinated by a public or private nonprofit agency (other than a political party), or combination thereof.' (U.S. Congress, 1964)
Two important observations should be made regarding the organisational structure of the CAP. Firstly, the Director of CEO was responsible for identifying the CAAAs and authorising monies to be made available to them (although the Act allocated funds on a state basis in a very general manner according to three criteria). The CEO by-passed for the purpose, not only local government but also State government. Not until the Green Amendment to the Act in 1967 did CEO have to contend with any statutory interference between the locality and Washington. Other writers have commented on the passage of this Amendment but as I will argue later, the Amendment was more consistent with later views of the Great Society programmes than their earlier intentions. The second important observation relates to the scope of the definition both of the CAA and the purpose of the CAP. These two aspects of the definition placed considerable power in the hands of the CEO to determine what kind of programme the CAP was to be. In practice, the breadth of definition and the discretion of CEO were used to allow a wide variety of different projects to operate relating in different degrees to local government organisations.

CAP funding came under five sections of the Act
1) Section 204, Financial Assistance for the development of CAPs.
2) Section 205, Financial Assistance for the conduct and administration of CAPs.
3) Section 206, Technical Assistance Grants.
4) Section 207, Research, Training and Demonstration Grants.
5) Section 209, Technical Assistance Grants to States to facilitate effective participation of the States.

From the inception of the programme, through to June 30th 1965, under Section 204, 11½ million dollars had been allocated to 315 projects, under Section 205, 104 million dollars to 313 projects, under Section 206, 723 thousand dollars to eight projects, under Section 207, 16½ million dollars to 84 projects and under Section 209, 4½ million to 51 projects. The bulk of the money was financing the conduct and administration of
CAPs, averaging 332 thousand dollars per project.

**Distribution of CAP Funds under Secs. 204-207 up to June 1965**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>State</th>
<th>Dollars per thousand poor (1959)</th>
<th>Number of projects</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>D.C.</td>
<td>28,693</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hawaii</td>
<td>10,135</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>New York</td>
<td>9,481</td>
<td>48</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Connecticut</td>
<td>9,653</td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>New Jersey</td>
<td>8,927</td>
<td>27</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Arizona</td>
<td>8,710</td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Massachusetts</td>
<td>7,224</td>
<td>24</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>California</td>
<td>6,414</td>
<td>52</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Illinois</td>
<td>6,350</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Maryland</td>
<td>5,013</td>
<td>16</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(Source: Congressional Quarterly (1970) for poverty population and Office of Economic Opportunity (1966))

It can be seen that the northern states come out disproportionately well in this distribution with the top ten states including New York, Connecticut, New Jersey, Illinois and Massachusetts. At the same time, the amount of money spent per poor person was extremely small. Washinton D.C. with the highest per poor person expenditure still only was receiving twenty eight dollars and sixty nine cents per poor person in the first year of CEO's operation. The money was further dissipated by the number of projects in each state.

One of the aspects of the direct link between the CEO at Washington level and the CAA on the ground was the fiscal arrangement. Assistance under Sections 204 and 205 were not to exceed 90% of the costs incurred. As the CAP developed and both the States and Local governments began to gain more control over the programme, the 90% grant from the Federal government became another of the categorical grants which the Federal government gave to Local government to increase its financial ability to maintain services or programmes which the Federal government mandated.
The language of the Act allowed a wide variety of functions to be undertaken under the Act and to be subsumed into 'community action' as a general term. Community action, within the Act, had the value of being all things to all people. While parallels can be drawn to the President's Committee on Juvenile Delinquency and Youth Crime projects and to the Ford Foundation projects, community action meant anything from the coordination of services to community power. One interpretation of community action which seems to be clear from the Act was that it was intended not as an exercise in independently politically strengthening deprived groups in the sense that the term has been used more recently. If there was any political component it was to incorporate the poor.

In the CAP Guide, published by the OEO, the variety of courses of attack on poverty were sketched.

'Remedial reading, literacy courses, employment counseling, homemaker services, job development and training, consumer, educational, vocational, rehabilitation, and health services are some of the many activities that can be supported and coordinated within a community action program to attack poverty.' (OEO, 1965: 7)

The approach was clearly service oriented and as the Guide pointed out later, aimed at coordination within a comprehensive welfare service system.

'Where several agencies are working in the same functional area, they relate to each other in a 'service system'. The mobilization of resources for a community action program should bring these various service systems together in a concentrated attack on poverty.' (OEO, 1965: 15)

The effort that the Guide refers to should include the educational, employment, family welfare, health services, housing, economic development, consumer information and credit and legal systems.

'Each of these service systems deals with only part of the complex and interrelated causes of poverty. The separate service systems need to be linked in a total network in order to mount an effective attack on poverty.' (OEO, 1965: 16)

1 Blumenthal (1967) explores this in detail
Community action in the sense used here related to and reflected the federal system of government. The emphasis was upon the local provision of services rather than federal provision, and the incorporation of the poor into the benefits of the programme.

Apart from the many interpretations of the meaning of 'community action' within the CAP, the use of the term 'community' itself requires some comment. In the British experience, 'community' when used in community development tends to reflect some local area with distinctive social or physical characteristics as a discrete neighbourhood. In the CAPs, the term 'community' as defined in Section 202(1) above is a much larger area without any particular implied social definition. The definition concentrated on administrative units. The CAP Guide expanded upon the definition given in the Act and made clear this identity of the meaning of 'community' with a political or administrative unit.

'Generally a community should be coterminous with a major political jurisdiction such as a city or county, or with a group of political jurisdictions exercising responsibility for related public programs. In metropolitan areas, wherever feasible, the community should include all of the urbanized or urbanizing portions of the area......

...... Communities containing very small populations are encouraged to combine their efforts with adjacent jurisdictions to ensure the creation of an adequate resource base........

The delineation of a community to be served should be related to the character and incidence of poverty it contains and to the type of programs or activities to be undertaken. For example, an entire State or even a number of States may constitute a community as a basis for action...' (CBO, 1965: 13)

To define a 'community' in such a broad way, apart from rendering the term fairly meaningless has clear implications for the concept of participation. The Guide advocated four sorts of participation; (a) representation in policy making and advising, (b) using existing neighbourhood organisations to advise and where appropriate administer neighbourhood based programmes, (c) provision of opportunities for residents to protest or propose additions to the CAP and (d) the
employment of residents of areas. Participation in this sense adds little to the normal 'participation' of citizens in electoral democracy. It implies little extra grass roots participation in the political and decision making system. In many CAPs, elections were used to engage citizens in the CAAs, but with the wide definition of community the representation on a CAA couldn't have the same effect as local small area based participation involving public meetings and recognising a more homogeneous interest on the part of the residents of poor neighbourhoods. Community, in the sense implied by the Act and the Guide, would seem to be a local government unit parallel to an existing statutory authority. The inevitable conflict that resulted with the established local authority, in most cases mayors, can be seen as having been contained within this conception of community. While 'the poor' were intended to become a political force within the local areas through the CAAs, the established power of the mayors and their power within the Democratic Party at national level made the OEO back off the emphasis on participation at an early stage.¹

A report in the Congressional Quarterly comments on this:

'The press reported in early November that the Bureau of the Budget had recommended that the poor be used primarily to carry out poverty programs, not to help design them as was the procedure. This was generally regarded as reflecting White House support for the Mayors' position. Shriver denied that any change in orientation

¹ Haar comments 'The storm caused by their (OEO's) emphasis on maximum feasible participation and control, as well as the direct funding of the cities' poor (rather than city agencies), caused increasing attacks by the mayors, who now initiated a counterrevolution against what had turned out, as they saw it, to be guerilla warfare in their own territory under the sponsorship of the federal government. Confrontation politics (whether reality or image) were opposed by the larger white community, whose power was being challenged and who viewed disruptions as signs of further deterioration of the community as a whole; by mayors, whose agencies were being rivaled and who were not receiving the power to allocate anti-poverty funds, necessary for patronage.' (Haar, 1975: 25-26)
was being made, however, indications are that he has yielded somewhat to political pressure.'
(Congressional Quarterly, 1966a: 256)

OEO was caught in a bind between the weak and general participation clause of the Act, the mayors' hostility to participation, and the intentions of the Administration to build up the power of the poor regarding existing institutions.

This dilemma was exploited by opponents of OEO throughout the programme. Thus in the 1966 Amendments to the Economic Opportunity Act

'The bill redefined 'community' so that an area smaller than an existing political subdivision could form its own community action agency. It also added the provision that any person serving on a community action board must actually live in the geographical area he represented...

The majority, in commenting on the new definition of 'community' written into the community action section of the Act, listed Watts in Los Angeles, Bedford-Stuyvesant in New York and the Hough area of Cleveland as examples of areas that would fall within the new definition.'
(Congressional Quarterly, 1966c: 1226)

In part, this was a more realistic definition of community and more in line with the social science arguments in favour of community action, but given that the Act's original definition created problems (which were not to go away through redefinition) for the Democratic Party through the mayors, it was the political pressure to remove parallel authority which provided the changes and not an awareness that, conceptually, the definition of community was weak and meaningless.

Political conflict centering around local control by established political institutions (eg State and Local governments) and the demands for participation were, over the years, modified by amendments to the Economic Opportunity Act such as the 'Green Amendment'.

1 The Green Amendment moved by Representative Edith Green (Dem. - Oregon) redefined the CAAAs. This amendment... required that CAAAs be designated by state and local governments. The CAA itself might be an agency of the state or local governments, or a nonprofit (public or private) agency designated by them. In the event that a state or local government failed to create or designate a CAA, or
Political conflict was 'managed' into the political system through formalising procedures and definitions, whose vagueness can be attributed not to a lack of clarity in the concepts employed, but because the definition itself was a political decision which reflected established institutional arrangements.

The Model Cities Program

'It has long been apparent that the health of our nation can be no better than the health of our cities.

Surely not a single American can doubt this any longer after the tragic events of this summer.

I called together (shortly after January 1964 - A.E.) some of the most brilliant minds, the most talented planners and the most experienced urban experts in the nation. After exhaustive study they recommended to me a number of proposals that hold vast promise for the future of every city in this nation. Chief among these proposals was the Model Cities Program - the most coordinated, massive and far-reaching attack on urban blight ever proposed to Congress. This was not just a federal program. It was designated to stimulate local initiative in the private sector, and at the state, county and local level.' (Johnson, 1967)

Within a relatively short time Johnson's commitment to the War on Poverty had wavered owing to a combination of different pressures.

1) The increased spending in Vietnam reduced the proportion of the budget which could be used to back the President's rhetoric of a total war against poverty. During the hearings on the 1966 Amendments to the Act, the Chairman of the Committee, Representative Adam Clayton Powell announced

'that the amount had been scaled back to the Administration's original request because of spending on Vietnam.'

(Congressional Quarterly, 1966b: 1063)

2) Democratic mayors in the large cities were financially and politically pressed. This was, in part, a result of the

failed to submit or support a satisfactory CAA, the CEO director was authorized to select a nonprofit organisation as the CAA. Whatever the character of the CAA, it was required to have a governing board not exceeding 51 members and divided equally among three groups; public officials, democratically selected representatives of the poverty areas, and representatives of business, labor, civic and charitable groups.' (Levitan, 1969: 66)
activity generated by the use of CAP funds that were outwith their control.

3) The antecedents of the War on Poverty's CAP came from the President's Committee on Juvenile Delinquency and Youth Crime and the Ford Foundation's projects and their concern with crime was a more long range concern with social disorganisation and poverty, that was translated into a focus on lack of opportunity (vulgarising the opportunity and delinquency thesis of Cloward and Ohlin (1960)). The Model Cities Program was developed at a time when both national and local power structures were being disrupted and threatened by the increased militancy of blacks and the ghetto riots. Many authors have discussed the influence of the riots in the major cities in the United States upon the development of the programme and the subsequent distribution of funds (Higgins, 1978:35-36 and Haar, 1975: 5-6). The riots themselves represented both a stick with which to beat the community action programme (where it was outwith local power's control) by blaming the unrest on the unfulfilled expectations generated by the CAP, and also an incentive to the federal government to deal with the problem in a more constructive and perhaps less costly manner than the use of Federal troops and the National Guard.

Another frequently argued impetus for the programme was the failure of the urban renewal programme to be more than merely a clearance programme in the interests of local business (Haar, 1975: 16-21). The tension that was created and exemplified between, on the one hand, the participation of community action and on the other hand, the lack of federal direction over the urban renewal programme was a recurring tension.

That the Federal government was placed, along with the cities, in a politically dangerous position made the need for federal government direction over the spending of grants much more important, while the Local governments also had their own political problems which may be articulated in different ways from those of the federal government, making their imput into decision-making equally important as far as they were concerned to avoid
an antagonism between the local and federal interest.

The accepted account of the events leading up to the establishment of the Model Cities Program concentrates upon the forming of the Task Force that proposed the Model Cities Program in its report: Proposed Programs for the Department of Housing and Urban Development (Task Force Report, 1965). Legislation had been passed in 1965 establishing a Department of Housing and Urban Development. Kennedy had unsuccessfully attempted to establish such a department. Johnson, with a Congress more amenable to Presidential initiatives, succeeded where Kennedy failed. Haar, a member of the Task Force and a subsequent Assistant Secretary in the Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD) reports that the initiative for the setting up of the Task Force came from a memorandum from Walter Reuther (1965), President of the United Auto Workers, to President Johnson on 15th May 1965 proposing a demonstration programme in six selected US cities to show what a coordinated attack upon their urban problems could achieve. The Task Force, whose deliberations were confidential, proposed a new approach to the cities, which was built on three 'principles'.

1) Concentration of resources in sufficient amounts to demonstrate what could be done.

2) Coordination of available talent and aid.

3) Mobilisation of the local leadership and initiative.

The programme, they proposed would select six cities with populations over 500,000, ten cities with populations between 250,000 and 500,000 and fifty cities with populations below 250,000.

The approach, besides having a focus upon housing and the bringing of existing housing up to standard, also included an attempt at

'...a change in the total environment of the area affected, with ample provision of public facilities: schools, hospitals, parks, playgrounds and community centers, concurrent attention to human needs, utilizing concepts and methods tested in the Community Action Program and providing for the participation by the people affected in demonstration areas'
- provision to ensure the economic stability and vitality of the community by including commercial and industrial elements that provide jobs and services for central city residents.' (Task Force Report, 1965: 296-297)

The Task Force proposed an initial expenditure of 13.2 million dollars in the first year to allow the planning of programmes and in the next three years project costs ranging between 754 and 893 dollars.

The political attractions for Johnson in such a programme lay in the support these financial allocations represented to the mayors of the big cities. Dissatisfaction stemming from the conflict generated in the War on Poverty and the lack of direction by mayors over the CAP provided an impetus to Johnson to provide benefits directly to the cities.

The Model Cities Program was the other end of a seesaw upon which Johnson stood. If the CAP were intended to give the black poor in the cities some influence and rewards within the political system, then the Model Cities Program compensated the cities for the disruptions to the political institutions caused by the CAP. Financial aid from the Federal government allowed the cities to respond to demands made upon them as a result of other federal programmes' activities.

The big city mayors' support for the Model Cities Program was crucial in gaining a constituency within the Congress for a measure which 'had a reception ranging from cool to hostile' (Frieden and Kaplan, 1977: 54). Mayors testifying before the House Committee on Banking and Currency supported the bill but criticised the low level of funding. The Mayor of Newark wanted the proposed 2.3 billion dollars budget over a five year period increased to ten billion dollars and the Mayor of New York, John Lindsay, argued that New York alone needed two billion dollars (Frieden and Kaplan, 1977: 56-57).

Farkas (1971) points out that the US Conference of Mayors were initially opposed to the programme because of the inadequate funding, the emphasis on new communities and because they wanted a ghetto bill for big cities. Although the funding remained inadequate support for the bill was forthcoming from
the mayors because of the funds it provided for the ghettos.

In his Special Message to Congress on the Demonstration Cities Program, Johnson defined two of the problems of the cities as

'... increasing pressures on municipal budgets, with large city per capita expenditures rising 36% in the three years after 1960.
- the high human costs: crime, delinquency, welfare loads, disease and health hazards....' (Johnson, 1966a)

Haar points to the problem of rising city expenditures combined with a lack of coordination and confusion in federal aid to cities. Federal aid had increased from 1.6 billion dollars in 1946 to 25 billion dollars in 1966 and the ACIR pointed out that there were 95 areas of State and Local activity for which 379 separate federal grants in aid were available, 219 of which had been added in the years 1961 to 1966 and 109 in the year prior to the Model Cities Program (Haar, 1975: 27 and ACIR, 1967: 140-142). The re-sorting and coordination of some of these federal programmes was of major concern at a time, when, there was, combined with growing disenchantment with the War on Poverty in Washington and the local power structures, growing pressures on the federal budget from the expenditure on Vietnam. The influence on the Administration and the Federal government of the Defense Department and the demands of the War on Vietnam is shown by Haar

'Toward the end of the deliberations, two of us were sent to see Secretary (of Defense - A.E.) Robert McNamara, whose prestige was at an all-time high: the President was relying on him for advice in domestic matters as well as those of defense. We met with him for half an hour at the Pentagon......' (Haar, 1975: 43)

I shall comment later upon the role of current defense and space programme thinking in the development of the domestic policies beginning with the Model Cities Program. It is sufficient to point out that many of the processes through which government policies became managed and grants distributed relied a lot on concepts developed in the Defense Department and in the National Aeronautics and Space Administration.

The rationale for the Model Cities Program was that through
increased coordination between and within federal agencies and the Federal and Local governments, matched with a concentration of funds upon certain areas, the model cities could indicate what could be achieved in urban areas through a comprehensive approach in contrast to the selected physical approach of urban renewal.

The approach designed by the Task Force involved an initial competition between cities for funds on the basis of their own programmes (in the rhetoric - based on local knowledge) and the provision to the Demonstration Agencies of an initial planning grant to plan programmes to be implemented with supplemental funds in the following years. These supplemental funds were to be used in conjunction with the series of categorical grants the locality was already receiving from the Federal government.

While Johnson, with the assistance of Congress could preempt the demands for more funding for the Model Cities, because of the pressures of Defense Department expenditure, he was not able to prevent Congress from expanding the programme to cover more cities, thus spreading the funds even more thinly than the Task Force proposed. To attract lukewarm Congressmen and Congresswomen, the Administration had to be able to indicate that benefits might accrue to their districts. A report in the Congressional Quarterly (1967b) on the Model City Grants indicated that there would seem to have been some substance to the claim by Republicans that support for the bill from some Democrats was being bought by funds for their district. Only nine of the planning grants (14% of eleven million dollars) out of a total of sixty three were allocated to Republican districts. Funds also went to two areas represented by House Democrats who played a major role in salvaging the Administration's Antipoverty Program, including the Chairman of the House Education and Labor Committee (Carl Perkins) where Pikeville, Kentucky with a population of 5,000 received a planning grant.

It is worth noting as well, the influence on the passage of the bill of the rioting in Watts in 1965 and riots in Chicago
and Cleveland in 1966. While some Congressmen and Congresswomen protested that the programme was rewarding rioters, others saw the necessity of dealing with some of the perceived underlying causes of the riots. Senator Fulbright remarked that the bill

'comes before us in a summer filled with strife and violence born of despair and frustrations of those who seek a better life. I do not condone or excuse acts of violence but I recognise the need to change the conditions out of which violence is spawned.' (Quoted in Haar, 1975: 82)

Senator Javits remarked

'If we let this slide, we are inviting what we will get - to wit, disorder in the cities, disorders and riots. If we do not pass it, we leave them no alternative but to loot and burn as a product of their despair.' (Quoted in Haar, 1975: 82)

The organisational structure of the Model Cities Program exemplified the increase in the importance of process over substance in federal programmes at the time. The Federal government began to be increasingly aware of the straightforward organisational and management issues involved in its programmes. Such an increase in awareness is connected to the use of management techniques and budgeting procedures in government.

The Model Cities Administration was organised within the Department of Housing and Urban Development. The main federal vehicles for the coordination of the range of programmes to be coordinated by the Model Cities Program were the Regional Interagency Coordinating Committees and the Washington Interagency Coordinating Committee, bringing together various concerned government departments at regional and national level. The Washington Committee was concerned with policy and coordination whereas the Regional Committees received city submissions and maintained liaison with local officials.

The programme was separated into two parts. Firstly, there was the planning phase which lasted one year. This phase began with HUD's approval of the city's application for a planning grant. From the first planning phase, a Comprehensive
Demonstration Plan was drawn up, which after acceptance and approval by HUD, would result in the city receiving a supplemental entitlement based on a percentage of existing federal funding directed to the Model Neighbourhood Area. The supplemental funds were not earmarked for specific projects, nor did they require matching funds from the city. The supplemental grant was set at a maximum of 80% of the aggregate amount of non-federal contributions required for all projects or activities assisted by Federal grant-in-aid programs which were carried out in connection with an approved Model City Program. (HUD, 1967: 27)

Thus if the city was spending ten thousand dollars as their contribution to the CAP (90% contribution from the Federal government - ninety thousand dollars), the Model City Supplemental Grant would be a maximum of eight thousand dollars. The supplemental funds were to be used, amongst other things, to provide support for new projects and serve as matching funds for categorical programmes (programmes receiving categorical grant-in-aid).

The City Demonstration Agencies which were designed to carry out the programme at the local level were defined as the city government or a local public agency. Section 112(2) of the Act read

''City demonstration agency' means the city, the county or local public agency established or designated by the local governing body of such city or county to administer the comprehensive demonstration programs.' (U.S. Congress, 1966)

The city was responsible for drawing together the various interests in the Model Neighbourhood and focusing their efforts on a 'problem analysis' prior to the application for a planning grant. This focusing of efforts was to

'begin to identify their basic underlying causes (the problems), examine the interrelationships among the problems, and consider the critical changes which might be effected in order to overcome the problems.' (HUD, 1967: 29)

Subsequently the cities were to develop a plan for
'the organisation and management of the work program during the planning period.' (HUD, 1967: 29)

This 'planning' which was to precede the application for a Planning Grant was the sort of emphasis upon process which the Model Cities Program concentrated on. The Guide went on to describe activities during the initial planning period.

'The administrative unit of the CDA will develop its organisational capability so as to plan and carry out a well coordinated comprehensive plan and to engage in continuing planning and evaluation during the implementation period.' (HUD, 1967:30)

This process seems to be a mishmash of planning, perhaps a search for an 'on-going planning situation': a) Planning plans b) Planning c) Plan the plans.

A serious point should be made about the emphasis of the Model Cities Program upon organisational features. Categorical grants-in-aid from the federal government contained constraints for local government in the manner in which they could be spent on the basis of the intended content of the programme. The federal review process for the Model City Program became increasingly concerned, however, not with judging plans against relevant service or content criteria, but against criteria that related to process. 'Organizational capability', 'problem analysis', 'goals', 'strategies' etc. were abstracted concepts, meaningless unless related to the substance of the federal government's aims concerning 'poverty neighborhoods'. The concern became focused upon the manner in which local government approached the problem, not the content of such an approach.

After completing the planning period the cities submitted an application to HUD for supplemental grants. The Guide indicates that the application is to include

'a Five Year Plan, a First Year Action Program, a Planning and Evaluation Program, and a statement of Administrative structure.' (HUD, 1967: 31)

The Guide went on to list the five steps to be taken to prepare the application. Again these 'steps' focus totally upon the process and not on the substance.

Organisationally, therefore, the Model Cities Program
differed from the War on Poverty in that it was funded under an existing Department (albeit, a new one) and the organisational processes were much more tightly defined.

This organisational concentration of the programme reflected the major concern of the federal government to increase the monies going to the cities, while ensuring that through coordination with other federal programmes pressure on federal government to do more for the cities would be relieved.

The Demonstration Cities and Metropolitan Development Act authorised appropriations for planning and technical assistance of twelve million dollars in each of the first two years, for supplemental funds and other spending of nine hundred million dollars over two years, rather than the Administration’s request for 2.3 billion over six years. As Lee and Dyckman (1970) point out the costs of three weeks of the Vietnam War covered the entire Model Cities Program budget for 1967-68. The Administration was faced each year with the problem of having the authorisations appropriated by Congress, especially with the increase in Vietnam spending and as the stimulus of spending on the War began to turn the problems in the economy of stagnation and unemployment, which Kennedy and Johnson had inherited from Eisenhower, into problems of inflation and lack of manpower, this became more difficult.

The struggle between the Administration and Congress to have passed the first appropriations went on until November 1966. In 1967, the appropriations were not passed until October and Congress had reduced the appropriation from 662 million dollars to 312 million dollars.

The nature and purposes of the programme are laid out in the Program Guide to Model Neighborhoods in Demonstration Cities (HUD, 1967).¹

¹) The programme was to be comprehensive.

¹ During the passage of the legislation owing to the unfortunate connotations of 'Demonstration' the word 'Model' was substituted.
The purposes are (1) to rebuild or revitalize large slum and blighted areas; (2) to expand housing; (3) to expand job and income opportunities; (4) to reduce dependency on welfare payments; (5) to improve educational facilities and programs; (6) to combat disease and ill health; (7) to enhance recreational and cultural opportunities; (8) to reduce the incidence of crime and delinquency; (9) to establish better access between homes and jobs; and (10) in general, to improve living conditions for the people who live in these areas.’ (HUD, 1967: 3)

2) The programme was to concentrate efforts. It required the concentration of Federal, State, and local public and private resources.

3) The programme was to coordinate Federal, State and local public and private efforts.

4) The programme was to demonstrate new and imaginative proposals.

’Cities should look upon this program as an opportunity to experiment, to become laboratories for testing and refining new and better methods for improving the quality of urban living.’ (HUD, 1967: 4)

5) The programme was to make substantial impact. The Guide set out ‘Program Achievement Standards’.

1) Education: The local program should be designed to make marked progress in reducing educational disadvantage and to provide educational services necessary to serve the poor and disadvantaged in the area.

2) Health: The local program should be designed to make marked progress in reducing ill health and to provide health services necessary to serve the poor and disadvantaged in the area.

3) Housing: The local program should be designed to contribute to a well-balanced city with a substantial increase in the supply of low- and moderate-cost housing and with maximum opportunities in the choice of housing and accomodation for all citizens of all income levels.

4) Income Maintenance and Social Services: The local program should be designed to make marked progress in reducing social disadvantage and to provide social services necessary to serve the poor and disadvantaged in the area.

5) Employment and Economic Development: The local program should be designed to make marked progress in reducing unemployment and underemployment and in providing maximum opportunities for employing residents in all phases of the program and enlarging opportunities for work and training.

6) Crime and Delinquency: The program should be designed to make marked progress in reducing the incidence of crime and delinquency.
The Model Cities Program, like the CAP of the War on Poverty, was concerned with the widest range of social services, reflecting the comprehensiveness of its aims.

'...the model cities budget had the effect of limiting local programs to what has been termed 'the service strategy' which was typical of most of the Great Society programs aimed at the poor.' (Frieden and Kaplan, 1977: 224)

The service strategy, as indicated above, distributed rewards to particular groups. Whereas the CAP had been an attempt to by-pass the local governments and provide directly federal benefits to the black poor, the Model Cities Program attempted this strategy in conjunction with city hall.

'The basic consequences of Model Cities in all cities was to expand the scope of non-white public employment without disrupting patterns of patronage, public employee unions or civil service restrictions on job allocation. Like the War on Poverty, Model Cities provided thousands of jobs for blacks, creating one of the first black dominated bureaucracies, and avenues of mobility for non-white public employees in other city agencies.'

(Friedland, 1979: 511)

Such a service strategy, while providing these political benefits for the Democratic Party contained contradictions within city government which, when the Democratic Party was no longer in power, nationally, led to a change of emphasis.

7) Transportation: The program should be designed to contribute to a well-balanced city with adequate public transportation facilities and should provide for ease of access between the residential areas and centers of employment .................

8) Physical Environment: The program should be designed to remove or arrest blight and decay in the Model Neighborhood and provide adequate public facilities (including those needed for education, health, social services, and recreation) and commercial facilities necessary to serve the Model Neighborhood ..........

9) Design, Historic Preservation and New Technology: Cities are encouraged to enhance the Model Neighborhood area by applying a high standard of design, to maintain as appropriate, natural and historic sites and distinctive neighborhood characteristics, and to make maximum possible use of new and improved technology and design, including cost reduction techniques ..............

10) Relocation: The local program should be designed to relocate satisfactorily all individuals, families, business concerns, and nonprofit organizations displaced in the carrying out of the program. '

(HUD, 1967: 7-16)
The Model Cities Program became, after a short period, part of the Federal grant-in-aid fiscal support to the localities which it was supposed to be coordinating. While the shift from what I will call a service delivery focus to a programme and planning focus did not arise solely within the Model Cities Program, it was at the time of the institution of the programme and increasingly through its development that this shift took place in Great Society programmes. The initial Task Force Report, while making clear the service concerns of the Task Force was an example of the programme and planning approach. The concepts of coordination etc are founded in a planning view of the nature of problem management. Hubert Humphrey, the Vice President, made such an approach clear when he spoke in Boston

'The Act does for the cities ........ what the National Aeronautics and Space Act did for the Space Program.'
(Humphrey, 1967)

CEO, along with other Federal agencies was also beginning to focus on a process oriented approach to problems. An example was the grant procedures laid down by CEO (CEO, 1968) in August 1968. In Appendix H to the instructions, the Planning Cycle for a CAA was set out for a year. This, in diagrammatic form, with a key, involved one hundred and nineteen steps and was replete with abbreviations such as CP (Chief Planner), TAG (Target Area Groups), AW (Application Writer), CA (Other Agencies) and as an illustration of the detail into which it went, it described activities such as

'13-14 CP completes revision and production of studies for authorized distribution
14-15 CP develops planning recommendations based on study findings and other information
13-15 CP reviews overall CAA program structure in light of new study findings.' (CEO, 1968: vii-17)

The CEO also produced such documents as a three hundred page long Grantee Reporting Manual called Management Information Reporting by CAA's (CEO, 1967). The CAP Management Information System was described as a method of reporting progress in carrying out plans.
To understand this purpose fully, this reporting system should be viewed as the final step in a series of related CAP management processes that must be accomplished at all levels to achieve the basic mission of CAP and its grantees. These steps are:

1) Define the needs of poor people,
2) Set program objectives for meeting these needs,
3) Analyze and select alternative courses of action for achieving these objectives,
4) Allocate resources among alternatives,
5) Assign individual responsibilities for carrying out the agreed - on courses of action,
6) Monitor progress against plans both to improve individual performance and to strengthen plans in each recycling of the planning process' (CEO, 1967: 7)

Although some may reject this as merely an example of bureaucratic capability to expand its functions (and hence power), this type of microlevel control over details of process allowed the Federal government much greater flexibility in dealing with projects and their policies, while exercising greater control over them than would be the case if the substantive aims were set but the processes unstated.

Such an approach attempted to overcome the contradictions faced by the government. As Robert Wood (Under Secretary at HUD under Nixon) pointed out in a speech to the Annual Symposium of the American Society for Cybernetics:

'If we are to govern urban America I believe we need a greater consolidation of authority at the metropolitan level and a decentralization of authority at the neighborhood level. These arrangements are not as contradictory as they may at first appear.' (Wood, 1968)

Before returning to the Model Cities Program, another example of this trend is worth focusing on. The Vice President's Handbook for Local Officials: a guide to federal assistance for local government (Office of the Vice President, 1967) was produced as part of Vice President Humphrey's overlordship of domestic programmes for the cities. In the Handbook the proliferation, both of local government and federal finance in the postwar years was commented upon. The average number of government units for a metropolitan area was quoted at 87, yet several areas had over 1,000 local units. This combined with the growth in personnel and finance presented a different
quality to the 'crisis of the cities'. State and local government employment had increased in the years 1958-68 by 70%. Federal aid payments in urban areas had increased from an actual 1961 level of 3.893 billion dollars to an estimated level of 10.329 billion dollars in 1968 (165%). The major increases had taken place in the fields of housing and community development (323%, 238 million dollars in 1961 to 1,006 million dollars in 1968), health, labor and welfare (203%, 1.419 billion dollars in 1961 to 4.299 billion dollars in 1968) and education (513%, 0.258 billion dollars in 1961 to 1.710 billion dollars in 1968) (Office of the Vice President, 1967: 259). The aim of the Model Cities Program as presented in the Handbook was to rationalise and direct in a more comprehensive manner this diversity of government. To anticipate President Nixon's view, the crisis of the cities was a crisis of government and not necessarily a crisis of inadequate or insufficient programmes delivering services and distributing goods. The preface to the Community Development Evaluation Series began

'In recent years observers of the 'urban crisis' have identified 'governmental fragmentation' as one source of the nation's inability to deal effectively with domestic problems.' (HUD, 1972)

The Vice President was quoted in his Handbook as having said

'The Model Cities Program is not so much a new program as it is a new approach. It asks participating cities frequently for the very first time, to make a searching self-examination of the basic problems and conditions that promote and permit ghettoes and which keep its people living in a perpetual state of depression and frustration, alienated from and resentful of the rest of society. It asks the cities to devise comprehensive solutions that are more than a band-aid or a hand-out - solutions that can produce new jobs and housing, new educational and health services, and most of all a new opportunity for the disadvantaged and discouraged to participate in the mainstream of American life.' (Office of the Vice President, 1967: 19)

The Handbook was intended to make local officials more aware of the programmes available and their interrelations.

The Model Cities Program contained from the beginning
this concentration upon federal review of process, but it was the Planned Variations introduced by President Nixon's Administration in 1971 which made clear the degree to which the shift from service delivery to process orientation had taken place.

President Nixon announced the selection of twenty cities for the Planned Variations in June 1971, as a forerunner to the proposed community development revenue sharing and general revenue sharing schemes which his Administration was committed to introducing. These approaches, which I shall discuss in more detail below, were the Republican attempt to solve the dilemma of local control and federal direction. Whereas the Democratic Party's strength was at the Federal level (both in the bureaucracy and the 'national intelligensia') and in the urban areas, the Republican strength lay in the States and business.

'...the inner city was not a promising source of strength for Nixon no matter what he did. Although the conception of the program did indeed have more in common with the New Federalism, the flow of resources through the newly decentralized mechanisms ended up in the hands of Democratic voters.' (Frieden and Kaplan, 1977: 212)

The Planned Variations were a two year demonstration programme in sixteen selected cities. Their main objective was to allow cities to improve their coordination of federal funds, to reduce bureaucracy and to overcome delay (HUD, 1972b). Three basic variations were introduced into the Model Cities Program in the selected cities.

1) Cities were given additional Model Cities supplemental grant funds to expand the program to cover all the areas in need in the city.

2) Local chief executives who represented local general purpose government were given stronger coordinating powers through the right to review and comment on all applications for Federal assistance that affected the community.

3) Federal agencies took steps to waive or minimise the administrative requirements for funds.
Planned Variations did not focus upon realigning, at Federal level, priorities and goals. Rather, it was concerned to allow cities greater discretion over the expenditure of federal funds. Planned Variations represented the beginning of the retreat of the Federal government from overtly setting priorities for local and state governments as the Great Society programmes had.

Nixon's New Federalism can be explained in terms both specific to his Republican Administration (as I attempted to do for Johnson and the War on Poverty) and in broader terms of national economic pressures which had effected both Administrations.

Looking at the distribution of funds by the cities in the Planned Variations, the major shift was from a Model Cities emphasis on social programmes to a Planned Variations emphasis on physical programmes. Economic programmes remained largely stable at 14.1% of funds under Model Cities (three year average) to 15.3% under the first year of the Planned Variations. Administrative expenditure decreased from 22.2% of funds (Model Cities three year average) to 13.9% in the first year of the Planned Variations. Social programmes expenditure decreased dramatically from 42.2% under the Model Cities to 27.8% under the Planned Variations, while expenditure on physical programmes increased from 21.1% to 42.7%. (HUD, 1972b)

Accepting that 'the problem' as presented by HUD remained the same (although this thesis does not subscribe to the reified notion of problem which is implied in government policy statements) then this shift in emphasis from social to physical programmes in the search for a 'solution' indicated two things.

1) The different form the 'problem' took for national and local government.

2) The importance of the process of federal distribution of funds in directing programme aims.

The change in programme process by the Nixon Administration produced different programme aims and a different articulation of the nature and causes of the problem to be faced.
The change in governmental thinking and in the structure of the War on Poverty and the Model Cities Program is illuminated by considering the links between the CAP and the Model Cities Program. One of the debates in the CAP referred to above, related to the place assigned for resident participation. The inclusion of a demand for resident participation and the lack of local government control over the CAP lead to conflict and escalating demands upon local government. Frieden and Kaplan state that a community development letter was issued by HUD, clarifying the participation question to the Community Development Agencies (of the Model Cities Program). This letter established performance standards rather than prescriptive requirements.

'Cities would have to provide an organizational structure that brought neighborhood residents into the process of planning and implementation; positions of leadership would have to be held by persons whom residents accepted as representatives of their interests and the structure of citizen participation would be required to give them direct access to the decision making process of the CDA with sufficient time to consider and initiate proposals and some form of acceptable technical assistance.' (Frieden and Kaplan, 1977: 76)

As Frieden and Kaplan go on to point out, a problem for HUD, OEO and the local government units was 'whose citizens were to be dominant - OEO's or HUD's?' The OEO concept of participation was in conflict with local government, while that of HUD was aimed at strengthening local government's capability.

'By 1967, some of the militance was gone, but Community Action Agencies still understood that they were to organize the poor and serve as their advocate, perhaps in cooperation rather than in conflict with the establishment. The Model Cities Program, however, was intended to create agreement and partnership between residents and city government.' (Frieden and Kaplan, 1977: 76)

Frieden and Kaplan show clearly how the Model Cities Program strengthened local government units and to an extent, especially after the passage of the Green Amendment to the Economic Opportunity Act in 1967, provided the mayors with a programme under their control and direction. Participation
in programme development in the sense used in the Model Cities Program had a sense much more closely connected to local government practice. If participation tended to be antagonistic to local government in the CAP, the participation content of the Model Cities Program was intended to legitimate existing practice.

'An important factor in the ultimate success of the Model Cities Program is the acceptance of the program by the residents of the various Model Neighborhoods. To help ensure such acceptance more complete information is needed to be provided to the residents and local administrators who are wrestling with the day-to-day problems of the Model Cities Program.' (HUD, 1972a)

The Community Development Block Grants

While the Community Development Block Grants were not designed as an antipoverty strategy, inclusion of the Model City grants into them and the substance of the guidelines for the CDBG makes it an interesting programme to discuss in conclusion. The CDBG's emphasis on the reorganisation of the fiscal relationship between federal and local government provides a parallel with some of the later British projects such as the CCPs. The reorganised relationship in Britain was, almost exclusively, concerned with organisational relationships within the local authority. The parallel lies in the move away from an exclusively 'urban poverty' focus to a more general concern with the functioning of the local state as a whole.

The idea of revenue sharing had been mooted by both the Republicans and Democrats near the end of the Johnson Administration. The purpose of revenue sharing was to reduce federal discretion over categorical grants, to simplify the number of grants and to allow local governments more say in the allocation of funds. Community Development Grants were instituted under the Housing and Community Development Act 1974. Title I of this Act provided for block grants for community development. During Nixon's campaign in 1968 and during his subsequent Administrations he criticised the growth
of the federal government's involvement in domestic programmes. He concentrated his early criticisms on the inefficiency of federal government directing local strategies.

'I have established both the Urban Affairs Council and the Office of Intergovernmental Relations in part so that the Government could be better advised on additional improvements in service systems. Further systematic restructuring is on the way. Each reform, I believe, will have a major impact on the quality of American government - an impact which will benefit all our citizens in all parts of the country......

By rationalizing, coordinating and decentralizing the systems through which government provides important social and economic services, we can begin at last to realize the hopes and dreams of those who created them.' (Nixon, 1969b)

In an address to the Nation on Domestic Programs (Nixon, 1969c), Nixon made clear the movement that I mentioned earlier from a service strategy to a management strategy when viewing the problems of the cities.

'We face an urban crisis, a social crisis - and at the same time, a crisis of confidence in the capacity of government to do its job.

A third of a century of centralizing power and responsibility in Washington has produced a bureaucratic monstrosity cumbersome, unresponsive, ineffective.

A third of a century of social experiment has left us a legacy of entrenched programs that have outlived their time or outgrown their purposes.

A third of a century of unprecedented growth and change has strained our institutions, and raised serious questions about whether they are still adequate to the times.' (Nixon, 1969c)

In the same speech, he announced his New Federalism, to return power to the States and 'the people'. The Model Cities Program came under attack within the Administration but despite the hostility of the Administration towards it, it was continued partly for the lack of a substitute.

Revenue sharing was an approach which was consistent with the concept of a New Federalism. Revenue sharing (both 'general' and 'special') transferred federal government tax receipts to local government institutions to be spent either, as in the case of general revenue sharing, in general local government support or, as in the case of special revenue sharing, on particular
sets of problems. General revenue sharing, which can be compared with the rate support grant in Britain, was introduced under the State and Local Fiscal Assistance Act 1972. It was a five year programme designed to spend 5.3 billion dollars in the first year and 30.2 billion dollars over a five year period. Frieden and Kaplan point out that the first year entitlements to general revenue sharing for calendar year 1972 were mostly more than first year model cities grants but that

'...even where revenue sharing exceeded model cities grants by a factor of two or three, local political pressures make far less available for spending in the model neighborhoods, which usually represent no more than a tenth of the city's population.' (Frieden and Kaplan, 1977: 226-227)

The special revenue sharing approach was designed to overcome some of these problems of general revenue sharing. The Model Cities Program was, comparatively politically relatively unimportant, both because of the amount of money being spent on it in relation to the amount involved in the revenue sharing programme and because the Model Cities Program would not have been the only programme to be affected by the withdrawal of federal direction over local disbursement of funds.

The special revenue sharing approach had five main parts:
1) Consolidation of urban renewal, model cities and neighborhood facilities programmes;
2) Replacement of categorical grant application procedures with a formula allocation for qualifying communities;
3) Reduction in administration and procedural requirements associated with categorical grants;
4) Assignment of all funds and decision making to general purpose local governments instead of special quasi-autonomous bodies (such as the CDA for model cities);
5) Elimination of requirements for matching funds. (Nathan, 1977)

The revenue sharing for community development was designed to collect a number of categorical grants, including model cities together. As Nixon announced in his Special Message to the Congress on the subject.
'Cities could thus use their allocation to acquire, clear and renew blighted areas, to construct public works such as water and sewer facilities, to build streets and malls, to enforce housing codes in deteriorating areas, to rehabilitate residential properties, to aid demolition projects, and to help relocate those who have been displaced from their homes or businesses by any authorities which drew on these urban community development special revenue sharing funds. They could also fund a range of human resource activities including those now funded by the Model Cities and Community Action programs.' (Nixon, 1971)

The problem of federal direction in relation to the aims of programmes financed under revenue sharing will be discussed later, but it was, in part, through the opposition of Congress to federal abdication in this area that the proposals took until 1974 to be enacted.

The 1971 proposal was reintroduced to Congress in 1973 as the 'Better Communities Act', proposing to include open spaces, water and sewer facilities and the public facilities loan programme with other urban renewal, model cities and neighbourhood facilities programmes in the grant. It also extended the sharing to urban counties, not just cities and contained a 'hold-harmless' provision, whereby local governments receiving less money under the block grant formula would have their entitlement made up for a period of years.

The Senate restricted local government's freedom to spend the money as they wished under the programme. It included national objectives in the bill. It imposed limitations on the use of funds and it also imposed an application from recipients, outlining the uses of the block grant funds. In the House-Senate Conference, the application procedure was reduced to a veto only power on the part of HUD. The Conference also agreed to authorize 8.45 billion dollars for three years under the Act.

The returning of discretion from the federal government to the localities was, in the rhetoric of New Federalism, giving power back to the people. In reality, of course, the Federal government was returning power from the federal bureaucracy.
to the local power structures within the States and localities. This insulated the Republican Administration from the demands of local groups collected powerfully at national level and provided both a confusion for Democratic local administrations (which groups to offend in competition for funds now under the localities' control) and also increased income to Republican suburban areas. The balance of federal spending was tipped away from the central cities.

'From the analysis of the first-year allocations under the CDBG program, three significant shifts of funds were found to have occurred:

1) A regional redistribution, with the advantages enjoyed in the past by the New England and Middle Atlantic regions under the programs folded into the block grant system shifting to other regions under formula system, particularly to the southern regions.

2) A substantial decrease in the advantage to central cities.

3) A concommitant gain by small communities, both metropolitan and non-metropolitan, under the formula system.'

(Nathan, 1977: 133-134)

These political considerations are essentially mirror image of the Democratic Party's concerns leading up to the founding of the War on Poverty in 1964. Nixon was rewarding his voters in the way Johnson rewarded his potential voters. At the most basic level, a service delivery approach was electorally favourable to the Democratic Party, whereas a physical programme which both the CDBG and the Planned Variations emphasised, rewarded business and local capital without necessarily providing rewards for those people whom the projects were supposed to aid.

This, however, is not a sufficient explanation. Just as the War on Poverty was congruent with both the electoral concerns of the Party and the economic concerns of government, so too was the Community Development Block Grant approach consistent with the economic pressures government faced at the time.

Two major changes in the pressures on the American economy occurred during the Johnson years. Firstly, the War on Vietnam took up an increasing amount of the federal budget and high defense spending, which entered the domestic economy through
fuller employment and industrial activity relating to the armaments and defense servicing, created inflationary pressures in the domestic economy. Secondly, the Johnson years had seen an expansion of the federal government unparalleled since Roosevelt. The Great Society programmes had increased both the absolute number of dollars federal government gave to localities and also the amount of federal involvement in the affairs of localities (which demanded an increase in the federal bureaucracy).

I have already commented in general terms on the growth in local government employment and federal government expenditure in urban areas. It is of importance to relate this growth to the overall budgeting and economic pressures upon the federal government. Referring back to the founding of the War on Poverty, the American economy faced, as has already been stated, different problems. The parallel growth of domestic expenditure and defense spending created tensions which were beginning to have their full effect in the late sixties. This parallel growth arose from Johnson's attempt to build and retain a consensus based on the one hand on the War on Vietnam and on the other, the Great Society. This consensus disintegrated in the last years of the Administration leaving Nixon with a more visibly divided society and one where Nixon's politics had a clearer base than those of Johnson. Gross and Marien (1968) argue that the balancing of interests by Johnson in his two 'wars' helped to achieve the consensus he sought.

'This is one of the many reasons for the 'relative consensus' achieved by President Johnson during the early years of his Administration. But with little visible success on either battlefront dissensus has firmly gained the upper hand. The graceful balancing act of limited commitment on all fronts has been submerged under the cries for decisive action on one front at the exclusion of the other.'

(Gross and Marien, 1968: 28)

In fiscal year 1961, the administrative budget expenditure on defense was 45.7 billion dollars, by 1969 the expenditure on defense had risen to 79.1 billion dollars of which 28.8 billion
dollars was reported being spent on South-East Asia (U.S. Budget, 1969), an overall increase in defense spending of 73.1% in the eight year period (excluding the Vietnam War the increase was 9.9%). In the same period the GNP had risen from 520.1 billion dollars in 1961 to 930.3 billion dollars in 1969, an increase of 78.9%. The amount of the GNP received by the federal government had risen from 18.6% of the GNP to 20.9% or an increase of 12.4% (U.S. Budget, 1975). Outlays by the federal government increased from 19.3% of the GNP to 20.5% in 1969, an increase of 6.2%. The 1968 outlay (21.6%) represented the highest percentage of the GNP received during the 1960s.

