Some Aspects of the Development of the Palestinian Peasant Economy and Society 1920 - 1939.

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I declare that this thesis has been composed by myself and that it is entirely my own work.
Dedication and Acknowledgement

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ABSTRACT

This thesis aimed at describing and analysing the specific experience of the peasant society and economy which existed in Palestine around the turn of the 20th Century and up to 1939. The core of the thesis is an attempt to produce an answer to three broad questions: The first question is simply "What was the peasant economy that existed in Palestine at the beginning of our period?" The answer was given in terms which closely related the peasant society of the time to its environment which was described and analysed as a totality structured by the relative importance of its constituent elements viz. the physical, the social and the historical.

The second question is "What were the major challenges that the years 1920-1939 posed to the viability of this peasant economy and society and its ability to perpetuate itself?" The broad challenge was analysed along two main lines. The first was the vast change which took place in the environment within which peasant society existed and operated - the strengthening of the Ottoman state followed by the Mandate Government and the adoption of policies which were detrimental to peasant society. Three broad policy areas were identified, namely policy towards Jewish land purchases, policy towards the exposure of peasant society towards the world market and policy towards the taxation of peasant society. The second line along which the broad challenge was analysed was to identify the effects of this challenge in terms of a serious deterioration in the land/labour ratio and the consequent effect on the viability of the peasant economy. Moreover, the decline in the relative position of peasant society relative to overall society in Palestine was also discussed.
The third question which this thesis has attempted to answer is "Once these challenges were posed, what were the responses of the peasant economy, and was the nature of these responses such that the peasant economy retained those fundamental characteristics to allow us to identify it as the peasant economy we defined in the first place?" The answer was given in terms of the type and relative importance of the various crops which peasant society produced, and in the degree to which the peasants could derive their minimum needs from within the peasant economy itself.
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Part I

Population & Settlement

Human settlement in Palestine dates back from the early dawn of human history. Archaeological evidence points out to sites of settlement that have been in continuous occupation for thousands of years, the earliest of which is sited on the outskirts of the present town of Jericho.

Throughout this history the frontiers of human settlement in Palestine have ebbed and flowed like a tide; sometimes leaving traces behind of sites and villages, houses and temples, sometimes vanishing altogether.

This ebb and flow of settlement is in the widest sense a verdict on the success and failure of man to adapt to his environment. This environment being the sum total of factors; some given by nature-fixed and unalterable for all time; some given by nature but
altered by man to suit his purpose and some, indeed the predominant ones, being the result of the development of human society.

Section One.

The Physical Environment.

Since deep back in geological time measured in millions of years, the geographical position of Palestine as part of the land mass connecting three continents, Asia, Africa and Europe has been fixed. And with it has been fixed the broad outlines of the physical environment which ultimately came to govern human settlement.

As Map (I/One/1) shows, not far inland from the Eastern seaboard of the Mediterranean, the greater part of this land mass is near desert, and not much further inland and to the East the land shades into total desert where life itself is
impossible apart from a few well adapted plant and animal species. On the fringes of this desert, the deserts of Syria and Arabia, a semi circle of cultivable land exists in which rainfall is high enough to permit arable cultivation. The 20 centimeter (8 inch) rainfall line marks its limits, since with less rainfall wheat cultivation is impossible.

The cultivable land as defined by this rainfall line begins at about Beersheba in Palestine and at first is only a fringe along the coast. To the East its limits are defined by the Hejaz Railway in Jordan, which roughly marks the line between the desert and the sown from near Aqaba in the south to the Syrian frontier in the north. There cultivation widens to include the Hauran and contracts back west of Damascus, which stands in its irrigated oasis, "El Ghutta", at the edge of the desert. Thence northwards the area widens again, under the influence of the anti-Lebanon mountains and stretches eastwards from Aleppo following the line of the Taurus Mountains along the Syrian-Turkish frontier, widening southwards to cover a big region known as the Jezira. The rainfall zone continues into Iraq, at a line between the two rivers running from Hit to Samarra. South of this, line begins the irrigated zone of Iraq, with very low rainfall, where cultivation depends on the water supplies from
the rivers Euphrates and the Tigris, in whose delta the Fertile Crescent ends.

Where no great rivers run therefore cultivation is a direct function of rainfall, and this rainfall in the Fertile Crescent varies considerably from mile to mile and from year to year. In space and in time.

All round the margin of the cultivated zone are the steppe regions of still greater uncertainty, where yields may be sufficient in a good year to give some return and where there is desert grazing in spring. These are regions of tribal grazing used by the nomadic and semi-nomadic population. This is the zone of marginal cultivation whose extent shifts and widens and narrows depending on rainfall for that year.

Narrowing our attention to the area of Palestine, the country to the west of the River Jordan is geographically divided into major parts that correspond to the divisions of the Fertile Crescent. In the South, from the port of Aqaba at the southern frontier to the Beersheba basin, is the complete desert of
the Naqab, which for the major part of history was mostly beyond the border of permanent settlement. The northern half of Palestine, to which most of the history of the country is related, is divided into three meridonal zones from west to east; the coastal plains the western uplands and the deep Jordan Rift Valley. The former are two semi humid areas while the latter is a narrow semi-arid to arid extension of the desert zone to the south.

The Western uplands of Palestine have an average altitude of 700-900 meters culminating in 1208 meters in Galilee. Their east-west extension is some 35 kilometers in Galilee and some 50 kilometers in the southern part of the Hebron Mountains. Erosion, gathering its impetus from the near shores of the Mediterranean, and even more so from the deep level of the Dead Sea 392 meters below Mediterranean Sea level, gave these uplands mountainous features through dissection. Their western and eastern flanks are dissected by deep valleys, descending to the coastal plain and the Jordan Valley and Dead Sea respectively. Except for a narrow central zone in the Hebron Mountains and certain inland basins in eastern Nablus Mountains and Galilee which are but little affected by dissection, level land is scarce throughout these uplands and slopes have been stripped of a good deal of their soil through erosion by wind and water.
There is no perennial river in the uplands as all watercourses are episodic "wadis", carrying flood waters for a few times in winter only and rarely flowing for more than a dozen times a year. They have absolutely no practical value for the mountain farmer. Springs too are situated near the bottom of the valleys or in the lower parts of slopes, thus having little significance for irrigation, though perennial springs are important as the main source of domestic water supply for many villages.

Conditions are quite different in the lowlands, the coastal plains and the large interior basins. Here land with good deep soils is amply available and so as a rule are springs, either on the plains or more often near the border line between plain and hill. The wadi beds too, though they often flow as occasionally as in the mountains are situated only a few meters below the level of the plains and could be used for irrigation.

Looking more closely at this northern part of Palestine that is non-desert, the country could be conveniently divided into seven topographic regions.

1. The Maritime Plain.
Defined as the area from Rafah to Haifa and from Haifa to the Northern Frontier, bounded on the west by the Mediterranean and inland by the 150-meter contour line. It is narrow in the extreme south but widens rapidly to about 24 kms and keeps its width till it reaches Wadi Mefjer where it begins to narrow again, and at the Carmel headland near Haifa, it is only about 200 meters. Immediately north of the Carmel it is some 17 kms and gradually narrows to less than 900 meters at Ras En Naqura at the Northern Frontier. This northern region could be considered separately of the south of the Carmel owing to fundamental differences in the soils of the two regions where it is heavy black in the north, whereas in the south a large percentage is wind-blown sand rendering the soil eminently suitable for the cultivation of citrus. Sand dunes are present along nearly the whole length of the coast.

The Maritime Plain is traversed by a number of perennial streams though none carries any great volume of water. A characteristic feature of many of these streams is the propensity of their lower courses to turn swampy if cultivation is neglected for a length of time though this is more noticeable to the north of Jaffa where rainfall is more plentiful in the parallel uplands than in the southern coastal plains.
2. The Highlands of Jabal el Kuds and Jabal el Khalil (Mountains of Jerusalem and Hebron).

The Highlands of Jabal el Kuds and el Khalil extend approximately from the north of Jerusalem to the latitude of Beersheba. They are a plateau of hard limestone between 600 and 1000 meters above sea level, whose strata are nearly horizontal over the greatest part of their length. On the west the limestone plateau does not descend directly to the Maritime Plain but is separated from it by a ridge of rounded hills, from 150-200 meters high, known as the Shephelah. It runs for nearly the whole length of the plateau, and is separated from the limestone foothills by a distinct depression. The Eastern slopes of Jabal el Kuds and el Khalil stand in hard contrast to the Shephelah in the west. The descent from the high central uplands is at first gradual till at some 15 km east of Hebron where it drops almost vertically to the shores of the Dead Sea.

Extreme aridity is the outstanding characteristic of the area east of the Jerusalem-Bethlehem-Hebron line known as the Judean Wilderness, a consequence of it being in the rain shadow of the uplands immediately to the west. So seldom does rain fall that vegetation is practically non-existent. Streams of
any considerable volume are absent.

3. The highlands of Jabal Nablus.

A region of lower altitude than Jabal el Kuds and el Khalil, Jabal Nablus consists of rounded hills and wide spacious valleys. There is no Shephelah for the foothills in the west are continuous with the upper edges of the central parts of the Coastal Plain and with the low hills that lead to the Carmel uplift. On the east, descent to the "Ghor" (the Jordan Valley) is much more gradual than in the case of Jabla el Kuds and el Khalil. The northern boundary is coincident with the southern boundary of the Plain of Jezreel and the Plain of Beisan.

The contrast between east and west is not so nearly as pronounced as for Jabal el Kuds and el Khalil. The moist winds from the Mediterranean Sea deposit a smaller proportion of their rain on the uplands than is the case in Jabal el Kuds and el Khalil, and consequently the eastern section, while not well watered, is nevertheless far from being a desert.

4. the Rift Valley of the Jordan.
From the Gulf of Aqaba, the great depression extends northwards throughout the whole length of Palestine and for over 30 kms beyond to northern Syria, the trench being of varying depth and width. Its greatest depth is reached at the floor of the Dead Sea - 790 meters below Sea level- from where it expands and narrows several times gaining elevation steadily, till at the southern end of Lake Huleh Sea Level is reached again. Northwards beyond the frontiers of Palestine, the altitude continues to increase reaching its maximum in the region of Baalbeck. The Rift Valley contains the Jordan, the single largest river in Palestine, as well as the three lakes of Palestine.

The Jordan originates as four streams beyond the northern boundary of Palestine near the foothills of Mount Hermon, where, eight kms after they unite, they enter the great marsh of the Huleh. Afterwards it descends rapidly by a series of cataracts to Lake Tiberias - a drop of 180 meters takes place in 12 kms. Lake Tiberias is 10 kms at its maximum and 16 kms long, its water being slightly saline but capable of supporting life. Leaving Tiberias, the Jordan pursues an extremely tortuous course to the Dead Sea. The river winds in a sunken valley called El Zor which varies in width from about 22 meters to 1600 meters, and which represents the extent of the flood plain of the river in
spring. The first important tributary of the Jordan is the Yarmuk which descends from the hills to the east (the Gilead) and joins the parent river at about 6.5 kms south of Tiberias. There is no outlet from the Dead Sea; it has been described as a great evaporating pan where the soluble salts brought down by the rivers have been accumulated continuously till at present there is a salinity of about 25%.

5. The Plain of Marj Beni Amer (Jezreel) and the Plain of Beisan.

Marj Beni Amer extends from the Mediterranean to the Jordan Valley and gives easy access from one to the other. On examination, the low lying area is seen to fall naturally into three divisions; (i) the region running some 16 km inland from the Bay of Acre, bounded by the Carmel on the south and on the east by the outlying hills of Lower Galilee. (ii) The plain of Marj Beni Amer proper, which is roughly triangular in shape - the base lying along the hills connecting Jabal Nablus with Carmel and the apex situated near Mount Tabor. The whole region is remarkably flat. (iii) From the eastern side of Marj Beni Amer triangle the Beisan Plain slopes eastwards, widening as it gradually descends, till finally a steep drop leads to the Ghor.
6. The Highlands of Al Jalil (Galilee).

The region is not of uniform character throughout but consists of two diverse regions; the divisions between the two sub-regions runs approximately from Acre to the north end of Lake Tiberias. The southern part (Lower Galilee) has a topography resembling that of Jabal Nablus, though the elevation in general is not as high as the latter's. Rounded hills running east to west with wide intervening valleys are characteristic; most noteworthy of the valleys being the Battuf where, in parts it is not swampy, is of great fertility. No perennial streams are found in Lower Galille.

Upper Galilee is much more rounded and is part of the southern extension of the Lebanon range. Elevations of 600 to 1000 meters are common with an intricate system of valleys which in general lies east and west. The descent to the Jordan Valley is steep, Spring water and streams are more plentiful in Upper Galilee than in any other part of the country owing to the heavier and more reliable rainfall.
7. The Naqab.

This consists of half the total area of Palestine starting from the southern end of the Maritime Plain and of Jabal el Khalil (Hebron Mountain). Large areas are potentially fertile if water is available. Lack of rain and suitable soil, however, makes the land south of Beersheba so difficult to cultivate as to be impossible. There were no peasant settlements in this half of Palestine.
PART I

Section Two.


Natural endowment is only one factor in the equation that determines human settlement. Equally important is the human response to the challenge posed by nature. Nature's challenge was posed in terms of a juxtaposition of the desert and cultivated land with a fluctuating margin in between.

The response of man was to evolve two ways of life each suited to its own divide of the desert and cultivation; the nomadic and the peasant which, over the millennia, managed to exist side by side, the one never managing to totally overcome the other.

Though the main object of this thesis is the study of peasant Palestine, this object cannot be adequately approached without examining at least the fundamental mechanisms of nomadic society.
since the nomads had such an important role in shaping settled life in Palestine, not just in the last hundred years or so but over the millennia.

The Nomadic Way of Life.

The popular misconception of nomads is that they are forever wandering aimlessly and haphazardly. In fact nomadism, though characterised by movement, is based on cyclical periodic movement which is governed in an orderly manner by parameters given by nature and by man in as strict a manner as the parameters which govern the other ways of life, peasant or industrial.

Of the three general types governed by the term "nomad"; nomadic hunters and gatherers e.g. Eskimos and some Kalahari Bushmen; tinker or trader nomads e.g. gypsies - and thirdly pastoral nomads - it is the latter type that characterised Middle Eastern nomads, including those in and around Palestine.

Pastoral nomads who depended on their domesticated livestock migrated in an established pattern in a given territory to find pasturage for their animals. Most groups had focal-sites which they
occupied for considerable periods of the year. Continuous search for water and pasture, however, made pastoral nomads the most mobile of the three nomadic groups. Usually the pattern of movement produced by animal herding have been classified into two main types: "horizontal" and "vertical". (1)

"Horizontal" migration, the more common of the two among the outer fringes of the border between the desert and cultivated land in the Middle East, involved movement of quite long distances and had a marked seasonality due to the summer and winter fluctuations in rainfall. In the Fertile Crescent, much of this movement was elliptical in form whereby, starting from the dry season base e.g. near Damascus for the Rawala tribes of northern Arabia, they worked their way down in October towards and into Arabia along an easterly axis, and then returned between late April and June through what is now Jordan - a more westerly axis.

"Vertical" nomadism made use of altitudinal variations in the seasonal availability of water and pasture, and was most widely spread where hills and plains were juxtaposed. Movement took place from winter pastures in the lowlands as the dry season set in, in the direction of the uplands along routes which were more exactly defined and controlled by other nomads or by settled people than

was the case with "horizontal" movement. Usually the tribe returned
to its original departure point along the same outward route.

Each type of pastoral nomadism, "horizontal" and "vertical"
had its own impact on settled society as this chapter will
show, for the distance and timing of migration had a strong
effect on the suitability of herd animals and consequently on the
economic and social organisation of the tribe, and ultimately
on the culture of that tribe; all being factors which in the
end defined the impact on peasant society. Camels and dromedaries
are more amply suited to long distance "horizontal" migration
in the particular conditions of the Middle East than say buffaloes,
sheep or goats. Camels and dromedaries need to be watered and fed
less and further between than cattle and are better carriers of
load under desert conditions.

Though the commitment of both types of nomadism to herding
was extremely strong, long distance "horizontal" nomadism resulted
in specialisation in herding to such an extent that certain
other material developments such as weaving, metal working, pottery
and variety in diet were not acquired to any appreciable extent. In
order to acquire these necessities, the long distance "horizontal"
nomads had to rely on settled society, whether through exchange
or by military force - the latter option having a strong attraction to nomadic society in view of the military advantages conferred on it by the mobility which a herding way of life required.

The militarism of long-distance nomads was reflected in their culture where the traditions of the raid or "Ghazu" on other nomads or on settled population were very strong, and in which culture the horse and certain fast and agile type of dromedaries figured prominently. Along the borders of Palestine, though more in what is now Jordan the Beni Sakhr and more to the north, the 'Anazeh tribes; and in the south along the borders with Sinai and what is now Saudi Arabia, the Teyaha and the Tarabin tribes were among the more prominent of such warlike nomads. Unchecked by organised force of settled societies, as was the case in the major part of the 19th Century Palestine, these tribes went on periodic sweeps of raid and plunder.

In nomadic society, whether "horizontal" or "vertical" types, the elementary unit of organisation was the patrilineally extended family; frequently an elder patriarch and his sons and their families. In addition an appreciable degree of primogeniture prevailed where the eldest son inherited most of the decision making powers of the group. When the basic unit was expanded to
include other groups in terms of closeness of blood relation and patrilineal descent, the basis of an encompassing pastoral social organisation, composed of related units with high capacity for fusion, was laid. This conferred distinct advantages on such society when the raising of a very large military horde was necessary, though such hordes were not maintained for very long since they easily split into their constituent parts. (2)

Having this type - the "horizontal" nomadism - ringed all round the permanently settled parts of Palestine, the other type, the "vertical" or semi-agricultural existed up to the first decades of the 20th Century within the immediate neighbourhood of towns and villages and in many of the spaces in between. Whereas the camels, dromedaries and horses made up the main herd animals of the "horizontal" nomads, sheep and particularly goats made up the herd animals of the semi-agricultural nomads, with horses and camels used for transport. In the early years of this century, semi-agricultural nomads were in occupation of extensive areas of Palestine; their presence and effect on peasant society being felt in each and every one of the geographical regions outlined in Part I, Section One. Moreover, the effects of modern economic development in its widest sense during the last hundred years were to affect these nomads much earlier, much more strongly and

in quite different ways than they affected the full "horizontal " nomads. (3)

Being less militarised than the "horizontal" nomads and less specialised in herding, nomads in this group were more amenable to cultivation in their own right rather than obtaining their food and other material needs through forcible expropriation of other cultivators, or by entering into arrangements where settled cultivators would surrender part of their produce in return for "protection" by these nomads. However it should not be thought that "semi-agricultural" nomads were merely peasants by another name for there were fundamental differences between them and peasants. (4)

Most important of these differences was the character of cultivation undertaken by semi-agricultural nomads. Usually a plot of land was cultivated, climate and topography permitting, for a number of years, normally two, until the stored fertility in that plot of land had been exhausted. The nomad would then leave with his flock of sheep and goats to another plot of land, leaving the exhausted land to recover by itself. Although the land and its locality as a whole would be the recognised ambit of a particular tribe or clan, the individual nomad may or may not return to the same plot of land he abandoned a few years before.

(3) P Baldensperger, "The Immovable East", Palestine Exploration Fund Quarterly Statement, 1922, p. 64.
No efforts were made to improve the land by rotation or organised fallowing, fertilisation or other methods accepted by peasants. Moreover mixed-farming was unknown to semi agricultural nomads as the predominant crop grown in this way consisted of barley in the south and variants of wheat in the north. Little else was grown.

A second major difference between settled peasants and semi-agricultural nomads was that the latter could freely revert, as groups, to total pastoral existence for a number of years should conditions of climate and security threats by other nomads or settled people demand it. To do this the social organisation of the clan retained many features of their "horizontal" nomadic brothers e.g. absence of private property rights in immovable property; the patriarchal organisation ready to coalesce in defence of perceived common interests, though again not for very long. Because of their lack of a strong military culture, the effect of such coalescing was usually weaker than a full scale invasion by "horizontal" nomads.

Moreover, their proximity to settled people, towns and peasants, made them more vulnerable to force exerted by settled society whether through peasants or organised Government. Indeed a most noticeable feature of the relationship between peasants and
semi-agricultural nomads in the last hundred years was that the inverse relationship between them operated quicker and more strongly than between the peasant and the "horizontal" nomads. This relationship operated not only through military violence and the imposition of settled society's "security" on the nomad, but also through the economic incentive and disincentives that governed the mobility of people across the barriers between the two ways of life, e.g. job opportunities, education, medical care etc. (5)

Having given the broad outlines of the nomadic way of life, attention could be focused in this and subsequent chapters, on the interaction between it and the peasant one starting with delineating the geographical areas in Palestine that each way of life occupied in the years immediately preceding our period.

Geographical distribution of nomadic encampments in late 19th Century Palestine.

In attempting to plot the geographical location of each way of life, it is important to note that political boundaries imposed subsequently by Western Mandatory Powers in the Levant did not necessarily coincide with the natural boundaries—between the desert and cultivated land for example. When looking at a map of Mandatory Palestine extending from the Jordan to the Mediterranean, vital factors that affected human settlement in Palestine itself were geographically located to the east of the Jordan and will not appear on a map of Mandatory Palestine. (6)

The most important omission is the location of "horizontal" nomads who inhabited the fringes of the Fertile Crescent east of the River Jordan. The great tribal confederations of the 'Anazeh and the Beni Sakhr, and large sections of the 'Adwan to the west of both roamed the deserts from Syria to Mesopotamia to what is now central Saudi Arabia (The Jauf) with their innumerable herds of camels. These nomadic strongholds were themselves outside Palestine. But unchecked by force of settled people, whether Government troops or peasants themselves, these tribes often went

on raids or "Ghazu" west of the Jordan. A favourite invasion route was through the natural flat country of Marj Beni Amer (The Jezreel Valley) which formed a corridor between the Mediterranean coast and the deserts to the east of the Jordan. Nomadic raids, it should be said were not confined to Palestine, for they occurred just as often in areas of the Fertile Crescent that were not part of Palestine e.g. the Jezireh in Syria and the Hauran which straddles the borders of what is now Jordan and Syria.

To show the situation as it existed in the years immediately before the Mandate, the most dependable source of information available is the Survey of Palestine. The Survey was conducted over a period of years starting in the late 1860's for the Palestine Exploration Fund, mainly by lieutenants Conder and Kitchener of the British Royal Engineers (Kitchener being the same Kitchener of First World War fame). Their research used modern survey techniques of determining distance, area and the lie of the land - mainly by trinagulation - and then systematically noting the position of each village, its approximate size and population, siting crops as well as any features of archaeological interest. In addition the approximate locations of nomadic tribes and their name was given in the Survey, appearing in the map provided for the Palestine Exploration Fund. (7)

In fact the Survey of Palestine as a source of information for historians of 19th Century Palestine is so well known to these historians that no lengthy introduction to it need be given; though naturally full justification has to be given for particular use.

Using the information on location and extent of coverage presented by the Maps of the Survey of Palestine, a computer map was constructed, Map (I/Two/1), showing the same encampments over the area that was later to become Mandatory Palestine. In common with all maps that will be used in this thesis, it was deliberately kept simple and not cluttered with details other than the points it is intended to illustrate as such details could be easily obtained from ordinary Atlases.

On examination of Map (I/Two/1), it could be seen that nomadic encampments in Palestine at the time of the Survey did show a definite pattern of geographical distribution. This distribution from north to south could be clearly seen in:

a) Those small inland basins in the hill country of western Upper Galilee connected by long tortuous routes to the Plain of Acre to the south west, or northwards to what is now Lebanon.
NOMADIC ENCAMPMENTS IN PALESTINE IN THE 1870's - according to the maps of the Palestine Exploration Fund

MAP (I/TWO/1)
b) The eastern parts of Galilee in the area of Safad Sub-District that bordered on the extensive swamps around Lake Huleh, and the north western shores of Lake Tiberias.

c) The area in the Nazareth and Beisan Sub-Districts that bordered on the plains of Marj Beni Amer (The Jezreel Valley).

d) The string of nomadic encampments along the Plain that extended from near Tulkarm to near Gaza.

e) The nomadic encampments in the plateau south of the village of Samu'- the last large permanently inhabited village at the southern tip of permanent settlement at the time in the Hebron Mountain.

f) The nomadic encampments in the arid area east of Ramallah - Jerusalem - Bethlehem - Hebron line (The Judean Wilderness).

g) The large concentration of nomadic encampments to the south of the line of Wadi Gaza, which connects Gaza to Beersheba.

Several striking features can be seen from this pattern of
geographical distribution of nomadic encampments.

Firstly, if one could term the Mountains of Hebron, Jerusalem, Nablus and Lower Galilee as the "core of peasant Palestine" for reasons that will be made clear shortly, then one could appreciate the near absence of nomadic camps in this "core". The exception to the rule was the area of the Judean Wilderness which although being the closest in physical proximity to the "core" is in reality outside it due to the extreme aridity of the area that prevents organised cultivation, and the consequent possibility of peasant settlement.

Secondly, one notes the strong presence of nomadic encampments on the plains of Palestine; though in some more than in others. For reasons that again will be made clear shortly, these plains were at the time marginal lands as far as peasant settlement was concerned, either for climatic reasons, or for reasons of lack of adequate degree of security that is necessary for peasant cultivation.

Thirdly, one notes that north of the line that represents Wadi Gaza, the majority of nomadic encampments at the time of the Survey were small in relation to the tribal areas to the south of this line. An examination of the names of the tribes
and clans mapped in the Survey of Palestine Maps, and knowledge of their history makes it clear that the majority of nomads north of the Gaza-Beersheba line were semi-agricultural nomads. To the south of this line, a similar examination of the names and history of the tribes encamped there would show that they belonged to the class of "horizontal" full nomads who roamed the outer fringes of the Fertile Crescent.

To say that the nomad and the peasant ways of life were essentially in a state of competition is not to say that they were engaged in daily battle. Apart from the occasional large-scale raids by warlike full nomadic tribes from across the Jordan - which were diminishing in number and intensity as the Ottoman State was increasingly successful in keeping them east of the Jordan - most of the "violent" encounters between peasants and nomads were small-scale theft of peasant sheep grazing away from the village or of ripened crops in the detached areas of the village just prior to the harvest. Many of these "violent" encounters were carried out by semi-agricultural nomads, most probably encamped in the district nearby.

However, as long as the peasants remained in the hill districts where the terrain and their closely-built villages afforded them
a good deal of protection against the mounted nomad, these daily incidents of theft and occasional murder did not pose a serious threat to continuous cultivation. Moreover, as long as the danger came from semi-agricultural nomads whose encampments and territory were nearby, the custom of "thar" (or revenge) where the relatives of the murdered would take revenge on the murderer or any of his relatives no matter how long after the event, meant that both sides had a vested interest, as clans, in limiting these incidents of murder which if unchecked would lead to endless chains of revenge and counter-revenge.

These checks and balances however did not operate against "full" nomads especially if the peasants ventured well outside the protection afforded by their hill districts into the then unpopulated plains, and had to face the onslaught of a mounted raiding party of "full nomads" on a sweep across the River or just as important, guarding what the nomadic tribe regarded as its grazing grounds. This was the reason why peasants had to wait till Government troops imposed a reasonable degree of security on the plains before they started to settle permanently there.

Until then however, the situation was that the two ways of life existed side by side, each jealously guarding what it regarded as
its domain which it exploited in a manner totally unsuitable to the other way of life. The nomad was interested in grazing his flocks without regard for the more disciplined way peasant agriculture was carried on e.g. fallowing, crop rotation and above all recurrent cultivation year after year (fallowing apart) of the same land by the members of the village.

The Towns.

Having outlined those fundamental traits in nomadic society that put it in a state of permanent competition for land with peasant society the primary result of which was the spatial separation of the two, this introductory description of the "snapshot" of the history of the Palestine of the 1860's and 70's by the Survey of Palestine could not be completed without taking into account the towns and the cities that existed in Palestine at the time.

Naturally, all figures for town populations at the time of the Survey were in the nature of informed estimates by contemporary observers and should be treated with caution. Taking this into
account, Table (I/Two/1) gives estimates of Palestinian town populations as they have been quoted in the "Memoirs of the Survey of Western Palestine". As the Table makes clear, some of the estimates were made by the surveyors themselves; others were quoted by them from other sources.

Several points stand out on examining the table.

Firstly is the small size of the majority of the towns in absolute terms. Only Jerusalem, Gaza, Nablus, Hebron and Acre approached or exceeded a population of 10,000; the largest being Jerusalem at around 20,000. All the above mentioned towns, Gaza apart, were in what has been termed the "core" of peasant Palestine i.e. the hill districts of the Mountains of Al Jalil, Nablus, Jerusalem and Al Khalil. (Galilee, Judea and Samaria).

Secondly, and naturally for the historian with the benefit of hindsight, the majority of the towns that were later to become more important, were at the time no larger than a large village. Indeed some were smaller than some large villages that later on remained so. Thus at the time of the Survey the towns of Ramallah, Majdal/Askalan, Shafa 'Amr, Tiberias, Beit Jala, Jenin, Ramle, Haifa and Bethlehem had a population each
Table (I/Two/1)

Estimates of town populations at the time of the Survey of Palestine 1860's/1870's.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Town</th>
<th>Source and approximate data of estimate</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Consul Rodgers 1859</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Safad</td>
<td>3,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Acre</td>
<td>3,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Haifa</td>
<td>2,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Shafa 'amr</td>
<td>4,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nazareth</td>
<td>&quot;miserable little hamlet - 300?&quot;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Beisan</td>
<td>2,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tiberias</td>
<td>&quot;long straggling village&quot;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jenin</td>
<td>10,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tulkarm</td>
<td>&quot;large village&quot;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nablus</td>
<td>20,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ramallah</td>
<td>5,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jerusalem</td>
<td>5,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bethlehem</td>
<td>3,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Beit Jala</td>
<td>10,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hebron</td>
<td>6,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ramle</td>
<td>3,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lud</td>
<td>3,460</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jaffa</td>
<td>8,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gaza</td>
<td>18,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Majdal/Asqalan</td>
<td>1,500</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


Either estimated directly by surveyors, or quoted by them from above mentioned sources.
in the 2000 - 3000 range. It should be remembered however, that in the long history of Palestine, many of these towns saw repeated cycles of contraction and expansion in response to the conditions of the time. None of these towns sprang from a fresh "green field" so to speak, as many were old enough to have been mentioned in the Bible and even earlier documents.

Thirdly, a closer examination (8) of the nature of many of these towns shows that their source of livelihood were not unlike those of a village proper i.e. inhabitants went out to work the fields round their towns and depended on these fields as the mainstay of their livelihood. The towns of Ramallah, Askalan, Shafa Amr, Tiberias, Beit Jala almost certainly fell into this category. Other towns combined this role with the provision of certain services - e.g. as local headquarters of government administration and troops, market towns for their immediate areas or certain amount of pilgrim traffic giving rise to associated handicrafts and hostelling. The towns of Jenin, Ramle Bethlehem, Nazareth and Safad fell into this category.

Towns of another class acted as the capitals of their regions with rather less bias towards "village economic functions" as in the first category and second, and orientated more towards

the provision of services that could not have been obtained in the local district capitals. Some of them sprouted certain industries that benefited from the raw materials provided by their hinterland such as soap and olive oil pressing in Nablus and glass in Hebron. The towns of Gaza, Nablus, Hebron, Acre and Jaffa fell into this category. Jaffa acted as the port of Palestine through which most of the pilgrim traffic passed until well into the 1930's when the port of Haifa was constructed.

In a category of its own was Jerusalem. Due to its religious significance to the Ottoman Empire, to the other main religions and because of the amount of pilgrim traffic it generated, Jerusalem had little of the attachment to its hinterland that the other towns had—apart of course from the provision of fresh food and some cereals from the surrounding villages. Jerusalem had no fields of its own and the majority of its inhabitants did not go out to work their fields. At the time the business of Jerusalem was Government in all its aspects, religion of three major faiths with the attendant "services" of clergymen, hostelling and feeding of pilgrims, souvenirs etc. and the trade that was needed to fulfill these functions.

As such Jerusalem was the only town where a clear division
of functions between it and its hinterland could be said to have existed in the 1870's. That division made the lifestyle and culture of Jerusalem closer to those of Beirut and Damascus than of geographically closer Palestinian towns and villages.
PART I

Section Three.

Patterns in Peasant Population & Settlement 1860's-1944.

Sections One and Two so far have outlined some factors which though external to peasant society, nevertheless played an important role in shaping it. This Section will concentrate on the study of peasant population growth and distribution from the 1860's till the 1940's.

Before this is done however, it is helpful to have a look at the sources of the data on which this Section is based.

In the study of Palestinian population between the 1860's and the end of the Mandate in 1948, three dates stand out. The first is the Survey itself (1) which was in the nature of an informed estimate of population and location of settlements by the Survey

team which toured Palestine making very detailed observations which they systematically recorded in the "Memoirs of the Survey of Western Palestine". It could be said that this Survey was conducted in as systematic a way as could have been possible at the time short of a full-blown census.

The second date was the Census of Palestine undertaken by the Mandatory Government in 1922 (2), being the first country-wide official census conducted in Palestine in modern times. It was lacking in certain aspects such as the depth of the questions asked since it recorded nothing but the number of people and the number of dwelling units. But on the whole it is perfectly adequate for the purposes required of it in this Section as shall be made clear.

The third date was the Census of 1931 (3), also undertaken by the Government of Palestine. This Census covered many more aspects than the 1922 one and was conducted in a far more scientific way. Moreover, it was better presented to the public.

These three sources presented an extremely valuable source of data which when collated, analysed and compared, provide excellent insights into peasant population growth and distribution.

The "anchor-point" of the analysis of the data from all three sources was taken as the 1931 Census. The population of each village was noted down as well as the Administrative Sub-District it belonged to in 1931. Then, taking account of changes in the Sub-District boundaries, Survey and 1922 data for each village was noted down alongside the 1931 data for the same village; thus for the purposes of comparison, a village both at the time of the Survey and in 1922 was deemed to have belonged to the same Sub-District as it did in the 1931 Census.

Having collected and collated the data for all three points, the analysis of peasant population growth and distribution between the Survey and 1931 was conducted along three main paths.

(a) To define the situation as it existed at the time of the first lot of data i.e. the 1860's Survey. This enabled one to make comparisons with and draw conclusions from the changes that occurred since the Survey.

(b) To identify the major changes that occurred since the Survey in terms of (i) growth and (ii) distribution of population.

(c) To place the peasant population of Palestine as it existed
during the years of the Mandate, within the context of the whole population of Palestine - peasant and otherwise.

(a) Peasant population at the time of the Survey of Palestine.

By its very nature, the Survey data has to be treated with more caution than the Census material. What the Surveyors did was to go round Palestine noting down the names, locations and approximate size of villages. However, the size was not noted in quantitative terms, but in terms of qualitative descriptions such as "small hamlet", "medium sized village", "large village" etc. Consequently, quantitative analysis is ruled out. However, what is not ruled out is the very fact whether or not a village was populated at the time, regardless of the size of the population.

Although there might be doubt as to what the terms "small hamlet" or "large village" precisely mean, there is much less doubt about
the meaning and consequently the usability of data which simply says whether a village was inhabited at the time or not. The vital test besides that of being inhabited, was whether or not any given settlement answered the definition of a peasant village adopted in this thesis - given at length in Part II - but could be briefly put here as "a permanently settled agricultural community which depends on organised recurrent cultivation of lands which are associated with it, whether belonging to it or not".

Naturally, one cannot give a brief definition that is watertight for there are variations even within the definition. The degree of permanence of these villages may vary for example. Some have been in continuous occupation for thousands of years while others went through cycles of abandonment and re-population. Similarly, some villages often moved their exact siting over the years - even by a few hundred yards.

Notwithstanding this, a computer map, Map (I/Three/1), was plotted, showing all villages which were described as inhabited in the "Memoirs of the Survey of Palestine". From examining the totality of the picture given by Map (I/Three/1), a number of salient features present themselves.
MAP (I/Three/1)

LOCATION OF VILLAGES DESCRIBED AS "INHABITED" IN THE MEMOIRS OF THE SURVEY OF PALESTINE IN THE 1870's

MEDITERRANEAN SEA
Firstly, the juxtaposition of the peasant and nomadic ways of life, outlined in the previous Section, could be seen graphically. Comparisons between Map (I/Two/1) and Map (I/Three/1) shows clearly the spatial separation of the two; the nomads concentrated on the plains which at the time had relatively few peasant villages. This pattern held true even when offset against semi-agricultural nomads, let alone full nomads. Where there was no large presence of villages, nomads had their camps, their sporadic cultivation and their flocks of goats. The reverse was equally true; where there was a large concentration of nomads, even semi-agricultural ones, such as round the shores and swamps of Lake Huleh and down to the north-western shores of Lake Tiberias, few villages existed. The same held true for the plains of Marj Benir Amer and the Plain of Acre, the Jordan Valley and the North and South Coastal Plains.

Naturally, the precise mechanisms which caused this separation are too complex and operated over too long a time span to be simply termed cause and effect. However, the causes of this separation, over and above those given already, will be discussed further in the course of discussion in this and the next Part of this thesis.

The second striking feature is the degree of concentration of villages in the hill districts and their paucity in the plains.
This preponderance of hill villages held true even when the proportion of land area covered by hill and plain relative to total area is taken into consideration. This preponderance of hill villages over plain ones held true in every region but especially so in the area from the northern borders of Palestine to a line extending from the Mediterranean to the Dead Sea passing through Bethlehem. Starting from there the plains widen somewhat down to the level of Gaza and the relative imbalance decreases, though hill villages still easily outnumbred plain villages.

When taking into account that many villages located immediately next to the 150-meter contour line delineating plain from hill in Map (I/Three/1), are in reality hill villages, it could be seen that the number of villages that could be considered purely plain villages did not exceed 100 out of a total of 598 villages in existence at the time. This formed a ratio of 1:6 although the plains formed an area of no less than 40% of the total area of non-desert Palestine (encompassed by Map (I/Three/1)).

Thirdly, peasant villages were not evenly spread even within hill country. It is noted that nearly 300 villages, out of a total of around 500 hill villages in Palestine were situated in the hill country between Nablus in the north and Bethlehem in the south.
It is for this reason that this region, being the "waist" of Palestine was also termed the "core" of peasant Palestine in the previous Section. In other words, not only were most peasant villages located on the hills, but most hill villages were located in the rectangle defined by a horizontal line passing through Nablus in the north and Bethlehem in the south; the 150-meter contour line in the west, and the Ramallah-Jerusalem-Bethlehem line in the east (delineating the western edge of the Judean Wilderness)

Fourthly it is noticed that there were tracts of land occupied by neither peasant nor nomad, nor indeed by cities or any other large form of human settlement. Four main such areas could be identified.

(1) The Jordan Valley from Beisan in the north, to the Dead Sea. No villages existed there at the time of the Survey except for Jericho - then only a medium village existing in its oasis. To the east of it was the Judean Wilderness, an area so waterless that no trees could grow in it.

(ii) Similarly, there was the almost complete absence of villages in the swamps around lake Huleh. The area was so malarial and mortality rates among the semi-nomadic inhabitants so high that at times no infants would survive the year they were born in.

(iii) Unlike the total desertion of the above regions however, there were a few villages in the central parts of Marj Beni Amer extending from the village of El Fuleh to the narrow passes between Lower Galilee and the northern parts of the Carmel near Haifa. There were also a few villages in the Plain of Acre which formed a triangle with its base on the coast between Haifa and Acre, and its apex at Shafa 'Amr. The density of these villages however, was far less than that on the hills.

(iv) To the west, large tracts of the northern Coastal Plain north and south of Tulkarm lacked permanent peasant villages although the eastern parts of these plains were used as the cereal lands of peasant villages located on the hills to the east, whereby the peasants established a temporary presence in their hamlets (khirbe) during the ploughing and harvesting operations, returning to their village in the intervening period after leaving a few watchmen. Few semi-agricultural nomads also inhabited this area which offered good grazing.

Very broadly, it could be said that the reason why these areas were so sparsely populated, was probably due to an unfortunate combination of climate, topography and history.
Historically, it can be seen that many of these unpopulated regions were situated on the "Via Maris" - the historic invasion route which went north from Egypt via the Sinai, across the southern and northern coastal plains, then rounded the Carmel near Haifa into the Plain of Acre. From there it passed through the Jezreel Valley into the Beisan valley and across the Jordan to the flat country beyond. In the 19th Century, this route was well-used by invading armies marching up and down on their way to and from Africa and Asia, leaving behind them, as most armies do, a trail of destruction. (5)

Due to higher rainfall in the north than in the south of the country, the water draining from the adjoining highlands would soon clog up with silt in suspension all drainage outlets to the Mediterranean, leaving extensive areas of the northern plains under swamps, soon turning malarial. Once drainage was neglected, due to the passing of a pillaging army or actual fighting, a vicious circle set in where the forming malarial swamps discouraged further maintenance of drainage especially if the long term outlook for security was menacing.

Further to the south, the South Coastal Plain remained inhabited

in the 19th Century, probably due to two factors. One was that the area around Jaffa was afforded more protection and care by Government troops, Jaffa being the natural port of Jerusalem at the time, and Jerusalem being an important city for its religous significance to the Ottoman Empire. Secondly, probably even with the same degree of destruction wreaked upon its villages by passing armies as villages further north, southern villages escaped long term depopulation on the same scale due to lesser rainfall of that latitude, both on the Plains themselves and on the adjoining highlands. Should a village be destroyed at any time, it could be re-occupied once the danger had passed without the accompanying danger of clogging-up of drainage outlets and turning the area into a swampy, malraial uninhabitable expanse, as was the case with the northern plains.

This line of reasoning is corroborated by known historical facts. From the inception of the 19th Century onwards, Palestine was plagued with armies that passed up and down its coastal plains. First Napoleon passed northwards from Egypt to Acre where he was stopped and defeated though French rule remained there for a few years afterwards. Then there was the Turkish restoration, followed in the 1830’s by the Egyptian invasion under Ibrahim Pasha, son of Mohamed Ali who ruled most of Palestine
until defeated by the Ottomans with the help of the European Powers. Then there was a further period of Ottoman restoration, followed as usual with settling of scores with those who had helped the enemy. Following that was a period of stagnation where Ottoman authority and the Ottoman state did not extend beyond the gates of major towns, Jerusalem included. This period was extensively described by Britain's Consul J. Finn and others. (6)

It was not till the accession of Abdul Majid and then Abdul Hamid II that Turkish authority was asserted against both peasant and nomad. From then onwards security, apart from the historically brief but terrible period of the First World War, continued on a steadily improving path. What periods of insecurity there were during the Mandate and up to the disaster of 1948 were limited in duration and extent - with the exception of the 1936 Arab Rebellion - and on the whole did not have the same effects on peasant settlement as did the 19th Century periods of sustained insecurity. The menace of the nomad was steadily diminishing. Instead limits to peasant settlement emanated from different directions as will be shown later on in this thesis.

(b) Major changes in peasant population & settlement 1870's-1940's.

Now that the outline of peasant settlement in Palestine at the time of the Survey of Palestine has been given, the task is to trace in some detail the changes that occurred between our starting date of the 1870's to the end of our period in 1939.

Given that over the period from the 1860's to 1939 as a whole, the peasant population of Palestine was systematically estimated or counted at three points in time (the Survey, 1922 and 1931); it follows that informed analysis could be made of two intervening periods over which changes took place: - (A) the period extending from the Survey to 1922 and (B) the period from 1922 to 1931.

Unfortunately however, the study of these two intervening periods cannot be undertaken by using the same methods. As has been already explained, the Survey data was not quantitative while the other two were. Consequently, whereas the pattern of change occurring in the first period has to be determined by a method which does not require knowledge of the number of inhabitants of every individual village; the second period can readily be analysed in
this way by using an appropriate form of statistical analysis.

A. The period from the Survey of Palestine to the 1922 Census.

In analysing this period, the following table, Table (I/Three/1) gives the number of villages known to have been populated (at any level) at the time of the Survey, the 1922 and the 1931 Censuses by Sub-District. A given village was included at all three points in whichever Sub-District it happened to belong to at the 1931 Census.

The main point about the number of villages which comes through from examining the above table is that the overwhelming majority of Palestinian villages were already in existence at the time of the Survey. Out of a maximum of 669 villages inhabited at any time (the 1931 Census), 598 were already in existence at the time of the Survey (90%). As for the period 1860's to 1922, the proportion of villages already existing was 95%.

However, two qualifications stemming from two groups of problems should be made regarding the method of constructing the above table.

Firstly, what this table is essentially doing is registering
Table (1/Three/1)

Number of villages known to have been inhabited at the time of the Survey of Palestine (c.1870), 1922 and 1931 Censuses, and proportion of all villages in Palestine at the time by Sub-district

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Sub-District</th>
<th>Survey No % of vils</th>
<th>All</th>
<th>1922 Census No % of vils</th>
<th>Survey-22 No % of All</th>
<th>% change 1922-31 (+/-) % of All</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Safad</td>
<td>36 6.8</td>
<td>30 4.7</td>
<td>-2.1</td>
<td>52 7.8</td>
<td>+3.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Acre</td>
<td>42 6.0</td>
<td>42 6.7</td>
<td>+0.7</td>
<td>45 6.7</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Haifa</td>
<td>29 4.8</td>
<td>33 5.2</td>
<td>+1.4</td>
<td>36 5.3</td>
<td>+0.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tiberias</td>
<td>14 2.3</td>
<td>18 2.9</td>
<td>+0.6</td>
<td>19 2.8</td>
<td>-0.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Beisan</td>
<td>8 1.3</td>
<td>12 1.9</td>
<td>+0.6</td>
<td>13 1.9</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nazareth</td>
<td>23 3.8</td>
<td>23 3.7</td>
<td>-0.1</td>
<td>23 3.4</td>
<td>-0.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jenin</td>
<td>55 9.1</td>
<td>59 9.3</td>
<td>+0.1</td>
<td>61 9.1</td>
<td>-0.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tulkarm</td>
<td>43 7.1</td>
<td>44 7.0</td>
<td>-0.1</td>
<td>44 6.6</td>
<td>-0.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nablus</td>
<td>83 13.8</td>
<td>86 13.7</td>
<td>-0.1</td>
<td>88 13.2</td>
<td>-0.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ramallah</td>
<td>55 9.1</td>
<td>55 8.7</td>
<td>-0.4</td>
<td>55 8.2</td>
<td>-0.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jerusalem</td>
<td>57 9.5</td>
<td>61 9.2</td>
<td>-0.3</td>
<td>60 8.9</td>
<td>-0.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bethlehem</td>
<td>7 1.2</td>
<td>7 1.1</td>
<td>-0.1</td>
<td>7 1.0</td>
<td>-0.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hebron</td>
<td>31 5.1</td>
<td>33 5.2</td>
<td>+0.1</td>
<td>33 4.9</td>
<td>-0.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jaffa</td>
<td>16 2.6</td>
<td>17 2.7</td>
<td>+0.1</td>
<td>17 2.5</td>
<td>-0.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ramle</td>
<td>56 9.3</td>
<td>60 9.5</td>
<td>+0.2</td>
<td>67 10.0</td>
<td>+0.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gaza</td>
<td>43 7.1</td>
<td>49 7.8</td>
<td>+0.7</td>
<td>49 7.3</td>
<td>+0.5</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

All Palestine 598 629 669

Sources.


whether a village has been noted down by the 1860 Survey, and then whether this same village has been inhabited in the 1922 and 1931 Censuses. Naturally there are errors; some due to oversight - though these have been minimised through manual checking and re-checking of computer results. A more difficult problem to rectify however, was the one emanating from differing practices between the Survey and the census takers. For example, three villages which were registered as being established after the Survey, viz. Askar, Balata and Rujeib in the Nablus Sub-District were so near to the town of Nablus, that it is open to doubt whether they were not mentioned by the Survey due to them not being there or due to the Survey having enumerated them within the total population of the town of Nablus, as its suburbs. If so, then these three villages with a total population at the 1922 Census of 926, should be added to the total of 598 already in existence at the time of the Survey.

Another problem stems from changes in names of villages between times. For example, a village in the Acre Sub-District, by the name of "Nahr" and a population of 419 and 552 in the 1922 and 1931 Censuses respectively, was not mentioned by the Survey. However, a village by another name, and occupying exactly the same site on the Maps of the Survey of Palestine was mentioned
by the name of "Dar el Jabakhanjy", and described as having around 150 inhabitants at the time of the Survey. Moreover, the Survey described this village as situated on "Nahr Mefshukh" (Nahr meaning River in Arabic). It is possible therefore that this village changed its new name to one derived from the nearby River. If this was so then it should be added to the total of villages existing at the time of the Survey.

The second group of problems stems from the division of the Ottoman Empire after 1917, and subsequent exchange of population and territory between the successor states. Thus although the above table shows that half of the villages created after the Survey were created in the period from the 1860's to 1922 and the other half in the years 1922-1931; this is not an entirely correct representation of reality since there was a transfer of population between Syria and Palestine between the two census dates, in favour of Palestine. This transfer was the result of the border-rectification treaty of 1925 whose net effect was the expansion of Palestinian territory.

As such there were villages, mainly in Safad Sub-District, which appeared in the 1931 Census but did not appear in the 1922 one purely for this administrative reason rather than
because they were populated between 1922 and 1931. According to the "Report of Census of Palestine 1931", Vol I, p.45, the total population added to Palestine was around 10,000.

Although the Sub-District most affected by the transfer—Safad, shows an increase of 22 villages "populated" between 1922 and 1931, according to the above table, it is clear that the majority of them were already in existence at the time of the Survey.

These qualifications however, do not substantially reduce the validity of the main conclusion which was drawn from the exercise, namely that it is proven beyond reasonable doubt that around 90% of the peasant villages of the first half of the 20th Century were already in existence in the 1860's. Consequently, it could be said that in terms of the number of villages, peasant Palestine maintained in the 1920's the same geographical distribution it had in the 1860's. The centre of gravity still remained in the "core" i.e. the hill districts.

In addition to the above main point, a second subsidiary point could be made. Over the period as a whole, the relative weight—measured in proportion of all Palestinian villages found in any single Sub-District—has changed little over the period.
This is especially so when the transfer of population between Syria and Palestine, which caused the figures for Safad to differ from the rest, is taken into account.

Therefore, it could be concluded that the broad outlines of peasant settlement, in terms of village numbers, were carried forward from the 19th to the first three decades of the 20th Centuries, largely unaltered.

However, because of the limitations of the Survey data in as much as no reliable quantitative estimates of village by village population are given, as explained earlier, these conclusions are the only useful and reliable conclusions that could be extracted from the data. Ideally, one would have preferred to examine the distribution in terms of village population, rather than village numbers, but this could only be done in the second intervening period - between 1922 and 1931, which is in any case the one that concerns this thesis most.
B. The inter-censal period 1922-1931.

Because of a much better data base than in the preceding period, it is possible to answer, in some depth, three vital questions:

(i) What was the pattern of distribution in 1922 of peasant villages in terms of village size (i.e. how many villages fell into a given size)?

(ii) What was the degree of concentration of population (i.e. what proportion of the population was concentrated in what size of village)?

(iii) What changes occurred in these two patterns from 1922 to 1931

In answer to the first question above as to the pattern of distribution of villages in terms of their size; it is patently insufficient to rely on crude averages. Comparisons between the mean village population of one Sub-District with another has therefore to be supplemented by a better technique. Consequently, analysis by frequency distribution was carried out whereby the number of villages in each Sub-District falling within a given size, was counted. The following tables, Table (I/Three/2 (a)) and Table (I/Three/2 (b)), give by Sub-District, average village size
and frequency distribution by size in absolute and percentage terms respectively.

From tables (I/Three/2 (a)) and (I/Three/2 (b)) above, it can be seen that the over 50% of the villages in Palestine as a whole had 400 inhabitants or less in 1922. A further 27.4% of villages had between 401 and 800 inhabitants, a further 11.3% had between 801 and 1200 inhabitants, while 10.3% had more than 1201.

Clearly therefore, the distribution for Palestine as a whole as far as the NUMBER of villages was concerned, was biased towards smaller villages.

However, from the above tables, another point comes through, viz the Sub-Districts did not adhere totally to the pattern established by the distribution for All Palestine. Three groups could be discerned.

First is the group comprised of the Sub-Districts of Safad and Beisan. This group had more than 70% in case of Safad and 83% in case of Beisan, of their villages having 400 inhabitants or less, while none of the remaining villages had more than 800 inhabitants.
Table (I/Three/2 (a) )

Average number of inhabitants per village; and number of villages having the following number of inhabitants in 1922- by Sub-District

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Sub-District</th>
<th>No. of villages with the following No. of inhabitants</th>
<th>up to 200</th>
<th>201-400</th>
<th>401-600</th>
<th>601-801</th>
<th>801-1001</th>
<th>1001-1200</th>
<th>1201 over</th>
<th>No. of vils</th>
<th>Average size</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Safad</td>
<td></td>
<td>12</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>283</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Acre</td>
<td></td>
<td>5</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>42</td>
<td>625</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Haifa</td>
<td></td>
<td>8</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>592</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tiberias</td>
<td></td>
<td>3</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>496</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Beisan</td>
<td></td>
<td>6</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>236</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nazareth</td>
<td></td>
<td>6</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>520</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jerin</td>
<td></td>
<td>24</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>55</td>
<td>548</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tulkarm</td>
<td></td>
<td>7</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>44</td>
<td>688</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nablus</td>
<td></td>
<td>22</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>86</td>
<td>449</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ramallah</td>
<td></td>
<td>16</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>55</td>
<td>445</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jerusalem</td>
<td></td>
<td>15</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>61</td>
<td>450</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bethlehem</td>
<td></td>
<td>1</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>425</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hebron</td>
<td></td>
<td>4</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>1,118</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jaffa</td>
<td></td>
<td>6</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>731</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ramle</td>
<td></td>
<td>14</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>60</td>
<td>507</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gaza</td>
<td></td>
<td>2</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>49</td>
<td>737</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>All Palestine</td>
<td></td>
<td>151</td>
<td>170</td>
<td>105</td>
<td>68</td>
<td>52</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>65</td>
<td>629</td>
<td>553</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table (I/Three/2 (b))

Percent of total number (*) of villages in Sub-District which had the following number of inhabitants in 1922- by Sub-District.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Sub-District</th>
<th>% of all villages in Sub-Dist. with the following No. of inhabitants</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>up to 200</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Safad</td>
<td>40.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Acre</td>
<td>11.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Haifa</td>
<td>24.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tiberias</td>
<td>16.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Beisan</td>
<td>50.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nazareth</td>
<td>26.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jenin</td>
<td>46.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tulkarm</td>
<td>15.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nablus</td>
<td>25.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ramallah</td>
<td>29.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jerusalem</td>
<td>24.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bethlehem</td>
<td>14.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hebron</td>
<td>12.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jaffa</td>
<td>35.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ramle</td>
<td>23.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gaza</td>
<td>4.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>All Palestine</td>
<td>23.9</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(*) See Table (I/Three/2 (a)).

In view of the history of the two Sub-Districts, the reasons could lie in the fact that many of the villages in these areas were relatively recently established. The villages in Beisan, which were situated in the Jordan Valley and open to nomadic raids, were only assured of a minimum degree of security after they were declared as the personal property of the Sultan Abdul Hamid II in the last quarter of the 19th Century.

As for the villages in the eastern section of Safad Sub-District which bordered on the swamps of Lake Huleh, the malarial nature of the swamps meant that organised settlement there was sporadic and not always continuous. It is instructive here to quote Y. Karmon who made a study of settlement in the Huleh Valley (7):-

"[Up to the years of the Mandate] ... The permanent Arab population of Palestine, which was mainly concentrated in the mountains, showed no inclination for settlement in the dangerous Huleh Valley, and its settlers were therefore refugees and outcasts, who could find no other place in the country. All of them soon fell prey to malaria, which destroyed first their physical fitness and then their will to work, caused death at an early age, and almost completely consumed the newborn generation in its tender childhood."

The second group of Sub-districts that could be discerned had an opposite pattern of distribution to the first, with the bias being towards large villages. This group was comprised of the Sub-Districts of Hebron, Acre, and Gaza. Only 27.3%, 30.9 and 28.6% respectively of their villages had less than 400 inhabitants; (markedly lower than the national average). Hebron Sub-District especially had more than 36% of its villages with 1201 or more inhabitants. The Sub-District of Jaffa, moreover, had 41.2% of its villages with population under 400, but had 35.3% of its villages with 1001 or more inhabitants, which puts it near Hebron in this respect.

The reasons why this pattern of distribution should exist are complex and need much study in themselves. (8) However, since the study of population distribution per se is not the object of this thesis, only tentative thoughts could be given here. It is probable that villages in Gaza and Hebron Sub-Districts needed to be large because of the needs of self defence that the geography of the area imposed. Situated at the very edge of the divide between the peasant and nomadic ways of life, villages in the area were historically open to attack by nomads. Safety in numbers was sought in the past and this pattern was carried

through into the 20th Century. However, it is not likely that this was the reason why villages in Sub-District of Jaffa were also large. The reason here probably had more to do with rapid economic development that was taking place in the area due to the expansion of Jaffa city and the cultivation of citrus in the district.

The third group of Sub-Districts comprised the remaining ones, which tended to have between 50 and 60% of their villages populated by 400 people or less. On the other hand, the proportion of large villages (1001 or more) tended to vary between 7% in Ramallah and 25% in Tulkarm.

Again, this thesis lays no claim to attempting to arrive at the precise mechanisms that have led to this pattern of distribution. But it is instructive to note that the Sub-Districts in this group are the ones which had the largest concentration of peasant population, so much so that they were termed "the core" of peasant Palestine in the last Section. It could be, subject to confirmation by a competent study, that this distribution was the optimum one that could be reached given the distance from the village that the peasant had to travel to and back from the fields. What this optimum was naturally depended on the topography and the proportion
of cultivable and uncultivable land within a given radius of the village.

Similarly, it is possible that village size was a function of the social organisation of the peasantry, where villages that grew beyond a certain maximum tended to have the "excess population" migrating to establish new villages, if such land was available. This subject will be discussed further in Part II of this thesis which deals with the socio-economic organisation of the village.

For the immediate purpose of this Section however, it could be concluded that on the whole, the distribution of villages showed a strong tendency towards the smallest size-group. 50% of all villages in Palestine in 1922 had a population of 400 persons or less.

(ii)

However, the above answer is not, on its own, a sufficient description of population distribution since it only analysed the NUMBER of villages. What needs to be determined now is the proportion of the POPULATION accounted for by any size-group of
villages. In other words, an answer has to be found for this question: "Although the majority of villages were small; what proportion of the peasant population did these small villages house?"

To do this and to describe the concentration of population, the following tables, Table (I/Three/3 (a)) and (I/Three/3 (b)), give in absolute and percentage terms respectively, the total number of persons living in all villages of a given size in 1922.

Tables (I/Three/3 (a)) and (I/Three/3 (b)) demonstrate that for Palestine as a whole, there was a strong tendency for population to concentrate in the larger villages although the preceding pages have shown that the larger villages made up only a small proportion of the total number of villages in Palestine. The strongest concentration is found in the largest size-group. Over 33% of the population in 1922 was concentrated in villages each with over 1200 inhabitants - 65 villages in all making up 10.3% of the total number of villages and having a mean village population of 1797 in 1922.

Moreover, although it was in this largest size-group that population concentration could be most clearly seen, all other
Table (I/Three/3 (a) )

Total number of persons living in all villages belonging to the following size-groups in 1922. By Sub-District.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Sub-District</th>
<th>Total number in all villages of size-group</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Upto 200</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Safad</td>
<td>1289</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Acre</td>
<td>837</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Haifa</td>
<td>907</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tiberias</td>
<td>435</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Beisan</td>
<td>830</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nazareth</td>
<td>652</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jenin</td>
<td>3055</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tulkarm</td>
<td>642</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nablus</td>
<td>2701</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ramallah</td>
<td>2095</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jerusalem</td>
<td>1728</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bethlehem</td>
<td>149</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hebron</td>
<td>585</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jaffa</td>
<td>709</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ramle</td>
<td>1215</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gaza</td>
<td>203</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>All Palestine</strong></td>
<td><strong>18032</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table (I/Three/3 (b))

Percent of total population of Sub-District living in villages belonging to the following size-groups in 1922. By Sub-District.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Sub-District</th>
<th>% of Sub-Dist. population in size-group</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Upto 200</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Safad</td>
<td>15.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Acre</td>
<td>3.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Haifa</td>
<td>4.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tiberias</td>
<td>4.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Beisan</td>
<td>29.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nazareth</td>
<td>5.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jenin</td>
<td>10.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tulkarm</td>
<td>2.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nablus</td>
<td>7.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ramallah</td>
<td>8.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jerusalem</td>
<td>6.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bethlehem</td>
<td>5.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hebron</td>
<td>1.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jaffa</td>
<td>5.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ramle</td>
<td>4.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gaza</td>
<td>0.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>All Palestine</td>
<td>5.2</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

See table (I/Three/3 (a)).

size-groups over 601 inhabitants to the village had a larger percentage of the population than their percentage of the number of villages warranted. In other words, more than they would have had, had the population been distributed evenly.

Having established this trend for Palestine as a whole, the task now is to identify Sub-District patterns, if any. One way of doing this is to identify the size of the median village in each Sub-District i.e. the size of the village at or below which 50% of the peasant population of the Sub-District lived. The argument is that the larger the median the stronger is the tendency of population to concentrate in large villages and vice-versa.

From Table (I/Three/3 (b)), it can be seen that for Palestine as a whole, the median village size-group is the group of villages with 801 to 1000 inhabitants per village. As for the Sub-Districts, four groups could be identified.

The first was comprised of the two Sub-Districts of Safad and Beisan which have been described as "recently inhabited" in the preceding pages. The median points were reached in the size-groups 401-600 and 201-400 respectively. Indeed other indicators confirm this as these two did not have any villages with a population
over 800. Mean village population in these two Sub-Districts was 282 and 236 persons respectively. The possible reasons for this pattern of distribution were discussed in the preceding pages.

The second group was comprised of six Sub-Districts which had their median point in size-group 601-800. These were Tiberias, Nazareth, Nablus, Ramallah, Jerusalem and Bethlehem. They had mean village population of 496, 520, 449, 445, 450 and 425 respectively.

It is instructive to note that the vast majority, if not all of the lands of these Sub-Districts were hilly. The proportion of uncultivable to total land was appreciably higher in these hilly Sub-Districts than in plain ones.(9) Moreover, cultivable and uncultivable lands were so inter-mixed that the total area of cultivable land that could be found within any given radius from the village was much smaller than in villages on the plains where the quality of the land tended to be more even. This meant that the peasants in these hill villages either had to spend more time each day travelling to and from the fields, or once the furthest fields were too far, another village had to be founded nearer to these lands.

(9) See Part IV, Section One, p.
As has been said earlier, this thesis lays no claim to systematic study of the determinates of village location a subject that needs much specialised study in itself. However, as tentative thoughts it could be argued that it is for the above reason that the population of these areas divided themselves into smaller communities than in plain villages. The point should be made here however, that the determination of the exact size of these communities at any given point in time, is more complex than that. Assuming that the above reasoning is correct, this "optimum radius" beyond which a "new" village had to be established could be obeyed only if there was enough land on which the "new" village COULD be established. If no such land was available, because of overpopulation for example, then any growth in population had to be "in situ", thus over-riding this "rule".

The third group with its median point in group-size 801-1000, was comprised of Acre, Haifa, Jenin, Ramle and Gaza. Mean village population was 626, 591, 511, 507 and 736 respectively. Unlike the second group, a far higher proportion of the land area of this one was flat and cultivable. It was possible therefore for a larger population to inhabit the same village and yet have enough cultivable land within an acceptable distance.
The fourth group, with the median point in size-group of over 1201 inhabitants to the village, was comprised of Tulkarm, Hebron and Jaffa. Mean village population was 689, 1118 and 732 respectively. The possible reasons for this distribution, which is exceptional in many respects, have been discussed earlier.

Besides examining the tendency of population to concentrate by size of village, however, the question of concentration of population in Palestine has another side to it viz. to determine how the population was concentrated GEOGRAPHICALLY.

Figure (I/Three/1) converts the data given in Table (I/Three/1 a) above into a histogram giving the peasant population of Palestine in 1922 by Sub-District. The same information is also given for 1931 as given in the 1931 Census Report.

It can be seen that the pattern of population distribution was very similar to the one established in the preceding pages when distribution in terms of village numbers was discussed. The main concentration was in what was described as the "core" of
Fig. (I/Three/1).

PALESTINE - RURAL POPULATION BY SUB-DISTRICT, 1922 AND 1931 CENSUSES

■ = 1922
□ = 1931
THOUSANDS OF INHABITANTS

SCALE = 1 : 1
peasant Palestine, comprised of the "inner core" of the Sub-Districts of Jenin, Nablus, Ramallah, Jerusalem, Bethlehem and Hebron and the "outer core" of the hilly parts of the Sub-Districts of Tulkarm and Ramle. Since the two patterns are similar, there is no need, for reasons of space, to discuss this any further.

(iii) The question of change between 1922 and 1931 in peasant population could be divided into three subsidiary questions.

The first relates to distribution in terms of number of villages in 1931. It has been established that very few villages were founded between 1922 and 1931. Although the number of villages increased from 629 in 1922 to 669 in 1931, half of this increase was accounted for by the transfer of 22 villages from Syria to Palestine in the boundary rectification. (See Table I/Three/1 and following discussion). This apart, it is clear that the geographical distribution of villages has changed little during the decade of the 1920's.

The second subsidiary question relates to distribution in terms of number of persons. Given that population growth was only
marginally expressed in terms of founding of new villages, the task now is to determine whether population growth took place within already established villages, and whether the rate of growth differed between one Sub-District and another.

The following table, Table (I/Three/4) gives the peasant population in 1922, 1931 and rate of growth by Sub-District.

Before going any further however, it is important to mention that although the figures given in this Section were compiled from village by village data supplied in the Census Reports, and not merely copied from the "discussion" or summarised parts of these Reports, the possibility of serious mathematical error arising from this method is minimised by checking manually the computer results.

