"THE DOCTRINE OF MAN IN THE WORKS OF ORIGEN"

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The writer's interest in the Ecumenical Movement has provided him during recent years with opportunities in both an official and a private capacity to visit many countries in Europe and there have contact with scholars in Universities and other places of learning. From among the numerous friends who have assisted him in the present investigation in larger or smaller degrees, he desires particularly to express thanks to the following.

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The writer is gratified to note that the above represent all the major Communions of the Church and thereby signify something of the 'ecumenical' possibilities centring around Patristic studies.
## CONTENTS OF CHAPTERS

### CHAPTER ONE - "The Works of Origen"

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Classification</th>
<th>1</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Textual Criticism</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Scriptural Exegesis</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Systematic Theology</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Apologetics</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Correspondence</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Miscellaneous Writings</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>List of Extant Writings classified in Greek and Latin</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### CHAPTER TWO - "Man and the Cosmos"

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>The foundation in God</th>
<th>9</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>The 'Divine Realm' inside the Holy Trinity</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The 'Primal' or 'Transcendental' Creation</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The 'Fall' and the appearance of the lower 'visible' Creation</td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The first stage resulting in Soul</td>
<td>16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The second stage resulting in Body</td>
<td>16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The succession of worlds</td>
<td>17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The restoration of the Cosmos</td>
<td>18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The incarnation of the Logos</td>
<td>19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Resurrection of Man conceived as a 'stage' in salvation</td>
<td>21</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The 'consummation' as incorporeal existence</td>
<td>22</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The 'salvation of the Devil'</td>
<td>22</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The final state - 'God all in all'</td>
<td>23</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Criticism of Origen's cosmology</td>
<td>24</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sources whence it is derived</td>
<td>24</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Biblical contribution</td>
<td>26</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Summary of Man's relation to the cosmological setting</td>
<td>27</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### CHAPTER THREE - "The Essence of Man"

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>The preexistence of minds</th>
<th>30</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Two meanings of the word 'Man'</td>
<td>33</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Appendix &quot;A&quot; on &quot;The Essence of Man&quot;</td>
<td>34</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Opinions of Huet, Redepenning, Denis, De Faye, Niebuhr, Koch, Karpp.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Appendix &quot;B&quot; on &quot;The Image and Likeness of God&quot;</td>
<td>36</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Christ alone 'the true Image'</td>
<td>36</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>How Origen thinks men are made 'according to the Image'</td>
<td>37</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Limitation of the Image of God</td>
<td>38</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Its distinctive marks in human nature</td>
<td>38</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Distinction between Image and Likeness</td>
<td>39</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Loss and restoration of the Image</td>
<td>40</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Origen's teaching more Platonist than Biblical?</td>
<td>42</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

---

{natexlab:1}
CHAPTER FOUR - "The Fall and Sin"

The premundane Fall .......................................................... 43
The nature of evil .................................................................... 44
Consequences of the Fall ......................................................... 44
Meaning of the higher and the lower cosmos .......................... 45
The lower cosmos the result of Sin ......................................... 47
Origen has two doctrines of the Fall and Original Sin .......... 48
The 'Alexandrian' or 'pre-natal' Fall Theory ............................ 49
The 'Caesarian' or 'birth-pollution' Theory .............................. 49
The place accorded to Adam ................................................... 51
Is a synthesis of the two theories possible? ............................ 54

CHAPTER FIVE - "The Freedom of the Will"

The important place Origen accords to freedom .................... 58
Redepenning's criticism ......................................................... 60
Huet's estimate of Origen's doctrine ....................................... 61
Freedom and Providence ......................................................... 62
Criticisms and Providence by Bigg and Denis ....................... 63

CHAPTER SIX - "The Soul"

Difficulty of the question ....................................................... 66
The Soul a result of the Fall .................................................. 67
The 'rational' and 'vitalistic' dichotomy ................................. 68
Views of Huet, Denis and De Faye ......................................... 71
Redepenning ..................................................................... 72
Verbeke and Karpp ................................................................. 73
The Soul as 'intermediate element' ....................................... 74
Origen's 'solutions' of the problem ....................................... 77

CHAPTER SEVEN - "The Body"

Part One on the Natural Body
The Biblical doctrine of the Body ......................................... 79
Origen's views on 'matter' ..................................................... 80
The two 'universal natures' of spirit and matter .................... 81
The body conceived 'negatively' .......................................... 82
The body conceived 'positively' ........................................... 84

Part Two on the Spiritual Body and the Resurrection
Origen's doctrine of the spiritual body is Biblical ............... 88
Is the Resurrection 'final'? .................................................. 91
The element of compromise and indecision ......................... 93
An intriguing question. What is the shape of the Resurrection body? ......................................................... 93

Appendix "A" on Reincarnation
Did Origen teach the Pythagorean form of the doctrine? .... 96
Did he teach the Platonic form of the doctrine? .................... 97
Views of noted Origenist scholars on these points .......... 101
Summing up .... the large element of uncertainty here .. 104

Appendix "B" on 'Spherical Bodies' ......................................... 105
CHAPTER EIGHT - "The Human Nature of Christ"

Origen first to use the phrase 'The God-Man' .................................. 106
His insistence on the 'historicity' of Christ .................................... 106
The 'Two natures' of the Incarnate Lord ....................................... 107
The Eternal 'Logos' ........................................................................ 107
The 'human' Soul of Jesus .............................................................. 108
Purpose of the Incarnation ............................................................... 109
The two unions involved in Christ .................................................. 110
Christ is both 'true' and 'actual' Man ........................................... 111
The sinlessness of His human nature .............................................. 112
Christ's human nature in the Passion and Resurrection ............... 115
The human nature of Christ 'beyond the Resurrection' .................. 117
Contradictory elements .................................................................. 118

CHAPTER NINE - "Summary and Conclusion"

I. What does a 'total' view imply? .................................................. 119
   Its bare outline ........................................................................... 120
   How Origen 'explains' the Christian doctrine of Man ................. 121
   Questions raised by Origen's 'total' view .................................. 123
   The achievement of the Alexandrian Fathers ............................. 124
   Origen's anthropology reflects the 'schism' of his age ............... 127
   Professor C.G.Jung on the character of Origen .......................... 128
   Consideration of the 'incoherences' in the doctrine ................... 132
   Bishop Westcott's summing up .................................................. 137

II. Origen's revelation of the 'contradiction in Man' ....................... 139
    Character of those who have denounced Origen's views ............. 141
    Appreciative estimates of his achievement ............................... 142

III. Is Origen's anthropology a 'museum-piece'? ............................ 143
    Where his ideas help us today ................................................. 145
    The fundamental dilemma and .............................................. 148
    The Origenist solution ......................................................... 148
Père Daniélou, in his recent book (1) sums up his own attempt
to present Origen and his teaching in all its rich diversity. "Au
cours de notre voyage, Origène nous est apparu successivement comme
un chrétien militant, comme un exégète savant, comme un génie
philosophique, comme un grand spirituel". Daniélou feels very strongly
that in the recent past Origen has been the subject of acute studies
of individual aspects of his greatness, but never of his true wholeness.
This tendency to put Origen into fixed categories (2) arises out of
the extraordinarily diverse capacities of Origen himself. "Ces diverses
aspects que les études de ces dernières années ont successivement mis
en valeur, il restait à en composer un visage, à faire surgir l'homme
qui avait rassemblé en lui tant de dons, et c'est cela que nous avons
essayé de faire, en nous refusant à simplifier une personnalité dont la
diversité est la caractére marquant".(3) Anyone, who has come to know
Origen well, must heartily agree with Père Daniélou's timely words and
be grateful for what may lay a permanent foundation for all future
approach to Origenist studies.

These thoughts serve as a useful reminder in undertaking to
examine Origen's doctrine of Man. We shall do well to heed Père
Daniélou's emphasis upon Origen's diversity. We shall see Origen's
doctrine of Man capable of being systematised with scintillating
clearness against the background of his cosmological philosophy. At
another instant, its outline will be blurred and without sharp edges
as we detect its shape looming through the massive folios of his
lengthy Commentaries. But while we value the clarity with which we can
detect his evident Platonism in the former, we shall no less treasure
the conviction which accompanies his equally evident Biblical Theology
in the latter...... and we shall know that both are Origen.

A doctrine of Man is not an easy magnitude to grapple with.
In one of his penetratingly sincere books (4) Martin Buber has expressed
all that sense of inadequacy and misgiving with which any student must
needs approach the problem. In an interesting way his thoughts link
up indirectly with what Père Daniélou has expressed above with regard
to the importance of grasping Origen's thought in its integrity. Buber
writes, "From time immemorial man has known that he is the subject most
deserving of his own study, but he has also fought shy of treating this
subject as a whole, that is, in accordance with its total character.
Sometimes he takes a run at it, but the difficulty of this concern with
his own being soon overpowers and exhausts him, and in silent resignation
he withdraws - either to consider all things in heaven and earth save
man, or to divide man into departments which can be treated singly, in
a less problematic way, less powerful and less binding way".(5)

(1) - "Origène" Paris 1948 p. 303
(2) - e.g. The work of Eugène de Faye or Hal Koch which 'explain' his
theology on the lines of its being a kind of systematised
Platonism, or the studies of Völker, which bring Origen out as
being preeminently a great mystic.
(3) - Daniélou. op.cit. p. 304
(4) - "Between Man and Man" London 1947
(5) - Buber. op. cit. p. 118
We should like to quote more fully from Buber's book, especially from the fifth and last section, which has all his characteristic thought provoking quality and is indispensable to every student who would seek a current prolegomena to the eternal question, What is Man? - but time and space forbid. We shall turn instead to a voice from the Christian East. As we hear it speak about this very topic of Greek Patristic studies, we shall detect the same call for an integrated approach. Father Danieŭlou spoke as a Roman Catholic, fortified by that profound sense of abiding wholeness which is inherent in that Church. Father George Florovsky knows that same background of 'Sobornost' in his Orthodox background, but in addition he has deep experience of growing integration among Christian thinkers of differing ecclesiastical traditions obtained in recent years through their participation in the Ecumenical Movement. He writes,(1) "Still in our own days the Greek Fathers are strangers and foreigners for the average Western theologian. It is completely forgotten that they were, and are to be, Doctors and Fathers of the Church Catholic and Universal and not just the teachers of the East. It is but true to say that we are living now in an age of Patristic revival. Greek Fathers are recognised once more as competent and safe theological guides in many quarters of the Christian West. And there is, in this rediscovery of the Fathers, a sure hope for a reintegration of Christian tradition, for a recovery of the true Catholic mind. And yet the success depends very much upon the right approach".

The shape, at least, of that 'right approach' seems to have made itself apparent. What Buber has stated in general regarding the doctrine of Man, what Florovsky has outlined in connection with the study of the Greek Fathers and what Danieŭlou has specified in regard to Origen in particular, is the same. The student must avoid the temptation of a departmental approach. He must seek to understand Origen's doctrine of Man in its totality. Yet, being human, he must recognise that he can never achieve the vision of totality without first humbly traversing the path mapped out by 'departmentalist' approaches. Accordingly, this thesis will be planned in the form of chapters, which successively explore 'Man' as Origen displays him, in a limited, sectional and 'departmental' manner. The concluding chapter will present the synthesis of these parts in order to lay bare, if it be at all possible, the 'total' view of Man which Origen portrays.

Let us then embark upon our voyage of discovery. Our first task will be to chart the sea upon which we must sail. To see clearly what are the materials at our disposal must first of all claim our attention.

(1) - "Address at the formal opening of St Vladimir's Theological Seminary and Academy" by Dr George Florovsky. New York. 1948.
"The Works of Origen"

The main facts of Origen's life need not detain us long. They have been frequently rehearsed. (1) He was born about the year 184, of Egyptian parentage and was reared in Alexandria, where he became Head of the famous Catechetical School. In the year 232 he moved to Caesarea, where he continued his life-work of teaching and preaching, frequently travelling considerable distances. He died, probably at Caesarea, in the year 253, after suffering great torture, some short time previously, as a confessor.

Origen was one of the most prolific writers of the ancient world. "Who among us could read all that he has written?" asked Jerome. (2) But time has reduced that vast output considerably. After his death, his friend Pamphilus the martyr collected together all the manuscripts upon which he could lay his hands and retained them in the great Library at Caesarea, where they were accessible to scholars. (3) Accordingly, when his works were denounced by Justinian in 543 as unorthodox, though few copies had survived in the original Greek, translations into Latin had in many cases been made.

His output may be classified as follows: textual criticism, Scriptural exegesis, systematic theology, apologetics, correspondence and miscellaneous. Not all of these six categories are of equal value for

(1) - c.f. Huet's "Origeniana" I. cc. i - iv which is the most detailed investigation and Aimé Puech's "Histoire de la Littérature Grecque Chrétienne" Vol.II. pp. 357 - 364 which is the most recent summary of the relevant material.

(2) - Ep. LXXXIII.

(3) - Eusebius's "Ecclesiastical History" VI. 32
our present purpose, but it will be useful to take a bird's eye view of their character and contents.

TEXTUAL CRITICISM Origen was a pioneer in the field of Biblical textual criticism. Associated with the great Library of the Museum at Alexandria, where was assembled the richest treasure of classical manuscripts, he trained himself in the critical methods of that circle. The fruit of his labours in this field was the Hexapla or parallel column Bible, giving the text successively in Hebrew, Greek and in subsequent translations of note. By means of an elaborate apparatus, Origen indicated which alterations in the text he favoured. This priceless work existed in the Library at Caesarea until the city was destroyed by the Saracens in 638.

SCRIPTURAL EXEGESIS Origen was not the first writer of a Scriptural Commentary, but he was the first to produce a Commentary on the whole Bible. What remains of this constitutes the bulk of his extant writings. To the category of exegesis also belong his Homilies or straightforward sermons addressed to ordinary congregations and his Scholia, which were marginal additions or 'unattached' comments on special verses or topics, which he probably stored for reference. His Commentaries are exceedingly large books, often deficient in sequence and logical structure. His fertile imagination produces a rich crop of speculation and brilliant Scriptural insight. It is in his Commentaries that he develops his remarkable allegorisation. For our present purpose these will prove invaluable for the way in which they cast indirect light upon his doctrine of Man, particularly as describing his conception of the nature of Christ. In his Homilies, he is more personal and frank. They are delightful to read and behind the zeal of this master exponent of Holy Scripture, we see the inward questionings and reverent, if bold, speculations of
a very sincere and lovable human being. They provide much valuable material for investigating his doctrine of Man. Most exist in Latin translations.

SYSTEMATIC THEOLOGY Origen is known to have composed three works of dogmatic theology (1) the only one extant being the "Treatise on First Principles" which, for our purpose, is undoubtedly our chief source for obtaining an insight into his attempt to give a systematised account of the doctrine of Man. It is composed of Four Books. The first deals with the doctrine of God, the angels, the Fall and the final Redemption of the Universe. The second Book treats of the World, Humanity, the Incarnation and the Nature and Destiny of the Soul. The third book is concerned with Freewill and kindred topics, while the fourth concludes with an exhaustive examination of the problems raised by the Divine inspiration of Scripture.

APOLOGETICS In this department Origen wrote one 'magnum opus', his famous reply to an attack upon the Christian Religion by a heathen philosopher Celsus. It consists of eight books, which are interesting, but make rather difficult reading owing to the diffuse style employed and Origen's failure at times to see the drift of his opponent's argument. Expressed briefly, the value of this book to us lies in the revealing way Origen discloses that two doctrines of Man, the classical and the Biblical, are fused together in his thought. (2)

CORRESPONDENCE Origen, like most of the Fathers, wrote many letters. Correspondence was one of the ways in which minds cross fertilised one another and stimulated growth. We can only regret

(1) - The two lost Treatises were "On the Resurrection" and "The Miscellanies" of which only very small fragments remain.

(2) - Aimé Puech in "Hist. de la Litt.Grec. Chrét." II. 429 says:­ "Il faut lire le 'Contre Celse' pour comprendre avec quelle sincérité Origène sait unir aux plus hautes spéculations métaphysiques la foi au Sauveur, la foi au Verbe éternel qui est aussi Jésus crucifié".
that only some small fragments and two authentic letters are extant - that to Julius Africanus discussing the 'History of Susanna' and that to Gregory Thaumaturgos, dealing with the relation between Christianity and Hellenic philosophy. Origen exhorts that the 'mind of the Scriptures' should dominate.

VARIOUS MISCELLANIES Under this head we may mention two works, the "Exhortation to Martyrdom", written in connection with Maximin's persecution in 235, and the "Treatise on Prayer" composed about 234. The former reveals the ardent religious spirit of Origen, but does not contribute much that is of philosophic value to our purpose. The latter is well constructed, beginning with a discussion on prayer in general, proceeds to examine what the Bible has to say about prayer, contains a remarkable exposition of the Lord's Prayer, and ends by rising into the category of a treatise on mystical theology. It is this latter section which has something to contribute to the idea of the doctrine of Man.

Such, in brief, is the material at our disposal. It represents only part, perhaps only a small part, of all that Origen wrote. This reminds us that we can never hope to penetrate completely and adequately into his mind. It is most unlikely that any new material from the lost originals will be discovered. (1) But what we have is sufficient, and more than sufficient, to obtain an illuminating insight into the thought of one, who to some of his admiring contemporaries seemed endowed with powers well nigh divine. (2)

(1) - In 1941 however, a quantity of papyrus leaves were found by the British Army Authorities while using some old quarries near the modern village of Toura in Egypt. Some of these relate to Origen and contain small fragments of the original Greek of the Commentary on the Contra Celsus and part of an unknown work. The opinion expressed is "cet opuscule...ne nous parait pas apporter de nouveauté appreciable sur la doctrine d'Origène" O. Guérin in 'Note préliminaire sur les papyrus d'Origène' in Revue de l'Hist. des Relig. Tome CXXXI. 1946. p.93

(2) - "Panegyric addressed to Origen" Gregory Thaumaturgos. C.II
To make precise and definite what has been said above in a general way, we here append an analysis of all the actual extant writings.

TEXTUAL CRITICISM

"The Hexapla" Many small fragments (1) Greek Hebrew

SCRIPTURAL EXEGESIS

"Genesis" Many scholia Greek
Of Commentary only one Book is Greek
extant out of twelve (2) Latin
All seventeen Homilies

"Exodus" Few scholia Greek
Some fragments of Commentary Latin
All thirteen Homilies

"Leviticus" Few scholia Greek
Minute fragments of Commentary Latin
All sixteen Homilies

"Numbers" Few scholia Greek
Nothing survives of Commentary Latin
All twenty-eight Homilies

"Deuteronomy" Few scholia Greek
Nothing known of Commentary Latin
None of the thirteen Homilies exist

"Joshua" Few scholia Greek
Nothing known of Commentary Latin
Twenty-six Homilies survive

"Judges" Very few scholia Greek
No mention of Commentary Latin
All nine Homilies

"Ruth" One scholium Greek

"I Samuel" (i.e. I Kings) Few scholia Greek
No mention of Commentary Latin
Homily One extant in translation
Homily Two extant in original

(1) - These fragments have been accumulated over four centuries. The collection was begun by Petrus Morinus in 1587, continued by Montfaucon in 1713, added to by Field in 1875 and Taylor in 1900. The writer has examined the copy of the Hexapla in the excellent Patristic Library of the Theological College of the Scottish Episcopal Church, Edinburgh, where he was formerly Vice Principal.

(2) - Jerome states thirteen.
"2 Samuel" Very few scholia Greek
(i.e. II Kings)

"1 Kings" Two scholia Greek
(i.e. III Kings)

"2 Kings" One Scholium Greek
(i.e. IV Kings)

"1 Chronicles" Nothing extant

"2 Chronicles" Nothing extant

"Ezra" Nothing extant

"Nehemiah" Nothing extant

"Esther" Nothing extant

"Job" Few scholia Greek
No mention of Commentary
(Three Books doubtfully ascribed)
Small fragment of one Homily Latin

"Psalms" Many scholia Greek
Small fragments of Commentary Greek and Latin
Nine Homilies Latin

"Proverbs" Fragments of Commentary Greek

"Ecclesiastes" Nothing extant

"Song of Songs" Some scholia Greek
Introduction and four books of the Commentary Latin
Two Homilies Latin

"Isaiah" No scholia Greek
Two small fragments of Commentary Greek
Nine Homilies Latin

"Jeremiah" Many scholia Greek
No mention of Commentary Greek
Twenty Homilies extant in Latin
Two Homilies extant in translation

"Lamentations" Many scholia Greek

"Ezechiel" Many scholia Greek
Fragments of Commentary Greek
Fourteen Homilies Latin

"Lesser Prophets" Only a fragment of Hosea Commentary Greek Greek
(Entirely lost are the twenty-five Latin
books on the Twelve Minor Prophets)
Many scholia
Eight books out of the original twenty-five are extant in Four Homilies in translation

Nothing extant

No scholia - but fragments of Commentary in Thirty-nine Homilies in translation

Few scholia
This was the largest of all his Commentaries. Only volumes I, II, VI, XIII and parts of XIX, XX, XXVIII and XXXII survive No Homilies

Fragments of Homily Four

Commentary in Ten books
Fragments of Books I and IX

Fragments of Commentary

Fragments of Commentary

Fragments of Commentary

Fragment of Commentary

Fragment of Commentary

Fragment of Commentary

Fragment of Commentary

Fragment of Commentary

Fragment of Commentary

Fragments of Homily (1)

Several scholia

"The Miscellanies" small fragments in translation

"Treatise on the Resurrection" very small fragments remain

"Treatise on First Principles" practically complete in translation (fragments of original preserved in variety of sources investigated by Koetschau in his Edition)

(1) - When books are omitted it means that nothing is known about Origen's exegetical works on them. The authority that he commented on all the Scriptures is Epiphanius in Haeres. 64. c.iii
APologetics

"Against Celsus" Complete in eight books extant Greek

Correspondence

"Letter to Africanus" extant in original Greek

"Letter to Gregory" extant in original Greek

Sundry fragments Greek and Latin

Various

"Exhortation to Martyrdom" extant in original Greek

"Treatise on Prayer" extant in original Greek

"The Conversations of Origen with Heraclides" Fragments extant in Greek (1)

(1) – This is the most recently discovered unknown work of Origen. It came to light in 1941. c.f. "Entretiens d'Origène avec Héraclide" edited from the Toura Papyrus by J. Schérer. Cairo, 1949
CHAPTER TWO

"Man and the Cosmos"

Having assembled our materials, we shall try to understand how Origen pictured Man in relation to the totality of things, to that Cosmos of which he is a part. This task will not be too difficult, because it forms in part the substance of the chief work of Origen, the "First Principles". It will be best if, throughout this section, we allow Origen to speak for himself.

His writings contain the description of a vast and involved cosmology. Its foundation is God "a simple and intellectual existence, admitting in Himself of no addition whatever, so that He cannot be believed to have in Himself a more or a less, but is Unity (ex omne parte μονάς) or, if I may say so, Oneness throughout (ένας) and the Mind or fount from which originates all intellectual existence or mind".(1) This God is the Creator. "This blessed and ruling power... that exercises control over all things, we call the Trinity. This is the good God and kindly Father of all, at once beneficent power and creative power... that does good and creates and providentially sustains".(2) The Cosmos is strictly hierarchical with God at the top. It descends with grades of beings. Origen found the order of the Persons in the Trinity a problem and suggested that even inside the Trinity there was a

(1) - De Prin: I.i.6 Koetschau V. p. 21
(2) - De Prin: I.iv.3 Koetschau V. p. 65 Origen held the orthodox view of the consubstantiality of the Persons. c.f. Hom:iv.1 in Isaiah "Solus Salvator et Spiritus sanctus, qui semper fuerunt cum Deo, vident faciem ejus" also Comm.in Joan: VI.33 Preuschen lv.113-3

"τῆς προσκυνηστῆς τριάδος... ἐστιν η Χαρισμάτων Θείων άρχη καὶ πηγή"
hierarchy of grades (1), the Son being less than (ἐλαττομός) the Father and the Holy Spirit being still lower. (ὑποτελέω) This Holy Trinity is eternally Creator. "It is absurd and impious to suppose that these powers of God have been at any time in abeyance for a single moment...... We can, therefore, imagine no moment whatever, when that power was not engaged in acts of well doing. Whence it follows that there always existed objects for this well doing, namely, God's works or creatures, and that God, in the power of His Providence, was always dispensing His blessings among them by doing them good in accordance with their condition and deserts. It follows plainly from this, that at no time whatever was God not Creator, nor Benefactor, nor Providence". (2) That which God has created eternally, however, is not the visible world which we see in material substance. "Certainly, if 'all things have been made in Wisdom' (Ps.104) then since Wisdom has always existed, there have always existed in Wisdom, by a pre-figuration and preformation, those things which afterwards have received substantial existence. (3) All this constitutes the truly Divine realm. Though it is not immediately connected with our investigation regarding Man in the Cosmos, it is important to notice what Origen has to say about

(1) - De Prin: I.iii.5 Koetschau V. pp. 55 - 56

(2) - De Prin: I.iv.3 Koetschau V. pp. 65 - 66

(3) - De Prin: I.iv.5 Koetschau V. pp. 67 - 68 For a profound 'probing' into this difficult question see St Augustine's "City of God" XII.15
the life and eternally creative activity which abide in the Trinity. Though his Subordinationism of the Son (and Holy Spirit) has been rejected by the Church in later centuries, he spoke at a time when these matters were being tentatively investigated and formulated. Discussing the eternal generation of the Son, he wrote - "We do not say that a part of God's substance was changed into the Son, or that the Son was pro-created by the Father out of no substance at all, from something external from God's own substance, so that there was a time when the Son did not exist; but, setting aside all thought of a material body, we say that the Word and Wisdom was begotten of the invisible and incorporeal God apart from any bodily feeling, like an act of will proceeding from the mind. (1) Now this Son was begotten (ἐγεννηθη) of the Father's will, for He is 'the image of the invisible God' and 'the effulgence of His glory and the impress of His substance', the 'first born of all creation', a thing created (κτίσμα) Wisdom". (2) Similarly, regarding the Holy Spirit, "the Holy Spirit...is first in rank of all who have been created (γεννησένων) by the Father through the Son". (3) In his description of the Divine realm Origen is careful to indicate that this primal creative activity within the Trinity is different in kind from all other creation "The statements which we make about the Father, (1) - The text at this point in Koetschau's GCS Edition changes from the Latin translation of Rufinus to the Greek derived from Justinian's Epistle to Mennas.

(2) - De Prin: IV.iv.1. Koetschau V. p. 349 For the use by Origen of 'γεννητόν' and 'κτίσμα' see the two excellent notes by Butterworth in his translation entitled 'Origen on First Principles' S.P.C.K. 1936 p.3 and p.314. From Jerome's Ep. ad Avitum 2, we know that Origen used 'γεννητόν' (Lat: factum) meaning created, in referring to Christ. Rufinus changed this in his Latin translation to 'natus' meaning begotten (Gr. γεννητόν)

(3) - Comm. in Joan: II.10 Preuschen IV. p. 65
the Son and the Holy Spirit must be understood as transcending all time and all eternity. For it is this Trinity alone which exceeds all comprehension, not only of temporal but even of eternal intelligence" (1)

We shall conclude this section with a quotation, which is actually the continuation of the above passage and serves well to introduce what is the substance and actual fact of the Cosmos as distinct from its Maker. "The rest of the things, however, which are external to the Trinity must be measured by ages and periods of time". (2)

B. The Transcendental Creation

With statements regarding 'the rest of things which are external to the Trinity' Origen leaves the Divine realm and begins to describe the elements of his cosmology in which man occupies a place. That which God creates is 'intelligences' (νοές) or 'rational beings' (σοφίας ἀγγέλις) His motive is overflowing goodness. "Now, when in the beginning, He created what He wished to create, that is rational beings, He had no other reason for creating them, except Himself, that is, His goodness" (3) These beings were all innocent and pure. "Before the ages, minds were all pure". (4) Though they possessed individuality, yet it was so shared and reciprocally enjoyed in society, that their existence was better described as an experience of abiding and eternal unity together in God. (5)

(1) - De Prin: IV.iv.1 Koetschau V. p. 350
(2) - De Prin: IV.iv.1 Koetschau V. p. 350
(3) - De Prin: II.ix.6 Koetschau V. p. 169
(5) - De Prin: II.viii.3 Koetschau V. p. 159
"They all formed a unity (ἐνάς) by reason of their identity in essence, in power and in energy and by their union with and knowledge of God the Word" (1) Though they are created beings, yet they are bodiless and immaterial (ἀσωμάτους καὶ ἄνοιχτος) without number or name (διὰ τὸ θεματικοῦ καὶ ἀνομένου) and are all equal. "As, therefore, He Himself in whom was neither variation, nor change, nor lack of power, was the cause of all that was created, He created all His creatures equal and alike, for the simple reason that there is in Him no cause that could give rise to variety or diversity" (2) Their number is fixed. "It is certain that He made them according to some definite number foreordained by Himself. (3) This world of spirits, external to the Trinity and constituting the true Creation, is not the visible world which we know. That has come into existence through a descent (κατεργασθεὶς), a Fall.

It is this 'transcendent world' of spiritual beings which in Origen's mind constitutes the 'real world' which is the 'substance' of the lower material world which is its 'shadow'. (4) Every 'Man' was created originally in this transcendent sphere and is consequently 'pre-existent' to his own subsequent life on earth. The description of the process whereby the cosmos has introduced into it, all the diversity, all the states of higher and lower which constitute its special feature of hierarchy, ranging from angels, through human beings to devils, brings us face to face with Origen's doctrine of the Fall or descent of these free spirits into souls and bodies.

(1) - De Prin: II.viii.3 Koetschau V. p. 159
(2) - De Prin: II.ix.6 Koetschau V. p. 169 (Quoted from Anathemas of Council of Constantinople 553)
(3) - De Prin: II.ix.1 Koetschau V. p. 164 (This 'limited' number is Origen's real belief)
(4) - We shall discuss later the obvious 'Platonism' of this conception.
C. The Visible World — As constituting the essential character of their being, these created spirits possess freedom. For some reason, which Origen fails to explain (1) adequately, these beings misuse their freedom and to differing extents depart from God. "They were seized with weariness of the Divine love and contemplation". (2) "Since these rational creatures... were endowed with the power of freewill, it was this freedom which induced each one, by his own voluntary choice, either to make progress through the imitation of God or to deteriorate through negligence. This was the cause of diversity among rational creatures, a cause that takes its origin, not in the Will or Judgment of the Creator, but from the decision of the creature's own freedom". (3) They all "started from one beginning, but were drawn in varying directions by their own individual impulses and were distributed throughout the different ranks of existence in accordance with their merit". (4)

In describing the distributions of these gradations in the Cosmos Origen does not make too clear whether only some of the original minds took part in the Fall or all of them. In his "First Principles" there are passages which support either view. "Before the ages, minds were all pure, both daemons and souls and angels, offering service to God

(1) - We can excuse Origen failing to add light to this most intractable of problems, the origin of evil. See "Freedom of the Spirit", Nicholas Berdyaev, London 1933 pp. 161 - 171 where a thoroughly Origenist cosmology is treated with sympathetic and penetrating insight. The gist of the passage is, "Initial freedom was the origin of evil at the highest levels of being".

(2) - De Prin: II.viii.3 Koetschau V. p. 159
(3) - De Prin: II.ix.6 Koetschau V. p. 170
(4) - De Prin: I.vi.2 Koetschau V. p. 80
and keeping His commandments. But the Devil, since he was one of them and possessed free will, desired to resist God and God drove him away. With him revolted all the other powers". (1) "Out of all the original unity of rational beings one mind remained steadfast in the Divine love and contemplation...he, having become Christ and King of all rational beings, created all bodily nature, both heaven and earth..." (2) Certain of those rational beings who have continued in that beginning...have allotted to them, in the ordering and arrangement of the world, the rank of Angel.(3) "A descent (deductio) therefore, of all alike, seems to be indicated, as taking place from higher to lower conditions, by the word \( \kappa \varepsilon \tau \kappa \beta \varepsilon \lambda \gamma \)." (4) The Holy Scriptures call the foundation of the world by a new and peculiar name \( \kappa \varepsilon \tau \kappa \beta \varepsilon \lambda \gamma \), which in Greek has rather the meaning of 'deicere', that is, to cast downwards and is... rendered incorrectly by the Latin 'constitutio'.(5) Whether we consider that the Fall involved all the original creation or only part does not greatly matter for our present purpose. What is important is that the 'foundation of the world' which in Biblical tradition means the actual direct creation of this visible world, for Origen means the appearance in embodied form of spiritual beings who have long previously pre-existed in the transcendentental Cosmos.