Looking at state and local expenditures between 1955 and 1969 the overall increase had been 244.1% with the major increases in dollars being in general expenditure (Schultze et al., 1971). Federal outlays to states and local governments rose from 7.112 billion dollars in 1961 to 20.255 billion dollars in 1969, a 184.6% increase. This represented an increase from 7.3% of total federal outlays to 11%, an increase of 50.7% (excluding defense, space and international programs, this rise was from 15.4% to 21.7%, a 38.3% increase) and was as a percentage of state and local revenue increased from 12% in 1961 to 17.4% in 1969, a 45% increase. (U.S. Budget, 1977)

This sketch of budget expenditures indicates two main points. Firstly, defense expenditure had risen rapidly in the 1960s. Secondly, the increase in federal government aid to state and local governments both in absolute terms and in relation to the total revenue of the states and local governments was dramatic.

One argument in support of the CDBG which relates to this overall picture, is that the CDBG by rationalising grant giving procedures and giving a greater role to coordination at a local level should, in the long run, have reduced, if not the absolute amount given from the federal government to states and local governments, at least the increase in federal government expenditure. General revenue sharing and block grants were seen
as reducing administrative inefficiencies and overlaps.

Another way in which expenditure under the CDBG was to be reduced was in the shift from 'software' to 'hardware' projects.

'According to law, public services may be funded only if they are related to a physical development activity in the same area and only if the community has been unable to get support for them under other federal programs.' (Frieden and Kaplan, 1977: 260)

In the first year, cities concentrated 42% of CDBG funds on urban renewal, 4.3% for public services and 7.7% for service related facilities and equipment (Frieden and Kaplan, 1977: 260). This is a similar picture to the shift that took place under the Planned Variations.

Frieden and Kaplan comment on the attraction of 'hardware' projects,

'Hardware projects are attractive locally because they are one-shot investments followed only by maintenance costs. Service programs may create clientele that demand high budgets for years into the future. Further, hardware projects are tangible and visible and, therefore, traditionally good politics.' (Frieden and Kaplan, 1977: 260-261)

Regarding the shift from the cities to the suburbs in expenditure by the federal government, it can be seen that the reduction in expenditure in central cities, apart from having clear political benefits for the Republicans, effected a shift from a 'social problem' oriented concern to a 'resource management' concern. Comparing the folded-in grant allocations with the CDBG allocations, (see page 90) the shift that was most pronounced was the shift from the central cities to other parts of the metropolitan areas.

Organisationally, the CDBG represented a departure from the collection at federal level of responsibility and discretion. Despite the inclusion by Congress of a greater overview by HUD in the programme, the lack of close federal control was an important element of the new programme (reflecting the New Federalism). The main distinction, however between general revenue sharing and block grants (special revenue sharing) was that the latter retained some federal control over the
Folded-in Grant Distributions compared with projected 1980 allocation of CDBG funds within metropolitan areas.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Area</th>
<th>Number</th>
<th>Folded-in (m. dollars)</th>
<th>Formula (m. dollars)</th>
<th>Folded-in % of total</th>
<th>Formula % of total</th>
<th>% change in $</th>
<th>change in share</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Central cities</td>
<td>362</td>
<td>1,498</td>
<td>1,182</td>
<td>71.8</td>
<td>42.2</td>
<td>-21</td>
<td>-29.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Satellite cities</td>
<td>152</td>
<td>94</td>
<td>140</td>
<td>4.5</td>
<td>5.0</td>
<td>+49</td>
<td>+0.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Urban counties</td>
<td>73</td>
<td>67</td>
<td>290</td>
<td>3.2</td>
<td>10.3</td>
<td>+433</td>
<td>+7.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rest of SMSAs</td>
<td>166</td>
<td>628</td>
<td>7.9</td>
<td>22.3</td>
<td>+378</td>
<td>+14.6</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total to metr. areas</td>
<td>1,825</td>
<td>2,240</td>
<td>87.4</td>
<td>80</td>
<td>+23</td>
<td>-7.4</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total to non metr. areas</td>
<td>263</td>
<td>550</td>
<td>12.6</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>+209</td>
<td>+7.4</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>U.S. Total</td>
<td>2,088</td>
<td>2,790</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>+34</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(Source: Nathan, 1977: 150)
general direction of local government priorities.

Nathan (1977: 54) reports on the application procedure. A single application from a jurisdiction had to contain a three-year community development plan summary, a one-year action programme, a housing assistance plan and a budget. The application had to be accompanied by assurances and certificates that

the local government had:

1) given maximum feasible priority to activities which will benefit low and moderate income families or aid in the prevention or elimination of slums and blight;
2) provided information about the program to citizens, held at least two public hearings, and provided for 'adequate' citizen participation;
3) complied with the non-discrimination provisions of the act and all other applicable federal laws and regulations;
4) complied with the David-Bacon 'prevailing wage' requirement;
5) submitted the application to state and area wide clearing houses for review and comment; and
6) assumed responsibility for meeting environmental review requirements under the act and agreed to accept the jurisdiction of federal courts with respect to enforcement of those responsibilities.' (Nathan, 1977: 54)

Through these requirements, HUD was able to exercise control over the direction of funding in particular, the first requirement that activities benefit low and moderate-income families. The definition of 'benefit' was vague.

HUD, under the Act, was given 75 days to approve applications unless they did not meet three requirements.

1) the needs and objectives described in the application are 'plainly inconsistent' with available facts and data;
2) the activities that the jurisdiction proposes are 'clearly not permissible' under the act; and
3) the planned activities are 'plainly inappropriate' to meeting the identified needs and objectives.' (Nathan, 1977: 55)

Funding of the CDBG through a formula allocation to cities, removed the competition between cities for funds. Allocation on a 'rational' basis - a funding formula - created a different political struggle over funds. On the one hand, with allocation within localities being decided upon at a local level, the local government unit became the location for more conflict
over funding allocations, being unable to point to federal direction of priorities in funding. On the other hand, the federal bureaucracy, in this case HUD, lost its discretion over allocation of funds. The conflict at a national level over the allocation of CDBG funds became centered around the formula for allocation and the level of appropriations which are matters that take place in the arena of Congress and the Administration.

The distribution formula at the introduction of the programme was divided between a formula entitlement allocation and a 'hold-harmless' allocation. The formula entitlement was a sum earmarked on the basis of the objective formula criteria e.g. population, overcrowded housing and poverty. The hold-harmless allocation guaranteed communities the same level of funding during the first three years as the annual average under the folded-in grant programmes during the five year period 1968-72. There were two exceptions one of which related to the Model Cities Program. The model cities hold-harmless meant that

'in some cases a city's hold-harmless amount under CDBG can begin to decline before the end of the third year of the program ..... Funding to sixty three model cities began to be phased down in the second year of the CDBG program.' (Nathan, 1977: 79-80)

The allocation formula's effect upon funding in different areas has already been indicated. The most important observation to make is that the CDBG represents the withdrawal of federal direction in the field and time period in which I am interested. I have already mentioned in brief the problems of political control and management which this withdrawal was confronting. Since this is a problem similar in both Britain and the United States, this is something that I shall discuss at greater length elsewhere.

The objectives of the Housing and Community Development Act the Act under which CDBG funds were distributed, were, in 1974
1) Elimination of slums and blight;
2) The provision of activities giving maximum feasible priority to benefiting low and moderate income families;
3) The elimination of conditions which are detrimental to health, public safety and public welfare;
4) The conservation and expansion of the nation's housing stock;
5) The expansion and improvement of the quality and quantity of community services;
6) A more rational utilization of land and other natural resources;
7) The reduction of the isolation of income groups within communities and geographical areas and the promotion of an increase in the diversity and vitality of neighborhoods;
8) The restoration and preservation of properties of special value for historic, architectural or esthetic reasons.'

(Boston, 1979: 2)

The provision of services in the cities which had experienced a growth of federal funding was a priority for cities. The withdrawal of services was a politically perilous act and the CDBG allowed the federal government to do just that without seeming to. The Model Cities Program and the CAP had institutionalised a service function in city governments. However, Nathan concludes

'Far and away the predominant approach to community development under the block grant proposal in its first year of operation involved a neighborhood conservation and growth strategy designed primarily to prevent urban blight.' (Nathan, 1977: 327)
Chapter Three
The British Projects

With the background that I have given on the American programmes, the difficulty of comparing them with the British projects should be apparent. The examples in Britain which were most nearly equivalent to the American experience were the Educational Priority Areas which designated certain areas for increased teacher pay and extra school buildings, Section 11 payments and the Urban Programme's distribution to local authorities of extra money for 'deprived areas'. Even here, the similarity lies, not in the content of the programmes but in that they were supplemental funds to local authorities.

A different set of political and economic forces from those in the United States were at work, which gave rise to the setting up of a different set of programmes. Considering that it is a main contention of this thesis that it is these forces which shape the most important aspects of policy, it is not surprising that they are fundamentally different.

Within central government and in some accounts of these programmes and projects (Higgins, 1978; Marris and Rein, 1972) a comparison is made between the Community Action Program and the Community Development Projects in Britain and the Model Cities Program and the Inner Area Studies. In all important aspects this comparison fails, except in as far as it tells us how social science ideas and general ideas in government are transmitted and what autonomy they have from the political and economic forces which create a demand both for such ideas and the programmes which are seen as being based upon them.

It is important to emphasise that at the time of the introduction of these projects Britain had an universalist system of welfare provision. Despite the apparent failings of the system, its avowed purposes were clear - to provide a support for all people in Britain in the most important areas of health, housing, education and income maintenance. No such system
existed in the U.S.A. in the early 1960s. Not only did Britain have such a welfare system, but it had been built up since the end of the war and indeed the history of progressive social policies was a much longer one than in America. The Wilson Government in 1964 was not faced, as Johnson was in the same year, with the task of attempting to ameliorate conditions which had arisen over centuries of exploitation and whose consequences the capitalist state was becoming unable to contain.

Allied to this basic difference, was that, whereas American imperialism and attempts at world hegemony were still a major force in American politics and economics, Britain had long since lost its position as the major imperialist power. The social policies of the two governments can be contrasted as being symptoms of, among other things, their relative world positions.

To begin with then, the American programmes, at least the CAP and the Model Cities Program, were part of the expansion of basic social welfare provision in a society whose wealth was being derived, and whose economy was booming, on the basis of its world power. The British projects were adjuncts to a supposedly comprehensive welfare system that was increasingly being constrained because of the rapidly decreasing economic prosperity of Britain. Throughout the period discussed, the major perceived problem of Britain was its poor economic record, its balance of payments deficit and its lack of growth. These conditions are very different from the problems that American politicians faced.

Educational Priority Areas

For simplicity, and because of their interconnected origins, I shall discuss the Educational Priority Area Action-Research Projects in conjunction with the Educational Priority Area Programme while making clear to which I am referring when only referring to one.

Any account of the development of the EPAs begins with the Plowden Report (Central Advisory Council for Education, 1967). While the Plowden Report endorsed the idea and sketched the
criteria for EPAs, the concept had already been current in educational thinking, and while not necessarily being seen as a need for area based compensatory educational programmes, compensatory education had been seen as an important aspect of policies concerned to promote equality. In the field of education, the importance for the state of giving substance to the ideology of equality of opportunity lay in the need for the more effective use of manpower, if Britain was to regain (or even maintain) its world economic position. Wasted manpower had even more direct threats to the state as was clearly identified in an article in the Times (1968) by the Education Correspondent. Reporting on a report by Sir Alec Clegg, Chief Education Officer for the West Riding of Yorkshire, under a headline 'Unemployed child is danger to society', the report reads, in part

'.... there are schools serving poor social areas where there are many children from large families and where many families are unemployed or receiving social security benefits and much truancy and the schools have more than their fair share of children who are retarded, disturbed, handicapped or deprived......' (Times, 1968)

The correspondent went on to quote the report

'As simple machines consume unskilled work and more sophisticated machines consume skilled work, the work left for men and women to perform will all be skilled. Unless education can provide men and women with the ability to master skills, we may, in the not too distant future have to face the prospect of educating for unemployment. It is unlikely that such a situation could arise without bringing about grave social unrest.' (Times, 1968)

Sir Alec Clegg was rather farsighted, compared with other policymakers.

Politicians of both parties had emphasised their concern with a more positive achievement of the equality of opportunity which was supposed to be part of British society.

'The essential point is that all children should have equal opportunity of acquiring intelligence and developing their talents and abilities to the full.' Introduction to the Newsom Report by Sir Edward Boyle, Conservative Education Minister. (Central Advisory Council for Education, 1963)
'... granted the differences in heredity and infantile experience, every child should have the same opportunity for acquiring measured intelligence, so far as this can be controlled by social action.' (Crosland, 1962)

Looking for a more pertinent answer than that provided in seeing an apparent consensus, to the question of why policy makers should be concerned with the question of educational opportunity, the Plowden Report provides some clues:

'Comparisons with other countries - all of them more recently industrialised than Britain but all now at a similar stage of economic development - suggest that we have not done enough to provide the educational background necessary to support an economy, which needs fewer and fewer unskilled workers and increasing numbers of skilled and adaptable people.' (C.A.C.E., 1967: para 143)

'...... from the earliest stages of education, the schools enlarge or restrict the contribution their pupils can make to the life of the nation. Money spent on education is an investment which helps to determine the scope for future economic and social development.' (C.A.C.E., 1967: para 145)

Apart from this concern with the investment aspect of education and the wastes incurred in poor educational attainment, there was the more covert racial element.

The racial element in British politics has been completely different from the American experience. The 'immigrant' vote, traditionally, has been taken for granted as being a Labour vote. The element of race in British politics has been underplayed by both major parties. to prevent the issue being established upon the political agenda because of the dangers inherent in different ways to both major parties.

The racial element was however thinly disguised in the deliberations over the Plowden Report and in the Plowden Report itself. Previously Section 11 payments had been made to schools that had to accommodate 'immigrant' populations and provide extra funds for areas with high 'immigrant' populations.

The Report argued for the designation of EPAs by the Department of Education and Science based upon information from local authorities supported by HMIs' reports, considering six criteria.
1) The proportion of unskilled and semi-skilled workers;
2) The proportion of large families;
3) The proportion of those on social security and receiving free school meals;
4) The proportion of overcrowded households;
5) Truancy rates;
6) The proportion of retarded, handicapped and non-English speaking pupils.

This recommendation, however, was not accepted and local authorities were invited to make bids for EPA funds under Circular 11/67. A system of bids had two different implications. Firstly, the government could ration resources in a more effective way by first stating the total sum of money available and then making allocations among a number of authorities. Designation of EPAs would set the number of EPAs and have to be financed from a sum which would be difficult to predetermine. Secondly, the government was not open to examination of the criteria of selection when receiving bids from local authorities. Without a set of criteria for allocation of funds, central government could allocate according to both demographic and financial data concerning a proposed EPA and also according to preferred service criteria. More power remained with central government than under a system of designation by criteria.

Returning to the issue of race, the 'non-English speaking' criterion for designation is stressed in other comments and discussions. Michael Young, a member of the Plowden Committee, at a teach-in of the Advisory Council for Education concerning the Plowden Report said:

'Unless a change is made we may end up with a permanent underclass consisting partly of native born people, partly of immigrants, but all living in the same high delinquency districts...' (Young, 1967)

And, as if portraying the problems of these 'high delinquency districts', a Whitechapel school headmaster, quoted in the Times Educational Supplement makes clear his moral and racial prejudices.
There are a lot of broken families, children living with grandparents or a mother alone. Some families of four or more have been abandoned by their mothers. There are mixed marriages, illegitimacy, mothers who associate with coloured men ......

(Times Educational Supplement, 1967)

Plowden specifically recognised the problem of 'immigrant' children in primary schools in chapter six of the Report;

'The concentration of immigrant families in the crumbling areas of industrial cities and boroughs has greatly complicated the tasks of their teachers.'

(C.A.C.B., 1967: 180)

As has been said before and will be repeated again, the mere existence of a 'social problem' has never been sufficient reason for government to act. Government constructs a 'problem'. 'Immigrants' become an educational 'problem'. Racist and sexist headmasters are not.

This is well illustrated by the case of the Plowden Report. The Report was delivered to the Secretary of State who was already aware of many of its conclusions, on 18th October 1966. It was not released until January 1967, debated in Parliament until March 1967 and the first government response in terms of action was not until April 1967 when the government announced that £54 million had been set aside for school building in the year 1968-69 and £3 million would be spent in thirty one local education authorities with EPAs. In July a special allocation of £16 million for school building in priority areas over the subsequent two years was announced. By April 1968 £43.3 million worth of bids had been received from 92 local authorities, the £16 million was eventually shared between fifty one authorities. January 1968 also saw massive cuts in public expenditure by the Labour Government. The 1969-70 school building allocation was reduced to £48 million and £33 million had been saved for 1968 by postponing the raising of the school leaving age.

It is within this context that the EPA programme must be placed. I argue that it was the other side of spending cuts. The EPAs contained the essence of a selective social service policy which could reduce expenditure. For the Labour Government
putting money into EPAs maintained its caring face, while
cuts in education were taking place. Labour educationalists
could point to the progressive aspects of its education policy,
while maintaining that the cuts were a response to economic
forces beyond the control of the government.

April 1968 also saw the implementation of the Plowden rec-
ommendations regarding allowances for teachers in EPAs. Teachers
in EPA schools received an extra £75 per annum. The schools
were recognised by the Secretary of State on criteria similar
to those proposed by Plowden. These two aspects of Plowden
were administratively and financially among the least challeng-
ing of the Report's recommendations. For instance the rec-
ommendation concerning experimenting with 'community schools'
would have required institutional, administrative, political
and financial changes. The EPA Action-Research projects attempted
to explore some of these recommendations.

Despite Government inaction, the Plowden Report was well
received by all interested parties. The debate in the House
of Lords on 14th March 1967 was opened by Lord Newton. With
regard to the educational priority areas, he suggested that the
positive discrimination approach 'puts on trial the Socialism'
of the government. He also called these proposals the most
controversial of the Report and while he welcomed them, he
suggested;

'I do not think that the policy should be pushed too
far.....' (Hansard, 1967a: Col 1177)

Lord Plowden in his contribution stated some of the links
between educational opportunity and economic growth to which
I have already referred;

'Our economic progress, which will determine our power
to reach almost all our national objectives, depends
on our success in making the most of the inherent
potential of all our population. The overriding priority
in an educational system designed to make the maximum
contribution to national objectives is, therefore, exactly
the same as that required to give all children equality
of opportunity.' (Hansard, 1967b: Col 206)

His speech also makes clear the importance of positive
discrimination (and its links to administrative discretion)
in social policy in a Britain facing economic problems.

'Equality must give way to discrimination ..... But to do this requires political courage because the electorate continues to identify discrimination with a means test and the mass unemployment of the 'thirties...

(Hansard, 1967b: Col 208)

'But as I have already suggested, a different approach to this problem of need by discrimination within the welfare state as a whole in favour of those least privileged would, I believe, give much more positive results for the money we spend.' (Hansard, 1967b: Col 209)

This is the basis of EPAs and the government's use of the concept. Throughout the history of the projects examined in Britain, the reduction of, or delaying the increases in, public expenditure has been seen, to greater or lesser extents, as a main economic priority. For a Labour Government, however, the reduction of public expenditure carries a very high price. The positive discrimination approach on an area base may have had the same intended effects, but a different appearance from means tested benefits. This theme of positive discrimination in a climate of economic restraint is one that was restated by other speakers both in the Lords and the Commons debates.

Lord Eccles argued;

'It would be much better if he (Secretary of State for Education) had the courage to cut back some of the existing programmes in order to give the recommendation the priority for which the Council makes so strong a case.' (Hansard, 1967c: Col 212)

Charles Morrison MP (Cons) argued in the Commons;

'.... it would seem that the concept of the EPA emphasises once again that in yet another sphere the day of the blanket benefit is over, that flat-rate Government aid for whatever purposes is outdated both by post war achievement and by the more specific problems which today face a British Government. If in education, we are to endeavour to provide more equality of opportunity for all children, we should have to discriminate positively in favour of the less fortunate areas.' (Hansard, 1967c. Col 824)

The other aspect of positive discrimination, apart from long term savings on expenditure relates to the issue of equality of opportunity and the indirect threat posed by violence. Lord Ritchie Calder commented in the Lords upon
this and brings into consideration some of the American experience.

'This (drop-outs) is something which ought to concern us deeply, not merely because of the wastage of these people themselves, but because here we have an inherent problem of greater magnitude for the future. I would remind your Lordships that this was the inflammable cause of the Watts riots in Los Angeles........ I would commend ........ (the Government) a close look at what has been done in America ....... A great many lessons - lessons which will be very valuable - can be learnt from them.' (Hansard, 1967d: Col 240)

This is an example of the way in which reference to the American experience focused upon two aspects of that experience. On the one hand, the violence, which was linked to race in American cities, particularly the riots of the late 1960s, and on the other, the programmes which America was implementing. Given that the programmes preceded the violence (in the case of the Community Action Program), the programme would not necessarily be seen, taking a superficial view such as Lord Ritchie Calder took, as being a model from which to learn. Again the problems of American education and American race relations are rather different from those of Britain. The black population of America were not fairly recent arrivals. Regarding programme structure and relating that to the British situation, the American educational system did not have the same central direction as was the case in Britain. On a large number of variables, the situation was entirely different, however, the point was made that America was experiencing violent racial upheavals which, it was argued, were going to occur in Britain if nothing was done to prevent them.

Both Young and Donnison, who were among the members of the Plowden Committee that went to the USA to look at primary education there have acknowledged the influence of positive discrimination in American education (Young, 1970; Donnison Interview). The existence though of the American experience and its transferability (about which there is some doubt) was not sufficient to implement an EPA policy.

As I have indicated above, although the response to the
idea of EPAs from the Government was sympathetic, their action was lukewarm and could hardly be seen to constitute a major departure from existing policy. From this evidence I conclude that, whereas the EPA school building and extra teachers allowance were a minor adjustment in educational expenditure, they represent a shift towards the principle of positive discrimination along the lines argued for by Charles Morrison and Lord Plowden. For the Labour Government it represented a small shift in principle, small because of the money involved, but in principle because of its institution at a time of education expenditure cuts.

The EPA Action-Research however illustrates a different approach. The main actors involved in launching the action research projects were all Labour establishment intellectuals. It represented an experimental approach derived basically not from the immediate economic or political demands that faced the state but from ideas based on an analysis of what was being defined as a problem. This would seem to be contrary to the whole basis of my thesis, but it is not. It illustrates the space within policy making in which ideas can relate to policy making, but only within the constraints of the political economy being faced at the time. An EPA approach that proved a success in meeting the aims of the programme would reduce costs and reduce potential conflict. The aims were:

'a) to raise the educational performance of children;
b) to improve the morale of teachers;
c) to increase the involvement of parents in their children's education;
d) to increase the 'sense of responsibility' for their communities of the people living in them.' (Halsey, 1972: 57)

The programme was not tackling a problem that needed an early solution.

In a letter to Patrick Gordon-Walker, the new Secretary of State for Education, Halsey and Young proposed an action research programme costing £5 million but commented

'if however this is not possible we are still convinced something useful can be done with a very much smaller
sum, perhaps as little as £100,000 per annum divided between five projects.' (Halsey and Young, 1967)

In a later letter to Shirley Williams (Minister of State at the Education Department), a reference was made to the 'hopeless discussion' with Gordon-Walker. Clearly the proposal was not seen to be a matter of urgency by the government. At a time of cuts in public expenditure and in the bleak post-devaluation climate, low priority was given to a programme whose benefits were not easily identifiable.

The EPA action research project was financed by funds both from the Department of Education and Science and the Social Science Research Council. By any account, the project was got off the ground through Michael Young and A.H. Halsey's perseverance and influence. A comprehensive account of the launching of the project is to be found in Dodds (1975). The official invitations to the local education authorities were sent out in May 1968.

The action-research projects main distinction from all other projects that I am discussing was that it was external to government. Although, particularly in the case of Halsey and Young, it is very difficult to draw precise definitions of status and role, they could be seen as academic entrepreneurs, who worked closely with the state bureaucracy and politicians. Their roles were concerned with all three functions of administration, decision making and developing ideas. Ideas developed by those closely connected with government cannot be formulated in a vacuum but are developed by people who have the most acute awareness of the various factors and forces limiting action. Positive discrimination on an area base combined with experimental action research was being developed as an idea, with which Halsey was connected, into what would eventually be the Community Development Projects.

The reports of the Educational Priority Projects (Barnes, 1975; Halsey, 1972; Payne, 1974; Smith, 1974; Morrison, 1974) provide an extensive account of significant aspects of the projects. Regarding the projects though in relation to other projects
and programmes under discussion, certain differences can be indicated.

The grants from the SSRC and the DES were administered through the Oxford University research unit set up under Dr Halsey. As the National Director, he was responsible for the projects as a whole. Each of the individual action research projects had a research team connected to it but based in a university. Projects were established in Birmingham, Liverpool, London, West Riding and Dundee.

In terms of funding, the amounts of money involved were minute compared to the American programmes. £175,000 in all over the different projects to evaluate the action in the EPAs was only a small gesture towards Plowden’s appeal for research. The lack of major amounts of money going to the local education authority or the EPA project differentiated this initiative from any of the American programmes, but also emphasised the experimental nature of the projects. The projects were within the tradition of social engineering and assumed that, given sufficient resources and a demonstrable success in achieving their aims, government would be persuaded to engage in further action. The history of the British projects has shown the fallacy of such assumptions.

The EPA action research projects differed in another major way from subsequent developments. They attempted with an entry into one social service - education - to achieve a change in a wide range of related fields. The single service approach had its failings which the projects were aware of, but given the institutional arrangements of education, the lack of funds, the newness of action research and the evidence of the problems in the American compensatory educational programmes, the overall design of the projects seemed to offer benefits beyond those they could feasibly hope to attain. Indeed Volume One of the Report pointed to some of the dilemmas and concluded;

‘Our own view in undertaking the EPA action research was cautiously open-minded on the capacity of the educational system to reform itself, dubious about an educational approach to the abolition of poverty, but
at least as optimistic as Plowden about the primary school and pre-schooling as points of entry for action-research aimed at inducing changes in the relation between school and community.' (Halsey, 1972: 5)

Perhaps the key importance of the EPA action research projects was not what it managed to achieve in relation to its limited goals, but the model of select demonstrations that it pioneered and the influence of that model on the Community Development Projects, the Inner Area Studies and other subsequent projects. The EPA action research projects were demonstration projects in the American tradition, but they were demonstration projects with much more extensive research elements built in from the beginning of the project. In American programmes, definitions of success or failure were openly supplied by the relative political power of interests backing the programme. The British experience has tended to conceal the overtly electoral and economic goals that can be achieved through the projects and the projects are gauged successes or failures through the nature and format of their reports, irrespective of the subsequent use of their conclusions or their relevance to the electoral and economic forces giving rise to them.

This is in a sense a reflection of both the size of the projects, in absolute terms, and their relation to existing service provision. In the American example, the sums of money involved built up electoral constituencies and provided irreversible sources of funds to the cities. The amount of money involved for example in the EPA action research projects neither created sufficient beneficiaries for them to become nationally powerful, nor a different balance of local education authority funds which would have been difficult to reverse. Whereas in America politically attractive policies could be implemented and look to the academic community to provide some rationale for these policies (the academic community gaining funds in return) in Britain and in particular in the EPA action research, the social scientists actively sought the money, persuading government to pay and justifying their projects to government in terms of politically desirable ends. Whereas the former relationship
lead to the perpetuation of policies after their initial attractions had faded, the latter left the projects, despite positive results, in terms of their avowed aims, to vanish without trace (not in the sense that nothing was left in the areas of the projects but in the sense that the issue was removed from the political agenda).

The EPA action research projects were dependant on the political climate in which they were developed and linked to the two other main projects developed at this time, the Urban Aid Programme and the Community Development Projects, which were financed under the Urban Programme. It is important to look at some of the main events at the time when discussing these three developments together.

The Urban Aid Programme

I have already commented on the American programmes and it should be remembered that the beginning of 1968 was an important time both for Britain and with events occurring in the United States. The CAP had been going for three years and the Model Cities Program had been launched. Ideas from America were filtering towards Britain. But it is not primarily the existence of these ideas that is important, but the political and economic climate in Britain at the time.

The devaluation of the pound in November 1967 was in a sense the turning point for the Labour Government of 1964-70. Looking back at the history of the government's economic policy, it would with hindsight seem that if, as some within the Labour movement and government at the time argued, the pound had been devalued in 1964, then some of the government's subsequent problems would not have occurred. The economic philosophy of the Labour Government was a developed form of managed capitalism. The use of planning and rational techniques to overcome the anarchy of the market was a key part of the Government's approach. The establishment of the Department of Economic Affairs, the National Economic Development Council and the Department of Employment and Productivity were all part of this technocratic approach to the economy. Devaluation
represented the failure of this strategy and brought about
the reintroduction of more directly oppressive management
of the economy. Cuts in public expenditure, prices and
incomes control and attempts at controlling the trade unions
became the new strategy.

Politically, the main issue apart from the political repercus-
sions of devaluation and public expenditure cutbacks was the
question of immigration. Immigration presented a peculiar
electoral problem for the Labour Party. It was a completely
different one from that which Johnson faced. Labour's strategy
since the 1964 election had been based upon an attempt at
maintaining a balance between the 'immigration control' element
of the party and the 'integrative' strategy to prevent the
alienation of the large principled Labour vote.

The early months of 1968 were dominated by different 'racial'
debates. In February, five Tory ex-ministers sponsored a motion
to restrict immigration during the expulsion of Asians from Kenya.
The Race Relations Bill was being debated in the House of Commons.
In April 1968, Powell made his famous racialist speech and was
sacked from the Shadow Cabinet. London dockers marched to the
Commons in support of him. In the United States, the assassi-
nation of Martin Luther King in April was followed by riots
in many major cities. Wilson in his speech replying to Powell
in May announced the Urban Programme. The electoral concerns
of the Labour Party over the issue of race were centered on
the solid Labour constituencies in run-down areas of Britain's
cities which were vulnerable to racialist candidates attracting
the anti-immigration working class voter as had occurred in
Smethwick. Whereas Johnson's programme aimed at providing
benefits for blacks in the hope of electoral gain from black
votes, the British programmes sought to ameliorate the conditions
which were being exacerbated by the influx of high proportions
of immigrants. The Labour Party sought to retain their tradi-
tional voters by a mixture of immigration controls and the
improvement of local conditions.

Wilson's speech in Birmingham announcing the Urban Programme
was totally concerned with immigration.

'It was Birmingham's annual May Day celebration and I devoted the whole of my fifty five minute speech to immigration and to Mr Powell.' (Wilson, 1971: 525)

Subsequently the immigration focus of the Urban Programme was down played because of the possible politically unfavourable response which could have occurred if the programme was seen as being an immigrants' programme (Edwards and Batley, 1978: 46). Rather the emphasis was on 'areas of special social need', whether they contained high immigrant populations or not. There seems to be some doubt as to whether or not the idea of an Urban Programme was something which Wilson announced unknown to the Home Office or whether it had been planned in advance. According to Crossman;

'... the so called urban programme, for improving community relations especially on race. The truth is that when the PM needed to make his great speech at Birmingham on immigration he thought up the idea of a new urban programme which was going to help the areas of social need without being a burden on their budget. The difficulty since then has been to make any practical sense of this idea.' (Crossman, 1976: Vol 3, 129)

Crossman was not, however, in a position where he would necessarily have been aware of discussions which might previously have been taking place in the Home Office or seen the brief Wilson had been supplied with before making his announcement, but he reinforced this account in a report on an Immigration Committee meeting on 23rd July 1969.

'First we had a report on the urban programme and the £25 million which was to be concentrated in the areas of greatest social need. This is absolutely first-rate. It all arose out of a speech which Harold made a year or so ago at Birmingham, promising special arrangements there. He said it without knowing exactly what he meant but he has made good sense of it since. It is a really good example of a political initiative of Harold's working out really well. It isn't costing too much and we are getting kudos for it.' (Crossman, 1976: Vol 3, 589)

After the Birmingham speech a working party was brought together on the 7th May to

'consider implementation of the new and expanded Urban
Programme mentioned in the PM's speech.... but it would in addition serve the interdepartmental committee of officers who were to meet for the first time on 9th May to consider a wide range of subjects affecting areas of immigrant population.' (Edwards and Batley, 1978: 43-44)

The Working Party contained representatives at Assistant Secretary level from the Ministry of Health and Social Security, the Department of Education and Science, the Department of Employment and Productivity, the Ministry of Housing and Local Government, the Treasury and the Home Office.

Whether or not the Urban Programme had already been envisaged by civil servants within the Home Office, the immigration slant of the programme was concealed from the public for fear of unfavourable political repercussions. Edwards and Batley report that the remit of the Working Party was broken into three categories.

'1) Information on immigrants especially in the field of employment;
2) Information on existing programmes of help;
3) An assessment of the correspondence of areas of need and areas of immigration .....' (Edwards and Batley, 1978: 44)

They also report that there was a growing awareness that a programme to deal with immigrants contained political problems but as is pointed out in the Runnymede Trust Briefing Paper by Clare Demuth,

'The Urban Programme was not intended as a race programme, although it was hoped that the black population living in deprived inner city areas would, like the other inhabitants, benefit from its provisions.' (Demuth, 1977: 5)

The Interdepartmental Working Party developed the Programme on the basis of Wilson's outline of the intentions of the programme. Their main negotiations centered around the interdepartmental arrangements rather than concerns with the nature of areas of special social need. Areas of special social need can be defined either in terms that create the context of the programme i.e. a reverse procedure concerning budgeting and administrative criteria, or on a basis of 'what is social need?' i.e. a critical examination of the problems facing inner city
areas. It is not surprising that the question of definition was a process of adjustment between the two.

For example, regarding the focus on immigrants, Edwards and Batley discuss the issue of disguising the programme's immigrant focus.

'The starting point (for the Working Party) then was that the Programme was indeed designed to help immigrants though the fact might have to be disguised. The next step was to question the case for a simple focus on immigrant areas and problems. It was noted that the Prime Minister had emphasised that the Programme would apply to all the deprived urban areas ............

The Race Relations Division of the Home Office supported this view by arguing against suggestions, in early drafts of the Working Party's report, that the presence of immigrants was somehow itself a measure of deprivation. They were victims rather than the cause of the deprivation of the areas they might live in. Arguments like these supported the political case for overriding a programme strictly devoted to immigrants, and ministers agreed in their meeting of 30th May that the Programme should deal with needs in general as well as with the particular problems presented by immigration.'

(Edwards and Batley, 1978: 46)

Another example which Edwards and Batley commented upon was the selection of criteria for areas of special social need. The Working Party, using as a starting point county boroughs and London boroughs, and after comparing them with their selection on the criteria of Plowden's EPAs, Section 11 grants, and Ministry of Housing and Local Government 'housing priority areas', ended up with a list which excluded only thirteen of the 114 boroughs. Eventually, the decision was made to get local authorities to measure their own needs on a stated basis and let central government make a final selection. This, of course, had clear political and administrative advantages. If selection was on the basis of publicly available criteria, e.g. census data, then the allocation would be largely predetermined by 'objective' factors, not allowing for central government discretion. A system of bids maintained administrative and political control with the central government.

The Home Secretary, James Callaghan, announced the Urban Programme in the House of Commons on 22nd July 1968.
programme was to involve £20-£25 million over four years. The emphasis of the first year's expenditure was on capital projects relating largely to education - nursery schools, day nurseries and children's homes. In response to the announcement, the Conservative spokesperson who, welcoming it, obliquely reasserted the racial element.

'I welcome the fact that the statement contains, not a direct relationship to race, but to an equal opportunity in life for all our citizens. Will the Right Honourable Gentleman also accept that if this is to have its optimum effect which we hope it will, he will have to satisfy the country that he has adequate control over inflow into the country....' (Hansard, 1968b)

The first Urban Programme circular was issued in October 1968 jointly by the Home Office, Department of Education and Science and the Ministry of Health and in this circular, the broad tentative definition of areas of special social need was made;

'They are districts which bear the marks of multiple deprivation which may show itself, for example, by way of notable deficiencies in the physical environment, particularly in housing; overcrowding of houses; family sizes above the average; persistent unemployment; a high proportion of children in trouble or in need of care; or a combination of these. A substantial degree of immigrant settlement would also be an important factor, though not the only factor, in determining the existence of special social need.' (Home Office, 1968d)

However for the purposes of the first phase only thirty-four authorities were asked to submit bids to begin the programme at once. The criteria for selection as maintained by the circular was that areas either

1) had more than 2% of households with more than 1½ persons per room (on 1966 census data), or
2) had an exceptionally high immigrant population, that is more than 6% of immigrants on the school roll (figures relating to January 1967) (Home Office, 1968d)

Such broad criteria are a good example of the use of indicators to increase central government control over the direction and use of funds. As Edwards and Batley point out;

'.... within the Home Office there was no illusions about the depth of thinking which underlay either the
criteria or the projects. The main aim was to get the Programme launched as quickly as possible within the budget allowed by ministers.' (Edwards and Batley, 1978: 63)

Callaghan's announcement referred to a 'study':

'The Government have now completed the first stage of their study of urban areas facing acute social problems in the field of education, housing, health and welfare. Many of these areas include concentrations of immigrants.' (Hansard, 1968a)

This is not consistent with Edwards and Batley's account of the working party's deliberations and emphasises the role of research in legitimating political, administrative or economic decisions.

The Bill was passed unamended and was entitled

'a Bill to authorise the payment to local authorities in Great Britain of grants towards expenditure incurred by reason of special social need in urban areas.' (Local Government Grants (Special Needs) Bill, 1968)

It allowed the Home Secretary to pay grants to local authorities who in his opinion were required

'in the exercise of any of their functions to incur expenditure by reason of the existence in any urban area of special social need.' (Local Government Grants (Special Needs) Bill, 1968)

Debate on the Bill showed again the 'immigration' slant of the concern with areas of special social need. The majority of speakers concentrated on the issue, despite the denial by the Government that the Bill was a Bill to deal with areas of high immigrant concentrations. However, there was no opposition to the Bill by the Conservatives and it passed into law in January 1969.

Organisationally, although the Urban Programme was administered in a division of the Home Office, reflecting its immigration roots, the first three circulars were issued jointly, the fourth was issued solely by the Home Office in agreement with other departments concerned (Department of the Environment, DES and the DHSS). The first circular restricted the eligibility for funding to the thirty four named authorities, subsequent circulars were open to all local authorities. The
field of approval was also expanded to include projects which were ineligible under the defined areas of help named in the first circular, although housing related projects were not included. Subsequent circulars began to be issued on a regular, twice yearly, basis requesting bids from local authorities.

The system of bids and funding to local authorities meant that the administration of the Urban Programme at central government level was not a major task. The local authorities or voluntary organisations were responsible for the conduct and administration of local projects.

Considering the level of funding, the Programme was also very small. Both the absolute level and the share to any particular authority were marginal. The first circular allocated £3.5 million which provided for 191 nursery classes, 35 day nursery schemes and 20 homes for children. The £5 million in the second circular was divided between 91 authorities and provided 225 nursery classes, 29 day nursery schemes and just under £1 million for children’s homes and hostels. (Home Office, 1970a)

Comparing the first seven phases of expenditure under the Urban Programme with total local authority expenditure and grants from central government to local authorities, the small scale of the programme is apparent.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Phase</th>
<th>Authorised expenditure on UP (£m)</th>
<th>Total Local income from grants (£m)</th>
<th>Local Gov. Act Grants (RSG)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>68/69</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>3.8</td>
<td>1798.6</td>
<td>1404.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>69/70</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>4.9</td>
<td>2048.8</td>
<td>1610.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>70/71</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>5.1</td>
<td>2395.3</td>
<td>1877.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>71/72</td>
<td>4,5,6</td>
<td>6.9</td>
<td>2776.6</td>
<td>2175.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>72/73</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>5.9</td>
<td>3265.3</td>
<td>2556.6</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

In 1972, while £3,505 million was received by local authorities as government grants, the total income of local authorities was £8,872 million. Only 39.5% was coming from central government and the Urban Programme allocation represented only 0.06% of local government income that year (Central Statistical Office, 1975).

Apart from the amount of money involved in the different phases, the Urban Programme at times was used by both central and local government to finance projects which were in need of finance, but because of the restrictions at the time were unable to get funded. In this way, the aim of the Urban Programme was subverted to provide extra money for local authorities to spend not on innovatory projects which would never have been established but on projects they would liked to have financed if they had the money. For example,

'in Phase 7 the Department of Education and Science gave 100% of its grant to providing some 20,000 nursery places, since there was no other way of financing this development.' (Bird, 1972)

Local authorities also used the Urban Programme to finance projects which could have been financed under other expenditure. This is clear when examining the sort of projects that were financed. This was another advantage of the lack of definition of what constituted special social need, and the lack of an examination by the Home Office of what forces were responsible for (and therefore action was needed upon) 'multiple deprivation'.

I have already indicated the sorts of projects approved in the first phases of the programme. Edwards and Batley provide an analysis of the types of projects financed under the programme for Phases 1 to 9.

As they point out, the overwhelming emphasis was on children's projects with 52.7% of projects being child-oriented. This emphasis on child oriented projects indicates the connection between the Urban Programme and the concern with the 'cycle of poverty' which was prevalent in the late 1960s and early 1970s.
Child oriented projects could be expected to break the cycle of poverty. This view of a cycle of poverty is however rather different from the avowed aims of the Urban Programme in terms of areas of special social need.

**Distribution of Project Types: Phases 1 to 9**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type of project</th>
<th>Number (%)</th>
<th>Type of Project</th>
<th>Number (%)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Pre-school playgroups</td>
<td>278 (9.5)</td>
<td>Other advice centres</td>
<td>28 (1.0)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Children's Homes, day nurseries, day care</td>
<td>51 (1.7)</td>
<td>Community centres</td>
<td>81 (2.8)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nursery education</td>
<td>574 (19.6)</td>
<td>Community workers</td>
<td>48 (1.6)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Adventure playgrounds</td>
<td>117 (4.0)</td>
<td>General community projects</td>
<td>95 (3.2)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other play facilities</td>
<td>362 (12.4)</td>
<td>Volunteer Bureaux</td>
<td>34 (1.3)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Youth activities</td>
<td>82 (2.8)</td>
<td>Accommodation for homeless</td>
<td>88 (3.0)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Care of the elderly</td>
<td>114 (3.9)</td>
<td>Language projects</td>
<td>165 (5.6)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Family Planning</td>
<td>128 (4.4)</td>
<td>Compensatory education</td>
<td>106 (3.6)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Family Advice Centres</td>
<td>61 (2.1)</td>
<td>General Social Work</td>
<td>94 (3.2)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Neighbourhood Advice Centres</td>
<td>27 (0.9)</td>
<td>General health</td>
<td>30 (1.0)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Citizens Advice Bureaux</td>
<td>24 (0.8)</td>
<td>Miscellaneous</td>
<td>80 (2.7)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Legal Advice Centres</td>
<td>8 (0.3)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Housing Advice Centres</td>
<td>92 (3.1)</td>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td>2929 (100)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(Source: Edwards and Batley, 1978: 146)

The costs of individual projects in these phases were also calculated by Edwards and Batley.

**Distribution of projects by cost**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Cost (£)</th>
<th>Number</th>
<th>%</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>0-1,999</td>
<td>1028</td>
<td>35.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2,000-3,999</td>
<td>543</td>
<td>18.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4,000-5,999</td>
<td>277</td>
<td>9.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6,000-7,999</td>
<td>184</td>
<td>6.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8,000-9,999</td>
<td>125</td>
<td>4.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10,000-11,999</td>
<td>132</td>
<td>4.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12,000-13,999</td>
<td>115</td>
<td>3.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14,000-19,999</td>
<td>135</td>
<td>4.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>20,000-29,999</td>
<td>146</td>
<td>5.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>30,000-49,999</td>
<td>136</td>
<td>4.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>50,000+</td>
<td>108</td>
<td>3.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td>2929</td>
<td>100.0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(Source: Edwards and Batley, 1978: 157)
The majority of the expenditure on a single project being less than £4,000 was also balanced heavily towards capital expenditure.

'In terms of the original allocation of funds to projects, the balance has been heavily in favour of capital. (Accumulatively a ratio of about 6:1 for phases up to phase 9, though the ratio has fluctuated over the phases)' (Edwards and Batley, 1978: 79)

While this was the case, the programme met five year's running costs on capital projects which Edwards and Batley estimate average implied costs per year of one third of the original capital expenditure. This is an interesting contrast to the service orientation of the CAP in the United States. Clearly, of course, the provision of capital projects by the Home Office to local authorities provided an adjunct to the already existing service structure of British social policy. It also was an effective rationing mechanism for capital expenditure at a time of cut backs in public expenditure in general. The innovative 'project' style of the programme did not either establish firm constituencies from whom service withdrawal would create problems, or create concentrated levels of expenditure which would through bureaucratic interests or political pressure, be hard to reduce.

Adjustment to the needs element of the Rate Support Grant which it could be argued would have been an alternative way for central government to influence local authority expenditure, would not have allowed for the same degree of control over local authorities as was possible with the Urban Programme. Not until the Urban Programme's allocation under the Partnership Schemes were announced on 1st December 1977 was the amount of funding increased to a significant level.

Under the allocation to the seven inner city partnerships in 1977, the total amount involved for 1978/79 was £15½ million allocated as follows:

- Liverpool £2½ million
- Manchester/Salford £2½ million
- Birmingham £2½ million
- Newcastle/Gateshead £1½ million
- London Docklands £3½ million
Lambeth £1 million
Hackney/Islington £1½ million
(Edward, 1977g)

This allocation as well as representing a considerable increase from the previous allocations represented a shift in government strategy which had occurred through the seventies and particularly after the Urban Programme was moved to the Department of the Environment and towards more general supplementation to meet local authority needs.

'It is intended that the urban programme should supplement the main programmes of central and local government by providing, in the most deprived areas of our towns and cities, facilities which (a) encourage local authorities to tackle special problems requiring the coordinated efforts of several local authority departments and/or other agencies; (b) encourage innovation leading to the adaptation of the main programmes; (c) unlock community initiatives.' (Edward, 1977g)

As was the case with the Model Cities expenditure in American cities this sort of income for local government in the UK became, over the decade, an established part of local government's income from central government. The increase in funds under the Partnership scheme will be something I shall consider later.

The Community Development Projects

The Community Development Projects (CDPs) which, in terms of publicity and their repercussions were the second major initiative by central government prior to the setting up of the Partnerships. Their establishment was almost entirely a departmental initiative and they were financed through the Urban Programme. In fact, they were portrayed by central government as being the research and experimental side of the Urban Programme. A Home Office memorandum to the Official Cabinet Sub-Committee discussing the Community Development Areas Projects (as they were called at the time) discouraged early publicity of the projects, because

'It is likely that Ministers will wish to refer to the project in connection with the Urban Programme as a whole which will contain provision for research and development expenditure on CDAs.' (Home Office, 1968f)
Although the projects were connected with the Urban Programme since they were the responsibility of the same central government department, their connections apart from finance with the rest of the Urban Programme were not close.