More important, these figures tally with the figures given in the Census Reports and in the comprehensive data given by the Government Statistician in 1946. (10)

Total settled population, excluding nomads and Government forces, was given at 557,641 Moslems and Christians. If from that one deducts the total of 207,696 Moslems and Christians who were classified as "Urban Population" (11) the resultant figure of

Table (I/Three/4)

Peasant(+) population in 1922 and 1931 Censuses and rate of growth, by Sub-District.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Sub-District</th>
<th>Population in 1922</th>
<th>Population in 1931</th>
<th>% Growth over 1922 over 9 yrs</th>
<th>Average p.a.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Safad</td>
<td>18,000(*)</td>
<td>21,844</td>
<td>21.3</td>
<td>2.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Acre</td>
<td>26,274</td>
<td>34,110</td>
<td>39.8</td>
<td>3.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Haifa</td>
<td>19,526</td>
<td>28,001</td>
<td>43.4</td>
<td>4.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tiberias</td>
<td>8,926</td>
<td>10,327</td>
<td>15.7</td>
<td>1.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Beisan</td>
<td>2,828</td>
<td>3,176</td>
<td>12.3</td>
<td>1.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nazareth</td>
<td>11,966</td>
<td>15,752</td>
<td>31.6</td>
<td>3.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jenin</td>
<td>30,154</td>
<td>37,963</td>
<td>25.9</td>
<td>2.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tulkarm</td>
<td>30,299</td>
<td>40,318</td>
<td>33.0</td>
<td>3.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nablus</td>
<td>38,605</td>
<td>48,812</td>
<td>26.4</td>
<td>2.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ramallah</td>
<td>24,454</td>
<td>31,635</td>
<td>29.3</td>
<td>3.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jerusalem</td>
<td>27,475</td>
<td>38,902</td>
<td>41.6</td>
<td>4.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bethlehem</td>
<td>2,977</td>
<td>4,055</td>
<td>36.2</td>
<td>4.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hebron</td>
<td>36,879</td>
<td>46,918</td>
<td>27.2</td>
<td>3.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jaffa</td>
<td>12,435</td>
<td>21,386</td>
<td>71.9</td>
<td>7.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ramle</td>
<td>30,424</td>
<td>42,549</td>
<td>39.8</td>
<td>4.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gaza</td>
<td>36,099</td>
<td>48,142</td>
<td>33.4</td>
<td>3.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>All Palestine</td>
<td>357,321</td>
<td>473,890</td>
<td>32.6</td>
<td>3.6</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(+ ) Population totals were "built-up" from village by village data supplied in the two Census Reports. Therefore they exclude nomads and Government troops deployed in the countryside, unlike the Census Reports which tend to include both in summarised totals for Rural Population.

(*) Though 1922 Census gave a figure of 8485, the total population of Safad Sub-District in 1922 is taken as 18,000 by this thesis so as to take into account c.10,000 persons added to the Sub-District in the boundary rectification of 1925. (See Report of Census of Palestine, Vol.I, p.45, Jerusalem 1931.)

$3^{49,945}$ is very close to the figures arrived at by this Section. The figures for 1931 were "built up" and checked in the same way.

From table (I/Three/4) it is clear that the rate of population growth in the nine years between the two Censuses was very high indeed. In the nine years between 1922 and 1931, peasant population of Palestine increased by nearly one-third (32.6%).

This increase however, was not spread evenly as some areas grew much faster than others. Four groups of Sub-Districts could be discerned according to their rates of growth.

Firstly is the group comprised of the Sub-Districts of Jaffa, Haifa, Jerusalem and Ramle whose populations increased from their 1922 levels by 71.9, 43.4, 41.6 and 39.8 percent respectively. The reasons for this increase are not hard to fathom since they were the regions that were affected most by economic development in the intervening period. Moreover they were the regions that contained the three major cities of Palestine, Jerusalem, Haifa and Jaffa-Tel Aviv.

The second group managed to grow more or less in step with
average rate of growth in Palestine as a whole. It was comprised of Bethlehem, Gaza, Tulkarm and Nazareth whose peasant population increased over their 1922 levels by 36.2, 33.4, 33.0 and 31.6 percent respectively. This group, apart from the special case of Bethlehem, were all either wholly plain Sub-Districts like Gaza, or had access to plain land although the villages themselves were situated on the adjacent hill country.

The third group was comprised of the Sub-Districts of Acre, Safad (after allowing for population transfer), Jenin, Nablus, Ramallah and Hebron where population increased over its 1922 levels by 29.8, 21.3, 25.9, 26.4, 29.3 and 27.2 percent respectively. It is very important to note that all of these Sub-Districts without exception were situated in hill country. Moreover, they largely comprised what has been described before as the "core" of peasant Palestine.

The fourth group was comprised of the two Sub-Districts of Tiberias and Beisan whose population grew by 15.7 and 12.3 percent respectively.

Clearly therefore, the peasant population grew at markedly different rates as between Sub-Districts. However, in analysing
the above distribution, it could not be simply assumed that the population lost by the groups which grew less than average simply moved on to villages in the group that grew at above average rate. Internal migration is a very difficult phenomenon to trace especially when there is no reliable data available. Not only could the "deficit" Sub-Districts lose their population to other villages, but many could be attracted to towns.

It needs to be established therefore, whether the towns in Palestine grew at a rate higher than that of peasant Palestine and for the Arab population as a whole between 1922 and 1931. If so then some significant inferences could be drawn.

Table (I/Three/5) gives the non-Jewish town populations as they were returned by the Censuses of 1922 and 1931.

Because of differences in classification adopted by the Census-takers in 1922 and 1931, summarised tables of urban population appearing in some Government statistics give rise to some confusion and might lead to faulty inferences. Two tables of the same Report claiming to give the same information about urban population might give apparently contradictory figures.
Table (I/Three/5)

Moslem & Christian population of towns at the 1922 & 1931 Censuses.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Town</th>
<th>1922</th>
<th>1931(*)</th>
<th>1931(+)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1922</td>
<td>9yrs</td>
<td>1931</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gaza</td>
<td>17,426</td>
<td>17,046</td>
<td>381</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Khan Yunis</td>
<td>3,089</td>
<td>3,811</td>
<td>78</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Majdal</td>
<td>5,097</td>
<td>6,226</td>
<td>1,129</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Beersheba</td>
<td>2,258</td>
<td>2,948</td>
<td>690</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jaffa</td>
<td>27,439</td>
<td>44,657</td>
<td>17,220</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ramle</td>
<td>7,278</td>
<td>10,413</td>
<td>3,135</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lydda</td>
<td>8,092</td>
<td>11,222</td>
<td>3,130</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hebron</td>
<td>16,147</td>
<td>17,396</td>
<td>1,249</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Beit Jala</td>
<td>3,101</td>
<td>2,729</td>
<td>372</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bethlehem</td>
<td>6,656</td>
<td>6,813</td>
<td>157</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jerusalem</td>
<td>28,607</td>
<td>39,281</td>
<td>10,674</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ramallah</td>
<td>3,097</td>
<td>4,285</td>
<td>1,188</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tulkarm</td>
<td>3,327</td>
<td>4,809</td>
<td>1,482</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nablus</td>
<td>15,931</td>
<td>17,183</td>
<td>1,252</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jenin</td>
<td>2,630</td>
<td>2,704</td>
<td>74</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Haifa</td>
<td>18,404</td>
<td>34,480</td>
<td>16,076</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Shafa 'Amr</td>
<td>2,288</td>
<td>2,823</td>
<td>535</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nazareth</td>
<td>7,381</td>
<td>8,677</td>
<td>1,296</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Beisan</td>
<td>1,900</td>
<td>3,013</td>
<td>1,113</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tiberias</td>
<td>2,523</td>
<td>3,221</td>
<td>698</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Acre</td>
<td>6,342</td>
<td>7,660</td>
<td>1,318</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Safad</td>
<td>5,775</td>
<td>6,894</td>
<td>1,119</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>All</strong></td>
<td><strong>195,685</strong></td>
<td><strong>258,824</strong></td>
<td><strong>63,139</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(*) Excluding what the 1931 Census Report classified as suburbs.
(+ ) Including town suburbs.

For example, "The Survey of Palestine 1945-1946" which was prepared for the information of the Anglo-American Committee of Inquiry, gives figures for 1931 urban population in Tables 7b and 8b, Chapter VI, of the Report which were not identical — those in Table 7b being less than those in Table 8b. If one goes back to the statistical breakdown of town by town population given in Volume II of the Report of the 1931 Census, however, it becomes clear that the reason was that Table 7b did not include the population of urban suburbs while Table 8b did.

To reduce the risk of confusion therefore, Table (I/Three/5) gives two sets of figures for town populations at the time of Census of 1931. The first set (second column in the Table) excluded the population of town suburbs so as to make the figures more compatible with the 1922 Census figures which did not specify whether suburbs were included or not. The second set (fifth column in the table) gives the town population inclusive of town suburbs. The Jewish urban population was excluded from the computation at all times.

These qualifications apart, it can be calculated from the above table and from table (I/Three/4), that the Moslem and Christian
population (excluding the nomadic population) was 553,006 (12) in 1922 and grew to 749,496 in 1931, an increase of 196,490 over 1922, or 35.5%.

In addition, it can be calculated that if the population of town suburbs were excluded, the percentage increase in urban population growth between 1922 and 1931 was 32.3% over the 1922 urban population. If the suburbs were included, then the rate is 40.8% over the 1922 urban population.

When percentage increase of urban population inclusive of suburbs (40.8%), is compared with the percentage increase of peasant population between 1922 and 1931 (32.6%), it is clear that Moslem and Christian town population increased at a rate higher than village population. Moreover it is clear that village population growth was less than the growth for ALL Palestine Christian and Moslem population (35.5%). Urban population meanwhile grew at a rate higher than ALL Palestine average.

Assuming a uniform rate of natural increase (before migration) between town and village, this indicates that there was a degree of internal migration from all Palestinian villages to all towns in Palestine. In other words, on the assumption that

(12) 10,000 were added to the population in 1922 in order to take into account the population that was to be transferred from Syria to Palestine in 1925 after the frontier rectification agreement between them.
the rate of growth of BOTH town and country was the same i.e. 35.5%
then the rural population in Palestine in 1931 should have grown
by 126,848 between 1922 and 1931. In fact, it has grown by 116,569
indicating that 10,279 have emigrated from villages to towns.

However, there could be another explanation for this namely that
population which was classified as "rural" in 1922 had been
reclassified as "urban" in 1931. It is important to note, however,
that a comparison of the 1931 and 1922 Census Reports does not show
villages "disappearing" on account of becoming town suburbs. All
villages that were in existence in 1922 were also in existence in
1931. Rather it was the population residing outside both the 1922
town boundaries and the villages proper that was included in the
expanded towns by 1931.

Until further study is made into this aspect, it is not possible
to ascertain the social origins of this reclassified population.
It should not be assumed however, that it consisted wholly of
peasants who retained their occupational structure but who found
themselves included in town population merely for administrative
reasons. It was not unknown for established urban families
to leave their traditional urban quarters after the First War
and build houses well outside old city walls but near enough
for them to travel to town especially that the security situation had improved and new roads were being built. Whereas in 1922 these sites would have been classified as "rural", it is likely that they would have been reclassified by 1931. (13)

Clearly, the above is only a rough estimate of the size of migration but since the assumptions behind it are clearly shown, it remains in the absence of better and more dedicated studies, on the whole a valid though rough guide to internal migration.

These qualifications notwithstanding, important inferences about internal migration of peasants can be drawn from both Tables (I/Three/4) and (I/Three/5).

Firstly, it could be inferred that neither the absolute size of migration from countryside to town (as calculated above), nor the size of this migration relative to 1922 population, nor as a proportion of population growth between 1922 and 1931, were so high as to indicate the presence of a flood of migration by 1931. Most of the population growth stayed behind in the countryside since the absolute total of "net migration to towns" of 10,279 was

(13) This was the experience of my own family and many others. See G. Fyrlonge, Palestine is my Country: The Story of Musa Alami, London, 1968.
only 8.8% of the total GROWTH in peasant population during the period and only 2.9% and 2.2% of TOTAL peasant population in 1922 and 1931 respectively.

Secondly it could be inferred that there was a degree of migration from village to village as witnessed by the differential rates of peasant population growth by Sub-District given in Table (I/Three/4). Undoubtedly, part of the explanation may be due to different rates of natural increase between villages. Without further information on this aspect however, it is impossible to estimate the contribution made by each factor. It is open to doubt however, whether the short time span between the Censuses allowed the latter factor to exert a stronger influence than the former.

Notwithstanding this, inter-village migration could be roughly calculated by using the same methods as above. Assuming that all peasant population grew at the same rate as the average for all peasant population between 1922 and 1931 viz. 32.6%, then those Sub-Districts which had more peasant population in 1931 than this rate of 32.6% warranted, must have received additional population from somewhere else. It is unlikely that the source was the towns as they were growing fast themselves.
These "recipient" Sub-Districts were identified earlier as those of Haifa, Jerusalem, Ramle and Jaffa. Whereas in 1922 they had a peasant population of 89,860, they should have grown by 28,935 had they grown at the rate of 32.6%. In fact, they grew by 41,978; or 13,043 more than if population growth was evenly spread across Palestine. This figure makes up more than one and a quarter times (127%) of the calculated migration from villages to towns. In other words migration from one village to another, exceeded migration from village to town.

Again, neither the absolute size of "net inter-village migration" nor its proportion of total population (3.6% of 1922 population and 2.7% of 1931) show a high degree of migration. Added together, migration from village to town and from village to village, as calculated above, did not exceed 6.3% and 4.9% of total peasant population in 1922 and 1931 respectively. These made an average annual rate of 0.72% and 0.54% of the population at the two dates.

For the "recipient" Sub-Districts however, this additional population made up a significant proportion of their totals. The "extra" growth in peasant population made up 10.4% of peasant population of these Sub-Districts in 1922 and 9.9% of the 1931 one. More significantly, the towns of these "recipient" Sub -
Districts, viz. Jerusalem, Jaffa, Haifa and Ramle grew at a very high rate as well.

It should be clear however, that much of this urban growth was not solely made up of population attracted from villages, but also by people attracted from other towns in Palestine. The urban population of some towns grew much less than the rate of growth of ALL Arab Palestinian population between 1922 and 1931. Hebron grew at 7.7%, Nablus at 9.8%, Jenin at 5.4%, Beit Jala at 8.9% and Bethlehem at 9.4%. It is significant that these towns were situated in the hill country which formed the "core" of peasant Palestine.

It could be concluded therefore that though peasant migration was still small by 1931, the direction of migration was not necessarily to the nearest town - the capital of the Sub-District for example. Population migrated from both town and village in "deficit" regions to both town and village in "recipient" regions, mainly in the Coastal Plain and Jerusalem.
The third subsidiary question (*) deals with the degree of concentration of peasant population by size of village in 1931. In Tables (I/Three/2) and (I/Three/3) and the discussion relating to them, it has been established that the majority of population in 1922 tended to concentrate in the larger villages although those large villages made up only a small percentage of the total number of villages in Palestine. The question here is to determine whether population growth in the intervening period has changed this pattern.

To do this, the following tables, Tables (I/Three/6 (a)) and (I/Three/6 (b)), give in absolute and percentage terms respectively the number of villages in each Sub-District in Palestine in 1931- categorised according to size.

It could be seen from Table (I/Three/6 (b) ) that for Palestine as a whole, there was an unmistakable shift in village size towards larger villages and away from smaller ones. These changes in the distribution as given in the above table could be viewed as two sides of the same coin.

Firstly there was a decrease between 1922 and 1931, in the relative weight of villages below 600 inhabitants. The percentage

(*) See p. 74
Table (I/Three/6 (a))

Number of villages having the following number of inhabitants in 1931, By Sub-District.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Sub-District</th>
<th>No. of villages with the following number of inhabitants</th>
<th>No. of Vil.s</th>
<th>Average size</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>up to 200</td>
<td>400</td>
<td>600</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Safad</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Acre</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Haifa</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tiberias</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Beisan</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nazareth</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jenin</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tulkarm</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nablus</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ramallah</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jerusalem</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bethlehem</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hebron</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jaffa</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ramle</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gaza</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

All Palestine | 122 | 158 | 102 | 91 | 57 | 39 | 100 |

Table (I/Three/6 (b))

Percent of total number of villages in Sub-District which had the following number of inhabitants in 1931. By Sub-District.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Sub-District</th>
<th>% of all villages in Sub-District with the following number of inhabitants</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>up to 200</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Safad</td>
<td>26.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Acre</td>
<td>4.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Haifa</td>
<td>16.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tiberias</td>
<td>10.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Beisan</td>
<td>38.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nazareth</td>
<td>21.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jenin</td>
<td>34.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tulkarm</td>
<td>13.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nablus</td>
<td>15.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ramallah</td>
<td>14.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jerusalem</td>
<td>20.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bethlehem</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hebron</td>
<td>6.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jaffa</td>
<td>17.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ramle</td>
<td>29.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gaza</td>
<td>4.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>All Palestine</td>
<td>18.2</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

See Table (I/Three/6 (a)).

decreased from 23.9 to 18.2 in villages with population up to 200; from 27.1 to 23.5 in villages of 201-400; from 16.6 to 15.2 in villages between 401-600. Whereas these three size-group accounted for 67.6% of all villages in Palestine in 1922, they only accounted for 56.9% in 1931.

Following on from the first, the second side of the coin was the increase in the relative weight of villages with above 601 persons. Whereas in 1922 such villages accounted for 32.4 of the total number of villages in Palestine, in 1931 they accounted for 42.8, an increase of about one-third. That there should be such a shift is not surprising since this is a natural result of population growth.

What is more significant however is that this shift occurred in all Sub-Districts, though more in some than in others: In every Sub-District, the proportion of villages inhabited by less than 200 decreased between 1922 and 1931; and the proportion of villages inhabited by more than 1201 increased. In the size-groups inbetween meanwhile, a consistent shift was taking place in favour of larger villages.

In addition to this shift in terms of the NUMBER OF VILLAGES,
a parallel shift was taking place in terms of the total NUMBER OF PERSONS inhabiting villages of any given size as the following tables, Table (I/Three/7 (a) ) and Table (I/Three (b) ) will show.

These give in absolute and percentage terms respectively, the total number of persons in 1931 inhabiting all villages of the size-groups mentioned above.

From Tables (I/Three/7 (a) ) and (I/Three/7 (b) ) above, it could be seen that the tendency of peasant population to concentrate in large villages, already apparent in 1922, was maintained, if not strengthened further between 1922 and 1931.

Whereas in 1922, 34.1% of the total population lived in villages smaller than 600 inhabitants; in 1931 only 23.5% of all peasant population lived in such villages. Similarly, whereas 33.6% of the population in 1922 lived in villages larger than 1201; in 1931, 43.2% lived in such villages. Again, as with distribution expressed in terms of number of villages (already discussed in Tables (I/Three/6 (a) & (b)) and related discussion), size-groups "up to 200", "201-400" and "401-600" lost a large part of their share of total population which they previously held. Naturally, this part was gained by the larger size-groups.
Table (I/Three/ 7 (a) )

Total number of persons living in all villages belonging to the following size-groups in 1931. By Sub-District.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Sub-District</th>
<th>total number in all villages of size-group</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Up to 200 200</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Safad</td>
<td>1768 4811 4113</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Acre</td>
<td>208 3240 2897</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Haifa</td>
<td>840 1514 2843</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tiberias</td>
<td>325 2676 1543</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Beisan</td>
<td>678 1868 0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nazareth</td>
<td>794 1555 932</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jenin</td>
<td>2808 2610 3622</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tulkarm</td>
<td>656 2796 4036</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nablus</td>
<td>1644 9503 6977</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ramallah</td>
<td>1039 3944 5156</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jerusalem</td>
<td>1748 4128 6043</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bethlehem</td>
<td>0 530 980</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hebron</td>
<td>326 1088 2026</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jaffa</td>
<td>445 618 411</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ramle</td>
<td>1950 3956 2967</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gaza</td>
<td>260 869 5851</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>----- ----- ----- ----- ----- ----- ----- -----</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>All Palestine</td>
<td>15449 45706 50406</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Percent of peasant population of Sub-District living in villages belonging to the following size-groups in 1931. By Sub-District.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Sub-District</th>
<th>% of Sub-Dist. population in size-group</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>up to 200</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Safad</td>
<td>8.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Acre</td>
<td>0.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Haifa</td>
<td>3.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tiberias</td>
<td>3.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Beisan</td>
<td>21.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nazareth</td>
<td>4.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jenin</td>
<td>7.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tulkarm</td>
<td>1.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nablus</td>
<td>3.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ramallah</td>
<td>3.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jerusalem</td>
<td>45</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bethlehelm</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hebron</td>
<td>0.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jaffa</td>
<td>2.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ramle</td>
<td>4.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gaza</td>
<td>0.5</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

All Palestine 3.3 9.6 10.6 13.3 10.9 9.1 43.2

See Table (I/Three/7 (a)).

This was not confined to Palestine as a whole, since it could be seen from comparing Table (I/Three/7 (b) and Table (I/Three/3 b) that smallest size-group (up to 200) in EVERY Sub-District, lost its relative weight to total population between 1922 and 1931. Similarly, it can be seen from comparing the same tables that the largest size-group in EVERY Sub-District (over 1201 or nearest size group) gained in relative weight between 1922 and 1931.

To sum up the conclusions arrived at so far in Part I, Section Three; it could be seen from the data and arguments advanced that:

(1) By and large, population growth after the 1870's was not expressed in terms of the founding of new villages. Although some villages were founded (more between 1870's and 1922 than between 1922 and 1931), the majority of villages that were in existence in 1931, were already in existence at the time of the Survey.

(2) That the centre of gravity of peasant Palestine stayed where it was at the time of the Survey, i.e. in the hill country, and within hill-country, in those hill districts ranging from Jenin in the north to the village of Samu' south of the town of Hebron in the
south. The other, though smaller, concentration of peasants was in the Sub-Districts of Nazareth and Acre and the hilly parts of the Sub-Districts of Haifa, Tulkarm and Ramle. As for the plains, the concentration of peasants was in the Ramle and Gaza Sub-Districts.

(3) That peasant population tended to concentrate in the larger villages although these were few relative to the total number of villages in Palestine. Furthermore, this pattern was maintained in the period between 1922 and 1931 and indeed strengthened.

(4) i. That the percentage increase in population from 1922 to 1931 (32.6% of 1922 population) was lower than the rate for the towns (40.8%).

ii. That there were marked differences in the rate of growth between villages in one region and another (as indeed between towns in one region and another).

iii. That as a result of (i) and (ii) above, there was a degree of internal migration from villages in the "deficit regions" to villages in the "receptive regions", mainly Haifa, Jaffa, Jerusalem and Ramle. Similarly, there was a degree of migration from village to town.

iv. But that this migration was not, in absolute terms or relative to peasant population in the "deficit" regions, on a large
enough scale as to cause a significant shift in the traditional pattern of distribution of peasants in Palestine.

(5) In short, the high rate of growth of peasant population that Palestine was experiencing, probably since the 1870's but certainly between 1922 and 1931, was taking place "in situ". In other words, Village population steadily grew in size. This growth was naturally placing more and more demands on the essential necessities of life that the village had so far provided for its inhabitants.

What were the implications of this growth in population and in the demands it was making will be discussed in the following Parts of this thesis.

Before doing this, however, the peasant population of Palestine has to be placed within the context of the total population of the country. A word moreover, must be said on the estimated growth of peasant population between the end of 1931 and 1939, the end of the period under study.
(c) Peasant population within the context of all Palestinian population.

The two Censuses apart, estimates of total and rural population of Palestine from 1922 to 1939, as given by various Government Departments, "have been prepared by adding the recorded natural and migratory increase to the figures of the settled population at the Census" (14). These estimates therefore, are less reliable than Census material in addition to being less detailed. In placing the peasant population within the context of the overall population therefore, it is more reliable to present the picture as it was captured at the time of the two Censuses.

The following table, Table (1/Three/8) gives the proportions of peasant population to Total Palestine population, and to Total Rural Population in 1922 and 1931, by Sub-District.

Table (I/Three/8 (a))

All Palestine population, and all Rural population in 1922 and 1931 by Sub-District.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Sub-District</th>
<th>All Palestine(*)</th>
<th></th>
<th>All Rural(*)</th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1922</td>
<td>1931</td>
<td>1922</td>
<td>1931</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Safad</td>
<td>32,790 (+)</td>
<td>39,713</td>
<td>24,029 (+)</td>
<td>30,272</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Acre</td>
<td>35,535</td>
<td>45,535</td>
<td>29,115</td>
<td>37,245</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Haifa</td>
<td>56,457</td>
<td>95,472</td>
<td>29,535</td>
<td>42,245</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tiberias</td>
<td>20,721</td>
<td>26,975</td>
<td>13,771</td>
<td>18,374</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Beisan</td>
<td>10,679</td>
<td>15,123</td>
<td>8,738</td>
<td>12,022</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nazareth</td>
<td>22,681</td>
<td>28,592</td>
<td>15,257</td>
<td>19,836</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jenin</td>
<td>33,534</td>
<td>44,411</td>
<td>30,897</td>
<td>38,705</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tulkarm</td>
<td>34,972</td>
<td>46,328</td>
<td>31,622</td>
<td>41,501</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nablus</td>
<td>56,695</td>
<td>86,706</td>
<td>40,748</td>
<td>51,517</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ramallah</td>
<td>30,005</td>
<td>39,062</td>
<td>26,901</td>
<td>34,775</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jerusalem</td>
<td>91,272</td>
<td>132,661</td>
<td>228,694</td>
<td>42,158</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bethlehem</td>
<td>24,613</td>
<td>23,725</td>
<td>14,834</td>
<td>14,180</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hebron</td>
<td>53,571</td>
<td>67,631</td>
<td>36,994</td>
<td>50,100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jaffa</td>
<td>65,314</td>
<td>145,502</td>
<td>17,605</td>
<td>47,535</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ramle</td>
<td>49,075</td>
<td>70,579</td>
<td>33,660</td>
<td>48,908</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gaza</td>
<td>73,885</td>
<td>94,634</td>
<td>47,418</td>
<td>67,551</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

All Palestine 693,718 984,739 431,757 600,407

(*) Exclusive of nomads in Beersheeba Sub-District.
(+): 10,000 added to take into account transfer of population from Syria to Palestine, 1925. (See previous text).

Table (I/Three/8 (b))

Proportion of peasant population to All Palestine population and to All Rural population in 1922 and 1931. By Sub-District.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Sub-District</th>
<th>All Palestine(*) population</th>
<th></th>
<th>All Rural(*) population</th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1922 %</td>
<td>1931 %</td>
<td>1922 %</td>
<td>1931 %</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Safad</td>
<td>56.3</td>
<td>55.0</td>
<td>76.9</td>
<td>72.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Acre</td>
<td>73.9</td>
<td>74.9</td>
<td>90.2</td>
<td>91.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Haifa</td>
<td>74.6</td>
<td>29.3</td>
<td>66.1</td>
<td>66.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tiberias</td>
<td>43.1</td>
<td>38.3</td>
<td>64.8</td>
<td>56.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Beisan</td>
<td>26.5</td>
<td>21.0</td>
<td>32.4</td>
<td>26.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nazareth</td>
<td>52.8</td>
<td>55.1</td>
<td>78.4</td>
<td>79.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jenin</td>
<td>89.9</td>
<td>85.5</td>
<td>97.6</td>
<td>98.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tulkarm</td>
<td>86.7</td>
<td>87.0</td>
<td>95.8</td>
<td>97.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nablus</td>
<td>68.1</td>
<td>71.0</td>
<td>94.7</td>
<td>94.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ramallah</td>
<td>81.5</td>
<td>81.0</td>
<td>90.9</td>
<td>91.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jerusalem</td>
<td>30.1</td>
<td>29.3</td>
<td>95.7</td>
<td>92.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bethlehem</td>
<td>12.1</td>
<td>17.1</td>
<td>20.0</td>
<td>28.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hebron</td>
<td>68.6</td>
<td>69.4</td>
<td>99.7</td>
<td>93.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jaffa</td>
<td>19.0</td>
<td>14.7</td>
<td>70.6</td>
<td>45.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ramle</td>
<td>62.0</td>
<td>60.3</td>
<td>90.4</td>
<td>87.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gaza</td>
<td>49.2</td>
<td>50.9</td>
<td>76.1</td>
<td>71.3</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

All Palestine 51.5 48.2 82.8 79.0

See Table (I/Three/8 (a)).

(*): Exclusive of nomads in Beersheba Sub-District.

Before examining the above tables however, it should be noted that the nomadic population of Beersheba Sub-District was excluded from the computation. The reason largely stems from the fact that the 1922 Census over-estimated the Sub-District nomadic population to such an extent as to make the figures highly unreliable. (15) Secondly, any attempt to compensate for the over-estimate would be too cumbersome and would be more of a hindrance than a help when discussing peasant population trends especially that Beersheba Sub-District had no peasant villages right through the period.

Taking into account the above qualification, a number of features can be seen from the Tables.

Firstly, that the proportion of peasants to total population in Palestine was slightly reduced. Whereas it was 51.5% in 1922, it fell to 48.2% in 1931. This naturally supports the arguments put forward in the preceding pages that there was a degree of net internal migration of peasants by 1931, albeit a marginal one. Just as important however, it could be concluded that most of peasant population growth took place "in situ" whereby the new generation, by and large stayed in its villages.

However, within the overall pattern of a slight reduction in the population

weight of peasant population relative to total Palestine population, there were variations between Sub-Districts. The Sub-Districts which had Palestine's major cities in them -Jerusalem, Jaffa and Haifa - saw a marked reduction in the proportion of peasants to total population, though more so in the case of Jaffa and Haifa than in Jerusalem. This was mainly due to the growth in urban population overtaking growth in peasant population in the Sub-District rather than due to reduction of peasant population in absolute terms.

The performance of four groups of Sub-Districts need to be noted

(i) Safad increased its proportion of peasants to total population quite markedly, almost wholly because of the 1923 population transfer between Syria and Palestine which added around 10,000 people -all peasants. When this is taken into account, as it was in the above Tables, then the proportion decreases, albeit marginally.

(ii) The peasant population of Tiberias and Beisan lost in relative terms mainly because of the increased Jewish settlement on the land in these two areas following the purchase of large tracts of land in the 1920's. (See Part III, Section One).

(iii) The peasant population of Bethlehem Sub-District gained in relative weight mainly due to the almost static growth in
urban population of the Sub-District while peasant population grew at average rate. (See Table (I/Three/5) and related discussion.

(iv) All other Sub-Districts showed a very similar performance where the relative weight of peasant to total population remained almost static. It is instructive to note that in these Sub-Districts not only did the peasant population make up the majority of total population, but it also made up the overwhelming majority of all rural population of these areas. It could be said that the Sub-Districts in this group were strongly peasant in character. Most of these areas were situated in the inner or outer "core" of peasant Palestine.

The second feature that could be noted from the above tables, is that the peasant population managed a similar performance relative to ALL RURAL population in Palestine between 1922 and 1931. The proportion fell slightly from 82.8% in 1922 to 79.0% in 1931.

However, the qualification regarding the exclusion of Beersheba nomads from total rural population should be kept in mind at this point. If these nomads were to be included in 1931 population (when they were correctly estimated at 48,123), the proportion of peasant to all rural population would then be 73.1%. Unfortunately however, since the true figure of Beersheba nomads in 1922 is not available
no comparable figure for 1922 could be given. This is why Beersheba nomads were excluded at both times.

Looking at the other Sub-Districts, it could be seen that there were marked differences in performance between them. The most striking reduction in the proportion of peasants to all rural population was in the Jaffa Sub-District where the proportion dropped from 70.6% in 1922 to 45.0% in 1931. This was almost wholly due to the growth of Jewish rural population in the area which increased from 3,986 in 1922 to 17,016 in 1931. (16) Similarly Beisan and Tiberias were affected by an increase in Jewish rural population, although to a smaller extent. According to the same source, the Jewish rural population in Beisan Sub-District increased from 659 to 1862 and in Tiberias from 1812 to 2404 between 1922 and 1931.

Apart from Safad (where the reasons of change were given above), all other Sub-Districts managed to more or less maintain the relative proportion between peasant and non-peasant rural population. An exception was Bethelehem which showed an increase in proportion of peasants to all rural population. It is not clear however, whether this had more to do with the over-estimation of Sub-District nomadic population in the 1922 Census, or due to

an increased tendency of nomads to become settled in villages.

Growth of peasant population 1932-1939.

So far in this Section, peasant and total population have been discussed in terms of the 1922 and 1931 Census only. Naturally this, for the reasons explained so far, is the safest and most reliable, as well as being the most detailed picture that could be given of population in the period 1920-1939. However, between November 1931, when the Census was taken, and 1939, the end of our period, eight years have elapsed in which population, peasant and otherwise have grown. Something must be said about this growth, notwithstanding the inherently less accurate and less detailed nature of population estimates. These estimates were given by various Government Departments though later collected and presented in two main documents. The first was "A Survey of Palestine - Prepared in December 1945 and January 1946 for the Information of the Anglo-American Committee of Inquiry" (Chapter VI), and the second was "Vital Statistics Tables 1922-1945" which was prepared by P.J. Loftus, the Director of the Department
of Statistics in the Government of Palestine.

The following tables, Table (I/Three/9 (a)) and (I/Three/9 (b)) give in absolute and percentage terms respectively, the Department of Statistic's estimates of All Palestine Population in 1944; All Rural Population, Moslem & Christian Rural Population, and Moslem & Christian Town Population, by Sub-District.

From Tables (I/Three/9 (a)) and (I/Three/9 (b)), it could be seen that for Palestine as a whole, the period between 1932 and 1944 saw a continuation of the trends already established in the period between 1922 and 1931, and analysed in the preceding pages.

Firstly, the proportion of peasant population to All Palestine population was slowly declining. Whereas it was 51.5% in 1922, 48.2% in 1931, it declined to 43.4%. The rate of decline however was slow in spite of the dramatic increase in total Palestinian population between 1922 and 1944 where the population increased by 123.5% over 1922.

Similarly, within this overall continuity, a number of Sub-
Table (I/Three/9 (a))


<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Safad</td>
<td>53,620</td>
<td>41,690</td>
<td>37,390</td>
<td>9,530</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Acre</td>
<td>68,330</td>
<td>55,970</td>
<td>53,070</td>
<td>12,310</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Haifa</td>
<td>229,630</td>
<td>84,670</td>
<td>55,670</td>
<td>26,430(2)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tiberias</td>
<td>39,200</td>
<td>27,890</td>
<td>20,790</td>
<td>5,310</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Beisan</td>
<td>23,590</td>
<td>18,410</td>
<td>11,410</td>
<td>5,180</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nazareth</td>
<td>46,100</td>
<td>29,590</td>
<td>24,290</td>
<td>5,180</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jenin</td>
<td>56,880</td>
<td>52,890</td>
<td>52,890</td>
<td>3,990</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tulkarm</td>
<td>83,240</td>
<td>70,250</td>
<td>60,250</td>
<td>8,090</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nablus</td>
<td>91,880</td>
<td>68,630</td>
<td>68,630</td>
<td>23,250</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ramallah</td>
<td>47,280</td>
<td>42,200</td>
<td>42,200</td>
<td>5,080</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jerusalem</td>
<td>240,880</td>
<td>71,270</td>
<td>68,070</td>
<td>72,610(3)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hebron</td>
<td>87,690</td>
<td>63,090</td>
<td>63,010</td>
<td>24,560</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jaffa</td>
<td>368,830</td>
<td>90,610</td>
<td>37,610</td>
<td>66,310</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ramle</td>
<td>123,490</td>
<td>73,430</td>
<td>62,130</td>
<td>31,220(4)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gaza</td>
<td>136,650</td>
<td>81,350</td>
<td>78,460</td>
<td>55,500(5)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

| All Palestine       | 1,692,250                | 872,090              | 733,870                 | 410,500                 |

Excluding Beersheba Sub-District.

(1) Moslem & Christian population were sections of populations from which peasantry was drawn. Druzes included in Moslem total.
(2) Including town of Shafa 'Amr (3,630)
(3) Including urban and rural population of what previously was Bethlehem Sub-District.
(4) Including town on Lydda (16,760)
(5) Including towns of Khan Yunis (11,220) and Majdal (9,910).

Table (1/Three/9 (b))

Proportion of peasant population to All Palestine Population and All Rural Population in 1944. Percentage increase in Arab Rural and Arab Urban Population between 1931 and 1944.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Sub-District</th>
<th>Proportion of Arab Rural to All Palestine Population</th>
<th>Proportion of Arab Rural to All Rural Population</th>
<th>% increase over 1931 Arab Rural Population</th>
<th>% increase over 1931 Arab Urban Population</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Safad</td>
<td>69.7</td>
<td>89.7</td>
<td>32.2</td>
<td>38.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Acre</td>
<td>77.7</td>
<td>94.8</td>
<td>40.4</td>
<td>55.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Haifa</td>
<td>23.9</td>
<td>63.4</td>
<td>60.1</td>
<td>181.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tiberias</td>
<td>53.0</td>
<td>74.5</td>
<td>33.1</td>
<td>48.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Beisan</td>
<td>48.4</td>
<td>62.0</td>
<td>20.9</td>
<td>61.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nazareth</td>
<td>52.7</td>
<td>82.4</td>
<td>47.1</td>
<td>- 9.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jenin</td>
<td>93.0</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td>42.1</td>
<td>43.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tulkarm</td>
<td>72.4</td>
<td>85.8</td>
<td>44.4</td>
<td>51.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nablus</td>
<td>74.7</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td>34.6</td>
<td>32.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ramallah</td>
<td>89.3</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td>21.5</td>
<td>18.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jerusalem</td>
<td>28.3</td>
<td>95.5</td>
<td>39.0</td>
<td>52.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hebron</td>
<td>71.9</td>
<td>99.8</td>
<td>29.8</td>
<td>40.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jaffa</td>
<td>10.2</td>
<td>41.5</td>
<td>71.5</td>
<td>39.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ramle</td>
<td>50.3</td>
<td>84.6</td>
<td>48.0</td>
<td>46.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gaza</td>
<td>57.4</td>
<td>96.4</td>
<td>52.0</td>
<td>57.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>All Palestine</td>
<td>43.4</td>
<td>84.2</td>
<td>41.4</td>
<td>48.9</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Excluding Beersheba Sub-District.

Districts also saw a continuation of the trends established between 1922 and 1931. The proportion of peasant to total population in the Sub-Districts that had Palestine's major cities - Jerusalem, Jaffa, and Haifa, declined still further by 1944. This was not due to a decline in the absolute number of peasants in these Sub-Districts. Indeed these numbers not only increased, but in the case of Jaffa and Haifa Sub-Districts they increased at a rate substantially above the rate of growth of peasant population in Palestine as a whole between 1931 and 1944. Whereas, the increase in peasant population in Palestine as a whole between 1931 and 1944 was 41.4% (over the 1931 peasant population) the increase in Jaffa was 71.5% and in Haifa was 60.1%. In Jerusalem, it increased more or less in step with the national average. The same could be said of the Ramle Sub-District, although the towns there were not of the same size as the other three.

Continuation of the trend, however, was not confined to cases where the trend in the proportion of peasant to total population of the Sub-District population was declining; but also in cases where the previous trend was upwards. The peasant population of Safad, and to a smaller extent Acre Sub-Districts managed to increase its proportion of the whole, largely because of the lower than average increase in the non-peasant population.
viz. Urban, Jewish and nomad.

A significant break with the previous trend occurred in three Sub-Districts. In Tulkarm, the proportion of peasant to total population dropped significantly from 1931 (87.0%) to 1944 (72.4%). This was largely due to the growth in Jewish rural population in the area following the large land purchases of the early 1930's.

In Tiberias and Beisan the peasant population managed to reverse the previous trend when it was declining relative to total population. Whereas in 1922 it accounted for 43.1% and 26.5% in Tiberias and Beisan Sub-Districts respectively; in 1931 for 38.3% and 21.0%; in 1944 the peasant population accounted for 53.0% and 48.4%. This was largely due to the slow increase in Jewish population over the years since 1931.

The significant overall impression that can be derived from the above tables, is that in contrast to the fast changes that were taking place in those Sub-Districts like Jaffa, Haifa, Beisan and Tiberias where the presence of peasant population was weak; those Sub-Districts which were always the strongholds of peasant population saw that status reinforced further. The proportion of peasant to total population increased in Jenin,
Nablus, Ramallah, Hebron, Gaza, Acre and Safad (the latter joining the ranks of a largely peasant Sub-Districts, a status which it gained after the population transfer). These Sub-Districts combined had a peasant population of 395,650 out of a total peasant population in 1944 of 733,870; or 54%. To that should be added the rural areas of Jerusalem Sub-District which were too remote to be affected by the pull of the city.

The significance of this is that peasant areas were becoming even more so with the passage of time. Palestine was dividing itself into two areas; one was that area which was largely non-peasant -whether urbanised or with strong Jewish presence -; and the other into largely peasant areas. The first area, with the exception of the "enclave" of Jerusalem City, was situated in what was previously described as the "periphery" of peasant Palestine - the Coastal Plains, the Acre, Jezreel and Beisan Plains. The second area, with the exception of Gaza Sub-District, was situated in the hills - of Lower and Upper Galilee but more so on the hill-country of the Mountains of Nablus, Jerusalem and Hebron.

Those areas that were strongly peasant in character at the time of the Survey of Palestine in the 1870's still retained that character by 1944, if not strengthened it. While that which was not
peasant country at the time of the 1870's Survey, saw whatever peasant presence there diluted further.

In addition to answering the question of changes in the relative weight of peasant population visa-vis total population, the 1944 population estimates given in Table (I/Three/9) allow an attempt to answer the question as to the rates of growth of peasant population and internal migration—bringing up to date the analysis of the same attributes for the previous years.

Again from Tables (I/Three/9 (a)) and (I/Three/9 (b)), it could be seen that the peasant population of Palestine increased from 733,870 in 1944; a percentage increase of 41.4% over 1931. This was less than the percentage increase of total population in Palestine which increased from 1,035,821 in 1931 to 1,692,250 in 1944 - 63%. However, since much of that percentage increase was accounted for by Jewish immigration, a better indicator of natural increase is the rate of increase of Arab settled population i.e. excluding Jewish and nomadic population. This population increased from 794,658 in 1931 to 1,144,370 in 1944 (17) an increase of 44% over 1931.

Peasant population therefore was increasing at a rate less than that for total Arab population (less nomads). The Arab population of the towns meanwhile increased to 410,500 in 1944, an increase of 48.9% over 1931. Indeed this may have been due to war conditions which caused people temporarily to move into the towns although in the absence of further research this could not be conclusively proved. There were other war factors which were tending to keep peasants in the countryside. For example priority was assigned by the Allies to growing all Middle East food needs locally rather than relying on imports in view of the restrictions on shipping space in the first three years of the war.

However assuming, as has been done while arriving at an estimate of internal migration in the inter-censal period 1922-1931 - that the rate of natural increase did not vary significantly between town and country; it follows that the countryside should have grown by 44% of its 1931 level - whereas it ACTUALLY grew by 41.4%. In other words there were 2.6% of the Arab peasant population who should have been in the countryside but were not - around 13,500 people.

However, if the above assumption is correct and 13,500 peasants
migrated to towns, this is by no means a flood of immigration as this figure constituted only 1.8% of the 1944 peasant population of Palestine. Assuming the 13,500 migrated evenly over the 13 years between November 1931 and 1944, then the rate of migration would have been less than 0.2% per year. Like the level of migration calculated for the period between 1922 and 1931, it is more aptly described as a steady trickle than a flood.

Nevertheless, Table (1/Three/9) shows that the peasant population was still increasing at a not inconsiderable rate of increase between 1931 and 1944. In the absence of any great outward migration from village to town, as has been shown, it could only be concluded that peasant population grew where it was - "in situ" - again like the period between 1922 and 1931.

As for the Sub-Districts, the pattern was again similar to that established in the period between 1922 and 1931. There was a significant increase in the peasant population of Haifa, Jaffa and Ramle to be joined in this period by Gaza and Nazareth. Assuming that the "natural increase" emanating from these Sub-Districts themselves i.e. excluding immigration, was equal to the average rate for all of the peasant population of Palestine (41.4%), then by 1944, these Sub-Districts should have grown to 234,119,
whereas they have ACTUALLY grown to 256,160, a difference of 22,041 in their favour.

On the opposite side were those Sub-Districts which have grown at a rate substantially below average, viz. Safad, Tiberias, Beisan, Nablus, Ramallah and Hebron. Each of these have grown by less than 8 percentage points below the national average. Using the same assumption as above, these should have grown to 265,317 by 1944. However, they ACTUALLY grew to 243,430; a difference of 21,887 to their disadvantage.

This is not to say that the migrant peasant from the "deficit" group simply moved on to villages in the "surplus" group. In the absence of further information on the pattern of migration, no such statements could be made. Movement could have taken place from village to town in the same Sub-Districts, or to towns in other Sub-Districts. What could be said with a fair degree of certainty however, is that the trend of migration from BOTH town and village in the "deficit" groups to BOTH towns and villages in the "recipient" groups established in the period between 1922 and 1931, still continued into the period from 1931 to 1944.

The overall impression is that by and large, the high rate
of natural increase of the peasant population before and during the Mandate did not lead to large-scale migration from the countryside to the towns. On the whole, the new generations stayed where they were born.
In the last fifteen to twenty years, there has been a strong interest in the study of peasant societies whether existing now or that once existed. Consequently theories of 'peasant society' abound to such an extent that the briefest survey would be far too lengthy and far too superficial to be of any use. For this reason, this thesis makes neither pretence nor claim to the study of 'peasant society' in the wider general meaning of the term. It is concerned only with the study of one peasant society - that of Palestine - which existed in a defined time span - that from 1920 to 1939.

Consequently, what is relevant and what is material is judged only in this light, while comparison with the experience of
other 'peasant' societies is better left to those better qualified to make them. The description and analysis that follow will translate this principle into practice.

This Part of the thesis will give a brief largely descriptive outline of the main parameters that governed peasant life in Palestine in the few decades leading up to the Mandate and which persisted into the first few years of the Mandate period itself. These parameters do not necessarily cover all aspects, for what is under discussion is a way of life no less. A way of life that included in it side by side the vital and the trivial, the material and the irrelevant.
SECTION ONE.

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THE VILLAGE.

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In any analytical sense the concept of "the village" is an extremely elastic and imprecise one for it means different things to different people at different times. Its mention could conjure visions of overcrowded dusty alleys and crumbling buildings in Egypt or India. Or it could conjure visions of rather idyllic, neat and dreamy villages at the foot of snow-clad mountains in Switzerland or Austria. Or indeed, it could, for the Londoner of the 1980's, conjure images of somewhat romantic serene collection of thatched cottages where City stockbrokers retire to after a hectic week of making money in the City.

Therefore, it is helpful if the Palestinian village of the period, if a typical one could be found, is described and related
to whenever the term 'village' is mentioned in this thesis. As has been made clear in Part I of this thesis, Palestinian villages tended to be of two types: hill villages which formed the majority and plain villages, then far fewer in number.

Being constructed of local material, mostly stone on the hills and mud bricks in the plains, villages were in harmony with their surroundings. Many hill villages were situated on the summits of rocky knolls or outlying spurs, mostly for ease of defence against raids by nomads or by other peasants and to facilitate drainage in the rainy season. Many others were situated on slopes, generally on the lowest part just above the bottom of basins. Others were situated on low hills in the basins. Hardly though were villages situated on flat ground even on the plains. (1)

Wherever possible, villages were constructed near a water supply such as a spring, although if no such convenient source was available, extensive use was made of rain-fed cisterns dug within the village built-up area. The stone used in these villages was either quarried from nearby sources, or reworked from old ruins that abounded in Palestine. The houses were built closely together even when the security situation improved. There were few outlying farmhouses or labourers' cottages scattered here and there.

as in Western Europe. Houses instead were built round narrow courtyards and winding alleys that alone separated them from each other.

Architecturally, lack of suitable timber for building in Palestine led to the adoption of domed shaped roofs of stone, necessitating construction of very thick walls of more than three feet in thickness to support the roof. (2) The villages in the plain, situated on any available elevation whenever possible, were as a rule not built of stone due to lack of it there and obvious difficulties of transport at the time. Instead mud bricks were used for walls with flat earthen roofs frequently rolled to make them watertight. This gave plain villages, especially to the south of Jaffa an appearance not unlike Egyptian villages.

Disregarding for the moment quantitative analysis such as variations in size of village lands, proportions of land under certain crops, prices etc., it could be said that prior to the turn of the 20th Century, the economy of Palestinian villages depended on the three sides of the triangle, viz. agriculture, animal husbandry and necessary peasant crafts, industries and services.

A. AGRICULTURE.

In spite of inroads made into the village economy by the market, domestic and export, village agriculture prior to 1900 was largely unspecialised. The village tended to produce all its own food needs with little regard for natural endowment that would have, in a competitive economy bestowed a degree of comparative advantage to products of regions, should these regions have opted for specialisation, commodity production and trade. For example, the Coastal Plains between Gaza and Haifa were later on to be famous for their citrus; the Nablus district was always famous for its olive groves; Hebron for its vines etc. It should be mentioned that the techniques of growing citrus, vines and olives were well known to the peasants and they did indeed grow them. However, it could not by any manner of means be said that the peasants at the time specialised in these products to any appreciable extent.

This generalised, polyculture tended to produce all over Palestine an agriculture that divided its land holdings among
(i) arable farming for the production of cereals and such crops as lentils, sesame and certain kinds of animal fodder; (ii) vegetable farming and (iii) plantations of fruit trees; olives, vines, citrus etc.

(i) Arable.

Cereals made up the staple diet of Palestinian peasants and as such formed a vital part of the land-allocation 'mix', while control and allocation of cereal lands formed an equally vital part of the social organisation and control within village society. More than any other, cereal lands were the subject of Masha', a form of communal land tenure and a major institution that governed the organisation of peasant society. Masha' will be discussed at length in a later Section of this Part. (3)

Although by nature the plains were more favourable for cereal cultivation than the hills, cereal farming was by no means confined to the former. If a village happened to be at the edge of the border line between hill country and plain, then it concentrated its cereal lands on the plains while other crops were situated nearer the village which was typically sited on the hills. It was a usual practice in such village for the peasants to

(3) For quantification of the importance of cereals in the product-mix, see Part IV, Section Three of this thesis.
stay away from the village for the duration of ploughing, seeding and harvesting operations where they sheltered in temporary hamlets called "khirbe". The finished product was then brought back to the village, leaving the "khirbe" unoccupied till the following season.

In the hill country proper, inland basins, plateau, valley beds or even laboriously constructed terraces were used - in short any level land that could be used for the purpose. Factors such as comparative productivity of one region with another, if the village lands did not happen to encompass more than one region, simply did not matter.

A quantitative analysis of cereal production and productivity is given in a later Part of this thesis. In the meanwhile the following is a brief description of the techniques and implements used in cereal production in the period round the turn of the 20th Century.

Apart from irrigation based on the major river systems of the Nile and Euphrates-Tigris, crop yields throught the history of the Middle east have been strongly influenced by rain, the major source of moisture especially in the case of cereals.
This rainfall is highly irregular in timing, duration, volume and exact area affected, and can result, even with otherwise modern inputs like tractors, fertilisers, pesticides etc., in wide fluctuations in yield. To take an example of contemporary Middle East cereal farming, in the marginal area of 250-300 mm average rainfall belt in Jordan in 1970, average wheat yield was 32.5 kg/dunum (*); while in 1971 the yield for the same area was 120 kg/dunum. Such fluctuations decrease in less marginal rainfall areas; the yield figures for 300-400 mm average rainfall belt was 139.5 kg/dunum in 1970, and 173 kg/dunum in 1971. For over 400 mm rainfall belt, the figures were 181.25 for 1970 and 187.25 in 1971. (4)

The example of Jordan in the 1970's was given to show that even with modern inputs that the peasants could never have had prior to the Mandate, the Middle East as a whole presented high risks as far as cereal farming was concerned.

To the peasants therefore, there was the crucial question of timing. The rainy part of the year was divided into the 'earlier rains' and the 'latter rains'. The former starting in October, went on to the beginning of December. This was followed by a relatively dry period up till around the middle of January when the latter

(*) 4 dunums = 1 acre.
rains continue till April or into May.

Because of the unpredictability of rainfall, it was difficult for the peasants to decide the exact time of planting. If too early, i.e. before the 'early rains' where the dry unmoistened soil was ploughed and seeded, and the rains do not come, then precious seed would have been wasted as well as considerable effort. If light 'early rains' fell and the seeds germinated, but the light rain was not followed by heavier rainfall, the crop would still have been lost. On the other hand, if the peasants postponed sowing till after the first rains have fallen, to insure germination, the crops would have been only part matured by the end of the 'latter rains' and the rainy season as a whole. Moreover, there would have been the risk of crops being damaged by the sharkia, the hot dry wind blowing from the deserts to the east, usually in May, which in a few days would turn the green fields of wheat and barley to parched yellow.

The only way open to the 19th Century farmer was to hope to catch as much rain as possible, mainly through good timing of ploughing and seeding operations.

In addition to timing, the term 'technology' as used in this

Section, also includes the system of crop rotation. The most widely practiced was two-crop rotation system where the land was divided into two areas. One was under winter crops (wheat, barley and 'kersemeh' - a form of fodder), while the other lies fallow for that winter. In this fallow land, in the spring, the summer crops (sesame, maize and vegetables) were sown. While in the former portion after the cereal harvest in May or June, the land lies fallow until the following spring when the summer crops were sown. In the portion that had been sown with summer crops in the spring, immediately after the harvesting of these summer crops, a new winter crop is sown. Thus in each part of the land, two crops, one summer and one winter, were planted in two years. The land remained fallow for about seven months after the winter harvest and three months after the summer harvest. Goats and sheep were brought in to graze on the stubble and to enrich the soil with their droppings, the only effort made at fertilizing the soil.

The other system of crop rotation was the three-crop rotation. The land was divided into three parts where different crops were planted in each successive year, the full cycle taking three years.

This system has the advantage of enriching the soil as each crop
uses different chemicals from the soil and adds others of use to the successive crop. Moreover, the system helps in destroying the wheat worm which dies if it does not find wheat in the soil in two successive years. However, there were also limitations on the use of the three-crop rotation system. Chief among these was that this system presumed the availability of more land per unit of production, whether the individual cultivator or the village as a whole, than the two-crop system. Historically, this was not the case even in times of low population pressure on the land, since the geographical concentration of villages in the hill district did put hill country and the immediately adjoining plains at a premium. Even if population density over the whole of Palestine was low, this was not the case in the areas where the population was concentrated. Distant land in the plains, though theoretically available, was in reality not so because of nomadic occupation of these areas. (6)

Moreover, when population growth started to put more pressure on the available land area, as did the withdrawal of land from the peasant sector by conversion into capitalist plantation farming by Arabs and Jews, and by Jewish purchases, the feasibility of three-crop rotation was diminished even further. The overriding concern of most peasants was the provision of enough grain

to assure the next year's supply of bread, which even with two-crop rotation was a difficult enough task.

Related to this were the difficulties imposed by the very nature of cultivation. As most villages farmed their cereal lands collectively under the *masha* system, it was not feasible for individuals to rotate their crops independently of the village as a whole, which almost always was in favour of two-crop rotation. This aspect will be more fully discussed when examining the *Masha* system.

Crop-rotation apart, little attempt was made at organic fertilisation of the soil. Dung was instead collected for fuel, which as scientific experiments conducted in the 1940's (7) proved, was more advantageous to the peasants since the dry sun-baked soil allowed the minerals in the fertilizer to be quickly oxidised and lost to the plants. Moreover, it was found that lack of heavy fertilisation by organic matter did not necessarily mean that yields could have been greatly increased when organic fertilizer was so heavily added, as there was usually, in the soil itself enough to provide most and sometimes all the nitrogen required for full crops. It was better to use the heat of oxidation for domestic purposes than to lose it uselessly in the soil,

especially in a region where firewood was hard to obtain.

The third aspect of the term 'technology' as used in relation to cereal farming by Palestinian peasantry, is the actual physical implements used. These consisted of the plough, the plough team and other minor instruments for threshing and winnowing.

The plough used was what is known as the nail-plough. It did not turn the soil over as the European plough does, but scratched the surface, uprooting weeds and preparing the seed bed without wasting, through exposure, precious moisture as the European plough would have done. Though to casual European observers it seemed crude and ineffectual, the nail plough evolved through centuries of experience and was actually much praised by trained agriculturalists familiar with the Middle East.(8) As has been mentioned, where irrigation was impossible soil moisture is the most important limiting factor in Middle Eastern agriculture. Water is lost by evaporation from the loose layer produced in preparing the seed-bed and the deeper the layer the more water will be lost. The shallow cultivation of the nail plough helps to keep to a minimum the inevitable water loss in the preparation of the seed-bed and the destruction of weeds in the ploughing process.

The nail-plough moreover, was made from local materials, mostly wood and could easily be repaired. The only non-wooden part in it was the iron share (sikkeh) which could have been forged by the local smith, or purchased from the nearest market town.

The plough team consisted mostly of oxen on the plains, though on the hills there was also some use of asses, camels and donkeys, the latter costing only about a tenth of the price of the ox, and far less expensive to keep. Animal feed used was tibn which was part of the straw left over in the threshing operation of sepetaring corn and straw. Barley 'tibn' was preferred as it was more nourishing. Hay was unknown. In years of deficient rainfall the yield of tibn was consequently deficient and cattle suffered considerably as a result. Fodder crops such as kersenneh were planted only if the reserves of tibn and other animal feeds from the preceding years were running too low. In later years though, animal feed crops were planted as a marketable crop.

The plough team was a vital input. Unlike land, but like other inputs such as seed, it was fully recognised as private property the possession of which determined the owner's share in any crop-sharing arrangement. This right of private property was
recognised even before production for the market assumed any significant scale. Again this aspect will be discussed more fully when examining the 'masha' system. (9)

(ii) Vegetable farming.

Much of the vegetable farming was dependent on irrigation mostly from springs, though much use was made of wells and cisterns. In such a dry climate as Palestine almost every spring was utilized to the utmost. Possession and use of water was a very jealously guarded right, as were the vegetable plots themselves. In hill country and those parts of the plain immediately adjacent to the hills, springs for the most part came out on the sides of the hills, often higher than the valley bottoms. Consequently, it was possible, by gravity flow, to water a series of terraces at different levels from the same source, the little rivulet sometimes reaching a long distance down the valley before it was finally absorbed.

Usually the vegetable plots (hawakir) were the closest cultivated land to the built up area of the village, as the village itself

(9) For discussion of physical implements see C T Wilson, Peasant Life in the Holy Land, Op. cit, pp. 198-204. Also see T E Post, "Land Tenure, Agriculture etc.", Palestine Exploration Quarterly, 1891, pp. 110-117.
often depended on the same spring for its domestic water supply. As a rule, the spring water of the village was divided among the clans (hamula or 'ashira), and these in turn divided the water between themselves in much the same way as masha' land was divided. The allocation was measured usually by hours of flow, though sometimes it was measured by diverting the flow into a pool, using a marked pole to measure capacity and outflow to each individual. Again as the case with masha' land, it was possible for individuals to have differing shares, resulting mainly from demographic accident. A hamula which historically had a large allocation of flow time, could through accident end up with fewer members and consequently more flow time per member.

Some villages had the good fortune of possessing large springs and being situated near the largest market for fresh vegetables, Jerusalem. This was probably true throughout history regardless of the degree of farming for the market in the other regions of Palestine. The villages of Silwan, Wallaje, Lifta, Battir, Urtas and Silwad were the most important such villages, where the land was raising more than two vegetable crops a year. At least three of these villages were among the most populous in Palestine. (10)

In the maritime plain, irrigation was not uncommonly carried

out from large wells 60 to 100 ft deep from which water was brought to the surface by means of an endless chain of earthenware jars or wooden buckets passing over a wooden wheel and dipping into the water at the bottom. Mules and donkeys were used to the drive the wheel. It should be mentioned though, that vegetable production for sale was growing fast in the plains during the last few decades prior to the Mandate in response to two main factors. One was the growth of town population. The second was that vegetable production went hand in hand with the growth of citrus production since the spaces between the young citrus trees were utilised for vegetable growing and irrigated from the same expensively drilled wells while the citrus trees passed through the six or seven years it took them to start producing fruit.

(iii) Plantation farming of fruit bearing trees. (11)

Till well into the 1930's, olive trees rather than citrus was the prime fruit-bearing tree for Palestine as a whole and for the hill country this is true to this day.

Geographically, olive groves, though found all over the country, were concentrated in the hill districts to the north of Jerusalem-

Bethlehem area. The Nablus Mountain, comprising what were to become the Sub-Districts of Nablus and Jenin during the Mandate, was the centre of olive farming. Next in importance was Lower Galilee, especially the area around Nazareth. Ramallah and Jerusalem areas also had extensive olive groves.

In the few decades prior to the Mandate, olives were vitally important in two respects. Firstly, olives and olive products, principally olive oil, formed a vital part of the peasants’ diet, the rest consisting of bread, vegetables like onions and tomatoes and things like lentils and sesame, the latter tending to become a cash crop as the period progressed. Occasionally, meat and milk products from the village flocks of sheep and goats supplemented the peasants’ diet, though the extent to which they did so depended on how well off the peasant village and the individual were.

Secondly, with the resurgence of State power which took place from the middle of the 19th Century and its consequent demand for taxes, some of which to be paid for in cash, and the increasing need of the peasants for cash to meet outlays such as rents, debts and increasingly essential purchases like kerosene and textiles, the olive crop was assuming the role of a cash crop. The crop was sold either for the table, for the presses to make olive
oils, or to factories, mostly in Nablus for making soap, a good deal of which was exported to Egypt and the surrounding regions.

Vineyards, like olive groves, were also to be found throughout Palestine. Like olives again, they tended to concentrate in certain areas, primarily the Hebron Mountain. Vines need a great deal of attention if they are to be really productive. The whole vineyard must be ploughed at least twice a year or the vines rapidly degenerate. Moreover, vines need to be carefully pruned or else there will be little or no fruit. In addition vineyards were invariably enclosed by large walls built of rough stone without mortar—almost the only type of land to be enclosed in Palestinian agriculture. This was to safeguard the crop from animals and robbers; guards and sentries also needed to posted.

Vines blossom about the end of May or beginning of June. A very small proportion of the grape harvest was made into wine in Palestine due to the Moslem prohibition of alcoholic drinks. Whatever wine was made, was made in monasteries, Jewish or German colonies, or some Christian villages. The wine was destined mostly for the consumption of these groups, or for export. In the Moslem vine growing areas, making up the largest share
of the total, the crop was made into raisins, dibs (a kind of molasses made from the juice and looks like a light brown syrup) or a number of other products utilizing the sugar content of the grapes for food. Some of the crop was simply grown and utilised as grapes for the table, some of which were sold on the Jerusalem and Hebron markets.

Figs were also widely grown and both fresh and dried, formed an important article of food. Fig trees and vines were often grown together as they take different substances from the soil whereas vines and olive trees do not thrive on the same plot and were rarely planted together.

In the maritime plain and some sections of the Jordan Valley, an increasing proportion of the land was put under citrus, mainly oranges. Though some of the crop was for domestic use, the major part, and the prime incentive for planting was the export trade to Egypt and Europe, mainly Britain. Unlike the main types of fruit trees described so far, citrus groves depended exclusively on irrigation, requiring watering every second day. The sinking of wells, digging of irrigation channels, preparation of the soil which needed large inputs of fertilizer,
pruning, picking the ripe fruit, packing and shipping made citriculture a capital-intensive concern, well outside the peasants' ability to finance it. This put the citrus 'industry' well outside the peasant sector, except in the crucial aspect of the peasant sector helping to provide labour.

B. ANIMAL HUSBANDRY (12)

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Whereas to the nomads the main herd animals were camels and dromedaries, to the peasants the main herd animals were sheep and goats on which they depended for an extremely important part of their diet. In addition to meat, the milk drunk in the country at the time was almost exclusively that of goats and ewes (cows were scarcely milked except in towns). The milk formed the basis of varied products such as butter and cheese. Moreover wool and hair were still being extensively used for various textiles, though by the end of the Century imports of European cloth were gaining fast.

Unlike the case in Europe, land was not enclosed specifically

for pasture. Rather shepherds took their flocks outside cultivated village lands where the land was open and the flocks allowed to graze extensively. Village lands were only used at the end of the cereal harvest or after gathering the grapes when the flocks were allowed to graze the harvested fields and vineyards. It was customary though that these rights of grazing of harvested fields were open to all not just to the villages own flocks. The grazing flocks provided the fields with their only source of fertilizer and as such they were welcomed. In the Maritime Plain, villagers actually welcomed shepherds from the hill country, providing enclosures for the flocks at night and rooms for the shepherds. These grazing rights were also extended to nomads and semi-nomads.

Away from the village, distances depended on the availability of pasture and water for in years of little rainfall, shepherds of villages well to the west of the river Jordan took their flocks to the east of the Jordan if there were more rainfall there. In winter and early spring many of the shepherds from the villages overlooking the Ghor (Jordan Valley) took their flocks down there to graze. If fairly abundant rain has fallen in the autumn in the Jordan Valley, owing to its warm almost tropical climate, a rich growth of vegetation sprang up there long before the
uplands have begun to get green. At such times thousands of sheep and goats were taken there for extended periods.

Sheep and goats were a good mix of herd animals as each subsisted on a different kind of vegetation; sheep on finer grasses, and goats, almost scavenger-like, on a wide variety of vegetation; indeed so wide that goats, if allowed uncontrolled grazing, posed a constant check to the spread of vegetation cover as they ate the young shoots. For peasants and nomads alike, however, sheep and goats formed the principal source of moveable wealth, and have been always the chief objects of loot in nomad and inter-peasant raids and by thieves. The latter were tempted by the fact that flocks while grazing stayed away from the parent village for considerable periods of time with only one or two shepherds to protect them. Stories of raids, defence of flocks and counter raids were very common indeed and formed an important part of the Palestinian peasant folklore.

The shepherds were rarely the owners of the entire flock, though they often owned a portion of it. For the most part the shepherds were merely hired to do the work, for which they received a certain amount of payment in kind - a measure of cereal per head, or every tenth kid or lamb born. Sometimes they were
allowed to milk the flock every other day, though this was useful only when towns were nearby where milk could be sold. Sometimes payment was in cash.

Apart from sheep and goats, cattle were also kept, though mainly as work animals. Beef and cows' milk were not widely popular at the time. In the seasons when they were not used for work, the animals were tended in much the same way as sheep, often being sent to graze in the Jordan Valley or in the Maritime Plain. Buffaloes were more common as work animals on the plains, especially in the south around Gaza. The camel was the principal beast of burden prior to the widespread construction of roads and railways starting in the last decade of the Nineteenth Century. All heavy traffic was carried by camels, and some of the peasants and semi-nomads got their living by camel-driving.