(1) - De Prin: I.viii.1 Koetschau V. p. 96 (Passage derived from Leontius of Byzantium)

(2) - De Prin: II.viii.3 Koetschau V. p. 160 (Passage derived from Anathema via of the Second Council of Constantinople)

(3) - De Prin: I.vi.2 Koetschau V. p. 80 (Passage occurring in the Latin translation of Rufinus only, which is possibly 'accommodated' to his 'orthodox' views)

(4) - De Prin: III.v.4 Koetschau V. p. 275

(5) - De Prin: III.v.4 Koetschau V. p. 274
The process of the Fall is gradual. Origen does not feel the acute difference of "the Either-Or, namely, with being in God or being separated from God" (1) instantly occasioned by any degree of sin. The Fall begins with a gentle cooling of love towards God. Origen takes this 'cooling off' in a literal sense and defines the first stage in the Fall as consisting of the change of Mind into Soul (ψυχή) where Psyche is derived philologically from ψυχέσεσθαι to cool.(2) The second stage is connected with the creation and appearance of bodies. Origen avoids the Gnostic judgment that bodies in themselves are evil. The farthest approach to this is in one passage to assert that they are impure in substance. (3) What he does say, however, is that they, along with the matter required to make them, have been created by God to serve as prisons or houses of correction. "God, therefore, made the present world and bound the soul to the body as a punishment". (4) "When they had revolted from their former blessedness, they were endowed with bodies in consequence of the fall from their first estate". (5) These bodies vary in density or grossness according to the degree of defection from God. "All rational creatures who are incorporeal and invisible, if they become negligent, gradually sink to a lower level and take to themselves bodies suitable to the regions into which they descend; that is to say, first ethereal bodies and then aereal. When they reach the

(1) - "Man in Revolt" by Emil Brunner. p. 263
(2) - De Prin: II.viii.3 Koetschau V. p. 158
(3) - Comm. in Joan: XX.16 Preuschen IV. p. 348
(4) - De Prin: I.viii.1 Koetschau V. p. 96
(5) - De Prin: I.viii.1 Koetschau V. p. 97
neighbourhood of the earth, they are enclosed in grosser bodies and last of all are tied to human flesh". (1) Origen went even further than this and could say - "Thus, that which by nature is fine and mobile, namely the soul, first became heavy and weighed down, and because of its wickedness comes to dwell in a human body. After that, when the faculty of reason is extinguished, it lives the life of an irrational animal; and finally, even the gracious gift of sensation is withdrawn and it changes into the insensate life of a plant". (2) The Fall is responsible for the creation of matter out of which bodies are formed. "When the Scripture says that God created all things 'by number and measure', we might be right in applying the term 'number' to rational creatures or 'minds' for this very reason, that they are so many as can be provided for, ruled and controlled by the Providence of God; whereas 'measure' will correspondingly apply to bodily matter, which we must believe to have been created by God in such quantity as He knew would be sufficient for the ordering of the world (Mundus)". (3)

This visible world is in Origen's scheme only one in a succession or series stretching back into the past and forward into the future. "God did not begin to work for the first time when He made this visible world...Just as, after the dissolution of this world, there will be another one, so also we believe that there were others before this one existed". (4) The individual spirit is free at every point to accept

(1) - De Prin: I.iv.1 Koetschau V. p. 64
(2) - De Prin: I.viii.4 Koetschau V. p. 103
(3) - De Prin: II.ix.1 Koetschau V. p. 165
(4) - De Prin: III.v.3 Koetschau V. p. 275
God and ascend or reject God and descend through the whole gamut of orders, pertaining to one world. "In the meantime, alike in these ages which are seen and temporal, and in those that are not seen and eternal, all those beings are arranged in a definite order proportionate to the degree and excellence of their merits". (1) Origen's cosmology is held together by a principle of sowing and reaping, which is akin to the Hindu doctrine of Karma. "And so it happens that some in the first, others in the second and others even in the last times, through their endurance of greater and more severe punishments of long duration, extending, if I might say so, over many ages, are by these very stern methods of correction renewed and restored....so that they advance through each grade to a higher one, until they reach at length, the things which are invisible and eternal". (2)

The Redemption or Restoration of the Cosmos next comes to be considered. The Providence of God never forsakes the rational intelligences who have forsaken Him in their descent. Even the fallen visible Cosmos is ruled by God "who, by the unspeakable skill of His wisdom, transforms and restores all things, whatever their condition, to some useful purpose and the useful advantage of all, recalls these very creatures, so very different from each other in mental quality, to one harmony of work and endeavour; so that, diverse though the motions of their souls may be, they nevertheless combine to make up the fullness and perfection of a single world, the very variety of the minds tending to one end, perfection". (3) But in one particular manner has God acted

(1) - De Prin: I.vi.3 Koetschau V. p. 84
(2) - Same passage continued.
(3) - De Prin: II.i.2 Koetschau V. p. 107
especially to recall His fallen creation back to Himself, namely through the Coming of Christ. "Just as we have said that all souls that have dwelt in this world have stood in need of many ministers and helpers and rulers, so, in these last times when the end of the world was near at hand and the whole human race was hastening to its final destruction and when weakness had overtaken not only those that were ruled, but also those to whom had been entrusted the care of ruling, then there arose the need...that the Author and Creator Himself should restore to the first the capacity to obey and to the second the capacity to rule, which in both cases had been corrupted and profaned. And so the Only Begotten Son of God...first fulfilled in Himself what He wished to be fulfilled in others and not only became obedient to the Father 'even unto the death of the Cross' but also at the consummation of the age..... He shall be 'the head of all things' and in Him shall be the 'fullness' of those who obtain salvation."(1) One can detect in the above passage, that Origen tends to think of Christ more as an Exemplar and Teacher than as Saviour in the commonly accepted sense of the Bible and Church. It was this aspect of his doctrine which drew from Jerome the criticism that Origen was 'the spiritual father of Arius', (2) and 'the first Pelagian'. (3) This salvation of the Cosmos through Christ, will be a gradual matter, however. It "will be accomplished through certain means and courses of discipline, and through periods of time. The whole world will not become subject to God through the pressure of some necessity that compels it into subjection, nor by the use of force: but by word, by reason, by

(1) - De Prin: III.v.6 Koetschau V. p. 276 - 277
(2) - Jerome: Ep. LI.3
(3) - Jerome: "Adv.Pelag." I.7
teaching and exhortation to better things and by the best methods of education." Salvation will also be forwarded by "such merited and appropriate threatenings as are justly held over the heads of those who contumaciously neglect to care for their own salvation". (1) Christ who appeared as Man to teach and save men, will similarly enter the other regions of the Cosmos in forms appropriate to these conditions, to save these other realms of fallen spirits. "Christ...because He pitied the various falls that had happened to those who originally belonged to the same Unity, and wished to restore them, went through all modes of being and was invested with different kinds of bodies and took different names, becoming 'all things to all', being changed into an Angel among the angels, into a Power among the powers, and into other ranks or species of rational beings, according to the necessities of each particular case, and then at last shared in flesh and blood like us and became a Man among men". (2) The process of cosmic restoration involves three stages, the principle of which is demonstrated in the career of the Redeemer, first Incorporation (as outlined above) then Resurrection into the transcendental Cosmos and finally, beyond Resurrection, Union with the bodiless and immortal Divine Nature. "It was needful....that there should exist a Resurrection, the figure of which was shewn in Our Lord and Saviour, which Resurrection should have its ground in the very Wisdom, Word and Life of God". (3) The charge against Origen that he denied the Resurrection (4) draws our attention to what appears to be a break in the

(1) - De Prin: III.v.9 Koetschau V. p. 278 Koetschau V. p. 355 Note
(2) - De Prin: IV.iv.5 (derived from Anathema vii. Second Council of Constantinople)
(3) - De Prin: I.ii.4 Koetschau V. p. 31
(4) - DePrin-II.i.2---Koetschau-V.--p.-107 Jerome. Ep. ad Avitum. c.I
logic of his cosmology. We have seen that he regarded the life of the preexistent spiritual beings in the transcendent Cosmos before their fall as being bodiless. Now, on their return, they appear to have bodies and it is not until a farther stage is arrived at, when they enter into a deeper union with God, that they achieve bodilessness again. Before we quote the relevant passages, there is a suggestion of Origen which throws light on this special problem raised. He distinguishes between the image of God possessed before the Fall and the likeness of God received after restoration. "Now the fact that He said, 'He made Him in the image of God' and was silent about the likeness (See Gen: I. 27 - 28) points to nothing else but this, that Man received the honour of God's image in his first creation, whereas the perfection of God's likeness was reserved for him at the consummation". (1) Certainly Origen accepted the resurrection as a stage in the process of the cosmic restoration. "It is from the natural body that the very power and grace of the resurrection evokes the spiritual body, when it transforms it from dishonour to glory". (2) "the soul at one time puts off one body which was necessary before...and it exchanges it for a second: and at another time it assumes another in addition to the former, which is needed as better covering, suited to the purer ethereal regions of heaven". (3) Probably Butterworth is right when he says (4) that Origen "found the term 'spiritual body' in the Scriptures and held fast to it". But perhaps also it was just this 'Biblical' pressure which

(1) De Prin: III.vi.1 Koetschau V. p. 280
(2) - De Prin: II.x.1 Koetschau V. p. 174
(3) - Con.Cel. VII.32 Koetschau II. p. 183
made Origen introduce into his cosmic redemption a resurrection which is not ultimately permanent. Elsewhere, he could write -"It must needs be that the nature of bodies is not primary, but that it was created at intervals on account of certain falls that happened to rational beings, who came to need bodies; and again, that when their restoration is perfectly accomplished (τὰς ἐπανομαχώμενὰς τὰς ἰκανίας γινώσκων) these bodies are dissolved into nothing". (1)

In this 'perfect accomplishment of their restoration' there is involved more than return to original bodiliness and true being, which would be an ontological restoration. Origen's thought was pressed to take the line it did, because of his urgent sense of the need to provide a 'theodical' restoration, that is, one which would justify the ways of God to men. Accordingly, he teaches the possibility that not only will death be destroyed but the devil and all who have opposed God will be converted and saved. Only with such a 'happy ending' did Origen feel that God would be finally victorious. "For all wicked men, and for daemons too, punishment has an end and both wicked men and daemons shall be restored to their former rank". (2) And yet this proposed solution did not really solve the problem posed by his insistent reiteration that the will is 'permanently free' and can always freely oppose God. Origen's theodicy ends poised in a curious indiscision between the poles of the dilemma he created. His intellect could not finally endorse the universalism of his heart. That he had doubts is evident from such passages as this, "Whether it be true that long-continued and deep-

(1) - De Prin: IV.iv.8 Koetschau V. p. 361
(2) - De Prin: II.x.8 Koetschau V. p. 183
-rooted wickedness turns to a habit and into a kind of nature, you reader, must judge". (1) But we must not close this examination of Origen's cosmology on a negative note. Let the visionary and inspired lover of God write his own epilogue. "Now I myself think that, when it is said that God will be 'all in all', it means that He is also all things. And He will be all things in each person as an individual... in such a way that everything which the rational mind, when purified from all the dregs of its vices and utterly cleared from every cloud of wickedness, can feel or understand or think will be all God, and that the mind will be no longer conscious of anything other than God, but will think God and see God and hold God and God will be the mode and measure of its every movement. In this sense 'God will be all in all'". (2)

We have now allowed Origen to speak for himself. We see how vast is the canvas upon which he has painted for us his cosmology. As we stand back to get the perspective of the whole, the question arises - How does Man fit into it? If we are sensitively aware of the place Man occupies in the Biblical setting, what strikes us immediately is that here, before us, is present a challenging difference. (3) Man's place

(1) De Prin: I.vi.3 Koetschau V. p. 84
(2) De Prin: III.vi.3 Koetschau V. p. 283
(3) - For an incisive statement of what constitutes a 'Biblical' setting see "Man in Revolt" Emil Brunner. p. 409 "It is not due to naivete but is the necessary consequence of the Biblical idea of God, that the Biblical picture of the world is absolutely anthropocentric...The world of which the Bible speaks is always the world for man, the world in which the fate of man is of supreme importance. Man is the centre of the world, in spite of the fact that God is his Creator and Lord....In this respect the Bible is in opposition to both the ancient and the modern idea of the cosmos, where man is integrated into the cosmos as a dependent element".
in Origen's Cosmos is scarcely unique and is not central in the Biblical sense. Apart from God, what is central is not Man, but these 'rational intelligences' who, by their universal fall, have become the various ranks of the descending hierarchy, on one level of which they are known as Man. Moreover, we seem to detect the absence of that special Biblical element which seems to assert that "Man is not a bit of the world; he stands over against all creaturely existence, as something special, as a new dimension". (1) Origen sees man as part of the process of a cosmos in which are at work a multitude of distinctly old dimensions. He is always looking towards an End which shall be as the old Beginning, a restoration which is not really a new creation. (2) Because of Origen's profound respect for the element of freedom in the cosmos, it would be wrong to exaggerate his emphasis upon process, beyond pointing out that it is just here, however, in implying that Man is distinctly involved in the cosmic 'process' of the fall and Restoration, that he departs most sharply from Biblical cosmology. The latter accepts the fall and Redemption, not as cosmic process but as occasions calling forth renewing Divine Acts.

Let us look closer at Origen's canvas and see if we can discover from what sources he has derived the materials with which he paints the picture. It can scarcely be disputed that it is Platonism which has

(1) - Brunner. op. cit.

(2) - Origen can say, "universum mundum velut animal quoddam immensum atque inmane opinandum puto" De Prin: II.i.3 Koetshau V. p. 108, and thereby emphasise the deep feeling of biological process which he had absorbed from the Stoics. It is a process, however, in which "semper similis est finis initiis" De Prin: I.vi.2 Koetshau V. p. 79 - 80
provided him with his 'two storeyed' structure of the visible world below dependent upon the transcendental metaphysical world above. From similar sources also he has obtained his fixed conviction that the soul is preexistent. Stoicism has probably contributed the idea of the plurality of worlds, though Origen insists that they are successive and afford the means of endless education moving towards 'the one far off Divine event, to which the whole Creation moves' when God shall be all in all. (1) From Stoic sources also has come his sense of the organic unity of the Cosmos in and through the Logos, working as an immanent Divine principle, and bridging the gulf between the fallen cosmos and God the Father who is wholly transcendent. Some students of Origen, de Faye for instance, have asserted a great debt to Aristotle, but the explication of that is somewhat involved and perhaps the most apposite reference to Aristotle is one from the same author who writes, "In the whole of his (i.e. Origen's) chapter on cosmology, there is not a single observation of fact". (2) The influence upon Origen's cosmology is less easy to assess than that of Greek philosophy. The frequent references throughout his writings to Basilides, Valentinus and Marcion are almost always in terms of refuting their ideas, such as those of the

(1) - Recent opinion inclines to the view that the plurality of worlds in Origen's system is traceable to Indian sources through Ammonius Saccas, Origen's early teacher at Alexandria. For this suggestion I am indebted to Dr Ernst Benz of Marburg University, Joint Editor of the revised text of Origen's Commentary on Matthew in the GCS Series, who discussed the matter with me in the autumn of 1950.

(2) - Aristotle, of course, is the spiritual father of modern science. See "A History of Science" W.C.D.Dampier-Whetham, pp. 32 - 40 De Faye's references to Aristotle in relation to Origen are found in Vol III. cc. vi and xii. op.cit.
Demiurge and the division of human souls into spirituals, psychics and materials. But, none the less, it is possible to be influenced unconsciously by those one consciously disagrees with, and it is probable that this has happened to Origen. In this matter, de Faye is again our guide. In one of his Origenist studies he inclines to the opinion that Valentinus is responsible for Origen's acceptance of the soul or psychic element in the Cosmos as being 'intermediary' between the spiritual and hylic, the mental and bodily. Also in Valentinus he sees the germ of the characteristic Origenist idea that the Fall in the transcendental Cosmos was the occasion of the appearance of the visible world. (1) Later, however, de Faye seems to minimise this indebtedness. (2).

How much of what is essentially Biblical is to be found in Origen's cosmology? We must never forget that he writes as a Christian. The whole purpose of the book in which nearly all of his cosmological speculations are collected neatly together is to defend the faith of the Church, to assert Biblical truth. Where he opened himself to the charges of heresy lay in the manner in which he allowed his speculations to soar beyond the limits of Christian truth 'which can be proved from the Scriptures,' Again and again Origen defends himself by insisting that he does not speak dogmatically. If we keep that in mind, we shall

(1) "Origen and his Work", the Olaus Petri Lectures delivered at Upsala in 1925, p. 85

(2) - "Origène, sa Vie, son Oeuvre, sa Pensée," Vol: II 'L'Ambiance Philosophique' p. 7 Where he concludes his examination of Gnostic influence with these words, "S'il est certain que la pensée non-chrétienne a formé en grande partie la sienne, il est tout à fait invraisemblable que ce paganiséait déteint sur lui."
arrive at the conclusion that Origen's speculations were a legitimate and creative adventure of the Christian spirit in dynamic contact with the living traditions of Platonism, Gnosticism and the like. The Church has subsequently rejected much of his system, but she continues to pay tribute to the courage and pure motives with which he undertook the adventure and thereby revealed in his own person and intellect something of both the enigma and the nature of the problem underlying the doctrine of Man.

Before we leave this section, we must summarise the relation of Man to the cosmological setting which Origen his afforded.

Man has three contacts - to God, to the transcendental Cosmos and to the visible world.

First, he is created by the God who made the Cosmos. Each person of the Holy Trinity has part in the creation and preservation of Man. "God the Father bestows upon all the gift of existence...... A participation in Christ, in virtue of His being the Word or Reason, makes them rational. There is also available the grace of the Holy Spirit, that those beings who are not holy in essence may be made holy by participating in this grace". (1)

Secondly, Man's true nature as a creature of God belongs to the transcendental realm, where he was originally created. His essence lies in his bearing the image of God. "The marks of the Divine image

(1) - De Prin: I.iii.8    Koetschau V. p. 61
in Man, may be clearly discerned, not in the form of his body which goes to corruption, but in the prudence of his mind, his righteousness, his self-control, his courage, his wisdom, his discipline, in fact in the whole company of virtues, which exist in God essentially and may exist in Man, as a result of his own efforts and his imitation of God". (1).

Thirdly, Man's present nature, involving a soul and a body, is the result of the Fall. If we remember that his 'true' nature is that of one of the preexistent retional intelligences, then, in Origen's cosmological picture, his involvement in the visible world has made him 'sub human' or less than what he really is. (2)

This brief review of Man's place in the Cosmos, as Origen conceived it, has served the purpose of raising most of the problems which we must now seek to investigate in greater detail. They have

(1) - De Prin: IV.iv.10 Koetschau V. p. 363
For Niebuhr's comment on Origen's views, see "Nature and Destiny of Man" Vol.II. p. 135

(2) - Every reader of Reinhold Niebuhr's "Nature and Destiny of Man" knows how profoundly and illuminatingly the author again and again directs our attention to the focal point of the problem, that there are two facts about Man which constitute the inner paradox, bedevilling every attempt to construct a satisfactory doctrine of Man. The first fact is that Man is a child of nature. The second fact is that Man is a spirit who transcends not only the Cosmos but himself. See pp. 1 - 4: 292: and passim. Also, for Origen and his time, Vol: II: pp. 133 - 137. See next chapter.
often been raised in the past (1) and they continue to be raised. We recollect again the sober counsel of Martin Buber, challenging to view Man in his totality and warning against the temptation to 'divide him into departments, which can be treated singly, in a less problematic way'... None the less, it is humanly necessary to take our eyes off the great sweep of Origen's vast canvas and now look at his doctrine of Man in its departments, beginning with that at the top, which constitutes Man's basic and profoundest relationship, that to God as his Creator.

(1) - For discussion of Origen's cosmology see:-

HUET - "Origeniana" II.ii.12
REDEPENNING - "Origines" I passim
                II passim pp. 1 - 268
                seriatim 271 - 454 and 462 - 464
DENIS - "De la Philosophie d'Origène c.iv. on 'Cosmologie'
BIGG - "Christian Platonists of Alexandria" c.vi.
De FAYE - "Origène" Vol; III. esp. pp. ii, v, vi, and vii
          and passim "Origen and his work" pp. 77 - 96
KOCH - "Pronoia und Paideusis" pp. 36 - 49 : 258 - 260
          and passim
DANIELLOU - "Origène" Book III.c.i on "Cosmologie" pp. 207 - 217
RAHNER - "Das Menschenbild des Origines" in Eranos Jahrbuch
          for 1947 pp. 197 - 248
DESSAUER - "Mensch und Cosmos" in Eranos Jahrbuch for 1947
          pp. 75 - 147
KARPP - "Probleme altchristlicher Anthropologie"
          pp. 212 - 223
CHAPTER THREE

"The Essence of Man"

All creatures which God has created have existed eternally in His Mind. (1) This does not, however, mean that they have existed as "creatures unbegotten and coeternal" in substance. (2) They have been 'created' by Him through Christ and this Divine action is called 'the beginning'. (3)

The creatures which God created are 'rational spirits' or intelligences' (τῶν λογικῶν... νοερῶν ουσιῶν). They have come into substantial existence simultaneously and are limited in number, pre-determined by God. (4) They are all equal and alike. (5) They

(1) - De Prin: I.ii.2 and I.iv.3,4,5. Koetschau V.30 and 66 - 68
Con. Cel: V.39 Koetschau II. 43
Comm. in Cant. III Lomm. xv. 48 "semper...praefiguratio..."

(2) - De Prin: I.iv.5 Koetschau V. 67 "neque ingenitas et coaeternas Deo creaturas" For Origen's relation to the characteristic thought of the schools of philosophy in the 3rd century, see De Faye, Vol: II (L'Ambiance philosophique) esp. pp. 11 - 12.

(3) - De Prin: II.viii.3 Koetschau V. 159
II.ix.1 Koetschau V. 163
Origen's references to the Logos are almost innumerable, but Books I & II of his Commentary on St. John's Gospel contain the substance of his doctrine. But see later chapter.

(4) - De Prin: II.ix.1 Koetschau V. 164. On Origen's curious insistence on the limitations of Creation, see Bigg's Note on p.198 of his 'Christian Platonists'.

(5) - De Prin: II.ix.6 Koetschau V. 169. Origen asserted this doctrine that God "aequales creavit omnes ac similes", positively as part of his theodicy to clear God from apparent injustice, and negatively to counter the teaching of the Gnostics, who taught that natures were of different kinds.
exist as individuals and are personal. (1) Their nature is entirely intellectual and together they constitute the real cosmos. (2) So close is their union together that they are distinguishable without being separable. (3) Their spiritual homogeneity constitutes their purity. (4) They are, as we saw when examining Origen's cosmology, related to each Person of the Trinity, deriving their existence from the Father, their rationality from the Son and their holiness or participation in the Divine substance from the Holy Ghost. (5) Once created they are immortal. (6) But we must admit a diversity of participation in the Trinity varying in proportion to the free consent of the individual spirits to the Divine goodness. Hence conditional immortality is hinted at. (7) As fundamental to their nature, the spirits possess freedom.

(1) - De Prin: III.i.22 Koetschau V. 239 "λογικῶν ἐπιστολακτῶν"
(2) - Con.Cel. VI.5 Koetschau II. 74 - 75. The phrase "Κόσμος ουράνος" was current in Neo Platonism as meaning the world of true "οὐράνιον", which contained the soul, but nothing lower. See art. "Neo Platonism" W.R.Inge in ERE. p. 310.
(3) - De Prin: II.viii.3 Koetschau V. 159
(4) - De Prin: I.viii.1 Koetschau V. 95 - 96
(5) - De Prin: I.iii.8 Koetschau V. 61
(6) - De Prin: IV.iv.9 Koetschau V. 363
also III.i.13 Koetschau V. 218
"incorruptae autem sunt et immortales caelestes virtutes: incorrupta sine dubio et immortalis erit etiam animae humanae substantia."
(7) - De Prin: IV.iv.9 Koetschau V. 363 But Origen is so unwilling even to concede this that he asserts that minds always possess seeds of restoration and renewal even when they abandon God.
(8) - De Prin: II.iii.3 Koetschau V. 118 "rationabiles naturae, a quibus numquam aufertur liberi facultas arbitrii"
Origen's consistent belief is that freedom is permanent and cannot be lost. (1) Yet again, he recognises that this freedom may be so misused that it permanently sets the creature in opposition to God. (2) We may regret that on the whole, Origen does not appear to develop his conception of freedom as much as we would desire. He mentions freewill on innumerable occasions, but it is nearly always 'freedom after the Fall' (3) In common with the Greek Fathers he emphasises the 'resemblance', (4) of the 'spirits' to God Himself. This draws forth from Jerome the taunt that Origen 'distributed the essence of Almighty God to angels and men'. (5) This is clearly exaggerated and is easily disproved by many of Origen's statements. (6) The 'resemblance' is asserted to be fundamentally in the possession of rationality. Because of his tendency to 'deify the reason in Man, Origen lays himself open himself to the strictures so penetratingly set forth by Niebuhr. (7)

(1) - HUET "Origeniana" II.ii.6 para 2 relates all Origen's divergence from Church doctrine to his insistence on this point "mentium προ οὔτε προς ἑαυτοῦ et pleni ac perpetui liberatis usus, semper vigentis ac florintis, maximam Origenianorum errorum partem prodiisse".

(2) - De Prin: I.v.5 Koetschau V. 78 "...si qui eo usque sui neglexerit, usque in eum deveniat statum, ut ea quae dicitur contraria virtus efficiat".

(3) - See HUET: II.ii.7 para.4 "Statum naturae integrae a statu naturae lapsae non distinxit"

(4) - De Prin: I.i.7 Koetschau V. 24 IV.iv.10 Koetschau V. 363 "quod propinquitas quaedam sit menti ad Deum, cuius ipsa mens intellectualis imago sit", and "et consanguinitatem quandam per hoc habere videntur ad Deum"

(5) - Jerome. Ep. ad Avitum 14 "Naturam omnipotentis Dei angelis hominibusque largituri"

(6) - De Prin: II.ix.2 Koetschau V.165. "Quod sunt ergo, non est proprium...

(7) - "Nature and Destiny of Man" Vol.I pp.15,29,53 and esp.note on p.80, and Vol.II passim and esp. p.13. Niebuhr's point is that, if the reason or any other 'part' of Man is equated with the Divine, Man's essential 'creaturliness' is destroyed. Moreover, in Christian thought not the reason only, but the body and the soul, make up the whole Man.
Is the above account truly applicable to Man, as we know him - a creature of body, soul and spirit? Yes, Origen would say, because the word Man has two meanings. It may mean the fundamental rational nature which underlies all creatures, angels and men alike. It may mean in a restricted sense 'animated mortal rational beings' on earth. (1)

We have therefore, obtained a basis upon which to construct Origen's doctrine of Man. By breaking Man into departments and examining one of these, he has become much simpler and less problematic. He is in his essence an immortal, incorporeal, rational personality, created by God with a nature which is homogeneous and is shared identically by all spirits alike. (See Appendix "A" at end of chapter setting forth views of reputed Origenist scholars, and Appendix "B" on "The Image of God").

It is because Man cannot, however, be left in a tidy department that we must extend our gaze once more over the canvas of his total nature and destiny, and investigate the situation which has complicated the simplicity of his original being and essence. That brings us to what in Origen's system of thought is of quite immeasurable importance - the Fall.

(1) - Comm. in Joan: II.23 Preuschen IV.79 "πάντων τών λογίκων..."  ἀνθρώπων"
Comm. in Joan: X.45 Preuschen IV.224 "πάντες λογικοί..."
Where Origen asserts that among the different ranks of Thrones, Dominions, Principalities and Powers, the subjects are in every case 'Men', and
Comm. in Joan X.45 where he states that the word "Ἀνθρώπον" can be restricted to "ἐπὶ τοῦ θνητοῦ λογικοῦ ζωοῦ μόνου"
APPENDIX "A" on 'The Essence of Man' giving opinions of Origenist scholars.

With quite remarkable unanimity, students of Origen agree that the essential nature of Man, as taught by him, lay in this transcendent and preexistent realm. Owing to Origen's habit of using 'ψυχή' and 'ψυχή του ζώου' sometimes interchangeably (though the context generally indicates the clear distinction which his logic requires) slight confusion has been introduced. What Origen taught, however, is that Man is essentially mind, as described above. The following passages from past and present works confirm this view.

HUET "Origeneana" II.ii.6 Para. 16. After an exhaustive examination of the nature of the soul, (Paras. 1 - 15) Huet sums up as follows:- "Atfatendum...est Origenianorum doctum cohaerentiam eo now compellere, ut anima sola constare hominem Adamantium dicamus".

REDEPENNING "Origenes" Vol: II pp. 359 and 369. All Redepenning's study of Origen has the massive solidity of German scholarship. Much of what he writes is a paraphrase of the actual text, but it is always accompanied by quotations in the subjacent notes. He inclines, rather more than Huet to stress Origen's acceptance of human nature in the Pauline body, soul and spirit relationship. (p. 369) But this does not prevent him, after describing successively the stages in the cosmic history which pass from transcendent creation, through the Fall to present conditions, to underline the abiding significance of "der inwendige Mensch, Abbild des ewigen Ebenbildes Gottes, des Logos; ein Mikrokosmos, in welchem die gesamte Welt sich darstellt. Dieser Vorzug ist dem Menschen unverlierbar eigen..."

DENIS "De La Philosophie d'Origène" p. 237. Though Denis has all the lucidity which characterises French thought, his study of Origen would have been improved had he broken up more his material into sections, instead of presenting it in long rambling chapters. In his chapter on 'Anthropology' he examines Origen's doctrine of Man, relating it closely to Philo and Clement, Origen's predecessors. After rightly criticising Origen's somewhat interchangeable use of the words, 'ψυχή του ζώου' and 'ψυχή του Υιού Θεοῦ' which cause confusion, he sums up his view regarding the essence of Man. "L'homme actuel, pour (Origène) comme pour Clément, est chair, âme, et esprit ou pensée, (ψυχή του Ζώου, ψυχή του Υιού Θεού). L'homme véritable est tout entier dans l'esprit ou dans la substance pensante (ψυχή του Υιού Θεοῦ, Τούχη κ' ουσία)".

De Faye "Origène: sa Vie, son Oeuvre et sa Pensée" Vol: III. p. 171 stresses (what is indeed the 'thesis' of his study) the Platonic character of Origen's doctrine. He writes:- "De quels éléments se compose-t-elle? Naturellement en premier lieu de Platonisme. Origène conçoit l'âme comme tout à fait à part du corps. Elle préexiste à celui-ci; elle Y entre; il lui arrive momentanément de le quitter; elle en est aussi distincte que possible."
Niebuhr is generally appreciative of Origen's genius though critical of 'Hellenic' bias in theology. He refers to him as "the greatest of the early Christian theologians", p.183, "the greatest of the Alexandrian theologians", Vol II. p. 60 "the greatest of Eastern theologians". When, however, he refers to Origen in connection with this very question of the essence of Man's nature, his characteristic allegiance to 'Biblical' theology causes him to speak incisively and not to beat about the bush. "Origen's Platonism completely destroys the Biblical sense of the unity of Man. For him the image of God in man the 'ψυχὴ λογικὴ' is really a fallen supernal spirit who expiates his preexistent fall by his life in a physical body."

Koch

"Pronoia und Paideusis" p. 37. This book is a kind of supplement to De Faye's three monumental volumes on Origen which were published between 1923 - 28. The author seeks to deal with topics which he feels were omitted in the former volumes, e.g. Providence and its kindred theme, Theodicy: and the question of the origin and nature of evil. Because of its original contributions to the field of Origenist scholarship, it is a really valuable book. The author confirms the point that Man's origin and roots are in the Platonic 'intelligible' world, where Origen bases his doctrine of Man. "Ohne Fall würde überhaupt nichts anderes existieren als die intelligible Welt".

Karpp

"Probleme altchristlicher Anthropologie" p. 196. This is one of the very latest studies of Origen. The author intended it to appear in 1937, but the war prevented this till 1950. The theories of the soul, associated with Tertullian (Traducianism), with Clement of Alexandria (Creationism), and with Origen (Preexistence), are successively examined in the light of Biblical Anthropology and Philosophical Psychology. It is interesting to note how clearly Karpp agrees with the general standpoint adopted above. "Das leben des Geistes - genauer gesagt, des zur Seele erkalten Geistes - im Leibe ist also nur ein vorübergehender Zeitabschnitt in seiner ganzen Existenz. Diese Episode ist aber das Menschsein. Denn der Mensch ist das Wesen, welches aus Seele und Körper besteht und dessen eigentliches Ich vorher und nachher nicht Mensch, sondern Seele oder Geist ist. Deshalb kann Origenes den Menschen als Seele bezeichnen, welches sich eines Körpers bedient", oder auch das Ich der Seele gleichsetzen. Quite clearly Karpp sees in Origen the distinction between 'true' Man and 'actual' Man, the latter being only an episode in the destiny of the former, which is essentially spiritual.
APPENDIX "B" on Origen's teaching on the 'Image and Likeness' of God.

Though in this chapter we have sought to describe as succinctly as possible, Origen's teaching on the essence of Man, there remains a useful purpose to be served in presenting that same material as set forth by him so amply throughout his Commentaries and Homilies, as a preacher of the Gospel and as a Doctor of the Church. For in these capacities he is presenting his doctrine of Man to men, and he is doing this in the language and terms of the Bible. In this way we catch a glimpse of the real Origen, taking up phrases of current speech, using metaphors of contemporary interest and assembling material which is homely and vital in presenting the Gospel message.

There were few texts which Origen loved quoting more than Genesis I. 26, 27. "And God said, Let us make man in our image, after our likeness....and God created man in His own image, in the image of God created He him, male and female created He them". Into his vast Commentaries, and through his hundreds of Homilies, he pours the burning conviction of his soul and the inspired insight of his imagination regarding the fundamental truth of religion that Man is the creature of God, that there is no true doctrine of Man which is not based on a sound theological foundation. Origen found that doctrine and foundation in the Biblical idea of the Image of God. Though all that Origen wrote (in spite of Jerome's derogatory remarks about its extent) is interesting to us today, his Homilies are most refreshing. When his pupils, Basil and Gregory, made a collection of his choice passages, they entitled it 'Philocalia', which means 'the love of the beautiful'. We must in this short note now cull from his Homilies, his Commentaries and elsewhere, something of that 'love of the beautiful' with which Origen conveyed his fundamental doctrine of Man in its Biblical setting.

Christ alone is the True Image of God -

The Divine Wisdom was the great topic of Alexandrian Theology. Origen said that this Divine Wisdom is the Logos or Christ Himself in His capacity of being the Image of God in the fundamental sense. He constitutes both the truth about God Himself and also the Revelation of God to us. "Now the Son is the Word (Logos) and we must, therefore, understand that nothing in Him is perceptible to the senses. He is Wisdom and in Wisdom we must not suspect the presence of anything corporeal. 'He is the true light that lighteneth every man coming into the world' but He has nothing in common with the light of our sun. Our Saviour is, therefore, the image of the invisible God, the Father. He is the truth (veritas) when considered in relation to the Father Himself and the image (imago) when considered in relation to us, to whom He reveals the Father". (De Prin: I.11.6 Koetschau V. 36).
Men are not this unique image, but are made 'according to this image'.