It would seem, from the evidence of participants in the setting up of the projects and in reviewing the minutes of the Interdepartmental Working Party which formulated them, that they were largely the creation of Derek Morrell, who was at the time in the Children's Department of the Home Office. The idea of a new approach to community development was put forward in the course of working out proposals for changes in the law relating to children and young persons. It was agreed to set up an Interdepartmental Working Party to look into possible new approaches to community development. The working party was set up at the end of 1967 and drew upon an interdepartmental network of civil servants. Represented on the Working Party at its first meeting in January 1968 were seven representatives of the Home Office (one of whom was secretary and Morrell was chairman), two representatives of the Ministry of Health, and two from the Ministry of Social Security, and one each from the Office of the First Secretary of State, the Department of Education and Science, the Ministry of Labour, the Treasury and the Ministry of Housing and Local Government.

At the same time the EPA (A/R) projects were being set up with funding from the Department of Education and Science. Prior to the first meeting of the working party, Morrell had been in contact with Halsey and Young to discuss his proposal and see what connections could be made between the two projects. Morrell indicated to Young that he did not want the proposed CDAs to preempt or to subsume the EPA projects. He also indicated that he would support the Department of Education and Science in arguing that EPAs could provide a path which CDAs could follow (Morrell, 1968a). On the other hand, it seems that the DES representative at the first meeting of the working party argued that the SSRC were
'ready to allow their operation to be subsumed under the community development area scheme, if this were under way soon enough.' (Home Office, 1968a)

Another parallel development which was occurring was the deliberations of the Seebohm Committee. It would seem clear from the evidence that
1) The Home Office did not wish to lose the Children's Department to a social services ministry;
2) That they were aware of some of the deliberations of the Seebohm Committee (although a member of the Children's Department denied that this was this case in an interview);
3) That the Working Party was aware of the implications of the CDAs in relation to Seebohm (they might be seen as trial runs for Seebohm).

Whether or not the CDAs can be seen as an attempt to preempt the establishment of a unified social service ministry outwith the Home Office remains unproven, but I suggest that it is highly likely that this was the Home Office's intention. Hall (1976: 67) reports that Seebohm met Morrell several times to discuss possible conflicts and overlaps. The Report of the Working Party (Home Office, 1968c) suggested that it might be put to ministers that they wouldn't want to make a decision on Seebohm until after the Royal Commission on Local Government and the Review of the National Health Service had been completed and hence the CDAs could be announced as an early response to Seebohm or a feasibility study of their proposals based on pilot projects. Indeed the minutes of the first meeting of the Interdepartmental Working Party presented CDAs as

'The idea of community development areas involved feasibility of a coordinated approach to the needs of the community as a whole in a number of ... areas.' (Home Office, 1968a)

Comparing the early conception of the CDAs with both the proposals of the Seebohm Committee and their analysis in the chapter on 'The Community' (Chapter 16 of the Seebohm Report) the similarities to those of the CDA idea are striking.

'(The object of CDAs is) to discover whether it was possible to demonstrate a methodology which offered
such support in a manner which was productive of increased individual, family and community autonomy, thus progressively diminishing the need for special forms of external support.' (Home Office, 1968b)

'The notion of a community implies the existence of reciprocal social relationships which among other things ensure mutual aid and give those who experience it a sense of well-being.' (Seebohm, 1969: Para 476)

Two recurring themes in the Working Party's discussions and report was the existence of 'need' which, given the already well developed system of social services, seemed to be limitless if approached through an increase in resources alone, and secondly an emphasis upon the importance of 'community functioning' in approaching this problem.

'...... the problem was how to reach these people whose need for external support was virtually limitless while the conditions which gave rise to such need remained unmodified.' (Home Office, 1968b)

The conditions that gave rise to this situation were seen to be the fragmentation of 'community' support systems both statutory and interpersonal.

'The aim of the new approach is to find ways of meeting more effectively the needs of individuals, families and communities, whether native or immigrant suffering from multiple forms of deprivation. Typically such people have many inter-related problems. Frequently, they have a limited awareness of the true nature of the problems which they face. Frequently, they do not know how to gain access to, or to use constructively, the services which exist to help people tackle personal and family problems as they arise. As a result, many of them suffer from an accumulation of unrecognised and unresolved problems which eventually demand difficult and costly social interventions, such as the removal of children from their families into some form of residential care.' (Home Office, 1968c)

The report went on to discuss various aspects of the proposed projects. It is clear that it was hoped that finance could be found through the Urban Programme and it was decided to wait for the recommendations of the Working Party on Immigration and Community Relations which was discussing the proposed programme. It was proposed to include two or three areas of high immigrant population in the experiment and to integrate a description of the entire experiment, and a before and after
measurement of the effects of intervention into the projects.

The American experience, which was reviewed in an Appendix written by a Home Office member of the Working Party, commented upon the Ford Foundation, Mobilization for Youth and PCJDYC projects. The lessons that were derived from the American experience at this stage and indeed at later stages centered on the organisational problems and possible structures of the projects, rather than an assessment of what American experience in attempting to deal with similar problems could teach the Home Office. Given the different bureaucratic structures in the two countries, it is not surprising that 'lessons' were not 'learnt' and whereas the conflict generated in the CAP in the United States was seen as something which the CDPs should carefully try and avoid, conflict in CDP was not eliminated, although it arose through different structures.

In a paper dated 28th October 1968, a Home Office official stated some of the lessons that might be learnt from the US experience on the basis of a talk with Professor Alfred Kahn, head of the Columbia School of Social Work.

The lessons were seen as

'(a) Their failure to recognise that successful intervention will produce leaders among the underprivileged and unless these can have legitimate status roles and some access to and control of community resources they are forced into anarchical postures.

(b) Discriminating intervention produces a middle class hostility and an overreaction from the dispossessed because even though their way of life improves they recognise their deprivation and demand overcompensation. At this point middle class sympathy turns to hostility and can cause an abrupt end to any programme.

(c) The bureaucratic structures involved must themselves be prepared to back innovatory techniques but also to change their own structure eg. their decision making must be more politically accountable. Their representative power structures must be supplemented by a sharing with leaders of the dispossessed and new lines of communication effectively established.' (Home Office, 1968g)

Other points raised in relating the American experience show a similar lack of analytical assessment, or close definition of the problem; Head Start is claimed to be 'the best bet', research is not seen as having the necessary tools to evaluate
such a long term programme and most significantly in that it has little to do with the stated concerns of the Home Office in developing CDAs, the report concluded with the warning:

'8) Probably the most potent danger is among middle class affluent youth. In the US, atomic science and the Space Programme is attractive to graduates. Medicine and social science are failing to recruit adequate personnel of good quality. The danger for us is that while we have adequate numbers reading Modern Humanities we are failing to modify our bureaucratic structures to accommodate them eg Columbia University one third of Committees, except those awarding degree results and appointing staff, allow student representation, democratically elected. There is a lesson in this for our CDA programme.' (Home Office, 1968g)

The American experience was not selected as being relevant to what would appear to be the most basic questions. 'What can the US's War on Poverty tell us about the nature and causes of poverty in the modern industrialised world?' or even 'What can we learn from the US in terms both of how important community regeneration is in dealing with poverty and how can a programme with these aims be approached?'. This raises the issue of the lack of an attempt within the Home Office to question and verify the largely metaphysical view of community which seemed to be leading Morrell towards the programmes. Although the theme of 'community' was widespread (witness Seebohm) the inclusion of it in the CDPs formation would seem to have required more justification than was forthcoming. For instance Morrell wrote;

'We live in a society which exhibits a diminishing sense of community, oases of community remain ....... but more and more such cohesion as our national society possesses has come to be a function of a vast complex of instrumental relationships and most of these relationships are fragmentary, highly differentiated and impersonal.' (Morrell, 1967)

What concerned the Home Office were lessons of organisational control over the projects. It is however clear that the question of cooption was not only recognised but articulated. Community involvement was intended to coopt.

'Devolution of power and the creation of new statutory
roles is vital for success, otherwise illegitimate new powerful pressure groups threaten the legitimate local government power structure...... Militant local new groups and militant demands for additional services and resources are inevitable. The only way of controlling these is to devolve real responsibility on to them.....' (my emphasis) (Home Office, 1968g)

After the Interdepartmental Working Party had reported, the proposals for the Community Development Areas Project were referred to a Sub-Committee of the Official Cabinet Committee on Social Services for final development. This sub-committee was chaired by a civil servant from the Lord President's Office and included representatives from the Treasury, the Department of Employment and Productivity, Home Office, Department of Education and Science, Ministry of Housing and Local Government, Ministry of Health, Ministry of Social Security and the Cabinet Office. The Scottish, Welsh and General Register's Offices were to receive papers and to be invited to meetings 'as necessary'. The secretariat was provided by the Cabinet Office and the terms of reference were 'to advise the Ministerial Sub-Committee on CDA on questions of policy arising on the establishment, execution and evaluation of the project.' (Cabinet Office, 1968a)

Morrell wrote to the Chairman of the Committee (of which Morrell was a member) laying out the objectives of CDPs.

' The key Home Office objective is to produce a situation in which individuals, families and larger social groups display greater awareness of their interdependence leading to greater mutual acceptance of their different needs and functions ........ In pursuit of this overall objective the focal social group is the family, the individual depends on the family for his primary experience of social relationships, which are in the sense described above accepting, communicative and cooperative .... It contributes directly by enriching the individual's primary experience of creative social relationships. It contributes indirectly by providing a firmer base of primary experience upon which to build a superstructure of broader social relationships, leading to a more creative use of social services as opposed to chronic dependance eg on social security benefits ....' (Morrell, 1968b)

This would seem to be a clear statement of the philosophical direction which Morrell was taking. Examining the relationship
between his view and the announced nature of the programme and between this and the eventual course of the programme, the motivating force in the development of policy cannot be found in Morrell's ideas. This shows how the forces which largely dictate the projects existence and direction are related to the initial ideas which led to the concern of Morrell to develop such a programme. As Mayo (1975) pointed out, the view of poverty that was contained within the CDA proposals was one of the individual of a marginal minority who had slipped through the net. The solution was seen as being administrative reform combined with some community development to stimulate self-help. Community development stimulating self-help is an attractive notion at a time of cuts in public expenditure especially when (as Johnson observed) the solution of increased welfare benefits and services seemed to be a bottomless pit. In a letter to the Chairman of the County Council's Association from the Office of the Secretary of State for Social Services, this view is put clearly;

'The prime aim will not only be to get people in these areas back onto their feet, but to enable them to stand more on their own in future by their own efforts.' (Office of the Secretary of State for Social Services, 1968)

This provides a contrast with the more philosophical and idealistic aim as put forward by Morrell. The aims as presented to the Town Clerks, inviting them to participate were a balance between the aims of Morrell and the more basic aims presented by the Office of the Secretary of State.

The Cabinet Sub-Committee's task was to formulate a hierarchy of detailed objectives. One of the lessons that the Sub-Committee claimed to have learnt from the American experience was this need for a hierarchy of objectives.

'The more general the objective, the less it is likely that a single project, even on a large scale will produce anything which could properly be described as a solution to problems of community development. Indeed the project as a whole is best thought of as a means of producing ameliorative change rather than solutions.' (Cabinet Office, 1968b)
The Sub-Committee was also responsible for suggesting which areas should be selected for pilot projects. The criteria which were to be used to designate the first three areas included:

1) At least one with an EPA action research project; 
2) They were to be well distributed geographically; 
3) They were to be strongly motivated; 
4) They were to be capable of being associated with a suitable university department; 
5) Between them they were to give rise to the kinds of problems likely to be encountered in the next phase without exhibiting problems in their most severe forms.

With regard to the question of selecting an area with a high proportion of immigrants in the population, the Home Office memorandum to the Sub-Committee suggested:

'...it is for consideration whether the problem of colour should be tackled in the first or second phase. Political and presentational considerations suggest the former, whereas common prudence suggests that it would be preferable to gain experience in areas with less intractable problems.'

(Home Office, 1968f)

Invitations were issued in February 1969 to three local authorities to establish the first projects and the announcement of the projects was made in the House of Commons by the Home Secretary on 16th July 1969. Liverpool, Coventry and Southwark were chosen to have the first pilot projects. The initial emphasis in the invitation to the local authorities was upon the coordination of services, experimentally at local level, to try and meet what were seen as being the interrelated needs of the residents of these areas.

'...... the experiment will be aimed at finding new ways of helping, through the social services, and a variety of forms of social action the needs of individuals, families and communities suffering from many forms of social deprivation. The experiment will be designed to bring together in a fully coordinated way all the different services, both central and local which are concerned to remedy the various forms of deprivation which tend to exist together, but the prime aim will not only be to get people in these areas back on their feet but to enable them to stand all on their own in the future, by their own efforts.'

(Crossman, 1969)
The Home Office's initial emphasis was on these three aspects:
1) Coordination of local services;
2) Self-help
3) An innovative approach to regenerate these areas through concentrating on the people in an attempt to achieve permanent improvements.

The remaining nine projects were announced over the next two years with projects in Cumberland and Newcastle upon Tyne being announced in August 1971 as the last of the twelve.

The approach which was put forward in the first Home Office Press Release (Home Office, 1969b) announcing projects in Coventry, Liverpool and Southwark suggested that inter-service teams were to be set up in the neighbourhoods and the teams were to be built up by the part-time secondment of workers from services in the area.

'In this way all relevant services will be brought together; child care, education, employment, health, housing, police, probation, social security, and welfare, as well as the help available from voluntary organisations. Each team ...... will try in particular to overcome the separate organisation of the social services by concentrating upon the total situation and needs of families, and individuals living in the neighbourhood and initiating a strategy of community work to bring them and the neighbourhood more effective help.' (Home Office, 1969b)

The research aspect of what was being described as an action-research project was to

' ...... throw light on how to make the social services more accessible and intelligible to the poor and severely deprived; how to develop better communication, and hence cooperation, between services; and how to use our limited resources to greater effect in dealing with the complex social problems in our cities.' (Home Office, 1969b)

The project which was to be financed under the Urban Programme, was the responsibility of the Home Office and included a central steering group at national level and a central research team which was to interrelate the research findings of the local research teams and coordinate the research in a similar way to the EPA action research, research directorate.
In January 1971, the Children's Department was moved from the Home Office to the newly established Department of Health and Social Security. It became increasingly anachronistic for the projects to be controlled from the Home Office and yet, as the Urban Programme as a whole developed, the Home Office retained the CDPs and resisted all attempts to have these concerns removed either to the Department of Health and Social Security or the Department of the Environment. Looking at this, it can be seen that without a service concern within the area covered by the CDPs, the only role that the Home Office could have played, if the experiment was to provide a basis for central government action at a local level on a broader scale, was that of giving information to other departments within central government. The structure of central government is not, however, conducive to this sort of interdepartmental cooperation and interchange as I will show with regard to the Department of the Environment and the Home Office during the Inner Area Studies. Another anomaly of the CDPs which already existed as they were being launched was that, with the acceptance of the Seebohm proposals and their implementation, the new social services departments created in the local authorities were already undergoing changes and any subsequent social service improvements which could have been assessed as having arisen from the CDP experience could not have been implemented at the local authority level, if that were to mean another reorganisation, without considerable cost in terms of disruption to the services.

A parallel can be drawn between the Office of Economic Opportunity and the central CDP administration's position in relation to their programmes and projects. However, it would be an inaccurate parallel because although they were both within major, powerful central government departments (OEO in the Executive Office of the President and CDP in the UP division in the Home Office), OEO was, in its own right, a major spending department building up services and with its own political constituency. The CDPs, on the other hand, if they had followed
their initial remit, would have been attempting to coordinate under direct Home Office control and guidance, services which were financed by, and supervised by other central government departments (eg Department of Health and Social Security and the Department of the Environment).

This anachronistic organisational structure, which was a product of central government departmental politics, was a sufficient reason in itself for some of the later problems faced by CDPs. The Home Office was left with twelve projects whose results could not be fed (even if under proper administrative arrangements they could have been) into action by other government departments outwith the control of the Home Office.

As it was, the projects developed an independence from the Home Office's control which led, at an early stage to a dramatically different set of projects than those intended by the creators of the CDPs. The way in which the projects did develop is not of major concern here except in as far as it relates to the subsequent establishment of the Inner Area Studies in the Department of the Environment and the Comprehensive Community Programmes in the Home Office. The directions taken by the projects can be seen in their final reports and in the reports of the CDP Intelligence and Information Unit.

The twelve projects and their relatively low level of funding make a sharp contrast with the American poverty programmes. The projects were entirely different from those in America both in their initial remit and their eventual histories. Parallels were drawn in the Home Office between the CDPs and the Model Cities Program and suggestions were made to try and make links between the American programmes and the British projects, but the reasons which were put forward in a memorandum in the Home Office related more to the strengthening of CDP than to learning. It was suggested that such a link would:

'enhance the prestige of CDP as a research enterprise and therefore facilitate the recruitment of good research personnel.' (Home Office, 1970b)

Subsequently nothing came of this.

Another attempt to combine the British and American experience
was the conference at Ditchley Park on October 29th - 31st, 1969. This was part of the effort to achieve common discussion of domestic policies between the two countries that Nixon and Wilson were planning.

'You and I recognise, Mr President, that sharing experience, sharing thinking, spelling out more clearly our social ideals for the 1970s is not a task for governments alone, for Parliament and Congress only, but for our social administrators and social workers.' (Wilson, 1970)

The Report of the Ditchley Park conference commented that the conference;

'reflected a desire on the part of the American and British governments to learn from each other's experience in social policy, and both Governments' concern with the problems presented by 'high need areas'. (Home Office, 1969a: i)

I shall comment in more detail at a later stage on this conference but it is sufficient to note here that there was little indication that in any specific way the Ditchley Park conference affected the subsequent content of the CDPs or the approaches taken to the problems of 'urban deprivation'. Rather it can be seen as having contributed to the general knowledge of Home Office participants and CDP workers.

Whereas in America the building of services in an area was seen as being of importance from the beginning of the CAP and only gradually through the Model Cities Program did this emphasis shift to the coordination of federal and local services, in Britain, this concern with coordination was of prime importance from the beginning of the projects. The British emphasis on personal inadequacy reflected the fact that services had been developed to a greater extent in Britain than in America. If, as was seen as being the case in Britain, services to provide for all sorts of need already existed, then the twin focus on personal inadequacy in making use of existing opportunities and the need to coordinate these services to make the clients task easier was a logical conclusion. In America, however, the emphasis of the programmes on personal inadequacy had different service implications and developed out of different
sets of influences giving its emphasis a different stress. While the British Welfare services were facing increasing and seemingly endless demands at a time of public expenditure cuts, the American federal government however was not placed in the same position. Rather it was hoped that through the introduction of services which did not already exist, the federal government would be able to increase the productivity of the poor and so aid the regeneration of the stagnant US economy.

The CDPs, like the American CAP, do reflect perceived economic and political demands upon central government. Thus the major factors that in my view account for the implementation of the Home Office's CDP proposals were:

(1) The CDP being an action-research project could be presented as research investigation connected to the development of the Urban Programme, which concealed the direct political factors in developing the Urban Programme;

(2) CDP could hope to produce new ways which would lead to the reduction in the need for and demands on social services, both in cash and kind;

(3) CDP at a small cost and even without favourable results could be presented by the government as an indication of its intention to deal with seemingly intractable problems of 'multiple deprivation'.

The issue of positive discrimination and area based projects were ones which raised other questions about the projects and relate closely to broader trends effecting the context in which the government was operating. I shall examine this and questions raised by the research aspect of CDP and EPAs in a later section.

The Inner Area Studies

The launching of the Inner Area Studies was announced in reply to a question in the House of Commons on 26th July 1972 by Peter Walker, Secretary of State for the Environment. He had earlier intimated that they were under consideration in a speech during the debate on the Budget. In the Budget speech he announced;

'....... I intend in the next few weeks, with, the coop-
eration of local authorities, to designate six towns and inner city areas where a group from my Department and local government will examine the total resources needed completely to transform such areas. The working group in each of these six towns will be headed by one of the Ministers from my Department, including myself. In this way we can bring to the attention of local government and my department the need for a much more total approach to make really remarkable progress in the areas concerned.' (Hansard, 1972a: Col 1698)

The Six Towns studies became divided between three Urban Guidelines Studies in Oldham, Rotherham, and Sunderland and three Inner Area Studies in Lambeth, Birmingham and Liverpool. In this announcement the Secretary of State defined the purposes of the two sets of studies. The Urban Guidelines purpose was:

'to help local authorities develop a total approach to the improvement of the urban environment, looking at their towns as a whole. They will be related primarily to the functions for which the new district councils will be responsible from April 1974. We hope to produce guidance of practical value on the interrelationship between activities and on using available resources to the best effect.' (Hansard, 1972b: Col 319)

The Inner Area Studies were concerned with:

'... the environmental problems of inner city areas... In these studies we shall be looking for possible courses of action on the environmental problems of inner city areas. This will involve practical work on the ground, of which my Department will bear the major part of the cost. We shall try to look at the needs of the study areas as a whole from the point of view of the people living in them and to derive lessons on powers, resources and techniques.' (Hansard, 1972b: Col 320)

The Inner Area Studies, which I will concentrate upon at the moment, were given as their brief:

1) To discover by study a better definition of inner areas and their problems;
2) To investigate by experiments on the ground the actions affecting the physical environment of these areas which could usefully be undertaken for social and environmental purposes;
3) To examine whether the concept of 'area management' can usefully be developed and what the practical implications would be to the local authority.
4) To provide the basis for general conclusions on statutory powers, finance and resource questions, and techniques. (Environment, 1977b)

The Inner Area Studies were each controlled by a local steering group chaired by a Minister and the reports were written by consultants to the studies. The establishment, within the Department of the Environment, of an urban deprivation focus had implications for the Home Office's control over this area.

McConaghy (1978) reports that, upon the establishment of the Department of the Environment in 1970, an Urban Policy Review was set up to look for some form of total approach to the problems of the worst areas. The Urban Policy Review became;

'... a shambles and noise of it leaked through Whitehall and beyond. Meetings between Junior Ministers and outside experts, well known private consultants, academics and the like were arranged; nobody knew what to do, but something had to happen. Peter Walker had come to the conclusion that outside contractors were essential.'
(McConaghy, 1978: 188)

The importance for the Secretary of State in setting up the Studies as soon as possible arose both because of the imminent reorganisation of local government and also because of the increased disorganisation of the Urban Programme which the DOE's establishment created. The DOE's approach emphasised their own departmental concerns but it is clear that with the basic problems in sight a more comprehensive approach had implications for other government departments and in particular for the Home Office.

The account in the Liverpool Report of the setting up of the Studies is inadequate, reflecting the most prevalent style of accounts for social policy developments.

'By 1972 there was growing anxiety in government about the conditions in which many people were living in inner city areas; about the persistence of pockets of poverty and social stress; about increasing crime rates and racial tension; about high levels of unemployment irrespective of changes in the national economy. It was becoming clear, too, that local authorities despite strenuous efforts, particularly in slum clearance, had not succeeded in eradicating urban deprivation.
So .... the Secretary of State for the Environment announced the commissioning of two groups of studies.' (Environment, 1977a: 5-6)

Comparing the initial remit of the CDPs with that of the IAS and the Urban Guidelines, the emphasis was quite different. Despite the concern of both the CDPs and the IAS with similar manifestations of deprivation in run-down areas, the IAS were concerned with the physical environment and management, planning and budgeting questions. It is not easy to attribute this shift from the coordination of services to a management approach in the same way as happened in the US to the political and economic forces affecting the government. Two major factors, I would suggest, led to this emphasis. On the one hand, the DOE, in developing the programme as a departmental initiative, had to remain within the departmental concerns with the rundown areas of the cities, this is reflected in the remit. For instance, major concerns with industrial and economic policy which could be seen as being of crucial importance are outwith the responsibilities of the DOE. The other important factor was the management oriented approach of the Conservative government, which reflected the wider economic picture of the country at the time.

'Prime Minister Edward Heath was dedicated to going about government in a 'business-like' way and graduates from Harvard School of Business Studies seemed to be everywhere. The new functional re-grouping of ministries into 'super-departments' suggested that each had to devise clear policy objectives.' (McConaghy, 1978: 186)

The establishment of the DOE as one of these 'super-departments' reflected this trend itself. The use and influence of American budget and management concepts gained importance in British government at this time and the IAS, and more particularly the Urban Guidelines, were part of this movement. The report of the management consultants McKinsey and Company on the management and organisation of Liverpool is credited with being important not only in the thinking around the IAS but also in the Baines Report on the management of local authorities (Environment, 1977a).

The Inner Area Studies were created out of these different
pressures; the movement towards and concern with the management, planning and budgetary techniques used by government (with an eye on the possible savings that could be made through rationalisation and simplification) and the attempt by the DOE to enter into the urban policy field to overcome problems with which it was confronted.

Influential in alerting Peter Walker to the problems of Inner Areas was Des McConaghy who had been the Director of the Shelter Neighbourhood Action Project in Liverpool and was invited to be a special adviser to the DOE by Walker. McConaghy indicates the differences between his approach and the approach of the DOE in his article (McConaghy, 1978).

'The way they (IAS) were launched goes a long way to show why governments continually fail to adopt policies for the needs of deprived areas, whether or not they are inner city areas. My own thesis has been that the worst urban areas are only the most visible and distressing manifestations of fundamental weakness in national, regional and local economies and in the institutions charged with managing them. It is a politically convenient fantasy to pretend that inefficient bureaucracy fragmented action and piecemeal measures are confined to those areas where they are most apparent.' (McConaghy, 1978: 184)

The institutional difficulties in developing the approach are also indicated by him. The place of SNAP in formulating the initiatives that were developed by the DOE is another example of the role of ideas in policy making and how they, while providing the initial articulation of an approach are modified beyond recognition by the more influential political, administrative and economic concerns facing policy makers.

If the Inner Area Studies are accurately portrayed as a departmental initiative which provided the promise both of the strengthening of the Department through the consolidation of a comprehensive concern with urban problems within the Department and prominence to the Secretary of State with a new initiative, it is not surprising that the IAS failed to develop in the ways in which their mentors had planned. The Home Office managed to maintain their control over the Urban Programme and the resources and concerns that went with it.
'Peter Walker and the late Tony Crosland, as Shadow Minister, both wanted to take over the Urban Programme, directly bringing into play the wide range of powers ostensibly enjoyed by the DOE.' (McConaghy, 1978: 185)

The approach of the DOE, centering on such issues as finance and management of run-down urban areas promised a more successful result than the Home Office's small-scale projects. The Home Office however managed to retain control over CDP and the Urban Programme at this stage. The removal of Peter Walker from the DOE and his replacement with the less dynamic Geoffrey Rippon in 1972 heralded the failure of the DOE's attempt. The Home Secretary was given overall responsibility for urban policy.

Even before the Home Office reasserted its control over urban policy, the Inner Area Studies began to lose significance. As McConaghy reports;

'With Mr Geoffrey Rippon's arrival as Secretary of State for the Environment these all seemed esoteric matters; he did not want to change much. Because the Studies were not directed around funding principles, the dedicated interest of local government was lost. The six projects concentrated on too widely varying aspects of the 'urban problem', partly because of differences in approach by private consultants, partly because the concerns of members and officers differed and partly because of differences in the situation of the six areas chosen. All the projects were kept away from central policy issues and were largely forgotten as an item of DOE business ....' (McConaghy, 1978: 192)

It is interesting to note that a similar course seems to have been followed by CDP. After being the much heralded experimental approach both the projects and studies vanished into relative obscurity (although they were both being highly productive and challenging to government in different ways) until they were resurrected; in the case of CDPs owing to the ability of the projects to make themselves heard nationally when the government attempted to close them down and, in the case of the IAS because the Labour Government could use their results to justify their new urban strategy of inner city partnerships.

A striking difference between the IAS and the CDPs was the use
of outside professional consultants to produce reports. The government could either have relied upon specially employed teams, as in the case of CDP, or regular local authority or central government personnel. However, they hired six different firms of consultants. The use of outside consultants had certain interesting features.

1) Established consultants of this type were less likely than teams recruited in the manner of the CDP teams to produce results which did not embody the necessary agreement about the nature and purposes of government.

2) The use of established consultants gave greater legitimacy to their findings — as outside consultants without a vested interest either within central government or the local authority.

The Inner Area Studies produced nearly forty reports on separate policy aspects as well as a summary of the three final reports. Each project was a discrete study without an overall joint research assessment as occurred with CDP, consequently certain of their recommendations and findings tended to conflict.

The major departure of the IAS was, however, in their broader scope and more comprehensive approach in their search for solutions. The questions that were being raised (and largely dismissed by central government) were being investigated in a rigorous empirical manner. Issues such as the relationship between employment and housing or the possible management restructuring at local authority level were raised in a way which could help to alleviate conditions and prioritise issues. These questions posed a much wider view of the problems of 'multiply deprived' areas than had other formulations by the central government whose previous approach had been primarily

---

1 In the case of the Inner Area Studies, Liverpool's IAS consultants were Hugh Wilson and Lewis Womersley, Chartered Architects and Town Planners, Roger Tym and Associates, Urban and Land Economists and Jamieson Mackey and Partners, Consulting Civil and Transportation Engineers, Birmingham's were Llewelyn-Davies, Weeks, Forestier-Walker and Bor and Lambeth's was in conjunction with Shankland Cox Partnership and the Institute of Community Studies.
focused on an individual and community pathology. It is perhaps ironic that the Conservative Government was responsible for an approach which moved away from a 'blame the poor' approach. As I have suggested above, however, this earlier approach reflected a lack of available funds to implement its service implications. By concentrating upon the processes of government, the DOE was moving in a similar direction to that taken by President Nixon in his assessment of there being a crisis of government. To attribute part of the problem to an institutional failing had few repercussions since most run-down areas were represented by Labour MPs and councillors and although the lack of institutional power in these areas was a result of the power of the more affluent areas of the cities, it did not pose the same electoral problems to them as was the case with Labour. For Labour, with councillors in a city where they had a marginal majority or were a large minority (until the revival of the Liberal Party at a local level through community politics (especially in Liverpool)) their safe seats were in the run-down areas and to maintain or win control over the local council, benefits had to be seen to be accruing to the more affluent marginal wards which might be under threat from other parties, especially if Labour was seen as spending too much money rewarding their established constituents or minority groups at the expense of others.

The action research component of the IAS had definite differences from that of the initial CDP idea of action research. It will be remembered that the original Home Office idea of action research was that of documenting the course of the projects and then assessing their results. In the action research projects of the Inner Area Studies, the report of the Lambeth project lays out three approaches to action research;

1) Classical

'The classical approach would analyse basic research and known facts, propose a topic for a new policy investigation, set up a scheme to try it out and subsequently evaluate it.'
2) Liverpool

'The approach of our colleagues in Liverpool, on the other hand, was to embark on a large number of action projects. These were either identified by the local authority at the outset or by the team; early in its work, in the expectation that the experience gained would lead itself to generalisation later.'

3) Lambeth

'We did not propose any action project which did not have a prospect of generalised conclusions in view at the outset.' (Environment, 1977c)

The overwhelming difference between the IAS and previous conceptions of action research was that the studies were clearly research studies using action to aid research. Previous action research had tended either to emphasise research as an aid to action as in the Home Office's conception of action research in the CDP, or as in EPA where the nature of the research was action oriented, being experimental. The IAS action research conception was nearer to that of the later CDP research.

As indicated above, the Inner Area Studies were largely ignored until the launching of Labour's Partnership schemes in the White Paper - Policy for the Inner Cities (Environment, 1977d).

The White Paper is described as being drawn up on

'the experience of earlier initiatives ... above all the Inner Area Studies for which the full reports are about to be published. The White Paper may be regarded as the Government's response to the Inner Area Studies for which summary reports were published in January of this year.' (Environment, 1977d)

The link between the IAS and the White Paper is more apparent than real. Interviews with consultants suggest that the government 'rediscovered' the studies and urged the consultants to prepare and publish their Final Reports as soon as possible to allow this claim to be made. But I shall return to the issue of the White Paper later because two other developments should be mentioned before discussing it.

Comprehensive Community Programmes

The Comprehensive Community Programmes were announced in
1974 in the House of Commons by Roy Jenkins, the Home Secretary in answer to a question from David Steel. The CCPs were formulated in the Home Office following a review of urban deprivation policy which had been instigated by the Treasury, following concern over the open endedness of the commitment which the Urban Programme implied and the plethora of projects developing without coordination in the Home Office and the DOE.

Previously questions had been asked in the House concerning coordination between the Home Office and the DOE regarding urban policy and the Prime Minister (Heath) had given the Home Secretary (Carr) the responsibility to overview these initiatives. The responsibility

'to undertake coordinating action to help areas of urban deprivation involves close consultation between all the Departments concerned with different aspects of this problem.' (Hansard, 1973b: Col 95-96)

CCPs could be seen as the Home Office's attempt to regain the initiative on urban deprivation policy. The CCP rather than referring to a project in the sense of CDP or IAS was a programme to be drawn up at local authority level considering the needs of the area as a whole and making recommendations to the local authority. Their purpose as announced in a Home Office Press Notice (Home Office, 1974) was,

'to bring about, through the coordinated efforts of central government, regional water and health authorities, local authorities, voluntary bodies and residents a re-ordering of priorities in favour of those living in the most acutely deprived areas.' (Home Office, 1974)

The programmes were to be developed through trial runs in selected local authorities. The CCPs' subsequent history are of interest since nothing really came of them. Having been announced as the new strategy produced through a review of Urban Policy after an interdepartmental study by the Urban Deprivation Unit, the CCP changed its form between announcement and implementation and then was gradually ignored until no more mention of anything but trial runs was made by the government. The Inner City Partnerships which were subsequently announced in the
White Paper in 1977 contained some of the features of the CCPs rhetoric but superseded them. The pilot programmes begun were left to continue their work on their own and with little encouragement that they would be used by central government.

The CCPs were a product of the Urban Deprivation Unit which was set up after the Home Secretary was given responsibility of coordinating the government's urban deprivation strategy. The Unit in 1974 consisted of ten staff costing £65,000 per annum. In answer to a question in the House of Commons, Alex Lyon, the Home Office Minister responsible stated

'... the unit's task is to help us in the development of Government policy directed to combating urban deprivation. In collaboration with other Government Departments it is making a wide ranging review of the nature and extent of urban deprivation, the problems underlying it and the policies brought to bear on it by central and local government.' (Hansard, 1974a: Col 1462)

The CCPs' foundations can be seen to embody the twin emphases of improved management and positive discrimination. They were intended to place an urban deprivation strategy within the corporate planning structure of local government and encourage local authorities to tackle the problems of urban deprivation but without necessarily spending more. The strategy was, more clearly than any other of the projects, an example of positive discrimination used as a means of distributing cuts in public expenditure and services. The reordering of priorities in favour of acutely deprived areas at a time of cuts effectively meant cutting less than elsewhere.

The UDU's proposals for CCPs met with some opposition, especially regarding the small area size of CCPs, which was originally envisaged in their announcement.

'The areas affected would each be of about 10,000 population, and would be identified from an analysis of indices of deprivation and from discussion with local authorities.' (Hansard, 1974b: Col 651)

The UDU later justified the shift towards the whole authority for the CCPs in terms of research findings.

'Urban deprivation ... is commonly used to refer to the condition's experienced by those who live in the so
called worst areas of our towns and cities. Areas characterised by the poorest physical and environmental conditions and by a whole tangle of social problems. Research has shown however that the concept of the worst area can be misleading recently completed analysis of the 1971 census of population undertaken by the DOE at the request of the Home Office Urban Deprivation Unit has shown that the areas identified as multiply deprived depend upon the definition of multiple deprivation employed.' (Home Office, 1975)

While this was the rationale, it is clear that unless the Home Office's review of urban deprivation was extremely sketchy they would have been aware of this in 1974 when the CCPs were announced. As early as the EPA research this point was being emphasised in relation to an area approach. The Home Office changed the CCPs from a small area based approach not on the basis of research but because of the political problems which local authorities found in the small area approach. Local authorities resisted yet another small area approach because within the authority, and particularly within the ruling group - which was often Labour in these cities - tensions were created between councillors whose wards also contained 'deprived areas' and the councillors whose wards were within a project area. A continuing problem of positive discrimination on a local level, especially acute when resources were short, was that certain areas were seen to receive more than they deserve. Local authorities, especially when there was little promise of much extra funds were reluctant to create these problems for themselves.

The management orientation of the approach, while stressing the comprehensive nature of the strategy, had few implications for central government funding. After the CDPs and the Inner Area Studies it is perhaps surprising that the organisation of government services should yet again be seen as the key to the problem, although CCP could be seen as being supposed to do what CDP failed to do. EPAs, though being the first of the projects to which others referred in tracing the roots of the concern, was based upon the premise that not only were more resources through a positive discrimination approach required
but also that the educational service itself needed some changes made to it, to become successful in meeting the requirements of poor areas. Changes in the institutional relationships of, or content of services had expenditure implications which particularly in 1974 were not in keeping with the overall economic picture as perceived by the government. The note to local authorities from the Home Office rationalised these considerations on the basis of previous experience.

'It must take account also of the experience of past initiatives and research both in this country and abroad which indicate that the problems of urban deprivation are such that they cannot be tackled effectively by means of special compensatory programmes of the self-help or community development type or by particular innovative or experimental projects such as those financed under the urban programme or even by pumping large amounts of money into small areas through environmental or physical improvements schemes but require the use of a wide range of policies and programmes from both central and local government which have been developed to help those most in need.' (Home Office, 1975)

This is a clear rationalisation. What else is a wide range of policies and programmes, if not money and new approaches? According to the note the aim was the restructuring and redirecting of major central government programmes to areas of high need.

'..... what is required is to direct the major programmes and policies of government to those most in need. Decisions about the allocation of scarce resources must obviously be settled through the political process but new administrative arrangements can help to ensure the political commitments are translated into effective action.' (Home Office, 1975)

The CCP was designed in three parts. Part I was to contain a description of the form and incidence of deprivation in the local authority area. This part of the CCP would provide local authorities with information upon which to select key issues for Part II. Part II was to consist of the analysis of these issues. The issues analysed were to be those upon which some action could be expected and the analysis was to develop
practical proposals. Part III was to be a programme of action for tackling urban deprivation in the local authority area in the next financial year. This format has echoes of the American planning models. It would seem at first sight to be obviously superfluous. No council maintaining that planning was carried out in a rational manner should start at stage three without having the necessary basic information or being aware of the issues, but government does not work in a linear and rational fashion and the 'planning' approach in both countries is simultaneously an admission of this and an attempt to conceal it. Another major characteristic of such an approach is the cold and rational technocratic model implied. If such processes were followed through councils would be essentially redundant since local planning authorities would merely have to respond 'neutrally' to the priorities which central government had determined.

CCPs were set up in Bradford, Wandsworth, Gateshead and Motherwell in Scotland. The Motherwell CCP differed significantly from the three English ones, being set up in the original small area manner which the Home Secretary had announced. The other three were authority wide CCPs. The Gateshead CCP was the first in England and the whole CCP proposal was overtaken by the Inner City Partnerships early in the CCPs' history.

The CCP attempted to link together the various local and central government agencies and departments involved. In Gateshead and Bradford there were three CCP groups - the Members Group which brought together local elected councillors and was chaired by a DOE minister to give political guidance to the CCP and make a political link between the Metropolitan Council, County Council and central government. The CCP working/steering group (in Gateshead there were two separate groups) responsible for the working arrangements and the coordination of the CCP respectively and the the CCP team which in the case of Gateshead was of four members and in Bradford seven. The Gateshead CCP team eventually became responsible for the Gateshead part of the Newcastle/Gateshead Inner Areas Programme set up under the
partnership arrangements.

The CCPs can be assessed as having been a failure. From the beginning they were greeted without enthusiasm. The time taken to begin to implement them, the change in their character and their lack of support from central government effectively destroyed them before they were begun. The initiative had been regained by the DOE and the responsibility for the CCPs were removed from the Home Office Urban Deprivation Unit in June 1977 to the DOE. The background to this transfer of responsibility is outlined below.

**Area Management Trials**

After the first general election of 1974 in February, the Prime Minister appointed Charles Morris as Minister for Urban Affairs within the Department of the Environment. This appointment was instantly and forcefully objected to by the Home Secretary, Roy Jenkins, who maintained that the DOE was encroaching on Home Office concerns. The political power of Jenkins led to Wilson backing down and no Minister was appointed after the October 1974 general election. A truce between the departments was called until Peter Shore managed in 1977 to have urban deprivation transferred from the Home Office to the DOE.

The Area Management Trials were set up by the DOE at the same time as the CCPs were being set up by the Home Office. The idea of area management was one of the briefs that the Inner Area Studies were given to look at. Liverpool set up a trial for two years in District D in April 1974 with the objectives of examining the ways in which area management would meet the needs of people living in the inner areas and whether it was worth implementing elsewhere. The functions of the Liverpool experiment were:

1) The identification of corporate objectives and advice on the allocation of budgetary resources for the area;
2) Control over a contingency budget and a special projects budget for the area;
3) Coordination of advice and information services for the area;
4) Advice on the implications of developmental programmes and
policies. (Environment, 1974)

The DOE sent out a Consultation Paper to Metropolitan District Councils in England with a population over 200,000 in 1974 to invite local authorities to report their experience and ask whether they would like to take part in a scheme of trials to explore area management's potential.

These trials were monitored by INLOGOV at the University of Birmingham under a project which began in June 1976. Eight schemes received support from the DOE - Dudley, Haringey, Kirklees, Newcastle-upon-Tyne, Islington, Middlesborough, Liverpool and Stockport. The aim if the schemes was

'to explore the potential of area management for adapting local government organisation so that it can respond more sensitively and effectively to the particular needs of areas.' (Mason et al, 1977: v)

Area management was not a strategy only concerned with alleviating deprivation, but a strategy to improve the effectiveness of local authorities in fulfilling their functions in a local area. The local authorities' concern with urban deprivation was just one of the functions of local government that the trials involved.

The area management trials, in the same way as the CDBG programme in the United States reflected how far the concern with urban deprivation and poverty in both countries had shifted over the course of these programmes. Like CDBG, the Area Management Trials had urban deprivation as part of their remit, but it was seen in the former case through a change in fiscal relationships between federal and local government, and in the latter case a change in the organisational and administrative arrangements of local government operation would achieve an improvement in urban conditions.

Area management is an example of the dilemma of government. Its move towards a more rationalist and corporate approach on the one hand requires more participation for legitimacy on the other hand.¹ Area management carried to its most logical

---

¹ As Cockburn puts it. 'Corporate management had concentrated
conclusion would have reorganised local government in a similar way to prior to reorganisation.

**Inner City Partnerships**

The importance of the end of my period in Britain is that it indicates another shift in the perception by government of the nature of the problems of what by now had come to be called 'inner city areas'. Whereas at the beginning of the period the concern was with individual manifestations of the effects of urban poverty - in educational performance, family breakdown etc., the end of the period is characterised by a government emphasis on the totality of the problem and its relationship to economic and political forces at work in the area, the region and the nation.

'We cannot tackle the problems of the inner city areas in isolation, John Silkin, Minister of Local Government and Planning, said today. The problems are part of a general framework ....' (Environment, 1976a)

The emphasis became upon employment and industry as well

'.... despite the very important differences between the major city areas of the country there is no doubt that they share common problems of a most daunting kind, arising above all from a declining economic and industrial base, in part caused by, and in part contributing to a major and unbalanced loss of population over the last decade and a half.

The extent and depth of these changes has led many people to seek urgent shifts in policy by central and local government to avert this crisis.' (Environment, 1976b)

Paradoxically, just as the Home Office's concern with service delivery for which they were not responsible divided the will to act from the ability to act, so the DOE's concern with industrial and employment policy suffered from this separation. The DOE could only change the location of industry or attract industry to the central city through changes in

---

on the internal management structure of councils. The central state's 'community package' was to make good its shortcomings - first by reviving, renewing, reproducing the relations of authority; second by concentrating on implementing policies; third by providing sources of information about the working class needed by management.' (Cockburn, 1977: 131)
the planning procedures and regulations and offering carrots to industry. It would have required a much more interventionist strategy to have succeeded and this would only have been achieved through the Department of Industry and the expenditure of public funds. The functional separation within central government has clear benefits for the state, in that the ability of the state to act appears to be limited. The limitations are self-imposed through departmental fragmentation. Friedland et al make a similar point when discussing the separation of the accumulation and legitimation functions of the state.

'First, authority over policies that impinge upon the profitability of economic processes are often located in one agency, while authority over policies that are designed to absorb political discontents generated by economic processes are located in other agencies. By such a separation, agencies which have some authority to determine the structure of employment opportunities are insulated from those agencies that deal with people who cannot find work because of lack of employment opportunities.' (Friedland, Piven and Alford, 1977: 457-458)

Departmental responsibility for the urban programme and urban deprivation was transferred from the Home Office to the Department of Environment on April 6th 1977 following an answer by the Prime Minister in the House of Commons to a written question (Hansard, 1977a). On the same day, the Secretary of State for the Environment put forward preliminary government proposals which were to be incorporated in the White Paper in June and the Inner Urban Areas Bill in December.

The Secretary of State's focus at the time centered upon two issues. Firstly, the increasing outmigration from the central cities resulting in decay.

'We cannot simply turn our faces away from the ancient fabric of the cities and leave them like some wild west ghost towns to moulder away ... because the consequences of turning our backs on the inner areas would, in my judgement, be likely to be mounting social bitterness, an increasing sense of alienation, worsening crime and vandalism and, in some areas, racial tension as well.' (Environment, 1977f)

He argued that the policies that had resulted in this out-migration must be changed.
The second focus was upon the costs of ignoring the problems of the inner cities, both in terms of social disorder (as mentioned above) but also in terms of capital investment that the inner cities contained.

'Even on a purely practical level there is a great deal of existing infrastructure — roads, mains services, schools, housing, commercial buildings — not all in good condition, some actually requiring replacement, but some quite new. It would be costly to stop using it prematurely and make alternative provision elsewhere.' (Environment, 1977f)

On the one hand, especially following the two close elections of 1974 and the rise of third parties, the loss of population in inner areas would have had parliamentary repercussions for the Labour Party with any redrawing of constituency boundaries to take account of these decreases in population, either by eliminating safe seats or by amalgamating wards into Conservative constituencies. Secondly, the capital investment represented by the inner cities, both private and state, is considerable. Ignoring the plight of the inner cities, at a time when there was a slowdown in finding new outlets for profitable investment for capital in expanding and new towns would have incurred considerable costs to private and state capital. For the state to invest in new houses in expanding areas, when it still had not repaid debts on older buildings in the inner cities was impossible at a time of economic restraint. For private capital the search for new areas of profitable investment had been increasingly unsuccessful with the completion of much of the expansion that had occurred in the 1960s. Government subsidies to firms and other capital investment in the cities could have promised to be a means by which new outlets for accumulation could be found.

Shore made six proposals in his statement in the Commons:

'First we shall give priority in the main policies and programmes of Government so that they contribute to a better life in these inner areas.'

'Secondly we need a more unified approach.'

'Thirdly our immediate priority must be to strengthen the economies of these areas.'
'Fourthly our policies on population movement, nationally as well as locally, need review and change.'