Though the camels bred for load carrying were different from the more agile and faster camels and dromedaries bred by the nomads for long distance migration across deserts and for war, the peasants still obtained most of their camels from the nomads who reared large herds of them specifically for the purpose. This trade provided a main avenue of peaceful exchange between the two ways of life.
C. VILLAGE CRAFTS AND INDUSTRIES. (13)

As was the case with most peasant communities, village crafts and industries were integral to the life of the village. They provided the peasant with clothing, shelter, tools, domestic utensils etc. However, it seems that crafts in the 19th Century Middle East, as indeed they were in many other places in the world though admittedly not at the same time, were the first aspects of peasant life to be affected by the mass produced wares of the European industrial revolution. European exports, especially textiles, reduced certain peasant crafts to a fraction of their former self in a very brief time span.

To be able to give a picture of village crafts, therefore, it was decided to ignore for the moment any attempt at quantification, by price and volume, of the effects European products were having on domestic village crafts. Rather, in common with this Section, it was decided to concentrate on non-quantitative description.

Out of more than fifty crafts that could be listed, a Report on

(13) See C T Wilson, Peasant Life in the Holy Land, op. cit, Chapter XIII. Also P Baldensperger, "The Immovable East, Palestine Exploration Fund Quarterly Statement, 1903 and 1904.
Village crafts and industries by the Government of Palestine grouped these crafts into eight categories (14) :-

1. Textiles including weaving of every kind, carpet weaving and weaving of mats, rugs, sacks, cloths and clothing. Dyeing, needlework, embroidery and lace making.

2. Building industry and trades. Palestine was largely a stone country and building in stone was well known and practiced. With the masons went carpenters and joiners, cabinet makers. Also there went lime-burning, mostly in the hills; and mud-brick making on the plains.

3. Metal smiths of all kind though concentrated round blacksmiths for agricultural implements, and silver and gold smiths for jewellery; copper and brass for pots pans etc.

4. Leather tanning of local skins and their manufacture into a variety of forms; saddles, boots and shoes.

5. Making of agricultural implements which was mostly of locally shaped wood for most of the locally used plough, forks etc.

6. The making of domestic utensils mainly in the widespread and ancient pottery. Basket weaving was also widespread.

7. Certain processing industries like oil pressing and soap making concentrated mainly in Nablus, the main olive growing region.

8. Considering the religious importance of Palestine, there were crafts that catered for pilgrims and tourists like olive wood carving, mother of pearl ornaments in Bethlehem, coloured glass making in Hebron. Also counted in this category is the making of certain Eastern musical instruments like lutes, drums and auods (a string instrument similar to the guitar).

The term "peasant crafts and industries" however should not be taken to mean that by definition they would have been physically located in the villages. The economy and society of the late 19th and early 20th Centuries were so dominated by the peasant way of life that even the most 'industrialised' of crafts and industries, soap-making in Nablus, was vitally dependent for its raw material input, olive oil, on the peasant sector. The availability of the raw materials, the terms of exchange and
prices were part and parcel of that peasant economy. The labour employed had very strong links to the villages and the produce, though primarily destined for exports, nevertheless was sold in large quantities in the local market.

Other crafts were concentrated on market towns like Tulkarm, Jenin and Ramallah. Prominent among these were metal working and tanning.

Before the advent of European imports, however, most crafts were practiced and located in the villages or the adjoining countryside. Many items were spun and woven locally from local materials like wool and sometimes cotton, though there were always certain items imported from Damascus and Egypt, these items being of high quality and highly prized. Construction on the other hand was wholly dependent on local materials and the villagers' own labour. The lime used was prepared by the villagers. Similarly agricultural implements were mostly locally made, with the metal parts either made by local blacksmiths or obtained from the nearest market town.
PART II

SECTION TWO.

Social Relations within Peasant Society.

Now that the outlines of the village economy which existed in the few decades prior to the Mandate have been given, analysis of this economy could not be adequately taken further without placing that economy in the context of the wider social relations that governed peasant life at the time. These relations played a crucial role in determining the way in which the peasants organised their economy, defined what they produced, for what purpose the way the produced it.
As was the case with most other peasant societies, Palestinian peasant society was based on kinship relations and the descent group. Relations between individuals were organised and directed along a network of kinship and marriage links so as to allow the precise definitions of relationships between any two members of peasant society. Relationships were established through the location of individuals at determinate points in this more or less extended network of kinship.

For the purpose of illustration, one could visualise a number of concentric circles, the smallest of which was centred on the household, the smallest permanent unit based on kinship relations, and the largest circle denoting the clan, the largest such unit. In between, social anthropologists (1) place one or two more circles. Firstly, the family (aileh or luzum) comprised of a number of households who share one paternal ancestor a few generations back. Secondly, the lineage (fachd) which was a sub-division of the clan, comprising a number of families.

Before these four categories could be examined, however, it is important to note that though these divisions may appear hierarchical and rigid in the sense of subordination of the

lower order division to the higher order one, this was not necessary the case. The divisions themselves were not clear-cut as the the descent groups formed a continuum or an overlapping series rather than a set of discrete clearly definable units. When looked at closely, it is difficult to determine precisely where the authority of the household ended and the family (luzum) started; and more difficult to determine where the line between the latter and the lineage was.

The same was true as between the lineage and the clan. The borderline between the divisions was blurred. More important, in times of fast economic change, this blurring of the lines was even more noticeable as differences in economic wealth, if derived from sources outside the village economy, could allow the status and influence of lower divisions, such as the family (aileh) to overtake nominally higher order divisions like the lineage or the clan. Individuals belonging to or associated with an influential sub-group would be tempted to bypass the authority of higher order group if it suited them. (2)

To present a picture of peasant society as it existed prior to its exposure to "outside" influences (the State, the Market, landlords etc.) which in our period started gathering pace

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in the last decades of the 19th C., it was decided to outline these divisions of the descent group on as if there were no such "outside" influences. These influences however, will be examined and incorporated in the analysis in subsequent chapters of this thesis.

A) Taking these divisions in ascending order; the smallest permanent social unit in peasant society was the household (dar). The definitions of household may differ, but during Mandate times the Government(3) considered as belonging to a household all individuals who ate from the same batieh (the batieh is the pan in which flour was kneaded into dough for making bread). Since food was by far the largest item of expenditure of peasants, the essence of the classification was the sharing of a common purse.

According to the above-mentioned report, the size of the household varied from one person living on his own, though very uncommon, to twenty or more people in the case of a man, the head of the household, living with more than one wife and

their children. Most commonly though, the household consisted of a nuclear family - man and wife plus all their children yet unmarried. Slightly less common was the nuclear family at an advanced stage with married sons or daughters having left home. Less common still were simple nuclear families with the addition of a parent of one of the spouses, usually the husband's.

Less common were households consisting of parental extended families, with the father as head of the household having his married sons and their children with him; or fraternal extended families of all married brothers living together. However, the mere fact of paternal or fraternal extended families living together in the same building, or co-residence, did not qualify them as one household. The critical factor in deciding whether or not they formed a household was whether or not they habitually ate from the same baṭiḥeh.

Beyond these very general indications of frequency of occurrence of each of the above types of households, it is difficult to determine precisely the proportions of households in each type for pre-Mandate peasant Palestine. There were very few scientific research works done on this aspect prior to this investigation which was conducted in the 1940's by the Mandate Government's Department of Statistics.
One simply does not know whether the proportions given by the Department in its survey of a sample of five villages in 1944, could generally apply to all villages in Palestine in the decades prior to the Mandate. The vast increase and diversification of occupational opportunity inside and outside the village which took place in the intervening years may have had a disproportionate effect on rate of household formation as well as on the size and constitution of the household that may have differed from village to village in the intervening time.

Scientific research on this aspect conducted in Jordan (4) in 1959 - the nearest in condition, place and time to peasant Palestine of the Mandate, suggest that there was a fundamental change in the constitution, and, most relevant for our purposes, in the economic functions of the household.

Whereas the household in the Jordanian example, as most likely was the case in pre-Mandate peasant Palestine, was previously the smallest production sub-unit of the village economy, the vastly increased scope for occupational opportunity, size of earning and consequently economic power afforded by non-village economy (e.g. soldiering or government employment or labouring) gradually turned the Jordanian household from a unit of

agricultural production as well as of consumption, into a unit where consumption predominated over the former role. The extent of this change was determined by the size of its earnings from working the village land. The larger the proportion of non-agricultural earnings brought in by members of the household, the more of a consumption unit and the less, relatively, of a production unit it became. And the lower the degree of economic dependency on the kinship group, the less amenable was the household to clan discipline.

As the production unit most intimately connected with the production process, the household had to allocate among its members all the agricultural and herding tasks incumbent in producing the necessities of life. This division of labour according to sex and seniority was by necessity limited in a peasant household engaged in the three sides of the triangle on which peasant economic life rested; agriculture, animal husbandry and necessary crafts and industries (outlined in Part II Section One).

Nevertheless this division of labour was real, and for pre-Mandate Palestine there is ample evidence that it existed. Ploughing and shepherding for example were man's work, gleaning after the harvest, gathering of firewood and cooking were women's
work, and the weeding of certain crops like sesame and looking after domestic animals while in the village were adolescent work. The harvest of the main crops was a collective work in which all hands shared. The point is that most tasks were by custom the preserve and the duty of certain members of the household.(5)

This thesis is not concerned in who did what among the members of the household, but in the very fact that it was the members of household who had to perform the actual operations of ploughing, seeding, harvesting etc. These tasks were not done 'communally' but household by household. The implications of this on the division of labour, scope and extent of specialisation and ultimately on productivity will be discussed later in this and subsequent sections.

B) The "circle" immediately after the household is the family (luzum or 'aileh)- members of the kinship group related through patrilineal descent. In defining the extent and limits of obligation along the lines of descent, those of the family are the easiest to trace. Members of the luzum related by patrilineal descent were closely implicated in critical functions of social

(5) For a discussion of the role of different members of the household see C T Wilson, Peasant Life in the Holy Land, Op. cit, Chapters VI, IX, X and XI where it will be seen that each of the tasks was done by a member of the household according to sex and age.
control; cases of marriage, murder, assault, rape etc. If one of their members was killed they were obliged to avenge him. If one of them committed murder, then they were, with the full sanction of peasant custom, open to revenge exacted by the murdered man's relatives. Alternatively, they were obliged to pay truce money ('utwa) to the murdered man's family. (6)

Membership of the luzum usually consisted of an individual, his brothers and their descendants; his father and his brothers and their descendants; and his paternal grandfather and his brothers and their descendants. However, it should not be thought that these limits were fixed for all time, for like other social units in peasant society they were responsive to change. The more isolated from outside influences village society was the more mutually dependent the peasants became and hence the stronger the obligations of kinship grew.

Regarding this point, research on peasant communities in Jordan of post-1948 (7), show that the higher the proportion of income derived from sources outside the village economy (e.g. soldiering), the less the extent of obligations was and the more the circle of people bound by obligation of vengeance dwindled — to the point where only second cousins, or perhaps

only first cousins among whom the obligation continued to be very strong, remained. It is most interesting to note that both the obligations of vengeance and the length to which they extended along the descent line, were not only confined to Palestinian peasant society. The same was noted in the study of societies based on communal organisation in Europe in the 9th to 12th Centuries (8). There as well, it was found that an effect of economic development and differentiation of occupational opportunities outside the community, also led to increased reluctance of more distant cousins to carry obligations of vengeance.

The luzum therefore, represented a point in the developmental cycle of kinship relations beyond the joint fraternal or parental extended family, but before the expansion of the group to such a size and genealogical depth that it comprised a lineage (fachl). The luzum, unlike the household, had little direct economic function. It was neither a unit of production, nor a unit of consumption. The luzum itself was divided into households of the cousins and second cousins etc. but did not perform any appreciable economic function except for some help given by the cousins at the time of the harvest when speed was important.

This however, did not mean that it was not important. The luzum performed at least two essential social functions that enabled the household to bring its labour to bear on the land.

First was the preservation, through the threat of vengeance and retribution, of a minimum of security for the individual and of a minimum of social order for the group. Most likely the major part of this function was directed internally; i.e. against other members of the same clan who might be tempted to murder and rob to better themselves economically. Though the same applied to strangers outside the clan, the frequency of this occurring was far less than incidents inside the clan. By the very nature of village society itself, meeting outsiders was not an everyday occurrence. In any case, the task of deterring outside aggression was done by higher-order levels than the luzum. (9)

Luzum solidarity however, was not necessarily confined to the serious and infrequent case of murder, but also to such mundane things as simple quarrels and squabbles, where the village immediately split along pre-determined lines of closeness of kinship.

Above all, the luzum was the group that regulated marriage

and insisted on being closely consulted about it. It was a very strong custom, still alive albeit rather weakened today, that paternal cousins had the right of first refusal so to speak. Considering that marriage and inheritance were the most important forms of property transfer, the luzum tried to keep it within its confines as far as possible. Not only was the issue of the transfer of land involved, but also issues like the amount of a dowry (mahr) which in Palestine, unlike in Egypt for example is paid by the husband. The closer in blood relation the bride's father was, the more likely it was that the mahr would be lower in the first place, and the more likely it was that some of it would find its way back to the husband's family through gifts, feasts etc. (10)

C) The lineage (fachd) consists of all patrilineally related men living in the village along with their wives and children. Although ties of kinship are not confined to the fathers side, social relations built on kinship ties had, in common with many similar societies, to follow either of paternal or maternal sides, but not both. It was difficult to follow both since it meant that each generation had a circle of relatives which was not the same

as that of the previous generation; the area of obligation and responsibilities continually and confusingly changed its contours. Such a group was too unstable to serve as the basis of the whole social structure. In Palestine, as in the Middle East and Moslem countries as a whole, it was patrilineal relations which formed the basis of society above the level of the household. (11)

Whereas, as has been mentioned in (B) above, group obligation to and accountability of individuals to paternally related relatives started with the luzum; the lineage extended those ties of obligation and accountability beyond the two or three generation circle and included different functions. "Blood money" was still paid by members of the lineage in proportion to the proximity of the contributor to the offender. Similarly members of the clan expected to be consulted on marriage, though social sanctions against non-compliance to their wishes by a member were not so severe as was the case with the luzum. (12)

Besides extending these functions, the main additional function of the lineage seems to have been in two aspects, economic and legal.

Although the household formed that sub-unit of production most directly in contact with the production process, vital parts of that process could not have been undertaken without co-ordination and co-operation of units larger than the household. Chief among these was the cultivation of cereals, the staple diet of Palestinian peasants. As has been mentioned before, (Part II, Section One), cereal lands were not enclosed and consequently it was essential, if the crops were not to be destroyed by flocks straying into these fields, that the whole field, comprising a large number of household parcels, should be planted and harvested simultaneously so as to allow the flocks on to a field only after all that area had been harvested. (13)

The necessity for co-ordination was also important because of periodic redistribution of land among households. Demarcation lines between the parcel of a household and the parcel of another were confined to a pile of stones, or a double line of furrows. Any demarcation method more substantial than that would have been too time-consuming and too wasteful of land to have been practicable. The only forces preventing individual cultivators tampering with these demarcation stones were the social norms of of behaviour and the social sanctions imposed by the group at the level most closely involved in that particular process i.e. the lineage.

Another need for a measure of co-ordination between households, was the need for a reasonable degree of uniformity in the standard of care given to the land. Since periodic redistribution was by lot; the next occupant of a particular area of land was most unlikely to be the same cultivator as the period before. The new owner had to have a reasonable assurance that this land was properly looked after - ploughed and weeded properly - and this again was best done through co-operation of the kinship group above the level of the household. Since the whole field was planted with the same crop, excessive discrepancies in yield in between neighbouring parcels would have attracted attention and investigation. In addition it was easier to keep track of the crop-rotation cycle of whole fields if they were uniformly cropped rather than attempting, hopelessly, to keep track of rotation cycle in a bewildering number of parcels. Co-ordination in this way allowed the synchronisation of all rotation cycles, allowing more or less uniform periodic redistribution, once every two years - the length of the most widely used cycle.

In other words, the lineage ensured the observance by "lower order" groups of the necessary minimum of standardisation of care and procedure that was necessary for successful communal production
Cooperation between members of the lineage was also desirable in animal husbandry. The households in a lineage usually appointed one of their members as a shepherd in charge of their animals gathered in one flock. It was impracticable for individual households to hire shepherds for the sake of a few heads; while on the other extreme the flocks of the kinship group larger than the lineage would in all probability have been too large, and in grazing, spread over too large an area for a shepherd or two to control.

A further sphere of co-operation, depending on the size of the village, was that as all members of a lineage lived together in the residential quarter of the village, one of their number ran the local general shop or store. There was always a proportion of needs that the village itself could not supply, no matter how inward looking it was (kerosene for example was in urgent need in the villages due to scarcity of firewood). The shop of that quarter supplied these needs, much of it on credit until the coming harvest when the shopkeeper was paid, mostly in kind. It helped the shopkeeper greatly to know that the full sanction of the kinship group was behind him to deal with defaulters.
Besides economic co-operation, the other major function of the lineage was to represent its constituent households and families in the political decision-making of the kinship group as a whole (i.e. at the level of the clan).(14) Such decisions which affected the economic well-being of all individuals and decisions on defence against outsiders were a necessary function regardless of the state of isolation from outside interference by the State or landlords since much of that defence was against nomads and other peasants. In any case, full isolation was never the case even at the height of peasant village isolation from the 1840's to the 1870's. This assumption was adopted only for illustrating peasant society and will be modified to take account of 'outsiders' in the coming Sections.

Obviously, while lower-order kinship levels like the household and the iuzzum had to be represented in decision making at the level of the kinship-group as a whole, it was too impractical to have the head of each household sitting in committee. The earliest level at which such representation could take place was the lineage.

Each lineage nominated an elder to represent it at the council of elders, although this did not mean that each lineage had an automatic right of representation. If the village included

a large number of lineages, the least influential, the least numerous or wealthy lineages were simply left out - naturally leading to tension and quarrels.

D) The clan (hamula or ashira) was the largest kinship group based on patrilineal lines of descent and functioning as a social group. This did not mean that there was no social discipline or social interaction beyond the clan; peasant society did not stop there by any means. Based on the highest group built on patrilineal lines of descent i.e. the clan, the village itself, composed of three or four clans, was the largest unit. The distinction is that the village, as a unit, was not based on patrilineal kinship group though the members of the constituent clans might be related on their mothers side. (15)

Rather, the village was based on relations of propinquity - (proximity and mutual assistance of two or more descent groups). Similarly, kinship relations, in the sense of ties of blood relation, extended beyond the clan into other villages. Each clan could say that members of another clan, residing in another village were their blood relations. The important factor, however, was that such links of blood did not form the basis of a social

grouping capable of organising itself. The clan then was the largest social unit built on patrilineal lines of descent.

Functionally the clan extended those functions of the lineage. In residential quarters of the village, houses of members of the clan showed a marked degree of clustering. (16) The same was true of the pattern of land distribution where peasants with adjacent land parcels were, almost always, members of the same clan and lineage, facilitating co-ordination and co-operation. The clan however, added the essential functions of being the highest decision-making body in arbitral, political and economic spheres.

The arbitral functions were carried out by the clan elders in settlement of disputes. The leading elders could, through social pressures of boycott and even gossip bring considerable pressure to bear on an individual who violated social norms to an extent whereby he refused their majority view in arbitration. Usually, this arbitration function was limited to members of the clan, but at times, if the offence grossly violated overall peasant norms such as rape or physical assault on old people, elders from one clan did and were allowed to arbitrate in cases involving members of another clan of the village. (17)

In the political sphere, apart from presiding over the distribution of the social product, which will be discussed below, the hamula was the level where the energies of the kinship group were mobilised and deployed against external threats. Whereas the lineage ensured participation of lower level kinship groups (itself, the luzum and the household) in decision making, the process itself was conducted at the level of the hamula.

In this respect the role of the elders and the Sheikh, the headman, were paramount. Here it is important to note that village clans were not equal in number or wealth or influence and it was usual for the Sheikh—strictly speaking an elder of one clan—to exercise a role of headman for the village as a whole and be accepted as such by the other clans as long as he and his clan could maintain their power. The history of peasant Palestine is full of stories of such dominant Sheikhs using the dominance of their clan in a major village to mobilize, direct and dominate the energies of whole villages, becoming in the process masters of large regions of the country. Famous among these were the clans and Sheikhs of Abdul Hadi, based on Arrabe (near Jenin) and Abu Ghosh (near Jerusalem). (18)

In their role as mobilisers and directors of kinship groups,

the powers of the Sheikhs have historically varied inversely with the powers of central government. When the latter was in abeyance, as it was in many parts of the country for much of the half-century prior to the 1870's, the powers of the Sheikhs, either individually or in alliance or under the leadership of a dominant Sheikh, were supreme. This did not necessarily mean that they were tyrannical for ultimately they were expressing village autonomy and had to rule with the advice and consent of the elders of their power base; their own hamula.

Conversely, the result of the resurgence of central state power was the weakening of the political position of the Sheikh, a symbol and a symptom of the dilution of village autonomy. Though this weakening was not a sudden act, but a long process, the functions of direction and control were progressively taken over by the State. Through creating and strengthening the position of the Mukhtar (19) - nominally elected by the clans to represent them but increasingly acting as the lowest rung of the State apparatus in the village - the State was establishing lines of communication to the village along which information and orders were transmitted, backed of course by the sanction of the use of State military power. This process will be discussed more fully in the next Section. It was mentioned here only to emphasize the political

function of the clan as part of the socio-economic set-up of peasant society.

This reduction in village autonomy however, was not to come till later. Meanwhile, one result of this type of social organisation was continual strife and wars between clans, villages or alliances of villages. This feature was strongly commented upon by European residents of Palestine in the period central government power was at its weakest. (20) Wars were waged for purposes of expanding village lands, plunder of the wealth of other villages, especially livestock, the most mobile form of wealth, or simply as a means for asserting the centrality of the clan as a focus of organisation and identity of the individual. (21) This motive, though hardly stated in those terms, was attested to by the number of wars waged for seemingly vague and trivial reasons, or for reasons of historical enmity between one village and another whose original cause had been completely forgotten by the combattants.

These European observers of peasant Palestine correctly noted that alliances of villages centred on two factions; the Qais and the Yemen. Most villages identified and championed the cause of one of them. These observers however, one believes erroneously, looked

(20) J Finn, Stirring Times: Or Records from the Jerusalem Consular Chronicles 1853-1855, London 1878.
to the distant past for a historical reason for this enmity between the factions rather than looking to the contemporary social organisation of the peasantry which used this kind of strife to sharpen and emphasize the identity of the kinship-based units. The Qais and Yemen factions were not regionally based in the sense that a whole region of Palestine was Qais and another Yemen. Rather villages belonging to either were inextricably mixed and geographically close to each other, strengthening the impression that in their own way they were helping each other, through externally-directed aggression, to emphasize their separate identities as has been mentioned.

Besides the arbitral and political functions, the clan performed the vital economic function of resource-allocation.

The essence of the kinship group so constructed was to assure the access of its constituent individuals, organised in households, to the object of their labour i.e. land, to enable them, through working it, to obtain the necessities - food etc. of their survival. In other words, the clan had to organise two different functions; firstly the production of these necessities and secondly the access of the individuals belonging to the clan to these necessities once they were produced.
In Palestine, these two functions of production and consumption were combined in the individual household in such a way that the clan assigned the household a definite plot of land to work—albeit for a period of time at the end of which it was assigned to a different household during periodic redistribution of land. (22) Subsequently, whatever the household produced on this land, it kept for itself. Unlike in some other societies based on kinship relations, the Palestinian peasant household did not contribute the produce to a communal food store from which it, together with other households could draw according to need.

The clan therefore was at one and the same time performing the function of (1) organising production and (2) affecting the distribution of the social product which it did before the actual labour process was performed—i.e. by allocating land—and not after—i.e. by allocating wheat, barley etc. once they were produced and gathered into a communal store.

However, the method and final outcome of resource-allocation by the clan had to comply with a number of constraints if the ties of kinship were to be preserved as the basis of social organisation.

First, the clan had to assure the access of the household to "enough" agricultural land to ensure the latter's physiological survival and by extension, its own.

Secondly, what area of agricultural land was "enough" was primarily determined by the productivity of the production sub-unit in direct contact with the labour process—just as the productivity of any mining organisation, for example, is ultimately determined by the productivity of the miner at the coalface. The productivity of this peasant production sub-unit, the household, was in itself limited by the extent of the division of labour that could be achieved within it.

In other words, productivity in peasant society was limited by what division of labour could be achieved by the six, seven or even ten members of each household. The clan may number thousands, but specialisation and efficiency attendant on the division of labour was confined to the limits of groups of seven or eight or ten individuals who constituted the household. Each household then had to perform the vast majority, though not totally all, labour processes undertaken by the village—each household on its own little patch.
As the division of labour was limited in this way, each peasant household evolved methods and tasks of production that suited this constraint. The techniques and implements of production were limited to what the peasant household could sustain with its own resources. The plough for example, was home-made and so were almost all the other implements. Similarly, the plough-animals had to be whatever animals the peasant could afford, which was not necessarily the most suitable. The plough-animals were the individual peasant's private property and an input he had to provide himself— he could not rely on a pool of plough animals maintained by the village.

The "task" of production was similarly circumscribed. As each household had to plant almost all of its food needs on its own land, it followed that the product-mix of the household was almost pre-determined for it. Thus cereals which made up the staple diet occupied the lion's share of the peasant's land. As the product-mix was discussed at length in Part IV, Section Four, there is no need to repeat it here except to reiterate its role in determining what the "minimum" area needed by the household was.

The upshot of the argument is that each household—while working
within the constraints of the level of productivity arrived at in the way outlined above - needed a definite area of land if it was to produce the physiologically minimum level of output. Below that, the physical survival of the household was questionable. (Naturally the minimum area of land that was "enough" also depended on the quality of the land, but not to confuse the issue, the term "area" in the present context assumes uniform quality. Quantification of this "minimum" area, or "lot viable" as the Mandate Government termed it, is given in Part IV, Section One.

Thirdly, the total area that a clan could posses was limited simply by the distance from the village that the peasants had to travel to reach their outlying fields. If too far then the peasants had to spend an important part of their time travelling to and from their fields severely restricting their time on the job which, in the conditions of Palestine, could mean serious delay both at the time of ploughing and the harvest. Or they had to stay away from the village in temporary quarters. This was possible and was done, security situation permitting, but at the cost of the temporary village turning into a permanent one possessing all the characteristics of its parent village. Indeed this was how many villages were founded in the period of population expansion starting in the 1870's. This is also
the reason why the folklore of many villages mentioned a common ancestry between inhabitants of one village and another. The important fact however, was that once a new village was formed it constituted a new social unit possessing its own decision-making powers and all other attributes possessed by its "parent" village.

Fourthly, this maximum ceiling on the total area of clan land was further limited by the area of land which it could hold as a social unit and maintain in the face of two dangers. Firstly, there was the "external" danger of other clans, villages or nomads forcibly taking possession of the clan lands that it could not defend. This happened quite frequently in the mid 19th Century and was commented upon as late as the Survey of Palestine itself in the 1870's. Secondly, the ability to defend its lands in the first place was a function of the number of able bodied men the clan could field. Since the other clans and villages, as well as nomads, were at more or less the same level of technology and therefore able to use or purchase roughly the same sort of weapons, numbers counted. The more men the clan could field, the higher were its chances of victory. The clan therefore had a vested interest in maximising the number of men, and by extension the number of households, that the land area in its possession could support.
Fifthly, the ideology of a society based on kinship group did not allow for excessive inequalities in landholding between one individual and another. When group identity was posed in terms of kinship, and when the productive process itself required a minimum of cooperation and coordination, excessive economic differentiation placed severe pressures on the forces holding the community together.

From the preceding pages therefore it could be seen that the process of resource-allocation in peasant society had to operate within these main constraints viz. (A) minimum needs of a household necessitating (B) a definite area of land determined by its quality but more important by socially determined limits to technology and productivity; (C) external and internal limits to maximum area of land a clan can hold and (D) ideological limits to differentiation within the clan.

In the case of peasant Palestine, these constraints led to a system of allocation of resources which emphasized rough equality of access to land by constituent members of the clan. This egalitarian nature of communal society is beyond doubt, and was noted by every contemporary writer on the subject. In their
description of Masha', the system of communal landholding, these writers very adequately described the mechanics of how periodic redistribution was effected though sadly most of them did not go beyond this to analyse the system. (23)

Though the analysis of Palestinian peasant society given above has attempted to illustrate the social necessity of this "egalitarianism", one should not idealise the system because of that, tempting as this may be. The same social system based on kinship of which egalitarian Masha' was a manifestation, was a system of low productivity leading to manifestation somewhat less idealistic than egalitarianism. Constant danger of famine and disease and attendant fatalism and resignation; constant strife between clans and villages to satisfy the everlasting need of emphasizing group identity; and above all the ease to which it could succumb to determined outsiders whether they were the resurgent Ottoman State, landlords or Zionists.

Notwithstanding the above, at this stage one could give a brief description of the process of periodic redistribution since this was the primary mechanism through which this egalitarianism was carried out.

Given the kinship group's requirement for a more or less egalitarian division of resources among members of the same clan, the application of this requirement resulted in a pattern of land allocation whose features were puzzling to many a European observer and many a colonial civil servant.

Firstly, as agricultural land was not of uniform quality, individual households had to have access to all types of land at any one time in order to fulfil all their food needs and to achieve a rough measure of equality of access to good-quality land. This meant that at the time of redistribution, each household not only needed to have its share of total clan land; but a corresponding share in each field, resulting in the fragmentation of the total holding of any one household among the different fields.

Dispersion of household land necessarily implied fragmentation of that household's total holding. It also meant that each field contained a large number of parcels owned by different households. Map (II/Two/1) shows a typical dispersion pattern of a household's landholding achieved in this way.

Though this dispersion pattern was always condemned as
A TYPICAL PALESTINIAN PEASANT LANDHOLDING - held in scattered fragments.

inefficient by Mandate officials and others, in the peasants' own terms this was not necessarily true. Given that the level of technology was socially determined and was limited by the division of labour that could be achieved within the household; and given that the minimum of co-ordination and co-operation functions in the particular labour process (e.g. synchronised harvesting, crop rotation etc.) were secured through kinship relations; then it follows that as long as the size of the average household's parcel was large enough to be worked efficiently by the household, it did not matter if a given field was divided into a number of parcels and worked in units rather as one big field. There were no returns to scale.

There was, however, a penalty in a drop in efficiency if the average parcel size fell appreciably below that optimum. But this was not a function of dispersion of the household's total landholding as much as a direct function of SIZE of total holding which naturally tends to drop as a result of pressure of population on total cultivable area available.

Obviously, the individual householder would have preferred all his land to be as near as possible. But since he could not reside out of the body of the village for security reasons; and since
kinship ties meant that whatever burden remoteness of fields imposed on peasants had to be shared equitably, then dispersion along these lines made sense, at least to the peasants.

Secondly, redistribution had to be periodic for a number of reasons.

(a) The kinship group had a commitment to ensure access of all its members to land, and as the total number of members varied due to births, deaths, marriages of women to outsiders which led them to leave the village etc., then periodic redistribution minimized these effects by distributing shares among all those living at the moment of redistribution.

There were two ways in which these shares were determined:

(i) The Zukur system (literally meaning 'males' since only males received a share while the females were counted with their menfolk) In this system all males living at the time of the operation of periodic redistribution, no matter what age, received an equal share of clan land. (24)

(ii) The Sahm system (literally meaning share) where the shares allocated by the Zukur system sometime in the distant past now devolved by inheritance to the heirs of the original shareholders. In each succeeding generation the process of inheritance was repeated. At any one time, therefore, the share of any individual of say the fifth or sixth generation varied according to demographic accident in the line of descent he belonged to. The more cousins he had the less was his share. Indeed by the time of Land Settlement operations of the Mandate Government in the 1930's, individuals were found whose share have reached huge denominators such as 1 in 3500 of a sahm. (25)

However, although these two ways of determining the individual's share of total clan land differed in minor details, these differences did not alter the principles of guaranteed access to land on which the Masha' was based. For reasons of space, therefore these differences will not be discussed further here.

(b) The second reason why redistribution had to be periodic was to prevent income differentiation between clan members which might place unacceptable pressures on kinship group solidarity. Since redistribution was by lot, regular redistribution would ensure

that all members of the clan had a chance of access to good as well as to bad land. Moreover, it would prevent the temptation of individuals, who might benefit from it, from turning the last redistribution into a permanent one merely through the passage of time. This lengthening of the interval until a stage was reached when the land was acknowledged as freehold property was indeed one of the most common routes to 'voluntary' i.e. not State imposed, final partition of Masha' land in the period from the 1870's till the 1940's.

Communal control and allocation of resources, however, did not necessarily mean that all resources were communally held. Just as in even the most virulent variants of modern capitalism, not all resources are subject to market control, Masha' allowed some resources to be held in a form akin to modern concepts of private ownership. Three broad groups of resources were prominent among these. First was the dwelling house of the peasant household. Second were the vegetable and plantation plots immediately adjacent to the village (hawakir). These plots which consisted roughly of between a fifth and a quarter of total village land, were highly prized as their proximity to the village allowed women and children to work them and to guard the crops and the fruits against theft and stray animals. By freeing the
men to work fields further away from the village they increased the amount of food the household could produce, labour time being a major constraint in peasant agriculture.

Thirdly, livestock was always held in private ownership. Although grazing away from the village was organised at one level or another of the kinship group (e.g. at the level of the lineage or the clan as a whole depending on optimum size of flock), the individual household was entirely free to kill sheep for food or sell them as it saw fit - constrained only by what the household saw as prudent. This is unlike the case of communally held land for example, when harvesting cereal crops of households was subject to clan timetable and collective decision.

Communal control, moreover, did not necessarily preclude features which would at first sight seem inconsistent with it. In the author's view there is no inconsistency in peasants selling part of their produce, whether for domestic or for export market. There is evidence for example, that Palestine was an exporter of cereals at the time of the Crimean Wars. (26) Sesame was exported on and off for decades before the turn of the 20th Century. At the time of the American Civil War, there were exports of cotton.

to Europe, the cotton being grown mainly round Nablus. These "spectacular" exports apart, it was not unknown for villagers to sell part of their produce on the market in the nearest town and yet maintain their communal structure and organisation.

The existence of markets and exchange whether by barter or for money do not in themselves negate communal organisation. As long as the producer had access to land, and consequently to the means of physical survival, the market was an added option that could be tapped if he had a surplus to sell. There was no inescapable economic compulsion on him to do so as long as his kinship group maintained his access to land. Rather, what mattered was whether or not the pull of the market was strong enough and enduring enough to exert unacceptable pressure on peasant society organised on kinship lines, leading to its dissolution. Whatever happened after the First World War, the effect of the market was not that strong as it is certain that communal organisation was the primary form of economic organisation among Palestinian peasantry, at least well into the few decades prior to the Mandate.

Similarly, the existence of crop-sharing arrangements was not in itself inconsistent with communal organisation so long as their
purpose was the complementarity of factors of production within the overall framework of communal organisation. Crop-sharing is essentially the definition of a return in kind to the owner of an input necessary for the production process. Though the system of Masha' ensured the access of all its members to land, it did not necessarily guarantee the individual householder the other necessary inputs - seed, plough team, implements etc. It could so happen that, through accident, a household lost its plough team while another did not; or the head of a household fell ill; or any other reason that meant that a household could not, unaided, undertake production of its own food in the short term. In such cases, crop-sharing as the portion of the produce paid to the provider of the missing factor of production, was essentially helping to correct a short-term disequilibrium in the normal ability of the household to perform its production functions.

That this was a well known method of correcting short-term disequilibria among Palestinian peasants is attested to by the high degree of familiarity with crop-sharing arrangements among them, and to the development of peasant customs and Islamic Law (Shari'a) regulating them. Shares tended to respond to relative scarcities of factors as in any other economic system. The crucial point, however, is that it did not lead to dispossession.

of the household from its right of access to resources guaranteed by its membership of the clan. Temporary shortages affecting individual households tended automatically to correct themselves - the householder would pay for another plough team over the years, since he did not permanently lose his right to land, only to temporary loss of part of the produce until such time as he could rectify the shortages.

Crop-sharing as such, therefore, was a feature of the system in which it was employed. It was a means and a technique that could be used by any system, whether communal or whether a growing agrarian capitalism. As such crop-sharing, within a communal framework is by no means inconsistent with communal organisation. Similarly, being a technique and a means, crop-sharing could be employed to serve purposes wholly opposed to communal organisation, as indeed it historically was in Palestine of the Mandate, being an intermediate stage in the dissolution of communal organisation and towards wage labour as will be discussed in Part IV, Section Two.
In summary and in conclusion to this Section; the analysis of the kinship group which formed the social setting of the peasant economy, shows a number of salient features. These features constituted socially-imposed constraints which governed production and productivity of peasant Palestine in as a concrete a form as social structure determines production and productivity in any society at any time.

Firstly, a system of kinship existed along the network of which relationships between individuals were determined by their location at determinate points along it. This system of kinship was established in advance of any particular labour process and was not temporary, for the duration of the hunt for example, as in other societies also based on kinship relations. Kinship social ties, as a basis of a social group, did not always need to be based on, or to have full congruence with the actual existence of a blood relationship (consanguinity) between the constituent members. But by and large, kinship relations were the bond that cemented the group together. Moreover, they were perceived by the group members as the "proper" and "natural" bond.
The second feature that sums up the social relations in peasant Palestine, was the intricate way in which the process of production itself was organised. The household was the kinship group sub-unit which directly carried out the majority of tasks required in producing the needs of peasant society. As such it ultimately defined the productivity of that society to the extent that productivity, a function of the division of labour, was constrained within what could be achieved among its constituent individuals, including the infant and the infirm.

In addition, the household was a unit of consumption as well as a unit of production since the produce it achieved from the resources allocated to it (primarily land, and sometimes water), was retained by it for its consumption.

Yet the household on its own could not have constituted the basis of peasant society, for to form such a basis, the unit of production had to attain two qualifications. It had to organise the process of production and secondly it had to have the ability to reproduce itself.

There are in the history of mankind cases when the household was capable of both, but the circumstances of Palestine in our
particular period made this impossible for two reasons. Firstly, though the household was the social sub-unit most directly involved in the production process it was dependent on the bigger groupings to secure, from nature and against other men, and allocate the necessary resources in the first place, and to assure the necessary measure of co-ordination and co-operation in executing some production functions.

Secondly, it could be argued that in a vacuum, the household could have done without these bigger groupings and depended solely on its own resources. In fact this was not possible since the household lacked the means to reproduce itself unaided by these bigger groupings. To begin with, its mere physical security was doubtful. Nomads would have overcome isolated households with ease.

Moreover, regardless of whether there were nomads or not, inter-peasant competition for the best resources (e.g. best quality land, perennial springs etc.) placed the peasant households in a state of permanent conflict with each other. In such a situation, large was beautiful since a larger number of individuals secured a measure of superiority in this competitive scramble. Since there were limits to what the household could achieve in numbers (primarily the physiological limits of how many
offspring could be produced), kinship group escalated in size to comprise the Luzum, then the lineage then finally the clan, the stage beyond which the forces of fission within the group overcame the forces of cohesion.

The unit of production that could satisfy both conditions viz. organisation of production and its own reproduction was the clan as a whole and not any constituent part of it. Though these constituent parts carried out distinct functions that performed parts of the production process or aided other sub-units in performing them, these sub-units of the clan could not on their own have satisfied the above two conditions.

Thirdly, it should not be thought that the clan itself was the limit of peasant society organised along kinship lines. As has been made clear, larger entities existed in the shape of the village and, less permanently, of alliances of clans and villages of which the clan was a part. But the relationship between these larger units were not based on kinship relations as were those within the clan.

Finally, it should not be thought that peasant society existed in an ideal condition where no exploitation of labourers by non-
labourer was possible because of such "egalitarian institutions" as the Masha' and periodic redistribution. This may have been true to a large extent only within the clan. But although differentiation was limited within the clan, it was not necessarily between clans. One clan for reasons of history, demography, geography or leadership, could be stronger than the others and assume a dominant role in its village and district. With or without alliances with other clans it could force weaker clans to pay tribute in return for "protection" etc. Moreover, powerful clans could clash over territory or overlordship of districts leading to incessant strife and struggle - as did actually take place in Palestine in the middle decades of the 19th Century. The point is that exploitation was possible in peasant society structured along communal lines by kinship relations, but in between clans, not within the structure of each individual clan.

Thus whereas the clan formed the smallest autonomous social unit of peasant society in Palestine, the household formed the sub-unit most closely in touch with the process of production itself. Ultimately, it was this social set-up that governed the economic organisation of peasant Palestine and its overall productivity.
The implications of this social set-up on the development of peasant society and its ability to face the challenges that were posed to its existence will be discussed in the coming Sections of this thesis.
The Changing Environment. The role of "Exogenous" forces in the development of Peasant Society in the last years of Ottoman rule.

Although in Part II, Section Two of this thesis, peasant society was posited in terms that implied its complete autonomy from outside forces, this was done merely to facilitate analysis of the internal structures of the primary social unit of peasant society, the clan. In reality, it is most unlikely that peasant society ever existed in such a degree of isolation as was posited above, even though there were times when such a state was approximated to. In the 19th Century, there were times when these "outside forces" allowed a large degree of autonomy especially in the period of continuous wars that started with Napoleon's invasion around the turn of the 19th Century and
went on till the resurgence of State power which started from the 1860's onwards.

However, whatever degree of isolation existed then, the period from the 1870's onwards saw an overall trend of progressive reduction in peasant autonomy and an ever-increasing and ascendant role for these "outside forces". However, before discussing these forces, it is important to note that despite this overall trend, the years from the 1870's onwards were not all years of decline for peasant society. Reality was somewhat more complicated.

For the purposes of this Section, the "outside forces" that had most effect on peasant society could be broadly identified as (A) The Ottoman State, and (B) Non-peasant forms of economic organisation of agricultural production viz. a rising class of landlords and the rise of private property rights in land.
The Ottoman State.

In between the Ottoman conquests of the 16th Century and the First World War, Palestine was part of the Ottoman Empire. Whatever the nature of the Ottoman State might have been in earlier centuries this Section will attempt to show that in the 19th and 20th Centuries the main thrust of the aims and aspirations of the State as expressed by its reforms and articulated by the reformers were diverging from peasant society as structured by kinship relations. This does not mean that there existed at any one time a blueprint or a master plan of reform which was consistently and unerringly followed for the process of reform itself was subject to political pressure by the interested parties, leading at times to some basic contradictions and confusion of purpose. Moreover, the process of reform was constrained by the ability of the State to carry out its intentions.

Great or small, the State's influence on peasant society can be analysed along three main lines: (i) the establishment of an effective presence on the scene that would allow it to carry out its intentions to any reasonable degree, (ii) the attempt to establish a broad thrust of intention and policy by the State towards society as a whole and peasant society
in particular as expressed and codified by relevant State Law and
(iii) the degree to which (i) and (ii) above combined to allow
the State to extract resources from peasant society and secondly
to determine the outlines of the process of production itself
by which these resources were produced, and whenever necessary
alter or abolish this process.

(i) The establishment of an effective State presence in 19th
Century Palestine.

The history of State effectiveness and presence in Palestine
in the 19th Century was a chequered one. Because of the limitations
of space however, only the briefest outline of this history could
be given. (1)

In the early decades of the 19th Century, central State power
in Palestine had to co-exist with the power of semi-independent
powers like Jazzar Pasha of Acre who, with the help of the
British Navy successfully resisted Napoleon's efforts to conquer
the city. His successor, Abdullah Pasha, was also powerful.

(1) The following three pages are a summary of much more detailed
accounts given in Masterman & MacAlister, "A History of the Doings of
the Fellahin...etc", Op. cit. Also M Ma'oz, Ottoman Reforms in
Syria and Palestine 1840-1861, Op. cit, Chapters 8 & 9. Also
The central State moreover, lacked the power to impose its will on the peasants of the hill country in Palestine who organised themselves in alliances centred on their chieftains and waged their incessant struggles and strife against each other. Even major routes like Jerusalem-Jaffa road could only be protected by Ottoman Governors in Jerusalem tacitly agreeing to the Abu-Ghosh coalition of peasants 'protecting' the route, for which they exacted a good tribute from travellers.

The Egyptian occupation initially brought about an increase in State power by virtue of the large standing army. The Egyptians, however, were forced to retreat by Turkish and European pressures and the central State of the Ottoman restoration reverted to the state of affairs that existed prior to the Egyptian invasion. The persistent inability of the Ottoman State to provide a large standing army to replace the Janissaries whom the Sultan destroyed in 1824 meant that Ottoman Governors lacked the troops, then the essential instrument of state power, needed to collect revenue. This deficiency of troops was exacerbated by the almost continuous wars that the Empire had to fight against the European Powers who were becoming increasingly more powerful relative to itself. For example, in the 1850's, State power in Palestine actually weakened because of the withdrawal of troops to fight in the
Crimean War.

However, from the 1860's onwards the Ottoman State made a consistent and determined effort to pacify the country. Centres of peasant-based military power were reduced by military campaigns against them by governors, like Arrabe in 1859. Nomadic threat was gradually reduced through extension of military garrisons benefiting from extension of the railway system. Turkish troops moreover were increasingly armed with superior European weapons. In addition, the Turks encouraged a string of Circassian settlements to the east of River Jordan which acted as frontier posts. The nomads themselves were encouraged to settle.

Increasingly the balance of power was shifting in favour of direct rule by the Central State and away from the former pattern in which local power groups like the a'yan (notables) and 'ulama (religious establishment) which derived their power from control of local resources in the towns and countryside, reduced the representatives of the Ottoman State to a role of being first among equals, and at worst reduced them to puppets whose existence was tolerated as a legitimising cover, if tolerated at all. In the two decades of the 1840's to the 1860's, the Ottoman
State, through employment of the Nizam (new model army) whenever it could be spared from other duties, managed progressively to reduce the most extreme manifestations of local autonomy which at times rejected even the pretence of Ottoman overall superiority. Campaigns were waged to subjugate Jabal Nablus, under the bitterly contested leadership of Abdul Hadis and Tugans, Jabal El-Kuds (Jerusalem Mountain) where peasant-based power groups like the Abu-Ghosh clan leading Yamani faction was engaged in perpetual struggle against the Qais faction led then by the Samhan family, and Jabal el Khalil (Hebron Mountain) led by Abd al Rahman 'Amir whose power base was the large village of Dura.

The foundations of direct rule by central Government were laid down in the 1840's and 1850's though at the time they did not lead to greater security in the countryside because of the process of military subjugation itself and because of the inability of either State or peasant to control nomadic incursions. Nevertheless it enabled the State to extend its power irreversibly in subsequent decades.

The outcome of this struggle however, was extremely important as the process of monopolising military power by the state to the
exclusion of local peasant-based groups was by and large complete by the accession of Abdel Hamid II in 1876. Subjugation of the nomads took longer, though use of powerful punitive expeditions against their desert strongholds and the establishment of a permanent military presence at the edge of the desert gradually reduced the menace of nomads to settled society. As far as Palestine was concerned, the nomadic menace was pushed east of the River Jordan, where Ottoman troops armed with superior weapons and supplied with an expanding railway network could contain them. Their final subjugation to the will of the central State was undertaken in the early 1920's by the British led Trans-Jordan Frontier Force, the precursor of the Arab Legion.

(ii) Policy and intention of the Ottoman State towards peasant society.

The consequences of this increasing military dominance of the Ottoman State as the sole wielder of military power in the land were immense. As far as peasant Palestine was concerned, State Law as opposed to peasant laws and customs derived from, and responsive to the dynamics of that society, was becoming the determinant
point of reference in the development of peasant society.

The ultimate implications of this power went beyond the extraction of resources from peasant society by taxation, rent or straightforward plunder. Peasant society was no stranger to that for it always supported a class of non-producers whether they be local feudal lords as the Sipahis and the timariots were prior to their destruction by the central State by the early 1800's. Moreover, peasant society also supported a class of non-producers consisting of leading rural families and Sheikhs or urban-based a'yan and ulama ultimately drawing on the surplus produced in the countryside through such activities as tax farming (iltizam) but without closely interfering in the way this surplus was produced.

It is a basic theme of this thesis that the broad thrust of State policy and action towards peasant Palestine from the 1850's till 1948 went beyond the appropriation of a share of resources produced by peasant society into progressively taking control of the process of social production itself by the emerging non-peasant forces inside and outside the State apparatus.

This is not to say that the process was smooth or clear-cut or
that it was necessarily the only outcome of the resurgence of central State power. Many states in history imposed stricter and more efficient central control than the Ottomans without altering the dynamics of peasant society to the ultimate outcome of that society's destruction. But two things may be said with a fair degree of confidence. Firstly, the imposition of central State control was an essential precondition of change since by disarming the peasants, the state prevented them defending the peasant form of social organisation by force of arms. Once that was achieved, the struggle between peasant and non-peasant forms of organisation was conducted through the market-place rather than on the battlefield.

Secondly, the State itself, through the totality of its policies - social, economic, security, legal etc. - was not only an overseer of the destruction of peasant society by third parties, but was itself an active agent in this, if not the most active.

The immediate task therefore is to define the broad thrust of Ottoman policies towards peasant society. As in many other areas of Ottoman policy however, it is not easy to discern a clear and
coherent trend. The process of policy-making was a complex one which had to respond to the demands and the pressures brought to bear by a large number of interested parties. It is not surprising therefore, that the resultant legislation was vague or contradictory at times.

However, enough substance and coherence remained in State policy towards peasant society to manifest itself and be articulated by the State's Land Law. Initially, all land laws were consolidated in a group of laws known as the Ottoman Land Code of 1858.(2) Soon after it was enacted however, the Code went through a very lengthy process of amendment which lasted from the middle of the 19th Century till the First World War when the new occupying Power, Britain, adopted it as the basis of Palestine's Land Law under the Mandate. Although it was amended and modified in parts, it formally remained in effect till the end of the Mandate.

According to the Code, ownership of land was held to have consisted of two elements; (1) the Raqaba i.e. bare ownership of land which, in the absence of any contractual or customary restriction on the use of land, left the owner with full unfettered freedom to use the land as he saw fit. (2) The Tassaruf or the usufruct of the land in possession whether the cultivator

owned the Raqaba of the land or not. The implications of the right of Raqaba, as will be seen, went much deeper than a mere tenancy right based on contract, for much of the validity of this type depended on possession and custom, rather than on statutory rights.

Based on these elements the Code recognised two main categories of landholding which formed the two opposing poles, and other categories which represented variations or combinations of these two elements. These latter categories formed a continuum between the two poles so as to make a mesh of laws that governed all lands, now deemed to belong to one category or another.

The two main categories were

a) Mulk holding, which was identical to the modern concepts of freehold. The landowner combined the Raqaba and the Tassaruf and consequently he was free to dispose of the land by contract or by will in any way he saw fit. He owned all what was on the land, underneath it and its usufruct.

b) Miri holding which historically made up almost all agricultural
land in Palestine between the inception of the Land Code and 1948. Here the Raqaba was owned by the State and the Tassaruf was held by the cultivator who was not free to dispose of the land but had to conform to certain laws and practices that governed use and disposition.

The theory of Miri, according to Goadby and Doukhan (3) was that it was land held "from the State under a lease of indefinite duration at a double rent of which one part consists in the Tapu payments (Bedl Misl) and fees payable under transfer and succession, and the other takes the form of tithe or taxes, or analogous periodic payments (Ijara Zemin)."

Miri land could not be assigned by will, or be turned to Wakf without permission of the State; the cultivator only had the usufruct of the surface soil and its produce, but not of any minerals contained in it. Inheritance was made partible between sons and daughters just before the First World War. Entry to Miri land was by permission of the State and upon payment of entry fee (Tabu). On its part, the State was not free to dispose of the land. It was bound by customary practices such as the strict order of priority assigned by practice to right of entry into Miri land upon the death of the owner or the

cessation of rights due to any number of carefully prescribed reasons.

Most of the other categories of landholding recognised by the Land Code mainly defined the different rights and obligations imposed on Miri land for and against each of the State and the cultivator.

c) **Mahlul** land, was Miri land on which the right of usufruct of the cultivator and its attendant rights had ceased to apply for a number of reasons, e.g. upon neglect of the land by not cultivating for more than three years for no good reason; or when upon the death of the original owner, the heirs declined to take up their right to accession to the land upon payment of the entry fee (tabu). The State was then free to dispose of the land by auction to fresh holders of Miri rights.

d) **Metrukeh** land was Miri land left aside for public use either by the community as a whole, or for the specific use of specified villages e.g. threshing floors or common pastures.

e) **Mawat** was land that was not claimed by anybody and situated no less than one and a half miles outside village boundaries.
Most of the lands of what was later to become the Beersheba sub-district belonged to this category.

In addition to the above, the Land Code recognised two other categories of land.

f) State Domain, where the State combined in itself the Raqaba and the Tassaruf. This category approximated very closely to Western notions of State ownership.

g) Wakf land where the Raqaba was in 'the implied ownership of the Almighty' and whose produce was dedicated to some pious purpose e.g. upkeep of mosque or a school. Vesting the Raqaba in God meant that the land was legally inalienable and could not be bought and sold, although in actual fact there were legal devices around this barrier. Generally only Mulk land could be dedicated as Wakf, though by special permission of the State, Miri land could be turned Wakf.
Having given a brief definition of the legal categories of landholding, discussion can now turn to the purpose and intention behind the Land Law that produced these categories.

These categories of landholding initially aimed at encoding in law the balance of power that existed at the time within Ottoman society after the ending of the privileges of the feudal Sipahis and timariots subsequent to the military destruction of the latter at the hands of the central state. The State now sought to make the relationship between itself and the immediate producer, i.e. the peasant, a direct one. (4)

In other words, the Land Code had to codify the relationship between the central state on the one hand, and two groups within Ottoman society on the other viz. the old feudal classees (the Ziamets and the Timariots), and the peasants. Consequently, the theory upon which the law governing Miri land was based was twofold.

Firstly, the advantages which might at one time have been enjoyed by the holders of Ziamets and Timars from their rights over the cultivating peasantry, were now to be the exclusive right of the central State without intermediary. The Land Code,

by asserting the State's right of Raqaba in Miri land, was in fact asserting the state's monopoly in extracting resources from the peasants in the form of tapu and tithe. There was to be no exploiting class independent of the central state.

It is accepted by the majority of historians that the Ottoman State managed to defeat the old feudal classes and end their rights in land in fact as well as in law. As such the history of the process need not be repeated here especially as it is the outcome of the process not the process itself that is relevant to us.

Secondly, vis-à-vis the peasants, the theory of the Law was that the land was granted directly by the State to the peasants for the purposes of cultivation on the condition that the peasant makes a double payment to the State, the Tapu and tithe. (5)

However, the mere legal title to the land was not, on its own, a guarantee that the State could extract resources from the peasants. There was no economic compulsion on the peasants to surrender part of their produce since they were in effective possession and control of all the inputs necessary to produce the crops—land, labour, seed, plough animals etc. They did not depend on the central state to provide any of these inputs.

To be able to extract the surplus therefore the State had to ensure the subordination of the direct producers by non-economic means.

Chief among these non-economic means was the imposition of taxes and rents on the peasants in the form of tithes and tapu payments. However, in the final analysis, the collection of these impositions depended on two factors. Firstly was the state's readiness to use force or the threat of force against the peasants to enforce the collection of the taxes and rents the Land Code sanctioned. This naturally depended on the strength of its presence on the ground in the form of troops, gendarmes, tax collectors etc. which the preceding pages have described.

Secondly the successful collection of taxes depended on the state's administrative ability since the administrative effort involved was immense as the Mandate authorities discovered and as will be discussed in Part III, Section Two.

Initially, the State attempted to collect taxes directly from the peasants by official tax-collectors (Mhassils). Tax-farming (Iltizam), which in Palestine and Syria was stopped by the occupying Egyptians, was officially abolished by the Ottoman
Hat-i-Serif of Gulhane in 1839. (6) Further Firmans in 1850 and 1852 ordered that Iltizam should be abolished and replaced by direct collection of taxes. In actual fact however the Iltizam remained the major system of tax-collection till the end of Ottoman rule in Palestine and was not abolished in fact as well as in law till the Mandate. (7) The consequences of this inability of the State to collect taxes directly were undoubtedly contradictory to the Tanzimat since in fact an intermediary was placed between the tax-payer and the treasury and thus undermined the policy of direct rule.

In some respects, this "new intermediary" was similar to the old one. The Iltizam which emanated from the vacuum that followed the destruction of the feudal classes of the Sipahis, resulted in the emergence of a class of urban-based functionaries who derived their power base from the resources they extracted and kept to themselves from the operation of the Iltizam. Tax-farming was determined by the Majlis (City Council) for its district which in effect meant that the urban dominated Majlis ensured the monopoly of profitable Iltizam to itself rather than permit the villagers themselves to undertake it as they were nominally allowed to by Law.

(7) Tax revenue fell so badly in 1840 that "Iltizam" was restored, see S J Shaw, "The 19th Century Ottoman Tax Reforms etc.", Op. cit., p.422.
To the central bureaucracy of the State, situated in Istanbul and based deriving its ultimate power from the Sultan, this meant the creation of another arm of the State apparatus whose power derived from and resided in the provinces. The struggle between the two arms of the State for relative supremacy over the other became what one historian, Albert Hourani, termed "The Politics of the Notables". (8)

These notables were identified as the ulama (religious leaders) who were the traditional spokesmen of the Islamic city and the 'Ayans (secular notables). In Hourani's words (9):

"From whichever groups the local leadership arises, we find it acting in much the same way. On the one hand, its leaders or their representatives are members of the Governor's divan, and thus have formal access to him.... Not only were the notables needed more by the Government, their intervention was also more sought after by the population in its dealings with the Government.... Notables became patron's of villages and this was one of the ways in which they came to establish their claims to ownership over them... The land Tax as well as other taxes were farmed annually. When the farms were auctioned, the large merchants and notables, in collusion with Ottoman officials, were in a good position to obtain them."

Yet, the powers of these "new intermediaries" were not the same as those of the old, now destroyed, feudal classes. The crux of the matter is that peasant society did not have to endure the notables only as partners of the central bureaucracy in extracting the

surplus from it through Iltizam. Had the notables been ONLY that, then their effect on peasant society would ultimately have been no more than another exploiter in a long series of exploiters that the village had seen. In the case of these exploiters, the village, through its own internal mechanisms organised production and only surrendered a portion of it to these classes and to the State; the size of the surplus surrendered depended on what force could be brought to bear on the village.

Instead what was unfolding since the middle of the 19th Century and continued till the end of the Mandate in 1948, was that the notables (urban and rural) gradually went beyond the mere appropriation of a share of the produce (but where production was organised by the village as based on kinship relations) into assuming control of the production process itself. This was by no means an easy or brief undertaking as will be shown shortly, nor was it complete even by 1948.

In this process of change, the notables were greatly helped by another fundamental and enduring feature of the Land Code. Having established the theoretical "eminent domain of the State" by invoking the principle of ownership of the Raqaba in Miri land, the Land Code (Article 8) expressly forbade Miri land of a village being held as a whole by the inhabitants of a village
or by a few of them as representing the others. Each inhabitant was required to have a separate Tapu grant. (10)

According to Goadby & Doukhan in *The land Law of Palestine*, p207

"...It cannot be too plainly stated that the Land Code recognised no common village land except the Metruke lands. The introduction of the idea of cultivated communal land is contrary to the Land Code and subversive, indeed of the principles upon which it is based."

With unusual vehemence and endurance, therefore, the Land Code, irrespective of its ability to carry out its intentions at the times, legislated to outlaw the Musha', the linchpin of peasant society as based on kinship relations.

However, the motivation of the original Land Land Code of 1858 in outlawing communal holding of land was not the establishment of private property rights in cultivable land. Private property rights were only recognised by the initial Code in Mulk land which formed only a very small proportion of cultivable land. in the Arab provinces of the Ottoman Empire (including Palestine). Again according to Goadby & Doukhan :-

"It is only gradually that the interest of Miri holder has become alienable. Originally, in Law if not in practice, the Miri holder was regarded as having only a personal interest in the land which was neither alienable nor heritable." (11)

Rather, the Land Code had a different initial motivation in outlawing the Masha' and secondly in not recognising unauthorised sale and inheritance in Miri land, (i.e. the characteristics that lay at the heart of the concept of private property). The motive was the need to assert the supremacy of the State over the cultivator who now had to face the State as an individual. The intention was that this individual should have been unorganised in an intermediary social unit, such as the clan, which would act as a limit on the State's freedom of action. Nor was it intended that this individual should have been free in the use of his Miri land.

The various qualifications on the grant of Miri rights by the State to the individual holder and the conditionality of that grant (such as the condition that Miri reverted to the State should the cultivator neglect the land by failing to plant it for three successive years for no good reason) were there to give the State an effective right and power of exclusion.

In other words, the State had assumed to itself the monopoly possession of land through which, and by whose consent only, the cultivator gained access to land. It is easy to see that the Law-makers realised that it would have been infinitely more
difficult to exercise this right of exclusion on a whole clan rather than on isolated individuals totally at the mercy of the State. One difficulty would have been the degree of force and coercion needed to back up the State's "right" if it was a clan it had to exclude. Secondly it was easier to replace a single excluded cultivator by another than to disrupt the whole process of production if a whole clan was so excluded, and in the process, to reduce the State's revenue.

To give effect to this principle of asserting its dominance over the individual cultivator deprived of the protection of his clan, the Land Code required the registration of title deed (kushan) to rights in Miri land which the state had granted him in the tapu grant. The issue of title deeds and their registration were entrusted to a department known as Daftar Khani (The Administration of Imperial Registers). Only individuals were allowed to register in this way. (12)

To summarise briefly the preceding pages: in codifying its supremacy, the State incorporated a number of major features in the Land Code which played a crucial part in the development of peasant society.

These were, (a) the premise of "eminent domain" of the State in Miri land as based on the legal fiction of owning the Raqaba. The Tapu and the Tithe were the "modus operandi" vis-à-vis the peasant of this premise in the sense that they constituted the means through which resources were extracted from the peasant sector.

(b) Not recognising, in law, communal organisation, of which the Masha' was the core. On the contrary, the Code required the partition of communally held land directly by administrative procedure, and indirectly by recognising only the individual cultivator's right in Miri.

(c) The Code required the individual cultivator to register his interest in the Daftar Khani.

The Land Code's initial aim was not the encouragement of private property rights in land. This only came later as will be shown.
(iii) The Outcome.

The third line along which the influence of the State on peasant society could be analysed is the outcome which (i) and (ii) above produced.

Contrary to the expectations of the law-makers, the land system in Palestine did not unfold in the direction desired by the original Code of 1858. Instead, the outcome was the emergence of a landlord class which developed in two broad stages. The first was the rise of a class of landlords which gradually but strongly imposed itself on the central bureaucracy of the State as a partner in the extraction of resources from the direct producers, although at this stage this landlord class lacked any military or economic means independent (13) of the central state itself. Its initial rise to power was fuelled by the inability of the central state effectively to administer what it legislated for, thus creating a vacuum which the latter filled, and on which it based its further advances. At this stage the primary weapon of the emerging landlord class was the control and the exercise of the Iltizam.

The second stage was the development of this landlord class into easing the direct producer away from immediate control of the production process and to gradually assume this power themselves. This transition was by no means complete by the end of the Ottoman era for it continued well into the Mandate and was not complete even then. The extent to which this process had reached was discussed and quantified in other parts of this thesis, but a start will be made in this Section to serve both as an introduction and a place where concepts and not only details are discussed.

In addition to Iltizam, the primary weapons used at this stage were the alteration of the Land Law, by exercise of political and economic pressure, to alter the meaning of Miri towards making it a right of private property in the European sense, though somewhat muddled and imprecise. Parallel to, though predicated on the first, the second weapon in gaining a controlling interest in land was the law requiring the land to be registered in individual names from which this landlord class, as most historians of the era rightly noted, gained immeasurable advantages. The third weapon was that feature of the times that most European observers professed to detest, namely usury and money lending to the needy peasants.
(B) The rise of the landlords.

Following on from the previous pages and looking at the role of Iltizam first, it is worth noting that the practice itself was well-known and practiced before the Tanzimat (the general movement of reform which started with the Imperial Order issued on the 23rd of February, 1838 (14) and of which the Land Code was a part). Although initially the Tanzimat attempted to abolish Iltizam along with what were regarded as the outmoded vestiges of pre-reform tax system; the central State soon proved its inability to collect taxes directly.

A'shar (Tithe) tax revenue fell badly in 1840 forcing the State to reconsider Iltizam in selected areas. In 1847 a decree was issued authorising the assignment of Iltizam for five years at a time in the hope that this would encourage tax-farmers to take a longer term view of the lands within their jurisdiction instead of squeezing as much as possible in the short term. This failed to generate enough revenue for the State, resulting in a brief period (1852-55) when the State attempted again to collect directly through Muhassils. The latter, however, proved ineffectual with the result that a new regulation, 20th

(14) In addition to sources mentioned in previous footnotes, see S J Shaw & E K Shaw, History of the Ottoman Empire and Modern Turkey, Cambridge University Press, 1977, Chapters 2 & 3.
December 1855 (1272 H.) was issued to regulate tax-farming, which remained in force, somewhat modified, till 1914. (15)

Terms of Iltizam were shortened to one or two years in the hope that this would facilitate closer control since tax-farmers had to come back to the State at shorter intervals. Moreover, Iltizam was restricted to bidding for individual villages, not districts. (16) Guarantees were required from intending contractors that they possessed property up to the value of 50% of the tithe-farm they were prepared to take on. Further safeguards were provisions requiring assessment of crops by Multazims or their representatives within three days of notice given by cultivators so that Multazims would not use delays as a means to force cultivators to agree to excessive demands. Cultivators on the other hand were required to transport the Multazim's Tithe, which was collected in kind, to his stores provided they were no more than an hours distance from the village. In case of Multazim's stores being more distant the villagers were to be paid according to a fixed tariff, which in practice was not always the case. In case of non-payment of dues by villagers, the Multazims had recourse to the execution officer through an appeal to the Ottoman Governor of the District whose Zaptie Gendarmes were freely used to enforce collection as well as in guard duties.

on the threshing floor and in transport of grain.

The **Iltizam** applied to the collection of tithes, which was the periodic payment by the producer to the State and not on the collection of the entry fee (tapu) paid on the grant of tapu rights in Miri. Mulk land was subject to Werko taxes and not to tithe. (17)

Although the burden of the tithe, as its name implied was supposed to be equal to one-tenth of the gross produce, it was increased by an **Imperial Iradeh of 1886 A.D. (1302H.)** to 11.5% and by a second **Iradeh of 1897 A.D. (1313H.)** to 12.5%. (18)

The following few passages are a descriptive account of tithe collection given in *Palestine Exploration Quarterly* of 1894 by Samuel Bergheim. Bergheim was a European who was familiar with Palestinian agriculture as his own family owned farming land in the vicinity of Ramle. Although somewhat longer than usual quotes, the following passages from Bergheim’s article nevertheless are useful as they graphically depict the way Iltizam actually operated.