Though theologians today would say that Origen's Christology was inadequate, chiefly on account of its subordinationism, yet no one would deny that it occupies the central place in his thinking. One way in which this is brought out is that Origen says that men are made in the image of Christ. They are 'images of the The Image'. This is the significance, he tells us, of the 'κατα εικονα' in the phrase 'κατα την εικονα' according to the image. The words used to describe the nature of the image, as being a thing derived, are 'fons', 'Origo' and 'δρακη' "If the 'first-born' of every creature is the Image of the invisible God, then the Father is His 'Arche' or Principle. In the same way, Christ is the 'Arche' or Principle of those who are made 'according to' the Image of God....Men, therefore, are not made according to that of which He is the Image, but 'according to the Image'" (Comm. in Joan: I. 1? Preuschen IV. 22)

The image of God is not confined to men -

We now come to a most interesting point, revealing one way in which Origen's Platonism confronts his Bibliicism and produces a doctrine which is characteristically original concerning his idea of what Man is.

By examination of such texts as Gen: xxxii. 24, where Jacob wrestles with a 'man', he is lead to comment that often in the Bible the word 'man' is used where we use 'angel'. From this point he goes on to argue "The names applied to the higher powers are not those of species of living beings, but those of the orders assigned by God to this and that rational being. Throne..dominion..principality..power are names of the businesses to which those clothed with the names have been appointed. The subjects themselves are nothing but men. The outcome of this is that 'the Light of men' must be held to be the same as the light of every being endowed with reason. For every rational being is Man, since it is 'according to the image and likeness of God'. It is the light of men, either, as we shewed above, because there is nothing to prevent us from regarding it as the light of other beings besides men, or because all beings endowed with reason are called men, because they are 'made according to the image of God'.

(Comm: in Joan: II. 23. Preuschen IV. 79)

The image of God is confined to the spiritual nature -

It was only natural that Origen's affinity with Greek ways of looking at the essence of Man should make him depart from the Biblical insistence that the body bears, if not a trace (1) at least a definite

(1) - c.f. the Roman Catholic doctrine as given in St Thomas Aquinas "Summa Theologica" Qu.93.Art.vi p.894 "We find in Man a likeness to God by way of an 'image' in his mind; but in the other parts of his being by way of a trace".
relation or connedtion with the image of God (1) "Certainly, we do not take this Man, who is said to be made in the image of God, to be corporeal man, for the workmanship of the body does not contain the image of God. Corporeal man is not said to be 'made' but 'formed'...that is fashioned from the mud of the earth. He who is made according to the image and likeness of God is our inner man, invisible and incorporeal, incorruptible and immortal. For it is in such things as these that the image of God is rightly understood".

(Hom: I.13 in Gen: Lommatsch viii. 121) "neque factus...sed plasmatus"

The distinctive marks of the image of God in human nature -

According to Origen there are four ways in which the marks of the Divine Image are discernible in human nature. These marks are spirituality, intellectuality, rationality and morality.

In asserting that man's spirituality consisted of a kind of affinity with God (TL φυσικής: Exhort. in Mart. 47. Koetschau I. 42) Origen laid himself open to charges by Jerome (Ep. ad Avit. 59. 4) that he equated the essence of human nature with the Divine. But this, as Huet (Origeniana: II.i.6 Para 2) shews, is what he does not do, as his statement (Comm. in Joan: XII. 25 Preuschen IV. 249) that 'it is impious to say that those who worship God are of the same essence' shews. All that Origen means is that human nature reflects the personality of the Divine and this is the essence of its being spiritual. Next, 'the mind', says Origen, 'is an intellectual image' of God (De Prin: I.i.7 Koetschau V. 24) and the whole capacity to know God arises out of this intellectual affinity. "Since we hold that the great God is in essence, simple, Invisible, incorporeal and Himself pure intelligence or something transcending intelligence and existence, we can never say that God is apprehended by any other means than through the intelligence formed in His Image". (Con.Cel: VII.38 Koetschau II. 188).

Origen's Platonic bias makes him repeatedly affirm that 'rationality' is part of the image of God. One passage will suffice for illustration - "Far above all bodies is the soul and especially the rational soul, for it is the soul and not the body which bears the likeness of the Creator". (Con.Cel: VIII.49 Koetschau II. 265)

Lastly, the marks of the Divine image in Man's moral nature are constantly set forth by Origen. "We hold the resemblance to God to be preserved in the rational soul which is formed to virtue". (Con.Cel: VII.66 Koetschau II. 216). "The marks of the Divine image in Man may be clearly discerned, not in the form of his body which goes to corruption, but in the prudence of his mind, in his righteousness, in his self control, in his courage, wisdom and discipline, in fact, in the whole company of virtues, which exist in God essentially, and may exist in Man, as a result of his own efforts and his imitation of God".

(De Prin: IV.iv.10 Koetschau V. 363).

(1) - c.f. the Reformed Church doctrine in Heppe "Reformed Dogmatics"238 "It is insisted by almost all, that even in Man's original corporeality the 'imago divina' in it was set forth".
The distinction between the image and likeness - 

Sometimes one feels that Origen is lead away by the over refinements of his own exegesis. The matter of the distinction between the image and likeness is a case in point. Today, most theologians and commentators consider the use of the two terms merely as an instance of Hebrew reduplication (o.f. Driver's Genesis, p. 14). To Origen they mean very much more. (1) Certainly he is not lacking in ingenuity. He regards the 'likeness' as being an advance upon the 'image'. In his original creation, Man obtained the image as a capacity for perfection. Through the Fall it is dimmed but not lost. By his response to the grace of God, he is enabled to do more than recover his image. He obtains the likeness, which is the actual embodiment in virtue of all the potential capacities of goodness inherent in his nature. Thus with Origen, the likeness is (to use a phrase of St Thomas Aquinesa: Summa 93.9. p. 901 Ed. Pegis) 'the expression and perfection of the image'. "Now the fact that he said, He made him in the image of God, (Gen: I.27) and was silent about the likeness, points to nothing else but this, that Man received the honour of God's image in his first creation, whereas the perfection of God's likeness was reserved for him at the consummation. The purpose of this was that Man should acquire it for himself by his own earnest efforts to imitate God, so that while the possibility of attaining perfection was given to him at the beginning through the honour of the image, he should in the end through the accomplishment of those works obtain for himself the perfect likeness". (De Prin: III.vi.1 Koetschau V. 280).

The extent of the loss of the image of God after the Fall -

Origen, like the early Fathers in general, does not think of the image being destroyed by the Fall. It is 'diminished', 'becomes earthy' or 'a lesser likeness'. In the following passage, we can picture Origen addressing an ordinary Christian congregation. His 'Gospel message' is optimistic. His confidence that his hearers can achieve the goal he sets before them is great. "For when God made Man in the beginning, He made him according to His own image and likeness and He placed this image, not externally but inside him. This could not be seen in you as long as your house was dirty and filled with rubbish. That fountain of wisdom was situated inside you, but could not flow, because Philistines had filled it with earth and made the image in you earthy. Then indeed, you carried the image of the earthy. But now, cleaned by the Word of God from all that weight and oppression, make the image of the celestial in you shine by the things you have heard". Then Origen brings in an

(1) - For a full discussion of this point concerning the two Hebrew words ' ' image, and ' ' likeness, see the article by K.L.Schmidt, pp. 149 - 195 entitled "Homo imago Dei in alten und neuen Testament" in Eranos Jahrbuch, 1947.
interesting figure of speech to drive home his point. "....... The Son of God is the painter of this picture (imago). And because the painter is such as He is and so great, his painting may by neglect be dulled down, but cannot by wickedness be destroyed. For always the image of God remains in you and it is possible for you to transcend the earthly image". (Hom: xiii.4 in Gen: Lommatzsch viii. 249)

This view of the Fall as constituting a 'privatio' only of the image has generally maintained itself in Catholicism. (1) The darker view, which sees an actual 'depravatio' commenced with St Augustine. (2) It finds expression at the Reformation in some passages of Calvin. (3) In modern times Karl Barth has continued this view of the virtual destruction of the image in a passage which has all the characteristic incisiveness of his style. (4)

Origen and the darker side of the picture -

It would be wrong, however, to leave the impression that Origen's whole treatment of the lessening of the image in fallen human nature was lightly treated. He is deeply aware of the evil in human affairs. In one remarkable passage, in which he comes near to a Gnostic antithesis between the Divine spiritual realm and the evil material realm, he suggests that fallen human nature possesses two 'images', one original and Divine, belonging to the first creation, and another acquired and diabolic, obtained through participation in the cosmic fall lead by Satan

"Wherefore, it behoves us to inspect and examine everything which we are about to do, lest perhaps, what we wish to do springs from the 'lusts of the devil'. When we recognise the 'lusts of the devil' let us stop wanting to do them, knowing that everyone who wishes to do the 'lusts of the devil' is totally unable to call God his Father. He has been made a son of the devil and has even been made and shaped according to the image of the father of Evil. In that he wishes to do evil lusts, the likenesses of that earthly one are formed and developed. He, the devil, was the first to become earthly, in that he was the first to fall

(1) - "Basic Writings of St Thomas Aquinas" Ed. by A.C. Pegis. 1944. Vol.II. Qu. 85. Art.1. p. 695.

(2) - "On Genesis" VI. 27 St Augustine. "Hanc imaginem in spiritum mentis impressam perditit Adam per peccatum".

(3) - "Institutes" II.i.8 Calvin. "Those who have defined original sin as the lack of original righteousness, which ought to inhere in us.....have not expressed with sufficient significance, the force and energy of it. Our nature is not merely poor and empty of good, but so fertile and fruitful in all works of evil, that it cannot be idle".

(4) - "Doctrine of the Word of God". Vol: I. Pt.i. page 273.

"... as a possibility for God proper to man, 'qua' creature, the "image of God" is not only, as we say with the exception of some remnants, ruined but annihilated "
from better things and desire another life contrary to the higher life. He was suited to become the principle (χρυσόν), not of the primal creation, (κτίσματος) nor of the actual works (πολυματίους) of the Lord, but of the moulded, material creation (πλασματικός). The highest principle of our nature (ἡ προηγομένη ὑπότασις) is made according to the Creator (κατ' εἰκόνα τοῦ κτισκόν). The other part of us, by reason of the original fault (ἐξ αἰτίας) is the material creation derived from the dust of the earth. If, on the one hand, forgetting the reality of the better part in us, we submit ourselves to that part in us formed from the dust, the better part will assume the image of the earthy. If, on the other hand, understanding what it is which is made according to the image of God and what is received from the dust of the earth, we wholly incline towards the former in whose image we have been made, we shall become according to the likeness of God. We shall have departed from every partiality to things material, to bodies and to anything to their likeness".


The restoration of the image -

The whole aim of religion is to restore to human nature the original brightness of the image of God. As we have seen, it cannot be destroyed without human nature ceasing to be itself. "The faculty of knowing, judging, desiring reward, of doing what is right, of courage and, as I said before, the effectual cause of every good thing was created by God Himself, according to the image". (Select. in Gen: Lommatzsch viii.51.) Its restoration is largely the work of human nature itself. It was Origen's emphasis upon this which prompted the accusation of being the father of Pelagianism. In one of his Homilies, he speaks of the image as being 'the deposit committed to a man'. "Let us see now, what is this deposit for which each one of the faithful is responsible? I think it is that we have received from God a deposit for safe keeping, our soul itself and our body. And do you want to see another greater deposit, which you have received from God. God has entrusted H is own image and likeness to your soul. Therefore, it is consistent that this deposit be not only received by you, but also returned entire by you. If, therefore, you are merciful, as your Father in Heaven is merciful, the image of God is in you and you are keeping your deposit entire. If you are perfect, as your Father in Heaven is perfect, the deposit of the image of God remains in you. Similarly, with all other things. If you are devoted, righteous, holy and pure in heart, and if all things which are present in God by nature, exist in you by imitation, the deposit of the Divine image is safe in you". Hom: IV: 3 in Lev; Lommatzsch ix. 219 - 220.

Yet Origen was not a Pelagian. He fully recognised the necessity of the grace of God, which coming through Christ, makes possible in every man that restoration of the image which constitutes his salvation. "For if Man, made according to the image of God, is made, through sin and by regarding the image of the devil, like unto the latter's image, though
it is contrary to his own nature... how much more shall he, by regarding that image of God, through the grace of the Word and his own virtue, receive again that form, which had been given him by nature? But let no one, recognising his own likeness to agree more with the devil than with God, despair of being able to regain the form of the image of God, because the Saviour came not to call the just but sinners to repentance". (Hom: I.13 in Gen: Lommatzsch viii. 124.)

We have felt justified in examining in some detail what Origen has to say regarding the image of God in human nature, because the recent quickening of interest in Biblical Theology in both Protestant and Catholic circles, has revived the importance of this topic.

The elucidation of Origen's views has a further interest in that it brings out how deeply connected with Biblical exegesis was the presentation of his fundamental and distinctive beliefs about Man, even when these beliefs, as in the nature of his essence, were deeply coloured by Platonist speculation.

Origen, however, never radically renounced his classical adherence to the doctrine that Man's essence consists in his purely spiritual part. He thereby failed to absorb the real Biblical doctrine regarding the image of God. For the Bible sees true man as that whole, consisting of body, soul and spirit, whose togetherness, as MAN, is what constitutes his being 'made according to the image'.

Origen's doctrine of the Fall is cosmic. It describes a multitude of individual defections on the part of the wholly spiritual 'νόημα'. (1) It would appear that Origen taught that the entire creation fell (2) with one solitary exception, namely the being who became the rational and human soul of Jesus. (3) If Origen were pressed to answer the difficult question regarding when the Fall took place, he would probably answer that it took place before time, 'before the ages' and cannot, therefore, be conceived in a strictly temporal manner (4) beyond suggesting that the 'νόημα' began the Fall contemporaneously, following swiftly upon the initial rebellion of one of the 'intelligences' who later became known as Satan. (5).

No adequate answer is provided to the question - Why did the Fall take place. In one passage, Origen says that 'the devil....since

(1) - De Prin: II.viii.3 Koetschau V. 159. Anathema II of Second Coun. Constant. 543 A.D.

(2) - Actually the extant texts are contradictory. Some (De Prin:I.v.3. Koet. V.73 "virtutes istae...ex merito....praelatae sint" and De Prin: I.v.5; Koetschau V. 77 "inter illas....quae adhuc inmaculatae permanent") state that some of the 'intelligences' did not fall. Other passages (De Prin: II.i.1: Koet. V.107 "το θεοκίλων της ἀγαθωτερ Γ '" and De Prin: II.viii.3: Koetschau V. 159. "πάντων των θεωκίλων της ρανθημην ....)const της θεωκίλων θεω...) imply a total fall.

(3) - De Prin: II.viii.3. Koetschau V. 160. (Anathema VIa of Second Council of Constantinople)

(4) - c.f. E.R.Redepenning, "Origenes" Vol.II.p.338 "Origenes....gleich dem Ewigen eine ideale Priorität zuerkennt, aus demselben die Zeit herleitet, und in dasselbe sie zurückführt, auf zeitlose Momente".

(5) - De Prin: I.viii.1: Koetschau V. 96.
he possessed freewill, desired to resist God and God drove him away'. (1)
In another passage he says that the 'intelligences' .......... were seized with weariness of the Divine love and contemplation and changed for the worse'. (2)

Origen's philosophy of evil is basically related to his doctrine of the Fall. The origin of evil lies in the will of each individual spirit, who has become evil simply by departing from the good. (3) Sin in its root is pride. (4). The loss or defection which constitutes the fall is the assertion of 'Not Being' which is synonymous with evil. (5)

What are the consequences of this universal Fall?
The unity (ἐνά) of the transcendental cosmos is broken and the spirits (ἀ λογίκα) begin to sink and separate from one another. (6)

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(1) - De Prin: I.viii.1 Koetschau V.96

(2) - De Prin: II.viii.3: Koetschau V.159. Bigg. "Christian Platonists" pp. 242 - 243 says "If the spirits were all alike, all subject to precisely the same conditions, why did any fall away?

(3) - De Prin: II.ix.2 Koet: V. 165 - 166. "Recedere autem a bono non aliud est quam effici in malo. Certum namque est malum esse bono carere. Ex quo accidit, ut in quanta mensura quis devolveretur a bono, in tantam mensuram malitiae deveniret".

(4) - Hom. IX.2 in Ezec. Lommatzsch XIV. 121. "Superbia peccatis omnibus major est, et ipsius diaboli principale peccatum".

(5) - Origen develops this explanation of sin and evil very clearly in II.13 of his Commentary on St. John. Freuschen. IV.69...... ο ς ἐ ρ α υ τρα φέ ντες τιν των "Ὅ τους μετεχέν, τω τετερέφθαται των "Ὅ τους κύριον "Ο λογικας "Ο λογικας..."

(6) - De Prin: II.i.1 and II.viii.3: Koet: V. 107 and 159.
Thus becomes manifest a vast hierarchy, ranging from the Cherubim and Seraphim, through rulers, authorities, lordships, angels, men and daemons. (1) Not only is the degree of the Fall indicated by these ranks or grades (which now receive names) but it is externally indicated by the possession of bodies, varying from light and ethereal vestures to dark and heavy frames. (2) Between the spirit and the body there exists an intermediary link called the soul. Some fallen creatures abide in this 'soul' condition without falling farther. (3) Divine punishment follows upon every defection or sin, and the body constitutes the form of this punishment. It is a prison. (4) Origen does not attempt to explain how it is that the individual spirits are collected into the various groups of the fallen hierarchical system, such as angels, men and daemons. We are left to assume that this is part of the dispensation of Divine Providence, which operates instantly the Fall has occurred and plans a vast cosmic 'education' wherein all punishment is remedial and aims at restoring every creature to its original condition of purity and freedom. (5) The innate freedom of the fallen spirits is not

(1) - De Prin: II.viii.3 Koetschau V.159
(2) - De Prin: I.vii.5.-II.viii.3 - I.viii.1: Koet:V.92-182-159 and 96 II. x. 8
(3) - De Prin: II.viii.3 Koet:V.161 "mens corruens facta est anima". Origen explains the 'soul' as being etymologically derived from χειμών 'cold'. It expresses the chilling of the true Divine life of ψυχή as it sinks from God. See preceding paragraphs of same passage. For the idea of spirits which remain in the 'psychic' stage of the Fall, see I.viii.4 Koet: V.102 - "But this seems to be merely a waiting place before incarnation. ἐν θεοῦ τιμίᾳ τἀν ψυχήν ἀν ἐξονθισθεῖν ἐν
(5) - De Prin: III.v.8 Koet:V.279. De Prin: I.i.2 Koet:V.17. H.Koch takes the title of his study of Origen from the two Greek words "πρῶτον καὶ πάντες τίς" which express this aspect of Origen's thought. c.f. De Prin: IV.i.7 and III.i.15. Koet:V.303 and 223.
destroyed and continues to operate in such a way that they may pass up and down in the hierarchy; men, for instance, becoming angels or daemons. (1)

As a result of the Fall, there is now created the 'αἰσθητὸν κόσμον' or universe which is apprehended by the senses. The original 'νοητὸν κόσμον' is not destroyed but continues to exist in a weakened form, weighed down by the body and darkened by reduced vision of God. (2) This cosmos is what is described in the narrative of the creation of the world in Genesis. It is called the 'καταβολὴ' since it is essentially a 'descent' from the higher cosmos to the lower. Though Origen sometimes describes the fall of individual spirits, as that of Lucifer, for instance, as taking place with great rapidity, generally descents are slow and gradual. (3) By this slow process it is possible for a spirit to descend to the level of the animals and insensate natures. (4)

Such, in brief, is the doctrine of the Fall described in the

(1) De Prin: II.viii.3 (Anathema v. of the Second Council of Constantinople).

(2) De Prin: II.viii.4. II.x.8. Koetschau V. 162 and 182. "aliaque mentes servare...prioris vigoris...nihil"

(3) De. Prin: I.v.5 and I.vi.2 Koetschau V. 77 and 81.

(4) De Prin: I.viii.4 Koetschau V. 103.

"ἐίτα τῆς λογικῆς δυνάμεως αἰσθητῆς τῆς αλογίας ἐμβλητεῖτεν. ἢκεῖθεν δὲ καὶ τῆς τιμῆς τῶν αἰσθήσεων Χάριτος ἐκφανεῖτος τῷ ἀναίσθητῳ ταύτῃ ζωῆν τὴν ἐν φυτοῖς μεταλαμβάνειν..."
First Principles. (1) We know that Origen gave two connotations to the word Man. Its cosmic reference included both daemons and angels. (2) Its terrestrial reference applies to Man as we usually think of him. In the Fall Origen saw this original cosmic Man split up into the different grades and ranks of creation, one of which forms terrestrial Man. All this vast diversity has come into existence, not by the plan of the Creator, but by the misdirection of freewill in the creatures. The visible cosmos is therefore, the result of Sin. (3)

In giving the above account, we have deliberately restricted ourselves to the material provided in the First Principles, because there we have Man most clearly related to Origen's cosmological

(1) - Both the resemblances to, and the differences from, Platonism of this outlook have been adequately dealt with by several Origenist students, among whom the fullest accounts are those of C.Bigg, "Christian Platonists" p. 276 (in which he traces Origen's theory of punishment to Plato's 'Gorgias'.) Eugène de Faye "Origène" III.vi. pp. 86 - 87 (in which he emphasises the identity of general conception, while elsewhere in "Origen and his Work" he points out the essential difference as being Origen's 'Christian' explanation of why the noumenal and phenomenal worlds contrast in terms of a transcendent Fall.) "It is worthy of note that this idea of a Fall, with the suprasensible world as its theatre, is utterly alien to purely Greek systems" p. 85. The channel through which Origen received the twin Greek and Christian conceptions was Gnosticism, Vol: I.pp. 100 - 101. H.Koch, "Pronoia und Paideusis" devotes almost half of his study to 'Origenes und die griechische Philosophie'. He sees the closest relationship between Origen and Plato in the basic idea of God which shapes the entire outlook. "Von Platon stammt in erster Linie der transzendentale Gottesbegriff nebst den meisten der Epitheta, womit Origenes den höchsten Gott zu beschreiben sucht" p. 202 - 203. Also p. 37 "Ohne Fall würde überhaupt nichts anderes existieren als die intelligible Welt".

(2) - Comm. in Joan: II. 23. Preuschen IV. 79.

(3) - For this estimate, see St Augustine's neat summing up of Origen's teaching in the "City of God" XI. 23 - "This is the world and this is the cause of its creation, not the production of good things, but the restraint of evil".
background. The picture is clear, logical and orderly. The question at once arises, - What relation has this doctrine of the Fall and Sin to the teaching of the Bible, particularly with its suggestion that the entire human race derives from Adam?

It was Bigg who, in his Bampton Lectures of 1886, emphasised that Origen has two doctrines of the Fall and Original Sin. The one, which we have described above, belongs to his Alexandrian period, when he absorbed the eclectic influences of the contemporary oriental, gnostic and hellenist thinking. (1) After 231, when he settled in Caesarea, he was there impressed by the locally established custom of Infant Baptism (2) and developed a 'Biblical' doctrine, which is approximately that of St Paul. If we turn now to his Homilies and Commentaries, we can form some idea of his thoughts about this new aspect of the origin and fall of human nature.

Origen's career at Alexandria as Head of the Catechetical School brought him constantly in touch with adults who were being prepared for Baptism. In his Homilies he frequently addresses these, and constantly his theme is that of the moral preparation required. (3)

(1) - "Christian Platonists of Alexandria" p. 246.
(2) - "Ideas of the Fall and Original Sin" N.P. Williams, p. 219.
(3) - Hom: xxi and xxii. in Luc: Hom: vi. 2 in Lev: are almost entirely in this vein.

XXI. "Propterea, obseco vos, ne absque cautela et diligentis circumspiceret bona, mundos vos a cunctis sordibus vitiosque servate, et tunc vobis remissio peccatorum fiet."

XXII. "Et vobis, qui venitis ad baptismum, dicitur: facite fructus dignos poenitentiae. Vultis scire, qui sunt fructus poenitentiae? Caritas fructus est spiritus, gaudium fructus est spiritus, pax, Patience, benignitas, bonitas, fides, mansue udo, continencia, et reliqua hujusmodi". (Lommatzsch v. 165 and 170)

For an excellent account of Origen's sacramental theology with special reference to Baptism, see "Origène" J. Danielou. pp. 65 - 72
The administration of the Church's sacramental rite, in which the factor of 'ex opere operantis' with its moral and volitional response to the living Saviour was emphasised, fitted in with Origen's theory of the pre-natal Fall, whose essential character was a moral and volitional weakening of response to a personal God. But, when, at Caesarea Origen joined a Christian community where Infant Baptism was an established rule, he was challenged in his own mind by the question, - What is the nature of this 'sinfulness' which in Baptism is believed to be removed quite apart from the personal 'repentance' of the unconscious recipient of the Sacramental Grace bestowed 'ex opere operato'?

The first direction of his thinking appears to have lead him to investigate that mysterious force or quality, which impresses the primitive mind particularly in connection with the natural processes of conception, birth and sex. Modern anthropologists, deriving the Melanesian term from R.R.Marett, have studied it as 'Mana' and define it as a physical basis of both magic and taboo. (1)

Does it not seem that human birth in itself is impure? asks Origen. (2) He then quotes the familiar text, (Psalm LI. 3 'In sin hath my mother conceived me') and proceeds to suggest that it is in order to remove this mysterious 'birth pollution' that baptism is


(2) - Hom: VIII.3 in Lev: - "Num vero requiramus etiam illud, quid causae sit, quod mulier, quae in hoc mundo nascentibus ministerium praebet, non solum, cum semen susceperit, immunda fieri dicitur, sed et cum pepererit".
applied to infants. (1) It was in this way, suggests N.P.Williams, that "Origen was compelled to search for the ultimate fount of the sinfulness of sexuality or generation - a broad universal fact, as he thought, which could hardly have been produced by a number of pre-natal or transcendental acts of individual souls - in some catastrophic happening upon the plane of matter; in other words, he was forced back upon the conception of a single historic 'Fall' in time and in this world, and therewith upon a more or less literal interpretation of the Adam story". (2)

But his thought does not arrive easily at that conclusion. In his Canticles Commentary we see him still struggling with this idea of 'birth pollution' and seeking to trace it to Eve being seduced by the serpent. (3) A poison is conveyed from generation to generation and only Christ is free from it, because He was born of a virgin and

(1) "Audi David dicentem: in iniquitatibus, inquit, conceptus sum et in peccatis peperât me mea mater: ostendens, quod quaecunque anima in carne nascitur, iniquitatis et peccati sorde polluitur". "Addi his etiam illud potest, ut requiratur, quid causae sit, cum baptismâ ecclesiae pro remissione peccatorum detur, secundum ecclesiae observantiam etiam parvulis baptismum dari: cum utique, si nihil esset in pervulis, quod ad remissionem debet et indulgentiam pertinere, gratia baptismi superflua videretur". (Lomm: ix. 318 - Hom: in Lev: viii. 3)

(2) N.P.Williams in "Ideas of the Fall and Original Sin" p. 226 - 227.

(3) Comm: in Cant: III. Lomm. xv. 54. "Qui enim talis est, merito dicit: sicus cervus desiderat ad fontes aquarum, ita desiderat anima mea ad te, Deus. Cervus quoque amicitiarum quis alius videbitur nisi ille, qui peremit serpentem illum, qui seduxerat Evam, et eloqui sui flatibus peccati in eam venena diffundens, omnem posteritatis sobolem contagio praevaricationis infecerat: et venerat solvere inimicitias in carne sua quas inter Deum et hominem noxius mediator effecerat?" Origen says that it is Christ who breaks this evil transmission of sinfulness.
His body alone is undefiled. (1) It is only when he comes to comment upon St. Paul's Epistle to the Romans, that his Caesarean 'birth stain' theory reaches its full development in line with mature Pauline thought.

The story in the third chapter of Genesis is assumed to be history. This is evident from practically all the references to Adam which occur in Origen's Commentary on Romans. There is one particularly interesting confirmation of his acceptance of the historicity of Adam, given elsewhere in his Matthew Commentary, where he quotes a legend to the effect that Adam was actually buried on the hill of Calvary, the place of the 'head', that is, the Head or Source of the human race. Adam. (2) Origen's quick imagination seized upon the Pauline figure of Adam and Christ as being the twin Representatives of the Human Race. In his St John Commentary, he likens Adam, or indeed identifies Adam, with Christ as the first born of all creation. But probably here the meaning is passing out of the strictly

(1) - Hom:XII.4 in Lev: Lomm.ix.389 "Omnis ergo homo in patre et in matre pollutus est, solus vero Jesus Dominus meus in hanc generationem mundus ingressus est, in matre non est pollutus. Ingressus est enim corpus incontaminatum. Ipse enim erat, qui et dudum per Salomonem dixerat: magus autem cum essum bonus, veni ad corpus incoiningatum". The force of the last word refers to the absence of the 'poisonous transmission' indicated in the preceding passage. c.f. N.P.Williams, pp.57 - 122 and 227 op.cit. That Origen was 'temperamentally' disposed to locate 'sinfulness' with sexuality and generation is evident from his own act of self castration. c.f. Huet "Origeniana" I.i.i para.13 and for an interesting psychological appraisal of Origen as a psychological type in connection with this act, see C.J.Jung, "Psychological Types" pp. 23 and 38.

(2) - "Locus autem Calvariae dicitur non qualemunque dispensationem habere ut illis, qui pro hominibus moriturus fuerat, moreretur, venit enim ad me traditio quaedam talis, quoniam corpus Adae primi hominis ibi sepultum est ubi crucifixus est Christus, ut 'sic ut in Adam omnes moriuntur sic in Christo omnes vivificentur' ut in loco illo, qui dicitur Calvariae locus, id est locus capitis, caput humani generis resurrectionem inveniat cum populo universo per resurrectionem Domini salvatoris, qui ibi passus est et resurrexit". (Comm: in Matt: xxvii.34. Klostermann xi.2. p.285).
historical level and becoming allegorised. (1) Adam's sin is accepted as being the single act of disobedience, as described in Genesis, which resulted in his expulsion from Paradise. (2) Being the original or 'source man' he contained in himself the whole human race potentially, who were accordingly expelled with him. (3) The punishment of sin is death. (4) It was after his original sin of disobedience that Adam became the begetter of the human race. (5) Both the life which he generated and the sin which he had committed were transmitted to his


κρυπτότακτος ἡσυχίας νόμος κτίσεως, ἀλλὰ καὶ Ἄδημ ἑρμηνεύεται ἀνθρώπος"


(4) - Comm: in Romans: V.1. Lommatzsch. vi. p. 326. "Per ipsum mors, quae ei ex praevericatione venerat, consequenter et in eos pertransit, qui in lumbis ejus habebantur".

(5) - Comm: in Romans. V.ix. Lomm: vi.397 - "Corpus enim peccati est corpus nostrum, quia nec Adam scribitur cognovisse Evam uxorem suam, et genuisse Cain, nisi post peccatum".
posterity. (1) This transmitted sinfulness lay dormant until with the coming of the Law with Moses, it was provoked into actual sins (praevvaricationes) whereby sinners became aware of their own sinful state. (2) The reversal of all this fallen condition of the human race has been undertaken by Christ, Who as the second Adam offers obedience in place of disobedience, life in place of death. (3) All justification is by faith alone. (4) Yet good works must follow faith. (5) The will of each fallen member of the human race, deriving from Adam, remains free and salvation results from free choice and acceptance of what Christ the second Adam has won.

(1) - Comm: in Romans.V.ix. Lomm.vi.325 and 326. "A muliere enim initium peccati, et ante mulierem a serpente, sive a diaboli, de quo dicitur in Evangelio, quia ille homicida erat ab initio. Sed vide in his ap ostolum naturae ordinem tenuisse, et ideo, quoniam de peccato loquabus, ex quo mors in omnes homines pertransierat, successionem posteritatis humanae, quae huic morti succubuit ex peccato venienti, non mulieri adscribit, sed viro".

"Neque ergo ex serpente, qui ante mulierem peccaverat, neque ex muliere, quae virum in praevaricatione facta est, sed per Adam, ex quo omnes mortales originem ducent, dicitur introisse peccatum, et per peccatum mors".

(2) - Comm: in Romans.V.1. Lomm:ix.p.322 - "Manifestum est autem, peccatum non posse imputari, ubi lex non est, quae arguat peccatorem. 'Regnavit autem mors' quae er peccatum fuerat ingressa, 'per Mosen', hoc est, usque quo lex permansit, in eos, qui peccaverunt secundum similitudinem pecci Adam' per quem mors ipsa accept ingressum"

(3) - Same passage - Christ "qui Adam forma futuri est, 'non secundum quod praevaricatus est, sed secundum hoc, quod sicut per ipsum mors ita per novissimum Adam vita ingressa est in hunc mundum: et sicut per illum in omnes homines condemnatio, ita et per Christum in omnes homines justificatio"


(5) - Same passage. p. 219. "Sed fortassis haec aliquis audiens resolvatur et bene agendi neglentiam capiat, siquidem ad justificandum fides sola sufficiat. Ad quam dicemus, qui post justificationem si injuste quis agat, sine dubio justificationis gratiam sprexit.... Indulgentia namque non futurorum, sed praeteritorum criminum datur".
Such in brief is Origen’s alternative theory of the Fall and original Sin, which he developed during his stay at Caesarea. If we may appear to have failed to describe it as clearly and logically as was possible in dealing with the theory of the Alexandrian period, it is, we believe, because Origen himself was far from being satisfied in his own mind. He was attempting to press his thought into a Biblical or Pauline mould. This uncertainty is revealed even in some of the passages of his Commentary on Romans, where the earlier ‘pre-natal’ Fall keeps intruding as an alternative. (1)

Is it possible that a mind, as philosophical as Origen’s was, could retain permanently two interpretations of the same truth, without attempting to combine them, harmonise them and to produce an integrated explanation? In attempting to answer that, we are at a disadvantage because his Commentary on Genesis (where he is sure to have got to grips with the Biblical account of Man’s origin and fall) is lost. Some students feel that his extant works are inadequate to make any such

(1) - Comm: in Romans. V.1. Lomm: vi. p. 328 - "Require sane, quoniam per unum hominem in hunc mundum dicit introisse peccatum, et certum est, qui hic 'mundum' terrenum hunc appellat locum, in quo homines habitant si in nullo alio loco introit peccatum, neque in illis locis inventur, ubi 'spiritualia nequitiae in coelestibus' nominantur. Sed et illum apud temet ipsum pertracta, unde in hunc mundum introit peccatum, aut ubi erat, priusquam huc introiret, aut si omnino erat, vel si fuit ante illum ad quem dicitur 'usque quo inventae sunt iniquitates in te, et propter hoc proici te in terram'. (Ezech. xxviii. 17)."