'Fifthly the Government have decided to recast the Urban Programme to cover economic and environmental as well as social projects and to increase it.'

Sixthly the Government proposes to offer special partnerships to the local authorities - both districts and counties - of certain cities.' (Hansard, 1977b: 1227-1228)

This increase in the Urban Programme was planned to be from £30 million a year to £125 million in 1979-80 and would represent a commitment to spend £1000 million over the next decade. Significantly the expenditure did not represent a new demand on the Treasury but was to be found within existing ceilings, thus, it could be argued largely negating its effects and making it as with the CCPs part of a policy of redistributing cuts.

Following Shore's announcement in the Commons, the government's proposals were put forward in a White Paper which was published in June. This White Paper, while being portrayed as drawing upon the experience of past initiatives, reflected the changing political and economic conditions in the ten years preceding, since the EPAs and the CDPs were being proposed. Not only had the political and economic conditions changed, however, but also the Government's concern (both its stated concern and the problems which these policies were designed to confront). The White Paper was more closely allied to the history of regional economic policies, the growth of the New Towns, and economic decline than to the previous concerns of the EPAs and the CDPs. It was concerned with population changes and regional growth. In 1977 poverty was no longer on the political agenda in the same form, although the publicity given to it made it a continuing problem for the state. The White Paper, unlike the EPAs, could not have been countered with discussions of income maintenance policies or more comprehensive service provision in the areas of deprivation. The focus had shifted to investment, employment and population movement, not because these were seen through a more enlightened assessment as being the root causes of the problems that previous programmes and projects had tried to tackle, but because it was these different aspects of the general problem of poverty which...
had, for the state, become the problem, despite having existed earlier.

The White Paper defined the nature of the problem as being one of economic decline, social disadvantage and physical decay.

'The decline in the economic fortunes of the inner areas often lies at the heart of the problem. Compared with their own conurbations, the inner areas of the big cities suffer from higher unemployment at all stages of the economic cycle. In inner areas generally there has developed a mismatch between the skills of the people and the kind of jobs available.' (Environment, 1977d: para 7)

'This shabby environment, the lack of amenities, the high density remaining in some parts and the poor conditions of the older housing in the inner areas contrast sharply with better conditions elsewhere. They combine together to make these areas unattractive, both to many of the people who live there and to new investment in business, industry and housing.' (Environment, 1977d: para 13)

'The Inner Area Studies have shown that there is a collective deprivation in some inner areas which affects all the residents even though individually the majority of people may have satisfactory homes and worthwhile jobs. It arises from a pervasive sense of decay and neglect which affects the whole area, through the decline of community spirit, through an often low standard of neighbourhood facilities and through greater exposure to crime and vandalism which is a real form of deprivation, above all to old people.' (Environment, 1977d: para 17)

Defining the need to arrest the decline the White Paper commented on 'social bitterness and alienation' and economic costs as the Secretary of State in the Commons had done.

'Within the inner cities, although some replacement is necessary there is much social capital - roads, main services, public buildings, housing, schools, commercial buildings - which has a useful economic life. It would be wasteful to underutilise or abandon so much investment by the community prematurely and to incur infrastructure costs elsewhere. Similarly with land: there would be little sense in taking more fresh land on the outskirts of cities - often of good agricultural quality - if vacant or underused land in the inner areas could be used equally well.' (Environment, 1977d: para 23)

The policies which were seen as being necessary in the White Paper to change these conditions centred on improving the overall economy of inner areas to regenerate their environment and effect a balance between the areas and the other parts of the city in
terms of population and jobs.

The means to change these conditions were firmly rooted in some of the planning mechanisms which were seen as having helped in the past to produce them. Thus, the White Paper advocated an intra-regional emphasis to industrial incentives policy to help inner areas. The inner areas legislation included new powers to local authorities to assist industry in inner areas. Accompanying this, the White Paper proposed increased training to overcome the perceived mismatch in vacancies and unemployment. Population balance was to be altered through encouraging the slow-down in population expansion in new towns and a greater balance in their intake to discourage the new towns from attracting the young and mobile, leaving a disproportionate number of the less employable in the inner areas.

Importantly all the proposals in the White Paper and the Bill were taking place at a time of cuts in public expenditure. The emphasis upon major programmes of central government and local authorities being prioritised to deal with inner areas, while being a step forward from no emphasis, was largely meaningless through the lack of extra funding.

The Inner Urban Areas Bill allowed the Secretary of State to designate districts with 'special social need' (a phrase whose roots go back ten years and during which time no rigorous operational definition had been made). Designated districts were enabled to make special loans at 90% for acquisition of or works on land and loans and grants for improving amenities. Partnerships between central and local government were mentioned - again with a very obscure definition of purpose.

'If the Secretary of State is satisfied that special social need exists in any inner urban area in Great Britain and that the conditions which give rise to the existence of that need are such that a concerted effort should be made to alleviate them ......' (Environment 1977e: Sec 4(1))

The major incentives in terms of loans centered on clearing land (demolition etc) and development of land. Loans were available for (amongst other things)

'(a) the construction of fencing or walls;
(b) landscaping and the planting of trees, shrubs and plants;’ (Environment, 1977e)

To adopt a successful strategy of boosting the profitability of industry in urban areas by socialising some of their costs, much greater financial involvement would have been necessary and would have had political repercussions unacceptable to both private capital and the state - greater public direction of investment and intervention in the economy. Despite the sums of money involved, therefore, the overall amounts were too small to achieve their desired aim - to increase profitability. The Inner Urban Areas Bill can be seen as the last of the series of token gestures I comment on. This tokenism of the British projects is not a characteristic shared by the American programmes. The tokenism of the British projects is clear when their substance is compared with their stated aims.
Chapter Four
The Context in Britain and America

In making a comparison between Britain and the United States, it is important to consider some of the main differences in the institutions and structures within which policy is developed. Such an outline, apart from its obvious importance in delineating and illustrating the contexts within which decisions are made, provides an analytical framework within which the importance of the fundamental differences in structures can be assessed. Therefore, while being illustrative, it also provides explanations for some of the policy differences observed while allowing the basic similarities to be highlighted.

The question is raised, however, as to which differences are important to emphasise and it is in answering this question that the relationship between the state structure, in particular the organisation of the state apparatus, and policy implementation is confronted. I do not, at this stage, intend to lay out, in abstract terms, this relationship, rather to describe with concrete discussion its outlines.

Three basic differences in the background will be discussed. Firstly, the important differences in the political structure of the state in the US and Britain. By the political structure of the state is meant the organisational and institutional arrangements of administration and arrangements for the appointment (by election or selection) of those concerned with the development of policy, its enactment and its implementation. Secondly, the different level of welfare provision within the two countries and the different nature of the related developments that were occurring at the time. Such a comparison is connected with the level of poverty and the perception of the extent of poverty. Lastly, there were the important economic differences and changes covering the periods discussed in both countries. While these comparisons begin five years apart, the economic strength of the US can be broadly contrasted with Britain's continuous economic decline.
1. The state in Britain and America

To begin with the political structure of the state, there are three aspects which have an influence upon the policy process and contribute towards explaining the differences between the two countries; the electoral system, the administrative and institutional arrangements of the state bureaucracy and the state apparatus at a local level.

The electoral system

Differences in the electoral structure and the party system make the mobilisation of issues onto the electoral agenda occur through a different process. This mobilisation of issues reflects different interests involved in the process. At the central level, with executive power residing in the President in the United States and the Cabinet in Parliament in the United Kingdom, the different composition of their electoral constituencies makes political calculations of the bases of electoral benefit rather different. In a constituency based election, the poor do not have any electoral significance. In the United States, on the other hand, poverty, when connected to racial disadvantage can attract a national block of voters in an election which is nationwide. Thus poverty is and was a much more electorally attractive issue in the United States than in Britain. Presidential elections can be won and lost through the ability of candidates to attract blocks of voters whose cohesion as voters would seem to be stronger than in Britain. With a high rate of abstentions in Presidential elections, compared to parliamentary elections in Britain, blocks of voters who do not traditionally participate in elections can provide large rewards in close contests. Whereas, in a British parliamentary election key marginal constituencies must be won to achieve a parliamentary majority, and the 'middle' ground is contested to win these seats, in an example like the 1964 Presidential election, Johnson was concerned with winning key states with a large number of electoral college members which could be won by mobilising the votes of previous non-voters. If the pattern of the Kennedy-Nixon election had been maintained in the election between Goldwater and Johnson in 1964, it was crucial for Johnson
to be able to win those states which were not part of his established constituency within the Democratic Party i.e. the north and eastern urban states. In Britain however, for the Labour Party, the retention of inner city constituencies is rarely in doubt except when, through loss of population, their boundaries are redrawn. While a Prime Minister relies upon the collection of individual legislators majorities to claim electoral victory, the President's majority is separate from that of legislators. This separation has importance for the influence of areas upon the electoral system and on the degree of party solidarity. The different electoral importance of areas to the executive plays a different part in the policy making process in the two countries.

The Model Cities Program met with some resistance from Congress in its passage. The support of Congressmen for a Presidential programme is neither a certainty, nor can it be assured through the same sort of mechanisms that a British Cabinet can normally assure the support of their party in parliament. The electoral success of the President and the same party Representatives and Senators are not intimately connected. The assurance then of support can take the form of rewards from the executive which may improve a Representative or Senator's chances of reelection independently of the effect it may have upon a President's. A British government's electoral interests are tied irreducibly to those of the members of parliament of the same party throughout the country. The government cannot exist independently of its ability to have legislation put through Parliament in the way an American President can. By providing Model Cities funds to Congressional districts the President could buy the support of Congress, a support which, if he was to be able to implement the programmes of his Administration was almost as important as being elected in the first place. This separation of power between the executive and the legislature cannot be underplayed in considering its effect upon the whole nature of the policy making process and

1 As it was his landslide victory over Goldwater made many of these calculations largely irrelevant.
particularly when considering the question of legitimation. Whereas the government in Britain can claim legitimacy for the exercise of power through Parliament and the electoral process itself, no such legitimacy can be claimed by the President in confrontation with Congress. Both Congress and the Executive have an electoral legitimacy and are, if only nominally, responsive to their different electorates and responsive to electoral pressure. In this case the electoral process does not have the same mystique as does the British system, not being as fundamentally sufficient for the exercise of power. In the case of the US, therefore, power cannot be only exercised in legislative process on the basis of a response to supposed electoral 'will' as evidenced by the ballot box. The electoral calculations therefore involved in becoming President or being elected to Congress are more apparent and more explicitly stated than would be the case in Britain, not because US politicians are more cynical than British ones but because the electoral process itself does not have to have the same mystique and apparent objectivity as that of the British system. The legitimacy is derived, in the American political system, rather, from aspects external to the process itself. Policies which are presented to Congress by the Executive cannot in the majority of cases derive support from future common electoral advantage - since this may not be a common advantage. Rather policies must be placed before Congress and a combination of particular electoral advantage, political reward and external rationality used to effect their passage. This external rationality becomes the most important legitimating function for the passage of legislation and is manifested in the importance of Congressional Hearings and their relative power compared to the impotence of Parliamentary Committees. Within the British system, the Committees have much less power to examine legislation than Congressional Hearings have, in terms of manpower and other resources alone, even ignoring the ability of the Cabinet to reverse Committee defeats when the

1 See page 26
legislation returns to the House of Commons floor. Because of this, I maintain that, for individual legislators the electoral constituency in the US is much more important than the power of the President or party affiliation because it is from this electoral constituency, which in the House of Representatives is on a discrete area base, that the Representatives derive their support. In Britain legislators are at times mere lobby fodder, lacking power without party support. In the American system the party lacks power without legislators support.

This relationship between the party and the Government has implications which in the British situation filter down to the local government level since the fortunes of the party as a whole are connected to the fortunes of the party at local level. The CCPs provide such an example. When announced, the CCPs were conceived of as having a small area focus like other positive discrimination projects. When implemented, however, they became an authority wide attempt at positive discrimination. This can be seen as being the result of pressure within the Labour Party due to the tensions created between local authority elected members of the party. Positive discrimination on a small area base lead to one area receiving what were seen as disproportionate amounts of resources by other members representing areas which could also claim to have concentrations of urban poverty. With the party system in Britain having the strength that it does, tensions at local level, while not being sufficient to overcome the pressure for a form of positive discrimination were sufficient to be translated through to national level resulting in the reassessment of the proposed programme and its implementation on an authority wide basis. This translation of party pressure from local to national level, in contrast with the US, ocurred in an unobservable manner and was not the result of open and apparent conflict, debate and negotiation.

Traditionally the worst areas of Britain's cities have provided the Labour Party with their most solid majorities and the Conservative Party with their least rewarding attempts at election. In such a system, therefore, the Government of whatever party
can, within the realm of electoral politics, relatively safely ignore these constituencies and struggle for control around more marginal ones. In the US this would not necessarily be the case since the President may need support for programmes on the basis of unique constellations of interests within Congress and the manipulation of such support in Congress becomes the cornerstone of successful presidential politicking.

The American electoral system and bicameral legislature has another important difference in the relationship between the two parts of Congress. Whereas the House of Lords in Britain has little effective power in the face of a determined government, the President is faced with a Congress whose two parts may have different interests. Senators, being elected on a state-wide basis and numbering two per state regardless of size are subjected to different pressures than Representatives. The length of their term being different\(^1\) and their electorates being wider make them both less reliant upon Presidential preference and less constrained by their need to be reelected. Given this, their electoral interests differ from those of Representatives and the President. Intra-party conflicts in Britain within Parliament may take place but can be resolved either through compromise by the government or by inducement. In the majority of cases, except where small parliamentary majorities exist, there are seldom sufficient members who will rebel against their party to influence directly policies which have already been decided upon by the Cabinet or Prime Minister. Urban poverty and positive discrimination anyway, largely has not been a subject of inter or intra party dispute in Britain. This has not been the case in the United States where programmes such as the Model Cities when presented to Congress by the President had to be negotiated by the executive both with respect to the Administration's wishes versus Congress's response but also between the House and the Senate's intentions with respect to the legislation. Frieden and Kaplan (1977, 39-64) provide a comprehensive summary of this conflict. Furthermore within

\(^1\) Senators, six years, Representatives, two years
Congress the separation between authorization and appropriation add to the extent of negotiation which has to occur, especially when considering legislators autonomy from the President.

It is important to remember that, with regard to the electoral system in the two countries, the three aspects of the electoral system; the importance of area-based constituencies, the role of party solidarity and the separation of Presidential or Prime Ministerial power from the legislature, all play an important role, individually and one upon another, in determining the viability of policy options. In general the two countries could be contrasted in that Britain has a high degree of party solidarity and an executive whose authority and action potential is derived, through this party solidarity from the legislature, whereas in America there is a lack of party solidarity and an executive and a legislature who are opposed in many cases, deriving a separate authority from their respective electorates.

Administrative and Institutional Arrangements of the State Apparatus

Regarding the political structure of the state other important differences exist. As well as the processes of the electoral system playing a role in policy making, the institutional and administrative arrangements of the state bureaucracy play an important role in shaping policy. While there are many direct similarities in the state bureaucratic structure in the two countries, there are some basic differences. The administrative structure's importance lies in how it determines the outcome of conflicts within the bureaucracy.

In America the top levels of the Administration are appointed by and responsible to the President (subject to Congressional approval) whereas in Britain the existence of a permanent 'non-political' civil service provides an appearance of separation between government and administration. Policies generated from within the state bureaucracy in Britain play an important role in strengthening civil servants' independance from their 'political masters'.

Thus, a major programme implemented by the executive in Washington, like the Economic Opportunity Act generates both a legislative and administrative loyalty to the existing President. In Britain, none
of the projects considered here produced the same identification with the government of the day, nor were they constituted as partisan measures in the way that occurred in the United States. Their planning was mostly executed within the existing departments by full-time administrators.

The difference in the United States and Britain in the relationship of the administrative machinery of the state to the elected government feeds through into the policy making process. While US Secretaries of large departments and their assistants may forge close links with other sources of power aside from the Executive Office, ultimately their authority and continued tenure relies upon Presidential support. It is as Presidential appointees that they derive their ultimate power. However, it is not only their links with the President that are important in their ability to execute policy. The Congress, lobbyists and major interests around their departmental concerns have an almost equal role in being able to inhibit or frustrate their intentions. Secretaries and their assistants spend a considerable amount of their time in strengthening these bases of power and providing a coalition around their departments' policies. It is in this public sphere that a department derives its strength and ability to act decisively and effectively.

In Britain, on the other hand, the department itself is a considerable source of power. Many politicians have commented on the power of the mandarins over their supposed political masters (Crossman, 1976, Benn, 1980). Their commitment and loyalty to the service and the Whitehall bureaucracy may be important in determining their ability to achieve results and advancement than any of their political overlords' views. This in part explains the nature of the relationship between policy and politicians which in Britain in the field of urban deprivation has been weak and in the US strong. Whereas in the case of the Inner Area Studies civil servants discouraged ministers from taking an active part in their organisation, beyond a token commitment in the form of chairing advisory committees (Interview), HUD encouraged and required the stamp of
Presidential backing in their launching and implementation of the Model Cities Program. Ministers in Britain cannot intervene successfully in an interdepartmental manner whereas the Executive Office provided an interdepartmental politically oriented milieu which could influence the course of departmental politics.

This relationship between the administrative mechanisms of government and the sources of political power has important consequences for what I call external rational validation. Some of the arguments I have made above in relation to the split between the executive and legislature can be applied in the American system in the negotiation of disputes between the administration and the government. The system rests upon a plurality of sources of power and negotiates in a much more public arena. In Britain, conflict is more concealed and may not be observed taking place between different power centres. The civil service can remove some of the more important disputes taking place from Ministerial review and present Ministers with a seemingly more objective assessment of a course of action which has been negotiated, not on objective criteria, but according to a balance of interests and power behind doors that are closed even to Ministers.

There are few examples in relation to the British programmes of this kind of controversy and its resolution. The few that there are indicate that the Minister was presented by decisions already made, or encouraged to play a minor role in such resolution.

In looking at the relationship between the administrative machinery of government and the sources of political power, there are two distinct ways in which this relationship affects the resolution of conflicts. First, conflicts may arise between the administration and the politicians over the ends and means of policy. This conflict in the area which I am interested scarcely arose in Britain. However in America different interpretations of programmes, based upon the differing interests of the bureaucracy and 'the Administration' occured both in the Community Action Program and the Model Cities Program. Such conflicts were resolved through the restatement of aims or their modification. This resolution appears to have the same quality (being rational within agreed
meanings) as the formulation of policies has.

Second, conflict may also arise within the administration, to then be resolved by politicians as arbitrators on the basis of their position as supposed political overlords of the state machinery. This conflict raises questions relating to the interdepartmental structure and power bases within the administrative machinery in both countries.

In both countries, there have been moves over the last decade to institute departments on a functional basis to overcome some of the overlapping concerns which give rise to interdepartmental conflict and attempts to preserve bureaucratic authority. It is not peculiar to government bureaucracies that these organisations, as organisations, derive power and authority partly on the basis of their size and the number of major programmes they are responsible for. However, especially within the British system of government, departments derive their power in interdepartmental conflicts from their importance within the Cabinet as well as their place in the civil service hierarchy of promotion. Thus, at least one of the major departments in Britain (Foreign Office, the Treasury and the Home Office) are seen as being required experience for promotion either within the civil service or within parliamentary party politics. The Home Office is the department which has been most concerned in Britain (of these three) with the development of urban deprivation strategies, and it is worth considering some of the interdepartmental issues that are raised by this and how these have been resolved.

The Home Office was, from 1967 to 1976, responsible for urban deprivation policies starting with the Urban Programme. The Home Office, in becoming involved through the Urban Programme and the CDPs in the affairs of local authorities was perhaps the most unsuitable of central government departments. While at the time of the Urban Programme and CDPs' initial launching the Home Office was responsible for children's services and probation services which had a direct link to local authorities, the impending reorganisation both of central government with regard to social services and the local authorities themselves made it unlikely
that the Home Office would continue to have much contact with local government. It certainly was not a responsibility which was likely to increase. The two previous positive discrimination approaches in the field, Section 11 of the Local Government Act 1966 and the EPA programme were run within the Department of Education and Science. The position of the CDPs in the Home Office became increasingly anachronistic, going some way to explaining their lack of direction and purpose.

Two rationales can be put forward for the Urban Programme being placed within the Home Office. Firstly, the Urban Programme was announced as a response to the racial questions raised by Enoch Powell, and the Home Office was responsible for immigration and through this race relations. Secondly, the Home Office, as one of the major government departments could be seen as being a sufficiently powerful department to provide the coordinating role necessary in the administration of the programme. In its initial stages the Urban Programme was controlled by an interdepartmental committee chaired by a Home Office civil servant and containing representatives from the many ministries with interests in the programme. The initial circulars announcing the programme were sent out under the joint authority of the Ministry of Education, the Home Office and the Ministry of Housing and Local Government. With the reorganisation of central government under the Heath Government the intention was to replace the existing fragmentation within Whitehall with major functional departments and in this field the most important were the Departments of Education and Science, Health and Social Security and the Environment. These 'super-departments' subsumed the smaller ministries under their control.

1 As Crossman (1976: Vol 3) illustrates in relation to the earlier combination of the Ministries of Health and Social Security, such a bureaucratic shuffle cannot achieve its objectives merely through the announcement of the merger. Health and Social Security under Crossman continued to operate as largely separate Ministries with their own establishments and ministers under Crossman's overlordship.
One of the main rationales for maintaining the urban deprivation focus in the Home Office after the reorganisation of Whitehall was claimed to be the ability of the Home Office as a major department to be able to act as a mediator or arbitrator within the central government machinery. This is, in a way, a similar argument to that put forward for the establishment of the CEO in the Executive Office of the President rather than in HEW, where it might have seemed more appropriate. Both the CEO and the Home Office were involved in projects which had different departmental concerns. However the specious nature of this argument for the Home Office in relation to the Urban Programme became apparent with the creation of superdepartments with wider ranging responsibilities and an increased influence over parliamentary business. As I argue subsequently, the attraction of the UP for the Home Office lay in the narrowing of the Home Office's concerns that accompanied the creation of super-departments. Thus there was a struggle on the part of the Home Office as a major department to maintain its influence and power. A position which was attractive both to leading civil servants within the department and to successive Home Secretaries.

It would be mistaken to see the Home Office's concern with urban policy as only reflecting its concern with social control - the Ministry of Internal Security of Bridges (1975). Such an explanation ignores the evidence that the Home Office managed to retain control over the Urban Programme against the opposition of the Department of the Environment on the basis of its strength as a major department. The history of the Minister of Urban Affairs in the Department of the Environment reflects this struggle. Both Home Office Ministers and civil servants wished to retain the Urban Programme especially after the loss of the Children's Department precisely to avoid the image of a Ministry of Internal Security which would have had repercussions for the Department in relation both to the 'public' and other departments, but also effect the careers and experiences of those ministers and civil servants. Both CDP and the Urban Programme had social control

1 The 'demotion of the Home Office to a Ministry of Internal
aspects but these were not their main purposes and unless clearer links can be demonstrated between the urban concerns of the Home Office and its more actively repressive functions, I think that the case made by Bridges is overstated. However the Urban Programme and the CDPs were concerned with social control in a pre-repressive stage and the alleviation of conditions in areas of 'special social need' could have reduced the need for repressive Home Office action. In this sense the programmes were concerned with the Home Office's repressive functions, although the link is indirect.

The persistence of the Home Office in retaining control over the Urban Programme can be contrasted with the establishment of the CEO in the Executive Office of the President. Whereas the Home Office retained the programme through political power and bureaucratic interest, the CEO was established in the Executive Office to improve its ability to perform as a coordinating body and remain independent from organisational inhibitions.

There are two aspects of the Home Office's ability to retain control over the field of urban deprivation policy long after it would seem to have been no longer a suitable department in which a strategy could be formulated and implemented. On the one hand, there is the bureaucratic inertia that I have mentioned and the conservatism of large organisations, governmental or not. The second aspect, which provides a contrast with the developments in America relates to the sources of political power within the state apparatus and the inability of politicians within the British machinery to adapt the institutions of government to attain their objectives.

Considering the links between the CDPs and the IAS at a central government level illustrates this point. The Inner Area Studies, while having a wider initial brief than that of the CDP's initial remit, covered very similar ground in their concerns to those of Security especially with the growth of the super-departments such as the Department of Health and Social Security and the Department of the Environment would weaken its potential importance in relation to the Treasury and the Foreign Office.
the CDPs. It would seem that within the same government the pursuit of the different strategies or explorations into a similar field should have called for an extensive exchange of experience and results. As far as I can assess the links that were made, interdepartmentally, were weak, consisting of a small number of meetings of personnel involved in the two approaches. The departmental structures of Whitehall, lines of communication and modes of operation prohibit more formal central assessment of strategies dealing with the same problem, unless the problem is sufficiently politically central to be filtered to the top of the hierarchy where common interdepartmental approaches can be calculated.

Where an interdepartmental approach was instituted such as in the Urban Programme, different departments came together, essentially as different departments. Bids from local authorities for Urban Programme funds were not assessed interdepartmentally, i.e. nursery schools versus housing advice centres. Such an approach would have required an interdepartmental definition of the causes and symptoms of urban deprivation. Instead departments allocated funds to services which were the responsibility of their own department out of a sum set aside for each department. This approach avoided potential interdepartmental conflict over the allocation of funds, while also resulting in a programme that was cobbled together rather than systematically executed.

In both these examples, while the Home Office was nominally concerned with the urban deprivation strategies pursued by successive governments, its inability to act as a decisive coordinator resulted in a lack of coordination of approaches within central government. Clearly the different size and importance of the programmes compared with those of America does go some way towards explaining the inability of the Home Office to provide the necessary political weight behind its departmental leadership to amalgamate more effectively the different directions being pursued. However, this is not a sufficient explanation and I would argue that this illustrates the different balance of power within the two institutional structures.
In America, the Model Cities Program was a programme, one of whose main aims was the coordination of the existing system of categorical grants within the cities. Frieden and Kaplan (1977) provide a comprehensive account of the problems faced by HUD in its largely unsuccessful attempts to achieve such a coordination. The lack of success is derived from different sources from that which plagued the British approaches.

The amalgamation of the plethora of categorical grants given by the federal government to the American cities was to be achieved by the newest federal department - the Department of Housing and Urban Development, and it also involved other departmental interests in Washington. This was the opposite of the Home Office's position. HUD was attempting to provide coordination from its position as a functionally based department rather than as in Britain with the Home Office, a powerfully established department. Likewise, the OEO which had coordinating responsibility with other federal departments was specially constituted to deal with the War on Poverty and, not having departmental status, had an indigenous political leadership which was less powerful than those being coordinated. The ability, within the American system, to institute such an approach, over the heads of the existing powerful interests indicates the way in which the different institutional structure of the state apparatus in America confers different power within it. Of course, in part an explanation derives from the differing importance in terms of resources and political visibility of the American programmes, but I would suggest, as above that this was not the only factor.

The coordinating role, both within the Model Cities Program and the OEO was not only at the level of the federal government within Washington with departments passing through their hierarchical channels commands to the base on the decisions of a central coordinating body. Regional and local coordinating committees were set up to achieve results. The difficulties which were faced are recounted by Frieden and Kaplan (1977) and were the result of some of the bureaucratic inertia which characterises large organisations. However, the problems of the Model Cities
in its attempts to provide desired results cannot be attributed solely to the difficulties of government agencies coordinating effectively. The strategy of the Model Cities Program rested upon more shaky assumptions.

The different institutional arrangements within central government which affected the course of the programmes in the two systems can be crudely characterised in terms of administrative bureaucratic power versus political direction. In the American system the departments are more reliant upon political direction than those in Britain because of their different relationship to the executive.

This characterisation provides some light on the subject of the nature of the legitimation provided within the programmes. In Britain the links between social science and the state apparatus have been largely within the civil service. In the example of the CDPs and the EPAs these programmes were developed by civil servants in collaboration with social scientists. Having been constructed within the administrative machinery of the state, the politicians approved their implementation being consonant with the political demands of the time. In America, Presidential initiatives set up task forces for both the Economic Opportunity Act and the Model Cities Program. These task forces then consulted with appropriate social scientists in the construction of their programmes. The social scientists, like moths, seem to gravitate towards the power source. Of course this gravitation is not a one way process and I will argue later that it is explicable in terms of the need to legitimate policy options by those responsible for selecting them.

The State Apparatus at a Local Level

The issue of coordination raises important questions concerning the structure of the state apparatus at the local level. The institution of programmes has been influenced by the different balances within central government, and how the central state relates constitutionally and institutionally with the local state. Within the British structure local governments are, in their constitution, separate bodies from central government, but essentially constituted to provide for the implementation of centrally defined
priorities. Education, social services and housing take up the lion's share of local authority resources. These services as with many others are largely defined by the state centrally, while being administered for central government by local councils. In America, local governments have not developed historically in such a manner. Their initial constitution and functions were separate from, or even opposed to the more central forms of the state. Until recently the federal government was not involved with domestic affairs to the extent that the localities were being dictated (whether constitutionally or through financial carrots). Localities could however be seen to be separate from, or opposed to the states themselves and their relationships with one another was under the direction of the states while being more constitutionally precarious and based more on institutionalised conflict than occurs within British local and central relations. In Britain, the central government can in the last resort replace the local authority with administrators appointed by them when faced by a refusal by local authorities to implement centrally defined policies.

American local government is characterised not only by a confusion of different units with different purposes but also with different forms of local government under the same name.

'The more general metropolitan area is characterised by a maze of governmental units: counties and overlapping, noncoterminous school districts, municipalities, townships and special districts. The number of such governments ranges from only 27 in the Baltimore SMSA (Standard Metropolitan Statistical Area) to more than one thousand in the Chicago area posing significant problems in the allocation of responsibility for performance of functions and the distribution of financial responsibility.' (ACIR, 1967: 58)

As well as the confusion of units within the cities, the forms also vary according to function and revenue. Looking at the sources of local government revenue, the variation between cities is wide so that whereas Baltimore received 35.2% of general revenue from state aid, Washington received 10.7%. Boston received 71.5% of local revenue from property tax whereas Washington received 30.5%. Other taxes (sales and income taxes) accounted
for 20.7% of Washington's revenue but only 0.7% of Worcester's (ACIR, 1967: 152). While British local authorities vary in their receipt of central government funds as a proportion of their total income, the absence of such wide discretion for local governments provides a much greater uniformity than is the case in the United States.

Whereas in Britain two tiered authorities are not hierarchically ordered but have a similar constitutional relationship to central government, in the American system each state provides the legality for its own local government units but within a much broader frame than in Britain. Many local governments have chosen their form of incorporation to be ratified by the state rather than having a uniform state wide form imposed upon them.

Where both state and federal governments are involved with local government units, fiscal considerations may be as important as constitutional ones. The influence that the federal government may have on, for example, a school board through the use of federal funds to encourage or promote integration may be much more important than the constitutional relationship with the state in deciding policy. This intermeshing of different jurisdictions and lines of control contrasts sharply with the much more 'orderly' existence of local government in Britain.

The War on Poverty, Community Action Agencies provide a good example of how this plethora of units effects the policy options available to federal government. While there are similarities in the CAP's direct approach to the poor 'over the heads' of local governments with that of the CDFs, in that the Home Office also tried to circumvent the established local authority machinery, these similarities cannot be conceived of as too important. In the case of the War on Poverty, the by-passing of both state and local governments and the setting up of community action agencies on a community basis followed a tradition of federal intervention directly in the affairs of the more local community. There were certain advantages both political and institutional to such an approach. The first obvious institutional advantage related to the difficulty, in any direct approach to states and local gov-
ernments of deciding exactly where, within the government organisation, such intervention should fit and how funds should be distributed in an effective manner. Federal government intervention in any other manner, if it was to produce results on the ground in a fairly rapid way, would have required liaison and contact with the plethora of existing local government units. Without fairly close federal direction, which would itself have required knowledge of conditions on the ground, there would have been no guarantee that the funds were being spent on the sorts of programmes that the policies were designed to produce. This is one of the explanations for the idea of 'maximum feasible participation' in the Economic Opportunity Act put forward by Moynihan (1970:87). He argued that maximum feasible participation was included to prevent employment in the programme going only to social workers and to assure that Southern Blacks received the benefits of the programme. This position was supported by Yarmolinsky, who put forward much the same interpretation. He points out that Richard Boone of the Ford Foundation and the President's Committee on Juvenile Delinquency and Youth Crime and an influential member of the Shriver Task Force argued for maximum feasible participation 'as the process of encouraging the residents of poverty areas to take part in the work of community action programs and to perform a number of jobs that might otherwise be performed by professional social workers.' (Yarmolinsky, 1969: 49)

The political advantages of the by-passing of state and local governments lay in the voters' identification of the programme with a Presidential initiative in an election year. Funds that were distributed through the existing channels of government could easily have been lost or confused and might not reach the ground with the same clear federal stamp on them. The War on Poverty as a nationwide, large scale programme was given greater visibility.

However, while there were advantages because of the existing confused structure of local governments, there were also disadvantages which arose because of it. The institution of CAAs increased the number of units of government since they could be classed as
similar to the existing special districts (i.e. fire and sanitation districts) which already received federal aid. Hambleton (1978) reports that in 1967 there were 78,259 units of local government in the United States of which 28,582 were general local government units, 23,885 special districts and 15,782 school districts (Hambleton, 1978: 91). Adding to the number of special districts and forms of funding to localities confused even more an already complex picture. While the War on Poverty as a federal programme may have found advantages in this direct funding, the federal government as a whole became more confused and less coordinated in its disbursement of funds to the states and localities. In that poverty was seen as and is a complex problem with many interrelated aspects, causes and symptoms, an approach which coordinated only one part of the federal government's response drew away from the resolution of the complexities.

Both the Model Cities Program and the Community Development Block Grants were approaches which attempted to overcome some of this confusion of local government from a federal standpoint. Unlike Britain, the federal government could not intervene to change the structure of local government in the states. The use of federal funds to attempt to achieve a more coordinated approach to what were federal priorities approached this problem in a different manner.

The Model Cities Program, and gradually the CAAs were incorporated into local government. The City Demonstration Agencies of the Model Cities Program, while being set up to coordinate the categorical grants of the federal government, were also concerned with the coordination of local approaches to the Model Cities. The Demonstration Agencies and their funds were controlled to a lesser or greater extent by the unit of general local government in the relevant city under federal guidance.

In conclusion, the federal government in the United States when deciding upon a course of action which involved the spending of funds was faced with a multitude of different relationships with local government which it could have adopted. As Sharpe has said of American local government (quoting Banfield and Wilson);
To say that it (local government) is fragmented is perhaps not strong enough; it lacks sufficient critical mass to the point where 'from a purely formal standpoint one can hardly say that there is such a thing as local government.' (Sharpe, 1973b: 131)

Funds could have been channelled through states, through cities, directly through agencies set up by the federal government and each of these states and cities will have varied its own institutional structure and this would have affected the nature of the relationship with the federal department involved.

A second important feature of local government which influenced the way in which policies were implemented (and therefore constructed) was the constitutional relationship between the federal government and the states and local governments. Until recently, the intervention of the federal government in the domestic affairs of the states was not seen to be a legitimate constitutional role for the federal government to play. However, beginning with Roosevelt's New Deal, the legality of federal involvement has been increasingly upheld. Johnson's Great Society programmes provided a second wave of federal involvement in domestic policy. The basic constitutional position is however the reverse of that in Britain. Whereas in Britain, parliament is sovereign, at least notionally, in America, 'the people' are sovereign and the states are federated on a voluntary basis without abdicating their rights as states. In relation to local governments, while the local governments derive their constitutional power through incorporation or charters from the states, the strength of the ideology of sovereignty in the people is such that the states cannot make extensive changes in the nature of local governments without their consent. New York City and Cook County, Illinois (Chicago) are perhaps the two best examples of local governments whose power is such that they have a considerable if not decisive influence over the course of state policy.

Again the institutional pluralism within the American system has important consequences, both for the visability of negotiations of power that occur and also for the need to legitimate decisions and arguments in an externally rational way to allow for the
maintenance of the system.

In Britain, on the other hand, local governments are largely the agents of central government. Parliamentary legislation, which sets out the structure and powers of local government prescribes much more precisely what courses of action may be taken and also imposes a uniform system throughout the country (apart from variations in Scotland). Legally local authorities have no powers other than those conferred on them by statute. A council cannot do things which exceed the powers granted to it by parliament. Formally, power is given to the local authority by parliament rather than to the center from the localities as in the American system.

Local government in Britain, while having a decentralised form, may be characterised by its concern with the administration of centrally determined policies. Tensions arise within local government by its nominal democratic form and the central direction given local government by the state at national level. These tensions increasingly occur with the realisation of the importance of the relationship between process and outcome (the 'within put'). Where national standards are prescribed and local authorities are given discretion, within their own administrative structure to provide goods and services up to, at least, national standards, then the authorities may act with flexibility with regard to their local electorate. However, as is increasingly the case, the restructuring of state expenditure involves a revision of established priorities and processes then the conflict inherent in a 'democratically' elected system of administering centrally defined priorities comes to the fore. 'Participation' mechanisms may be seen as one attempt to defuse this potential conflict between local councils and their constituents.

As in America, British local administration contains special districts such as Health Authorities, but is on the whole a much more unitary system despite the two tier system introduced in both England and Scotland. Local government in Britain is controlled by central government through legislation, through administration and through financial relationships. Legislative control is the
most basic, and is derived from the constitutional nature of the relationship between Parliament and the local authorities. Administrative control operates through the supervision of local authorities by government departments, and the issuing of circulars and other guidance to local authorities. In some cases the supervision of local authority departments by central government is extensive.

'The Local Authority Social Services Act, 1970, is the most authoritarian piece of local government law to have been passed in recent years. It requires the responsible authorities to appoint a social services committee, restricts the business coming before the committee subject to the consent of the Secretary of State, empowers the Secretary of State to prescribe the qualifications to be held by a director of social services and requires local authorities to act under general ministerial guidance in relation to these functions.' (Richards, 1973: 86)

However in the case of other services central government's administrative control may be much less. The main way in which central government exercises power over local authorities is through the extent to which local authorities are dependent upon central government for their financial support. Local authorities income comes through the rates, from government grants and by charging for services. The main source of income over recent years has been from central government grants. In 1965-66, 51% of local authority income was derived from government grants and this rose to 56% in 1970-71 and 67% in 1975-76 (Hambleton, 1978: 53).
However, since the rearrangement of central finance for local authorities, the majority of this money comes from the Rate Support Grant which is not earmarked for specific spending as are categorical grants in the United States. With the number of functions placed mandatorily upon local authorities, their freedom to select priorities is much more limited than is the case in the United States with the Community Development Block Grant.

Central government also controls the extent to which local authorities can borrow money to finance capital expenditure. Loan sanctions must be received before local authorities may borrow and the purpose of the expenditure, as well as the level of public borrowing, is taken into account by central government.
in allowing local authorities to raise money. Cost controls are also used to limit capital expenditure.

'These controls on capital expenditure deprive councillors of control over many fundamental aspects of local government services. The problem is compounded by the inability of central government to coordinate the issue of loan sanctions by different departments.' (Hambleton, 1978: 35)

Local authorities may also be subject to external audit to check that any expenditure has been legally incurred and therefore prevent local authorities developing services or other provisions which they have no power to do. This control exercised by central government over local authorities is not entirely monolithic as Hambleton points out, since Whitehall departments have problems of coordination amongst themselves. The Department of the Environment and previously the Ministry of Housing and Local Government have the main contacts with local authorities through their influence on the rate support grant levels and the general direction of local authorities. Where the local authorities are acting mainly as agents of direct central government policy, i.e. in education or social services, the responsible central government department has responsibility for liaison and supervision with the local authorities. Local authorities cannot be seen only as agents of specific central state policies but also agents of the central state in the conditions of government and administration that they provide in their own areas.

Central government's links with local authorities are beset by institutional and administrative problems. Firstly, the civil service career structure and administrative practices being different from that of local authorities means that two different traditions and modes of operation face one another. Therefore even when a coordinated policy may exist within a central government department, the different modes of operation of the two structures may make liaison a problematic task.

Secondly, the central government structure is not conducive, being composed of separate bureaucratic power centres, to the free flow of information and demands for action. For instance,
the Home Office did not have departmental responsibility for the services which CDPs were concerned and therefore was acting as a coordinating center within central government through which the results and information from CDPs could be processed. At the very least, information from CDP was not properly being utilised within central government. More fundamentally, the Home Office was unable to persuade other central government departments to change their policies or procedures on the basis of recommendations deriving from CDP action-research. The Home Office was left with a great deal of information for which it, as a department, had no use.

As I have said, the Department of the Environment has a great deal more contact with local authorities and it was, logically, responsible for the Six Towns Studies. Certainly, the Urban Guidelines Studies which raised questions about the organisation of local authority structures was within the direct concern of the Department of the Environment and addresses questions that were important for the Department of the Environment to be able to overcome. In particular, the tension, which I have already mentioned and will expand upon, between the central control of local authority processes and policies and the need to have local authorities legitimated with regard to their electorate.

The Department of the Environment, however, suffered some of the same problems, with regard to the Inner Area Studies, as CDP in relation to the Home Office. The IAS were concerned with matters beyond the scope of the department's responsibility. An attempt was structured into the Studies to overcome this through the development of steering committees representing the different departmental and local authority interests involved. However the structure of interdepartmental power limited the viability of such an approach.

In conclusion, the different structures of the state administrative apparatus effects both what policy options were available for implementation, how they were implemented and how 'successful' they could be. Different sectors of the state apparatus do have some institutional power which is not necessarily equivalent to
'state power' and effects how they operate both with regard to one another and internally.

2. State Services in Britain and the United States

Developments in service structure in Britain

In Britain, unlike America, the highly developed system of welfare services and provisions played an important part in deciding what options were open to deal with the perceived problems of areas of special social need. In Britain, the failure of the supposedly comprehensive welfare state was initially interpreted as being a failure in the coordination of different services. Three major events which influenced the context in which area based policies were implemented, should be looked at in turn. Firstly the Seebohm Report on local authority personal social services (Seebohm, 1969) and the subsequent reorganisation of social services in local authorities, secondly the reorganisation of local government after the Redcliffe Maude Report (Royal Commission, 1969) and thirdly the implementation and advocacy of local participation in planning following the Skeffington Report (Skeffington, 1969). These three events can be seen to be within a similar trend toward on the one hand rationalisation of the organisation of the state apparatus and on the other hand the need for democratic legitimacy within a rationalised system.

The Seebohm Committee was appointed in December 1965 to

'review the organisation and responsibilities of the local authority personal social services in England and Wales, and to consider what changes are desirable to secure an effective family service.' (Seebohm, 1969: para 1)

Personal social services in England were administered in a number of small departments within local authorities. 'Social work' type services were distributed amongst children's, welfare, health, education and housing departments. The aim of the Seebohm Committee and subsequent legislation was to unify the services so that the client was approached on the basis of the full range of their needs rather than as a client for the housing welfare officer with a child seeing a children's officer etc. Such an approach was intended to unify the existing services allowing for greater coordination over the range of the problems that any one family
might have. The most important aspect of these services when compared with the American situation was the relatively similar service structure to be found across the country.

Most of the Seebohm Committee's recommendations, especially in the chapter on the community, paralleled the thinking in the Home Office which led to the setting up of the CDPs. The full extent of the British Welfare State, embracing education, housing, the health service, social security etc, is in sharp contrast to the American situation, not only in the comprehensive nature of the provision but also in that it was, at least in principle, a universal system available as of right throughout the country and did not vary (as did welfare provision in the USA) from area to area.

Another important aspect of the Seebohm Report was the emphasis given in it to 'the community' both as an area for social work practise and as a source of potential self-help. The Seebohm Report, in this respect, reflected the development of interest in local neighbourhood approaches.

'Such ideas point to the need for the personal social services to engage in the extremely difficult and complex task of encouraging and assisting the development of community identity and mutual aid, particularly in areas characterised by rapid population turnover, high delinquency, child deprivation, and mental illness rates and other indices of social pathology. Social work with individuals alone is found to be of limited effect in an area where the community environment itself is a major impediment to healthy individual development.' (Seebohm, 1969: para 477)

The Royal Commission (1969) which proposed the reorganisation of local authorities was, as I have previously stated, part of the rationalisation of the state apparatus occurring at the time. The old system of local government suffered from the piecemeal way in which it was constructed. The system had been built on the Victorian structure of local government and developed as population centers expanded. There were a variety of problems associated with the old system; the small scale of the largest units, the lack of coordination between services and the arbitrary division between urban and rural boroughs and county councils and county boroughs.
The reorganised system contained within it greater uniformity, allowing for improved central control and local coordination and an emphasis on the need for democratic involvement in the affairs of local authorities.

The Local Government Act 1972 may, therefore, be seen as being a parallel development to the reorganisation of national government departments that the government had recently carried out. The main emphasis of both these developments was on the greater organisational efficiency of government services through their reorganisation. This is a common theme throughout the area based policies and the other developments occurring at national and local level. In the past, the introduction of new services had been seen as a way to improve the conditions on the ground. The late sixties saw the beginnings of a continuing emphasis, which is still with us today, of reorganising existing services to maximise their efficiency. It is this reorganisation which I call restructuring.

The Skeffington Committee was appointed in March 1968 to 'consider and report on the best methods, including publicity, of securing the participation of the public at the formative stage in the making of development plans for their area.' (Skeffington, 1969: para 1)

While the planning that was being considered by the Committee was largely in the realm of traditional physical planning, the importance of the Committee is that it represented a growing movement towards participation in the processes of government. This movement towards participation is reflected in EPAs, ODFs and the other area based strategies as well as in the reorganised local authorities and the setting up of such bodies as Community Health Councils. As the Committee said:

'We understand participation to be the act of sharing in the formulation of policies and proposals ......... Participation involves doing as well as talking and there will be full participation only where the public are able to take an active part throughout the plan making process.' (Skeffington, 1969: para 5)

However, despite the rhetoric, participation was a process of consultation by planners of 'the people' or the various interest groups concerned with changes.
In conclusion, in Britain, the existence of an already fairly comprehensive system of welfare, which was supposed to prevent anyone falling through the net did not leave the political scope for the development for new and extra policies to deal with poverty. The existing services and programmes were rearranged and reorganised to improve service delivery. However, as I have argued above, when looking at the developments within the contexts of other policies being pursued at the time, it can be seen that this reorganisation of services is only one part of a broader strategy. The Seebohm Report reflected concerns with reorganising services to more effectively meet need. The reorganisation of both central and local government reflected the concerns with reorganising the administrative apparatus of the state to reinforce central control and local coordination. The Skeffington Report reflected concerns with participation within a system which with increased central control conducts itself more in the language of a technocracy than a democracy. These three aspects of service coordination, central direction and 'participation' are reflected in the area based strategies developed.