(18) ibid
"This tax is farmed out by the Government to the highest bidder, who in addition to the bribes which he must give to officials in order to secure the purchase has to pay a much larger sum than the actual value of the tithe, or tenth of the produce if honestly collected. The tithe owner, Ashar, is then expected to proceed to the village as soon as the harvest commences, but no villager is allowed to begin harvesting until the arrival of the 'Ashar or his representative. The 'Ashar, however, delays going to the village so long as he possibly can, and he creates all kinds of difficulties on order to force the cultivators to compound with him for a fixed quantity of grain and other produce of land in lieu of the fair tithe or tenth.

On arriving at a village, which he does with a host of servants, he for the first four or five days does nothing on the plea of fatigue, illness or other excuses and the community is obliged to provide him and his servants and his horses with food all the time.

He then starts by making a list of all the Shaddadin (peasants actually cultivating that season) and the number of the faddan of each (a measure of the area). He then rides round all the fields and professes to be surprised at the amount of the crop, exclaiming — though in reality it may be half the average — 'This is the heaviest crop I have ever seen. What a wonderfully plentiful year this is.' when probably it is anything but that.

He then returns to the village and calls all the Shaddadeen together with the Khatteeb (village priest) and the elders at their head. He then takes the list he has made and addresses one of the Shaddadeen, 'Oh, so and so', naming him, 'what a marvellous crop of wheat and barley you have in your mawaress (measure of small area of cultivated field). Wonderful. How plentiful God has been to you. Praise be to him. The natural reply given by the Shaddad thus addressed as well as by all present is, "El hamdu l'illah" (Thanks be to God). 'Well' continues the Ashar, 'I am glad you all agree with me that this is a plentiful year. Now how much do you think', addressing the shaddad, 'will your entire crop, barley, and wheat etc. amount to so many measures when threshed, and adds before the Shaddad has time to answer, 'I think so many - naming an amount five or six times as great as it could under even the most favourable circumstances produce.'
There is then a general outcry from all the Shaddadeen, 'Yes it is a blessing however much or little, but it can never make the amount you state.'

The farce is gone through several times, and over several days, until either one party or the other is wearied out. The villagers - that is each Shaddad- sometimes agree to pay a fixed quantity of grain or other produce in place of legal tenth. The 'Ashar then departs, but leaves a servant to watch that no grain is removed from the threshing floor after it has been brought there and threshed, until the quantities agreed to be paid by each Shaddad have been delivered to him.

Sometimes the villagers hold out and refuse to compound, and the Ashar then places several of his servants to watch that all the grain, (in the straw as harvested) is brought to the threshing floor. When all the harvesting is done, the straw still unthreshed as brought from the field belonging to each Shaddad is put up by him, the Shaddad, into what he considers ten equal stacks. The Ashar is then asked to choose one stack. This he does, but refuses for some days to have it threshed and winnowed (which the Shaddad is bound to do for him) and until this is done the Shaddad is not allowed to touch his own stakes.

After a day or two, the Ashar goes round to look at all his stacks representing the tithe, and having made the inspection he then calls his men and orders them to prepare their horses and leave the village immediately, 'I have been robbed of more than half of each stack belonging to me' (totally untrue, because the stacks given for the tithe have all been removed to another part of the threshing floor and have been closely watched night and day by the servants of the Ashar). 'I am going to put my case into the hands of the authorities.' In the end the villagers each and all agree to pay a certain number of measures of grain etc. in addition to the division already made, i.e. the stack already set apart for the Ashar. When this has been threshed and winnowed and a quantity sufficient for the supplementary amount agreed upon as above has been delivered, camels are provided by the villagers at their own expense to carry the grain of the Ashar to the chief town in the district. The Ashar then clear out together with his servants, and the Shaddadeen proceed with their own work of threshing etc.
I may add that I can safely say from close observations I have made during nearly ten years' farming in the Sharon plains near Ramle, that the amount collected by the Ashar rarely if ever, averages under ONE THIRD of the whole crops, instead of the legal TENTH viz 33 per cent, instead of 10 per cent.

Although it is not possible with the information available for Pre-Mandate Palestine to quantify with any appreciable degree of precision the extent to which resources were drained from the peasants through excessive taxation by tax-farmers in collusion with State officials, there is little doubt that such a state of affairs existed. Non-quantitative evidence derived from observations of European observers and from Mandate Government reports and memoranda on the subject of taxation in general(19) repeatedly criticised the 'venality' and corruption of tax farmers and Ottoman officials.

Two points however should be kept in mind. Firstly, tax-farmers had every incentive to extract from the peasants as much of the produce as possible since there was a rapid and sustained growth in the markets, domestic and foreign, where tax-farmers could dispose of their collections. Urban population was growing fast (as explained in Part I, Section Three) enabling the tax-farmers to convert whatever they collected from the peasants

in kind into money by selling into urban markets. Unlike the peasants who had to pay tithes as soon as the harvest was collected and before even threshing commenced, tax-farmers could afford to 'play the market' in the sense of waiting for most propitious time to sell into a strong market, making additional profits in the process.

Domestic market apart, there is evidence that Palestine, or at least the districts round Jaffa and Gaza, was a net exporter of peasant-produced agricultural products (e.g. wheat, barley, maize, olives etc. but excluding citrus - a plantation crop par excellence). From 1874 to 1889 Jaffa exported the equivalent of £2,280,000 Sterling in wheat, barley, maize, sesame seed and olive oil, while it imported £177,000 in wheat and flour, £6376 in barley and £12,000 in maize. (20) These exports were conducted by merchants and not by peasants.

Second point to be kept in mind is that "industry" of tax-farming was itself growing in complexity. Areas and concessions were sub-contracted while the 50% collateral required by the Government was a subject of negotiation between individuals where one would put up the guarantee in return for a higher share etc. This complexity was leading into a cycle where power, wealth

and influence were needed to gain tax-farming concessions in the first place, and once gained the concession would lead to more influence. Effectively this led to the exclusion of peasants from tax-farming on their own behalf, though they were permitted by law to do that. In addition it led to a growth in numbers and pervasiveness of tax-farmers whom the peasant sector had to endure and support.

Simultaneously with the Iltizam, another factor aided in the establishment and expansion of a landlord class, viz. usury and money-lending.

The practice of money lending was by no means the invention of the 19th Century for it was well known and practiced for centuries before. Whatever the social context of usury may have been prior to our period, however, two points deserve attention in examining usury in the context of late 19th Century Palestinian peasant society.

Firstly, as a practice it attracted more and more attention from the late 1860's onwards, almost in step with the growth of the power of the central State and the role of a landlord class. Admittedly this could have been due to the increase
in numbers of books published on the area due to easier travel by steamship and railways, and to increased European interest in the area. Until further research is done, however, the fact remains that books and articles published about the six or seven decades prior to the 1870's (21) did not rate usury as a major problem as did later books. The most pressing problems of the time were inter-peasant wars and general lack of security, while the most pressing problem of the last decades of the Ottoman period as it seemed to knowledgeable observers (22) was increasingly becoming the problem of usury. If anything one must assume that this topicality of usury reflected the timing and intensity of the practice.

The second point is that though the practice itself was ancient, its ramifications in the context of late 19th and early 20th Centuries were not.

Agricultural production, especially in the physical conditions of the Middle East, is by nature a risky and unpredictable undertaking. There is almost a certainty of a disastrous harvest occurring every few years and falling on whole districts, or just as likely, on individual villages and individuals within the village whose lands were adversely affected by the micro-

environment for that particular year. It was not unknown for yields on one piece of land to fall dramatically while the yield on an adjacent but slightly differently situated land not to fall at all (23). The reason may have been due accidents of rainfall or to the precise pattern of the scorching easterly wind for that year etc. Whatever the reason, at times individual peasants needed help from outside the resources of their own household to be able to survive till next harvest.

Normally, as has been indicated before, this help would have been forthcoming in the context of clan and kinship social organisation, where relatives, depending on degree of closeness, were socially obliged to help by providing food that year to be returned later or to be repaid by altering the terms of crop-sharing arrangements to the benefit of the donor until, and only until, this temporary disequilibrium has been corrected. The recipient of aid for that year was naturally expected to give aid to others should they need it in future years. However, this cycle of self-help and correction of short-term disequilibria within the clan itself was being increasingly short-circuited to the extent that surpluses were being removed from the peasant sector by the Iltizam and like practices, thus undermining the clan's ability for action in this sphere. To remove 30% of the

gross produce by the tax-farmers, as has been suggested in the previous pages, seriously impaired the peasants' ability to build up and carry over any reserves from good years to frequent bad ones. The individual peasant could not be helped by other peasants barely having enough for themselves after the tax-farmer's visit.

The result was the inevitability of resorting to money lenders. The following quotation from a European observer at the time is very instructive,(24)

"The peasant cultivators.....seldom lay by anything in good seasons and so are almost to a man in debt. Capitalists in the cities are always ready to lend their money at extravagant rates of interest, such as 2 or 3 per cent a month. Such loans encumber the patrimony of the farmer with hopeless mortgages, and in the end the owner is forced to yield up his title, and become Sherik el Hawa (Partner of the Wind or tenant at will). Yet such is the tendency of things to go on as they have begun, that such tenants usually remain in the ancestral house, and work the ancestral acres as if they were their own) where he and his ancestors were once proprietors. In this way, as individual capitalists favour certain villages, they gradually absorb all the property of the peasants, and the villagers become their metayers (in Arabic Muzari'in) and enjoy for their work a variable proportion of the produce. If the seed is furnished by the proprietor, the peasant usually gets but a fourth of the net yield."

The ramifications of usury were twofold. Firstly repayment of borrowed capital and interest by the peasant necessarily meant a transfer a further share of the produce to non-peasant sector which when coupled with the effects of the Iltizam put the peasants in an increasing spiral of debt and dependence.

Secondly, usury assumed an increasing role in undermining peasant society as it was based on kinship relations and creating the preconditions for the emergence of a new system of land use that was not so based. The changeover was neither a quick nor an evenly spread process, over time and across the country. Rather, it proceeded in stages which can be outlined briefly.

(1) The first was a gradual increase in the proportion of the total crop which was placed on the market. Whatever the usurers and the tax-farmers, who were often the same men or related to each other, extracted in kind from the peasants in lieu of tithes and interest and capital repayments, they sold in the domestic and export markets. Part of this function had been performed by the peasants themselves who used to sell part of their produce if a surplus existed in exchange for products they needed from the towns. To this extent, this transfer in favour of tax-farmers and money lenders of this function was a pre-emption of this
task and exclusion of the peasants from as much of it as possible.

(ii) The second stage was a similar increase in the proportion of land being placed on the market. The rate of extraction of resources from the peasant sector meant that sooner or later numerous individuals would be unable to meet their capital and interest repayments and this would lead to loss of title to land which by the 1880's was enforceable in the courts of law.

Once land had passed into the hands of usurers who either sold it off or retained it themselves, land itself acquired a place in the production process different from the one which had been placed on it by the clan prior to its alienation. Before, land was an instrument of production to whom the peasant was guaranteed access by virtue of his membership of the clan through Masha' and periodic redistribution. Now, the landlord, through the exercise of private property right including that of withholding land from selected groups or individuals, gave the land a value dependent on that monopoly of it; a value expressed in terms of rent where rent had not existed before in communally-organised society.

Two features of this process of commercialisation of land could
be observed here. One is that landlordship could and did transitionally co-exist with communal organisation and its manifestations of Masha' and periodic redistribution. However, this usually lasted only to the point at which the landlord could force permanent partition of land on the clan.

Co-existence was possible because initially what the landlord gained in private-property right from the peasant who could not repay his debt was that peasant's share (sahm) of clan land, that is to say the fraction of land he was entitled to at the redistribution but not any definite area of land. Should communal organisation still predominate to the extent of undertaking further periodic redistributions then the landlord received a "new" piece of land proportional to his share but over which he still held the same right of monopoly and rent. However, the landlords did their best to impede periodic redistributions and lengthen the intervals between so as to gain permanent right to the land by prescription especially that the land law looked favourably at permanent partition of Masha'.

Secondly, the landlords tended to leave the peasants themselves to undertake production in the same way as before, for which the landlord received a rent (traditionally one-tenth of the produce
although this was rising as Part IV, Section Two will show.) If the landlord happened to have more interest in undertaking farming himself, which, except in the citrus growing areas of the coast, was not common at the time, crop-sharing arrangements between landlords and peasants took account of the fact of ownership. Most important however, was that this right of the landlord could be bought and sold freely without reference to the clan and above its head, something which the peasants themselves could not do when communally organised.

(iii) The third stage was the increase in the number of peasants seeking wage employment on or off the land. Briefly, it could be said that once the individual peasant lost his automatic right of access to land which was guaranteed by his clan but which now had to be handed over to usurer/landlord in lieu of repayment of debt, that peasant had to depend on whatever wages he could earn in the countryside or in the city to keep him alive. This process itself was greatly helped by the general growth in population (25) and by the general scramble for land (26) which pushed the land/labour ratio in an unfavourable direction as Part IV, Section One will show.

(25) See Part I, Section Three, p. 76, 111 and related discussion.
(26) See Part III, Section One.
Apart from **Iltizam** and usury, the third feature that aided the rise of a landlord class was the exercise of political power within the Ottoman Empire to deflect the Land Code from its original intentions (given earlier) and into increased recognition of private property rights in **Miri** until the distinction between **Miri** and **Mulk** became blurred, though not totally extinct.

Following the first series of laws promulgated in 1858 and 1859 (1274H and 1275H) setting out the outlines of the land Code and laying down the requirement for registration of tapu rights in **Miri**, subsequent legislation was enacted which was "aimed at the modernisation of the Ottoman Land Law and also the enlargement of the interest of **Miri** holder." (27) This enlargement of the interest of **Miri** holder in the direction of private property rights in the modern sense, proceeded in a number of spheres.

(a) First, was the liberalisation of the right of **Miri** holder permitting him to buy and sell his interest.

In Islamic Law, (the **Shari'a**) there was no restriction on the freedom of sale and disposition of **Mulk** property. According to Goadby & Doukhan (28), this contrasted with feudal European law where there was a distinction between moveable and immovable

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(28) ibid, p.37.
property in this respect. The Ottoman Land Laws before and after the Land Code only concerned themselves with the regulation of the process of sale but neither in theory nor in practice did they seek to limit the Mulk holder's freedom of sale.

Before the liberalisation however, the situation regarding Miri was different. The Land Code, by invoking the principle of "eminent domain of the State" regarded the Miri holder as only having a personal interest in the land, which was neither alienable nor heritable. Disposition of Miri interest could only be made with the leave of the Land Registry (Daftar Khani) given upon an official request by the Miri holder in a procedure set out in detail by the Code. Any disposition of a Miri interest by the holder was necessarily limited to the Tassaruf of the land and it could not affect the Raqaba. In Ottoman law such transfer was not regarded as a sale since it was not a transfer of property but merely a transfer of "right of usufruct". Transfer of Miri was designated Feragh (29) as opposed to the term Bey' (30) which applied to Mulk.

Not that these legal restrictions on sale of Miri—prior to official liberalisation—materially hindered the process of acquiring Miri land by the landlords. The provisions of the

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(29) Feragh', meaning transfer - the term derived from the Arabic term for vacancy.
(30) Bey', literally meaning sale.
Code as to the necessity of obtaining prior official consent were easily met with by landlords able to bribe the relevant officials into granting their consent.

But bribery is one thing and legal sanction is another. Now the Law itself eventually changed in response to pressure so that the Law of Disposition of 1331H (1913 AD) fully and explicitly recognised the right of every holder of Miri and Waqf to transfer, mortgage, or lease his land without requiring the consent of the official, and thus "in effect superseded Article 36 of the Land Code and all other provisions making requisite the consent of the Official to transfers and mortgages." (31)

Moreover, the Law of 1331 H helped the process of liberalisation of the powers of transfer and mortgage by rationalising some of the complexities that emanated from previous distinction between Miri and Mulk. Before the Law, any improvements to Miri land (such as trees and buildings) undertaken by the Miri holder were themselves considered Mulk and this led to an anomalous situation where the land itself answered the law of Miri and these improvements answered the law of Mulk. The 1331H Law now stipulated that trees and buildings and other improvements affected after its promulgation would henceforth follow the land by mere association.

and become Miri, i.e. subject to one process of law, whether in sale or inheritance.

(b) The enlargement of powers of sale was accompanied with the enlargement of powers of mortgage of Miri and its use as collateral for securing credit. As with the original intention towards sale, the Land Code did not recognise Miri as valid collateral since such collateral or pledge had to be capable of being validly sold and was required to be the Mulk of the pledgor (Land Code Article 116). (32)

As long as restrictions on sale of Miri applied, a Miri holder could not wholly pledge his interest in Miri. All that the Code allowed was that the creditor, in case of default by the pledgor, could assume possession of the latter's interests in the Tassaruf until and only until the latter discharged his debt. (33) Previously when the restrictions were in operation, the parties to a mortgage had to conform to the procedure laid down by the "Tapu Law of 1275H", which broadly emphasized the States "eminent domain" by requiring prior consent of the Official to such an arrangement. As such a private mortgage was null and void, ("Tapu Law, Article 30"). (34)

(33) ibid, p.164.
(34) ibid, p.165.
However, as soon as the rights of Miri holders to sell the Tassaruf in Miri were admitted and enlarged by subsequent legislation, it became possible for the creditor irrevocably to sell the Tassaruf of the debtor in case of default, subject only to any explicit agreements between the two as to redemption.\(^{(35)}\)

The previous paragraphs emphasized at length the importance of changes in the Land Law because without these changes the circle by which the peasant could be separated from his land would not have been complete. This circle consisted of all the elements discussed so far: tax-farming, usury etc. Without these changes in the Law, it would not have done the landlord much good if he lent the peasants money and went all through the steps outlined above to expropriate the peasant's land, and when he came to it, he found that the Law did not permit him to transfer this land from the peasant to himself. Nor, just as important, would it have done the landlord much good if he discovered that he could not have the "commercial freedom" of selling or mortgaging this land as in modern business practice. The land would not have been a commodity to be freely bought, sold or mortgaged for profit. This would have defeated the whole purpose of the exercise.

(c) The third sphere of Land Law reform after the passage of the Land Code was in rights of succession and inheritance in Miri. As with right of sale and mortgage, the right of succession in Miri was originally very limited. The holder was deemed to have only a personal interest in Miri which did not limit the State's right to dispose of this land upon it becoming Mahlul on his death. Preference was indicated in the Code to granting Tapu rights to the children of the deceased holder but "the right thus accorded to persons designated not being a right of inheritance according to Moslem law, the person entitled to take the holding upon the death could not be correctly described as heir to the deceased. He had merely a staturory right to a grant (of Tapu right and upon payment of Tapu fees) in his place. This distinction between inheritance is marked by the use of the special term "Intigal" (transmission) to denote the latter." (36)

In other words, since the State had the power to grant or withhold Tapu grant then the children of the deceased were only assured of a prior consideration to such a grant by the State, but no compulsion on the latter's part to grant it.

In the vast majority of cases this pre-emptive power of the State did not prevent the children of the deceased from acquiring the Tapu grant themselves upon payment of Tapu fees. In the course of time, there were changes in the law that limited the State's

freedom and enlarged that of the Miri holder, but not to the same extent that powers of sale and mortgage were enlarged. By the end of the Ottoman era, the State still had considerably more real powers in determining inheritance than in either sphere of sale and mortgage.

The gradual enlargement of the interest of Miri holder was by a series of laws, notably the Law of 1284H and 1292H which, though they did not make the extension of the right of transmission in Miri and Waqf compulsory in all cases, nevertheless limited the State's right to grant Tapu rights to whoever it chose. The law now laid down an order of priority for persons who had a preferential right to obtain a grant of Tapu right upon the death of the original holder. So long as these rights existed the land was not pure Mahlul upon death of the holder but was said to be subject to Right of Tapu (Mustaheksi Tapu).

The Law that governed inheritance in Miri into the Mandate was the Provisional Ottoman Law of 1331H (1913 Law of Inheritance). (37)

This Law still treated Mulk and Miri as different species of

property notwithstanding other Laws which were bringing the two closer together. The major restriction on inheritance applied to Miri as opposed to Mulk was that Miri could not be bequeathed by will but devolved to the heirs (now defined and assured of their right) according to a special law of succession.

The major feature of this law of succession was partible inheritance between male and female descendants. This was a major departure from Islamic Law where the male inherited two shares as opposed to one share inherited by the female. It was moreover, contrary to the patrilineal bias of peasant society as based on kinship group where for example periodic redistribution of Masha' land was accorded to males only, females being counted with their husbands or their fathers. In practice however, females were usually persuaded by their families to waive their right to partible inheritance in favour of their brothers, though the procedure specified by Law required assurances that no duress had been brought on the female to waive her right. The State itself charged fees both on inheritance by the female in the first place, and upon her waiving her right and was consequently not so averse to a Law that went contrary to accepted custom in the land.
In showing the degree of change in direction that the Ottoman Land Code underwent between the passage of the Land Code and 1914, it is worth examining this passage from the Law of Disposition of 1331H. (1913 A.D.-Article 5 (38):-

"Art. 5. Whoever owns by virtue of a formal title-deed, Mi'ri or Wakf land may transfer it absolutely or subject to redemption, and may lease it and lend it and mortgage it as security for a debt, and he alone has the right to all increase and to full use of it and to all the crops which grow naturally upon it; he is also entitled to cultivate the fields, pastures and gardens and cut down the timber or vines upon it, and, if there are buildings upon it, to destroy them or pull them down and convert the land on which they are erected into cultivated land. He may also convert his land into gardens by planting vines or trees or fruit trees provided that the ownership remains with the State.

In other words, the powers of the Mi'ri holder, as defined by Article 5 above, were so wide that by time the above article was passed in the last few years of Ottoman presence in Palestine, the similarities of Mi'ri to Mulk overwhelmingly outweighed their dissimilarity. That dissimilarity was now confined to inheritance (i.e. inadmissability of testamentary disposition of Mi'ri save by a special law of inheritance; that Mi'ri could not be turned Waqf and finally that Mi'ri was subject to Tithes.

The last two differences were to prove of minor importance as the State (Ottoman and Mandate) soon evolved ways of taxing all categories of land including Mulk which did not substantially differentiate between them.

In conclusion therefore, it could be seen that by World War I, three processes were very well advanced. These processes were carried forward into the Mandate years and were to form a major influence upon the development of peasant society up to 1939, the end of our period.

The first was the establishment on the ground of the power of the Central State, first in the military sphere, and then increasingly in the sphere of civil administration and legislation. The second process was the creation by the State of a body of law which initially emphasized its monopoly of extracting resources from the peasant producers by way both of Tithe and by Tapu fees which the peasant paid on entry to Miri.

The third process was the creation of a landlord class which used the initial inability of the Central State to administer
what it legislated for, in order to advance itself. Through the Iltizam and power of patronage and privileged access to Ottoman centres of provincial power, this class managed to extract resources from the peasants, but more important it managed to gain control of the primary tool of the production process itself, land. A growing cycle of peasant poverty, indebtedness and loss of title to land was accelerating.

In step with its growing power, the landlord class managed to alter the Land Law so that unfettered rights of private property in land could be recognised in title, sale & disposition and in succession and inheritance. By 1913, the law recognised land as a commodity that could be freely bought and sold.

At this point however, it is important to keep in mind that the Ottoman Land Laws, or any other laws, were not changed in response to pressures from landlords (or any other section of the community) originating in what was to become Mandate Palestine. Palestine was too small in area and population to induce such changes by itself. Rather, these were changes that came in response to pressure from other, more influential parts of the vast Empire. It is possible that these laws affected other parts of the Empire differently.
from the way they affected Palestine though the extent of this cannot be determined by this thesis.

Secondly, in the context of Palestine, the term "landlord" should not conjure images of vast estates and fabulously wealthy landowners. Since quantitative analysis of landholding is given in Part IV of this thesis, it is sufficient to note here that the typical size of the typical landlord's holding was in tens of acres rather than in hundreds or thousands. Admittedly, large tracts of land were registered in the names of large landowners like the Sursocks and the Tayyans who owned tens of thousands of dunums in the Jezreel Valley and the Northern Coastal Plain. But these were areas with relatively sparse peasant population and were procured through the very same process outlined above viz. urban-based "notables" using privileged access to and bribery of Ottoman officials in Beirut to transfer vast tracts of land into their own name.

Regardless of size of holding however, what is important is that the function of the small landlord and that of the magnate were the same. To both land was a commodity to be bought and sold for profit. So was the produce of that land and so was the labour power that tilled it, including his family's labour power as well.
As an agent of change, there is little doubt that the Mandatory Government of Palestine played a primary role. With the setting up of the British-led and trained Administration there was set up an instrument of change of an efficiency and pervasiveness which has not been seen in Palestine before. The long years of Ottoman neglect, benign or otherwise, came to a close, although it should be said that the Ottoman Administration itself was increasingly improving in efficiency in the years leading to 1914.

With the Administration as an instrument however, came policies that were not merely extension and refinement of the policies of yesterday. In pursuance of its own Imperial interests, Britain had arranged the "grant" of the Palestine Mandate by the League
of Nations to itself and enshrined in that Mandate the provisions of the Balfour Declaration which it, as a Government, made to the Zionists. In it, it promised to facilitate a Jewish National Home in Palestine.

Had all these policies of the British Government been merely concerned with "politics", then they would have been no concern of this thesis. However, they had, as they could not but have, a strong effect on peasant society in Palestine.

Some of these effects were indirect in the sense that the influx of Jewish immigrants and Jewish capital into concentrated areas of Palestine like the three major cities and the Coastal Plains and the north, created opportunities and threats to the peasants which would not otherwise have been created. Job opportunities in the building trade, industrial and farm labour, road building programmes which though financed and managed by the Government were nevertheless so influenced by Jewish presence, are but few examples of many that could be given.

Above all, from the point of view of the Arabs who at the inception of the Mandate constituted around 90% of the population, the overall policy of the creation of the Jewish National Home
meant that an inevitable bias was built-in the policies and execution of those policies by the Palestine Government in favour of the Jewish National Home and against the interests of the Arab majority, the greatest part of which was peasant. It was not a bias out of love or hate of Arabs or Jews by the British Mandate officials, nor any of the simplistic explanations given by apologists of the Mandate. It was an institutionalised bias emanating from the requirements of the Mandate. It was a bias necessary to fulfill the "Jewish National Home" requirements of the Mandate, whether right or wrong.

Thus what the indirect effects of these policies did was to change the overall environment in which peasant society operated. As these indirect effects of these policies would take volumes to write about, it has been decided not to include them in this thesis except when unavoidablely necessary.

However, these policies also had a direct impact on peasant society. These will be discussed in the following three Sections of this Part. The first, relating to the loss of land by the peasant sector mainly to Jewish purchases, was undoubtedly a direct and unequivocal result of the Jewish National Home policies enshrined in the Mandate. The second effect, discussed in Section Three - as
to the Government's policy towards exposure of peasant society to the world market, was influenced to a large extent by the desire of the Government to "protect the consumer", mostly urban Jews at the expense of the producer, mostly Arab peasant.

However, there were other areas of Government policy which were less influenced by the Jewish National Home policy, chief among these was Government's policy towards taxation of peasant society, as discussed in Section Two. In that the Government was governed by the legacy of the past in terms of the old pre-1914 forms of taxation and the time necessary to change them. The vision as to what should take the place of the old taxes, and consequently on whom they should fall and by how much, was not a legacy of the past but a result of conscious policy. This policy was to use the taxation system to undermine peasant society in favour of the "progressive farmer" as Mandate officials used to put it. That this was the aim is beyond doubt as the relevant Section will show.
Part III.

Section One.

Government Policy towards loss of land by Peasant Sector.

By the time of the British Occupation in 1917/18, Palestine peasantry was still in occupation of the largest share of cultivable land in Palestine, a position which in spite of gradual and cumulative loss, it was to maintain till the end of the Mandate in 1948.

Before going any further, however, it is important to note that when one is speaking of share of land being occupied by peasant society, a problem of method immediately crops up. Since Government Land Registers and statistics were more concerned with registering 'legal' than 'economic' ownership of land, examination of Registers
does not immediately reveal how a particular area of land was
being farmed, by peasant methods and for their ends or otherwise.

Here it is important to reiterate the distinction already
gone into in Part II, that 'legal' ownership of large tracts of
land by large landlords did not necessarily preclude the same land
from being occupied and farmed by peasants, as tenants, in
essentially the same way as lands actually owned by peasants
in the manner outlined in Part II, Sections One and Two. Legal
ownership and land use are two different concepts that may or may
not coincide. Consequently the distinction between peasant and
non-peasant land use will not become clear merely from a cursory
look at Land Registries.

What land belonged to peasant society at any particular time,
therefore, is a matter of assumption and interpretation on the
part of the researcher.

The central assumption of this Section is that, as peasant
society was in possession of by far the largest share of cultivable
land area at the beginning of the Mandate, lands gained by
non-peasant interests - if it could be demonstrated that these
interests were fundamentally different from peasant sector -
were lands that constituted a net loss to the area held by the peasant sector. The relationship of the peasant community to these lands then was radically altered from holding them in the manner outlined in Part II, Sections One and Two, to a type of relationship where the peasant sector was provider of labour power as on citrus lands, or lost touch with them altogether as in a growing proportion of Jewish-owned land.

The balance of land not lost in this way could then be said to have remained in peasant hand to be farmed either in the old way, or, as will be shown in Part IV, Section Three and others, to have become the subject of struggle between peasants and landlords.

As far as Palestine was concerned, only in two cases could it be said that transfer of land ownership also meant a clear-cut transfer to another sector. The first and by far the largest, was the acquisition of land by Jewish interests. The second was the conversion of land into citrus plantations, whether owned by Jews or Arabs.
Jewish Land Purchases.

Together with large-scale immigration, Jewish land purchases were probably the most explosive political issue of the Mandate period. Numerous books, articles, government reports and commissions of Inquiry were concerned with the issue, so much so that the correspondence, memoranda and minutes about the subject take up at least half of all documentation on economic matters found in the Public Records Office in London.

This thesis however, is not concerned with the minutiae of the policy-making process itself, the lobbying, the negotiations or the frequent policy volte-faces. Rather it is concerned with the fact that Jewish land purchases—because of the unique character and aims of the Zionist movement which fuelled and controlled most of them, reduced the total area of land available to peasant society in two ways. First was by direct reduction through buying from the landlords, the Government or the peasants themselves. The second was by Jewish purchases from landlords or Government of lands which were extensively grazed and farmed
by semi-nomads, but which formed the 'land reserves' that peasant society would have moved into in the course of time, as it had been doing in the course of its lateral expansion, had these lands not been pre-empted by Jewish purchases. Part I, Section Three has already shown that around 10% of villages in existence in 1931 were founded after the time of the "Survey of Western Palestine" in the 1860's.

Before discussing the extent and effects of these purchases, however, it is important to note the broad outlines of the Mandate Government policy towards Jewish Land Purchases, since without the permission of the Government, it is doubtful whether Jewish purchases would have reached the extent they did.

Under the terms of the Mandate by which the League of Nations "entrusted" Britain with governing Palestine, the British Government saw its commitments in the following terms (1) :-

1. Article 2 of the Mandate provides that the Mandatory shall be responsible for placing the country under such political, administrative and economic conditions as will secure the establishment of the Jewish National Home.

2. Article 6 of the Mandate provides that the Administration of Palestine, while ensuring the rights and position of other sectors of the population are not prejudiced, shall encourage, in co-operation with the Jewish Agency, close settlement by Jews on the land, including State lands and waste lands not required for public purposes.

3. Article 11 of the Mandate states "...It (the Administration) shall introduce a land system appropriate to the needs of the country having regard among other things to the desirability of promoting close settlement and intensive cultivation of the land."

The Palestine Government was therefore committed to facilitating Jewish acquisition of land in Palestine. However, with the establishment in 1920, of the Civil Administration under Herbert Samuel, the first High Commissioner, the broad guidelines of the Mandate Articles were supplemented by other policy considerations dictated by the interests of the Mandatory Power itself. Chief among these considerations was that "It must be mainly the work of the Jewish people itself to bring about such conditions in Palestine as will secure the establishment of the National Home; and the principal task of the Government is to remove any disabilities or incapacities which would impede the fulfilment of this purpose. The action of the Government in regard to Jewish settlement on the land has been similar to that taken with regard to immigration; that is it has removed unfavourable discrimination imposed by Ottoman legislation and given equal opportunity to all persons to acquire land and register it in their own names."(2)

(2) Draft of Report of Administration to the League of Nations for the period July 1920 to December 1922, PRO CO733746, p. 15.
This the Government did by allowing those Jews who were not considered citizens of the Ottoman Empire and therefore barred from owning land under the Ottoman regime, to do so as well as allowing them to register in their own names lands which were registered in allowable names by such category of Jewish persons in order to circumvent Ottoman regulations. Moreover, the Mandate Government allowed corporations to own land, thus opening the door to such major land purchasing bodies as the Jewish National Fund.

But the British Government excluded the option of large-scale expropriation of Arab lands in favour of turning them over to Jewish settlers. It was foreseen that such action would involve Britain from the start in a lengthy, expensive and damaging process where large military forces would have to be kept in Palestine to enforce large-scale expropriation. With the large and expensive garrison already necessary in Palestine, and with the damage to Britain's standing in the world and among the Moslem people in the Empire, the British Government was simply not prepared to undertake such a policy openly.
Nor was the British Government ready to countenance a covert policy of expediting land transfers to Jewish interests by expropriation on the grounds of public interest. Herbert Samuel attempted to set such a precedent in 1923 by expropriating land in Athlit/Kabbara/Zor el Zarka in the Tul Karem Sub-District to which the Arabs had full and recognised legal title, on the grounds that P.I.C.A. (Jewish Colonisation Association) would be acting in the "public interest" by carrying out works involving drainage of marshes. Samuel, however, was firmly told by the Colonial Office that "strict proof should be required of the plea of public utility" (3), and that "if the work were exclusively for the benefit of the public..... it should be carried out by Government itself."(4)

Apart from the grant of fully-owned Government land (State Domain) in Concessions to Jewish bodies, which the Articles of the Mandate required and to which the Colonial Office did not object, so long as the cost in terms of Arab protests was not judged unduly prohibitive, the main avenue of land acquisition by Jews was to be by purchase of Arab owned land. This was especially the case when it was discovered by a Government Commission appointed in 1922 to report on the extent of lands "at the disposal of the Government

(3) Colonial Office to High Commissioner, Desp. dated 1.4.23 - PRO C0733/42, 1923
(4) Colonial Office to High Commissioner, Desp. dated 29.9.23 - PRO C0733/48, 1923.
that "at first sight there would not appear to be any land available for fresh settlers"(5).

Having excluded expropriation, overt or covert, and having a limited area of State Domain to give in concessions to Jewish interests, the major avenue of access left to the Jewish interests was through purchase on the open market. Sooner or later however, this policy of purchase was bound to exhaust the supply of land that could be purchased with relative ease. "It has been recognised from the Occupation that the development of the National Home by means of Jewish immigration and settlement of the land would sooner or later raise the question of the "present position" of the Arabs on the land, since the area of cultivable land in Palestine is limited and is wholly cultivated, (6) whereas the population is increasing rapidly both naturally and by immigration." (7)

In other words, the Administration was content to permit the Jewish agencies to purchase as much land as they wanted as long as these purchases, which invariably resulted in eviction or departure of those previously in occupation of such land, did not result in "a landless and discontented class, which was a potential danger to the country." (8)

(6) My own emphasis.
(8) ibid, p.1.
Such a class, as the Colonial Office knew full well from its experience in India and Egypt, (9) meant an expensive outlay in terms of military garrisons in order to keep law and order in the country. In legal terms moreover, this fear was provided for in the Articles of the Mandate where it was laid down that "it was the duty of the Administration to ensure that the position of the Arabs is not prejudiced by Jewish immigration." (10)

This fundamental contradiction in aims of Government policy to Jewish land purchases was reflected in its application on the ground, which - apart from the "freezing action" of the Military Administration between 1917-1920 of disallowing any transactions in land and leaving the Land Registries closed as long the Military Administration was in effect - swayed from one extreme to another, from turning a blind eye to total prohibition.

Three periods may be discerned in the evolution of Government policy towards Jewish land purchases.

First Period.

The first and the longest period lasted from the inception of the Civil Administration in July 1920 till the Arab Rebellion in 1929 and its aftermath. Paradoxically, the period started with provisions of the Land Transfer Ordinance of September 1920, soon to be repealed, which went counter to the major theme of Government policy in this first period. Though the Administration reopened the land registers and repealed the restrictive provisions of the Ottoman laws which had hitherto prevented Jewish corporations from buying land openly, the aims of the first Land Transfer Ordinance of 1920 were to give the Administration control of disposition of landed property in order firstly to safeguard the occupants and secondly to prevent speculation.

Therefore, it ordered that any land transactions had to have the written consent of the Administration, and that such consent would be given only if the person acquiring the property fulfilled the following conditions: "a) He must be a resident of Palestine, b) He shall not obtain under this Ordinance property exceeding in value LE 3000 or in area 300 dunums of agricultural land and 30 dunums of urban land, c) He himself intends to
cultivate or develop the land immediately." Furthermore, the Administration shall also withhold its consent, unless it "is satisfied that in case of agricultural land either the person transferring the property if he is in possession, or the tenant in occupation, if the property is leased, will retain sufficient land in the district or elsewhere for the maintenance of himself and his family."

The Report on Land Settlement at the end of 1921 (The Abramson Report (11)), however, reached the conclusion that "we are of opinion that every encouragement should be given to landowners to sell their excess areas and that there should be no restriction on sale.....The Land Transfer Ordinance, 1920, has restricted sales and in consequence has shackled the free flow of money....we recommend therefore a revision of the Land Transfer Ordinance removing the restrictions on sales." (12)

High Commissioner Samuel himself, judging from repeated telegrams to the Colonial Office extolling the virtues and popularity of repealing the 1920 Ordinance (13) was strongly in favour of repealing these restrictions.

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(11) All Reports, apart from their official title and date, will also be referred to by the name of the Chairman of the Committee.


(13) For example, Telegram dated 22.11.21 claiming that "Restrictions in land transfer are unpopular....suggest to be authorised to announce abolition of restrictions locally". PRO C0733/7, 1921.
it was foreseen by the Administration that to allow large scale purchases and consequent evictions of Arab occupants on the one hand, while retaining an official policy of restrictions which was being ignored in the other, was detrimental to the credibility of the Administration. In an internal Colonial Office minute on the recommendations of the Abramson Report, Palestine Government Secretary Eric Mills wrote, ".....when the Zionists can buy from Mr George Sursock [a Lebanese landlord living in Beirut] over 65,000 dunums of land in the Galilee district near Jezreel, the restrictive clauses then become a farce. As regards the large sale just quoted, I heard just before I left Palestine that it would entail the removal of eight Arab villages from one locality to another. If that is the case, it follows that the restrictive clauses designed for the protection of the tenants do not meet with their wishes." (14)

The Government then drastically amended that Ordinance in December 1921 completely abrogating the anti-speculation provisions and leaving intact only a diluted form of protection for occupants, whereby a tenant (as opposed to a smallholder, the labourers of a tenant or any other class of occupant) were supposed to be left "sufficient land in the district or elsewhere for the maintenance of himself and his family." This amended Ordinance

(14) Internal Colonial Office Memo dated 27.11.1921. PRO CO733/7, 1921.
remained the corner-stone of government policy till the turn of the decade.

Second Stage.

The second period in the evolution of government policy towards Jewish land purchases followed on from the first. The emergence of the question of land sales together with immigration, as the primary political issues in the country was emphasized by Arab demands in the Arab Rebellion of 1929 and the findings of the Shaw Commission which was appointed to investigate into the causes of the rebellion and which reported in March 1930.

Without quantifying, for the moment, the results of the first period in terms of area purchased and occupants evicted, the broad sweep of the effects of these policies became apparent when the Shaw Commission reported that

"the position arising from the dispossession of Arab tenants as a result of the sale to Jews of the lands they were cultivating, had reached an acute stage. The Commission reached the conclusion that there was no alternative land to which persons evicted could remove and that in consequence a landless and discontented class was being created. They advised that unless some solution could be found to deal with this the question would remain a constant source of discontent and a potential cause of future disturbances." (15)

This judgement on the effects of the first period in Government policy was followed by the suggested remedy which formed the core of the second period viz. that "In the view of the Commission, Palestine could not support a larger agricultural population than it carried in 1930, unless methods of farming were radically changed." (16)

Following the Shaw Report, the British Government sent Sir John Hope Simpson to Palestine in the autumn of 1930 to examine on the spot the questions of immigration, land settlement and development.

Hope Simpson's conclusions were that at the time of his Report, August 1930, "with the present methods of Arab cultivation there was no margin of land available for agricultural settlement by new immigrants with the exception of such undeveloped land as various Jewish organisations held in reserve." (17) To Sir John Hope Simpson, the situation was summarised in his belief that "It is the duty of the Administration, under the Mandate to ensure the position of the Arabs is not prejudiced by Jewish immigration. It is also the duty under the Mandate to encourage the close settlement of Jews on the land, subject always to the former condition. It is only possible to reconcile these apparently conflicting duties by an active policy of

(17) Internal Colonial Office, Memorandum regarding Mr Ramsay MacDonald's letter to Dr Weizmann of the 13th February 1931, with special reference to its bearing upon the proposals recently approved in principle for restricting the sale of land in certain areas of Palestine, PRO CO733/290/75072/MOST SECRET file, 1936, p.4.
agricultural development having as its object close settlement on the land and intensive cultivation by both Arabs and Jews." (18)

Apart from his principal recommendation that Government should undertake an Agricultural Development Scheme "whereby the fellah's farming methods would be improved, so that he would be able to gain a reasonable livelihood from a smaller area of land than that which had previously been essential", Hope Simpson maintained that "until the scheme was worked out the control of ALL disposition of land should rest with the authority in charge of development. Transfers were only permitted in so far as they did not interfere with that scheme." (19)

It was understood, however that since the Development Scheme was on a very large scale affecting the whole country, this power to control all disposition of land effectively gave the High Commissioner a powerful right of veto over land transfers.

A third recommendation of the Hope Simpson Report was to hold an investigation into the number of landless Arabs.

These three main recommendations, among other minor ones, were embodied in the White paper of 1930. The White Paper envisaged

(19) ibid, p.2.
two types of action. The first was to be based on two draft Ordinances received in March 1930 from Sir John Chancellor, then High Commissioner: a) The Transfer of Agricultural Land Ordinance which conferred upon the Government control over all disposition of agricultural land belonging to "a person who was an Arab in favour of a person not an Arab should not be operative unless made in writing and approved by the High Commissioner"(20); b) An Ordinance to Amend the Protection of Cultivators Ordinance 1929 which provided that no order for eviction should be made unless the landlord satisfied the Court that the tenancy had been validly determined and that adequate provision had been made for the livelihood of the tenant.

"The Secretary of State for the Colonies was inclined to approve the enactment of these two ordinances as temporary measures pending a final decision on land policy. In an accompanying Government Statement on the subject (21) in May 1930, it was mentioned that legislation was to be introduced with the object of controlling disposition of agricultural lands in such a manner as to prevent dispossession of the indigenous agricultural population and that these temporary measures would be superseded in any case by such permanent enactment as might be decided upon when future policy was determined upon in the light of Hope Simpson's Report." (22)

(20) Internal Colonial Office, Memorandum Palestine - land Legislation, dated 19.5.1932, PRO CO733/217/97072/Pt.1, 2 & SECRET file, 1932, p.3. (21)
In other words, Government control over Jewish land purchases was to cover all of Palestine, albeit only for a limited period as declared. However, judging from reports and correspondence, it was the intention of the Palestine Government under John Chancellor to enforce the restrictions on purchases as the norm, throwing the burden of proof on the purchaser to prove that his particular case would not lead to eviction of cultivators – whether tenants, small owners or agricultural labourers. The realisation that the British Government was aiming for such a course of action, with the publication of the White Paper in October 1930,

"led to a storm of protest from the Jews throughout the world and to organised pressure upon His Majesty's Government both in Parliament and outside to induce them to modify that statement. ....His Majesty's Government viewed the political situation created by this campaign with such gravity that on the 6th November 1930, the Cabinet appointed a Cabinet Committee to consider the Palestine situation.....Great pressure was exerted by the Jews to induce His Majesty's Government to accept modifications and to attenuate as far as possible the meaning to be attached to various passages in the White Paper to which objections were felt by the Jews, and so impressed were His Majesty's Government with the importance of going as far as possible to meet Jewish wishes in this respect that they felt obliged to disregard the strong protests received from Sir John Chancellor, then High Commissioner for Palestine and , after prolonged discussion with the Departmental representatives, very considerable concessions were made."(23)

(23) Memorandum regarding Mr Ramsay MacDonald's letter to Dr Weizmann of the 13th February 1931 etc., Op. cit, p.3.
This volte-face was embodied in a letter from Ramsay MacDonald, then Prime Minister, to Dr. Weizmann then head of the Jewish Agency, on the 13th February 1931, which was discussed at length by the Cabinet and which Ramsay MacDonald described as "the authoritative interpretation of the White paper on matters with which this Paper deals." (24)

Whereas the two above mentioned draft Ordinances forwarded by Chancellor were aimed at "controlling disposition of agricultural land in such a manner as to prevent dispossession of the indigenous agricultural population",(25), MacDonald's letter now confined control over land disposition to controlling the sale of such lands as would be necessary for the purposes of the Development Scheme, as proposed in the White Paper of October 1930. Accordingly the Colonial Office instructed the High Commissioner to change the draft legislation to make it clear that Government control was confined to purchases "directly related to the operations of the Development Authority".(26)

But, and here was the heart of this volte-face, this Development Scheme was not the one originally envisaged and which originally formed the second type of action proposed by the Palestine Government and the Colonial Office following the Hope Simpson recommendations.

(24) This letter was termed "the Black Letter" by the Palestinians to describe this volte-face as well as their anguish.
(26) ibid, pp. 5-6.
The original Development Scheme was conceived as a large and comprehensive plan as evidenced by its estimated costs.

"...[Although] in his report no estimate of the amount of money was given by Sir John Hope Simpson, [such an estimate being] excluded at the express request of the Secretary of State, Lord Passfield...in the course of discussion it became clear that Sir John Hope Simpson's estimate of the full cost of his scheme might amount to as much as £8,000,000. For this expenditure it was estimated that 10,000 Arab families and 20,000 Jewish families could be settled on the land on the assumption that the settlement of Jewish families were carried out at the same cost per family as the Arabs. The figure of 10,000 Arab families represented a rough estimate given orally by Sir John Hope Simpson of the number of Arab families who had been dispossessed of their holdings as a result of the manner in which the policy of the Balfour Declaration and the Mandate had hitherto been applied."(27)

Immediately upon the receipt of Hope Simpson's Report however, the Cabinet Expert Sub-Committee appointed to inquire into the Report recommended the drastic curtailment of the scope of the Development Scheme - the recommendations being accepted by the Cabinet on the 24th September 1930.(28) The Committee's main recommendations, which were to set the tone of Government policy towards Jewish land purchases in this and the next stage of evolution of British policy towards Jewish land purchases were that

[1] "His Majesty's Government are morally bound to see that

(27) Memorandum regarding Mr Ramsay MacDonald's letter to Dr Weizmann of the 13th February 1931 etc., Op. cit, p.5.
(28) ibid, p.7.
provision is made for the dispossessed Arabs [who] should be resettled at an estimated cost of £2.5 million in all, with His Majesty's Government guaranteeing a loan to the Palestine Government for the purpose and making provisions for the interest and sinking fund charges for the next five years."

[ii] "No financial obligation, however, of any kind rests on the Government in regard to the settlement of Jews on the land for the purposes of the Jewish National Home. [but] that Jewish organisations should be permitted to proceed at their expense with the development and settlement of reserved land (i.e. land already bought but not yet settled). At the then rate of Jewish settlement this reserved land was expected to be sufficient to meet all Jewish requirements over the next five years.

[iii]" To provide by means of legislation that during the next five years no further parcels of land shall be acquired by Jewish organisations in order to give time for the assimilation of the landless Arabs." (29)

In other words, the British Government, on the grounds of estimated costs, recoiled from its original policy of "agricultural development having as its object close settlement on the land and intensive cultivation by both Arabs and Jews". A policy framed on the assumption that a full programme of development envisaged by Sir John Hope Simpson would be adopted in spite of the inevitable heavy expenditure, had now to be remodelled so as to harmonise with the decision to incur expenditure which was estimated to suffice only for the resettlement of "10,000 dispossessed Arab families." (30)

(29) Memorandum regarding Mr Ramsay MacDonald's letter to Dr Weizmann of the 13th February 1931 etc., Op cit, p.6.
(30) ibid, p.8.
Soon, however, the definition of "dispossessed Arabs" was itself narrowed down (31) to such an extent that it eventually encompassed only 800 (32) of the original 10,000 Arab families. The scope of the Development Scheme, moreover, was itself steadily narrowed down till J.H. Thomas, Colonial Secretary in the National Coalition Government, decided that it should be deferred indefinitely in October 1931. He informed the High Commissioner that "it must not be assumed that the £2.5 million loan will be practicable in the light of the existing financial circumstances." (33)

On the other hand, the British Government, on grounds of Zionist pressure, recoiled from a policy whereby a supreme power to veto land transactions should be placed in the hands of the High Commissioner. Under the circumstances of land hunger it is possible that he might have used it to severely limit Jewish land purchases.

Third Stage.

Policy towards Jewish land purchases in its third stage had to be based on two basic tenets derived from the second stage.

(32) "This figure takes no account of owner-occupiers, or of Arab villagers who have hitherto worked as labourers for Arab landowners, but who will find their means of livelihood vanish when both the
The first was that no appreciable sums of money were to be expected from the British Government, or allocated from Palestine funds to enable a more intensive use of the land. The second was that Jewish pressure on the British Government would not allow it meaningfully to prohibit land transfers to the Jews in Palestine.

Consequently, between the early transfer in 1931 of Sir John Chancellor, the High Commissioner who presided over the attempts to limit Jewish purchases in the second stage, and the Land Transfer Regulations of February 1940 whereby there was a total prohibition of sales over large areas of Palestine, what government action followed was essentially an attempt by Government to reconcile two fundamentally conflicting demands on it. The conflict emanated from the Government's wish to allow - or its inability to disallow - large scale Jewish land purchases on the one hand while on the other it baulked at the social repercussions of the consequent evictions and alienation of land from the Arab community whose land resources were already under severe strain due to the demands of a growing population.

Government action was based mainly on legislation, which because of this fundamental contradiction was becoming more and more complicated and tortuous, and at the same time patchy, irksome ownership of the land and the work on it become Jewish in place of Arab. For financial reasons, if on no other grounds, the Palestine Government cannot undertake to settle on the land those owner-occupiers or Arab villagers who have lost their employment." Revised Draft Memorandum for Cabinet - Land Policy for Palestine, Op. cit, p.10.

(33) Colonial Office to High Commissioner, Telegram dates 15.1.1931. PRO C0733/214/97049.
and ineffective.

Although it was fully acknowledged that the class of Arabs dispossessed by Jewish land purchases was comprised of a) tenants, b) small owner-occupiers and c) agricultural labourers, the bulk of protective legislation in the 1930's was aimed only at the tenants, the smallest class of the three.

A main factor inducing the Government to adopt this view was that since the Government, mainly on grounds of cost, did not accept any liability on itself to resettle the former owner-occupiers or labourers who became landless up till the Hope Simpson Report as it did with tenants, it could not subsequently concede that these two classes needed protection, as it admitted, did the tenant class. In his minute the Colonial Office Under-Secretary Williams wrote "Sir Arthur Wauchope (the new High Commissioner), considers and I agree with him, that the right of a tenant to a holding sufficient for the subsistence of his family must be assured, but, in conformity with the proposal not to register owner-occupiers as 'landless Arabs', we consider that the right of the owner-occupier to sell his land should remain unrestricted, at any rate for the present." (34)

(34) Revised Draft Memorandum for Cabinet. Land Policy for Palestine, PRO CO733/217/97072, 1932, Para. 11.
At first, temporary legislation, the Protection of Cultivators Amendment Ordinance, was enacted on 28th May 1931 to be valid for only a year though it was later extended for another year in May 1932 and finally incorporated in a rationalised Protection of Cultivators Ordinance of 1933 which was meant as the permanent legislation. The main provisions aimed at ensuring that a tenant of two years standing could not be evicted without a year's notice and without compensation except for non-payment of rent or negligence or bankruptcy "unless the High Commissioner is satisfied that 'equivalent provision' has been secured towards the livelihood of the tenant". The Ordinance, however, did not specify what this equivalent provision must be. (35) It also specified that the tenants' rent could not be raised except with the consent of a governmental board. The main drawback of this temporary (Protection of Cultivators Amendment) Ordinance of 1931, and its extension in 1932, was that it did not prevent eviction but only delayed it; and secondly that it allowed compensation in forms other than land in the case of eviction.

This last drawback, however, was removed when a new ordinance was enacted in 1933 extending the provisions of the earlier one indefinitely and adding that "equivalent provision" must be made in land. Protection of the tenant then depended upon whether he was

declared a "statutory tenant" under the terms of the Ordinance.

An immediate result of such an ordinance in a system of land tenure where rights in land were very badly documented and where there was growing pressure of population on the land, was to open the way for continuous conflict and endless litigation between tenant and landlord and for a continuous search for ways of circumventing the Ordinance.

As for the other classes of cultivators, no protective legislation reached the Statute Book although at the outbreak of the General Strike and subsequent Arab Rebellion in May 1936, consultations were taking place between the High Commissioner, Sir Arthur Wauchope and the Colonial Office regarding the promulgation of an ordinance protecting small owner-occupiers, the largest section of Arab cultivators. Although up till May 1935 the High Commissioner considered legislation unnecessary,(36) continued large-scale sales of land led him to report that "the situation had in the meantime greatly changed owing to the greatly increased Jewish immigration which had taken place in the last two or three years combined with the fact that the Jews had largely increased funds at their disposal to make them pay enhanced prices for the land which they wished to acquire."(37)

(36) High Commissioner to Colonial Secretary, Desp. dated 22.2.1935, PRO CO733/272/75072/2, 1935, p.1.
(37) ibid, p.2.
Wauchope's fears were that "although there might be no immediate distress and little unemployment, the outlook was disquieting. The chief danger lies in the fact that although owners who sold their land were at the time finding employment otherwise, when employment became scarce they would join the ranks of the unemployed, and no longer having any land they would be unable to obtain a livelihood."(38)

There is no need to examine in detail the High Commissioner's proposals on dealing with small holders protection. Suffice it to say that no legislation on the matter reached the Statute Book till the Land Transfer Regulations of 1940.

The Regulations of 1940 brought to an end not only the third stage in the evolution of Government policy towards land transfers, but also indicated the realisation that the limited cultivable area of Palestine could not at the same time support the increasing pressure on the land by the natural growth of the Arab population while steadily sustaining large scale losses of land to the Zionists.

The change of mind by the British Government was brought

(38) High Commissioner to Colonial Secretary, Desp. dated 22.2.1935, PRO CO733/272/75072/2, 1935, p.2.
about by two factors. The first was the amount of time and effort Britain needed to suppress the Arab Rebellion that extended from 1936 till 1939 as a result of which the country had to be reoccupied as Government authority at times did not extend outside the boundaries of the main towns. Land sales to Jews as well as Jewish immigration were the most emotive issues behind the Rebellion.

The second factor was the outbreak of the Second World War and Britain's need to pacify the Middle East which was threatened by Italian expansionism. The realisation that the extension of the war to the Middle East was imminent induced Britain to compromise on the issue of land sales. Britain did not want to fight the Italians, and possibly its Axis allies, in the Middle East with Arab and Moslem resentment against it being fuelled by the issue of Palestine which by then was taking on a regional as opposed to purely Palestinian character as earlier Palestinian Rebellions up till then had done.

The Land Transfer Regulations of 1940 divided the country into three zones, A, B and C. Zone A where land sales by Arabs to non-Arabs were entirely prohibited. This Zone comprised 16,680 out of a total area of 26,320 sq.km. In Zone B where transfers were
likewise prohibited except for "transfer made in execution of a judgement or order in satisfaction of a mortgage executed and registered before the 18th May 1939." Zone C, comprising 1,292 sq.km. was a Free Zone where there were no restrictions on land sales. It was mainly situated in areas, in the coastal and inland plains, which already had been heavily affected by Jewish land purchases.

Having outlined the evolution of Government policy towards land sales and transfer, the problem now is to determine the success or failure of that policy from viewpoint of the Arab population, of which the peasantry comprised the largest part. Above all, success or failure is measured by the simple but brutal fact of the number of dunums that the Jews managed to buy; the more the area lost, the less was the area that remained in Arab hands and from viewpoint of peasant society, the more confined and restricted it became.

Although land sales were not always registered in Government Land Registers because of collusion between buyer and seller to evade land transfer regulations, or because of the long standing
aversion on the part of the peasants towards registering sale agreements between themselves, the Land Registers still remain the best indication, if not an absolute measure, of land sales.

The following table, Table (III/One/1) is based on Government statistics as supplied in various Blue Books and Statistical Abstracts of Palestine.

On examining Table (III/One/1), several salient features become clear. First is the fact that about 45% of the land was bought before the end of 1920, though a large proportion of that was not registered in Jewish names till the first High Commissioner, Herbert Samuel, allowed retro-active registration of such transactions, including registration in the names of corporations such as the Jewish National Fund. Second, is the fact that much of the buying came in two waves in the mid-1920's and the mid-1930's, the two other outstanding years being 1921, when the sale of the Jezreel Valley from the Sursocks of Beirut was largely completed; and 1929, when large areas of Wadi el Hawareth lands in the Tulkarm Sub-District were sold by the Tayan family, also of Beirut.
Table (III/One/1)


<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Dunums</th>
<th>Palestine Pound (LP)</th>
<th>Average LP/dunum</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>to end of</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1920</td>
<td>651,048(*)</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1921</td>
<td>90,785</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1922</td>
<td>39,359</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1923</td>
<td>17,493</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1924</td>
<td>41,765</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1925</td>
<td>101,131</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1926</td>
<td>38,978</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1927</td>
<td>18,995</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1928</td>
<td>21,515</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1929</td>
<td>64,517</td>
<td>342,338</td>
<td>5.306</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1930</td>
<td>19,365</td>
<td>137,070</td>
<td>7.078</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1931</td>
<td>18,894</td>
<td>135,538</td>
<td>7.293</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1932</td>
<td>18,894</td>
<td>148,881</td>
<td>7.880</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1933</td>
<td>36,992</td>
<td>854,797</td>
<td>23.108</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1934</td>
<td>62,114</td>
<td>1,647,837</td>
<td>26.529</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1935</td>
<td>72,905</td>
<td>1,699,448</td>
<td>23.310</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1936</td>
<td>18,145</td>
<td>158,825</td>
<td>8.753</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1937</td>
<td>29,367</td>
<td>392,918</td>
<td>13.379</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1938</td>
<td>27,280</td>
<td>174,551</td>
<td>6.398</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1939</td>
<td>27,974</td>
<td>382,297</td>
<td>13.666</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


Sources.

LAND VALUES(1929-1939):- Government of Palestine, "Statistical Abstract" for the year 1939 (pp.162, Table 189) and the year 1936 (pp. 98, Table 134).

Total area remaining in Arab hands as at 1/4/1935 was 9,567,030 dunums according to village-by-village data given in Government of Palestine, "Village Statistics", Jerusalem, 1938.

1 acre = 4 dunums.
According to A. Granott (39), Jewish land purchases passed through two stages.

The first phase extended from the beginning of Jewish purchases in the 1880's till the end of the 1920's. Most of the land in this stage was bought from big non-Palestinian landlords, mostly living in Beirut like the Sursocks and the Tayans. Table (III/One/2) shows that this category accounted for 57% of all Jewish purchases from all sources up to 1927. Typically, these areas were purchased in very large unified units of tens of thousands of dunums. Most of the lands in this category, especially in the Jezreel Valley, were turned over to mixed-farming by various types of communal or semi-communal settlements by their Jewish purchasers more for "political" purposes than for any expected commercial returns in spite of the huge capital sums invested in them.

The second phase of Jewish purchases extended from the late 1920's till the end of the Mandate. As long as large tracts of land were available, the Jewish buyers preferred them, but when the supply of these lands ran out, the purchasers turned to Palestinian owned lands, which typically had three features.

Firstly they were in far smaller lots. Secondly, they carried a larger number of Arab cultivators per dunum, whether tenants or owner-occupiers, who cultivated them more intensively than the less densely populated lands in the first category. Thirdly, though Jewish purchases of lands in this category were still largely situated on the plains, these were nevertheless situated nearer to the core of peasant Palestine than the outlying lands in the plains which had been bought from large landlords. Sellers, both large and small, usually sold part of their lands which they previously cropped with peasant crops within the usual summer and winter crop cycle, in order to utilize the capital in improving their remaining lands to take cash-crops, usually citrus in the districts were most of these purchases took place - the Sub-Districts of Jaffa, Ramle, Tulkarm, Haifa and the northern parts of Gaza.

Jewish purchasers of small areas, especially in the citrus lands comprised private individuals as well as the large specialised purchasing bodies. To many of these individuals commercial as opposed to political considerations were primary.
Table (III/One/2).

Jewish Landownership by former owner and period of purchase.

--- PURCHASES FROM ---

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>PERIOD</th>
<th>TOTAL</th>
<th>BIG LANDOWNERS</th>
<th>NON-PALESTINIAN</th>
<th>PALESTINIAN</th>
<th>MISC.</th>
<th>PEASANTS</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>DUNUMS</td>
<td>dun. %</td>
<td>dun. %</td>
<td>dun. %</td>
<td>dun. %</td>
<td>dun. %</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1878-1890</td>
<td>67073</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>18809 28.0</td>
<td>48264 72.0</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1891-1900</td>
<td>60218</td>
<td>23901 39.7</td>
<td>3678 6.1</td>
<td>6898 11.5</td>
<td>25741 42.7</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1901-1914</td>
<td>118290</td>
<td>37428 31.6</td>
<td>39928 33.8</td>
<td>35839 30.3</td>
<td>5095  4.3</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1920-1922</td>
<td>103137</td>
<td>77794 75.4</td>
<td>21443 20.8</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>3260 1.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1923-1927</td>
<td>199678</td>
<td>171706 86.0</td>
<td>24712 12.4</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>3260 1.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1928-1932</td>
<td>92432</td>
<td>42038 45.5</td>
<td>3454 36.2</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>16940 18.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1933-1936</td>
<td>41150</td>
<td>6107 14.9</td>
<td>25776 62.7</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>9265 22.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL</td>
<td>681978</td>
<td>358974 52.6</td>
<td>167802 24.6</td>
<td>91001 13.4</td>
<td>64201 9.4</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Having examined Government policy towards Jewish land purchases and the crude totals and general pattern of these purchases over the period to 1939, the analysis can now be focused on the stock of land held by Jewish owners in the year 1935.

An in-depth analysis of one or more years is necessary because crude totals do not give an adequate answer as to (i) geographical concentration; (ii) the type and quality of these purchased lands and (iii) assessment of the overall effects of these purchases on peasant society. The reason the year 1935 was chosen was mainly because reliable official data do exist for that year and are available in a final form prepared by the Government. Second reason is that the bulk of Jewish purchases were made before May 1935, as can be seen from Table (III/One/1), so that the picture given in 1935 would not have been drastically altered by 1939 - the end of our period.

This study was conducted by the Department of Statistics of the Palestine Government and published in 1938 under the title Village Statistics. It followed and was predicated on the promulgation of the Rural Property Tax Ordinance in 1935 which divided all land in Palestine into 15 categories (later increased to 16) according to their value- starting with citrus as Category One and ending

with uncultivable land as Category 16. Although the above Tax Ordinance and the categories will be discussed in depth in Part III, Section Two, it is important to note here that the data that appears in the following pages are the result of analysis of the village-by-village data given in Village Statistics. They do not depend on brief summaries or estimates given by the government, and it is hoped that the analysis will be all the more accurate and reliable for it.

Table(III/One/3) below gives a breakdown of all Jewish-owned land as at 1st April 1935 as compiled by the Government and given in Village Statistics. The Table shows the proportion of Jewish-owned lands to all lands by Sub-District and District.

On examining this table, it becomes evident that the impact of Jewish purchases on the Arab sector in terms of land lost is far greater than the percentage of Jewish owned land to all land in the whole of Palestine suggests (9%). This is due to a number of causes.

Firstly, Jewish purchases were highly concentrated. Whereas Jewish land ownership was negligible or non-existent in the
TABLE (III/Ons/3).