Comm: in Romans. V.4. Lomm: vi. p. 364 - "Omnes enim in loco hoc humiliationis et in convalle fletus effecti sunt: sive quod in lumbis Adami fuerunt omnes, qui ex eo nascentur et cum ipsa pariter ejecti sunt: sive allo qualibet inenarrabili modo et soli Deo cognito unusquisque de Paradiso trusus videtur et excepisse condernationem"
It is therefore, only with the greatest hesitancy, knowing how inadequate are the grounds for making the attempt, that we suggest the following solution to the problem.

In one of his Homilies on Genesis, Origen argues that a clear distinction exists between Man's invisible and interior nature and his bodily and external form. When it says in Genesis, that God made Man, it uses the word 'formed' to explain how his body came into existence. Adam is formed out of the dust or slime. But the true Man, the interior and invisible spirit, which bears the image of God, was created in an incorporeal state. May we not say that Origen retained his Platonic conception of the myriads of preexistent spirits, created by

(1) - N.P.Williams, "The Ideas of the Fall and Original Sin, p. 230 - 
"It will have been seen that it is no more possible to educe a single thought-out scheme of Fall-doctrine from the writings of Origen than from those of his Greek-Christian predecessors, the Apologists, Irenaeus, Clement. The main interest, indeed, which his speculations bear for the purposes of our enquiry resides in the fact that in them we find, lying side by side, and not yet articulated into coherent systems the 'disecta membra' of both the chief versions of the Christian doctrine of Man and Sin, 'once-born' or minimising, or 'twice-born' or maximising, which henceforward were destined to compete for the allegiance of the Church".

(2) - Hom: I.13 in Gen: Lomm: viii. p.121 - "Hunc sane hominem, quem dicit ad imaginem Dei factum, non intelligimus corporalem. Non enim corporis figmentum Dei imaginem continet, neque factus esse corporalis homo dicitur, sed plasmatus, sicut in consequentibus scriptum est. Ait enim 'et plasmavit Deus hominem' si est, finxit de terrae limo. Is autem, qui ad imaginem Dei factus est et ad similitudinem, interior homo noster est, invisibilis et incorporalis, et incorruptus at que immortalis".

(3) - Further on, after giving the literal meaning of 'male and female created He them' Origen proceeds to allegorise this into meaning the inward marriage between spirit and soul, which results in the fruitful progeny of inward thoughts in the individual mind. "Videamus autem etiam per allegoriam quomodo ad imaginem Dei homo factus est masculus et femina. Interior homo noster ex spiritu et anima constat. Masculus spiritus dicitur, femina anima potest nuncupari. Haec si concordiam inter se habeant et consensus, conveniethia inter se ipsa crescent et multiplicatut, generantque filios sensus bonos, intellectus, vel cogitationes utiles...".
God in the eternal world, the transcendent cosmos? When, however, they fell, they were condemned to inhabit bodies...bodies, which, however, were formed by God. The story of that formation is part of the story of the foundation (καταβολή) of the world. To procure these bodies, God formed Adam, who by his generation became the source of all human bodies into which came the preexistent spirits.

There is one short passage in the First Principles, which is a kind of key opening the door to what may have been the hidden synthesis in Origen's mind. We shall quote it fully in English, besides giving the original Greek in the foot notes. (1) - "All go back to Adam, who the Apostle says is Christ (1 Cor: xv.45). For the origin of all families that are in touch with the God of the whole world (τῶν ζηλων) began lower down with Christ, who comes next after the God and Father of the whole world (τῶν ζηλων) and is thus the father of every soul, as Adam is the father of all men". Does the meaning not appear to be exactly as we have suggested above, that every soul was created in the Divine Realm through Christ, who is therefore its father or originator. This applies to all the rational beings, who in their diverse falls became angels, men or daemons. But those who became men and were required to take bodies, derived these through Adam, who is therefore, their father or source, as far as characteristic bodily human nature is concerned. Man, therefore, has two sources. He is the product of two 'creations' - a higher and a lower. He is the child of two Original

(1) - De Prin: IV.iii.7 - "πάντων ἀναγομένων ἐπὶ τῶν Ἀδάμ. Ὁν ἐκ ἀπόστολος εἶναι φησὶ τὸν Χριστὸν ἢ πὰσα βορὰ θερμή πατριῶν τῶν ὡς πρὸς τῶν τῶν θεῶν κατωτέρω ἀπὸ Χριστοῦ ἡ ἡράκλειο τοῦ μετὰ τῶν τῶν θεῶν φαντάζεται οὕτω πατρὸς οὗτος πάσης γενεᾶς. ὡς δὲ Ἀδάμ πατὴρ ἐστι πάντων τῶν ἀνθρώπων."
Sources, to which all families trace back, to Christ and to Adam, who share a representative and archetypal function and can to that extent, in the Apostle's words, be identified together.

No doubt, if this is near the harmonisation of Greek and Biblical ideas which Origen may have attempted, he would have elaborated it much more fully. The very problem of the uneasy combination of the dissimilar theories has emphasised, however, how complex Origen's doctrine of Man is becoming. We have seen that, possibly in his own synthesis of all his departmental approaches, there remained elements which would not combine, aspects which would not correspond, and that there is no easy way by which we can arrive at a total view of so complex an enigma as Man.
"The Freedom of the Will"

Most students of Origen have commented upon the importance of freedom in all departments of Origen's thought. Huet saw in it the twin source of Origen's errors. (1) De Faye called it the cornerstone of his entire system. (2) Koch describes it as the foundation of all his theology. (3) Danielou describes Origen's universe as being a 'world of freedoms'. (4) We could repeat such comments from as many more writers. Let us now look for ourselves into this question.

Origen certainly was supremely interested in the topic. He composed a special treatise thereon which is however now lost. (5) The longest single chapter in his 'First Principles' is devoted to Freewill: (6) while throughout that work he makes frequent references to it. He touches upon a wide variety of aspects in nearly all of his other writings. (7)

(1) - HUET "Origeniana" II.ii.6 para 2 "mentium προωνυμίας et pleni ac perpetui libertatis usus...maximam Origenianorum errorum partem prodisse".

(2) - De FAYE "Origène" III. 179. "Le libre arbitre est la pierre angulaire du système tout entier de notre théologien".

(3) - KOCH - "Pronoia und Paideusis" p. 284. "Die Lehre von der Willensfreiheit bildet eins der Fundamente in Origenes ganzer Theologie".

(4) - DANIELOU "Origène" p. 207. "Son univers est un monde de libertés".

(5) - So DENIS "De la Philosophie d'Origène" p. 249. "La liberté l'avait même assez préoccupé pour qu'il lui consacrât un traité spécial, aujourd'hui perdu".

(6) - De Prin: III.i.

The "νόεσ" as originally created were free. (1) Each individual has the capacity and freedom of choice to do what is wholly good. (2) As long as they abide in goodness they remain pure. (3) The goodness which they possess depends upon the right use of free choice to preserve it and make it their own. The Fall begins with a weakening of adherence to the good. 'Negligence' ἄμελεια is Origen's favourite word for describing the slipping away from God which is the lapse into sin. (4) Only in one passage does he speak of resistance to God and rebellion and that is in connection with the devil. (5) It was this primal misuse of freewill which brought the 'stumbling-block' of death to those unwilling to undertake the labours of virtue. (6) Once the 'νόεσ' have become negligent, that is, are fallen creatures, they are punished by being imprisoned in bodies. In this condition, they live permanently confronted by the alternatives of good and evil.

(1) - De Prin: II.ix.2 Koetschau V. 165. "Voluntarios enim et liberos Motus a se conditis mentibus creator indulsit." Also II.ix.7 De Orat: VI.1 - 4 Koetschau II. pp. 311 - 314 and XXIX.13 Koetschau pp. 387 - 388.

(2) - Comm.in Cant: IV. Lommatzsch xv. 72 "inesse unicuique animae vim possibilitatis, et arbitrii libertatem, qua possit agere omne quod bonum est".

(3) - De Prin: I.viii.4 Koetschau V. 102 - 163.

(4) - De Prin: II.ix.2 Koetschau V. 165 "desidia et laboris taedium in servando bono et aversio ac negligentia meliorum initium dedit recedendi a bono".

(5) - De Prin: I.viii.1 Koetschau V. 96.

(6) - Comm. in Matt: XIII.23. Benz und Klostermann X.1 p. 243

"...ἀόρ "ὁ θεὸς θάνατον αὐξ ἐποίησεν", οὕτως οὐδὲ σκάνδαλα ἐκτίσειν, ἀλλὰ τὸ αὐτός ξούσιον ἐγένεισεν ἐν τήν τὸ σκάνδαλον, μὴ βουλὴ θεῖαν ἀνατίθηναι τὸν ὑπὲρ ὑπερὶ ἀρετῆς πένους..."
None the less, argues Origen, their freedom remains. They are still uncompelled or subject to any necessity. (1) This constitutes Origen's distinctive doctrine that the will is permanently free. It was free during the preexistence of each individual and its misdirection accounts for his present life here on earth. It remains free during this life and its exercise freely determines his own future destiny. All the diversity in the world is not due to Divine arrangement, but to the exercise of creaturely freewill before or during this life.

(1) - REDEPENNING "Origenes" II. 317 - 328 deals very searchingly with Origen's whole doctrine of freedom and freewill. After describing the somewhat 'gnostic' pattern of Origen's cosmology with its 'graded' Trinity, constituting the Divine realm where freedom and necessity are identical, he next examines the 'Transcendental' world of spirits, whose possession of goodness is not essential but accidental, depending upon freedom of choice to preserve it. Redepenning then comes to the human situation which is the result of the Fall. He states that implicit in Origen's thought is the distinction between material freedom, which is surrender to the good (the original state of the 'νόος ') and formal freedom, which is power to choose between good and evil (the present and restricted freedom of the fallen spirits). But what Origen completely fails to understand is that the former alone constitutes true freedom. The spirits through their Fall have lost this true freedom. What they have is a kind of unfreedom. It is this which Origen exalts to make it virtually become their true freedom which it cannot be.

Redepenning's criticism is one which Brunner would heartily endorse - "Man in Revolt" p. 265.

The concluding part of Redepenning's criticism is as follows:- "Sein begriff der Freiheit, die er mit Vernunft wesentlich verbunden denkt, fast ganz in der stoischen Weiss, gründet sich auf die Beobachtung der bedingten menschlichen Freiheit, wie sie erscheint, wo Gutes und Böses schon neben einander in dem, welcher handelt, angetroffen werden. Anstatt es zu bemerken, dass in diesem Zustande bereits Unfreiheit ist, und so die wahre Freiheit noch eine ganz andere Seite haben müsse neben dem Moment des Wähens, steigert er nur das Wählenkönnen, und findet so das Wesentliche der Freiheit in dem völlig ungehemmten Wahlvermögen" p. 319.
After death the will continues to be free. (1) Another aspect of human freedom which Origen appears to stress is the 'indifference' of the will, that is, its equal aptitude or tendency to move towards good or evil. (2) It is clear, however, that Origen does not mean to exclude

(1) - De Prin: Pref.5.Koet: V. 12 "non nos necessitate esse subjectos, ut omni modo, etiamse nolimus, vel mala vel bone agere cogamur" and De Prin: III.i. l - 6. Comm.in Roman. VI. 3 Lomm: VII.10 - 11 "sponte nostra ipsi nos exhibemus, nullo cogente, vel peccato servire, vel justitiae per obedientiam nostram" and Comm. in Roman VII.17 & VIII.10. Hom.XVII.4 in Jer. Klostermann III. 148 "k^etos €k^etos €k^€st €st1 αεων γραϕηναι... κ.τ.λ." Comm. in Roman. V.10 Lomm: vi. 409 "in futuris saecululis teneat arbitrii liberatatem......"

(2) - HUET "Origeniana" II.i.7 paras. 1 - 5 Lomm: XXIII.40 - 52 takes up this point and defends Origen against the charges put forward by Jerome in the iv century and by Jansen in the xvii century. He quotes two passages (Comm. in Roman. III.3....Lomm: vi. 181 and Comm. in Cant. IV..Lomm: xv. 72) which effectively support his contention that Origen distinguished between the nature of freedom before and after the Fall. But he criticises him for a failure to sustain this distinction throughout his works generally. It is this, says Huet, which has provoked the misunderstandings regarding his teaching and has lead to the charge that he taught pure indifferentism. Actually, Origen was quite orthodox. He taught that while after the Fall the strength of the human will for good was weakened, the principle of its pure nature as freedom of choice was preserved. This was all that he meant by his insistence on the permanence of freedom. None the less, his failure, as we have pointed out, to sustain his basically correct view and his connecting it with preexistence, led him into errors.

Huet's summing up is as follows:- "Verum ut in definienda arbitrii humani libertate rectum iter tenuit Origenes, non itidem in distinguenda naturae integrae, ac naturae lapsae liberrate satis adhibuit reperias et saepe naturae culibet, quae rationis composita sit, quemunque denum ordinem adepta sit, aequalem tribuit liberi arbitrii facultatem, et usum, ut supra dictum est. Atque est unus fuit e praecepis Pelagianorum erroribus, paribus liberis arbitrii viribus pollentem finxisse hominem Hodie nascentem, parique justitia, allisque instructum dotibus, quals a Deo conditus fuit Adamus. Attamen, si perfricare velimus frontem, et Origenem periculo quovis defendere, hanc adhiberis poterimus exceptionem: quamvis humanae vires libertatis per Adami lapsum infractae ac debilitatae sint naturam tamen ipsam libertatis illius suam servasse integritatem: nec ullam proinde signatum esse ab Origene distinctionem inter libertatem, quae Adami praecessit lapsun, et quae consequa est, quod ad purum respicerit libertatis naturam, non ad robor ipsius et potestatem"
the action and necessity of grace. He states definitely that since the Fall, the will of itself is insufficient to achieve the good. (1)

All exercise of freewill takes place in a providentially controlled world in which God ever seeks to direct the individual soul to its eternal salvation. (2) His care of souls is greater than the devil's activity to mislead and destroy them. (3)

Having formulated his theory of the freedom of the will, Origen sought to justify it on Scriptural grounds. Two difficulties faced him. One was that, while most of the Scriptures supported the general moral foundation of his outlook, there were a number of passages which appeared to deny the freedom of the will. (4) The other difficulty was encountered when Origen confronted the 'predestination' theology.

(1) - De Prin: III.ii.3 Koetschau v. 250 "Ea autem virtute, quae nobis data est ut vincere possimus, secundum liberi arbitrii facultatem aut industrie utimur et vincimus, aut segment et superamur". Hom: XII.5 in Numb: Lomm: x. 135 "Quomodo posceret ab homine Deus, nisi haberet homo in sua potestate, quod poscenti Deo deberet offerre? Sunt ergo, quae dantur a Deo, et sunt, quae praebentur ab homine".

(2) - Con. Cel. V.21 Koetschau II. 23 "ημεῖς δὲ κατὰ τὴν ἀναλογίαν τῆς σχέσεως τῶν ἐφ' ἡμῖν ἐκκέντρον οἰκονομεῖος θαλ' ὑπὸ τῶν θεοῦ λέγουτες τὸ κάν καὶ ἔξω θέτω κατὰ τὸ ἐνδεχομένου ἐν δεξετείς... κ.τ.λ..."

(3) - Hom.XX.3 in Numb: Lomm: x. 255 - 254 "Sui namque arbitrii est anima, et in quam voluerit partem est ei liberum declinare; et ideo justum Dei judicium est, quis sponte sua sive bonis, sive pessimis monitoribus paret. Vis tibi adhuc amplius quid ex scripturis divinis ostendam, quodmodo major cura salutis erga homines Deo est, quam diabolo perditionis?"

(4) - The entire first chapter of the third book of his "First Principles" is devoted to the general Scriptural support of his view. We need not review his treatment of the matter here, as it has been critically surveyed by Denis. op. cit. p. 249 ff. who does not feel that Origen succeeds in grasping the full challenge which much in the Bible presented to his theory. We shall refer to Denis's criticisms fully near the end of this chapter.
of St Paul. (1) To his own satisfaction he overcame these difficulties, but it is the considered opinion of most subsequent students of his work, that he failed to penetrate into the real core of the problem. (2) It was left to Augustine, to deepen the depths of Biblical insight into the

(1) - This he did in his Commentary on Romans, where he side-stepped the issue, arguing that predestination simply means that God foresees that right disposition leads to salvation.

Among all Origenist students, perhaps Bigg has attempted best to discuss the particular problem involved here in connection with predestination, determinism, grace and freewill, as these are raised by Origen, particularly in his Romans Commentary.

In his Bampton Lectures, "The Christian Platonists of Alexandria" - pp. 109 - 111, 245 - 245, 274, 278, 333 - 359 he approaches the problem in its background setting of Alexandrian philosophy in general. St. Paul and Plato, according to Bigg, are united in conceiving of freedom as being freedom from conflicting motives, never as being freedom of the will in itself. (p.109). The Alexandrians, however, made an advance when they directed attention upon this latter aspect of freedom, and defined the will as an independent faculty, choosing between good and evil, selecting, and in fact creating, its own motive. (p.111). They were driven to this in face of the Gnostic teaching, that, if Adam sinned, then his Creator was an imperfect God, and not freedom, but determinism, swayed human destiny. Origen, Bigg feels, escaped the charge of teaching out and out indifferentism of the will, because he admitted that at a point in the upward stage, grace absorbs the will, and at a point in the downward stage, evil becomes second nature. It was this setting of freedom in grace which made Origen's contribution a Christian contribution.

Grace is always present to the will, first in the form of reason which leads to virtue; and secondly, in the form of revelation which leads to salvation and that eternal life which is the gift of God. None the less, Bigg is highly critical of the refusal on Origen's part to fix a point at which the culminating stages of absorption of the will by grace or fixing of it in evil as second nature, take place. This meant that Origen's departure from Plato was only to push the insoluble problem of the will's freedom one step further back and to stereotype one form (i.e. Clement's) of the vicious theory of indifferentism. (343)

(2) - DENIS "Philosophie d'Origène" pp. 249 - 279 traces Origen's failure to his inadequate psychology. "Si Origène s'était donné le temps de méditer longuement ce qu'il écrivait, au lieu d'entasser ve volume sur volume, il se serait bien vite aperçu que cette physiolog le stoïcienne convenait assez mal avec la tendance générale de ses pensées. (p. 252). In agreement with Redepenning and other critics, as we have noticed, Denis points out the limitation of Origen's view that freedom is essentially 'freedom of choice between good and evil', "(αυτοναθανατον") he writes, "ou libre arbitre est-il toujours, pour Origène, identique au προαριστηκόν ou la faculté de choisir. It devait pourtant voir dans la liberté quelque chose de plus profond". (p. 253).
question, to unite grace and freedom, and to bequeath to Christian posterity the classical exposition, which Origen distantly glimpsed only in his Commentary on the Song of Songs. (1)

None the less, Origen's contribution to the study of freedom in human nature is noteworthy. He may, indeed, have based his ideas on an inadequate psychology. No doubt, he misplaced the emphasis, giving too much attention to human effort and too little to Divine Grace. He may also have minimised the disastrous effects of sin on human nature and freedom. But these were 'errors' which surrounded, but did not usurp, the central place and significance which he gave to freedom. He never ceased to preach that Man is most truly Man when he is most truly free. His errors belonged to his temperament and also largely to his

(1) - DENIS feels that Origen's treatment of the theme in his two main 'loci classici' - the First Principles and the Treatise on Prayer "n'ont qu'une médiocre originalité" (250). In his Commentary on the Song of Songs he comes nearest to achieving an adequate philosophy of freedom when he dilates upon love as the supreme motive of the will directed to God. "L'amour ainsi entendu n'est pas un simple mobile de la volonté, mais le mouvement même de la volonté, qui, mue par Dieu, va au bien en général, et par conséquent, à Dieu" (p. 259). Unfortunately, according to Denis, Origen hesitates to follow these ideas to their fullest consequence. It would not serve any considerable purpose to follow Denis through all his detail. Suffice it to conclude by noting that in his opinion Origen's preoccupation with freedom of choice led him into two erroneous attitudes of mind. First, though Origen made original sin 'le point de départ de toute sa cosmologie', yet actually, through divesting it of all historic origin and meaning, by relegating it to a preexistent world, he removed from it true practical significance. (p.263) Secondly, his insistence on freewill tended to efface the importance of grace, and he turned prevenient grace into concomitant grace. "Dans ces limites, Origène est absolument conforme à ce qui est devenu l'orthodoxie. Mais bientôt la liberté reprend la place principale. La grâce accompagne toujours nos actes méritaires; mais il semble qu'elle les suive plutôt qu'elle ne les prévient". (p. 276).
time. His orthodoxy belongs to the unchanging sweep of Christian insight which demands that in every doctrine of Man freedom and morality shall harmonise to the well-being of Man and the glory of God. Origen in all his study of Freedom never ceased to keep these twin poles in sight. (1)

(1) - DANTÉLOU "Origène" p. 204 "Ainsi Origène - et c'est le propre d'un grand système - ramène toute sa pensée à deux données: une Providence bienfaisante, des créatures libres. Absolument tout dans sa doctrine se déduira de ces deux principes".
CHAPTER SIX

"The Soul"

We turn now to the question of the Soul, which Origen himself recognised to be specially difficult. (1) The treatise, which he is believed to have written about the Soul, has not survived. (2) None the less, there remains ample material, and once again, it is in the First Principles, representing his Alexandrian period, that we find the fullest exposition. (3) Another difficulty, however, remains, namely Origen's habit of using 'νοῦς' and 'ψυχή' or 'mens' and 'anima' at times almost interchangeably, (4) It is, however, practically always clear from the logic of the passage which term is implied, as Origen's general outlook is quite evident. (5)

(1) - Comm: in Joan: VI.14. Preuschen. IV. p. 124 - "καὶ ἡμαξακαλῶς ὁ περὶ ψυχῆς λόγος πολὺς καὶ διεφερόμενος ὃν ἡμαχθήσομεν ἀπὸ τῶν ἐν τοῖς γραφαῖς σφοράδων κειμένων ἰδίως δεῖξαι πράγματες "

De Prin: III.iv.1 Koetschau V. 264 where he sets forth three theories of the soul - (a) whether it consists of two parts of which 'una caelestis et alia inferior, (b) or of one heavenly part only, moved however to evils 'quae corpori grata sunt', or (c) of one essence but composed of a rational and an irrational part 'una per substantiam pars....rationabilis....pars vero inrationabilis'.

(2) - Pamphilus: "Apologia pro Origene" C.VIII. Lommatzsch. xxv. p. 397. "Denique in tam multis, et tam diversis ejus libris nusquam omnino inventur ab eo liber proprie de Anima conscriptus...".

(3) - De Prin: II.viii. the whole of which chapter is devoted to the Soul.

(4) - Examples of this are: - De Prin:III.iii.5 Koetschau V.p.262.line 11. De Prin: I. i.7 Koetschau V.p. 23.line 26.

His fundamental conception is that the soul is the result of the Fall. "Mens corruens facta est anima". (1) For general purposes, we may consider this 'mind' which fell as being synonymous with 'spirit' in human nature. This, is, at least, what Origen himself says is the usage of Scripture. (2) In these same Scriptures, however, we find a clear distinction between 'spirit' (πνεῦμα) and 'soul' (ψυχή). The latter has an intermediary function to perform between spirit and body, and is open to the influences of both virtue and vice. The spirit, however, which is in a man is 'something not accepting things inferior' (ἐνεπιδεκτόν δὲ τῶν ψυχῆρων). (3) It is the better or higher part of human nature (4) and is called the rational soul. (5) Its function is that of the guiding or leading principle in life. (6) It possesses a 'natural affection' (φιλήτρον φυσικὸν) for its Creator. (7)

(1) - De Prin: II.viii.3 Koetschau V. p. 161. Every Origenist scholar recognises this distinction, though few think that he succeeded in making clear what is involved. Denis op.cit. begins his discussion with these words:- "Qu'est-ce donc que l'âme? Entendons bien la question: Je dis : Qu'est-ce que l'âme (ψυχή), et non : Qu'est-ce que l'esprit (πνεῦμα) ou la nature raisonnable (λογική, νοερά φύσις)?" and proceeds to state that Origen failed to explain what he meant. "Grand embarras pour Origène et ses interprètes". (pp. 184 - 185)

(2) - Con.Cel: VI.70 Koetschau II. p. 140 - "πρὸς γὰρ ἀντιδίαστολήν τῶν ἀσθενῶν ἔθος τὴν γραφήν τῇ νοητῇ ἀνομίᾳ ζεῖν πνεύματε καὶ πνευματικά".

(3) - Comm: in Joan: XXXII.18 Preuschen IV. p. 455 "ἐν πάσῃ τῇ γραφῇ διαφοράν ψυχῆς καὶ πνεύματος καὶ μέγιστον κέν τε θεωρῶν εἶναι τὴν ψυχήν καὶ ἐπὶ διεχομένην ἀρτιότην καὶ κακίαν".

(4) - Comm: in Romans. I.10 Lomm: vi. p. 36 "meliore...parte, in spiritu".

(5) - De Prin: I.v.2 Koetschau V. p. 71

(6) - De Prin: II.xi.5 Koetschau V. p. 188 "spiritus principalis" which occurs also as "ἡ ψυχουκόν". It is a Stoic term. c.f. De Faye III.183.

(7) - Con.Cel: III.40 Koetschau I. p. 236
powers of imagination and desire, by which it may be defined. (1) It
does not grow with the body but is inserted from outside the body, which
it preexists. (2) But once inside the body, it is exposed to influences
both good and evil which place it in a situation of conflict. (3) The
embodied soul arrives in this present world by a kind of death. (4) The
nature of souls has no diversity, as the Gnostics teach. All souls are
the same, being rational in essence. (5)

Apparently, when Origen said that the mind in falling became
soul, he did not mean to say that the whole of mind became soul. The
'ψυχή' appears to retain a definitely intellectual aspect, which
justifies the phrase 'the rational soul'. This conception is clearly set
forth in a passage in the First Principles, wherein Origen suggests that
the soul consists of a 'better part' along with 'another part' which
through the misuse of freewill has come into 'a condition contrary to
the nature of its original purity'. (6)

(1) - De Prin: II.viii.1 Koetschau V. p. 152. "fantastikà kai òmnetikà"

(2) - De Prin: I.vii.4 Koetschau V. p. 90 "hominis est anima, non cum
corporibus ficta sed proprie et extrinsecus probatur inserta".

(3) - De Prin: III.iii.3 Koetschau V. pp. 248 - 9.

(4) - De Prin: IV.iii.11 Koetschau V. p. 339 "quae de superiori caelo
ad nostra habitacula venientes quodammodo mortuae sunt".


(6) - De Prin: II.x.7 Koetschau V. p. 161 - "de natura ipsius animae
intelligendum est, pars ejus melior illa docetur, quae 'ad
imaginem' Dei 'et similitudinem' facta est, alia autem 'pars' ea, quae
postmodum per liberis arbitrii lapsum contra naturam primae conditionis
et puritatis adsumpta est.....".
We must now try to deduce the nature of this 'other part'. A careful examination of all Origen's references to the soul (1) make it fairly clear that he is now thinking of the soul as 'vital principle' to the body. (2) In coming into that condition which is contrary to its original purity it has become the 'friend and beloved companion of the material body'. (3) In explaining what this 'animal soul' is, Origen uses extensively the language and ideas of St Paul concerning the flesh 'σαρκί' (4).

To bring out the differences from the 'rational' soul, we may examine it under the same heads, as have been given on the previous page when dealing with the latter. This 'vital' soul constitutes the earthly and lower part of human nature. (5) Just as the 'higher part', through its close relation to the mind, could be called the 'rational soul', so this 'lower part', through its close relationship with the body, can be called the 'soul of the flesh'. (6) Its passions are those of

(1) - These are exceedingly numerous, as the Indexes to the separate works both in Migne's "Patrologia" and in the G.C.S. series show. In preparing this study the writer has examined in detail, close on two hundred references in the First Principles and over two hundred in the 'Against Celsus'; as well as numerous quotations in the Commentaries and Homilies.

(2) - Most of the study of the soul as 'vital principle' comes from chapter four of the third book of the First Principles. Much of the material is conveyed as 'opinion' deriving from imaginary disputants and it may be Rufinus who serves it in this form. It represents, however Origen's attempts to grapple with the essential difficulty of the problem

(3) - De Prin: II.x.7 Koet: V. p. 181 - "amica et cara materiae corporalis".

(4) - De-Prin- St Paul: Romans VIII. 6 - 9.

(5) - De Prin: III.iv.2 Koetschau V. 264 - "inferior et terrena".

(6) - De Prin: III.iv.2 Koetschau V. p. 265 - "de hac anima, quae proprie carnis est anima".
irrational animals. (1) The chief function of this lower soul is to vitalise and move the body, which is quite dead without it. (2) The lower soul is by nature hostile to, and opposed to, the spirit. (3) Besides being the medium through which the bodily passions are expressed, this 'soul of the flesh' has many other passions which in no way take their origin from the flesh, and yet are contrary to the spirit, such as ambition, avarice, jealousy, envy and pride. (4) This lower soul is produced along with the body, is transmitted along with the bodily seed and cannot subsist apart from the body (5) in whose blood it exists. (6) All living creatures have souls of this 'vital' nature, from the highest angels and stars down to the lowest organic forms (7) and we can even speak of God having a soul, though in this case it is Christ who is His Soul. (8) Finally, Origen describes this lower soul as being a kind of 'material spirit'. (9).

(1) - De Prin: I.viii.3 Koetschau V. p. 103 "ἀνθρωπίνης δὲ ψυχῆς πάθος ὁ πρὸς τὸ ζῷον ἐστὶν ἐξαισθητικὸς"

(2) - De Prin: III.iv.1 Koetschau V. p. 264 - "quae corpora secundum proprium quidem naturam mortua sunt et penitus ex anima, quia ex nobis, id est ex animabus corpus materiale vivificatur".

(3) - Continuation of the same passage.

(4) - De Prin: III.iv.2 Koetschau V. p. 266

(5) - De Prin: III.iv.2 Koetschau V. p. 264 - 265

(6) - De Prin: III.iv.2 Koetschau V. p. 265 (Based on Leviticus xvii.14)

(7) - De Prin: II.viii.1 Koetschau V. p. 152 (animals) and 153 (angels)

(8) - De Prin: II.viii.5 Koetschau V. p. 163 "Sicut enim anima per omne corpus inserta movet omnia et agit atque operatur universa: ita et unigenitus filius Dei, qui est verbum et sapientia ejus, pertinget et pervenit ad omnem virtutem Dei, insertus ei".

(9) - De Prin: III.iv.2 Koetschau V. p. 265 - "spiritus quidam materialis".
The above exposition of Origen's doctrine of the soul of 'actual' man has brought out the evident dualism or dichotomy which characterises it. Indeed, more than two component parts are suggested. We might fairly speak of a trichometry, consisting of spirit, rational soul and fleshly soul. (1).

(1) - The nature of the soul appears to have presented to students of Origen the most difficult part of their task in explaining his doctrine.

HUNT. "Origeniana" II.i.6 devotes twenty sections to a meticulous examination of Origen's doctrine and a valuable running commentary on the main criticisms directed against it. He appears not to have felt as deeply as later writers the difficulty of combining the rationalist and vitalistic elements and is content to give his opinion that Origen held that the essence of the soul was mind only.

DENIS "De la Philosophie d'Origène" pp. 184 - 188 brings out clearly what he feels is the contradiction involved in ascribing to the soul 'deux théories qui s'accordent assez mal ensemble; celle qui considère l'âme comme l'esprit déchu, celle qui en fait le principe vital' (187). He blames Origen for asserting that 'L'âme est une sorte d'intermédiaire entre la chair et l'esprit' and then for failing to make indubitably clear whether it belongs 'à la création première ou bien n'est-elle née qu'avec la matière palpable et visible?' (185) Denis has many other criticisms, which are weighty but need not detain us here.