Poverty and Welfare Services in the United States

Returning to the American picture, I shall look at the context of poverty and welfare services which existed in the United States in the early sixties. If the rediscovery of poverty in Britain is folklore, so too is the influence of Michael Harrington's book, The Other America (1963) on the development of the War on Poverty. The book is credited with awakening the Kennedy Administration to the problems of poverty in America. This idealistic interpretation of social policy development is, however, the main brunt of my thesis. As will be shown later the influence of such 'facts' can be assessed as being small. However moral outcries that justify policy have had an important mystifying role in capitalist democracies. That policy can be argued to be developed in response to a 'just need' is a more consensually oriented appeal than that of more naked self interest. Such an explanation fits in with the ideology of capitalism as responsive and caring.
Nationally, an important analysis of the nature and extent of poverty was carried out by the Council of Economic Advisers staff as background material in the preparation of the War on Poverty. The staff updated the work on poverty that had been done by Robert Lampman. The Economic Report of the President (Council of Economic Advisers, 1964a) contained the CEA's analysis of poverty in the United States. The Council make clear a reason for concern with poverty.

'We pay twice for poverty: once in the production lost in wasted human potential, again in the resources diverted to coping with poverty's social byproducts. Humanity compels our action, but it is sound economics as well.' (Council of Economic Advisers, 1964b: 65-66)

The Council set a poverty standard of three thousand dollars per annum for an average family and calculated that 50 million persons were in poverty on this criterion or 20% of the families in the United States. They concentrated upon the 11 million youth who were represented in this population (16.6% of youth). Analysing the data by breaking down the population to look at who was poor they reported that the old, less-educated, non-whites tended to be over represented in the poverty population. They pointed to the importance of unemployment in contributing to poverty in families.

Paralleling some of the British arguments around the setting up of CDPs, the CEA saw poverty to a large extent as a cultural phenomena.

'Poverty breeds poverty. A poor individual or family has a high probability of staying poor. Low incomes carry with them high risks of illness; limitations on mobility; limited access to education, information and training ..... Lack of motivation, hope and incentive is a more subtle but no less powerful barrier than lack of financial means. Thus the cruel legacy of poverty is passed from parents to children.' (Council of Economic Advisers, 1964b: 78-79)

The American approach focused on an analysis in terms of a culture of poverty.

Another important feature of American poverty is racial inequality. The place of blacks in American society and their poverty was a powerful political force in the politics of the 1960s. The civil rights movement and the rioting in the ghettos are seen
by most observers as events which have had considerable influence on the subsequent development of policy (Piven, 1974b). Much literature focuses particularly on the question of the black poor and controversy has surrounded many of the debates over the causes of black poverty and the ways to overcome this (Rainwater and Yancey, 1967). The black poor are more important in America for various self-explanatory reasons. Firstly the black poor are more visible and have been ghettoised in America. Secondly, the powerlessness of blacks became recognised in the sixties with their demands for more political power. In Britain no such minority existed in quite the same way as in America.

In part the appearance of the black poor can be seen as giving credence to ideas of cultures of poverty. Such an explanation ignores the basic racism which underlies the position faced by blacks in advanced capitalist societies. Many of the federal government's efforts were aimed at ameliorating the symptoms of this racism. The institutional and quasilegal barriers to black advancement held in check the self-development of black groups and resulted in the frustrations which gave rise to both peaceful political protest and also anarchic destruction. Much of the urban focus of the Community Action Program and the Model Cities Program was concentrated on the black poor in the cities.

Poverty within the United States varied geographically to a much greater extent than in Britain. Partly this is a function of the size of the country. In 1959 much of the poverty was non-white poverty in the rural southern states (Morrill and Wohlenberg, 1971: 37). As the poor moved in the 1960s to the ghettos in the north and east, so the poverty shifted and the focus of government concern became urban.

Welfare Provision in the United States

Leiby (1978) points to tensions in the American provision of welfare which parallel those in Britain and concern with central-local relationships.

'On the one hand, the way to the welfare state seemed to require national initiatives, bureaucratic expertise and planning, and a professional spirit of service, the promise of technocracy; on the other hand, programs and services
seemed to require a local support, initiative, and organisation that was more intimate and comprehensive than an assortment of federal bureaucrats could manage.' (Leiby, 1978: 298)

American provision of welfare services and benefits is much more complex than in Britain. Provision has grown up in the states in a haphazard fashion without a necessary direct federal involvement. The levels of provision varied considerably from state to state and until the 1960s there was no attempt to construct a nationally uniform network of social service provision. The Kennedy and Johnson Administrations went some way towards attempting to do this. The Great Society legislation of Johnson was mainly focused on increasing provision for the poor and increasing the political rights of blacks. While social security arrangements varied considerably from state to state, the social work services also varied from county to county. Leiby quotes a research monograph by Robinson (1960) which revealed;

'that more than one quarter of the counties in the nation did not have a full-time local public health unit, and one-fifth did not have public health nurses (who would actually find cases). Public assistance, which dealt with clients who were usually under great stress, was a mental health hazard rather than a help because its benefits were so low and its administration so demeaning. Thirty seven percent of the counties had no child welfare services of any sort, and half of the rest had no public child welfare services; since these dealt primarily with children who were separated or likely to become separated from their families, the deficiency was serious. Probation and parole services were lacking in one-quarter of the counties, and where they existed the workers were too few and, usually, poorly prepared and paid. The public schools were perhaps in the best condition. They were universal and usually had some specialized capacity, but even this fell far short of any reasonable standard, and of course wealthier districts did much better than poor ones. Two-thirds of the counties had no public recreation program ........ Only 9 percent of the counties had a family service agency, fewer than one quarter had mental health clinics.' (Leiby, 1978: 307)

During the sixties attempts were made to overcome some of these deficiencies in the American welfare system. The programmes in America, unlike those in Britain, were basic to this attempt. Rather than providing a supplement to existing systems of welfare such programmes as the CAP were a basic part of the newly created
welfare system. The provision of welfare services expanded rapidly through the Johnson Administration.

Medicaid which provided health care for all public assistance recipients and medically indigent persons was part of the unfinished business of the New Deal. Like many of these programmes, the programme was financed through grants-in-aid to states with the states contributing to the costs. This resulted in a continued lack of uniformity nationwide. The programme tried to encourage uniform benefits by requiring coverage of basic services. Variation between states occurred because states were given discretionary authority to determine eligibility, range of optional medical services and extent of coverage. However, Medicaid expenditure increased from 2.5 billion dollars in 1967 to 9 billion dollars in 1973 and while ten million people received benefits in 1967, more than twenty-three million did in 1973 (Davis, 1977).

The Elementary and Secondary Education Act, 1965 provided for the first time, federal assistance to public schools. This was important in two ways. Firstly, symbolically, the federal government's intervention in public schools had been bitterly opposed on both religious and racial grounds. Local autonomous school boards in the better financed areas did not want federal finance which also implied elements of federal control over such things as racial segregation in schools. The poorer school districts, however, were badly in need of such federal support.

Title 1 of the Act received 12.5 billion dollars over the decade beginning with 960 million dollars in 1966 and rising to 1.8 billion in 1973. These funds were distributed to states on the basis of concentrations of children from families below a specified income level and states distributed the funds to local educational agencies according to federal guidelines. The Act allowed for a considerable amount of discretion as to how the funds were used by the states and educational authorities (Levin, 1977).

In the field of housing, the federal government became involved firstly in building housing projects providing a residual function in the housing market, then in rent supplements to local housing
authorities to allow them to lease homes to poorer families, in providing income to housing authorities to build houses and in guaranteeing mortgages for poorer families. The Housing Act (1961) provided for subsidized below market interest rate mortgage insurance programmes to assist rental housing for moderate income families. Under the Housing Act (1965) federal payment could be made to meet part of the rent of low income families in privately owned housing built with FHA mortgage insurance assistance. The Housing and Urban Development Act (1968) established a home ownership programme providing special mortgage insurance and cash payments for low and moderate income home buyers, to help them to meet their mortgage payments (Wallace, 1977).

The food stamps programme provided a convenient way of intervening in the food market to prevent prices to farmers dropping because of gluts, while at the same time providing a benefit to the poor over which there was some control. By 1972, the food stamps programme's annual expenditure was 1.9 billion dollars. (Leiby, 1978:324)

The major welfare programme, Aid for Families with Dependant Children (AFDC) had a caseload which doubled between 1963-69. In 1972, there were eleven million recipients which included 7.9 million children or 10% of the nation's children. Expenditure increased from less than one billion dollars in fiscal year 1965 to more than four billion dollars in 1974 (Lynn, 1977).

Other cash programmes included social insurance for old age, survivors and disability, unemployment insurance, workmen's compensation, veteran's programmes. However, as Lynn comments:

'Because federal, state, and local agencies, congressional committees, and private interest groups are divided into numerous entities concerned with specific substantive or professional interests, the resulting programs are also fragmented. As the Joint Economic Committee's 1974 report on its public welfare study pointed out '11 committees of the House of Representatives, 10 of the Senate and 9 executive departments or agencies have jurisdiction over the broad set of income security programs.' The term income-maintenance 'system' is merely a handy euphemism.' (Lynn, 1977: 83)

Almost all these different welfare programmes suffered from the
problems associated with residual forms of welfare: stigma, low take up, low benefits and low thresholds. Added to this was the peculiar problem resulting from a federal system of government. States provided different levels of service and benefit.

The Contrasts

These sweeping pictures of the contexts in which policies developed in the two countries provide sharp contrasts. On the one hand, the British welfare state was fairly comprehensive and uniform, on the other hand, the welfare system in America was piecemeal, residual and varying from area to area. With this in mind, it should be clear that to approach poverty policies in the two countries as if they were in some sense taking place within a comparable frame is a mistake. Policies are clearly developed in the short term on a process of muddling through or building upon past provision. This being the case, the foundations upon which they rested were very different.

The second contrast that is provided is between the reality of poverty in the two countries and the way that this was articulated into the policymaking process. While there were broad similarities within the poverty population, the British population did not contain the large black population nor the rural poor to the extent that is the case in America. As well as this, the overall level of poverty in the United States was greater and the degree of relative poverty more severe. These conditions in both countries existed, however, prior to any 'public' or government 'awareness' of the problem. It cannot be said that the mere existence of need results in action. Nor is it the case that its discovery results in action. The 'discovery' of poverty in the two countries took on different forms and resulted in different tensions within the existing political structure. In America, the 'discovery' of poverty matched concerns with the increasing racial tensions in American cities, while also being consistent with the desire to expand the domestic economy by increasing output and consumption. In Britain, the 'discovery' of poverty played an important role in the strategy of the Labour Government 1964-70. With a Labour Government abandoning its socialist
commitment's, a traditional 'socialist' caring concern with the less well off was a counter to some of the clearly capitalist policies the government was adopting. Cutting areas of public expenditure, attempting legislation against the unions and supporting American aggression in Vietnam were policies which carried some political price with the left. They revealed the nature of the government. At the same time, the publicity given to the rediscovery of poverty, to lack of educational opportunity, poor housing and insufficient services made policies which could be portrayed as serious attempts to deal with the problems much more attractive. However it is clear that even this minimal attempt itself met with some resistance within the government.

3. Economic Trends

The most important part of this background material concerns the economic changes taking place in the two countries at the time. Particularly after the recession in the early 1970s in both countries, the influence of the overall economic situation facing the state became increasingly important. The early 1970s brought to the fore some of the underlying economic contradictions upon which the prosperity of the advanced capitalist states is based. The manifestation of these contradictions, while demanding more active attempts to overcome them by the state, also allows some of the latent characteristics of past social policies to be apparent.

It is important to reflect on the role of the state in the economic life of capitalism. There are two important aspects to this role. Firstly the state has an important function in regulating conflicts between parts of capital and providing the general social and economic framework within which accumulation can proceed. The economic framework has two parts. On the one hand, there is the general fiscal and monetary regulation of the conditions within which capital can accumulate. On the other hand, this regulation involves the state itself within the frame of capitalist relations of production. Education for example does not only imply state expenditure on education within a system of capitalist relations. It is also, importantly, state expenditure which, as state expenditure, is playing a role affecting fiscal and monetary conditions.
Within the Keynesian approach adopted by many capitalist states at the time, state expenditure has important functions in regulating demand, in determining the money supply, and in affecting interest rates on the national markets. The state entered into some of these relationships as a capitalist (e.g., borrowing); in others it intervened as a capitalist state in the regulation of the market within which capital is operating.

The 1960s in both America and Britain may be seen as the end of the period of post-war growth and the beginning of the end of the Keynesian economic paradigm as the major influence in government thinking. The post-war period, which in the United States extended for a longer period of time than in Britain, was characterised by expanding production, greater consumption, more consumer goods and a higher standard of living. The 1972 recession began to reverse these trends.

A clear statement of the Keynesian approach to demand management through fiscal policies comes from Pechman.

'The major contribution that fiscal policy can make to economic growth is to help keep total demand roughly in line with the productive potential of the economy. An economy operating at less than full employment is one in which potential GDP is larger than the total of actual spending by consumers, business and government. The remedy is to increase private or public spending through fiscal and monetary stimulation. Conversely, when total demand exceeds the capacity of the economy to produce goods and services, the remedy is to curtail private or public spending through fiscal and monetary restraint.' (Pechman, 1977: 23)

He goes on to qualify this by showing how difficult this process has been in practice to achieve. The US economy in the 1960s reflects this problem.

To view an economic policy based upon the principles of demand management in isolation from its political corollaries, is to fail to understand the connection between the political and the economic. Keynesian policies are not merely a set of policies within the sphere of fiscal and economic concerns. They are also a set of political relationships. The way in which the state regulates the economy and the part that it plays in relation to the economic context of private capitals, changes and adapts the nature of the
relationship between capital and labour in a way which reaches beyond the economic relationship. Keynesian economic policies have not merely been accompanied by a series of conciliatory social policies. These conciliatory social policies are an integral part of the balance of class forces that Keynesianism attempts to maintain, based upon stability and social peace, without apparent class conflict.

The American Economy

In America, the sixties can be divided into two parts. Firstly, the 'success' of Johnson's economic policies and the growth in the American economy and secondly the beginnings of its decline as the American economy became overheated by the Vietnam War expenditure. In the same way the Labour government's policies in the sixties could be divided around the devaluation of the pound. In the first period there was an attempt to introduce much more extensive management into the economy and in the second, the offensive by the Labour Government against the working class. In both countries some of the subsequent developments can be understood much more fully given the background of the economic policies pursued in the two countries at the time. The subsequent history of the economic policies pursued and the imposition of the world economic recession made for very similar considerations in the two countries. However, the earlier period illustrates a sharp divergence.

The Kennedy Administration took a much more active role in the management of demand than had the Eisenhower Administration. Eisenhower had largely left alone the economy in a traditionally conservative manner and while the Korean War provided for growth within the US economy, the subsequent mild recession was left untended. When Kennedy took office, there was a budget surplus relatively high unemployment and stagnation within the economy. The way forward he adopted was to introduce a tax cut to stimulate demand and so take up some of the 'slack' within the economy. The Administration failed to achieve its tax cut. However, some other measures were adopted in an attempt to encourage increased employment, such as the Manpower Development and Training Act. The Johnson Administration succeeded where Kennedy had failed and
achieved a tax cut. This coupled with the social programmes began to have an effect upon demand and growth.

The seeming success of keynesian demand management was reflected in the optimistic lecture given by Walter Heller, the ex-chairman of the Council of Economic Advisers, under Kennedy and then Johnson. Speaking at Harvard in 1966, Heller said;

'Economics has come of age in the 1960s. Two Presidents have recognised and drawn on modern economics as a source of national strength and Presidential power. Their willingness to use, for the first time, the full range of modern economic tools underlies the unbroken U.S. expansion since early 1961 - an expansion that in its first five years created over seven million new jobs, doubled profits, increased the nation's real output by a third, and closed the fifty billion dollar gap between actual and potential production that plagued the American economy in 1961.' (Heller, 1966: 1)

However, if the 'new economics' had come of age in 1966, its middle and old age were not far off. The main target of the Kennedy and Johnson Administrations was to 'close the gap' between actual and potential GNP. In the period from 1956-61, the real GNP rose at an average rate of 2.1% (Okun, 1970: 35). Between the first quarter of 1963 and the second quarter of 1965, the real GNP increased at an annual rate of 5.7% and from the second quarter of 1965 to the first quarter of 1966 the GNP increased at an annual rate of 8.5% (Okun, 1970: 67). As can be seen, the approach taken by the Administration was successful in the short term. However by the end of the decade, the annual rate of increase of the GNP in 1970 was -0.6%.

Unemployment also fell. The rate had been fluctuating between 5.5% and 6% during 1962 and 1963 and fell to 5% during 1964, declining to 4.7% during the spring of 1965 (Okun, 1970: 47). In 1966, the unemployment rate was at the low point, a rate of 7.3% for minorities and 3.8% for the overall population. The overall unemployment rate continued to fall to 3.5% by 1969. (see next page).

While unemployment decreased and the GNP increased at a dramatic rate up until 1966, the effects of demand management were reversed after 1966. The increase in defence expenditure and federal, state and local governments expenditure in general, began to have an effect upon the rate of inflation. 1965 and 1966 saw the consumer
price index beginning to rise dramatically after a small and gradual increase over the previous four years. This coupled with the added inflationary pressures brought to bear on the economy by the increased commitment to the War on Vietnam, slowed down the rate of growth in the GNP during 1967. In the years 1966-68, the defence budget grew by more than 10 billion dollars per annum.

**U.S. Economic Indicators**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>GNP (Billion dollars)</td>
<td>560.3</td>
<td>632.4</td>
<td>749.9</td>
<td>864.2</td>
<td>977.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% Increase in GNP over previous year</td>
<td>6.6</td>
<td>5.5</td>
<td>6.5</td>
<td>4.7</td>
<td>-0.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total government expenditure ($b) (Fed., state &amp; local)</td>
<td>176.2</td>
<td>196.4</td>
<td>224.8</td>
<td>282.6</td>
<td>333.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Government exp. as % of GNP</td>
<td>31.4</td>
<td>31.0</td>
<td>30.0</td>
<td>32.7</td>
<td>34.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Defence exp. ($b)</td>
<td>49.3</td>
<td>50.7</td>
<td>55.4</td>
<td>78.7</td>
<td>78.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Surplus/deficit</td>
<td>-7.1</td>
<td>-5.9</td>
<td>-3.8</td>
<td>-25.2</td>
<td>-2.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unemployment</td>
<td>5.5</td>
<td>5.2</td>
<td>3.8</td>
<td>3.6</td>
<td>4.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unemployment for minorities</td>
<td>10.9</td>
<td>9.6</td>
<td>7.3</td>
<td>6.7</td>
<td>8.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Consumer Price Index (1967=100)</td>
<td>90.6</td>
<td>92.9</td>
<td>97.2</td>
<td>104.2</td>
<td>116.3</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


Government expenditure as a proportion of GNP fell from 32% in 1961, to 30% in 1965 (U.S. Department of Commerce, 1975) reflecting the effect that the growth oriented policies had upon the national product. However, from 1966 to 1970, the proportion rose from 30% to 34%. The GNP's increase was declining while
military expenditures were unstable and the effects of prior commitments to government expenditure were working their way through the economy.

The advantage of a tax cut for economic stimulation lay in its immediate effects upon domestic consumption, its disadvantages were that it was difficult to reverse (as Johnson would have liked to do to finance the War on Vietnam) and that the money 'freed' in a tax cut will not necessarily be spent in a way which increases consumption in the most desirable sectors. Government expenditure had advantages and disadvantages as well, as a tool of economic policy. To manipulate demand, increased government expenditure was a less sharp instrument, in that its effect took time to work through the economy. Secondly, government expenditures, especially on social programmes could not be promoted, politically, as one-off expenditure but imply future and in many cases open ended commitment to continued expenditure. Tax cuts, unlike government expenditure, may have a direct effect upon levels of investment and interest rates, since those receiving tax cuts in the higher income levels are more likely to save than spend. This is for the 'new economics' a two edged sword. On the one hand, increased domestic consumption encourages a growing GNP, but such a growth in the GNP requires increased levels of investment. The investment boom, which had been contributed to by the tax cut had begun to peter out in late 1966. The fall in the rate of increase in GNP can be partly attributed to this slowdown.

It is important to emphasise the fluctuating nature of the U.S.'s economic fortunes in the 1960s. It seemed up until 1966 that Keynesian demand management did work and would continue to provide increasing prosperity. Accompanying this prosperity and growth, it was argued, would be a filtering down of its effects to the poorest people. The temporary success conceals some of the basic economic contradictions within capitalism. Poverty was not seen as a structural part and necessary product of this mode of production. This temporary success also concealed the impossibility of separating the economic from the political and social. The international hegemony which the U.S. was fighting to preserve in Vietnam was
as much responsible for American prosperity as any manipulation of the American domestic economy.

The period of success in maintaining this international hegemony began to end, coinciding with the over-effects of domestic economic policies, during the early 1970s. The American and subsequently the world economy began to experience a recession. I shall examine the reasons for this world recession and some of its implications for the U.S. and Britain later.

Government domestic policies provide an interesting parallel with the changing position of the U.S. economy as seen through keynesian eyes. The emphasis changes over the sixties from one concerned with expanding service provision and encouraging participation in the work force, reflecting the desire to decrease the gap between actual and potential GNP and then towards the rationalising of services in an attempt, not only to reduce the increase in government expenditure, but also to allow for a rationalisation of services to fit them more closely to the new economic 'reality'. It is important not to see the developments in the sixties as the total story. The recession which began in the early 1970s had important repercussions which will be more easily compared with the development of the recession in Britain.

The British Economy

When discussing the economic changes that occurred in Britain during the 1960s, it is important to make plain some of the differences in the nature of the British economy from that of the American. One of the basic differences lies in the role of Britain as one of the world's major trading nations. America does not rely for its wealth, to the same extent as Britain, upon its trading position. However, while both currencies in the sixties were major world currencies, being held by foreign countries in large amounts, the dollar was not so dependent upon the balance of payments position to maintain the U.S.'s ability to honour these dollars. In Britain the sixties were characterised by recurring balance of payments crises and the history of the Labour Government's economic policies is largely one of attempts to overcome these crises.

When the Labour Government was elected in 1964, it was faced
with an economy at nearly full employment and an increasing balance of payments deficit. While one way of overcoming the balance of payments problem would have been to devalue the pound on taking office, the Government resisted such a move to avoid any unpopular electoral consequences which might occur because they would shortly have to have another election to achieve an overall majority in Parliament. Devaluation was also rejected as an option because of the unfavourable reaction abroad which could have resulted and the fear that the Labour Government would be seen as too prepared to devalue out of balance of payments problems as the post-war Labour Government had done. Instead, therefore, of devaluing on taking office, the Government attempted to restore the competitiveness for British goods by instituting a technological revolution to accelerate the growth in productivity and through national planning to ensure an increase in exports and reduction in imports. An incomes policy was also seen as being a necessary part of this strategy to prevent incomes rising as productivity rose, so reducing the benefits to profits of such productivity increases. In summary, national planning was intended to stimulate growth and productivity and lead to an export boom. However this soon became an impractical course of action. The balance of payments problem accelerated rather than declined and a deflationary strategy seemed to be the only course of action open although it implied abandoning the commitment to full employment and growth. This led to a return to the stop/go strategy that the previous government had adopted and the Labour Government was pledged to avoid. The introduction of a wages and prices freeze was part of this strategy. The results were disappointing and the government was eventually forced to devalue the pound in November 1967, and, with wages increasing to make up some of the ground lost through devaluation, reinstitute a wages and prices policy, coupled with cuts in public expenditure and attempts to control the unions through the proposed industrial relations legislation.

The role of foreign trade in the British economy meant that, unlike the U.S., full potential growth and employment could not be achieved only through encouraging domestic demand. Any increase
in domestic demand produced an inflow of imports which had to be accompanied by an increase in exports to prevent a balance of payments deficit. Exports could only become more competitive and increase through their prices being kept down through increased productivity or holding down wages. A strategy of increasing productivity demanded increased investment and relied upon a growth in the amount of money in the economy with inflationary and import prone tendencies that this implies. Keeping down wages also had the effect, not only of political problems within the Labour movement, but also of restraining domestic demand and so decreasing consumption of domestically produced goods. These tensions produced the stop go cycle of the sixties.

Government also used public expenditure to try and control domestic demand and deflate the economy. A large increase in public expenditure of the kind that the Labour Government's manifesto was pledged to, unless financed by growth in the domestic economy, would have had to be financed through taxation which might either reduce investment or further suppress wages (depending upon where the taxation fell). The resulting cuts in public expenditure implemented by the Labour Government were announced both as deflationary measures and to increase the amount of money available for investment without increasing the absolute amount of money which was available, since this would have had inflationary consequences for the pound and the balance of payments.

The situation of the British economy in the 1960s was therefore rather unique, in that the British economy through its historical development as a major world trader, had in the loss of its imperial strength to compete in the world markets in a way which it was unable to, especially given the strength of its labour movement and the size of its welfare state.

Another important aspect of the economic approach which the government attempted to follow and which had reverberations throughout the British system of government was the use of planning. While the Tories had set up the National Economic Development Council in the early sixties as the beginnings of indicative planning in the country, the Labour Government seemed, in many
fields to substitute this concept of 'planning' for a commitment to socialist planning. The distinction between capitalism and socialism is in the nature and content of their plans, not in their existence. Planning in its capitalist form infiltrated the Labour Government increasingly. With such planning was accompanied a whole ethos of neutral evaluation, technical development and statistical indicators. I shall look at it in other fields later. However the National Plan was perhaps the major platform of the Government's national economic policy up until 1966.

'Indeed one could date the life cycle of the Plan as: 'conceived October 1964, born September 1965, died (possibly murdered) July 1966.' (Opie, 1972: 170)

Opie points to a major failing in the technocratic approach to planning adopted by the Labour Government.

'The ultimate choice among options is a political choice, not to be avoided by greater use of research and statistics. When it came to the ultimate choice, the Government preferred to sacrifice faster growth and full employment to the existing exchange rate, and not the other way round. In July 1966, fierce deflationary measures were imposed, together with a statutory wage and price freeze, in a frantic effort to close the external deficit and hopefully to reverse what many held to be a worsening trend in our external position.' (Opie, 1972: 170-171)

The progress of the Labour Government's economic policy was such that by the end of their term in office it could be argued that the period as a whole was characterised by a failure to have a policy. Political pressures produced changes in economic policy, which in turn influenced political forces. The Government muddled through in classic style so that by the end of the period little had been achieved. Certainly the period was not characterised by the optimism in economic management which occurred with the American economy. The basic difference in the development of the two national economies can be explained in terms of their world position and the size of their domestic economies. Whereas in America, the domestic economy and its resources were of such a size that the economy as a whole was relatively self-sufficient, in Britain, the economy relied almost exclusively on trade with foreign competitors. America's world position also allowed it to not have to compete either with foreign competitors or with foreign consumers. It
could impose its will. Britain had lost this position of world
e hegemony after the first world war. For these reasons the sixties
saw divergent trends in the two economies. The seventies however
began with a capitalist world economic crisis which imposed itself
upon the international capitalist world economy and can be seen
to have resulted in similar pressures in the two countries. It
is this which I shall examine next.

Restructuring expenditure and 'the crisis'

The economic recession of 1974-1975 is often attributed to the
rise in oil prices by the OPEC countries. While these had effects
to different degrees upon different countries the source of the
recession is to be found elsewhere. This recession was the first
recession on an international scale since the end of the second
world war. This resulted from the synchronisation of the international
industrial cycle through increased internationalisation of capitalist
production brought about by the growth in multi-national enterprises.
The internationalisation of the crisis created a problem for national
states attempts at avoiding recession in the traditional manner,
through demand management. Increased demand in one country at a
time of international recession, rather than promoting domestic
production was likely to lead to increased imports.

The recession produced a decline in production in all the major
capitalist countries in 1973 and 1974. In the United States,
between the fourth quarter of 1973 and the second quarter of 1975
industrial production declined by 14.4%, in the U.K. between the
fourth quarter of 1973 and the fourth quarter of 1974 the decline
was 10.1%. With this decline in production, countries exporting
raw materials saw a reduction of their currency reserves from a
combination of inflation and lack of demand for their exports,
which in turn produced a lack of demand for imports. The balance
of payments problems created for some western nations through
the fall in exports resulted in import restrictions of varying
kinds by the imperialist powers (Mandel, 1978).

Looking at the utilization of productive capacity in manufacturing
industry in the U.S., it can be seen how the trend from 1966 onwards
was generally downwards with each successive 'boom' resulting in
These accounts of the performance of the United States and British economies are intended to show general trends, not to provide a detailed analysis of shifts during the years of the programmes. An important feature, left out of my account is therefore, the attempts of the Heath government to make a shift in the management of the economy, a shift which was reversed in the 'Barber boom' of 1972. I ignore this in my text, because rather than representing a dramatic departure which influenced the development of the policies I am studying, its effect was one of continuing the already well established trends which I discuss. There were however during this period three other events in the world economy which had repercussions for the deteriorating position of Britain; the breakdown of the Bretton Woods monetary system, the rise of world prices for raw materials and the oil crisis. Inflation in Britain increased sharply in 1971, the balance of payments position worsened in 1973 and manufacturing output fell from 1973 onwards, all this was occurring within the context of an increasingly militant labour movement.
a lower utilization than previously.

Rate of Utilization of Productive Capacity in Manufacturing Industry in the U.S.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Rate(%)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1966</td>
<td>92 (Boom)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1967</td>
<td>78 (mini-recession)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1968</td>
<td>88 (Boom)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1969</td>
<td>87 (Boom)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1970</td>
<td>78 (Recession)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1971</td>
<td>75 (Recession)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1972</td>
<td>78 (Boom)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1973</td>
<td>83 (Boom)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1974</td>
<td>78 (Recession)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1975</td>
<td>65 (Recession)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
(Source: Mandel, 1978: 26)

Inflation also contributed to and was symptomatic of the recession.

Annual Rate of Increase of Consumer Prices in %

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>United States</th>
<th>Britain</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1960-65 (average)</td>
<td>1.3</td>
<td>3.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1968</td>
<td>4.2</td>
<td>4.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1970</td>
<td>5.9</td>
<td>6.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1972</td>
<td>3.3</td>
<td>7.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1974</td>
<td>11.0</td>
<td>16.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1975</td>
<td>7.8</td>
<td>22.1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
(Mandel)

As Mandel says:

'The prime cause of inflation, however, is undeniably the swelling of credit in the private sector, in other words the swelling of bank debts, and of credit facilities, which was the essential pillar of the long period of expansion that preceded the acceleration of inflation. The western economy sailed to prosperity on a sea of debt.' (Mandel, 1978: 29, original emphasis)

It can be seen, looking both at the rates of inflation and the utilization of productive capacity in the U.S., that the recession did not arrive from the blue. It was a culmination of a trend and was characterised by its international synchronisation. Higher levels of unemployment, lack of growth and inflation were trends developing from the late sixties onwards. The importance of the recession was that in hitting the capitalist world together, no one nation could find ways through and out of it.

As I have indicated earlier when looking at the U.S., the Keynesian way through the recession within one country would be to increase
domestic demand through increased government expenditure. However, with inflation running at high levels and with the crisis manifesting itself as a crisis of credit and finance capital, increased government expenditure had the effect of increasing the inflationary pressures which were contributing to the recession. Rather than going for a straightforward reduction in government spending, which itself could have a further effect upon the recession, both in the U.S. and in the U.K., the government selectively restructured spending attempting to decrease or stabilise it, in a way which would not reduce demand within the economy.

There is another aspect of the problem of government expenditure in the seventies. While government spending was caught in this prong between its inflationary and anti-recession tendencies, so too was government expenditure in a contradictory political position. Government expenditure both alleviated some of the social effects of the recession while being seen as part of the cause of the recession because of its effect on the money markets.

The solution to such dilemmas cannot be easily found. Both in Britain and America similar tactics were adopted from the early seventies onwards. Clearly, the role of public spending in Britain has had a greater overall political effect than in America. This can be attributed to the much greater size of the public sector in Britain, the strength of the labour movement and the position in which Britain is regarding the stability of its currency and the effects of the domestic credit markets on that stability and upon public expenditure. Under capitalism, public services have the two-fold and contradictory nature of being on the one hand gains that have been won through struggle by the working class over the years and provide social provision for workers, raising their standard of living, and on the other hand, the actual provision itself reflects the current needs of capitalism in regulating the form of social relations and the future needs of capital in its own reproduction. Therefore health services, education and other social services while providing real benefits to workers provides them in a context which benefits capital, although in a different manner.
With the onset of the crisis, which while being symptomatised in relation to industrial capital, has its roots in the financial system of capital, the state is faced with its own contradictory attempts to, on the one hand increase demand for industrial goods through deficit spending, and on the other, lower the rate of inflation and stabilise the financial markets by reducing the level of borrowing. It is attempting to confront both these contradictory tendencies that leads to the restructuring of the nature of state expenditure.

Education, for instance, is an example in which this is particularly clear. To reduce state expenditure on education across the board would be cutting off the capitalists noses to spite their faces. Educational expenditure stimulates demand, provides for an educated and disciplined work force and is a gain hard won by the working class. The spending on education is therefore not cut across the board. The different requirements are attempted to be reconciled. Firstly, capital spending on future projects is cut, which while affecting the future level of demand, also has important implications for future state borrowing requirements. It could be hoped that with the prospect of future lower or more stable interest rates, capital can invest and so restitute some of the potential lost demand. The main areas of educational spending in current budgets which are curtailed are what may be seen from the capitalist's point of view as the frills of education. Nursery education, remedial teaching, pupil-teacher ratios, none of which will hopefully result in a reduction in the output of educational establishments. Even if some educational progress is sacrificed the overall level of unemployment and future likely unemployment trends allow for some of this reduction in educational 'output'. Meanwhile the ideological struggle takes place to persuade the working class that expenditure on education is not being cut, that it is being redistributed or the cuts are merely in increases in expenditure. In this way, through restructuring the state attempts to reconcile the contradictory pressures caused by the position of state expenditure in capitalist society.

These patterns can be seen in all sorts of ways in the programmes
with which I am concerned. In Britain, from the beginning of the area based strategies, they have been positive discrimination strategies which imply a selectivity and consequent improvement in 'efficiency'. They also are seen as being important initiatives although the amount of money spent on them or government interest in them would seem to be small. They also have an important propaganda role to play and if they succeed can be useful ways of saving money in the future. Massive education cuts were being imposed as the EPAs were launched. School building allocations nationally were being cut at the same time as the EPA allocation to primary school building were being announced.

In both countries, there has been a trend towards focusing upon the reorganisation of the procedures conceals the reorganisation of priorities which accompanies it.

Another aspect of the restructuring of public expenditure during crisis which I mention above, is the ideological assault which accompanies it. If the cuts are seen by the working class as real, then the second line of defence is to persuade the working class that they were necessary anyway! Social security scroungers are the most blatant example. However this process is more discrete as well. The emphasis, not upon cutting expenditure, but upon stabilising it, the emphasis upon increased efficiency rather than on the substance of increased efficiency, these are all parts of the ideological assault.
Chapter Five
Comparing the United States and Britain

This chapter considers issues of how the programmes and projects were presented and how this presentation managed the political debate taking place. I go on to consider the transatlantic connections in social science and to show how two particular themes, developing from tensions in state expenditure and in the polity of the two countries had important roles in shaping action. These themes, that of the shift from service provision to service management, and that of central control and democratic legitimacy, provide a transatlantic input into the rhetoric of presentation. Similar tensions provided a common vocabulary which was translated into the different contexts of the two countries and incorporated into the rhetoric of presentation, giving the appearance of similarity to the programmes and projects, an appearance which was far from the reality.

The presentation of policy

In discussing these projects and programmes, it is important to note the use of similar rhetoric in presenting the policies for public consumption and the use in both countries of social science to provide an external rational legitimation for policy initiatives.

The aims of the policies in both countries were couched in consensual terms and were largely unquestioned within the political process. Any debate concerning the policies tended to be in terms of the best means to achieve these ends. For example, the Republican counter proposal to the War on Poverty was their 'Opportunity Crusade'. The emphasis on improving individual opportunity was similar although the means were different. Subsequently, the Model Cities Program was variously attacked for not spending enough money, involving too great a federal direction over local affairs or rewarding rioters. In no case was opposition to such policies on the grounds that the problems articulated did not exist. In Britain, the Urban Programme, albeit with changes in emphasis, was launched by a Labour Government, continued by a Conservative Government and eventually expanded by a Labour Government. Again,
the debate that did occur was centered on the structure of the programme not on its aims or the nature of the problems it was ostensibly constructed to deal with.

Apart from questions raised by the CDP teams (and largely rejected by those who set the political agenda), in neither country were questions raised concerning whether the problems which had been identified were amenable to government solution. The ideological assumption throughout was that these problems were aberrations, which were amenable to state action, provided that policy began with a clear understanding of the problems and that the problems were tackled on the basis of this understanding.

As I have argued previously, these policies were not developed primarily for the reasons given. The existence of poverty in and of itself is not in a capitalist society, a cause of action. Poverty is a chronic result of capitalism, an unavoidable aspect of capitalist relations. Policies were developed to meet short or long term needs under the guise of an acceptable intent, and this made it even more important to provide, in terms of their stated aims, rational and technical justifications for the means developed.

Both the Johnson Administration and the Wilson Government can be characterised as liberal administrations with close ties to established intellectuals, particularly to the 'new' intellectual - the sociologist. Economists have, in the past played a variety of roles, both actively within government and as apologists for the economic course taken by government. In the sixties in both countries the sociologist/planner became important. This can be explained in terms of the relative 'success' of the post war economies giving rise to changes in the perception of problems - with the result that problems were defined as social rather than economic. This optimism was reflected in the thinking of the sixties before some of the weaknesses of Keynesian economic management were highlighted. Moynihan (1970) displayed this confidence.

'(The econometric revolution) was part of the extraordinary growth in knowledge of the twentieth century, with all its accompanying forms of instability. The economy may yet suffer utter collapse, just as we may yet blow ourselves up: intermediary miscalculations are not only to be seen as possible, but to be expected. But the master term is
miscalculation: fewer and fewer basic decisions in the society are made without some form of quantified knowledge being brought to bear on them.’ (Moynihan, 1970: 29)

The relabelling of problems as being social rather than economic can be illustrated by the rejection by the Kennedy Administration and its economic advisers of explanations of areas of high unemployment and poverty which saw them as manifestations of economic problems whose roots lay in the structure of the American economy. This structural view would have required a reappraisal of the Keynesian policies of demand management that the Administration was pursuing. Unemployment was believed to be amenable to a policy of economic growth which was consistent with orthodox and successful economic policies and also as being exacerbated by specific 'opportunity-based' factors. Solutions therefore lay, not in the restructuring of the economy, but through a socially oriented programme to give effect to desirable economic policies. The redefinition of problems as being social and more importantly open to modification through social programmes protected both the existing distribution of rewards and the ideology of liberal capitalism.

As Shaw argues;

'We can sum up this crucial transition in bourgeois thought by saying that sociology arises and assumes the economic problems are solved, when economic problems have become transparently social problems which cannot be solved within the framework of bourgeois economics. Sociology deals with the manifestations of the contradictions of the mode of production, social relations between classes in political, cultural and ideological forms. But it does so by systematically divorcing them from their basis in the mode of production itself.' (Shaw, 1975: 82)

The approach of both countries was one of piecemeal social engineering. Problems could be resolved and desirable changes effected through the well thought out and experimental implementation of policies based upon an understanding of the problems and the effects of action upon them.

Halsey (1974) terms this approach 'experimental social administration'.

'...... these programmes .... postulate a new relation between social science and social policy. They assert
the idea that reforms may be seriously conducted through social science experiment .... The idea is that among possible policies about which little is known, a rational plan A seems to be most viable. The politician commits himself to trying plan A in an experimentally devised situation, but at the same time commits himself to abandoning it if evaluation by the most valid social science techniques show that it does not work and ought therefore to give way to plan B.' (Halsey, 1972: 126).

This approach implies two aspects of the relationship between social science and policy making. On the one hand, there is the apparent aspect of social science assessment and evaluation of policy in order to improve politically determined choices. On the other hand, this connection between social science and policy making conceals the political choices made.

Halsey's approach centers on a traditional sociological dichotomy. 

'... we must first distinguish the 'scientific' from the 'value' problem: to ask separately what is possible and thereby, with the issues and alternatives sharply defined, to decide on preferences and priorities .... It is necessary at every step to try and make explicit what are implicit assumptions of political aims and what are the value premises of sociological analysis.' (Halsey, 1972: 3-4)

Although he comments on the complexity of such a strategy, he nevertheless advocates that it should be attempted. I would argue however that such a course creates a false dichotomy between facts and values and attempts a distinction which cannot be sustained.

What is of interest in the growth of sociology in government is not that 'knowledge' had increased and could be used by politicians to achieve value choices selected through the political process, but that in both countries the liberal social democratic political aims of the government were reflected among a large establishment of intellectuals. These intellectuals were given a role to play in government which was not based upon their 'expert' knowledge. While intellectuals played an important administrative and political role in their guise as intellectuals, the governments of both countries were able to present their political choices in terms of rational means designed on the basis of knowledge.

This is the crux of the transatlantic connection. Words may represent 'concepts', but 'concepts' require either a theoretical or operational basis to become more than empty words. These
intellectuals provided a series of words which were used on both sides of the Atlantic in these programmes. The use of these words implied a social scientific basis for policy development which shared the experience of both countries. Translating words, theoretically or operationally requires political choices. For example, a whole series of common words can be identified which give an appearance of similarity to the programmes and projects designed on both sides of the Atlantic.

'The long-range objective of every community action program is to effect a permanent increase in the capacity of individuals, groups and communities afflicted by poverty to deal effectively with their own problems so that they need no further assistance.' (Office of Economic Opportunity, 1965: 7)

'... this support should be aimed not merely at dealing with their problems but also enabling the individuals, families and communities concerned to learn to live more satisfying lives without requiring so much additional support.' (Home Office, 1968e)

To aim to achieve a position where the poor 'need no further assistance' or don't require 'so much additional support' is rhetoric without considering the context within which this is to take place. Considering the differences between the United States and Britain on two of the most basic welfare services - health and social security, these phrases are describing two different ends. Yet without definition within a particular setting the aims appear to be identical. If however, the aim is translated as being a reduction in public expenditure on services for the poor than perhaps similarities arise, but this is not the aim as stated. The aim relates to the relationship of the poor to services, not the relationship of the services to public expenditure.

For a sociologist approaching the question of the independence (or future independence) of the poor from government welfare

1 Reduction in public expenditure may be a common aim within the two countries because of the similar position that public expenditure has within the economy. However, welfare services, as I show are derived from differing sets of institutional, social political and economic factors which make the concept of 'welfare services' vague without explicit reference.
services, a basic starting point would be to ask, What services?, not merely to add background but because it makes a substantial difference. The words become connected to a concrete reality. Independence within a comprehensive welfare system or independence within a residual welfare system are not the same.

'The most effective and desirable community action program is one which is broadly based, organised on a community wide basis, and involves the coordination of a variety of antipoverty actions. A broadly-based, coordinated program should eventually embrace components in all of the major service systems.......... To be broadly-based, a community action agency must provide ample opportunity for participation in policy making by the major public and private agencies responsible for services and programs concerned with poverty, other elements in the community as a whole, and the population to be served by the community action program.' (Office of Economic Opportunity, 1965: 16-17)

'The CDP is a modest attempt at action research into the better understanding and more comprehensive tackling of social needs, especially in local communities within the older areas through closer coordination of central and local official and unofficial effort, informed and stimulated by citizen initiative and involvement.' (Home Office, 1971)

Coordinating different administrative jurisdictions is not the same as coordinating different departments within the same jurisdiction. While 'coordination' as a word may be the same, it has a completely different operational meaning in the two countries.

The initial concern of CDP with coordination was focused on the interservice team which, being seconded from existing local authority departments, was to provide a more comprehensive approach to the problems of the area than was possible under the existing system of separate local authority departments. This coordination was to be achieved through the cooperation of local authorities and largely rested upon their own initiative. The CAPs, on the other hand, were imposed by the federal government, receiving direction and guidance from the OEO and attempted to intervene and coordinate other established services relating to their own aims.

'Community' is also used in a very different sense in the two countries. Whereas in America, both in the CAP and the Model Cities Program, the community aspect of the programmes had implic-
ations both at a local government level and at a neighbourhood level, the 'community' was articulated as being a set of interest groups. In the British CDPs, 'community' referred to a small geographical area and one of the aims of the projects was to increase the sense of the small area as a homogeneous 'community'. In the American sense of the word, the focus was upon statutory relationships and institutional power. In the sense used by the Home Office, 'community' was a set of informal interpersonal relationships.

The CDBG emphasised the distinctions between the British and American meanings of 'community development'. The equivalent to 'community' as used in Britain in the American terminology would be 'neighbourhood'. 'Community' in American legislation implied a political subdivision in most cases smaller than a state. This was not 'community' in the sense of 'a community' - the more active ideological sense of the word as used in Britain. Whereas in Britain, the ideological aspect of the term relates to its consensual orientation and its 'cultural' undertones, in America, the ideology of 'community' is connected to the nature of government and the state. The formality of American legitimacy and sovereignty derives from the ideology of government representation of a plurality of personal and community interests, community interests and legitimate power, deriving from the sovereignty of personal interests within the American democratic structure. 'Community' is an ideological term not a technical one, although at times it may be presented as such, and being ideological in character its use and meaning have a historical base.

Participation is another word which was frequently used in relation to these policies. The CAPs were to be run with the 'maximum participation' of the poor. The Model Cities Program under Section 103(a)(2) of the Act provided for 'widespread citizen participation in the program'. The CDPs were to tap 'resources of self-help and mutual help which may exist among people in the neighbourhood'. Participation through community councils and community development was increasingly emphasised in Britain in various fields of local government - e.g. school
councils, local plans — although these were not necessarily connected to poverty or deprivation.

Arnstein (1969) divided participation into eight rungs on a ladder, categorising them in three classes as non-participation, tokenism and citizen power. The bottom rung she calls 'manipulation', where people are placed on advisory committees or boards to 'educate' them and engineer their support. Above 'manipulation' on the ladder is 'therapy'.

'On this assumption, under a masquerade of involving citizens in planning, the experts subject the citizens to clinical group therapy. What makes this form of 'participation' so invidious is that citizens are engaged in extensive activity but, the focus of it is on curing them of their 'pathology' rather than changing the racism and victimization that create their 'pathologies'. (Arnstein, 1969: 218)

The third rung of the ladder she calls 'informing', which she sees as an important step towards legitimate citizen participation. Frequently however, the information is of a onesided nature without feedback. Officials give citizens information that supports the official position.

'Consultation' may be combined with other modes of participation but may also be a way of assessing citizen feeling without necessarily using this to effect changes. Public hearings, neighbourhood meetings and attitude surveys are the most common forms of consultation that she points to. The fifth rung, 'placation', is characterised by some degree of influence. The example she uses is placing a few hand-picked 'worthy' poor on CAAs. She sees the majority of Model City Program participation structures as being at the level of placation or below. The remaining three rungs are within the level of citizen power, where power is redistributed between citizens and powerholders.

'Partnership can work most effectively when there is an organised power-base in the community to which the citizen leaders are accountable; when the citizens group has financial resources to pay leaders reasonable honoraria for their time-consuming efforts; and when the group has the resources to hire (and fire) its own technicians, lawyers and community organizers. With these ingredients, citizens have some genuine bargaining influence over the outcome of the plan.... ' (Arnstein, 1969: 221-222)
She points out that where power has been shared in most cases it has had to be taken by the citizens rather than having been given to them.