Percentage of Jewish-owned land of all land (Arab & Jewish), by Sub-District, District and Category of Cultivation. As at 1/4/1935.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>CATEGORY</th>
<th>ALL 1-16</th>
<th>UNCUlt- 16</th>
<th>CITRUS 1-2</th>
<th>PLANT- 5-8</th>
<th>TAXABLE 9-13</th>
<th>UNTAX. 14-15</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>ACRE</td>
<td>0.6</td>
<td>0.3</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>1.3</td>
<td>1.0</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SAFAD</td>
<td>11.0</td>
<td>4.1</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>29.4</td>
<td>21.0</td>
<td>21.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TIBERIAS</td>
<td>41.9</td>
<td>31.5</td>
<td>92.4</td>
<td>40.5</td>
<td>44.4</td>
<td>63.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NAZARETH</td>
<td>25.1</td>
<td>7.5</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>14.1</td>
<td>36.3</td>
<td>14.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BETSAN</td>
<td>9.9</td>
<td>29.9</td>
<td>85.0</td>
<td>27.7</td>
<td>27.5</td>
<td>28.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GALILEE</td>
<td>17.1</td>
<td>7.2</td>
<td>28.1</td>
<td>10.5</td>
<td>26.4</td>
<td>25.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HAIFA</td>
<td>33.9</td>
<td>25.0</td>
<td>99.5</td>
<td>49.8</td>
<td>39.6</td>
<td>7.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>JENIN</td>
<td>0.42</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>1.2</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TULKARM</td>
<td>15.6</td>
<td>9.2</td>
<td>68.0</td>
<td>0.3</td>
<td>18.9</td>
<td>1.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NAHLUS</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HAIFA</td>
<td>10.9</td>
<td>6.4</td>
<td>81.5</td>
<td>7.1</td>
<td>17.4</td>
<td>0.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>JERUSALEM</td>
<td>5.0</td>
<td>3.3</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>2.9</td>
<td>6.7</td>
<td>1.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RAMALLAH</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BETHLEHEM</td>
<td>0.14</td>
<td>0.1</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>0.1</td>
<td>0.1</td>
<td>0.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>JERICHO</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HEBRON</td>
<td>0.2</td>
<td>0.1</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>0.6</td>
<td>0.2</td>
<td>0.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>JERUSALEM</td>
<td>0.7</td>
<td>0.4</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>0.6</td>
<td>1.1</td>
<td>0.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>JAPFA</td>
<td>35.2</td>
<td>28.0</td>
<td>47.5</td>
<td>24.2</td>
<td>28.9</td>
<td>28.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RAMLE</td>
<td>13.1</td>
<td>8.8</td>
<td>42.5</td>
<td>16.7</td>
<td>11.2</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GAZA</td>
<td>2.0</td>
<td>0.3</td>
<td>10.4</td>
<td>0.9</td>
<td>2.4</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SOUTHERN</td>
<td>11.0</td>
<td>6.4</td>
<td>40.5</td>
<td>11.4</td>
<td>8.4</td>
<td>0.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL</td>
<td>9.0</td>
<td>3.9</td>
<td>47.1</td>
<td>6.3</td>
<td>14.9</td>
<td>6.0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Sources. Government of Palestine, Village Statistics, Jerusalem, 1938. The publication consists only of tables giving village-by-village data from which this and other tables in this thesis were compiled.
Sub-Districts of Acre, Jenin, Nablus, Jerusalem, Ramallah, Bethlehem, Jericho, Hebron and Gaza, there was a substantial presence in the Sub-Districts of Safad (11%), Tiberias (41.9%), Nazareth (25.1%), Beisan (9.9%), Haifa (33.9%), Tulkarm (15.6%), Jaffa (35.2%) and Ramle (13.1%). In other words, whereas Arab ownership rested mainly on the core sub-districts of peasant Palestine, Jewish ownership was located on the periphery of this core.

Secondly, the crude figure of 9% represents Jewish ownership of all categories. A large proportion of that figure however, represents superior quality lands. Column 2 of the Table shows that the proportion of Jewish uncultivable lands to all uncultivable lands in Palestine, was invariably lower than was warranted if distribution of land by quality was even. Thus for example, whereas the ratio of Jewish ownership of all lands was 9%, Jewish owned uncultivable lands in the whole of Palestine was only 3.9%. This unevenness in quality becomes even more marked when it is observed that a large proportion of Jewish uncultivable lands were accounted for by 1) Tiberias Sub-District (50,751 dunums) mainly for the Huleh Concession granted by Government and 2) Haifa Sub-District (104,678 dunums) mainly accounted for by Government Concessions in Atlit, Kabbara, Caesarea and Zor el Zarka. If Jewish uncultivable lands in these two Sub-Districts
were taken out of total Jewish uncultivable lands, the proportion of the latter to all uncultivable land in Palestine would drop to 1.5%.

There were two broad causes behind this pattern. First was that the Jewish owners did invest far larger sums of capital in the land than was available for Arab cultivators. Second was that as the Jews had to buy their lands, it was not unnatural for them to buy better lands whenever possible although worse lands were also bought.

Whether the Jews bought lands that were already of high quality at the time of purchase or whether they bought lands that they improved themselves, the fact remained that by 1935 the stock of land in Jewish hands contained a higher proportion of better quality land than did the Arab stock. This view is reinforced when one looks at the Jewish share of each category of land.

In citrus lands, the cash crop par excellence, Jewish ownership was 47.1% over the country as a whole. This was more or less the ratio in the main citrus-producing Sub-Districts of Jaffa and Ramle.
In cereal lands, however, the Jewish presence was less marked than in the citrus lands, although it still accounted for a higher proportion of the better cereal lands. 14.9% of all taxable cereal lands were Jewish; while the Jewish share of all land was 9%. Similarly, the Jewish share of worst land was lower - 6% of all untaxable cereal lands.

Most of Jewish cereal lands were concentrated in the Sub-Districts of Nazareth (102,091 dunums) out of a Jewish Palestine total of 706,656 dunums of cereal lands; Haifa (186,971 dunums), Tiberias (93,214) and Beisan (68,612 dunums). Most of these cereal lands were situated in the major inland basins of the Jezreel Valley and the Acre Plain, large parts of which were bought in large units from absentee non-Palestinian landlords in the early 1920's and which had up till then formed the cereal lands of surrounding Arab villages.

The discrepancy in the quality of land between Arabs and Jews can clearly be shown in the following example. Assume two hypothetical landowners, one Arab and one Jew where each owns 100 dunums of land divided by categories in the same proportions as their respective communities, then the two landowners'
tax assessments under the Rural Property Tax Ordinance 1935, where tax rates are based on net annual value of the land, (explained at length in Part III, Section Two), would broadly reflect the capital value of the portfolio of the two individuals. Naturally, this method will not by itself answer the question of how far the land was improved by the Jews. Nevertheless, it gives an idea of the quality of the land area in Jewish hands in 1935.

Table (III/One/4) gives the proportions of each landowner's 100 dunums that fell in the 16 Categories according to which the Government assessed rural taxes. It also gives the rate of tax of each category, and the assessed tax to which each landowner was liable on his land, itemised by category.

On examining Table (III/One/4), three features stand out.

First is the large discrepancy in the assessed tax between Arab and Jew, the latter being 5.25 times the former. The largest cause of this discrepancy was due to the larger share of citrus land in the Jewish landowner's land-mix than that of the Arab, although in absolute terms Arabs accounted for over 55% of all citrus land in Palestine at the time (April 1935).
Table (III/On4/4)

Tax Assessment of a "representative" 100 dunums of Arab, and 100 dunums of Jewish landholding divided into Official Tax Categories reflecting the "land-mix" of the two communities. As at 1/4/1935.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Category Type</th>
<th>No. of dunums in Category</th>
<th>Tax Assessment in LP.</th>
<th>Rate of Tax per dunum LP.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Arab</td>
<td>Jewish</td>
<td>Arab</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1-2 Citrus</td>
<td>0.9</td>
<td>8.3</td>
<td>0.74</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5-8 Plantations</td>
<td>8.7</td>
<td>5.9</td>
<td>0.28</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9-13 Taxable Cereals</td>
<td>32.5</td>
<td>57.0</td>
<td>0.475</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14-15 Untax. Cereals</td>
<td>7.2</td>
<td>4.6</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>16 Uncultivable</td>
<td>49.8</td>
<td>20.5</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>1.500</td>
<td>7.871</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


Based on data compiled from village-by-village breakdown given in the above source.
The second feature is that this Jewish lead over Arab peasants is reinforced further when it is kept in mind that little citrus lands were owned by peasants as most were held by Arab plantation owners. If the share of Arab citrus land (0.9 dunums out of the Arab's hypothetical 100) is taken out of the account, the discrepancy between Jew and Arab peasant widened further to a factor of 1 to 10. As a measure of the 'typical' peasant's landholding pattern this procedure approximates more closely to constructing a true picture of the discrepancy in quality between Jewish landowner land and Arab peasant land than if Arab citrus lands are included.

The third feature is that even when the citrus lands of both Arabs and Jews are excluded from the computation of tax, the balance of quality was still firmly on the Jewish side by a factor of 1 to 1.4. This was accounted for by the fact that most of the non-citrus Jewish lands were in Category 9-13, taxable cereal lands, which accounted for 57 out of the 100 dunums as opposed to only 32.5 dunums in the corresponding Category for Arabs. When untaxable categories 14-16 are taken into consideration the discrepancy widened still further as almost half of the Arab total holding was made up of Category 16 uncultivable lands (49.6%), as opposed to only 20.5% for the Jews.
It needs to be remembered however, that the quality of an area of land is a function of the inputs of capital and technology that went into it as well as its natural endowment. In this respect, the Jews ploughed a lot of capital into the land though not to the extent of transforming them entirely from complete waste to first class lands. Whereas it was possible to transform sand dunes or ordinary agricultural land into high-quality citrus lands dependent on irrigation, it was not possible -given the physical conditions of agriculture in Palestine- to bridge a similarly wide gap in quality between rain-fed cereal lands formerly ploughed by a peasant with a team of oxen and the same land presently farmed by a modern Jewish tractor. On such cereal lands capital inputs swiftly encountered diminishing marginal returns. This resulted in a capital input on Jewish cereal producing areas in the Jezreel Valley of 100 times that of equivalent Arab lands, whose effect was to increase yields by only a fewfold - barely comparable with yields achieved by traditional methods in the Balkans. (41)

As such cereal lands accounted for half of all Jewish lands, mainly concentrated in the Jezreel and Acre Valleys, and as it was well known that much of the Jezreel Valley was already farmed by the surrounding Arab villages when 250,000 dunums of it was sold by the Sursocks over the heads of the tenants

(41) See D Warriner, Land and Poverty in the Middle East, London, 1948, p. 52, where she wrote "Even the Jewish farms on non-irrigated land achieve only an average yield of wheat of 8 hundredweight to the acre. This
in the early 1920's, it becomes clear that though the Jews markedly improved the lands that passed into their hands, much of these lands had already been cultivated and of good quality. Often they were better cereal lands than those left in peasants' hands on the adjoining hills.

Having determined the extent of the loss to the Arab sector, by area and by quality of land, the question now is to determine the direct results of these purchases in terms of the number of peasants displaced from the lands acquired by the Jews.

In the 1930's this question was a very emotionally and politically charged one with Arabs tending to inflate the figure, the Zionists tending to deflate it and the British hoping to muddle through the fundamental contradiction in which they placed themselves with the Balfour Declaration. On the one hand, they wanted to encourage Jewish settlement on the land and to diminish any financial responsibility falling on them to settle landless Arabs and therefore having a strong interest in deflating the number of landless Arabs. On the other hand, whenever the British adopted a policy of restricting sales—especially in 1930 and

figure is below the European average (9½ hundredweight to the acre), and is about the same as the average wheat yield in Eastern Europe.

The fact that the most modern and intensive methods achieve only the same wheat yield as the Balkan peasant, with his primitive and extensive cultivation, suggests that the scope of agricultural advance is limited, at least as far as cereal cultivation is concerned, and cereals are still the chief crop."
1939 after Arab Rebellions that cost the British dear in men, money and prestige to put down - they had an interest in inflating the number of landless Arabs in order to support their restrictive legislation.

For this reason, there is no quick and easy answer to this question which could be found in any one government report. In public, the Government made the gesture of appointing somebody to inquire. Following the Hope Simpson Report, John French was appointed in 1931 to inquire into Immigration, Agricultural Development and Land Settlement in Palestine with special responsibility for inquiring into the number of Arabs made landless by Jewish buying.

However, the definition of these landless Arabs towards whom the Government accepted responsibility for resettlement was so artificially restricted by the British Prime Minister's letter to Dr. Weizmann (already referred to) that French's findings told only part of the story. These landless Arabs were defined as those "who can be shown to have been displaced from the lands which they occupied in consequence of the lands falling into Jewish hands, and who have not obtained other holdings on which they can establish themselves or other equally satisfactory occupation, subject to the following exceptions: (1) Persons who have themselves sold their land, that is owners who of their own free will have sold their lands; (2) persons who own land elsewhere; (3) persons who have found and are now cultivating as tenants land other than that from which they
were displaced; (4) persons who obtained land after sale of land from which they were displaced but have since ceased to cultivate it on account of poverty or other reasons; (5) persons who were not cultivators at the time of sale, for example ploughmen and labourers". (42)

The numbers of "landless Arabs so defined were found to be 656."(43) It is clearly obvious though that this much restricted definition did not come anywhere near estimating the true number of Arabs displaced by Jewish purchases. As this was the only comprehensive inquiry conducted by the Palestine Government into the subject throughout the period, this unanswered question, unfortunately, could only be answered by an indirect way - which is consequently but unavoidably less accurate and less exact.

(1) One way is to accept at face value the estimate of Sir John Hope Simpson himself, given secretly to the British Government but not subsequently published. "The figure of 10,000 Arab families represented a rough estimate of given orally by Sir John Hope Simpson of the number of Arab families who had been dispossessed of their holdings as a result of the manner in which the Balfour Declaration and the Mandate had hitherto been applied."(44) By the rule of thumb then current, 10,000 families numbered roughly 57,000 persons.

(42) Brief on Government's Proposals for the Protection of Small Owners by the Preservation of Subsistence Areas, PRO CO733/290/75072, Pt.2, 1936, p.4.
(43) ibid, p.4.
(44) Memorandum regarding Mr Ramsay MacDonald's letter to Dr Weizmann of the 13th February etc., Op. cit, p.5.
(ii) Once leaked to the Zionists, Hope Simpson’s estimate was naturally attacked by the Zionists, not least by A. Granovsky, at the time Director of the Jewish National Fund, the Jewish Agency’s land purchasing body. Granovsky’s reply was “how very lightly figures are handled when dealing with such weighty problems!” and accused Simpson of a “tendency to portray the activities of the Zionist Organisation as harmful to the fellah population.”

(45) But Granovsky himself did not give an estimate of the overall number of dispossessed Arabs.

What he gave though was a Table containing the number of Arab tenants on tracts acquired by two Jewish purchasing bodies - the Jewish National Fund and the American Zion Commonwealth - in the Jezreel Valley and the Plain of Acre up to the date of publication of his book (1931). Table (III/One/5) below is extracted from Granovsky’s table.

This table is useful in trying to estimate the total number of displaced Arabs. Since Jewish land purchases were relatively homogenous in character, it is not widely inaccurate to extrapolate from a known average figure of Arabs displaced per dunum of

land purchased in order to arrive at a figure for all Arabs so displaced. Granovsky's table gives such a known figure.

Before extrapolating from Granovsky's figure of 688 Arab tenant families on tracts acquired by these two Zionist bodies, it is important to take note of several relevant points.

First is that along with the Jewish National Fund, the Palestine Colonisation Association (PICA) then ranked as the largest Jewish land purchasing body. Up till 1931 PICA acquired 454,907 dunums, of which 70% came from absentee landlords and the balance from owner-cultivators, while the Jewish National Fund acquired 239,170 dunums, 89.3% of which came from large absentee landlords and the balance from owner-cultivators. Since Granovsky admitted that PICA did not treat purchased land differently from the Zionist Organisation "thus, when the PICA buys tracts from large landowners it allows the tenants to remain thereon FOR A CERTAIN PERIOD (*)" on "areas leased in consideration of a certain amount per dunum, and the agreement is renewed from year to year, UNLESS THE LAND IS REQUIRED FOR JEWISH SETTLEMENT. (*) " (46)

It is therefore not wildly inaccurate to treat PICA and Jewish National Fund lands similarly for the purposes of estimating

(*) My own emphasis
Table (III/One/5)

Number of Arab Tenant Farmers on Tracts Acquired by Jews in the Plains of Esdraelon and Acre.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>LAND</th>
<th>SELLERS</th>
<th>TRACTS ACQUIRED</th>
<th>NUMBER OF TENANT FAMILIES</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Nuris Block</td>
<td>Sursock</td>
<td>29,400</td>
<td>38</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nahalal Block</td>
<td>''</td>
<td>21,800</td>
<td>64</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ginegar</td>
<td>''</td>
<td>11,500</td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tel Adas</td>
<td>''</td>
<td>21,500</td>
<td>34</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hartie/Herbaj</td>
<td>''</td>
<td>26,000</td>
<td>59</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sheikh Ebreik</td>
<td>''</td>
<td>24,000</td>
<td>57</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jeb'ata/KhmeiFis</td>
<td>''</td>
<td>20,000</td>
<td>96</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kafreitta &amp; Mejdel</td>
<td>''</td>
<td>10,300</td>
<td>54</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jedda</td>
<td>''</td>
<td>6,900</td>
<td>22</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tel Shemam</td>
<td>''</td>
<td>10,100</td>
<td>40</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kuskus/Tab'un</td>
<td>Sursock</td>
<td>15,500</td>
<td>47</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Afule</td>
<td>''</td>
<td>10,200</td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Shumam</td>
<td>Sursock/Raish/Atala</td>
<td>5,300</td>
<td>17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Abu Shusha</td>
<td>Karkabi</td>
<td>3,600</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Warakani</td>
<td>''</td>
<td>44,588</td>
<td>117</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Total: 261,388 688

Source: A. Granovsky Land and Jewish Reconstruction in Palestine, Jerusalem, 1931. Table opposite p. 89.
the number of Arab tenants on them and their treatment of these tenants especially by way of eviction when "the land was required for Jewish settlement".

Secondly, the figure of 688 is applicable only to Arab tenant farmers but did not include agricultural labourers working for these tenants. Neither, naturally, did it include the number of owner-occupiers on other Jewish National Fund lands. However, when it is taken into consideration that the Report of the Census of Palestine (47) established that "there are two farmers for every one agricultural labourer among the Moslems" on a national scale; then the number of families of agricultural labourers on Jewish National Fund lands would be \( \frac{688}{2} = 344 \) families; making 1032 Arab families on the above mentioned lands.

To this must be added a certain percentage to account for the number of families within an Arab village who did not farm the land as tenants or as agricultural labourers, but nevertheless were always necessary and present in peasant villages- like shopkeepers, the village mosque sheikh, Mukhtar (headman), beggars etc. One assumes this ratio as 10%, though this figure is admittedly arbitrary.

The number of families then becomes 1135. In other words, for each 230 dunums of land purchased by the Jewish National Fund, one Arab family was either dispossessed at the time of purchase or at a subsequent time convenient to the Zionists.

Table (III/One/1) has shown that between 1920 and 1931 around 500,000 dunums were purchased by the Jews which, assuming the ratio of 230 dunums to one displaced Arab family arrived at above is broadly correct, would give the total number of families displaced between 1920 and 1931 as 2175. If the balance of land purchased up to 1920 is added to the area purchased between 1920 and 1931, and the total of 1,123,500 dunums is treated on the same basis, the resultant number of displaced Arab families would reach 4900. This is not an unreasonable assumption since a large proportion of pre-1920 lands were bought either just before or just after the First World War, but not settled till later.

If Jewish purchases from 1932 to 1939 are added, the resultant total area in Jewish hands in 1939 would be 1,420,200 dunums - which when treated on the above basis would give a figure of 6170 displaced Arab families.
(iii) A third way of estimating the number of Arab families displaced by Jewish purchases is to extrapolate from the average density of the Arab peasant population that remained in possession of its lands in the Sub-Districts that witnessed the heaviest concentration of Jewish purchases.

Considering the small area of Palestine, and the relatively uniform character of the area which comprised any given Sub-District it is not likely that the density of Arab rural population between areas that remained in Arab hands and areas that were sold or given in concession to the Zionists—which for the sake of argument were or could have been occupied by a similar Arab rural population—would have been so great as to preclude this line of reasoning altogether.

Admittedly, there is an element of speculation in this method. But when the result is compared to the results arrived at by methods (i) and (ii) above, it will be seen that this method is not invalidated altogether. Before going any further, however three specific qualifications on this method of estimation should be kept in mind. The first is that the resultant number of Arab families thus affected were not necessarily all physically evicted from the land. Jewish buyers needed only to buy this land first
to pre-empt these Arab families from occupying the land which they would otherwise have occupied, had it not been bought by the Jews. The resultant figure of Arab families therefore includes an element of pre-emption as well as of eviction.

Secondly, this method is likely to over-estimate the number of Arab families actually evicted (as opposed to pre-empted) since the Zionists did receive large tracts of Government land which carried fewer Arab inhabitants to the dunum than the average for the Sub-Districts they were in. These large concessions were mainly in the Tiberias, Safad and Haifa Sub-Districts. However, this does not wholly invalidate this method as large tracts were bought which were already inhabited by Arab peasants at the time of purchase. Table (III/One/5) is only one example of the existence of such tracts.

In any case, since what we are extrapolating from is the average peasant population density of the Sub-District and not the national density, then the spareseness or otherwise of the Sub-District peasant population will be automatically taken into account, thus minimising the distortion inherent in this method.

The third qualification is that the number of Arab families thus
affected was not wholly made up of peasants. A large number of semi-nomads were also affected, though if the experience of other districts in Palestine since the 1880's is to be generalised to the lands in question, these semi-nomads would have assumed an increasingly peasant character or their lands would have been taken over by peasants. The exact number and proportions of semi-nomads settled or of the semi-nomads' lands taken over by peasants cannot be determined with any precision. What needs to be kept in mind however, is that not all affected Arab families were peasant ones falling within the definition of a peasant adopted in this thesis.

Table (III/One/6) gives the average density of rural Arab population and the estimated number of Arab families affected on the assumption of a uniform density of population between land purchased by Jews and land remaining in Arab hands. The table confined itself to those Sub-Districts that were affected to any appreciable extent by Jewish land purchases. The other Sub-Districts were affected to a fraction of one per cent or less of their area. In conformity with the Government practice at the time, which was confirmed by the findings of the Census of Palestine, 1931, the average size of the Arab family is taken as 5.75 persons to the family.
Table (III/One/6)

Estimate of Displaced Arab families as extrapolated from average density of Arab peasant population. Selected Sub-Districts.
As at 1/4/1935

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Sub-District</th>
<th>Arab Rural Population</th>
<th>Arab Land Area</th>
<th>Dunums per Arab Family(*)</th>
<th>Jewish Land Area</th>
<th>No. of Displaced Arab families</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Safad</td>
<td>32,065</td>
<td>573,041</td>
<td>103</td>
<td>76,478</td>
<td>742</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tiberias</td>
<td>17,640</td>
<td>261,729</td>
<td>85</td>
<td>189,952</td>
<td>2,235</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nazareth</td>
<td>19,346</td>
<td>359,185</td>
<td>107</td>
<td>121,277</td>
<td>1,133</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Beisan</td>
<td>10,766</td>
<td>269,061</td>
<td>144</td>
<td>85,545</td>
<td>594</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Haifa</td>
<td>42,416</td>
<td>669,381</td>
<td>91</td>
<td>347,041</td>
<td>3,814</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tulkarm</td>
<td>46,894</td>
<td>634,707</td>
<td>78</td>
<td>117,777</td>
<td>1,510</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jaffa</td>
<td>32,057</td>
<td>207,444</td>
<td>37</td>
<td>117,780</td>
<td>3,183</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ramle</td>
<td>53,963</td>
<td>790,674</td>
<td>84</td>
<td>121,491</td>
<td>1,416</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gaza</td>
<td>73,610</td>
<td>1,078,063</td>
<td>84</td>
<td>21,661</td>
<td>258</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Total for Affected Sub-Districts 328,757 4,843,285 84 1,199,002 14,915


Based on data compiled from village-by-village breakdown of area and population given by the above named source.

(*) Arab family = 5.75 persons average.
The net result produced by this method is an estimate of 14,915 families either (a) actually displaced or (b) pre-empted from occupying these lands by Jewish buyers claiming them first.

In conclusion, looking at this Section's attempt at estimating the number of Arab families affected by Jewish land purchases, it seems that the number was not very far from Sir John Hope Simpson's estimate of 10,000 families, or some 60,000 persons - comprising around 10% of Arab rural population in the whole of Palestine at the time, or 18% of the Arab rural population in those Sub-Districts most heavily affected by Jewish land purchases (enumerated in Table (III/One/6)).
PART III.

SECTION TWO.


In Palestine as in other countries, the tax burden in the Mandate period was divided between direct taxes comprised up to 1935 of a) Tithes and b) Werko which were subsequently replaced by a Land and House Tax, and indirect taxes which were made up of customs duties on imported goods and excise duties levied on some local produce.

This Section will attempt to assess the impact of the Government tax policy on the peasant sector in terms of its burden i.e. the
proportion of the total product of that society appropriated by Government in direct taxes. This is not to lessen the importance of indirect taxes. Nevertheless the fact remains that the study of the impact of indirect taxes is so lengthy and involved as to need a separate work itself. For example, without adequate data on the consumption patterns of peasants it is impossible to work out what indirect taxes affected peasants and by how much. No such research was carried out by the Government at the time.

Consequently this Section deals only with direct taxes. In the interest of brevity, the history of and attitudes towards individual taxes will be kept to the minimum necessary.
Direct taxes.

(1) The Tithe.

The situation on the eve of the British Occupation 1917/18.

The ancient tax of the tithe was still being levied in Palestine at the time of the British Occupation in 1917/1918, though the rate of tax was officially fixed at 12.5% instead of 10% as the name implied. The extra 2.5% were impositions to pay for education and the setting up of an agricultural bank.

In the vast majority of cases the collection of the tithe was farmed out to tax-farmers who tendered for one or more villages in an auction. As the Ottoman central Government (as has been explained in Part II, Section Three) possessed neither the machinery nor the political inclination to supervise the operations of these tax farmers so the rate of tax collected was generally higher than the official one. The collection process turned into a battle of wits and power between the peasants and the collector, each attempting to turn the outcome in his favour.
The contractors being generally drawn from the richer classes of influential notables, "breaches committed by the contractors in the tithes regulations were never looked into by the government officials who favoured the contractor in every case." (1)

Though the tax-farmer paid the Government in cash, he collected the tithe in kind after the crop was either measured or weighed on the threshing floor, the cultivators being obliged to carry the produce paid in tax to the tax farmer's depot not more than one hour's transport from the village - although again in actual fact the peasants had to do that however far away the depot was from the threshing floor.

The tithe under the British Military and Civil Administrations 1919-1939.

This was the system that the British Army found in 1917 and which, by a Proclamation dated 7th May 1918 was reinstated together with all taxes in force under the Turkish Government prior to the entry of Turkey into the War. However, though the Military Government maintained the principle of the tithe, namely a 12.5% tax on the gross produce of the land, right from the start the higher

(1) Report of the Tithes Commission - Palestine, PRO CO733/20, 1922, Section V.
(i.e. British) echelons of the Military followed by the Civilian Administration found themselves extremely uneasy with the tithe.

In broad terms, the Administration saw three main drawbacks to the tithe that continued to plague its application till it was abolished in 1935.

(a) It was cumbersome and awkward to administer.

Although simple in concept the administration of the tithe as a tax to be annually assessed and collected from numerous, largely illiterate cultivators, was not a straightforward task which suited a colonial power with relatively few men of its own on the spot to supervise a new and inexperienced bureaucratic machine manned by local staff. The difficulty was chiefly in the tithe's inherent resistance to standardisation of procedure that was necessary if, year in and year out, the whole lengthy process of estimation and collection was to be directed and controlled by a modern centralised bureaucracy.

The nature of the tithe was in essence a local one. Assessment was meaningless without close knowledge of ever-changing local conditions such as localised rainfall which in a country like
Palestine varied from field to field; of the exact timing of rainfall; of wind, locusts, pests and numerous other factors that made the difference between a meagre crop in a bad year and, at the productivity level then prevailing, a crop that, by international standards, was not that much more even in a good year, but which nevertheless was vital for the survival of the cultivator and his ability to pay tax.

Moreover, difficulties faced the Government in the simple matter of scheduling assessors' visits to villages as different kinds of cereals, let alone crops, did not mature at the same time in any given locality. In the hill country for example, barley may mature at the end of May, wheat in June and kersenneh (the local fodder crop) in July and so on. This required frequent visits by assessors and the attendant machinery of control and supervision, involving considerable expenditure for little return.

Further difficulties were faced because of the need to guard the crops during assessment from theft or from attempts by peasants to cheat, either by spiriting crops away or moving stacks from piles not yet assessed to previously assessed ones. The government could not pay enough guards nor could the local Mukhtar, who was increasingly acting as the local representative of central
government, enforce authority too strictly on a community within which he had to live all year round.

In Turkish times, all these lengthy, tedious and labour-intensive chores were undertaken by the tax-farmer, who possessed this local knowledge, experience and close contact with the peasants to say nothing of his ability to apply arbitrary force. However, the tax-farmer's primary interest was in benefiting himself at the expense of both peasant and Government. Now that the Government had taken the decision to do away with tax-farming, it was soon to discover that undertaking the task itself was pushing the cost of collecting the tithe to an unacceptably high proportion of tithe revenue.

Nevertheless, having abolished tax-farming and having taken the decision to collect the tithe from the cultivators directly, the Military Administration first, followed by the Civil Administration in 1920, introduced a number of major alterations to ease the administrative task of tax collection. Though the principle of the tithe, namely 12.5% tax of the gross produce was kept, these alterations nevertheless were strongly to colour the application of the tithe up till its abolition in 1935.
(i) The tithe was to be collected from the direct producer not in kind but in money. The Government realised straight away that collection in kind would involve inordinate expenditures in transport, storage and disposal of the crop accruing to it in tax that was beyond its means at the time. Payment of tax in cash, however, necessitated the undertaking of two operations.

First the physical quantity of the crop had to be ascertained. For this purpose the country was divided into districts and these into circles where an estimating commission, comprised of salaried officials and local elders, assisted by the Mukhtar (village headman) carried out the assessment. Control over these commissions was exercised by the central staff of the District Governor and ultimately by the staff of the central Revenue Department. Other relatively minor alterations were made in the task of ascertaining the physical quantity which had to do with the cheapest and most reliable method of ascertaining but which for the sake of brevity need not be entered into here. (2)

(ii) Once the physical quantity was assessed, a Redemption price was fixed by the Military Governor of the District, subject

(2) For a description of the operation of Tithe collection under late Turkish, British Military and early Civilian rule, see Report of the Tithes Commission Palestine, Sections V and VI.
to the approval of the Controller of Revenue, which imputed a money value to the physical quantity. The market price of the crop was taken as a standard, with the actual redemption price being fixed a little below this figure. Although right of appeal against assessment or against the redemption price was heard by a special committee appointed by the Governor, the Governor’s decision after that was final.

The collection of the redemption price was not made from the grower individually, but from the Mukhtar who undertook to collect the entire amount due from his village against a rebate of 2% of the amount collected.

With minor modifications this system of double estimation (i.e. estimating the physical quantity and setting a redemption price on it) went on till 1927 when the Commutation of Tithe Ordinance was promulgated.

(b) The tithe, being in essence a tax on the annual produce of agricultural land, was unpredictable in yield especially in a country like Palestine where yields were largely a function of irregular rainfall. This unpredictability of yield could be demonstrated in the following table, Table (III/Two/1), showing
Table (III/Two/1)

Yields of major crops & total Assessment of Tithes 1920/1-1925/6

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>1920-1</th>
<th>1921-2</th>
<th>1922-3</th>
<th>1923-4</th>
<th>1924-5</th>
<th>1925-6</th>
<th>Average</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Wheat</td>
<td>75,153</td>
<td>72,885</td>
<td>87,146</td>
<td>86,457</td>
<td>92,192</td>
<td>100,807</td>
<td>85,773</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Barley</td>
<td>51,869</td>
<td>61,328</td>
<td>35,383</td>
<td>26,386</td>
<td>32,310</td>
<td>40,658</td>
<td>41,322</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Maize</td>
<td>30,353</td>
<td>14,819</td>
<td>23,527</td>
<td>16,353</td>
<td>33,905</td>
<td>31,869</td>
<td>25,138</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Yield in tons

Tithe Assessment @ 12.5% in LP.

512,680 287,778 240,825 206,886 306,813 318,442 312,570

Sources.
Government of Palestine, Report of the Average Tithe Committee 1926
PRO C0733/135/441766.
considerable fluctuations in the yield of certain crops, and fluctuations in total assessments of the tithe for the same years.

In addition to variability in the yield of the physical crop, further uncertainty was added by the abolition of collection of the tithe in kind in favour of collection in cash. Fluctuations in tithe revenue now became a function of fluctuations of market prices as well as fluctuations in physical produce. Though market prices of grain in Palestine followed world prices, there was nevertheless considerable fluctuations in prices as Table (III/Two/7) shows.

(c) Apart from being administratively awkward and fiscally unpredictable, the Tithe as a tax was not an instrument of economic policy that the Government could easily use to shape the development of Palestinian agrarian society away from the peasant form of organisation and in favour ofthe "progressive farmer", as Government officials politely put it.

Like the peasant society of which it was an ancient part, the tithe was a precapitalist concept whose assumptions were radically different from the modern concept of an 'income tax'.
Primarily, it assumed that peasant society was not geared for production for the market and profit of the individual enterprise operating in a competitive and ever-changing environment. Rather, it was geared for production for immediate consumption within a technologically and competitively more stable environment, as was explained in Part II.

As such, the elasticities that the tithe as a tax was designed to cope with were ones of short-term fluctuations due to 'natural' causes such as deficient rainfall, pests, scorching easterly winds etc. The underlying principle of the tithe was to appropriate a fixed proportion (10% in principle) of the gross produce, irrespective of yield leaving the remaining 90% to the cultivator to reproduce his conditions of labour (to live, provide for next year's seed, marry, have children and generally do next year what he had done this year and did the year before.) There was no question of capital, costs and net profit. Nor was there a question of 'opportunity cost' where if his 'profits' from agriculture were not high enough, he would move into another line of work, since no other line of work was open to him.

That the peasants were accustomed to and as happy with the Tithe as anybody could be paying taxes, was attested to by the Report of
The Tithe Commission 1922: "What could be more just than a tax which is yearly based on actual results?" (3)

Against this the 1922 Tithe Commission brought in what was to prove the standard Government economic argument for abolishing the tithe, namley that "The system militates against improvement in agriculture as generally the less intensification and development is carried out, the less in proportion are the dues payable. Energy initiative and enterprise are not encouraged thereby." (4) In other words, the system was to be used positively to encourage the adoption of individual profit as the regulator of production, in place of the old motive and regulator of producing to satisfy the immediate consumption needs of the direct producer.

In view of the disadvantages of the tithe (a, b and c above), The Tithes Commission as far back as 1922 had been strongly and "unanimously of the opinion that a radical change in the system of taxation would be beneficial both to Agriculture and to the Government," and they suggested that "the cadastral survey of Palestine be pressed with all speed with the view to the adoption of taxation on land instead on the yearly produce." However, the most they could do at the time was to recommend

(3) Para. 40, Section VI.
(4) ibid, Para. 39, Section VI(B).
temporary palliatives to reduce the administrative and fiscal inconveniences explained above. It was realised that the cadastral survey would take at least ten to twelve years to finish, and that this survey was essential if a tax on land instead of yearly produce was to be adopted. (5)

These palliatives mainly institutionalised through the Civil Administration those changes already carried out by the Military Administration and referred to in an earlier part of this Section (abolishing tax-farming; introducing Redemption Price and payment in cash etc.). This modified system of annual estimation of crops for tithe purposes, however, was to remain in operation till 1927.

On the 12th March 1926 a committee was appointed by the new High Commissioner, Lord Plumer, "to consider and report what measures can be advantageously taken in advance of Land Settlement to replace the existing system of collection of tithe on the products of the soil by the collection of revenue on an annual assessment for a term of years; and to state what, if any, consequent increase or savings in staff or other costs of collection they envisage." (6)

This committee, The Average Tithes Committee of 1926, also

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(6) Average Tithe Committee - Majority Report, PRO CO733/135/441766, 1926, p.3.
recognising that the operations of the cadastral survey and land settlement where rights in land were systematically delineated and settled were not yet advanced enough to allow the land tax to be introduced, decided that it was faced with essentially three options. (7) Since they decided to do away with the tedious operation of annual estimation and to adopt as the basis of taxation, an average of the tithe paid in the years since the inception of the Civil Administration, the choice of this average was to have been either 1) To average the quantities (Q) of the tithe taken in kind but to impute to them a Redemption Price (P) fixed annually depending on market prices ruling at the time; or 2) to average (Q) but fix Redemption Prices "once for all for a selected period"; or 3) "to take the average for a series of years of the value of tithes in money" i.e. to find the average of (Q x P) for the period.

Fatefully for peasant society during the remaining years till the tithe was replaced by a tax on land, the committee took the third alternative, namely averaging the annual \(\frac{1}{4}\) in money taken by the Government in lieu of tithes. The basis of the commuted tithe was to be the average of the aggregate tithe assessed in the village during the four-year period immediately preceding the application of the Commuted Tithe Ordinance to the particular area in which the village was situated.

It must be said however, that the impression the author has of the Average Tithe Committee which took this momentous decision, was one of amateur callousness. No reasoned argument was given in their report as to why this particular way of averaging was adopted, except to say that, in the experience of the few years before the report, the results achieved by the three methods of averaging were pretty much the same. Though some thought was given to possible variations in quantities and allowed for by a provision whereby the High Commissioner could remit part of the taxes, the magnitude of fluctuations due to the combined weight of 1) bad harvests and 2) drastic fall in prices, was overlooked. Instead, when this precise conjunction of consecutive disastrous harvests and severe falls in prices came about from 1928 to 1933, the most that the High Commissioner, even the sympathetic John Chancellor, could do in the face of the need for revenue and the reluctance of the Colonial Office to sanction large and repeated tithe remissions, was to grant remissions that were nowhere near the required scale, as will be shown later on in this Section.

In spite of some initial reports from the High Commissioner to
the Colonial Office declaring the Commuted Tithe as a success(8), its application was to prove a crushing burden on the cultivators as will be seen.

The third and long-promised stage of direct rural taxation came after long study and numerous reports over several years. The final outcome as it was applied in the Rural Property Tax Ordinance of January 1935, to take effect from 1st April 1935, based taxation on the net annual value of the land - this being "the balance left after deducting costs of production from the average value of the average gross annual produce of the land."(9)

The tax, calculated on this basis, was to be in the form of a flat rate per dunum according to category of land, as all land was classified into one of sixteen categories depending on crop and fertility of land - see Table (III/Two/2). In principle the tax was to amount to 10% of the net annual value, except in the case of land under citrus and bananas where it was to amount to 12.5%. However, The Rural Property Tax was to replace the Tithe and the House and Land Tax (Werko), but not the Animal Tax as will be shown later on. The tax was to be paid by the

(8) High Commissioner to Colonial Secretary, Desp. dated 19.4.1929, PRO C0733/171/67275, 1929.
registered owner of the land.

The Rural Taxation Committee of 1932, on whose report and later refinements the system was essentially based, then attempted to quantify the basic constituents of this formula for each category of land. For purposes of estimating these constituents, land under cash crops, like citrus and bananas was considered separately. Other categories however, were treated as multiples of unirrigated ground crops (UGR - wheat, barley, maize etc.). Thus land under irrigated vegetables for example was to be taxed at 1.5 times UGR; fruit plantations (mainly olives) to be taxed similarly at 1.5 times maximum assessment of UGR.

This new practice of assessing other crops as multiples of UGR gave the latter an added importance over and above the fact that these crops made up the most important part of the product mix of peasant society. Now they became a standard by which the other parts of the product mix were measured for tax purposes.

It is essential therefore to examine with care how the Government arrived at its estimates of 'net annual value' of UGR. This it did by the following procedure : -
A. "The Committee considers that the highest yield obtainable with ordinary methods of agriculture in Palestine amounts to 80 kilograms of wheat [per dunum]. Any excess over this quantity would be due to improved methods of cultivation involving costs of production above the normal proportion. In consideration of this extra expenditure the assessment should not be increased."(10)

Since, as will be made clear in the following paragraphs, costs of production were assumed to be two-thirds of gross annual value, in effect an element of regressive taxation was intentionally built into the new tax whereby the tax would form a smaller and smaller proportion of the net annual value the higher this annual value became. Since the threshold was deliberately fixed at the maximum likely limit to the number of kilograms of wheat achievable with 'ordinary' - i.e. peasant methods and productivity - it follows that the tax system deliberately discriminated against peasants: as all producers with productivity higher than 80 kilograms of wheat per dunum incurred a marginal rate of tax of zero on their extra produce, this effectively brought down their average rate of tax on their total produce. This is true whether one thinks that this was desirable or not; and in any case the Palestine Government never hid its desire to 'encourage the progressive cultivator'.

B. Having estimated quantities, the committee then imputed a cash value to them, viz. "the average price of wheat is 10 mils per kilo ....[the price selected being] the average of the harvest-time prices for the five years 1927 to 1931 as quoted from his lists of wholesale market prices by the Director of Agriculture & Forests. This period comprised two years of good prices, one of medium prices and two of low prices."(11)

The Committee then multiplied quantity by price to reach the conclusion that "maximum assessment of gross annual value that should be permitted would therefore be 800 mils per dunum." (12)

However, here again the Government fell into the same 'mistake' as with Commuted Tithes. The conversion prices it put on the physical quantities were grossly inflated because i) they were based on wholesale prices which were not the prices obtainable by producers since transport costs and wholesalers' other costs and profits were added to the produce before it was put on the wholesale market. ii)'Conversion prices' were based on an average of the last five-years performance; but as prices were falling drastically this average tended to 'over-estimate' prices actually obtainable for crops in the market in any given

(12) ibid.
year. This was foreseen by an expert, Sir John Campbell, who was asked to comment (13), but the Government and the Colonial Office ignored his advice, saying that these "observations are met by the Committee's recommendations that a general review of conversion prices every five years" be undertaken. (14)

C. Having calculated in cash form the gross annual value, the committee then proceeded to estimate costs of production which it defined "to include the annual cost of labour and material required for the cultivation of various categories of land, and the annual provision to be made for amortization of capital outlay and interest on capital. The cost of maintenance of the farmer and his family has been excluded from the costs of production." (15)

Again, unfortunately, the seemingly scientific and exact method of arriving at costs of production broke down badly when all the Committee could recommend in its Report was a vague claim, unsubstantiated by a single figure in the relevant paragraphs that "the cost of production for all categories should be considered to be two-thirds of the gross annual value". (16) This was described as "baffling" by one contemporary commentator "as the cost of production obviously varied considerably from one village to

(13) Minute dated 15.11.1932, PRO C0733/216/97060.
(14) Observations of Committee on Sir John Campbell's Note on the Report of the Rural Taxation Committee, under covering letter from High Commissioner to Colonial Secretary dated 23.2.1934, PRO C0733/267, 1934, p.4.
(16) ibid, p.11.
another, and from an Arab village dependent on family labour to a highly mechanised Jewish settlement."(17) Not in one of the numerous Reports or in the correspondence on the subject, could the author discover why the costs of production were taken to be two-thirds of gross annual value.

As has been mentioned earlier, the end result of all the lengthy deliberations of the numerous committees was the Rural Property Tax Ordinance of 1935 whereby all land was classified into one of sixteen categories, and a rate per dunum for each category was fixed. These are shown in the following table, Table (III/Two/2).

Having surveyed the development of the most important of the direct rural taxes in the Mandate, a brief survey can now be made of the other two types of direct rural taxation in preparation for an attempt to estimate the actual as opposed to the theoretical burden of direct rural taxes on the agricultural population.

Table (III/Two/2)

Statement showing number, description of, area and rate per dunum of Tax Categories as determined by Rural Property Tax Ordinance 1935.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Cat. No.</th>
<th>Description of Category</th>
<th>Area dunums</th>
<th>Rate per dunum (in Mils)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>Citrus (excl. Acre Sub-Dist.)</td>
<td>139,076</td>
<td>825</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>Citrus (Acre Sub-District)</td>
<td>7,289</td>
<td>410</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>Bananas</td>
<td>5,790</td>
<td>560</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>Village built-on area.</td>
<td>43,910</td>
<td>160</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>1st grade irrigated land</td>
<td>4,714</td>
<td>40</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>2nd grade irrigated land</td>
<td>270,570</td>
<td>35</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7</td>
<td>3rd grade irrigated land</td>
<td>640,508</td>
<td>30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8</td>
<td>1st grade Unirrigated Ground crop</td>
<td>337,314</td>
<td>25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9</td>
<td>2nd grade Unirrigated Ground crop</td>
<td>224,713</td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10</td>
<td>3rd grade Unirrigated Ground crop</td>
<td>846,475</td>
<td>18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11</td>
<td>4th grade Unirrigated Ground crop</td>
<td>751,950</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12</td>
<td>5th grade Unirrigated Ground crop</td>
<td>983,230</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13</td>
<td>6th grade Unirrigated Ground crop</td>
<td>1,902,644</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14</td>
<td>7th grade Unirrigated Ground Crop</td>
<td>745,776</td>
<td>NIL</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15</td>
<td>8th grade Unirrigated Ground crop</td>
<td>230,848</td>
<td>NIL</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>16</td>
<td>Forest &amp; Uncultivable land</td>
<td>6,506,484</td>
<td>NIL</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

13,641,000

THE HOUSE AND LAND TAX (WERKO)

The Werko, which derived its original authority from the Ottoman Law of the 5th August 1866 (18) was levied in the form of a percentage of the capital value of land (whether Mulk or Miri) and of buildings. The original rates varied from 4 per 1000 on Miri to 10 per 1000 on Mulk. Rates on buildings varied similarly according to use and state of repair. However, the rates were subsequently increased from time to time by the Ottomans; by 56% on Miri land; 61% on Mulk land and 41% on Buildings - though these surcharges were abolished from the 1st April 1922 on land and buildings either assessed for the first time since the British Occupation or on old properties which were re-assessed when they changed hands since then and had to be registered in the newly opened official registries. Otherwise, in the absence of periodic re-assessment, 'old' land and buildings not so re-assessed were taxed at the old rate, including the various surcharges. (19)

For this reason, the Werko as carried over from Turkish times was becoming increasingly out of tune with reality as it was based on assessment of capital value which was made

(18) Memorandum on Revenue by the Treasurer together with a Summary of the Receipts during the years 1925-1930, Chairman: Sir Samuel O'Donnell, PRO CO733/196, 1931, p.44.
(19) ibid, p.46.
a long time before the British Occupation. The fast rise in land and property values due to Jewish immigration, natural increase in population and increased and more differentiated economic activity were taken into consideration only partly and randomly. The result was clearly discriminatory against newly-registered property.

Though the Mandate Government recognised the defects of the Werko from the start, it could not effect any real change before the time consuming cadastral survey was well advanced. In 1928 the Urban Property Tax Ordinance was introduced to replace the Werko - among a number of other taxes, in urban areas. More relevant, however, that part of the Werko that was levied in rural areas was not replaced till the promulgation of the Rural Property Tax Ordinance of 1935, which also replaced the Commuted Tithe. Instead of the Werko, the 1935 Ordinance taxed village built-on areas at the rate of Mils 160 per dunum.

ANIMAL TAX. "AGHNAM"

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As ancient as the tithe, the Animal Tax was originally "a tithe on the living produce of the land and was collected in kind
at the rate of one head on every ten heads. ... It is not of the nature of a grazing fee ... [as] ... it was ascertained by the Committee ... [appointed to investigate into all taxes] ... that grazing fees are not charged." (20)

"Lambs and kids under one year, camels under two years and camels used solely for ploughing are exempt from the tax... [and so are ] buffaloes used solely for ploughing." (21)

Unlike the case with the Tithes however, it was the Ottomans, not the British, who introduced the principle collecting the tax in cash instead of in kind. The Mandate Government continued the practice, adopting the same 'rate per head' after converting it into Egyptian and then Palestinian currency. The rates were 48 Mil. on sheep and goats and 120 Mil.s on camels and buffaloes. (1000 Mil = 1 LP = 1 Sterling).

Although it was recommended by successive committees appointed to rationalise the rural taxation system in Palestine that "the proposed rural land tax should be substituted for the animal tax as well as the tithe and werko " (22), the then High

(20) Report of the Committee appointed by H.E. to give further consideration to the Draft Ordinance on Rural Property Tax, High Commissioner to Colonial Secretary Desp. dated 23.2.1934, PRO CO733/267, 1934, p.8.
Commissioner Arthur Wauchope, decided that "the balance of argument was in favour of maintaining the separate enforcement of the Animal Tax", as this was "the only direct contribution to State revenue by the pastoral population." (23) Consequently, unlike the Commuted Tithe and the Werko, the Animal Tax was retained after the introduction of the Rural Property Taxation Ordinance in May 1935.

Estimate of true burden of Direct Rural Taxation.

Although in theory the burden of direct agricultural taxes in Palestine was to constitute a fixed proportion of the tax-payer's income, in reality this was far from the case. The true burden instead fluctuated widely, often making up a much higher proportion of the taxpayer's income than sanctioned by the original concept of the tax. That this was so was readily accepted by the Government in its various reports as will be seen shortly.

(23) High Commissioner to Colonial Secretary, Desp. dated 23.2.1934, PRO CO733/267/37560, Pt. 1, 1934, p. 4.
However, before going into the process of estimation itself, a word must be said about the concepts and methods used in making an estimate of the burden of direct rural taxation and the limitations inherent in them. The estimates were made in two broad ways.

1) The first was in terms of the proportion of the gross produce exacted in tax. As has been said earlier in this Section, the concept of the tithe did not differentiate between capital, income, costs and profits. Rather the theory was that the State extracted a fixed proportion of the gross produce, leaving the remainder to the cultivator to consume and to provide the seed, implements, plough team and other inputs needed for cultivation in the following season. In recognition of this, this Section has attempted to estimate the burden of direct taxation in terms of the proportion of the gross produce it constituted. This has been done for each of the three periods of the application of rural taxation which had been identified earlier, namely 1922-1927, 1928-1934 and 1935-1939.

2) Secondly, in order to discuss the question further, another set of estimates was made which took into account "costs of production" as well as the volume and value of gross produce. This was done to
allow, wherever possible, an estimate of the ability of the peasant to satisfy his minimum consumption needs and to undertake cultivation in the following season with whatever was left of the gross produce after the tax has been deducted. It is at this point that one needs to exercise more caution because of the inherent weaknesses imposed by the limitations of available data. The limitations mainly arose because the Government did not always collect data on costs of production and cost of living which could be easily and unambiguously applied to a peasant economy. This meant that the calculation for each of the three periods had to be arrived at differently. The differences and limitations imposed, however, will be made clear when we come to make the estimates for each of the three periods.

The First Period 1922-1927.

Two points need to made at this point. The first is that for the sake of simplicity, the burden of taxation in this period will be judged only in relation to the main peasant crops rather than in relation to all crops, an operation which would needlessly complicate the calculation. Four main crops
were chosen, namely wheat, barley, durra and sesame because they made up the staple crops of peasant Palestine and because taxes on them constituted the largest share of all direct rural taxation. Between 1924 and 1927 tithes on wheat made up 42.4% of all tithes, on barley 12.6%, on durrah 9.1% and on sesame 3.1%. - 69.2% in all. (24)

The second point is that to be able to make realistic estimates of the burden of rural taxation, realistic estimates have to be made first of (i) the volume and types of the main peasant produce, (ii) actual yields which prevailed in the years under examination since yields in Palestine could fluctuate so widely due to weather as to make the use of average figures almost meaningless, (iii) the prices obtainable by the peasants for their crops, and (iv) costs of production which, in a peasant economy, have to take into account the cost of living of the peasant and his family.

Since the estimates will also be used in the following two periods, the following tables give them for the period 1922 to 1939 and not only for the period 1922 to 1927.

(24) Memorandum on Revenue by the Treasurer together with a Summary of Receipts during the years 1925 to 1930, April 1931, PRO CO733/196, Statement C in Appendix.
(i) Fortunately, the data on annual output of the four main crops is easy to obtain since the government had consistently published this data from the inception of the Civil Administration in 1920 till 1939.

The following table, Table (III/Two/3), gives the annual production of wheat, barley, durra & maize and sesame from 1922 to 1939 inclusive. A histogram and linear trend line based on the least squares method is also produced in a later part of this thesis. (25)

(ii) Although the data on crop yields was obtained directly from government publications for the years 1931 to 1939, it was not possible to do the same for the years 1922 to 1930. (26) The data for these years could only be estimated indirectly. Looking at the data which could be calculated directly, the following table, table (III/Two/4), gives the area sown with the four crops for the years 1931 to 1939, which when combined with the annual production figures given in table (III/Two/3) above, allows us to calculate the yield figures for those years. In addition, the arithmetic mean the standard deviation and the percentage of the mean which the standard deviation constituted are also given in the table.

(25) Figures (IV/Three/1 A) to (IV/Three/1 D).
### Table (III/Two/3 )

Annual production of wheat, barley, durra & maize and sesame, 1922-1939. (in tons)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>wheat</th>
<th>barley</th>
<th>durra</th>
<th>sesame</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1922</td>
<td>87,146</td>
<td>35,383</td>
<td>23,527</td>
<td>3,398</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1923</td>
<td>86,457</td>
<td>26,385</td>
<td>16,353</td>
<td>3,656</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1924</td>
<td>92,190</td>
<td>32,311</td>
<td>33,925</td>
<td>3,612</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1925</td>
<td>101,079</td>
<td>40,753</td>
<td>30,595</td>
<td>2,594</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1926</td>
<td>99,023</td>
<td>69,358</td>
<td>23,914</td>
<td>1,817</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1927</td>
<td>99,406</td>
<td>44,524</td>
<td>37,471</td>
<td>5,831</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1928</td>
<td>65,288</td>
<td>46,697</td>
<td>32,732</td>
<td>1,978</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1929</td>
<td>87,873</td>
<td>46,240</td>
<td>31,439</td>
<td>4,169</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1930</td>
<td>87,339</td>
<td>60,071</td>
<td>37,058</td>
<td>2,365</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1931</td>
<td>79,650</td>
<td>41,200</td>
<td>16,862</td>
<td>2,024</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1932</td>
<td>51,073</td>
<td>24,300</td>
<td>15,452</td>
<td>449</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1933</td>
<td>44,447</td>
<td>33,926</td>
<td>8,860</td>
<td>214</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1934</td>
<td>82,855</td>
<td>68,714</td>
<td>42,423</td>
<td>2,633</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1935</td>
<td>104,353</td>
<td>68,905</td>
<td>46,135</td>
<td>6,914</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1936</td>
<td>76,059</td>
<td>55,169</td>
<td>22,122</td>
<td>1,847</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1937</td>
<td>127,420</td>
<td>75,417</td>
<td>61,023</td>
<td>9,317</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1938</td>
<td>44,435</td>
<td>66,736</td>
<td>63,253</td>
<td>6,441</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1939</td>
<td>89,190</td>
<td>86,230</td>
<td>42,896</td>
<td>3,754</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

As for the years for which no data on area sown exists, namely 1922 to 1930, the yield could only be calculated indirectly. This was done in the following way.

(a) Having calculated the mean area with each crop for the years 1931 to 1939 in table (III/Two/4), one needs to establish how representative of those years this mean was. This was done by calculating the standard deviation and the percentage of the mean it constituted. As can be seen, the proportion of the standard deviation to the mean was 10.1% for wheat, 14.7% for barley, 8.6% for durra & maize and 32.5% for sesame. This means that one could say with a fair degree of confidence that the figure for average area sown with wheat, barley, durra & sesame was a good description of reality. Although there were fluctuations between one year and another, their magnitude was limited. The same however, could not be said of the average for area sown with sesame since the standard deviation was 32.5% of the mean.

(b) Having established that fluctuations in yearly sowing were fairly limited, sesame excepted, it was assumed that the average figure which applied to the 1930's could also be applied to the
Areas sown & yield of wheat, barley, durra and sesame 1931-1939.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Wheat Area Sown '000 dun.</th>
<th>Wheat Yield kg/dun.</th>
<th>Barley Area Sown '000 dun.</th>
<th>Barley Yield kg/dun.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1931</td>
<td>2,358</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>1,704</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1932</td>
<td>1,723</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>1,766</td>
<td>17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1933</td>
<td>1,768</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>1,886</td>
<td>17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1934</td>
<td>1,930</td>
<td>44</td>
<td>2,010</td>
<td>35</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1935</td>
<td>2,251</td>
<td>47</td>
<td>2,628</td>
<td>26</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1936</td>
<td>2,320</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>2,723</td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1937</td>
<td>2,259</td>
<td>56</td>
<td>2,237</td>
<td>34</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1938</td>
<td>2,085</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>2,031</td>
<td>33</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1939</td>
<td>1,863</td>
<td>48</td>
<td>1,926</td>
<td>45</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mean</td>
<td>2,083</td>
<td>40.4</td>
<td>2,061</td>
<td>32.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Stand.Dev.</td>
<td>210</td>
<td>12.8</td>
<td>304</td>
<td>14.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% S.D. of Mean</td>
<td>10.1%</td>
<td>31.7%</td>
<td>14.7%</td>
<td>43.5%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Durra Area Sown '000 dun.</th>
<th>Durra Yield kg/dun.</th>
<th>Sesame Area Sown '000 dun.</th>
<th>Sesame Yield kg/dun.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1931</td>
<td>939</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>196</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1932</td>
<td>1,012</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>108</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1933</td>
<td>916</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>102</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1934</td>
<td>1,012</td>
<td>46</td>
<td>110</td>
<td>24</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1935</td>
<td>1,075</td>
<td>43</td>
<td>270</td>
<td>26</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1936</td>
<td>839</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>99</td>
<td>19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1937</td>
<td>1,143</td>
<td>53</td>
<td>260</td>
<td>36</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1938</td>
<td>1,079</td>
<td>59</td>
<td>204</td>
<td>32</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1939</td>
<td>1,015</td>
<td>42</td>
<td>191</td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mean</td>
<td>986</td>
<td>43.1</td>
<td>181</td>
<td>23.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Stand.Dev.</td>
<td>85</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>59</td>
<td>10.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% S.D. of Mean</td>
<td>8.6%</td>
<td>41.9%</td>
<td>32.5%</td>
<td>43.3%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

years from 1922 to 1930. This assumption is not unreasonable since a look at table (III/Two/4) gives the impression that there was not a vast difference between the output figures of the 1920's and those of the 1930's. The mean area sown of the 1930's therefore could be adopted as a "notional" figure of area sown in the 1920's. In other words, one can assume that the area sown in the 1920's with wheat had been in the region of 2,08,000 dunums, with barley in the region of 2,06,000 dunums, with durra and maize in the region of 986,000 dunums and with sesame in the region of 181,000 dunums. It should be said however, that "notional" figure of area sown with sesame should be treated with more caution than the others because of the wider annual fluctuations from the mean of the latter.

(c) Once the "notional" figure of area sown in the 1920's has been estimated, one can calculate the annual yield of the four crops by dividing the figures of annual production given in table (III/Two/3) by the "notional" area calculated above. The results are given below in table (III/Two/5).
Table (III/Two/5)

Estimated yield based on the notional area sown with wheat, barley, durra & maize and sesame, 1922-1930.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>wheat</th>
<th>barley</th>
<th>durra</th>
<th>sesame</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1922</td>
<td>42.0</td>
<td>17.2</td>
<td>23.9</td>
<td>18.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1923</td>
<td>41.6</td>
<td>12.8</td>
<td>16.6</td>
<td>20.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1924</td>
<td>44.3</td>
<td>15.7</td>
<td>34.4</td>
<td>20.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1925</td>
<td>48.6</td>
<td>19.8</td>
<td>31.0</td>
<td>14.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1926</td>
<td>47.6</td>
<td>33.7</td>
<td>24.3</td>
<td>10.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1927</td>
<td>47.8</td>
<td>21.6</td>
<td>38.0</td>
<td>32.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1928</td>
<td>31.4</td>
<td>22.7</td>
<td>33.2</td>
<td>10.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1929</td>
<td>42.2</td>
<td>22.4</td>
<td>31.9</td>
<td>23.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1930</td>
<td>42.0</td>
<td>29.2</td>
<td>37.6</td>
<td>13.1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Notional area sown in dunums:
- wheat: 2,080,000
- barley: 2,060,000
- durra: 986,000
- sesame: 181,000

Yield figures calculated by dividing official output figures given in table (III/Two/3), by figures of "notional" area sown as calculated - see text, p. 341 and 343.
However, it is important to keep in mind that opinions differed greatly as to yield figures. This was more so prior to the 1931 when the government did not systematically collect and publish data on areas sown as it had subsequently done from 1931 onwards. Writing about the period 1914-1922, Dr Wilkansky (27) estimated the yield of wheat at 53 kilograms per dunum, 79 kg.s for barley, 24 for durra & maize and 23 for sesame. RE Sawyer on the other hand, made an estimate in 1923 (28), whereby he put the yield of wheat at 65.5 kilograms per dunum, of barley at 66, of durra and maize at 34 and of sesame at 23. Another estimate made by a government report in 1930 (29), estimated yields of wheat at 48 kilograms per dunum, of barley at 63, of durra & maize at 44 and of sesame at 10 kilograms per dunum.

It should be mentioned however, that all these estimates were on the whole higher than the figures arrived at in the preceding paragraphs and the related tables. This held equally true for the period between 1931 and 1939 when the government gave figures for both tonnage produced and area sown thus minimising the uncertainty of trying to estimate what the area sown was, as the preceding pages have attempted to do for the period 1922 to 1930.

It is possible that there had been a degree of under-estimation

(27) Dr Wilkansky, The Fellah’s Farm, quoted in Report on Immigration, Land Settlement and Development 1930, Appendix 24, p. 185.
(28) RE Sawyer, The Agricultural Situation in Palestine, June 1923, PRO CO733/46, Appendix II(a).
on the part of the government due to peasants hiding crops or due to village Mukhtars misleading the tax collectors in order to protect their communities. It is difficult to believe however, that evasion could have been so consistent, so widespread and allowed such a high proportion of the produce to remain undecalred as to evade detection and remedy by the government. The problem of tax evasion was not rated highly even by the reports which dealt specifically with agricultural taxation during the Mandate period. Unless proven wrong therefore, one has to assume that the data collected by the government on the area sown, on tonnage produced and on taxes assessed and collected is substantially correct.

(iii) In any case, having worked out more realistic yield figures for the period 1922-1939 inclusive, attention will be now directed to estimating the actual prices obtainable by the peasants for their crops.

Fortunately, throughout the Mandate, the Department of Agriculture did furnish a continuous series of retail and wholesale prices of major crops obviating the need and uncertainty of having to work them out indirectly. However, before attempting to arrive at average crop prices for the period, it must be borne
in mind that what the cultivators obtained for their crops were not the wholesale prices quoted by the government departments since wholesale prices included an element of profit and wholesale charges by the time the crops were placed on the wholesale market. Secondly, wholesale prices as averaged over the year as a whole is not wholly representative of price obtained by the cultivators since the latter, because of their pressing need for cash to pay their debts, taxes and other charges, disposed of their crops as soon as possible after the harvest, which was normally the period of lowest prices.

In this respect, this Section has emulated the practice adopted by the Revenue Department when the latter had to fix an annual Redemption Price between 1922 and 1927, as explained in the survey part of this Section. The Redemption Price was the price on the basis of which the cultivator was assessed for tithes and the government used to fix it somewhat below the average wholesale price for the year. Between 1924 and 1927 the proportion of the Redemption Price to the average wholesale price was calculated as 76.6% for wheat, 79.5% for barley, 82.5% for durra & maize and 89.6% for sesame.(30)

For the purposes of this Section therefore, the prices obtainable

(30) Average Redemption Price given in Memorandum on Revenue by the Treasurer together with a summary of Receipts during the years 1925 to 1930, PRO CO733/196. Average wholesale prices are as in Table (III/Two/6), p. 349.
by the peasants were taken as 80% of average wholesale prices. It is realised that this percentage might have fluctuated between one year and another depending on the bargaining position of the peasants relative to the wholesalers. In the worst years of the agricultural crisis of 1930 to 1933, this proportion could have been much lower (31). However, in the absence of more dedicated and systematic information on the subject, one has to accept the calculation as based on the relationship between the Redemption Price and average wholesale prices for the years when both prices were in use. At least, this method has the advantage of being verifiable.

The following table, Table (III/Two/6), gives the estimated prices obtained by peasants, calculated as 80% of average wholesale price for the year, for the period 1922 to 1939 inclusive.

(iv) Before attempting to estimate the costs of production however, the term itself has to be clearly defined. But as the three periods of the application of agricultural taxes have been treated differently by this Section depending on the availability of suitable data, the precise meaning of the term and the precise context to which it applied will be given when dealing with

Table (III/Two/6)

Prices obtained by peasants for their crops, 1922-1939. (*)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Calendar Wheat Mil/kg</th>
<th>Barley Mil/kg</th>
<th>Durra Mil/kg</th>
<th>Sesame Mil/kg</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1922</td>
<td>10.88</td>
<td>6.92</td>
<td>5.73</td>
<td>22.88</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1923</td>
<td>8.16</td>
<td>6.72</td>
<td>5.44</td>
<td>22.24</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1924</td>
<td>12.00</td>
<td>8.8</td>
<td>7.92</td>
<td>20.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1925</td>
<td>14.64</td>
<td>9.55</td>
<td>9.55</td>
<td>23.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1926</td>
<td>11.2</td>
<td>6.12</td>
<td>6.12</td>
<td>24.16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1927</td>
<td>10.16</td>
<td>6.32</td>
<td>6.56</td>
<td>22.32</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1928</td>
<td>11.6</td>
<td>7.44</td>
<td>6.98</td>
<td>20.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1929</td>
<td>9.6</td>
<td>6.32</td>
<td>7.28</td>
<td>19.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1930</td>
<td>6.56</td>
<td>3.12</td>
<td>4.00</td>
<td>13.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1931</td>
<td>6.00</td>
<td>4.24</td>
<td>4.8</td>
<td>12.96</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1932</td>
<td>9.04</td>
<td>5.76</td>
<td>5.92</td>
<td>17.36</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1933</td>
<td>8.4</td>
<td>4.96</td>
<td>5.52</td>
<td>15.36</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1934</td>
<td>7.68</td>
<td>4.56</td>
<td>4.72</td>
<td>12.64</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1935</td>
<td>7.12</td>
<td>4.32</td>
<td>3.92</td>
<td>14.48</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1936</td>
<td>7.55</td>
<td>4.57</td>
<td>5.45</td>
<td>16.06</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1937</td>
<td>8.13</td>
<td>5.58</td>
<td>5.8</td>
<td>16.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1938</td>
<td>8.41</td>
<td>4.42</td>
<td>4.76</td>
<td>N/D</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1939</td>
<td>7.94</td>
<td>3.89</td>
<td>4.6</td>
<td>N/D</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Average

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Calendar Wheat Mil/kg</th>
<th>Barley Mil/kg</th>
<th>Durra Mil/kg</th>
<th>Sesame Mil/kg</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1922-27</td>
<td>11.17</td>
<td>7.4</td>
<td>6.89</td>
<td>22.67</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1928-34</td>
<td>8.41</td>
<td>5.2</td>
<td>5.59</td>
<td>15.97</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1935-39</td>
<td>7.83</td>
<td>5.16</td>
<td>4.91</td>
<td>15.68</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Currency. LP (Palestinian Pound)=1000 Mills.

(*) Determined as 80% of Official Average Wholesale Price for the year - see text p. 347.

Having determined the above four elements needed to make an estimate of the burden of direct rural taxation, it is possible to proceed with the examination of the burden in each of the three periods concerned.