De FAYE "Origène" Vol. III. p. 84 f. - stresses the Platonic source of Origen's thought. The relevant passage explains itself. "La ὑγεία du Timée est bien différente de celle à laquelle Platon promettait l'immortalité dans son Phélion. Celle du Timée est formée de deux principes différents L'un c'est 'la substance indivise et identique à elle-même' et l'autre 'c'est la substance qui embrasse les corps; c'est l'autre' L'âme n'est donc esprit ni corps. C'est 'une troisième espece'.' This idea, says De Faye, "Origène l'adoptera sans discussion....."
The essential problem which the doctrine of the soul raises is that of determining which element in the dichotomy (or trichotomy) constitutes the 'self' in 'actual' man. Before the Fall, this problem did not exist. Man's self was identical with what he truly was or spirit. After the Fall, he continues to be this spiritual being, but modified so as to be also a soul, both in the sense of that which Origen calls the 'rational' soul, and also in the sense of being that 'soul of the flesh' which is the vital principle. Students of Origen

REDEPENNING "Origenes" II. p. 369 - has a way of paraphrasing Origen's text which makes it difficult at times to know whether he is reproducing Origen's own thought or giving his own interpretation. In the following passage, however, where he stresses Man's wholeness as body, soul and spirit, he attempts to combine the two conceptions by asserting that the soul means the intermediary, binding element, possessed of both rationalistic and vitalistic components and whose individual self, however, remains the highest spiritual component. "Man kann nun diese niedere Vegetationskraft im menschlichen Körper, diese vernunftlose Psyche darin, gleichsam als zweite, niedere Seele ansehen, und hierfür die Schriftstellen anführen, die dem Fleische ein eigenes Begehren, eine eigene, dem Gesetz des Geistes widerstreitende Weisheit beilegen. Inzwischen ist doch die Seele nur Eine, und unzulässig selbst die Dreiteilung, die Plato machte. Der Mensch ist ein Ganzes. Man kann nach Paulus sagen, er bestehe aus Geist, Seele und Leib. Seine eigentliche Ichheit ist seine Seele (Psyche), und diese ist individuell bestimmter, oder eingeengter, erhalteter Geist, aber doch auch so noch dieses höchste von allem, Vernunft oder Geist". Sie is, ferner, als gefallener, der Körperlichkeit bedürftiger und in den Menschenleib hineingewiesener Geist, mit der animalischen Lebenskraft des Körpers, der niederen Psyche, diesem zweiten im Menschen, verbunden, und der Leib ist des Dritte: so hat der Mensch Geist, Seele und Leib. Will man aber höhere und niedere Psyche in eins rechnen, weil ja doch des Geistige im Menschen eben auch nur Psyche ist, so muss diese, sofern sie einerseits eine vernünftige, von der anderen Seite an das Animalische im Körper hingeegeben ist, als zwiefaches betrachtet werden. Demgemäß ware denn zu sagen, der Mensch bestehe aus höherer, wie aus niedriger Seele, und aus dem Leibe. Nur unter scheide man neben diesen Dreifachen nicht noch eine eigene böse Seele, wie gnostische Irrlehrer. Es ist vielmehr zwischen Geist and Leib die eigentliche Ichheit des Menschen, seine Seele, in die Mitte gestellt, und entweder giebt sie jenem oder diesem sich hin, un ein Geistiges oder Fleischliches zu werden".
are united in criticising him for his failure to solve the problem which his description of human natures has raised with regard to the soul.

Huet, Redepenning, Verbeke and Karpp, as we have pointed out, consider that throughout all the vicissitudes of the change involved by the Fall, it is the 'spirit' which continues to constitute the essential self. Man, in falling, comes to possess a soul or vital principle through which he dwells in, and makes use of, a body, but he still continues to be a 'spirit'. On the other hand, Denis, De Faye,

VERBEKE "L'Évolution de la Doctrine de Pneuma" pp. 456 - 469 is a most valuable critic of Origen. In his book he traces the ideas of soul and spirit from the time of the Stoic Schools to St Augustine. He lays great stress upon the influence of Pauline thought upon Origen's trichotomy, asserts that 'νεφελις' and 'σαρκός' designate not constitutive elements of human nature so much as centres of good and evil influences within the single individual soul. In holding this view of two contrary tendencies which influence the essential Man, who is distinct from both, Origen was simply keeping in line with Alexandrian philosophy confirmed by Pauline theology. "Le dualisme psychologique d'Origène est également une élaboration philosophe de l'anthropologie paulinienne, avec son antithèse 'νεφελις - σαρκός'. En effet, d'après le philosophe alexandrin, ces deux parties de l'âme sont plutôt des foyers de tendances bonnes ou mauvaises que des éléments constitutifs du composé humain". (467)

KARPP "Probleme altchristlicher Anthropologie" pp. 186 - 190 is the author of the most recently published study of Origen. His book is a model of succinctness, orderly arrangement and German thoroughness. His view is that "Der gesamtbegriff der Seele umfasst ... zwei wesensverschiedene Bestandteile in sich". But we must understand the expressions of Origen about 'parts' of the soul as being metaphorical. "Allerdings ist diese Bezeichnung mit Vorsicht zu gebrauchen. Dass man nämlich strenggenommen bei ihm gar nicht von Teilen der Seele sprechen dürfte, zeigt das Verhältnis der Seele zum Geiste (νοος). Dieser ist letzten Endes kein höherer Teil der Seele, sondern er ist in gewisser Weise die Seele selbst" (189)
(and Verbeke, in another passage) (1) suggest that after the Fall, Man is no longer pure spirit, but is something 'intermediary between spirit and body', without actually being either. It is this 'intermediary' element, the very soul, which is Man now.

Certainly, from a perusal of the passages in which Origen describes the nature of the soul in this present life, there is ample evidence to support this 'intermediary' view. It is this 'soul' which is in the centre of the moral struggle, the issue of which is its salvation. But when we ask, what is the nature of its salvation, we get the surprising answer that it is to cease being 'soul' and again become 'mind'. (2) For this to be achieved, it is necessary for God to discipline it and burn out of it all these passions and vices which are the very expression of its 'vitalist' energy, (3) The whole present visible world has been instituted for the training and discipline of souls, on account of their excessive spiritual defects. (4) The happiness of the soul is not to be found here below in this present world, but in the coming world. This world is the scene of the first and greatest struggle. (5) It is in the power of the Christian religion

(1) - VERBEKE "L'Évolution de la Doctrine du Pneuma" pp. 456 - 457
L'amè occupe une position intermédiaire entre l'élément supérieur et l'élément inférieur, étant susceptible d'une vie vertueuse ou vicieuse...... le pneuma n'est pas tellement le principe de la vie intellectuelle et volitive ni le centre de toute la vie consciente, qui gravite autour d'un moi transparent à lui-même"

(2) - De Prin: II.viii.3 Koetschau V. 155.
(3) - De Prin: I.i.2 Koetschau V. 17 - "Sed consideremus quia Deus consumit quidem et exterminat, sed consumit malas mentium cogitationes, consumit gesta turpia, consumit desideria peccati...."
(4) - De Prin: III.v.4 Koetschau V. 275
Con.Cel.
(5) - De-Prin: II.42 Koetschau I. 166.
to change or reform souls from evil to good during this time of conflict (ἐκ μετασχήματος). (1) Those souls who turn to God are joined to Him and become one spirit with Him. (2) It is always better for the soul to follow the spirit than the flesh. (3) Those who surrender themselves to the irrational passions never cease to advance to further wickedness even when found in the irrational state. (4) It is possible for the essence of the soul to be cut off from the Holy Spirit, with whom it ought to have become 'one spirit'. (5) Such, in brief, is the pattern of the situation in which the human 'soul' acts and lives and decides.

Before we leave this paragraph, we must notice one curiously bold piece of ethical reasoning to which Origen gives expression in one place. It is better for the soul, if it fails to follow the spirit, to be mastered by the flesh, than to remain within the sphere of its own will. (6) Does not this uncertainty regarding the nature of the human soul, - an uncertainty, evident both in Origen's own writings and in the work of those who have sought to interpret him - indicate something of vital importance to our study of the doctrine of Man? 'Actual' Man is this...

(1) Con. Cel: III.69 Koetschau I. 261
(2) - De Orat: IX. 2 Koetschau II. 319
(3) - De Prin: III.iv.3 Koetschau V. 267
(4) - De Prin: I.viii.4 Koetschau V. 103
(5) - De Prin: II.x.7 Koetschau V. 181
(6) - De Prin: III.ix.3 Koetschau V. 268 - "Melius autem est ut, si fieri potest, adhaerens spiritui efficiatur spiritalis; si tæro id non potest, magis expedit eam vel carnis malitiam sequi, quam in suis positam voluntatibus animalis inrationabilis statum tenere". Origen's argument is that satiation in the sins of the flesh can cause violent revulsion leading to a true conversion and turning to the spirit and God.
problematic creature who does not carry the answer to his own enigmatic constitution in his present state of being. Have we not, almost unwittingly, struck that factor of vital significance in our investigation? Niebuhr in his 'Nature and Destiny of Man' repeatedly calls attention to the predicament which faces every student of Man's being. He finds in Man a creature of vital energies, a 'natural' being, and he also finds in Man a creature bearing the image of God and 'transcending himself'. (1) It is not a simple matter of noting the distinction, which the idealist would suggest, between Man as 'self in contemplation' and Man as 'self in action'. Though the problem is one concerned with the 'psyche' it is not susceptible of a psychological solution.

Quite clearly, Origen has raised this problem, which becomes apparent whenever the investigation is allowed to escape from the oversimplifications, which are provided whenever we attempt to 'explain' by this or that formula, or 'place' Man into this or that category. The best we can do is to face 'the schism in the soul' which indicates that actual Man is both a thing of nature and supernature, a fallen sinner and the child of God. There seems to be no possibility of seeing Man steadily, and seeing Man whole. His actual existence is anything but steady, and his present state is anything but whole.

(1) - Niebuhr - "Nature and Destiny of Man" - I. 174 - 178.
How deeply did Origen realise all this? In some ways, profoundly and almost unconsciously, when, for instance, he insists, in season and out of season, that freedom must be preserved as being the crucial factor. Origen does build his ethics around the freedom, first of the spirit abiding in the good before the Fall, and later of the 'spirit-cum-soul' poised between good and evil, after the Fall.

When, however, Origen attempts to 'explain' either the freedom, or the schism which has resulted from the misuse of the freedom, his answers seem to fail in reaching the height which they promised. When he views the problem from the 'height' of the self transcendence of the spirit, he asserts that the 'soul' of Man will cease to be when once it has expiated its sins and no longer requires a body and returns to be Mind once more. Such an answer consists of solving the equation by extracting one of the terms. This we might call his 'Alexandrian' or 'Platonic' answer, because it expresses the bias of his thinking as conveyed in the First Principles, taken as a whole.

When, on the other hand, he views the problem, not from the height of the spirit, but from the depth, or at least the ordinary level of the soul in this present life, his solution of the 'schism', or his uniting of the 'dichotomy' between soul and spirit, is entirely different. Writing in his First Homily on Genesis he says that each individual man is made 'male and female after the image of God'. The inner man consists of both spirit and soul. The spirit is masculine and the soul is feminine. If these are married together they beget in the individual mind a progeny of good feelings and useful thoughts. The rupture of this marriage between spirit and soul in the individual man's nature constitutes a kind of divorce. If the soul forsakes the spirit
to which she is married and joins with the body, she commits adultery
and her children are illegitimate. (1)

Such an answer betrays a gnostic origin and fails to rise out of
psychology into religion, where alone either the correct question can be
asked, or the true answer be given. (2) It is interesting to observe
in passing, the attractiveness of this idea to some modern psychologists
of the feminine Anima and the masculine Spiritus (or as Jung employs the
term, 'Animus') as solving the 'Schism in the Soul' by their union
together. (3).

(1) - Hom: I.15 in Gen: Lommatzsch viii. 126 - "Videamus autem etiam
per allegoriam quomodo ad imaginem Dei homo factus masculus et
femina est. Interior homo noster ex spiritu et anima constat. Masculus
spiritus dicitur, femina anima potest nuncupari. Haece si concordiam
inter se habeant et consensum, convenientia inter se ipsa crescut et
multiplicantur, generantque filios sensus bonos, et intellectus, vel
cognitiones utiles, per quae repleant terram, et dominentur in ea: hoc
est subjectum sibi sensum carnis ad meliora instituta voluntatem spiritus
insolescit.....et cetera".

(2) - G. Quispel. "La Conception de l'Homme dans la Gnose Valentinienne"
ERANOS JAHREBUCH 1947 - "On ne doit pourtant perdre de vue que
la vie dans le monde ne fait que donner forme à l'essence de l'homme
spirituel, mais ne le rend pas conscient du monde transcendent.....".
The process of 'giving form to the essence of Man' in this life is
explained in terms of an inner mystical marriage. "Le principe feminin
Produit l'essence, le principe masculin forme l'essence que le feminin
a produite". Hippol., Ref. VI.30........il est sans conteste que les
Valentiniens one employé l'image du mariage pour exprimer la polarité
des choses spirituelles". pp. 277, 278 and 279.

(3) - C.G. Jung - "Psychological Types" pp. 588 - 596, esp. 595.
CHAPTER SEVEN

"The Body"

Part one

The Natural Body.

The Biblical doctrine of the body is that it constitutes an essential part of human nature. Without it Man is not truly man. Origen differed fundamentally from this. His doctrine regarded the body as the 'second stage of the Fall'. (1) Having a body, Man is not truly man. But Origen felt compelled to work out a compromise between the two contrary notions. (2)

Before we consider these matters, we must learn what Origen has to say about matter, which is the substance of all bodies. - "It is proved by many declarations throughout the whole of Scripture that the Universe was created by God, and that there is no substance which

(1) - De Faye - "Origène" III. 102 - "Après l'âme c'est le corps. L'apparition de delui-ci est le deuxième degré de la chute. Tous les êtres qui ont failli, - et c'est la totalité des essences rationnelles, le Logos excepté - dont les intelligences, deviennent des âmes et revêtent un corps".

(2) - Denis - "De la Philosophie d'Origène", pp. 298 - 299 - works out carefully the emergence of this conflict of ideas, which was not confined to the mind of Origen for its battlefield. It arose when the doctrine of the resurrection became a subject of philosophical research. "La doctrine de la resurrection des corps se recontraite avec celle de l'immortalité de l'âme: qu'y avait-il besoin de ce corps de mort, comme l'avait appelé l'Apôtre, si l'âme était essentiellement immortelle, si elle pouvait subsister seule et vivre de sa vie propre?" What Scripture challenged Origen to face was "c'est que l'âme ne saurait être immortelle naturellement, et que ce n'est pas à l'âme, mais à l'homme tout entier qu'est promise l'immortalité".
has not received its nature from Him. This (1) means that though sin has been the occasion of the appearance of the visible universe and bodies, it is God who has created them or made them appear. (2) Matter in itself is formless (3) but never actually exists without 'qualities' (4) as it is the Divine purpose by an alteration of qualities to create 'bodies' as 'coverings' for the fallen spirits. (5) In one sense the whole cosmos is a gigantic body 'held together by the power and reason of God, as by one soul'. (6) St Augustine, in a famous and oft-quoted passage, in which he criticises the entire structure of Origen's cosmology, said - "this is the world and this is the cause of

(1) - De Prin: I.iii.3 Koetschau V. 50 - 51. - Origen is here dismissing the Gnostic doctrine taught by Marcion. c.f. also Comm: in Joan: I.17 Preuschen IV. 22 where we learn that Origen adopts the Platonic conception of the \( \Upsilon \kappa \epsilon \mu \nu \gamma \varsigma \ Delta \varsigma \) which, as receptive principle, takes the impression of \( \epsilon \lambda \delta \varsigma \) form. c.f. Plato "Timaeus" 51 A.

(2) - De Prin: III.v.4 Koetschau V. 275 - "his animabus, quae ob nimios defectus mentis suae crassioribus istis et solidioribus indigere corporibus, et propter eos, quibus hoc erat necessarium, mundus iste visibilis institutus est".

(3) - De Prin: IV.iv.6 Koetschau V. 357 - "informen materiam".

(4) - De Prin: IV.iv.6 Koetschau V. 357 - "neque enim cum materiam subiciunt omni corpori per omnia convertibilem substantiam vel commutabilem vel divisibilem, extra qualitates eam secundum proprietatem suam subicent".

(5) - De Prin: IV.iv.8 Koetschau V. 361 - "rationables naturae quae indigent indumento corporeo". Denis "Philosophie d'Origène" p.176 takes a poor view of Origen's philosophisings here - "Les développements d'Origène sur la matière, qui, n'ayant aucune forme et aucune qualité par elle-même, pour recevoir toutes les qualités et toutes les formes.....n'offrent absolument aucune originalité ni aucun intérêt".

(6) - De Prin: II.i.3 Koetschau V. 108.
its creation, not the production of good things, but the restraining of evil". (1) Brilliant indeed as that criticism is for its neatness, it tends, however, to be more clever than true. It calls attention to only one aspect, the negative aspect, of what Origen is trying to describe. It omits adequate reference to the positive aspect. Origen asserted that God was responsible for two creations and that they were intelligibly related together in the Divine Wisdom. Elsewhere Origen writes, "The whole argument then, comes to this, that God has created two universal natures, a visible, that is, a bodily one, and an invisible one, which is incorporeal. The invisible, which is also the rational nature, is changed through the action of the mind or will, by reason of the fact that it has been endowed with freedom of choice. As a result of this, it is found sometimes in the good and sometimes in the opposite. The bodily nature, however, admits of a change of substance, so that God, the artificer of all things, in whatever work or design or construction or restoration He may wish to engage, has at hand the service of this material for all purposes and can transform and transfer it into whatever forms and species He desires as the merits of things demand". (2)

Let us therefore, now see how Origen conceived of bodies, in a negative way, as well as positively.

(1) - St Augustine - "City of God" XI. 23.
(2) - De Prin: III.vi.7 Koetschau V. 289. (The whole passage is closely connected with Plato's argument in the Phaedo c.f. 79 A)
We shall begin with the 'negative' aspect, which St. Augustine called attention to. "So long as a soul continues to abide in the good, it has no experience of union with a body" (1) but "It was for those souls, which on account of their excessive spiritual defects required those grosser and more solid bodies...that the present visible world was instituted". (2) Inherent in this 'negative' aspect is the idea that God has made the body as a 'prison' or 'punishment' - "God therefore made the present world and bound the soul to the body as a punishment", (3) Though the Fall is in one sense contemporaneous, yet it has apparently been lead by Satan. It is he, therefore, who is the first to be enclosed in a body. (4) Owing to the diversity of degrees in the individual falls, the corresponding bodies vary in density or grossness. The angels have 'fine and ethereal bodies'; we human beings 'grosser bodies'; and the daemons, 'cold and murky' bodies'. (5) Individual souls, however,

(1) - De Prin: I.viii.4 Koetschau V. 103.
(2) - De Prin: III.v.4 Koetschau V. 275.
(3) - De Prin: I.viii.1 Koetschau V. 96.

But St Augustine "City of God" XI.23, accuses Origen of inconsistency and departure from this logical order of corporeal grossness in proportion to sinfulness. He writes: - "In point of fact that we might see that the deserts of souls are not to be estimated by the qualities of bodies, the wickedest devil possesses an ethereal body, while man, wicked, it is true, but with a wiskedness small and venial in comparison with his, received, even before his sin a body of clay". St Augustine is right in pointing out some inconsistency in Origen. Though he does not state in the First Principles (the work to which Augustine refers) that devils have ethereal bodies, he implies it in some places - (De Prin: III.ii.1 Koetschau V. 248). But Origen is clear of the charge concerning Man. He definitely teaches that Man is preexistent and has sinned before getting his body of clay.
are constantly passing from rank to rank, up or down, and consequently making use of finer or grosser bodies, according to their merits. (1) In contact with the mind of St Paul, Origen develops in his Commentary on Romans, the idea of the 'body of sin' as inclusive of all bodies which have participated in the rebellian of Satan. He speaks of Satan as being the 'head of the body of sin' and, speculating about the origin of human bodies through Adam, the corporeal father of the human race, concludes that "the body of sin means our fleshly body, which we inherit from Adam, because it is not written that Adam knew Eve his wife and begat Cain until after sin". (2) This idea of the body's sinfulness which is somehow connected with sex is not infrequently expressed by Origen. In one place he speaks of the 'adulterous' nature of bodily matter, (3) and in another place he expresses the quaint idea that in the Scriptures, only wicked men celebrate their birthdays. (4) The body is evil in the sense that it is the 'locus' of these animal passions

(1) - Comm: in Matt: XVII. 30 Benz und Klostermann X. 671.

(2) - Comm. in Roman: V.9 Lomm: vi. 395 & 397 - "de his, qui veterem hominem nondum crucifixerunt, dici posse, quod sint corpus peccati et membra, cujus corporis caput sit diabolus"
"Corpus ergo peccati est corpus nostrum, quia nec Adam scribitur cognovisse Evan uxorem suam, et genuisse Cain, nisi post peccatum".

(3) - Comm. in Joan: XX. 14 Preuschen IV. 348 - "αυτοί τοις ἐπόρους ὄντες."

(4) - Hom: Viii.3 in Lev: Lomm: ix. 317 - "Soli peccatores super hujusmodi nativitate laetantur. Invenimus etenim in veteri quidem testamento Pharaonem regem Aegypti, diem natalis sui cum festivitate celebrantem, in novo vero testamento Herodem". See Karpp - "Probleme altchristlicher Anthropologie" p. 197, Note 1, wherein he connected the meaning with the idea of impurity, as indicated on our previous page.
which are at enmity with the spirit. The link between the soul and
the body is described as a 'disastrous friendship'. (1) Finally, death
is linked in an essential way with the body. It is in fact, a thing
'dead in itself' apart from the life-giving soul who inhabits it. (2)
It is the body which constitutes the source of corruption. (3).

We have shewn fairly adequately, from throughout Origen's
writings, how considerable is this negative aspect of the body, as
punishment, prison, adulterous body of sin and source of death and
corruption. Let us now turn to the positive aspect and see what Origen
has to say about that. We shall find, perhaps to our surprise, just as
much material with which to construct a different picture.

First of all, we do well to emphasise that Origen, even though
he stresses so many evil circumstances connected with the body, never
teaches that the body is evil in itself. He is an implacable opponent
of Gnosticism. The body may be a consequence of sin and evil, but it
is a divinely appointed consequence and serves a divine purpose in
checking that evil. The evil of sin in itself lies in the creaturely
will which has 'defected' from God. (4).

(1) - Comm: in Joan: I.32 Preuschen IV. 40 - "ἐκὶ βλασφήμου θεοῦ ποιμήν καὶ κατέστρεψεν".
(2) - De Prin: III.iv.1 Koetschau V. 264 - "quae corpora secundum propriam quidem naturam mortua sunt et penitus exanima, quia ex
nobis, id est ex animabus corpus materiale vivificatur, quod utique
contrarium est et inimicum spiritui, trahimur et provocamur ad haec
mala, quae corpori grata sunt".
(3) - De Prin: III.vi.1 Koetschau V. 282 - "Ubicumque corpora fuerint, statim corruptio subsequatur".
(1) - Karpp - "Probleme altchristlicher Anthropologie" p. 197.
"Zunächst ist festzuhalten, dass die Leiblichkeit nicht die
Ursache des Bösen ist, sondern seine Folge...".
Some of the ways in which the divine purpose is achieved through the body are as follows. It constitutes the principle of individuation and separation. (1) It makes visible and embodied the fact of separation which the Fall has spiritually called into being. It also serves to exteriorise the vast diversity of inner and conflicting purposes which the individual choices have released, giving them an appearance form, which corresponds to their inner character. In this way God is able to recall the very creatures who have revolted against Him and are so different from each other in mental quality, to 'one harmony of work and endeavour'. (2) Thus the visible or corporeal world, the 'κόσμος αἰθήτος' is ruled and over ruled by God, lest 'so immense a work should be dissolved by the conflict of souls.'

Closely connected with this idea is the notion that all bodily life is designed by God to be educative. The way in which Origen conceives this process taking place through the punishment of bodily life, is that it constitutes a humiliation, which is the countering of pride, the root sin. By the restraints of bodily life, by all that constitutes life in 'the place of tribulation' the soul is educated to seek after God and the things belonging to the transcendent realm from

(1) - Redepenning - "Origenes" II. 331 - "In jenem Zustände waren die Geister alle innerlichst Einerleiheit; durch ihren Abfall und die verschiedenen Grade darin entstand Verschiedenheit, die in die Erscheinung treten muss, als Leiblichkeit...".

(2) - De Prin: II.i.2 Koetschau V. 107 - "Deus vero per ineffabilem sapientiae suae artem omnia, quae quoquam modo fiunt, ad utile aliquid et ad communem omnium transformans ac reparans profectum, has ipsas creaturas, quae a semet ipsis in tantum animorum varietate distabant, in unum quendam revocat.................ne scilicet tam immensum mundi opus discidiis solveretur animorum...".
which it has departed. Only this returning fully to God can constitute for Origen the road of progress. (1) That this estimate of the positive purpose underlying bodily life belongs very truly to Origen's whole outlook is brought out very clearly by two writers - Hal Koch in his 'Pronoia und Paideusis' and by Walther Völker in "Das Vollkommenheitsideal des Origenes". (2).

Nor is the body's relation with the spirit or soul entirely one of hostility and discord. Soul and body are joined together to form a stable compound, whereby human nature is made an organised

(1) - Origen develops this theme characteristically in one of his Homilies, which, though it may be prolix and involved in allegorical obscurities, drives home clearly its point. Hom: in Exod: III.3. Lomm. ix. 27, 28 - 30. "Exeundum igitur nobis de Aegypto: relinquendus autem mundus, si volumus Domino servire... Tridui iter proficiscimur de rebus mundialibus auferentes ad statuta divina convertimus...".

"Vides quid agit cruda superbia? Donec in laboribus hominum non est, et cum hominibus non flagellatur: propterea tenuit eum superbia".

"Nemo ergo ita ineruditus divinae sit disciplinae ut flagella divina perniciem putet, ut verbera Domini poenalem credat interitum".

(2) - Koch. op. cit. p. 40 - "Wenn Gott daher die Materie schuf, war es, um die Seelen zur Strafe in die Körper and die sichtbare Welt hinabzusenden; dieselbe ist ein "τάντα κακά κεφάλαια", wo die Seelen gedemutigt werden; aber 'ubi tormenta sensorint, scint Deum'; ihr Hinabsteigen bezeichnet zwar eine Pein, und die Körperlichkeit ist ein Hindernis für die Vereinigung mit Gott, eine Begrenzung, von welcher es sich zu befreien gilt, aber dies hindert nicht, dass diese Pein und dieser Kerker eine Wohltat gegen die Seelen ist, wenn sie einmal gesündigt haben: denn die Strafe ist immer und in jeder Form eine Wohltat".
whole, to serve the purposes of God, its Creator. (1) The body, which is disciplined so as to serve the spirit which uses it, can become, not an obstacle, but an assistance to the spirit. (2)

We see that Origen was far from adopting entirely any theory which regarded the body as wholly evil and of negative value. (3).

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(1) - Comm. in Joan. XIII. 50 Preuschen IV. 277 -

The word 'κράσις' is best translated as compound. It is stronger than 'μίξις' which means the mixing together of two things which can be separated naturally.

(2) - De Prin. II.ii.2 - Koetschau V. 112 - 113 - "cum vero perfectioribus ministrat (ac. materialis substantia) et beatioribus, in 'fulgore caelestium corporum' micat et 'spiritalis corporis' indumentis vel 'angelos Dei' vel 'filios resurrectionis' exornat, ex quibus diversus ac varius mundi conplebitur status".

(3) - Cadiou "Origen: His Life at Alexandria" p. 161 - finds in the contact which Origen had with Ammonius Saccas, the source of this 'optimistic' view of the body, introduced into a system of thought which, to be entirely logical, ought to have despised the body more. He writes, "Without any shadow of doubt, the soul is said to be a prisoner in the body, but we must understand this expression to take account of the fact that the soul is prepared for the body by a sort of inclination to it... a mutual sympathy can be observed between soul and body". "The psychology of Ammonius was... a diluted Platonism. It preserved the dogma of the Fall by liberating it from the pessimistic consequences with which the majority of the Gnostic sects remained content. This was precisely what Alexandrian orthodoxy was trying to do at the beginning of the third century".

We need only add that, while all the above is true, we ought never to forget that the influence of the Biblical tradition was always at work in this direction re-shaping Origen's classical 'bias'.
CHAPTER SEVEN

Part two

The Spiritual Body and the Resurrection.

Origen has so much to say about the resurrection that we must, right at the outset discipline ourselves to give only the barest outline of his teaching. One of his special treatises was 'On the Resurrection' but only some small fragments remain. Even with that loss, the references spring forth almost from every page and show how largely it loomed in his mind and thinking.

By the Resurrection of the body, Origen did not mean what is called Transmigration or Metempsychosis. (1) Nor did he mean an actual resuscitation of the present physical body. (2) What he did mean was a transformation of the body, whereby it was changed and adapted for more glorious conditions of life, involved by the redemptive process of Christ's salvation restoring Man to God. In many ways, his doctrine of the resurrection was one of the most 'Biblical' elements in his system of thought, (3) though we shall see that in one particular point, whether

(1) - Con. Cel: VII. 32 Koetschau II. 182 - "Our teaching on the resurrection is not as Celsus imagines, derived from anything we have heard on the doctrine of metempsychosis". See APPENDIX A.

(2) - De Prin: II.x.3 Koetschau V. 175 - "absurdum videtur et contra Apostoli sensum dicere, id rursum 'carnis et sanguinis' passio in implicari...".

(3) ) Butterworth - "Origen on First Principles" p. xiv. has this neat summing up - "Origen's doctrine on these questions, though it ran counter to the gross materialism of many in his time, is both rational and scriptural. He found the term 'spiritual body' in the Scriptures and held fast to it. The body, he contended, must be suitable to the sphere in which it has to live, and in a spiritual world we shall need spiritual bodies. These would be the same bodies which we have now, because they would be the garments of the same personality; but they would not resemble the earthly body in appearance, in structure or in function".

the resurrection body was final in human destiny, he found the greatest difficulty in tidying up the strands of his thinking.

Origen begins by locating the 'principle' of the resurrection, not in any natural sphere, but in the transcendental realm of the Divine nature, being basically related to God Himself. This he explains in terms of the nature of Christ as the Word or Logos, Who is both the principle or 'arche' of creation and resurrection. (1)

The Resurrection is not a 'natural' event, such as mere survival of bodily death might be regarded. It is something which is higher than 'cosmic' process, being a 'restoration by the Will of the Creator'. None the less, the individual is not the merely passive recipient of a Divine action or impression. His conduct here on earth is what determines the character of degree of glory which shall attend the condition of the resurrection body. Origen believed in judgment after death, as well as judgment determining our entrance into this life which is before death. (2).

(1) - De Prin: I.ii.4 Koetschau V.31 - "Verum quoniam futurum erat ut etiam deciderent aliqui a vita et mortem sibi ipsi conscriserent ex eo ipso, quod a vita deciderent (non enim aliud est mors quam a vita discedere), et utique non esset consequens ut ea, quae semel ad vivendum fuerant procreata a deo, penitus deperirent, oportuit ante mortem esse talem virtutem, quae futuram dissolveret mortem et esset resurrectio, quae in domino et salvatore nostro formata est, quae resurrectio in ipsa dei sapientia et verbo eo vita consistet".

(2) - De Prin: III.vi.5 Koetschau V. - "Denique caro nostra ab inperitis et infidelibus ita post mortem deperire aestimatur, ut nihil prorsus substantiae sua reliquum habere credatur. Nos vero, qui resurrectionem eius credimus, immutationem eius tantummodo per mortem factam intelligimus, substantiam vero certum est permanere et voluntate creatoris sui certo quo tempore reparari rursus ad vitam, atque iterum permutationem eius fieri; ut quae primo fuit caro 'ex terra terrena' tum deinde dissoluta per mortem et iterum facta 'cinis ac terra' ('quoniam terra es' inquit 'et in terram ibis') rursus resuscitetur e terra et post hoc jam, prout meritum inhabitantis animae pososcerit, in gloriam 'corporis' proficiat 'spiritalis'."

None less, argues Origen, we can understand from the Scriptures something of the mystery of this resurrection which is the act of God. St Paul has given us the natural image of the seed which is sown and described the mystery which that contains. (1) He asserts that once the resurrection has taken place there is no more 'dying over again', thus ascribing to the resurrection a kind of finality or passing completely away from the present world. (2) The natural body which is raised by the power of God has in it even now the germ or seed of this mystery. (3) After the resurrection, the body is like to what the bodies of the angels are now. (4) Though Origen speaks of the resurrection as being a 'future' event, which will take place at the appointed time known to God, he yet modifies this by introducing an idea of gradual and slow transformation through ages. (5).

(1) - Con.Cel: V. 18 - 19 Koetschau II. 19 - 21.

(2) - De Prin: II.x.1 Koetschau V. 174 - "Quae si verum est quod resurgunt et 'spiritalia' resurgunt, dubium non est quin abiecta corruptione et deposita mortalitate resurgere dicantur a mortuis: alioquin vanum vidébitur et superfluum resurgere quem a mortuis, ut iterum moriatur".

(3) - Same passage continued - "Quod ita demum intelligi evidentius potest, si qui diligenter advertat, quae sit 'animalis corporis' qualitas, quae in terram seminata 'spiritalis corporis' reparet qualitatem. Ex 'animali' namque 'corpore' ipsa virtus resurrectionis et gratia 'spiritale corpus' educit, cum id ab 'indignitate' transmutat ad 'gloriam' ".

(4) - Comm. in Matt: XVII. 29 Benz und Klostermann X. 667.