Her seventh rung, 'delegated power', is where citizens have achieved dominant decision making authority and differences have to be resolved by powerholders starting the bargaining process rather than responding to pressure. The last rung, with the greatest level of citizen power, is 'citizen control' as with 'community' controlled schools and where the citizens have direct access to funding sources.

Without accepting her categorisations, she makes the point forcefully that participation has many meanings and can be all things to all people. Without definition of participation, operationally or theoretically, it becomes mere rhetoric. It does, however, serve a useful purpose in being so uncontestably 'a good thing'.

'The idea of citizen participation is a little like eating spinach: no one is against it in principle because it is good for you. Participation of the governed in the government is, in theory, the cornerstone of democracy - a revered idea that is vigorously applauded by virtually everyone.' (Arnstein, 1969: 216)

At a local level participation is important within a bourgeois electoral democracy, be it America or Britain, and similar trends have occurred on both sides of the Atlantic. These trends are explained in terms of the tensions created within electoral democracy on the local level. It is on the local level that the state appears more clearly for what it is.

'In some respects the class antagonism that always lies just below the surface in British society has been more evident in urban local government than in national.' (Sharpe, 1973a: 7)

The building of roads, redevelopment, and the balance of the provision of services are in the interest of the dominant class. Increased 'efficiency', 'rationalisation' and 'coordination' on the local level are all aimed at improving the performance of the local state as an agent of the central state. To impose efficiency onto a democratic structure without providing outlets for legitimately expressed dissent would be to construct tension. However,
participation mechanisms do not only allow for expressing dissent, but allow dissenters to be coopted into the state machinery. The decision making processes of central and local government are not the neutral channels that they appear to be. As well as the state being a capitalist, rather than a neutral state, I would argue that the processes within the state have a capitalist form. It is not the case that at a central or local level decisions could be made differently (in a non-capitalist way) with the inclusion of different participants or groups into the process. The process mobilises and diffuses within its structure issues that might be placed on the agenda. Therefore the 'choices' that are made are defined within the framework of the state as a capitalist state. The levels of local rates may reflect a decision in terms of improved levels of service provision and less industrial development (owing to high local taxation to finance services) or lower levels of service provision and higher levels of industrial development. This is not a decision which can be avoided through its reconstruction into different terms. The local state and the central state are themselves only given part of the control over decisions affecting their environment. Participation within this limited frame demands a structured rather than a willed cooption. Therefore, the emphasis on participation in decisions affecting the local community can be seen to be basically a method of cooption of local protest to overcome some of the structural tensions which arise in the move towards greater control by the state, centrally, over local decisions.

There is a common aspect of most of the rhetoric to be found in the policies on both sides of the Atlantic. 'Coordination', 'participation', 'planning', 'evaluation' are all terms in themselves which are not objectionable. It is hard to make an argument for an unplanned, uncoordinated approach to social problems. However, it is the reasonableness of these seemingly technical means that serves a purpose for politicians, administrators and social scientists alike. Firstly, policies can be presented in terms of these uncontestable means and ends and hence gain acceptance in political debate, and prevent opponents from questioning what
are presented as consensually agreed ends. Secondly, the means-ends dichotomy is maintained to the maximum benefit of those exercising power. The practical implementation of means is part of the end itself, and is a political choice, exercising power and changing the sort of society in which policies are implemented. With all my examples above, and particularly with participation, the implementation of the means to tackle poverty provided different rewards to different groups depending upon how the words were operationally defined. These operational definitions were not only not passively technical and peripheral to policy making, they were actively political and central to the distribution of benefits from these policies.

It is both in the manner in which these ideas were used to put across policies and in the common themes themselves that a similarity can be found between the two countries. Not only in both countries were poorly defined concepts used to present the nature and purposes of the projects; but they were also, to a large extent, the same poorly defined concepts.

The management of public and private debate

There is a distinction however which needs to be drawn between presentation in debate within the state apparatus and presentation for agreement to a wider audience. In the first case the debate between government departments and between the administration and other political parties or interests, is founded upon a shared understanding of the nature of and purposes of the system of government. In this case, emphasis tended to be given to the fact that the programmes and policies would preserve or improve existing relationships between government and governed and between parts of the government.

For instance, departmental control over policies has been a subject for debate in both countries. In the U.S.A., the establishment of the OEO, the placing of the poverty programme in the Department of Health, Education and Welfare or the distributing of functions to all concerned departments were debated within the Johnson Administration. There was a symbolic purpose in creating a new agency to direct the War on Poverty. However, the discussions
around the issue are of importance in exemplifying how a concern with questions of organisation can provide this legitimacy for political options within the state apparatus.

A memorandum from R. F. Kennedy, the Attorney General, to T. Sorensen, a White House aide, made the focus on organisational means to reach uncontested ends clear.

'.... we regard it as vitally important to create a 'brain trust' to develop a genuine rationale for this comprehensive attack on poverty. This rationale should encompass all of the areas examined in the study, the result of a new hard look at poverty by competent and imaginative people drawn from within and outside government....' (Kennedy, Robert F., 1963)

Again in an earlier memorandum from David Hackett of the Attorney General's Office to William Capron of the Council of Economic Advisers, the Attorney General's Office argued:

'We believe that fundamental to accomplishing anything in the Federal government is the development of an administrative structure which clearly assigns responsibility.' (Hackett, 1963)

The discussion of the programme within government was centered upon its administrative structure and to a degree its administrative aims. The British experience with the Inner Area Studies and the CDFs is parallel. The key questions internally being the organisational structure of the projects and their relationship to other departments.

Ideas of coordination have their place in coordinating government action. So for instance the Task Force on the Model Cities saw the three main principles on which this new approach was to focus as being; the coordination of available and special resources, the coordination of all available talent, and the mobilisation of local leadership and initiative.

'Only by such an approach can we rise to a new level of effort that resolves the dilemmas we have outlined.' (Task Force, 1965: 265)

Of course these 'principles' did not represent an approach, merely the organisational principles of an approach. Focusing on the process as defined by ill-defined concepts managed the debate within the government just as the debate without the state apparatus was managed.
The presentation of policies for approval outwith the state apparatus, e.g. to the electorate and the media, tended to be couched in terms of the overall aims of the programme without questioning assumptions about the nature of 'the good society'. For instance, a concern to promote equality of opportunity, whether in terms of education or defined more broadly, is common both to the British and the American policies and is emphasised in both countries.

Johnson in his announcement of the War on Poverty said;

'The young man or woman who grows up without a decent education, in a broken home, in a hostile environment, in ill-health or in the face of racial injustice - that young man or woman is often trapped in a life of poverty.' (Johnson, 1964e)

He went on to argue that the War on Poverty was not aimed at supporting people but rather at giving them new opportunities to allow them to develop.

'It is an effort to allow them to develop and use their capacity,.... so that they can share as others share in the promise of this nation.' (Johnson, 1964e)

The idea of educational priority areas was also put across in this way, as an attempt to improve the opportunities for individuals to share in the benefits of society.

Equality of opportunity is a fundamental part of the ideology of advanced capitalism. The formal equality and freedom of all in capitalist society rests upon a belief that everyone has an equal opportunity to succeed and hence that the system is basically just. The existence of chronic poverty and inequality of opportunity negate this ideological justification for an unequal class society.

Equality of opportunity as an aim in terms of which these policies can be presented then has this two fold nature. First, the existence of equality of opportunity is recognised as universally desirable within established political debate. Secondly, the demonstration of its non-existence is a further spur to action, even if that demonstration is one which is manufactured or stage managed to provide support for policies.

This is where the similar nature of the language of political debate confronts a problem. Whereas in a programme like the
CAP, the pressure for these policies was generated within the Administration and the problem for the Administration was how to place poverty on the political agenda without running the risk of the political losses outweighing the political gains, in other programmes, like the Model Cities Program, the policies were a response to political pressure and the problem lay in producing a sufficient response to deal with these pressures. Why then should the same sort of rhetoric prevail in the two programmes, let alone the two countries?

The answer illustrates my general point even more clearly. The similarity in the rhetoric behind the programmes related to the ideological justification of these programmes within the general ideology of the operation of society. In two capitalist countries, the fundamental definition of what constitutes a 'good society' does not derive primarily from two different national cultural views, but from similar definitions imposed by a common mode of production.

While this explanation can be used to explain the similarities in the rhetorical presentation of policies in terms of overall societal aims e.g. equality of opportunity, abolition of poverty, decent housing, it does not explain the use of the same words in the two countries to present different policies i.e. coordination, participation, partnership. I have attempted to explain this similarity in terms of the focus of public presentation for internal debate centering on process and for external debate on agreed overall aims. This explanation still does not give the full picture. For this it is necessary to consider the social science linked nature of the terminology and the internationalisation of social science within the English speaking world. As I will argue later, the use of social science linked terminology performed a legitimating function for these policies, being couched in an expert and technical manner. However, the process of development of social science ideas is one which relates in this context to the economic and political developments occurring within the two countries. The shift which is found in both countries from service delivery concerns to management and planning is a reflection
of this.

Transatlantic social science connections

This similarity in the use of terminology derived from social science is, in part, a result of the international links of social science and, in part, a result of the governmental links between the two countries. The Plowden Committee went to the United States to look at compensatory education there. A Home Office official went to the United States to make links between the programmes there and the CDPs. The OEO sent the Director of Evaluation to London to discuss similarities between the projects in Britain and the American experience and other formal and informal consultations took place. The translation of terminology is therefore not surprising in that the programmes and projects were superficially similar. The emphasis must however be on terminology not on concepts. As Halsey has said, ideas came across the Atlantic, woolly on departure and soggy on arrival.

Two important attempts were made to translate the American experience to the British context, neither of which seem to have had a great impact, concomitant with learning throughout these projects.

The first, the Ditchley Park Conference, was a meeting of politicians, social scientists and administrators from both sides of the Atlantic to exchange and develop experiences and was intended to help develop British thinking on CDPs and EPAs. The second was Smith and Little's (1971) study of American compensatory education projects prior to their work with the EPAs, intending to relate the U.S. experience to Britain.

The Ditchley Park Conference Report clearly illustrates the degree to which social science evaluation of, and involvement in the projects in both countries matched the politicians' concern with the problem of legitimating these policies. Morrell, chairing the conference was quoted as saying;

'Legitimacy for a policy of reconciliation could be sought in the process of obtaining consent, and the painstaking accumulation of evidence. If this hypothesis was helpful the role of the social scientist was to produce evidence, while the role of the politician or administrator was to
generate consent.' (Home Office, 1969a: 2)

Later he said;

'.... both the politician and the social administrator had a real need of a body of reliable macro-theory, on which they could draw in situations in which decisions about policy had to be made at short notice.' (Home Office, 1969a: 8)

This makes the point clearly, but I would argue that such macro-theory - already politically determined by the implied rejection of theoretical approaches inconsistent with liberal democratic structures - does not exist. What exists is a set of generalised terminology which can pose as macro-theory.

This was expressed at the Conference by Rein in challenging some of the interpretations of the links between social scientists and politicians that had been put forward.

'Professor Rein said that he felt there were two issues in the minds of politicians. First, they had to improve efficiency in government without increasing expenditure; and second, they were looking for new constituencies and sources of political support. He felt personally that the whole process of delineating social objectives, as it had been carried out in the design of successive major American programmes in delinquency, poverty and urban redevelopment, was vitiated in that it reflected fashion or whim rather than any consistent attempt to develop a theory of social change. This he called 'faddism'." (Home Office, 1969a: 38)

I am arguing that it was this 'faddism' that led to the similarities in the terminology applied across the Atlantic and that the origins of 'faddism' can be found in the need for politicians and administrators to have effective legitimation for their policies. The latter theme was frequently referred to at the conference. The two most obvious statements of this were by the Chairman and by Shirley Williams, Minister of State at the Home Office. Williams was reported as saying;

'She emphasised her own recognition of the importance of evaluation in social policy. It was no longer sufficient, in the complex societies of the West, to legitimise social policy through political process or hereditary process.' (Home Office, 1969a: 13)

The same theme was pursued in the remarks of the Chairman in conclusion.
'... in the use of power there ought to be a search for legitimacy. New policies needed an authority derived not only from political consent, but also from empirical evidence of their utility ..... The process of searching for a legitimate base for the exercise of power was obligatory for the politician or administrators in social policy. It did not matter that success could not be absolute or that policies lacked the clarity or precision of academic standards.' (Home Office, 1969a: 47)

This search for legitimacy in general leads into another similarity between Britain and the United States which was highlighted by the Ditchley Park Conference - the achievement of legitimacy through evaluation. The role of evaluation in these projects was politically and organisationally determined. Consider the changing role of evaluation in CDP as an example of this in Britain. Few of the original research roles were in fact carried out. The empirical assessment of the achievements was not produced because of the political setting and organisational structures of the projects.

Likewise, in the American programmes, both the CAP and the Model Cities Program were originally intended to be small scale 'demonstration' programmes to assess the possible benefits of such forms of action. In the memorandum to T. Sorensen from the Council of Economic Advisers setting out the proposals for the Poverty Program, the CEA proposed that one of the major elements of a Coordinated Community Action Program should be;

'a program which concentrates primarily on a limited number of demonstration areas - our current thinking is a total of about 10, .... - to which substantial amounts of federal assistance would be provided under existing programs and under new programs.' (original emphasis, Council of Economic Advisers, 1963)

The Task Force on the Model Cities also proposed a small scale experimental programme.

'We propose a program that would select on the basis of criteria outlined below six cities with populations over 500,000, ten cities with populations between 250,000 and 500,000 and fifty cities with populations below 250,000.' (Task Force, 1965: 295)

The original memorandum to Johnson proposing this programme had suggested a total of six demonstrations (Reuther, 1965). Because
of both the difficulties in passing through Congress a programme which didn’t distribute rewards more widely and because of the limited political benefits that a small scale demonstration programme could provide, the American demonstration proposals, in both cases, became more extensive, but there was still an evaluation aspect built into them with the suggestion that such evaluation would improve the projects through monitoring and assessment. The issue of evaluation research is one that I shall discuss later. At this stage, it is important as an example of a similarity which owes more to rhetoric than to substance. As was clearly pointed out by the Ditchley Park Conference, evaluation research was not a technique, nor a procedure, but is merely a relationship between social scientists and policy. A relationship whose content can take different forms, but which serves a similar purpose in providing seemingly technical assessment for policies.

From service provision to service management

The second key similarity in the two developments was the shift in the language and terminology used from that of a social service based rationale, to a planning and budgeting rationale.

By social service rationale, I refer to those programmes which were primarily concerned with social service provision. The planning and budgeting rationale refers to those programmes which were concerned with the systems of service delivery and focused on questions of service planning and budgeting. An example of this shift in Britain can be found in the movement from EPAs, which had an almost exclusively service focus in that their main aim was to change schools to meet the needs of children from deprived areas, to the CCPs and the Area Management Trials, where the focus was on the process of government and its structures. The CCP approach was influenced to a great extent by corporate planning ideas and budgetary planning. These influences were not entirely unidirectional in that, while the CCPs in structure were presented as reflecting corporate planning thinking, this presentation concealed the economic, political and organisational influences upon their development. An example of the same shift in the United States is between the service oriented focus of the Community Action
Program and the increasingly process oriented reforms associated with the later part of Johnson's Administration and Nixon's. This similar shift from a service to a process orientation took place at different times, over a different period, but had an influence in both countries on almost all aspects of government policy, not merely welfare and urban policy, and can be traced to similar causes. Explaining this provides an interesting example of the interaction between ideas and the structures in which they develop. The development of planning theories - in particular 'systems analysis' - which could be applied more broadly than the previous physical planning theories arose mostly during the late 1960s. Particularly in the United States, systems analysis was being applied, beyond its original weapons application, in industry and gradually within the federal government. With this use of techniques came the associated technocratic views of the nature of government, both in Britain and the United States. Wood, the Under Secretary for Housing and Urban Development, stated this technocratic view clearly.

'The relevance of science and research must be established anew with a skeptical Congress and with a generation that wasn't around when radar saved England from the Nazis ... Together we can establish that rationality and empiricism are still the best way to approach discontinuities in our environment - and to do so in hard, cold, tangible, visible ways.' (Wood, 1968)

The student movement and the Vietnam War led to the fracturing of the growing consensus of technocracy.

The growth of the technocratic myth had, however, served a purpose. It gave credibility to the continuing attempts to maintain a consensus post 1968 and having effected a permanent shift in the climate of opinion a set of theory and techniques had been built up which, without existing in a consensual vacuum, became part of the language of government - corporate planning, operations research, management by objectives etc. While this language was largely developed in America and at a time of consensus, its implementation and effects on policy occurred later. The economic crisis propelled what was a politically useful set of language and techniques from being applicable in general throughout
government and specifically in departments and agencies with unstable expenditure demands, to being a crucially necessary part of the management of the state across all its functions. While management planning and budgeting techniques are now under critical scrutiny and questioned to a much greater extent than they were when first developed, they paradoxically are much more influential than when previously not open to such a breadth of criticism. The explanation lies in what these ideas can do for the state, not in providing an 'objective theoretical' rationale for carrying out the necessary planning and budgetary measures, but in helping to select measures on the basis of a process. The state's operations became not only increasingly similar in logic to those of a private capitalist, but in its concern with efficiency began to operate like a private capitalist (Offe, 1975).

That the War on Poverty should also have had a service emphasis is perhaps not surprising given the low level of service provision existing at the time. A direct service aspect also provided a contact point which literally achieved a direct link up through the OEO between the Presidency and the poor.

In both countries this shift did not only occur on the ground - there was also a shift in the emphasis which was given to the programmes by spokespersons when presenting them. Whereas it would have been possible for Johnson to have emphasised the organisational aspects of the poverty programme in his announcement of the programme (Johnson, 1964e), he, in fact, emphasised why there should be a war, and what the content of the war would be, in relation to the lack of opportunities upon which he had commented. Just as CDPs view of the causes of poverty combined a pathology of the poor with a malfunctioning of existing services so too this was the CAP's basis. The difference, however, lay in the action implications in the two countries with their different levels and organisation of existing service provision.

A service oriented programme, emphasised in a service oriented rationale, provided a match between the economic, political and electoral demands the programme was designed to face, with a current social science theme. CDPs emphasis upon service coordination
followed the same type of proposals for the CAPs from the Bureau of the Budget. The service coordination view of community action was put forward by the Bureau of the Budget for the CAP because of the BCB's place and role within the federal government. The efficiency of federal services concerns the BCB at all times, not only when resources are scarce. This service coordination strategy was replaced however by a participation strategy (Peterson and Greenstone, 1977) in the actual CAP. For the CAP to coordinate services that were not funded through the COE was institutionally difficult given the comparative power of the departments and agencies. This could only be avoided through a participation strategy which included CAP funded service provision.

The shifts in the two countries have two important similarities, as I have said. Firstly, the continuum was the same from service orientation to a planning orientation to an eventual focus on budgetary planning. Secondly, the shift in the two countries had parallels in the economic and political contexts in which it was taking place.

At a broad level, these shifts can be related to the economic problems developing in the late 1960s and becoming acute in the recession in 1972. This developing crisis had major repercussions in a variety of fields.

Firstly, the economic implications of the crisis relate, not only, to the structure of capital accumulation on a world scale, but also to the economic management role played by the state in the advanced capitalist economies. The post World War II boom and the seeming success in the management of capitalist economies through keynesian economic policies (a success which is clearer in the example of the United States than in Britain) suffered set backs in the late 1960s and met with reappraisal in the 1970s as these policies failed to achieve all that they had seemed to achieve previously. The implications were not only located in the sphere of private accumulation and the state's role in this process. Increasingly the crisis created a restructuring of state services. The major restructuring is still taking place and prior to restructuring, the incipient crisis led only to a retrenchment in
state expenditure and various attempts to increase the productivity of state expenditure.

Secondly, the crisis produced a redefinition of problems. As I have suggested previously, the 1960s after a decade of seeming success in the management of the economy by the state, the problems of advanced capitalist nations tended to be redefined as social problems, open to social solutions. With the retrenchment of state expenditure in the late 1960s, exacerbated in Britain by the continuing decline in Britain's industrial base and the Labour Government's failure to achieve the successful economic climate through planning, that it had hoped to achieve, and in the United States through the major expense of the Vietnam War, the emphasis upon social service solutions became no longer appropriate nor in tune with the levels of public expenditure. Improvements in planning - planning in the broader sense of managing resources and assessing interactions between resources - became better matched to these conditions. Not only was there a logical continuity within such a shift in abstract terms (the focus on improving services clearly raises questions about the nature of the existing services and their effectiveness), but also the continuity was one which matched existing economic conditions. The model of experimental social administration which was being applied in both countries might have led to other attempts to tackle problems, attempts similar in their expenditure implications to the programmes developed previously, i.e. the implementation of 'Plan B' in Halsey's terms. However, this was not what occurred. What happened was that 'Plan A' was readapted and reconstructed to reduce expenditure and improve the efficiency of existing approaches. In the same way the budgeting focus of later programmes like the CDBG or the CCPs experienced the same shift. The shift recognised the inadequacies of previous attempts to make planning the main tool to control expenditure and programme development. The emphasis upon budgeting and financial planning systems, while being similar to the previous shift, also included a restructuring element in expenditure. Early attempts at implementing budgeting based planning systems such as PPBS in the United States were forerunners of the attempts
at restructuring such as zero-based budgeting or PARs (Policy Analysis and Review) in Britain.

A concentration on budgeting techniques does not, of itself, provide for a restructuring of state services, merely the necessary climate in which such restructuring can take place. Other factors both within the state apparatus and in the wider environment may militate against any attempts to restructure. This leads to a third repercussion of the crisis. As crisis tendencies develop and become more manifest, there are political problems posed for the state in its attempts to find ways out and forward. These political problems may center around a variety of different arenas. Struggle may develop in different ways and it is this aspect of the political manifestations of crisis that I shall return to at the end of this chapter.

While the concepts employed both in setting up and developing the programmes and in justifying them changed, they had in common their 'social science' roots. The type of social science concepts changed from being concepts developed in sociology to those in planning to those whose source is to be found in the systems analysis school of planning. The shift across these lines shows how, while many of the personnel involved may remain the same, the 'discipline' or field itself cannot be seen as being only a reflection of its value or its relevance to government at any one time. The state is, therefore, involved in selecting from the many different approaches which develop within social sciences, those that are most applicable at the time to changing conditions. It must be emphasised as well that there is both rhetoric and substance in the state's use of these concepts and words. The translatability may be rhetoric, but the operational use of ideas that have developed is substantive.

Before looking at this concretely in the programmes and projects, there is another aspect of this shift that is similar, for a more

1 Glennerster (1975) discusses in detail the development of budgetary planning in Britain and the United States. He shows a 'two track' system developed in Britain. One concerned with forward planning of public expenditure, the other with reviewing policies and programmes (eg PAR). In his summary he argues, 'We saw that tight fiscal constraints, which were partly economic and partly political in origin, were a major reason for the British government's attempt to design a much stricter system of long term budget planning. The different fiscal position of the United States went a long way to explain why such planning had failed in the 1960s and suggested that it might begin to develop in the mid 1970s as the budget constraints tightened.' (pg 252)
of the social sciences, that it should occur, though, is another symptom of the crisis which operated to break down many of the existing coalitions upon which social democracy was built. In the United States, the intellectual consensus, within and without government, developed under the Kennedy Administration up until the conflict generated within the United States over the War on Vietnam. In Britain, the 'Butskellite' consensus, which involved similar links between politicians and intellectuals, began to break down with the failure of the Labour Government's strategy and the strengthening of the left and right as the crisis developed.

The break up of the consensus can be explained in terms of the lessons that were learnt through the failure to achieve the ends intended. Such a failure was explained in various ways and gave rise to disagreement over alternative ways of proceeding. However, such an explanation implies a model of learning and a role for knowledge in policymaking which is untenable. Rather the break up of consensus is better explained in terms of the conflict generated by the crisis. Rewards were redistributed through restructuring as for example in the CDBG and previously managed conflicts of interest became more clearly apparent. In these circumstances, the material conflicts were reflected in a conflict of ideas and disagreement on a more fundamental level than previously regarding the aims of policy and the means of achieving them.

Returning to the programmes under discussion I shall seek to show how this shift has occurred and go into greater detail about why it did occur, when it did in the two countries. Clearly this shift was along a continuum so that even the earliest programmes or projects had some elements which were similar to those in the later, but that there was no discontinuity in this respect, does not affect my case. I have taken a programme from each country to illustrate the shift for purposes of presentation.

I shall use the examples of the CAAs in relation to the Model Cities Program and the CDPs in relation to the Inner Area Studies to illustrate the service orientation of their approaches.

The Community Development Projects, in their initial conception were concerned with the accessibility and effectiveness of existing
services. The intention being to have neighbourhood based multi-service teams representing different central government and local authority departments bring together in a coordinated way, existing services, making them more relevant to the particular needs of the area by encouraging the formation of mutual help through community development. The roots of such an approach are to be found in much of the social science theory at the time. The emphasis that was placed on bringing together services, while having some clear political and economic advantages, could be related to criticisms of the organisation of existing services and the previous problem oriented approach of the British welfare services. Services traditionally focused on housing problems, child welfare problems etc., rather than upon the person of the 'community'. Thus the CDPs represented a shift in emphasis away from individual service orientation to problems to a focus on the individual's, family's or community's problems as a whole. While the CDPs were not, in their conception, intended to provide new services except in as far as the reorganisation of services could be argued to be providing a new service - i.e. information centers - this concern both with service provision for the poor and the institutional relationships within which this provision took place had parallels with the community action agencies of the War on Poverty.

One of the interpretations of community action in the CAP was this emphasis on the reorganisation of institutions and their relationship to their clientele. Community action in this sense was to make services more accessible to the poor and also more adaptable to their demands.

The service concerns of the CAP and the CDPs were replaced in the Inner Area Studies and the Model Cities Program. When the Model Cities Program was set up, it attempted again to focus upon the coordination of existing services within Model Neighbourhoods. The programme was, however, initiated at a time when the increase in federal programmes of a variety of sorts had reached a crisis of coordination and resulting chaos. Chaos was not only manifested in the fiscal and budgeting aspects of the programmes but also in the political control and direction of the programmes at a
neighbourhood level.

The Inner Area Studies and the Model Cities Program both contained service components. The planning phase of the CAP of the War on Poverty had been diluted owing to the need to implement the programme rapidly. With the Model Cities Program, the planning phase was given prominence. Indeed, moves were made in the passage of the legislation authorising the programme to exclude all but the planning phase from the authorisations. The Model Cities were, as I have reported previously, concerned to a great extent with issues of organisation and coordination. This development, as with the Inner Area Studies and Urban Guidelines in Britain, reflected the tensions in the developing crisis of state expenditure. While increased services or attempts to meet need became more politically important, they became economically less possible. Greater central control or direction over the ways of meeting these needs attempted to overcome some of these tensions. Programmes such as the Model Cities, with their emphasis on planning, combined decentralisation of authority and programme implementation with centralisation of control over methods and means. The Model Cities Program included a Technical Assistance aspect from the federal government which had been the result of the downgrading of the role that had been initially intended in the legislation for the federal coordinator. Such a strong intervention implied in the role of federal coordinator was politically unacceptable to the localities and was removed from the legislation.

The Inner Area Studies included in their brief the question of area management and, as with the Model Cities Program, the main professionals involved were the 'planning consultant' type. This focus on both understanding more fully how the Inner Areas operated and in what ways they could be better managed reflected once again the concerns raised by the pressure on public expenditure.

The shift continued through into the CDBG and the CCPs. Here, not only were existing services being reappraised and replanned but the actual emphasis of the government priorities became different. I have already commented on the changes in the nature of the Model Cities Program brought about by the introduction of
the Planned Variations which were a forerunner to some extent to the revenue sharing approaches introduced by the Nixon Administration. One of the most basic effects of the development of revenue sharing in such programmes as the CDBG was not only to redistribute funds, geographically, but also to change the nature of the expenditure.

The CCPs and later the Inner City Partnerships included these aspects of redistribution and shifting expenditures. Here the stated aims were to be able to redirect major programmes to areas of greatest need. In other words to restructure the system of expenditure relating to areas of urban deprivation.

Central control and democratic legitimacy

The last major important similarity in these programmes and projects is the tension which they attempted to manage between increasing central control and legitimating the policies in a democratic manner. This tension was a direct reflection of the nature of capitalist democracies. It highlights the political repercussions of the developing crisis in capitalist production.

As social problems become more firmly placed on the political agenda and with their increasing severity, the necessity of successful resolution becomes more acute for the state. Such resolution requires greater direction in problem management on the part of the state, while at the same time - because of the political nature of 'problem' definition - the resolution of these problems in terms of dominant interests cannot be seen to be occurring. To avoid this, the rational and technical facade of the decision making process must be emphasised to allow solutions to appear to be neutral. The increased central control that is associated with crisis management needs increased concealment as central control in order to be legitimised.

For these reasons, I argue that in both countries participation in a broad sense has been emphasised while at the same time central control has increased. Central control has increased over the most important areas of decision making - size of budgets etc, while participation has become part of the implementation process of centrally defined goals. Decentralisation is another
part of this participation. The decentralisation within the state apparatus of some of the less important issues, while increasingly centralising control over the most important determinants of action. As Scheffer commented on Nixon's revenue sharing programmes:

'(Nixon's actions) embodied a determined executive centralisation of power, while implementing a decentralisation of administrative authority to the field.' (Scheffer, 1976: 6)

Both participation and decentralisation aimed to create legitimacy for increased planning at a central level. Greater central control is incompatible with the view of society as either a pluralist or consensually based one. Participation can be seen as being a commitment to democracy and as a countervailing force to central control.

As with the shift in social science used in the programmes, so too there has been a shift in the balance between participation and centralisation. Whereas, in both countries, the early programmes emphasised participation in various forms, whether maximum feasible participation of the CAP, or the involvement of parents in schools of the EPAs, the later programmes emphasised decentralised management structures. The two are not the same. Participation meant cooption of those without the system of government to increase the appearance of legitimacy of that system. Decentralising management decreases tensions within the state apparatus.

Marris and Rein (1972) provide an interesting contrast with Cockburn (1977) in their assessment of the interests involved in promoting participation. They argue that the British and American interest in 'local coordination and planning in community involvement and selective experiment' (Marris and Rein, 1972: 11) stem from some similar basic concerns.

'Firstly the disparity between needs and fiscal resources.' (Marris and Rein, 1972: 10)

They go on to argue that the only hope of economy lay in the reorganisation or concentration of services. A second concern that they argue was similar was that;

'... in both countries, there is a more and more articulate protest against the prerogatives of government planning.'
People no longer resign themselves so amenably to decisions which disrupt their neighbourhood or displace them from their houses. Authority seems at once more intrusive and more remote, determining the public interest by a collusion of bureaucracy and expertise beyond effective democratic control. Thus the structure of representative government does not seem an adequate protection of the citizens' authonomy, and threatens to alienate people, losing their fundamental consent.' (Marris and Rein, 1972: 13)

Marris and Rein fail to observe that it is not only a question of authority 'seeming' more intrusive. It actually becomes more intrusive. 'As Cockburn (1977) commented on the aims put forward by the Department of the Environment for neighbourhood councils:

'It is all there: saving on public expenditure; building up a corporate community point of view to match the inter-corporate decision process of the state bodies ...... and the creation of a sense of membership ...' (Cockburn, 1977: 108)

The aspect of incorporation in participation and decentralisation both in Britain and the United States is indicated by Cockburn and by Powledge (1970). In both accounts of local government in a single jurisdiction they have examples of the acceptable limits to participation imposed by the local state. In the case of New Haven, as reported by Powledge, this occurred in the division of local neighbourhood groups into responsible and irresponsible, based upon their attitude towards the existing power structure and how far their aims could be achieved without changing the status quo of the relationship of power. Much the same report occurs in Cockburn's discussion of participation in Lambeth.

This tension between, on the one hand, decentralisation for greater efficiency and greater legitimacy and on the other hand greater central control over the most important determinants of the political and economic context is both overcome and exacerbated through increasing decentralisation. Decentralisation leads increasingly to the need for greater central control, just as greater central control leads to greater decentralisation. This contradiction operates in three ways. Firstly, participation or decentralisation mask the extent of central control especially when this is an ongoing process. The establishment, for instance, of community
consultation structures such as community councils or local plans in Britain conceals the increase of both the centralisation of power (for instance over local government through the rate support grant and controls over the structure and purposes of local government) and the increasingly corporate nature of the decision making process excluding electoral democratic inputs. As well as masking the centralisation of power, decentralisation legitimates the centralisation of power by making it appear to be taking place within the traditional form of democratic government in consultation and under the control and direction of 'the people'.

Secondly, as Marris and Rein point out, decentralisation, particularly administrative decentralisation, can be more effective in managing scarce resources. If part of the cause of the tension between decentralisation and central control is a political reflection of the economic crisis which the state faces, then any reduction in expenditure through improved service delivery can hope to reduce the tension. However, the separation between administrative decentralisation to improve service delivery through increased coordination and central control over more general aspects of provision (i.e. how much? for whom? and in what way?) cannot be maintained. Where is the dividing line between administrative considerations and resource considerations? As I have argued above the two are largely inseparable, but in being hard to separate, this division relates to the third way in which attempts to overcome this tension exacerbates it.

Participation may clash with central control. If participation is not successfully managed from the centre, more than 'creative conflict' may result. Participation within a structure of electoral democratic government demands a consensual base upon which to operate. Fundamental conflict over the distribution of resources and control over their allocation may arise without such a consensual base. For example, the conflicts generated both in the War on Poverty and the CDPs between established channels of administration and the programmes operations were created by different aims and interests. Attempts to regain control by the center of the locality in both countries exacerbated the conflicts over the

1 See Cockburn (1977: 123-127) and articles by Bennington and Mayo in Lees and Smith (1975)
interests involved.

The three similarities in the two countries that I have outlined above; the rhetorical presentation of the policies and the rhetoric employed, the shift in the concepts upon which the programmes were based, and attempts to overcome the tension between the need for greater central control and greater decentralisation of administration, have a nexus in the issue of legitimation. I shall explore this subject more fully in the next chapter.
Politics, administration and social science

'When they (government agencies) use social science at all, it will be on an ad-hoc, improvised, quick and dirty basis. A key official needing to take a position, respond to a crisis, or support a view that is under challenge, will ask an assistant to 'get me some facts'. The assistant will rummage about among persons who are reputed to be expert, who are perceived to be politically sympathetic, and who are available at the moment. The process may take a few weeks, it may be done in a few hours. Social science is used as ammunition, not as method, and the official's opponents will also use similar ammunition. There will be many shots fired, but few casualties except the truth.' (Wilson, 1978: 92)

In his essay Politics as a Vocation, Max Weber provided the classic statement of the traditionally conceived relationship between the politician and the administrative expert:

'According to his proper vocation, the genuine official .... will not engage in politics. Rather, he should engage in impartial 'administration' ...... Sine ira et studio, 'without scorn and bias', he shall administer his office.' (Gerth and Mills, 1974: 95)

And in Science as a Vocation, Weber claimed that science would assist the political actor achieve 'clarity'. Science can say 'If you take such and such a stand, then according to scientific experience, you have to use such and such a means in order to carry out your conviction practically.' (Gerth and Mills, 1974: 151)

Politics in this traditional model concerns itself with ends, administration and science with the means to these ends.

Habermas explores these relationships further and presents three models of interaction between the politician and the expert. His first model, the decisionistic model, is similar to that of Weber's but he points to the problems of such a strict separation.

'(The politician) makes use of technical knowledge, but the practice of self-assertion and domination requires in addition that a person or group with specific interests make decisions and carry them out. In the last analysis political action cannot rationally justify its own premises.' (Habermas, 1971: 63)

This model is based on a Weberian view of politicians making
value choices with the aid of a technical approach to means. That this is no longer acceptable as an analysis of the relationship between science, administration and politics is widely agreed. Technical rationality, according to Habermas, has escaped from the essentially subservient role that the traditional model placed it in.

'... politics now takes on a peculiarly negative character. For it is oriented toward the elimination of dysfunctions and the avoidance of risks that threaten the system: not, in other words, toward the realization of practical goals but toward the solution of technical problems.' (Habermas, 1971: 102-103)

The association of politics with the solution of technical problems is at the basis of Habermas's technocratic model which reverses the traditional relationship between science and politics.

'The latter (the politician) becomes the mere agent of a scientific intelligensia, which, in concrete circumstances, elaborates the objective implications and requirements of available techniques and resources as well as of optimal strategies and rules of control.' (Habermas, 1971: 63-64)

Habermas presents a third model which he calls 'pragmatistic'.

'In the pragmatistic model the strict separation between the function of the expert and the politician is replaced by a critical interaction. This interaction not only strips the ideologically supported exercise of power of an unreliable basis of legitimation but makes it accessible as a whole to scientifically informed discussion.' (Habermas, 1971: 66-67)

These models can be summed up as the decisionistic model providing legitimation for the exercise of power while the technocratic attempts to rationalise the exercise of power, but however both are at the expense of democracy. The pragmatistic model is the one which Habermas sees as the more rational-democratic form of decision making. However, in my view this very much depends upon the definition given to critical interaction and the relationship between the politician, the expert and existing social classes. As it is Habermas's models are ideal types and, as such, can be criticised on heuristic grounds. The world is not a model, but a series of dynamic processes which do not remain constant. Models attempt to distill social processes which, by their nature are dynamic.
I contend that the public presentation of action is the essential missing connection in the examination of the relationship between politics, administration and social science. The pragmatistic model of decision making requires, for a rational and democratic approach to decision making, an imput into the political sphere of public demands.

"In the last analysis the process of translation between science and politics is related to public opinion. This relation is not external to it, as though it were a question of taking prevailing constitutional norms into account. Rather it follows immanently and necessarily from the requirements of the confrontation of technical-knowledge and capacity with tradition-bound self-understanding." (Habermas, 1971: 74)

"While integrating technology into the hermeneutically explicated self-understanding of a given situation, the process of the scientization of politics could be realized only if we had the guarantee that political will had obtained the enlightenment it wanted and simultaneously that enlightenment had permeated existing political will as much as it could under given, desired, and controllable circumstances. This could be guaranteed only by the ideal conditions of general communication extending to the entire public and free from domination...... The depoliticization of the mass of the population and the decline of the public realm as a political institution are components of a system of domination that tends to exclude practical questions from public discussion." (Habermas, 1971: 75)

Edelman (1977), in discussing the use of symbols in politics provides evidence of how this depoliticization to which Habermas refers occurs through the symbolic nature of political actions. Using elections as an example, Edelman makes a preliminary important observation that relates to the separation, but not exclusivity of symbolic action and substance.

"It does not follow that election campaigns are unimportant or serve no purpose. It is rather that the functions they serve are different and more varied than the ones we conventionally assume and teach. They give people a chance to express discontents and enthusiasms, to enjoy a sense of involvement. This is participation in a ritual act, however; only in a minor degree is it participation in policy formation." (Edelman, 1977: 3)

Neither Habermas nor Edelman make the connection that can be made between the role of symbols and the mode of domination, but as Edelman says;
'Political symbols bring out in concentrated form those particular meanings and emotions which members of a group create and reinforce in each other. There is nothing about any symbol that requires that it stand for only one thing...... The point is that every political institution and act evokes and reinforces a particular response in its audiences .... In democratic countries these institutions (elections etc.) reinforce beliefs in the reality of citizen participation in government and in the rational basis of governmental decisions, regardless of what is said in the course of the proceedings on particular occasions.' (Edelman, 1977: 11-12)

I argue that it is through the use of symbols in politics that the connection between the decision making process (the science-politics relationship) and the mass of the population is achieved. The alienation of democratic rights through the ballot box and the structure of bourgeois democracy reinforces the power of the symbolic appearance of democracy over the reality of class domination. Where political institutions and political acts have this symbolic function, the mobilisation of mass participation and mass democratic action, combining the understanding of class with the understanding of science to create a pragmatistic model of decision making remains impossible. As it it the reinforcement of political symbols in their appearance as political acts takes place to strengthen this separation and domination.

In this chapter I want to draw on the example of poverty programmes to begin to analyse the relations between social science, administration and politics in Britain and the United States in the period under discussion. My aim is to go beyond the rather general type of discussion, valuable though it is, that we have inherited through Habermas and Marcuse from Weber. As the advanced capitalist countries began to experience serious 'disturbances of the conditions of their stability' (Habermas, 1971: 109, quoting Offe), just what were the relations of science, administration and politics?

First, though, a clarificatory note. In Habermas's discussion, whatever the appearance of concreteness, the terms 'science', 'politics' etc., do not refer to concrete institutions or actors. They are in the Weberian sense, ideal types. Particular individuals (say Professor Halsey), or particular institutions (say the
Home Office) cannot be unequivocally classified as instances of one or other of these categories. By politician I shall mean the elected politician, by administrator, the bureaucrat within the state's administrative apparatus whether he or she be a political appointee or not, and by social scientist, an expert who is used in government either on a full-time basis or as a temporary adviser, but claims to exercise judgement on the basis of their expert knowledge, not a claim based on expertise in administration or political calculation. The individual politician may combine in her/his role, characteristics of 'science' and 'administration' as well as those of 'politics' (as may the scientist or administrator). This is no trivial point of terminology, for as shall emerge below, one vital rationale for the use of social scientists in government is precisely that their role can be much broader than 'science' per se might be taken to imply.

The social sciences come of age

The search for consensus was a prominent part of the political strategy of Keynesianism. This consensus can be seen in the 'Butskellite' coalition in Britain and through the course of the Johnson Administration. In the search for consensus, research provided an important impetus.

'The legislation enacted during the 1964-68 period was largely congruent with this popular and scholarly consensus. It may have been this congruence that led President Kennedy to make the remark, now so quaintly dated, that important problems before the nation were technically complex but did not involve ideology. By the end of the early 1970s popular uncertainty matched scholarly disagreement about how to deal with poverty and unemployment, how to improve education and build up workers' skills, and how to restrain inflation.' (Aaron, 1978: 146)

Since Roosevelt's Brains Trust in the 1930s, the use of social science in the United States' government had been increasing, not only with social scientist advisors to government, but also with social science trained bureaucrats within the administration.

---

1 Senator Daniel P. Moynihan, the present Democratic Senator for New York State is a very good example of this. He has been an administrator under both Kennedy and Nixon, a Harvard professor and presently an elected politician.
However, the main use of social science within government, throughout the earlier period and then during the war, had been the use of economic advisers. In the post war period, behavioural scientists, particularly psychologists were used to develop strategies to deal with the broad range of 'psychological' conflicts generated by the war and its aftermath. What distinguishes the social science consensus developed during the sixties was the degree to which social sciences played a role in shaping policies whose aims were not merely economic but also concerned with the social aspects of the 'good society' of the liberal democratic consensus.

This reflected the shift towards social programmes as the economic regulation of capitalism seemed to be being successfully achieved. The continued post-war growth had not brought the degree of 'filtering down' which had been expected, and as the economic future looked increasingly optimistic, problems created by rising expectations, coupled with the failure of economic policies to deliver social goods became defined in social or psychological terms. The definition of problems in social or psychological terms had implications for the policy approaches which were seen to be appropriate.

The growth in the use of what can be described as generalist social science in policy making began in the sixties. Generalist social science had two features. Firstly, the blurring of disciplines (e.g. the social psychologist cum sociologist cum planner) was pronounced and secondly, the generalist social scientist was used to approach a problem in which he or she was seen as an expert e.g. urban poverty, rather than being asked to bring an approach in which he or she was an expert (e.g. sociological analysis) to a particular problem. From now on I shall use the terms social scientist and social science to refer to this generalist social science.

A first empirical blurring of the ideal-typical divide between social science and politics occurs when we remember that the social sciences, as bodies of trained personnel and established organisations, are themselves in large part the creation of the state.
Social scientists are not merely 'used' by the state, just as the state is not merely used by social scientists to increase funding for the disinterested pursuit of study within their own discipline. There is a mutual relationship which is part derived from the power of the state to generate areas of interest.

'... trends suggest that government agencies may be increasingly involved in determining the shape of not only the American economy, class structure and everyday life, but the fundamental character of social research as well.' (Useem, 1976)

When the CDPs were being launched, there was a shortage of qualified research workers to take part in the CDP research teams. In a situation of supply and demand (while price is not necessarily involved) the openings available at the end of a university education must have some influence on the numbers likely to become involved in such a course. The shortage of research workers in 1969 reflected the high demand for such skills and was in turn reflected by the large numbers of students entering the social sciences.

The expansion of the social sciences in the 1960s in Britain was paralleled by a smaller increase in the applied sciences. University courses moved away from the more traditional academic pursuits towards more 'relevant' courses. This movement was even more pronounced in the United States with the introduction in universities of a greater emphasis on more vocational courses at the expense of the traditional pursuit of 'pure' knowledge.

**Percentage Increase in Students between 1961/62 and 1966/67 in British Universities**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Undergraduate</th>
<th>Postgraduate</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Social Studies</td>
<td>181.2</td>
<td>149.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Arts</td>
<td>26.5</td>
<td>42.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Applied Sciences</td>
<td>120.2</td>
<td>94.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Overall Increase</td>
<td>62.3</td>
<td>65.1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(University Grants Committee, 1968: 19)

The increase in social studies is striking, even granted the small base in 1961/62. An explanation of this rise as being
created by the differences in the youth of 1961 and 1967 is unsatisfactory. For instance, if it was merely that the youth of 1967 were more socially aware than the youth of 1961, why should a similar large increase have occurred in the applied sciences? More fundamentally, how could these changes in perception by the youth be explained? I suggest that this sort of increase was primarily the result of the increased rational technocratic mode of domination which affected both perception and political 'realities'.

The increase in applied science was part of the same growth in technocratic approaches to problem solving. Another explanation which sees the increase in social sciences as a result of increasing government funding for social science research, leading to an increased student intake into the social sciences, still leaves open the question of why government funding increased. This would be a circular argument if this was explained as being a consequence of the increase in results which proved valuable to the state from social science research.

The increase that occurred in Britain in the 1960s was also to be found in America during this period.

Bachelors and First Professional Degrees Awarded in 1957 and 1967 by Field of Study

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Field of Study</th>
<th>1957</th>
<th>1967</th>
<th>% increase</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Anthropology</td>
<td>350</td>
<td>1825</td>
<td>421.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Economics and Agricultural Economics</td>
<td>7393</td>
<td>13829</td>
<td>87.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Geography</td>
<td>699</td>
<td>2163</td>
<td>209.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>History</td>
<td>11692</td>
<td>31793</td>
<td>171.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Political Science</td>
<td>5874</td>
<td>17733</td>
<td>201.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Psychology and Educational Psychology</td>
<td>6191</td>
<td>19542</td>
<td>215.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sociology and Rural Sociology</td>
<td>6383</td>
<td>17751</td>
<td>178.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other Social Sciences</td>
<td>10572</td>
<td>19959</td>
<td>88.8</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Totals

Behavioural and Social Sciences | 49154 | 124595 | 153.5 |
All fields of study             | 340347| 594862 | 74.8  |

Behavioural and Social Sciences as % of all fields | 14% | 21% |

(National Academy of Sciences, 1969: 138)
This growth in behavioural and social sciences in the United States was accompanied by a large increase in federally funded research. In 1951, the federal outlay for social research was 6 million dollars annually, by 1971, the figure was 421 million dollars, an annual average growth rate of 23% (Useem, 1976). By the mid-sixties in the United States social science research on domestic programmes began to dwarf social science research in the defence field, so that by 1967 100 million dollars was being spent on social science research in the Office of Education, 35 million dollars in the Office of Economic Opportunity and 28 million dollars in the Defense Department (Lyons, 1969).