Looking at the first period, 1922-1927, an estimate will be made in terms of the proportion of the gross produce exacted by the government in taxes. This is based on two elements. The first is to estimate the cash value of the total peasant produce in the years concerned by multiplying the quantities produced (32) by the cash price obtainable by the peasants. (33) The second element is to determine the amount of tax assessed on the peasants less any remissions which might have been allowed by the government.

The following table, Table (III/Two/7), gives the proportion of tithe and Werko of the cash value of the crops between 1922 and 1927.

It can be seen from the above table that in terms of the value of gross produce, as obtained by the cultivators as opposed to

(32) See Table (III/Two/3) on P. 340.
(33) See Table (III/Two/6) on p. 349.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Actual Payments in L.P.</th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Tithe</td>
<td>Werko(1)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>------</td>
<td>-------</td>
<td>----------</td>
<td>---</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1922</td>
<td>240,825</td>
<td>128,660</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1923</td>
<td>208,886</td>
<td>134,720</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1924</td>
<td>306,813</td>
<td>141,880</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1925</td>
<td>318,544</td>
<td>151,684</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1926</td>
<td>306,813</td>
<td>141,880</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1927</td>
<td>212,825</td>
<td>153,271</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>1,498,504</td>
<td>857,391</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Plus Arrears c/f into 1928</td>
<td>77,348</td>
<td>42,082</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>1,575,852</td>
<td>899,473</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Value of all crops in same years = L.P. 14,416,695

Tax as Percent of Crop value

10.9%  6.2%

Proportion of Tithe & Werko to value of Gross Produce = 17.1%

(1) Agricultural Werko = 4/5 of Total Werko as estimated in p. 10, Report of the Average Tithes Committee 1926, PRO CO733 Vol. 135.

wholesalers or retailers, that the tithe was well within the proportion sanctioned by principle, taking into account that it was 12.5% up till 1925 and 10% thereafter. However, when the Werko is added to the tithe, the burden of 17.1% of gross produce that both of them represented was a heavy one. This burden, however, was not so heavy as to cause pressure on the government to sanction any remissions of tax. The remissions during this period totalled only LP. 3,441 of tithes and LP. 7,383 of Werko - a fraction of one per cent of assessment. (34)

This lack of pressure moreover, is confirmed by the absence in official correspondence between the Palestine Government and the Colonial Office of consistent and widespread complaints against taxes that were to characterise the following period. It could be that the burden of tithe and werko was seen by the peasants as an improvement over the much higher proportion exacted by the tax-farmers in the Ottoman period.

Having estimated the burden in terms of gross produce, the task now is to estimate the burden while taking some account of the "cost of production". A peasant economy however does not depend on the purchase of inputs like labour, seed, plough animals and others. Most of the labour tasks are performed by members of

the household and as such the relevant factor in estimating the "cost" of the labour input is to determine the cost of living of a typical peasant family. As for the other inputs, the usual case was for the peasants to retain part of the harvested crop for use as seed in the following season. The animals used were usually bred from animals already owned, in whole or in part, by the household. Consequently, the calculation of costs for a peasant household is different from calculating costs for a modern farming enterprise where inputs are usually purchased on the open market, and where the market price is a sufficient indication of the cost of these inputs to the modern enterprise.

The ideal calculation therefore should use cost data which is applicable to the peasant household. In the first period under discussion (1922-1927) however, the use of such data poses serious problems. Although the government did publish some statistics on the cost of living (35), these statistics applied to a typical urban family living in one of the three main cities (Jerusalem, Jaffa and Haifa). They did not apply to a peasant family. Similarly the government did publish statistics on the cost of purchasing plough animals (36), but this data was collected from markets for these animals which existed in the large or provincial towns. Without further processing and "adjustment", therefore, any attempt

(35) In Statistical Abstracts, see for example, Statistical Abstract of Palestine 1936, Table 82, p. 61.
(36) Quoted in M Brown "Agriculture", The Economic Organisation of Palestine, S Himadeh (ed.), Table 33, p. 171.
to use the data based on inputs purchased by a modern enterprise to construct an estimate of the cost of these inputs to a peasant household is problematical.

What could be done in this case is to attempt to "adjust" the cost of purchased inputs, by discounting them by a suitable multiple if these costs were higher than the costs applicable to the peasant, or incrementing them if the reverse was true. However, this course of action introduces so many new variables into the calculation as to make the outcome strongly suspect. One has to determine the level of the multiple needed to discount the cost of purchased oxen for example. It could be 80% of the open market price, it could be 70% or indeed it could be anything.

Because of the lack of such data for the period 1922-1927, this Section has not adopted this route. Instead, the approach adopted was to give an estimate of the burden of taxation as it was given by a knowledgeable and authoritative source (37), and then testing these estimates to see how well they accorded with the data on production, yield, selling prices and costs arrived at in the few preceding pages of this Section. It is recognised that the data given by RE Sawyer applied to a modern farm with purchased inputs rather than to a peasant household. But this does not

(37) It is fortunate that the earlier of these sources, RE Sawyer, based his example on the earlier years of the Mandate, while the second group of sources, namely Hope Simpson, Wilkansky and Johnson-Crosbie wrote in the middle years of the Mandate.
altogether invalidate the resultant estimate of the burden of taxation in this period if one treats these estimates as an "impression" rather than a precise calculation. In the opinion of the author, a verifiable impression is of more use than an estimate which had been so qualified and so "adjusted" as to make it a mere shadow of the data we started with, in terms of its verifiability.

The following is an estimate given by RE Sawyer, Director of the Department of Agriculture of the Government of Palestine in 1923. (38) The following table, Table (III/Two/8), reproduces the estimate exactly as it was given in RE Sawyer's report, apart from basing the calculation on a per-dunum basis instead of a per hectare basis, ten dunums being equal to one hectare.

From the above table, it can be seen that in terms of both yield and prices obtainable by the peasants for their crops, RE Sawyer's estimates were wide of the mark. Whereas Sawyer's estimates, for example, put the yield of wheat at 80 kilograms per dunum, the average yield for the period from 1922 to 1927 as calculated in this Section were 43.8 kilograms per dunum. Indeed, Sawyer himself admitted that average yields as opposed to the maxima

(38) RE Sawyer, The Agricultural Situation in Palestine, Jerusalem, 1923, Appendix X, Example A.
Table (III/Two/8)

Approximate costs of production, Selling Prices & Incidence of Taxation on Staple Crops in certain typical cases - per dunum.

On the basis of Maxima (*) Yields and Current Prices in the Jaffa District for the Season 1921.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Wheat</th>
<th>Barley</th>
<th>Durrah</th>
<th>Sesame</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Cost of:</strong></td>
<td>P.T.</td>
<td>P.T.</td>
<td>P.T.</td>
<td>P.T.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ploughing</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Seed (8 kg)</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sowing</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Harvest &amp; Transport</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Thresh. &amp; Winnow</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total Cost</strong></td>
<td>58</td>
<td>53</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>29</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Plus Tithes (then @ 12 1/2%)</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>10.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Plus Werko (**)</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total Expenses</strong></td>
<td>76</td>
<td>68</td>
<td>42</td>
<td>41.6</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Selling Price of:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>80 kg*17 Mil</th>
<th>108 kg*10 Mil</th>
<th>90 kg*7 Mil</th>
<th>30 kg*28.3 Mil</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Tbn (husks for fodder)</td>
<td>136</td>
<td>208</td>
<td>63</td>
<td>85</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total Receipts</strong></td>
<td>146</td>
<td>123</td>
<td>63</td>
<td>85</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Net Profit</strong></td>
<td>70</td>
<td>55</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>43.4</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Proportion of Tithe & Werko to Net Profit

|                | 25.7% | 27.3% | 47.6% | 29.0% |


* It was readily acknowledged by R.E. Sawyer that average yields as opposed to the Maxima adopted in his example, "were considerably lower and the incidence of taxation higher".

** Rate of Werko per dunum also derived from same Report, same Appendix, Example B.
Table (III/Two/9)

Reworking of R.E. Sawyers estimate of burden of taxation as in Table (III/Two/) using more realistic crop yield and price assumptions for period 1922-27 inclusive: per dunum.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>wheat</th>
<th>Barley(1)</th>
<th>Durra</th>
<th>Sesame</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Cost of:</strong></td>
<td>P.T.</td>
<td>P.T.</td>
<td>P.T.</td>
<td>P.T.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ploughing</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Seed (2) (8kg)</td>
<td>8.9</td>
<td>7.4</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sowing</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Harvest &amp; Transport</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Thresh. &amp; Winnow</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total cost of</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Production</td>
<td>54.9</td>
<td>50.6</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>29</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>plus Tithes (@ 11.75%)</td>
<td>6.3</td>
<td>6.5</td>
<td>2.2</td>
<td>4.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>plus Werko</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total Expenses</strong></td>
<td>63.2</td>
<td>59.1</td>
<td>36.2</td>
<td>35.5</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Selling Price of:

43.8kg*11.2Mil 63kg*7.4Mil 27.5kg*6.9Mil 16.8kg*22.7Mil

|                  |        |           |       |        |
| Tbn (husks for fodder) | 5    | 9         |       |        |
| **Total Receipts** | 54    | 55        | 19    | 38.1   |

Net Profit (Loss) 9.2 (Loss) 4.1 (loss) 17.2 2.5

Proportion of Tithe & Werko to Net Profit Adds to losses incurred 260%

(1) Average yield taken as 63 kg/dun for portion of total crop grown by peasants, so as to exclude less productive half of crop grown by nomads of Beersheba Sub-District.
(2) Costed at average selling price.
(3) For half the period Tithe was at 12.5% and the rest at 10%.
adopted in his example were "considerably lower and the incidence of taxation considerably higher". (39)

Secondly, as calculated in this Section, the prices obtainable by the peasants for their crops were considerably lower than those postulated by Sawyer in his example, especially in the case of wheat – the single most important peasant crop and to a lesser extent in the case of barley. Prices of durra and sesame were near enough Sawyer's postulated prices to warrant caution in interpreting the significance of the drop in prices.

Nevertheless, having worked out more realistic data on yield and on prices, it is possible now to rework Sawyer's example using the figures arrived at in the preceding pages. The following table, Table (III/Two/9), is a rework of Sawyer's example as it appeared earlier in table (III/Two/8).

Although the accuracy of Table (III/Two/9) should not be over-estimated because of drawbacks mentioned earlier, the table nevertheless remains a useful indication as to magnitude of the burden of Tithe and Werko.

(39) RE Sawyer, The Agricultural Situation in Palestine, Appendix X, Example A.
It is clear that the farmer in Sawye's example had actually made a loss when measuring the return to the farmer after the costs of production, inclusive of tithe and Werko, are deducted from the sum obtained on sale of his produce at the average prices which prevailed during the period 1922-1927. In Sawyer's original example in table (III/Two/8) on the other hand, the farmer made a good profit. In fact, assuming that this farmer could not supplement his income from other sources, he was better off seeking work as a labourer than undertaking cultivation in his own right, assuming that he could find work throughout the year.

Historically, however, an increasing number of peasants turned to supplementing their incomes from work on Government built roads and other projects as well as seeking work as unskilled labourers in the towns in the less busy seasons of the year. (40) In addition, some income was obtained from other crops like olives and fruit trees. As a last resort however, many peasants turned to the money lenders in the bad years, albeit on exorbitant terms.

On the whole however, it is unlikely that the burden of direct taxation in this period had been disastrously heavy. With recourse

(40) See Part V, p. 540-543.
to other sources of income, most peasants could make ends meet. That this was so was in large measure due to the automatic linkage between measurement of actual performance in terms of yield and prices, and the assessment of tax liability arising thereon. This linkage was inherent in the annual assessment of the actual produce as it stood on the threshing floor and the fixing of a Redemption Price in relation to the market price that applied that year. Within an acceptable margin of error due to estimator's oversight or favouritism when estimating physical crops, tithe assessment remained within the tithe's ancient principle of appropriating a fixed proportion of the gross produce, regardless of the costs of producing the crop, whichever way this cost was calculated.

The Second Period 1928-1934.

The second period was the period of the application of the Commuted Tithe from 1928 to 1937. The principles of the Commuted Tithe were explained in the previous Survey part of this Section.
Looking at the burden of the Commuted Tithe and Werko in terms of Gross Produce first, Table (III/Two/10) gives the burden of both in terms of cash value obtainable by cultivators for their produce on the same principles as Table (III/Two/7) did for the preceding period. Government take in both taxes is net of remissions for each year. However, it includes arrears brought forward from the previous period but excludes arrears that were carried forward into the succeeding period, 1935-1939. According to an official estimate, the arrears of tithes amounted to LP. 135,969, and arrears of werko amounted to LP. 113,234. (41)

It should be mentioned at this point that from 1928 onwards, the werko tax on urban property was abolished and progressively replaced by an urban property tax. (42) Therefore whereas in the first period (1922-1927), the proportion of total werko tax paid by agriculturalists was estimated by the Financial Treasurer (43) as 4/5ths of total werko, this proportion must have increased rapidly as the tax on urban property was assessed and collected separately from that on rural property.

(41) Report of the Rural Taxation Machinery Committee, PRO CO733/267/ 37560, p.35.
Table (III/Two/10)

Tithe & Werko as Proportion of cash value (obtainable by cultivators) of Gross Produce, 1928-34.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Actual Collections in LP. (*)</th>
<th>Remissions</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Tithe</td>
<td>Werko</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1928</td>
<td>231,593</td>
<td>168,796</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1929</td>
<td>251,919</td>
<td>178,589</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1930</td>
<td>189,541</td>
<td>130,473</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1931</td>
<td>60,010</td>
<td>120,177</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1932</td>
<td>106,841</td>
<td>109,078</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1933</td>
<td>57,720</td>
<td>108,923</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1934</td>
<td>108,919</td>
<td>126,709</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

1,006,543 942,745 748,972 8,885

Value of all(**) crops, 1928-1934 = LP. 10,100,000

Tax as percent of crop value = 9.9% 9.3% 7.4%

Proportion of Tithe & Werko to value of Gross Produce = 19.2%

(*) Actual collections of tithe and werko paid by all agricultural interests, peasant or otherwise. Inclusive of arrears brought forward from 1922-1927, but excludes arrears carried forward into 1935-1939.

(**) Excluding citrus but including all other crops.

Sources. As for Table (III/Two/7) on p. 351.
It can be seen from Table (III/Two/10) that with the grant of large and repeated remissions of tithes, plus the reduction of the rate from 10% to 7.5% in 1933, the burden of the tithes was reduced to around 10% of the value of the gross produce. However, unlike tithe remissions, no significant remissions of werko were granted. On the contrary, with the progress of the cadastral survey and the settlement and registration of private rights in land, more land was being taxed at the new up-to-date valuation instead of at the original Ottoman one.

Admittedly, a proportion of the werko was paid on newly constructed buildings or improved lands, some of which were in Jewish hands. But it should be kept in mind that most of Jewish building activity at the time took place in urban rather than in rural areas. As urban property was subjected to an urban property tax separate from werko after 1928, and as the vast majority of Palestine's lands were in Arab ownership at the time, it follows that most of the werko tax between 1928 and 1934 was levied on Arab rural interests, the majority of which was peasant.
Nevertheless, the fact remains that the werko tax collected by the government did increase which, together with the fall in the value of the gross produce, raised the proportion of werko from 6.2% on the preceding period to 9.3% in the current one. The total burden of both taxes increased from 17.1% in the previous period to 19.2% in the current one.

This conclusion, namely that the total burden of tithe and werko made up 19.2% of the value of gross produce, is supported by evidence which is totally independent of the calculations made in this Section. The evidence is derived from the results of a survey conducted by the government in 1930. (44) The investigation was in the form of a questionnaire which was completed by 104 Arab villages. The villagers were required to provide information on numerous economic aspects such as income, yields, rents and costs of production and living.

Among the information provided, the villagers declared that the combined gross income derived from the cultivation of field crops and fruit trees, inclusive of olive trees, was LP. 376,086. (45) It should be kept in mind that the term "income from cultivation" used by the Johnson Crosbie Report, covered the same crops as did

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(45) Johnson-Crosbie Report, Table IV, p. 5.
the estimates of gross income undertaken in this Section, namely income from the cultivation of wheat, durra, barley, sesame, legumes and other ground crops, fruit trees and vegetables. Both, the Johnson Crosbie Report and this Section, excluded income from citrus, stock, dairy produce, poultry, income derived from labour in or out of the village or income from any other source. In other words, the comparison between "income from cultivation" estimated by this Section and by the Report, is valid.

Together with declared gross income from cultivation, the Johnson-Crosbie Report provided information on actual collections of tithe and werko taxes for the period, which it put at LP. 53,034 in tithe (46), and LP. 21,955 in werko (47), a combined total of LP. 74,989, or 19.94% of the gross income from cultivation declared by the peasants.

Admittedly, the Johnson-Crosbie Report did not accept the gross income declared by the peasants. Instead, it estimated that the "true" total income from cultivation was LP. 703,512 (48). In arriving at its own revised estimate of gross income, the Johnson-Crosbie Report maintained that the difference between its own estimate of gross income and that declared by the peasants was due to two reasons. (1) The difference was "largely attributable

(47) Johnson-Crosbie Report, Table XXIX, p. 25.
to the different prices at which the produce in kind has been valued. The replies to the questionnaire, though purporting to quote average prices, clearly reflect the depressed prices now prevailing, while the commuted tithe is based on the higher prices of previous years." (49)

(ii) The difference was also due to the different estimates of crop yield. The Report, based its yield figures on the commuted tithe figures which were themselves based on averaging the yields obtained over the four preceding years. The yield figures adopted by the Report were 70 kg/dun for wheat, 59 for barley, 37 for durra and 9 for sesame. (50)

In other words, in estimating the value of gross produce, the Johnson-Crosbie Report fell in the same mistake which was pointed out throughout this Section. This mistake is that in the conditions of Palestine where yields could fluctuate widely due to climatic conditions, the adoption of yield averages as a basis of tax assessment would inevitably lead to wide fluctuations in the burden of the tax itself. Theoretically, this could work out to the disadvantage of the government, should actual yields be higher than the average, but in the circumstances of Palestine of the late

(49) Johnson Crosbie Report, para. 13, p. 6.
1920's and early 1930's, it was the peasants who suffered since actual yields were lower than the average on which the tithe was based. A similar mistake occurred when the Johnson-Crosbie Report adopted the prices based on the commuted tithe returns.

As this Section has already discussed the actual yields and the actual prices which prevailed during the period 1928-1934, there is no need to repeat the argument here, except to say that the figures on yield, prices and incomes declared by the peasants were, evidently, a much better representation of actual conditions than those of the Johnson-Crosbie Report. Consequently, one is justified in adopting the estimate of gross income declared by them in preference to the one estimated by the Report. One can conclude therefore, that it is not wide of the mark to say that the combined burden of tithe and werko in this period amounted to approximately one-fifth of the gross produce. This conclusion was supported by a government report which was published after the Johnson-Crosbie Report. In it, Sir John Hope Simpson wrote (51):

"...the Arab cultivator has now to sell, not one-tenth, but one-fifth of his crop in order to pay the tithe in cash. Indeed in many cases the amount is more than one-fifth for the prices for Commutation of the Tithe were based not on prices of the village but on those of the market town, and the two rates vary largely. In addition, the price of sale is lower than the price of purchase, and the price of forced sale is still lower. At the time of this enquiry actual prices of sale were in certain cases extraordinary. Villages found it exceedingly difficult to sell at all, and there was an established case reported in which barley was sold at Gaza at L.P. 2 a ton, when the quoted market price was L.P. 3.100, itself a price exceedingly low."

Although Sir John Hope Simpson was writing in 1930 before any major remissions were granted and when the agricultural crisis was at its height, and although the burden of the tithe for the period as a whole was considerably reduced by large remissions, the fact remains that the burden of both tithes and Werko together as worked out in the above Table was, if anything, an under-estimate of the true burden taking into consideration that crop prices adopted in valuing Gross Produce were 80% of wholesale price which, in Hope Simpson's view was far below the price actually obtained by the peasants.

Having estimated the burden of direct rural taxation in terms of the gross produce, the task now is to estimate the burden in terms which take the cost of production in account, inclusive of the cost of living of a typical peasant family. This burden will be
looked at in relation to an estimate given by Sir John Hope Simpson (52), and reproduced in the following table, Table (III/Two/11).

The above table has taken the cost of family labour into account because it was patently unrealistic and misleading not to do so. The necessary labour input had to be performed, and for it to be performed the labourers had to live. Consequently the cost of providing a family of six with the minimum necessities was included. That it is necessary to reiterate this very obvious fact is due to the tendency of Mandate officials not to include the cost of family labour when estimating costs of production, as happened in the Johnson Crosbie Report (53) on which Hope Simpson based his example, and as also happened in the Report of the Rural Taxation Committee of 1932 (54) on which the Rural Taxation Ordinance of 1935 was based.

It can be seen from the above table that the return from agriculture was not sufficient to cover the costs of production, once the cost of living of the peasant family is taken into account. On top of this, the combined burden of the tithe, werko and Animal Tax had to be carried by the cultivator whose

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(53) See, for example, Johnson-Crosbie Report, Op.cit, Table XVIII and related discussion on p. 16, when cost of family labour was only partially included.
(54) Report of the Rural Taxation Committee 1934, PRO CO733/267/37560, p.11 - which declared that "The cost of maintenance of the farmer and his family has been excluded from the costs of production."
Table (III/Two/11)

Estimate of return to owner-cultivator (1), and cost of production inclusive of family labour given by Sir John Hope Simpson based on average Market Prices, July 1930.

From 100 dunums of which 76 dunums cereal, 18 fruit trees and fallow, and 6 dunums uncultivated.

GROSS INCOME.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Field Crops</th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Wheat 37% = 28 dunums @ 70 kg = 1960 kg @ 5.9 Mil = 11,564</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Barley 15% = 11 @ 59 kg = 649 kg @ 2.7 Mil = 1,752</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Durra 23% = 18 @ 37 kg = 666 kg @ 3.1 Mil = 2,064</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sesame 2% = 9 @ 9 kg = 81 kg @ 16.1 Mil = 1,304</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other 13% = 12 = 1,927</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>18,611</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Fruit Trees:
Olive
 Others

Total from Cultivation approx.
Stock, Dairy Produce, Poultry etc.

Total Gross Income

(Continued on next page)......
Table (III/Two/ 11 )........continued from previous page.

COST OF PRODUCTION.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Description</th>
<th>Amount</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Annual Share of cost of plough animals</td>
<td>2.000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Implements</td>
<td>1.000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Forage for plough animals</td>
<td>7.000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Seed</td>
<td>6.500</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hired labour</td>
<td>3.500</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Transport to village</td>
<td>2.000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total Taxes</strong></td>
<td><strong>22.000</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tithe</td>
<td>4.500</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Werko</td>
<td>1.800</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Animal Tax</td>
<td>.500</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total Cost of living for a family of six:</strong></td>
<td><strong>6.800</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>wheat and durra</td>
<td>10.000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>olives and olive oil</td>
<td>3.000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>other village produce</td>
<td>4.000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>necessities of non-village origin</td>
<td>3.000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>clothing</td>
<td>5.000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>communal expenditure</td>
<td>1.000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total Costs of Production</strong></td>
<td><strong>26.000</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(1) Inclusive of cost of family labour as measured by cost of living.

returns in the specific period to which Hope Simpson's estimates relate, could not even cover the costs of production before taxes.

The situation unfortunately, was not unique to the period round July 1930 to which Hope Simpson's above-quoted example relates. If his example is re-worked for the period 1928-1934 as a whole, taking (i) average yields as in Table (III/Two/4), and (ii) average prices obtainable by the cultivators as in Table (III/Two/6), then a picture not materially different from Hope Simpson's example emerges. Thus where average prices for the period were actually higher than Hope Simpson's (55), average yields were much less than postulated by Simpson who freely admitted than he based average yield on the Johnson-Crosbie Report which itself calculated yield on the basis of Commuted Tithe Returns (which were far higher than actual performance).

Even when yields of barley are adjusted to exclude lower than average yields of that portion of the produce grown by the nomads of Beersheba Sub-District, where crops were grown by very extensive techniques (56), gross income for the period as a whole works out at approximately IL 39,000 instead of IL 40,600 as in Hope Simpson's example.

(55) Average prices during the period 1928-1934 were 8.41 Mil/kg for wheat, 5.2 for barley, 5.59 for durra and 15.97 for sesame - see Table (III/Two/6). Yields for wheat in the same period were 34.5 kg/dun., 22.6 for barley, 29.5 for durra and 13.8 for sesame. See Tables (III/Two/4) and (III/Two/5).

(56) An average yield of 63 kg/dun of barley was assumed - in common with the yields which the peasants had declared in their reply to the questionnaire in the Johnson-Crosbie Report, Table VIII, p.8.
Meanwhile, average costs inclusive of family labour were assumed to be the same for the period 1928-34 as a whole as in Hope Simpson's example. In reality this is an under-estimation of costs since Hopse Simpson's costs were measured at the time of the lowest prices (July 1930) of the whole Mandate period. These prices were well below the average for the period 1928-1934. Nevertheless, so as not to increase uncertainty by recalculating them, they were assumed to apply to the period as a whole. Therefore, the conclusions that apply to the example above are also valid for the period 1928-1934 as a whole, namely that the cultivators were hard put to produce enough to cover their cost of production and provide for their families even before taxation. The burden of the latter increased the total burden into crisis proportions.

That there was a crisis in this period is beyond question. Hardly a report or correspondence between the Palestine Government and the Colonial Office regarding agriculture was free from discussion of the crisis. Committees were appointed to investigate, substantial remissions of Assessed Tithe were made, but suffice it here to quote Hope Simpson's comment regarding the crisis and the burden of taxation on Palestinian peasants in this period (57):

"It is no exaggeration to state that the fellah population as a class is hopelessly bankrupt....Everywhere this year the small cultivator has had to borrow to pay his taxes when he had to pay them. In very many cases he has found it impossible to pay them at all. The arrears of agricultural taxes are very heavy."

The Third Period, 1935-1939.

The third period extended from 1935, the date of the application of the Rural Property Tax Ordinance of 1935, till the end of the Mandate in 1948. This thesis however, will only examine the period until 1939, the end of our period. As has been mentioned earlier in the survey part of this Section, taxation was levied as a fixed sum per dunum of agricultural and village built-on land, the rate varying according to the classification of land by quality and type of produce - there being sixteen categories in descending order of value.

The following table, Table (III/Two/12), gives the category of land, rate of tax per dunum, area comprising each category and the tax assessed on such land in the two years 1935 and 1938. These two years were the only ones in the period for which such data could be found in the Blue Books or the Statistical Abstracts. For a description of the category of land, refer to Table (III/Two/2).
In Table (III/Two/12), tax assessment on citrus and bananas (Categories 1-2 and 3 respectively) was not computed because these crops, due to their high initial capital requirement, were not grown by the peasants on any appreciable commercial scale, which makes their inclusion unnecessary. As can be seen from the table, total assessment for the remainder of the crops, the vast majority of which were grown by peasants, was LP.102,362 for 1935/6 and LP. 103,332 for 1938/9.

When this assessment is looked at in relation to the stated objectives of the Rural Property Tax Ordinance 1935, of taxing Net Profit at the rate of 10%, it will be found that although one would not entirely agree with the arbitrary practice of taking costs of production of all crops as two-thirds of the value of Gross produce - the Ordinance nevertheless, had indeed succeeded in its stated intent.

The following table, Table (III/Two/13), gives the value of crops, excluding citrus, bananas and tobacco, costs of production calculated as two-thirds of gross value of the produce, and the ratio of tax to net value for the years 1935 and 1938.
Table (III/Two/12)

Area, rate of tax per dunum and tax assessment by Category
(as defined by the Rural Property Taxation Ordinance 1935)—
as at 1.4.1935 and 1.4.1938.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Cat.</th>
<th>Area dun.</th>
<th>Rate Mils</th>
<th>Assessment LP</th>
<th>Area dun.</th>
<th>Rate Mils</th>
<th>Assessment LP</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>139,076</td>
<td>825</td>
<td>267,369</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>7,289</td>
<td>410</td>
<td>8,346</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>5,790</td>
<td>560</td>
<td>3,947</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>43,910</td>
<td>160</td>
<td>7,025</td>
<td>76,399</td>
<td>400</td>
<td>12,224</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>4,714</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>189</td>
<td>4,490</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>180</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>270,570</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>9,470</td>
<td>220,966</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>7,734</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7</td>
<td>640,508</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>25,215</td>
<td>594,149</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>17,824</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8</td>
<td>337,314</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>8,419</td>
<td>315,099</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>7,889</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9</td>
<td>224,713</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>4,494</td>
<td>222,701</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>4,454</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10</td>
<td>845,475</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>15,237</td>
<td>845,037</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>15,211</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11</td>
<td>751,950</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>11,279</td>
<td>736,924</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>11,054</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12</td>
<td>983,230</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>11,799</td>
<td>977,713</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>11,733</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13</td>
<td>1,902,644</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>15,221</td>
<td>1,878,768</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>15,030</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14</td>
<td>745,776</td>
<td>NIL</td>
<td>744,244</td>
<td>NIL</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15</td>
<td>230,548</td>
<td>NIL</td>
<td>214,970</td>
<td>NIL</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>16</td>
<td>6,506,484</td>
<td>NIL</td>
<td>6,469,309</td>
<td>NIL</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

13,641,000 102,362 13,580,891 103,332

(*) For Categories 4-13 only.

Table (III/Two/13)

Gross and Net values of crops by type, costs of production(1), assessed Rural Property Tax (2) and ratio of tax to net value for the years 1935 and 1938.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Crop</th>
<th>Value in LP.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1935</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-----------------------------</td>
<td>--------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cereals</td>
<td>1,597,100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vegetables</td>
<td>365,735</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other fruits less bananas</td>
<td>1,000,000 (3)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fodder</td>
<td>130,000 (3)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>approx. 3,092,835</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Less Costs of production</td>
<td>2,041,271</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Net Value</td>
<td>1,051,564</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Assessed Rural Property Tax</td>
<td>102,362</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ratio of Tax to net value</td>
<td>9.73%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(1) Costs of production = 2/3 of Gross Value according to Rural Taxation Committee 1932 - see text, p. 329.
(2) On crops listed in this table only.
(3) Approximate figures used being the rounded average for the whole period since exact figure not published in Blue Book for the year.

It can be seen from Table (III/Two/13) that the in terms of tax assessed on peasant products, the Rural Property Tax Ordinance of 1935 posed much less of a burden than did the two previous periods of taxation - the simple tithe and the commuted tithe. This was welcome relief to the hard pressed peasants and explains the cessation of the constant stream of complaints about taxation that flowed between the Palestine Government and the Colonial Office after 1935 (except for pleadings to reduce taxation on Citrus which was suffering from bad crops and marketing problems which need not concern us here).

This drastic reduction in the burden whether measured in terms of gross or net produce, had been due to a combination of favourable factors. The first is that the period as a whole did not see the series of bad harvests that the previous period had, (see table (III/Two/3)). The second is that although the averages of prices for the period did not increase from the averages of the previous period (see Table (III/Two/6), the trend, nevertheless, stopped falling. Indeed, in some years prices were actually rising, albeit marginally. According to the last mentioned table, the worst year in terms of prices for wheat, barley, durra and sesame was 1935 when they were put at 7.12, 4.32, 3.92 and 14.48 Mils per kilogram respectively. All the other years meanwhile, saw
prices that were comfortably above these levels.

The third factor is that like the commuted tithe before it, the Rural Property Tax Ordinance adopted averaging of price performance of the preceding years as the basis of the new tax. The crucial difference however, is that, as has been mentioned in the above paragraph, prices had stopped falling and were actually above the rock-bottom prices of 1930/31. Even in the worst year of this period, 1935, the price of wheat was 18.7% higher than the price in 1931, that of barley was 38.5% higher than in 1930, that of durra was actually 2% lower than 1930 although durra prices from 1936 to 1939 were much higher, and the price of sesame was 11.7% higher in 1935 than in 1931. (58)

Admittedly, the resultant averages adopted by the new Tax were still higher than actual performance (average adopted by the new Tax for wheat for example was 10 Mil/kg as opposed to actual performance price of 7.83 Mil/kg - see Table). Nevertheless these new averages were nearer actual performance in any given year from 1935 to 1939 than the averages adopted by the commuted tithe compared to any individual year during its application.

The fourth factor is that the Ordinance, by substituting the

(58) See Table (III/Two/6) on p. 349.
Rural Property Tax for both tithe and Werko, effectively lowered the rate of direct agricultural taxes on the cultivator - Werko very often working out at no less than half the tithe collection. The cultivator was now to be taxed not at at least 15% of gross produce (combined tithe and Werko) but at 10% of the net value of the produce.

The fifth and undoubtedly the most important factor, was that the new tax took into account costs of production - which it took albeit arbitrarily, as 2/3 of the gross value of the produce. Had the costs of production not been taken into account, and had the gross produce been taxed on the old tithe basis, the assessment for either 1935 or 1938 would have been in the region of L.P.300,000 instead of L.P.100,000.

However, at the end of this Section, direct agricultural taxes though crucial in their burden on peasant society, should be put in perspective in relation to government revenue as a whole for the period under review.

As can be seen from the following table, Table (III/Two/14), direct agricultural taxes - tithe, Werko (later replaced by Rural
Property Tax and Animal Tax, were steadily making up a smaller and smaller proportion of Government revenues. Instead, the leading role was increasingly being assumed by indirect taxation, mostly in the form of Customs duties. This trend paralleled the increasing diversification of the economy emanating from non-peasant sources - like the inflow of capital that accompanied Jewish immigration, and the increased prosperity of the citrus industry, which depended mainly on exports and the growth of urban demand.
Table (III/Two/14)

Total Government Revenues & Direct Agricultural Taxes (1) 1921-39.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Total Gov. Revenue</th>
<th>Direct Taxes</th>
<th>Ratio %</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>L.P.</td>
<td>L.P.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>21/2</td>
<td>2,371,531</td>
<td>432,590</td>
<td>18.24</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>22/3</td>
<td>1,809,831</td>
<td>396,534</td>
<td>21.91</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>23/4</td>
<td>1,675,788</td>
<td>370,606</td>
<td>22.12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>24/5</td>
<td>2,154,946</td>
<td>475,693</td>
<td>22.07</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>25/6</td>
<td>2,809,324</td>
<td>510,126</td>
<td>18.16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>26/7</td>
<td>2,451,365</td>
<td>379,196</td>
<td>15.47</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>27/8</td>
<td>2,358,365</td>
<td>367,937</td>
<td>15.60</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>28/9</td>
<td>2,497,011</td>
<td>343,259</td>
<td>13.75</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>29/30</td>
<td>2,355,623</td>
<td>369,529</td>
<td>15.69</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>30/1</td>
<td>2,462,304</td>
<td>329,535</td>
<td>13.38</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>31/2</td>
<td>2,354,696</td>
<td>229,904</td>
<td>9.76</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>32/3</td>
<td>3,015,917</td>
<td>310,229</td>
<td>10.29</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>33/4</td>
<td>3,985,492</td>
<td>143,073</td>
<td>3.59</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>34/5</td>
<td>5,452,633</td>
<td>201,404</td>
<td>3.69</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>35/6</td>
<td>5,770,457</td>
<td>130,529</td>
<td>2.26</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>36/7</td>
<td>4,640,821</td>
<td>99,747</td>
<td>2.15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>37/8</td>
<td>4,897,356</td>
<td>143,980</td>
<td>2.94</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>38/9</td>
<td>5,937,280</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>39/40</td>
<td>6,768,352</td>
<td>123,697</td>
<td>1.83</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(1) Direct Agricultural Taxes are Tithe & Werko later replaced by Rural Property Tax; and Animal Tax levied throughout Mandate. Tithe - inclusive of all Tithe (Citrus, Jewish products etc.) Werko - on agricultural land = 4/5 of total up to 1925, 95% for remainder.
Animal Tax - L.P.7,000 deducted to cover tax paid by Beersheba nomads, this being approximate proportion of animals owned by nomads.

Sources. Statistics of Total Government Revenue in Statistical Abstract of Palestine 1939, Table 132, p.111. Figures for direct agricultural taxes up to 1926 in Report of the Average Tithes Committee, PRO C0733/117; for the years 1926-1930 in Memorandum on Revenue by the Treasurer together with a Summary of the Receipts during the years 1925 to 1930, PRO C0733/196/87033; for the years 1931-1939 in various Statistical Abstracts and Blue Books published in the period.
PART III

Section Three

Government policy towards the exposure of peasant society to the world market.

Although in the Mandate as a whole, the volume and value of foreign trade in areas like citrus exports far out-weighed trade in peasant-related produce which was overwhelmingly concentrated in cereals and food products, this Section will only discuss foreign trade as it related to peasant society and its products. Other areas will be mentioned only in so far as they affected peasant society.

The opening up of the peasant economy in Palestine to the world market can be looked at in two stages. The first is to outline
briefly what government policy was towards this exposure. The second is to determine the effects of this exposure on the internal workings of the peasant economy in terms of output, prices and incomes.

A. Outline of Government Policy.

As with other aspects of Palestine Government policy, policy towards foreign trade was directed at the outset by both the broad thrust of Mandate policy and by specific requirements enshrined in the Articles of the Mandate.

Having embarked on the Jewish National Home policy, the essence of which was to allow large numbers of immigrants in, it followed that the Government had to devise the means of feeding these extra mouths. Though theoretically, they could have been fed by the produce of Palestine, few officials seriously entertained the idea that Palestine could feed a population which through immigration and high rate of natural increase was expanding much faster than indigenous food production. This is quite apart from any change in tastes that might result from the influx of immigrants with diet preferences that could not have been satisfied from local
sources - local wheat for example, though of higher nutritional
value than imported white wheat flour, was nevertheless unsuitable
for certain kinds of baking e.g. European like cakes.

In addition to this general requirement specific requirements
and restrictions on policy were laid down by Article 18 of
the Mandate, the following clauses of which set the tone of
subsequent policy (1):

" - The Mandatory shall see that...there shall be no discrimination
in Palestine against goods originating in or destined for any
of the said States [Members of the League of Nations].

- Subject as aforesaid and to other provisions of the Mandate,
the Administration of Palestine may, on the advice of the Mandatory
impose such taxes and custom duties as it may consider necessary,
and take such steps as it may think best to promote the development
of the natural resources of the country and to safeguard the
interests of the population.

- It may also, on the advice of the Mandatory, conclude a
special customs agreement with any State the territory of which
in 1914 was wholly included in Asiatic Turkey or Arabia."

In the general area of discrimination for or against produce
of Palestine by any member state, the test case as far as exports
of Palestine peasant produce were concerned came early in 1923. In April 1923 the High Commissioner, then Herbert Samuel, observed that Britain was intending "that a duty of 10/- a quarter should be imposed upon malting barley imported into Great Britain with a preference of one third in favour of the Dominions." He went on to say "I would venture to submit that the opportunity should be taken to include barley grown in Palestine and imported into Great Britain, on the same footing as the produce of countries of the British Empire."

Samuel observed that before the War, around 40,000 tons a year were available for export and that in 1908 38,000 tons were actually exported, almost all to Great Britain.

The Colonial Office however, rejected this request on the grounds that "the extension of Imperial Preference to Palestine would constitute a direct infringement of the obligations arising from 'most favoured nation' clauses of this country's commercial treaties with other Powers."(3)

Since for the duration of the Mandate, barley - in good years - constituted by far the main exportable peasant crop, this refusal to extend Imperial Preference by the former recipient of barley exports put paid to any hopes of Palestine peasant

(2) High Commissioner to Colonial Secretary, Desp. dated 27.4.1923, PRO CO733/44, 1923.
(3) Colonial Secretary to High Commissioner, Desp. dated 16.5.1923, PRO CO733/44, 1923.
exports securing favourable discrimination by importing countries.

However, though the failure to obtain preferential treatment for its exports may have seemed damaging to peasant society, the more relevant question was how much protection peasant produce could hope to enjoy in its home market against competition. This competition stemmed from imports from two main sources; the largely peasant societies that existed in the surrounding countries of Mandated Syria and Jordan; and from the produce of countries enjoying the advantages of modern farming methods and natural endowments far more favourable than in Palestine - mainly U.S.A., Australia and Eastern Europe.

From the outset of the Mandate imports originating from the surrounding countries on the one hand and from third countries on the other were put on diverging paths in terms of their subjection to tariffs. While the Military Administration promptly restored the tariff system of the Ottoman Empire which imposed an 11% ad valorem duties on imports and 1% on exports, an arrangement was immediately entered into with Syria which provided for reciprocal exemption from all duties, for goods which were the local produce of the countries concerned. This free trade
agreement, the Syria-Palestine Customs Agreement of the 25th of August 1921 was entered into to minimise the dislocation caused by separating the two countries which were part of the Ottoman Empire before the War and therefore subject to the same Customs regulations. Otherwise imports from third parties were subject to 11% ad valorem duties which were raised to 12% in 1924. In the general process of converting generalised ad valorem duties into specific ones, these were later converted into a cash sum; e.g. L.P. 3.500 per ton on wheat imports by 1930. (4)

In effect therefore, as far as Palestinian peasant produce was concerned a dual tariff system was in operation; allowing in part unrestricted imports from Syria and Trans-Jordan while subjecting imports from third parties to an import duty varying around 11-12% of value. Throughout the 1920's subsequent changes to the Syria-Palestine Customs Agreement introduced modifications and clarifications as to the precise definition of exempted goods, but the principle of free trade between both countries in agricultural goods of local origin was maintained.

This dual system was retained largely intact till 1935 in spite of pressures for modifications brought about by the agricultural crisis of the 1930's (discussed earlier in this thesis). Then

by 1935, seeing that any likely benefits to the Palestinian peasant that could have been derived from raising duties on wheat and flour imports from third parties was severely curtailed by the duty free imports from Syria, the Palestine and the Syrian Mandatory Administrations agreed to limit the entry of only a quota of 5000 tons of Syrian wheat duty-free. Any additional quantity was subject to a specific rate of L.P.3.00 per ton of hard wheat (the same variety as grown by Palestinian peasants).

As for third countries, with the advent of the agricultural crisis in 1930, the Administration responded to the recommendations of the Johnson-Crosbie and Hope Simpson Reports, by raising import duties on wheat and flour by ordinance as from the 1st of April 1930. By the time of the former committee's report, the specific duty in force which then was estimated by the Committee to have been equal to 20-25% ad valorem, was considered insufficient and it was recommended that it should be increased by 50% to represent 33% ad valorem. The intention was that the peasants would be able to get L.P. 12.00 per ton for their wheat.(5) Moreover, a licencing system of imports was recommended to force bakeries to use a higher proportion of local wheat in their bread. In addition the Johnson-Crosbie Report recommended the banning of unrefined

(5) Report of A Committee on the Economic Conditions of Agriculturalists in Palestine and the Fiscal Measures etc. (Johnson-Crosbie Report), Op. cit, p.54. Also Note on Meeting between the Chairman, Standing Committee for Commerce & Industry and Members regarding the Customs Tariff on Wheat and Flour, held in the Treasury Government Offices, Jerusalem, on Friday 15th Dec., 1933, under covering letter, High
olive oil imports as the only way of stopping these imports. Minor other duties were also recommended.

These recommendations, duly implemented by the Administration were followed in July of the same year by a further increase in the duty on wheat, flour and semolina and the introduction of a tax on sesame seed.

In 1932, the Customs duties which were raised in the previous two years were replaced by a two-rate tariff system; a low rate of L.P. 2.00 per ton to be applied during the off season months of January to May inclusive; and a high rate of L.P. 5.00 per ton to be applied during the harvest season of June to December inclusive. The corresponding rates for flour of wheat and rye were L.P. 5 and L.P. 8.00 per ton, care being taken to maintain an L.P. 3.00 per ton differential between the two. However, this scheme was found inadequate since "flour was a commodity which could be stored for two years [and] flour could therefore be dumped now [13th December 1933] and the fellaheen affected adversely next year."(6)

In June 1933 a sliding scale of import duties was introduced on imports of wheat, rye and flour to permit a variation in the duty to counterbalance variations in the price of imports.

Commissioner to Colonial Secretary dated 15th January, 1934, PRO C0733/250/37235, 1934, p.54.

(6) Extracts from Minutes of Standing Committee for Commerce and Industry held on 13th Dec., 1933, under same covering letter from High Commissioner to Colonial Secretary as Footnote (5) above.
Prices of each article were to be decided periodically by the Director of Customs and rate of duty calculated accordingly so that the effect of increased imports would drive prices downwards if the latter were rising above the target, and raise duties, thereby -hopefully- reducing imports if domestic prices were falling below target. The target price which the Government hoped to stabilize by the adoption of the sliding scale was L.P. 9.00 per ton for wheat and L.P. 12.500 per ton for wheat flour. This target represented a reduction on the targets the Johnson-Crosbie Report hoped to achieve by their recommended measure of L.P. 12.00 for wheat and L.P. 15.500 for flour and for the attainment of which a higher rate of duty was enforced in the sliding scale of early 1933. Nevertheless this high rate was replaced in June of the same year, to attain the lower target price of L.P. 9.00 on wheat.

As has been mentioned earlier, during 1935 hard wheat, the type that made up the bulk of imports from Syria, was excluded from the list subjected to the sliding scale and subjected to a specific duty of its own. The other items i.e. flour of wheat or rye, semolina and soft wheat were kept on a sliding scale but the rates were raised.

In the case of barley, the duty was raised in June 1934 from
L.P. 1.00 per ton to L.P. 2.00 per ton and in August of the same year to L.P. 3.00 per ton. In 1937 the rate of duty was fixed at L.P. 1.00 per ton when barley was valued at L.P. 5.00 or under, and imports of barley were exempted from duty when barley was valued at over L.P. 5.00 per ton.

B. Effects of imports on peasant sector output, prices and income.

Output.

In terms of output, the effects of imports could be said to have been detrimental if it could be demonstrated that the opening up of the domestic market to imports, led to an appreciable decline in the local production of these goods. As wheat and flour made up the largest items in imports which could be termed as direct competitors to peasant products, the question will be largely examined with reference to these two items.

An examination of output figures for the major peasant crops
given in Table (III/Two/6) on page shows that on the whole, if the effects of bad harvests due to 'natural causes' are excluded, output of major peasant crops was pretty stable.

To eliminate some of this distortion, Figure (III/Three/1) plots the 3-year moving average of local output of wheat between 1920 and 1939 and another plot of the same long term trend calculated by least-squares method. It is clear from both that output of wheat was more or less stable for the period as a whole, apart from the severe drop in output due to the series of disastrous harvests between 1930 and 1934.

The pattern for the period was that, apart from the first few years, the increased demand for wheat and flour due to immigration and growing population was being met by imports which more or less bridged the gap between local output and consumption needs of the country as a whole. Figure (III/Three/2) shows total consumption, local production and imports of wheat and flour from 1922 to 1939.

Having established that output of wheat and barley did not suffer as a result of imports, it is important to try to fathom the reasons. For imports to lead to a reduction in local output, not only do imports have to be appreciably cheaper than the
FIG. (III/THREE/1)

PALESTINE PRODUCTION OF WHEAT 1922-1939 (X 100 TONS)

= 3-YEAR MOVING AVERAGE
= LINEAR TREND LINE (LEAST SQUARES)
Fig. (III/THREE/2)

Palestine Production of Wheat & Imports of Wheat and Flour 1922-1939.

---

- = Local Wheat Production (x 100 tons)
III = Imports of Wheat (x 100 tons)
### = Imports of Flour (x 100 tons)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Local Wheat Production</th>
<th>Imports of Wheat</th>
<th>Imports of Flour</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
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<td></td>
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<tr>
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<td>1926</td>
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<td></td>
</tr>
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<td>1930</td>
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<td></td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>1931</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1932</td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>1933</td>
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<td>1934</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>1939</td>
<td></td>
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</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
marginal cost of local production, but there must be no impediments and rigidities in the market that would prevent the lower prices of imports from being translated into lower local production and consequently more imports. In other words the competitive trade-off between price and output on the lines of the classical perfect competition model must be allowed to work. There must be a correlation between prices and production.

From figures of output and prices given in Tables (III/Two/6) on page 349 and (III/Two/7) on page 351, it is clear that this was not the case as far as local output of wheat was concerned. A very low correlation between prices and output existed. The coefficient of correlation between prices of one year and output in the same year for wheat for example was 0.173. Calculating the coefficient on the assumption that prices in one year would influence the peasants as to how big an area they would plant for the next, (i.e. a one year lag) the Correlation was 0.172. It is therefore clear that market prices were not the prime consideration that governed the production decision of the peasant, at least in the short term.

Naturally one could not rely in reaching this conclusion solely on the calculation of correlation coefficients between prices and
production since tonnage produced in the case of Palestine is not, on its own, a good indication of area sown because of year to year fluctuations in yield due to weather conditions. Therefore, the conclusions reached above have to be reinforced by evidence independent of the correlation method.

Chief among these is the figures collected by the Government of areas sown with particular crops. These are found in Table (III/Two/5) on page 344. Unfortunately though, these figures were collected only after 1935. But notwithstanding this it can be seen from the table that the area sown in each of these years was remarkably stable irrespective of prices for the corresponding period and irrespective of yield.

The second cause of the existence of rigidities was that the link between prices and decisions by peasants to increase or decrease sowings was limited by a production ceiling and floor which the peasants had no choice but to meet.

If, on the one hand, prices were low and the peasants wished to restrict production, there were in-built constraints on the degree to which they could do that. The bulk of grain produced by peasants was retained for their own consumption or to pay
money-lenders who invariably had prior call on the peasants' produce, leaving only a small part to be marketed directly by the peasants. These two items of minimum consumption and debt-payment when added to the factors of uncertain yields and a growing population meant that the peasants had to sow the maximum area they could. It did not pay them to restrict production in order to raise prices since any shortfall was likely to be replaced by imports instead of being reflected in rising prices.

If on the other hand prices were high and the peasants wished to increase production further, there was the constraint of available land when by the 1930's, in the words of the Johnson-Crosbie Report "there was little cultivable land that remained uncultivated" (7). Increase in production was further confined by static productivity where there was little evidence to suggest that productivity in Arab peasant cereal farming was noticeably rising, if at all, during the period.

Although it has been shown that grain imports had no demonstrable effects on the peasants' decision as to the areas sown with wheat and barley, it could be argued that grain imports had another effect on peasant output, namely to encourage the peasants to

invest in other areas such as animal husbandry and vegetable production.

As for animal husbandry, table (III/Three/1) below gives the number of sheep and goats as enumerated by the government for Aghnam (Animal Tax) purposes from 1920 to 1937. There were no enumerations in the years 1931, 1933, 1935, 1936, 1938 and 1939. Figure (III/Three/3) gives the data in the above table in a graphic form and plots the linear trend line over the period as a whole.

It is clear from the above that there was no increase in the number of sheep and goats in the period. On the contrary there was a decrease in their numbers, albeit a gradual one. Two points should be kept in mind at this point. The first is that sheep and goats formed the bulk of the peasants' animal wealth. Although the peasants owned other animals like donkeys, camels, buffaloes, cattle etc., these were largely work animals not primarily reared for their meat, milk or other by-products. Moreover, the government did not collect data on their numbers as completely as it did on sheep and goats. Their inclusion therefore would confuse the argument rather than enhance it especially that sheep and goats made up more than 75% of the number of animals, though less than
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<th>Goats Index 1920=100</th>
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NUMBER OF SHEEP ENUMERATED IN PALESTINE BETWEEN 1920 AND 1937

--- LINEAR TREND LINE

### NUMBER OF SHEEP (* 1000)

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<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
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<th>1922</th>
<th>1924</th>
<th>1926</th>
<th>1928</th>
<th>1930</th>
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<td>50</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>150</td>
<td>200</td>
<td>250</td>
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NB. No enumerations were undertaken in 1931, 1933, 1935, 1936, 1938 and 1939.

Sources. Government of Palestine, Statistical Abstract of Palestine 1939, Table 58, p.47.
FIGURE (III/THREE/3 B)

NUMBER OF GOATS ENUMERATED IN PALESTINE BETWEEN 1920 AND 1937

______ = LINEAR TREND LINE

= NUMBER OF GOATS (* 1000)

NB. No enumerations were undertaken in 1931, 1933, 1935, 1936, 1938 and 1939.

Sources. Government of Palestine, Statistical Abstract of Palestine 1939, Table 58, p.47.
that by value. (8)

The second point to be made is that sheep and goats are animals which were typically kept by the peasants rather than by Jewish settlers or by full nomads. The former tended to keep dairy stock or poultry but very few sheep and goats while the latter tended to keep camels and horses as well as some sheep and goats. In the year 1937 for example, the number of sheep enumerated in the Beersheba Sub-District which had no peasant villages at all was 42,435 (20% of Palestine's total), while the number of goats was 22,048 (6.1% of the total). (9) Considering that the bulk of Palestine's nomadic population lived in this Sub-District, it is clear that the overwhelming majority of sheep and goats enumerated in the other Sub-Districts belonged to the peasant sector, whether actually owned by individual peasants or by landlords within the sector. In other words, the above table, on the whole, gives a true picture of the fluctuations in the numbers of sheep and goats owned by the peasants.

As to the other area into which the peasants could have diverted resources viz. vegetable production, the question was discussed at some length in Part IV, Section Four. The main conclusion was

(8) Statistical Abstract of Palestine 1939, Table 58, p.47. Also see Abstract for 1936, Table 52, p. 49..
(9) ibid.
that though there had been an increase their production by 1939, much of that increase was accounted for by Jewish settlements. However, even discounting the Jewish share, it is clear that the increase in Arab vegetable and dairy production did not markedly reduce the dominance of cereals within the product-mix of the peasants by 1939 — whether in the proportion of total area devoted to cereals or by market value of the output.

Prices.

As for the effects of imports on prices, there is little doubt that prices did fall considerably during the period and that the main cause was the fall in world grain prices. Figure (III/Three/4) plots a 3-year moving average of prices obtainable by peasants (given in Table (III/Two/6) and a long term trend line calculated by least-squares method. It is important to note here that the fall in prices merely reflected the fall of all commodity prices on the international market, grain included. The main point is that the fall in prices was reflected in Palestinian prices via the Government’s policy of allowing in considerable
FIG. (III/THREE/a)

TREND OF WHEAT PRICES OBTAINED BY PEASANTS 1922-1939.

■■■■ = 3-YEAR MOVING AVERAGE
- - - - = LINEAR TREND LINE (LEAST SQUARES)
MILS PER TON

0 125 250 375 500 625 750 875 1000 1125 1250 1375 1500

1922 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 34 35 36 37 38 39
imports. If the Government did not do that, static local production coupled with fast expanding population would have caused prices to rise considerably as had happened when the availability of imports was much reduced in the years immediately after the First World War and during the first years of the Second.

The implication of the combination of tariff policy outlined above and of these cheap imports was that as long as imports of grain into Palestine were not limited by quota but merely by an unchanging ad valorem or specific duties, then prices in Palestine would merely follow world prices of grain so long as the world market price was low enough to surmount the twin barriers of transport costs and Customs duties - and this was comfortably the case in practice.

Admittedly, Palestine imported grain throughout the 1920's and the 1930's. But the crucial difference between the two periods was that the first had been for the most part one of relatively high prices in the international market while the second saw a severe fall in prices.

However, in terms of their depressing effects on local prices a
distinction should be made at this point between imports from the two sources which were mentioned in the survey part of this Section; imports from Syria and Trans-Jordan which were allowed into Palestine free of duty for the major part of the period under review, and imports from third parties which were subject to varying rates of ad valorem and specific import duties.

Imports from Syria and Trans-Jordan were not novel since Syria, Trans-Jordan and Palestine were part of the Ottoman Empire before the War and therefore part of the same customs area. Nor were these imports necessarily harmful to Palestinian producers since Syrian cereal production was conducted by peasants along more or less similar lines as in Palestine and consequently at a roughly comparable level of productivity. With 'natural protection' afforded to local Palestinian produce due to transport costs incurred by Syrian imports, the depressing effect on local Palestinian prices was not serious. In the words of Johnson-Crosbie Report "the local farmer is quite prepared with the natural protection due to transport charges, to compete with grain produced on a system similar to his own."(10) Indeed, prior to the First World War and well into the 1920's, imports of grain from Syria into Palestine and vice versa was common practice in case of failure of harvest in either territory.

Table (III/Three/2) shows tonnage and average prices of imports of wheat and flour from Syria and from all other parties which were not exempted from import duties between 19331 and 1938, and the percentage of imports from Syria of all wheat and flour imports.

It can be seen from the table that most Syrian imports were in the form of wheat while imports from other countries were mostly in the form of flour. More important however, average prices of wheat and flour from non-Syrian sources were significantly and consistently lower than prices of imports from Syria. This fact is more noticeable in the case of flour imports where the Syrian share of total imports was lower than in the case of wheat. Consequently, imports from non-Syrian sources exercised a stronger downward pressure on local prices to the extent they undercut both Syrian and Palestinian prices.

In the words of the Johnson-Crosbie Report "His [the peasant's] fear is of grain produced by large scale cultivation in the great wheat centres of the world." (11)

Table (III/Three/2)

Volume and average prices of wheat and flour imports into Palestine from Syria and All countries, 1931-1938.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>SYRIA</th>
<th></th>
<th>ALL COUNTRIES</th>
<th></th>
<th>% Syrian/All</th>
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<tr>
<td>Year</td>
<td>tons</td>
<td>L.P./ton</td>
<td>tons</td>
<td>L.P./ton</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
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<td>------------</td>
<td>----------</td>
<td>------------</td>
<td>----------</td>
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<tr>
<td>1931</td>
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<td>21,196</td>
<td>7.82</td>
<td>99</td>
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<tr>
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<td>8.52</td>
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<td>60,047</td>
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<td>9.54</td>
<td>92</td>
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<td>9.18</td>
<td>37,163</td>
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<td>7.05</td>
<td>39,210</td>
<td>7.56</td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
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</table>

**WHEAT**

**FLOUR** (of wheat)

<p>| | | | | | | |</p>
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
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<td>11.81</td>
<td>26,918</td>
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</table>

Incomes.

As for the effects of imports on peasants' income, to say that the fall in prices was not reflected in marked adjustments in the area sown is not to say that the peasants were indifferent to the price level which was set by the world market. While not going into counter-factual history of guessing what the effects on incomes would have been if the factor of high rate of growth of population had been combined with zero imports, it is certain that peasant incomes, as a consequence of Government's tariff policy, were affected in two ways.

Firstly, world prices determined family income to the extent that this family participated in the market, as buyers or as sellers of grain. The balance of gain or loss depended on whether the family was a net buyer or a net seller. If a net seller, then, all other things being equal, the world price determined the value of the net quantity of grain which it put on the market. As long as prices were relatively high, as they were up till 1927 (12), then those peasant families who were net sellers of grain benefited to the extent to which they had a surplus to market.

(12) See Table (III/Two/6) on p. 349.
This relationship persisted as long as prices exceeded costs of production, which was the case in the years up to 1927. (13) However, when local prices fell steeply in the late 1920's, in sympathy with world prices, production costs, inclusive of family labour, did not fall at the same rate, as was shown in an earlier Section. (14) There were minimum requirements which the peasant family needed in order to survive to produce a given quantity of grain in an environment of static long-run productivity i.e. excluding fortuitous factors such as inclement weather etc. The fall in prices was not matched by a proportionate fall in the cost of providing these requirements. Unfortunately, what made matters worse for the peasants was that the early 1930's saw a series of disastrous harvest which, when coupled with the fall in prices led to the unmistakable agricultural crisis of the time.

On the other hand however, if the peasant family was a net buyer of grain, then it would have benefited from the fall in prices. While it is not possible without further research to determine the numbers of families who benefited and those who lost, it should be kept in mind that grain played a crucial role in the staple product of peasant society. (15) Whether

(13) See Table (III/Two/7) on p. 351.
(14) See Table (III/Two/11) on p. 370 and related discussion.
(15) See Part IV, Section Four, pp.
measured in terms of proportion of the land area occupied by grain, or by the proportion of its cash value of the crops, grain remained by far the most important peasant product throughout the Mandate. Although the fall in grain prices benefited some peasant families in as far as they were consumers, it hurt many more who were producers.

The second way in which the government's tariff policy affected peasant incomes was through the tax system. Not only did world prices dominate the internal Palestinian market in grains and therefore the price of that portion of the produce that the peasants bought or sold on the market; but world prices also had a 'kick-back' effect on peasants' incomes even when the latter did not market their own grain. This effect was transmitted through the practice of the Palestine Government of collecting taxes in cash and not in kind by assigning a redemption price to the physical quantities of produce (as explained in an earlier part of this thesis.) Now, this redemption price was fixed up till the introduction of the Commuted Tithe in 1928 by reference to prices in the towns which were largely determined by prices of imported grains. In other words, that portion of the peasant produce which he did not market, and which constituted the greater part of his produce according to the Johnson-Crosbie
Report (16) was being priced and consequently taxed with reference to prices dictated by the world market.

Unfortunately this linkage only operated up till 1928 when world prices were high. When prices fell however, the benefit of a lower tax assessment was not transmitted to the peasants because of the rigidity of the redemption prices due to the operation of the Commuted Tithe. The redemption price (as well as the physical quantity of produce) were now calculated on the basis of the average tithe paid in the four years preceding 1928, which were years of high prices. Redress, in as much as it was granted, was only effected through the arbitrary and incomplete method of remission of taxes, as explained in Part III Section Two.

PART IV

CONTINUITY & CHANGE IN THE INTERNAL DYNAMICS OF PEASANT SOCIETY 1920-1939.

So far in this Thesis, Part I described the physical environment to which Palestinian peasant society adapted itself; secondly it outlined the juxtaposition within this environment of two ways of life—peasant and nomad—and their consequent geographical separation where the former occupied the hill country and the latter the semi-deserts and the plains; thirdly it analysed the pattern of peasant population in terms of pattern of settlement size of villages, population growth and relative weight in total Palestinian population between peasant and non-peasant sectors.

Part II followed on by describing, analysing and placing in a coherent whole the basic elements of which peasant society was constructed:—

a) the village and its economy which rested on the triangle of agriculture (mainly arable), animal husbandry and crafts,
b) those social relations between the various constituent elements of peasant society which had a relevant and material influence on the patterns and levels of production, consumption, exchange and productivity, and

c) Subsequently, the role of the 'exogenous' but nevertheless crucial factor of the impact of the Ottoman State was outlined up till the British Occupation. This served both as an introduction to the role played by the Mandatory Government and as recognition of the role played by the Ottoman State itself.

Part III then discussed in some detail the three most important influences on the development of peasant society between 1920 and 1939 for which the Mandatory Government was the prime agent; a steady and large loss of land to non-peasant sectors (mainly Jewish purchases and citriculture); the burden of taxation and lastly, the government's policy towards and the effects of the opening up of the country to the world market.

This Part, Part IV, will bring together the various strands of argument posited in the previous Parts. Having outlined in Part II the major internal dynamics of peasant society which survived up till the beginning of the Mandate, the task is to determine the extent to which the processes and policies previously discussed
jeopardised the survival of peasant society by interrupting and subverting the operation of these dynamics.
Section One.

Pressure of peasant population on the land and its consequences.

In common with other peasant societies in the Middle East and elsewhere, the high and sustained rate of growth of peasant population in Palestine posed a major strain on peasant society in terms of that society's ability to perpetuate itself through satisfying the minimum physical needs of its members.

As Part I, Section Three of this thesis has described and analysed the growth of peasant population, and as other parts of this thesis have shown that this growth in population was not matched by an increase in the cultivable area available to peasant society - on the contrary that there was a large and steady loss of land to other sectors - this Section will follow on by analysing the effects of this combination in terms of the land/labour ratio and the consequences of this unfavourable trend.

The statistical part of this analysis is based on data given
by the Government of Palestine in Village Statistics (1), which, though published in 1938, actually gives a village by village, category by category, breakdown of each village's total landholding as it existed on the 1st April 1935. The data is given according to Arab and Jewish ownership of (a) the total area of landholding in dunums, (b) village built up area, (c) area under citrus, (d) area under plantations (which included all crops such as olives, vines, vegetables etc. which were not separately itemised), (e) area under taxable cereals, (f) area under untaxable cereals and (g) the area which the government classified as uncultivable. This breakdown was compiled from data collected by the government in connection with the Rural Property Tax Ordinance of 1935.

Moreover, figures of village population were given. However, since these figures were only estimates in the sense that they were comprised of the 1931 Census figures plus a uniform percentage calculated to represent the growth of population from 1931 to Mid-year 1937 for which time they were given, it has been decided that for the purposes of this Section only the actual 1931 Census population figures will be used without adding a percentage to represent population growth. This was done so as to avoid any discrepancies that might arise due to differing rates of population growth through natural increase or by migration from one village

to another or from one sub-District to another. The percentage which was added by the government applied uniformly throughout the country and would not have revealed any regional patterns. Secondly this was done so as to compare the results of one Census with another instead of comparing the results of the 1922 Census with a 1937 estimate. In short it was done in order to compare and contrast like with like.

Taking into account the geographical conditions of Palestine, it is important to note that firstly, cultivable land is invariably much less than total land - cultivable being defined by Government as that land which could be brought into cultivation by the application of the techniques and within the financial resources of the average Palestinian cultivator.(2) To discuss the land/labour ratio in terms of total as opposed to cultivable land is therefore meaningless. Secondly, it must be noted that the proportion of cultivable land to total land differs markedly from one Sub-District to another to such an extent as to make crude averaging similarly meaningless. Thus whereas Jaffa Sub-District had 91% of total land classified as cultivable, Bethlehem Sub-District had only 35%.

(2) Report on Immigration, Land Settlement and Development, 1930, op.cit., p.21
Consequently, once the proportion of cultivable land is shown all further discussion of land in this Section will be in terms of cultivable land as opposed to total land.

Table (IV/One/1) below gives the number of Arab peasant villages in each Sub-District, the total area of the village (as opposed to nomadic tribal) land belonging to Arabs (as opposed to Jews), the area classified as cultivable by the government and the percentage of total land it formed.

Figure (IV/One/1) moreover, converts into graphic form the total land area of each Sub-District, and the proportion of each that was classified as cultivable.