(5) - De Prin: III.vi.6 Koetschau V. 287 - "In hunc ergo statum omnem hanc nostram substantiam corporalem putandum est perdurandum, tum cum omnia restituentur, ut 'unum' sint, et cum deus fuerit 'omnia in omnibus'. Quod tamen non ad subitum fieri sed paulatim et per partes intelligendum est, infinitis et immensus labentis saeculis. . . .". 
Such, briefly stated, is Origen's doctrine of the resurrection. It is a soundly Biblical exposition, owing much to St Paul. If Origen had stopped there, no one would ever have accused him of heresy. But the strong Platonic current in his thought forced him once more to attempt a compromise between two contradictory ideas. The Platonist in him said, 'True Man is incorporeal and, when he is completely saved, is delivered from every kind of body, gross or fine, earthly or celestial' (1). The Biblical exponent in him declared that the 'spiritual body' constituted the attainment of salvation and was permanent. (2)

Consequently, there arose in his mind the question, Was the resurrection final in the destiny of Man? The answer to this is not given categorically in the affirmative by Origen. Like so many other answers, it represents an attempt to work out a compromise between the two conceptions mentioned. Judging, however, from our knowledge of Origen's outlook as a whole, it is probable that the Platonist element

(1) - The 'Platonist' passages in the first Principles, where Origen argues that the final state of redemption or restoration is one of incorporeality are as follows:-

De Prin: IV.iv.8 Koetschau V. 361 (Bodies are created at intervals on account of Fall)

De Prin: II.iii.2 Koetschau V. 114 (Bodily substance will cease to exist when there is no use for it any longer)

De Prin: II.iii.3 Koetschau V. 118 (Our condition at some future time will be incorporeal)

De Prin: III.vi.1 Koetschau V. 281 (The essence of bodily nature an obstacle to union with God)

(2) - The 'Biblical' passages where he appears to argue to the contrary (though the passages show signs of having been 'doctored' by Rufinus: Vide relevant notes in Koetschau's edition) are as follows:-

De Prin: II.ii.2 Koetschau V. 112 (Life without a body is found in the Trinity alone)

De Prin: IV.iii.15 Koetschau V. 347 (The Trinity alone truly incorporeal. There are some existences which have been created incorporeal, but in actual fact these always use bodies).
was rather determinative. That means that he really conceived of a return to incorporeality, to a state consistent with his basic conviction that essential man is mind and mind alone. The passage in which he states this compromise which leans away from the strictly Biblical position is as follows: "This, then, is how we must suppose that events happen in the consummation and restitution of all things, namely, that souls, advancing and ascending little by little in due measure and order, first attain to that other earth and the instruction that is in it, and are then prepared for those better precepts to which nothing can ever be added.......and....... when they have been rendered capable of receiving God, then God will be to them 'all in all'. It follows, of necessity, that then even their bodily nature will assume that supreme condition to which nothing can ever be added". (1)

This was the passage which Jerome interpreted as meaning that in the end the whole of bodily nature would be resolved into the Divine nature, which is superior to all others.(2)

(1) - De Prin: III.vi.9 KoetschauV. 290 - 291 - "Hoc itaque modo in consummatione ac restitutione omnium fieri putandum est, ut paulatim proficiant et ascendentes modo et ordine perveniant primo ad terram illam et eruditionem, qua in ea est, in qua ad meliora et illam, quibus jam addi nihil potest, instituta praeparantur.....et.... cum capaces Dei fuerint effecti sit eis "Deus omnia in omnibus" Tunc ergo consequenter etiam natura corporea illum summum et cui addi jam nihil possit recipiet statum..."

(2) - Jerome. Ep. ad Avitum 10 Quoted by Koetschau V. 291
compromise lies just here, that one can think of this as meaning the
destruction of bodily nature and hence the denial of the finality of
the resurrection of the body, or the consummation of bodily nature in
a supreme manner, constituting indeed the very acme of the meaning of
the resurrection.

Not to end this chapter at this point seems like demanding an
anti-climax....but Origen’s scheme requires that a tail piece be added
none the less. It is an addendum which is so interesting and so
relevant that it may be regarded not as an anti-climax but as indeed
the true and eminently fitting fulfilment of the same.

Origen, as part of his characteristic 'compromise' suggested
that the bodies which rise in the final resurrection are 'spherical' (1)
or have the 'form of light'. (2) The matter is treated with

(1) - De Orat: XXXI. 3 Koetschau II. 397 -

"εις κατασκευάστες γὰρ τῶν ἐποροκίων τὰ σῶματα, διὰ καὶ γόνατα
σωματικὰ (See Philippians II. 10) ἔχειν λύπα, ὑπολαμφάνειν οὐ πάντα
τὰ χρήματα, ὁμοιομοίως παρὰ τοῖς χρήσιμως περὶ τῶν ἔλεγχων ἔκπληξιν
ἐποδειγμένων λύπων τῶν σωμάτων......"

(2) - Comm. in Matt: XVII. 30 Benz und Klostermann X. 671

"καὶ καθά τὸ μεταχειριστήριον ζωένειν αὐτῶν τὰ σώματα
τῆς ταπεινώσεως, γίνεσθαι τοιάντα, ἔριπτα ἐστὶ τὰ τῶν
ἄγγελων σώματα, αἰθέρια καὶ ἀνθρεπές φῶς"
characteristic erudition and thoroughness by Huet (1) but in spite of his attention to the subject, it has continued to mystify scholars. (2) It does, however, admirably 'complete' Origen's pattern, though he himself wisely does not press it. It provides for that total transcendence of terrestrial shape and form which he felt were intimately involved - not in primal creation but in subsequent fall. It supplies that perfect form which alone to logic seems to harmonise with a condition when God, who is Light, shall be all in all, and His

(1) - Huet - "Origeniana" II.ii.9 Para. ix Where he collects together references to the relevant passages, made by students in the early centuries. What Huet thought of the 'compromise' which we have extolled is evident in the concluding words of his examination of it "Vides inconstantiam hominis, animis suscitatis corpora detrahentis nonnunquam, nonnunquam affingentis, nec pro certo habentis ecquamnam illa figuram habitura sint".

To which, as a lover of Origen as well as Huet, we can only reply, 'Quot homines, tot sententiae'

(2) - Dr N.P. Williams, writing the review of René Cadiou's "La Jeunesse d'Origène" 1936 in The Journal of Theological Studies, Vol:XXXIX, No. 154, page 193, expresses this mystification. - "It is a disappointment to the present reviewer that M. Cadiou makes no attempt to explain the mysterious opinion apparently ascribed to Origen by the fifth of Justinian's anathematisations, namely, that in the Resurrection the bodies of men will be 'σφατος της ημερας του θεου'"

The question implied in this remark called forth in the succeeding number of the J.T.S. No. 155, page 247, an answer, which for comprehensive yet concise erudition, combined with simplicity and clarity, is a model of its kind. We feel that it so adequately 'clears up' whatever 'mystery' may still linger about this subject, that it ought to be quoted in full, and accordingly add it as an additional and separate note at the end of this chapter.
creatures have returned to their original and purely spiritual condition. Origen offered it only as suggestion, and we can only comment upon its appropriateness as rounding off a system which seeks to marry together the highest intuitions of the Christian Faith with the boldest speculations of Hellenistic religious philosophy. (1)

(1) - See APPENDIX B at end of this chapter.
APPENDIX A. on Reincarnation

Whether or not Origen taught the doctrine of reincarnation, or what special form of it he adopted, if he did teach it, are questions of considerable interest, which have had no unanimous answer from those who have studied the question. His approach to the matter is almost entirely one of argument from first principles, supported or countered by reference to Biblical sources. Never does he claim to present evidence of an empirical nature, as did Plato with his doctrine of reminiscence.

I. Did Origen teach the "Pythagorean" form of the Doctrine?

First of all, let us look at the passages in which Origen appears to teach some form of the doctrine. When the soul falls away from the good (Ἀπορρέουσα τοῦ καλοῦ) says Origen, it is rendered brutish and as befits its degree of fall, it is clothed with the body of this or that irrational animal. If Origen stated this without qualification, then we have evidence that he gave expression to the Pythagorean doctrine. Jerome accuses him of doing so and contemptuously rejects the qualification which Origen adds to the end of the chapter. No greater injustice could be done to Origen, however, than to insist that "these opinions have simply been brought forward in order to be rejected". He promises to discuss the matter on a Scriptural basis later and refute and drive away this perverse doctrine.

(1) - Denis - "De la Philosophie d'Origène" p. 193 quotes the following as being "La seule allusion à la reminiscence platonicienne qu'on rencontre dans Origène..." Πάς τε τραγικόν καὶ τὰ περὶ τοῦ θεοῦ δομήμηκταν μᾶλλον ἢ καὶ τὰ τινὰς ἁρμονίαν ἔχουσιν δοκιμίως ἢ ἐφημέριαν νομιζώ τῆς (De Orat: xxiv.3 Koetschau II. 355) It is scarcely weighty however.

(2) - De Prin: I.viii.4 Koetschau 104 Denis discusses this actual text (p. 190 op.cit) and says, "Le premier de ces textes, s'il était seul, ne prouverait absolument rien: on pourrait n'y voir qu'une métaphore et une Hyperbole".

(3) - i.e. that souls transmigrated into the bodies of animals as well as into other human bodies. c.f. ΕΠΕ ΗΧ. 433.

(4) - For reference to this, see Huet "Originiana" II.i.6 paras 17 - 20, and also Butterworth's useful notes on pp. 72-74 of his translation.

(5) - De Prin: I.viii.4 Koetschau V. 105 - "Sed haec, quantum ad nos pertinent, non sint dogmata, sed discussionis gratia dicta sint et abiciantur. Pro eo autem solo dicta sunt, ne videatur quæstio mota non esse discussa. Verumtamen suo in loco et tempore confutato hoc perverso dogmata atque depulso, ea quae de scripturis sanctus ab illis prolata sunt, qualiter intelligi debeant exponemus".

Insert line omitted by typist - "that he was insincere when he added his explanation...."
too
be/hurried in our dismissal of the Pythagorean form of the doctrine from
all connection with the name of Origen. One of the many results of the
painstaking work achieved by Koetschau in his edition of the First
Principles, has been to 'establish' the authenticity, or at least greater
acceptability, of many passages formerly rejected as being too heretical.
In one such passage, formed composite from two works by Gregory of
Nysa (1) Origen repeats this idea of souls coming successively into the
bodies of men, beasts and insensate creatures. Koetschau has placed this
just before the passage we mentioned above, and so makes it subject to
the same qualification, given by Origen, as before. But, none the less,
the forcefulness of the whole passage and the way in which it so easily
slides into Origen's whole cosmological outlook, makes one realise better
how Jerome felt about such 'speculations'. Perhaps, we cannot say more
than that Origen was distinctly sympathetic towards such ideas, though
the evidence on the whole is against his having accepted them, at least,
quite in the manner popularly known as Pythagoreanism.

II. Did Origen teach the "Platonic" form of the Doctrine?

Though Plato in the Phaedrus does mention the possibility of souls
entering animal bodies, the general theme is that of human souls
successively inhabiting human bodies. This is the usual meaning of
reincarnation. What has Origen to say about this? Is his attitude
sympathetic? We can answer these questions better, if we leave the
First Principles, in which most of the references tend to approximate to
the Pythagorean form of the doctrine with its idea of abyssmal descents
into irrational bodies, (2) and turn to the Commentaries and the Contma
Celsum.

In his Commentary on St. John, there is a lengthy but excellent
example of Origen's method when he sets out 'to discuss the matter on
a Scriptural basis'. We shall do our best to present it briefly in
its three logical stages.

It starts from the text, "If ye will receive it, this is Elijah
which is to come" spoken by Jesus concerning John the Baptist. Origen
states that he will give the argument first of 'those who find in our
passage a support of their doctrine of transcorporation' and then of
those who as Churchmen 'repudiate the doctrine of transcorporation as
false', and finally, a summing up of his own views.

(1) - De Prin: I.viii.4 Koetschau V. 102. (The passages are from
Gregory of Nyssa: - "De Anima et Resurrectione" Migne 44. p. 112,
and "De hominis opificio" Migne 44. p. 229).

(2) - De Prin: II.x.8 Koetschau V. 182. This passage is described by
Jerome as clearly defending
the " μετεμφυσώσετιν " of both Plato and Pythagoras. See the
note by Koetschau at foot of page. The passage is capable, however
of supporting 'human reincarnation' exclusively.
(a) When John was asked, "Art thou Elijah?" his reply was, "I am not". This indicates that he did not know that he was Elijah. Those who seek in the passage to find support for their belief in transcorporation, will then say that his ignorance is explained by the fact that when a soul clothes itself in a fresh body, it does not quite remember its former lives.

The doctrine of transcorporation was definitely known to the Jews of Christ's time. (1) For instance, when the Jews spoke about Jesus as being one of the old prophets, who had risen not from his grave, but from his birth (Luke ix.5) they were assenting to this belief.

Further, such a statement as "all these things (i.e. the remarkable incidents connected with John the Baptist) had been much spoken about in the hill country of Judaea" makes it completely certain that the messengers of the Jews, the priests and the Levites, knew perfectly well that John the Baptist had been born and had not appeared miraculously as 'from the dead by a kind of resurrection'. Accordingly, when they asked, "Art thou Elijah?" it is clear that they were assuming the doctrine of transcorporation, that it was a current doctrine of their times and was not foreign to their secret teaching. John, therefore, says, "I am not Elijah", because he does not know about his former life.

Origen ends this first section with these words, which shew a sympathetic attitude on his part - "These thinkers entertain an opinion which is by no means to be despised". (2)

(b) - Origen now turns to what he calls the argument of the Churchmen, who repudiate the same doctrine. Again, he starts with a Biblical text, on the basis of proceeding by exegesis. The prophecy of Malachi iv. 5-6 "Behold, I send unto you Elijah the Tishbite, before the great and notable day of the Lord" refers to John the Baptist. This is indicated by St Luke I. 17 - "He shall go before his face in the spirit and power of Elijah".

A Churchman who rejects the doctrine of transcorporation as false, and does not agree that the soul of John ever was Elijah, may appeal to the above quoted words of the angel (Luke I.17) and point out that it was not the soul of Elijah that is spoken of at John's birth, but the spirit and power of Elijah. Just as the God of the Universe identified himself with His saints, so as to be called the God of Abraham, the God of Isaac and the God of Jacob, much more might the Holy Spirit identify Himself with the prophets so as to be called their spirit. Consequently, the phrase 'spirit and power of Elijah' might just as easily have been 'spirit and power of Isaiah' or any other prophet who shared the same Holy Spirit. It does not refer to Elijah personally, as indicating that he was John the Baptist before the latter was born. (3)

(1) - See ERE Vol: xii. 435 art. 'Jewish Transmigration' for confirmation

(2) - Comm: in Joan VI. 10f Preuschen IV. 119 - 124 - The word used consistently by Origen is 'μετεντωματόθεως' which we translate transcorporation to bring out its difference from 'μετενωματωματωματωματα' the word more usually employed in this connection. c.f. Denis. Note 2 on page 192 op.cit.

(3) - Comm. in Joan: VI.11 Preuschen IV. 120 ff.
(c) - Having given what he considers to be 'both sides of the argument' Origen sums up his own views as follows:-

"At another time than this, the point would certainly call for a careful enquiry, and the arguments would have to be well weighed as to the essence of the soul; as to the principle of her composition; and as to her entering into this body of earth.

We should also have to enquire into the distributions of the life of each soul, and as to her departure from this life, and whether it is possible for her to enter into a second life in a body or not, and whether that takes place at the same period and after the same arrangements in each case, or not.

...also whether she enters the same body or a different one, and, if the same, whether the subject remains the same while the qualities are changed, or if both subject and qualities remain the same, and if the soul will always make use of the same body or will change it.

Along with these questions it would also be necessary to ask what transcorporation is and how it differs from incorporation, and if he who holds transcorporation must necessarily hold the world to be eternal. The view of these scholars must also be taken into account, who consider that, according to the Scriptures the soul is sown along with the body, and the consequence of such a view must also be looked at. In fact, the subject of the soul is a wide one and hard to be unravelled, and it has to be picked out of scattered expressions of Scripture. It requires therefore separate treatment". (1)

There yet remains one other group of references to this topic of reincarnation in the works of Origen to which we must refer. Right at the end of his life, he wrote his great apology, the Contra Celsum. In that work, he is more definite than anywhere else in expressing an opinion about the matter. That opinion is always adverse. He quite clearly denies the doctrine as held in the minds of his contemporaries who followed Pythagorean and Platonic patterns of the doctrine. He asserts the resurrection as something quite different. It may be that Origen's thought in this matter underwent a development. We shall never, however, be able to know clearly the exact form of that development, because, as we have said, the main source from which we might learn, is lost. (2)

The gist of the passages in the Contra Celsum is as follows:-

a) In discursing about the meaning of St Paul's dictum that the wisdom of this world is foolishness with God, Origen does not hesitate to include among the 'false systems of philosophy' constituting the 'wisdom of this world' that of the Platonist who 'believes in the immortality of the soul and in the doctrine of its transcorporation'. (3) He is prepared on occasion, to give the doctrine categorical denial. "We do not believe that souls pass from one body to another and that they may descend so low as to enter the bodies of the brutes". (4).

(1) - Comm. in Joan vi. 14 Preuschen IV. 123 - 124.

(2) - So Pamphilus "Apology for Origen" VIII. Lomm: xxix. 397 and the section entitled "Responsio ad nonam criminationem...de transmutatione animarum", page. 405.

(3) - Con.Cel: I.13 Koetschau I.66 (4) - Con.Cel: VIII.30 Koet.II.245
b) One of the arguments of Pythagoreans was that wickedness resulted in descent into irrational and insensate forms of life. Origen counters this by asserting that wickedness is followed by punishment and 'not by the descent of the rational nature sometimes into all kinds of irrational animals, and sometimes into that state of being, which is incapable of using the imagination'. (1) Twice he speaks in a disparaging tone about the 'myth of transcorporation'. (2)

c) Even of greater interest to us than categorical denial, are those passages in which Origen contrasts the doctrine with the Christian ideas of Incarnation and Resurrection. First, he considers that Christ's taking of a human body was entirely different from the kind of event which is implied in ordinary reincarnation. "If Celsus had reflected on what is appropriate to a soul which is to enjoy an everlasting life, he would not have ridiculed the entrance of the Immortal into a mortal body, which took place, not according to the transcorporation of Plato, but in conformity with another and higher view of things". (3) Secondly, he makes clear that in his mind transcorporation does not take the place of the resurrection. "Our teaching on the subject of the resurrection is not derived from anything which we have heard on the doctrine of transcorporation". (4).
THE VIEWS OF ORIGENIST SCHOLARS

It will be of interest to end this section by referring to the opinions held by the chief Origenist students concerning this matter of reincarnation.

HUET  "Origeniana" II.ii.vi. paras. 17 - 20 distinguishes carefully between two doctrines covered by the one word 'μετένεγκματοςθόλυσι'. First, there is the notion of a rational soul migrating from a celestial, human or demonic body into the body of an animal. Second, there is the other notion of the migration of a rational soul throughout the ranks of celestial, human and demonic bodies, short of animals. It was this latter doctrine which fitted into Origen's principles. "Unde et Theophilus Origenem dixisse ait, hominem crebrius mori: Quod non aliter intelligo, quam animas saepenumero e corporibus in corpora transire et μετένεγκματοςθόλυσι." (Para. xvii. Lomm. xxiii. 34)

Huet then proceeds to defend Origen against the attacks of Jerome and Justinian to the effect that he also taught the former and Pythagorean form of the doctrine. His defence is (a) that the accusation is absurd, since so many passages in Origen refute it. The passages in the First Principles used by Jerome are not Origen's own opinions, but raised solely for discussion, and (b) all the other passages in the Commentaries and the Contra Celsum reject Pythagorean transcorporation. All that Origen meant, when he appears to have said that the souls of men become even the souls of beasts, was that in wickedness they make themselves like beasts. (Para. xx. Lomm. xxiii. 39).

REDEPNENNING  "Origenes" I. 29 II. 345 and 463 considers that Origen did not teach that souls entered animal bodies because in these the soul is nothing but the vitality of the blood and cannot survive the death of the body. "Nur konnedie See!en nicht auch in Theirleiber eingehaben, weil in diesen die Seele nichts als die Lebenskraft des Blutes ist, eine unvollkommene Substanz, unfahig den Korper iuberdauern". p. 345.

In an interesting Appendix on the Origenist teaching on the resurrection (p. 462 - 464) he refers to Con. Cel. IV. 92 (Koetschau I. 365) where Origen states his belief that certain wicked daemons can inhabit the bodies of animals. Redep-enning suggests that Origen later accepted the possibility that some kind of association with an animal body might a form of punishment.

BIGG  "Christian Platonists of Alexandria" p. 241 says straightforwardly, "Origen rejected the Platonic doctrine of Metempsychosis". In a valuable note he amplifies this, referring to texts and giving his reasons. Had Bigg written later, however, when he would have had access to Koetschau's revised text of the First Principles, he would not have been quite so categorical.
DENIS "De la Philosophie d'Origène" pp. 190 - 1 examines the question in considerable detail. He is convinced that Origen did not teach the usual form of the doctrine, because it was that of many of the Gnostics whom he opposed. What he did teach was that the soul 'migrates' from heaven to earth and vice versa. This 'migration' involves the same body, which is transformed according to the life assigned to the soul (p. 192). Origen taught that the individual soul never incarnates more than once in a body appropriate to the conditions of this world, during the same phase of its existence (p. 195).

Denis feels that there are many inconsistencies in Origen's doctrine however. He mentions his use of the Stoic conception of the 'σωματικοὶ λόγοι' (Comm. in Joan. XX. 2 Preuschen IV. 328) which involves introducing "an idea of heredity which is wholly inconsistent with the idea of preexistence and individual responsibility" (pp. 197 - 199).

WILLIAMS "Ideas of the Fall and Original Sin" p. 215, does not investigate the matter deeply, and simply comments, "Origen may have been subtly influenced by the Hindu doctrines of reincarnation and karma, though he steadfastly refused to admit more lives than three, pre-natal, present and future."

As we approach contemporary sources, we detect a slight change of angle. Writers are more open to admit that the influence of Platonism, and even Pythagoreanism, was greater than hitherto imagined. This change can be due to no other cause than the admission by Koetschau, into the text of the First Principles, of passages which were previously suspect.

DANIELLOU "Origène" p. 282 - "Le point faible de la pensée d'Origène est donc ici sa doctrine des existences successives. Les esprits connaissent de multiples incarnations et ne sont pas conscients dans l'existence suivante de celle qui précède."

CADIOU "Origen: His Life at Alexandria" p. 162 writes in a more conservative vein...... though the quotation at least illustrates the disappearance of the element of categorical denial! "Origen also admits, in accordance with the principles he held in common with the 'Notes of Ammonius', that there is a transmigration of souls or a succession of bodies for one and the same soul, but he distinguished it clearly from the metempsychosis of his day".

"Origen on First Principles" Introduction p. xv.
gives what is in many ways the best summing up which well expresses the balanced view about the matter as it stands today. "The last charge of all, and perhaps the most difficult one to counter, is that Origen taught the doctrine of the transmigration of souls. Now, any reader of the First Principles, if he takes into consideration, as he must do, the irrefutable evidence of Jerome, and the Emperor Justinian, will be forced to admit that Origen at least allowed the possibility of transmigration. That is putting the case at its lowest. Pamphilus does not quote the evidence of the First Principles. He relies on passages from the Commentary on St Matthews in which Origen argues against the doctrine. We possess the Greek text of this passage, so that there can be no doubt of its genuineness.

The argument runs as follows: If such transmigration should occur, it would happen, by hypothesis, as a punishment for sin. What, then, could prevent the process from going on infinitely, and destroying the possibility of a time when 'Heaven and earth shall pass away'? If, on the other hand, men should be at last, one by one and through infinite ages, become purified so as no longer to need bodies, what then becomes of the statement of Scripture - "When the Son of Man cometh, shall he find faith on the earth?'

The reasoning is very different from that in the First Principles. It is possible that Origen's opinion had changed in the intervening years. Or he may have felt that more caution was needed in a Commentary which would circulate widely among all classes of Christians, than in a treatise which reflected for the most part the discussions between himself and his students in the Catechetical School".
SUMMING UP

We have examined above, both what Origen himself said about Reincarnation, and what others have thought he said. The result has been to leave our minds in a state of uncertainty, which exactly reflects the situation indicated in the views quoted. Origen makes bold and striking assertions which appear to be his opinion that some form of reincarnation does take place... he then qualifies them, and even denies them - 'raising the question to reject it'.

In the later years of his life, when he was at Caesarea and wrote the great defence of the Christian Faith, the 'Contra Celsus', he definitely repudiates the doctrine, apparently dismissing it entirely for a doctrine of the Resurrection, which admits of no alternatives.

On the other hand, no one can read the First Principles, with its vast sweep of 'worlds without end', of the tireless patience of God as souls rise and fall in the cosmic drama, and falls and redemptions succeed one another, without seeing that such a process cannot go on without reincarnation being involved. We see how the general trend of scholarship, since the publication of Koetschau's text (1) is rather in line with attributing to Origen a more definite and positive doctrine of reincarnation than before.

The one definite statement which can be made is that he indisputably taught the doctrine of pre-existence, and it is that doctrine which almost necessarily involves some form of reincarnation whether it be developed on a vast scale to include many bodies during the 'life history' of one world, or be reduced to a bare minimum indicated by pre-natal, present and future only. Since the treatise, in which he promised to give 'separate treatment' to all the problems raised in connection with reincarnation, has never been found and may never have been composed, we shall never obtain the certainty we desire regarding Origen's full views. In any case he was a thinker who by temperament avoided pushing his speculations to their logical conclusions.

(1) - N.P. Williams, writing in the Journal of Theological Studies, vol. xxxix, No. 154 p. 191 - 192, discusses fully and well the questions involved in this matter of the 'reconstituted' text of the 'De Principiis' and its bearing upon reincarnation and kindred topics.
APPENDIX B on 'Spherical Bodies'

(The following 'Note' by Wilfred L.Knox on "Origen's Conception of the Resurrection Body" is quoted from The Journal of Theological Studies. Volume XXXIX, July 1938. No. 155. Page 247)

"Professor N.P.Williams, in a very interesting review in J.T.S. vol. xxxix, No. 154, p. 193, regards Origen's view that the resurrection bodies will be "σφατοειδή" as 'mysterious'. I suggest that the answer to the problem is to be found in the Timaeus 33B, where the sphere is the perfect shape. c.f. also 44D, where the spherical shape of the human head aptly represents the fact that it is the most divine element in us which controls the whole. On the ordinary analogy of macrocosm and microcosm it would naturally follow that the resurrection body would possess the perfect shape, i.e. the sp-here. But this would also logically imply that the resurrection body, being spherical, would be merely a permanent survival of the spherical element concentrated in the head, in other words, the "σφατοειδή" in the soul of man, which was also the element of Mind and also the peculiarly divine element in man (Posidonius as. Diog. Laert. 7. 139).

Thus Origen's view might naturally be taken to mean that only the divine element in man survives, a view which is also implied in Cicero Tusc. Disp. I. 17. 40 (cf.Wisd.iii.7 and Dan.xii.3, where the souls of the righteous appear as 'sparks' or 'stars!') In other words, the permanent element in man is a 'σφατοειδή' similar in character to the stars, though imprisoned in a material body, as in Philo De Gigant. 2 (7 sqq., M. I. 263) following presumably Posidonius, since the same theme appears in Cicero De Nat. Deor. 2.15.42 sq. (c.f.also Corp. Herm. I. (Poiemandres) 26a (Scott 128).

As against this Justinian maintains that the resurrection body is 'ἄθροισ' which appears to mean that it is erect or upright, like the human body. This reflects the Stoic argument as to design in nature. Man as a 'heavenly' animal is the only one that looks up to heaven. The view goes back to the Timaeus 90A. It is a favourite commonplace in Hellenistic literature, as in Philo Quod. Det. Pot. Ins. 23 (85, M. I. 207), Cicero De Nat. Deor. 2. 56. 140 and passim. Justinian may have meant that the resurrection body would be composed of flesh and blood, or he may have regarded it as the whole quasi-material soul, consisting not merely of the element of Mind, concentrated in the brain, but of the whole 'ψυχή' diffused throughout the body c.f. Philo De Fug. et Inv. 32 (182 M. I. 573); Tert. De Anim. 9, where Tertullian refers to a revelation granted to a prophetess, but the conception was a Stoic commonplace.) Justinian seems to have overlooked the fact that the erect position of man was no longer necessary, when he has ceased to contemplate heaven from below and was already standing above the firmament. Origen's view, however, was dangerous, if pressed to its logical conclusion; but Origen's greatness lay largely in his refusal to press his views in this way."
CHAPTER EIGHT
"The Human Nature of Christ"

Origen was the first theologian to use the phrase the 'God-Man' in describing the nature of Christ. (1) He was indeed, one of the first great Christian thinkers to attempt the working out of a systematic Christology. The general pattern of his thought is orthodox, but the details have in many cases been rejected subsequently by the Church. (2)

None has better expressed the 'historicity' of the human nature of Christ. "He emptied Himself and was made Man, was made flesh, although He was God..... and was born and suffered in truth and not in appearance only..... and died our common death and truly rose from the dead...". (3)

None has better kept the 'balance' between the human and the Divine natures. "When therefore, we see in Christ some things so

(1) - Hom. in Ezech: III.3 Lommatzsch xiv. 44 - "Deus homo...
(For a full list of the relevant passages see Redepenning "Origenes" II. 384 Note 1.) Also De Prin: II.vi.3 Koet: V.142.

(2) - Bigg - "Early Christian Platonists of Alexandria" p. 232 - 233 defines the matter as follows: "Origen's view of the God-Man - a term which he first employed - differs from the ordinary view, generally speaking, only in so far as it is conditioned by his opinions of the preexistence of the Soul and of the nature of the resurrection body".

(3) - De Prin: I. Pref. 4 Koetschau V. 10 - The full passage runs...
"novissimis temporibus se ipsum exinaniens homo factus est, incarnatus est, cum Deus esset, et homo factus mansit quod erat, Deus. Corpus assumsit nostro corpori simile, eo solo differens, quod natum ex virgine et spiritu sancto est. Et quoniam hic Jesus Christus natus et passus est in veritate, et non per phantasiam, communem hanc mortem vere mortuus; vere enim et a mortuis resurrexit et post resurrectionem conversatus cum discipulis suis assumtus est."
human that they appear in no way to differ from the common frailty of mortals, and some things so Divine that they are appropriate to nothing else but the primal and ineffable nature of Deity, the human understanding with its narrow limits is baffled. Being struck with amazement at so mighty a wonder, it knows not which way to turn, what to hold to, or whither to betake itself. If it thinks of God, it sees a Man. If it thinks of a man, it beholds one returning from the dead with spoils after vanquishing the kingdom of death". (1)

None has better expatiated upon the Christ, not of history, but of the eternal world, where as Logos He dwells in the heavens. The first two books of his Commentary on St John's Gospel are one long and unbroken eulogy of the Logos. Origen distinguishes between the historical or 'somatic' knowledge of Christ, which those whom he calls 'carnal' long after in faith (νίκτις), and the mystical or spiritual knowledge of Christ as heavenly Wisdom, which those who are 'perfected' possess by knowledge (γνώσις). (2)

(1) - De Prin: II.vi.2 Koetschau V. 141 "............... si Deum sentiat, mortalem videt; si hominem putet, devicto mortis regno cum spoliis redeundem a mortuis cernit".

(2) - Comm. in Joan: I. 7 Preuschen IV. 13 - "ἀναγκαίον πνευματικὸς καὶ σωματικὸς χριστικὴ ἡμῶν".
How then did Origen build up his doctrine of the human nature of Christ? He commences at the 'transcendental' level, where were created all 'true' men in the form of the 'νοσ' or 'γι λογικ'. Among all such beings, one and one alone did not take part in the universal and cosmic Fall. "Out of all the original unity of rational beings, one mind remained steadfast in the Divine love and contemplation". (1) Elsewhere, Origen explains how this situation fitted and prepared this soul to be the medium between God and human nature possessed of body, and so constituted the foundation of the Divine Incarnation. "Whereas, by reason of the faculty of freewill, variety and diversity had taken hold of individual souls so that one was attached to its author with a warmer and another with a feebler love, that soul, of which Jesus said, 'No man taketh from me my soul', clinging to God from the beginning of the creation and ever after with a union inseparable and indissoluble, as being the soul of the Wisdom and Word of God, and of the truth and the true light, and receiving Him wholly, and itself entering into His light and splendour, was made with Him in a preeminent degree one spirit." (2).

(1) - De Prin: II.viii.3 (Anathema vi.a, Coun. Constant.553) Koet:V.160

(2) - De Prin: II.vi.3 Koetschau V. 142
Before proceeding with our task of reconstructing Origen's doctrine of the human nature of Christ, we must digress for a moment to grasp his idea of the purpose of the Incarnation. Père Daniélou has pointed out how small, comparatively speaking, is the place which the Incarnation occupies in Origen's system. (1) This is simply because Origen has so much to convey concerning the Eternal Logos, who to his mind has never ceased continually to be in living contact with human nature, as being eternally that light of reason which lighteth every man coming into the world. This serves to introduce the following passage describing the purpose of the Incarnation, and bringing out very clearly the 'educative', or 'pedagogic', character of the matter. "Just as we have said that all souls that have dwelt in this world have stood in need of many ministers and rulers and helpers, so in the last times when the end of the world was near at hand, and the whole human race was hastening towards its final destruction, and when weakness had overtaken not only those that were ruled but also those to whom the care of ruling had been committed, then there arose the need, not of such help as this, nor of defenders like these, but the aid of the author and Creator Himself was demanded in order to restore to the first the capacity to obey and to the second the capacity to rule, with in both cases had been corrupted and profaned". (2)

(1) - Daniélou. - "Origène" p. 258.
(2) - De Prin: III.v.6 Koetschau V. 276 - 277.
Christ, therefore, is mainly a Teacher. Origen does not neglect or deny any other aspect of His nature, but it is this, the aspect which is designed to restore that true 'Gnosis' or 'Wisdom' which is fundamental behind the Incarnation. (1) The purpose of Christ Incarnate is not different in principle from the purpose of Christ the Eternal Logos, Who is unceasingly at work illuminating mankind. He, Who is always among His creatures spiritually as immanent World Reason, now comes among them in the flesh, taking their 'human' nature upon Him.