This growth in state financed social science research in the United States was part of an attempt to use social science to solve social problems. While the state looked to social science to emulate the advances of natural science, the social scientists looked to the natural sciences as well.

'The successes of the scientists have led to efforts by many social scientists and some humanists to emulate their technical - and political - methods.' (Brookings, 1962: 95)

In the American situation, the role of the universities and research institutes as part of the system of capital accumulation and their relationship to the state are much clearer to see than in Britain. While in Britain the state is responsible for most of the financing of higher education, the finance is in the form of basic support with greater flexibility within this. Bodies such as the University Grants Committee and the Social Science Research Council have some limited independence from control by the state. They have an independence in the day to day direction of university development, within a context controlled by the state. In America, on the other hand, higher education is a major sector for investment by private capital and is an 'industry' in its own right. The extent of higher education and the number of institutions make for a profitable source of capital investment. The American university system has generated a set of peripheral industries (like publishing academic textbooks) to a much greater extent than in Britain. The state's control over research in the United States is maintained by the large research contracts awarded by federal
bodies for specific research.

Yet the observation that the expansion of the social sciences was to a large extent state-initiated obviously begs the question why that expansion should have been seen as desirable. And that returns us directly to the question of the nature of the inter-relation of science, politics and administration.

The promise of social science

The promise of social science was on several levels. Firstly, social science research had an information function.

Although basic statistical data of the type that was gathered together for the allocation of EPA funds was fairly haphazard, this information function of research became more extensive in such examples as the Inner Area Studies where a great deal of empirical material was collected by the various studies. In the United States, the reporting procedures built into the federal government programmes also provide for this intelligence role. What was the information's purpose? Could it be used? Parallels can be discerned in the collection of data by other federal agencies and government departments which allowed the state, given the necessary resources, to analyse this information and assess the changing trends reflected. Economic indicators have been the forerunners of the present collection of social indicators in both countries. How far does this collection of information act in a meaningful way upon government policy? The main use would seem to be in the analysis of developing trends and to act as an early warning system for government of potential problems which may arise. At the same time it allowed government to assess policies and indicate the direction in which they might develop. This was in part a technocratic function.

If however this information gathering function had been the only promise of social science it would hardly have been exciting. Caplan et al. (1975) argue that policy makers are more interested in the use and production of 'soft' knowledge which they define as non-research based, qualitative and couched in lay language as opposed to 'hard' knowledge which they define as being research based, quantitative and couched in scientific language. They go
on to make some points which relate to how and why certain sorts of knowledge are used.

'Much of the importance of such an idea for the policy maker lies in its ultimate integration into his entire perspective on a problem ....... the use of soft knowledge suggests that when decision makers contribute to the formation of policy, they can see themselves moving from scientifically supported positions without becoming embroiled in the most esoteric deliberations required to substantiate the true scientific merit of such positions.' (Caplan et al, 1975: 18)

This 'soft' knowledge of Caplan was what Johnson found an appealing potential role that social science could perform. It is worth quoting at some length a speech by President Johnson on the occasion of the fiftieth anniversary of the Brookings Institution.

'There is hardly an aspect of the Great Society's program that has not been moulded, or remoulded, or in some way influenced by the community of scholars and thinkers... .... there is a third aspect of intellectual power that our country urgently needs tonight, and in my judgement it is being supplied sparingly ....... This is the power to evaluate. It is the power to find the marrow of the problem, the power to define it as acutely as it can be defined. It is the power to say about public policies or private choices 'This works. This does not. This costs more than we can afford, or this costs more than it is worth. This is worth more than it costs. This will probably give us an acceptable result. But this will complicate the problem and make it impossible for us to solve.'

'I can for instance, imagine no more exciting break-through in human knowledge than one that still eludes us: understanding the real dynamics of urban life. This is such a mixture of physical, financial, and psychological questions as to confound the best minds in this Nation. Overcrowded streets and housing, unemployment, inadequate schools, transportation systems that compound problems instead of relieving them, air and water pollution, blight and ugliness, rising crime and delinquency, tax structures that impose the heaviest burdens on the governments that are least able to bear those burdens, racial riots and tensions, and so on down a list that is already too familiar to all of you...... What do we want our cities to be and then, how can we achieve what we want?' (Johnson, 1966b)

This speech reflects both the extraordinary optimism in the ability of 'science' to solve social problems at the time and the difference between the place of social science in the American and British systems which I shall go on to discuss. In this speech
Johnson was making an appeal to social scientists to produce solutions to problems of political conflict, to make the value choices that are the traditional responsibility of the politician. The questions of 'costs' and 'values' which he placed within the remit of social science are clearly difficult to resolve. However, in part, his optimism could perhaps be attributed to the successful prosecution of economic policy at the time. The introduction of PPBS and cost-benefit analysis into the federal government were precursors of an approach, which sought, not merely, to legitimise the resolution of conflict with technocratic means, but to replace and resolve conflict with technocratic means. That social science, and particularly economics, is not able to overcome the political conflict generated over values is not surprising in retrospect, but the approach taken by Johnson implied that such an attempt might succeed.

The apocalyptic tone of Johnson's pronouncement severely dates in time and place. But the basic message, that social science can inform policy making, can help selection of the best policy is commonplace. This view has two versions - the traditional, handmaiden of politics version and the technocratic version.

The traditional version is contained in the emphasis on evaluation research. Evaluation research grew dramatically in both countries in the sixties and the programmes and projects in both countries contained evaluative aspects.

It has not been sufficient for social scientists to say 'this may work - try it', but it has become common for social scientists to be involved in the process of evaluating proposals which, to varying extents, reflect their ideas. Whereas in Britain, the emphasis was on the experimental nature of the projects, this was not the case in America. Although the Model Cities Program began as a demonstration programme and for the reasons I have indicated above, expanded, it nevertheless had an experimental side to it. Evaluation and research was an important part of the OEO and various planning consultants investigated the ways in which the Model Cities Program was being developed. In Britain all the initiatives that I am concerned with had some action-
research component from which government was supposed to learn. This evaluative aspect was based upon the 'problem solving' orientation which Johnson extolled.

The more technocratic version was not confined to bona-fide social scientists but emphasised the role of the expert in policy making. Even where the political element might have been excluded from the remit of the expert, the role of expert adviser could not be effectively separated from that of politician surrogate.

'Despite the President's protestations that the task force should leave the politics to him, these were not unsophisticated people and they were right to exercise their discretion insofar as their intimate awareness of the interests in the housing and city program enabled them to blend the terms of their own proposal in order to achieve workable accommodation.' (Haar, 1975: 50)

Johnson increased the role of Presidential task forces to give him advice on potential programmes. Many of these task forces were encouraged to work in confidence to avoid generating premature political conflict over their proposals. The way in which they were set up supports a view of the dispassionate expert as someone who generates ideal programmes. However, those usually appointed to such task forces were of course not dispassionate experts but frequently people who were involved in a range of ways in the field which was being considered, and included businessmen, labour leaders and others whose interest in the field was more than academic. This use of experts who were neither administrators, nor social scientists in America is particularly interesting. Their role could be seen as generating a consensus for the proposals on the basis of the constituencies that they represented. However, this would more obviously have been the case if the task force's work and proposals had not been conducted in relative confidentiality as was the case. I suggest that these task forces can, more accurately, be compared with the Departmental Committees and Royal Commissions in Britain, which contain a similar sort of mix between the directly involved and the outside expert. What the construction of groups such as this does achieve is that the group can often develop a common political paradigm within which they operate. Therefore their role can be seen as that of the politician surrogate.
- they may not bring identical political views to focus on a problem, nor may their collective political view be identical with that of the politicians who instituted their work. What they generally do is approach the political problem within the same general political paradigm and in this way act as agents of the dominant consensus, and achieve this, without generating the conflicts inherent in a bureaucratic or political initiative.

'On the whole, the report expressed the kind of approach to which social scientists in the 1960s were likely to turn when presented with the problems of drafting new urban programs where previous approaches had seriously faltered but not to the point of their total disavowal. There were few of the defense mechanisms that would have come from an agency sending its ideas through channels, nor any of the institutional restraints unavoidably present when departments are asked to generate legislative proposals. The task force had not presented the type of strategy, surely, that would have emerged, in the ordinary way of doing business, from a congressman's staff or from bureaucrats responsible for the administration of existing programs.' (Haar, 1975: 54)

Investigation by experts with a social scientific approach had advantages, not only for the development of specific programmes. 'Better' programmes could be constructed through the more detached approach of the appointees to task forces. At the same time, the approach reinforced some of the basic political directions of the administration. But to see the role of task forces as primarily that of providing 'better' programmes because of their relative independence from other parts of the state apparatus, begs a number of questions especially when looked at from a comparative perspective.

I have already indicated that there are bodies in Britain, which, in terms of their constitution and membership are similar to Presidential task forces - the difference that stands out is that in America, the task forces particularly those which dealt with the Model Cities Program and the War on Poverty, were concerned with developments which were central components of the President's political and domestic strategy. No such concern is to be found within the British system. In the American task forces, pragmatism and political calculation were very much appreciated. To quote
Moynihan, the Shriver Task Force for the War on Poverty wanted a programme that would:

'pass Congress, help win the Presidential election and eliminate poverty, perhaps in that order.' (Moynihan, 1966)

Both the handmaiden of politics and the technocratic politician surrogate versions of the promise of social science share assumptions concerning the pragmatic nature of social science. This view sees both social science 'facts' and political 'realities' meeting in the policy making process on an equal basis. Policy makers can adjust and redefine these 'facts' in a pragmatic fashion, giving rise to policy in a way which takes account of both. This pragmatic social science I shall call 'rationality-in-practise'.

One of the major problems of an explanation which relies on this 'rationality-in-practise' as an account of the social science-politics relationship is that it fails to account for the subservience of social science to political forces. Rationality-in-practise cannot uncover this subservience since it is based on a view of social science as giving policy advice on the basis of 'realistic' assessment and a sense of rational 'progress'.

Rationality-in-practise?

Looking at the material provided relating to the programmes and projects in the two countries can lead to a more critical assessment of this notion of social science in policy making as rationality-in-practise. The basic assumption is that social science and politics meet as equals and through pragmatic adjustment move forward to a compromise.

The concrete way in which this occurs is in the rationalisation of decision making. Decisions are couched in terms of rationality not on the basis of comparative power. However, power, democracy and rationality are a strange mixture. If democracy allows preferences and values to dictate policy choices, then these choices do not have to be rational. Preferences and values are not always arrived at in a rational manner. Democracy, by its nature, does not have to be rational. In the same sense, power does not have to be used rationally to be power. That policy processes are neither democratic nor rational would be a fundamental
part of my view. However, the ideas of democracy and rationality are important symbols which act as veils to the exercise of power. Democracy as well as being irrational, includes conflict. Viewing capitalist democracy as a process of class conflict in a class society removes the veil over the exercise of power, in the interests of a dominant class.

Consider a particular example of this process. There was a conflict among academics over educational disadvantage and the ways in which this could be confronted. Bernstein (1970) argued against a positive discrimination strategy in education, arguing that education could not compensate for what were problems arising through the way that society was organised. Halsey, in setting up a compensatory education programme paid attention to Bernstein's objections:

'... there are many who would share Professor Bernstein's distaste for the notion of compensation on the grounds that it is difficult 'to talk about offering compensatory education to children who in the first place have not as yet been offered an adequate educational environment ' as well as the argument that the phrase tends to direct attention away from the internal organisation and the educational context of the school and focus attention on the shortcomings of families.....' (Halsey, 1972: 21)

But in paying attention to Bernstein's criticisms, Halsey took a pragmatic approach, based not on a social science assessment, but on political pragmatism. The argument, while couched in a form of social science assessment, is resolved on the basis of political realities. Education cannot change the world, but the DES wasn't providing funds to change the world, and education could change something. The possibility of change doesn't arise from the nature of education, but from the definition of education in political terms that are given. Decisions appear to be decided upon the basis of rational assessments. The political possibilities are inextricably linked and shape the definition of the problem.

Political realities determine the nature of the reality which the social scientist is asked to investigate. Pragmatic considerations construct the form of investigation. Empiricism emphasises the information role of social science. Social science presents
a more complete picture of a politically determined subject. Social science, above all, remains 'relevant'.

Social scientists in both countries have been used more as politician or administrator surrogates than for their particular ability to give academic answers to the problems which arose. But what distinction can be made between the social science task and that of either administrator or politician? If there is no distinction, then this 'relevant' pragmatic social science is to be expected. I suggest that it is a mistake to see social science and politics as separate entities operating in different worlds, rather the two have been inextricably linked. But the essential linking has occurred within an assertion of their separation. A distinction is made in institutional terms between social science and politics. The appeals that were made by, for example, Johnson, implied a higher order of 'truth' in the deliberations of social scientists. Yet these deliberations take place within a paradigm which social scientists share with politicians about the nature of society and long term goals. The use of outside advisers allowed a progressive liberal government, such as the Labour Government 1964-70, to adapt the pace of reform. The sharing of a political paradigm is an important feature of the use of social scientists. From a survey of 204 persons at upper levels of decision making in the executive branch of the federal government, Caplan et al conclude;

'Our data appear to show that the considerations of whether or not a policy decision is politically feasible overrides any consideration of the relevant implications of social science information.' (Caplan et al, 1975: 35)

They go on to say that the knowledge that is used either supports contemporary political positions or appears to have an insignificant political implication.

When knowledge has contrary political implications, the result is predictable. The CDP pamphlet which considered the relationship between housing finance and the conditions of housing (Community Development Projects, 1976) was described by the Conservative housing spokesperson as a 'slick Marxist tract'. Such a dismissal of a study of the nature of housing finance in terms of a differing
political perspective allowed the contents of their analysis to be confronted, not on the basis of knowledge, but in terms of how it related to political pragmatism and interests. Likewise the assimilation of the CDP Information and Intelligence Unit's research into such areas as industrial decline into the policy making process could not take place within the approach that the CDPs brought to their analysis of industrial decline, but had to be changed to adapt to political forces. Therefore, rather than engaging in a debate about how accurate such analyses are, how much they expand our understanding of the basic nature of the processes that are occurring, the CDPs' research was largely ignored. Where it was used, it was used in a manner consistent with the dictates of political pragmatism. Thus, the Inner City White Paper (Environment, 1977d), while concentrating upon the importance of industrial decline, ignored the implications of the explanation for industrial decline put forward by CDP.

All these separate examples are intended to indicate how the notion of the relationship between politics and social science as being one which rests upon an interchange of perspectives is wrong. What does occur is that the political imperatives shape the nature of social science's role. However, it is not only political imperatives in a narrow sense, it is also administrative and institutional forces which play a part.

To conclude this discussion I shall show what the role of social science was in a particular example of these policies. Again, the example that I use derives from the American experience because the necessary information is more accessible to examine American developments in more detail. I would suggest, while there is a basic difference arising from the different structures of the state apparatus, the experience in Britain would also be similar. Indeed looking at the only three examples for which evidence can be gathered; the EPAs, CDPs and the Inner Area Studies, the same administrative, institutional and political adaptation of ideas occurred, with the emphasis being upon the role of the expert as expert in pragmatic adaptation of ideas to an imposed political reality rather than the approach which experimental social engineering
advocated.

Using the example of the founding of the Community Action Program of the War on Poverty, to challenge the view of social science themes and ideas as an equal force, let alone a determining force in social policy developments, I can expand upon how policy objectives relate to social science themes. I have already discussed the role of electoral politics and economic problems on these developments.

The accepted 'idealistic' view of the role of social science and intellectuals upon policy was clearly stated by Moynihan. 'The early 1960s were marked by a precipitous and unprecedented rise to influence of university intellectuals in the councils of government most notably that of the national government. They not only adorned the Washington scene, but to an astonishing degree they shaped it. The late 1960s was marked by an equally precipitous decline in the position of these professors.' (Moynihan, 1970: xxxi)

It is a common view of the Great Society that the Johnson Administration combined the intellectual drive identified with Kennedy and the political will and capability of Johnson to produce social legislation unparalleled since the New Deal. Such a view of policy development is voluntaristic and idealistic. The Administration is portrayed as independent from the political conditions within which it operates. On the other hand, a deterministic view would be equally suspect. It cannot be argued that social scientists and intellectuals in Washington had no opportunity to use their perceptions of problems to influence policy. The imperatives for action cannot be retrospectively identified as being located entirely within the economic and political structures.

Donovan reported that when Johnson decided to initiate the War on Poverty;

'it was a team of Eastern liberal intellectual-politicians under the leadership of a member of the Kennedy family establishment (Shriver) which was responsible for formulating it.' (Donovan, 1967: 29)

Various accounts of the work of the Shriver Task Force exist (Levine, 1970; Levitan, 1969; Blumenthal, 1967; Moynihan, 1970; Yarmolinsky, 1969). This Task Force is of interest as a partisan intellectual gathering. The Task Force was both concerned with
the administrative planning for the War on Poverty and the content of such a war within the framework of the electoral politics of the Administration. Although Johnson set up the Task Force at the end of January to develop a strategy for the war, the basic issues and methods had been determined already. Levitan (1969) reported that the ad hoc Task Force of the Bureau of the Budget and the Council of Economic Advisers that had been set up previously under the Kennedy Administration had largely written the Economic Opportunity Act by January 6th 1964 and that the ad hoc Task Force had been persuaded by the President's Committee on Juvenile Delinquency and Youth Crime (PCJBYC) to include the community action concept. Further support can be found for this in a memo from the Executive Office of the President to the main departmental heads on January 21st 1964 (White, 1964), which makes clear that much of the poverty programme had already been decided upon and included a Community Action Program as a key element. Thus, Johnson in his Annual Message to Congress on the State of the Union (Johnson, 1964a) in early January had set the stage for the community action theme. Although the specific policies that Johnson recommended did not include the establishment of a community action programme, it is clear that the community action concept is contained within his approach. The Shriver Task Force, in drawing up the Economic Opportunity Act consulted, and according to Donovan (1967) was strongly influenced by, Paul Ylvisaker (who was a Ford Foundation executive involved in developing their grey areas program), participants in projects in New Haven and the staff of the PCJBYC. While Donovan argues that community action and participation of the poor came from the PCJBYC, Moynihan (1966) adds to the picture by stating that the community action concept was firmly embedded in the Shriver Task Force from the beginning. Walter Heller of the Council of Economic Advisers had already argued for community action as part of the War on Poverty in a memo of December 20th 1963 (Heller, 1963f). The community action concept of the CEA concentrated though on the coordination and evaluation of existing federal, state and local programmes (in a similar way to the initial conception of
CUP in Britain). The Shriver Task Force, on the other hand, according to Moynihan, was:

'pragmatic, experimental, and ...... somewhat intellectual in the sense of an awareness of various currents of thought.' (Moynihan, 1966)

This shows how much the administrative and political imperatives dictated the Task Force's deliberations, rather than the construction of an ideal programme.

The intellectuals of Washington were shaping policy in a different way from that which could be supposed. As Levitan points out:

'The Administration portrayed the bill as a thoughtfully conceived, comprehensive and integrated approach to combating poverty, even though it was really a series of compromises among various executive departments.' (Levitan, 1969: 39)

The example of the Shriver Task Force is clear - knowledge of the organisational structure of government and political loyalty were important. Scientifically precise or rigorous concentration on the nature of poverty, its causes and its possible cures were secondary.

The Kennedy Administration's ad hoc CEA-BOB Task Force had already considered the development of a small number of experimental demonstration projects after the manner of the PCJBYC projects. Yet despite an awareness that such an approach was a necessary part of any exploration that might lead to the elimination of poverty, the programme expanded into a catch-all affair, embodying many different conceptions fused together. At the most basic level, Wofford (1969) points out that no thought was given to the distinction between poverty as lack of money and poverty as a way of life. Any consciously innovative approach based on an understanding would have produced a different programme altogether. The members of the Shriver Task Force must have been aware of the contradiction themselves.

As Sundquist points out:

'The bill was thus a composite of new ideas like community action and long discussed ideas like Youth Conservation Corps. It had something for children, something for youth, something for the adult poor and something for the rural poor. It appealed to altruism, with its bold objective of wiping out poverty and to conservatism by emphasizing
that this would be accomplished not through handouts but through opening opportunity for people to escape poverty through their own efforts.' (Sundquist, 1969: 77)

The point should be clear. Professionals and social scientists developed the programme on the basis of their claim to expert knowledge. Shriver reported to the Committee Hearings in Congress that he had consulted 137 outside experts and he provided the Committee with their names. The Task Force had not used 'expert' knowledge, but their own knowledge of the administrative and political constraints within which the Administration operated. Social science justified the programme. Though the ideas themselves may have had validity and have been worth attempts to implement them, such an approach was secondary to the political impetus which gave rise to the programme. As Piven argues;

'.... social scientists and other professionals ..... provided the theoretical justification for the Great Society. Each new measure was presented as a politically neutral 'scientific cure' for a disturbing social malady, thus obscuring the fact that the federal government was trying to give something to blacks...... Finally the professionals lent an aura of scientific authority to what otherwise might have been perceived as mere political rhetoric.' (Piven, 1974a: 280)

Piven's assessment of the role of professionals and social scientists provides one answer to the question of what role social science plays in the policy making process if it is not a free exchange of pragmatic rationality. She argues that social scientists provide legitimation for policy.

External legitimation of policies

One way in which social science could be of importance in policy making is as the legitimation of policy decisions. 'We are going to do X because economics/sociology/political science shows it to be the best thing to do'. This is however in a crude form. Legitimacy is a much more subtle process.

The increased use of social scientists coincided with a faith in economics to deal with some of the problems of the economy. What is of interest is the technocratic view of problem solving which came to dominate policy making. This technocratic rationalism was a reflection of the need to legitimate political options.
Rein and Schon (1977) suggest;

'Policy makers use research as an instrument to legitimate action in the perpetual striving for consensus of belief and for organisation of the structure of government action, policy may influence the research agenda more than research influences the direction of policy.' (Rein and Schon, 1977: 235-236)

However, this itself raises further questions about the role of legitimacy and technocratic rationalism. Social science has not always provided legitimacy. Previously other sources of legitimacy were found. Why then should this technocratic rationalism have prevailed in the 1960s? Why was consensus so important? Firstly, expectations, changed through increasing economic growth, raised questions about the nature of the economic, social and political order. Secondly, whereas capitalism had successfully imposed the ideology of the market, as a law outside human control, this had not occurred with regard to the political and social. As traditional forms of domination began to break down, e.g. the church, the family, other forms of domination replaced them. The breakdown of this domination was accompanied by an interference by the state in the social and political arena to rearrange disintegrating relations. However, in this necessary interference, the apparent objective nature of social relationships was called into question (Habermas, 1976: 72). The traditional forms of domination no longer sufficed to act as a break to demands for change. The legitimation provided by a technocratic rationality supplemented traditional forms. This new form of domination became increasingly important over this period, and the use of social science to achieve consensus increased. Within the social sciences particular approaches came to be more appropriate than others at particular times. By appropriate, I mean they coincided more accurately with the changing perceived reality and the particular political forces which achieved prominence and exercised power. In the sixties and into the seventies, both in Britain and America, the social science focus moved, as I indicate in the previous chapter, in the field of urban poverty, from an emphasis on a social psychological and pathological model of poverty, to a concern with the
coordination and management of government services, to a focus on planning and the process of decision making, to a concern more recently with the economic settings of poor areas and the relationship between their economic development and the development of the national economy. These different models were all, to different degrees available for use as explanations and as bases for action from the early sixties. However, they tended to gain prominence, one after another, in what I argue is close coincidence with the changing reality of state expenditure, the economy and the political rewards to be distributed by successive governments or administrations.

I have already discussed the shift from service provision to service management. This shift was accompanied by a shift in the language of legitimation. I shall use the shift in the United States to illustrate this.

How different policies and understandings are justified by a claim to rationality can be seen by comparing the public statements of Presidents Johnson and Nixon at the beginning of their terms of office. They display different logics but similar claims to rationality for policies that were intended to deal with the manifestations of urban poverty.

For Johnson, speaking at the beginning of his 'Great Society', the emphasis in the War on Poverty was upon the delivery of services to the poor.

'Our chief weapons in a more precipitated attack (on poverty) will be better schools, and better health, and better homes, and better training, and better job opportunities to help more Americans, especially young Americans, escape from squalor and misery and unemployment rolls where other citizens help to care for them.

Very often a lack of jobs and money is not the cause of poverty, but the symptom. The cause may lie deeper in our failure to give our fellow citizens a fair chance to develop their own capabilities, in a lack of education and training, in a lack of medical care and housing, in a lack of decent communities in which to live and bring up children.' (Johnson, 1964a)

Poverty was characterised as being a problem of an individual's opportunity to develop. Confronting this problem demanded an increased delivery of services.

1 Since I cover the periods upto 1974 in the United States and 1977 in Britain, this more recent shift is more evident in the British material than in that covering the United States.
'I have called upon all the departments and agency heads and their personnel to dedicate themselves to this great task, and to exert their maximum energies and resources to assist our fellow citizens who are ill-clad, ill-fed, ill-housed or to whom the door of self-improvement and opportunity is closed.' (Johnson, 1964d)

Nixon speaking five years after Johnson launched his Great Society emphasised instead the structure of government.

'We face an urban crisis, a social crisis - and at the same time a crisis of confidence in the capacity of government to do its job.' (Nixon, 1969c)

He argued that government was the problem and, through increased effectiveness would become more capable of reaching its uncontended goals.

'By rationalizing, coordinating and decentralizing the systems through which government provides important social and economic services, we can begin at last to realize the hopes and dreams of those who created them. Business learned long ago that decentralization was a means to better performance. It's time that government learned the same lesson.' (Nixon, 1969b)

Whereas Johnson focused upon the delivery of new services to meet needs, Nixon focused upon the management of services.

'One of the principal aims of the Administration's continuing study of the antipoverty effort will be to improve its management effectiveness.' (Nixon, 1969a)

These statements do not merely reflect different political approaches. Political options within government do not result from the differing goals of different political parties within the framework of pluralistic bargaining over value choices, and the development of analyses supporting such options does not result from the neutral assessment of different means or courses of action, rather political options result from the changing political and economic context which faces the state.

President Johnson throughout his Administration emphasised the importance of building a consensus for his policies based upon a realistic assessment of objectives, with the implicit view that the choice of means to achieve these objectives was a technical rather than a political decision. After declaring war on poverty, he defended the basic rationality of such a war before numerous groups ranging from businessmen to foreign
correspondents. Consensus not only strengthened the Administration as a Democratic Administration, but also the state itself. Such a consensus was fairly successfully maintained in the early stages of the Johnson Administration. Gradually, though, increased conflict over Vietnam illustrated the connection, in another area, between the legitimation of the Administration's domestic policies and the legitimation of the state.

Johnson's speeches of the time, even linked the legitimacy of the objective (the elimination of poverty) to the legitimacy of the state and its instruments. They also reflected the breadth of the consensus that Johnson was attempting to construct.

On 27th April 1964, he spoke to members of the U.S. Chamber of Commerce and put the rationale for the War on Poverty in these terms:

'If a peaceful revolution to get rid of these things - illiteracy and these ancient enemies of mankind that stalk the earth where two thirds of the masses are young and clamouring and are parading and are protesting and are demonstrating now for something to eat and wear and learn and for health - if a peaceful change of these conditions is impossible, violent changes are inevitable .......

(Johnson, 1964f)

Johnson began by basing his case on a moral obligation to defeat 'the enemies of mankind' and then appealed to direct self interest and the fear of revolution. He elaborated by commenting upon the foundations of capitalist democracies and their stability.

'In this political democracy, what you have and what you own and what you hope to acquire are not secure when there are men that are idle in their homes and there are young people that are adrift in the streets, and when there are thousands that are out of school and millions that are out of work and the aged are lying embittered in their beds.' (Johnson, 1964f)

He portrayed the War on Poverty as being in the interests of the businessmen to whom he was speaking if they wished to 'acquire securely'. Johnson emphasised his sympathy for the businessman's position that afternoon. In a speech to the International Labour Press Association, the War on Poverty was again presented as morally justified and reasonable as well as being
clearly politically necessary for continued accumulation by capital. In answer to a question from a member of the ILPA, he pointed out that without peaceful and orderly changes, violent changes were inevitable.

'People are just not going to stand and see their children starve and be driven out of schools and be eaten up with disease in the twentieth century and they are going to revolt. These fellows that own these 100,000 acre ranches better understand it and the Chamber of Commerce better understand it. I understand it and I have a little nest egg that I want to protect.' (Johnson, 1964g)

For wider audiences he sought a consensus through a softer appeal to the ideological justification of U.S. capitalism - justice, freedom and the quality of the American way of life. In his Annual Message to Congress; the Economic Report of the President, he argued;

'American prosperity is widely shared. But too many are still precluded from its benefits by discrimination; by handicaps of illness, disability, old age or family circumstances; by unemployment or low productivity; by lack of mobility or bargaining power; by failure to receive the education and training from which they could benefit.' (Johnson, 1965a)

Johnson's attempt to create a consensus for the War on Poverty based upon the acceptability of its goals and the rationality of its means can be seen in a speech Johnson made at Baylor University largely justifying United States intervention in the affairs of the Dominican Republic under the guise of counter attacking communist 'subversion'. In the speech he reflected on the quality of the American system of government.

'At home, with the strong cooperation of our Congress, we are waging war on poverty; we are opening new paths of learning for all our children; we are creating new jobs for our workers; we are providing health care for our older citizens; we are eliminating injustice and inequality; we are bringing new economic life to whole regions.' (Johnson, 1965d)

These excerpts illustrate both Johnson's arguments for his policies and also his emphasis upon what he saw as essentially individualised problems unemployment, ill-health, education, old age etc..

I have already commented upon how this view of the nature and
causes of poverty was consonant with the prevailing political and economic forces confronting the Administration at the time. The shift towards more concern with government structure occurred at the end of the Johnson era and was continued into Nixon's. The same forces were operating upon the Nixon Administration as operated on Johnson's. The movement away from the institution of new services for the poor, the sick, the elderly etc. towards the rationalisation and coordination of services and resources began during the Johnson Administration. The increased institution of PPBS and other management techniques in the Administration could be correlated with the increase in expenditure on the War on Vietnam, with its competing demands on public expenditure. Vice President Hubert Humphrey in a speech in August 1967 emphasised the organisational facets of the problems of the cities while he connected progress in the cities with imperialist expansion abroad.

'If we presume to stand in this world as the friend and helper of new nations, we must demonstrate our capacity and willingness to help our own people.' (Humphrey, 1967)

He called the Model Cities Program, a Marshall Plan for urban America and went on to say that the Act which established the Model Cities Program does

'.... for the cities ..... what the National Aeronautics and Space Act did for the space program.' (Humphrey, 1967)

The shift towards a language of management and legitimation in terms of organisation continued through into the Nixon Administration, being pursued with great vigour by the Republicans in their attempts to dismantle Democratic programmes.

These statements by the President present the language within which debate was to occur. A public debate can be engaged within an 'agreed' frame of meanings and understandings by the creation of apparently rational policies. It is important to emphasise that it is not a direct appeal to 'social science' that creates legitimacy since social scientists are at different times regarded by the majority of the population as quacks and charlatans. It is rather that the role they play confers legitimacy.

It would be a crude view of legitimation to see it as providing a complete cover for existing policy making. Social science
ideas provide the language and rationale of legitimacy. Therefore to see social science's role purely as legitimating particular policies does not provide a comprehensive explanation of the social science/politics relationship. I am skeptical as to the comprehensiveness of this explanation in that if it is merely a question of generating experts to overcome political divisions, then experts can be created counter to the experts representing the official line. Secondly, the population as a whole has little respect for the status of social science as knowledge.

It is clear that the relationship between politics and social science has not been entirely unidirectional either, as would be implied if social scientists were only seen to have a legitimating role. Their legitimating role was important but was not their only role - I have already mentioned evaluation and the provision of information as other roles. Looking at both countries, it can be seen that while the programmes and projects may have been overwhelmingly determined by the political and administrative forces, they did maintain some of the initial ideas which had been derived from social science.

External legitimation of policy making

Perhaps though, it is not only particular policies that are legitimated but the process of policy making itself. Policies are given 'meaning' (in the sense of a place within the framework of existing goals) through their advocacy, not necessarily through their substance. This 'meaning' has a legitimating role that may be separate from the policies' purpose. Since the substance and direction of developments are largely determined by economic and political goals acting through institutions and by administrative arrangements and bargains, the ability of the government independently to impose its will against these forces is limited. In concealing this, the appeal to external legitimation through ideas is strong.

Programmes both provide tangible benefits on the ground and provide symbolic benefits in terms of public relations. The War on Poverty is a clear example of how the secondary aspect may play an important part. The War on Poverty as a symbol of concern by
the Administration for the plight of America's poor gained support for Johnson from the liberal constituency whose loyalty was to the Kennedys. This liberal constituency, however, did not contain those who were affected by the reality of poverty or were to be affected by the substance of the programme. The symbol of the programme in itself was a token of concern for them. At the same time, the programme was portrayed as a consistent complement to the foreign policy being pursued by the Administration. In this way the President could try and achieve a consensus around his domestic liberalism and his foreign interventions on the basis that they were part of the same strategy.

Similarly in Britain, the symbolic role of the programmes being implemented is clear. Whereas the substance of the programmes in the United States was also considerable, the symbolic importance of those in Britain was paramount. Crossman's statement about getting kudos for the urban programme makes it obvious how apparent this was even to those involved in developing the programme. Whether Wilson did or did not have some clear ideas about the content of an urban programme, his announcement of the programme in his speech replying to Powell indicated its symbolic value. He did not propose a programme in the sense of any definable course of action which the government intended to pursue, what he did announce was the existence of a programme. In a sense, therefore, what was important was that the Labour Government was going to do something and not the details of what that something was. The announcement itself achieved part of its aims. This can be seen to be repeated throughout the course of the various programmes in Britain. The announcement of a new initiative, irrespective of the nature of the initiative was more important than its subsequent content in terms of publicity and presentation.

It is important to consider the two ways in which policy is presented. It is presented within the state apparatus and towards the public at large. Both are part of the same process of legitimation and domination of the understanding of meaning. That, for instance Johnson should define the debate on the War on Poverty as being in terms of the ability of the poor to take advantage of the
opportunities that exist within American society provided a meaning for the idea of poverty within which policy can then be articulated and assessed. Whether or not poverty as a reality has any relationship to this meaning is unimportant for subsequent action.

The use of meanings and symbols separated the relationship between social science, politics and administration from the understandings and control of those upon whom policy subsequently operated and affected. Symbols act as part of the language of legitimation to achieve what Edelman (1977) calls 'political quiescence'. In avoiding the substance of policy and in determining the structure of meanings within which debate occurs, any challenge to legitimation is contained within a field decided upon by the power structure.

The Model Cities Program presented Johnson with a problem in the managing of the debate in such a way that would present the policy making process in the technical manner upon which his consensus was built. Johnson's legitimation for the Model Cities Program was simultaneously a legitimation for the policy making process itself.

Whereas the initial memorandum from Walter Reuther to President Johnson outlining a Demonstration Cities Program proposed a limited experimental demonstration program, the program was expanded to cover a considerable number of cities and towns, thus largely negating its supposedly experimental aspect. This expansion of the programme took place because of a variety of pressures. These pressures were primarily political - the desire to expand the base of the programme and so increase the political support for it in terms of the number of Congressmen in whose interest it was to support the programme - and institutional, the desire of HUD, being a new department, to have control over a large new programme to enhance its image. Political problems in the passage of the Model Cities legislation were overcome by making it provide not merely funding for large cities, which it was argued already received disproportionate amounts of federal funding and national prominence. The managing of the measure in the Senate by Senator Muskie from Maine, a rural state without a nationally prominent
'problem' city, helped to achieve this. For HUD the expansion of the Model Cities Program into smaller cities and towns strengthened its role within the Administration in relation to other large government departments and allowed it to present itself as a Department not merely concerned with urban America. Such an expansion within the Administration strengthened the importance of HUD as a major department. These pressures for a widespread programme were not appropriate, nor able to be couched in the right language, to be placed before Congress as reasons for extending the programme. Indeed the rationale of an experiment was such that its scale actually denied its experimental nature. Instead the President in proposing the programme had to emphasise its value to all America. The President had begun to talk of the problems of the cities prior to the establishment of the Task Force and prior to Reuther's memorandum.

'.... the city has been at the center of civilization. It is at the center of our own society. Over seventy percent of our population - 135 million Americans - live in urban areas.' (Johnson, 1965b)

In the message proposing the Model Cities Program, the President reemphasised the extent of the problem and how it affected all Americans.

'By the year 2000 four out of five Americans will live and work in a metropolitan area.' (Johnson, 1966a)

Rather than rationing resources, on the basis of central assessment of which cities contained the most favourable conditions for the launching of such an experiment in order to create an experimental demonstration programme, the President proposed a more circuitous approach to rationing what were clearly already going to be overstretched resources, even if Congress authorized and appropriated the full funding that the President was requesting.

'It will not be simple to qualify for such a program. We have neither the means nor the desire to invest public funds in an expensive program whose net effects will be marginal, wasteful or visible only after protracted delay. We intend to help only those cities who help themselves.' (Johnson, 1966a)

This reflected the dilemma of the rational external legitimation of the political process. While the form of demonstration
programme could be argued and presented as being determined by
criteria which were generally acceptable and rational, the presen-
tation itself was designed to overcome the conflict generated
by, and resolved on the basis of, political power.

The President gave meaning to the Model Cities Program
structure. He presented the programme as a rationally conceived
and constructed attempt to deal with the problems of the city.
This symbol of the programme in a concrete manner provided a
legitimacy for the policy process, not merely the policy itself.

Internal mediation

As well as legitimisation being important for the political process
as viewed from outside, legitimisation is important in the mediation
of conflicts internal to the process. Social science plays a
role in the internal mediation of conflict.

I maintain that social science has an important part to play
in mediating conflicts within the processes of government in
Britain, and so providing its resolution with a legitimacy. The
legitimacy given to the process, in its very nature, cannot be
defined separately from the overall legitimacy of the mode of domin-
ation itself. It is equally technical and rational.

In Britain social scientists on the edges of government generate
ideas within the same political paradigm as the politician. These
ideas may subsequently be found to be consonant with some of the
more specific political pressures for action operating at the time
(this was so in the case of the EPAs and CDPs). This role for the
social scientist in Britain emphasises the importance of the processes
of government decision making in providing a legitimate form for
the exercise of power. In America, social scientists, who share
many characteristics with their British counterparts (especially
regarding the party political connections which exist) have a
role which is involved much more centrally within the structure of
government, whether on congressional staffs, or in the Administration,
in providing a common political language for the resolution of
conflict which occurs within a common rational technocratic mode.
Thus just as wizards and soothsayers may have been used in the
past, so now we have social scientists.
This difference in the two countries provides an important contrast in the legitimating of the policy making process. The different structure of government at both a central and local level in Britain and America leads to a different place within each system for external rational legitimation.

Institutional separations are not only important at a Federal level in the United States, but are built into the American system of government at all levels, thus replicating the process on a neighbourhood level and giving the American system of government its apparent 'pluralism'. A pluralism that is within the structures of political power, rather than as the term implies, a pluralism stretching throughout society - a pluralistic state rather than a pluralistic society.

In Britain, departmental separation gives rise to negotiation, but a negotiation that occurs outwith the public arena. Whereas in the British system, the negotiation that does take place, takes place behind closed doors over issues which are not publically displayed, in the American structure, the issues are much more publically accessible because of the institutional separations. In America therefore, the language in which mediation takes place is one which has to be consumed publically as well as privately, whether this language represents actual resolution or not.\(^1\) To achieve these compromises and negotiations within the separated structure of the United States, I argue that 'rational resolution' and the use of a supposedly technocratic approach has been used to conceal what are accomodations made on the basis of relative power. Whereas in America, throughout the state apparatus, competing centers of power struggle over the implementation of policies, in Britain, the system being unitary and heirachical does not have this conflict to the same degree (clearly there are interdepartmental conflicts).

In Britain it is the administrative process, the process of government itself which is legitimated, rather than specific policies being developed. Therefore, when there is a changing relationship

\(^1\) Edelman (1977: 134) calls this 'hortatory language'.
between local and central government, it is this relationship which becomes the focus for legitimation. Either within central government in the construction of options, or in the direction of local authorities by central government, an appeal is made to external rationality that this is the best way to approach policy making.

The British system of government derives its legitimacy on the basis of the process of policy making being rational and having a democratic imput. The American system, on the other hand, derives its legitimacy on the basis of the separated structures giving rise to democratic and rational decision making. In the British system the decision making process is concealed from public scrutiny and it is in this protection from scrutiny that it achieves its legitimacy. Where the processes of the state themselves are one of the main sources of authority, expert knowledge is provided within the state as a 'neutral' referee in conflicts over means and ends. If the conflict cannot be resolved through the operation of the processes themselves, then expert knowledge provides within the concealed processes an external rational legitimation to resolve the conflict. This is in a crude form. Decisions are not opposed to one another and then mediated through the introduction of an external legitimation. The process contains provision for legitimation throughout.

In the American system legitimacy is derived from the structure giving rise to democratic and rational decision making. As I have already discussed this involves the sharing of meaning within the political structure. The resolution of conflict occurs on the basis of relative political power but the 'best' decision to be taken is presented as the most 'rational' decision. It is defining this 'social good' that scientists are asked to play

1 I use the term 'authority' here not in the sense of the power that is derived from the processes of the state, but in the sense of the exercise of power which is seen as being legitimate because of the nature of the processes. In other words, the processes of the state themselves are seen to be a construction of the democratic history of the development of the state into its contemporary form.
a role in a public forum.

Social science as entrepreneur

In the British example, experimental approaches such as EPAs, CDPs or the Inner Area Studies could be launched on a limited scale. Indeed their limited scale had certain distinct advantages. Firstly, limited programmes such as the three mentioned, did not require legislation and therefore were subject to limited discussion in Parliament. Secondly, the amount of money involved was of such a small scale that controversy could be avoided at national level, since the expenditure implications did not seriously conflict with established interests. Thirdly, and perhaps as a result of the second advantage, any positive results deriving from limited programmes would be a bonus. Whereas large scale programmes in the United States required to be oversold, small scale ones in Britain could be underplayed.

Given this, in Britain, support for the implementation of area based strategies did not require to be mobilised within the electoral sphere. Apart from the Inner Area Studies, the planning and approval of the initiatives all took place, to different degrees among civil servants and those academics close to the civil service. Whereas in America programmes were constructed to meet political problems perceived and articulated in the Executive, in Britain, the projects were first planned by civil servants and academics and then used existing political conditions to acquire support.

In Britain, the key features of EPAs, CDPs and the Inner Area Studies were developed outwith the state apparatus, although they were subsequently modified and reconstructed to cope with the political realities which they had to confront. That the EPAs were not launched on the scale proposed by Halsey and Young should not downgrade the influence that their ideas had in developing the project in the first place. In these cases, social science came into government in an attempt to get government support for projects which were developed to deal with social problems. These projects were constructed by social science entrepreneurs, combining with civil servant entrepreneurs (like Morrell), to provide
a role for social science within government and connections between universities and the civil service. It is interesting to consider that many of the social scientists involved in, for instance the EPAs and CDPs (in particular Young and Halsey) were part of the Labour Party establishment in that they already had close ties with prominent Labour politicians. The Conservative Party has not had allies of this sort from whom advice was forthcoming, except perhaps in economics. The Labour Government of 1964-70 set a trend, which continued into the following Labour Government, of using outside academic advisers as think tanks for new ideas and policy developments. Heath, later tried to institutionalise such a function within the Cabinet Office with the setting up of the Central Policy Review Staff. However, an important difference was that the Labour Government's advisers who constituted an extra set of ministerial advisers were (in an institutional sense) opposed to the civil service.

It is important to recognise the importance of social science entrepreneurs, because it indicates the two sided nature of the relationship between the state and social science. It has not been an entirely one way process.

Knowledge and expertise

What then does the social scientist bring to policy making? I would say that it is not nothing, but it is less than the abstracted knowledge which their claim to science would seem to imply. It is what I would call expertise. This expertise could be equated with what I have termed pragmatic problem solving. It is an expertise based upon sharing a political paradigm with politicians and a knowledge of the political, administrative and institutional constraints within which policies are developed.

As Wolanin says in his study of Presidential Advisory Commissions;

'... the full-time professional staffs of commissions are frequently not oriented toward rational-comprehensive decision making or scientific inquiry. They are most often lawyers and middle-level substantive experts from the federal government. Their training and professional experience incline them toward a method of problem solving that proceeds by collecting the available data and analysing it in terms of making pragmatic adjustments and modifications in the existing programs and approaches. A rational
comprehensive or hypothesis-experiment investigation is foreign to them.' (Wolanin, 1975: 101)

This pragmatic approach and the construction of what are seen as possible options had an interesting effect, both on the nature of social science and also for the sort of legitimation it conceals. Beneath the veneer of scientific inquiry lies the truth of political determination. Robert Wood, Under Secretary of HUD, continually reinforced the need for this sort of investigation in speeches he made to encourage social scientists to take part 'practically' in the development of new strategies for the cities. But instead of appealing for rigorous ideas that could be applied to new strategies, he made clear the need both for political and practical coincidence between the ideas being developed and the approaches they implied.

'I believe the opportunity for academic, philosophic contribution to urban policy was never greater. My simple theme is, however, that unless the philosophy is rooted in empiricism, accompanied by precise and rigorous intellectual discipline and empirical analysis, its basic propositions will not be accepted. The public will still continue to correct intuitive speculation with common sense.' (Wood, 1967)

This statement contains many interesting implications for the role that social science was to play in urban policy and also how that role should shape the epistemological foundations of social science. To see anything but empiricism as intuitive speculation and to equate empiricism with the 'public's' common sense has totalitarian implications for the development of social science. Even a crude empiricism would not see the result of empiricist inquiry as common sense.

The sort of empiricism that Wood extolled was the 'soft' knowledge to which Caplan (1975) referred. For the lay person an empirical approach avoids some awkward epistemological questions raised by other methodological approaches, while also avoiding more fundamental political questions. 'Commonsense' is based upon political realities. Expertise implies an understanding based upon experience of the political realities which shape and form particular situations. The role of social science in task forces and the use of social scientists as general experts
implies the use of this expertise. The areas of interest of the most prominent social scientists used in the United States and Britain, and their methods of approach have been within the pragmatic tradition of social policy. Academic relevance has been determined by political relevance.

This expertise defines not only the role of social scientists, it can define the nature of the very 'tools' of social science. Indicators, such as census data, have a conceptual base which is derived and constructed through a process which owes much to pragmatic considerations and experience. It is worth digressing here to make this point using the example of poverty and area based approaches because it raises some of the basic issues.