Having shown the extent of uncultivable land, the question of the land/labour ratio can now be discussed in terms of cultivable land only. The immediate aim is to establish the average size of per capita holding of cultivable land in the two census years of 1922 and 1931 so as to discern a trend and in doing so to allow a discussion of its implications later on.
## Table (IV/One/1)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Sub-District</th>
<th>No. of Villages</th>
<th>Total Dunums</th>
<th>Cultivable Dunums</th>
<th>%</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Jaffa</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>144,718</td>
<td>133,376</td>
<td>91</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gaza</td>
<td>49</td>
<td>662,640</td>
<td>566,206</td>
<td>84</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tulkarm</td>
<td>51</td>
<td>607,804</td>
<td>438,293</td>
<td>71</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Beisan</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>121,508</td>
<td>84,144</td>
<td>68</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ramle</td>
<td>72</td>
<td>697,345</td>
<td>451,581</td>
<td>64</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nazareth</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>323,553</td>
<td>192,899</td>
<td>59</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tiberias</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>220,243</td>
<td>126,912</td>
<td>57</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jenin</td>
<td>63</td>
<td>834,223</td>
<td>472,590</td>
<td>56</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Safad</td>
<td>76</td>
<td>454,894</td>
<td>241,885</td>
<td>53</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ramallah</td>
<td>55</td>
<td>633,522</td>
<td>333,596</td>
<td>52.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Haifa</td>
<td>38</td>
<td>596,591</td>
<td>316,171</td>
<td>52.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Acre</td>
<td>54</td>
<td>762,283</td>
<td>365,540</td>
<td>47</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nablus</td>
<td>96</td>
<td>1,510,113</td>
<td>651,038</td>
<td>42</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jerusalem</td>
<td>66</td>
<td>479,758</td>
<td>196,312</td>
<td>41.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hebron</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>1,432,047</td>
<td>588,644</td>
<td>41.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bethlehem</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>85,788</td>
<td>31,179</td>
<td>35</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

All Palestine 735 9,567,030 5,283,697 55.2

TOTAL & CULTIVABLE LAND AREA BY SUB-DISTRICT. (X 1000 DUNUMS)

- TOTAL AREA
- CULTIVABLE AREA

0 150 300 450 600 750 900 1050 1200 1350 1500 1650

JAFFA
GAZA
TULKARM
BEISAN
RAMLE
HAZARETH
TIBERIAS
JENIN
SAFAD
RANALLAH
HAIFA
ACRE
NABLUS
JERUSALEM
HEBRON
BETHLEHEM
Unfortunately, in estimating the per capita holding of land for the years 1922 and 1931, two serious problems of method crop up which need to be kept in mind when compiling and interpreting the resultant per capita averages for 1922 and 1931. These problems stem largely from the way the government collected the statistical data on which this Section is based.

I. The first problem relates to the fact that the land data collected relate to the year 1935 only. No village by village statistics were either collected or published before then. Since therefore, the figures relating to land and those relating to population were not collected for the same years—the population censuses relating to 1922 and 1931, it follows that the combination of the three sets of figures must be adequately justified by a priori reasoning. This reasoning takes into account the following facts.

a) The geographical concentration of Jewish land purchases was such that either (i) the majority of Sub-Districts containing the majority of Arab villages were only marginally affected by them or not affected by them at all, or (ii) that the remaining Sub-Districts, albeit a minority, were strongly affected by these purchases.
Table (III/One/3) in Part III, Section One shows that in the Sub-Districts of Acre, Jenin, Nablus, Ramallah, Jerusalem, Bethlehem, Jericho, Hebron and Gaza, Jewish land ownership accounted for much less than 2% of all land there by 1935. These same Sub-Districts accounted for 423 Arab peasant villages out of a Palestine total of 735 - 57%. They also accounted for 3,205,008 out of 5,283,697 dunums of Cultivable land in Palestine or 60.6%. Another group of Sub-Districts consisting of Safad, Beisan and Ramleh were affected to the extent of around 10% each. This group totalled 161 villages (22% of total) and 777,610 dunums (14.7% of the total).

In other words, the figures of Arab peasant landholding which applied in the year 1935 could be applied to the year 1922 without such a degree of distortion as to make the results untenable. All other things being equal, it could be safely assumed that the villages in these Sub-Districts had more or less the same area of land in 1935 as they did in 1922. Jewish purchases did not reduce this area to any material extent.

However, the same could not be said of the third group of Sub-Districts. A greater amount of caution needs to be exercised in
applying the 1935 landholding figures to the year 1922. This group, consisted of the Sub-Districts of Tiberias, Nazareth, Haifa and Jaffa, where the proportion of Jewish owned land was 42%, 25%, 34% and 35% respectively. As the majority of these lands were transferred to the Jews after 1922 (3), it follows that the simple application of the 1935 figures to 1922 would under-estimate the area of land owned by the Arabs in 1922 by an amount equal to the area bought by the Jews between 1922 and 1935.

However, since this group comprised only a minority of peasant villages, and since any doubts it may cast on the results are confined to the Sub-Districts mentioned, this problem of method does not invalidate the approach adopted in this Section when it comes to estimating the trend in the land/labour ratio in Palestine as a whole.

b) The second fact is that Jewish purchases apart, a major government investigation (4) has shown that very little village changed hands as a result of sale - and little of that was transferred to buyers outside the village. It has been shown by the investigation that the most common method of transferring property was through inheritance rather than through sale.(5)

(3) See Table (III/One/1) on p.282 and related discussion.
(5) ibid,
As such, it is highly unlikely that there was a sharp break in the pattern of ownership of village lands between 1922 and 1931.

c) The third fact is that by the mid 1920's, it has become clear that all land that could be cultivated in Palestine was already in cultivation (6), thereby excluding further significant inputs of culturable land into the calculation of per capita average after 1922.

It follows from (a), (b) and (c) above that the figures for land applicable to 1935 and published in Village Statistics could be matched with the population figures applicable to 1922 and 1931 provided that caution is exercised in interpreting the resultant per capita averages for those Sub-Districts most affected by Jewish purchases - these being named under heading (a) above. In these Sub-Districts the resultant figures for 1922 are most likely to under-estimate per capita holding by an amount equal to the land which Arab villages had in 1922 but lost since. Since it is impracticable to attempt to calculate it village by village, the reader is asked to keep the overall picture in mind.

Otherwise, for those Sub-Districts not affected by Jewish land

(6) See Footnotes (5), (6) & (7) in Part III, Section One, p. 260
purchases, the landholding pattern in terms of total and cultivable areas of the villages given in Village Statistics could be taken as describing fairly adequately the landholding pattern that existed in 1922.

II. The second problem of method stems from the frontier rectification between Palestine and Syria that took place after the 1922 Census, whereby some 26 villages were added to Palestine which were not included in the 1922 Census. The Sub-District affected was Safad. The precise effect is that no population figures are available for these 26 villages for 1922 making the calculation of per capita average in 1922 for them impossible. Consequently, only 1931 per capita figures for Safad will be given.

However, before giving the average per capita holding, it is important to note that in calculations of this sort, crude averages are not always good description of reality. These averages have to be verified by other means if they are to be relied upon. For this reason an analysis by frequency distribution was carried out whereby the number of villages falling into any given band of average values was noted.
Table (IV/One/2) - (a)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Sub-Dist.</th>
<th>No.of Crude Vil.s</th>
<th>Aver. land upto following No. of dunums</th>
<th>Det(**)</th>
<th>15</th>
<th>30</th>
<th>45</th>
<th>60</th>
<th>75</th>
<th>over 75</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Safad</td>
<td>-</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Acre</td>
<td>54</td>
<td>13.9</td>
<td></td>
<td>12</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Haifa</td>
<td>38</td>
<td>16.2</td>
<td></td>
<td>5</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tiber.</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>14.2</td>
<td></td>
<td>3</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Beisan</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>29.7</td>
<td></td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nazar.</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>16.1</td>
<td></td>
<td>1</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jenin</td>
<td>63</td>
<td>15.7</td>
<td></td>
<td>4</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tulkarm</td>
<td>51</td>
<td>14.5</td>
<td></td>
<td>7</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nablus</td>
<td>96</td>
<td>16.9</td>
<td></td>
<td>10</td>
<td>45</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ramal.</td>
<td>55</td>
<td>13.6</td>
<td></td>
<td>0</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jerus.</td>
<td>66</td>
<td>7.2</td>
<td></td>
<td>5</td>
<td>54</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Beth.</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>10.5</td>
<td></td>
<td>0</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hebron</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>16</td>
<td></td>
<td>0</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jaffa</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>10.7</td>
<td></td>
<td>0</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ramle</td>
<td>72</td>
<td>14.8</td>
<td></td>
<td>12</td>
<td>38</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gaza</td>
<td>49</td>
<td>15.7</td>
<td></td>
<td>0</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

All Palest. 656 15.2 60 347 178 40 17 5 9

Percent of No. of villages 9.2 52.9 27.1 6.1 2.6 0.8 1

(*) Excluding Safad Sub-District.
(**) Uninhabited detached areas of inhabited villages.

sources. Government of Palestine :-

Data on land area: compiled from village-by-village breakdown given in Village Statistics, Jerusalem, 1938

**Average per capita holding of Cultivable Land in Arab Villages in 1931: Crude Average and Frequency Distribution. By Sub-District.**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Sub-Dist.</th>
<th>No. of Crude Vil.s Aver.</th>
<th>No.of villages with per capita Cultivable land upto following No. of dunums</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Det(*)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Safad</td>
<td>76</td>
<td>11.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Acre</td>
<td>54</td>
<td>10.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Haifa</td>
<td>38</td>
<td>11.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tiber.</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>12.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Beisan</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>26.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nazar.</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>12.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jenin</td>
<td>63</td>
<td>12.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tulkarm</td>
<td>51</td>
<td>10.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nablus</td>
<td>96</td>
<td>13.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ramal.</td>
<td>55</td>
<td>10.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jerus.</td>
<td>66</td>
<td>5.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Beth.</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>7.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hebron</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>12.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jaffa</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>6.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ramle</td>
<td>72</td>
<td>10.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gaza</td>
<td>49</td>
<td>11.8</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

|           | All Palest. 735 | 11.15 | 66 | 483 | 139 | 29 | 7  | 4  | 4 |
|           | Percent of No. of villages | 9 | 66 | 19 | 4 | 0.9 | 0.5 | 0.5 |

* - Uninhabited detached areas of inhabited villages.

**Sources.** Government of Palestine: -
- Data on land area: compiled from village by village data in *Village Statistics, Jerusalem, 1938*.
- Population data: compiled from village by village lists in *Census of Palestine 1931, Volume II, Principal Statistical Tables, Jerusalem, 1932*.
Table (IV/One/2) below gives by Sub-District, the crude average per capita landholding (of cultivable land only), and the frequency distribution of the number of villages falling in each band for the years 1922 and 1931.

From examination of the two tables several features become clear. The first is that in this particular instance, the crude average is a good description of reality since in any given sub-district, average per capita landholding in most villages tended to cluster round the sub-district average value as can be verified from the frequency distribution analysis.

The second is that in addition to being a good fit for each sub-district, the crude average for Palestine as a whole is also a good description of the picture in Palestine as a whole. The only sub-district that had a substantially different average value to the others was Beisan (approximately 30 in 1922 and 26.5 in 1931). However, because Beisan had few villages (only 13) this difference does not materially alter the resultant impression.

The third is that at both dates, 1922 and 1931, the class which totalled the largest number of villages was that below 15 dunums.
This class accounted for approximately 50% of villages in 1922 and 66% in 1931.

The implications of these facts are that a) per capita landholding in Palestine as a whole fell from 15.2 dunums in 1922 to 11.15 dunums in 1931—a fall of 36.3% in ten years (a rate which corresponds to the rate of natural increase of the peasant population resident in their villages), and b) this fall in the average was spread evenly throughout the country indicating a generalised pressure of population on the land due to a high but evenly spread increase in population.

However, to say that there had been a generalised and, in geographic terms, evenly spread fall in average per capita holding is not to say that distribution of land within any given village was therefore even. The eveness or otherwise of the distribution of village land among villagers has to be independently established.

To establish this, the most useful source of information, on this subject as on many others dealing with social and economic aspects of Arab villages, is the Survey of Social and Economic Conditions in Arab Villages in 1944. This investigation was conducted by the Department of Statistics of the Government.

of Palestine to look into the social and economic condition of five Arab villages in a comprehensive and scientific way. The five villages were chosen on the basis of a priori reasoning, as a representative sample of Arab villages in Palestine, although it was admitted that it this sample did not represent a 'true' statistical sample since

"it is not possible to test by recognised methods the probable degree of divergence of the characteristics of the sample from the characteristics of the rural population as a whole. The sample however, was carefully selected with due regard to the known facts concerning the whole rural population. Typically sized villages in respect of area and population were selected. Abnormally rich and abnormally poor villages were avoided as were villages in which the bulk of the land is owned by very few persons. It can be said that the villages selected fairly represent the typical cereal-growing Arab villages, while the qualitative facts disclosed by the Survey most probably apply generally among Arab villages throughout the country." (8)

Naturally, caution has to be exercised in linking the results derived on the one hand from nation-wide comprehensive surveys like the population censuses of 1922 and 1931 or the register of land ownership like the one published under the title Village Statistics to results derived from sample surveys like the Survey of Five Villages on the other.

In addition, a major point has to be kept in mind when using the Survey's findings, namely the date of its compilation; 1944. Naturally, any comparisons made with the findings of Village Statistics or the two Censuses will have to take the timing into account.

For example, whereas the All Palestine average per capita holding of land in 1922 was 15.2, and in 1931 was 11.15, in 1944 the average for the five villages combined was 8.6 dunums of cultivable land per village resident - indicating a continuation in the trend of the decline in the land/labour ratio. Although the precise rate could be easily calculated from arithmetical point of view, from the methodological point of view it has to be hedged with so many qualifications and reservations as to make it useless. Any comparisons therefore will have to remain those of overall impressions than of precise calculation. Bearing these qualifications in mind, one can proceed to use the Survey.

Out of the Survey's inquiries, the one most relevant to the present purpose is the determination of the size of holding and the distribution of holdings among the villagers. The following definition was given by the Survey Report- "An individual's holding is the aggregate area of parcel-shares which he possesses. Each
parcel or parcel-share may be termed a fragment of a holding." (9)

The following table, Table (IV/One/3) gives in absolute and percentage form the distribution according to size of the holdings of the residents of the Five Villages. The table has been compiled from Tables 73 and 74 of the Report of the Survey. (10)

It can be seen from Table (IV/One/3) above that the crude average size of holding of cultivable land was 34.7 dunums. More significantly, however, the table shows a strong unevenness in the distribution which can be seen by matching the number of holdings into groups corresponding to the area of land each group occupied.

In the first group, 53.3% of all holdings accounted for 13.2% of all land area - these being held in holdings of less than 20 dunums of cultivable land. In other words the average holding in this group amounted to 8.4 dunums which in effect meant that their owners, though owning land, owned less than would have sufficed to provide them and their families with more than a small fraction of their needs.

(10) ibid, pp.52-54.
Table (IV/One/3).

Distribution of holdings among residents of the Five Villages surveyed in 1944 - according to size.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Size of holding</th>
<th>No.of hold.</th>
<th>% of all hold.</th>
<th>Cum.%</th>
<th>Area Dun.</th>
<th>% of all area</th>
<th>Cum %</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>0.6</td>
<td>0.6</td>
<td>0.8</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1 - 10</td>
<td>227</td>
<td>32.6</td>
<td>33.2</td>
<td>1,206</td>
<td>5.0</td>
<td>5.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11 - 20</td>
<td>140</td>
<td>20.1</td>
<td>53.3</td>
<td>1,928</td>
<td>8.2</td>
<td>13.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>21 - 30</td>
<td>91</td>
<td>13.1</td>
<td>66.4</td>
<td>2,254</td>
<td>9.3</td>
<td>22.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>31 - 40</td>
<td>59</td>
<td>8.5</td>
<td>74.9</td>
<td>2,106</td>
<td>8.7</td>
<td>31.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>41 - 50</td>
<td>43</td>
<td>6.2</td>
<td>81.1</td>
<td>1,957</td>
<td>8.1</td>
<td>39.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>51 - 60</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>4.5</td>
<td>85.6</td>
<td>1,742</td>
<td>7.1</td>
<td>46.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>61 - 80</td>
<td>48</td>
<td>6.9</td>
<td>92.5</td>
<td>3,306</td>
<td>13.7</td>
<td>60.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>81 - 100</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>3.3</td>
<td>95.8</td>
<td>2,079</td>
<td>8.6</td>
<td>68.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>101 - 120</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>1.6</td>
<td>97.4</td>
<td>1,229</td>
<td>5.1</td>
<td>73.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>121 - 140</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>0.7</td>
<td>98.1</td>
<td>637</td>
<td>2.6</td>
<td>76.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>141 - 200</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>1.1</td>
<td>99.2</td>
<td>1,345</td>
<td>5.6</td>
<td>82.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>201 - 300</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0.1</td>
<td>99.3</td>
<td>239</td>
<td>1.0</td>
<td>83.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>301 +</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>0.7</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>4,083</td>
<td>17.0</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>TOTAL</strong></td>
<td><strong>696</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td><strong>24,147</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

In the second group, 21.6% of all holdings accounted for 19% of all land area. In other words the average holding in this group amounted to 27.25 dunums. Moreover, the size of the holding in this group ranged between 20 and 40 dunum, which dramatically improved the chances of the holder in this group over the one in the first in extracting a good proportion of his needs from the holding, though as will be seen later, the holder in this group still needed to supplement his income from other sources.

The third group, of holders of 40-60 dunums, consisting of 10.7% of all holdings accounted for 15.2% of all land. The average size of the holding in this group was 50 dunums (11).

The fourth group amounting to 10.2% of all holdings accounted for 22.3% of all land area. The average landholding in this group amounted to 75.8 dunums and were held in holdings varying between 61 and 100 dunums. It is almost certain that the owners who fell into this group could in ordinary circumstances support themselves solely by cultivation - although by no means at an extravagant level and provided that the landholder's family size was not markedly above average.

The fifth group which consisted of the remaining 4.2% of

(11) The exact average was 49.98 dunums.
all holdings accounted for 31.3% of all land area. The average size of holding amounted to 251 dunums with the size of holding being not smaller than 100 dunums.

Together with the fourth group, the fifth one shows as strong an 'unevenness' in land distribution in its favour as the first group did to its disadvantage. Whereas 14.4% of all holdings found in groups four and five accounted for 54.4% of all land area, almost exactly the reverse was the case with the first group where 53.3% of all holdings accounted for only 13.2% of all land area in the five villages.

However, it is immediately noticeable that though, in relative terms, the distribution of holdings was uneven, the picture as a whole when looked at in absolute terms, is definitely not one of such polarisation as to conjure up images of the existence of a mass of landless proletariat pitted against a few huge estates. Even the largest group, group 5, had an average landholding of around 250 dunums or 80 acres - by no means a 'huge estate'.

Rather, the picture is one of such pressure of a fast growing population on a static area of land that it reduced about half the holdings to no more than token presence which survived
into 1944 only through the work of the Moslem laws of partible inheritance rather than economic viability - here defined as the simple ability of the holding to support its owner in whole or in good part. From one generation to the next, population growth meant that the inheritors ended up with much less land than their predecessors.

This paramount role of inheritance on the distribution of holdings is attested to by the Report of the Survey itself which is well worth quoting on this point:

"The resistance of land ownership to all influences other than inheritance is shown by the fact that in ten years from 1935 to 1944 there were about 30 transactions in land in Village A, the only village where this information was sought. The area involved in these transactions amounted to the significant figure of 86 dunums. Seven of these transactions related to the purchase from non-residents of pieces of land totalling 10 dunums, while the remainder were transactions between the villagers. It may therefore be concluded that the pattern of ownership is set almost entirely by inheritance."(12)

Having determined the pattern of distribution of land in peasant society as represented by the Five Villages surveyed in 1944, the task now is to assess the implications of this pattern on the ability of the land to support its occupants, by providing them with the minimum necessities of life. This ability depends

on two broad factors.

a) The first is the return from the land in terms of the extent to which it could provide these necessities. Return in this context is based on (i) the nature of the product to which the land is devoted, (ii) the technology which is employed in its production (iii) the return made on the sale of these products, the easiest expression of which is in cash terms and (iv) the deductions from these returns to the peasants by 'exogenous agents' such as government taxation and money lenders.

As Section Three of this Part will discuss the product mix of peasant society in some detail, suffice it here to say that well over 80% (13) of the land available to peasant society was devoted to cereal production right up to to 1939. Of the remainder, the largest part was devoted to the production of olives. Therefore any discussion of the capacity of the land to support its occupants must by necessity be in relation to the predominance of cereals in the product mix.

In theory this assumes that the product-mix did not vary with the size of of the holding when for example, production shifted to higher value products as the size of the holding diminished. (13) See Table (IV/Three/2)
In practice however, this was unlikely for three reasons. The first is that the dominance of cereals was so overwhelming that the area devoted to them must have included small holdings as well as large ones. The second reason is that this predominance of cereal production was a general feature of Palestinian peasant agriculture. As Part Four, Section Three will show, it was not so concentrated that whole areas specialised in it while others concentrated on other crops of higher value. Cereals were grown in every village in every Sub-District of Palestine of the time.

The third reason is that the cultivation of cereals by individual households was an integral part of the peasant society as organised on kinship lines. What the individual peasant owned under the Masha' system was not a piece of land, but a definite share of the aggregate land area belonging to the clan. He was not free to cultivate it as he pleased. If, during periodic redistribution, a parcel of land which he owned happened to be in a field which the clan placed under cereal crops, then he had no choice but to place this parcel under cereals. Social pressure and social sanction ensured his observance of this custom as was discussed in Part Two. In conclusion therefore, it is clear that the capacity of the land to support its occupants must, by necessity, be discussed in relation to cereal lands.
As for the technology employed this thesis has previously described this technology in detail in Part II. As such there is no need to go into this subject again except to say that it has been shown (14) that as the long term trend of average area sown with cereals was very stable throughout the period, and as the long term trend in cereal output was similarly stable, it follows that the long term trend in productivity - measured in production per dunum - itself remained stable over the period as a whole.

As for prices, it has been shown in Part III, Section Two that the long term trend of prices in the period was significantly downward. The clear implication of this is that, given the two other factors under heading (a), it needed an increasing area of land to be sown with cereals in order to produce a stable cash return as time went on. This was quite apart from any deductions from these return which were made by taxation or by payments of loans to money-lenders. Whereas the burden of taxes fluctuated through the Mandate as was discussed in Part Three, Section Two, it is not possible, without further research to determine precisely the share exacted by the money-lenders.

(14) See Table (III/Two/4), on p. 342 and related discussion.
b) This brings us to the second broad factor determining the extent to which the land could support its occupants given the factors grouped under heading (a) above; namely the simple question of 'how much land constituted the necessary minimum?'

This question was discussed at length by the Government of Palestine itself in connection with two problems. The first was the sale of land to Jewish purchasing bodies and the consequent eviction of Arab cultivators. The government was increasingly concerned with the rise of a class of landless Arabs who, though they managed to find employment in the towns mainly in construction and factory work while the boom years up to late 1935 lasted, were nevertheless in the potentially dangerous situation of becoming a security problem when prosperity in the towns collapsed. The government was therefore discussing the problem with a view to legislating for a minimum holding below which the Arab 'cultivator' - whom it initially defined as the tenant though soon afterwards it expanded the term to include small owner-occupiers - could not sell land to Jewish or indeed Arab interests.

The second question to which the government addressed itself was the same one as concerns us now; namely the increasing
landlessness arising from the severe pressure of population on the land. The government, in response to the recommendations of the major reports (the Johnson-Crosbie, the Hope Simpson and the French Reports) was hoping to alleviate this problem with a comprehensive government-led and controlled Development Scheme which would enable the land, through intensification of agriculture and the provision of credit, to support a larger population. However, this scheme was never implemented because of the reluctance of the Colonial Office to sanction and guarantee the necessary funding in view of the financial situation in Britain itself. The Development Scheme was never carried out beyond satisfying the minimum obligation which the British Government took on itself, namely to settle some 590 families who answered the extremely narrow British definition of persons shown to have been displaced by Jewish purchases. (15)

However, regardless of the fate of the Development Scheme, what is of immediate relevance to the purposes of this Section is that in the process of these discussions the government devoted considerable time to trying to ascertain the minimum necessary holding that, with the technology and financial means then available to the cultivator, could support him and his family on the land. This minimum was termed by the government the 'lot

(15) See Part III, Section One, p. 273 Footnote (31)-(33).
viable'. As this 'lot viable' is nearest to a knowledgable and scientific estimate of the minimum necessary, it will be adopted by this thesis as a basis for estimating the ability of the land to support its occupants in view of the pattern of land distribution given above.

The following is what the then High Commissioner, Arthur Wauchope, reported to the Secretary of State for the Colonies in a Despatch marked "SECRET" and dates 19.12.1935. (16)

"The extent of the 'lot viable' will vary according to the locality and type of land. It is proposed to adopt, so far as it is applicable, the criterion for a 'subsistence area' laid down in Section 9(1) of the Protection of Cultivators Ordinance, 1933. The following table sets out the different standards which were provisionally laid down in 1933 for the 'subsistence area' in certain localities:

Table (IV/One/4)*

Standards of minimum "subsistence areas" laid down in 1935 by the Government of Palestine.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>ZONE</th>
<th>UNIRRIGATED</th>
<th>IRRIGATED</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>INTENSIVE</td>
<td>EXTENSIVE</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Citrus &amp; vegetables</td>
<td>cereals &amp; fodder</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

1. Hills of Galilee and Judea 75 dun. 10 dun. 30 dun.

2. Plains.

(a) Maritime Plain
   (i) From Fal el Nakura to a line through Majdal and Hebron 75 dun. 10 dun. 30 dun.
   (ii) south of this line 120 dun. 10 dun.

(b) Plain of Esdraelon. 75 dun. 10 dun. 30 dun.

(c) Valley of Jezreel
   (i) Western portion 120 dun. 10 dun. 30 dun.
   (ii) Eastern Portion 150 dun. 10 dun. 30 dun.

(d) Jordan Valley 200 dun. 10 dun. 30 dun.

(e) Hula 100 dun. 10 dun. 30 dun.

3. Plains of Beersheba 200 dun. 10 dun. 30 dun.

(*) Although a direct quote, this table will be referred to as above for ease of identification in the course of discussion.

However, before proceeding to look at the land distribution in terms of the estimates of the 'lot viable' advanced by the High Commissioner above, it is instructive to look at other estimates of the 'lot viable' given before that date by various informed sources.

In 1930 the Director of Lands of the Palestine Government, Major Abramson, put the estimate "in the case of Arabs" at 110 dunums "subject to reduction in the case of adoption of intensive cultivation where the land is suitable for such cultivation."(17) The Joint Palestine Survey Commission, a commission organised, directed and financed by American Zionists to investigate further into Palestine's potential for absorbing Jewish immigrants, put the minimum area required to provide the needs of one family at 160-320 dunums for 'dry mixed farming' but a much smaller unit in the case of irrigated farm units.' (18)

Dr Ruppin, a prime organisers of Jewish colonisation on the land since the turn of the 20th Century and by the mid-1920's Head of the Land Department of the Palestine Zionist Executive, put forward the following estimates according to the zone and nature of the crops cultivated (19):-

Citrus and banana groves - 10-15 dunums

Dairy farming - 100-120 dunums
Cereals etc. - 150-200 dunums

The Johnson-Crosbie Report, basing its findings on the returns of a questionnaire of 104 villages in 1930, declared that "To provide the minimum cost of living for a family, a holding of 75 dunums seems to be necessary for an owner-cultivator, while a tenant requires 130 dunums. The small holder or tenant who has not the necessary minimum holding must supplement his income either by hiring himself out as a labourer inside or outside the village or by engaging in transport work, in charcoal or lime-kiln or some such occupation." (20)

The Hope Simpson Report decided that "an area at least 130 dunums is required to maintain a fallah family" The same minimum was adopted by the French Report (21), with the proviso that no definitive conclusion could be reached without further knowledge and practical experience. Hope Simpson's and French's figures were accepted by the Supreme Moslem Council as authoritative ones and in the course of discussion of various legislative measures to prevent displacement of Arab cultivators, based its arguments on them. (22)

From the above it can be seen that the High Commissioner's estimates given in Table (IV/One/4) were somewhat conservative, as regards the minimum necessary of unirrigated land in the Hills of Judea and Galilee, which was put at 75 dunums. This apart however, his figures seem to agree with most of the figures given by various experts and Official Reports. Consequently, to prevent distortion and confusion, the High Commissioner's figures will be adopted unaltered as the yardstick of measuring the capability of the land to support its occupants given the pattern of land distribution given earlier in this Section.

To arrive at the most appropriate measure of the "lot viable" to apply to the Five Villages in the 1944 Survey, one has first to take into consideration their geographical location. Four were located in the Ramle Sub-District on the borderline between the Plains and the hills on the eastern boundary of the Sub-District. The fifth was in an adjacent Sub-District but next to the others in location. Consequently, the Zones of Cultivation in Table (IV/One/4) most appropriate to them are (1) the hills of Galilee and Judea, and (2) the Maritime Plain within the area bounded by Ras el Nakura at the Lebanese border to a line through Majdal and Hebron in the south.

(22) For example, Correspondence from Supreme Moslem Council to High Commissioner dated 27.12.1934, PRO C0733/272/75072/2, 1934.
In other words, the minima specified by the table and applicable to the Five Villages were 75 dunums of unirrigated land, 10 dunums of intensive irrigated citrus & vegetable land and 30 dunums of irrigated but extensive cereals & fodder land.

As for irrigated land, none of the Five Villages investigated in the 1944 Survey held any citrus lands - and were typical in this respect of the vast majority of peasant villages in Palestine.

As regards the non-cereal part of the product-mix of the Five Villages, the Survey did solicit information on the extent of such non-cereal land, which it grouped under the term "Plantation". In this, the Survey was adopting the same classification as the Rural Property Tax Ordinance 1935, on which the post-1935 classification of land was based. It should be remembered however, that the term "Plantations" included fruit trees such as figs and almonds as well as irrigated vegetables. Nevertheless, in reply, it was found that the Five Villages held between them 567 dunums of "Plantations" land out of a total cultivable land area of 25,685 dunums, or 2.2%.

Unfortunately, no other information is available in the
Survey on the area categorised as "Plantations". However, it is clear that the Five Villages put most of their unirrigated lands under cereals. In other words, the main yardstick of the minimum "lot viable" relevant to them is that of 75 dunums of cereal lands per holding - as shown in the table.

Having established the appropriate yardstick, one can proceed to measure the landholding pattern of the Five Villages against it.

From Table (IV/One/3) showing the distribution of holdings in the Five Villages by size, it is clear that no less than 90% of the holdings were below 80 dunums accounting between them for 68% of the total area of cultivable land. In other words, only one holding in 10 in the Five Villages could support its owner wholly from the land. The remainder had to supplement their incomes by amounts varying inversely with the area of their holdings.

Indeed the smallest 50% of all holdings were of an average size of 8.4 dunums i.e. around 10% of the minimum recognised "lot viable". Moreover, another 13.1% of all holders had areas between 20 and 30 dunums -or less than half the "lot viable".
In addition to those on either extreme of the distribution viz. those who could support themselves wholly from the land, and those who could do so only marginally; a third group could be identified by excluding the first two groups which totalled 74%, from the computation. In other words one quarter of all landholders could ordinarily derive from half to nearly all their needs from the land but needed to make up the deficiency from other sources.

The inescapable conclusion is that only around 35% of all holdings in the Five Villages could either wholly support their occupants or support them to the extent of covering 50% of their needs. Having established this fact, the implications on peasant society will be discussed in the next and remaining chapters of this Part.
Part IV.

Section Two.

Tenancy and Rent.

Having demonstrated in previous Parts of this thesis the extent of change in the 'environment' within which peasant society operated and which resulted in severe population pressure on the land, this and the following Sections will discuss some of the major responses of peasant society to these challenges.

In the Palestinian peasant economy the factors of production were combined within and subject to the Masha' system, the lynchpin of the economic organisation of peasant society as previously described. The system was then described in its 'pure state' showing it as the method through which the kinship
group ensured the access of all its members to the land which was within that group's power to protect against dispossession by other competing kinship groups.

However, because the system was described in its 'pure' state, it should not be imagined that it was immune from changes dictated by powerful economic forces and trends which posed a serious challenge to its existence by eroding the foundations on which it was built.

The challenges to which peasant society had to respond emanated from three directions. a) the conjunction of a high rate of population growth and a diminishing supply of land which led to the pressure outlined before, b) the movement of the terms of trade against the then major marketable peasant produce as dictated by lower world cereal prices and c) the high proportion of the peasants' gross produce appropriated by the government in direct taxes.

In response to this challenge peasant society reacted in four different ways which will be discussed shortly. Briefly they could be grouped under 1) altering the terms of tenancy and rent. 2) the slide into severe fragmentation of the land
area controlled by peasant society. 3) An attempt, though rather belated and unsuccessful, to shift away from the mix of products to which that society's land was traditionally devoted. 4) The resort to sources of income outside the traditional peasant economy by those who could not find adequate income within it. This was done either through a total break with the countryside by peasants migrating to the towns, or through peasants seeking seasonal and temporary work to supplement whatever income they derived from the land.

As for tenancy and rent, the perview of this Section, the response was a complex one which for the sake of clarity could be divided into a short-term response and a long-term one.

In the short term, peasant society adopted the classical economic response of shifting the balance of rewards in favour of the scarce factor of production - in this case land as will be shown. This shift was effected through the traditional mechanisms and techniques of allocating rewards to factors, with which the individual members of this society were familiar, namely crop-sharing arrangements. These arrangements as their name imply, were largely verbal agreements between individuals whereby the share of inputs necessary to undertake cultivation was
delineated; and so was the share of each in the resultant crop - received in the overwhelming majority of cases in kind rather than in cash.

Unfortunately however, no systematic investigation by the Government of Palestine was undertaken specifically into the aspect of tenancy and rent on which to base this Section's research and conclusions. What references there were to this topic in government reports - which were primarily devoted to other aspects of peasant society, had largely been 'qualitative' judgements and opinions of officials albeit informed and knowledgeable - rather than conclusions based on 'statistical' investigation and analysis.

Therefore larger reliance had to be placed on 'secondary' sources. It is freely admitted that some arguments in this Section are based on the findings of other researchers - most notably that of Ya'cov Firestone in his excellent study of the relationship between landlords and tenants in the area known in this thesis as the Jenin Sub-District. (1)

Despite the imperfection of the sources of this Section's information, the arguments it employs are central to this thesis

since what this Section is attempting to do is to integrate the 'qualitative' judgements of government officials and the findings of Firestone's study into the overall framework built in this and previous Parts of this thesis.

Tenure in Mandatory Palestine, as probably in any other country going through the same stage, was not a clear cut affair with an unambiguous contractual written agreement which clearly defined obligations and rewards.

In his article(2), Ya'cov Firestone identified

"two superimposed principles of tenure. The first of these was the crop-sharing compact between the traditionally acknowledged factors of production that shared in the produce: land, seed, ploughing stock and labour. The second principle of tenure was the "muzara'a" or co-cultivation compact between landowner and cultivator. In this compact the cultivator (the farmer) represented the other factors of production as far as the landowner was concerned and assigned him his rent-share of the crop. Only as a second step was the rest of the crop divided among the other factors of production and here the farmer represented the landlord."

However, when it comes to determining the return to any given factor of production, Firestone's distinction between the two principles is not material. His distinction is only between which individual received what at what stage - not

of what return accrued to the land as a factor of production. For example if X was the legal owner of the land and, according to Firestone's second principle, rented it to Y for a given share, who subsequently organised the operation and for the duration acted as the landowner, then Y received the share of land as a factor of production from the other partners in the operation, plus a share denoting his 'management fee' plus a share in return for any stock etc he contributed, if any, and from that Y remitted X's share in lieu of rental. X, as the owner of the factor of production -land- still received his share of the crop, only at one remove.

Firestone then classified the forms of tenure in that part of Palestine during the years of the Mandate. They were

"in descending order of involvement in farming on the part of landowner :-
(a)cropping : the landowner retained the capital (the stock) the labour being performed by croppers.
(b)joint-farming : the landowner who owned the stock, appointed a villager to operate the farm, made over a share in the stock to him, debited him its value, and split with him the crop share due to the seed and to the ploughing stock under the crop-sharing compact. The operator whom we shall call the joint-farmer, could then perform the labour himself or take on croppers.
(c)share-rent farming : the landowner provided only the land, the farmer supplying the whole capital. The farmer in turn could, if he wished, take on joint-farmers or croppers or sub-farm out the land.
(d)tenancy in which cash replaced the share-rent." (3)

It is clear then that the landowner could combine any form of tenure that were of advantage to him. Looking at cropping first, it was acknowledged by Firestone that the cropper nominally stood "a notch above the daily labourers because he had been promised a season's tenure". But whereas previously he had been accorded a one-fourth share of the crop in recognition that his labour constituted one of the four recognised factors of production by the 1930's this share, though nominally acknowledged, was in reality hedged with other qualifications that effectively increased his work load or forced him to hire helpers for tasks that he was not previously required to undertake, thereby reducing his effective share. Indeed, Firestone's conclusion was that "there was little difference between him and any other regular farm worker paid in kind."

As an example of the second type of crop-sharing arrangement, joint-farming, Firestone further on in his article gives an instance when the landowner actually advanced the majority of the factors, apart from labour, and agreed to receive less than the proper share of the crop - in fact making a loss on the contract. However, Firestone recognised that this was a
conscious decision by the landowner made with the purpose of allowing cultivation to continue since:

"the plain fact was that [the other party in the contract] had been in a weak economic position at the outset of the season... [because] by 1934 three disastrous seasons have left the peasant with no resources to spare for any outlay, so that it was up to the capital owner to put up all the funds needed to make a go of the farm...[though] clearly the joint-farm did not always demand of the landlord heavy subsidies to the joint-farmers and croppers. But it rarely seems to have involved profits - at least not in the 1930's...While it is difficult to entertain an economic motivation for this, a social and political explanation is not far to seek since [the village in question] was the cradle of [the landowner's clan], the anchor of their political support in the entire region, the home base on which they fell back again and again in time of trouble." (4)

For this reason, Firestone observed that many absentee landlords were pulling out of joint-farming. They tended to find themselves in the unenviable position of being the only party capable of financing the operation in hard times - which was getting very burdensome in an environment where "From 1929 to 1936 Arab farming in Palestine, traditionally afflicted by poor yields and a high burden of indebtedness, went through a period of extreme hardship owing to a combination of consecutive crop failures with the competition of agricultural imports seeking entry at depressed world prices." (5)

Firestone also reviewed share-rent farming arrangements which he described as the most common arrangements. "The share-rent

(5) ibid.
association [was a type of association] in which one party supplied the land alone, for which he got a rent-share of the crop, and the other parties contributed his own or hired labour, as well as animals and tools." (6)

Up till 1939, share-rent rather than cash rent was the most common form of rent and the one preferred by cultivators since it took account of fluctuations in crops. However, "the cash rent has been gradually taking its place since 1935." (7) More important, whereas

"under the Mandate the factors of production acknowledged to collaborate in turning out the crop were four in number [in the district] and that the rent-share was accordingly one-fourth of the crop, .... around the turn of the Century it was likely to have been one-fifth. Hill land, shallower and much harder to cultivate, rated less. Towards the close of the Mandate period, hill soils had gone up to one-fourth of the crop, and the better land in the plain to one-third." (8)

This increase in the share of the crop going to landowners was also observed by Mandate Government officials and reports. The Johnson-Crosbie Report estimated average rents in 1930 at 30% of gross income of farmers (9) though it did not give its definition of rent in terms of a spectrum of obligations and rewards, as Firestone had done above.

(6) ibid, p.182.
(7) ibid, p.183.
(8) ibid, p.184.
It is clear from Firestone's research therefore, that in the short term there had been a definite shift in rewards in favour of the scarce factor, land, and that this shift was in response to the worsening of the bargaining position of labour relative to the other factor of production.

The Long-Term Response.

However, the study also shows a related long term trend of equal significance. Not only were rewards being shifted but the concept and the overall traditional philosophy of peasant society by which the farming operation itself was conducted was also being materially altered.

Although discussion in this Section has been so far conducted in terms of "factors of production" and similar terminology which might imply the primacy of economic relations over any other type of social relations, e.g. bonds and obligations of kinship, it must be stressed that this was by no means how the participants themselves originally saw it, nor is it the intention of this
thesis to convey the impression that in the short term economic considerations were the prime ones behind every economic decision, although in the long term economic considerations were highly material.

The landowner in the joint-farming venture in Firestone's example did not carry on this loss-making arrangement for economic reasons. "It was not the prospect of easy earnings that kept him at it until his death in 1942. Yet every year between 1932 and 1942 he operated seven to nine joint-farms there and [at a neighbouring village.]" (10) Nor was it hypocrisy on the part of the participants that the croppers' share was formally acknowledged as the traditional one-fourth of the produce, and yet effectively reduced by adding obligations on him that were not previously required.

Other examples could be given, but the point is that these traditional terms of reference, because of their familiarity, were being used as the vehicle progressively to effect long-term changes - thus the actual reduction of the croppers' share, regardless of the terms it was expressed in. Equally important was the shift from the type of crop-sharing arrangements that did not suit the owners of the scarce resource, like joint-farming,

by the relatives of the farmer in Firestone's example, into forms of crop-sharing that suited them like share-rent and finally going the whole way to full use of cash rents instead of rent in kind.

In other words, the nearer the participants came to perceiving the totality of relations (economic, social etc.) between them in wholly economic terms, and the more they formulated these relations on cash basis, the less was the scope for non-economic relations between them. And the less these were, the further they progressed away from the peasant organisation of society in which social relations in the kinship group were at least as equally important as economic ones.

This usage of crop-sharing arrangements was a far cry from the original role of these arrangements described in Part II, Section Two. There it was stressed that, all other things being equal, these arrangements were merely a response to a short-term disequilibrium, and would not have outlasted their immediate cause.

If, for example, the main earner of a household lost his plough team through accident or poverty, he then entered into a crop
sharing arrangement with an owner of such a team, whereby the latter received a specific share of the produce - normally one quarter - in return for contributing one of the four factors of production recognised as of equal importance by the peasants. However, and this is the main point, as soon as the earner felt able to do without this team, he was at liberty to terminate the crop-sharing arrangement.

The arrangement did not entail a permanent separation of functions between the various factors of production since the effects of this short-term disequilibrium did not entail the permanent separation of the earner from his land. The earner was guaranteed his share of land by virtue of his membership of the kinship group - and this share was given to him at the next periodic redistribution of land which was basic to the Masha’ system. What it entailed was a temporary loss of part of the produce of the land, but not the land itself, which he ceded to the ploughman until such time as the earner in our example recovered.

From one generation to the next therefore, the household could retain within itself possession of all four factors of production because the kinship group to which it belonged guaranteed its
access to land which when combined with the household's labour, allowed, in ordinary circumstances, the purchase of the other two factors, the ploughing stock and the seed.

However, this situation held true only as long as "other things remained equal". These _ceterus paribus_ conditions were 1) that there should be a sufficient supply of land to allow the peasant to extract the minimum necessities of life. Otherwise, labour would simply abandon the land and seek a living in the towns, if at all possible, 2) that there is sufficient return from this land whether measured in cash terms or in terms of physical crops produced, 3) that there should exist a legal and political environment which would not create laws and enforce them by employing the power of the State with the aim of the forcible dissolution of the old society as did the Ottoman and then the Mandate Government from the _Tanzimat_ onwards, and 4) that the resources appropriated from the peasant sector by way of taxation or repayments to money-lenders, should not be on such a scale as to leave the peasant with insufficient resources to keep himself and his family.

As these 'other things' have been dramatically altered during the course of the Mandate (11), they created a situation where such

(11) Each Condition was discussed in a separate section of this thesis.
crop-sharing arrangements as share-rent and cash-rent became more
common than joint farming or the old type of cropping where
labour was considered on at least equal terms with the other
factors of production. All of these crop-sharing arrangements were
known to the peasants for a long time, but now the growing
predominance of the first two and the demise of the latter two,
created a mix of crop-sharing arrangements that worked against
the continuation of the peasant organisation of economy and society.

Instead, in step with the inexorable march of change, a strong
trend developed towards the separation and ownership of the factors
of production was establishing itself. Short-term disequilibria
were no longer adjusted in the stable environment of a society
organised along kinship lines with its own stabilising institutions
like the Mesha', periodic redistribution and guarantee of access
to land.

Rather a situation was fast arising where modern tenancy based
on the vesting of ownership of different factors of production
in different entities was spreading itself. Increasingly the
landlord became the modern landlord and so did the tenant, the
small-holder, the owner-occupier and the landless labourer.
One owned the land, one the capital, one nothing but his labour
and some a bit of each. But no longer were they guaranteed access
to land by virtue of their membership of the kinship group.
This transitional stage is what the Mandate Government officials
were observing and commenting about at first hand and this is what
Ya'cov Firestone found in his research into the books of prominent
landowners in the Jenin Sub-District in the mid 1930's. But because
these changes were taking place by means of the old and familiar
crop-sharing arrangements originally conceived for a different
purpose and operated in a different environment, there arose
a situation where new wine was being poured into old bottles.
PART IV

Section Three.

The "Product Mix" in peasant Society 1920-1939.

In stark contrast to the significant changes that were taking place in the organisation of the Palestinian peasant society between the Wars, the types of crops and their relative weight of the total did not materially change in this period. This product mix, whether measured by the proportion of land devoted to each crop or by annual output, retained the essential features that characterised it at the beginning of our period.

Before going any further however, it should be kept in mind that this stability in peasant product mix should not be interpreted as lack of change in Palestinian agriculture as a whole. Indeed
this was far from the case since Palestine saw a spectacular growth in the cultivation of citrus. However, as has been explained, the capital and annual running outlays of citrus put its cultivation almost completely outside the peasant economy, apart from the provision of some supplementary and seasonal income to those peasants who found employment in the citrus plantations.

Similarly there was a substantial increase in dairy farming. Most of the increase however was on modern capital intensive Jewish farms. Their stock consisted mostly of Dutch, Friesian and Swiss breeds, fed on specially grown fodder and housed in well designed stables. Indeed by 1935, sale of dairy and related products accounted for 50% of Jewish farming income (excluding citrus). (1) By 1937 their milk output was 37 million litres as opposed to the estimated output on Arab farms of 66 million litres. (2) Arab dairy stock however, apart from being kept in the open, was fed on natural grazing in winter and stubble in summer. This meant that milk output followed a seasonal pattern depending on the abundance of food supplies for the flocks. Consequently, most milk was produced in three months of the year, February to April.

As these changes were taking place outside the peasant sector they fall outside the perview of this thesis. But what is the

(2) ibid, p.178
The concern of this thesis is to outline the developments, if any, in peasant society's own product mix.

Without any doubt the pride of place in the peasant's product mix was assigned to cereals. This is not surprising nor is it unique to Palestine. Many peasant societies, over the ages, tended to give grains the pride of place in their product mix. However, what this Section will attempt to do is to give a quantitative picture of this dominance. The analysis is based on giving the answer to three broad questions. Firstly, what proportion of the land did cereals occupy in any given year? Secondly, was this predominance evenly spread throughout the country? Thirdly, were there any significant changes in the predominance of cereals during the years of the Mandate?

In answer to the first question, the following tables, Table (IV/Three/1a) and (IV/Three/1b) give in absolute and percentage form the land area and the proportion of Cultivable land devoted to Citrus, Plantations (including olives, vines, vegetables etc), Taxable Cereals and Untaxable Cereals by Sub-District for the year starting first of April 1935. The above product categories were the Government's own and appeared in its publication Village Statistics, 1938.
Table (IV/Three/1 (a))

Area of Arab-owned land (excl.nomad) under following categories of crops by Sub-District - 1935. In dunums.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Sub-Dist.</th>
<th>Citrus</th>
<th>Plant.s</th>
<th>Tax Cereal</th>
<th>Untax. Cereal</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Safad</td>
<td>133</td>
<td>64,463</td>
<td>128,687</td>
<td>47,204</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Acre</td>
<td>9,014</td>
<td>81,160</td>
<td>212,944</td>
<td>53,165</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Haifa</td>
<td>46</td>
<td>26,805</td>
<td>244,822</td>
<td>32,792</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tiberias</td>
<td>111</td>
<td>16,158</td>
<td>95,256</td>
<td>14,601</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Beisan</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1,005</td>
<td>77,421</td>
<td>6,791</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nazareth</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>17,385</td>
<td>161,806</td>
<td>11,895</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jenin</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>87,374</td>
<td>346,373</td>
<td>39,762</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tulkarm</td>
<td>12,291</td>
<td>80,302</td>
<td>330,129</td>
<td>12,701</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nablus</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>160,832</td>
<td>244,436</td>
<td>256,400</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ramallah</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>187,471</td>
<td>74,100</td>
<td>69,024</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jerusalem</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>52,427</td>
<td>83,920</td>
<td>55,310</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bethlehem</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>11,211</td>
<td>15,258</td>
<td>4,534</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hebron</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>41,518</td>
<td>359,666</td>
<td>184,238</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jaffa</td>
<td>43,844</td>
<td>16,004</td>
<td>72,246</td>
<td>381</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ramle</td>
<td>30,228</td>
<td>26,339</td>
<td>359,245</td>
<td>23,950</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gaza</td>
<td>17,404</td>
<td>27,623</td>
<td>491,104</td>
<td>28,300</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>113,071</td>
<td>908,077</td>
<td>3,297,413</td>
<td>841,048</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table (IV/Three/1 (b) )

Percent of all Arab-owned Cultivable land (excl.nomad) under the following crops by Sub-District - as at 1/4/1935.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Sub-Dist.</th>
<th>Citrus %</th>
<th>Plant.s %</th>
<th>Tax Cereal %</th>
<th>Untax. Cereal %</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Safad</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>52</td>
<td>19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Acre</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>57</td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Haifa</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>76</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tiberias</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>74</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Beisan</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>91</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nazareth</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>83</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jenin</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>72</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tulkarm</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>74</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nablus</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>37</td>
<td>38</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ramallah</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>55</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jerusalem</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>42</td>
<td>27</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bethlehem</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>48</td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hebron</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>60</td>
<td>30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jaffa</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>53</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ramle</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>78</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gaza</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>85</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td>2.2</td>
<td>17.6</td>
<td>63.9</td>
<td>16.3</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

From the above two tables it is clear that for Palestine as a whole, the proportion of total Arab cultivable land devoted to cereals - even when taking into consideration lands under citrus which was not a peasant product - amounts to 80.2%. Most of these cereal lands were under taxable cereals - untaxable cereal land being Categories 14 and 15 under the Rural Property Taxation Ordinance 1935.

Although the above two tables were presented largely in cereal vs. non-cereal terms because these were the classifications adopted by Village Statistics, a more comprehensive breakdown of the product mix for the same year, 1935, is given in the following table, Table (IV/Three/2). The resultant picture, however, does not alter the conclusions that could be derived from the first table - it merely provides more details.

As can be seen from table (IV/Three/2), the predominance of the staple crops of wheat, barley, durra and sesame was still considerable in 1935. These four crops accounted for 77.2% of all cultivable land for that year.

In addition to assessing the importance of these staples in terms of the land area they occupied, an estimate should be made of
# Table (IV/Three/2)

Area under cultivation and production of the Principal crops, 1935.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Crop</th>
<th>Dunums</th>
<th>% of total area</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>A. Cereals</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>wheat</td>
<td>2,251,018</td>
<td>28.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>barley</td>
<td>2,627,939</td>
<td>33.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>lentils</td>
<td>82,693</td>
<td>1.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>kerserneh</td>
<td>192,936</td>
<td>2.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>maize</td>
<td>70,436</td>
<td>0.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>beans</td>
<td>32,564</td>
<td>0.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>peas</td>
<td>2,548</td>
<td>0.03</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>durra</td>
<td>1,004,977</td>
<td>12.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>sesame</td>
<td>269,920</td>
<td>3.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td>6,535,031</td>
<td>79.73</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>B. Citrus</strong></td>
<td>298,000</td>
<td>3.74</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>C. Other Fruits</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>olives</td>
<td>474,466</td>
<td>6.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>melons</td>
<td>125,875</td>
<td>1.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>grapes</td>
<td>149,450</td>
<td>1.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>almonds</td>
<td>25,880</td>
<td>0.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>figs</td>
<td>98,742</td>
<td>1.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>apples</td>
<td>5,614</td>
<td>0.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>others</td>
<td>20,622</td>
<td>0.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td>901,453</td>
<td>11.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>D. Vegetables</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>tomatoes</td>
<td>32,246</td>
<td>0.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>cucumbers</td>
<td>17,377</td>
<td>0.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>potatoes</td>
<td>6,142</td>
<td>0.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>others</td>
<td>c.60,000</td>
<td>0.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td>115,795</td>
<td>1.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>E. Fodder for the dairy</strong></td>
<td>c.100,000</td>
<td>1.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td>7,972,481</td>
<td>100.00</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

their cash value. The following table, Table (IV/Three/3) gives the value of total agricultural production for the year 1935 and the proportion of this total accounted for by each crop. However, since few peasants owned citrus plantations on any significant scale, the table calculates these proportions in two ways— the first includes the value of the citrus crop in the calculation of the value of total agricultural output, and the second excludes it.

Table (IV/Four/3) above shows that if citrus is excluded from total agricultural production, then the old staples of wheat, barley, durra and sesame still retain their preponderance in the product mix, accounting for 51.8% of the total value of agricultural production.

However, it should not be imagined that the remaining products (other than citrus and specially grown fodder) were any less peasant products than the staples. Much of the olive crop for example was consumed by the peasants because olives formed an important part of their diet. The surplus was sold either as fruits or in the form of oil, partly for human consumption and partly for the soap making industry— though sales to the latter tended to decline in step with the decline after 1930 of soap exports to Egypt, previously the largest single market for Palestinian soap.
Table (IV/Three/3)

Estimated cash values of agricultural production for 1935.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Crop</th>
<th>Value L.P.</th>
<th>% of Total</th>
<th>% of total value less citrus</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>A. Cereals</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>legumes &amp; oil crops</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>wheat</td>
<td>861,437</td>
<td>15.9</td>
<td>29.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>barley</td>
<td>294,294</td>
<td>5.4</td>
<td>10.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>durra &amp; maize</td>
<td>229,676</td>
<td>4.2</td>
<td>8.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>sesame</td>
<td>107,978</td>
<td>2.0</td>
<td>3.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>others</td>
<td>104,615</td>
<td>2.0</td>
<td>3.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td>1,597,100</td>
<td>29.5</td>
<td>55.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>B. Citrus</strong></td>
<td>2,535,870</td>
<td>46.8</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>C. Other Fruits</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>olives</td>
<td>473,998</td>
<td>8.7</td>
<td>16.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>melons</td>
<td>125,850</td>
<td>2.3</td>
<td>4.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>others</td>
<td>c. 130,000</td>
<td>2.4</td>
<td>4.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td>365,735</td>
<td>6.7</td>
<td>12.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>D. Vegetables</strong></td>
<td>365,735</td>
<td>6.7</td>
<td>12.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>E. Tobacco</strong></td>
<td>92,880</td>
<td>1.7</td>
<td>3.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>F. Fodder</strong></td>
<td>c. 100,000</td>
<td>1.8</td>
<td>3.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td>5,420,744</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

In answer to the first question posed previously as to the proportion of cereals in the product mix, the answer therefore is that whether measured in terms of the land area devoted to cereals or in the cash value of the cereal crop, cereals still formed the backbone of the peasant product mix in 1935, the year under study. However, in terms of the cash value of Palestinian agriculture as a whole, it is clear that in 1935, citrus was by far the single most important crop by value. Even so, cereals retained an important share, accounting for more than one fifth of the value of all agricultural produce.

In answer to the second question as to whether this importance of cereals was evenly spread throughout the country, Tables (IV/Three/1a) and (IV/Three/1b) above gave an indication of how widespread the predominance of cereals was. Of the 16 Sub-Districts in Palestine, 13 had more than 70% of their cultivable land devoted to taxable and untaxable cereals. The exceptions were 1) Ramallah, in which plantations (mostly olives) accounted for 55% of the land; 2) Bethlehem where again olive groves accounted for 35%, though cereals nevertheless accounted for 62% of the land; and 3) Jaffa where citrus groves accounted for 32%, plantations for 11%, but where cereals still accounted for 53% of the land.
Though the term "untaxable cereals" might imply that much of the land devoted under this heading was so poor in quality as to be untaxable, the fact remains that the vast majority of cereal lands in Palestine were not of this category. For Palestine as a whole, around 80% of all land under cereals was included in the Category "taxable cereal". The emphasis on cereals in other words, was not a chance occurrence by peasants who because the land was good for nothing else, devoted it to cereals, as if by default.

However, to test the above tables and to provide more detail, the product mix of each individual village in Palestine for the year 1935 was analysed and the results displayed in the following tables, Table (IV/Three/4 a) and (IV/Three/4 b). The tables show the frequency distribution of villages according to the proportion of total cultivable village land devoted to taxable and untaxable cereals in the year 1935.
Table (IV/Three/4/ a)

Number of villages in which Cereal lands accounted for the following percentage of the total cultivable village land:—by Sub-District— as at 1/4/1935.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Sub-District</th>
<th>0 to 15</th>
<th>16-30</th>
<th>31-45</th>
<th>46-60</th>
<th>61-75</th>
<th>over 75</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Safad</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Acre</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Haifa</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tiberias</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Beisan</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nazareth</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jenin</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tulkarm</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nablus</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ramallah</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jerusalem</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bethlehem</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hebron</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jaffa</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ramle</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gaza</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Total: 33 55 72 82 84 101 307 735

Table (IV/Three/4 b)

Percentage of number of villages in Sub-District in which cereal lands occupied the following percentage of total cultivable village land :- By Sub-District - as at 1/4/1935.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Sub District</th>
<th>0 to 15%</th>
<th>16 to 30%</th>
<th>31 to 45%</th>
<th>46 to 60%</th>
<th>61 to 75%</th>
<th>over 75%</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Safad</td>
<td>10.5</td>
<td>5.3</td>
<td>6.6</td>
<td>14.5</td>
<td>6.6</td>
<td>11.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Acre</td>
<td>3.7</td>
<td>3.7</td>
<td>11.1</td>
<td>9.2</td>
<td>14.8</td>
<td>22.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Haifa</td>
<td>2.6</td>
<td>2.6</td>
<td>2.6</td>
<td>10.5</td>
<td>7.9</td>
<td>5.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tiberias</td>
<td>4.8</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>4.8</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>19.0</td>
<td>28.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Beisan</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>7.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nazareth</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>8.3</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>8.3</td>
<td>12.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jenin</td>
<td>3.2</td>
<td>1.6</td>
<td>3.2</td>
<td>9.5</td>
<td>14.3</td>
<td>23.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tulkarm</td>
<td>3.9</td>
<td>5.9</td>
<td>5.9</td>
<td>2.0</td>
<td>11.8</td>
<td>19.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nablus</td>
<td>6.3</td>
<td>12.5</td>
<td>15.6</td>
<td>16.7</td>
<td>16.7</td>
<td>13.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ramallah</td>
<td>9.1</td>
<td>29.0</td>
<td>25.5</td>
<td>16.4</td>
<td>9.1</td>
<td>5.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jerusalem</td>
<td>7.6</td>
<td>10.6</td>
<td>18.2</td>
<td>22.7</td>
<td>15.2</td>
<td>10.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bethlehem</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>14.3</td>
<td>14.3</td>
<td>28.6</td>
<td>28.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hebron</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>3.0</td>
<td>12.1</td>
<td>12.1</td>
<td>12.1</td>
<td>9.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jaffa</td>
<td>5.9</td>
<td>23.5</td>
<td>5.9</td>
<td>11.8</td>
<td>11.8</td>
<td>11.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ramle</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1.4</td>
<td>5.6</td>
<td>8.3</td>
<td>4.2</td>
<td>12.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gaza</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>All Palestine</td>
<td>4.5</td>
<td>7.5</td>
<td>9.8</td>
<td>11.2</td>
<td>11.4</td>
<td>13.7</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source. Government of Palestine, Village Statistics, as for Table (IV/Three/4 a).
From examining Tables (IV/Three/4 a & b) above plus Tables (IV/Three/1 a & b) given previously, two characteristics could be discerned.

The first is the proportion of land devoted to cereals in Palestine was high in every Sub-District. Out of 16 Sub-Districts only in the Sub-District of Ramallah (55 villages) did the proportion of villages devoting over 45% of their cultivable land to cereals fall below 40% (to 14.5%) as can be seen from Table (IV/Three/4 b) above. As for the rest, four (Nablus, Jerusalem, Safad and Jaffa) totalling 255 villages, devoted between 40-70% of their land to cereal. The remaining 11 Sub-Districts, totalling 425 villages, devoted more than 70% of their land to cereal.

The second characteristic that could be discerned is the existence of two groups of Sub-Districts.

The first group had a vastly higher than average proportion of their land, even by the standards of Palestine, devoted to cereal growing. This group was comprised of the Sub-Districts of Haifa, Beisan, Nazareth, Ramle and Gaza where 68% of the villages or more -reaching 82% at Gaza - devoted more than 75% of their land to cereal production. Together this group
numbered 196 villages out of a Palestine total of 735, or 26.7%. Moreover these four Sub-Districts accounted for 1,334,398 dunums of taxable cereals out of a Palestine total of 3,297,413 - or 40.5%. In addition they accounted for 103,728 dunums of untaxable cereal out of a Palestine total of 841,048, or 12.3%.

In terms of actual tonnage produced in 1935 (the year under review) this group produced 47,785 tons of wheat out of a Palestine total of 104,353 tons, or 45.8%. Similarly, they produced a total of 21,013 tons of barley out of a Palestine total of 68,905, or 30.4%. (3)

To summarise this group, though it only had a quarter of the villages in Palestine, they possessed 40% of the better land in Palestine devoted to cereal, and 12% of the worse land. In return, they produced nearly half the wheat of Palestine and a third of its barley.

It is not surprising that the Sub-Districts in this group managed this performance since they were more favourably endowed by nature than other areas in Palestine. The northern Sub-Districts in this group; Haifa, Nazareth and Beisan were located either in the Jezreel Valley or in the Acre Plain where the soil

and moisture conditions were the most favourable in the country. The areas comprising the southern group in Ramle and Gaza were also situated in the plain and, although they did not enjoy as much rainfall as further north, they had sufficient. Nevertheless, more land was planted with cereals in these two Sub-Districts than anywhere else in Palestine as they accounted for 26% of all land under taxable cereal crops in the country.

Indeed, the two regions were historically exporters of grain before the First World War. Southern grain plus Beersheba barley destined for the whisky breweries of Scotland used to form the major exports of Palestine. (4) Similarly, the ports of Haifa and Acre used to export the grain of the Jezreel Valley together with the grain of the neighbouring Syrian territory of the Hauran where camel caravans of grain used to traverse the Valley itself. (5) However these exports had largely dried up by the First World War.

The second group of Sub-Districts that could be identified, was the one comprising of Safad, Nablus, Ramallah, Jerusalem and Bethlehem. This group showed appreciably less than average area devoted to cereals. Together, these five Sub-Districts, which accounted for 40.8% of all villages accounted for only 16.6%

of all taxable cereal lands. However, they accounted for 51.4% of untaxable cereal lands, i.e. lands of poorer quality. It was not surprising therefore that they accounted for 13.7% only of the wheat harvest of all Palestine in 1935, and of 13.8% of the barley crop. (6)

The reasons for this poor performance are not hard to fathom since these Sub-Districts were located in the hilly spine of Palestine. The only soil that could be planted with cereals was whatever soil accumulated inbetween the steep hills or in laboriously constructed hillside terraces. Few inland plains or plateaux of appreciable size could be found in the above Sub-Districts, although two inland plains, of Arrabe and Arrabe el Butuf were located in the neighbouring Sub-Districts of Jenin and Acre respectively (two Sub-Districts which included both hill and plain country in their inventory).

However, for the same reason that this second group lagged behind in the cultivation of cereals, they achieved prominence in the cultivation of the second major peasant crop, olives. Three (Jerusalem, Ramallah and Nablus) out of the five Sub-Districts accounted for 211,714 dunums out of a Palestine total of 474,466 dunums under olives, (7) or 44.6% - almost 2.5 times the number of

---

(7) ibid, Table XVIII.
dunums they would have had if the olive acreage was evenly distributed.

The answer to the second question (as to the evenness over the country of the importance of cereals in the peasant product mix), though a complex one, is undoubtedly in the affirmative. Almost all peasant villages devoted a large proportion of their land to cereals regardless of their location. However, because of natural endowment, some devoted more of their land to cereals than others since natural endowment was the largest single factor determining yields and consequently the size of crops. Some devoted almost all their land as in Gaza; some as in Ramallah, only whatever land could be physically placed under cereals with such expenditure of resources and effort as might have been possible within the peasant’s technology and resources.

Now to the third question of whether there were significant changes in the predominance of cereals during the years of the Mandate up till 1939. The answer is that for peasant society, the dominance of cereals in the product mix did decline somewhat, but neither the rate of decline nor the extent to which it had
reached by 1939, were serious enough to threaten the position of cereals as by far the leading crop in peasant society.

This conclusion is based on two sets of data. The first is the actual output of various cereal and non-cereal products for the years 1920 to 1939.\(^{(8)}\) However, although this data is necessary for ascertaining the actual output, it is not a useful indicator of the relative importance in the product mix that the peasants allocated to each crop. This is because yields fluctuated so widely from year to year due to weather conditions, that output produced from a given area in one year could amount to no more than 60% of the output derived from the same area sown the year before.\(^{(9)}\) Consequently, a second set of data is given showing the areas sown with the four main cereal crops in the years for which such data exist - 1933-1942.\(^{(10)}\)

In order to present the trend in the production of cereals and other products in a concise and easily read form, the two sets of data for the main cereal crops are given in the form of a histogram. In addition, a linear trend line based on the least squares method is given to show the upward or downward trend in the series.

The following figure, Figure (IV/Three/1) shows the annual

\(^{(8)}\) For data on cereal output see Table (III/Two/3) p. 340 For non-cereal output see Appendix
\(^{(9)}\) For example, yield of wheat was 21kgs/dunam in 1938 and 48kgs/dunum in 1939. See Table (III/Two/4), p. 342.
\(^{(10)}\) Data in Table (III/Two/4). p. 342.
production for the years 1922 to 1939, the area sown for the years 1933 to 1942 and the linear trend line for these two series for each of the following crops: wheat, barley, durrah (maize) and sesame.

Figure (IV/Three/2) gives only the linear trend line and the annual production between 1922 and 1939 for olives, and 'other winter crops' (which include lentils, kersenneh, peas and beans).