The way in which the union was made proceeded as follows: That unique 'mind' who had never wavered from love and fidelity to God was now selected to become the Soul in the mysterious and unique union between Divinity and Manhood which constitutes the historic, incarnate Christ. There are two 'unions' involved in the process. The first one, that existing between the Logos and the pre-existing Soul of the man Jesus (2) and that constituted in the womb of the Virgin by the

(1) - Harnack - "History of Dogma" pp. 162 ff (abridged edition) is particularly illuminating in his description of Origen's Christology and makes this evident.

(2) - Though this union implied the persistence of a mutually free choice, which was theoretically capable of being broken, actually says Origen "what formerly depended upon the will, was, by the influence of long custom changed into nature". The entire passage, De Prin: II.vi.5 Koetschau V. 144 - 145, is as follows:- "Naturam quidem animae illius (sc. Christi) hanc fuisse, quae est omnium animarum, non potest dubitari; alioquin nec dici anima potuit, si vere non fuit anima. Verum quoniam boni malique eligendi facultas omnibus praesto est, haec anima, quae Christi est, ita elegit 'diligere justitiam', ut pro immensitate dilectionis inconvertibiliter ei atque inseparabiliter inhaereret, ita ut propositi firmitas et affectus immensitas et dilectionis inextinguibilis calor omnem sensum conversionis atque immutationis abscederet, ut quod in arbitrio erat positum, longi usus affectu jam versum sit in naturam: ita et fuisse quidem in Christo humana et rationabilis anima orenda est, et nullum sensum vel possibilitatem eam putandum est hæbuisse peccati".
uniting of this Soul with the body of flesh. (1) The development of these two 'κράσεις' or bindings, constitute the two crucial points which are fundamentally relevant in the study of the nature and destiny of Man. The former represents what Man is intended to be by God, a wholly incorporeal spirit created by God and united to Him in voluntary and loving union. The latter represents what Man has actually become through falling away from God, a spirit bound to, or imprisoned in, a body. The Incarnate Christ, therefore, becomes in Origen's Christology the possessor of a 'human' nature which represents both 'true' and 'actual' Man. (2) This implies that His 'actual' humanity possesses a special uniqueness. While in the case of all other men, their possession of a 'soul' and a 'body' represent the consequences of the Fall, in the case of Christ there cannot possibly be any such suggestion. His actual human nature is entirely without sin. Origen feels that His virgin birth is what safeguards this. In several passages, he argues that all human birth involves sin (sordes) in the form of a kind of defilement inherent in sex and processes of birth in general, (3). Origen is confronted with this difficulty - a difficulty which the Roman Catholic Church later met through the promulgation of the dogma of the Immaculate Conception. Origen, however, knows no such doctrine.

(1) - De Prin: I. Pref. iv Koetschau V. 10
(2) - It was Denis, op. cit. p. 237 who pointed out this distinction... "L'homme actuel, pour (Origène)...est chair, âme et esprit.... L'homme véritable est tout entier dans l'esprit...."
(3) - Vide ante. p. 49.
He argues the matter out in his Fourteenth Homily on St Luke's Gospel, on the text "A pair of turtle doves and two young pigeons". (Luke II.21) Of Mary, he says, "Let us say boldly, that she was human and required purification after childbirth". (1) With less assurance, but compelled, he feels, by his interpretation of Scripture, which says that the offerings were required for THEIR purification, continues, "Therefore, Jesus also required purification and was impure or was defiled by some sort of uncleanness. Perhaps I appear to speak rashly, but I am moved by the authority of Scriptures". (2) Elsewhere, however, he denies that Jesus had any defilement in his human birth, arguing that He alone of all mortals was exempt (3) since, according to Leviticus, XII.2 it is only the woman who has conceived seed, who is defiled, but Mary was a virgin.

Just as we saw, in Origen's doctrine of ordinary human nature, that the 'soul' is that intermediary element which connected the transcendent spirit with the animal body, so it is, in the nature of

(1) - Hom. XIV in Luc: Lommatzsch v. 134.
(2) - Huet - "Origeniana" II.ii.4 Paras 1 - 3 deals, as usual, with the matter exhaustively. He asserts that Origen was mislead by using a wrong Biblical version, which has "κυρή" their, instead of "κυρή", her, as in the Vulgate. He states that it is proved that Origen had no intention of asserting any 'uncleanness' in connection with Christ's nature by what he says elsewhere in a passage from the Catena, derived from Origen on Leviticus xii, 2....
(3) - Hom. XII.4 in Lev: Lommatzsch ix. 389 - "Omnis ergo homo in patre et in matre pollutus est, solus Jesus Dominus in hanc generationem mundus ingressus est, in matre non est pollutus. Ingressus est enim corpus incontaminatum".
Christ, this 'Soul' which is the connection or bridge between the Divine Nature and the body. "This Soul, then, acting as a medium between God and the flesh (for it was not possible for the nature of God to mingle with a body apart from some medium) there is born, as we said, the 'God-Man', the medium being that existence to whose nature it was not contrary to assume a body. Yet neither, on the other hand, was it contrary to the nature of that soul, being as it was a rational existence, to receive God, into whom, as we said above, it had already completely entered, by penetrating into the Word and Wisdom and Truth". (1).

Origen is most insistent in asserting that this Soul of Christ is a human soul. (2) His contribution to Christology in this respect has left a permanent mark, which has become part of the orthodox faith of the Church. (3) Yet this soul is so united

(1) - De Prin: II.vi.3 Koetschau V. 142. - "Hac ergo substantia animae inter Deum carnemque mediante (non enim possibile erat Dei naturam corpori sine mediatore misceri) nascitur, ut diximus, 'Deus-homo', illa substantia media existente, cui utique contra natural non erat corpus assumere. Sed neque rursum anima illa, utpote substantia rationabilis, contra naturam habuit capere Deum, in quem, ut superius diximus, velut in Verbum, et Sapientem et Veritatem tota jam cesserat".

(2) - De Prin: IV.iv.4 Koetschau V. "Volens igitur filius Dei, pro saluti humani generis apparere hominibus et inter homines conversari, suscept non solum corpus humanum, ut quidam putant, sed et animam, nostrarum quidem animarum similem per naturam".

(3) - c.f. H.R.Mackintosh, - "The Person of Jesus Christ" p. 169 Origen's "main conception, according to which the personal Logos united Himself to the personal soul (and so to the body) of Jesus, differs noticeably from the tendency of earlier writers, like Irenaeus, to say rather that the Logos became man. This insistence on the personal being of Christ qua man is a conspicuous merit in his system".
to the Divine Logos as to be in a sense identified with it. (1) Origen has some striking expressions which bring out what the theology of a later period called 'communicative idiomatum'. (2) He can also sum up with superb neatness of theological expression ideas whose content of meaning could not be exhausted by many volumes, as when he says that in this soul of Jesus 'there began the union of the Divine with the human nature, in order that the human, by communion with the Divine, might rise to be Divine, not in Jesus alone, but in all who believe and enter upon the life which Jesus taught". (3)

Though this pre-existent Soul of Jesus, which alone did not fall, and was chosen to be the Soul of Christ, constitutes the essence of the human nature of Christ, the God-Man, yet this description does not exhaust His Humanity. The Incarnation, as taught in Scripture, and as set forth by Origen, involved the assumption of human flesh. We have already noticed in what manner Origen conceived the taking of that flesh through the virgin birth. It is important to note that Origen does not hesitate to use the Pauline word 'σωματικά'. (4). We may assume that this involves, in addition to the 'rational soul',

(1) - De Prin: IV.iv.4 Koetschau V. 354 - "ἀπερ ἐν εἰσιν, οὕτω καὶ ἐν εἰσιν καὶ ἐν εἰσιν καὶ ἐν εἰσιν ἐν εἰσιν"

(2) - De Prin: II.vi.3 Koetschau V - "per omnem Scripturam tam divina natura humanis vocabulis appellatur, quam humana natura divinae nuncupationis insignibus decoratur".

(3) - Con. Cel: III. 28 Koetschau I. 226 "δριμωτε θεία καὶ ἀνθρωπίνη συνεφαίνεται...

(4) - Con. Cel: III. 28 Koetschau I. 226 - "ἀναλαβόντως τὴν ἐν ἀνθρώποις..."
the presence in Christ of that vital principle or animal soul, which in studying Origen's doctrine of ordinary human nature, we found created so many problems both of psychology and logic. The problem, however, is less acute in the case of Christ, Who never in any occasion consented through moral weakness to the temptations of this 'soul of the flesh', and consequently never brought about any identification of Himself with it. Christ is the actual, realised example of how the flesh ought to be subject to the spirit. Not only is there never found in Him any sin (peccatum) which would indicate failure on the part of the rational soul to adhere to the Logos, but neither is there any sin (sordes) or defilement arising out of consent to the flesh. Yet all His temptations were real temptations, and His sharing in human nature was a real experience of human weakness. The passages, in which Origen stresses all this, literally abound. (1)

What part did Origen conceive the human nature of Christ to play in the great crises of the Crucifixion and the Resurrection? It is here that he appears to depart from the broad outlines of what has been established as orthodoxy. Though the Passion was in no sense 'docetic', and though it achieved the mystery of the atonement on our

(1) - Con. Cel: II.25 Koetschau I. 154
Con. Cel: III.25 Koetschau I. 222
Comm. in Joan: XX.11. Preuschen 340
Frag. Catenae xliii. Preuschen 534
Frag. Catenae lxxxviii Preuschen 552
behalf, as the Scriptures define, yet it was not the Logos who
suffered, but the human soul of Jesus. (1) No one, says Origen,
who is a Christian and however simple he may be, and unversed in
critical studies, would be so extravagant as to affirm that 'the Life
died' or 'the Resurrection died'.... Observe how distinctly they
say that it was a Man who should endure these human sufferings. (2)

After the Passion, the human Soul of Jesus 'became a soul
without a body'.(3) In this state He visited Hades. The body with
which He rose was the human flesh, the 'σάρξ', now glorified, the
spiritual body into which it had been transmuted. If we can trust
Pamphilus, who quotes a passage from Origen's lost treatise on "The
Resurrection" (4). Origen argued that the 'flesh' of Christians,
which had struggled against sin in a warfare engaged along with the
'soul', must rise again as a reward deserved for what it had endured
and achieved 'on account of Christ'.(4). Yet, though it is 'flesh'

(1) - De Prin: IV.iv.4 Koetschau V. 353 - 354 - "οὐ δήποτε ἐστὶν ἡ τεταράμενη
cæ pi r i a r o s  σάρξ  ὑπὸ  ὡ μονογενής  καὶ  πρωτότοκος  πάσης  κτίσεως"

(2) - Con. Cel. VII.16 Koetschau II. 168 and part of 167 - "οὐδεὶς
 ἐμπρόντησε  ἡ  μονὴ  ἐστὶν,  ἐν  εἰς  τέθνηκεν  ἡ  σῶμας  ἡ  ἀνάγκης  ἑαυτὸς
 ὡς  ἡμεῖς  ἡσύχασαν  ἐρώτησεν  τὸν  ἱερότοιχον  ἃνθρώπων"

(3) - Con. Cel. II.43 Koetschau I.166 - "γυμνὴ  σώματος  γενόμενος

(4) - Pamphilus - "Apologia pro Origine" Caput vii. Lommatzsch.xxiv.379.
which rises, as we see in the case of Christ, whose 'fleshly' wounds were apparent, yet when the full glorification which follows the resurrection is achieved, these wounds disappear, and 'flesh' is transmuted into something finer than flesh. This was what happened in the case of Christ. (1)

Beyond the Resurrection is the Ascension. Just as we saw that the final destiny of all men, as seen through Origen's eyes, leads towards a final state beyond the resurrection of the body, when the entirety of human nature is essentially united to God, so in the case of Christ, the 'first fruits of the dead', the entirety of His human nature is taken up by the Logos and united so as to become 'one spirit' as it was before its assumption of human 'soul' and 'body'. (2)

"He whom we regard as having been from the beginning God, and the Son of God, is the very Logos, Wisdom and Truth. With respect to His mortal body, and the human soul which it contained, we assert that not merely by their communion with Him, but by their unity and intermixture, they received the highest powers, and, after participating in His Divinity, were changed into God. If any should feel difficulty about

(1) - See especially Con. Cel:II. 61 and 62 Koetschau I. 185 - 184 where Origen describes the shewing of the wounds to Thomas, who 'could not believe that Christ had been raised in a body which was the antitype of the former'. Then Origen goes on to explain (c.62) that Christ 'after His resurrection' existed in a body intermediate, as it were, between the grossness of that which He had before His sufferings and the appearance of a soul uncovered by such a body'.

(2) - Con. Cel: III.41 Koetschau I. 237.
our saying this regarding His body, let them attend to what is said by the Greeks regarding matter, which, properly speaking, being without qualities, receives such as the Creator desires to impress into it, and which frequently divests itself of those which it formerly possessed, and assumes others of a different and higher kind. If these opinions be correct, what is there wonderful in this, that the mortal quality of the body of Jesus, since the providence of God so purposed it, should have been changed into one that was ethereal and Divine? ".

If we follow the 'letter' of the above passage, it can be interpreted as maintaining the Resurrection on orthodox lines, but if we follow the logic of Origen's whole scheme of thought, then the force of "His mortal body....and His human soul....were changed into God" means that they ceased to be body and soul, and the Resurrection has been transcended by some higher mystery. This note of uncertainty is precisely what was in the mind of Origen himself, who could not really fuse together two elements which were contradictory.
"Summary and Conclusion"

In our introduction, we quoted Martin Buber's striking remark concerning the approach to every doctrine of Man. "From time immemorial man has known that he is the subject most deserving of his own study, but he has fought shy of treating this subject as a whole, that is, in accordance with its total character. Sometimes, he takes a run at it, but the difficulty of this concern with his own being soon overpowers and exhausts him, and in silent resignation he withdraws - either to consider all things in heaven and earth save man, or to divide man into departments which can be treated singly, in a less problematic, less powerful and less binding way". We also pointed out, as being a striking new element in the approach to the study of Origen, how Daniélou stresses the need to grasp Origen's wholeness and to refuse to simplify a personality whose diversity is its striking characteristic.

We have now completed that 'departmental' study of Origen's doctrine of Man. The challenge that this kind of treatment is 'the less problematic, less powerful and less binding way' must be responded to by attempting to utilise this material in constructing the picture of the 'total' approach. What does such a total view imply? In the first place, it is obviously the sum of the parts. It is, however, more than that. The saying that the whole is more than the sum of the parts may be trite, but is, none the less, true. The total view also requires that we see the relationship of that whole to the time and place of its origin. Every study of what Man is, be it ever so abstractly and generally treated, none the less belongs to the particularity of the
circumstances from which it emerges. Secondly, we ought to form an estimate of Origen as being the creator of that particular doctrine. No author can avoid 'colouring' what he produces, and, while he may convey some of the vital truth about Man in general through the very colour of his personal characteristics, it is important that we as critics should be aware of that colour or personal bias and make allowance for it, if necessary. Lastly, the significance of Origen's doctrine of Man in its wholeness would lack point, unless we attempted to relate it in some way or other to our own time. It may turn out to be simply a 'museum piece' or, on the other hand, there may be indications that we have struck something which, after being buried for long ages in the graveyard of ideas, is ready for a kind of resurrection or revival.

In bare outline, Origen's doctrine of Man has much simplicity. It fits in tidily into the three basic 'epochs' of the classic pattern of any Christian scheme. Man is originally the 'creature' of God bearing His 'Image', designed to fulfil his nature and destiny by obeying and serving his Maker. But Man through the misuse of freewill falls and is disciplined and punished by God by having to struggle in this present life of conflict, temptation and hardship, visited by suffering and death. Man, however, is not forsaken by God, and Providence has arranged his Redemption through Christ, who by becoming the God-Man, achieves on Man's behalf the victory over sin or moral defection, and death or ontological negation, by His Crucifixion and Resurrection.

To 'explain' all this Biblical pattern to the intelligentsia of his time, Origen, however, freely turned to both Gnostic and Platonist...
materials (without actually adopting the principles of these systems so as to destroy the Biblical foundations). What he then exhibited appeared to many to constitute something incompatible with the simplicity of the Gospel. That creature of God bearing His Image is not actual Man as we find him in this world of time and space, but a purely spiritual, incorporeal existence, originally created in Eternity (and possibly existing eternally in the Mind of God in a totally inconceivable manner). Every 'Man' is, therefore, preexistent to this present life. 'Man', conceived thus as preexistent, is the 'original being' who antedates every 'angel', 'human being' or 'devil'. Because Man could use his freewill in this preexistent state and because the Cosmos is governed by unalterably just and moral laws fixed by the Creator, the state 'Man' now finds himself in is the result of his own choices which antedate this life. All the differences which make up the perplexing diversity of the world are due to the exercise of freewill in these rational existences and are not due to any 'favouritism' or 'caprice' on the part of God.

In the second stage of the human drama which takes place in this world, we discover 'Man' as a fallen creature. His Fall is shared by the angels and the devils, though theirs is different in degree but not in kind. As a result of having fallen and departed from God in the centre of his essential being, each individual 'Man' is punished by being imprisoned in, or at least disciplined by, the burden of a body. To use this body he must possess a soul or vital organisation to animate the body. This soul, looked at from another angle, that is, from above, may be considered to be the form which the spiritual or rational principle which IS Man takes when it falls and cools off from the warmth and light
Of the Divine Realm. It is this state or condition of 'spirit-cum-soul-cum-body' which constitutes 'actual Man'. The provision, arranged by God, of material universe and bodies, which serve as the training ground or school for fallen souls being recalled to their original estate, forms the visible universe or Creation mentioned in the Bible (though it is not the primary Creation of the original transcendent beings in Preexistence). The destiny of the individual souls, because of their permanent freewill, remains in their own hands throughout the discipline of the fallen condition. They may respond and become better, or they may grow more negligent and become worse. Because of this, Divine Providence has arranged (and here Origen claims only to be speculating) the possibility of 'Men' ascending in the scale of spiritual hierarchy to the ranks of angels or descending to the levels of devils and even lower.

Already, Origen seems to have departed much from the simple rather straightforward message in the Biblical ideas of Man as Child of God and redeemed sinner. When, however, he philosophises concerning the third 'epoch' in the Christian destiny of Man, he parts still farther from the familiar and the simple. Because the 'body' is a 'prison' for the soul, in the Platonist sense, redemption must mean ultimate deliverance from that body. Accordingly, Origen suggests that the Resurrection is only a stage in the refinement of the body before it ceases to be such through the final union of the spirit with God. But because, there may never be removed from God's original Creation consisting of Minds, permanently endowed with freewill, the possibility of their again departing from God, there also remains the possibility of an endless series of visible worlds being recalled into existence as need arises. Also,
actual redemption of sinners takes a very long time.... much longer than the infinitesimally short period allotted in each incarnate life, and the succeeding worlds are required to extend indefinitely the basic pattern of the universe as a 'school for souls'. The patience of God cannot be exhausted. Just as He became Man on this earth, so that Man might be the better educated, encouraged, healed and restored by His Creator Himself, so also will He, as need arised, assume the 'forms' of all the other ranks of the fallen hierarchy in order to restore them by whatever mystery of suffering, or outpoured love, the situation requires.

Such is the 'total' view of Origen's doctrine of Man. What immediately strikes the student as marking it with distinctiveness is the vast 'cosmic' sweep involved, the large element devoted to 'speculation', the abiding presence of Biblical truths presented in such a manner as to separate the 'total' view distinctly off from Platonist and Gnostic conceptions which are suggested in certain aspects and departments of its presentation. Quite obviously, the 'total' view raises profound questions. How deeply is it involved in contradictions? Is it a consistent and legitimate development of the Biblical foundations of Christianity? Does it, as a system of thought, possess coherence? Before we answer these questions, or by way of attempting to prepare the way for their answers, let us return to the points raised at the beginning of this chapter, as being related to the attempt to utilise aright the material provided by the 'departmental' examination of Origen's ideas about Man. We suggested that, in addition to 'summing together the parts' the 'total view' requires that we see the relationship of that whole to the time and place of its origin.
The tremendous achievement of the Alexandrian Fathers, Clement and Origen, in commending Christianity to the Stoic-minded intelligentzia of the dying civilisation of the second and third centuries, is one which needs constant repeating and emphasis. (1) This is one of the many great tasks which Origen set before himself, a task for which he alone in many ways was equipped and suited. He was sensitively aware of the dynamic need for a living contact between the Gospel and Hellenic philosophy, the two magnitudes giving shape and form both to the commencing Christian Civilisation and to the ending Hellenic pattern. (2) In one sense every thinker of the early centuries had to take account of these magnitudes, in their mutual challenge and response and in their coincidence and contact. We cannot claim that Origen or the School of Alexandria was unique. What singles out Origen especially, however, was the depth of his Christian conviction linked to the boldness of his creative imagination in 'exploiting' the vital ideas of Gnosticism, Hellenic philosophy and the like, without being overpowered by them. What made Origen's achievement considerable was that, whereas Clement, his great predecessor at the Catechetical School of Alexandria, was perhaps more of a Greek Philosopher than a Christian Theologian, the

(1) - Arnold J. Toynbee - "A study of History" Oxford 1939. V.367 & 539, with his usual massive erudition and penetrative capacity to pierce through to the significant issue, stresses this contribution of Origen in particular and indicates (along with suggestive parallels from Far Eastern sources) its importance for the Western Society.

(2) - Throughout this consideration of the pattern of historical background, we have adopted without qualification Toynbee's view that it is 'Hellenic' culture which informs the Latin or Roman period throughout which Christianity arose.
exact opposite was true of Origen. (1) A Tertullian or a Jerome could feel the pregnant issues between the new Gospel and the old philosophy, only in terms of sharp and bitter conflict. (2) Origen was one of these rarer minds who, by means of an alchemy of interior sympathy with both elements in the conflict, can change and partly unite them in a degree of synthesis. But the victory which he won, or perhaps we should say the understanding which he brought about, was something achieved for the Church and subsequently retained permanently. For this reason alone, Origen ought never to have been subjected to the cruel, and, at times, incredibly unreasonable, attacks which in later times assailed his name. He was not a Gnostic, but he brought to the defence of the Church's faith, all the brilliant imaginative resources of Gnostic insight. He was not, on the last count, a Platonist in the uncompromising meaning of that term, but he brought all the intellectual integrity of Platonism into the service of investigating the philosophical problems which the Christian religion raised. From start

(1) - De Faye - "Clément d'Alexandrie" Paris 1896... writes, "Ouvrez le 'De Principiis' et vous constaterez sur tous les points que l'inspiration chrétienne modifie les notions philosophiques et métaphysiques que s'approprie Origène,...... dans une mesure beaucoup moins philosophe grec que Clément et beaucoup plus théologien chrétien..." (p. 300)

(2) - c.f. Tertullian's assertion that Greek Science was the invention of devils. (Quoted by Bigg, op.cit. p. 78)
to finish, Origen was, and remained, a 'man of the Church'. (1)

The above brief sketch of the historical pattern of Origen's time enables us to see 'the time and place of origin' of that doctrine of Man which concerns us here. The vital and significant factor to which we must give our attention is that the background is one of quite fundamental 'schism'. What does that mean? There are periods in history when the basic ideas of philosophy, and religion, which shape the social fabric of a society are relatively unified and stable. There are other periods, however, when this inner structure of thought is rent by schism, when transition replaces stability, diversity of outlook is substituted for unity and, as it were, two or more systems of thought struggle together within the womb of an age. Into such a time was Origen born.

(1) - Among comparatively recent books, there has been a remarkable revival of this term, as a tribute to Origen. Eugène de Faye entitles the concluding chapter of his three volumes on Origen, as 'Origene, homme d'Eglise'. Hal Koch similarly uses the phrase in its original Greek ἀνθρώπος εἰς ἐκκλησίαν in his corresponding last chapter of "Pronoia und Paideusis". This is all the more remarkable since that writer's general opinion is summed up, in regard to Origen, "....dass sein Gottesbegriff, seine Kosmologie, seine Seelenlehre, seine Ethik, ja, fast jeder einzelne, Punkt seines Systems in der Tat griechisch ist". (p. 305 and 307). Daniélou, in his new book, p. 41. writes, "Origène est d'abord un homme d'Eglise". Père du Lubac, in his great contemporary eulogy to Origen, "Histoire et Esprit .... L'Intelligence de l'Écriture d'après Origène" entitles his second chapter, in which he lists the great achievements of Origen in the third century, "Origène, homme d'Eglise". p. 47.

We may regard all this as sufficient evidence of a growing new approach to Origen, an approach at once rational and sympathetic, an approach, which appears to be spontaneously 'ecumenical', since we see from the above names, representation from the French Reformed Church, Roman Catholicism and Danish Lutheranism.
Now, if there is any department of man's intellectual effort, which is supremely sensitive to this complex pattern constituted by the major grouping of the ideas of a period, that department is anthropology. In philosophy, there is a technical phrase - the egocentric predicament - which expresses something similar to what is meant here. When we think of Man, we think of that which 'predicates' all other interests. Accordingly, it ought not to surprise us, if we discover in Origen's anthropology a reflection of this fundamental 'schism' which characterises the early centuries when Christianity and Hellenism were 'vis-a-vis'. For any doctrine of Man to possess fundamental coherence, it is not sufficient that the individual thinker be clear headed, he must 'think' in an age which displays more fusion of its basic ideas than separation and schism. It is not a simple matter of the thinker creating the thoughts. There is truth in the idea that the thoughts shape the thinker. It was Origen's destiny to be born into an age of fundamental schism and in spite of his brave efforts to 'think' out a true synthesis between Christianity and Hellenic culture, the pattern of schism penetrated his anthropology and bedevilled it with an incoherence which becomes evident at every point of the departmental approach, as well as standing out clearly in the 'total' aspect. (1)

(1) - Very significantly, Arnold Toynbee entitles the section out of which we selected his references to Origen.... "Schism in the Body Social". This section, in turn, belongs to a larger part entitled, "The Disintegrations of Civilisations" c.f. Vols. V -VI.
There are those who would claim that the true Christian Doctrine of Man, being part of the 'data' of Divine Revelation carries within it its own interior 'coherence' and ought not, on principle, to attempt any fusion with purely human cultures such as the Hellenic. In reply to such arguments we argue that Origen just did not look at things in that way. He did not see truth in terms of black and white. Jesus Christ, as Logos, was the inspirer of all truth everywhere and there was truth in Plato and many others who had never walked with Jesus in Galilee. This thought about Origen himself seems to introduce us with easy transition to the third topic we suggested required investigation, namely that of forming an estimate of Origen the man and thinker, as being the author of his own particular doctrine of Man.

It was with a sense of gratification and pleasant surprise that the writer turned over the pages of C.J. Jung's fascinating book, "Phyohological Types", on recollecting that the very persons selected by Jung to illustrate the psychological pattern of the early Church period, were Tertullian and Origen. The theme of Jung's book is/familiar one of the twin psychological types, the extravert and the introvert, the 'object-regarding' and the 'subject-regarding' minds. Each type is classified according to whether it gives priority to the intuition, the reason, the feelings or the senses. Jung interprets the situation of psychological stress and conflict in the period which we are considering, in the following manner. (1)

Christianity, with its emphasis upon 'love' and 'faith', did not favour 'knowledge'. Accordingly, the 'intellectual' type "scarcely came into his own. The 'regula fidei' was too narrow and permitted no independent movement. Moreover, it was poor in positive intellectual content. It contained a few ideas, which, although of enormous practical value, were a definite obstacle to thought. The intellectual was much more hardly hit by the 'sacrificium intellectus' than the man of feeling." (1)

Jung goes on to argue that Gnosticism "with its vastly superior intellectual content.......must have made the greatest possible appeal to the intellectual within the Church".

It was only by building up inside the Church an intellectual structure, which could satisfy the 'intellectual' type that Christianity could win the battle with Gnosticism and thereby preserve the true integrity of the Church. But not all Christians were agreed on the point that 'intellectualism' was a desirable component of Christianity.

Jung proceeds...."Perhaps the battle with the Gnosis is most clearly presented to us in two figures who were extremely influential,

(1) - Op. cit. p. 19 - That Origen indeed felt all that Jung asserts seems to be evident from several passages in the First Principles. c.f. De Prin: IV.ii.6 and IV.ii.1. A third passage, which we shall quote to illustrate the point, is De Prin.: II.xi.2 Koetschau V. 184. "Quidam ergo laborem quodammodo intelligentiae recusantes et superficiem quandam legis litterae, consecantes et magis delectationi suae quodammodo ac libidini indulgentes, litterae solius discipuli, arbitrantur reprimissiones futuras in voluptate et luxuria corporis expectandas...."
not only as fathers of the Church, but also as personalities. These were Tertullian and Origen...." Tertullian was the type who rejected the claims of the intellect. "The Gnosis, which in reality is a passion for thought and cognition, he attacked with unrelenting fanaticism, including both philosophy and science, which are so closely linked up with it" Yet Tertullian was no simpleton. It is possible to reject the claims and authority of the intellect and still remain a highly intellectual person. "By virtue of the acuteness of his mind he saw through the poverty of philosophic and of Gnostic learning, and contemptuously rejected it. He invoked against it the testimony of his own inner world, his own inner realities, which were one with his faith". (p. 20) Jung claims that Tertullian is essentially the 'subjective' or 'introvert' type of personality, whose ultimate standard of truth is within his own soul. "The self-mutilation achieved by Tertullian in the sacrificium intellectus led him to the unreserved recognition of the irrational inner reality, the real ground of his faith". (p. 22) We need not spend any more time on Tertullian, since it is with Origen that our greater interest lies.

Origen, according to Jung, was "the absolute opposite of Tertullian. Whereas Tertullian sacrificed his intellect before the claims of an inner irrational authority of Faith, Origen sacrificed his sensual hold upon the world before the claims of the objective intellectual authority of Reason. (1) "For Origen, evidently, the

(1) - Jung sees the symbol of this 'sacrifice' in Origen's act of self-castration, which he 'explains' psychologically on these lines. See also HUET "Origeniana" I.i.13 Lommatzsch xxii. p. 25.
intellect was not so much a specific danger as feeling and sensation with their enchainment to the object. Through castration, he freed himself from the sensuality that was coupled with Gnosticism; he could then yield himself unafraid to the riches of Gnostic thought, while Tertullian through his sacrifice of intellect turned away from the Gnosis, but thereby reached a depth of feeling, that we miss in Origen.

Whatever opinion we may form of Jung's analysis of the Psychological factors at work in the personality of Origen, there is no doubt about the interest inherent in what he has to say. It bears directly upon our estimate of Origen's anthropology. We see so clearly, that it is in some senses an over intellectualised doctrine. The tendency to investigate every problem connected with Man and to be attracted more by the abstruse problems than by the normal difficulties is evidence of the deep 'colour' of intellectualism imparted to the 'total' picture of the doctrine. (1) This then largely explains in psychological terms of possible 'unconscious motive' why Origen felt bound to construct a doctrine of Man, which insists that Man is solely 'Mind'. This was why he was moved to depart from the 'Biblical' 'datum' that Man, not merely in his 'actual' nature, but also in his 'true' nature, is body and soul, as well as spirit or mind. This was possibly why he felt

(1) - Rather interestingly, Denis, writing in 1884 in his "Philosophie d'Origène, calls attention to this very point which we have stressed in connection with Origen's 'bias' towards 'difficulties'. After pointing out how Origen lacks the power of interior observation, as evident in Augustine, Jerome and Tertullian, but has, on the other hand wide learning and penetration, Denis asks how it is that his ideas about the soul are so often full of uncertainty, confusion and gaps. He gives as the answer...." Un tour particulier d'esprit, qu'il tenait du milieu intellectual dans lequel il s'était formé, l'habitude de s'attaquer d'abord et presque uniquement aux questions les plus obscures et les plus insolubles....". p. 220
attracted to an 'explanation' of the final destiny of Man as involving entire incorporeality, when even the resurrection is transcended. For Origen 'Mind' must triumph at all costs and in the end 'Mind' as well as God 'must be all in all'.

We have sufficiently dealt with three out of four preliminary investigations, suggested at the commencement of this chapter, connected with the picture of Origen's total view of Man, to turn now to the questions raised on page 123. How deeply is this total view involved in contradictions? Is it a consistent and legitimate development of the Biblical foundations of Christianity? Does it, as a system of thought, possess coherence? These questions have been answered in part in what has been said above in describing the fundamental 'schism' rupturing the entire fabric of thought, during the transition period between ancient Hellenic culture and the nascent Christian civilisation. It remains only to amplify with some detail what has been sketched in broad outline and principle.