Much is made of problems of defining poverty and measuring its existence. It is clear that almost any definition is relative since the concept itself is relative. In both countries for the purposes of action a poverty level has been defined. In Britain the Supplementary Benefit level is used. This limited monetary definition of poverty has been broadened to include other aspects of 'deprivation' (which would seem an almost synonymous term for poverty). Deprivation has however been defined in terms of more tangible assets than money, rather akin to the quality of life. Deprivations such as overcrowding, unemployment, lack of basic amenities are open to attempts at measurement. However, within this tradition of looking at poverty in terms of quality of life, there are aspects which cannot be empirically assessed with such ease. Environmental standards, mobility, life chances etc. would logically become part of such an approach. However, government policies have shied away from these more problematic and less observable aspects.

How are concepts defined and operationalised in policy terms? It is now almost folklore in British social policy how the rediscovery of poverty came about through the publicising of reports such as Abel-Smith and Townsend's (1965) showing that monetary poverty still existed in Britain to quite a wide extent despite the existence of a Welfare State which was supposed to have prevented anybody falling below what were basic requirements to
meet need. Through the sixties concerns were expressed about a wide variety of broader aspects of living conditions: housing (Milner-Holland Report, 1965), education (CACE Reports), social services (Seebohm). With this concentration on other aspects of living conditions came the broadening of the concepts being dealt with under the heading of poverty. An area based focus developed that looked at areas of cities which had been left behind and were inadequately serviced by the welfare state.

This interpretation of the continuation of poor conditions of life in the country in certain areas is a product of the relationship between existing government policies and methods of analysis.

Firstly, existing government policies (especially within the pragmatic tradition of British social research and policy making) defined the nature of the problems that were explored. Conditions were examined within the same unstated frame as that within which policies are constructed. Poverty is defined in terms of income relative to the SB level. This is an accessible method of measuring poverty. Poor housing is measured in terms of overcrowding and lack of basic amenities because the data exists from the census to make such a definition. The way that statistics and data are collected affects how they may be used while how they have been used shapes future investigation and action.

The clearest example of this effect is in the definition of areas of deprivation. In that data collected for the census are analysed on the basis of enumeration districts which are geographically defined, a geographical basis is immediately introduced. The collection of other statistical information about the level of life in Britain is also collected on other area bases. Local authorities' wards are used to aggregate data and wards are compared one to another on basic social indicators. Such an initial area focus provides an area concept of deprivation.

The second way in which this relationship is reinforced is through the pragmatism of social policy developments and research. The rediscovery of poverty did not lead to a major questioning of the basic structure of British welfare provision. A new approach
was neither organised nor proposed which would have replaced the failing Beveridgean approach. Given this pragmatism, a redefinition occurred. Rather than the existence of poverty being seen as negating the pretensions of the British welfare state, the existence of poverty was seen as being an indication of residual failures within an otherwise comprehensive system of provision. To develop extra means of coping with these failings became an obvious approach.

This is exemplified in the field of positive discrimination in education. Data relating to the lack of opportunity for some children did not lead to the reexamination of the educational system as a whole, its role in society and its effects upon class. Rather the failings were seen as peripheral and could be overcome if not by a process of more of the same, at least through extra efforts within the same structure.

The development of area based policies in Britain and the accompanying definition of the problem occurred through a cumulative process. As more 'exceptions' came to light so the breadth of the definition of poverty had to be expanded. What occurred was the definition of changing concepts in a pragmatic manner.

**Summary**

In this chapter I have tried to explore the politics-science relationship. I have included administration in a peripheral manner but administration has an important role when it is recognised that 'politics' includes the politics of institutional structures. It is in this broader sense that I use the term politics. I have attempted to argue that traditional explanations of the politics-science relationship fail to explain the degree to which social science is shaped by political pragmatism. I have gone further than this however in arguing that this pragmatically framed social science does itself play a role in the policy making process.

Politics and social science do not mutually accommodate one another in the policy making process. Political forces do not merely use social science to legitimate political decisions, but social science has an important role in both providing a rational technical language and approach which legitimates the process of
policy making. It also provides a way of mediating internal conflicts. The importance of policy making legitimation and internal mediation is different in the two countries.

Finally, while social scientists also act as entrepreneurs who initiate policy developments, the sort of social science, including its epistemological basis is shaped by the political and administrative context within which it operates.
Chapter Seven
Conclusion

In this final chapter I shall first consider some of the implications of the nature of the relationship between the state and welfare, social policy and social science. I shall then consider some different views of policy making. I shall conclude by considering some of the different roles that social science could play in policy making, contrasting them with its present role.

I have described policy as being the outcome of a number of different relationships. Some of these relationships provide the context within which the state operates, while others shape the mode in which the state operates. For example, the political and economic relationships which constitute the context of the state both provide the impetus and direction for its action while also forming the nature of its action. Policy making is an outcome of these relationships. Within the state apparatus, the institutional and administrative organisational arrangements of the state provide another important impetus and constraint for state action.

As can be seen from the previous two chapters, the issues to be considered in looking at policy development have a complexity which does not lead to a straightforwardly developmental account of the policy making process. To attempt to impose a comprehensive multi-causal model on policy development has not been my aim. However, there are important common general forces which have been important. In particular the issues which I consider in my fourth chapter have provided the context which shaped these policies. The issues considered in chapters five and six gave the policies their more particular form.

Higgins (1978: 11-27) reviews three models of policy development, which she compares with the development of the programmes and policies in Britain and America. She identifies the first as being the view which sees policy as developing according to compassionate concern, pragmatism or the imperatives of industrialisation. The second she calls a 'Conspiracy Theory' of welfare. The last she
presents as an alternative model which she derives from Lindblom (1959) and calls 'ad hocism' or 'muddling through'. Her three models of change in social policy are unsatisfactory for a number of reasons. Firstly, her models are not all encompassing in the sense that there are other possible explanations which she leaves unexplored. Secondly, particular explanations are not clearly attributable to any of her models. For instance, Piven and Cloward's views in Regulating the Poor (1971), which she terms conspiratorial, also emphasises the imperatives of industrialisation. Thirdly, the models themselves are not mutually exclusive in that ad-hocism can be a form of pragmatism and can be easily be combined with a model of conspiracy. Conspiracy can take place in an ad-hoc way. Her alternative model leaves as much unexplained as there is to explain.

'Many influences were at work. Change could have gone in a number of different directions on a number of different occasions. There was nothing inevitable about the form it eventually took. Attempting to explain its particular manifestations is a frustrating task and there are no clear-cut answers. In such a situation the attractions of a holistic view of change are obvious. The Conspiracy Theory is neat, comprehensive and simple, while the alternative model described here is complex, untidy and unable to offer conclusive explanations.' (Higgins, 1978: 26)

It is an unsatisfactory approach to study the complexity and untidiness of the world and deliver the verdict - it is complex and untidy. This is in part because her conclusions are arrived at merely from viewing the appearance of the world without sufficient critical reflection.

First, it is important to lay to rest the bogey of 'Conspiracy Theory'. 'Conspiracy Theory' is a stick with which bourgeois social scientists frequently try to beat marxists and neo-marxists. It seems sufficient to say that something is a 'Conspiracy Theory' to condemn it. Conspiracy theory replaces functionalism as a sociological insult. If there was a 'Conspiracy Theory', which I have yet to come across, it could not be rejected so simply. Conspiracies do take place. Politicians do act in sinister, devious and underhand manners, and a conspiracy may contribute to a specific event. Kennedy (Bay of Pigs), Johnson (Vietnam) and
Nixon (Watergate) all took part in conspiracies. My main difference with Higgins is that I do not seek to say X is why Y occurred. Such an approach would lead me into having to say, as Higgins does that there are no simple answers. The formulation of Higgins' investigation is itself inadequate. The sole object of the study of social policy change cannot merely be to explain specific events - in my view, it must also consider the forces, which are not necessarily observable, and identify the essential features of social change. To focus exclusively on observable events entails an epistemology which cannot adequately comprehend the nature of the world.

In rejecting Conspiracy Theory, Higgins says;

'In order to substantiate the Conspiracy Theory we will need to look not only at the effects of policy but at the motives of policy makers.' (Higgins, 1978: 17)

There are some Marxists who attribute the formulation of policy to the direct consciousness of a ruling elite. However, their approach is open to the same criticism as Higgins'. To study social change only on the level of individual motivation leads to the disregard of important epistemological questions and a denial of the real nature of the object of study. The appearance of social forms is clearly shaped by the world in which they appear. This is not merely a question of perception (i.e. of how appearance is organised) although the organisation of appearance in perceptual terms is important. To put it in simplistic but concrete terms, an approach to the world based upon an understanding of the class nature of capitalism allows the class nature of the world to appear. On the other hand, an understanding which approaches the world in a pluralistic fashion, itself creates the appearance of pluralism. However this is not sufficient. If this were all, then we could say that what the world was depends upon how it is seen (within what frame of perception it is viewed). To go beyond that it is necessary to realise that (as a basic requirement of a scientific approach) some understanding of the relationship between the perceived world and why it appears as such is important.

To be more concrete in my criticisms of Higgins, the labelling of Piven and Cloward as Conspiracy Theorists is misconceived on
two counts. Their functionalism, which is undeniable, can be criticized in that it does not sufficiently explain how the functional coincidence between the 'demands' of the state and policy making occurs. This allows the gap to be filled in the minds of critics by a motivated conspiracy. This is in part the result of an insufficient theoretical consideration of the nature of political and economic imperatives and how they are mobilised.

It is tautological to see changes taking place which maintain but adapt capitalism as occurring to achieve their own ends. Such an explanation would allow everything to be explained merely in terms of itself. The process is not as simply elucidated. I shall try to deal with this by taking examples from my own work which might well be accused of being functionalist or over conspiratorial. When (and I acknowledge Piven and Cloward's influence upon this), I argue that electoral benefits were to be gained by the development of the Community Action Program, I introduce a consciousness on the part of the Administration which clearly existed. The evidence is there to show that Johnson was aware of his electoral needs and also that politicians do enter politics with such calculations in mind. However, I am not saying that this was the only reason, or even that this function was a sufficient one to create the War on Poverty. Other relationships are also of great importance, for instance the relationship of the War on Poverty to state expenditure, and to the overall economic picture. Although there is a conscious and functional element involved in this approach, and the approach does not explain in a complete way what occurred, it approaches a more complete explanation than the 'ad hocism' of Higgins. It is only by going beyond the frame of the apparent that the nature of the broader forces can be studied. Therefore by counterposing alternative developments which could have occurred, which are outwith the bounds of pragmatism the policy making process can be confronted with its own nature. Doing this it can be seen that what was occurring was not an open and experimental development, albeit within an incremental frame. Policy developed within a set of boundaries.
State policy (in this particular example, state welfare policies) are the outcome of conflicting relationships within society and within the state apparatus. The conflicting relationships within society can be reduced to the balance of class forces at any particular time. It is through this balance of class forces that state economic and fiscal policies derive their particular form. Economic and fiscal policy, as I have already shown, cannot be separated from political and social relations - including those within the electoral arena. The conflicts within the state apparatus, whose source lies in the institutional and administrative aspects of the bureaucracy, provide for a more immediate impetus for the development of policy in a particular manner. These conflicts within the state apparatus are also dependant upon the nature of the constitutional relationships which govern the form of the state apparatus.

In the example of these policies, within the overall frame of the development of welfare policies in the nineteen sixties and the early nineteen seventies, the political and economic balance being sought was the compromise and conciliation of conflicting class interests. The state engaged increasingly in a series of policies whose aim was both to 'include' those who had previously been 'excluded' (by emphasising equality of opportunity and productive potential) and to do this in a non-contentious way, without exacerbating other existing conflicts (the evidence is clear both in the War on Poverty and the Urban Aid Programme with regard to exacerbating racial tensions). Part of the process of inclusion involved the identification of new possibilities for representation (i.e. participation) and for the allocation of resources. This was to be achieved within existing relationships of representation and distribution.

The relationship between social science and social policy in these programmes can be seen within this frame of analysis. Social science had the two important roles of providing for the legitimate resolution of conflicting interests and providing for the generation of a consensus on the basis of an authority which was presented as being separate from the value choices applying
within the political process. That this consensus was not successfully constructed is not surprising when seen in these terms. The generation of such a consensus was based upon an ideological view of the nature of social relations which excluded the possibility of fundamental class conflicts as being a source of political and social conflict. To maintain existing social relations was to maintain the source of the problems. Consensus, inclusion and conciliation could not resolve these conflicts, but could only mask them to a lesser or greater extent. Ultimately, of course, whether they succeeded in reducing conflict or not, this was a cosmetic achievement which left conditions 'on the ground' unresolved.

This view of the nature of the policy process and the role of social science in it differs significantly from the more established views of policy making. It is important to note that these more established views of policy making go a long way towards creating the context within which it has been seen as being possible for social science to play some technical role in 'improving' social policy making. These established views can be seen broadly to be encompassed within three themes. One seeing policy as in some sense as an outcome of function. This includes different views of social change ranging from Marxist 'functionalists' through to those convergence theorists who see welfare development as a response to the social demands of industrialisation and its associated productive forces. Another sees policy as being an outcome of bargaining, whether this is expressed as 'ad hocism' or as pluralistic bargaining between identifiable interests. Here too, there are Marxists who see policy developments as being the outcome of bargaining, albeit not within a pluralistic frame but from a class frame. The least expressed, but most often implicit view is that of policy as being the outcome of rational humanism. Indeed this rational humanism is frequently implied as a motive force behind some of the functionalist or bargaining views of policy making; the initial impetus being derived from a

---

1 I deliberately use the word 'theme' rather than model. These are not intended as heuristic classifications to replace Higgins' unsatisfactory models. Rather they provide analytical outlines.
rational humanism, mediated through other forces. While it may seem unnecessary to spend time refuting this rational humanism, it has some important implications. Those who, like myself, reject the rational humanistic basis of policy making may be accused both of empirical inaccuracy (because we cannot provide alternative motivations) and also of the bogey 'conspiracy'. These allegations are unjustified. To deny that rational humanism is a basis for policy outcomes is not to imply that policy makers pretend that they are concerned with welfare, while they are actually developing other more devious schemes. It is only to imply that the best 'will' does not necessarily win through. It is not enough to be well intentioned, and even the best structured institutions would not lead to outcomes which are a distillation of rational humanism. Action derives from a complex interplay of will, circumstance and conflicting interest. I have attempted to outline some of the most important of these. Abstracted will had little place in the process.

The basic assumption of a rational humanistic basis for policy direction leads to an ideological construction which places policy within the realm of the rational and the technical. The search for the resolution of conflicts to allow the light of sweet reason to shine through implies that these conflicts are not fundamental and can be resolved. My view is of course the reverse. Reason is not masked by conflict. Conflict is masked by reason. This reason takes a rational and technical form in its attempts to impose a consensus. This 'consensus' has two aspects. Firstly, it implies that the existing distribution of class power, despite its shifting nature, is in some sense natural. Capitalism is posed as being a universal law for the ordering of economic and political relationships. Secondly, and more specific to the period that I am examining, the rational technical mode of domination, as I have previously said, is an important part of Keynesianism. Under Keynesianism the rational technical form of domination provides conciliation through rationality.

No doubt some readers will expect some prescriptive recommendations. Policy recommendations are within the main stream of
writing in social policy, and in most accounts of these programmes such prescriptions exist. However, such an expectation suggests a failure to understand the main point of studying these programmes. Perhaps Higgins comes closest to this;

'It has not been the purpose of this book to spell out an alternative poverty programme. That has been done more comprehensively and in more detail elsewhere. Indeed its purpose has been almost the reverse. The foregoing chapters have been intended to show that the debate about the desirability of one poverty programme as against another is academic if there is no means of ensuring that either gains political support. The real problem is not the content of the programme but how to win that support.'

(Higgins, 1978: 139)

While recognising that the essential aspect of a prescriptive account of the programme is the requirement for political support, I argue that her conclusions do not go far enough. The main point is that she presents the state as being capable of learning, not merely in an ad hoc manner, but also in a rational and reflexive manner. Many analysts of social policy are drawn into social policy examination in such a way that they base the nature of their analysis on the assumption that government will learn.

Hambleton (1978) is one of the most striking examples, exhibiting considerable faith in the ability of the state to learn and arguing that its apparent inability is derived from its structure and approaches, rather than, as I argue, from its nature. Using Schon's work (1971), Hambleton argues that there are two facets of public learning; problem recognition and adaptive capacity. Hambleton says the former

'is concerned with the ability of government to perceive and understand the true complexity of problems in the community - the way they interrelate and often reinforce one another and the way they change over time.'

(Hambleton, 1978: 10)

and sees the second as being

'concerned with the ability of government to respond to these differing and changing problems at the appropriate organisational level in a timely and effective manner. This requires the development of institutions which are capable of bringing about their own continuing transformation.'

(Hambleton, 1978: 11)
Underlying Hambleton's view is a view of the state which I suggest is incapable of being sustained. The state is not the adaptive and reflexive organ that he would like it to be, not merely because it is not organised in this way, but also because of the role that the state plays in capitalist society. To be able to consider how the state can act and how the state can learn requires an explicit theory of the nature of the state, as it is, rather than an assumption that the state is adaptable to whatever the 'people' want it to be. The state is not a collection of institutions, organised in a haphazard manner and capable of adaptation without limit. It is a capitalist state deriving its form, functions, and legitimacy from capitalist relations.

Edwards and Batley (1978) fall into the same trap by failing to have an explicit view of the nature of policy making. In drawing their conclusions and 'lessons' from the Urban Programme, they say:

'What then would be the prescription for the future if the implications of these arguments were to be translated into policy? It would be the development of a more intellectually-discriminating response to urban deprivation wherein the major tactic would be to employ broad-based policies that would be supplemented only where research deemed them expedient by limited area-specific programmes.' (Edwards and Batley, 1978: 251)

It is however the ideological relationship between 'learning' and 'government' which leads to this form of pragmatic criticism. Attempts at prescriptive statements are imposed upon social science through the relationship that it has with the state. To disregard this is to be seen as being 'irrelevant', 'politically motivated' and 'unscientific'. However I am posing a non-prescriptive social science approach.

Relevance for policy makers cannot be a criterion by which knowledge is judged. If social science and social scientists are to see their role as improving the organisation of society within a consensual or pluralistic framework, then they abdicate both their responsibilities as social scientists and their responsibilities as human beings in a political world. However, the
growth of the social sciences as government funded areas of knowledge depends upon their perceived relevance and results that are seen to be useful. This leads to the inbuilt conservatism of much applied social research and social policy analysis. Empiricism and practicality are seen as inherent goods.

To move beyond this, it is necessary, neither to see policies in the terms which they are given nor take the state as unproblematical. Its appearance and the appearance of policy are dictated by its nature. But does this deny the ability of social policy analysis to be able to help government improve its understanding?

Where the increase in the rational technocratic mode of domination becomes clear is in the degree to which this pragmatic approach becomes the approach. Two strands can be seen to have been drawn together, and Hambleton's work illustrates this well. On the one hand, there is the substantive knowledge of a particular area, on the other hand, deriving from planning theory, there is the thread concerned with the processes of policy application. They are brought together within the existing frame of political possibilities and the limits defined by their own pragmatism.

My work has been exploratory. I have outlined different presentations of policy development. The different conclusions which I draw from these policies are not rigorously 'proved'. To provide, within the scope of a PhD thesis a comprehensive and conclusive argument covering the themes that I have been pursuing is unrealistic. It would have been impossible to set out with rigorous hypotheses, without detailed knowledge of the programmes which comes with original investigation. In this sense this work raises more questions than it answers. In particular, it would be interesting to investigate more exactingly the particular uses that social science has been put to in the policy making process. To do this it would be necessary to take some discrete developments in both countries and collect as much relevant information on them as possible. This would be difficult in Britain with the secrecy which surrounds government policy making.

Given the information that is available in both countries, it would have been possible to concentrate on a small number of events.
In Britain, the launching of the Inner Area Studies and their relationship to the Community Development Projects would have provided an interesting source of information regarding the use by central government of CDP results. Information could be collected on the precise links within central government between the Home Office and the Department of the Environment. The directions in public expenditure at the time could be charted and the decision to use outside consultants could be looked at in the light of CDP experience. Likewise, the launching of the Inner Urban Areas Bill with the accompanying White Paper raises interesting questions which could be open to investigation, especially the precise timing of the publication of the Inner Area Study Reports. The conclusions I have drawn here about these events are not proven. However they raise plausible and interesting questions.

In America, a similar development open to comparison would be the launching of the Model Cities Program and the same sort of detailed information regarding previous experience, the relationships of different government departments, the move from study to action and the use of social science results would go into making an illuminating source of conclusions. Frieden and Kaplan (1978) cover much of this ground but not with the focus that I should like.

It is also of concern that some of those who have been privy to the decision making process in Britain have allowed themselves to be constrained by the civil service in reporting their investigations. For instance, Edwards and Batley were in a unique position to be able to tell us more about how the Urban Programme developed. It is understandable, given the degree of power that central government can wield over academics that they resisted the temptation of producing an unauthorised account. To continue to be restrained by constraints which have nothing to do with understanding the processes of the state, forces what are presented as objective academic investigations, to be apologies of different sorts. Social policy analysts or social policy advisers will never maintain standards of self-criticism and reflective analysis if they maintain that it is more important to be 'included' in policy making - despite constraints, than to be excluded.
choice is clear. We can either be apologists and legitimators, or we can be ignored while probing in ways which, while the information may not be there for us to provide conclusive 'proofs' of our theses, can at least provide material which raises issues and discussion in a way which is not constrained by political and bureaucratic dictates.

A state that can spend £5,000 million on Trident missiles, maintain an army of occupation in Northern Ireland, and build Concorde cannot provide meaningful employment, reasonable housing and a good quality of life for everyone. Social scientists maintain an approach which vacillates between pessimistic talk of 'intractable problems' to optimistic 'new approaches'. Each new policy development is greeted with enthusiasm, jobs are gratefully received, research diligently pursued, but when nothing happens (and nothing can happen), complexity is pronounced as the problem.
References

AARON, Henry J.
1978 Politics and the Professors

ABEL-SMITH, Brian and TOWNSEND, Peter
1965 The Poor and the Poorest
London: G. Bell and Son

ADVISORY COMMISSION ON INTERGOVERNMENTAL RELATIONS
1966 Intergovernmental Relations in the Poverty Program
1967 Fiscal Balance in the American Federal System

ARNSTEIN, Sherry
1969 'A Ladder of Citizen Participation'
Journal of the American Institute of Planners, July 1969

ATKINSON, A.B.
1975 The Economics of Inequality
London: Oxford University Press

BACHARACH, Peter and BARATZ, Morton S.
1970 Power and Poverty
New York: Oxford University Press

BARNES, Jack
1975 Educational Priority Vol. 3: Curriculum Innovation
in London's E.P.A.s
London: H.M.S.O.

BENN, Tony
1980 The Case for a Constitutional Civil Service
Institute for Workers Control

BERNSTEIN, Basil
1970 'Education Cannot Compensate for Society'
in David Rubinstein and Colin Stoneman (eds),
Education for Democracy
Harmondsworth: Penguin Books

BIRD, D.L.
1972 'Remarks to Conference', at Conference on the
Urban Programme, 25/11/72
Liverpool: Liverpool Council of Social Service

BLUMENTHAL, Richard
1967 Community Action: The Origins of a Government Program
Massachusetts, U.S.A.
BCSTON, City of
1979 Improving Boston's Neighborhoods: A Guide to the Housing and Community Development Act
Unpublished: City of Boston, Mayor's Office

BRIDGES, Lee
Race and Class xvi (4)

BROOKINGS INSTITUTION

CABINET OFFICE
1968a 'Minutes of the First Meeting of the Official Cabinet Committee on Social Services, Sub-committee on Community Development Area Projects, 10/9/68'
Unpublished: Confidential Source

1968b 'Minutes of the Official Cabinet Committee on Social Services, Sub-committee on Community Development Area Projects, 15/10/68'
Unpublished: Confidential Source

CAPLAN, Nathan et al.
1975 The Use of Social Science Knowledge in Policy Decisions at the National Level
University of Michigan: Center for Research on the Utilization of Scientific Knowledge, Institute of Social Research

CARRIER, John and KENDALL, Ian
1973 'Social Policy and Social Change'
Journal of Social Policy 2(3)

1977 'The Development of Welfare States: the production of plausible accounts'
Journal of Social Policy 6(3)

CENTRAL ADVISORY COUNCIL FOR EDUCATION (ENGLAND)
1963 Half Our Future (Newsom)
London: H.M.S.O.

1967 Children and Their Primary Schools (Flowden)
London: H.M.S.O.

CENTRAL STATISTICAL OFFICE
1979 Annual Abstract of Statistics
London: H.M.S.O.
CLOWARD, Richard and OHLIN, Lloyd
1960 Delinquency and Opportunity
New York: Free Press

COCKBURN, Cynthia
1977 The Local State
London: Pluto Press

COMMUNITY DEVELOPMENT PROJECTS
1976 Profits against Houses
London: Home Office

CONGRESSIONAL QUARTERLY
1960 Guide to the Election Results

1966a 'Problems follow rapid expansion of 'War on Poverty'
21/1/66

1966b 'Antipoverty Amendments' 27/5/66

1966c 'Antipoverty Bill' 10/6/66

1967 'CQ Fact Sheet on Model City Grants' 1/12/67

1970 Congressional Quarterly, 28/8/70

CONRAD, Joseph
1973 Heart of Darkness
Harmondsworth: Penguin Books

COUNCIL OF ECONOMIC ADVISERS
1963 'Poverty Program' Memo to T. Sorensen, White House
20/12/63
John F. Kennedy Archives, Boston: Heller Papers

1964a Annual Report of the Council of Economic Advisers,
Transmitted to Congress, January 1964

1964b 'The Problem of Poverty in America', reprinted from
Annual Report of the Council of Economic Advisers
1964 in Burton A. Weisbrod (ed), The Economics of
Poverty (1965)

CROSLAND, C.A.R.
1962 The Conservative Enemy
London: Jonathan Cape
CROSSMAN, Richard
1969 'Letter to the Town Clerk of Coventry, 7/2/69, from
the Secretary of State for Social Services
Unpublished: Confidential Source

1976 The Diaries of a Cabinet Minister
London: Hamish Hamilton and Jonathan Cape

DAHL, Robert
1961 Who Governs?
New Haven: Yale University Press

DANGERFIELD, George
1966 The Strange Death of Liberal England
London: MacGibbon and Kee

DAVIS, Karen
1977 'A Decade of Policy Developments in Providing Health
Care for Low-income Families' in Robert Haveman (ed),
A Decade of Federal Antipoverty Programs
New York: Academic Press

de BRUNHOFF, Suzanne
1978 The State, Capital and Economic Policy
London: Pluto Press

DEMUTH, Clare
1977 Government Initiatives on Urban Deprivation
London: Runnymede Trust

DODDS, D.H.
1975 'The Origins of the EPA at Denaby', a study presented
as part of the M.A. (Education) Degree at the University
of Leeds
Unpublished: Leeds University

DONOVAN, John C.
1967 The Politics of Poverty
New York: Pegasus

DOWNS, Anthony
1957 An Economic Theory of Democracy
New York: Harper and Row

ECKSTEIN, H.
1960 Pressure Group Politics: The case of the BMA
London: George Allen and Unwin

EDELMAN, Murray
1977 The Symbolic Uses of Politics
Urbana: University of Illinois Press
EDWARDS, John and BATLEY, Richard
1978 The Politics of Positive Discrimination
London: Tavistock Publications

ENVIRONMENT, Department of
1974 Proposals for Area Management, Liverpool Inner Area Study (IAS/LI/3)
Liverpool: Liverpool Inner Area Study

1976a 'Tackling the Problems of Inner City Areas'
Press Notice 582 (23/5/76)
London: Department of the Environment

1976b Speech by Peter Shore M.P., Secretary of State for the Environment at Manchester Town Hall
Press Notice 835 (17/9/76)
London: Department of the Environment

1977a 'Change or Decay', Final Report of the Liverpool Inner Area Study
London: H.M.S.O.

1977b 'Unequal City', Final Report of the Birmingham Inner Area Study
London: H.M.S.O.

London: H.M.S.O.

1977d Policy for the Inner Cities (Cmnd 6845)
London: H.M.S.O.

1977e Inner Urban Areas Bill
London: H.M.S.O.

1977f Speech by Peter Shore M.P., Secretary of State for the Environment, to the Save Our Cities Conference, Bristol
Press Notice 63 (9/2/77)
London: Department of the Environment

1977g 'Urban Aid for Inner City Partnerships for 1978/79 Announced'
Press Notice 654 (1/12/77)
London: Department of the Environment

FARKAS, Suzanne
1971 Urban Lobbying: Mayors in the Federal Arena
New York: New York University Press
FRIEDEN, Bernard and KAPLAN, Marshall
1977 The Politics of Neglect
Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press

FRIEDLAND, Roger C.
1977 Class Power and the Central City: The Contradictions of Urban Growth
University of Wisconsin, Madison: Unpublished PhD

FRIEDLAND, Roger C., PIVEN, Frances Fox and ALFORD, Robert
1977 'Political conflict, Urban structure and the fiscal crisis'
International Journal of Urban and Regional Research 1(3)

GERTH, H.H. and C. WRIGHT MILLS (eds)
1974 From Max Weber: Essays in Sociology
London: Routledge and Kegan Paul

GINSBERG, Norman
1979 Class, Capital and Social Policy
London: Macmillan

Gough, Ian
1979 The Political Economy of the Welfare State
London: Macmillan

GROSS, Bertram M. and MARIEN, Michael
1968 'The President's Questions - And Some Answers' in Bertram Gross (ed), A Great Society?
New York: Basic Books

HAAR, Charles
1975 Between the Idea and the Reality: A Study in the Origin, Fate and Legacy of the Model Cities Program
Boston: Little, Brown and Co.

HABERMAS, Jurgen
1971 Toward a Rational Society
London: Heinemann Educational Books
1976 Legitimation Crisis
London: Heinemann Educational Books

HACKETT, David
1963 'Memo to William Capron, Council of Economic Advisers, (5/12/63)'
J.F.Kennedy Library, Boston, Mass: Heller Papers

HALL, Phoebe, LANE, Hilary, PARKER, Roy and WEBB, Adrian
1975 Change, Choice and Conflict in Social Policy
London: Heinemann

GLENNERSTER, H.
1975 Social Service Budgets and Social Policy
London: George Allen & Unwin Ltd.
HALL, Pheobe
1976 Reforming the Welfare
London: Heinemann Educational Books

HALSEY, A.H.
1972 Educational Priority Vol 1: EPA Problems and Policies
London: H.M.S.O.

1974 'Government against poverty in school and community'
in Dorothy Wedderburn (ed), Poverty, Inequality
and Class Structure
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press

HALSEY, A.H. and YOUNG, Michael
1967 'Letter to Patrick Gordon-Walker, 29/12/67'
Unpublished: Confidential Source

1968 'Letter to Shirley Williams, 17/1/68'
Unpublished: Confidential Source

HAM, Chris
1980 'Approaches to the study of social policy making'
Policy and Politics 8(1)

HAMBLETON, Robin
1978 Policy Planning and Local Government
London: Hutchinson

HANSARD
1967a Lord Newton
House of Lords 14/3/67

1967b Lord Plowden
House of Lords 14/3/67

1967c Lord Eccles
House of Lords 14/3/67

1967d Lord Ritchie-Calder
House of Lords 14/3/67

1967e Charles Morrison M.P.
House of Commons 16/3/67

1968a James Callaghan M.P.
House of Commons 22/7/68

1968b Quintin Hogg M.P.
House of Commons 22/7/68

1972a Peter Walker M.P.
House of Commons 23/3/72
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Person</th>
<th>Position</th>
<th>Date</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1973a</td>
<td>David Lane</td>
<td>House of Commons</td>
<td>5/3/73</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1973b</td>
<td>Edward Heath</td>
<td>House of Commons</td>
<td>17/7/73</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1974a</td>
<td>Alex Lyon</td>
<td>House of Commons</td>
<td>15/5/74</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1974b</td>
<td>Roy Jenkins</td>
<td>House of Commons</td>
<td>18/7/74</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1977a</td>
<td>James Callaghan</td>
<td>House of Commons</td>
<td>6/4/77</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1977b</td>
<td>Peter Shore</td>
<td>House of Commons</td>
<td>6/4/77</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

HARRINGTON, Michael
1963   The Other America
       Baltimore: Penguin Books

HECLO, Hugh
1974   Modern Social Policies in Britain and Sweden
       London: Yale University Press

HELLER, Walter
1963a  'Memo to John F. Kennedy, 1/5/63'
       John F. Kennedy Library, Boston: Heller Papers
1963b  'Memo to John F. Kennedy, 8/6/63'
       John F. Kennedy Library, Boston: Heller Papers
1963c  'Notes on a meeting with John F. Kennedy, 21/10/63'
       John F. Kennedy Library, Boston: Heller Papers
1963d  'Notes on a meeting with John F. Kennedy, 19/11/63'
       John F. Kennedy Library, Boston: Heller Papers
1963e  'Notes on a meeting with Lyndon B. Johnson, 24/11/63'
       John F. Kennedy Library, Boston: Heller Papers
1963f  'Memo to T. Sorensen, White House, 20/12/63'
       John F. Kennedy Library, Boston: Heller Papers
1964   'Memo to Lyndon B. Johnson, 17/7/64'
       John F. Kennedy Library, Boston: Heller Papers
1966   New Dimensions of Political Economy
       Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press

HIGGINS, Joan
1978   The Poverty Business, Britain and America
       Oxford: Basil Blackwell
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Reference</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1977</td>
<td>HOLLOWAY, John and PICCIOTTO, Sol</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>'Capital, Crisis and the State'</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Capital and Class 2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1975</td>
<td>HOLTERMANN, S.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1968a</td>
<td>HOME OFFICE</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>'Minutes of the First Meeting of the Interdepartmental Working Party on Community Development Areas, 17/1/68'</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Unpublished: Confidential Source</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1968b</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>'Minutes of the Third Meeting of the Interdepartmental Working Party on Community Development Areas, 2/4/68'</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Unpublished: Confidential Source</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1968c</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>'Community Development: An Experiment in Social Growth', Report of the Interdepartmental Working Party on Community Development Areas, 21/5/68</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Unpublished: Confidential Source</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1968d</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Urban Programme Circular No 1, October 4th</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>London: Home Office</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1968e</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>CDP Draft Information Paper, 15/10/68</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Unpublished: Confidential Source</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1968f</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>'Memo to the Official Cabinet Sub-committee on Community Development Areas Project, 15/10/68'</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Unpublished: Confidential Source</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1968g</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Community Development Areas, Note by Joan Cooper, 28/10/68</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Unpublished: Confidential Source</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1969a</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>'Experiments in Social Policy and Their Evaluation' Report of an Anglo-American Conference held at Ditchley Park, Oxfordshire, 29-31 October</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Unpublished: Confidential Source</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1969b</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>'Community Development Project - A Major Experiment in Improving the Social Services for the Most in Need', Press Release 16/7/69</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>London: Home Office</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1970a</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Urban Programme Circular No 3, April 20th</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>London: Home Office</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
1970b 'Collaboration with the US Department of Housing and Urban Development', Internal memo from J. Banks to G. Otton, 21/7/70 Unpublished: Confidential Source


1975 'CPs', Note by the Home Office, Urban Deprivation Unit for discussion with senior officers of the Local Authorities in England who have expressed an interest, 4/9/75 Unpublished: Confidential Source

HOUSING AND URBAN DEVELOPMENT, Department of

1972a 'Citizen Participation in the Model Cities Program' Community Development Evaluation Series No 2 Washington D.C.: Department of Housing and Urban Development

1972b 'Planned Variations: First Year Survey' Community Development Evaluation Series No 7 Washington D.C.: Department of Housing and Urban Development

1972c 'Coordinating Federal Assistance in the Community' Community Development Evaluation Series No 8 Washington D.C.: Department of Housing and Urban Development

HUMPHREY, Hubert

JOHNSON, Lyndon B.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Title</th>
<th>Location</th>
<th>Publisher</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1964d</td>
<td>'Letter to Sargent Shriver on his Appointment to direct the Program to Eliminate Poverty, 12/2/64'</td>
<td>Public Papers of the President, 1964</td>
<td>Washington D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1964g</td>
<td>'Answer to a Question from a Member of the International Labor Press Association, 27/4/64'</td>
<td>Public Papers of the President, 1964</td>
<td>Washington D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


1971 The Vantage Point New York: Holt, Rhinehart and Winston

KAUFMAN, Herbert
1958 'The Next Step in Case Studies' Public Administration Review Vol xviii

KENNEDY, John F.

KENNEDY, Robert F.

LEE, Douglass B. and DYCKMAN, John W.

LEIBY, James

LEVIN, Henry M.

LEVINE, Robert A.

LEVITAN, Sar A.

LEES, Ray and SMITH, George
LINDBLOM, Charles
1959 'The Science of Muddling Through'
Public Administration Review, Spring

LOCAL GOVERNMENT GRANTS (Social Need) BILL
1968 London: H.M.S.O.

LONDON EDINBURGH WEEKEND RETURN GROUP
1980 In and Against the State
London: Pluto Press

LUKES, Steven
1974 Power: a radical view
London: Macmillan

LYNN, Laurence E.
1977 'A Decade of Policy Developments in the Income-Maintenance System', in Robert H. Haveman (ed),
A Decade of Federal Antipoverty Programs
New York: Academic Press

LYONS, Gene M.
1969 The Uneasy Partnership: Social Sciences and the
Federal Government in the Twentieth Century
New York: Russell Sage Foundation

MANDEL, Ernest
1978 The Second Slump
London: NLB

MARCUSE, Herbert
1972 One-dimensional Man
London: Sphere Books

MARRIS, Peter and REIN, Martin
1972 Dilemmas of Social Reform
Harmondsworth: Penguin Books

MASON, Tim et al.
1977 Tackling Urban Deprivation: The Contribution of
Area Based Management
Birmingham: INLOGOV, University of Birmingham

MAYO, Marjorie
1975 'The History and Early Development of CDP', in
Ray Lees and George Smith (eds), Action-Research
in Community Development
London: Routledge and Kegan Paul

MILIBAND, Ralph
1972 'Reply to Nicos Poulantzas', in Robin Blackburn (ed),
Ideology in Social Science
Glasgow: Fontana/Collins
MILNER-HOLLAND REPORT
1965 Report of the Committee on Housing in Greater
London, Cmd 2605
London: H.M.S.O.

MISHRA, R.
1977 Society and Social Policy
London: Macmillan

MORRELL, Derek
1967 'Acceptance, communication and cooperation'
Unpublished: Confidential Source

1968a 'Letter to Michael Young, 17/1/68'
Unpublished: Confidential Source

1968b 'Letter to the Chairman of the Sub-committee on
Community Development Areas, 13/10/68'
Unpublished: Confidential Source

MORRILL, Richard L. and WOHLENBERG, Ernest H.
1971 The Geography of Poverty in the United States

MORRISON, Charles M. (ed)
1974 Educational Priority Vol 5: EPA - A Scottish Study
Edinburgh: H.M.S.O.

MOYNIHAN, Daniel P.
1966 'What is 'Community Action'?'
The Public Interest, Fall 1966

1970 Maximum Feasible Misunderstanding
New York: Free Press

McCONAGHY, Des
1978 'Setting up Six Towns: An Urban Strategy Gap'
Town Planning Review 49(2)

NATHAN, Richard et al.
1977 Block Grants for Community Development
Washington D.C.: Department of Housing and Urban
Development

NATIONAL ACADEMY OF SCIENCES
1969 The Behavioural and Social Sciences: Outlook and Needs,
Report by the Behavioural and Social Science Survey
Committee of the Committee on Science and Public Policy,
National Academy of Sciences, The Committee on Problems
and Policy, Social Science Research Council
New Jersey: Prentice-Hall
NIXON, Richard M.
1969a 'Special Message to Congress on the Nation's Antipoverty Programs, 19/2/69'
Public Papers of the President, 1969

1969b 'Statement on Establishing Common Regional Boundaries for Agencies Providing Social and Economic Services, 27/3/69'
Public Papers of the President, 1969

1969c 'Address to the Nation on Domestic Programs, 8/8/69'
Public Papers of the President, 1969

1971 'Special Message to the Congress on Special Revenue Sharing for Urban Community Development, 5/3/71'
Public Papers of the President, 1971

O'CONNOR, James
1973 The Fiscal Crisis of the State
New York: St Martin's Press

OFFE, Claus
1975 'The Theory of the Capitalist State and the Problem of Policy Formation', in L.N. Lindberg et al. (eds), Stress and Contradiction in Modern Capitalism

OFFICE OF ECONOMIC OPPORTUNITY
1965 Community Action Program Guide Vol 1: Instructions for Applicants

Washington D.C.: Office of Economic Opportunity


1968 Applying for a CAP Grant
Washington D.C.: Office of Economic Opportunity

OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF STATE FOR THE SOCIAL SERVICES
1968 'Letter to the Chairman of the County Councils' Association'
Unpublished: Confidential Source
OFFICE OF THE VICE-PRESIDENT
1967 The Vice-President's Handbook for Local Officials
Washington D.C.: Office of the Vice-President

OKUN, Arthur M.
1970 The Political Economy of Prosperity

OPIE, Roger
1972 'Economic Planning and Growth', in W. Beckerman,
The Labour Government's Economic Record 1964-70
London: George Duckworth and Co.

PAYNE, Joan
1974 Educational Priority Vol 2: EPA Surveys and Statistics
London: H.M.S.O.

PECHMAN, Joseph A.
1977 Federal Tax Policy

PETERSON, Paul and GREENSTONE, J. David
1977 'Racial Change and Citizen Participation: The
Mobilization of Low-income Communities through
Community Action', in Robert H. Haveman (ed),
A Decade of Federal Antipoverty Programs
New York: Academic Press

PHILLIPS, Kevin B.
1970 The Emerging Republican Majority
Garden City, N.Y.: Anchor Books

PIVEN, Frances Fox and CLOWARD, Richard
1971 Regulating the Poor
New York: Vintage Books

PIVEN, Frances Fox
1974a 'The Great Society as Political Strategy', in
Richard Cloward and Frances Fox Piven, The
Politics of Turmoil
New York: Pantheon Books

1974b 'The Urban Crisis: Who Got What, and Why?', in
Richard Cloward and Frances Fox Piven, The
Politics of Turmoil
New York: Pantheon Books

POULANTZAS, Nicos
1972 'The Problem of the Capitalist State', in Robin
Blackburn (ed), Ideology and Social Science
Glasgow: Fontana/Collins
POWLEDGE, Fred
1970 Model City
New York: Simon and Schuster

RAINWATER, Lee and YANCEY, William L.
1967 The Moynihan Report and The Politics of Controversy
Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press

REIN, Martin and SCHON, Donald
1977 'Problem Setting in Policy Research' in C. Weiss (ed),
Using Social Science Research in Public Policy Making

REUTHER, Walter
1965 'Memo from Walter Reuther to L.B.J., 15/5/65'
Reprinted in Charles Haar, Between the Idea and
the Reality
Boston: Little, Brown and Co.

RICHARDS, Peter G.
1973 The Reformed Local Government System
London: George Allen and Unwin Ltd.

ROBINSON, Reginald et al.
1960 Community Resources in Mental Health: Joint Committee
on Mental Illness and Health, Monograph Series No 5
New York: Basic Books

RODGER'S, Barbara
1977 'Comparative Studies in Social Policy and Administration',
in H. Heisler (ed), Foundations of Social Administration
London: Macmillan

ROYAL COMMISSION ON LOCAL GOVERNMENT IN ENGLAND
1969 Redcliffe-Maud Report, Cmnd 4040
London: H.M.S.O.

SCHEFFER, Walter F.
1976 'Intergovernmental Relations and Decentralization',
in W.F. Scheffer (ed), General Revenue Sharing
and Decentralization
Norman: University of Oklahoma Press

SCHON, Donald
1971 Beyond the Stable State
London: Temple Smith

SCHULTZE, Charles L. et al.
1971 Setting National Priorities: The 1972 Budget
SEEBOHM REPORT
1969 Committee on Local Authority and Allied Personal
Social Services, Cmd 3703
London: H.M.S.O.

SHARPE, L.J.
1973a 'American Democracy Reconsidered Part 1'
British Journal of Political Science 3(1)

1973b 'American Democracy Reconsidered Part 2'
British Journal of Political Science 3(2)

SHAW, Martin
1975 Marxism and Social Science
London: Pluto Press

SKEFFINGTON REPORT
1969 People and Planning
London: H.M.S.O.

SMITH, G.A.N. and LITTLE, A.
1971 Strategies of Compensation: A Review of Educational
Projects for the Disadvantaged in the United States
Paris: OECD

SMITH, G.A.N. (ed)
1975 Educational Priority Vol 4: The West Riding Project
London: H.M.S.O.

SUMNER, Colin
1979 Reading Ideologies: an investigation into the
Marxist theory of ideology and law
London: Academic Press

SUNDQUIST, James L.
1969 'Origins of the War on Poverty', in James L. Sundquist
(ed), On Fighting Poverty
New York: Basic Books

TASK FORCE REPORT
1965 Proposed Programs for the Department of Housing and
Urban Development, reprinted in Charles Haar, Between
the Idea and the Reality
Boston: Little, Brown and Co.

TIMES
1968 'Unemployed Child is Danger to Society'
Article by Education Correspondent, 10/5/68
London: Times Newspapers

TIMES EDUCATIONAL SUPPLEMENT
1967 'After Plowden- Down East with the Deprived, 20/1/67'
London: Times Newspapers
TOWNSEND, Peter
1976 The Difficulties of Policies Based on the Concept of Area Deprivation. Barnett Shine Foundation Lecture London: Department of Economics, Queen Mary College, University of London

UNIVERSITY GRANTS COMMITTEE

U.S. BUDGET

U.S. CONGRESS

U.S. DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE, Bureau of the Census

USEEM, Michael

WALLACE, Phyllis A.
WHITE, Lee  
1964  'Memo to Secretaries of Labor, Agriculture, H.E.W., Commerce, Interior, the Attorney General and the Administrator of HHPA, 21/1/64'  
John F. Kennedy Library, Boston: Heller Papers

WILSON, Harold  
1971  The Labour Government 1964-70  
London: Weidenfield and Nicholson

1970  'Reply to a toast by President Nixon, 27/1/70'  
Public Papers of the President, 1970  

WILSON, James Q.  
1978  Social Science and Public Policy: A personal note in Lynn (ed), Knowledge and Policy: the uncertain connection, Vol 5, National Research Council, Study Project on Social Research and Development  
Washington D.C.: National Academy of Sciences

WIRZ, W.  
1964  'Memo to T. Sorensen, 23/1/64'  
John F. Kennedy Library, Boston: Heller Papers

WOFFORD, John G.  
New York: Basic Books

WOLANIN, Thomas R.  
1975  Presidential Advisory Commissions  
Madison: University of Wisconsin Press

WOOD, Robert  
1967  'New Role in Urban Research', Address to the Association of Urban Universities, Detroit, Michigan, 6/11/67  
Washington D.C.: Department of Housing and Urban Development

Washington D.C.: Department of Housing and Urban Development

YARMOLINSKY, Adam  
1969  'The Beginnings of OEO' in James L. Sundquist (ed), On Fighting Poverty  
New York: Basic Books
YOUNG, Michael
London: Times Newspapers

1970 'Letter to A.H. Halsey, 20/10/70'
Unpublished: Confidential Source