As can be seen from the above figures, the trend in wheat production was definitely downwards, although the rate of decline was small. As for barley, although there was a fairly strong expansion in the tonnage produced, the land area devoted to barley did not expand in step with increased production. Although it is not possible at this stage to give definite reasons for this increase in yield, it is not unlikely that favourable weather was behind it. As for the other peasant "staples", sesame and "other winter crops" witnessed a marginal rate of increase of output, while olives and durrah & maize saw a higher rate of increase though still a gentle one. Overall however, it could be said that over the period as a whole, the output of the "staple" products including cereals was fairly constant, especially when account is taken of the area actually sown with the various crops and not
FIGURE IV/THREE/1 A

AREA SOWN AND TONNAGE PRODUCED IN PALESTINE 1922-1939 - WHEAT

- = LINEAR TREND LINE
■■■ = AREA SOWN (× 1000 DUNUMS)

TONNAGE PRODUCED (× 1000 TONS)

Year
1922
1924
1926
1928
1930
1932
1934
1936
1938

0 50 100 150 200 250 300

0 15 30 45 60 75 90 105 120 135 150 165 180
FIGURE (IV/THREE/1 B)

AREA SOWN AND TONNAGE PRODUCED IN PALESTINE 1922-1939 - BARLEY

--- LINEAR TREND LINE
### = AREA SOWN (*1000 DUNUMS)

### = TONNAGE PRODUCED (*1000 TONS)
FIGURE (IV/THREE/1 C)

AREA SOWN AND TONNAGE PRODUCED IN PALESTINE 1922-1939 - DURRA (MAIZE)

- = LINEAR TREND LINE

= AREA SOWN (* 1000 DUNUMS)

TONNAGE PRODUCED (* 1000 TONS)
FIGURE (IV/THREE/1 D)

AREA SOWN AND TONNAGE PRODUCED IN PALESTINE 1922-1939 - SESAME

--- LINEAR TREND LINE

### AREA SOWN (* 1000 DUNUMS)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Area Sown</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1922</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1924</td>
<td>150</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1926</td>
<td>200</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1928</td>
<td>250</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1930</td>
<td>300</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1932</td>
<td>350</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1934</td>
<td>400</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1936</td>
<td>450</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1938</td>
<td>500</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### TONNAGE PRODUCED (* 100 TONS)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Tonnage Produced</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1922</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1924</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1926</td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1928</td>
<td>25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1930</td>
<td>30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1932</td>
<td>35</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1934</td>
<td>40</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1936</td>
<td>45</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1938</td>
<td>50</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
FIG. (IV/Three/2 (A))

OUTPUT & TREND IN PRODUCTION OF VEGETABLES 1922-1939. (x 100 tons)

--- = LINEAR TREND LINE (LEAST SQUARES METHOD)

OUTPUT & TREND IN PRODUCTION OF MELONS 1922-1939. (x 100 tons)
FIG. (IV/Three/2 (B))

OUTPUT & TREND IN PRODUCTION OF OTHER SUMMER CROPS 1922-1939. (x 100 tons)
only the tonnage produced since the former is a better indication of whether or not the peasants made a conscious decision to vary their product mix.

On the other hand, Palestine as a whole, i.e. peasant and non-peasant sectors, saw a sharp rate of increase in the production of other crops (citrus apart), as could be seen from Figure (IV/Three/2). The four main ones were vegetables, melons, tobacco and 'other summer crops' which included grapes, figs, almonds and other fruits.

As can be seen from the figure, the rate of increase in output had been a high one indeed. However, not all production in these crops could be attributed to peasant producers, since it was in these same crops that Jewish farm production was making fast progress.

The main conclusion which could be drawn from the above is that although by 1939, cereals were still by far the most important type of peasant crop whether measured in terms of their cash value or in terms of the proportion of land devoted to them, the sheer volume of output over the years of the Mandate was falling - albeit marginally. What is equally important however,
is to relate this fact to the challenge which was facing peasant society in terms of a) a steadily worsening land/labour ratio, b) a strong downward trend in cereal prices and c) a heavy tax burden which did not ease till after 1935. To compensate, peasant society should have taken one or both of two venues. The first was to significantly increase cereal output either by increasing the area devoted to cereals or by increasing productivity. In fact, peasant society did neither since by 1939, all the land that could be cultivated was already cultivated. As for productivity, this thesis has shown that there had been no discernable upward trend in the yield of cereal crops during the Mandate years.

The second venue open to peasant society was to shift production away from the old "staples" and into the production and marketing of higher value crops. However, although the very last years of our period saw a strong upward trend in the output of vegetables, melons and other summer crops, these crops were not enough to compensate for the worsening situation and the challenges explained above. Not all production of these crops, moreover, was undertaken by the peasants since Jewish presence was strong in these areas, as was that of the non-peasant Arab sector. Secondly, in terms of cash value, or in terms of the proportion of the total land area devoted to them, these crops still accounted for less
than 6% of the total cultivable area, (11) and around 20% of the total cash value of all peasant crops (12) - even when lumping together all output of these crops, whether peasant, Jewish or otherwise.
PART V.

CONCLUSION & DISCUSSION

Before bringing together the arguments advanced in the previous pages, it is perhaps helpful to put down clearly what this thesis does and does not claim to do.

This thesis is not a study of the Palestinian economy as a whole in the sense that this Palestinian economy was built up of at least four main sectors viz. the nomadic/semi-nomadic way of life, the Arab non-peasant sector, the Jewish sector and the peasant sector itself. It is a study of only one sector, the peasant economy.

Secondly, this thesis is not a study of two-way interaction
between peasant and non-peasant sectors. The study focused only on what influences the non-peasant sectors had on the peasant one, but not on what influences the peasant sector had on the other sectors. This exclusive focusing on the one-way flow of influences from the non-peasant to peasant sectors stems from the need to limit and define the purview of this thesis, and not from the lack of awareness of the significance of the "outward" flow of influences from the peasant to non-peasant sectors - intensely fascinating and important as these were for the Palestinian economy as a whole.

Thirdly, this thesis did not attempt to arrive at sweeping conclusions such as claiming that peasant society was "thoroughly destabilised" or that it was sinking into a state of dependence and underdevelopment, (1) or that it merely formed the backward sector of a dual economy which existed in Palestine and of which the Jewish sector formed the advanced sector. (2) It is my firm belief that the study of Palestinian peasant society is simply not advanced enough to allow such sweeping judgements to be made.

It must be said at this point that the easiest, and the most tempting, path would have been to "borrow" a ready-made theory derived from the experience of other peasant societies, and then to try to adapt it to the Palestinian experience. This,

however, would have been more of a hindrance than a service to the study of the Palestinian peasant society because it would have prejudiced the research and compromised its validity. It is not uncommon in such circumstances to collect only such data as would fit the pre-conceived theory, albeit out of a sub-conscious desire for a neat solution than out of intellectual dishonesty. The end result may look neat, seemingly coherent and well constructed. But the question should be asked then of whether the end result describes the situation as it existed in Palestine at the time, or whether one is looking at the experience of the peasant society of pre-Revolutionary Russia or of medieval England or India - with a "cloak" of Palestinian data which was selected to fit the Russian, the English or the Indian experience.

Admittedly, one could not remain totally unaware of the experience of these societies, nor remain in ignorance of some of writings on such experiences. This thesis has indeed taken note of non-Palestinian experiences and where relevant, aspects of the Palestinian experience have been compared and contrasted to the experience of other areas. This, however, does not mean that the Palestinian experience has been merely used to prove or disprove any theory which was derived from the Russian, English, Indian
or any other experience. This thesis does not claim to contribute towards a "general" theory of peasant society or economy - and asks not to be judged as if it did. Rather, what this thesis attempted to do was to describe and analyse the specific experience of one peasant society, namely that peasant society and economy which existed in Palestine in the period between the turn of the 20th Century and 1939.

The core of this thesis is an attempt to produce an answer to three broad questions. The first question is simply "What was the peasant economy that existed in Palestine at the beginning of our period?" The second question is "What were the major challenges that the years 1920-1939 posed to the viability of this peasant economy and its ability to perpetuate itself?" The third question is "Once these challenges were posed, what were the responses of the peasant economy, and was the nature of these responses such that the peasant economy retained sufficient of those fundamental characteristics to allow us to identify it as the the peasant economy we defined in the first place?"

The first Question. What was the Palestinian peasant economy?
Before attempting to answer the specific question of what constituted the Palestinian peasant economy, one has to arrive at a working definition of the term 'peasant economy' itself. One such definition was provided by Daniel Thorner (3), who wrote:

"We use five criteria for determining whether the total economy of a given country, nation or large colonial area is to be taken as a peasant economy. All five of these must be satisfied before an entire economy of a given country can be termed peasant.

Our first two criteria relate to production and working population. In a peasant economy, roughly half of the total population must be agricultural; and more than half of the working population must be engaged in agriculture. Our third criterion requires the existence of a State power and a ruling hierarchy of a particular kind: one in which the 'kinship' or 'clan' order has weakened sufficiently to give way to a 'territorial State'. Our fourth criterion is the rural-urban separation...We do not consider an economy to be 'peasant' unless it contains a significant number of towns with a definite pattern of urban life quite different from that of the countryside. Simply as a rough quantitative indication, at least 5% of the entire population of a given country should be resident in towns.

Our fifth and final criterion, the most fundamental, is that of the unit of production. In our concept of peasant economy the typical and most representative units of production are the peasant and family households.... In a peasant economy half or more of all crops grown will be produced by such peasant households, relying mainly on their own family labour.

In a peasant economy the first concern of the productive units food crops to feed themselves; But this cannot be their sole concern. By definition, they live in a State and are linked with urban areas. They must willy-nilly sustain the State, the towns, the local lords. Hence, in one way or another, they must hand over, surrender or sell to others part of their food crops."

It is clear from the preceding chapters that what we are dealing with is a society which answers Thorner's general definition of

what constitutes a peasant economy. The answers to Thorner's five criteria are all in the affirmative. In 1922, more than 51.5% of all the population in Palestine was comprised of Arab peasants (4). There was an an Ottoman State which, together with its functionaries, managed to extract from the peasants as much as one-third of their produce. (5) Moreover, there was a large urban population which in 1922 formed 25% of total population. (6) Lastly, the household did indeed form the basic unit of production which depended on the labour of its members and which devoted the majority of its output for the satisfaction of its immediate needs.

To end the analysis at this point however, is to rob this thesis of any usefulness it may aspire to, namely to show the specific experience of the Palestinian peasant society as it actually operated, rather than whether it fitted one definition or another. In answer to the question of what specifically constituted the Palestinian peasant society therefore, this thesis did not attempt to define the peasant economy of Palestine as if it were "ahistorical" i.e. as if it were somehow an abstraction divorced from its environment. Rather this environment was described and analysed as a totality structured by the relative importance of its constituent elements viz the physical, the

(4) Table (I/Three/8 (b), p. 100.
(6) Table (I/Three/5), p. 80.
social and the historical.

(i) The physical element.

Prior to the mass application of modern technology, the physical environment must have seemed totally unchangeable to the peasant. All he could do was to adapt as best as he could to the pattern of climate and soil nature has given him. Thus, the peasant settled only in those areas of Palestine which had a combination of soil and climate which he could work with the implements and techniques available to him. The southern half of Palestine was abandoned altogether as were large areas of near desert in the northern half such as the Judean Wilderness, although large tracts of these abandoned areas were to be reclaimed and turned into productive regions in the last three or four decades.

The most immediate effect on peasant society was in the limit to the variety and types of crops to which peasant society could devote its land. In part, the product-mix of any peasant society is a function of the social organisation of that society. Cereals, for example, typically occupy the largest proportion of a peasant society's land because of the need of the households to feed themselves in the absence of large scale trade in foodstuffs.
However, the physical environment plays an important role in determining not only the type of cereals most suitable, but the yields obtainable. At the beginning of our period, the three main varieties of cereals, wheat, barley and durra & maize, typically occupied about 80% of the total cultivable land area of most villages.

Annual yields on the other hand, fluctuated so widely that it is almost meaningless to speak of an average yield. The yield of wheat, for example, was 33 kilogram per dunum in 1936, 56 kg/dunum in 1937 and 21 kg/dunum in 1938. (7) Admittedly however, wide annual fluctuations in yield are not peculiar to Palestine or the Middle East. Annual fluctuations were as much a feature of English medieval (8) or Indian (9) agricultural, for example, as much as they were a feature of Palestine’s. However, like in England and in India, patterns of landholding were developed by the peasants in order to spread the risks of disastrous failures of harvest and to minimise the damage befalling any single household. These risk minimising strategies will be discussed in the next few pages.

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(7) Table (III/Two/4).
However, in addition to the direct effect of the physical environment in determining the geographical location of peasant settlement, there were other indirect, though equally important, effects. Man’s response to this physical environment was not confined to evolving the peasant’s way of life, for a pastoral nomadic way of life evolved to take advantage of the huge expanses that formed the margin between the full-desert where no life was possible, and the sown where sufficient rainfall allowed consistent agriculture along peasant lines. In common with the rest of the Fertile Crescent, Palestine was divided among these two ways of life. Each had its redoubts where the other could not occupy and hold for any length of time; the nomads to the east of the Jordan and south of Beersheba, and the peasants in the hill country.

Apart from their respective redoubts however, the two ways of life were in a state of permanent conflict over the "no-man’s-land" in between - mainly in the plains of Palestine. For much of the 19th Century, these plains were denied to the peasants largely because of the lack of security although they were well suited by nature for cereal cultivation. Examination of the two maps in Part I, Section Two, will show that there was a clear spatial separation between the peasants and the nomads whereby the former occupied the hill country and the latter occupied the plains.
The use of the term 'conflict' does not necessarily mean incessant and violent war of apocalyptic battles to the finish between peasants and nomads, for, on the whole, it was a low intensity affair along mundane lines such as dispute over an area of land wanted by the peasant for cultivation, and by the nomad for his flock; or highway robbery or theft of livestock. Nor was conflict the only type of relationship between the two for there were numerous trade, marriage and even alliance relations between them. However, that there was a fundamental conflict of interests between the two ways of life is undeniable.

The social element.

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The peasant however, did not respond to the physical environment as an individual, but as a member of a social group which was firmly based on kinship relations. As long as peasant society remained in a state of isolation from "exogenous" influences, it was these social relations which, almost wholly, determined the economic and social behaviour of the peasant. Moreover, these social relations governed the response of peasant society to the "exogenous" influences themselves. This thesis has attempted
to identify the elements of this structure and place them in a coherent whole.

The totality of social relations underpinning peasant society in Palestine were envisaged as a series of concentric circles starting with the household -as the smallest- and going through the family (luzum or aileh) the lineage and finally the clan (the hamula). A number of conclusions were reached regarding the effect of this type of social set-up on the economic organisation of peasant society.

A. The first was that the household was identified as the basic unit of peasant society. Indeed, there is nothing startling about this since the household formed the basic unit of most, if not all, peasant societies- so much so that a whole school of theory, led by and named after AV Chayanov, was constructed on this premise. Although one can confirm that a number of basic features found in the Palestinian peasant economy concurred with the basic features expounded by this school of thought (10), it must be stressed that this thesis does not claim to prove or disprove Chayanov's theory, or indeed any other theoretical framework apart from the one expounded by this thesis. Nevertheless, one can identify three such broad areas.

(i) The household acted as the sub-unit of society which carried out the immediate process of production—the ploughing, seeding, weeding, harvesting, cultivation of fruit trees, looking after its own stock of sheep, goats and ploughing stock etc. This was possible because of two points.

The first was that the tasks of the household were not performed communally by all members of the clan regardless of which household they belonged to. Rather, they were carried out household by household where members of any given household applied their labour to a precise well-defined object of their labour which was differentiated from the object of labour of the neighbouring household. This differentiation was either permanent—through exercising the right of private property (as in the case of livestock and fruit trees); or for the duration (as in the case of arable land under Masha’) whereby the land "belonged" to the household till the next periodic redistribution. Either way, the produce of this labour belonged only to the household and not to a communal store for example to which all households contributed all produce and from which they drew all their needs.

The second point was the absence of a systematic and large scale employment of wage labour by the peasant household in the period before the turn of the 20th century. This does not mean that
the wage labourer (harrath) was totally absent from the scene at the time. However, it has been established that even when the household did not gain access to land through Masha' and by virtue of its membership of the clan, it typically entered into crop-sharing arrangements with the landlord, rather than gain its livelihood through wage labour. (11) The gains to the household from these arrangements then depended on the quantity of inputs which it contributed to the co-cultivation contract. Labour was one of the four main inputs, the others being land, seed and plough animals.

(ii) Essentially therefore, the household had to perform the majority of necessary labour including the management of labour, from its own resources. The implication of this on the peasant household and the peasant economy was that, effectively, the limit on specialisation and the division of labour was set by the number of productive individuals in the household. The division of labour could proceed mainly along the lines of age and sex of the constituent members. The cultivation of cereal lands, for example, was man's work, gleaning after the harvest, gathering firewood, cultivating the vegetable plots immediately adjacent to the village (hawakir) was woman's work, while looking after the livestock in the vicinity of the village was adolescent work.

More important than listing the functions of the individuals within the household, however, is to note the implications of this set-up when these limits on household productivity were translated from the level of the household to the level of the peasant economy as a whole.

In economic terms, no returns to scale could be secured as the unit of production - the household - could not manage more than a limited input of factors, no matter which strategies were used in order to maximise output relative to the number of individuals in the household. For example, it has been suggested (12) that a main reason why the peasants used to hold their land in parcels scattered in different parts of the village lands, was that this pattern maximised the effective number of hours which could be worked by the peasants - since different parcels situated in different parts, required work on them at different times. That Palestinian peasants used to scatter their holdings is beyond doubt (13). It is debatable however, whether this was solely due to the need to maximise effective labour time. It is possible that the household also aimed at minimising the risks of famine since scattering meant that only a part of the household's holding could be affected by a disastrous harvest, rather than the total holding. In the circumstances of Palestine where yields varied considerably from year to year, risk aversion was not

an unimportant consideration.

Whatever the reason, the fact remains that the productivity of the household, and by extension, the peasant economy as a whole, was limited by whatever division of labour that could be achieved within the household. Of the two main factors, labour and land, the productivity of the peasant economy did not increase with an increase in population and the labour supply. This increase was simply not translated into a larger market or a larger individual enterprise, as larger population would only mean more households doing exactly the same thing with no division of labour among them. On the contrary, any increase in population which was not matched with an increase in land, would swiftly lead to over-population and famine.

Nor would there be a return to scale from a large supply of land relative to population, since there is a limit to what the members of the household could farm. Beyond this, the land would be left uncultivated - as indeed large areas in the plains of Palestine in the 19th Century remained uncultivated for the lack of peasants to cultivate them. It could be argued however, that in such circumstances, the household could maximise its income by turning land over to pasture, as pasture requires relatively less labour than arable farming.
Unfortunately, it is not possible to confirm or reject this argument conclusively in the case of Palestine in the second half of the 19th century, since no reliable data exist regarding the number of animals owned by the peasants. However, two points could be made here. The first is that the geographical concentration of peasant settlements in the hill country meant that most of the lands that could, potentially, be turned to pasture were in the plains. As these plains, the time, were occupied by nomads and semi-nomads who depended on herding as the main source of their livelihood, and who were in a state of continuous conflict with the peasants, it is open to doubt whether the peasants were allowed appreciable grazing rights on the plains. The second point is that when the reverse became true during the years of the Mandate - i.e. when land became scarce relative to population in Palestine as a whole, there is evidence that the numbers of animals had dropped. Thus whereas the numbers of sheep have fallen from 260,000 in 1920 to 209,000 in 1938, the numbers of goats have also fallen. However, since the timing of the fall coincided with the onset of the period of bad harvests from 1928 (14), the causes of this fall could not be exclusively attributed to a long-term trend of turning pasture land to arable.

Apart from limiting the quantity of inputs which could be managed by the household, the constraints on productivity inherent

(14) Table (III/Three/1), p. 400.
in the household as the primary unit of production were reflected in the technology employed. All implements and techniques had to suit the needs of the household. Only those implements that it could wholly or largely make and repair itself were used. Similarly, only the techniques that the household could apply were employed.

(iii) The third area where one could identify some similarities between Chayanov's model and the Palestinian experience, is in the role of the household as the primary unit of consumption as well as being the unit of production. A major tenet of Chayanov's model was that in a peasant society "economic activity is dominated by the requirement of satisfying the needs of a single production unit, which is at the same time a consumer unit." (15)

It could be confirmed that this constraint was indeed present in the experience of the Palestinian peasant society and was reflected in the product mix that the household typically produced. Although no reliable data exists on the period before the Mandate, it has been conclusively proved that nearly 80% of the peasants' land was devoted to cereals, the main item in their diet, and that this was typical and persisted till the end of our period in 1939. (16) Even the non-cereal part of their land, such as olives and vegetables was similarly devoted to satisfying the food needs of

(16) Table (IV/Three/1 (b)), p. 472.
the household. There is no evidence that the few decades prior to the Mandate saw a pattern of product-mix substantially different from the one which dominated the Mandate years themselves.

This product mix pattern however, itself limited trade and exchange. As all households produced more or less the same products, the scope for trade between peasant households was limited. Trade with third parties however, was possible and was undertaken either for the satisfaction of scarcities due to bad harvests, or for the disposal of surpluses due to exceptional ones. In addition, although the peasant economy was largely self-sufficient, there is evidence that even in the latter part of the 19th century, the peasants were purchasing essential goods from sources outside the peasant economy. Increasingly for example, kerosene was being purchased in order to make up for the lack of firewood for cooking and candles for lighting. Imports of oil products, largely kerosene, into Jaffa for the year 1899 for example, exceeded

"60,000 boxes [of 20 gallons]...and the price rose considerably towards the end of the year, the consumption of this article, on account of its being the only means of furnishing light to the inhabitants of Palestine, being very great. Neither gas nor the electric light has as yet been introduced into this country, so that with the exception of a very small consumption of candles, everybody has to fall back on paraffin." (17)

(17) Diplomatic and Consular Reports, Report for the Year 1899, on the Trade and Commerce of Palestine, p.4.
Alternatively, trade was possible according to the quantities of grain and other products that could be forcibly extracted by the peasants by "outside" forces, whether tax-collectors or a new breed of landlords. But these forces pushing for such trade, it is important to keep in mind, were not forces "internal" to the peasant economy and society, and could be ignored when discussing the internal dynamics of peasant society. The important point is that the peasants were not averse to trading, if such trade helped them satisfy their consumption needs. Indeed, this conclusion does not contradict Chayanov's model which stated that

"peasant households have entered the sphere of monetary and commodity circulation: demands not satisfied by direct production may be satisfied through purchase up to the value of marketed output plus borrowing." (18)

B. In addition to the above, this thesis has reached another broad conclusion regarding the social structure of peasant society. Although the Palestinian peasant household performed extremely important functions which were not at variance with those of the household in Chayanov's model, there were other areas where Chayanov's model did not fully explain that society's experience.

The main area was the existence of the clan and other social units larger than the household. Important as the functions of the

household were, it should not be imagined the household could have carried out these economic functions without the mediation of larger social units of peasant society. In the conditions of Palestine of the time (and most probably for a long time before), these larger social units had to create the preconditions which would allow the household to perform its economic functions in the first place. Some of these preconditions had to do with "external" threats to the social group as a whole; and some had to do with essential "internal" functions.

The "external" functions revolved mainly round securing the members of the kinship group against nomads, or just as likely, against other peasants. This function had two main aspects to it. The first was the mere provision of adequate defence against attack and dispossession. Indeed, this role could not be underestimated in Palestine of the time when the absence of effective Ottoman State authority led to continuous wars between the peasants themselves and between the peasants and the nomads.

It is interesting in this respect to quote the following passage outlining the history of an area near the Jordan river prior to the imposition of security by the Ottoman Government (19) :-

"Villagers were forced to pay the khawa, a tax on wheat and animals levied by the neighbouring tribes in return for protection and allowance to till their soil. In response to these depredations villagers united under the leadership of the strongest family among them to protect their crops and sheep. Disorder was so widespread in the region at the end of the 19th century that the inhabitants were prevented from emigrating only by the Ottoman government's dispatch of an expedition which, joining with the villagers, drove the bedouins out of the Jordan Valley into southeastern Jordan."

Besides this aspect of "passive" defence of peasant territory and property, it needed social units larger than the household in order to secure additional land in time of population expansion. At such times, the household did not merely go out and cultivate any area of land it found convenient for in the circumstances of Palestine it was very difficult for it to do so. One reason was that although population density over the country as a whole was relatively low, the density of peasant population over those areas identified in this thesis as the "core" of peasant Palestine, was much higher. As could be seen from Maps (I/Two/1) and (I/Three/1), the peasant population showed a marked tendency to concentrate geographically. When the cultivation of additional land on any appreciable scale became necessary, it was customary for peasant settlements to throw out "daughter" settlements, not in the vicinity of the mother settlement, but a few days travel away.

This process was described by Granott in the following passage
"The village of Beit Lid in the Tulkarm Sub-District, lying on the hill in the neighbourhood of the town of Tulkarm, had in its possession a large khirbeh (*) in the neighbourhood of Nathania, at a considerable distance from its own boundaries; the khirbeh which belonged to two hamulas (**) and embraced 5,336 dunums with 460 souls, was turned into a permanent and independent village. Another village in the Tulkarm Sub-District has a khirbeh which is a small village on its own, inhabited by members of a hamula who have left the village in order to attend to their lands and trees around the khirbeh. Frequently, the khirbeh belongs to a certain hamula which had lands in the village; sometimes however, the hamula either in whole or in part, transfers itself to the khirbeh and settles there permanently." (20)

The same broad process was described by RT Antoun who wrote (21):

"According to village elders, the inhabitants of Tibne used to descend from their hill stronghold during the ploughing season, plant their crops in the surrounding area, and return to Tibne until the harvest period. They descended again to harvest their crops, storing sufficient seed in nearby rock shelters for the next year's planting. Then they returned with their crops to Tibne where they spent the off season. As the population increased, the transportation of crops along the treacherous paths to Tibne became increasingly difficult. The inhabitants of Tibne decided to divide the surrounding territory among themselves permanently. The division probably occurred round the turn of the century. Each descent group settled in the centre of the lands it cultivated."

It is clear therefore that it was impossible for isolated households to gain access to additional land. They would have been overwhelmed by nomads and by other peasants. This feature of the peasant society in Palestine is at variance with a basic assumption in Chayanov's model, namely that land was in flexible supply to the household.(22) This does not mean that the household could not

(21) R T Antoun, Arab Village, Op. cit, p.18
obtain additional land, but that whatever additional land it
needed, had to, and could only be, obtained through the clan.

This dependence of the household on the clan gave rise to
several features which had to do with the "internal" functions
of the clan. These functions could be divided into economic and
non-economic functions. The latter were in areas like adjudication
of disputes between the various sub-units of the clans, and the
regulation of marriage. What is more important is to note that
for the clan to perform as a cohesive unit—which it needed
to be if it were to defend itself—the clan had to impose social
and economic discipline on its constituent sub-units—the lineage,
the family and right down to the household. This discipline
was necessary if the forces of fission between these sub-units
were not to overcome the forces of cohesion, to the detriment
of all.

In the economic sphere, the clan had to ensure the access of all
its members to sufficient land to feed them. Since the clan could
defend only a given amount of land against other clans or nomads,
it had an interest in maximising the number of individuals on such
land as it could defend. This it could only do by ensuring
that land was distributed as equally as possible among the
individual households.
To put this principle in practice, the principles of "Masha'" land and periodic redistribution were applied. In peasant custom - as opposed to the "exogenous" State Law - all land was deemed as belonging to the clan as a whole. Individuals only had a determinate share of the total. This land was periodically redistributed, by lot, among the individual household in the manner explained in some detail earlier. (23) The clan enforced this egalitariansim by ensuring the access of individual households to land, and allowing them to organise production and perform the necessary tasks themselves.

The kinship-group did not organise the immediate process of production at the the level of the clan itself - in the sense that all individuals belonging to the clan were given tasks to perform by the elders; all crops harvested were placed in a communal store and needs were met from that store. While some kinship-group based societies did perform in this way, it is doubtful that this was an efficient method once the group size has passed a certain level. The complexities, stresses and strains involved in organising a few hundred people would have been beyond the managerial abilities of the elders at the time. Indeed these "managerial" difficulties would have made it doubtful whether clan size could have reached a larger

(23) Part II, Section One, p.166.
size had it not been been for the adoption of the household as a social sub-unit of the kinship-group in the manner described above, rather than a mere biological provider of individual members. It would have been far easier to devolve the numerous small-scale decisions to the household level, while the clan controlled the more important question of assuring access of all to land and enforcing minimum discipline. The clan, however, ensured a minimum of egalitarianism.

However, because the clan has to ensure a rough measure of equality in the access of households to good-quality land as well the area of land, another feature of peasant land tenure evolved, namely the scaterring of the individual's total holding in separate parcels. This was in addition to reasons of minimising risk of total loss of income due to a disastrous harvest, and of maximising effective labour time on the land whereby different parcels needed work at different times. Granott stated the reason as follows (24):

"In order that every fellah might receive his full share from the common property, his holding was assigned to him from all sections of the property and in lands of different categories."

In conclusion to the preceding pages therefore, it could be seen that the basic mechanisms of peasant society and economy were outlined as a self-reinforcing totality. The limits to overall productivity set by the division of labour achievable within the household, determined the level and type of output. Moreover, it determined the type of social organisation which based itself on the household as the basic sub-unit, namely the family, the lineage and the clan. In turn that organisation ensured the access of the household to land, the object of its labour, thereby starting the cycle again.

(iii) The historical element.

The above analysis however, has shown that peasant society was a coherent, autonomous totality which could function in a state of isolation from forces "outside" itself. It did not need a State nor landlords, nor international trade, nor indeed a large measure of internal trade. It could organise the process of production in the manner described above, and reproduce itself from one generation to the next without the mediation of these "outside" forces - as indeed it had done for centuries.
Notwithstanding this ability to survive on its own, however, the fact was that peasant society in late 19th and 20th Centuries did not exist in a state of "splendid isolation" from "outside" forces. Peasant society existed within a social formation in Palestine itself that had forms of social organisation other than that of the peasant. Moreover, Palestine itself was part of two Empires, the Ottoman and the British and could not but be influenced by social and economic and legislative developments within them.

It is a basic contention of this thesis that, in the context of Palestine of the late 19th century and up to 1939, it was these "outside" forces that posed the major challenge to peasant society and its ability to perpetuate itself. Prior to that, the internal structures of peasant society which governed its economic organisation, had reached such a degree of internal equilibrium that bordered on the static. Once the division of labour had reached a certain level, the social relations that governed peasant society ensured that it did not proceed any further. From then onwards, the second generation was largely a carbon copy of the first. And with this blocking of further progress, the hope that change would emanate from inside was lost.
Change however, was forthcoming. If change was not inherent in the internal dynamics of peasant society, then sooner or later change had to be imposed on it in spite of itself by "outside" forces whose power have overtaken that of static peasant society. As such, neither the pace nor the direction of change had to be necessarily in favour of peasant society, for change was designed to benefit only the agents and initiators of change.

THE SECOND AND THE THIRD QUESTIONS. THE CHALLENGE AND THE RESPONSE.

Having answered the first major question of this thesis by analysing the internal structures of peasant society, a second and a third questions need to be answered, namely "what were the major challenges which were posed to the viability of the peasant economy and its ability to perpetuate itself?", and "once these challenges were posed, what were the responses of the peasant economy, and was the nature of these responses such that the peasant economy retained sufficient of those fundamental characteristics that allowed us to identify it as the peasant economy we defined in the first place?"
Conceptually, the broad challenges to peasant society could be analysed along two lines. The first line is the vast change which was taking place in the environment within which peasant society existed and operated. The second line is to identify the effects of these changes on the internal workings of peasant society.

Undoubtedly, one of the most far-reaching changes in the environment of peasant society, and the one which had the most profound implications, had been the almost irresistible rise of the modern state. The process started from a position of near-total absence from the scene, when the writ of Ottoman governors did not extend beyond the gates of the main cities, and when even Jerusalem itself was occupied by the peasants from the surrounding districts.

Gradually however, the first steps in the long road towards the hegemony of state power over all other sectors within society, were taken with the establishment of an effective military presence on the scene, for such such presence was the necessary precondition which would allow the state to carry out whatever social and economic policies it had. Although in other areas of the world, the presence of such state power may be taken for granted, this was by no means a guaranteed affair in Palestine, as Ottoman power on the ground ebbed and flowed throughout the 19th Century. The state did
not begin the process that ended with its final hegemony over all the other sectors till after the 1850's.

Simultaneously with the establishment of state military power in Palestine and the Fertile Crescent as a whole, a lengthy debate was underway in Istanbul, and other centres of Ottoman power, regarding the broad thrust of social and economic policy, not only towards Palestine but towards the Empire as a whole. It was this general policy as well as specific policy towards peasant society, as expressed and codified in the Land Laws of the State, that this thesis aimed at establishing.

Initially, the Ottoman Land law envisaged a situation where the relationship between the individual peasant and the State was a direct one with no intermediary. (25) Thus the legal "fiction" was invented whereby all Miri land (which in Palestine meant all cultivable land) was the property of the State which it leased to the peasant as an individual, in return for a double-payment; one (tapu) to be paid on entry of the individual to the land; and the second, the tithe, was an annual tax on the produce of the land.

In effect therefore, peasant society became under a binding legal obligation to pay taxes, which by definition, was a deduction.

(25) Part II, Section Three, p.208.
from the social product which would have otherwise been devoted to the consumption, investment or savings of that society. Although in theory, the rate of tax should have accorded with the letter of the law, the true burden of the tax fluctuated widely between the 1870's and 1939. One cannot say with a high degree of confidence what the precise rate was prior to the Mandate, although some sources put it as much as one-third of the gross produce of the peasants. (26) However, historians agree that a major contribution to overtaxing the peasants, was the practice of tax-farming by the state, which lacked the administrative machinery to collect the taxes directly from the peasants. (27)

As for Mandate times, although the practice of tax-farming was abolished immediately upon the setting up of the British Military Administration in 1917-1918, the burden of taxation on the peasants also fluctuated widely. The burden of the tithe in the period 1922-1927 have been estimated at around 11% of the value of gross produce while the werko amounted to around 6% (28). Indeed, this rate of actual taxation was in keeping with the letter of the law, since the rate of the tithe was brought down in 1925 from 12.5% to 10% of the gross produce. Moreover, it represented a considerable easing of the burden of taxation from Ottoman times. However, the following period, 1928-1934, saw the true burden of direct rural

(26) For example see S Bergheim, "Land Tenure in Palestine", Palestine Exploration Quarterly, 1894, see p.222 of this thesis.
(28) Table (III/Two/7), p. 351.
taxation rise considerably. Had it not been for large remissions of tax, the tithe on its own would have accounted for over 17% of gross produce (29), while werko would have claimed an additional 9%. In the event however, tithe remissions reduced the actual burden of both to around 20% of gross produce. It was not till the third period, 1935-1939, that the combined burden of both tithe and werko, now consolidated under the Rural Property Tax Ordinance of 1935, accounted for around 10% of the value of gross produce.

However, payment of taxes was not the only outcome of the social policy of the resurgent state. Even more far-reaching in its effect on peasant society was the encouragement which state law and action had given to forms of land tenure that were contrary to those of peasant society. Arguably, the initial objective of the State's Land Laws of the 1850's, was not to create private property rights in land. Rather the Law was meant to codify the status quo which prevailed when the central Ottoman State militarily defeated the feudal classes, namely that the central bureaucracy was, for the time, the sole source of power in the land. The prize, so to speek, was that the relationship between it and the direct producer was to be a direct one with no feudal classes in between - in other words, the central bureaucracy of the Ottoman State claimed to itself the monopoly right to extract resources directly from

(29) Table (III/Two/10), p. 362.
the peasant.

As it turned out however, the central bureaucracy could not enforce what it legislated for because it lacked the administrative machinery to carry out its policies. Its early attempts to collect taxes directly from the peasants had to be given up in favour of resorting to the tax-farmers because of the immense difficulties of the task. Even the much better organised Mandate Government found the administrative effort involved in direct tithe-collection almost insuperable, and soon transferred to another system. (30) It is not surprising therefore that the Ottomans had to resort to the tax-farmer.

The gap between state policy and its capability therefore, was so large that a vacuum was created which was steadily filled by a class of urban-based functionaries who initially acted as the intermediaries between the State and the peasant. These tax-farmers were drawn from their ranks and they staffed the local government departments. Though initially these classes were mere functionaries of the central state, gradually they used privileged position to advance their interests in two main ways.

Firstly, these functionaries - in their capacity as tax-farmers

(30) Part III, Section Two, pp. 318-320.
used the operation to extract the maximum they could from the peasants and divert it into their own pockets. (31) Secondly, had this been all however, the effect of this open plunder on peasant society would have been no more than another one in a long series of exploiters that this society witnessed in its history. The point is that these functionaries were not content to leave the peasants themselves to organise the process of production while they -like all exploiters before them, exacted a share of the final produce. It was not enough to acquire the produce of the land - the land itself had to be acquired.

The exact process of how this was done is a lengthy and complex one, which started in Ottoman times but continued throughout the years of the Mandate, and was not complete even then. A start, however, was made in Ottoman times to secure the essential prerequisites needed in this process of expropriation of the land itself, as opposed to its produce, namely that the law of the land should allow this land to be held in private property. These classes therefore, aimed to retain those features of the original Ottoman Laws which aided this purpose, such as the laws requiring the breaking-up the communal land tenure of the peasantry (e.g. law requiring compulsory partition of Masha').

(31) A graphic description of this operation which captured the process as it happened on the ground was given by a contemporary observer, and is quoted on p.219, in Part II, Section Three.
Equally important was the need to alter other earlier Ottoman land laws so as to facilitate the emergence of private property rights in land. Without the full freedom to buy and sell, dispose, inherit and mortgage land, the value of land would have been much diminished to the rising classes.

Although in some respects the period of the Mandate proved to be a continuation of state policy of late Ottoman times, in many others it was a qualitative break with the past. Undoubtedly, the most important new factor was the commitment of the Mandatory to the creation of a Jewish National Home in Palestine. What this thesis is interested in however, is not the political side of the question, fascinating and momentous as it was, but to define and assess the direct impact of this policy on the development of peasant society.

Of the numerous issues which arose from the implementation of the National Home policy, one of the most controversial had been the question of Jewish land purchases. Certainly, the question of Jewish land purchases did not start with the Mandate, as a quarter of the total area in Jewish ownership by 1939 was bought before the First World War, though much of that was not registered in
Jewish names till after 1920, because of the Ottoman prohibition on registering land in names of non-Ottoman citizens, or in corporate names.

However, the Mandate was a qualitative step forward, for the Zionists, in the sense that it did not only adopt a permissive attitude, but that the Mandatory was required by the articles of the Mandate to actively encourage the close settlement of the Jews on the land. The land Registries were opened in 1920, the registration of land in corporate names was allowed, and although legislation was enacted to "protect" Arab cultivators, neither the definition of who was to be protected nor the actual implementation of the protection policy were successful in stemming the tide of Jewish land purchases by 1939, the end of our period. It was not till the Land Transfer Regulations of 1940 (32), that Jewish purchases were totally prohibited in some areas, while allowed in others - mainly on the Coastal Plain.

As far as peasant society was concerned, the most immediate effects of Jewish land purchases were twofold. The first was the loss of those lands already occupied by peasants, but which they had to vacate at one time or another as a consequence of them

being purchased by the Jews. The second effect was the loss of land which the peasants would have moved into, in the course of time, but were pre-empted from doing so as a result of the land being bought by the Jews. Sir John Hope Simpson privately estimated the number of the peasants affected as 10,000 Arab families, a figure which is not at variance with the estimate arrived at in this thesis by using a number of independent methods. (33) The total area lost to peasant society by 1939, on the other hand, amounted to 9% of the total cultivable lands of Palestine. (34)

However, because of the geographical concentration of Jewish purchases in the plains of Palestine, the effects of these purchases were not evenly spread throughout the country. Rather, there were areas like the Sub-Districts of Jenin, Nablus, Ramallah, Hebron, Acre and Gaza which were hardly touched by Jewish purchases while other areas like the Sub-Districts of Tiberias, Nazareth, Haifa, Tulkarm, Jaffa and Ramle which saw the bulk of Jewish purchases. In other words, Zionist purchases were concentrated in the areas defined by this thesis as the "periphery" of peasant Palestine, as opposed to the "core" which was situated in the hills.

Admittedly, many of these areas were not occupied by peasants but by nomads and semi-nomads at the time of purchase. However, it

(33) See Part III, Section One, pp. 294-304.
(34) Table (III/One/3), p. 288.
should be kept in mind that peasant society was going through a period of rapid population growth at the time, and it is most unlikely that some, if not all of these lands, would not have been taken over by the peasants. It has already been shown that many villages, motivated by population growth which started well before 1920, were throwing off "daughter" villages (35), not in the immediate vicinity of the mother-villages, which were situated on the hills, but in and towards the plains. In effect therefore, what the Zionists were doing, advertently or inadvertently, was that they were denying the Palestinian peasant society the "land reserves" which this society was in the process of moving into, due to an increasing population pressure, since the restoration of a tolerable security situation by the Ottomans after the 1870's.

However, by saying that the Zionists denied peasant society the "land reserves" which it had been in the process of occupying, and which totalled about 10% of the cultivable area of Palestine, is not to say that had the Zionists not done that, the fundamental problems of peasant society would have disappeared. It could be argued that the lands in the plains were naturally endowed with higher rainfall and with soil more suitable for growing cereals than in the adjoining hills, and were therefore potentially more productive, provided the security situation allowed the

peasants enough time to effect all the cumulative improvements which are needed to transform hitherto neglected land into productive fields. But even if we accept this argument, which is not without merits, the fact remains that land hunger in Palestine, as will be discussed shortly, was fast approaching a scale against which the effects of the loss of these "land reserves" were dwarfed. To this extent, the direct economic effects of the Zionist land purchases, had been to make an already bad problem worse.

It must be stressed however, that these were only the direct effects. The Jewish National Home policy of the Mandate Government had other indirect effects which need to be kept in mind, although limitations of space precluded their study in detail in this thesis. The most important indirect effect was the creation in Palestine of an advanced sector, namely the Jewish, which, although deriving its roots and its impetus from sources totally external to the Arab peasant society, could not but drastically alter the environment in which this peasant society existed.

Whereas the economy of Palestine as a whole was unmistakably peasant immediately after the First World War, by the outbreak of the Second, the peasant economy as a whole was relegated to second place, and by the 1945, peasant society dropped even further to
constitute a mere sector of the total Palestinian economy, albeit an important one. Whereas in 1923/4, direct agricultural taxes, namely the tithe, werko and animal tax, accounted for 22.12 % of total government revenue, in 1939/40 they accounted for no more than 1.83% (36). Moreover, although no statistics of national income existed before 1944, the value of agricultural produce which could conceivably be regarded as peasant - i.e. excluding citrus which accounted for LP. 1.56 million (37) and excluding 30% of the total value of agricultural production estimated to have been contributed by Jewish sources (38) - did not exceed LP. 18.5 million out of a total national output in 1944 of LP. 123 million, or 15%. (39) In short, whereas a peasant society did not cease to exist in Palestine by the 1940’s, the Palestinian economy as a whole ceased to be peasant.

Inevitably, this relative decline in importance of the peasant sector led to the adoption of policy options by the government which were not always to the benefit of peasant society, especially when the requirements of peasant society clashed with those of the National Home policy to which the Mandatory Government was committed. One such area of conflict was in trade protection in which the government had to chose between two essentially contradictory courses of action. Because, on the one hand, it

(36) Table (III/Two/14), p.378.
(38) ibid, p.25
(39) ibid, p.15
had a commitment to encourage Jewish immigration which was highly urban in character and which was therefore a consumer of foodstuffs, it was under an obligation to allow into Palestine foodstuffs at the lowest possible price. On the other hand, the Palestinian peasant society, while a tiny producer by international standards, had an interest in maximising prices, since foodstuffs and especially grains, were practically all that it produced.

Ever since the inception of the Mandate however, the government imposed no tariff barriers except for an 11% ad valorem duty on imports from countries other than Syria and Trans-Jordan, but which were designed more for revenue purposes than as a meaningful tariff barrier. (40) For most of the 1920's this conflict was not very sharp because of the high prices which prevailed in the international market and which were reflected in domestic prices. The onset of the depression in international agricultural prices however, caused prices of domestic grains in Palestine to fall sharply so that in 1931, a ton of wheat could obtain a mere 40% of its 1925 price or 52% of its 1928 price. (41)

Although the government did subsequently introduce a tariff barrier based on a sliding scale, the influx of Jewish immigrants which followed the rise of Hitler to power, ensured that domestic

(40) Part III, Section Three, p. 387.
(41) Table (III/Two/6), p.345.
output became a steadily smaller portion of total domestic consumption, \(^{(42)}\) and almost by extension, it ensured that domestic prices were closely aligned with international ones.

The direct effects of this policy on peasant society in terms of output were slight since it has been established \(^{(43)}\) that the peasants did not materially alter the annual area sown with grains from one year to another. Indeed, this behaviour fits in with that postulated in AV Chayanov's model, where it was postulated that peasant households went on planting, regardless of market price, as long as the consumption needs of the household were not met. \(^{(44)}\)

However, this does not mean that this policy had no effect on peasants' incomes. Although it can be argued that it was beneficial to the peasants, as consumers, to have access to cheap food, and therefore that they had benefited from such a policy, the question of where were the peasants to derive the income to pay for their purchased, though cheap, food, needs to be answered. This is especially so since it has been clearly shown \(^{(45)}\) that the product mix of peasant society did not alter in favour of the production of high value goods, such as fresh vegetables or dairy products which enjoyed a

\(^{(42)}\) See Figure (III/Three/2), p.8, and related discussion.
\(^{(43)}\) See Table (III/Two/4), p.338, and related discussion.
\(^{(45)}\) See Table (IV/Three/2), p.471, and related discussion.
certain measure of protection due to their perishability. As such, the only source of income for the household, from agriculture, was the production of the staple products like wheat, barley and durra. It is unlikely in such a case that the peasants derived much benefit from selling grains as producers, in order to purchase grains, as consumers, when the prices of domestic grains were determined by the international market.

This was not because the peasants were averse to trading in foodstuffs, for Palestinian peasants, like in Chayanov's model (46), have by the 1930's "entered the sphere of monetary and commodity circulation: demands not satisfied by direct production may be satisfied through purchase up to the value of marketed output plus borrowing." The reason was that the value of their marketed output, mostly grains, was determined by the world market through the absence of any meaningful tariff or quota protection. It was cheaper for the peasants then to produce the maximum quantity of grain they could from their land, rather than sell grain, only to buy it back, especially that there were no market segments which Palestinian grain could occupy as a special product. Whereas at the beginning of the century, such a market existed for Gaza and Beersheba barley which used to be exported to Britain for malting purposes, the adoption of Imperial Preference

in favour of malting barley from the dominions in the early 1920's closed this outlet completely. (47)

In addition to the challenges posed by the state and by massive Zionist immigration with all its implications, peasant society was facing another extremely serious challenge, namely the high rate of natural increase of the peasant population itself. This population increased from 357,321 in 1922 to 473,890 in 1931, an increase of 32.6% over 1922 (48); and increased further to 733,870 in 1944, an increase of 41.4% over 1931. (49) Between 1922 and 1944, the Palestinian peasant population more than doubled itself.

The area of cultivable land however, did not increase. On the contrary, the net area available to the peasants actually decreased as Jewish purchases, conversion of land to citrus and the expansion of the towns steadily claimed more land. The inevitable result was a serious deterioration in the land/labour ratio which fell from a national per capita average of 15.2 dunum of cultivable land in 1922 to 11.15 dunums in 1931. (50) Although no census of population was taken after 1931, the available evidence taken from an in-depth survey of five representative villages in 1944, suggests that the trend in the deterioration of the land/labour ratio

(47) See Part III, Section Three, pp. 382-384.
(48) Table (I/Three/4), p.73.
(49) Table (I/Three/9), p.104.
(50) Table (IV/One/2), p.426.
continued unabated. The average per capita holding of cultivable land, including land owned by residents outside the villages, was 8.1 dunums. (51)

Naturally, the average per capita holding was not representative of the actual distribution of holdings among the peasants. Fortunately however, the 1944 survey furnished figures for actual distribution of holdings in the five villages (52), and when these were pitted against the best available estimates of the minimum size of holding necessary to support a peasant family (53), the answer pointed towards severe problems in the peasant economy. Only one in ten of the holdings could support their owners wholly from the land, while the remainder had to supplement their incomes by amounts varying inversely with the area of their holdings.

Indeed the smallest 50% of the holdings were of an average size of 8.4 dunums, a mere one-tenth of the area recognised by the Government of Palestine as sufficient to wholly support a peasant family. Another 13% of the holdings were between 20 and 30 dunums. And only one-quarter of the owners of holdings could ordinarily derive from half to nearly all of their needs from the land, but needed to make up the deficiency from other sources. (54)

(51) There being 2,984 residents according to Survey of Social and Economic Conditions in Arab Villages 1944, Op. cit, Table 1; and 24,147 dunums of cultivable land, Table 74.
(52) Table (IV/One/3), p.433.
(53) Table (IV/One/4), p.443, and related discussion.
(54) See Part IV, Section One, pp. 448-449.
In other words, by 1944, the peasants had to rely massively on income derived from sources outside their villages. Only few holders could support themselves wholly from the land. The others maintained a presence in land which, for many, was only a token one and which had devolved on them through inheritance. For them, the need to supplement their income from sources other than cultivating the household's holding along the lines explained earlier, was inescapable. To them, the peasant economy, although not peasant habits, norms and culture, was dead.

Although the examination in detail of those "outside" sources of income from which the peasants had to supplement their income is not included within the purview of this thesis, the evidence from such studies as have been conducted into this aspect support the conclusions arrived at in this thesis.

As far back as 1931, the Report of the Census of Palestine stated that the earners in the agricultural population, whom it defined as consisting of rent-receivers, actual farmers engaged in ordinary cultivation, and agricultural labourers,

"number 108,376 and of these earners 26,240 or 24.2% have returned a subsidiary occupation, this proportion comprising 1.9% who returned an agricultural subsidiary occupation, and 22.3% who derived a secondary livelihood from some activity not concerned with agriculture. It is thus clear that nearly a quarter of the agriculturalists would be unable to maintain their present standard of life if they were unable to find a secondary means of subsistence." (55)

In her study of Arab labour in Mandatory Palestine, moreover, Rachel Taqqu (56) maintained that there were two sources of employment for peasants apart from agriculture. The first was in the towns themselves which attracted migrant Arab peasants.

"The private building trade and allied work in quarries and in cement manufacture absorbed the largest part of the migrants. In the 1931 census, nearly 7000 Arabs were recorded as earning their living in the construction industry; figures on the remarkable expansion of building activity in the next four years suggest that this figure must have grown substantially. Also, casual day labourers were excluded from 1931 statistics and must be considered in addition, the construction of Haifa harbour, which began in 1929 and was completed in 1934, attracted some 2,000 Arab workers from all parts of Palestine. The ports also prospered, and in 1936 the government welfare Inspector estimated that more than 2,000 Arab workers were employed at Jaffa port each day. The number of Arab labourers at the Haifa harbour in the same years appears to have fluctuated between 800 and 1,600. The railways similarly expanded their wage rolls between 1930 and 1936 by some 1,000 Arab workers, to a total of about 3,000. Jewish sources claimed up to 1,500 Arabs worked in Jewish industries during these years; and the oil companies in Haifa also employed some 1,000 Arabs." (57)

The second major source of employment outside agriculture which was identified by Taqqu, was the extensive programme of public works which were undertaken by the "technical" departments of the government, mainly the Department of Public Works, the Railways and the Department of Customs. Officials from these Departments "engaged village workers on a seasonal or casual basis for the construction of roads and for the erection of selected government buildings; the railways and the harbour works similarly maintained large casual labour forces." (58)

(57) ibid, p.58.
(58) ibid, p.86.
"Because of its utilitarian value, roadwork was preferred over the granting of advances to villagers; loans, moreover, would only add to rural indebtedness. Through a normal programme of public works it was widely believed that rural unemployment could be eliminated. The government thus considered public works as purely supplemental employment which could help prevent a major rural exodus." (59)

Apart from the sources of employment outside agriculture which were identified by Rachelle Taqqu however, there were other sources of income inside agriculture, but outside the peasant economy. The major source of such employment was in citrusculture in which it was stated that

"During the last season in which the [citrus] industry worked at a normal level (1938/39) some 19,000 workers were employed in the Jewish groves during the busiest season. About half of this total were engaged in fruit picking. Of this total, between four and five thousand were permanent labourers, the remainder being seasonal labour. During a normal season, some 15,000 persons were employed in the Arab groves during the busy months. Between three and five thousand persons only were permanent labour." (60)

Employment in the citrus industry however, was not the extent of Arab wage labour within agriculture. It has been estimated that, out of 59,190 non-Jewish earners in agriculture, 26,495 earners were classified as agricultural labourers, or 44.5%. "There are thus two farmers for every one agricultural labourer among the Moslems." (61) However, it must be kept in mind that this ratio does not indicate that economic differentiation and polarisation has progressed very far among the Moslem population who, by and

large, constituted the peasant population. The Census Report cautions against this conclusion by stating that

"the different agricultural groups overlap and merge one into the other. Many smallholders live partly on rent and partly on cultivation; and some cultivators obtain a secondary means livelihood by working on the fields of their richer neighbours." (62)

Indeed, this conclusion is supported by evidence derived from the survey of the five villages conducted in 1944, in which the absolute size of the largest holdings was not such as to indicate a great deal of polarisation. The average size of holding in the group of largest holdings, was around 250 dunums - or 80 acres, by no means a huge estate. (63)

Rather, the picture seems to be one of a generalised pressure on the land resulting in an equally generalised deterioration in the land/labour ratio. Some indeed fared better than others, but, with the exception of notable cases like the Sursocks and the Tayyans, there were no extreme cases of polarisation in landownership in Palestine. The Sursocks and the Tayyans, it should be noted, did not own their lands in the hills, where peasant society was concentrated, but in the plains. Moreover, at the time when they purchased these lands from distant Ottoman

(63) Table (IV/One/3), p.433, and related discussion.
officials, namely the 1880's, the lands were largely occupied by nomads and semi-nomads. Peasant society, at the time (the 1880's) was still in the process of expansion from its home in the hills and towards the plains. These lands moreover, were soon sold to the Jewish land purchasing agencies and were lost to peasant society altogether. In any case, these exceptional cases should not cloud the issue of what was happening inside peasant society itself.

In conclusion therefore, it could be seen from the preceding evidence that two fundamental tenets of the peasant economy as defined in this thesis have been eroded by the 1940's. The first one was that the peasant household should be able to support itself primarily from its agricultural activity. It was demonstrated that not only did the Palestinian economy as a whole cease to be peasant by 1940, but that the household within the peasant sector itself had increasingly to resort to sources of income from outside agriculture in order to supplement the income it derived from agriculture itself.

The second tenet which was eroded was in the employment of wage labour. Although the different groups of landlords, owner-
cultivators and agricultural labourers merged into each other, as has been asserted by the 1931 Census Report, the scale on which it was done whereby the labourers constituted 44% of total earners in agriculture, rendered it a basic departure from the basic model. Once the peasant household starts to employ wage labour on any significant scale; or alternatively once members of the household start to be employed as labourers on any scale, then the immediate linkage between consumption needs and production decisions that is so fundamental to peasant society, would be lost. In a peasant economy, this linkage meant that "economic activity is dominated by the requirement of satisfying the needs of a single production unit, which is, at the same time a consumer unit." (64)

The loss of this immediate linkage, however, is followed by the loss of many other attributes of the peasant economy which were predicated on it. The utility of labour, for example, would cease to have the subjective value imputed to it by the household, which in the peasant economy meant that the peasant would

"increase effort only if he had reason to believe it would yield a greater output which could be devoted to enlarged investment or consumption, but he does not push the drudgery beyond the point where the possible increase in output is outweighed by the irksomeness of the extra work." (65)

(65) ibid, p.153.
Once employed as a wage labourer, the decision as to how much effort he put in was largely taken away from him, since almost by definition, he had to sell his labour power in order to derive the necessities of life which he had been unable to produce from his land.

Also predicated on the demise of this "labour-consumer" balance which was a basic feature of peasant society, was the eventual weakening and demise of the patterns of production and productivity which were explained earlier in this thesis, namely a product-mix dominated by cereals and productivity levels which were dominated by the extent of the division of labour which could be achieved within the household.

This however, does not mean that the transition from these historical patterns to patterns which were becoming increasingly dominated by wage labour, was swift. Although there were signs of increase in the production of vegetables and other non-cereal goods in the peasant economy in the very last years of the period up to 1939, the dominance of cereals in the peasant product-mix, nevertheless, persisted largely unshaken up till 1939. Most of the agricultural tasks were still being done by members of the household.
However, although the Second World War and the disaster that had befallen the Palestinian people in 1948, transforms the discussion of Palestinian economic history into the realm of speculation and counter-factual history, it is instructive to note what Richard Antoun wrote about the peasant household in a Jordanian village in the early 1960's when the Jordanian peasant, like the Palestinian one before him, had been deriving a large proportion of his income from sources outside agriculture (66):

"The household then, is a consumption unit rather than a production unit in the strict sense. This fact should be mentioned since many anthropologists working in tribal and peasant societies have stressed the cooperation in productive tasks (agriculture or herding) among the members of the household. The occupational structure of the village indicates that such cooperation is not present in Kufr al-Ma, for only a minority of the working men are engaged in agriculture."

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T Correspondence regarding draft Ordinance Exempting Cotton Tithes, January 1925, PRO C0733/87.

T Administrative Report for the Quarter ending 31.3.1925, PRO C0733/92.

T/F Correspondence regarding Agricultural Loans, May 1925, PRO C0733/93.

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T/F Memorandum and Correspondence regarding Kabbara Concession, July and August 1925, PRO C0733/95 & 96.

T Administrative Report for the Quarter ending 30.6.1925, November 1925, PRO C0733/99.

T Correspondence regarding the protection of the flour milling industry in Palestine, December, 1925, PRO C0733/99.

1926

Correspondence regarding Beisan Lands, January 1926, PRO C0733/111.

T Correspondence regarding Agricultural Loans, January 1926, PRO C0733/111.

T Correspondence regarding Land Settlement in Palestine, April 1926, PRO C0733/114.

T/F Correspondence regarding the disposal of Jiftlik Lands, May and August 1926, PRO C0733/114 & 116.
T/F Correspondence regarding and Report of Average Tithes Committee October 1926, PRO C0733/117.

T Correspondence regarding the economic position of Palestine, November 1926, PRO C0733/118.

1927.

T Correspondence regarding Customs Duty Exemptions, PRO C0733/134/44169.

F/T Report of Average Tithes Committee - Majority Report and correspondence, October 1927, PRO C0733/135/441766.

F Memorandum and correspondence regarding Sir Ernest Dowson's Land Settlement Scheme, PRO C0733/136/444225.

T Explanatory Note and correspondence regarding draft Land Settlement Ordinance 1927, PRO C0733/142/44605.

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F Correspondence regarding and Report on Land Taxation by Sir Ernest Dowson, PRO C0733/152/57195.

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T Explanatory Note on Taxation of Tobacco Amendment Ordinance, PRO C0733/169/67156.

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T Correspondence regarding and Report on Werko and Land Taxation, PRO C0733/171/67260.

T Correspondence regarding and Report on Tithes, PRO C0733/171/67275.
P/T Correspondence regarding draft Registration of Land Ordinance, PRO CO733/174/67383.

P/T Correspondence regarding and Report on Irrigation, PRO CO733/174/67391.

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T/F Correspondence regarding Land Taxation, PRO CO733/189/77155.

F Correspondence regarding Eviction of Arab families from Wadi el Hawareth Lands, PRO CO733/190/77182.


T Correspondence regarding The Economic Conditions of the Fellaheen, PRO CO/733/192/77304.

T Correspondence regarding the Development Scheme, PRO CO733/194/77402.


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F Correspondence regarding and Report of the Financial Commission PRO CO/733/196/87033 Part Two.

T Correspondence regarding Co-operative Credit Societies, PRO CO733/199/87064 Pt. 1-2.
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F/T Correspondence regarding and Note for the Secretary of State on the draft Protection of Cultivators Ordinance, PRO C0733/234/17272 Pt.1 & SECRET file.

F/T Correspondence regarding and Memorandum on Agricultural Banks in Palestine, PRO C0733/242/17448 Pt.1-2.

T Correspondence regarding proposal for issue of short term crop loans, PRO C0733/243/17448 Pt.1.

F/T Correspondence regarding Tithes, PRO C0733/244/17470.

F Memorandum on draft Partition of Masha' Land Ordinance 1933, PRO C0733/245/17483.

F/T Correspondence regarding Agricultural Loans, PRO C0733/245/17493.

T Correspondence regarding Taxation, PRO C0733/246/17526.

1934.

F/T Correspondence regarding Customs Tariffs, PRO C0733/37235.

F/T Correspondence regarding Settlement of Displaced Arabs, PRO C0733/251/37249.

F/T Correspondence regarding draft Protection of Cultivators Amendment Ordinance 1934, PRO C0733/252/37272 Pt.1.

F Correspondence regarding Agricultural Mortgage Company, PRO C0733/262/37448 Pt.1,3.
F Correspondence regarding and Report of Committee on Rural Property Taxation, PRO C0733/267/37560 Pt.1-2.

1935.

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F Correspondence regarding and Memorandum on the position arising out of the sale of land by Arabs to Jews, PRO C0733/272/75072.

F/T Correspondence regarding Protection of Cultivators Ordinance, PRO C0733/272/75072 Pt.2.

F/T Correspondence regarding and Report of Committee on Security and Allocation of Loans, PRO C0733/274/75902.

F/T Correspondence regarding Rural Property Tax (Amendment) Ordinance No.26 of 1935, PRO C0733/279/75160.

F/T Correspondence regarding and Note on the proposed Irrigation Ordinance, PRO C0733/284/75314.

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F/T Correspondence regarding and Memorandum by the Colonial Secretary to the Cabinet on Land Policy in Palestine, PRO C0733/290/75072 Pt.1.

F Correspondence regarding and Report of Committee and Sub-Committee appointed to inquire into proposals to restrict land sales, PRO C0733/290/75072 Pt.2.

F Correspondence regarding and Brief on Government's Proposals for the Protection of small owners by the reservation of subsistence areas, PRO C0733/75072 Pt.2.

F/T Correspondence regarding and Memorandum on the Interpretation of Mr Ramsay MacDonald's letter to Dr Weizmann of the 13th February 1931, with special reference to its bearing on the proposals recently approved in principle for restricting the sale of land in certain areas in Palestine, PRO C0733/290/75072 MOST SECRET file.

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1940.

Palestine Land Transfer Regulations 1940, UK Parliamentary Papers, Cmd. 6180.

1944.


1946.


Repeated reference has been made in the thesis to four sources of data where it was not possible to give page numbers identifying the exact place from which the information quoted was derived. These four sources are

1. The Survey of Western Palestine undertaken in the 1870's for the Palestine Exploration Fund. This source was used to determine whether a given village was inhabited at the time, and if so, to plot its location in Map (I/Three/1) on page 43. These villages were listed in the Memoirs of the Survey, and to help the reader, a photocopy of a typical page of the Memoirs is enclosed. (No. 1).

2. The Census of Palestine for the year 1922. A photocopy of a typical page is enclosed. (No. 2)

3. The Census of Palestine 1931, Vol. II. This is the volume which gives the statistical tables listing the population of towns and villages. A photocopy of a typical page is enclosed (No. 3).

4. Village Statistics. This publication by the Department of Statistics of the Government of Palestine gives a village-by-village breakdown of the land area of all villages in Palestine. The data was transferred to a computer data file which was subsequently analysed and used at various stages in the thesis. Naturally, it was not possible to give a precise page number. A photocopy of a typical page is enclosed. (No. 4).
6. Beit Rima (Lq).—A small village on the summit of a ridge with wells to the west. It is mentioned in the Talmud (Mishnah Menachoth, ix. 7) as a town whence wine was brought to Jerusalem, and was consequently within the bounds of Judea.

7. Deir Abu Meshal (K r).—A small and partly ruinous stone village in a very strong position on a lofty hill. For the antiquities see Section B. A pool exists on the south side of the village, which supplies the place with water.

8. Deir Ghassâneh (Lq).—A village on a ridge, with springs in the valley below. It is of moderate size, built of stone, and has olives beneath it.

9. Deir en Nidham (Lq).—A small hamlet on a high point, with olives round it. It is just above the ruins of Tibneh, and water is obtained from the 'Ain Tîbneh.

10. Deir es Sûdan (Lq).—A village of moderate size, with a well to the west, on the slope of a hill, with olive-groves round it.

11. Jibia (Lq).—A small village on high ground, with olives below. This place appears to be the Geba noticed in the 'Onomasticon' (s.v. Gebin) as 5 Roman miles from Gophna (Jufna) towards Neapolis.

12. Jiljilla (M q).—A large village on the top of a high hill, with a well to the south, and a few olives. The ridge is arable land. The name suggests its identity with Gilgal, a town in the mountains near Bethel. This Gilgal (2 Kings ii. 1) is mentioned as though above Bethel (verse 2), which does not agree exactly with the position of Jiljilla (2,441 feet above the sea), and of Beitin (2,890), but the descent into the great valley, Wady el Jib, may account for the expression, 'went down to Bethel.'

13. Kefr 'Ain (Lq).—A small hamlet on a hill-slope, supplied by the 'Ain Mâtrân, in the valley south-west.

14. Khûrbeh Bûrham (M r).—A few houses on high ground.

15. Kâbar (L r).—A small village on a hill-top, with rock-cut tombs, cisterns, and olives.

16. Kurâwa Ibn Zeid (Lq).—A small village on a knoll, with ancient tombs, and a tank, surrounded with olives.
## TABLE XI: POPULATION BY DISTRICTS AND SUB-DISTRICTS

### SUP-DISTRICTS OF ACER

#### NORTHEN DISTRICT

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Locality</th>
<th>Administrative Division</th>
<th>District</th>
<th>Sub-Division</th>
<th>Total Male</th>
<th>Total Female</th>
<th>Total</th>
<th>Total Population</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
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*Note: Details for each locality are not provided in the table.*
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<tr>
<th>Number of</th>
<th>RELIGION</th>
<th>HINDUISM</th>
<th>ISLAM</th>
<th>CHRISTIANS</th>
<th>BUDDHISM</th>
<th>CONJURED</th>
<th>NO RELIGION</th>
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<td>MALES</td>
<td>FEMALES</td>
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<td>161,872</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Note:** The table above lists the population statistics for various regions within the Gaza district, including the number of males and females for each religious group, as well as those with no religious affiliation. The data is organized in a tabular format, with each column representing a different category (total, males, females, etc.).