As we have tried to see Origen steadily and to see Origen whole, few things have become more clearly evident than the reality of the many contradictions, inconsistencies and incoherences which have invaded his doctrine of Man. He founds his anthropology upon a basically 'religious' affirmation. Man is God's creature. Origen finds no difficulty in affirming this, both on grounds of the Christian Revelation and also on the basis of Greek philosophy. This in itself is an interesting reminder to us that, in Origen's time, human society as a whole, was probably more 'religious' in all its basic intuitions
and assumptions than the modern world. (1) But, even here, right at the beginning of his anthropology, there appear, if not actual contradictions, inconsistencies or out-and-out incoherences, at least the clear indications and signs that he is deriving his fundamental postulates from two sources, at least. From Biblical sources he utilises the notion of the 'image of God' - that significant conception which stamps the soul with divinity without making it Divine. It is, however, from Greek philosophy that he adopts his notion of the soul's preexistence, which, while in no way denying the ultimate postulate of Divine createdness, pushes the frontiers of origin farther back behind the curtains of mystery. By attempting to marry together these two conceptions (what Niebuhr distinguishes as 'Man as creature and Man as Image of God') (2) Origen presents the the first part of his synthesis. What makes the alliance romantic is that the partners are at least of different dates of birth. In

(1) - In this connection, the following passage from that stimulating writer of today, Eugen Rosenstock-Hussey, in his book, "The Christian Future or The Modern Mind outrun", p. 106, is apposite:- "The pagans, as well as the Jews, prayed and sacrificed and experienced rapture. The three actions, the modern students pretend to be ignorant of, were familiar then. Kings, Priests, Poets, Prophets, the offices regenerated by Jesus were known. Only, their union in every man's life was deemed impossible. The modern, unemployed, inarticulate, psychoanalysed, cog-in-the-wheel has no ambition to be King, Prophet, Poet Priest. This ambition will have to be kindled before they understand 'divinity'. The man of antiquity knew many stories about God or gods, but had never heard of Jesus, so they could be told about Jesus by beginning with God". This was exactly what Origen did so well in his "Contra Celsum".

saying this, however, we do not mean to suggest that Origen is introducing at this point something foreign into the Christian religion which is not there already, but only that he is 'explaining' Man as a creature along Greek lines and Man as image of God along Biblical lines. It was for this reason that we permitted ourselves in Chapter Three to displace the normal balance of a chapter by introducing a Note on the 'Image of God' and a summary of scholars' opinions regarding Man's creaturely essence, which together exceeded the quantity of material making up the normal text. In further 'defence' of Origen, we may add that in his time there was no need to feel bound to any special theory of the soul's origin. Origen, moreover, claimed to speculate only when the Church had up to date put forward no definite statement to guide the faithful. (1)

It is when we come to that 'department' in both Theology and Anthropology which is concerned with the problem of Sin, that we see predicaments arise, incoherences appear and the contradictions threaten the unity of the doctrine. Man, as found in history, as an actual being possessed of body, soul and spirit, is very different from what Man is in the transcendental realm of 'Mind' in which he has been created by God. His soul and his body are the result of Sin. These constitute limitations, frustrations and reductions of his true being.

(1) - HUBT "Origeniana" II.ii.6 Para. 12, quotes St Augustine as supplying four possible theories of the soul's origin, one of which (that connected with preexistence) was Origen's own suggestion. But elsewhere Augustine rejects this. C.f. "City of God" XI.23.
The Biblical account, as we have emphasised before, is quite different. Man's body and soul are part of his essential humanity. (1) Granted that they have been injured by sin and are inherited in a sinful condition through Adam, the original Man, in whom the entire human race potentially fell, yet none the less, they constitute Man, and any doctrine of the redemption of Man must mean the redemption of his whole 'actual' being. It was for the purpose of investigating all these questions in detail, that we devoted the chapters (4 - 7) to the 'departmental' study of Man's 'spirit', 'soul' and 'body', and of the factors of freewill and sin. What we discovered was that at practically every point, two theories are uneasily fitted together, and that these in some cases flatly contradict each other, and only occasionally seem to fuse together. Freedom is described as operative in the true sense in the transcendent realm of preexistence before the Fall. It is, however, through its misuse that the entire visible creation has to come into existence, and a set of new conditions fundamentally constituted by the dual presence of good and evil introduced. Yet freedom remains as a permanent endowment of the soul, and there is little suggestion or realisation of what is Biblical Theology is the crux of the matter - the 'tragic' character of the Fall, the 'disastrous' nature of the damage of sin to the soul, a disaster

(1) - This affirmation has maintained itself with much consistency throughout the subsequent history of Christian Theology. It will be found in all the classic summaries of 'denominational' faith and doctrine. c.f. for example the vehemence with which it is expressed in Heinrich Heppe's "Reformed Dogmatics" p. 221 ff.
primarily affecting the seat of personality at its highest level, in the will, binding it so that its real freedom is just what has been lost. When we consider the soul, there is evident the same confusion. Gnosticism supplies the pattern of the vast hierarchy of descending beings, which at a certain stage become 'psychic' or 'souls'. Origen certainly rejects the Gnostic notion that different 'kinds' of men have been created, because that would impugn the justice and impartiality of God, but he adopts the Gnostic notion of the graded ranks which result from the Fall and affect human nature, so that the 'soul' can choose to become 'spiritual' or 'material'. The confusion is increased when Origen cannot state clearly whether all 'Mind' in falling becomes 'Soul' or part remains unfallen simply by remaining the 'rational' part of the soul. How this 'rational' soul can also be a mortal 'vital principle' of the body is entirely unsolved.

Nor do these difficulties clear up when we enter the third section of the theological pattern, that of eschatology. The Biblical doctrine of the destiny of Man has an element of 'now or never' challenge in the Gospel presentation of its message. It also contains the vital 'either-or' of immediate decision. Origen is alive to all this. No one who has read his 'Contra Celsum' could deny his 'evangelical' fervour regarding the saving of souls. His life, which drew to Christ so many disciples, was his best testimony. None the less, Origen dissipates all this Biblical element as he sketches his vast cosmogony, describes the succession of worlds without end, and declares all punishment to be remedial and all Providential government to be eternally educative. This is Plato, but it is hard to square with the 'hard sayings' of the Gospels.
Origen rounds off his anthropology with his exposition of the humanity of Christ, the God-Man. There seems to be no doubt about the 'orthodoxy' of his doctrine here. He accepted the Incarnation as the Church accepted it. He desired only to explain the Christ of the Scriptures, which he loved as none before or after him has done better. But his profound personal conviction regarding the Eternal Logos, caused him to convey the meaning of the Jesus of history in such a manner as to seem to evacuate the real historical significance of that figure. Not that Origen denied either the historicity or the humanity of Jesus. (That was made abundantly clear, we hope, in Chapter Eight on 'The Human Nature of Christ'). But he explains the Humanity of Christ in such a way that one feels it merely repeats in the form of a kind of 'demonstration', the 'ideal pattern' of what every human being goes through. There is lacking the dramatic Biblical sense that the Incarnation is something New. The Humanity of Christ is not a New Creation. It is the preexistent Soul of the only 'Man' who did not fall and thereby merited to be chosen by the Logos for the union of God and Man in one Christ.

We have spent enough time in illustrating the nature of the inconsistencies and incoherences of Origen's total view. None, perhaps, has ever more fairly and more generously described Origen's achievement and failure than Westcott, "Origen is above all things a Christian philosopher. With a firmer conviction of the universal sovereignty of truth, a larger grasp of facts and a deeper sympathy with the restless questionings of the soul than any other Father, he claims for the domain of Christianity every human interest and power. He affirms that
Christianity is capable of coordinating all thought and all experience. It cannot be surprising, however, that Origen failed to give a consistent and harmonious embodiment to his speculations. His writings represent an aspiration rather than a system, principles of research and hopes, rather than determined formulas. At the same time, his enthusiasm mars the proportions of his work. His theorising needs the discipline of active life, without which there can be no real appreciation of history or of the historical development of truth. The absence of a clear historic sense is, indeed, the spring of Origen's chief errors." (1)

In a somewhat similar vein, Father Prat, the Jesuit writing as a Roman Catholic, says, "Here we encounter" i.e. in connection with Origen's teaching on the origin and destiny of rational beings, "an unfortunate amalgam of philosophy and theology. The system that results is not coherent, for Origen, frankly recognising the contradiction of the incompatible elements that he is trying to unify, recoils from the consequences, protests against the logical conclusions and often corrects by orthodox professions of faith the heterodoxy of his speculations" (2)

(1) - B.F. Westcott. Article "Origenes" in Smith and Wace's "Dictionary of Christian Biography" London 1887 p.96

(2) - F. Prat Article "Origen and Origenism" in the "Catholic Encyclopaedia" Vol. XI. pp. 306 - 312
II. The impression must not be conveyed that because of these incoherences which we have discovered in Origen's anthropology, his achievement is being condemned. On the contrary, Origen need not be condemned outright at all. Does not his apparent failure to construct a consistent doctrine of Man perhaps point directly to the nature of Man himself. Man is just this strange creature, in whom contradiction rules in place of harmony. It is Brunner who has stressed this approach to the problem of Man in our own day. The theme of his great anthropological study, 'Man in Revolt' is simply this profound 'Christian' description of actual Man - Man is in actual contradiction to his origin, to the Will of God for him. One would not spontaneously link Brunner and Origen together....but in their respective doctrines of Man, they are saying the same thing. It is interesting to observe also that there is a similarity between Brunner and Origen with regard to their use of Biblical elements in constructing their respective doctrines. Both regard the Bible's authority as determined by the extent to which it communicates Christ. Neither are tied to the historicity of Adam, yet each ascribe to Adam an important and significant meaning. Both, though in strikingly different ways, regard the Fall as a 'cooling' from Divine love, which takes place in every spiritual individual who ought, according to the Will of God, to be dwelling in Divine Community.

It is, comparatively speaking, easy to construct a coherent anthropology, if one limit oneself to a single set of fundamental principles. We might describe the doctrines of Man, which are contained in the systematic theologies of the 'Church' as coherent in that sense.
They may endure, as they have done, for many centuries, until a time comes when the fundamental thought structure of an entire period is challenged by the intrusion of another and alien system of ideas. Then, when the attempt is made to build a 'consistent' anthropology which will do justice to the larger meaning given to Man, the 'schism' makes itself apparent. Origen lived in such a period. We live in another which is similar today. It is for that significant reason that there are things in Origen's attempt which are valuable to us and can help us to understand the apparent failures to form an adequate doctrine of Man for our own time. Within living memories, we have seen the rise and disappearance of 'Machine Age Man', 'Economic Man', 'Liberal Man'. At the present moment the ideologies of 'Communist Man', 'Totalitarian Man', and many another journalistic phrase confront us. Deeper than these passing fancies stands the notion of 'Christian Man'. It cannot be placed in the category of another ideology, because its meaning transcends the thought forms of any age or civilisation. It is derived from the Bible, but it is not limited to the Bible in the way a Karl Barth might suggest. It slowly emerges when men are brave enough, patient enough, adventurous enough to be starkly honest and attempt what Buber realised is terrifyingly difficult. It emerges only out of 'real' religious experience, when the Living God is confronted, when the successive phases of the mysteriously relevant life of Jesus are appropriated and humbly made the principles and the pattern of all living.

It is because we regard Origen as being one of these brave and humble spirits that we value his attempt to answer the undying question, What is Man? We recognise that he failed to push forward the frontiers
of understanding very much further, but we consider that his very
failure is perhaps better than the success of less adventurous spirits.
That his attempt has been enormously stimulating to men of subsequent
ages is evident from the abundant praise and blame that it has evoked.

If we look searchingly at the men, who in past ages have uttered
bitter denunciations of Origen, we shall see that in differing ways, and
in various respects, they have been what we might call 'departmental'
men - great, no doubt, powerful perhaps, and often dominating personal¬
alities, but scarcely 'whole' man. They may have had the penetration of
minds, which see far in one direction, but they have lacked the 'circum¬
spection' which humbly tries to do justice to the 'total' situation and
outlook. Luther is a case in point. He dismissed Origen with a
contemptuous reference (1) because he could not tolerate one who seemed
not to grasp the intensity of his own religious experience regarding
'justificatio sola fide'. Jansen is another instance. He denounced
Origen as much as Jerome in the latter's later years and saw in him
(incorrectly) the source of Arianism.(2) Many more instances of this
'narrow' and 'limited' approach to Origen abound.(3).

On the other hand, those who have attempted to understand Origen
sympathetically, have always avoided these denunciations. They have

(1) - Martin Luther "Tischreden I 1912, p. 106 - "Origenem jam dudum
diris devovi".
(2) - c.f. HUET "Origeniana" II.ii.7 para.3 Lomm.xxiii. 44.
(3) - The fullest survey of opinions in favour of and against Origen
is to be found in HUET "Origeniana" II.iv.1 - 4. Lomm:xxiv.
pp. 1 - 105. See also Walther Völker's "Das Vollkommensheitsideal des
Origenes" pp. 1 - 21.
continued to be critical. They have passed judgment upon Origen...but their criticism has not blinded them to the magnificence of the attempt. They have realised that Origen is one of these massive persons in whose presence one is judged. Huet is, in many ways the sanest of all Origen's critics. He subjects his thought to a meticulous examination, but he preserves a healthy objectivity in the matter. His wide and truly profound erudition, along with his evident charity, enables him to grasp Origen more 'totally' than any of those before him. (1) Erasmus was another of these sane critics. In his appreciation he wrote, "A single page of Origen teaches me more about Christian philosophy than ten of Augustine." (2) Anglicans have not been behind in expressions of appreciation, "There has been no truly great man in the Church who has not loved him a little", wrote Bigg. (3) "Origen's faith was Catholic and therefore he welcomed every kind of knowledge as contributing to the its fulness" was the summing up of Westcott. (4) And this 'tradition' of Anglican appreciation is echoed in the work of a contemporary theologian who writes, "Origen has several claims to veneration. He was one of the greatest teachers ever known in Christendom, an Abelard without his arrogance, a Newman who never mislaid his disciples". (5).

(1) - Huet's crisp Latin conveys 'much in little', c.f. "Origeniana" II.iii.1 Para.1 "Ubi bene, nemo melius; ubi male, nemo pejus".
(2) - "Opera Erasmi" Vol. III. p. 91 Basel Edition 1558.
(3) - BIGG "Bampton Lectures" 1886 p. 329.
(4) - WESTCOTT "Origenes" Dictionary of Christian Biography 1887, page 140.
(5) - PRESTIGE "Fathers and Heretics". Lecture on Origen, p. 91.
III. We could not end this brief estimate of Origen's anthropology without attempting to say something regarding the relevance of his doctrine for our own time. When one has made a special study of a subject there is a temptation to ascribe to it an importance greater than it actually possesses. We must be on our guard in this matter here. What is probably the most balanced estimate of the importance of his anthropology? Is it merely a 'museum-piece' or does it possess something, perhaps long buried in the graveyard of virtually forgotten ideas, which might profitably be reconsidered in our time?

Let us be quite frank. Much of what all the Fathers wrote is of the 'museum-piece' variety. They lived in a world which was historically, geographically and scientifically less mature than our own. On the other hand, we must avoid statements which sound like harsh, ill-considered generalisations. The Fathers cherished what we cherish too. They are part of that continuous 'Christian' tradition to which we belong. Without them that tradition would have been immeasurably poorer. There are not lacking signs that a better awareness of what they have to give us is becoming increasingly apparent. Professor J.H.S.Burleigh, writing about St Augustine, has commented upon the fact that though much in the "De Civitate Dei" is outmoded or merely prolix, yet there is also much of permanent value. He offers the opinion that "the time of neglect seems to be passing and St Augustine is returning to his own. Much of the most fruitful recent theology, and not least that associated with the Ecumenical Movement, shows an increasing understanding of his doctrine."(1) Dare we claim

something similar for Origen? In some way Origen is less 'outmoded' than the majority of the Fathers. This is particularly true with regard to the kind of 'climate' of his mind. His vast cosmology is one in which men of our present age, nurtured so deeply in science, can live in, and breathe freely in, without a sense of intellectual discomfort. (1)

It is this association together in the mind of Origen of a passionate loyalty to the Gospel with all that that means for basic religion, and the capacity to live in a vast realm of nature, which seems in so many ways 'cut off' from God or 'fallen from' God, that suggests to our mind an affinity with the basic modern situation. We Christians believe that God is the God of the rational coherence of the universe and also of its vitalistic energies....but these two fundamental 'deliverances' of the universe do not come to us 'married' but rather by their 'divorce' create one of the major problems of religious philosophy. We stand in need of the help which great minds, who have in some way coordinated these two 'world views' in their own experience and outlook, can give us. Origen, we would dare to say, is one such mind.

(1) - As early as 1886, Bigg in his "Early Christian Platonists of Alexandria" p. 199 could write:- "It is evident how little Origen would have been embarrassed by modern geology".
With that in the background of our thoughts, we would put forward, hesitatingly and tentatively, as a matter merely for discussion, the following suggestion regarding Origen’s anthropology and its meaning for us today.

Man in our present age has discovered himself more profoundly than ever as a mysterious contradiction. Well may he utter Pascal’s famous cry, "Quelle chimère est-ce donc que l'homme? Quelle nouveauté, quel monstre, quel chaos, quel sujet de contradiction, quel prodige! Juge de toutes choses, imbécile ver de terre; dépositaire du vrai, cloaque d'incertitude et d'erreur: gloire et rebut de l'univers". (1)

It is what Brunner has expressed so adequately from the Christian viewpoint in his "Man in Revolt", - but the specifically Christian analysis does not necessarily exhaust the matter. The intuitive experience which we possess in our highest and also profoundest moments is simply that we exist in both Time and Eternity together. We continue to have two 'world views' which do not readily unite.

Origen expressed his sense of the enormous 'time and space factor' which impinges upon human destiny when he constructed his vast cosmology with its succession of worlds in time and its penetration in spatial height and depth within. It was easy for St Augustine (2) to throw discredit on such speculations and assert the superiority of the Genesis narrative with its few thousand years since the Creation,

(1) - Pascal "Pensees", No. 434 Collection Gallia. p. 182.
(2) - St Augustine "City of God" XII. 10 - 12.
because Origen's system, as De Faye has described it contains 'not a single observation of fact'. (1) 

Today, however, the situation is entirely different in the one respect that is important. We are confronted with the vast kind of cosmology which Origen presented and it comes to us as indisputable fact. To Origen its significance may have been metaphysical; for us its reality is factual. (2)

Once that indisputable fact has been absorbed and allowed to influence us in changing the orientation of our whole outlook, we are compelled to rethink our whole doctrine of Man. (3) Can Origen help us here? We recognise that his cosmology is simply an amalgamation of Platonism, Stoicism and the kindred philosophies of his time. Its significance is that he unites it with that other 'world outlook' which is not scientific, but is basically religious and centres in the Revelation of Christ. How does that other outlook come to be held by Man? It is the fact of religious experience, that in Christ we confront the Living God. We are immediately related to that Eternal Being, who is the End which is hoped for as culminating all temporal processes, and who is the omnipresent Existence filling all Space. It is this awareness of an immediate confrontation of the Ultimate in all its aspects, the quality of categorical decisiveness, of 'either-or'

(1) - De Faye "Origen and His Work" p. 90.

(2) - De Faye "Origène" Vol. III. p. 108 - "La cosmologie d'Origène comme celle de Platon, n'est pas une science; c'est une métaphysique".

(3) - For an excellent statement of the moral obligation to open the mind to the modern scientific cosmology, see Brunner's chapters on 'The growth of Man and the doctrine of Evolution' and 'Man in the Cosmos' pp. 390 - 434 of "Man in Revolt".
alternatives in the 'Kerugma' of the Gospel, that has consistently lead the Church to dismiss as fantastic all the elaborate 'cosmologies' with their infinite time series and limitless worlds embracing human destiny. It was easy to dismiss such cosmologies when they were merely metaphysical experiments. It is impossible today, when we know them as facts. The universe is just this enormous, spacious and infinitely long process. If we accept, and there is very good reason for doing so, the slow ascent of Man through thousands of years, with his still greater geological and astronomical background, why should we not reconsider the corollary which Origen (lacking our scientific knowledge) felt moved to present - that Man is spiritually involved in the slow time process, that he is 'preexistent' as well as called to live confronted by present 'existence-in-decision'.

This is our dilemma. As Christians accepting the Biblical Revelation with its categorical challenge to 'existence-in-decision' before the Living God, we have no place in our doctrine of Man for speculations regarding whether Man is capable of reincarnation or of lives in other worlds short of that Eternal life with God in His Kingdom. On the other hand, as members of our modern Western Society, we must accept the scientific conception of the Universe with its virtually infinite series in time and measureless extent in space, and see ourselves as involved in that so as, in our 'temporal' aspect, to belong to it. As belonging to it, we cannot see how death should suddenly negate and end all the chain of cause and effect, which so obviously holds it together. There is need for a continuation of Time as well as the hope of Eternity in the eschatological aspect of anthropology.
Origen supplies us with this in the factor which is unique in his spiritual cosmology, as marking its special contribution to the doctrine of Man. The entire Universe is a School for souls. The final stage in all their learning is the truth of the Gospel, but it is the 'Eternal Gospel' - not just the knowledge of the incarnate Christ. The arriving at that end of all spiritual education takes for some long ages, and so there is needed provision, such as the vastness of time and space make possible, for the kind of background such as the following quotations from the "First Principles" lay bare....

"The perfect restoration of the entire creation....will be accomplished through certain means and courses of discipline and periods of time; that is, the whole world will not become subject to God by the pressure of some necessity that compels it into subjection, nor by the use of force, but by word, by reason, by teaching, by the exhortation to better things, by the best methods of education...."

(De Prin: III.V.6 Koetschau V. 279)

"We must not think, however, that it will happen all of a sudden, but gradually and by degrees, during the lapse of infinite and immeasurable ages, seeing that the improvement and correction will be realised slowly and separately in each individual person. Some will take the lead and hasten with swifter speed to the highest goal, others will follow them at a close interval, while others will be left far behind; and so the process will go on through the innumerable ranks of those who are making progress and becoming reconciled to God from their state of enmity, until it reaches even to the last enemy, who is called death, in order that he, too, may be destroyed and remain an enemy no longer."

(De Prin: III.VI.6 Koetschau V. 287 - 288.

Have we been right in asserting that perhaps Origen has some small contribution to make to our own attempts to construct a richer and profounder doctrine of Man - something that may have been neglected for centuries in the graveyard of ideas? It is for the reader to judge.
We shall content ourselves by quoting what one of the greatest modern Origenist scholars, De Faye, has said. (1)

"Quelle est enfin la part qui revient à Origène lui-même dans cette doctrine cosmologique? N'a-t-elle aucune originalité? Il ne faut pas que la multiplicité des détails nous la voile. Ce qui constitue le caractère original de cette cosmologie, c'est qu'elle est essentiellement pédagogique. Notre théologien est profondément convaincu que Dieu soi propose de sauver les hommes en faisant leur éducation. Celle-ci corrigera leurs fautes et les affranchira de leurs péchés. C'est le sens de la vie humaine. Mais il est clair que la plupart des hommes meurent sans s'être amendés. Leur éducation n'est pas faite. Voilà pourquoi Origène adopte l'idée de la pluralité des mondes.

Avant lui, Plutarque, faussant sur ce point compagnie à l'auteur du Timée, avait aussi postulé des mondes successifs. Ce était pour des raisons philosophiques. C'est pour des raisons morales qu'Origène veut qu'après ce monde il y en ait un autre. Les mondes sont des écoles. Le pécheur passera d'une école à l'autre jusqu'à ce qu'enfin il s'amende et devienne parfait.

Voilà une fort intéressante théorie. C'est une manière de comprendre le Cosmos qui n'appartient qu'à notre théologien. Rien de pareil, ni chez les théologiens gnostiques, ni chez Clément d'Alexandrie. Cette grande idée, les théologiens du iv siècle ne l'ont pas comprise. L'Eglise ne l'a pas adoptée. Elle a été oubliée et méconnue pendant des siècles".

(1) - De Faye "Origène" Vol. III. pp. 109 - 110.
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A. Editions of Origen's Works.

(A comprehensive list of the early Editions is given by Redepenning on pages 472 - 476 of Volume II of his work, "Origenes", referred to below in Section "B")

The following Editions have been studied or referred to in connection with this present thesis. All quotations, however, are taken from the latest, the German Edition, published by the Church Fathers Commission of the Royal Prussian Academy, or, when these have been inaccessible through difficulties of transmission from the Russian Zone of Germany, from the Lommatzsch Edition of 1831 - 48.


This Edition was commenced in 1733 by the Benedictine Monk of St Maur, Charles Delarue, and completed in four Crown Folio Tomes, by his nephew, Vincent Delarue, in 1759. It is virtually the first of the great modern editions which have become widely accessible to scholars.


3. "ORIGENIS OPERA OMNIA" in the twenty-five volumes, published in Berlin between 1831 and 1848, is also the Delarue edition, edited, however, and considerably emended and improved by C.H.E. Lommatzsch.

4. "ORIGENES WERKE" in the series "Die griechischen christlichen Schriftsteller der drei Jahrhunderte, herausgegeben von der Kirchenväter Commission der Konigl. Preussischen Akademie der Wissenschaften". Though the complete works have not yet appeared, the volumes in the series, devoted to Origen so far, are, 2, 3, 6, 10, 22, 29, 30, 33, 35, 38, 40, and 41. Leipsig. 1899 - 1941 .........


(This is the first contribution of English scholarship. The Index and Notes at the end are useful).


8. "Origenes De Principiis". E.R. Redepenning. Leipsig, 1836. (Contains a useful introduction which discusses the rival merits of Jerome and Rufinus as translators of Origen, and prefers the former).


B. Books on Origen.

(In this list are given only such books as are devoted entirely or mainly to Origen, or possess at least significant sections concerning his work. References to general works, which make passing mention of Origen, are indicated in the footnotes).


(This 'Treatise on Origen' appeared along with a number of revised texts which Huet prepared and published. It remains to this day a work of indispensable value to the student. Erudite, orderly, accurate and balanced it constitutes a model of scholarly investigation. In the editions published by Delarue and Lommatzsch, the absence of a 'Table of Contents' at the beginning is a drawback and accordingly we append one at the end of this section, in the hope that it may enable future students to utilise Huet more conveniently).


(The fullest and best German study. It appeared before the revised texts of the GCS Series and accordingly lacks the foundation of progress which these exhibit. But its value is indisputable. Redepenning is exhaustive in his research, and interprets Origen faithfully, rarely departing from the textual sources).
DENIS, M.J. "De la Philosophie d'Origène" Paris 1884

(This book has all the traditional merits of French 'lucidity' and is of first class importance in the study of such a topic as Origen's doctrine of Man, since it devotes itself mainly to Origen's achievements as a theologian. Though the work appeared before Koetschau's revised text of the 'De Principiis' came out and accordingly suffers somewhat for that fact, its merit as a critical analysis of Origen's system in general is scarcely diminished. Some of the main deliverances of Denis are mentioned in the course of this thesis).


(Along with Westcott's article on 'Origenes' in the Dictionary of Christian Biography, this constitutes the chief work of English scholarship devoted to Origen. It is useful for reference on all matters, is distinguished for a kind of 'facility of phrase' which sums up much in little and conveys in general an appreciative and balanced judgment on Origen. Its special value lies in the way it studies Origen along with Clement and so enables the readers to appreciate better the Alexandrian background which is the key in part to any understanding of the topics raised).


(De Faye, like Bigg, was an authority on Clement as well as Origen, though he published his studies separately. He was also deeply versed in the study of Gnosticism and the many Neo-Platonist Schools of the early centuries. His work accordingly is somewhat shaped by a 'bias' towards relating Origen more to his philosophic milieu than has been the custom of scholars. Nonetheless, this is just its great value, that it reveals as no other work does, how closely connected were many of Origen's ideas with the contemporary philosophy of his times. It is De Faye who has demonstrated clearly Origen's relations to Plato and Aristotle. Reference to this is made in the notes connected with several of the chapters in this thesis).

KOCH, H. "Pronoia und Paideusis" Berlin und Leipsig 1932

(This work by a Danish Lutheran Clergyman ought to be consulted after reading De Faye, as it attempts to fill up the gaps in the latter's treatment, particularly as relating Origen to Plato. It consists of three parts, the first devoted to an elucidation of the foundations of Origen's thought, and the second to an examination of its relationship of Greek Philosophy, and the third which attempts to 'place' Origen in the setting of Christendom as a whole. Koch's main theme is the stressing of the part played by the motive of Divine Education in all Origen's system).
VÖLKER, W. "Das Vollkommenheitsideal des Origenes" Tubingen 1931.
(This is one of the most 'advanced' books on Origen in the sense that it cannot be profitably studied without a considerable knowledge of Origen's whole system in general. It is built round the material, abundant in Origen's writings, which concerns the inner life of the Christian soul, with the notions of asceticism and mysticism which were growing slowly into part of the Church's mystical theology. It is without doubt one of the most valuable contributions made in recent years to the study of Origen, bringing out clearly how he may be regarded as the 'Father' of Piety as much as the 'Father' of Biblical Exegesis or of Systematic Theology).

CADIOU, R. "La Jeunesse d'Origène". Paris 1933.
(This work appeared in English in 1944, under the title "Origen: His Life at Alexandria". It brings out very clearly the persistent 'twin sources' of Origen's thought in Biblical Christianity and contemporary philosophy, and is eminently readable, being 'unencumbered' by many notes and references. Those who see in Origen a man of the most diverse capacities and aspects will find in this work a sympathetic study of this approach).

VERBEKE, G. "L'Évolution de la Doctrine du Pneuma" Louvain 1945.
(Only a comparatively small section of this book is devoted to Origen, pp.461 - 469, but its value lies in the way in which it relates to his system of thought ideas which have passed through the crucible of so many other minds, Stoic, Hellenist, Neo Platonist and Christian. Reference to this work will be found in the notes connected with relevant chapters).

DANIELLOU, J. "Origène" Paris 1948
(We have already commented upon the importance of this book in our Introduction. Apart from its significance to scholars, as pointing out the shape of a new approach to Origen which does justice to his amazing diversity, this book is remarkable also on account of its 'popular' appeal, circulating, as it appears, among a much wider reading public than is generally the case for books of this kind. Perhaps this indicates an increasing interest in Patristics! ).

(Father de Lubac, enjoys, along with Father Daniello, the reputation of being perhaps the foremost scholar of Origen in the Roman Catholic Church today. This book is the product of a lover of Origen who knows his Origen as profoundly as he knows his Bible. It illustrates in a significant way, the revival of interest in the Roman Church both in Biblical and Patristic studies. There burns in the work an almost 'mystical' intensity of devotion to the Word of God, and it is a joy to every lover of the Bible (and Origen the prince of exegetes) that such a work should arise today in the Roman Catholic Church).
KARPP, H.  "Probleme altchristlicher Anthropologie"
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(The war and post-war difficulties held up the publication of
this work, which ought to have appeared in 1937. Three theories
of the origin of the human soul are studied around the names of
Tertullian, Clement of Alexandria and Origen, with additional
materials from other sources. The relevant problems are
carefully investigated and the plan of the whole book is logical
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**HUET'S "ORIGENIANA". Table of Contents: for reference**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>LIBER PRIMUS</th>
<th>&quot;Origenis vita&quot;</th>
<th>Para</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Caput primum</td>
<td>His life and history</td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Caput secundum</td>
<td>Continuation</td>
<td>19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Caput tertium</td>
<td>Continuation</td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Caput quartum</td>
<td>To his death</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>LIBER SECUNDUS</th>
<th>&quot;Origenis doctrina&quot;</th>
<th>5</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Caput primum</td>
<td>&quot;Origenis eruditio&quot;</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cap. Secund.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Quaestio prima</td>
<td>&quot;De Deo&quot;</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Quaestio Secunda</td>
<td>&quot;De Sanct. Trin&quot;</td>
<td>30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Quaestio tertia</td>
<td>&quot;De Christo&quot;</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>&quot;Eius Incarnat.&quot;</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>&quot;Oikonomia&quot;</td>
<td>30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Quaestio quarta</td>
<td>&quot;De beata M. Vir.&quot;</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Quaestio quinta</td>
<td>&quot;De angelis&quot;</td>
<td>38</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Excursus I</td>
<td>The Trinity</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>II</td>
<td>Their essence</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>III</td>
<td>Distinctions</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IV</td>
<td>Divinity Christ</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>V</td>
<td>Holy Spirit</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>VI</td>
<td>Subordination</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>VII</td>
<td>The Soul of Christ</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>VIII</td>
<td>Two natures</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Quaestio sexta</td>
<td>&quot;De anima&quot;</td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Quaestio septima</td>
<td>&quot;De libero arbitrio&quot;</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>&quot;De gratia&quot;</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>&quot;De praedestinatione&quot;</td>
<td>26</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>&quot;De astris&quot;</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Quaestio octava</td>
<td>&quot;De resurrectione mortuorum&quot;</td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Quaestio nona</td>
<td>&quot;De postremo judicio&quot;</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Quaestio Decima</td>
<td>&quot;De poenis et praemiis&quot;</td>
<td>26</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Quaestio undecima</td>
<td>&quot;De mundo&quot;</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Quaestio duodecima</td>
<td>&quot;De Paradiso terrestri&quot;</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>&quot;De Adamo&quot;</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Quaestio decima tertia</td>
<td>&quot;De allegorica Scripturae interpretatione&quot;</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Quaestio decima quarta</td>
<td>&quot;De potestate ligendi et dissolvendi&quot;</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>&quot;De eucharistia&quot;</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>&quot;De matrimonio&quot;</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>&quot;De magicis artibus&quot;</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>&quot;De engastrymytho&quot;</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>&quot;De mendacio&quot;</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>&quot;De jurijurando&quot;</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Caput tertium - Generale Origenianae doctrinae examen**

Excursus nona "Free will and Grace" 19

**Caput quartum - Fortuna doctrinae Origenianae**

Sectio prima 24
Sectio secunda 25
Sectio tertia 21
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>LIBER TERTIUS</th>
<th>&quot;Origenis scripta&quot;</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Caput primum</td>
<td>&quot;De scriptis Origenis&quot;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Caput secundum</td>
<td>&quot;De exegetica et Hermenautica&quot;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sectio prima</td>
<td>De varia exegeticon genera</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sectio secunda</td>
<td>De singula exegetica</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sectio tertia</td>
<td>De interpretationibus</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sectio Quarta</td>
<td>De Hexaplis</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Caput tertium</td>
<td>&quot;Origenis sytagmata&quot;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sectio prima</td>
<td>&quot;De singula sytagmata&quot;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sectio secunda</td>
<td>De interpretationibus</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Caput quartum</td>
<td>&quot;De ordine...librorum&quot;</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Appendix - Libri falsi

"De tribus libri in Job"
"De posteriore in Job Commentario"
"De Commentario in Marcum"
"De Homiliis in diversos"
"De Homilia in Codice Vaticano Tis Ho Sozomenos..."
"De Scholiis in Orationem Dominical"
"Canticis B.Virginis Zachariae Simeonis"
"De lamento Origenis"
"De orthodoxa fide"
"De alio quodem Dialogue"
"De libellis de haeresibus"
"De singularitate Clericorum"
"De Astrolabio"
"De Breviario"
"De sermone de catechesi"
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